All the Shills Money Can Buy

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ll the Shills Money Can Buy HOW KAZAKHSTAN AND AZERBAIJAN USE USEFUL IDIOTS, CROOKED ACADEMICS, AND LAW-BREAKING LOBBYISTS TO WHITEWASH THEIR POLICE STATES  

BY CASEY MICHEL  

 

All the Shills Money Can Buy

Michel 1 

“Though starkly put, [the] comparison of lobbyists to defense attorneys is in fact the most common defense offered by lobbyists who work for foreign despots. But there are of course some rather striking distinctions here. Lawyers represent clients who may or may not be guilty, and when the evidence against them is clear, the clients almost always go to prison. Lobbyists for dictators are working for people whose crimes are generally documented beyond dispute, and when they succeed, they enhance their clients’ grip on power and ability to continue oppressing their citizens and pillaging the national treasury. The only people at risk of going to jail are political dissidents opposing the dictator- clients.”  clients.”   - Ken Silverstein, Turkmeniscam  

“What’s your wife’s name? What school do you go to? Who funds your scholarship right now? Where do you work? How do you pay your meals? … What’s your cholesterol count?”   - Dr. Brenda Shaffer

 

All the Shills Money Can Buy

Table of Contents 3 – Introduction 16 – Legal Legacies 23 – Media Manipulation 50 – Free Agent Diplomacy 64 – Crooked Academics, Tainted Think Tanks 80 – Innovation as Success?

Michel 2 

 

All the Shills Money Can Buy

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Introduction12 

Since lobbying first began as a formal entity in the United States  –  since  since veterans of the War of Independence first hired William Hull in order to aid in demands for wartime compensation3 –   –  innovation  innovation has followed suit. Changes in lobbying methodology, influenced by resultant efficacy, arose with successive administrations and successive demands, with legal

requirements following apace. The origins of the term “lobbyist” “lobb yist” in and of itself exists as testament to innovation; those seeking the ear of US President Ulysses Grant took leave of prior  protocol and instead tailed the president through the lobby of the Willard Hotel, knowledgeable that the president would not only be free, but was likely to have enjoyed a handful of drinks.4  Enforcement of regulation, or attempts therein, followed thereafter, with the first efforts at lobbyist regulation arising in 1876. 5 Those lobbying for foreign entities shared much overlap in methods with those lobbying for domestic entities, including providing informational material, organizing meetings, landing speaking opportunities, and reaching out to media to provide coverage of assorted related events. However, those tho se acting on behalf of foreign principals stake one discernible difference from their domestic counterparts: Not only does the Federal Election

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 Silverstein opening quote taken from: Silverstein, Ken. Turkmeniscam. New York: Random House, 2008, 163. Shaffer opening quote taken from: Michel, Casey. “Brenda Shaffer’s Conflicts of Interest,” 23 Oct. 2014. Retrieved from, and audio available at,  at,  http://www.caseymichel.com/blog/2014/10/23/brenda-shaffers-conflicts-of-interest (accessed 8 April 2015). Shaffer’s quote came during an on -the-record discussion at Columbia University on 23 Oct. 2014. Opening image courtesy: “Spin doctors to the autocrats: how European PR firms whitewash repressiv repressivee regimes,” Corporate Europe Observatory, Observatory, 20 Jan. 2015. Full report available at http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/20150120_spindoctors_mr.pdf .  2  The author would like to express his sincere gratitude to Columbia University’s Harriman Institute, without whom this report would not be possible, and most especially Dr. Alexander Cooley and Dr. Elise Giuliano. He would also like to thank the researchers with enough hutzpah to prior cover this topic  –  Ken  Ken Silverstein, most notably –  and  and his  parents, of course. 3  Silverstein, Turkmeniscam, 52. 4  Craig Holman, Origins, Evolution and Structure of the Lobbying Disclosure Act , PUB. CITIZEN, 11 May 2006, 5. For the sake of this essay, the term “lobbying” will be understood along the lines o off Holman’s definition; that is, “the process of petitioning government to influence public policy.” Holman, 1. 5  Holman, 2-3.

 

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Commission prohibit any foreign national from funding any an y facets of American elections,6 but since 1938, such agents have been required to register under the auspices the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), enacted following on the heels of concerns about Nazi propaganda in the United States. FARA remains in effect today, toda y, with assorted amendments supplemented in the ensuing decades. As traditionally understood, lobbying –  that  that is, “the process of petitioning government to influence public policy”7 –   –  existed  existed under the political science rubric of an “iron triangle.”8 

Lobbyists presented the “interest groups” who “often pressur[e]” bureaucrats, while simultaneously representing organizations and interests that can present electoral support to Congressmen. Such formulation continues, especially on the th e domestic front. However, as foreign lobbyists do not represent an inherent electoral bloc  –  that  that is, constituents from their foreign country are unable to vote –  such “iron triangle” stands slightly shifted, relying less upon public appeals and more greatly upon foreign policy concerns and contingencies. Indeed, the United

States’ 1976 Lobby Law formally can help elucidate this primary difference. The 1976 Lobby Law divided lobbying between “direct” “d irect” and “grassroots,” with the former “stating one’ s position on specific legislation to a legislator ” –  the  the preferred method among foreign lobbyists –  and  and the latter appealing directly to the broader public  –  one  one of the primary methods of those engaged in domestic lobbying.9 For decades, traditional methods of lobbying lobb ying dominated efforts of foreign

entities’ image-management efforts among English-speaking audiences, albeit with a marked emphasis on the “direct” aspect of lobbying. lobb ying. It may well be argued that, inde indeed, ed, such methods

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 Further details on such prohibition can be located at the Federal Election Commission’s “Foreign Nationals” Website. Retrieved from  from http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/foreign.shtml  http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/foreign.shtml (accessed 25 April 2015). 7  Holman, 5. 8  Sullivan, Larry. The SAGE glossary of the social and behavioral sciences. Sage Publications, 2009. “Iron Triangles.”  9  Sullivan, Larry. The SAGE glossary of the social and behavioral sciences. Sage Publications, 2009. “Lobbying.”  

 

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still dominate such efforts, in the sense of outweighing those efforts deemed innovative in both magnitude and funding. Among the predominance of these traditional methods, lobb lobbyists yists and firms engage in outreach to both media and Congress, holding both face-to-face meetings while also bundling informational material to outlets and politicians (and staffs) alike. Lobbyists also utilize traditional methods to seek to engage the th e broader public –  although  although this remains rarer for foreign lobbyists than domestic lobbyists. Such methods include arranging speaking

engagements, while also helping organize events even ts related to furthering the client’s interests, from small luncheons to lavish banquets. To be sure, it should be noted that “traditional” should not denote “prior”; for instance, members of lobby ing organizations no longer directly dispense checks to legislators on the floor of Congress. 10   Nonetheless, it may well be argued that innovative tactics stands that much more necessary in the twenty-first century, due both to the phalanx of regulation surrounding such  policies as well as the sheer expansion of actors seeking to enact policies, or to ameliorate the reputations of their clients. Much of such innovation, in fact, comes on the heels of increasing globalization. With increasing ease of communication and an d travel, foreign entities –  many  many flush with excess hydrocarbon wealth they have opted to spend abroad, rather than domestically –   have found themselves able to access English-language markets and audiences with far greater ease than in the decades prior, and with presumed greater ease moving forward. Where an American audience in the mid-twentieth century would wo uld have heard of, for instance, Kazakhstan through rare coverage in the media, they can now both actively access data on the country via an online search, but can easily ea sily access such information passively, through television commercials or advertising inserts in English-language publications.

10

  Ibid  Ibid .

 

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Such access comes amidst a remarkable shift within the world of Anglophone journalism, in which revenue for traditional media  –  newspapers  newspapers and magazines, especially –  continues  continues to  plummet while new media entities, from Huffington Post to NowThis to BuzzFeed , continue to expand. However, two stark realities prevent this from being a simple transfer of personnel and revenue stream. Firstly, the new news entities, while expanding rapidly, do not yet claim nearly the breadth of operation nor revenue the prior media organizations formerly held. While that may ma y shift in the mid-term, there is little likelihood BuzzFeed will suddenly enjoy the economic salience The New  New York Times once knew. As such, while new media has helped staunch some of the economic outflow from journalism, much of the revenue –  as  as well as many of the personnel no longer in journalism, or no longer seeing a future in journalism  –  has  has veered toward the world of public relations. To select but one metric, the Pew Research Center has foun found d that the salary gap between public relations specialists and news reporters has increased approximately $20,000  per year over the past decade.11 Secondly, outlets comprising the new media grouping do not yet enjoy the reputation of prior media entities. That is not n ot to say that they have outright earned   aa less-than-stellar reputation; after all, Stephen Glass and Jayson Blair worked for The New  Republic and The New York Times, respectively. However, these new media outlets have not yet 12

 built up their reputations to nearly the level of trust accrued through old media counterparts.   Moreover, these new media outlets enter the market within the general tide of coarsening

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 Williams, Alex. “The growing pay gap between journalism and public relations ,” Pew Research Center, 11 Aug. 2014. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/11/the-growing-pay-gap-between-journalism-and-public2014.  relations/  (accessed 8 April 2015). relations/ 12  To choose but one example, an a n October poll from Pew Research Center found that The Economist , BBC, and  NPR were the three most-trusted outlets of the 36 surveyed, while  BuzzFeed was the least-trusted outlet. Gottfried, Jeffrey; Kiley, Jocelyn; Matsa, Katerina; and Mitchell, Amy. “Political Polarization & Media Habits,” Pew Research Center, 21 Oct. 2014. Retrieved from  from http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits/  http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits/   (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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attitudes toward media as a whole. 13 As media offerings have proliferated, we have witnessed a concomitant decrease in trust toward mainstream media  –  all  all while public pub lic relations specialists earn that much greater pay than their journalism counterparts. As The Washington Post recently found, in 2004 there were slightly more than three PR specialists for every journalist in the US. In 2014, there were nearly five times as many.14  It is within these two trends –  the  the enhancement of innovative inno vative tactics within foreign lobbying and public relations efforts among English-speaking English -speaking audiences, as well as the decreasing capacity of journalism outfits to carry their editorial duties  –  that  that I have elected to examine the public relations and image-management innovations brought to bear by the Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani governments, and related interests, over the past half-dozen years. The selection of these two nations stems from a variety of factors, including distinct similarities in hydrocarbon wealth, secular post-Soviet autocratic governance, g overnance, majority Turkic Muslim  populations, and designs on putative multi-vector foreign policies. Indeed, as will be detailed through this essay, the images both Baku and Astana seek to craft in the West are remarkably similar. These nations, they would have English-speaking audiences au diences believe, are glamorous and  progressive, friendly toward Israel and bulwarks against fundamentalists, fundamentalists, bastions of stability in a sea of chaos –  all  all while providing significant outposts of potential energy energ y security. While much

of my research takes place from 2013 onwards, I’ve delimited the time frame to 2009 due to a handful of factors, not least  because this appears the earliest instance of Azerbaijan’s willingness willingness

13

 According to a 2014 Gallup poll, “ Americans’ confidence in the media's ability to report ‘ the news fully, accurately, and fairly’ has returned to its previous all-time low [.]” Only 40 percent responded that they enjoyed enj oyed a “great deal/fair amount” of trust –  with  with those identifying as Republicans registering only 27 percent. McCarthy, Justin. “Trust in Mass Media Returns to All -Time Low,” Gallup, 17 Sept. 2014. Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/poll/176042/trust-mass-media-returns-time-low.aspx  (accessed 8 April 2015). http://www.gallup.com/poll/176042/trust-mass-media-returns-time-low.aspx  14  Tankersley, Jim. “Why the PR industry is sucking up Pulitzer winners ,” The Washington Post, 23 April 2015. Retrieved from  from http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/04/23/why-the-pr-industry-is-suckingup-pulitzer-winners/  (accessed 24 April 2015). up-pulitzer-winners/

 

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to work with a lobbying organization at the fore of public relations innovation. Wh While ile I discuss methods employed by other post-Soviet nations throughout, I’ve refrained from commenting  at length on their practices, not least because some –  say,  say, Turkmenistan –  show  show little appetite for image-management in the West, while others  –  say,  say, Russia –  maintain  maintain far greater resources on hand.15  In order to further our understanding of traditional methods of lobbying among foreign  principals, especially within the post-Soviet sphere, it is worth briefly briefly examining the traditional

mechanisms of Russia’s approach in the United States. Much like those mentioned above, Moscow engaged with American public relations r elations firms –  most  most notably Ketchum  –  to  to lead traditional methods of image-management. For Ketchum, according to an investigation from  Politico, the deal was a “coup, even for a big global company. At about $5 million a year, it was

‘one of Ketchum’s top 10 accounts,’ according to a former executive familiar with the Russia  portfolio.”16 As it is, Ketchum pursued methods often associated with public relations firms, including organizing media sessions and preparing for interviews, as well as engaging with lobbyists to remove policies deemed detrimental to US-Russia relations, including the JacksonVannik Amendment. Ketchum also helped land a widely read 2013 opinion editorial (“op-ed”) in 17

The New York Times from Russian President Vladimir Putin.  Such methods –  media  media outreach,

especially –  highlighted  highlighted the traditional methods of public p ublic relations, with organizing meetings on  behalf of assorted policies presenting one of the traditional methods of lobbying.

15

 Pomerantsev, Peter and Weiss, Michael. “The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money,” The Interpreter, 22 Nov. 2014. Retrieved from  from  http://www.interpretermag.com/the-menace-ofunreality-how-the-kremlin-weaponizes-information-culture-and-money/  (accessed 8 April 2015). unreality-how-the-kremlin-weaponizes-information-culture-and-money/ 16  O’Brien, Luke. “Putin’s Washington,”  Politico, Jan./Feb. 2015. Retrieved from http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/putins-washington-113894.html#.VT7v4LNFBYc  (accessed 27 http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/putins-washington-113894.html#.VT7v4LNFBYc  April 2015). 17  Putin, Vladimir. “A Plea for Caution from Russia,” The New York Times, 11 Sept. 2013. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html?_r=0  (accessed 27 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html?_r=0 April 2015).

 

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Prior to this period of examination, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan had also focused most especially on heretofore traditional methods of lobbying and image-management. Not only were these methods infused with less innovation than the methods detailed through this essay, but these traditional methods were also utilized by other nations alongside. These traditional methods did not cease with the advent of the innovative tactics detailed b below; elow; certain of these methods have continued to the present, often in the employ of both nations. To wit, both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have continued to put forth “sponsored content” within English-

language publications. “Sponsored context” exists as a journalistically neutral method in which content favorable to either nation is published alongside the outlet’s primary publication –  with  with a  prominent disclaimer alerting the audience that the “sponsored content” is published through a mechanism exterior to the outlet’s editorial or reportage arm. Both states have also continued to utilize paid lobbyists to engage with outlets to publish pub lish op-eds by state officials, or by members of organizations carrying similar interests to Baku and Astana. Within diplomatic efforts, Azerbaijan has consistently targeted American lawmakers at both state and federal levels,  pushing everything from recognition of Azerbaijani territorial integrity integrity to stronger relations  between Washington and Baku. Kazakhstan, likewise, has focused on international fora, allowing Astana to land, for instance, the 2010 20 10 OSCE Chairmanship. Both nations have also  been involved in donations within the Anglophone scholarly community, donating significant sums to American university bodies composing reports on the respective nations  –  and,  and, in certain instances, receiving favorable coverage consequent. But this examination will not focus on parsing prior methods of public relations and image-management; this essay, rather, will look at the recent innovative tactics of the Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani efforts therein.

 

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The selection of these two nations also stems from the necessity of public relations and image-management within Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in expanding their reputational and economic reach. Such practices arise, a rise, in part, to overcome the authoritarian legacies and realities within either country. Both countries have enacted enact ed widely repressive policies against and within their populations, targeting most especially civil rights advocates, political opposition, and independent media, among others. Such repression can be found through almost any metric. Both nations are regularly tabbed as “Not Free” by Freedom House, and both remain within the

 bottom third of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index Index and the bottom quartile of Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index. Indeed, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) recently named Azerbaijan the fifth-most censored country in the world.18 Moreover, such repression has only increased since 2009. Azerbaijan, which  The  Economist describes as a “nastier autocracy” than even Belarus,19 currently maintains twice the

number of political prisoners in Russia and Belarus combined. 20 According to the International

Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), “Repression of Azeri civil society, NGOs and journalists has escalated significantly.”21 Baku was also recently the first nation to see its status downgraded  by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative due to its restrictive restrictive policies.22 Kazakhstan,

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 “10 Most Censored Counties,” Committee to Protect Journalists, April 2015. Retrieved from https://cpj.org/2015/04/10-most-censored-countries.php  https://cpj.org/2015/04/10-most-censored-countries.php (accessed 21 April 2015). 19  “Belarus and the great bear,” The Economist , 11 April 2015. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21648038-russias-antics-ukraine-are-upending-politics-elsewhere-belarusand-great-bear  (accessed 8 April 2015). 20  “Open Letter Regarding the Human Rights Situation in Azerbaijan,” Freedom House, 13 April 2015. Retrieved https://freedomhouse.org/article/open-letter-regarding-human-rights-situation-azerbaijan#.VTZbIbNFBYe   from  https://freedomhouse.org/article/open-letter-regarding-human-rights-situation-azerbaijan#.VTZbIbNFBYe from (accessed 21 April 2015). 21  “Azerbaijan: Repression Escalates in Run -up to European Games,” International Federation for Human Rights, 21 April 2015. Retrieved from  from https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-Human-Rights/eastern-europecentral-asia/azerbaijan/azerbaijan-repression-escalates-in-run-up-to-european-games  (accessed 21 April 2015). central-asia/azerbaijan/azerbaijan-repression-escalates-in-run-up-to-european-games 22 Denber, Rachel. “A Demotion for Azerbaijan,” Human Rights Watch, 15 April 2015. Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/15/dispatches-demotion-azerbaijan  http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/15/dispatches-demotion-azerbaijan  (accessed 21 April 2015).

 

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meanwhile, boasts a “postmodern dictatorship,”23 according to the Human Rights Foundation, while CPJ recently “condemn[ed the] eradication of Kazakh independent media.” 24 FIDH

additionally notes that “torture and other forms of ill-treatment continue to be widely widel y used in Kazakhstan.”25 Kazakhstan also saw government forces kill at least 14 unarmed protesters during

the 2011 Zhanaozen events, a massacre Astana then utilized to enact “a harsh and unprecedented crackdown on freedom of expression and political plurality[.]”26 Kazakhstan has since continued  jailing opposition leaders and shuttering remaining independent press, with President Nursultan Nursultan

 Nazarbayev, one of the world’s longest-running leaders, set to enter yet another term in office in 2015. According to the US State Department’s most recent human rights report, Kazakhstan “lack[ed] an independent judiciary” and placed “severe limits on citizens’ rights to ch change ange their government.”27 In Azerbaijan, meanwhile, the US State Department Depa rtment witnessed “[i]ncreased restrictions on freedoms of expression, assembly, and association,” as well as “increased reports of arbitrary arrest and detention, politically motivated imprisonment, lack of due process, executive influence over the judiciary, and lengthy pretrial detention for individuals perceived as a threat by government officials [.]”28 Nonetheless, both countries prefer to pose a progressive,

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 Halvorssen, Thor. “So Sue Me: DC Henchman of Kazakh Dictator Threatens HRF with Lawsuit,” Human Rights Foundation, 13 Nov. 2012. Retrieved from  from  http://humanrightsfoundation.org/news/so-sue-me-dc-henchman-ofkazakh-dictator-threatens-hrf-with-lawsuit-00161  (accessed 25 April 2015). kazakh-dictator-threatens-hrf-with-lawsuit-00161 24  “CPJ condemns eradication of Kazakh independent media ,” Committee to Protect Journalists, 21 April 2014. Retrieved from  from https://cpj.org/2014/04/cpj-condemns-eradication-of-kazakh-independent-med.php  https://cpj.org/2014/04/cpj-condemns-eradication-of-kazakh-independent-med.php (accessed 25 April 2015). 25  “Kazakhstan: Justice must prevail for torture victim Rasim Bayramov ,” FIDH, 28 Jan. 2015. Retrieved from https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-Human-Rights/eastern-europe-central-asia/kazakhstan/16872kazakhstan-justice-must-prevail-for-torture-victim-rasim-bayramov  (accessed 25 April 2015). kazakhstan-justice-must-prevail-for-torture-victim-rasim-bayramov 26  “Central Asia: Widespread Rights Abuse, Repression,” Human Rights Watch, 31 Jan. 2013. Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/31/central-asia-widespread-rights-abuse-repression  http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/31/central-asia-widespread-rights-abuse-repression (accessed 8 April 2015). 27  “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 –  Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan,”” US State Department. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=220395#wrapper  (accessed 25 April 2015). 28  “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 –  Azerbaijan,” US State Department. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=220255#wrapper  (accessed 25 April 2015).

 

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 professional image for English-speaking audiences –  while  while simultaneously existing as two of the most repressive, predatory regimes extant –  for  for the sake of easing investment concerns and appeals, especially as it pertains to hydrocarbon extraction ex traction and transit. Likewise, from a security  perspective, Azerbaijan seeks to carve a distinct narrative for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict while simultaneously enhancing the putative international threat from Iran. Kazakhstan positions

itself as an “island of stability” in a region buffeted by b y uncertainty, while simultaneously seeking to extricate itself from the image and assumptions stemming from other nations ending e nding with the

suffix “-stan.” Due to the relatively recent nature of Azerbaijan’s Azerb aijan’s and Kazakhstan’s innovative tactics within public relations and image-management, academic literature on such topics remains relatively sparse. However, a sequence of critical and investigative accounts have helped shed light on this phenomenon. In addition add ition to assorted reportage within English-language press, a

series of reports have helped parse the methods method s and tools present within Azerbaijan’s and Kazakhstan’s attempts at furthering their reputational and economic reach. For instance, a 2012 report from the European Stability Initiative (ESI) entitled “Caviar Diplomacy” detailed the methods Azerbaijan utilized to obtain favorable prognoses for recent presidential and 29

 parliamentar y elections from the Council of Europe’s parliamentary assembly (PACE).  

According to ESI, one Azerbaijani source said, “Caviar, at least, is given at every [PACE] [P ACE] session. But during visits to Baku many other things are given as well. Many deputies are regularly invited to Azerbaijan and generously paid. … Gifts are mostly expensive silk carpets,

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 “Caviar Diplomacy,” European Stability Initiative, 24 May 2012. Retrieved from http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB8QFjAA&url =http%3A%2F%2Fwww.esiweb.org%2Fpdf%2Fesi_document_id_131.pdf&ei=prUtVc_xAsalgwTLmoO4BA&usg =AFQjCNEKWZHgCPNtkSpKP6NOxx4pNVXBgQ&sig2=5p9arRrIGrGhvFJmLD6ZSA&bvm=bv.90790515,d.eX Y (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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gold and silver items, drinks, caviar and money. mone y. In Baku, a common g gift ift is 2 kg of caviar [worth

nearly 3,000 euros].”30 A 2015 report from Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) further detailed the diplomatic lobbying efforts by Azerbaijani- and an d Kazakhstani-funded entities

attempting to spin the countries’ respective human rights records. 31 (Indicative of the reception CEO received in its investigations, Demir Murat Seyrek, the head of a Brussels-based

communications firm working for the Azerbaijani Ministry of Culture, told CEO to “F*** off.”32) Human Rights Watch, likewise, has reported extensively on former British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s role with Kazakhstan, including a lengthy public correspondence between Blair and Hugh Williamson, HRW’s director of the Europe and Central Asia division d ivision. During their correspondence, Blair failed to delineate his role in Astana, offering broad, obfuscating responses in lieu of details –  a key factor in the formulation of his model of “free agent

diplomacy,” to be detailed below. As it pertains to academia, investigative reporter Ken Silverstein has thus far put forth the most illuminating material on the confluence of academia and funding from the Caspian region, including a handful of articles examining the role traditional lobbying –  viz.  viz. funding for academic institutions, in stitutions, especially from Azerbaijan –  has  has  played within coaxing favorable proclamations from certain members of the scholarly 33

community.   The essay as follows adds to the growing canon of examinations of public relations and image-management among Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, but with a more especial focus on the distinct lack of disclosure among those tasked with buffing the reputations of Baku and Astana  –  

30

  Ibid  Ibid .  “Spin doctors to the autocrats: how European PR firms whitewash repressiv repressivee regimes,” Corporate Europe Observatory. 32  “Spin doctors to the autocrats: how European PR firms whitewash repressiv repressivee regimes,” Corporate Europe Observatory, 25. 33 Silverstein, Ken. “Academics for Hire,”  Harper’s, 30 May 2006. Retrieved from https://archive.is/DjGjR#selection-285.376-285.693  (accessed 8 April 2015). https://archive.is/DjGjR#selection-285.376-285.693 

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 both within media and the scholarly community –  as  as well as examining the roles the two

governments have played in utilizing Blair’s presence. That is to say, this essay focuses on innovative tactics –   –  those  those employed for the sake of buffing the images of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan among English-language audiences, as well as within international bodies. The essay opens with a brief history of lobbying and image-management among foreign entities within English-speaking audiences, especially in the United States, and proceeds to examine three  primary areas of innovation, all combining forms of obfuscation for the sake of buffing buffing the image of Baku and Astana. The first section deals with innovations found within media  –   namely, the utilization of online media for the creation of pro-government outlets, as well as the outright failure(s) of disclosure among lobbyists posing as mere observers. Likewise, this section discusses the failure of certain publications in question in clarifying these relations –  or  or even in

showing any interest in clarifying. The second deals d eals with the phenomenon of “free ag agent ent diplomacy,” a term I’ve employed to examine most especially Blair’s network –  and  and his network’s work –  within  within Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. And lastly, I examine the infiltration of Baku and Astana funding into the world of academia and think tanks –  as  as well as the pairing of academics and think tanks who have received significant funding from, and published material sympathetic to, Baku, despite their nominal independence. Throughout this essay, I will be examining innovative methods employed by Baku and Astana, and those seeking to enhance the reputational and economic breadth of the autocratic regimes in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, within English-speaking audiences. Through this examination, it is clear c lear both Baku and Astana, as well as attendant parties, have sought to exploit and expand existing trends within journalism and diplomacy in their attempts to achieve a chieve such aims. Such success within this innovation, however, remains to be seen, and appears to vary based upon the audience targeted. These

 

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audiences vary from diplomats and policy-makers to scholars and students attempting to examine the region, as well as occasional attempts at engaging swaths of the broader public. No audience

has been left untouched by Baku’s and Astana’s innovative tactics –  and,  and, unfortunately for audiences and rights advocates alike, there the re appears little likelihood that such methods will begin waning in the near future.

 

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Legal Legacies “I CAN TAKE THE FLAK.”   -EDWARD

J. VON KLOBERG III

 

 

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Before delving into the methods of innovation, it remains necessary to briefly detail the legal backing and restrictions for foreign entities in attempting to sway English-speaking –  and  and especially American –  audiences.  audiences.34 Per FARA regulation, those acting on behalf of foreign

agents are required to register their work, and any an y attendant “informational materials (formerly  propaganda),” with the Department of Justice.35 These agents must likewise disclose such relations to Congress during testimony.36 Such regulations exist because, after the first attempts to regulate lobbying came to pass in the United States, an external aactor ctor entered into a heretofore domestic process: foreign nations, or interests therein. In the mid-1930s, the th e Nazi government retained the services of lobbyist Ivy Lee, under the th e auspices of a company called German Dye Trust. Lee –  nicknamed “Poison Ivy” by Upton Sinclair –  stood as “the father of modern public p ublic relations,” and worked “to favorably influence American public opinion of the Third Reich.”37  As it is, Lee did not go far fa r to mask his ties to the Nazi government; according to one report from Time on his appearance before Congress, “Inasmuch as [the Dye Trust] was one of o f the two early

and potent backers of Adolf Hitler and inasmuch as the German Government has assumed pretty thorough control of private business, the committee got the impression that Mr. Lee might just as well have been retained by the Reichskanzler himself .” .”38 As such, Congress enacted in 1938 the

Foreign Agents Registration Act, an act that demands disclosure of individuals “engag[ing]   within the United States in political activities for or in the interests of such foreign principal ” or

“act[ing] within the United States as a public relations counsel, publicity agent, information  34

 Kloberg quote taken from: Silverstein, Turkmeniscam, 9.  “FARA Frequently Asked Questions.” Retrieved from  from http://www.fara.gov/fara-faq.html http://www.fara.gov/fara-faq.html  (accessed 24 April 2015). 36   Ibid  Ibid . 37  Silverstein, Turkmeniscam, 4-5. Lee had prior served at the behest of Poland, Romania, and –  in  in a display of the t he ideological immaterialism of certain of these lobbyists  –  the Soviet Union. He also represented IG Farben, “ a chemical company later to produce the lethal let hal gas for the death chambers in the t he concentration camps .” “S pin doctors to the autocrats: how European PR firms whitewash repressive regimes,” Corporate Europe Observatory, 9.   38   Ibid  Ibid .

35

 

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service employee or political consultant for or in the interests of such foreign principal[.]”39An

“agent” is, broadly, any individual who acts in any “capacity at the order, request, or under direction or control, of a foreign principal[.] ”40 A “foreign principal” includes “ a government of a foreign country and a foreign political party,” a “ person residing outside the United States,” or any organization “organized under the laws of … a foreign country.”41 While perhaps broad, numerous exceptions remain allowing individuals and organizations to forego registration.42  The motivations for such passage, both in 1938 1 938 and thereafter, remain multi-fold. According to Jahad Atieh, the Act –  originally designed solely against “Nazi propaganda” 43 –   –  

was “not designed to substantively censor or restrict foreign propaganda; rather, it was designed to deter its use and adoption through mandatory disclosure requirements and fear of criminal  punishment.”44 Indeed, as the 1987 Supreme Court case of Meese v. Keene delineated, the Act

neither “ prohibits, edits, [n]or restrains the distribution distribution of materials” in question.45 The Act  passed with an apparent presumption that public awareness would suffice as preventative

 pressure to end ties with unseemly foreign governments. As Silverstein Silverstein notes, “The idea seems to  be that with the need for disclosure, lobbyists would find it too embarrassing embarrassing to take on clients that were hideously immoral or corrupt, no matter how much money the they y were offered. That 46

assumption proved to be naïve.”  Whatever the discrepancy between text and intent, a broad  39

 See Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. § 611. Ibid .   Ibid  41   Ibid  Ibid . 42  Atieh, Jahad. “Foreign Agents: Updating FARA to Protect American Democracy,” University of Pennsylvania  Journal of International Law, Vol. 31, 2010, 1062-1063. 43  Holman, 4. 44  Atieh, 1056-1057. 45  U.S. Supreme Court, Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987). Syllabus available at https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/US/481/481.US.465.85-1180.html. https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/US/481/481.US.465.85-1180.html.  46  Silverstein, Ken. Turkmeniscam, 5. As Silverstein notes, perhaps no individual punctures this theory to a greater extent than Edward J. von Kloberg Kl oberg III, who served as a lobbyist at tthe he behest of Saddam Hussein, Laurent Kabila, Mobutu Sese Seko, Samuel Doe, and Nicolae Ceaușescu Ceaușescu. Von Kloberg –  whose motto was “shame is for sissies” –   was also the sole lobbyist to respond positively to a Spy Magazine investigation into lobbyists willing to represent a neo-Nazi organization. See Silverstein, Turkmeniscam, 9; Levine, Art. “Shame is for Sissies,” Mother Jones, 40

 

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 base rationale for the Act’s passage rests upon the necessity of exposing heretofore non-public  pressures on Congress. Moreover, as such pressures serve foreign powers, “there exists an inherent fear of the secret perversion of our officials by foreign governments whose interests are

not in line with those of the American people.”47 Amendments to the Act followed thereafter, including a 1942 amendment amend ment clarifying the protection of national defense  –  as  as well as the  placement of enforcement under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department48 –   –  and  and a 1966

amendment that “changed the primary focus of FARA from an anti-propagandist tool into an instrument of regulation over grassroots lobbying as well as lobbying lobb ying of Congress by foreign agents.”49  The predominance of lobbying for foreign principals p rincipals shares significant overlap with its domestic counterpart. Many of the lobbyists lobb yists and firms engage in media and Congressional outreach, packaging informational material to outlets as well as politicians and staffs alike. Lobbyists further arrange speaking engagements and help h elp organize events related to furthering

the client’s interests, from small  luncheons to lavish banquets. Likewise, the increasing ease of travel has allowed lobbyists to expand the scope of providing travel arrangements for Congressmen.50 Cultivating relationships, disseminating information, and approaching attendant audiences –  whether  whether within the diplomatic, scholarly, or broader community –  to  to further the interests of the clients remains the broader aim of those registered under the auspices of FARA.

Sept./Oct. 2005. Retrieved from  from http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2005/09/shame-sissies http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2005/09/shame-sissies  (accessed 28 April 2015). 47  Atieh, 1066. 48  Atieh, 1056-1057. 49  Holman, 4. 50  Silverstein highlights highlights one indicative instance: “In 2004 six former members of Congress served as ‘election observers’ in Cameroon and offered an upbeat assessment of President Paul Biya’s overwhelming reelection victory, which a local Roman Catholic card inal described as ‘surrounded by fraud.’ It turned out that the firm of Patton Boggs, which worked for the Cameroonian government, had arranged the trip of allegedly independent observers, whose expenses were paid by the Biya regime.” Silverstein, Ken. “Their Men in Washington,” Harper’s, July 2007.

 

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As with domestic lobbying patterns, foreign agents seek, at their base, to improve the image and standing of their respective clients within assorted circles in America. As it is, the expansion of wholesale foreign lobbying within the United States has

continued apace since FARA’s inception. Such expansion shouldn’t necessarily be surprising; as Silverstein writes, foreign governments have realized that “lobbyists are the crucial conduit through which pariah regimes advance their interests in Washington.” 51  As one former lobbyist

told Silverstein, “It's like the secret handshake that gets you into the lodge.” 52 Funds swell, staffs increase, and approaches within traditional lobbying methods strengthen and expand. The foreign funds for agents representing foreign principals have expanded spectacularly in the

decades following FARA’s creation. According to the most recent information available, the governments spending the most on lobbying lobb ying efforts in the United States include the United Arab Emirates ($14.2 million), Germany ($12 million), and Canada ($11.2 million) –  with  with

Azerbaijan’s $2.3 million representing the tenth-highest rate in the US.53 However, as Atieh writes, as “lobbying has grown in the latter half of the twentieth century, its abuses have followed suit.”54 For instance, a 1958 case found an FBI agent “illegally acting as a foreign

agent” on behalf of the Dominican Republic –  though  though the ruling was later overturned 55  –  –  and  and a 1961 scandal revealed that West Germany German y hired a public relations firm in order to write speeches for members of Congress.56 In 1963, further amendments allowed exemptions for attorneys and

51

  Ibid  Ibid .   Ibid  Ibid . 53  Itkowitz, Colby. “Which foreign countries spent the most to influence U.S. politics? ” The Washington Post, 14 May 2014. Retrieved from  from http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/wp/2014/05/14/which-foreigncountries-spent-the-most-to-influence-u-s-politics/  (accessed 25 April 2015). countries-spent-the-most-to-influence-u-s-politics/ 54  Atieh, 1052. 55  Frank v. United States, 262 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cited in Atieh, 1058. 56 RUSSELL WARREN HOWE & SARAH HAYS TROTT, THE POWER PEDDLERS: A REVEALING ACCOUNT OF FOREIGN LOBBYING IN WASHINGTON 22 (1977), cited in Atieh, 1058. 52

 

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domestic subsidiaries for foreign corporations  –  providing  providing further avenue for the exploitation of loopholes.57  The ability to exploit such loopholes stems from a pair p air of realities. Firstly, Congress has

“done little to alleviate many of the loopholes loop holes that exist,” especially as opposed to domestic lobbying legislation.58 Moreover, the Justice Department’s enforcement –  either  either in ability or willingness –  has been “abysmal.” 59 As Silverstein wrote in 2007, “ The U.S. General Accounting Office estimated in 1990 that less than half of foreign lobbyists who should register under FARA actually do so, and there is no evidence that matters have improved.”60 Not only is the staff tasked with enforcing FARA far too small to deal with its workload, but FARA inherently rests upon a self-reporting mechanism. That is, those who do not register under FARA do not need to

notify the Justice Department. “FARA,” as Atieh notes, “is essentially self - policed.”  policed.”61 FARA is not quite an honor system, but it lacks both breadth in investigative inve stigative powers and mechanisms to

enforce reportage. Still, it should be noted that FARA’s range surpasses registration and enforcement mechanisms within the European Union. According to Corporate Europe

Observatory, “we know far more about the governments contracting lobbyists in Washington than we do about those in Brussels. ”62 Despite its myriad and continued flaws, FARA presents a relatively broad lens into lobbying methods and attempts within the US, even with the loopholes  present. It is with this legal background, and with the aforementioned trends among journalism,

that I will turn to my first topic of innovative tactics among Azerbaijan’s and Kazakhstan’s

57

 Atieh, 1059.  Atieh, 1052. 59  Atieh, 1067. 60  Silverstein Silverstein,, “Their Men in Washington.”  61  Atieh, 1062. 62 “Spin doctors to the autocrats: how European PR firms whitewash repressiv repressivee regimes,” Corporate Europe Observatory, 9. 58

 

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efforts at public relations and image-management: manipulation within media, and the ethics of modern journalism.

 

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Media Manipulation

“YOU’RE A SCANDAL MONGER AND I DON’T WANT TO TALK TO YOU.”   -DAN

BURTON

 

 

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As it pertains to English-language media, the most substantive innovative tactics among the Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani governments, or related organizations pushing identical interests, lies within the realm of disclosure, or lack therein. 63 Likewise, both states have discovered and utilized outlets who continually fail to clarify relations between lobbyists and governments and interests in question. But before parsing the editorial innovations and manipulations extant within the lobbying and public relations efforts to burnish the images of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, it remains necessary to delineate the means with which these states have not  enacted  enacted any forms of innovation. innov ation. That is, it remains necessary to examine the traditional methods with which these states have engaged English-language media, and to thus examine how they have extended in their innovations and manipulations  –  and  and why that extension can be found most especially within the distinct lack of disclosure extant over the past few years.

Both states have recently engaged in “sponsored content” inserts with American  publications. “Sponsored content” remains a ethically neutral journalistic procedure in which exterior organizations, or those tangential to the publication’s editorial  arm, produce content  bundled within the respective publications, with a prominent notification alerting the reader reader that

the material in question does not stem from the publication’s p ublication’s editorial wing. For instance, o n 21 September 2011, the American newspaper USA Today carried a one-page insert on “Kazakhstan

 –  Central Asia’s leading market.”64 Detailing the myriad aspects of Kazakhstan’s economic viability, the insert shared statistics on Kazakhstan’s oil reserves and resource potential, as well as why Kazakhstan “has much to celebrate and a great deal to look forward to.” Nearly four

63

 Burton quote taken from: Wemple, Erik. “Former congressman and Azerbaijan advocate finds receptive audience at Daily Caller,” The Washington Post, 3 April 2015. Retrieved from  from http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erikwemple/wp/2015/04/03/former-congressman-and-azerbaijan-advocate-finds-receptive-audience-at-daily-caller/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 64 “Kazakhstan –  Central Asia’s leading market,” USA Today, 22 Sept. 2011. Retrieved from http://www.theworldfolio.com/files/old/1315923677.pdf (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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years later, Washington Times ran a multi-page insert detailing how Azerbaijan, according acco rding to the

headline, is a “Thriving U.S. Ally,” 65 with further material noting that Azerbaija n is a “strategic American ally that deserves our full support.” 66 To be sure, other post-Soviet governments go vernments have employed such inserts. In 2015, for instance, USA Today ran a similar –  and  and lengthier –  insert  insert to its prior Kazakhstan offering, detailing why Tajikistan is a “[s]table and strategic [country] at the

crossroads of Asia.”67  Throughout all inserts, the publications in question ran prominent disclaimers, noting that the material within originated exterior from, or tangential to, the respective publication’s editorial arms. The Kazakhstan insert, for instance, noted at the bottom

that “USA Today is not did not participate in its preparation and is not responsible for its content,” while The Washington Times’s insert on Azerbaijan specified that the ma terial was

“Prepared By The Washington Times Advocacy Department,” rather than the newspaper’s editorial department. All inserts present an instance of traditional “sponsored content” –  material  material  published alongside the publication, but produced exterior to the respective publications’ editorial components and with a broad, clear disclaimer to such effect. Kazakhstan has also

approached “sponsored content” deals on television, helping fund a segment on CNN in 2012 that painted the country in a flattering light. The necessary disclaimer, however, stood less  prominent than its print counterpart, appearing only during a “one -minute promo for the

series.”68 In the program CNN additionally featured an “energy expert” who commented on the

65

 Wemple, Erik. “Washington Times hearts Azerbaijan,” The Washington Post , 29 Jan. 2015. Retrieved from  http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2015/01/29/washington-times-hearts-azerbaijan/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 66  “Topic –  Azerbaija  Azerbaijan,” The Washington Times. Retrieved from  http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/azerbaijan/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 67  “Stable and strategic at the crossroads of Asia,” The World Folio. Retrieved from http://www.theworldfolio.com/news/stable-and-strategic-at-the-crossroads-of-asia/3568/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 68  Fisher, Max. “CNN’s Effusive Coverage of Kazakhstan Is Quietly Sponsored by Its Subject,” The Atlantic, 23 July 2012. Retrieved from  from http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/07/cnns-effusive-coverage-ofkazakhstan-is-quietly-sponsored-by-its-subject/260149/  (accessed 24 April 2015). kazakhstan-is-quietly-sponsored-by-its-subject/260149/

 

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state of energy affairs in Kazakhstan. This “expert” was also the “chairman of a government-

operated NGO created by” the Kazakhstani president, meaning that CNN, “in a sense,  present[ed] one of its advertisers as an unbiased expert to evaluate the work of that same

adviser.”69 CNN denied any impropriety in its approach, but coverage from The Atlantic and  Eurasianet highlighted the ethical questions extant, providing a hint of the media obfuscation to

come.

These states have also engaged in traditional methods of opinion editorials (“op-eds”) in English-language publications. Kazakhstan, for instance, has utilized public relations firms to engage with English-language publications, hiring the London-based firm BGR Gabara in 2010

under the auspices of acting as a “public relations firm.”70 BGR Gabara chief Ivo Ilic Gabara later noted that “every op -ed that you read that has come out of Kazakhstan … is our work”71 –   –   including, presumably, a 2012 op-ed from Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev within The New York Times.72 Likewise, these states have engaged in traditional lobbying efforts among

current Western diplomats –  more  more of which will be discussed later in this essay –  that  that result in favorable op-eds following such lobbying engagement. 73 For instance, former Rep. Michael

69

 Smith, Myles. “Kazakhstan: CNN Blurs Line Between Be tween News and Advertising,” Eurasianet , 20 July 2012. Retrieved from  from http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65688  http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65688  (accessed 24 April 2015). 70  US Department of Justice. Registration Statement, BGR Government Affairs, LLC, Foreign Agents Registration Act. 7 April 2011. Retrieved from. from. http://www.fara.gov/docs/5430-Exhibit-AB-20110411-35.pdf. http://www.fara.gov/docs/5430-Exhibit-AB-20110411-35.pdf.   71  Newman, Melanie  Newman, Melanie and Wright, Wright, Oliver. “Kazakhstan: PR firm’s plan to to target Sting after gig boycott (video),” The  Independent , 8 Dec. 2011. Retrieved from  from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/kazakhstan-pr-firms plan-to-target-sting-after-gig-boycott-video-6273824.html (accessed 8 April 2015). 72  Nazarbayev, Nursultan. “Wha  Nazarbayev, “Whatt Iran can learn learn from Kazakhstan,” Kazakhstan,” The New York Times, 13 March 2012. Retrieved from  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/opinion/what-iran-can-learn-from-kazakhstan.html?_r=0  from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/opinion/what-iran-can-learn-from-kazakhstan.html?_r=0 (accessed 8 April 2015). 73  While not necessarily a sign of innovation, it is worth noting that least one of the governments in question has managed to hire an American media consultant in direct opposition to said consultant’s political beliefs –  further  further evidence of erosion of stated or prior principle. Baku engaged Liz Mair, a former aide to former Texas Gov. Rick Perry and self-described “libertaria “libertarian,” n,” in late 2014 under the auspices of “provid[ing] public relations services.” Mair terminated the contract before its stated six-month tenure. “Azerbaijan Hires Ve teran U.S. Political Consultant,” RFE/RL, 23 Oct. 2014. Retrieved from  from  http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-mair-consultant-us politics/26652897.html  (accessed 25 April 2015).  politics/26652897.html

 

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McMahon visited Azerbaijan in mid-2013, alongside a contingent of Congressional representatives on a fact-finding trip. Soon thereafter, McMahon wrote an op-ed in The  Washington Times painting Azerbaijan in a discernibly favorable light, noting that Azerbaijan is

the “only former Soviet bloc country countr y singled out by a doctrine of U.S. foreign policy that is almost 21 years out of date[.]” 74 Organizations affiliated with furthering parallel p arallel interests –   though not necessarily at the behest of the governments in question –  have  have also penned multiple op-eds. Denis Jaffe, for instance, has written multiple op-eds within The Hill  that  that have sought to

hype the military threat emanating from Armenia. One of Jaffe’s op -eds, written in February 2015, stakes that “Armenia … conducted the largest human rights abuses in the entire postSoviet history,”75 while a second op-ed from 2014 discussed the “terrorist boasts” of the Armenian president.76 In both op-eds, The Hill identifies Jaffe as an “analyst” with the “U.S. Azeris Network,”77 a “non- profit”  profit” that remains the “first and largest grassroots advocacy and voter education network setup by and for the Azerbaijani-American voters in 2007.”78 Again, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are by b y no means outliers to such traditional practices.

74

 McMahon, Michael. “It’s unfair to hold Azerbaijan to a higher standard than Russia,” The Washington Times, 10 Dec. 2013. Retrieved from  from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/10/mcmahon-its-unfair-holdazerbaijan-higher-standard/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 75  Jaffe, Denis. “Hypertopia of the Armenian lobby,” The Hill , 16 Feb. 2015. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/civil-rights/232823-hypertopia-of-the-armenian-lobby (accessed 8 April 2015). 76  Jaffe, Denis. “Armenia threatens Azerbaijan with missiles,” The Hill, 20 Aug. 2014. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/215412-armenia-threatens-azerbaijan-with-missiles (accessed 8 April 2015). 77  U.S. Azeris Network Website. Retrieved from  from  http://www.usazeris.org/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 78  U.S. Azeris Network Facebook page. Retrieved Retrie ved from https://www.facebook.com/USAzerisNetworkUSAN/info?tab=page_info (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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But where Jaffe notes his connection to an organization with clear ties to Azerbaijani interests, other writers have offered op-eds but have claimed that they maintain no interaction with governmental officials. While no direct link has emerged to the governments, the parallel natures of these op-eds, alongside the timing and manner of publication, present conspicuous ties  between such authorship and hint at potential coordination. As one expert on journalistic ethics and international law noted, “There’s a scandal that’s been simmering for many man y years concerning the operations of lobbyists and their placement of pieces on editorial pages  –  particularly  particularly as opeds.”79 Maayan Jaffe, for instance, has written at least five op-eds in English-language  publications since 2013 that have attempted to paint Azerbaijan in a flattering light, including highlighting Azerbaijani-Israeli relations,80 noting inter-ethnic tolerance within Azerbaijan, 81  and, in two instances, calling in Roll Call  for  for Congress to cut funding for  Radio Free  Europe/Radio Liberty due to criticisms of Azerbaijan.82 (The latter op-ed garnered enough

 publicity that Nenad Pejic, RFE/RL’s editor in chief, felt it necessary to pen a response to

79

 Interview with author, 28 April 2015.  Jaffe, Maayan. “Unlikely allies,” Washington Jewish Week , 28 Aug. 2013. Retrieved from  http://washingtonjewishweek.com/5024/unlikely-allies/,  (accessed 8 April 2015). Jaffe, Maayan. “Azerbaijan-Israel http://washingtonjewishweek.com/5024/unlikely-allies/, relationship is glimmer of hope, model for Muslim-Jewish peace,” The Hill, 3 Nov. 2014. Retrieved from http://itk.thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/222501-azerbaijan-israel-relationship-is-glimmer-of-hopemodel (accessed 8 April 2015). 81  Jaffe, Maayan. “How to deal with Islamic State? Promote inclusiveness and tolerance,”  JNS.org , 16 Sept. 2014. Retrieved from  from http://www.jns.org/jns-blog/2014/9/16/how-to-deal-with-islamic-state-promote-inclusiveness-andtolerance#.VRc7PLNFBYc  (accessed 8 April 2015). tolerance#.VRc7PLNFBYc 82  Jaffe, Maayan. “Congress Should Stop Using Taxpayer Money to Fund Radio Free Europe’s Attacks on Our Allies,”  Roll Call, 25 Aug. 2014. Retrieved from http://www.rollcall.com/news/congress_should_stop_using_taxpayer_money_to_fund_radio_free_europes-2358301.html (accessed 8 April 2015); Jaffe, Maayan. “Congress: Support Higher Level of Press Freedoms, End Propaganda,” Roll Call , 9 Dec. 2014. Retrieved from http://www.rollcall.com/news/congress_support_higher_level_of_press_freedoms_end_propaganda_commentary238569-1.html  (accessed 8 April 2015). 238569-1.html 80

 

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Maayan Jaffe’s piece.83) Jaffe maintains no public connection to the Azerbaijani government, or to organizations pertaining to Azerbaijani interests. Within her op-eds, Jaffe J affe is identified with her

 prior journalistic credentials: “former “former editor in chief of the Baltimore Jewish Times,” “senior writer/editor at Netsmart,” “breaking news editor at the Jerusalem Post,” etc.. When contacted by this author, Maayan Jaffe declined to answer questions pertaining to her work on Azerbaijan,

citing “Passover” and “full-time” employment as why she “[doesn’t] have flexibility to talk.”84  (Denis Jaffe and Maayan Jaffe do not appear to be related to one another.) A woman named  Norma Zager, likewise, has penned multiple op-eds on similar themes. With no obvious connection to the Azerbaijani government or o r organizations pushing Azerbaijani interests, Zager,

identified only as a “journalist and author,” took to The Hill to call for Congress to slash funding for RFE/RL.85 Zager also wrote additional op-eds pushing p ushing Azerbaijani interests –  citing  citing Azerbaijani tolerance,86 burgeoning Azerbaijani-Israeli relations, 87 and calling on the US to increase support for Azerbaijan88 –   –  without  without any clear interest relating to said topics. When

contacted by the author, Zager noted that she “became interested in Azerbaijan when I met so me of their diplomats while writing pieces about Israel.”89 She clarified that the “diplomats” did not request that Zager write the aforementioned pieces. When Wh en asked about her stance on  RFE/RL,

83

 Pejic, Nenad. “Radio Free Europe Is Independent Media –  Not  Not State Propaganda,” Propaganda,” Roll Call, 9 Sept. 2014. Retrieved from http://www.rollcall.com/news/radio_free_europe_is_independent_media_not_state_propaganda_letter_to_the236105-1.html (accessed 8 April 2015). 84  Email correspondence, 2 April 2015. 85  Zager, Norma. “Friends with money: A new dynamic in foreign affairs,” The Hill, 28 July 2014. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/213364-friends-with-money-a-new-dynamic-in-foreign-affairs (accessed 8 April 2015). 86  Zager, Norma. “The Circle of Friendship: Azerbaijan and Israel,” Jewish Times, 28 Aug. 2013. Retrieved from  http://jewishtimes.com/10778/the-circle-of-friendship-azerbaijan-and-israel/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 87  Zager, Norma. “One Muslim Nation’s Brave Support S upport of Israel,”  PJ Media, 28 Aug. 2010. Retrieved from http://pjmedia.com/blog/one-muslim-nations-brave-support-of-israel/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 88  Zager, Norma. “Azerbaijan and the ‘Bear’ next door,” The Hill, 19 April 2014. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/203871-azerbaijan-and-the-bear-next-door (accessed 8 April 2015). 89  Email correspondence with author, 9 April 2015.

 

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Zager said she did “not recall one about radio free Europe [ sic],” and stopped answering questions thereafter.

 Nonetheless, Zager’s pieces present discernibly similar themes to those of Maayan Jaffe. Maayan Jaffe’s op-eds on Azerbaijan ran from August 2013 through December 2014, while Zager’s ran from August 2013 to July 2014. Coordinating op-eds has taken place domestically  prior: In the 1930s, Alabama Senator Hugo Black “held a congressional hearing on the source of

… telegrams and discovered that lobbyists impersonated constituents by dictating hundreds hu ndreds of unique telegrams to Western Union associates.”90 Likewise, as Silverstein found, the firm APCO

“had someone on staff who ‘does nothing but’” place op-eds –  and  and APCO “actually wrote the  pieces and then went out and found ‘signatories’ for its in-house work.”91 A second firm, Cassidy & Associates, “would recruit friendly authors –  a ‘well-respected scholar’ … –  for  for opeds it could plant in newspapers.” 92 Interestingly, on at least one instance, one o ne of the publications saw fit to notify its readership that the author in question did not carry any affiliation with organizations pushing Azerbaijani instances. In a March 2015 op-ed in The Hill , former

Mississippi Rep. Ronnie Shows writes that he hopes “policy “polic y makers in the United States will continue to realize that Azerbaij an is an ally and it is in our interests to work together.”93 When listing Shows’ credentials, The Hill noted that he “works for the lobbying lobb ying firm AUX Initiatives.

Azerbaijan is not an AUX client.” The delineation of AUX Initiatives’ clientele is a welcome move toward transparency, but stands largely neutered within The Hill ’s ’s myriad instances of

90

 Holman, 3.  Silverstein, Turkmeniscam, 30. 92  Silverstein, Turkmeniscam, 155. 93  Shows, Ronnie. “In global war on terror, US must strengthen ties to Azerbaijan,” The Hill, 13 March 2015. Retrieved from  from http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/235530-in-global-war-on-terror-us-muststrengthen-ties-to (accessed 8 April 2015). 91

 

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failing to disclose those writers for whom their respective companies maintain Azerbaijan as a client. Kazakhstan has also seen writers pen pro-government pieces p ieces without any clear connection to the government. In March 2015, Sara Grillo wrote a piece in the investment  publication ValueWalk  detailing the myriad ways in which there are a re few things “hipper” than Kazakhstan.94 Within the piece, Grillo –  identified as “CFA, President at Grillo Investment

Management” –  notes that she is “tired of Kazakhstan getting wrongfully lumped together with the other ‘-Stan’ countries” and that the country was on the “on its way to becoming  a world  player.”95 Neither Grillo nor her investment firm carry any clear connection co nnection to Kazakhstan or Central Asia, and when asked by the author why she saw fit to describe Kazakhstan on the “up and up” economically –   especially especially in light of the significant economic downturn in 2015 –  Grillo  Grillo was oblique. “Some guy called me from the some UN project or something and wanted to know what I thought of central asia [ sic]. It got me thinking,” she replied. 96 Indeed, the past few months have seen a decided uptick in individuals with no clear ties to the region seek to paint

Kazakhstan in a flattering light. (These individuals’ hagiographic descriptions of Kazakhstan’s 2015 presidential election will be discussed later.) In April 2015, in the aftermath of an election in which Nazarbayev took 98 percent of the vote, Penn State Prof. Sophia McClennen took to Salon to note that “there are certain things the Kazakhs are getting g etting right –  things  things that we in the

United States get wrong,” including campaign scheduling and campaign-finance limits.97 

94

 Grillo, Sara. “Kazakhstan Is The New Black,” ValueWalk, 13 March 2015. Retrieved from http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/03/kazakhstan-investing/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 95   Ibid  Ibid . 96  Email correspondence with the author, 18 March 2015. 97  McClennen, Sophia. “Our stunted democracy could learn from Kazakhstan: Another Bush/Clinton race doesn’t look free to the rest of the t he world ,” Salon, 27 April 2015. Retrieved from http://www.salon.com/2015/04/27/our_stunted_democracy_could_learn_from_kazakhstan_another_bushclinton_rac e_doesnt_look_free_to_the_rest_of_the_world/  (accessed 28 April 2015). e_doesnt_look_free_to_the_rest_of_the_world/

 

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Another writer, Darius Sinai, published a piece in GQ magazine in late 2012 headlined, “How

Astana could lead the world.”98 Published nearly a year to the date after the deadliest government-led massacre Kazakhstan has seen since independence, Sinai noted that the

“ peacefully, multiculturally Muslim” country could be “a beacon for future global policy[.]” GQ identified the writer as the “Editorial Director of Conde Nast Contract Publishing and Editor-inChief of Conde Nast's Baku magazine, magazine , a global contemporary art quarterly. ”99 Little further information about Sinai exists online, aside from an October 2012 2 012 photo at the opening a new art gallery –  in which Sinai is standing next to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s daughter, Leyla Aliyeva, presenting one of the more public moments of consilience between Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani interests.100  These methods –  including  including sponsored content and engaging public relations firms to  place op-eds –   present present relatively traditional, commonplace methods of public relations in the West. And without a firm connection to the governments in question, it remains impossible to

confirm that individuals penning pieces polishing Azerbaijan’s and Kazakhstan’s Kazakh stan’s images are part of an organized campaign. But where these nations have excelled and innovated stands within the realm of disclosure, or lack therein. These states, largely in conjunction with US-based lobbyists, have foregone disclosing relations and ties, muddying links between governmental funding and individuals such that readers remain unaware of potential exterior motivations for the material –  be  be they op-eds or entire outlets  –  in  in question. That is, these nations, and those individuals they have hired, have speared a distinct, novel approach of foregoing ethical

98

 Sinai, Darius. “How Astana could lead the world,” GQ, 19 Dec. 2012. Retrieved from  from http://www.gqmagazine.co.uk/comment/articles/2012-12/18/astana-future-energy-expo-2017 (accessed 8 April 2015). 99   Ibid  Ibid . 100  Photo available at  at http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/darius-sanai-and-leyla-aliyeva-attend-bakucellar-164-news-photo/167359924  (accessed 26 April 2015). cellar-164-news-photo/167359924

 

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requirements for the sake of utilizing English-language media to burnish their reputations. As  journalism shifts and capacities therein degrade –  as  as staffs shrink, as editors see less time to research potential failures of disclosure, and as the talent pool poo l of public relations operations concomitantly expands –   these these states and respective lobbyists have attempted to exploit such trends that much more. Such shift comes to the detriment of the publication and readership alike, and to the presumed benefit of the governments in question. One instance of such lack of disclosure exists within the digital publication Silk Road  Reporters. While other digital publications have arisen through foreign lobbying efforts –  for  for

instance, the firm JWI launched the digital  Myanmar Monitor at the behest of the Burmese government101 –   –  Silk Road Reporters, launched in January 2014,  presented presented itself as an

“independent news website” with a stated focus focu s on “providing coverage of Central Asia.” Indeed, the publication stood largely welcome at its open, with its coverage  –  which  which included

examinations of Kyrgyzstan’s “shadow economy” 102 and power brokers within Central Asia 103 –   –   helping to expand the scant English-language coverage in existence. Soon, however, the  publication began pushing a distinct string of nominally objective pieces that painted Kazakhstan in a distinctly flattering light. For instance, one piece from October, written by John C. K. Daly, staked that Kazakhstan deserved a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council,

as Kazakhstan existed as a “progressive, peaceful peace ful country … that will bring perspectives to the UNSC that have yet to be heard.”104 Another piece highlighted Kazakhstan’s “new and dynamic

101

 Silverstein, Turkmeniscam, 52.  Aydaraliev, Mirbek. “Kyrgyz Shadow Economy a Hinderance to Development [ sic],” Silk Road Reporters, 24 Feb. 2014. Retrieved from  from http://www.silkroadreporters.com/2014/02/24/kyrgyz-shadow-economy-hinderance/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 103  Kamilov, Marat. “Clans Make Kings,” Silk Road Reporters, 26 Jan. 2014. Retrieved from http://www.silkroadreporters.com/2014/01/26/clans-make-kings/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 104  Daly, John C. K. “Kazakhstan Seeks UN Security Council Seat,” Silk Road Reporters, 27 Oct. 2014. Retrieved from  http://www.silkroadreporters.com/2014/10/27/kazakhstan-seeks-un-security-council-seat/ (accessed 8 April from 2015).

102

 

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economy,”105 while another noted that the nation served as a “shining example of a developing economy in Central Asia.”106 (As with Grillo’s piece above, these analyses come during Kazakhstan’s most noteworthy economic downturn since the 2008 200 8-2009 financial crisis.) Daly, likewise, contributed further still to the hyperbole, claiming that Kazakhstan Kazakh stan maintained a

constitution with “prophetic foresight” that allowed the country to exist as a “prosperous and stable multiethnic state … anchored in its constitutional development,” all while maintaining a  judiciary that “need not feel a decision would affect [its] future due to political pressure.” 107  While such hyperbole could otherwise be ascribed to ignorance or contrarianism, links  between Silk Road Reporters’s management and lobbyists seeking to better Kazakhstan’s image

in the West cast doubts on the publication’s claimed objectivity. From its inception, Silk Road  Reporters existed without an obvious form of funding, as neither advertisements nor

subscriptions stood available on the site. James Kimer, the site’s “owner and editor,” claimed that funding came from an “inheritance” “inhe ritance” from his grandmother.108 To be sure, it remains entirely  possible that Kimer was, indeed, funding his coterie of writers with with an inheritance from his grandmother. Nonetheless, a series of links to Astana, and to those tasked with burnishing

Kazakhstan’s image, suggests other ties as well.109 In addition to Silk Road Reporters, Kimer

105

 Daily, John C. K. “Kazakhstan Looks to Become Central Asia’s Silicon Valley,” 6 O ct. 2014. Silk Road  Reporters, Retrieved from  from http://www.silkroadreporters.com/2014/10/06/kazakhstan-looks-become-central-asiassilicon-valley/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 106  Silk Road Reporters Facebook page. Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/silkroadreporters/posts/1562358137326117 (accessed 8 April 2015). 107  Daily, John C. K. “Kazakhstan Celebrates its Constitution,” Silk Road Reporters, 28 Aug. 2014. Retrieved from http://www.silkroadreporters.com/2014/08/28/kazakhstan-celebrates-constitution/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 108  Michel, Casey. “Silk Road Reporters: An Independent News Site for Central Asia?” The Diplomat, 11 March 2015. Retrieved from  from http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/silk-road-reporters-an-independent-news-site-for-central-asia/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 109  It remains worth noting that Kimer’s connection to Central Asia predates his work with Silk Road Reporters. He had prior worked with the law firm that represented Mina Corp., the fuel co company mpany accused of providing kickbacks to the autocratic Bakiyev family toppled in Kyrgyzstan’s 201 0 revolution. “Artisan Gateway Serves Demand for Arbitration Against EPT East, Inc.”  PR Newswire, 12 Sept. 2011. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a9x9sOm0lSCI (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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runs K Social Media Consulting, a Washington-based PR firm that presents itself as a “new

 breed of public relations” agency.110 Likewise, Kimer is also listed one of two “Media Relations Counsels” with the Amsterdam Group, a separate American public relations firm. 111 Amsterdam Group, as it is, is run by Sam Amsterdam –  who,  who, in turn, works for the aforementioned BGR Gabara. As the head of digital di gital communications with BGR Gabara, Amsterdam was charged with helming “traditional and social media campaigns” for Kazakhstan in the United States. 112 That is to say, the head of a nominally independent outlet focus on Central Asian news is listed as

working directly for the man charged with leading Kazakhstan’s media campaigns in the United States. Kimer denied any links between Kazakhstan and Silk Road Reporters, and –  contrary  contrary to Silk Road Reporters’s aforementioned descriptors of Kazakhstan –  also denied “any kind of

 beneficial coverage whatsoever from the way we do news.”113 

Questions extended beyond the site’s slant, however. Two of the authors contacted –   Daly and Joshua Noonan  –  declined  declined to comment on their work with Silk Road Reporters, and none of the other contributors appeared to carry any online track record, nor any evidence of

existence whatsoever. While Kimer noted that all of o f the “contributors” listed on the page’s “About Us” page used their real names, he cited their contact information as “absolutely confidential” and suggested contacting Irada Guseynova, the site’s former features editor, in order to contact these contributors. 114 Guseynova, however, wrote that she “had no desire to pass

along correspondents’ contact information to an unknown unk nown individual. If you need authors, search

110

 K Social Media Website. Retrieved from  from http://ksocialmedia.com/ (accessed 8 April 2015).  Amsterdam Group “About Us” Website. Retrieved from  http://amsterdamgroup.net/about-us/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 112  BGR Gabara, Samuel Amsterdam Website. Retrieved from  from http://www.bgrgabara.com/x-bios/bgramsterdam.html (accessed 8 April 2015). 113  Michel, “Silk Road Reporters: An Independent News Site for Central Asia?”  114  Silk Road Reporters “About Us” Website. Retrieved from  from  http://www.silkroadreporters.com/about-us/ (accessed 8 April 2015).

111

 

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for yourself.”115 In a follow-up email, Guseynova added, “I don’t think I need to explain ANYTHING [ sic  sic][.]”116 Following the requests for contact information, Silk Road Reporters

erased the “contributors” from the “About Us” page, pa ge, though they remained available via Internet archive.117 The publication also scrubbed information pertaining to American editor “Joe

Peerson,” the only employee, according to Kimer, who used a pen -name and whose sole task consisted of “collecting aggregated news coverage” of the region. (Kimer did not answer questions as to why an American simply collating information required a pen-name.) After its links to Kazakhstani lobbyists came to light, Silk Road Reporters hired a pair of regional writers with a discernible online track record  –  highlighted  highlighted by Kseniya Bondal, a writer best known for

her work with U.S. Central Command’s regional propaganda propagand a site, Central Asia Online.118  Likewise, Silk Road Reporters promptly began running advertisements, and noted that the site

received “ private and institutional support for its operations,” but did not specify from whom. However, nowhere on the site did Kimer disclose his link to Amsterdam, the man who had been

tasked with leading Kazakhstan’s image-buffing in the United States. Kimer’s Silk Road Reporters appears to be the lone nominally independent outlet that has failed to disclose its ties to those pushing Kazakhstani interests. But where Kimer could  plausibly note that no direct  compensation  compensation from the Kazakhstani government has come to light –   and as Kazakhstani lobbyists have prior p rior preferred to simply fund trips for writers to Kazakhstan119 –   –  the man charged with helping lead Azerbaijan’s media approach within the

115

 Michel, “Silk Road Reporters: An Independent News Site for Central Asia?”   Ibid .  Ibid  117  Silk Road Reporters “About Us” Website, dated to 27 Aug. 2014. Retrieved from  https://web.archive.org/web/20140827141801/http:/www.silkroadreporters.com/about-us/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 118  Trilling, David. “Propagandastan,” Foreign Policy, 22 Nov. 2011. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/21/propagandastan (accessed 8 April 2015). 119    Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections, Silverstein, Ken. “The prospect of oil adds a sheen to the Kazakh re regime,” gime,” 12 March 2004. Retrieved from  from http://www.gasandoil.com/news/central_asia/6d8dda77700094e1e4c6dfe46cdd691f (accessed 8 April 2015) . One of the writers, Georgie Anne Geyer, insisted that Kazakhstan’s willingness to fund the 116

 

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United States cannot stake such claim. Jason Katz acts as the “founder and principal” of The Tool Shed Group, LLC.120 According to Katz, The Tool Shed Group, founded in 2008, “is a full service strategic communications, public relations, public affairs, business development and fund raising firm” that “specializes in international affairs, politics, policy and business development for governments, quasi-governmental entities, NGOs, not-for-profit organizations, executives and corporations throughout the world. ”121 In 2009, The Tool Shed Group began providing

“consulting services related to business development, strategic communications and public affairs” to Azerbaijan’s Consulate General, the only foreign principal for whom Tool Shed Group works.122 Soon thereafter, Katz penned multiple op-eds o p-eds for Huffington Post  detailing,  detailing, for

instance, the merits of Azberaijani “democracy” 123 and the strength of Azerbaijani-Israeli relations.124 Katz wrote five such pieces with  Huffington Post over a period of less than one year, all pushing Azerbaijani interests, all clearly part of his work for Baku. According A ccording to his  biography on Huffington Post , Katz serves “as a senior advisor to the Republic Rep ublic of Azerbaijan, their Consulate General in Los Angeles and Ministry of Information Technology and Communications.”125 In his penultimate piece with  Huffington Post , however, those observing the region began to take note of Katz’s effusive praise for Baku. After Katz described Azerbaijan

as “a progressive, cosmopolitan, open, secular and Western-oriented society” that “makes for an

trip for her and her three colleagues  –  only two of whom disclosed the source of the trip’s funding –  had  had no bearing on her writing. “I’m a little beyond that,” Geyer noted. 120  Jason Katz LinkedIn Website. Retrieved from  from  https://www.linkedin.com/in/jasonkatztoolshedgroup (accessed 8 April 2015). 121  Ibid .  Ibid  122  US Department of Justice. Registration Statement, Tool Shed Group, LLC, Foreign Agents Registration Act. 9 March 2009. Retrieved from  from  http://www.fara.gov/docs/5916-Registration-Statement-20090309-1.pdf.  http://www.fara.gov/docs/5916-Registration-Statement-20090309-1.pdf.  123  Katz, Jason. “A Game Played Smarter,” Huffington Post, 18 March 2010. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jason-katz/a-game-played-smarter_b_422401.html (accessed 8 April 2015). 124  Katz, Jason. “Azerbaijan and Israel: Not a Typical Relationship,”  Huffington Post, 22 May 2010. Retrieved from 125 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jason-katz/azerbaijan-and-israel-not_b_509229.html (accessed 8 April 2015).  Jason Katz  Huffington Post Biography Website. Retrieved from  from  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jason-katz/ (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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ideal vacation destination,”126 Silverstein, then with Harper’s, described the piece as a “PR handout —  or  or blow job, to be less polite —  for his firm’s client[.]”127 Katz soon ceased writing for Huffington Post .

However, it appears possible Silverstein’s critique may have had the opposite op posite of its intended effect. Instead of ending his writing, Katz, following Silverstein’s analysis of Katz’s

“PR handout,” simply ceased disclosing his relationship with Azerbaijan in any of his op -eds outside Huffington Post . Indeed, such move away from disclosure may have been hinted at

within Katz’s ear ly ly filings with FARA, as it does not appear that any of his  Huffington Post opeds were filed along with Tool Shed S hed Group records. And within this decision lies one of Katz’s, and Azerbaijan’s, most distinct innovations within its approach to image -management in English-language media: the utter lack of disclosure between public relations specialists and Azerbaijan. After his final piece with Huffington Post in 2011, Katz contributed at least nine opeds to English-language publications. He has published pub lished four op-eds with Roll Call and three opeds with The Hill , as well as an additional write-up in The National Review and the Spanishlanguage La Opinion.128 All of these pieces discuss Azerbaijani interests. His first piece in The  Hill , for instance, focused on the strength of Azerbaijani “democracy,” 129 while his first piece in  Roll Call called for a mending of American-Azerbaijani relations. 130 In another offering, Katz

126

 Katz, Jason. “An Odd Voice from a Noble Land,”  Huffington Post, 14 June 2014. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jason-katz/an-odd-voice-from-a-noble_b_538351.html (accessed 8 April 2015). 127  Silverstein, Ken. “Huffington “Huffington post Allows Lobbyists to Take Dictator Out for Spin on its Site,”  Harper’s, 15 June 2010. Retrieved from  from http://harpers.org/blog/2010/06/huffington-post-allows-lobbyist-to-take-dictator-out-forspin-on-its-site/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 128  Katz, Jason. “Política exterior en California,” La Opinion, 11 Oct. 2014.  2014. http://www.laopinion.com/blogs prioridades-legislativas-california-politica-exterior  (accessed 8 April 2015). 129  Katz, Jason. “Democracies don’t just spring up,” The Hill , 8 Oct. 2013. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/327199-democracies-dont-just-spring-up (accessed 8 April 2015). 130

 Katz, Jason. “America and Azerbaijan: Strained Relations Must be Mended,”  Roll Call, 17 Dec. 2013. Retrieved from from   http://www.rollcall.com/news/america_and_azerbaijan_strained_relations_must_be_mended_commentary229654-1.html?pg=2 (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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wrote that “Washington is too eager to criticize Azerbaijan,” 131 while he separately noted that the “U.S. can learn much from a nation like Azerbaijan.”132 In his piece in The National Review, Katz manages to spin an ostensible piece on mourning the loss of colleague Alexandros Petersen

into a denigration of Azerbaijan’s geopolitical antagonists: “ The Armenians, Palestinians, and Iranians are all true believers, as is the Taliban. ”133 Legally, there is little amiss with Katz’s decision to write; acting as a FARA-registered lobbyists does not preclude Katz from contributing op-eds. However, Katz makes no attempt to disclose his relationship with Azerbaijan in any of these nine op-eds. He readily discloses that he is the “principal”134 of Tool

Shed Group, a “consultancy that advises foreign governments, NGOs and corporations in the realms of strategic communications, politics and policy. ”135 He often adds further that he “ is also the former head of Public Affairs and Public Relations for the American Jewish Committee,  based in Los Angeles.” However, in none of the nine pieces written –  all,  all, again, highlighting or  pushing Azerbaijani interests –  does Katz disclose that Azerbaijan serves as Tool Shed Group’s  primary foreign client. There does not exist any legal component within non-disclosure –  that  that is, there appears

no potential legal ramifications to Katz’s lack of disclosure –  and  and Katz complied with FARA regulations in listing his op-eds within supplemental materials among Tool Shed Group’s FARA

131

 Katz, Jason. “America’s lack of leadership is feeding global instability,” The Hill, 18 Sept. 2014. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/217930-americas-lack-of-leadership-is-feeding-globalinstability (accessed 8 April 2015). 132  Katz, Jason. “U.S. can learn from Azerbaijan,” The Hill, 17 Feb. 2014. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/198445-us-can-learn-from-azerbaijan (accessed 8 April 2015). 133  Katz, Jason. “Don’t Throw Afghanistan to the Wolves,” The National Review, 7 Feb. 2014. Retrieved from http://www.nationalreview.com/article/370574/dont-throw-afghanistan-wolves-jason-katz (accessed 8 April 2015). 134  Ibid .  Ibid  135

 Katz, Jason. “If it Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It: Grimm Situations May Occur,”  Roll Call, 30 May 2014. Retrieved from from   http://www.rollcall.com/news/if_it_aint_broke_dont_fix_it_grimm_situations_may_occur_commentary233410-1.html?pg=2&dczone=policy (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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registry.136 However, journalistic ethics demand the reasonable disclosure of any and all interests  pertaining to either author or publication, allowing the reader to form a more informed opinion of the material at hand. 137 Noted one expert on journalistic ethics , “A journalist is supposed to be an agent of free inquiry for the public, not someone who is tied to these lobbyists.”138 When contacted by the author, certain of the publications in question updated the pieces to reflect

Katz’s relationship with Azerbaijan. National Review updated Katz’s biography, noting his link to Azerbaijan, while The Hill  now  now carries a trio of cor rections, rections, all reading that “Katz is paid to

 provide strategic advice to Azerbaijan. This note was added after Katz’s foreign agent registration was brought to the attention of The Hill.” 139 As The Hill ’s ’s Editor -in-Chief -in-Chief Bob Cusack said, “Jason Katz didn’t identify himself as representing Azerbaijan. … We conduct independent research on the people who submit pieces to us. However, because we receive hundreds of op-ed submissions per month, the vetting v etting process is thorough though not exhaustive.” The editor-in-chief of Roll Call declined to comment on the record, however, with

Katz’s articles reading as if Katz were an unbiased observer.140  An editor with Capitol Weekly, meanwhile, provided the author with a correspondence with Katz, in which Katz attempted to pitch an op-ed discussing the California legislature’s commentary on Armenia, but without disclosing his relationship with Azerbaijan. Identifying only his relationship to Tool Shed Group, Katz writes, I am writing, as I would like to submit to you the attached op op-ed. -ed. I wrote it and it concerns the Legislatures recent (and really odd) foray into U.S. foreign affairs [ sic].

136

 US Department of Justice. Supplemental Statement, Tool Shed Group, LLC, Foreign Agents Registration Act. 29 Oct. 2014. Retrieved from  from http://www.fara.gov/docs/5916-Supplemental-Statement-20141029-11.pdf .  137  According to the Society of Professional Journalist’s Code of Ethics, journalists –  and,  and, by extent, those writing for the publication –  should “[d]isclose unavoidable conflicts.” “SPJ Code of Ethics,” Society of Professional Journalists. Retrieved from  from http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp  http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp  (accessed 25 April 2015). 138 139 Interview

with author, 28 April 2015.  XX  Email correspondence with author, 14 April 2015.

140

 

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It begs the question of whether the Legislature had the right or if it was proper to do so and why they were not doing the business of the people of the State.141  Capitol Weekly did not publish Katz’s op-ed, though Katz managed to publish a Spanish-

language version with La Opinion one month later –  again,  again, without disclosing his relationship to Azerbaijan, yet another egregious breach of journalistic ethics. When presented with Katz’s lack of disclosure, Ann Cooper, the former executive director of the Committee to Protect Journalists,

noted, “Full disclosure would demand revelation of [Katz’s] Azeri tie. It should make a   difference to the reader to know whether someone is writing out of pure conviction, or because

his company works for the country whose interests he’s writing about.” 142 Jay Rosen, a New York University journalism professor and noted commentator on journalistic ethics, responded

 bluntly: “You don’t need a journalism professor to provide an ethics ‘ruling’ about this one. You can do it yourself. … If I’m reading an op-ed of yours, what do I need to know about you to understand where you’re coming from on this?  Would, ‘hey, my firm works for the country I’m writing about’ fall under that heading?”143 In Katz’s recent op-eds, it appears he has made no effort to offer such disclosure to the respective publications  –  nor  nor have the publications done their due diligence in researching Katz’s work and clientele. While he dutifully registered his documentation and write-ups with FARA, Katz helps h elps highlight one of the innovative tend tendencies encies Azerbaijan had brought to bear within English-language media: a failure to disclose a relationship any reasonable reader would otherwise expect.

But Katz’s knack for innovative tendencies for the th e benefit of Azerbaijan did not stop with his own lack of disclosure. In June 2014 Capitol Weekly published a piece on Nagorno-Karabakh

141 142 Email

Jason Katz and John Howard, 10 September 2014.  Email correspondence correspondence between with author, 8 April 2015.  Email correspondence with author, 8 April 2015.

143

 

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written by a woman named Mallory Mallor y Moss.144 Detailing how “Armenian and Russian forces annihilated the Azerbaijani town of Khojaly ,” Moss identifies herself as a “ Board Certified  Nurse Practitioner of Psychiatry and a clinical nurse specialist specialist in psychiatric nursing.” Moss also  penned two additional pieces with The Hill –  in  in April 2014145 and June 2014146 –   –  on  on Khojaly,

identified only as a “noted commentator” and “board-certified Nurse Practitioner,” respectively. While peculiar –  there  there seems no obvious reason why a background in nursing should allow one to opine on the geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabakh –  such  such descriptors, on their face, do not present any journalistic or legal breach. However, myriad m yriad links between Moss, Katz, Tool Shed Group, and Azerbaijan not only present p resent severe ruptures of journalistic ethics, but appear to stand contrary to FARA regulation. A search of domain registration reveals that Moss has registered multiple Azerbaijan-related URLs since 2013, including BakuWoman.com, MeetAzerbaijan.com, and AboutAzerbaijan.org, among others, as well as the notably misspelled SouthernCaucuses.com.147 In each instance, Moss lists her name, address, add ress, and telephone number. And in each instance, Moss lists her registrant organization as The Tool Shed Group. That is to say, Moss, according to database registration records, either works or worked in the employ of

Tool Shed Group. (Moss likewise created an “Azerbaijani Olympic Athlete” Facebook group in early 2014.148) Moreover, on multiple instances in April 2015, Katz referred to Moss as his

“wife”149 on his Facebook, and in April 2015 Moss changed her name on Facebook to “Mallory

144

 Moss, Mallory. “Mental health and an Assembly resolution,” Capitol Weekly, 13 June 2014. Retrieved from   http://capitolweekly.net/mental-health-assembly-resolution/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 145  Moss, Mallory. “The language of genocide,” The Hill, 24 April 2014. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/204175-the-language-of-genocide (accessed 8 April 2015). 146  Moss, Mallory. “Boko Haram and the relevance of genocide,” The Hill, 16 June 2014. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/209317-boko-haram-and-the-relevance-of-genocide (accessed 8 April 2015). 147  Domain registry available at  at whois.domaintools.com. whois.domaintools.com.  148  Azerbaijani Olympic Athletes Facebook Website.  Website. https://www.facebook.com/groups/274894489330337/ 149 (accessed

8 April 2015). Website. Retrieved from   Jason Katz Facebook from  https://www.facebook.com/jason.katz.127 (accessed 8 April 2015).   2015).

 

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Moss Katz.”150 To sum: Katz claims Moss as his wife, and Moss has made repeated statements –   available via domain registry –  highlighting  highlighting her employment with Tool Shed Group. Moss ignored repeated requests to clarify her relationship with Katz and Tool Shed Group. When

asked to clarify his relationship with Moss and Moss’s relationship with Tool Shed Group, Katz did not answer, but instead blocked this author on Facebook. However, not only has Moss failed to disclose these relationships in her h er op-eds, but both she and Katz did not appear to disclose these op-eds and this relationship within the FARA database. A request for a search of FARA revealed “NO records of any registration(s) under

FARA for a Mallory Moss[.]”151 A Department of Justice lawyer noted that the “department “dep artment does not issue advisory opinions to third parties regarding the activities of other persons or organizations.”152 In light of fact that Katz has disclosed his series of op-eds to FARA, it stands

to reason the Moss’s op-eds must, or should, likewise be disclosed. According to one lawyer working with FARA litigation, Moss should have likewise registered with FARA, via a Short Form Registration Statement as a member of Tool Too l Shed Group. 153 “It certainly sounds as if Mrs. Moss should have filled out a Short Form Registration as an employee of or consultant to Tool

Shed,” the lawyer said. “In terms of materials, the op-eds should have been included in Tool Shed’s regular filings, at least.”154 After being contacted by the author, The Hill  added  added a note that a “firm that is paid to provide strategic advice to Azerbaijan submitted this op -ed. This note was 150

 Mallory Moss Facebook Website. Retrieved from  from  https://www.facebook.com/mallorymoss (accessed 8 April 2015). 151  Email correspondence with author, 9 April 2015. 152  Email correspondence with author, 9 April 2015. 153  Per FARA, any “ partner, officer, director, associate, employee, and agent of a registrant” who “engages in [any] activities in furtherance of the interests of the t he registrant's foreign principal ” must fill out a Short -Form Registration Statement. The only exception among those required to sign a Short-Form Registration Statement are those “i n a secretarial, clerical, or in a related or similar capacity.” Further details on Short Form Registration Statement can be found at “Short Form Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign A gents Registration Act of 1938.” Retrieved from from  1938   http://www.justice.gov/doj/resource/short-form-registration-statement-pursuant-foreign-agents-registration-act1938 (accessed 24 April 2015). 154  Interview with author, 23 April 2015.

 

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added after information was brought to the attention of The Hill.” The firm in question? Tool Shed. Nonetheless, the tandem have managed to pen a dozen op-eds in English-language  publications over the span of nearly two years in favor of Azerbaijani interests –  all  all while failing to disclose that Azerbaijan stands as one of the primary clients of Tool Shed Group.

 

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Dan Burton’s Diplomacy 

To be sure, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are not the lone former Soviet nations to employ individuals within English-language media outlets, or to see such individuals employed by organs and organizations close to the former Soviet governments. For instance, Hilary Kramer, a self-described investment advisor, wrote four op-eds in Forbes that, according to a Eurasianet investigation, “portray Tajikistan in a favorable light.” 155 One such piece detailed the necessity

and benefit of Tajikistan’s planned Rogun Dam, which would stand as the highest dam in the world upon completion.156 Eurasianet  Eurasianet linked Kramer to Fabiani & Company, a lobbying agency hired by Talco, a state-run aluminum plant that is currently Tajikistan’s largest company.157 As a representative from Fabiani told Eurasianet , “We go to [Kramer] wh en there’s an investment angle.” When notified of Kramer’s lack of disclosure a bout her relationship with Tajikistan,  Forbes removed all of Kramer’s posts about Tajikistan. 158 Nonetheless, while other post-Soviet

countries have utilized individuals within English-language media who have failed to disclose relations to these respective nations, they have not engaged in such practice –  in  in such innovation

 –  to  to the extent of Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan.

155

 Trilling, David. “Tajikistan “Tajikistan Using DC Proxies t o Build Support for Rogun Dam,” Eurasianet, 13 Feb. 2014. Retrieved from  from http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68042 (accessed 8 April 2015). 156  Kramer, Hilary. “Importance “Importance of Rogun Dam for the War on Terror,”  Forbes, 4 March 2013.  Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20130312013531/http://www.forbes.com/sites/hilarykramer/2013/03/04/importance-ofrogun-dam-for-the-war-on-terror/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 157  US Department of Justice. Supplemental Statement, Fabiani & Company, Foreign Agents Registration Act. 22 July 2013. Retrieved from  from http://www.fara.gov/docs/6045-Supplemental-Statement-20130722-5.pdf .  158  A second  Forbes writer, Mark Adomanis, also maintains ties with the post-Soviet image-management operations, having worked in 2014 for Russia’s foremost propaganda outlet, Rossiya Segodnya. Adomanis has not disclosed such relationship in any material published through Forbes. Forbes’ blogging platform has long been critiqued for maintaining far less oversight than traditional blogging outgrowths within traditional news outlets. For more, see Mark Adomanis Sputnik Biography Website. Retrieved from  from http://sputniknews.com/authors/mark_adomanis/ (accessed 8 Aprilfrom  20 15); Kirchner, Lauren. “Forbes.com Gets a New Slant,” Columbia Journalism Review , 6 Aug.24 http://www.cjr.org/the_news_frontier/forbescom_gets_a_new_slant.php?page=2   (accessed 2010. Retrieved from  http://www.cjr.org/the_news_frontier/forbescom_gets_a_new_slant.php?page=2 April 2015).

 

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Fortunately, Kramer provides a convenient link between these post-Soviet states  –  and  and  points to further innovative tactic yet. She elected to extend her lack of disclosure within Forbes

to at least two pieces on Azerbaijan, Az erbaijan, noting in one that “ Azerbaijan has charted a path for itself that is not ideological, but open.”159 Further, she has offered praise for the Azerbaijan America Alliance (AAA), which, as Eurasianet points out, is also a Fabiani client. Indeed, it is within the AAA that we discover confirmation of the willingness of those pushing Azerbaijani interests to do so without disclosing their ties. The AAA describes itself as a “ non-partisan, non-profit organization” seeking to “to foster an atmosphere of mutual understanding and respect between the people of Azerbaijan and America[.]”160 Soon after its formation in May 2011, the AAA hired former Republican Congressman Dan Burton as its new n ew Chairman of the Board. 161 As

Burton said at the time, “ The friendship between our countries is very important and I shall work hard to make it even stronger .” .”162 Initially, it appeared Burton’s placement as AAA’s public face would remain relatively limited, focused largely on speaking engagements en gagements under large banners of former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev. 163 However, as with Kramer, Katz, and Moss, Burton soon found himself published in English-language Eng lish-language media without the requisite disclosure

alongside. Burton’s wrote his first piece pushing Azerbaijani interests in June 2013, detailing the

159

 Kramer, Hilary. “America, Meet Azerbaijan,”  Forbes, 7 Nov. 2012. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/hilarykramer/2012/11/07/america-meet-azerbaijan/ (accessed 8 April 2015); Kramer, Hilary. “Azerbaijan: A Metaphor for Sustainable Change,”  Forbes, 25 Nov. 2012. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/hilarykramer/2012/11/25/azerbaijan-a-metaphor-for-sustainable-change-2/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 160 Azerbaijan America Alliance “About Us” Website. Retrieved from  http://azerbaijanamericaalliance.org/mission (accessed 8 April 2015). 161  “The Azerbaijan America Alliance Announces Former Congressman Dan Burton as Chairman of the Board,”  PR  Newswire, 13 Feb. 2013. Retrieved from  from http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-azerbaijan-americaalliance-announces-former-congressman-dan-burton-as-chairman-of-the-board-191097441.html(accessed alliance-announces-former-congressman-dan-burton-as-chairman-of-the-board-191097441.html (accessed 8 April 2015). 162  Ibid .  Ibid  163

 Azerbaijan America Alliance Facebook photo. Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=651514518195797&set=pb.296931403654112.2207520000.1373460531.&type=3&theater (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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 burgeoning relations between Azerbaijan and Israel in The Washington Times.164 Instead of highlighting his position as the head of the AAA, however, The Washington Times described

Burton solely as “a senior member of the House Foreign F oreign Affairs Committee and chairman of its Europe, Eurasia and emerging threats subcommittee. ”165 Likewise, Burton also wrote a piece on

the benefits of constructing Tajikistan’s Rogun Dam without –  as  as with Kramer –  highlighting  highlighting links to Fabiani.166 

Much like Kramer, however, Burton’s pretense as a disinterested observer soon faltered through external media coverage. After Burton published his third piece without disclosure –  this  this time on Azerbaijani tolerance,167 and in conjunction with the Azerbaijani “sponsored content” insert mentioned above –  The Washington Post  reporter  reporter Erik Wemple pointed out the lack of disclosure.168 The Washington Times issued a clarification reflecting Burton’s relationship with AAA. However, but a few weeks later, the Daily Caller publication committed an identical oversight. Burton wrote an op-ed denigrating Armenian interests in Daily Caller , and identified himself solely as a former Congressman.169 When Wemple attempted to investigate why Burton failed to identify his position with AAA, he found an audience that was less than receptive. Not only did Daily Caller fail to respond to Wemple’s questions, but B urton took to epithets in response:

164

 Burton, Dan. “The peril of stiffing a rare friend in the Caucasus,” The Washington Times, Retrieved from 26 June 2013. Retrieved from  from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/26/the-peril-of-stiffing-a-rare-friend-in-thecaucasu/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 165  Ibid   Ibid . 166  Burton, Dan. “Tajikistan’s clean energy resources,” The Washington Times, 7 March 2014. Retrieved from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/7/burton-tajikistans-clean-energy-resources/?page=all#pagebreak (accessed 8 April 2015). 167  Burton, Dan. “Why Azerbaijan is important to America and the free world,” The Washington Times, 28 Jan. 2015. Retrieved from  from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/28/dan-burton-why-azerbaijan-is-importantto-america-/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 168 169 Wemple,

“Washington Times hearts Azerbaijan.”  Burton, Dan. “Is Armenia America’s Ally or Iran’s?” The Daily Caller, 12 March 2015. Retrieved from http://dailycaller.com/2015/03/12/is-armenia-americas-ally-or-irans/ (accessed 8 April 2015). http://dailycaller.com/2015/03/12/is-armenia-americas-ally-or-irans/ 

 

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In a short phone chat with Burton, the advocacy group chairman asked, “Are you the one who’s been calling everyone about my op-eds?” Yes, responded the Erik Wemple Blog. “I don’t really want to talk to you,” said Burton. Why not? “Because you’re a scandal monger and I don’t want to talk to you. I have no desire to talk to you,” he said. A plea to hear out the Erik Wemple Blog fetched no response. 170 

Strikingly, in December 2013 Burton penned a letter to The Washington Times in which he explicitly lays out his position as AAA chairman. 171 Moreover, this is not the first time The Washington Times has been found behaving suspiciously viz. the amelioration of post-Soviet

regimes. In 2011, Columbia Journalism Review detailed The Washington Times’s relationship with Central Asia Newswire, noting that the paper “apparently agree[d] to lend an air of

authenticity to a subscription newswire whose only paying pa ying client … seems to have been the th e 172

Kazakhstan government itself[.]”

 Even with Burton’s letter and the Columbia Journalism

 Review report, however, The Washington Times only clarified Burton’s relationship with

Azerbaijan following questioning from a The Washington Post reporter. Likewise, while editor John Solomon told the author in early April 2015 that Burton’s June 2013 write-up –  in  in which Burton notes that “few places in the world … are as welcoming to Americans as Azerbaijan” 173 –   –   would be updated to reflect his connection to AAA, the op-ed remains unchanged. 174 Burton’s   piece on Rogun has also not yet been updated to reflect his relationship with Fabiani, nor has his article in Daily Caller .175 That is to say, The Washington Times has only updated the lone article

170

 Wemple, “Former congressman and Azerbaijan advocate finds receptive rece ptive audience at Daily Caller.”   Burton, Dan. “Promoting A lasting partnership between Azerbaijan and America,” The Washington Times, 10 Dec. 2013. Retrieved from  from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/10/burton-promoting-lasting partnership-between-azerb/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 172  Wilensky-Lanfor d, d, Ethan. “News for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan,” Columbia Journalism  Review, 23 March 2011. 173  Burton, “The peril of stiffing a rare friend in the Caucasus.”   174  Email correspondence with author, 7 April 2015. 175  AAA, it should be noted, also appears to engage in a traditional form of lobbying lobb ying in order to generate positive  press coverage of Azerbaijan. AAA helped host host a 14 June 2013 event, event, entitled entitled “US-Azerbaijan Strategic Dialogue,” 171

for the Potomac for Studies,” Policy Studies. event, David J. Smith,mov[ing] identifiedtoward as a “senior fellow at the Potomac InstituteInstitute for Policy pennedFollowing a piece inthe The Hill on “Azerbaijan democracy”. Azerbaijan America Alliance Facebook page:  page: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Azerbaijan-America-

 

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on which The Washington Post has written. All other articles in question have remained

available and unchanged. Kramer’s pieces on Tajikistan have been removed entirely, but her op eds on Azerbaijan remain available for public consumption. And this, then, is perhaps the greatest finding within these attempts at innovative tactics in English-language publications. It’s not simply that these individuals tied directly to Kazakhstani and Azerbaijani governments have failed to disclose those links; rather, even when  presented with this information, certain of the publications in question fail to clarify these relations. Forbes, National Review, The Hill, and The Washington Times only partially rectified

their descriptions of the writers, or rectified the biographies months later. Other publications mentioned above –  Roll  Roll Call and Daily Caller , especially –  both  both failed in due diligence on the

writer’s potential interests, and have done nothing to clarify these links in the months and years since. Despite the clear necessity of disclosure, it appears that editors remain rema in as uninterested in disclosing links as the writers –  and  and respective countries  –  do,  do, to the detriment of their  publication and their readership alike. These lobbyists and governments have innovated through their lack of disclosure –   and and the publications, by and large, seem largely unconcerned.

Alliance/296931403654112?sk=events (accessed April 2015); Smith, David and Woolsey, James. “Azerbaijan moves toward democracy,” The Hill , 7 Aug. 2013.8Retrieved from from   http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign policy/315855-azerbaijan-moves-toward-democracy  policy/315855-azerbaijan-moves-toward-democ racy (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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Free gent Diplomacy

 

“[KAZAKHSTAN] IS A COUNTRY THAT IS ALMOST UNIQUE I WOULD SAY IN ITS CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND THE WAY IT BRINGS DIFFERENT FAITHS TOGETHER, AND CULTURES TOGETHER.”   -TONY

BLAIR

 

 

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When formulating innovative tactics within the realm of media outreach, organizations involved with improving the images of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan were attempting to reach a relatively broad, diffuse audience. 176 However, such an extensive readership –  in  in terms of geography and background alike –  does  does not present the lone audience for those who would seek to help Baku and Astana ameliorate their reputations in the West. Rather, diplomatic efforts, and utilizing diplomatic ties, remain a key component for these governments. But before examining innovative tendencies within these campaigns, it remains necessary, necessar y, as above, to delineate traditional methods employed by these respective governments. Azerbaijan, Az erbaijan, for instance, has consistently targeted American lawmakers at both federal and local levels in lobbying efforts. At the state level, the governments have lobbied on a state-b state-by-state y-state basis for support of everything from Azerbaijani territorial integrity to rote recognition of strengthening relations between the United States and Azerbaijan, as was recently seen in Washington state. 177 Kazakhstan, meanwhile, has engaged in assorted lobbying efforts to land positions within international organizations, as with the 2010 OSCE OSC E Chairmanship or with current efforts to earn a non non- permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.178  As with media efforts, both approaches have been tainted by discernible lacks of disclosure. For Kazakhstan, see the instance of Silk Road Reporters above lobbying for the UNSC seat. For Azerbaijan, meanwhile, examine a 2013 SOCAR-sponsored trip that saw ten Congressmen and 35 staffers land an all-expenses-paid trip to Baku. As a later  Houston Chronicle investigation found, the reports filed by th e lawmakers showed that “none disclosed

176

 Blair quote taken from: “Tony Blair’s star turn in Kazakhstan video,”  BBC , 24 April 2012. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-17827773  (accessed 8 April 2015). http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-17827773  177  Washington State Senate Resolution 8661. Further details can be found at http://app.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2015-16/Htm/Bills/Senate%20Resolutions/8661Azerbaijan%20Republic%20Day.htm Azerbaijan%20Republic%20Day.htm   (accessed 17 April 178  “The sultan takes over,” The Economist  , 17 Dec. 2009.2015). Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/node/15127669 (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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b y corporations, foreign governments or any sponsorship of their Baku conference trips by

lobbyists,” and that taking “a foreign trip to a conference sponsored by corporations that employ lobbyists appears to be a violation of congressional ethics rules, according to the House ethics 179

  manual.” (As one journalist in attendance wrote, the trip appeared app eared to be “the biggest b iggest 180 concentrations of American political star power ever seen in the Caucasus.” ) According to the United States’ Office of Congressional Ethics, there exists “[o]verwhelming evidence” SOCAR   managed to funnel $750,000 to fund the congressional trip –  and  and that the non-profits no n-profits that claimed to sponsor the trip misled the House Ethics Committee. 181 The obfuscation was relatively straightforward. One month before the convention, SOCAR S OCAR created a non-profit whole-cloth, to which it funneled three-quarters-of-a-million dollars with “directives that funding be spent on hotels, flights, and other costs associated with travel,” according to the OCE. Those on the trip

also received hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of gifts. 182 Such sponsorship transits back into the media sphere –  into  into the aforementioned descriptors d escriptors of traditional engagement in order to craft positive images in the media  –  and  and can be seen most especially in a comment from

179

 Olsen, Lise and Tucker, Will. “Lawmakers’ trips to Baku conference raise ethics questions,”  Houston Chronicle, 26 July 2014. Retrieved from  from http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Lawmakerstrips-to-Baku-conference-raise-eithics-5649142.php?cmpid=twitter-premium&t=3a9014c8757fcfd54e (accessed 8 April 2015). 180  Luxner, Larry. “Azerbaijan Rolls Out Red Carpet For Visiting U.S. Lawmakers ,” The Washington Diplomat, 26 June 2013. Retrieved from  from http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&id=9391:azerbaijanrolls-out-red-carpet-for-visiting-us-lawmakers&Itemid=428 (accessed 8 April 2015). 181  “OCE Referral Regarding Rep. James Bridenstine .” Retrieved from http://oce.house.gov/disclosures/Review_No_15-6068_Referral.pdf  (accessed 12 October 2015). 182 Crites, Alice; Higham, Scott; and Rich, Steven. “ 10 members of Congress took trip secretly funded by foreign government,” The Washington Post, 13 May 2015. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/10-members-of-congress-took-trip-secretly-funded-by-foreigngovernment/2015/05/13/76b55332-f720-11e4-9030-b4732caefe81_story.html  (accessed 14 May 2015). However, at government/2015/05/13/76b55332-f720-11e4-9030-b4732caefe81_story.html least two members of Congress were nonplussed with their gifts. “[New Mexico Representative Michelle] Lujan Grisham told ethics investigators that she did not disclose the rugs because she did not think they were particularly valuable. She also thought that they were unattractive. “It’s not a carpet I would have purchased,” the congresswoman said.” Rep. Danny Davis further claimed his rug maintained “no personal value.” Korecki, Natasha.

“Times, Danny19 Davis trip underfrom  U.S. http://chicago.suntimes.com/politics/7/71/616441/danny-davis-fine-rug-partethics review; says lavish rug still rolled up in his house ,” Chicago SunMaydefends 2015. Retrieved from oil-company-gift-still-rolled-unwrapped  (accessed 19 May 2015). oil-company-gift-still-rolled-unwrapped

 

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Maryland lawmaker Tawanna Gaines, who noted during the trip to Baku, “They’ve asked for nothing in return. What they expect expe ct is to educate us, and for us to spread the wo rd.”183 Bakurelated agencies have also funded trips for British MPs to Azerbaijan, 184 and have likewise

engaged in what has been termed “Caviar Diplomacy” in order to coax more palliative prognoses for its election results from PACE.185 Undisclosed sponsorship, subtle gift-giving, the expectation that such effusive treatment will result in both legislation and positive domestic coverage for an English-speaking audience –  these  these methods are not necessarily especial to Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, but nonetheless com prise a notable swath of these countries’ efforts at image-management. Where Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have proven innovative, however, is in helping refine

the notion of what I will term “free agent diplomacy.” Such construct exists as a recent  phenomenon, or in a refined state as a recent phenomenon, and is seen most especially within

former British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s post -premiership tenure in attempting to expand the reputational and economic reach of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. “Free agent diplomacy,” with the current, most refined iteration we are witnessing with Blair’s work in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, carries a handful of components. componen ts. Similar to the “revolving door” phenomenon exists  between domestic actors and domestic organizations, the actor seeks to enjoin his name and reputational reach to a foreign government in question, regardless of reasonable humanitarian concern, while offering little discernible response to subsequent public outcry and failing to heed calls to return funds accrued from the authoritarian government (or related entity).186 Moreover,

183

 Luxner, “Azerbaijan Rolls Out Red Carpet For Visiting U.S. Lawmakers .”   Doward, Jaime and Latimer, Charlotte. “Plush hotels and caviar diplomacy: how Azerbaijan’s elite wooed MPs,” The Guardian, 23 Nov. 2013. Retrieved from  from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/azerbaijan-caviar184

diplomacy-for-mps (accessed 8 April 2015). Initiative.  185   “Caviar Diplomacy,” European Stability 186  Holman, 2.

 

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not only does the foreign government enjoy the actor’s extended network, but the actor  purposefully enjoys an unclear mission within the country while simultaneously employing employing financial obfuscation and failing to publicize the funds received in toto. As to the governments for whom such actor is willing to work, Blair set the threshold in a 2015 interview with  Newsweek : “The prerequisite for us to work in a country is that we think the leade leadership rship is trying to do the right thing.”187 The definition of “right thing” remains unclear; as evidenced eviden ced above, if

Kazakhstan’s leadership “is trying to do the right thing,” it stands feasible that nearly all countries are available for engagement. Blair encapsulates this notion of “free agent diplomacy” wholly –  and  and his work with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan provides the necessary relationship for reifying such concept, as I will attempt to illustrate below.

In 2011, Kazakhstan hired Blair as an “official adviser.”188 This position is not Blair’s sole foray into international efforts following the end of his ministership in 2007. 2007 . According to  Bloomberg , Blair “presides over a network of companies com panies and charities that operate in more than

20 countries, with financing from a tangle of private, corporate and government sources.”189  Blair has earned hundreds of millions of dollars in post-premier consultancy work, and his clients have included Rwanda, Albania, and Kuwait. Blair has additionally employed convoluted corporate tax structure in order to obfuscate the extent of his role(s). He has muddled his finances, in part, due to his h is claims about media interest, saying, “There’s a section of the media

187

 Perry, Alex. “Inside the Mind of Tony Blair,”  Newsweek, 10 April 2015. Retrieved from http://www.newsweek.com/2015/04/17/democracy-isnt-working-inside-blair-inc-320933.html (accessed 8 April 2015). 188  Lewis, Jason. “Oil rich dictator of Kazakhstan recruits Tony Blair to help win Nobel peace prize,” The Telegraph, 9 Oct. 2011. Retrieved from  from  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/tony-blair/8857689/Oil-richdictator-of-Kazakhstan-recruits-Tony-Blair-to-help-win-Nobel-peace-prize.html (accessed 8 April 2015). 189

 Baker, Stephanie. “Blair Scorned at Home Builds Business Empire Abroad,”  Bloomberg , 4 April 2013. Retrieved from from   http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-04-04/blair-scorned-at-home-builds-business-empire-abroad.html (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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that will go after anyone connected with me, and I can’t operate like that.”190 However, it is

 believed that Blair’s contract with Astana is “potentially [his] [his] most lucrative.”191 Bloomberg  Bloomberg reported that, “[s]ince the spring of 2011, the Nazarbayev government has paid 8 million pounds 192

($12.9 million) a year to [Blair].”  According to sources in Kazakhstani media, the figure could reach as much as 16 million pounds (approximately $25 million) annually, 193 a figure recently reported by Daily Mail.194 Blair has denied such figure, and has said s aid that the extent of remuneration “is obviously confidential.”195 He has added that he sees no personal profit from

his venture in Kazakhstan, and that all funds are “instead [used] to fund his charities.”196 While Blair continues to decline to confirm the income related to his work with Kazakhstan, it appears

Windrush Ventures, one of Blair’s primary corporate vehicles for his cluttered work with Astana, is one of the former prime minister’s most profitable companies. 197  Just as the fiscal features of the deal are blurred by b y secrecy and conflicting reports, so too

are the aims and purposes of Blair’s presence in the t he country. In addition to o opening pening an office of

190

  Ibid  Ibid .  Gizitdniov, Narlman. “Kazakh Billionaire Says He’s Got Nothing to Hide,”  Bloomberg , 13 Nov. 2013. Retrieved from  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-13/kazakh-billionaire-says-he-s-got-nothing-to-hide.html  from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-13/kazakh-billionaire-says-he-s-got-nothing-to-hide.html (accessed 8 April 2015). 192  Ibid .  Ibid  191

193 “Тони Блэр продлил контракт с правительством Казахстана,”  Kazakhstan Today, 2 Feb. 2012. Retrieved from http://www.kt.kz/rus/government/toni_bler_prodlil_kontrakt_s_praviteljstvom_kazahstana_1153563381.html from  (accessed 8 April 2015). Full quote in Russian: “При этом господин Блэр пересмотрел стоимость своих услуг и увеличил цену вдвое. Теперь Казахстан будет платить ему 16 млн фунтов стерлингов в год, сообщает телеканал КТК.”  194  Drury, Ian. “Speak on hunger for 20 minutes? That'll be £330,000, said Blair: Plans for speech at world hunger conference dropped over fee,” Daily Mail , 31 May 2015. Retrieved from  from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article3104684/Plan-Tony-Blair-address-world-hunger-conference-aban 3104684/Plan-Tony-Blair-address-wor ld-hunger-conference-abandoned-333-000-fee-20-minute-speech doned-333-000-fee-20-minute-speech.html .html   (accessed 1 June 2015). 195  “Correspondence Between HRW and The Office of Tony Blair Regarding His Work W ith the Government of Kazakhstan,” Human Rights Watch. 30 Oct. 2013. Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/30/correspondence-between-hrw-and-office-tony-blair-regarding-his-workgovernment-kazak (accessed 8 April 2015). 196  “Democratic reforms, TBA,” The Economist , 16 Nov. 2013. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2013/11/tony-blair-kazakhstan (accessed 8 April 2015). 197

 Mendick, Robert. “Tony Blair’s fortune boosted £13m by 'bumper year',” The Telegraph, 4 Jan. 2014. Retrieved from from   http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/tony-blair/10551183/Tony-Blairs-fortune-boosted-13m-by-bumperyear.html (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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Blair Associates in Astana, Blair has formulated a “Policy Advisory Group,” an organization  whose composition remains unknown. 198 According to his office, Blair’s f ocus ocus was found in a 2012 speech in Kazakhstan: “The work my team does within the Policy Advisory Group, and outside experts, focusses on areas such as de-centralisation, de -centralisation, public procurement, judicial and other reforms to do with the Rule of o f Law, precisely those types of things identified by the EU

and others as necessary for Kazakhstan’s future development.” 199 Emphasizing his advisory role, as well as his role as facilitator within the Policy Advisory Group, Blair has delineated his focus as a logical outgrowth of reforms deemed apt by b y the EU. His work, he claims, parallels efforts by Brussels –  efforts  efforts to ingratiate Kazakhstan into the World Trade Organization, into the OSCE, into the modernizing world of liberal democracies. But Blair’s rhetoric stands in stark contrast to a series of competing claims as to his actual purpose in Kazakhstan. 200 As the Financial Times

reported upon Blair’s initial signing, the efforts of the former PM, who “was often described as a master of spin during his time as British prime minister,” 201 would center on how to help

Kazakhstan “present a better face to the west.”202 Kazakhstani media expanded upon such claims: According to a former spokesman for the Kazakhstani Kazakh stani Foreign Ministry, Blair’s work

198

 Lewis, Jason. “Tony Blair, Kazakh police and human rights questions,” The Telegraph, 17 March 2013. Retrieved from  from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/tony-blair/9935000/Tony-Blair-Kazakh-police-andhuman-rights-questions.html (accessed 8 April 2015). 199  “Tony Blair urges Kazakhstan to ‘evolve and reform’ as it moves to the next level of political and economic development,” The Office of Tony Blair, 26 May 2012. Retrieved from http://www.tonyblairoffice.org/news/entry/tony-blair-urges-kazakhstan-to-evolve-and-reform-as-it-moves-to-thenext-le/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 200  It is worth noting that Kazakhstani opposition figures claim Blair’s work, stated or otherwise, will not actually result in any measureable change. “The Interior Ministry is very much in control of the situation in Kazakhstan, and  believe me they will never let these Western consultants get close to understanding the real problems of our system,” said opposition leader Zhambolat Mamai. Lewis, “Tony Blair, Kazakh police and human rights questions.”   201  Lillis, Joanna. “Britain’s Master of Spin to Burnish Kazakhstan’s Image,”  Eurasianet , 24 Oct. 2011. Retrieved from  http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64361 (accessed 8 April 2015). from 202

 Pickard, Jim; Gorst, Isabel; and Pfeifer, P feifer, Sylvia. “Blair works on makeover for Kazakhstan,” Financial Times, 21 Oct. 2011. Retrieved from  from http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/290ce292-fc03-11e0-b1d800144feab49a.html?siteedition=uk (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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“will increase the investment attractiveness of the republic.”203 However, it is not necessarily the nation-wide image alone that Blair may be b e expected to help rehabilitate. Silverstein wrote that a

“source with inside knowledge of Kazakhstan’s leadership told me that the for mer mer prime 204

minister is expected to help buff Nazarbayev’s personal image internationally.”  As such, it doesn’t seem entirely unreasonable that, as The Economist noted, “many thought [Nazarbayev] might be seeking help to win himself a Nob el Peace Prize” by hiring Blair. After all, Blair, in a

correspondence with Human Rights Watch, claimed that Kazakhstan “is the only country to have given up nuclear weapons”205 –   –  a  a notably false claim, considering co nsidering Ukraine and Belarus also simultaneously released a post-Soviet nuclear stock. Moreover, Blair has also a lso acted as a de facto speechwriter for Nazarbayev, recommending approximately 500 words of text for one of

 Nazarbayev’s speech –  while  while attempting to sidestep governmental responsibility for the massacre at Zhanaozen.206  Despite the questions about the purpose of his role in Kazakhstan, it is clear Blair has taken numerous opportunities to help buff b uff the image of Kazakhstan internationally. An hour-long 2011 video, produced by Agentsvo Khabar, features Blair pandering to the government officials

203 “Сотрудничество

с Тони Блэром повысит инвестиционную привлекательность Казахстана –  МИД,” Retrieved from  from http://newskaz.ru/economy/20111024/2042755.html (accessed 8 April 2015). Full quote in Russian: “Сотрудничество правительство Казахстана с бывшим премьер -министром Великобритании Тони Блэром, который будет консультировать Астану по экономическим и политическим вопросам, поможет повысить инвестиционную инвестиционную привлекательность республики, сообщил официальный представитель МИД Казахстана Алтай Абиббулаев.” 204  Silverstein, Ken. “Buckraking Around the World With Tony Blair,” The New Republic , 14 Sept. 2012. Retrieved from  http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/magazine/107248/buckraking-around-the-world-tony-blair from (accessed 8 April 2015). Despite his accolades, Blair has not gone as far as other Western politicians still in office in  brushing Nazarbayev’s Nazarbayev’s image. US Representatives Darrell Issa and Eni Faleomavaega, as well as a handful of Japanese politicians, have gone so far as to nominate Nazarbayev for the Nobel Peace Prize, citing his work in tthe he nuclear sphere. Likewise, Texas Congressman Joe Barton, in 2002, was discovered inserting language drafted by Patton Boggs on Kazakhstan’s behalf into the Congressional Record . See Silverstein, Turkmeniscam, 52. 205  Correspondence Between HRW and The Office of Tony Blair Regarding His Work With the Government of Kazakhstan.” N ovost ovostii -K azakhstan azakhstan, 24 Oct. 2011.

206

 Mendick, Robert. “Tony Blair gives Kazakhstan’s autocratic president tips on how to defend a massacre,” The Telegraph, 24 Aug. 2014. Retrieved from  from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/tony-blair/11052965/TonyBlair-gives-Kazakhstans-autocratic-president-tips-on-how-to-defend-a-massacre.html (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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who have hired him.207 “In the work that I do there, the re, I find [Kazakhstanis] really smart people, capable, very determined –  and very proud of their country,” Blair says. “It's a country that is almost unique I would say in its cultural diversity and the way it brings different faiths together,

and cultures together.” Blair repeats such talking points in subsequent interviews with Wall Street Journal 208 and Vanity Fair .209 In each of these interviews, and in his additional correspondence with Human Rights Watch, Blair avoids criticizing the Kazakhstani government. Rather, he seeks to paint the notion of a secular, tolerant, Muslim-majority nation that remains

“strategically important” for the West. 210 Blair’s avoidance of criticism in the midst of its discernible rights backslide stands glaring –  as  as does his seeming lack of concern about

associating with the Kazakhstani government, key components compon ents of Blair’s construction of free agent diplomacy.

Blair’s public correspondence with HRW helped highlight h ighlight the obfuscations inherent in his position within Kazakhstan. Penned by HRW’s Williamson, the organization’s original letter noted the discernible civil rights decline Kazakhstan has witnessed since Blair began his

involvement: “Over the last two years there has been a marked decline in respect of fundamental freedoms such as freedom of religion, freedom of association, assembly, assembl y, and speech, freedom

from torture, and the right to a fair trial.”211 Addressing Blair’s role, HRW attempted to delineate Blair’s “terms of reference for [his] work in Kazakhstan,” as well as the “role and composition of the Policy Advisory Group.” However, in response, Blair failed to address either question, noting

207

 “Tony Blair’s star turn in Kazakhstan video,”  BBC .  Fidler, Stephen. “Tony Blair on Israel -Palestine, Putin, Eurozone, ‘Brexit’ and Kazakhstan,” Wall Street Journal , 25 Nov. 2014. Retrieved from http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2014/11/25/tony-blair-on-israel-palestine-putineurozone-brexit-and-kazakhstan/ (accessed 18 April 2015). 209  Ellison, Sarah. “Tony Blair Defends His Legacy in Response to Recent Criticism,” Vanity Fair, 4 Dec, 2014. Retrieved from  from http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2014/12/tony-blair-profile (accessed 8 April 2015). 208

210

 Ibid . 211 Ibid 

 “Correspondence Between HRW and The Office of Tony Blair Regarding His Work Wi th the Government of Kazakhstan,” Human Rights Watch.

 

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only that his “work is completely in line with the direction d irection the international community wants Kazakhstan to take.” Additionally, Blair cited Kazakhstan’s struggles with “extremism,” without clarifying how such concern would affect his work. wo rk. His final communique with HRW also sidestepped related questions. In covering the back-and-forth, bac k-and-forth, Eurasianet ’s ’s Joanna Lillis notes that between Zhanaozen, increased media and political persecution, and a stifling religious law,

“what is indisputable is that Kazakhstan’s democratization record is far poorer today than it was when [Blair] started.”212 The wife of jailed opposition figure Viktor Kozlov summed the success of Blair’s purported position: “I haven’t seen any results from Blair’s work as adviser to  Nazarbayev. And I definitely won’t see any.”213 There has been little reason for optimism surrounding recent methods out of Astana. As Williamson followed up, “From what we know, [Blair] has been indifferent to those suffering abuses and has given a veneer of respectability to

the authorities during a severe crackdown on human rights.”214 Blair’s efforts –  or  or lack thereof –   seem to back Williamson’s statements. 

Still, Blair’s work in buffing Kazakhstan’s image does not end with his h is advisory role. Since Blair’s hire in 2011, individuals connected closely with Blair have hav e lent their efforts to the Kazakhstani government. For instance, Omnia Strategy –  a law firm run by Blair’s wife, Cherie

 –  recently  recently received nearly $600,000 from the Kazakhstani government for reviewing investment treaties.215 Jonathan Powell, likewise, serves with Blair’s Policy Advisory Group –   –  and  and is best

known for his time as Blair’s chief of staff during the latter’s tenure as prime minister. Moreover ,

212

 Lillis, Joanna. “Kazakhstan: Blair Criticized for Cozying Up To Astana,”  Eurasianet , 15 Nov. 2013. Retrieved from  http://www.eurasianet.org/node/67770 (accessed 8 April 2015). from 213  Lillis, “Kazakhstan: Blair Criticized for Cozying Up To Astana.”   214  Peev, Gerri. “Blair advises Kazakh dictator on liberty –  and repression gets worse,”  Daily Mail , 10 Nov. 2013. Retrieved from  from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2498993/Blair-advises-Kazakh-dictator-liberty--repressiongets-WORSE-Former-PM-accused-helping-preside-reversals-human-rights.html gets-WORSE-Former-PM-accused-helping-preside-reversals-human-rights.html  (accessed 8 April 2015). 215

 Mendick, Robert. “Cherie Blair signs deal to act for Albania where her husband is official adviser,” The Telegraph, 7 March 2015. Retrieved from  from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/tony-blair/11457121/CherieBlair-signs-deal-to-act-for-Albania-where-her-husband-is-official-adviser.html (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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such connections have allowed Astana to also “retain[…] the services of Alastair Campbell, the former Downing Street communications chief.”216 Simultaneously, Sir Richard Evans, a “close associate” of Blair,217 serves as chairman of the Kazakhstan’s state holding company, c ompany, Samruk –   218

and was initially introduced to Nazarbayev by Blair.

 Worth approximately $81.9 billion in

2011, Samruk –  which  which was headed by Nazarbayev’s son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev –  also  also managed to hire Lord Mandelson for a pair of effusive speeches, in which h hee bizarrely

highlighted the “special role [Samruk] played as a savior of the world economy.” Additionally, not only is it worth noting that Kulibayev purchased Prince P rince Andrew’s former marital home for $3 million more than the asking price –  and  and subsequently allowed it to decay, generating further discussion on corruption and money laundering 219 –   –  but,  but, more importantly, it is worth recalling

that Mandelson was the “architect of Mr Blair’s election victories.” 220  The most prominent member of Blair’s extended network involved in aiding Kazakhstan’s image, however, appears to be Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales. (Wales married Blair’s former diary secretary, Kate Garvey, with Blair and his wife, Cherie –  who  who later helped Wales cut the cake to celebrate cel ebrate Wikipedia’s 10th anniversary –  attending.  attending. 221 Wales has also advised on Internet strategy for Blair’s Faith Foundation.222) In 2011, Wales awarded Rauan Kenzhekhanuly as the inaugural Wikipedian of the Year for his work on the Kazakh-language

216

 Lewis, “Oil rich dictator of Kazakhstan recruits Tony Blair to help win Nobel peace prize.”    Ibid .  Ibid  218  “Q&A with Richard Evans, Chairman of Samruk,” Euromoney. Retrieved from http://www.euromoney.com/Article/1844163/Q-A-with-Richard-Evans-Chairman-of-Samruk-Our-mandate-is-tomake-two-and-two-add-up-to-more-than-four.html  (accessed on 1 Dec. 2013). make-two-and-two-add-up-to-more-than-four.html 219  Leigh, David and Bates, Stephen. “Prince Andrew and the Kazakh billionaire,” The Guardian, 29 Nov. 2010. Retrieved from  from http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/nov/29/prince-andrew-kazakh-billionaire (accessed 1 Dec. 2013). 220  Lewis, “Oil rich dictator of Kazakhstan recruits Tony Blair to help win Nobel peace prize.”   221  Cowan, Matt. “Fail study: Jimmy Wales and Nupedia,” Wired , 1 April 2011. Retrieved from http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2011/05/features/fail-study-jimmy-wales/viewgallery/266408 http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2011/05/features/fail-study-jimmy-wales/viewgallery/266408  (accessed 217

18 222

April 2015).  “Reflection from our 2011 Faiths Act Fellow Lorne,” Tony Blair Faith Foundation, 11 Au g. 2011. Retrieved http://www.tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/news/2011/08/11  (accessed 18 April 2015). from  http://www.tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/news/2011/08/11 from

 

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 platform WikiBilim.223 However, multiple users noted WikiBilim’s distinct lack of criticism among multiple topics –  the  the article on Nazarbayev contained no notable critiques of his decades-

long rule, while Zhanaozen’s entry contains nothing on the massacre –   –  while  while simultaneously 224

receiving government funding.  At the time, Wales said he didn’t believe Kenzhekhanuly’s

 NGO was “politicized.” However, after Kenzhekhanuly returned to an official position in the government, Wales said that he regretted giving the award to Kenzhekhanuly. 225  In his work with Kazakhstan  –  in  in utilizing his position and network as former prime minister; in his attempts at muddying financial clarity –  Blair  Blair has refined the concept of free

agent diplomacy. However, while Blair’s work with Kazakhstan Kaz akhstan stands as what appears to be his most lucrative post-premier venture, his concurrent work with Azerbaijani interests points to the innovative tendencies linking these two governments, gov ernments, and the role free agent diplomacy plays

within such innovation. Blair’s work in pushing Azerbaijani interests is neither as lucrative nor as lengthy as his work with Astana, but both work in concert with one another. In 2014, the consortium heading construction of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline  –  set  set to help transit Azerbaijani gas to a European market –  hired Blair. As with Kazakhstan, Blair’s role and mission remains largely unclear; it appears he was hired to assuage remaining concerns about the pipeline construction.226 As it is, the pipeline project, set under und er the broader rubric of the So Southern uthern Gas

Corridor, remains a key party of Azerbaijan’s foremost international energy and economic  project. Blair has yet to comment publicly on his work with the consortium, nor has he specified

223

 Rauan Kenzhekhanuly, LinkedIn. Retrieved from  from  http://www.linkedin.com/pub/rauankenzhekhanuly/24/8b7/b16  (accessed 18 April 2015). kenzhekhanuly/24/8b7/b16 224  Smith, Myles. “Kazakhstan Wikipedia Controversy Raises Questions About the Crowd,” Eurasianet , 27 Dec. 2012. Retrieved from  from http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66343 (accessed 8 April 2015). 225  Michel, Casey. “Wikipedia Founder Distances Himself from Kazakhstan PR Machine,”  Eurasianet, 2 April 2015. 226

Retrieved from  from http://www.eurasianet.org/node/72831 (accessed 8 April 2015).  Chazan, Guy, “Tony Blair to advise on Azerbaijan gas project,” Financial Times, 17 July 2014. Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/28b699ae-0d9f-11e4-815f-00144feabdc0.html (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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funding received. Nor, additionally, has he clarified whether he donated funds received for a 2009 speech in Baku, in which he received nearly $150,000. 227 (In 2009 David Plouffe, the former senior advisor to US President Barack Obama, also received $50,000 for speaking in 228

Baku –  but  but he later donated the sum following pressure from human rights groups.

) As with

Kazakhstan, Blair has avoided criticizing Azerbaijan, but has, rather, opted to lend his h is reputational weight to an authoritarian nation in order to ameliorate the reputation of these respective governments within the West, as well as augment the economic reach of these nations.229  Blair has employed such methods elsewhere, but is within these two former Soviet nations, and within Kazakhstan most especially, that Blair has helped perfect this notion of free agent diplomacy. He has dismissed or ignored criticism from the human rights community; he has obfuscated corporate details, such that his compensation compe nsation remains unclear; he has further failed to stake the objective of his work; and he has served at the b behest ehest of authoritarian regimes, and concomitant bodies, who have only grown more repressive during his tenure. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, and related organizations o rganizations alongside, are certainly not the first authoritarian regimes to employ former Western statesmen –  see  see former German Chancellor Gerhard

Schröder’s recent work in Russia, for instance. But Kazakhstan Kaz akhstan and Azerbaijan have reaped the  putative benefits of Blair’s innovation within free agent diplomacy, and have aided Blair in formulating the innovation to further their own reputational and economic ends. They have

227

 “Azerbaijan: Tony Blair’s Baku Appearance Stirs Controversy,” Eurasianet, 7 Dec. 2009. Retrieved from http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/news/articles/eav120809c.shtml (accessed 8 April 2015). 228  Simpson, Glenn. “Plouffe to Donate Speaking Fee to Pro -Democracy Groups,” Wall Street Journal, 10 Feb. 2009. Retrieved from  from http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123421448248665029 (accessed 8 April 2015). 229  Mendick, Robert and Meo, Nick. “Tony Blair told by b y Azerbaijan victims: ‘Give your £90,000 speaker's fee to

charity’,” The Telegraph, 13 Dec. 2009. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/azerbaijan/6795896/Tony-Blair-told-by-Azerbaijanvictims-Give-your-90000-speakers-fee-to-charity.html (ccessed 8 April 2015).

 

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allowed the expansion and refinement of such a role, with little indication that such relationship

 –  or  or that such employment of o f free agent diplomacy –  will  will cease anytime soon.

 

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Crooked cademics,  

Tainted Think Tanks

“SOME THINK TANKS IN WASHINGTON ARE

OPENLY CONVEYING THAT THEY CAN SERVICE ONLY THOSE FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS THAT PROVIDE FUNDING.”   -INTERNAL REPORT COMMISSIONED

 

BY THE NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY 

 

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As detailed above, Azerbaijan’s and Kazakhstan’s most recent innovative tendencies within media rest upon their lobbyists’ failures to disclose ties to the respective  governments. Likewise, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have allowed Tony Blair to refine his concept of free agent diplomacy, in which he lends his reputational reach to furthering the interests of Baku and Astana.230 However, it is within the sphere of academia a cademia and think tanks that we see the twinning of such trends –  the  the lack of disclosure, and the co-opting of prior reputation –  in  in attempting to

augment Kazakhstan’s and most especially Azerbaijan’s repute and economic reach within English-speaking audiences. Where the aforementioned lobbyists don’t necessarily rest upon their reputations in their media write-ups, and where Blair doesn’t necessarily n ecessarily fail to disclose his ties to either Kazakhstani or Azerbaijani interests, it is within academia that we have recently seen a largely concurrent pairing of the two. Combining the lack of disclosure with the individual and organizational reputations within certain Washington-based academics and think tanks, Azerbaijan –  and  and Kazakhstan, to a lesser extent –  has  has stood at the forefront of a disconcerting trend, calling into question the integrity and forthrightness of nominally independent ind ependent actors, with

 potential ramifications only just now coming to the fore. And as we’ve seen recently, such trend has extended into the broader world of nominally independent think tanks, threatening to undercut reputation and independence alike. Moreover, Azerbaijan appears to be one of the foremost actors within an additional  trend  trend therein, which will be discussed at the end of this section: the pairing of academics with distinct interests in furthering Baku’s causes to those think tanks potentially sharing and pushing parallel interests.

230

 Internal report quote taken from: Confessore, Nicholas; Lipton, Eric; and Williams, Brooke. “Foreign Powers

Buy Influence at Think Tanks,” The New York Times, 6 Sept. 2014. Document in available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1284105-1-aaa-general-doc-viewer_new.html#document/p5/a176108 (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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To be sure, the marriage of post-Soviet p ost-Soviet interests and nominally independent academics has existed as a phenomena for a relatively extended period. To pick but one example, S.

Frederick Starr, the founding chairman of Johns Hopkins’ Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, has seen his sympathetic analyses to regional governments linked to funding from interests therein. 231 But such abject lack of disclosure as we’ve seen recently postdates such accusations. On an individual level, perhaps no academic better encapsulates such trend than Brenda Shaffer, a University of Haifa political p olitical science professor and visiting researcher at Georgetown University’s Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies .

According to her publicly available biographies, Shaffer is a “specialist on energy and foreign  policy, energy security policies, Azerbaijan, the Caucasus, Caspian energy and Eastern

Mediterranean energy issues,”232 and had prior served as Research Director of the Caspian Studies Program at Harvard University.233 Shaffer further served as president of the Foreign F oreign Policy Section of the American Political Science Scienc e Association as well as visiting professor at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, 234 and was named in 2015 a Nonresident Senior Fellow with

the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. 235 Shaffer’s listed biographies –  no  no public CV seems to exist –  also note that she has worked in governmental capacities, having served “ as an

advisor to the Government of Israel’s Zemach Committee for natural gas policy po licy and Israel’s Ministry of Energy and Water.”236 As her myriad publications, testimonials before Congress, and

231

 Silverstein, Ken. “The Professor of Repression,” Harper’s, 24 May 2006. Retrieved from http://web.archive.org/web/20060612235816/http://www.harpers.org/sb-professor-repression-3284828.html (accessed 8 April 2015). 232  Brenda Shaffer University of Haifa Biography Website. Retrieved from  from   http://lecturer.haifa.ac.il/showen/1232 (accessed 8 April 2015). 233  Brenda Shaffer Georgetown University Biography Website. Retrieved from http://explore.georgetown.edu/people/bss51/?action=viewgeneral&PageTemplateID=360  http://explore.georgetown.edu/people/bss51/?action=viewgeneral&PageTemplateID=360 (accessed 8 April 2015). 234  Georgia Tech “Energy as a Tool T ool of Foreign Policy” Event Website. Retrieved from http://www.gatech.edu/hg/item/49707 (accessed 8 April 2015). 235

 Brenda Shaffer Atlantic Council Biography Website. Retrieved from http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/about/experts/list/brenda-shaffer (accessed 8 April 2015). 236  Shaffer Georgetown Biography.

 

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numerous media appearances attest, Shaffer is widely considered one on e of the foremost experts on the field of European, Caspian, and Mediterranean energy security. Shaffer, however, maintains an additional role, one on e that points to the innovative tactic of twinning a lack of disclosure to the reputational credentials of an academic in order to push Azerbaijani interests. In 2014, Shaffer became one of the few academics for whom both bo th The New York Times and The Washington Post were forced to issue clarifications or corrections due to the

author’s lack of disclosure. According to The New  New York Times, Shaffer discussed Azerbaijani affairs without revealing her work as an “adviser to Azerbaijan’s state-r un un oil company,” thus  breaking a contractual obligation to “disclose conflicts of interest, actual or potential.”237 The Washington Post  quickly followed, adding a clarification to Shaffer’s S haffer’s op-ed on European energy

that her piece “should have noted that the author has consulted for … Azerbaijan’s state-run oil company, SOCAR ..””238 Unfortunately, such addenda were not written at the behest of Shaffer,  but came about only after Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty exposed Shaffer’s link to SOCAR in September 2014.239 Within its report, RFE/RL revealed that Shaffer has served as an “Advisor to

the President of SOCAR for Strategic Affairs” since at least March 2013, when she presented herself in such capacity at an energy workshop in Budapest.240 According to the Harvard Crimson, Shaffer has continued to serve in such capacity with SOCAR.241 

237

 Shaffer, Brenda. “Russia’s next Land Grab,” The New York Times, 9 Sept. 2014. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/10/opinion/russias-next-land-grab.html?_r=1#addendums (accessed 8 April 2015). 238  Shaffer, Brenda. “Stopping Russia from cornering Europe’s energy market,” The Washington Post, 3 Nov. 2014. Retrieved from  from http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/stopping-russia-from-cornering-europes-energymarket/2014/06/15/5cf1ea02-e82e-11e3-afc6-a1dd9407abcf_story.html (accessed 8 April 2015). 239  Coalson, Ro bert. “Azerbaijan’s “Azerbaijan’s Opinion-Shaping Campaign Reaches ‘The New York Times’,”  Radio Free  Europe/Radio Liberty, 18 Nov. 2014. Retrieved from  from http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-lobbying-westernmedia-brenda-shaffer/26592287.html (accessed 8 April 2015). 240  Draft Program, “Workshop on Contractual Issues Related to Energy Trade,” 18 March 2013. Retrieved from http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Conferences/2013_March_20/Budapest_workshop_agenda.pdf   241

 Zhuang, Victoria. “Panelists Weigh Implications of Cyprus Natural Gas Reserves,” The Harvard Crimson, 21 Oct. 2014. Retrieved from  from http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/10/21/cyprus-natural-gas-impact/ (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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However, to date, there appears no public record of Shaffer attempting to disclose this fact outright –  neither  neither in published op-eds, nor in multiple Congressional testimonials, nor in any of her appearances as a putatively p utatively disinterested energy analyst. According to her Georgetown  biography, Shaffer has published 21 articles and op-eds since 2013, three of which discuss Azerbaijan directly in the headline, and almost all of which discuss energy an and d regional hydrocarbon security.242 In none of the publicly publicl y available articles, however, does Shaffer disclose her affiliation with SOCAR. For instance, in a 2014 2 014 policy brief with the German Marshall Fund on energy security in the greater Middle East, Shaffer is identified only as a

“specialist on energy and foreign policy, polic y, energy security polices, Azerbaijan, the Caucasus, Caspian energy, and Eastern Mediterranean energy en ergy issues.” 243 In a 2015 analysis discussing Caspian energy opportunities with The Washington Institute, Shaffer is identified only as “ a specialist on international energy issues.”244 According to one analysis, none of Shaffer’s 25 opeds prior to her New York Times op-ed noted her role with SOCAR.245 Likewise, no records exist within FARA of Shaffer registering her relationship with SOCAR. A search of o f the Sunlight

Foundation’s Influence Exporter revealed three instances of Shaffer’s name within FARA records, all as an individual contacted by DCI Group, LLC, a public relations organization registered on behalf of the Embassy of Azerbaijan. 246 Two of the filings note that DCI Group

242

 Brenda Shaffer Georgetown University “Publications” Website. Retrieved from http://explore.georgetown.edu/people/bss51/?action=viewpublications&PageTemplateID=360 (accessed 8 April 2015). 243  Shaffer, Brenda. “Can New Energy Supplies Bring Peace?” German Marshall Fund, 11 March 2014. Retrieved from  http://www.gmfus.org/publications/can-new-energy-supplies-bring-peace (accessed 8 April 2015). from 244  Shaffer, Brenda. “A Nuclear Deal with Iran: The Impact on Oil and Natural Gas Trends,” The Washington  Institute, 27 Jan. 2015. Retrieved from  from  http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/a-nuclear-dealwith-iran-the-impact-on-oil-and-natural-gas-trends (accessed 8 April 2015). 245  Bruckner, Till. “U.S. Foreign Policy P olicy Manipulation via Media Is Systemic, Warns Expert,” Huffington Post, 22  Nov. 2014. Retrieved from  from  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/till-bruckner/us-foreign-policymanipul_b_5842272.html (accessed 8 April 2015). 246  Brenda Shaffer, Sunlight Foundation Influence Exporter. Retrieved from http://foreign.influenceexplorer.com/contact-table?recipient_id=165890 (accessed 24 April 2015). http://foreign.influenceexplorer.com/contact-table?recipient_id=165890 

 

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met with Shaffer on 5 Dec. 2012 –  three months before the first public confirmation of Shaffer’s role with SOCAR –  to “introduce her to media.” Why Wh y DCI Group deemed it necessary to

“introduce [Shaffer] to media” remains unclear. As aforementioned, there is nothing legally impermissible with failing to disclose links to foreign governments or foreign entities within op-eds, analyses, or interviews. However, as detailed above, legal discrepancies exist between disclosure for op-eds and for Congressional testimony –  as  as well as FARA records. On two separate instances in 2014, Shaffer testified before Congress.247 In June, she spoke before the US Helsinki Commission, where, according to  RFE/RL, “she was identified only by her he r Georgetown affiliation.” 248 Early on in her testimony,

Shaffer echoed many of the same talking points that Katz, Moss, and other Azerbaijani lobbyists have delineated: Azerbaijan is a Muslim-majority country that has not established any special status for Islam, observes complete separation of religion and state, and protects equal rights for citizens regardless of religious or ethnic origin. The Republic of Azerbaijan not only allows religious freedom, but observes freedom from religious coercion. During its short  period of independence prior to being conquered by the USSR, Azerbaijan in 1918 was the first Muslim-majority state to grant women suffrage, two years before the United States and long before most of Europe. 249 

Within her testimony, Shaffer also expends considerable effort discussing the benefits of the Azerbaijan-led Southern Gas Corridor: At the end of 2013, Azerbaijan Azerb aijan and a number of international in ternational investors announced their final investment decision on the Southern Gas Corridor, which is designed to bring 247

 Shaffer also spoke before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in Dec. 2012  –  discussing “Iranian Influence in the South Caucasus” –  a  a few months before public record reveals she began her tenure with SOCAR. Shaffer S haffer spoke alongside none other than Dan Burton. Brenda Shaffer testimony before House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Testimony available at  at http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearings/view/?1481 (accessed 8 April 2015).  248  Coalson, “Azerbaijan's Opinion-Shaping Campaign Reaches 'The New York Times' Ti mes'.” 249  Brenda Shaffer testimony before US Helsinki Commission, 11 June 2014. Testimony available at http://csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewWitness&ContentRecord_id=1570&ContentType=D& ContentRecordType=D&ParentType=H&CFID=24776527&CFTOKEN=1740e9c894c03e2-B5E2BED5-9D956297-D6E4E3269CF29317 (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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Azerbaijan’s natural gas volumes into Europe. This ambitious project will provide the first new volumes of natural gas into Europe in decades de cades and allow a number of states along the route to improve the security of their energy supply and lower their dependence on Russia. This $45 billion project that crosses seven countries cou ntries and six regulatory  jurisdictions is being built in such a way that it can easily be expanded, and can thus transit additional volumes of gas from new sources in the future. At the same time, adjoining can be to reach The additional markets that will needbetothe improve their security ofpipelines supply, such as built the Balkans. Southern Corridor catalyst for natural gas interconnectors in Southern Europe. For Fo r a number of years, the European Eu ropean Union has spoken about the importance of interconnectors, and this project has encouraged the development of these connecting pipelines between different European countries.250 

One month later, Shaffer spoke in front of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on European Affairs. 251 Once more, Shaffer identified herself as an academic alone; in a video of the testimony, Shaffer is introduced only as an acad academic emic and author of

“numerous books.”252 And as before, Shaffer spends a notable amount of time discussing the  benefits of the Southern Gas Corridor: [The Southern Gas Corridor] will bring significant investment and create tens te ns of thousands of jobs in southern Europe. The Southern Gas Corridor is an energy superhighway that can facilitate transport of increased volumes of gas from different sources, such as additional fields in Azerbaijan, Central Asia, Iraq, and potential  production in the eastern Mediterranean. Spurs can be built from the Southern Corridor to reach additional markets in Europe, such as the Balkans. The project is being built with double the capacity that is needed for its current supply contracts and can be scaled up to a capacity of 60 BCM (2.2 tcf) annually in order to serve as a conduit for additional supplies into Europe. The Southern Gas Corridor will also serve as a catalyst for new interconnectors in Southern Europe and thus should help improve the supply situation in this region.

Shaffer illustrates the importance of Azerbaijan’s role within the Southern Gas Corridor via a highlighted map included within her testimony. Conveniently, the SOCAR-led Trans-Anatolian

250

  Ibid  Ibid .  Brenda Shaffer testimony before US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on European Affairs, 8 July 2014. Testimony available at  at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Shaffer_Testimony1.pdf. http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Shaffer_Testimony1.pdf.  

251

252 Video

of Brenda Shaffer testimony before US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on European Affairs, 8 July 2014. Video available at  at  http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/renewed-focus-oneuropean-energy-07-08-14p (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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Pipeline also stands as one of the Southern S outhern Gas Corridor’s primary projects.253 As aforementioned, no public record appears to exist of Shaffer’s disclosure of her relationship with SOCAR; neither her transcripts nor her “Truth in Testimony” disclosure form, dated to 254

December 2012, share such information.

 Likewise, as per FARA regulation, “ Any agent

testifying before a committee of Congress must furnish the committee with a copy cop y of his [or her] most recent registration statement.”255 However , as no record of o f Shaffer’s relationship with SOCAR –  which remains an “entity … having its principal place of business in a foreign

country”256 –   –  appears  appears to exist within FARA records, it remains unlikely such documentation was  presented to Congress. Despite coverage in the media, Shaffer has continued to make public appearances in her capacity as an academic, rather than alerting her audience to her role as adviser with SOCAR. Moreover, Shaffer has opted to carry this role  –  and  and this lack of disclosure –  within  within scholarly

spheres. She spoke alongside SOCAR’s Deputy Vice President Vitaliy Baylarbayov at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government in March 2014, without clearly disclosing her relationship. 257  That fall, she spoke at Columbia University alongside Baylarbayov once more on the Southern

Gas Corridor, identifying herself as a “moderator” rather than a SOCAR adviser. When asked

253

 “Azerbaijan and the Southern Gas Corridor to Europe,” Conference Report, The Jamestown Foundation, 13 Sept. 2013. Retrieved from http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&ved=0CD0QFjAF&url=http%3A%2F%2 Fwww.jamestown.org%2Fuploads%2Fmedia%2FConference_Report_ _Azerbaijan_and_the_Southern_Gas_Corridor_ _FINAL_web_version.pdf&ei=7iAvVdH_HeySsQTA_oCADg&usg=AFQjCNHIHgzMlrU6PcrPFkZcVvelmsGTg&sig2=ECWn-gz0gg5Z-zc3gfyz5g&bvm=bv.91071109,d.cWc (accessed 8 April 2015). 254  Brenda Shaffer “Truth in Testimony” Document, available at http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA14-TTF-ShafferB-20121205.pdf.   http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA14-TTF-ShafferB-20121205.pdf. 255  “FARA Frequently Asked Questions.”  256 Ibid   Ibid . 257

 “SOCAR Deputy Vice President gives lecture at John F. Kennedy School of Government,” Newz.Az, 20 March 2014.  http://news.az/mobile/articles/87014  2014. http://news.az/mobile/articles/87014  (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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whether or not Congress was aware of her relationship with SOCAR when she testified, Shaffer instead responded with commentary about cholesterol and marital status: [H]aving worked on energy as a researcher and every side of the table for governments, for companies, I’m very proud of my role, and I don’t think that just like, for instance, a

 professor of MBA law probably couldn’t teach law well if he’s neverinbeen to theprobably court, or a  professor of  –  if he hadn’t been involved in or engaged business couldn’t teach, you know, how does a negotiation work, how do you do a contract. I think my students benefit from the fact that I have been be en on every side o off the table. On the other hand I think that, you know, kno w, part of the American way is a right to privacy. Like, if I asked you, OK –  ‘What’s your wife’s name? What school do you go to? Who funds your scholarship right now? Where do you work? How do you pay your meals? … What’s your cholesterol count?’ –   –  there’s nothing to be ashamed of in any a ny of those answers. But the idea that you come in and try to you know, well, pick apart everything in my  background, or whatever, why don’t you, instead of shooting the messenger, why don’t you look at my message?258  It appears Shaffer defended her position not to disclose her role with SOCAR due to a “right to  privacy.” While such right certainly exists, claiming such right when opining on a project as a nominally neutral actor –  despite  despite carrying very obvious interests in the success of such project –  

does not fall under the rubric of “privacy,” but as a conflict of interest demanding disclosure in  both academic and professional capacities. This exchange at Columbia appears to be the closest Shaffer has yet come to publicly acknowledging a cknowledging her role with SOCAR  –  but  but even then, she failed to confirm such role. Shaffer, again, is not the first academic to have h ave worked in the emplo employ y of a foreign entity.

But the innovative tactic doesn’t lie within the simple funding –  and  and attendant apologia –  for  for Azerbaijan. Indeed, in 2006,  Harper’s Silverstein wrote that Shaffer was “eager to back regimes in the [Caspian] region,” most especially Azerbaijan, after the US -Azerbaijan Chamber of

Commerce helped donate $1 million to launch Harvard’s Caspian Studies Program. 259 Rather,

258 Michel, “Brenda Shaffer’s Conflicts of Interest.” Shaffer’s quote came during an on -the-record discussion at Columbia University on 23 Oct. 2014. 259  Silverstein, “Academics for Hire.”  

 

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the innovative tactic rests within the twinning of foreign entities employing the reputation of an academic –  especially  especially one as credentialed as Shaffer S haffer –  with the concomitant lack of disclosure.

However, such pairing, as we’ve seen over the past few years, does not necessarily need to lie within a sole academic, but can expand organizationa lly. And as we’ve seen recently, it can exist within the broader world of well-regarded, and heretofore nominally independent, think tanks. Foreign principals, through lobbyists, have attempted to groom relations with think tanks since at least the mid-1970s, when Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelly maintained contacts with

think tanks on behalf of Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi. Ketchum even “connect[ed] with American think tanks” on Russia’s behalf. 260 Lobbyists remain within their legal rights to arrange meetings, speaking engagements, and even sponsorship of scholarly reports –  so  so long as such engagement is likewise reported within FARA documentation. do cumentation. However, it remains contingent upon the think tank to disclose such funding or relationship for the sake of transparency, much in the same manner manne r as journalistic outlets. And within that necessity of disclosure, of transparency, we can unearth the innovative tactics brought to bear b by y involvement of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. In late 2014, The New York Times revealed a lengthy investigation into the recent phenomenon of foreign governments injecting funding into Washington-based think tanks. The study revealed that more than two dozen o off these think tanks

had received nearly $100 million from at least 64 “governments, state-controlled entities or government officials” over the past few years, though the total funding “is certainly more.” 261  (Such funding comes in an atmosphere of decreasing space for individual think tanks; according to one study, the number of Washington-based think tanks expanded from 100 to 306 from 1970

260

 O’Brien, “Putin’s Washington.”

261 Confessore;

Lipton; and Williams. “Foreign Powers Buy Influence at Think Tanks,” The New York Times, 6 Sept. 2014. Retrieved from  from http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/us/politics/foreign-powers-buy-influence-at-thinktanks.html?_r=0 (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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to 1996.262) According to the Times, “The think tanks do not disclose the terms of the agreements they have reached with foreign governments. And they have not registered with the United States government as representatives of the donor countries, an omission that appears, in some cases, to  be a violation of federal law[.]” Much of the fallout from the investigation focused on Brookings Institution, to which Qatar recently pledged a $14.8 $14. 8 million donation. At least one visiting v isiting fellow

at the Brookings Doha Center revealed he “had been told during his job interview that he could not take positions critical of the Qatari government in papers .” Brookings denied any and all censorship of its scholars,263 but in September Rep. Frank Wolf wrote an open letter noting that

think tanks “are considered to be independent sources of information and their policy recommendations are expected to in the national interest, rather than their special interest. … I hope you will end this practice of accepting money from Qatar and o other ther foreign governments.”264 It remains unclear whether any of these tanks cited have ceased accepting funds from foreign governments or agents therein. As it is, the rationale behind governmen ts’ willingness to fund think tanks is relatively straightforward: Such funding appears to enjoy enjo y far less stringent oversight than directly funding lobbyists. An internal report commissioned by the  Norwegian Foreign Ministry summed the logic as such: In Washington, it is difficult for a small country to gain access to powerful politicians,  bureaucrats and experts. Funding powerful think tanks is one way to gain such access, and some think tanks in Washington are openly conveying that they can service only those foreign governments that provide funding. 265  262

 Drutman, Lee and Teles, Steven. “Why Congress Relies on Lobbyists Instead of Thinking for Itself,” The  Atlantic, 10 March 2015. Retrieved from  from http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/when-congress-cantthink-for-itself-it-turns-to-lobbyists/387295/ (accessed 8 April 2015). 263  “Brookings Statement on  New York Times Article Examining Foreign Government Funding of U.S. Think Tanks,” Brookings Institute, 6 Sept. 2014. Retrieved from  from  http://www.brookings.edu/about/media-relations/newsreleases/2014/0906-foreign-government-funding-us-think-tanks (accessed 8 April 2015). 264  Frank Wolf letter to Brookings Institute, 9 Sept. 2014. Letter available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1301186/rep-frank-wolfs-letter-to-strobe-talbott-at.pdf .  265 Confessore; Lipton; and Williams. “Foreign Powers Buy Influence at Think Tanks.” Document available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1284105-1-aaa-general-doc-viewer_new.html#document/p5/a176108 (accessed 8 April 2015).

 

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Think tanks, as Wolf notes in his letter, are “supposed to be different” from lobbyists. 266 Their  breadth of impact relies on their reputation, and their reputation relies upon their independence. It is within this formulation that foreign governments have injected their funding, hoping to

subvert and utilize think tanks’ independence while failing to disclose such ties. In addition to Brookings, The New York Times singles out Atlantic Council as one of the think tanks at the fore of such innovation. According to the Times, foreign funding makes up “as much as 20 percent of [Atlantic Council’s] budget, because of special, one-time on e-time gifts from certain foreign nations in recent years. ”267 One researcher focusing on foreign funding for think tanks was less diplomatic in his observation: “Of all entities involved, of all the big think tanks, the one that seems to be the most engaged, the one run most like a bordello, is Atlantic Council.

Atlantic Council just doesn’t seem to care, and they seem to operate b by y taking huge sums from foreign sovereigns, and then preparing programs for foreign sovereigns. … Atlantic Council is an absolute floozy, and it’s completely ridiculous that it doesn’t even seem to care.” 268 Atlantic Council insists that such funding does not degrade or impugn their research and reputation.

“Most of the governments that come to us, they understand we are not lobbyists,” Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe said. “We are a different entity, and they work wo rk with us for totally different purposes.” Kempe did not specify what these purposes were, but The  New York Times detailed how foreign funding resulted in “limits to [the] independence” independen ce” of the

founding director of Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East . In total, Atlantic Council has accepted funding from at least 25 different foreign governments since 2008, but has

266

 Frank Wolf letter to Brookings Institute.  Confessore; Lipton; and Williams. “Foreign Powers Buy Influence at Think Tanks.” Document available at

267

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1284105-1-aaa-general-doc-viewer_new.html#document/p5/a176108 (accessed 8 April 2015). 268  Interview with author, 28 April 2015.

 

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not disclosed the total amount. 269 Two of these foreign governments, according to the Times, are Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.270  Astana has prior experience helping fund think tanks in Washington, including engaging with lobbyists to help fund Starr’s Central Asia -Caucasus Institute in 2008 to produce three reports on Kazakhstan. At the time, the institute failed to disclose the funding from Kazakhstan, a reality that compounded the fact that all three reports painted Astana in distinctly flattering lights –  despite  despite the fact that Starr claimed his team maintained complete editorial freedom.271  Kazakhstan has also helped fund at least one task force run b by y American think tanks recently. Atlantic Council, however, appears to be the lone Washington-based think tank to whom Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have directly donated funding over the past few years. 272 While Kazakhstan donated directly through governmental auspices, Azerbaijan donated governmental funding through SOCAR. 273 Indeed, the Times singled out Azerbaijan’s usage of helping fund Atlantic Council as a prime example of such innovation. 274 In 2012, according to FARA records,

Azerbaijan engaged the lobbying lobb ying firm DCI Group to “build relationships with think tanks on  behalf of Azerbaijan.” The agreement further notes that “US think tanks are vital contributors to

269 Ibid   Ibid . 270

 Confessore; Lipton; and Williams. “Foreign Powers Buy Influence at Think Tanks.” Infographic available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/07/us/politics/foreign-government-contributions-to-nine-thinktanks.html?_r=0 (accessed 8 April 2015). 271  Such funding presents one of the instances in which FARA documentation contributed to transparency, as such funding was uncovered through the FARA filings of lobbyist APCO Worldwide. Schwartz, Emma. “Kazakhstan Pays for Academic Reports,”  ABC   News News, 29 Sept. 2015. Retrieved from http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=5908348  http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=5908348  (accessed 25 April 2015). One of these reports, as it is, was written  by John C. K. Daly –  the  the same individual affiliated with flattering Kazakhstan in Silk Road Reporters.   272  Kazakhstan paid $290,000 prior to its 2010 OSCE Chairmanship for the creation of a task force –  managed  managed by  both the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Institute for New Democracies –  that  that would create reports on Astana’s chairmanship. The reports later received noted criticism for downplaying certain contex t that would have undermined the progress in Kazakhstan staked within the reports. Kucera, Joshua. “ Kazakhstan: Report Focuses Attention on Astana's OSCE Priorities ,” Eurasianet, 9 Dec. 2009. Retrieved from http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav121009a.shtml http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav121009a.shtml  (accessed 25 April 2015). 273 Confessore; Lipton; and Williams. “Foreign Powers Buy Influence at Think Tanks.” Document available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/07/us/07thinktank-docs4.html?_r=1 (accessed 8 April 2015). 274  Ibid .  Ibid 

 

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the formulation of US policy and serve as validator s of official policy positions,” and DCI Group

will in turn “[d]evelop a core group of think tanks for outreach.” (The documents do not specify what “[d]evelop” will explicitly entail.) Following both the SOCAR donation and the hiring of DCI Group, Atlantic Council, according to the Times, hosted at least one event that “focused on the exact themes that the Azerbaijani lobbyists had been hired to promote ” –  in  in this case, a July

2014 panel discussing Azerbaijan’s “concerted efforts in recent years to demonstrate demon strate its value as a NATO partner country,” as well as the West’s “strategic asset” of the Southern Gas Corridor. When contacted by the Times regarding SOCAR’s involvement with Atlantic Council, Kempe

responded, “ None of [SOCAR’s] funding has been applied to DC programming or activities. They are not an active, current funder of any of our activities, so no reason to mention them at our recent event on Azerbaijan's partnership-for- peace NATO activities.”275 According to

Kempe, since SOCAR’s funding had not been directed toward Washington, no disclosure stood warranted.

This lack of direct funding for “DC programming or activities” may ma y well be th e case, but, as the Times discusses, the event directly echoed Azerbaijan’s public relations goals. Moreover, during the July 2014 event, Atlantic Council hosted a SOCAR adviser on the panel without disclosing her role with the energy company: compan y: Shaffer, who was identified only by he herr Georgetown affiliation. That is to say, SOCAR helped fund a nominally independent think tank

that then hosted an event that echoed SOCAR’s pitch on So Southern uthern Gas Corridor, during which the think tank presented one of SOCAR’s advisers as a nominally independent academic. And the relationship between Atlantic Council and Shaffer does not stop there. As aforementioned, Atlantic Council hired Shaffer in early 2015 as a Nonresident Senior Fellow, without disclosing

275

 Ibid .  Ibid 

 

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in her biography that she serves as an adviser to SOCAR. On 2 21 1 April, Atlantic Council hosted

an event entitled, “Global Ramifications of the European Energy Union ,” with Shaffer –   identified by only her Atlantic Council and Georgetown affiliations –  speaking.  speaking.276 Technically, Azerbaijan will likely not be a member of o f any forthcoming European Energy Union. But

SOCAR has noted that the company will play a “vital role” in the creation of the European Energy Union,277 and European ministers have already called on Azerbaijan to participate in the formation of such union. 278 Nonetheless,  Nonetheless, it doesn’t appear that Atlantic Council believes such relationship between SOCAR, Azerbaijan, and the European Energy Union warrants the

disclosure of Shaffer’s role as an employee of SOCAR. SO CAR. According to an Atlantic Council spokesperson, Shaffer disclosed her relationship with SOCAR to Atlantic Council, and “will not work on Azerbaijan-related issues as part of her fellowship.” When asked why wh y the European Energy Union discussion was not consi dered “Azerbaijan-related,” the spokesman noted that

should “anything related to Azerbaijan arise, [Shaffer] will disclose her relationship with SOCAR. Her affiliation with SOCAR is ongoing.”279 That is to say, not only onl y was Atlantic Council knowingly failing to disclose Shaffer’s role with SOCAR, but they confirmed that

Shaffer’s “affiliation” with the Azerbaijani company is “ongoing.” Shaffer did not return multiple requests for comment. This consilience –  this marriage of Azerbaijan’s simultaneous co-opting of both academics and think tanks, with lack(s) of disclosure apparent –  presents  presents the latest development

276

 Atlantic Council “Global Ramifications of the European Energy Union” Event Website. Retrieved from http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/events/upcoming-events/detail/global-ramifications-of-the-european-energy-union (accessed 8 April 2015). 277  SOCAR press release. “EU Releases Introductory Video on European Energy Union,” 14 Feb. 2015. Retrieved from  http://socarusa.com/eu-releases-introductory-video-on-european-energy-union/ (accessed 8 April 2015). from 278  Rafigoglu, Agshin. “Latvian Minister: ‘Azerbaijan should participate in creation of European Energy Union’,”

 APA, 6 Feb. 2015. Retrieved from  from http://en.apa.az/xeber_latvian_minister_____azerbaijan_should_par_222738.html (accessed 8 April 2015). 279  Email correspondence with author, 13 April 2015.

 

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within Azerbaijan’s innovative techniques in academia and scholarship. (While Kazakhstan has donated directly to Atlantic Council, the efficacy and result of this specific move  –  whether  whether in  presentations or hiring non-disclosed agents –  remains  remains unclear.) Both Shaffer and Atlantic

Council, now working in concert with one on e another, seemingly mutually reinforce one anothe another’s r’s reputational reach.280 Azerbaijan, in turn, benefits that much more from the strengthening of the standing of these two clients. In turn, with both failing to disclose –  with  with Shaffer failing to disclose her role with SOCAR, and with the Atlantic Council failing to disclose one of its senior

fellows’ ties to Azerbaijan –  both  both expand a prior pattern of non-disclosure. In this pairing of Shaffer and Atlantic Council, we can witness the foremost front of this pattern of innovative tactic within Azerbaijani lobbying and public relations efforts within the United States. Such relationship features the innovations of non-disclosure in media efforts, alongside the co-opting of heretofore respected individuals (and organizations) for the furtherance of public relations goals. The new pairing of Shaffer Sha ffer and Atlantic Council features the best  –  or  or worst –  aspects  aspects of

Azerbaijan’s innovations, to the detriment of any audience exposed to their work.

280

 So, too, do instances in which Shaffer, Katz, and Burton all ap pear with one another, as they did at 2014’s US-

Azerbaijan Convention –  all  all without, according to program material, disclosing their relationships with Azerbaijan. For more, see: “U.S.-Azerbaijan Convention: Part II ,” Turkic American Convention, 30 April 2014. Retrieved from http://turkicamericanconvention.org/u-s-azerbaijan-convention-part-ii/ (accessed 8 April 2015). http://turkicamericanconvention.org/u-s-azerbaijan-convention-part-ii/ 

 

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Innova Innov ati tion on as Success?

 

“TONY BLAIR ABSOLUTEL Y SHOULD BE SLAMMED FOR TAKING MONEY FROM KAZAKHSTAN. I CONDEMN IT WITHOUT RESERVATION.”   - J I M M Y W A L E S  

 

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The purposes of these aforementioned innovations  –  in  in helping Blair refine his policies of free agent diplomacy; in foregoing disclosure within op-eds, op -eds, within academic ventures, within Congressional testimony –  is not, of course, innovation for innovation’s sake. 281 Rather, these are methods for the furtherance of certain goals, found within the realms of reputational and economic reach. These are innovations for the sake of buffing the images of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan among English-language audiences, as well as within international bodies. As it  pertains to the latter, the ability to evaluate success stands a bit more accessible. accessible. That is, we can

say that, for instance, Kazakhstan’s lobbying and image-management efforts aided in its landing the 2010 OSCE Chairmanship and 2017 World Expo. Likewise, Baku managed to land the inaugural European Olympic Games, set to begin June 2015. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan remains one of two finalists for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, as well as one of two finalists to land the 2022 Winter Olympic Games –  a  a move that, if successful, may

well be regarded as the most distinct accomplishment of Kazakhstan’s lobbying to date. But the links between landing such positions and the aforementioned innovations within

lobbying efforts remains tenuous. Evidence linking lack(s) of disclosure, or Tony T ony Blair’s concomitant network and networking skills within his free agent diplomacy, to landing the World Expo or the European Olympic Ol ympic Games stands far from convincing. Likewise, absent a wider polling of English-language audiences as to their views on Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, it remains unlikely we can determine whether such efforts at swaying a broader body p politic olitic stands effective –   although although it is worth noting that such broad populace does not remain the primary target audience for such innovation. As such, we should examine a few distinct policies that we

281

 Wales quote taken from: Michel, “Wikipedia Founder Distances Himself from Kazakhstan PR Machine.” 

 

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can tie to specific innovations detailed above, abo ve, and seek to aanswer nswer the question: Is such innovation worth the effort?

If we are to examine Azerbaijan’s and Kazakhstan’s Kaz akhstan’s usage of non -disclosure within media to further their aims, we cannot look at publications alone; we must, likewise, examine the responses therein. It is difficult to discern the efficacy of such media program  –  again,  again, we lack  polling mechanisms among readership or English-language audiences to examine correlation  between non-disclosure and views on Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan. But when such lobbyists are outed in separate media –  as  as Burton has now been, twice –  it  it stands clear that such innovative tactic is undermined that much more. Moreover, where these lobbyists have managed to utilize the general, or perceived, degradation and an d relaxation of journalistic norms to further excuse their lack of disclosure, they seem to have overlooked two key components: comments and social media. Where prior public response to such writings could only have been found in letters or responding op-eds –  for  for which the same editors would need to give their go-ahead in order to  publish –  readers can now examine public responses to the lobbyists’ op-eds within the

comments section or via Twitter. And those who seek to out such lobbyists’ lacks of disclosure are eager to utilize both. In five of Katz’s op -eds in which he discusses Azerbaijani interests,

readers have left comments below pointing out ou t that Azerbaijan stands as Tool Shed Group’s clients. In one example from The Hill , a commenter notes, “ Did they forget to say this article was funded by the government of Azerbaijan? ”282 Observations continue on social media, as well. On

Twitter, Freedom House Program Officer Nate Schenkkan Tweeted, “After @RFERL exposed a  paid shill for Azerbaijan writing in the NYT, another paid shill attacks them in The Hill” –  which  which was promptly re-Tweeted by everyone from Human Rights Watch’s European media director to

282

 Katz, “U.S. can learn from Azerbaijan.” 

 

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a Huffington Post writer.283 In Katz’s most recent offering in Roll Call –  and  and as the top comment, no less –  a  a commenter writes, “It is simply absurd that Mr. Katz would accuse anyone an yone of

‘shilling’ for another entity or group –  considering  considering that, according to U.S. U.S . Department of Justice, 284

he is currently a paid foreign agent of the Republic of Azerbaijan. ”

 Just as it remains unclear

the potential impact of Katz’s op -eds, it remains likewise unclear of how many readers find their ways to the comments or Tweets. Nonetheless, the information unveiling relations between lobbyists and foreign governments remains not only publicly available, av ailable, but attached directly to the op-eds in question. There are also outright responses to pro-governmental op-eds,

highlighting the blinkered analyses written by those buffing Astana’s or Baku’s Ba ku’s image. Jonathan Chait, the most widely read writer currently at  New York magazine, approaches McClennen’s

defense of Kazakhstan’s 2015 election in exegetical e xegetical fashion, defusing each of her points. As he writes, “Indeed there’s no campaign drama at all a ll [in Kazakhstan], if you define drama to mean such things as permitting political rallies or media that criticizes the regime or any doubt about the outcome of the election. Those things can be quite distracting.”285 The responses on Twitter

almost unanimously sided with Chait’s C hait’s write-up. The Daily Beast ’s ’s Jamie Kirchik likewise took US Rep. Robert Wexler to task for whitewashing the election. Wexler had prior observed the

election was “quite impressive” and that he “do[es] not know of anywhere else in the world today where there is such diversity and yet there seems to be such harmony.”286 According to

283

https://twitter.com/nateschenkkan/status/512852958447669248.    Nate Schenkkan Twitter. Retrieved from  from  https://twitter.com/nateschenkkan/status/512852958447669248.  Katz, Jason. “Can Members of Congress Shill for Constituents?”  Roll Call, 25 Feb. 2015. Retrieved from http://blogs.rollcall.com/beltway-insiders/can-members-of-congress-shill-for-constituents-commentary/?dcz= http://blogs.rollcall.com/beltway-insiders/can-members-of-congress-shill-for-constituents-commentary/?dcz=   (accessed 8 April 2015). 285  Chait, Jonathan. “The Inevitable Salon Defense of Kazakhstan’s Election System Is Finally Here and It’s More Amazing Than You Could Have Imagined,” New York, 28 April 2015. Retrieved from http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/04/salon-defense-of-kazakh-election-is-finally-here.html  http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/04/salon-defense-of-kazakh-election-is-finally-here.html (accessed 28 April 2015). 286  Michel, Casey. “The Rise of the Zombie Monitors,” The Diplomat , 30 April 2015. Retrieved from 284

http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/the-rise-of-the-zombie-monitors/  (accessed 1 May 2015). Wexler was by no means http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/the-rise-of-the-zombie-monitors/ the lone Western individual to approve of the election. Former U.S. Rep. Steve Stockman “welcomed the openness” of the vote; Latvian journalist Juris Paiders claimed the election was “a very important democratic event ”; and

 

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Kirchick, Wexler noted that “Kazakhstan is in a special place in terms of its development as a

country[,]” and that “ election day –  in  in terms of the mechanics of the vote, in terms of its fairness  –  was  was nothing short of impressive, in terms of turnout itself, civic responsibility[.]”287 Observed Kirchick, “it is beyond pathetic that [Wexler] … would issue a clean bill of health h ealth to a Central Asian police state where the same man has h as been president for 26 years.”  As it pertains to Blair, if we are to take his claims at their face –  if  if we are to believe Kazakhstan hired him, prowess and reputation attendant, to help push Kazakhstan toward European norms –   we we can safely stake that his presence appears to have been an abject failure. Kazakhstan has enacted a series of stifling civil rights laws since Blair’s hire, sliding significantly within corruption and press freedom indices since he joined Astana. (Suffice it to say, despite claims and assumptions otherwise, the likelihood of Nazarbayev landing a Nobel Prize stands even less likely now than before Blair was hired.) Likewise, if Blair was to increase

Kazakhstan’s investment attractiveness, as the Foreign Ministry official stated, he likewise seems to have faltered: Kazakhstan has dropped a thirty places within the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rankings since 2012. 288 While other former diplomats  –  including  including former Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski, former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, former Austrian Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer –  have served as members of Nazarbayev’s

“International Advisory Board,” none appear willing to follow in Blair’s footsteps of operating

British writer Rupert Goodman noted that he “did not observe anything that led me to question the integrity of the voting process.” Likewise, according to KazInform, Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, claimed that “Washington believes the presidential elections were conducted properly.”  287  Kirchick, Jamie. “Former Congressman Bob Wexler’s Shameful Dictator Shilling,” The Daily Beast , 11 May 2015. Retrieved from  from http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/11/former-congressman-bob-wexler-sshameful-dictator-shilling.html (accessed 11 May 2015). shameful-dictator-shilling.html  288 http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings    World Bank “Ease of Doing Business” Rankings, Rankings available at  at  http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings

 

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under the rubric of free agent diplomacy, either in breadth or compensation.289 And the reputational hits to Blair –  whether  whether within media coverage of his h is Kazakhstani obfuscation, or

with Wales noting that Blair “absolutely should be slammed to taking money from Kazakhstan” 290

and that Wales “condemn[s] it without reservation”

  –  –  have  have accelerated in the years since his

hire. Blair has seen untold compensation for his efforts, but the benefits Kazakhstan has accrued from this refinement of free agent diplomacy remain, at best, b est, questionable. The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline likewise remains stalled in discussion and debate. As it pertains to the innovative lack of disclosure within academia and think tanks, we’ve

seen relatively significant fallout when such actors’ ties to Baku or Astana are outed. To wit, multiple articles have been written since 2014 attesting to Shaffer’s role with SOCAR, including multiple articles by RFE/RL alone. Terming her work as part of “Azerbaijan’s opinion-shaping

campaign,” RFE/RL ran through the list of publications within which Shaffer Sha ffer did not disclose her relationship with SOCAR. While her work with Atlantic Council has ha s not yet received external coverage, multiple public comments from individuals affiliated with Freedom House and Wall Street Journal have already noted this failure of disclosure. Likewise, while the Congressional

Azerbaijan Caucus has grown considerably over the past decade, it remains too early to tell

whether or not Shaffer’s lobbying for support for the Southern Gas Corridor will prove successful –   or or even whether this lobbying played any direct role in any potential support Washington will lend to the furtherance of the Southern S outhern Gas Corridor.291 Nonetheless,  Nonetheless, Shaffer’s relationship with SOCAR, now exposed, remains readily available in the public sphere.

289

 Mayr, Walter. “What Human Rights Problems? European Politicians Shill for Kazakh Autocrat,”  Der Spiegel, 13 March 2013. Retrieved from  from  http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/european-social-democrats-lobby-forkazakhstan-autocrat-a-888428.html (accessed 8 April 2015). 290 Michel, 291

“Wikipedia Founder Distances Himself from Kazakhstan PR Machine.”   “U.S. Congressional Azerbaijan Caucus expands ,” AzerNews, 10 July 2013. Retrieved from http://www.azernews.az/azerbaijan/56594.html  (accessed 25 April 2015). http://www.azernews.az/azerbaijan/56594.html

 

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It is worth noting that these innovative tactics aren’t necessarily meant solel y for external consumption among English-language audiences. These are also methods meant for domestic consumption –  to  to display to domestic audiences the respect, the th e reach, the reputation engende engendered red in the West of the regimes in Baku Bak u and Astana. For instance, aforementioned analyses from Shaffer, Katz, and Burton have already alread y received positive coverage within Azerbaijani press,

utilized as evidence of Baku’s supposed positive image abroad. Commenting on Shaffer’s Congressional testimony, an Azerbaijani pub lication noted that “Shaffer spoke extensively about

Azerbaijan’s ability in stopping the efforts of outside powers to use religion as a tool to destabilize the country.” Covering Burton’s Washington Times piece, another Azerbaijani  publication discussed Burton’s claim that “the rest of the free world need more friends like Azerbaijan.”292 The same publication also interviewed Katz in February 2015, allowing the lobbyist to speak at length about Azerbaijani victimhood during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  Needless to say, none of the Azerbaijani press disclosed relations.293  But if we turn back to influencing Western audiences, audien ces, and all the difficulties and shortcomings of these innovations, we also find something  –  from  from both journalistic and academic  perspectives –  that  that much more dispiriting. While we can point to comments and Tweets and

coverage consequent from these lack(s) of disclosure, or while we can point to Blair’s apparent failures within stated or presumed goals in Kazakhstan, it does not appear as if such fallout has yet reached the vehicles utilized for such innovation. That is to say, while Katz and Blair and Shaffer have all been widely maligned for their work, their work continues nonetheless. Blair is still in the employ of Kazakhstan, even as Kazakhstan continues its rights backslide. Katz and his

292

 Badalova, Aygun. “Dan Burton: US needs more friends like Azerbaijan,” Trend, 29 Jan. 2015. Retrieved from

http://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/2358626.html (accessed 8 April 2015).  “Helsinki Commission holds hearing on several dimensions of US-Azerbaijan ties,” News.Az, 12 June 2014. Retrieved from  from http://www.news.az/articles/politics/89310 (accessed 8 April 2015).

293

 

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coterie have continued writing op-eds without disclosing d isclosing their relations to Azerbaijan. Shaffer, likewise, has not only continued offering o ffering her regional energy analyses, but Atlantic Council has h as seen fit to have her opine on the European Energy Union  –  a  a union, again, for which SOCAR

said it would play a “vital role” –  without  without publicly disclosing her role as a SOCAR S OCAR employee. And perhaps this is the greatest, or most substantive, takeaway from the innovations examined above. This conclusion is not to be found within how many readers are convinced, or how many

 policies are directly enacted as a result. It’s found in how the vehicles in question –  the  the newspapers publishing these shills; the think tanks hiring these non-disclosing employees –  seem  seem to care so little about the hits to their reputation, or to the veracity of their content. Katz continues to write. Silk Road Reporters continues to avoid disclosing its leadership’s links to Kazakhstani lobbyists. Shaffer continues to speak on Azerbaijani energy. Atlantic Council  –  and  and Georgetown –  continues  continues to allow Shaffer a platform. p latform. Their relationships with lobbyists, their interests in furthering Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani causes and reach rea ch and economic swell, remain re main  publicly and readily available. And yet, nothing is done –  and  and all continue to work and write and

speak as nominally independent actors. Perhaps Pe rhaps it’s too early to tell; perhaps, since these innovative tactics have come only recently, these publications and academic institutions have not yet come to full realization of how they the y have been (mis)used by those seeking to buttress Baku

and Astana. Or, more distressingly, perhaps they don’t care. Perhaps they’re willing to forego such disclosure because of inertia, or because they feel the reputational hit will be g greater reater should they admit such links. These innovations may not have swayed millions, and they may not have

enacted the specific policies in question, but bu t they’ve taken root in heretofore independent , largely reputable institutions. And certain these institutions appear disinclined –  not  not unable, but unwilling –  to  to do anything about it.

 

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