Alliance in Decline: A Study of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23 1780935196, 9781780935195

Citation preview

ALLIANCE

IN DECLINE A study in Anglo-Japanese relations, 1908-23

This page intentionally left blank

ALLIANCE

IN DECLINE A study in Anglo-Japanese relations, 1908-23 Ian H. Nish

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC COLLECTIONS Japanese Politics and International Relations

B L O O M S B U R Y LONDON • NEW DELHI • NEW YORK • SYDNEY

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Pic 50 Bedford Square London WC1B3DP UK

1385 Broadway New York 10018 USA

www.bloomsbury.com First published in 1972 This edition published in 2012 by Bloomsbury Publishing pic © I a n Nish, 2012 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Ian Nish has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury Academic or the author. Bloomsbury Academic Collections ISSN 2051-0012 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: 9781780935195 (cloth) ISBN: 9781780933191 (Bloomsbury Academic Collections: Japanese Politics and International Relations) ENTIRE COLLECTION ISBN: 9781780933184 (Bloomsbury Academic Collections: Economics, Politics and History of Japan) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. Printed and Bound in Great Britain

For my mother and in memory of my father

This page intentionally left blank

FOREWORD THIS is primarily an account of the negotiations leading up to the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1911 and of the working relationship which linked the two countries until the alliance ended a decade later. During this period the alliance, from being a diplomatic instrument limited mainly to north-east Asia and aimed against Russia, developed into something which presented a major problem in the affairs of the southern and eastern Pacific area and consequently became a subject of deep political concern in the United States. The alliance had, as Professor A, L. P. Dennis wrote in the preface to his Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1922, become a part of American foreign relations and 'its disappearance is an important event in American diplomatic history*. The decade under discussion might therefore be described as 'the American phase of the alliance*. I have pleasure in acknowledging the gracious permission of Her Majesty the Queen to quote from the papers of King George V in the Royal Archives, Windsor. In addition, I wish to thank the Birmingham University Library for the use of the Chamberlain papers, the Mitchell Library, Sydney, for the Morrison papers, the National Maritime Museum for the Jerram papers, the Scottish Record Office for the Lothian papers and the Sterling Library, New Haven. To the staffs of these and other libraries I am grateful for their tolerance and helpfulness. My researches have once again been assisted by those mentioned in the Acknowledgements to my earlier volume on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1966). I have in addition benefited greatly from the help of new friends and colleagues, especially Professors Ikei Masaru, Matsuo Takayoshi, Tsuji Kiyoaki, Mr Hagihara Nobutoshi, Captain Malcolm Kennedy, Professor W. Roger Louis, Dr P. C. Lowe, Dr Fay Carter and Mrs Carol Wrattan. In the preparation of this study I have thrice visited the United States and Japan, being supported on the last occasion by a Hayter travel grant. Finally I would say to the staff of vii

viii

FOREWORD

the Athlone Press without fear of contradiction 'Go-kuro sama deshita'. London School of Economics and Political Science July 1971

I.H.N.

CONTENTS

I. ii. ill. iv. v. vi. vii. viii. ix. x. XL xii. xin. xiv. xv. xvi. xvn. xvin. xix. xx. xxi. xxii. xxiii.

Abbreviations Introduction The Alliance in its International Context, 1908-10 Manchuria, Korea and Arbitration, 1910 First Steps towards the Third Alliance The Imperial Conference and the Third Alliance The Aftermath of the Third Alliance The Alliance and South China, 1913-14 The Alliance and the German-Japanese War Anglo-Japanese Campaigns Marking Time in East Asia 'The Present Hollow Friendship' The Anglo-Japanese Secret Agreement, 1917 Effects of American Entry into the War Reversing the Flow, 1918 The Alliance and the End of the War The Alliance in the Year of the Peace-Making Brave New World in East Asia? The Alliance and the League of Nations The Alliance and the United States On the Eve of the Imperial Conference The Imperial Conference On the Eve of the Washington Conference The Washington Four-Power Treaty Prolonged Funeral Bibliographical note ix

ix i 15 28 45 60 81 99 115 132 158 178 196 212 229 249 263 277 288 305 319 333 354 368 383 398

CONTENTS

X

Select Bibliography Index

402 416 MAPS

The Japanese Empire in 1920 North-East Asia Tsingtao

2 16 114

ABBREVIATIONS AC ADM ED CAB CID DCER DBFP DDF FO FRUS Hayashi Memoirs INF Inoue fed-Jen JSL

Kato NGB NGB T. NGNB TSM AJ Pol Hist AHR EHR

Papers of Austen Chamberlain, deposited in the Birmingham University Library Admiralty records, deposited in the Public Record Office, London British documents on the origins of the war, 1898—1914 ed. G. P. Gooch and H. W. V. Temper-ley British cabinet papers, deposited in the Public Record Office, London Committee of Imperial Defence Documents on Canadian external relations Documents on British foreign policy, 1919—39 Documents diplomatiques fran$ais Foreign Office records, deposited in the Public Record Office, London Foreign relations of the United States Pooley, A.M. (ed.), The secret memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi Ministry of Information records, deposited in the Public Record Office, London Segai Inoue-ko den Japan Society of London Ito Masanori, Kato Takaaki Nihon gaiko bunsho (Japanese diplomatic documents) Nihon gaiko bunsho, Taisho period (1912-25) Nihon gaiko nempyo narabi ni shuyo bunsho (Chronology of foreign affairs of Japan and important documents) Taiheiyo senso e no michi (The road to the Pacific war) Australian Journal of Politics and History, Brisbane American Historical Review English Historical Review xi

Xll

ABBREVIATIONS

Historical Studies, Historical Studies, Australia and New Zealand, Melbourne ANZ Journal of Asian Studies JAS Journal of Modern History JMH Nikon gaikoshi kenkyu (Studies in Japanese diplomatic NGK history) Pacific Historical Review PHR Japanese names have been rendered with the surname or family name preceding the personal name in accordance with normal Japanese practice.

Introduction THE Anglo-Japanese alliance was signed in 1902 and revised in 1905. It was to be revised again in 1911 and to survive the first world war and the immediate post-war settlement. But, as a result of clamant criticisms, mainly from outside powers, the alliance came up for review at the time of the Washington conference in 1921 and was there replaced by the four-power treaty, by whose terms the alliance came to an end with the exchange of ratifications. Its end came in August 1923 after more than twenty-one years of existence, years of turmoil in the world at large and of rapid change in east Asia. This is a study of the alliance from the negotiation of the third treaty in 1911 until its end. This decade can appropriately be described as the period of 'the alliance in decline', a period of attrition from the high hopes of 1902. The decline cannot be traced to any one incident nor can it be said to have been completely irreversible. Disharmony was visible in the relations between the two countries at all levels; but it was especially to be observed in differences of policy over China, which led to positive hostility. The alliance also declined in reputation: whereas it had been welcomed in 1902 as a development of the Open Door doctrine, it gradually acquired a bad name as a cloak for Japan's acquisitive policy on the Asian continent and was roundly condemned in the United States. But, even if discordant notes were sounded, both sides recognized that there was still definite value in the alliance. It was a question, therefore, of balancing its advantages, particularly for Britain the naval ones, with its increasing unpopularity in world opinion. In the outcome, the two governments were prepared to renew the alliance for ten years in 1911 and were even slow to give it up, despite international pressure, in 1921. So the story is one of decline, disappointment and disillusion rather than one of abrupt disruption. It is necessary to look first at some of the factors which affected the formulation of policy in Japan and Britain after 1908.

2

INTRODUCTION

The Japanese Empire in 1920

INTRODUCTION

3

DIPLOMACY IN JAPAN

Japan's policy towards Britain was influenced by the peculiar methods by which it was formed. The role of the prime ministers was as important in diplomacy as that of the foreign ministers because the latter were invariably career diplomats, recalled from abroad for the ministry. The cabinet was a rubber-stamp for the policies which they jointly worked out.1 The foreign minister was generally handicapped by having spent long periods abroad and was very often the voice of the Foreign Ministry bureaucrats. At this period most of the senior men in the Foreign Ministry had seen service in the London embassy, which was still the most sought-after overseas posting. In general, trainees went first to London to learn the language and few of the upand-coming men had not done so. They often returned later to London at a formative stage of their career to see diplomacy in the key capital of the western world. Things changed gradually as the highpoint of service abroad came to be China, the place where the ambitious young men were more likely to score a success; but this change did not take place until the 19205. For the period of this study the London embassy commanded ambassadors of the highest calibre and was the summit of ambition in the service. This had the side-effect that many of her bureaucrats tended to be wedded to a pro-alliance policy. By the period 1910 to 1920 when the Foreign Ministry had existed forty years, the influence of its foreign advisers on policy was not marked. Henry W. Denison lived on till 1914; but, while he was active in drafting treaties and was a frequent councillor to young officials like Shidehara, he did not lay down lines of high policy which was left to the Japanese.2 This was an indication of the degree of Japan's modernization and independence. She was at a different stage of development from China which still had a large staff of foreign advisers though even they were not much consulted by the Chinese leaders. Certainly the genro or Elder Statesmen continued to have an influence on policy-making throughout the span of this study; but certain reservations have to be made. Ito died at the hands of a Korean assassin in 1909; Matsukata and Oyama were too elderly to be active. 1 On the limitations mposed by the need to consult the Gaiko chosakai (1917-21), see below, p. 200. 2 On the earlier career of Denison, see Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance^ London, 1966 (hereafter cited as Nish), p. 172; Shldehara Kijuro, Tokyo, 1955, pp. 53-60; Umetani Noboru, O-yatol gaikokujin, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 105-12.

4

INTRODUCTION

This left Yamagata and Inoue, both of whom were to have their effect on policy towards Britain. Prince Katsura was sometimes spoken of as being an 'informal genro' of the second generation in the years immediately before his death in 1913; but his political power came from his personal prestige rather than his status as a member of this influential group. So the power of the Elder Statesmen was mainly exercised by Yamagata who with remarkable stamina remained an active manipulator of affairs down to his death in 1922. But the genro as an institution and as a group was dying by the natural process of decay; 3 and Yamagata's authority stemmed from his clan connections and military rank and the fact that most of the active political leaders of the day were either his proteges (e.g. General Terauchi Masatake) or bound to him by some personal understanding (e.g. Hara Kei or Okuma Shigenobu). Because of their advanced age, the genro did not allow themselves to become involved in the routine of administration; they intervened occasionally when an issue of high policy arose. When crises developed, as over Japan's entry into the Great War in 1914, they interfered to some effect; but they did not always succeed in overturning the decision of the cabinet. It is therefore a misunderstanding to speak of Japan as a genr5-dominated society. It is wiser to see Yamagata, and to a lesser extent Inoue, making sporadic sorties into the realm of policy-making and forcing the cabinet to take cognizance of their views. It was not that they were called upon but rather that they took the initiative. Their interventions were private and secret; and little leaked out about them except what journalists could deduce from the sudden appearance of the Elder Statesmen in Tokyo when some crisis had developed. Nor were their actions necessarily sinister: they interfered as often as not in the interest of cautious diplomacy and internal stability.4 Part at least of the power of the genr5 came from their function of advising the emperor on the choice of a future prime minister or on general affairs of state. It is, therefore, germane to ask whether the emperor had much impact on foreign affairs. This study begins at the tail-end of the reign of the Emperor Meiji (1868-1912) and covers 3 The genro are usually understood to have consisted of Matsukata Masayoshi, 183 5— 1924; Ito Hirobumi, 1841-1909; Saigo Tsugumichi, 1843-1902; Inoue Kaoru, 18361915; Oyama Iwao, 1842-1916; Yamagata Aritomo, 1838-1922; and (later) Saionji Kimmochi, 1849-1940, and Katsura Taro, 1848-1913. 4 B. S. Silberman, 'Bureaucratic development and the structure of decision-making in the Meiji period', Journal of Asian Studies (hereafter cited as/^5), 27 (1967), 81-94*

INTRODUCTION

5

most of the reign of the Emperor TaishS (1912-26). These emperors certainly presided over the Imperial Council when important decisions such as entry to the war were reported; but the proceedings were formal and it is not thought that the emperor expressed positive views. When the Emperor Meiji died, the British ambassador wrote that he had guided deliberations on all important state matters and especially had played a decisive role in the making of the first alliance in 1901 by choosing to back the cabinet against the delay advocated by It5.5 But such occasions were rare. Moreover, the Emperor Taisho lacked the experience and seniority of his father and, being temperamentally unstable, he was secluded from public gaze. So there are no significant interventions by the throne or the court in our story. It is not possible to speak with equal certainty about the power of the army and navy. Certainly, down to the Washington conference the navy was much more pro-British than the army and never contemplated Britain as the potential foe. Certainly, the army was active throughout the period 1910 to 1920 in the conduct of China policy. What is not so easy to establish is the role that the services played in major diplomatic decisions on a world basis. There are important casestudies, like those of Professors Hosoya and Morley on the Siberian intervention, which indicate how vital was the role they played in this specific issue. But it is uncertain how representative this case was. The army's attitude towards entry into the European war is not completely clear, but obviously, through the important place which the army and navy ministers had in the cabinet, they were able to make their views known on such issues as whether Japanese troops should be sent to the western front between 1914 and 1918. It was possible in my earlier study to ignore the effect of public opinion. This is less so after 1908. This was a time when the political parties were trying to exploit the resources of the Diet in order to have some say over foreign policy. It is the start of a period which may be described as 'Taisho democracy' when ministries could in part be party ministries, as in the case of those led by Yamamoto and Okuma (1913 and 1914 respectively); but, interlarded with them were the 'transcendental ministries', whose policies 'transcended' party divisions. This did not mean that the predominant parties of the day, Seiyukai, Kenseikai or Doshikai, were invariably divided on the 5

Foreign Office records deposited in the Public Record Office, London (hereafter cited as FO), 371/1391 [38857], MacDonald to Grey, 28 August 1912.

6

INTRODUCTION

general lines of foreign policy, though opposition parties used crises such as that of 1915 over China policy to indicate their divergences. Nor should it be assumed that politicians in the Diet were consulted over issues in advance. But they did have the power to ask awkward questions and to call on the foreign minister to answer. It was possible for him to side-step inconvenient interpellations; but the fact remains that the Diet in the Taisho period could be a valuable corrective to the purely bureaucratic formulation of policy. Nor should one rule out the power of the press. From 1905 there was an active journalism of dissent, associated with the Heimin Shimbun and the attack on the Portsmouth settlement of that year. This was found not so much in the main newspapers as in the smaller provincial ones, which were often associated with opposition parties. It was also seen in periodicals like Child Koron and Tqyo Kei^al Shimbun^ which looked critically at prevailing lines of policy, even if more on domestic than on foreign affairs. Not least among these voices of dissent were the socialists like Katayama Sen and Kotoku Denjiro (Shusui) who were not slow to question traditional policies.6 The journalism of dissent was to have a bearing on Anglo-Japanese relations during the Great War, when there were many stern Japanese critics of Britain's performance.

BRITAIN'S FAR EASTERN POLICY The continuity of Japan's policy towards Britain came from the fact that, but for a small minority, the Japanese saw the alliance as being to their advantage. The continuity of British policy towards Japan derived from the fact that from 1905 to 1916 foreign policy was in the hands of a single, hard-working and perceptive minister. It is possible to criticize Sir Edward Grey in other aspects of his policy for his wishful thinking and for seeing issues too much in black and white terms. These criticisms do not apply with equal force to his far eastern policy where he had a realistic view of Japanese ambitions. He had adopted the Japanese alliance as the policy handed down by his predecessor, Lord Lansdowne. This did not mean that he was pro-Japanese for in the last resort the existence of an alliance between countries does not 6 Matsuo Takayoshi, Taisho demokurashii no kenkyu, Tokyo, 1966; Sugiyama Chuhei, *The development of economic thought in Meiji Japan*, Modern Asian Studies, 2 (1968), 325-41.

INTRODUCTION

7

imply the existence of unbounded friendship between them. The alliance was an agreement of convenience; and it continued to suit British interests. Grey's basic thinking was that Japan was an ambitious and expanding nation but that Britain had nothing to fear from her so long as the alliance continued. This is clear from his remarks in 1911: I do not think there is the least chance of a quarrel with Japan, because I am quite convinced that the Japanese policy —her whole arrangements with Canada show it and I find it in every way — is to concentrate her people in Korea and Manchuria and the parts neighbouring to herself in the Far East, and she does not want to encourage them to go abroad, though she has some difficulty in preventing them. There will never be a quarrel between Japan and the United States out of any attempt of Japan to settle herself on the American side of the Pacific Ocean; that being so, I am quite sure there will not be trouble.?

This was the basic approach which made Grey fairly tolerant towards Japan's policy in China: Japan could not be deprived of opportunities everywhere and might reasonably claim to expand in China.8 And there is reason to believe that his successors, A. J. Balfour and Lord Curzon, thought likewise. They were, to be sure, dissatisfied with Japan's methods but were not intolerant of her more moderate aims. The foreign secretary had behind him the specialized skill of the far eastern department. The detailed minutes which even quite junior members of the department endorsed on the files after 1906 certainly had their influence. The heads of the department were specialists who carried with them long experience of its working. It is possible to argue that Sir Francis Campbell and after his death in December 1911 Sir Walter Langley were Europe-oriented never having seen service in the east or indeed abroad. It was not until Sir Ronald Macleay became head in 1916 that a person with such experience rose to be assistant under-secretary.9 Despite this, ministers were well served by the department. 7

Cabinet papers (hereafter cited as CAB) 2/2/2, Grey to mth meeting, C.I.D., 26 May 1911. 8 Austen Chamberlain papers (hereafter cited as AC) 26, Balfour to the cabinet, 30 May 1921. 9 During the 19105, Lampson, Alston, Bax-Ironside, Max Muller, Ashton-Gwatkin joined the department in junior positions and imported into their minutes the more authentic atmosphere of the orient. Perhaps more by coincidence than by design, the Peking legation was better represented on the Whitehall staff than the Tokyo embassy and this may have had some effect on British policy after 1919.

8

INTRODUCTION

In Tokyo and Peking there was quite remarkable continuity. Britain was represented in Japan by Sir Claude MacDonald (1900-12) and by Sir Conyngham Greene (1913-19) while in China Sir John Jordan was minister from 1906 to 1920. This gave a tremendous strength to British diplomacy in a period of crisis in the area. Though Peking only qualified as a legation, the calibre of Sir John Jordan was quite exceptional: in his knowledge of Chinese, his skill in negotiation and his personal acquaintance with successive Chinese leaders.10 His experience of Chinese problems was unrivalled. He had a reputation for being diffident about expressing opinions to London but, when he did come to a decision, it was authoritative. MacDonald and Greene did not possess the same deep knowledge, but they were competent and judicious officials.11 One must add that the advice given from Peking was often diametrically opposed to that from Tokyo, especially over Japan's doings in China. This was to be a recurring feature in the 19203 and 19303. Grey was, on the whole, ready to accept the advice of the man on the spot and certainly valued the verdicts of Jordan. But there were of course many occasions when British policy stemmed not from local considerations in Peking or Tokyo but from wider world considerations. This was especially true over matters of high policy, such as the Anglo-Japanese alliance, where naval questions had to be taken into account. Communication with the far east was comparatively difficult in our period. It was not easy for Whitehall to double-check its views on policy by recalling the diplomat to hear his impressions. The transSiberian railway reduced the travelling time to a fortnight; and its facilities had greatly improved by the years after 1910. But this route became unreliable and slow with the coming of the Great War and impossible after 1917. There were delays too on the Suez and American routes during the war. In the circumstances, Jordan found it best 'to trust largely to telegrams and to make the written word as colourless 10

This estimate of Jordan is confirmed by Lau Kit-ching, 'Sir John Jordan and the affairs of China, 1906-16', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 1968. 11 For a character sketch of MacDonald, see Nish, p. 146. By 1910 MacDonald was being attacked in financial circles for not defending British interests with enough energy but the Foreign Office renewed his appointment for two years. See G. A. Lensen (ed.), D'Anethan dispatches from Japan, 1894—1910^ Tokyo, 1967, p. 255. It was widely believe. that MacDonald had 'quite a different position in the eyes of the Japanese to any other foreign Ambassador or Minister here* (Royal Archives, AA 43, Prince Arthur of Connaught (Tokyo) to King George V, 19 September 1912).

INTRODUCTION

9

as possible'.12 Thus, the telegraph which had been sparingly used in the pre-war period on grounds of expense was established as the prime means of communication and continued so after the war. It was by this means too that westerners in the east were kept in touch with the progress of the war; and one observer described himself as being well-informed on the state of hostilities from 'the admirable telegraph service'.13 Of course, seamail despatches and private letters continued but only minor or bulky matters were relegated to the despatches after 1914 and the number of private letters from British representatives in Peking and Tokyo which had earlier helped so much in shaping policy was seriously reduced. Indeed, during the war> they were hardly sent unless they were carried by safe hand. While on the one hand the effect of the war was to push the Foreign Office into the twentieth century by forcing it to rely more on the telegraph, it did on the other impede the exchange of confidential information between diplomats and officials. The increase in the number of permanent correspondents in the far east kept the diplomats on their toes. By 1910 most of the British dailies had more or less full-time newsmen in the area, able to interview the local leaders and available to be influenced by them. The Times was in the lead and had a correspondent of world stature in China until 1912 in person of Dr Ernest Morrison. From 1905 onwards Morrison's sympathies became increasingly anti-Japanese, whereas the Tokyo correspondent until 1912, Captain Frank Brinkley, was pro-Japanese. Such was the reputation of the paper and the need felt by the Japanese to win it over that they invited the foreign editor, Valentine Chirol, to tour Japan, Korea and Manchuria in 1909. Morrison was specially asked to accompany him and he reluctantly did so. Whereas Chirol in his despatches was inclined to praise Japanese railway enterprise in Manchuria, Morrison continued to be sullenly hostile and to write against the Japanese alliance.14 The Japanese obviously considered that anti-Japanese feeling was deeprooted in the British press and that they should go to some trouble to woo the specialist writers involved. During the Great War it was deemed necessary to avoid publishing 12 FO 800/31, Jordan to Langley, 15 February 1915. 13 G. E. Morrison papers, deposited in the Mitchell library, Sydney (hereafter cited as Morrison papers), 104, Morrison to Dr Prothero, i December 1915. 14 I have dealt with this tour of inspection in *Dr G. E. Morrison and Japan', Journal of the Oriental Society of Australia, 2 (1963), 42-7.

io

INTRODUCTION

items which showed the Japanese in a poor light and might ruffle their feelings. In some instances, The Times declined out of a sense of journalistic responsibility and a desire to 'protect the national interest' to publish certain reports. Thus it withheld the text of the Twenty-one Demands in 1915 when it was first received in London from a Chinese source, though its authenticity was later established. It was the Manchester Guardian which led the way in publishing this message which was so damaging to Japan's reputation.15 Whether this was government censorship of the press in the interest of the Japanese alliance or a matter of editorial policy on the part of Printing House Square is difficult to establish but in either event it gave Chinese sympathizers grounds for complaint. COMMERCE AND LOANS

Economic factors were not a cause of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Neither side was primarily motivated by hopes of improving the trade between Britain and Japan or, indeed, between Japan and the British empire. Sir Ernest Satow reminded Grey that Britain 'must not be under any illusion as to the alliance being of an economic advantage to us'.16 This prediction was to prove all too accurate. The succeeding decade was to show that Japan could not expand her trade without encroaching on existing British trade preserves. That the two countries were natural competitors was clear particularly in two main areas: China and India. While British exports to China remained almost static by value between 1890 and 1913 (the last representative year before the war), Japanese exports expanded almost thirteen-fold.17 This was not quite so alarming for Britain as it might appear since Japan's main expansion was in Manchuria; but the question was how long it could be before Japanese commerce clashed seriously with British interests in the Yangtse area. Meanwhile there had been by 1914 a steep rise in the trade between Japan and India; but what irritated the Government of India was that the Japanese shipping line, Nihon Yusen Kaisha, enjoyed rights in the Indian coastal trade, whereas British companies were excluded from the Japanese coastal trade. 15

Morrison papers 104, Morrison to Alison (The Times), 17 November 1915, in which Morrison says that the Manchester Guardian was later assisted by the Chinese government to bring out a China supplement. 16 FO 800/43, Satow to Grey, 31 March 1906. 17 Kajima Morinosuke, Nichi-Ei gaikoshi, Tokyo, 1957, pp. 455-6.

INTRODUCTION

n

Moreover, there were suspicions that N.Y.K. received a large subsidy from its government which its British competitors did not. Thus there were prospects of acute rivalry in the near future. The quantity of direct Anglo-Japanese trade was not insignificant. While the leading market for Japan's exports was the United States, followed by China, France, Britain, Hong Kong and India, Britain and India were the leading importers into Japan down to 1914. The world depression brought about a reduction of Japanese trade in 1908-9; but the figures below are still fairly representative of trends in the prewar period. Japan's trade (in thousand yen) Country

Exports

Britain Hong Kong British India Straits Settlements Total United States All countries

Imports

1898

1909

1898

1909

11,270 34,291

27,092 21,675 14,425 5,661

44,836 7,338

86,227 628

51,623

68,853

96,057

154,984

63,919 214,929

131,547 413,112

38,215 220,401

54,043 394,198

6,062

43,883

65,157

2,972

Source: Department of Commerce, Tokyo (adapted).18

That there were hopes of expanding this trade was shown in the Anglo-Japanese exhibition of 1910. After the Japanese government postponed to 1917 the grand exhibition which was originally arranged for 1912, it adopted an alternative proposal to hold an exhibition in London. A bill appropriating a larger amount than Japan had spent before on such a project was approved by the Diet without a dissenting vote. In a burst of publicity the exhibition was opened in the White City, London, in May in the presence of the royal family and of Prince Fushimi of Japan and remained open until October. Although it was privately organized on the British side, the Japanese government 18

The Japanese Empire, a reprint of The Times Japanese edition, 19 July 1910, London, 1910, pp. 40-1.

12

INTRODUCTION

treated it as a state enterprise.19 Not unexpectedly it went far beyond the ordinary industrial exhibits, by including stands for the army and navy. Sections on Japan's overseas expansion, covering her rule in Taiwan, Korea (though the peninsula had not been annexed at the time of the exhibition) and Kwantung, were accommodated in what was oddly described as 'the Palace of the Orient'. The whole was on a lavish scale and was unquestionably intended to be a shop-window for Japan: it would set out unblushingly her industrial achievements, emphasize her standing as a civilized state and suggest her aspirations for the future.20 Its unspoken motto might have been 'intimations of imperialism' and, in a country like Britain where such intimations were presumably expected to be acceptable, the message was received without the batting of an eye-lid. The exhibition was widely held to be a failure. The organizers on both sides denied this on the ground that it did develop important trading links between the two countries.21 But it did not result in a marked increase in trade as the statistics for 1913, the last full year before the coming of the war, show. Perhaps the prime objective of the Japanese was political rather than commercial: to demonstrate to their ally what a modernized society and what a great power Japan had become. Certainly no expense was spared in issuing publicity. There was a special supplement to The Times, lavishly illustrated and expensively produced, towards which the Japanese exchequer was understood to have contributed over £3000 and which probably cost £10,000. There were colossal entertainments and elaborate garden parties. One commentator observed that pro-Japanese sentiments in Britain were 'never more pronouncedly shown than during the AngloJapanese Exhibition'.22 Indeed it seems to have been intended to recapture some of the enthusiasm for the Japanese alliance which had been waning since 1905. The alliance — and perhaps the exhibition also — created a willingness among private financiers to invest in Japan. One such venture was the setting up as a result of Admiral Yamamoto's visit to Britain in 1907 of the Muroran armaments factory in Hokkaido. While half the capital was put up by the Hokkaido Tanko company, the other half 19

Yoshizawa Kenkichi, Gaiko 6o-nen, Tokyo, 1958, pp. 48-9. The Times, Japanese edition, 19 July 1910. 21 Japan Weekly Mail, 4 March 1911. 22 Gaimusho no loo-nen, i, Tokyo, 1969, 583-4; C. Pearl, Morrison of Peking, Sydney, 1967, p. 214. 20

INTRODUCTION

13

was supplied jointly by Armstrongs and Vickers Sons & Maxim. Although the factory received orders from the navy, it was not patronized by the army and had difficulty in making ends meet.2^ After 1905 Japan was more ready to canvass for large foreign loans. In August 1906 when Japan was still enjoying a post-war boom, she sent Takahashi Korekiyo again to Europe with the stated object of floating a sterling loan at 4 per cent.24 He found the City of London disinclined to lend because of Japan's already heavy borrowings and France reluctant unless she received certain political concessions. It was only in March 1907 that a loan of £23 million was concluded at 5 per cent, jointly in London and Paris. The terms caused wide-spread disappointment in the Japanese press; but the government took the view that they were not unfair in view of the depression in Europe.25 Funds were also needed for the semi-nationalized south Manchurian railway company, and a mission visited Europe in the summer of 1907. The first debenture issue of £4 million, guaranteed by the Japanese government, was made in London in July 1907, being followed by a second instalment of £2 million in June 1908 and a third of £2 million in December.26 Depression struck Japan in 1907, and the government was forced to resort to severe retrenchment measures in the following year. This included a policy of 'no more loans for the present' and of paying off existing debts.27 Though there were a few municipal and colonial loans issued, there was no government loan issued until May 1910 when the economic situation had improved and Japan undertook a major conversion of the existing loans at 5 per cent. Simultaneously with an issue of 4 per cent franc bonds in Paris, the Japanese government issued in London £10 million in 4 per cent sterling bonds. But it realized only £8 million, the remainder being 23

FO 371/1140 [49453], Colonel Somerville to MacDonald, 26 October 1911; FO 371/477 [43689], Sir A. Noble to Grey, n December 1908. J. D. Scott, Vickers^ London, 1962, pp. 84-5, 252, shows that, after the ending of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the Japanese government refused to renew the licence and Vickers* connection with the enterprise ended. 24 Nihon gaiko bunsho. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo (hereafter cited as NGB) 39/11, no 363; Takahashi Korekiyo, Takahashi Korekiyo jiden, Tokyo, 1936, pp. 787-93. Takahashi was a prominent official of the Bank of Japan. 25 FO 371/2711, Hong Kong Bank to Campbell (F.O.), 4 April 1907. 26 T. Akashi and N. Suzuki, Nihon Kinyushi^ Tokyo, 1957, i, 242. 27 CAB 38/15/19, memorandum by E. G. Harman (Treasury), 'Finances of Japan, 1909', 8 November 1909.

i4

INTRODUCTION

left in the hands of the underwriters* Despite this setback, the south Manchurian railway company succeeded in issuing a loan of £6 million at 4^ per cent in January 1911 and found that it was oversubscribed.2® A number of municipal and railway loans were concluded in London and Paris in succeeding years. With the start of the European war, Japan accumulated large balances overseas and gradually became a lending, rather than a borrowing, power, most of her investments being channelled to China. Clearly these loans were an index of co-operation between the two countries, which has significance for their political relationships. It is safe to say that British financiers were not uninfluenced by the existence of the alliance, which was a guarantee of stability in the far east and gave them some security for their money. But these loans were much more influenced by pure considerations of the market, namely, the extent of Japan's borrowing and the state of international finance. Nor can it be proved that the British government exerted pressure in favour of lending to Japan or even smoothed the passage of the loans. Grey was probably justified in claiming that British financiers were Very independent, and it was not in the power of the Government to influence them to any great extent'.29 28

Akashi and Suzuki, p. 242. 29 FO 371/87 [39825], Grey to F. Bertie (Paris), 23 November 1906.

CHAPTER I

The Alliance in its International Context, 1908-10 THE alliance in its declining years was no longer purely a selfcontained, bilateral partnership between Britain and Japan. On the one hand, both of the partners were, after the Russo-Japanese war, increasingly looking over their shoulders at the United States, which was becoming more and more open in her criticisms of Japan: the story of the alliance had become — and was to remain until 1921 — part of the broader story of a triangular relationship with the United States. On the other hand, the alliance became after 1907 part of a complicated system of international treaties with France and Russia. While those in which Japan took part were primarily concerned with east Asia, they had important implications for global politics. Before beginning our detailed examination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance as it stood in 1910, we must endeavour to set the alliance within the context of far eastern international relations after 1908. What divided the powers most was the problem of China, and especially Manchuria.1 CHINA AND THE POWERS

The first alliance had grown out of the uncertainties over China, Manchuria, and to a lesser extent Korea in 1901. Uncertainties over China and Manchuria were still prominent in the minds of statesmen at the end of the decade. China had been gravely weakened in the Boxer disturbances and had been saddled with a burden of reparations in the aftermath. There was no longer the prospect of outright annexation of her territory, but the Chinese saw the railway and loan policies of the powers as a more subtle form of intrusion. Nationalist groups called 1

The best account of international relations in the far east between 1905 and 1913 is Tsunoda Jun, Manshu mondal to kokubo hoshin, Tokyo, 1967. 15

North East Asia

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, 1908-10

17

for opposition to this intrusion and for the creation of a strong centralized state, if necessary by overturning the Manchu government. The Manchus, for their part, embarked on a large number of fundamental reforms in the field of education, suppression of opiumsmoking and encouragement of Chinese commerce. Well-intentioned and idealistic as these were, they did not satisfy the opposition and only served to excite further resistance in the provinces. The powers had always had difficulty in organizing a common front for dealing with China, but from 1910 some of them agreed to channel their loans to the Manchu government through an international consortium, consisting of France, Germany, the United States and Britain. Although Russia and Japan were excluded as powers which did not have funds available for investment in this way, Manchuria was commercially dominated by these two countries after 1905. If the powers were to apply Open Door principles there, they would have to break this effective international monopoly of those in situ, especially the Japanese. The semi-nationalized south Manchurian railway company had made a slow start partly because of Japan's financial weakness — which forced her to borrow abroad for much of the capital of the company — and partly because of the under-developed economy of the area. The Antung-Mukden line had been only a military line in 1905 and had to be constructed afresh. It was not connected effectively with Korea until the bridge over the Yalu river was opened to traffic in November 1911. Moreover, for all the qualities of the Japanese as administrators, they failed to encourage migration to the area. So Japan's progress in south Manchuria was initially slow; and, in the eyes of many Japanese, the area was still vulnerable to foreign intrusion.2 China and the other powers were unaware of Japan's disappointment at this slow progress and viewed Japan's action as a gradual and systematic attempt to dominate the commerce of Manchuria. As a testcase, China in November 1907 made arrangements with the British firm of railway contractors, Pauling & Company, to construct a short line from Hsinmintung to Fakumen, about fifty miles from the railway junction of Mukden. Japan protested that it violated assurances she had received from China in 1905. Britain was confronted with the choice of supporting the British contractor or upholding the rights of 2 Kungdu C. Sun, The first twenty-years of Manchurian development, Cambridge, Mass., 1969. See also Tsurumi Yusuke, Goto Shimpei, Tokyo, 1937, Hi, for Goto's years as president of the south Manchurian railway company.

i8

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, 1908-10

her ally. Foreign Secretary Grey decided that the contractor could only receive his support if it proved that the line would not compete with the Japanese. Since this could not be done, he told his representative not to sponsor this commercial venture since 'the proposed Chinese line would give rise to unfair competition5.3 Grey had shown that, even if it meant sacrificing British interests, he would not be a party to any scheme with political overtones Vhich would depreciate the value of the Japanese section of the Railway, the only asset of commercial value which the Japanese gained by their war with Russia'. This was to be an important, and a politically awkward, precedent for Britain in the future.4 Britain rejected the view that China was on the point of breaking up and that this was a process which Japan's activities in Manchuria were accelerating.5 INTERNATIONAL

RAMIFICATIONS

When we turn to look at the alliance in the wider context, Britain had had treaty arrangements with France since 1904 and Russia since 1907. Despite the colonial origins of the French treaties, they were working well and need not detain us. The Anglo-Russian agreements of 1907 are more difficult to interpret. Britain entered into them as a means of taking the 'defence of India' out of British politics. To some extent this strategy succeeded: Foreign Ministers Izvolskii and Sazonov claimed that it was their chief object to maintain good relations. But India continued to protest against Russian activities in Persia and in 1911-12 Grey had to make sharp protests about the movement of Russian troops there. As late as July 1914, Grey complained that Russia was expanding into southern Persia and not fulfilling her side of the original bargain.6 The shortcomings of the Anglo-Russian agreements in British eyes were not properly understood by Japan whose cabinet endorsed a memorandum on the country's foreign policy in September 1908. One part of the resolution dealt with Japan's attitude towards foreign countries, especially Britain: The Anglo-Japanese alliance is the marrow of Japan's foreign policy. Since 3

British documents on the origins of the war, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and H. W. V. Temperley, London, 1926-38 (hereafter cited as BU), viii, nos. 349-50. 4 J. A. White, The diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese war, Princeton, 1964, pp. 339-41. 6 5 BD, viii, no. 380. FO 800/74 (Grey), Buchanan to Grey, 18 April 1912.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, 1908-10

19

the conclusion of the second alliance, there have been substantial changes in the diplomatic relations of European countries. In particular there were the Anglo-Russian and Russo-Japanese agreements of last year. Although this added a significant new fact to international relations, it only means that the maintenance of peace which is the object of the alliance will have to be accomplished by the two agreements between Britain and Russia and between Japan and Russia. This may bring about important changes in the relationship between the powers in future. But, to the extent that there is no change in the situation between Britain and Germany, we believe that there is no danger of any major change in the real strength of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.7

But there were differences of degree between Japan's commitments to Britain and to Russia. Elsewhere in the resolution quoted above, the cabinet spoke of the situation 'if by any chance* relations with Russia became more dangerous, while the army in its defence plans continued to urge rearmament in preparation for a war of revenge from Russia and identified Russia as a potential enemy. As late as February 1914, the influential Major-general Tanaka Giichi wrote, 'on the very day we observe a direct handshake between Russia and Britain, the AngloJapanese alliance becomes a dead letter'. He concluded that Japan must try to impede as far as possible any co-operation between Britain and Russia for the sake of preserving peace in the east and maintaining the spirit of the British alliance.8 Britain's worries over Russia related to the Persian gulf; Japan's to the far east. It is a common belief that Russia ceased to be actively interested in the far east after 1905 and in effect withdrew from the area. Certainly under Izvolskii and Sazonov there was no wish to fight a war of revenge with Japan nor were the funds available, but the evidence suggests that Russia never in practice withdrew. She continued to maintain and expand her railway; she sent large numbers of emigrants to populate the zone; her politicians like Kokovtsev and Stolypin paid important visits of inspection to Siberia and north Manchuria. There were rumours in 1909 of Russia increasing her forces in the east by about 30,000 men; and the Foreign Office was told that such increases had been under discussion. Grey had no doubt Japan was 7 Nikon gaiko nempyo narabi ni shuyo bunsho, 2 vols., Tokyo, 1955 (hereafter cited as NGNE), i, Bunsho, 305. 8 Tanaka Giichi den, 3 vols., Tokyo, 1958, i, 572-3. Part of a long memorandum by Tanaka, 'Mammo ni okeru Rokoku no Kodo* (Russia's actions in Manchuria and Mongolia).

20

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, 1908-10

'afraid of a Russian revanche and is preparing for contingencies'.9 The Russian defeat had not lessened border friction. It was in 1912 with the appointment of a new Russian minister to Peking, V. N. Krupenskii, that Russia launched her expansion policy in Mongolia 'which brought such brilliant results'. But the new policy was thoroughly deplored by Russia's minister in Tokyo, N. N. Malevskii-Malevich, who found that it hindered his dealings with Japan merely in order to capitalize on the chaos caused on the periphery of China by the revolution there. *o As Grey imagined, the Japanese were still highly suspicious of the Russians. Tokutomi Roka (father ofSoho) went to Russia in 1906 and found the country remarkably unaffected by the war, compared to Japan which had been crippled by it. Japan not surprisingly considered it to her advantage to enter into a treaty with Russia defining spheres of interest in Manchuria and eliminating the causes of conflict between them.11 The agreement of 1907 was one of convenience and not of trust. Britain had no objection to Japan's association with Russia so there was everything to be said in its favour. Its significance, however, should not be exaggerated. It was not the swing of the pendulum diverting Russia's interest back to Europe and the middle east. It did not permit Japan to relax her vigilance over Russian activities in east Asia, which continued to be treated as a threat right down to the end of the tsarist government. The balance of power was not vitally affected.12 Japan's arrangement of convenience with Russia emphasized two dimensions of Japan's position: as a world power and as a power active in parts of China. These were naturally related but there were seeming contradictions. On the world stage, she was the loyal partner of Britain: this was the result of the 'kotsuzuiron', the notion that a British alliance must be the centrepiece of Japan's diplomacy. This thinking has recently been criticized for its undue caution and its tendency to commit Japan excessively to safeguarding British interests.13 Then, by extension, Japan became the partner of France and Russia. Her obligations to these powers had relevance only for the far 9

FO 371/691 [38226], Grey's minute on Nicolson to Grey, n October 1909. D. Abrikosov, Revelations of a Russian diplomat, Seattle, 1964, p. 189. 11 A. M. Pooley (ed.), The secret memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashl, London, 1915 (hereafter cited as Hayashl memoirs'), p. 22yfF. 12 I agree with the conclusion of R. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, Seattle, 1966, p. 307 and pp. 332-4. 13 Talhelyo senso e no mlchl, i, Tokyo, 1963 (hereafter cited as TSM\ p. 166. 10

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, 1908-10

21

east and should not be understood as extending to Europe. It is farfetched to imagine that Japan had joined the Entente in Europe or become 'an Entente power/ On the narrower stage of China, Japan was excluded from the financial operations of the powers and from the consortium when it was set up in 1910. Although she did not have a surplus of capital to invest in China, she felt deprived and was resentful of the actions of those powers, especially Britain and France, whose political partner she was. Since she was determined to dominate investment in Manchuria, she was drawn to make a series of regional arrange ments there with Russia. The question was how much substance there was in the apparent cordiality between Russia and Japan.14 The shortcomings of the Russo-Japanese agreement of 1907 soon became apparent. On 9 December 1909 Izvolskii told the British ambassador that he was worried about the rumours of a deterioration in Russo-Japanese relations. So keen was Grey to avoid a breakdown between them that he told MacDonald that it was desirable to allay the rumours. When approaches were made in Tokyo, the foreign minister replied that the rumours had no foundation. As a result communiques were issued in the Japanese, Russian and British press that relations between the two countries were most friendly.15 On the analogy that there is no smoke without fire, it is wise to be sceptical about these diplomatic denials. The fact is that there was, and continued to be, a great deal of mutual distrust. Unlike any other European power, the Russians eyed the Japanese over common frontiers, and this was the breeding-ground of many suspicions. In Japan generals like Katsura Taro, Terauchi Masatake and Tanaka Giichi were highly suspicious of the Russians and their intentions in the far east. Tanaka wrote early in 1912 that Russia had made great strides since 1905 in expanding her military installations which were almost as powerful as those of Japan in terms of numbers; since the double-tracking of the trans-Siberian railway would be complete within two years, Japan's policy should be one of vigilance towards Russia. Despite Japan's decision to renew the Russian agreement in 1910 and 1912, there were persistent jealousies on both sides.16 This implies that the treaties with Russia were subordinate and 14

Hayashi memoirs, pp. 210-14. JBD, viii, nos. 368-78. 16 Tanaka Giichi den, i, 506-7; Makino papers, 44, memorandum on the Russo-Japanese alliance. 15

22

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, 1908-10

secondary to the British alliance and not, as is often asserted,1? a counterpoise to it. Britain was informed of these agreements and approved of them, since they eliminated the possibility of war in the far east. Japan and Russia were drawn into these 'agreements of convenience' because of the special circumstances of China where they were both the 'out' powers against the 'in' powers. But there was no love lost between them. P A C I F I C P R O B L E M S A N D T H E U N I T E D STATES

Japan was not only a continental power but also a Pacific power. In the Pacific Japan was running up against the opposition of the United States, as she already was in China. The issues involved were Japanese emigration and naval power. From the time the San Francisco school question exploded in December 1906, the administration of Theodore Roosevelt had a succession of immigration disputes with Japan. Roosevelt was careful not to allow the disputes to get out of hand, but in the summer of 1907 he decided to send his Atlantic fleet into the Pacific. Originally conceived in the context of American naval preparedness — and therefore primarily a domestic issue — it came to be regarded in the long, hot summer of 1907 as a naval demonstration against the Japanese. The president expounded to the Japanese ambassador the notion of an American-Japanese agreement in November and appeared to get his concurrence. But Ambassador Aoki's response was disowned by the foreign minister, Hayashi Tadasu, who disliked the idea of a wide-ranging agreement. Aoki Shuzo was replaced by Takahira Kogoro in January 1908, and an interim gentlemen's agreement on immigration, which had been under negotiation since November, was signed on 18 February.18 Roosevelt tried to enlist the support of Britain in two capacities: as the ally of Japan, and as a country whose dominions in Australia, New Zealand and Canada were affected by Japanese immigration in the same way as California. Grey, seeking like the Japanese to keep the immigration issue separate from the alliance, declined to make common cause. Instead he urged the dominions to settle their own problems with 11 E.g. by Shinobu Seizaburo, 'Taisho gaikoshi no kihon mondai', Nihon gaikoshi kenkyu (hereafter cited as NGK\ Taisho jidai, 1958, p. 9. is Kajima M., Nichi-Bei gaikoshi, Tokyo, 1958, pp. 285-90; Hayashi memoirs, pp. 23641; Esthus, op. cit.; C. E. Neu, An uncertain friendship, Cambridge, Mass., 1968; NGNB, i, Bunsho, pp. 284-305.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, 1908-10

23

Japan. The Canadians sent a mission under the minister of labour, Rodolphe Lemieux, to Japan in November. The essence of the understanding reached was contained in a secret memorandum laying down that merchants, travellers and students should be permitted to enter Canada freely but that all labourers should be excluded, apart from household servants and agricultural labourers who were not to exceed 400 in any year. Notes were exchanged in January 1908. After some teething troubles, the quota system (in the words of MacDonald) 'worked very well mainly because the Japanese Government have, as they always do, "played the game".'19 In 1911, the Canadian prime minister told his dominion colleagues that it was still working satisfactorily from the standpoint of Ottawa.20 The other dominions affected did not reach similar arrangements. On countless occasions Roosevelt sought to find out the terms of the Lemieux agreement. But the Canadians who considered themselves to be in a different position from the Americans advised Britain to keep the matter secret.21 Grey considered the immigration issue to be a most sensitive one and was content to take an optimistic view of Japanese intentions. As he told the imperial conference in May 1911, he was convinced that Japanese policy was 'to concentrate her people in Korea and Manchuria and the parts neighbouring to herself in the Far East'. Given this over-all attitude, it is not surprising that Grey did not want to confuse the issue by making common cause with the Americans. Early in 1908 the air was full of war scares between the Americans and the Japanese. It is probable that Roosevelt thought that Japan was in no position to wage a war and queried the possibility of war developing. Grey certainly had reached a similar conclusion as early as July 1907: The Americans talk angrily but they have no means of getting at the Japanese, unless they build a much larger fleet. It is true that Japan cannot materially hurt the Americans, except in the Philippines which would be no great loss, but unless America could bring Japan to her knees, she would lose prestige and Japan would gain it.22

This proved in the long run to be a perceptive assessment of the balance of forces in the Pacific area. It was also a doctrine of con19

20 FO 800/29 (Grey), MacDonald to Grey, 5 January 1909. BDy vi, 790. BD, viii, nos. 353-5; Documents on Canadian external relations (hereafter cited as DCER), i (1909-18), Ottawa, 1967, 593. 22 FO 371/270 [26176], Grey's minute on MacDonald to Grey, 10 July 1907. 21

24

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, 1908-10

venience: had there been an American-Japanese confrontation, Britain would have been in a delicate position since she was required under the alliance to go to Japan's aid in event of attack by any one power. Much as Grey wanted to retain the friendship of Japan, he wanted at all costs to avoid a clash with the United States. Fortunately the Japanese in March 1908 invited the American fleet to visit Japanese ports during its Pacific cruise; and, when the 14,000 men disembarked for seven days in October, they were lavishly entertained. It was a small price to pay for the lessening of tensions. Though it cost a lot of money, it was not so much (as Premier Katsura told MacDonald with a twinkle in his eye) as the American sailors who had not been allowed shore leave at Manila left behind them in Japan.2^ If Grey did not wish Britain to be involved in war with the United States, that did not mean that he was ready to entertain Roosevelt's proposals for an 'Anglo-American coalition against Japan*. This scheme from Roosevelt's lively imagination, whose details have only recently come to light, was transmitted early in 1908 unofficially through Mackenzie King of Canada rather than Ambassador Bryce. There is no evidence that Britain responded seriously to the proposal that the two powers should approach Japan jointly over immigration. Indeed it may have completely miscarried by confirming British suspicions of Roosevelt and convincing Britain that Japan was a more stable partner than the United States. Grey had no wish to drag immigration into the alliance,24 and the Japanese, despite occasional protests,25 were content to leave it that way. Roosevelt was still ready to make approaches to Japan. The opportunity for fresh overtures arose with the change of the Tokyo ministry in July 1908 and its determination to improve relations with America. Just after the successful visit of the American fleet to Tokyo Bay, the Japanese ambassador, Takahira, told Roosevelt of his government's desire for an American-Japanese understanding and presented a draft. It was on the lines of that worked out by Aoki almost a year previously. On 30 November there took place an exchange of notes of an inoffensive kind between Secretary of State Elihu Root and Ambassador Takahira, sometimes mistakenly referred as the 'Root-Takahira 23 BDy viii, no. 356. 24 R. M. Dawson (ed.), William Lyon Mackenzie King, i, London, 1958, 150-66; D. C. Gordon, 'Roosevelt's smart Yankee trick', Pacific Historical Review (hereafter cited as PHR), 30 (1961), 351-8. 25 E.g. FO 371/1614 [971], Grey to Rumbold, 3 January 1913.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, 1908-10

25

agreement*. It said nothing about emigration and dealt only with Pacific and Chinese problems. It was in the mould of the Open Door doctrine as Roosevelt chose to reinterpret it in 1908: both powers disclaimed aggressive tendencies and agreed to support the independence and integrity of China. Clearly the signatories had mental reservations about Manchuria. But the Root-Takahira note was still favourably spoken of by the delegates to the Washington conference in 1921.26 Britain was given advance notice by both parties of the terms of these notes. Grey took the view that they were exceedingly welcome and entirely in accord with the purposes of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of August I9O5,27 Of course the Root-Takahira notes, having nothing of an alliance about them, were distinctly weaker. In all likelihood, the Foreign Office accepted the view of Ambassador James Bryce that their importance lay not so much in their terms as in the fact of their conclusion which marked a period in American Pacific policy and 'silences the last echoes of the war cries of last year'. It was odd that Japan should reach such an understanding with an administration nearing the end of its term; but presumably she was confident that the incoming Republican president, William H. Taft, would 'feel bound by his predecessor's acts more than successors generally are'.28 The Root-Takahira understanding was an administrative convenience which did not touch the excitable public opinion on both sides and did not in the long run unduly affect Taft's administration. Roosevelt was also involved in the abortive project for an American-German-Chinese agreement. It was the brainwave of the Emperor Wilhelm II of Germany and was probably touched off by the new quadrangular relationship between France, Russia, Britain and Japan in the far east. In the summer of 1907 he instructed his Washington ambassador to test opinion on the subject; and Roosevelt did not reject the idea out of hand. However, as 1908 developed, much of the American-Japanese tension evaporated; and Roosevelt lost interest in an anti-Japanese front. Wilhelm left the running to Tang Shao-yi, the Chinese official, who visited Washington on a mission in December 1908, but the scheme came to nothing.29 The partners in the Anglo-Japanese alliance viewed this scheme 26

Komura gaikoshi, 2 vols., Tokyo, 1953, ii, 306-18. 28 ? BDy viii, nos. 357, 359. BD, viii, no. 362. 29 Luella J. Hall, 'The abortive German-American Entente of 1907-8*, Journal of Modern History (hereafter cited as JMH\ i (1929), 219-35; Esthus, pp. 257$".; Neu, pp. 267rT.; Nakayama Jiichi, Nichi-Ro senso igo, Osaka, 1957, ch. 3. 2

26

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, 1908-10

with suspicion. The kaiser was not anxious to appear as the initiator of an anti-Japanese front. He therefore apologized to the Japanese for a needless indiscretion about them in his notorious Daily Telegraph interview on 29 October 1908. But the Japanese were cautious and resentful. Japanese statesmen, who viewed the kaiser's doings and racist statements frequently with distaste, failed to establish a cordial relationship with Germany, despite successful missions by Admiral Ijuin, Prince Arisugawa and Prince Kuni.30 Britain too thought the idea extravagant. There was much talk of the naval rivalry in the Dreadnought race which inevitably divided Britain and Germany. But Grey took the line that 'there is some force in the Emperor's criticism of our first Dreadnought. I think we built it and boomed it unnecessarily'.31 Not so anti-German as he is sometimes represented, Grey was still hopeful of a settlement; and there was no thought in Britain that an inevitable war was looming. It is therefore premature to suggest that now that Russia had ceased to be an object of suspicion to Britain and Japan — a contention which I do not share — the alliance was directed primarily against Germany. This is only true in the narrow sense that the alliance allowed Britain to concentrate her naval strength in European waters and this stood her in good stead in her developing rivalry with Germany.32 These are some of the strands in the developing triangular relationship which is to dominate the rest of this study. Both Japan and Britain were thinking much more of America's attitude towards the alliance. By the Root-Takahira notes, the position had been partially stabilized between the United States and Japan. Between Britain and America, things were less clearly defined. Since the Russo-Japanese war, President Roosevelt had put out numerous feelers, some official and some unofficial, some fruitful and some unfruitful. They covered a host of problems: arbitration, Japanese immigration, the Manchurian railways. What they seemed to be offering was 'a complete understanding' on the far east.33 The London government was slow to react 30 D'Anethan dispatches, nos. 214 and 221. 31 Hardinge papers (deposited in the Cambridge University library), 20, minute by Grey on Goschen to Hardinge, 13 May 1910. 32 I have argued (Nish, p. 362) that in so far as the Triple Entente in Europe was antiGerman, 'the alliance too would in the long term tend to become anti-German*. But I do not consider this to have been true of 1908-9. 33 BDy viii, no. 352.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, 1908-10

27

to Roosevelt's blustering manner and his diplomatic inventiveness, but, in the long run, Roosevelt's overtures forced Britain to refine her choice: Japan or America? They brought Britain to recognize what had probably been true all along: that she was not likely to support Japan in any conflict with the United States, because British and American interests in the world were so closely tied up. As Roosevelt made way for Taft in March 1909, Britain had not made up her mind.

C H A P T E R II

Manchuria, Korea and Arbitration, 1910 ON 12 February 1910 the annual commemorative dinner for the signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was held in Tokyo in circumstances of some disarray. The host was Count Komura. The guests from the British embassy turned up as usual in full evening dress. But the Japanese ministers who were all due to attend the function had not arrived by the time the dinner was served. The result was that the host and principal guests camped out 'in a desert of empty chairs' and, though these gradually filled up with jubilant ministers, they were, as the British ambassador observed, dressed in frock coats, their everyday garment of business. 'It was not until the toasts were about to be given that Marquis Katsura slipped into his seat, as smiling as ever after eight hours in the House where he had stayed to the last to fight the Salt Monopoly Bill.'1 It was a sign that General Katsura's bureaucratic ministry, which was formed in July 1908, while it had much to gain from successful foreign relations, had to devote most of its efforts to domestic problems and the hurly-burly of party politics. In the lower house of the Diet, it was faced by the latent opposition of the Seiyukai party, the majority party which was prepared to work along with the bureaucrats, provided they followed a policy of retrenchment. Year by year, as the Diet session approached, Katsura had to negotiate with Prince Saionji, the party president, a compromise settlement which would ensure its parliamentary support for his measures. Faced with such realities, the alliance celebrations had to be accorded second place. Katsura chose as his foreign minister Viscount Komura Jutaro, who had served him in a similar capacity from 1901 to 1905. He returned from London where he had been a not very successful ambassador to take up office on 27 August 1908. His was not a warm personality: he was reserved and reticent and retiring, and he was more suited for i ED, viil, no. 379. 28

M A N C H U R I A , KOREA AND ARBITRATION, 1910

29

secretariat than for embassy work. He was hampered in his declining years by being a sufferer from consumption. He was often absent from the ministry because of sickness and sometimes failed to attend diplomatic receptions for months at a time. That this had remarkably little effect on the policies which he succeeded in pushing through was largely because of the loyal assistance he received from his viceminister, Ishii Kikujiro. One of his first acts was to appoint Kat5 Takaaki as his successor in London on 12 September. The choice was a surprising one, in that Kato had attacked Komura over the Portsmouth settlement in 1905 and was regarded as the 'foreign minister of the opposition party'. Indeed it has been said that the Foreign Ministry was divided into Komura men and Kato men. On the other hand, Komura had his reasons. The two were not really divided on policies; and, since the main task for the next few years would be the revision of the AngloJapanese commercial treaty, it would be valuable for Japan to be represented in London by one who was widely recognized there as an Anglophile and had commercial experience. Kato was approached through two of the genro, Ito and Matsukata. He took the opinion of many prominent politicians who urged him to accept, as he did on i September. He left Japan on 17 December to take up his appointment and was to remain four years in London where he had been minister before in the 18905. It was to be a difficult period in Anglo-Japanese relations and an important transitional phase in the British alliance. Kato was an independent-minded man. As a predecessor of Komura at the Foreign Ministry, he did not hesitate to dispute his instructions, if he disagreed with them. The four years of his tenure saw many squabbles between Kasumigaseki and the London embassy.2 The Britain to which Kat5 now returned was the Britain of Asquith's ministry (1908-16). The Liberal party's People's Budget was rejected by the House of Lords in November 1909 and was to precipitate a constitutional crisis between peers and commons, which made domestic politics the all-engrossing topic of the day. It led to general elections in January and December 1910, as the Liberals sought to get a mandate for Lords reform. Amid the hurly-burly, the Foreign Office was guided by the loose rein of Sir Edward Grey, with whom Kat5 was to establish a relationship of remarkable confidence. The 2 Ito Masanori, Kato Takaaki, 2 vols., Tokyo, 1934 (hereafter cited as Kato\ i, 591-602.

30

M A N C H U R I A , KOREA AND ARBITRATION, 1910

instability of the domestic political scene, with the dissolutions of parliament and the general elections, hindered the processes of diplomacy. But it cannot be said that it greatly changed the shape of AngloJapanese relations which tended to be unaffected by public opinion or parliamentary interpellations during this period. MANCHURIAN RAILWAYS

Before the Anglo-Japanese alliance came up for reconsideration in 1911, international relations in east Asia were complicated by a strong American initiative.3 On 6 November 1909 Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, the strong man of the Taft administration, proposed to Britain the neutralization or internationalization of railways in Manchuria. Britain replied without enthusiasm. Within the Foreign Office the proposal was regarded as ill-timed and inept in so far as it was made in total disregard of the legitimate interests of both Russia and Japan. Still the State Department persisted: on 18 December it presented Japan with the neutralization scheme together with one whereby the United States and Britain would secure a railway lease for the Chinchow-Aigun line in Manchuria. London's reaction was that the matter was primarily one for arrangement with China and, if the Americans cared to push through the scheme in the teeth of opposition from Japan and Russia, Britain would remain a spectator. As in the case of the earlier Hsinmintung-Fakumen railway project,4 she chose to neglect the interests of the British concessionaire, Pauling & Company, and to respect the rights of the powers on the spot, not so much because of her diplomatic links with Japan and Russia as because of considerations of equity. This two-pronged American initiative was regarded by the Russians and Japanese as highly provocative. There was immediate consultation between them with a view to mapping out a course of common action. On 21 January 1910 Russia and Japan jointly refused neutralization. A week later Japan through her minister in Peking warned China not to proceed with the Chinchow-Aigun project without consulting the two powers directly affected, Russia and herself. On 2 March the 3 The best recent accounts of the American initiative are to be found in Tsunoda, pp. 460-78 and in Uchida Yasuya, Tokyo, 1969, pp. 126-41. Uchida was ambassador in Washington, 1909-11. 4 See above, p. 17—18.

MANCHURIA, KOREA AND ARBITRATION, 1910

31

Japanese cabinet re-affirmed its hostility to this railway challenge and advocated closer co-operation with Russia.5 Britain was unhappy at the increasing American initiatives which were stirring up trouble in a delicate situation. When in January the Americans turned to another tack and reverted to their plan for a common front on Asian immigration, the Foreign Office recommended that Britain should not 'appear to be conspiring with the United States against Japan'. So Britain's reply amounted to a series of courteous refusals as this matter was pursued.6 The Japanese were aware of, and welcomed, this attitude of self-abnegation on Britain's part. Grey was turning a deaf ear to the pleas of commercial interests in China from a feeling that Japan had a right to develop the south Manchurian railway in accordance with the Portsmouth treaty and that Britain had by the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1899 consented not to get involved in railway building north of the Great Wall. The Jiji Shimpo stated that Britain had 'adopted an eminently impartial attitude, which is in some measure due to their inborn respect for fair play but chiefly to the warm friendship which sprang from the Alliance'.7 Whatever the cause, Britain was not anxious for the heroic role of imposing international limitations on Japan or Russia. On 19 March the Japanese cabinet decided to approach Russia for a new agreement confirming that of 1907. Ambassador Motono had had many discussions with Komura to this end and had urged this course. Now that he was on the point of return he was given a mandate to speed matters on with Izvolskii. On 18 May Russia presented Motono with the draft of an agreement, which was finally signed on 4 July. It contained a public treaty and a secret treaty of six clauses, which related exclusively to Manchuria. In general, it was an attempt by the two powers to consolidate their position in these territories and make clear their common stand against Knox's various proposals. It is important to know the attitude of Britain to this treaty. Ambassador Nicolson in St Petersburg was one of its advocates: 'it would be of advantage to us if Russia and Japan could be brought into close relations'.8 Nicolson was not, of course, thinking of their establishing 5 NGNJB, i, Bunsho, 33off.; Komura gaikoshi, ii, 249ff.; Koshaku Katsura Taro den, 2 vols., Tokyo, 1917, ii, 395-4146 FO 371/921 [2983], minute by Campbell, 19 January 1910; [4810] Grey to Bryce, 7 February 1910. 7 JSDy viii, no. 379. 8 Hardinge papers 20, Nicolson to Hardinge, 26 January 1910.

32

MANCHURIA, KOREA AND ARBITRATION, 1910

exclusive spheres in Manchuria but of taking tension out of relations between the two. In the knowledge of America's outlook, Grey was more circumspect: he wrote in April that Britain should continue to be sympathetic to a further Russo-Japanese agreement but 'should when there is an opportunity put in a word to show that we expect the open door to be guaranteed*.9 He spoke to both countries on these lines and both governments gave assurances that they had no intention of departing from the policy of the Open Door in China. The agreements were communicated to Britain in advance of signature. Britain was assured that there was no inconsistency between this and the AngloJapanese alliance and was told by Komura that the line of demarcation would become important Vhen Russia is stronger and ready to go to war again'.10 In other words, the Japanese foreign minister had mental reservations about Russia's long-term objectives. The general attitude in London was that the new agreements were a natural response to Knox's ill-timed policies.11 KOREA

One aspect of the Russo-Japanese negotiations which did not find its way into the final text was one which intimately affected the AngloJapanese alliance — the issue of Korea.12 The position there was that Prince ltd had resigned as resident-general to become president of the Privy Council in Tokyo and had managed to secure the succession of his deputy, Sone Arasuke, on 14 June 1909. Ito had held out for liberal policies and there was reason to believe that Sone, who was in Britain's eyes 'a charming old gentleman', would also follow this path.13 In fact, however, the Katsura government took the occasion to change its approach: on 6 July the cabinet decided that 'the annexation of Korea should be resolutely carried out at the appropriate time'.14 It seems likely that It5 did not resist this change of outlook; but the decision was kept confidential until the opportunity came closer. Opportunities improved when Ito on a harum-scarum visit to Harbin on 26 October was assassinated by a Korean exile. Ito's visit was completely unofficial, 10 9 JBD, viii, no. 381. BD, viii, no. 386. 11 FO 371/920 [29461], Max Muller (Peking) to Grey, 27 July 1910. 12 Under article III of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1905, Britain recognized Japan's right *to take such measures of guidance, control and protection in Corea as she may deem proper and necessary*. 13 FO 371/879 [4523], Bonar to Grey, 3 January 1910. 14 NGNB, i, Bunsho, 315-16.

MANCHURIA, KOREA AND ARBITRATION, 1910

33

though it was possibly his hope to meet Kokovtsev, the Russian finance minister, who was then in Harbin, and discuss the feasibility of a better understanding between their two countries. Apologies were offered by the Koreans; but unquestionably the incident confirmed the charges of disorder which the Japanese were making and was thought to justify sterner measures. Japan did not act immediately though Korea was frequently on the agenda of the cabinet. It was probably fear of world opinion which deterred them. Clearly Russia, once the dominant power in Korea, would not welcome Japanese annexation there. Izvolskii was inclined to protest but ultimately said that he had no objection to Korea's eventual annexation.15 It seems likely that one of Japan's reasons for entering into the new Russo-Japanese agreement was to extract Izvolskii's approval over Korea whose annexation took place within a month of the signing. It was equally important to get the approval of her ally, Britain. In 1905 Britain had by implication agreed to Japan's protectorate in the peninsula when she agreed to the reference to Korean independence being dropped from the original Anglo-Japanese treaty. But that did not mean that she had already committed herself on Korea's annexation as a colony. Korea was a place where Britain had few interests: some mining, trade and missionaries. Moreover, she had little sympathy for the Koreans or their institutions and responded coldly to the appeals of emigre Korean organizations which were received in great numbers. Yet she was certainly not in favour of annexation, which would heap international odium on Japan and also on Japan's ally. In a conversation with Komura on 17 December 1909, MacDonald had received the ambiguous assurance that 'the government had not the slightest intention of departing from the line of policy they had decided upon, and I might rest assured that the status quo would be maintained in Corea, at any rate for some time to come'.16 This was of course highly misleading, as well as being ambiguous, in so far as the Japanese cabinet had already secretly decided upon annexation. The Foreign Office set great store by this assurance on which it was still relying in the summer.1? On 18 February Komura notified each of his ™ NGB 43/1, no. 15. FO 371/877 [2668], MacDonald to Grey, 17 December 1909; I cannot trace any Japanese account of this conversation. 17 BD9 viii, no. 390; History of The Times, iii (1884-1912), London, 1947, 686. 16

34

M A N C H U R I A , KOREA AND ARBITRATION, 1910

ambassadors overseas of Japan's intention to annex; but there is no evidence of Kato passing the details over to Grey or hinting at this becoming his country's ultimate policy. It was not until 19 May that Komura communicated the policy to MacDonald, who hoped that when the moment arrived he would be informed of it and Komura agreed to do so. Speaking unofficially and without specific instructions, MacDonald argued that the time was inopportune: Japanese negotiations over treaty revision might receive a setback; the agitation caused by Japan's refusal to consider internationalization of Manchurian railways had not yet subsided and could become acute; it would be a source of embarrassment to Britain. Komura assured him that no date had been decided and no power would oppose the scheme.18 On 30 May General Terauchi Masatake was appointed residentgeneral in place of Sone. When he reached Seoul in July, the Foreign Office concluded that 'everything points to annexation at a not very distant date'. Grey asked his officials: 'on what grounds other than commercial can we or the other Powers object to annexation?'19 But the secretariat could find no grounds for protest. In a conversation with Kato on 14 July, Grey asked whether the moment was opportune for annexing Korea in view of the susceptibilities of the powers. He hoped that the Japanese 'whenever they annexed Corea, would be stating that they would maintain for a long term of years/the present Tariff of Corea as guaranteed by Treaties'. When Kato asked whether Britain would approve annexation if this economic point were met, Grey was non-committal. Clearly Grey was hinting, however mildly, at the folly of Japan's going to the extreme of annexing the peninsula. Within a week Japan gave an undertaking that she was prepared to preserve the status quo over import and export duties in Korea for the present. Grey, however, wanted a definite period to be stated, before he would 'concede the question of principle', and stated that Britain must decide urgently 'whether in principle we will agree to annexation and all that it implies in return for economic terms'. On 5 August the foreign secretary reported that 'we have accepted the principle of annexation of Corea by Japan... we are asking that the present Corean tariff shall remain in force for ten years'.20 Britain had professed to dis18

NGB 43/1, no. 546; FO 371/877 [21768], MacDonald to Grey, 22 May 1910; Kajima, Nichi-Ei gaikoshi, p. 463. 19 FO 371/877 [24149], minutes by Alston and Grey, 4 July 1910. 20 BD, viii, no. 399. See also nos. 392-8.

MANCHURIA, KOREA AND ARBITRATION, 1910

35

cuss the issue in terms of principle but had finally decided to trade her approval for a guarantee of the economic status quo. Japan accepted this condition *so far as circumstances permit' but fixed the term at eight years only. Kato thought that for Japan to make a fuss over two years was petty-minded and urged Komura to accept Britain's wishes, arguing that Japan 'needs Britain's full and cordial support'.21 On the following day the home government gave in, British officials were content, and annexation was accomplished by treaty on 22 August without Britain raising any objection. This was surely a tribute to Kato's influence in Tokyo. Grey observed to Kato that comment was sure to be made upon the bearing of Article III of the alliance upon the annexation: 'it appeared to me that this article did not contemplate annexation and that therefore the agreement did not entail any positive obligation upon us to support annexation of Corea: on the other hand it seemed to me that it would be inconsistent with the spirit of the agreement for us to oppose the annexation'.22 In fact, as on most aspects of continental policy, the alliance of 1905 was unspecific and irrelevant to Korea. On 5 November MacDonald went to Korea for a fortnight's visit of inspection, meeting the acting governor-general, a son of Prince Yamagata. He was entirely satisfied with the manner in which the annexation had been carried out. Grey minuted with some relief on his report: This is much more satisfactory than reports which we used to receive of Japanese conduct before annexation. It shows the tendency which there is for the best influences in the Japanese Govt. to get control of affairs. For some time it looked as if they had not done so in Corea.2^

Grey was obviously pleased that his worst suspicions were not confirmed, but MacDonald and perhaps Grey were judging the new regime in Korea by criteria of efficiency on which Britain's own imperialism was based. Since 1905 Britain had not been a positive advocate of Korean independence; by 1919 she was to have regrets over Korean annexation; but in 1910 her attitude was that of a great imperial power towards one that was following her example. Various criticisms are made of Britain's role in the annexation. It is alleged that Britain had advance warning of the annexation taking 21 23

22 Kato, i, 676, Kato to Komura, 14 August 1910. JBD9 viii, no. 402. FO 371/879 [45764], Grey's minute on MacDonald to Grey, 29 November 1910.

36

MANCHURIA, KOREA AND ARBITRATION, 1910

place. This is only a partial truth. All powers had an inkling that something was afoot; Britain was aware that the Japanese government had decided in principle to annex but had no idea of what was to be the timing of the actual annexation. A second criticism is that Britain treated the whole issue on a purely selfish, commercial basis. There is some truth in this. None the less the heart-searchings in the Foreign Office show that Britain claimed to be examining the question in terms of principle but found herself in a quandary as to the grounds on which she could protest. It was only then that she agreed to accept the annexation provided Britain's treaty rights in Korea were preserved. A third charge is that Britain showed complicity in Japan's ambitions, which is a charge frequently made against the alliance. This is unfair; Britain was not privy to Japan's ambitions nor did she want to be. She was concerned with the international implications rather than the issue of Korean independence. On the whole, Britain's approach was, therefore, to discourage Japan on the ground that the time was inopportune but, at the same time, to do so in such a mild way that her intervention would not take the final decision away from the Japanese themselves.24 A N G L O - J A P A N E S E C O M M E R C I A L T R E A T Y , 19!!

While this high-level diplomacy was proceeding, relations between Britain and Japan were being prejudiced by an outburst of British wrath against Japan's proposal to revise their existing commercial treaty of 1894. In a zone where Britain's interests were so largely commercial as the far east, mercantile opinion had to be heard. While it rarely expressed itself on diplomatic issues, it was not slow to make representations when it felt that its interests were being injured, as in the case of the 1910 tariff negotiations. This had the effect of stirring up much anti-Japanese feeling at a time when Grey, with a general election in the offing, had to be specially sensitive to public opinion. Japan's problem was that the 1894 treaty and the subsequent treaties with other powers, while they had reversed the unequal treaties, had not given her tariff autonomy, which was desirable for her developing industries. The original treaties with the powers were due to lapse in 24

Nikkan gaiko shiryo shusei, edited by Kamikawa Hikomatsu and Kim Ching Myong, 8 vols., Tokyo, 1962-8, passim; Yamabe Kentaro, Nikkan heigo shoshi, Tokyo, 1966, pp. 216-24; F. H. Conroy, The Japanese seizure of Korea, 1868-1910, Philadelphia, 1960, ch. 8 passim; C. I. Eugene and Hankyo Kim, Korea and the politics of imperialism, i8j61910, Berkeley, 1967, p. 216.

MANCHURIA, KOREA AND ARBITRATION, 1910

37

July 1911 and, if she wanted to revise them, she had to give notice of denunciation on 16 July 1910, as she did. Before this took place, there had been elaborate preparations. Premier Katsura in October 1908 had set up a Treaty and Tariff committee with Komura as chairman and Home Minister Hirata Tosuke and Ambassador Inoue Katsunosuke as deputy chairmen. On the basis of their report, a draft treaty was drawn up and approved by the cabinet in August 1909. Before negotiations were undertaken, Japan published the terms of the treaty and tariff which she sought. The Japanese decided that the first approaches would be made to Britain. On 7 March Ambassador Kato told Grey that Japan Vould like us to be the first country to conclude a new treaty as we had been the first to make the old one with them and perhaps the treaty made with us might serve as a model for subsequent treaties with others'.25 Presumably it was the Japanese hope that Britain, as an ally, would be more sympathetic towards her wishes for tariff autonomy and more anxious to steer through an acceptable settlement. Grey consulted the Board of Trade whose calculations confirmed the view of the Tokyo embassy that Germany would gain at Britain's expense in the tariff as published. The Board felt that 'the exceptionally liberal manner in which Japanese imports are treated in the U.K. affords a strong ground for asking that we should not be treated less favourably than any other country'. Britain should, therefore, postpone the conclusion of a treaty on a simple 'most favoured nation' basis until she was able to see what shape the new tariff would finally take as a result of negotiations with other powers.26 When Grey conveyed this to Kato on 11 March, the ambassador replied that 'most favoured nation' clauses would be the basis of the new treaties and that conventional tariffs would only be arranged in case of protectionist powers like France and Germany.27 Opinion in Britain, roused by chambers of commerce and the newspapers, became very heated over the issue, claiming that Japan's ally should be treated on the same basis as protectionist countries. Thus, after the first informal conference in July, negotiations made no progress. On 9 October MacDonald told Premier Katsura how detrimen25 FO 371/921 [8606], Grey to MacDonald, 7 March 1910. 26 FO 371/921 [8219], Board of Trade to Foreign Office, 7 March 1910. 27 FO 371/921 [8607], Grey to MacDonald, n March 1910. NGB deals rather unsatisfactorily with the Anglo-Japanese negotiations by reproducing only Kato's lengthy retrospective report, Kato to Hayashi, 7 September 1911, NGB 43/1, no. 3.

38

MANCHURIA, KOREA AND ARBITRATION, 1910

tal this misunderstanding had been to Britain's attitude towards the alliance. There is evidence that Katsura took this threat seriously and immediately offered to seek a new formula. When MacDonald's tactics were reported to Grey, the foreign secretary warned him to say nothing which would throw doubt on Britain's disposition to renew the alliance and to lay stress rather on 'public opinion here being adversely affected in future than upon any change having taken place already and irretrievably'.28 MacDonald's threatening reference to the alliance was, as we shall see, untimely because of feelers which Grey had put out to Japan about arbitration arrangements. Because of their fundamental differences, both sides agreed to suspend talks till the autumn. The second unofficial conference opened in London on 16 November with Kato, Yamaza Enjiro and Yoshizawa Kenkichi representing Japan.29 The Japanese were genuinely seeking out a formula which would meet Britain's insistence on advantageous tariff rates, while clinging to the principle of tariff autonomy. After many sessions with Sir Hubert Llewelyn Smith, under-secretary at the Board of Trade, Kato urged Tokyo to make some concessions from a political point of view in keeping with the spirit of the alliance and asked for blanket instructions delegating everything about the treaty revision negotiations to his own discretion and for his own proposals to be taken as the basis of discussions. On 7 December Foreign Minister Komura, after consulting Katsura, authorized negotiations on the lines of Kato's personal plan.30 This implied that the ministry had accepted the need for commercial concessions in order to sustain the good relationship between the two countries; it took the line that, the alliance being the centre-piece of Japanese foreign policy, it was necessary to avoid any course of action which seemed likely to prejudice friendly relations. It tried to overcome the differences that had arisen by adopting a formula in which bilateral concessions were made: Japan would consent to a conventional tariff on some British imports, while Britain undertook to retain on her free list some goods exported to her from Japan (habutae, copper, straw). While the appearance of unilateral concessions by Japan was avoided, Japan's concessions were in fact rather greater than Britain's. The compromise was agreed 28 FO 371/922 [39117], MacDonald to Grey, 9 October 1910; Grey to MacDonald, 9 November 1910. 29 Kato, i, 617-22; Yoshizawa Kenkichi, Gaiko 6o-nen, p. 52. 30 Kato, i, 620-4.

MANCHURIA, KOREA AND ARBITRATION, 1910

39

between MacDonald and Komura on 3 December and was adopted by the delegates in London as the basis for continued negotiations.31 Kato told Grey on 16 January 1911 that both the fact that a formula had been arranged and that the Japanese tariff was to be specially modified in Britain's favour should be kept absolutely secret. Japan desired this for parliamentary reasons in Tokyo, although it is also likely that she had in mind her continuing negotiations with other countries. Grey explained that, when parliament met, he too would be pressed with questions and that early publication of the arrangements was desirable. Kato was, however, adamant that premature publicity would be damaging.32 He later convinced Grey of the difficulty which Komura would have in the Diet in reconciling his earlier more sanguine statements with the bargain which had just been made with Britain: it might cause dissatisfaction in Japan to learn of the special concessions on duties which had been made to Britain and it would be inconvenient for other countries to know the details too soon.33 So secrecy was maintained yet awhile. Meanwhile on 6 February Grey together with the president of the Board of Trade had explained the proposals in a memorandum to the cabinet and recommended emphatically that they be accepted in principle. Two days later they were endorsed at a cabinet meeting. A formal session of the delegates was held in London on 3 March; and at the end of the month Grey circulated to the cabinet the treaty in its final form. It was eventually signed on 3 April with a conventional tariff attached and published three days after.34 Kato wrote in his diary that 'the labour of more than one year has been crowned with a success which ought to be hailed with joy by reasonable men on both sides'. With considerable justification, Kato's biographer plays up the ambassador's special role in the signing of the British commercial treaty of 1911 for he had enjoyed a discretion which was quite exceptional.35 When the treaty was announced, there was a note of disappointment in Japan. Japan did not recover tariff autonomy in name though she did ensure that her goods were admitted freely to Britain. So far as the conventional tariff was concerned, it was said to be reciprocal 31

Kajima, Nichi-Ei gaikoshi, pp. 460-1; Kato, i, 629. FO 371/1137 [2323], Grey to MacDonald, 16 January 1911. 33 FO 371/1137 [6936], minute by Grey, 21 February 1911. 34 CAB 37/105/9, Grey/Buxton to cabinet, 6 February 1911; CAB 37/106/44, Grey to cabinet, 28 March 1911. 35 Kato, i, 629. 32

40

MANCHURIA, KOREA AND ARBITRATION, 1910

although, as the British ambassador observed with some relish, 'it is perfectly evident that in it Japan alone makes the actual concessions while those of Great Britain are problematic and relate to the distant future'.36 In Britain, the interests of Lancashire and Yorkshire recognized that Japan had shown a spirit of concession. Moreover, as Grey told Kat5, 'the result gave me special pleasure, because the political effect of a commercial treaty of the kind would be good'.*7 Although Japan's treaty with the United States had been signed two months earlier, the new Anglo-Japanese treaty was welcome in Britain: for once the alliance seemed to have paid dividends. ANGLO-AMERICAN

ARBITRATION PROPOSALS

On three counts in the far east the Taft administration had received a setback: Manchurian railways, the Russo-Japanese agreement of 1910 and Korea. 'Dollar diplomacy' seemed to have led them nowhere. In particular, it had brought them no support from Britain. On 24 August the British ambassador in Washington, James Bryce, reported that 'irritation is felt in official circles at Washington at the attitude taken by H.M.G. towards the Chinchow-Aigun railway' and suggested that Britain should 'soothe American susceptibilities in Far Eastern matters'. Britain by appearing to condone the activities of Russia and Japan had seemed to come out for monopoly against the Open Door; and 'the catch-word of the Open Door has attained a kind of sanctity in [American] public opinion'.38 The Foreign Office argued that the Americans, seeing their China policy resulting in a fiasco, were venting their annoyance on Britain, whereas, in view of her engagements with Russia and her relations with Japan, Britain could hardly have acted otherwise than she did. Grey himself concluded that 'interference with railways has been the wrong tack altogether: Japan could not have been expected to give up the railway which she had acquired by the Portsmouth treaty.'39 Moreover Knox's internationalization proposals had made the task of keeping the door open in Manchuria more difficult. He therefore replied defending Britain's standpoint for Bryce's own information but stressing the extreme desirability of working with the 36

FO 371/1137 [16162], MacDonald to Grey, 14 April 1911. FO 371/1137 [14429], Grey to MacDonald, 13 April 1911; [6779], Grey to MacDonald, 21 February 1911. 38 FO 371/920 [32420], Bryce [Durham, N.C.] to Grey, 24 August 1910. 39 Grey's minute on above. 37

MANCHURIA, KOREA AND ARBITRATION, 1910

41

Americans, and 'not imperilling our good relations with them in other parts of the world by adhering too literally to a policy of strict reciprocity in the Far East'.40 Grey's reference to 'not imperilling our good relations in other parts of the world5 may have referred to the arbitration proposals then under discussion. On n July 1910 Andrew Carnegie, the millionaire industrialist, wrote to Grey quoting President Taft's talk to the Peace and Arbitration Society of New York in March in favour of extended arbitration agreements. Grey replied that any proposal for an AngloAmerican arbitration treaty would be favourably received.41 When Bryce visited Taft at the president's summer residence on 5 August, Taft said that 'a good example would be set to the rest of the world if the United States and Great Britain were to conclude a Treaty of Arbitration of the wider scope he had indicated'. While there were mixed feelings in the Foreign Office over the difficulties which had been invariably raised by the senate to arbitration in the past, it was a suggestion which could not be turned down out of hand, especially as Britain, and Grey in particular, had shown herself anxious to preserve the status quo by arbitration agreements. Grey was advised on 8 Sep tember that we could not tell the [Americans] that we can't sign a Treaty for 5 years because of our alliance with Japan. It would be a nasty reminder of our engagements under that agreement and bring the Anglo-Jap[ane]se Agreement into disrepute here. If, on the other hand, we approached the Japanese Ambassador confidentially [about Japan's willingness to enter a general arbitration agreement with the United States], I do not see why the Japanese Government should refuse.42

Attracted to such a strategy, Grey agreed to follow this course when 40

FO 371/920 [32420], Grey to Bryce, 22 September 1910. Also FO 800/83 [Grey], Grey to Bryce, 7 January 1911. 41 FO 371/1023 [26234], Grey to Carnegie, 29 July 1910. Ambassador Bryce had anticipated Carnegie's letter by suggesting that Grey should discuss with ex-President Roosevelt on his European tour a proposal that Britain, the United States and Japan should 'agree to treat as disturbers of the peace any nation that declared war without due notice* (FO 800/82, Bryce to Grey, 9 May 1910). Roosevelt was in Britain from 16 May till 10 June, and may well have discussed arbitration treaties at the meetings he had with British political leaders. Certainly he had stressed the point in his Nobel Peace Prize address on 5 May. Carnegie had been lobbying furiously for arbitration throughout the summer in Britain. E. E. Morison (ed.), The letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1954, vii, 75. 42 JBD, viii, no. 447, minute by Louis Mallet, assistant under-secretary.

42

MANCHURIA, KOREA AND ARBITRATION, 1910

he was next in London. On 26 September Grey saw Kato and explained that there was a possibility of the American government proposing a universal arbitration treaty and that he would be willing to receive such a proposal if it came. There were two possible ways of reconciling this with the alliance: 1. if the provisions of the Arbitration Treaty conflicted with those of the Alliance, the Alliance must remain the governing factor till the date when it expired; when its renewal was under discussion, the Arbitration Treaty would have to be taken into account, but till it expired it would, as the prior Treaty, be the governing factor; 2. to tell the United States Government that any conflict between the Treaty of Arbitration and the Alliance would be avoided if they invited Japan, as our Ally, to be a party to the Treaty, or to make a similar Treaty with the United States.

It was the second proposal that Grey wanted to canvass. Kato deduced rightly that the originator of this proposal had been Carnegie.43 He further reported that it was not to be regarded as a matter of any urgency. No immediate action was taken on the telegram in Tokyo. Komura suffered from a recurrence of his consumptive condition from mid-September till mid-November. Indeed he saw MacDonald for the first time for two months on 29 November and was 'still looking somewhat pulled down'. While Ishii Kikujiro, the vice-minister, and Katsura were coping with most business, this was clearly a matter for Komura himself to deal with on return to duty. Grey's attitude was to encourage an overture but to let the Americans take their time. Grey was sincerely convinced of the merits of arbitration for the settlement of differences with the United States, although some of his civil servants like Arthur Nicolson had grave misgivings. Yet he left the initiative to Washington, because of the possibility that the senate, jealous that it should not lose any of its powers, would reverse the arbitration proposals as it had done in 1897 and 1905. It was better, therefore, to leave the president to choose the appropriate time for the approach. While Grey made clear in December and January that he would welcome America's proposals, he showed no sign of wanting to make the running. It was only in the spring that he called for an end to Washington's delays and urged Taft to set things moving. Was it not odd that Grey should take up the matter with Japan eight months in advance of the first American draft coming to hand? Does it 4

3 SDy viii, no. 405; NGB 44/1, no. 125.

MANCHURIA, KOREA AND ARBITRATION, 1910

43

not suggest that he was anxious to slip out of Britain's unwelcome obligations under the Japanese alliance and was merely using the American 'overtures' as a pretext? This is certainly a possibility which cannot be ruled out, and Grey's action in September was suspect. But the Japanese already knew that British assistance against the United States was questionable in any case, and Britain's purpose in forewarning Japan of these adjustments was, therefore, merely to state formally what was recognized as the existing situation. Moreover, Grey, in speaking to Kato in September, had no idea that the American proposals would be so long delayed. On the American side, things took a leisurely course. Secretary Knox on 18 November expressed regret at the recent want of cordiality in Anglo-American relations in the far east but indicated that all was set fair for extended arbitration proposals.44 After learning Britain's point of view from Grey during the course of a world tour, ex-President Roosevelt wrote to Taft on 22 December that it was 'our interest not to take any steps as regards Manchuria which will give Japan cause to feel, with or without reason, that we are hostile to them'. Knox, rising to this implied criticism of his policies, attributed much of the blame to London but took heart that 'we shall in the future receive more support for our policy from Great Britain than we recently have had'.45 Both from the American and British viewpoints, therefore, the time was ripe for proceeding with the revision of the arbitration treaty of 1908. Things livened up in the New Year when Taft made a further reassuring speech. On 16 January Grey told Ambassador Kato that there was a good prospect of the arbitration treaty coming about in the near future and asked what Japan's reaction was to his September proposals.46 When Kato referred to Tokyo, Komura rejected the proposal that Japan should become a party to such an arbitration agreement on the grounds that the fate of the state should not be subordinated to arbitration and, secondly, that, if Japan entered into the suggested treaty, there was the danger, since the majority of arbitrators would be Europeans and Americans, that she would stand in an unfavourable position from the point of view of cultural differences, of race and religion. On the other point, Japan admitted that Britain, because of her 44

EDy viii, no. 448. Morison (ed.), The letters of Theodore Roosevelt^ vii, 189-92- T. Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese war, London, 1925, p. 323. 45

46 NGB 44/1, no. 125.

44

M A N C H U R I A , KOREA AND ARBITRATION, 1910

economy and the position of Canada, would naturally steer clear of any hostilities with the United States and would, in the event of trouble breaking out between Japan and the United States, try to avoid involvement, regardless of the alliance. For this reason Japan had no objection to the conclusion of an arbitration treaty between Britain and America but wished to exclude the alliance from its purview.47 In a separate message Komura took a bold initiative. He felt that his reply might give rise in Britain to the notion that the Japanese alliance was an obstacle to an unlimited Anglo-American arbitration treaty; and there was the fear that this might imperil the renewal of the alliance. For this reason it would be best, if it were possible, to use the occasion of the arbitration negotiations to make amendments to the alliance: to make clear that it would not apply if the United States became the adversary and to dispel any anxiety on Britain's part that she might be dragged into a dispute between Japan and the United States. On the other hand, it would be useful to make amendments which would be appropriate to the annexation of Korea and other great changes which had taken place in the far east since 1905. If Japan could at the same time fix the term of the new treaty for ten years, it would greatly strengthen her foreign policy.4^ Kato was instructed to mention these thoughts to Grey as his own personal views when he was putting forward Japan's reply on the arbitration issue. Kato saw the foreign secretary on 20 January and discussed the matter. Over the alliance Grey said that the proposal would require consideration. He did not give a definite reply but certainly did not turn down the suggestion.49 Komura's proposals set in train a new set of alliance negotiations. The various events of 1910 dealt with in this chapter contributed to this unexpected result. The evident failure of Anglo-American cooperation in the far east led both sides to approach arbitration in an accommodating spirit. The troubles over Korea and the commercial treaty made it desirable that Britain and Japan should revise and update their alliance and, if necessary, extend it for a further term. 47 NGB 44/1, no. 126, Komura to Kato, 17 January 1911. 48 NGB 44/1, no. 72. 49 NGB 44/1, nos. 73 and 127

CHAPTER III

First Steps towards the Third Alliance 4

lT is the Naval question which underlies the whole of our European Foreign Policy and more than the European Foreign Policy/1 These remarks of Grey in a speech on 26 May 1911 contained what was obviously a veiled reference to the motives underlying the Japanese alliance. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was a naval alliance and its chief value to both powers was its naval value. Now that Komura had proposed an early renewal, it is necessary to make an assessment of the advantages which the 1905 treaty had conferred. It is fitting to write first of the naval advantages. Britain derived from the alliance security with economy. After the battle of the Japan Sea, she had with Japan's agreement withdrawn her battleships to European waters but kept a squadron of five cruisers there. This was a modest naval presence, considering the volume of her trade with China and her far-flung empire in the south Pacific. This ensured the security of her Pacific dominions at minimum cost.2 Such economies were vital, because of the Admiralty's policy of concentration in European waters and the naval race with Germany in the building of Dreadnoughts which had developed from 1908 onwards. Of course, there was an element of risk in this. The Australians were already giving vent to their feeling that Japan had built up her naval strength to a point where she must be regarded as a threat to the British dominions in the area. By an agreement of 1909, Australia was permitted to operate her own navy; she could from 1911 rely on a squadron being retained in her own waters without fear of transfer to zones where imperial, and not Australian, interests had to be defended. 1 BD^ vi, p. 782. Good accounts are given in Tsunoda, pp. 597-629, and P. C. Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, 1911—15, London, 1969, pp. 33-57. 2 Papers of Sir George Clarke, secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence, 1903-7 (deposited in the British Museum), Add. MSS 50836, memorandum by Clarke, 15 December 1906; 'The Treaty gives us considerable advantages and moderate liabilities.'

45

46

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THE THIRD ALLIANCE

Even this did not solve Grey's dilemma: Britain's homeland was immune from any danger from Japan; but Australia, New Zealand and Canada had different notions of security. There might therefore come a time when Britain would have to choose between the naval benefits of the alliance and the security needs of her dominions. The Japanese also derived security with economy from the alliance. As a result of her victory over Russia, Japan gained eight battleships and three cruisers. Her strength in 1910 amounted to eleven modern battleships, thirteen armoured cruisers and seventeen protected cruisers. This superiority in the east was unchallenged as no other powers were ready to build up their forces there for the present. In the long term, it was inevitable that the Americans, who were marked out as the imaginary enemy of the Japanese navy, should want to strengthen their naval forces, especially when the Panama canal was opened in 1914; and the Pacific cruise of their fleet had suggested as much. Japan's problem was her finance. Since 1905 she had not been able to afford much money for naval building. While there was no question about the size or efficiency of her fleet, it was recognized by 1910 to be falling behind the Dreadnought programmes of other first-class naval powers. It was impossible to foresee whether finance would be available to remedy this. In these circumstances the assurance of Britain's naval co-operation under the alliance in an emergency was valuable; and her navy men were the great enthusiasts for the existing alliance.3 While it was difficult for the navy to get its estimates past the Finance Ministry, it planned to lay down in 1911 four armoured cruisers (including one to be built by Vickers) and one battleship to be built at Kure.4 It was shortage of finance rather than absence of ambition which delayed the fulfilment of the naval building programmes. The navy was only marginally dependent on Britain, compared to a decade earlier. Many of Japan's officers came to British naval colleges; she relied on Britain for the supply of heavy guns; and she still looked to Britain in her war plans for many of the transports which would carry her troops to the war zones in the war against Russia which was still contemplated as a theoretical possibility.5 However, it was only 3 Yamamoto Gombei to kaigun, Tokyo, 1966, pp. 229-30. Admiralty papers 116/1270, note by Bethell, 25 January 1910 (hereafter cited as ADM). 4 FO 371/1141 [2371], minute by Lampson, 18 February 1911. 5 Library of Congress, Japanese War Ministry microfilm, T. 530, R. 101, F. 07057, 'Nichi-Ei gunji kyoyaku ni kansuru ken', shows that Japan still wanted to get British transports as late as June 1913.

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THE THIRD ALLIANCE

47

exceptional ships which still required to be built in British yards like the battle-cruiser Kongo, laid down at Barrow in 1911. The British Admiralty with a healthy scepticism towards international co-operation reacted unenthusiastically to Japanese proposals for joint exercises. When the Japanese suggested joint signalling schemes, the First Lord responded coolly: 'It will be followed up by proposals from the Japanese for joint exercises of a more ambitious kind, embracing probably fleet tactics and exercises in gunnery and torpedo work ... The Japanese are at present very much behind Great Britain in their knowledge of these subjects/6 This was fairly representative of the attitude of senior British naval officers to several similar requests from Japan. They were not inclined to have more than the limited commitments to the Japanese under the Yamamoto-Fisher understanding of 1907.7 This derived partly from a reluctance to share secrets with any foreign navy and partly from the valid reason that such co-operation with Japan could be dangerous if the alliance were allowed to lapse. Yet there was no doubt that the board of Admiralty was generally in favour of keeping the alliance in existence on account of the naval benefits which it conferred on Britain. This was readily understandable when it is recalled that the advantages which Britain obtained so much exceeded those which Japan obtained.^ POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

What lay behind Komura's decision to propose a renewal of the alliance? First there was the fear that the British government might wish to terminate it in 1915. In a retrospective remark shortly before his death, Komura told Sir Claude MacDonald: Even in China and notably in your colonies, persistent rumours were afloat that the alliance would not be renewed when the proper time came and, although I personally did not believe this, rumours were persistent and widespread and were producing a very unsettling effect and therefore to my mind the time had arrived to put an end to these rumours in the most efficacious manner possible.9 6

FO 371/691 [38548], statement by First Lord of Admiralty, c. 31 August 1909. Cf. ADM 1231, memorandum by W. Graham Greene, 15 October 1909. 7 Nish, pp. 357-8. 8 FO 410/58 [24696], Admiralty to Foreign Office, 21 June 1911. Cf. CAB 38/18/46, R. McKenna at inth meeting, C.I.D., 26 May 1911: 'We are secure while the Treaty lasts/ 9 FO 371/1145 [39300], MacDonald to Grey, 3 September 1911.

48

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THE THIRD ALLIANCE

Unquestionably these rumours existed, but they reflected public, rather than government, opinion. The Japanese were inclined to take an unduly pessimistic view of Britain's attitude towards the alliance. Kato's reports were full of indications that the alliance which had been so enthusiastically received at its renewal in 1905 had now declined in public favour. He passed on the opposition of the Daily News and the Manchester Guardian to its eventual renewal in 1915* He relayed accounts of the protests in London at the savage sentences passed on Kotoku Shusui for his part in the assassination attempt on the Meiji emperor in the summer of 1910 and of the socialist demonstrations outside his London embassy in January 1911. Kat5 passed on warnings about the intense fear in mercantile circles of Japanese ambitions in Manchuria and Mongolia.™ Unquestionably these contained some truth and weighed with Kasumigaseki as can be seen from Komura's own writings, where the London reaction to the alliance is depicted as being unfavourable.11 Kato's own conclusion was that by 1910 the British government was regarding the alliance almost as a nuisance (jamamono).12 It was an inconvenience in dealing with her colonies and with the United States. Ishii who was vice-minister under Komura (1908-11) described this later as 'the British government's dilemma' at a time when war was brewing between Britain and Germany: she wanted to continue the alliance because it strengthened her hand with Germany but the alliance made it difficult for her to reach an arbitration agreement with the United States. Komura, argued Ishii, showed great skill in recognizing Grey's dilemma and in meeting it half-way by offering to extend the alliance on an emasculated basis: from Japan's standpoint, the alliance was not indispensable; yet it had its advantages and conveniences. Japan was therefore prepared to retain the alliance as an ornament.13 In my view, this retrospective judgment of the 19205 greatly underestimates the benefits which Japan stood to gain from the alliance and from its renewal and distorts Japan's reactions in 1911. The alliance was very much more than an ornament. There were many practical reasons why Japan was likely to benefit from renewal. Firstly, as Yamamoto states, revision in 1911 was to some extent accepted in order 10

n Kato, i, 631-3. Komura gaikoshi, ii, 403-4. *2 Kato, i, 631. 13 Ishii Kikujiro, Gaikoyoroku, Tokyo, 1928, pp. 69-70; Gatko kaiso dampen, pp. 70-1.

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THE THIRD ALLIANCE

49

to get British recognition of her annexation of Korea.14 The Japanese who have a tidy mentality wanted to get international support (as they already had from Russia) for their act of colonization. Again, as Komura admitted, there was little prospect of getting Britain to take up arms on Japan's behalf against America under the alliance. Since this was not practical politics, it was better for Japan to bow before Britain's wishes and let her conclude some agreement with the United States. Thirdly, there was the fear of Japan's isolation. The Japanese were distant observers of the tensions between Britain and Germany and do not seem to have been greatly worried by them, but they had the notion that, if a grand coalition were formed against Germany consisting of Britain, France and Russia, it would probably act to Japan's disadvantage, since Britain's need of Japan would be much less.15

There was not strong opposition to the alliance in Japan at this stage. The Elder Statesmen were generally favourable. Ito, before his death, had spoken to MacDonald of its advantages on the ground that 'our local interests do not clash'.16 Yamagata was inclined towards additional agreements with Russia, but this desire had been taken care of by the two treaties in 1907 and 1910. There was a good deal of criticism from the Japanese press, as might have been expected from a comparatively free institution, which concentrated on the complaint that the alliance was one-sided and that it forced Japan to put all her eggs in one basket. But the opposition was not such as to deter statesmen like Katsura, Komura and Kato, whose careers had been associated with the nurture of the alliance and who were convinced of its advantages from the standpoint of national interest. Komura was probably not far wrong when he told the British ambassador that there was not a single man of any standing in any class, whether military, naval, com mercial or political, who did not heartily approve of the AngloJapanese alliance.1? How did Britain view Komura's proposal and the alliance as a whole in 1911? Grey's proposal on the alliance in September 1910 had only been that the alliance be modified when it came up for renewal and had contained nothing about its early renewal. This implied that the 1905 agreement should run out its full course to 1915 and should only 14

15 Yamamoto to kaigun^ p. 234. Cf. NGNB, i, Bunsho, 305-6, BD, viii, no. 365; this is not confirmed in Kaneko Kentaro, Ito Hirobumi den. 17 FO 371/1145 [39300], MacDonald to Grey, 3 September 1911.

16

50

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THE THIRD ALLIANCE

then be altered to exclude the possibility of hostilities between Britain and America. Komura's offer, therefore, came as a complete surprise. In some respects the alliance of 1905 had not lived up to its expectations as a charter for the Open Door powers. The reference to China's independence and integrity seemed by 1911 to have a hollow ring because of Japan's actions in Manchuria. The British government had to be sensitive to the criticisms from a wing of the press and various publicists of influence.18 Similar views came from various quarters in the United States, but, as the Foreign Office knew, these were often interested parties. On the whole, it was too early to speak of Japan's anti-British activities in China proper. Grey tried, as we have seen, to keep a balanced attitude, aware of mercantile criticisms calling for an end to the alliance while loyal to Japan who had some justification for natural expansion on the continent. Observe his conversations of remarkable frankness with Ambassador Kato between 1908 and 1913.19 There was an element of cold calculation in Grey's attitude on this subject: Britain was trying to be considerate to the Japanese in the hope that British interests might be assisted by them — but this was not always fulfilled.2** The alliance no longer conferred the advantages which had been hoped for by its British authors in 1905. The promise of Japan's assistance on the north-west frontier was vaguely phrased in 1905 and, since Japanese troops could not have gone there in large numbers, may well have been window-dressing. But after the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 the defence of the north-west frontier was a contingency which need no longer be provided against and, since Japan had refused to consider her help as extending to Persia, the alliance was irrelevant to that situation. Such was the agreed view of Grey and the secretary for India (1910-15), Lord Crewe.21 As Britain's focus of interest moved away from the defence of India, it turned instead to the defence of her empire in the Pacific. This implied that it turned from defence against Russia to defence against Japan. A systematic examination of 18

Nish, *Dr G. E. Morrison and Japan', Journal of the Oriental Society of Australia, 2 (1963), 42-7; C. Pearl, Morrison of Peking, pp. 192-7; J. O. P. Bland, Recent events and present policies in China, London, 1912, pp. 293-6, 363-5. i? See below, p. 88-91. 20 E. W. Edwards, * Great Britain and the Manchurian railway question, 1909-10', English Historical Review (hereafter cited as EHR\ 81 (1966), 769. 21 BD, vi, 789-90. Cf. also DBFP, I (xvi), no. 768, memorandum by Curzon, 28 December 1921.

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THE THIRD ALLIANCE

51

the defence needs of Britain's dominions, especially Australia and New Zealand, and dependencies, especially Hong Kong, was made in the period between 1909 and 1911; and the general conclusion was that, apart from Japan, there was no likelihood of effective external attack.22 But, so long as the alliance lasted, there was little probability of such an attack. On the other hand, there was a strong body of dominion opinion which called for the denunciation of the alliance. Australia and New Zealand were suspicious of Japanese emigration and her unchallenged naval supremacy in the Pacific. It certainly appeared to some in London that Britain might have to choose between her empire and her alliance. Instead she chose a mediatory role, trying to convince the dominions that their best defence against foreign attack rested with the alliance and the Japanese fleet. DEFENCE P R E L I M I N A R I E S

The British defence experts were responsive to this opposition; but what should be done if the alliance were denounced? The Committee of Imperial Defence (C.LD.) had placed it on record that in such an event 'care should be taken sufficiently to reinforce the Fleet in the Far East before the termination of the Alliance in order to neutralize the danger from a preponderant Japanese Fleet in the China Seas'.23 In view of budgetary considerations, it was hardly likely that sufficient reinforcement could foreseeably be sent. Meanwhile the consensus view in the Foreign Office was that If our alliance is terminated in 1915, Japan will have her hands free to act in the Far East without restraint or control by us. It is possible that we might in that case find the Japanese fleet arrayed against us in the Pacific or allied with that of some other Power. These are changes that are unpleasant to contemplate and I believe that in 1914 it will still be our policy to be in alliance with Japan.24

But would this London line be acceptable to the dominions? This was one of the subjects studied by a sub-committee of the C.LD. set up in July 1910 to formulate defence questions to be discussed at the imperial conference which was due to be held the next summer. It was 22 CAB 38/17. Cf. N. R. Bennett, The naval pivot of Asia: an examination of the place of Hong Kong in British far eastern strategy, 1900-14', Journal of Oriental Studies (Hong Kong), 7 (1969), 63-75. 23 CAB 38/17, C.LD., 102nd meeting, 29 June 1909, 24 FO 371/918 [24689], minute by Hardinge, 13 June 1910.

52

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THE THIRD ALLIANCE

thought likely that the dominions would wish to discuss the future of the alliance; and the question was how the home government should handle the issue. The Foreign Office had no doubts that the maintenance of the alliance was a vital British interest and that 'in 1914 or earlier we shall discuss with Japan the terms of its renewal'. Grey thought that 'it would be disastrous if we were to denounce the alliance when the time for its renewal comes' for reasons of imperial defence. Towards the end of January 1911 Grey came to regard 1912 as a suitable time to open discussions with Japan.25 It would appear that he envisaged renewing the alliance near the point of its termination. Further, he was not disposed — though this is no part of our present concern — to discuss British policy at an open session of the forthcoming imperial conference. These views were confirmed by the prime minister before Komura's new proposal reached the Foreign Office.26 These remarks which reveal Britain's long-term naval dependence on Japan have to be considered in the light of the divisions within the cabinet over the Navy estimates. At their meeting on i March 1911 several members of the cabinet, especially Lloyd George and his fellow navy-baiter, Churchill, urged that 'considerable economies could, with perfect safety, be effected in the present Naval Expenditure on the Mediterranean, China and Pacific squadrons'.27 Thus the cabinet seemed to endorse the view that Britain must for some time to come rely on Japan. Of course this view was based on the assumption that the German naval law was not altered unfavourably to Britain — a condition which was not fulfilled when the Anglo-German talks reached a deadlock at the time of the Agadir crisis in July. Doubtless suspicion of the German plans had its effects on Admiralty opinion; but it seems too much to say, as does Marder, that 'the probability of an increase in the German Navy Law speeded up the time-table' for revision of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.28 In fact, because of Taft's long-awaited 25 CAB 38/17/5, C.I.D., io8th meeting, 26 January 1911. 26 Nish, 'Australia and the Anglo-Japanese alliance, 1901-11*, Australian Journal of Politics and History (hereafter cited as AJ PoL Hist*\ 9 (1963), 207-12, quotes the relevant documents In extenso; and they are not repeated here. 27 CAB 41/33, Asquith to the king, i March 1911. 28 A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 5 vols., London, 1961-70, i, 238. Marder concludes that, not long after Germany's action, 'Grey sounded out the Japanese about prolonging the alliance for ten years'. This implies wrongly that the overtures were started from the British side.

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THE THIRD ALLIANCE

53

arbitration proposals, the momentum of discussions was affected more by America's pace than by Germany's activity. PROPOSALS FOR EXTENSION WITHOUT REVISION

Komura's overture was not intended to provoke an immediate response. Allowing for this, Grey was strikingly dilatory. Partly he did not want to push ahead with the alliance until something positive was heard of the arbitration treaty; partly there was the possibility of disagreement over the alliance at the imperial conference. There was also the constitutional crisis in Britain: the general election in December had brought about no change in the relative strengths of the parties and there seemed to be months of political strife ahead. Grey differed from his colleagues in advocating abolition of the house of lords and felt so strongly that he had offered his resignation to Asquith in 1910. It was still sufficient of an anxiety to affect his diplomatic preoccupations in the early months of 1911,29 Nor were later months likely to be conducive to the cool-headed formulation of foreign policy: 'I am depressed at the thought that the spring and summer will bring the Imperial Conference and Coronation with all their interminable banquets, parties and uniforms.'30 At the cabinet meeting on 16 February, one of the first after the election,31 Grey, whose return to active duty after a bout of illness was welcomed by his colleagues, made a statement on the subject of the proposed arbitration agreement with the United States and its possible effect on treaty relations with Japan.32 It was purely in the nature of a report and no decision was required. On 6 March Taft seemed to speak with greater enthusiasm of the arbitration treaty; he had asked Knox to take it up as soon as possible now that the Japanese treaty and other urgent matters had been disposed of.33 But Knox did not feel the same urgency. Grey presented to the cabinet Bryce's despatch of 27 February, together with the text of the Olney-Pauncefote treaty of 1897, which had been signed by the president but not ratified by the 29

R. Jenkins, Asquith^ London, 1964, p. 206; G. M. Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon^ London, 1937, pp. 171-5. 30 FO 800/98, Grey to Hardinge, 18 December 1910. 31 There had been no cabinet meetings between 24 November 1910 and 8 February 1911, because of the general election. 32 CAB 41/33, Asquith to the king, 16 February 1911. 33 FO 800/83. Bryce to Grey, 6 March 1911. The United States-Japan commercial treaty had been signed on 21 February 1911. Above, p. 40.

54

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THE THIRD ALLIANCE

senate. He was determined to leave the Americans to make the definite proposals, but he circulated these preliminary documents in order that delay might be avoided when the draft treaty was received.34 In the house of commons on 13 March Grey made a judicious plea for urgency by indicating afresh that Britain would be delighted to receive proposals from the United States on the lines that President Taft had sketched out. Balfour indicated for the opposition that he too would welcome such an approach. In a conversation with the Japanese ambassador on 20 March, Grey took up the suggestions made by Kato in January. He ruled out the proposal that the alliance be excluded from the operation of any arbitration treaty as this might expose the alliance as an obstacle to arbitration. He was more attracted by the idea that the alliance should be revised by extending its term at the same time as the arbitration treaty was concluded.35 In effect, Grey had personally accepted the quid pro quo envisaged by the Japanese: extension in return for the inclusion of an arbitration clause. Kato asked that his government should respond warmly to Grey's reply. Komura welcomed the opportunity 'to strengthen and improve the alliance'. On 27 March, when Kato met Grey who was expecting to receive the American proposals any day, he went rather beyond his unspecific instructions and indicated that, in return for an extension, Japan would agree to a modification of the alliance 'which would except from it questions arising under the arbitration treaty with the United States.'36 This enabled Grey to refer the matter to his cabinet colleagues. Both sides were agreed that any revisions should not be delayed until 1914 and would be undertaken in 1911; but there was so far no specific mention of an extension for as long as ten years. At the cabinet meeting on 29 March, Grey reported on his talks with Kato, saying that the ambassador was quite willing that matters coming within the purview of an arbitration treaty with the United States should be excepted from the operation of the Japanese alliance. After considerable discussion, the cabinet decided to propose to Japan a renewal of the alliance for a further term of ten years to date from the present year.37 This was the first mention of ten years; there was no 34

CAB 37/105/22, Grey to cabinet, 8 March 1911; BD, viii, no. 458. NGB 44/1, no. 74; BD, viii, no. 411. 36 NGB 44/1, nos. 75 and 76; BD, viii, no. 414. 37 CAB 41/33, Asquith to the king, 30 March 1911. 35

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THE THIRD ALLIANCE

55

response to the Japanese suggestion that it should be strengthened; nor did it define which treaty should have priority. In other words, a good deal of scope was left to the foreign secretary. When Grey saw Kato later that day, he told him that the cabinet had unanimously agreed to revise the alliance alongside the American arbitration treaty and to extend its term. Britain proposed to wait for the communication from America before discussing a new draft of the alliance since it would be difficult to know how to amend it until the American draft arrived. On the term of extension, Grey said he was thinking of renewing it until 1920 or 1921, though he was evidently intent on keeping his options open. In any case, the extension would date from the time of completing the modifications and there was no certainty that this would be 19n.38 Had it been widely known, this decision would not have been popular in the United States. The press there was singling out the alliance as the main hindrance to the conclusion of an arbitration treaty with Britain. Ambassador Bryce seems to have been convinced that these press attacks were having an effect upon the State Department and contributing to the delay in preparing the American draft. Grey, therefore, assured the Americans that 'when the arbitration treaty is under way the point will not cause any difficulty, as it had already been discussed with Japan'.39 It was hoped that this assurance would satisfy the American officials that the alliance was being modified in a direction less dangerous for American interests. Surely this would enable the negotiation of the arbitration treaty to be taken up with some speed and permit the parallel negotiations over the alliance to be completed. A more serious criticism came from the British embassy in Tokyo. It will be recalled that on 3 April 1911 the new commercial treaty had been signed in London on terms not unsatisfactory to British interests. Ambassador MacDonald deduced that Japan had acted favourably over the tariffs because of her uncertainty about Britain's attitude towards the alliance. Now he argued that her uncertainty over Britain's willingness to renew the alliance 'would be a check to any unnecessarily forward policy on the part of Japan' in the next few critical years. The government's decision to renew it straightaway had come to him as a great surprise: his view was that, 'though a modification might with great advantage be made now, its definite extension should 38

NGB 44/1, no. 77; BD, viii, no. 415.

39 ££), viii, no. 464.

56

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THE THIRD ALLIANCE

if possible be avoided'.40 This was an awkward and untimely point of view for Whitehall. It was awkward in that MacDonald had not been consulted at all in making what had been purely a London decision and could reasonably feel aggrieved that he had learnt of it first indirectly from the Japanese. It was untimely in that it came too late for any account to be taken of it. When MacDonald's views reached London, Nicolson minuted that the ambassador had not considered the question from all points of view and Grey added that the alliance would become unpopular if it became an obstacle to an arbitration treaty with America, while the apprehension that it might not be renewed would seriously affect Japan's naval shipbuilding and Britain's.41 In short, the alliance was not being renewed solely on account of far eastern considerations — which were uppermost in MacDonald's mind — but for reasons divorced from the far east, namely naval considerations and American opposition to the alliance. MacDonald was told that these matters outweighed his belated criticisms.42 Shortly afterwards he sailed for England on 25 April to attend the coronation. Though his activities in London are not completely documented, he had a conversation with Grey on 23 May which covered articles III and IV of the new treaty. However, it can be stated with confidence that on this occasion, unlike his visit in 1901, he was not recalled for consultations; nor did he take any hand in negotiations.43 On 31 March Komura wired that he entirely agreed with Grey that major revision of the alliance was unnecessary: it only required amendment to bring it into line with the new situation. Kato wondered whether his government was thinking of inserting some clause to safeguard Japan's special interests in Manchuria and advised that there was no prospect of such an amendment receiving the approval of the British government.44 On 5 April the Japanese cabinet met to consider an argued memorandum by Komura which recommended that the alliance be renewed with the following modifications: i

to make the duration of the new treaty of alliance 10 years from the date of its signature. Since the main object of the present revision of the treaty is to extend its duration, it is necessary to fix the period of validity of the new treaty at 10 years reckoned from the date of signing. 40

BD, viii, nos. 417 and 420. 42 1 BD) viii, nos. 417 and 420; Lowe, pp. 39-42. BD^ viii, no. 419. 43 FO 371/1140 [18951], India Office to Foreign Office, 17 May 1911; BD, viii, no. 423. 44 Komura gaikoshi, ii, 405-6; NGB 44/1, no. 79. 4

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THE THIRD ALLIANCE

57

2

to add a provision whereby the treaty of alliance does not apply to a country which has a treaty of general arbitration with either of the contracting parties to the alliance. The object of this article is of course to put the United States outside the effective scope of the treaty. It would not be proper form to mention the United States specifically in the text of the treaty. Moreover the signature of the alliance may perhaps precede the completion of the arbitration agreement between Britain and the United States; and it would be difficult to take it into account before it is concluded. Thus procedurally it is best to make provision for it by way of a general clause. 3 to expunge Articles 3 and 6 from the present treaty. Article 3 of the present treaty contains the provision concerning Korea and is no longer necessary now that annexation has been completed. Article 6 is the clause relating to the Russo-Japanese war and is no longer necessary. They should both be dropped automatically. 4 to add a provision whereby Britain recognises the special interests which Japan has in adjacent territories. The provision concerning Britain's special interests near the Indian frontier contained in Article 4 of the present treaty was originally included in compensation for Britain recognising Japan's special position in Korea. While the provision concerning Korea is no longer needed on account of its annexation, Japan has as a result of its acquisition of Korea come to possess territory on the continent of Asia and has built up a relationship closely resembling the position which Britain has in India. Thus it would be appropriate if we endeavoured as far as possible to get Britain to recognise our special rights on our continental frontier on the same lines as the provision dealing with the Indian frontier. It is difficult to assess whether this would be awkward for the British government. Since, as we have said before, the main object behind the revision of the present alliance is to extend its duration, it would be best for us not to drive home this point if it becomes clear that Britain absolutely cannot agree to it.45 The cabinet approved Komura's recommendations on the points Japan should demand. Kato was immediately sent the cabinet's draft. On 7 April Kat5 who had of course had disputes with Komura in the past offered three criticisms of the draft, relating to arbitration and the Korean frontier. Over Manchuria, he urged that there was no prospect of the adoption of such amendments and moreover it was both valueless and harmful to confuse the negotiations unnecessarily.46 There developed what Kato's biographer calls a 'telegraph war' between these 45

Komura gaikoshi^ ii, 406-7.

46

Katoy i, 643-4; NGB 44/1, no. 82.

58

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THE THIRD ALLIANCE

two strong personalities. However, Komura would not listen and told Kato to act in accordance with his instructions. The ambassador raised the points in his mandate on a personal basis at a meeting with Grey on 13 April. Grey passed Kato a piece of paper on which he had written a draft of the arbitration clause 'for his own enjoyment', as he expressed it.47 Grey had already a fairly detailed knowledge of the Japanese terms because Komura had talked them over with MacDonald who had reported them to London. He did not show any enthusiasm for retaining the provision for Japan's support on the Indian frontier far less for according Japan British support on Korea's frontier. He therefore proposed that it be dropped; and the India Office made enquiries from the Government of India which agreed to the entire elimination of all mention of the 'Indian frontier' from the revised alliance.48 It was the arbitration formula which caused the greatest difficulty. Komura who was trying to find a suitable arbitration clause suggested in a farewell interview with MacDonald that the 'provisions of the revised alliance agreement should not apply when either of the [allies] has concluded a Treaty of unlimited arbitration with a third Power, unless the Third Power joins or is joined by one or more other Powers with whom either of the Allies has not concluded a Treaty of unlimited Arbitration. >49 This is an important proviso though it is not clear what was assumed. Did Japan fear that Germany or China might join with the United States in war against Japan and wish to make provision accordingly? In any case, the formula was a non-starter for Britain drew up her own formula which was close to that ultimately adopted. This was passed from Grey to Kato on 8 May: 'Nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon Japan or Great Britain the obligation of going to war with a third Power [with whom either party has an arbitration treaty].'50 Kato made clear that this did not cover many of the contingencies which his government had in mind. When the Japanese came to devise their first draft, they dovetailed these two formulae; but Grey insisted on the British wording, since arbitration was the mainspring of his interest in the present revision and extension of the alliance. 47

Kato, i, 651; NGB 44/1, nos. 84—6; BD, viii, no. 422. BD^ viii, no. 418; FO 371/1140 [18951], India Office to Foreign Office, 17 May 1911. 49 BD> viii, no. 423 (my italics). so BD^ viii, no. 424. 48

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THE THIRD ALLIANCE

59

Three days later Kato put forward suggestions to Tokyo for amending the drafts as first conceived. On 16 May the Japanese cabinet met and consented to a formal draft which was confirmed by the emperor the same day.51 Japan's draft was not merely to endorse the 1905 treaty but to 'replace' it. While, as we have seen, it adopted part of Britain's wishes over the arbitration clause, it persisted in article III in a vague clause over Korean frontiers, though it did not ask for Britain's assistance there. It included a military/naval clause in article VI and was intended to last for ten years from its signature. There was also a lengthy memorandum explaining the purpose behind the Japanese draft which came into the hands of the Foreign Office on 17 May. This was the first official draft following the personal parleys. Unlike 1901 and 1905, the Japanese had on this occasion drawn up the draft — a sign of their maturity and of the alliance's maturity. Grey did not make any observations on it — he was prepared to let the matter tick over until he received the American arbitration draft which was known to be on its way. Grey seems to have wanted to hasten slowly over Japan. He wished not to conclude anything before the arbitration agreement had made progress. The two should be concluded simultaneously, he told Kato; but, if for some reason the negotiation with the United States did not come to anything before August, it would be better to conclude negotiations with Japan so that the amended treaty would be ready when parliament met in 1912. Evidently he was not at this stage thinking in terms of an early settlement.52 Indeed, Grey was evidently stalling Japan in the hope that the arbitration treaty with the United States would precede the revision of the alliance. But Grey was to change his stance many times during these negotiations. As Ambassador Kato observed, there was in the Foreign Office during these months a 'reimetsu keiko' — a tendency to blow hot and cold.53 5i NGB 44/1, nos. 91-2 .

52 BD\, viii, no. 425

53 Kato ,i 651

C H A P T E R IV

The Imperial Conference and the Third Alliance THE Japanese were worried about the alliance being discussed at the imperial conference which was due to open in May. Prompted by parliamentary questions which urged the British government to consult the dominions fully on important imperial issues, Kato asked Grey on 8 May whether it was intended to solicit their approval of the revision of the alliance and whether there was a fear of their opinion being an obstacle to the Anglo-Japanese negotiations already in train. Grey replied that he was proposing to explain the advantages of continuing the alliance from the point of view of the defence of the mothercountry and of the dominions and to obtain the sanction of the dominions: 'it would not hinder the discussions for revision'.1 Whether Grey was quite as confident as his words implied is doubtful. Certainly the Japanese were afraid that the dominions would not favour renewal of the alliance; and these fears were not unjustified if one bears in mind the tenor of public opinion in the dominions over the past decade. If Grey had any confidence, it was because the discussions on the alliance were to be held in strict privacy, unexposed to public opinion, and were to be studied not within the context of popular sentiment but strictly in strategic and financial terms. The London government had steered the dominions' discussion of the alliance in the direction of defence considerations from early in 1911. It was agreed in March that defence questions should be discussed at meetings of a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence to which representatives of the dominions would be summoned. This would restrict the attendance and ensure that spokesmen did not play to the gallery in their speeches.2 Moreover a large number of reports 1

NGB 44/1, no. 91, contains a detailed account of Kato's discussion with Grey, which is reported in much less detail in BD, viii, no. 424. 2 CAB 38/17/13, C.I.D. sub-committee, u March 1911. 60

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE

61

were prepared on the implications for imperial defence of the continuation or termination of the alliance. On 24 March it was further agreed that a comprehensive report should be drawn up by the C.I.D. secretariat for presentation to the dominion prime ministers in advance of the conference. This was completed on 3 May under the title 'Australia and New Zealand: strategic situation in the event of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance being determined'.^ Its underlying theme was that 'it is desirable from an educative point of view that the Governments of the Dominions should understand to what extent the comparative immunity from the danger of attack at present enjoyed by them is due to the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and our close relations with the United States of America'.4 It was hoped that the discussion would veer to considerations of imperial naval power and that this would deflect the attention of delegates from their more parochial disputes with the Japanese over immigration, trade, etc. In short, the home government had tried to choose the ground most favourable to its own position.5 The C.I.D. report was printed on 19 May and duly circulated. The memorandum itself was on predictable lines. It starts with the assertion, So long as the Japanese Alliance remains operative not only is the risk of attack by Japan excluded from the category of reasonable possibilities to be provided against, but British naval requirements are held to be adequately met if the combined British and Japanese forces in the Pacific are superior to the forces in those waters maintained by any reasonably probable combination of naval Powers.

Were the alliance to be ended, the possibility of Japan being ranged against Britain, either alone or in combination with some other naval power, could not be prudently disregarded. In the event of war with Japan, Australia and New Zealand would be vulnerable and might not in the short term be defensible by the British fleet. The inescapable conclusion was that the whole strategic situation in the far east will depend largely upon the extent to which Australia and New Zealand 3 CAB 5/2/2/ySC, 4pp. Also CAB 2/2/2, C.I.D., io9th meeting, 24 March 1911. 4 CAB 38/17/13. 5 Accounts from the commonwealth constitutional angle are given in J. E. Kendle. The colonial and imperial conferences, 1883-1911, London, 1967; Lowe, pp. 271-8; I. R. Hancock, 'The 1911 Imperial Conference', Historical Studies, Australia and New Zealand (hereafter cited as Historical Studies ANZ), 12 (1966), 356-72; Nish, 'Australia and the Anglo-Japanese alliance, 1901-11', AJ Pol. Hist., 9 (1963), 207-12.

62

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE

find it possible to develop their respective contributions to the naval forces of the Empire [which together should] produce a combined fleet equal to or stronger than that of Japan... It is therefore desirable that the naval forces of the Commonwealth should be developed, and that the reorganisation of the military forces of Australia and New Zealand on the lines laid down by Lord Kitchener in 1910 should be completed without delay.6

The imperial conference assembled on 23 May and met almost daily until 20 June. Foreign policy was discussed not at the conference itself but at a special meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence held on 26 May. By this device it was possible to make frank ministerial statements and to conduct proceedings under a veil of secrecy. After a detailed review of the international situation, Grey announced that 'the practical point on which I hope a decision may be reached is that the Japanese alliance should be extended for another ten years' on the understanding that the extension does not in any way affect the freedom of the dominions to deal with the immigration question for themselves. He argued that, if the alliance were abandoned, Britain would have to keep — if we are to secure the sea communications between the Far East and Europe, and also between the Far East and Australia and New Zealand — a separate fleet in Chinese waters which would be at least equal to a two-Power standard in those waters... In the interests of strategy, in the interests of naval expenditure and in the interests of stability, it is essential that the Japanese Alliance should be extended.7

The response from the prime ministers was favourable, provided the situation over immigration remained unimpaired.8 Asquith as chairman thanked them for their approval of the alliance proposals. Such was London's attempt to 'consult' the dominions. Grey said that he was asking for a 'decision', though in fact the home government had reached the decision in March when it informed Japan of its intention to renew the alliance for ten years. What was wanted was dominion confirmation of this home government decision. Not that the dominions' reaction was unimportant. Their unanimity in favour of 6 CAB 5/2/2/78C, 3 May 1911. 7 CAB 2/2/2, C.I.D., i nth meeting, 26 May 1911, 37 pp. That part of Grey's remarks dealing with the Anglo-Japanese alliance is cut out from BD, vi, 789-90, inexcusably since it was the only substantive point on which the prime ministers' sanction was sought. My italics. & CAB 38/18/405 Lowe, pp. 275-7.

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE 63

the alliance made an important difference to the history of the renewal. But the degree of consultation was less than that at the imperial conference of 1921. The same day Grey told Kato that the proposal to prolong the alliance had met with 'cordial and unanimous approval'. He added that some of the dominions were 'apprehensive' of such a pacific invasion of their territory by the Japanese as would displace their own population. Kato replied that the Japanese were 'disposed by the Alliance to do what they could to prevent movements of Japanese emigration that were disagreeable to us. If there were no Alliance, they might be less able to influence the free movements of Japanese'. Grey concluded that 'as the Dominions' Representatives had agreed so cordially to the extension of the Alliance, my personal opinion was that we had better proceed with it, even if the Arbitration negotiations with the United States hung fire'.9 In short, because of the response of the prime ministers, Britain was prepared to go ahead with extending the alliance, regardless of arbitration developments. When the British cabinet met on 31 May, after three days in which the dominion prime ministers had met in secret session under the disguise of being the Committee of Imperial Defence, Asquith reported on the conference. He laid stress on 'the excellent tone and temper which has characterized all its discussions' and remarked with special gratification 'that representatives of the Dominions had unanimously approved the proposed renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance this year for a further term of ten years'.1** This was the case which Grey had presented to them and asked them to sanction. It would have been hard for the dominions to have vetoed the home government's proposals without assuming the obligation to make a greater naval contribution. The effect of the decision was of course to remove one cause of hesitation in months past, the fear that the southern dominions might oppose the continuation of the alliance. London could now go ahead with the renewal with the blessing of the dominions. The Japanese bent over backwards to give assurances which would meet the anxieties of the dominions. The Tokyo government confirmed Kato's views and on 7 July Foreign Minister Komura himself adverted to the remarks of the Australian premier at the conference and stated categorically that Japan 'would never countenance emigration of s* J3D, viii, no. 427; Komura gaikoshi, ii, 498-9; Kato, i, 655. *° CAB 41/33, Asquith to the king, 31 May 1911.

64

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE

her nationals to countries unwilling to receive them'.11 Novel as this assurance was, it was in line with the declaration which had earlier been given to the Americans at the time of signing the AmericanJapanese commercial treaty in February.12 DIFFICULTIES OVER ARBITRATION

Grey had left Kato with the impression that he would proceed with renewing the alliance without waiting for the satisfactory completion of the American arbitration negotiations. In fact, he did not act as precipitately as his remarks implied. There was no relevant communication between Britain and Japan between 30 May and 26 June. Why did the alliance negotiations hang fire? Partly it was because there was an air of fiesta abroad in London in preparation for the coronation of King George V on 22 June, and partly because of the pressure of work connected with the imperial conference. But it also depended on the slow pace of developments on the arbitration front. Ambassador James Bryce had become exasperated by the American delays which he attributed to the laziness of Secretary Knox and the State Department. He therefore took the serious step of going direct to President Taft on 16 May and urging him to push ahead with the negotiations quickly. Bryce's argument was that, if the treaty were signed and referred to the senate in July, it had a good prospect of passing. He received the American draft the following day and telegraphed its contents to London. Because of the continuing press comment in the United States that the Anglo-Japanese alliance as it existed was a hindrance to arbitration, Britain notified the State Department that 'it is proposed to insert a clause in the Japanese treaty so that we shall not be forced to go to war with a Power with which we have an agreement for unlimited arbitration'. The detailed text did not reach the Foreign Office till 29 May. It was circulated to the cabinet on 10 June, regarded as generally acceptable and listed for discussion along with the alliance by the cabinet on 20 June, the closing day of the imperial conference. Grey wrote apologetically that the cabinet could not arrange an earlier meeting because the imperial conference had even taken up holidays in order to complete its business.13 11 FO 371/1144 [30759], Rumbold to Grey, 7 July 1911. 13 FO 800/83, Grey to Bryce, 15 June 1911.

12

See above, p. 40.

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE 65

Meanwhile the Foreign Office was collecting the views of departments on the alliance. In fact, replies from the Admiralty and the War Office did not arrive in time for discussion by the cabinet, by which their views were naturally superseded.14 On 20 June the whole of the cabinet meeting was devoted to discussing, and suggesting amendments to, the drafts presented by the American and Japanese governments.is The criticisms were for the most part verbal and technical; and there was no question of the cabinet withholding approval. Grey, therefore, gave the go-ahead to the Japanese and Americans. He told Bryce that he hoped 'to deal with the Japanese Alliance by settling with the Japanese Government the actual wording of the new article therein in time for publication while the U.S. Senate is dealing with the Arbitration Treaty'.i FO 800/83, Grey to Bryce, 21 June 1911. i? NGB 44/1, no. 97; BD, viii, no. 428. " FO 800/68 [Grey].

66 THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE

Japanese, while withdrawing their earlier draft, sought to cover its substance by a secret exchange of notes. It was essential, said Komura, to have some understanding for the guidance of the naval and military authorities of the amount of help Japan might expect from Britain in 'the very remote contingency' of a war between Japan and America, in which America was joined by one other power.19 But Grey would not agree to any secret memorandum and would not contemplate Britain being implicated in war with the United States. Drafts of the arbitration clause were placed before the British cabinet at its meeting on 7 July, which was specially called for the purpose. The text was finally approved, the effect being, as Asquith observed, 'that the alliance will not in any event impose either upon the United Kingdom or upon Japan the obligation of going to war with the United States'.20 On 10 July the Japanese agreed to the original British formulation of the clause which made no mention of the United States by name and was fully bilateral. The text had been hammered out in hard bargaining; and Grey had dug in his toes over the arbitration provision which, he insisted, had to be in line with his own policy towards the United States. The Japanese, who stood to lose considerably from this clause as compared with the treaty of 1905, gracefully gave way after a hard fight but were presumably satisfied by gaining in return a ten years' extension of the alliance. Grey told Kato that the revised alliance had been unanimously approved by the cabinet. It was signed in London on 13 July. The Japanese had asked for two days' delay between signature and publication in order to report to the privy council and to convey the text to Russia, France and the United States. Its terms were:21 The Government of Great Britain and the Government of Japan, having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of the 12th August, 1905, and believing that a revision of that Agreement responding to such changes would contribute to general stability and repose, have agreed upon the following stipulations to replace the Agreement above mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as the said Agreement, namely: (a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India; (£) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by 19 20

FO 371/1140 [30759], Rumbold to Grey, 7 July 1911. CAB 43/33, Asquith to the king, 8 July 1911.

21

NGB 44/1, no. 102.

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE 67 insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China; (c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions:— Article I It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests. Article II If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any Power or Powers, either High Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other High Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it. Article III The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement. Article IV Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force. Article V The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the Naval and Military authorities of the High Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

68 THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE Article VI The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date. In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipsofacto^ continue until peace is concluded. A S S E S S M E N T OF THE 19!! T R E A T Y

The publication of the new agreement was not accompanied by the same kind of explanatory note that had been issued in Britain in 1902 and 1905. It was left to the text to reveal the motives of the signatories. For this purpose the very muddled preamble is not helpful. It states that the aim of the parties was to bring the alliance into line with the important changes that had taken place since 1905. The vital difference was, of course, Japan's annexation of Korea; and the effect of the new treaty was for Britain publicly to confirm her acquiescence, even if obliquely. The other important difference in the situation was Japan's greater involvement in Manchuria. Komura had sought as part of the negotiation to obtain Britain's recognition for Japan's special rights beyond her Korean frontier; but, as we have seen, Britain would not accord such recognition under the treaty. Instead, the preamble reaffirms the faith of the signatories in 'the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire*. This was an Open Door declaration in line with those in the earlier treaties. In offering premature renewal of the alliance, Komura had hoped to establish a basis on which Britain and Japan could co-operate in China and especially in Manchuria. One might say that Komura, while he was agreeable to meeting Britain's wish for an arbitration clause in order to please the Americans, was hopeful of winning Britain's support in China and thus neutralizing the hostility of Americans there which he had experienced for several years. When Komura made the proposal that Japan and Britain 'should stand together in matters Chinese',22 Grey made it clear that he was not inclined to be drawn into intervention in China with the Japanese and wanted to avoid being tied to Japan's apron strings there.23 At 22

BD, viii, no. 423.

23 Tsunoda, Manshu mondaiy p. 623.

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE 69

the same time, Grey told Kato on 26 May that he 'was quite sure the Japanese Government, though they might naturally find difficulty in controlling the free movements of their population, did not wish it to go to distant places, but preferred that it should turn to Korea, Manchuria and other regions in the neighbourhood of Japan'.24 This has important implications. By suggesting that the natural direction for Japanese emigration should be to the Asian continent, Grey was expressing the hope that Japan would check emigration into the British empire in the Pacific. Ill-defined as Open Door doctrine was, this statement was hardly consistent with it. Among the terms of the treaty the arbitration clause (article IV) which was included at Britain's request was novel. This was indeed the reason why Britain was willing to renew the alliance in 1911 instead of 1915. It is sometimes argued that arbitration was merely the flimsy pretext for amending the 1905 alliance and that Grey was really trying desperately to wriggle out of the unwelcome obligations of conflict with the United States which it imposed on Britain. Some evidence would tend to support this: after receiving the endorsement of his far eastern policy at the imperial conference, Grey was prepared to proceed with the revised alliance, whatever happened to the arbitration negotiations. But this was at a late stage in the negotiations. For most of the time Grey was genuinely wedded to the idea of arbitration and even suggested that Japan should enter into the proposed arbitration treaty with the United States. So arbitration was not merely a convenient pretext for dodging awkward commitments. Japanese are inclined to say that article IV is unilateral, that is, it favours only Britain.25 On the contrary, the article is so worded that it could also apply to any arbitration arrangement entered into by Japan. But Komura and his advisers had always distrusted arbitration. So the fact that the clause was in effect unilateral was not Britain's fault. It reflected Japan's specific desire that whatever was agreed on arbitration should be seen to be bilateral. The meaning of the arbitration clause was of course obscure and unspecific. Though Grey had wanted to specify the United States by name, the Japanese were not prepared to agree to this and so it was left as Vith a third power'. This left undefined the contingency of a fourth power joining the power with whom the arbitration treaty had been concluded. It has to be read in the light of Grey's undertaking 24

BD, viii, no. 427.

25

Tsunoda, p. 623.

70 THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE

on 26 June which was correctly reported by Kato and understood by Japan to be part and parcel of the treaty: If the United States were at war with Japan, and some other country, such as Germany, joined the United States, Great Britain would not argue that, because Germany was the ally of the United States, therefore Great Britain could not go to war with a fourth Power, even if the terms of the Alliance demanded it.26

It is true that Grey refused to give this undertaking in the form of a secret note attached to the treaty. But it doubtless had some binding force on a Liberal government in the future, though even then the phrase was so worded as to make it far from a clear-cut obligation. One general point which was to come up for discussion in later years was the application of the alliance to India. The preamble clearly speaks of the objects being those of 1905, namely the maintenance of their territorial rights in the regions of eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in those regions. Any obligation upon Japan to send troops to India in defence of the northwest frontier had been explicitly withdrawn at Britain's wish in the course of negotiation. But was there any residual responsibility for India itself? Some Japanese thought there was: the Hochi Shimbun^ an anti-government paper, spoke of Japan as still being 'India's policeman', though its exact image is not quite clear.2? In India the new viceroy, Lord Hardinge, wrote that the alliance was an 'important factor, upon which the external peace and security of India so largely depend', though he was evidently not referring to the third alliance specifically. In reply to a parliamentary question, the Foreign Office stated that the geographical area to which the alliance relates had not changed from the 1905 treaty but had gone on to say that it did not apply to Persian defence.28 As the decade developed and as Indian nationalism became a factor to contend with, the Indian authorities became less happy about any reference to India in the alliance and wanted all mention of it dropped when the treaty came up for review. In the treaties of 1902 and 1905, the 'enemy contemplated' was Russia. It was no longer Russia in 1911; but who was it? Many writers 26

BD, viii, no. 428; NGB 44/1, nos. 97-8. Quoted in A. L. P. Dennis, The Anglo-Japanese alliance, Berkeley, 1923, p. 37. 2 8 J3D3 viii, no. 443; Lowe, p. 29. 27

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE

71

have interpreted the alliance of 1911 retrospectively and claimed that the 'enemy contemplated' was Germany. I cannot accept this view. Firstly, I do not believe that the evidence suggests that Britain was set on a war course with Germany as early as 1910 or 1911.29 Nor is there evidence that Britain in the negotiation of the treaty was thinking of enlisting Japan's support against Germany. What is true is that Germany crops up in the remarks just quoted over the arbitration clause. Moreover, Britain's desire for renewal sprang from her inability to countenance building up her fleet in the far east at the same time as she was confronting Germany in European waters. In May Britain had been seriously vexed by Germany's reply over naval disarmament and had told Germany so.30 It can be said that the treaty of 1911 reflected a subsidiary British response to German naval building. It left Britain indirectly, though not in its wording, free to build in Europe or concentrate there without worrying about Japanese naval competition. But, except for this naval sense, Germany was not the 'enemy contemplated' under the 1911 treaty.31 Those who associate the renewal with German activities make great play of the coincidence between the signature of the alliance and the outbreak of the Agadir crisis. Many studies hint that it was rushed through because of the Mediterranean emergency, which started with the arrival of the gunboat Panther at Agadir on i July.32 It is true that it was at the cabinet called to finalize the alliance that Grey reported his important communications to France and Germany; it is also true that Lloyd George's Mansion House speech followed within a week of the signature of the third alliance. It is true that there was a flurry of activity in the last fortnight before signature, that is, between 26 June and 13 July. But this was not caused by Agadir or the deteriorating European situation. Rather it was caused by two circumstances inherent in the renewal: the late receipt in London of the arbitration draft and the difficulty of the British cabinet in giving early attention to it because of the imperial conference. Against these two delays, there 29 Dennis, pp. 32-4; Ishii, Gaiko yoroku, pp. 68-9; Tsunoda, pp. 625-6; Chang Chung-fu, The Anglo-Japanese alliance^ Baltimore, 1931, pp. 157-8; A. W. Griswold, The far eastern policy of the United States-, Newhaven, 1938, pp. 168-9. 30 CAB 41/33, Asquith to the king, 17 May 1911. 31 Kajima, Nichi-Ei gatkoshi, p. 464, pleads strongly for Britain's anti-German feelings being the key to the renewal in 1911. 32 Among authors who hint at this are Marder, From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, p. 239; Dennis, Anglo-Japanese alliance, p. 34. But see Lowe, p. 47n.

72 THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE

has to be set the urgency of getting the alliance completed before the senate considered the arbitration treaty. Thus there was inevitably a spate of activity early in July but this was not connected with Agadir. It is possible to be oversubtle in associating the Japanese alliance with European events and affairs. The 1911 treaty was largely negative and contained few original ideas. It altered its predecessor only slightly in scope and objectives. Indeed, while one can speak of the 1905 treaty as being a revised treaty, one can speak of the 1911 treaty as being primarily a renewal. This is perhaps to neglect the importance of the arbitration clause, but this only expressed in words what was already recognized in London and Tokyo, the truth that Britain would not go to war with the United States for Japan's sake. That apart, the vital clause was the continuation of the treaty for ten years. Britain wanted it for naval reasons; Japan for security, being afraid of the prospect of isolation from 1915 onwards. Let no one under-estimate the significance of renewing the treaty until 1921 —it could not be revoked during this long and eventful period — but the extension was not particularly novel. Before we conclude this survey of the 1911 treaty, it is necessary to add a word to assess which country benefited more. Professor Tsunoda wrote that the 1911 negotiations are to be distinguished from those of 1901 and 1905 by being resolved by a unilateral concession on the part of Japan, for which Komura is criticized.33 Certainly Japan made a concession over arbitration. Certainly Britain gained something psychologically by being exempted from her obligation to go to the aid of Japan in the event of war with the United States. This was regarded as the first step towards the sought after rapprochement with the United States. Another Japanese commentator, Ishii, who as the foreign vice-minister at the time was well-informed, has observed that 'such real benefits as Britain received from the Anglo-Japanese alliance came primarily from the third alliance'.34 This may be true. But it was at the cost of tying her hands to those of Japan for ten years and at the risk of thereby discrediting herself in the east. By some ingenious argument, Ishii proceeds to praise the renewal of the alliance as the highpoint of Komura's policy. His reasoning runs: for Japan, the British alliance was merely an 'alcove decoration' (tokonoma no kazarimono), it reflected credit on the country but conferred few practical advantages on it: Britain was in a dilemma, being prevented by 33

Tsunoda, pp. 623-7.

34 Ishii, Gaiko yoroku, p. 74

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE 73

the alliance of 1905 from entering into an arbitration treaty with the Americans; Komura launched a 'life-boat' to Britain by agreeing to a modification of the alliance but without sacrificing anything of substance. It was a triumph for Komura, who was able, as the Japanese variant of the English metaphor has it, to kill two rabbits with the one stone: it won for Japan Britain's goodwill and secured American approbation. 35 it was a weak treaty since Japan had no guarantee of assistance against the United States but this did not particularly matter since the alliance was only a decoration at the best of times. Other Japanese authors by no means accept Ishii's assumptions or the gist of his argument. Professor Kajima clearly does not hold the alliance to have been a mere ornament. He criticizes the unsoundness of Komura's diplomacy, questioning whether it was wise for Japan to take the initiative in revising the alliance prematurely and suggesting that it would have been better to have awaited developments over arbitration and possibly have retained the second alliance for its full term till 1915. I would hold with Kajima that the Japanese decision to offer renewal was based on an unsound estimate of Britain's mind: Japan was unduly afraid that Britain might otherwise denounce the alliance.36 This was hardly likely either in 1911 or in 1915.1 would disagree with Ishii who praises Komura for his skilful diplomacy but criticizes him by implication for concluding a weak treaty. Komura's greatness lay in his recognition that, by offering guarantees over America, he was not really making a major concession; in return for the arbitration clause, Japan was getting substantial rewards. She was disappointed about it to be sure, but she gained over Korea and over the prolongation of the alliance. While one can never draw up a balance sheet for an alliance, there is some ground for believing that the treaty accorded equivalent benefits to each side. It was by no means an 'unequal treaty' representing only concessions by Japan. Some closing comments should be offered on the nature of the negotiations. They were much less dramatic than in 1901 or 1905 on the British or the Japanese side. We know much less about any disagreements which they provoked, especially on the Japanese side,37 but there is not much evidence of opposition from the genro. The whole seems to have been carried through without difficulty from the officials 35 Ibid., pp. 68-72. 36 Kajima Morinosuke, Nikon gaiko seisaku no shiteki kosatsu, Tokyo, 1938, p. 274. 37 NGB 44/1 does not provide much apart from the bare bones of negotiation.

74 THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE

and cabinet. It was a secretariat alliance, negotiated secretly, without any of the disclosures of 1905. It was the responsibility of Komura and Katsura who had held similar posts in 1902 and 1905. They were able to bring it to fruition without consulting press opinion or taking account of opposition. Much depended also on the strength and influence of Kato, who was ready to argue with Komura, for the sake of long-term political advantages. Japan took the initiative in making the renewal. This was the claim made by her government; and it is substantially true. Moreover, she put up the draft, even though the language of negotiation was English. Presumably the drafting was the work of Denison. Moreover, she had set the pace throughout, while Grey was inclined to delay. This was the reverse of what one might have expected: Britain was slipping out of an unwelcome obligation and one would have expected her to take the initiative, but it was not so. Different from 1901 and 1905, Komura, with the realism which characterized his foreign policy, decided once he had resolved on renewal in 1911, to press strongly and keep up the momentum. It was indeed a sign of Japan's diplomatic maturity. In Britain too, it was a secretariat alliance. It was a tribute to the enthusiasm of Whitehall which was deaf to the opposition of interested groups in Britain. Grey carried it through alone and received consistent support from the cabinet. He showed himself to be a convinced exponent of the alliance, although he was aware of its shortcomings. Despite his visit to London, MacDonald, who did not know of Grey's intentions until late in the day, contributed little. The renewal was approved by the dominion prime ministers, who once again acted without consulting feeling in their home territories. Once they were apprised of the naval position, they gave a ready assent. Colonial Secretary Harcourt had disparagingly said that a presentation of the strategic aspects of the alliance 'might perhaps have a most useful educative effect on Colonial opinion' at the approaching conference.38 With the facts in front of them, the premiers backed the London government in the line which it had already adopted. In the main, Grey had his own way. REACTIONS TO THE 1 9 1 1 ALLIANCE

It is always difficult to assess the reaction to a treaty, since so much depends on the weight given to the words of condemnation or praise 3

8 CAB 38/17/5, C.I.D., io8th meeting, 26 January 1911.

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE

75

accorded to it. This is particularly true of the 1911 alliance. The alliance was no longer novel, and the new treaty hardly came as a surprise which caught the headlines. It had been attacked in both countries before the renewal was negotiated, and it was not to be expected that its premature renewal would be welcomed in various quarters. In Japan especially, those who were most in favour of the alliance for the sake of the security which it offered her were not likely to be pleased with the weakening of its terms.39 Its reception was predictably less cordial than in 1902 or 1905. But both governments —and they were once again the initiators of this 'secretariat alliance' — were disposed to be philosophical and to make allowances for the reactions which had been growing up over the years. They took the view that, on the whole, the response was as satisfactory as could have been expected. As in the case of the previous alliance agreements, the 1911 treaty was communicated in advance to chosen governments. On the day of signature, it was passed to the allied diplomatic representatives of the United States, Russia and France for early transmission to their governments. There was no arrangement for it to be communicated to Germany, for reasons which are not altogether clear. Neither Britain nor Japan had a special treaty relationship with Germany; and this may have distinguished her from the chosen countries. It is unlikely that the signatories regarded the 1911 treaty as being anti-German or offensive to Germany. The treaty was published in London on the evening of 14 July and in Japan on the following day. In British papers like The Times, it was generally welcomed. Those like the Manchester Guardian and Daily News, which had been critical of the alliance in the past, chose to praise the new treaty with its arbitration clause. This was the reaction in Canada and Australia. In parliament a number of questions were asked, but these did not imply criticism. To some extent the announcement slipped through unawares, especially on account of the Agadir crisis, Lloyd George's Mansion House speech and the resulting public anxiety which did not subside till September. Kato, though he was perhaps a sanguine commentator, commented on the change in British attitudes from a year before and the favourable reception which was now given to the revised treaty.40 39 E. B. Mitford, 'The future of Japan', National Review, 60 (1912), 840: 'The Alliance in its present form has not in Japanese eyes the same value as that of 1905.' 40 Katoy i, 657; The Times, 14 July 1911; Lowe, pp. 51-3.

76 THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE

In Japan, reaction was more full-throated. The publication of the alliance followed after that of the Chinese currency loan agreement which seemed to the Japanese to challenge their interests in Manchuria. This led the newspapers to be cooler than might otherwise have been the case. The Osaka Mainichi was most fierce in its attack, claiming that recent events in the far east had proved Britain to be an unreliable ally and that the alliance had already outlived its usefulness. Even the Jiji Shimpo, the stoutest defender of the alliance, was more moderate in its praise. On the alliance as such, the British charge d'affaires reported that, with a few exceptions, comments were favourable.41 Moreover, Vice-minister Ishii admitted to him that 'only the yellow press showed any discontent with or desired to criticize the terms of the Agreement'.42 On a different tack Hayashi Tadasu, the old apostle of the alliance, writing in the Jiji Shimpo, seems by implication to have been critical of his government for not identifying itself with the Anglo-American arbitration treaty, since to resort to arbitration was an ever-increasing tendency among 'civilized nations'.43 Press reaction overseas was analytical without being consciously involved. There was no particular opposition to its terms, even in Germany. Le Temps of Paris observed judiciously that the alliance which had formerly been renowned for its practical benefits to both sides had now taken on a more theoretical quality and did not afford positive assistance to either. Novoye Vremya felt that it was a wellbalanced treaty: some parts were a clear victory for Japanese diplomacy, but the arbitration clause was of definite value to Britain. None of these newspapers saw the treaty as affecting their own national interest adversely. ANGLO-AMERICAN ARBITRATION

TREATY

The fact that the 1911 treaty was communicated in advance to the State Department brought it into line with the procedure followed in 1902 and 1905.^ But the American connection was in this case a good deal closer in that the existing treaty had been amended well in ad41

FO 371/1140 [31183], Rumbold to Grey, 17 July 1911. 2 BD, viii, no. 445. But see Tsunoda, Manshu mondal^ pp. 625-9. 43 BDy viii, no. 446. Cf. Hayashi memoirs, p. 17, which contains an extract from Hayashi's contribution to the coronation number of the Japan Times, presumably 22 June 1911 (and not 22 July as stated), 44 BD, viii, no. 437. 4

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE 77

vance of its expiry in order to meet the needs of the proposed arbitration negotiations. When the alliance was announced, Ambassador Bryce described the American mood as one of great pleasure; it would, he hoped, serve 'to extinguish the attempts made here to stir up illfeeling between the United States and Japan'.45 The Japanese generally resented the attention which Britain was inclined to pay to American demands. They were not convinced of the merits of arbitration treaties, and certainly not of those unlimited in scope. Japanese international lawyers were inclined to be sceptical of the principle of general arbitration and had successfully convinced the Foreign Ministry against it. Kato who knew of this condemned their attitude as one of'empty theory' and emphasized the need for a realistic approach.46 It was perhaps in the knowledge of this Japanese opposition that President Taft went out of his way to praise the generosity of Japan for modifying the alliance in the course of a welcoming speech to Admiral Togo on 5 August during his American visit.47 Ambassador Bryce signed the arbitration treaty with Philander Knox on 3 August. One of the reasons why he had pressed the Americans to hurry up with the drafting had been to 'get it to the Senate as soon as possible'. The senate which had the right to withhold consent from treaties presented by the president had a Republican majority which was divided; and it was by no means certain that it would support the treaty. The Foreign Relations Committee deliberated on it from 5 August; but the report of the majority spokesman — Senator Henry Cabot Lodge — stressed that the conclusion of treaties of arbitration was an infringement by the administration of senate rights. Without taking a decision, the senate went into recess. When the treaty came under senate scrutiny again in January 1912, an amendment was moved by Lodge which was 'tantamount to saying that nothing is to be arbitrated under the Treaty if it is not to the interest of the United States to arbitrate it'.4« When it was passed by the senate in March, it made reservations which ran counter to the 45 FO 800/83, Bryce to Grey, 17 July 1911. T. Dennett in a highly disputable phrase had argued that 'President Roosevelt had made the American Government an unsigned member of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance* {Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese war, p. 317). R. B. Haldane, the secretary for war, had told an American representative in January 1911 of his hope that before he left office he would see some agreement between the United States, Britain and Japan and added that England stood ready to use her best efforts to smooth over any difficulties between the United States and Japan (E. H. Zabriskie, American-Russian rivalry in the far east, Philadelphia, 1946, p. 179). 4* Kato, i, 658. 47 NGB 44/1, no. 130. 48 BD, viii, no. 513

78 THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE

president's advice and made the treaty unacceptable both to him and to Britain. There was little further hope of any legislation being taken up until the presidential election had been held in November. Disheartened at the failure of what he had thought of as the major achievement of his seven-years' embassy. Ambassador Bryce sought permission to resign. The arbitration treaty lapsed because of the weak position of President Taft and because of differences of view on the powers of the senate. It was not dropped on the merits of the treaty or its international aspects. Because of this denouement, article IV of the 1911 alliance did not come into effect. Britain's main purpose in amending the treaty had been unexpectedly frustrated by reason of domestic politicking in the United States. Where did this leave the Anglo-Japanese alliance? In legal terms, article IV lapsed so far as the United States was concerned since the arbitration treaty had not been ratified; and Britain's assistance to Japan was prescribed under article II. It had, however, transpired during the negotiations that Britain had no intention of going to the assistance of Japan in the event of war with the United States. The Japanese had, moreover, discounted the possibility of receiving aid in such circumstances. But the Japanese government naturally clung to the letter of the 1911 treaty. It was only after 1917 that it allowed its ambassadors, Ishii Kikujiro, Hayashi Gonsuke and Shidehara Kijuro, to announce publicly that Japan had never seriously expected Britain's assistance if she were engaged in war with America.^ The unwritten understanding between the two powers was known also to the State Department. But, in the decade of bad American-Japanese feeling which followed 1911, it was never politic for the State Department to make the real position public. When the alliance was assailed by illinformed criticisms in the American press from 1918 onwards, the administrations found it politically disadvantageous to intervene by countering the misinformation. Thus, although the arbitration clause had proved to be a failure, Britain's underlying reluctance to give military assistance to Japan was better understood after 1911 in the Japanese and American administrations. This is not to efface the deep disappointment felt in British circles at the failure of the arbitration treaty. In the case of Bryce, whose aspira49

Ishii, Gaiko yorokuy p. 71, where Ishii explains that during his mission to the United States in 1917 he told American audiences of Japan's willingness in 1911 to exclude the United States from the scope of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. See below, pp. 316, 342.

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE 79 tions had been so high, the resulting depression was painful.50 In the case of Whitehall, there was a certain resignation at the senate's frustrating the diplomatic purposes of the administration. But so much that had been done over the Japanese treaty to accommodate American susceptibilities seemed to have been sacrificed for the sake of the senate's amour propre. JAPANESE CABINET CHANGES

As in 1905, the Katsura cabinet did not long survive the conclusion of the alliance treaty. During the last week in August Katsura resigned. Though it had eliminated some opposition by the compromise settlement it had made with the Seiyukai party, the ministry was faced with demands for increases in the army and navy, and these could only be financed by the floating of loans which would have run counter to Katsura's promise to follow a policy of retrenchment. Moreover, it felt that it had accomplished its objects, particularly in the field of foreign policy. It had pushed through the annexation of Korea without exciting the opposition of any major power; it had brought off the new commercial treaties which enshrined the principle of tariff autonomy. For these achievements, Katsura had been honoured in April by promotion to the rank of prince, thereby setting him above all of the Elder Statesmen except Prince Yamagata, while Komura and the governorgeneral of Korea, General Terauchi, had been promoted to count.51 A devotee of the British alliance must blush to record that its renewal probably took a subsidiary place among the government's objectives and represented in Japanese eyes a lesser achievement. It is an odd coincidence that the same team which carried through the alliance in 1902 and 1905 should again be responsible for its renewal in 1911. Katsura had always been favourable to it, but in 1911 he was more concerned with financial, than with diplomatic, problems. There is probably some truth in the view that it was this preoccupation with financial stringency that explained 'the almost unnatural haste of the Japanese to renew the alliance this year and the detente in AmericanJapanese relations'.52 But Katsura's support was incidental: the moving 50

E. S. A. Ions, James Bryce and American democracy, 1830—1922, London, 1968, pp. 230-7. 51 These promotions were announced on 21 April 1911. Kato's promotion to baron for services connected with the renewal of the alliance took effect in August. 52 FO 371/1140 [49940], MacDonald to Grey, 27 November 1911.

8o THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE AND THE THIRD ALLIANCE

spirit was Komura. It had been his vision to take the initiative to renew the alliance prematurely. Yet its fulfilment was at times threatened by Komura's acute ill-health. During the course of negotiations he had been seized with a severe attack of pneumonia which his frail frame seemed quite unable to bear.53 But he pulled through and later confessed that he wanted above all to ensure Japan's security for the future by completing the third alliance. Shortly after his retirement he died, on 26 November at the age of 5 7, having been foreign minister for the greater part of the decade. On 30 August Katsura bowed out in favour of Prince Saionji and his Seiyukai ministry without the intervention of the genro. Though Saionji was president of the party, his appointment was not really as a party man. It was his deputy premier, Hara Kei (Takashi) who infused the element of party politics, so distrusted by Japanese conservatives. A cartoon of the time captured the spirit of the transfer by showing Katsura's bullet-shaped head being extended like a concertina and turned into the long face of Saionji, above the caption 'the long and the short of it*. The implication was that the two were in essence the same thing, offering no real policy alternative. Saionji faced the same financial troubles which had brought Katsura to despair, and it was with these domestic problems that Japan would be preoccupied down to 1914. 53 FO 371/1145 [51951], MacDonald to Grey, 9 December 1911.

CHAPTER V

The Aftermath of the Third Alliance ALTHOUGH the alliance had been prolonged for ten years, it was immediately thrust into a situation which threatened its very existence. The reasons why it held together were that Britain recognized the naval benefits she derived from the alliance exceeded the disadvantages she suffered from Japan's continental activities and that Japan saw no reason to end the alliance. Japanese politicians, certainly, were dissatisfied with the scale of advantages which their country derived from the new treaty and sought to modify it by giving it increasingly a Chinese orientation. For this purpose, the outbreak of the Chinese revolution in October 1911 was a moment of opportunity. At its outset, the allies were united in proclaiming a policy of strict neutrality. Within a month they drifted apart, the Japanese cabinet favouring support for a constitutional monarchy and the British keen to leave China to determine her own destiny. It was, however, through the influence of British officials in China that an armistice was worked out between the government and the revolutionaries. The Japanese felt that it compromised Britain's position to have treated openly with the southern republicans. This criticism became even more shrill when the Ching emperor abdicated in February 1912 and a republic was declared. To the members of the Japanese Diet, then in session, this represented the complete failure of Japan's diplomacy. The Saionji ministry felt an increasing sense of grievance against Britain, who, it seemed, had played a part in this failure.1 One of the casualties of the crisis in Japan was the alliance. It is possible to argue that the alliance was not relevant to events in China, except in so far as it professed to guarantee China's territorial integrity. However, this was not how it was viewed by many Japanese * M. Ikei, 'Japan's response to the Chinese revolution of 1911', J4S, 25 (1966), 21327; Kajima, Nichi-Ei gaikoshi, pp. 434-6; M. C. Wright, China in revolution: the first phase 2900-13, New Haven, 1968; P. C. Lowe, ch. 3; Tsunoda, pp. 741-4. 81

82

THE AFTERMATH OF THE THIRD ALLIANCE

who saw it as a possible instrument of co-operation in China. When it failed to live up to this promise in 1911, it was widely attacked in the newspapers. Thus, the Osaka Mainichi accused Britain of bad faith in that, by treating directly with the revolutionary forces, she had betrayed the basic principle of the alliance which guaranteed the territorial integrity of China; and it branded the alliance as a dead letter in that there had been no sign of co-operation between the two signatories during the crisis.2 The Kokumin Shimbun went even further: the Japanese government would be unwise in China to follow the lead of Britain, which was already a sated power; if it did not take a resolute line of its own, Japan would be left empty-handed when the moment of opportunity passed.3 These criticisms of the alliance as it affected China were widely reported in Britain and attracted adverse comment. Only the most pro-alliance of newspapers, Jiji Shimpo, claimed defensively that the alliance had been beneficial and pointed out that Japan could never have annexed Korea had it not been in existence.4 One who was anxious to stem the tide of criticism against the alliance in both countries was Kato. Having completed the treaty of commerce and the revision of the alliance, he had taken a spell of leave and had been observing the mounting criticism of the alliance in Tokyo since October. Kato had served with the Saionji cabinet in 1906 and had a certain influence with the present Saionji government. He argued that, to meet the harsh attacks on Britain and the alliance, the Japanese government should make a firm declaration that the alliance was still the centrepiece of its policy. If this were done in the form of a message to Britain, whose newspapers were filled with accounts of Japan's doings in China, it would have a reassuring effect. Kato's proposal was that he should bear on his return a message from the Emperor Meiji to the British king regarding the alliance. He secured the agreement of Saionji and of Foreign Minister Uchida. When Kato approached the genro, he found that they hesitated. It was all very well for the emperor to express cordiality between the two courts but he should not be forced to enter the political arena by lending his backing to a given treaty. The genro were in any case sympathetic to turning towards Russia rather than concentrating unduly on the British al2

Osaka Mainichi, 18 January 1912. Kokumin Shimbun^ 5 February 1912. 4 J. O. P. Bland, Recent events and present policies in China^ London 1912, pp. 364-5; FO 371/1369 [18675], MacDonald to Grey, 18 April 1912. 3

THE AFTERMATH OF THE THIRD ALLIANCE

83

liance. None the less they were talked round to a compromise arrangement which would not commit the emperor too much. On 9 April 1912 the cabinet unanimously agreed to a course similar to that advocated by Kato. Saionji informed the emperor and a rescript was drawn up conveying 'imperial orders on his return to duty'.5 MacDonald called on Kato on 17 April just as he returned from the palace and was shown the emperor's autograph letter, stating that the benefits of the alliance increased as time went on.6 Kato was also given a more specific message from the cabinet entitled 'Imperial foreign policy towards Britain', which was, exceptionally, signed by all cabinet ministers. It stated: The alliance is the crux [marrow] of the Japanese government's foreign policy and is an object which it will always unflinchingly uphold. It will be our policy not only to stress and preserve the alliance but hereafter to strengthen the foundations of the alliance more and more and work towards the preservation of peace in the far east and support for our imperial interests.

Kato was to endeavour to improve relations between the two countries.7 He returned to his post satisfied at having induced his government to give him the mandate he requested. Kat5 reached London on 5 May and, after presenting the messages to Grey, passed over the Emperor Meiji's message at a special audience with the king at Buckingham palace on 14 May. The two messages were of course very welcome to Britain which took the view that divergent interests were bound to emerge and had to be accepted. The king in due course replied that he hoped that 'the alliance which has been productive of such beneficial results, may long be maintained'.8 In his July foreign policy statement to the house of commons, Grey thought it politic to pay tribute to the alliance. It had, he said, in the last few years worked nothing but good: it had not brought Britain into worse relations with any other power, it had prevented disturbances in China from giving rise to international apprehensions, and moreover, it had conferred similar benefits on the Japanese.9 That there were grounds for believing that a reassertion of Grey's faith in the alliance was necessary goes without saying, but were there other 5 Kato, i, 668. FO 371/1389 [18675], MacDonald to Grey, 18 April 1912. 7 Kato, i, 669. 8 Kato, i, 670. 9 House of commons debates, 10 July 1912, 40, 1991-3. Extracts quoted in Lowe, pp. 87-8.

84

THE AFTERMATH OF THE THIRD ALLIANCE

reasons for this political gesture? Certainly Japan had just concluded her new agreement with Russia and it was important to assure British opinion that this was not aimed at Britain. Senior statesmen on both sides recognized that the two countries could not follow an identical path on all issues and that conflicts would unfailingly arise which the alliance would have to be large enough to comprehend. Only on this basis could their special relationship hope to survive.10 An opportunity soon arose to give expression to the special relationship. The death of the Emperor Meiji was the end of an age of achievement for Japan. It was natural that his funeral on 13 September 1912 should be the occasion for an expression of national mourning and also of international respect. While the Japanese were slow to make the appropriate arrangements,11 most of the major countries decided to send distinguished delegations. Prince Henry of Prussia attended for Germany, Secretary of State Knox for the United States, and the British mission was led by Prince Arthur of Connaught, who had led an earlier mission in I9o6.12 While he was in Tokyo, Prince Arthur invested the new Taish5 emperor with the Order of the Garter, the highest honour available to a foreign sovereign and one which his father had acquired only in 1906. This too was an attempt to reinforce Anglo-Japanese relations at a time when they were generally under attack, but its effectiveness can never be measured. Certainly the Emperor Taisho was not likely to carry the influence and charisma which his father had attracted in his last years, and it was already known in diplomatic circles that he was lacking intellectually and temperamentally.^

BRITAIN'S FAR EASTERN NAVAL CONCERNS Grey had used no mere idle rhetoric when he had told the house of commons in July 1912 that 'the relation between the Japanese alliance 10

Cf. Bland, Recent events and present policies in China, pp. 364—5. The third RussoJapanese agreement was signed on 8 July, two days before Grey's speech. 11 Kato, i, 687, complained of the dreadful suspense and unpardonable negligence of his government. 12 Other members were Lord Methuen, Admiral Poe and Miles Lampson. Prince Fushimi accompanied by Admiral Togo and General Nogi had earlier gone to London to attend the coronation of King George V in 1911. Prince Arthur of Connaught reported that Britain had 'been invited to land 500 men to take part in the funeral. Not so the foreigners, which is sure to annoy them considerably' (Royal archives, AA. 43, Prince Arthur to the king, 8 September 1912). 13 FO 371/1391 [38857], MacDonald to Grey, 28 August 1912.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE THIRD ALLIANCE

85

and naval strategy is an intimate one'.14 Though, as I have argued, the Agadir crisis of July 1911 had come too late to affect the conclusion of the third Japanese alliance, it was to have its repercussions in the months following. The Agadir incident had brought to light the unreadiness of the Royal Navy and underlined the need for further concentration of Britain's naval strength nearer home waters which became the subject of urgent study. The failure of Haldane's mission to Berlin and the publication of the German supplementary naval bill (or Novelle) in March 1912 created a situation where positive steps had to be taken, even though diplomatic means were still being employed to remove Anglo-German naval tensions. Things were not improved by the naval activities of the powers in the Mediterranean: the Austrians and Italians were beginning to construct Dreadnoughts, while the Germans had, after their humiliation at Agadir, decided to establish a Mediterranean squadron. The main solution to this developing rivalry between Britain and the nations of the triple alliance seemed to the Admiralty to be further concentration. But it was difficult for Britain to pursue a policy of drastic concentration, while maintaining British squadrons equivalent to the German ones in every foreign station. Not least among the Admiralty's worries was the China station where, according to the new first lord, Winston Churchill, Britain was 'pledged under the Treaty with Japan to maintain the strongest Fleet of any European Power in those waters'. It is doubtful whether Britain was so pledged: she had been up to 1905 but it is uncertain whether the obligation continued thereafter. At all events, Britain could not honour such a commitment, and Churchill only conceded that the China squadron was 'practically equal to Germany'.15 The strong German Pacific squadron under Vice-Admiral Maximilian Count von Spee was concentrated on the naval base of Tsingtao in the leased territory of Kiaochow. Von Spee's squadron consisted of two up-to-date armoured cruisers16 and three light cruisers. It was the Admiralty plan in 1912 to oppose this with four armoured cruisers on the China station and one in Australia. The trouble was that, with the many competing demands, it was impos14

House of commons debates^ 10 July 1912, 40, 1991-3. R. Churchill (ed.), Winston Spencer Churchill^ ii, Companion vol. 3, London, 1969, memorandum by Churchill, 2 February 1914. 16 Scharnhorst (completed 1907; 11,420 tons; 23.2 knots; 8 x 8.2", 6 X 5.9") and Gnelsenau (1908; 11,420 tons; 23.5 knots; 8 x 8.2", 6 X 5.9")' 15

86

THE AFTERMATH OF THE THIRD ALLIANCE

sible to meet this target.17 By 1913 the strength of the China squadron had been reduced to two armoured cruisers and was inferior to Germany's.1* One way of overcoming this deficiency was by arranging cooperation with other navies in the area. The commander-in-chief, China from 1910 to 1913, Vice-Admiral Sir Alfred Winsloe, held discussions with his French opposite number which led to an informal understanding that the two squadrons should unite under a single joint command in any emergency with a third power. The key to success lay in devising a joint signal manual which was sent to all far eastern commanders under seal with instructions that it should not be opened unless specifically ordered. But the French squadron was a weak one and, being charged with the defence of Indochina, it was uncertain how mobile it would be if war broke out.19 The puzzle, therefore, is why Britain did not rely more upon her ally, Japan.20 Of course, there were obligations of naval support implicit in the 1911 alliance, but, at this stage, Britain did not attempt to crystallize them or build upon them. Perhaps this was partly the legacy of the Fisher era, when the first sea lord had been reluctant to co-operate too much with the Japanese navy in their various requests.21 Partly it may be accounted for by the current expansive mood within Japanese naval circles, which was giving rise to serious political crises in 1911 and 1912. It was presumably Britain's object to secure Japan's naval co-operation in an emergency without encouraging too much Japan's penchant for building Dreadnoughts which might in the long run be used to challenge Britain's overall naval superiority. 17

Cf. CAB 37/111/89, memorandum by W. S. Churchill, 6 July 1912. Minotaur (1908; 14,600 tons; 23.1 knots; 4 X 9.2", 10x7.5") an ii, 144.

92

THE AFTERMATH OF THE THIRD ALLIANCE

the 'Taisho seihen', the political crisis which had reached a new peak. As soon as he reached Shimonoseki, he encountered Katsura's emissary who asked him to join the new Doshikai party which Katsura had just formed and to depart from his former Seiyukai alignment. There were those who tried to prevent this; but doubtless the attractions of cabinet office after five years elsewhere were enough to over-ride any reluctance on Kato's part. He reached Tokyo on 28 January and met Katsura at his house in Shimo 2 Bancho the next morning. He seems to have agreed to join the Doshikai and was offered the portfolio of foreign minister and the post of deputy premier. 3 3 As Kato did when he was invited to become a minister in October 1900, he laid down conditions before accepting: the practice of 'two-tier diplomacy' should be repudiated; he would as foreign minister accept full responsibility for foreign affairs; if the military party disagreed with his notions of foreign policy, he relied on Katsura to keep the military under control. When these conditions had been accepted, Kato was sworn in at Aoyama palace the same afternoon. 34 Kato's days in office were concerned not with foreign policymaking but with mediation in the domestic political crisis. He found Katsura in despair over the opposition from all sides. Katsura had tried to strengthen his political position by the formation of his new Doshikai party on 20 January and he could not therefore expect the special arrangement of 1911 with the Seiyukai president, Saionji, to continue. Kato's solution for this party impasse was that, just as the party leaders in Britain had made a pact before King George V, so there should be a political truce between Katsura and Saionji before the new sovereign. There were talks on 8 February which seemed to reach agreement. The emperor intervened to ask the Seiyukai to retract its motion of no confidence. But this did not succeed and on 10 February it was announced that the cabinet had resigned.35 In the hope of reducing the army-navy friction which had contributed to the Taish5 political crisis, the 'father of the navy', Admiral Yamamoto Gombei, was declared the new prime minister. He would have been glad if Kato had continued as foreign minister. Indeed he sent Kato an invitation through Makino Nobuaki (Shinken), who was a friend of Kato since student days together in London. But Kato, 33

34 Kato, i, 690 and 698. Kato, i, 698; Nish, pp. 101-2. Kato, i, 702-4; Najita, chs. 7 and 8 passim. Katsura died shortly after on 10 October 1913. Another stalwart of the alliance, Hayshi Tadasu, had died in July of that year. 35

THE AFTERMATH OF THE THIRD ALLIANCE

93

having identified himself with Katsura's Doshikai party, was in a delicate position and felt it proper to decline. He marked the event in his diary in English, which was his private foible, describing it as 'the day I refused to stay in office'.36 His departure from office after only twelve days must have been a bitter blow for such an ambitious man. Makino was appointed in his stead, but Kato, so his biographer argues, was on such good terms with both Yamamoto and Makino that he was able to guide the foreign policy of the new ministry.3? It must have been a double disappointment for Kat5 after all the grandiose schemes of which he had dreamed since he had been recalled from London. But he took consolation from the fact that he was able to pass on to the new ministry the gist of his conversations with Grey. In the middle of March Kato met Yamamoto and Makino in the prime minister's residence and told them about Grey's 'undertakings' and asked them whether they could not base their policy upon it. Both ministers agreed to try. 38 it is true that Kato spoke a year later with disappointment that the new ministers had not built on the foundations which he had prepared.39 But the shadow of the Kato-Grey conversations was to fall on many of Japan's policies in the war years. NEW MEN AND THE ALLIANCE

There was no fear that the new ministry would be less cordial towards the British alliance. Yamamoto had been navy minister from 1898 to 1906 and had been associated with the pro-British group. He had moreover been leader of the military-naval mission to Britain in 1907 which had concluded the military agreements.40 He showed himself to be friendly in his early conversations and public speeches, and, when the Diet opened at the end of the year, he reasserted his faith in the British alliance in his policy speeches. In his addresses to both houses on 21 January 1914 he confirmed this stance, while Foreign Minister Makino stated that the alliance was the centre-piece of Japan's diplomacy in his foreign affairs report to the upper house on 3 February.41 36

38 Kato, i, 712-14. 37 Kato, ii, 146. Kato, i, 718. P. S. Dull, *Count Kato Komei and the 21 demands', PHR, 19 (1950), 151-61. 40 Nish, pp. 354-7. 41 Yamamoto Gombel-den, ii, Tokyo, 1967, 989-94. In Makino's foreign affairs speech on 21 January 1914, he said: 'It is recognized by all that the alliance was influential in quietening down the recent disturbances in China and that we must depend on its effectiveness in the future for maintaining order in east Asia' (Gaimusho no too-nen, i, 586). 39

94

THE AFTERMATH OF THE THIRD ALLIANCE

Doubts about the alliance came not from the ministry of the day but from those who saw Japan's role to be one of expansion. The problem for the Yamamoto cabinet was that, during its term of office, some Japanese grew increasingly restive and uncomfortable within the limitations which were supposedly imposed on them in China by the British alliance and were ready to dispense with these irksome limitations. The transaction of business between the two countries at diplomatic level was also to be placed in new hands. One of KatS's last acts as foreign minister had been on 8 February 1913 to appoint as his successor in London, Inoue Katsunosuke (1861-1929). Inoue had been orphaned at a young age and adopted by the genro, Inoue Kaoru. He had been educated in England from 1871 to 1879 at what the Japanese call the London School of Political Economy. Most of his diplomatic service since 1884 had been in Europe, latterly as head of mission in Germany from 1898 to 1907. After two years as ambassador in Berlin, he returned to the Foreign Ministry and did short stints in Chile and on the important Treaty Revision committee (1908-10). He spoke good English and was sometimes referred to as 'an English gentleman',42 although he had the ample moustache which was perhaps more reminiscent of German than of English fashions. He certainly established most cordial relationships with the Foreign Office, but he was hardly a strong character like Kato. He probably had less influence too in Tokyo, although his connection with the genro through his father may have had its impact during his critical years at the embassy. As soon as Inoue reached London on 8 June, he took on a heavy load of speech-making, and reiterated the message of Anglo-Japanese friendship in political and economic terms.43 British representation was also altered when Sir Claude MacDonald retired in November 1912 after twelve years in Tokyo. His place was taken by Sir Conyngham Greene (1854-1934) who reached Tokyo in March 1913. He was to be stationed in Japan until the spring of 1919 and thus became the custodian of the alliance during a strange period of its history. As his service since the i88os had been mainly in South Africa and Europe, he was a novice in the east. Yet he was shrewd, kindly and hard-working. He was much less unquestioning of the Japanese than MacDonald and some of the embassy staff and he was to become by 1919 very anti-Japanese. 42 4

Koshaku Inoue Katsunosuke kun ryakuden, Tokyo, 1935, p. 178. 3 Ibid., pp. 180-5.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE THIRD ALLIANCE

95

Another new figure on the far eastern scene was the commander-inchief, Vice-admiral Sir Thomas Martyn Jerram (1913-15). Offered the post in November 1912, he accepted it with serious reservations about the poor state of Britain's naval preparedness in the face of German naval power in the far east. When he took up the appointment in Hong Kong on 29 March 1913, he formed the impression that 'things in China are in a very parlous condition'. However, there was a lull and, before inspecting the Yangtse valley, he decided to visit Japan.44 He had 'many talks with Saito, the Minister of Marine, Ijuin, Chief of the War Staff, and old Togo, the latter very taciturn, reminding me of Sir Arthur Wilson'.45 The contents of these talks are not known from the British or Japanese archives. They led Japan to tell the British Admiralty that she wanted to hold it to its promise in 1907 to supply transports for the movement of Japanese troops overseas, even if her shipbuilding had since made great strides.46 The most that Jerram commented in private correspondence was that 'all tended to increase the Entente Cordiale with the Japanese, a matter which was perhaps rather neglected by my predecessor'.4? Jerram became an admirer of the alliance and certainly valued it from a naval point of view as a useful auxiliary to his otherwise weakened squadron. Writing to the Admiralty opposing further reductions in his squadron, he argued that: 'If the Japanese Alliance can be safely calculated on, we have an overwhelming superiority and there is no more to be said, except that the Japanese have themselves expressed the opinion that the least force England should maintain on the China Station is 5 armoured Cruisers.' Britain's armoured ships, the Minotaur and the slow Hampshire, were no match for the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau, while in the category of unarmoured cruisers Germany had three (Emden, Niirnberg and Leipzig) to Britain's two (Yarmouth and Newcastle). He converted the Admiralty to the view that there would be grave risks incurred by the reduction contemplated.4® Indeed, the battleship Triumph was sent 44

Jerram papers, Jerram to Charles Jerram, 22 April 1913. This small collection is deposited in the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich. 45 Jerram papers, Jerram to Charles Jerram, 7 May 1913. 46 Library of Congress, Japanese army microfilm, T. 530, R 101, F 07057, 'Nichi-Ei gunji kyoyaku ni kansuru ken* (1913). This is not an account of a new military agreement in 1913 but an enquiry about the applicability of the agreements reached in London in 1907 (Nish, pp. 357-8). 47 Jerram papers, Jerram to Charles Jerram, 7 May 1913. 48 Jerram papers, Jerram to Admiralty, ? September 1913.

96

THE AFTERMATH OF THE THIRD ALLIANCE

out as a reinforcement, which would be more heavily armed than the German ships on the station. Although Jerram prepared plans for contingencies, he could not induce the Admiralty to make decisions on them. The most that he obtained was a rule-of-thumb instruction from Admiral (later Sir) H. Jackson (1855-1929), the chief of the War Staff in 1913-14, whose attitude was one of despair: 'I think Tsingtau will have to [be] left alone (as regards land attack) but I can get no decision. A proper attack would necessitate troops from India ... I must admit China gives me anxiety if there should be war shortly but I can't get others to see it.'49 There were after all more pressing problems nearer home which demanded decision. London was not unaware of the problems involved but was prepared to take the risks. Moreover, officials in London did not imagine that Japan would join in any anti-German war, far less attack Tsingtao. This was remote from their thinking. Although Jerram had tried to build up relations with Japan, it appears that neither he nor indeed the diplomats had posed the question: would Japan take part in a war in which Britain was involved with Germany? There is no evidence of the Japanese taking decisions on this before war broke out. Jerram's dispositions were worked out on the assumption that there would be no intervention by Japan. In the War Orders which were agreed between the Admiralty and the commander-in-chief, it was laid down that the first rendezvous for the China squadron in event of war was to be a point southward of Tsingtao from which the German ships could be blockaded in the harbour.50 There was no sign that Japan's help was expected or would be requested. Jerram confessed later that when war broke out in 1914 'nothing was further from anyone's thoughts than that Japan would be asked or even allowed to step in'.51 Instead, the sole prospect of assistance was from the French, whose two armoured cruisers, Montcalm and Dupleix, Jerram described as Very broken reeds to rely on'.52 It was the genius of Winston Churchill as first lord of the Admiralty (1911-15) to recognize that Britain's policy of naval concentration in 49

Jerram papers, Sir H. Jackson to Jerram, 15 April 1914. These War Orders were in July 1914 changed by concentrating the squadron in Hong Kong. 51 Jerram papers, Jerram to Clara Jerram, ? November 1914. 52 Jerram papers, Jerram to Admiralty, ? September 1913. This view is to some extent shared by Admiral R. Daveluy, Inaction maritime pendant la guerre anti-germanique, 2 vols., Paris, 1920, ii, 90—2. Daveluy was commander of the Dupleix in 1914. 50

THE AFTERMATH OF THE THIRD ALLIANCE

97

home waters forced her into dependence on Japan's support. From 1911 he tried to bring opinion round gradually to this admission. There were professional circles within the Admiralty, where it was regarded as a confession of failure to call on Japan for help. Yet the stark fact was that British naval power in the far east in July 1914 was only nominally superior to that of the German Pacific squadron. It was only in the first weeks of the war that these prejudices were overcome. Secondly, there was the suspicion, not to say fear, on the part of British dominions in the south Pacific at any extension of Japanese naval power. To such feelings Churchill addressed himself frequently, most notably in a famous house of commons speech on 17 March 1914. He argued that the safety of Australia and New Zealand was secured by the naval power of Britain and by the alliances based on that naval power; British naval power could protect them against encroachment by European powers or by Japan. So far as the Japanese alliance was concerned, he argued that there was a strong continuing bond of interest between Britain and Japan: it is this bond that is the true and effective protection for the safety of Australia and New Zealand, and this bond depends entirely on the maintenance of British naval supremacy;... if Japan chose to indulge in ambitions of empire or colonization in the Southern Pacific, she would be no loser so far as the European situation was concerned.53

Churchill's meaning is not completely clear: there is much special pleading and there is probably a large element of wishful thinking. Yet there is realism too. There is wishful thinking in the sense that Churchill saw the alliance, combined with British world naval supremacy, as a deterrent to Japanese expansionist ambitions. There is special pleading in the sense that Churchill is trying to convince the reluctant southern brethren that they need have no fear of the Japanese alliance and that the concentration of the Royal Navy in European waters did not menace their security. Yet there is the fundamental realism that Britain, because of her naval weakness in Pacific waters, was dependent on Japan and had to trust in Japan's good faith under the alliance. The sooner this message penetrated the better. It is no surprise therefore that the Japanese showed an immediate interest in Churchill's not altogether flattering remarks. His speech, 53 House of commons debates, 17 March 1914, 59, 1931-4. Churchill had been arguing along these lines in his memorandum of February 1912 and his statement on imperial naval policy, presented to the i23rd meeting of the C.I.D. on n April 1913.

98

THE AFTERMATH OF THE THIRD ALLIANCE

together with the white paper on which it was based and the editorial comment, was reported to Japan by telegraph and in extenso by despatch.54 While there is no information about the Japanese government reaction when it reached there on 13 April — there was a government crisis at the time — there is no doubt that it gave them a penetrating view of British government thinking on its naval dilemma. 54 NGB T. 3/III, no. 601.

C H A P T E R VI

The Alliance and South China, 1913—14 AMBASSADOR GREENE left an account of the initial problems facing him in Tokyo: When I first arrived in Japan in the early spring of 1913,1 found the situation very complicated. We had a number of old and thorny questions outstanding with the Japanese Government, most of which concerned infringements of the principles of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and related to China. Some of these questions were political issues involving the independence and integrity of China, others were economic and financial, including disputes respecting concessions, claims, loans and so on, originating for the most part in pursuance of the Japanese policy of peaceful penetration of that country, while in the case of other differences of opinion the political and economic issues were closely intertwined. In fact, it was a general tangle, further complicated by delicate questions on matters which interested the Government of India, the Dominion Governments, and our Colonial possessions in the Far East.i

Some of these issues, such as those last mentioned, were connected with treaty revision and the adhesion of imperial territories to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty of 191i, which the Japanese government was anxious to encourage.2 Some also were consular matters which tended to acquire the same complexity as issues of high policy. But it was already clear to Greene in March 1913 that the main diplomatic problem which confronted him was not relations with Japan, so much as with Japan in China. That is, his concern for the future was likely to be with Japanese expansion on the Asian continent in its bearing on British interests. The Yamamoto cabinet had to try to reconcile conflicting interests. It wanted to avoid anything approaching a showdown with Britain or the other powers. On the other hand, it could not be oblivious of the 1

FO 371/5360 [F. 2116], note by Greene, c. n September 1920, 2 NGB T. 2/1, section i. 99

ioo

THE ALLIANCE AND SOUTH CHINA, 1913-14

recent explosion of Japanese enterprise in south and central China, over which the cabinet had little control. Japanese enterprise had been established in Shanghai for a decade and was in an expansive mood. Through commercial loans and skilful political alignments in south China, it had developed considerable interests in the Tayeh and Pinghsiang mines and the Hanyang ironworks in the Yangtse area and a whole host of ancillary industries, generally known as the Hanyehping enterprises. Since the recovery in the Japanese economy in 1910-11, it was in a position to develop this stake as a complement to its own domestic industries, particularly the Yawata Ironworks.3 Before this could be done, Japan had to set up her own railway network covering her enterprises. According to this view, Britain's 'stone-walling' was essentially monopolistic and inconsistent with her general laisser-faire attitude. Since there was little scope for doing a deal which would be truly reciprocal, Japan had no alternative but to make a discreet encroachment on Britain's preserve.4 Down to 1914 this led to some disenchantment on both sides, but it was only a foretaste of what was to follow, when Britain's 'backs-to-the wall' resistance could no longer be maintained. The second Chinese revolution in the summer of 1913 presented an opportunity which many Japanese hoped would bring their government to take a more active posture in south China. But it held to neutrality, although after the killing of three Japanese nationals in Nanking, it asked for the dismissal of the general who was responsible. Suspiciously, the Foreign Office concluded that the Japanese call for the dismissal of General Chang was an excessive demand to make on President Yuan and was probably intended to bring about his downfall and, thus, the disintegration of China. In a telegram drafted by Eyre Crowe, the permanent under-secretary, an appeal was made to Japan: 'in regard to any action calculated to disturb the status quo in the Yangtse valley or to drive the Chinese Government into an attitude which may end in general foreign intervention, the British Government expect to be consulted in accordance with article I of the agreement.'5 This was one of the rare occasions when Britain invoked the 3

Segal Inoue ko-den, v, Tokyo, 1934, 296-308; A. Feuerwerker, Chinas early industrialisation, Cambridge, Mass., 1958, pp. 68, 79!?. 4 Kita Ikki, Shina kakumei gaishi, Tokyo, 1921, p. 177 ff., was to argue that there were no grounds for Britain to claim an exclusive sphere of influence in the Yangtse area and that war between Britain and Japan for south China was inevitable. 5 FO 371/1625 [43980], Grey to Greene, 27 September 1913. Crowe, in penning this

THE ALLIANCE AND SOUTH CHINA, 1913-14

101

alliance over Chinese matters. The Japanese replied, cordially enough, that they would unfailingly consult with Britain, considering that their policy to China was based on the principles of the alliance.6 However, the Japanese, made aware by the British protest of the consequences of their action, decided not to call for punishment of General Chang but to be content with an apology from President Yuan, which was readily given. The groups of miscellaneous adventurers and traders who made up the so-called 'south party' in Japan were gravely dissatisfied with the British attitude during the second revolution and Nanking incident. They proceeded to attack the alliance which they regarded as a brake on their activities. The matter came to a head in November when a rumour was reported that Japan was approaching Britain to disown the alliance. The British ambassador concluded that the campaign against the alliance had been started by those disappointed adventurers who had hoped to push their own interests in espousing the cause of the south in China, or again by those who had been advocating a 'strong policy* in that country, and who had found themselves headed off by the existence of the alliance.. J

Not that those like the continental adventurers were likely to be favourable to the alliance in any case. Indeed they were anti-western and saw the Japanese replacing the western imperialists.8 In the aftermath of the second revolution, the Japanese again became very active, especially in Manchuria and the Yangtse valley. It was their activities in the second region which brought them into conflict with Britain. Britain's view was that Japan was disentangling herself from her consortium partners, now that the reorganization loan was completed and recognition was being given to Yuan, and that, in any case, Britain was strong enough to fight her own battles.9 Yet British rights in the Yangtse valley were ill-defined, and it might be of long-term advantage to find out what would satisfy the Japanese 'in the telegram, was evidently unaware that there was a revision of the alliance in 1911 and referred to the alliance of 1905. Surely a salutary reminder to latterday enthusiasts of the alliance. 6

FO 371/1625 [44586], Inoue to Grey, i October 1913. FO 410/62 [54205], Greene to Grey, 15 November 1913. 8 Kita Ikki, Shina kakumei gaishi^ p. lyyff. G. M. Wilson, Radical Nationalist in Japan: Kita Ikki^ 1883-1933, Cambridge, Mass., 1969, pp. 54-7. 9 FO 371/1621 [37781], memo, by J. D. Gregory, 19 August 1913. Japan had joined the consortium with Russia in June 1912. 7

102

THE ALLIANCE AND SOUTH CHINA, 1913-14

way of participation'.10 Thus, when Japan made an approach on the subject of the Nanking-Pinghsiang railway in the very heart of the Yangtse industrial region, Britain took the occasion to probe her desire for co-operation: [Britain] would be glad to consider in what manner and to what extent it would be practicable to arrange for subsequent participation in the scheme, but if the Japanese Government desire to obtain benefits or privileges in the Yangtse valley it would be only equitable that they should be prepared to concede corresponding advantages to British enterprise in south Manchuria ... [Britain] would be glad to be informed of the approximate amount of capital which the Japanese Government anticipate would be supplied from Japanese sources and, further, to learn the specific material advantages which the Japanese Government particularly desire to obtain for their nationals.11

This was an attempt to treat the Japanese demands in a polite and conciliatory spirit, without in fact conceding anything of substance. It was intended to probe Japanese intentions in central China. It was a preliminary and tentative overture made within the context of the Open Door doctrine, but Britain had proposed two conditions which were not likely to find acceptance with the Japanese. On the one hand, she had asked for privileges in Manchuria in return for concessions in the Yangtse area.12 The Japanese were hardly likely to yield concessions in what they had persistently regarded as their exclusive sphere. On the other, Britain had asked for definite indications about the amount of capital which any Japanese group would contribute to a co-operative project. The Foreign Office had reason to believe that Japan was in a bad way financially: 'She can hardly balance expenditure by revenue, and goes on borrowing; at present she has to pay more than 5 % for loans.'13 The Foreign Office felt that it was Japan's hope to borrow abroad for her railway projects in the Yangtse valley, as she had earlier done with some success in the case of the south Manchurian railway. However, if it was unlikely that Japan would on these grounds be in a 10

FO 371/1625 [44586], minute by Langley on Greene to Grey, 29 September 1913. FO 371/1621 [43164], Grey to Inoue, n October 1913; NGB T. 2/II, no. 734. 12 Japan's minister in Peking had earlier suggested that the objects of the alliance 'would be furthered if we could strengthen our political solidarity by an economic understanding* whereby there should be a balance between Japan's sphere in Manchuria and Britain's sphere on the Yangtse and reciprocal rights for the nationals of the other in each sphere. FO 371/1621 [27446], Jordan to Grey, 31 May 1913. 13 FO 800/83 [Grey], Bryce (Japan) to Grey, 26 May 1913. 11

THE ALLIANCE AND SOUTH CHINA, 1913-14

103

position to take up London's offer, the British memorandum was more than a sophisticated diplomatic joke. The fact was that the Japanese industrialists, capitalizing on the goodwill they had won from the south party in China during the revolution of 1913, were active in the Yangtse area and this was serious and inconvenient for British interests. The present overture was the first in a series of approaches to examine whether it was better to resist these activities or meet Japan half-way. Ambassador Greene thought Britain's object was 'to arrive at some definite understanding with Japan, with a view to safeguarding our interests against her insidious encroachments upon the accepted policy of equal opportunity for all and the "Open Door" in China'.14 This account, written in 1920, is no doubt coloured by later events but it certainly captures the essence of a number of approaches which cannot be considered in detail here.1* As Britain probably predicted, Japan was unwilling to contemplate the bargain suggested: she claimed her right to build die line but made the concession that she was willing to allow British capital to share in it. She emphasized that Japanese interests in south Manchuria were special, being not only economic but also political.1** Britain was equally determined: she could not contemplate co-operating with Japan in the Yangtse if she was to be excluded from Manchuria. In a forthright statement on 2 February 1914, Grey offered 'to recognize Japan's sphere of interest in Manchuria and to decline to support British railway enterprise there' on condition that Japan did not participate in a railway in what was already a British railway district.1? Japan decided in the light of general relations to withdraw her claim a fortnight later.is This withdrawal has to be read in the light of Japan's proposal to China on 19 February for financing and constructing an AmoyFoochow-Nanchang-Hankow line. When Britain got wind of this, she told Japan firmly that she had no objection to supporting a Japanese concession between Fukien and Nanchang — Fukien province was after all generally recognized as a Japanese sphere of interest — 'but if it proves necessary or desirable to construct an extension of this railway from Nanchang to Hankow, then [Britain] must claim the right to 14

FO 371/5360 [F. 2116], note by Greene, c. n September 1920. Lowe, ch. v, is the most up-to-date and authoritative account. 16 NGB T. 2/II, no. 736. " FO 371/1933 [5325], Grey to Greene, 2 February 1914. 18 Kajima, Nichi-Ei gaikoshi, pp. 352-3.

15

io4

THE ALLIANCE AND SOUTH CHINA, 1913-14

obtain the required concession for this section for British enterprise'.19 This was equivalent to defining a sphere in the central Yangtse around Hankow, in which Britain refused to allow intruders. This seemed to the Japanese to be an unreasonable position since they had large interests in the Hanyehping enterprises and were already deeply involved in the Yangtse area. On 6 April Foreign Minister Makino approached the cabinet for authority to proceed with the railway between Kiukiang and Nanchang and, after this had been granted, made a loan of three million yen through the Toa Kogyo company for this purpose.20 On 10 June Japan replied to Britain, reiterating her claim for participation and quoting concrete cases to illustrate her contention that Japanese enterprise in the Yangtse region was more readily discernible than British.21 This was the most serious of various altercations over Chinese railways at the time.22 Britain and Japan had not hitherto been territorial or financial rivals in China, but the moment had arrived when Japan's capitalists were showing greater activity in central China and Britain decided to stand firm on her privileges in the Yangtse area. For the present, however, neither side was prepared to press the dispute to a breakdown in relations. Between the Chinese revolution and the outbreak of war, the focus of the alliance was on China. In Britain's view, Japan was guilty of 'insidious encroachments upon the accepted policy of equal opportunity for all and the "Open Door" in China'.23 In a later report to the cabinet, the Foreign Office reviewed the situation thus: By the middle of 1914 Japan's forward movement had progressed to such an extent that we were, on the one hand, in process of formulating a definite policy for our own protection in China and, on the other, were seriously contemplating a joint consideration with Japan of the political aims of the two Powers in the Far East.24

It is the second aspect which is germane to the story of the alliance. While Britain consistently declined to admit Japan to the important Nanking-Hsiangtan line, she made proposals for mutual recognition of 19

FO 371/1933 [7587], Grey to Greene, 21 February 1914. 20 NGNB, i, bunsho, 378-9. 21 Kajima, Nichi-Ei gaikoshi, pp. 350-6. 22 NGNBy i, bunsho, 379, Japan's declaration of 13 June 1914 on Anglo-Japanese railway misunderstandings in north China, the case of the Chinchow-Chaoyang railwa project. 23 FO 371/5360 [F.2ii6], note by Greene, c. n September 1920. 24 CAB 37/148, memorandum by J. D. Gregory, May 1916.

THE ALLIANCE AND SOUTH CHINA, 1913-14

105

industrial spheres of interest, Japan in Manchuria and Britain in the Yangtse. It is hard to tell whether the proposal that Britain's capitalists should have the right to invest in Manchuria in return for British recognition of Japan's sphere there was a serious one. Britain was, i any case, committed not to invest in railways north of the Great Wall by the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1899, though this had probably been forgotten in the Foreign Office. The British officials recognized that 'as we are hardly likely — for strategic reasons — to get the same reciprocity from the Japanese [in Manchuria] as we might be prepared to give them in the Yangtse, a bargain of any kind would hardly be practicable'.25 Yet the bargain was offered; and, fortunately for Britain it was rejected by Japan. Undeterred by Britain's willingness to do a deal, Japan proceeded to demand railway rights in the heart of Britain's sphere, from Nanchang to Hankow. It would have been hard for the weak cabinet of Admiral Yamamoto to have resisted the commercial pressures on it to support this project. Yet it could only be done in the face of known British opposition. Certainly it dispelled any hopes of a genuine Anglo-Japanese partnership in China, though this must in retrospect be described as a doubtful starter in any case. It is difficult to assess the effect of this commercial rivalry on the alliance. For some observers, the alliance had never been at a lower ebb. Thus, Ambassador Greene commented huffily, 'while they will never let us into their spheres, they are trying to steal a march into ours, and this is not cricket between Allies'.26 But Grey took a longer view and accepted a certain amount of Japanese commercial expansion with equanimity. Railways, he wrote, were 'a question of adjusting special British and Japanese commercial interests rather than of general policy'.2? In terms of general policy, the continuance of the alliance was an essential British interest. Moreover, there seemed to be evidence that the alliance could act as a brake on Japanese incursions into China, an argument which was to be repeated as long as the alliance lasted. CHANGE TO THE OKUMA CABINET

While these ambitious schemes for co-operation in China were being promoted, the hybrid Yamamoto cabinet was being assailed on the 25

FO 371/1621 [37781], memorandum by J. D. Gregory, 19 August 1913. FO 800/31, Greene to Langley, 22 February 1914. 27 FO 371/2324 [54503], Grey to Greene, 3 May 1915.

26

106

THE ALLIANCE AND SOUTH CHINA, 1913-14

home front. The cause was the Siemens incident which stole the headlines from 22 January 1914 onwards. It transpired from evidence given to a Berlin court that commission had been given to Japanese naval officers by foreign firms, including Siemens and Vickers, and by Mitsui, in order to win contracts. There seems no reason to doubt that bribery had taken place, and that only the tip of the iceberg had been exposed.28 The press covered the story in enthusiastic detail; and, as one author puts it, there was hardly a Japanese schoolgirl who did not know the English word 'commission'.29 The Diet, which was in session from 26 December to 25 March, found the topic a convenient one with which to harry the government. It was not that the premier or the cabinet were implicated, but Admiral Yamamoto was one of the founders of the modern navy, and he was a Satsuma leader as were the naval officers involved. Yamamoto at length resigned on 24 March. The choice of a successor presented the genro with especial difficulties. They sought someone who would not rock the boat but who would resist the advancement of the Seiyu party which had helped to provoke the crisis over the army and navy in 1912-13. They first asked Kiyoura Keigo who was preferred by Yamagata but he failed to form a cabinet because of naval resistance. At a meeting of Elder Statesmen on 8 April, Inoue Kaoru strongly argued the merits of the veteran statesman, Okuma Shigenobu. Inoue's purpose was to curb the powers of the Seiyukai; and in this design Okuma agreed to cooperate.30 When the genro agreed, Inoue approached Kato who had become president of the new Doshikai party after Katsura's death, and asked for his party's support for Okuma's appointment. At a meeting on it April in Inoue's house, the two statesmen discussed how to handle the political situation and how to deal with foreign policy. Kato agreed to offer his support.31 A new cabinet was, therefore, sworn in on 16 April, consisting of Okuma supporters and a few Doshikai members. Since the i88os Okuma had been recognized as the 28 Pearl, Morrison, p. 224. Captain Douglas Brownrigg to G. E. Morrison: 'There are some confiding idiots who fancy that this country is run on the non-squeeze principle: all I have to say to that is that it shows them either to be absurdly credulous or lamentably ignorant, as there is not a move made of any sort or kind in the Armament or Machinery line or of course in the ship-building line generally, without very large sums of money being diverted from their intended destination.' 29 Okubo Toshiaki, Nikon ^enshi, x, Kindai 3, Tokyo, 1964, p. 73 30 Oka Yoshitake, Yamagata Arltomo^ Tokyo, 1958, p. 133. 31 Inoue papers, 27 (6), points discussed between Baron Kato and Marquis Inoue on 11 April 1914.

THE ALLIANCE AND SOUTH CHINA, 1913-14

107

grand old man of the political parties. Since it had generally been the intention of the genro to prevent party politicians from holding office, he had only presided over a short-lived ministry in 1898. In 1914, at the age of 77, he was the leader of a minority party and was so dependent on genro support that he could not follow his policies independently.32 Yet he had popularity, seniority and — his greatest political asset — eloquence, which could be confused with loquacity. Okuma was obliged to appoint as foreign minister and deputy premier, Kat5 Takaaki, the leader of the Doshikai, which had agreed to support the coalition.33 Kato's position within the cabinet had both strength and weaknesses. His position was weak in so far as the cabinet was working under 'genrd orders' and there was a traditional antagonism between him and Yamagata, the leading genro, and considerable suspicion of him by Inoue, the 'second genro'. At the same time, he was no longer merely the diplomat under transfer as he had been when he thrice before had occupied the post of foreign minister (1901, 1906 and 1913). He was the political leader of one of the factions which were bundled together in the great furoshiki of Okuma and had much greater say within the ministry because of his political strength. 34 Moreover Kato had definite views on foreign policy, especially towards China. After his brief period of office in 1913, he had gone to China for a tour of inspection in April. He had toured the Yangtse valley and Shantung before going on 17 May to Peking where he was lavishly entertained by President Yuan.35 Little is known of Kato's thinking, except that he formed the lowest opinion of China's stability, and this was more than confirmed by the 1913 revolution. At the same time, during an encounter with Sun Yat-sen, he refused to give him any indication of support for those against the Peking government. During the preliminaries to the formation of the Okuma cabinet, Inoue had made it clear that he expected the ministry to undertake an active commercial role in China, co-operating wherever possible with the western powers.36 Such was Okuma's mandate. Okuma himself had a reputation as an expert on things Chinese, Just before his appointment, he had mentioned that in his view it was 32 Oka, p. 134; Inoue ko-den, v, 350-9. 'Makino's handing over notes, c. 15 April 1914', NGK, Taisho jidai, 1958, 143-6. 34 'Furoshiki' is a silk sheet of cloth, used by Japanese to bundle up parcels and able to accommodate small or large-sized articles. 36 35 Kato, i, 733-7. Inoue ko-den, v, 3076*", 33

io8

THE ALLIANCE AND SOUTH CHINA, 1913-14

Japan's divine mission to assist China.37 Speaking to The Times' correspondent in Tokyo as the new prime minister, he later dwelt on the importance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance as the centre of authority in the far east and urged its development into an economic alliance in China in which one ally would supply money and the other intimate knowledge of Chinese matters and other advantages arising from geographical propinquity.38 When the details of this interview were cabled back to Tokyo, it caused a great stir. On the one hand, the British ambassador commented that these remarks appeared to come as an afterthought, rather than as a premeditated suggestion — certainl. this would accord with Okuma's casual, and often indiscreet, method of expounding his views to the press. At the same time, Greene thought that it would have to be treated by the British government as a ballon d'essai which represented Okuma's true thinking on the matter, as he had been expressing similar views for the last few years.39 What was meant by this 'economic alliance' was hardly spelled out. Would it merely be a tacit understanding to extend the political alliance as it existed to some sort of economic or financial partnership or would the alliance have to be explicitly revised to take in clauses bearing on financial partnership? Okuma did not make this clear. Unquestionably the conversion of the alliance into a medium for associating 'British capital and Japanese brains' (by which was meant organizing ability) would have conferred great advantages on Japanese with ambitions in China. So Okuma's advocacy of it was not casual or irrational. Yet was it representative of Japanese opinion? Probably it was not. There is sufficient evidence that Japan was prepared to act alone in China in 1914. Investments were being stepped up sharply through the Toa Kogyo kaisha, the semi-government corporation set up in 1912 primarily for investment in China, and merchants were extending their individual commitments there. There seemed to be little demand for Anglo-Japanese partnership or a reorientation of the alliance. On the contrary, some writers thought the idea of Japanese partnership with Britain in China to be anathema. Thus, Kita Ikki condemned Okuma's remarks as humbug and took the line that Japan should allow the Chinese to develop on their own, protected from the imperialist powers by the Japanese according to a variant of the Monroe 37

38 Shin Nikon, March 1914. The Times, 4 May 1914. FO 371/1939 [24502], Greene to Grey, 17 May 1914: Shinobu Seizaburo, 'Taisho gaikoshi no kihon mondai', NGK, Taisho jidai, 8-9. 39

THE ALLIANCE AND SOUTH CHINA, 1913-14

109

doctrine.40 Although Kita was not a representative thinker, his views on this point were probably widely accepted and reflected Japan's disillusion with the gains which she had made by following a policy of co-operation with the west over two decades. The Foreign Office was not unaware of these undercurrents of opinion. Many officials were disillusioned with Japan's performance during the Chinese revolution of 1913 and the evident desire for continental expansion on the part of Japanese public opinion. It was generally accepted in London that private Japanese had actively assisted the rebels against Yuan. Admiral Jerram remarked that many observers in the east felt that, because of the alliance, Britain was 'at the bottom of it and egging Japan on'. He added, 'Of course we are not and her increasing importance works our commerce great evil.'41 It was therefore a natural assumption that, if the alliance were expanded into a commercial partnership, Britain would have to share the unpopularity of the Japanese in China. Admiral Jerram observed that everyone in China 'loathes and distrusts the Japanese', and this was an impression widely shared in informed British circles.42 Certainly the Foreign Office acted as though it believed that Britain should, and could, go her own way in China without the Japanese: Grey was advised that the alliance was 'a political alliance and we want no industrial partnerships'.43 Thus, Okuma's overture — if it was an overture — was cursorily examined and not favourably considered. While Grey made no attempt to catch this balloon, the Japanese did not try to send another on the self-same flight. They were not for the present strong enough for the proposition to be readily accepted in London. Significant as it was as an indication of Japanese thinking before the war broke out, it was soon forgotten in the atmosphere of crisis developing in Europe. The whole idea was not likely to appeal to the British government. Japan had little capital available for investment in China and had not impressed with her 'know-how' during the revolution of 1911-12; Britain was to all appearances ascendant in 40 G. M. Wilson, *Kita Ikki's theory of revolution*, JAS> 26 (1966), 95; Wilson, Radical Nationalist in Japan: Kita Ikki, pp. 53-7. 41 Jerram papers, Jerram to Charles Jerram, 12 September 1913. 42 Ibid. At the same time, Jerram wrote that the alliance was *an immense boon', although primarily from a naval point of view. The official most extreme in his criticism of the Japanese was Beilby Alston, the charge" d'affaires in Peking during Jordan's absence on leave, e.g. FO 371/1625 [40079], Alston to Grey, 15 August 1913. 43 FO 371/1939 [24502], minute by Langley on Greene to Grey, 17 May 1914.

no

THE ALLIANCE AND SOUTH CHINA, 1913-14

China and could see little advantage in permitting Japanese encroachments into her own sphere in China proper. So the proposals were deferred, only to be revived by Japan in very different circumstances three years later.44 By 1917, the Japanese were in the ascendant in China and had the capital necessary for investment there. So the proposal for Anglo-Japanese economic partnership was again one-sided and was again unlikely to appeal to the junior partner — in this instance, Britain. BRYAN S PEACE C O M M I S S I O N TREATY AND THE A L L I A N C E

The most contentious and troublesome issue within the alliance since 1911 had been its application to China. From August 1914 the most important aspect was to be its application to the coming of war in Europe. Yet it is convenient at this point to discuss its application to the United States which underwent some change when Britain signed a conciliation treaty with the Americans. It will be recalled that Britain's hopes for a treaty of general arbitration with America had been frustrated by the reservations added by the senate and had died with the end of Taft's presidency. After the inauguration of President Wilson in 1913, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan took early steps to encourage the other powers to sign treaties with the United States, whereby all disputes arising between them would be placed before a commission for investigation. The recommendation of these so-called Peace Commissions would not be binding on the parties, though their deliberations would allow a cooling-off period. Britain was one of the first powers to show herself ready to enter into negotiations to this end. The Japanese who were similarly approached showed little interest initially and, thinking of anti-Japanese legislation in California then causing trouble, told Bryan on 26 May 1913 that there were circumstances which made it difficult to reply. Bryan, however, maintained the pressure, and Japan was kept posted of the success of American negotiations with other countries, presumably on the assumption that, if all others agreed, she would surely not stand out. Although the Anglo-American negotiations were delayed because of the need to consult the dominions, they were ultimately successful. The treaty was signed on 15 September 1914, the 44 Cf. New East, Tokyo, October 1917, 99.

THE ALLIANCE AND SOUTH CHINA, 1913-14

in

same day that France, Spain and China signed similar treaties. With the exchange of ratifications on 10 November, Bryan was able to glory in almost thirty ratified treaties.45 In Britain, however, the treaty passed almost unnoticed. Britain's act obviously had relevance to the alliance through the arbitration clause of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1911. Britain tried to avoid complicating the negotiation of the peace commission treaty by omitting to consult Japan. But the Japanese kept a close watch on Britain's proceedings. In reply to a question from Ambassador Inoue on 14 September, Grey said that, if Japan were to enter into a peace commission treaty at the request of the American government, Britain and Japan would be in an identical legal position towards America: it would from Britain's point of view be a most opportune development.46 But it was necessary to define Britain's position if Japan did not avail herself of this opportunity. In a memorandum of 21 September, Grey argued that the object of the peace commission treaty was the same as that of the general arbitration treaty of 1911. While admitting that the report of the peace commission would not be binding and the treaty was accordingly not an arbitration treaty, it claimed that the General Arbitration Treaty did contain a provision for a commission of enquiry; the Peace Commission Treaty is therefore a method of giving effect to a part, and in practice the most operative part, of the General Arbitration Treaty. It is the method now adopted of securing that Great Britain and the United States should never go to war with each other.47

Thus Britain held that the United States was henceforth excluded from the purview of the alliance beyond any shadow of doubt. Her memorandum contained a lot of special pleading, and Britain was on doubtful legal ground. Devoutly as Britain wished to throw off any obligation to support Japan in a war with the United States, it strained the meaning of the peace commission treaty to use it as an instrument to this end. At any rate Britain had given a unilateral statement of her position. Britain's contentions were neither accepted nor denied by Japan. The Japanese do not appear to have replied to the memorandum. Grey in his memoirs wrote that the Japanese government and its ambassadors in London 'understood, as in the case of the Bryan Peace Treaty with 45

For a contemptuous view of these treaties see Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vii, 809. NGB T. 3/1, no. 230. For the text of article IV, see above, p. 67. 47 FO 410/63 [52839], Grey to Inoue, 21 September 1914; NGB T. 3/1, no. 233.

4

ii2

THE ALLIANCE AND SOUTH CHINA, 1913-14

the United States, the difficulty in which we sometimes found ourselves, and they smoothed the path'.4^ If the Japanese resented Britain's act, they maintained silence about it. It was not until 1920 that the relevance of the peace commission treaty for the alliance became the subject of major public debate. The Japanese spokesman then declared that it was not 'necessary to carry on legal analysis... for it was already well understood that the alliance should in no case be directed against the United States'.49 The natural consequence of Japan's deliberate vagueness was that the other interested party, the United States, could justly claim that it was by no means clear what Britain's formal commitments to Japan were under the alliance until this statement was made. The whole position would have been simplified if Japan had followed most of the world's powers by entering into a treaty with the United States. When asked to advise his government in September and October, Ambassador Chinda in Washington suggested that it would be best to avoid negotiations unless Japan saw the end of existing diplomatic problems like the various anti-Japanese moves being made in the Californian legislature and expressed the view that the peace commission method was not suitable for the ordinary run of AmericanJapanese disputes.50 Since Tokyo was forced to make a serious protest to Washington on 26 October about anti-Japanese discrimination in California, Foreign Ministry officials were disposed to turn a deaf ear to the repeated urgings of the State Department.51 On 3 November Ambassador George Guthrie told Japan that all major countries (like Britain, France and Russia) had signed and only Japan and Germany among first-rank powers had not entered into peace commission treaties. Foreign Minister Kato replied that, when further anti-Japanese moves might be made in California, it was necessary to give Bryan's proposals very special attention but he was deferring presenting the issues to the cabinet.52 There the matter seems to have petered out. Despite the fanfares in Washington, these peace commission treaties failed to attract public notice in London and Tokyo. The AngloAmerican agreement had been negotiated quite independently of the Japanese alliance and was entered into on its own merits and not as a 48

Grey, Twenty-five years, ii, 100. FO 800/329, memorandum on 'The Anglo-Japanese Alliance Agreement and the United States', 1921. so NGB T. 3/1, nos. 231 and 239. si tfGB T. 3/1, nos. 67 and 78-84. 52 NGB T. 3/1, no. 247. 49

THE ALLIANCE AND SOUTH CHINA, 1913-14

113

means of dodging inconvenient obligations under that alliance. The fact that Britain believed that she did clarify her position vis-a-vis the Japanese alliance by signing the American treaty was purely coincidental. There was, of course, no question of Britain's action being concealed from Japan; the Japanese were aware of the state of negotiations in Washington. True, Britain did not consult Japan; but she was not legally required to do so. Japan had the option of associating herself with the peace commission treaties but concluded that her national interest would not be served by doing so. It was not pleasant for Japan to be reminded that she could not expect any help from Britain in the event of war with the United States; but realists in Japan had known this long before 1911. Britain's note of 21 September was a secret document, and the interpretations which it contained were not widely known. Yet critics of the alliance in Japan suspected as much and were sceptical of its value for their country. Since many Japanese still hoped to pin on Britain a moral obligation to come to their aid against America, it was open to Americans who were critical of the alliance to point out the vagueness with which Britain's obligations to her ally were defined on this point.

ii 4 THE ALLIANCE AND THE GERMAN-JAPANESE WAR

Tsintao

CHAPTER VII

The Alliance and the German-Japanese War O N 23 August there began what the Japanese often call the GermanJapanese war (Nichi-Doku sens5). It is probable that Japanese do not, by using this conventional phrase, mean to suggest that their country did not take part in the world war of 1914-18. Nor do they mean that they did not take up arms against Germany's allies, such as Austria. But the use of this phrase does imply that there were special characteristics about Japan's war effort, both in range and intensity, which differentiate it from that of European powers engaged in the war.1 When Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August, it prepared the way for naval encounter between them not only in the Atlantic but also in the Pacific. The two powers allegedly wished to prevent hostilities being extended to the far east or the status quo there being interfered with and they made declarations to this effect. Germany intended to tell Japan that her East Asiatic squadron would avoid hostile acts against Britain in case Japan remained neutral. But it is doubtful whether this could have been observed in a total war. In fact, there is no evidence that this message was conveyed to Japan through representations in 1

There is a disappointing lack of monographic studies of Japan's role in the war of 1914-18 by Japanese authors. The NGB series now covers the war period in its entirety, and a new crop of studies may be expected before long. There are a number of articles on Japan's entry, notably that by Nagaoka Shinjiro. 'Oshu taisen sanka mondai', NGK, Taishojidai (1958), 26-38, and Sakurai and others, 'Dai-ichi-ji sekai taisenshi kenkyu no gendoko', NGK, Dai-ichi-ji sekai taisen (1963), 74-90. Among books, Kajima, Nichi-Ei gaikoshi, ch. 13, is helpful, while the biographies of Kato Takaaki, Inoue Kaoru and Inoue Katsunosuke are useful for 1914-15. In English, the best study of the first year of the war is Lowe, ch. vi, which performs a great service in reproducing most of the vital documents. C. N. Spinks, 'Japan's entrance into the world war', PHR, v (1936), 297-311; T. La Fargue, China and the world war, Stanford, 1937; R. H. Fifield, Woodrow Wilson and the far east, New York, 1952, are also valuable studies. A more recent study of the war period in east Asia which was invaluable is Madeleine Chi, China diplomacy, 1914-18, Cambridge, Mass., 1970. "5

n6

THE ALLIANCE AND THE GERMAN-JAPANESE WAR

Berlin or in Tokyo.2 On 12 August the German ambassador in Tokyo, Count Rex, did hint at the neutralization of certain sea areas, but he was here airing his own views and speaking without the authority of his government, with which he was no longer in direct communication.3 Britain also seemed to be hopeful of keeping the far east out of the war, if at all possible. On i August the foreign secretary told Japan that, 'if we do intervene, it would be on the side of France and Russia and I therefore did not see we were likely to have to apply to Japan under our alliance'.4 This stand was supported by a memorandum penned by Sir Walter Langley, assistant under-secretary in charge of the far eastern department, which argued that 'although the Alliance provided for assistance in the event of an attack "wherever arising", since there was no immediate threat to Britain's or Japan's special interests in East Asia or India then no assistance from Japan was necessary'.5 None the less Britain put the formal legal position before Japan by way of precaution. Grey warned the Japanese that 'if hostilities spread to the Far East and an attack on Hong Kong or Wei Hai Wei were to take place, we should rely on their support'.6 Such was Japan's obligation under the treaty of 1911. But Britain did not seriously consider that any such eventuality would materialize. T^he War Office withdrew its Japanese language officers for the European fronts, not foreseeing that their skills would be needed in the war. Two were later intercepted in Honolulu on their journey home and ordered back to TokyoJ Britain's message was laid before the Japanese cabinet when it met in the prime minister's official residence at 9.30 a.m. on 4 August. The cabinet received a detailed report about the war situation from Kato and military explanations from the war and navy ministers. The meeting which concentrated on this one topic did not break up until 2.30 p.m. With the cabinet's authority, the Foreign Ministry issued a statement of policy: the government expected to be able to observe an attitude of strict neutrality but would be ready to take the necessary steps in accordance with its obligations under the alliance with Britain.8 The decision was communicated to Britain in greater detail: while Japan 2

The only references are NGB T. 3/III, nos. 90 and 121. 4 3 NGB T. 3/III, no. 129; Chi, p. 4. BD, xi, no. 436. 5 BD, xi, no. 534. The note was not prepared by Tyrrell as stated in this collection. 7 6 BD, xi, no. 549. F. S. G. Piggott, Broken Thread, Aldershot, 1950, p. 89. 8 NGB T. 3/III, no. 94; Tokyo Asahi^ 4 August 1914.

THE ALLIANCE AND THE GERMAN-JAPANESE WAR

117

would maintain a strict neutrality towards a European war, she would in the event of an attack on Hong Kong or Weihaiwei or a similar concrete act of aggression, be prepared at once to support the British government, if called upon.9 The inclusion of the words 'if called upon9 gave London the impression that Japan would only act at Britain's behest. Grey, therefore, replied to the Japanese ambassador that, just as Japan had not requested British intervention in the RussoJapanese war, so Britain in turn would, if possible, avoid drawing Japan into any trouble; 'but, should a case arise in which we needed her help, we would gladly ask for it and be grateful for it'.1(> The question of Japan's entry was still fluid. It was Britain's naval position in the China seas which brought her on 5 August to change her attitude. As earlier chapters have shown, the German and British squadrons in China were fairly evenly balanced in larger ships. At the end of July Admiral Jerram was at a disadvantage in that the battleship Triumph was in dock at Hong Kong, starting a long refit. When he was informed of the approach of war, the Triumph had to be taken out of dock and manned from the crews of the river gunboats which had been paid off — a procedure which took time. When war ultimately broke out, Jerram was on the point of proceeding to the entrance of Kiaochow bay in accordance with his war orders when he received instructions from the Admiralty to concentrate at Hong Kong. At this time, Admiral von Spee with his armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau was in the Caroline islands, and the light cruiser Emden paid a short visit to Tsingtao and made a sortie in which she captured a Russian auxiliary ship and several merchant ships. Then she sailed south to rendezvous with her main squadron in the Marianas. The British squadron meanwhile left Hong Kong in two forces: one under Jerram made for Yap to destroy the German wireless station and intercept the Emden\ the other under Captain Fitzmaurice with the Triumph and the cruiser Yarmouth proceeded to blockade Tsingtao with some success. Jerram was, however, unable to trace the Emden which sailed to the south China seas, damaging shipping as she went. Some criticism was aimed at Jerram for allowing the Emden to go in and out of Tsingtao, but the explanation really lay in his instructions from London.11 The result was that the Admiralty recognized in the early days of the war that Britain did not possess the margin of strength 10 9 JBD, xi, no. 637. JBD, xi, no. 641 (my italics). 11 Jordan papers, 12, Jordan to Alston, 9 November 1914.

n8 THE ALLIANCE AND THE GERMAN-JAPANESE WAR in the west Pacific necessary to blockade Tsingtao, to police shipping lanes and to pursue the German vessels.12 Reluctantly the British government came round to admitting that German naval activities could not be combated single-handed. After consultation with the Admiralty, Beilby Alston in a lengthy memorandum of 5 August argued that British and German naval strength in the China seas was roughly equal and serious damage to British trade could only be averted by calling on Japan for assistance.13 Meanwhile at a meeting of the cabinet, it had been agreed on the advice of a subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence that German ports and wireless stations in the China seas must be seized.14 Grey discussed the position with Winston Churchill as first lord of the Admiralty and with the first sea lord. In the evening Grey prepared a telegram asking for Japan's assistance. In doing so, he knew that Japan's cruiser squadrons were at the ready at the ports of Saseb5 and Masampo (Korea) and that her ships were already patrolling in Korean waters. He may also have learnt through the naval attache that the Japanese navy was willing and anxious to help. Ambassador Inoue was told on 7 August that the British government would gladly avail themselves of proffered assistance of Japanese Government in the direction of protecting British trading vessels from German armed merchant cruisers which are now attacking British commerce in various quarters, while British war ships are locating and engaging German war ships in Chinese waters. As this task will require some time, H.M. Ambassador in Tokio has been instructed to inform Japanese Government that it would be of the very greatest assistance to H.M. Government if they would be good enough to employ some of their war ships in hunting out and destroying German armed merchantmen in China. British Government realize that such action on the part of Japan will constitute declaration of war with Germany, but it is difficult to see how such a step is to be avoided.15

The Japanese naval role as here envisaged was to be a secondary one, but the political consequences were immense. 12 This story is dealt with in detail in Nish, 'Admiral Jerram and the German Pacific fleet, 1913-15', Mariner's Mirror, 56 (1970), 411-22. An important source is LieutenantCommander George Gipps, 'Journal kept in H.M.S. Triumph, China squadron, including the siege of Tsingtao, i August I9i4-January 1915', deposited in the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, MSS 8125. 13 FO 371/2016 [36648], note by Alston, 5 August 1914. 14 CAB 41/35/26, Asquith to the king, 6 August 1914; Asquith papers, box in. is NGB T. 3/III, no. 104 (my italics). Cf. BD, x (2), p. 823.

THE ALLIANCE AND THE GERMAN-JAPANESE WAR

119

When he received Britain's request, Kato called on the prime minister at his official residence and discussed Japan's entry into the war. He put forward three proposals: that Japan enter the war; that the scope of her entry be not limited to pursuing German vessels; and that Japan negotiate with Britain in order to draw up the reasons for entering the war properly. Okuma agreed to these points and approved of calling an emergency cabinet meeting.16 The cabinet met at 10 p.m. on 7 August at Okuma's personal residence at Waseda.17 Kato expounded the position in detail and concluded that to enter the war on the broad basis of the Anglo-Japanese alliance would not only observe the basic intention (honshitsu) of that alliance but would also be very useful in building up Japan's peace-keeping role in east Asia. His biographer tries to suggest that he was the dispassionate advocate of this course from a position of neutrality but it seems more likely, and more in character, for him to lead and convince the cabinet of his way of thinking, though voices were raised for the contrary view. The meeting adjourned after 2 a.m. At 5.30 a.m. Kato left Ueno station for Nikko to report on the position to the emperor. Returning to Tokyo in the evening, he attended a meeting of cabinet members with the genro, Yamagata, Matsukata, and Oyama. There were those who suspected that loss would be entailed in a war with Germany, feared the consequences of a German victory and wondered whether there was not a non-belligerent, diplomatic means of resolving the situation in the far east.18 Kato's arguments carried the day and within thirty-six hours of the British request Japan had with the force of an electric shock (as Kato's biographer describes it) decided informally to enter the war on Britain's side. It was a personal triumph for Kat5 who was the leading sponsor of this course but it was also a grave risk to take and the responsibility was largely his. It was ultimately decided that the best course would be to send an ultimatum to Germany and ask her to transfer the Tsingtao leased territory to Japan.

JAPAN'S ULTIMATUM Japan's first action was to consult Britain and discuss the form which the ultimatum would take. Kato passed over a note to Greene on 9 August: 16 18

17 Kato, ii, 77. Not in Kato's residence as stated by La Fargue, p. 12. Kato, ii, 78. Hara nikki, vi, 7 August 1914.

iio THE ALLIANCE AND THE GERMAN-JAPANESE WAR Once a belligerent Power, Japan cannot restrict her action only to destruction of hostile armed merchant cruisers, but it will become necessary for her to resort to all and every possible means for attainment of the object common to the two allied Powers as far as the Chinese waters are concerned, namely the destruction of the power of Germany to inflict damage upon the interests of Japan and Great Britain in Eastern Asia. Besides, as the employment of some of the Japanese warships for the destruction of German armed merchantmen may be regarded as an act limited in scope and dictated by the temporary convenience of Great Britain, the Imperial Government are of opinion that they should base their participation in the war on the broad grounds stated in the Agreement of Alliance.i^

Japan had thus agreed to declare war but not to accept restrictions on the operations of her navy. Things were unexpectedly precipitated. In discussion with Viceminister Matsui on 8 August, the German ambassador in Tokyo, Count Rex, lost his temper and flew into a rage, shouting and using exceedingly threatening language. This leaked out and was supposed to have made informed opinion more inclined towards war with Germany. It certainly strengthened Kato's hand in his exchanges with Britain. But the affair may have been exaggerated for the purpose of domestic consumption because Kato met Count Rex on several later occasions.20 While Japan was not ready to accept a limited role, Grey was under considerable pressure to call upon Japan to restrict her intervention. Wherever Japanese forces threatened to operate, anxious voices were raised. China was horrified at the prospect of a Japanese invasion of Kiaochow; and there was the added risk that it would result in a recurrence of the civil war in China and impair the unstable position of the Yuan regime. On the other hand, the dominions of Australia and New Zealand, the Netherlands East Indies and the United States did not welcome a thrust by the Japanese navy to the south China seas and the south Pacific islands. A concrete proposal for the neutralization of the Pacific area was put forward by the State Department and favoured by Jordan in Peking.21 However, this was envisaged as an anti19 NGB T. 3/III, no. 108. Lowe, p. 185. NGB T. 3/III, no. 107. Rex claimed that the Japanese army would lose its reputation if it attacked Tsingtao and that Japan would have to give compensation for occupying Tsingtao when Germany was victorious in Europe. FO 800/68, Greene to Grey, n August 1914. The English version of the ultimatum is in Lowe, p. 218. 21 FO 371/2016 [37530], Barclay to Grey, 8 August 1914. 20

THE ALLIANCE AND THE GERMAN-JAPANESE WAR

121

Japanese move and was soon out-dated by Kato's headlong rush to declare war. After discussion at the cabinet on 10 August, Grey told Kato that his government believed that 'acts of war in the Far East will be restricted' to the sea alone and thought it 'desirable to maintain this attitude as long as possible'. Britain would therefore 'refrain for the present from invoking action under the Treaty'.22 There were many undertones to this new move, but its basic object was to prevent Japan from attacking Kiaochow. Kat5 replied the same day that he was determined to send Germany an ultimatum but that he had no objection to a joint note being given to China recommending her to rely on Japan and Britain for the maintenance and protection of peace and order there.23 Ambassador Greene warned London of the dangers of Japan acting alone and by implication hinted that it would be wiser to give in to her and trust that Britain could, by acting alongside her, bring influence to bear on Japan in time to come. Kat5 asked for a prompt reply. The matter, therefore, came up the following day at the British cabinet, which kept the Japanese position under daily review at this time. The cabinet opinion was that 'the general interests involved in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance warranted and required common action but that the operations should be limited in area to the coasts of China and the China Seas and westward'.24 In short, Japan was not to be discouraged but was to be limited. Grey accordingly told the Japanese that the special interests of Britain in east Asia were not so menaced as to make it essential to appeal to the alliance. He recognized, however, that Japan had also interests to consider and that she alone had the right to judge what action was required in view of the German ambassador's threats. He took up Kato's offer to make a joint statement to China but proposed a formula which went far beyond Kato's intention: it was to state that the action of Japan will not extend beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas, or to any foreign territory except territory in German occupation on the continent in Eastern Asia. This, he concluded, was important to prevent unfounded misapprehension abroad.25 Grey had tried to preserve an impression of consistency in Britain's attitude under the 22

FO 371/2016 [37691], Grey to Greene, 10 August 1914. NGB T. 3/III, no. 113. Cf. Kato, ii, 97-99, on the discussion between Kato and the Dutch minister. 24 25 CAB 41/35/27, Asquith to the king, n August 1914. NGB T. 3/HI, no. 127. 23

122 THE ALLIANCE AND THE GERMAN-JAPANESE WAR

alliance, but he had acquiesced in whatever action the Japanese chose to take. Since Kato had shown himself to be adamant about going to war, Grey had in effect admitted that an ultimatum might be sent to Germany and that an attack on Kiaochow might be contemplated. Britain was powerless to refuse to recognize the course of action on which Japan decided. At the same time, good relations were still far from restored because Grey's formula was objectionable to Japan and was to result in an unpleasant series of exchanges which were to hurt Japanese feelings more than the issue of entry into the war. In his last demands Grey had misjudged the temper of the Japanese and assumed a paternal attitude. Kato refused to adopt the last suggestion and so the ultimatum to Germany was drafted in a form which Britain did not approve. It is not completely true to say that Britain Vas not informed about this ultimatum until after it had been despatched5.2^ It had been the subject of considerable toing and froing, but Kato had called a halt and decided to go ahead without Britain's approval, as he was perfectly entitled to do. Ito Masanori claims that Britain on 14 August 'reversed its cancellation of the invitation to Japan' to take part;27 but Britain, while keeping her legal position unchanged, only offered co-operation. Kato's biographer recounts the joke that, just at the height of this misunderstanding on 14 August, the Admiralty asked whether Japanese officers who were in Britain for training could be allowed to assist against German ships marauding in waters close to the United States. Kato told Greene smilingly that the Admiralty at any rate seemed to recognize the limitation of Japan's war zone as unreasonable.28 The Japanese cabinet met on 15 August for emergency session. In the afternoon there was an imperial conference at which Kato went over the whole process in detail before the emperor. He received formal approval for war with Germany and for the terms of the ultimatum. At 7.15 p.m. it was handed over by Vice-minister Matsui to German Ambassador Rex. It was also necessary to convey it to Funakoshi Mitsunojo, Japan's charge d'affaires in Berlin. Because of telegraphic problems it was sent direct and also through the diplomatic representatives in Britain, Italy, Russia, Holland, Switzerland and Sweden. By these eight channels, it finally reached Berlin early on 17 August.29 The 26 H. B. Morse and H. F. MacNair, Far eastern international relations, Boston, 1931, p. 572. 27 28 29 Kato, ii, 99. Kato, ii, 94. Kato, ii, 99-101.

THE ALLIANCE AND THE GERMAN-JAPANESE WAR

123

ultimatum called on Germany to withdraw German armed vessels of all kinds immediately from far eastern waters and to deliver to Japan by 15 September the leased territory of Kiaochow with a view to its 'eventual restoration to China'. It allowed the long period of seven days for the German reply.30 J A P A N S D E C L A R A T I O N OF WAR

Japan's ultimatum of 15 August did not meet Grey's wish that she should agree to some form of geographical limitation. When Grey found that the document contained no such undertaking, he warned that he would, 'whenever Japan declares war, make a public statement as to the geographical limits of Japanese action, unless this has already been done by the Japanese government themselves'. The Tokyo embassy received assurances that Kat5 'will make a general reference as to the geographical limits of action in a formal statement, and an early opportunity of supplementing this will be taken either by the prime minister or Baron Kato in a public utterance which will be intended to dispel the special apprehensions mentioned'. Grey observed that, if this was not made soon or explicitly, it would be essential for Britain to give appropriate assurances to her self-governing dominions.31 The assurances desired were of two kinds, one pertaining to China, one to the Pacific. Britain hoped to give China a joint declaration which would include some assurance that no intention of territorial aggrandizement at China's expense was entertained by either power and that all Chinese territory in German occupation which might be captured by Britain or Japan would on the termination of hostilities be restored to China. Over the Pacific, Grey spelt out the problem fairly bluntly. Britain wanted Japan to declare that she would not occupy German islands in the south Pacific which were of deep importance to her self-governing dominions; interfere on the western seaboard of the American continent; or take possession of the Netherlands East Indies. Ridiculous as they might seem, these doubts did exist, and Britain wanted Japan to take the opportunity of rejecting 'these unpleasant rumours'.32 30

NGB T. 3/III, no. 154. Other allies had allowed only twenty-four or forty-eight hours. The English version of the ultimatum is in Lowe, p. 218. 31 NGB T. 3/III, no. 185. ^ NGB T. 3/III, no. 155.

i24 THE ALLIANCE AND THE GERMAN-JAPANESE WAR

The long-awaited statement was made by premier Okuma on 17 August. It was as near to a statement of war aims as Japan came at this stage of the war: Japan's object is to eliminate from the Continent of China the root of German influence, which forms a constant menace to the peace of the Far East and thus to secure the aim of the alliance with Great Britain. She harbours no design for territorial aggrandizement or entertains no desire to promote any other selfish end. Japan's warlike operations will not, therefore, extend beyond the limits necessary for the attainment of that object and for the defence of her own legitimate interests.33

This statement, which sought to remove uneasiness among the powers over the safety of their territories both in China and the Pacific, reached London too late to forestall the government in issuing a statement of its own on the lines that it had earlier sketched to Japan. On the evening of 17 August, the Press Bureau, only lately set up by the British government, issued to the press a statement that It is understood that the action of Japan will not extend to the Pacific Ocean beyond the China Seas, except in so far as it may be necessary to protect Japanese shipping lines in the Pacific, nor beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas, nor to any foreign territory except territory in German occupation on the Continent of Eastern Asia.34

This was, of course, issued without Japanese consent and was not an accurate reflection of Japanese intentions, but was it a deliberate perversion of Japan's views? Probably it was not. Ambassador Inoue had suggested that his country was prepared to act within prescribed limits on 11 August. Moreover there was evidence in Okuma's statement of a willingness to give assurances, and, when it was reported to London, it too was published by the Press Bureau to indicate Japan's own version of her objectives. Nor did the British version serve any purpose by forcing Japan to make a statement of her own, because the Okuma statement almost coincided with the London statement. The most baffling problem is why the Foreign Office thought there was such a need for urgency. One clue is to be found in Grey's explanation that, 'if we had not made some such publication, unfounded apprehensions would have given rise to a Press campaign in America or elsewhere whereby irreparable mischief would have 33 NGB T. 3/III, no. 206.

M NGB T. 3/III, no. 196.

THE ALLIANCE AND THE GERMAN-JAPANESE WAR

125

been done'. Whatever the circumstances of its issue. Grey was glad that the announcement had been made, even though he may not have authorized it.35 In other words, he was annoyed with Japan and was prepared to risk the ill will to which it might give rise there. The Japanese Foreign Ministry made no official protest but naturally resented such a unilateral act on Britain's part. Kato deprecated the whole notion of geographical limits and later told the British ambassador that the London statement was no more than conjecture about Japan's intentions. He made it clear that Japan did not regard herself as being bound by it. Grey was ready to concede this: he assured Japan that it 'did not purport to represent the text of a formula which the two governments had agreed upon, but our own version of what we understood to be the intentions of the Japanese Government'. With that in view, it had been prefaced by the words 'it is understood'. However it was explained away, Kato resented the British announcement. He forthwith let Britain know that he proposed to cancel the preparations which were being made for an Anglo-Japanese note of assurance to China.36 The whole incident showed all too clearly the lack of confidence between the two allies. There had indeed been diplomatic sharp practice on both sides. Kato had gone ahead with the ultimatum without Britain's agreement; Britain had got her own back with the unilateral declaration. In a sense Britain was fortunate over the press statement: it showed the world that she was uncommitted to Japan over future action in China, and it showed her dominions that she wanted Japan to observe limits in the Pacific. She was fortunate also that it did not lead to a more serious reaction in Japan. Grey was later to write: *to explain to an ally that her help will be welcome, but that you hope it will not be made inconvenient, is a proceeding that is neither agreeable nor gracious'.37 It was also offensive, but Japan was too preoccupied with her own objectives to take offence. It did not have any practical effect in influencing the Japanese in their later policy. No reply came from Germany within the prescribed period. The Japanese cabinet, therefore, decided to declare war on Germany on 23 August. An imperial rescript was issued, bearing the signatures of all 35

FO 371/2017 [40207], minutes by Alston and Grey, 18 August 1914. 36 NGB T. 3/III, nos. 210 and 211. 37 Grey, Twenty-five years, iii, 33. Cf. DBFP, I (iii), no. 613, memorandum by Gregory, 20 December 1919.

126 THE ALLIANCE AND THE GERMAN-JAPANESE WAR the ministers.38 The eighteenth Kurube division and twenty-ninth cavalry brigade were immediately mobilized for service in China.

THE A L L I A N C E AND J A P A N S D E C I S I O N

It has always been hotly debated how far Japan's entry into the war was due to the alliance. Most Japanese believed that their country made its move in accordance with the specific provisions of the alliance.39 The operative clause of the 1911 treaty (article II) provided that, if either ally 'should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests' in eastern Asia or India, the other ally 'will at once come to the assistance of its ally and will conduct the war in common5. As Britain saw it, Germany had not attacked Hong Kong or Weihaiwei and the conditions for Japan's intervention had not been fulfilled. Kato too seems to have admitted privately that this clause had not come into operation and that Japan was not obliged to take part, though he held in public speeches that Japan was required under the alliance to assist Britain.40 The foreign minister's standpoint was a subtle one: that Japan made her move in accordance with the general spirit of the alliance rather than its specific clauses and that, although she had no legal obligation, she had a moral one. Japan's position was reinforced by the fact that Britain had asked for assistance, even if that request was of a restricted nature. Kato was probably right that such restrictions could not operate in a total war. They reflected a misunderstanding on Britain's part of Japan's position. This was readily admitted by one Whitehall official: 'we did not at first realise how keen they were to come in... They may perhaps have taken some offence at the desire which was certainly felt here at first to avoid additional complications in the Far East'.4* Britain spoke with two voices, inviting Japan and then trying to restrain her. As one Japanese writer puts it, Britain's attitude was com38

NGB T. 3 /III, no. 240. The English text is in Lowe, p. 221. Tokyo Asahl^ 23 August 1914. 39 E.g. Ichihashi Yamato, The Washington conference and after ^ Stanford, 1928, p. 118, after examining various views, concluded that 'beyond any doubt it was the British pressure, based upon the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which caused Japan*s entrance into the war*. For a review of the literature, see C. R. Hicks, Japans entry into the war, 1914^ Reno, Nevada, 1944. 40 Kato, ii, 73-4; above, p. 67. 41 Jordan papers, n, Langley to Jordan, 13 August 1914.

THE ALLIANCE AND THE GERMAN-JAPANESE WAR

127

42

plex and flexible. It was understandably complex because the start of the war placed tremendous strains on the shoulders of government and on co-ordination between the ministries. Japan was only one strand in the complex tangle of wartime diplomacy. It was flexible in the sense that many changes in British thinking took place soon after the war began. Britain's reluctance to call on Japan had to be set against her impotence to deal with the situation. This accounts for the apparent volte-face which took place in the first few days of the war, when the Admiralty discovered that it had over-estimated British naval strength in the far east. But of course her invitation was a godsend for Kato and those who wanted to take Japan into the war. They saw that it suited their plans for Japan to join the allies. But without some encouragement from outside it would have been difficult to convert the other leaders to this course. The one who pressed strongly for entry and carried it through its various stages was Kato. He did so because of Japan's obligations of friendship under the alliance (jogiron).43 But this wore a bit thin when Britain withdrew her invitation. He also wanted to use the occasion to 'build up further the standing of Japan in the East for the sake of permanent peace'.44 But even this seems to be rather unspecific as a statement of Japanese war aims. If one probes for Kato's motives, it is difficult to deny that they are to be found in China, Manchuria and Mongolia. It is probable that he had not yet his purposes worked out in detail. But he saw that the world war gave him a free hand in China and that the existence of German bases there gave him a handle to accomplish Japan's ambitions. In the head of the foreign minister, the prime object was to consolidate her position in Manchuria: it was now the 'psychological moment' of which he had spoken to Grey in 1913. That Kato carried the day with his colleagues was due to the dominant position of the Doshikai within the ministry and to his strong personality. Kato also had the backing of the military. There may have been some officers who doubted Kato's confidence in Britain's ultimate victory and considered Germany the stronger military power. But even they had to admit Kato's argument that Japan was unlikely to suffer much from joining the war, whoever was victorious in Europe. The army and navy saw Japan's involvement in the war as a means of 42

Nagaoka Shinjiro, Oshu taisen sanka mondai', NGK, Taishojidat (1958), 27. 44 « Kato, ii, 78-9. Kato, ii, 78-80.

128 THE ALLIANCE AND THE GERMAN-JAPANESE WAR solving the hitherto intractable issue of the increase in the army and navy estimates. It would be easier to justify these after Japan had entered the war on the side of the major world powers. This was in any case the basic military problem which the Okuma ministry had inherited. In June it had set up the Bomukai (Council of Defence) to study the problem, and with the advent of war the council was able to recommend an increase in the army by two divisions and the increase demanded in naval shipbuilding. By September Okuma warned the house of representatives of the extra expenditure which would be entailed by Japan's entry into the war. Owing to the opposition of the Seiyukai, the proposals for army and navy increases were held up by the budget sub-committee of the lower house late in November, although they were eventually approved in 1915. It will be seen that Japan's involvement in a war assisted the army and navy to obtain their demands and that the services might therefore be expected to support Japan's participation in the war. It was also in the interest of the Okuma ministry to sponsor Japan's entry into the war in order to resolve this nagging domestic issue. It would be wrong to imagine that Japan was united in declaring war. The opposition parties were cool towards the war and critical of Kato's diplomacy. They saw it as a means for achieving the army and navy increases to which they were opposed. At the conferences of the Seiyukai and Kokuminto just before the Diet session opened on 3 December, they came out against the expansion plans and thus laid themselves open to the charge of disloyalty to the state. During the Diet they charged that Okuma was diverting attention from domestic criticisms to an overseas war. They suffered the fate of those who give the impression of being unpatriotic during a war: they lost seats to the government party at the general election in March 1915. But the attitude of the parties was reflected in newspaper articles of the time and many like the Toyo Kei^ai Shimpo spoke regularly in the cause of peace. More important than the opposition of the political parties was the mounting opposition of the genro. At the start they had been consulted and had given their consent to Japan joining the Entente powers. But they had differing degrees of enthusiasm. Inoue Kaoru, who was prevented by illness from attending the genr5 meeting on 8 August, sent a letter on the following day to Yamagata and Okuma. He welcomed the outbreak of war in Europe as 'the divine aid conferred on the new Taisho era for the achievement of Japan's destiny' and urged that

THE ALLIANCE AND THE GERMAN-JAPANESE WAR

129

they should grasp this opportunity by joining a union of powers against Germany. He recommended that, in order to benefit from this divine aid, Japan should cement her relations with Britain, France and Russia and, on this basis, mediate as the unifier of China.45 The difference between Kato and the genrd that emerged was not on the main lines of foreign policy but on his handling of the ultimatum to Germany. Over the terms of this, the Elder Statesmen were not consulted and considered that Kato had been too precipitate. Moreover Kato, breaking with a practice from the past, was sparing in the number of secret diplomatic documents which he circulated to the genro, holding that foreign policy must be formulated in the Foreign Ministry. From 14 August the genro became more and more doubtful about Kato's neglect of foreign, especially American, feeling. By 3 September it was widely thought that relations between them and the ministry were very hostile; and rumours circulated that Kato's resignation had been called for and that Okuma was resisting this pressure.46 A meeting was held in Inoue's house on 24 September between the genro and the prime minister. The genro expressed their misgivings about the country's exclusive devotion to Britain and asked whether Japan might not find herself isolated on this account. Okuma agreed that there should be prior consultation with the genro on diplomatic issues, provided time allowed,47 but, despite the articles of agreement which were drawn up, there was continuing tension between the genro and Kato who did not in practice mend his ways. One conclusion which has to be drawn from this complicated story is that the early exhilaration created in Japan by the outbreak of war in Europe had within a month evaporated. Inoue, whose rejoicing at the news from Europe was among the most rhapsodic, came by September to believe with his fellow genro that Japan had moved too fast and committed herself unequivocally to a fixed position from which she would have difficulty in extracting herself. Many interested parties joined this chorus of criticism. Even an independent observer like the senior banker, Takahashi Korekiyo, expressed the view that Japan's financial position was too precarious for her to become a 45 Inoue ko-deny v, 367-9, memorandum, *Kokkai shorai sairyosaku* [best policy for Japan in the future], c. 9 August 1914; Yamagata-den, iii, 296-8. 46 Ham nikkt, vi, 20 August, 3 September, 27 September 1914. 47 Inoue ko-den^ v, 387—92. Agricultural Minister Oura, who was a protege of Yamagata, was worried about deteriorating relations with the genro and arranged with Mochizuki Kotaro, Inoue's private secretary, for them to meet Okuma.

130 THE ALLIANCE AND THE GERMAN-JAPANESE WAR full-fledged belligerent and urged Okuma to make a peaceful settlement with Germany.48 Taken together, this implied that there was less unanimity towards the war in Japan than in practically any other country involved and that, whereas in European countries opinion tended to become more war-minded the more the war seemed to be evenly matched, opinion in Japan tended to become detached and disinterested the clearer it became that she had got involved in a long drawn-out struggle. This was the almost inevitable result of what was described by his critics as Kato's 'kake-komi sansen' (precipitate scurry into war). Japan's alternatives to this were to maintain neutrality or to adhere to the German cause. We may spare a thought for the possibility that she might have chosen the German side. It is arguable that she might by this course have achieved her objects in China and Manchuria equally well and that many groups in Japan would have supported it. Yet there is really no sign of her negotiating with Germany or of her wanting to do so. The course was steered by Kato who does not seem to have entertained an approach to Germany, apart from the ultimatum. Since Germany did not respond, Japan was by September a committed power, though this did not preclude negotiations with Germany later/9 Although many wartime publicists in Britain tried to present the situation otherwise, the fact was that relations between Japan and Germany were not bad or irretrievable. Japan had resented Germany's attitude in 1895 and the kaiser's utterances about the yellow peril in 1904-5. However, relations under the embassies of Mumm von Schwarzenberg (1906-11) and Count Rex (1911-14) had distinctly improved and had become cordial without being friendly. Visits from German dignitaries like Dr von Holleben, a former minister in Tokyo, the Regent of Brunswick and Bernhard Dernburg, the ex-minister of colonies (1907-10), had improved matters in 19105° and the attendance of Prince Henry at the Emperor Meiji's funeral in 1912 had certainly been appreciated in court circles. Moreover Germany was deliberately cautious over criticizing Japan's actions in China.51 It cannot, therefore, be said that the Japanese government had a great animus against 48

Okuma-ko 85-nenshi, iii, 182-3; Kajima, Nikon gaiko seisaku, pp. 297-8. Funakoshi Mitsunojo, Nichi-Doku kokko dan^etsu hishi, Tokyo, 1934. 50 JBD, viii, no. 408; D'Anethan diaries, no. 239. si FO 371/1625 [40264], Greene to Grey, 13 August 1913.

49

THE ALLIANCE AND THE GERMAN-JAPANESE WAR

131

Germany or that it had given evidence of a desire to evict Germany from Tsingtao much before the outbreak of the European war. The attack on the German lease and the German Pacific islands was, in Japan's eyes, a means to her own ends and was made without especial animosity against the Germans. In the event, instead of adhering to Germany, Japan supported Britain. Yet the month of August saw a serious crisis in the alliance. There had been disagreements and disappointments between the allies before. Over railway policies in China in 1910 and the revolutions in China in 1911-13, the two powers had pulled in different directions. But at the start of the war, when Britain invited Japan's assistance and then tried to discourage her from entering the war, it was an unprecedented blow for Japan and brought to the fore the suspicions underlying the alliance. It was the first major dispute between the allies, the first time that they had tussled directly with one another. The damage done was not irreparable; but confidence could only be restored by exercising extreme caution. The incident high-lighted the fact that Japan had already come of age. She was no longer a power that could be browbeaten by Britain or brought into line by an appeal to the principles underlying the alliance. She decided to enter the war in 1914 and, when she discovered that she could not take Britain along with her, she went ahead without British consent. She issued her ultimatum to Germany without consulting London or informing it in advance. Britain reacted by publishing unilaterally a statement of what she believed to be the limits within which Japan would act. But the Japanese were playing the stronger hand. The crisis of August was an early occasion when they manipulated Britain for their own ends and exploited the alliance to fulfil their own ambitions. While they professed to be acting in accordance with the alliance, they were in fact pursuing their own interests. This is a very different view from that sometimes expressed in 1914, namely, that the wily British had dragged the reluctant Japanese into the war by insisting on their obligations under the pernicious alliance.52 Almost the exact opposite was the case. 52 E.g. NGB T. 3/III, no. 254 (i) where 'A Moslem' denounces Japan for making an understanding with 'the great brigands', England, France and Russia.

CHAPTER VIII

Anglo-Japanese Campaigns TSINGTAO CAMPAIGN

The campaign against Tsingtao has a double significance in the story of Anglo-Japanese relations. On the one hand, it generated by its conception a diplomatic crisis as difficult as the crisis over Japan's entering the war and created much bad blood between Britain and Japan. On the other, it ended up with a campaign in which a British contingent operated alongside the Japanese troops — the only case of joint military operations in the history of the alliance, if one excludes the Siberian expedition. It had the additional interest that the British contingent, which was admittedly small, acted under Japanese command. The resulting co-operation was less than satisfactory and led to some recrimination on both sides which lasted until the end of the war.1 Germany's stake in China was the territory of Kiaochow, for which she had acquired a ninety-nine-year lease in 1898. It consisted of the lease hold (mainly Tsingtao city) and a neutral zone of fifty kilometres around it. Tsingtao was the starting-point of the railway which the Germans built to Tsinan, where it joined up with the main arterial line to the Chinese capital. It had the deepest and best harbour on the China coast and was thus developed as the base for the German Pacific squadron and became a leading trading port in China, third only in importance to Shanghai and Tientsin. Much of Germany's expenditure on the territory had been used to develop the port and to fortify the strong natural position of Tsingtao. There was a garrison of between 3000 and 4000 men, chiefly marines, and a force of Germantrained Chinese soldiers. 1

From the Japanese side, the best printed sources are Taisho 3-nen Nichi-Doku senshi, Japanese general staff, Tokyo, 1916, 2 vols.; and Hora Tomio, Dai-ichi-ji Sekai Taisen, Tokyo, 1967, pp. 81-122. Important materials in the library of the Ministry of Defence, Ichigaya, Tokyo, are Tsingtao homen senki, vol. i; and Senji Shorui, vol. 5. From the British side, an important source is Lieutenant-commander George Gipps's 'Journal kept in H.M.S. Triumph, China squadron, including the siege of Tsingtao'.

13*

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

133

Japan's attitude towards Tsingtao was always vague, deliberately so. It is broadly true that Japan entered the war in order to consolidate her position in China. It was clear from 10 August that Japan's entry into the war would inevitably be followed by an expedition against Tsingtao. In her ultimatum to Germany, Japan asked for the immediate withdrawal of German warships from China waters and the delivery to Japan within a month of 'the entire leased territory of Kiaochow, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China'. It was the Foreign Ministry's consistent line that the territory would be restored to China. Yet Foreign Minister Kat5 had mental reservations. He revealed to Britain that 'even if we were to return it to China, it would be necessary to attach many conditions to it', covering such matters as the Japanese lease and railways in south Manchuria. But no early attempt was made to spell out these conditions. Britain's reaction to this was also studiously vague. While accepting the assurances at face value, she had deep-seated suspicions of Japan's ultimate intentions. Britain was in a delicate position. She professed to be on good terms with Yuan Shih-k'ai and did not want to see the instability of China increased as a result of anti-German operations. At the same time, Anglo-Japanese relations had sunk to an all-time low and the moment was ripe for a conciliatory gesture which would deflect Japan from making any arrangement with Germany. As in other quarters of the wartime coalition, Britain's problem was to prevent promises made to one friend leading to the defection of another. Grey probably hoped that Japan would be content with compensation for her Tsingtao endeavours in Manchuria, but he told the Japanese that 'it would be most unfair for any of the allied Powers to put claims in China which would in any way prejudice terms of peace to be made by Japan'.2 This seemed to suggest that he contemplated Japan compensating herself in China proper. In a further private conversation with Ambassador Inoue on 22 August, the foreign secretary gave the impression that Britain would have no objection to Japan's demanding Kiaochow in return for her exertions in the far east.3 In his own account, Grey qualified this by saying that the compensation should not be inconsistent with the integrity and independence of China.4 But misunderstanding had already taken root in Japan where it was believed that Grey had come round to condoning her possession of the 2 NGB T. 3/III, no. 250. 4 FO 371/2017 [43718], Grey to Greene, 22 August 1914.

3 NGB T. 3/III, no. 239.

134

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

Tsingtao territory. This was a serious failure of communication for it appears that Grey intended to convey that, while he was not opposed to Japan's temporary occupation of Kiaochow which was a thorn in Britain's flesh, he had no intention of confirming Japan in permanent possession of the lease.5 The exchanges of the time were conducted in such an evasive way that wrong impressions were readily formed, and because of the flurry of activity it was hard to test their accuracy. Kato did not expect Britain to take any part in operations against Tsingtao. But Grey laid it down as early as 12 August that Britain would be as fully represented as possible, though he was reluctant to make 'a false move with our Ally'.6 Partly this decision reflected Britain's suspicions of Japan's ultimate object; partly it was a response to China's wish that Britain should take part so as not to leave her to the sole mercies of Japan. Britain therefore offered her cordial co-operation to Japan in any campaign fought on China's soil, though it was not welcomed enthusiastically. Next Britain went beyond this to suggest on 13 August that the co-operation of France and Russia should be invited for the Tsingtao operations. This would give the campaign a completely allied complexion and would avoid giving offence to the other members of the Entente who had troops available in the east. This request came as a blow to Japan, and especially to the Japanese army, which wanted to take the German fortress on its own. Kato on 19 August refused to enlist the co-operation of France and Russia. Although Grey reverted to his proposal, he withdrew it a week later in the face of the Japanese veto.7 Britain envisaged her role in any campaign that developed as that of a watchdog on the Japanese and naturally was only too anxious to have this invidious task shared with her European allies, but the Japanese who were planning a military exercise rather than a diplomatic one could reasonably claim that such a multiplication of national armies would be unworkable. Germany was prepared to risk a war rather than cede the territory. From a message intercepted between Berlin and Tsingtao, there is some evidence that she may have sought to return it to China with 5

Kajima, Nichi-Ei gaikoshi, p. 401. Jordan papers n, Langley to Jordan, 13 August 1914. Pearl, Morrison, pp. 383-4, indicates that Ronald Macleay of the Peking legation blamed the decision on 'that brute Winston impetuously butting in without consulting others*. 7 NGB T. 3/III, nos. 135, 209, 233, 249; CAB 41/35/28, 29, 34, Asquith to the king, 12, 13 and 20 August 1914. 6

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

135

certain reserve conditions.8 But she made no attempt to come to an arrangement with the Japanese. Instead it may have been the German hope to hold out in the fortress of Tsingtao for half a year or so, by which time the war in Europe might have ended in German victory. The kaiser reminded the governor, Captain Meyer Waldeck, that 'it would shame me more to surrender Kiaochow to the Japanese than Berlin to the Russians' — a grandiloquent expression which bears the imprint of William's abiding fear of the yellow peril. Optimism was not entirely unfounded: Tsingtao was well-armed, if not impregnable. Moreover, it was not known whether the Japanese could conduct a successful army-navy landing in such inhospitable terrain. When, however, a force of some 30,000 Japanese was landed, the German force of 3500 plus the reservists who flocked to Tsingtao from the rest of China could not be expected to hold out for long. As soon as war was declared on 23 August, the Japanese navy blockaded the bay of Kiaochow. Troops were landed on 2 September at Lungkow in the north of Shantung province, but they encountered heavy rains and flooding. A brigade landed instead at Laoshan Bay on 19 September. It was not until 27 September that they were in a position to open a general attack from Tsimo, ten miles outside the Kiaochow zone. Meanwhile a British expeditionary force had arrived in Laoshan bay on 24 September, together with the naval force under Captain Fitzmaurice consisting of the battleship Triumph and the destroyer Usk which had been blockading Tsingtao since 10 August. It consisted of one battalion of the South Wales Borderers and one company of Sikhs and was commanded by Brigadier-general Nathaniel W. Barnardiston. It was a token force of 1650 men sent from Tientsin and Hong Kong. By comparison with the Japanese numbers it was of microscopic proportions.9 With these combined forces Tsingtao was surrounded on 12 October, and after a general bombardment the fortress fell on 7 November. The Germans were taken to Japan for internment. It was announced that the Kiaochow territory would remain under Japanese rule for the duration of the war and that General Kamio Mitsuomi, the Japanese commander-in-chief, would become governor-general. 8

FO 371/2016 [38494], Jordan to Grey, 12 August 1914; Chi, China diplomacy, pp. 9—10. 9 C. T. Atkinson, The history of the South Wales Borderers, 1914-18, London, 1931. pp. 73-84. The second battalion South Wales Borderers from Tientsin (22 officers and 910 men) made up with the thirty-sixth Sikhs the British expeditionary force.

136

ANGLO-JAPANESE

CAMPAIGNS

Britain agreed that her forces should serve under Japanese command. On 24 August a joint agreement was reached about the taking of Tsingtao, whereby British troops would operate under the Japanese commander-in-chief from the landing of British units in the zone of operations. It was further agreed that the Japanese military commander should, in dealings with China, sign as 'commander-in-chief, allied forces'.10 That this arrangement only came into effect from the landing of British units represented a difference of approach to the whole expedition. It was part of the Japanese strategy to land their formidable force at Lungkow which was well outside the Kiaochow territory. It was known, however, that the Chinese regarded this as a violation of their neutrality, and they later protested vehemently against it. Britain's policy was to avoid 'becoming a party to unprovoked violation of Chinese territory if China opposed it' and her troops were landed at Laoshan bay within the German zone. While it is hard to see how the Japanese could have made their initial landings in a position which would have failed to infringe Chinese neutrality without the risk of sustaining very heavy casualties, the choice of Lungkow, so far from Tsingtao, was provocative. The task of the British troops was much easier in so far as they were landing when the Germans were already engaged elsewhere and the Japanese already commanded the anchorage. It will be readily understood that with whatever good grace the Japanese Foreign Ministry accepted British participation in the force attacking Tsingtao, the military authorities on the spot reacted differently. The landing at Lungkow had been difficult and floods had made the march on Tsingtao hard for troops and especially for wheeled vehicles. While German resistance was not distinguished, the Japanese task was complicated enough without the presence of foreign troops, for which the Japanese had to supply food, horses, fodder and other facilities.11 In these circumstances there were bound to be tensions between the two forces. There was a host of cases where British troops were mistaken for Germans, blocked on the march, fired upon and taken prisoner. On one occasion a captain of the Sikh regiment was captured 10

Senji shorui, v, ch 2 (i). u The Japanese lost the battleship Takachio blown up and sunk on 18 October; their casualties amounted to about four hundred. Gipps on 10 November recorded his view that the Germans had put up *a rotten defence*.

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

137

and maltreated. There were in most cases profuse apologies from the Japanese. This problem tended to peter out when the British forces began to wear distinguishing marks and take along interpreters.12 More serious was the poor opinion formed by the Japanese of the quality of British troops, though not of the Sikhs. The Japanese troops viewed with some consternation the Borderers clad in tropical shorts and solar topis. Rumours grew that in the final stages of the taking of Tsingtao British units were repeatedly reminded by Japanese commanders of the necessity of advancing in conjunction with the Japanese troops, but they would only retreat. It is difficult to test the accuracy of this charge. But a British diplomat later reported that 'Japanese military officers in Tsinan... have freely expressed their opinions to Chinese officials to the effect that the men are not good fighters and that their officers come from wealthy families and are therefore unfitted for the hardships and dangers of a campaign'.13 More serious still were the failures of communication at the top. The Japanese did not take the British commanders into their confidence over their plan of campaign. There was also coolness between the commanders-inchief. General Kamio Mitsuomi and Brigadier-general Barnardiston. Kamio, for example, would not allow the British to send direct signals to Peking or overseas. When Barnardiston was asked on his return to London to comment on this estrangement at the top, he appeared to brush it aside and refused to admit having any reason to complain of Japan.14 Friction between the British and Japanese army thus affected the military operations at every level of command but it is hard to say whether these incidents were more numerous than the disagreements which have arisen in all combined operations in history.15 As against this record of misunderstanding, there is evidence that naval co-operation was mainly satisfactory. It is true that the British took umbrage when, after the taking of Tsingtao, the Japanese tried to get Captain Fitzmaurice to return to Weihaiwei in order (it was 12 Gipps journal, 3 October 1914. 13 FO 371/2381 [25662], Pratt to Jordan, 18 December 1914. 14 FO 371/2381 [25662], minute by Alston, 6 March 1915.1 have not dwelt here on the treatment of British military and naval attaches who joined the Japanese army as observers. The pattern of Japanese resentment was much the same; but the issue was much less important than between the armies. H. Borton, Japans modern century. New York, 1955, p. 254. Atkinson, South Wales Borderers, pp. 82-3, mentions the disagreements but plays them down. is Cf. H. G. W. Woodhead, A journalist in China, London, 1934, p. 83. For a less tolerant view, see Lowe, pp. 197-8.

138

ANGLO-JAPANESE

CAMPAIGNS

thought) to avoid the appearance of a British naval contingent in the final triumphal march through Tsingtao.16 If this was indeed the Japanese intention, it certainly failed. One British commentator on the naval action who was able to take a broad view was Captain Hubert Brand, the naval attache at the Tokyo embassy, who was present at the operation as an observer. In a letter of thanks to Vice-admiral Kat5 Sadakichi of the Suwo, the commander of the second fleet, he wrote: After three months' service in ships under your command, I am more than confident that in the Japanese navy, Great Britain has a most faithful and very valuable Ally. I shall take an early opportunity of reporting to the British Admiralty on the cordial state of relations between our two Navies during the late operations off Tsingtau.17

This euphoria over the success of naval co-operation seems to have been shared by the Japanese. In a letter in English, Admiral Kato replied that As the effect of the European disturbances, we have met the chance of realizing the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. As the first step of the realization of our alliance, HMS Triumph and Usk, representing the British Navy, joined the Second Squadron under my command and combined in the operation of attacking Tsingtau. Overcoming many hardships, HMS Triumph and Usk have admirably accomplished their duties of escorting transports, of landing troops and of enforcing blockade; especially the facts that the Triumph often joined our main division in bombarding the Forts of Tsingtau and that she has well shown the ability of the British Navy in every circumstance are not only to be highly appreciated but they have contributed much to the success of the operation.18

Evidently there was effective co-operation and a good deal of cordiality in the naval sphere. It must be admitted that it was the bitter military experience that hit the headlines in Japan, rather than the naval harmony. It was eagerly grasped by pro-German groups who wrote on the theme that 'the gilded dross of Great Britain has been exposed and her real strength is now known to us ... As to the British Army, it is cowardice itself'.19 These sentiments, sparked off by the campaign in Tsingtao, were to 16

17 Gipps journal, 10 November 1914. Senji shoruiy v. Senji shoruiy v, Kato to Captain Brand, 20 November 1914. Brand also wrote to the navy minister on 25 November, offering thanks 'for your forethought and kindness in sending such a liberal stock of wine for my use*. 19 FO 800/31, extracts from the Far East, 'Discrediting the Anglo-Japanese alliance*. 18

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

139

re-appear for the rest of the war in certain Japanese newspapers and magazines. The British ambassador could only take comfort in the hope that 'a healthy change will come when the war ends favourably for our arms'; but in the meantime there would be 'some hesitation shown here as to the ultimate issue of the war, and a tendency to "hedge" in appreciating the worth of the British alliance'.20 Britain's suspicions were greatly increased by the simultaneous activities of the Japanese troops elsewhere in Shantung. Britain wanted to keep Japan's energies directed against Germany. The Chinese too hoped that this might be so and had indeed encouraged British participation in the expedition with this in mind. But all hope that Britain would be in command or in control was vain. She was a toothless bulldog in her relations with Japan and her military leaders. Even as the attack on Tsingtao was under way, Britain learnt that Japanese troops were also moving into western Shantung. Late in September the Chinese protested against their occupation of Weihsien. They opposed the military occupation of the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu railway line which took place on 3 October and the seizure of Tsinanfu which followed later in October. The Chinese requested the British, whose troops had of course taken no part in this westward operation, to use their good offices with Japan. But the Foreign Office declined on the ground that continued German control of the railway was impossible and Japanese action was necessary. Britain was in any case powerless to influence the course of events, though this could not be publicly stated. The consul at Tsinan, J. T. (later Sir John) Pratt was less content with the highhanded actions of the Japanese military. He gives a first-hand account of the happenings at Tsinan in his book War and politics in China. On occasion he let off steam in his reports and Jordan, who was no Japan-lover, had to reprimand him for his intemperate language. Pratt reported that British participation in the expedition to Shantung was a complete farce and Whitehall admitted that it showed up 'our Japanese allies in a very unfortunate light as cooperators in the field'.21 Britain's reputation in China was also tarnished. Certainly Britain's identification with the Japanese in Shantung disposed the rank and file of Chinese against her for the rest of the war. 20 FO 371/2388 [58208], Greene to Langley, 6 April 1915; [48201], Jordan to Grey, 22 April 1915. 21 FO 371/2381 [25662], Jordan to Langley, 29 January 1915, enclosing Pratt to Jordan, 18 December 1914. See also War and politics in Chtna^ pp. 137ff.

i4o

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

Preoccupied as Britain was with the outbreak of war with Turkey, she had to regard Shantung as a marginal area of the war. At the same time, the Tsingtao campaign had to be regarded as a successful one. It was in the aftermath of the fall of the German 'colony' that Balfour, called upon to speak at a Guildhall dinner, remarked: Everybody must sympathize with the feelings of the Japanese, who have shown ... all that courage, enterprise and organization which have always distinguished them. Everybody must sympathize with them when they have learned that the great fortress erected by those who so flouted them in 1897 [? 1895], has fallen to their arms, never again to return to those who built it. Our allies in the Far East are the first among us who have reached conclusively and finally the objective for which they strove.22

It was one of the paradoxes of the Great War that the early decisive victories were won outside Europe. At the same Guildhall dinner, the Japanese ambassador in London was given a special standing ovation. His biographer suggests that because of the fall of Tsingtao the function seemed to focus on him. In his address, he returned thanks for the unexampled cordiality shown to his country at the time.23 If further confirmation is required, let it come from a memorandum circulated to the British cabinet early in 1915: The heaviest blow delivered at German world-power has been at the hands of Japan by the capture of [Tsingtao] and, although her sphere of action has been limited, it has provided the Allies with a prize that, in the eyes of Germany, is the greatest that has been won from her since the war began.2*

There was no shortage of commentators who saw the fall of Tsingtao purely as a blow against Germany; fewer saw its less fortunate consequences. It was more damaging for China than it was for Germany. Moreover, as an example of Anglo-Japanese military collaboration, the first of its kind, it had been disappointing. NAVAL WAR IN THE PACIFIC

Whereas in European waters the German fleet did not leave its home bases until later in the war, her China squadron was already cruising 22 24

23 The Times, 10 November 1914. Inoue ko-den, v, 198-200. Asquith papers, box in, note by Lord Esher, ? January 1915.

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

141

in the Pacific when war was declared and was a serious threat to commerce. Whereas in every other sector of the world the naval forces of the Entente enjoyed a superiority over those of Germany, in Chinese waters they were lacking both in numbers and in the composition 01 the squadron.25 The Triumph was out of commission and the French vessel, Montcalm, was in the remote Pacific. Thus, on 10 August, when Japan announced her willingness to enter the war, it was greeted in British naval circles with mingled surprise and satisfaction. Admonishing Canada who had questioned whether Japan's entry into the war should be encouraged, Winston Churchill took the view that 'the entry of Japan will of course make the Pacific absolutely safe very soon ... Any declaration against the entry of Japan into the war would do harm.'26 Since no detailed plans for Anglo-Japanese naval co-operation had been worked out in peace-time, they had to be speedily improvised. It was arranged that the Japanese fleet would assume responsibility for patrolling and commerce protection north of the equator. This enabled the commander-in-chief of the British China squadron, Admiral Jerram, to devote his time to the difficult task of clearing Admiral von Spee's squadron from the Pacific. Because of the coaling of his squadron and the shortage of supplies, von Spee was forced to make for the Atlantic. At Coronel off the west coast of South America, the Royal Navy sustained a serious reverse early in November when five cruisers — Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, Niirnberg, Dresden and Leipzig — met the Good Hope, Monmouth and Glasgow under Admiral Cradock, sank the two former and damaged the last. The cabinet blamed Cradock for disobeying orders and attacking the German squadron in a state of inferiority.27 But the action off the Falkland islands a month later resulted in the German fleet being driven off the seas for the time being. Meanwhile Admiral Jerram, relieved of his responsibility for the north China seas, was able to concentrate the main force of the China squadron at Singapore. But the squadron was greatly under strength for the wide-ranging patrol and convoy duties which it was called upon to perform. When Japan issued her ultimatum to Germany, there was a greater possibility of obtaining reinforcements from the 25

Daveluy, Inaction maritime pendant la guerre anti-germanique, ii, 94.

26 DCER, i, no. 62. 27 CAB 41/35, Asquith to the king, 4 November and 10 December 1914.

i42

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

Japanese navy. There was nothing specified in the alliance or in associated agreements about combined naval action in event of war nor was there any reference to the extent of naval assistance which might be expected. The Japanese Ministry of Marine took the line that 'since Japan's object in entering the war was to preserve peace in the far east in accordance with the friendship of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the navy should take steps to ensure cooperation between Britain and Japan'.28 On 21 August, two days before breaking off relations with Germany, it was decided to send the battle-cruisers, /fo^/and Chikuma, to join the British squadron at Singapore.29 It was unprecedented for Japanese ships to operate under the command of foreigners and the question had to be specially considered. In orders to the commanders concerned, it was stated that there was no question of the Japanese navy's full co-operation with the Royal Navy; it was merely a matter of limited co-operation in a restricted sphere. Thus, the Ibuki and Chikuma were to be associated with the command of Admiral Jerram, just as the Triumph and Usk were to operate under Japanese command in north Chinese waters. There is no evidence that this gave rise to special difficulties and the arrangement continued amicably until the end of the war.30 Before the British squadron had begun blockading Kiaochow, the cruiser Emden left and made for the straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean. Jordan regarded this as an act of negligence on Jerram's part, though it was probably an inevitable consequence of the Admiralty's decision to concentrate on Hong Kong when war broke out. 3i After overwhelming the Russian cruiser Zemchug in the Penang Roads the Emden appeared off the Hooghly on 14 September and proceeded to sink six merchant ships. The Admiralty was annoyed that they had not taken evasive action instead of playing into the Emden s hands by sticking to established trade routes. 32 Her raids in the Indian Ocean had great success, and it was not until 9 November that she was destroyed by the Sydney at the battle of Cocos islands. Japanese 28

Senji shorui, v, ch 2/1. Cf. Japanese Navy Ministry microfilm, Library of Congress, T. 335, R. 91/92, F. 175256*"., Admiral Takeshita to Captain Rymer, 19 September 1914. 30 Kato Kanji-den, Tokyo, 1941, pp. 600-2. Admiral Kato was commander of the Ibuki. It seems to have been understood in the British ships that their captains could not issue orders to the Japanese captains but only invite their collaboration. 31 Jordan papers 12, Jordan to Alston, 9 November 1914. Cf. Nish, 'Admiral Jerram and the German Pacific fleet', Mariner's Mirror, 56 (1970), 420-1. 32 CAB 37/121/123, Admiralty to cabinet, 14 October 1914. 29

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

143

cruisers had taken part in the campaign against the Emden and were disappointed that, because they were acting under command of the British admiral, they had not been allowed to destroy the Emden themselves. 3 3 The exploits of the German ships rendered the Pacific and Indian oceans unsafe for a while and surely implied a serious criticism of the concentration strategy which had been followed by the Admiralty for a decade. It had implications for the expeditionary forces which were to be sent from Australia and New Zealand to Europe. In September the Admiralty refused as unnecessary and for the moment impracticable any stronger escort for the New Zealand force than the three cruisers of the *P' class at present in adjoining waters. But the New Zealand government postponed the expedition in view of the dangers apprehended from the German cruiser activity. The London cabinet considered this humiliating situation at its meeting on 22 September and found that there were no ships available. It had to tell New Zealand that the expedition should be postponed, possibly for six weeks.34 At the Admiralty's suggestion, Grey approached the Japanese who promised to send a battleship for the convoy duty to Wellington. When the matter came before the cabinet on the following day, it was decided to order the cruiser Minotaur from Singapore to accompany the Japanese battle cruiser IbukL With the protection of these ships, whose appearance in New Zealand ports was a novel experience, the contingent eventually sailed.35 Because of the lack of naval preparedness which this emergency revealed, Britain was thrown into Japan's arms. Britain's next problem was to deal with the German Pacific islands, which were significant as radio stations. New Zealand had taken over Samoa on 30 August and Australia New Guinea on 13 September. The Japanese fleet took the Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas in September-October. This created a serious diplomatic crisis. On 12 October Kato told Greene that, since public opinion was demanding compensation for the assistance Japan was giving the allies, Britain should make no request for the transfer of islands which Japan might occupy strategically. This was a change of tune from the assurances given by Premier Okuma in public on 17 August and by Kat5 privately two days later.36 Greene recommended that 33

34

Kato Kanji-den, 602—5.

CAB 41/35/46, Asquith to the king, 22 September 1914. 5 CAB 41/35/47, Asquith to the king, 23 September 1914.

3

36

See above, p. 124.

144

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

it would be at once politic and graceful if we offered them some signal mark of our confidence which would vindicate their policy in eyes of nation and would assure us their further assistance, should we require it. I submit that this object would be attained, should HM Government deem it possible, without alarming American and Australian sentiment, to refrain from requesting at present juncture the transfer to Great Britain of any islands which Japan may occupy for strategic reasons. Without approaching the larger issue, Grey replied appreciatively to Japan but stated that Australia proposed to occupy Yap. The Japanese replied amicably enough that they would remain in occupation until the arrival of the Australians.37 Yet the Japanese navy was calling for permanent retention of all occupied islands, including Yap, though the cabinet remained undecided.38 There the matter rested until 18 November when the Australians announced their expedition to 'relieve the Japanese occupying Yap and other islands north of Equator'. Four days later on the basis of Japanese protests the Colonial Office asked that the expedition should not proceed to islands north of the equator.39 Until the political questions were resolved, the expedition was held up. On 27 November, Grey told Japan that great importance was attached to Yap and suggested the compromise formula that Australia be free to occupy those islands unoccupied by Japan. Tokyo agreed to order the Japanese commander to hand over Yap to the Australian force, but on i December Kato sent Grey a vital communication as the result of a crucial cabinet meeting: Japan desired that none of the islands in the Caroline, Marshall, Mariana and Pellew groups which were already in her possession should be visited by the Australian expedition. In view of the previous understanding regarding Yap, it could be excepted and Japanese troops would, if required, withdraw when British forces reached the island. Looking beyond the present, the message added that Japan would naturally insist on retaining permanently all German islands lying to the north of the equator and relied on Britain's support when the proper moment arrived.40 This was to hold a pistol to Britain's head and Grey, relying on Japanese assistance while the Scharnhorst and Gnetsenau were still at large, could only equivocate.41 He 37

FO 371/2017 [58696 and 59527], Greene to Grey, 12 and 14 October 1914. 38 NGB T. 3/III, no. 637. 39 NGB T. 3/III, nos. 645-51. 40 NGB T. 3/III, no. 653. 41 Japanese Navy Ministry microfilm, T. 335, R. 91-92, F. 17525!?., Admiralty to Japanese Navy Ministry, 15 November 1914.

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

145

replied that it was not British policy to commit herself to recognizing Japan's permanent retention of German islands north of the equator 'but we are ready to proceed to the end of the war on the understanding ... that all occupation of German territory... will be without prejudice to the final arrangements*. He went on to announce that Australia's expedition was being requested not to proceed north of the equator.42 On 3 December the Colonial Office cabled Australia that it was most convenient for strategic reasons to allow the Japanese to remain in occupation for the present, leaving the question of the future to be settled at the end of the war.4^ Three days later the colonial secretary gave the governor-general of Australia a private account of the crisis, arguing that, since it would be impossible at this moment to risk a quarrel with 'our Ally' which would be the certain and immediate result of any attempt diplomatically to oust them now from these islands 'you ought in the most gradual and diplomatic way to begin to prepare the mind of your Ministers for the possibility that at the end of the war Japan may be left in Possession of the Northern Islands and we with everything south of the Equator'.44 Of course this decision was not taken in quite such a cavalier manner as might appear. Greene, in recommending that Grey should meet the Japanese half-way, argued that the islands north of the equator were 'climatically undesirable, small and scattered and are as near to Japan as they are far removed from Australia. Australia must have little if any population which she could spare to send to these remote and probably unproductive northern islands.'45 Some of this thinking was also present in Australia but it must be admitted that, on the whole, Australian opinion was bitterly shocked by these new developments and deeply resentful of the restrictive attitude adopted by Whitehall. Colonial Secretary Harcourt in a note to Asquith and the cabinet under the title 'The Spoils' hit the nail on the head: he foresaw great trouble with Australia, 'especially as regards the Marshall Islands, the trade of which has been, even under German rule, exclusively with Australia'.46 In January 1915 Britain enquired whether Australia would object to 42

FO 410/63 [77663], Grey to Greene, 3 December 1914. E. Scott, Official history of Australia in the war of 1914-18, xi, Sydney, 1938, 763. 44 Quoted in W. R. Louis, Australia and the German colonies in the Pacific, 1914-19', JMH38 (1966), 409-10. 45 FO 800/68, Greene to Grey, 5 December 1914. 46 Asquith papers, box 114, memo by L. Harcourt, 27 March 1915. 43

146

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

Japan's continued occupation if it was expedient for the peace settlement. In February Australia answered that she was unlikely to raise serious protest On 28 March Winston Churchill, the first lord of the Admiralty, wrote to Admiral Oguri Kosaburo, the naval attache in London: It has been a matter of the highest satisfaction to me that the signal success which has been achieved by the cooperation between the navies of Japan and Great Britain has been reflected in the relations established between the two Admiralties. When the history of this great war comes to be written, the ungrudging and whole-hearted assistance of Japan will furnish a striking chapter, and the cordiality that has united the naval staffs of both countries will endure as one of our pleasantest recollections . . . For the moment our attention is turned to the naval operations in the North Sea and the Mediterranean, but we know that should ever the need arise we can rely with confidence upon the powerful aid of the navy of Japan.4?

By cordial letters of this sort to Japan, Churchill was deliberately cultivating the goodwill of the Japanese navy because of Britain's severe naval difficulties east of Suez. The active phase of the Pacific war had ended; but Britain continued to expect support, further afield. Since it was essential for Britain to cultivate Japanese naval opinion, the concessions she made over the north Pacific islands, which were primarily a naval concern for the Japanese, were judicious ones. The islands were outright German possessions and were therefore less likely to encounter formidable international opposition at a peace conference than Shantung, which was China's sovereign territory leased to Germany. Although the Japanese considered the prime value of the islands to be strategic, they also had hopes of expanding their commerce there and one of their early acts was to call the local chiefs to Tokyo for consultation.48 It was probably in this commercial context that Australia objected most strongly to the assurances which Britain had given. Indeed, this issue highlighted the dilemma which was always implicit for Britain in the Japanese alliance: that of reconciling the interests of her dominions with those of her ally and, if need be, of choosing between them. There were real divergences between the v Senji shorui, v. Cf. DCER, i, no. 62. Cf. Morrison diary, c. 16 August 1916. Elders from Ponape, Jaluit and Kusai came to Tokyo on 10 August 1915. 48

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

147

dominions and Japan over the islands which made London's decisions down to 1919 especially painful. P R O P O S A L S FOR A W I D E R A L L I A N C E

Even before the war began, Russia and France had tried to broaden the alliance by gaining admission to it. In the case of Russia, this was first talked of when the Russian ambassador in Tokyo, Nikolai N. Malevskii-Malevich, called on the newly installed premier to offer greetings on 7 May49 but the issue was allowed to lapse until July when the Persian question was agitating officials in Whitehall. Russia proposed to Britain a 'triple guarantee5 between Japan, Russia and Britain of their various Asiatic possessions. Although Grey was noncommittal, it appealed to some as a means of placing Anglo-Russian relations in the middle east and India on a more satisfactory footing.5*5 After the war started, Foreign Minister Sazonov expanded his proposal: Ve ought to take advantage of the present friendly dispositions of the Japanese Government to induce them to associate themselves with the Triple Entente both in their diplomatic and strategical action'. He added that, while Britain and Japan were allies by treaty and England and Russia allies de facto, Russia's position with regard to Japan was rather anomalous and ought to be placed on a somewhat similar footing to that of England.51 If the interests of one of the signatories were threatened, the three would jointly frame the measures to be taken, and they should not conclude any arrangement with other powers without consultation between themselves. The British officials were divided; but Grey evidently took it seriously enough to refer it to the cabinet on 11 August, although it was without any positive result.52 Meanwhile the French had been informed of the proposals during the visit of the French president to St Petersburg late in July. On 4 August, their ambassador in Tokyo proposed to Japan that she should conclude an alliance with France and shortly after asked to be admitted to the Anglo-Japanese alliance.53 Kato acted cautiously, taking the 49

Me^hdunarodnye otnosheniya v epokhu imperialiyna: dokumenty i^ arkhivov tsarkogo i vremennogo pravltelstv^ i8j8-i$ij, Series 3, Moscow, 1938, vol. ii, no. 379, vol. v, no. 378. so BD, x (2), 821. si BD, x (2), 821-2. 52 JBD, x (2), 822-3. The best treatment of this subject is in Kajima, Nichi-Ei gaikoshi, PP- 377-9; Lowe, pp. 207-12; and Kuroha Shigeru, Nichi-Ei domei no kenkyu, Sendai, 1968, pp. 370-84. 53 NGB T. 3/III, nos. 574-6.

i48

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

opinion of Ambassador Ishii in Paris, whose view was that Japan should await developments in the war situation.54 The Russians were also bringing pressure to bear in Tokyo for extending the AngloJapanese alliance to take in Russia and France and claimed to be speaking with Grey's blessing.55 However, Kato, who had many other problems on his desk — not least Britain's evident animosity — was inclined to let the matter lapse. Strangely but probably coincidentally, the Elder Statesmen intervened at this point to endorse the notion of a strong Anglo-JapaneseFranco-Russian coalition. Inoue, in a memorandum dictated to his secretary, Mochizuki Kotaro, about 10 August, argued that Japan, by joining such a coalition, would be able to establish her ascendancy in China. Moreover 'we must take steps to get Englishmen at this crisis to repent of their feeling towards their alliance with Japan which is tending of late to become cool; and we must now make the RussoJapanese agreement, which has for some years been a paper-treaty, a more practical and realistic agreement'.56 Yamagata generally concurred in this but stressed the long-term view that the racial attitude of Europe and America towards Asians was bound in future to deteriorate.5? The Elder Statesmen brought pressure to bear on Premier Okuma towards the end of August in favour of strengthening Japan's international alignments. But Kato, who would not tolerate the interference of the genro in diplomatic affairs, resisted this pressure until Japan had declared war and contented himself with the statement that the time was not yet opportune for discussing a new alliance. On 5 September Britain, France and Russia entered into the declaration of London not to make a separate peace while the war continued. The text was communicated to Japan but she was not informed in advance. When Ambassador Inoue complained in London, he was told that Britain who had no relevant agreements with France and Russia had required to enter into an alliance with them to carry on the war in common; but article II of the 1911 treaty made similar guarantees between Japan and Britain unnecessary; and Britain had told her European partners that the declaration must not be regarded as modifying the 1911 alliance provisions, which were a prior commitment on Britain.58 On 9 September Kato expressed satisfaction at the British 54 NGB T. 3/III, no. 581. 56 Inoue ko-den, v, 366-9.

57

ss NGB T. 3/III, nos. 577-8. Inoue ko-den, v, 370; Yamagata-den, Hi, 910-14.

58 FO 371/2019 [47409], Grey to Greene, 7 September 1914.

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

149

statement.59 Japan was not at this stage asked to subscribe to the London declaration. As soon as Inoue Kaoru returned to Tokyo on 9 September, he raised the subject of a quadrangular alliance with Okuma. The topic was raised diplomatically on the initiative of Kato on 15 September. Ishii in Paris urged delay since he felt that the addition of France and Russia would inevitably change the alliance and weaken it.60 Ambassador Motono in Russia, however, strongly recommended that negotiations should be started.61 Kat5 who himself felt that these proposals would inevitably weaken the alliance also consulted Britain: it was one thing for Russia to ask for this before Japan entered the war, but, now that Japan was a belligerent, what could be Russia's motive? Grey admitted that he was quite favourable to the idea but felt it would come about more naturally at the end of the war for, like the other powers, Japan was too preoccupied militarily to consider 'a large political alliance extending beyond the war'. Grey promised not to stir in the matter until Kat5 was disposed to entertain the proposal.62 Kat5 would fain have let the issue die. But Okuma was forced to meet the genro on 24 September and hear criticisms of Kato's handling of foreign affairs with special reference to this issue. The genro were anxious to exploit Japan's position of strength by entering into alliance with Russia and France.63 So on 28 September Kato again raised the question with London, stating — but as his own view only — that to add Russia and France to the alliance would deprive it of any realistic object and of its special quality as an offensive-defensive alliance.& However, Whitehall was no more prepared to move than Kato. Indeed after the diplomatic rebuffs of August, it was determined to leave Japan to decide on a matter which was only of limited advantage to Britain during a European war.65 The taking of Tsingtao was yet another landmark in these straggling negotiations. When the quadruple alliance proposal was raised again by Russia and France early in 1915, it was with different motives. Russia, for her part, was anxious to remove her troops from Siberia for use on the eastern front but was not prepared to do so without guarantees from Japan. France, on the other hand, was more attracted 59

NGB T. 3/III, no. 598; also nos. 594-600 passim. 60 NGB T. 3/III, no. 585. « NGB T. 3/III, no. 586. 62 FO 410/63 [50954], Grey to Greene, 17 September 1914. « Inoue ko-den, v, 387-92. « NGB T. 3/III, no. 590. « NGB T. 3/III, no. 591.

150

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

by the possibility of inducing Japan to send troops to Europe.66 Britain was sceptical of France's optimism on this score and came out with a fresh proposal that Japan should be asked to adhere to the declaration of London; the most that could be expected of Japan was that she should not make a separate peace, now that the active phase of the war in the far east had passed.6? But again Kat5 was adamant: to add Russia and France to the alliance was like adding water to whisky; nor was he inclined to interfere with the London declaration at this stage.68 Kato had stuck to his guns in the face of approaches by Russia and France and of counter-policies devised by the genro with which he had no sympathy. Grey recognized that the alliance was in a sick state and had to be nursed with care back to health; it was better not to complicate the recovery by admitting two new demanding patients. Behind these alliance proposals lay the desire for Japanese aid. By September Britain discovered that Japan's assistance could be valuable in the Indian Ocean and beyond. She asked for a division of the Japanese battle fleet to be sent to the Mediterranean and offered to pay for the expenditure involved. The Japanese declined early in September. The British cabinet's reaction was that, while the Japanese would object to their troops being used in Europe, they could ultimately be persuaded to send ships to European waters.69 This reflected an optimism for which there is not much warrant in Japanese sources. Two months later, on 3 November, Japan was again approached for naval aid, in connection with a projected entrance into the Baltic. This request was also refused, although Kato gave the assurance that his government might change its attitude 'if England were really in desperate straits, if she were to be actually invaded'. Not long after, on 15 November, further naval assistance was invited in a message sent off late at night by the cypher clerk at the Foreign Office in error — what was described as 'a monumental brick'.70 The Japanese took the occasion to clarify their position: they would share in the pursuit of the Scharnhorst and in the protection of shipping in the Pacific and Indian oceans but they would not send a squadron to the Mediterranean or the 6

FO 371/2383 [6757], minute by Alston on Grey to Greene, 19 January 1915. 67 FO 371/2383 [5242], Grey to Bertie, 9 January 1915. 6g FO 371/2383 [6364], Grey to Greene, 18 January 1915; Kato, ii, 116-19. 69 CAB 41/35/40 and 41, Asquith to the king, 2 and 5 September 1914. 70 NGB T. 3/III, nos. 628, 629. No. 621 contains the views of the cabinet.

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

151

71

Dardanelles. Britain made no further attempt to enlist Japan's naval aid for over a year. In contrast, Russia and France were more interested in Japan's military assistance in Europe. To invite Japan to send troops to European battlefields did not have the political disadvantages which must accompany any action by her armies against the Germans in China. Indeed to divert Japanese troops to Europe would be of distinct political benefit to the powers in east Asia. In the autumn the three Entente powers joined to request Japanese troops for the western front: this was declined. Under pressure from his allies, Grey raised the matter privately on 6 November. It received detailed study in the War and Navy Ministries before the cabinet decided that Japan could not comply, mainly because 'the patriotic feelings of the Japanese nation* were not yet roused by the European conflict.72 This was followed by frequent appeals to Japan's moral obligations under the alliance, but she was able to contend forcefully that the alliance had nothing to do with Europe and imposed no obligation upon her to send troops there. Russia and France supported these initiatives, although they felt that they came more effectively from Britain. When Grey's enthusiasm wilted in December, France repeated the request and suggested that the powers would give, if need be, such guarantees as Japan might reasonably demand in return for her help. There was also a good deal of clandestine activity to this end in the four capitals concerned.73 When, however, the Entente powers met in London in January 1915 to discuss what compensation could be offered to Japan, the main proposal was for the removal of racial discrimination against Japanese in British colonies. At the official level, the question was allowed to drop. Japanese opinion was divided over sending an expeditionary force to Europe. Within the cabinet, there was a minority, including Prime Minister Okuma, which was inclined to favour the idea but it was 7i NGB T. 3/III, no. 624. A slightly garbled version of this incident is given in Eustace Percy, Some memories, London, 1958, pp. 42-3. The message came in from the Admiralty and was not vetted or referred to the cabinet but was sent straight off. It was quite sensibly worded, although it greatly exaggerated Japan's desire to help in Europe. Cf. Japanese Navy Ministry microfilm, T. 335, R. 91/92, F. 17525^*., Admiralty to Navy Ministry, 15 November 1914, where Japan was invited to send a squadron to the Dardanelles. 72 NGB T. 3/III, no. 621 73 Kara Kei, Nikki, Tokyo, 1950, vi, 16 January 1915. Ambassador Motono was an advocate of Japan sending troops and he may have given Russia an exaggerated impression of Japan's desire for an expedition.

152

ANGLO-JAPANESE

CAMPAIGNS

opposed by the service ministries and this damned the proposal. Kato told the British ambassador that the majority of the cabinet was hostile, partly because of the hostility which the idea would encounter from the majority in the Diet.74 In the realm of public opinion, only three newspapers — Yoro^u Choho, Tokyo Asahi and Miyako — could be said to support an expedition. The key voice was that of the army, and it would not countenance the proposal at any time during the war. Its grounds were straightforward: the Japanese conscript army could only be used outside the country if the national interest was seen to be at stake; to send troops so far away would render Japan liable to attack; it would be a most expensive operation. Of course, there were suspicions that there were other factors which contributed to the refusal: that it was unthinkable for the Japanese army to fight the German; that the generals were self-conscious after fighting a not very successful campaign in Shantung. Gertainly the time for the Entente approaches could not have been worse chosen for the army was thoroughly disgruntled with Britain over the Tsingtao campaign and was not likely to give a favourable, co-operative reply.75 Even when an association was formed with the object of sending a corps of volunteers to Europe, the army leaders stepped in and crushed it.76 The war in the far east had ended. Japan would still assist the allies through the actions of her navy and would particularly ease the lot of Britain. She would not undertake military action for four years yet and she was still reluctant to have dealings with the other Entente members. She refused to control trade to neutral, or even to enemy, countries. For the rest of the war, her criterion would be self-interest. THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS AND THE ALLIANCE

In the first half of 1915 the central theme in Japan's diplomacy was her relations with China. The so-called Twenty-one Demands crisis that developed was a major turning-point in international relations in east Asia. But its ramifications are too vast to be covered here, especially as the alliance was not at stake and was only marginally affected.77 74

FO 800/68 [Grey], Greene to Grey, 5 December 1914. FO 371/2381 [2942], Colonel E. F. Calthrop to War Office, 10 December 1914. 76 FO 371/2388 [36422], Greene to Grey, 16 February 1915. 77 In addition to the standard works by Fifield and La Fargue, the subject has recently been well studied by P. C. Lowe, ch. 7, and M. Chi, pp. 28-61. 75

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

153

On 18 January the Japanese minister in Peking presented President Yuan Shih-k'ai with a statement of demands. Since Tsingtao had fallen on 7 November, it was desirable for Japan to reach some sort of understanding with China over the administration of the territory captured by the Japanese troops; but the demands presented were of a more wide-ranging character and covered not only Shantung but also south Manchuria and Japan's commercial position in Fukien and the central Yangtse. Various versions of the demands leaked out. The Japanese had divided their requirements into demands (Groups I-IV) and 'desiderata' (Group V). It was not until 22 February that Japan disclosed to the world the substance of Group V and attempted to justify the artificial distinction between demands and wishes. Negotiations proceeded in Peking at a snail's pace with the Chinese looking over their shoulders for the intervention of friendly governments. Britain's position goes some way towards explaining the bulldozer tactics of Kato. He was, after all, an experienced diplomat, though not in handling the Chinese. The Twenty-one Demands are puzzling in their comprehensiveness and in the mode of their presentation. In both respects they were an odd departure from the cautious diplomacy which had characterized Japan since the days of Komura. This requires explanation. On the one hand, Kato had recently been under strong pressure from the military and the commercial world, with many of whose demands he had little sympathy. On the other, he felt that he had assurances from Britain which would prevent an international storm arising from the demands. It will be recalled that Kato had (as he supposed) early in 1913 extracted from Grey the statement that Japan had a case for obtaining from China an extension of her Kwantung lease which was otherwise due to lapse in 1923. In answer to an approach at the beginning of the war, Grey reiterated his view: 'I have not forgotten the conversation regarding the Liaotung Peninsula which I had with Baron Kato on the eve of his departure from this country, and I realize fully that in return for her expenditure of blood and money Japan may find it necessary to make conditions.'™ Moreover, Grey had thought it politic late in 1914 to confirm to Japan that Britain had no designs whatever upon the former German territory in China. It may well have appeared to Kato that 'the psychological moment' had arrived to test these assurances, even though he was to combine these matters with other demands which were not to Britain's 78

NGB T. 3/III, no. 236, Grey to Greene, 21 August 1914. Above, pp. 89—91.

154

ANGLO-JAPANESE

CAMPAIGNS

liking. But the fact remains that Kat5 took a calculated risk that there would be no outside interference with Japan's initiative because of her new-found strength in the area and the preoccupation of most of the world powers in war. Kato did not want Britain to comment on demands which were the subject of bargaining with China. On 20 February, Grey, feeling that Britain was both directly and indirectly affected by the demands, decided that he was entitled to offer some general observations. Indirectly she was involved because of her concern for China; and Grey asked that Japan 'should refrain from advancing any demands which could reasonably be considered to impair the integrity or independence of China' as it would be hard 'to reconcile such demands with the terms of the Alliance'.79 When no satisfactory reply had been received by 9 March, Grey again stated that, if he were approached by the powers or questioned in parliament on the subject, my desire is to be able to say that there is nothing in Japanese action which conflicts with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and that I am prepared to justify Japanese action or, if required, to support i t . . . I recognize that there must be an expansion of Japanese interests and influence in China as there has been in the case of other Powers, and that Japan naturally expects to see this increased.80

Thus Grey's approach was one of extreme caution since he wanted to avoid any breach with Japan; while he sought assurances from Japan, he gave the Chinese no hint of support. Britain was also directly affected by Group III of the demands which dealt with the Yangtse valley, traditionally a British sphere of interest. Grey first asked that demands which were likely to encroach on British commercial interests should be freely discussed between them. When there was no sign of response, Britain notified Japan that the Canton-Chaochow and Nanchang-Canton railways were reserved for British firms. Over the Hanyehping Company in whose mines and arsenals there was already much Japanese investment, Britain did not feel that there was any scope for successful protest, although it was a Yangtse enterprise, and chose to regard it as *a minor point'. On 26 April when the final terms were presented, Britain took fright at the prospect of a Sino-Japanese war. After consulting his colleagues, Grey urged Japan on 3 May not to press Group V and 79 80

FO 371/2322 [21624], Grey to Greene, 20 February 1915. FO 371/2322 [28473], Grey to Greene, 9 March 1915.

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

155

three days later offered British mediation. In the absence of any indication of American support, Grey confined himself to seeing what could be done to secure agreement in Peking and Tokyo.81 Kato passed over the final ultimatum to China in the afternoon of 7 May, giving forty-eight hours for reply. Japanese troops which were estimated at 20,000 in Manchuria and 30,000 in Shantung were placed at the ready. On 9 May China accepted Japan's revised draft. Treaties covering the Kwantung lease and Shantung together with documents covering the other points at issue were signed on 25 May and ratifications were exchanged a fortnight later. The proviso was inserted by Japan that Group V would be postponed for discussion at a later date. Even if she had to save face on this point, she did obtain most of the items which she had originally demanded. China could not rival the Japanese in arms and could not resist the terms without outside support. The British minister observed to President Yuan that war 'must mean immediate disaster', while 'compliance with the modified demands would give China time to await the issue of the European war'.»2 These remarks were made without the authority of his home government but they were harmless enough, because Yuan knew only too well the futility of long-term resistance. Britain could take little comfort from this crisis. She lost confidence in her ally, Japan, whose action was often compared with Germany's action in invading Belgium, and in Kato, who had hitherto been the personification of Anglo-Japanese friendship. Britain's interventions had all been made in the name of the alliance, so it was still considered to have its charm, but, without any force behind it, the alliance could have little practical effect in far eastern affairs. Jordan observed that up to the present crisis Britain 'still clung to the delusion that the Alliance retained all its former force and potency' but it was much better now 'to recognize the facts, unpleasant as they may be'.8^ This was also the view of Greene who counselled that Britain's best course was to mark time and avoid being drawn into discussions with Japan which would only bring into relief the marked divergence between British policy in China and Japan's claims to a special position there. si FO 371/2324 [56360], Grey to Greene, 6 May 1915. Cf. History of The Times, 23122,920, i, London, 1952, 428. Geoffrey Dawson was probably right to infer that 'there are two opposing policies in our Government. Some think we must at all hazards ignore the problem during the term of the war, while others are in favour of a firm line at once.* 82 FO 371/2324 [55075], Jordan to Grey, 5 May 1915. 83 FO 800/31 [Langley], Jordan to Langley, 13 May 1915.

156

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

Britain's attempt to balance on a tightrope during the crisis did not appeal to either of the parties immediately concerned. In China her position was represented as being much more pro-Japanese than was actually the case. In Japan opinion, which was influenced by British press comment both at home and in the treaty-port press, came to regard Britain as hostile to Japan's China policy and as having deprived her of the legitimate points demanded in Group V. There was a hostile reaction among the Japanese daily and periodical press which went beyond the China issue to criticize London's conduct of the war and question the bravery of the British army. An article by Oishi Masami in Set/I to Shakai observed that 'the English soldiers in the campaign against Tsingtao would not advance; they would only retreat, even when they were ordered to advance and struck on their backs by the rifle'.84 The alliance also came in for its full quota of abuse. So intemperate and insulting did these articles become that Ambassador Greene took the opportunity to point out to Kato that it was unwise to allow disagreeable things to be persistently written about Britain without some protest by the government. Kat5 denounced this campaign in a speech to the Diet on 23 May and 'made amends handsomely while he was about it', making some friendly remarks about Sir John Jordan, who had come under especial attack^5 Shortly afterwards another official protest was made about an article which appeared in the Yamato on 17 July. The Yamato was a popular newspaper, whose circulation was due to its sensationalism and whose editor, Matsushita Gunji, was nominally a member of Kato's Doshikai party. On 20 July Ambassador Greene protested that the article was 'a pure attack upon the navy and army of Great Britain', was 'outrageous in its language and indecent in its references' and 'passes the bounds of reputable journalism'.86 Kato in reply pointed out that so little was the Yamato under government influence that the paper had on occasions even made vile personal attacks on himself. Regretting that nothing could be done to exercise an effective control over the publication of those undesirable articles, he reminded Greene that 'during the recent Sino-Japanese negotiations, some of the English newspapers in China and at home have been pretty free in their publication of biased reports and un84

FO 371/2388 [58208], Greene to Langley, 6 April 1915. 5 FO 800/247 [Alston], Greene to Langley, 10 June 1915. 86 Japanese Foreign Ministry microfilm, Library of Congress, MT 1141/2547, Greene to Kato, 20 July 1915. 8

ANGLO-JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS

157

friendly comments about Japan*. Thus, Kato effectively called in the Manchester Guardian (and the other pro-China newspapers) to redress the grievance felt at the Yamato.w But anti-alliance literature was growing in both countries. 87

Japanese Foreign Ministry microfilm, MT 1141/2551, Kato to Greene, 27 July 1915.

C H A P T E R IX

Marking Time in East Asia J A P A N ' S actions in the first year of war were regarded with suspicion elsewhere in the world. Her entry into the war and her campaigns were so evidently based on self-interest. Her unquestioned gains had been made at the expense of China rather than of Germany. Yet, having once established her position of strength in north China, Japan did not use it by and large as a prelude to a further wave of extortions and spoliations from China. The second year of the war, which is the subject of this chapter, was to be a time of consolidation, a period of'marking time' for Japan. Marking time in east Asia was also the cherished desire of Britain's leaders. The crisis over the Twenty-one Demands had, of course, been deeply disillusioning for Japan's ally, who became aware that her own restraining powers were ineffective. But Sir Edward Grey still held to that sympathetic view of Japan and realistic view of the east which we have observed in the pre-war period. Langley summed up his superior's view of the crisis thus: 'As the Japanese are excluded from our colonies and from the United States . .. they have a right to claim a special position in the Far East and room for expansion there, and if they had at a less critical moment appealed to him frankly on that subject I believe that they would have had a sympathetic hearing.'1 Such thoughts are later reflected in Grey's autobiography when he asks: 'what Western nation with a population feeling the need for territorial outlets would have used such an opportunity with more, or even with as much, restraint?'2 Such attitudes, certainly unfashionable when the book was written, really echoed Grey's words during the war, when Britain realized her impotence in the east. After the Foreign 1

Jordan papers 14, Langley to Jordan, 30 April 1915. *Marking time' was the phrase used by Greene to indicate the policy he favoured for Britain in east Asia (FO 800/68, Greene to Grey, 8 January 1916). 2 Grey, Twenty-five years, iii, 34. 158

MARKING TIME IN EAST ASIA

159

Office had reviewed alternative policies open to Britain, Grey decided that 'for the present, when we should be at a disadvantage vis a vis Japan, our right policy is to efface ourselves over the demands ... and bide our time till the war is over and trust to being then able to repair the damage'.3 This was Britain's charter for marking time.

JAPAN DROPS THE PILOT

The China crisis had led to serious disagreements within the Japanese leadership. In a number of interviews with Premier Okuma, the Elder Statesmen had indicated that they were unanimously opposed to the handling of the China policy and also sought a rapprochement with Russia. But they were more concerned with their vendetta against Kato than with policy-making. They agreed to urge on Okuma a change of foreign minister. At meetings on 24 and 25 June they told the prime minister that, if Japan were to dispel Chinese suspicions of their country, he must get rid of Kato.4 This was no simple proposition for Okuma, because Kato was the president of the Doshikai, the largest party in his coalition government and the one which had gained in support during the March election.5 Okuma was by no means disaffected towards Kato and had grown in dependence upon him. Indeed, the Okuma cabinet was often referred to as 'Kato's cabinet'. The prime minister initially stated that a change of foreign minister was quite out of the question. The genro therefore wondered whether to work towards the resignation of the whole cabinet. Okuma would probably have agreed quite readily, because he was tired of office. But the Elder Statesmen decided that it was tactically inadvisable, since it might play into the hands of the Seiyukai opposition.6 In July the genro campaign to oust Kato unexpectedly achieved an 3

Jordan papers 14, Alston to Jordan, 19 March 1915. FO 371/2323 [31819], memorandum by Alston on Japanese demands', 14 March 1915; Lowe, pp. 238-9. 4 KatOy ii, 44-50. Inoue Kaoru, who shared with Yamagata the role of leading genro, died on i September 1915. He was a more popular figure than Yamagata and had a political following. Ambassador Greene described him as 'a pivot of intrigue* (FO 371/2391 [143082], Greene to Grey, 6 September 1915). 5 In the general election on 25 March, the Okuma cabinet secured an outright majority with 198 seats, of which the Doshikai won 153 seats, as against the Seiyukai 108 and Kokuminto 27. 6 Inoue Katsunosuke-den, pp. 224-7, contains a letter from Tzuzuki Keiroku, Inoue's private secretary, to Katsunosuke of 23 July 1915, which discusses the genro activities.

160

MARKING TIME IN EAST ASIA

early success through the resignation of Home Minister Oura who had been found guilty of bribing several Diet members in connection with the March elections. The whole of the Okuma ministry resigned on 29 July on account of the scandal and Kato, alleging ill-health, took the occasion to retire from the ministry before it was reconstructed on 10 August.7 Thus, the most pro-British of Japanese statesmen at the time ceased to be a minister. He was not to return to power until he became prime minister in 1924. Perhaps expecting an earlier recall, he acted and voted as a loyal government supporter. He was by no means cowed with a sense of failure and continued to be an influential public speaker on foreign policy in his capacity as a party leader. Okuma himself took over interim charge of the Foreign Ministry and invited Baron Ishii KikujirS, ambassador to France (1912-15), to accept the appointment. Ishii returned from Paris via the United States and assumed office on 13 October. He chose as his vice-minister Shidehara Kijuro, who had been minister to the Netherlands (1914-15). The new team did not represent a marked change from the Kato regime. Indeed, observers saw the hand of Kato in both appointments for Ishii was his friend while Shidehara was his brother-in-law. Nor were their views on overall policy vastly dissimilar. Ishii was associated by virtue of his term of office in Paris with the cause of the Entente. When consulted by Kato about policy in 1914, Ishii had generally sided with him on the issue of entering the war. However, the new minister had never before held senior office, was comparatively young and had not the aggressive personality of Kato or his strong political base. Thus his appointment implied not so much a change in policy as a change in the methods of policy-making whereby there would be greater consultation with the Elder Statesmen. It was Ishii's idea, which was wholeheartedly endorsed by Britain, that he should first make a short trip from Paris to London. His intention was to gather first-hand impressions before returning to Japan rather than to conduct authoritative discussions, but he was briefed by Tokyo after the cabinet meeting on 26 August to emphasize Japan's new position in China and to steer clear of certain topics, especially her contribution to the war effort.8 Ishii reached Victoria station on 29 August and spent two days at Claridges. He visited the king at Buckingham Palace and met the cabinet, excepting only Asquith. He had eighty minutes of conversation with Grey and touched on such 7

Inoue ko-den, v, 420-3; Kato, ii, 50-4.

» NGB T. 4/IIIA, nos. 30-2.

MARKING TIME IN EAST ASIA

161

topics as the London declaration, the possibility of talks between Japan and Russia, and China. The foreign secretary stressed the importance of helping Russia with rifles and ammunition, and of supporting Russia in Europe. He passed over what he knew about Russia's desire for an alliance with Japan. For his part, Ishii indicated, as he already had done to Delcasse, that Japan would, if invited by the allies, adhere to the declaration of London.9 Thus, many of the topics which were to occupy the next fifteen months of diplomacy were presaged in these seminal discussions. The meetings also served a more personal purpose. In the recent past, the British foreign secretary had often known his Tokyo opposite number well. Ishii's career up to this point had not permitted this. Now Grey and the foreign minister-presumptive met face to face and the experience was beneficial for each. Moreover, the visit was a reminder that in Japanese eyes London was still the most important diplomatic capital overseas. The reorganization of the Okuma ministry finds its counterpart in the formation of the coalition government in Britain in May.10 The Asquith Liberal government had tried to deal with the complex war situation with an apparatus of government only slightly modified from peacetime, the ordinary cabinet and the war council. After reconstruction Asquith continued as prime minister but Conservatives joined the ministry. Grey continued as foreign secretary but was suffering from his eyesight and the strain of the Foreign Office in war was to impose an increasing burden on his health in the months ahead. The coalition ministry was assailed with the difficulties of the Dardanelles campaign and later the failure of its strategy and tactics. Nineteen-fifteen was therefore to be a year of gloom; and that gloom was reflected in the disunity within the cabinet. By the end of the year it was decided to concentrate the comparatively slender resources of the Entente on the western front, to galvanize the Russians to uphold the eastern front, and to obtain the maximum assistance from the various allies. In each of these objectives Japan was to be called upon to play a part; but, so long as the fortunes of war went so badly for the Entente, Japan met the allied demands with a reluctance which was frequently interpreted abroad as disloyalty. 9 CAB 37/133/24, Grey to Greene, 31 August 1915; Ishii, Gaiko yoroku, pp. 118-19; NGB T. 4/IIIA, no. 34. 10 The crisis of May 1915 has most recently been discussed by S. E. Koss, Lord Haldane: scapegoat of Liberalism, New York, 1969, ch. 7.

162

MARKING TIME IN EAST ASIA JAPAN ADHERES TO THE LONDON DECLARATION

It goes without saying that Japan was able to take a relaxed attitude towards the war which was not possible for the other Entente powers. Moreover there were suspicions about her true allegiance: Greene wrote In the meantime, and particularly as long as the Germans can keep the fighting in the enemy's country, there will, I fear, be some hesitation shown here as to the ultimate issue of the war, and a tendency to 'hedge' in appreciating the worth of the British alliance.11

Repeated allied requests to Japan to send an army to the western front had drawn a blank and there was some reluctance to ask her to extend her naval commitment. Lord Kitchener as secretary for war asked for 200,000 more rifles with ammunition, adding with unconscious irony that 'this would be a graceful acknowledgment of our good offices in the recent Sino-Japanese negotiations'.12 Yet the Japanese Ministry for War, which was understood abroad to be more than a little corrupt after the Siemens affair and to be anti-Entente, refused because of the altered situation in China. It was in any case clear to Britain that her needs were less pressing than those of Russia. Russia had over-mobilized her manpower from the start of the war and her appetite for arms was immense. She had suffered defeats in the north-west in January 1915 and was recognized to be the vulnerable part of the Entente. She was putting pressure on Japan on her own behalf and was asking Britain too to intercede. Deliveries were needed within four months and it was believed that Japan during this time could supply 500,000 rifles.13 Since continued Russian resistance was vital to the Entente, Kitchener persuaded Grey to raise the matter. In doing so, Grey argued that the supply of arms to Russia was a matter of high policy which could not be left to the Japanese minister for war. It must be undesirable for Japan to see Russia driven back in Europe and forced by Germany into a policy of expansion in the east. At Kitchener's suggestion, Grey suggested that this request be raised with Yamagata.14 In reply, he was told that the Japanese were already giving 11

FO FO 13 FO 14 FO 12

371/2388 [58208], Greene to Langley, 6 April 1915. 371/2384 [61127], War Office to Drummond, 15 May 1915. 371/2383 [105716], Hanbury-Williams to Kitchener, 28 July 1915. 371/2387 [111945], Grey to Greene, 13 August 1915.

MARKING TIME IN EAST ASIA

163

enormous amounts of help to Russia, unknown to Britain. When a list of these services was presented to Grey, he was so taken aback that he confined himself to hoping that 'the Japanese would continue in their well-doing'.15 Of course the Japanese were not as unaware of the political implications of Russia's plight as Britain may have thought. There were in high places those who were suggesting that a closening of political ties with Russia might be beneficial for Japan. It was thought that this had been raised by Marquis Inoue on a visit to Tokyo in June.16 Kato indeed was so forthcoming as to tell Greene that Inoue was displaying 'a strange interest in the idea of an Alliance between Japan and Russia', pushed on by interested parties.17 For their part, the Russians had since the war shown that they would welcome a closer relationship with the Japanese. Since 9 January 1915 Grey had been repeatedly approached by France and Russia over the position of Japan and the Entente. They argued that, if Japan adhered to the Entente, Russia would be able to withdraw all her troops from Siberia. Grey admitted that, owing to pressure of time in September 1914, he had signed the declaration of London — which was equivalent to a war alliance — without consulting the Japanese. But Japan had subsequently agreed that her loyalty was assured by article II of the 1911 alliance whereby the two allies had to conduct war in common and make peace jointly. Any new agreement was unnecessary.18 Grey duly reported this conversation to Ambassador Inoue on 11 January, without, however, mentioning that the aim of the European powers was the withdrawal of Russian troops from Siberia. Grey asserted that he would act as Kato wished, either welcoming Japan as signatory to the September declaration or confirming what he had told the ambassadors.19 Kat5's reply was predictable and restated the views he had earlier expressed. He preferred to link Japan to the war by the obligations of the British alliance rather than complicate her relations by entering into either a quadruple alliance with the Entente, separate alliances with France and Russia or expanding the British alliance 15 Jordan papers 14, Langley to Jordan, 16 September 1915. Greene considered that he too had received an unpleasant rebuke, FO 800/247 [Alston], Greene to Langley, 9 September 1915. 16

17 18 19

Inoue ko-den, v, 416-17.

FO 371/2383 [84385 and 90435], Grey to Greene, 25 June and 6 July 1915. CAB 37/123/18, Grey to Bertie, 9 January 1915. CAB 37/132/22, Grey to Greene, n January 1915.

i64

MARKING TIME IN EAST ASIA

to take in her wartime allies. Any of these remedies would only dilute the whisky so far as Japan was concerned.20 By mid-summer there was a possibility that Japan might have changed her views. The treaties with China had been concluded and the individualistic foreign policy of Kato had been somewhat discredited. Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister, had formed the impression from talks with the Japanese ambassador that Japan was con templating a regular alliance with Russia and, ever fertile in grandiose diplomatic schemes, commended it to Britain on the ground that it would prevent Japan from moving closer to Germany during or after the war. Late in July, Grey raised the matter with Kato: 'M. Sazonov appears to favour a triple alliance or entente between Great Britain, Russia and Japan or possibly a quadruple alliance or entente between these three Powers with the addition of France/21 Grey, however, thought that the adherence of Japan to the tripartite convention of 5 September 1914 might constitute the first step in meeting Russia's desires. After a cabinet meeting on 28 July, Kato replied in terms which reflected no particular enthusiasm: the Japanese had not considered it necessary to adhere to the London declaration, although there was no particular objection on their part to their formally joining it. Grey therefore commended Japan's adhesion even at this late stage, saying that it would give satisfaction to the Russians.22 However, Grey was anxious not to leave the impression that the Japanese did not have a completely free hand. He stressed that Britain would not object to Japan entering upon 'a new Alliance in any form that would ensure close relations between Japan and Russia without sacrificing any of the objects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance', but he wished to assume a neutral stance and did not propose to encourage any proposal at Petrograd of which Japan disapproved.2^ He later elaborated these views by explaining that 'recent events had caused me to modify the views that I had expressed about the difficulty of discussing a new alliance while the war was in progress'.24 Britain had left the way open to Japan to complement the British alliance with another compact with any of the allied powers. Yet the Japanese showed 20

Kato, ii, 114-19; Inoue Katsunosuke den, pp. 206-10; NGB T. 4/IIIA, nos. 6-9; Ishii, Gaiko yoroku, pp. 116-19. 21 NGB T. 4/IIIA, no. 13. 22 FO 371/2383 [99697], Grey to Greene, 29 July 1915; NGB T. 4/IIIA, nos. 19-21. 23 FO 371/2383 [103788], Grey to Greene, 31 July 1915. 24 CAB 37/132/24, Grey to Greene, 17 August 1915.

MARKING TIME IN EAST ASIA

165

no enthusiasm for embarking on bilateral negotiations with Russia. Kato was inclined rather towards the modest proposal of joining the London declaration as a signatory. But there were doubts even here. Since rumours were circulating that the signatories of the treaty of London had agreed not to oppose at any peace conference the demands which any of the three governments might present, Japan wanted to know the extent of these commitments. Grey denied that a general understanding of this kind existed, but he later admitted that Britain and France had given Russia to understand that 'it was no longer part of our policy to prevent her from having [an] outlet through Constantinople and the Straits. Perhaps it was one result of this that Russia had never, in discussing a possible settlement after the war, mentioned anything to us about the Far East.'25 Japan could therefore rest assured that she was not, by adhering to the declaration, assuming concealed obligations and that Russia had not been given promises bearing on east Asia. Things moved faster when Kato retired. In London, Ishii was able to confirm — what Grey already knew — that Japan was willing, if invited, to adhere to the London agreement.26 On 18 September a formal invitation to Japan to adhere to the London declaration went forth from the three Entente powers. Within a week the cabinet decided in favour and the ambassadors of the three powers were informed. It was left till Ishii himself took up the reins of office on 13 October for the final formal steps to be taken. Japan adhered to the London declaration on 19 October, undertaking not to make peace with the central powers independently of her allies. The major benefit for the Entente was to minimize the danger of Japan making a separate peace with Germany; for Japan it was to assure her of a seat at any peace conference. She was now tied to the fortunes not merely of Britain but also of France and Russia.2? Japan's action had subtle consequences for the British alliance. Whereas Japan had hitherto professed that her connection with the war had been dependent on her British alliance, she now became a fully fledged member of the wartime Entente. The allied nations hoped that Japan would now increase her contribution to the war. Russia for her 25

FO 371/2383 [103867], Grey to Greene, 28 July 1915; CAB 37/132/10, Grey to Greene, 6 August 1915. 26 FO 800/67 [Grey], Grey to Greene, 31 August 1915. Also CAB 37/133/24. 27 Japan agreed to Italy's adhesion to the London declaration on 30 November (NGNB, i, Bunsho, 418). It was not ratified by the Privy Council until i March 1916.

166

MARKING TIME IN EAST ASIA

part did not regard this action as implying that proposals for a RussoJapanese alliance would be dropped until after the war; on the contrary she pressed ahead with the idea. But any thought of Russia joining an expanded Anglo-Japanese alliance was now dead. SHOWDOWN IN CHINA

In the months following their China settlement, the Japanese were determined to assert their predominance among the powers in China, and the British government had resolved not to challenge this. However, there were those in the War Office and the City who were anxious to persuade China to support the war effort of the Entente. Their scheme as it evolved in November — to some extent prompted from Peking — had two features: to develop the Chinese arsenals with foreign capital and mobilize their production for the Russian front; and to persuade the Chinese to restrict the activities of Germans in China.2^ There was, however, no intention of securing Chinese troops for the western front. The scheme could not proceed without securing the approval of the Japanese and in their reply of 6 December they made it clear that they were opposed to involving China in the war and would not permit the development of China's arsenals with Entente help or the creation of a large Chinese army. While some hope remained of co-operation in clamping down on the activities of German agents in China, discussions dragged on into 1916 without anything concrete emerging. Regretfully Grey had to accept Japan's 'objections to the mere idea of China's joining the Entente'29 and did not take any positive initiative in that direction thereafter. The Japanese saw in the scheme an attempt by President Yuan to ingratiate himself with the Entente with a view to obtaining their approval to his plans to become emperor, but they also roundly condemned Britain for her roundabout attempt to befriend China. Even more damaging in the eyes of Tokyo was the Peking message to Asahi on 25 November which suggested that, while the powers were 28 This topic is dealt with in Kwanha Yim, 'Yuan Shih-k'ai and the Japanese', JAS 24(1964), 63-73; Chi, China diplomacy, pp. 62-84; P. C. Lowe, 'Great Britain, Japan and the fall of Yuan Shih-k'ai', Historical Journal, 13 (1970), 706-20; Nish, 'Dr Morrison and China's entry into the world war, 1915-17' in Hatton and Anderson, Studies in diplomatic history in memory of D. B. Horn, London, 1970, pp. 324-8. 29 FO 371/2341 [196071], Grey to Bertie (Paris), 22 December 1915; Shidehara, pp. 102-3; NGB T. 4/IIIB, nos. 814-20.

MARKING TIME IN EAST ASIA

167

trying to get China into the war, Britain was trying to negotiate an alliance with her. The terms of the alleged treaty were actually quoted.30 If true, this suggested extreme bad faith on Britain's part. Jordan denied the rumour in Peking and Grey promptly scotched it: We have not contemplated anything of the kind and have no intention except in consultation with Japan, of entering upon negotiations of a political nature with China. When the matter was merely one of purchase of guns and rifles, we dealt with it alone, but we approached Japan directly it assumed a political aspect and we have consistently refused, without the cooperation of Japan, to continue discussing the matter at Peking.3i Part of this undertaking was ultimately published in the press in the form of a public disclaimer. But the rumour that Britain had dared to discuss terms of alliance with China brought forth a thunderclap of criticism in an outraged Japan. Many of the newspapers accused Britain of rank disloyalty to the alliance. Criticism started in the dailies, Mainichi, Chuo and Kokumin^ but it reached its most strident crescendo in the popular, but scarcely reputable, Yamato^ whose views are summarized thus: The alliance has served its purpose, England is now Japan's principal adversary, and further co-operation between the two is only possible on the following conditions: (1) England must recognise in practice Japan's absolute supremacy in China. She must abandon her claim that the Yangtse Valley is her sphere of interest, and all other hard and unjust conditions which hold Japan under. In other words, she must understand that the maintenance of order in China rests on Japan's power alone, and she must recognize the full and unqualified equality of all. (2) England must show the utmost goodwill towards the extension of Japanese commerce in India and the South Seas, and must remove all limitations differentiating in favour of herself against Japan's trade, ships, and general 'kultur'. In other words, the full equality of Japan and England must be recognised in practice in these regions. (3) In Australia, Canada, Africa, India, and other self-governing English possessions, Japanese citizens must be put on an equality with English in 30

Japan Weekly Mail, 27 November 1915. Galperin, pp. 317-21. FO 371/2341 [178314], Grey to Greene, 26 November 1915. Also Japanese Foreign Ministry microfilm, PVM 19(3), 2o8ff.; and NGB T. 4/IIIB, nos. 803-6. PVM 19(3), contains an important note of December 1915, 'Kyokuto toku ni Shina ni okeru Nihon no chii ni kansuru Eikoku seifu no gemmei', which suggests that Japan was anxious to see what recognition of her position in China Britain was willing to give. 31

168

M A R K I N G TIME IN EAST ASIA

position, rights, and honours; all regulations of exclusion, based on considerations of race, trade, or sentiment, must cease. (4) Article 5 of the [1911] Treaty must be repealed in order that the purely formal but substantially meaningless nature of the offensive and defensive alliance may emerge clearly from its provisions. (5) Similarly in the preamble, the reference to India must be omitted, for it is in the highest degree unjust that Japanese lives should be sacrificed for a region in which the two Powers have no common interests without the compensation of an equivalent condition.

In February 1916 there were particularly scurrilous attacks on Jordan in the Yamato and Nichi Nichi. This was in part sparked off by the anti-Japanese attitude of the British-owned treaty port press in China. Thus the Peking and Tientsin Times had on 25 January pointed to the 'ill-tempered attacks upon the Alliance by some of the less influential papers, the most notorious of which is the Yamato ... It does come as a surprise to find even an irresponsible Japanese paper daily denouncing Britain and her Allies, and eulogizing the Germans and all their works',32 and the touchstone for what came to be known as 'the anti-British campaign' was Britain's suspected hostility to Japan in China. During the Diet session from December to February there were many interpellations, hostile to Britain. In January Baron Den Kenjiro in the house of peers asked whether it was true that British subjects in China were instigating Chinese to boycott Japanese goods, and Ishii gave a non-committal reply. On 9 February Greene had occasion to remonstrate with the foreign minister. Three days later Ishii made a conciliatory speech in the lower house, deploring the frequent indiscreet utterances in Japan against Britain and vice versa. While it was difficult to control such excesses, Ishii hoped for the discontinuance of 'such disagreeable utterances'.33 Greene was evidently satisfied with this declaration and suggested that he should not make a number of remonstrances which had been authorized from London. Ishii's speech had not been an eloquent defence of Japan's ally but Ishii was a much less experienced parliamentarian than his predecessor, Kato. He had pointed out that there were faults on both sides, drawing attention to the British press at home and abroad. The Japanese regarded the Manchester Guardian as the hub of the anti-Japanese press in Britain. So far as the editors of the English-language China press were concerned, 32

Peking and Tientsin Times (edited by H. G. W. Woodhead), 25 January 1916. 33 FO 405/220 [29229], Greene to Grey, 14 February 1916.

MARKING TIME IN EAST ASIA

169

Jordan and the foreign editor of The Times advised them that abuse of Japan was injurious to British interests and was likely to do great harm.34 What differentiated this anti-British campaign from that of the previous summer was the suspicion in the Foreign Office that it had the backing of the Japanese authorities. Greene wrote of the outburst in December that, 'although German money may have had some say in the disturbance, it is not impossible that it was the Japanese Government who let loose the storm'.35 This speculation cannot be tested after such a long passage of time. It seems to be confirmed, however, that German money was behind the Yamato and Child articles, which were translated into German and distributed on a scale which was exceptional.36 What is less plausible is that the government should attempt to operate through a fairly disreputable organ like the Yamato or the others which joined in the campaign. These papers were mainly antigovernment and such an alliance of convenience was basically unlikely. It was often argued by Britain that Japan should use her press laws against the disloyal papers. But press censorship in Japan was generally confined to internal issues and to the large-circulation papers. Some Japanese, Ishii included, were inclined to reply that the Foreign Office was being ultra-sensitive and should ignore the fulminations of the yellow press. But this was not easy in the war situation, when all criticism was suspect. In view of the publicity given to these sustained attacks, it was necessary for Britain to take steps to mobilize Japanese well-wishers. This was first attempted when the Tokyo embassy recruited John Robertson Scott, a well-known journalist in the pre-Northcliffe mould, who had set off for Japan early in 1915 for research in agricultural sociology (as it would now be called). In his memoir, he recounts how he was pressed to turn aside from his studies and 'attempt the more immediately useful task: to explain why western nations, whose manifest interests were peace, were resolutely squandering their blood and wealth in war'.37 Acting on the authority of the Foreign Office, Ambassador Greene employed Scott for a period of three months from 3 March 1916 to develop the work in his private capacity but to be paid 34 FO 800/44 [Grey], Jordan to Grey, 14 March 1916. 35 FO 800/68 [Grey], Greene to Grey, 8 January 1916. 36 FO 371/2840 [59105], minute by Lampson, 31 March 1916. 37 J. W. Robertson Scott, The foundations oj Japan, London, 1922, p. xi.

i7o

MARKING TIME IN EAST ASIA

through the embassy.38 His function was to counteract adverse criticism appearing in the Japanese press with regard to the alliance and Britain's conduct of the war and to publish a series of articles over his own name. His first article appeared in the leading periodical Tatyo.*9 Scott also published independent pamphlets, the first of which was entitled Japan, Great Britain and the world: a letter to my Japanese friends. It was a rather plush pamphlet of eighty-eight pages which contained both an English and a Japanese text on opposite pages and Vas translated as a labour of love by a Japanese public man whose leisure was so scant that he sat up two nights to get his manuscript finished'.40 It was printed in 25,000 copies and circulated at the expense of the embassy to every newspaper in Japan besides libraries and members of the Diet. It enjoyed some success and ran for at least three subsequent editions.41 In form, it was a rejoinder to a moderate attack on the British alliance by Asada Koson in Taiyo. Scott argued that it was common in the Japanese press to call for the immediate and radical revision of the alliance or for its early abrogation but he claimed that Japan was merely uncomfortable over the alliance because of her national ambitions in China: 'if Japan can exhibit wisdom, patience and self-restraint during the War her future can hardly fail of being glorious . . . [but] she may be rash. Old as a nation, but young in her realization of national power, she is like a young giant.'42 Thus, with a mixture of praise for Japan and criticism, he made his appeal for tolerance towards the alliance and restraint in China. Early in 1917 Scott published a further pamphlet in the same bilingual format entitled The ignoble warrior. It was a discussion of the nature of the Great War and the objects for which the Entente powers were fighting. It was circulated in tens of thousands of free copies43 but, like his earlier writings, its impact is difficult to assess. What is certain is that the battle for Japan's soul had begun. Interestingly enough, the focus of the propaganda war was the Anglo-Japanese alliance, not because it was at stake in the war with Germany but because it was an important symbol and, as an important symbol, it encountered, at this stage of its history, sharp attacks in Japan and was stoutly defended in British quarters. 38 FO 371/2839 [41960], Greene to Grey, 3 March 1916. 39 FO 371/2839 [81082], Norman to Grey, 13 March 1916. 41 FO 371/2839 [67386], Greene to Grey, 8 April 1916. 42

43

Scott, Japan, Great Britain and the world, Tokyo, 1916, p. 39.

FO 395/91, Scott to Charles Sale, 3 January 1917.

40

Scott, p. xi.

MARKING TIME IN EAST ASIA

171

JAPAN'S INDISPENSABLE ASSISTANCE By February 1916 the Foreign Office had decided that further Japanese assistance was indispensable. Britain's objective must be to involve Japan more in the war. It would be foolish to underestimate the contribution which Japan had already made: her campaign over Tsingtao had been one of the most successful operations of the war to date. Equally it would be foolish to pretend that Japan could not do more, if she had the will. Her government had more than once rejected requests to send troops to the western front or to the Russian front. But Britain had not given up hope of a substantial Japanese contribution. If this were to be achieved, she must do what she could to improve Japan's relations with the Entente and, on the other hand, avoid an unnecessary conflict with Japan over China by adopting the policy recommended by Greene of 'marking time'. While there were circumstances which made military assistance unlikely in the near future, there were great hopes of naval assistance being stepped up. True, Japan had refused an invitation in September 1914 to send a section of her navy to the Mediterranean or European waters, on the ground that she would not be justified in risking the loss of her battleships by mines or submarines at so great a distance from Japan. On i February the Admiralty petitioned the Foreign Office to ask Japan for destroyers rather than battleships and three days later Grey asked the ambassador for a flotilla of destroyers to be sent to the Mediterranean or British home waters. Grey hoped that this proposal would be viewed by Japan as a lesser risk. Later, the Admiralty suddenly re-assessed its requirements. On 9 February therefore Grey made a formal approach for a cruiser squadron to be sent to the Indian Ocean, with a small force of destroyers to patrol the Malacca Strait. This was a greatly modified proposal. On 16 February Japan agreed that she would probably be able to offer four cruisers and four destroyers if Australia and Canada were included in the AngloJapanese commercial treaty of 1911 and a Japanese scheme for recognition of Japanese doctors in the Straits Settlements were approved. In both cases the Japanese complained of discrimination against Japanese in Britain's overseas empire and the first request meant that Japan wanted to end discrimination over immigration and coastal shipping. Japan, however, later made it clear that she was not imposing these as conditions though

i72

MARKING TIME IN EAST ASIA

a general feeling of regret is prevalent in the Imperial Diet that anti-Japanese feeling is still strong in British colonies, and the Government are being attacked on the matter. If Government should now present a supplementary budget for defraying expenses calculated to protect British colonies, it might give rise to an unpleasant and awkward situation.44

Although Britain was uncertain whether these terms were a sine qua non of naval assistance, the Colonial Office was deputed to examine all Japan's demands and Grey promised that matters pertaining to Australia would be raised with the new Australian prime minister, William Morris Hughes, who was already on his way to Britain. Late in March Grey was able to report some progress. Over medical officers in the Straits Settlements, Britain finally recommended the admission of Japanese doctors to attend to the needs of Japanese nationals, a compromise not altogether pleasing to the Japanese, and announced that Canada agreed to adhere to the 1911 treaty, provided it did not affect existing practice over immigration.45 Japan was not satisfied about the replies over immigration, the coastal trade or the 1911 treaty. None the less she agreed to despatch a flotilla of destroyers and some cruisers to concert with the Royal Navy in patrolling the Indian ocean and Australian waters at the end of March.4* The Australian issues which were more difficult to resolve had to await direct discussions between the Japanese ambassador and Hughes in London.47 Because of Hughes' illness and his busy programme, this could not be achieved until 9 June. Grey had had interim conversations with the Australian premier on 22 March and 9 May which were reported to the Japanese ambassador.4^ In general, the British government urged Hughes to adopt a 'conciliatory attitude'. While there was some agreement over coast-wise trade — though no real concessions — Australia declined to allow free entry to Japanese for business and trade as distinct from labourers (although she agreed to admit tourists and students) and showed no enthusiasm for adherence to the 1911 treaty.49 While the possibility of adherence was discussed in 1917, discussions on the subject were allowed by Australia to lapse. Japan hoped that her expanding wartime trade with Australia could be 44

FO 410/65 [36950], Grey to Greene, 21 February 1916. 5 NGB T. 5/1, no. 175; FO 410/65 [56401], Grey to Greene, 23 March 1916. 4 4 * NGB T. 5/III, nos. 321-2. ? NGB T. 5/1, pp. 183-216. 4 » NGB T. 5/1, no. 179; CAB 37/147 [92475], Grey to Greene, n May 1916; Kajima, Nichi-Ei gaikoshi, p. 407. 49 NGB T. 5/1, no. 183; FO 371/2950 [26707], Chinda to Balfour, 2 February 1917. 4

MARKING TIME IN EAST ASIA

173

placed on a permanent basis by securing Australia's adherence to the treaty, but Hughes was moving towards restrictive tariffs to protect her infant industry. In the end, Japan did not get the guarantee of continuing trade which she sought, although tariff proposals injurious primarily to Japan were avoided. Japan gave the naval help demanded without insisting on her price. Of course, the Japanese navy was not opposed to increasing the range of its activities. Its ships worked most amicably with the Royal Navy in the Indian ocean. Its officers may indeed have been in favour of going further afield, but Britain realized that at each request for further assistance the Japanese would increase their demands: 'steady pressure is being exercised on the Japanese government by sections of public opinion which think Japan has got nothing out of the war' and demands for more substantial British concessions would grow louder as time went on.50 Moreover the government of India was not content that its naval defence should be committed to Japan's charge and did not welcome the Indian ocean becoming a 'Japanese lake'. It complained in 1916 about a Japanese proposal to send a warship on a cruise along the Indian coast and later asked to be consulted before such arrangements were made, 'having in view the susceptibility felt in India for some time past as to the presence of Japanese warships in Indian waters'.51 If Britain had strong grounds for keeping demands for assistance to the minimum, she had to bear in mind that, with the naval war going far from well, increasing demands would in course of time have to be made. It was inevitably Admiralty policy to concentrate in home waters and to live with the Japanese presence in the eastern part of the Indian ocean. BRITAIN AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 1916

On 3 July 1916 the Japanese entered into their fourth agreement with Russia, which is generally referred to as 'the Russo-Japanese alliance'. The full story of the negotiations is not vital to an account of AngloJapanese relations. But it is widely believed that Japan's entry into a new and intimate relationship with tsarist Russia implied dissatisfaction with the British alliance. It is therefore relevant to ask how far the Russian 50

CAB 37/148/12, note by J. D. Gregory, 19 May 1916. 51 AC 45, Chelmsford to Austen Chamberlain, June 1917.

174

MARKING TIME IN EAST ASIA

alliance was a substitute for the British link and what attitude the London government took towards it.52 Early in 1916 Tsar Nicholas II sent his uncle, the Grand Duke George Michaelovich, as head of a mission to Japan. While the military members of the delegation were trying to increase the quantity of arms supplied from Japan, the diplomats were putting forward proposals for some alliance. Foreign Minister Ishii's initial reaction was discouraging. But, after pressure from the Elder Statesmen who felt that the British alliance could no longer be relied on, the cabinet decided on 14 February to take up negotiations with Russia. It was left to the Japanese ambassador in Petrograd, Motono Ichiro, to present Japan's terms along the lines that Japan should supply arms to Russia and in return demand concessions in Mongolia and Manchuria, especially the sale of the Chinese eastern railway to the south of Harbin. Although Japan was anxious for an understanding with Russia, her terms were severe. The Japanese knew they were in a strong bargaining position and that their draft could afford to be a tough one. Their demand for the cession of the Chinese eastern railway and for concessions in China was firmly refused by Russia at the outset; and it seemed as though the negotiations would not proceed very far. Because of a leakage, both sides agreed to report to Britain that negotiations were taking place. Russia commended the talks on the ground that they would afford a pretext for urging Japan to co-operate in crushing German power in China and the far east. But Grey replied that this topic was not worth pursuing and its inclusion in the agenda would only complicate the exchanges with Japan unnecessarily; a breakdown in discussions would be disastrous. Grey further told the Russian ambassador that it was natural that Japan, which was 'always excluded from every other part of the world', should 'expect opportunities of commercial expansion in China'.53 In short, Britain was urging Russia to approach the negotiations in a conciliatory spirit for the sake of the war effort. Britain was not kept informed in detail of the progress of the talks because both sides were doubtful whether the deadlock would be broken. Thus, on n May Japan informed 52 The subject is best dealt with in Peter Berton, The secret Russo-Japanese alliance of 1916', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1956, and G. D. Malone, 'War aims towards Germany* in A. Dallin, Russian diplomacy and Eastern Europe 1914-1?, New York, 1963. 53 FO 410/65 [41979], Grey to Buchanan, 5 March 1916; [51658], Grey to Buchanan, 16 March 1916.

MARKING TIME IN EAST ASIA

175

London briefly of the shape of negotiations, saying that she would report in greater detail when there was a prospect of something materializing,54 Yet the Foreign Office still considered that it was 'lamentably ignorant' of the main features of the bargain which was being discussed.55 When Russia and Japan finally approved the terms in June, they agreed to pass copies to Britain and France in advance of signature. At a meeting with the foreign secretary on 26 June, Ambassador Inoue passed over the drafts of the public and secret agreements and offered assurances that they did not conflict with the British alliance. Grey for his part said that he was satisfied that they would reinforce the Anglo-Japanese alliance and be supplementary to it.56 He later wrote that they caused him lively satisfaction and did not appear to contain anything which conflicted with the British alliance but some journalists in Paris latched on to the fact that Grey, following Kato's views, had in 1915 opposed a closer rapprochement between Japan and Russia and must in consequence be disappointed with the new development. Grey accordingly confirmed that such views were groundless and that he positively welcomed closer relations between the two allies.57 There seem to be ample reasons for taking these assurances at their face value. They were not merely a cover to conceal Britain's disappointment. It was in Britain's interest that Japan should be closely linked with Russia. The British view was that anything that could be done to bolster Russian resistance was beneficial, and that the munitions which Japan had promised and the removal of any threat in the far east would enable Russia to put up a more effective fight. Moreover it was an advantage for Japan to link herself with Russia, because the fortunes of the Entente powers were inextricable and a closer arrangement with Russia would deter Japan from any inclination to veer towards Germany. There was no serious inconsistency between the new alliance and the Anglo-Japanese alliance which it resembled in many ways. True, it made no mention of the territorial integrity of China, such as had appeared in the preamble of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1911, but it was due to last until 14 July 1921, which was thought to be the 55 CAB 54 NGB T. 5/1, nos. 121-3. 37/148/1256 NGB T. 5/1, no. 140; FO 410/65 [119704], Greene to Grey, 21 June 1916. 5 i NGB T. 5/1, no. 150; above, pp. 163—6.

i76

MARKING TIME IN EAST ASIA

terminal date of the British treaty. So there is no force in the view that the Russian treaty was designed to replace the British treaty or that 'the Anglo-Japanese treaty had already been virtually denounced in Russia's favour'.5^ They were recognized as being supplementary and were therefore advantageous to Britain. Statesmen in Tokyo were henceforth to speak of the twin pillars of Japanese foreign policy as the British and Russian alliances.59 There is no reason to believe that this view was not genuine. Further, the two signatories had been quite proper in their procedure during the negotiations. Britain had been informed from time to time but had not been consulted about the forthcoming treaty. Although the Japanese may not have been quite certain of Britain's reaction, Grey certainly encouraged the idea with Russia. Between the initialing of the drafts and the signature of the final treaty, it was duly communicated to Britain for her information. Thus, on procedural grounds, one cannot say that there was anything inimical to Britain in the new treaty. There were some individual suspicions about it in Whitehall, but Grey was personally convinced that it was not hostile in intent. As if to confirm this impression to the Japanese, King George V went out of his way to mention the matter in his farewell remarks to Ambassador Inoue. On 13 June, when the ambassador had completed three years' service, he was given permission to return to Tokyo. At his audience with the king, he was told how much the sovereign approved of the Russo-Japanese alliance, especially as 'Germany had gone out of her way to adopt towards Japan a different attitude from that taken towards other members of the Entente'.60 Clearly these were not casual remarks; it was evidently felt that, by allying with Russia, Japan had thrown her weight firmly on the side of the Entente and thereby dissipated some of the doubts held about her loyalty in the war. Considering the wartime conditions, Inoue Katsunosuke was shown quite exceptional regard when he finally left London on 22 July. He and his wife were seen off at the station by the acting foreign secretary, Lord Crewe, as well as the under-secretary and the permanent undersecretary. Partly this was a mark of affection for Inoue personally, who 58 History of The Times, 2922—2920, i, 429. Similar views are found in A. Morgan Young, Japan under Taisho Tenno, p. 92 and Morse and MacNair, Far eastern international relations, p. 588. 59 Kuroha, Nichi-Ei domei no kenkyu, p. 399, speaks of the Russo-Japanese alliance as 'one prop of the British alliance*.

60 NGB T. 5/1, no. 151.

MARKING TIME IN EAST ASIA

177

had been a popular and Anglophil ambassador; partly it was a gesture of respect for his country whose goodwill was vital for Britain and whose continued assistance was indispensable. Inoue's biographer observes that such a send-off was unusual for any ambassador at the court of St James and had not been accorded to his predecessors, Hayashi, Komura or Kato.61 Yet they were more important ambassadors. The difference lay in the fact that Britain recognized that Japan's goodwill must be cultivated at all costs in 1916. 61 Inoue Katsunosuke den, pp. 250-1. London was aware that during the Twenty-one Demands crisis, Inoue had striven to influence his government from persisting in Group V and from going over the brink of war and that he had carried his convictions to the extreme of asking for recall. It was therefore in recognition of his 'strenuous, selfsacrificing efforts' that he was accorded this farewell (ibid., 220-2).

CHAPTER X

'The Present Hollow Friendship51 AFTER the Tsingtao campaign Japan's attitude towards the war tended to differ even more from that of the other allied countries. She kept aloof from the European aspects of the war. Germans were not imprisoned in Japan and could operate their companies under Japanese names; there were no black lists or regulations debarring trading with the enemy or preventing enemy nationals from being carried by Japanese ships if they were not members of the armed forces. Many Japanese were not certain that Germany was not going to win and rued the day that Japan had joined the Entente. By 1916 many others, especially those like the scientists, professors, soldiers and journalists who were by training or enthusiasm pro-German, felt that the time was ripe for an accommodation with the Germans. JAPAN AND GERMAN PEACE PROPOSALS

The Gaimusho was much more cautious in its approach to German peace initiatives. Overtures were received at a most unofficial level from German sources in China and Sweden, mainly between March and May 1916. The Germans would not have been worth their salt if they had not put out peace feelers; Japan would have been foolish to ignore any murmurs of peace that came her way. It is not necessary to treat the peace overtures in depth and thus duplicate studies of these topics for our sole concern is with the effects which these German-Japanese parleys had on Britain.2 1 The phrase is taken from FO 371/3816 [206006], Greene to Langley, 30 August 1917; see below, p. 221. 2 F. W. Ikle, 'Japanese-German peace negotiations during world war F, AHR 71 (1965), 62-76; F. Fischer, Germany's aims in the first world war, London, 1967, pp. 22836; Elmar Peter, 'Die Bedeutung Chinas in der deutschen Ostasien-politik, 1911-17', doctoral thesis, Hamburg, 1965.

178

'THE PRESENT HOLLOW FRIENDSHIP'

179

The initiative came from the German minister in Peking, Admiral Paul von Hintze, who took up his post in January 1915 after innumerable picturesque adventures en routed An intimate of the kaiser, he had been minister in Mexico (1911-14) and was to become foreign minister in 1918. The crisis over the Twenty-one Demands presented him with a golden opportunity. He surreptitiously met the Japanese minister in Peking and gave the impression that Germany would give Japan a free hand in China, if she would make peace. News of the meeting leaked out and found its way into the Tokyo Asahi. Also in the spring the Austrian and Turkish diplomatic representatives in Stockholm had tried to bring together the Germans and the Japanese, but the move was abortive and, in any case, came to the notice of the allies. Hintze urged his government to make a bold approach: if the Germans were to recognize Japan's ambitions in China and make appropriate concessions, they were likely to be able to tempt Japan away from the Entente. The Germans took confidence from the alienation between Britain and Japan over the Twenty-one Demands and the frequent references in the Tokyo press to the 'nutzlos Vertrag', the 'waste-paper agreement' with Britain. The kaiser and Admiral Tirpitz were the strongest advocates of these approaches, while the Foreign Ministry was reluctant to pay the price of long-term concessions in China for the sake of a German-Japanese understanding. So the instructions which Hintze was given were rather lukewarm: he was not to approach the Japanese officially but to compare notes on a personal basis.4 It was not until January 1916 that Hintze returned to his peace parleys. He made his overtures to Matsudaira Tsuneo, the consulgeneral at Tientsin, whose Japanese concession was presumably thought to be a less conspicuous place for negotiations than Peking itself. Shortly afterwards Prime Minister Okuma gave one of his endearingly frank and incredibly indiscreet interviews to the press. Speaking to a correspondent of the Kokumin, he admitted that Germany was 'secretly endeavouring to conclude a separate peace with Russia and attempting a peace movement with Japan also through influential individuals and various other agencies'.5 His remarks were vague enough, but they were, at least by the canons of the old diplomacy, an oddly frank 3

4 T. Hohler, Diplomatic petrel, London, 1942, pp. 222-3. Peter, p. 2iiff. CAB 37/142/21 [25007], Greene to Grey, 10 January 1916, circulated to cabinet on 24 February. 5

i8o

'THE PRESENT HOLLOW FRIENDSHIP*

revelation. It remains an open question whether they were intended to draw some sort of counterbid from the Entente powers. On 24 January Ambassador Inoue reported to Grey on the secret German-Japanese discussions in China. Grey took the opportunity to say that it was a wicked lie to suggest, as the German minister had, that Britain was a political obstacle to Japan; on the contrary, Japan's development in the far eastern area was her natural destiny and the powers had no alternative but to recognize this fact.6 This was a line which he had taken many times in the past and which he was now to crystallize in a new declaration to the Japanese. On 31 January he reverted in discussion with the Japanese ambassador to the GermanJapanese parleys and assured him that we ourselves did not intend to put forward claims to any of the German concessions in China. I said this, as German overtures had implied that we should always stand in the way of Japan in China ... If the future of those [China] concessions came to be discussed with the Chinese government, discussion could not be a source of difficulty between Japan and ourselves.? As we know from the British archives, this was only the first move in an abortive project to bribe Japan to keep away from Germany. Could Japan be tempted by concessions in the area of her main interest, China? Britain was prepared to return Weihaiwei to China because of the compensations she might be called upon to make, but, after strong exception to the whole idea was expressed by Jordan, the project was dropped.8 Grey justified himself thus: If we had not made it clear that we should not bar Japan's expansion of interests in the Far East it would clearly have been to Japan's advantage to throw in her lot with Germany. Japan is barred from every other part of the world except the Far East and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance cannot be maintained if she is to be barred from expansion there also and if we are to claim German concessions in China as well as taking German colonies in Africa and elsewhere.^ Clearly Grey took a pessimistic view of Japan's loyalty to the Entente; and in retrospect there is much to warrant his pessimism. Britain's request for naval help in early February had been received in a haggling 6 Kajima, Ntchi-Ei gaikoshi, p. 403. 7 FO 405/220 [22349], Grey to Greene, 31 January 1916. 8 FO 371/2647 [20152], Grey to Jordan, n February 1916. 9 FO 371/2647 [30061], Grey's minute on Jordan to Grey, 15 February 1916.

'THE PRESENT HOLLOW FRIENDSHIP'

181

spirit. On the other hand, Greene made clear his view that 'there has never been any sign of real sympathy with Germany here, especially in Government, where there is a strong current of feeling in the opposite direction' and pointed to the negotiations with Russia as a token of anti-German leanings.10 The second phase of these overtures occurred in the neutral capital, Stockholm. On i April, through the intermediacy of Eklund, Stinnes and the Austrian and Turkish ministers there, the Japanese minister, Uchida Sadazuchi, had a most secret meeting with the German minister, Baron von Lucius. The hope was expressed that, through Japanese help, Russia would agree to make a separate peace and that Japan herself would be prepared to consider doing likewise.11 Uchida's report reached Tokyo on 4 April; and, after a brief examination of it in the Gaimusho, the gist was passed to Ambassador Greene the following day with a minimum of delay. Grey did not reply until 29 April but later apologized for the hold-up caused by Easter and the necessity of consulting Asquith. He did not consult the cabinet. His view was that the most suitable course in the first instance would be for Ishii to consult France and Russia so that a common decision could be arrived at. This was advice strictly in accordance with the treaty of London. On 3 May, therefore, Japan consulted Russia and France.12 Meanwhile, on 27 April, Uchida and Lucius had a second meeting at which Germany spelled out her terms for peace: if Japan would persuade Russia to make a separate peace, Germany would concede to Japan the German colonies now occupied by her. Uchida was told by Tokyo to be particularly non-committal and to show himself neutral to the German approach. On 6 May yet a third meeting took place when Ishii warned Uchida to avoid further discussion, indeed reprimanded him for taking part.1? The second overture was more concrete in offering Japan the former German 'colonies', Kiaochow and the Pacific islands, and asking only for compensation for private property and railways. Grey, deducing that this concession of the territories she had occupied would not be unattractive to Japan, treated it more seriously. He declined to comment on it without consulting France and Russia. He then reported 10

CAB 37/146/26 [81080], Greene to Grey, 7 March 1916. NGB T. 5/III, nos. 69 and 70. Uchida was minister to Sweden (1912-18). Uchida was not one of Japan's top-flight diplomats, nor was Stockholm a major posting. 12 E. T. S. Dugdale, Maurice de Bunsen, London, 1934, p. 312. 13 NGB T. 5/III, nos. 78 and 100. 11

i8z

'THE PRESENT HOLLOW FRIENDSHIP'

these developments for the first time to the British cabinet by a circular of 4 May. At a meeting of the cabinet five days later, it was agreed to tell Japan that Britain had received no hint that the Germans would agree to terms which would be tolerable to the allies and that the recent speech of the German chancellor confirmed this.14 In other words, Grey avoided treating the overture as one addressed to Japan and handled it as an approach to all the Entente powers. This decision was conveyed to Japan on 11 May and Ishii gave Uchida instructions on how to reply to the Germans. A week later Uchida let the Germans know that Japan was 'not in a position to enter into discussions for a separate peace with the German Government. If Germany is sincerely disposed to make proposals regarding peace, such proposals should be addressed' to the four Entente governments jointly. However, Japan would be ready to transmit any further proposals to her allies.15 Shortly afterwards the Germans indicated that the talks would be broken off. Thus, Japan had turned down the opportunity of receiving from Germany undertakings about her occupied territories in China and the Pacific. True, she had already received undertakings of sorts from the allies but an assurance from Germany would have been valuable in the event of a German victory. The final step in these unofficial discussions came early in 1917 when Hintze again made a secret approach. Believing that the new Japanese minister, Hayashi Gonsuke, would be less amenable than his predecessor, Hioki, Hintze went to Tientsin and held discussions with the Japanese consul-general there. His approach was no longer purely inspired by the idea of using the leverage of Japan to get Russia to conclude a separate peace; this time he proposed to acknowledge Japan's supremacy in the far east and offered her a free hand there in return for making peace.16 Hintze withdrew from Peking when China broke off relations with Germany in March 1917 and with that the German-Japanese talks ended. We are concerned less with the substance of these peace parleys than with Japan's actions as the ally of Britain, a member of the Entente and a subscriber to the London declaration. We should first note the fairly representative reaction of a leading Whitehall official: 'Much of this, according to our notion, is not merely not "playing the game" 14

CAB 37/147 (10), Grey to cabinet, 4 May; (18), Asquith to the king, 8 May 1916. !5 NGB T. 5/III, no. 105, also nos. 106 and 113. CAB 37/148/9, 18 May 1916. is DBFP, I (vi), p. 589.

'THE PRESENT HOLLOW FRIENDSHIP'

183

but it indicates a certain tendency to a veiled rapprochement between the two countries which is slightly disquieting.'17 There was, of course, some truth in this. On the other hand, it has to be said that Japan's standing in the war was less than that of other members of the Entente and, just as they were using the war to further their national selfinterest, so Japan was entitled to follow hers, even if it meant taking deep soundings of this kind. Moreover, she was prompt in informing Britain of these approaches: there was only a gap of twenty-four hours in each case. She was not similarly expeditious in informing France and Russia, who already knew of them through intercepts, but once she received Grey's advice she was quick to report to Paris and Petrograd. Japan had not initiated the overtures and her reaction to them complied with the London declaration. To be sure, Professor Ikle writes of 'Japan's own trickery in leaking Germany's terms to the Allies'18 — with a view to extracting concessions from them. If there was trickery, it was towards Germany: Japan led Germany up the garden path, as the German Foreign Ministry suspected all along. There was little impropriety in communicating the talks to the Entente. It was indeed her obligation, if peace was to be made in common. Nor can her hopes of extracting concessions from the Entente have been high. Britain had given some undertakings early in the war and now took the occasion to confirm them. Russia was negotiating an alliance with her, but there was no sign of Russia being more yielding because of Japan's disclosure. On the whole the Japanese Foreign Ministry comes out well from these overtures and appears to have acted with some propriety. Doubtless Japan took a calculating look at the German offer and found it wanting. Japan already had commitments from the allies over Shantung and the Pacific islands which guaranteed her position. Germany was offering something which it was not within her power to give or withhold, for she would not be in a position to deprive Japan of her acquisitions after the war whether she was victorious or not. Perhaps, if Germany had increased the stakes, Japan's reaction might have been different, but from her standpoint, her actions were quite above board. As a result of the failure of these overtures, Japan became tougher in her actions against Germans from the summer of 1916 onwards. She closed the local offices of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank in September; and German commercial enterprises which had earlier been tolerated had to be wound up. 17

CAB 37/148/12, memorandum by J. D. Gregory, 19 May 1916.

18

Ikle, p. 73.

184

'THE PRESENT HOLLOW FRIENDSHIP' INDIA AND JAPAN

In 1916 there were countless incidents where feelings between Britain and Japan were ruffled and Japan claimed that Britain's actions were insensitive and often ham-fisted. The things that the Japanese complained about were miscellaneous and included the anti-Japanese attitudes in Australia, the notorious speech in which the governor of Hong Kong had referred to 'heathen Japan', and the anti-Japanese feeling expressed in the British treaty port press in China.19 There were also commercial irritations: because of the shipping shortage, Britain became harsher over imports in May 1916 and the embargo affected the entry of Japanese cotton goods to Britain for the rest of the war.so From her strong bargaining position, Japan protested, but Britain refused to budge. Moreover, the British colonial administrations, viewing Japanese trade and industrial encroachments with disquiet, issued regulations of a restrictive kind which the Japanese regarded as aimed at themselves. One area where there were serious complaints on both sides was India. The Japanese, who were virtually the naval protectors of the sub-continent, sought to expand their markets under conditions of free trade; the government of India intended to make sure that British trade re-established itself at the end of the war, without alienating Japan during the war years. The Calcutta government, in any case, was much preoccupied with Indian 'sedition' and claimed that Japan was 'a most important centre of seditionist communications'.21 Since the beginning of the war, many Indian nationalists who were regarded as seditionists had found a haven in Japan, where they came under the protection of groups associated with Toyama Mitsuru. The most notorious example was that of Rash Behari Bose, who led the Ghadr rebellion in February 1915 and sought refuge in Japan three months later. Under persistent pressure from the British embassy, the Okuma government granted an extradition order against Bose on i December but he went underground with a certain amount of official complicity.22 Some suggested the 19 Japanese Foreign Ministry microfilm, MT 1.1.4.1, 'Japanese complaints against Britain, 1908-26'. 20 CAB 37/145/29 [67014], Grey to Greene, 5 April 1916. 21 FO 371/3064 [31781], 'Directions followed by Indian sedition in the Far East', 10 February 1917. 22 Japanese Foreign Ministry microfilm, MT 1.1.4.1, p. 2648, article by Count Soejima, 16 December 1918. An extradition order had been issued for Bose on 28 November but he was untraceable. For accounts of the incident see Takeuchi Yoshimi (ed.), Ajia shugi, Tokyo, 1963, pp. 172—82; D. Dignan, New perspectives on British far eastern policy, 1913-19, St Lucia, 1969, pp. 280-2.

'THE PRESENT HOLLOW FRIENDSHIP'

185

connivance of Okuma himself; Ambassador Greene in later years concluded that the person responsible was Baron Goto Shimpei — and this was a charge never forgotten in Britain.2^ Certainly the Pan-Asian group through Toyama exercised some sinister influence; but it should not be thought that Japanese in high places were inclined to share the British Indian attitude on sedition out of loyalty for the alliance or to be accomplices by imprisoning Indians in Japan. At all events, Bose lived on in Japan till his death in 1945 having assumed Japanese nationality in 1923. Britain lost confidence in the Japanese security services and decided to take drastic counteraction. In order to prevent Indian nationalists travelling from Hong Kong or Shanghai without passports, the new commander-in-chief, China, Admiral W. L. Grant, sent the cruiser Laurentic to intercept ships off the China coast — an area reserved since 1914 for patrol by the Japanese navy. Early in February the Tenyo Mam was stopped and searched and nine Indians taken off. This created a storm among Japanese. Grey in studiously timid language expressed the hope that the Japanese government would *not permit this incident to be made the occasion of a popular demonstration'; but the Japanese replied firmly that any repetition would make it impossible for them to consider further naval assistance.24 In the meantime a dozen Japanese vessels had been searched, in two cases shots having been fired. In the face of the ultimatum from the Gaimusho, Britain had no alternative but to promise that no further search of Japanese merchant-ships on the high seas would take place. Japan was notified on 5 April that British warships would stop interfering with her shipping and recognize the patrolling of the China coast as a Japanese preserve.25 The British in these incidents cannot escape the criticism of being ham-fisted. For the sake of a comparatively minor objective, Britain had doubly insulted Japan. It was an insult to the flag of an ally: it was doubtful what right the Laurentic had to search the ships of Britain's ally, even for contraband of war. Moreover, it was an insult to the Japanese fleet, on whose goodwill Britain was, and continued to be, dependent. But the government of India with its strong intelligence network was so adamant that it was difficult for the London government to resist its pressure. Long after the searches had ended, the " FO 395/168 [108597], Greene to Balfour, 26 April 1918. FO 410/65 [46008], Grey to Greene, n March 1916; [53107], Grey to Greene, 15 25 March 1916. FO 410/65 [59082], Grey to Greene, 5 April 1916. 24

186

'THE PRESENT HOLLOW FRIENDSHIP'

Indian government persisted in the charge that Japan was one of the main centres for organizing 'the anti-British campaign in India5. The government of India was equally exercised over the activities of Japanese agents on the periphery of India. In June 1915 it had complained that Japanese influence in Tibet was greatly on the increase and later that movements of the few Japanese in the area were decidedly suspicious. Moreover, there was evidence during the anti-monarchy disturbances in south China that local rulers in Yunnan and Kwantung had placed large orders for arms in Japan. The Political Department in a lengthy memorandum dated 16 May concluded that What we have to guard against in the immediate future is precisely the possibility of a repetition by Japan on the eastern side of those tactics by which Russia has for half a century embarrassed us on the western side. That is to say, to prevent Japan from establishing herself in positions from which in time of war she can threaten the security of the north and north-east frontier of India, and the eastern frontier of Burma, compelling us to lock up troops for their protection.26

A document of a similarly alarmist character had been prepared by the General Staff on 14 May and had received detailed consideration in the Foreign Office, which took the more level-headed view that 'It is only reasonable to suppose that the independent and uncontrollable elements in Japan are in sympathy with Asiatic attempts anywhere to cast off the European "yoke". The Government — for all its correctness — cannot, apparently, take a really strong line in this matter.' The writer argued that the domination of China by Japan must inevitably produce a current of pan-Asiatic aspiration throughout the East. There was no way in which Britain could for the present safeguard India against this, but 'it is this danger which renders it imperative for us to resume as soon as we are free an effective part in Far Eastern policy'.^? That the Indian issue was an irritant between Britain and Japan cannot be denied. But these two or three episodes involving India have to be seen in perspective. From this peak in 1916 Indo-Japanese irritation was allowed to smoulder on until the end of the war. Indian interests had to be subordinated to those of the London government which was determined to obtain the fullest measure of support from 26

CAB 37/148/4, note by the Political Department, India Office, 'Japanese policy in its bearing on India*, 16 May 1916. 27 CAB 37/148/12, memorandum by J. D. Gregory, 19 May 1917.

'THE PRESENT HOLLOW FRIENDSHIP'

187

Japan. India too had to adopt an attitude of patient vigilance: her attitude is well expressed by Lord Hardinge after he retired as viceroy: The Government of India were well aware of the effort being made by Japan on the lines of economic penetration in India and of the fact that India is honeycombed with Japanese spies, but that there was any military danger to be apprehended from Japan was regarded as absolute rubbish ... The hands of the Government of India are tied during the progress of the war, as it is desirable to do nothing to alienate Japan or to weaken the alliance, but the Government of India had, when I left, quite made up their minds how to deal with Japan economically at the end of the war.28

There is reason to believe that after 1916 the Indian authorities stopped trying to teach the Japanese a lesson and accepted the policy of waiting for the war's end as the London government was doing. BEILBY ALSTON AND THE ETERNAL TRIANGLE

The China debacle at the end of 1915 had been an embittering experience for Grey and forced him to rethink his policy. He had charged Alston of the far eastern department with the task of working out a formula for China which would meet Japan half-way. The nub of Beilby Alston's proposals was that Japan's ambitions in China would be met if she acquired the German lease there. When this was referred to Minister Jordan in Peking, he pointed out that Britain was acting unjustly in offering Japan properties over which China possessed sovereign rights and that it was for Britain and Russia to provide concessions from their own leased territories. Grey fully recognized the case which Jordan had made and agreed that he had no 'wish to make offers to Japan at the expense of China'. His problem was that Japan might find it to her advantage to throw in her lot with Germany unless Britain gave proofs that she would not 'bar Japan's expansion of interests in the Far East'.29 2 8 FO 800/210 [Balfour], minute by Hardinge, 12 March 1917. Hardinge had returned from India in April 1916 to become permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office. 29 FO 371/2647 [30061], Grey to Jordan, n February; minute by Grey on Jordan to Grey, 15 February 1916. In Japanese Foreign Ministry microfilm, PVM 19(3), a memorandum had been drawn up in December 1915, entitled 'Kyokuto toku ni Shina ni okeru Nihon no chii ni kansuru Eikoku seifu no gemmef (The British government's statements about Japan's position in the Far East, especially in China), which analyses the various undertakings Britain had given.

188

'THE PRESENT HOLLOW FRIENDSHIP'

There was no immediate bargain struck but the matter was talked around for some months. On 11 April a memorandum which seems to represent Grey's thinking was drawn up: There is no fundamental conflict of interests in the Far East, as is sometimes insinuated, between ourselves and Japan... Both countries are bent before all else on maintaining the integrity of China, and the wholesome discussions that arise from time to time as to the best means of proceeding with this object in view only concern methods and never principle.30 Whether this was illusory or not, it was convenient in the circumstances of war to believe it; it implied that it was not beyond the wit of man to work out some arrangement. In Japanese eyes there were two persons who stood in the way of this, Yuan and Jordan. Japan was suspicious of, and hostile to, Yuan Shih-k'ai and chiefly his scheme to become emperor. But Yuan died on 6 June, with his government collapsing around him. Japan was equally suspicious of Jordan, whose shortcomings were, according to the Kasumigaseki view, to admire Yuan and, in consequence, to advise his home government wrongly. In short, Jordan was suspected of being anti-Japanese. There had been attacks on Jordan in the Japanese press, especially Nichi-nichi^ since 1915. The story is taken up in 1916 from a Japanese source: Grey, fearing that Jordan had been stationed in China a long time, decided to recall him to London on long leave out of friendship for Japan. His intention was conveyed to the Japanese embassy most secretly. It goes without saying that for the British government to adopt such a friendly policy was due to the skill of Inoue. He immediately reported this news to the Tokyo government. Our Foreign Ministry officials imprudently published it to the press [in July]: enlarging on the fact that Jordan had been given long leave, they said that the British Government had come round to dismissing him since his continuance at Peking was bad for Anglo-Japanese relations. Thereupon the British government, though it was on the point of dismissing him out of consideration for Japan, could not put its decision into effect in the face of this press publicity.3i Were it true, this account given by Inoue's biographer would be highly significant and Inoue's greatest triumph as ambassador. But 30 31

FO 371/2841 [68358], memorandum on China and Japan, n April 1916. Inoue Katsunosuke den^ p. 246.

'THE PRESENT HOLLOW FRIENDSHIP'

189

it is wrong on several counts. Grey certainly thought it would be wise for the sixty-four-year-old Jordan to be given leave but it was left to him to choose when he wished to take it. Jordan certainly was rather out of touch with the European scene and the war situation: he was unaware, as we have seen, of how indispensable Japan's help had become for Britain. It was not, therefore, Japan's complaints that made it desirable for him to return so much as British convenience. Nor is there any truth in the allegations about dismissal. When the press statement came out in Tokyo in July, Jordan naturally complained about it and Grey, assuming that the source of Japan's information was Ambassador Greene, was on the point of administering a sharp rebuke. The Japanese source was instead London; and Grey clarified the position with Jordan.32 Undoubtedly it would have been an act of great significance if Britain had withdrawn a diplomat, either temporarily or permanently, at the behest of a foreign government but this was far from being the case. When Jordan did come to London on leave, he was asked whether he still wanted to return to Peking or not and, having opted to go back, he stayed there until 1920.33 One subsidiary consequence of Jordan's furlough was that Beilby Alston from the Foreign Office was sent out to act as charge d'affaires in Peking. It was intended that he should become minister, should Jordan decide to retire.34 Hearing that Alston was about to travel out to the far east, Honda Kumataro, the counsellor of the London embassy, suggested that he should visit Tokyo and that the occasion should be used (along with the good fortune of Yuan's death in June) to put relations between Britain and Japan in China on a better footing than they had been since 1915. According to Alston, his idea was that, if Great Britain and Japan had a frank discussion of their respective interests in China and presented the public in Japan with some kind of closer Entente there, the moment would then be ripe for 'advising' China to get rid of the Germans and some plan might be devised of dealing them a death blow there. He wished me to know his own private ideas on this subject, in case any suggestions of the kind should be made to me at Tokio but begged me to treat them as entirely private. It may be that he is 32

FO 800/44 [Grey], Grey to Jordan, 7 July 1916; draft of Grey to Greene, not sent. FO 800/30 [Langley], Alston to Langley, 6 August 1917. Jordan claimed that it was Balfour who asked him to return to China and, when he showed reluctance because of his forty years' service there, Balfour said, 'that is the reason*. 34 Ronald Macleay, the counsellor in Peking, returned to London in September 1916 to head the far eastern department at the Foreign Office. 33

190

'THE PRESENT HOLLOW FRIENDSHIP'

going to put these ideas into [sic] Baron Ishii — and they may or may not be adopted.35

The proposal obviously appealed to both Honda and Alston, who were anxious to break the deadlock between their two countries and had been active in the past with schemes to this end. Yet there is no evidence that Honda passed on these ideas to Tokyo or that Ishii was prepared to entertain them. It was certainly an opening which Grey could not afford to disregard since tensions in China were sapping Japan's help in the war. Alston received encouragement from Grey to pursue it before he left London, though this was certainly only a secondary purpose of his journey. Alston visited Tokyo at the end of July and had several long conversations about China with Foreign Minister Ishii who promised that 'we are to have no "surprises" in China... and there was no cause for suspicion or misunderstanding'.36 Ishii referred to the regrettable agitation lately carried on by the press of both countries, which he termed 'yellow' and 'irresponsible' and said that such things were unavoidable in every country and should not be taken seriously. Ishii was not forthcoming over the expulsion of Germans from China and Alston did not press the matter. Ishii remarked with gratification about the statement on Anglo-Japanese relations which George V had made to Ambassador Inoue on his departure from London.37 It was clearly a disappointment to Alston that Ishii was not more positive. London had been worried that Alston's appearance in Tokyo would spark off questions about 'his status, present or future, at Peking' in view of the rumours that had circulated about Jordan. Instead 'everything passed off very well; there was no fuss made about his arrival, which passed unnoticed by the papers'. Greene gave a small dinner party to which Ishii, Kato, Hayashi Gonsuke, Shidehara and Koike Chozo came — all Alston's old friends. 3» The ambassador then returned to the hill station of Chuzenji, leaving Alston, as he put it, 'to "run his own show" with his Japanese friends who were anxious to show him hospitality and attention'.& These remarks suggest that there was 35

FO 800/44, Alston to Drummond, 10 June 1916. Alston cannot have had a special assignment in Tokyo, because he stated in several letters that it was a mistake that he had been sent out. 37 FO 800/68 [Grey], Alston (Peking) to Grey, 16 August 1916; above, p. 176. 38 FO 800/68 [Grey], Greene to Grey, i August 1916. »Ibid. 36

'THE PRESENT HOLLOW FRIENDSHIP'

191

an element of mystery associated with Alston's visit, but there is no evidence that he had any clearly defined mission. Alston told Grey that his conversations with Ishii and Kato were 'really all that matter' and his discussions with Kato were not any more positive than those with Ishii which have already been mentioned. Nor was there any sign that Honda's hope that Ishii might discuss some sort of bargain over China bore any fruit. There was evidently not much scope for a breakthrough in dealing with the problems of the 'eternal triangle'. Alston was able to take up with Greene, who confessed that he felt isolated from the thinking of the Foreign Office because of the weakness of wartime communications, some of the issues troubling Whitehall. Among these, anti-British sentiment in Japan was the most important problem. After their discussions, Greene wrote to the foreign secretary: 1 was grieved, though not surprised, to hear how anxious you had felt about the attitude of Japan. We have had to skate over some stretches of very thin ice here. Today our prestige is recovering.' Greene was optimistic that the Robertson Scott campaign and the various steps which had been taken in London to counteract the press agitation in Japan were having an excellent effect.40 Methods of counter-propaganda were being kept going through British committees in Japan and the Department of Information in London.41 In retrospect, such steps as had been taken seem to have been halting and haphazard. A party of Japanese newspapermen visited the Grand Fleet for an entire week and interviewed Admiral Sir John Jellicoe. Japanese papers were asked to publish the articles which their correspondents sent.42 But the fortunes of war were not running in favour of the Entente and did not provide a satisfactory background for an effective publicity campaign. At the battle of Jutland on 31 May the Royal Navy suffered heavily and the German fleet escaped. The losses on the Somme in July were another severe blow. In August another anti-British campaign took shape in the Japanese press, with the alliance again the focal point of attack.43 What bothered British officials — and what they could not understand — was why the Okuma ministry tolerated these press campaigns which were not in their interest any more than they were in Britain's. 4 ° ibid. 41 See the report on British propaganda in the far east published on 20 December 1916 in the archives of the Ministry of Information (hereafter cited as INF), 4/4A. 42 Japanese Foreign Ministry microfilm, MT 1.1.4.1., p. 2587, 30 May 1916. 43 See the periodical Seiko for 1916.

i92

'THE PRESENT HOLLOW FRIENDSHIP'

The answer is by no means clear cut. One factor was that the Japanese press was freer than most foreigners imagined. The degree of interference varied with the individual minister and Okuma was less inclined to intervene. It was true that the Okuma government did step in when it was convenient to do so but this was more likely over domestic, than foreign, affairs. Moreover, it was easier for a ministry to use its powers over the large papers and to ignore the small, and the anti-British papers were more often the small newspapers and magazines. A further factor is that intellectuals like Yoshino Sakuzo and the pro-German professors were allowed considerable scope for criticism, and it was a more comfortable thing for the ministry if they chose a foreign target. Thus the Okuma ministry, itself weakened by dissension, does not appear to have been inclined to be severe on the press. L O N D O N ' S DOUBTS ABOUT THE A L L I A N C E Since Alston's attempt to resolve the eternal triangle with China and Japan had proved to be a non-starter, there seemed to be no alternative but for Britain to let the matter rest unresolved. British and Japanese ideas on China remained incompatible for the rest of the war, and no further steps were taken to reconcile them. By the summer of 1916 the reputation of the Okuma cabinet had sunk to its lowest point. In foreign affairs its popularity depended on its handling of China, which to some was a creditable achievement and to others a dismal failure. The Foreign Ministry itself was doubtful whether it had been successful. Minister Hioki revealed to a meeting of his diplomatic colleagues in Peking when he was recalled in June that 'the position of a Japanese Minister here was an intolerable one .. . no Minister could satisfy the insatiable demands of the Japanese people ... he was glad to make his escape from such a thankless post'. This had accounted for the failure of his predecessors, Ijuin and Yamaza, and contributed, by his admission, to his own.44 The same sentiment was to be echoed by his successor, Hayashi Gonsuke, in the future. The pace of the government's China policy seemed to be dictated by runaway horses — by the shishi (China adventurers); there was a widespread feeling that the government was being influenced by extremist groups, as some of the episodes in this chapter have suggested. The Japan Times^ a semi-official organ, came out with a call for sup44

FO 800/43 [Grey], Jordan to Langley, 29 June 1916.

'THE PRESENT HOLLOW FRIENDSHIP'

193

pression of the s/iishi: 'There is perhaps not another country where men of this class so constitute themselves into an influence by standing between the people and the Government... It is these men who in the last 10-15 years have made the country's foreign negotiations difficult and even fruitless.'45 Surely this was a cri de cceur of the government itself. The Elder Statesmen thought it was necessary to curb these elements and the irresponsible party politicians if Japan was to hold her head high among the nations. Japan had never stood lower in Britain's estimation. Greene in a long evaluation of the position in September observed: Prior to the war, and indeed for many years before, there was a tendency to look upon Japan as a model of all the international virtues... In England they were extolled as the best and most devoted of Allies... Today we have come to know that Japan — the real Japan — is a frankly opportunist, not to say selfish, country, of very moderate importance compared with the giants of the Great War, but with a very exaggerated opinion of her role in the universe.46

While there is much truth in this assessment, it was jaundiced by irritation at the intransigence of the Okuma ministry over increasing its contribution to the war. It fails to recognize the new-found strength of Japan in the industrial sphere and in military power. But it may be that it was still too early in the war for the great strides which Japan had made to be fully apparent. Kato, no longer in the government, reminded his countrymen during a speech at Kyoto in May 1916 that *JaPan was not such an enormously strong power as some conceited patriots believed'. What irked so many foreign observers at the time was an excess of national self-confidence. They did not blame the government for the feeling so much as for failing to keep it within due bounds. So far as Britain was concerned, there was the problem of the alliance, its relevance to wartime conditions. Greene's view was that As long as Great Britain was able to maintain her prestige in the Far East, Japan was enthusiastic for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but when the hour of our distress arrived and we began to pay the penalty for our national unpreparedness, she wavered. We now see our Ally as she is, and not as some of us were inclined to visualise her. 45 46

FO 371/2694 [185538], Greene to Grey, 20 August 1916. FO 410/65 [222589], Greene to Grey, 26 September 1916.

194

'THE PRESENT HOLLOW FRIENDSHIP'

Since the Russo-Japanese alliance, it was no longer Russia but Germany who had become the tertium quid envisaged by the 1911 treaty. But the effect of the alliance, argued Greene, was 'to perpetuate the insinuation of a want of confidence in Russia and to give us a shadowy claim upon Japan for services which she will now never be called upon to render and of which she is actually desirous to be relieved'.4? He was referring presumably to Japan's role in the defence of India against Russia although this had largely been written off in 1911. If the alliance was in Britain's eyes hollow, it was also offensive, in so far as Britain was being dragged at Japan's heels in China. There were only two grounds for optimism here. One was that, since the crisis of 1915, Japan had made no further demands and put forward no claims to concessions apart from Kiaochow. She was expanding her trade but, as one official noted, 'I doubt whether we should be wise to resist [Japan's commercial development of China], even if we could. If we desire to keep on good terms with Japan and to stop agitation against India, we must allow her to expand somewhere and China is the only safe place.'48 Grey admitted that he held much the same view. This would involve commercial sacrifices for Britain. But — and this was the second ground for optimism — if industrial co-operation in China was successfully worked out, it might act as some check on Japan's political activities there.49 Disappointed as Britain was with Japan in some ways, there was no question of ending the alliance while the war continued. It is often argued that Britain concurred in Japan's actions during the war because of the alliance. It would be truer to say that because of the war Britain could not resist Japan's activities and that the alliance did not come into the question. The British policy of 'marking time' in the far east — the phrase is Greene's50 — reflected the special insights of Sir Edward Grey as 47

48 Ibid CAB 37/148/4, minute by E. Drummond, 18 May 1916. FO 800/44 [Grey], Jordan to Grey, 14 March 1916. Cf. also FO 371/2841 [68358], Foreign Office memo of u April 1916: *There is no fundamental conflict of interests in the Far East, as is sometimes insinuated, between ourselves and Japan; . . . [if Japan sometimes] felt called on to take independent drastic steps which exposed her temporarily to certain criticisms elsewhere, yet she invariably in the end was found to have subordinated the protection of her interests to complete loyalty to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.* 50 FO 800/68 [Grey], Greene to Grey, 8 January 1916. Greene urged Grey to 'mark time a little longer, and tide over the critical period of the war without giving too much encouragement to a country whose aspirations are incalculable and her methods so different from our own*. 49

'THE PRESENT HOLLOW FRIENDSHIP'

195

foreign secretary. In its implications this doctrine was inconsiderate and unsympathetic towards China, and in some respects immoral, but, regarded from the standpoint of British power in the area, it was a doctrine of realism. It is possible to rhapsodize about Grey's foreign policy or criticize it; but, in the far east at any rate, it was a policy of realism and compromise. Guided to some extent by his officials, Grey made a personal contribution in steering Britain towards a recognition that she was powerless to influence the actions of Japan, however much she disliked them and was injured by them. There can be little doubt that this policy was sensible and was based on an acute perception of the realities of the situation. In December Grey resigned after eleven years at the Foreign Office. Despite bad eyesight, broken health and personal tragedies, he had carried the burden of office well and left his individual stamp on Britain's far eastern policy. It might reasonably have been thought that Grey with many claims on his attention in war-torn Europe would have little time to devote to Sino-Japanese problems. The archives present a different picture; he gave far eastern affairs a great deal of personal attention. It may be that, in this area of the world, diplomacy counted for more than in Europe where military considerations dominated diplomatic decisions.

CHAPTER XI

The Anglo-Japanese Secret Agreement, 1917 IN March 1917 the British embassy in Tokyo was embarrassed to receive a large consignment of Japanese marmalade of the best quality. It was valued at £1500 and was sent as a gift to the British army and navy from a Japanese well-wisher. The donor, the head of the Yamashita shipping company, asked that it should be despatched to fighting units and, presumably to prevent it being pilfered by needy hands en route, he particularly requested that it should be acknowledged by units at the front where it was consumed.1 Research does not show how these pots were finally distributed; nor what transports of joy they induced. The gesture was a symbolic one and by no means unique. In January, other well-wishers had decided to raise a sympathy fund to show their compassion for the war-stricken countries of Europe. Contributions to the fund were readily forthcoming and a total of two million yen was reached in six months. 'Far removed as [Japan] is from the centre of conflict', as the organizers wrote in their appeal, *her people have not witnessed the bloody decimation of their country and the mountains of corpses that mark the battlefields of Europe.'2 These gifts were genuine expressions of sympathy and also signs of Japan's new-found prosperity. Since the war began there had been vast commercial prosperity. Many of her industries were working twentyfour-hour shifts in order to meet the demand for war materials. Her exports increased from 526,581,000 yen in 1912 to 1,127,468,000 yen in 1916. The extent and distribution of these exports is shown in the following figures:3 1 FO 371/2952 [66526], Greene to Balfour, 30 March 1917. Yamashita Kamesaburo was described as a 'funa narikin* (nouveau riche of the shipping world) and founded the shipping company which still bears his name. Due to the boom in charter rates, Japanese shipowners, even quite modest ones, enjoyed considerable prosperity during the war. 2 3 Japan to her allies, Tokyo, January 1917. New East, I/i, June 1917.

196

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE SECRET AGREEMENT

Destination Russia in Asia Dutch Indies British India China United States Canada Australia Britain Russia

197

Exports in yen 1916 1913 4,271,000 5,148,000 29,873,000 54,660,000 184,473,000 5,090,000 8,637,000 52,869,000 4,897,000

27,693,000 17,418,000 71,418,000 192,712,000 340,228,000 22,318,000 27,778,000 102,657,000 33,420,000

The most dramatic increases were in China where her merchants were thriving in the absence of European traders and in the United States which was also enjoying a wave of wartime prosperity. Japan was also establishing markets in colonial territories like the Dutch Indies and India as well as in Australia and Canada, where imports from Europe had been drastically reduced, and her growing mercantile marine was fully stretched to cater for her new markets. It is not surprising that for the first time Japan enjoyed a huge export surplus and turned from being a debtor nation to one that was itself able to export capital overseas. The European powers, though they benefited from Japan's goods, were apprehensive lest Japan should at the end of the war have a grip on their pre-war markets which could not be won back. POLITICAL CHANGES

Towards the end of 1916 a change of government took place in both Japan and Britain. By October Okuma, seventy-eight years of age, wanted to resign because of the bitter attacks on him for his domestic and China policy. In December Asquith resigned because of dissatisfaction, within the ministry and in the country at large, at the way the war effort was being organized. The new cabinets that emerged should be looked at in more detail because they presided over the affairs of their countries for the last two years of war. When Okuma offered his resignation on 4 October, he proposed Kato Takaaki as his successor on the ground that he was the leader of the Doshikai, the largest party in the Diet. But, at the meeting of the

198

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE SECRET AGREEMENT

genro that day, this suggestion was rejected and Yamagata proposed General Terauchi Masatake, the governor-general of Korea. It was the intention of the genro to avoid the evils of party politics which had, they thought, afflicted Japan over the previous five years and to form a 'whole-nation' cabinet which would act as a symbol of national solidarity. The new Terauchi cabinet, which was formed on 9 October, was therefore a throw-back to the ministries of General Katsura and a reversal of the trend towards party supremacy of which the Okuma ministry had been one example. At the end of November Terauchi appointed as foreign minister Motono Ichiro, the ambassador to Russia. Motono was well versed in European diplomacy, having served in St Petersburg for ten years. He had long identified himself with the cause of Japan's greater participation in the European war and had seen the major diplomatic triumph of his career, the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese alliance, as a step in that direction. However, he was not influential or well known in Japan and his long sojourn in Europe had left him somewhat remote from the dominant trends of Japanese foreign policy, especially towards China. To Britain's way of thinking, Motono's appointment was highly satisfactory; and his performance was generally to live up to expectations and to make up some of the lost ground. What had condemned the Okuma cabinets in the eyes of the outside world and of many groups in Japan had been their China policy. Among Motono's first acts was to re-think Japan's attitude towards China. He completed a memorandum on the subject on 30 December and had it approved by the prime minister and by the genro, Yamagata and Matsukata.4 On this basis, the cabinet passed a detailed resolution on 9 January 1917, declaring its policy to be the maintenance of China's independence and territorial integrity and abstention from all interference in her internal affairs. It was hoped that this policy could be worked in harmony with the foreign powers and that its softer line would help to remove the latent opposition of the United States. At the same time, Japan was to endeavour to establish her commercial power gradually in China and to maintain her existing rights in Manchuria, Mongolia and Fukien.5 The emphasis was to be on friendship with China and, under the persuasion of the home minister, Goto Shimpei, on 'economic partnership with the Chinese'.6 Using ^ NGNB, i, Bunsho, 421-4. 6 Shidehara, pp. 113-17; Goto Shimpel^ iii, 838fF.

s NGNB, i, Bunsho, 424-7.

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE SECRET AGREEMENT

199

loopholes in the resolution, Terauchi sent an emissary, Nishihara Kamezo, on four missions to China in 1917 to conclude financial agreements with the Peking government. This loan policy was largely Terauchi's own initiative but Nishihara also communicated with Finance Minister Shoda and Motono. It was only vaguely known to the Foreign Ministry and the diplomats overseas and was bitterly criticized by the vice-minister, Shidehara.7 Yet the full implications of this policy took a while to emerge and, for the present, it appeared that the harsher overtones of the Kato-Okuma policy had been erased and a more conciliatory policy adopted. Motono made it clear that he wanted Japan to act loyally to her wartime allies. The whole emphasis of his foreign policy statement to the thirty-eighth Diet on 23 January was on this theme: the real cause of the war was Germany's inordinate ambition which Japan could no more tolerate than the European powers; she would act in line with the decisions of the allied economic conference held in Paris in September; she had adopted a common front with the Entente in response to the German peace overtures of December.® It was little wonder that Britain found the new ministry an agreeable change after her recurrent disagreements with the Okuma-Ishii partnership: 'we can hardly hope for a more friendly Government than the present.'9 It was therefore a surprise and a disappointment for Britain when, in response to a no-confidence motion shortly after, Terauchi dissolved the Diet and arranged for a general election which was ultimately held in April. However Terauchi's strategy proved successful and the opposition Kenseikai party suffered a crushing defeat. It had been hoped that Terauchi would provide a cabinet of national unity. Now that the elections had altered the balance of parties in favour of the ministry, it was the hope of Terauchi's sponsor, Yamagata, to establish a consistent and durable foreign policy, especially in regard to China.™ If this was not to be subject to the vagaries of party strife, it had to include some mechanism for consultation of interests not covered by the cabinet. The prime minister readily took up a scheme 7

Goto, iii, 836; NGB T. 6/2, pp. 635-700. Gensui Terauchi Hakushaku den, Tokyo, 1920, pp. 832-6. 9 FO 371/2951 [13893], Greene to Balfour, 18 January 1917, minute by Gregory, See also FO 800/203 [Balfour], Greene to Balfour, 19 January 1917 and FO 800/68 [Grey], Greene to Grey, n October 1916. 10 Cf. memorandum by Yamagata of 18 February 1917, translated in de Bary, Sources of Japanese Tradition, pp. 712—13. 8

200

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE SECRET AGREEMENT

for an advisory committee on foreign affairs which had been under discussion for almost a year. On 2 June he convened a meeting of party leaders to secure their adhesion but, while the representatives of the Seiyukai and Kokuminto agreed to join the committee, the leader of the Doshikai (now the Kenseikai), Kato Takaaki, did not accept on the ground that it violated the principle of cabinet responsibility and hence of party government.11 It has to be remembered also that Kato was hostile to Terauchi who had refused to work with him, that he was still under attack for his China policies in 1915 and that his party had suffered a reverse in the elections. He was, therefore, not predisposed to serve. Moreover, Terauchi did not go out of his way to urge Kato's acceptance. So Kato, who has been at the centre of the story of the British alliance since its inception, refused to identify himself with the new body and lost his chance of having a say in foreign affairs. Yet part of Terauchi's object was achieved: the leaders of the Seiyukai and the smaller Kokumint5 had agreed to join. On 5 June the constitution of the Rinji Gaiko Chosakai (literally, temporary foreign policy examination council) or Advisory Council on Foreign Relations, as it is generally known, was announced. It was to consist of representatives of the cabinet, the privy council and the political parties. Apart from the party leaders who had agreed to take part, it maintained a balance in representation between the Satsuma and Choshu clans and included places for the bureaucrats. Its object was the unified discussion of foreign policy and the removal of foreign affairs from the realm of party controversy. As it worked out in practice over the next five years, it acted as a double check on the actions of the foreign minister and the cabinet and was thus an impediment to the conduct of the Foreign Ministry bureaucrats. Yet it did ensure, as the genro had done in the past, that on major issues of policy Japan did not act hastily and without circumspection. It was in effect a review body of high-powered statesmen who tried to work out a consensus view of Japan's national interest.12 11

Kato, ii, 263-72; cf. Hara nikki, vii, 31 May 1917. The cabinet representatives were Terauchi, Motono, Goto, War Minister Oshima, Navy Minister Kato. From the privy council were appointed Ito Miyoji, Hirata Tosuke, and Makino Shinken. The Seiyukai was represented by its president Hara and the Kokuminto by its president, Inukai Tsuyoshi. The best short account in English is to be found in Morley, pp. 23-7. The most recent in Japanese is Kobayashi Tatsuo (ed.), Suiuso Nikki: ltd Miyoji Bunsho^ Tokyo, 1966, preface, pp. 6-10 and 'Rinji gaiko chosa iinkai no setchi', NGK, Nihon gaikoshi no sho mondai, ii, 1964, 53—71. 12

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE SECRET AGREEMENT

201

There were changes too in Britain. After a process not entirely dissimilar from that which had led to the appointment of Terauchi, Lloyd George was appointed prime minister of a new coalition government on 6 December 1916. Towards the end of a year full of difficulties and disappointments, there had been top-level soundings, so familiar to the Japanese scene, from which it emerged that Asquith's leadership of the first coalition had lost its appeal and that Lloyd George was the successor acceptable to the widest range of opinion. It was hoped that the British nation could be roused to new efforts and revitalized with a confidence in victory through his dynamic and articulate leadership. Lloyd George appointed Balfour as his foreign secretary. No one could have been better qualified for the task: he had been closely connected with foreign affairs from 1895 to 1905; he had played an important role in the early years of the Committee of Imperial Defence, coordinating defence with diplomatic considerations; he had just served for eighteen months at the Admiralty. He was experienced in top-level negotiation and was to prove skilful at concentrating on high policy while leaving routine to the Foreign Office. He was to be assisted though that is not an entirely appropriate word — by Lord Robert Cecil in 1917-18 and by Lord Curzon in 1919 during his absences from London. Balfour was not a member of the new five-member war cabinet which was set up in December 1916 on the principle that it should generally consist of persons unburdened by departmental administration. But he saw all the papers of the war cabinet and was entitled to attend whenever issues concerning his department were down for discussion. This was a relief because those who had to attend its often wordy deliberations found it to be a wearisome and timeconsuming business.13 While the Lloyd George cabinet was committed to unswerving pursuit of the war, it had to face months of reverses which could not fail to demoralize the nation. There was the failure of the Russian front, the collapse of the French army in the summer of 1917, the merchant shipping losses as a result of U-boat action, and the food shortages culminating in strikes on the home front in May. By the end of the year there was an active pacifist movement, associated with the 13

A. Temple Patterson, Jellicoe, London, 1969, p. 178. The members of the war cabinet were the premier, Lord Curzon, Lord Milner, Arthur Henderson and Bonar Law, but others attended by invitation.

202

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE SECRET AGREEMENT

public letter of Lord Lansdowne in November.14 In such a situation of gloom, Britain's policy in the far east was to concentrate on mobilizing the resources of the area in the interest of the Entente and on suppressing long-term issues which were inconvenient at the moment and could be postponed till the end of the war. Britain's authority in that area had always rested on her naval power; but, as Lord Jellicoe remarked in the spring of 1917, Britain had not for many months had absolute command of the sea, or anything approaching it.15 This was bound to affect Britain's standing in the east. BRITAIN S NAVAL DILEMMA

With new managements installed in Tokyo and London, there was a feeling that the time might be ripe for Japan's role in the war to be placed on a new footing. The initiative came as in the past from the Admiralty which was gravely worried by the extent to which British shipping was suffering from the operations of German submarines. The only remedy which the newly installed first sea lord, Sir John Jellicoe, could suggest when he came into office in December 1916 was for Britain to mobilize more effectively the support of her allies. The German U-boat offensive had been a factor since the early days of the war. But President Wilson had threatened in May 1916 that, if Germany sank ships without warning and sacrificed American lives, he would break off diplomatic relations. So the submarines for some months were circumscribed in their actions; but by December they were again causing heavy losses to allied tonnage. This was serious enough, but there was always the threat, though this did not materialize until i February 1917, that Germany would proceed to sink any merchant vessel on its way to the Entente countries, regardless of American reactions. Admiral Jellicoe took the most pessimistic view of the submarine menace. Writing to Admiral Beatty on 30 December, he complained gloomily that 'We are losing merchant shipping (British, Allied, Neutral) at the rate of about 300,000 tons a month or more and this rate will, I fear, increase during the next 2-3 months.'16 Twelve merchant ships were sunk in December and twenty in the January 14

(Lord) Newton, Lord Lansdowne, London, 1929, ch. xx. Lansdowne to Daily Telegraph, 29 November 1917. « Patterson, Jellicoe, pp. 162-3. !6 A. Temple Patterson (ed.), The Jellicoe Papers, ii (1916-35), London, 1968, 127-8.

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE

SECRET A G R E E M E N T

203

following. What depressed Jellicoe was that adequate steps had not been taken earlier by way of import restrictions, shipbuilding, convoys or patrols. Now the country had to face a serious emergency with resources which were already fully stretched, and Jellicoe, with a pronounced pessimistic streak in his nature, felt it to be his task to bring the emergency home in all quarters. Jellicoe felt that Britain's allies had not been doing enough. Writing earlier to Admiral Jackson in November, he had expressed the view: *If we can't persuade either France or Japan to take any share in the naval part of the war our diplomacy must be rather weak. Japan owes us a great deal and I should hope ought to be made to tackle trade questions in the Pacific.'17 Evidently he wanted Japan to step up patrols in the south Pacific. Later, as first sea lord, he reverted to this idea in a lengthy review of Britain's naval position, part of which under the heading *JaPan as an a^y' was written by himself: It cannot be said that the attitude of Japan has been entirely satisfactory. It is true that in certain respects they are much handicapped owing to the antagonism between the United States and Japan, but the trouble lies far deeper than that ... It is probable that the attitude of Japan towards the war was at first largely governed by their belief that the German military machine was invincible, but it is fair to say that of late the general feeling in Japan has improved; the victories of the Somme and Verdun have shown them their mistake. Nevertheless apart from the selling of guns and ammunition to the Russians and ourselves, Japan is not taking a full share in the war.18

The problem was to decide where and how to ask for assistance and to predict what political concession Japan was likely to demand in return. Eventually the Admiralty decided that Britain needed destroyers in the Mediterranean and light cruisers in the south Atlantic. It asked the Foreign Office to propose to Japan that two of the four light cruisers assisting the allies at Singapore should be transferred to the Cape of Good Hope to deal with German raiders, while a flotilla of destroyers should be based on Malta to deal with submarines and protect trade.19 On ii January 1917 Ambassador Greene passed these requests on to the Japanese after the protracted new year celebrations. 17

Jellicoe paper -s7 i, 1893-1916, London, 1966, 186-8, 8 November 1915. Jellicoe papers, ii, 135-6, memo of 30 December 1916. 19 FO 410/65, Admiralty to Foreign Office, 18 December 1916.

18

204

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE SECRET AGREEMENT A N G L O - J A P A N E S E SECRET A G R E E M E N T

When the British request was received, the Tokyo government was engaged in reviewing its policies. In the first place, it had been examining its war aims. An inter-departmental committee called the Kowa Jumbi iinkai (Peace preparation committee) had been meeting regularly since October 1915 in order to map out Japan's desiderata when the peace conference was held. Japan's position in Shantung appears to have been much more a matter of concern than the Pacific islands. These deliberations took on a new urgency in the autumn of 1916 when Honda Kumataro, the counsellor in the London embassy, recommended that Japan should without delay discuss her wishes with her allies in advance. The object was not solely to inform them of Japan's desires but to have them accepted before any peace conference.20 Quite apart from this, Foreign Minister Motono was taking a fresh look at his country's policies. When the cabinet met on 12 January 1917, it considered a long memorandum from him on the policy that Japan should take in the present war situation. Japan's position was studied in three eventualities: that of a deadlock in the war, of a German victory, and of an allied victory. The cabinet accepted that the best policy after the war would be for Japan to continue her wartime alignments and associate herself with Britain, Russia and France and that there was no other long-term policy available to the country for the moment.21 This debate was not sparked off by the British request; indeed there was no mention of it. Instead, it appears to have been part of a systematic review of policy being undertaken by Motono, in the course of which he had re-framed the policy towards China.22 On 26 January Motono met Ambassador Greene to convey Japan's reply on naval assistance. Motono said that it would be much easier for him to overcome objections in the Cabinet and in the naval general staff to British proposals for an extension of the sphere of Japanese naval help if Britain could meet certain of Japan's desires.23 He formulated these in a note: Exchange of views has already taken place in the earlier stage of the war between the British and Japanese Governments on the subject of Shantung 20 Shidehara, pp. 134-5; Japanese War Ministry microfilm, T. 325-6, R. 90, Peace preparations to end hostilities, 1915; Suiuso nikki, pp. ix—x. 21 NGB T. 6/III, no. 667. 22 NGNB, i, Bunsho, 424-7; above, pp. 198-9 23 NGB T. 6/III, no. 674.

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE SECRET AGREEMENT

205

and the German islands in the South Seas. Although from the tenor of the Conversations held between Lord Grey and Marquis Inouye, the views of the two Cabinets seem to be in accord, yet the matter was left open, the British Government having expressed the hope that the question of disposal of the South Sea Islands might be put off to the time of peace negotiations. Having however regard to the utmost importance attached by Japan to the questions of Shantung and the German possessions in her occupation, the Imperial Government deem it essential that an agreement should be reached with the Allies as soon as possible in advance of the formal formulation of their demands ... for presentation to the enemy Governments.

Over Shantung, Greene, in conveying the message to his government, took the view that it was purely a question of substituting Japan for Germany and that this had little special importance for British interests. Over the islands, Greene pointed out that it was not a new demand, except in asking for assurances while the war was going on rather than at its end: I have always been and still am inclined to believe that we should do well to make a virtue of necessity and give the desired assurance: Japan is in practical possession of the islands, and if she declines eventually to give them up, we must either compel her to go out or offer her some compensation which might well be more onerous than acquiescence now.

As regards naval assistance, he did not believe that Japan would hesitate to grant it in any case.24 This had been the impression conveyed to him at his interview with the navy minister on 15 January.25 The Foreign Office, knowing the Japanese to be inveterate bargainers, had been speculating what form their counter-demand would take. Would it be money compensation or some commercial concessions? That the eventual demand had economic and political implications and had both international and imperial significance meant that it was on a larger scale than had been expected. Over Shantung, it was pointed out that Britain was under a certain moral obligation towards the Chinese to see that the leased territory is eventually restored, i.e. the Chinese Government were told on 24

FO 371/2950 [22137], Greene to Balfour, 27 January 1917. Taisho 4-nen naishi 9~nen seneki kaigun senshi furoku, Dai 6-pen kimitsu hoshu [Appendix to the naval war history, 1915-20, series 6], Hereafter referred to as 'Kaigun senshi'. This also indicates that the navy was split into 'hakensetsu' and 'hantaisetsu', those favouring sending the ships and those opposing. 25

206

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE

SECRET AGREEMENT

12 August 1914 that they need have no apprehension as to the results of any joint action by British and Japanese in China. But we are not committed more specifically than that. 26

The assistant under-secretary, Langley, took the view that: It has always been certain that Japan would claim the Islands north of the Equator and Germany's rights in Shantung and if we are going to give them to her eventually we may as well do so now and get some quid pro quo.n

The matter was already referred to the war cabinet with whom the decision ultimately lay. But for the present it rested with the Colonial Office to test dominion opinion and to formulate the terms. On 2 February Japan agreed to make available the necessary naval assistance.28 As Greene had predicted, this was granted regardless of Britain's response to her political demands, though Japan was doubtless confident that Britain would not refuse. The Tsushima and Niitaka were to be sent to the Cape of Good Hope; the Akashi and two flotillas of destroyers were to be sent to the Mediterranean. Thus far, the Japanese had exceeded Britain's desires. But the Japanese ships were not to serve under the command of the British admirals but only to act in co-operation with them. Since there was no immediate reaction from London, Greene on 10 February took upon himself the responsibility for accepting this and other conditions which the Japanese navy had imposed.29 The Japanese set great store on operating under their own command, and not as in the early stages of the war, operating under British command. They were now in a position to insist on this condition and successfully did so.30 Meanwhile on the diplomatic front, the Japanese ambassador in London presented two detailed memoranda on 2 February. The first dealt with German concessions in China and argued that Grey had since the beginning of the war given Japan 'satisfactory assurances'; the last of these on January 1916 had indicated that Britain 'would raise no 26

FO 371/2950 [22137], note by Gregory, 29 January 1917. Ibid., note by Langley, 29 January 1917. 28 According to 'Kaigun senshi', Admiral Kato heard views in favour of sending ships to the Mediterranean from Rear-admiral Akiyama Saneyuki who had just completed a tour of inspection to the European battle-fronts. On the other hand, he met opposition from Commander Nakamura Ryozo, the head of the first operations section of the general staff, based on the ground that it represented a complete change in national policy. It was only after much high-level discussion that Kato recommended the cabinet to agree to the British proposal, as it did at its meeting on 10 February. 29 NGB T. 6/III, nos. 97-8. 30 Kaigun senshi. 27

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE SECRET AGREEMENT

207

objections to Japan's negotiating with China as to the final disposition of [the German] concessions*. The second concerned the German South Pacific islands. Here the Japanese argument was that Kato had in November 1914 given notice that 'the Japanese nation would naturally insist upon the permanent retention of all the German islands north of the equator' and that Grey and the Australian prime minister, Hughes, had by implication accepted this point of view in discussions between March and May 1916.31 Balfour had earlier passed the island issue to the Colonial Office, feeling that it affected British interests much more than the Shantung question. While the dominions were being consulted, the cabinet observed on 5 February that 'the possible entry into the war of the United States increased the necessity of an early decision in regard to Japan and Shantung and the occupied islands north of the equator in order to avoid negotiations in the subject with another power'.*2 By the time the war cabinet again met on 10 February, the approval of Australia and New Zealand had been received. 3 3 it was therefore agreed that the Japanese demand should be admitted. Britain's reply was passed to Ambassador Greene on 14 February and passed to the Japanese two days later: His Majesty's Government accede with pleasure to the request of the Japanese Government for an assurance that they will support Japan's claims in regard to disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in Islands North of Equator on occasion of Peace Conference, it being understood that Japanese Government will, in eventual peace settlement, treat in same spirit Great Britain's claims to German Islands South of Equator.34

But this did not reveal Britain's motives or the war cabinet's thinking, though some of the underlying factors appear in another message of the time. This laid down as a cardinal point in British policy that concessions to Japan could be looked for only in the direction of British interests in China. 31 FO 371/2950 [26707], Chinda to Balfour, 2 February 1917; NGB T. 6/III, no. 674. 32 CAB 23/1. 33 FO 371/2950 [30566] Lord Liverpool (New Zealand) and [30905] Munro Ferguson (Australia) to Colonial Office, 6-7 February 1917. 34 FO 371/2950 [36133], Balfour to Greene, 14 February 1917; NGB T. 6/III, no. 673. The war cabinet had originally agreed to the statement with the words 'and our general policy elsewhere* at the end. But Balfour argued that this would be 'inexpedient and unfair' and the phrase was dropped [CAB 23/1(63 and 65), 12 and 14 February 1917].

208

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE SECRET A G R E E M E N T

H.M. Government are quietly resisting attempts to allow the Japanese to get a footing in industrial undertakings in China in provinces bordering India and Thibet, and in the Yangtse valley... It is doubtful whether, in the present condition of British political and financial helplessness in the Far East, H.M. Government are secure enough to maintain the existing state of things against any pressure that may suddenly arise. Moreover, it must be realised that, should it be necessary at any time to ask for military and even largely increased naval favours from the Japanese, the price that would have to be paid could only be ... at the expense of British interests in China.35 The message seems to be that, since it is not possible for Britain to resist Japan's ambitions in China or the islands, the best course is to recognize their demands provided that they do not encroach on established British interests in China or, more importantly, in India. Britain's counter-demand that Japan should similarly guarantee her claims to islands south of the Equator was considered by the Japanese cabinet on 20 February. It had before it a recommendation from Motono that the reciprocal guarantee should be given. It was unanimously confirmed and Britain was informed on the following day.36 The wording of the Japanese acceptance has come in for criticism on the ground that it was less full-blooded than the British guarantee. But there is nothing in the text to suggest this; and there is nothing in Japanese sources to indicate that Japan had any intention to make it so. It would appear that the British decision was taken by the war cabinet on the strong recommendation of Balfour, with only Curzon dissenting. Yet Curzon's opposition does not appear in the cabinet minutes themselves.37 Moreover, it was a London decision. Ambassador Greene in Tokyo and Minister Jordan in Peking were not consulted. It is clear from Greene's writings that he would have favoured the arrangement, and likely that Jordan would have opposed it. In fact, Jordan was not informed until some time later.3« Nor could there be widespread consultation on a secret agreement of this kind in wartime, when Japan was occasionally in a position to intercept messages between London and Peking. So far as the Foreign Office was con35 FO 371/2693 [263898], Balfour to Greene, 13 February 1917. 36 NGB T. 6/III, nos. 678-9; Fineld, pp. 53-5. 37 DBFP) I (xiv), no. 167, footnote at end by Curzon, 10 November 1920. 38 For lack of consultation with Peking, see Pearl, Morrison^ pp. 383-4. For Greene's views, FO 371/2950 [64494], Greene to Balfour, 14 February 1917 and Greene to Langley 23 February 1917.

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE SECRET AGREEMENT

209

cerned, the China aspect was a regrettable, but inevitable, necessity — a decision which had to some extent been taken earlier in the war. The island question had been left to the Colonial Office and the dominions were content to accept it on a quid pro quo basis. Yet even here there were consolations, even if romanticized ones: Although [Japan] thereby acquired considerable war gains at a relatively low price, the [north Pacific islands] have brought her up against the barrier of the Equator, which obstructs irrevocably her advance south and confines her once more within a definite space. The concession therefore cuts both ways; and, if we have made an unpleasant virtue of necessity, Japan has, as far as her southward Pacific penetration is concerned, come up against an almost equally unpleasant condition of finality.39 Decades later, this forecast was proved wrong. Yet it gave some consolation in 1917, as did the consideration that it merely formalized concessions which had been given earlier in the war. These were small consolations for a decision born of Britain's desperation. If Japan was to be induced to play her full share in the war as an ally, Britain had to make concessions. Thus, at this stage in Anglo-Japanese relations, Britain had the role of the party who asked favours and Japan that of the party who granted them where it suited her to do so. It was to remain so for the rest of the war. The Japanese, of course, viewed the whole transaction differently. They were already in possession of the islands in question and in virtual occupation of a large part of Shantung. To make advance arrangements for the retention of these territories was only the natural tactic of wise statesmanship. It was unthinkable that Japan should return the islands to Germany, whether the latter was successful in the war or not. Over Shantung, wider and more delicate considerations were involved: the subject was intimately bound up with her China strategy. She was, however, hopeful of winning over the Peking government to an acceptance of Japanese rights in the area.4(> ANGLO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT AND THE OTHER POWERS

On 15 February Britain notified her European allies, France, Russia and Italy, of the nature of her guarantee. Four days later Motono 39 DBFP I (iii), no. 613, note by J. D. Gregory, 20 December 1919. NGNB, i, Bunsho, 424-7, policy statement on China, 4 January 1917; Kajima, Nichi-Ei gaikoshi, pp. 401-8; Fifield, pp. 53-5. 40

210

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE SECRET AGREEMENT

sought to obtain similar guarantees from France arid Russia by presenting a memorandum to their ambassadors in Tokyo.41 She further requested Britain's support in her approach to these powers. Britain agreed to do so but informed Japan that she had also notified the Italian government. Motono therefore decided to ask Italy on 24 March for appropriate guarantees.42 Japan's wording in these cases differed from that used to Britain and took the line that: In view of recent developments in the general situation and in view of particular arrangements concerning peace conditions such as arrangements relative to the disposition of the Bosphorus, Constantinople and the Dardanelles having already been entered into by the Powers interested, [Japan] believes that the moment has come for it also to express its desiderata relative to certain conditions essential to Japan.43

The French foreign minister, Aristide Briand, replied cautiously on i March, asking as a counter-demand that Japan should help to obtain from China the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany. Motono, in confirming his acceptance of the French condition, wrote, with unconscious irony or bland effrontery, that his government 'did not fail to make all efforts from the beginning' and confirmed its intention of doing its utmost. Japan's ally, Russia, was less prompt and had to be reminded on i March. She eventually agreed with the sole stipulation that Japan should support China's entry into the war. Italy agreed in less committal form on 23 March.44 It has to be remembered that this group of treaties fell within the category of secret treaties. It was not until the Bolshevik leaders decided to disclose the secret commitments of the tsarist government in 1918 that they came to be widely recognized.45 Although the Manchester Guardian then reproduced the terms of Britain's undertaking, the London press, considering it to be embarrassing to the British government, seems to have ignored the secret disclosures. Apparently the European governments did not notify Britain of their decision to support Japan. Right down to the publication of these Bolshevik disclosures, the Foreign Office was evidently uncertain what support 41

FO 371/2950 [47583], Chinda to Balfour, 20 February 1917. Motono had earlier approached Russia informally on 8 February (NGB T. 6/III, no. 668, where dating is wrong). Cf. Fifield, pp. 54-5. 42 NGB T. 6/III, nos. 679, 680 and 692. 43 NGB T. 6/III, no. 677 44 NGB T. 6/III, no. 677(2), Krupenskii to Russian foreign minister, 16 February 1917. Japanese editors do not mention that the dating was Russian style. 45 F. S. Cocks, Secret treaties and understandings, pp. 84-5.

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE SECRET AGREEMENT

211

other countries had offered. Langley wrote as late as July 1918: 'we may assume that [Japan] approached all the principal Allied powers and probably got them all to recognize her right of succession'. But Hardinge was by no means certain that Britain and Russia, the only Pacific powers, might not have been the only ones to give the guarantees: 'if Japan had approached France and Italy I think we should have heard of it.'46 One can only deduce that there was great uncertainty in Britain about the extent of support which Japan had obtained. These undertakings were not dissimilar in character from those made by the principal allies, for example, to Rumania and Italy. Whereas in those cases it could be said that promises were given to win them away from the central powers, in this case Japan was given promises to hold her within the Entente and induce her to contribute more to the war effort and to end her obstructiveness, especially over China. These undertakings of 1917, though reluctantly given, were an inevitable part of entente diplomacy and were no more iniquitous than many similar wartime guarantees. The attempt which France and Russia made to give these secret treaties a degree of reciprocity was abortive. In return for support to Japan, they asked for Japan's assistance to get China into the war. However, as we have seen above, Japan had already decided to alter her policy on this point early in February. So, the reciprocal concession which she was now asked to give early in March amounted to no new concession. Yet the allies were so keen to get the Japanese to exert themselves more in the war that they were prepared to give any paper guarantees and the insertion of a reciprocal demand from Japan was purely to prevent the whole transaction from having too unilateral an appearance. By extracting the promise of Japan's support for her acquisition of the south Pacific islands, Britain got more out of these treaties than France or Russia. But she probably had more to lose in terms of security from Japan's possession of the other islands. 46

FO 371/3233 [122105], minutes by Langley and Hardinge, 12 July 1918.

CHAPTER XII

Effects of American Entry into the War H O W E V E R precarious the strategic position of the Entente powers at the start of 1917, their diplomatic position improved with the increasingly vigilant attitude of President Wilson towards Germany. Returned to the White House for a second term, he took a strong line against the augmented submarine campaign which the Germans proposed to wage against enemy and neutral shipping alike from the beginning of February. When his approaches were rejected, the United States severed relations with Germany on 3 February. Wilson's worst suspicions were confirmed by the disclosures in the 'Zimmermann telegram'. This telegram from Foreign Minister Alfred Zimmermann to the German minister in Mexico dated 19 January had come into British hands and been successfully decoded. It was then passed over privately to the Americans on 24 February just before a submarine sank the liner Laconia. The gist of the telegram was that, if war broke out between Germany and the United States, Germany would offer Mexico an alliance and that the Mexican president should mediate between Germany and Japan and request Japan to take part in their alliance. Wilson took the risk of conveying this devious message to the press; and the result was highly damaging to Germany — but also to Japan.1 i A. S, Link, Wilson, v, The decision for armed neutrality, Princeton, 1960, pp. 342!?. and 435fF. Also Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmermann telegram. New York, 1959; E. R. May, The world war and American isolation, i^i^-i 7, Cambridge, Mass., 1959. Many Americans refused to believe the genuineness of this message. But Zimmermann admitted its authenticity before a Reichstag committee in March. Fritz Fischer, Germany's aims in the first world war, p. 235, suggests that Zimmermann's aim was to 'draw Japan over to Germany's side . . . In this plan Zimmermann was hoping to exploit the latent hostility between Japan and Britain masked by the Alliance and the open antagonism between Japan and the United States'. If this is true, it was a blundering effort. The British ambassador in Washington had reported several times in 1916 that Japan was 'encouraging Mexico in an attitude of hostility' (FO 899/10, Rice to Grey, 31 March 1916; CAB 37/151/4, Rice to Grey, 23 June 1916). 212

AMERICAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR

213

The telegram was a matter of great delicacy for Foreign Secretary Balfour. While it was a bombshell which could be used with telling effect against the Germans, it would, if it were disclosed and published, be incriminating for Britain's ally, Japan. He therefore took the precaution of asking Chinda, the new ambassador, about Japan's relations with Mexico. Chinda, who had been responsible for Mexico while he had served in Washington, was able to report that relations were not close; and Balfour, thereupon, communicated the intercept to the American ambassador.2 When the telegram was disclosed in the press, the Japanese government came under grave suspicion. It printed emphatic denials in the world's press; it protested to the State Department that there were no grounds for imagining that Mexico could persuade Japan to make peace with Germany; and it affirmed that this was merely an outrageous plot on the part of Germany to sow dissension between Japan and her allies.3 Japan received from the American government assurances that it did not believe in the German allegations and that Japanese loyalty to the allies was not suspect.4 But the public throughout the world, which was inclined to be obsessed by suspicions of Japan's disloyalty, was not so readily disabused. Indeed, it may have injured American-Japanese relations irreparably. Even in Britain there were many who were prepared to believe the worst of the Japanese. One official in the Foreign Office, evidently dissatisfied with Tokyo pronouncements, wrote later in the year that the publication of some Japanese 'disclaimer as regards Mexico .. . would be very useful, whether it were true or not'.5 B A L F O U R S M I S S I O N TO W A S H I N G T O N

When the United States finally declared war on Germany on 6 April 2 Young, Balfour', p. 378. See also T. Hohler, Diplomatic petrel^ London, 1942, pp. 2234. For Japanese reports on Mexico, NGB T. 5/III, 549-625. Chinda, an experienced diplomat and tough negotiator, was ambassador at Washington (1911—16) and London (1916-20). 3 NGB T. 6/III, nos. 986-99. But see papers of Frank L. Polk (Sterling Memorial library, New Haven), 81/254, Phillips to Polk, 17 February 1917, in which Ambassador Sato Aimaro admitted that 'Japanese had sold a considerable amount of arms to Mexico: that these arms were of old type and would not be accepted by the Russians and consequently were on the hands of various manufacturers: that the Japanese in Mexico were a source of embarrassment to the Japanese Government*. * NGB T. 6/III, no. 999. 5 FO 371/2954 [235613], minute on Greene to Balfour, 2 November 1917.

214

AMERICAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR

1917, it was urgently necessary for the Entente nations to send highpowered missions to Washington. It is not appropriate to discuss the British or Japanese missions in detail, but, because the Americans entered the war at daggers drawn to one of the allies, Japan,6 some of the conversations of the British delegation in the American capital are pertinent to our theme. When the British mission led by the foreign secretary, A. J. Balfour, reached Washington in April, one of its most pressing tasks was to acquaint the American leaders with some aspects of wartime secret diplomacy. High among these was the Anglo-Japanese secret agreement of February 1917. On 30 April Balfour disclosed to President Wilson the existence and character of certain secret treaties concluded between the allied powers, though he apparently did not pass over the texts.7 A month later he wrote to the president 'to fulfil, though in somewhat belated fashion, my promise to send you the text of various Agreements which Great Britain has come to with the Allied Powers'.8 Not having copies with him, he had to have them sent on from London. No list of contents was attached to the letter and it cannot be said for sure that the Anglo-Japanese understanding was among them. Balfour may not have considered that it could be described as an agreement. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that he did disclose the existence of some such treaty in connection with the Pacific islands but not in respect of Shantung. If so, he can hardly have passed over the original notes. In making this distinction, his thinking was that the Shantung undertaking did not cover a transfer of territory: 'it took nothing from China which China possessed; China was not an Ally'. Britain's guarantee did not represent a territorial change and was not information which it was vital to impart.9 This would have been in line with British thinking. But one cannot exclude the hypothesis that the precise undertaking over Shantung was deliberately withheld in order to prevent the Americans forming a bad impression of Japan at the outset and trying to reopen the matter. The issue has become one of controversy. Secretary of State Robert 6

W. B. Fowler, British-American relations, 1913-18, Princeton, 1969, pp. 245-6, shows that Wilson was seriously discussing the possibility of a Japanese attack on the Philippines on 13 July 1917. 7 Dugdale, Balfour, ii, 200-1. s FO 800/208 [Balfour], Balfour (Washington) to Wilson, 18 May 1917. 9 Balfour papers (British Museum), Add. MSS, 49699 and 49734, Balfour's note of September 1919.

AMERICAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR

215

Lansing told the Senate Foreign Relations committee in August 1919 that he had no knowledge of the treaties as a whole before the peace conference; and this led to a fierce attack on Balfour by Senator Walsh.10 The Foreign Office, therefore, tried to establish the truth; but its findings were inconclusive: 'The trouble is that there is absolutely no record here of what documents were taken by Balfour or what were subsequently sent to him . . . It is therefore simply a question of memory, in which — as you know — Balfour is not particularly strong.'11 This account, of course, refers to the treaties as a whole and not to the Pacific islands declaration only. When Viscount Ishii later visited Washington, he told Secretary Lansing on 6 September about the declaration regarding the German Pacific islands, adding that it was impossible for Japan to return the archipelago to Germany.12 But here again Ishii seems to have withheld the information about Shantung. It does suggest that, in the case of both Britain and Japan, it was felt that revelations about Shantung would irritate Wilson. As might be anticipated from the Admiralty's anxieties about the submarine campaign, one of Balfour's prime functions in Washington was to obtain naval assistance from the American government. In particular, his object was to get the United States to concentrate her building on destroyers rather than capital ships, of which there was already a sufficiency on the allied side. But Balfour recognized that, if the United States was willing to forgo construction of capital ships in favour of light craft for the overall allied interest, she would require some guarantees that she would not be found inferior at the end of the war. Wilson's adviser on foreign affairs, Colonel E. M. House, discussed the issue with Balfour's secretary, Sir Eric Drummond, on 13 May, and Balfour cabled the prime minister about the diplomatic guarantees which would be required. At the war cabinet on 19 May, Lord Robert Cecil, who was acting foreign secretary in Balfour's absence, discussed a possible naval alliance with the United States. 10 DBFP, I (v), no. 374. See also no. 355 and United States relations with China, Washington, 1949, pp. 437-8. 11 FO 800/158 [Curzon], Campbell to Tyrrell (Washington), 4 November 1919; also in DBFP, I (v), no. 388. 12 Kajima, Nihon gaiko seisaku no shiteki kosatsu, pp. 331-3; Chi, pp. 108-9. But see Fifield, p. 5 5. In any case, the State Department knew something of Britain's commitment from the publications of the Bolsheviks early in 1918. See Polk papers 85/39, memo by E. T. Williams, 5 March 1918. Beers, Vain endeavour, Durham, N.C., 1962, p. 150: 'Most historians now believe that [Lansing] and Wilson knew far more about the secret treaties of 1917 than they were willing to admit to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.'

216

AMERICAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR

Would it, however, be possible to 'gain Japanese assent... by adopting Lord Grey's policy of giving Japan a free hand over the whole of China'?13 Cecil reported to Balfour as follows: If we were to undertake to give naval aid to the United States in a future war I feel that the spirit of our treaty with Japan would make it incumbent on us to inform her of what we were doing. She might regard such a step as making valueless the whole treaty and this might lead to prolonged negotiations. Indeed it might be necessary to recast the alliance altogether. All this requires very careful consideration by the War Cabinet since a false step might throw Japan into the arms of our enemies. At the same time it is very important to induce the United States to concentrate on building destroyers and speaking for myself and I believe for all my colleagues the idea of a defensive alliance with the U.S. is so attractive to us that any step which would lead in that direction we should desire to take. We are therefore carefully considering what is the best way of reconciling Japan to such proposed action. In the meantime would it be of any use to point out to the U.S. Government that with or without a guarantee popular opinion here would undoubtedly force us to go to the assistance of America if she were attacked by Japan? It would therefore be perfectly safe as a matter of practical politics for the U.S. Government to forgo the building of capital ships at the present time.14 Here was presented what was to be Britain's dilemma as long as the Japanese alliance lasted: how to increase collaboration with America, while remaining faithful to Japan, who could not welcome AngloAmerican co-operation.15 The naval proposal was not taken further while Balfour was in America. When he returned home, he introduced the subject at the war cabinet on 19 June, suggesting as a formula that the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan should engage singly and severally to assist each other against any maritime attack for a period 13

C. Seymour (ed.), The intimate papers of Colonel House, 4 vols., Boston, 1926-28, iii, 69-71; CAB 23/2/142. w FO 800/208 [Balfour], R. Cecil to Balfour, 19 May 1917. *s This dilemma is illustrated by the remarks of Breckinridge Long to Frank Polk on 21 January 1918 (Polk papers 77/29) where he disapproves of the 'proposal to ask England to coordinate her policy with ours and bring pressure on Japan in Chinese and Siberian matters* on the ground that *a greater part of England's influence in Far Eastern matters is a reflected one and now exists largely because of her understanding with the Japanese who really have the influence. To make this proposal to them is to ask them to do something which our experience during the war has taught us we have no reason to expect from them, because they always defer to the Japanese/

AMERICAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR

217

of four years after the conclusion of the present war.16 In a memorandum three days later, he elaborated on the formula, stressing the merits of a straightforward maritime defence treaty with the United States: The objection to it arises out of our existing Treaty with Japan. It is quite true that there is no logical incompatibility between our actual Treaty with Japan and this suggested Treaty with America. Both are defensive. If Japan attacked America, we should certainly, if appealed to, come to America's assistance; while, if America attacked Japan, we should be under no Treaty obligation to join in the attack. [Such a treaty with America would be regarded] as the beginning of the end of an Alliance which has already lasted 20 years, and has, on the whole, conduced to stability in international relations in the Far East. This is a danger not to be lightly run, and probably the best way of avoiding it is to try to associate Japan from the beginning with the new arrangement.1? It is remarkable to find the foreign secretary writing that, if Japan attacked America, Britain would probably defend America. This is a strange gloss on the alliance of 1911. But so steeply had the Japanese alliance declined during the war years that such a stance was taken up without question in responsible quarters. The war cabinet authorized Balfour to negotiate with the United States on the basis of an agreement between all the allies.18 He therefore prepared a detailed letter for Colonel House to pass on to the president. Balfour assured the American government that the Cabinet were and are profoundly attracted by the idea of any defensive arrangement with the United States. They were clear that, with or without a guarantee, popular opinion in this country would undoubtedly force us to go to the assistance of America if she were attacked by Japan. At the same time, we realize that a private and informal assurance of this nature would hardly be sufficient to allow the U.S. Government to forgo the building of capital ships, in view of the widespread popular mistrust of Japanese intentions, though in the opinion of our naval authorities the United States have nothing to fear from Japan, since with some important exceptions the American Fleet is much superior to the Japanese numerically and otherwise. Of the larger capital ships, both constructed and under construction, with the exception of battle-cruisers, the United States have already a considerable preponderance. On the other hand, their number of 16

CAB 23/3/165 (9), 19 June 1917. Dugdale, ii, 210; CAB 23/3/174, Appendix, 'Future naval construction in the United States'. is CAB 23/3/174 (5), 22 June 1917. 17

2i8

AMERICAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR

fast light cruisers is, in the opinion of our naval authorities, quite inadequate for the operations of a Fleet of the dimensions of that of the United States, while their superiority in destroyers over the Japanese is also insufficient. Most urgent requirements of the American Navy as against Japan are in fact for light cruisers, destroyers and anti-submarine craft, and, with the exception of the battle-cruisers, it would seem to be a waste of resources for the U.S. Government to build more capital ships. Main difficulty of an arrangement between our two countries is that, if Great Britain undertakes to give naval aid to the United States in a future war, Japan will probably consider that the agreement is directed against her. We think that the spirit of our Treaty with Japan would make it incumbent on us to inform her of what we were doing, and we assume that the idea of secrecy must be excluded. Announcement at Tokio of such an arrangement must inevitably raise highly dangerous discussion, and would certainly be interpreted by Japan as primarily aimed at blocking her ambitions in China, the Pacific and the Far East generally, with the result that she might throw herself into the arms of our enemies, in which event a most perilous situation would be created. I have therefore endeavoured to find a formula which would, while overcoming these difficulties, assure the United States of absolute protection at the end of the war either against the German Fleet (which, as you recognized, is the real peril), against Japan, or against both; and the only method of so doing appears to be to endeavour to associate Japan from the beginning with the new arrangement. This would have the triple effect of allaying Japanese fears, of engaging Japanese support, and of advertising the Treaty as a protection against Germany ... Balfour had in this way secured that his tentative proposals did not ignore Britain's ally, Japan, but took account of her interests. If the European members of the Entente were included in addition to Japan, the British proposals seemed to afford the 'foundation for a maritime league to ensure the peace of the world'. Balfour concluded by suggesting that the powers in question should subscribe to the statement: that, in view of the diversion of Government ship-building in the Naval Yards of the U.S.A. from the construction of capital ships to that of vessels suitable for antisubmarine warfare, the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia and Japan engage singly and severally to assist each other against any maritime attack for a period of four years after the conclusion of the present war.19 19 FO 800/209, Balfour to Bayley (consul-general, New York), 5 July 1917. Bayley was to pass this secret coded message to Sir William Wiseman, who would himself decode it and transmit it to Colonel House. The draft of 26 June is in Balfour papers, Add. MSS. 49699.

AMERICAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR

219

There was nothing final about these terms or indeed the proposals themselves. They were never put to Japan or the other powers affected. The whole tenor of the letter illustrates that Britain was not disposed to act independently of Japan because of the obligations under the alliance and because of the suspicion which still persisted that Japan was only loosely tied to the Entente and would, if crossed, go over to the other side. Although Britain had reservations about Japan's naval strength, she realized that Japan would have to be invited to join any maritime league. House and later Wilson found fault with Balfour's plan. The president thought that, if it were to deal with the submarine menace, the United States would have to concentrate on destroyers rather than capital ships without impairing naval strength after the war; nor did he want to add to the secret treaties by entering into a naval alliance with the major European powers and Japan; nor could he guarantee any binding treaty on this subject passing the senate. Thus, by midsummer, the subject petered out at America's request. Britain was left with the assurance that 'the United States will proceed as energetically as possible to build destroyers'20 and this saved her from having to make any awkward approaches to Japan. As the above quotations have shown, the American entry into the Great War had filled Britain with a hope that there was some possibility of an Anglo-American entente in the future on a world-wide basis. As long as this remained a possibility, Britain recognized that her alliance with Japan must take a secondary place. Of course, it had served its purposes in the past; it was useful for the present. But its value to Britain did not stand comparison with a possible AngloAmerican combination. In relation to the far east, such a combination also appealed to many observers. Even Ambassador Greene called attention to the great advantages which would accrue from AngloAmerican co-operation: The day may come when we may have to reconsider our situation vis-avis of Japan and America in the Pacific and the Far East. At present we are bound by our Treaty to Japan, and if His Majesty's Government are thoroughly satisfied with the attitude of our Ally throughout the War, and persuaded of her reliability in the future, there would appear to be nothing for us to do but to 'carry on'. 20 House, iii, 72-6; FO 800/209 [Balfour], Wiseman to Drummond, 18 July 1917; Fowler, pp. 53 and 245-6.

220

AMERICAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR

But there is another side of the picture, and, as one who has been brought into close contact with the realities of our relations with this country, I should like to remind you of some of the more important impediments in the path of complete confidence. 1. The arrogance, opportunism and selfishness of Japan's foreign policy. 2. Japan's aspiration to the hegemony of the Far East. 3. Japan's philandering with India, and her attitude towards Indian sedition. 4. Japan's economic claims (much resented by the Indian Government) in that country, including shipping-competition, coasting trade, Customs duties, etc. 5. Japan's alleged aspirations in regard to the Netherlands Indies, carrying with them a menace to Hong-Kong, the Straits Settlements and Singapore, the greatest British trading port (I think) in the world. 6. The suspected designs of the Militarist party in Japan against the integrity of China. 7. Japan's jealousy of Great Britain's old-established economic situation there, and her efforts to defeat it. 8. Last but not least, the colour bar, which baffles agreement between Japan and our Over-Seas Brethren, and finds implacable opposition in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada. Now, if you will examine these impediments from the American angle, I think you will find that, while on the one hand the very points of divergence which separate us irreconcilably from Japan might in some instances even serve to draw us closer to America; on the other hand there is little, if any, prospect, judging by past results, of a sincere and lasting rapprochement between America and Japan. Neither understands the other, and each distrusts and despises the other. Might not, then, the possibility of a friendly understanding between ourselves and our great White Outposts in the Pacific — Australia, New Zealand, and Canada —with our great White Neighbour — the United States of America —be worth considering? The similarity of AngloAmerican interests in and round the Pacific, and the growing divergence of Anglo-Japanese aims and outlook referred to above, suggest the intensive cultivation of our friendship with America, who after the War should become more than the vox et praeterea nihil of past years in Far Eastern affairs. I would not of course suggest any precipitate action, such as an abrupt denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which might merely convert Japan's calculating and doubtful friendship into active hostility, or even provoke a Japanese-German understanding. But might we not perhaps in due time free our hands by either (a) watering down the Alliance to an Entente (its original objective, Russia, having disappeared) or, (b) merging it in

AMERICAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR

221

a triangular arrangement between Great Britain, the United States and Japan. We shall, no doubt, witness a settlement of accounts between Great Britain and Japan after the war when due credit will be given for services rendered, but, even so, I cannot help thinking that the present hollow friendship cannot be continued and must in due course be resolved into some relation at once less intimate and more genuine; and that we might well try to bring in America on our side to redress the balance in the Far East.. ,21

There was no doubt that a proposition of this kind was as attractive to officials in Whitehall as it was to Greene. After some scrutiny, Langley told Greene rather cautiously in a long letter on 28 October that his views were considered to be 'sound'.22 The trouble was that this ideal of a trans-Atlantic — not to speak of a trans-Pacific — partnership was difficult of attainment, because of American sensitivities. The Foreign Office was aware of Wilson's suspicions over Britain's war aims and was doubtful how far the United States was prepared to be permanently committed outside her own continent. Still many in Britain clung to these optimistic hopes without a proper realization of the domestic snags which Anglophiles in America faced.23 America's entry into the war and Balfour's mission had generated hopes in Britain for a solution of the Pacific question on a bilateral, or even a trilateral, basis which are to remain a prominent consideration right down to 1921. If these hopes were to be fulfilled, it was necessary for Britain to work for understanding between Japanese and Americans for the rest of the war. I S H I I S M I S S I O N TO W A S H I N G T O N

Japan had been an outsider to the private conversations of the Balfour mission. Britain was to be an outsider to the inner deliberations of the mission which Japan sent to Washington under the former foreign minister, Ishii Kikujiro, later in the year. Yet the discussions in Washington were not unrelated to the Anglo-Japanese secret agreement of February since they were steered by the Japanese towards a discussion of China generally — and, by implication, Shantung — and of Pacific security. The Foreign Office had qualms that Japan might extract 21

FO 371/3816 [206006], Greene to Langley, 30 August 1917. FO 371/3234 [206006], Greene to Robert Cecil, 2 November 1918. 23 Papers of Sir William Wiseman, British liaison agent in New York, 1917-18 (Sterling Memorial library, New Haven) 90/27, Wiseman to Northcliffe, 10 August 1917. 22

222

A M E R I C A N ENTRY INTO THE WAR

undertakings in Washington similar to those already given in London: The Japanese have made up their minds to bring on a general discussion both with us and with the Americans of all outstanding questions in China and elsewhere. They have waited so long before doing so that we had begun to hope they would wait till the end of the war.24 Thus, in the British mind, the Ishii mission was associated with the guarantees which Britain had been forced to concede earlier in the year. The Japanese request to send an embassy was made on 12 May and granted two days later. On 13 June Ishii was appointed as plenipotentiary and given instructions to deal with the position of Japanese in the United States and to clarify Japan's special interests in China. Some ten days later these were elaborated in secret instructions which suggest that the major items were to be the activities of the two powers in China and the Pacific.25 Ishii reached America on 13 August and made a number of conciliatory speeches, dwelling on the economic links forged during the war. His talks with Secretary of State Lansing began on 6 September and continued until the signature of the joint note on 2 November.26 Ishii arrived at a time when Japan was by no means popular, either with the public or the government. In China the two countries were rivals since the American attempt to re-establish the international loan consortium in 1916; in the Pacific the Americans were conscious that their island of Guam was virtually surrounded by Japanese-occupied islands; and there were deep suspicions about Japanese intentions in Mexico. Moreover, the United States was not convinced that Japan had been pulling her weight in the war and asked Britain for her opinion.27 In reply, Britain was not altogether frank. Bearing in mind the need for American-Japanese understanding, Balfour laid down that a factual statement should be given of the assistance which Japan had given the allied cause but 'we need only touch lightly on what they have left undone'. So a glowing account was given of the assistance which Japanese arsenals had given in supplying the needs of the Russian front, though it was pointed out that the Japanese general staff was unwilling, 24 FO 371/2954 [173607], minute by T. H. Lyons on Greene to Balfour, 5 September 1917. 25 NGNB, i, Bunsho, 434-7; on the Ishii mission generally see NGB T. 6/III, pp. 705— 874. 26

27

Ishii, Gaikoyoroku, pp. 135-60; Chi, pp. 108-13.

FO 371/2954 [153795], Spring Rice to Balfour, 2 August 1917.

AMERICAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR

223

and the government probably unable, to send a military expedition to Europe.2® Compared to what was being written for domestic consumption in all departments of the British government, this was a restrained statement but it has to be remembered that it was Britain's task to create American-Japanese harmony, to preserve it for the duration of the war and to prevent the Americans from casting up to the Japanese mission its country's shortcomings as this information could only have been derived from allied sources. The Ishii-Lansing note was passed on to Britain by Ambassador Chinda one day before it was signed. Predictably the Whitehall officials commented that much depended upon the interpretation to be placed upon Japan's 'special interests in China' and that it was largely window-dressing.29 The issue which arose was whether Britain should adhere to the note publicly. Balfour felt that a note which (a) proclaimed the 'open door' and (b) said that notwithstanding the 'open door' Japan had special rights in parts of China and (c) omitted to say that we also had special rights in parts of China (viz. the Yangtse Valley) could not be formally accepted by us without, by implication, making a surrender of our rights.30 Britain, therefore, informed the parties on 19 November that she did not propose to adhere to the notes. This did not imply that Britain was not as delighted as the Japanese that the Ishii mission had culminated in the establishment of more harmonious relations. Ambassador Greene felt that, with the exchange of notes, public opinion in Japan began to move in the direction of active intervention in the war. Spring Rice in Washington thought the mission had had 'a very excellent moral effect', though in its specific object — Japan's attempt to overcome the embargo placed by the United States on her exports of steel — it had obtained less satisfactory results.31 Arrangements for naval co-operation had been worked out which allowed Japan to relieve American ships in the Pacific and America to transfer them to Atlantic service. Britain was heartened by the success 28

FO 371/2954 [153795], Balfour to Spring Rice, n August 1917. FO 371/2954 [213773], Page to Balfour, 8 November 1917, minute by Langley. 30 FO 371/2954 [213295], minute by Balfour, about 8 November 1917. 31 FO 800/209 [Balfour], Rice to Balfour, 25 October 1917. A parallel mission led by Baron Megata Tanetaro hinted at economic co-operation, including co-operation in China, using American capital and Japanese know-how on the same lines as the Okuma proposals of 1914. Its suggestions fell on deaf ears. 29

224

AMERICAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR

of the mission,32 though she had reservations about the settlement of the China question and the durability of the new-found AmericanJapanese harmony. The foreign secretary wrote: 'When I was in America, I found that the State Department took a profoundly gloomy view of Japanese policy. I did what I could to combat suspicions which seemed to me, on the evidence, somewhat excessive; and the subsequent Japanese Mission may have done more/33 The Americans and Japanese were likely to prove ill-adjusted allies for the rest of the war. From Britain's point of view, Japan's short-term policy in China had in any case become more amenable during 1917, however unacceptable her long-term ambitions there. In February the Japanese cabinet had altered its policy of two years' standing by encouraging Premier Tuan to break off diplomatic relations with Germany.34 In the months that followed, it egged him on to go further and enter the war, even though America was urging him to concentrate his efforts on solving China's domestic problems.35 To Japan's disappointment, Tuan and his northern party were forced out of office in May. When he returned to power by military force in July, Japan decided to lay down her China policy once and for all. By a resolution of 20 July the cabinet decided to support the northern party and to turn down the requests for help which she had received from the southerners.36 On 7 August she asked Britain to promise to support the Peking government and withhold assistance from anyone seeking to overthrow it. Britain was ready to accede to this request and offered to recommend it to the American government. Japan therefore approached the other allied governments for support to Tuan but received only guarded replies. Britain viewed this as a major break in Japanese policy. Considered in the light of the perpetual difficulties over China which Britain had 32 Kuroha, Nichi-Ei domei no kenkyu, p. 429, comments that 'ways of preventing the alliance deteriorating because of American-Japanese estrangement had been fully explored*. 33 FO 800/203 [Balfour], Balfour to Milner, 19 January 1918. 34 NGB T. 6/III, no. 189, cabinet resolution, 9 February 1917. It should be pointed out that this decision preceded Britain's offer to support Japan over Shantung. Shidehara, pp. 113-1735 The American line was that China was trying 'to play a little international politics with a view to making friends here and in Europe who would be useful in its relations with Japan' (Polk papers 89/117, Polk to Wilson, 10 March 1917) and should be discouraged from foreign adventures. 36 NGNB, i, Bunsho, 437-8.

AMERICAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR

225

faced from Japan in 1915 and 1916, the new policy could not fail to be welcome in Whitehall, even if there were suspicions: The most astonishing development [in the far east] is the sudden volte face of the Japanese Government in regard to their apparently sincere desire to create a stable government in China and their wish that we should cooperate in consolidating the present regime in Peking. After our experiences of their intrigues at Shanghai and in Canton, Yunnan etc with Southern Revolutionaries, this is a refreshing change and one cannot help thinking that if it is genuine there must be some arriere pensee, perhaps some bargain struck there between Tuan and them of which we as yet know nothing.37

In fact, Premier Tuan was considerably indebted and obligated to Japan, although the foreign powers only became slowly aware of the extent. Yet unquestionably Terauchi's new China policy, taken with the Ishii-Lansing note, relieved the tension over China which the allies had found to be a serious cause of discord in the past.

JAPAN'S NAVAL CONTRIBUTION 1917 Britain continued to act as though she expected further naval concessions from Japan long after she had granted her political concessions in February. When the contributions of the various allies were discussed by the war cabinet in the spring, opinion was divided into two camps. Those like Balfour and Austen Chamberlain, who took a broad international view, were prepared to ignore Japan's shortcomings as an ally and were modest in their expectations for the future.38 Those like General Sir William Robertson who took a parochial British view blamed Japan for her selfish pursuit of her own interests: *JaPan frankly entered on the war for what she could get out of it, and once she had obtained Tsing Tau she was satisfied to await the result, in the meantime making a handsome profit out of the supply to Russia of munitions paid for by Russian gold.'39 The prevalent opinion in the navy was that Japan was not pulling her weight but, if there was suspicion, there was also respect for her ships and her officers.40 37

Jordan papers, 16, Macleay to Jordan, i October 1917. This subject is dealt with in Nish, *Dr Morrison and China's entry into the world war', in Hatton and Anderson, Studies in diplomatic history, pp. 322-37, and in Chi, ch. 6. 38 AC 20/77, war cabinet, 22 March 1917. 39 AC 20/78, note by Robertson, 12 February 1916, re-circulated, April 1917. 40 I would dissent from the view expressed in Marder, iii, 203n: 'there had never been any warmth of feeling in the Navy for the Japanese as Allies'. Successive first sea lords (Fisher, Jackson, Jellicoe) had been critical of Japan but their scepticism had been tinged with respect.

226

AMERICAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR

By the end of April the losses of shipping to the submarine attacks of the enemy had again become severe and regular. Britain, therefore, asked Japan that at least twelve more destroyers should be sent to European waters for patrol and convoy duties.41 Japan, however, refused because four were in dock de radoub and the fleet was under strength, though there was a wing of the navy which was anxious to help because it would improve the navy's case for an increased building programme. Britain asked for reconsideration and the Japanese on 23 May agreed to send four vessels (Yanagi, Momo, Kas/itand Hinoki) to the Mediterranean.42 Apart from that, the Japanese provided protection for transports between Aden and Colombo. So great were Britain's losses that the Japanese were asked in the summer 'to obtain official control over their mercantile marine with a view to utilization of some part of their tonnage for purposes connected with the war'.43 This was not regarded by the British Shipping Controller as an unfair request since it was reported that Japan was employing much of her tonnage in carrying her goods to what had previously been British markets. But there is no trace of Japan accepting this far-reaching advice and nationalizing her merchant marine for allied purposes. By their own lights, the Japanese were doing all that the slender thread of Anglo-Japanese friendship would justify. Thus, when the Americans entered the war, the Japanese confidently asked Britain for a statement of the services which their navy had rendered the allied cause during the war. There was some resistance in Whitehall to the publication of 'any sort of "puff" of the very modified naval assistance rendered by the Japanese', especially as Britain was still engaged in asking for more.44 However, it was agreed that the assistance given had not been inconsiderable and finally an appropriate statement was made in the house of commons on 24 May. Even after America's entry into the war, the state of British naval preparedness left much to be desired. On 21 July Admiral Jellicoe reported that the comparative strengths of the British and German battle-cruiser fleets would be cause for serious concern by the end of the year.45 He continued, unexpectedly: 41

FO 371/2950 [88517], Admiralty to Foreign Office, 30 April 1917. FO 371/2950 [115863], Balfour to Greene, 12 June 1917. 43 FO 371/2950 [138072], Balfour to Greene, 19 July 1917. 44 FO 371/2950 [91911], minute by Lyons on Admiralty to Foreign Office, 5 May 1917. 45 Jellicoe papers, ii, 185, 21 July 1917. 42

A M E R I C A N E N T R Y INTO THE WAR

227

There seems to be only one way of meeting this difficulty, namely by the use of Japanese battle-cruisers, as this is the only other nation besides German. and ourselves possessing vessels of this type. It is very improbable that the Japanese would consent to any of their battle-cruisers joining the Grand Fleet, and even if they did, it is doubtful whether they would be a match for German battle-cruisers when manned by Japanese. Britain should therefore sound Japan about selling two of her battlecruisers. The scheme was approved in principle by the board of Admiralty and the war cabinet on 28 August.46 When the approach was made, the Japanese reply on 5 October was a non possumus: since Japan had only four battle-cruisers, the sale of even the two older units to Britain could not be contemplated.47 The Admiralty had two other possibilities in view, either that Japan might be willing to exchange her cruisers for British battleships or that she might lend Britain two cruisers until the end of the war. Underlying these far-reaching proposals was the notion that, with America as Japan's ally, the only enemy that the Japanese navy could contemplate was Germany and hence there was no point in its being bottled up in the Pacific. Yet there was also the suspicion that Japan might be conserving her naval strength in the long term for use against Britain.48 It was the proposition that Japan should attach two of her battlecruisers to the Royal Navy for the duration of the war that was put. After a lengthy gap, the Japanese declined on 15 November on the ground that naval building was a sensitive subject and the government would be defeated if it countenanced such a proposal,49 These reasons were quite genuine and Balfour advised the cabinet that there was no hope of persuading Japan along these lines. Still Balfour tried to convince the Japanese ambassador of Britain's need and was disappointed, if not surprised.50 Early in 1918 Britain was able to claim that the tide had turned in the naval war. The submarine menace had been stemmed: shipping losses had been reduced; and severe losses had been inflicted on the German 46

47

Jellicoe papers, ii, 188.

FO 371/2955 [182535], Balfour to Greene, 18 September 1917. Cf. Marder, iii, 203. Jackson to Balfour, 7 June 1916: Japan's 'attitude gives rise to some suspicion as to her action after the war when we may be exhausted by our efforts, so the transfer of any of her best righting units to our Navy would be all in our favour, if she breaks the alliance with us and leans towards our possible future enemies'. 49 CAB 23/4/250 (9), 16 October and 271 (8), 13 November 1917. 50 Marder, iv, 44; FO 371/3233 [33087], Greene to Balfour, 7 January 1918. 48

228

AMERICAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR

submarines. The Japanese squadron continued in the Mediterranean until the end of the war. It operated under the command of Admiral Sato Kozo in the Akashi\ and, while it was not to be subject to the orders of the other allies, it was to observe a special relationship with the British commander-in-chief which it did not grant to the French.si If we try to assess Japan's naval contribution to the allied effort, we have to conclude that it was considerable in the last stages of the war. It was by no means the sole cause of allied success in meeting the submarine onslaught; but it has to be numbered as one factor alongside the contribution of American destroyers and the success of the British convoy system. Her contribution in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean was a great relief to the Royal Navy. Finally, Japan's naval assistance was more valuable to Britain than to other members of the Entente who were less dependent on keeping open trade channels. On the Japanese side, it suited the navy to extend its operations because its ships gained experience beyond their own waters but also because it gave grounds for asking the government for further expansion of shipbuilding beyond the existing five-year programme. 51

Kaigun senshi, 'Oshia taisen zengo ni okeru teikoku kaigun gumbi no gaikyo*. On Japan's contribution see Marder, v, 36-7.

CHAPTER XIII

Reversing the Flow, 1918 TOWARDS the end of 1917 the picture was a gloomy one for the Entente. With the Italian defeat, the likely defection of the Russians as a result of the revolution, the deadlock on the Flanders front and the French change of government, there were ample grounds for pessimism. But adversity creates resolution. And one aspect of the resolution was to try once again to mobilize Japan's support. Over the navy, Britain had been employing Oliver Twist tactics and generally getting more when she asked. On other fronts, Japan's contribution was open to criticism. In the last year of the war steps were taken to reverse the flow by converting some sections of Japanese opinion from their pro-German sympathies and especially to win over the military by persuasion and by gesture.

CONVINCING THE JAPANESE

Britain had some difficulty in countering anti-allied publicity in Japan. The main problem was that, if her propaganda was to reach proGerman groups in Japan, it had to reach the leading universities in Tokyo and Kyoto where many of the professors had German sympathies. If this were to be done successfully, publicity matter had to be pitched at a level which would appeal to an intellectual readership. To this end, there appeared in June 1917 the first issue of the New East (Shin Toyo): a review for the empires of Britain and Japan.-It carried warm articles of welcome from Prime Minister Terauchi, Foreign Minister Motono and the ex-ambassador to London, Inoue Katsunosuke, as well as from Lord Curzon, a member of the war cabinet. It was a bilingual monthly of about 100 pages with an English section and a smaller Japanese section at the end, conveniently the start from the Japanese readers' point of view. It was evidently modelled on one of 229

23o

REVERSING THE FLOW, 1918

the British literary magazines and was a lavish publication with articles of high quality. It has been fairly described as a 'fancy Magazine to express Anglo-Japanese unity in the days of the First Great War'.1 The New East was founded on the suggestion of Robertson Scott who had been undertaking freelance literary work in the allied interest in Japan. The Foreign Office assisted in seeking out 'an enterprising and patriotic Englishman who will be prepared to launch and finance the scheme'.2 In September 1916 it persuaded Charles Sale, who had for long resided in Japan and now operated a London merchant-banking house, doing business with Japan, to supply £9000 of the initial capital.3 To disguise Sale's position, the superintendence of the magazine was placed in the hands of a London committee composed of Lord Burnham (Daily Telegraph}, Sir George Prothero (Quarterly Review\ J. St Loe Strachey (Spectator} together with Sale. The editorial work was done by Scott with the aid of Hugh Byas. The British government professed to have no connection with the magazine, as it was thought that this would stigmatize it in the eyes of the Japanese. The Foreign Office left control to the London 'literary committee', while Ambassador Greene was at pains to dissociate the embassy from Robertson Scott. This was, however, to some extent deceptive. Although Sale did make the very substantial contribution of £2000 to the venture, the balance was a sum which would otherwise have gone to the Treasury by way of super-tax.4 In part, therefore, his contribution amounted to a subvention from the government. At the same time, there was no question of the paramountcy of the London committee being challenged by the Foreign Office. But it has to be admitted that, despite these precautions, the New East, selling at 50 sen, was regarded by Japanese as a British government organ. There were of course other media for war propaganda, the war pictorial, Senji Gaho, and a later supplement distributed with it, Senji Jiho. These were the responsibility of Hugh Byas, Scott's assistant editor. They were written entirely in Japanese and were distributed gratis to schools, libraries, military establishments and the like. The Senji Jiho dealt with the story of the war in a not uninteresting way and included translations of articles sent out from London. Their popu1

F. T. Ashton-Gwatkin, 'Reminiscences of John Paris', Bulletin JSL, 51 (1967), 12. FO 395/17 [103074], Greene to Grey, 4 May 1916; above, pp. 169—70. 3 FO 395/17 [174133], Grey to Greene, 5 September 1916. 4 FO 395/17 [133472], Cecil to McKenna (Treasury), 17 July 1916. 2

REVERSING THE FLOW, 1918

231

larity can hardly be assessed; but their monthly circulation was increased from 15,000 to 25,000 copies early in 1918.5 The New East was the main propaganda venture and caused the greatest stir. It professed to meet a need which Japanese intellectuals felt for an international magazine of higher quality than the corresponding Japanese magazines. It proved difficult to obtain contributions from Japanese but the editor of the Tokyo Asahi^ Matsuyama Chujiro, sent in an article on the Anglo-Japanese alliance for the September 1917 issue, which, despite its criticisms of Britain, Robertson Scott published. In his editorial entitled 'Some Japanese and a friend', he tried to rebut these criticisms and others which had appeared in recent Japanese papers.6 In the Japanese translation at the end of the number, the defence was presented in a way which was highly offensive to the Japanese. This led to bitter attacks on him in the Japanese press, many of which were more attributable to the poor translation than to Robertson Scott himself. As a result, he became the object of close scrutiny by the Japanese police7 and was threatened with prosecution. A typical response came from the not very influential paper Nippon oyobi Nippon/in. Replying to New East's full-throated advocacy of the alliance, the Japanese writer confessed that he had not given the matter 'one serious thought' and added: We are indeed secretly surprised at the feebleness of England against Germany. We cannot help thinking at times, 'If it had been Japan.. /. The future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance seems to be exceedingly anxious and uneasy. If changes in Russia and China should continue as they are doing to-day, then we cannot treat the alliance as if it was a lifelong bond or a thing to be relied on.8

While there were more pungent and offensive parts of the articles in question, this quotation is interesting as representing the thinking of many moderate Japanese. Scott was unrepentant about the line which he had taken. In a letter to Sale, he claimed that the only hopeful policy was 'to avoid constant nagging, to be a student and a friend of Japan but to speak vigorously 5

INF 4/46, John Buchan to Carson, September 1917. FO 395/91 [216176], Greene to Balfour, 27 September 1917. 7 Robertson Scott papers, library of St Antony's College, Oxford, reveal this. 8 Nippon oyoll Nipponjin, 15 September 1917, articles by Oba Kako and 'Akamon gakujin*. See also Morgan Young, p. 107, where it is stated that the deportation of Scott was demanded for his criticisms of Japan. 6

232

REVERSING THE FLOW, 1918

and fearlessly when necessary'.9 Aware of the controversy which his magazine had sparked off, Sale thought differently. He instructed Scott henceforth to 'introduce all that is best in each nation to the other,.. and avoid contentious subjects'; it was unwise to cater for the young progressive student element by inserting such writers as Sidney Webb and Bernard Shaw who represented extreme views.10 This was described as a 'moderate admonition' to the editor. It was feared in the Foreign Office that a person so touchy as Robertson Scott would almost certainly resign but, caught up in enthusiasm for his new venture and working untiringly with a very small staff to get it established, he let the admonition pass. With its sails trimmed to the new winds, the New East ceased to be an effective organ of propaganda. But the whole incident high-lighted an incompatibility in the project: was the New East to be an instrument of wartime publicity for Britain, or was it to be a primly virtuous medium for conveying uncritically the image of both peoples at their own estimation, or was it to be a literary magazine which by definition must contain criticism or controversy? The position was never fully resolved. In addition to this, Britain was through her consulates collecting intelligence on Japanese politicians and on Indian revolutionaries in Japan. This activity was divorced from the embassy, though it made use of British secret service funds. It operated through Japanese, Indians and British nationals. Some writers have attributed great significance to this intelligence work11 but it seems to be doubtful whether it was on a scale to differentiate it from the ordinary intelligence work of an embassy in wartime. While Japan was sometimes referred to as 'the most shaky of our allies',12 the propaganda campaigns there were not on an exceptional scale.

EXCHANGE OF FIELD-MARSHALS' BATONS

Afflicted by difficulties on all sides, the allies in the autumn of 1917 again appealed to Japan for an increased military contribution. A 9

FO 395/91 [203854], Scot to Sale, 7 September 1917 10 FO 395/91 [227574], Balfour to Greene, 27 November 1917. 11 Dignan, New perspectives on British far eastern policy, 1913-19* PP* 285-91. FO 371/3233, Greene to Balfour, 7 January 1918, contains a report based on information from 'our principal secret agent' who was Japanese. 12 FO 395/91 [31811], E. Gowers to Montgomery, 8 February 1917.

REVERSING THE FLOW, 1918

233

supreme effort was called for and Japan was approached from all the allies, except the Americans, for greater sacrifices. The strategy was discussed by the British war cabinet on i and 16 October when it was agreed that, though there were some fronts (as in the south Pacific) where it was undesirable to encourage Japan, the 'best fronts for the Japanese were Mesopotamia and Russia'.13 It should be observed that the British, unlike the French, thought it unlikely that Japan would agree to send troops to Europe. Ambassador Greene was told, when he raised the matter in Tokyo, that there was no hope of sending troops to Europe, though he was inclined to conclude that Japan might still be persuaded by appropriate compensation to relent.14 The subject became merged with the creation of a supreme allied war council. Britain notified Japan of the proposal on 23 October. If Japan were to take part, it would obviously become a forum for criticism of her war effort. The proposal was scrutinized by the Tokyo cabinet and the Advisory Council on 6 November and it was, nevertheless, agreed that Japan should take part.15 A meeting of the council was due to be held at Versailles late in November. It appears that Japan was determined to scotch in advance any suggestion at the conference that she should be called upon to contribute forces for any European front. Ambassador Chinda, who reported that the fortunes of the allies were so low that Japan could not avoid discussion of the subject, was instructed to prevent its being raised at formal sessions and was given arguments to rebut the proposal if it was mooted.16 Moreover, Finance Minister Shoda Kazue made it clear in a speech at a banquet of the Osaka Economic Association on 15 November that it was quite impossible to send forces to Europe and claimed that the allies understood the manifold reasons against it.17 Notwithstanding all these endeavours, the Japanese delegates to the conference, Ambassador Chinda and Ambassador Matsui Keishiro in Paris, found that they were confronted by requests for troops, especially for Siberia. On their government's orders, they stalled. Yet there were many abroad who felt that the allies had a right to expect Japanese troops on the European fronts and were disappointed with the lack of response. In December the allied ambassadors informed Japan that the conference had decided 13 CAB 23/4/242(13) and 23/4/250 (8); NGB T. 6/III, nos. 125 and 126. FO 371/2954 [202615], Greene to Balfour, 20 October 1917. 16 is NGB T. 6/III, nos. 135 and 147. NGB T. 6/III, nos. 165 and 174. i? NGB T. 6/III, no. 158. 14

234

REVERSING THE FLOW, 1918

to ask her to intensify her efforts but Motono had no hesitation in turning down any proposal for an expedition to Europe.1^ This reinforced the belief in Britain, which was even more pronounced in America, that Japan was merely playing at war and was content to reap its profits without contributing anything substantial. The blame was thought to rest with the army leaders who had a special influence on the Choshu-based Terauchi cabinet. They had indeed vetoed the various proposals on the ground that the army could not be used outside the far east, that transports were not available and that all schemes were unfavourably regarded by public opinion and the political opposition. It would be wrong, however, to imagine that the army general staff was swimming against a tide of enthusiasm for a more active part in the war. Most Japanese were convinced that it was not in Japan's interest to send troops to the major battle-fronts, and only a small minority favoured it. The question which lingered in British minds was whether it was their approach that was at fault. The result of this self-examination was essentially a soldier's remedy, an attempt to make a direct appeal to the semi-independent Japanese General Staff and, in particular, to the emperor as commander-in-chief. On 14 September Major (later Majorgeneral) F. S. G. Piggott, then G.S.O. 2 at Fifth Army headquarters, sent a memorandum from France to the Military Intelligence department of the War Office, suggesting that *JaPan would do anything if properly approached' and proposing that Britain should send a mission to Japan just as she had to other allied capitals which should take the form of a special commission led by a royal prince to present the emperor with a field-marshal's baton.19 In November Piggott pushed the idea again with the assistance of Major-general Neill Malcolm, whose brother Ian Malcolm, M.P., was Balfour's parliamentary privat secretary. It was brought to the notice of the foreign secretary and met with general, if cautious, approval.20 Balfour, who was in Paris for the allied meetings at the end of the month, took the opportunity to meet Piggott and discuss his proposals for increasing Japan's participation in the war, but no final line of approach was decided on. Piggott justified his proposal on the ground that the Japanese emperor had as much title 18

FO 371/2954 [232618], Greene to Balfour, 6 December 1917. Piggott, Broken thread, p. 96. Piggott, a language officer, had served in Japan on the military attache's staff for ten years and was one of Britain's Japan experts. 20 FO 800/210, 17 November 1917. 19

REVERSING THE FLOW, 1918

235

to a British field-marshal's baton as the king of Siam, the only foreign king to have received one. It was left that Piggott, while on leave in London, should discuss the proposition with Lords Milner and Reading.2! The foreign secretary, as one might expect, was sceptical about this gesture yielding any results and reiterated his view that it was 'extremely doubtful whether the Japanese will give military assistance outside the far east',22 but the subject was kept prominently before his attention. Lord Northcliffe, with his special responsibilities for the British image abroad, wrote that it was 'not too late to counter German propaganda in Japan'.23 On 6 December Piggott met Reading and argued that, since no mission had visited Tokyo, the Japanese might be feeling neglected and would be pleased with the compliment proposed. Milner, as the member of the war cabinet responsible for Russian and extra-European affairs, was also attentive. In the interview with him, Piggott pressed the suggestion that 'the gesture might synchronize with the opening of a New Year, which has a special significance in Japan'.24 Milner later showed some sympathy for a more understanding approach to Japan: I know there is a very strong prejudice against Japan among the Entente Powers. I think myself that a good case could be made on the other side on general grounds and that, if Japan has not done much for the Alliance, she has, on the other hand, not been very tactfully handled by it... When we came to examine in detail how and where she could help, we have always got ourselves bogged in 'doubts and dismays'. The only propositions we have put to her have been of the most unattractive character from her point of view.25

With these leaders converted, Britain moved quickly. On New Year's day, King George V in a personal telegram offered the Japanese emperor a field-marshal's baton. The Emperor Taisho accepted with gratification and, in turn, conferred the rank of Japanese field-marshal on the British king. Celebrations took place in army circles, marked by a strong emphasis on the Anglo-Japanese alliance as the key factor in Japan's foreign policy.26 Field-marshal Haig sent 21

Piggott, p. 96; Wiseman papers, 90/70, memo by Piggott, i December 1917. 22 FO 371/2955 [229961], hand-written note by Balfour, 3 December 1917. 23 FO 800/209, Northcliffe to Balfour, 13 December 1917. 24 Reading was on leave from his post as high commissioner to the United States and was consulted because of American reactions. Piggott, p. 97. 25 FO 800/203, Milner to Balfour, 18 January 1918. 26 M. D. Kennedy, Estrangement of Britain and Japan, Manchester, 1969, p. 18, Also Piggott, 'The army of Japan', Nineteenth Century and After, 84 (1918), 751-3.

236

REVERSING THE FLOW, 1918

congratulations on behalf of the British armies in France, while General Oshima Kenichi, Japan's war minister, offered good wishes to King George V. The euphoria soon passed when a new crisis of confidence came to the notice of the Foreign Office. Roland Morris, the American ambassador in Tokyo, disclosed to Greene conversations he had had with Home Minister Goto, who had said: 'that Japan had made a mistake in entering the war at Great Britain's invitation; that the latter was a "spent power" and could not now "crush" Germany;... that [Japan] was not strong enough to bring about cessation of war but that America could do this with Japan to back her'.27 There is nothing in Japanese official sources to suggest that this was more than a casual remark but Goto's papers confirm these were his views. Morris's report must have been accurate.28 This seemed to suggest that Japan was following a dual diplomacy because Motono appeared to be loyal to the allied cause. Balfour's reaction was that this conversation had taken place without the knowledge of the foreign minister and did not represent his views; but 'it gives one furiously to think'.29 Balfour had no idea that Goto's views reflected those of the cabinet better than Motono's various conversations did. When, as a result of further discussions, the American ambassador confirmed that there was in Japanese government circles *a growing distrust of England's staying qualities', London became more alarmed. Greene's view was that it was not German propaganda but rather the lack of up-to-date and reliable data on the war from the allied side that caused the trouble.3° So depressing was this news that the matter was discussed by the war cabinet on 22 February, when it was agreed to give Greene very full information which would enable him to counteract the impression that Britain was suffering from warweariness.31 Balfour duly provided an optimistic account of Britain's domestic and war situation for publicity purposes.32 That the views which Goto was expressing were not entirely his personal whim was suggested by other evidence. It appears that Terauchi, briefing a secret meeting of the general committee of the house of peers in February, said that he was convinced that the war would not end before autumn 1919 and that it would result in final 27

FO 371/3234 [7896], Greene to Balfour, u January 1918. 29 s Goto Shimpeiy iii, 883-8. FO 800/203, Balfour to Milner, 19 January 1918. 3 0 FO 371/3234 [33374], Greene to Balfour, 19 February 1918. 31 CAB 23/5/352(7), 22 February 1918. 32 FO 395/169 [88674], Balfour to Greene ,5 March 1918.

2

REVERSING THE FLOW, 1918

237

victory for Germany.33 His statements were based on reports from his representatives in European capitals. Since General Tanaka, the influential army leader, had made a speech in May 1917 in defence of an alliance with Germany, it seemed that there was a group associated with the Terauchi ministry who had lost faith in the allied cause. It was widely suggested that they were contemplating the possibility of a separate peace with Germany, but there is no evidence for this particular rumour in the Japanese archives. Admittedly, many of the memoranda of the period are extremely cautious, not to say pessimistic, in their estimates of the outcome of the European war. It was impossible to forecast when the war would end and what the balance of forces at the end of the war would be; Japan had therefore to be careful not to lose her opportunity of rapprochement with Germany; she must avoid giving offence to Germany in case it became necessary to do business with her at a later date.34 In March the old anti-British campaign which had been silent for most of Terauchi's ministry so far began afresh. The Yamato was again in the forefront with its doubts about allied victory.35 It is impossible to say whether this was pure coincidence or whether it reflected a change in government censorship arrangements. In sum, Japan was living up to her reputation as the shakiest ally.

SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENTS

Yet Goto's indiscretions were not the only cause of Anglo-Japanese suspicions in January. There were deep suspicions also arising from the chaos in Siberia caused by the November revolution in Russia. It is not relevant to the story of the alliance to give a narrative account of the complicated diplomacy which resulted. The alliance was not at stake,36 but, in so far as we are concerned with the ups and downs in relations between the two powers, we cannot wholly ignore the 33

FO 371/3819 [32927], Greene to Curzon, 21 January 1919. NGB T. 7/1, no. 578, e.g. pp. 854-5. The biographies of Gotd and Terauchi have little to say on these issues and it may be that wartime Britain was obsessed with these questions of loyalty and was too ready to exaggerate them. 35 New East, May 1918. 36 It is, however, true that Japan did consider whether she had obligations under the alliance to co-operate with Britain in Siberia. See the memorandum of the political affairs bureau, Japanese Foreign Ministry, i March 1918, in NGB T. 7/1, no. 473. 34

238

REVERSING THE FLOW, 1918

diplomacy over Siberia, which touched a sensitive spot in Japanese thinking and generated many cross-currents of opinion. ^ When the question of allied intervention in Siberia was raised in November and December 1917, the indications were that Japan wished to take part and, indeed, was eager to do so. Ambassador Greene had occasion in November to request Japan only to act in conjunction with the other allies. Yet, when Balfour proposed to Ambassador Chinda in London that an American force be sent to Vladivostok to guard the allied stores accumulated there, Chinda made it clear that Japan could not agree since, if the need for an expedition arose, it was for Japan alone to undertake it and from geographical considerations it was her natural right and duty.38 In Japan's view, Britain seemed to be bending too much towards American suspicions of Japan. On 30 December, Lord Robert Cecil told the Japanese ambassador that Britain was discussing the question of sending troops with the United States and was herself sending the cruiser Suffolk from Hong Kong to Vladivostok.39 This suggested to the Japanese that negotiations were taking place behind their backs and seemed to foreshadow a tendency for the powers to act alone. In order to beat Britain, Japan immediately sent a cruiser of her own to Vladivostok, which arrived two days ahead of the Suffolk.4® All these portents seemed to indicate Japan's enthusiasm for involvement. But Japan's apparent eagerness was illusory. At a meeting of the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs on 27 December, opinion was divided with the weight of opinion against intervention. These uncertainties leaked out. Cecil complained that the Japanese would not say what they intended to do, while Greene speculated that Japan would be 37 There are a host of excellent studies on this subject: J. A. White, The Siberian intervention, Princeton, 1950; J. W. Morley, The Japanese thrust into Siberia, i$i8 New York, 1957; C. Hosoya, Shiberiya shuppei, Tokyo, 1956; R. H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet relations, 1913-21-, 2 vols., Princeton, 1961 and 1968; J. Swettenham, Allied intervention in Russia, 1918-19: and the part played by Canada, London, 1967; J. Bradley, Allied intervention in Russia, ic)iy—20i London, 1968. The main Japanese material on the subject in Suiuso nikki, the diary of Ito Miyoji which gives an account of the deliberations of the Gaiko chosakai, is printed in Suiuso nikki, pp. 1-196. Official documents are in NGB T. 7/1, pp. 634-1027. 38 NGB T. 6/1, no. 569. 39 NGB T. 6/1, no. 585 40 Kato Kanji Taisho den, pp. 662-5; Japan's action was certainly anti-British in intention. The Japanese had been annoyed by the fact that Britain had consulted the United States in advance and had presented her decision to Japan as a fait accompli. The navy immediately took steps to send the Iwami and Asahi the following day. Kaigun senshi, ch. 5, Siberian intervention. NGB T. 6/1, no. 572.

REVERSING THE FLOW, 1918

239

opposed to any kind of joint military occupation of eastern Siberia: 'if Japan intervenes there, she desires to do so alone/41 In fact, the foreign minister was the most favourably disposed member of the cabinet and conveyed a false impression of its thinking. The war cabinet in London had the Siberian situation under daily review. On 18 January Lord Milner, whose special responsibility was Russian policy, wrote to the foreign secretary that, while the majority of the cabinet wanted to discourage isolated action by the Japanese, he felt otherwise: [Siberia] is a case where she is in a far better position to act than any of the rest of us, and where she quite evidently would like to act, if action becomes necessary... Why should we not encourage her at least to the extent of suggesting that, if allied intervention is necessary, it is Japan who should take action on behalf of the Allies? ... At the worst, this is making a virtue of necessity. If Bolshevikism becomes too rampant in that quarter, Japan certainly will intervene, whether the other Allies like it or n o t . . . The objection to her doing so is twofold (i) that Russia might resent it (2) that Japan would seize the opportunity to take undue advantage of her allies — I think too there is a certain advantage in getting Japan more deeply committed than she actually is in the world-struggle against Germany and German influences. There is always a certain danger, as it seems to me, as long as she remains only half in, of her gradually slipping out and even ultimately of her being 'got at' by the Germans.42 Balfour's reaction was to suggest that the difficulties were greater than Milner imagined: the Russians would resent a Japanese expedition and the Americans would be hotly opposed to Japan acting on her own. The Russian committee of the Foreign Office had already expressed the view that Japan should send a large force to occupy the whole length of the Siberian railway to the borders of European Russia; its 'fear is, not that Japan will go too far, but that, having comfortably settled down in Eastern Siberia, she will not go far enough'.4^ The proposal went to the cabinet who, despite Balfour's reservations, supported it, subject to American approval. The approach to Washington was unsuccessful and President Wilson, in a policy statement on i March, declined to ask Japan to act in Siberia. Nevertheless, the Entente 41

FO 371/3235 [58920], Greene to Balfour, 28 January 1918. Naval opinion was also divided: while most agreed to some form of intervention, some felt that Japan should not send forces without the prior agreement of the powers. Kaigun senshi, ch. 5. 42 FO 800/203 [Balfour], Milner to Balfour, 18 January 1918. 4 3 FO 800/203 [Balfour], Balfour to Milner, 19 January 1918.

240

REVERSING THE FLOW, 1918

powers, acting through Britain, formally invited Japan to occupy the eastern sector of the trans-Siberian railway, while suggesting that she might issue a declaration showing the purity of her motives. The cross-currents among Japanese statesmen now became apparent. Having like Goto and Terauchi lost confidence in the European Entente, Yamagata told the cabinet that Japan should not send an expedition unless America supported it. This view was endorsed by the Advisory Council at the insistence of Hara and Makino and was incorporated in replies to the powers on 19 March, but Foreign Minister Motono with the backing of the army general staff asked the prime minister for a full-scale review of the Siberian issue, now that the treaty of Brest-Litovsk had been signed between Germany and Russia. In a lengthy memorandum of 2 April, he recapitulated his arguments in favour of Japan sending an expeditionary force, describing it as an urgent necessity.44 Yet the powers that be rejected the demand for an early decision, and Motono, treating it as an issue of confidence, offered his resignation on 10 April. Two weeks later, the deputy premier, Goto, who was close to the Yamagata line over Siberia, was appointed in his place. As his biographer records, the appointment came as a bolt from the blue in the Foreign Ministry: it sounded like rushing waters to sleeping ears.45 The change of foreign minister was not welcomed in London. British officials had enjoyed cordial relations with Motono and believed that he was personally committed to the war effort and would prove to be co-operative over Siberian affairs. His resignation was a disappointment, but it was tempered by the knowledge that Motono was suffering from recurrent illnesses arising from an operation for cancer some four years earlier, so that his tenure at the Foreign Ministry would have been limited in any case. However, his replacement by Baron Got5 was regarded as 'the most unfortunate appointment which could have been made'.4^ Goto as home minister and deputy premier was widely recognized as the power behind the Terauchi cabinet. He was regularly referred to in Foreign Office papers as 'notorious' and was regarded as anti-British. A doctor by profession, he had gone for training to Germany; he spoke little or no English; and he had been a high colonial official in Taiwan and Manchuria. Moreover his wartime 44

45 NGB T. y/I, no. 514. Goto Shimpei, in, 811. FO 371/3237 [71781], Greene to Balfour, 23 April 1918, minute by MacLeay. See also FO 371/3237 [60566], Greene to Balfour, 4 April 1918. 46

REVERSING THE FLOW, 1918

241

activities had not endeared him to Britain: 'not only is [he] suspected of pro-German sympathies but [he] is known to shelter and encourage Indian seditionists [such as Rashbehari Bose] besides supporting PanAsiatic and chauvinist parties in Japan.'47 Although this was the British assessment, Japanese sources present Goto's attitudes and policies as all sweetness and light and provide no evidence of disloyalty to the allies. Yet there can be no doubt of his unpopularity abroad.48

BATON MISSION UNDER DISCUSSION

Even before this change took place, Britain had been discussing means for dealing with Japan's suspected deviation from the allied cause. One opening for this seemed to present itself in the military mission which, according to protocol, had to be sent to confer the fieldmarshal's baton on the Taisho emperor. This was a War Office responsibility, but the personnel of the mission was a matter for agreement within the war cabinet. Among the ministers who had to be consulted was Lord Beaverbrook, the press magnate, who had been appointed in February as minister of information with special responsibility for allied countries.49 He took up his new task with zest and soon formed the lowest opinion of the existing Foreign Office information department which had been trying to handle war propaganda without descending to the level of mere salesmanship for Britain. In particular, Beaverbrook was far from impressed with the amateur basis on which Britain was conducting her propaganda in Japan. His associate in the propaganda field, Lord Northcliffe, had already derived the impression that it was vital to send a distinguished mission to Japan to neutralize German activities and, when he heard that a military mission was about to be sent out, felt that it would provide a great opportunity.50 The two "new brooms' reacted to this opening with enthusiasm. Simultaneously, Beaverbrook addressed himself to the question of 'what steps could be taken to keep a satisfactory atmosphere in Japan' and, in 47

FO 371 3237 [71781], Greene to Balfour, 23 April 1918. Goto, iii, 820, states wrongly that allied governments were favourably disposed to him, especially the American ambassador, Roland Morris. 49 Beaverbrook, Men and power-, London, 1956, p. 267. 50 FO 371/3234 [44575], note by Cecil, n March 1918; Northcliffe, who refused to serve under Beaverbrook, was given parallel responsibilities for propaganda in enemy countries. R. Pound and G. Harmsworth, Northcliffe^ London, 1959, p. 652. 48

242

REVERSING THE FLOW, 1918

particular, what improvements could be made by his ministry in the organization of British information services there.51 Such interference was bound to lead to resentment in the Foreign Office. On 10 March Britain informed Japan that the mission would be led by General Sir Arthur Paget. The question was whether, as Beaverbrook strongly advocated, the military mission should be accompanied by a civilian mission 'to counteract German propaganda' in Japan. The Foreign Office objected that the Japanese would expect to conduct policy discussions with such a mission as had taken place on the earlier Ishii and Balfour missions to the United States in 1917 and it was not in Britain's interest to discuss China with Japan while the war lasted. Moreover, Balfour believed that the negotiations over Siberia were approaching such a delicate stage that he was reluctant to entrust them to any mission, however distinguished. It became one of the serious problems of the war cabinet to reconcile these conflicting views. At its meeting on 18 March it considered memoranda from Beaverbrook and Lord Robert Cecil (for the Foreign Office). It decided to ask the king to alter the arrangements by inviting either the duke of Connaught or Prince Arthur of Connaught to head the delegation and added that there should be a civilian side to it. By this compromise, it left the dispute unresolved, like so many war cabinet decisions. While Lord Derby as secretary for war, the minister ultimately responsible for the baton mission, had successfully argued that the mission was a formal one and propaganda had no place in it, the cabinet had agreed that the Ministry of Information should select minor officials who might be suitable as its members. Furthermore it left the Foreign Office to consult the ambassador in Tokyo about what would constitute 'the best kind of mission' and deferred its final decision until this had been received and Balfour had the opportunity to make his recommendations on it. The Japanese were accordingly informed on 20 March that the mission was being planned on a more elaborate basis.52 Balfour was assisted against Beaverbrook by three factors. First, the king, doubtless under the prompting of the War Office, intervened to announce that he was 'against the idea of introducing into the military mission either political or commercial members or Propaganda Agents'. He would not permit members of the royal family to head such a missi FO 395/169 [88674], Beaverbrook to Roderick Jones, 5 March 1918. 52 CAB 23/5/366 (10); NGB T. y/III, no. 79.

REVERSING THE FLOW, 1918

243

sion as had been proposed.53 Since the conferment of the title was a royal prerogative, it was difficult not to observe the sovereign's wishes. Secondly, the Japanese, in no small bewilderment over the purpose of the forthcoming baton mission, pointed out the danger that the despatch of a special mission under conditions of secrecy might give rise to inconvenient misunderstandings and encourage the speculation that Britain was trying to put pressure on Japan to move to western Siberia. Balfour assured Japan that Britain had no such political purpose.54 Thirdly, the Tokyo ambassador pointed out the danger of a political mission to Japan in present conditions: Japan would expect such a mission to lead to some declaration recognizing a Japanese Monroe Doctrine in China, as it was thought that the Ishii mission had extracted from the United States.55 Fortified by this, Balfour asked the king to reconsider whether he could not send Prince Arthur of Connaught to head a non-political mission which was Veil worth doing from an international and diplomatic point of view'.56 The king agreed to recall Prince Arthur from France for the purpose. Japan raised no objection to such a deputation. Despite an appeal by Balfour, Beaverbrook persisted in the proposal to send representatives of his ministry on the mission.57 Balfour, therefore, invited Lord Salisbury to act as the leading civilian member of the mission, stressing that he would not be expected to negotiate on any of the various questions pending between the two governments; his concern would be 'the higher diplomacy — the interchange of ideas in informal fashion with the leading Japanese statesmen, and the appreciation of their point of view'.58 However, Salisbury could not see any point in going to Tokyo without being in a position to talk about Siberia and declined. There were few prominent people who were likely to accept the figurehead position which was implied; and Balfour could think of appointing no one of less than Salisbury's distinction. He justified his position to Beaverbrook: 53

CAB 24/46 [4042], Stamfordham to Balfour, 21 March 1918. :23 Hughes concluded his protest with a puckish banzai. But this, taken with his more formal protest that Australia had not been consulted over the Pacific islands in connection with the secret agreement of 19 ly,24 forced the Foreign Office to re-examine its position in preparation for discussion by the war cabinet in November. Evidently Hughes gave some signs of wanting to renege on the Japanese undertaking, whether the London government did so or not.25 However, it was proved to the satisfaction of the Foreign Office that Australia and New Zealand had been fully consulted through the Colonial Office in 1917 and were no less pledged than the mother-country. So, after the armistice had been concluded, Lloyd George thought fit to raise the issue in cabinet on 21 November and to address Hughes with a celtic rhetoric which doubtless had its impact: It is clear that His Majesty's Government can neither now, nor at the Peace Conference, go back on this official assurance without committing a breach of faith of which no Australian Government would wish them to be guilty. I am confident that you will not assist the enemies of the Empire by exposing before the nations in council a difference of opinion on a point with regard to which Britain has obviously no selfish interest, and the honour of the two great Australasian Dominions is no less pledged than that of the Mother Country. Let me further point out that if successful objection were made from a foreign quarter to Japan retaining possession of the German Pacific Islands North of the Equator, it would probably be on the plea of 'no annexations' and would equally apply to our retention of islands South of the Equator.26

Australia could not fail to appreciate the sting in the tail. For our purposes, it is enough to report that, though a re-examination took place, Britain decided in advance to observe her wartime guarantees to support Japan at the peace conference over Shantung and the Pacific islands.27 Yet to the outside world the British government still reiterated its formal position that wartime territorial acquisitions could only be held pending the deliberations of a peace 23 FO 800/203 [Balfour], Hughes to Balfour, n September 1918. 24 Hughes made this allegation at a meeting of the war cabinet with the dominion prime ministers on 13 August 1918. CAB 23/7/457. « CAB 23/8/497, 5 November 1918. 26 FO 371/3236 [187840], Lloyd George to Hughes, 29 November 1918; CAB 23/8/505. 27 Balfour papers, Add. MSS 49699, note by Balfour, 'Thoughts on the German colonies', June 1918: 'Japan is indeed the heir of Germany in China and we promised to support her claims to the Pacific Islands north of the equator. So far we are committed/ Scott, Australia in the war, xi, 769-70.

2.6o

THE ALLIANCE AND THE END OF THE WAR

conference. Lloyd George, in his war aims speech in January 1918, had declared that captured territories were occupied 'at the disposal of a Conference whose decision must have primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants of such Colonies'. While this criterion applied to the Pacific islands, it did not apply to Shantung which in the mental reservation that the British cabinet made was not deemed to be a 'captured territory'. Unquestionably when it came to formulating war aims Japan was the most awkward member of the Entente, for she had revealed that her desire was to be compensated for her efforts in China, an allied, rather than an enemy, country. Doubts arose as to whether she was of the same stuff as the other partners in the Entente. Many felt that her action in China was imperialistic and was synonymous with territorial aggrandizement. But, if the British government believed this, it certainly did not say so; and the 'responsible press' maintained a charitable reserve in its reportage of Japan's wartime actions.2® On account of these various disappointments the alliance was in Britain's view at its nadir during the war years. Britain reluctantly tolerated Japan's actions in China and the Pacific because of her own impotence and because of her expectations of Japan's future contribution to the war. Whitehall generally underestimated such military efforts as 'our beloved eastern ally' did make: witness the remarks quoted from Jellicoe.29 Its officials seemed to forget that the alliance was a far eastern alliance and that Japan was not obliged to go to Britain's assistance except in certain circumstances which never actually arose. Japan did more than she was legally called upon to do. The foreign secretaries of the day seem to have recognized this: there was no question of denouncing the alliance during the war, and, when it seemed to be running out in 1921, advantages were discovered in it which had been ignored earlier. Britain's disappointment with the alliance during the war was real enough, but it was 'for internal consumption only'. E F F E C T S O F T H E A R M I S T I C E I N EAST A S I A

The war of 1914-18 was a world war and had its full impact on the far east. The greatest change was an indirect one, the changed status in the world of the United States, whose hostility to Japan was no 28 Jordan papers, 16, Jordan to Bryce, 25 February 1919.

29

See above, p. 203.

THE ALLIANCE AND THE END OF THE WAR

261

secret. It is true that her interventions on the far eastern scene had not revealed a clear-cut policy: in her attitude towards the Twenty-one Demands and the Lansing-Ishii note she had been less downright in her opposition to Japan and China than the general undertones of American feeling had suggested. Yet she had become a first-rate military-naval power in the last eighteen months of the war and was recognized as capable of vast expansion. Would her new power be exerted in the Pacific after the war? One British writer observed: * When the vast armies now in Europe are at liberty to act elsewhere there will be no difficulty in impressing upon Japan if necessary disapproval of her policy in Asia or of the advantage she has taken of the preoccupation of the Allies during the last four years.'30 But would this speculation materialize? Many Japanese thought so. Japan emerged from the war as third in the table of world powers; she had developed industrially and financially to an unprecedented degree during the war. Yet her security was still in question. She had observed America's military and naval developments, asking 'To what field will these military preparations be turned? It can only be the Pacific for the navy and the far east for the army. The area of great power conflict will surely move from the Atlantic to the Pacific.'31 By comparison, Britain like the European powers was regarded as being exhausted and no match for America. This was not the estimate of many hopeful British observers in the far east. For them, there had merely been 'a temporary eclipse of western influence which will pass away with the end of the European war'.32 Perhaps Britain could reassert her authority in the area with a great demonstration of her naval power. It was not to be. She tried to maintain her pre-war strength, but thoughts turned to the need for retrenchment and more Anglo-American co-operation in the area. What about the alliance in the new dawn of peace? The Foreign Office had its hands too full with Europe's needs to spare it a thought. At the end of the war Jiji Shimpo suggested that the time was ripe for an extension of the alliance, but Ambassador Greene, who had spoken sceptically of the alliance in 1917, again advised Whitehall that the proposed League of Nations will... create a new situation in regard to 30

Lothian papers, GD 40/17/31, Metcalfe to MacDonough, September 1918. Dr Soeda in Taiyo, 15 June 1918. Cf. Millard, Democracy and the eastern question, pp. 12-14, f°r the views of Dr Sawayanagi on the alliance (Taiyo, 28 January 1919). 32 Jordan papers, 16, Jordan to Langley, 29 May 1918. 31

262

THE ALLIANCE AND THE END OF THE WAR

the whole question of Alliances, and enable [Britain] to merge the AngloJapanese Alliance — which I venture to think has lived its day and done its great work — in such a League. This new solution would make it easy for us to give our old friend — the Alliance — a decent burial without hurting Japanese susceptibilities.33

Strange sentiments indeed from the diplomat, who, by the nature of his appointment, was the conservator of the alliance itself! Less strange that Sir John Jordan, his counterpart in Peking, wanted the alliance discarded bag and baggage: it had become meaningless amid the new concepts of world affairs that were emerging and the English language had to be abused in order to make sense of it.34 However, the peace conference would show that the new world would not be quite so new. For the war years the alliance changed its character. From being a diplomatic instrument imposing precisely defined obligations, it came to be regarded as a symbol. Often during the war when either partner wanted something, it appealed in terms of the alliance, even if it was not strictly relevant. When there was criticism of 'the present hollow friendship' in Tokyo or London, it was the alliance that was the focus of attack. In the vast anti-alliance literature of the day, the alliance became the symbol of deterioration in the state of Anglo-Japanese relations. It thus attracted mud-slinging which it did not deserve. 33 FO 371/3234 [206006], Greene to Cecil, 2 November 1918. See also above, pp. 219—21. 3 4 Jordan papers, 16, Jordan to Macleay, 3 June 1918. Jordan expresses the hope that 'we shall have no more of these artificial and unnatural Alliances resting on no community of interests or national ideals, and the time will, I hope, come when it will be no longer necessary to abuse our mother tongue in bolstering up arrangements of which we have had many specimens in Far Eastern diplomacy in my time*.

CHAPTER XV

The Alliance in the Year of the Peace-Making THE problems of the European settlement in 1919 were so absorbing for Britain that other aspects of international relations were gladly neglected. For areas which were only indirectly affected by peacemaking, the year following the armistice was a dull period for diplomacy. The far east was one such area. Of course, there were important east Asian issues which came before the Paris peace conference and these will be examined later in this chapter. But a subject like the AngloJapanese alliance which so many had said would call for urgent review as soon as the war ended was willingly ignored by Britain and Japan for a year while more pressing matters received attention. For the remaining years of the alliance there was — fortunately for its historians — relatively stable government in both the allied countries. In Britain the Lloyd George coalition cabinet continued in office from 1918 till 1922. In Japan Hara presided over the cabinet from September 1918 till his death by assassination in November 1921. Since Hara was not really a 'new man' as he is so often depicted, the two countries had to face the adjustments of the post-war world under the rule of *old men'. After the resounding victory of Lloyd George's coalition government in the general election of December 1918, the making of British foreign policy was in the hands of Lloyd George, Balfour and Curzon. Officially the foreign secretary continued to be Balfour as had been the case since 1916. Like Lloyd George, he was a thinker rather than a great administrator. For most of 1919 Balfour was in Paris, engrossed in the affairs of the peace settlement. In his absence Lord Curzon presided over the Foreign Office and in due course he succeeded Balfour after his resignation in October. He was a great administrator, industrious, punctilious over detail and a firm disciplinarian. His weakness arose 263

264

THE ALLIANCE IN THE YEAR OF THE PEACE-MAKING

from his personality and his experience as viceroy of India: his approach to diplomacy was magisterial, and to Asian countries paternalistic. His strength lay in the clarity of his thinking, his skill in presenting a case and his rhetorical powers.1 There was much interference in foreign policy-making by the prime minister himself. Partly this was inevitable in years of almost continuous international conferences which the premier himself had to attend; partly it was the legacy of Balfour who was inclined to let others encroach on Foreign Office preserves. Such at any rate was Curzon's view. Lloyd George's interventions in foreign affairs only affected the far east at one or two points in our story, but they did impose on the Foreign Office added administrative problems which were not reduced by the fact that the prime minister was, in Curzon's words, 'slapdash'. Moreover the prime minister's press department often poached on foreign news and by its disclosures impeded relations between the Foreign Office and the press.2 Nor was the Foreign Office working with full efficiency. For much of 1919, a large proportion of its officials was in Paris; and the London end operated on many issues as a postbox. It had been understaffed during the war and had to provide for many new posts afterwards. Until the reorganization of 1919 took effect, 3 a great deal of work had to be undertaken by a seriously stretched staff. In 1919 the far eastern department came under Sir John Tilley as part of his responsibilities as assistant under-secretary. One writer commented sardonically that Tilley's 'special recommendation was that he has never been in the Far East'.4 And Tilley in his self-effacing way might not have protested too much at that: he admitted that 'I laugh when I look at the Foreign Office list of 1919 and note the departments which professed to be under my supervision'.5 These criticisms are no reflection on the quality of work that was done or the advice that was given, but condi1

C. Hardinge, Old diplomacy', London, 1952, p. 275, speaks of Curzon's 'ineptitude in dealing with foreigners whom he could not understand*. Cf. H. Nicolson, Cur^on: the last phase, 1919-25, London, 1934, pp. 32-5. 2 FO 800/329, extract from a letter by Tyrrell, 10 December 1921. 3 FO 800/158, minute by Hardinge, 26 June 1920. Commenting on the suggestion that religious quotas should be adopted to make up for the 'absence of a middle stratum* of foreign service officials, he wrote: 'The composition of the staff of an Embassy on a religious basis would present very serious difficulties. We could not find Jews or Scotch Presbyterians to go round!' 4 Pearl, Morrison of'Peking, p. 389. 5 J. A. C. Tilley, London to Tokyo, London, 1942, p. 91.

THE ALLIANCE IN THE YEAR OF THE PEACE-MAKING 265

tions were not appropriate for the consideration of long-term policy until the German treaty was completed. In Japan foreign affairs were dominated by the personality of Hara Kei (Takashi) who was elected prime minister in September 1918. He was the first commoner prime minister and formed his cabinet of party politicians from his majority Seiyukai party. But he was not so much a believer in parties as a manipulator of parties in his own interest. Nor was his enthusiasm for democracy in Japan especially marked: in 1920 he was content with widening the franchise rather than allowing universal manhood suffrage. Hara was not the instinctive radical: he was afraid of the winds of change in post-war Japan. As foreign minister Hara chose Uchida Yasuya, who had like himself been the protege of Mutsu Munemitsu and was a seasoned diplomat.6 He had been foreign minister under Saionji (1911-12) and was a typical bureaucrat, efficient and hard-working, cordial but secretive, ambitious but a man of independent means. On one occasion when Uchida was criticized by Yamagata in conversation, Hara defended him stoutly. He was given the nickname of 'rubber doll', partly because of his facial features, partly because he had to be flexible and play to the tune of Hara who, with his energetic and out-reaching personality and with his experience on the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs (gaiko chosakai) from the start, often dabbled in diplomacy. Appointed at the age of fifty-four, Uchida had the misfortune to be foreign minister at a time when Japan was to lose many of her wartime gains, and this detracted from his reputation.? The making of foreign policy at this time entailed an elaborate search for consensus. It was firstly desirable for Hara to maintain good relations with Yamagata, the most important of the genro. Thus, on an average of about twice a month, detailed conversations on policy took place with the premier visiting Yamagata's home at Odawara or the trim figure of Yamagata in cloak or straw hat coming up to Tokyo. While the Siberian intervention lasted, the military too had a special say in policy-making, and it was essential for Hara to win over Yamagata and his Choshu protege, the war minister, General Tanaka Giichi. The third pressure under which Hara operated was the economic slump which started with the armistice and was not overcome until 6

M. Ikei, Uchida Yasuya, Tokyo, 1969. He was minister, Peking, 1901-6, Ambassador to Vienna, 1907-9, Washington, 1909-11, Petrograd, 1916-18. Acted as premier, 1921. 7 FO 410/74 [F. 675], Eliot to Curzon, 31 January 1923.

266

THE ALLIANCE IN THE YEAR OF THE PEACE-MAKING

1921. In the resulting conditions of unemployment and business collapse, it was essential to seek new overseas markets and develop that of the United States by retaining her goodwill. Perhaps unique among the wartime allies, Japan was not overcome with joy at the restoration of peace. As some like Tokutomi Soho observed, Japanese had been divided during the war between those of British and those of German persuasion and there were many who in 1919 would have welcomed an outcome more evenly balanced between the two. Certainly it would have suited Japan's national interest if the collapse of the central powers had not been so complete. The Japanese appear to have thought that, if they were to face future trouble, it was likely to come from 'the Anglo-Saxon bloc* and it did not bode well for them that 'the Anglo-Saxons* emerged as top-dogs in the year of the peace-making.8 P A R I S PEACE

CONFERENCE

The alliance was not at stake at the Paris peace conference, which opened in January 1919 and dominated the scene for six months. The discussions had little bearing on the alliance. The outcome did not directly affect the alliance. Yet the conference was a sticky time for Anglo-Japanese relations, especially because of the wartime undertakings which Britain had given to Japan. Moreover some of the discussions left a scar on their relations which could not quickly disappear. While, therefore, it is necessary to discuss the conference, it is legitimate to deal with only a limited number of the issues relating to the far east here. These are, first, the mandates for the German Pacific islands because this was an issue full of anxiety for the British dominions; secondly, the issue of racial equality because the alliance purported to depend on racial harmony; thirdly, the future of Shantung because this was central to stability in east Asia. These three issues have certain common features: they are all issues on which the United States, if not President Wilson himself in all respects, was anti-Japanese; and they all required Britain to attend to the voice of the dominions. The Japanese delegation at Paris was not as distinguished as those of the other allies. Since the conference was sufficiently delayed to allow someone to be sent from Japan, the role of chief negotiator fell to Makino Nobuaki (Shinken), the long-time ally of Hara on the gaiko 8

Oka Yoshitake, Tenkankl no Taisho, 1914-24^ Tokyo, 1969, p. 100.

THE ALLIANCE IN THE YEAR OF THE PEACE-MAKING

267

chosakai, who left Tokyo on 11 December. To add lustre to the delegation, Prince Saionji was later appointed as its head, but he did not set off until ii January and did not reach Paris until early in March. Much of the detailed negotiation was therefore left to the three ambassadors, Chinda from London, Matsui from Paris and Ijuin from Rome, but they had received detailed instructions, which had been thoroughly scrutinized by the Advisory Council and cabinet, and were kept on a tight rein from Tokyo. One might assume that the Japanese leaders were full of confidence, knowing that they had gilt-edged guarantees from three of the allies. Japanese sources, however, make it clear that they were by no means sure that the guarantees still held good. Not only did they consider the American attitude an uncertain quantity, but they also feared that Britain and France had given secret undertakings to China when she entered the war and that these might supersede the promises earlier made to Japan. Hence, at the instance of Goto, they urged that Japan get the allies to withdraw any conditions which had been arranged in connection with China's entry into the war.9 This was in fact an illusory fear since China had extracted no such guarantees. In the outcome, Lloyd George assured Makino in Paris that a promise was a promise and Britain would keep her promises of 1917 to Japan.10 Britain was not committed to supporting China at the peace conference so that the Japanese were being unnecessarily nervous. A more legitimate fear had been aroused by Britain's repeated statements in connection with the Pacific islands and Shantung that wartime conquests should be placed at the disposal of the peace conference. This meant that the British did not guarantee that the territories Japan desired would automatically go to her but only that Britain would support her claims. When the nature of the 1917 agreements was disclosed early in the Paris discussions, President Wilson's reaction was to brand them as private arrangements and to refuse to recognize them. Much depended therefore on the weight he would carry as the conference unfolded. In practice it proved difficult for him to argue against or outvote the powers who were already committed to Japan. GERMAN P A C I F I C ISLANDS The Japanese delegation's overall instructions were to maintain a 9 Goto papers, reel 47. 10 Makino papers, 348-

268

THE ALLIANCE IN THE YEAR OF THE PEACE-MAKING

close understanding with Britain and the other allied powers at all times and to act in concert with them in order to avoid anything which would injure Japan's interests. But to act in concert with Britain was more easily said than done.11 Let us turn first to the question of the German islands to the north of the equator, the surrender of which was one of Japan's basic demands. The first scheme put forward by the powers that had occupied these islands during the war — Japan, and (in the case of German islands to the south of the equator) Australia and New Zealand — was outright annexation by the occupier.12 However, Australia and New Zealand shared America's anxieties about Japan and were not prepared to support Japan in annexing and fortifying a chain of islands astride the west Pacific. The British empire delegation worked out a formula which substituted for annexation the allocation of these islands by way of mandate from the League of Nations. Japan accepted the broad lines of this solution early in February. It was later devised that C-class mandates would be granted for the Pacific islands and that they would be administered as 'integral portions' of the mandatory power's territories. The implications were that, since the islands were to be placed under the ultimate authority of the League, they could not be fortified and their strategic importance was reduced; since they were to become 'integral portions' of the mandatory's territory, they did not have to be subject to the 'open door' either for goods or men, which had previously operated in the area. The Japanese argued strongly for the open door to be applied in C-class mandates but in vain. While they tried to keep the same attitude as Britain, the Japanese were reluctant to agree to the British compromise plan as they wanted to preserve full sovereignty, but, faced with the opposition of all the other powers, they had to concede.13 It has to be admitted that, while this was a subject on which Britain and Japan might have expected to find common ground, the British formula for C-class mandates was a device against Japan. True, it was not until 6 May that President Wilson came round to allocating the 11 NGB T. 7/III, no. 538. Hara nikki, viii, 86. 12 The major studies on this are H. Duncan Hall, Mandates, dependencies and trusteeship, Washington, 1948, and 'The British Commonwealth and the founding of the League mandate system* in Bourne and Watt, Studies in international history, London 1967; S. P. Tillman, Anglo-American relations at the Paris Peace conference of 1919, Princeton, 1961; W. R. Louis, * Australia and the German colonies in the Pacific, 19141919', JMH -$% (1966), 407-21. 13 Makino papers, 348.

THE ALLIANCE IN THE YEAR OF THE PEACE-MAKING 269 territories to the powers that had occupied them during the war. But the earlier theoretical discussions of C-class mandates had been based on what proved to be an accurate estimate of the ultimate allocation. It brought to light again that the British dominions feared and distrusted the Japanese and that the home government had no hesitation in supporting them.14 By not pressing for complete annexation of the islands, the British dominions avoided the expense of building naval bases or military fortifications on them. RACIAL EQUALITY CLAUSE

Racial equality had been an unspoken problem of the Anglo-Japanese alliance since its beginning. Because the British dominions did not want large-scale immigration of Japanese, it suited both parties to sweep immigration and racial considerations associated with it under the carpet. The London government had no trouble of its own because it presided over a multi-racial empire; its problem was with its dominions. The first time that Japan had made a plea for racial problems to be considered internationally was in 1919. Much of the resultant rumpus had a considerable, if indirect, relevance for the avowedly multi-racial alliance. It was President Wilson's fourteen points which sparked off agitation on this subject in Japan. Many societies sprang up to advocate that the conference at Paris should be used for the abolition of racial discrimination and that the creation of the League of Nations would provide the opportunity for declaring the equality of the yellow race.15 This was widely supported in the press in what became a campaign for racial equality. The subject was discussed in the gaiko chosakai in November and December; and it was agreed to adopt it as one of Japan's demands. It had the advantage of being an issue on which Japan could make common cause with China. The instructions to the delegates were couched in cautious terms: 'If the League of Nations proposal seems to be taking practical shape, try to find a suitable means for guaranteeing racial equality.' In doing this it would first be necessary to approach Britain and the United States privately.16 Although n Cf. CAB 23/35/8. 26, 18 December 1920. Sutuso nikki) pp. 785-9, various clubs to Ito Miyoji, 7 December 1918. Hara nlkki^ viii, 86. ifi NGB T. 7/III, no. 538, pp. 677-8; Makino papers, 345. In NGB T. 7/III, no. 557, Makino doubted whether Japan's leaders were sufficiently informed about the proposed League. 15

27o

THE ALLIANCE IN THE YEAR OF THE PEACE-MAKING

the preliminary conversations proved to be abortive, the Japanese decided to go ahead regardless because a powerful nation-wide society for the removal of racial discrimination was organized in February and threatened to embarrass the government. It was on 13 February that Makino asked for provision to be made in the League covenant to eliminate causes of racial strife.17 After failing to get the amendment passed in the commission on the League, it was decided to take up the negotiations privately with the British 'colonies', but these approaches reached an impasse at the end of Marches In accordance with their government's instructions and against the warnings of the various delegates, the Japanese decided to discount the Australian attitude and proposed to the League commission on 11 April that the preamble should recognize 'the principle of equality of nations and of just treatment of their nationals'. The word 'race' was studiously avoided. The Japanese delegates were under orders to place the issue on record but decided to insist on a vote being taken; and eleven out of seventeen delegates favoured inserting the clause. But Wilson ruled from the chair that a resolution on a matter of principle required a unanimous vote and the resolution was lost. Chinda had said during the debate that certain Japanese felt that Japan should not enter the League unless she was satisfied over the racial issue. This, however, was a mild blackmail, and, when it came to the plenary session on 28 April, Makino did not press the matter, promising instead to raise it with the League after its establishment. Was Japan's insistence on the racial equality clause merely a bargaining counter which she was prepared to yield for the sake of success elsewhere? Certainly, when the moment of choice came at the end of April, the Japanese delegates held out for their demands over Kiaochow rather than the more intangible principle of racial equality. They 17 M. Ikei, 'Pari heiwa kaigi to jinshu sabetsu teppai mondai', NGK, 3/4 (1962), 44-58. is Makino and Chinda visited Hughes on 14 March and had a lengthy and abortive exchange of views. Hughes avoided further meetings on the pretext of journeys or illnesses. On 21 March the Japanese offered a new draft, but Hughes replied that he could not agree because of the immigration issue, threatening that, if anything were passed by the commission, he would appeal to the full conference. On 25 March, at Lord Robert Cecil's suggestion, Makino and Chinda met all the empire representatives. After two hours' discussion, Borden drew up a compromise formula, with which Hughes again disagreed. On 30 March, when the Japanese modified their formula for the preamble, Smuts and Borden again acted in a mediatory capacity, but Hughes, who at one point seemed inclined to accept, ultimately required that the right of immigration should be excluded by express wording. Saionji in his report on the Paris conference (27 August 1919) laid the blame squarely on the British dominions (Suiuso nikki, p. 692).

THE ALLIANCE IN THE YEAR OF THE PEACE-MAKING

271

accepted a defeat in order to ensure victory on the other score. This would be in character for the Japanese who have not tended to fight for abstract principles. Yet the racial issue was much more than a bargaining-counter to be surrendered gladly: it was a genuine conviction, honestly held. Informed by the delegates of the possibility of failure, Kara recorded his view that 'there was no prospect of this draft being approved in accordance with our proposals; but it is not a subject which merits withdrawal from the League of Nations; even though we have not attained the desired result, it is satisfactory that we could maintain the present position'.19 Having fought the battle and lost, there was no point in refusing in pique to enter the League, which was in any case a significant honour for Japan. In short, the racial equality issue was always held to be a secondary demand rather than a primary one and was put forward as something of a forlorn hope. Yet the government was under considerable domestic pressure from the press, the opposition parties and a mushroom growth of new societies which had arisen in the idealistic atmosphere which followed the fourteen points. The hold of the government was a precarious one and it decided to include this issue in the mandate rather against its better judgment. By March the forty-first Diet was out of the way. The issue had been pressed by the Japanese delegates to the limits but firmly resisted by the powers. The moment was therefore opportune for a graceful retreat. Even if Japan was reconciled to this failure, the controversy it generated did have its long-term effect on Anglo-Japanese relations. Britain did not come out unscathed. That she had not attempted to discipline her dominions or lay down a common policy for them came as a staggering revelation to the Japanese. It gave them a foretaste of the new post-war standing of the dominions. Japan drew the conclusion that she could not trust Australia. Baron Katd was not perhaps atypical when he spoke of W. M. Hughes, who was a politician scarcely comprehensible to the Japanese, as a peasant, intending it as a term of opprobrium.20 When the alliance came up for discussion in the years that followed, Japan assumed — wrongly as it happened — that Australia would be at the centre of the opposition to it, stirring up hostility in imperial councils. The Japanese may have yielded with dignity over racial equality, but the lessons of their defeat persisted in their thinking in the future. 19

Hara nikki, viii, 30 March 1919.

20

Young, Taisho Tenno, p. 222.

272

THE ALLIANCE IN THE YEAR OF THE PEACE-MAKING TSINGTAO AND SHANTUNG

While the racial equality issue was being decided against Japan, the conference turned to the future of Tsingtao, over which Japan demanded that Germany should transfer the lease to her without compensation. Although this was Tokyo's basic requirement, the Japanese in Paris were aware that world opinion was very unfavourable towards this demand.21 Among the negotiators the British were probably most favourable. On 15 April Wilson had a lengthy discussion about SinoJapanese problems with Balfour who argued that, since the question of Tsingtao was 'regarded by Japanese public opinion as a point of honour', it would be very difficult for them to yield on it and Britain was bound by her pledge to support them.22 On 21 April the Japanese foreign minister informed his delegation that, if Japan's demands over Shantung were not met, they should defer signing the League covenant.23 It was probably due to one of the early initiatives of the young Matsuoka Yosuke, the controversial foreign minister of the early 19403, that this was disclosed to the press in Paris. Since the covenant would be gravely prejudiced if Japan like Italy withdrew from the conference, the matter was taken up urgently by the Council of Three which heard statements from Makino and the Chinese.24 It was generally conceded that the Sino-Japanese treaties of 1915 and 1918 could not be abrogated by the conference. Points of detail were referred to an expert committee25 which reported without delay that, while either course contained serious drawbacks for China, it was to her advantage to accept Japan's succession to German rights as defined in the SinoGerman agreement of 1898 rather than accept the position created by the treaties of 1915 and 1918.26 This report was discussed by the Council of Three on 24 April when it was decided to ask Balfour to talk the matter over with the Japanese with a view to working out terms on which Japan would ultimately hand Tsingtao back to China.2? Balfour met Chinda and Makino and reported that the Japanese 21 Horikawa, p. 248, quoting a memorandum by Matsuoka who accompanied Makino to Paris. 22 Lothian papers GD 40/17/55, Drummond to Kerr, 15 April 1919; FO 800/329, Drummond to Clerk, 17 April 1919; Balfour papers, Add. MSS. 49699, note by Balfour, 16 April 1919; Mantoux, p. 197. 24 23 NGNJ3, i, Bunsho, 480 NGNB, i, Bunsho, 480-2. 25 Consisting of J. Gout (France), E. T. Williams (U.S.A.), R. Macleay (Britain). 2 Lothian papers, GD 40/17/74, report of experts, 24 April 1919. 27 Lothian papers GD 40/17/74, Hankey to Balfour, 21 April 1919; Lloyd George to Balfour, 26 April 1919.

THE ALLIANCE IN THE YEAR OF THE PEACE-MAKING

273

expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the intention of Japan to surrender every privilege in the peninsula which involved an interference with Chinese sovereignty; and they maintained the view that this surrender was consistent with, and, indeed, was contemplated by, their treaties with China of 1915 and 1918 ... It soon became evident that, while an agreement could be reached as to the policy which ought to be embodied in the peace negotiations and pursued in the future, no agreement was possible with regard to the policy which had been pursued in the past. Nor did this seem necessary. It was only the future which concerned us.

On this basis was devised a formula whereby the Japanese undertook 'to hand back the Shantung Peninsula in full sovereignty of China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao'.28 The matter was discussed again by the council of prime ministers on 29 and 30 April when it was agreed that German rights in China should, on this understanding, be restored under the peace treaty, not to China but to Japan. The Japanese delegation reported to Tokyo that the meeting had agreed to its demands. Only in a restricted sense was this true for the conference did not recognize the treaties of 1915 and 1918 as the Japanese positively wanted. At the same time it did not invalidate the treaties as the Chinese wanted. It merely disregarded them and substituted a new formula based on Japan's self-abnegation, which was worked out privately with the Japanese delegates. Yet Japan was not committed to a time by which the territory had to be handed back.2^ Was this merely a paper decision? Much depended on its acceptance by the Tokyo authorities and on publicity being given to it. On 5 May Makino, with the authority of his government, issued the terms of the Balfour formula to the Paris press. On 17 May Uchida in Tokyo published a lengthy press statement in which he endorsed and defined the points which Makino had made on Shantung. This explained Japan's undertakings as she herself saw them, but there were obscurities and deliberate evasions. It failed to please the Chinese which led to their government's refusal to sign the Versailles treaty and to antiforeign disturbances and boycott movements in Chinese ports. Balfour, who considered the Chinese to be ungrateful, took the view that China 28 DBFP I (vi), p. 565; Balfour papers, Add. MSS. 49751, note by Balfour, 27 April 1919. 29 No mention is made of this arrangement in Saionji's report on the Paris conference, Suiuso nikki) p. 692.

274

THE ALLIANCE IN THE YEAR OF THE PEACE-MAKING

"by the efforts of Japan and her allies, without the expenditure of a single shilling or the loss of a single life, had restored to her rights which she could never have recovered for herself from Germany.30 But this judgment was based on the assumption that Japan would willingly return the territory to China before long. The Americans were sceptical of this; even France and Britain had their doubts. Like Clemenceau, Lloyd George honoured the much-vaunted guarantee of 1917 to Japan to support her at the peace conference. This made things awkward for Wilson. Yet it is hard to see how, even if the British and French had gone back on their wartime promises, the solution would have been any different. Japan was in a dominating bargaining position; and her blackmail, if it had materialized, would have harmed the League. C O N F E R E N C E A F T E R M A T H I N EAST ASIA

The conditions under which Japan had agreed to retrocede Kiaochow to China were included in a note handed to the Chinese delegation on behalf of the Council of Four. The object of the allies was to get Japan to publish these undertakings. But the government was reluctant to do so on the ground that it would be humiliating before public opinion. The other powers, therefore, considered among themselves whether they were not entitled to make the conditions public. Balfour certainly thought that Britain had the right to do so.31 There was general agreement that the Japanese assurances were satisfactory 'if properly and promptly executed' but 'the question is how far the Japanese will prove true to their word and here experience of the past regarding Japanese policy in Manchuria makes it difficult not to feel some suspicions as to their real intentions in Shantung'.32 In the circumstances it was not surprising that the acting foreign secretary, Lord Curzon, was anxious from the signature of the Versailles treaty on 28 June onwards to discuss China policy with the Japanese ambassador — . treat which Chinda was all too ready to defer.33 In the first of their conversations on 18 July, Curzon told Chinda that he could not regard the wartime agreements of 1915 and 1918 as 30 DBFP, I (vi), p. 565. 3i DBFP, I (vi), no. 427. Lothian papers, GD 40/17/74, memo by Kerr, undated. 33 That a new line of policy was being worked out is suggested by Curzon's minute of 22 June: 'Before we settle when to discuss with either Japan or China, let us be clear what to discuss* (FO 371/3694 [90722]). 32

THE ALLIANCE IN THE YEAR OF THE PEACE-MAKING 275

'possessing any great validity'. This implied that Britain had honoured her obligation at Paris but did not really believe in the treaties. Curzon was annoyed that Japan's declaration at Paris 'which was to a large extent a justification of the action taken by the Powers, had never been published to the world'. He urged Japan to make the announcement speedily or she would find herself in isolation.34 On 2 August Foreign Minister Uchida made his long-awaited statement about Shantung: Japan's policy was to hand back Shantung peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and, upon an arrangement being reached with China, Japanese troops would be completely withdrawn.^ From Britain's point of view, the gravest shortcoming in the statement was that it once again set no time-limit for troop withdrawal, hinting only that steps would be taken after the Versailles treaty was ratified. While Japan ratified that treaty on 30 October, the promised negotiations showed no sign of beginning. Curzon asked for further elucidation and concessions in an interview with Chinda on 9 August, which set out Britain's disappointment on the lines that America had earlier done.36 In this series of interviews, Curzon was evidently trying to induce Japan to liberalize her post-war policies towards China. Reports on them were studied at successive meetings of the gaiko chosakai. That they were resented goes without saying; but they had some influence.37 Britain and America had offered a common front against Japan's policy in China and had called in question the validity of Japan's wartime treaties, which was the essence of her case in China.38 It only remains to look a little into the future and record that on 34 DBFP, I (vi), no. 429. Also nos. 436, 464. There is some evidence that the State Department acted similarly, see Polk papers 77/45, note by Polk, 18 July 1919: *In accordance with the President's instructions, I told Mr Debuchi that it was our understanding that the agreement reached in Paris superseded the 1915 and 1918 agreements insofar as Shantung was concerned/ Suiuso nikki, pp. 583-6. 35 NGNB, i, 235; DBFP, I (vi), no. 460; The Times, 6 August 1919. 36 DBFP, I (vi), nos. 464 and 484. 37 Suiuso nikki, p. 678, meeting of 9 September 1919. Curzon later described these exchanges as 'my heated discussions with Viscount Chinda' (DBFP^ I (xiv), pp. 406—7). 38 Details of the Curzon-Chinda exchanges were transmitted to the State Department; this seems to suggest that this pressure on Japan was part of a concerted policy. Suiuso nikki, p. 5741!. The Foreign Office hoped that the exchanges had 'done much to clear the air, and it is now up to the Japanese to take the next step and to shew whether they intend to defy Europe and America' (FO 371/3817 [118979], minutes on Alston to Curzon, 18 July 1919).

276

THE ALLIANCE IN THE YEAR OF THE PEACE-MAKING

24 January 1920 Japan made an overture to China over Shantung. The Chinese, naturally heartened by the American withdrawal from the peace settlement, left a generous margin before sending their reply on 22 May: they had not signed the German treaty and were 'not therefore in a position to negotiate directly with Japan' over Tsingtao.39 Attempts were made to break the stalemate right down to the Washington conference; but it suited the Chinese to let the anti-Japanese boycotts continue and trust to the intervention of the United States in their favour. It is against this background of unremitting Sino-Japanese tension that the re-thinking of the alliance was to take place. It is possible to write of the Japanese coming out of the peace conference with gains on all points of substance. This may well pass if one takes the narrow view that the settlement ended with the signing of the Versailles treaty. But, as soon as it was signed, Britain and the United States each made an important volte-face and called in question Japan's continental policies. It certainly took much of the gilt off the Versailles ginger-bread so far as Japan was concerned. Not of course that Britain and the United States were speaking with one voice: Britain had no wish to reopen the Versailles clauses on the far east, whereas the Americans were soon to be absolved from any commitment to the settlement. Yet to many Japanese these Anglo-American efforts represented a concerted attempt to interfere with affairs in their own sphere of influence. They condemned the peace settlement as the 'pax Anglo-Americana' because they felt the two powers were determined to collaborate against Japan. Certainly over Japan's three prime demands, Tsingtao, the Pacific islands and racial equality, Britain and Japan had been at odds, and on each of the issues the difference of view had been fundamental, though not intractable. & China year book, 1921-2, pp. 717-18.

CHAPTER XVI

Brave New World in East Asia? B R I T A I N ' S post-war dilemma in east Asia was well described in the words of Sir John Tilley, an assistant under-secretary at the Foreign Office. He wrote in December 1919 that 'Owing to Japan and the United States being apparently irreconcilable, it is very difficult for us to work a policy in the Far East conjointly with both of them, while it is essential for us, owing to our naval weakness in the Pacific, to have a friendly Japan.'1 In other words, the vulnerability of British possessions in the Pacific and the needs of defence in India and China made it necessary for Britain to keep on friendly terms with Japan, while, because of her financial and other weakness, she needed American goodwill. Was she to mediate between the two and keep them apart? Or was she to declare herself for one or the other? These were large, and by no means straightforward, questions. It took time for the issues to crystallize in the post-war period. Although peace had been restored in east Asia, it is questionable whether stability had been restored. There was little stability in China or Siberia. Moreover there was little stability in the American-Japanese-British relationship which had been an important factor in the area since 1908. It is necessary in this chapter to examine the response of the three powers to the issues which were thrown up as men waited to see if a brave new world would emerge in east Asia. It was natural that Britain should not wish to continue after the war the pusillanimous policy towards Japan which she had followed inevitably during the war years. Japan had then expanded far and wide, territorially and commercially, and the British government had observed the process in silence but with the determination to stage a comeback. Moreover the British public was not fully aware of the extent of Japan's actions because of the wartime reticence of the British press, where 'not a word reflecting upon Japanese action i DBFP91 (vi), no. 617.

277

278

BRAVE NEW WORLD IN EAST ASIA?

[in China] has been allowed to appear'.2 It was hardly likely that such restraint would continue to be observed. On the narrower issue of the peacetime future of the alliance, there was considerable public anxiety that because of it Britain's name was associated with Japan's actions, which came to be viewed in a less favourable light with the return of peace. Nor did it salve the liberal conscience that many of these actions violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the alliance. It was only to be expected therefore that under a more forceful foreign secretary like Curzon Britain would take up a more critical posture. The British archives for the three post-war years abound in carping complaints from Britain to Japan and 'frank exchanges of views'.3 There was an underlying rivalry in trade. Although this does not much feature in the diplomatic records, British merchants were making a determined effort to recapture markets in China and the rest of Asia where Japan had become predominant during the war. But Hara was also committed to a policy of commercial expansion so the allies seemed to be set on a collision course. Britain was anxious to counteract Japan's 'policy of peaceful penetration, especially in the field of finance'.4 When the first signs of post-war slump appeared in Japan, Britain looked on at Japan's economic distress without too many tears and with a sure eye to her national interest. Take, for example, the remark of a Whitehall official: 'The slump together with labour troubles, a new problem for Japan, should do much to weaken Japanese competition and favour our reentry into Far Eastern markets.'5 From January 1919 political relations have to be seen in the light of acute commercial competition. The entry of the United States into the European war had suggested to many in Britain that she might be able to collaborate with the Americans in east Asia. Britain was a highly over-stretched power and had lost ground during the war to the peripheral powers like America and Japan. There were those like Leopold Amery who scouted the idea that Britain should work with both and sponsor a post-war settlement on the basis of a world-wide Monroe doctrine, with 2

Jordan papers, 16, Jordan to Bryce, 25 February 1919. On such subjects as the repressive measures used against Koreans since the Mansei riots in 1919, unfair commercial practices used against British merchants in Shantung, and supposed Japanese interference in the Anglo-Chinese negotiations on Tibet. 4 DBFP, I (xiv), no. 40. 5 FO 371/3819 [52781], minute by P. W. M. Ramsay on Greene to Curzon, 27 January 1919. 3

BRAVE NEW WORLD IN EAST ASIA?

279

Japan exercising these rights for the far east. There were also many who wanted to turn their backs on Japan and concentrate on the United States. Britain was economically and financially dependent upon the United States and hoped that their wartime goodwill would continue. To cement a special relationship she had sent Lord Grey of Fallodon (the former Sir Edward Grey) as ambassador to Washington in August 1919.6 However, Britain was more keen for compromise than was America, where the Irish question riled some sections of opinion and naval rivalry antagonized others. So relations were cool and, with Wilson a sick man, there was not scope for the rapprochement which Britain sought. Hopes were badly dashed when the senate refused to ratify the Versailles treaty and the League covenant in March 1920. This left British statesmen in a mood of disillusion about the unpredictability of Anglo-American co-operation. Already at the end of December Grey had resigned, feeling that his mission had failed. The fact that general co-operation could not be achieved did not of course exclude co-operation in particular areas. Could the two powers act conjointly in east Asia, where it was agreed that their policies had much in common? Several proposals were put forward in 1920 in the hope of overcoming some of America's distrust of Britain.? The Tokyo government was not unaware of these trends in Britain's post-war policy. It accepted that Britain was bound to reassert her interests, to be critical of Japan and to veer towards the United States. These were regarded as inescapable ripples in a necessarily changing pool. While Japan was conscious of the strength with which she emerged from the war, she was conscious also of the danger of isolation if she antagonized her wartime allies.8 She was content to fit into the framework of the League of Nations and there was not much hostility among policy-making groups to the British alliance, which continued to be fundamental to Japan's policy.9 On the other hand, there was a serious concern that Britain was siding with the United States in an anti-Japanese policy in China in 1919 and 1920. There were influential voices raised against the new financial consortium for China whose 6

DBFP, I (v), pp. 980-1065, on Grey's mission. For Britain's underlying purpose, see e.g. Drummond to Balfour, 23 January 1919 (Lothian papers, 40/17/55). 7 N. Meanay, *The British empire in the American rejection of the treaty of Versailles', A.J. Pol. Hist., 9 (1963), 213-34. 8 Oka, Tenkanki no Taisho, p. lyoff., summarizes the Japanese government's views admirably. 9 Kuroha, Nichi-Ei domei no kenkyu, pp. 606-7.

280

BRAVE NEW WORLD IN EAST ASIA?

terms were approved, despite Japan's dissatisfaction, in October 1920 and the Pax Anglo-Americana which seemed to underlie it. In a strange way, however, the blame came to be attributed to the Americans rather than the British.™ How was Japan to act towards the United States? A leading Japanese authority, Mitani Taichiro, sees the immediate post-war period under Hara as one of transition: the Hara cabinet took as its object a change to a conciliatory approach towards the United States and a change in policy towards China and aimed at integrating these two considerations in the formulation of its foreign policy.11 It was by no means easy for Hara, who had travelled in America in 1908 and had great respect for her potentialities, to improve relations as he wished. So bitter had relations become in every sector — China, Manchuria, Siberia, the Pacific — that it was difficult even to make overtures. Moreover, the British alliance which aroused such fierce antagonism in American public opinion was a deterrent to effective discussions.12 The nub of the matter was China. Hara saw that if he was to make headway with the Americans, he would have to curb Japan's ambitions there. To do this was to run in the face of strong feelings in Japan herself. At the one extreme there were the nationalists and the military who felt that Japan had the right to a major say in China and a claim to leadership, and even supremacy, in east Asia. At the other, there were those who were opposed to giving up territories which Japan had acquired by the war and been allocated by the peace settlement. When Japan was faced in China with suspicion, resentment and an effective boycott of Japanese goods, the difficulty of Hara's position was clear. The new Chinese nationalist movement which flared up in the summer of 1919 was supported by the United States. The Hara cabinet therefore restrained its forward policy, while keeping concessions to the minimum. Meanwhile it inaugurated the policy of peaceful economic expansion which was to be Japan's objective for most of the 19205. The prolonged 10

Polk papers 77/42, Long to Polk, 17 April 1919: 'There are a great deal of antiAmerican expressions, whether it be propaganda or not, in the Japanese press. There is a great deal of anti-Japanese tone in our press. If it goes on as it is, there will be trouble ahead.' 11 H. Shinohara and T. Mitani, Kindai Nikon no seiji shido, p. 345. See also Hara nikki, viii, 25 August 1919 in which Hara was told by Saionji that Japan's most urgent task was to secure some accommodation with the United States and Clemenceau had promised to exert France's good offices to that end. 12 For talk of American-Japanese war see DBFP, I (vi), no. 773.

BRAVE NEW WORLD IN EAST ASIA?

281

slump of 1920 made this a matter of urgency. Hara's first aim was to build up Japanese markets in the United States and to that end he sought to maintain the best possible diplomatic relations. But Japanese companies were also anxious to consolidate their position in China and especially Manchuria. This could only be done at the risk of hostility from the Chinese and the Americans. But the Japanese hoped that a via media could be found. Thus Hara was always saying in his conversations that for Japan to maintain her unique position in Asia should not conflict with her desire for co-operation with the United States.13 In short, he hoped to get the best of both worlds. So far as the third power, the United States, was concerned, she was in a happily strong position. Britain and Japan were both petitioners for her favour. Moreover, like Japan she emerged from the war without being overstretched, and by her decision not to associate herself with the peace settlement she was able to dodge the all-consuming problems of Europe in 1920 and 1921. It was with this untrammelled vision that she could concentrate on the threat of Japan in the west Pacific and the parlous state of China in the throes of civil war. It was not that the Wilson administration or the Republican administration in 1921 seriously entertained thoughts of war with Japan, but there was an unending succession of disagreements over Siberia, Manchuria and Shantung which many interpreted as portents of an eventual war. American opinion had developed a neurosis towards the AngloJapanese alliance. With grounds for suspicion of the two partners individually, the Americans were doubly suspicious of the objects of the partnership. They were inclined to blame all the failures of American far eastern diplomacy upon it, from the railway neutralization scheme of 1909 to the treatment of Shantung at Paris. They were convinced that the alliance was hostile to their own interests and refused to accept the allies' protestations of innocence. They pointed out with some justification that the alliance had of late conferred considerable benefits on Japan. Any time in the post-war period a broad section of American opinion would have been in favour of using its influence to bring the alliance to an end. The American government was not so ill-informed or so incautious in its statements as the ordinary run of politicians and journalists;14 but it shared their distrust of the alliance and was content to be carried forward by the popular mood. 13 14

Hara nikki, viii, p. 250, 19 June 1919. Davis papers, 19, Davis to Lee of Fareham, 6 July 1921: 'There is more feeling

282

BRAVE NEW W O R L D IN EAST ASIA? NAVAL RIVALRY

One factor which contributed to the tension between the three Pacific powers was their naval rivalry. The defeat of the German fleet left the Royal Navy ascendant in European waters but it still found difficulty in coping with the defence needs of the British empire. There was a tendency for the focus of naval attention to move from the Atlantic to the Pacific where Japan and the United States were building up their squadrons as a threat to each other. If the various fleets had been reinforced on the scale they were planning, a war could not have been ruled out. But there was an element of illusion in the war scare which developed, because the naval building programmes announced in these years did not have the approval of public opinion in the three countries. The new element in the Pacific was the increase in the naval strength of the United States. After the battle of Jutland in 1916, the American government had embarked on a new programme which provided for the building of sixteen new capital ships, but for the duration of the war her heavy building was concentrated on destroyers to combat the submarine menace. The end of the war saw some battleships under construction and a powerful naval lobby which was calling for an American navy second to none. A fresh three years' programme was presented in December 1919, after many shifts in Wilson's policy, but even its more modest proposals failed to meet with Congress approval. It was generally accepted that the United States had the industrial capacity and the funds to build against both Japan and Britain if she so chose. The building programmes created a scare in Japan where it was assumed that they were intended for use in the Pacific. The Japanese were further disturbed by the Pacific fleet which was established in the summer of 1919 and threatened to become almost as powerful as the Japanese navy itself.15 Japan continued to take counter-action against American naval expansion. While the Japanese army treated Russia as the power against which it had to arm, the navy had, since 1907 and especially [among Americans] on the subject of the Japanese treaty than I had imagined, and a very general misunderstanding as to its present scope and bearing. I was surprised the other day to find one of the most intelligent men of my acquaintance wholly ignorant of the fact that it contained any clause which would eliminate a quarrel between Japan and America from its provisions.' 15 For fuller discussion see S. W. Roskill, Naval policy between the wars, i, The period of Anglo-American antagonism, 1919-29, London, 1968,212-13; H. and M. Sprout, Towards a new order of sea power: American naval policy and the world scene, 1918—22? passim.

BRAVE NEW WORLD IN EAST ASIA?

283

since the defence review of 1918, taken it to be the United States. At the outbreak of the world war, Japan had had a large navy with a large proportion of old or obsolescent vessels. It was easier during the war for the naval authorities to gain acceptance for their plans, though the long-term objective for naval building of an eight-eight fleet, that is, a fleet of eight battleships and eight cruisers, had originally been devised as long ago as 1907. It had been endorsed by the Okuma government in 1914; but, since the absence of funds prevented its fulfilment, the navy had to content itself with an eight-four plan approved in 1917 and an amended eight-six plan, adopted by the Diet in the following year.1 $ With the resources voted, she built battle-cruisers of the superDreadnought type. In October 1918, the navy minister, Admiral Kato Tomosaburo, presented with the endorsement of the Defence Committee the full eight-eight plan, the idea being that the new fleet would be ready by 1928 and the existing fleet would be converted into a second-line fleet. It had to be a ten-year project because Japan was still comparatively poor in naval building facilities and had not the capital for a crash building programme. After many vicissitudes in the cabinet, it received approval in October of the next year. The Hara government approached the Diet in December for the allocation of 100 million yen for military expenditure, including the eight-eight fleet. But the proposal lapsed because the Diet was dissolved in February 1920 on account of its intransigent attitude on the Universal Suffrage Bill, After the general election in May, the Diet reassembled in special session; and Admiral Kato presented his new proposals for the eighteight fleet which were eventually approved on 7 July 1920.^ Already in May the Mutsu, the world's largest battleship, had been launched in Yokosuka, a symbol of Japan's new shipbuilding skills. Not that this gradual naval expansion went without protest. There was considerable feeling among politicians that the budget, a large proportion of which in 1921 went on naval expenditure, was more than Japan could afford and that means for checking armament expenditure should be sought. Despite the fact that Japan's economy was suffering from a post-war recession, the criticisms of this increased naval expenditure were very weak. This reflected the gloomy view that the Japanese took of the international situation.1^ Certainly the finance 16 17 18

Yamamoto to kaigun, pp. 409—10; TSM, i, 8 and 18. Yamamoto to kaigun, pp. 409-11; DBFP, I (vi), no. 774. Oka, Tenkanki no Taisho, p. 170; Yanaga, p. 399.

284

BRAVE NEW WORLD IN EAST ASIA?

minister, Takahashi, complained bitterly and may have caused the navy minister to have second thoughts. It is also likely that Admiral Kato was impressed that the more Japan built up her navy, the more Britain and America would be drawn together against her. By the end of the year, he made it clear in a public speech that Japan would welcome some arrangements for naval disarmament. Thus, much of the sting was taken out of the Japanese programme, some of whose features were held in suspense. Britain was in a different position. She emerged from the war with more than forty Dreadnoughts, a number far greater than the United States or Japan, and she was no longer required to concentrate her battleships in European waters. She was therefore in a position to declare a naval building holiday.19 In this situation she was not keen to see the building programmes of either Japan or the United States increased. Curzon made it clear to Lord Grey at the Washington embassy that it was still the determination of British leaders that in framing their own naval estimates they would take no account of the U.S. naval programme and would not build against the U.S. Navy as against that of a possible rival or enemy ... The strength of the British Navy next year will be based upon a standard of security that does not take account of the U.S. Navy as a possible enemy.20

It was hoped to reassure those Americans who professed to fear 'British navalism' that Britain would not build against them despite her association with Japan. Britain's post-war attitude towards Japan was worked out by the Naval Staff. In a memorandum entitled 'Naval situation in the Far East', the Board of Admiralty presented the C.I.D. with its views at the end of October 1919: 'it is unlikely in view of the days of economy ahead of us ... that we shall be able to maintain a Fleet equal to hers in the Far East in peace time.' In event of war with Japan, it would be essential to avoid the fleet being locked up at Hong Kong; the squadron should be based instead upon the probable port of assembly of the main fleet, which might be assumed to be Singapore. This port might be considered sufficiently far from any Japanese possessions to make an 19

Roskill, Naval policy, i, 212-21; Marder, op. cit., v, 236-8. 20 FO 800/158, Curzon to Grey, 9 September 1919. Cf. also FO 800/329, Dormer to Drummond, 28 November 1918; J. K. McDonald, 'Lloyd George and the search for a postwar naval policy, 1919* in A. J. P. Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George: twelve essays, pp. 191-222.

BRAVE NEW WORLD IN EAST ASIA?

285

attack upon it in force improbable during the period available before the fleet arrived.21 In short, if the alliance were not renewed, Japan must be regarded as the probable enemy.22 Yet this had, of course, been the position since the start of the alliance: if it were revoked, Britain would have to build against Japan. At the same time, it was a serious reflection on the alliance that Britain should regard Japan as a country which was expansionist and from which her own imperial territories were menaced.23 In order to examine the problem of imperial naval defence, Lord Jellicoe was sent to India, Australia, New Zealand and Canada between February 1919 and March 1920. He concluded that everything pointed to Japan as 'the nation with which trouble might conceivably arise in the future' and recommended the creation of a Pacific fleet of twenty capital ships (including four carriers) to be based on Singapore, which would give Britain a strength double that of the Japanese.24 It is true that Jellicoe was not kept fully in touch with the thinking of Whitehall during his trip and that his views were not seriously pursued by the Admiralty, far less the government.25 The Admiralty accepted the need for stringency over naval expenditure, which was finally laid down in 1921 by the Committee on the National Economy, presided over by Sir Eric Geddes, but it clung all along to the optimistic hope that it would 'prove possible to arrive at some satisfactory understanding with Japan' without losing sight of 'the desirability of maintaining a powerful Squadron at Singapore'.26 Certainly the cost of Jellicoe's proposals would have been beyond Britain's capacity, even allowing for any contribution which might be forthcoming from the dominions, and it was convenient to overlook the Japanese threat and trust to political solutions of the problem. But this was not a comfortable stance for the admirals who found themselves in the anomalous position of calling for naval provision against Japan, while hoping for a continuance of the Japanese alliance. The alliance was for Britain a 21

FO 371/3822 [150512], Admiralty to C.I.D., 31 October 1919, on the basis of which the Foreign Office described Britain's strategic position as 'distinctly gloomy' (FO 371/3816 [150925]). 22 Marder, v, 237-8. 23 ADM 1231, MO 1161/21 of 15 April 1921 shows that the Admiralty would not agree to Japanese naval officers witnessing Atlantic Fleet firings. 24 Roskill, i, 278, quoting Jellicoe to Admiralty, 3 February 1920. 25 Patterson, Jellicoe, pp. 223-4, shows that he reached Ottawa before he received the Admiralty memorandum of 31 October 1919. 26 DBFP, I (vi), p. 1054, quoting Admiralty to Foreign Office, 12 February 1920.

286

BRAVE NEW WORLD IN EAST ASIA?

means of saving naval resources and was to that extent valuable; but, as the strategists surveyed the situation in east Asia, they reckoned that Britain would have to treat Japan as the notional enemy in future. The British government adopted two general criteria. One was the ten-year rule which came into effect in 1919 and laid down that budgets would be prepared on the assumption that the British empire would not be engaged in any major war over the next ten years.27 The other was the one-power standard which the Admiralty used in the naval estimates in March 1920. While these estimates included no provision for new construction, acceptance of a one-power standard could be expensive, if Japan continued her building, even if the notion of competing with American building had been discarded. Moreover, there was the danger, as the C.I.D. stressed in its extended review at the end of 1920, that, if America and Japan built against one another, either fleet might be used against Britain.28 Thus, by the beginning of 1921, Britain, Japan and the United States were seriously considering their naval security, including the building of capital ships. The governments were more responsible in their approach than were the big navy lobbies in all three. Faced with financial stringency, they showed a sober desire for naval limitation: Admiral Kato spoke in December 1920 in its favour; in Britain the Bonar Law committee recommended it; and in America congress opinion encouraged it. Thus naval problems, while they certainly added to tensions in the Pacific area, were not wholly insuperable. Britain and Japan knew that the ending of the alliance would force them to make greater naval provision in the area, and this was a strong argument for its continuance. To revert to the remarks of Tilley with which this chapter began. It is true that Britain in 1919 found it hard to work jointly with Japan and the United States because of their mutual irreconcilability. This 'triangular relationship' had, of course, been fundamental to all consideration of the alliance since 1911; but with the increasing activities of the Americans in the Pacific after 1919 triangular tensions grew in im27 Roskill, i, 215-22. 28 CAB 2/3, CID, i34th meeting, 14 December 1920. In 1921 Britain was maintaining a China squadron inferior, but not markedly, to that maintained in 1914. At the outbreak of war, the Royal Navy had in these waters two armoured cruisers, the Triumph and two light cruisers; in 1921 it had the Hawkins and four light cruisers, making up the fifth light cruiser squadron. Now that the German menace was gone, it was no small fleet.

BRAVE NEW WORLD IN EAST ASIA?

287

portance. The problem was more complex than Tilley made out. In the naval sphere, there were equal tensions on all three sides of the triangle, American hostility to British naval strength being not the least element. Among the miscellaneous tensions, there was Anglo-American solidarity against Japan over the formation of the 1920 consortium. Curzon took an especially rosy view of the success achieved in the consortium negotiations: Japan, sooner than be left in isolation, had been compelled to join. Once such agreement was arrived at, it was possible to tell Japan that she must fall into line with these arrangements or else the Powers concerned would fight her commercially. The result was that Japan had agreed to co-operate and we were now in a position to exert pressure on her.29

This was a corollary to the deep-seated British conviction that Japan was susceptible to international pressure, whether through the consortium or through the alliance. In the other area of dispute, the Siberian campaign, there were large areas of disagreement between Britain and the United States. Looking back on Japan's conduct in December 1920, the British high commissioner there wrote that he had 'found Japanese policy not dishonourable and, if wanting in consistency, not more inconsistent than that of other Powers; they have hitherto made good their assurances about Siberia, and all accusations of plots to seize Chinese Eastern Railway and complicity with bandits have hitherto proved unfounded'.30 There were few Americans who took such a view of Japan's activities. It reminds us that, though many were calling for a common Anglo-American policy, there were only limited areas where this was feasible. The idealism of the brave new world was singularly lacking among the powers in east Asia. 29

CAB 23/25, Curzon's statement, 30 May 1921.

30

DJBFP, I (xiv), no. 181.

C H A P T E R XVII

The Alliance and the League of Nations NOT long after the Versailles treaty was signed the alliance came up for review in both Britain and Japan. It was not that there was overt dissatisfaction with the agreement of 1911 so much as anxiety that the alliance might be incompatible with the covenant of the League of Nations and that it aroused the distrust of America and China. The position of the alliance vis-a-vis the League was a matter of common concern which the allies did not succeed in resolving, even in an interim way, until July 1920, when one year's notice of ending it could be given. The alliance's unpopularity in the wider world was a more lasting issue and was not ended until the Washington conference. This posed new problems for the allies who had hitherto approached the alliance without too much attention to the standpoint of others. Now they had lost their freedom of choice. The next chapters will deal with the consideration which the allies had to give to the various outside interests: the League, China, the United States and the British dominions. The League covenant naturally took no cognizance of diplomatic instruments like the alliance which had survived from pre-war days when the League had scarcely been dreamt of. Paragraph twenty provided that League members who had undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the covenant should take immediate steps to secure release from them. Moreover the covenant was antipathetic towards exclusive military alliances. There was no doubt that if Britain and Japan, founder-members of the League, were to honour its covenant they would have to re-think the position of their alliance. On the other hand, the covenant explicitly excluded from its purview regional understandings for the maintenance of peace like the Monroe doctrine. It was arguable, therefore, that the alliance could be so modified as to make it legally compatible with the covenant. These modifications would presumably imply the omission of the military clauses. Thus, 288

THE ALLIANCE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

289

those who spoke of renewing the alliance in the years that followed were speaking not of renewing the agreement of 1911 in identical terms but of revising it to bring it into line with the thinking of the League. Whether it could be amended to be brought into line with the covenant was a question which could not at that stage be referred to any arbiter and had to rest on the understanding of the two parties and on the 'League-consciousness' of their leaders. It was essentially a legal question, and experts differed over whether the alliance could be appropriately amended. In the end, the question was never put to the test. But both allies admitted as a working hypothesis that the League covenant must be regarded as the superior instrument. The status of the alliance had been troubling the allies for some time. Since President Wilson had elaborated his Fourteen Points, the Japanese in particular had been concerned lest the alliance should become irrelevant in the new international order which seemed likely to emerge.1 Wilson's suspicious attitude towards the alliance was well known and it was assumed that when he said that there could be no alliances within the League, he intended that the Anglo-Japanese alliance would have to be brought to an end. Japan naturally consulted Britain several times in 1918. But the Foreign Office was a divided house on this issue and, for want of a firm attitude, was content to let things take their course. There were those like Ambassador Greene who took the view that a League would assist Britain in releasing her from her Japanese entanglement and that an international body on the lines that Wilson conceived might provide a framework behind which Britain could shelter in ending the alliance without unduly antagonizing the Japanese. Until the summer of 1920 there was no need for precipitate action. The failure of the American senate to approve the treaty of Versailles left the future of the League uncertain. And even when the first assembly was held in Geneva in November 1920, the League was far from a going concern. Among British and Japanese leaders there were differing degrees of confidence in it. While this uncertainty lasted, there was a good case for making only a minimum of change in existing instruments of security like the alliance. POST-WAR JAPAN AND THE ALLIANCE

The Hara cabinet was in favour of the alliance. Its view was that 1

FO 371/3238 [166626], Greene to Balfour, 3 October 1918.

290

THE ALLIANCE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Japan, though she emerged from the war as one of the strongest powers in the world, was really isolated and needed to keep the friendship of her wartime allies. Kara was supported in this by every influential group in Japan. This was the underlying presupposition in the deliberations of the gaiko chosakai, the watchdog over foreign policy. It had the agreement of the genro. Yamagata, the most important of them, was content to back Hara in the cautious line of adhering to the alliance and brought with him the support of the Choshu leadership of the army. Whatever their pro-German inclinations during the war years, the top leaders of the army in peacetime appear to have wanted the alliance to continue. Thus in autumn 1919 General Fukuda, vice-chief of the general staff, said that he was strongly in favour of continuing the alliance and that the minister for war, General Tanaka, shared his view.2 There was no serious doubt about the loyalty of the navy which had grown up in the shadow of the alliance. Even the opposition politicians like Kato Takaaki and Okuma Shigenobu and leading business figures like Shibusawa Eiichi were in favour. 3 The politician who seemed to the rest of the world to be the bogey-man of the Terauchi ministry, Goto Shimpei, professed to be converted. He was at this time on a world tour to study the post-war policies of western nations. After he had — with the greatest reluctance — been granted an interview by Curzon, he wrote his lordship a cordial letter of thanks: 'I see more and more that my country must work in harmony with these two great powers [England and America]; and I am anxious to have some few of our young men educated with special regard to the maintenance and furtherance of Anglo-Japanese goodwill.'4 Japan then was overwhelmingly in favour of continuing the alliance with the minimum of revision. There were groups which opposed and criticized the alliance but they were not influential. There were extremists and military officers who claimed that Japan did not benefit enough from the alliance and that the 1911 treaty was one-sided. There were many newspapers, agents of dissent, who held the alliance in question. There were opposition members of the Diet who asked transparently hostile questions. Yet these voices had little influence on policy. The British alliance continued to be, in the platitudes of politicians' speeches, the kotsu^ui (marrow or backbone) of Japan's policy. But this 2 DBFP, I (vi), nos. 528 and 773. 3 DBFP, I (vi), no. 598 and I (xiv), no. 52. 4 Goto papers 47/88, Goto (Claridge's) to Curzon, 27 June 1919.

THE ALLIANCE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

29!

is to ignore the main change in the immediate post-war years. Professor Mitani in an important interpretative essay sees a change taking place in Japan's traditional policies towards the end of the world war, especially in 'the substantial dismemberment of the British alliance which had hitherto been the fundamental "frame of reference" of Japan's diplomacy'.5 Certainly there are signs that Hara while holding fast to the alliance wanted some reconciliation with the United States. Whether the alliance was the 'backbone' any longer, the focal point of Japanese diplomacy was America. Ideally he wanted to supplement the alliance with an understanding with America and to achieve some sort of Anglo-American-Japanese coalition for east Asia. If any detente with the United States could be achieved, the British alliance would become much less important. In a sense, the alliance took second place in the aspirations of the Hara diplomacy.6 Hara may well have worked on the assumption which ultimately proved to be false that Japan could keep on good terms with the United States, while at the same time maintaining her wartime gains in China. In short, Hara hoped to build on the Lansing-Ishii treaty as Japan interpreted it. This was all the more important because in the post-war period she saw her economic future tied up with exports to the United States. It was desirable for economic reasons to broaden the base of her foreign policy. This was all a change of emphasis rather than one of alignment. But it had its bearing on the alliance which was valuable in preserving Japan from isolation but was not the sole desideratum any longer.7 In June 1919, the issue arose in a concrete form over the encouragement given to the anti-Japanese movement by British and Americans in China. The new British minister in Tokyo, Beilby Alston, who was quite a well-wisher of Japan, let it be known that he was hopeful of harmonizing Anglo-Japanese relations in China through discussions in Tokyo; he hoped to work also for the continuance of the AngloJapanese alliance. When Hara received a report on this, he wanted to encourage Alston's efforts: 'even if the effectiveness of the alliance is limited after the establishment of the League of Nations, its continuation would be very useful; nevertheless I should like by some means to undertake negotiations with the United States.'8 He thought the overture important enough to raise with Yamagata at their next meeting. It appeared that, while Alston wanted to achieve some results during his 5 7

Shinohara and Mitani, p. 294. Kuroha, pp. 606-7.

8

6 TSM, i, 164-5. Hara ntkki, viii, p. 241, 10 June 1919.

292

THE ALLIANCE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

term of office, the American ambassador, Roland Morris, also thought it was a good opportunity to work for American-Japanese friendship. Kara and Yamagata agreed that Anglo-American-Japanese understanding was essential for Japan.9 The Japanese were anxious to cultivate the good opinion of Britain. In view of the alliance with Britain, it was thought that Saionji as chief delegate to Paris should cross to London on his homeward journey and seek an audience with King George V. It was arranged that he should present a message from the emperor which was approved by the gaiko chosakai on 26 June, just before the signing of the Versailles treaty. Uchida explained that he thought it appropriate in view of the British alliance if Saionji, who was not due to sail from Europe until 19 July, should pass over a message which would enthusiastically emphasize Japan's good feeling towards Britain, her ally for more than seventeen years; Anglo-Japanese unity had not only given striking results in the dark years of war but would without doubt be of equal benefit in the new era of peace into which the world was entering.1** This Saionji presented to the king at Buckingham Palace on 10 July. King George V made a jocular reference to President Wilson, which was passed on to Tokyo and inadvertently was allowed to leak out to the press.11 Saionji also had discussions with Curzon but they were of no substance, being mainly about the unpopular Goto's visit to London shortly before.12 Shortly after his return to Tokyo, Saionji had a long talk with Hara. Clemenceau, he said, had told him privately that the world had since the war been divided between Japan, Britain and the United States; and Japan's urgent task was to get an understanding with the Americans.13 Ishii, who had been ambassador in Washington and returned to Tokyo in July, also spoke of deteriorating relations and urged that, in order to improve them, representation in Washington should be at the highest level. It was for this reason that the highly regarded foreign vice-minister, Shidehara Kijuro, was appointed as next ambassador on 11 September.14 9

Hara nikki, viii, p. 250, 19 June 1919. Suiuso nikki, pp. 525-7, meeting of 26 June 1919. 11 FO 371/5350 [F. 370], Alston to Hardinge, 25 February 1920. 13 12 Hara nikki, viii, p. 305, 25 August 1919. Ibid. 14 Polk papers 77/42, Polk to Long, 15 April 1919. Long felt that Ishii was retiring prematurely because he 'does not want to be held personally or politically responsible for the turn [American-Japanese relations] are taking*. Also Polk papers 77/45. 10

THE ALLIANCE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

293

Before Japan ratified the Versailles treaty, she wanted to be satisfied about the relationship between the alliance and the League covenant. This question was under consideration by the Foreign Ministry, the Privy Council and the Advisory Council during September and October. The archives contain a memorandum on the subject by Dr Tachi Sakutaro, the eminent international lawyer. His view is close to that later published in 1921 by Tamura K5saku, a secretary in the London embassy, in what must have been an authorized statement, which argued that the alliance 'lost its validity from the very moment the Covenant was ratified by both Governments'.15 Finally at the gaiko chosakai on 29 October, Ito Miyoji confirmed the views expressed by the Privy Council by drawing attention to the inconsistencies between the alliance and the covenant in a speech of inordinate length. There was the view, he said, that they were not mutually contradictory but this was not a considered opinion based on a careful reading of the text. He thought it appropriate that the Japanese government, without waiting for the expiry of the alliance, should open negotiations with Britain. The other members of the council agreed; and this was published as government policy.16 But the desire to re-negotiate the alliance was really no more urgent in Japan than it was in Britain, which had problems enough of her own at the time. In a telegram to Ambassador Chinda on 15 December, Foreign Minister Uchida reminded him not to press the issue: 'on our part we will avoid mentioning this subject as far as possible. But you are instructed to pass on at appropriate moments intelligence about the opinions expressed by political leaders, trends in public opinion in Britain etc.' In a speech to the forty-second Diet on 22 January 1920, Hara stressed that the alliance was firm and stable, and Uchida in a long reply to an interpellation expressed the Japanese government's desire to continue with it.17 In short, majority opinion in 15

Japanese Foreign Ministry microfilm, PVM 12-43. Tamura, 'The relations between the League of Nations and the Anglo-Japanese alliance', The Asiatic Review, 17 (1921), 416-18. 16 Hara nikki, viii, pp. 356-7; Suiuso nikki, p. 710. 17 Uchida biography, 20 (7). An essential source for the period from 1919 to 1922 is the draft biography of Uchida Yasuya (Uchida Yasuya denki genko), which is available in the Ninon gaiko bunshoshitsu, Tokyo. Uchida's second period at the Foreign Ministry is dealt with in volumes 14 to 24. The volumes of special relevance to this study are vols. 14 on the Paris peace conference, 20 on the ending of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and 17 on the Washington conference. An edited version of the original has recently appeared under the title Uchida Yasuya,

294

THE ALLIANCE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Japan was to persist with the alliance, if at all possible, but to leave it to Britain to make the first new move. RE-EXAMINATION

IN WHITEHALL

Staff difficulties in the Foreign Office made it difficult to look at the alliance soon after the war. Early in April 1919 Conyngham Greene left Tokyo on retirement from the diplomatic service after six years there. It was originally intended that Sir Ralph Paget should succeed him; but instead the embassy was left vacant.18 Beilby Alston, who had been counsellor at Peking and was temporarily on special assignment at Vladivostok, took over as charge d'affaires with the rank of minister. For his part, Greene on his return to London spoke despondently about Japan; he did not favour a prolongation of the alliance after 1921; he recommended that whatever arrangement Britain reached with Japan should not injure her friendly relations with the United States, w As his ultimate successor the committee, chaired by Lord Curzon, appointed Sir Charles Eliot to Tokyo. Eliot had entered the foreign service in the i88os but resigned from it after a dispute in 1904. After a period as vice-chancellor of Sheffield and later Hong Kong universities, he was anxious to return to a diplomatic career. In 1918 Lord Bryce wrote to Balfour suggesting Eliot for a job in Siberia, since he knew both Russian and Chinese and was on the spot in Hong Kong.20 Balfour appointed him as high commissioner in Siberia in August, 1918, an appointment in which he enjoyed considerable success. The following August Curzon proposed Eliot for the embassy at Tokyo and Eliot was delighted to re-enter the permanent service.21 Eliot suggested that he should return to Britain for briefing and this was agreed. The appointment was approved by the Japanese emperor and was announced on 8 September. Eliot travelled to Peking, Shanghai and then to Tokyo en route to London.22 Eliot was a worthy, if unusual, choice, being an oriental scholar with a brilliant intellect but a rather aloof manner. Ikei Masaru (ed.), Tokyo, 1969. It reduces the manuscript to one-quarter of its length and tends to leave out the portions of diplomatic interest. is Lothian papers, GD 40/17/55, Drummond to Kerr, i February 1919. 19 FO 371/3816 [150925], note by Bentinck, 4 December 1919. 20 FO 794/1, Bryce to Balfour, n June 1918. 21 FO 794/1, Curzon to Eliot, 8 August 1919. 22 FO 371/3822 [128405], Alston to Curzon, 10 September 1919.

THE ALLIANCE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

295

On 7 October Alston sent home his views on the continuation of the alliance in preparation for any discussion which took place after Eliot reached London. He maintained that the alliance could not continue in its present shape since 'Russia has crumbled to pieces and Germany is utterly defeated'; he looked towards a friendly understanding (an entente cordiale) with her which might not even be in writing. The ideal arrangement would be a union pledged to rehabilitate China, embracing also the United States; 'resentment [of Japan] should not blind us to the fact that it will be a matter of the greatest difficulty to ensure the rehabilitation of China without her goodwill'.23 It was December before the despatch reached London and there was no sign of an urgent response. Tilley minuted that 'the papers should be brought up every month or we may find that the time for denouncing the Treaty [July] has come before the League of Nations has got under way'. Many views on the alliance at this time were based on unfounded assumptions. Thus, Alston enclosed a memorandum by the first secretary at the Tokyo embassy, arguing that 'we cannot afford to break away from Japan unless we can rely upon the constant support of the League (i.e. America)' and that Britain would derive very little positive advantage in the maintenance of the alliance, providing the covenant is duly ratified by the United States and other nations.24 By the time these views reached London in December, the possibility that the United States would join the League had disappeared. Another willo'-the-wisp idea was the discussion in Alston's letter of an alliance between Russia, Germany and Japan which had 'on several occasions lately been openly discussed in the press', because of the likelihood of Japan facing Anglo-American co-operation against her in China. Curzon minuted that there was a 'danger that if we leave Japan alone she will quickly drop into the arms of Russia and Germany' and emphasized 'the extreme difficulty of a practical Anglo-American agreement' in any sector.25 This was to be a recurrent theme in the next two years among British ministers, but there is no evidence in Japanese sources to indicate any serious intention to seek a rapprochement with Germany or the Soviet Union. Germany sent a high-powered ambassador in August 1920 in the person of Dr Wilhelm Solf, the former 23 24 25

DBFP, I (vi), no. 522. Cf. Hara nikki, viii, p. 241, 10 June 1919. DBFP, I (vi), no. 522, enclosing memorandum by C. Wingfield. FO 371/3816 [150925], minutes of 8 December on Alston to Tilley, 7 October 1919.

296

THE ALLIANCE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

colonial minister, but there was no sign of a special relationship being rapidly created.26 At the turn of 1920 it was recognized in London that much would depend on how America shaped in the next year. Was she entering a new period of isolation? Would the effect of the forthcoming presidential election in November be to dampen all initiative in foreign affairs? With doubts on both these points, it was best for Britain to watch and wait. Meanwhile it was desirable to study where Britain's interest in the alliance lay and to sort out the position over the League. The latter was a legal problem on which various views could be expressed, and there would have to be conversations with the Japanese to work out a common response. The former was a matter of high policy in the formulation of which naval considerations would probably be paramount, as befitted an alliance where the main benefits for Britain had been largely naval. Hardinge took the view that 'with the growing strength of the Japanese Navy there can be little doubt that the Admiralty will press for a renewal' .2? Officials took advantage of Eliot's presence in London from 17 December until he left for Tokyo by the Tamba Maru of the NYK line on 14 February to discuss the far eastern situation with him. Meanwhile Curzon decided to canvass the views of the India Office, the Colonial Office, the War Office and Admiralty — the departments which had a claim to be consulted over the alliance — and sent them a copy of Alston's letter in order to indicate the opinions formed by the man on the spot.2^ Curzon himself took a hand in drafting the terms of the accompanying letter and thus showed his own preliminary reactions to the question. While realizing the necessity of avoiding any danger of misunderstanding between Britain and America and Britain's difficulty in conducting a policy in the far east in harmony with both the United States and Japan, he stated his opinion that our naval position in the Pacific renders it desirable to have a friendly Japan, while the existence of some form of agreement with that country would also make it easier for His Majesty's Government to keep a watch upon her move26 E. von Veitsch, Wilhelm Solf: Botschafter %wischen den Zeiten, Tubingen, 1961, pp. 240-61. The author suggests that Solf considered his function to be the restoration of confidence between countries recently at war by cultural as well as political means. Solf had held a succession of important appointments: Governor of Samoa till 1910; colonial minister; then foreign minister in 1918 after the resignation of Hintze. 27 DBFP, I (vi), no. 528, fn. 3. 28 FO 371/3816 [166706], minute by Curzon, 5 January 1920.

THE ALLIANCE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

297

ments in China, to demand of her in her dealings with us a greater measure of freedom and frankness than it would otherwise be possible to expect, and to exercise a moderating influence on her policy generally. It is true that our relations with her in China may be difficult in the future, but they will probably be less so if she is bound to us even by a loose alliance and much less so than if she were to become the ally of Germany. ... whether [Russia] is going to be dangerous on her own account as a Bolshevist Power, or dangerous owing to German influence, it would be well to provide a counter-acting influence by continuing the Japanese Alliance with such modifications as may be required in order to comply with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations. There is the further danger that, if we abandoned the alliance, Japan might form the alliance with Russia and Germany of which there have already been so many rumours.2^

In a brief delphic utterance, the Admiralty replied on 12 February that 'a continuation of the Alliance in its present form [was] neither necessary nor desirable' but, in view of the prevailing financial stringency, 'They hope it will prove possible to arrive at some satisfactory understanding with Japan on the lines' suggested by Curzon.30 In reply to Curzon's further suggestion that they should base a powerful squadron upon Singapore as this would greatly increase British prestige in the far east and strengthen his hands in any negotiations with Japan, the Admiralty replied predictably that 'without considerable increase in Naval expenditure, they do not see their way to maintain Forces sufficient to support a strong policy involving a possible coercion of Japan'.31 The War Office also favoured the retention of some form of alliance or understanding with Japan because Britain's military position in the far east might be most embarrassing were there hostilities with Japan.32 So far so good: opinion in Whitehall seemed to be generally in favour of renewal. Tilley concluded that the resulting treaty 'will have to say uncommonly little but I believe it will be useful as a reinsurance and for keeping the Japs a little in hand'.33 The problem arose from the Colonial Office which felt it necessary to approach the self-governing dominions. It found the documents sent to be inadequate for the purpose and asked for something more 29 DBFP, I (vi), pp. 1053-4. 30 FO 371/3816 [178570], Admiralty to Foreign Office, 12 February 1920. 31 Roskill, i, 293, has misjudged the tenor of the Admiralty's reply which is not hostile to some agreement with Japan. 32 DBFP, I (vi), pp. 1054-5. 33 FO 371/3816 [177312], minute by J. A. C. Tilley, 21 February 1920.

298

THE ALLIANCE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

substantial. This was necessary in preparation for the imperial conference which was then due to be held in the autumn of 1920. It was generally agreed that after the help they had given during the war, there could be no objection to the dominions being consulted; at any rate they must be consulted on something more than the minimal scale of 1911. Of course, it would inevitably involve delay and would probably prevent a decision being reached before the sensitive date of July, if the matter was deferred for an imperial conference. So a note had to be drawn up setting out the case for and against the alliance.34 This memorandum on the effect of the alliance on foreign relationships was drawn up by C. H. Bentinck, a member of the far eastern department. It was presented on 28 February and amended extensively in accordance with Curzon's instructions. This slightly toned down the case against Japan and further developed the case for renewal of the alliance. It was then sent to the Colonial Office on 19 March for the dominions. Because of the destination of the document and the publicity which might be given to it, it was not so much an objective analysis of the situation as a partisan statement of the course which Curzon was intending to follow. It was more weighted in favour of Japan than the contemporary comments of officials might have suggested, but it represented Curzon's, and probably also the cabinet's, thinking which was important for the dominions.35 The general drift of the memorandum's argument may be seen from the following extracts: The interests of Great Britain and the United States of America in China are similar whereas they are often in conflict with those of Japan. The Chinese would prefer to see us ranged alongside of the United States, opposing the Japanese at every step. To do this, we should have to be sure of the active support of the United States upon which, as recent events have shown us, we are unable to rely. We should, besides, have to maintain in the Far East a fleet and an army beyond our resources. In spite of lukewarmness on the part of Japan [during the war], she kept her word to us faithfully, giving us all the help she was bound by Treaty to give and, at a price, going beyond her obligations. Her statesmen are sensitive upon points of honour and though they drive hard bargains at times, it must be admitted that they have attempted to play the game. 34

FO 371/3816 [177312], minute by Bentinck, 14 February 1920. For criticism of Curzon's action, see D. K. Dignan, * Australia and British relations with Japan, 1914-1921', Austsalian Outlook, 21 (1967), 139-41.. 35

THE ALLIANCE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

299

An isolated Japan might be driven to seek an alliance with a RussoGerman combination to counter-balance an Anglo-Saxon cooperation. There have already been rumours to this effect. [The advantages of renewing the alliance to both sides would be considerable.] When we come to draw up the terms of a possible new instrument for prolonging the alliance, the dominating factor for us will have to be the necessity of not antagonizing the United States. [That being so], some sort of Tripartite understanding in the Far East, to which France might also adhere, would indeed be an ideal situation. Until our ideal can be realised, however, we must content ourselves with the next best arrangement — alliance with Japan; intimate friendship and co-operation with the United States of America and France.36

This was a fair and balanced assessment of Britain's attitude to Japan. Its conclusions come close to those ultimately worked out at the Washington conference. The distinction which it draws between the ideal and practical solutions is valid. Indeed the main difference of opinion among politicians in Britain was not over the ultimate objectives, where there was remarkable unanimity, but over the feasibility of the 'ideal solution', that is, inducing the United States to join some Anglo-Japanese arrangement. Many in Britain, even in high places, felt that the anti-British party in the States was too strong to allow this and that the senate's action over the Versailles treaty implied American unwillingness to accept any commitments to foreign states in the future. Not only was Britain disillusioned by the treatment of the peace treaty, but she was also annoyed at her own impotence to influence American policy. A postscript is provided in a memorandum on internal conditions in Japan written by F. T. Ashton-Gwatkin of the far eastern department. He argued that a renewal of the alliance would strengthen the hands of the present oligarchic government in Japan at a time when a more democratic regime might reasonably be expected to establish itself within the next few years, and that renewal should accordingly be delayed. But his colleagues felt that reconsideration of the alliance could not be held up to await crystallization of the domestic situation in Japan. The matter was allowed to rest with Hardinge's summing up that experts 'all tend to a renewal or continuation of the alliance in a new and modified form. What that form should be will require much discussion.'37 36 DBFP, I (vi), no. 761.

37 DBFP, I (vi), no. 789 and pp. 1050-3.

300

THE ALLIANCE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ELIOT IN TOKYO

Sir Charles Eliot reached Yokohama on 6 April in a light cruiser of the Royal Navy to which he had transferred at Shanghai for the last part of his journey. This was to follow a precedent set by Conyngham Greene when he took up his appointment in 1913. To the Foreign Office it seemed desirable 'to show our flag once again at Yokohama' and it was thought that Eliot's 'arrival in a warship should add considerably to his prestige with the Japanese'.38 This was a time when Britain was conscious of her naval weakness in the far east which, it was feared, would convince the Japanese that they had little to gain from the alliance. When Eliot reached Japan's shores in such viceregal fashion, he was welcomed by the crown prince who was often called upon to act for the ailing Taisho emperor. Eliot's instructions were in general form: as soon as he had been in Japan long enough to form an opinion, he should report home on the state of public and official feeling in Japan about the alliance.39 Whether there was a supplementary mandate of a private kind cannot be said for sure. Certainly his mandate was considerably more restricted than the Japanese had been led to expect from a conversation Eliot had with the Japanese ambassador in London, Viscount Chinda, on 14 February. He then indicated that British policy was to amend the alliance as necessary in the light of the League covenant but certainly to renew it. This was obviously pleasing to the Japanese but perhaps suggested in a misleading way that Britain had already formulated her policy. Certainly Eliot let the general election of 10 May 1920, in which the Seiyukai scored a great victory by capturing 278 out of 464 seats, pass before he made his first approach. The question of the alliance was broached by him on 19 May at an interview with Foreign Minister Uchida. Eliot read a note on the legal relationship between the alliance and the covenant but declined to leave a copy. Both countries were dependent on the alliance if the League of Nations could not provide the results expected of it, but both were agreed that some sort of amendment of the alliance was essential, although these revisions did not have to be completed by 13 July.4 Two days later Uchida obtained the sanction of the cabinet for the revision of the alliance. On 22 May Eliot was informed that Japan was also in favour of its renewal and 38 FO 371/3822 [172575], minute by Bentinck, 15 January 1920. 39 DBFP, I (xiv), no. 36. I (xiv), no. 287. 16

324

ON THE EVE OF THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

the Japanese side many reports were written but the one which most appealed to Hara was a less discreet account from the naval attache in London which complimented the prince on his conversations with Asquith, Milner and Lloyd George and concluded by hailing the visit as a great success.20 There were apparently no diplomatic discussions held under cover of the mission though Chinda, the former ambassador to London, did accompany the crown prince. It is doubtful whether the visit had any direct bearing on the alliance; but, in so far as it had some success in re-establishing goodwill, the mission did have an indirect influence during a crucial period. FOREWARNINGS OF IMPERIAL DISSENT

After this brief digression, let us return to the approach of the imperial conference. Neither ally viewed the prospect of the alliance being discussed there with particular contentment. So far as Japan was concerned, she had accepted the idea that the future of the alliance would have to be discussed with the dominion prime ministers but still felt that such a discussion could only be to her own disadvantage. Moreover, her statesmen were none too pleased with the recurrent delays in assembling the dominion representatives.2! In Britain too, there was no little apprehension about the attitudes that might emerge. It was commonly assumed in Whitehall that 'the Dominions are strongly against the renewal of the Alliance, mainly on racial grounds'.22 It was a situation which resembled that of 1911, when the dominions had been assumed to be hostile to the renewal of the alliance beforehand, although they were found to be less so when the subject was argued out. There was in 1921 no question but that the dominions would have to be fully consulted before a decision was taken. The first uncertainty was whether the alliance would still be in existence when the dominion prime ministers at long last got round to examining it. It was held by the legal advisers of the Foreign Office that the one year's notice necessary to terminate the 1911 agreement had been given in July 1920 when the two allies had presented their joint declaration to the League of Nations.23 According to their view, 20

Hara nikki, ix, 6 July 1921, Kobayashi to Admiral Ide. E.g. Suluso ntkkly p. 816, statement of Uchida to privy council, n July 1921. 22 Lothian papers GD 40/17/209, Kerr to J. Dove (editor of the Round table), 13 July 1920. 23 See above, pp. 302—4. 21

ON THE EVE OF THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

325

this meant that, when the 1911 alliance reached its full ten years* span in July 1921, it would lapse automatically. However, the prime ministers were not due to assemble until the middle of June. Therefore, if they were to have time to consider the question without undue haste, it was desirable that the alliance should be extended for an interim period. In these circumstances, the Foreign Office proposed to the dominions that it might be prolonged by one year.24 This suggestion put the cat among the pigeons. It was difficult for those in London to gauge the opinions of the dominions because their leaders often spoke with differing voices. It was deduced that Australia would be prepared for a renewal, so long as it did not entail any stipulation which might threaten her policy of excluding Japanese.25 This was later confirmed by the prime minister, W. M. Hughes, in a major speech in the Australian house of representatives on 7 April. In essence his argument was that, since 'Britain was no longer able to maintain her navy at the strength necessary for the complete protection of the Empire... no man can deny that it is a thing more precious than rubies that we should have an alliance with the greatest Power in the East.'26 Hughes' conversion to the alliance arose from political convenience rather than from any new-found friendship for Japan. Not unexpectedly, the Japanese deduced from their experiences at Paris that Australian influence in imperial councils would be hostile to themselves. It was the new Canadian government of Arthur Meighen, which offered the strongest opposition. Meighen, who took over as premier in the summer of 1920, was his own external affairs minister and was greatly influenced by the lucidly expressed views of his senior civil servant, Loring Christie, the legal adviser to the department. The confrontation was sparked off by Christie's memorandum of i February.2? On 15 February Meighen cabled London that there was a danger that any special relationship between Britain and Japan to which America was not a party, would come to be regarded by America as an unfriendly exclusion and as a barrier to an English-speaking concord. 24

FO 371/6672 [F. 1042], Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 24 March 1921. FO 371/6672 [F. 927], minute by Ashton-Gwatkin, 16 March 1921. 26 FO 371/6674 [F. 2362], circular to cabinet, June 1921. 27 L. Christie, The Anglo-Japanese alliance, i February 1921', in A. R. M. Lower, 'Loring Christie and the genesis of the Washington conference of 1921-1922', Canadian Historical Review, 47 (1966), 38-48. For an account of the domestic background of the Meighen government, see Putnam Weale, Indiscreet chronicle, ch. 2. 25

326

ON THE EVE OF THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

It was recommended that Britain should terminate the alliance and try to bring about a conference of Pacific powers for the purpose of adjusting regional problems. Meighen suggested sending his predecessor, Sir Robert Borden, to Washington for discussion before the imperial cabinet. A week later Lloyd George replied that his cabinet held that there were very strong arguments for discussing the whole problem fully with the imperial cabinet before any approaches, however informal, were made to the United States. On i April Canada, which had received the message scouting the possibility of an interim renewal of the alliance, came to the attack, complaining that the London cabinet would be compelled by Japanese susceptibilities to adopt a policy of renewal simply because no one would be able to present a practical alternative. Meighen's telegram came before the British cabinet on 21 April but could not be resolved because of Curzon's illness.28 When he had recovered, Curzon drafted a reply after discussion with Lloyd George, and this was sent off by Churchill as colonial secretary on 26 April in these terms: The proposal of a Conference of Pacific Powers is one which the Imperial Cabinet may well discuss but which it is impossible for us to prejudge at this stage owing to the attitude adopted by Australia, In the meantime we would strongly urge that [the] Canadian Government should not approach the Washington Government independently at this staged

This message reached Meighen in time for the debate on this topic in the Canadian parliament on 27 April. During this exchange of views any action to give the alliance an interim extension was held up. In view of Canada's protest, however, it was finally agreed to suggest to Japan its prolongation by three months only. Curzon saw the Japanese ambassador on 9 May in the midst of all the festivities connected with the crown prince's visit to London and passed on Britain's request.30 While Hayashi took this suggestion cordially, it created a stir in Tokyo. The Japanese had no idea that the alliance would be automatically liquidated in July because they did not consider that the joint notice to the League in July of the previous year had in any sense indicated a desire to terminate it: evidently the allies had been working on different assumptions. 28

FO 371/6672 [F. 1605], minutes of cabinet, 21 April 1921. DCER, iii, nos. 209-15. 29 DBFP, I (xiv), no. 261, fn. 13. DCER, iii, no. 216. 30 FO 371/6673 [F. 1797], Curzon to Eliot, n May 1921.

ON THE EVE OF THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

327

Foreign minister Uchida was worried about Britain's approach and had the matter examined by his legal advisers. Though Hayashi had an inconsequential discussion with Curzon on 25 May, nothing happened until the cabinet meeting two days later. Hara recorded that 'it was the right of both sides to continue or terminate the alliance but for it to be "self-extinguishing" without arranging negotiations for continuation was unreasonable'. At the gaikS chosakai the following day, the draft reply to Britain was approved with some amendment.31 Uchida told Eliot that in Japan's view the joint communication of July 1920 did not mean the alliance would automatically come to an end on 13 July 1921; it could only be ended by invoking article 6 of the 1911 agreement; if the imperial conference decided against it, it would still have to be ended as prescribed in article 6; Japan could not agree to extend the alliance by three months but would agree to make some announcement to the League.32 This view was not sustained by the Foreign Office. On 8 June, therefore, Curzon gave the Japanese ambassador a formal letter, informing him that 'the communication of last year must be held to constitute the notification of termination required under article 6'. Despite Britain's peremptory tone, Uchida declined to accept this view; and it looked as though 'a very awkward situation might be created'.33 The Japanese were by this time quite well informed about Canadian opposition and the general support for the alliance from the other dominions. The alliance cropped up when Hara talked over matters with Yamagata on 31 May. Hara wondered whether Britain was not too deferential to America: in a world order which was dominated by three great powers, Britain, the United States and Japan, it must be assumed that America would not be pleased by the combination of two of the three.34 The Japanese had throughout the spring been considering what could be done to smooth relations with America. They were exploring the possibility of a three-sided treaty which the Americans could be induced to join, and a draft was prepared. However, this was an exercise within the Foreign Ministry and never reached the stage of an official exchange.35 On n April Uchida put out feelers about a 31

Hara nlkkl^ ix, 27 and 28 May 1921. Japanese Foreign Ministry microfilm, PVM 12-43, P« *72> 3° May J 9 2I 3 DBFP, I (xiv), no. 291. 33 DBFPy I (xiv), nos. 297 and 301. 34 Hara nikki, ix, 31 May 1921. See also Suluso nikki, p. 817, Uchida statement, n July 35 1921. Japanese Foreign Ministry microfilm, PVM 19. 32

328

ON THE EVE OF THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

possible exchange of views with Britain on the alliance which might either be independent of the conference or be so designed as to produce proposals for submission to it. But, when the Japanese ambassador in London made cautious enquiries at the Foreign Office, he was told that, since the status of the dominions was not the same as before the war, it would merely alienate them to open talks beforehand. ^ This may serve to indicate the feeling of impotence which the Japanese had. They had premonitions that the alliance might virtually be annulled at the imperial conference without their being able to influence the outcome. There were, indeed, not many options open to the Japanese who were largely dependent on Britain's moves. BRITISH CABINET PREPARATIONS

Britain too was steeling herself for the imperial conference discussions on the alliance. In parliament at regular intervals since November 1920 questions had been asked about Britain's intentions over the alliance. From April onwards these questions multiplied. Their general tenor was that the house of commons should have the opportunity of discussing the alliance in advance of the imperial conference. After a memorial by this lobby, which was evidently led by Lord Winterton, some provision was made for a discussion but the British government did not reveal its hand, n This did not imply that the cabinet had not given the matter considerable thought. Indeed they devoted a special cabinet meeting on 30 May exclusively to the alliance and the line to be taken at the imperial conference.38 Curzon led off with a masterly exposition of the situation in the far east and the pros and cons of the alliance. Like his later expositions to the conference itself, it was the result of thorough study of the files and was delivered with lucidity and precision. Against the alliance, it could be said that its original function — to act as a counter-balance to an aggressive Russia — had disappeared; its existence was a source of irritation to the United States; it was alienating the sympathy of China and encouraging 36

Uchida biography, 20 (7). AC 26, Chamberlain to Vansittart and Marsh, 8 June 1921. 38 Detailed proceedings of this cabinet were kept on the prime minister's orders (CAB 23/25) and have been available to researchers for some years in AC 26. They have been extensively reproduced by Michael Fry in 'The North Atlantic triangle and the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance', JMH, 39 (1967), 55-7. 37

ON THE EVE OF THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

329

Japanese forward policy which Britain ought to be resisting. Yet he felt that the arguments in favour made out the stronger case. The alliance had over the years proved a great and substantial success; in the future we might be faced with a combination of a resuscitated Russia and a revived Germany in the far east;39 the alliance gave Britain the means of putting a check on Japan's ambitions; it absolved Britain from maintaining large naval and military forces in the far east; and the Japanese were in favour of renewal. In the present difficulty, he continued, the natural inclination was to ask 'why should there not be a tripartite Agreement between Great Britain, America and Japan?' The difficulty was that the anti-British party in America would probably not tolerate any such agreement and, even though it were to be agreed to by the house of representatives, it would fail in the senate. Further there could be no guarantee of American stability. Curzon had thus rejected the major finding of his departmental committee. The alternative which he favoured was that the alliance should be renewed in modified form and for a shorter term, say four or five years, and that the Japanese should be told that the United States and China would have to be consulted: * Though it might be possible to provide for the participation of the United States at a later date should they so desire, he would not propose their inclusion now, since the policy of the American Government was so apt to change abruptly with changes in Administration.' There was a full discussion in cabinet, in which the lead was taken by Winston Churchill, who as colonial secretary had a major say on an imperial issue of this kind. Churchill reported that Canada was undoubtedly against the renewal of the alliance and had even gone so far as to suggest taking an independent line if Britain renewed the alliance. Yet he hoped it would be found that there was not any great difference of opinion with Canada over the proposals made by Curzon. With his usual persistence he pressed the Canadian proposal for a Pacific conference where America and Japan might come to some agreement. Balfour added that 'the Pacific' was continually being referred to but he thought the important question concerned China. In fact in most of the 39 Rumours of a German-Russian rapprochement in the far east with or without Japan go back to 1918 (Lloyd George, Memoirsy p. 2075; see a^so above, p. 257). The new German ambassador, Dr Solf, who reached Tokyo in August 1920, was thought in Britain to be charged with a special mission to separate Japan from her wartime allies as, for example, by suggesting that she take a line of her own on German reparations (DBFP, I (xvi), no. 527).

330

ON THE EVE OF THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

discussions of the next few months the Pacific was used as a convenient euphemism for China. Lloyd George admitted that he thought a German-Russian combination a future possibility and concluded that the arguments of Curzon were irresistible. He 'liked the Japanese. The reasons they gave very often for doing things were quite unintelligible and they might have no conscience but they did stand by those who stood by them and they had given unfailing support to their Allies at International Conferences.' He was in favour of arranging a Pacific conference but only after Britain had told the Japanese that she would not drop them. The cabinet passed the following resolutions: a. at the forthcoming meeting with the representatives of the Dominions and India, to support the proposal that the President of the United States of America should be asked to summon a Conference of the Pacific Powers, but only after it had been made quite clear to Japan and to other Powers concerned that we had no intention of dropping the Alliance; b. that the period of renewal of the Alliance should be shorter than the previous term of 10 years and that its terms should be so drawn as not to be inconsistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations or liable to offend American susceptibilities. With the latter object in view, conversations precedent to the renewal of the Alliance should be entered into with the United States and China.

Such was the Churchill-Curzon compromise. Clearly it was an important meeting even if the resolutions were not decisive. It was an attempt to reconcile Canadian views by promising a Pacific conference which was not of course to be confined to naval matters. The decision to go ahead with a watered-down alliance after consultation with America and China was less clear cut. What sort of an alliance would be left after conversations with two countries implacably opposed to it? And would the end-result not be equivalent to 'dropping the alliance' which it was the precise stipulation of the resolution not to do? Britain's leaders approached the imperial conference with these vague terms of reference and were considerably less committed to the continuation of the alliance than might be imagined. Nor was the cabinet decision destined to remain the canon for long. One of the weaknesses in Curzon's presentation to the cabinet was that the views which he cited were in many cases rather ancient. He therefore asked Eliot in Tokyo and Auckland Geddes in Washington whether they wanted to confirm or modify the opinions on the alliance

ON THE EVE OF THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

331

which they had expressed in 1920. Eliot replied without altering his views drastically,40 but Geddes recommended that, instead of a treaty between Britain and Japan, there should be a tripartite agreement, with the United States added. He had earlier toyed with this idea but had subsequently become a strong alliance man, believing that its renewal would have a sobering effect on anti-British elements in the States. Later on 23 June he talked the matter over with the new American secretary of state, Charles Evans Hughes, who showed himself unexpectedly willing to explore new avenues. Indeed, after talking the matter over with President Harding, Hughes proposed the exchange between the three countries of identic notes on policy and claimed that 'by the adoption of some such policy, difficulties in America may be avoided'. This opening was disturbing for the British cabinet which had earlier ruled out such a solution because of the hostility of the senate. Hughes' move seemed to throw into the meltingpot some of the conclusions of the meeting on 30 May.41 The Japanese too had to be handled with extreme caution. They were very displeased with Britain's interpretation that the alliance would come to an end in July. The Japanese ambassador had handed over three memoranda including the opinion of the Japanese legal authorities which contended that the alliance did not lapse automatically. Confronted with this, Curzon in one of his more light-hearted minutes confessed: 'I cannot pursue all these legal labyrinths but the most sensible opinion seems to me that of the Japanese expert. Anyhow do let us get out of the arena of juridical hair-splitters and settle the prolongation coute que coute.'42 Curzon had throughout been sceptical of the opinions of his own legal experts, though he surprisingly did not feel strong enough to overrule them. They stuck to their guns but admitted privately that there were weaknesses in the British case.43 The matter stayed in the realm of the hair-splitters yet awhile. The Japanese were determined not to agree to any prolongation and Curzon therefore applied to the Law Officers of the Crown, Sir Ernest Pollock, advocate-general, and Sir Gordon Hewart, solicitorgeneral, for a ruling on 17 June and received the opinion that 'the joint communication of 8/7/20 does not constitute a notification within 40 FO 371/6673 [F. 2008], Curzon to Geddes and Eliot, 31 May 1921. DJSFP, I (xiv), nos. 294, 298, 308 (circulated to dominion premiers). 42 FO 371/6674 [F. 2228], minute by Curzon, 2 June 1921, « DBFP, I (xiv), no. 288, fn. 2,

41

332

ON THE EVE OF THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

article 6 of an intention to terminate the agreement on 13/7/21 ... [but] the agreement will expire automatically unless it is renewed in the interval'.44 Curzon was again dubious about the advice of his legal colleagues. How was he to reconcile the views of his legal experts with those of Japan? If his own were sound, the hour-glass of the alliance had hardly a fortnight to run. To end the stalemate, Curzon suggested on 27 June that both sides, while agreeing to differ over the significance of the 1920 declaration, should issue a second joint notification to the League so worded as to show that the agreement remained in force until October. In this way both sides would be able to subscribe without admitting the correctness of the other's interpretations. Disappointment was the reaction of the Japanese. It seemed as though Britain would resort to any device to end the alliance; it filled them with doubts about their understanding of the British position. On i July Uchida discussed the case with the prime minister who agreed that it would have to go before the cabinet and the Advisory Council.45 But ere this took place Britain in the midst of consultation with the dominion premiers had second thoughts. On the eve of the imperial conference, Britain had at last made up her mind. It will not have escaped attention that the views of the cabinet towards Japan were much more favourable than those of the Foreign Office secretariat and its legal advisers. It was not that the secretariat's views were wrong-headed or partisan or irrational. Rather it was the case that the cabinet instinctively took into account a wider range of factors, especially naval factors, and was persuaded to take a more favourable view of the Japanese connection. It remained to be seen whether the dominion representatives could be similarly persuaded. 44 45

FO 371/6674 [F. 2316], Law Officers to Foreign Office, 24 June 1921. Hara nikki^ ix, I July 1921.

C H A P T E R XX

The Imperial Conference THE imperial conference opened on 20 June when Lloyd George gave his address as chairman. While it was a review of world affairs, it dealt at some length with the problems of the Pacific and especially with the problems presented by the Japanese alliance: Our alliance with Japan has been a valuable factor [in maintaining peace and fair play for all nations] in the past. We have found Japan a faithful ally, who rendered us valuable assistance in an hour of serious and very critical need . .. We desire to preserve that well-tried friendship which has stood us both in good stead, and to apply it to the solution of all questions in the Far East, where Japan has special interests and where we ourselves, like the United States, desire equal opportunities and the open door.1

These questions included the need for sympathetic treatment of China and friendly co-operation with the United States. He wanted to avoid the growth of armaments; but the very life of the empire was built upon sea power and 'we have therefore to look to the measures which our security requires'. This was a straightforward exposition of the dilemma Britain faced, showing how central was the problem of the alliance. It did not, however, reveal the home government's hand and was deliberately vague. In the discussion that followed, the Canadian premier, Arthur Meighen, avoided controversial ground concerning the alliance. It was left to Hughes to state the following day that, even if the alliance could not be renewed precisely in its existing form, the case for its continuance was very strong, despite the difficulties arising out of America's attitude; but 'any future Treaty with Japan, to be satisfactory to Australia, must specifically exclude the possibility of a war with the United States of Amerca'. Like Hughes, the New Zealand premier, W. F. Massey, urged the need for conferences with America and Japan.2 It was 1 2

CAB 32/2, imperial conference, ist meeting, 20 June 1921. CAB 32/2, imperial conference, 2nd meeting, 21 June 1921. 333

334

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

here that the matter was left while the conference passed to other considerations until the following week. On 27 June Lloyd George re-introduced the Pacific issue by pointing out the possibility of some rapprochement between Germany and Russia which would inevitably affect the far east and arguing that the renewal of the alliance should be studied in that context.3 Next day Curzon proceeded to state the home government's case for and against renewal of the alliance. The main argument against it was Japan's action in China, where so much British capital was invested, and this had had a disturbing effect on Britain's position there. On the other hand, it had served the interests of both sides and been a stabilizing force in the far east. If Britain dropped the alliance, she would lose the opportunity of putting pressure on Japan, while Japan as a restless and aggressive power might 'seek future friends in another quarter; and this, in another ten or twenty years' time, might alter the whole face of the Eastern world and constitute a danger to our position'. Curzon presented two alternative plans: either to renew the alliance for a term of four to five years in such a form that the American government might come in (this renewal to be independent of a Pacific conference but not inconsistent with it); or to renew the existing alliance for one year so as to provide for the holding of a Pacific conference in the interval.4 In either event, any conference was to follow the renewal of the alliance. While Curzon's remarks were favourable to the alliance, he avoided feeding the delegates with a ready-made solution of the problem from London. On 29 June Meighen, the junior among the assembled delegates, presented Canada's viewpoint which opposed the renewal of the alliance in any form whatever. He was obviously smarting under London's rejection of his earlier suggestion that Washington should be consulted before the conference. If the alliance were renewed, he argued, Britain's relations with the United States would deteriorate and Canada would suffer most of all. He considered that, while Japan may have proved a loyal ally, she had not been true to the alliance in so far as the integrity of China was concerned: If we do enter into another Treaty, we have every ground to expect them, hold the check rein as we will, to succeed in duplicating the performance of 3

CAB 32/2, imperial conference, yth meeting, 27 June 1921. CAB 32/2, imperial conference, 8th meeting, 28 June 1921; R. Graham, Arthur Meighen, ii, And fortune fled, Toronto, 1963, pp. 88-9. 4

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

335

the last twenty years in further invasion of this very independence and integrity of China. Insofar as she does that with us walking by her side, it makes us particeps criminis and thus affects our standing with all other nations.

Meighen proceeded to dispose of the many arguments advanced by Lloyd George, Curzon and Balfour which seemed to tend towards a renewal of the alliance.5 His performance was impressive, his argument lucid, and his standpoint unyielding. If at times he struck extreme positions, he doubtless had his eyes partly faxed on his crumbling political position in Ottawa and on the benefit which he might derive from a Victory' on the imperial stage. Meighen's exposition ran into attacks from the other dominions. W. M. Hughes took the line that he would vote against renewal of the alliance only on condition that the United States would give Australia an assurance of safety; Canada already had an assurance of safety from having a strong neighbour over her border; Australia had not. Massey generally supported these views and pointed out that Dr Wilhelm Solf, the new German ambassador in Tokyo, who was known to New Zealand from his previous post in Samoa, was doubtless working to bring about an alliance with Japan.6 There were clearly divergent views, but the atmosphere was that of a debate rather than a battle. CABINET BACK TO C O N F E R E N C E

On the morning of 30 June an important cabinet meeting was convened to work out the home government's line at future imperial meetings on the alliance. Curzon reported that Arthur Meighen had opposed the renewal of the Treaty even more strongly than had been anticipated. He had emphasized the very strong opposition in America to the renewal of the Alliance, and had given the impression that the Canadian Government would be unable to agree to any form of exclusive Agreement with Japan, and that Canada would have to dissociate herself from a decision to enter into any such Agreement.? 5 CAB 32/2, imperial conference, 9th meeting, 29 June 1921. DCER, Hi, no. 217. Meighen's concern for China may have been increased by the fact that B. L. Simpson, the self-styled political adviser to China, had met Loring Christie on 30 April and 3 May and called on Meighen once. 6 CAB 32/2, imperial conference, loth meeting, 29 June 1921. See above, pp. 295-6. 7 FO 371/6675 [F. 2438], proceedings of emergency cabinet, 30 June 1921; CAB 23/26/56.

33 159, 197, 200; see also Kenseikai Drummond, Sir Eric, 215 Eklund, 181 Elder statesman, see genro Eliot, Sir Charles, 287; as ambassador in Tokyo, 294—6, 300—2, 309—10, 312-13, 327, 330-1, 345-8, 354, 356, 360, 385-9, 392

INDEX

419

Harcourt, Lord, 74, 145 Harding, President Warren G., 312, 314, 320, 331, 343-5, 350, 362, 386 Hardinge, Lord, as Indian viceroy, 70, 187; in Foreign Office, 211, 296, 299 Harmsworth, Cecil, 306 Harvey, Colonel George, 336, 340, 344, 350 Hayashi Gonsuke, biog., 309, 78; as minister in Peking, 182, 190, 192; as ambassador in London, 309-10, 314, 316-17, 326-8, 339, 342, 345-6, 3489,388 Hayashi Tadasu, 22, 76, 177 Hearst press, 316, 343 Heimin Shimbun, 6 Henry, Prince of Prussia, 84, 130 Hewart, Sir Gordon, 331—2, 337 Higashi-fushimi, Admiral Prince, 247 Hintze, Admiral Paul von, 179-83 Hioki Eki, 153, 182, 192 Hirata Tosuke, 37 Hirohito, crown prince, 300, 321-4, 326, 386, 388 Hochi Shimbun, 70 Hokkaido Tanko company, 12 Holland, see Netherlands Holleben, Dr von, 130 Honda Kumataro, 189-91, 204 Hong Kong, n, 51,95,99, 116-17, 126, 135, 142, 184-5, 22°, 284, 294, 301, 310,389 Hosoya Chihiro, Professor, 5 House, Colonel Edward M., 215, 217— 19 Hsinmintung—Fakumen line, 17—18, 30—1 Hughes, Charles Evans, American secretary of state, 331, 336, 344, 346, 350, 354-7, 3