Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era: America In Retreat? [1st ed. 2020] 303037257X, 9783030372576

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Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era America In Retreat? Edited by Maud Quessard · Frédéric Heurtebize · Frédérick Gagnon

Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era “One might think that a book entitled Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era: America In Retreat? is just another ‘let’s beat up on President Trump because he breaks with long-established traditions, practices, and policies in American foreign policy’ book. It’s much more than that. The entries in this edited volume situate President Trump’s foreign policy initiatives into the broader context of a changing international system structure, thus suggesting that some of these policy shifts could have arisen anyway due to the evolving nature of international threats and opportunities. The result is a more comprehensive and balanced assessment of President Trump’s foreign policy agenda and approach. Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era is a welcome addition to the literature of U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century, sure to be widely-cited in the future.” —Ralph G. Carter, Professor of Political Science, Texas Christian University, USA “This is an original and comprehensive volume that addresses Trump’s foreign policy transformations and the strategic challenges facing the United States and its allies, notably in Europe and the Middle East. A must read.” —Jonathan Paquin, Professor of Political Science, Université Laval, Canada “This co-edited volume, which contains chapters from a host of distinguished scholars from several countries, is a formidable piece of research and analysis. It ranges across the globe to assess the consequences of President Donald Trump’s foreign policies in every continent. It relies on the appropriate secondary sources but, more importantly, on a wide range of primary sources. It addresses such issues as the Russian Republic’s cyberstrategy, the American trade war with China, Franco-American security cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa, the use of tariffs and economic sanctions against a variety of countries, etc. This is merely to scratch the surface of this comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the causes and consequences of the foreign security and economic policies of the Trump administration. Everyone interested in exploring this multifaceted topic should obtain this book.” —William R. Keylor, Professor of International Relations and History Emeritus at The Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University, USA

Maud Quessard · Frédéric Heurtebize · Frédérick Gagnon Editors

Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era America In Retreat?

Editors Maud Quessard Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM) École Militaire Paris, France

Frédéric Heurtebize History and Politics Paris Nanterre University Nanterre, France

Frédérick Gagnon Strategic & Diplomatic Studies University of Québec Montréal, QC, Canada

ISBN 978-3-030-37257-6 ISBN 978-3-030-37258-3  (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37258-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover image: © Alex Linch shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

Introduction 1 Maud Quessard, Frédéric Heurtebize and Frédérick Gagnon Strained Alliances America’s Surprisingly “Constrained” Presidency: Implications for Transatlantic Relations 15 David G. Haglund The Evolving Transatlantic Link: What European Response? Disentangling the European Security Debate 33 Barbara Kunz Polish–US Relations in the Trump Era: From Worries to Honeymoon? 53 Amélie Zima

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CONTENTS

America’s Retreat in the Middle East and Africa “If I Forget Thee O Jerusalem” 75 Antoine Coppolani The Two Faces of US Counterterrorism Under Trump 99 Stephen Tankel Hand in Hand and Eye to Eye? US–French Counterterrorism Cooperation in the Sahel in the Trump-Macron Era 121 Maya Kandel Power Competition in the 21st Century The China Dream: America’s, China’s and the Resulting Competition 139 Gary J. Schmitt Deterrence and Dialogue: The US–South Korea Alliance in Search of a New Lease of Life in the Face of Kim Jong-Un’s “Nuclear Diplomacy” 163 Marianne Péron-Doise Challenging America and the West: A Russian Cyberstrategy? 183 Kevin Limonier The End of Trade Multilateralism and the Impact of Economic Warfare on Alliances Business First: Trump’s Economic Measures as Offensive Weaponry 203 Célia Belin and Samuel Denney

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Trump’s US Foreign Policy and Latin American Multilateralism: An Assessment of Words and Deeds 221 Kevin Parthenay Breakpoint in Time: Donald Trump’s Trade Policy Toward Canada 239 Frédérick Gagnon Notes on Contributors 255 Index 261

List of Figures

Challenging America and the West: A Russian Cyberstrategy? Fig. 1

Russian State-sponsored contents propagation model on the Internet and social media 191

Trump’s US Foreign Policy and Latin American Multilateralism: An Assessment of Words and Deeds Fig. 1

Bilateral trade between LAC and the United States (all products; unit: US Dollar thousand) (Source International Trade Center, Trade Map, 2019. Accessed online: https://www.trademap.org/) 228

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List of Tables

Trump’s US Foreign Policy and Latin American Multilateralism: An Assessment of Words and Deeds Table 1

US sanctions against Venezuela

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Introduction Maud Quessard, Frédéric Heurtebize and Frédérick Gagnon

Since Donald Trump’s inauguration as president on January 20, 2017, much ink has been spilled on the radical turn taken by US foreign policy and on the supposed passing of the liberal international order.1 Established in the aftermath of World War II, that order has rested on two major pillars: military alliances with countries opposing then Soviet communism and free trade, both promoted and guaranteed by America’s peerless power. In the late 1940s, the Truman administration established an 1 Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, The Empty Throne: America’s Abdication of Global Leadership (New York: Public Affairs, 2018); Robert Jervis et al., ed., Chaos in the Liberal Order: The Trump Presidency and International Politics in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018); Niall Fergusson et al., ed., Is This the End of the Liberal International Order? (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 2017); Justin Massie and Jonathan Paquin, America’s Allies and the Decline of US Hegemony (London and New York: Routledge, 2019); G. John Ikenberry, “The Plot Against American Foreign Policy: Can the Liberal Order Survive?” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (May–June 2017): 2–9. Scholars did not wait for Trump’s election to lament the decline of American power and influence in international relations: Robert Kagan, The World America Made (New York: Vintage, 2012); Thomas Friedman et Michael Mandelbaum, That Used to Be Us: How American Fell Behind in the World It Invented and How We Can Come Back (New York: Picador, 2011); and Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order (Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2014).

M. Quessard · F. Heurtebize (B) · F. Gagnon History and Politics, Paris Nanterre University, Nanterre, France e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Quessard et al. (eds.), Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37258-3_1

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order based on cooperation; instead of punishing Germany and Japan, its former enemies, Washington decided to make them major stakeholders in a US-led, rules-based, capitalist, free-trading, and democratic international system. International relations were not doomed to be a zero-sum game. The leading power could help create a world that benefited those who accepted Washington’s Pax Americana. The United States would provide public goods, underwrite the costs but reap the fruit: a stable system supported by allies and like-minded states would make America stronger and safer. IGOs such as the GATT (later WTO), the IMF or the World Bank in the economic realm, and military alliances, such as NATO, SEATO as well as multiple bilateral defense agreements all served that purpose.2 Alas, many a scholar and observer lament, “the world America made” is now in jeopardy. Concerns mounted during the Republican primaries as Donald Trump broke one foreign policy taboo after another. For the New York real estate mogul, the military alliances that had underpinned American primacy since the late 1940s were now a drain on America’s economy; the United States paid for its allies’ security but got little in return. Worse, thanks to Washington’s protection, industrial powerhouses like Germany and Japan had been able to develop flourishing economies and build gleaming infrastructure while the United States was becoming “a third-world nation.”3 The complaint was hardly novel. Similar arguments had been voiced in the late 1960s and early 1970s; as US economic growth was slackening, American leaders and Congress had called for “burden sharing.”4 But the Republican candidate smashed some of the foreign policy establishment’s core tenets. The backbone of Western collective security since 1949, NATO was deemed “obsolete.” Similarly, defense treaties with Japan and South Korea now seemed under threat. “If somebody attacks Japan, we have to immediately go and start World War III, OK? If we get attacked, 2 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Michael Mastanduno, “System Maker and Privilege Taker: US Power and the International Political Economy,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 121–154; and Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 28, no. 1 (2003): 5–46. 3 “Transcript: Donald Trump Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views,” New York Times, March 26, 2016. 4 John Oneal and Mark Elrod, “NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change,” International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 4 (1989): 436–456.

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Japan doesn’t have to help us. Somehow, that doesn’t sound so fair,” Trump said.5 Tokyo, Seoul, but also Riyad were now strong and rich enough to fend for themselves and develop their own nuclear capabilities. Similarly, the free trade agreements that Republican leaders had always supported were now viewed as hugely detrimental to US economic interests. Negotiated by Bill Clinton and ratified with Republican support, NAFTA was in Trump’s view “the worst deal ever made.” The TransPacific Partnership (TTP) spearheaded by Barack Obama to contain China’s ascent was no better, and neither was the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) then being negotiated with the European Union. Free trade agreements and globalization had favored Washington’s friends and foes alike at America’s expense. The United States had spent billions of taxpayer dollars to secure trading routes that benefited exporting giants like China, Japan, or Germany only to see the US market flooded with foreign-made products and US trade balance further deteriorating. Were he elected president, America would not embrace isolationism, Trump vowed, but it would not “be ripped off anymore by all of these countries.”6 Like Senator Ted Cruz, his main contender in the 2016 Republican primary, and like Barack Obama himself in the 2008 campaign, Trump rejected the neoconservative approach to American foreign policy. With good reason. Not only had neocon endeavors squandered American blood and treasure, he asserted, they had completely destabilized the Middle East.7 Trump challenged orthodoxy, however, by overtly spurning democracy and human rights promotion and by candidly asserting that he did not adhere to the idea of American exceptionalism. “I never liked the term,” he admitted before a group of supporters in Texas. Since January 2017, Donald Trump has partly delivered on his promises to break with past policies and attitudes and to roll back the liberal internationalism that his predecessors since World War II strove to build and maintain. In keeping with his “America First” campaign theme, the president’s foreign policy has been defined by unabashed nationalism and unilateralism, making Trump a leading figure of the Sovereignist 5 Quoted in Thomas Wright, “Trump’s 19th Century Foreign Policy,” Politico Magazine, January 20, 2016. 6 “Transcript: Donald Trump Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views.” 7 Donald Trump, 5th Republican Presidential Debate, Las Vegas, Nevada, December

15, 2015.

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International (so to speak) that has gained momentum elsewhere in the West—as exemplified by Orban’s Fidesz in Hungary, Kaczynski’s ´ PiS in Poland, Salvini’s Lega in Italy, and, more momentously, Brexit, but also by the rise and normalization of far-right parties in most European countries. By withdrawing from a number of multilateral treaties and agreements—UNESCO, the Paris accord on climate change, the Iranian nuclear deal, or the INF Treaty—the United States has reasserted its sovereignty and freedom of action, the administration claims. His approach to international relations is starkly Hobbesian. Every state has to fight for its own. America no longer is a “city upon a hill” but a city in the middle of a plain or, to borrow from Hobbes’ metaphor, a gladiator in the middle of the arena.8 “As President of the United States, I will always put America first, just like you, as the leaders of your countries will always, and should always, put your countries first,” he told the United Nations’ General Assembly in September 2017.9 Meanwhile, national security experts have questioned the existence and the future of American grand strategy.10 While some considered that Trump’s election signaled a clean break, others believed that the Trump presidency would pursue the grand strategic traditions of retrenchers.11 At the end of his first year in office, Trump’s grand strategy was clarified by two documents. Issued in 2017 and 2018, the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy sought to give weight to what had become significant since Barack Obama’s second term: a new era of great power competition.12 The post-Cold War era of American primacy, unilateralism, and indiscriminate engagement would be over. Responding to

8 Stephen Wertheim, “Donald Trump Versus American Exceptionalism: Toward the Sources of Trumpian Conduct,” H-Diplo, ISSF, Policy Series, America and the World— 2017 and Beyond, February 1, 2017, https://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-5KTrump-exceptionalism. 9 Remarks to the UN General Assembly, New York, September 19, 2017. 10 Hal Brands, American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump (Washington, DC: Brook-

ings Institution Press, 2018); Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich, “Does Donald Trump Have a Grand Strategy?” International Affairs 93, no. 5 (September 2017): 1013–1037. 11 Sestanovich, Stephen, Maximalists and Retrenchers: America in the World from Truman to Obama (New York: Vintage Books, 2014); Barry Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2014). 12 Michael Mandelbaum, Mission Failure, America and the World in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

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small local and regional challenges would no longer determine US strategy. The reemergence of China and Russia posed far more serious threats to the United States both in Europe and in Asia. Thus, the priority has been given to the Indo-Pacific strategy, where the United States would provide the main military guarantees against great power aggression and support the nation’s regional allies and partners.13 Where relationships with allies are concerned, the administration got off to a rocky start. Donald Trump has had disparaging words for longstanding democratic allies like Japan or the European Union: the chief executive called the latter a “foe” while Secretary of State Pompeo riled against EU institutions in Brussels. Vice President Pence followed that trend when he lectured European allies at the Munich Security Conference in February 2019, which turned into an insecurity conference laying bare the numerous transatlantic divides on a number of issues including the Iran nuclear deal and commitment to NATO. Meanwhile, the US president has shown complacency toward Washington’s most challenging adversaries, such as Putin, Xi, and Kim Jong-un, as well as unflagging support for its most unsavory allies as illustrated by Trump’s refusal to firmly condemn Saudi Prince Mohamad Ben Salman for journalist Jamal Khashogi’s murder. In the realm of international trade, the US president has equally focused on undoing decades-old policies of building a multilateral, rulesbased world economic environment. The “new generation” free trade agreements such as the TPP and the TTIP, were meant to make the United States the focal point of international trade and the main norm setter, especially in Asia, thereby both cushioning Washington’s relative economic decline and containing Beijing’s ascent. The Trump administration withdrew from both and imposed tariffs not only on China but also on Canada, Mexico, or the EU. True to his promises made during the 2016 presidential election, the president believes that tariffs and trade wars will force US economic opponents to change their international behavior and adopt policies that will bring good jobs back to the United States, open international markets to US products, and protect the intellectual property of American companies. This approach has been 13 Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region,” Washington, DC, June 1, 2019; Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski, The End of Grand Strategy: US Maritime Operations in the TwentyFirst Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2018).

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a risky gamble, as the countries targeted by Trump’s trade war reacted by imposing their own tariffs on US goods, including agricultural products from the US Midwest, the region that helped bring Trump to the White House in 2016. The president is nevertheless convinced that the storms associated with his trade war are only temporary, and that his policies will allow the United States to secure its leading position among the world’s major economies in the long run. Since he took office, President Trump has nonetheless softened some of his transgressive campaign stances on important issues. He has committed the United States to honoring NATO’s Article 5. Likewise, he has reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to defending Japan and South Korea against Pyongyang’s nuclear threat—but has since fallen “in love” and started negotiating with Kim Jong-un.14 In the Middle East, as in Afghanistan, Trump has long maintained—and even increased—US involvement before unexpectedly declaring victory over ISIS and the subsequent withdrawal of US troops. There he has thus abandoned the previous realist expectations of the United States favoring a balance of power in the region and has paved the way for the growing influence of the Moscow–Teheran axis in the region.15 In the shadow wars—secret wars and counterterrorism—, the White House has seemed to make a worrying break with the previous administrations (Obama and Bush). President Trump wanted at first to act faster and break with the legal and collective decision-making procedures of his predecessor. The United States is limiting transparency in military interventions (especially those by Special Forces and the CIA), breaking with the legal framework and the practice of civilian control over military action and favoring bilateral alliances in counterterrorism. This has led to foreign operations that are not part of a defined strategic vision. It thus appears that the Trump administration has made a 180-degree turn, with many serious consequences for long-term US national interests. Overall, it seems, Donald Trump has conducted a policy of retrenchment from the liberal international order and from the international order tout court. US diplomatic tools have been impaired by drastic budget cuts, unstaffed positions both in Washington and in the field, and by feuds 14 Remarks at a “Make America Great Again” Rally in Wheeling, West Virginia, September 29, 2018. 15 Stephen Walt, “Who’s Afraid of a Balance of Power,” Foreign Policy, December 8, 2017.

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between the president and advisors or cabinet members, forcing many of them to leave the White House. US foreign policy was overly predictable, Trump complained during the 2016 campaign; accordingly, it has become more unpredictable. This has come at a significant cost. Indeed, Trump appears to have jeopardized Washington’s influence. By increasing American disengagement, he has deepened the existing divides between the United States and its traditional allies. In a context of great power competition, traditional allies worry about the future of their partnership with the United States and question the relevance of more autonomous postures.16 ∗ ∗ ∗ This volume aims to examine both the evolution of US foreign policy since Donald Trump’s accession to the presidency and the strategic challenges confronting the United States and its allies in a changing world environment. It offers to do so through the contributions of a transatlantic community of scholars combining academics, think tank fellows, former policymakers and administration officials from both sides of the Atlantic. Given the evolutions in the strategic environment, the emphasis will be laid on: (1) the future of transatlantic relations and US relations with NATO and the evolution of US–Eastern European states relations in the context of the European reassurance; (2) the questioning of military cooperation under Trump and the American Way of War in the Middle East and Africa, along with the analysis of the Washington–Tel Aviv and Washington–Riyad axes in light of the Moscow–Teheran axis; (3) the pursuit of the US strategy in the Indo-Pacific region and the future of US–Chinese rivalry and interdependency; the challenges of new forms of power competition with the identified revisionist powers, China and Russia; the future of American power on new battlefields—in cyber and information warfare that are part of the game of power politics of today; (4) finally, Trump’s tendency to blur the line between American allies and enemies and to challenge the status quo on key issues for states and regions that the United States usually defines as partners (Canada, Europe 16 Benjamin Haddad and Alina Polyakova, “Europe Alone: What Comes After the Transatlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs (July–August 2019).

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and Mexico, among others). While US traditional allies have become aware that “Trumpism will survive Trump,” different scenarios will be examined to put the future of American power in perspective.

PART I: Strained Alliances Part I will examine the impact of the administration policies on the evolution of transatlantic relations, it will insist on European perspectives. David G. Haglund’s chapter looks into the Trump presidency’s implications for transatlantic relations. It challenges the common assumption that Donald Trump, to borrow from Walter Russel Mead’s categorization, is a “Jacksonian” president. Rather, David G. Haglund draws thoughtprovoking parallels between the current president and Woodrow Wilson. Barbara Kunz’s contribution focuses on the changing nature of the transatlantic relation. Contrary to widely held beliefs, the author argues, the primary factor of this change is not President Trump’s policy but evolutions in the structure of the international system. These shifts, notably caused by the rise of China, will have a major impact on transatlantic security relations. As they are structural in nature, any expectations that transatlantic relations will go back to “normal” after the Trump presidency are unrealistic. In her chapter, Amélie Zima deals with the relation between the United States, Poland and NATO, a relation deeply determined by Russia’s behavior. Moscow’s recent show of strength, as manifested by the annexation of Crimea, has incited Warsaw to strengthen NATO’s Eastern flank and called for the establishment of a permanent US base in Poland.

PART II: America’s Retreat in the Middle East and Africa In his chapter, Antoine Coppolani argues that unlike proponents of the so-called “centralist” approach, which make the resolution of the Israel– Palestine conflict a core US foreign policy objective, Trump seems to adhere to the “marginality” approach according to which the Israeli– Palestinian predicament prevents Washington from focusing on other strategic designs in the region, such as weakening Iran. Israeli–Iranian relations will without a doubt play a crucial role in the evolution of the

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Middle East. Still, although weakened by sanctions and a policy of isolation, Iran now finds itself in Syria, at the door of the Jewish State. This in turn raises new issues: despite obvious divergences from Barack Obama’s policies, not only has Donald Trump pursued his predecessor’s relative US retreat from the Middle East, he has accelerated it just as Russia consolidates its foothold in the wake of the Syrian civil war. The chapters by Stephen Tankel and Maya Kandel both look at the future of transatlantic cooperation in counterterrorism, an area in which the United States and its European allies have worked more closely than the recent political discourse may imply. Still, Tankel’s contribution shows that difficulties lay ahead. Most European countries are primarily concerned with the domestic dimension of counterterrorism and show reluctance to engage in concrete action in the Middle East or Africa. Likewise, divergences exist over the concept of counterterrorism and the tools it should entail. Hence the collective failure of the United States, European countries, NATO, and the EU to leverage one another’s strengths as effectively as possible when it comes to working together. Kandel’s chapter lays the emphasis on French–American cooperation in the Sahel, one often presented as a showcase of burden-sharing between Washington and one of its allies. Nonetheless, although the United States has reasserted its financial and logistical support for Frenchled Opération Barkhane, a (relative) military disengagement from the African continent, combined with the implementation of “America First” precepts in Africa, could eventually affect bilateral counterterrorism cooperation in the Sahel. More importantly, concerns are being raised as to the right approach to counterterrorism in Africa and questions abound on the definition of the enemy. Those challenges need to be addressed in the broader context of the return of great power competition, and of how it will affect Africa (Cold War redux?).

PART III: Power Competition in the Twenty-First Century This part tackles Washington’s policy as international relations are characterized by the return of great power competition in the twenty-first century. It deals with the United States confronting the “revisionist powers,” its attempts to contain the Chinese dragon in the Indo-pacific, and to face Russian hybrid threats in cyberspace.

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Gary Schmitt’s contribution reviews the most recent era of US–China ties, from President Nixon’s opening to China to the Trump administration, through the lens of both China’s and America’s expectations about China’s rise to great power status. Current tensions would not be inevitable if reformist voices within China had more influence and if China’s Dream had only been to reclaim its status on the world stage. But, the combination of that ambition with the desire of the Communist Party to maintain its rule over the country has meant that the PRC’s understanding of its interests, history, and security were almost doomed to collide with American expectations. In the United States, expectations about China were driven initially by a desire to help it rise as a counterweight to Russia, but also to make it a “responsible stakeholder” in the international order. Neither of these was particularly realistic, however, thus explaining why the current relationship has ended up where it has. As concerns arise regarding the reemergence of power conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region, Marianne Péron-Doises’s chapter addresses the US strategic posture in Northeast Asia, the implications of North Korean nuclear and missile programs, and the challenges of extended deterrence commitments for the US–South-Korea Alliance. It draws on a comparative approach between the United States and NATO and the US–SouthKorea Alliance, analyzing the diplomatic, operational and tactical dimensions of deterrence in both cases. Kevin Limonier’s contribution offers an original perspective on Russian capabilities in cyberspace as a new terrain for projecting its strength, notably against the United States. Time and time again, Russia has been accused of hacking email servers from the Democratic National Committee or of launching cyberattacks on a number of infrastructures. Russia is also blamed for supporting the arguments of the American right, through media agencies like RT and Sputnik as well as through social networks. While it is extremely difficult to technically attribute these cyberattacks to the Russians, it seems that Russia has succeeded, using relatively modest means, in challenging the United States in a field where it once appeared hegemonic. The chapter examines the political and strategic mechanisms in Russia which brought the governing authorities to consider cyberspace—and more specifically the Internet—as the new arena of confrontation with the United States.

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Part IV: The End of Trade Multilateralism and the Impact of Economic Warfare on Alliances This part assesses Trump’s economic and trade policy and its impact on an already-ailing economic multilateralism. The chapter by Célia Belin and Samuel Denney shows that Trump’s foreign policy often combines economic and security priorities, and weaponizes tariffs and sanctions to promote US national interests. They show that Trump does not hesitate to use similar recipes to treat US enemies and allies. As a result, the White House imposes sanctions against enemies such as Iran, but also tariffs on European allies. In a period of relative US decline in the world, Trump’s rupture with the concept of positive integration in favor of a competitive zero-sum approach to trade and the world economy is supposed to allow the United States to remain dominant in its competition with Russia and China. Only time will tell whether this approach will be effective or not. Kevin Parthenay looks at how Trump’s foreign policy and approach to trade and multilateral cooperation has affected Latin America. Rolling back liberal internationalism in the Americas just as he has done in other regions of the world, Trump has proposed to build a wall at the US– Mexico border, renegotiate NAFTA and abandon the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Such decisions and Trump’s desire to fight immigration from Central America have forced Latin American governments to try to diversify their relationships in the world, in order to compensate for the uncertainty that Trump has brought to the White House. In the last chapter of the book, Frédérick Gagnon shows that this same uncertainty has profoundly altered the dynamics of Canada–US trade relations, challenging the “special relationship” that has existed between Ottawa and Washington since at least the Cold War. While Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Barack Obama both believed in liberal internationalism, the importance of free trade between Canada and the United States and the need to fight climate change, Trump’s election in 2016 has forced Trudeau to change many of his foreign policy priorities and focus primarily on managing the Canada–US trade file. Trump has treated Canada like other countries in the world: he has used his “art of the deal” to try to convince Trudeau to make key concessions when Washington, Ottawa, and Mexico renegotiated NAFTA. Trump has also imposed tariffs on Canada, a sign that the days when Canada had almost no difficulty to convince Washington that North American trade was positive for American workers might be a relic of the past.

Strained Alliances

America’s Surprisingly “Constrained” Presidency: Implications for Transatlantic Relations David G. Haglund

Introduction If ever there was a truism regarding the 44 individuals who have occupied the American presidency since the inception of the republic, it would appear to be that the current one, the 45th president, is such a special case that he really has to be considered sui generis.1 There has never been anyone quite like him sitting in the highest office in the land, so the consensus view maintains. This is so, whether one believes that Donald J. Trump has been doing a wonderful job or an atrocious one. His admirers and critics alike agree that this polarizing president has been cut 1 See Arthur Paulson, Donald Trump and the Prospect for American Democracy: An Unprecedented President in an Age of Polarization (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018). Although there have been 45 administrations, an enumerative oddity results in there having been only 44 actual human beings presiding over these administrations. This relates to the manner in which Grover Cleveland’s time in power is assessed. Because he served two discontinuous terms—elected in 1884, failing to be reelected in 1888, and regaining the White House in 1892—his reign is counted as two separate administrations, thus he is both America’s 22nd president and its 24th. In contrast, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was elected four consecutive times from 1932 through 1944, is counted as only one president, the country’s 32nd.

D. G. Haglund (B) Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Quessard et al. (eds.), Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37258-3_2

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from a decidedly different bolt of cloth than any predecessor, no matter from which party.2 What admirers like to stress, namely, Trump’s willingness to shatter taboos and venture where no others have dared to go, his detractors chalk up to his simply being out of control.3 In either case, this president is regarded to be free of the constraints that normally encumber the ability of a chief executive to translate every policy whim into a political outcome. In this chapter, I am going to take a skeptical stance regarding the image of Trump unchained (some say, unhinged). In doing so I will invoke two sets of constraints—one derived from analytical categories derivative of the broad sweep of US foreign policy, the other dating from the decade of the 1980s. What I will not be addressing are two very recent, and constitutional, constraints upon the Trump presidency. Those two recent constraining developments reflect the reality that America’s political system of checks and balances continues, despite many alarms to the contrary, to function.4 The first was the Democrats’ capture of the House of Representatives in the midterm election of November 2018. Then, the following April, came the appearance of the long-awaited (if heavily edited, or to use the current term of art, “redacted”) report produced by special counsel Robert S. Mueller III, probing allegations

2 For assessments, pro and con, see Victor Davis Hanson, The Case for Trump (New York: Basic Books, 2019); Bob Woodward, Fear: Trump in the White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018). 3 This latter, best exemplified in Michael Wolff, Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House (New York: Henry Holt, 2018). 4 Regarding those checks and balances, the locus classicus is Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 4th rev. ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1957). Corwin is remembered especially for observing that when it came to matters of foreign policy, the Constitution offered the executive and legislative branches of government a “permanent invitation to struggle.” Others have lately been arguing that the “struggle” has been increasingly a one-sided contest, favoring the executive; see, for example, Barbara Hinckley, Less Than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Douglas L. Kriner, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); and Walter A. McDougall, The Tragedy of U.S. Foreign Policy: How America’s Civil Religion Betrayed the National Interest (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016).

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whether the Trump campaign had colluded with Russian operatives to influence the outcome of the 2016 presidential ballot.5 Important as these are, they are not the sort of constraints upon which I concentrate in this chapter. Instead, I will restrict my focus to a pair of extra-constitutional sources of constraint upon the presidency of Donald Trump, and to demonstrate how each of these can be said to have had a bearing upon American foreign policy over the past few years, with a particular focus upon the country’s relationship with its transatlantic allies. One constraint might be said to be exogenous to the president, and the other endogenous. Each, albeit in different ways, affects both the manner in which Trump approaches his responsibilities (as he takes these to be) and the way in which others interpret his decision-making; together, the dual constraints act to shed light on the rudiments of the president’s “operational code” (or worldview).6 The section immediately below examines the constraint that I characterize as “exogenous.” Let us see what it entails.

Paradigm Constraint: The Geopolitical Significance of Eponym The category of exogenous constraint employed in this section of the chapter draws its inspiration from notions regarding “ideal types,” first introduced by the German sociologist, Max Weber, as a means of assisting investigators in carrying out their task of characterizing and assessing social phenomena. As Weber employed them, ideal types owed their existence to the need for scholars to be able to synthesize meaning out of 5 While the Mueller report ultimately found that the Trump campaign had not colluded with Russian state figures to influence the election, the president’s own reaction upon learning in May 2017 that Mueller had been appointed to lead the investigation into the collusion allegations spoke volumes about his own perception of the tenuousness of his situation. Upon discovering from his then attorney general, Jeff Sessions, of Mueller’s appointment at a meeting in the Oval Office, Trump responded dejectedly, “Oh my God. This is terrible. This is the end of my presidency. I’m fucked.” Quoted in Peter Baker and Maggie Haberman, “A Portrait of the White House and Its Culture of Dishonesty,” New York Times, April 18, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/18/us/politics/white-house-mueller-report. html?emc=edit_th_190419&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=621718380419. 6 On this concept, see Alexander L. George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making,” International Studies Quarterly 13 (June 1969): 190–222.

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a universe of discrete, variegated, and confusing phenomena; they would serve as indispensable templates for advancing knowledge.7 In the study of American foreign policy, ideal types have often had a presence, even if at times more of an unspoken than a spoken one. During the closing years of the Cold War, for instance, John Lewis Gaddis betrayed inspiration of a Weberian origin when distinguishing between what he held to be the two chief scholarly approaches to the study of US foreign policy, called by him (borrowing his rubrics from J. H. Hexter), “lumpers” and “splitters.” The former camp consisted of synthesizers for whom ideal types, whether so named or not, constituted an essential component of their methodology; the latter represented a body of analytical investigators smitten with the charms of rampant disaggregation.8 Another, more recent, Weberian is Walter Russell Mead, who has provided an extremely useful, even if far from perfect, metaphorical typology of America’s foreign policy, in a book that can be taken as representing the “lumper” approach on steroids—save that this time, it is the decisionmakers rather than the scholarly and policy analysts who are situated within constructs that illuminate the boundary conditions within which they operate. Writing at the start of the twenty-first century, Mead invited his readers, both abroad and at home, to rethink what they believed they knew about US foreign policy, going back to the very dawn of the country’s independent existence. To both American and European observers, Mead delivered a stern reminder: you do not know as much as you think you know. He bade them to realize that America’s foreign policy drew from a long established legacy of policy experience, and sometimes wisdom, such that it was simply wrong to imagine that nothing from the preSecond World War decades could possibly provide foreign policy guidance for an America suddenly assuming the role of superpower. To the contrary, Mead reached back to the past to produce four ideal types (he called these “paradigms”) that, over the long sweep of American history, have formed the basis of the country’s strategic culture, either on their own or in combination with another paradigm. At various times, and in differing circumstances, these were each to provide effective guidance for the national interest. There have been four, and only four, such 7 Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, ed. and trans. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (New York: Free Press, 1949). 8 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. vii–viii.

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paradigms, each represented eponymously. In no particular chronological order, these four eponyms are the Hamiltonians, Wilsonians, Jeffersonians, and Jacksonians. Each is associated by Mead with a particularly distinctive foreign policy dispensation. Thus, for the Hamiltonians, measures that seek to promote the country’s economic interests in accordance with reliance upon international law, all in close association with Great Britain, represent the epitome of sound policy. By contrast, the Wilsonians prioritize the promotion not of commercial but of political values, in particular those associated with liberal democracy, and while the fostering of their agenda need not preclude close cooperation with Great Britain on a bilateral basis, the Wilsonian preference is to “multilateralize” and institutionalize world order. Jeffersonians are, like Wilsonians, also acutely focused upon defending liberal democracy, but they believe—quite unlike the Wilsonians—that too ambitious a foreign policy, even and especially one dedicated to promoting the spread of liberal democracy, can result in the loss of democratic liberty at home. For this reason, Mead likens the Jeffersonians to American “Stalinists” in that they believe in revolution in one country only, whereas the Wilsonians are American “Trotskyites,” convinced that unless liberal democracy can be spread far and wide, it will end up getting extinguished at home.9 The final, and in some ways the most interesting, ideal type is represented by the Jacksonians. This group is said to be most enamored and expressive of the political values of nationalism, augmented by a preference, when intervention abroad is needed to defend legitimate security interests, for the robust use of force. It is easy to see why Donald Trump so often chooses to portray his foreign policy as coming straight out of a Jacksonian playbook, and thus to be founded upon, and bounded within, an established paradigm that serves both to guide and to constrain policy. He calls himself unabashedly a nationalist, is highly suspicious of multilateralism, even when it takes the form of a military alliance, and for good measure he has core supporters—his celebrated “base”—said to reside in the Jacksonian heartland of America, the part of the United States often dismissed by coastal elites as “flyover” country, populated by the great

9 Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001), p. 181.

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rural unwashed.10 If that were not enough, he hangs a portrait of Jackson on conspicuous display in the Oval Office, using it as often as he can as backdrop to visual images showing him hard at work, and somehow guided by the reassuringly restraining hand of the 7th president. Despite this not-so-subtle attempt to market his presidency as the second coming of Andrew Jackson’s—and hence not at all the frightful policy salmagundi of his critics’ imaginings—there are obviously certain Jacksonian vestiges that can only correspond poorly with the Trump brand of policymaking. So important are these vestiges that they should give us reason to dismiss outright the relevance of this Weberian ideal type when it comes to understanding current American policy. The president’s base might be Jacksonian; he himself is not. In fact, shocking if not scandalous as the analogy might appear to some, you could say that in certain salient respects, Donald Trump has more in common with America’s 28th president, Woodrow Wilson, than with its 7th, Jackson. For starters, there is the matter of military service. Andrew Jackson was a military hero before he was anything else, and it was only because of his victory at the Battle of New Orleans that he became elevated to cult figure in early nineteenth-century America, and eventually a viable political candidate on the national stage.11 Donald Trump, in contrast, is well known for having managed (and he was far from being alone in this) to avoid serving in the Vietnam War, his generation’s equivalent to Jackson’s War of 1812.12 Not only this, but he earned for himself a mountain of notoriety in mid-July 2015 by mocking someone who genuinely was a war hero and who was, in many ways, a Jacksonian icon. The target of scorn was, of 10 On the Trump base, see Walter Russell Mead, “The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal World Order,” Foreign Affairs 96 (March/April 2017): 2–7; J. D. Vance, Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis (New York: HarperCollins, 2016). 11 See John William Ward, Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955); David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, The Rise of Andrew Jackson: Myth, Manipulation, and the Making of Modern Politics (New York: Basic Books, 2018). 12 Although some of Trump’s harshest critics like to consider him a “draft-dodger,” he managed quite legally to avoid being sent to Vietnam, initially by availing himself of a student deferment from conscription (the famous “2-S” category) and upon its expiry, apparently managing to secure a “1-Y” medical assessment from his draft board, because of bone spurs in the heel of one foot. This condition, while exempting him from conscription for overseas service, would have placed him in a call-up category should, for instance, the Viet Cong have stormed the beaches of Long Island.

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course, Senator John McCain, whose imprisonment and torture at the hands of his North Vietnamese captors discommended him in the eyes of then-candidate Trump, who professed not to regard POWs as heroes!13 This is why some observers have been wont to conclude that to the extent the 45th president could be labeled “Jacksonian” because of any character traits he might possess, it has more to do with his resemblance to the personal quirkiness of fellow entertainer Michael Jackson than any of the steadfast martial qualities of his distant predecessor in the executive office, Andrew Jackson. But to remark that Trump may bear less resemblance to Andrew Jackson than he and others like to pretend is not necessarily to establish that Mead’s Wilsonian ideal type makes a better fit for the current chief executive. Indeed, many who regard with a certain fondness America’s 28th president would be very puzzled, if they were not so outraged, by the mere hint that Trump and Wilson could have anything in common, given that the latter is usually associated with “liberal internationalism” and the former with its diametric opposite of “illiberal nationalism,” to such an extent that he can routinely be taken to be the “anti-Wilsonian.”14 Trump as “Wilsonian”? How do I dare, in this section, to suggest the relevance of a Wilsonian motif, and how might this be considered helpful in understanding the current crisis in transatlantic relations? There are a pair of personal qualities that suggest a basis for comparability between the 28th and 45th presidents, but they do not necessarily have any discernible bearing upon transatlantic security relations, so they will only be mentioned here in passing. One of these personal qualities concerns the issue of racism. Whether or not Donald Trump is the “racist” many of his harshest critics insist he must be, there can be no question that no other president besides Woodrow Wilson has ever, in the past century, been caught up in discussions of racism to anything like the extent of Donald Trump. He may not be the racist Wilson is widely considered to 13 According to Trump, the only reason McCain was considered by some war hero is because he was captured; but as far as he himself was concerned, McCain “is not a war hero…. I like people who weren’t captured.” See “Donald Trump: John McCain ‘Is a War Hero Because He Was Captured’,” Chicago Tribune, July 18, 2015, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-donald-trump-johnmccain-20150718-story.html. 14 Steven Metz, “How Trump’s Anti-Wilsonian Streak May Revolutionize U.S. Strategy,” World Politics Review, April 21, 2017, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/ articles/21914/how-trump-s-anti-wilsonian-streak-may-revolutionize-u-s-strategy.

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have been, but he certainly has a knack for making many people think he is.15 Yet another Wilson comparison, similarly unflattering to either president, comes easily to mind. In the case of each leader, critics have not been shy to highlight what are to be taken to be defects of personality that can render their decision-making less “rational” than would normally be desired or assumed in a president. As with the issue of racism, so too is it with that of postulated psychological dysfunctionality. Wilson was seen by critics as being, among other things, possessed of a God-given conviction that he and only he could set the world to rights, once he opted to take America into the First World War in 1917.16 For his part, Trump is often adjudged to be suffering from some psychological affliction(s) primarily

15 Wilson has longtime been considered by many scholars to have been the most frankly representative example of a racist president since before the Civil War. See Kathleen L. Wolgemuth, “Woodrow Wilson and Federal Segregation,” Journal of Negro History 44 (April 1959): 158–173; Nancy J. Weiss, “The Negro and the New Freedom: Fighting Wilsonian Segregation,” Political Science Quarterly 84 (March 1969): 61–79; Morton Sosna, “The South in the Saddle: Racial Politics During the Wilson Years,” Wisconsin Magazine of History 54 (Autumn 1970): 30–49; and Richard M. Abrams, “Woodrow Wilson and the Southern Congressmen, 1913–1916,” Journal of Southern History 22 (November 1956): 417–437. 16 See for this psychoanalytical critique, Sigmund Freud and William C. Bullitt, Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Twenty-Eighth President of the United States: A Psychological Study (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), as well as the somewhat less vitriolic but still harsh assessments of Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: John Day, 1956); and Bernard Brodie, “A Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Woodrow Wilson,” World Politics 9 (April 1957): 413–422. Other writers have located what they took to be the problem not in Wilson’s psychological condition but in his neurological one; for examples, see Edwin A. Weinstein, “Woodrow Wilson’s Neurological Illness,” Journal of American History 57 (September 1970): 324–351; as well as Weinstein, James William Anderson, and Arthur S. Link, “Woodrow Wilson’s Political Personality: A Reappraisal,” Political Science Quarterly 93 (Winter 1978–1979): 585–598. A judicious summary of the contending camps—the psychoanalytical versus the neurological—is found in Dorothy Ross, “Woodrow Wilson and the Case for Psychohistory,” Journal of American History 69 (December 1982): 659–668. Finally, it should not be imagined Wilson has lacked for defenders against the charge that he was wrong in the head, with his most notable defender remarking wryly that for “a mentally unbalanced person, Wilson had a remarkable career. Somehow, he managed to make distinguished contributions to the four separate fields of scholarship, higher education, domestic politics, and diplomacy.” Arthur S. Link, “The Case for Woodrow Wilson,” Harper’s Magazine 234 (April 1967): 85–93, quote at p. 93.

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manifested through narcissistic impulses, though hardly of any God-given provenance, since unlike Wilson, Trump is not much of a church-goer.17 There is a third, and much more relevant, reason for daring to suggest a Wilsonian analogy for Trump, a reason relating more to policy than to personality. Although no one seems to remember this, it is important nonetheless: Woodrow Wilson happened to be the first president to extol publicly the virtues of “America First”—employing those exact words in a June 1916 address in Philadelphia to implore his countrymen to put America first in their affections. To the president, America First meant the “duty of every American to exalt the national consciousness by pacifying his own motives and exhibiting his own devotion.”18 In short, they should forget about their ancestral homelands locked in a struggle in the European civil war that broke out two years earlier, and give all of their affection to their new country, America. Trump’s borrowing of America First phraseology is usually thought to draw inspiration not from its earliest, Wilsonian, instantiation, but from its second appearance in foreign policy debates, during the early stage of the Second World War, in the year prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. We regard this second iteration of the catchphrase to have been a recipe for disaster, given how tightly associated have been, in historical memory as well as in fact, the America First Committee, whose star attraction was the aviator Charles A. Lindbergh, and the persistence of America’s continued aloofness from the European balance of power until 1941.19 This is why, each time that Trump intones the two words, they are taken as proof positive that he is an isolationist bent on withdrawing America from the world. Despite their being arrayed on decidedly different ends of the “internationalism-isolationism” continuum, there is one way in which both Wilson and Trump can be considered similar. Neither has had a

17 Illustratively, see Brandy Lee, et al., The Dangerous Case of Donald Trump: 27 Psychiatrists and Mental Health Experts Discuss a President (New York: St. Martin’s, 2017). 18 Quoted in A. Scott Berg, Wilson (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2013), p. 397. 19 For useful assessments of the impact of America First at the time, see in particular

two books by Wayne S. Cole, America First: The Battle Against Intervention, 1940–1941 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1953); Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974). Also see Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935–1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966).

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very soft spot in his heart for multilateral alliances. Wilson was convinced that alliances were a leading cause of war in general, and certainly of the most recent one specifically. What he wanted was hardly to perpetuate the continuation, after the fighting in Europe ended in 1918, of the de facto but real wartime alliance between the USA, the UK, and France. Instead, he wanted to overthrow the age-old balance of power mechanism in its entirety, replacing it with a novel vision of “collective security” that by its very nature stood as the negation of collective-defense structures such as alliances.20 This may not have made him an isolationist; but by the same token it would be next to impossible to construe him as being a champion of multilateral alliances.21 Nor would anyone wish to defend the proposition that Donald Trump is a big fan of such alliances. This is not the same, however, as saying that the current president is an isolationist. He may take a dim view of multilateralism and institutionalism, but there are, to him, other ways for America to have a continued presence in the world. The principal such way, for Trump, is bilateralism. To understand his preference for bilateralism as well as his thinly disguised disregard for the transatlantic alliance as a multilateral entity, we need now to turn to the second set of extraconstitutional constraints upon the president. This is the set of endogenous constraints stemming from the 1980s, Trump’s formative decade.

Pitkin Not Wordsworth: The Ongoing Significance of the 1980s for Donald Trump The poet William Wordsworth may have been on to something when he generalized about the child being father to the man; but in the particular case of Donald Trump’s operational code, it would be hard to 20 On collective security as the “essence” of Wilsonianism, see John A. Thompson, “Wilsonianism: The Dynamics of a Conflicted Concept,” International Affairs 86 (January 2010): 27–47. 21 Lloyd E. Ambrosius, “Wilson, the Republicans, and French Security After World War I,” Journal of American History 59 (September 1972): 341–352. Wilson agreed, only reluctantly, that the tripartite alliance so desired by France should be incorporated into the Versailles treaty, but when the US Senate failed to ratify the latter, the former also became a dead letter. See Louis A. R. Yates, The United States and French Security, 1917–1921: A Study in American Diplomatic History (New York: Twayne, 1957); Walter A. McDougall, France’s Rhineland Diplomacy, 1914–1924: The Last Bid for a Balance of Power in Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

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improve upon a different cultural idiom, Walter Pitkin’s one about life beginning at forty.22 This section on “endogenous” constraint is going to concentrate upon the 1980s, and to make the claim that in the intellectual development of Donald Trump, the decade in which he turned forty (in 1986) was to have a powerful impact upon his future attitude toward the transatlantic alliance. There are two reasons for the enduring constraint imposed by this particular bit of chronology. The first relates to the publication of a book that provides a remarkable window into the “diplomatic” style of the future president. The second is intimately connected with the debates about a postulated American “decline” that featured so centrally in foreign policy discussions of the Cold War’s last decade. For reasons related to constraints of my own (space), I concentrate on the first of these only.23 The book, of course, is the part “autobiography,” part extended pep talk, he co-authored with Tony Schwartz, published to reasonable fanfare in 1987, under the title, Trump: The Art of the Deal.24 It is unclear how much of the book was actually written by its principal protagonist and anointed hero; Schwartz would later insist that while most of the sentences were of his own doing, the deeds and thoughts recorded in the book were Trump’s. Sometimes dismissed as a work of self-adulation and therefore of not much use to serious analysts, the book actually helps us make sense of how the future president would see the world of diplomacy. Its pages are replete with various tales of how Trump managed to come out on top in most of the dramas recounted, almost all involving some aspect of real-estate transactions in the greater New York area (with one foray into the world of sport). One chapter stands out: “Trump Cards: The Elements of the Deal.”25 Somewhat less modestly than the famous Decalogue ghost-written millennia earlier by Moses, the Trump list of

22 Associated with the American psychologist, Walter B. Pitkin, Life Begins at Forty (New York: McGraw Hill/Whittlesey House, 1932). William Wordsworth’s 1802 poem, My Heart Leaps Up, is the source of the line, “the Child is father of the Man.” 23 Readers interested in a sprightly review of the recurring bouts of “declinism” in America should consult Josef Joffe, The Myth of America’s Decline: Politics, Economics, and a Half Century of False Prophecies (New York: Liveright, 2014). 24 Donald J. Trump, with Tony Schwartz, Trump: The Art of the Deal (New York: Ballantine Books, 1987). 25 Ibid., 45–63.

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commandments actually numbers eleven, and while many of these contribute more to befuddlement than to wisdom, there are some precepts that speak volumes about the future foreign policy orientation of Donald Trump, and are well worth pondering. Three especially come to mind, Trump’s fifth, eighth, and tenth commandments (respectively, “use your leverage,” “fight back,” and “contain the costs”). The three together can easily be considered generative of a trio of policy implications that, three decades later, would feature so centrally in the Trump administration’s “dealings” with transatlantic allies. Using one’s leverage, in the case of a superpower such as the United States, corresponds closely to a preference for bilateral rather than multilateral dealings, for in the case of the former, vast disparities in power can reasonably be assumed to yield more favorable outcomes than would be anticipated under multilateralism. In particular, the use of leverage bilaterally could be expected to result in the kind of “reciprocity” that this president makes no secret about desiring, expressed colloquially in the idea that “if you do me a solid, I will do you one in return.” Bilateralism is not, despite what many critics of it believe, the same as unilateralism; much less is it a synonym for isolationism. But by the same token, its more explicit expectations regarding the working of reciprocity does tend to fly in the face of multilateralism’s expectation that reciprocity should be “diffuse” rather than direct, with no requirement that tit be compensated by tat in each and every instance.26 The eighth Trumpian commandment, to fight back, has also been said to act as a constraint (albeit not a healthy one) on the president’s foreign policy. The argument is that America’s relationships with traditional transatlantic allies grow unnecessarily strained because the president simply cannot resist going for the digital jugular in response to real or imagined slights coming from fellow leaders in allied countries. Disagreement on policy matters is nothing new, as between leaders of what has been

26 Some scholars hold diffuse reciprocity to be one of the three defining characteristics

of a multilateral order, with the two other stipulatory elements being indivisibility and nondiscrimination. See Lisa L. Martin, “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism,” International Organization 46 (Autumn 1992): 765–792; John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” International Organization 46 (Summer 1992): 561– 598.

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termed the “democratic alliance.”27 Indeed, the saving grace of this kind of alliance, it is held, inheres in attackers and “attackees” understanding the rules of civil disagreement; in short, while they frequently argue, they also realize that their shared political values and, to some, their collective identity, minimize the downside risk of their bickering.28 One obvious negative consequence that this particular Trumpian tick from the 1980s has had upon America’s relations with its traditional NATO allies has been to stir up anew the old “anti-American” bogey that always seems to sleep with one eye open within the confines of the transatlantic region. On the assumption that America, being so powerful, can easily afford to brush aside the consequences of annoying allies (often, many of them feel, gratuitously so) there need be no lasting harm associated with the current upsurge in anti-Americanism within important parts of the West, what Julia Zweig labeled, a decade or so ago, “friendly-fire” anti-Americanism.29 But on this important question of whether American diplomacy suffers due to the unpopularity of the country’s president in many (not all) allied countries, the scholars remain divided, sometimes divided between what they now think as opposed to what they thought a decade ago. A case in point is provided by two Dartmouth College IR specialists, Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth. Back in 2005, during the second term of George W. Bush, the pair were skeptical that there were any real foreign policy costs associated with what was widely taken to be the administration’s “unilateralism.” More recently, however these two scholars have expressed concern that ill treatment of the country’s security partners might render its alliances less of a force-multiplier for it, especially vis-à-vis China. Even before the election of Donald Trump, they argued that the “country’s military superiority is not going anywhere, nor is the globe-spanning alliance structure that constitutes the core of the

27 The principal source for conceptualizing NATO as the “democratic alliance” par excellence is Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 28 See Thomas Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization 54 (Winter 2000): 1–39. 29 Julia E. Sweig, Friendly Fire: Losing Friends and Making Enemies in the AntiAmerican Century (New York: Public Affairs, 2006). Also see, for that era’s wave of criticism of American foreign policy, Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).

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existing liberal international order (unless Washington unwisely decides to throw it away).”30 Since the onset of the Trump administration, public opinion globally (insofar as that can reliably be discerned through survey techniques), testifies to a profound souring in respect of American leadership, almost entirely associated with the plummeting favorability ratings of the president.31 Starkly illustrative of the current tarnishing in an American brand dragged down by perceptions of Trump is evidence from polling done in America’s most reliable ally, and traditional “best friend,” Canada. An opinion poll published in early May 2019 sampled Canadians’ relative images of a selected group of countries, including the USA, China, Mexico, the UK, France, and Germany. The results were telling, if not surprising, such has been the Trump effect north of the Canada–US border: higher favorability scores were recorded for the UK (86% rating it “positively”), Germany (82%), France (77%) and even Mexico (65%) than for the United States itself (44%). Fortunately for what remains of the American image as a good neighbor, China managed to rack up a more dismal score, of only 23%.32 Then there is the Trumpian tenth commandment: contain the costs. Because of the unstated implication of this injunction to reduce one’s own “skin in the game,” it is not difficult to see how this vestige of 1980s’ Trump philosophy can and does have a bearing upon relations with the transatlantic allies. The connection shows up in high relief under the policy rubric of “burden sharing.” Now, Donald Trump did not invent the American grievance over burden sharing within NATO. This is a grievance with a lengthy pedigree, demonstrated by Democratic as well as Republican presidents dating back almost to the very origins of the Atlantic alliance. The first public staging of the burden-sharing drama occurred with NATO’s Lisbon summit in 1952, when the Truman administration

30 Stephen G. Brooks, and William C. Wohlforth, “International Relations Theory and the Case Against Unilateralism,” Perspectives on Politics 3 (September 2005): 509–524; and Idem, “The Once and Future Superpower: Why China Won’t Overtake the United States,” Foreign Affairs 95 (May/June 2016): 91–104, quote at p. 91. 31 For one such assessment, see Richard Wike et al., “Trump’s International Ratings Remain Low, Especially Among Key Allies,” Pew Research Center, October 2018. 32 The survey was conducted by pollster Nik Nanos in the last week of April 2019; see Michelle Zilio, “Canadians More Positive About Ties with Europe Than with the U.S., China: Poll,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), May 3, 2019: A6.

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called on the allies to so step up their contributions to the conventional defenses of the alliance as to be able, within the span of two years, to field 98 divisions and 7000 combat aircraft for the European theater!33 Needless to say, the allies showed themselves incapable of meeting this ambitious conventional-force goal. Withal, the alliance survived, in the short run thanks to a decision by the Eisenhower administration to prioritize nuclear rather conventional deterrence with its “New Look” strategy, and in the long run because of the fortuitous ending of the Cold War, followed by the demise of the Soviet Union itself.34 But while the stage props might have been shifted around, the drama continued with a new cast reading from a familiar script. NATO’s halting assumption of security obligations outside of its traditional “area,” starting in the Balkans in the 1990s and continuing in the Middle East in the early twenty-first century, witnessed a revival of the traditional refrain, whereby American presidents, no matter their names, implored allies to do more, with the metric for assessing “more” typically being the percentage of GDP allocated to their respective defense budgets. In the event, 2% has come to be the magic figure that attests to an ally’s doing “enough” to carry its share of the burden, but it has not been a metric that flatters most alliance members. Americans do not fail to notice this.

Conclusion Prior to Donald Trump, presidential finger-wagging was just that; few “underspenders” (i.e., the majority of the membership) really sensed there to be any real danger in their choosing to allocate public finances to other budgetary envelopes. But Trump has injected a new element in their calculations, predicated upon their worry that perhaps he means it when he warns that unless they spend more, the United States itself might decamp from NATO. Although no ally has ever seriously entertained the option of invoking article 13 of the Washington treaty and leaving the alliance—not even France in 1966, when Charles de Gaulle kicked the alliance’s headquarters out of the country and pulled France’s forces out of NATO’s integrated command structures—with Donald Trump there is a lurking 33 Luca Ratti, A Not-So-Special Relationship: The US, the UK and German Unification, 1945–1990 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), p. 52. 34 See David N. Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1983).

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suspicion that America’s commitment to the alliance it created can no longer be taken for granted.35 This is what “transactionalism” has meant, to date, for the transatlantic alliance. How should the allies respond to the Trump phenomenon? First, they should realize that America under its current president almost certainly will not exercise article 13 and decamp; nevertheless, they should use the slight risk of this happening as a means of “goading” themselves to act more coherently and credibly in the realm of European security. Second, they should refrain from lecturing this administration about the perils of straying from the path of multilateral cooperation, and abandoning the liberal-democratic international order that many European leaders never tire of repeating, was built and nourished by America itself. The Trump team realizes how much of the heavy lifting America has done over the decades—and that is the problem, given how this transactional president senses that the lifting has been inadequately compensated. Third, the European allies should stimulate their own transactional juices, availing themselves of bilateral opportunities to work toward a common aim, somewhat along the lines of the reasonably successful cooperation France and the United States have effected in combatting terrorism in western Africa and elsewhere.36 Finally, they should remember that nothing lasts forever, and in the context of American presidencies, another election is always just around the corner. After all, the United States and other allies managed to put up tolerably well with Charles de Gaulle, and he was in power for the first ten years of the Fifth Republic’s existence. Europe should be able to wait out the American Gaullist currently sitting in the White House, whether for another year or another five years. However, even were this president to fail in his re-election bid in November 2020, no one should ever imagine that a Democratic administration would automatically choose a return to

35 Article 13 of NATO’s founding treaty stipulates that “[a]fter the Treaty has been in force for twenty years [viz., after 1969], any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.” “The North Atlantic Treaty,” in The NATO Handbook: 50th Anniversary Edition (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1998), p. 399. 36 As is argued by David G. Haglund and Maud Quessard-Salvaing, “How the West Was One: France, America, and the ‘Huntingtonian Reversal’,” Orbis 62 (Fall 2018): 557–581.

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multilateralism as the preferred default setting for its “grand strategy.”37 Whether it is Donald Trump in the White House or not, a certain element of “transactionalism” can be guaranteed to continue to inflect America’s relationship with its transatlantic allies in new and challenging ways. Nevertheless, China’s ballyhooed “rise” of recent years may turn out to provide a tonic for US–European ties, strange as the thought might otherwise seem on first encounter. This is because of two trends. The first is that, in the United States, China is one of the few issues in foreign policy (it may be the only one) capable of engendering a semblance of bipartisanship. Loathed as this president may be by his Democratic adversaries, his policy of “getting tough” with China is one that elicits their approval. And this gets us to the second trend, which concerns the impact China’s growing power (and appetite for geopolitical influence) might have upon European members of the alliance in coming years. It used to be argued by some European policy intellectuals that, unlike the United States, “Europe doesn’t do China.”38 Recently, however, there is evidence that Europeans themselves are growing aware that if they do not “do” China, then China will “do” them. And if this does not have to imply Europe’s joining together with America in a new cold war intended to contain China’s growing power, it does at least suggest that Washington, even under a re-elected Donald Trump, might continue to place value in having allies. Thus, ironically, China might contribute to frustrating the anti-alliance “Wilsonianism” of Donald Trump (or any successor) by making it obvious to Americans that allies can be useful to have.39 37 See Rebecca Friedman Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “The Day After Trump: American Strategy for a New International Order,” Washington Quarterly 41 (Spring 2018): 7–25. 38 Alex Danchev, “Shared Values in the Transatlantic Relationship,” British Journal of

Politics and International Relations 7 (August 2005): 429–436, quote on p. 433. 39 See the “transactionalist” assessment of John J. Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” International Security 43 (Spring 2019): 7–50, quoting from pp. 48–49: “Most of the countries in Europe, especially the major powers, are likely to become part of the U.S.-led bounded order, although they are unlikely to play a serious military role in containing China. They do not have the capability to project substantial military power into East Asia, and they have little reason to acquire it, because China does not directly threaten Europe, and because it makes more sense for Europe to pass the buck to the United States and its Asian allies. U.S. policymakers, however, will want the Europeans inside their bounded order for strategically related economic reasons. In particular, the United States will want to keep European countries

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References Corwin, Edward S. The President: Office and Powers, 4th rev. ed. New York: New York University Press, 1957. Heidler, David S., and Jeanne T. Heidler, The Rise of Andrew Jackson: Myth, Manipulation, and the Making of Modern Politics. New York: Basic Books, 2018. Hinckley, Barbara. Less Than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. Jonas, Manfred. Isolationism in America, 1935–1941. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966. Mead, Walter Russell. “The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal World Order.” Foreign Affairs 96 (March/April 2017): 2–7. Mead, Walter Russell. Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001. Paulson, Arthur. Donald Trump and the Prospect for American Democracy: An Unprecedented President in an Age of Polarization. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018. Ruggie, John Gerard. “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution.” International Organization 46 (Summer 1992): 561–598. Thompson, John A. “Wilsonianism: The Dynamics of a Conflicted Concept.” International Affairs 86 (January 2010): 27–47. Trump, Donald J. with Tony Schwartz, Trump: The Art of the Deal. New York: Ballantine Books, 1987.

from selling dual-use technologies to China and to help put economic pressure on Beijing when necessary. In return, U.S. military forces will remain in Europe, keeping NATO alive and continuing to serve as the pacifier in that region. Given that virtually every European leader would like to see that happen, the threat of leaving should give the United States significant leverage in getting the Europeans to cooperate on the economic front against China.”

The Evolving Transatlantic Link: What European Response? Disentangling the European Security Debate Barbara Kunz

The transatlantic link is changing. Contrary to widely held beliefs, the main driving force for this change is not President Trump—currently the focus of the debate on the matter—but evolutions in the international system’s structure. These evolutions, notably caused by the rise of China, will have a major impact on transatlantic security relations. As they are structural in nature, any expectation that transatlantic relations will go back to “normal” after the Trump presidency is unrealistic. For that reason—and in light of a deteriorating security environment—European security is at the crossroads. As of today, the defense of Europe is heavily dependent on the United States. Through NATO, the continent relies on US security guarantees for its territorial defense. Even beyond NATO, the United States is a key player in European security through its bilateral engagement with numerous European states. US forces also play key roles in military operations outside of Europe to enhance the continent’s security, such as in Africa or

B. Kunz (B) Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s) 2020 M. Quessard et al. (eds.), Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37258-3_3

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the Middle East. Against that backdrop, a changing transatlantic relationship has considerable implications for European security at various levels, not just within the Atlantic Alliance on which the debate is essentially concentrated.1 The evolving transatlantic relationship does of course not necessarily imply a complete US withdrawal from European security affairs. Such a black and white scenario does indeed seem improbable, at least at this point. Yet, Washington’s shift of focus to Asia will likely imply lesser US attention—and resources—for Europe’s security. Diminished US involvement leading to gradual disengagement may well characterize transatlantic security relations in the years and decades to come. In addition to these systemic factors, many Europeans also fear that Trumpism will survive Trump. For Europe, this implies two challenges at once. First, Europeans will need to ensure their own security to a much greater extent than today. Yet, Washington’s shift of focus will in all likelihood not only mean a less prominent US role in ensuring Europeans’ security. It is, secondly, likely to cause the United States to adopt a more instrumental stance on transatlantic security cooperation, raising American expectations as to the transatlantic security partnership’s return on investment. American demands vis-à-vis Europeans when it comes to supporting Washington’s worldwide endeavors are likely to grow. Europe will have to respond to these two challenges: ensuring its own security (at least to a much larger degree than today) and making its armed forces fit for a more transactional transatlantic relationship in which US demands for more burden sharing will be more assertive. After a very brief overview of the United States’ role in European defense, this chapter will move on to opening the black box of “Europe,” arguing that there is no single European analysis of what less US implication in European security entails. The third and fourth sections then discuss the current debate on the future of European security and analyze its shortfalls and the misconceptions standing in the way of a true European Grand strategy debate. They are followed by a final section looking beyond the current debate, identifying topics for future agendas.

1 As just one illustration of that point, see Azita Raji, “Trump’s Tariffs and the Future of Transatlantic Ties,” War on the Rocks, June 5, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/ 06/trumps-tariffs-and-the-future-of-transatlantic-ties/.

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The US Role in European Security: A Very Brief Overview The key role the United States plays in European security is first and foremost established by the security guarantees enshrined in the 1949 Washington Treaty. Article 5 defines that an armed attack against one member of the alliance is considered an attack against all allies. On paper, this does not necessarily confer a predominant role to the United States. In reality, however, this article’s relevance depends on US military power and political will to actually enforce the security guarantees set forth. Moreover, the United States provides weapons for NATO’s Nuclear sharing policy of deterrence, thereby ensuring Europe’s coverage by the so-called nuclear umbrella.2 The Atlantic Alliance is thus at the heart of transatlantic security. Understandably, therefore, the current debate on future transatlantic security relations is mostly centered on this organization. It is, however, important to keep in mind that American engagement in European security is not limited to NATO. There are, at least, three more vectors outside of the Alliance. First, there is—sometimes longstanding—bilateral defense cooperation between the United States and European states, e.g., in the industrial field but not only. Examples of such longstanding bilateral cooperation include the Nordic countries, with e.g., Thule Airbase in Greenland (Denmark) or the US Marine Corps’ prepositioned materiel in Norway as part of the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program since 1981. In the present context of a reemerged Russian threat, US bilateral engagement moreover takes the shape of reassurance measures beyond what NATO is doing as an alliance, notably the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). This initiative, launched in reaction to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, “enables the United States to enhance the US deterrence posture, increase the readiness and responsiveness of US forces in Europe, support the collective defense and security of NATO allies, and bolster the security and capacity of US allies and partners.”3 Under Trump, funding for the EDI

2 US nuclear weapons are stationed in five non-nuclear NATO member states: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. 3 See US European Command Public Affairs Office, “FY 2020 European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) Fact Sheet,” https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q= &esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&ved=2ahUKEwiSpufQ8PLjAhUG_aQKHb_RAGUQFjA FegQIBRAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eucom.mil%2Fmedia-library%2Fdocument%2F

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has increased. Since Russia annexed Crimea, bilateral defense cooperation between the United States and individual European countries is clearly on the rise.4 This even concerns countries that are not part of NATO. For example, both Sweden and Finland signed statements of intent with the United States in 2016 to step up bilateral defense cooperation.5 Second, there is the presence of US troops in Europe as an element of global US strategies. While this presence may not be “about” Europe in the first place, it certainly has the indirect effect of underlining the credibility of Washington’s commitment to European security. Examples include the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) based at Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart in Germany. Probably even better known is Ramstein Airbase, the location of the United Air Forces in Europe’s headquarters, which inter alia serves as a logistical hub and plays a key role in US operations against terrorism in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan or in the horn of Africa. Overall, more than 35,000 US troops were stationed in Germany alone as of December 2018.6 Finally, at times significant operational cooperation between the United States and the Europeans is taking place outside of NATO. One such example is Washington’s support for France’s opération Barkhane in the

39550%2Ffy-2020-european-deterrence-initiative-edi-fact-sheet&usg=AOvVaw0ljA7Zqax OU9xgaUxJc2Ee. 4 For instance, the entire Nordic Baltic region is seeking to establish closer ties with the United States, as for instance illustrated by the US Defense Secretary attending a meeting of the so-called Northern Group, see US Department of Defense, “Mattis to Visit Europe for NATO, Northern Group Meetings,” November 3, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/News/Article/Article/1362725/mattisto-visit-europe-for-nato-northern-group-meetings/. Further south, Romanian President Klaus Iohannis and Donalt Trump issued a joint statement in August 2019, in which they declared “Our militaries stand shoulder to shoulder in defense of freedom and look to bolster our defense and deterrence posture on NATO’s Eastern Flank, including in the Black Sea, which is of strategic importance for transatlantic security.” See White House, “Joint Statement from President of the United States Donald J. Trump and President of Romania Klaus Iohannis,” August 20, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/ joint-statement-president-united-states-donald-j-trump-president-romania-klaus-iohannis/. 5 For further details, see Barbara Kunz, “Northern Europe’s Strategic Challenge from Russia. What Political and Military Responses?” Russie.NEI.Visions 111, Ifri, October 2018, https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/russieneivisions/northerneuropes-strategic-challenge-russia-what. 6 See Statista, “Where U.S. Military Personnel Is Stationed Abroad,” March 13, 2019, https://www.statista.com/chart/17355/us-military-overseas/.

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Sahel, which to preserve is a key French interest.7 The United States moreover supports France with intelligence. Paris, however, is not the only European government interested in operational cooperation with the United States, albeit motivations may vary. The same for instance applies to Denmark, with Copenhagen being keen on ensuring the highest level of interoperability possible with US armed forces.8

Consequences of a (Gradual) US Withdrawal: Opening the Black Box of “Europe” As noted above, much of the debate on future transatlantic security is centered on NATO. But in light of the transatlantic security relationship’s many facets, the exclusive focus on the Atlantic Alliance is shortsighted. It is looking at the entire spectrum of US engagement in European security that allows for accounting for what individual states in Europe stand to lose in case of decreased US engagement in European security affairs. The consequences of a—gradual—US disengagement are indeed not the same for all Europeans. Views differ from capital to capital, depending on the threats national leaders perceive and the role the US plays in countering them. Threat perception varies widely across Europe, and so do views on the United States’ role and relevance to different European countries’ security and ultimately survival. In the context of the continent’s current security debate, European countries may roughly be divided into four ideal-typical categories. First, there is a number of countries in Europe where the predominant view is that Russia represents the major threat. Deterring Russia is these countries’ priority, which logically entails a focus on territorial defense. National defense policies are designed accordingly, with, in some cases, complete reorientation after 2014 such as in the Swedish case. In other words, these countries prioritize engaging in precisely that kind of defense activities in which Europeans are the most helpless without the United

7 For example, the US Air Force supports France with refueling tankers deployed in Operation Juniper Micron, see Lawrence Sena, US Air Forces in Europe & Air Forces Africa, “Fairchild KC-135s, Airmen Support Operation Juniper Micron,” October 3, 2018, https://www.usafe.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1653862/fairchild-kc135s-airmen-support-operation-juniper-micron/. 8 See Mikkel Runge Olesen, “Det dansk-amerikanske forhold efter den kolde krig i lyset af valget af Trump,” Internasjonal Politikk 75, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 28–35.

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States: deterrence, and in particular deterrence by conventional means, i.e., “boots on the ground.” Where European vulnerabilities are concerned, the United States is hardly replaceable in this context. From these countries’ vantage point, their survival is ultimately guaranteed by US involvement in European security. A potential retreat from European security affairs is consequently seen as a vital threat to national security. Countries in this category include the notoriously Atlanticist Baltic states and Poland, but also Nordic countries or Romania—with Warsaw probably being the loudest protagonist in European debates.9 The second category mainly includes France: countries perceiving real threats from the South. These primarily comprise terrorism spreading to Europe from regions with no functioning states—such as the Sahel—and other unwanted consequences of state failure and instability, not least potentially uncontrollable flows of migration toward Europe. With several deadly terrorist attacks on French territory in recent years, Paris’s concerns are clearly anchored in reality. The priority consequently is on expeditionary operations, aimed at countering threats where they emerge— such as France’s (unilateral) opération Barkhane in the Sahel or interventions in the Near East. In that endeavor, US support is most valued.10 The end of Franco-US military cooperation would certainly have negative consequences for France. However, the nation’s survival would not be considered at stake. This is the major difference between this category and the category outlined above.

9 This is clearly reflected in the respective countries’ strategic documents and posture reviews. At a political level, the four Nordic defense ministers as well as the Icelandic minister of foreign affairs for example qualified Russia’s actions as the “biggest challenge for the European security situation” in a joint op-ed (see Peter Hultqvist, Nicolai Wammen, Gunnar B. Sveinsson, Ine Eriksen Søreide, and Carl Haglund, “Vi utdyper det nordiske forsvarssamarbeidet” [We Are Deepening Nordic Desence Cooperation], Norwegian Government, April 10, 2015, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/ vi-utdyper-det-nordiske-forsvarssamarbeidet/id2404378/). As far as Poland is concerned, see the numerous statements to that effect by Polish officials, e.g., Polish ambassador to NATO Tomasz Szatkowski: “‘Russia Is Undoubtedly a Threat’: Polish NATO Ambassador,” TVP, September 2, 2019, http://www.tvp.pl/polandincom/news/politicseconomy/russia-undoubtedly-a-threat-polish-nato-ambassador/44205787. 10 See Florence Parly, “The US-French Relationship in a Changing World,” speech at the Atlantic Council, Washington, March 18, 2019, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/sallede-presse/discours/discours-de-florence-parly/discours-a-l-atlantic-council-the-us-frenchrelationship-in-a-changing-world.

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These first two categories are what may be labeled the extreme ends of the European security spectrum. In between them are those countries who lean toward either category, yet without the sense of urgency that characterizes debates in the countries named above. What separates these countries from the two first categories is that they do not perceive any imminent threat. Defense in general therefore plays a relatively subordinate role in national debates and political priorities. Germany, for instance, leans toward the first category and went back to officially prioritizing territorial defense.11 Yet, Berlin hardly perceives any imminent threat. The German debate thus lacks the urgency that characterizes debates in France or in the Baltic states. Southward-looking Italy or Spain, in turn, lean toward the second category. All of these categories are of course ideal-typical. Subsuming one European country under a specific category does not necessarily imply that its leaders do not share any of the concerns of its allies subsumed under another category. These categories are, however, relevant in that they summarize national positions and priorities in the current context. They are, moreover, clearly reflected in the different countries’ actual defense policies and military spending and hence their security priorities. As shall be argued below, these categories also structure the debate on the way ahead for European security.

What to Do? The Current Debate on the Future of European Defense The various European states’ defense priorities and policies differ, sometimes greatly. Consensus on what ought to be done collectively at the European level—and in particular within the EU—has not been achieved. The fact that the European Commission is about to take on a greater role in defense will also not have a major impact in this respect: processing threat perceptions and defining defense priorities in terms of defense spending and planning remains in national hands.12 There is no European

11 German Ministry of Defense, Konzeption der Bundeswehr, July 20, 2018, https:// www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/26544/9ceddf6df2f48ca87aa0e3ce2826348d/20180731konzeption-der-bundeswehr-data.pd. 12 On the increasing supranationalism in EU defense, see Pierre Haroche, “Supranationalism Strikes Back: A Neofunctionalist Account of the European Defence Fund,” Journal of European Public Policy, Published online April 26, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 13501763.2019.1609570.

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consensus on threat perception. Consequently, neither is there a European consensus on defense priorities, let alone the role the United States should play in them. It is thus hardly surprising that there is no single “European” or “Brussels” stance on European security in a post-Atlantic era. In fact, there is not even a solid consensus on the emergence of a post-Atlantic era. The Changing Transatlantic Link Is Not the Universally Accepted Starting Point Occasional rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, the evolving transatlantic relationship hardly constitutes the universally accepted conceptual starting point of Europe’s current security debate. The one exception to this observation may be France, where President Macron has repeatedly stated that the continued European integration was taking place against the background of a “progressive and unavoidable disengagement of the United States.”13 In turn, similar statements by German chancellor Angela Merkel, who famously claimed that Europe had to “take its fate into its own hands,” have remained without any concrete political consequences so far and have hardly entered standard German discourse.14 In most countries subsumed under the first category above, questioning the possible continuity of transatlantic relations in their current shape even remains somewhat of a taboo—although the realization that there will be no “back to normal” in transatlantic relations continues to spread. The fact that, in the end and after in some cases considerable initial opposition, 25 out of currently 28 EU member states decided to participate in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) may serve as an illustration of that evolution.15 13 Emmanuel Macron, “Initiative pour l’Europe. Discours d’Emmanuel Macron pour une Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique,” September 26, 2017, https://www. elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/09/26/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuelmacron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique. 14 Philip Olterman, “‘Europe’s Fate Is in Our Hands’: “Angela Merkel’s Defiant Reply to Trump,” The Guardian, January 16, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ 2017/jan/16/europes-fate-is-in-our-hands-angela-merkels-defiant-reply-to-trump. 15 For more background, see Justyna Gotkowska, “The CSDP’s Renaissance. Challenges and Opportunities for the Eastern Flank,” OSW Commentary 243, June 28, 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2017-06-28/csdpsrenaissance-challenges-and-opportunities-eastern-flank.

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Yet, there clearly is a debate on the future of European defense. But rather than following from a shared realization that transatlantic business as usual is not on the agenda, this debate is mainly triggered by the 2016 European Union Global Strategy (EUGS)—which famously calls for European strategic autonomy—and the ensuing (but not necessarily causally linked) progress made in the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).16 Unsurprisingly, how countries position themselves in this debate is directly related to the respective capitals’ security and defense priorities. The debate is thus clearly structured around the various categories outlined above. This is the reason why this debate is so difficult to disentangle: coming from different starting points, not everybody is talking about the same thing. The divide largely runs between those who prioritize the “South” and those who prioritize the “East.” In terms of defense priorities, this amounts to a divide between those who wish to focus on expeditionary operations and those whose focus is on deterrence. A non-negligible portion of the debate thus consists of various capitals talking past each other. In reality, Europe does not pursue one debate, but often two debates in one, seeking answers to two different questions. The Two Main Questions of Europe’s Defense Debate(s) The key question of this first strand of the debate reads: how can Europeans strengthen Europe’s defense capabilities to the extent that they can fill the voids (potentially) left by the United States? What should they invest in to reduce their dependence on the United States in order to be prepared for the day when Europe eventually has to stand on its own? This debate essentially concerns the European Union’s CSDP. As defined in the Lisbon Treaty’s article 42, CSDP is about civilian and military assets, and the EU can “use them on missions outside the Union.” This first strand is thus largely about expeditionary operations, as well as investments in capabilities required to that end. Concrete proposals and projects to this effect concern the various steps taken at EU level

16 These advances most notably include Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defense Fund. For a good overview, see e.g., Margriet Drent, Eric Wilms and Dick Zandee, “Making Sense of European Defense,” Clingendael Report, December 2017, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/ Making_Sense_of_European_Defence.pdf.

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since 2016, but also Paris’s (non-EU) European Intervention Initiative.17 France is the most active contributor to this strand of the debate, in which the European Union—and the Commission in particular—also play an increasingly relevant role. In turn, the key question for most countries belonging to the first— territorial defense—category is: What can be done to preserve the transatlantic link, both through NATO and bilaterally, in order to continue ensuring credible deterrence against Russia? What can be done to ensure the continued presence of US troops in Europe, or even increase that presence? Only the United States is considered to confer credibility to deterrence, which must remain on top of the agenda. Losing the United States thus not only means losing that credibility, but likely also the matter’s position on the European security agenda. Consequently, any attempt at conceptualizing European security without America is—at best, and certainly rightly so—considered a chimera by the members of what may be labeled the deterrence camp. From that point of view, keeping the US involved in European security affairs must be the key priority. Convincing the United States to remain engaged in European security is obviously a difficult task. Yet, some European capitals try hard. The first illustration that comes to mind is of course Poland, notably with its ambition to host US troops on its territory in what has come to be known as “Fort Trump.”18 But even other countries have displayed a tendency to try to accommodate the United States. One indicator may for example be procurement decisions, with countries opting for American military hardware. Finally, and very importantly in the present context, measures to keep the Americans in also include avoiding anything that might alienate Washington.

17 See Drent, Wilms, Zandee, “Making Sense of European Defence.” On the European Intervention Initiative, see Alice Billon-Galland and Martin Quencez, “European Intervention Initiative: The Big Easy,” Berlin Policy Journal, October 15, 2018, https:// berlinpolicyjournal.com/european-intervention-initiative-the-big-easy/. 18 See Polish Ministry of National Defence, “The Foundation of Fort Trump Is an Investment in Our Security,” October 30, 2018, https://www.gov.pl/web/nationaldefence/the-foundation-of-fort-trump-is-an-investment-in-our-security.

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Where Both Strands Meet: The European Strategic Autonomy Debate The two strands of the debate outlined above eventually meet in the discussions on European strategic autonomy. These started with the 2016 EUGS. The EUGS “nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union,” yet without providing a concise definition of the notion’s content or implication.19 Ever since, European strategic autonomy has been a subject for debate. France in particular is pushing; President Macron has repeatedly said that he wants his country to be the “engine” of European strategic autonomy.20 Others have vehemently argued against European strategic autonomy or at least called for caution.21 Then Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło for instance declared that “the so-called strategic autonomy of the EU [must] not lead to weakening of [the] European contribution to [the] deterrence and defense potential of NATO.”22 In sum, the lack of a concise definition of European strategic autonomy, for example in terms of a Level of Ambition, has led to cacophony. As Szydło’s statement illustrates, things become seemingly incompatible when the assumption that European strategic autonomy is detrimental to the transatlantic link and/or effective deterrence enters the picture. This assumption is based on three pillars. First, it is assumed that resources invested in European strategic autonomy will be lacking elsewhere, where they are truly needed. Secondly, it is assumed that investing in European strategic autonomy will alienate the United States and hence weaken NATO and the transatlantic link. Washington’s reactions have contributed

19 “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the

European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy,” June 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/ topics/eu-global-strategy/17304/global-strategy-european-unions-foreign-and-securitypolicy_en. 20 Emmanuel Macron, “Vœux du Président Emmanuel Macron aux Armées,” January 19, 2018, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/01/19/voeux-du-presidentemmanuel-macron-aux-armees. 21 For an overview, see Margriet Drent, “European Strategic Autonomy: Going It Alone?” Clingendael Policy Brief, August 2018, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/ default/files/2018-08/PB_European_Strategic_Autonomy.pdf. 22 Beata Szydło, “Remarks by Prime Minister Beata Szydło at the PISM Foreign Policy Forum” [undated, conference held in 2017], https://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/ d64322fb-ff00-47f2-ac03-973423ad2aa3:JCR.

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to fueling such fears.23 Thirdly, some readings of “European strategic autonomy” even seem to imply that the (unrealistic) goal of its proponents consists of replacing the United States in ensuring effective conventional deterrence against Russia.24 It is at this point the above-established lacking common starting point plays in. What the issue really is about is two different takes on causality: while the proponents of European strategic autonomy argue that bolstering EU (and otherwise European) defense efforts are the appropriate reaction to a US disengagement already underway, its opponents claim that it is precisely these efforts that risk triggering that disengagement. The awareness of these different takes on causality yet seems limited across Europe—hence another reason why the debate’s protagonists are talking past each other. Rather than seeking to clarify the meaning of “European strategic autonomy,” a great deal of the debate has morphed into whether one is “for” or “against” the notion. Working definitions are in the meantime established within the Brussels bureaucracy.25 What is clearly missing is a shared political understanding of what the notion refers to, notably when it comes to (conventional) deterrence and collective defense as distinct from expeditionary operations. Part of the reasons that led to this cacophony is that conventional deterrence hardly is on the agenda of the country that declared itself the engine of the debate: France. With many

23 See e.g., Steven Erlanger, “U.S. Revives Concerns About European Defense

Plans, Rattling NATO Allies,” The New York Times, February 18, 2018, https:// www.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/world/europe/nato-europe-us-.html. See also the letter Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Andrea L. Thompson sent to High Representative Federica Mogherini in May 2019, available at https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/1073-19-5-1-02-letter-to-hrvpmoghe/6cdebd319d226b532785/optimized/full.pdf#page=1. 24 Compare again with Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło’s speech quoted above. Szydło went on to argue: “Presently we do not see any alternative to security guarantees resulting from our membership in the North Atlantic Treaty. The strategic autonomy should not mean distancing ourselves from our main ally in the field of security, the United States.” (Beata Szydło, “Remarks by Prime Minister Beata Szydło at the PISM Foreign Policy Forum.”) Similar statements can frequently be heard in countries subsumed under category one in this chapter. 25 Frédéric Mauro, “Strategic Autonomy Under the Spotlight: The New Holy Grail of European Defence,” GRIP Report 2018/1, https://www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/ RAPPORTS/2018/Rapport_2018-1_EN.pdf.

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in Parisian circles taking for granted that “defense” means “expeditionary operations,” French diplomacy has failed or at least neglected to reassure its European partners that the objective of supplanting Washington in deterring Russia is not on Paris’s agenda—for the simple reason that conventional deterrence hardly is on Paris’s agenda. In a French context, “deterrence” almost exclusively refers to nuclear deterrence. Yet, that dimension remains somewhere in the background in the current context, despite being the very lynchpin of French strategic thinking. The reason is that the French nuclear bomb remains a purely national affair nobody really ever questions, although it is believed to enhance not just France’s security, but also its neighbors’. Thanks to the national deterrent, as seen from Paris, the issue of deterrence is basically “covered,” meaning that the focus for debate and concrete measures at the European level can be on tackling threats from the South. France is thus not opposed to many European countries’ defense priority—rather, Paris is neglecting this priority’ relevance. Against this backdrop, framing the current debate in terms of being “pro” or “anti” American engagement in European security affairs makes little sense. Such a move merely serves as a smokescreen to hide the actual debate. A United States’ withdrawal is on no capital’s agenda. This is yet an accusation Paris is at time facing. Reactions to French proposals have at times been vivid. The closer one is to the ideal-typical first category introduced above, the harsher—with e.g., a Polish voice declaring that “Macron’s Visions Are Suicidal for Poland.”26 It is, however, erroneous—and perhaps a proof of ill will—to believe that the driver for French proposals is anti-Americanism and the old Gaullist dream of kicking the US out of Europe.27 The French debate on building a “Europe de la défense” independently from NATO has, in political terms, been settled with the 2012 Védrine report, which concluded that France’s return into NATO’s Integrated Military Command Structures under president

26 Andrzej Talaga, “Macron’s Visions Are Suicidal for Poland,” Euractiv, October 4, 2017, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-policy/opinion/macrons-defencevisions-are-suicidal-for-poland/. 27 For more background, see Olivier Schmitt, “The Reluctant Atlanticist: France’s Security and Defence Policy in a Transatlantic Context,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 4 (2017): 463–474, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1220367.

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Nicolas Sarkozy was a success.28 Nevertheless, Paris could of course have made greater efforts explaining its positions to its allies. Berlin could have supported its partner in that endeavor. This aspect of the debate should in any case be discarded as a pseudo-debate that prevents progress on the issues that really matter: ensuring Europe’s ability to tackle all threats the continent is facing.

Taking the Debate to the Grand Strategy Level The reality is that Europe is facing considerable threats of very different kinds. These include conventional war and terrorism, i.e., the “East” and the “South,” as well as a whole gamut of other issues ranging from hybrid threats to cyber-attacks. Conceptualizing European defense as a zerosum-game between collective territorial defense and expeditionary operations makes no sense. For Europe as a whole, the question can hardly consist of choosing between the two. Rather, the question must be how both dimensions can be tackled, with all the requirements this entails for national and European defense planning and spending. In finding solutions to this crucial question, more clarity on the role the US intends to play in the years and decades to come would of course be helpful— if not even a precondition for the development of appropriate European strategies. The greater the degree of US disengagement, the greater the gaps Europeans will need to fill on their own. When it comes to deterrence and collective defense, these gaps seem almost impossible to fill. Prospects are less dim regarding expeditionary operations—which is not to say there are no lacunae in the latter dimension. In particular, Europe notoriously lacks strategic enablers, an issue that so far continues to be insufficiently addressed. Improving means for situational awareness and bolstering European intelligence cooperation are other items that should be high on the agenda. So far, measures such as PESCO have not significantly altered Europe’s ability to act. This would of course be expecting too much, given that these are recent developments. It is therefore crucial for Europeans to persevere in their endeavors. 28 Hubert Védrine, “Rapport pour le Président de la République française sur les conséquences du retour de la France dans le commandement intégré de l’OTAN, sur l’avenir de la relation transatlantique et les perspectives de l’Europe de la défense,” November 14, 2012, https://otan.delegfrance.org/Le-rapport-Vedrine.

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Assuming that Washington will adopt an increasingly instrumental stance on transatlantic security cooperation, Europeans will increasingly have to think about how they can support the United States in its military endeavors rather than the other way around. It is indeed likely that Washington will not only insist on a greater return on investments in monetary terms, but also in terms of military contributions. Without the capabilities required for various types of expeditionary operations, Europeans will not be able to meet such expectations. Here again, more clarity on these expectations would be extremely helpful. Seen from that angle, investing in European strategic autonomy is an investment in the transatlantic security relationship. This is the narrative that should be strengthened—in Europe, as well as across the Atlantic. In short, what would be needed is taking the debate on European strategic autonomy to the Grand Strategy level, in order to define the European Union’s position in a multipolar world. If Washington were to play a constructive role in this debate, this would be beneficial to transatlantic security at large. In reality, the current debate on European strategic autonomy (indirectly) is a debate about the United States and its implication in European security affairs, not with the United States. The big unknown factor remains the United States’ willingness to continue its engagement in European security and if so, to what degree.

Items for Future Agendas: Beyond the Current Debate The current European debate by and large refers to the short to midterm of European defense policies. Yet, taking the idea of profound and systemic evolutions in transatlantic relations seriously, a number of even more fundamental issues arise. Notably, with respect to effective deterrence and territorial defense in Europe, there are at least two more—difficult and controversial—key questions pertaining to the long-term. First, if the US nuclear umbrella were to be lifted over Europe, should it be replaced by something else? And if so, what? With France and the United Kingdom, Europe today counts two nuclear powers, of which France will remain a member of the European Union. Paris’s announced initiative intended to “give more substance” to article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty may—in the very long-term—include a nuclear dimension. Whether there is an appetite for French nuclear protection in the rest of Europe still

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remains to be seen. Another completely hypothetical (and at this point highly unlikely) option could consist of an EU nuclear deterrent.29 Secondly, what is the right institutional setting for European defense cooperation aimed at deterrence and collective territorial defense should NATO be in decline? If it is the European Union, how can and should the Union’s CSDP be developed? As of today, CSDP is not about defending the EU’s territory. Yet, one may argue that the EU’s CSDP was created in another time, and also for another time. The functional distinction between the EU/CSDP and NATO already begins to be blurred, if only marginally so. A number of recent EU undertakings indeed do have an (indirect) Article 5-dimension to them: most notably so the PESCO project on military mobility, or—beyond CSDP properly speaking—undertakings such as Rail Baltica.30 A more holistic approach to European security is the path to follow. These debates have not even really started, yet they are the ones Europeans ought to prepare for. This also means developing mid- to long-term visions at national levels, which are so far lacking in the vast majority of capitals. Yet again, more clarity from Washington would be utterly helpful. The task of developing long-term visions comes in addition to doing the homework in national defense policies. Many European countries struggle to be up to the task in terms of capabilities and investments in defense. Regardless of whether one believes NATO’s 2-percent-objective to be a valid indicator or not, it is clear that a number of European countries face severe military shortfalls. This is notably the case in Germany, where the parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces’ reports reaches that same conclusion year after year.31 The debate on European 29 For a discussion of Europe’s nuclear options, see Bruno Tertrais, “The European Dimension of Nuclear Deterrence: French and British Policies and Future Scenarios,” FIIA Working Paper 106, November 2018, https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/ 2018/11/wp106_tertrais_european_nuclear_deterrence.pdf. 30 The PESCO project on Military Mobility aims to simplify and standardize military transport across borders, thereby contributing to effective deterrence. Rail Baltica aims to integrate the Baltic states into the European rail network. Although not primarily a military project, better railway connections obviously have positive implications for military logistics and possibilities for troop transfers. 31 For its latest edition, see German Bundestag, „Unterrichtung durch den Wehrbeauftragten. Jahresbericht 2018 (60. Bericht)“, Drucksache 19/7200, January 29, 2019, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/072/1907200.pdf.

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defense spending and thus transatlantic burden sharing is of course not new. It was in fact a recurrent theme even before Trump, as e.g., illustrated by Secretary Gates’ farewell speech in 2011.32 In light of political developments at national levels, it remains to be seen whether the countries concerned will make moves toward higher defense spending in the years to come.

Conclusion As this chapter has argued, there is no single European answer to the evolving transatlantic relationship and (relative) US disengagement. Rather, the various European countries’ positions are clearly shaped by their respective defense priorities, based on their different threat perceptions. Absent a shared understanding of threats and priorities derived thereof, European capitals defend their national interests rather than seeking to frame a common European approach to the future of European security. In fact, they do not even share a common understanding of how the transatlantic security relationship is evolving. In finding answers to the questions raised above, one aspect would consequently be key: more clarity on the degree of further US involvement in European security affairs. The European debate, as necessary as it is, would indeed benefit from constructive American contributions clarifying Washington’s intentions. The United States should be open about them, in order to allow Europeans to tailor their reactions to actual necessities derived of (partial) US disengagement. Likewise, and perhaps even more importantly from a Washington perspective, the United States should clarify its expectations toward its European allies in an emerging multipolar world. Starting a meaningful dialog on the future of European security with the United States is consequently more than urgent and the key measure to prepare the continent for 2030 and beyond. Equally important would be political leadership within Europe itself. So

32 US Department of Defense, “Remarks by Secretary Gates at the Security and Defense Agenda, Brussels, Belgium,” June 10, 2011, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/ Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4839.

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far, however, no such leadership is in sight—not even from the traditional “engine” of European integration, i.e., France and Germany.33 The degree of US engagement in European security affairs will ultimately be decided in Washington, not in Paris, Berlin, or Warsaw. Black and white scenarios of course seem unlikely: a complete US withdrawal is apparently not on the agenda. But it seems equally unlikely that Washington will keep up the level of its European engagement for the sake of Europe when it will increasingly want to deal with other great powers. That things will change for Europeans seems unavoidable.

References Drent, Margriet, Eric Wilms, and Dick Zandee. “Making Sense of European Defense.” Clingendael Report, December 2017. https://www.clingendael. org/sites/default/files/2017-12/Making_Sense_of_European_Defence.pdf. Drent, Margriet. “European Strategic Autonomy: Going It Alone?” Clingendael Policy Brief, August 2018. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/ 2018-08/PB_European_Strategic_Autonomy.pdf. Gotkowska, Justyna. “The CSDP’s Renaissance: Challenges and Opportunities for the Eastern Flank.” OSW Commentary 243, June 28, 2017. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2017-0628/csdps-renaissance-challenges-and-opportunities-eastern-flank. Haroche, Pierre. “Supranationalism Strikes Back: A Neofunctionalist Account of the European Defence Fund.” Journal of European Public Policy, April 26, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1609570. Kunz, Barbara. “Why Franco-German Leadership on European Defense Is Not in Sight.” NUPI Policy Policy Brief 10, 2019. https://nupi.brage.unit.no/ nupi-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2599512/NUPI_Policy_Brief_10_ 2019_Kunz-2.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y. Lord, Ellen M. and Andrea L. Thompson. “Letter to High Representative Federica Mogherini.” May 1, 2019. https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/ 1073-19-5-1-02-letter-to-hrvp-moghe/6cdebd319d226b532785/ optimized/full.pdf#page=1. Mauro, Frédéric. “Strategic Autonomy Under the Spotlight: The New Holy Grail of European Defence.” GRIP Report 2018/1. https://www.grip.org/sites/ grip.org/files/RAPPORTS/2018/Rapport_2018-1_EN.pdf. 33 See Barbara Kunz, “Why Franco-German Leadership on European Defense Is Not in Sight,” NUPI Policy Policy Brief 10, 2019, https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi-xmlui/ bitstream/handle/11250/2599512/NUPI_Policy_Brief_10_2019_Kunz-2.pdf?sequence= 2&isAllowed=y.

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Schmitt, Olivier. “The Reluctant Atlanticist: France’s Security and Defence Policy in a Transatlantic Context.” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 4 (2017): 463–474. Talaga, Andrzej. “Macron’s Visions Are Suicidal for Poland.” Euractiv, October 4, 2017. https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-policy/opinion/ macrons-defence-visions-are-suicidal-for-poland/. Tertrais, Bruno. “The European Dimension of Nuclear Deterrence: French and British Policies and Future Scenarios.” FIIA Working Paper 106, November 2018. https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/ wp106_tertrais_european_nuclear_deterrence.pdf.

Polish–US Relations in the Trump Era: From Worries to Honeymoon? Amélie Zima

Introduction Poland is often labeled the most Atlanticist country in Central Europe: this Atlanticism seems to have resulted in a systematic alignment with US positions at the expense of European solidarity and an American preference for arms procurement. However, a more detailed analysis demonstrates that there was no equivalence between post-communism and Atlanticism as it was a political construction that resulted from the necessity to solve the Polish security dilemma. Though Polish Atlanticism reached a climax following NATO membership in 1999 and Polish participation in the US invasion of Iraq, several disappointments as well as the election of a pro-European liberal government led Polish political actors to adopt a more balanced approach and to promote the development of EU security and defense policies. However, following the election of the nationalist and conservative PiS (Law and Justice) government in Poland

A. Zima (B) University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, France

© The Author(s) 2020 M. Quessard et al. (eds.), Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37258-3_4

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in 20151 and of Donald Trump in the United States in 2017, the Polish agenda is again marked by a stronger Atlanticism. The PiS government has resumed a policy of arms procurement characterized by a preference for US hardware and has supported the building of a US base in Poland. However, the ideological proximities between the PiS party and President Trump do not exclude tensions, due to the evolution of the Polish domestic arena but also to Trump’s declarations about NATO’s obsolescence. Against this backdrop, Poland has adopted a new security rhetoric emphasizing the role of the EU in security matters and signed a defense cooperation agreement with the UK in December 2017. Nevertheless, the tensions surrounding Trump’s rhetoric have been eased and a defense treaty between the two States was ratified in June 2019. Drawing on a historical perspective, this chapter intends to analyze how and why Poland adopted an Atlanticist orientation. It will then focus on the shift in strategy following the participation in the war in Iraq and the subsequent disappointments which led to a rebalancing of transatlantic relations with a pro-European approach. The chapter will take into consideration the situation since the PiS and Trump took office. Through the analysis of the current US–Polish relationship, the chapter aims to provide some keys to understanding why Poland considers the United States its major ally and security guarantor.

1 Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwo´sc´ , PiS) is a national-conservative political party, which rules Poland since 2015. Following the October 2019 elections, it has 235 seats in the Sejm (lower chamber) and 48 in the Senate (in 2015, the PiS had 235 seats in the Sejm and 61 in the Senat). State Electoral Commission (PKW). “Official results of the 2019 elections,” https://wybory.gov.pl/sejmsenat2019/pl/wyniki/sejm/ pl and https://wybory.gov.pl/sejmsenat2019/pl/wyniki/senat/pl. “Official results of the 2015 elections,” https://parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl/349_Wyniki_Sejm.html and https:// parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl/351_Wyniki_Senat.html. The party was founded in 2001 by the Kaczynski ´ twins, Lech and Jarosław, as a Christian democratic party. In 2005, it won the parliamentary election while Lech Kaczynski ´ won the presidency (he died in the Smolensk plane crash in 2010). Law and Justice formed coalition with far-right League of the Polish Families (LPR) and populist Selfdefense of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona). Jarosław Kaczynski ´ served as Prime Minister, before calling elections in 2007 because of the collapse of the coalition. The party came in second to liberal Civic Platform (PO) and sat in the opposition until 2015, when it has won the parliamentary and presidential elections. The party platform is dominated by a social conservative agenda, values the influence of Catholicism in public square and favors economic interventionism. The party is mildly Euroskeptic, shares similar political tactics with Hungary’s Fidesz but with anti-Russian stances. The PiS MEPs sit in the European Conservatives and Reformists group in the European Parliament.

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Post-1989: From Political Construction to Radical Atlanticism Poland’s Atlanticist orientation resulted from the agenda designed by Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Foreign Affairs Minister from 1989 to 1993. The Minister’s aim was to overcome the dilemma of the encirclement between the German and Russian neighbors, which twice caused the ruin of Poland. It was thus necessary to transform the geographical position of Poland from a disadvantage into an asset by becoming a regional hub. Therefore, the experience of the past strongly influenced the construction of Polish foreign policy. To achieve this goal, Minister Skubiszewski implemented a policy of so-called “small steps.” The idea was to dissolve the Warsaw Pact and to obtain German recognition of the Oder-Neisse line to then engage in a Euro-Atlantic integration policy and to recast regional cooperation. This period was characterized by the development of Polish Atlanticism; meanwhile, Washington put pressure on Bonn to accelerate the negotiations on the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. The Polish government became aware that the United States remained a major player on the European scene and that its presence could contribute to solving the Polish security dilemma. However, Poland was more cautious in its foreign policy than other Central Eastern European countries at the beginning of the nineties. NATO membership was put on the agenda of the Polish government later than in Hungary or Czechoslovakia—as mentioned in the documents of the Ministries in Spring 1992, under the Olszewski government and the formal application was submitted in October 1992 by the subsequent government led by Hanna Suchocka.2 The reason for this belated submission was mainly due to the later withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. While Soviet troops’ withdrawal was completed in June 1991 in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Poland had to wait until October 1992 for the bulk of the troops to be removed and September 1993 for the few ones that stayed in Poland to supervise the repatriation of Soviet troops from Germany.3 2 Interview with Jerzy Kozminski, Polish ambassador to the United States (1994–1998), January 2012, Warsaw. 3 On this period, see Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski, The New Atlanticist: Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy Priorities (Londres: Chatham House, 2007); Andrzej Krzeczunowicz, Krok po kroku Polska Droga do NATO (Krakow: Znak, 1999); Roman

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In addition to joining a community of democratic and liberal values, NATO was considered a means to keep American troops in Europe and maintain stability on the continent.4 It was all the more important as the beginning of the nineties was characterized by tensions and uncertainties due to the emergence of new States and the reshaping of alliances (the dissolution of the USSR, wars in the former Yugoslavia, and the partition of Czechoslovakia).5 Hence it was necessary to assert and prove that the United States and the European States shared the same values and should maintain and strengthen their alliance. The US presence was also considered as a way to prevent every possible weakness from the Western European countries. Indeed, European passivity in September 1939, when the Nazis invaded Poland, which launched World War II and was followed by the Soviet invasion, was ill perceived by some Polish political leaders; they feared that this stance would reappear if tensions were to rise between Russia and Central Europe.6 Finally, during this period, Polish political actors did not consider that other security options such as the European Union (EU)7 and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)8 or regional

Ku´zniar, Poland’s Foreign Policy After 1989 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2009); and Amélie Zima, “La construction politique de l’atlantisme en Europe centrale,” Études internationales 49, no. 2 (Spring 2018): 391–418. 4 Interview with Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Polish Defense minister (1990–1993 and 1997– 2000), November 2011, Warsaw. 5 “Polska a bezpieczenstwo ´ europejskie,” speech of Polish Foreign Affairs Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, North Atlantic Assembly, November 1990, London, in Janusz Stefanowicz, Polska-NATO, wybór dokumentów, 1990–1997 (Warsaw: ISP-PAN, 1997). 6 Interview with Andrzej Olechowski, Polish Foreign Affairs Minister (1993–1995), October 2011, Warsaw. 7 The European Union has been established by the Maastricht treaty that came in force

in 1993. It is the polling of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, established by the 1951 treaty of Paris), the European Economic Community (EEC, established by the 1957 Rome Treaty), and Euratom (European Atomic Energy Community created in 1957). From six members, the EU has grown to 28 members and its current legal basis is the Treaty of Lisbon that came in force in 2009. Its main institutions are the Commission, the European Parliament, the Central European Bank, and the European Court of Justice. 8 The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is a securityoriented intergovernmental organization. Its mandate includes issues such as crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation, arms control, promotion of human rights, freedom of the press, and fair elections. Its 57 members are European, Central Asian, and North

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groups could be alternatives to NATO. The ECC/EU did not have hard security capacities and its role during the wars in the former Yugoslavia illustrated that it was unable or unwilling to act as a security provider. The same applied to the CSCE. Moreover, this solution would have meant that the Russians would manage, hand in hand with the Americans, the security of Central Europe.9 After joining NATO, Poland pursued an Atlanticist and pro-US foreign and defense policy. In 2002, rejecting the French and Swedish bids, the SLD social democratic government bought F16 fighter jets manufactured by Lockheed Martin. This Atlanticist stance reached its climax with the signing of a letter, alongside seven other European countries, pledging for a united front with the United States vis-à-vis Iraq.10 Poland was also among the signatories that actively participated in the invasion. After the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein, Poland assumed command in the area of Babylon—involving 15 countries and 9200 soldiers in total, including a Polish contingent of 2300 soldiers. The government’s pro-US slant was not exactly reflected among the Polish population, however. Public opinion polls showed that 55% of the Polish population was uncertain about the US role in the international arena and that only 20% thought that this role was positive. Moreover, 58% of respondents considered that the United States participated in the spread of insecurity and conflict.11 Besides, more than two-thirds of those interviewed opposed the presence of Polish troops in Iraq.12 Finally, this Atlanticist stance did not lead Poland to neglect its own capacities. In fact, the modernization of the armed forces has been a American States. It has its roots in the 1975 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) held in Helsinki, Finland, which was an East–West forum during the Cold War. The fall of the USSR brought about changes in CSCE that eventually has become the OSCE in 1994. 9 Amélie Zima, D’ennemi à allié. L’adhésion de la Hongrie, de la Pologne et de la République tchèque à l’OTAN (1989–1999) (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2019), 73–91. 10 The eight countries were the following: Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Spain. 11 CBOS, “Polacy o roli Stanów Zjednoczonych w s´wiecie,” November 2004, https:// www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2004/K_178_04.PDF. 12 CBOS monthly opinion pools made between January and December 2004 showed that the Polish opposition to the sending of Polish soldiers in Iraq was between 60 et 74%. See CBOS, “Stosunek do obecno´sci polskich zołnierzy ˙ w Iraku,” December 2004, https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2004/K_194_04.PDF.

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national priority whatever the government, which reflects Poland’s will to have a voice in international organizations such as NATO and the EU thanks to its military strength.13 Besides, Polish politicians have conceptualized burden sharing between the Alliance and the EU14 : NATO stands for its hard-security capabilities while the EU, of which the Poles are still very supportive, guarantees the other aspects of security such as economic and energy security.15 Next is regional political–military cooperation and finally international agreements.

Polish Disillusion: Shifting Toward the European Union After the War in Iraq The war in Iraq marked the pinnacle of Polish Atlanticism, it was then followed by a shift in foreign and security policy. Indeed, the support for US actions did not bring the expected dividends. Polish companies obtained few contracts in the reconstruction of Iraq, and Washington refused to lift the visa requirement for Polish citizens. Furthermore, the “Reset” policy, launched in 2009 by the Obama administration, which aimed to improve US–Russia relations, as well as the US disengagement from Europe in favor of the Pacific, led to a downgrading of the importance of Central Europe on the American agenda. These disappointments, which coincided with the election of the pro-European liberal Civic Platform (PO) government in 2007, led to the adoption of a new foreign and defense policy orientation.16

13 The PO liberal government (2007–2015) initiated a modernization plan of 91 billion zloty (approximatively 23 billion US dollars) for 2014–2022. The PiS government has found this plan unrealistic and forecasted it downwards: 72 billion zloty (18 billion US dollars) for 2017–2022. 14 Interview with Jerzy Maria Nowak, Polish representative at OSCE, at the International Atomic Agency and at the European representation at the UN (1991–1997), general director for security policy at the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, member of the team in charge of the negotiations with NATO, December 2011, Warsaw. 15 Since EU adhesion in 2004, the Polish support has always been massive: around 70% in the 2000s and above 80% since 2014. See CBOS, “Jakiej Unii chc˛a Polacy?” April 2017, https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2017/K_050_17.PDF. 16 Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) is a liberal-conservative political party. The party was formed in 2001. In the 2001 general election, PO emerged as the largest opposition party, behind the ruling centre-left Democratic Left Alliance (SLD).

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The PO backed a rebalancing of the transatlantic relationship through the development of the EU’s defense policy (the Common Security and Defense Policy, CSDP). This was based on the idea that a stronger EU defense contribution was essential for balanced transatlantic relations. During the Polish EU presidency in 2011, the reinforcement of the CSDP was one of the main priorities on the agenda. Furthermore, this goal would have reinforced the Polish position within the EU by playing one of the cards that was available for the country as a regional military power. Nevertheless, this commitment did not result in effective achievements17 and led the Polish government to adopt a new stance, which consisted in reinforcing cooperation with willing states as provided by the treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU, known as the Lisbon Treaty). The distance between the two States during that period could be symbolized by comments from Foreign Affairs Minister Sikorski that were leaked in Wprost magazine. Sikorski told former Finance Minister Jacek Rostowski that: “You know that the Polish-US alliance isn’t worth anything… It is downright harmful, because it creates a false sense of security … Complete bullshit. We’ll get in conflict with the Germans, Russians and we’ll think that everything is super, because we gave the Americans a blow job. Losers. Complete losers.” Sikorski described the Polish attitude toward

PO remained the second-largest party at the 2005 general election behind the nationalconservative party PiS. After the collapse of the coalition led by PiS in 2007, Civic Platform won the general election and formed a government with the agrarian Polish People’s party (PSL). Following the Smolensk plane crash, Bronislaw Komorowski became the first President from PO in the 2010 presidential election. Tusk was then reelected as Prime Minister in the 2011 general election but stepped down in 2014 to assume the post of President of the European Council. Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz led the party in the 2015 general election but PO was defeated by the PiS party and President Komorowski failed in running for reelection. Since 2015, PO is the second-largest party in Poland. Following the October 2019 elections, it has 134 seats in the Sejm (lower chamber) and 43 in the Senate (in 2015, the PO had 138 seats in the Sejm and 34 in the Senat). State Electoral Commission (PKW). “Official results of the 2019 elections,” https://wybory.gov.pl/sejmsenat2019/pl/wyniki/sejm/ pl and https://wybory.gov.pl/sejmsenat2019/pl/wyniki/senat/pl. “Official results of the 2015 elections,” https://parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl/349_Wyniki_Sejm.html and https:// parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl/351_Wyniki_Senat.html. Since its creation, the party has shown stronger electoral performances in Warsaw and all the biggest Polish cities as well as in the west and the north of Poland. 17 One of the key opponents to the consolidation of CSDP during the Polish presidency was the UK.

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the United States using the word “murzynsko´ ´ sc´ ,” which can be translated as negritude and a willingness to be exploited.18 This mistrust and the pro-European orientation of the PO came up against the backdrop of the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the outbreak of war in Ukraine’s Donbass, however, leading to renewed focus on NATO as the only organization able to help Poland ensure its territorial defense. As early as 2014, PO Defense Minister Tomasz Siemoniak asked for the reinforcement of the Eastern flank and for NATO forces to be stationed permanently in Poland. In the meantime, a NATO Center of Excellence dedicated to counterintelligence (NATO CI COE) opened in Krakow in 2015.19 Such developments did not imply a complete disengagement from the EU, however, but rather a continuation of the burden-sharing stance. That is why then Polish PO Prime Minister Donald Tusk asked for the creation of a common EU energy policy. For indeed, energy supplies can be used as a political tool by Russia, given its quasi-monopolistic position.

PiS and Trump: From Tensions to Security Deals In 2015, the PiS party won the presidential and legislative elections. During the first months of its term, there was no drastic shift from the precedent strategy, as the PiS government also advocated for the reinforcement of NATO’s Eastern flank. At the Warsaw summit in July 2016, the strengthening of the Eastern flank was decided by NATO members. Troops from several member states were deployed on a rotating basis to demonstrate Atlantic solidarity with the Eastern flank’s NATO members. Nevertheless, during the same summit, tensions arose between the PiS government and the Obama administration regarding the deterioration of the rule of law in Poland, especially where attacks on the independence of the judiciary were concerned. In his speech at the summit, President Obama made several references to the political situation in Poland and voiced his concerns:

18 “Rozmowa Sikorski-Rostowski. ‘Mozna ˙ za*´c PiS komisj˛a specjaln˛a ws Macierewicza’,” Wprost, June 22, 2014, https://www.wprost.pl/453226/rozmowa-sikorski-rostowskimozna-zac-pis-komisja-specjalna-ws-macierewicza.html. 19 NATO, “NATO Welcomes Its 24th Centre of Excellence,” September 30, 2015, https://www.act.nato.int/nato-welcomes-its-24th-centre-of-excellence.

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Indeed, after the Cold War, the rebirth of Polish democracy was an inspiration to people across Europe and around the world, including in America. Because Poland’s progress shows that democracy and pluralism are not unique to any one of our cultures or countries – they are describing universal values. And a central tenet of American foreign policy is that we speak up for these values around the world, even with our closest allies. And it’s in that spirit that I expressed to President Duda our concerns over certain actions and the impasse around the Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal. I insisted that we are very respectful of Poland’s sovereignty, and I recognize that Parliament is working on legislation to take some important steps, but more work needs to be done. And as your friend and ally, we’ve urged all parties to work together to sustain Poland’s democratic institutions. That’s what make us democracies – not just by the words written in constitutions, or in the fact that we vote in elections – but the institutions we depend upon every day, such as rule of law, independent judiciaries, and a free press. (…) These are values that are at the heart of our alliance, which was founded, in the words of the North Atlantic Treaty, “on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.”20

These tensions with the Obama administration did not mean that PiS warmly welcomed the choice of Donald Trump as the Republican candidate and his subsequent electoral victory. This could seem paradoxical as both PiS and the new president somehow share a similar ideological outlook. They are against the traditional elite (although most of the PiS members have had a long political career), they value patriotic and conservative values, they make a distinction between “good” and “bad” citizens and oppose immigration. However, the PiS party has a different economic and social program based on state interventionism and social assistance. In fact, during the US electoral campaign, the PiS government had some concerns regarding the US commitment in Europe. Those concerns were mainly raised by Trump’s declarations on NATO’s obsolescence, on burden sharing, as most of the European Allies do not spend 2% of their GDP on defense, and on countries that he considered undefendable such as the Baltic States. At the NATO Warsaw summit, Polish President Andrzej Duda pleaded for the creation of a European army to compensate for the reduction of European forces due to Brexit and to make up

20 The White House, “Remarks by President Obama and President Duda of Poland After Bilateral Meeting,” July 8, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2016/07/08/remarks-president-obama-and-president-duda-poland-after-bilateral.

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for any American failure to stand for Europe’s defense. This statement reflects a paradigmatic change. In the 1990s, it was the American presence in Europe that compensated for any European weakness. In a November 2016 interview, PiS Foreign Affairs Minister, Witold Waszczykowski, reminded that “Trump as a candidate questioned large US spending on NATO” and expressed the hope that “the future US president will pursue America’s security interests that are convergent with those of NATO and Poland” but also that special services and advisors will “show him how the competition in the world looks like” and that it will “correct this rhetoric and return to pursuing American interests.”21 Alongside his declarations on NATO, Donald Trump’s willingness to get along with Vladimir Putin led some Polish politicians, including former PO Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, to fear a “Yalta 2.0.”22 Soon after the election, those remarks were downplayed by US Defense and State Secretaries. By the end of the campaign, Trump had already provided some reassurance to Poland, saying in a meeting to the Polonia, the Polish diaspora in the United States, that Poland was one of the closest allies of the United States and that it could always count on US support as it is one of the few NATO countries to spend 2% of its GDP on defense. Significantly, the Polish president, in his letter of congratulations to Trump, mentioned the US commitment made at the NATO summit in Warsaw to participate in the strengthening of the Eastern flank.23 Following the elections, tensions on strategic and security issues lessened. The pro-EU declarations of President Duda have not been followed up with action. Poland agreed to join the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and welcomed the creation by the European Commission of the European Defense Fund, but

21 Witold Waszczykowski, “W Rosji otwieraj˛a si˛e szampany? Szef MSZ: przestrzegałbym władców Kremla,” Interview by Bogdan Rymanowski, TVN24, November 9, 2016, https://www.tvn24.pl/wybory-w-usa-witold-waszczykowski-o-konsekwencjach-dlapolski,690507,s.html. 22 Radoslaw Sikorski, “NATO przejrzało na oczy,” Interview by J˛edrzej Bielecki, Rzeczpospolita, July 7, 2016, https://archiwum.rp.pl/artykul/1313362-NATO-przejrzalo-naoczy.html. 23 Andrzej Duda, ‘President Duda’s Letter to His Excellency Donald Trump’, November 9, 2016, Official Website of the Polish Presidency, President.PL, November 9, 2016, https://www.president.pl/en/news/art,293,president-dudas-letter-to-hisexcellency-donald-trump.html.

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it reduced its participation within Eurocorps.24 While Poland would have become a framework nation, it remains an associated nation. According to the official explanation, this decision is due to the fact that Poland would not have the means to fulfill the obligations related to the status of framework nation because of the strengthening of NATO’s Eastern flank. Moreover, the Polish arms procurement policy has largely favored US manufacturers. For example, Defense Minister Antoni Macierewicz,25 in office from 2015 to 2018, canceled the purchase of French Caracale helicopters that had been negotiated by the former PO government. He argued that the offsets were insufficient and instead opted for Black Hawks produced by Lockheed-Martin. His successor, Mariusz Błaszczak, has followed this trend by declaring Poland would buy Patriot systems and HIMAR light multiple rocket launchers. A deal is also being negotiated regarding the purchase of F35 fighter jets. But that has been criticized by the opposition, namely former BBN26 director, General Koziej, former PO Defense Minister Bogdan Klich and former chief of staff Mirosław 27 Indeed, F35 fighter jets are not fully operational yet and Róza ˙ nski. ´

24 PESCO highlighted a tension within the PiS government. Defense Minister

Macierewicz, in function from 2015 to 2017 and one of the strongest proponents of the US orientation, did not want to ratify it contrary to Prime minister Morawiecki. 25 Antoni Macierewicz’s activities and networks have been investigated by Tomasz

Piatek, a journalist for the liberal daily Gazeta Wyborcza. See Thomasz Piatek, Macierewicz i jego tajemnice (Warsaw: Arbitror, 2017). It shows, among other things, the troubled ties of the former Minister with a former US senator who became a lobbyist for LockheedMartin and with individuals linked to the mafias and Russian military intelligence services. It earned its author the 2017 award from Reporters Without Borders. 26 The BBN is the National Security Office. 27 Justyna Ko´c, “Gen. Mirosław Róza ˙ nski: ´ W miar˛e jedzenia apetyt maleje,” Wiadomo.co,

June 15, 2019, https://wiadomo.co/gen-miroslaw-rozanski-w-miare-jedzenia-apetytmaleje/. General Mirosław Róza ˙ nski, ´ commander-in-chief of the armed forces (DG RSZ), is one of the 40 generals who had resigned since PiS won the elections. The reasons for these resignations, which have been accompanied by numerous dismissals, can be explained by the disagreement with the political line adopted by the PiS concerning the modernization of the armed forces and the creation of the Territorial Guard. This poses a problem of oversight and weakening of the armed forces as those officers had been trained in the academies of NATO countries, had a knowledge on the functioning of NATO and field-experience, mainly in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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even Pentagon experts have raised concerns about their readiness. Therefore, a more efficient and cost-effective solution would have been to purchase F-16s as the Polish army already had the training and the educational framework, and the know-how and logistical capacities to maintain the jets, eliminating its dependence on a third state and contributing to the maintenance of a local defense industry. Moreover, no statement was made regarding the offsets, which is all the more paradoxical since the PiS government had previously canceled the purchase of Airbus Caracale helicopters on the pretext of insufficient offsets. On the American side, symbolic gestures have been made to demonstrate US involvement in Poland’s security. President Trump came to Warsaw in July 2017 to take part in the second Three Seas Initiative summit and made a public speech in a special location, the 1944 Uprising memorial. The administration shares Polish concerns regarding the building of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline by Russian firm Gazprom. To ensure Central European and most notably Polish energy security, the Trump administration supports the construction of the Baltic Pipe and contracts have already been signed between Polish and American firms for LNG delivery (liquified natural gas) thanks to the construction of an LNG terminal in ´ the Polish port of Swinouj´ scie. Likewise, there is the pledge to build a US base by 2020 in Redzikowo (next to Gdansk) ´ as part of the antimissile shield. Finally, the Trump administration has lifted the visa requirement for Polish citizens in October 2019. This issue was one of the main bones of contention between the two countries as the visa obligation created complications since there are approximatively 10 million Polish Americans and numerous links between the Polish diaspora and Poland. In view of the electoral importance of the Polish American, every single US government had pledged to lift the requirement that discriminates Poles, who are not treated on the same legal standing as the majority of EU citizens. This decision, which was a 2016 electoral promise of Donald Trump and the top-priority of US ambassador to Poland Georgette Mosbacher when she has taken office in 2018, is presented by the US administration as a “remarkable accomplishment” and a proof of the strength of the bilateral relationship.28 28 The White House, “Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding the Nomination of Poland for Entry into the Visa Waiver Program,” last modified October 4, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-presssecretary-regarding-nomination-poland-entry-visa-waiver-program/.

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However, the Trump administration has declined the Polish demand to build a permanent American base in Poland, the so-called Fort Trump as President Duda already named it.29 The reasons for this negative epilogue are fourfold. First there were dissensions within the Polish government: President Duda offered the US 2 billion dollars to build the base, but Prime Minister Morawiecki was only willing to disburse 2 billion zloty (approximatively 511 million US dollars).30 Secondly, this US decision was in line with the strategic path already undertaken by the Obama administration, rebalancing to Asia mainly because of the rising importance of China as a strategic power and the context of a commercial war between the two States. Thirdly, the Pentagon opposed the project as it could fray relations with other European allies but also with Russia. Finally, the Pentagon has reassessed its priorities: funding should no longer be dedicated to building new bases but rather to cybersecurity and to modernizing the military.31 In the meantime, a joint declaration on defense cooperation was signed in June 2019. The main points of that agreement are: (1) to increase the

In 2017, the European Parliament asked the European Commission to restore visa obligations for US citizens as Washington refuses to grant access to the territory to nationals of five European countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Poland, and Romania). 29 The proposal of President Duda to name the compound “Trump” was criticized

by the political opposition. Barbara Zdrojewska, a PO senator, said on Twitter: “President Duda decided to take advantage of Trump’s vanity and came out with this Fort Trump. Had he done it in a private conversation, jokingly, it would have been a crafty move, but blurting it out during a news conference in front of half of the world was pathetic. He humiliated himself, us and Trump,” Barbara Zdrojewska (@BZdrojewska), September 18, 2018, https://twitter.com/BZdrojewska/status/1042154794830454786. Tomasz Siemoniak, former PO Defense Minister, also criticizes this proposition: “What an embarrassment in front of the entire world! Even leaders of banana republics had more respect for themselves and their countries than President Duda does,” Tomasz Siemoniak (@TomaszSiemoniak), September 18, 2018, https://twitter.com/TomaszSiemoniak/ status/1042151789179674624. Our translation for both tweets. 30 “Prezydent Duda w USA marzy o ‘Fort Trump’,” Gazeta Wyborcza, September 18, 2018, http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,23938280,prezydent-duda-w-usa-marzy-o-fordtrump.html?disableRedirects=true. 31 “Fort Trump odjezd ˙ za. ˙ Amerykanie nie zbuduj˛a stałej bazy w Polsce,” Gazeta Wyborcza, March 14, 2019, http://wyborcza.pl/7,75399,24546215,fort-trump-odjezdzaamerykanie-nie-zbuduja-stalej-bazy-w-polsce.html.

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current US military presence in Poland by about 1000 additional soldiers and to focus on providing additional defense and deterrence capabilities in Poland32 ; (2) to establish an Advanced US Division Headquarters in Poland (probably in Poznan); ´ (3) a joint Training Center (CSB) in Drawsko Pomorskie; (4) a US Air Force MQ-9 aircraft squadron for reconnaissance operations in Poland; (5) infrastructure for a brigade combat group, an air combat brigade, and a logistics support brigade; and (6) cooperation and joint training of special forces.33 This commitment is part of the European Defense Initiative, a program enacted by President Obama in 2014 after the annexation of Crimea by Russia as a key security guarantee from the United States to Europe. This program consists of training, multinational military exercises, and development of military capabilities. Despite President Trump’s declaration, the budget for this program is steadily increasing. Furthermore, this treaty is in line with President Trump’s remarks on burden sharing among NATO members. He has said that the additional troops would probably be redeployed from Germany, leaving the overall number in Europe the same. The US Department of Defense has not confirmed that redeployment, however, it demonstrates once again the tensions between President Trump and Chancellor Merkel over defense spending and the will of the US President to favor allies, like Poland, that appropriate 2% of their GDP to defense and are willing to fund the presence of US troops.34 The new US–Polish treaty was welcomed by NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, as showing the “strong commitment of the US to European security and the strength of the transatlantic bond.” However, for the former BBN director General Koziej, this treaty is not a big shift, as it is part of an evolutionary process that has been underway for five years,

32 There are already 4500 US soldiers in Poland in the framework of NATO EFP

(nonpermanent presence). 33 Juliusz Sabak, “Deklaracja Duda-Trump. Kluczowe wnioski,” Defence 24, June 13, 2019, https://www.defence24.pl/deklaracja-duda-trump-kluczowe-wnioski-analiza. 34 Paweł Wronski, ´ “Trump: b˛edzie 2 tys. wi˛ecej zołnierzy ˙ USA w Polsce,” Gazeta Wyborcza, June 12, 2019, http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24893819,trump-bedzie-2-tyswiecej-zolnierzy-usa-w-polsce.html.

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since the NATO Newport summit in 2014 that paved the way for the deployment of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP).35

A Rapprochement Darkened by Tensions Over Domestic Issues? The new US–Polish security agreement has generated many critics, while some bones of contention remain in the bilateral relationship. Indeed, some of the PiS government’s decisions have generated friction with Washington.36 The Polish government has imposed a policy that aims to give it a firm grip on the media. Through resignations and dismissals of numerous journalists, the PiS has taken control of the national public television broadcaster as well as the Audiovisual Council (KRRiT) and wants to subordinate private media. The main target of the PiS party is a private TV channel, TVN24, because of its live broadcast of parliamentary debates which show that the Speaker of the Diet (the lower house of Poland’s parliament) and the PiS MPs do not respect legislative procedures. The TVN24 channel was fined 1.5 million złoty (around 345,000 US dollars), but this penalty was eventually canceled by the KRRiT. The EU and the US State Department have protested, all the more so that TVN24 is being partly financed by American funding. However, this fine was not encouraged by Jarosław Kaczynski, ´ the leader of PiS party and Prime Minister Morawiecki, who considered it was a bad signal to send to foreign investors. After an appeal by the Polish ombudsman and before Mr. Morawiecki’s first visit to the European Parliament in Brussels, the fine was annulled. Thus, attacks on foreign-funded media remain difficult because of political and diplomatic ties. Furthermore, the political uses of history made by the PiS government have led to tensions with Washington. The most significant example is the IPN law (Institute of National Remembrance) which imposes penalties of up to three years imprisonment in case “of attribution to the Polish nation or state, despite facts, crimes against humanity,” including the 35 Justyna Ko´c, “Gen. Stanisław Koziej o spotkaniu Duda-Trump: Nic wielkiego si˛e nie dzieje,” Wiadomo.co, June 12, 2019, https://wiadomo.co/gen-stanislaw-koziej-ospotkaniu-duda-trump-nic-wielkiego-sie-nie-dzieje/. 36 On Polish domestic situation, see Georges Mink, “L’Europe centrale à l’épreuve de l’autoritarisme,” Politique étrangère (Summer 2016): 89–101; Maciej Gdula, Nowy Autorytaryzm (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, 2018).

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Holocaust.37 This law is not only intended to counter the false expression of “Polish death camps,” in reference to those built in Poland by Nazi Germany—which has been denounced by all Polish governments and diaspora organizations—, but to exonerate the Poles of any participation in crimes against humanity. The Israeli authorities have interpreted this law as a Holocaust denial and the US State Department has indicated that it will have a negative impact on Poland’s strategic interests and on its relationship with the United States, including the freezing of contacts with high-level diplomats and high-ranking members of the administration. The American Jewish Committee also condemned it: We are friends of Poland. We will never forget that it was the first target of Nazi forces. Its resistance in WWII was powerful, as was its contribution to Allied victory. But crimes by Poles against Jews occurred, as elsewhere. No Polish law should seek to ban such discussion.38

The promulgation of this law illustrates the lack of geopolitical vision of PiS leader Jarosław Kaczynski, ´ who had not foreseen the negative impact it could have at the international level. To ease tensions, a Polish delegation went to Israel and President Duda, who participated in the March of Living with the Israeli President, sent the law for review to the Constitutional Court. A second step took place in June 2018, when Parliament amended the law by removing the element of a criminal conviction. This change, which was made in one day in violation of parliamentary rules, took place the same day as a press conference by Prime Minister Morawiecki and his Israeli counterpart Netanyahu on the subject of the new Israeli–Polish relations. Following this change, contacts resumed at the highest level. President Duda met with his US counterpart in September 2018 and June 2019 in Washington. Still, tensions may arise on the question of Polish Jews between the two countries, especially regarding the spoliation and restitution of Jewish properties, as the US law 447 JUST: 37 IPN laws of January 26 and June 27, 2018. See Institut Pamieci Narodowej. Ustawa, O IPN, https://ipn.gov.pl/pl/o-ipn/ustawa/24216,Ustawa.html. On IPN creation and functioning, see Georges Mink, “Is There a New Institutional Response to the Crimes of Communism? National Memory Agencies in Post-Communist Countries: The Polish Case (1998–2014), with References to East Germany,” Nationalities Papers 45, no. 6 (2017): 1013–1027. 38 AJC (@AJCGlobal), January 27, 2018, https://twitter.com/ajcglobal/status/ 957319879421460480.

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“Justice for Uncompensated Survivors Today” obliges the State Department to report to Congress the measures taken by European countries for the restitution of the property of Holocaust victims and their compensation.39 However, this law raises issues, as a compensation law had already been cosigned in 1960 with the United States and the evaluation of the prejudice and the question of property are of extreme legal complexity. Furthermore, for the PiS government, it would also mean that Poland would be considered as co-responsible for the Holocaust, which is unacceptable for the Poles, all the more so that Germany has never compensated Poland for the losses suffered during WWII.40

Conclusion: A Multilateral Rhetoric but a US Commitment? After a strong Atlanticist orientation that resulted from a will to overcome the Polish security dilemma in the early nineties, Poland’s security policy has become increasingly multifaceted. On the one hand, Polish governments have supported initiatives aimed at developing the CSDP during the Polish EU presidency in 2011 but also since the electoral victories of the PiS party in 2015. PESCO has been ratified and a pro-EU bent was displayed during a high-level summit “Together for Europe,” organized in Warsaw in May 2019 to commemorate the 15th anniversary of the accession of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to the EU. In the Warsaw Declaration adopted at this summit, the leaders of CEE countries stated that: “The European Union has become what it is now: the most developed area of 39 US Congress, Senate. Justice for Uncompensated Survivors Today (JUST), Act of 2017, S.447, 115th Cong., 1st sess., introduced in Senate February 2, 2017, https:// www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/447. 40 Jewish property was confiscated by the Nazi Germans, then taken over by the Communist State and by Poles, who often came from territories taken over by the USSR and acquired property rights through a long and uninterrupted occupation. Synagogues have been returned to Jewish communities. But private property can only be claimed by their owners or their heirs. Such goods may have been occupied, sold, and resold legally. Thus, land may still be claimed by heirs of former owners, but postwar buildings belong to other owners.

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economic integration, freedom, security and justice; and a space in which all values are shared and where common goals are pursued.”41 In the security area: Europe must improve its defense capabilities and deepen cooperation in the field of security within the EU in cooperation with partners such as NATO. EU-NATO cooperation should be further developed and strengthened, on the basis of mutual consolidation, without prejudice to the specificity of the security and defense policies of any of the Member States, in the spirit of values and transparency and with full respect for the principles of inclusiveness, reciprocity and decision-making autonomy of both organizations.42

These stances also demonstrate the evolution of security issues and the adoption of a broader conception of the notion, since the EU is considered the appropriate organization to tackle issues of migration and climate change. On the other hand, the Polish government has sought new strategic partners. A defense cooperation agreement with the United Kingdom was ratified in December 2017. This DCA is the second the UK has ratified, following the Lancaster House treaty with France.43 The goal of the DCA for Britain is to recreate a network of allies but also to deter Russia as both Poland and the UK consider it one of the main security threats.44 The areas of cooperation are mainly joint exercises, cybersecurity, and the development of capacities. Indeed, according to British officials, the UK is more willing than the United States to sell weapons and to transfer technology.45 Since the beginning of 2019, there have been talks between 41 “Deklaracja warszawska dotycz˛aca ponownego zjednoczenia Europy,” June 1, 2019, https://www.premier.gov.pl/files/files/deklaracja_warszawska_dotyczaca_ponownego_ zjednoczenia_europy_-_nasza_unia_nasza_przyszlosc.pdf. 42 Ibid. 43 According to a British official based in Poland, there is a long way to go for the British–Polish DCA to have the same dimension as Lancaster House, interview made in February 2019. 44 See HM Government, “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom,” 2015, https:// assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/555607/2015_Strategic_Defence_and_Security_Review.pdf; Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, “Koncepcja Obronna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej,” May 2017, https://www. gov.pl/attachment/78e14510-253a-4b48-bc31-fd11db898ab7. 45 Interview with a British official based in Poland, February 2019, Warsaw.

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the British and Polish governments on CAMM and CAMM-ER missiles, which are medium-range anti-aircraft and anti-missile missile and are considered to be among the best in this category in NATO countries.46 However, this opportunity to diversify its suppliers is dampened by the current pro-US trend on arms procurement.47 Despite the numerous tensions that have arisen between the two States, Warsaw has yet again adopted a strong and blatant US orientation in security policy. In this context, the pro-EU stances and the diversification of security partners still have to be followed by concrete action so as not to be mere rhetoric. Acknowledgement The author would like to thank Dr. Marek Madej (University of Warsaw) for his comments and suggestions on an earlier version of the text. This chapter is mainly based on fieldworks made in Warsaw and on semistructured interviews with key diplomatic actors.

References Gdula, Maciej. Nowy Autorytaryzm. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, 2018. Krzeczunowicz, Andrzej. Krok po kroku Polska Droga do NATO. Krakow: Znak, 1999. Ku´zniar, Roman. Poland’s Foreign Policy After 1989. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2009. Longhurst, Kerry, and Marcin Zaborowski. The New Atlanticist: Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy Priorities. London: Chatham House, 2007. Mink, Georges. “L’Europe centrale à l’épreuve de l’autoritarisme.” Politique étrangère 2 (Summer 2016): 89–101. Stefanowicz, Janusz. Polska-NATO, wybór dokumentów, 1990–1997. Warsaw: ISPPAN, 1997. Zima, Amélie, “La construction politique de l’atlantisme en Europe centrale.” Études internationales 49, no. 2 (Spring 2018): 391–418. Zima, Amélie. D’ennemi à allié. L’adhésion de la Hongrie, de la Pologne et de la République tchèque à l’OTAN (1989–1999). Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2019.

46 Zbigniew Lentowicz, “Brytysjkie rakiety przeciwlotnicze kusz˛a Warszaw˛e,” Rzcezpospolita, January 23, 2019, https://www.rp.pl/Przemysl-Obronny/310049941Brytyjskie-rakiety-przeciwlotnicze-kusza-Warszawe.html. 47 Interview with Tomasz Siemoniak, PO Defense Minister (2011–2015), February 2019, Warsaw.

America’s Retreat in the Middle East and Africa

“If I Forget Thee O Jerusalem” Antoine Coppolani

Introduction The least one can say is that President Donald J. Trump has not forgotten Jerusalem, or Israel, since his election in November 2016. In a few months, he took multiple decisions in favor of the Hebrew state. While his predecessors had steadfastly refused to do so, he moved the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. In that same month of May 2018, he announced the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in Vienna on July 14, 2015, a move which was a top priority for the Israeli government. President Trump also announced the closure of the Palestine Liberation Organization mission in Washington and the end of US funding to the United Nations Reliefs and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). This series of decisions raises questions about Trump’s approach to the Middle East, and its implications for the region. With great fanfare, the Trump administration announced the conclusion of the “deal of the century,” the so-called “ultimate deal” which would bring peace to the Middle East and would return the Promised Land to the land of milk and honey. In reality, it seems to be only a pretext for the time being,

A. Coppolani (B) History Professor, University Paul-Valéry, Montpellier, France e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Quessard et al. (eds.), Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37258-3_5

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for another of Trump’s strategic objectives: to reassure Israel, and to ease tensions between the Hebrew state and the Sunni states. And maybe to strike another “deal of the century”, a new “Strategic Alliance in the Middle East,” reminiscent of the 1955 Baghdad Pact. The difference being that this alliance could eventually include Israel, formally or informally. How could this miracle be accomplished? By removing the Palestinian question, but also through fear of a common enemy: Iran, whose “Axis of Resistance” and land route linking it to the Mediterranean are a cause for concern for both the Israelis and the Sunni Gulf States.

A “Deal of the Century” as Improbable … as It Is Useful To some extent, Kissinger’s famous maxim about Israel—“Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic policy considerations”—applies to Donald J. Trump.1 At first glance, the American President has little interest in the Middle East, apart from domestic policy considerations. Trump ran on a program of “America First” that leaves little room for an interventionist Middle East policy. According to his entourage, quoted by Adam Entous in a feature for the New Yorker, Trump views the Middle East as a source of trouble, in every sense of the word, and has no firm philosophical outlook on what has been happening there for centuries.2 The immediate priority, in Trump’s mind, would be not to intervene or even to disengage. This was confirmed after he came to power. For example, according to Martin Indyk, on April 13, 2018, when Trump announced very limited French, British, and American missile strikes against chemical weapons installations in Syria, the American president was in fact outlining a Trump doctrine for the Middle East. This doctrine, according to him, is indeed that of relative disengagement. Better (or worse) still, according to Indyk, Trump is following in Barack Obama’s footsteps: the doctrine of

1 Jacob Eriksson, “Master of None: Trump, Jerusalem and the Prospects of IsraeliPalestinian Peace,” Middle East Policy 25, no. 2 (Summer 2018): 51. 2 Adam Entous, “Donald Trump’s New World Order,” The New Yorker, June 18, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/donald-trumps-new-world-order.

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“leading from behind” has never been so relevant! “No amount of American blood or money can build lasting peace and security in the Middle East, it is a troubled place,” Trump declared.3 With respect to the Arab–Israeli conflict, the first declarations made by Trump during the election campaign gave a similar impression. At the end of 2015, he addressed an audience that in theory should have been his: the Coalition of Jewish Republicans. However, instead of cheers, his speech provoked some mockery and even booing. It is true that there was uneasiness from the outset, when he addressed the Jews present, regarding Iran, proclaiming that he was an outstanding negotiator, just like them.4 Tensions continued to rise: booing broke out as Trump refused to comment on the indivisibility of Jerusalem as the capital of the Hebrew state. While he agreed that Israel made many sacrifices in past efforts to achieve peace, he said he didn’t know whether it was really determined to make peace, to take the last step, at the cost of additional sacrifices. The same was true of the Arabs, as Trump admitted that he knew very little about their leaders and did not work with them. Donald Trump’s relations with Israel and the American Jewish community warmed considerably when he delivered his speech to the AIPAC in March 2016. A speech summarized by his repetition of “I love Israel.”5 In the same speech, Trump indicated that his priority would be Iran. With his usual modesty, he claimed to have studied the Iran issue in “great detail” (“I would say actually greater by far than anybody else”). His conclusions? Iran, a sponsor of international terrorism, was rewarded with 150 billion dollars, while giving little in return. He therefore stated as his top priority his desire to “dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran,” laying out a three-point plan. First, to oppose Iran’s attempts to dominate and destabilize the region, from Syria to Yemen, through the Golan Heights (where he accused the Iranians of trying to open a new front against Israel) and Gaza (where he accused Iran of supporting Hamas

3 Martin S. Indyk, “A Trump Doctrine for the Middle East,” The Atlantic, April 14, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/trump-syria-middleeast/558053/. 4 Jeremy Diamond, “Trump to Republican Jewish Coalition: I Am a Negotiator, Like You,” CNN Politics, December 3, 2015, https://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/03/politics/ donald-trump-rjc-negotiator/index.html. 5 Timothy Alexander Guzman, “Donald Trump AIPAC’s Speech: I Love Israel,” Centre de recherche sur la mondialisation, March 31, 2016, https://www.mondialisation.ca/ donald-trumps-aipac-speech-i-love-israel/5516675.

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and Islamic Jihad). Secondly, he promised to annihilate the international terror networks set up by Iran. Finally, before dismantling the nuclear deal, he pledged to enforce it strictly, more than ever before. He referred to the specific issue of Iran’s ballistic missile capability, which in his view had increased since the signing of the JCPOA. Indeed, the issue of ballistic missiles is an undeniable weakness of the JCPOA. For this reason, the United States insisted that the UN Security Council adopt Resolution 2231 on July 20, 2015, a few days after the signing of the agreement; it includes certain elements of previous resolutions, and specifically establishes a provisional ban (eight years) on Iran’s work in the field of nuclear delivery systems and imposes a five-year moratorium on the delivery of conventional weapons to Tehran.6 During the election campaign, Trump gave the impression that he did not have a specific policy on the Arab–Israeli conflict. Indecision, incompetence, lack of interest, or on the contrary, “constructive ambiguity”? It is difficult to decipher which; perhaps all of them combined. In any case, at the Republican Jewish Coalition, in December 2015, he expressed his wish to act as an impartial mediator. A few months later, at a campaign meeting in Charleston, South Carolina, he refrained from assigning responsibility for the conflict and its impasse to either side, saying he wanted to play the role of the “neutral guy.”7 However, this stance was in itself, confusing. On the one hand, as Aaron David Miller wrote, the myth of the “honest broker,” the role that the United States could or should play in the search for peace in the Middle East, is long gone. The United States has tended to become, on the contrary, “Israel’s lawyer.”8 On the other hand, not concerned about contradicting himself, Trump, on other campaign stops, did not hesitate to place the historical responsibility for the failure of negotiations on the Palestinians. Affirming that Israel had agreed to sit at the negotiating table without preconditions for years, and saying that at Camp David in 2000, Ehud Barak made “an incredible offer, maybe even too generous,” which Arafat rejected—an offer that 6 Arms Control Association, “Addressing Iran’s Ballistic Missiles in the JCPOA and

UNSC Resolution,” Issue Briefs 7, no. 8 (July 27, 2015), https://www.armscontrol.org/ Issue-Briefs/2015-07-27/Addressing-Irans-Ballistic-Missiles-in-the-JCPOA-and-UNSCResolution. 7 Eriksson, “Master of None,” 54. 8 Aaron David Miller, “Israel’s Lawyer,” Washington Post, May 23, 2005, http://www.

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/22/AR2005052200883.html.

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was repeated in 2008, when Ehud Olmert had made an equally generous proposition. As for Secretary of State Kerry’s proposals, according to Trump, Mahmoud Abbas did not even bother responding to them.9 Significantly, thanks in particular to the efforts of two of Trump’s close advisors, Jason Greenblatt and David Friedman, the Republican Party had adopted a platform that no longer referred to a two-state solution in the Middle East, a few days before at its convention in Cleveland, Ohio. The text was resolutely pro-Israeli and excluded the imposition of any solution on Israel. Trump tweeted that the platform was “the most pro-Israel of all time,” and he was probably not wrong.10 Four years earlier, the same party’s platform had proposed the creation of two democratic states, existing side by side in peace and security: a Jewish state with secure and defensible borders, Israel with Jerusalem as its capital, and Palestine. The change that occurred at the beginning of 2016 actually reversed the developments of the last quarter-century: the two-state solution was implicit under Clinton, formalized by Bush in 2002, and also sought after by Obama.11 During the campaign, and after the election, the rapprochement between Trump, Israel, and what Walt and Mearsheimer called the “proIsraeli lobby” in the United States, accelerated. In September 2016, at the United Nations General Assembly, Jared Kushner suggested to the Israeli Ambassador Ron Dermer that Donald Trump meet Benjamin Netanyahu, a meeting which did take place. It turns out that the Israeli Prime Minister is a close friend of the Kushner family, while Ron Dermer, ambassador to the United States since 2013, although born an American citizen, is a fervent admirer of Donald Trump. He is a graduate of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, a school he said he chose after reading The Art of the Deal, Trump’s magnum opus.12 In September, the Trump–Netanyahu meeting aimed not only to establish a personal link between the two, but also to give Trump a presidential stature and highlight his excellent relations with Israel to the evangelical Christian electorate. Kushner said, only half-jokingly, that according to Netanyahu, only 9 Guzman, “Donald Trump AIPAC’s Speech.” 10 Molly O’Toole, “How Donald Trump and the GOP Dropped the Two-State Solution

for Mideast Peace,” Foreign Policy, July 14, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/ 14/how-donald-trump-and-the-gop-dropped-the-two-state-solution-for-mideast-peace/. 11 Ibid. 12 Entous, “Donald Trump’s New World Order,” 6.

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one person in the world could have challenged Trump for the Republican nomination: Netanyahu himself, such was Trump’s popularity with evangelical Christians!13 The 2016 Presidential election results confirmed the importance of this segment of the electorate. According to a study by the Pew Research Center, the white born-again/evangelical Christian electorate voted 81% for Trump and 16% for Clinton. Trump also won among Protestants, with 58% of the vote versus 39% for his competitor, and Catholics: 52– 45%. On the other hand, the Jewish American vote rallied behind Hillary Clinton, with 71% versus 24%.14 In this aspect of the vote, the Israeli question plays a significant role. Curiously, opinion polls show that 82% of white evangelicals believe that God gave Israel to the Jewish people, compared to only 40% among American Jews.15 As for the Jewish American electorate, while only 24% voted for Trump, a majority of Orthodox Jews voted for him.16 It must be said that Barack Obama also contributed, involuntarily, to this rapprochement between Trump and Israel. On February 18, 2011, during his first term in office, the United States used its veto power to block a draft resolution condemning the settlements in the territories occupied since 1967.17 This was the first and only time the United States exercised its veto during the Obama presidency. Nothing of the sort happened in December 2016. The United States abstained from the vote on resolution 2334 on December 23, 2016 calling for an end to colonization, declaring it illegal and contrary to the objective of a twostate solution. Whereas in 2011, the Obama administration had deemed the settlements illegal but considered a resolution condemning them as 13 Ibid., 19. 14 Jessica Martinez and Gregory A. Smith, “How the Faithful Voted: A Preliminary

2016 Analysis,” Pew Research Center, November 9, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/ fact-tank/2016/11/09/how-the-faithful-voted-a-preliminary-2016-analysis/. 15 Sébastien Boussois, “La montée en puissance des protestants évangéliques dans la politique étrangère américaine,” Revue internationale et stratégique 2, no. 110 (2018): 41. 16 Yonat Shimron, “Most US Jews Oppose Trump but Othodox Stick with Him,” Desert News, September 13, 2017, https://www.deseretnews.com/article/865688710/ Most-US-Jews-oppose-Trump-but-the-Orthodox-stick-with-him.html. 17 UN News, “United States Vetoes Security Council Resolution on Israeli Settlements,” UN News, February 18, 2011, https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/02/367082-unitedstates-vetoes-security-council-resolution-israeli-settlements.

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an obstacle to peace, it now deemed the colonies as an obstacle to peace and that international condemnation was needed. This was a significant alteration of the US position, since it had to go back to 1980, and the vote ordered by Jimmy Carter on resolution 465 to find a precedent.18 Of course, such an about-face on the part of the Obama administration sparked an outcry in Israel, where it was considered a real slap in the face.19 At the same time, it was an opportunity for the Trump team to get closer to the Israelis after eight tense years of the Obama presidency.20 Once in power, Trump’s appointment of his team focused on Israel and the Middle East confirmed that, in Ron Dermer’s eyes, the Israeli government saw the “end of the tunnel.” The new president appointed Jason Greenblatt, one of his main lawyers since 1997, as Special Representative for International Negotiations. An Orthodox Jew living in New Jersey, Greenblatt is a descendant of Hungarian refugees and a graduate of Yeshiva University in New York. Although Greenblatt supported a two-state solution, he added a series of conditions to this prospect.21 On the one hand, he stated that the solution in the Middle East could not be imposed, but should rather be negotiated. On the other hand, he said that the settlements were not an obstacle to the pursuit of peace (born in 1967, Greenblatt himself attended a yeshiva in the Gush Etzion settlement block in the 1980s). Finally, he proclaimed that not only was Jerusalem the capital city of the Hebrew state, but that the indivisibility of the city was essential to the security of its citizens, regardless of their religious beliefs.22

18 Harvard Law Review, “Recent Resolution: International Law—Israel’s Settlement Activities—United Nations Security Council Asserts Illegality,” Harvard Law Review 130, no. 8 (June 10, 2017): 2267–2276. 19 Sharen Haskel, “Obama’s Slap in the Face,” The Jerusalem Post, December 27, 2016, https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Obamas-slap-in-the-face-476697. 20 Entous, “Donald Trump’s New World Order,” 7–8. 21 Judy Maltz, “What Does Jason Greenblatt, Trump’s Int’l Negotiator, Really Think

About the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict?” Haaretz, December 29, 2016, https://www. haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-what-does-trump-s-negotiator-think-about-a-twostate-solution-1.5478326. 22 Elise Labott and Theodore Schleifer, “Trump Appoints His Business Attorney to Manage International Negotiations,” CNN Politics, December 23, 2016, https:// edition.cnn.com/2016/12/23/politics/trump-appoints-his-business-attorney-to-manageinternational-crises/index.html.

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However, Greenblatt looks almost moderate when compared to David Friedman, the man Trump chose as ambassador to Israel. Born in 1958, the son of a rabbi, Friedman is also an Orthodox Jew. A graduate of Columbia University and NYU Law School, he is a lawyer and, more specifically, a bankruptcy lawyer. Donald Trump was his client, most notably during the case of the bankruptcy of his Atlantic City casinos. Friedman is known for his piecemeal and sulfurous comments on the Arab–Israeli conflict. Shortly before the Senate hearings (where the Foreign Affairs Committee confirmed it by a meager 12–9 vote), he had proclaimed that Israelis had as many, if not much more, rights over Judea and Samaria than the Palestinians.23 With regard to Gaza, Friedman is known to have told the State Department, which informed him, once in office, of the catastrophic situation in Gaza, that he did not understand the problem: “I do not understand. Basically, the people who live there [in the Gaza Strip] are Egyptians. Why can’t Egypt take them back?”24 This question is far from rhetorical: it illustrates perfectly the theory of the so-called “three-state solution,” whereby Palestinians would achieve hypothetical autonomy in Egypt (notably in the Sinai) and in Jordan, that is outside of the third state, Israel. Last but certainly not least, David Friedman is a staunch supporter of the Israeli settler movement. In particular, he and his family have very close ties with the Beit El colony, literally, the “House of God.” Founded in 1977 on private land confiscated by Israel for military reasons, the settlement was then regularized by Israeli courts for national security reasons. David Friedman’s support for the emblematic Beit El colony is in keeping with the third man in the group of Trump emissaries in the Middle East: his own son-in-law, Jared Kushner. Another common point being, of course, that neither Kushner, Friedman nor even Greenblatt had any foreign policy or diplomatic experience before working for the Trump administration. When she resigned in October 2018, UN Ambassador Nikki Halley described Jared Kushner as a “hidden genius,” particularly for the renegotiation of NAFTA, but also for his work on the Middle East 23 Andrew Kaczinski, “Trump Israel Envoy Pick: Israel Has ‘As Much Right, If Not a Much Greater Right as Palestinians’ to West Bank,” CNN Politics, February 24, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/24/politics/kfile-david-friedman-west-bank/ index.html. 24 Entous, “Donald Trump’s New World Order,” 28.

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peace plan.25 Who is this unknown genius? Born in 1981, he comes from a family that survived the Holocaust, his grandparents having emigrated from Belarus in 1949. Like his father, Charles Kushner, Jared entered real estate development after graduating from Harvard and NYU, while also acquiring the New York Observer in 2006. In 2009, he married Trump’s beloved child, Ivanka, who converted to Orthodox Judaism the same year. Jared Kushner’s family is close to Benjamin Netanyahu.26 Above all, the Kushners are known for their donations to Israeli causes and in particular for their financing of Jewish settlements, including Beit El and Yitzhar, north of Ariel and south of Nablus.27 On November 22, 2016, President-elect Donald Trump, declared that he intended to conclude “the deal of the century,” the so-called “ultimate deal,” to put a stop to this “conflict that never ends” in the Middle East.28 He claimed that his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, was a man of character, capable of signing this deal. In January 2017, Kushner obtained an official position as a counselor at the White House and occupied the office closest to the Oval Office. Since then, Kushner, who had written Trump’s speech to AIPAC, has made several trips to the Middle East. Not much is known about this still unpublished “deal of the century,” besides a few slivers of information. On the other hand, the approach that is being pursued is taking shape. The first element is secrecy, which Dennis Ross concedes, is not necessarily a bad thing: in the early stages of negotiations, it is not unusual for the United States not to show its cards with respect to the contents of its proposals, and if these early stages last, so be it.29 The second element is a complete reversal of the ways and means used in the past by the United States. Here again, as Ross points out, but also

25 Emily Birnbaum, “Haley Calls Jared Kushner Trump’s ‘Hidden Genius’,” The Hill, October 9, 2018, https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/410552-haleycalls-jared-kushner-trumps-hidden-genius. 26 Entous, “Donald Trump’s New World Order,” 6. 27 Eriksson, “Master of None,” 51. 28 Barak Ravid, “Trump: I Intend to Achieve the ‘Ultimate Deal’—Israeli-Palestinian Peace,” Haaretz, November 12, 2016, https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/.premiumtrump-i-intend-to-achieve-the-ultimate-deal-israeli-palestinian-peace-1.5460564. 29 Tal Schneider, “Dennis Ross: The US Peace Plan Is Serious,” Globes, June 26, 2018, https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-dennis-ross-the-us-peace-plan-is-serious-1001243146.

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Aaron David Miller and Robert Malley, the Trump administration is completely reinventing the American approach to the Palestinian conflict.30 Since all past efforts have failed, this is the time for new approaches, but which ones? The idea is to get rid of the “false realities” that previous administrations would have promised to the Palestinians. The idea is also to avoid any abstract conception of peace in favor of concrete and practical solutions, even if they are more limited in scope. The idea, finally, is that the Palestinians will be seduced or will have to be satisfied with improvements in their living conditions and measures affecting them individually and no longer by grandiose and abstract promises of political success.31 We must stop telling the Palestinians that their aspirations are legitimate and that, consequently, a final agreement would represent a setback (instead of a real right of return they would only get scraps; instead of a formal state, they would have only a rump state; instead of sovereignty over Jerusalem they would get it over only parts of the Holy City). The strategy of Trump and his emissaries is different: Palestinian claims, if one tries to comply with them from the outset, are not the way to a pragmatic agreement, but rather an insurmountable obstacle to this agreement. It is only by wrestling from the Palestinians all their illusions that the path to peace can be taken.32 In this new approach, Trump and Kushner do not hesitate to say that they will make up for their lack of experience in international relations by applying their business experience. At a press conference held on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2018, President Trump reaffirmed that the solution in the Middle East will be similar to the “closing of a real estate deal.”33 At the United Nations, Mahmoud Abbas launched a philippic attack on the United States, accusing it of bias. He formally refused to allow the United States to play the 30 Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, “If Trump Wants the Ultimate Deal He Must Not Repeat These Mistakes,” The Washington Institute, October 2, 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/if-trump-wants-theultimate-deal-he-must-not-repeat-these-mistakes. 31 Robert Malley and Aaron David Miller, “Trump Is Reinventing the U.S. Approach

to the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict,” The Atlantic, September 20, 2018, https://www. theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/trump-israel-palestinians/570646/. 32 Ibid., 6. 33 Amir Tibon, “Trump: Two State Solution Will Be ‘Like a Real-Estate Deal’,”

Haaretz, September 27, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/trump-two-statesolution-will-be-like-a-real-estate-deal-1.6511571.

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role of mediator in the peace process, claiming that it had torpedoed the peace process. He also proclaimed that “Jerusalem is not for sale” and that “Palestinian rights are not a bargaining chip.”34 Yet it is indeed this approach, directly inspired by the business world that the United States intends to favor. Jared Kushner stated this explicitly to Saeb Erekat, one of the “historic” Palestinian negotiators, when they met during the Trump trip to Saudi Arabia, Israel and the Palestinian Territories in May 2017. Erekat told Kushner that he felt he was dealing more with real estate developers than with US government officials. Kushner replied irrevocably: “Saeb, you failed to make peace by dealing with politicians. You probably need to move on to real estate developers.”35 It is not without reason, that at the UN assembly, Mahmoud Abbas considered the very term “deal of the century” to be cynical. What is in it for the Palestinians other than humanitarian measures, he asked?36 This fear is well-founded, since the whole strategy of the Americans is to reduce the Palestinian claims to almost nothing. Erekat said that he was treated by Trump’s team in a very cavalier manner: he was asked to accept thirty cents on the dollar he expected; otherwise he would only get fifteen cents tomorrow.37 This is exactly the state of mind of Trump’s team, which compares the Palestinians to bad investors. In private, David Friedman went even further. He, the banker specialized in bankruptcy, boasted of preparing a bankruptcy agreement for the Palestinians.38 However, is everything lost for the Palestinians? Nothing could be less certain, Trump is unpredictable. He did not hesitate to challenge historical American allies: Trudeau or Merkel, for example, by ridiculing them. It is not impossible that one day, if he needs to, he will stand up against his ally Netanyahu. However, since Trump is much more popular than Obama in Israel, it is not clear that the Prime Minister could oppose the Republican as much as he did with his Democratic predecessor. When Netanyahu tussled with Obama, his popularity rose in Israeli

34 VOA News, “Abbas Bashes Trump, US Policies in UN Speech,” VOA News, September 27, 2018, https://www.voanews.com/a/palestinian-president-urges-trump-to-rescindjerusalem-aid-decisions/4589953.html. 35 Entous, “Donald Trump’s New World Order,” 35–36. 36 VOA News, “Abbas Bashes Trump, US Policies in UN Speech.” 37 Entous, “Donald Trump’s New World Order,” 35. 38 Ibid., 31.

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opinion polls. A contest with Trump would certainly not have the same results.

Toward a New “Strategic Middle East Alliance”? All these tribulations raise the question of whether Trump is innovative in his approach to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and, as John Podhoretz argues, or whether, on the contrary, he is misguided and ruining the central role of the United States in the Middle East.39 Like Robert Malley and Aaron David Miller, John Podhorez shares the observation that all past attempts to achieve peace have failed. However, unlike the two men, who believe that Trumpian methods are doomed to failure and catastrophe, the editor of Commentary believes that he should be given, at the very least, the benefit of the doubt and time to see the fruit that his policy will or will not bear. The flaw in Miller and Malley’s reasoning is that, aware of the failure of past attempts, in which they were often actors, they offer few new avenues to explore.40 Podhoretz believes that Trump’s Middle East policy embodies a new type of authentic realism. Trump and his team see the Israelis as they are, not as they would like them to be. In this respect, they differ from members of previous administrations who sought to influence the Israelis and make them believe that the Hebrew state was at the center of all the problems in the Middle East. The so-called realists of the past were not realistic, says Podhoretz. They were in fact fantasists. They fed on the fantasy that Israel was mainly a burden for the United States; without its existence, or at least if the Israeli–Palestinian problem was resolved, all issues in the Middle East would be solved. The so-called realists cherished the idea that, through concessions, through the magic of a peace process, an agreement whose shape no one could draw would open a new era of peace.41 Unlike the advocates of the “centrality thesis” (dear, for example, to Barack Obama) who make the settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict a central aim of American foreign policy, Trump seems to have 39 John Podhoretz, “A New Realism: America & Israel in the Trump Era,” Commentary 145, no. 3 (March 2018): 14–16; Malley and Miller, “Trump Is Reinventing the U.S. Approach.” 40 Ibid. 41 Podhoretz, “A New Realism,” 16.

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aligned himself with the thesis of the “marginality” of this conflict. Marginal, not because it is unimportant, but because this issue, due to its complexity, cannot be tackled head-on. The publication of the “ultimate deal,” although announced with great fanfare, is constantly being pushed back, which does not seem to bother the Israelis, the Arab Gulf states or even the Palestinians, who have very little hope in regard to its potential contents… Benjamin Netanyahu, at the United Nations General Assembly, stated that as Prime Minister, Israel would not give up the West Bank. In his opinion, nothing is urgent: we must wait and see42 … As for the Palestinians, they have described the so-called “deal of the century” as a “slap in the face” when some of the ideas were conveyed to them during a meeting with Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman Al Saud in November 2017: a Palestinian entity would be established in Gaza and parts of the West Bank; specifically, in zones A and B, but also 10% of Zone C. This would therefore mean control over a non-contiguous territory, while the majority of the settlements in the West Bank would remain. The Palestinian capital would not be in Jerusalem, but in Abu Dis or Ramallah, and there would be no right of return for refugees.43 Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Palestinians themselves are wondering whether their best option would be a single state in which Palestinians and Israelis have equal rights.44 Saeb Erekat gives serious consideration to this proposal, which was ridiculed by Trump: “Israel will have a Prime Minister named Mohammed in a few years’ time,” he reportedly said during a meeting with King Abdullah of Jordan.45 Another option being pursued is that of a confederation with Jordan, or a Palestinian settlement in the Sinai.46 Even in the case of a binational state, the Jewish nature of the Hebrew 42 Tibon, “Trump: Two State Solution Will Be ‘Like a Real-Estate Deal’.” 43 Eriksson, “Master of None,” 58. 44 Ibid. 45 Sputnik, “«Le PM israélien s’appellerait Mohammed», Trump ironise sur l’État binational en Israël,” Sputnik, August 20, 2018, https://fr.sputniknews.com/international/ 201808201037735629-pm-israelien-mohammed-trump-etat-binational-israel/. 46 Amin Arefi, “Israël-Palestine: le vrai plan de Donald Trump,” Le Point, September

3, 2018, https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/israel-palestine-le-vrai-plan-de-donald-trump-0309-2018-2247990_24.php; Jonathan Cook, “Que contient l’ «accord du siècle» de Trump? La réponse est déjà sous nos yeux,” Middles East Eye, June 19, 2018, https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/reportages/que-contient-l-accord-du-si-cle-detrump-la-r-ponse-est-d-j-sous-nos-yeux-1515330698.

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state cannot be called into question, since on July 19, 2018, a law with a constitutional scope was passed defining Israel as “the nation-state of the Jewish people” and encouraging Jewish settlement as a “national value.”47 In short, relations between the United States and Israel are excellent at the moment, because the former has granted virtually all the wishes of the latter. Thomas Friedman, who has a way with words, wrote that it is not “the art of the deal” that we must speak about when it comes to Trump and Israel, but rather “the art of the giveaway,” as the American President grants all of Israel’s wishes.48 Hayelet Shaked declared that President Trump, with his decision to relocate the American Embassy to Jerusalem, has acted as a true Churchill of the twenty-first century and that he put an end to the policy of capitulation of all the Chamberlains that preceded him. On her Twitter account, the Justice Minister, a member of Habayit Ayehudi (The Jewish Home) went even further, comparing Donald Trump Jr. to Cyrus the Great: “Trump in his generation, as Cyrus in his.”49 Curiously, in the current situation, Israel enjoys a “state of contentment,” to use the expression of Shlom Lipner, a Brookings Institution specialist in Israeli–American relations, even though the country is surrounded by extremely dangerous conflicts. Lipner points out that most Israelis are satisfied with their country’s strategic posture. They have not necessarily forgotten the idea of peace: they simply believe that the current situation is the best they can hope for. The maintenance of the status quo seems, in this respect, to be a policy in itself.50 Among the reasons for Israeli satisfaction in the current context, is the fact that Israel is undoubtedly a less controversial issue than ever before

47 Shalom Lipner, “The Summer of Israel’s Contentment,” Brookings, July 30, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/30/the-summerof-israels-contentment/. 48 Thomas L. Friedman, “Trump, Israel and the Art of the Giveaway,” New York Times, December 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/opinion/trumpforeign-policy-giveaway.html. 49 Quoted in Elie Barnavi, “Israël-Iran: vieille idylle, acrimonieux divorce,” Revue des Deux Mondes (September 2018): 41. 50 Shalom Lipner, “The Summer of Israel’s Contentment.”

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in the Arab world. While this observation may not be true in the socalled “Arab street,” it is much more so in the chancelleries.51 Three major developments contribute to explain this phenomenon. On the one hand, the fact that Israel is not only an independent energy state now, but a net exporter. The contracts signed in 2016, then 2017, for ten and then fifteen billion dollars, with Jordan, and then Egypt, for gas from the Tamar and Leviathan fields are significantly changing the situation in the Middle East.52 The second important development is that Israel is working with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council in the field of security and intelligence sharing. The Israeli prime minister himself, states that apart from Iran, the state has relations with “practically all the countries that do not recognize it” because of their economic needs and, especially, because of Israel’s expertise in security matters.53 As for Egypt, gas projects can only increase the security cooperation already underway in the Sinai, for example.54 Last but not least, Israel and the Sunni Arab states, particularly those in the Persian Gulf, have found themselves a common enemy: Iran. Ironically, it is worth noting that this is probably one of Barack Obama’s most successful peace initiatives. Probably one of the reasons that most justifies his improbable Nobel Peace Prize obtained upon taking office in 2009. Contrary to what he had stated as his objective that year, Obama was unable to make peace in the Middle East. In 2013, he failed to put a stop to the war in Syria, by refusing to intervene when the red lines he had set himself were crossed. However, through the magic of the JCPOA, in July 2015, Obama succeeded in establishing a relative peace between Israel

51 Shai Feldman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, “Why Everyone Loves Israel Now,” Brookings, March 26, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/ 03/26/why-everyone-loves-israel-now/. 52 Le Monde and Agence France-Presse, “Israël conclut un contrat «historique» de fourniture de gaz à l’Egypte,” Le Monde Afrique, February 20, 2018, https://abonnes.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/02/20/israel-conclut-uncontrat-historique-de-fourniture-de-gaz-a-l-egypte_5259630_3212.html. 53 Tovah Lazaroff, “Netanyahu: ‘We Have to Act Now Against Iran’,” The Jerusalem Post, December 6, 2017, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Netanyahu-We-have-toact-now-against-Iran-517171. 54 Piotr Smolar and Nabil Wakim, “Entre Israël et l’Egypte, un contrat gazier «historique», mais beaucoup d’incertitudes,” Le Monde, February 21, 2018, https://abonnes.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2018/02/21/entre-israel-et-legypte-un-contrat-gazier-historique-mais-beaucoup-d-incertitudes_5260330_3234.html.

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and the Sunni Gulf States. As Michael Oren, the former Israeli Ambassador to Washington, who has often crossed swords with the American President, notes bitterly: “Obama wanted to bring Jews and Arabs closer through peace. He succeeded in doing so by creating a common opposition to his Iranian policy.”55 The effects of this relative agreement are being felt. It is not insignificant to note that the relocation of the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem did not cause the clashes or even the protests that might have been feared. Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman was in fact careful to avoid the question. The very day after the announcement, in December 2017, his criticism was very limited, and he even boasted of the future of Israeli–Saudi relations at a meeting with a WINEP delegation! Where yesterday, the status of Jerusalem seemed crucial and was the stumbling block to peace agreements, like at Camp David II in July 2000, the issue now seems to have become almost secondary.56 In reality, more than ever, the treatment of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has become an adjustment variable. It is not so much the “deal of the century” that the Trump administration is seeking, but rather a marginalization of the conflict, which must no longer be a kind of nuisance preventing the achievement of otherwise strategic goals. So what are these intentions? Mainly, the weakening of Iran, thought of as alpha and omega of the American strategy in the Middle East. Taking advantage of the “new Cold War” between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Donald Trump sought to forge an informal alliance between the Sunni Gulf States and Israel. As well as an alliance, formal this time, between the Sunni Gulf States: the project to create a Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), which was announced in the summer 2018. The origins of this idea of an alliance between the Gulf States and Israel apparently go back to a meeting between Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump, at Trump Tower, on September 25, 2016. The idea of the alliance was presented to Trump, Kushner and Steve Bannon. Netanyahu had even less difficulty convincing the future President and his team as

55 Quoted in Entous, “Donald Trump’s New World Order,” 15. 56 Robert Satloff, “Mohammed bin Salman Doesn’t Want

to Talk About Jerusalem,” Foreign Policy, December 14, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/ 14/mohammad-bin-salman-doesnt-want-to-talk-about-jerusalem/.

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the proposed plan was in line with his hostility to Iran and, above all, to Obama’s policies.57 A few weeks later, it was Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince and Minister of Defense of Abu Dhabi, the capital of the richest of the seven United Arab Emirates, who was welcomed by the Trump team. On December 15, 2016, at the Four Seasons in New York, he met with Kushner, Bannon, and General Michael Flynn, who would become President Trump’s first National Security Advisor. The Crown Prince intended to make the President-elect’s advisers understand that his country’s major issue was Iran, and not Israel.58 In addition, MBZ, as he is known, made it clear that his Saudi counterpart, MBS, was on the same wavelength. MBS only came to power in Saudi Arabia in June 2017, when his father, having himself taken the throne in 2015, ousted Muhammad bin Nayef and made MBS the Crown Prince of the kingdom, as well as the Minister of Defense.59 Following MBZ’s visit to Washington, it was Mohammad bin Salman’s turn to go to Washington, this time in March 2017, for a meeting with Trump in the Oval Office.60 This trip was also an opportunity for the Crown Prince to forge a personal relationship with Jared Kushner, only four years his senior (Kushner was born in 1981). It began with a lunch on March 27 and the relationship then deepened, MBZ and Jared Kushner being known for their long phone calls and discussions until the early hours of the night.61 It is therefore logical that, in May 2017, President Trump did not make his first international visit to Mexico or Canada, but rather to Saudi 57 Entous, “Donald Trump’s New World Order,” 44. 58 Ibid., 44–45. 59 Ben Rhodes, “A Fatal Abandonment of American Leadership,” The Atlantic, October 12, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/jamal-khashoggiand-us-saudi-relationship/572905/. 60 Yara Bayoumy, Jeff Mason, Warren Strobel, and Reem Shamseddine, “Saudi Deputy Crown Prince, Trump Meeting a ‘Turning Point’: Saudi Adviser,” Reuters, March 14, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-usa/saudi-deputy-crownprince-trump-meeting-a-turning-point-saudi-adviser-idUSKBN16L2CT. 61 Philip Rucker, Carol D. Leoning, and Anne Gearan, “Two Princes: Kushner Now Faces a Reckoning for Trump’s Bet on the Heir to the Saudi Throne,” The Washington Post, October 14, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/two-princes-kushnernow-faces-a-reckoning-for-trumps-bet-on-the-saudi-heir/2018/10/14/6eaeaafc-ce4611e8-a3e6-44daa3d35ede_story.html?utm_term=.27c3f801fadb.

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Arabia and Israel. Trump’s stay in Saudi Arabia, although brief, resulted in three meetings: a bilateral one with the Saudi King; a multilateral meeting with the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries; and a third meeting with representatives of the fifty-five Arab and Islamic countries gathered in Riyadh for the occasion.62 In absolute terms, the United States would like to see the establishment of an “Arab NATO,” along the lines of the Baghdad Pact of 1955, financed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with Egypt and Jordan providing troops and, ultimately, an informal alliance with Israel. For MBS, this project would be logical, since Saudi Arabia would play, mutatis mutandis, the central role played by the United States in NATO.63 However, as evidenced by the postponement of the Arab Gulf States Summit scheduled to take place in Washington on October 12–13, 2018, it is unlikely that this Arab NATO institution will actually be created in the near future, particularly due to dissension among the Gulf States, namely between Qatar on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other.64 As for a formal alliance with Israel, it remains a long way off, despite the ongoing rapprochement. Saudi diplomacy remains officially focused on the proposals of the 2002 Arab initiative. As Fabrice Balanche rightly points out, the Israeli–Palestinian question remains divisive for the Sunni states, regardless of the reconciliation outlined above. However, in the Shia world it is a unifying factor. In this respect, it remains a central element of the new Cold War being fought in the Gulf today.65

62 Abdulhadi Khalaf, “Les projets américains d’une «OTAN arabe»,” Orient XXI,

September 24, 2018, https://orientxxi.info/magazine/les-projets-americains-d-une-otanarabe,2644. 63 Ibid. 64 Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier, “Pourquoi le projet américain d’une Otan arabe n’est pas près d’arriver,” Atlantico, October 15, 2018, http://www.atlantico.fr/decryptage/ pourquoi-projet-americain-otan-arabe-est-pas-pres-arriver-jean-sylvestre-mongrenier3532970.html; Middle East Policy Council, “Mixed Reactions to the Proposed Middle East Strategic Alliance,” Middle East Policy Council, October 9, 2018, http://www. mepc.org/commentary/mixed-reactions-proposed-middle-east-strategic-alliance. 65 Fabrice Balanche, “The Iranian Landbridge in the Levant: The Return of Territory in Geopolitics,” Telos, September 14, 2018, http://www.telospress.com/the-iranian-landbridge-in-the-levant-the-return-of-territory-in-geopolitics/.

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The Shiite “Axis of Resistance” and Land Corridor With regard to Iran, does Trump really have a strategy beyond increasing pressure in all its forms? In turn, does the Islamic Republic, aware of the obvious unpredictability of the one who has described himself as a “stable genius,” have a strategy vis-à-vis the United States apart from letting the Trump storm pass and waiting for a change in the White House. The Israeli–Iranian relationship will undoubtedly play a crucial role in developments in the Middle East. Since the Iranians, although weakened by sanctions and the policy of isolation, are now in Syria, at the gates of Israel (concretizing the land bridge of the Shiite crescent). This leads to a new line of questioning: despite its obvious differences with Barack Obama’s policy, does Donald Trump not endorse, in its continuity, a form of relative withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East? This policy coincides with Russia making its great comeback in the region.66 There is a real debate, in the United States and elsewhere, on the extent of the Iranian threat and the attitude that should be adopted accordingly. On the one hand, some, like Stephen Walt, believe that the threat is dangerously exaggerated. In “The Islamic Republic of Hysteria,” he argues that the whole strategy of the Trump administration is based on a threat that does not exist: Iran. He describes a natural balance of powers, in short, between a bloc made up of Israel, Egypt, the UAE, and Jordan, on the one hand, and Iran, on the other. As a result, he argues that strong US support for Saudi Arabia and Israel can only have negative effects. It would be better for the United States to keep its options open.67 In an article on October 15, 2018, Walt went even further: contrary to the Obama administration, which stated that “all options [including war] were on the table” vis-à-vis Iran, but created conditions that made war unlikely, Trump adopted a policy that made a conflict with Iran very plausible, if not probable. Moreover, according to Walt, giving Israel and Saudi Arabia free rein would encourage the lowest instincts of these

66 Dimtri Trenin, What’s Russia Up To in the Middle East? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018). 67 Stephen M. Walt, “The Islamist Republic of Hysteria,” Foreign Policy, January 16, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/16/the-islamic-republic-of-hysteria-iranmiddle-east-trump/.

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nations.68 A similar story is told by a prominent expert on Saudi Arabia, Bruce Riedel, who calls on the United States not to let itself be dragged into a new war with Iran by the Israelis and the Saudis. Riedel believes that the United States by rejecting the JCPOA has placed itself on a dangerous path of a new and dubious military operation, like in 1982 or 2003.69 A few days after Riedel’s warnings at the Brookings Institution on May 15, 2018, and two weeks after the United States withdrew from the JCPOA, Secretary of State Pompeo spoke to another, much more conservative think tank, the Heritage Foundation. He justified the withdrawal from the JCPOA (through the weakness of sunset clauses, in particular), but also American sanctions. According to Pompeo, the sanctions would force Iran to either devote itself to keeping its economy afloat or to financing its wars: it could not do both. In the same speech, the secretary of state issued a dozen conditions that essentially amounted to radical regime change in Iran.70 Can Pompeo and Trump’s strategy succeed? They claim to want to reach “a better agreement” and some, like Dennis Ross, believe that this hypothesis is not so far-fetched.71 According to him, the weight of sanctions, if real, could bring the Iranians back to the negotiating table, just like the sanctions between 2006 and 2010, and the European boycott of Iranian oil from 2012 onwards, which eventually led to the JCPOA. It is true that in this case, the sanctions will likely be more difficult to apply.72 Iran has already reached an agreement with Russia to export its oil, and

68 Stephen M. Walt, “This Is America’s Middle East Strategy on Steroids,” Foreign Policy, October 15, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/15/this-is-americas-middleeast-strategy-on-steroids/. 69 Bruce Riedel, “Don’t Let Israel and Saudi Arabia Drag the U.S. into Another War,” Brookings Institution, May 15, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2018/05/15/dont-let-israel-and-saudi-arabia-drag-the-u-s-into-another-war/. 70 Mike Pompeo, “After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy,” Interview by Kay Coles James, The Heritage Foundation, May 21, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/defense/event/afterthe-deal-new-iran-strategy. 71 Dennis Ross, “Iran Is Throwing a Tantrum but Wants a Deal,” Foreign Policy, August 15, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/15/iran-is-throwing-a-tantrumbut-wants-a-deal/. 72 i24News, “Iran, Russia Reach Deal to Circumvent US Oil Sanctions: Israeli Report,” i24News, October 14, 2018, https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/186374181014-iran-russia-reach-deal-to-circumvent-us-oil-sanctions-israeli-report.

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then resell it via the Caspian Sea. In addition, Iran can now rely on the Port of Chabahar, or even the Pakistani port of Gwadar, to export oil to India or China.73 Nevertheless, according to Ross, Putin could play the go-between and propose a new agreement running until 2045, which Trump would hasten to describe as “huge.”74 The collapse of Iran is not in Putin’s interest. In recent years, and particularly since 2015, the “Shiite axis of resistance” as it is commonly called, has been part of the buffer that protects Syria. This “axis of resistance” (to Israel, the Sunni states and their American ally) or Shia crescent is also at the tip of the new Silk Road, which can strengthen it, whereas a war would weaken it. However, since 2015, with all due respect to Stephen Walt, the geopolitical situation seems to have favored Iran. By supporting the Houthis in Yemen, Iran weakened Saudi Arabia on its southern border. Additionally, unthinkable until spring 2017, an Iranian axis now prevails in the Levant. The Iranians have succeeded in establishing a land corridor linking their country to the Mediterranean, via Syria and Lebanon—and right under Washington’s nose since the Shia militias joined forces in May 2017 not far from the American base of Al-Tanf.75 As soon as July 25, 2015, a few days after the signing of the JCPOA, General Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards, was in Moscow and it is believed that it was then that the Russian–Iranian intervention was decided, before Bashar al-Assad formally requested Russian military assistance on September 30. Meanwhile, Sergei Lavrov had gone to Tehran to seal the agreement.76 This Iranian presence in Syria fundamentally disturbs the Israelis, who have issued four red lines: no permanent Iranian presence in Syria; no Iranian operations against Israel launched from Syria; no transfer of military technology from Syria to Lebanon; and no arms production in Lebanon. The Israelis, supported by the Saudis, are calling for intervention in Syria. War appears close, as the Israeli army is now openly claiming responsibility for strikes

73 Gawdat Bahgat, “US-Iran Relations Under the Trump Administration,” Mediterranean Quarterly 28, no. 3 (2017): 108–109. 74 Ross, “Iran Is Throwing a Tantrum but Wants a Deal.” 75 Balanche, “The Iranian Landbridge,” 2. 76 Trenin, What’s Russia Up To.

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against Iranian targets in Syria, including with F35s. However, all indications are that Iran will either choose to wait for Trump to leave office, or will promote not a direct confrontation, but low or medium intensity conflicts that will allow it to maintain national unity while blaming the United States, its allies, and their aggressive policies. In this scenario, it is not impossible that Iran will emerge as the winner of the current crisis. Just like Russia; since the beginning of the crisis, the Israeli prime minister has met with the Russian president more than any American president… The situation in the Middle East is fluid, and it is difficult to say who will prevail. The relative withdrawal of the United States, to the benefit of China and, especially, Russia, in this region of the world seems to have begun. Paradoxically, however, Trump’s probably very illusory policy on MESA, seems to be reversing, at least for the moment, the decline that began under Obama. Negative effects of the JCPOA exist, despite its undeniable qualities. Pierre Razoux in the Revue des Deux Mondes, in September 2018, suggested that President Macron should travel to Iran.77 The French President’s objectives are in fact in line with American concerns: fears over what waits on the horizon (2025/2030); a guarantee sought over Iran’s regional role; and guarantees on Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, all this outside the JCPOA. However, where the United States has, for better or for worse, the balance of power, French diplomacy favors dialogue, persuasion, and perhaps, also… la poudre de perlimpinpin (fairy dust).

References Balanche, Fabrice. “The Iranian Landbridge in the Levant: The Return of Territory in Geopolitics.” Telos, September 14, 2018. Barnavi, Elie. “Israël-Iran: vieille idylle, acrimonieux divorce.” Revue des Deux Mondes (September 2018): 40–47. Boussois, Sébastien. “La montée en puissance des protestants évangéliques dans la politique étrangère américaine.” Revue internationale et stratégique 110 (2018): 34–42. Entous, Adam. “Donald Trump’s New World Order.” The New Yorker, June 18, 2018.

77 Pierre Razoux, “Le dilemme des relations franco-iraniennes depuis 1979,” Revue des Deux Mondes (September 2018): 22–30.

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Eriksson, Jacob. “Master of None: Trump, Jerusalem and the Prospects of IsraeliPalestinian Peace.” Middle East Policy 25, no. 2 (Summer 2018): 51–63. Indyk, Martin S. “A Trump Doctrine for the Middle East.” The Atlantic, April 14, 2018. Malley, Robert, and Aaron David Miller. “Trump Is Reinventing the U.S. Approach to the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.” The Atlantic, September 20, 2018. Ross, Dennis. “Iran Is Throwing a Tantrum but Wants a Deal.” Foreign Policy, August 15, 2018. Special Issue: “Trump’s Middle East.” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 6 (November– December 2019). Trenin, Dimtri. What’s Is Russia Up To in the Middle East? Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018. Walt, Stephen. “The Islamist Republic of Hysteria.” Foreign Policy, January 16, 2018. Walt, Stephen. “This Is America’s Middle East Strategy on Steroids.” Foreign Policy, October 15, 2018.

The Two Faces of US Counterterrorism Under Trump Stephen Tankel

Introduction Donald Trump made defeating terrorism one of the defining themes of his campaign for president. His election on the hyper-nationalist America First platform naturally raised the question of how US counterterrorism would change under a Trump administration. If a satisfying answer to this question appears elusive more than two years into Trump’s time in office it is because his administration’s counterterrorism policies have been Janus-faced.1 On one side is actual counterterrorism. These are policies that have evolved under a Trump administration and are sometimes in place despite, rather than because of the president, but which still exist within a traditional counterterrorism paradigm. The other side is faux counterterrorism—policies dressed up as counterterrorism, and which are intended purely to serve Trump’s political purposes. These policies fit into 1 The concept of a Janus-faced US counterterrorism policy I describe in this chapter builds upon an article I co-authored with Josh Geltzer in 2018. See, Josh Geltzer and Stephen Tankel, “Whatever Happened to Trump’s Counterterrorism Strategy?” The Atlantic, March 1, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/ trump-terrorism-iraq-syria-al-qaeda-isis/554333/.

S. Tankel (B) American University, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Quessard et al. (eds.), Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37258-3_6

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a wider pattern of rhetoric and actions that, rather than combating all forms of terrorism, may actually enable white nationalist terrorism.

Actual Counterterrorism Trump issued his first National Strategy for Counterterrorism in October 2018. The document claimed to mark “a shift in America’s approach to countering and preventing terrorism.”2 In reality, it exhibited considerable continuity with the approach taken by President Barack Obama’s administration, which in turn built on adaptations President George W. Bush made during his second term. Trump’s strategy reflects new developments—the increased use of social media by terrorist groups, and the challenges related to foreign fighter returnees—but most of the objectives and lines of effort look remarkably similar to the ones found in Obama’s 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism.3 In this regard, the strategy is reflective of ongoing efforts that share much in common with Trump’s predecessors. These include intelligence cooperation with foreign partners to interdict terrorist operations, building the counterterrorism capacity of partner forces, using the criminal justice system to prosecute those arrested in the United States on suspicion of terrorist activities, and relying on distinctive US capabilities, including armed drones, to degrade the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and their respective affiliates in various hot spots around the world. One of the main points of continuity is the burden-sharing aspect of Obama’s “indirect” strategy to combatting terrorism. It became apparent during the decade after the September 11 attacks that military campaigns with a large US footprint were neither successful nor sustainable. As al-Qaeda expanded in the wake of the Iraq invasion, the Bush administration began to put greater emphasis on building the capacity of partner forces to help them combat al-Qaeda franchises and other jihadist threats.

2 The White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America (Washington, DC, October 2018). 3 The White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington, DC, June 2011).

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Obama built on this practice, and explicitly made working by, with, and through partner nations a cornerstone of his counterterrorism strategy.4 Trump adopted this approach in his own counterterrorism strategy, which emphasizes “collaborating so that foreign governments take the lead wherever possible, and working with others so that they can assume responsibility in the fight against terrorists.”5 Professionals at the working level continue to pursue partnerships using traditional instruments of statecraft, including engagement through bilateral channels and at multilateral and international forums such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Cooperation is sometimes presented in ways intended to take the edge off the president’s bullying rhetoric with which he has berated close US allies, with assertions that “America First does not mean America alone.6 There are important distinctions between the Trump and Obama approaches to burden sharing beyond the former’s belligerent rhetoric. Obama relied heavily on local and international partners to fight terrorist groups on the ground, both in an effort to share the costs and risks, but also to make gains more sustainable by giving local actors “ownership” of the fight. As a result, he invested in stabilization and development activities intended to fill the void in the aftermath of military operations. Obama also saw building partnerships as a way to reduce the perception of American unilateralism and strengthen the international system by boosting interdependence. And internationally, Obama sought to encourage greater counterterrorism cooperation—including robust law enforcement and intelligence cooperation—among democratic partners by better aligning US actions and values with those of our closest allies, especially in Europe.

4 “Transcript: Obama Addresses Counterterrorism, Drones,” NPR, May 23, 2013, https://www.npr.org/2013/05/23/186305171/transcript-obama-addressescounterterrorism-drones. 5 The White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America. 6 The White House, Remarks by President Trump and NATO Secretary General Jens

Stoltenberg at Bilateral Breakfast, July 11, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-nato-secretary-general-jens-stoltenberg-bilateralbreakfast/; Adam Edelman, “Trump to Davos: ‘America First Does Not Mean America Alone’,” NBC, January 26, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/ trump-tells-davos-crowd-america-first-does-not-mean-america-n841306.

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Trump has pursued a much more transactional approach to cooperation. This approach is most evident in his engagements with America’s democratic allies—especially in NATO—who Trump aims to browbeat into greater burden sharing by the implicit (and at times explicit) threat to limit US protection if they don’t do (and pay) their fair share. Trump has hectored NATO countries to boost defense budgets with little regard for the critical counterterrorism cooperation many of them provide. He has also risked undercutting counterterrorism cooperation by pursuing transactional, and sometimes random objectives that come at the expense of burden sharing where it does occur. For example, Trump arbitrarily canceled a US presidential visit to Copenhagen and insulted the Danish prime minister because she refused to entertain the idea of selling Greenland to the United States. The Danes have been a steadfast US counterterrorism partner despite facing no major terrorism threats themselves, and have actually sustained casualty rates in Iraq and Afghanistan at a higher rate than the US military. US counterterrorism professionals at the working level continue to pursue partnerships using traditional instruments of statecraft, including engagement through bilateral channels and at multilateral and international forums such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Many US allies and partners continue to work with the United States on counterterrorism at the time of writing despite Trump’s bellicosity, not because of it. They cooperate because they see shared priorities when it comes to terrorist threats, and are aware of how they can benefit from the unique, high-end capabilities that the United States can provide.7 Most countries, even those with whom the United States does not share counterterrorism priorities, nevertheless wish to maintain a working security relationship with the United States for reasons that will continue to be relevant well after Trump’s stay in the Oval Office is over. And because of the way security cooperation is structured, counterterrorism professionals from other countries have developed patterns of cooperation with US counterparts. These patterns of cooperation, to say nothing of the wider US approach to counterterrorism, could be tested as America’s priorities

7 On the importance and limitations of shared threats for cooperation see, Stephen Tankel, With Us and Against Us: How America’s Partners Help and Hinder the War on Terror (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2018).

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shift and if Trump embraces his more isolationist instincts. It is helpful to differentiate broader shifts within the US security establishment from actions the president has taken largely on his own. The 2018 US National Defense Strategy, which reflected the consensus view of security, defense, and military officials in the United States declared that, “Interstate strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”8 This reprioritization was still in progress at the time of writing, and some analysts question whether the Department of Defense was taking the steps necessary to effectuate a pivot to great power competition.9 Nevertheless, there were some notable indicators that the United States was prepared to realign its resources away from counterterrorism. For example, in summer 2018, then Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis ordered the military to reduce the presence of US forces in Africa by several hundred Special Operations troops in order to focus more on threats from Russian and China.10 A strategic review that could lead to further reductions on the continent was underway at the time of writing.11 These broader shifts raise questions, which Trump’s rhetoric and actions have reinforced, about the US commitment to key counterterrorism battlefields. Trump promised during his campaign to intensify the US military campaign against the Islamic State and other terrorist groups, but he also pledged to end “stupid wars” and bring home American forces still fighting in places like Afghanistan and Syria. In December 2018, Trump took much of the world, including his own advisors, by surprise when he announced via tweet a full and rapid withdrawal of

8 The Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the Competitive Edge (Washington, DC, January 2018). 9 Mackenzie Eaglen, “Just Say No: The Pentagon Needs to Drop the Distractions and Move Great Power Competition Beyond Lip Service,” War on the Rocks, October 28, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/just-say-no-the-pentagon-needs-todrop-the-distractions-and-move-great-power-competition-beyond-lip-service/. 10 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon May Cut Commando Forces in Africa in Major Military Review,” New York Times, June 4, 2018. See also, Eric Schmitt, “Where Terrorism Is Rising in Africa and the U.S. Is Leaving,” New York Times, March 1, 2019. 11 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Eric Schmitt, “Despite Vow to End ‘Endless Wars,’ Here’s Where About 200,000 Troops Remain,” New York Times, October 21, 2019, https:// www.nytimes.com/2019/10/21/world/middleeast/us-troops-deployments.html.

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over 2000 US troops in Syria.12 The president attempted to justify this decision by falsely claiming the Islamic State was completely defeated, rather than merely degraded, before allowing his administration to walk back the troop withdrawal.13 The episode nevertheless reinforced questions about US staying power in terrorist hot spots. Trump has also waffled on Afghanistan, acknowledging his desire to bring home US troops fighting there while simultaneously deploying several thousand more of them to the war-torn country.14 Yet the potential that Trump could abruptly end US mission there at any time with a single tweet hovers over the mission. The number of American troops still in Afghanistan has declined over the past year as peace talks with the Taliban gained steam.15 Although these talks foundered in September 2019, American and Afghan officials have suggested that the overall US force presence could continue to drop further as troops cycling home may not be replaced.16 As this book was going to press, Trump ordered yet another withdrawal from northern Syria and promised the troops deployed there would return to the United States. In addition to hunting Islamic State remnants, the US forces he sought to withdraw were helping to maintain a delicate arrangement wherein the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish forces jointly patrolled the Syria-Turkish border. Trump’s order to withdraw US troops came after a call with Turkish

12 “Trump Shocks Allies and Advisers with Plan to Pull US Troops Out of Syria,” The Guardian, December 19, 2018; Timothy Bella, “‘Trump Gets No Credit’: As Republicans Question Syria Withdrawal, Trump Tweets to Defend Himself,” Washington Post, December 20, 2018. 13 Bill McCarthy and Miriam Valverde, “Fact-Checking Donald Trump’s Claims About Syria and US Troop Withdrawal,” Politifact, October 8, 2019, https://www.politifact. com/truth-o-meter/article/2019/oct/08/fact-checking-donald-trumps-claims-aboutsyria-and/. 14 Stephen Tankel, “The Only Way Trump’s Afghanistan Plan Would Make Sense,” Fortune, August 22, 2017, https://fortune.com/2017/08/22/trump-afghanistan-speech/. 15 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Mujab Mashal, “U.S. Is Quietly Reducing Its Troop Force in Afghanistan,” New York Times, October 21, 2019. 16 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Eric Schmitt, “Despite Vow to End ‘Endless Wars,’ Here’s Where About 200,000 Troops Remain.”

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President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was intent on invading northern Syria to eliminate America’s Kurdish partners in the SDF. The withdrawal, which was so sudden that US forces had to bomb arms depots as they retreated, was widely condemned by numerous terrorism experts and members of both major political parties in the United States for several reasons.17 First, it was viewed as a betrayal of the Kurds and a greenlight for Erdogan to engage in ethnic cleansing. Second, the SDF was forced to pivot from fighting the Islamic State to combating Turkish forces. At least one hundred Islamic State prisoners escaped from SDF-run prisons.18 Third, rather than coming home as Trump had promised, some of the troops were redeployed to Iraq. Others were redirected to secure oil fields in eastern Syria. Members of the administration, including Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, asserted the intent was to keep the Islamic State from seizing the oil fields, a problem created by the decision to abandon the Kurdish-led SDF.19 Trump arguably made matters worse when he stated his intent to pillage some of the oil these fields produced.20 Fourth, the abrupt withdrawal and betrayal of a key US partner was viewed as another blow to American credibility with allies and other counterterrorism partners around the world.21 Although Trump’s commitment to keeping US forces in various counterterrorism battlefields is questionable, his preference for relying mainly 17 The S.D.F. lost approximately 11,000 of its troops. The United States lost six. 18 Greg Norman, “More Than 100 ISIS Prisoners in Syria Are on the Loose Following

Turkey’s Invasion, US Envoy Says,” Fox News, October 23, 2019, https://www.foxnews. com/world/isis-prisoners-escape-syria-turkey-invasion. 19 Karen DeYoung, Dan Lamothe, Missy Ryan, and Michael Birnbaum, “Trump Decided to Leave Troops in Syria After Conversations About Oil, Officials Say,” Washington Post, October 25, 2019. 20 Trump said his intention was to “make a deal with an Exxon Mobil or one of our

great companies to go in there” and modernize the productive capacity of these fields, adding that the oil can, “help us, because we should be able to take some also.” Lauren Hirsch, “Trump Wants to Make a Deal with Exxon or Others to Tap Syrian Oil: ‘We Should Be Able to Take Some’,” CNBC, October 27, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/ 2019/10/27/trump-wants-to-make-a-deal-with-exxon-or-others-to-tap-syrian-oil.html. 21 According to US officials, America’s closest allies, including France and the United

Kingdom, were not consulted about the decision in advance French President Emmanuel Macron found out about the decision on Twitter. “The Betrayal of our Syrian Kurdish Partners: How Will American Foreign Policy and Leadership Recover?,” House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, October 23, 2019, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearings? ID=7CEB42E4-E0BA-46F7-95F1-4BBCD17A8C38.

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on the use of force to achieve counterterrorism objectives is clear. Trump has repeatedly declared his preference for US military action to accomplish counterterrorism objectives, including most famously proposing a plan to combat the Islamic State that consisted of “bomb[ing] the shit out of them.”22 He has turned back the clock to the type of overwhelmingly military-centric approach toward counterterrorism that characterized the early Bush years. This has been obvious in greater latitude given to military commanders and more relaxed rules of engagement when it comes to the use of force.23 Trump has relaxed the military rules of engagement in “hot battlefields” like Afghanistan, and loosened Obama-era restrictions on drone strikes and commando raids beyond them.24 The pace of counterterrorism operations has escalated in Yemen, in Somalia, and elsewhere under Trump’s watch.25 Depending on their implementation, such changes can have significant consequences—both positive and negative—but they still fall within the basic counterterrorism paradigm that Trump inherited. What’s missing is a public explanation of why the administration has made these changes and what strategy they’re intended to serve. US government transparency—about where US forces are operating, who they are targeting and under what authorities—has declined considerably since Trump took office.

22 See, for example, Tim Haines, “Trump’s Updated ISIS Plan: ‘Bomb the Shit Out of Them,’ Send in Exxon to Rebuild,” RealClear Politics, November 13, 2015, https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2015/11/13/trumps_updated_isis_plan_ bomb_the_shit_out_of_them_send_exxon_in_to_rebuild.html. 23 Jim Michaels, “Trump Gives Defense Chief Mattis Running Room in War-Fighting,” USA Today, April 5, 2017; Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “Trump Administration Is Said to Be Working to Loosen Counterterrorism Rules,” New York Times, March 12, 2017. 24 Aaron Mehta, “Mattis Reveals New Rules of Engagement,” Military Times, October 3, 2017, https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2017/10/03/mattis-revealsnew-rules-of-engagement/; Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “Trump Poised to Drop Some Limits on Drone Strikes and Commando Raids,” New York Times, September 21, 2017. 25 Christopher Woody, “Trump Is Ordering Airstrikes at 5 Times the Pace Obama

Did,” Business Insider, April 4, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-is-orderingairstrikes-at-5-times-the-pace-obama-did-2017-4; Helene Cooper, “Over 100 Shabab Militants Killed in U.S. Airstrike in Somalia,” New York Times, November 21, 2017; and Karoun Demirjian, “U.S. Will Expand Counterterrorism Focus in Africa, Mattis Tells Senators,” Washington Post, October 20, 2017.

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This more aggressive use of force is part of a wider trend under Trump in which US counterterrorism—and US foreign policy in general—has become more militaristic and less focused on political and socioeconomic dynamics. Trump’s preference for military action over other instruments of national power extends to the support he is prepared to offer other countries. His administration has attempted to cut assistance for economic development and their civilian sectors. This priority is clear by looking at the two budgets the Trump administration produced for fiscal years 2018, 2019, and 2020, all of which increased money for the Department of Defense and slashed funding for foreign aid administered by the State Department and USAID.26 This prioritization risks creating conditions in which partner militaries either fill the void or hand off responsibility to civilian entities unprepared to sustain any gains made. Slashing foreign assistance also makes it more difficult to stabilize conflict zones where terrorists operate and prevent fragile states from becoming terrorist safe havens. The Bush and Obama administrations both attempted to reduce the risk factors for terrorism, albeit with very mixed results. The Bush administration sought to incorporate stabilization, reconstruction, and development into its counterterrorism strategy, and Obama built on this practice. Politically and ideologically, Bush made the “freedom agenda” a lynchpin of US counterterrorism strategy. Promoting democracy in the Arab world was intended to address political alienation, which the Bush administration viewed as the main driver of terrorism, and help the United States win the war of ideas against al-Qaeda. This constituted a major part of the effort to combat radicalization and terrorist recruitment during the first half-decade after 9/11, and provide to be an overly simplistic approach. The “freedom agenda” focused on getting leaders to hold free elections at the expense of many other issues. Promoting democracy without 26 Leaders from both parties came together and pledged to fight Trump’s attempts to bypass Congress and roll back billions of dollars from the foreign aid budget. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government: A New Foundation for American Greatness (Washington, DC: Fiscal Year 2018); Office of Management and Budget, Efficient, Effective Accountable: An American Budget (Washington, DC: Fiscal Year 2019). On Congress see, Lesley Wroughton and Patricia Zengerle, “U.S. Senators Pledge to Fight Trump Push to Cut Foreign Aid,” Reuters, August 16, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-trump-aid/u-s-senators-pledge-to-fighttrump-push-to-cut-foreign-aid-idUSL1N1V71ET.

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addressing other push and pull factors for radicalization was unlikely to solve the jihadist problem.27 Moreover, although the freedom agenda and its explicit connection to Iraq gave the impression that the Bush administration intended to impose democracy, local elites were prepared to do more to prevent democratization than Washington was to promote it. The freedom agenda thus produced the worst of both worlds. It failed to ameliorate the political conditions that contributed to jihadism, which gained a greater foothold in the Middle East thanks to the Iraq invasion. Simultaneously, the push for democratization antagonized counterterrorism partners, such as Egypt, which resisted pressure from the United States to change their political systems. The Iraq invasion alienated these partners as well as other close allies, such as France, which opposed the war. Because Bush’s freedom agenda had strained relations with many partners, especially Muslim countries, Obama deemphasized democratization. During a speech in Cairo intended to reset relations with the Muslim world, Obama declared that while the United States remained committed to governments that reflect the will of their people, it would not attempt to impose a system of government on other nations.28 Instead, the United States would attempt to push partner nations in a direction that advanced US counterterrorism interests while setting an example through good governance and respect for human rights.29 The Obama administration tried to take a more nuanced approach to countering violent extremism (CVE), which it defined as “the preventive aspects of counterterrorism as well as interventions to undermine the attraction of extremist movements and ideologies that seek to promote violence.”30 Rather than pushing for major political reforms, Obama would attempt to address the different push and pull factors that contributed to terrorist recruitment and radicalization. Yet the administration failed to achieve consensus on how to execute a CVE agenda. One 27 Push factors create conditions that make individuals or communities more susceptible to recruitment and radicalization. These factors may be the product of events in an individual’s life but also are often connected to structural conditions in society. Pull factors draw an individual toward an extremist group or cause. 28 Barack Obama, “A New Beginning,” New York Times, June 4, 2009. 29 National Strategy for Counterterrorism (2011). 30 White House, “Fact Sheet: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism,” February 18, 2015.

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camp within the administration argued for staying narrowly scoped on CVE-specific initiatives that directly focus on keeping people at risk of executing or supporting terrorist violence from doing so. Another camp insisted on the need for a more wide-ranging approach that also includes CVE-relevant activities to address myriad societal risk factors.31 Under Obama, the US government attempted to focus on both narrowly scoped initiatives and wider reforms. At the narrower end of the spectrum, the Obama administration supported local partners, including civil society organizations and other nongovernmental actors, including religious leaders, teachers, and local businesses, all of which are considered critical actors when it comes to countering radicalization.32 When Obama expanded the use of CVE-related economic development, these programs ranged from dispensing economic support funds (ESF) to governments to supporting local communities that ran vocational training programs for at-risk youth.33 More broadly, his administration attempted to help and encourage partner nations to build their security capacity consistent with the principles of good governance and rule of law, which, as research shows, correlate with lower instances of terrorism.34 After the Arab uprisings, Obama pursued political reform more robustly. He attempted to help midwife regime change in some countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, while simultaneously reassuring other long-standing autocratic partners that the United States would not abandon them. Both the Bush and Obama administrations recognized the need to work with partners that do not share US values, but they each attempted to promote political reforms. These reforms were often unsuccessful, but at the very least they sent the message that the United States cared 31 Background briefings for the author by US government officials. See also Department

of State and USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2016); Romaniuk, Does CVE Work? 32 On these types of activities see, Andrew Glazzard and Eric Rosand, “Is It All Over for CVE?” Lawfare, June 11, 2017; Eric Rosand, “Communities First: A Blueprint for Organizing and Sustaining a Global Movement Against Violent Extremism” (Washington, DC: The Prevention Project Organizing Against Violent Extremism, December 2016). 33 Some of the local efforts built on preexisting initiatives, such as a USAID pilot program launched in 2006 to combat radicalization in the Sahel. See Jeffrey Swedberg and Steven Smith, “Mid-Term Evaluation of USAID’s Counter-Extremism Programming in Africa,” USAID, February 1, 2011. 34 Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young, “Terrorism, Democracy, and Credible Commitments,” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2 (June 2011): 357–378.

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about these issues and was paying attention to how other countries governed themselves. The US government continues to pursue efforts geared toward terrorism prevention—the administration’s preferred term for countering violent extremism—under Trump’s watch. For example, his counterterrorism strategy implies the United States is committed to pressing partner governments to allow civil society to function. Yet these efforts are occurring in spite of the president, not because of him. Since taking office, Trump has been openly hostile to promoting good governance and rule of law abroad. His repeated claims that the media is the enemy of the people, for example, have signaled to autocrats everywhere that they have carte blanche to crush dissent. For evidence of this, look no further than the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. Trump’s embrace of authoritarianism—to the point of expressing respect for and sometimes even envy of foreign dictators—makes it harder for the United States to dissuade other countries from pursuing the types of repressive policies that fuel terrorism and undercut civil society organizations that are essential to countering radicalization.35 When Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt, an autocrat who prioritizes crushing political opposition, sometimes even at the expense of combating IS-Sinai, asked Trump to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization, he “found himself pushing on an open door.”36 The title of the New York Times story from which this quote came said it all, “On Muslim Brotherhood, Trump Weighs Siding With Autocrats and Roiling Middle East.” Trump subsequently demanded the designation despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of experts agreed the Brotherhood does not fit the criteria. Designating it would “politicize the designation process, which would undercut the strength of actual designations against terrorist groups,” to quote one expert, while simultaneously diverting resources from combating real terrorist groups like the Islamic State and 35 Domenico Montenaro, “6 Strongmen Trump Has Praised—And the Conflicts It Present,” NPR, May 2, 2017, https://www.npr.org/2017/05/02/526520042/6strongmen-trumps-praised-and-the-conflicts-it-presents; Philip Rucker, “‘Dictator Envy’: Trump’s Praise of Kim Jong Un Widens His Embrace of Totalitarian Leaders,” Washington Post, June 15, 2018. 36 Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton reportedly favored designating the Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization even before el-Sisi made the request. See, Eric Schmitt, Helene Cooper, Edward Wong, and Charlie Savage, “On Muslim Brotherhood, Trump Weighs Siding with Autocrats and Roiling Middle East,” New York Times, May 6, 2019.

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al-Qaeda. The issue remained under review by the State Department at the time of writing. One area where the president’s counterterrorism strategy has evolved beyond his predecessors’ for the better is in its acknowledgment of the threats posed by domestic terrorists not motivated by jihadist ideology. This is a welcome addition, even if the strategy muddied the water by lumping white nationalists and other right-wing extremists—who were responsible for the largest number of deadly attacks in the United States since 2001—together with far less lethal actors like animal rights organizations.37 Since then, the US government has elevated the threat from what it terms “racially/ethnically motivated violent extremists,” and begun developing policies to combat them domestically and internationally.38 Yet these efforts face headwinds in part because of the president. He has not only promoted faux counterterrorism policies in pursuit of political and ideological objectives but also crossed the line into enabling white nationalist terrorism.

Faux Counterterrorism No counterterrorism strategy is perfect in planning or execution, but most experts would probably agree that Obama and Bush pursued policies intended to address genuine terrorist threats and keep Americans safe, even if their efficacy was and is subject to a healthy debate. The same could be said for the Trump administration’s approach to actual counterterrorism. It is overly militaristic and often undercut by the president’s rhetoric and actions, but it nevertheless falls within the traditional paradigm of counterterrorism. By contrast, Trump’s faux counterterrorism is, ultimately, driven by raw political calculation and white nationalist ideology that includes a broad-brush emphasis on radical Islam and conflation of terrorism with immigration. These two positions—a knee-jerk opposition to Islam and conflation of terrorism and immigration—have repeatedly manifested in the form of anti-Muslim rhetoric, efforts to stoke fear in the wake of attacks perpetrated by jihadists and underplay those conducted by white nationalists, multiple attempts to implement an anti-Muslim travel ban that in no way reflects the real threats facing Americans, and the perpetuation of rumors 37 Government Accountability Office, Countering Violent Extremism: Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts (Washington, DC, April 2017), http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683984.pdf. 38 Author interviews with US officials.

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that jihadists are infiltrating migrant caravans crossing the United States’ southern border.39 These elements of Trump’s brand of counterterrorism represent a total, seemingly deliberate, rejection of the policies of his predecessors.40 Trump’s faux counterterrorism undermines the more positive aspects of his administration’s actual counterterrorism efforts against al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the wider jihadist movement. His rhetoric and policies risk strengthening the jihadist narrative of a US-led war against Islam and creating the impression that the US government’s position is that Muslims don’t belong in Western societies. This can make it easier for groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State to recruit and increase the potential that Muslims, especially in the West, recruit themselves. Researchers monitoring Islamic State fanboys on Telegram as well as on official channels have found evidence of these actors responding to Trump’s policies by posting videos and memes of jihadist ideologies stating that the West will eventually turn against its Muslim citizens. Additionally, Trump’s anti-Muslim bias risks becoming a disincentive for Muslim Americans to cooperate with law enforcement because they believe the government is discriminating against them.41 The bigger danger is that Trump’s nativist agenda, which informs his faux counterterrorism policies, enables white nationalist terrorism. I use the term “enabling” to contributing—directly or indirectly though the pursuit of positions and policies—to an environment in which terrorism and extremist violence can flourish. The term is useful for two 39 See, for example, Adam Serwer, “Trump’s Caravan Hysteria Led to This,” The Atlantic, October 28, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/ 2018/10/caravan-lie-sparked-massacre-american-jews/574213/; Rosie Gray, “Trump Defends White-Nationalist Protesters: ‘Some Very Fine People on Both Sides’,” The Atlantic, August 15, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/ 08/trump-defends-white-nationalist-protesters-some-very-fine-people-on-both-sides/ 537012/; and Jonathan Lemire, “Trump Downplays White Nationalism Threat After Massacre,” Associated Press, March 16, 2019, https://www.apnews.com/ a36d40133acf40b5a0ddda2fa130736e. 40 Bush emphasized that combatting terrorism should not be equated with being antiIslam. Obama reiterated this message and worked diligently to build the public’s resilience to terrorist attacks. 41 “Trump and Counterterrorism: Sixteen Years After 9/11,” War on the Rocks, September 11, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/trump-and-counterterrorism-sixteen-years-after-911/.

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reasons. First, it avoids the trap of trying to show direct causality for specific attacks, which is difficult to assess, and instead pays attention to how an actor helps to fuel the movement from which terrorists emanate. It is possible to preside over an executive branch apparatus that actively opposes terrorists—arresting and prosecuting individuals involved in illegal activities, as US law enforcement continues to do—while simultaneously enabling extremists. The term also accounts for the fact that even people who are not inspired by Trump still may be more prone to commit acts of extremist violence because of the environment he has helped create. Second, the term enabling focuses on the impact of the positions and policies in question, not the motivation behind them. Leaders and governments may engage in enabling behavior because they sympathize with an extremist cause, to enhance their domestic legitimacy with key constituencies, to project power abroad, or for various other reasons. Trump may not be deliberately trying to enable white nationalist extremists and terrorists, but his rhetoric and actions are having that effect by validating their fears about immigrants, Muslims, Jews, and other minorities.42 Scholars have identified five indicators of “dangerous speech,” at least two of which must be present for rhetoric to qualify: a powerful speaker with a high degree of influence; a means of dissemination that is influential in itself; an audience that has grievances and fears the speaker can cultivate; a social or historical context that is propitious for violence; and a speech act that is clearly understood as a call to violence. At least the first four of these indicators have been present in Trump’s rhetoric.43 Trump is the president of the United States, and his rallies and Twitter feed provide a means of direct communication to white nationalist extremists, who clearly have grievances he can cultivate and a history of 42 Adam Serwer, “Trump’s Caravan Hysteria Led to This,” The Atlantic, October 28, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/caravan-liesparked-massacre-american-jews/574213/; Nicole Goodman, “Donald Trump Keeps Calling Adversaries ‘Globalists,’ Despite Warnings It’s Anti-Semitic,” Newsweek, August 1, 2018, https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-anti-semitic-globalist-koch1052375; and Brian Resnick, “White Fear of Demographic Change Is a Powerful Psychological Force,” Vox, January 28, 2017, https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/ 1/26/14340542/white-fear-trump-psychology-minority-majority. 43 The Dangerous Speech Project, https://dangerousspeech.org/.

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violence. Republican allies in Congress and the conservative media amplify Trump’s messages, have actively promoted conspiracy theories and “dog whistles” that resonate with white nationalists.44 Trump has made calls for violence as well, although it is hard to know with certainty whether they influenced individuals involved in terrorism or other incidents of extremist violence.45 The president’s policies, some of them implemented under the cover of counterterrorism, reinforce his rhetoric. At the time of writing, his administration had made three attempts to implement an anti-Muslim travel ban ostensibly to combat terrorism, despite the fact that the ban in no way reflected the real terrorist threats facing Americans.46 Although his party controls the executive and legislative branches, Trump has threatened to shut down the government on multiple occasions over his demands to build a border wall to keep out, in practical effect, nonwhite immigrants.47 In late 2018, Trump ordered the US military to deploy troops to the southwest US border to head off a caravan of refugees. The deployment followed Trump’s efforts to turn the caravan into a national emergency in advance of the US mid-term elections.48 By mobilizing the machinery of government in service of policies that are not only anti-immigration but also anti-immigrant, Trump illustrates a commitment to action and to white nationalist objectives that goes beyond mere rhetoric. These policies, which are intended to cater to his 44 Laurie Goodstein, “‘There Is Still so Much Evil’: Growing Anti-Semitism Stuns American Jews,” New York Times, October 29, 2018; Mike DeBonis, “GOP Presses Ahead in Casting Soros as Threat Amid Criticism That Attacks Are Anti-Semitic,” Washington Post, October 29, 2018. 45 Meghan Keneally, “A Look Back at Trump Comments Perceived by Some as Encour-

aging Violence,” ABC New, October 19, 2018, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/backtrump-comments-perceived-encouraging-violence/story?id=48415766. 46 The Supreme Court upheld the third attempt, although not on the grounds that Trump’s reasoning or motivation was correct. Rather, in a 5–4 ruling, justices found that, as president, Trump had the statutory authority to make national security judgments regarding immigration despite his history of incendiary rhetoric against Muslims. 47 Jacob Pramuk, “Trump May Choose to Shut Down the Government This Weekend Over His Border Wall Demands,” CNBC, September 26, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/ 2018/09/26/trump-may-force-government-shutdown-over-border-wall-spending.html; Philip Rucker, Robert Costa, and Damian Paletta, “Trump Threatens Again to Shut Down Federal Government Over Border-Wall Funding,” Washington Post, July 29, 2018. 48 Serwer, “Trump’s Caravan Hysteria Led to This.”

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base and mobilize voters through fear, also reinforce the white nationalist threat perceptions that fuel extremist activism and violence. The use of American troops as political pawns is especially notable because it sends the explicit message that force against immigrants is both necessary and legitimate. As if that were not clear enough, Trump compared the caravan of approximately 3000 men, women, and children to an “invasion,” and said US forces should fire on them if they throw rocks.49 Enabling can include actions that thwart efforts to combat extremism, as well as those that encourage it. Trump has repeatedly refused to single out white nationalists for culpability after terrorist attacks or to disavow them in general. Trump famously asserted there was “blame on both sides,” following outbreaks of violence, including the murder of one woman by a self-proclaimed white supremacist, that occurred when white nationalists rallied in Charlottesville, Virginia, against the removal of statues of Confederate leaders.50 Internationally, Trump responded to the terrorist attacks against mosques in Christchurch by claiming he didn’t see white nationalism as a rising threat around the world.51 Scholars of political violence have pointed out that both of these actions may lead white nationalists to believe Trump supports their views and will be more tolerant of extremist violence or illegal acts than previous presidents.52 Trump has also been a direct impediment to combating white nationalist extremism in certain cases, although in these instances the US government bureaucracy has served as a check on the president’s impulses. For example, soon after taking office, Trump cut money for a government program intended to counter different forms of violent extremism in the United States and canceled funding for outside groups working

49 Ryan Browne and Nicole Gaouette, “Pentagon Rejected Request for Troops It Viewed as Emergency Law Enforcement at Border,” CNN, November 2, 2018, https:// www.cnn.com/2018/11/02/politics/white-house-pentagon-troops-border/index.html. 50 Dan Merica, “Trump Says Both Sides to Blame Amid Charlottesville Backlash,” CNN, August 16, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/15/politics/trumpcharlottesville-delay/index.html. 51 Andy Campbell, “Donald Trump: ‘I Don’t Really’ See a Rise in White Nationalism,” Huffington Post, March 15, 2019, https://bit.ly/2YbmrbC. 52 Arie Perliger, “Terror Isn’t Always a Weapon of the Weak—It Can also Support the Powerful,” The Conversation, October 28, 2018, https://theconversation.com/terror-isntalways-a-weapon-of-the-weak-it-can-also-support-the-powerful-82626.

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to counter white supremacist ideology specifically.53 This was part of a wider effort to demolish the federal government infrastructure created to prevent extremist violence by domestic actors. In the years since his election, however, elements of the US government have begun attempting to rebuild this capability. In September 2019, the US Department of Homeland Security officially recognized white supremacist violent extremism as a major national security threat and introduced a new counterterrorism strategy that placed a major emphasis on countering it.54 The National Counterterrorism Center and State Department also began devoting more attention to the issue according to outside experts that both agencies consulted as part of this effort.55 Quantifying the impact of Trump’s enabling rhetoric and actions, including his faux counterterrorism policies, is difficult. His campaign was a coming-out party for far-right and white nationalist groups, which by 2016 were coordinating more and pooling resources.56 There are numerous instances of American white nationalist extremists citing Trump or his positions after committing various acts of violence.57 Internationally, the person allegedly responsible for the terrorist attacks against mosques in 53 Julia Edwards Ainsley, “White House Budget Slashes ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ Grants,” Reuters, May 23, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-budget-extremism/white-house-budget-slashes-countering-violent-extremism-grantsidUSKBN18J2HJ; Laura Strickler, “Trump Admin Will Apparently Not Renew Program to Fight Domestic Terror,” NBC News, October 31, 2018, https://www.nbcnews. com/politics/national-security/trump-admin-will-apparently-not-renew-program-fightdomestic-terror-n926361. 54 Tess Owen, “DHS Just Finally Recognized White Nationalism as a Major Terror Threat,” Vice News, September 20, 2019, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/j5yjkb/ dhs-just-finally-recognized-white-nationalism-as-a-major-terror-threat. 55 Author discussions with outside experts on white nationalist terrorism. 56 J.M. Berger, “How White Nationalists Learned to Love Donald Trump,” Politico,

October 25, 2016, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/10/donald-trump2016-white-nationalists-alt-right-214388; Greg Sargent, “Trump’s Hate and Lies Are Inciting Extremists. Just Ask the Analyst Who Warned Us,” Washington Post, October 29, 2018. 57 Lorenzo Ferrigno, “Donald Trump: Boston Beating Is ‘Terrible’,” CNN, August 21, 2015; https://www.cnn.com/2015/08/20/politics/donald-trump-immigration-bostonbeating/; Roxana Hegeman, “3 Men Accused of Kansas Mosque Bomb Plot Ask Judge for Pro-Trump Jurors,” Talking Points Memo, December 11, 2017, https://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/three-men-accused-kansas-mosque-bombplot-request-pro-trump-jurors; Mitch Smith, “Kansas Trio Convicted in Plot to Bomb Somali Immigrants,” New York Times, April 18, 2018; and Danielle Paquette, Lori Rozsa,

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Christchurch, New Zealand praised Trump in his terrorist manifesto as “a symbol of renewed white identity and common purpose.”58 The alleged terrorist who opened fire in a Walmart in El Paso, TX, killing over 20 people, wrote in his manifesto that the attack was a “response to the Hispanic invasion of Texas.”59 Trump has used the term “invasion” repeatedly to warn that America was under attack by immigrants streaming across its southern border. Not all white nationalist extremists who commit an act of terrorism laud the president, but that does not mean their violence is disconnected from the environment he has helped to create. Robert Bowers, who slaughtered 11 people in the Tree of Life synagogue on October 27, bought into Trump’s concocted threats of a migrant caravan and cited it in an online post shortly before his attack.60 But he also believed the president was a poser, “a globalist, not a nationalist,” and therefore he had to take matters into his own hands.61 Anyone familiar with the study of political violence will recognize this dynamic: Figures of authority promote extremist ideas, but they do not take sufficient action to satisfy some of the rank-and-file, who then act on their own. Trump gave a statement after the attack in El Paso in which he condemned white supremacy. Yet even then, the president focused the majority of his remarks about possible motives for the attack on mental health

and Matt Zapotosky, “‘He Felt That Somebody Was Finally Talking to Him’: How the Package-Bomb Suspect Found Inspiration in Trump,” Washington Post, October 27, 2018. 58 Melissa Davey, “Christchurch Shooting: Ardern Says ‘Manifesto’ Sent to Office Minutes Before Massacre,” The Guardian, March 17, 2019. 59 Peter Baker and Michael D. Shear, “El Paso Shooting Suspect’s Manifesto Echoes Trump’s Language,” New York Times, August 4, 2019. 60 Colin Kalmbacher, “Alleged Synagogue Shooter Robert Bowers Endorsed GOP Talking Point That Jewish Groups Funded Migrant Caravan,” Law and Crime, October 27, 2018, https://lawandcrime.com/high-profile/alleged-synagogue-shooter-robertbowers-endorsed-gop-talking-point-that-jewish-groups-funded-migrant-caravan/. 61 Taly Krupkin, Amir Tibon, and Judy Maltz, “‘Screw Your Optics, I’m Going In’: Suspected White Supremacist Shooter Behind Pittsburgh Synagogue Attack,” Haaretz, October 28, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium-screw-your-optics-i-mgoing-in-who-is-the-suspected-pittsburgh-shooter-1.6595724.

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issues and the glorification of violence in video games.62 And not long after, Trump appeared to blame the media as well, “Fake News has contributed greatly to the anger and rage that has built up over many years.”63 Moreover, as of the time of writing, the Trump campaign has refused to stop using the word “invasion” in television advertisements, despite the fact that the men allegedly responsible for the terrorist attacks in El Paso and Pittsburgh used the same language.64

Conclusion Donald Trump’s National Defense Strategy declared interstate strategic competition, not terrorism, to be the primary concern in US national security.65 As someone who has spent more than a decade studying terrorism and advising policymakers on how to combat it, I’m heavily in favor of prioritizing conventional security concerns. Terrorism will remain a persistent challenge, however, and can warp domestic politics, hijack foreign policy, and destabilize other countries. For this reason it cannot be ignored. Yet, with the exception of firing off tweets after major jihadist terrorist attacks, Trump has failed to make counterterrorism the issue one might have expected given how hard he campaigned on the fears associated with terrorism. Like other major policy areas, the Trump administration’s approach to counterterrorism is something of a jumble. It is hard to quibble with the overall thrust of his counterterrorism strategy, which reads like a traditional interagency product that could have been developed by any administration. This is arguably better than the alternative—the strategy could have been written to reflect Trump’s broad-brush emphasis on radical Islam, the conflation of terrorism with immigration, and “bomb the shit out of them” approach to the problem. Yet it is not at all clear that Trump is aware of his own administration’s strategy, much less that he agrees with it.

62 President Trump complete remarks on Mass Shootings, https:// www.rev.com/transcript-editor/shared/F4EpWBodk2NZ3A6Xy1Vb6TUI9ckO_ Ui6OFx6iNbgABGlJakHi1MKCRs7km3rSXa_zGysWiONJqz9r49Yyap4-Guuenk? loadFrom=DocumentDeeplink&ts=5.88. 63 https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1158340095608610816. 64 Michael Crowley, Rick Rojas, and Campbell Robertson, “President Plans Visits to Places Where Grief Mixes with Anger at Him,” New York Times, August 6, 2019. 65 The Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.

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The administration has repurposed some of the more effective elements of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama approaches to counterterrorism, but it has also reverted to the type of overwhelmingly military-centric approach toward counterterrorism that characterized the early Bush years. Moreover, although programmatic efforts to counter radicalization and recruitment continue, the administration has largely abandoned efforts to promote stabilization or necessary political reforms and instead embraced authoritarians abroad. Trump himself continues to make no distinction between jihadists and the Muslim communities that often are on the frontlines in the fight against terrorism. He has also gone out of his way to alienate key allies in Europe. Most alarming is that he has used faux counterterrorism policies as a Trojan horse to pursue political and ideological objectives. His rhetoric and action in these areas risk undermining actual counterterrorism efforts and actually enabling white nationalist terrorism. This weakens the United States at home and on the international stage.

References Department of Defense. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the Competitive Edge. Washington, DC, January 2018. Department of State and USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism. Washington, DC: Department of State, 2016. Findley, Michael G., and Joseph K. Young, “Terrorism, Democracy, and Credible Commitments.” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2 (June 2011): 357– 378. Government Accountability Office. “Countering Violent Extremism: Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts.” Washington, DC, April 2017. http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683984.pdf. Office of Management and Budget. Budget of the U.S. Government: A New Foundation for American Greatness. Washington, DC: Fiscal Year 2018. Office of Management and Budget. Efficient, Effective Accountable: An American Budget. Washington, DC: Fiscal Year 2019. Rosand, Eric. “Communities First: A Blueprint for Organizing and Sustaining a Global Movement Against Violent Extremis.” Washington, DC, The Prevention Project Organizing Against Violent Extremism, December 2016. Tankel, Stephen. With Us and Against Us: How America’s Partners Help and Hinder the War on Terror. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2018.

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“Transcript: Obama Addresses Counterterrorism, Drones.” NPR, May 23, 2013. https://www.npr.org/2013/05/23/186305171/transcript-obamaaddresses-counterterrorism-drones. White House. “Fact Sheet: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism,” February 18, 2015. White House. National Strategy for Counterterrorism. Washington, DC, June 2011. White House. National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America. Washington, DC, October 2018. White House. Remarks by President Trump and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at Bilateral Breakfast, July 11, 2018. https://www.whitehouse. gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-nato-secretary-generaljens-stoltenberg-bilateral-breakfast/.

Hand in Hand and Eye to Eye? US–French Counterterrorism Cooperation in the Sahel in the Trump-Macron Era Maya Kandel

Introduction French-American cooperation in the fight against terrorism, particularly in Africa and in the Sahel, is often cited as one of the most, if not the most, important aspects of the French–American bilateral relationship today. Within the defense relationship, it is an area where the United States and France work shoulder to shoulder and see eye to eye—or so it seemed until recently—in the words of officials of both countries. This chapter will first give a general overview of how such a relationship came to be, compared to the antagonism in Africa between the two countries during the Cold War; it will then analyze what has changed in the TrumpMacron era, especially with Trump’s “America First” foreign policy and the emphasis on great power competition rather than on the fight against terrorism; and finally where both countries go from there, given changing domestic circumstances, in France as in the United States, and rising skepticism on the current approach.

M. Kandel (B) Université Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris 3 (CREW), Paris, France © The Author(s) 2020 M. Quessard et al. (eds.), Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37258-3_7

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The key elements of the bilateral counterterrorism (CT) cooperation remain the same: intelligence collection and sharing, special forces cooperation (crucial for Barkhane but also outside of the Sahel area), US logistical support for the French operation (transport and refueling—in 2013 for Serval, since 2014 for Chammal in Syria and Iraq, maybe less so for Barkhane), and US financial support for Barkhane and the G5 Sahel— through a bilateral rather than multilateral framework.1 The high level of military cooperation achieved in the past few years was important enough for then Defense ministers Jean-Yves Le Drian (now France’s Foreign Affairs minister) and Ash Carter to sign a Joint Statement of Intent in late November 2016, outlining and formalizing the new level of defense cooperation reached between the two countries, and providing a framework for future bilateral cooperation. The basis is a shared vision of contemporary security threats, common objectives, and excellent operational cooperation.2

How French--US Cooperation in Africa Came to Be Presidents Emmanuel Macron and Donald Trump have largely inherited this strong bilateral cooperation, which arose from structural, circumstantial, and personal factors in the first half of the 2010 decade. 1 Serval was a military operation launched in January 2013 to counter the advance of jihadist forces on Mali’s capital Bamako: see Christopher Chivvis, The French War on Al Qa’ida in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). The Barkhane operation succeeded to Serval in the summer of 2014, marking the transition to a stabilization mission, covering a larger area of the Sahel, specifically the five countries of the G5 Sahel: Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad. See Bruno Charbonneau, “De Serval à Barkhane: les problèmes de la guerre contre le terrorisme au Sahel,” Les Temps Modernes, nos. 693–694 (2017): 322–340. 2 This chapter draws from several previous works by the author on US policy in Africa: “Le dilemme sécurité-libertés: les contradictions de la politique américaine en Afrique,” Politique Américaine, no. 24 (2015); “La stratégie américaine en Afrique,” Étude de l’IRSEM, no. 36 (Paris: Irsem, 2014), http://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/ 340846/4786994/file/Etude%20IRSEM%2036%20-%202014.pdf. Also published in English “U.S. Strategy in Africa”; “L’Afrique est restée sous le radar de Donald Trump,” Le Monde, November 10, 2018, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/11/10/ trump-meprise-autant-l-afrique-qu-obama-la-respectait_5381708_3212.html; “Pour l’armée américaine, l’Afrique est un laboratoire de la lutte antiterroriste,” Le Monde, November 20–21, 2016, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/11/10/trump-mepriseautant-l-afrique-qu-obama-la-respectait_5381708_3212.html.

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Constraints, Events, and Pragmatism The structural factors are the changes that occurred in the international strategic environment, as well as in the domestic political landscapes of both countries, leading to reduced means due to budgetary constraints on both sides, and less appetite in Washington for military adventures abroad, especially in areas deemed not crucial for American national interests. For the United States, it translated under Obama into a growing emphasis and appreciation for allies doing their part to share the burden, and in the idea of having the United States in a supporting role (leading from behind) with the French in the lead when no direct American interests are threatened. For France, starting under President Sarkozy, a new willingness to work with the United States, including in Africa, arose as a consequence of budgetary pressure leading to reduced military means, limiting the strategic space for a French “Gaullist” autonomous approach. Finally, an “Americanization” of the French perspective on fighting terrorism occurred under François Hollande’s presidency, with a strong convergence of both countries’ CT approach (rather than COIN).3 Circumstantial factors were mostly events on the ground and pragmatism on both sides in responding to the degradation of conditions in Mali in 2012, provoking the French intervention in January 2013 known as “Operation Serval” to stop jihadists’ descent on Bamako, which was (almost) immediately supported by the United States through financial and logistical support. The experience of working together on the military and intelligence levels was further enhanced by French participation in the US-led anti-ISIS coalition starting in 2014, and by the consequences of the 2015 attacks in Paris: after the November 13, 2015, terrorist attacks in Paris, the Obama administration and the Hollande government decided to create the “Comité Lafayette” for the exchange of intelligence between the two countries, thus giving France a quasi-Five Eyes status. Personal factors played as well, including the strong support by Pentagon leaders Leon Panetta and then James Mattis, who were both on the same page concerning the importance and role of allies in US strategy, and shared appreciation for the so-called “French way of war.” Another important personal connection was between Special Forces leaders Admiral McRaven and General de Saint-Quentin. Shared combat experience 3 Alice Pannier and Oliver Schmitt, “To Fight Another Day: France Between the Fight Against Terrorism and Future Warfare,” International Affairs 95, no. 4 (2019): 897–916.

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since Afghanistan, mutual appreciation, as well as increasing volumes of embedded and exchange officers (institutions, commands—AFRICOM, Barkhane) also played an important role in strengthening the bilateral mil-to-mil relationship.4 The current leaders have thus inherited a strong bilateral cooperation from their predecessors. Elected in May 2017, Macron also inherited a military operation that was already over 4 years old. The French 2017 Strategic Review declared that the Sahel remained critical for French security interests but also insisted that the goal was to transition to regional forces and responsibility. Barkhane supports the rise of the G5 Sahel joint force, placing its action in a regional framework, with the help of European and international partners, including the United States, while seriously focusing on and enhancing the development side (Alliance Sahel) for stabilization purposes, but also to create the conditions leading to a progressive French disengagement. There is a sense of responsibility on the French side, but also a sense that, as an anonymous official put it bluntly, that: “the French won’t leave Mali in the state that they didn’t find it.” The military commander of Barkhane, General Bruno Guibert, is the first to say that “there is no military solution for the Sahel,” only political ones and progress is slow on that front. On the American side, US policy in Africa and more precisely in the Sahel has remained relatively stable under Trump, thanks to two major characteristics: Africa remains essentially under Trump’s radar; and regarding the Sahel and cooperation with France, the military component and anti-terrorism focus have also protected it from presidential scrutiny and turbulence. However, the election of Donald Trump has also led to a very large debate in the United States on the objectives and priorities of American foreign policy, breaking an enduring consensus in particular on the US role in the world, and on the role and importance of allies in US foreign and defense policy. America First, Trumpism and Consequences for US Policy in Africa The US 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) stated that “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S.

4 Michael Shurkin, France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014).

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national security.”5 A decline in the counterterrorism budget has followed, and the fight against terrorism in general will become less important, for the executive, if not for the general public. The emphasis on great power competition, Russia and most importantly China, has also led the administration to question the relevance of Africa for US national interests, and foreign policy in general. This has already led to a redeployment of some American military forces, with an announced reduction of 10% of the US Special Forces present on the African continent. However, Africa also appears in the NDS as a theater of great power competition. The military commander of AFRICOM, General Thomas Waldhauser, chose to focus on this aspect in his March 2018 testimony to Congress, referring to his area of responsibility as an “increasingly crowded and competitive strategic environment,” and explicitly pointing to “competition with external players like China and Russia.”6 Of course, there are obvious advocacy reasons to defend his role and budget. But Congress has been responsive, and US Senators in particular have been sensitive to this competition between possible partners for African governments. Such a focus is unlikely to disappear, given the increased focus of the US Congress on China, and increasing Chinese presence on the African continent, principally through the extension of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, which defines China’s foreign policy in the current era.7 Trump’s Africa policy has been unfolding in a relative political vacuum, especially in the first 18 months of his administration. The Assistant Secretary of State for Africa (Tibor Nagy, a career diplomat) was only named and confirmed by Congress at the end of June 2018, one year and a half after the start of the Trump administration. In the White House and at the Pentagon, the most important people for Africa policy have been two former CIA members, nominated in 2017: Cyril Sartor at the National 5 Department of Defense, Summary of 2018 National Defense Strategy of the USA: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 6 Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Statement of General Thomas D. Waldhauser, United States Marine Corps Commander United States Africa Command,” March 13, 2018, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Waldhauser_ 03-13-18.pdf. 7 Daniel Flatley, “Africa’s Terror Fight to Suffer as China, Russia Take U.S. Focus,” Bloomberg News, July 11, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0711/africa-terror-fight-to-suffer-as-china-russia-take-u-s-focus.

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Security Council (NSC) in the White House, and Alan Patterson at the Department of Defense. Both have left in 2018. Patterson’s position has, since October 2018, been occupied by an acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Michelle Lenihan, previously Director for the Sahel region in the same office. Sartor was replaced by Elizabeth Erin Walsh, until then NSC director for international organizations and alliances. Prior to the definition of an actual strategy, a speech by Tom Shannon, then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, in September 2017 at the USIP remained the only thorough presentation of an African policy under Trump.8 The speech echoed the priorities of the Obama administration’s strategy for sub-Saharan Africa (the first of its kind), coupled with an emphasis on the continent’s trade opportunities. Whereas Obama listed four priorities, focusing on the first two (strengthening democratic institutions, developing economic growth, trade and investment, advancing peace and security, and promoting development), Shannon presented a different prioritization: peace and security; the fight against terrorism; a move from aid to trade, increasing trade and investment; and finally, democracy and good governance. The National Security Strategy (NSS) published in December 2017 devoted two pages to Africa to indicate, in the logic of “America first,” that the continent presented opportunities for US trade, but that corruption and terrorism prevented them from being exploited.9 Finally, in December 2018, National Security Advisor John Bolton unveiled a concise—the document is only four pages long—“New Strategy for Africa”, defining a new top priority of countering the “predatory policies” of China and Russia on the continent and restoring American influence. Bolton also indicated that the United States would reassess its support for all U.N. Peace Keeping Missions on the continent. This Bolton announcement followed Pentagon statements confirming a thenunspecified “reduction of the U.S. military footprint in Africa” (now seemingly limited to 10%, as pointed above) which is expected to focus on Djibouti, Somalia, and Libya. However, Bolton’s sudden departure 8 Thomas A. Shannon, “U.S.-African Partnerships: Advancing Common Interests. Remarks by Thomas A. Shannon, Jr., Under Secretary for Political Affairs at U.S. Institute of Peace,” U.S Department of State, Washington, DC, September 13, 2017, https://www.state.gov/remarks-and-releases-under-secretary-for-political-affairs/us-african-partnerships-advancing-common-interests/. 9 Department of Defense, “National Defense Strategy.”

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in September 2019 has again raised speculations that the focus on Africa might shift back again between these various priorities: counterterrorism, great power competition, and trade and business opportunities.

The Fight Against Terrorism, from Obama to Trump Stephen Tankel detailed the major changes in counterterrorism under Trump and in particular concerning direct (kinetic) actions (airstrikes and raids) outside conventional war zones, which had developed greatly under Obama and had become the defining characteristics of the “Obama model” of counterterrorism. Specifically, Tankel points to two main developments under Trump: a significant expansion of US direct airstrikes in Libya and Somalia (operated by AFRICOM); and an evolution in the use of Special Forces, not only in the case of insufficient local forces, but also increasingly to protect them, as was the case in Niger until the Tongo Tongo ambush of October 2017 (see below).10 These developments are inseparable from the new rules of force engagement adopted at the end of 2017 (Principles, Standards, and Procedures). Admittedly, they preserve two important aspects established by the Obama administration: distinction between war zones (active hostilities) and other countries; and concern for civilian victims. But the Trump administration has also removed two levels of demand: the standard that the terrorist target poses an imminent, direct, and enduring threat to US people or interests; the bureaucratic process, which was directed, under Obama, by the White House, but which now remains at a lower operational level, specifically in the military chain of command. The result has been a lower threshold for conducting operations, and less supervision of military decisions by political personnel (which is not necessarily negative in the Trump era, given the degradation of processes in decision-making, and which has allowed to preserve a certain coherence of action, particularly for AFRICOM). However, the increasing lack of transparency from

10 Stephen Tankel, “Donald Trump’s Shadow War,” Politico Magazine, May 9, 2018, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/05/09/donald-trumps-shadowwar-218327; Maya Kandel, “La lutte contre le terrorisme sous Obama,” Annuaire Français des Relations Internationales (Paris: Edition Panthéon-Assas, 2017).

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the Pentagon in general makes it difficult to analyze, debate, and evaluate such decisions.11 The 2017 Niger Ambush and Its Consequences On October 4, 2017, an ambush near the Tongo Tongo village in Niger cost the lives of four US soldiers accompanying Nigerien soldiers on a counterterrorism mission; the rapid arrival of French reinforcements (overflight by armed Mirage 40 minutes after the start of the ambush, arrival of helicopter reinforcements nearly five hours later) prevented additional casualties, a point which the Pentagon report strongly emphasizes in its public part.12 While Americans, including most Congressmen, seemed to discover the presence of US troops in Niger on this occasion, the June 2017 Trump administration’s public notification did indicate the presence of 645 American troops in Niger, making it the country with the largest American military presence in sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of Djibouti. Figures concerning the presence of the CIA and the DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency, involved in the fight against drug trafficking) are obviously classified. The first reaction in Congress was a vocal concern regarding AFRICOM, accused of taking too much risk in an area without direct US national interests, and of generally being involved too directly in local combat without having enough troops available.13 These points were raised repeatedly during a Senate hearing on October 30, 2017, which focused not on Niger but on the 2001 authorization to conduct military operations (AUMF), and more widely on the various legal authorities applying to train and equip programs of partner armies in Africa in particular, in the context of renewed scrutiny over America’s involvement in distant and long-lasting wars against terrorist groups. The Pentagon investigation and congressional concerns in 2018 focused in particular

11 Loren DeJonge Schulman and Alice Friend, “The Pentagon’s Transparency Problem,” Foreign Affairs, May 2, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/unitedstates/2018-05-02/pentagons-transparency-problem. 12 Department of Defense, “October 2017 Niger Ambush: Summary of Investigation,” May 10, 2018. 13 Scott R. Anderson and Sabrina McCubbin, “Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s AUMF Hearing,” Lawfare Blog, November 1, 2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/ summary-senate-foreign-relations-committees-aumf-hearing.

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on the role, number, and rules of engagement of US Special Forces in Africa. One aspect regularly pointed out by US specialists is that US Special Forces arriving in Africa often come from theaters of active hostilities (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria) and apply the same rules of engagement. But the missions in Africa are supposed to be support missions at the most, and in most cases training missions—in accordance with the “light footprint” approach, or its latest Trumpian version of “Working By, With, and Through Partners.” This is a general problem of the evolution of post-2007 Special Forces (since the Iraq surge), with forces that specialize in raids and counterterrorism, even though the African posture involves country experts and trainers. One of the first consequences was confirmed by a leak in the New York Times, pointing to an ongoing investigation (now a report) by the Pentagon and announcing a reduction of 25% of US Special Forces in Africa over a period of 18 months, and of 50% over 3 years.14 As mentioned above, the reduction has been limited to 10% at the time of this writing (it is estimated that there are 1200 US Special Forces deployed in subSaharan Africa and a total of 7300 in 92 countries around the world).15 Uncertainty remains about what, if anything, will replace them, with the US Army’s regional brigades being a mentioned option. It seems that the Pentagon is willing to revisit the evolution that has gradually made Special Forces the central actor of counterterrorism: the budget line dedicated to Special Forces in the fight against terrorism (Section 1208 of the Budget Laws of the Pentagon), created in 2005, reached 100 million in 2017, attesting to the importance of the forces as a central player in contemporary counterterrorism.16 It is significant in this respect that the Pentagon’s Budget Approval Act for the fiscal year 2019 requires the Department of Defense to submit an evaluation report from SOCOM, the command of the US Special Forces around the world.

14 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Eric Schmitt, “Special Operations Forces in Africa Likely to Face Cuts in Major Military Review,” New York Times, June 4, 2018, https://www. nytimes.com/2018/06/04/world/africa/commandos-africa-pivot-major-powers.html. 15 John Campbell, “U.S. Military Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa Will Likely Decline,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 5, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-militarypresence-sub-saharan-africa-will-likely-decline. 16 Joe Penney, “Africa, Latest Theater in America’s Endless War,” New York Review of Books, March 12, 2018, https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/12/africa-latesttheater-in-americas-endless-war/.

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Impact on US Bilateral Cooperation with France in the Sahel The bilateral relationship remains excellent in terms of information exchange via the Lafayette committee set up after the November 2015 attacks in Paris. It is undoubtedly the most crucial element of FrancoAmerican cooperation in Africa and in the fight against terrorism in general. It is mutually beneficial and not likely to change. However, any reduction of Special Forces on the ground, who often play a crucial role in initiating or complementing intelligence collection, could have consequences for the volume of information made available to Barkhane, which could then affect bilateral cooperation. Congress renewed in the 2019 Pentagon budget (National Defense Authorization Act, signed by Trump in August 2018) the authorization for the Secretary of Defense to spend up to $445 million in support of counterterrorism operations of “allied countries.” It is this provision, renewed since 2017, which has allowed the United States to provide financial assistance to France’s Operation Barkhane (in 2018, the Pentagon planned 85 million dollars, 50 were finally voted and about 40 actually spent). This budgetary provision is now well accepted by members of Congress in the United States. The quick reaction and help from French military forces during the ambush of Niger (in particular the good coordination between Barkhane and the American forces) reassured the Congressmen and played a role in maintaining support from Congress, limiting, for a time, rising interrogations on the costs vs. benefits of allies in general and particularly in the fight against terrorism. US support for the G5 Sahel has also been maintained, with the only red line for the United States being to avoid going through the U.N.—the anti-U.N. agenda being an essential feature of the “America First” doctrine. However, a new provision originating in the House of Representatives called in 2018 for another report from the Pentagon on the way in which US military assistance is coordinated with several countries or allied organizations including France, named alongside the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the EU and the African Union. But on the executive side, support remains for the French approach of relying on the G5 Sahel force coupled with its development component embodied by the Alliance Sahel. The main concern today in Washington vis-à-vis the Sahel is the contagion of instability beyond Mali; the US priority is therefore to contain

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the threat of terrorism, in particular by working with and in Niger. The US drone base in Agadez is now operational, and US military presence has been maintained, even after Tongo Tongo: 730 US troops remain in Niger according to a June 2018 presidential notice to Congress.17 AFRICOM’s main exercise, focusing on enhancing interoperability of Special Forces, Flintlock, took place in Niger in 2018, a country of interest for the United States as well for its operations in southern Libya, a major priority of AFRICOM in the fight against ISIS in Africa. A Changing Landscape on Capitol Hill: Fewer Champions, Less Attention A significant feature of US policy in the Sahel in the Trump administration, and of US–French cooperation, has been to remain distant from White House interference: the Department of Defense and Congress have worked together closely, with little White House interference, and French officials and military have been keenly aware of that. This could change. In Congress, in particular, interest in Africa has been declining among lawmakers, especially with the departures of Senators Bob Corker and Jeff Flake, who often led the way on African issues. In the Armed Forces Committee, Senator James Inhofe, who replaced John McCain, has a strong interest in Africa but sees many issues through the prism of religion, and through his own personal ties and friendships, in particular with the leaders of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. He could however be inclined to pursue the fight against Islamic terrorism. Senator Chris Coons, who was among the first to support France in Mali in January 2013, has consistently played a leading role in African issues in Congress (he was then chairman of the Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs). Coons is familiar with some countries (he studied in Kenya, speaks Swahili, was involved in the anti-apartheid movement) and was responsible for adding the “Sense of the Senate on support for Sahel Joint Force Countries” to the 2019 Pentagon budget authorization. Finally, Senator Richard Durbin is closely following the situation in the DRC. Another activist on Africa has been Senator Bob 17 Donald Trump, “Statements & Releases, Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Prop Tempore of the Senate,” June 8, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/text-letterpresident-speaker-house-representatives-president-pro-tempore-senate-4/.

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Menendez, ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who recently recommended to the Secretary of State an American initiative on the Sahel, though without mentioning any coordination with the French efforts. For now, the budget cuts announced by the Senate on military aid programs have primarily targeted the Middle East and the AfPak region— Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Islamic Anti-State Fund (Iraq, Syria).18 The Waldhauser audition of March 2018 insisted on maintaining the American posture as “complementary to that of our allies like France and the United Kingdom.” On the Sahel, Waldhauser mentioned, significantly, the “African-led, French-assisted, U.S.-supported G5,” while focusing on Niger, a country “at the crossroads of American efforts.” Finally, several members of Congress remain anxious to maintain the level of American commitment in the fight against terrorism in Africa, including in the Sahel.19 Likewise, there is still a bipartisan coalition in Congress to protect financing for development and external aid, even under Trump, and especially for Africa.20 Moreover, the American financial support to Barkhane remains limited in view of the total US defense budget, 733 billion dollars in the 2020 NDAA, and the 2017 Niger ambush highlighted other benefits of French presence and bilateral coordination. At the Pentagon, Mattis was supportive of allies and his successor, Mark Esper, reiterated—although more cautiously—his adherence to Mattis’ worldview in his confirmation hearing on July 16, 2019. The concern most often expressed in Washington is that of an early French withdrawal from Mali. But while the United States will likely reduce risks and budgets for certain areas, it does not (yet) seem intent on disengaging or breaking with the “light footprint” approach of counterterrorism set by Obama. Cooperation with Niger, “a strategic location at the crossroads of three terrorist

18 John M. Donnelly, “Senate to Weigh Large Cuts to Military Aid,” Roll Call, 19 juillet 2018, https://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/senate-weigh-large-cuts-military-aid. 19 Jack Detsch, “Congress Seeks Uptick in North Africa Operations,” Al-Monitor, June 25, 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/06/congress-north-africaoperations-sahara.html. 20 John Norris, “Bipartisan Advances in International Development Defy Conventional Wisdom,” American Progress, May 8, 2018, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/ security/news/2018/05/08/450447/bipartisan-advances-international-developmentdefy-conventional-wisdom/.

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fronts based in Libya, Mali and Nigeria” in the words of AFRICOM, continues to intensify, and the United States will soon operate (or has started operating) there with armed drones from their base in Niamey; the second US Nigerien base of Agadez is supposed to be operational since the end of 2018.21 This approach seems to confirm the persistence of the general view of the jihadist challenge, based on a vision of an “arch of crisis” going from the Middle East to North Africa, and that could spread to Central Africa.

Conclusion: The Future of Bilateral Cooperation and of Counterterrorism in the Era of Great Power Competition The Trump presidency marked the end of an era for Africa, the end of the “myth” of Obama as a Black man in the White House. A myth because Obama disappointed the exaggerated expectations of Africans, but a strong symbol nonetheless: the end of this symbol has been exacerbated by some of Donald Trump’s comments on Africa. Macron on the other hand represents a change of generation, and there is an attempt to really break with la Françafrique (meaning old relations with the former colonial power), a traditional promise of French presidents in the postCold War era, but one that has been followed this time by pragmatic efforts: by opening French archives on dark episodes of France’s colonial past, by recognizing the past such as torture in Algeria, and by returning African artwork. These are strong signals. These symbols need to be considered in the broader context of the return of great power competition, and how it will affect Africa. AFRICOM commander Waldhauser mentioned in his March 2018 testimony to Congress that the African continent was now a “more crowded and competitive” strategic environment. Russia is back, China has been offensive for a while: there is an intensifying competition with “alternative offers” for African countries, whether from China, Russia or others, from Japan to India, Turkey, and Morocco (Brazil less so recently). The African continent must also be considered as an information battleground

21 John Vandiver, “Armed U.S. Drones Up and Running in Niger,” Stars and Stripes, July 20, 2018, https://www.stripes.com/news/armed-us-drones-up-and-runningin-niger-1.538637.

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in the broader context of information warfare RT France broadcasting, especially because of a mix of factors that make local populations “vulnerable” to disinformation, including the weakness of traditional media, the high connectivity of people via the smartphone revolution, low levels of education, and resentment toward colonial powers and “the West” in general. Shared objectives remain for both France and the United States, especially to contain the spread of violence and instability, promote political solutions, mostly strengthening local institutions and central governments, and find “African solutions to African problems.” There is also a larger common perspective, as France and the United States also share the common goal of making Europeans more responsible and capable of doing their part in Africa as in Europe in terms of defense, in the region closest to Europe and which affects most European security and more generally politics (terrorism, migrations, traffics…). Differences on the policy level due to the very different approaches in Paris and Washington on multilateralism vs. bilateralism should not obscure that. Tempering these differences is also the fact that France’s major US interlocutors on counterterrorism in Africa remain in the Pentagon, the intelligence communities, and Congress—where that hostility is much less widespread. Still, skepticism is growing on both sides of the Atlantic (and it is nearly unanimous among Africanist academics and think tankers) on the current approach to counterterrorism in general and of Africa in particular, an approach that has been dubbed a “new rent for authoritarian regimes” by academic Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, because it promotes regimes and methods that often fuel, or even produce more terrorism.22 A bigger question mark is whether the United States on one side and (less so) France on the other side, are finally going to turn the page of counterterrorism in its current form. There are certainly signs in France, even though there are not yet largely discussed, as well as in the United states, either with a reelected Trump finally embracing isolationism or at least ending “endless wars,” or with a very left-wing Democratic president elected after campaigning on the end of “forever wars.” This concerns primarily more visible US theaters of war, and more specifically the Middle East and Afghanistan. But another event like the Niger ambush, costing 22 Marc-Antoine Pérousse de Montcols, “En Afrique, la lute contre le terrorisme est la nouvelle rente des régimes autoritaire,” Interview by Maria Malagardis, Libération, May 30, 2018.

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the lives of US soldiers, could well open another line of debate on US involvement in the Sahel. Trump has certainly reiterated his public opposition to “endless wars.” On the Democratic side, one of the most striking elements of the first primary debates between Democratic candidates was the total absence of any mention of terrorism, including in answers to the question on “the greatest threat to the U.S.” The change in less than three years was striking. The 2018 National Defense Strategy announced it however: “we are emerging from a period of strategic atrophy, which has eroded our military competitive advantage… Interstate strategic competition, not terrorism, is the first national security concern.” Viewed from the Pentagon, closing the period of the “Global War on Terror” is perhaps the major “advantage” the institution has seen in Trump’s “America First” doctrine, however blurry it might be otherwise. An implicit consequence of “America First” is that the fight against terrorism is the responsibility of the countries concerned and that even “light”, “supportive”, or other US involvement produces more terrorists and, above all, creates risks for Americans that otherwise would not exist. In terms of the future of the bilateral cooperation between France and the United States, this could mean two things: the renewed utility to have French soldiers take the risks by doing the fighting on the ground, with American support; or it could mean the opposite: deciding there are no US national interests in the Sahel, justifying an end to a bilateral cooperation considered as a gift from US taxpayers to a freeriding European ally.

References Charbonneau, Bruno. “De Serval à Barkhane: les problèmes de la guerre contre le terrorisme au Sahel.” Les Temps Modernes 2, nos. 693–394 (2017): 322– 340. Chivvis, Christopher. The French War on Al Qa’ida in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Goya, Michel. “La guerre de trois mois: l’intervention française au Mali en perspective.” Politique Etrangère 2 (Summer 2013): 157–168. Hunt Friend, Alice. “The Evolution of U.S. Defense Posture in North and West Africa.” CSIS: Washington, DC, CSIS Brief, August 2018. Kandel, Maya, ed. La stratégie américaine en Afrique. Paris: Etude de l’IRSEM n°36, 2014. Also in English: U.S. Strategy in Africa (2015).

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Kandel, Maya. “Le dilemme sécurité-libertés: les contradictions de la politique américaine en Afrique.” Politique Américaine 2, no. 24 (April 2015): 129– 42. Leboeuf, Aline. “La compétition stratégique en Afrique: approches militaires américaine, chinoise et russe.” IFRI, Focus stratégique, no. 91 (August 2019). Pannier, Alice, and Olivier Schmitt. “To Fight Another Day: France Between the Fight Against Terrorism and Future Warfare.” International Affairs 95, no. 4 (2019): 897–916. Schmitt, Olivier. “The Reluctant Atlanticist: France’s Security and Defence Policy in a Transatlantic Context.” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 4 (2017): 468–471. Shurkin, Michael. France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014.

Power Competition in the 21st Century

The China Dream: America’s, China’s and the Resulting Competition Gary J. Schmitt

President Trump came into office expecting he could cut deals with China over trade and, with Beijing’s help, solve the North Korean problem. After his first summit with President Xi in April 2017, Trump called his relationship with Xi “outstanding.” At the very same time, his administration was developing a national security strategy that presumed that China—a rising and revisionist power—would be a long-term strategic competitor. From the Chinese side, because Trump saw himself as a dealmaker and ran as a candidate uninterested in defending the global liberal order, this was a president who might recognize China’s “rightful place” on the world stage. As Xi told Trump at that first summit, there are “a thousand reasons to make the China–US relationship work, and no reason to break it.” Yet, at the same time, Xi’s China was making no effort to slow down its military expansion into the South China Sea, was tightening the Communist Party’s control domestically, and continued to see the Americanled international order as something imposed and to be challenged. Both presidents are definitely a break in style and substance from their predecessors. However, it would be wrong, as some are inclined

G. J. Schmitt (B) American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Quessard et al. (eds.), Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37258-3_8

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to think, that the currently uneven and often more tense relationship between Beijing and Washington is principally a result of these two unique leaders coming to power. That they have exacerbated and brought to the fore underlying issues in the relationship is certainly true. However, the roots of the current situation predate both Xi and Trump. As journalist and author John Pomfret has noted, the cycle of enchantment and disappointment between the two countries is now centuries old.1 But the current cycle begins with President Nixon’s opening to China in the early 1970s and Deng Xiaoping’s reform efforts following Mao’s death. What follows is an account of the American vision for China following Nixon’s decision to change US policy toward the People’s Republic and ends with President Obama’s strategic “pivot” to Asia. The next section details the Chinese leadership’s determination both to recover China’s place on the global stage and maintain the Party’s primacy at home. This has taken various policy paths under different leaders, but the destination has remained constant. Following the discussion of China’s Dream, the chapter then turns to a discussion of the multiple strategic issues facing the United States as it comes to terms with the fact that the American and Chinese visions for and about China are incompatible. And, finally, the chapter ends with a discussion of the Trump administration’s response to the challenge posed by China, with key questions being raised about the president and his team’s ability to meet that challenge successfully.

America’s Modern China Dream As bad as relations were between Beijing and Washington for most of the first two decades of the Cold War, there were still Americans who believed that China should be treated less as part of the Communist bloc and more as a separate civilization. By the late 1960s, there were calls within American policymaking circles to develop a new relationship with the PRC. Even Richard Nixon, writing a year before being elected US president, argued that the United States needed to “urgently” come “to

1 John Pomfret, The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom: America and China, 1776 to the Present (New York: Picador, 2017), 6–7.

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grips with the reality of China,” pull it back within “the family of nations,” and “induce change” to alter its “imperial ambitions.”2 Although President Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger framed the “opening to China” in 1971–1972 as a realist gambit to counterbalance the Soviet Union, their expectations for the policy change outpaced any pragmatic analysis of what might reasonably be accomplished. Nixon viewed the opening as a revolution in world affairs, “a turning point in history,” while Kissinger saw it as already producing an “extraordinary situation” in which, other than the UK, “China might well be closest to us in its global perceptions.” Nixon concluded after his first visit to Beijing that it was “the week that changed the world.”3 The fact is, the opening to China did not radically change the strategic environment. China continued to send armaments to North Vietnam throughout the Vietnam War and did little to moderate Hanoi’s behavior. And whatever headaches the new ties between Beijing and Washington might have given Moscow; they did not make the Kremlin any less aggressive on the world stage. Because the opening had not produced a significant change in Soviet behavior, President Carter’s administration moved to double down on the counterbalancing strategy. In exchange for allowing exports of oncerestricted American technology to China, ending formal ties with the Republic of China, and normalizing them with the People’s Republic, the United States established intelligence listening posts inside China aimed at the Soviet Union and garnered some modest covert support from Beijing for the anti-Soviet effort in Afghanistan. Quid pro quos to be sure, but they did not add up to the administration’s hoped-for strategic partnership. As President Carter remarked upon Zbigniew Brzezinski’s return from a trip to Beijing, Brzezinski “had been seduced” by promises of what deeper ties might bring.4 The Carter administration’s most significant policy step was its support for legislation granting the PRC most favored nation (MFN) trading status, which lowered tariffs on Chinese imports to levels limited to US allies and partners. Coming in the wake of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform

2 Richard M. Nixon, “Asia After Viet Nam,” Foreign Affairs 46, no. 1 (October 1967): 121–122. 3 Pomfret, The Beautiful Country, 462, 466. 4 Pomfret, The Beautiful Country, 479.

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proposals in late 1978, the legislation established the idea that facilitating China’s economic growth would put it on the path to political reform. As one member of Congress stated then, the “Seeds of democracy are growing in China.”5 Although Ronald Reagan was personally skeptical of the effort to deepen strategic ties with the PRC, his administration as a whole supported moving forward—and did so.6 Arms sales were approved, as well as programs to assist China with the export of advanced technologies. The goal, in the words of a 1984 presidential directive, was “to help China modernize, on the grounds that a strong, secure and stable China can be an increasing force for peace, both in Asia and the world.”7 In exchange, Beijing was willing to assist the United States in covert programs in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Angola aimed at complicating Soviet and Vietnamese interventions in those countries. However, during Reagan’s tenure, China also transferred nuclear weapon designs and material to Pakistan and sold missiles to Iran and Saudi Arabia, indicating Beijing’s own strategic views were not as aligned with the United States as Washington expected. But, at this point, a second key feature of America’s China dream arose: Near-term divergences between the United States and Chinese policies could be put aside in the belief that the partnership would coalesce over the longer term as Beijing grew increasingly confident about America’s benign attitude about China becoming a great power. The great stress test of this attitude occurred almost immediately after Ronald Reagan left office. In June 1989, the PRC leadership crushed the massed gathering of pro-liberalization Chinese in Tiananmen Square. Although the American public’s views of China turned decidedly negative, the George H.W. Bush administration attempted to limit the damage to US–China ties. The president sent National Security Adviser Brent 5 Pomfret, The Beautiful Country, 486. 6 Also skeptical about the transformational aspect of US–PRC ties was Secretary of

State George Shultz. According to Shultz, he and President Reagan viewed China “as a giant crippled by its own ideology.” “So long as” it maintained that ideology, “there would necessarily be restraints on the kind of relationship you could have with the United States.” George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribner, 1993), 398. 7 Ronald Reagan, “National Security Decision Directive 140,” White House, 1984, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-140.pdf. A second objective listed by the National Security Decision Directive was to “encourage” Chinese liberalization.

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Scowcroft on a secret trip to Beijing “to keep open the lines of communication” and assure Deng that Bush would “do [his] best to keep the boat from rocking too much.”8 So, while the end of the Cold War removed the geostrategic logic behind the rapprochement between the United States and China, the United States shifted the case for closer ties on the grounds that engagement, particularly economic engagement, would affect China itself. Bush argued “as people have commercial incentives, whether it’s in China or in other totalitarian countries, the move to democracy becomes inexorable.”9 With public opinion about China having changed, candidate and thenPresident Bill Clinton initially attempted to tie renewing China MFN trade status to improvement in its human rights record. By 1994, the Clinton administration abandoned that policy in favor of “constructive engagement.” It did so despite China’s increasing truculence toward Taiwan, its increase in military spending, and its lack of help in curtailing North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The administration’s expectation was that having been invited into a mesh of international forums— especially the World Trade Organization (WTO)—Beijing would see the benefits of being part of the liberal international order and would have an interest in helping sustain it. According to Clinton, economic liberalization would “more fully liberate the potential” of the Chinese people and lead them to “demand a greater say” in how they were governed.10 It was an argument repeated by members of Congress who voted by clear majorities for approving China’s membership in the WTO.11

8 George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 156. 9 George H.W. Bush, “The President’s News Conference,” George H.W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum, June 5, 1989, https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/ public-papers/494. 10 Bill Clinton, “Remarks at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies,” March 9, 2000, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-2000-book1/html/ PPP-2000-book1-doc-pg404.htm. 11 The Senate voted 83–15 in favor of World Trade Organization membership for

China. In an earlier vote, the House passed the measure by 237–197, with three out of four Republicans voting for it. See Matthew Vita, “Senate Approves Normalized Trade with China,” Washington Post, September 20, 2000, https://www.washingtonpost. com/archive/politics/2000/09/20/senate-approves-normalized-trade-with-china-83-15/ 65af298f-bf61-47ed-9daa-267cc16a60e4/; Eric Schmitt and Joseph Kahn, “The China

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The George W. Bush national security team’s initial intention was to be more skeptical about US–China ties, with candidate Bush calling China a “strategic competitor.”12 There was still to be engagement, but it was to be balanced by more hedging on the security front. But 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq reduced the time, attention, and resources available for the administration to carry out those hedging plans. Moreover, Chinese behavior gave Washington little reason to believe the PRC was changing as hoped. As a sign of that dissatisfaction, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick gave a speech in September 2005 calling on China to become a “responsible stakeholder.”13 China had greatly benefited from the international order, Zoellick argued, and it was time for Beijing to recognize its responsibilities to that order by ending policies that abused or challenged it. President Barack Obama came into office determined to lower the priority given to national security affairs and focus more on America’s domestic needs. To carry this plan out, the administration moved to reset relations with Russia and China. In the case of Beijing, this meant a policy of “strategic reassurance” in which Washington indicated that it had no intention of challenging the regime’s human rights record or its core interests. Once China was reassured, other policy interests, such as tackling global warming or weapons proliferation, could become the building blocks for a more satisfactory relationship. Obama’s outreach to China—coming in the midst of the 2008 Great Recession—was read by China’s leadership as a sign of American weakness. US power was in decline, and China no longer had to “hide” its capacities or “bide” its time, as Deng Xiaoping had once recommended.14

Trade Vote,” New York Times, May 25, 2000, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/ 25/world/china-trade-vote-clinton-triumph-house-237-197-vote-approves-normal-traderights.html. 12 This was quoted in Thomas W. Lippman, “Bush Makes Clinton’s Policy an Issue,” Washington Post, August 20, 1999, A9, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/campaigns/wh2000/stories/chiwan082099.htm. 13 Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” US Department of State, September 21, 2005, https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/ zoellick/rem/53682.htm; Pomfret, The Beautiful Country, 606. 14 For Deng’s quote and China’s view that 2008 was “an inflection point in world history” and “the moment” to right “China’s one hundred years of humiliation,” see Elizabeth C. Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 188–189.

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China became even more assertive with its neighbors, with the Chinese foreign minister telling the Association of Southeast Asian Nations members in 2010, “China is a big country. Bigger than any other countries here.”15 By the end of 2011, the Obama team realized its attempt to deepen engagement with China was not working as planned. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for a “pivot” to Asia, with a goal of developing a “web of partnerships and institutions” clearly intended to check Chinese assertiveness.16 Not long after, the president announced his strategic “rebalancing” to the Asia-Pacific region, which would include finalizing a region-wide free trade agreement and expanding American military assets in theater.17 With the president’s decision, for all intents and purposes, Washington had awoken from its China dream.

China’s China Dream The goal of resurrecting China from its impoverished depths is dated to Deng Xiaoping’s speech on December 13, 1978, calling for reforms in defense, agriculture, science and technology, and the economy—the “Four Modernizations.”18 Yet, as Deng later admitted, “opening the windows” to let fresh air in would inevitably bring flies in as well.19 One such “fly” was Wei Jingsheng, the Chinese electrician whose call for a “Fifth Modernization”—democracy—was the boldest of public appeals for political reform. Wei was subsequently sentenced to 15 years in prison.20 In 15 John Pomfret, “US Takes a Tougher Tone with China,” Washington Post, July 30, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/29/ AR2010072906416.html. 16 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/. 17 See White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” November 17, 2011, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ PPP-2011-book2/pdf/PPP-2011-book2-doc-pg1440.pdf; Department of Defense, “Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense,” January 2012, http://archive.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf. 18 Deng Xiaoping, “Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts, and Unite as One in Looking to the Future,” December 13, 1978, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/ dengxp/vol2/text/b1260.html. 19 George J. Church, “China: Old Wounds Deng Xiaoping,” Time, January 6, 1986, http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,1074879-9,00.html. 20 Pomfret, The Beautiful Country, 481.

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a speech following Wei’s arrest, Deng stipulated that there would be no questioning the continued leadership of the Communist Party and that those who employed such “sensational slogans” as “give us human rights” would be judged as “counter-revolutionaries, enemy agents, criminals.”21 Deng’s admonitions notwithstanding, discussions of broader reforms inevitably arose.22 By the mid-1980s, there was a spike in proliberalization demonstrations among students across China. This was met with a government crackdown in January 1987 (the “Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign”) and the purge of Communist Party head Hu Yaobang for his reformist sympathies and his failure to deal with the students strongly enough.23 In retrospect, the government’s order to clear Tiananmen Square should not have come as a surprise, even if the brutality involved was. In Tiananmen’s wake, the Communist Party ordered a large-scale purge of party members who showed “serious tendencies toward bourgeois liberalization.”24 Tens of thousands were culled from the party’s ranks, and Zhao Ziyang, the general secretary of the Communist Party, was put under house arrest.25 Given Deng’s determination to keep the Communist Party in control, combined with the rhetoric and substance of the demonstrators’ demands, it was predictable that China’s leaders would look to blame the United States for the turmoil, accusing it of engaging in “a smokeless world war” against China.26 To counter this “threat,” the government adopted a national “Patriotic Education Campaign.”27 The program was to address, in Deng’s words, the “worst omission” the party had made in

21 Deng Xiaoping, “Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles,” March 30, 1979, http:// en.people.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1290.html. 22 As Minxin Pei has noted, some party members were also in favor of a wider reform

agenda, thinking that “China’s economic reform could not move forward without complimentary political reform.” Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 50. 23 Pomfret, The Beautiful Country, 504–505. 24 Joseph Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2001), 21–43. 25 Louisa Lim, The People’s Republic of Amnesia: Tiananmen Revisited (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 49. 26 Pomfret, The Beautiful Country, 519. 27 Pomfret, The Beautiful Country, 535.

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ideological matters—insufficiently guarding against bourgeois sentiments infecting not only the party but also Chinese society.28 Countering Western liberalism became more pressing following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. With communism as a governing theory now lacking legitimacy, the “education” would focus on generating a heightened sense of Chinese nationalism.29 The party’s new mandate would be reclaiming China’s place in the world—a place outside powers, it was said, previously denied it. Not only was this China dream ambitious, but it would be sustained based on resentments aimed at the United States and the West. From Beijing, America’s hostility toward China was confirmed by Washington’s decision after Tiananmen Square to ban arms sales and nuclear cooperation. Despite the Bush White House’s effort to keep ties between the two countries on an even keel, China’s leaders already read the United States as an ideological threat that could not be trusted to resist China’s rise. Accordingly, after Tiananmen, Beijing moved to reduce tensions with Moscow and buy advanced Russian weaponry. This new relationship took on even greater urgency following the surprisingly easy American military victory in the First Gulf War and China’s own assessment of its military’s weakness. Having to deal with the new hegemonic position of the United States, Deng’s strategy was to concentrate on increasing China’s “comprehensive national power.”30 For the time being, Deng’s advice was to avoid a confrontation with the United States.31 Given China’s potential—high 28 New York Times, “Deng’s June 9 Speech: ‘We Faced Rebellious Clique’ and ‘Dregs of Society,’” June 30, 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/30/world/deng-s-june-9speech-we-faced-a-rebellious-clique-and-dregs-of-society.html. 29 Suisheng Zhao, “A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 1, no. 3 (1998): 297. 30 Ashley J. Tellis, “China’s Grand Strategy: The Quest for Comprehensive National Power and Its Consequences,” in The Rise of China: Essays on the Future Competition, ed. Gary J. Schmitt (New York: Encounter Books, 2009), 25–52. 31 “The essential theme of China’s approach during this period was expressed in Deng’s ‘24 Character Strategy’ formulated in the aftermath of Tiananmen and shortly before the final collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union. Here Deng advised that, in light of its relative weakness, diplomatic isolation and potential susceptibility to economic pressure, China should ‘hide its capabilities and bide its time.’” Aaron L. Friedberg, “Competing with China,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, June– July 2018, https://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/2018/survival-global-politics-andstrategy-junejuly-2018/603-02-friedberg.

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personal savings rate, a vast pool of labor, and an untapped domestic market—it was thought that even partial economic liberalization could produce substantial growth, which it did.32 Deng’s advice, however, went only so far and was bounded by the party’s partial reliance on Chinese nationalism for popular legitimacy. As the Republic of China (Taiwan) moved away from one-party rule and prepared for its first presidential election, Beijing reacted by conducting a series of missile “tests” off Taiwan in the summer of 1995 and the following spring. The Chinese leadership understood the change in Taiwan to be a challenge to its nationalist vision of “one China” and the CCP’s own legitimacy as Taiwan (ethnically Chinese) moved toward selfrule. The Clinton administration responded by sending two aircraft carrier groups to the surrounding waters. Struck by its inability to influence Taiwan’s voters or effectively respond to the American naval challenge, the Chinese government accelerated its military modernization effort. The next decade began with China joining the WTO. Taking advantage of the opening to the world’s markets to become an export powerhouse, China saw a burst in economic growth. Nevertheless, while economic liberalization had proved immensely beneficial in raising living standards and providing the government with new resources, there was the ever-present concern that continued liberalization would jeopardize the party’s control over the country. Accordingly, keeping control over key sectors of the economy through state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was necessary for noneconomic reasons. SOEs’ existence gave the party a continuing patina of “socialist credibility.” It also gave the government a foundation from which to moderate unemployment and implement industrial strategies, and it also provided a resource for a patronage system that kept party members loyal to the regime.33 The substantial growth in government resources actually reduced pressure to push for further reforms as Hu Jintao’s new leadership team came into power in 2002.

32 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Gross Domestic Product for China,” https:// fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MKTGDPCNA646NWDB. 33 On the slowdown in economic reform and the policy logic behind them, see Pei,

China’s Trapped Transition; Sebastian Heilmann and Lea Shin, “The Rise of Industrial Policy in China, 1978–2012,” Harvard-Yenching Institute, 2013; Xin Li and Kjeld Erik Brodsgaad, “SOE Reform in China: Past, Present and Future,” Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 31, no. 2 (2013): 54–78, https://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/cjas/article/ view/4333/4761.

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The halt in reforms would have consequences. President Hu’s 2006 call for China to become a “harmonious society” was a signal that China increasingly was not. Large-scale protests were numerous. There were growing problems involving the environment, income inequality, and government corruption.34 Plus, there was a growing recognition that the existing Chinese economic model was “unsteady,” “unbalanced,” and “unstainable.”35 China was becoming a “fragile superpower,” whose leaders were feeling increasingly insecure about the present and the future.36 Even after the Great Recession in 2008, during which China initially gained global prestige in contrast to the performance of Western states, there was a sense that this gain was something of a Potemkin village. China was facing a tightening global market for its goods and, to keep the global recession at bay, had doubled down on debt to finance an array of domestic projects of marginal benefit. Growth slowed, and individual income was not what it might have been if economic reforms had moved forward. Given Chinese demographics, China was becoming old before it became rich.37 Also clouding China’s future was the continuing unrest in Tibet, Xinjiang, and the fall of autocratic governments in the Middle East (the Arab Spring). By the end of Hu’s term, many Chinese elites were moving more of their personal wealth out of the country.38

34 Minxin Pei, “The Dark Side of China’s Rise,” Foreign Policy, March/April 2006, 32– 40, https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/20/the-dark-side-of-chinas-rise/; Tom Orlik, “Charting China’s Economy: 10 Years Under Hu,” Wall Street Journal, November 16, 2012, https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/11/16/charting-chinas-economy10-years-under-hu-jintao/. 35 To see Wen Jiabao’s speech before the National People’s Congress in March 2007 as quoted, see International Monetary Fund, “IMF Survey: China’s Difficult Rebalancing Act,” September 12, 2007, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/ 04/53/socar0912a. See also, The World Bank and Development Research Center of the State Council, China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013), XXI, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/781101468239669951/pdf/762990PUB0china0Box374372B00PUBLIC0.pdf. The report was published after President Xi came to power but was drafted in 2011. 36 Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 37 Nicholas Eberstadt, “Will China (Continue) to Rise?” in The Rise of China: Essays on the Future Competition, ed. Gary J. Schmitt (New York: Encounter Books, 2009), 136–147. 38 Economy, The Third Revolution, 32.

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As Xi Jinping took control of both the party and the Chinese government in late 2012 and early 2013, he faced the critical question of what path China would take. He could choose greater liberalization to get the economy moving again but risk the party’s control, or he could double down on the party’s control over the country in the name of stability. Xi picked the latter—consolidating not only his own power but also strengthening the party’s sway over key elements of China’s economy and society.39 On the economic front, Xi has scaled up China’s mercantilism. Xi’s “Made in China 2025” involves government subsidies, local content mandates, and restricted access for foreign companies unless and until they share technology. As for the SOEs, they have grown larger through consolidation, remained tied to the party through cross-level appointments at the highest management levels, retained privileged access to state banks for below-market credit, and, according to Xi, are understood as “national champions” in their key industrial sectors. To help legitimate this sharp turn with the broader Chinese public, Xi has, on the foreign policy front, pushed an agenda that is more nationalistic and, on the domestic side, he has engaged in an initially popular anti-corruption campaign against government and party officials.40 It is tempting to read Xi’s ascendancy and program as a distinct version of the China dream.41 And there are unique aspects to his rule. But key fundamentals—such as keeping the party ascendant, never seeing economic liberalization as an end in itself, not allowing political reforms to truly take hold, desiring to see China rise once again to its previous imperial preeminence,42 and believing this ultimately meant butting 39 On Xi’s vision for China, see Economy, The Third Revolution, 3–5, 9–15, 18. On

sway over society, see General Office of the Communist Party of China, “Communique on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere,” April 22, 2013. The translated text can be found at ChinaFile, “Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation,” November 8, 2013, www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation. 40 Economy, The Third Revolution, 10, 33, 186–230. 41 To some extent, this is the argument underlying Economy, The Third Revolution,

9–15. 42 Dan Blumenthal, “China: The Imperial Legacy,” in Rise of the Revisionists: Russia, China and Iran, ed. Gary J. Schmitt (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2018), 45–68. Xi’s intent to reassert China’s preeminent place in Asia is strongly implied in his 2014 assertion that “Asia’s problems ultimately must be resolved by Asians and Asia’s security ultimately must be protected by Asians.” Xi Jinping, “New Asian Security Concept for New Progress

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heads with the United States—have long existed within the upper echelons of the CCP and Chinese government. Xi’s policies are different less because they are a fundamental change in course but rather because they are more explicit about what has always been there. Even the abandonment of Deng’s “bide” and “hide” advice in foreign policy is a recognition that Deng’s advice was tied to China’s then relative weakness and, accordingly, could be put aside when China achieved its dream of becoming a great power once again.

The Challenge The problem the United States currently faces with the People’s Republic is broad, encompassing diplomacy, economics, security, and ideology.43 Although not on the scale of the US–USSR competition during the Cold War, today’s competition with China has become an “echo” of that earlier competition in its complexity. Thinking of the competition as simply between a “rising power” and an “established hegemon” fails to capture adequately what is at stake and what is to be done.44 The starting point for American statecraft since World War II has been ensuring that no non-democratic power is dominant on either side of the Eurasian landmass. This has meant, among other things, establishing alliances among (mostly) like-minded states on and surrounding that landmass. It also involved establishing a liberal-leaning economic order

in Security Cooperation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, May 21, 2014, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml. 43 On this point, see Thomas J. Wright, “China’s East Asia Challenge,” in All Measures Short of War: The Contest for 21st Century & the Future of American Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017), 67–98. See also Friedberg, “Competing with China,” 31–51; Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis, “Revising US Grand Strategy Toward China,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 2015, https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/ sites/default/files/pdf/2015/04/China_CSR72.pdf. 44 See Gary J. Schmitt, “The Challenge Ahead,” in Rise of the Revisionists: Russia, China and Iran, ed. Gary J. Schmitt (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2018); Hal Brands, “Democracy vs. Authoritarianism: How Ideology Shapes Great-Power Conflict,” Survival, October–November 2018, 62, 67–72.

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that reduced barriers among the principal democracies and, in turn, generated the kind of wealth and resources that helped keep non-liberal hegemons at bay.45 In other words, from the US viewpoint, “national interests” were infused with considerations of regime principles of both friends and foes as much as considerations of calculations of raw national power. As challenging a task as deterring Chinese ambitions might be, the United States enjoys certain advantages. It should be capable of generating sufficient economic and technological resources to be competitive, field a more professional and battle-tested military, provide a more attractive “soft power” model to much of the world, and retain a global system of alliances that cumulatively far outpaces what Beijing can pull together diplomatically, economically, and militarily.46 Although the relative superiority the United States and its allies currently enjoy is less than what it was just a decade ago, the overall advantage still lies with the West. Moreover, China’s economic growth is slowing.47 It was China’s success on the economic front that allowed it to promote itself as an alternative governance model and provided it with the resources to improve its military, “bank” its programs of foreign assistance, and satisfy its oftentimes restive population that one-party rule—if not fully legitimate—was at least tolerable. But economic reform has stalled. Massive investments in industrial capacity and infrastructure have kept GDP growth from declining even further but at the cost of inefficiency, overcapacity, and increased corporate- and state-level debt.48

45 Robert Kagan, The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World (New York: Knopf, 2018). 46 On the relative advantages of authoritarian and democratic systems, see Brands, “Democracy vs. Authoritarianism,” 87–98. 47 On the underlying trends and issues in the Chinese economy, see Derek Scissors,

“Now or Never for the Chinese Economy,” American Enterprise Institute, December 4, 2017, http://www.aei.org/publication/now-or-never-for-the-chinese-economy/; Derek Scissors, “Deng Undone,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2009, https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2009-05-01/deng-undone-0. 48 Personal income levels provide a more accurate picture of China’s economic state. The Chinese government reported disposable income in 2016 at approximately $4000, less than one-tenth of the equivalent American figure. “China’s per capita GDP in 2016 was only 80 per cent of the world average, one-seventh of the US and was ranked the 68th globally.” IANS, “Chinese Economy Still Has a Long Way to Go: Economist,” Economic Times, April 16, 2018, https://auto.economictimes.indiatimes. com/news/industry/chinese-economy-still-has-a-long-way-to-go-economist/63785111.

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China’s economic “miracle” has resulted in pulling hundreds of millions of Chinese out of extreme poverty. But, as impressive as that is, more than half a billion Chinese living in the rural areas remain poor and, without a change in property laws to enable them to own their land, will likely remain so. China is also short on key resources—water, metals, and energy—and faces a significant demographic problem generated by its decades of one-child policy. There was some early hope that Xi’s statement that the market should have a “decisive” role in the Chinese economy would revive the reform agenda. Instead, Xi has introduced more statist policies.49 If China’s economic growth is slowing and President Xi has prioritized domestic stability over growth, one possible consequence could be greater appeals on his part to Chinese nationalism.50 How long China could flex its muscles regionally and globally absent a stronger economy is a question, but, in the short to medium term, it means the United States and regional allies would be competing with a still ambitious China. To meet China’s efforts, the United States will need to take a number of steps.51 Among the most pressing issues is addressing China’s now more than two-decade-old military modernization program designed to neutralize American power projection capabilities. To deal with China’s considerable arsenal of anti-access and area denial (A2AD) capabilities—consisting of an array of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles,

49 See Katherine Koleski and Nargiza Salidjanova, “China’s Technonationalism Toolbox,” US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 28, 2018, https:// www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%27s%20Technonationalism.pdf; Scott Kennedy, “Made in China 2025,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 1, 2015, https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025. 50 Notable in this regard is growth in the number of times “love of country” is mentioned in the Chinese press annually as the economy has slowed: from 6893 in 2009 to 18,460 in 2016. François Godement, “Expanded Ambitions, Shrinking Achievements: How China Sees the Global Order,” European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2017, https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR204_-_EXPANDED_AMBITIONS_ SHRINKING_ACHIEVEMENTS_-_HOW_CHINA_SEES_THE_GLOBAL_ORDER. pdf. 51 Mark Gunzinger et al., “Force Planning for the Era of Great Power Competition,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, October 2, 2017, https://csbaonline. org/uploads/documents/CSBA6302_%28Developing_the_Future_Force%29_PRINT.pdf.

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fourth- and fifth-generation strike aircraft, advanced air defenses, and antisatellite systems—the United States will need to: diversify its military basing in the region; harden existing bases; increase the number of fifthgeneration aircraft, underwater assets, and missile defense systems available for the region; ensure greater resiliency of its space-based assets; and pursue development of advanced technological systems, such as stealthy unmanned air and naval assets and hypervelocity missiles to counter existing Chinese defense systems. These additional capabilities also must be matched with increased numbers of deployable ships and aircraft. Maintaining the commons of the sea and air requires presence; but the US Navy and Air Force are sized (at best) for one ocean—the Pacific—and are too few for the whole of the Indo-Pacific region. Given China’s own strategy, Washington should expand its existing “hub and spoke” security arrangements with Japan, South Korea, and Australia into a more integrated coalition of security partners. Adding India to that coalition to form “a Quad” would create a formidable regional system, better aligned to countering China’s strategy.52 Sustaining and, where possible, deepening ties with Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan, and the Philippines would maximize a counterbalancing strategy by Washington. Yet none of these plans is viable over the long run if the United States is not seen as having sufficient military presence and deterrent capabilities to reassure partners. Of course, deepening ties requires more than military presence and hardware. No less important is a geo-economic strategy that mitigates Chinese mercantilism and Chinese leverage over regional economies. The Trans-Pacific Partnership was the heart of the Obama administration’s efforts in this regard, and, while not without drawbacks as a trade agreement, its underlying strategic intent was sound.53 Creating a network of bilateral agreements instead is possible but will take considerably more time and effort and may not, at the end of the day, create the kind of 52 On prospects related to involving India in the administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy, see Paula J. Dobriansky, “India Can Become a Key US Partner,” Wall Street Journal, August 21, 2018, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/india-can-become-keyus-partner; Derek Grossman, “Is India the Weakest Link in the Quad,” Foreign Policy, July 23, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/23/india-is-the-weakest-link-in-thequad/. 53 Derek Scissors, “Grading the Trans-Pacific Partnership on Trade,” American Enterprise Institute, December 9, 2015, https://www.aei.org/publication/grading-the-transpacific-partnership-on-trade/.

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regional economic community that facilitates liberal norms and the exercise of American leadership. The United States and its democratic allies also need policies to push back against Beijing’s exploitation of the current global order’s openness through cyber theft, forced and unforced technology transfers, and influence operations designed to prevent or, at least, moderate foreign government decisions that Beijing deems offensive.54 Tightening Chinese access to critical technologies for military use, demanding and enforcing reciprocity on trade and market access, and preventing Beijing from punishing a country (as it has with Norway, the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea) by denying it access to the Chinese market for some action Beijing considers unfriendly requires “a whole of the West” response.55 Finally, if the competition between an authoritarian China and the democratic West is not the full-blown ideological contest that confronted the United States and the West during the Cold War, it would be a mistake to ignore the ideological competition between the two.56 In this case, the People’s Republic starts at a deficit. As Elizabeth Economy writes, “China is an illiberal state seeking leadership in a liberal world order.” “At a fundamental level,” she continues, “China’s efforts to promote soft power are hampered by the nature of its political system. … Economic inequality, environmental pollution, and the lack of the rule of law, constrain the appeal of a China model.”57 Moreover, Chinese behavior in the South China Sea and, more broadly, in the region has left it with a regional favorability rating of just 34%, less than half of Japan’s rating of 76%.58 Even Australia, which has a significant trade surplus with China, 54 Thomas G. Mahnken, Ross Baggage, and Toshi Yoshihara, “Countering Comprehensive Coercion: Competitive Strategies Against Authoritarian Political Warfare,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 30, 2018, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/ documents/Countering_Comprehensive_Coercion%2C_May_2018.pdf. 55 With reference to Europe in particular, see Economist, “China’s Designs on Europe,” October 6, 2018, 13; Francois Godement and Abigael Vasselier, “China at the Gates: A New Power Audit of EU-China Relations,” European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2017, https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/China_Power_Audit.pdf. 56 Brands, “Democracy vs. Authoritarianism,” 64–67. 57 Economy, The Third Revolution, 17, 221. See also, Godement, “Expanded Ambitions,

Shrinking Achievements.” 58 China Power Project, “How Are Global Views on China Trending,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 7, 2017, https://chinapower.csis.org/ global-views/.

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has grown wary of China’s attempts to influence its politics domestically, and now views the PRC’s “growing power” as a “threat.”59 In Europe, none of the three major powers—the UK, France, or Germany—has a majority that looks upon China favorably. Presumably, this is tied to lack of reciprocity in trade relations, ham-handed efforts to punish European governments for policy views the Chinese perceive as violating their “core interests,” forced technology transfers, human rights abuses, and, in the case of the UK, doubts regarding China’s pledge to maintain “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong.60 In regions where China is seen more favorably—in Latin America, Africa, and Central Asia—it is often tied to Chinese “largesse” on commercial projects, most notably in the case of the Belt and Road Initiative. Yet, here as well, exposing the sometimes-predatory aspect of many of these projects would be useful to lessen the reputational advantage Beijing gets from these programs.61

The Trump Administration’s Response More explicitly than any recent administration, the Trump administration has formally put China at the front and center of its security concerns. The National Security Strategy (December 2017) states that the United States is engaged in a “contest for power” with China, and that the contest reaches “across political, economic and military arenas,” and involves the use of “technology and information” in an attempt to “shift regional balances of power.” Moreover, the contest is “fundamentally political,” 59 Lowy Institute, “2018 Lowy Institute Poll,” June 20, 2018, https://www. lowyinstitute.org/publications/2018-lowy-institute-poll. 60 For an overview of these issues, see Congressional Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report, 2018,” October 10, 2018, 1–11, https://www.cecc.gov/sites/ chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/2018AR_Executive%20Summary_0.pdf. 61 Conversely, it would be useful for the United States and allies to point out that they have not conceded Asia to China economically, even as Chinese investments in the region have risen comparatively. See Derek Scissors, “China Global Investment Tracker,” American Enterprise Institute, https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/; US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Direct Investment by Country and Industry: 2017,” July 30, 2018, https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/ fdici0718_fax.pdf; Japan External Trade Organization, “Japanese Trade and Investment Statistics,” https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics.html; and ChinaPower, “Does China Dominate Global Investment?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-foreign-direct-investment/.

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existing “between those who favor repressive systems and those who favor free societies.”62 As a “revisionist” power, China “seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor.”63 Or, as the follow-on National Defense Strategy (January 2018) asserts, while “regional hegemony” is the near-term goal, China seeks “global preeminence in the future.”64 The administration’s response to the Chinese challenge is a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” As explained by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, “free” means every nation in the region is “able to protect their sovereignty from coercion by other countries,” and, domestically, it means “good governance,” which includes citizens being able to “enjoy their fundamental rights and duties.” Regarding “open,” the secretary stated it meant “open access to seas and airways” and “fair and reciprocal trade,” including “open investment environments,” “transparency,” and improved regional “connectivity.”65 As explicit as the administration is about the strategic challenge posed by China, it has not precluded working with China. The National Security Strategy asserts that its Indo-Pacific vision “excludes no nation.”66 In remarks given by then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis at the ShangriLa Dialogue in June 2017, he conceded that “China occupies a legitimate position of influence in the Pacific.” And while competition between the two powers is “bound to occur, conflict is not inevitable.” The United States is seeking to “engage China diplomatically and economically” for a

62 White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” December 25, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 63 White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” 64 Department of Defense, “Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United

States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge,” January 2, 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-DefenseStrategy-Summary.pdf. 65 Michael Pompeo, “Remarks on ‘America’s Indo-Pacific Economic Vision,’” US Department of State, July 30, 2018, https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/ 07/284722.htm. 66 White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” 46.

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“results-orientated relationship.”67 While the administration judges previous American policies to have been overly optimistic about changing China itself through engagement, it is not abandoning the idea of engagement altogether. The administration’s strategy documents omit language that would suggest that moderating or deterring Chinese behavior might pressure Beijing to undertake the kind of fundamental reforms deep engagement had previously hoped to bring about.68 This assessment of the Trump administration’s response to the Chinese challenge focuses on administration documents and speeches. But three broad issues appear to complicate the administration’s ability to carry out its formal strategy—not the least of which is uncertainty about future levels of defense spending. Although Donald Trump promised a massive military buildup while running for office, his initial increase in defense spending was quite modest.69 Substantial new moneys have been added to the Pentagon’s budget in fiscal years 2018 and 2019, but this increase (adjusted for inflation) only brings the Pentagon back to the level of defense spending projected in 2011. Yet the military imagined in 2011 is not up to meeting the Trump administration’s stated strategy today. That year, the Obama administration and its defense team concluded that the American military was sized and equipped to handle only one major military contingency at a time. The “rebalancing” to Asia was not just a policy preference but also a necessity given the US military’s limited capacities and capabilities. To add sufficient forces to Asia required, as the Pentagon’s defense guidance

67 James Mattis, “Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Shangri-La Dialogue,” June 3, 2017, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1201780/ remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-shangri-la-dialogue/. 68 In a Shangri-La Dialogue speech by then Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan, he also reiterated the US desire to have a “cooperative relationship” with China and that “competition does not mean conflict.” Patrick M. Shanahan, “Acting Secretary Shanahan’s Remarks at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2019,” June 1, 2019, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1871584/ acting-secretary-shanahans-remarks-at-the-iiss-shangri-la-dialogue-2019/. 69 Giselle Donnelly and Gary J. Schmitt, “Trump’s Fake Defense Buildup,” Weekly Standard, March 3, 2017, https://www.weeklystandard.com/thomas-donnelly-and-garyschmitt/trumps-fake-defense-buildup.

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assumed,70 the European theater to remain peaceful and the US military to begin limiting operations in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Neither of these has occurred. As a result, the Pentagon is now engaged in three theaters but doing so with a force that is stretched thin, with shortfalls in readiness and equipment.71 The issue is not whether the US military is the preeminent military in the world. The issue is whether it can be so in three theaters at once.72 A second, strategic issue is the practicalities of both hedging and engaging at the same time. For most of the post-Cold War period, the desire to engage with China meant that hedging took a back seat in policy discussions because it was thought that taking strong security measures would provoke the leadership in Beijing and disrupt whatever engagement initiatives were ongoing. However, even with a more realistic view of the competition with China, the tension does not simply go away. American companies and farmers are still interested in doing business in China, and it is difficult to see decisive cooperation from China, say on North Korea, while the United States is selling arms to Taiwan or challenging Beijing’s claims over the South China Sea. And, indeed, this tension also underlies the administration’s hardline approach to China on the economic and trade front. Is the administration’s goal to correct unfair trade practices or squeeze China’s economy with an eye to lessening the PRC’s “comprehensive national power”? Is the administration’s policy to remedy existing problems in economic engagement or leverage economic ties to hedge against—that is, complicate—China’s rise? In theory, it could be both, but success in fixing the former will make sustaining the latter goal politically difficult as reengagement gains momentum or as presidential campaigning necessitates a quick fix to the tariff wars.

70 Department of Defense, “Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” January 2–3, 2012, http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_ Guidance.pdf. 71 Giselle Donnelly et al., To Rebuild America’s Military (American Enterprise Institute, October 7, 2015), http://www.aei.org/publication/to-rebuild-americas-military/; Gary J. Schmitt, “Contrary to Optimistic Claims, Military Has a Readiness Crisis,” Hill, August 19, 2016, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/291974-contrary-tooptimistic-claims-military-has-a-readiness. 72 Gary J. Schmitt, “NATO’s Strategic Problem,” Weekly Standard, July 12, 2018, http://www.aei.org/publication/natos-strategic-problem/.

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Finally, a third major challenge to the administration’s strategy toward China is the president himself. Unlike “cabinet” governments, the American constitutional system vests “the executive power” in a single person. Accordingly, whatever the formal statements made by the administration’s national security team, the president’s personality will matter. And this is undoubtedly true in the case of Donald Trump, whose views about the relative unimportance of the difference between democratic and authoritarian rule and the value of allies and the liberal international order more broadly could well complicate a comprehensive approach to the challenge of a rising, authoritarian China. An America First approach to allied diplomacy, trade, and security cooperation rests uneasy with a “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy and complicates hopes for creating an EU–US concord to push back against problematic Chinese behavior. A broader understanding of statecraft and multilateral institutions is necessary if the strategy is to succeed over the longer term.

Conclusion The existing tension between China and the United States was probably inevitable. This is not to deny that, during the 1980s and 1990s, Beijing experimented with various reforms, such as allowing village elections and the creation of NGOs to work in society. However, as these examples also show, Beijing set limits on their expansion and, in the end, did not allow them to grow in such a way as to challenge the party’s primacy.73 Similarly, when Jiang Zemin spoke of expanding the party’s ranks to include private entrepreneurs, it was read as a sign of his desire to reform party thinking along more pragmatic lines. Undoubtedly true, but it was also

73 On the state of NGOs and limits to their activities pre-Xi, see Amy E. Gadsden, “Chinese Nongovernmental Organizations: Politics by Other Means?” American Enterprise Institute, July 23, 2010, http://www.aei.org/publication/chinese-nongovernmentalorganizations/. For an overview of the greater constraints on civil society organizations in the Xi era, see Freedom House, “China,” in Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis, 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/china. Regarding village elections in China, see Monica Martinez-Bravo et al., “The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China: Theory and Empirical Evidence of the Autocrat’s Trade-Off” (working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, November 13, 2014), 34–36, https://personal.lse.ac.uk/padro/working-papers/Vdem_FINAL_20171107.pdf.

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a way of reaffirming the party’s leadership over a growing Chinese commercial elite. China’s dream is imperial in scope, and the Party has never wavered in its intent to be in control when China realizes that dream. The combination of those two ambitions meant that the PRC’s understanding of its interests, history, and security were virtually certain to run afoul of American expectations. In turn, America’s expectations about China were driven initially by a desire to help China rise as a counterweight to Russia, but there was always the hope that it would become more of a partner than just a strategic piece on the global chessboard. But for that to happen, Americans had to convince themselves that China would progress beyond one-party rule and, failing that, somehow behave as though its authoritarian nature would not prevent it from becoming a “responsible stakeholder” in an international order designed by the West and consistent with its values.74 Neither of the American expectations was particularly realistic. President Trump and President Xi have undoubtedly put in place policies that have hastened bringing the competition between the two countries to the forefront. But this strategic competition was well underway before either came to office. Given a state’s natural desire to establish, when it can, an international environment that helps support the security and prosperity of its own particular regime, and given the fundamental differences between the US and Chinese regimes, it should come as no surprise that the current relationship is where it is today.

References Brands, Hal. “Democracy vs. Authoritarianism: How Ideology Shapes GreatPower Conflict.” Survival 60 (October–November 2018): 61–114. Economy, Elizabeth C. The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.

74 As former Vice Foreign Minister and Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of

China’s National People’s Congress Fu Ying acknowledged, “China has long been alienated politically by the western world” and “never fully embraced” the international order that rests on “American or western values.” China Daily, “Fu Ying’s Speech at Chatham House in London,” July 8, 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/cn_eu/201607/08/content_26021696.htm.

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Friedberg, Aaron L. “Competing with China.” International Institute for Strategic Studies, June–July 2018. https://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/ 2018/survival-global-politics-and-strategy-junejuly-2018/603-02-friedberg. Kagan, Robert. The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World. New York: Knopf, 2018. Pei, Minxin. China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006. Pomfret, John. The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom: America and China, 1776 to the Present. New York: Picador, 2017. Schmitt, Gary, ed. The Rise of China: Essays on the Future Competition. New York: Encounter Books, 2009. Shirk, Susan L. China: Fragile Superpower. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. White House. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” December 2017, 25. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/ 2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. Wright, Thomas J. All Measures Short of War: The Contest for 21st Century & the Future of American Power. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017.

Deterrence and Dialogue: The US–South Korea Alliance in Search of a New Lease of Life in the Face of Kim Jong-Un’s “Nuclear Diplomacy” Marianne Péron-Doise

Since the historic talks between Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore in June 2018, the debate has intensified within the US–South Korean alliance on how to adapt security relations and strategic cooperation to an apparently dialogue-ready North Korea. This new context involves a careful adjustment of the allies’ defense positions with regard to the concepts of deterrence and “détente.” The evolution of the transatlantic alliance, often mentioned to describe the security relations between the United States and South Korea, can provide useful insights.1 Since its creation in 1949 and its fluctuating relationship with the Soviet Union and then Russia, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has had to constantly adapt. It was able to do so because it derived a strategic advantage from its dual nature, both military and political. In its seventy years of existence, it has developed a strong political identity around the “narrative of freedom” and the establishment of 1 Scott Snyder, The US–South Korea Alliance, Meeting New Security Challenges (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012).

M. Péron-Doise (B) Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire (IRSEM), Paris, France e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Quessard et al. (eds.), Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37258-3_9

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forums and frameworks for dialogue and partnership, while strengthening its operational credibility.2 Its leadership has consistently sought to maintain a balance between its conventional and nuclear deterrence capabilities while emphasizing the strength of the transatlantic relationship and American security guarantees. The pivotal scope of Article 5 and the resulting concept of collective defense have characterized the Alliance and its indivisibility. In addition, the organization has been able to rely on a strong declaratory policy by regularly reasserting the importance of American nuclear weapons deployments in Europe as a security guarantee.3 With President Trump in the White House, can it still be considered a model for the existing security framework between the United States and South Korea? Where does Japan, which also benefits from an American security guarantee, fit in that structure? Has a strategic triangle4 formed over the years between the three countries as a result of the relationship between the United States, NATO, South Korea, and Japan? China itself does not hesitate to describe the existing political-military relations between Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo as an “Asian NATO” or “Cold War relics”—including Australia and the other countries in the Indo-Pacific region linked by a security agreement with the United States.5 Under the Trump administration, China feels that it is the object of increased power competition and strategic rivalries with the United States. The US National Security Strategy and the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report clearly articulate a military vision in Asia within the network of

2 Julian Lindley-French, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: The Enduring Alliance (London: Routledge, 2015) and “1949–1979: Different World, Different Europe, Different NATO,” Aspenia Online, April 4, 2019, https://aspeniaonline.it/1949-2019different-world-different-europe-different-nato/. 3 See paragraphs 53 and 54 of the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit Communiqué, https:// www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm. 4 US experts on Northeast Asia issues, Ralph Cossa and Victor Cha advocated the term of “virtual alliance” to describe the security ties existing between the USA, Japan, and South Korea in the post-Cold War era. See Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US–Korea–Japan Security Triangle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 5 Adam P. Liff, “China and the US Alliance System,” The China Quarterly 233 (March 2018): 137–165.

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established alliances and partnerships aimed at containing Chinese expansion and influence in the Indo-Pacific region.6 Both South Korea and Japan have NATO partner status and contribute to the Alliance’s activities, operational, and other.7 The ambiguity is that their close strategic relationship with the United States is at the root of this rapprochement.8 Technically, if South Korea and Japan are NATO partners “outside the Euro-Atlantic area,” they are first and foremost allies of the United States with whom they have each signed a security agreement. Nevertheless, through its unique political–military organization and capabilities, NATO exerts a strong influence on both South Korea and Japan, which are keen to see some of its emblematic roles—including its level of operational coherence and solidarity, notably expressed through the United States’ security guarantee—reflected in their security relations with Washington. This study, therefore, draws parallels between NATO and the South Korean–American security alliance. This empirical approach is also inspired by Donald Trump’s tendency to resort to the same arguments regarding his European allies in NATO and US security relations in Northeast Asia on the hotly debated topic of “burden sharing.”9 Trump considers these relationships extremely unbalanced to the detriment of the United States, which finds itself confronted with partners who act as “free-riders” because they don’t pay their share, both financially and militarily, to ensure their security. In Europe and Asia alike, President Trump has talked bluntly with his allies and has deployed a transactional 6 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 18, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf; Department of Defense, The Indo Pacific Strategy Report, June 1, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/ Department-of-defense-indo-pacific-strategy-report-2019.pdf. 7 The two countries have contributed to the International Stabilization Afghanistan Force (ISAF), and to the fight against maritime piracy in the Indian Ocean alongside NATO. Since 2014, as part of NATO’s Interoperability Initiative, they have been participating in the Interoperability Platform, which brings together allies and 24 partner countries. 8 Michito Tsuruoka, “Asia, NATO and Its Partners: Complicated Relationship,” Nato Review, February 2010, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/Asia/nato_partner_ asia/EN/index.htm; Zachary Keck, “Should China Welcome an Asian NATO,” The Diplomat, April 30, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/should-china-welcome-anasian-nato/. 9 Martial Foucault, Frédéric Mérand, “The Challenge of Burden-Sharing,” International Journal 67, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 423–429.

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diplomacy where economic considerations outweigh diplomatic coherence.10 During NATO’s 2018 Summit, he called for a doubling of defense spending in each member state from 2 to 4% of GDP, leading to a transatlantic malaise.11 The debate on defense spending does not reflect the real trend in expenditures by NATO countries. The US president’s confrontational bargaining style has resulted in a growing divide between Washington and its allies, and in creating a serious crisis of confidence regarding America’s military commitment to Europe.12 On a similar note, the way President Trump has engaged the cost-sharing debate with South Korea, urging Seoul to increase its share of the burden, has been interpreted as a threat of disengagement just as a nuclear North Korea is becoming more aggressive.13 The point here is that South Korea is already paying billions to host and support US forces and bases, while these installments are also an asset for Washington’s strategic posture in Asia. After all, the presence of American forces in South Korea and Japan remains a pillar of US strategy toward China.

Europe/Northeast Asia: Convergence and Constraints in the Regional Security Dynamics of the Alliances The difficulty of the debate on the transatlantic relationship, as illustrated by the 2018 NATO Summit, is echoed in Seoul, where similar issues—adjusting the US–South Korean security alliance, the deterrent 10 Michael J. Green, “Trump and Asia: Continuity, Change and Disruption,” Asian Forum, April 18, 2019, http://www.theasanforum.org/trump-and-asia-continuity-changeand-disruption/; Steward M. Patrick, “Trump in His Own Mad Way Has Forced a Real Debate Over Transatlantic Ties,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 10, 2019, https:// www.cfr.org/blog/trump-his-own-mad-way-has-forced-real-debate-over-transatlantic-ties. 11 Ewen Mac Askill and Pippa Crerar, “Donald Trump Tells NATO Allies to Spend 4% of GDP on Defense,” The Guardian, July 12, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2018/jul/11/donald-trump-tells-nato-allies-to-spend-4-of-gdp-on-defence. 12 Speaking at a political meeting in Berlin on May 28, 2017, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that Europeans must now take their fate into their own hands because they cannot rely on the United States, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ europe/angela-merkel-europe-donald-trump-us-germany-ties-eu-india-a7762811.htm. 13 For 2018, Seoul’s contribution for the cost of the American military presence was about 830 million dollars, covering 40% of the expense. The new cost plan, following Donald Trump’s request, asked South Korea to pay 924 million dollars for 2019.

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effect of the US guarantee and the credibility of extended deterrence— are being debated. However, though it may be tempting to draw a parallel between the territorial tensions produced by Russia’s aggressive postures in Ukraine and by China’s assertiveness in the South and East China seas, the regional strategic contexts largely differ. Signed in 1953 at the end of the Korean War, the mutual defense treaty between Washington and Seoul was and remains focused on the North Korean threat and on the objective of responding to the possibility of a new land invasion. Moreover, despite a security agreement signed in 1951 with Japan and the evolution of Japan–US relations towards a more balanced strategic partnership, no significant political-military mechanism has been created between Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo.14 Following President Trump’s decision to pursue leader-to-leader engagement with Kim Jong-un in 2018, the US–South Korean security relationship has faced the challenge of maintaining its credibility in the context of a “détente” process with Pyongyang. Breaking with President Obama’s “strategic patience,” Trump’s approach has received enthusiastic support from South Korea’s president Moon Jae-in.15 In this respect, military restraint measures have been put in place, including the suspension or downscaling of major training exercises such as Team Spirit, Key Resolve, or Foal Eagle. These initiatives do not prevent a form of strategic lucidity, since it is clear that military leaders on both sides are aware that North Korea is continuing to develop its nuclear deterrence capabilities by pursuing its enrichment activities.16 Likewise, as demonstrated by the 2019 report presented by the Pentagon to Congress on China’s

14 Victor Cha, Power Play Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). 15 President Moon Jae-in belongs to the South Korea progressist political family that

is in favor of engagement with North Korea, namely “sunshine policy” as defined by one of his predecessor president Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003). The recent information coming from North Korea and the development of market economies in parts of the country suggest that Kim Jon-un is willing to launch an economic reform. Moon Jae-in sees this objective as giving Kim an incentive to dialogue. If relations improve between North Korea, the United States, and the outside world, the regime will be more likely to denuclearize in the long run, which is one reason why South Korean progressive policymakers are promoting inter-Korea economic projects. 16 “North Korea Now Able to Miniaturize Nuclear Warheads, Japan Defense Report,” The Guardian, August 12, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/21/ north-korea-now-able-to-miniaturise-nuclear-warheads-japan-defence-report.

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military posture,17 the accelerating modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces, just like its strategic opacity, constitutes a new challenge to the regional balance. These two elements—Pyongyang’s ballistic and nuclear programs and, in the background, China’s military buildup—influenced political-military discussions in both Washington and Seoul and resulted in the highly controversial decision to implement the US missile defense system, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD), on South Korean soil in spring 2018. Seoul was rightly concerned about damaging a hitherto cloudless relationship with Beijing. Criticized domestically, the deployment was also strongly denounced by China and Russia. Notwithstanding assurances that the missile system would only target attacks from North Korea, its deployment so close to their borders irritates Beijing and Moscow, which see it as a direct attack on their security interests and on the concept of “global strategic stability” that they promote.18 Moscow, which has consistently denounced NATO’s expansion in the Baltic and the establishment of a missile defense system in Europe, cannot accept the prospect of a shift in the regional security balance in favor of the United States on its Asian flank. As for China, it is concerned that THAAD will undermine its nuclear capabilities and its so-called antiaccess or anti-denial strategy (A2/AD) mainly directed against the United States. Furthermore, the true effectiveness of the system was put into question, as its coverage of South Korean territory was considered incomplete and, according to its detractors, would only serve to protect American military personnel, most of whom are stationed around Seoul.19 The US withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), on August 2, 2019, added a new element of uncertainty 17 US Department of Defense, “Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019,” Annual Report to Congress, May 2019, https://assets. documentcloud.org/documents/5987010/2019-chinamilitarypowerreport.pdf. 18 The concept of strategic stability was formally agreed on for the first time between then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and then U.S. President George H.W. Bush during the negotiations on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in June 1990. It was defined in terms of removing incentives for either side to launch a nuclear first strike. 19 Michael Elleman and Michael J. Zagurek, Jr., “THAAD: What It Can and Can’t Do,” 38th North, March 10, 2016, https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/201603-10_THAAD-What-It-Can-and-Cant-Do.pdf; Invook Kim and Soul Park, “Deterrence Under Nuclear Asymmetry: Thaad and the Prospects for Missile Defense and the Korean Peninsula,” Contemporary Security Policy 40, no. 2 (2019): 165–192.

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to this complex debate in a Northeast Asia marked by the rise of the Chinese nuclear and ballistic arsenal.20 Washington and its NATO allies have rightly accused Russia of failing to comply with this treaty by developing a new missile featuring a 2500-kilometer minimum range. The desire to counter Chinese capabilities is also at the root of the American decision to acquire new intermediate missiles available for deployment in the Indo-Pacific. While the US National Defense Strategy describes both Russia and China as great power threats, China is clearly singled out as the most important challenge to America’s interests over the long term. Beyond that diagnosis, the withdrawal from INF shows the disdain for multilateral institutions and arms control treaties that characterizes Donald Trump’s worldview epitomized by “America First.”21 As such, the current US administration would be too reluctant to extend the Start treaty, which expires in 2021. The fear is therefore that this erosion of the Cold War era arms control architecture will ultimately foster nuclear proliferation.22 The prospect of major powers strengthening their arsenals can only reinforce the desire for other state actors to acquire them. This could confirm Pyongyang’s view that, faced with superpowers with shifting strategic calculations, nuclear weapons provide a standing on the international scene and constitute a regime’s life insurance. Moreover, after his scathing criticism of the Joint Comprehensive Plan

20 The 2019 DoD report to Congress on China estimates the PLA Rocket Force has 1500 short-range ballistic missiles, 450 medium-range ballistic missiles, and 160 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, in addition to hundreds of long-range groundlaunched cruise missiles. These can target many US allies in Asia (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan). In the case of the DF-26, the missile threat may be extended to the US territory of Guam, location of major Air Force and Navy forward operating bases in the Indo-Pacific. China has also developed a specialized anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21D. Looking to the future, China may well be ahead of the United States and its allies in developing advanced hypersonic missiles. See DoD, Annual Report to Congress, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” May 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/ 2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf. 21 Walter R. Mead, “The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal World Order,” Foreign Affairs 96 (March/April 2017): 2–7; Peter Dombrowsky, Simon Reich, “Does Donald Trump Have a Grand Strategy?” International Affairs 93 (September 2017): 1013–1037; and Michael J. Green, “Trump and Asia.” 22 Steven Erlanger, “Erosion of Nuclear Deals Creates Instability,” New York Times, August 12, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/08/world/europe/arms-racerussia-china.html?

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of Action (JCPOA),23 and growing pressure from the American administration against Iran, Donald Trump’s tendency to withdraw from the framework of past treaties and agreements does not encourage the North Korean leader to engage in a negotiation process that calls his nuclear capabilities into question. Following a North Korea missile test in July 2017, a new sense of vulnerability has emerged in Washington, in particular around the possibility that North Korea threatens US territory with its intercontinental ballistic missiles.24 As then presidential candidate Donald Trump himself had suggested, some among American conservative circles now recommend that Washington advise its allies in Northeast Asia to build their own nuclear defenses.25 Strongly internalized by South Korea and Japan, the fear of “strategic decoupling”26 is not unlike the Euromissile crisis of 1977 to 1982. Caused by Moscow’s deployment of SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe, the latter had then severely damaged the transatlantic relationship. Aside from their military capability, the deployment was an attempt by Moscow to decouple the United States from its European allies, whose security rested on anticipation that a Soviet invasion of NATO territory would trigger a US nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. The SS-20 constituted both a threat and a potential bargaining chip. In the event of Soviet aggression against Western Europe, the United States would face a dilemma: conceding NATO’s defeat or launching a retaliatory strike. The Reagan administration responded forcefully by deploying Pershing II missiles in Western Europe. The move resulted in negotiations, in Moscow’s acceptance of the US “zero option” proposal, and

23 Agreement signed in Vienna in 2015 after intense negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group (United States, Russia, China, France, Germany, United Kingdom) to regulate Iran’s nuclear program, including the lifting of sanctions in exchange for the termination of Tehran’s enrichment program. 24 Sam LaGrone, “NORAD Chief: North Korea Has Ability to Reach U.S. with Nuclear Warhead on Mobile ICBM,” USNI News, April 7, 2015, http://news.usni.org/ 2015/04/07/norad-chief-north-korea-has-ability-to-reach-u-s-with-nuclear-warhead-onmobile-icbm. 25 Ted Galen Carpenter, “America Should Rethink Its Commitments to Allies,” The National Interest, July 14, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/americashould-rethink-its-commitments-allies-66922. 26 Ankit Panda and Viping Narang, “North Korea ICBM: A New Missile and a New Era,” War on the Rocks, July 6, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/northkoreas-icbm-a-new-missile-and-a-new-era/.

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in the withdrawal of all Nuclear Armed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) on both sides. Given that they can theoretically reach United States territory, North Korea’s nuclear arms pose a threat even greater than the Soviet SS-20s did. Pyongyang’s short-term objective appears to be to make South Korea and Japan question America’s commitment to defend them in the event of a North Korean attack in the same way that Moscow challenged NATO’s cohesiveness with its SS-20 missiles. The North Korean leader appears to be rational. He certainly does not intend to unleash a nuclear war, which would bring the collapse of his regime and his country. He is using his nuclear weapons as a threat and potential bargaining chip, in much the same way that Moscow used the SS-20. The United States has developed sufficiently strong relations with South Korea and Japan to believe that it can confidently tackle a range of crisis scenarios involving North Korea’s conventional, ballistic, chemical, or nuclear capabilities. To varying degrees, all three countries are sensitive to the destabilizing potential of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and to China’s military aggressiveness. They have agreed to set up missile defense systems to protect themselves and contain these potential threats. However unlike in Europe, the bilateral alliances maintained by the United States in Northeast Asia do not operate within an integrated multilateral security framework. NATO is based on a political commitment to collective defense and a consensus-based decision-making mechanism. The organization also has integrated command structures and interoperability standards that give it a very strong military posture. None of this exists between Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo. While the United States has developed a high degree of interoperability between its forces and those of South Korea and Japan, there is no mechanism in place to engage in integrated trilateral military operations in case of conflict. It was not until 2016 that South Korea and Japan signed an agreement on the sharing of military intelligence, including the North Korean missile threat.27 Any prospect of developing military cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul comes up against political animosities

27 The General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSMIA). It was called

into question by South Korea in the summer of 2019 at the height of political and trade tensions between the two countries. See Jesse Johnson and Sakura Murakami, “South Korea Decides to Exit Intelligence-Sharing Pact with Japan,” The Japan Times, August 22, 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/08/22/national/politicsdiplomacy/south-korea-japan-intelligence-sharing-pact-gsomia/.

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caused by historical wounds and unresolved territorial differences that are quick to revive nationalist sentiments. As a result, no significant operational or tactical coordination has been achieved between the militaries of Washington’s two major allies in Northeast Asia.

The Challenges of Adapting the Combined US--South Korean Forces to a Changing North Korea Since the 1950s, joint training by US–South Korean forces—mainly on the ground—has been aimed at preparing for a “second Korean war.” In the event of a crisis, the 28,500 US troops stationed in Korea would be joined by some of those based in Japan and others sent by the Hawaiibased US Indo-Pacific Command. The combined US–South Korean forces are preparing for different scenarios. These include an invasion from the North, nuclear conflict, and stabilization operations to manage major troop and refugee movements that could follow a collapse of the North Korean regime.28 The United States and South Korea have repeatedly taken initiatives to redesign their combined exercises in terms of size, volume, and complexity as part of the Combined Forces Command training. These adjustments have most often been made with a view to integrating them into a specific diplomatic approach. First, it aimed at preventing the North Korean regime from weakening the cohesiveness of the political and military alliance between Washington and Seoul. Yet more importantly, it was about entering into negotiations with North Korea with the certainty of being prepared to respond effectively together against any aggression from the North. The operational benefits of some of these training sessions were due to their scale. Their concerted reduction illustrates a very concrete way of

28 Terence Roehrig, “Reinforcing Deterrence: The U.S. Military Response to North Korean Provocations,” in Joint U.S.–Korea Academic Studies: Facing Reality in East Asia: Tough Decisions on Competition and Cooperation, ed. Gilbert Rozman, vol. 26 (Korea Economic Institute of America, 2015), http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/ reinforcing_deterrence_the_u.s._military_response_to_north_koren_provocations.pdf.

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supporting the dialogue process with Pyongyang without, however, calling into question the Alliance’s cohesion and level of cooperation. From 2018, the US and South Korean military authorities have worked to modify their joint training exercises and adjust their strategic communication to give them a less aggressive tone. Foal Eagle, a key annual military exercise between the US and South Korean forces was held in a diminished form in November 2018 in order not to interfere with ongoing negotiations with North Korea. However, those changes have not detracted from the fundamental message of deterrence and commitment that the alliance intends to display. Despite decreasing tensions in the Korean peninsula, and despite the Trump and Moon administrations’ emphasis on diplomacy, military circles in both countries have remained anxious to continue training and operating as an alliance in terms of defense strategy and doctrine. In September 2018, newly nominated to become the Commander of US Forces in Korea, General Robert Abrams expressed the view that a pause in exercising had resulted in a degradation of readiness.29 A year later, during his statement before the House Armed Service Committee, his message was more nuanced. “We must continuously strike a balance between the clear need to train and exercise military capabilities and the requirement to create space for and support strategic diplomacy.” Carefully worded, the idea is that both countries must combat the perception that maintaining an effective level of defense runs against a logic of diplomatic engagement—which is, as General Abrams knows, what North Korea regularly claims. He is aware of the importance of elaborating a counternarrative that will convince the political leadership, both in the United States and South Korea, that effective diplomacy should not entail neutralizing one’s defense capabilities, and that they do not undermine the search for confidence-building measures and the reduction of tensions. But the idea, however desirable it may be, was not supported with the same degree of enthusiasm in Washington or Seoul.30

29 “Gen Abrams: Joint US–South Korea Military Exercises a Top Priority,” Stars and Stripes, September 25, 2018, https://www.stripes.com/gen-abrams-joint-us-south-koreamilitary-exercises-a-top-priority-1.549099. 30 A letter by 13 members of Congress to then Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan on January 29, 2019, requesting the resumption of major US–ROK training illustrates this position. See https://larsen.house.gov/sites/larsen.house.gov/files/images/HASC% 20Member%20Letter%20to%20SecDef%20re%20Korea%20Exercises.pdf.

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Its verbal threats notwithstanding, the North Korean regime is fully aware of the military superiority of the South Korean–American Alliance and its ability to inflict severe damage, if not to threaten its existence. This does not prevent Pyongyang from being confident in its own destructive capacities. Beyond its nuclear and chemical arsenal, North Korean conventional artillery and short-range missile capabilities can reach the South Korean capital as well as the thousands of American military personnel and their families living there. Similarly, the US territory itself is no longer safe—at least theoretically—from Pyongyang’s long-range ballistic missiles since the successful launch of the Hwasong-14 in July 2017.31 Therefore, should Kim Jong-un, frustrated with ongoing sanctions, decide to return to his policy of provocations by ballistic or nuclear missile tests, it could reduce the Alliance’s response options. The situation could be further complicated if the regime decides to rely on covert initiatives such as cyber-attacks against civilian–military infrastructure for which it is difficult to attribute blame and that do not necessarily involve military responses. In his 2019 New Year speech, Kim Jong-un set out a roadmap for future US–North Korean relations while referring to a “new path” if the United States maintained sanctions and pressure on the regime or even in the event of an about-face from Donald Trump, as in the example of the agreement with Iran. The North Korean leader stated that North Korea would “no longer produce, test, use or propagate” its nuclear weapons while asking the United States to take “corresponding measures.”32 Unsurprisingly, his demands include the end of major US– South Korean training exercises, the establishment of a peace mechanism to replace the armistice regime, and the withdrawal of sanctions. Kim Jong-un has several political options: he can keep his nuclear weapons or choose to “freeze” the program if he does not dismantle it; he can rely on the support of China and Russia, which have already spoken out in favor of lifting sanctions; finally, he knows that the South Korean president is ready to engage in active economic collaboration. The resumption of relations between the two Koreas has made it possible 31 Statement of general Robert B. Abrams before the House armed service Committee, Washington, March 27, 2019, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20190327/ 109234/HHRG-116-AS00-estate-Abrams-20190327.pdf. 32 Kim Jong-un 2019 New Year speech, The National Committee on North Korea, January 1, 2019. English trans. via the North Korea newspaper Rodong Simnun, https:// www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/kimjongun_2019_newyearaddress.pdf/file_view.

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to reactivate a number of commitments that are deemed crucial to the success of the Sunshine Policy—the policy of opening up to the North— initiated in the 2000s: sports exchanges, family reunifications, humanitarian assistance, railway reconnection, and economic cooperation. There has also been a significant military component with the establishment of confidence-building measures such as the demining the demilitarized area (DMZ) and establishing a military dialogue. An inter-Korean liaison office was opened in Kaesong in September 2018. This inter-Korean rapprochement, although favored by the American president, reflects a desire for strategic autonomy that is not without military consequence. As strategic experts point out, the United States and South Korea need to innovate in their cooperative approach in order to give the Alliance its full potential. A balance must be struck between the necessary defense capabilities and the changes in attitude needed to adapt. This requires a common understanding of the challenges posed by the evolving North Korean threat and the changing security landscape induced by the rise of China.33 Similarly, as the perception of roles and responsibilities evolves within the Alliance, discussions on who should lead operations become more pressing. In wartime, it is expected that the Combined Forces Command—an American–South Korean staff, headed by the Commander of the US Force in Korea—would be in charge. But President Moon Jae-in has made the transfer of command to a Korean General a political issue. He faces the reluctance of the US military officials who believe that their South Korean counterparts are not ready for the responsibility. This lack of trust is reciprocal. President Moon fears being drawn into a conflict with the North without being consulted by Donald Trump, particularly in the event of preemptive strikes.34 The Alliance’s foreseeable developments, such as its transition to a combined defense system under South Korean leadership, present many challenges that test its cohesion. However, if these changes are made collaboratively, they can lead to a strengthening of the Alliance’s deterrence capabilities and enhance its level of operational readiness and diplomatic weight in the region. 33 Scott Snyder, South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018). 34 Julian Borger, “Donald Trump Threatens to ‘Totally Destroy’ North Korea in UN Speech,” The Guardian, September 19, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ 2017/sep/19/donald-trump-threatens-totally-destroy-north-korea-un-speech.

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The Impact of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) on the Concept of “Extended Deterrence” Around the Korean Peninsula After 2006 and the unprecedented situation created by the first North Korean nuclear test, the decision was made by the South Korean– American alliance to adapt a strategy of deterrence with the creation of the Extended Deterrence Political Committee in 2010. In 2015, this committee incorporated a missile defense dimension to become the Deterrence Strategy Committee which led to the establishment of a consultation mechanism the following year—the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (DSC)—with the aim of considering security issues from a regional perspective.35 Paragraph 3 of the inaugural document clearly reaffirms the nature and scope of the United States’ commitment to its ally. The United States reiterated its ironclad and unwavering commitment to draw on the full range of its military capabilities, including the nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense, to provide extended deterrence for the ROK, and reaffirmed the longstanding U.S. policy that any attack on the United States or its allies will be defeated, and any use of nuclear weapons will be met with an effective and overwhelming response. In particular, the United States emphasized that it remains steadfast in meeting these enduring commitments and providing immediate support to the ROK.

The Trump Administration has continued these discussions, which have led to the revision of its nuclear doctrine. Published in February 2018, the Nuclear Posture Review proposed the development of new, low-power, tactical weapons, and appeared largely directed against China and Russia, although North Korea is repeatedly mentioned.36 Through

35 US Department of Defense, “Joint Statement for the Inaugural Meeting of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group,” December 2016, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Joint-Statement-forthe-Inaugural-Meeting-of-the-Extended-Deterrence-Strategy-and-Consultation-Group.pdf. 36 US Department of Defense, “US Nuclear Posture Review 2018,” February 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEARPOSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.pdf.

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its numerous references to the United States’ obligations toward its European and Asian allies, the document is part of a strong declaratory policy aimed at reassuring its allies and sending a dissuasive message to North Korea.37 It clearly takes into account the change in regional strategic balances resulting from developments in the North Korean ballistic and nuclear threat since Kim Jong-un took power in 2012. As a new phase of uncertainty unfolds in the American–South Korean relationship, the alliance must define and implement a stance that prepares it for the worst-case scenario but also for the absence of a crisis while serving political–military objectives for the denuclearization of the peninsula. Translating this approach into a consistent narrative that can counterbalance North Korean discourse is not easy. If speaking too harshly would be counterproductive, an overly “euphoric” public diplomacy would not serve the Alliance’s objectives either. The latter needs a minimum of strategic clarity to operate effectively. However, it is apparent since the Singapore meeting that the term denuclearization does not have the same meaning for the Americans and the North Koreans. On the one hand, Washington defines denuclearization as the final elimination of all nuclear weapons or components with the dismantling of related sites and the establishment of a robust verification system. On the other, Pyongyang sees denuclearization as a gradual regional process involving the withdrawal of any American nuclear weapons system from the Korean peninsula, including the troops deployed there. This step-bystep approach, which is supported by China and Russia in the United Nations Security Council, also requires the integration of sanctions relief in response to North Korean “efforts.” Since its establishment, the South Korean–American alliance has gradually strengthened its military capabilities while adding a strong political message, designed to illustrate an unwavering collective resolve. Its assets include a balance of conventional forces in its favor, long-range strike capabilities, missile defense, defensive cybersecurity capabilities and an adequate nuclear component. Washington maintains the capacity to deploy nuclear resources in the region, in particular through strategic bombers capable of influential action in the event of a political–military crisis scenario. It is especially committed to a nuclear posture based on 37 CSIS debate transcript, “Assessing the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review: Regional Threats Panel,” CSIS, March 2, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessing-2018nuclear-posture-review-regional-threats-panel.

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broad-based deterrence.38 As we have seen, this major strategic commitment is based on a clear declaratory policy in which the United States reserves the right to use nuclear weapons when an ally’s vital interests are threatened.39 The two allies have shared this approach unequivocally so far, but North Korean nuclearization could lead Seoul to ask Washington to restore a permanent nuclear presence on its soil. In September 2017, the South Korean defense minister told a parliamentary session that he was considering asking Washington to redeploy nuclear weapons in South Korea. Similarly, a national debate could begin on the acquisition of nuclear resources for South Korean defense, but this debate remains marginal.40 Politicians and lawmakers in South Korea, most of them from conservative parties, have suggested that the country should produce its own nuclear arsenal while others consider South Korea should advance its capacity to make preemptive strikes. For the time being, most discussions in South Korean strategic circles focus more on the credibility and level of the US nuclear engagement.41 Opinions are being voiced comparing the terms and nature of the American commitment to South Korea with that to its European allies. The latter is considered more structured because it is codified by language built around the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept, which was updated in 2012 with the publication of the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review. It is also based on high-level public diplomacy, as it is supported by communiqués issued by the Organization’s biannual Summits attended by the leaders of the Member States.42 Ultimately, South Korea would like to enjoy a degree

38 Kim and Park, “Deterrence Under Nuclear Asymetry.” 39 US Nuclear Posture Review. 40 Toby Dalton, Narushige Michita, and Tong Zhao, Security Spillover, Regional Implications of Evolving Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018), 17–22; Cheong Seong-Chang, “La politique extérieure du nouveau gouvernement sud-coréen et la question nucléaire nord-coréenne,” Conference paper, IRSEM, Paris, September 29, 2017. 41 Cheong Seong Whun, “Redeploying American Tactical Nuclear Weapons to Counter North Korea’s Nuclear Monopoly,” Asan Institute, December 17, 2018, http://en.asaninst.org/contents/redeploying-american-tactical-nuclear-weapons-tocounter-north-koreas-nuclear-monopoly-2/. 42 NATO Strategic Concept 2010, November 19, 2010, revised in 2012, following the Lisboa Summit. “As Long as Nuclear Weapons Exist, NATO Will Remain a Nuclear Alliance,” https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_82705.htm; NATO Deterrence

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of American nuclear security guarantee similar to that provided to Washington’s European allies in the context of transatlantic relations. NATO’s nuclear deterrence is based on three pillars. The first is political: there are high-level statements on the role of nuclear weapons in the organization’s strategy, which are accompanied by supportive declaratory policies from the three nuclear countries of the alliance (USA, France, and United Kingdom). The second is of a technical–military nature: the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. The deterrent value of these provisions is significant because they illustrate the Alliance’s resolve in the face of potential adversaries and reinforce the perception that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all and will inevitably involve an American response. The third element is procedural and comprises the consultation process that follows political developments and planning in peacetime and is intended to inform policymakers in times of crisis. Some of these elements are already in place within the framework of the South Korean–American alliance, including declaratory policy and the existence of specific mechanisms to discuss the conditions for nuclear deterrence. Moreover, in both cases, missile defense is presented as a useful way of strengthening the deterrent role of nuclear weapons. It can be argued that North Korea may be deterred from attempting a nuclear attack on Seoul or Tokyo if it expects a strong trilateral response. However, Pyongyang has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to divide the allies and to use Korean nationalism to its advantage. It is also a characteristic of its diplomacy to play on the latent anti-Americanism generated by the strong US military presence on South Korean soil, or on the resentment of the past linked to Japanese colonization. It is not impossible that this kind of calculation could lead Pyongyang to target its attacks against Japan, in the hope that South Korea would be hesitant to come to the aid of a former occupying power.

Conclusion In Europe and Northeast Asia, the growing fear of a military crisis with a potential nuclear dimension is testing Washington’s military commitments and the credibility of American Alliances. While Europe has been able to adapt within a multilateral framework, Japan and South Korea have and Defense Posture Review, February 12, 2012, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ official_texts_87597.htm.

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had to adjust their defense posture in the context of a bilateral relationship with the United States. Encouraging greater trilateral cooperation between US, South Korean, and Japanese forces would bring the Northeast Asian security system closer to NATO’s collective defense model. But this is not without difficulties because the Washington–Seoul–Tokyo “strategic triangle” does not work at the moment. The recurring animosity that characterizes relations between Tokyo and Seoul is a worrying geopolitical variable for the stability of alliances in Northeast Asia.43 The deterioration of relations between South Korea and Japan in the summer of 2019 and Tokyo’s resulting economic sanctions towards Seoul is only one manifestation of that problem. Though history is partly to blame in the renewed antipathy between the two countries, it does not explain everything.44 It appears that Asia is in a period of political transition, and rising populism leaves space for the expression of exaggerated nationalisms. The United States is powerless to reduce the climate of mistrust and animosity between its two main strategic partners in North Asia. The Obama administration tried to remedy that issue by organizing trilateral meetings in April 2014, followed by coordination meetings between Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo on North Korea. But these initiatives have proved ineffective.45 Political–military relations between the United States and the two Koreas are also at a critical stage. If relations fail to evolve to the minimum level of mutual trust necessary to achieve real détente, tensions will persist, and no viable solution will be found to counter North Korean proliferation. This perspective requires the United States and South Korea to coordinate their approaches to convince North Korea of the benefits of dialogue and to accept a process to reduce tensions on the peninsula.

43 Scott Snyder, “Japan, South Korea Tensions Are Eroding Security in Northeast Asia,” Council of Foreign Relations, August 23, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/blog/japan-southkorea-tensions-are-eroding-security-northeast-asia. 44 In fact, the essence of the dispute is linked to the decision of a South Korean court to reverse the 1965 peace treaty between South Korea and Japan by reopening the still painful case of the “comfort women.” In addition, the South Korean Supreme Court demanded that Japanese companies pay compensation to South Korean workers engaged in forced labor during the colonial period. 45 Scott Snyder, “Obama’s Mission in Asia: Bring the Allies Together,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 21, 2014, https://www.cfr.org/blog/obamas-mission-asia-bringallies-together.

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However, the success of this combined diplomacy rests on the demonstration of US–South Korean military capabilities that could encourage North Korea to suspend its provocations. The challenge is to put in place a joint defense posture expressing the resolution and capabilities of the two allies, while also maintaining stability and the balance of power on the Korean peninsula without feeding the North Korean insecurity complex. The North Korean regime faces an understandable dilemma. Although accepting a dialogue with South Korea and the United States, it must not appear to be lowering its guard and imply that it is in a weak position. This difficult exercise of negotiating with a historical opponent involves both sides approaching the discussions in a symmetrical posture, each hiding its real or supposed vulnerabilities. In this context, the perceived erosion of the defense capabilities of the South Korean–American alliance, both in terms of political and operational cohesion, is a factor that can have a significant impact on the outcome of the negotiations.

References Cha, Victor. Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016. Dalton, Toby, et al. “South Korea Debates Nuclear Options.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 27, 2016. https://carnegieendowment. org/2016/04/27/south-korea-debates-nuclear-options/ixn3. Green, Michael. By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783. New York: Columbia University Press, 2017. Halperin, Morton, Peter Hayes, and Leon Sigal. “A Korean Nuclear WeaponsFree Zone Treaty and Nuclear Extended Deterrence: Options for Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.” Napsnet Special Reports, April 12, 2018. https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/a-koreannuclear-weapons-free-zone-treaty-and-nuclear-extended-deterrence-optionsfor-denuclearizing-the-korean-peninsula/. Katzianis, Harry J., et al. “How North Korea Perceives—and Respond— to US–South Korea Joint Military Exercises,” National Interest, August 1, 2019. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/how-north-koreaperceives—and-responds—-us-south-korea-joint-military-exercises. Litwack, Robert. “Nuclear Crises with North Korea and Iran: From Transformational to Transactional Diplomacy.” Wooddrow Wilson Center, October 2019. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/book_ downloads/nuclear_crises_north_korea_iran.pdf.

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Meijer, Hugo, ed. Origins and Evolution of the U.S. Rebalance Toward Asia: Diplomatic, Military, and Economic Dimensions. New York: Palgrave, 2015. Snyder, Scott. South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers. New York: Columbia University Press, 2018. U.S. Department of Defense. “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting a Networked Region.” June 1, 2019. Whun, Cheong-Seong. “Redeploying American Tactical Nuclear Weapons to Counter North Korea’s Nuclear Monopoly.” Asan Report, December 2018. http://en.asaninst.org/contents/redeploying-american-tacticalnuclear-weapons-to-counter-north-koreas-nuclear-monopoly-2/.

Challenging America and the West: A Russian Cyberstrategy? Kevin Limonier

In July 2016, in the midst of the American presidential campaign, hackers stole 19,952 emails and their 8034 attached documents from the servers of the Democratic National Committee (DNC), and later published them on Wikileaks. On January 6, 2017, several weeks after the election of Donald Trump, the CIA published a document that accused Russia of having tried to “influence” the presidential election by “undermining” Hillary Clinton and by “helping” the newly elected president. In other words, the hacking of the DNC servers, along with a campaign orchestrated by Russian-financed media outlets, had boosted the election of Donald Trump—who was seen as more favorably inclined toward Moscow that his opponent.1 Since then, the publication of the report on “Russian interferences” during the 2016 presidential campaign, prepared by Special Counsel Robert Mueller, has confirmed several of the prior suspicions. Yet, the exact level of Russian interference in this matter remains uncertain, as does the concrete impact of these operations of influence on the American electorate. 1 «Background to “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution» (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.

K. Limonier (B) French Institute of Geopolitics, University of Paris 8, Saint-Denis, France © The Author(s) 2020 M. Quessard et al. (eds.), Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37258-3_10

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Such doubts, raised by some Republican leaders and by most Russian diplomats, were not enough to ease the fear that such a scenario might be played out again in one of the many elections held in Europe afterwards: the 2017 French presidential elections, the referendum on the independence of Catalonia that same year, the elections to the European Parliament in 2019 and so on. Each of these campaigns raised fears of possible interference from Moscow, modeled on the alleged Russian involvement in the 2016 US presidential election. As a consequence, North American and European media outlets increasingly pair “Russian” and “cyberattack” in their news reports. Beyond this intense media coverage, the public declarations of political leaders, from all parties, have contributed to cementing, in the collective imagination, the image of the hacker (often Russian, sometimes Chinese) as a techno-political figure capable of changing the course of history in western democracies. Faced with these representations, we need to go back to the starting point of the DNC leaks. It all began with an operation of social engineering, and a desire to enter the servers of the Democratic National Committee.2 Hackers apparently sent an email to one or more employees and leaders of the Democratic Party, bearing the name of someone trusted and containing an infected link or attached document. At least one of those emails was opened on a computer connected to part—or all—of the DNC network, making it easy for the hackers to extract the emails that were later disclosed by Wikileaks. According to several sources, the computer code found on the DNC computers looks quite similar to one made famous by the hacking operations of a group known for attacking organizations and states hostile to Russia and baptized Advanced Persistent Threat 28 (APT28) by the cybersecurity firm Crowdstrike. Interestingly, and contrary to what they evoke, APTs are not always sophisticated attacks.3 With the DNC leaks, final success rested more on an ability to deceive employees than on forcing its way into the network. If the attack itself probably required some specific technical equipment, its sophistication and financial costs were nowhere close to other offensive cybernetic campaigns, such as the one

2 Social engineering consists in unfairly acquiring information of strategic importance. 3 Dmitri Alperovich, “Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Com-

mittee,” Crowdstrike (blog), June 15, 2016, https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bearsmidst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/.

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led by Israel and the United States that targeted Iran’s centrifuges with the Stuxnet worm. With APT28, we are dealing with a computer attack of presumably limited sophistication which, thanks to the documents extracted as a result of it, has propelled Russia to the rank of serious threat for the stability of Western democracies. In other words, the cost–benefit ratio for the government of the Russian Federation—providing that it was directly linked to these attacks—has proven so widely beneficial, as the political profits largely trumped its overall financial costs, that we need to investigate how Russia commits itself to a cyberspace understood as a space of confrontations. Indeed, if Russia possesses clear technical expertise in this field,4 its offensive capabilities are far exceeded by that of the United States, or even of China and Israel—two countries which have made a name for themselves in cybersecurity. But despite those limitations, Russia has made the headlines with the DNC hack, one of the most successful cybernetic operations in the history of digital networks. Here, we want to investigate the different aspects of the Russian offensive posture in cyberspace in order to better comprehend the inner workings of a cyberwar of the “weak against the strong.” Offensive actions attributed to Russia are made more efficient by a representation of cyberspace that is highly different from the one shared by most western countries. Also, these actions need to be understood in the particular context of Russian history, rooted in its Soviet past, but also structured by the perception of potential threats to the national interest that can spread out through cyberspace. Last but not least, we need to pause and think about the specific nature of the attacks that have filled the media landscape of many western countries after 2016. Indeed, whether Russia has directly been implicated in those attacks or not, what is really remarkable is the Russian ability to raise “cyberspace” as a core element of its great power narrative, and to use that narrative in order to fill the gap that exists between Russia’s modest economic weight and its aspiration to be challenge the American superpower.

4 A spokesman for BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, a firm specialized in fighting cyber-spying, declared in 2014 that the Snake virus (generally attributed to Russia) was “one of the most sophisticated and tenacious threats under our watch.”

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Cyberspace vs. Information Space: A Differentiated Perception of Cybernetic Threats To understand the offensive cyber-actions attributed to the Russian Federation, it is necessary to discuss the representations that condition the use of coercive measures in its national doctrine. Offensive actions are first shaped by the task officers’ representation of a digital “battlefield.” Russia sets itself apart from other powers through a unique representation of cyberspace that shapes the doctrines influencing its conduct of cybernetic operations. Though most Western countries have adopted the concept of “cyberspace,” the latter is perceived differently in Russia where official documents refer to it as an “information space.” Similarly, the prefix “cyber-,” used to adapt a number of concepts to the realities of digital spaces of data exchange, is often replaced by the adjective “informational” (informatsionny) in Russia. Thus, in the Russian official documents and positions, the terms “information security” or “information defense” replace the notions of “cybersecurity” and “cyberdefense”— both widely used in the United States and in Europe. This is more than a semantic alteration: a particular history and a specific balance of power have influenced a hierarchy of strategic priorities that has set Russia apart. If the term “cyberdefense” was coined by the American military in the early 1990s to illustrate the new priority of maintaining the integrity of the then-emerging digital networks, “information defense” can be traced back to the Soviet preoccupation with the control of information.5 Moreover, during the 1990s, American strategists believed that the greatest threats to the infant cyberspace would either be criminal groups or complex viruses, both capable of partly—or totally—damaging new digital systems that had quickly become essential, especially in banking. Russia, however, emerged from the Cold War with a heavily indoctrinated state apparatus and a staff trained at a time when a special KGB accreditation was required to own a map with a scale lower than 1:25,000—others

5 Lance Strate, “The Varieties of Cyberspace: Problems in Definition and Delimitation,” Western Journal of Communication 63, no. 3 (September 1999): 382–412, https://doi. org/10.1080/10570319909374648.

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were necessary to access copy machines, foreign newspapers, or an international phone line.6 Therefore, a different historical inheritance on each side of the former “Iron Curtain” led western armies to care primarily about the security and the management of the containers (the systems of data exchange) whereas the Russian military chiefly focused on content (the information that transits through the networks). As simplistic as this representation may appear, it allows us to better apprehend the current gap between Russia and Western countries in their representations of cyberspace and of the threats surrounding it. Finally, and out of this gap, we can classify the offensive actions attributed to Russia over the past two years into two separate categories: cybernetic actions on the one hand, and information actions on the other.

Cybernetic Actions and Information Actions Cybernetic actions cover all malicious actions that target digital systems through computer networks. Those include cyberattacks strictly defined and as gradually accepted by western cybersecurity doctrines over the past two decades: viruses, malwares, and trojans threatening the integrity of an entire system, whether to destroy it or to extract confidential data from it. Even though the Russian doctrine insists primarily on the informational aspects, the country does possess the technical capabilities to pursue offensive cybernetic actions. It is even likely that the Russian Federation was responsible for the very first cyberattack conducted by one country against another, in Estonia in 2007. At the time, Russian hackers used a distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack to saturate the servers of the Estonian government.7 Likewise, Russia found a second occasion to show its offensive cybernetic talents a year later, in the midst of the

6 Michel Rozanov, “Cartes faussées, cartes sous clé,” Hérodote, nos. 58–59 (1990): 193–202; Mikhail Voslensky, La Nomenklatura - Les Privilégiés En U.R.S.S (Paris: Belfon, 1980). 7 A DDOS attack consists in overburdening a service or server with requests (or con-

nection attempts) leading to its interruption. This type of attack is usually not very sophisticated, but requires consequential “fighting power” to overload the targeted servers. It is mostly made of private computers and connected objects infected with a malicious program, which directs them to strike the targeted server with a multitude of requests, all without their owners’ knowledge.

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Russian-Georgian War of August 2008. There, a series of more sophisticated attacks paralyzed parts of Georgian telecommunications, while the Russian army physically destroyed some of the central infrastructures of its adversary. Nonetheless, Russia only started to intensify and multiply its offensive cybernetical actions with the 2014 Maidan Revolution in Ukraine. Several viruses, such as Snake, were found in the servers of several defense ministries in Eastern European countries afterwards.8 In February 2015, the French TV channel TV5 Monde was targeted by a group named “cybercalifate,” an attack that intelligence later attributed to Russian hackers.9 That same year, a Ukrainian electricity plant stopped functioning due to a trojan baptized Black Energy, depriving hundreds of thousands of inhabitants from electric power for 24 hours. It also led to shocked reactions in the media: there was no precedent, as no electrical infrastructure had ever been interrupted as a result of a computer attack.10 It should be noted that Russia’s fingerprints on those actions has never been established from a technological point of view. Indeed, one of the first characteristics of cyberattacks is the near-impossibility of tracing the attacks back to their source, as hackers usually hide behind proxies—intermediary servers set between the target and themselves. And the limited amount of formal evidence that some governments might have through their intelligence services is in practice almost never publicized.11 This strictly limited amount of technical evidence allows for a wide array of interpretations, emanating from political leaders, media outlets, or private actors. Yet, and as they are mulling over the attribution of the attacks, actors on both sides are risking an escalation of denunciations not grounded in evidence, as made clear by the current American case. For example, the malware found in the servers of the DNC was the subject of

8 According to a BAE Systems report, Snake is a particularly sophisticated virus that primarily attacks systems belonging to defense ministries in Europe and North America. 9 Serge Leblal, “Piratage de TV5 Monde, La Piste Russe Se Précise,” Le Monde Informatique, June 10, 2015, https://www.lemondeinformatique.fr/actualites/lire-piratage-detv5-monde-la-piste-russe-se-precise-61430.html. 10 «IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01 Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure» CERT alert, US Department of Homeland Security, 2016, https://www.us-cert.gov/ ics/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01. 11 This political decision is often justified by an unwillingness to compromise intelligence sources on the field.

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a variety of reverse engineering analyses.12 These studies (including one published by the firm FireEye) taught us that a group of presumably Russian hackers was responsible, and that their interests were closely aligned on Moscow’s, and yet nothing has allowed us to formally link these hackers to the Russian government thus far. Despite the ambiguities making attribution more difficult, Russian cybernetic actions have historically been well understood in Europe and in the United States, as they closely align with the classical representation of threats they entertained. As a consequence, cybernetic actions have largely structured, until 2013–2014, how Western militaries perceived the various offensive actions that were presumably falling within the Russian repertoire. Over the past couple of years however, another type of offensive action has emerged, reaching its climax during the 2016 American presidential election: information actions. Incidentally, they can easily be traced back to the older doctrine of focusing primarily on content and its propagation. In practice, such operations consist in using cyberspace to spread information that is misleading—or altogether fake—to create, confirm, or support a power relationship that favors Russian interests. Nowadays, this tactic is mostly directed toward large European countries; yet, information actions are very often mistaken for more traditional operations of disinformation or destabilization. This parallel is particularly tempting as the Soviet Union acquired a remarkable expertise and a solid reputation for conducting such operations abroad, in Africa and Latin America especially. Without denying clear connections with Soviet approaches—many members of the current Russian cybernetic staff were trained to focus on “active measures” during their early years—we ought to avoid pinning down information actions simply to a modernized set of tactics. In fact, they are noticeably different from past Soviet methods because using digital networks (and social networks predominantly) as vectors of propagation requires altogether new tactics and processes to answer the new technical constraints stemming from digital technology. The closest example we have is Russia’s stated support for several French presidential candidates in 2017, namely Marine le Pen

12 Reverse engineering entails “disassembl[ing] and examin[ing] or analyz[ing] in detail (a product or device) to discover the concepts involved in manufacture usually in order to produce something similar.” See: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reverse% 20engineer.

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(head of the far-right Front national) and François Fillon (centerright). Beyond some gestures of goodwill, such as the meeting between Vladimir Putin and Mrs. le Pen in April 2017, the Russian government relied on a potent informational apparatus, led by its two multilingual media outlets: Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik—the latter being controlled by a public holding, Rossia Segodnia, which is statutorily a state unitary company (uniternoe predprijatie).13 Those two outlets, created in 2005 and 2014 respectively, have long endorsed the pro-identity and nationalistic segments on the French right; during the 2017 campaign, they started producing a large number of articles very critical of another candidate, Emmanuel Macron. Neither Sputnik nor RT has a noticeable following in France.14 Still, Russia cast a large shadow over the presidential campaign, and the information circulated by these outlets was widely echoed on digital networks. Paradoxically, the direct audience of these outlets is disconnected from their impressive ability to spread information on social media. And the information produced by Russian public agencies is conceived as digital content that can be easily spread out to the public following a concentric model (Fig. 1). At the heart of the model, RT and Sputnik spread their contents through three types of channels. First, they rely on their loyal readers; those sharing their editorial line are often classified on the right or farright (but also, though to a lesser extent, on the far-left), and they republish contents on their own networks. Second, a multitude of blogs with far-right leanings republish contents produced by RT and Sputnik, for the sake of “re-informing” the public, thus bringing it to new viewers. It has been established that some of these platforms have purposely been created to replicate the content and

13 The statute of state unitary company (Federalnoe Gossoudarstvennoe Unitarnoe Perdpriatie—FGUP) is usually granted to structures with activities deemed highly strategic for the state. An example is the company Kosmitcheskaïa Sviaz which owns an important fleet of communication satellites. 14 The French version of RT had 346,000 followers on Facebook and 64,000 on Twitter in April 2017. The French version of Sputnik had 287,000 followers on Facebook and 39,000 on Twitter that same month. These numbers are lagging far behind large media outlets such as Le Monde (with 3,734,000 likes on Facebook and 7 million followers on Twitter).

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Fig. 1 Russian State-sponsored contents propagation model on the Internet and social media

related specific narratives.15 This element has been highlighted by the Mueller report, publicly naming some individuals close to Vladimir Putin for their involvement in repeated attempts at manipulating information. For instance, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who was once the Russian president’s 15 Kevin Limonier, “The Dissemination of Russian-Sourced News in Africa: A Preliminary General Map,” Research Paper (Paris: Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire [IRSEM], 2018), https://www.irsem.fr/data/files/irsem/documents/ document/file/2965/RP_IRSEM_No66_2019.pdf.

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cook, was in charge of several shell companies together known as the Internet Research Agency (IRA) at the time of the 2016 American presidential election. The existence of this structure was made public by the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta in 2013, and it has been nicknamed a “troll factory.”16 Actually, besides being in charge of fake platforms and fake pages on social networks (a method known as astroturfing), the IRA had been hiring staff to post comments on social networks aimed at discrediting specific narratives or, on the contrary, at artificially inflating the popularity of others.17 Moreover, this strategy has also been deployed by the third canal of influence used to propagate narratives and contents produced by Russian state-sponsored media outlets. Indeed, some technical protocols take advantage of the algorithms used by social networks to artificially dope the visibility of these contents. This is what bots do: automatically and massively sharing content to make it more trendy. Likewise, several methods of clickbait are being used. They had originally been devised to generate online revenues, and consist in using catchy titles and playing with the readers’ emotions to attract as many readers as possible. There again, such methods seem to have been systematically used by the IRA, and at a large scale. If this model can partly be explained by dogmatic differences in the representation of cyberspace in Russia and in most western countries, it is first and foremost a reaction to what Moscow perceived, from the early 2000s on, as a foreign strategy of destabilization targeting its territory. Clearly, the perception of a foreign threat—whether it can be substantiated or not—led to the constitution of an offensive apparatus to counter it and to the offensive methods discussed so far. This representation of digital networks as a potential threat emerged gradually. It was triggered by the success of Kavkaz Center in 1999,

16 Aleksandra Garmazhapova, “Gde ivut Trolli. Kak Rabotat InternetProvokatory v Sankt-Peterburge i Kto Imi Zapravlet,” Novaya Gazeta, September 9, 2013, https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2013/09/09/56265-gdezhivut-trolli-kak-rabotayut-internet-provokatory-v-sankt-peterburge-i-kto-imi-zapravlyaet. 17 Colin Gerard, “«Usines à Trolls» Russes: De l’association Patriotique Locale à l’entreprise Globale,” La Revue Des Médias, June 21, 2019, Institut National de l’Audiovisuel (INA) edition, https://larevuedesmedias.ina.fr/usines-trolls-russes-de-lassociationpatriotique-locale-lentreprise-globale.

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a website administered by the Chechen rebellion.18 It promoted the creation of an emirate in the Caucasus, from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea, and it published extreme religious content for years, including repeated calls for their readers to take up arms.19 At the time, the Chechen question was far from being solved and Russia was still facing recurrent deadly attacks; for that reason, the fight against Kavkaz Center’s online Islamist propaganda alerted Russian authorities to the need for defensive and offensive informational tools in cyberspace. The color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia in 2004 and 2005 further reinforced this belief. Moscow saw them as the product of foreign interference in its “near-abroad,” and they were critical in structuring the perception of a European and American threat for the stability of numerous former Soviet republics, embodied in foreign NGOs and media outlets.20 In 2005, shortly after the revolutions, the Russian government announced the creation of Russia Today, which now stands at the heart of Moscow’s informational apparatus.21 RT aimed at replicating the successes of Al Jazeera during the American intervention in Afghanistan, and immediately set itself to contest the narratives developed by western media outlets and to offer an alternative reading of international affairs, nicely summarized in its slogan: question more. However, this informational apparatus was only scaled up between 2011 and 2014 in reaction to two events. First, the large demonstrations during the winter of 2011–2012, with hundreds of thousands of Russians protesting Vladimir Putin’s decision to run for a third presidential term. If some Russian leaders called Europe and the United States on for their alleged attempts at destabilizing the country—critics altogether similar to those made during the color revolutions—restructuring the Russian informational apparatus was the most consequential answer to 18 Ismael Chellal, “Les Frontières Virtuelles de l’Émirat Du Caucase: Une Stratégie Insurrectionnelle,” Regard Sur l’Est, December 2012, http://old.regard-est.fr/home/ breve_contenu.php?id=1368&PHPSESSID=4f067a53667afadea4051d4b4ef21a1b. 19 After the website was blocked in Russia, it was successfully hosted by servers in Lithuania, in Sweden, and later in Estonia. It is now on the federal list of extremist material in Russia and cannot be reached with a Russian IP address. 20 Boris Pétric, “À propos des révolutions de couleur et du soft power américain,” Hérodote 129, no. 2 (2008): 7, https://doi.org/10.3917/her.129.0007. 21 Kevin Limonier and Maxime Audinet, “La stratégie d’influence informationnelle et numérique de la Russie en Europe,” Hérodote 164, no. 1 (2017): 123–144, https://doi. org/10.3917/her.164.0123.

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the demonstrations that winter. The opposition movement emerged and was organized on social networks, but it was quickly counteracted by a massive number of online profiles—created overnight—arduously defending the candidacy of Vladimir Putin. Online trolls, many of them paid, joined in droves online groups bringing protesters and opponents to Vladimir Putin together. Their job was quite simple: they raised constant polemics through their relentless posts, therefore sowing discord and eventually breaking these online communities apart. They were helped by a proper army of botnets used to “drown” online content favorable to the demonstrations by the automatic replication of a huge number of pro-Putin articles.22 Hence, the 2011–2012 protests happened to be the first event during which the digital tools that are at the core of today’s information actions were massively used. The “conservative turn” taken by Vladimir Putin since his return to the presidency in 2012, and the Ukrainian crisis, both substantially extended these actions on social networks beyond the Russian borders: trolls and botnets appeared in Ukraine during Maidan and they are now seen as a threat to national security in the Baltic states. Brought together by their clear ideological coherence, the actions developed by these actors have been amplified by the decision, in December 2013, to disband the historical press agency RIA Novosti and to replace it with Rossia Segondia, with a much larger budget. A year later, the international radio Voice of Russia was in turn knocked down and replaced by the Sputnik agency, thus completing the structuration of the apparatus we know today. Therefore, after 2014, the Russian offensive informational structure reached the maturity that allowed it to broaden its actions beyond the post-Soviet area—including on American territory.

“Active Measures” in Cyberspace: A New Vector of Russian Power Projection? Obviously, setting information and cybernetic actions apart is partly arbitrary. Most of the offensive actions in cyberspace that have been attributed 22 A botnet (or bot) is a robot generated by a human operator, often along thousands of others. They are used on social networks for several reasons: to artificially inflate the audience of a specific website, or the popularity of a page. They can also be used to propagate some posts or keywords which, replicated on a massive scale, fool the algorithms used by social networks into acknowledging a genuine public interest for them.

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to Russia—such as its involvement in the 2016 presidential campaign—are a combination of both. The alleged intrusion of APT28 in the servers of the DNC (a cybernetic action) was followed by a wide information offensive bringing together Russian international media outlets, but also—and noticeably—Wikileaks which published the stolen DNC data. That said, the data divulged apparently didn’t contain any information that could have changed the outcome of the election. Besides several revelations on the strategy of the Clinton campaign to oust its primary opponent Bernie Sanders, the DNC leaks are mostly interesting for what they reveal on the inner workings of American politics—elements that usually remain unseen. Therefore, the Clinton campaign was less shaken by the content of the published data than by the publication itself; or, in other words, by the fact that computer and human flaws allowed (presumably Russian) hackers to steal data from the presidential party of the world’s leading military and economic power. This combined attempt at disinforming (or misinforming) on the one hand, and at discrediting through actions against symbolic targets (such as the leaks of documents stolen from the flawed DNC servers) on the other hand, is not groundbreaking. Actually, this tactic was already used by the Soviet Union, which orchestrated a multitude of similar operations. During the 1970s for instance, the Soviet Union tried to scuttle a warming relationship between the United States and Egypt, an improvement later embodied in the Camp David Accords of 1978; indeed, between 1976 and 1979, the KGB created fake documents, all bearing the name of American institutions, that relayed calls to overthrow Sadat’s government, or insulting language toward Muslim people. Those documents were communicated anonymously to Egyptian authorities, newspapers close to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, to the Syrian Baas Party, and tried to spark a diplomatic crisis between the two countries. In 2016, however, the documents were not fake. Yet, the method used to divulge the data, even though they didn’t contain any major revelation, looked very similar to the combined psychological and technical operations theorized in the Soviet Union during the 1970s as “active measures.” Otherwise described as “perception management” by Brad Williams,23 active measures constituted, in their original conception, a 23 Brad Williams, “How Russia Adapted KGB ‘Active Measures’ to Cyber Operations,” Fifth Domain, March 20, 2017, https://www.fifthdomain.com/home/2017/03/ 20/how-russia-adapted-kgb-active-measures-to-cyber-operations-part-ii/.

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type of “counter-measure[s] making it possible to penetrate early on the intentions of the enemy in order to obstruct his ability to take unwanted measures, by misleading him through subversive activities for instance.”24 In practice, there were three types of “active measures,” all presumably crafted by Yuri Andropov, and described in 1985 by Dennis Kux, a former American diplomat and chairman of the Active Measures Working Group,25 as: • The “black” measures, coordinated by the foreign intelligence operations department of the KBG (known as Service A), and encompassing clandestine operations, the use of agents of influence, the diffusion of fake rumors and the creation of fake documents to fool journalists and politicians. • The “grey” measures, coordinated by the international department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC-CPSU), and which were implemented with the help of Communist parties and fronts in other countries, NGOs, research institutes on international relations affiliated with the Soviet Union, or clandestine radio stations. • The “white” measures, coordinated by the ideology department of the CC-CPSU and which were implemented by the national press agencies, Soviet international media outlets (TASS, RIA Novosti, Radio Moscow) and the information services of the Soviet embassies. Altogether, these measures embodied the public side of the operations of influence conducted through diplomacy, financial transactions, and humanitarian operations.26 This classification reminds us of the distinction between cybernetic and information actions: the first set of actions belong to clandestine operations—i.e., “black” measures—and some of them actually result from the “cooperation” of groups of independent hackers and foreign intelligence 24 Kontrrazvedyvatelny

Slovar (Dictionary of Counterintelligence) (Moscow: The Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB, 1972). 25 The Active Measures Working Group was a working group organized within the Department of State during the 1980s. Its goal was to “counter the Soviet disinformation effort.” 26 D. Kux, “Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation,” Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College XV, no. 4 (1985): 19–28.

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services.27 The second category largely brings together the “white” measures, with RT and Sputnik, and the “gray” measures, with the galaxy of blogs, bots, and politically conscious users who, throughout the world, take on themselves to propagate Russian positions on social networks. With that in mind, we find a complete reappropriation of the model of active measures in cyberspace. Nowadays, social networks play a central role in the propagation of information and in the making/structuring of political opinions of a majority of citizens; it makes this reappropriation of this fifty-year-old model easier. Meanwhile, the ambiguity surrounding the technical attribution of cyberattacks leads to all sorts of narratives and theories that nourish the confusion surrounding those actions. Simultaneously, the (human) vulnerability of a large number of data storage systems creates more opportunities for operations made to destabilize and discredit targeted actors.

The Poor Power vs. the Superpower: Why Challenging the West? Thus, through cybernetic and informational actions, Russia uses cyberspace as a preferred territory for the projection of its power, understood by Raymond Aron as “the ability [for a political entity] to impose its wishes on other entities.”28 And, if we have exposed here the tools used by Russia to influence other political entities via cyberspace, we haven’t yet questioned the Russian motivations behind such actions carried against the United States and other Western governments. First, we need to keep in mind that there is a fundamental asymmetry between the United States and Russia and, as such, the confrontation between the two countries cannot be analyzed as if they were on an equal footing. Just to mention a few numbers, the former is the first 27 The recent arrest of the Russian hacker Piotr Levachov in Spain shed a light on some of the connections that link Russian intelligence to the cyber-mafias. Levachov has become famous for being of the planet’s most important “spammers” (someone sending spams, unwanted emails in large amounts). He seemingly put his network of computers at the disposal of the Russian intelligence services to influence the American presidential election (through the massive propagation of emails favorable to Donald Trump) and to access the infected computers of some American leaders. Meanwhile, a former collaborator of Kaspersky, today incarcerated in Moscow, has talked about recurrent recruitments of state hackers among former cybercriminals. 28 Raymond Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2004).

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economic, scientific, and military power in the world whereas the latter has a GDP equivalent to that of Italy, registers approximately 15 times less patents than the United States, and spends an average 5 times less than the Americans for each of its soldiers.29 Hence, if the United States is a global superpower, Russia lags far behind: its practical geopolitical “importance,” providing that it could be calculated, is without a doubt closer to European nation-states (France, the U.K., or Germany) than to China, or even India. Yet, Moscow is definitively acting as a superpower when it tries to influence the outcome of an American election, as the USSR would have back then. For that reason, there is a gap between the economic situation of the country and its international actions, between its objective means and its international objectives. That said, this gap isn’t new: it was theorized by the French historian Georges Sokoloff who described Russia as a “poor power.”30 This oxymoron highlights the Russian ability, since the late Middle Ages, to regularly take center stage in international affairs while lagging behind Western countries in terms of wealth. According to Sokoloff, Russia has long oscillated, since the reign of Ivan IV the Terrible in the sixteenth century, between phases of aspiration to power (derzhavnost’ 31 ) and phases of profound, sometimes existential, crises. After the economic, political, social, and moral crisis of the 1990s, the “renewal” of the Russian power, orchestrated by Vladimir Putin over the past twenty years, underlines one such cycle described by Sokoloff: the national GDP per capita has increased fourfold since 1991 and Russia has again found a voice on the international scene.32 Furthermore, these renewals are characterized by an ability to quickly close the gap in domains considered as strategic by Russian authorities. Today, the focus is on cyberspace, as was the space race in the 1950s and 1960s, or the

29 https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_941_2015-part1.pdf; Isabelle Facon, “La Menace Militaire Russe: Une Évaluation,” Les Champs de Mars, no. 29 (2017): 31–57. 30 Georges Sokoloff, La puissance pauvre: une histoire de la Russie de 1815 à nos jours

(Paris: Fayard, 1993). 31 There is no clear translation of the term “derzhavnost” in English. According to the Russian-English Universal Dictionary, the term could be defined as “Great power statehood,” and more precisely as the action to seek power to ensure Russia’s unity and stability. This term is used since the nineteenth century. 32 https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/RUS/russia/gdp-per-capita.

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creation of a heavy industry to “catch up and surpass” the American economy under Stalin. Given the Soviet or Russian lack of financial capital, all those episodes have been driven by the necessity to maximize the cost/effectiveness ratio to the extreme. Indeed, though it is difficult to assess the cost of the informational and cybernetic operations launched during the 2016 presidential campaign, it is very likely that it was far below the price, say, of a fighter jet. However, Russia successfully influenced the American political life with a few million rubles, and to a scale never matched before. That victory of a poor power has largely been celebrated in Moscow, especially as it echoes an idea widespread in Russia: the belief that the fall of the USSR and successive NATO enlargements to the East during the 1990s–2000s were the result of a vast and offensive campaign of influence led by the United States to silence Russia and deprive it of its “near abroad.” For that reason, and despite official denials, the Russian informational campaign against the United States in 2016 has specifically been viewed as a “revenge.” And that revenge occurred at a convenient time: the Russian economy seems to be durably listless. The Russian government is thus trying to distract part of the public opinion by pursuing such “geopolitical adventures” in the name of a renaissance of the country’s power. In practice, most of the Western accusations thrown at Russia in matters of cyberattacks and informational actions strengthen the solid popularity of Vladimir Putin. Hence, the American “name and shame” strategy of accusing Russia without possessing the technical evidence to specifically attribute the cyberattacks could be counterproductive in the long run. What is being portrayed as a “victory” or “revenge” in Moscow doesn’t need to be lived as a defeat by the West, however. If we take the 2016 election for example, for the idea of a “defeat” to be sustained, we would need the ability to assess the extent to which the Russian informational and cybernetic actions effectively did influence the result of the vote—which is scientifically impossible. If we can count the number of likes produced by the publications of the IRA, or the money spent by the organization in advertising on social networks, we will certainly never be able to evaluate how many voters had been directly and effectively influenced by them when they reached the polling stations. The true defeat could be to grossly exaggerate the role played by Russia in the rise of populist and far-right movements in Europe and in the United States, thus underplaying other socioeconomic factors internal

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to these countries and which, we ought to believe, influenced the outcome of recent elections more than informational operations shepherded by Moscow. In other words, the clear danger for the United States and other Western countries would be to let ourselves being trapped in the representations created by Moscow to enhance its own power internally. If we do, we would be strengthening this imaginary of renewed power deployed by Moscow to reassert its political legitimacy, and we would be bearing, through our own rhetoric, part of the added value that allows this “poor power” to be perceived as a definite power before being seen as effectively poor.

References Facon, Isabelle. “La Menace Militaire Russe: Une Évaluation.” Les Champs de Mars, no. 29 (2017): 31–57. Gerard, Colin. “‘Usines à Trolls’ russes: de l’association patriotique locale à l’entreprise globale.” La Revue Des Médias. June 21, 2019, Institut National de l’Audiovisuel (INA) edition. https://larevuedesmedias.ina.fr/usines-trollsrusses-de-lassociation-patriotique-locale-lentreprise-globale. Limonier, Kevin. “The Dissemination of Russian-Sourced News in Africa: A Preliminary General Map.” Research Paper. Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire (IRSEM), Paris, 2018. https://www.irsem.fr/data/files/ irsem/documents/document/file/2965/RP_IRSEM_No66_2019.pdf. Limonier, Kevin. Géopolitique du cyberespace russophone. Paris: l’Inventaire, 2018. Limonier, Kevin, and Maxime Audinet. “La stratégie d’influence informationnelle et numérique de la Russie en Europe.” Hérodote, no. 164 (2017): 123–144. Pétric, Boris. “À propos des révolutions de couleur et du soft power américain.” Hérodote, no. 129 (2008): 7–20. Rozanov, Michel. “Cartes faussées, cartes sous clé.” Hérodote, no. 58–59 (1990): 193–202. Sokoloff, Georges. La puissance pauvre: une histoire de la Russie de 1815 à nos jours. Paris: Fayard, 1993. Strate, Lance. “The Varieties of Cyberspace: Problems in Definition and Delimitation.” Western Journal of Communication 63, no. 3 (1999): 382–412. Voslensky, Mikhail. La Nomenklatura - Les Privilégiés En U.R.S.S. Pierre Belfond. Paris, 1980.

The End of Trade Multilateralism and the Impact of Economic Warfare on Alliances

Business First: Trump’s Economic Measures as Offensive Weaponry Célia Belin and Samuel Denney

In an increasingly multipolar and competitive world, American power has declined on the international scene since the mid-2000s. “Forever wars” in the Middle East and Central Asia, the 2008–2012 Great Recession, and internal domestic divisions have drained Americans’ morale and selfconfidence. At the same time, China is increasingly putting pressure on the United States economically, technologically, and militarily; Russia has renewed its spoiler foreign policy to best make use of limited resources; and the share of the global economy held by the traditional West is shrinking steadily, as the United States’ share of global GDP has shrunk from 20 to 15% over the past two decades. Both Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, different though they are on innumerable counts, have shared a diagnosis of a downward trend for American power, a steadily increasing reluctance to intervene militarily, a reaffirmation of geostrategic competitors, and a multiplication of intractable global challenges. Yet, as America’s leadership is increasingly contested, Presidents Obama and Trump have relied on both very similar

C. Belin (B) · S. Denney Center on the United States, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] S. Denney e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Quessard et al. (eds.), Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37258-3_11

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and markedly different sources of power to reestablish or protect American preeminence. To slow down the pace of US decline, President Obama viewed American economic power as instrumental. The Obama administration bet on the diffusion of Western norms and standards to constrain geostrategic adversaries, China in particular, notably through the negotiation of mega-regional trade agreements. By further integrating the world with the American economy, the Obama administration sought to maintain the United States’ place at the center of a changing geopolitical arena. By contrast, the Trump Administration has abandoned the concept of positive integration in favor of a competitive zero-sum approach on all fronts. Using the dominant position of the dollar, US financial centers and the American market, and the United States’s still formidable military power, the United States is able to constrain adversaries as well as allies—through custom duties, sanctions, threats, and the extraterritorial application of US law. Similarly, President Trump has signaled his impatience with allies that cost too much and has increased US demands for burden-sharing. Under President Trump, economic and security priorities have become intertwined and taken on an ideological nature, as the administration weaponizes economic interdependence through tariffs and unilateral sanctions.1 The Trump administration’s approach faces both economic and systemic risks, because it increasingly pushes US allies and adversaries to bypass or duplicate common economic institutions, such as by creating a European equivalent to SWIFT as proposed by German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas in order to protect their sovereignty. Worse still, it undermines what would be a united Western front against alternative economic and political models, such as the Chinese and Russian, by favoring disunion rather than the emergence of common norms when faced with the economic challenges of the twenty-first century.

1 For a masterful analysis of the weaponization of economic interdependence as part of the Trump administration’s larger relationship with Europe, see Constanze Stelzenmueller, “Hostile Ally: The Trump Challenge and Europe’s Inadequate Response” (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, August 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/hostileally-the-trump-challenge-and-europes-inadequate-response/.

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From Mega Regional Trade Negotiations to Bilateral Trade Offensives The US retreat from large, regional trade deals began even before the Trump administration. The two populist heroes of the 2016 US presidential election on the right and the left, Donald Trump and Sen. Bernie Sanders (also Hillary Clinton’s far-left challenger in the Democratic primaries of 2016), both attacked President Obama’s legacy on trade. They both took aim in particular at the two mega-regional trade deals that the administration had negotiated: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which included 16 countries of South-East Asia, south and north America plus Japan, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the European Union. Both TPP and TTIP stemmed from the idea that global trade negotiations at the World Trade Organization were jammed, blocked by the demands of emerging countries.2 Thus, in order to reestablish preeminence, the United States pushed for the negotiation of regional agreements where American norms and standards would play an outsized influence. These agreements sought to address some of the new challenges to global trade—the harmonization of regulatory frameworks, nontariff barriers to trade, security of investments—as well as the rapid increase of trade with East and South East Asia and the strategic challenge posed by a growing China. As the Obama administration ended, TTIP negotiations were stalled, blocked by irreconcilable positions on defense markets and public procurements, and TPP came under fire on both sides of the aisle, with Democrats viewing it as unfair competition from countries with lower environmental and social standards while Republicans took a hard turn against free trade under Donald Trump for causing the decay of America’s industrial sector. The 2016 campaign revealed a drop in the traditional favorability of the American people to trade. In October 2016, the percentage of Americans with a positive opinion of trade (45%) was about the same as the percentage of Americans with a negative opinion (43%).3

2 See “Strategic Implications of Transatlantic Trade Negotiations,” with Fabien Besson, Rapport Schuman sur l’Europe, l’état de l’Union en 2014, 2014. 3 “Positive Views of Free Trade Agreements Rebound to Pre-2016 Levels,” Pew, May 10, 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/10/americans-aregenerally-positive-about-free-trade-agreements-more-critical-of-tariff-increases/ft_18-0510_trade-tariffs_positive_views/.

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Under the influence of then-candidate Donald Trump, the Republican party became particularly skeptical of trade, with only 36% of Republicans viewing free trade as a good thing in 2016, a drop of 20 points since 2009.4 Indeed, along with immigration, trade was and is President Trump’s signature issue. He was able to impose his protectionist instincts on the Republican mainstream, which traditionally has had a wildly different perspective on trade. Building on his reality TV-driven image as a successful businessman, Trump harshly criticized what he perceived as “bad deals,” through which countries were “taking advantage of the United States.” All countries, adversaries as well as allies, became the object of his ire on trade as he denounced trade deficits with China and the EU alike. At the heart of new US trade policies lay Trump’s obsession with bilateral trade deficits, specifically on goods, not services, which led him to advocate for bilateral renegotiations of trade deals, to allow the United States to maximize its leverage. As Donald Trump entered the White House, he deployed a threestep trade strategy: first, scrap all the current trade negotiations and trade deals; second, spark trade confrontations with partners and rivals through the imposition of tariffs; third, negotiate better deals. The first step was also the easiest. As expected, the United States abandoned the TPP negotiations entirely, with no objective to renegotiate a deal. The other countries party to the deal proceeded without the United States, and left the door open for China to join. This net gain in influence for America’s main strategic rival has not been a topic of discussion. The confrontation between the United States and China has instead taken a bilateral turn, with little discussion of a more global approach either through reform of the WTO or by actually pursuing a transatlantic partnership on dealing with China. Similarly, President Trump voiced his intention to terminate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada and Mexico. However, it rapidly became apparent that Trump’s

4 “Continued Partisan Divides in Views of the Impact of Free Trade Agreements,” Pew, April 24, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/25/support-forfree-trade-agreements-rebounds-modestly-but-wide-partisan-differences-remain/ft_17-0424_freetrade_usviews_2/.

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Republican allies would be highly unhappy about the economic repercussions felt by central, northern, and southern conservative states, which rely heavily on cross-border trade. This pressure led Trump to move quickly to negotiations and to sign the US–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) in November 2018. Overall, changes from NAFTA are far from spectacular, but the move allowed Trump to claim that it offered better protection for the US auto industry and intellectual property. The second phase of Trump’s offensive on America’s trade partners consisted of imposing tariffs on steel and aluminum in March 2018, using a rarely applied national security rationale (authorized under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962). These decisions came as a shock, especially because of the indiscriminate nature of his targeting, striking a blow to steel imports even from traditional US allies like Canada, the European Union, and Mexico. Rapidly, trade partners reacted and negotiated waivers, retaliated, and launched legal proceedings at the WTO.5 Since then, President Trump has consistently flagged the possibility of imposing other tariffs, targeting strategic economic sectors in specific countries: tariffs on wood from Canada, on automobiles from Germany, on wine from France, on textiles from China. The biggest confrontation to date has been the theatrical trade war President Trump has launched against China. Beginning with the March 2018 imposition of steel and aluminum tariffs, the Trump administration has increasingly applied specific economic pressure on China in the form of tariffs on an ever-increasing amount of Chinese goods (25% tariffs on up to $250 billion of products by June 2019 with an additional $300 billion worth under consideration). Trump’s goal has been to force China to make trade concessions and change its economic model.6 Instead, China has retaliated through counter-tariffs and currency devaluation. A broad consensus exists that the Trump administration is right in

5 European Commission, “European Commission Reacts to the US Restrictions on Steel and Aluminium Affecting the EU,” May 31, 2018, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ press/index.cfm?id=1851. 6 Ana Swanson and Jim Tankersley, “Tariffs on China Don’t Cover the Costs of Trump’s Trade War,” New York Times, July 15, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/15/ business/trade-war-tariffs-revenue.html.

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its focus on China in its attempt to address both its practice of subsidizing domestic companies to disadvantage international rivals and its massive intellectual property theft.7 But at the same time, President Trump’s insistence on unilateral tariffs and his willingness to compensate American workers through bailouts underscores the ideological importance both of trade as a national security matter in general and of confronting China in particular. The third aspect of Trump’s trade strategy, “negotiate better deals,” is so far a work-in-progress with few effective successes. The new USMCA agreement, intended to replace NAFTA, has yet to be ratified by the United States, as pressure is building for Congress to pass the agreement before the end of Trump’s first term.8 Other negotiations have yet to come off the ground entirely. EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s visit to Washington, DC in July 2018 put a stop to a then steadily escalating trade dynamic. Both Trump and Juncker agreed to proceed with a reduction of trade barriers on industrial goods, in an effort to relaunch productive transatlantic negotiations, with Europe making additional concessions on importing US energy and agricultural products.9 At this point though, little has been achieved in terms of a wider trade agreement. Also, President Trump’s more than a year-long standoff with China has not resulted in China caving to economic pressure, but instead has only continued to escalate and drive the world’s two largest economies apart. At the time of writing, average tariffs on Chinese goods stand at 21.2%, up from 3.1% when Trump was inaugurated.10 Among the fundamental novelties of the Trump Administration’s trade policy is the linkage of trade to security aspects, specifically US military 7 Ryan Hass, “On U.S.-China Trade, America Is Off Track,” Brookings Institution,

June 24, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/06/24/on-us-china-trade-america-is-off-track/. 8 Richard Cowan, Susan Cornwell, and Andrea Shalal, “Top U.S. Trade Official Submits USMCA Ideas to Democrats: Lawmakers,” Reuters, September 11, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-usmca/top-us-trade-official-submitsusmca-ideas-to-democrats-lawmakers-idUSKCN1VW2NL. 9 European Commission, “Joint U.S.-EU Statement Following President Juncker’s Visit to the White House,” July 25, 2018, https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ STATEMENT-18-4687_en.htm. 10 Ana Swanson, “As Trump Escalates Trade War, U.S. and China Move Further Apart with No End in Sight,” New York Times, September 1, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2019/09/01/world/asia/trump-trade-war-china.html.

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support or US military alliances. As he complains about the United States’ trade deficit with Germany and Germany’s performance in automobile sales in the United States, President Trump would also highlight the fact that Germany fails to spend 2% of GDP on defense as pledged as a member of NATO. This type of linkage between two vastly different areas of policy is novel, as is the emotional charge that goes with it (Trump has often said that the United States is being “ripped off” by both allies and competitors or that the world is “laughing at us”), and using the threat of tariffs as a tool to reprimand countries. Negotiating a deal with the United States does not even guarantee security from economic blackmail on trade. In May 2019, Trump, unhappy with Mexico’s migration policy, threatened the country with a 5% tariff on all imported goods. His announcement had real-life effects, when financial markets reacted with a widespread sell-off the day after the announcement.11 Trump’s arm-wrestling techniques, combined with the volatility of his position depending on his personal displeasure over other policy matters, create massive uncertainty not only for policymakers, but also investors. Economists have already pointed out that some of these threats—like the May 2019 Mexico affair—have pushed investors away from the American market, including from formerly safe investments such as US Treasury government bonds, toward investments considered less volatile such as German bunds or the euro.12 Under the Trump administration, economic interdependence is viewed as not only an opportunity for shared prosperity, but also as a mechanism to monitor and control partners’ foreign policy choices. The new USMCA, intended to replace NAFTA, includes a “non-market economy” clause (article 32.10) that requires a party who wishes to enter in free trade negotiations with a non-market economy to disclose it to the other two parties, and offers these parties the possibility of terminating the agreement if the negotiations result in a deal. In effect, this clause has been viewed as a means to prevent Mexico or Canada from entering 11 Corrie Driebusch and Nathan Allen, “Stocks Close Lower as Trump’s Mexico Tariff Threat Rattles Markets,” Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/ articles/global-stocks-and-bond-yields-drop-on-mexico-tariff-concerns-11559289992. 12 Adam S. Posen, “Trump’s New Tariff Actions: A Wakeup Call to Global Markets,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 31, 2019, https://piie.com/blogs/ trade-investment-policy-watch/trumps-new-tariff-actions-wakeup-call-global-markets.

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into trade negotiations with China (labeled a “non-market economy” by the World Trade Organization) without US authorization, further consolidating Washington’s sphere of influence and restricting Canada’s and Mexico’s foreign policy choices.13 These tactics may last beyond Trump, as competition with China deepens. The Trump administration’s trade strategy creates several long-term questions, for both investors and partner countries alike. How do you enter in an agreement with an American administration that keeps changing gears? How long before the economic relationship that you seek to both sides’ benefit comes back to constrain your political action? The ratification process of the USMCA, for example, has been badly hurt by Trump’s threats against Mexico. Trump’s method also raises strategic questions. His treatment of allies and rivals alike has weakened the solidarity felt among Western partners. While also a response to the demands of emerging countries at the WTO, TTIP served as both a specifically transatlantic response to globalization and as a mechanism of empowerment for American and European companies faced with the competition of China. Thus, Trump’s indiscriminately offensive trade policy has weakened the transatlantic sphere with regard to trade competition with China, effectively undermining his unilateral drive to reign in Chinese violations of WTO rules.14

Sanctions as a Prime Tool Under the Trump Administration The flip side of the Trump administration’s weaponization of the global trading system through tariffs has been its widespread use of sanctions as a preferred coercive foreign policy tool against adversaries. In total,

13 Chuck Chiang, “Alarm Bells Ring Over Non-Market Economy Clause,” Business Vancouver, October 11, 2018, https://biv.com/article/2018/10/alarm-bells-ring-overnon-market-economy-clause. 14 Peter Chase, “Time to Hit ‘Reset’ on Transatlantic Trade,” The Ripon Forum 53, no. 2 (April 2019), https://www.riponsociety.org/article/time-to-hit-reset-on-transatlantictrade/.

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during the first two years of President Trump’s term, nearly 2100 separate foreign entities, including individuals, companies, and foreign government bodies, have been added to the US sanctions list.15 Both the Trump administration’s most notable foreign policy accomplishment— achieving a summit with North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un to discuss nuclear arms control—and its most controversial foreign policy move— its drive to confront Iran—came as the result of crushing multilateral and unilateral sanctions regimes. The Trump administration’s use of sanctions represents the continuation of what has been a trend in post-Cold War American foreign policy. As the collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States as the world’s sole economic and military superpower, the United States has increasingly utilized the financial architecture underpinning globalization to impose effective sanctions.16 In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the focus shifted to terrorism financing. Under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act, the US Department of Treasury then received broad powers to designate financial institutions as “primary money laundering concerns,”17 a charge that could lead to massive losses beyond the fines imposed by sanctions. Unsurprisingly, sanctions use greatly increased after 9/11 because it suited an environment in which the United States faced threats from non-state actors against which the use of force was not always the most effective response.18

15 Peter Harrell and Elizabeth Rosenberg, “Economic Dominance, Financial Technology, and the Future of U.S. Economic Coercion” (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, April 29, 2019), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ economic-dominance-financial-technology-and-the-future-of-u-s-economic-coercion, 7. 16 On this, read Jacob J. Lew and Richard Nephew, “The Use and Misuse of Economic Statecraft: How Washington Is Abusing Its Financial Might,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-10-15/useand-misuse-economic-statecraft. 17 US Department of the Treasury, “Fact Sheet: Overview of Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act,” https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ tg1056.aspx. 18 “Sanctions and Financial Pressure: Major National Security Tools,” US Congress, House of Representatives, House Foreign Relations Committee, 115th Congress, Statement of Juan C. Zarate, Chairman and Co-Founder, Financial Integrity Network, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20180110/106761/ HHRG-115-FA00-Wstate-ZarateJ-20180110.pdf.

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For a long time, large trade deals like NAFTA, TTIP, or TPP have served as the positive economic counterpart to sanctions. With further access to the US economy and financial system—and thus greater potential for profit—countries and companies became increasingly exposed to US sanctions. In a remarkable departure from this tradition, President Trump has kept the sanctions part of the tool box but abandoned the free trade dimension. In addition to its stated preference for bilateral trade deals and outright protectionism, Trump’s foreign policy has mostly focused on imposing unilateral sanctions on foes and secondary sanctions on allies, a dangerous acceleration of an already existing trend.19 Indeed, given Trump’s reluctance to use military force, its use of sanctions carries unique advantages. With “no institutional culture” of evaluating the loss of potential economic gains20 and little desire to examine the human costs in a targeted country,21 sanctions are inherently less expensive than military engagement and fit into Trump’s promises to reduce US military interventions. Sanctions too can be—and have been— deployed more rapidly than the US military.22 Congress has increasingly grown assertive over the last decade, with regard to imposing or waiving sanctions. As part of the ramping up of sanctions against Iran in 2010, Congress not only expanded the use of secondary sanctions, but also further restricted the ability of the Obama administration to waive them.23 More so now than ever, tensions between Congress and the Executive branch over sanctions have come to a head under the Trump administration.

19 Peter Harrell, Elizabeth Rosenberg et al. “Maintaining America’s Coercive Economic Strength: Five Trends to Watch in U.S. Sanctions” (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2019), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/maintainingamericas-coercive-economic-strength. 20 Elizabeth Rosenberg quoted in Kathy Gilsinan, “A Boom Time for U.S. Sanctions,” The Atlantic, May 3, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/ 05/why-united-states-uses-sanctions-so-much/588625/. 21 Andrew Cockburn, “A Very Perfect Instrument: The Ferocity and Failure of Amer-

ica’s Sanctions Apparatus,” Harpers Magazine, September 2013, https://harpers.org/ archive/2013/09/a-very-perfect-instrument/. 22 For example, after the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein’s assets were frozen by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) overnight with the stroke of a pen. See Andrew Cockburn, “A Very Perfect Instrument.” 23 Jacob J. Lew and Richard Nephew, “The Use and Misuse of Economic Statecraft.”

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Now, massive congressional support for sanctions against Russia has been viewed as effectively overriding President Trump’s reticence to take aggressive action against Moscow.24 Congress also required that President Trump submit any substantial reduction in sanctions on Russia to congressional review and gave itself new capacities in imposing sanctions related to the 2016 Global Magnitsky Act.25 Given the extreme difficulty in actually removing sanctions passed by Congress as laws—such as following the second Iraq War—an increasing Congressional role could also lead to an increasing permanence of sanctions. While sanctions have been employed extensively to address many foreign policy challenges (e.g. North Korea, Venezuela, Cuba, Syria), the Iran case is the clearest illustration of how the strength of the American economy allows the Trump administration to pursue its determined unilateralist course. A confrontation between the Trump administration and Iran appeared certain even before President Trump’s inauguration. During his campaign for president, Trump repeatedly criticized the 2015 Iran nuclear deal signed by his predecessor, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and vowed to renegotiate the accord. When Congress did not reimpose the nuclear sanctions after President Trump first refused to certify Iranian compliance in October 2017,26 Trump formally withdrew the United States from the deal and reimposed the nuclear sanctions by presidential memorandum in May 2018,27 with the sanctions formally going into effect in November 2018. A formal US strategy for the sanctions was presented soon after in a speech at the Heritage Foundation by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo: “unprecedented financial pressure” would force Iran to change course on a range of activities, from its nuclear program

24 Matthew Nussbaum and Elana Schor, “Trump Signs Russia Sanctions Bill but Blasts Congress,” Politico, August 2, 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/ 02/trump-signs-bipartisan-russia-sanctions-bill-241242. 25 Peter Harrell, Elizabeth Rosenberg et al. “Maintaining America’s Coercive Economic Strength: Five Trends to Watch in U.S. Sanctions.” 26 Donald J. Trump, “Remarks by President Trump on Iran Strategy” (speech, Washington, DC, October 13, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/ remarks-president-trump-iran-strategy/. 27 Donald J. Trump, “Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (speech, Washington, DC, May 8, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-joint-comprehensive-plan-action/.

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to ending support for “Middle East terrorist groups, including Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.”28 Over the protests of its European allies, the United States unilaterally imposed sanctions on more than 700 Iranian individuals and entities, including 50 banks and their foreign subsidiaries and 250 individuals who were designated as Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List).29 The United States has also sought to prevent countries from buying Iranian oil. While 180-day waivers were first issued for important importers of Iranian oil like India and China, Secretary Pompeo announced in April 2019 that these waivers would not be extended and called for all countries, including China, to bring imports of Iranian oil “to zero.”30 Following an announcement by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani that Iran would walk away from aspects of the JCPOA, further sanctions were imposed on Iran’s steel, aluminum, iron, and copper industries, the country’s largest sources of revenue apart from its oil industry.31 The US withdrawal from the JCPOA and subsequent ramping up of economic pressure have been criticized by all major signatories of the JCPOA and driven a wedge between the United States and its European allies, who viewed the accord as a unique success for diplomacy and a good way to buy time for further negotiations with an abhorrent regime in Iran. In particular, the US use of the so-called secondary sanctions,32 designed to target third party entities dealing with a sanctioned company

28 Michael R. Pompeo, “After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy” (speech, Washington, DC, May 21, 2018), https://www.state.gov/after-the-deal-a-new-iran-strategy/. 29 SDN Designation prohibits US individuals or entities from carrying out business with

a targeted individual and freezes their assets. See US Department of the Treasury, “U.S. Government Fully Re-imposes Sanctions on the Iranian Regime as Part of Unprecedented U.S. Economic Pressure Campaign,” November 5, 2018, https://home.treasury.gov/ news/press-releases/sm541. 30 Edward Wong and Clifford Krauss, “U.S. Moves to Stop All Nations from Buying Iranian Oil, but China Is Defiant,” New York Times, April 22, 2019, https://www. nytimes.com/2019/04/22/world/middleeast/us-iran-oil-sanctions-.html?module=inline. 31 David E. Sanger, Edward Wong, Steven Erlanger, and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Issues New Sanctions as Iran Warns It Will Step Back From Nuclear Deal,” New York Times, May 8, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/08/us/politics/iran-nucleardeal.html?module=inline. 32 Harrell, Rosenberg et al. “Maintaining America’s Coercive Economic Strength.”

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was viewed—especially in Europe—as illegal extraterritorial application of US law. This sentiment combined with stark disagreements over policy decisions has driven Europe to look for ways to circumvent US sanctions and even divert trade away from the United States. Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the European Union vowed to maintain the JCPOA through trade to prevent the even greater security risk of an Iran striving for a nuclear weapon. In so doing, Europe has threatened various forms of economic decoupling with the United States through the creation of alternative payment channels such as a European equivalent to SWIFT33 and to increase the role of the euro in international payments in part due to “political risks, such as unilateral decisions that directly affect dollar denominated transactions.”34 Officials have raised the potential of using its blocking statute—which in effect would forbid European citizens from complying with US sanctions in addition to negating their financial consequences—to shield European companies doing business in Iran.35 Yet, Europe’s most direct response was its announcement of a special purpose vehicle to maintain trade with Iran, later founded as the Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges (INSTEX). Yet, despite the EU Blocking Statute,36 European companies have thus far opted to prioritize access to the US market over trading with Iran and have complied with US sanctions. INSTEX was long delayed and only operationalized six months after its founding.37 But with threats of

33 Heiko Maas, “Wir lassen nicht zu, dass die USA über unsere Köpfe hinweg handeln,”

Handelsblatt, August 21, 2018, https://www.handelsblatt.com/meinung/gastbeitraege/ gastkommentar-wir-lassen-nicht-zu-dass-die-usa-ueber-unsere-koepfe-hinweg-handeln/ 22933006.html?ticket=ST-4063567-aIa6bKbLVzkDb6jxc5ci-ap4. 34 European Commission, “Commission Presents Ways to Further Strengthen the Euro’s Global Role,” December 5, 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6643_en. htm. 35 “France Urges Europe to Push Back Against ‘Unacceptable’ US Sanctions on Iran,” France 24, May 11, 2018, https://www.france24.com/en/20180511-iran-franceusa-europe-business-push-back-against-unacceptable-sanctions-nuclear-trump. 36 European Commission, “Updated Blocking Statute in Support of Iran Nuclear Deal Enters into Force,” August 6, 2018, https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4805_ en.htm. 37 “EU Mechanism for Trade with Iran ‘Now Operational’,” Deutsche Welle, June 28, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/eu-mechanism-for-trade-with-iran-now-operational/ a-49407662.

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higher US scrutiny for even using INSTEX,38 it is unclear whether it will ever see much use. As tensions have continued to escalate throughout 2019, Europe’s inability to independently maintain trade with Iran, combined with Iran’s demands for relief from US sanctions before entering negotiations, underscore both the near impossibility of conducting a truly independent foreign policy while closely tied to the US financial system and the degree to which the United States and the European Union are tied together on Iran: while the United States can drive Iran to the brink financially, European mediation can help bring about negotiations (as demonstrated by French President Macron’s attempt at mediation at the 2019 G7).39 This hyper-aggressive use of sanctions presents two main risks for the United States. First, it runs the risk of alienating the United States from its allies. Second, sanctions also risk creating a business environment that is too unstable or toxic for the targeted country to ever recover—and is therefore self-defeating. The increasing complexity of US sanctions has led to ever greater compliance costs for international businesses. Companies may even decide not to operate in countries that are not currently sanctioned but may be sanctioned—a state referred to as “semisanctioned.”40 Once sanctions are removed, the reputational damage of sanctions and the chance that a country may be sanctioned again in the future can also lead companies to opt out of business opportunities there in order to minimize risk, fundamentally undermining the success of sanctions relief.41

38 Michael Lipin, “Exclusive: US Vows to Pursue Ship Owners Who Violate Iran Oil Sanctions,” Voice of America, March 19, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/ voa-news-iran/exclusive-us-vows-pursue-ship-owners-who-violate-iran-oil-sanctions. 39 Tom McTague, “What the Iran Crisis Reveals About European Power,” The

Atlantic, June 25, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/06/ us-iran-sanctions-eu/592489/. 40 Harrell, Rosenberg et al. “Maintaining America’s Coercive Economic Strength.” 41 Richard Nephew, “The Hard Part: The Art of Sanctions Relief,” The Washington

Quarterly, Summer 2018, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X. 2018.1484225?journalCode=rwaq20.

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Conclusion: Weaponizing the Economy During her confirmation hearing in January 2009, futureSecretary of State Hillary Clinton popularized the idea of “smart power,” or the use of a “full range of tools—diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural—picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation.” It meant deploying diplomatic efforts to solve conflicts, resorting to economic pressure to avoid military intervention, promoting American soft power to exercise leadership. The idea was to maximize influence through diplomatic engagement, hopefully achieving American-led goals beneficial to all. On the opposite side of the ideological spectrum, the Trump administration has deployed a business-oriented doctrine, which consists in using all the tricks of business deals within the realm of trade and foreign policy. It has transformed America’s role in the world. Instead of relying on its “smart power,” the United States has engaged in zero-sum games against allies and foes alike. When there can only be winners and losers, the concept of alliances only extends so far. The administration’s aggressively unilateral, black-and-white approach to tariffs and sanctions and willingness to penalize allies have deepened the bitterness felt when US allies find themselves on the opposite side of any foreign policy issue. The strength of US secondary sanctions is now viewed as a fundamental foreign policy weakness by Europeans, who are likely to increase their ability to resist them, either through deterrence or direct countermeasures.42 The inability of the United States to drive Iranian oil exports to “zero” or to force Iranian capitulation could undermine US sanctions in the long-term by sending the message that US sanctions are not all-powerful—and thus can be beaten.43 In short, the current apex of American financial power may ultimately cause its own weakening if it continues to be used incorrectly. Aspects of President Trump’s confrontational approach may outlast his administration. As the 2020 presidential election approaches, it appears

42 Ellie Geranmayeh and Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, “Meeting the Challenge of Secondary Sanctions” (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2019), https:// www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/meeting_the_challenge_of_secondary_sanctions. 43 Elizabeth Rosenberg, “Maximum Pressure on Iran Won’t Work,” Foreign Policy, April 26, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/26/maximum-pressure-on-iranwont-work/.

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increasingly clear that the Democratic candidate, whoever she/he may be, will be a war-skeptic, as was Obama, as is Trump. With the United States continuing to lose ground economically to China and the American public becoming even more opposed to foreign adventurism, aspects of President Trump’s confrontational approach may outlast his administration. In this environment of military intervention fatigue, American strategists are increasingly using tariffs and sanctions as long-lasting tools for their strategies of offense or containment to differing degrees. Influential Washington-based foreign policy observers have advocated a responsible competition that could also see an enhanced use of sanctions as countries seek to avoid a cataclysmic great power war. Thomas Wright, from the Brookings Institution, has written that the United States should adopt a policy of “responsible competition” in a new era of great power rivalry, with a major US advantage coming from its financial power44 — ideas reflected partly in the 2017 National Security Strategy. Similarly, Brookings’s Mike O’Hanlon even specifically recommended “a possible mix of broad-based tariffs, targeted sanctions, sectoral sanctions and possibly financial sanctions” as a response to a Russian or Chinese aggression after deterrence has failed.45 As competition sharpens, it appears likely that American foreign policy officials will more quickly reach for the sanctions scalpel rather than the military hammer. Whether Trump leaves office or returns to the White House in 2021, the use of economic interdependence as a weapon will survive. And as great powers bump up against each other, with allies caught in the middle, economic warfare and the resulting political blowback are likely to increase.

44 Thomas J. Wright, All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the 21st Century and the Future of American Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017). 45 Michael E. O’Hanlon, “The Senkaku Paradox: Preparing for Conflict with the Great Powers,” Brookings Institution, May 2, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ order-from-chaos/2019/05/02/the-senkaku-paradox-preparing-for-conflict-with-thegreat-powers/?utm_campaign=Brookings%20Brief&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium= email&utm_content=72319274.

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References Belin, Celia. “Balancing Act: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Franco-American Relationship and the Way Forward.” Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, October 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/research/balancing-actthe-limits-of-pragmatism-in-the-franco-american-relationship-and-the-wayforward/. Geranmayeh, Ellie, and Manuel Lafont Rapnouil. “Meeting the Challenge of Secondary Sanctions.” London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2019. https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/meeting_the_challenge_ of_secondary_sanctions. Harrell, Peter, and Elizabeth Rosenberg. “Economic Dominance, Financial Technology, and the Future of U.S. Economic Coercion.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, April 29, 2019. https://www.cnas. org/publications/reports/economic-dominance-financial-technology-andthe-future-of-u-s-economic-coercion. Lew, Jacob J., and Richard Nephew. “The Use and Misuse of Economic Statecraft: How Washington Is Abusing Its Financial Might.” Foreign Affairs 97 (November/December 2018): 139. Nephew, Richard. The Art of Sanctions: A View from the Field. New York: Columbia University Press, 2017. Nephew, Richard. “The Hard Part: The Art of Sanctions Relief.” The Washington Quarterly, Summer, 2018. Rosenberg, Elizabeth. “Maximum Pressure on Iran Won’t Work.” Foreign Policy, April 26, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/26/maximumpressure-on-iran-wont-work/. Stelzenmueller, Constanze. “Hostile Ally: The Trump Challenge and Europe’s Inadequate Response.” Brookings Institution, August 2019. https:// www.brookings.edu/research/hostile-ally-the-trump-challenge-and-europesinadequate-response/. Wright, Thomas J. All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the 21st Century and the Future of American Power. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017. Wright, Thomas J. “A Post-American Europe and the Future of U.S. Strategy.” Brookings Institution, December 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/ research/a-post-american-europe-and-the-future-of-u-s-strategy/.

Trump’s US Foreign Policy and Latin American Multilateralism: An Assessment of Words and Deeds Kevin Parthenay

Introduction Trump’s accession to the US Presidency has had significant consequences on Latin American domestic politics and diplomacy at the regional and continental levels. In the realm of international trade, the US president has equally focused on undoing decades-old policies of building a multilateral, rules-based global economic environment. Since January 2017, Donald Trump has mostly delivered on his promises to break with past policies and attitudes and to roll back the liberal internationalism that his predecessors since World War II strove to build. Trump’s attitude toward Latin America has been highly paradoxical. His rhetoric indicated a bet on economic protectionism and a withdrawal from Latin American affairs. In fact, the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (in charge of Latin America and Canada) remained without an Assistant Secretary for over a year. Trump only announced the Bureau’s new leader, Kimberly Breier, on October 15, 2018. Concretely, most of the strategic issues regarding the Southern Continent were dealt with at the highest level on Twitter. This is true for the “Mexican wall,” the

K. Parthenay (B) University of Tours, Tours, France e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Quessard et al. (eds.), Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37258-3_12

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renegotiation of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the exit from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). However, President Trump has finally invested in relations with the continent. As part of his current strategy for reelection, he has invested heavily in the relationship with Mexico as a means to strengthen his “America first” discourse. The issue of Mexican and Central American migrants has fuelled his nationalist and populist rhetoric. Although the relationship with Latin America is mainly indirect, it remains a major preoccupation for the Trump administration. It is worth noting, however, that Trump’s accession to power coincides with a specific context in Latin American politics. In 2017, the continent entered a “super-electoral cycle 2017-2019” during which almost all the countries in the region held general elections. The political and diplomatic context is highly uncertain. One hypothesis surrounds the debate: a political turn to the right with the surge of conservative forces, since the election of Mauricio Macri in Argentina. After a decade of “progressism”1 that has bet on the consolidation of multilateralism and continental political interdependence, this dual change (one being uncertain in Latin America at that time), raises many questions. What influences this paradoxical diplomatic stand vis-à-vis Latin American multilateralism? How has the election of Donald J. Trump affected Latin American interdependence? What kind of policy instruments can the US administration use to roll back agreements and traditional diplomatic practices vis-à-vis the Southern Continent? What does the US rollback on multilateralism mean for Latin America? These are the questions we will address in this chapter in order to better understand the strategic challenges that have arisen for Latin America since Donald Trump’s accession to the presidency. First, we will conduct a historical examination of the multilateral relationship between the USA, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Second, we will present our scheme of investigation to assess impacts. Third, we will propose an empirical approximation of three traditional sectors of US foreign policy in Latin American countries (LAC): trade, foreign aid, and intervention in political crises. Finally, we will offer concluding remarks assessing the impacts of Trump’s foreign policy on LAC multilateralism.

1 We prefer the term “progressism” to “left-wing” as the Latin American left in that period has been highly heterogeneous.

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The US Hegemony and LAC Multilateralism The relation between the United States and LAC has generated an extensive literature for decades. The analysis of US foreign policy toward Latin America and their reciprocal relationship has been widely developed under the prism of US hegemony.2 Since the early nineteenth century, Latin America has become the United States’ backyard and a target to ensure “homeland security.” At the same time, LAC often expected a lot from the cooperation with their giant neighbor. In that respect, it is important to review the historical patterns of this special relationship. The United States has repeatedly tried to implement hemispheric initiatives, since the first proposal materialized at the 1889 First International Conference of American States in Washington. It resulted in the creation of a Pan-American Union whose Secretariat was in Washington that inspired some concerns for Latin American states as they were afraid of any foreign influence in a post-independence era. After the Second World War and on the brink of the Cold War, the US strategy through the Truman Doctrine paved the way for political and military interventions on the continent. In the name of “hemispheric security,” the United States proclaimed itself the “global policeman” in its own backyard.3 The “Good Neighbor Policy” initiated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt resulted in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty, 1947), together with the Inter-American Treaty for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes (Pact of Bogota, 1948), as well as the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS). As Andrea Oelsner underlines, those multilateral tools were based on “unequal expectations” as the United States was seeking allies to contain communism and LAC were looking for military assistance.4 Those unequal expectations are key to understanding the specific kind of relationship between the United States and Latin American multilateralism.

2 Joseph S. Tulchin, Latin America in International Politics: Challenging US Hegemony (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2016). 3 Ronaldo Munck, Contemporary Latin America (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 140. 4 Andrea Oelsner, International Relations in Latin America: Peace and Security in the Southern Cone (New York: Routledge, 2005).

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The collapse of communism gave birth to a new international order even more dominated by the United States. The rise of Latin American regional multilateralism and the influence of the United States came together through the “Washington Consensus” and the resurgence of what Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) termed “open regionalism.” The neoliberal paradigm, promoted as much by the United States as by the international financial institutions (World Bank, IMF), largely influenced the nature of the regional organizations created at the time. The failure of neoliberal policies, at the end of the 1990s, provoked political alternation and strengthened anti-American sentiment and suspicion toward any US intervention in the multilateral framework. The newly elected political leaders decided to create alternative frameworks for regional cooperation (UNASUR, ALBA, and CELAC), based on principles of solidarity, reciprocity, with a clear predominance of political power on the economy and markets and with an explicit will to unfold autonomously from US influence.5 These new LAC multilateralisms develop while the United States focus on different fields of action and with little interest for Latin America. The election of new conservative and market-oriented leaders in Latin America coincides with the accession to power of President Trump and opens a new era for the relationships between the United States and LAC multilateralism that deserve to be explored.

Exploring Words and Deeds On the one hand, there is fluctuating attention and interest from the United States toward Latin America. On the other hand, there is a constant desire on the part of Latin America to make the most of asymmetrical cooperation, without neglecting the promotion of autonomous tools when necessary. The question that arises is whether— given the explicit desire not to exert a hemispheric hegemony on behalf of Trump’s presidency—Latin America is led to invest in instruments that can be described as “regional multilateralism.” In other words, does the US withdrawal from the region mean more regional cooperation at the subcontinent level? Furthermore, contrary to previous decades, the United States no longer is the only player in Latin America. With that 5 Pia Riggirozzi and Diana Tussie, eds., The Rise of Post-Hegemonic Regionalism: The Case of Latin America (London: Springer, 2012).

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in mind, it is necessary to examine another question related to how the US withdrawal from Latin America implies new opportunities for external powers. Here we examine the explicit extension of the Chinese and Russian presence. We proceed with an empirical exploration from Trump’s accession to power to the launch of the electoral campaign for the 2020 presidential election. We explore the “words and deeds” through the use of press releases, official statements from the State Department, Latin American Foreign Affairs Ministries, and regional and international organizations to help understand the impacts of Trump’s foreign policy choices on Latin American multilateralism. In the period under study, we explore three dimensions that have historically characterized the US presence in the region: trade, aid and crisis intervention (or crisis policy). For each dimension, we consider three aspects that will provide answers on the changes to US foreign policy under the Trump presidency: an assessment of the US withdrawal; alternatives and autonomous initiatives from the Latin American continent; changes in the presence of external powers.

Rolling Back the US International Liberalism What measures did Donald J. Trump take to roll back on international liberalism and how have these policies affected Latin America? Trump attacked any trade agreement, in line with his campaign slogan: “America first.” Once in office, he decided to withdraw from two major trade agreements that had a direct impact on the Latin American continent: the NAFTA and the TPP. The NAFTA was implemented in 1994 to encourage trade between the USA, Mexico, and Canada. Its main purpose was to remove barriers to the exchange of goods and services among the three countries. This trade agreement is representative of the 1990s neoliberal agreements that tried to foster open economies and standards harmonization. In that perspective, the TPP represents a new generation of trade agreements called “mega-trade agreements.” Indeed, the TPP initially proposed to lower tariffs and other trade barriers between eleven countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the USA, and Vietnam. Since the launch of the electoral campaign, Donald J. Trump has held very harsh stances against both agreements. From the first official debate of the 2016 campaign, Trump stated that “NAFTA is the worst trade deal maybe ever signed

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anywhere, but certainly ever signed in this country.”6 Taking office in January 2017, Trump immediately sought to replace NAFTA with a new agreement and opened new trade negotiations with Canada and Mexico. On May 18, 2017, the Trump Administration sent a 90-day notification to Congress of its intent to begin talks with Canada and Mexico to renegotiate and modernize NAFTA.7 Besides, in May 2017, Trump declared that the TPP was “a disaster that would hurt US manufacturing.”8 Mexico, Peru, and Chile were the three Latin American states most directly impacted by the US withdrawal from these two trade agreements and the new tone of US foreign policy. Faced with Trump’s desire to renegotiate NAFTA, the immediate reaction from the Mexican President, Enrique Peña-Nieto, was “to seek out new opportunities south, east and west.”9 Once Trump announced his will to replace this trade agreement, the Mexican government created a back-up plan and turned toward the Pacific Alliance, a coalition officially established on April 28, 2011. Created without formal structure, it intends to promote trade in line with previous neoliberal trade agreements and emerged from right-wing governments (Mexico under Enrique Peña Nieto; Chile under Sebastian Piñera’s first term; Peru under Alan Garcia; and Colombia under Juan Manuel Santos). In 2018, the Pacific Alliance was the 8th largest world economy and 40% of Latin American GDP.10 Confronted with the changing tone of the White House under Trump’s presidency and the replacement of NAFTA, the Pacific Alliance has become a strategic tool for economic growth in the region. Since June 2017, it has planned to expand the regional grouping. 6 CBC, “NAFTA Is the Worst Trade Deal Maybe Ever Signed Anywhere,” September 27, 2016, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/nafta-is-the-worst-trade-deal-maybe-eversigned-anywhere-1.3780231. 7 Congressional Research Service, “NAFTA Renegotiation and the Proposed United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA),” February 26, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/ crs/row/R44981.pdf. 8 CNBC, “TPP Nations Agree to Pursue Trade Deal Without US,” May 21, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/20/tpp-nations-agree-to-pursue-trade-dealwithout-us.html. 9 Pablo Calderón-Martinez, “Mexico Negotiates NAFTA with Painful History in Mind—And Elections on the Way,” The Conversation, February 2, 2018, http://theconversation.com/mexico-negotiates-nafta-with-painful-history-in-mindand-elections-on-the-way-90643. 10 Ibid.

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Canada is planning to become a full member of this market-oriented coalition. Beyond NAFTA renegotiation, the Pacific Alliance also serves as a “safe-haven” from the trade war between the United States and China. During the XIII Presidential Summit of Puerto Vallarta (Mexico), the presidents built up a Strategic Vision for 2030 that projects an expansion of the economic grouping. Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Singapore became associate member states and South Korea applied for the same status. They also sought to bring regional blocs closer together, in particular to strengthen the relationship between the Pacific Alliance and MERCOSUR, and, beyond Latin American, with ASEAN and the European Union.11 This acceleration of economic cooperation via the Pacific Alliance has nonetheless had to cope with a slowdown of the Mexican commitment since the election of the new President, Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), a left-wing President. Since his inaugural speech in December 2018, AMLO has fiercely opposed neoliberalism and has instead proposed inward-oriented foreign and economic policies. As a consequence, Mexico has bet on a strategy of intensification of bilateral relationships rather than participating in a Latin American regional multilateralism, largely inspired by a market-oriented and conservative ideology.12 Are some external powers benefiting from the change in US trade policy? “The Latin America and Caribbean region’s trade with China hit record levels in 2018, on both the import and export sides, which rose to 3.0 and 2.6 percent of GDP, respectively. China continues to be the most important export market for South America and remains second to the United States for exports from the LAC region overall.”13 LAC’s trade balance with China improved in 2018. The region had a trade deficit of approximately 0.4% of GDP, its lowest level since 2009. This improvement was spurred by two factors: increasing prices for major commodities such as petroleum, oil, and copper, and the trade frictions between China

11 Pacific Alliance, Official Statement of Puerto Vallarta, XIII Pacific Alliance Summit, July 24, 2018. 12 In that perspective, Mexico intensified its relationship with the European Union and on April 21, 2018, upgraded its trade agreement with the EU. Mexico and Canada also decided to strengthen their economic relationship. 13 Global Development Policy Center, “2019 China–Latin America Economic Bulletin,” 2019, https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2019/02/21/2019-china-latin-americaeconomic-bulletin/.

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500000000 450000000 400000000 350000000 300000000 250000000 200000000 150000000 100000000 50000000 0 2016 Trade Balance

2017 Exports LAC to US

2018 Imports LAC from US

Fig. 1 Bilateral trade between LAC and the United States (all products; unit: US Dollar thousand) (Source International Trade Center, Trade Map, 2019. Accessed online: https://www.trademap.org/)

and the United States. Conversely, the trade balance with the United States has decreased since 2017 (see Fig. 1). LAC countries are rapidly joining the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the China-initiated Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In 2019, seven LAC countries became prospective AIIB members (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela), and twelve signed BRI agreements (memorandums of understanding, cooperation agreements, or framework agreements): Panama, Bolivia, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, Venezuela, Uruguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana. After decades of American trade hegemony and special relationships, China now seems to better embody globalization and free trade. As such, “BRI claims to offer a global network of infrastructure projects in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas – mainly to facilitate trade – whilst bringing the promise of Chinese investment and economic development for partner nations.”14 In the economic and political context in Latin America described above, China represents a strategic alternative for LAC. 14 Fermin Koop, “Belt and Road: The New Face of China in Latin America,” Dialogo Chino, April 25, 2019, https://dialogochino.net/26121-belt-and-road-the-new-face-ofchina-in-latin-america/.

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“They Haven’t Done a Thing for Us”: The US Aid Policy U-Turn As a 2019 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report states, “foreign assistance is the largest component of the international affairs budget and is viewed by many as an essential instrument of U.S. foreign policy.”15 On the global scale, the United States is the “largest foreign aid donor in the world, accounting for about 24% of total official development assistance from major donor governments in 2017.”16 However, since the accession of Donald Trump to the presidency, US aid policy has taken a sharp “U-turn.” Since his election, Trump “has repeatedly called for deep cuts to foreign assistance programs.”17 The final goal of drastically reducing aid is clear and leads to questions on the role the United States intends to play on the global scale. In that matter, the Central American case is emblematic of this will to drastically reduce foreign assistance. In June 2019, Trump decided to cut off American aid to three Central American countries: Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. He argued that those States were failing at containing migration flows that affect security at the US southern border. As reported by the Financial Times, Trump declared that “we were paying them tremendous amounts of money, and we’re not paying them anymore because they haven’t done a thing for us.”18 This declaration is highly divergent from older practices. Historically, the United States has invested significantly in the region through its aid and development agency (USAID). In recent years, the Obama administration established an “Alliance for Prosperity,” an initiative that mainly targeted the development of countries of the Northern Triangle (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras), that were most affected by constant and growing flows of emigration. This initiative was heavily funded, with the promise of one billion dollars. However, the Trump administration’s decision to cut off

15 Congressional Research Service, “Foreign Aid: An Introduction to US Programs and Policy,” April 16, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40213.pdf. 16 Ibid. 17 James McBride, “How Does the U.S. Spend Its Foreign Aid?” Council on Foreign Relations, October 1, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-spend-itsforeign-aid. 18 Demetri Sevastopulo, Aime Williams, and Jude Webbe, “Donald Trump Cuts Off Aid to Three Central American States,” Financial Times, June 17, 2019, https://www. ft.com/content/f3cd73d2-9135-11e9-aea1-2b1d33ac3271.

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foreign assistance to Central America hammered countries that are already highly vulnerable and strongly reliant on external assistance. In response, the United States and Mexico signed a Declaration of Principles on Economic Development and Cooperation in Southern Mexico and Central America on December 18, 2018, in order to complement the “Alliance for Prosperity.”19 Trump’s strategy aims at redirecting the anti-immigration policy costs on Mexico. Pressured by the Trump administration on trade issues—with the threat of imposing new tariffs on Mexican exports, Mexican President Lopez Obrador has asserted a new regional leadership since he came into office. He has called for the elaboration of a development initiative for the three countries of the Northern Triangle. Under his leadership, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico gave a mandate to the ECLAC through its General Secretary, Alicia Barcena, in order to elaborate a “Plan for Integral Development” (December 1, 2018). This initiative is “a comprehensive development plan with the aim of formulating a diagnosis and presenting recommendations to advance toward a new development pattern and give rise to a new vision regarding the complexity of migratory processes.”20 This episode potentially leads to a redefinition of Mexico’s role in the region. Mexico once endorsed the role of the “older brother” in Central America, in particular during the decade of civil wars (1980s). Assuming a steady position on migration and trade issues, Trump opened a window of opportunity for the newly elected Mexican President to assert his leadership over the region. However, Lopez Obrador faces a complex regional configuration as he succeeded in a countercyclical election. On the Latin American political spectrum, he is the unique representative of a moderate left, among an overwhelming majority of right-wing governments and some resistant radical left fighters (Nicaragua, Bolivia, Venezuela). As a consequence, it does not prefigure a positive scenario for regional multilateralism that currently faces a major crisis.

19 U.S. Department of State, “United States–Mexico Declaration of Principles on Economic Development and Cooperation in Southern Mexico and Central America,” December 18, 2018, https://www.state.gov/united-states-mexico-declaration-of-principles-oneconomic-development-and-cooperation-in-southern-mexico-and-central-america/. 20 ECLAC, “ECLAC’s Executive Secretary Calls on the UN System to Address the Fundamental Causes of Migration,” February 26, 2019, https://www.cepal.org/en/news/ eclacs-executive-secretary-calls-un-system-address-fundamental-causes-migration.

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Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the initiative implemented by the States of the North Triangle and Mexico leaves out a central player in regional cooperation and development, the Central American integration system (SICA). The construction of this plan and the sudden reactivation of Mexican leadership in the region is a reminder of the fragility of Latin American multilateralism. Indeed, the cessation of US aid to Central America has not given rise to further continental reactions, beyond Mexico, which, given the trade pressure imposed by the United States, is clearly not acting only out of altruism. The crises in Venezuela and Brazil explain such a fragmented multilateralism.21 In this respect, it even seems that Mexico rather endorsed a kind of “bound leadership.” Since 2001, the United States has distanced itself from Latin American affairs. This created opportunities for emerging powers to extend their presence on the continent and this is particularly the case for China. Globally speaking, in Latin America, the growth of Chinese loans are both profit-driven and a form of diplomacy.22 In the last decade, China has invested heavily in Latin America through loans to different countries. It reached a yearly high of 35.6 billion dollars in 2010. Nonetheless, we observe an important decrease since 2015, from 21.5 billion dollars to 7.7 billion in 2018 (to Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador, and Dominican Republic). Still, this soft diplomacy does not only involve granting loans to Latin American states but also the ratification of agreements (or memoranda of understanding) that insert those states in macrostructural initiatives developed by the Chinese government. Among those, the BRI is key. As of 2019, 15 LAC countries have a BRI agreement.23 Moreover, during the Second Ministerial Meeting of the China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Forum, held in January 2018 in Santiago, Chile, the group approved a special declaration on the BRI that appeared as “a diplomatic victory for China in the region.”24 The LAC Foreign Affairs Ministers mandated ECLAC in order to strengthen their cooperation with China in the frame of the BRI initiative. Finally,

21 Kevin Parthenay, La crise au Venezuela et déstabilisation du multilatéralisme latinoaméricaine, Note de recherche no. 50 (Paris: IRSEM, 2018). 22 Kevin P. Gallagher and Margaret Myers, “China–Latin America Finance Database” (Washington, DC: Inter-American Dialogue, 2019). 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid.

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China is expanding its presence in the region as evidenced by the changing diplomatic configurations. Indeed, for many years, LAC maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan and did not de facto recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC). However, this diplomatic positioning is gradually changing. Year after year, the official diplomatic relations with the PRC, which requires its recognition and the end of relations with Taiwan, have been developing. In August 2018, El Salvador established official relations with China and, as a result, ended relations with Taiwan. Undoubtedly, this motivated the roughness of the Trump administration as this decision occurred in a context of trade war with China and constituted a diplomatic victory for Beijing.

US Intervention in LAC’s Political Crises In recent years, Venezuela has faced the worst economic and humanitarian crises in Latin America’s contemporary history. Since the death of Hugo Chavez in 2013 and the accession to power of Nicolas Maduro, the country has been caught in a spiral of crises. The country is facing an unprecedented economic slump with a dramatic collapse of its GDP, which fell by 35% between 2013 and 2017, and the accumulation of external debts. That economic slump resulted in a social crisis (humanitarian) and a political one. On the political side, President Maduro drifted to an authoritarian type of government with violent repressions of opposition and human rights violations, as recorded by the UN Human Rights Commission.25 The Venezuelan crisis illustrated an ambiguity in the diplomatic positioning of the United States vis-à-vis Latin America. The accession to power of Donald Trump led to renewed concern vis-à-vis Venezuela, despite an asserted diplomatic and commercial isolationism and a manifest lack of interest for the southern continent as a whole. The Obama administration had already cracked down on regime officials,26 asserting

25 United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, accessed on October 21, 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/LACRegion/Pages/VEIndex.aspx. 26 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela,” Executive Order no. 13692, March 9, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/ 03/09/executive-order-blocking-property-and-suspending-entry-certain-persons-c.

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Table 1

233

US sanctions against Venezuela

March 8, 2015 (Obama administration)

August 24, 2017 March 19, 2018 May 21, 2018 November 1, 2018

January 25, 2019

13692—blocking property and suspending entry of certain persons contributing to the situation in Venezuela 13808—imposing additional sanctions with respect to the situation in Venezuela 13827—taking additional steps to address the situation in Venezuela 13835—prohibiting certain additional transactions with respect to Venezuela 13850—blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Venezuela 13857—taking additional steps to address the national emergency with respect to Venezuela

Source Author’s elaboration

the Maduro government’s excesses posed a threat to US national security and foreign policy. However, these measures remained largely symbolic, as many dignitaries of the regime had placed their assets outside the jurisdiction of the United States. Under Trump’s administration, new sanctions were issued by the Treasury Department against Venezuelan officials (see Table 1), including magistrates, and the rhetoric hardened sharply against Maduro.27 Outlining that “all options are on the table,”28 including military intervention, Donald Trump reopened an old chapter of US–Latin America relations. This military threat opened a Pandora’s box and recalled tragic episodes of US military intervention in the continent.29 During a visit to Colombia, Vice President Mike Pence told President Juan Manuel Santos that “President Trump was very clear in saying that we would not remain inert in the face of the fall of Venezuela in a dictatorship.” He added 27 U.S. Department of State, “United States Strategy for Engagement in the

Caribbean,” Press Release, June 21, 2017, https://www.state.gov/press-releases/. 28 Ben Jacobs, “Trump Threatens ‘Military Option’ in Venezuela as Crisis Escalates,” The Guardian, August 12, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/11/ donald-trump-venezuela-crisis-military-intervention. 29 In particular, the Guatemalan intervention of 1954 and the Panamanian intervention of 1989.

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that “a bankrupt state in Venezuela threatens the security and prosperity of the entire hemisphere and the people of the United States of America.”30 This is reminiscent of the very foundations of the Pan-American and the Inter-American system that emerged originally under the Monroe Doctrine (1823).31 These statements highlight the strategic dimension of Venezuela for US interests. Three main factors of concern for the United States are at stake: first, trade interdependence, as the United States and Venezuela have maintained very close trade relations (particularly with respect to oil transactions); second, the Venezuelan crisis is likely to destabilize another strategic area for the United States, the Caribbean basin, considered as a “third frontier”32 ; third, the United States is desperate to avoid the consolidation of an openly anti-US regime that could be a bridgehead for China and Russia. The stakes are high: Beijing and Moscow’s presence could then restrict access to regional resources and also result in alliances with competing global players.33 The OAS was the first to mobilize in response to the Venezuelan crisis, especially its Secretary General, the Uruguayan Luis Almagro. Created in 1948, the OAS’s main missions are the defense of democracy and human rights on the American continent. Faced with democratic drifts and recurrent violations of human rights, the continental organization organized a series of emergency meetings to provide a solution to the crisis. However, Venezuela and its allies systematically denounced and refused the intervention of an organization known for responding to Washington’s injunctions. Indeed, the OAS has traditionally been considered on the continent as a US diplomatic tool. Within the continental organization, diplomatic tensions, in particular between the United States and Venezuela, reached their breaking point on April 26, 2017, when the Minister of External Relations Delcy Rodriguez announced Venezuela’s withdrawal

30 Reuters, “Pence Says ‘Failed State’ in Venezuela Threatens United States,” August 14, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-venezuela-pence-idUSKCN1AU1SN. 31 Juliette Dumont, “De la coopération intellectuelle à la diplomatie culturelle: les

voies/x de l’Argentine, du Brésil et du Chili (1919–1946)” (PhD diss., Université Sorbonne Nouvelle—Paris 3, 2013). 32 U.S. Department of State, “United States Strategy for Engagement in the Caribbean.” 33 Evan Braden Montgomery, In the Hegemon’s Shadow: Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016).

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from the OAS, a first in the organization’s history. This first external sign of fragmentation in LAC multilateralism is only the tip of the iceberg of a strong Venezuelan diplomatic strategy, oriented particularly toward the Caribbean. Some regional organizations have indeed been largely manipulated in this crisis. For instance, the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) echoed regional divisions as Venezuela tried to “lock” allies in those arenas. In both organizations, Cuba has worked intensely to strengthen alliances for Venezuela. Oil has also played a central part. Most CARICOM countries are accountable to Venezuela through the Petrocaribe program and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA). In the face of the crisis, the Caribbean area has become highly strategic and has been the subject of a Cuban tactic to counter the OAS and through it, the United States, who responded by trying to reassess their commitment in the region. What is also interesting to observe is that the de facto exit of the OAS as a legitimate player in the Venezuelan crisis resolution opened new venues to build multilateral arenas or tools. Several attempts and proposals emerged autonomously from LAC countries. Among those, we will mention the “Presidents Group” coordinated by the Ex-UNASUR General Secretary (Ernesto Samper); the “Lima Group,” born from the ashes of the OAS’s capacity to intervene in the crisis,34 and more recently a stillborn “Forum for the Progress of South America” (PROSUR). The converging characteristic of those burgeoning diplomatic spaces and instruments is to circumvent as much as possible the United States in the crisis resolution process. The Lima Declaration (August 8, 2017) and its meetings are emblematic as they tried to exhort the UN to intervene in the crisis, which the UN eventually did but with multiple and variable voices.35 Likewise, even if PROSUR36 was officially created for fostering regional cooperation and development in South America, it was rapidly accused of dissimulating political motives, namely to push change in Venezuela. Even if PROSUR has not yet given any real sign of formal activities, it is interesting to observe this attempt by liberal-conservative presidents to 34 Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Peru, to which Guyana and Santa Lucia later joined. 35 Elodie Brun and Kevin Parthenay, “The United Nations Faced to the Venezuelan and Nicaraguan Crises: A Plural Actor,” Unpublished working paper, forthcoming 2020. 36 Created on March 22, 2019 by the Santiago Declaration between the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, and Peru.

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create their own regional experiment in response to previous post-liberal regional experiences (such as ALBA and UNASUR), simultaneously targeting and trying to isolate Maduro’s Venezuela. At the International Conference for Democracy in Venezuela organized in Lima, on August 6, 2019, Trump underlined the paramount preoccupation for the United States: the extension of the Chinese and Russian presence in LAC. Trump’s then National Security Advisor John Bolton declared: “we are sending a signal to third parties that want to do business with the Maduro regime: Proceed with extreme caution.”37 China and Russia were the obvious targets of that admonition. Bolton urged Russia not to “double down on a bad bet,” and told China that “the quickest route to getting repaid” for its loans to Venezuela was by supporting “a new legitimate government.”38 Those statements stem from the activities orchestrated by China and Russia in support of Maduro’s regime either through loans or direct military cooperation (Russia). While we estimate that China handed Venezuela 50 billion dollars in 2018,39 Russia also massively supported the regime with at least $17 billion in loans and lines of credit since 2006. Both external players also helped save the National Company for Petroleum (PDVSA). While China now adopts a more cautious stand regarding their loans in exchange for petroleum, Russia has maintained its support. In return, it received stakes in CITGO, a US-based oil giant, and now possesses (through the Russian company, Rosneft) approximately 40% of the current oil projects in the country.40 Besides, Venezuela has progressively become one of the main customers for the Russian arms industry. Between 2001 and 2011, we estimate that Venezuela purchased 11 billion dollars’ worth of Russian arms.41 Consequently, the Chinese and Russian strategies are highly disruptive as they directly challenge the traditional conception of US hegemony in the region. 37 Euractiv, “US Warns Off Venezuela Allies at Lima Group Meeting,” 2019, accessed online on October 21, 2019, https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/uswarns-off-venezuela-allies-at-lima-group-meeting/. 38 Ibid. 39 DW, “How to Resolve the Venezuelan Debt Conundrum,” 2019, https://www.dw. com/en/how-to-resolve-the-venezuelan-debt-conundrum/a-47483575. 40 Gérard Latulippe, “Russie et Venezuela: la géopolitique du pétrole,” Huffington Post, August 26, 2017. 41 Parthenay, La crise au Venezuela.

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Conclusion In Latin America, the Trump administration’s willingness to move away from multilateralism (in the political and economic sense) has thrown the presidency into an original paradox fueled by the desire to protect US strategic interests, particularly from and in the South of the continent, while showing a willingness to withdraw or reduce its diplomatic presence in the region. On this basis, Donald Trump’s foreign policy has had two major effects. First, this withdrawal from the region has opened up new venues for regional cooperation (Pacific Alliance, Lima Group, PROSUR). Secondly, changes in the traditional terms of US foreign policy have had the effect of reshaping the configurations of LAC multilateralism through the empowerment of new external and nontraditional actors in the region. This has led some states to endorse regional leadership, in particular Mexico in the Central American isthmus, as well as extending the presence of China and Russia on the continent. The right-wing governments that rose to power in Latin America and were inclined to promote economic liberalism and the market economy are now dealing with a US partner that is sending all the signals of a protectionist retreat. In this regard, at a time when the return of conservatism in the region could have led to a strengthening of the economic relationship with the United States, those states are rather dedicated to diversifying their alliances, in line with the numerous initiatives proposed by China (AIIB, BRI, bilateral agreements). As a result, the United States has to adopt a renewed vigilance in a region that has long been considered its backyard, at the very moment when it appears to have lost interest in Latin America. With the paradox mentioned above, a contradiction arises in the implementation of Trump’s foreign policy. Despite the lack of interest in Latin America, the geopolitical reality has led to regular interventions on two main issues: the political crisis affecting Venezuela and the migratory flows emanating from Central America. From these two contexts arise contradictions between words and deeds. In Central America, while President Trump makes the fight against migration a priority to preserve homeland security, he has decided at the same time to cut off foreign aid to the region. Concerning Venezuela, despite the obvious lack of interest in regional political issues, the Trump administration (Trump himself, John

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Bolton, Rex Tillerson and Mike Pompeo, and Elliott Abrams) has not ceased to intervene in the crisis affecting the country since 2016. In the end, the changes in US foreign policy implemented under the Trump presidency have precipitated Latin American governments, belonging to a new political era characterized by a return to conservatism, to seek the diversification of their relations and diplomatic tools in order to limit the risks arising from ambiguous, uncertain, and fluctuating stands. If we cannot attribute a driving force to the Trump presidency in the reconfiguration of LAC multilateralism, it has undoubtedly been the vector (sometimes indirectly) of a complexification of international configurations at the heart of the continent.

References Braden Montgomery, Evan. In the Hegemon’s Shadow: Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016. Calderón-Martinez, Pablo. “Mexico Negotiates NAFTA with Painful History in Mind—And Elections on the Way.” The Conversation, February 2, 2018. http://theconversation.com/mexico-negotiates-nafta-with-painfulhistory-in-mind-and-elections-on-the-way-90643. Congressional Research Service. “Foreign Aid: An Introduction to US Programs and Policy.” April 16, 2019. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40213.pdf. Congressional Research Service. “NAFTA Renegotiation and the Proposed United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA).” February 26, 2019. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44981.pdf. Grabendorff, Wolf. “The United States and Western Europe: Competition or Co-Operation in Latin America.” International Affairs 58, no. 4 (1982): 625–637. McBride, James. “How Does the U.S. Spend Its Foreign Aid?” Council on Foreign Relations, October 1, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/howdoes-us-spend-its-foreign-aid. Munck, Ronaldo. Contemporary Latin America. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Oelsner, Andrea. International Relations in Latin America: Peace and Security in the Southern Cone. New York: Routledge, 2005. Parthenay, Kevin. La crise au Venezuela et la fragmentation du multilatéralisme latino-américaine. Note de recherche no. 50, Paris, IRSEM, 2018. Tulchin, Joseph S. Latin America in International Politics: Challenging US Hegemony. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2016.

Breakpoint in Time: Donald Trump’s Trade Policy Toward Canada Frédérick Gagnon

Canada and the United States enjoy one of the closest bilateral relationships in the world, often described as a “special relationship.”1 In the area of security and defense, both countries must, for instance, coordinate their efforts to protect a common border about 9000 kilometers long.2 On energy, they are “each other’s largest […] trading partners as measured by the value of energy commodity trade.”3 Yet, energy exchanges represent only a small part of the considerable economic links that exist between Canada and the United States. For example, nearly 80% of Canada’s exports go to the United States, accounting for just under $300 billion in value and about 20% of Canada’s GDP.4 Such a dependence on the United States has often encouraged Ottawa to place the preservation of Canadian ties with the United States above all other foreign policy goals. 1 Laura Dawson and Sean Speer, “Managing the Canada–US Relationship from the Honeymoon to the Long-term,” Macdonald-Laurier Institute, March 2016, 2. 2 Ibid. 3 Andrew Stanley, “Mapping the U.S.–Canada Energy Relationship,” CSIS Brief, May 7, 2018, 1. 4 Dawson and Speer, “Managing the Canada–US Relationship,” 5–6.

F. Gagnon (B) Raoul Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, Center for United States Studies, University of Québec in Montreal, Montreal, QC, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 M. Quessard et al. (eds.), Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37258-3_13

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Canada’s Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, has not departed from this rule. When he assumed office in November 2015, he wasted no time before reaching out to President Barack Obama. When the two leaders first met in Manila, Philippines, during the 2015 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, it was already clear that they shared similar views on the need to fight climate change and defeat ISIS and terrorism in the Middle East, or to sign the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, a trade pact between the United States, Canada and ten additional signatories such as Japan, Australia, and Mexico. The relationship between Trudeau and Obama became so cordial that observers did not hesitate to call it a “bromance.”5 However, Donald Trump’s rise to the US Presidency has profoundly altered the dynamics of Canada–US relations, particularly on trade. This chapter will show that the Trump Presidency has marked a breakpoint in time for Canada–US relations in three respects. First, Trump’s negotiating style and views on trade with Canada differ from those of his predecessors and represent one of the most important challenges in the history of Canada–US trade relations, and certainly the most urgent since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, after which the American government adopted various measures that thickened the Canada–US border to protect the United States against terrorism. Second, Trump’s implementation of policies consistent with his trade vision has forced Canada to comply with various American requirements that affect not only Canada–US trade, but also Canada’s relations with other countries around the world, China in the first place. Third, Justin Trudeau and Canadians might have to get used to a more difficult trade relationship with the United States from now on, because there is ample evidence that Trump’s views on trade with Canada have gained ground in the United States. Indeed, various local actors who viewed Canada more positively before Trump’s election in 2016 have now embraced his economic nationalism.

5 Aaron Blake, Kayla Epstein and Ryan Carey-Mahoney, “The Budding Bromance Between President Obama and Canada’s Justin Trudeau, in 11 Great Pictures,” The Washington Post, March 10, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/ wp/2016/03/10/the-budding-bromance-between-president-obama-and-canadas-justintrudeau-in-11-great-pictures/?noredirect=on.

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Dealing with Trump’s Attitude and Negotiating Style If there is one issue on which Donald Trump has been consistent since his election in 2016, it is probably international trade, with Canada in particular. During the 2016 Republican primaries and his election duel against Hillary Clinton, the future president called the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada the worst trade agreement ever signed by the United States.6 He promised to withdraw from NAFTA, but eventually changed his mind and embarked on a lengthy renegotiation process with Mexico and Canada. This led to the signing, on November 30, 2018, of a new agreement with Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto and Justin Trudeau, the United States– Canada–Mexico Agreement (USMCA). Passed by the US Congress and signed into law by Trump in January 2020, the USMCA was intended to make several important changes to Canada–US trade. Among them, Justin Trudeau agreed to give American farmers better access to the Canadian dairy market.7 Trump initially refused to lift US tariffs on Canadian steel (25%) and aluminum (10%) that he had imposed on Canada since June 1, 2018. The president finally decided to abandon these tariffs in May 2019, but the fact that he imposed them on Canada for almost a year shows that he is willing to go to great lengths to confront a close ally over what he considers to be unfair trade practices. Such views are consistent with the economic nationalism that has guided his trade policy toward most other countries and regions of the

6 We have detailed Trump’s negotiating style and views on trade with Canada in several other contributions. This chapter builds on these in particular: Frédérick Gagnon, “La ‘relation spéciale’ canado-américaine à l’épreuve du fossé idéologique entre Donald Trump et Justin Trudeau,” Revue de Recherche en Civilisation Américaine (December 2017): 1–20; Frédérick Gagnon, “‘I Love Canada’: Canada–U.S. Relations Under Trump’s Presidency,” in Donald J. Trump’s Presidency: International Perspectives, eds. John Dixon and Max Skidmore (Washington, DC: Westphalia Press, 2018), 69–86; and Frédérick Gagnon and Christophe Cloutier-Roy, “Ephemeral or Durable? Donald Trump’s Impact on Canada– US Issues in the Great Lakes Heartland and Northeast Borderlands,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, published online in December 2019. 7 Krystalle Ramlakhan, “Ontario Dairy Farmers Disappointed with New USMCA Trade Deal,” CBC News, October 1, 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/ontariodairy-farmers-reaction-usmca-trade-deal-1.4845586.

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world, such as China, Mexico, and Europe.8 It could be summed up in four premises.9 First, Trump is deeply convinced that globalization, trade agreements, and “unfair trade practices” have allowed the United States’ trading partners to take advantage of America for decades. He has called China a “currency manipulator,” said there are too many German cars in America and denounced trade deficits with countries like Mexico. Although one of the United States’ most important allies, Canada has not received preferential treatment from the president. For example, in a speech he delivered in Kenosha, Wisconsin, in April 2017, Trump said that Canadian dairy regulation is a “complete and total disaster” for American farmers and that all American trading partners must be fair to American workers, including Canada.10 Such statements illustrate the second premise guiding Trump’s vision of Canada–US trade: in his view, traditional allies of the United States are not to be trusted blindly in every case and every time; they sometimes have things to be blamed for and must be held accountable when necessary. This is exactly what Trump suggested in an interview on the popular 60 Minutes television show in October 2018. When asked about his decision to impose tariffs on partners such as Japan, the European Union and Canada, he answered with the following question: “I mean, what is an ally?”11 The third premise of Trump’s economic nationalism on Canada–US trade is the idea that while Canada is an exemplary partner in many respects and is not the greatest trade threat to the United States, trade is nevertheless a zero-sum game “where any country’s win is considered another’s loss.”12 As such, Trump believes that the United States can and should get more from all of its trading partners, even those with whom

8 Simon Lester and Inu Manak, “The Rise of Populist Nationalism and the Renegotiation of NAFTA,” Journal of International Economic Law 21, no. 1 (March 2018): 153–156. 9 See Gagnon and Cloutier-Roy, “Ephemeral or Durable?” 10 Brett Purdy, “Dairy Farmers of Manitoba Shoot Back at Trump After He Calls

Out Canadian Industry,” CBC News, April 19, 2017, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ manitoba/look-within-manitoba-dairy-farmers-shoot-back-at-trump-1.4075092. 11 Uri Friedman, “The President of the United States Asks, ‘What’s an Ally?’,” The Atlantic, October 15, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/ 10/donald-trump-60-minutes-ally/573019/. 12 Lester and Manak, “The Rise of Populist Nationalism,” 153.

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the United States has a very cordial relationship. Here, we can certainly draw a parallel between how President Trump has conducted American trade relations since his arrival in the White House and how he conceived of his role as a businessman before entering politics. For example, in The Art of the Deal, a 1987 Trump best-selling book co-authored by Tony Schwartz, Trump is described as a ruthless but savvy businessman, convinced that there are no friends in business and that interpersonal and commercial relationships sooner or later take the form of rivalries that make winners and losers, and where personal gain must be the priority.13 This brings us to the fourth premise underlying Trump’s views on Canada–US relations: the belief that his role as president is to restore America’s past industrial and manufacturing glory and that it is always better to create jobs in the United States rather than in other countries, including Canada. The now-famous election campaign slogans used by Trump in 2016, “Make America Great Again” and “America First,” already reflected his stated desire to bring “good jobs” back to the Americans. Trump reiterated this wish in his inaugural address on January 20, 2017, stating that the United States had enriched other countries and that the wealth of the American middle class had been stolen and “redistributed across the entire world.”14 In implementing his trade policy toward Canada, Trump has always sought to promote job creation in the United States first and foremost. Breaking with his predecessors, including Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, he has never bought the idea that the trade links and open markets between Canada and the United States have created more good jobs in the United States than if Ottawa and Washington had restricted trade between the two countries. It is in this spirit that Trump used trade tariffs against Canada to try to revive the US steel and aluminum industry, even though the tariffs posed a major threat to Canadian jobs in these sectors. Similarly, in December 2017, Trump recommended the imposition of duties of nearly 300% on the CSeries, a type of commercial aircraft produced by Bombardier, Canada’s leading aerospace company. True to his vision, Trump’s objective in this case was, once again,

13 Donald Trump and Tony Schwartz, The Art of the Deal (New York: Random House, 1987). See also Gagnon, “La ‘relation spéciale’ canado-américaine,” 5. 14 Donald Trump, “The Inaugural Address,” The White House, January 20, 2017.

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to stimulate job creation in the United States, this time by giving Boeing an advantage in its race against an “unfair” international competitor.15 In addition to these four premises that guide Trump’s vision of Canada–US trade, another important challenge for Trudeau is the unorthodox negotiating style and personality of the President of the United States. Three observations in this regard are crucial to understanding what Trudeau has been facing since Trump took office. First, Trump does not negotiate trade agreements in the same way as his predecessors. Instead of coming to the NAFTA negotiating table looking for common ground that would benefit both the United States and Canada, Trump and his team, led by the US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, seem to have been largely inspired by the way Trump conducted his own personal negotiations when he was a businessman. This formula is described in his book The Art of the Deal and consists of three ingredients: (1) set the bar as high as possible even if the goal may sometimes seem exaggerated or unrealistic (think big ), (2) fight to the end and use all means to achieve the desired objective (push and push and push), and (3) never break promises made to those who support you (deliver the goods ).16 Trump has used his “art of the deal” on a regular basis since his first formal meeting with Trudeau in Washington in February 2017. In the case of the renegotiation of NAFTA, for example, he has never renounced his promise to sign a new trade agreement with Mexico and Canada (deliver the goods ), he has set the bar as high as possible, even going so far as to propose to tear up NAFTA (think big ), and he has used all means, including trade tariffs, to force Canada to make major concessions to the United States (push and push and push). For Trudeau, a second challenge related to Trump’s personality is that it is difficult to know the president’s real intentions and to guess which of his public statements should be taken seriously or are likely to guide the official policies of the United States government toward Canada. This is now a well-known phenomenon, but President Trump does not hesitate to communicate his state of mind publicly on the spot, thanks to his preferred means of communication, Twitter. Canada and Justin Trudeau 15 Alana Wise, “Trump Administration Sides with Boeing in Bombardier Dispute,” Reuters, December 20, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-bombardier/ trump-administration-sides-with-boeing-in-bombardier-dispute-idUSKBN1EE2J4. 16 Trump and Schwartz, The Art of the Deal. See also Gagnon, “La ‘relation spéciale’ canado-américaine,” 6.

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have not been the targets of Trump’s tweets as often as other countries and heads of state, such as China and Xi Jinping. That said, Trump has not hesitated to attack Canada when he thought he needed to, forcing Trudeau to ask himself what to do with the often surprising and sometimes undiplomatic statements of his American counterpart. For example, in a tweet published on September 1, 2018, when the renegotiation of NAFTA was not moving fast enough to his taste, Trump announced the following on Twitter: “There is no political necessity to keep Canada in the new NAFTA deal. If we don’t make a fair deal for the U.S. after decades of abuse, Canada will be out.”17 For Trudeau, an important dilemma then arose: should Canada take Trump seriously and comply with American demands or keep calm and gamble that the president is bluffing? More importantly, knowing that a third characteristic of Trump’s personality is that he does not like to be attacked personally and that he responds strongly to salvoes, what attitude should Trudeau adopt in his personal interactions with Trump? Keep a cool head and try at all costs to get along well with this president? Or speak frankly, clearly express his disagreement, at the risk of offending Trump and putting Canadian interests at risk? Since Trump’s election, Trudeau has tested both recipes. During the first few months of the Trump presidency, his team and him did everything possible to avoid personal clashes with Trump. For example, Trudeau’s decision to replace Stéphane Dion with Chrystia Freeland as Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 2017 is partly explained by the Prime Minister’s desire to entrust the management of Canada–US relations to someone less likely to cause turmoil in Washington (Dion has a reputation as a fighter and does not have his tongue in his pocket).18 That said, noting that Trump did not offer preferential treatment to Canada despite Ottawa’s active advocacy efforts and outreach in Washington, Trudeau sometimes changed his strategy, adopting a more combative and critical attitude toward the president. For example, when Trump decided to impose tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum, Trudeau stated that

17 Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter account, September 1, 2018. 18 Jocelyn Coulon, Un selfie avec Justin Trudeau: Regard critique sur la diplomatie du

premier ministre (Montréal: Québec Amérique, 2018), 88 and 97.

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such a policy was “insulting and unacceptable.”19 A few days later, at the G7 summit held in Quebec and hosted by Canada, Trump’s decision to leave the event before the work and meetings were completed reminded Ottawa that the president did not appreciate Trudeau’s critics.20 It also showed that Trudeau’s attacks on Trump almost automatically lead to a negative reaction from the US president, which can potentially hurt Canada–US relations.

Adjusting to the Trump Reality Navigating rough waters since the beginning of the Trump presidency, Trudeau thus had to adapt to the radical change that occurred in Washington after Barack Obama’s departure from the White House. For the Canadian Prime Minister, this adjustment has taken at least three forms. First, Trudeau has been forced to change Canada’s foreign policy priorities and reallocate enough government resources for his team to focus its energies on managing the Canada–US file. This is the conclusion of the personnel at the US Embassy in Canada, in a secret but since declassified memo stating that Trump has convinced Trudeau to adopt an “America First foreign policy.”21 The memo also states that: “Trudeau promoted […] Chrystia Freeland to Foreign Minister in large part because of her strong U.S. contacts […] Her mandate letter from the PM listed her number one priority as maintaining “constructive relations” with the United States.”22 Freeland would not be alone in this quest. As explained by a former member of Trudeau’s foreign policy team, officials and representatives of the Privy Council Office (which supports the Prime Minister and his Cabinet), of the Canadian Embassy in Washington and of key ministries such as Global Affairs Canada and International Trade and 19 Cristiano Lima, “Trudeau: Rationale Behind Trump’s Tariffs ‘Insulting and Unacceptable’ to Canada,” Politico, June 1, 2018, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/ 06/01/trudeau-trump-canada-trade-tariffs-617957. 20 For an account of the tumultuous relationship between Trump and Trudeau during the G7 summit, read Chapter 1 of Aaron Wherry, Promise and Peril: Justin Trudeau in Power (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2019). 21 US State Department (US Embassy in Ottawa), “Canada Adopts ‘America First’ Foreign Policy,” Unclassified US Department of State Memo, March 6, 2017, https:// foia.state.gov/Search/results.aspx?searchText=chrystia+freeland&beginDate=&endDate=& publishedBeginDate=&publishedEndDate=&caseNumber=. 22 Ibid.

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Investment would now make it a priority to conduct a formal offensive in all American political, economic and cultural circles to remind them of the importance of the trade relations between the two countries.23 For Trudeau, “maintaining ‘constructive relations’ with the United States” also meant that it would now be essential to address the main topics of discussion that Trump wanted to address, the renegotiation of NAFTA in the first place. But that’s not all. Since one of Trump’s priorities was to break with Barack Obama’s foreign policy legacy, it would also become more difficult for Trudeau to continue to promote the policies that were dear to the Trudeau/Obama duo. For example, at the first official Trudeau–Trump meeting in Washington in February 2017, Trudeau did not insist on addressing the issue of climate change or the reception of Syrian refugees on North American soil, knowing that Trump was in serious disagreement with him on these. On trade, Trudeau also knew that it was probably impossible to convince Trump not to keep his election promise to remove the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, which he had done a few weeks before their meeting. Ironically, Trump’s arrival in the White House and the risk he posed to the future of Canada–US trade forced Trudeau to modify some of his own foreign policy promises made during the 2015 Canadian election. The day after his victory, Trudeau had indeed stated in a public speech that Canada’s friends around the world could expect Canada to resume its key role on the international scene after the years of Stephen Harper, Trudeau’s predecessor. Using the phrase “Canada is back” to express his thoughts, Trudeau promised, for example, to break with Harper’s disinterest in the UN, to sign and promote the Paris Accord on climate change or to strengthen Canada’s participation in peace operations in Africa.24 In the years that followed, many observers and leading Canadian foreign policy experts felt that, beyond words, Trudeau’s promises had not been kept, at least not up to the expectations he had initially created. That is the opinion of Professor Roland Paris, a former Trudeau adviser, who asked the following question in a blog article published in 2017: “When and

23 Coulon, Un selfie avec Justin, 222. 24 Kim Richard Nossal, “Promises Made, Promises Kept? A Mid-term Trudeau Foreign

Policy Report Card,” in Justin Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy, Canada Among Nations 2017, eds. Norman Hillmer and Philippe Lagassé (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 35–37.

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how will Trudeau convert his global celebrity into action?”25 In the area of UN peace operations, for example, Trudeau’s delay in deploying Canadian troops to Mali, a decision that was postponed several times before being officially announced in March 2018, caused great disappointment among Canada’s allies, France for example, which has a significant presence in that country. Experts of Mali such as Professor Bruno Charbonneau did not hesitate to talk about a “missed opportunity for Canada” on the international scene.26 When we look more closely at Canada–US relations, we see that the Trump election probably partly explains why so many observers believe that Canada missed its return. In the case of Mali, for example, Canada did not need to obtain the approval of the Trump administration before deploying Canadian soldiers to that country. However, it appears that Trudeau postponed his decision until later after Trump’s election because he wanted to “obtain a better sense of what the Trump administration expects of allies and ensure it wasn’t offside with the new president who has repeatedly accused Western countries of falling short on basic defense commitments and has said he wants the NATO military alliance to focus more on counterterrorism.”27 Trudeau’s third major adjustment to Canadian foreign policy after the 2016 American election also illustrates how some of Trudeau’s decisions are handcuffed to those of President Trump.28 This change concerns the three-way trade relationship between the United States, Canada, and China. Since his arrival in the White House, Trump has promised to negotiate a new agreement with China to encourage Beijing to change some policies that the President of the United States considers unfair. For example, Trump wants China to stop manipulating its currency in 25 Roland Paris, “When and How Will Trudeau Convert His Global Celebrity into

Action?,” University of Ottawa, August 5, 2017, http://www.rolandparis.com/singlepost/2017/08/05/When-and-How-Will-Trudeau-Convert-His-Global-Celebrity-intoAction. Quoted in Coulon, Un selfie avec Justin, 231. 26 Bruno Charbonneau, “Le retour manqué du Canada?,” Le Devoir, 3 mai 2017, https://www.ledevoir.com/opinion/idees/497805/le-retour-manque-du-canada. 27 Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “Ottawa Weighs Risks of Child Soldiers in Mali,” The Globe and Mail, March 6, 2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ ottawa-weighs-risks-of-child-soldiers-in-mali/article34210997/. 28 Norman Hillmer and Philippe Lagassé even go so far as to say that the “Age of Trudeau is Handcuffed to the Age of Trump,” in Justin Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy, Canada Among Nations 2017, eds. Norman Hillmer and Philippe Lagassé (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 13.

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order to stimulate its exports to the American market. He also wants China to respect the intellectual property of American companies, fight fentanyl production, which contributes to the opiate crisis in the United States, and buy more American products, including agricultural goods, which could help reduce the US trade deficit with China. Using a strategy similar to the one he adopted with Canada during the renegotiation of NAFTA, Trump decided to impose trade tariffs on China to force it to comply with his demands. The trade war between China and the United States quickly had an impact on Canada as well, in at least two ways. On the one hand, as part of the renegotiation of NAFTA, Trudeau signed a new agreement, the USMCA, whose scope and effects are not limited to bilateral relations between Canada and the United States, or even the Canada–United States–Mexico trio. As explained by the Director of the Institute For 21st Century Questions, Irvin Studin, USMCA Article 32.10 shows that the Trump Administration wanted to have some control over the trade agreements that Canada might be tempted to sign with countries like China in the future.29 This article stipulates that any USMCA member must inform the other members of the agreement of its intention to enter into trade negotiations with “non-market countries.”30 In addition, if an agreement is signed between a USMCA member and a “non-market country,” the other USMCA members must be able to see the text of the agreement in advance, and they have the right to leave the USMCA if they consider it necessary. Although Article 32.10 does not directly mention China, most observers agree that it is the main country to which the term “non-market country” refers.31 Some go further by stating that this section of the USMCA text represents an erosion of Canadian sovereignty to the benefit of the United States, because it “effectively strips Canada of any ability to negotiate free-trade agreements with China.”32

29 Irvin Studin, “An Open Letter to Justin Trudeau,” Global Brief, Fall/Winter 2019, https://globalbrief.ca/2018/11/an-open-letter-to-justin-trudeau/. 30 See the text of the USMCA on the website of the US Trade Representative, accessed

October 18, 2019, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/ Text/32_Exceptions_and_General_Provisions.pdf. 31 Josh Wingrove, “NAFTA’s China Clause Is Latest Blow to Trudeau’s Asia Ambitions,” Bloomberg, October 4, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201810-04/nafta-s-china-clause-is-latest-blow-to-trudeau-s-asia-ambitions. 32 Studin, “An Open Letter.”

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On the other hand, on December 1, 2018, the Trump Administration dragged Canada further into the trade war between the United States and China when the US Department of Justice asked Canadian authorities to arrest Meng Wanzhou, the chief financial officer of Chinese tech giant Huawei, in Vancouver for extradition to the United States. According to the US authorities, Wanzhou allegedly defrauded several financial institutions and played a key role in Huawei’s violation of US trade bans with Iran. China’s response quickly followed: shortly after Meng’s arrest, the Chinese government arrested two Canadian nationals, former diplomat Michael Kovrig and businessman Michael Spavor, both accused of espionage. Beijing also suspended imports of canola and meat from Canada.33

Why Trump’s Economic Nationalism Might Survive After Trump Trump’s rise to the presidency is not only a breakpoint in time for Canada for the aforementioned reasons. It is also a challenge for Canadians because the US President has made economic nationalism a more popular position than before in the United States and has convinced many other elected officials of the benefits of his views on Canada–US trade.34 Trump’s impact on public opinion about trade has been well documented in a study conducted by the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland.35 The authors show that a majority of American voters now believe, like Trump, that US trade policy “has been negative for jobs and American workers” and that more jobs are lost from US imports than gained from US exports.36 The study also highlights that Trump has affected party attitudes about trade in general and with Canada in particular. Before Trump’s election,

33 Aleksandra Sagan, “Meat Industry Groups Concerned for China Import Ban, Working with Government,” CBC News, June 26, 2019, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ calgary/china-meat-ban-industry-goverment-canada-reaction-1.5191153. 34 The arguments and data included in this section are presented in more detail in

Frédérick Gagnon and Christophe Cloutier-Roy, “Ephemeral or Durable?” 35 Steven Kull, “Globalization and Trade: A Study of American Attitudes,” Program for Public Consultation, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, October 19, 2017: 2–3, http://www.publicconsultation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/ Globalization_Report.pdf. 36 Ibid.

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Republicans often saw free trade and globalization less negatively than Democrats.37 Not anymore. The study conducted by the School of Public Policy shows that “Republican views of trade dipped in 2016” and that Democratic voters have viewed trade more positively than Republicans since. In addition, a greater proportion of Republicans than Democrats believe that US trade with the rest of the world ultimately results in job losses for Americans. The Trump effect on the Republicans’ perception of NAFTA is particularly notable. According to the study, the percentage of Republican voters who believe that this trade agreement has been harmful to the United States rose from 45% in 2004 to 68% in 2017, while the percentage of Democratic voters with a positive view of NAFTA grew from 52 to 76% over the same period.38 Another study conducted by Public Policy Polling in June 2018 even shows that only 54% of voters who voted for Trump in 2016 have a positive view of Canada (compared to 77% who voters who voted for Hillary Clinton).39 The 2018 midterm elections, the first to be held after Trump’s victory in 2016, demonstrated how Republican elected officials and candidates for the US Congress or governorships in states that have close ties with Canada now seem convinced that there is an appetite among Republican voters for Trump’s economic nationalism and his singular views on trade with Canada. For instance, in Ohio’s senatorial race, Republican candidate Jim Renacci declared that he is “proud the see President Trump using tariffs” to protect manufacturing jobs in the state.40 Republican Governor of Illinois Brune Rauner similarly argued that Trump’s tariffs are necessary to fight unfair trade deals.41 In Wisconsin, Trump’s grievances against the Canadian dairy industry were echoed by many electoral actors such as Sean Duffy, the Republican representative in the 7th District of the

37 Ibid., 2. 38 Ibid. 39 Public Policy Polling, June 13, 2018, https://www.publicpolicypolling.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/PPP_Release_National_61318.pdf. 40 WYKC/WOSU, “Ohio Senate Debate,” October 14, 2018, https://www.c-span. org/video/?452628-1/ohio-senate-debate&start=753. 41 WGEM, “Illinois Gubernatorial Debate,” October 11, 2018, https://www.c-span. org/video/?452823-1/illinois-gubernatorial-debate.

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State, who stated that: “Canada’s unfair trade policies have specifically hurt Wisconsin dairy farmers.”42

Conclusion These examples illustrate the challenge that Canada will face in the coming years. As this chapter has shown, far from being an anecdote and an unimportant event, Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 presidential election has marked a turning point in Canada–US trade relations in at least three ways. First, Trump’s first term shows that the president intends to negotiate hard with Canada and is determined to put the United States’ trade interests ahead of those of their northern neighbor. Second, Canada’s economic dependence on the United States will force Ottawa to remain on the lookout for how Trump will manage American trade policy with the other major world powers, China in the first place, which already sees Canada as an accomplice to Trump’s trade war against Beijing. Finally, the growing popularity of Trump’s economic nationalism in the United States, and particularly within the Republican Party, shows that Canada’s access to the American market cannot be taken for granted anymore. Public opinion polls show that Canadians are aware of the risk that the Trump presidency poses to Canada’s prosperity. According to a study conducted by Research Co. in June 2019, 65% of Canadians believe that Trump “has been bad or very bad” for Canada, and only 17% believe he has been “good” for the country.43 It is therefore not surprising that 80% of Canadians would prefer a Democratic victory to Trump’s reelection in 2020.44 The Democratic nomination race to choose the candidate who will face Trump, however, illustrates that Canada may not be at the end of its rope even if Trump is forced to leave the White House. At least that is 42 RiverTown Newsroom, “7th Congressional District Q and A: Here’s Where Duffy, Engebretson Stand,” Hudson Star-Observer, October 31, 2018, https://www. hudsonstarobserver.com/news/government-and-politics/4522334-7th-congressionaldistrict-q-and-heres-where-duffy-engebretson. 43 Jonathan Szekeres, “Canadians Think Donald Trump Is Bad for Canada: Poll,” News 1130, June 19, 2019, https://www.citynews1130.com/2019/06/19/canadiansthink-donald-trump-is-bad-for-canada-poll/. 44 Josh Dehaas, “Nearly 8 in 10 Canadians Prefer Dems Over Trump; Sanders, Biden Most Popular: Poll,” CTV News, July 21, 2019, https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/nearly8-in-10-canadians-prefer-dems-over-trump-sanders-biden-most-popular-poll-1.4517305.

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what a series of interviews conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations in July 2019 with the 2020 Democratic candidates revealed.45 Invited to present their vision of international trade, the Democrats expressed views that are reminiscent of Trump’s economic nationalism. For instance, Bernie Sanders argued that treaties like NAFTA have resulted in “massive jobs losses in the United States and the shutting down of tens of thousands of factories.”46 Kamala Harris stated that she will “oppose any trade deal that doesn’t look out for the best interests of American workers,” while Cory Booker said he opposed the Trans-Pacific Partnership because it “would have led to the further decline of US manufacturing.”47 Among the leaders to win the Democratic nomination, former Vice President Joe Biden was then the only one to distance himself very clearly from Trump, saying that trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership are not perfect, but that the idea behind them is “a good one.”48 Such a position clearly departed from what Democratic candidate Elizabeth Warren stated in a Foreign Affairs article presenting her vision of trade: “For decades, both Democratic and Republican leaders asserted that free trade was a rising tide that could lift all boats. Great rhetoric, except that the trade deals they negotiated mainly lifted the boats on the wealthy while leaving millions of working Americans to drown.”49 This lukewarmness of Democrats on international trade does not necessarily mean that the trade relationship between Canada and the United States would be as strained as it has been with Trump if Democrats took over the White House in 2020. Indeed, it seems fair to believe that none of the Democratic candidates would use the same negotiating style as Trump to deal with Canada. But the serious concerns expressed by Democrats about international trade and globalization during the 2020 election campaign suggest that the days when Ottawa had virtually no 45 Council on Foreign Relations, “Election 2020: Candidates Answer CFR’s Questions,” July 30, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/election-2020-candidates-answer-cfrs-questions. 46 Council on Foreign Relations, “The Democratic Candidates on the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” July 30, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/article/democratic-candidates-trans-pacificpartnership. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Elizabeth Warren, “A Foreign Policy for All: Strengthening Democracy—At Home and Abroad,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/2018-11-29/foreign-policy-all.

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difficulty convincing presidents like Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, or Bill Clinton that trade with Canada is totally safe and beneficial is a relic of the past.

References Coulon, Jocelyn. Un selfie avec Justin Trudeau: Regard critique sur la diplomatie du premier ministre. Montréal: Québec Amérique, 2018. Dawson, Laura, and Sean Speer. “Managing the Canada–US Relationship from the Honeymoon to the Long-term.” Macdonald-Laurier Institute, March 2016. Gagnon, Frédérick. “La ‘relation spéciale’ canado-américaine à l’épreuve du fossé idéologique entre Donald Trump et Justin Trudeau.” Revue de Recherche en Civilisation Américaine (December 2017): 1–20. Gagnon, Frédérick. “‘I Love Canada’: Canada–U.S. Relations Under Trump’s Presidency.” In Donald J. Trump’s Presidency: International Perspectives, edited by John Dixon and Max Skidmore, 69–86. Washington, DC: Westphalia Press, 2018. Gagnon, Frédérick, and Christophe Cloutier-Roy. “Ephemeral or Durable? Donald Trump’s Impact on Canada–US Issues in the Great Lakes Heartland and Northeast Borderlands.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal: 1–15 (published online in December 2019). Hillmer, Norman, and Philippe Lagassé, eds. Justin Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy, Canada Among Nations 2017. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Lester, Simon, and Inu Manak. “The Rise of Populist Nationalism and the Renegotiation of NAFTA.” Journal of International Economic Law 21, no. 1 (March 2018): 153–156. Stanley, Andrew. “Mapping the U.S.–Canada Energy Relationship.” CSIS Brief, May 7, 2018. Studin, Irvin. “An Open Letter to Justin Trudeau.” Global Brief, Fall/Winter 2019. Trump, Donald, and Tony Schwartz. The Art of the Deal. New York: Random House, 1987. Wherry, Aaron. Promise and Peril: Justin Trudeau in Power. Toronto: HarperCollins, 2019.

Notes on Contributors

Célia Belin is a visiting fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. Her areas of expertise include trans-Atlantic relations, U.S. foreign policy toward Europe, French politics and foreign policy, the role of civil society in foreign policy, religion/secularism, and strategic prospective analysis. Prior to joining Brookings, she served for over five years as an advisor on U.S. affairs and trans-Atlantic relations in the French foreign ministry’s Centre d’Analyse, de Prévision et de Stratégie (policy planning staff). She taught U.S. foreign policy to master’s students at University Paris 2 and University of Saint-Denis. Previously, Belin was a guest fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and a visiting research scholar in the Middle East Institute at Columbia University. Belin holds a doctorate in political science (University Paris 2), a master’s degree in international relations (University Paris 2), and a bachelor’s degree in Modern Languages/Business (University of Burgundy). Antoine Coppolani is a professor of international history at the Université Paul Valéry (Montpellier III). He has published Richard Nixon (2013), Le temps des Kennedy (2005), and numerous articles on US foreign policy, international relations, and American political history. He is currently writing a book on the United States and the Arab–Israeli conflict.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 M. Quessard et al. (eds.), Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37258-3

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Samuel Denney is a Senior Research Assistant in the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution. He is also the 2019 Europe Fellow for Young Professionals in Foreign Policy. Prior to Brookings, he worked as an intern for the Europe Practice at the Albright Stonebridge Group, a geopolitical risk consultancy, in Washington, DC, for the European Union Affairs desk at the State Chancellery of North Rhine-Westphalia in Düsseldorf, and for the Bertelsmann Foundation in Washington, DC. He received an M.A. in German and European Studies from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in 2018 and a B.A. in German and European Studies from Vanderbilt University in 2014. Frédérick Gagnon is full professor, holder of the Raoul Dandurand Chair in Strategic and Diplomatic Studies and Director of the Center for United States Studies at the University of Québec in Montreal. He was Visiting Fulbright Chair at SUNY Plattsburgh and UC Berkeley (2014– 2015), Fulbright grantee at UMASS Amherst (2005), Visiting Scholar at the Canada Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and at the Center for American Politics and Citizenship of the University of Maryland (2006), and Visiting Scholar/Professor at the Center for Canadian-American Studies of Western Washington University (2008). He has published books on the U.S. Congress, U.S. Government, the impact of 9/11 on U.S. foreign policy, Hollywood movies and the U.S. national security state, and on the theories of U.S. foreign policy. His articles have appeared in journals such as Foreign Policy Analysis, Études internationales, Canadian Review of American Studies, European Review of American Studies, Québec Studies, and Politique américaine. David G. Haglund is a Professor of Political Studies at Queen’s University (Kingston, Ontario). His research focuses on trans-Atlantic security, and on American and Canadian international security policy. Among his books are Latin America and the Transformation of U.S. Strategic Thought, 1936–1940 (1984); Alliance Within the Alliance? FrancoGerman Military Cooperation and the European Pillar of Defense (1991); Will NATO Go East? The Debate Over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance (1996); The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century’s End (2000); Ethnic Diasporas and the Canada-United States Security Community: From the Civil War to Today (2015); and The US “Culture Wars” and the Anglo-American Special Relationship (2019). His

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current research project focuses on strategic culture and the France–US security and defense relationship. Frédéric Heurtebize is an associate professor of US history and politics at the University of Paris Nanterre. A former Fulbright visiting research associate at Georgetown University and at the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, he has published Le péril rouge, Washington face à l’eurocommunisme (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2014) and articles on US foreign policy and trans-Atlantic relations, including “Eurocommunism and the Contradictions of Superpower Détente,” Diplomatic History 41, no. 4 (2017); «Le GOP et la politique étrangère: vers un nouvel isolationnisme?», Politique américaine 29 (2017); “Washington’s Cold War Diplomacy in Italy in the 1970s,” Society 51, no. 5 (2014); and “The Union of the Left in France: A Threat to NATO? The View from Washington,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 9, no. 3 (2011). Maya Kandel is a member of the Policy Planning Staff, French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, in charge of the United States and Transatlantic relations, and Editor-in-chief of Les Carnets du CAPS. Maya Kandel is a French historian, an associate researcher at Université Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris 3, specialized in U.S. foreign policy and defense issues, U.S. Congress, and trans-Atlantic issues. From 2011 to 2016, Maya Kandel was the Program Director and Senior Researcher on the United States at the French Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM). A graduate of Sciences Po, Paris (Ph.D., M.A., B.A.) and of Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA, M.A. International Affairs), Dr. Kandel works on U.S. foreign policy, the role of Congress, and transAtlantic issues. She has written extensively on these subjects for academic as well as general public publications. Her recent work has also focused on U.S. policy and strategy on the African continent, and in particular U.S.–French military cooperation. Barbara Kunz is a researcher at IFSH, where she primarily works on European security and defense affairs. She mainly focuses on the various national approaches—in particular in Germany, France, and Northern Europe—and developments in relevant organizations, notably the European Union and NATO. Barbara Kunz studied political science and international relations at the Institut d’études politiques (Sciences Po) in Paris. She also holds a PhD from Stockholm University, awarded for a dissertation on US foreign policies toward Poland, Ukraine, and Belarus after

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the end of the cold war. In the context of her doctoral studies, she was a visiting fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations (SAIS/Johns Hopkins University) in Washington DC. Kevin Limonier is an associate professor (Maître de conférences) in geography and Slavic studies at the French Institute of Geopolitics (University of Paris 8), and an associate researcher at the Castex Chair of Cyberstrategy (Institute of Advanced Studies in National Defence, IHEDN). He is also head of the Observatory of the Russian-Speaking Cyberspace, a research unit dedicated to the post-soviet segment of the Digital Space as a new geopolitical and technical object of studies. Originally a specialist of innovation policies in USSR and contemporary Russia, his work now focuses on the history and the geography of the Russian cyberspace, and on the development of new methods of data collection and data visualization for mapping digital exchanges, borders, and conflicts in Eurasia. Kevin Parthenay is a full professor of Political Science at University of Tours (France). He is a Research Associate in the Political Observatory of Latin America and the Caribbean (OPALC/Sciences Po). His research interests focus on comparative regionalism (with a current project on staffing regional organizations in the Global South), Latin American foreign policies, Latin American and Caribbean multilateralism (with a current project on High Seas Regulation), and the quality of democracy in Central America. Between 2013 and 2019, he was deputy director of the Latin American Campus of Sciences Po. He recently published a book entitled A Political Sociology of Regionalisms: Perspectives for a Comparison (Palgrave, 2019). Marianne Péron-Doise is a Former French Navy Officer and is a Senior Researcher at Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire (IRSEM), Paris. Her work focuses on Northeast Asia security issues (Japan–Korean Peninsula) and global maritime security topics as emerging naval forces and key maritime theaters, such as the Horn of Africa, the Indian Ocean, the South and East China Sea, or the South Pacific. Marianne Péron-Doise is a graduate of the Institut d’études politiques, Aix-en-Provence. She also holds a Postgraduate research degree in Modern History. Marianne Peron-Doise was a Visiting Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo. She is a former auditor of the Centre for Advanced Studies on Modern Africa and Asia (CHEAM) and

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has occupied several senior positions on security issues in Asia-Pacific in the French Ministry of Defence, notably Head of the Asia-Pacific Department, Delegation for Strategic Affairs from 2007 to 2011. She was Political Adviser at the Allied Maritime Command in Northwood, UK, from 2012–2015. She is also a contributor for various journals and publications dealing with strategic and security issues. Maud Quessard is an associate professor of US Foreign Policy and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Strategic Research at the Paris Military School (IRSEM). She holds a Ph.D. from la Sorbonne University and graduated from Sciences Po. She is the author of several articles on US soft and smart power, and has recently published Guerres de l’information et stratégies d’influence: Propagande et diplomatie publique des Etats-Unis depuis la guerre froide (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2019), “Entertainment Diplomacy”, in T. Balzacq et al. (eds.), Understanding International Diplomacy (Palgrave, 2020), with David Haglund, “How the West Was One: America, France, and the Huntingtonian Reversal,” Orbis 62, no. 4 (2018), and with Céline Marangé, Les guerres de l’information à l’ère numérique (Paris: PUF, 2021). Gary J. Schmitt is a resident scholar in strategic studies at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) where he studies national security and longerterm strategic issues affecting America’s security at home and its ability to lead abroad. In addition, Dr. Schmitt directs AEI’s Program on American Citizenship, which focuses on constitutional and civic issues. Dr. Schmitt served as minority staff director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He was also executive director of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (then known as the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board). Before joining AEI, Dr. Schmitt was executive director of the Project for the New American Century. He is the author, coauthor, editor, and coeditor of many books. Dr. Schmitt has been published widely in the popular press, including, CNN.com, The Financial Times, FoxNews.com, The Hill, The Los Angeles Times, The National Interest, National Review Online, The New York Times, RealClearDefense, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, and The Weekly Standard, among others. His appearances on radio and television include ABC News, C-Span’s “Washington Journal,” Fox News, MSNBC’s “Hardball,” NBC News, and the “PBS NewsHour.” Dr. Schmitt has a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago and a B.A. in politics from the University of Dallas.

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Stephen Tankel is an assistant professor in the School of International Service at American University and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Dr. Tankel specializes in international security with a focus on terrorism and counterterrorism, political and military affairs in South Asia, the changing nature of alliances, and security cooperation. He has published widely on these topics and conducted field research in Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, India, Kenya, Lebanon, Pakistan, and the Balkans. Dr. Tankel is the author of numerous works, including With Us And Against Us: How America’s Partners Help and Hinder the War on Terror (Columbia University Press, 2018) and Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba (Oxford University Press, 2011). He is also a senior editor of the web magazine War on the Rocks, an associate editor of the Texas National Security Review, has been on the editorial boards of Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and a frequent media commentator. Dr. Tankel previously served as a Senior Advisor at the Department of Defense and frequently advises U.S. policymakers, practitioners, and members of the Intelligence Community. Amélie Zima is an ATER at Sciences Po, Paris (Temporary Lecturer and Research Fellow). She received her Ph.D. in 2015 and was awarded the best Ph.D. prize of the IHEDN (French Institute for High Defense Studies). Previously, she has been a CNRS postdoctoral fellow at the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM) and at the Ecole des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS). She was a doctoral fellow at CEFRES in Prague (French Center for Research in Social Sciences) and at the Polish Academy of Science. She has mainly lectured on European affairs and comparative politics at Sciences Po, Paris, Paris 1 PanthéonSorbonne University, and Paris-Nanterre University. Her research focuses on NATO, security policies of CEE countries, and memory issues. She recently published, D’ennemi à Allié: L’adhésion de la Hongrie, de la Pologne et de la République tchèque à l’Alliance atlantique 1989–1999 (Peter Lang, 2019).

Index

A Alliances, 151, 234, “America 126, 243,

1, 2, 6, 24, 27, 56, 126, 152, 171, 180, 209, 217, 235, 237 First”, 3, 9, 23, 76, 121, 130, 135, 169, 222, 225, 246

B Bilateralism, 24, 26, 134

C Canada, 5, 7, 11, 28, 91, 206, 207, 209, 210, 221, 225–227, 235, 239–254 China dream, 145, 147, 150 Counterterrorism, 9, 99–103, 105– 108, 110–112, 114, 116, 118, 119, 127–129, 132, 134, 248 Cybersecurity, 184–187 Cyberspace, 9, 10, 185–187, 189, 192–194, 197, 198

D Defense, 2, 29, 33, 36–41, 44–46, 49, 53, 54, 57, 59, 61, 62, 66, 70, 102, 121, 122, 124, 132, 134, 145, 154, 158, 173, 175, 177, 179–181, 188, 205, 209, 234 Defense industry, 64

E Economic coercion, 211 European Union (EU), 3, 5, 9, 39–44, 47, 48, 53, 54, 56, 58–60, 64, 67, 69, 70, 130, 205–208, 215, 216, 227, 242

F Foreign policy, 2, 3, 11, 16, 19, 25–27, 31, 55, 76, 82, 118, 121, 125, 150, 151, 203, 209–211, 213, 216–218, 233, 239, 247, 253 Free and open Indo-Pacific, 157, 160

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 M. Quessard et al. (eds.), Alliances and Power Politics in the Trump Era, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37258-3

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INDEX

G Great power competition, 4, 7, 9, 103, 121, 125, 127, 133 I Influence, 1, 6, 7, 10, 17, 31, 54, 55, 86, 113, 126, 148, 155–157, 183, 186, 192, 196–200, 205, 206, 210, 217, 222–224 International liberalism, 225 Iran, 5, 8, 9, 11, 76–78, 89–91, 93–96, 142, 170, 174, 185, 211–216, 250 Israel, 68, 75–82, 85–93, 95, 185 J Jacksonian, 8, 19–21 L Latin American countries (LAC), 222–224, 227, 228, 231, 235–238 Light footprint, 129, 132 M Middle East, 6, 7, 9, 29, 34, 75–79, 81–84, 86, 89, 90, 93, 96, 108, 110, 132–134, 149, 159, 203, 214, 240 Militarized, 107, 172, 189 Military cooperation, 7, 38, 58, 122, 171, 236 Multilateralism, 11, 19, 24, 26, 31, 134, 222, 224, 225, 227, 230, 231, 235, 237, 238 N Nationalism, 3, 19, 112, 115, 180, 240–242, 250–253

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 3, 11, 82, 206–209, 212, 222, 225–227, 241, 244, 245, 247, 249, 251, 253 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 2, 5–10, 27–30, 32, 33, 35–38, 42, 43, 45, 48, 53–58, 60–63, 66, 67, 70, 71, 92, 102, 164, 165, 169–171, 178–180, 199, 209, 248 Northeast Asia security, 10, 169, 180 North Korea, 143, 159, 167, 170–181, 213 Nuclear deterrence, 45, 48, 179

P Palestine, 79 Poland, United States, 8, 54 Power politics, 7

R Retreat, 9, 38, 205, 237 Revisionist power, 7, 9, 139 Russia, 5, 7–11, 35–38, 42, 44, 45, 56, 60, 65, 66, 70, 93, 94, 96, 125, 126, 133, 144, 161, 169, 170, 174, 176, 177, 183–190, 192, 193, 195, 197–199, 203, 213, 234, 236, 237

S Sahel, 9, 37, 38, 109, 121, 122, 124, 126, 130–132, 135 Sanctions, 9, 11, 93, 94, 170, 174, 177, 180, 204, 210–218, 233 Soft power, 152, 155, 193 South Korea, 2, 6, 154, 155, 164, 166, 167, 169–173, 175, 178–181, 227

INDEX

Strategic autonomy, 41, 43, 44, 47, 175 T Tariffs, 5, 6, 11, 34, 141, 159, 204, 206–210, 217, 218, 225, 230, 241–245, 249, 251 Trade, 1, 3, 5, 11, 126, 127, 139, 143, 145, 154–156, 159, 160, 171, 204–210, 212, 215–217, 221, 222, 225–228, 230, 231, 234, 239–244, 247–254 Trade wars, 5, 6, 207, 227, 232, 249, 250, 252 Transactional, 30, 34, 102 Transatlantic security, 8, 21, 33–37, 47, 49 Trudeau, Justin, 11, 240, 241, 244, 249 Trump, Donald J., 1–9, 11, 15–17, 19–21, 23–31, 33–36, 49, 54, 61, 62, 64–66, 75–88, 90–96, 99–107, 110–119, 122, 124–128, 130, 131, 133–135, 139, 140, 156, 158, 160, 161, 169, 170,

263

173–176, 183, 197, 203–213, 217, 218, 221, 222, 224–226, 229, 230, 232, 233, 236–238, 240–253 Trump foreign policy, 2, 11, 212, 225, 237

U Ultimate deal, 75, 83, 84, 87 US Alliances, 179 Use of force, 19, 106, 211

V Venezuela, 213, 228, 230–237

W White nationalist terrorism, 100, 111, 112, 116, 119 Wilsonianism, 24, 31

X Xi Jinping, 150, 245