Alfonso de Cartagena’s 'Memoriale virtutum' (1422): Aristotle for Lay Princes in Medieval Spain 9004411151, 9789004411159

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Alfonso de Cartagena’s Memoriale virtutum (1422)

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The Iberian Religious World Series Editors Ana Valdez (University of Lisbon) Ricardo Muñ oz Solla (University of Salamanca)

Editorial Board Camilla Adang (Tel Aviv University) Pablo C. Díaz Martinez (University of Salamanca) Carlos Eire (Yale University) Natalio Fernández Marcos (High Council of Scientific Research of Madrid, csic) Rodrigo Furtado (University of Lisbon) Eleazar Gutwirth (Tel Aviv University) María Jordan (Yale University) Alisa Meyuḥas Ginio (Tel Aviv University) Stuart B. Schwart (Yale University) António Vasconcelos de Saldanha (University of Macau) Carsten Wilke (Central European University) Veronica Williams (University of Buenos Aires, conicet)

Deceased Members: Filomena Barros † 2021 (University of Évora) Herman Prins Salomon † 2021 (University of New York at Albany)

volume 8

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/irw

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Alfonso de Cartagena’s Memoriale virtutum (1422) Aristotle for Lay Princes in Medieval Spain

Edition, study, and translation by

María Morrás Jeremy Lawrance

leiden | boston

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This is an open access title distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, which permits any non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided no alterations are made and the original author(s) and source are credited. Further information and the complete license text can be found at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ The the CCoflicense applyvirtutum only to the original material. The useresearch of material from other sources The terms criticalofedition Memoriale forms part of the following project: (indicated by a reference) such as diagrams, illustrations, photos and text samples may require Alonso de Cartagena. Obras Completas (acoc). ffi 2014-55902-p (Ministerio de Economía y further permission from the respective holder. Competitividad), ip Juan Miguelcopyright Valero Moreno. The critical editionEsc. of Memoriale forms the following research project: Cover Illustration: Q-ii-9, f. 1. virtutum Title-page of Q,part withofrubrished titulus, illuminated initial, litterae Alonso de Cartagena. Obras Completas (acoc). ffifigures, 2014-55902-p (Ministerio de Economía y notabiliores, floral border with animal and human and the arms of Santamaría/Cartagena at the Competitividad), ip Juan foot (see also Figure 5). Miguel Valero Moreno. Cover Q-ii-9, f. 1. Title-page ofData Q, with rubrished titulus, illuminated initial, litterae LibraryIllustration: of CongressEsc. Cataloging-in-Publication notabiliores, floral border with animal and human figures, and the arms of Santamaría/Cartagena at the foot (seeCartagena, also FigureAlonso 5). de, 1385?-1456. Memoriale virtutum. | Cartagena, Alonso Names: de, 1385?-1456. Memoriale virtutum. English. | Morrás, María, editor. | Lawrance, Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jeremy (translator), editor. Title: Alfonso de Cartagena's 'Memoriale virtutum' (1422) : Aristotle for lay princes Names: Cartagena, Alonso de, 1385?-1456. | Cartagena, Alonso in medieval Spain / edition, study, andMemoriale translationvirtutum. by María Morrás, Jeremy de, 1385?-1456. Memoriale virtutum. English. | Morrás, María, editor. | Lawrance, Lawrance. Jeremy (translator), editor.: Brill, 2022. | Series: The Iberian religious world, Description: Leiden ; Boston Title: Alfonso; volume de Cartagena's 'Memoriale virtutum'references (1422) : Aristotle for lay princes 2213-9141 8 | Includes bibliographical and index. in medieval Spain / edition,(print) study,| and translation by (ebook) María Morrás, Jeremy Identifiers: lccn 2022006615 lccn 2022006616 | Lawrance. isbn 9789004411159 (hardback) | isbn 9789004194502 (ebook) Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2022.ethics. | Series: The Iberian religious world, Subjects: lcsh: Aristotle. Nicomachean | Medieval philosophy. 2213-9141 ; volume 8 | Includes references and(ebook) index. | Classification: lcc b430.c373 a44bibliographical 2022 (print) | lcc b430.c373 Identifiers: lccn 2022006615 (print) | lccn 2022006616 (ebook) | ddc 171/.3–dc23/eng/20220404 isbn 9789004411159 (hardback) | isbn 9789004194502 (ebook) lc record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022006615 Subjects: lcsh: Aristotle. ethics. | Medieval philosophy. lc ebook record availableNicomachean at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022006616 Classification: lcc b430.c373 a44 2022 (print) | lcc b430.c373 (ebook) | ddc 171/.3–dc23/eng/20220404 lc record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022006615 lc ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022006616 Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill‑typeface. issn 2213-9141 isbn 978-90-04-41115-9 (hardback) Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill‑typeface. isbn 978-90-04-19450-2 (e-book) issn 2213-9141 Copyright 2022 by María Morrás and Jeremy Lawrance. Published by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, isbn 978-90-04-41115-9 (hardback) The Netherlands. isbn 978-90-04-19450-2 (e-book) the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau and V&R unipress. Copyright Morrás and Jeremy Lawrance. Publishedagainst by Koninklijke Brill nv, NVMaría Koninklijke2022 Brillbynv reserves the right to protect this publication unauthorized use.Leiden, Requests for The Netherlands. re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill nv via brill.com or copyright.com. Koninklijke nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, This book is Brill printed on acid-free paper and produced in Nijhoff, a sustainable manner. Brill Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau and V&R This mentis, book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in aunipress. sustainable manner. Koninklijke Brill nv reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill nv via brill.com or copyright.com. María Morrás and Jeremy Lawrance - 978-90-04-19450-2 Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:17:34PM via Open Access. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

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Contents Preface vii List of Figures ix Abbreviations x Introduction 1 1 The book and its milieu 1 2 Courses for horses: Aristotle for lay princes 11 3 Memoriale’s paratexts: political and cultural ideas 4 Style and Latinity 27

18

Prolegomena to the critical edition 40 1 Description of MSS 40 2 Recension 52 3 Editorial criteria 64 4 Translation 67

Memoriale virtutum: Text and translation Stemma and sigla

71

Tabula (addita ad initium A) Liber i Liber ii

73

80 232

Apparatus of minor variants Works cited Index 430

370

403

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Preface This is not the first attempt to edit Memoriale virtutum. The basic filiation of the stemma was spotted by Mar Campos Souto, who consulted five of the six MSS for her edition of the fifteenth-century Castilian translation Memorial de virtudes (Cartagena 2004, 154–155); in her commentary she also identified many of Cartagena’s sources. Arturo Hernansanz Serrano (1993) earlier transcribed Q for a memoria de licenciatura; and Luis Parra García (2002, 464n3) stated that he had an “edición crítica ya […] preparada”, also springing from a dissertation on Bk i (1998); these remain unpublished. Only after undertaking this text for Grupo ACOC of IEMYR did we learn of a more ambitious recent project, Cristina Martínez Gómez’s PhD (2016) with critical edition—the first to include the Basel MS—and Spanish translation, which she graciously allowed us to see in its pre-published form. She was the first to carry out the improbus labor of combing the MSS for variants, and though we too spent months “amarrados al duro banco” we did not find a great deal to add. To her belongs the honour of having published the first scholarly edition and modern translation of our text. As medievalists our aim has been somewhat different from that of the classical scholars. We treat medieval Latin as the living language it was (Mohrmann 1958) and have not modernized the text according to the orthographical rules reinvented by nineteenth-century German philologists. We attempt to recover the text Cartagena wrote in 1422, as far as possible in the actual form he may have written it. Our commentary is likewise less concerned with Memoriale’s relation to Antiquity than with its place in fifteenth-century literature and Cartagena’s role in adapting the sources to his own cultural milieu, a study for which the foundations have been laid by the leading authority on Cartagena, Luis Fernández Gallardo (1999a, in particular ii, 445–603 on Memoriale; 2001; 2012a, 33–90), and by María Díez Yáñez’s recent thesis on the Spanish reception of Aristotle (2015). We hope our effort may serve in these ways as a further step towards a fuller understanding of the text. We should like to thank Juan Miguel Valero for the invitation to participate in his project “Alonso de Cartagena. Obras Completas” (FFI 2014-55902-P. Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad), and Laura Ranero Riestra for her guidance in the mysteries of the Mendeley website and other favours. Without the kindness of Cristina Martínez Gómez in letting us see her edition before its publication, this book would be a good deal poorer. We are also grateful to Ángel Escobar for his helpful answers on the progress of his Aristoteles Latinus en España project and perspicacious comments on our typescript, and to

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viii

preface

Noel Fallows, Miguel Ángel Pérez Priego, Mar Campos Souto, Tomás González Rolán, María Díez, Luis Fernández Gallardo, Teresa Jiménez Calvente, Jerónimo Miguel, and Rafael Bonilla for generous gifts, over several years, of books and materials we have used in our study.

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Figures 1 2 3 4 5

6

BNE Mss/9178, f. 1r. Title-page of A, with rubrished tituli and illuminated initial 40 BNE Mss/9212, f. 1r. Title-page of H, with illuminated initial and litterae notabiliores, and space for title-rubric, unfilled 43 Esc. J-ii-25, f. 1r and 6r. Title-page (bottom half torn, showing f. 2) of J, and f. 6r with marginal corrections by a second hand 44 Burgo de Osma, Catedral Ms. 117, f. 2. Title-page of O, with rubrished titulus, calligraphic initial, and litterae notabiliores 46 Esc. Q-ii-9, f. 1. Title-page of Q, with rubrished titulus, illuminated initial, litterae notabiliores, floral border with animal and human figures, and the arms of Santamaría/Cartagena at the foot 48 BNE Mss/9178, sign. [*i]r. First page of added Tabula libri inserted at the start of A 73

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Abbreviations Biblical abbreviations follow NRSV, pp. ix–x, those for Greek and Latin works The Oxford Classical Dictionary (Hornblower & Spawforth 2012, pp. xxvii–liii); editorial sigla are listed on p. 71, below. Additional abbreviations and details of editions referred to are as follows: BNE C. Clem. Cod. corde cport D. d.a.c. Decretum Dig. DRAE Du Cange EN Esc. Glossa ord. HB in c. Instit. Intro. L&S LSJ LXX Mcast MV NRSV PG PL

Biblioteca Nacional de España, Madrid Causa, in Decretum, Pars ii Clementinae (Clementis papae v Constitutiones), in Richter & Friedberg 1879–1881, ii, 1125–1200 Codex Iustinianus, in Krueger et al. 1868–1872, ii Corpus diacrónico del español at http://corpus.rae.es/cordenet.html Corpus do Português, Davies & Ferreira 2006– at http://corpus.byu.edu/ Distinctio, in Decretum, Pars i dictum before the canon Gratiani Concordia discordantium canonum, in Richter & Friedberg 1879– 1881, i Iustiniani Digesta seu Pandectae, in Krueger et al. 1868–1872, i, 1(bis)–873 Real Academia Española, Diccionario de la lengua española, 22nd edn (2001), rev. online edn (2014) at http://dle.rae.es Glossarium mediæ et infimæ Latinitatis, in Du Cange 1883–1887 Ethica Nicomachea (Gk), in Aristotle 1890 Real Biblioteca del Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial Glossa ordinaria (1) In S. Scripturam, in Strabus Fulgensis et al. 1603; or (2) In Corpus iuris canonici, in Gregorius xiii 1582 Hebrew Bible / ‫תורה נביאים וכתובים‬, in Bible 1997 in corpore articuli, in the body of the article Institutiones Iustiniani, in Krueger et al. 1868–1872, i, 1–56 “Introduction”, pp. 1–39 below, cited by section (§) A Latin Dictionary, in Lewis & Short 1879 A Greek-English Lexicon, in Liddell & Scott 1996 Septuagint / Παλαιὰ Διαθήκη κατὰ τοὺς Ἐβδομήκοντα, in Bible 2006 Castilian trans. of MV, after 1474, in Cartagena 2004 Memoriale virtutum, cited from the edn below by Bk, chapter, and line New Revised Standard Version, in Bible 1995 J.-P. Migne (ed.), Patrologiae cursus completus: Series Graeca, 161 vols. (Lutetiæ Parisiorum: the editor, 1857–1866) J.-P. Migne (ed.), Patrologiae cursus completus: Series Latina, 221 vols (Lutetiæ Parisiorum: the editor, 1844–1865)

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abbreviations Proleg. Sent. Eth. Sext. STh. Vet. interp. Vulg. X.

xi

“Prolegomena to the critical edition”, pp. 40–68 below, cited by section (§) Sententia libri Ethicorum, in Aquinas 1969, cited by Lib., lectio, para. (i.1.1) Liber Sextus Decretalium D. Bonifacii papae viii, in Richter & Friedberg 1879–1881, ii, 929–1124 Summa theologica, in Aquinas 1888–1906 Vetus interpres of EN (Lat.), in Aristotle 1972–1974, fasc. iv, 375–588 Biblia Sacra iuxta Vulgatam versionem, in Bible 1994 Liber Extra (= Decretales Gregorii ix), in Richter & Friedberg 1879–1881, ii, 1–928

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Introduction 1

The book and its milieu

One of the leading writers of his age, Cartagena came to authorship late in life and as a result of circumstance. At the age of thirty-seven, between October and December 1421, he was sent by Juan ii of Castile on the first of four diplomatic missions to negotiate treaties with João i of Portugal (regn. 1385–1433). The embassy took nearly a year, much longer than expected; it was probably in the spring of 1422—he ends with mention of trees in blossom—, during the hours of leisure “quod mihi habundancius quam voluissem sub hac legacione concessum est”, that Cartagena was induced at the behest of crown prince Duarte (1391–1438) to write what he called the first-born of his original writings (“primogenitam hujuscemodi scripturam meam”).1 During that year he also translated for fellow-ambassador Juan Alfonso de Zamora, “con muy pequeño trabajo […] en las oras que sobravan del tiempo que sabedes”, Cicero’s De senectute and De officiis, and the last two books of Boccaccio’s De casibus virorum illustrium; and perhaps started on Cicero’s De inventione for Duarte.2

1 Memoriale virtutum, Liber i, Prologus, ll. 25–26, and Conclusio, ll. 4–5 (cited from the edition below, henceforth MV, by book, chapter, and line). The significance of the embassies is studied by Salazar (1976); the first is described in Alvar García de Santamaría’s Crónica de Juan ii, Año 1421 cap. 40, and Año 1422 cap. 27 on the follow-up visit of Jan.–April 1423 (BNE Mss/1618, ff. 83, 1044—the latter out of order on three leaves in another hand inserted between ff. 104– 105 with a note by Jerónimo Zurita, “Antes del año m.cccc.xxiii, 104. | Sacada del original [i.e. Santamaría’s autograph, Esc. X-ii-2] enel qual no está lo precedente”; Santa María 1891, i, 258– 259, 310–311). Carvajal 1517 abbreviates (Año 1421 cap. 34, 1423 caps 58–59, ff. 74v, 81/1877, 411, 423–424), but his chief variant is “al doctor don Alonso de Cartajena” for “don Alonso García de Santa María”. On the Portuguese side, Fernão Lopes’s Crónica de João i and its continuation by Gomes Eanes de Azurara reach only 1411 and the conquest of Ceuta in 1415 respectively; the version “reformed” by Duarte Nunes de Leão (d. 1608) mentions the embassy, but adds nothing of moment (Leão 1642, Cap. 99, pp. 379–381). 2 The quotation is from the preliminaries to Tulio de senetute, dated Montemor-o-Novo 10/ 19 Jan. 1422 (BNE Mss/7815 f. 6r; Cartagena 1996, 157, 371 n48, and see 16–22; Moreno 1988, 355); Caída de príncipes is dated 30 Sept./9 Oct. 1422 (Cartagena 1495, sig. a2v); on Rethórica de Tulio see n56, below. “Primogenitam hujuscemodi scripturam” must therefore mean “of an original kind” or “in Latin”. Fernández Gallardo (1999a, ii, 447–449; 2012a, 34–35) argues that MV was written not in 1422 but in 1425, from the mention of the Canaries in i.14 25; Prince Henrique’s abortive attempt to invade Gran Canaria in 1424 provoked angry protest from Castile, and Cartagena was sent to negotiate terms with João i in December of that year, leading later to the Treaty of Medina del Campo of 1431 and his Allegationes super conquesta Canarie at Basel in 1436 (Suárez Fernández 1960, 38–64 and 1963; Cartagena 1994; Lawrance 2013). We hold to © María Morrás and Jeremy Lawrance, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004194502_002 María Morrás and Jeremy Lawrance - 978-90-04-19450-2 © Morrás Jeremy Lawrance, | doi:10.1163/9789004194502_002 ThisMaría is an open accessand chapter distributed under 2022 the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. Downloaded from Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:17:34PM via Open Access. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

2

introduction

Memoriale virtutum is divided into two books consisting of two prologues, sixty-three chapters, and an epilogue on the moral virtues. Cartagena presents the work as rudiments extracted from Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea (“rudimenta protracta”, MV i.Prol. 59 and i.1); in practice he lifts passages from its commentary by Aquinas. On the face of it, then, the work looks like a novice exercise in note-taking, harking back to the Salamancan aulas and the world of late medieval scholasticism he knew as a student. By the definition of the schools it was a kind of compilatio, for he says: omnia ergo que sine auctore scripta hic legeris Philosopho et glosatoribus ejus, Thome presertim, attribue, nec a me quicquam esse additum vel mutatum existimes nisi exempla vel verba que ad ordinis connexionem vel ad planiorem intelligenciam conferre putavi. MV i.Prol. 42–46

Defining the four kinds of scholastic discourse under the headings scriptor (“scribe”), compilator, commentator, and auctor, Bonaventure (1221–1274) put the compiler who wrote other men’s matter “with additions, but not his own”, just above the “mere scribe” who wrote other men’s matter with no additions or changes. In a different category was the commentator, who added his own matter, albeit for the purpose of clarifying (ad evidentiam) other men’s words. Yet in Bonaventure’s definition even the auctor wrote “sua et aliena”.3 In fact he the standard dating (Serrano 1942, 241; Cartagena 1996, 17 n20 and 2004, 29 & n42) on the grounds that Cartagena certainly could not have made a throw-away remark to Duarte about the Canaries during the tense confrontation of 1424–1425, but in truth it makes little difference. The one relevant fact is that, when writing MV, Cartagena had not heard of the controversial new trans. of EN by Leonardo Bruni (completed 1417–1418). In the prologue to his work critiquing the latter, Declinationes super nova quadam Ethicorum Aristotelis translatione addressed to the relator Fernan Díaz de Toledo, Cartagena states that he first heard of Bruni during a later embassy to João i in 1427, where a certain Portuguese scholar back from Bologna showed him some of the Italian’s works; but his first sight of Bruni’s EN came “quadriennio fere post elapso”, when he was shown it one winter night in Salamanca (documents show this means either September 1430 or, more likely, November 1432) by Toledo’s nephew Pero Díaz (“cum una noctium de moralibus se sermo ingessisset, ingeniosus adolescens nepos tuus novam quandam Ethicorum translationem in medium produxit quam Leonardum noviter scripsisse tradebat”: Cartagena 2000, 194–196). 3 Commentaria in iv libros Sententiarum, Lib. i, Quaestiones Proœmii 4 resp. “quadruplex est modus faciendi librum: aliquis enim scribit aliena nihil addendo vel mutando, et iste mere dicitur scriptor; aliquis scribit aliena addendo, sed non de suo, et iste compilator dicitur; aliquis scribit et aliena et sua, sed aliena tamquam principalia et sua tamquam annexa ad evidentiam, et iste dicitur commentator, non auctor; aliquis scribit et sua et aliena, sed sua tamquam principalia, aliena tamquam annexa ad confirmationem, et talis debet dici auctor” (Bonaventura

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introduction

3

saw less difference between these activities than we expect. His interest lay not so much in establishing a scale from bad to good in terms of originality, since all were meritorious, but in defining various methods of transmitting the words of predecessors, with or without expository material. This reflected an attitude to authorship different from ours, one in which writers strove actively—however insincerely—to show that they were not original. The approach was profoundly rooted in medieval epistemology, and specifically in their notion of scriptural auctoritas, the indefectible validity of certain written texts. We should not, however, mistake this as meaning that the Middle Ages’ concept of authority excluded recognition of individual creativity. On the contrary, the Seraphic Doctor’s affirmative answer to his quaestio on the curious problem of whether or not Peter Lombard was the causa efficiens of Sententiae marked a moment when authority and authorship began to be clearly distinguished, despite the lack of different terms for them. Bonaventure concluded: “quod sunt ibi multa dicta aliorum, hoc non tollit Magistro auctoritatem sed potius eius auctoritatem confirmat et humilitatem commendat”.4 We have to do, then, not with a culture that denied or ignored the status of authors, but one in which, to use Michel Foucault’s term, the “author-function” shaped the structure and reception of texts in a distinct way.5 The prolific compiler Vincent

1882–1902, i, 14–15; henceforth all emphases are ours unless otherwise indicated); see Parkes 1976 (on this passage, 127), and on the more general earlier semantics of compilare, Hathaway 1989. We return to the specific generic characteristics of compilatio, in particular its key component of ordinatio, below at n19 & ff. 4 Bonaventura, loc. cit., 15; see Minnis 1979, 1988 (on this passage, 94–95), 2008. The praise accorded to the author’s “humility” epitomizes the difference between medieval concepts of authorship/authority and our ideas of creativity/originality. Bonaventure’s quaestio addressed a specific issue; some commentators on Sentences argued that God was the author, Lombard a compiler, e.g. Robert Kilwardby, Quaestiones in iv Sententiarum, i, qu. 1 “Licet igitur huius libri possit Magister dici compilator vel promulgator, auctor tamen esse debet dici Deus”. Yet Kilwardby went on to say that, being inspired by God, this “compiler” was both a sort of angel and the book’s efficiens principalis (cited by Rosemann 2015, 1–12, at 7–8, who comments, “it is likely that the term auctoritas [in Bonaventure] should be rendered as ‘authorship’. Yet of course it also means ‘authority’ ”). 5 Foucault 2001 explores the fact that this “fonction-auteur ne s’exerce pas d’une façon universelle et constante sur tous les discours”. Whereas for us, for example, fiction is authorial and science anonymous, in the Middle Ages it was the other way around; works such as Cantar de Mio Cid or Amadís were anonymous, while “les sciences naturelles […] n’étaient reçus […] qu’ à la condition d’ être marqués du nom de leur auteur. «Hippocrate a dit», «Pline raconte», […] c’ étaient les indices dont étaient marqués des discours destinés à être reçus comme prouvés” (p. 827/212). That is to say, the author-function “n’est pas définie par l’attribution spontanée d’ un discours à son producteur, mais par une série d’opérations spécifiques et complexes” (832/216); it is a “propriété discursive” that modifies “les modes de circulation, de

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4

introduction

of Beauvais stated that he was not the author simpliciter of his Speculum, since he added “little or nothing of his own” and “by authority” it belonged to the Holy Fathers and other ancients; yet for all that, it was a “new work”.6 Cartagena too, in one of Memoriale’s most striking metaphors, described it as his task to be not an author, merely a pen (i.Prol. 18–19 “non ut auctoris sed meum ut calami officium poscebas”). To copy out authoritative texts like the Latin version of the Philosopher (exponent par excellence of Reason or “nature”, as opposed to the revealed truth of Faith or “grace”) was a laudable exercise, not theft (“nec enim fur judicari volo”, ibid. 40); but just as Vincent argued that his work was “new”, so too Cartagena went on to overturn his self-image as mere pen by talking of Nature’s generosity in granting even modest wits like him a certain facultas scribendi and, in the next sentence, of being carried away by his pen to “write” a small book (“calamo decurrente libellum scripsi”, 29). It is in terms of such medieval attitudes to the author-function that we should consider the meaning of Memoriale virtutum and Cartagena’s authorial role in it. The first question to ask is: was Cartagena truly a compiler? He entitled his work not compilatio—he never uses the word, though he was to do so in Doctrinal de los caballeros (n21, below)—but “remembrancer”, and states that what this meant was the record not of a book but the slippery words of an oral discussion (MV i.Prol. 13–15 “illa que adinvicem loquebamur ut scriberem precepisti […] labilia verba”).7 His task was to write a memorandum of that talk valorisation, d’ attribution, d’ appropriation des discours”, the “complexity” lying in the variable ways in which this function operates in different cultures. 6 Vincentius Bellovacensis 1591, i, f. 1v Generalis prol. 4 “hoc ipsum opus novum quidem est simul et antiquum, […] antiquum certè auctoritate et materia, novum verò partium compilatione et earum aggregatione […], utique meum simpliciter non sit, sed illorum potius ex quorum dictis fere totum illud contexui. Nam ex meo ingenio pauca et quasi nulla addidi; ipsorum igitur est auctoritate, meum autem sola partium ordinatione” (cited in part by Parkes 1976, 128, who glosses, “The compilatio derives its value from the authenticity of the auctoritates employed, but it derives its usefulness from the ordo in which the auctoritates [a]re arranged”). Foucault (op. cit., 822/207) poses the inevitable question: “Si un individu n’était pas un auteur, est-ce qu’ on pourrait dire que ce qu’ il a écrit […] pourrait être appelé une «oeuvre»?” This is the root of the problem being discussed here, and Vincent (who is cited at MV i.14 30) answers explicitly: yes, it can be a work—and an opus novum, at that. 7 Du Cange v, 336–337 gives sixteen entries s. xi–xv for memoriale, memorialis (liber)— damned by Nolte as “suspect” and “faulty” despite Suet. Iul. 56.6 “memorialis libelli”, Macrob. Sat. iii.6.11, Gell. NA vii.7.8 “Sabinus Masurius in primo memorialium” (Noltenius 1744, 614)— in senses ranging from “memorial, monument” (cf. Vulg. Ex 3:15, Ps. 101:13, 134:13, Jdt 9:15) to “necrology”; but most are legal (diploma, charta collectarum or datiorum, index, etc.; and cf. Cod. xii.19.10 “Statutos memoriales […] in scrinio quidem memoriae”, 19.13.2 “memorialium matricula”; Dig. l.16.144 “Libro memorialium”). Close to MV ’s sense is Salamancan canonist Juan Alfonso de Benavente in 1453, “studens debet facere memor[i]alia et epilogationes

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(“cedulam”, i.Prol. 28), for which an appropriate term was reportatio; but his pen “ran away” and he ended up adding chapter and verse of “aliqua que me legisse memineram” that he had mentioned “hiis in sermonibus” (i.Prol. 7–8).8 The first striking fact about the resulting work, as Martínez Gómez (2016, 52) observes, is that it eschews “la forma dialogada”. Things might have been different twenty years later, when the new breeze of humanism brought literary dialogue back into fashion, but Memoriale’s format clearly signals its adherence to the methodology of the medieval schools.9 The next striking fact—and de textibus et glossis et notis” (Benavente 1972, 90, i.5 §80); and later Archbp Martín de Ayala of València’s Epitome constitutionum, 16 April 1566 “per archiverios capituli fiat unum memoriale omnium negotiorum […] quæ litigiosa sunt” (Sáenz de Aguirre 1693–1694, iv, 147). The word occurs elsewhere in titles (e.g. Eulogius of Córdoba’s Memoriale sanctorum, PL cxv, 731–818; the alphabetic metrical summary of the Bible Roseum memoriale of c. 1430 in Petrus de Rosenhaym 1489; Gabriele Bucci’s historical Memoriale quadripartitum of c. 1480; and see n10, below); but Cartagena’s device of inviting the reader to “call the work ‘memorial’ if you will” (“si vis”, i.Prol. 29–30; see n49 ad loc.) shows that he meant it to sound unusual and arresting, like his other Latin titles (Defensorium, Confectio Catoniana, Duodenarium, Conflatorium, Anacephaleosis). 8 On reportatio see Minnis 1988, 101–102, 192; Hamesse 1997 shows it was specially used in university law and theology. Cedula too was a jurists’ term (Du Cange ii, 247 “ceda, cedula pro Schĕda, schĕdŭla [vulg. dim. < class. scĭda “leaf of paper”] in veteri Vocabulario Juris utriusque. […] Hispani et Itali dicunt etiam Cedula, Galli Cedule”); Cartagena surely had in mind Sp. cédula, cf. Palencia 1490, f. 457r “Singraphum es memorial obligatorio o subscripçión de çédula de la mano [cirographi]; […] en las çédulas de mano se suelen solamente escrivir las substantias delo fecho”. Cédula (real) is attested in corde × 723 in s. xv legal texts, × 33 in literary texts with senses close to the one here (e.g. Villena 1994–2000, ii: Traducción y glosas de la Eneida i–iii, glosa § 115, 57 “el primer cogimiento que escriven con los testigos […] llaman çeda; e viene çédula dende, que quiere dezir […] cualquier minuta, siquiere primero original que después se ha de reduzir en mejor forma”). 9 On humanistic dialogue in fifteenth-century Spain see Zappala 1989; Vian Herrero 1991; Gómez Moreno 1994, 197–201; Solervicens 2005; Miguel, in Lucena 2014, 160*–164*. In the 1440s Cartagena wrote a series of answers to enquiries from noble laymen; in them he adopts the format of the epistle (Qüestión sobre el fecho de la cavallería to Santillana, Epistola ad comitem de Haro, Oracional for Fernan Pérez de Guzmán), but he was familiar with Ciceronian dialogues, having translated De senectute in 1422, and in his Questio ortolana (Morrás 1996) he announced that he was emulating Cicero’s Tusculanae disputationes, though only the circumstances are imitated (he boasts that his was a real debate in a real garden), the basic form being that of a scholastic quaestio. Nevertheless, in the same years he experimented with fictional dialogues between historical characters in Duodenarium (1442) q.4, caps 5, 10, 15 (Fernández Gallardo 2007, 75–83; Jiménez Calvente 2015). An instructive parallel is André do Prado’s Horologium Fidei, addressed to Duarte’s brother Prince Henrique c. 1450. It too is a compilatio, a discussion of faith and reason based on the Apostle’s Creed (hence “Clock”: twelve apostles, twelve chapters, twelve “hours”) written at the prince’s request during a moment of otium (Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Ms. Vat. lat. 1062 f. 1r/Prado 1994, 32 [Prohemium]), but in dialogue—not the humanist kind, but not a medieval disputatio or

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the reason why he avoids calling his work a compilatio—is that, apart from the legal texts which he adds, Cartagena does not in fact reproduce his authorities verbatim. At 39,785 words Memoriale is more than two thirds (68 · 5 %) the length of Aristotle’s Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια (58,097); but Cartagena’s acknowledged guide, Angelic Doctor Aquinas’s Sententia Ethicorum (MV i.Prol. 42–44 “omnia […] glosatoribus ejus, Thome presertim, attribue”), is 202,666 words, and his unnamed other main source, Moral Doctor Geraldus Odonis ofm’s Expositio et questiones super libros Ethicorum, perhaps twice as long again, by which measure one could call our text a drastic abbreviatio (“brevi epilogo”, MV ii.Prol. 76). It nonetheless represents, at a conservative estimate, six or seven hours of spoken delivery. We may safely conclude that Cartagena greatly expanded the conversation; but the compilatio of the relevant parts of Aristotle’s work (Bks iii–v) is a reordered précis. In another memorable metaphor in his prologue Cartagena claims that, despite his resolve to bid farewell to everything not covered in the conversation (“omnibus valedicendo, ea dumtaxat que ultro citroque loquuti sumus […] ex Philosophi dictis assumpsi”), he was “constrained” to add some things that simply refused to be left out (“jussa abire noluerunt”, i.Prol. 36–39). In other words, his own statements and the statistics forefront the preponderance of aliena, other men’s matter, but also pinpoint the fact and extent of his compilatory role. But of course, the numbers tell only a small part of the story. Often the most vital additions or changes are effected by a single word or even letter, such as substituting sg. “God” for pl. “gods” (Deus, dei, n234) or punctiliously adapting every occurrence of the word humilis so as to use it in a specifically Christian positive sense, as opposed to its negative sense in Aristotle (Gk ταπεινός, n250). The problem for the critic of Memoriale is thus to figure out not just the content of the original conversation, but the precise nature of each of Cartagena’s interventions and what his overall disposition of the borrowed texts means, regardless of who wrote the words or his modest disavowals of authorship/authority. The latter were commonplace in all sorts of texts, Latin and vernacular, as for example in the one by Vincent of Beauvais cited above (n6); and we find them in the prologues to all Cartagena’s other works, whether or not they were compilations.10

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master-pupil doctrinal altercatio either, since the “colóquio (não) havido” was meant to flatter Henrique by making him lead the discussion (Nascimento, in Prado 1994, 10–14). The Évoran Franciscan Prado had spent over thirty years in Italy as magister at Bologna and the papel curia (Costa 1967); he cites Aristotle from Bruni’s “novam translacionem” and other books “I read in Florence” (f. 11v/p. 82; Martins 1960, 282, 295), yet his florid Latin is far more scholastic than Cartagena’s. Carré (2002, 356 & nn3–9) for example cites such very well known authors as Bartholo-

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What, then, does Cartagena leave out, and what does he add? To begin with he omits the philosophical scheme of Aristotle’s work, which was to deduce by logical argument from endoxic first principles (i.e. ones that could be agreed by ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος, any man of all-round education, EN 1094b12–1095a2) a practical definition of what is the good life. Aquinas’s aim was to pursue the same plan, or take it further.11 By these standards Memoriale is not a philosophical work, for it takes for granted the definitions of “virtue” and “the good”. Cartagena had no interest in discussing such concepts, which for him were defined by Catholic doctrine; he ignored the meaning of happiness (εὐδαιμονία) and the beautiful or noble (τὸ καλόν) as ends of human behaviour because his religion attached no value to this world or earthly pursuits, and where he suspected ancient pagans of having erred in this regard he did not hesitate— belying his modesty about not changing “anything”—to abandon his sources and tell us (e.g. MV i.19 54–65 on the Stoics’ “patent error” about suicide, or ii.27 27–34 on the “intolerable”, “utterly absurd” theorem of the Cynics; nn143, 312). It is noteworthy that he never imputes such error to Aristotle himself, carefully twisting his words (n143) or suppressing any such critique in Aquinas (n230) to avoid it. Even so, he inserts a wholly non-Aristotelian preliminary distinction between the one true “beatitudo seu felicitas hominis”—the invisible “supernatural” kind that “non tractarunt philosophi”, which he too refrains from analysing—and the imperfect happiness (“non vera et perfecta”) he calls “secundum principia naturalia” (MV i.2 5–27, citing Aquinas, STh. I-ii.62.1). This lower natural or worldly happiness and its virtues are the subject of Memoriale, but the definition he offers is nonetheless perfunctory and tautological: happiness consists in … behaving virtuously (MV i.2 27–28 “solet enim sic definiri: felicitas est anime operacio secundum virtutem perfectam”).12

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maeus Anglicus, De proprietatibus rerum i.1 “de meo pauca vel quasi nulla apposui, sed omnia quae dicentur de libris authenticis […] compilavi”; Brunetto Latini, Trésor i.1 “ne di je pas que li livres soit estraiz de mon povre sens ne de ma menue science, mais il iert aussi comme une bresche de mel coillie de diverses flors, car cest livres est compilés seulement des merveilleus diz des autours ki devant nostre tens ont traitié de philosophie.” Further examples in Guenée 1985; of special interest, in view of the work’s title, is Jean de SaintVictor’s prologue to his early fourteenth-century Memoriale historiarum claiming to be “hujus libri compilator, non inventor”. There is debate as to how Aristotelian Aquinas’s Christian synthesis in Sent. Eth. really is (e.g. Jordan 1992, 1993; Owens 1993; Doig 2001, 109–193); for example, did he replace θεωρία “metaphysical contemplation” (the highest end of man, EN 1177a10–20) by mystical visio beatifica in the afterlife (Donato 2003)? A modified précis of EN 1176a30–1177a10 ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια/Sent. Eth. x.10.9. In his distinction between natural and supernatural happiness Cartagena follows Aquinas, who makes the contrast with Aristotle explicit in Sent. Eth. i.9.11 “Loquitur enim in

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Happiness is Virtue, Virtue Happiness—that is all ye know on earth, and all ye need to know. Aristotle indeed insisted on a conceptual link between aretḗ and eudaimonía, but only after rebutting vulgar fallacies about happiness from things like pleasure or wealth, and by arguing the case that, as excellence constitutes well-being, so well-being defines what is excellent. To ignore this process and cut to the sound-bite of its conclusion is to short-circuit the project of EN; but Cartagena makes clear that his task, like the original oral discussion, was not philosophical but “directive” (MV i.4 33–34 “de hiis enim solum conferendo loquebamur que ad morum direccionem pertinent”). Technical terms like habitus (ἕξις) and central doctrines of Aristotle’s thought surface as the book proceeds, such as that virtues may be defined as a just mean (EN 1106b27 μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή) between extremes of defectus (ἔλλειψις) and superhabundancia (ὑπερβολή); but when Cartagena observes at the outset that the intellectual virtues other than practical wisdom (prudencia, φρόνησις) are of no concern because, “licet sint excellentes in se, non tamen reddunt hominem bonum vel malum” (MV i.4 26–27; thus many knowledgeable men are not good, many ignorant men are—“ut sunt plures religiosi”, he glosses, perhaps divining that Aristotle might not have regarded monks as either wise, virtuous, or happy), we see the divide between him and the Greek philosopher. EN’s conclusion rests on the “function argument” that what distinguishes us as human is the use of reason, and hence the highest good must consist in wisdom, some kind of excellent exercise of the intellect.13 Cartagena counters with an idea that is avowedly religious—though we may regard it as no less reasonable—about the possibility of virtue that springs from the simplicity of an innate, or as he conceives it divinely implanted, goodness (cf. Aristotle, EN 1103a19 οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται). Indeed he goes further, and to his account of how felicitas consists in the exercise of virtue adds the rider, “only given God’s help”: principia naturalia […] non sufficiunt ad ordinandum hominem in beatitudinem predictam [in heaven], unde opportet quod superaddantur homini divinitus aliqua principia per que ita ordinetur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem sicut per principia naturalia ordinatur ad finem connaturalem, non tamen absque adjutorio divino. MV i.2 12–17, 23–24, from Aquinas, STh. I-ii.62.1; see our n61

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hoc libro Philosophus de felicitate qualis in hac vita potest haberi; nam felicitas alterius vitae omnem investigationem rationis excedit.” See n14, below. For an explanation of Aristotle’s debated natural teleology, together with a general exposition and critique of the philosophical content of EN, see the fine overview and bibliography in Kraut 2014, § 2 and passim.

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“The extent to which a philosophical virtue theory was able to detach itself in the Middle Ages from theology is disputed”, states Bejczy (2011, 1365), since “the moral psychology underlying medieval virtue theory is essentially Christian, as it rests on the notion of fallen human nature.” For the Church Fathers the seven virtues (three theological, four cardinal, with seven corresponding capital sins) could have their source only in a divine gift from God, exclusive to Christians, leading to celestial beatitude. This was standard doctrine in theology (Peter Lombard, Sent. ii.27.1 §1 “Virtus est bona qualitas mentis qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur”; cf. Aquinas, STh. Iii.55.4). However, the twelfth and thirteenth-century rediscovery of Aristotle and the ancient Peripatetic-Stoic theory of virtues (five intellectual, eleven or twelve moral) as perfections of man’s capacity for good—acquired dispositions to choose a rational mean between excess and deficiency—led philosophers to debate with theologians the role of nature/nurture (virtus acquisita or consuetudinalis) vs. grace (virtus infusa), and the degree to which the former can be transformed by charity into “gratuitous” or “salvific” virtue.14 In the outcome “the most frequently copied work on the virtues from the Middle Ages” proved to be Martin of Braga’s sixth-century Formula vitae honestae, which is “entirely Stoic” (Bejczy, loc. cit.; cited as “Seneca” at MV II. 13 69); but the early fourteenth-century saw a revival of the Augustinian concept of virtue by grace only that was to exercise “remarkable influence” on Petrarch and the founders of Italian humanism, for it chimed with their conviction that we are moved to exercise virtue not by scholastic logic but by their own specialism, eloquence or theologica rhetorica (Trinkaus 1970). Cartagena, however, stayed anchored in the rigorous scholastic teaching of Aquinas. Deus/divinus occurs sixty times— almost once per leaf—in Memoriale, which adheres to the theological doctrine that only God infuses salvific virtue; but at the same time Cartagena adopts the philosophers’ concept of virtutes consuetudinales (i.2 40–41 “assuefaccio bonorum actuum […] inducit habitus virtutum, ideo dicuntur morales, quasi consuetudinales”); and though he accepts a role for eloquence in persuading 14

For such debates, to which a fifteenth-century reader drew attention in the margin at MV ii.Prol. (n201), see Chenu 1927; Doig 2001, 1–108; Bejczy 2008a. Aristotle mentions the idea that virtue may be “god-given” (θεόσδοτον, θεόπεμπτον), but only to dismiss it as “matter for another kind of investigation” (EN 1099b9–17 τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον). Aquinas, Sent. Eth. i.14.3–5 well understood the different meaning of “god” for ancient Greeks and Christians, but agreed the topic could be skipped (“ex dono deorum, id est substantiarum separatarum quas antiqui ‘deos’ vocabant. […] Sed dicit hoc esse magis proprium alterius perscrutationis, scilicet metaphysicae”), the crux being that virtue is discibile (“ostendit tolerabiliter dici quod felicitas sit ex causa humana quia, etiam si sit a Deo principaliter, tamen adhuc homo aliquid cooperatur”).

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us to act virtuously, he presents logic as the clearer, more profound and efficacious method: “aliud est ad virtutis opera suadendo exhortari, aliud quid ipsa sit virtus et diverticula ejus inquirere; illud suadele dulcedinem exigit, […] hoc autem faciliorem viam intelligendi procurat” (i.Prol. 52–55). In the light of this last point Memoriale’s omission of the philosophical marrow of EN emerges as less critical than it might first seem. It implied no disdain of reason or philosophical method; indeed, the opposite. Cartagena accepted Aristotle as authoritative, calling his five (that is, four and one apocryphal) works on ethics the fundamental corpus from which all others derived, just as legal works derived from the Corpora of civil and canon law (an attitude he never abandoned: Escobar Chico 2016); but specified that they did so “a sola racione, nichil enim auctoritatis doctrinis Philosophi tribueretur nisi racione probasset” (MV i.1 59–60). His interest lay not in debating the reasoning, however, but in delineating the places where it falls short of faith—as we have noted, a contested point—and applying the discussion of “natural” virtues to the “directive” purpose laid down by the courtly colloquy (“hiis terminis contentus quos statuit illa hesterna colloquucio”, Concl. 1–3), as Aristotle, with his stress on the practical end of ethics, intended it should be, though he also insisted that no ethical theory can offer rules or a decision procedure, a point to which Cartagena paid less attention. It would be interesting to know the circumstances of that “colloquucio”. Since it took place, as Cartagena is careful to say in his first words, not in Duarte’s apartments but in the king’s chamber of state (“in camera regia illustris progenitoris tui”, i.Prol. 1), and since he describes his task with the legal term cedula (n8, above) and as a command (“scripture brevissime commendari imperasti”, ibid. 17–18; “mandato tuo”, Concl. 1), it might seem at first as if the discussion arose from the business of Cartagena’s legation. We know from the chronicles (n1, above) that there were lengthy disagreements between the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns as to the terms and duration of the peace treaty; but how might such negotiations have involved discussion of virtues? Besides, Cartagena makes clear the confabulacio was private, between himself and Duarte (he uses singular tu throughout both prologues); its subject was things “que ad bene vivendum conducunt”, aimed at “nostri interioris hominis cognicioni” and to be “studied” not as negotia but in the contemplative solitude of otium and the company of “libris solempnibus” from the prince’s well-stocked bibliotheca (ii.Prol. 1, 12–19, 73).15 Without discounting an ulterior

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In places Cartagena envisages a wider readership (MV i.1 60–62 “hec sufficiant […] ut sciat unusquisque”), ending “Quicumque ergo sit ille in cujus manus hic libellus noster

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political motive, then, we may assume that the work was primarily intended for the moral edification of the thirty-one-year-old heir-apparent to the throne.

2

Courses for horses: Aristotle for lay princes

From this last point of view Memoriale may be considered a kind of speculum principis, a genre Cartagena specifically lists among the principal forms of ethical discourse (MV i.1 42–44 “in materia morali […] alii glosas, alii commenta, alii summas, alii tractatus diversos ad erudicionem et regimina principum”). It is only when we consider his compilation in the specific light of this secular purpose that the work’s import emerges. He not merely skims over the theological and all but one of EN’s intellectual virtues, but also makes changes to the list of moral ones. He says that, like Aristotle, he will discuss eleven (MV i.8 1–4 “justicia, fortitudo, temperancia, liberalitas, magnificencia, magnanimitas, moderacio, mansuetudo, affabilitas, veracitas, eutrapelia” vs. EN’s courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, proper pride, right ambition, good temper, friendliness, truthfulness, tactful wit, justice), but groups together as Bk i the four “cardinal” virtues (Aquinas, STh. I-ii.61.1; see MV ii.Prol. 62–65), for which purpose he transfers justicia (δικαιοσύνη, the whole of EN Bk v, 1129a– 1138b) to the head of the list before fortitudo (ἀνδρεία, EN Bk iii, 1115a–1117b) and distributes the treatment of self-mastery quite differently (temperancia MV i.24–29 and, “quia videtur adherere” (i.30 1), continencia i.30–35—counted as one virtue in the eleven above, but adapted to Christian ascetic doctrine; vs. σωφροσύνη EN Bk iii, 1117b–1119b, and ἀκρασία/ἐγκράτεια Bk vii, 1145b–1154b, after the eleven virtues have been discussed).16 He makes numerous minor

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devenerit, solent enim scripture ante multorum occulos devenire quos scribentes non cogitabant” (Concl. 79–81); but he directly addresses only Duarte. In putting the Cardinal Virtues first Cartagena followed popular Christian tradition and iconology; but this too was not exempt from scholastic debate. Albertus Magnus and Aquinas argued that prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude were the more important virtues even by Arist.’s own definition; later commentators like Geraldus Odonis and Buridan stated bluntly that, whatever Arist. said, they were the only essential ones (Bejczy 2008b). Cartagena certainly used the Franciscan Geraldus (n17), widely taught in Spain despite papal condemnation of certain views (Guiral Ot 2001, 10–11, 23–25) and the source for many of MV ’s most interesting divergences from Arist.; outwardly, however, he continued to side with the orthodox Dominican masters—predictably, given his family’s lavish patronage of the Blackfriars’ Burgos friary of San Pablo, which between 1451 and 1456 he would promote to the rank of estudio general (Reichert 1900, 265; Madrid, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Clero Regular perg. 189.8, 11 and Códice 57-B Libro de fundaciones ff. 282– 284v).

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changes of order and emphasis in Bk ii as well, not forgetting to tack on at the end two chapters on Aristotle’s little appendix on αἰδώς “shame” (EN Bk iv 1128b10–35) under its Christian guise as verecundia “modesty”, so that in fact his list contains thirteen virtues. All this upsets Aristotle’s logical argument, but is done with a purpose: to concentrate on princely qualities. The virtues that really concern Cartagena are the explicitly lordly ones, as his vocabulary shows. The commonest single nominal form in the book is magnanimus (89 occurrences), and of nominal roots the most frequent after functional virtus, homo, and racio (noun/adj., all inflexions, 403, 250, 221 respectively) are fort-is/itudo (181), just-us/icia (152), magnanim-us/itas (131), honor/-abilis (108), and liberal-is/itas (99). Magnificus/encia occurs 69 times and princ-eps/ipatus/ipare 50, putting them also among the work’s top twenty-five concepts, equalled only by general terms vicium (88), actus (83), defectus (73), natura (73), superhabundancia (67), habitus (65), and appetitus (53). Interestingly, the five virtues in this list are joined by intemper-ancia/atus (83, vs. temper-ancia/atus 61) and incontin-encia/ens (68, vs. contin-encia/-ens 33)—that is to say, the defects and excesses of selfcontrol receive more mention than its middling virtues, another statistic that seems relevant to a medieval noble readership. Meanwhile, intellectual prudencia, supposedly the chief of virtues, the one that includes and controls all the others (MV i.7 1 “In tantum est […] principalis quod nulla virtus moralis potest esse sine ea”), occurs 53 times (3 chapters, 1552 words), less than any of the “lordly” virtues and vices listed above and less than half as often as the top three: justice (9 chapters, 5562 words), magnanimity (7 chapters, 4461), and fortitude (7 chapters, 4421)—more or less the opposite of Aristotle, for whom, as pointed out above, the intellect was paramount. “In principe exemplificamus”, asserts Cartagena at one point, “quia est clarius exemplum” (i.13 51–52); but in truth the prince was not so much an example as the exemplary centre of attention; for, as a little earlier he quotes the sage Bias as saying, “principatus ostendit virum” (MV i.9 18). To this last remark, lifted from his source (EN 1130a1–2 ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει/Sent. Eth. v.3.10), Cartagena adds his own gloss: “nam ex eo quod princeps debet […] tendere ad bonum plurium, requiritur in eo major […] claritas virtutum” (MV i.9 18–23). A little later he explains that this extra “splendour” derives from the fact that the ruler’s exercise of justice and virtue is “non […] ut singularis persone, sed ut publice et tanquam ducis seu gubernatoris communitatis” (i.11 9– 10). In Bk ii he goes on to say that virtues like magnificence and magnanimity— the ones that confer dignitas, “quasi quidam ornatus omnium virtutum” (ii.11 31–32)—cannot be exercised by vulgares homines who lack the requisite wealth and power; they require a kind of “superexcellencia” which cannot exist “sine

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prosperitate et habundancia rerum temporalium”, but also by the same token a more perfect virtue, “quia non est facile quod aliquis moderate ferat bona fortune sine virtute” (ii.12 39–63). The words are again from Sent. Eth., but Cartagena extends the notion that the operation of virtue is more “difficult” for powerful men to embrace the idea that, because public, it is more important. In his society, the fact was that noblemen were most honoured (“aliqui reputantur digni honore, […] quia nobiles excedunt ignobiles in nobilitate”, ii.12 41– 43); hence it was imperative they should also be most honourable (“hoc facere debent, ut nobiles genere et in magnis honoribus constituti; nam isti habent in se quandam magnitudinem et dignitatem”, ii.8 23–24). This remoulding of virtue ethics to the realities of medieval social hierarchy and estates-theory is, as Fernández Gallardo (2001) observes, the nub of Memoriale, the point towards which its reordering of Aristotle’s argument drives. We see it very clearly, for example, in the chapters on fortitudo militaris (i.21–23), where Aristotle’s στρατιῶται “(professional) soldiers” are first transformed into milites, and then by a standard medieval transposition into “knights” (Mcast translates “fortaleza cavalleril”, “cavalleros” passim), with all the corollary changes of emphasis and implication which this entailed, slipping finally into calling them “nobiles et armorum peritos” (i.23 6–7) and ending on the “experti et exercitati in armis” whom he and his readers have read about “in Hyspania” of old and know “eciam hodierna die” (ibid. 55 et seqq.). The climax comes when Cartagena numbers the properties of the magnanimous man enumerated by Aristotle, making them seem less like observations than the Twenty Commandments for princes (ii.13–14; see n244), and then adds a whole chapter drawn from Geraldus Odonis, his primary source for such interpolations, in which he shows how—contrary to appearances, and directly contradicting Aristotle—magnanimity is compatible with Christian humility. “Beneficiare est superexcellere”; therefore the magnanimous man humbly thanks God for his own benefits—by definition he cannot be anything less than a powerful and wealthy lord—and superexcells to benefit others (ii.16, nn255– 263).17 This leads to Memoriale’s close, where, picking up his praise of princely 17

Geraldus’s Expositio cum questionibus is often the source when Cartagena reverses Aristotle’s overt meaning—without saying so—to adapt the argument to his purpose (see nn95, 103–105, 112, 124–125, 130, 133–134, 199, 231, 237, 241, 255–260, 263–268, 277, 286–288, 304, 309–311, 313). Geraldus too made free use of everyday examples and quotations from the Bible, Fathers, and law; in these respects Cartagena resembles him more than Aquinas (though none of them is as entertaining as Aristotle). Now forgotten, Geraldus was highly regarded down to the sixteenth century (for his standing among humanists see Lines 1999). Several medieval Spanish copies of Expositio are extant: e.g. BNE MSS/6546 (Bks i–ii & part of iii, olim friary of Santo Tomás, Ávila: Lohr 1998, 277), Tarazona, Archivo

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moral reflection and education in the Prologue to Bk ii, Cartagena concludes— Conclusio here bearing its logical sense—with a lengthy peroration on the role of vice and virtue in public action, doubtless inspired by his reading of Boccaccio’s De casibus virorum illustrium, which he was to engage to translate in the months following.18 As examples of vice and its power to bring down empires he adduces lustful Tarquin’s rape of Lucretia (rather missing the point that for Livy and the ancients this initiated the rise of the Roman republic and empire) and feeble Roderic’s rape of La Cava. For the corresponding effects of virtue he wastes no time on classical parallels—could pagans be properly virtuous?— but launches straight into a parade of heroes of the Reconquest, the kings of Castile and Portugal. It was their just, courageous, and magnanimous virtue (together with the divine aid of St James, as the dean of Santiago de Compostela is careful to add at every opportunity) which rolled back the cursed swarm of Hagarenes. It is they whom Duarte is called upon to emulate. This, then, was the guiding purpose that determined Cartagena’s authorfunction in Memoriale. He adapted EN in ways which, as Bejczy (2008a, 8–9) says of the medieval tradition in general, “not always faithfully reflected Aristotle’s system but certainly fitted the intellectual climate of medieval society, and perhaps even met some of its moral needs”. With this in mind we may return briefly to the questions of compilation, authorship, and originality raised in our first section. Parkes has shown how, in generic terms, the distinctive feature of a compilation became its ordinatio “into clearly defined books and chapters, or other recognizable divisions”

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Catedral Capitular MSS 15 and 71, Sevilla, Biblioteca Colombina 7.5.14 (Lohr 1968, 163– 165; Porter 2009, 248–259, the latter with a useful overview of the work’s significance). Interesting is Salamanca, Biblioteca General Histórica de la Universidad (henceforth BUS) Ms. 1869 (olim Colegio Mayor San Bartolomé; Lilao Franca & Castrillo González 1997– 2002, ii, 203), for this might have been the actual source of Cartagena’s knowledge of the work, though it is in suspiciously pristine state. If it was, it raises the interesting question of why he never mentions Geraldus’s name, given that it begins with the prominent rubric “Incipit scriptum super librum Ethicorum fratris Geraldi Odonis ordinis Fratrum Minorum bachalarii in theologia”. The answer would most likely be his outward allegiance to the Dominicans (n16, above). Cartagena cites Boccaccio by name at MV i.30 85 (n184). The colophon of his translation’s first edition stated that the work was written “en enxemplo e castigo de todos los grandes Emperadores, Reyes, Señores e Señoras que sobre la haz de la tyerra en este circular orbe dominan, cuyos señoríos no pueden exceder de passar por tal vía, […] sojuzgados a la mayor parte so el desordenado poder de la Fortuna e su rueda” (Cartagena 1495, f. 149v; with a plate of Fortune’s wheel on the title-p.). Memoriale’s exemplary stance is just as evident, but it tellingly replaces the irrational whims of Fortune by the ordered ethical operation of virtue vs. vice.

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(1976, 130, and cf. n6, above). Cartagena refers to his division of Memoriale into two books with the metaphor of breaking a journey, clarifying that this was specifically intended to make its perusal less laborious for amateur lay readers (“ut minus labor afficiat […]. Si quem ergo laborem ex lectura ejus conceperis, […] declinacione resolve”); and though the textual tradition is unclear as to their numbering (66–67, below), all witnesses show the books were further divided into fourteen sections (by virtue) subdivided into sixty-three chapters of on average about 50–60 lines, an arrangement characteristic of contemporary works of this nature.19 As proper to the task of the compilator, but again with the specific needs of noble readers foremost, he further embroidered each chapter with exempla “ad ordinis connexionem vel ad planiorem intelligenciam” (MV i.Prol. 45–46), by which he meant not just everyday examples but citations of classical, biblical, patristic, or more recent exempla. Despite the claim to be doing this only for ease of comprehension, it is clear, for instance when he cites Vincent of Beauvais in connexion with the Canary Islands (i.14 28–30 & n117), Boccaccio on Nero’s bestial cruelty (i.30 84–86 & n184), or the Alfonsine royal chronicles for exemplars of courage (i.18 52–64 & nn138–139), or when he refers to jousts and bullfights (“torneamentis et jostis” i.17 49–53, “pugnandum cum tauro” i.18 66–68), that his purpose is really a literary one— to embellish and entertain.20 Whereas legal and biblical proof-texts are quoted

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MV i.Prol. 30–33 & n50. Excluding i.3 (only 9 lines, on the theological virtues), the chapters range from 22–97 lines; the average in Bk i is 55 · 6, with a mean of 59·5; and in Bk ii, 55·9 and a mean of 56· 5. Aquinas’s or Geraldus’s divisio into lectiones and quaestiones, based on their perception of the content’s technical argument and designed for professionals in the schools (see Briggs 2008, and pp. 21–22 below), are to be distinguished from this “easy” style of packaging for noble readers, parallels for which are adduced by Campos Souto (Cartagena 2004, 195–196 n12), e.g. Enrique de Villena’s division of his Eneida into 366 capítulos, one for each day of the year, to “quitar el enojo” for his princely addressee and other “perezosos” romançistas: “acatando que en el presente tiempo non quieren tancto estar en el leer de las istorias cuanto cumple al entender d’ellas […], fizo esta división, e aun los capítulos los más breves que pudo, porque la brevedat d’ellos combide e afalague al leedor, poniendo en cada uno sentençia complida”. Such “maneras atractivas e alliçitivas” he called “útiles […] a los que han talante, e aun a los que non lo han, para las leer” (Villena 1994–2000, ii: Traducción y glosas de la Eneida Libros i–iii, 28 & glosa §108, 55– 57), rebuffing the excuse that noblemen did not have “time” to idle away on reading—if not they, then who?—, on which see Fernández Gallardo 2012a, 33–34, and n318, below. On these forms of exemplification see Bizzarri 2016. Cartagena usually names his extra sources (“Tullius” three times in i.1, i.5, though he borrows from Cicero silently on at least four other occasions; Vegetius—from Aquinas—i.21; “Seneca”, i.e. Martin of Braga, ii.13; Collaciones patrum, i.e. John Cassian, i.30; Ecclesiastica hystoria, i.e. Rufinus, ii.19; Gregorius Magnus, i.7; Vincent of Beauvais, i.14; Boccaccio, i.30), but the majority are biblical (19) or legal (39). On his use of such sources see Kohut 1973 and 1977; Cartagena

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verbatim as auctoritates (that is, “compiled” in the technical sense), the historical and classical examples are paraphrased for his lay audience. As suggested above, this loose and varied manner of incorporating secondary sources was no doubt why Cartagena avoided describing Memoriale as a compilatio.21 Instead he calls his work a compendium (Concl. 11) and his technique composicio (“opusculum in forma memorialis compositum […] sub brevi epilogo […]; effectum et res que sub hac composicione traduntur”, ii.Prol. 74–80), and goes on to compare the scribendi modus of a “composer” in this sense to the skill of a cook spicing a hotch-potch (“unusquisque […] aliis doctrinis commiscens novum saporem invenit, ut coqui facere solent qui cibos ita subtiliter miscent ut qui sint sepe difficiliter cognoscantur”). Even so, Cartagena claims to abjure the loftier “subtleties” of this “laudable” culinary style, striving only for a plain style and everyday language: Etsi laudabilis subtilisque sit, ego in presenti illum sequutus non sum; nolui enim novis involucionibus antiqua mutare, sed que sub altitudine stilli obscura jacebant in planiorem loquendi modum et cothidianum sermonem deducere. ii.Prol. 85–88

Like the preceding protestations of clarity, this one is true only in a most disingenuous sense. Certainly the intention was to write at a level intelligible and attractive to his lay audience, but in critical terms the claim to write “plainly”

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1996, 60–77, 205–207; Campos Souto 1997a–b; Fernández Gallardo 1999b; Olivetto 2010. As for embellishment, we note many examples like “Venus dolosa Ciprigena” in i.32 n192— if these were what Cartagena meant by “pauca que […] jussa abire noluerunt, que ex nominibus auctorum cognosces” (i.Prol. 39–40), he was being deeply artful. In another category belong unacknowledged quotations, e.g. from Geraldus (n17, above) or biblical phrases like “unaqueque provincia habundat in suo sensu” (MV i.12 41–42 “is fully content in its own opinion”, cf. Rom 14:5). In Doctrinal de los caballeros (c. 1445) Cartagena would distinguish three sorts of didactic work, “doctrinas de sabidores”, “ejemplos de los antiguos compilados por historiadores”, and “ordenanza de leyes”, his being explicitly—despite its title—a compilatio of the last (“las recorrí superficialmente y ayunté de ellas algunas […] en esta breve compilación, […] no guardando la orden de los títulos que en sus lugares tenían; […] pues que aquí están apartadas a este fin singular, me pareció que cumplía tener en ello la orden particular que a la intención pertenece”—i.e. three Bks divided into assorted titles and laws); but though he adds rubrics “en comienzo de cada título […] para introducción”, he makes clear that, like Gratian (cf. Cartagena 2004, 214 n16), “en el tenor de las leyes no mudé palabra”, concluding: “yo no hice leyes, más compilé aquellas hechas que a este vuestro propósito me parecieron hacer” (Pról. and Concl., in Cartagena 2006, 64, 66–67, and 398).

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can never be innocent, and in this case it is flagrantly belied not merely by stylistic embellishments like those touched on above, but by the peremptory decision to write in the learned language, not “cothidianus sermo” (see § 4, below). We may conclude, then, that Cartagena’s compilatory style indeed sought to “spice up” his work—and that this was also precisely what made it novel. Of all the features we have mentioned, however, the most striking is the barrage of interpolated legal texts. Memoriale makes over fifty direct references to law codes, forty-two of them actual quotations introduced by such phrases as “legiste dicunt”, “ut canoniste aiunt”, or more often by chapter and verse, and some stretching to fifteen or twenty lines: twenty-eight of canon law (23 from Gratian’s Decretum, far and away the primary source, 5 from the decretals), fourteen of civil (7 from Dig., the second main source, 3 each from Cod. and Instit., 1 from Novellae Theodosii). It is not sufficient simply to say that these juridical references reflect Cartagena’s training as a lawyer. Whereas the other exempla serve literary ends, the legal texts change the nature of the discourse—and are designed to do so, for the “direction” of his royal addressee. If Cartagena sidesteps the philosophical marrow of Aristotle’s work, making clear that his interest in natural reason extends only to its use as a means to directive ends, then by peppering his chapters with law citations he displays his adherence to a different but no less rigorous intellectual discipline. That he was “only a jurist” would be one of Leonardo Bruni’s more futile counter-attacks in their later dispute about the meaning of EN.22 The link between law and virtue is controversial, both in philosophy and in jurisprudence; nonetheless, Cartagena never questions it, for it underpins his aim to write a work aimed at the ruling class and the Christian prince as legislator.23 22

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In a letter to Francesco Pizolpasso of 15 October 1435(?) rebutting his opponent’s criticisms, Bruni remarked of Cartagena’s persona that he “seemed to be” a juris professor and advised him “ut juris periti in jure suo se contineant, […] ne cum superficiem aliquam norint, sibi de tota re judicium arrogare pergant”; and of his arguments, that they displayed ignorance of not just Greek but Latin: “recte suadebam juris perito ut in suo studio versaretur; haec enim quae de Latina lingua existimat ita sunt […] ut nichil videri possit absurdius” (Bruni 1741, ii, 81–90 Ep. vii.4, at 85, 88; Cartagena 2000, 270–272). As usual he missed the philosophical point, being concerned only with grammar (we return to his verbal critique at n43, below). On the controversy, Cartagena 2000, Seigel 1968, 123–133; Morrás 2002; Hankins 2003, 200–207; Valero Moreno 2014, 264–280; Lawrance 2018. The apparent antinomies of law and virtue ethics—e.g. that while virtue is defined as a disposition to act morally and hence presupposes the voluntariness of those acts (STh. Iii.6.1), law places extrinsic restraints on action for utilitarian reasons; or that while ethics by definition cannot be embodied in general principles, law seeks to codify universal rules on deontological grounds—are debated by Aristotle (e.g. EN 1179b–1181b/Sent. Eth. x.14–

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Memoriale’s paratexts: political and cultural ideas

In the two prologues and epilogue of Memoriale Cartagena steps forward from the anonymity of his role as compiler to draw out the ideas assembled in the body of the book and apply them to his purpose. These first-person paratexts sketch out themes that would inform all his subsequent works. For example, he eloquently extolls the delights of reflective otium, prompted by the circumstance of writing in the pastoral locus amoenus of Azoia.24 “Vale, optime princeps,” runs the envoi, “et hoc ruralis solitudinis munus dignanter accepta, viridibus in pratis Azoye ruris quod nosti vernantium arborum sub umbra conscriptum” (Concl. 92–94). This brilliant closing rhetorical flourish of rhythmical prose framed between the double cursus plani of “dignánter accépta ~ sub úmbra conscríptum” is designed to do more than just call up the shared delights of that shady sylvan scene. Through the mention of solitudo it links back to

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17: though freely exercising virtue is the proper end of man, it is necessary to restrain those incapable of acquiring it by coercive positive laws) and by Aquinas (e.g. STh. I-ii.90–108, notably 92.1: if law is given for the purpose of directing human acts, insofar as those acts conduce to virtue it can help men become good). The controversy rages on, sharpened by such evident objections as that in democracies (of which both Aristotle and Aquinas disapproved) adjudication should depend not on inordinate trust in the virtue of judges but on criteria public and accessible to all. For historical critique and current arguments see for example Slote 1995; Huppes-Cluysenaer & Coelho 2013, particularly the editors’ introduction and Lawrence B. Solum’s essay, “Virtue Jurisprudence: Towards an Aretaic Theory of Law”, pp. 1–32. But Cartagena shows no interest in such debates (“non querimus investigare omnia que pertinent ad materiam justicie, nam illud prolixissimum esset et operosius proposito, sed solum volumus scire quid sit justicia prout est virtus”, MV i.8 27– 29); he regarded the relation as unproblematic (see i.8 32–54) and followed his jurist peers in regarding ius as the “ars boni et aequi” and lawyers as the sacerdotes of vera philosophia (Dig. i.1.1; see Castilla Urbano 2012, 140–141, citing Kelley 1976, 1988). The toponym Azoia (formerly Azóia, < Ar. َ‫ الز َاوِ ية‬al-zāwiya “corner, nook, recess”, hence “shrine, small mosque, hermitage of a saint or marabout”) is not easy to identify; there are places so called in the districts of, among others, Sesimbra, Santarem, Sintra, Leiria, and Loures. According to João i’s itinerary, in spring 1422 the court was mostly in Lisboa (Moreno 1988, 356); likeliest, therefore, is Santa Iria de Azoia (Loures), by the promontory on the Tagus estuary where nobleman Nuno Vasques de Castelo-Branco would later build the castle-palace of Pirescoxe (1442), 7 km north of Lisboa on the road to Vila Franca de Xira where the king travelled on 9–13 April. The mention of lush woods and Duarte’s knowledge of the place (“quod nosti”) might seem rather to point to the small hill-top village of Azoia with its Ermida de Alcolgulhe above the River Lena 3km south of Leiria on the road to the royal monastery of Batalha, “lugar lavado de todos os ventos, por cuja causa talvez livre de contágios e sádio” according to Padre João Nogueira in 1758, which became part of the Casa do Infantado (estate of the second son of the king) in 1655; but there is no record of the court travelling anywhere so far north in the spring either of 1422, 1423, or 1425 (Moreno, ibid., 356, 358, 363).

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the Prologue of Bk ii, where Cartagena exclaims that nothing could be more appropriate for a prince like Duarte than the virtuous solitude of an otium dedicated to reading and meditation. He illustrates the benefits of such studious retreat by two exempla. The first is Scipio Africanus’s famous tag about otium in Cicero’s De officiis, a book which was Cartagena’s pillow-companion of the moment (n2, above): se nunquam minus ociosum quam cum ociosus, nec minus solum quam cum solus erat, quia in ocio et solitudine de se ipso et de arduis actibus cogitabat. MV ii.Prol. 21–23 & n202

The second historical exemplum is more novel, though it picks up a hint already adumbrated in the discussion of fortitude in MV i.18 22–24 (“Fortem ergo indubie dicam illum qui […] pro bono publico se exponit, ut de multis Hyspanie gloriosis principibus […] cronice narrant”). Taken from those same patriotic national legends of Castile, it tells (or rather invents, n203) the story of how, in the dark days of oppression by Muslim invaders, Count Fernan González would retire to the cave of the hermit Pelayo on the banks of the river Arlanza to fortify his spirit for the coming battles through solitary meditation: Sed quid Scipione egemus, cum catholica domi habundent exempla? Quidnam aliud agebant principes gloriosi quorum strenuis operibus Hyspani solii gloria resplendet, cum a justis bellis vacarent que pro fidei catholice exaltacione gerebant, nisi seipsos diligenter conspicere et ad divina opera instruere? Et ut ceteros taceam, Fernandus comes regibus par de cujus femore universi jam Hyspanie reges et tu ipse descendis, cum Castelle preesset, que tunc angustis limitibus coartata undique hostibus premebatur, inter nimias pressuras solitudinem interdum querebat, et abditi montis spelunce quam Pelagius ille habitabat in Arlançe fluminis ripa (ubi post monasterium solempne construxit quod in hodiernum diem stat) segregatus a suis se conferebat ut solus divina cogitaret, que inter tumultum exercitus contemplari non poterat. Sed illius seculi angustie hanc nostro tempori latitudinem pepererunt! MV ii.Prol. 23–35

In this exemplary portrayal of the conjunction of fortitudo and sapientia we find a first seed of what was to become Cartagena’s great ambition: a project to foster a new kind of nobleman and prince, cultured and virtuous, at the heart of the respublica. In the following twenty years he would follow up his

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first exhortation to intellectual otium with a series of vernacular translations intended to educate and enlighten the ideal statesmen of his dream, a project summed up in his Epistola ad comitem de Haro (c. 1442).25 Thus we see in embryo one of the striking facets of Cartagena’s future literary career: a churchman who, amid all the crises of Mother Church in a critical century, wrote chiefly for noble lay readers and turned his erudition and knowledge of jurisprudence to the task of translating the pamphlets of pagan philosophers or pondering the pundonores of knighthood. Without doubt, in his vision of an educated and moral nobility Cartagena saw a future remedy for the most pressing political problem of his day: the battle for supremacy between king and factious aristocracy. He placed his pen at the service of regalism and autocracy; it was no mere pipe-dream but a coherent policy, fostered by the Crown, which happened also to be the way of the future. Cartagena died before the plan bore fruit, but in Spain as elsewhere in Europe “courtization”, the transformation of knight into courtier, was to be one of the most significant factors in the transition from medieval feudal Ständestaat to Renaissance absolutism.26 Memoriale’s passage on Fernan González introduces another political theme that was to become a leitmotif in Cartagena’s later work. By juxtaposing the exemplum of Scipio with one from national history he was doing more than indulge in chauvinism. “From Fernan González’s loins”, he declares, “descend all the kings of Hispania”, including Duarte of Portugal himself (ii.Prol. 27– 28). Behind this questionable piece of genealogy lay the germ of an idea that would later be worked into one of the century’s most influential political ideologies: the neo-Gothic myth of the unity and imperial destiny of the five Iberian kingdoms (Castile, Aragon, Portugal, Navarre, and in the future—as Cartagena glimpsed—Granada). The myth made the monarchs of Castile rightful successors to the crown of all Hispania, inheritors of a divine mission to drive the Muslims from Spanish and North African soil and to achieve the redintegratio regni of the Visigothic empire. This nexus of ideas, which mixed polit-

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Cartagena 2020 (for the date, Fernández Gallardo 2012a, 229). On the “panorama idealizado” of otium as an “espacio privilegiado” for literary pursuits in Cartagena’s dedications, which Campos Souto links to the “metas y aspiraciones del humanismo italiano”, see Cartagena 2004, 194n9 and 326–327n4 on this passage, with parallels from the Ciceronian translations and Epistola. On Cartagena’s advocacy of arms and letters, Morrás 1993. For a brief exposition of Norbert Elias’s concept of Verhöflichung or “courtization” (Elias 2006) in this context see Lawrance 2012, and more broadly 1990. The rise of absolutism has been treated at length by political historians, e.g. Suárez Fernández 1959; Nieto Soria 1992a–b, 1993, 1994, and with special reference to Cartagena Fernández Gallardo 1999a, 2002; Morera 2007 rebuts the simplistic older view that the process involved a straightforward class struggle between letrado “new men” like Cartagena and the feudal caballeros.

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ical policy with the heady fumes of legend and superstition, would preoccupy Cartagena—despite his openly Jewish origins—for the rest of his life; he was still working on its formulation in Anacephaleosis regum Hispaniae, unfinished at his death. Adopted by the propagandists of the Catholic Monarchs, the neoGothic myth became a lynchpin of imperialist thinking when—by mistake in 1492 and genealogical happenstance in 1516—Castile first acquired an empire and then became heir to the Holy Roman Empire.27 This does not exhaust the significance of the Prologue to Bk ii. What distinguished the “Catholica exempla” of arms and letters from the classical examples was naturally the operation of Christian virtue; but Cartagena lays stress on a more specific point. Fernán González and his peers did not merely prepare themselves “ad divina opera”; their meditation included an inner examination of conscience (“seipsos diligenter conspicere”, “ut solus divina cogitaret”, ii.Prol. 26, 33). The emphasis on interiority (“nostri interioris hominis”, ibid. 16) provides the vital link between virtue and public life, the intimate connexion of “propria publicis et publica propriis” (ibid. 50–56) that we have singled out as the theme of Memoriale. Yet it also reminds us of the semblanza of Cartagena penned by his admirer Pulgar, which portrays a man who laid special stress on cleanliness of language, thought, even clothes and table manners, but only insofar as it reflected an inner cleanliness of spirit: la linpieza esterior del ombre dezía él que era alguna señal de la interior; pero entendía aprovechar poco la linpieza del cuerpo e de las ropas e de las muy linpias vestiduras e aparatos si no se conseguían con ello la sinceridad de los pensamientos e la linpieza de las obras. Pulgar 2007, 186

Cartagena could not abide being praised to his face, Pulgar went on to say, “porque si la conçiençia acusava de dentro, poco dezía él que aprovechan los loores de fuera”. Brian Tate traced the origins of this notion of the interior man back to Augustine (Pulgar 1971, xlii–xlviii); others speculate that it may have 27

On these strains in Cartagena’s thought see Tate 1970; Fernández Gallardo 1993b, 268–269, 280–285; Villa Prieto 2010; Castilla Urbano 2012. The Neo-Gothic nationalist myth is the subject of a large and still contentious literature, of which Maravall 1981; González Fernández 1986, 2004, 2008; Ladero Quesada 1993 give overviews. For a reappraisal of Castro’s thesis of the role of converso attitudes in its revival by Cartagena in the fifteenth century, not as racial (pseudo)psychology but “restated in terms of Bhabha’s analysis of the disjunctive temporality of the nation […], unsettl[ing] the image of a seamless national continuity from past to present because they place[d] greater significance on the re-creation of the nation as ‘new’ ”, see Rosenstock 2000.

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been a mentality shaped by his converso background. At all events, it is evidenced throughout Memoriale, but clearly from Stoic sources: “per exteriores hominum operaciones discernuntur mores interiores”, we read in II.24 39– 40, or in ii.12 38 and 14 21–23 that true virtue and magnanimity depend on “interiora bona”, not “que exterius occurrere possunt”. Such phrases show that the preoccupation with conscience was already a component of Cartagena’s thought in his earliest work. It was to influence his later view of precisely what constitutes true learning and wisdom, and hence his tempered and critical attitude towards the new studia humanitatis arriving from Italy. The future author of Oracional, a layman’s treatise on prayer which stresses the inwardness of spiritual life, seems already in the 1420s to have been predisposed to spiritual currents concerning conscience that pointed forward to Devotio moderna and the Reformation.28 In these ways we see that Memoriale laid the basis for Cartagena’s later contribution to fifteenth-century Spanish letters. This raises the ancillary question of the work’s subsequent fortune. Strangely, it is not listed in an inventory of Duarte i’s books of 1433–1438, and there is no trace of any copy in Portugal.29 Nevertheless, “o Memorial das Virtudes que das Héticas d’Aristótilles me ordenou o adayam de Sanctiago” is listed among the treatises on virtues “per cristãaos de todas maneiras, gentios, judeus e mouros”—after Egidio

28

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The persistence of Cartagena’s moral attitudes emerges from Campos Souto 2000. For a broad recent study of the “converso thesis” regarding the rise of this emphasis on inner conscience see Giordano 2010, especially pp. 52–62; and on Cartagena’s consequent critique of the rhetorical turn of humanism, as expressed in his Declinationes on Bruni’s approach to EN (Cartagena 2000), after the pioneering work of Di Camillo 1976, 49–66 see for example, besides the studies cited in n22 above, Morrás 1995, 1996; Fernández Gallardo 2008. “Estes são os livros que tinha el rey dom Duarte”, in Livro da Cartuxa or dos Conselhos, a miscellany identified as the “livro que comsigo sempre trazia de cousas familiares e especiaes” mentioned by his chronicler Pina (1914, 88, Cap 4) but preserved only in late copies: Lisboa, Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo Ms. 1928 (s. xvi ex., olim Cartuxa de Scala Cœli, Évora), ff. 212v–215v, in Dias 1982, § [54], 206–208; Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal Cod. 3390 (s. xvii), f. 163, in Duarte i of Portugal 1942, 414–416; and Cod. 13179, copied by Manoel Severim de Faria, chantre of Évora, 1613. For an attempt—mostly incorrect— to identify the 20 books “de latym” and 64 “de lingoajem” see Braga 1892, 209–238; MV was certainly not one of them. However, Sousa 1739–1749, i, 544–546 (Livro iii, §41 “Collecção de algumas obras delRey D. Duarte, e no fim o Catalogo das que escreveo” 529–558) edits the rubric as “Memória dos livros do uso delRey D. Duarte, a qual está no dito livro antigo da Livraria da Cartuxa de Evora”, perhaps meaning his source was a different MS (the lost original?). If this were correct, it would suggest the books were only the working portion of the king’s collection; and, as Viterbo (1901, 1) reminds us, the main royal library perished in the Lisbon earthquake of 1755.

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Romano’s De regimine principum and alongside Andrea De Pace’s “Pumar das Virtudes” (Viridarium principum), Valerius Maximus, Cicero’s De officiis, and John Cassian’s Collationes Patrum—in Leal Conselheiro, a compilation of “enssynos e avisamentos […] de mal fazer se refrearem e pera viver virtuosamente” addressed by Duarte to his queen Leonor de Aragón in the 1430s.30 It has often been assumed that Cartagena’s work influenced Duarte, but the chaotic list of authorities above hardly suggests a mind intellectually capable of digesting Memoriale’s drift, and apart from some parallels in Duarte’s attempt to discuss prudence (Ch. 55; Cartagena 2004, 34–35) Dionísio (2004) concludes that there is little concrete point of contact. Be that as it may, the six extant MSS and translation of Memoriale show that it achieved a certain diffusion. One MS was made from a copy that Cartagena took with him to the council of Basel, betraying a professional clerical interest; another was probably for deposit in Burgos cathedral (see descriptions of B and Q in Proleg. §1, below). Some or all of the rest belonged to noblemen and reflected the nascent “aristotelismo cortesano” of the day. This lay Aristotelianism was impressively widespread, but mostly took the form of vulgar translations and compendia; it is there we should seek for traces of Memoriale’s influence.31 One text that shows interesting parallels is a vernacular compendium of EN described by Pagden as “by far the most popular version of an Aristotelian moral work to appear in Spain during the fifteenth century” (1975, 299–302). In some copies this Éthica de Aristóteles is even spuriously attributed to “Alonso de Santa María, obispo de Burgos”, but in fact it was written by a noble, Nuño de Guzmán, for his brother the lord of La Algaba (Sevilla) in 1467, and he states that he took it from “una esplanaçión en lengua aragonés [sic] fabricada e sin escollos”, since he found it “más esplícita e menos intrincada” than the translation “de la lengua latina en ydioma ytálico” he had commissioned twenty years before from the Florentine bookseller Vespasiano da Bisticci.32 The text dif-

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Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France (henceforth BnF) ms. Portugais 5—from the Aragonese royal library in Naples, very possibly Leonor’s own copy—ff. 3–96, at f. 53r–v, Cap. 50 “Em geeral da prudencia, justiça, temperança, fortelleza, e as condiçõoes que perteecem a boo consselheiro” (Duarte i of Portugal 2012). Pagden 1975, 287–293, 296–305; Díez Yáñez 2013 and 2015, esp. pp. 212–221 on Memoriale; Valero Moreno 2014. On medieval Hispanic Aristotelianism in general see Heusch 1991a–b, 1996; Escobar Chico 1994. The details are from the prologue, preserved only in Guzmán’s own MS, Oxford, Bodleian MS Span.D.1, f. 1v; whereas Ethica d’Aristotele di messere Lionardo d’Arezzo “tradotta in volgare in Firenze ad petitione di messere Nugnio Gusmano spagniolo” is now New Haven, Yale University Library MS 151 (Pagden, loc. cit.; Russell & Pagden 1974; Lawrance 1982, 84 and 1989, 17–19 & n27; Mota 1992). The “Aragonese” original, attributed to “el egre-

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fers formally from Cartagena’s compilation, being an example of what Cuenca i Almenar (2012, 8) calls “el gènere escolàstic de les conclusiones”—edited highlights that strictly follow the order and wording of EN. Yet it too divides the work into chapters of a page or two and adapts it to the practical use of “the Christian lay public” (Pagden 1975, 301–302). Thus it substitutes Aristotle’s εὐδαιμονία as the aim of ethics by “la final bienaventurança del hombre, quier sea en esta vida siquier después de aquella” (Intro., sign. a3r), interpolates a distinction between natural and positive law silently drawn from Gratian’s Decretum (“matar ombre” vs. “andar camino en domingo”, v.1, sign. e6r), and surreptitiously parts company with Aristotle on the question of suicide (v.8, sign. f4r). More striking still is its use of contemporary examples, explaining Aristotle’s δημοκρατία by reference to “las comunas de Ytalia” (v.2, sign. e7r; cf. n54, below), or the moral universality of some customs “assí como el fuego de la India e el de España en una manera escalienta” vs. the credulous relativity of others “ca el que nasce en África es moro e el que nasce en Francia christiano” (v.4, sign. e8r– v). Noteworthy is a passage in the discussion of epiqueya on an example added to Aristotle by Aquinas from his master Albertus Magnus’s lectiones, who in turn found it in early commentaries translated from Greek (Aquinas 1969, ii, 323–324 n), of a law “in quadam civitate” against foreigners being admitted to the city’s ramparts. It is repeated by Cartagena, among others (MV i.15 13–19 & n121), and likewise by Éthica de Aristóteles, but the vernacular compendium goes further than any of its Latin predecessors in decking out the phrase “in quadam civitate” with the local colour of an historical allusion: Tornando a lo de las leyes, dize que no pudieron ser más justas ni mejores en aquel caso. Verbi gracia, una çibdat opulenta asý como es Valencia, en la qual ay munchos estrangeros, castellanos en especial, está en frontera de Castilla; e por esto, agora ha çien años aviendo guerra estos dos regnos, los estrangeros oviesen sydo causa de perder la çibdat dando çierto lugar a los enemigos por que entrasen. Razonable ley avría sydo en aquel caso gio bacheller de la Torre” in the colophon of some copies of the heavily revised and re-written version printed at Zaragoza (Aristotle 1488–1490, sign. p7v), survives also in Catalan (Llibre de monàstica o ètica d’Aristòtil, Barcelona, Biblioteca de Catalunya Ms. 296, ff. 1–132v; Cuenca i Almenar 2012). A further eight fifteenth-century MSS and a repr. of the incunable recension survive; the attribution to Cartagena—plus the fatuous claim that he based it on Bruni’s Latin—figures in Cambridge University Library MS Add. 8275, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Ms. Ott. lat. 2054, and BNE Mss/1204 (s. xviii); the remaining witnesses—Esc. K-ii-13, BNE Mss/4514, Mss/6710, Mss/7076, Madrid, Universidad Complutense BH MSS 152, Barcelona, Arxiu de la Corona d’Aragó ms. Ripoll 161, Aristotle 1493a—are anonymous. We cite from the last, unless otherwise indicated.

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sy el prínçipe desta çibdat ordenara en pena de muerte que nunca jamás estrangero, en especial castellano, subiese en las murallas, en tiempo de guerra mayormente. Síguese que agora viniesen los moros de Granada e cercasen la çibdat, e los estrangeros subiesen a la muralla e la defendiesen; çierto es que avría quistión destos tales sy deven morir por la ley ordenada o si han de reçebir benefiçio por la defensión que han fecho a la çibdat contra los enemigos. E vet aquí como la ley, bien que no pudo ser mejor en aquel tiempo, agora fallesçería en aqueste otro. Éthica de Aristóteles v.733 Whether any of these parallels between Éthica de Aristóteles and Memoriale mean that the author of the compendio had seen Cartagena’s compilation (which he called compendium too, MV Concl. 11) remains an open question. Its Aragonese provenance would be no obstacle, since a copy of Cartagena’s work could have reached that kingdom through Duarte’s consort Leonor de Aragón, just as the MS of Leal Conselheiro did (n30, above); but the parallels all have counterparts in other medieval commentaries and translations of EN. To peruse Éthica de Aristóteles is to be struck in every paragraph by verbal reminiscences of Memoriale, yet to establish any direct influence would require a full word-by-word comparison, and even that might well be inconclusive. For the present we can assert only the parity of aims in the two books and their shared cultural outlook, not intertextuality. In the same sense we adduce one further case. Íñigo López de Mendoza’s Proverbios o Centiloquio was written in response to Juan ii of Castile’s request (“me fue mandado”) for a mirror of princes for his teenage son, the future Enrique iv, during a royal stay in Mendoza’s palace at Guadalajara in 1436–1437. In its “Prohemio” Mendoza lays out his defence of the poet’s duty to deal with things “que provoquen a los omnes a toda virtud, esfuerço e fortaleza”, beginning with a quote of the first words of EN 1094a1. The prologue is full of phrases reminiscent of Cartagena’s paratexts to his mirror of princes for João i’s son Duarte fifteen years earlier (Santillana 1988, 216–267, at 216–222):

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Quoted from the Oxford MS, f. 69r by Cuenca i Almenar 2012, 14; the passage is replaced in the incunable version—presumably the Union of Crowns of Castile-Aragon (1479) and conquest of Granada made it obsolete—by an odd invention about blood-letting at court. Cuenca suggests the example may help date the compendium and fix its authorship in València, but the story is as much pro-Castilian (anti-Andalusī) as pro-Valencian; a more pertinent question seems to be, did any such law exist in València? It seems not; at all events the source was certainly some such Aristotelian work as Memoriale i.15 or Sent. Eth. v.16.9 (see § 4, at n41 below).

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Esta pequeñuela obra me cuydo contenga en sí […] buenos exenplos, de los quales non dubdo que la Vuestra Exçelencia e alto ingenio non caresca; pero […] como sean escriptos en muchos e diversos libros e la terneza de la vuestra hedad non aya dado tanto logar al estudio de aquellos, pensé de fazer algunas breves glosas o comentos, señalándovos los dichos libros e aun capítulos. […] Ca para qualquier prática mucho es neçessaria la theórica, e para la theórica la prática. E por cierto, de los tienpos aun non cuydo yo que sea el peor despendido aquel en que se buscan o inquieren las vidas e muertes de los virtuosos varones, assí como de los gentiles los Catos e los Sçipiones, e de los christianos los godos e los doze Pares, de los ebreos los Machabeos; e aun si a Vuestra Exçellençia plaze que tanto non nos alexemos de las vuestras regiones e tierras, del Çid Ruy Díaz e del conde Ferran Gonçález, e de la vuestra clara progenie el rey don Alfonso el Magno e el rey don Ferrando, el qual ganó toda la mayor parte de la vuestra Andaluzía. […] Como dize Séneca en una epístola suya a Luçilio, siempre deven ser ante vuestros ojos. […] Podría ser que algunos […] dixiessen yo aver tomado todo o la mayor parte destos Proverbios de las dotrinas e amonestamientos de otros, assí como de Platón, de Aristótiles, de Sócrates, de Virgilio, de Ovidio, de Terençio e de otros philósophos e poetas. Lo qual yo no contradiría, antes me plaze que assí se crea e sea entendido. […] Pues, bienaventurado príncipe, tornando a nuestro propósito, Sçipión Africano […] solía decir, assí como Tulio lo testifica en el dicho libro De offiçios, que nunca era menos ocçioso que quando estava ocçioso, nin menos solo que quando estava solo; la qual razón demuestra que en el ocçio pensava en los negocios e en la soledad se informava de las cosas passadas, assí de las malas para las aborresçer o fuyr dellas como de las buenas para se aplicar a ellas o las fazer a sí familiares. Again, the multiple echoes are striking, and Cartagena may indeed have been present in Guadalajara when Proverbios was being written (Morrás 2012, 54– 57), but there is nothing to prove influence; we have to do once more with a shared milieu and horizon of expectation. Yet what is most notable about Mendoza’s “Prohemio” is that, crammed as it is with quotations and allusions to ancient authors, not a single reference is to a Christian auctoritas. Perhaps the most significant novelty of Cartagena’s Memoriale, whether or not it influenced the works mentioned above, was its message that, for the practical moral education of noble lay readers, a pagan philosopher like Aristotle might provide the most suitable teaching.

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Style and Latinity

Towards the end of §2 above (pp. 16–17) we mentioned the ramifications of Cartagena’s claim to write in planior loquendi modus and cothidianus sermo (MV ii.Prol. 86–88), or what he elsewhere calls a plain, pedestrian style (“Nec altum loquendi modum quesivi, sed plano et pedestri stillo et verbis ad nostram doctrinam utilibus usus sum”, i.Prol. 49–51). “Plain” means the opposite of “no style”, for simplicity is as much a conscious effect of language as difficulty; it may be harder to achieve, and is no less complex to analyse. In Memoriale’s case it involved among other things the use of various rhetorical tropes of amplificatio: proverbs, exempla, quotations. Here we focus on the style from a purely linguistic point of view. The first surprising facet of Cartagena’s disingenuously modest pose is that cothidianus sermo did not mean “everyday”, i.e. vernacular, speech. From his own claims it emerges that by “planus et pedestris stillus” he meant a discourse steered towards brevity and clarity: brevitati non modicum detuli; sed nec brevius potui ut clare dicerem, nec clarius loqui ut breviter explicarem, claritatem brevitate et brevitatem claritate contemperans. Non enim decebat sub nomine Memorialis prolixitate verborum vagari, cum brevitas sit amica memorie. Concl. 5–9

This ought to imply a style as transparent as possible, one in which the language strives for an effect of invisibility. Why, then, write in Latin for a reader who certainly could not read the language without conscious effort or outside help?34 Might Cartagena have done so because he could not speak Portuguese? No, this cannot be the answer, for he later went on to do the same in works addressed to nobles for whom he could have written in Castilian, but chose not to (Epistola ad comitem de Haro for Pedro Fernández de Velasco, Duodenarium for Fernan Pérez de Guzmán); besides, when he undertook to translate Cicero for the Portuguese prince, he did not hesitate to do so in Spanish. Abandoning such circumstantial explanations, we are driven to consider more complex cultural reasons. The fact is that Cartagena did not compose

34

We do not assert that Duarte was illiterate in Latin, even if all the works produced under his name were Portuguese; but there is a difference between being fluent, actively and passively, as Cartagena and his clerical peers were in Latin, and the kindergarden grammar likely to be acquired by princes. For the latter, the notion of any Latin being “plain” or “everyday” involved taking the terms with a pinch of salt.

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any works in the vernacular apart from translations until he came to compile the laws of knighthood for the count of Castro in Doctrinal de los caballeros (c. 1444), where the choice of Castilian was determined by the sources, and a brief reply to Santillana’s vernacular Qüestión sobre la cavallería (1444) on Bruni’s De militia. In Duodenarium (1442) he answered Fernan Pérez de Guzmán at length in Latin, but in El oracional (late 1454) he decided to favour the same nobleman’s qüestión on the spiritual life—strictly matter for Latin, one might think—with a full-scale reply in the vulgar language or, as he put it, with the “cavallos e armas que a la tal conquista responden”: Queríavos ayudar con espada e manto, como suelen ofrecerse los cavalleros de la armada cavallería a sus amigos a quien quieren valer, porque estas son guarniciones que todo omne tiene consigo o prestamente puede tener. […] ¿E que ál llamaremos en lo scientífico “espada e manto” sinon aquello que muy aýna sin mucho estudio se puede haver? E esto es lo que […] la lengua vulgar que llamamos “materna” sin mixtura de eloqüentes palabras puede expremir, por que en lugar de sciencia sirva lo llano con buena e sana intención explicado, e en lugar de eloqüencia vengan a servir la cottidiana e común manera de fablar […]. Por ende, noble e discreto varón, sy en algunas otras qüestiones [= Duodenarium] vos respondí en lengua latina flaca e rústicamente conpuesta, aun agora más llano quiero ser, respondiéndovos en nuestro romance, en que fablan así cavalleros como omnes de pie, e así los scientíficos como los que poco o nada sabemos […]; mayormente que, pues a todos cumple saber lo que vós preguntades, convenible paresce que se responda en lengua que se entienda por todos. Cartagena 1487, Prólogo, ff. a2r–a3v, at a3r

Here “cotidiana e común manera de fablar” finally means what we expected planior loquendi modus and cothidianus sermo to mean in 1422: nuestro romance, the “lengua que se entiende por todos”. Thus we seem to be presented with the reverse of what is usually understood as the progress of the humanist revival of Antiquity: instead of moving towards writing in the classical language, Cartagena progressed the other way, starting with Latin and ending, in his last and in this respect most innovative work, with the vernacular. From such a perspective it might be argued that in his first work Cartagena was simply doing what Aquinas’s Italian pupil Friar Egidio Romano had done in 1280 when he addressed his De regimine principum to the twelve-year-old heir to the throne of France in Latin even though, had the boy felt any inclination

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to read it, he would have needed a French crib.35 Despite outward similarities, however, the circumstances were quite different. Apart from Memoriale’s ostentatiously interpersonal mode of illocution springing from its origin in a conversation (“Hec tibi, princeps illustris, mandato tuo parens […], hiis terminis scribendo contentus quos statuit illa extrema colloquucio tua”, Concl. 1–2, etc.; addressed with tu/tuus 28 times), so that it strikes us as being directed to Duarte in a more real and active way than Egidio’s work to Philippe le Bel, there had been great cultural changes in the intervening century and a half. Foremost among them, as we are reminded by Cartagena’s deliberate paradox of calling Fernan Pérez de Guzmán “studioso cavallero” in Oracional (Prefacio, f. a4r), was the Renaissance drive towards the education of the aristocracy (§ 3, at n26 above). Generally speaking, the fifteenth century would see a notable rise throughout Europe in the number of Latin works addressed to lay patrons, as also in the number of laymen desirous of reading them; but against this must be set the equally important rise of vernacular forms of humanistic enterprise. The picture is thus complex: although from certain points of view the decision to write Memoriale in Latin might be regarded as conservative, from others it was pioneering—probably the first text in Iberia of such a nature ever addressed specifically to a lay reader. Was the reason, then, the subject-matter: Aristotle, being a technical author, required treatment in the scholarly language? This was certainly an important part of Cartagena’s thinking. The nub of his argument for compiling the Ethics was the typological distinction between works that “persuade” us to virtue by eloquent oratory and those that teach us what it is by logical enquiry (MV i.Prol. 52–53 “aliud est ad virtutis opera suadendo exhortari, aliud quid ipsa sit virtus et diverticula ejus inquirere”). The prologues to his translations of Cicero make clear that he regarded the first kind, “los fermosos tractados de los eloqüentes oradores antiguos”, as suitable for communicating in the vulgar language.36 Works of the second kind were another

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De regimine principum proved the most widely read work of its kind in the Middle Ages, and there were numerous versions for lay readers (compendia, glosses, French, English, Catalan, etc.). Haro and Santillana, for example, possessed Juan García de Castrojeriz’s Castilian gloss (extant in 22 MSS and an incunable of which 59 copies are known: Fradejas Rueda, Acero Durántez, & Díez Garretas 2003; Haro’s copy, BNE Mss/12904; Santillana’s, BNE Mss/10223); in addition Haro had the Latin (BNE Mss/9236), and Santillana Henri de Gauchy’s French translation (BNE Res/31). The quoted phrase is from Tulio de senetute, Pról. (Cartagena 1996, 155). In Rethórica de Tulio he justifies a free approach to translating such texts on the grounds that, “si el ynterpetrador sigue del todo la letra, necesario es que la escriptura sea obscura e pierda grant parte del dulçor”; so for “doctrinas que non tienen el valor por la abtoridat de quien las dixo nin han seso moral nin míxtico, […] non me paresce dapñoso retornar la yntençión

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matter, for in them technical rigour was paramount, a point developed at length in the controversy with Leonardo Bruni ten years later.37 Ten years after that, in Epistola ad comitem de Haro, he again returned to the distinction; noble laymen were enjoined to leave theology and philosophical “sublimities” to the professionals, and though they might learn “a little” Latin, dialectic, and rhetoric so as to ascend to moral “documents”, they could as well read the latter—works of the “persuasive” rather than “scientific” sort—in translation.38 Yet this too can only be part of the answer. In the Middle Ages Latin was proudly regarded by clerics as the “door” ( janua) that divided them from nonprofessionals, the language exclusive to their estate; and yet Cartagena’s project was specifically aimed at noble lay readers who, like Duarte, had never studied “in litterarum gy[m]na[s]iis” (MV i.Prol. 3–4).39 At that date and place, and in view of its addressee, we should have to conclude, therefore, that the ultimate reason for Cartagena’s choice of Latin was flattery. He intended the polite fiction that Duarte would be able to read Memoriale as a compliment to his royal patron; but at the same time as an equally polite encouragement for him to pursue the studies and knowledge necessary to that end (a conclusion that, incidentally, parallels Nascimento’s argument concerning André do Prado’s equally

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de la escriptura en el modo del fablar que a la lengua en que se pasa conviene” (Cartagena 1969, 30–32). Declinationes, Cap. 5 “Qui scientiarum districtissimas conclusiones eloquentiae regulis subdere vult non sapit, cum verba addere ac detrahere ad persuasionis dulcedinem pertinet, quod scientiae rigor abhorret. […] Sapienti viro illud congruum judico: sub restrictis et propriissimis verbis quae scientifica sunt discutere, post vero ad elimata documenta et purificatas doctrinas persuadendo verbis eloquentibus acclamare” (Cartagena 2000, 232); cf. De los ofiçios (Cartagena 1996, 207) on scientific works that “aunque se trasladen en la lengua vulgar, non se podrían por el que non aprendió entender sin maestro”. Cartagena 2020, 113 (Cap. 9, f. 20r) “Multi enim ex gentilibus […] in moribus tamen honeste loquuntur, alii virtutes ac vicia scientifice designando, ut Plato et Aristoteles, alii ad virtutum sequellam et viciorum fugam suo clamore excitando, ut Cicero et Seneca”; 119 (Cap. 10, f. 22r) “Militares igitur viri persuadendi sunt quod theologicas investigationes aut philosophicas sublimitates […] illis professoribus qui ingenio et exercicio valent totumque vite sue tempus […] huiuscemodi laboribus dedicarunt tractandas ac investigandas dimittant, ipsi vero aliis levioribus occupentur”; 121 (Cap. 11, f. 23r) “ut filii nobilium ydioma literale quod ‘grammatice locutionem’ vocamus et de dialethica et rethorica aliquid discant, quatenus subtiliores ad intelligendum cetera fiant, deinde […] ad moralia documenta, saltem sub vulgari lingua et groso tradendi modo, adiscenda aliquam operam dent”. Juan Alfonso de Benavente, Ars et doctrina studendi et docendi, Pars i, cap. 1 §16 “sicut ‘baptismus est ianua omnium sacramentorum’ [Decretum D.32.6 Verum; Glossa ord. i, 211 ad loc. d-Necessarior], sic bene legere totius discipline et omnium scientiarum ianua et fundamentum existit” (1972, 52). On this and the following paragraphs see Lawrance 1991; Fernández López 1997; Fernández Gallardo 2012a, 194–195, 2012b.

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flattering dedication of his Latin Horologium Fidei to Prince Henrique three decades later, n9 above). Hence the circumstances of the original conversation—in the vernacular, of course—, the prince’s succeeding request for its “memorialization”, the involvement of Aristotle, and the subsequent presentation to Duarte of the work in Latin provide a paradigm of the social and cultural processes to which we have referred. Nevertheless, the decision to do so presented the author with the tricky problem of writing a work designed to be transparent, yet couched in the prestigious but murky medium of a language with which men of Duarte’s estate were not expected to be conversant. This is the topic that concerns a stylistic critic. In the passage quoted above from Oracional, Cartagena states twice over that what distinguishes “lengua vulgar” from Latin—even “rustic” Latin—is that, while plainer (llano), it lacks the ancient language’s eloquence (eloqüentes palabras, eloqüencia). Such remarks problematize still further the claim to have written Memoriale in “plain and pedestrian” … Latin. Any analysis of Cartagena’s stylus planus has to take into account such authorial statements of intent and attempt to resolve their manifold contradictions. When we speak below of his Latinity as being “simplified” or “vernacularized”, therefore, the comments do not refer to his command of or putative level of knowledge of the language and its grammar, but are meant as judgments relating explicitly to his stated aims of transparency and clarity vs. eloquence (or … its absence). A place to begin is by comparing Cartagena’s compilation with its chief source, Aquinas’s Sent. Eth. One is immediately struck by how ruthlessly Cartagena applies the pruning shears to the Angelic Doctor’s scholastic quiddities. He states that he writes so that “absque revolucione librorum legere valeas quod cum glosatorum crebris divisionibus et subdivisionibus legi solet”; and indeed, the form of Aquinas’s lectiones is that of seemingly endless divisio (“the Philosopher states A, then B; A is divided into three parts, B into two; the first of A is subdivided into two …”, and so on ad infinitum). For schoolmen this was a method of making Aristotle more memorizable for students; but for his amateur readers Cartagena lifts out the leading ideas and consigns the rest to the dustbin, along with its concomitant technical vocabulary. Compare, for example, the start of their respective treatments of fortitudo: Aristotle: ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἤδη φανερὸν γεγένηται· φοβούμεθα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά / Quoniam quidem igitur medietas est circa timores et audacias, iam et prius dictum est. Timemus autem scilicet terribilia. EN 1115a6–7/Aristotle 1972–1974, iv, henceforth Vet. interp., iii.7, p. 421 5–6

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Aquinas: Quoniam quidem igitur medietas, etc. Postquam Philosophus determinavit de virtutibus moralibus in communi, hic incipit determinare de singulis in speciali. Et primo determinat de virtutibus quae sunt circa passiones interiores; secundo de iustitia quae est circa operationes exteriores, in v libro ibi De iustitia autem et iniustitia etc. Prima autem pars dividitur in partes duas: in prima determinat de virtutibus moralibus quae sunt circa principales passiones respicientes ipsam hominis vitam; secundo determinat de virtutibus moralibus quae sunt circa quasdam secundarias passiones respicientes exteriora hominis bona, in iv libro ibi Dicamus autem deinceps, etc. Circa primum duo facit: primo determinat de fortitudine, quae est circa passiones respicientes corruptiva vitae humanae; secundo determinat de temperantia, quae est circa passiones respicientes ea quibus humana vita conservatur, scilicet cibos et venerea, ibi Post haec de temperantia, etc. Circa primum tria facit: primo investigat materiam fortitudinis; secundo determinat modum operationis ipsius, ibi Terribile autem non in omnibus quidem, etc.; tertio determinat quasdam virtutis proprietates, ibi Circa audacias autem et timores, etc. Circa primum duo facit: primo resumit quod manifestum est ex praemissis de materia fortitudinis, scilicet circa quas passiones sit; secundo inquirit obiecta illarum passionum, prout circa eas est fortitudo, ibi Timemus autem, etc. Dicit ergo quod iam supra dictum in ii, quod fortitudo est quaedam medietas circa timores et audacias; importat enim fortitudo quamdam animi firmitatem per quam animus stat immobilis contra periculorum timores. Deinde cum dicit: Timemus autem, etc., investigat obiecta passionum praedictarum secundum quod circa eas est fortitudo, et specialiter ex parte timoris, circa quem principalius est fortitudo, ut infra dicetur. Eadem autem sunt obiecta timoris et audaciae, nam illud idem quod per timorem aliquis refugit, per audaciam aggreditur. Circa hoc ergo tria facit: primo ostendit quae sint obiecta timoris; secundo ostendit circa quod genus horum sit fortitudo, quia circa timorem mortis, ibi Non enim circa omnia, etc.; tertio ostendit in speciali circa cuius mortis timorem sit fortitudo, ibi Videbitur autem utique, etc. Dicit ergo primo quod terribilia sunt quae timemus, quasi timoris obiecta. Sent. Eth. iii.14.1–4

Cartagena: Fortitudo est medietas quedam inter timores et audacias; importat enim quandam animi firmitatem per quam animus stat inmobilis contra timo-

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res periculorum. Est ergo fortitudo ille habitus electivus secundum quem homo se habet firme et intrepide circa pericula propter bonum. Objectum autem fortitudinis est illud quod terribile est, nam cum fortitudo sit circa timores et audacias moderandos, principaliter tamen circa timores, ut infra dicetur; et terribilia sunt que timemus. MV i.17 1–7

The chief device of plainness here is brevitas. The first of Cartagena’s three sentences cuts straight to ll. 17–18 of Aquinas, the last paraphrases his succeeding eight lines expounding Aristotle’s final six words, preserving the salient idea but excising the ponderous logic-chopping of secundum quod, specialiter, principalius, circa quod genus, etc. And this is so with the major part of the text. To discuss Memoriale’s vocabulary or syntax in general terms would be pointless, since much of its wording is copied from the sources; its “style” consists in the first place of the things not copied, of which the most notable are the omitted technicalities and horrid jargon—the very things that humanists mocked about “barbarian” scholastic Latin. Despite his protestations, however, Cartagena’s “plainness” betrays a concern not just for ease and brevity but also for elegance. In the first sentence he rewrites “quaedam medietas” as “medietas quedam”, “circa timores et audacias” as “inter timores et audacias”, “periculorum timores” as “timores periculorum”, and omits the heavy repetition of fortitudo in the second clause. These details cannot be fortuitous; they are meant as better sounding, more accurate, or more rhythmic phrases. The recast last sentence shows similar concerns: circa is here the apt preposition, concessive cum + subj. renders the argument clearer, the addition of moderandos improves both sense and sound. Most striking is the intervening sentence, a concise definition of courage in terms of Aristotelian virtue ethics. It is not taken from Aquinas, but silently adapted— again with stylistic retouches—from Geraldus Odonis.40 Alongside this evidence of attention to a lighter but more elegant register there is, to be sure, a certain tendency towards linguistic vulgarization; that is, 40

“Est ergo fortitudo ~ pericula propter bonum” resumes Guiral Ot 1500 iv.1, f. 55va “fortitudo est medietas circa timores & audacias, omnis autem timor & omnis audacia est circa terribile, & nos timemus terribilia, ex quo habetur quod obiectum fortitudinis est terribile”; iv.2, f. 57ra “fortitudo est habitus medius circa ausibilia & terribilia in bellicis periculis aggressivus et expectativus propter desiderium boni”; and iv qu.1, f. 60va “Quod autem sit [habitus] electivus patet […] ubi dicitur quod fortis in bello eligit bonum pro omnibus tristitiis quas sustinet”. Besides compression, stylishness is evident in such details as substituting hispid “[habitus] in periculis aggressivus et expectativus” by “secundum quem homo se habet firme et intrepide circa pericula”.

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adopting features of Romance lexis and syntax. An example is the use of 2ndperson demonstrative iste for este, where standard Latin would be hic. So we find: Ista [“the latter”, virtutis doctrina quam in pelle didiscimus] bonos facit, illa [“the former”, quam solum in animalium membranis] ad bonum inducit. […] Illi [“the former”, sapientes] adinveniunt, isti [“the latter”, alii] adinventis utuntur. MV i.Prol. 6–7, 24

Sed ista [“what I have just said” = haec] intentui nostro non congruunt. i.8 26–27

More vulgar still is use of abl. gerund as Sp. adverbial gerund, instead of pres. part. (e.g. “tam generaliter de eis loquendo […] quam eciam specialiter de eis tractando […] disseruit”, i.3 5–7), fuisse in pass. perf. (e.g. “inter nos habitus fuit sermo”, ibid. 8, for habitus est; cf. Sp. fue tenido), or words like barones, capitaneus, josta, marinarii, torneamentum, trufator. Yet such features do not have the overall effect of making his language less elegant than Aquinas’s; on the contrary, they render it lively, energetic, and immediate. Compare the following: Sicut in quadam civitate statutum fuit sub poena capitis quod peregrini non ascenderent muros civitatis, ne scilicet possent dominium civitatis usurpare. Hostibus autem irruentibus in civitatem, peregrini quidam ascendentes muros civitatis defenderunt civitatem ab hostibus, quos tamen non est dignum capite puniri, esset enim hoc contra ius naturale ut benefactoribus poena rependeretur. Et ideo secundum iustum naturale oportet hic dirigere iustum legale. Sent. Eth. v.16.9

Ut in exemplo, ferunt enim in quadam civitate statutum fuisse ne peregrini muros ascenderent, et peregrinus ascendens capite puniretur; cum autem hostes in civitatem irruerent civibus ignorantibus, peregrini a casu transeuntes muros ascenderunt et civitatem ab hostibus defenderunt. Attenta igitur justicia legali capite puniri deberent, quod absurdissimum et inconveniens esset et contra justum naturale, quod vult ut benefactoribus non mala sed bona rependamus. Sed interveniet hic epiqueya, et quod legislator si previdisset statuisset, hoc bonus legis minister faciet; non enim legis verbis observatis contra mentem ejus veniet, nam ut

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legiste dicunt, “in legem committit qui verba legis amplexus contra legis nititur voluntatem”. MV i.15 13–2241 Aquinas’s abrupt “Sicut” and drily legalistic “sub poena capitis” are rewritten in more lively style as “Ut in exemplo, ferunt enim” and “et capite puniretur”, engaging the reader’s suspense in the story, while the barbaric syntax and SVO wordorder of “quod non ascenderent muros” are corrected to elegantly classical “ne peregrini muros ascenderent”; yet to the same end class. ablative absolute “hostibus autem irruentibus in civitatem” is simplified as “cum autem hostes in civitatem irruerent” (though cf. following “civibus ignorantibus”) and “peregrini quidam ascendentes muros civitatis defenderunt civitatem ab hostibus” rephrased omitting the clumsy repetition of civitas and using parataxis for greater narrative vividness, but also with more emphatic classical SOV order yielding a striking rhyme: “peregrini a casu transeuntes muros ascenderunt et civitatem ab hostibus defenderunt”. The sense of energy continues in the explanatory sequel, with its rhetorical exaggeratio “quod absurdissimum et inconveniens esset et contra justum naturale” embroidering “esset enim hoc contra ius naturale”; its personification of law and equity as subjects of active verbs (“justum naturale, quod vult”, “interveniet hic epiqueya”); and the concluding amplificatio of a legal citation (n122). The desire to lend colour and movement, to use language in an overtly emotive way, is unmistakeable; Memoriale is a great deal more stylish in this sense than other Aristotelian compendia. In short, by “plain” and “clear” Carta-

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See § 3 at n33 above, and nn121–122 below. The example was expanded from Byzantine commentaries on EN 1137b19–24, e.g. “Heliodorus of Prusa” (attrib., c. 1350), Paraphrasis Eth. Nic. v.16 § 195 διὰ τοῦτο τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον συμβαινόντων οἱ voμοθέται στοχάζονται· τὸ γὰρ ξένον ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος ἀνιόντα κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ πολέμου τὴν πόλιν ὠφελῆσαι (Heylbut 1889–1892, ii, 109); or Anonymus, Scholia in Eth. Nic. v.14: ὁ νόμος καθόλου πᾶς, οἷον […] τὸν ὑπερβάντα τὸ τεῖχος νυκτὸς τεθνάναι· ὅμως ἐνδέχεταί τινα […] ὑπερβῆναι τὸ τεῖχος νύκτωρ […] μὴ τῷ νόμῳ ὑπεύθυνος εἶναι· ἐν οἷς ἡ ἐπιείκεια δείκνυσι τὸ κατ᾽ ἐπανόρθωσιν δίκαιον, οἷον ὅτι […] τὸν μὴ μετὰ κακίας ὑπερβάντα τὸ τεῖχος ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκης ἐπειγούσης μὴ ἀπάγεσθαι. (Heylbut 1889–1892, iii, 249) Cf. also Guiral Ot 1500 v.18, f. 117ra: Verbi gratia, lex est in quadam ciuitate quod peregrini muros ciuitatis ascendentes capite puniantur. Contingit autem quod peregrini innocenter transeuntes per illam ciuitatem audiuerunt clamorem quod hostes contra ciuitatem repente irruerunt; qui peregrini promptiores quam ciues muros ascenderunt et urbem defendentes saluauerunt. Nunc ergo queritur quid iuris, utrum mori debeant sicut lex dicit; et respondet epiekes quod non, quia contra ius naturale est reddere malum pro bono, nec legislator si presens fuisset reos esse dixisset.

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gena meant “more direct” but also “more entertaining”; and if his Latin is not humanist, it is certainly not scholastic either. His vulgarisms are not “low” in either a stylistic or a linguistic sense; instead they function as a kind of modernizing colloquial intertextuality, a deliberate register intended for vivacity, as when he delights to tell us—apropos of nothing in Aristotle or the argument— the Spanish word for a siege palisade (“muro quem vulgariter palenquum dicimus”, MV i.20 53 & n149). And this sense of subjective engagement with realia, the eye for the concrete world of sense and experience, is the underlying characteristic of the style. Defining the distinction between φρόνησις (prudentia, practical wisdom) and ἐπιστήμη (scientia, knowledge), for example, Aquinas explains that the former does not concern things determined by the laws of necessity (“neque de his quae sunt simpliciter impossibilia aliter se habere, neque de his quae sunt impossibilia agere”); Cartagena says bluntly, no one plans whether the sun will rise (“Nullus enim consiliatur si sol orietur”, MV i.5 12–13 & nn70–71). Or again, Aquinas talks vaguely of aliquid prohibens, “some prohibition” of diet; Cartagena specifies, “in Lent” (i.31 41 & n186). For Aristotle’s πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου “empty alarms of war” Aquinas exemplifies, “sicut fragor armorum, concursus equorum et alia huiusmodi”; Cartagena, senses alert, concentrates on sound: “ut strepitus equorum, fragor armorum, tubarum sonitus”—and then adds the stunning image, “cum enim magna acies equestris se movet, videtur inexpertis quasi quidam terremotus” (i.21 6–8). This is the “plain, everyday way of speaking” in a nutshell. Only in one respect does Cartagena relinquish his direct, concrete style to side openly with the “barbarian” scholastics: namely, in his fondness for technical Graecisms. It is strange that schoolmen clung with such tenacity to these unintelligible words, but they were regarded as scientific. Cartagena spared his lay reader many of his sources’ technicalities, but refused to abandon eubulia, synesis, gnomi; gnomiticus; castrimargus; banausia, apirocalia; kaymus, acrocolus, discolus; autochiastos or -phastos, eiron, blancopanurgus; bomolochi, agrioti, eutrapeli. A few entered Spanish, like policia “constitution” (πολιτεία, i.1 22, i.12 11–12, 15, 17), epiqueya “equity” (ἐπιείκεια; see the passage from i.15 above & n118), ypocrita (ὑποκριτής, i.31 52 & n188), or melodia “concord” (μελῳδία, ii.9 5 & n235); most were forgotten.42 It can hardly be said that Cartagena or anyone

42

On the Graecisms mentioned see nn74; 125; 169; 228; 239, 271, 278; 281, 286, 289; 292, 294. Policía is first attested in corde in 1414, and × 37 before 1500; epiqueya × 13 from the 1440s (Alfonso de la Torre, Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo, Alfonso Chirino) to the 1740s (Mayans); melodía × 141 to 1500, from Berceo onwards, but usually in the ordinary (etymologically correct) musical sense “melody”, in which Cartagena uses it too at MV i.25 7; only two or three fifteenth-century attestations have the metaphoric sense “harmony”, one being Car-

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else in Iberia properly understood the terms (they caused the scribes sad perplexity). It is noteworthy, however, that he did not accord the same treatment to, say, medical terms; thus Aquinas’s hydropisis, phtysis, and epilentiae are vernacularized as febris continua and terciana (MV i.34 47–48 & n197). It is clear that he saw Vetus interpres’s Graecisms in a different light, regarding them as indispensable to the philosophical rigour of his ethical project, even for amateur readers. This, indeed, was to be the central pillar of his argument in Declinationes against Bruni’s humanist translation of EN: that to replace such technical terms by supposedly more elegant Ciceronian periphrases was not to translate Aristotle but to traduce him. We may be able to think of rational objections to Cartagena’s stance, but Bruni had no idea what they might be. Posturing buffoonishly as an ape, he tried to convince us this was no philosophical problem but simply a matter of, as he put it, “sniffing” words for their antique literary credentials. The list of terms condemned by his olfactory organ included a number of those used in Memoriale: Quid enim est aliud quam barbara simul et Latina et Graeca in unum confundere, et chaos, ut ita dixerim, literarum moliri? Vide quam multum inter me et illum intersit: ego millies singula verba olfacere soleo priusquam literis mandem, nullum denique nisi probatum et ab optimis auctoribus michi commendatum recipio; ille autem passim undecunque oblatum arripit. Itaque bomolchos et agricos et eutrapeles et epieces et cacectos et cetera huiusmodi monstra verborum probat.43 We should not, however, allow the ineptitude of Bruni’s defence to obscure the real strangeness of this vocabulary and, more still, of the linguistic choices that

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tagena’s own Apología sobre el psalmo «Júzgame, Dios» “la melodía y concordia de nuestros pensamientos y deseos” (n235); cf. Vicente de Burgos, in Bartholomaeus Anglicus 1494, sign. 2a2ra (f. 116r) viii.1 “El mundo […] ha en sý […] unidad & consonançia syn discordia & una suavidad & melodia, segund dize sant Agustín sobre el Génesis”; Alfonso de Zamora(?), Morales de Ovidio “la melodia de la oraçión & de la confessión”. Bruni 1741, ii, 81–90 Ep. vii.4 (to Francesco Pizolpasso, 15 October 1435, cited in n22, above), at 88. Whether the flagrant Graecism χάος “chaos, the formless abyss of the first state of the universe” was meant as ironic self-mockery (“ut ita dixerim”) is hard to say, but Bruni’s petulant self-importance makes it unlikely. “Putat enim non Graeca modo,” he adds, “verum etiam (ut ipse appellat) ‘Galetica’ quaedam et Germanica et Hispanica vocabula in Latinam orationem esse admiscenda”, a habit abhorrent “ab omnium bene litteratorum opinione” which he attributes to Cartagena’s being a juris peritus. Over the page he attacks Vetus interpres on similarly frivolous grounds, objecting to its use of architectonica, bomolcos, and agricos, or putting tristitia for dolor, honestus for bonus, eligere for expetere, and per se bonum or summum bonum for bonum (p. 89).

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motivated it. In fact words like εὐβουλία (“rectitudo consilii”, MV i.6 2 & n74), σύνεσις (“bonum judicium de consilio”, ibid. 19), γνώμη (“eleccio moderativa in casu particulari”, 25–27) are not technical terms at all; there was no good reason not to use the straightforward Latin equivalents given by Cartagena. By contrast, there could be strong philosophical arguments for retaining the original names of fundamental concepts like ἕξις, εὐδαιμονία, ἐνέργεια (i.4 7–11 & n66), or ἀρετή; but in these cases Vetus interpres preferred its own inadequate or misleading renderings habitus, beatitudo, actio, virtus. Likewise to insist on keeping eutrapelia for εὐτραπελία “tactful wit” was mindless pedantry, whereas to rename σωφροσύνη and ἐγκράτεια as temperancia and continencia, or more strikingly to refuse to use Aquinas’s philotimus or Geraldus’s euphilotimia for φιλοτιμία “right ambition” and call it instead moderacio (ii.17 1–2 & nn264–265), shifted Aristotle’s argument towards an alien religious moral system of selfdenial. We are drawn to conclude that, while Cartagena’s attitude to the need for accuracy in philosophical vocabulary was indubitably justified, the Graecisms actually chosen were red herrings—neither needful nor accurate. For a society that knew no Greek, mangled words like gnomiticus, castrimargus, blancopanurgus, or autochiastos were not scholarly rigour, just decorative noise. Hence, paradoxically, the feature of Memoriale’s style that at first sight looks most rebarbative, technical, and unliterary turns out to be the most insubstantial, ludic, and purely acoustic of all—mere entertainment for the ear, not matter for the mind. All the evidence, then, even including the topic of the last paragraph, combines to reveal Cartagena’s strong voluntad de estilo (Marichal 1957, 21–61; and see Morrás 1994). Memoriale may be a compilation from other sources, but the stamp of its author’s voice is everywhere present. In the course of this introduction we have had occasion to cite similes and metaphors, rhythmic cursus and rhyme, figures of alliteration, anaphora, and asyndeton; we have seen how the sources are rewritten in more elegant register, and how varied kinds of example are used both to clarify and enliven the content. As for the rhetorical theory of high, middle, and low styles, despite a disclaimer (“Nec altum loquendi modum quesivi”, i.Prol. 49–50) he consciously uses more than one level, rising in the Prologues and Conclusion to a declamatory register, in the body of the text adopting an expository one, and in a few places indulging in familiar language that on one occasion even descends to what looks suspiciously like a joke, though it turns out to be copied from Aristotle (“naturale est quod omnes diligant opera sua, sicut parentes diligunt filios et poete poemata sua”, ii.2 43–44 & n213).44 Should there linger any doubt as to the degree to which these suas44

Cartagena’s stylistic aims in Memoriale are sketched out in Fernández Gallardo 1999a, ii,

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introduction

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ory techniques were deliberate, one need only point to the abundant rhetorical questions, apostrophes, exclamations and other forms of authorial parecbasis in the Prologue and Conclusion to Bk ii. These are marks of a fully conscious and intentionally personalized author-function. A final point regarding style remains. The MS tradition gives evidence, chiefly in the β branch but also in B and in a separate way in O, of what appears to be a degree of stylistic rewriting. The retouches are minor, commonest being replacements of pre-posed copulative et or sed at the start of sentences by enclitic ergo or autem, or inversions of order (e.g. postposition of adjs); one or two are syntactic (subj. for indic., fut. for pres.), but none amounts to a change of intention. The variants seem prompted by a desire—not always well-informed—to improve the Latinity, or at any rate to make it look more classical. Many of them were due, intentionally or otherwise, particularly in B and O (the most inaccurate copies), to the scribes; nevertheless, the history of the text shows that β derived from a copy in the author’s possession in the 1450s and this raises the question, discussed below (Proleg. § 2, list (e) & n47), of whether some of the changes may have been Cartagena’s own. The problem admits no definite answer, since none of the variants provides conclusive textual evidence of authorial intervention. If it could be shown that any revisions were Cartagena’s, they might help show how his Latinity and style evolved, for instance through contact with humanists. We have pointed to a few cases where authorial intervention seems possible or even likely (e.g. nn77, 95, 175, 265), but have not undertaken any thorough study of the problem, the evidence in our present state of knowledge being too inconclusive. Nevertheless, we end with this mention of it, in the hope that some future scholar may be able to resolve it. 462–470, and 2012, 42–44. Díez Yáñez 2015, 214–216 and Martínez Gómez 2016, 63–73 discuss aspects of his Latinity and rhetoric in more detail. The fullest literary treatment to date is by Hernansanz 1994, 181–186, who singles out the “mayor complicación sintáctica” and “vocabulario más rebuscado” of the paratexts. This inflation of style is well observed (the anteposition “tremendamente efectista” of adj. in prep. phrases proprio in corpore, nostra in pelle, MV i.Prol. 4–6; subordinate clauses expressed by verb participles, long periods, SOV word order; lexical items like ginagiis, dedignacione, cedulam, fuscaret, conculcata, i.Prol. 4, 12, 28, 21, Concl. 30). He also speaks of a “radical change” to a more sober and monotonous expository style in the text itself, though mentioning the use of anecdotes and exempla, of which he asserts—sadly, without instances—“no es raro que […] nos mueva cuando menos a sonreírnos […] por el fino sentido del humor”.

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Prolegomena to the critical edition 1 A

Description of MSS BNE Mss/9178 (olim Bb.63) s. xv, membr., iv + 74ff., 290×210, a–i8 k2, unsigned, with vertical flourished catchwords; original roman foliation in red on verso; rubrished running-titles “Ł” (liber) on verso, “pꝰ”, “primꝰ” (ff. 2–38) and “secũꝰ”, “ii.ꝰ” (ff. 39–73) on recto. 1 ruled col. of 38 lines, gothic book-hand with rubrished titles, 7-line calligraphic capitals and 3-line flourished black-letter for the first word of each chapter (see plate below), with rubrished chapter numbers in the margin. A series of reader’s marks added in the margins (s. xv).

figure 1

BNE Mss/9178, f. 1r

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i

(ff. 1–73r) [rubric] Memoriale virtutum. | Pridie Inclite ~ ſub umbra cõſcriptũ :- (ff. 73v–74 blank). * (ff. [i]–[ii]v) [rubric] Incipit tabula libri adño aldefonſſo ſce̅ marie […] uocatus | memoriale uͬ tutũ ~ ⸿xxviii De fine ſeu explectione ȷntenti & concluſione p̈́ ſentis libri & quot casꝰ aut accessꝰ tp͂ oribꝰ p͂ |tꝰitis ex exercione uel separacione uͬ tutũ multis orta ſint. (Table of contents, by another hand; see pp. 73–78). Biblioteca Nacional 1953–2002, xiii (1995), 233; Valle Rodríguez 2004, 256–258. Facs. at http://bdh.bne.es/bnesearch/detalle/bdh0000089038.

One of the earliest of the MSS, to judge by the author’s name in its Tabula (“Aldefonsso Sancte Marie legum doctore Conpostellane ac Segobiensis ecclesiarum decano”), Morrás (1991, 220 §3) conjectures it might have been a presentation copy for Duarte, Martínez Gómez (2016, 79) that it belonged to the count of Haro (Paz y Melia 1897, 160; but cf. H). The provenance remains uncertain, though its marginal reader’s ×’s and manicules ☜ (see Figure 1) are similar to those in MSS from the library of Íñigo López de Mendoza, marquis of Santillana (e.g. BNE MSS/10137 Pero López de Ayala, Morales de Job). B

Basel, Universitätsbibliothek Handschriften A viii 35 s. xv1, paper, 356ff., 210×140, composite of 15 items; various hands, (i) written space 170×105, 36–42 lines, gothic cursive, rubricated; (ii) 175×105, 34–37 lines, gothic cursive with rubrics and capitals in red, corrections in two hands; (iii) 145×90, 24–26 lines, gothic cursive; (iv) 145×95, 27–28 lines, gothic cursive; (v) ff. 318–327, 165×120, 33–34 lines, gothic cursive, perhaps autograph; ff. 328–335, 145×90 with pen ruling, 27–28 lines, gothic bastarda; ff. 336–345, 140×90, 22–23 lines, gothic cursive, rubrished to 337; ff. 346–356, 160×110, 30–34 lines, bastarda. i (ff. 1–132) [Varia theologica (chiefly Cistercian)] (a, ff. 1–18r) Godefridus Antissiodorensis, ocist, Declamationes de colloquio Simonis cum Jesu (PL clxxxiv, 437–476). (b, ff. 18r–30r) Bernardus Claraevallensis, ocist, De diligendo Deo (PL clxxxii, 973–1000). (c, ff. 30v–69v) Ps.-Bernardus Claraevallensis, ocist (or ps.-Bonaventura), Vitis mystica (PL clxxxiv, 637–715, with variants in the order of chapters). (d, ff. 70r–76v) Tractatus de septem columnis domus Sapientiae. (e, ff. 76v–77v) Liber de potentia caritatis (“excerptum ex confessione Augustini”). (f, ff. 77v–82r) Ps.-Augustinus (or ps.-Anselmus), Manuale de salute anime 1–17 (PL xl, 951–959). (g, ff. 82r–102v) Gulielmus de S. Theodorico, ocist (Ps.-Bernardus Claraevallensis), Epistula ad fratres de Monte Dei (PL clxxxiv, 309–354). (h, ff. 102v–132r) Bernardus Claraevallensis, ocist, De consideratione (PL clxxxii, 727–808). (f. 132v blank).

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prolegomena to the critical edition ii

(ff. 133–178) [rubr.] Memoriale virtutum. (ff. 133v–178v) [ ]ridie inclite princeps cum in Camera regis ~ viridibus in pratis azoye Ruris quod nosti vernancium arborum sub umbra conscriptum. (f. 179 blank) iii (ff. 180r–308v) [Cartusiensis quidam, Sermones] (note by another in marg. “Quidam furatus hunc librum delevit hoc nomen domus nostre et ordinis scribens istam litteram, superius totum abscidit sicut et primum folium libri huius in principio abscidit”) iv (ff. 309r–315r) [Gennadius Massiliensis (Ps.-Augustinus), De definitionibus ecclesiasticorum dogmatum] (PL lviii, 979–1000). (ff. 315v–317v blank.) v (ff. 318–344) [Sermones varii in conc. Basiliensi] (a, ff. 318r–326v) Georgius episcopus Vicensis prov. Tarraconensis, Sermo de annuntiatione beatae Mariae Virginis factus in concilio Basiliensi die assumpcione novi Regis Romanorum domini Alberti regis Ungarie et Bohemie anno 1438. (f. 327 blank.) (b, ff. 328r–335v) [Praemonstratensis quidam, Sermo habitus Dominica septima post octavam Pentecostes (26 Julii) 1433 in concilio Basiliensi]. (c, ff. 336r–344r) [Nicolaus Iaquelli, Sermo habitus Dominica prima in Quadragesima in concilio Basiliensis]. (ff. 344v–345 blank.) vi (ff. 346r–351v) [Peregrinus de Oppeln, Sermones iv de sanctis]. (ff. 352–356 blank.) * (front endleaf) “provenit a domino Anthonio decano Rinfelden vel potius a domina Lostorffin”, and a Conspectus libri in which is listed “Burgensis Memoriale virtutum, opusculum notabile”. Provenance: donated by “domina Lostorffin” to the Kartause, Basel (olim B xxxiij, E xxxix, i.e. from the Bibliotheca antiqua and hence acquired before 1487: Halpom 1984, 226, 238–240; Dominé 2012, 47). Scarpatetti et al. 1977, §192; Steinmann 1982, 352, and UB library catalogue entry (Martin Steinmann, unpubl.); Kristeller 1963–1997, v, 45; Martínez Gómez 2016, 80–81. The library declines to allow reproductions, owing to the tightness of the binding.

The copy was clearly made in Basel, where Cartagena must have taken a MS in 1435, for by 1474 it was in the “old library” of the city’s Charterhouse St Margarethental in Kleinbasel’s Theodorskirchplatz, with other MSS from “Anton, dean of Rheinfelden” (e.g. Lohr 1994, 20, Universitätsbibliothek A X 88; Künzle 1977, 106, B viii 4). The donor “Frau Margred Brand genannt Lostorff[er]in”, who was already making endowments to the university and Kartause by 1467 (Staatsarchiv des Kantons Basel-Stadt, Klosterurkunden St. Theodor Urk no. 63 http://query.staatsarchiv.bs.ch/query/detail.aspx?ID=836352), left her books to the latter (Zedler 1903, 52–53 n1), where she was buried in 1474 (Stückelberg

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figure 2

43

BNE Mss/9212, f. 1r

1896). The monastery, founded in 1401, was “un centre intellectuel florissant” during and after the Council (Dominé 2012, 45), acquiring “the finest library in the whole Upper Rhine region” (Halpom 1984, 225), which after the Protestant dissolution passed to the University library in 1590. H

BNE Mss/9212 (olim Bb.69, proc. Haro) s. xv, paper, 66ff., 300×210, a–e12 f6, unsigned, with catchwords and original roman foliation + modern arabic foliation in pencil; running-titles “ł” (liber) on verso, “pꝰ” (primus, ff. 1–34), “sꝰ” (secundus, ff. 35–65) on recto. 2 ruled cols of 39 lines, gothic cursive book-hand with rubrished tituli, calligraphic capitals, and 2line black-letter for the first word of chapters; on f. 1r a 5-line illuminated initial, preceded by space for an illuminated title, empty (see Figure 2). On f. 34v (end of

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prolegomena to the critical edition Bk i), col. 2 is empty except for the words “[S]unt at”̃ in large black-letter, crossed out. i (ff. 1–65v) [Memoriale virtutum, untitled] Pridie inclite pͬ nceps ~ ſub vmbra ꝯſcͬptũ | Deo gr̅as | Explicit memoriale virtutũ. laus honor deo p̅ ri̅ virginiꝙ marie et o̅ ibus ſt̅is Amen. (f. 65v col. 2 and f. 66 blank, the latter unruled). Biblioteca Nacional 1953–2002, xiii (1995), 242; Valle Rodríguez 2004, 256. Facs. at http://bdh.bne.es/bnesearch/detalle/bdh0000096081.

This handsome MS belonged to Cartagena’s friend Pedro Fernández de Velasco, first count of Haro, being listed in the inventory of books he donated to the Hospital de la Vera Cruz in Medina de Pomar in 1455 (Lawrance 1984, 1090 § 48).

figure 3

Patrimonio Nacional. Real Biblioteca del Monasterio de El Escorial J-ii-25, f. 1r (bottom half torn, showing f. 2 behind), and f. 6r, showing corrections

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prolegomena to the critical edition

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Esc. J-ii-25 s. xv, paper, 280×195, 186ff. (horadados; foot of f. 1 torn), modern pencil foliation. Composite of two parts: (i) a–e12 f12−1 (lacks 1 after f. 64, torn stub at the gutter; foliation skips missing leaf) g6+1 (last leaf tipped in), catchwords; single unruled col. 31–35 lines, 190×110, gothic cursive, formal black-letter chapter initia for MV i.Prol. and i.1, spaces for initials and rubrics, blank, with marginal lead-letters and chapter numbers where lacking in tituli of i.Prol., i.6, i.9–12 (see Figure 3). Interlinear and marginal corrections by a contemporary hand, and some annotations by another. (ii–ix) single ruled col. 35 lines, neat gothic bookhand, rubrics, large red initials, and flourished ascenders at chapter heads. i (ff. 1r–78v) prologus [in marg.] | [ ]ridie inclite princeps cum ~ viridibus in pratis Azoỹe Ruris quod noſti vernãcium arborum ſub vmbra conſcriptum. | [manus altera] Explicit & concertatus ſiue correptus eſt. ii. (ff. 79–89) Incipit ꝯuerſio ſc̅e marie egipciace quã tranſtulit de Greco in latinũ paulꝰ venerabilis diaconꝰ ſc̅e Neapoł’ ecc̅e (PL lxxiii, 671–690, from Sophronius, Vita Mariæ Aegyptiæ, PG lxxxvii, 3697–724). iii (ff. 90–92r) [anon. Speculum religiosorum, index ‘Doctrina saluberrima qualiter per horas diei ocupari debemus’] Quoniam ut ait apostolus 1a. cor. xxiiiº omnia honeste ~ reverentiam matris dei. (unident.) iv (ff. 92v–98r) ps.-Augustinus, Epistula ad Cyrillum de magnificentiis Hieronymi (PL xxxiii, 1120–1126). v (ff. 98v–109) Bonaventura, [De triplici via, alias Incendium amoris] (1882– 1902, viii, xvii, 3–27). vi (ff. 110–143r) ps.-Eusebius Cremonensis, Epistula ad Damasum episcopum Portuensem et Theodosium senatorem Romanorum de morte S. Hieronymi (PL xxii, 239–282). vii–viii (ff. 143v–146) Gregorius i Magnus, Epp. ix.122 Ad Recharedum Visigothorum regem and ix.121 Ad Leandrum Hispalensem episcopum (PL lxxvii, 1050–1056). ix (ff. 147–156) Bonaventura, Itinerarium mentís ín Deum (1882–1902, v, xxx, 295–313, incompl.)]. x (ff. 157–186) Richardus [de Bury Dunelmensis], Philobiblon. * (f. 186v) Opuſcula conte͂ta In hoc volumine ſunt hec. | .1. Vita & ꝯuꝰſio bt̅e marie egipcia͠ce ~ 9 philobiblon Ricardi dulmen̅ [contemporary index of second part of MS, ii–x] (At the head, s. xvii–xviii hand, “Este libro no tiene autor tiene ciento y noventa y | dos hojas, y una al principio rota”) Antolín 1910–1923, ii, 488–490. Facs. https://rbdigital.realbiblioteca.es/s/rbme/​ item/13763

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Though the spaces for initials show that MV in (i) was a fair copy, it is full of corrections checked against the original (explicit, f. 78v “concertatus sive correptus est”). The provenance is unknown; the contents of the MS’s second component (ii–viii) point to a monastic milieu.

figure 4

O

Burgo de Osma, Catedral Ms. 117, f. 2 (start of Memoriale virtutum)

Burgo de Osma, Biblioteca de la Catedral Ms. 117 s. xv, paper & membr., 137ff., 185×125, a–n10 o6, catchwords, modern pencil foliation 2–137; single col. of 28–30 lines, gothic bookhand with rubrics, 10-line tracery initials and first words in larger square script at the start of chapters (Figure 4). Marginal corrections, and flourished crosses indexing authorities, etc. in other hands. i (ff. 2–92v) [rubr.] Incipit memoriale uͥ tutũ editũ a dn̅ o alfonſo ep̅ o burgenſi. | Pridie inclite pͥ nceps ~ arboꝝ sub umbra ꝯſcͥptũ. (f. 93r) Explicit memoriale uͥ tutũ editꝮ a dn̅ o alfonſo epiſcopo burgenſi.

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ii

(ff. 93r–99v) [Leonardo Bruni, In hypocritas] [rubr.] Incipit inuectiua in ypocritas ciceroniane eloq̅ ncie viri dn̅ i leonardi de arecio. | Ex om̅ i genꝰe hominũ ~ In vicia aut̅ aliena nõ curiosꝰ sis sȝ ĩ tua | Explicit inuectiua ꝯᷣ ypocͥtas ciceroniane eloq̅ ncie viri dn̅ i leonardi de arecio. (Bruni 1996, 310– 331; Campo 1998) iii (ff. 99v–137v) [Giovanni Tinto de’ Vicini, De institucione regiminis dignitatum] (ff. 99v–101v) ded. Alfonso Carrillo de Albornoz (S. Eustachii card. 1408–1434). (ff. 101v–102r) [rubr.] Johãnis tincti de vicinis de fabͬ iano de instituc̄one regiminis dignitatũ ad magnificũ & graciosũ adoleſcenteȝ baptistã chiauellũ de chiauellis de fabriano dn̅ ȝ suũ. “Epistola” and “Responsiva”. (ff. 102r–137v) Prologus, table of 15 chaps, dialogue of Tinto and Battista “Aduenisti tincte in tp̅ ore ~ exemplar & speculũ ꝓspecturi”. (Vicini 1977) * (f. 1v) [in another s. xv hand] Ista continẽtꝰ in isto volumȷne | ¶ memoriale uȷrtutũ | ¶ inuectiua leonardi cont ͬ ypocritas | ¶ opuſculũ de ĩſtitucione regimȷnȷs dignȷtatu[m]. Rojo Orcajo 1929, 205–206; Kristeller 1963–1997, iv: Alia itinera ii: Great Britain to Spain, 498. Madrid, Archivo Histórico Nacional microfilm 130.

The MS was made for the splendid library of books, many of literary content in the new humanist script, collected by Pedro de Montoya, bishop of Burgo de Osma 1454–1474 (Rojo Orcajo 1929, 13–14, 15). It has marginal annotations comparable with those in BNE Vitr/18/7 (Tractatus de vita et moribus philosophorum et de quibusdam dictis eorum), copied by Montoya’s chaplain García de San Esteban in 1473. Q

Esc. Q-ii-9 (olim iii-743; from Capilla de la Visitación, Burgos?) s. xv, paper & membr., iv + 62ff., 300×210–215, composite of items in different hands, some autograph, ii later; modern foliation in pencil 1–58, antique foliation i–vi on first six leaves of iv. Item i a–c12 d4, first three quires with outer bifolia of membrane, horizontal catchwords and traces of signature d on ff. 26, 29. 2 cols, 205×150 (70+70), 39–44 lines, gothic cursive bookhand, incipit in round capitals, four-line calligraphic initials in red up to f. 24v, some unfinished on ff. 25–28, the rest empty; f. 1r gilded and illuminated tracery border and initial with babewyn (centaurs, animals, naked humans), foliage, and coat-of-arms of the Cartagenas (vert, a fleur-de-lys argent, referring to their claim as Levites to descend from the Virgin)(see Figure 5). i (ff. 1r–37r) Incipit: trat᷈ t us: Ꝗvocatur: memoriale: virtutvm: et diri-gitvr: Sereniſimo: edvardo: f.o Primo. Genito: ioh͞ i s Regis:

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figure 5

prolegomena to the critical edition

Patrimonio Nacional. Real Biblioteca del Monasterio de El Escorial Q-ii-9, f. 1

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Portvgalie: et fvit: coposi-tvs: areverendisimo: domino: Alfonso: de: cartaiena: Episcopo: bvrgensis. | Pridie inclite pͬ nceps ~ vernãcim arboꝝ sub vmbra cõscͬptũ. | deo gracias. | Explict memoriale uirtutuȝ laus & honor deo pat ͥ virginiꝙ marie & o͡ibꝰ s͡tis Amen (ff. 37v–40 blank). ii (ff. 41 and conjoint leaf 50) [Arenga pro tradendo gradu doctoratus in universitate Complutensi] Recte ut arbitror kͣrissime fili gradum doctoratus ~ consequaris sume uistum decerno que a | [f. 50r] aliquanto alacrius ~ et in qͦ nos iubet ap̅ lꝰ glꝰiari deus inmensus Benedictus in sc̅la Amen. (f. 50v blank). iii (ff. 42–46v) [Card. Juan de Torquemada, Epistula consolatoria ad fratres (autograph) & Ad Joannem ii, Benedetto di Anagni, Epistula] a (ff. 42– 42v) fratres kͣrissimi & nr̅i leticia cordis // Cor ad laborem natus ~ absens tªsmitto. otpime [sic] vos vałe fr̅es opto. Ex Burgis .xvii. aprilis. // vestrum exinanitus amore. b (f. 43) Yhus. Reverendissime in xͬo pater et mi singľarissime dn̅ e salve felix. Et si minus ~ depͬ cationibus deũ imploro. Vale felicissime. Ex burgo .xx. madij. ꝙ͠ raptissime. Rssme pater, date veniam si parum compte rem peregi alias politius faciemus. Bn̅ dt̅us de Anania servitor V.D. (f. 43v blank) c (ff. 44–46v) †Preclarissime princeps & inclitissime dn̅ e Rex. Post humilimã recomendacionȝ vestre celsitudinis Regie ~ et plenitudine diuĩe gracie tempora pꝰ longeva. Amen. Scͬptũ Basilee .xx. septembrꝰ. Vr̅e Regalis Magestatis orator & sꝰuus frater Iohannes de turre cremata. (ff. 47– 49v blank, f. 50 conjoint with 41 in ii) iv (ff. 51–58r) [Fernan & Pero Díaz de Toledo, Epístulae] Petrus. Eminenciora et magis pꝰfecta bona ~ aduꝰsis exẽpla custodiat clemencia salvatoris Amen. .xv. iunii dominaco̅ is vr̅e plãtula humilis petrꝰ (ff. 58v–62 blank). * (on flyleaf of i, in s. xv hand) IĦS | qui fuerit in mľtine populi facile ſedico̅ ȝ | mľtitunis patitꝰ. Multitudo .n. mr̅ ē ſedico̅ is | et contumacie. Quia qͥ dqͥ d amultis pꝰcatꝰ | plerũꝙ manȝ invindicabile. Paucitas | at̅ magr̅a e̅ diſcipline.̷ h cͬſoſtomꝰ sr̅ | mathiũ | id’ Sa. in pͬ no ꝙ ad abraham qꝛ ſacꝰdos et | ꝓpha̅ fuit· Et ad ddꝰ qꝛ Rex. fuit. de xo | reꝓmiſiȏ fct͡a. Et sic Xp̅ s fuit | Rex ſacꝰdos et ꝓpha̅. Et | ddꝰ fuit pͥ mͦ portꝰ in lr͡a | qꝛ maȷor ē dignitas regni | quaȝ nature ***. [= ps.-Chrysostom, Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum, Homilia 1, PG lvi, cols 612–946, at 621, etc.] (On front leaf f. iv) an old signature “iii/743”, crossed out. Antolín 1910–1923, iii, 379–380. Facs. https://rbdigital.realbiblioteca.es/s/rbme/​ item/14188.

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The MS is certainly not “el que presentó el mismo Autor al Príncipe Eduardo” (Rodríguez de Castro 1781, 246), for it was completed after 1440. The incipit styles the author “Alfonso de Cartajena episcopo Burgensis [sic]”; he was made bishop elect 6 July 1435 (Eubel 1913–1914, ii, 112), entered into possession of the see in 1439, and only gained the new surname after the royal grant of hidalguía, coat-of-arms, and mayorazgo to his brother Pedro on 22 November 1440 (Cantera Burgos 1952, 472, citing a privilegio of 1448 in Burgos, Archivo Histórico de la Catedral vol. 11, doc. 44). Cartagena himself continued to sign as Santamaría until at least 1452 (Serrano 1942, 119 n1), and Pulgar still called him so in his semblanza of the 1480s (Pulgar 2007, 185). The coat-of-arms could mean the copy belonged to Alfonso’s uncle Alvar García de Santamaría (d. 1460), whose library inventory lists “un libro que se llama memoriale virtutum en papel e latín cubierto de prieto” (Cantera Burgos 1952: 198–202, at 199), but the MS’s other texts (letters of Cardinal Torquemada at the Council of Basel, playful epistles by the Relator Fernan Díaz de Toledo and his nephew Pedro) make it more likely it came from Cartagena’s own milieu. However, its text of Memoriale has numerous gross errors that cannot have been checked by its author, even if some variants suggest an exemplar with revisions (see below). More likely, then, it was one of the eighteen volumes of Cartagena’s works posthumously copied and deposited by his tomb (inventory of 1487, Burgos, Archivo Histórico de la Catedral, Capilla de la Visitación Libro i, f. 116 “Los libros que están debaxo de las gradas del altar de la dicha capilla que hordenó e compuso el dicho señor obispo don Alonso e después de su fallescimiento se pusyeron allí con cadenas”, § 3 “Memoryale virtutum”: Cantera Burgos 1952, 448–449). The contemporary De actibus Alfonsi de Cartagena states: Omnia vero predicta librorum volumina reposita sunt in libraria eclesie Burgensis translata et scripta post obitum eius. Quod si forte in ipsis codicibus inventum fuerit aliquid nisi bene scriptum, inputari magis debet vicio scriptorum quam sibi, quoniam si ipso vidente fuisset quicquam male positum, absque dubio non remansisset incorreptum. Ipse vero humilitatis causa numquam voluit se in suis codicibus nominari, sed clientuli sui et familiares post eius obitum posuerunt nomen eius in tabulis titulorum. Lawrance 2000, 149, ll. 157–164

The emphasized details dovetail with the characteristics of Q, in which, for example, Cartagena would surely not have overlooked such mistakes as his title “episcopo Burgensis” in the incipit. When Flórez searched (1771, 398), all but one

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of the eighteen volumes were gone from Burgos. Cathedrals were extensively ransacked in the Habsburg period by royal librarians and other collectors; the case for thinking that a MS such as Q might have come from the Capilla de la Visitación has been adumbrated elsewhere (Lawrance 2000, 141 n32).45 Finally, also cited in the apparatus is an anonymous literal Castilian translation Memorial de virtudes, made from a witness of the α-branch (see § 2, below): Mcast Esc. h-iii-11 s. xv ex., membr., 275×200, 76ff., modern foliation in ink, a–c6 d5 e6 f5 g4, catchwords. 2 cols, 37 lines, gothic cursive, gilded and illuminated litterae notabiliores, rubrished tituli and paraphs; (f. 1r) illuminated border and miniature 59×61 of a clerical figure in blue cassock and red tunic labelled “Doctorum humilis” kneeling before an allegorical female figure in black mantle with a book and sceptre (Prudence?) holding a ladder labelled “Virtutum norma” (“Probablemente la Virgen María”, says the catalogue, but there is no halo and it would imply a misreading of the book’s content, which is about virtus naturalis, not infusa.) i (f. 1) “Porque las cosas nobles e provechosas ~ la qual nuestro señor quiera desde agora por suya abçetar” [Prologue]. (ff. 1v–75v) “Este otro día, glorioso príncipe, como en la camara real ~ en los verdes prados del aldea Azoya que sabes so sonbra de los arvoles fazientes verano escripto” [Memorial de virtudes, ed. in Cartagena 2004] (f. 76 blank). Rodríguez de Castro 1781, 243–246; Pérez Bayer in Antonius 1788, ii, 265 n1; Zarco Cuevas 1924–1929, i, 221; facs. https://rbdigital.realbiblioteca.es/s/rbme/​ item/13679; Cartagena 2004, 183–186.

The translation was dedicated to Isabel de Portugal (d. 1496), queen dowager of Juan ii and mother of Isabel the Catholic, after the latter’s accession to the throne on 13 December 1474:

45

On the textual status and characteristics of the Visitación MSS see Olivetto 2014. One certain theft from Cap. Visitación, with Cartagena’s arms and notes of 1490–1514 by his relative “Antonius de Maluenda” (Cantera Burgos 1952, 404), is BNE Mss/5568 (= Inventory 1487 § 10 “Los libros de Seneca que son [blank] romançeados”). Following Antolín, Esc.’s online catalogue conjectures that Q “probably” came from the Count-Duke of Olivares, having passed to him in 1626 with Jerónimo Zurita’s books from the Charterhouse of Aula Dei in Zaragoza. The latter provenance seems improbable and there is no record in Olivares’s catalogues (Andrés 1972–1973) or indication in the MS to suggest it was so; still, the conjecture is not incompatible with a provenance from Burgos, since both Zurita and Olivares used their royal positions to force cathedrals to surrender books.

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Porque las cosas nobles e provechosas, mientra más se estienden al pro común, no solamente más nobles mas aun divinas se fazen, segund que lo escrivió Aristótiles en el primero de las Éthicas, comigo pensando determiné trasladar en nuestra común lengua castellana un graçioso e noble tratado que de virtudes fallé, el qual de los dichos de los morales filósophos compuso el de loable memoria don Alfonso de Santa María obispo de Burgos al muy illustre e muy ínclito señor don Duarte, rey de Portugal, seyendo primero prínçipe, al qual Memorial de virtudes intituló. E por quanto […] las tales se me representaron mucho en perfección en la muy excelsa e sereníssima señora la infante doña Ysabel, sobrina del dicho señor rey e madre de la muy alta e muy poderosa señora doña Ysabel reyna de Castilla nuestra señora, juzgué a su Señoría más le pertenesçer […], vezes muy muchas le suplicando delante su Señoría mande la obra siguiente leer, porque só çierto en la leer dará dulçe govierno al ánima suya. (f. 1 [Prologue]; Cartagena 2004, 191–192) Rodríguez de Castro (1781, 246) was the first to suggest that this fine illuminated parchment folio was “el que el Traductor presentó á la Infanta Doña Isabel”. It certainly belonged to the royal collection before 1575 (Beer 1903, xcviii “Lengua castellana. Sagrada escritura, de mano, en folio. No. 169 […] § 45 Tratado de virtudes de don Alonso de Sancta Maria, obispo de Burgos”), though it seems odd that a donor would forgot to identify his or herself in any way in the presentation copy, rendering the dedication pointless.

2

Recension

Memoriale virtutum is extant in the six MSS detailed above, and we can deduce the existence at least four more now lost—an impressive count for a text of this nature, making it Cartagena’s best preserved Latin work.46 By the standards of medieval MS transmission they show little variance (3141 variants, 7 · 9 % or 1 every 12·7 words; we might expect ca. 25%), and reconstitution is mostly simple. However, it is trickier to trace a precise history of the text.

46

There was once thought to be another copy of Memoriale in Madrid, Real Biblioteca ii651, but this MS, now returned to its original owner (Salamanca, BUS Ms. 1720), contains Cartagena’s Oracional, Apología sobre el salmo “Júzgame, Dios”, and Declaración sobre un tratado de S. Juan Crisóstomo (Lilao Franca & Castrillo González 1997–2002, 65–66; see Morrás 1991, 221).

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To establish a stemma we give below a selection of significant errors, drawn from both the app. crit. and the apparatus of minor variants (pp. 370–401 below, henceforth app. min. var.). These immediately reveal two important relationships, namely between AJ vs. HQ, the clearest proof being a misplaced leaf in the common ancestor of the latter at i.30 which Q and H blithely copied as they found, despite the fact that it leaves the text incoherent, the argument illogical, and chapter i.30 with only twelve lines while i.32 has 106: (a) AJ vs. common errors in HQ i.Prol. 26–27 39 39 40 51 i.14 21 i.15 23 i.17 49 51 i.18 54 i.21 9 19–20 i.24 i.29 i.30

42 32 2–85

i.35 15–16 ii.Prol. 48 60 64 76 77–78 44 ii.8 ii.14 43 ii.16 25 ii.17 59–64 ii.21

54

ad que AJ

atque HQ visa om. HQ abire noluerunt AJ labore voluerunt HQ cognosces AJ cognoscere HQ multos AJ multis HQ a nomos om. HQ decens AJ dicens HQ justis J jostis A jocis HQ in Gallia AJ ingalea HQ Cid AJ ad HQ ense et AJ ee̅ (= esse) et H et cum Q milites ~ bellum et om. HQ (by homoeoteleuton) delectatur AJ deteſtatur HQ uis AJ ius HQ imperfectum ~ bestialis sicut de transpos. ad i.32 7 HQ (due to a misplaced leaf in the exemplar) inexpressibiles AJ irreprehensibiles HQ occupantur a se AJ occuase Q occu ase H (with a space) de om. HQ ut AJ et HQ sanctorum AJ sociorum HQ opusve meum AJ opus ne medium HQ decet AJ dicet HQ quod non congruit AJ que non congruunt HQ Mathei AJ in titľo HQ (i.e. reading mt. as ın t.) Est ergo moderacio ~ usus earum om. HQ inde AJ unde HQ

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ii.22

5

ii.23

40 58 40 55 59 39–40

illi AJ nimis AJ ii.25 reputavi errorem AJ neccessarii AJ ludentis AJ ii.26 nedum a ~ turpitudinis AJ Concl. 10 impedit AJ 60–61 primus AJ 69 Castella AJ 70 colimbriam AJ 72 septenium AJ 72 78 geritis AJ

non insunt ~ ea que om. HQ (by homoeoteleuton) illa HQ minus HQ reputauit HQ (with a space) neccessarium HQ ludentes HQ ne diuina ~ a turpibus HQ impendit HQ primo HQ castello HQ coliberrima HQ septimum HQ miraculo om. HQ gentis HQ

These shared errors in HQ prove they form a separate branch of the stemma. We analyse their relationship below, but a more urgent question is the connexion between A and J. That they were related is suggested by the above collation, but only conjunctive error can prove it. There are few errors common to both, and even fewer are significant: (b) HQ vs. common errors in AJ i.Prol. i.10 i.27 i.33 ii.22 ii.27

35 61 34–35 23 22 28

reputare HQ seu ~ opponitur HQ epularum HQ incontinencie β inmundiciam HQ Cinici HQ

refutare AJ (Mcast desechar) et ~ opponuntur AJ (see n95 ad loc.) puellarum AJ (see n173 ad loc.) continencie AJ mundiciam AJ conici J coniti A

(on ii.1 24 perditus AJ per se perditus HQ and ii.6 17 dato quod AJ eciam si HQ see app. crit.) The tally is short, but it suffices to show that A and J were related. However, many separative errors prove that neither descends from the other, as this selection indicates:

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(c) A vs. errors in J (showing that A does not derive from J) i.5 i.14 i.15 i.18 i.19 i.25 i.32 ii.Prol. ii.25 ii.27

8 35 35 12 40 19 30 75–76 49 25–26 30 ii.28 17 Concl. 50

suos om. J vendidit AHQ deviet AHQ maris AHQ modo AHQ

vendit J deveniet J mortis J bono J odore. delectacio om. J vehementem AHQ venientem J aliquorum AHQ aliorum J relevandum AHQ repellendum J virtuosus AHQ virtus J hominis AHQ homines J magnanimitate AHQ longanimitate J alas AHQ alias J

(d) J vs. errors in A (showing that J does not derive from A) i.30 60 ii.Prol. 18 23 34 ii.16 78 ii.27 29 Concl. 7 70 81

quos deificabant J impendimus JHQ egemus JHQ tempori JHQ mala J possunt JHQ contemperans JHQ conjunctim JHQ fastidiose JHQ

quos hedificabant A, om. HQ impedimus A agemus A pectori A magna A magna et HQ debent A et intemperans A conjunctioni A studiose A

The relation between A and J was not interdependence, therefore, but descent from a common subarchetype α. J was written by a scribe with better Latin but more prone to errors of omission, dittography, etc. However, it has a series of contemporary corrections by another hand. The explicit “concertatus sive correptus est” (f. 78v), added by this second hand, indicates that “correption” involved checking against another MS (concertare, calqued on Sp. concertar “cotejar, concordar una cosa con otra”, DRAE s.v.6). The collation clearly took place soon after J was made, and its accuracy implies that the control copy was the exemplar itself. It makes J the most reliable of all the witnesses, closely followed by A. Turning to the other branch, we have seen that H and Q are related; they descend from a common subarchetype β. From the Cartagena coat-of-arms

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on its first page we judge that Q was most likely copied posthumously by his familiares for deposit in Burgos cathedral, while H was made for his friend and patron the count of Haro some time before 1455 (see the descriptions, above). From their provenance, then, we should expect both to have been copied from an exemplar in Cartagena’s own possession. However, since Q explicitly attributes Memoriale to “Alfonso de Cartagena, bishop of Burgos” (i.e. after 1440) whereas A attributes it correctly to “Alfonso de Santamaría, dean of Santiago and Segovia” (between 1422 and 1435), we deduce that α was earlier than β; and this is borne out by variants in β that show a drift away from the circumstances of the work’s composition, for instance ignoring the careful distinction between calling Alfonso xi of Castile and Afonso iv of Portugal “majoribus nostris” but Juan ii of Castile “domini mei” in i.18 58–60 (see app. crit.). Yet some β readings are not errors per se and look less like corruptions than deliberate rewriting. Given the point made above about HQ’s exemplar, therefore, such adiaphora variants could in theory represent later revisions by Cartagena himself. For example: (e) β vs. α: lectiones adiaphorae (possibly authorial amendments?) i.Prol. 35

est α

enim est β (there are scores of such variants) 14 Pius papa α Jeronimus β (correcting the attribution, i.7 n77) 37 secundam α aliam β i.9 i.11 16–18 Simile eciam ~ per om. β (deleting a reference to republicsingulos anism? n99) dicetur forsam α forsan dicet aliquis β i.12 52 i.23 31 alius α aliquis qui virtuosus non sit β duabus racionibus α tribus racionibus β (in all, three reasons i.28 4 are given) 8 Vicesima quarta α .xxiij. β (correcting a citation of Decretum C.23) i.30 60 quos deificabant α om. β (deleting a reference to paganism? Also expunged is the Homeric quotation ad loc.) 76–77 vita sua α eorum vita β (i.e. of sacerdotes, not subj. Johannes) ii.Prol. 58 alia α cetera β 24 perditus α per se perditus β (corr. from Aristotle, ii.1 n207)

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ii.13 ii.21 ii.22

39–40 infra dicemus α (→ ii.16 41) 32 colloquutivum α 62 vite α

supra diximus β (→ ii.11 18) affabilem β (cf. Geraldus Odonis, n277) ȷnte Q in te H (a variant in the source, n285)

Even if these variants were revisions, however, from the textual point of view all except i.7 14, i.28 4, ii.1 24, and ii.13 39–40 are trivial. They affect wording, not substance, and could as well be scribal interpolations as retouches by the author, so to call β a “second recension” would be tendentious. Though certainly distinct from α, we find no conclusive evidence that HQ record Cartagena’s considered final intention. Besides, too many glaring errors are left uncorrected for him to have had any hand in overseeing either (a prime example being the misplaced leaf, but mistakes like castello for Castella “Castile”, coliberrima for Colimbriam “Coimbra” in Concl. 69–70 could hardly have escaped an author’s notice either). Q, despite its fine title-page and connexion to Cartagena’s family, is a careless copy and its orthography more Hispanized than any other (to take only the first leaf: i.Prol. 8 begnina /beɲína/ or /benína/ for benigna, 24 adinbeniunt /aðim̈ ˈbẽnjun/ for adinveniunt, 39 quesse for que se, and errors like 26–27 atque /áðke/ for ad que, 28 aliquod /álikoð/ for aliquot). H is better spelled but no more reliable; its scribe was a shaky Latinist, spotting nothing odd in cookery spiced by horses or blind men (equi, ceci for coqui “cooks”, i.25 49, ii.Prol. 84) and gaily transcribing luĩe lumine as hũc hunc or leaving spaces for endings he found as hard as conferendo (conferen , i.4 14, 34). But though equally bad, Q and H derived independently from β, as the following selections from Prologi and Conclusio alone suffice to show: ( f ) H vs. errors in Q (showing that H does not derive from Q) i.Prol. 46 59 59 ii.Prol. 31 39 47 Concl. 12 56 77 79

accurate AH (lacuna in J) Hic αH protracta J pertracta AH habitabat αH excito αH quodammodo αH vero αH criptis αH quotquot αH Quicumque αH

auctt͛ e (i.e. auctoritate) Q Hec Q pertractata Q habitat Q exercito Q quemadmodum Q enim Q scriptis Q quot Q quecumque Q

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(g) Q vs. errors in H (showing that Q does not derive from H) i.Prol. 3 7 9 21 31 32 36 ii.Prol. 5 12 13 50 75 Concl. 4 33 39

disserebas αQ me αQ indicium αQ habet AQ (lacuna in J) moderata αQ conceperis αQ in illam αQ novi αQ cum αQ abstrahimur αQ rei αQ philosophicas α ph͠ıcas Q ut αQ innumerabilium αQ

discernebas H mihi H iudicium H haberet H moderat H repereris H nullam H non H est H abstrahuntur H in H phisicas H et H numerabilium H incolunt om. H

It will be clear that in general β presents a far less reliable text than α. Nevertheless it cannot be ignored; besides transmitting six or seven correct readings (b, above), the possibility that a few variants may reflect authorial revisions has to be borne in mind. The above deductions about AJ and HQ are fairly clear, but the picture is complicated by B and O. Both belong to the α-branch but appear to show signs of contamination from β, or an intermediate stage between the two. The problem with the latter notion, however, is that the two MSS are widely separated in place and date. B, evidently made during Cartagena’s stay in Basel 1435– 1437, must have been taken from a copy he took with him on his travels, and hence with a terminus ante quem of 1434, whereas O—which obviously cannot have derived from the copy in Switzerland—would seem to have been made for Pedro de Montoya later, probably in the 1450s or after (see the descriptions, above). Both MSS nevertheless still share all but one of α’s conjunctive errors in (b) above (in i.33 O corrects continencie to incon-, in ii.22 B reads inmundiciam, both easy to conjecture); and they also side with AJ in all but seven of the variants in (a), the exceptions being i.Prol. 26–27 and i.18 54, where both read “atque” and “ad”, and i.17 49, i.21 19–20, ii.17 59–64, Concl. 60–61, 69, where B alone shares β’s errors and omissions. Some of the readings shared by OBβ could be coincidental, but that seems highly improbable in such cases as the following:

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(h) Errors or revisions in OBβ vs. AJ i.Prol. i.5 i.21 i.30 ii.2 ii.3 ii.9 ii.16

44 44 24 61 59 8 30 76

bonitatem AJ nititur AJ excellit AJ quamcumque aliam AJ eciam AJ quidem AJ

esse om. OBβ virtutem OBβ (see n73 ad fin.) innititur OBβ excedit OBβ (dittography) aliam quamcumque OBβ autem OBβ quedam OBβ (cf. Sent. Eth., n237) ante arduis ins. et. OBβ

Such variants can only have arisen from unclear words in the archetype, as suggested by H’s reading at i.10 29 “indebite” AJBQ vs. ĩiuste ĩdebite H injuste O, and J’s at i.18 46 “transvadare” AB vs. transvadꝰe J transvadere Oβ, where nonexistent *transvādĕre “go through” (cf. ēvādo) for transvădāre “wade through” evidently arose from a misread abbreviation; or else from some form of contamination between the branches. We have suggested above at (e) that Cartagena may have tinkered with his copy of the text after Memoriale was presented to Duarte. It seems possible—other texts by him support the hypothesis— that what we are dealing with is a text that underwent a process of minor authorial changes.47 If so, one would be tempted to consider the possibility that α and β were one and the same: Cartagena’s personal copy, with handwritten revisions gradually accumulating in the margins, pages getting jumbled, etc. However, this solution would leave unexplained both the large number of variants in β not shared by later O, and its far closer affinity to earlier B. These facts disprove any straightforward chronological theory of progressive revision in a single archetype. More to the point, of β’s adiaphora variants that might be revisions listed in (e) above, O shares none at all and B shares only three (“cetera” for “alia” in ii.Prol. 58, “affabilem” for “collocutivum” in ii.21 32, and “in te” for “vite” in ii.22 62). In other words, only a small proportion of the variance between the six MSS, if any, can be attributed to progressive authorial revision, and the existence of at least two separate subarchetypes is certain.

47

There are signs of this in Libros de Tulio, e.g. rewriting De los ofiçios’s prol. after being in Basel (Cartagena 1996, 121–123, 126–130). Praising Pier Candido Decembrio for sending his version of Plato’s Republic to a friend for correction, “summe utile iudico […] amico alicui […] inspicienda corrigendaque scripta nostra prius quam ad extraneorum noticiam deueniant mandare”, Cartagena added: “quod si amicus deest […], saltem nos ipsi competenti temporis spatio interiecto reuideamus” (Saquero Suárez-Somonte & González Rolán 1991, 219, § viii).

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All the same, B can only have been made from a copy in the author’s possession in Basel. Contrary to expectation, as we have mentioned, it shares far more readings than O with β (both together share thirty, O alone shares four, B alone 200); but against this there are some 513 places where B agrees with α against β. Furthermore, of forty-eight readings unique to Bβ listed by Martínez Gómez (2016, 89–90), sixteen are omissions and another sixteen substitutions of et or sed by autem, twelve clustered in ii.1–3—these must have been changed to look less vulgar, more “Latin”. All this makes B look like a forerunner of β, as yet without many of its errors and with the leaves still in the correct order, but possibly with some minor authorial revisions—an idea that makes sense if, as seems likely, the MS which Cartagena took to Basel was the one from which, via another apograph, H and Q descended. The following selection of variants, be they errors or revisions, illustrates these points: (i) i.7 i.13 i.14 i.20 i.29 i.30

i.32 i.34 ii.1 ii.2

ii.3

ii.5

Bβ vs. αO 12 de sui natura αO 20 32–33 28–29 13 29 Et illud αO 60 67 28 50–51 32 3–4 22–23 34–35 38 57 61 9 15–16 28 29 2

de sua natura Bβ ejus ~ lucrum om. Bβ inter ~ fideiussor om. Bβ honestati ~ propinquum om. Bβ qui ~ appetitus om. Bβ Illud autem Bβ quos deificabant α (hedif- A) om. Bβ ferunt enim om. Bβ sed qui αO qui autem Bβ vel mollis ~ incontinens om. Bβ Et est juxta hoc α (est om. O) Est autem Bβ et dabit αO dabit autem Bβ Et observat αO observat autem Bβ comendatur autem Bβ Et comendatur αO Et solent αO solent autem Bβ non autem Bβ Et non αO sed liberalis αO liberalis autem B liberalis autem est qui β sed liberalis αO liberalis autem Bβ si contingat autem Bβ et si contingat αO et deficit αO deficit autem Bβ Illiberalis autem econtra Bβ Illiberalis econtra αO et senectus αO senectus autem Bβ

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ii.13 ii.18 ii.23 ii.28

31–32 30 59 Et quandoque αO 26 regnantis om. Bβ

ipse ~ que om. Bβ ire om. Bβ quandoque autem Bβ

Stemmatically, as a witness made from Cartagena’s own copy and mid-way between the two branches, B should be highly significant; but textually it is disappointing. Plagued with unique errors (some 550; Martínez Gómez 2016, 90–94 lists 116 omissions, and note the clumsy interpolation at i.8 51, app. min. var.), its value is confined to the cases where it confirms that variants in H and Q, not being unique to β, could possibly be revisions. As for O, it remains in general so close to α that we assign it to this branch in the apparatus; from now on “α” means AJO. The variants it alone shares with β are few and minor: ( j) Oβ vs. AJB i.8 i.23 i.27 ii.Prol

31 37 28 85

vulneribus AJB bonam AJB sit AJB

post alia om. justicia Oβ in vulneribus Oβ ad bonam Oβ sic Oβ

(in i.21 48 Pugnaces AJB pugnantes Oβ, Mcast’s “lidiantes” shows the error cropped up in α too) Where A and J differ, however, O clearly sides with J. Martínez Gómez (2016, 94–95) lists some fifty conjunctive errors shared by the two; they include all but two of the cases in (c), the exceptions being “deviet” for J’s “deveniet” in i.15 35 and “alas” for “alias” in Concl. 50. These two could easily have been corrected by conjecture. However, that is not the case in some other places where O does not replicate J’s mistakes, like the following: (k) O vs. errors in J (showing that O does not descend from J) i.3 i.14 i.32 ii.15 ii.23

9 35 30 3 52

nominamus AOBβ vendidit AOBβ vehementem AOBβ sint AOBβ lucri AOBβ

nominavimus J vendit J venientem J possint J lucrari J

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Conversely, our provisional dating of the MSS suggests that J cannot have been copied from O, and the fact is proved by the latter’s very many separative errors, as the following highly selective list from i.Prol. alone suffices to show: (l)

J vs. errors in O (showing that J does not descend from O)

i.Prol. 3 17 19 29 51 60

nimium AJβ devenerant AJβ poscebas AJβ scripsi AJβ doctrinas JAβ

nimirum O diversa O ponebas O conscripsi O doctrinam O quorsum om. O (with a line to show it was illegible)

In other words, JO derived independently from a common sub-subarchetype α1. This explains the conundrum of why O, despite being a late copy, is closer to α than earlier B, but still leaves a question mark as to why it nevertheless sides on occasion with β. There is no simple answer to the latter problem, and conjecture would be fruitless; the cases in ( j) could be coincidental. What we can say, however, is that O’s scribe was the sort of fellow who, like Herakles, should have had snakes placed in his cradle at birth. He gives over 600 unique readings (more than any other, almost three times the number in A and J put together); a good proportion are inversions in order (76 in Bk i, 23 in Bk ii of which only 1 after ii.17—he tired of it) and other changes that can only have been due to a mischievous ambition to improve the style. Sometimes, it seems, he just knew better than the author: e.g. i.17 53 “plerumque” AJBβ “sepe” O, good jousters are not “mostly” brave soldiers, just “often”—impossible to misread, so either he lazily repeated sepe from the line before or we have to do with a jumped-up clerk who held a low opinion of men-at-arms. By rights, then, O’s unique readings ought to be relegated without mercy to the apparatus of minor variants, but in one or two places it alone presents a text that looks authentic: (m) O vs. Ω i.1 48 tanquam ad principaliores reduci O tamquam reduci J reduci ABβ The phrase “tanquam ad principaliores”—clearly from α1, though J only partly preserves it—is not necessary to the sense and could have been interpolated, but its very redundancy militates against this (why invent words that are not

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needed?). It looks, therefore, as if “ad principaliores” dropped out first, rendering “tanquam” senseless so it too was then omitted; we tentatively restore the phrase to the text. Again, in i.31 46 O reads “uteretur” vs. A “utitur”, while JBβ write senseless “utetur”; O’s reading is grammatically most correct, and it seems likely that utetur was an error for utꝰetur, A’s reading a conjecture, so we hesitantly adopt O (n187). In i.30 83 only O sides with A in reading “infimitatem bestialem” against J and the other witnesses’ asinine “infirmitatem”, showing that O’s scribe was no incompetent, merely untrustworthy. For this reason, in other cases where similar things happen it is difficult to decide whether we are dealing with authentic readings. For example: i.10 51 peccant ABβ dicuntur peccare O peccare J Clearly “peccare” was in α1, but did O interpolate “dicuntur”, or did J omit it? If the latter, was “dicuntur peccare” the original reading and “peccant” a conjecture once “dicuntur” dropped out, or the other way round? There can be no certain answer, but these cases warn us to take extra care with O’s unique variants. Where we judge there to be a chance of its reading being an authentic one, we include it in the main apparatus. One final testimony remains to be considered. The anonymous translation Memorial de virtudes (Mcast) was made from a witness of the α-branch, as shown by Campos Souto; but it was not any of the extant ones (Cartagena 2004, 155–156). The version therefore provides independent corroboration for the reconstruction of this branch, and on one occasion even points to a correct reading (or spelling, n317 ad loc.) against the whole Latin apodosis: (n) Mcast vs. Ω Conc. 2 [hesterna] Mcast de anteayer externa JOBβ exterma A Where Mcast presents readings relevant to criticism of the Latin text we cite them using the edition by Mar Campos Souto (Cartagena 2004). They prove particularly useful, for example, in ii.17 61–ii.18 44 where the best witness J is lacking a leaf. In sum, we have two extant witnesses of each branch, two more of an intermediate stage between the branches, and a seventh indirect testimony of the first (see the stemma, p. 71 below). These would be optimum conditions for recovering the archetype, were it not for the evidence suggesting that the author himself tampered with the text over time. Be that as it may, we have elected to use α, the branch closest to the original presented to Duarte in 1422

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and also much the purer and better preserved, as the basis for our text, falling back on β only in the six places where α is in error (b). Where the branches present adiaphora variants—that is, where β possibly presents not a corruption but a revision—α is still preferred, but β’s reading is duly given in the main apparatus. Discounting expectant (i.1 23) and externa as orthographic variants, we have resorted to conjecture against all the MSS in only two cases: (o) Conj. edd. vs. Ω i.20

33

appropiaverit :

ii.20

37

qui est passio :

apropriaverit ABβ appropinquaverit JO (see n147) quia est passio Bβ que est passio α (n274 ad fin.)

As Martínez Gómez (2016, 488) points out, the second of these is quoted from Aquinas—one of only two places where Cartagena actually names his source (“secundum Thomam” 30)—, who wrote qui (Sent. Eth. iv.14.6). Evidently the archetype of MV did not read this, for how could scribes have misunderstood so simple a relative right next to its noun? Both variants are grammatical (quia causal clause, que making amicicia instead of amore the subj. of est); but whereas α is nonsense, Bβ happens to reflect Aristotle, not Aquinas (EN 1126b23 διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας ὅτι ἄνευ πάθους ἐστὶ/Vet. interp. “Differt autem ab amicitia quoniam sine passione est”). It seems likely, then, that the error was Cartagena’s and went back to a variant in his copy of Sent. Eth. All the same, quia does not make clear sense here; so we follow Martínez Gómez in emending to “qui”.

3

Editorial criteria

The outstanding textual matter is the question of a copy-text. In editing Cartagena’s Latin works the incidentals of orthography and punctuation are topics of the greatest interest. Hotly debated during the fifteenth century, they became hallmarks of greater or less adherence to the new humanist philology. However, the witnesses of MV do not permit us to draw firm conclusions in regard to Cartagena’s usage. Though some things are clear—e.g. always spelling nihil, mihi as nichil, michi, invariably writing classical ae as e, never ae, æ, or ę, and externa, extimare for hesterna, aestimare (the Swiss scribe of B did not recognize the latter and always copied it as existimare)—there are hundreds of variants in such cases as intervocalic -t-/-c-/-ct-/-tt- or the reduplication/sim-

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plification of consonants (iddem, sollere, seppe, litera, comunis). Such spellings reflected pronunciation: the variable single or double consonants and omissions of initial h- show that, as we should expect, there were no geminates or aspirate in Spanish Latin; cases such as audater for audacter (i.17 47) or the wild confusion of sencit, -sit, -tit for sentit (i.13 38–42 n109) show that -ct- -c-t- were all pronounced /ʦ/ or /s/ before front vowels; while expurcissimos for spurcissimos (Concl. 29), expect- /espét/ for spect- (i.1 23, i.18 44–45) and spectando /espetándo/ for expectando (i.19 10) show predictable confusion from Sp. epenthetic e- before sp-. That such barbarisms abounded in the archetype is suggested by cases like B’s seemingly inexplicable dicti for i.25 31 “dati sunt illis isti sensus”, the reason for which is revealed by Q’s spelling dacti, i.e. /dáʦi/. One might assume that Q, bearing the Cartagena arms on its title-page, would preserve his orthography best. However, it is so heavily abbreviated that it would be unusable as copy-text even if we were sure its thoroughly Hispanized spelling was closest to the author’s, which we are not because its congener H is often the most correctly spelt of all the witnesses. Of the two H would seem likelier to be faithful, since it was copied by a professional scribe unsure in Latin and hence less prone to spell words according to his own ideas; but this in turn would mean that β itself was more correctly spelled than any of the α witnesses, which, if true, would seem to imply that Cartagena amended his orthography after 1435 due to contact with humanists in Basel and Italy. However, H commits so many errors that we can have little confidence that it preserves the orthographic minutiae of its subarchetype. For these reasons, though any judgment remains unscientific (we know of no Latin autographs by Cartagena for comparison), we conclude that the older, more correct branch α may preserve the original’s accidentals better than β. At any rate it seems worthwhile to give a text as close as possible to the one written in Portugal, if only for the purpose of showing what Cartagena’s Latinity was like before his travels. However, A, J, and O are not consistent, either internally or with each other. Of the three J displays the most regular orthography in terms of standard fifteenth-century Iberian usage, and is also the best punctuated. Perhaps rashly, we take these as signs that it may be closest to Cartagena’s own usus scribendi, so we choose J as our copy-text, for the most part adopting its accidentals in orthography and punctuation, but recording orthographic differences that could be original in app. min. var. This procedure still involves an element of regularization. For example, the witnesses usually write Latin nominal endings in -entia as -encia, but in verb participles J varies—along with the others, but not in the same places— between -entia/-encia, with a slight preference for the former. Since the distinction between, for example, conveniencia (sg. n.) and convenientia (pl. part.) is

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useful, we have regularized it; and we have done likewise in most cases where J uses more than one spelling, which if often does within the same sentence. So we choose eciam, ocium against ecciam/ectiam, occium/otium; derived nominal suffixes -cio, -cia vs. -tio, -tia (legacio, sapiencia), but comparative -tior vs. -cior on adjs ending in -t- ( fortior); -tt- vs. -ct-, -t- in mictere/mitere, actinere; -mm- vs. -m-, -nm- in comunis, inmoderatus; -f- against -ff- in deffectus, reffert; but -pp- (× 136) against -p- (× 5) in opportet, and conversely opportunitas, oppositus vs. opo-. Even so we do not regularize every spelling since, besides giving useful evidence about the phonology of late medieval Hispanic Latin, such variants sometimes help explain corruption, like dacti → dicti above. For clarity, however, against our own rule and very likely contrary to Cartagena’s usage, we adopt β’s sūmere (though it also writes sumus for summus) against α’s repugnant barbarism *sŭmmere. A separate question is the transcription of the graphs i-j (or ı-ȷ) and u-v. Classical Latin did not have the second letter of these pairs; medieval scribes used them, but merely as positional variants (v for initial u, j for i after i, n, m, etc.) with no regard to their vocalic or consonantal values even though, unlike Romans, they pronounced consonant i- and u- as /ʤ/ and /v/. However, modern typography does not deal in positional variants; one is therefore constrained to choose between dispensing with j and v altogether or distinguishing them phonetically. Given the point about medieval pronunciation we opt for the latter, regularizing i, u for vowels or semi-vowels (substanci̯a, su̯ asi̯o) and j, v for consonants. As for punctuation, we modernize without apology, regarding it as the duty of editors to produce not just a meaningful text, but one that makes clear what they think the meaning is. All the witnesses are to a greater or lesser extent punctuated; in cases of doubt we follow J, which uses virgule, point, and double virgule in a more consistent way than all the others, noting in the apparatus three or four places where we contradict it. A and Q add paraph marks (calderones, ⸿), frequently but in the latter case with no logic of any kind; we too split the text into paragraphs, but without reference to these MS paraphs. Punctuation is an exact science, text division a matter of judgment; readers may wish to bear in mind that there are no line-separations within chapters in the medieval witnesses. At the end we list 2800 indifferent variants (app. min. var.), and at the start transcribe the Tabula libri added by a different hand on a separate quire at the front of A, absent from all the other witnesses. Its misreadings show it was copied from a distinct written exemplar, not compiled anew from A itself; furthermore it disagrees with A’s numbering of MV ii.13–14 on the properties of the magnanimous man, counting them as a single chapter, so that in ii.15–28

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its numbers are one less than A’s. Nevertheless, the tabula’s source was a very early and authoritative one, for it alone calls the author “Dr Alfonso de Santa María, dean”. Tabula libri thus provides invaluable evidence that the continuous numbering was originally intended, a matter that has produced some confusion for editors since JOB and Mcast have no through-numbering, Q’s spaces for titles and numbers are empty, and H, though correctly through-numbered, miscounts in both Bks by including the Prologi in the tally. Since all the witnesses agree in making a break between ii.13 and 14 (though not distinguished by litterae notabiliores in Q, there is a distinct space for a heading), it is clear that A’s numbering is the authentic one; we have unhesitatingly adopted it. The purpose of our commentary is to justify textual decisions, explain aspects of linguistic or historical interest, and point to Cartagena’s treatment of his sources. In the latter respect we have chosen not to cite every phrase copied from Aristotle/Aquinas; this has been done by Campos Souto and Martínez Gómez (who usefully italicizes exact correspondences in her text), and besides, both sources are freely available online in searchable form. Given that the bulk of Cartagena’s wording derives in one way or another from Aquinas, we concentrate instead on the more interesting places where it does not. When we do refer to Sent. Eth. we incorporate the helpful numbered subsections to lectiones added by Ricardo M. Román in his online transcription (see Aquinas 1969). EN we quote in Greek (citing Bekker’s col. in Aristotle 1831 but using Bywater’s text in Aristotle 1890); Cartagena never saw this and could not have read it if he had, but for any philosophical comparison of his thought with Aristotle’s it is naturally imperative to confront his vocabulary with that of the original. For English equivalents of terms we have been guided by the Revised Oxford Translation (trans. W.D. Ross, rev. J.O. Urmson, ed. Jonathan Barnes, in Aristotle 1984, ii, 1729–867). Where Vet. interp. helps explain the text we cite the Recensio recognita of Grosseteste’s translation attributed to Willem van Moerbeke (Brams 1994; Poblete 2014), which survives in at least 246 MSS, using the critical edition in Aristotle 1972–1974 (3B, fasc. 4) but also consulting the versions in Sent. Eth. (Aquinas 1969), various MSS (e.g. BNE Mss/6440 and 6442), and the incunable of Geraldus Odonis’s Expositio (Guiral Ot 1500), which was Cartagena’s prime secondary source after Aquinas, perhaps the very one he used for studying Aristotle at Salamanca.

4

Translation

This makes no pretension other than to give the plain sense of the Latin as simply as possible; finer linguistic or literary implications are consigned

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to the commentary. In three respects, however, we elect for a word-for-word rather than sense-for-sense approach: (a) for biblical quotations we adapt the Authorized King James Version, or Douay-Rheims where Vulg departs from HB; (b) where Cartagena’s syntax is aberrant (most commonly in sequence of tenses) we signal it by translating what he wrote into equally aberrant English; and (c) when he uses scholastic barbarisms we reproduce them (“bomolochs”, “gnomitic”, “eutrapely”), adding explanations in brackets if need be. But the crucial point is his technical vocabulary for virtue ethics; we strive to use a single translation for each term, and to reflect how—in part no doubt unwittingly—it Christianizes and obfuscates Aristotle. For further discussion we refer readers to our Intro. and commentary.

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Memoriale virtutum: Text and Translation

∵

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Stemma and sigla The stemma does not show the relation between B and α, nor between O and β, because to draw dotted lines between these would conventionally imply contamination, whereas we have argued above that the connexions may rather have been due to authorial revision over time. In the former case we have placed B on the β-side because it must have derived from a copy owned by Cartagena and shares readings with the later branch that look like such revisions, but in fact it agrees with α more often; in the latter, O is indubitably related to J by unique errors, but also shares significant variants with β. As regards these two witnesses, therefore, the lines and levels represent not their strict textual-critical place in the stemma—that is hard to establish, though neither is as important as might first appear, due to their scribes’ numerous wayward and unauthorized tamperings with the text—but, instead, our reconstruction of the putative history of the text. A B H J Mcast O Q

BNE Mss/9178 Basel, Universitätsbibliothek A viii 35 BNE Mss/9212 (olim Haro) Esc. J-ii-25 Esc. h-iii-11 (anon. Castilian trans., c. 1475–1495) Burgo de Osma, Biblioteca de la Catedral Ms. 117 Esc. Q-ii-9

α β Ω

consensus AJO (= subarchetypus i) consensus HQ (= subarchetypus ii) consensus omnium

© María Morrás and Jeremy Lawrance, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004194502_004 María Morrás and Jeremy Lawrance - 978-90-04-19450-2 © Morrás Jeremy Lawrance, | doi:10.1163/9789004194502_004 ThisMaría is an open accessand chapter distributed under 2022 the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. Downloaded from Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:17:34PM via Open Access. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

72 add. conj. corr. del. ins. om. suppl.

stemma and sigla

addidit (added by) conjecit (conjectured by) correxit (corrected by) delevit (deleted by) inseruit (interpolated by) omisit (omitted by) supplevit (inserted as a correction by or in)

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[Tabula Memorialis virtutum addita ad initium A]

figure 6

BNE Mss/9178, sign. [*i]r. First page of added Tabula libri inserted at the start of A

Incipit tabula libri a domino Aldefonsso Sancte Marie legum doctore Conpostellane ac Segobiensis ecclesiarum decano traditi illustri principi infanti Duarto primogenito Portugalie: vocatus Memoriale virtutum, in duos libros divisus, quorum primus post prologum dat causam dicte divisionis et pedestri stillo composicionis et de aliis notandis specialiter que fructifera in eo reperta fuerint quibus conputetur et in xxxv capitulis concluditur.

5

1–189 Tituli librorum et numeri capitulorum rubro distincti © María Morrás and Jeremy Lawrance, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004194502_005 María Morrás and Jeremy Lawrance - 978-90-04-19450-2 © Morrás Jeremy Lawrance, | doi:10.1163/9789004194502_005 ThisMaría is an open accessand chapter distributed under 2022 the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. Downloaded from Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:17:34PM via Open Access. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

74

[tabula memorialis virtutum addita ad initium a]

⸿i.

De generali distinctione moralis doctrine quinque librorum qui apud regimen proprie perssone, domus, et regni nec non virtutis magnificencie et fructus eloquencie, qui a philosophis conditi fuerunt et moralis philosophie corpus dici possunt, ex quo ab eis virtutes ut a fontibus cetera flumina manant. De generali distinctione virtutum, que tripliciter dividitur ut morales clarius cognoscantur. De virtutibus theologicis que sint, de quibus ex sequentibus causis cesat nisi solum ante alias propter suam dignitatem nominari. De virtutibus intellectualibus, quot et que sint et qualiter dividuntur, et qua ex causa omissis aliis de prudencia primo tractat. De prudencia, quid sit et qualiter difinitur, et circa que consilium debet esse, que in tres partes tractatur quarum sequens prima est. De secunda parte prudencie, quam tres virtutes comitantur et que sint. De tribus partibus prudencie, in quantum est virtus principalis, et quomodo virtutes naturales non sunt proprie nisi quando descrecione reguntur et tunc efficiuntur morales. De virtutibus moralibus, et primo de justicia, que in novem partes dividitur et primo in duas, videlicet legalem et particularem, et quomodo qui legalem habet omnes virtutes videtur habere. De secunda parte justicie, et quod secundum predicta posset dici quod justicia legalis non est virtus per se, et quomodo aliis virtutibus est comunis. De tercia parte justicie, qualis sit justicia particularis et que sit differencia inter avariciam et liberatitatem et inter justiciam legalem et particularem, et que requiruntur ad hoc quod aliquis virtuosus et justus dicatur. De quarta parte justicie, que in duas principales species dividitur, et quando equalitas servatur prima vocatur justicia distributiva et secunda contributiva. De quinta parte justicie, qualiter in quacumque ejus specie secundum quandam proporcionalitatem est equalitas observanda et alias esset injusticia, et quomodo in recta policia virtus aliis bonis fortune precelere debet. De sexta parte justicie, quam cum sit comutativa non producta proporcio geometrica sed arismetica observari debet eciam in volunta-

10

⸿ii. ⸿iii. 15

⸿iiii. ⸿v. 20

⸿vi. ⸿vii.

25

⸿viii.

⸿ix. 30

⸿x.

35

⸿xi.

⸿xii. 40

⸿xiii.

12 ⸿ii. dividitˀ corr. super lin.

25 ⸿viii. spatium inter novem et partes quattuor litterarum

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[tabula memorialis virtutum addita ad initium a]

⸿xiiii.

⸿xv.

⸿xvi.

⸿xvii. ⸿xviii. ⸿xix.

⸿xx.

⸿xxi.

⸿xxii.

⸿xxiii.

⸿xxiiii.

⸿xxv.

75

riis, licet non sit ita manifesta suo loquo atendendo in actionibus et passionibus et qualitate perssone. De septima parte justicie, quod predicta equalitas propter diversas indigencias hominum non posset semper observari inventa fuit pecunia, et quid sit et qua ex causa antiqui eam vocabant fidejussorem. De octava parte justicie, cui legali aliqua virtus adiungitur que epiqueya Grece dicitur, et quid sit, de qua utendum non est nisi evidentissima utilitas et manifesissima causa hoc petat. De nona et ultima parte justicie, et quomodo antiqui dubitaverunt an sibi posset quis facere injusticiam, et probatur quod sic, quamvis non particularem methaphoram seu similitudinariam. De fortitudine quid sit et quomodo ex audacia vel timore fortis seu timidus quis dicitur, qui in novem species seu partes dividitur. De secunda parte fortitudinis, circa que sit et quomodo aliquis potest dici vere fortis, et maxime apparet in factis repentinis. De tercia parte fortitudinis, quomodo indistincte terribile non est ei objectum, et que sit differentia in[ter] timorem et audaciam fortitudine in medio consistente. De quarta parte fortitudinis, et licet que dicta sunt ex ea vera cognoscitur, est alia non vera sed assimilat[a] in qua major pars forcium reperitur, que in quinque species subdividitur. De quinta parte fortitudinis, que secundam et terciam subdivisionem continet fortitudinis non vere, et quomodo verus fortis in eis extaret. De sexta parte fortitudinis, que quartam et quintam continet subdivisionem fortitudinis non vere et qualis sit deterior et quomodo circa eam verus fortis se habeat. De septima parte fortitudinis, cujus dictis annotandum est quod licet medietas ipsa sit inter timores et audacias virtuosius sit expectari quam aggredi. De temperancia quid sit et quomodo in sex partes dividitur, et principalius circa querendam delectacionem quam circa fugiendam tristiciam. De secunda parte temperancie, quomodo licet ipsa sit circa delectaciones corporales non tamen circa sequencia nisi per accidens, ut ibidem patebit, et qualiter circa temperanciam et intemperanciam consistit.

61 ⸿xix. inter : in

64 ⸿xx. assimilata : assimilatˀ

45

50

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60

65

70

75

80

69–70 ⸿xxii. subdivisionem : sub diuiſionẽ

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[tabula memorialis virtutum addita ad initium a]

⸿xxvi.

85

90

95

100

105

110

115

De tercia parte temperancie, prout ipsa se habet circa concupiscencias et delectacio in delectabilibus quarum due sunt species, et quomodo in eis delinquitur. ⸿xxvii. De quarta parte temperancie et defectu in delectacionibus que insens[i]bilitas nominari potest, et quomodo temperatus circa delectabilia se habet. ⸿xxviii. De quinta parte temperacie, et qualiter dupliciter probatur [in]temperancia que ei opponitur esse deterior quam timiditas que oponitur fortitudini. ⸿xxix. De sexta parte temperancie, quod sicut puer corripitur manu pedagogi ita concupiscencia regi debet per racionem, et alias qualiter argumentatur. ⸿xxx. De continencia, que in sex partes dividitur, et in prima quomodo sunt tria genera ei contraria et alie tres disposiciones laudande, et quomodo diversimode ex causa duorum que ad quodcumque bonum opus operandum requir[un]tur nominatur. ⸿xxxi. De secunda parte continencie, quomodo non est perfecta virtus, neque incontinencia pura malicia, et ex consuetudine uniuscujusque provenit virtus vel malicia, et qualiter per passionem operatur contra racionem. ⸿xxxii. De tercia parte continencie, qualiter proprie est circa illas delectaciones que pertinent ad temperanciam et quomodo deterior est intemperatus quam incontinens et incontinencia simplex quam ira. ⸿xxxiii. De quarta parte continencie, et qui ejus sint duo boni habitus. Et incontinencie que duo vicia et quomodo nominantur. ⸿xxxiiii. De quinta parte, quibus causis intemperatus est deterior incontinenti vel moli et pejor molis quam incontinens et inter incontinentes pejor est debilis. ⸿xxxv. De sexta parte continencie, ad quid inventus sit ludus et quomodo qui eis utitur intemperate evenit ex molicie et qui temperare non potest dici viciosus. Incipit prologus secundi libri continen[s] satis notanda signanter de ocio non ocioso et quomodo ad bene vivendum intra cetera noticia virtutum prestat; in quo sunt viginti et octo capitula.

85–86 ⸿xxvii. insensibilitas nominari : in sensabilitas no͞iari nominari 88–89 ⸿xxviii. intemperancia : temp̱ancia 97 ⸿xxx. requiruntur : reqͥ ritˀ 105 ⸿xxxiii. post habitus linea protracta 113 Incipit continens : cõntie̅n̅

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[tabula memorialis virtutum addita ad initium a]

⸿i.

⸿ii. ⸿iii. ⸿iiii. ⸿v. ⸿vi. ⸿vii. ⸿viii.

⸿ix.

⸿x.

⸿xi. ⸿xii.

⸿xiii. ⸿xiiii.

⸿xv.

77

De liberalitate que dividitur in quatuor partes, in prima qualiter liberalitas temperat cupiditatem atquirendi vel possidendi res exteriores et laudabilior est in largitate quam in accepcione. De secunda parte liberalitatis, et que attendit liberalis in dando et acquirendo et in quibus causis est deterior illiberalis prodigo. De tercia parte liberalitatis, quis dicitur esse prodigus et quomodo differt liberalis ab eo et ab illiberali et a magnifico. De quarta parte liberalitatis, quomodo prodigalitas sit saciabilior illiberalitate et illiberalitas deterior prodigalitate. De quinta parte liberalitatis, quibus causis vicium illiberalitatis sit insanabile et que sit integralis liberalitas et particularis. De magnificencia, que sit et que diferencia sit inter liberalitatem et eam, et dividitur in quatuor condicio magnifici. De secunda parte magnificencie, quot et que sunt proprietates magnifici. De tercia parte magnificencie, in quot et quibus magnos sumptus facit magnificus et cui pertinet facere que faciliter imperare non possent. De quarta parte magnificencie, quomodo superhabundans vocatur banausus, et sua male consumendo parvificus, et qualiter deterior est banausus quam parvificus nisi sit liberalis. De magnanimitate, que in sex partes dividitur, in prima quis videtur esse magnanimus et qui extrema accipit vocatur ventosus seu pusilanimus. De secunda parte magnanimitatis, circa que sunt et quomodo est necessarium magnanimo esse virtuosum in illis virtutibus. De tercia parte magnanimitatis, qua ex causa magnanimus ex honoribus sibi exhibitis non immoderate delectatur, ymmo parvipendet eos quando non propter virtutem sibi fiunt. De quarta parte magnanimitatis, et de viginti proprietatibus magnanimi divisis in duabus virtutibus. De quinta parte magnanimitatis, quomodo qui in ea difficiunt vel super habundant vocantur presumptuosi et qui defficiunt pusilanimes. De sexta parte magnanimitatis, qualiter licet magnanimo in aliquibus videatur convenire superbo multum ab eo differt, ymmo est

131 ⸿viii. magnos : magnꝰ ac deinde prauificꝰ

135–136 ⸿ix. banausus : bãnaſiꝰ passim

120

125

130

135

140

145

150

136 parvificus : p͋ ueficꝰ,

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78

155

⸿xvi. ⸿xvii.

⸿xviii. 160

⸿xix.

165

⸿xx.

⸿xxi. 170

⸿xxii. ⸿xxiii. 175

⸿xxiiii. ⸿xxv. 180

⸿xxvi.

185

⸿xxvii. ⸿xxviii.

[tabula memorialis virtutum addita ad initium a]

humilis, et quomodo dignitas est desideranda non ut presit sed ut prosit. De moderacione, circa que sit et quis dicitur esse moderatus. De mansuetudine, que duplex est, et de sex proprietatibus mansueti et quomodo qui non irascitur ubi oportet triplici racione est vituperandus. De secunda parte mansuetudinis, quomodo iracundia evenit secundum diversas circunstancias que reducuntur ad tres species, et qualiter medium est laudabile et superhabundancia et defectus sunt vituperabiles. De affabilitate, in qua duo sunt, et que sit et quomodo differt a vera amicicia, et in prima duplex respectus, et quomodo in colloquiis humanis reperiuntur tres virtutes. De affabilitate et sex proprietatibus viri affabilis, et quomodo qui in ea superhabundat propter adipiscendam pecuniam vocatur blanditor seu adulator, et quid faciendum sit quando hii audiuntur. De veracitate, in qua duo sunt, quomodo nominatur qui eis accipit extrema et medium, et que sunt octo genera mendacii et octo raciones quibus non debet mentiri. De secunda parte veracitatis, quomodo vituperabilior est qui in ea exc[e]dit quam qui minuit, et quibus modis hoc accidit. De eutrapeli[a], in qua duo sunt, quomodo in ludo qui sit ad risum potest esse quedam conveniens colloqucio, et quomodo vocatur qui in eo superhabundat vel defficit et qui habet medium et quibus causis. De secunda parte eutrapelie, que dicere et audire convenit eutrapeliam et quare et quid sit eutrapelia seu graciositas. De verecundia, in qua duo sunt, quare non ponitur in numero virtutum et quomodo duplex sit in ea differencia et quomodo etati juvenili conpetit. De secunda parte verecundie, quomodo potest sumi dupliciter et totidem destrui, et quomodo verecundia proprie sumpta non conpetit viro virtuoso sed sit erubescencia seu honestus pudor. De acumulacione virtutum, quod finis sciencie moralis non est a re sed ab opere. De fine seu explectione intenti et conclusione presentis libri et quot casus aut accessus temporibus preteritis ex exercione vel separacione virtutum multis orta sint.

172 ⸿xxii. excedit : excidit 173 ⸿xxiii. eutrapelia : eutʳpelie 183 ⸿xxvi. destrui : dextrui 185 ⸿xxvii. nõnest corr. super lin. 189 duo quae supersunt folia vacua

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Memoriale virtutum [ad Eduardum filium primogenitum Johannis regis Portugalie]

1

5

10

15

20

Liber primus

Prologus Pridie, inclite princeps, cum in camera regia illustris progenitoris tui mutuo loqueremur et protensius sermo se aliquantulum extendisset, incidit materia virtutum, quas sapienter nimium et subtiliter disserebas; et cum in litterarum gynagiis non legisses, restat ut putem illas te proprio in corpore didiscisse. Honesta quippe et sancta virtutis doctrina, quam non solum in animalium membranis, non in pelliculis edulinis, sed nostra in pelle didiscimus!48 Ista bonos facit, illa ad bonum inducit. At ego cum aliqua que me legisse memineram hiis in sermonibus contulissem, aure benigna attendebas, quod virtuosi appetitus vehemens indicium dixerim; et enim qui avide virtutes loqui et audire vult virtutibus uti proponit. Et cum hinc inde verba fierent, docti hominis utrumque opus agebas, quia et que nosti sine arrogancia docebas et que dicebantur sine dedignacione audiebas. Conjunxisti eciam hiis prudencie tue testimonium certum, cum illa que adinvicem loquebamur ut scriberem precepisti; non enim contentus transitorio flatu diuturnitate scripture labilia verba retinenda decernis. Ego vero, si ex me aliquid petieras scribi, ignoranciam meam in excepcionem objeceram; sed cum non a me sed ab altis ingeniis prodita que ad memoriam loquendo devenerant scripture brevissime commendari imperasti, nichil fuit quod opponerem, quia non ut auctoris sed meum ut calami officium poscebas. Nec enim tam avare nobiscum se habuit natura ut magne sapiencie viris solum modo scribendi facultatem concedens reliqua ingenia quadam sterilitate fuscaret, sed liberalius res se habet; nam

Tit Incipit tractatus qui vocatur Memoriale virtutum et dirigitur serenissimo Eduardo filio primogenito Iohannis Regis Portugalie Q Memoriale virtutum et in Tabula (v. supra) traditi illustri principi infanti duarto primogenito portugalie A Memoriale virtutum OB, om. JH Liber i l. pꝰ in titulis paginarum AH, et A in Tabula [liber] primus post prologum; om. JOBQ Prologus tit. AJ, om. OBβ 16–25 [objeceram ~ habundancius lacuna medii fol. abscissi J] 48

in pelliculis edulinis: Mcast “en pellejas de cabrito”. Cic. Mur. 75 “stravit pelliculis haedīnis lectulos” (“with skins of kids”), Juv. 11.66 “pinguissimus agro | haedulus” (dim. haedus “little kid”); hædŭlinus “of little kids” is not listed in Du Cange, but DMLBS gives 5 attestations 1250–1444 (Latham et al. 1975–2013, s.v.).

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Memorial of Virtues [to Duarte, firstborn son of King João of Portugal]

1

Book One

Prologue The other day, renowned prince, when we were speaking together in the royal chamber of your illustrious progenitor and the conversation had ranged somewhat more broadly than usual, we touched upon the subject of the virtues, on which you began to discourse exceedingly wisely and subtly; and since you never studied letters in the schools, I can only suppose you have learned them first-hand and in person. How honourable and holy is the teaching of virtue we study not merely on sheets of parchment and little hides of kids, but in our own skin! The latter makes us good, the former only points towards the good. Even so, when I contributed to these discussions a few things I remembered having read about, you listened with benign attention. This I would call forcible proof of a virtuous appetite; for anyone who keenly speaks and hears about the virtues clearly intends to practise them. As words went to and fro you exercised both functions of a learned man, teaching what you know without presumption and listening to what was said without condescension. To these proofs of your practical wisdom you have joined yet another by ordering me to write down the ideas we shared; not content with the passing breath of speech, you decree that our slippery words be preserved in the lasting medium of writing. Had you asked for something written by me, I should have pleaded my ignorance; but since you commanded a very brief written account of pronouncements not by me but by the exalted minds that came to memory as we were speaking, I had no excuse since you were requesting my offices not as author but as pen. Nature has not been so miserly with us as to grant the ability to write only to men of great wisdom, obfuscating all other minds with a kind of sterility. No indeed! things are more liberally arranged, for no man is entirely precluded from the job of writing unless he wants to be. Nevertheless, writers are

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nullus omnino a munere scribendi nisi volens eicitur. Gradu tamen non minimo sejungitur dignitas scribentium. Sapientes enim scribunt quia sciunt, alii ut sciant; illi adinveniunt, isti adinventis utuntur. Libenter ergo aliquantulam partem temporis quod mihi habundancius quam voluissem sub hac legacione concessum est ab aliis evocatam studiis ad que ut ocium fugarem confugeram in hoc exercicio delectabili pariter et honesto ad preceptum tuum aliquot occupavi diebus; et cum cedulam putassem scribere, calamo decurrente libellum scripsi, quem si vis Memoriale virtutum appella.49 Et licet brevis sit, in duos tamen libros distinxi; nam et unicam dietam viatores prandio dividere solent, ut minus labor afficiat quem moderata requies interrumpit. Si quem ergo laborem ex lectura ejus conceperis, librorum distinccione quasi ad quendam terminum declinacione resolve.50 Nec michi tantum cure fuit multa inquirendo congerere quantum illa que se offerebant reputare; tam amplissima est radix virtutum ut omnes honestatis doctrine ab illa succrescere et in illam confluere videantur, sed omnibus valedicendo ea dumtaxat que ultro citroque loquuti sumus vel loqui juxta materiam sic in transitu racionabiliter potuimus ex Philosophi dictis assumpsi, preter admodum pauca que se interserere visa sunt et jussa abire noluerunt, que ex nominibus auctorum cognosces.51 Nec enim fur judicari volo; satis namque malum habundat si de virtutibus loquentes aliis in rebus a virtutum operibus deviemus, sed in ipsa scriptura virtutis in virtutem committere impudentissimum est.52 Omnia ergo que sine auctore scripta hic legeris Philosopho et glosatoribus ejus, Thome 23 sejungitur O se jungitur Aβ desechar) | est αB enim est β lacuna in J, cf. 16–25 supra] 49

50

28 et cum αB quod cum β 35 reputare β refutare αB (Mcast 40 namque om. β 42–50 [impudentissimum ~ pedestri

habundancius quam voluissem: Leão 1642, 380 “Sobre o concerto destas pazes esteve o Deão de Sanctiago em Portugal todo o resto daquelle anno e algũs mezes do anno seguinte de 1423, com que encheo o tempo de hum anno inteiro, por a muita differença que avia do que ElRey de Portugal pedia ao que ElRey de Castella queria conceder”; Crón. Juan ii, Año 1422 cap. 27 “tardaron […] un año” (Santa María 1891, i, 310). si vis Memoriale virtutum appella: on the title, and this characteristic way of giving it, see Intro. §1 n7, and cf. “Podéisla llamar si vos pluguiere Doctrinal”, “quem si vis Duodenarium appella”, etc. (Cartagena 2004, 195 n10). declinacione: Mcast “por la distinción de los libros así commo a un término acostándote lo amengua”. The sense “evening halt, overnight stop” mixes the notions of declining day (Vulg. Jer 6:4 “declinavit dies quia longiores factae sunt umbrae vesperi”) and class. “bending aside”. Thence scholastic “class after sun-down” (John of Salisbury, Metalogicon i.24 “vespertinum exercitium quod declinatio dicebatur”, PL cxcix, col. 855), which Cartagena was to use in the title of Declinationes super nova quadam Ethicorum Aristotelis translatione. Ordinatio as a kind of stage-coaching in the journey of reading was one of his favourite similes, used already in the prologue to Tulio de senetute (Cartagena 1996, 157 & 369 n34); see Cartagena 2004, 195–196 n12.

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memoriale virtutum

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separated by no small difference in rank: the wise write what they know; the rest, so they may learn. The former find things out, the latter make use of their findings. I therefore willingly devoted a small part of the spare time granted to me more abundantly than I would wish during this embassy, taking it away from other studies in which I had taken refuge as a way of banishing idleness, to spending a few days on this exercise you commanded, as delightful as it is honest; and though I had thought to write a mere memorandum, my pen ran away and I have written a little book. Call it, if you will, Memorial of Virtues. Though short, I have divided it into two books. Travellers usually split even a single day’s journey with a dinner so their weariness may be lightened by the interruption of a well-measured rest; therefore, if you are afflicted with any weariness in reading it, use the division into books as a kind of halting-place to dispel it with an evening diversion. Besides, I was less concerned to pile up a multitude of things by research than to prune back the material that offered itself, for the root of the virtues is so broad that all honest teachings seem both to shoot up from it and flow back into it. Bidding farewell to all that, then, I have taken from the Philosopher’s sayings only the things we discussed or might reasonably have discussed in passing as relevant to the matter, apart from a very few which seemed to muscle in and refused to depart when ordered, which you will recognize from the names of their authors. For I do not wish to be judged a thief; it is bad enough if, when talking about the virtues, we deviate from acting virtuously in unrelated things, but to commit a crime against virtue in the very writing about virtue is the summit of impudence. Therefore attribute everything you read here that is not assigned to an author to the Philosopher and his commentators, in particular Thomas, and do not suppose anything has been

51

52

illa que se offerebant reputare: α’s refutare is lectio facilior, simplistic drivel (MV has nothing to do with “refuting” sources, the word never occurs). Two senses of reputare are possible: (a) “count over; repute” (“freq. and class.”, L & S), attested × 29 in MV, e.g. ii.12 34 “alia reputabit parva”, 41 “aliqui reputantur digni honore”, with a nod to late/jurid. Lat. “impute”, ii.13 54 “reputaretur ad vicium”, cf. Dig. xi.7.17 “reputatum est ei ad justitiam” = Vulg. Gen. 15:6, Rom. 4:3); but more likely here, in antithesis to congerere and in concord with the succeeding horticultural imagery of roots and growing, (b) redupl. re- + putare “prune (trees)”, so “cut back, trim” (Du Cange vii, 137 s.v. translates “retrancher, resecare”; cf. Sp. repodar); cf. n143 ad fin., below. in virtutem committere: “commit a crime against virtue” (legal; cf. MV i.15 21 “in legem committit”, n122; L & S s.v.4a–b, citing Dig. xlviii.5.40 “in legem Iuliam […] commisisse”, Cic. Verr. ii.i.6 “multa […] in deos et in homines impie nefarieque commisit”). Mcast “invirtud cometer”, but Lat. *invirtus does not exist.

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presertim, attribue, nec a me quicquam esse additum vel mutatum existimes nisi exempla vel verba que ad ordinis connexionem vel ad planiorem intelligenciam conferre putavi. Inter que si quid forte minus accurate scriptum repereris—reperies autem, ut suspicor—, non illos sed me ex inpericia vel incuria non plene intellectum noveris scripsisse, cum animo tamen correccionis cupido et ad emendacionis tue suscepcionem parato. Nec altum loquendi modum quesivi, sed plano et pedestri stillo et verbis ad nostram doctrinam utilibus usus sum, non inmemor multos morum doctrinas excelso eloquencie gradu tradidisse; sed aliud est ad virtutis opera suadendo exhortari, aliud quid ipsa sit virtus et diverticula ejus inquirere. Illud suadele dulcedinem exigit, ut audientium corda percutiant jacula premonentis; hoc autem faciliorem viam intelligendi procurat. Non enim presentis propositi est composicione verborum ad actus virtutum generaliter acclamare, sed ipsam demonstrare virtutem, qua cognita unusquisque quid sibi expediat videbit; ipsa namque ejus cognicio sine precone proclamat. Moniciones ergo illas, que summe utiles sunt, aliis in libris lege; hic virtutis moralis rudimenta protracta, quia ad presens non eleganciam sermonum sed conclusionum soliditatem inquirimus quorsum hec.53 Quod intendimus exsequamur; et omnipotentis Dei a quo et in quem dependent virtutes et tendunt auxilio humiliter implorato oracio sequens conceptum nostrum exaret. Lib. 1 Cap. 1 Generalis distincio moralis doctrine Omnis doctrina que ad dirigendos mores hominum traditur in tria genera principaliter dividi solet. Primum est eorum que tangunt regimen proprie persone. Secundum est quod pertinet ad regimen domus. Tercium est quod tractat de regimine civitatis; et civitatem intelligo quamcumque communitatem, sive sit quoddam parvum opidum sive civitas magna vel una provincia vel eciam unum regnum; sufficit enim quantum ad hoc quod populus sit unus et habeat inter se colligacionem unius universitatis, sive regatur sub uno rege sive per modum communitatis ut faciunt Veneti, Florentini, et similes.54

44 esse om. OBβ 53 ipsa sit αB sit ipsa β 59 ꝓtracta (pro-) J ꝑtracta (per-) AOBH pertractata Q 60 punctum et paragraphum post hec AQ inquirimus. quorsũ hec/ quod J (buscamos. E fasta aquel fin que aquí entendemos Mcast) inquirimus —— hec qͦ d cum linea vocem non intellectam indicanti O; sine punctis H Cap. 1 tit. α, om. BQ Capl̛m scd͞m H 53

quorsum hec: “(conclusions on) whither, to what end these (rudimenta) [tend]” (Plaut. Pseud. 217 “tenes quorsum haec tendant?”, Cic. De or. iii.24.91 “quorsum igitur haec spectat […] oratio”, Leg. i.24.63 “quorsus haec pertinent?”). Omission of a verb made this hard for scribes (app.crit.), but AJQ’s punctuation clears it up.

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added or changed by me other than the examples or words I thought helpful for linking up or making the argument plainer. If among these you chance to find any less than accurately expressed—and you will find some, I suspect—, you shall know it was not they who wrote them but me, having failed to understand fully due to incompetence or carelessness, though always in a spirit eager to be corrected and ready to accept your rectifications. Nor have I sought a high style; I have used a plain and pedestrian pen, and practical words suitable for teaching. I am mindful that many have handed down moral doctrines with the highest degree of eloquence; but one thing is to exhort people to act virtuously by suasive means, another to enquire what virtue itself is, with its by-roads and diversions. The former requires persuasive sweetness so the preceptor’s darts strike the hearts of his listeners, whereas the latter aims for an easier path to understanding. It is not my present purpose to frame my words as a general call to act virtuously, but rather to demonstrate what virtue itself is, in order that, once recognized, everyone will see what he should do; such a recognition shouts out by itself, without the need for anyone to cry it aloud. Read other books for those exhortations, most useful as they are; here I draw out the rudiments of moral virtue, since for the moment we seek not elegance of language but solid conclusions about what they mean. Let us proceed with our intention, then; and having humbly prayed for the help of almighty God, upon Whom the virtues depend and towards Whom they strive, let the following discourse set out our purpose. 1.1 General division of moral doctrine All doctrine handed down for guiding human conduct is customarily divided into three principal kinds. The first is of things concerning governance of the individual, the second pertains to governance of the household, the third treats governance of the city, by which I mean any community, whether it be some small township or a great city, a province, or even a kingdom; the sufficient condition is that it should consist of a single population bound together in a single corporation, whether it be ruled under a single king or by a communal method, as done by the Venetians, Florentines, and the like.

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per modum communitatis: i.e. like an Ital. comune. The addition of contemporary, not ancient, examples is noteworthy. Cartagena refers again to republican constitutions in i.11 16–18, below (“provinciis que reguntur per modum communitatis”; see n99 ad loc. on β’s omission of the sentence).

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Primum regimen quod est proprie persone tractat Philosophus in libro Ethicorum, quem distinxit per decem libros. Et quia tunc regitur bene homo quando utitur virtutibus et ad usum virtutum deserviunt bona exteriora (nam inter virtutes sunt alique que sine prosperitate exerceri non possunt, ut magnificencia, cujus exercicium requirit maximos sumptus quos quis habere non posset sine maxima habundancia rerum temporalium), et quia hanc prosperitatem vocant homines bonam fortunam, ideo Philosophus composuit quendam libellum brevissimum De bona fortuna.55 De secundo regimine quod est domus composuit quendam librum qui dicitur Yconomica, in quo tractat qualiter se debet habere homo in rebus domesticis, tam cum uxore et filiis quam circa familiares liberos et servos et eciam circa jumenta et animalia bruta que racione carent et circa inanimata. De tercio regimine quod est civitatis tractat in libro Politicorum, quem distinxit per octo libros, in quibus distinguit diversas species policiarum et scribit multa que pertinent ad salvacionem et corrupcionem earum, inserendo alias doctrinas que ad populi regimen [s]pectant. Et quia ad bene regendum populum multum confert eloquencia, que consistit in persuadendo hominibus et attrahendo eos a malo ad bonum (nam ut ait Tullius in Rethorica, eloquencia induxit homines ad fundandum civitates, soli enim vagabantur per herema sicut fere et per bonam persuasionem et eloquenciam inducti sunt ut civiliter viverent, nec enim ad ea que quis per racionem invenit alios nolentes trahere potest nisi eloquencie dulcedine suadeat, et hec racio persuasiva que est quedam equitas est materia juris positivi, nam jus positivum illud quod mere positivum est consistit in quadam bona persuasione seu equitate que induxit juris consultos et alios conditores jurium ad condendum jura, unde ut idem Tullius ait, eloquencia pars est sciencie civilis), ideo Philosophus ad complementum documentorum moralium composuit quendam librum qui

12 alique αB quedam Q, om. H 19 liberos αB (los familiares libres e siervos Mcast) et liberos β 23 spectant : expectant Ω (v. pp. 64–65) 24 ad bene αB bene ad β 26 post rethorica add. sua β 55

De bona fortuna: an apocryphal s. xiii confection from Eth. Eud. vii.14 + [Mag. Mor.] ii.8 (Aristotle 1493b), often cited by Aquinas (Sent. Eth. x.14.9, STh. I-ii.68.1, etc.). To judge by the number of copies, it was better known in Spain than EN itself until Bruni’s translation began to be read (Lohr 1998, 301–302, under the titles).

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The first form of governance, that of the individual, is treated by the Philosopher in his Ethics, which he divided into ten books. And since man is well governed when he practises the virtues and uses his external goods for the practice of virtues (for there are some among the virtues that cannot be exercised without material prosperity, like magnificence, the exercise of which requires very great expenditure beyond the capacity of anyone who lacks the greatest abundance of worldly goods), and because men call this prosperity “good fortune”, the Philosopher also composed a very short little book On Good Fortune. About the second kind of governance, that of the household, he composed a book called Economics, in which he treats how man should behave in domestic matters, either with his wife and children or towards his free servants and slaves and even irrational beasts of burden, brute livestock, and inanimate property. The third kind of governance, that of the city, he treats in his Politics, which he divided into eight books wherein he distinguishes the various kinds of constitution and writes at length on how they succeed or fail, along with other doctrines regarding the government of the people. Furthermore, in governing people well a great role is played by eloquence, which consists in persuading and attracting men away from the bad towards the good, for as Cicero says in his Rhetoric, it was eloquence that led men to found cities. They used to wander solitarily through the wastelands like beasts, and were first induced to live socially through good persuasion and eloquence; and anyone who discovered things by rational means could only attract his unwilling peers to them by the persuasive sweetness of his eloquence. This persuasive reason, which is a form of equity, is the matter of positive law, for positive law, insofar as it is merely positive, consists in the kind of good persuasion or equity that led jurists and other legislators to found laws; for which reason Cicero also says, “eloquence is a part of political science”. Therefore the Philosopher composed, as a complement to his moral teachings, a work called Rhetoric, which he divided into

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appellatur Rethorice, quem distinxit in tres libros in quibus ponit multa que ad loquendi suavitatem et periciam pertinent.56 Et in hiis quinque libris consistit tota philosophia moralis. Nam licet infinita pene est multitudo librorum qui de moribus tractant, et non dicam legere, nam illud prorsus impossibile esset quia vita hominis sufficere non posset, sed eciam nomina auctorum recensere difficillimum esset et impossibilitati propinquum—quis enim sufficeret ennarrare quot viri tam antiqui quam moderni, Greci pariter et Latini, gentiles et catholici in materia morali scripserunt? Alii glosas, alii commenta, alii summas, alii tractatus diversos ad erudicionem et regimina principum et aliorum, alii epistolas scriptitarunt, ut recte possit dici quod Salomon ante tot secula scripsit, “faciendi plures libros nullus est finis” (Ecclesiastes, capitulo ultimo)—,57 sed licet innumerabilis sit copia librorum, omnes tamen fere qui ad mores pertinent in hiis quinque libris fundamentum posuerunt vel ad eos tanquam ad principaliores reduci possunt; et sicut in jure, licet sit scripta immensa multitudo librorum, tamen textus jurium in certis et determinatis libris continentur qui appellantur corpus (canoniste enim quatuor libros dumtaxat juris canonici corpus vocant, legiste vero quinque libros solummodo corpus juris civilis appellant; quicumque autem doctores usque in presens de jure scripserunt ex hiis libris fundamenta sumpserunt et directe vel indirecte per contenta in eis intentus suos probant), sic in materia morali hii quinque libri Ethicorum, Bone fortune, Yconomice, Politicorum, et Rethorice possunt dici corpus philosophie moralis, quia ex istis originem

43 Alii glosas α Nam alii glosas β Et alii glosas B 44 scriptitarunt AJB scriptitaverunt O (muchas vegadas escrivieron Mcast) scripserunt β 46 est finis α finis est Bβ 48 tanquam ad principaliores O tãꝙ̃ J, om. ABβMcast 53 in αB ad β | fundamenta ABβ (fundamentos Mcast) fundamentum JO 56

Tullius in Rethorica: a précis of Cic. Inv. rhet. (Rhetorica vetus) i.1–3 and 6: [2] cum in agris homines passim bestiarum modo vagabantur, […] quidam magnus videlicet vir et sapiens […] dispersos homines […] congregavit et eos […] ex feris et inmanibus mites reddidit et mansuetos. […] [3] Age vero urbibus constitutis, ut fidem colere et iustitiam retinere discerent […] qui tandem fieri potuit nisi homines ea quae ratione invenissent eloquentia persuadere potuissent? Profecto nemo nisi gravi ac suavi commotus oratione […] ad ius voluisset sine vi descendere. […] [6] magna et ampla pars est artificiosa eloquentia quam rhetoricam vocant […], ut eam civilis scientiae partem esse dicamus. However, the intervening passage on rhetoric’s role in founding positive law (“hec racio persuasiva […] induxit juris consultos […] ad condendum jura”) is Cartagena’s addition, and not Arist.’s view (cf. EN 1179b7–13). He later began a translation of Inv. rhet. for Duarte (Cartagena 1969; the above passages, 35–36, 40), perhaps during the same embassy as MV

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three books wherein he expounds a great many things pertaining to pleasant and skilful speaking. The whole of moral philosophy rests upon these five books. Although the multitude of books on morals is almost infinite and it would be very difficult and well nigh impossible, I do not say to read them, for the length of a man’s life could not possibly suffice for that, but even to list the names of their authors— who could give an account of all the great men, ancient and modern, Greek and Latin alike, gentile and Catholic, who have written on moral matters? Some have scribbled glosses, some commentaries, some summas, some various treatises for the instruction and rules of princes and others, some epistles, so one might well say what Solomon wrote so many centuries ago, “Of making many books there is no end” (Eccl 12)—, yet although the abundance of books is innumerable, almost all those that pertain to conduct base themselves on these five or can be related back to them as their more fundamental sources. Just as in law, though an immense multitude of books has been written, nevertheless the texts of the laws are contained in certain fixed books called the corpus (so canonists call no more nor less than four books the Corpus iuris canonici, civilists appeal to exactly five as the Corpus iuris civilis; all doctors who have ever till now written about law have taken these books as their foundation and directly or indirectly prove their assertions by what is contained in them), so on the subject of morals these five books of Ethics, Good Fortune, Economics, Politics, and Rhetoric can be called the Corpus philosophiae moralis, because

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and as a consequence of this mention, though he only finished it years later, as he explains in Rethórica de Tulio’s prologue: Fablando con vós, prínçipe esclaresçido, en materias de sçiençia en que vós bien sabedes fablar, en algunos días de aquel tiempo en que en la vuestra corte por mandado del muy cathólico rey mi señor estava, vínovos a voluntad de haver la arte de la retórica en claro lenguaje […]; e mandástesme, pues yo a esa sazón paresçía haver algunt espaçio para me ocupar en cosas estudiosas, que tomase un pequeño trabajo e pasase de latín en nuestra lengua la Rethórica que Tullio compuso. […] E començando ocupar en ello la péñola, sobrevino mi partida e quedó a vós […] una muy pequeña parte del comienço. […] E pasaron después tiempos asaz, […] por sobrevenir tales tiempos que a los semejantes estudios otorgaron ferias noctorias. (Cartagena 1969, 27–28) Alii glosas ~ alii epistolas: reminiscent of Bonaventure’s fourfold division of scholastic discourse (Intro. § 1 n3) but distinct in that it skips the scriptor and distributes the offices of compilator and commentator among glossae, commenta, and summae, that of auctor among tractatus and epistolae. Cartagena gives no hint where he locates his own “authorfunction”. faciendi plures libros: Eccl 12:12 (cf. Cartagena 1996, 206 & 389 n37).

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sumpserunt vel cum eis concordare videntur omnes pene moralium doctrinarum auctores.58 Et auctoritatem quam corpora jurium habuerunt tam a racione quam a potestate conditorum, isti vendicant a sola racione; nichil enim auctoritatis doctrinis Philosophi tribueretur nisi racione probasset. Et hec sufficiant ad generalissimam designacionem hujus materie, que etsi non confert ad sciendum aliquas conclusiones, expedit tamen ut sciat unusquisque unde petendum sit quod inquirere voluerit et, cum legerit aliquos qui hec lato sermone et prolixis investigacionibus discutiunt, cognoscat unde fundamentum originale habuerunt, ab hiis enim fontibus cetera flumina manant. Lib. 1 Cap. 2 Distinccio generalis virtutum Quoniam inter nos longius progressus est sermo et ad materiam moralium virtutum descendimus, ut ea que loquuti sumus clarius scribantur premittendum brevissime est que sint genera virtutum ut morales lucidius cognoscantur. Sciendum est ergo quod virtutes distinguntur in tria genera principaliter: alie enim sunt theologice, alie intellectuales, alie morales. Racio hujus distinccionis est quia beatitudo seu felicitas hominis est duplex: una est supernaturalis que humanam naturam excedit, ad quam homo sola divina virtute pervenire potest secundum quandam divinitatis participacionem secundum quod dicitur (secunda Petri secundo) quod per Christum facti sumus “consortes divine nature”; et istam non tractarunt philosophi sed sancta lex Domini inmaculata convertens animas illam edocuit et predicavit.59 Et quia ista beatitudo proporcionem humane nature excedit, ideo principia naturalia hominis ex quibus procedit ad bene agendum secundum suam proporcionem non sufficiunt ad ordinandum hominem in beatitudinem predictam, unde opportet quod superaddantur homini divinitus aliqua principia per que ita ordinetur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem sicut per principia naturalia ordinatur ad finem connaturalem, non tamen absque adjutorio divino. Et hec principia vocantur virtutes theologice propter tria: primo quia habent

Cap. 2 tit. α, om. BQ Capl̛m tʳciũ H 58

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corpus philosophie moralis: Arist. EN and Pol. were seen as a trilogy with spurious [Oec.], but Cartagena’s making up the number by including De bona fortuna and Rh. to match the Corpora Iuris Canonici (4 titles) and Civilis (5) is an original gambit, paving the way for his inclusion of legal sources below. consortes: 2 Pet 1(not 2):4 “maxima et pretiosa nobis promissa donavit, ut per haec efficiamini divinae consortes naturae”; on this founding passage cf. Aquinas, STh. I-ii.62.1 (n61). istam non tractarunt philosophi: Sent. Eth. i.9.11 “Loquitur enim in hoc libro Philosophus de felicitate qualis in hac vita potest haberi; nam felicitas alterius vitae omnem investigationem rationis excedit”, i.17.10 “Quaerere autem utrum homines post mortem aliqualiter

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almost all the authors of moral doctrines take them as their original source or are seen to coincide with them. The two corpora of laws gained their authority both from reason and from the legal standing of the legislators, whereas our authors claim theirs only from reason; for no authority would be granted to the Philosopher’s doctrines, had he not proved them by reason. Let these remarks suffice as a very general designation of our subject, which although it does not contribute to knowledge of any particular conclusions, nevertheless enables each man to know where to look for what he has decided to enquire into, and to recognize the original source when he reads some of those who discuss these matters at length and after prolix investigations; for all other rivers flow from these springs. 1.2 General division of the virtues Since our conversation progressed further and we came down to the subject of the moral virtues, for the greater clarity of this written account of our discussion a very brief explanation of the different kinds of virtue should be given first, so as to distinguish more lucidly which are moral. We should know, then, that virtues are divided into three principal kinds: theological, intellectual, and moral. The reason for this division is that man’s beatitude or happiness is twofold. The first is the supernatural which exceeds human nature, to which man can arrive only by divine virtue according to some share of divinity according to the saying in 2Pet 2 that through Christ we become “participants in the divine nature”; and this kind was not treated by the philosophers, but taught and preached by the immaculate holy Law of the Lord that converts souls. And since this beatitude exceeds the capacity of human nature, the natural principles by which man proceeds to act well according to his capacity are not sufficient to ordain man for the said beatitude. Hence it is necessary that, just as man is ordained for his connatural end by natural principles (though not without divine help), certain principles over and above them be divinely added to him by which he may be ordained for supernatural beatitude. These principles are called the theological virtues, for three reasons: first, because

vivant secundum animam […] non pertinet ad propositum, cum Philosophus hic agat de felicitate praesentis vitae […]. Et ideo huiusmodi quaestiones, quae longa discussione indigerent, hic praetermittendae sunt […]. Alibi autem haec plenius disseruimus”; and cf. i.12.5 “ponere felicitatem in operatione animae rationalis […] conveniens est secundum hanc opinionem antiquam et communem omnibus philosophis.”

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Deum pro objecto in quantum per eas recte ordinamur in Deum; secundo quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntur; tercio quia sola divina revelacione in sacra Scriptura hee virtutes traduntur.60 Ut scribit sanctus Thomas in Prima Secunde, questione sexagesima secunda, articulo primo: “Alia vero felicitas est ad quam potest homo pervenire secundum principia sua naturalia”, auxiliante tamen Deo sine quo nichil boni fieri potest; et licet non sit felicitas vera et perfecta sicut illa eterna ad quam suspiramus, est tamen perfeccio hominis in hac vita et dirigit ad veram et eternam beatitudinem; et ista consistit in operacione virtutis.61 Solet enim sic diffiniri: felicitas est anime operacio secundum virtutem perfectam.62 Et quoniam partes hominis principales sunt due, una est intellectiva, alia est irracionalis in qua communicat cum brutis animalibus (nam de parte vegetativa quantum ad presens non curatur, quia secundum illam nec dicitur homo bonus nec malus, nam ex eo quod quis sit magne stature vel parve vel pinguis vel macilentus non dicitur virtuosus vel non, in hiis enim communicat homo cum plantis; ideo in hiis que ad mores pertinent nulla mencio fit de hac parte, sed de aliis duabus). Et sicut sunt due, ita sunt duo genera virtutum: habitus enim qui recte disponunt et perficiunt partem intellectivam vocantur virtutes intellectuales, dicte ab intellectu, habitus vero qui bene moderantur et regunt partem sensitivam et reddunt eam obedientem racioni dicuntur virtutes morales, dicte a more. Mos enim idem est quod consuetudo; et quia in hiis que pertinent ad bonum regimen partis sensitive multum operatur 20 sacra αB sancta β 22 sexagesima secunda αB lx.viͣ. Q lxxi. H | Alia vero αB dicens li [?] vero H dicens et spatium Q (n61 ad fin.) 31 nec JO uel ABβ (o malo Mcast) 35 intellectivam AB intellectam (pro -ctĩam ut alias) β intellectualem JO 60

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hee virtutes: all taken from STh. I-ii.62.1 (next n). AJ’s spelling hee, not he, for hae is guaranteed authentic by β’s error hec, as also at i.8 2, i.25 44, i.26 14, ii.Prol. 66, ii.28 24 (app. min. var.). Perhaps a convention for long or closed /eː/ (cf. hii for hī, i.1 55, etc.), it is well att. in medieval MSS: e.g. González Muñoz 1996, 19 “hee ignorantie tenebre”, etc.; Historia Legionensis/Silensis in BNE Mss/1181 (Pérez de Urbel & González Ruiz-Zorrilla 1959, 134 app. crit., 164, 172, etc.) and BNE Mss/8592, f. 170r “hee urbes”, etc., both MSS s. xv; elsewhere, at random, DMLBS, Latham et al. 1975–2013, s.v. hic1 × 3; D’Avray 2001, 100, 120, 124, etc. × 11; Brewer 2015, 120 “hee littere”; the incunable Guiral Ot 1500, passim; etc. ut scribit sanctus Thomas: STh. I-ii.62.1 in c., the quotations from which in fact begin above at 5: Est autem duplex hominis beatitudo sive felicitas […]: una quidem proportionata humanae naturae, ad quam scilicet homo pervenire potest per principia suae naturae; alia autem est beatitudo naturam hominis excedens, ad quam homo sola divina virtute pervenire potest secundum quandam divinitatis participationem, secundum quod dicitur ii Petr. I quod per Christum facti sumus “consortes divinae naturae”. Et quia huiusmodi beatitudo proportionem humanae naturae excedit, principia naturalia hominis […] non sufficiunt ad ordinandum hominem in beatitudinem praedictam; unde oportet quod superaddantur homini divinitus aliqua principia per quae ita ordi-

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they have God as their object, insofar as we are rightly ordered by them for God; second, because they are infused in us by God alone; third, because these virtues are handed down by the divine revelation of holy Scripture alone. “But different”, writes St Thomas in STh. I-ii.62.1, “is the happiness which man can attain according to his natural principles”, though this too only with the help of God, without Whom nothing good can come to pass. Even if this is not the true and perfect happiness like that eternal one we long for, it is nevertheless man’s perfection in this life, and guides towards the true and perfect beatitude; and it consists in the practice of virtue. The definition usually runs like this: happiness is the practice of the soul according to perfect virtue. And since the principal faculties of man are two, one being the intellective, the other the irrational faculty he shares with wild animals (taking no account for present purposes of the vegetative, because a man is not called good or bad according to this faculty; no one is said to be virtuous or not by reason of his being large or small in stature or fat or thin, as these are things man shares with plants; so in this discussion of conduct no mention is made of this faculty, only of the other two), and just as they are two, so there are two kinds of virtues: the dispositions which correctly dispose and perfect the intellective faculty are known as intellectual virtues, derived from intellectus “intuitive understanding”, while the dispositions which properly moderate and control the sensitive faculty and render it obedient to reason are called moral virtues, derived from mos, mōris “custom”. Custom is equivalent to habit; and since in matters that pertain to the good governance of the

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netur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia ordinatur ad finem connaturalem, non tamen absque adiutorio divino. Et huiusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae. The quaestio (for discussion of which in relation to Arist. and “natural” happiness see Lubac 2008; O’Connor 1950; and Intro. § 1 above, at nn11–14) is Cartagena’s source for this and the next chapter, signalling by its placement at MV ’s start the intention of framing his compilation within the bounds of theology; but he does not quote it verbatim, showing that β’s muddled “dicens” (app. crit.) was a misreading. Solet enim sic diffiniri felicitas: EN 1102a5–6 Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν τελείαν (Vet. interp. “Si autem est felicitas anime operacio quedam secundum virtutem perfectam”)/Sent. Eth. i.19.1 “Dictum est enim supra quod felicitas est operatio quaedam secundum virtutem perfectam”, referring back to i.11.11–13 “felicitas est operatio propria hominis secundum virtutem in vita perfecta”. Cartagena omits Arist.’s entire argument on this topic and goes on to briefly summarize in 163 words the last paragraphs of Bk i, 1102a26–1103a10 (453 words)/Sent. Eth. i.19.3–20.14 (2110 words) on the distinction between the rational or intellectual (λόγον ἔχον, διανοητικόν) vs. the irrational or moral (ἄλογον, ἠθικὀν) parts of the psychē.

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consuetudo, nam assuefaccio bonorum actuum presertim a juventute inducit habitus virtutum, ideo dicuntur morales, quasi consuetudinales ex bona consuetudine inducte.63 Lib. 1 Cap. 3 De virtutibus theologicis Theologice virtutes sunt tres: fides, spes, karitas, ut traditur per Apostolum, prima ad Corinthios tercio decimo.64 Iste perficiunt hominem supernaturaliter et reddunt acceptum Deo; de istis quid sint et quem ordinem inter se habeant est recurrendum ad sanctos doctores, qui eas lucidissimis doctrinis declararunt, et post antiquos signanter Thomas modernis temporibus tam generaliter de eis loquendo in Prima Secunde quam eciam specialiter de eis tractando in Secunda secunde mirabili luciditate disseruit. Ideo in istis non est inmorandum; nec eciam de hiis inter nos habitus fuit sermo, sed propter dignitatem earum eas ante alias nominamus. Lib. 1 Cap. 4 De virtutibus intellectualibus Intellectuales virtutes sunt quinque, videlicet sapiencia, sciencia, intellectus, prudencia, et ars, sicut sunt quinque modi per quos anima dicit verum.65 Nam interdum anima intellectiva considerat neccesaria, interdum contingentia. Necessaria vero distinguntur, quia aliqua sunt principia prima que non eliciuntur ab aliis principiis, sicut dicimus quod totum est majus sua parte; alia sunt conclusiones que descendunt ab aliis principiis. Contingentia eciam dividuntur in duas species, nam aliqua sunt agibilia, aliqua factibilia. Est enim differencia inter agere et facere; nam agere proprie dicitur opus quod remanet in agente, ut bene regere seipsum et populum sibi commissum et bene disponere negocia; facere est opus quod procedit exterius, ut edificare domum vel similia.66

Cap. 3 tit. α, om. BQ Capl̛m qʳtũ H 3 et α aut Bβ Cap. 4 tit. α, om. BQ Capl̛m qͥ ntũ H 7 aliqua factibilia α aliqua sunt factibilia Bβ (algunas son factibles Mcast) 10 vel JOBQ (o Mcast) et AH 63

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dicuntur morales, quasi consuetudinales: Sent. Eth. ii.1.3 “moralis virtus fit ex more, idest ex consuetudine. […] Et inde est quod nomen virtutis moralis sumitur a consuetudine, parum inde declinans, nam in Graeco ěthos per e breve scriptum significat morem sive moralem virtutem, ythos autem scripta per ȳ Graecum quod est quasi ē longum significat consuetudinem”/EN 1103a16–17 ἡ δ᾽ ἠθικὴ [ἀρετὴ] ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. Disregarding the etymological quibble, Cartagena says consuetudinalis, nowhere in Aquinas but used by Vet. interp. and common in scholastic jargon. Theologice virtutes: 1 Cor 13:13 “nunc autem manet fides, spes, caritas, tria haec; maior autem his est caritas.” The chapter is added to the scheme of the original sermo and

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sensitive faculty habit plays a large role, as getting accustomed to good acts especially from youth induces dispositions for virtues, they are called moral, that is to say habitual or induced by good habits. 1.3 On the theological virtues The theological virtues are three: faith, hope, charity, as handed down by the Apostle, 1Cor 13. These perfect man supernaturally and render him acceptable to God; on what they are, and what mutual order they have, one must have recourse to the holy Doctors, who have explained them in the most lucid doctrines, and after the Fathers notably Thomas in modern times, who discoursed about them with marvellous lucidity, both speaking of them in general in STh. Iii and treating them in particular in ii-ii. Therefore there is no need to dwell on them. Nor, indeed, did we converse about them; but I name them here before the others out of respect for their rank. 1.4 On the intellectual virtues As there are five ways in which the soul tells the truth, the intellectual virtues are five: namely theoretical wisdom, knowledge, intuitive understanding, practical wisdom, and craft. Sometimes the intellective soul considers necessary things, sometimes contingent; but the necessary are distinguished as being either first principles that are not deducible from other principles, as when we say the whole is greater than its parts, or conclusions that derive from other principles; and the contingent are likewise divided into two kinds, being either actable or factible. For there is a difference between acting and making: “to act” is properly applied to operations that have an effect on the agent himself like governing oneself and the people committed to one or disposing one’s affairs well, whereas “to make” is an operation that has an external effect, like building a house or such things.

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ignoring Arist. (Intro. § 1 at n12; theologica does not occur in Sent. Eth.) only “propter dignitatem” (8), its length indicating the matter’s indiscutibility. Intellectuales virtutes: this marks the start of the compilatio proper of EN, but in an order determined by MV ’s purpose. Arist. briefly defines moral vs. intellectual virtues at the close of Bk i, 1103a3–9/Sent. Eth. i.20.13–14 (n62 above); Cartagena jumps to his main discussion in Bk vi, beginning at 1139b14–16/Sent. Eth. vi.3.2 “Sunt autem quinque numero quibus anima semper dicit verum […], scilicet ars (τέχνη, craft expertise), scientia (ἐπιστήμη, knowledge), prudentia (φρόνησις, practical wisdom), sapientia (σοφία, theoretical wisdom) et intellectus (νοῦς, intuitive understanding); unde patet quod ista quinque sunt virtutes intellectuales”. agere et facere: Sent. Eth. i.1.13 “quae manet in ipso operante […] dicitur actio, […] transiens in exteriorem materiam […] factio”—an inadequate rendering of Aristotle’s “acti-

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Et secundum istas differencias distinguntur virtutes intellectuales. Nam habitus qui perficit animam intellectivam ad cognoscendum principia et ad vere sciendum ea vocatur intellectus; ille enim qui ex lumine intellectus agentis cognoscit principia indemostrabilia dicitur habere virtutem intellectus. Habitus vero qui disponit animam intellectivam ad sciendum vera de conclusionibus que descendunt ab aliis principiis vocatur sciencia. Est et tercius habitus qui complectitur utrumque et disponit animam ad cognoscendum veritatem tam in profundissimis principiis nature indemostrabilibus quam in conclusionibus que a principiis procedunt, et iste vocatur sapiencia; qui ergo singulari dono divino tantum lumen ingenii assequutus est ut vera cognoscat tam in principiis quam in principiatis que pertinent ad archana nature dicitur sapiens, sicut fertur de Socrate et de similibus.67 In contingentibus autem ille habitus qui perficit animam ad recte discernendum et agendum agibilia vocatur prudencia; ille vero habitus qui disponit hominem ad bene faciendum factibilia dicitur ars. Et quoniam iste virtutes intellectuales, licet sint excellentes in se, non tamen reddunt hominem bonum vel malum preter prudenciam (nam possibile est quod aliquis sit sapientissimus et vigeat tanta perspicacitate ingenii quod multa cognoscat de profundissimis nature, et tamen sit deditus viciis; et econtra sunt nonnulli qui recte et virtuose vivunt, non tamen noverunt sciencias speculativas et alia hujusmodi, ut sunt plures religiosi et alii), ideo ommissis aliis virtutibus intellectualibus de prudencia aliquantulum dicamus, quia ista pertinet ad mores hominum dirigendos de quibus loquuti sumus; de hiis enim solum conferendo loquebamur que ad morum direccionem pertinent.68

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vity” vs. “product”, EN 1094a4–5 τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ᾽ αὐτὰς ἔργα. The distinction is brought up here, but only used below (n71). sicut fertur de Socrate: a singular misrepresentation of Socrates, whose method was concerned with anything but arcana naturae and who famously denied being sapiens, as Aquinas elsewhere noted (Sent. Eth. iv.15.17, on EN 1127b25) and Cartagena himself picked up (MV ii.23 55 “Socrates qui negabat se esse sapientem”). Naturally the phrase is not in the sources; perhaps a garbled deduction from the end of Bk vi, 1144b29–30/Sent. Eth. vi.11.7–12 on Socrates’s dictum, “[omnes] virtutes esse scientias”? ommissis aliis virtutibus: the preceding chapter guts EN’s whole Bk vi in 21 lines; its excision of every aspect not concerned with princely conduct—throwing overboard sapience, science, intellect, craft—illustrates Cartagena’s authorial role in moulding the matter “ad mores dirigendos”, even if he justifies it by referring to the original conversation (“de quibus loquuti sumus […] conferendo loquebamur”). Only prudentia (practical wisdom, sense) is deemed “pertinent” for discussion, summarily, in the next three chapters.

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The intellectual virtues are distinguished according to these differences. The disposition which perfects the intellective soul for recognizing principles and truly knowing them is called intuitive understanding (intellectus); he who recognizes indemonstrable principles by the light of active intuitive understanding is said to have the virtue of intellect. The disposition which disposes the intellective soul to know true things by drawing conclusions from other principles is called knowledge (scientia). There is a third disposition, which comprises both of these and disposes the soul to know the truth both in the most profound indemonstrable principles of nature and in the conclusions that follow from those principles, and this is known as theoretical wisdom (sapientia); he who by a singular divine gift achieves such illumination of mind that he knows the truth both of principles and of the effects of those principles that belong to the secrets of nature is called “wise”, as we say of Socrates and others like him. In contingent things, on the other hand, the disposition that perfects the soul to correctly discern and do actable things is known as practical wisdom or “prudence” (prudentia), while the disposition that disposes man to produce factible things is called craft (ars). But since apart from prudence these intellectual virtues, though excellent in themselves, do not make man good or bad (for it is possible for someone to be very wise and possess such powerful perspicacity of mind as to know much about the most profound things in nature, and yet give in to vices; and by contrast there are some who live rightly and virtuously and yet know nothing of speculative sciences and such things, for example many in the religious orders and others), let us omit the other intellectual virtues and say a little about practical wisdom or prudence, because this pertains to guiding men’s conduct, about which we spoke; for in our discussion we talked only about things relevant to moral guidance.

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Lib. 1 Cap. 5 De prudencia capitulum primum Prudencia est ille habitus qui reddit hominem potentem bene consiliari circa propria bona et utilia, non in aliquo negocio particulari sed universaliter circa omnia que sunt bona et utilia ad hoc: ut tota vita humana sit bona et recta.69 Nam si aliquis sciat bene consiliari in aliquo actu dumtaxat, ut puta circa ea que pertinent ad fortitudinem vel ad sanitatem vel ad aliquam negociacionem, non dicitur prudens simpliciter, sed dicetur prudens limitative quantum ad hoc vel illud. Simpliciter autem prudens nullus dicitur nisi ille qui scit bene consiliari et dirigere actus suos ut tota vita sua recte et sine macula dirigatur. Ideo prudencia diffinitur sic: prudencia est habitus verus cum racione activus circa hominis bona et mala. Et sic differt ab aliis virtutibus intellectualibus; nam intellectus, sciencia, et sapiencia sunt circa speculativa et neccessaria que non possunt aliter se habere, ut supra diximus, in quibus non est consilium. Nullus enim consiliatur si sol orietur, sed consilium est circa contingentia que possunt aliter et aliter se habere, et circa ea que sunt homini conferentia vel nociva; et sic prudencia differt a sapiencia, intellectu, et sciencia.70 Differt eciam ab arte, quia ars, licet sit circa contingentia, est tamen circa illa que consistunt in faciendo. Faccio autem, ut supradictum est, dicitur illa operacio que facit opus extra operantem, ut edificare domum et similia; accio vero est illa operacio que remanet in operante, ut bene regere seipsum et sibi commissa; nam licet interdum accio inducat aliquid extrinsecum, ut cum prudens mandat aliquid operari, sepe tamen actus prudencie remanet intra seipsum, videlicet in dirigendo bene actus suos ad bonum finem; et licet aliquis sciat bene edificare vel aliquod aliud opus artis facere, non propter hoc erit bonus homo simpliciter, possibile est enim quod sit malus in aliis. Sepe enim boni artifices sunt mali homines quantum ad mores; interdum eciam propter maliciam suam utuntur male arte, et ad bonum artis exercicium requiritur prudencia. Quod non potest

Cap. 5 tit. A De prudencia JO, om. BQ Capl̛m sextũ H será dicho Mcast) 8 suos om. JO 69

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habitus ~ bene consiliari: EN 1140a24–28/Sent. Eth. vi.4.2 “dicit quod ad prudentem videtur pertinere quod sit potens ex facultate habitus bene consiliari circa propria bona et utilia, non quidem in aliquo particulari negotio, puta qualia sint bona vel utilia ad sanitatem vel fortitudinem corporalem, sed circa ea quae sunt bona et utilia ad hoc quod tota humana vita sit bona.” This chapter summarizes Aquinas’s lectio 4 in simplified form. si sol orietur: cf. Sent. Eth. vi.4.4 “nullus consiliatur neque de his quae sunt simpliciter impossibilia aliter se habere, neque de his quae sunt impossibilia agere illi. […] Ex quibus omnibus sequitur quod prudentia neque sit scientia, neque ars.” Central to Cartagena’s approach is the replacement of Aquinas’s austere logic-chopping by such homely examples, which simplify (MV i.Prol. 44–46 “nec a me quicquam […] nisi exempla vel verba

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1.5 On prudence. Chapter 1 Prudence is the disposition that renders a man capable of making good decisions regarding proper goods and utility, not in some particular business but universally regarding all things that are good and useful, to the end that the whole of human life should be good and right. If someone knows how to make good decisions just in one act, as for instance regarding things that pertain to courage or health or some business transaction, he is not called prudent simply, but will be called prudent limitatively, in respect of this or that. Only he who knows how to make good decisions and direct his acts in such a way that his whole life is directed rightly and without stain is called simply prudent. Hence practical wisdom is defined thus: prudence is a true disposition for acting rationally with regard to man’s goods and evils. It differs from the other intellectual virtues thus: that intuitive understanding, knowledge, and theoretical wisdom concern speculation about necessary things that cannot come to pass in any other way, as I said above, and in these there is no room for decision-making. No one takes counsel about whether the sun will rise; decision-making concerns contingent things that may come to pass in this way or that, and that are either helpful or harmful to man. Thus prudence or practical wisdom differs from theoretical wisdom, intuitive understanding, and knowledge. It also differs from craft, because though craft regards contingent things, they are things that consist in making. Making, however, as said above, is the name for an operation that produces an effect external to the operator, like building a house and such things; whereas acting is an operation that has an effect on the agent himself, like governing himself and the things committed to him correctly; for though acting sometimes involves something external, as when the prudent man orders something to be carried out, the acts of prudence nevertheless have their effect within himself, that is to say, in correctly guiding his acts to a good end; and though he may know well how to build or produce some other work of craft, he will not be a simply good man because of that, indeed it is possible that in other matters he may be bad. Good craftsmen are often bad men in a moral sense, and sometimes so bad that they even use their craft to bad ends; the good exercise of craft requires prudence. This latter cannot happen in respect of the ad ordinis connexionem vel ad planiorem intelligenciam”) but also embellish the source (see Intro. § 2, at n20). The ordinatio too is designed for a simpler, more direct reading; the preceding definition (“Ideo prudencia difinitur sic”) in fact paraphrases a later passage of Sent. Eth. vi.4.6–7 “Deinde cum dicit ‘Relinquitur ergo’, etc. [= EN 1140b4–6 λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά], concludit ex praemissis definitionem prudentiae, et dicit […] quod prudentia sit ‘habitus cum vera ratione activus’, non quidem circa factibilia, quae sunt extra hominem, sed ‘circa bona et mala ipsius hominis’.”

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contingere circa prudentem, nam qui scit que agenda sunt et non agit non dicitur prudens; potest autem dici sagax vel astutus, sed non prudens.71 Est enim de essencia prudencie rectitudo appetitus, quia licet prudencia consistat in racione hominis tanquam in subjecto proprio, et per istum respectum dicitur virtus intellectualis, sed tamen quia una cum recto judicio racionis debet habere rectitudinem appetitus circa ea que pertinent ad finem honestum et bonum humane vite potest dici virtus moralis. Et pro tanto sciencia et ars, quia consistunt in sola racione, possunt oblivioni tradi per dissuetudinem exercicii; prudencia vero nunquam traditur oblivioni, quia habet appetitus rectos. Bene autem potest perdi et destrui per maliciam supervenientem, nam possibile est quod quis sit aliquando prudens et bonus, et post corrupto appetitu fiat malus et viciosus et per consequens imprudens; nam omnis malus est imprudens, quinymo insanus et stultus dicitur omnis improbus, ut ait Tullius in Paradoxa.72 Ideo quantumcunque homo bonus sit, summe cavere debet ne in maliciam incidat, nam et “Paulus vas eleccionis castigat corpus suum et in servitutem redigit ne aliis predicans ipse reprobus inveniatur” (De penitenciis, dist. secunda, c. Si enim, versu Paulus); sed tamen per modum oblivionis quod obliviscatur prudenciam suam impossibile est, quia esset oblivisci bonitatem.73

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Differt eciam ab arte: cf. Sent. Eth. vi.4.5 “Quod autem prudentia non sit ars patet per hoc, quod aliud est genus actionis et factionis [cf. n66, above]; unde prudentia quae est circa actiones, differt ab arte quae est circa factiones.” Again the point is expanded with simple examples (“ut edificare domum”, “ut bene regere seipsum”) while jettisoning Aristotle’s recondite reference to Pericles (EN 1140b7) and Aquinas’s technical discussions (artificiata, vi.4.7; euprasia = εὐπραξία, EN 1140b7; the distinction between fronesis and “soffrosini, quasi salvans mentem” = EN 1140b11 σωφροσύνην […] ὡς σῴζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν, vi.4.7, 9) to make way for the simple point that masters of a craft may be “crafty” (Mcast “artero”) but not necessarily good or “prudent”. rectitudo appetitus: this paragraph jumps to the end of Aquinas’s lectio, Sent. Eth. vi.4.14 “prudentia […] non tamen est cum sola ratione sicut ars vel scientia, sed requirit rectitudinem appetitus, […] quia habitus qui est in sola ratione potest oblivioni tradi, […] prudentia non traditur oblivioni per dissuetudinem” (EN 1140b25–30), but with additions (Cicero, canon law) that steer the argument towards Christian ethics. insanus ~ ait Tullius: there are phrases to this effect, though not these words, in Cic. Paradoxa Stoicorum (i.27 “Paradoxon 4: ὅτι πᾶς ἄφρων μαίνεται/Omnis stultos insanire. […] non stultum, ut

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prudent man, for he who knows what should be done and does not do it is not called prudent; he may be called shrewd or clever, but not prudent. An essential of prudence, then, is rectitude of appetite, because although practical wisdom is founded on a man’s reason as its proper subject, and in this respect is called an intellectual virtue, yet because in addition to correct rational judgment it must have right appetite regarding things pertaining to the honourable end and good of human life, it can be called a moral virtue. Equally, knowledge and craft, because they are founded on reason alone, can be entirely forgotten through lack of practice; whereas prudence can never be entirely forgotten because it has right appetites. However, it can easily be lost or destroyed by supervening evil, for it is possible for someone to be prudent and good for a while and then become bad and vicious by corruption of his appetite. Yet by this very token he will become imprudent, for every bad man is imprudent, or rather, as Cicero puts it in his Paradox, every evil man is insane and stupid. However good a man may be, therefore, he should take utmost care not to fall into evil ways, for even “Paul, ‘the chosen vessel’, punished his body and enslaved it, so that after proclaiming to others he himself should not be disqualified” (De penitenciis [C.33.3 De poenitentia], dist. 2.40 Si enim, § 1 Paulus). Nevertheless, that he should obliterate his prudence by way of forgetfulness is impossible, because it would be to forget his goodness.

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saepe, non inprobum, ut semper, sed dementem”, ii.17–19, v.35; cf. Tusc. iii.iv.9–11 “omnes insipientes igitur insaniunt”). All witnesses read “in Paradoxa” (Mcast “en la Paradoxa”), a solecism that displays ignorance of Greek even if it means “in only one of them”. Paulus ~ inveniatur: Decretum C.33.3 [= De poenitentia] dist. 2.40 §1, citing 1Cor 9:27 “sed castigo corpus meum et in servitutem redigo, ne forte cum aliis praedicaverim ipse reprobus efficiar”; also C.32.5.11 “Si Paulus apostolus vas electionis [Acts 9:15] […] ob carnis aculeos et incentiva viciorum reprimit corpus suum et servituti subicit ne aliis predicans ipse reprobus inveniatur”, citing Rom 7:24 “quis me liberabit de corpore mortis hujus?” The first of the 40 legal citations that characterize MV (Intro. §2, at n22). Sed tamen ~ oblivisci bonitatem: Cartagena’s own paraphrase of Aristotle’s conclusion (σημεῖον δ’ ὅτι λήθη […] φρονήσεως οὐκ ἔστιν, i.e. prudence depends not on knowledge or craft but on a disposition to do τὰ ἀγαθὰ, the good, which cannot be “forgotten”). The variant virtutem for bonitatem is clearly corrupt (the sentence is about the “homo bonus”, this obscures the point); for the textual problem it raises see Proleg. §2, at (h).

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Lib. 1 Cap. 6 [De prudencia] Capitulum secundum Hanc prudenciam comitantur alique virtutes que in Greco sic dicuntur: eubulia, synesis, et gnomi.74 Eubulia est quedam rectitudo consilii, nam quia ad prudentem pertinet bene consiliari illa bona consiliacio seu consilii rectitudo appellatur eubulia. Sed ad hoc ut proprie sit virtus requiruntur quatuor. Primo, quod consilium dirigatur in bonum finem, nam si aliquis consilietur subtiliter ad malum finem, ut si sagax fur scit inquirere modos et subtilitates ad subtilius et securius furandum, non dicitur habere eubuliam, nam de esse virtutis est ut bonus finis intendatur. Secundo, quod ad finem rectum perveniatur per recta et licita consilia, nam si aliquis rectum finem intenderet sed malas vias ad illum adipiscendum consiliando inquireret non dicitur habere eubuliam, ut si aliquis furaretur ad elemosinam dandam. Tercio, quod fiat consiliacio cum modo et tempore opportunis, nam si velociter ita quod precipitentur negocia vel tam tarde quod fugiat opportunitas operandi non est eubulia. Quarto, quod bene quis consilietur ad bonum finem totius vite, si enim ad aliquod certum negocium, utpote ad sanitatem vel ad mercaturam vel ad actus bellicos sciat quis bene consiliari, et non ad alia, non habet eubuliam simpliciter sed limitative quantum ad hoc vel illud. Est ergo eubulia rectitudo consilii ad bonum finem simpliciter tocius vite per vias congruas et tempore convenienti. Synesis est bonum judicium de consilio, nam recta et bona inquisicio que dicitur consilium eorum que expediunt ad bonum humane vite pertinet ad eubuliam, recte autem judicare et eligere quid agendum sit de inventis in consilio dicitur synesis. Et quoniam facta humana sunt diversissima et evenit interdum secundum circunstancias temporum et negociorum quod non expedit assumere viam que in pluribus assumi solet sed accipere aliquam viam singularem et moderari singulariter negocia, si ista eleccio moderativa in casu particulari facta fit recte et prout expedit ad bonum et rectum finem dicitur gnomi.75 Et quoniam, licet in scienciis speculativis racio operetur solummodo duo (primo invenit inquirendo, secundo de inven-

Cap. 6 tit. AJB, om. OQ Capl̛m septimũ H 11 furaretur αB furetur β 19 est αB enim β 23 diversissima αB (muy diversos Mcast) diversimoda β 24 pluribus αB plurimis β 25 accip̱e aliquam JOB (tomar alguna carera Mcast) accipe aliquam β accipere aliam A 26 fit AJ sit OBβ 74

eubulia, synesis, et gnomi: skipping Aquinas’s lectiones 5–7, this chapter summarizes Sent. Eth. vi.8–9 (ΕΝ 1142a32–1143b16) on the “adjuncts and, as it were, hand-servants” of prudence (33): εὐβουλία (good counsel), σύνεσις (judiciousness), and γνώμη (discretion), replacing technicalities (eustochia, Sent. Eth. vi.8.3; rectitudo metaphorical or literal, vi.8.12; etc.) by everyday examples (“ut si aliquis furaretur ad elemosinam dandam”, “utpote ad sanitatem vel ad mercaturam”, etc.) and reducing over 3200 words (855 in Gk) to 449.

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1.6 [On prudence.] Chapter 2 This prudence is accompanied by other virtues which in Greek are called euboulía, sýnesis, and gnṓmē. Euboulia is a certain rectitude of decisionmaking; because it behoves the prudent man to make good decisions, this good decision-making or rectitude of decisions is given the name euboulia. Yet for it to be properly a virtue requires four things. First, that the decision be directed to a good end, for if someone makes decisions subtly for evil purposes, for example if a shrewd thief knows how to find subtle ways and means of stealing more subtly and safely, he cannot be said to have euboulia, for it is of the essence of virtue that the intended end should be a good one. Second, that the right purpose should be reached by right and licit decisions, for if anyone intends a right end but in deciding finds bad ways of achieving it, he cannot be said to have euboulia; for example, if someone were to steal in order to give alms. Third, that the decision be made in a timely and opportune way, for if it is made so fast that the business is rushed, or so slowly that the opportunity to act is lost, it is not euboulia. Fourth, that the person in question make a decision properly directed to a good end for the whole of his life, for if anyone knows only how to make proper decisions for some particular business such as health or trading or acts of war, and not for the rest, he does not have euboulia simply, but limitatively, in respect of this or that. Euboulia, then, is rectitude of decision-making for a good end, simply and for a whole life, by appropriate ways and at the suitable moment. Synesis is good judgment about decisions, for the right and proper questioning that is called decision-making about things that promote the good of human life belongs to euboulia, but correct judgment and choice about which of those things discovered in decision-making is to be acted upon is called synesis. And because human deeds are very diverse and it sometimes happens that due to the circumstances of times and affairs it is not expedient to take the normal path taken in the majority of cases, but instead to accept some singular path and manage affairs in a special way, if this choice of management taken in the particular case is made rightly and fittingly for a good and right end it is called gnome. And though in speculative sciences reason operates in only two ways (first making discoveries by research, second making judgments about the dis-

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si ~ fit recte ~ dicitur gnomi: fit fit and ſit ſit (or ſic) are hard to distinguish in cursive gothic; initially AJ’s “fit” and OBβ’s “(facta) sit” (Mcast “fuere fecho”) both look possible, but pres. indic. fit (logical condition) is far better than hypothetical perf. subj. facta sit, which furthermore should take subj. in the apodosis; cf. 30–31 “si fit ~ dicitur synesis”, below. The solution accords with the primacy of AJ in the stemma.

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tis judicat eligendo quid tenendum sit, quia quantum ad scire pertinet sufficit cognoscere veritatem), in materia tamen pratica et operabili racio operatur tria (primo invenit inquirendo, secundo de inventis eligit judicando, tercio precipit exequendo, nam licet in hiis que ad scienciam pertinent contentamur cum jam scimus quod scire volebamus sed in operabilibus non sic, ymo postquam scimus quid operandum sit operamur), primum ergo quod est rectitudo consilii in inveniendo pertinet ad eubuliam; secundum quod est rectitudo judicii seu eleccionis in eligendo ex repertis in consilio quid fieri debeat, si fit ut communiter et ut in pluribus eligi debet, dicitur synesis; si ut in paucioribus et singulariter extra communem ordinem, dicitur gnomi; tertium vero quod est precipere et exequi pertinet ad prudenciam. Et sic prudencia est principalis virtus, iste vero accessorie et quasi familiares ejus. Lib. 1 Cap. 7 [De prudencia] Capitulum tercium In tantum est prudencia virtus principalis quod nulla virtus moralis potest esse sine ea. Ad cujus intelligenciam est sciendum quod est alia virtus que dicitur naturalis et alia moralis. Virtus naturalis est illa inclinacio quam quis habet a natura propria; sunt enim aliqui qui inclinantur ad justiciam, alii ad fortitudinem vel ad liberalitatem vel ad abstinenciam. Ista ergo disposicio dicitur virtus naturalis, sed non est proprie virtus, quod patet ex eo quod interdum est in pueris qui carent judicio racionis et in bestiis, sicut leo naturaliter est fortis; et si iste inclinaciones non regantur per discretionem possent inducere maxima dampna, sicut si aliquis velox ad currendum curreret clausis occulis posset enormiter ledi.76 Sic in moralibus si inclinatus ad liberalitatem expendit sua sine discrecione perdet substanciam suam, et si inclinatus ad abstinenciam abstinet immoderate perdet corpus. Simile est in aliis actibus qui de sui natura sunt laudabiles et virtuosi, qui si indiscrete agantur vituperabiles sunt, unde Pius papa ait:

29 eligendo om. β Cap. 7 tit. αB, om. OQ Capl̛m octavũ H 6 ante naturalis om. virtus β 12 sui α sua Bβ 14 pius papa α (Pío papa Mcast) ierõiꝰ Q iˀoꝰ H, om. B 76

in pueris ~ bestiis, sicut leo: from the final two sections of Sent. Eth. vi (ΕΝ 1143b17– 1145a11) Cartagena selects only the point that prudentia embraces all the virtues (vi.11.13 “nulla earum potest haberi sine prudentia, nec prudentia sine eis […]; et sic […] omnes simul inerunt cum ea”/ΕΝ 1145a2–3 ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ ὑπαρχούσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν) and the illustration that, without it, “natural” virtues are not moral (vi.10.4–5 “naturales

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coveries by choosing what to accept, since as far as knowledge is concerned it is sufficient to recognize the truth), in practical and functional matters reason operates in three (first making discoveries by research, second making choices about the discoveries by judgment, third intervening by putting them into execution, since although in things to do with knowledge we are satisfied once we know what we wanted to know, in functional matters it is not so; instead, once we know what has to be done, we do it). Hence the first, rectitude of decisionmaking in discovery, belongs to euboulia; the second, rectitude of judgment or choice in choosing what should be done from the things discovered in the decision-making process, if it turns out that the choice should follow the common practice in most cases, is called synesis, and if out of the ordinary and special to rather few cases, gnome; but the third, intervention and execution, belongs to prudence. So prudence is the principal virtue, while these latter are accessory and, so to speak, its handmaidens. 1.7 [On prudence.] Chapter 3 Prudence is so much the principal virtue that no moral virtue can exist without it. To understand this we should know that there is a difference between what is called natural and what is called moral virtue. Natural virtue is an inclination anyone has by his own nature; some people are inclined to justice, others to courage or liberality or abstinence. This character is therefore called natural virtue, but it is not properly a virtue; this is clear from the fact that it sometimes exists in children lacking rational judgment, and in beasts. The lion, for example, is naturally brave. But if these inclinations are not ruled by discretion, they could cause very great damage. If some fast runner were to run with his eyes shut, he could be horribly injured; just the same in moral matters, if a man inclined to liberality spends his property without discretion he loses his wealth, and if a man inclined to abstinence abstains immoderately he loses his life. It is the same in all other acts which by their nature are praiseworthy and virtuous, but if performed indiscreetly become blameworthy. For this reason Pope Pius says:

habitus sive inclinationes etiam pueris et bestiis insunt, sicut leo naturaliter est fortis […]. Si corpus fortiter moveatur absque visu dirigente, accidit quod […] fortiter laedatur […]; si enim aliquis habeat fortem inclinationem ad opus alicuius virtutis moralis et non adhibeat discretionem, accidet gravis laesio”). The chapter then concludes with proof-texts bringing prudence firmly into the fold of the Christian cardinal virtues.

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Non mediocriter errat qui magno bono prefert mediocre bonum. Nonne racionabiliter homo dignitatem ammittit qui vel jejunium karitati aut vigilias prefert sensus integritati, ut propter immoderatam ac indiscretam psalmorum vel officiorum decantacionem aut amencie aut tristicie notam incurrat? (De consecracione, dist. quinta, c. Non mediocriter)77

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Tunc ergo iste virtutes naturales efficiuntur proprie virtutes et dicuntur virtutes morales quando reguntur discrecione, que pertinet ad prudenciam, unde Gregorius in secundo Moralium ait quod cetere virtutes, nisi ea que appetunt prudenter agant, virtutes esse non possunt.78 Et hinc sumitur racio illius conclusionis que communiter dici solet; dicunt enim, “Qui habet unam virtutem habet omnes, et qui unam perdit omnes perdidisse videtur.”79 Que conclusio, licet dure videatur sonare, vera est. Sumitur autem racio ejus ex suprascriptis. Prudens enim, ut dictum est, dicitur ille qui omnes actus suos recte dirigit ad universalem finem tocius humane vite; qui vero aliqua bene regit et aliqua non prudens non est, sed potest dici sagax vel astutus. Sed qui aliquam virtutem moralem non habet non potest dici bene regere universaliter actus suos, ergo prudenciam non habet; cum igitur sine prudencia virtus moralis esse non possit, nullam habere videtur. Et sic in circulo reducta racione in hunc modum, prudencia non est sine omnibus moralibus virtutibus, nulla virtus moralis potest esse sine prudencia. Sequitur ergo quod nulla moralis virtus potest esse sine alia, cum ad esse cujuslibet requiratur prudencia et ad esse prudencie requirantur omnes.80 Et hoc quoad morales virtutes, nam in naturalibus nichil prohibet unam esse sine alia; possibile est enim, ymo videmus

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20 iste virtutes naturales αB naturales iste virtutes β 25 et qui unam perdit omnes αB (perdidit O; e el que pierde una a todas Mcast) et qui in una virtutum deest omnes Q, om. H 28 vero ABβ (enpero Mcast) enim JO 35 cujuslibȝ virtutꝯ requiratur Q cujuslibet reͥⱱıtur H cujuslibet requiritur αB 77

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unde Pius papa: Decretum Pars iii De consecratione dist. 5.24, citing ps.-Jer. Regula monachorum (Richter & Friedberg read abstinentiam before inmoderatam, some witnesses read continentiam, others omit). “Pius papa” is not a corruption, but from Gratian’s previous canon, Nichil enim prodest from Pius i, Ep. 1; many witnesses lack the intervening rubric “Item Ieronimus” (Richter & Friedberg, n217 ad loc.). The mistake was certainly in the original, but β’s correction could be an authorial revision (Proleg. §2, at (e)). unde Gregorius: Greg. i Magnus, Moralia in Job ii.46 “nisi virtutes reliquae sapientiae epulis repletae ea quae appetunt prudenter agant, virtutes esse nequaquam possunt” (PL lxxxv, 588–589).

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He who prefers a middling good to the great good makes no small mistake. Is it not reasonable that a man who prefers fasting to charity or long vigils to the health of his sense loses his reputation, or that for immoderate or indiscreet recitation of the Psalms or divine offices he should incur the charge of insanity or depression? (De consecratione dist. 5.24 Non mediocriter) These natural virtues therefore only become the proper virtues called moral virtues when they are ruled by discretion, which belongs to prudence; for which reason Gregory says in Bk ii of his Moralia that virtues other than those which pursue what they seek with prudence cannot be virtues. This explains the commonly voiced opinion that says, “He who has one virtue has them all, and he who loses one virtue appears to have lost them all.” This conclusion may sound hard, but it is true. The reason follows from what is written above. Prudent, as I have said, is the name we give to a man who rightly directs all his acts to the universal purpose of all human life. One who manages some things well, but others not, is not prudent, though he may be called shrewd or clever. But he who lacks any one moral virtue cannot be said to manage his acts well universally, therefore he lacks prudence; hence, since a moral virtue cannot exist without prudence, he clearly has none of them. So the argument comes round in a circle to this point: prudence does not exist without all the moral virtues, and no moral virtue can exist without prudence. It follows from this that no moral virtue can exist without another, since prudence is a requirement for the existence of each, and they are all required for the existence of prudence. This applies as far as moral virtues are concerned; in the case of natural virtues there is nothing to stop one existing without another. It is possible, and indeed

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dicunt enim: the “common saying” has the look of a proverb but its second half, though integral to what follows (the “hard-sounding” part), is not attested. The first is in Cic. Off. ii.10.35 “cum inter omnes philosophos constet, a meque ipso saepe disputatum sit, qui unam haberet omnes habere virtutes” (= Tulio de los ofiçios, Cartagena 1996, 290 & 413 n345, adducing Floresta de filósofos § 1077, BNE Mss/4515 f. 47r, in Foulché-Delbosc 1904, 55; and cf. Benvenuto da Imola, Comentum super Dantis Aldigherii Comoediam, Paradisus 1.37–42 “qui habet unam virtutem perfecte habeat omnes”); the idea reflects Aquinas, STh. I-ii.65.1. cujuslibet requiratur: it would seem the archetype erroneously read (or seemed to read, see H) “requiritur”; Q rightly corrected to subj. in accord with “requirantur” in the next line, but interpolated “virtutis” (app. crit.).

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communiter aliquos inclinari ad liberalitatem et non ad castitatem vel econtra, et sic in aliis virtutibus. Concordat autem cum hoc quod in foro penitencie in quocumque crimine est deflenda jactura omnium virtutum et pro omnibus indulgencia petenda, unde Augustinus, exponens illud “Defleat peccator quia offendens in uno factus est omnium reus”, ait: Omnes virtutes patiuntur detrimentum ab uno vicio, nam si quis cadit in avariciam largitatem destruit, et eciam castitatem minoravit; amore pecunie vel violaret castitatem, vel saltem minus amaret. Si enim tanta propter Deum adhuc castitas inest ut nolit eandem perdere, tamen saltem minori gaudio, minori affeccione tuetur eam, ubi videt inde procedere dampnum pecunie; sicque et in aliis que, etsi non expellantur, tamen percepcione unius vicii vel saltem parum minuuntur vel intencione deteriorantur. Unde omnis virtus cuiquam crimini est deflenda, et de omnibus indulgencia est petenda. (De penitenciis, dist. quinta, c. Consideret)81

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Lib. 1 Cap. 8 De virtutibus moralibus et primo de justicia Expeditis intellectualibus, de moralibus virtutibus videamus. Et morales virtutes sunt undecim, que sunt hee: justicia, fortitudo, temperancia, liberalitas, magnificencia, magnanimitas, moderacio, mansuetudo, affabilitas, veracitas, eutrapelia. De singulis ergo videamus. Est autem justicia habitus ille secundum quem dicimur operativi justorum operum.82 Nam ex justicia causatur in homine quedam inclinacio ad opera justicie; post inclinacionem fiunt opera justa, et ex operacionibus justis redditur homo volens justa et sic efficitur justus. Nec enim ex eo quod quis operetur aliqua opera que videntur justa dicitur justus, sed quando habet jam habitum causatum et constantem in voluntate ad volendum justa. Est enim justicia in

38 vel αB et β 44 post amore add. enim β (ut in Decreto, sed v. Richter & Friedberg app. crit. ad loc.) 45 punctum transpos. post pecunie J Cap. 8 tit. α, om. BQ Capl̛m nonũ H 6 in homine om. β 7 justa α justicie Bβ 81

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Defleat peccator ~ omnium reus: the sentence, from August. De vera et falsa poen. c.14, is quoted in this form as a rule in X. v.41.9 (De regulis juris, cap. Defleat); but Cartagena cites Decretum C.33.3 De penitencia, dist. 5, c.1 § 4, where the passage is given at length, but without these words. Est autem justicia habitus: EN 1129a6–9 ὁρῶμεν δὴ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἕξιν βουλομένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην, ἀφ’ ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀφ’ ἧς δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βούλονται

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a common sight, that some people are inclined to liberality but not chastity or vice versa, and likewise with other virtues. This is consistent with the fact that in the forum of penance any crime means bewailing the loss of all virtues and begging remission of purgatory for all [crimes]. For this reason, expounding the sentence “Let the sinner bewail, because by offending in one thing he becomes guilty of everything”, Augustine says: All virtues suffer detriment from a single vice. If someone falls into covetousness he ruins generosity, and even tends to diminish chastity; for the love of money he might violate chastity, or at least be less in love, for even if he still has enough chastity for God’s sake not to want to destroy it, all the same he at least keeps it with less joy or affection when he sees it entails financial loss. And so it is with other virtues, which, even if they are not thrown out, are nevertheless at least a little diminished or lessened in the intent by taking on a single vice. Hence for any crime all virtue is to be bewailed, and remission of purgatory sought for every one of them. (De penitenciis [C.33.3 De penitencia] 5.1 § 4 Consideret) 1.8 On the moral virtues, and first on justice Having disposed of the intellectual virtues, let us look at the moral ones. There are eleven moral virtues, namely: justice, courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, moderation, gentle manners, friendliness, truthfulness, tactful wit. Let us look at them one by one. Justice, then, is the disposition by which we are called agents of righteous works. From justice man acquires some inclination for works of justice; the inclination is followed by righteous works, and from these just operations a man who wants righteous things becomes just. Simply because someone does what appear to be righteous things does not mean he is called just; that only happens when he already has an acquired and constant disposition of will to want righteous things. Justice is therefore located in the will as its proper

τὰ δίκαια/Sent. Eth. v.1.4 “talis habitus per quem tria causantur in homine: primo quidem inclinatio ad opus iustitiae secundum quam dicitur homo operativus iustorum; secundum est operatio iusta; tertium autem est quod homo velit iusta operari”. The following nine chapters—inverting Arist.’s order to put justice at the head of the cardinal virtues, their 5562 words making it the chief virtue in MV above magnanimity and fortitude—give a very free précis of EN 1129a–1138b (6589 words)/Sent. Eth. v.1–17 (22,847), adding sixteen legal citations and various examples.

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voluntate sicut in subjecto proprio, et non est in passione concupiscencie vel irascibilitatis sicut alie virtutes morales. Et hinc est quod juris consultus describendo justiciam dixit: “Justicia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum unicuique tribuens”.83 Nec enim superflue dixit “voluntas”, sed ad denotandum quod consistit in voluntate et non in parte concupiscibili vel irascibili. Nam licet justicia moderetur passiones, ipsa tamen consistit in voluntate ut in proprio subjecto. Sed hoc omisso, quia pertinet magis ad quandam sciencie inquisicionem quam ad planam morum nostrorum informacionem quam intendimus, in primis animadvertendum est quod in materia justicie plurime sunt distinciones prout fuerunt diversi tractatores. Juriste namque multa membra fecerunt, sicut et juris, nam aliud est jus divinum, aliud humanum, et aliud naturale, aliud gentium, aliud civile; et civile diversas sub se species continet, ut late tractant decretiste a prima distinccione usque ad quintam decimam, et legiste in materia de justicia et jure et in aliis plurimis locis; alii vero aliis distinccionibus usi sunt, prout unusquisque proposito suo convenire cernebat.84 Sed ista intentui nostro non congruunt, qui non querimus investigare omnia que pertinent ad materiam justicie, nam illud prolixissimum esset et operosius proposito, sed solum volumus scire quid sit justicia prout est virtus, ut cognoscamus eam inter reliquas virtutes morales. Ideo utemur distinccione Philosophi. Est ergo justicie duplex species: quedam dicitur justicia legalis, alia justicia particularis.85 Justicia legalis est ille habitus voluntatis per quem homo redditur obediens legibus. Leges enim jubent ea que pertinent ad virtutes et prohibent vicia in omni genere virtutum et viciorum. Jubet namque lex pericula sustineri pro defensione patrie, aciem in bello non deserere, quod pertinet ad fortitudinem; prohibet alienum thorum violari, quod pertinet ad temperanciam; injuriam non fieri, quod est mansuetudinis; et sic in similibus discurrendo per omnes

12–13 describendo αB distribuendo β 21 diversi tractatores αB (los tractadores Mcast) diversi tractationes H diverse tractationes Q 31 post alia om. justicia Oβ 33 vicia om. β 34 namque ABβ ergo eras., nãꝙ in marg. J namque ergo O 36 ad temperanciam om. β 83 84

juris consultus ~ dixit: Dig. i.1.10, reading “ius suum cuique tribuendi” (Ulpian); also Instit. i.1.1. ut late tractant decretiste: Decretum D.1–15, on natural and divine law. et legiste: Instit. i.2; Dig. i.1. The “aliae distinctiones” are, in canon law, various ecclesiastical constitutions; and

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subject, not in the emotion of concupiscence or irascibility like other moral virtues. Hence it is that the jurisconsult describes justice by saying: “Justice is the constant and perpetual will to give each man what is his by right”. He did not say “will” superfluously, but to indicate that it depends on the will and not on the concupiscent or irascible faculty of the mind, for though justice governs the emotions, it depends itself on the will as its proper subject. Leaving this aside, since it belongs more to some scientific investigation than to the plain education of our conduct that is my intention, we should first observe that on the subject of justice there are as many different distinctions as there have been experts. Jurists have divided it into many headings, as they have done with the law; for divine law is one thing, human law another, natural yet another, the law of nations another, civil another; and civil law embraces various kinds too, as the decretists discuss at length in Distinctions i to xv, and the civilists under the heading De justitia et jure and in various other places; others have used other distinctions, as each saw fit for his own purpose. These matters, however, have no bearing on our intent; it is not my wish to investigate everything pertaining to the subject of justice, for that would be very prolix and more toilsome than intended, but only to know what justice is inasmuch as it is a virtue, so we may recognize it among the rest of the moral virtues. For that reason let us use the Philosopher’s distinction. Justice is of two kinds: one is called legal justice, the other particular justice. Legal justice is the disposition of will by which man is rendered obedient to the laws. In every kind of virtues and vices, laws decree the things that pertain to virtues and prohibit vices. Thus the law orders us to endure dangers for the defence of our country and not desert the ranks in war, which pertains to courage; it prohibits us from violating another man’s marriage bed, which pertains to temperance; not to make insults, which is part of gentle manners; and so on and so forth,

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in civil, public vs. private, unwritten vs. written state leges, popular plebiscita, senatorial consulta, princely placita, magistrates’ edicta, etc. Ideo utemur distinccione Philosophi: EN 1130a14–b5/Sent. Eth. v.2–3 on the distinction between ὁ νόμιμος δίκαιος (legalis) and δικαιοσύνη κατὰ μέρος (particularis), summarized over the next two chapters.

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virtutes, ut magnifeste patet intuenti diversas materias juris canonici et civilis.86 Unde legiste dicunt precepta legum esse “honeste vivere, alterum non ledere, jus suum unicuique tribuere”, quod omnes virtutes includit et omnia vicia excludit; nec enim honeste vivit peccator.87 Ille ergo qui ex habitu voluntatis obediens legibus sequitur virtutes et declinat a viciis dicitur habere justiciam legalem et est justus et legalis. Qui vero econtra ex habitu depravato voluntatis non curat de legibus sed sequitur vicia et a virtutibus deviat dicitur injustus et illegalis. Et hinc habet ortum quod dici solet quod justicia non est unica virtus sed omnis virtus est, et injusticia non est unica malicia sed omnis malicia est.88 Nam justicia est communis virtus et concurrit cum omnibus virtutibus, et injusticia est commune vicium et concurrit cum omnibus viciis, loquendo de justicia legali que est generalis et communis virtus, ut dictum est. Et hinc est quod in utroque Testamento sub vocabulo justicie plerumque laudantur omnes virtutes, et cum de aliquo bono fit mencio vocatur justus, ut illud “Justus ut palma florebit”; et in aliis plurimis locis videmus quod sub nomine “justi” laudantur boni, quia exprimendo justiciam omnes virtutes exprimimus, intelligendo de justicia legali.89 Lib. 1 Cap. 9 [De justicia] Capitulum secundum Sed secundum hoc posset dici quod justicia legalis non est virtus per se, sed videtur esse eadem virtus cum reliquis.90 Nam si aliquis se habeat fortiter in bello dicitur justus legalis et habere justiciam legalem, quia leges hoc jubent; et dicitur eciam fortis et habere fortitudinem. Sequitur ergo quod justicia legalis et fortitudo in hoc casu sunt idem. Similiter in actibus temperancie abstinens ex deliberato habitu ab illicito coitu videtur habere temperanciam, et quia leges hoc inducunt dicetur justus legalis; sequitur quod justicia legalis et

Cap. 9 tit. AJB, om. OQ Capl̛m decimũ H 86

87 88

1 hoc αB hec β

6 ab illicito αB et illibato β

diversas materias juris: EN 1129b19–23 προστάττει δ’ ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν […], καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν […], καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς/Sent. Eth. v.2.5. Cartagena adds a legal proof-text (next n). legiste dicunt: Instit. i.1.3, reading cuique; cf. also Dig. i.1.10. quod dici solet: Floresta de filósofos “Proverbios de Séneca llamados Viçios e virtudes: De justiçia” [10], BNE Mss/4515 f. 106v “Justiçia non es parte de virtud mas es toda la virtud, e lo que es sin justicia non es parte del mal mas es todo mal” (Cartagena 2004, 224n19, citing Foulché-Delbosc 1904, 119 § 2478).

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running through all the virtues, as is manifestly clear to anyone who inspects the various subject-headings of canon and civil law. Hence lawyers say the precepts of the laws are: “live honestly, hurt no one, give each man what is his by right”, which embraces all the virtues and excludes all the vices; for a sinner does not live honestly. So a man who follows virtues and turns from vices, obedient to the laws by the disposition of his will, is said to have legal justice and is just and law-abiding; whereas by contrast, one who from the depraved disposition of his will has no respect for laws, follows vices, and turns from virtues is called unjust and lawless. This is the origin of the saying, “justice is not a single virtue but the whole of virtue, and injustice is no single kind of evil but the whole of evil”. Justice is virtue in common and participates in all the virtues, injustice is vice in common et participates in all the vices, if we are referring to legal justice, which is the general and complete virtue, as I have said. This is why in both Testaments all the virtues are often praised under the single word “justice”, and when mention is made of some good man he is described as just, as in “The righteous [ justus] shall flourish like a palm tree”; and we see in numerous other passages that the good are praised with the name “just”, because when we say justice, understanding this to mean legal justice, we express all the virtues. 1.9 [On justice.] Chapter 2 According to this, however, it could be said that legal justice is not a virtue per se, but appears to be one and the same as the other virtues. If someone conducts himself courageously in war he is said to be law-abidingly just and have legal justice, because the laws decree this; but he is also said to be courageous and have courage, so it follows that legal justice and courage in this case are the same thing. Similarly in acts of temperance, a man who abstains by deliberate disposition from illicit intercourse is considered to have temperance, and because the laws establish this he will also be called law-abidingly just; it

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in utroque Testamento: Ps 92:12 (Vulg 91:13). The sentence is added (cf. Sent. Eth. v.2.9) to lead into the next chapter (“Sed secundum hoc”, 1). Heedless, B made bold to add a maladroit interpolation (app. min. var.). posset dici quod ~ non est virtus per se: Cartagena expands this objection from Sent. Eth. v.2.13 to clarify the point that justice is a virtue, but “ad alterum”, not “ad se ipsum” (11–12; cf. EN v.1 1129b28 ἀρετὴ μέν ἐστι τελεία, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον/Sent. Eth. v.2.7 “est quaedam virtus perfecta, non simpliciter sed in comparatione ad alterum”), making it the most “laudable” (13). On virtue’s public aspect see Intro. §2, pp. 12–14.

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temperancia sunt idem. Sic in mansuetudine et in aliis virtutibus. Et secundum hoc sequeretur quod legalis justicia non esset virtus per se separata ab aliis, sed esset idem cum aliis virtutibus. Ad cujus intelligenciam est animadvertendum quod justicia est virtus ad alterum; proprie enim non consistit justicia in hiis que homo habet ad se ipsum, sed in hiis in quibus conversatur cum altero. Ideo laudatur summe justicia; aiunt enim quod “preclarissima virtutum videtur esse, et neque Hesperus neque Lucifer ita admirabilis”.91 Nam dicitur alienum bonum, quia non consistit in quantum homo tendit ad bonum sui ipsius sed in quantum tendit ad conservandum bonum alterius, unde commendatur et in proverbium ducitur illud quod unus de septem antiquis sapientibus Grecorum nomine Bians dixit inquiens, “Principatus ostendit virum”.92 Nam ex eo quod princeps debet communicare cum pluribus et tendere ad bonum plurium requiritur in eo major excellencia virtutis; nec enim est neccessaria tanta claritas virtutum in illo qui solum debet curare de bono sui ipsius et alicujus alterius vel forsam paucorum sicut in illo qui debet regere seipsum et unam magnam rem publicam. Intelligo autem principem non solum regem sed quemcumque prepositum aliis, ecclesiasticum vel secularem; sed quanto major principatus, tanto major virtutis excellencia requiritur. Recte ergo dixit principatum ostendere virum, quia in principando facilius apparet si est vir—id est, homo virtuosus et perfectus—vel ne. Hoc sic presupposito, est attendendum quod actus virtutis dupliciter considerari potest: primo in quantum quietat appetitus proprios, et secundum hoc est hominis ad se ipsum; secundo in quantum per illum tenditur ad bonum alterius, et secundum hoc est hominis ad alterum. Secundum primam consideracionem pertinet ad unam de virtutibus moralibus, secundum secundam consideracionem pertinet ad justiciam legalem. Declaratur hoc per exempla suprascripta. Cum aliquis se fortiter habet in bello possumus habere duplicem consideracionem: unam in quantum ille bene disponit seipsum ad sustinendum pericula propter bonum publicum, et secundum hanc dicitur fortis et habet fortitudinem; secundam in quantum per tolleranciam proprii periculi

14 hesperus OB esperus J asperus A sperꝰ β (ni el sol ni el luzero Mcast) Mcast) vians AQB viaus H 37 secundam αB aliam β 91

18 Bians JO (Bians

neque Hesperus neque Lucifer: EN 1129b29–32 πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ “οὔθ’ ἕσπερος οὔθ’ ἑῷος οὕτω θαυμαστός”· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοί φαμεν “ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ’ ἀρετὴ ἔνι” καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετή, […] ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ’ οὐ μόνον καθ’ αὑτόν/Sent. Eth. v.2.7 “neque Hesperus, idest stella praeclarissima vespertina, neque Lucifer, idest stella praeclarissima matutina, ita fulgeat”. The saying, from Euripides, became proverbial (παροιμιαζόμενοι).

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follows that legal justice and temperance are the same thing. The same is true of gentle manners and the other virtues, and from this it would follow that legal justice would not be a virtue per se separate from the others, but the same as the other virtues. To understand this we should observe that justice is virtue in relation another; properly speaking, justice does not consist in a man’s relationship to himself but in his dealings with another. Hence justice is highly praised; “it appears the brightest of the virtues,” they say, “and neither the evening nor the morning star is so wonderful”. It is called another’s good, for it depends not on how much a man strives for his own good but on how much he strives to uphold the good of others. For this reason people commend and turn into a proverb that saying of one of the seven wise men of ancient Greece named Bias which runs, “Princeship shows the man”. For the fact that the prince must deal with the many and strive for the good of the many means that a greater excellence of virtue is required of him; no such splendour of virtues is necessary in one who must only look after the good of himself, and perhaps one or two others, as is required of the man who must rule both himself and a great commonwealth. By “prince” I mean not only a king but anyone set over others, ecclesiastic or secular; but the greater the princedom, the greater the excellence of virtue required. Rightly did he say “princeship shows the man”, then, because governing as prince makes it easier to see whether or not he is a man—that is, a virtuous and perfect man. Taking all this for granted, we should pay attention to the fact that any act of virtue can be considered from two points of view: first, the degree to which it assuages a man’s own appetites and in this measure is directed towards himself; second, the degree to which it leads to the good of another and in this measure is directed towards others. From the first point of view the act pertains to one of the moral virtues, from the second it pertains to legal justice. This is explained by the examples given above. When someone conducts himself courageously in war, we can consider it from two points of view: first, how well he prepares himself for undergoing dangers for the public good, and by this measure he is called courageous and has courage; second, how much his suffering

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Bians dixit: from the same passage, EN 1130a1–2 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει/Sent. Eth. v.2.10 “Bias [Aquinas c. 1482, sign. f8r “bians”] enim, qui fuit unus de septem sapientibus, dixit quod principatus ostendit virum”. None of the copyists—nor perhaps the author—recognized “bians” as Bias, though he was known so in the vernacular as one of the antique Seven Sages (e.g. Santillana’s Bías contra Fortuna; cf. August. De civ. D. xviii.25); but Cartagena’s retention of the saying, when he omits most of Arist.’s argument, forefronts his interest in princely virtues (claritas 21), on which the paragraph then expands.

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tendit ad bonum rei publice, et secundum hanc dicitur justus legalis et habere justiciam legalem. Simile in virtute temperancie: in quantum enim homo abstinendo a concupiscenciis pravis quietat se ipsum et disponit bene appetitus suos, dicitur temperatus; in quantum vero per quietacionem propriam cessat a nocumento alterius quia non querit violare thorum alienum, dicitur justus legalis. Sic et ille qui bene se disponit in passionibus ire per respectum ad bonam disposicionem et quietacionem sui ipsius dicitur mansuetus, habito autem respectu quia per hoc intendit cessare ab injuria alterius dicitur justus legalis. Fatendum est ergo quod justicia legalis que est communis virtus et cetere virtutes morales sunt circa idem sed non sunt idem. Nam habito respectu hominis ad seipsum actus virtutis pertinet ad unam virtutum moralium, hanc vel illam prout casus accidit, habito vero respectu hominis ad alterum pertinet ad justiciam legalem; et sic legalis justicia concurrit cum aliis virtutibus moralibus et est in eadem materia in qua alie sunt, sed non est eadem cum eis, ymo differt ab illis propter diversas consideraciones et respectus, ut supra ostensum est. Lib. 1 Cap. 10 [De justicia] Capitulum tercium Justicia particularis est ille habitus qui facit hominem justum et equalem in communicacionibus que sunt ad alterum.93 Si enim aliquis ex habitu voluntatis habet nolle lucrum illicitum nec vellet aliquid de alieno habere furando vel rapiendo vel fraudando vel per alium modum indebitum, dicitur habere justiciam particularem. Et ut hoc clarius videatur est advertendum quod, sicut supradiximus, omnes actus virtutum pertinent ad justiciam legalem, et licet generaliter ad eam pertineant, quilibet tamen actus pertinet specialiter ad suam virtutem moralem; et econtra omnes actus viciosi pertinent ad injusticiam legalem, sed tamen specialiter quilibet est oppositus sue virtuti; ut in exemplis suprapositis, qui enim timide se habet in bello committit vicium timiditatis, quod est oppositum fortitudini; qui mechatur committit intemperanciam, que est opposita temperancie; qui percutit alium peccat in ira, que est opposita mansuetudini. Sunt tamen aliqua vicia que non sunt opposita certe et singulari virtuti, ut sunt illa que pertinent ad avariciam. Si enim aliquis furatur vel rapit aliena vel decipit aliquem ut lucrum aliquod sibi habeat, iste dicitur

38 habere αB habet β (tiene Mcast) 52 illis ABβ (dellas Mcast) aliis JO Cap. 10 tit. AJB, om. OQ Capl̛m xȷm H 2 sunt α fiunt Bβ (se fazen Mcast) 3 nolle αB (non querer Mcast) hoc ut nollit β 93

Justicia particularis: following on (see n85, above), he broadly paraphrases Sent. Eth. v.3– 4.

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personal danger achieves the good of the commonwealth, and by this measure he is called law-abidingly just and said to have legal justice. It is the same with the virtue of temperance: to the degree that a man subdues his own perverse desires by abstinence and disposes his appetites correctly, he is called temperate; but to the degree that by so subduing himself he refrains from harming another by not trying to violate someone else’s marriage bed, he is called lawabidingly just. So too the man who correctly controls his emotions for the sake of his own good state of mind and tranquillity is called gentle-mannered, but to the extent that he thereby strives to avoid insulting another he is called lawabidingly just. We must grant, therefore, that legal justice, the common virtue, and the rest of the moral virtues concern the same thing, but are not the same. Considering a man in relation to himself, an act of virtue belongs to one of the moral virtues, this one or that according to the case; but considering a man in relation to others, it belongs to legal justice. Thus legal justice participates in the other moral virtues and comes under the same heading as the rest, but it is not the same as them; on the contrary, it differs from them from various points of view and in various respects, as shown above. 1.10 [On justice.] Chapter 3 Particular justice is the disposition that makes a man just and equitable in dealings with another. If someone by voluntary disposition shows himself to be against illicit profit and unwilling to take anything that does not belong to him by theft, robbery, fraud, or any other improper method, he is said to have particular justice. To make this clearer we should note that, as explained above, acts of the virtues all pertain to legal justice, but though generically they belong to it, any given act pertains specifically to its own moral virtue. Conversely, all acts of vice pertain to legal injustice, but any given one is specifically opposed to its own virtue; so in the examples above, a man who behaves timidly in war commits the vice of cowardice, which is the opposite of courage; one who commits adultery commits intemperance, which is opposed to temperance; one who strikes another sins by anger, which is opposed to gentle manners. However, there are some vices which are not opposed to any definite single virtue, such as those that pertain to covetousness. If someone steals or robs from others or deceives someone for his own profit, he is said to sin by particular injustice,

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peccare per injusticiam particularem, quia ista vicia non sunt opposita alicui certe et determinate virtuti morali. Ideo contra ista est hec virtus justicie que appellatur justicia particularis. Et si dicatur quod ista vicia pertinent ad avariciam, verum est; sed avaricia non opponitur alicui determinate virtuti nisi justicie particulari. Nam avaricia et injusticia particularis idem sunt, sumendo avariciam proprie, prout differt ab illiberalitate. Aliud est enim illiberalitas, et aliud avaricia. Illiberalitas est retinere sua ultra debitum modum et non expendere ubi expendere deberet, et ista est vicium oppositum liberalitati, que est virtus moralis; avaricia vero est rapere vel furari vel accipere aliena violenter vel fraudulenter vel indebite, et istud vicium non habet aliquam certam virtutem moralem cui opponatur preter justiciam, et ista justicia cui opponitur dicitur justicia particularis. Qui ergo non succurrit amico de pecuniis suis vel non dat elemosinam pauperi cum potest non est proprie avarus sed est illiberalis; qui vero aliena tollit indebite, iste est proprissime injustus et avarus, non tamen dicitur illiberalis nisi hoc in parvis rebus faciat, ut in materia liberalitatis dicetur. Et licet promiscue utamur istis verbis et vocemus avaros interdum illos qui sunt illiberales (cum enim videmus aliquem thesaurizare peccunias et abscondere ultra debitum nec expendere ubi deberet, dicimus eum avarum), non tamen est propria loquucio; dici enim debet illiberalis, non autem avarus. Sed qui aliena tollit dicitur avarus et injustus; qui vero in utroque errat, quia nimium conservat que sua sunt et aliena tollere vult, utroque nomine dignus est et dici debet illiberalis injustus et avarus. Et quia interdum hec duo vicia coniunguntur in eadem persona utimur indifferenter istis vocabulis, unum sumendo pro alio; sed proprietas vocabulorum est quam supradiximus. Est ergo particularis justicia illa virtus que est directe opposita avaricie et facit hominem habere se equaliter et juste in communicacionibus ad alterum. Et hec est diversa a justicia legali non ut differunt diverse species adinvicem, sed ut differt species a genere suo, sicut diceremus quod animal et homo sunt diversa; non enim differt homo ab animali taliter quod homo non sit animal, sed differt in hoc quod homo est species, animal genus, et homo est animal, non tamen omne animal est homo. Sic dicitur de justicia legali et particulari quod differunt inter se quia omnia que pertinent ad virtutes, sive sint sub justicia particulari sive sub aliis virtutibus, pertinent ad justiciam legalem, ideo justicia legalis dicitur communis virtus, ut supradictum est; non tamen omnia que pertinent ad justiciam legalem sunt sub justicia particulari, sed illa dumtaxat

22 avaricia αB est avaritia β 23 ista om. β 29 indebite AJBQ ĩiuste ĩdebite H injuste O 30 illiberalis αB illiberalitas β 34 non autem α non tamen B et non β 35 quia αB qui B, om. β 42 hec om. β 45 est species αB sit species β 49 communis virtus αB virtus communis β

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because these vices are not opposed to any definite or defined moral virtue; hence the contrary of them is this virtue of justice named particular justice. You may say that these vices belong to covetousness, and that is true; but covetousness is not opposed to any defined virtue except particular justice, for covetousness and particular injustice are the same, taking covetousness in its proper sense as something different from illiberality. Illiberality is one thing, covetousness another; illiberality is holding on to one’s goods beyond due measure and not spending where one should spend, which is the vice opposed to liberality, which is a moral virtue; whereas covetousness is robbing or stealing or receiving other people’s goods by violent, fraudulent, or improper means, and this vice has no definite moral virtue to which it is opposed besides justice, and this justice to which it is opposed is called particular justice. Someone who does not come to the help of a friend with his money or does not give alms to a pauper when he can is not properly speaking covetous, but illiberal; whereas someone who takes other people’s goods by improper means, he is very properly speaking unjust and covetous, but is not called illiberal unless he does this only in small matters, as will be explained under the heading of liberality. So, though we may use these words promiscuously and sometimes call those who are illiberal covetous (as when we see someone hoarding up money and hiding it unduly and not spending when he should, we call him covetous), it is an improper usage; he should be called illiberal, not covetous. Someone who takes other people’s goods, on the other hand, is called covetous and unjust. Someone who has both faults, saving what is his to excess and also wanting to take other people’s goods, deserves both names and should be called illiberal, unjust, and covetous; but because these two vices are now and again joined in the same person, we use the names indifferently, substituting one for the other. Nevertheless, the proper meaning of the names is what I have said. Particular justice, then, is the virtue directly opposed to covetousness; it makes a man conduct himself equitably and justly in his dealings with others. This is different from legal justice, not in the way various species differ from one another, but as the species differs from its genus, just as we might say, an animal and a man are different things; man differs from an animal not in the sense that man is not an animal, but because man is a species, animal the genus; man is an animal, but not every animal is a man. We say that legal and particular justice differ from each other in the same sense: that is, everything pertaining to the virtues, whether it comes under particular justice or under the other virtues, belongs to legal justice, so that legal justice is called the common virtue, as said above; but not everything that belongs to legal justice comes under particular

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que sunt contraria avaricie. Homicide enim, adulteri, et timidi peccant contra justiciam legalem et contra fortitudinem et temperanciam, sed non contra justiciam particularem, nec enim ista vicia pertinent ad avariciam nisi forsam per accidens intencio operantis aliud induceret; si enim aliquis committeret homicidium vel adulterium propter peccuniam vel aliud lucrum, hic dici potest injustus et avarus nedum secundum justiciam legalem sed eciam secundum justiciam particularem, quia voluit habere aliena illicite. Et hinc potuit habere ortum quod legiste dicunt, “voluntas et propositum distingunt maleficia”.94 Concludendo ergo potest dici quod justicia legalis nichil aliud est quam quidam habitus electivus qui est in homine ad conservandum leges propter bonum commune; injusticia vero seu illegalitas que huic opponitur est per oppositum ille habitus electivus secundum quem homo transgreditur leges contempto bono communi.95 Justicia autem particularis est ille habitus electivus secundum quem homo reddit unicuique quod suum est; injusticia vero particularis per contrarium est ille habitus electivus secundum quem homo capit vel retinet quod suum non est. Nam accipere aliena vel retinere indebite quantum ad hoc idem est, unde Augustinus ait, “Si quid invenisti et non reddidisti, rapuisti; quantum potuisti fecisti, quia plus non invenisti; qui alienum negat, si posset, et tolleret; Deus cor interrogat, non manum” (Quarta decima, questione quinta, c. Si quid).96 Et repeto semper habitum electivum quia hoc est commune omnibus virtutibus moralibus, ut operentur ex habitu et eleccione. Si enim aliquis operaretur unum vel duos vel eciam decem actus virtutum non dicitur virtuosus nisi haberet habitum causatum, hoc est consuetudinem operandi; antiquum namque proverbium est, “una yrundo non facit ver”. Sic unus actus non facit hominem virtuosum, sed quando ex pluribus actibus est acquisitus habitus seu consuetudo, tunc proprie homo dicitur habere

51 peccant ABβ (pecan Mcast) dicuntur peccare O peccare J 57 voluit αB (quiso Mcast) vult β | hinc om. β 61 seu ~ opponitur β et ~ opponuntur αB 69 si posset et tolleret ABβ si posset extolleret J extolleret si posset O 76 homo dicitur αB dicitur homo β 94 95

legiste dicunt: Dig. xlvii.2.54 (53) “maleficia voluntas et propositum delinquentis distinguit”. injusticia vero seu illegalitas: the very free way in which Cartagena summarizes Aquinas in these chapters, with few actual quotations, makes clear that, as a trained lawyer, he felt confident to present Arist.’s doctrine on justice for the most part using his own words; he even indulges below in one of his rare 1st-pers. authorial parecbases (“Et repeto …”; outside the Prologi and Concl., only here, i.1 4 and i.9 23 “intelligo”, i.21 29 “non sumo”, i.33 38 “Repeto” again). In fact, however, these two sentences are the first of many borrowings from his unacknowleged second main source, Geraldus Odonis’ Expositio et questiones super libros Ethicorum (there being no modern edition, we cite relevant passages in extenso):

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justice, only the things that are contrary to covetousness. Murderers, adulterers and cowards sin against legal justice, and against courage and temperance, but not against particular justice, for these vices do not belong to covetousness, except perhaps by accident if the intention of the one who practises them has some ulterior motive; if someone were to commit murder or adultery for the sake of money or some other gain, he can be called unjust and covetous not only according to legal justice but also according to particular justice, because his will was to get what belongs to others illicitly. This is what enabled the jurists to say, “crimes are defined by will and intention”. In conclusion, therefore, it can be said that legal justice is nothing other than a certain elective disposition in man to uphold the laws for the common good; whereas its opposite, injustice or illegality, is by contrast the elective disposition whereby man breaks laws in contempt of the common good. Particular justice, on the other hand, is the elective disposition whereby man renders unto each man what is his; in contrast, particular injustice is the elective disposition whereby man seizes or hoards what is not his. In this respect to take from others or to hoard unduly is the same thing, for as Augustine says, “If you find something and do not return it, you have robbed, and to the greatest extent possible, just because you did not find more; he who refuses to recognize that a thing belongs to someone else will snatch it if he can. God examines the heart, not the hand” (C. 14.5 Si quid). And I keep repeating “elective disposition” because all moral virtues have in common that they are practised by disposition and choice. Should someone practise one, two, or even ten virtuous acts, he is not called virtuous unless he has an acquired disposition, that is, a habit of doing so; for there is an ancient proverb, “one swallow doth not a summer make”. Likewise one act does not make a man virtuous; only when the disposition or habit is acquired by numerous acts can a man be properly said to have virtue.

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Nota ergo quod hi quatuor habitus sic differri possunt iuxta communia dicta, ut dicamus quid sit iustitia legalis: quod iustitia legalis est habitus electivus servandi legem propter bonum commune; iniustitia vero oppositum est, habitus electivus transgrediendi legem contempto communi bono. Iustitia vero particularis est habitus electivus reddendi cuilibet quod suum est; iniustitia vero opposita est habitus electivus capiendi et retinendi quod suum non est. (Guiral Ot 1500 v.4, f. 97vb) The main verb of Cartagena’s second clause in Ω is est 61, but in αB this is anacoluthic after pl. opponuntur (“La injusticia […] e la illegalidad que contrallan a ésta es” Mcast). The original error was clearly caused by adding et illegalitas to Geraldus, but forgetting to adapt the verb; β’s revision is necessary, and could be authorial. unde Augustinus ait: Decretum C.14.5.6, conflating August. Serm. de Script. 178.8 (PL xxxviii, 965).

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virtutem.97 Ille ergo vere dicitur justus qui ex habitu causato operatur opera justa. Alludit autem hiis que supraproxime de justicia particulari dicta sunt communis usus loquendi; cum enim in aliqua provincia prohibentur rapine et furta et similia crimina que consistunt in ablacione rerum alienarum, communiter dicunt homines quod est terra magne justicie quia quilibet est dominus rerum suarum, quasi dicant quod nulli aufertur res sua sine sua voluntate; et econtra cum crimina pertinentia ad avariciam impunita dimittuntur, clamant homines non esse justiciam in terra illa, quasi justicia sit virtus opposita vicio avaricie. Quod intelligendum est de justicia particulari, que directe opponitur avaricie, que est injusticia particularis; nam legalis justicia communis virtus est et omnibus viciis opponitur et cum omnibus moralibus virtutibus concurrit, ut diximus. Lib. 1 Cap. 11 [De justicia] Capitulum quartum Hec particularis justicia subdividitur in duas species principales.98 Una est que consistit in distribucionibus rei communis in singulos vel contribucionis rerum singulorum in commune; est enim distribuere cum aliquid commune dividitur inter plures, contribuere vero per contrarium quando illa que sunt singulorum reducuntur ad commune. Declaratur hoc per exempla. Videmus in provinciis que reguntur sub rege quod reges distribuunt inter subditos bona communia, conferunt enim dignitates et officia subditis suis et donant peccunias et alias res mobiles et inmobiles; et licet multa ex istis que donant sint regis seu principis, non tamen sunt ejus ut singularis persone sed ut publice et tanquam ducis seu gubernatoris communitatis sibi subdite, et sic distributa ab eo videntur a tota re publica distribui. Per contrarium eciam videmus contribucionem fieri, nam singuli de populo contribuunt aliquid in commune; aliqui enim solvunt tributa, alii gabellam de negociacionibus et mercanciis suis, alii decimas cum portus maris ingrediuntur, alii alia secundum diversas consuetudines et statuta regnorum que legiste regalia appellant. Et sic singuli contribuunt in commune, et rex qui est administrator communis distribuit in singulos. Simile eciam fit in provinciis que reguntur per modum communitatis, nam cives contribuunt

79 rapine αB alique rapine β 82 post res om. sua Bβ Cap. 11 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m duodecimũ H 5 hoc om. β 15 sic om. β 16–18 Simile eciam ~ singulos om. β 97

una yrundo non facit ver: this embellishment is from a quite different passage, EN 1098a19–20 μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα/Sent. Eth. i.10.12 “in praesenti vita non potest esse perfecta felicitas […]. Sicut enim una hirundo veniens non demonstrat ver, nec una dies temperata, ita etiam nec una operatio semel facta facit hominem felicem, sed quando homo per totam vitam continuat bonam operationem.”

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The man who is truly called just, then, is one who practises just works from an acquired disposition. And again, common parlance alludes to what I have just said about particular justice; for when robberies and thefts and similar crimes consisting in the carrying off of other people’s property are prohibited in some province, men commonly call it a land of great justice because each man is lord of his own property, meaning that no one has anything of his taken away without consent; whereas when crimes to do with covetousness are left unpunished, men cry out that there is no justice in the land, as if to say that justice is the virtue opposite to the vice of covetousness, understanding this to mean particular justice, which is directly opposed to covetousness, which is particular injustice; for legal justice is the common virtue opposed to all the vices and accompanies all the moral virtues, as I have said. 1.11 [On justice.] Chapter 4 This particular justice is subdivided into two principal kinds. One concerns distributions of common property among individuals or taxation of individuals for the common purse, where distribution means dividing something common between many, taxation on the contrary the taking back for common use what belongs to individuals. This can be made clear by examples. In provinces governed by a monarch we see that kings distribute public goods among their subjects by conferring ranks and offices on those subjects and granting them money and other movable and immovable property; and though many of these gifts are the king’s or prince’s property, they do not belong to him as a private person but as a public figure in his capacity as leader or governor of the community subject to him, so that the things distributed by him are considered to be distributed by the whole commonwealth. On the other hand we also see taxation being levied, whereby individual members of the populace contribute something to the public purse; some pay tributes, others sales-taxes on their transactions and merchandise, others tithes on entry to sea-ports, and others different levies according to the kingdoms’ various customs and statutes which jurists call regalia. Thus individuals contribute to the public purse, and the king who is the administrator of the public purse distributes to individuals. The same also happens in provinces governed as communes, where

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subdividitur in duas species: the distinction between distributive and commutative justice is discussed in EN 1130b30–1131a29/Sent. Eth. v.4–7. As before Cartagena simplifies and rearranges, with added examples and texts to bring out the main point: the practical relevance of “private” (non-legal) justice for a public ruler.

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aliquid in commune, et rectores communitatis distribuunt per singulos.99 Cum ergo in istis distribucionibus et contribucionibus observatur equalitas quia distribuentes distribuunt equaliter prout debent et contribuentes non gravantur sed contribuunt equaliter prout tenentur, hec observancia equalitatis in distribucionibus et contribucionibus vocatur justicia distributiva, a distribucione dicta. Est alia species particularis justicie que consistit in commutacionibus hominum inter se, non prout a communi distribuitur in singulos nec prout a singulis contribuitur in commune sed prout singuli communicant res suas et actus suos cum singulis. Et hec observancia equalitatis que fit in commutacionibus que inter homines fiunt vocatur justicia commutativa, a commutacione dicta. Et sic particularis justicie alia dicitur distributiva, alia commutativa. Est eciam sciendum quod commutacionum que inter homines fiunt duplex est species. Alique enim sunt voluntarie, alique involuntarie.100 Voluntarie dicuntur ille commutaciones que a dominorum voluntate procedunt, ut vendicio, locacio, donacio, mutuum, et omnes contractus; nam licet contrahentem post peniteat, voluntaria tamen commutacio dicitur quia in voluntate contrahentis inicium sumpsit, unde et legiste dicunt, “sicut ab inicio liberum est contrahere, sic post contractum non est liberum resilire”.101 Involuntarie autem subdividuntur in duas species: alie enim sunt involuntarie clandestine, alie involuntarie violente. Clandestine sunt ille que ignorante altero fiunt, ut furtum, adulterium, et similia crimina (et cum dicitur adulterium pertinere ad injusticiam particularem, intelligitur in quantum consideratur ut quedam usurpacio rei aliene que est uxor alterius, nam aliter consideratum ad intemperanciam pertinet, ut supradictum est). Violente vero sunt ut rapina, occisio, et alia hujusmodi. Cum ergo in istis commutacionibus observatur equalitas prout

31 ille om. β 34 contrahentis αB (del conprante Mcast) ꝯttͣ a (contracta) Q ꝯt ͣ H (e quando Mcast) sed cum β ut cum B 99

38 et cum α

Declaratur hoc per exempla: the whole passage is added—drawing on matter to be developed below—with the specific purpose of defining “distribution”, “contribution”, and “redistribution” in terms of the realities of the medieval monarchical Ständestaat, right down to mention of tributa pechos, gabellam alcabala (Ar. ‫ ق َب َال َة‬qabāla “deposit” < ‫قبل‬ qabila “receive”), and decimas ~ portus diezmos. This is noteworthy enough, but more remarkable is that Cartagena discusses not only kingdoms, the norm for him and his readers, but also constitutions per modum communitatis: the previous mention of these at i.1 7–8 (n54 above) shows he meant contemporary city-states in Italy, not ancient Athens. He was perhaps preparing for Arist.’s mention below of “democracy” (i.12 12–17 n103), but the only cogent explanation for his interest in the comuni—since he certainly had no sympathy for their liberties—was his legal training, in which he would have encountered discussions of the “civitas per se sufficiens et sibi princeps” in civilists of the Bologna

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citizens contribute something to the public purse and the leaders of the community distribute among individuals. Now when equality is observed in these distributions and contributions because the distributors distribute equally as they should and the tax-payers are not extortionately oppressed but contribute equally as they are obliged to, this observance of equality in distributions and contributions is named distributive justice, from distributio. Then there is the other kind of particular justice which affects men’s mutual transactions; not the kind where the public wealth is distributed to individuals nor the kind where individuals contribute to the public wealth, but the kind where individuals share their goods and acts with other individuals. The observance of equality that occurs in transactions made between men is named commutative justice, from commutatio “exchange”. So one kind of particular justice is called distributive, the other commutative. We should also know that there are two kinds of transactions between men: some are voluntary, some involuntary. “Voluntary” transactions are those that proceed from the will of the owners such as sale, leasing, donation, exchange, and all contracts; for though the party to a contract may later regret it, the transaction is still called voluntary because the contract first sprang from his will, for which reason the jurists also say, “as one is free to make a contract at the start, one is not free to withdraw after it is made”. Involuntary transactions, on the other hand, are subdivided into two sorts: some are clandestine involuntary, others violent involuntary. Clandestine are those that are done without the knowledge of the other party, like theft, adultery, and such crimes (and when we say adultery pertains to particular injustice, it is to be understood as being a kind of usurpation of property which does not belong to us, namely another man’s wife; from another point of view it pertains to intemperance, as said above); violent are those such as robbery, manslaughter, and others of like kind. When due equality is observed in these transactions we say

100 101

school such as Bartolus, determined to uphold the jurisdictions of their own cities against the emperor or pope (e.g. Woolf 1913, 112–207). The sentence was omitted by β, probably by homoeoteleuton (singulos ~ singulos); though one might also suppose that talk of non-monarchical rule would have been frowned upon by certain people in 1450s Spain. duplex est species ~ involuntarie: Sent. Eth. v.4.3–4, simplified and explained legally with a proof-text. legiste dicunt: Cod. iv.10.5 (lex Sicut De obligationibus et actionibus) “Sicut initio libera potestas unicuique est habendi vel non habendi contractus, ita renuntiare semel constitutae obligationi adversario non consentiente minime potest”; the wording of the quotation is taken from the heading of the law in glossed recensions.

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debet, dicitur observari justicia commutativa, nam ad justiciam commutativam pertinet observare equalitatem in omnibus commutacionibus que inter homines fiunt, tam in voluntariis quam in involuntariis, sive sint clandestine sive violente. Lib. 1 Cap. 12 [De justicia] Capitulum quintum Juxta hec est animadvertendum quod in quacumque specie justicie est equalitas observanda, sed debet observari secundum quandam proporcionalitatem.102 Si enim sine differencia equaliter omnia omnibus distribuerentur, vel in commutacionibus equalitas materialiter ad litteram servaretur, non esset justicia sed injusticia premaxima. Proporcio tamen diversimode fieri debet. In distributiva enim justicia proporcio fit sic: debet attendi qualitas personarum quibus distribucio fit et quantitas rerum que distribuuntur, et proporcionare quantitatem rei cum qualitate persone, et hac proporcione habita distribuere, ut in exemplo: si princeps vult distribuere centum decem militibus et cuilibet militi dat decem, equaliter videtur distribuere quantum ad rem, sed non est equalis distribucio si persone sunt inequales, est enim digniori magis tribuendum. Dignitas autem consideratur diversimode secundum diversas policias provinciarum, nam in aliquibus provinciis curant solum de libertate et omnes liberos reputant equales, in aliis preponunt divicias, alii attendunt nobilitatem, alii virtutem; et hec est recta policia, ut late hec tractantur in libro

Cap. 12 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m xiiȷm H 102

6 fit sic αB sic fit β

est equalitas observanda: for Arist. “proportionality” is a mathematical idea (EN 1131b12– 1132a1 καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν [in διανομή distributio] γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί. […] τὸ δ’ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι [commutationibus] δίκαιον […] κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν), to which he adds a pseudo-etymology, δίκαιον < δίχα “divided down the middle, in two equal parts” (1132a25–35 ὥσπερ γραμμῆς εἰς ἄνισα τετμημένης, ᾧ τὸ μεῖζον τμῆμα τῆς ἡμισείας ὑπερέχει, τοῦτ’ ἀφεῖλε καὶ τῷ ἐλάττονι τμήματι προσέθηκεν [ὁ δικαστὴς]. […] τὸ δ’ ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ […]· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν). Aquinas seizes on this with the inordinate glee of a schoolboy mathematician: aequale in iustitia commutativa non attenditur secundum proportionalitatem illam, scilicet geometricam, […] sed magis secundum arithmeticam […]: sex enim secundum arithmeticam proportionalitatem medium est inter octo et quatuor, […] sed non est proportio eadem utrobique, nam sex se habet ad quatuor in sesquialtera proportione, octo autem ad sex in sesquitertia; e contrario vero secundum geometricam

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commutative justice is being maintained, for it belongs to commutative justice to maintain equality in all transactions between men, both voluntary and involuntary, whether they be clandestine or violent. 1.12 [On justice.] Chapter 5 In this connexion we should note that equality is to be observed in whatever kind of justice, but it must be maintained in accord with some proportionality. If everything were to be distributed equally to everyone without distinction, or if in transactions equality were to be kept materially to the letter, it would not be justice but gross injustice. However, proportion should come about in different ways. In distributive justice proportion comes about thus: attention must be paid to the quality of the persons to whom the distribution is made and the quantity of the things being distributed, and the quantity of the thing made proportional to the quality of the person, and distribution should be made in the light of this proportion. For example, if a prince wishes to distribute to a hundred and ten men-at-arms and gives each ten, he appears to distribute equally as far as the money is concerned, but it is not an equal distribution if the persons and unequal, for more should be given to the more worthy. Worth, however, is regarded in different ways according to the different constitutions of provinces; in some they care only for liberty and consider all free men equal, in others they put wealth first, others pay attention to nobility, others virtue; and this latter is the right constitution, as treated at length

proportionalitatem medium exceditur et excedit secundum eamdem proportionem sed non secundum eamdem quantitatem, sic enim sex est medium inter novem et quatuor, utrobique enim invenitur sesquialtera proportio, etc., etc. (Sent. Eth. v.6.4); and on the divided line, tres lineae aequales, in quarum una scribatur in terminis a-a, in alia b-b, in tertia g-g; linea ergo b-b maneat figura indivisa, linea vero a-a dividatur per medium in puncto e, linea vero g-g dividatur per medium in puncto z, auferatur ergo a linea quae est a-a una pars quae est a-e et apponatur lineae quae est g-g et vocetur hoc appositum g-d, etc., etc. (ibid., v.7.2–6) Cartagena magisterially ignores all this and cuts straight to matter relevant to a ruler: proportion as rank (“ut in exemplo: si princeps vult” 9; cf. the impersonal wording in Sent. Eth. v.6.5 “quod non consideratur ibi diversa proportio personarum”) and whether this contravenes biblical prohibitions of acceptio personarum, drawing on Geraldus (next nn).

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Politicorum.103 Cum ergo distribucio fit, est attendendum illud secundum quod attenditur dignitas in illa policia cui preest distribuens. In recta autem policia, ut dictum est, attendenda est virtus; si ergo aliquis princeps expugnato castro vult distribuere spolia militibus, non equaliter distribuet, sed si donat centum duci qui secum duxit mille milites debet donare decem capitaneo vel baroni qui duxit centum milites, et proporcionare per hunc modum: sicut se habent centum ad ducem mille militum, ita se habent decem ad capitaneum centum militum.104 Et hec proporcio dicitur geometrica, in qua non attenditur numerus rei sed habetur respectus ad quotam, nam sicut dux excedit capitaneum in decuplo, ita res donata duci excedit rem donatam capitaneo in decuplo, nisi strenuitas capitanei supleat numerum gentium. Nam in proporcione habenda est racio meritorum, et hec est proporcio que debet observari in justicia distributiva, tam in distribucionibus bellicis quam pacis, et quando recte et bene observatur conquiescunt homines et sibi satisfactum putant, quando vero in hac proporcione peccatur oriuntur scandala, jurgia, et murmuraciones; cum

25 rem donatam αB donatam rem β 103

Dignitas autem consideratur diversimode: EN 1131a26–29 τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς νομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ’ ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ’ ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλοῦτον, οἳ δ’ εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ’ ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετήν/Sent. Eth. v.4.11: Non tamen dignitatem distributionis omnes secundum idem attendunt, sed in democratica politia, in qua scilicet plebs dominatur, attenditur dignitas secundum libertatem, quia enim plebei sunt aequales aliis in libertate, ideo reputant dignum esse ut aequaliter eis principentur; sed in oligarchica politia, in qua aliqui pauci principantur, mensuratur dignitas secundum divitias vel secundum nobilitatem generis, ut scilicet illi qui sunt excellentiores genere vel divitiis plus habeant de bonis communibus; sed in politia aristocratica in qua aliqui principantur propter virtutem, mensuratur dignitas secundum virtutem; ut scilicet ille plus habeat qui plus abundat in virtute. Et sic patet quod medium iustitiae distributivae accipitur secundum proportionalitatem. et hec est recta policia: the reference to Arist. Pol. is from Geraldus, despite his muddled idea that dēmokratía and oligarchía meant in the first instance not constitutions but classes (plebei, burgenses): Omnes enim in quacumque civitate confitentur opertere esse in distributionibus mensuram et regulam secundum dignitatem quandam […]. Tamen non omnes cives secundum diversas civilitates ordinati dicunt esse unam et eandem dignitatem que mereatur honorari; sed democratici dicunt illam dignitatem esse libertatem (isti sunt plebei qui non parificantur maioribus nisi in sola libertate [i.e. being free men, not slaves] et idcirco libertatem extollunt); oligargici vero dicunt hanc dignitatem esse divitias (isti sunt burgenses potentes et divites qui divitiarum facultatem extollunt quia in ea cete-

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in Politics. Thus whenever a distribution is made, we must pay attention to the factor that defines worth in the constitution of which the distributor is head. In a right constitution, as I have said, virtue must be the yardstick. Thus, if after a stronghold is conquered some prince wishes to distribute the spoils to his menat-arms, he will not distribute them equally; instead, if he grants one hundred to the duke who led a thousand men-at-arms he should grant ten to the captain or baron who led a hundred men-at-arms, and so on proportionately: as a hundred is to the duke of a thousand men-at-arms, so is ten to the captain of a hundred men-at-arms. This proportion is called geometric; it is not based on a numerical division of the amount but scaled by a constant ratio, so that as the duke exceeds the captain by ten times, so the amount granted to the duke exceeds the amount granted to the captain by ten times, unless the captain’s enterprising keenness makes up the number of his troops, for rewards should also take proportional account of merits. This is the proportion that should be observed in distributive justice for distributions in both war and peace. When it is rightly and correctly observed men acquiesce and think themselves satisfied; but when there are infringements of this proportion, scandals, quarrels, and murmurs arise, for when goods are equally distributed to unequal persons,

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ros antecellunt; quidam autem nati ex oligargicis dicunt hanc libertatem esse nobilitatem generis […]); aristocratici vero sicut boni et virtuosi dicunt hanc dignitatem esse virtutem, que sola meretur honorari […]. Ad evidentiam autem huius particule notabitur quod tres sunt recti principatus, scilicet regnum ubi principatur unus ad commune conferens vel commodum; aristocratia ubi principantur pauci virtuosi et boni ad commune conferens; politia vel policratia ubi principantur multi ad commune conferens. Tres vero sunt transgressiones, […] tyrannis, […] oligarchia […], democratia ubi principantur multi plebei ad sua commoda […]. Hec autem habentur in li. viii c. x et iii et iiii Politice. (Guiral Ot 1500 v.6, f. 100v) In Pol. iii 1274b32–1288b6 (at 1287b36–1288b2) Arist. argues that the best polity is one ruled by its best citizens. Cartagena is more balanced than Geraldus, for he does not indulge in cheap social denigration; but he ignores Arist. For him “right” unquestioningly means monarchy; not bothering with the Gk terms, he begins casually with a feudal prince and his milites “knights” and goes on in the next paragraph, entirely his own addition, to equate “recta policia” with medieval estates-theory, while taking aristokratía as a purely moral term. aliquis princeps expugnato castro vult distribuere: cf. lower down in Guiral Ot 1500 v.6, ff. 100v–101r: Ponatur ergo quod bona unius castelli data sint expugnantibus et capientibus ipsum. Venit comes qui vocatur a cum centum armatis, et venit baro qui vocetur b cum quinquaginta armatis; capto castello dividuntur spolia in duas partes, una tamen est alteri dupla et vocatur g, altera vero subdupla et vocatur d. Hiis ergo sic dispositis patet quod est proportio quedam comitis ad baronem.

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enim inequalibus personis equaliter bona distribuuntur vel equalibus inequaliter, solent magna scandala oriri, ut in multis mundi partibus factum legimus. Sepe eciam etsi in rei veritate non peccetur, si tamen illi qui recipiunt credunt peccari, conqueruntur. Simile eciam in contribucionibus intelligendum est. Debent enim subditi compelli ad contribuendum secundum hanc proporcionem; si enim sine proporcione contribuere cogerentur, peccaretur contra justiciam distributivam. Proporcio autem contribucionis attenditur secundum diversas consuetudines et statuta provinciarum. In aliquibus namque tributis consideratur quantitas facultatum, in aliis qualitas personarum, in aliis mercature et negociaciones, prout quelibet civitas sibi statuit; unaqueque enim provincia habundat in suo sensu. Et quod dicimus in distribucionibus bonorum, idem accipiendum est in laboribus et periculis; nam sicut honores et bona temporalia sunt distribuenda proporcionaliter, ita ad labores et ad pericula sunt vocandi subditi proporcionaliter, attenta qualitate personarum et rerum. Frequentius enim sunt vocandi milites ad defendendum rem publicam quam agricole, quia illi de stipendiis rei publice eciam tempore pacis vivunt, isti ipsam rem publicam peccuniis propriis et laboribus adiuvant; et sic in similibus. Et quod in principe et re publica dicimus idem intelligendum est in quocumque domino inferiori per respectum ad subditos, ut quilibet potest videre in regimine proprie domus; sed in principe exemplificamus quia est clarius exemplum. Sed dicetur forsam, si in distributiva justicia attenditur qualitas personarum et unus alteri est preferendus, ergo permittitur accepcio personarum, quod tamen legimus utriusque Testamenti tabula esse prohibitum.105 Sed sciendum est quod accepcio personarum proprie est preponere vel postponere personam persone propter causam indebitam; quando vero in distribuendo prefertur persona persone propter majorem virtutem non dicitur accepcio personarum, quia proprie loquendo non est preferre personam sed virtutem vicio, cum bonus prefertur non bono, vel majorem virtutem minori, cum melior

52 Sed dicetur ~ justicia α, om. B (et Mcast) Sed forsan dicet aliquis si β αB est alteri β 105

53 alteri (altero O) est

Sed dicetur forsam: a demonstration of Cartagena’s cautious attitude to Aristotelian ideas that appear to challenge medieval ideology. In this case the dubiety seems highly relevant if, as the preceding paragraphs imply, qualitas personae be taken to refer merely to an individual’s social rank and power. He extracts the argument from Guiral Ot 1500 v qu.9 “Utrum acceptio personarum opponatur iustitiae distributive”, ff. 101rb–va: De tertio sciendum quod proprie possumus secundum dicta sanctorum Patrum rescribere acceptionem personarum dicentes quod est preponere vel postponere personam persone propter causam indebitam. […]

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or unequally to equal, major scandals tend to arise, as we read has happened in many parts of the world. Often, indeed, even when there is in fact no infringement, if the recipients believe that there is, they complain. The same is also to be understood of taxes. Subjects should be compelled to contribute according to this same proportion; if they were forced to contribute disproportionately it would be an infringement of distributive justice. Proportion in taxation is based on the various customs and statutes of provinces. In some tributes the quantity of means is taken into account, in others the quality of persons, in others merchandise and business dealings, as each and every city decides for itself; every province is fully content in its own opinion. And what I say about distributions of goods is likewise applicable to forced labour and dangers; just as honours and temporal goods should be distributed proportionally, so subjects should be summoned for labours and dangers proportionally, taking into account the quality of persons and things. Men-at-arms should be more frequently summoned to defend the commonwealth than farmers, since the former live at the public expense even in times of peace while the latter sustain the commonwealth with their own money and labour; and so on in similar cases. And what I say about the prince and commonwealth is also applicable to any lesser lord with respect to his subjects, as anyone can see from the governance of his own household; but I use the prince as an instance because it is the clearest example. It will perhaps be said that if attention is given to the quality of persons in distributive justice and one is to be preferred to another, then class discrimination is permitted; but we read in the Table of both Testaments that this is prohibited. We should know, however, that properly discrimination is putting one person before or behind another for undue cause; whereas when in distribution one person is preferred to another for greater virtue, it is not called discrimination, since properly speaking it is not preferring the person but virtue to vice, when a good man is preferred to a not good man, or greater virtue to lesser, when a better man is preferred to a good one; and this pertains

Et ad hoc tendit intentio Philosophi in 3. conclusione dicentis quod proportio rerum distribuendarum debet fieri secundum proportionem personalium meritorum illorum in quantum meritorum […]; si honores sint distribuendi bonis propter causam bonitatis, bonus erit simpliciter honorandus, sed magis bonus magis honorandus et maxime bonus maxime honorandus; but by twisting words, manages to leave class discrimination unscathed. utriusque Testamenti: 2 Chr 19:7 “non est enim apud Dominum […] personarum acceptio”; Rom 2:11 “non est personarum acceptio apud Deum.”

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132 60

preponitur bono; et hoc pertinet ad justiciam distributivam. Sin autem in distribuendo propter aliquam indebitam causam seu affeccionem preponeretur unus alii, tunc pervertitur justicia et judicium, unde Gregorius ait: Quatuor modis humanum judicium pervertitur: timore, dum metu potestatis alicujus veritatem loqui pertimescimus; cupiditate, dum premio animum alicujus corrumpimus; odio, dum contra quemlibet adversarium mollimur; amore, dum amico vel propinquo prestare auxilium contendimus, (Undecima, questione tercia, c. Quatuor)106

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quia quecumque harum causarum est indebita ad preponendum personam persone tam in commutativa justicia quam in distributiva; et hec est proprie accepcio personarum que prohibita est jure divino et humano. Lib. 1 Cap. 13 [De justicia] Capitulum sextum In commutativa justicia est observanda proporcio non geometrica quam diximus observari debere in distributiva, sed alia que appellatur arismetica et hec est illa proporcio secundum quam attenditur quantitas rei, non qualitas personarum. Si enim aliquis emit rem pro centum, non attendimus an sit nobilis vel ignobilis, virtuosus vel ne, sed quisquis sit ille si centum debet centum solvat. Et ad evidentiorem intellectum hujus est animadvertendum quod justicia consistit in quadam equalitate. Cum ergo in commutacionibus humanis reperitur inequalitas, per viam justicie est reducenda ad equalitatem; quod in voluntariis commutacionibus satis clarum est, ut puta si Ticius per aliquem contractum habuit a Seyo rem valentem centum est in lucro valenti centum, Seyus vero sentit dampnum in centum; si igitur Ticius per seipsum satisfacere non vult, recurritur ad judicem tanquam ad justiciam animatam, qui tollendo lucrum indebitum a Ticio et dando Seyo adequat eos, et sic nullus eorum sentit dampnum nec lucrum.107 Si dubitatur inter eos an sit aliqua inequalitas, judex determinat et reducit eos ad equalitatem, si inequales reperit; et hoc est manifestum reperire in omnibus commutacionibus voluntariis.

61 aliquam αB aliam β (otra Mcast) 14 Si αB Si vero β 106

Cap. 13 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m xiiiȷm H

11 igitur αB ergo β

Gregorius ait: Decretum C.11.3.78. Richter & Friedberg omit auxilium, though their app. crit. shows it was a common reading; and state in a note: “Apud Gregorium non est inventum, sed apud Isidorum.”

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to distributive justice. If, on the other hand, one is placed in front of another in distribution through some improper cause or affection, then the course of justice is perverted. In this regard Gregory says: Human judgment is perverted in four ways: by cowardice, when we are frightened to speak the truth from fear of some potentate; by greed, when we corrupt someone’s mind by bribery; by hate, when we plot against some adversary; by love, when we strive to give help to a friend or relation. (C.11, quest. 3.78 Quatuor) Any one of these is an improper cause for placing one person in front of another, in commutative just as much as in distributive justice; and this is the proper meaning of discrimination, which is prohibited by divine and human law. 1.13 [On justice.] Chapter 6 In commutative justice we are not to observe the geometric proportion that I said should be observed in the distributive, but another called arithmetic. This is the proportion based on the quantity of the amount, not the quality of the persons. If, for example, someone buys a thing for one hundred, we pay no regard to whether he is noble or ignoble, virtuous or not; whoever he is, if he owes one hundred, let him pay one hundred. For a clearer understanding of this we should note that justice depends on a certain equality. Thus when inequality is discovered in human transactions, it must be brought back to equality by means of justice. This is clear enough in voluntary transactions. For instance, if by some contract Titius has received a thing worth one hundred from Seius, then he is in profit to the amount of one hundred while Seius is in loss to the same amount. Now, if Titius is unwilling to make good the debt by himself, the case is brought before a judge, as the embodiment of justice, who makes them equal again by taking the improper profit from Titius and giving it back to Seius; so neither of them makes a loss nor a profit. If any doubt persists between them as to whether there is any inequality, the judge sentences and brings them back to equality, if he finds any inequality between them; and this is manifestly to be found in all voluntary transactions.

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ad judicem tanquam ad justiciam animatam: EN iv.5 1132a21 ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον δίκαιον ἔμψυχον. Cartagena’s example shows his legal training; “Titius et Sejus” were the civil lawyers’ names for “Smith and Jones” (cf. i.31 n186, below). B, not recognizing this, read socius “partner” for both.

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In involuntariis autem est observanda hec eadam proporcio, licet non sit ita magnifesta; sed patebit in exemplis.108 Si quis rapit alicui aliquam rem, hic est consideranda duplex inequalitas: prima quia dominus sentit dampnum rei et predo habet lucrum ejus, secunda quod predo habuit lucrum secundum intencionem suam, licet in rei veritate non sit lucrum, scilicet quod implevit voluntatem suam, et dominus dampnum, quia fracta est voluntas sua et sensit tristiciam et rancorem in ablacione rei sue. Quid ergo facit justicia animata que est justus judex? Aufert rem a predone et restituet domino, et sic prima inequalitas reducitur ad equalitatem; puniet insuper predonem in triplo secundum jus commune vel in alia pena secundum leges municipales et diversa statuta, et dabit domino; et sic sicut res fuit ablata a domino et applicata predoni, sic auferetur a predone et restituetur domino et hec prima inequalitas reducitur ad equalitatem, et sicut predo gaudebat tempore rapine et dominus tristabatur, sic in solucione pene predo tristabitur, dominus gaudebit, et sic secunda inequalitas tollitur et devenit ad equalitatem. Simile in furto et in aliis criminibus, sed pena minuitur et augetur secundum quod magis vel minus offenditur, ut patet per diversas materias jurium. Hinc enim sumi potuerunt multe theorice juris positivi; inducunt namque jura acciones diversas, quarum aliquas vocant rei persequutorias, alias penales, et puniunt criminosos diversimode, que omnia si quis bene adverterit ex fonte hujus commutative justicie procedere videbit. Interdum tamen non potest reduci lucrum ad equalitatem sed reducitur dampnum, ut si unus occidat alium occisus sensit dampnum quia perdidit vitam, occisor sensit illud quod lucrum putabat, licet non esset, scilicet implere voluntatem suam in occidendo; judex ergo occidit occisorem et sic adequat eum in dampno cum occiso quia perdit similiter vitam, sed occisus non sentit lucrum quia mortuus erat; sentiunt tamen aliqualem consolacionem consanguinei et qui eum diligebant.109 Sed forsam dicetur quod in hac justicia commutativa non est attendenda proporcio arismetica que considerat quantitatem rei; ut puta si subditus percuteret principem, absurdum esset dicere quod dumtaxat repercuteretur, sed

18 rapit α rapuit Bβ 27 a om. β 30 ante dominus ins. et β advenit β venit B 41 similiter αB simpliciter β 108

31 devenit α (tráese Mcast)

patebit in exemplis: all his own, as far as we can tell, and more to the point than Aquinas or Geraldus, who carry on with their struggles to express mathematical ideas that would now strike any child familiar with algebra (which they were not) as elementary. By his reference to leges municipales et diversa statuta in 26 Cartagena shows clearly the distinct discipline within which he is working; he could go on (“sumi potuerunt multe theorice juris”, 33) but, obeying his own rule when talking of virtue (i.Prol. 40–42), virtuously exercises self-control.

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In involuntary ones this same proportion is to be observed, even if it is not so manifest; but examples will make it clear. If someone robs something from someone, there is a double inequality to be considered: first because the owner suffers loss of the thing and the robber has profit of it, and second that the robber profited from his intention (even though in truth it is not a profit), that is to say, carried out his will, whereas the owner suffered his loss, since his will was flaunted and he feels grief and rancour at his property being taken. What, then, does the embodied justice that is the just judge do? He takes the property away from the robber and restores it to the owner, thereby reducing the first inequality to equality; but he will also punish the robber by a threefold fine according to common law or by some other penalty according to the municipal by-laws and various statutes, and give it to the owner; and so, as the property was taken from the owner and acquired by the robber, it will be taken from the robber and restored to the owner, so reducing the first inequality to equality, and as the robber rejoiced at the time of his robbery and the owner was aggrieved, in paying the penalty the robber will be aggrieved and the owner will rejoice, thereby removing the second inequality and restoring equality. The same holds for theft and other crimes, except that the penalty is decreased or increased according to the greater or less gravity of the offence, as is made clear in the various sections of the laws. Here one could have taken up many theoretical points of positive law; for instance, the law codes introduce various kinds of prosecution called charges for recovery or penal cases, and punish criminals in various ways, all of which anyone who well examines them will see flow from this commutative justice. Sometimes a profit cannot be restored to equality, only the loss reduced, as when someone kills another; the victim suffers the loss of his life, the killer feels what he thought was his gain (though it was not), namely carrying out his will by killing; the judge therefore kills the killer, and so makes him suffer the same loss as the victim because he too loses his life, but the murdered man feels no gain because he is already dead; all the same, some consolation is felt by his relatives and those who loved him. It will perhaps be said that this commutative justice should not be based on the aspect of arithmetic proportion that takes into consideration the quantity of the matter. For instance, if a subject were to strike the prince, it would be absurd to say that he should merely be struck back; it is necessary that he be

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sensit dampnum ~ sentiunt tamen: the MSS variously spell sent- senc- sens- all four uses of sentire (app. min. var.), but not to distinguish pres. from perf. since both were pronounced the same (/senʦ-it/ → /sens-it/); all are pres., as in 22 above. We resist regularizing, however, since the phonology was integral to the spellings.

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opportet eum majori pena puniri; et si princeps percuteret aliquem plebeyum, inconveniens esset quod ipse repercuteretur. Quam ob rem sciendum est quod aliqui de antiquis philosophis voluerunt quod justicia commutativa fieret semper per contrapassum; et isti fuerunt Pitagorici, contrapassum autem appellant quod juriste dicunt penam talionis, hoc est dicere quod qui aliquid fecerit simile contrapatiatur. Quod falsum est; nam licet aliquando hoc fiat, non tamen semper, ut patet intuenti diversas penas criminum.110 Ridiculum enim esset dicere quod adulter in penam adulterii in uxore sua adulterium pateretur, quia per hoc uxor offenderetur et pena peccatum induceret.111 Est ergo proporcio in commutativa justicia observanda non secundum contrapassum accionis et passionis sed secundum quantitatem rei et quandam equalem proporcionalitatem accionum et passionum. Et ut hoc clarius videatur, est considerandum quod per commutativam justiciam interdum est ad equalitatem reducendum nocumentum rei, interdum persone. Quando tractatur de nocumento rei habetur respectus ad quantitatem rei, non ad qualitatem persone; si enim princeps vel plebeyus centum debet, illa solvere tenetur non attenta differencia persone, ut dictum est. Quando est nocumentum persone non attenditur solummodo quantitas accionis vel passionis sed qualitas personarum, quia qualitas persone auget vel minuit quantitatem accionis vel passionis, ut in exemplo suprascripto. Si plebeyus leviter percutiat principem, non equalia pateretur si et ipse leviter repercutiatur, quia nedum nocuit persone principis sed totam rem publicam lesit; et hinc est quod hoc crimen vocant legiste lese magestatis et punitur gravissima pena per legem Juliam, diversimode tamen secundum diversa capita legis.112 Si princeps autem percutit leviter plebeyum, non esset equalis

57 equalem om. β 110

62 persone om. β

69 gravissima pena αB pena gravissima β

isti fuerunt Pitagorici: EN 1132b21–30 δοκεῖ δέ τισι καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς [“reciprocation”] εἶναι ἁπλῶς δίκαιον, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔφασαν. […] πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ· οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, οὐ δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν, οὐ πληγῆναι μόνον δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι/Sent. Eth. v.8.1 “haec fuit sententia Pictagoricorum, qui determinabant quod simpliciter iustum est idem quod contrapassum. […] improbat praedictam positionem […] dicens quod contrapassum non congruit circa iustum distributivum […]; ut si aliquis in principatu constitutus percusserit aliquam privatam personam, non requirit hoc iustitia quod princeps repercutiatur, et similiter si aliquis percutiat principem, oportet quod non solum percutiatur sed quod etiam gravius puniatur”. Cartagena swiftly identifies this as lex talionis, carefully setting it in the ambit of Roman law, which preferred equitable compensation; for as he well knew, falsum est: in the Sermon on the Mount Christ banned the OT “eye for an eye” (‫עין תחת עין‬, Ex 21:22–25, Lev 24:19–21) with his injunction to turn the other cheek (Mt 5:38–39; August. Contra Faustum 19.3). It was a major point of controversy for medieval commentators.

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punished with a greater penalty. Conversely, if the prince were to strike some plebeian, it would be unfitting that he should be struck back. On this subject we should know that some ancient philosophers held that commutative justice should always take reciprocal form; I refer to the Pythagoreans, who gave the name contrapassum ‘suffering in return’ to what jurists call retaliation in kind, that is to say, that when someone has done something, he should suffer the same in return. But this is false; though it is sometimes done, anyone who looks into the various punishments for crimes will clearly see that it is not always so. It would be ridiculous, for example, to say that an adulterer should be made to suffer reciprocal adultery on his wife as punishment for his adultery; that would be an offence against his wife, and the punishment would involve a sin. Proportion is to be observed in commutative justice, then, not by a reciprocity of deed and retaliation but by the quantity of the matter and some equitable proportionality of deeds and retaliations. To see this more clearly we should consider that by commutative justice equality has sometimes to be restored for an offence against property, sometimes for an offence against the person. When it is a case of an offence against property regard is had to the quantity of the thing, not the quality of the person; whether a prince or a plebeian owes one hundred, he is obliged to pay them without regard to the difference of person, as I have said, but when it is an offence against the person it is not just the quantity of the deed or the retaliation which is taken into account but the quality of the persons, because the quality of the person increases or diminishes the quantity of the deed or retaliation, as in the example above. If a plebeian lightly strikes the prince, it would not be an equitable punishment for him too to be

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adulter in penam adulterii: cf. Guiral Ot 1500 iv.8 “Utrum contrapassum sit simpliciter iustum”, f. 104va “Secundo, quod nulla punitio iusta est inhonesta et preiudicialis […], puta si aliquis habens bonam uxorem mechatus est cum uxore proximi sui, si modo in hoc eodem puniretur quod quis mecharetur cum sua, esset utique punitio inhonesta et preiudicialis illi bone mulieri, quamvis sic fuerit punitus David rex Israel, ut habetur 2 Re. 12 et 16. Ille tamen qui hoc fecit, sc. filius eius, inhoneste egit et iniustissime.” per legem Juliam: EN 1132b29–30/Sent. Eth. v.8.4 “non requirit iustitia quod princeps (ἄρχοντα) repercutiatur”. Cartagena expands with a reference to the law of treason, l. Julia maiestatis (Dig. xlviii.4, Cod. ix.8), to which Geraldus also alludes (Guiral Ot 1500 iv qu.12, f. 104rb “commisit crimen lese maiestatis”); but he alone adds the remarkable recommendation that a prince be swayed by “aliqualem ruborem, vel forsam consiliari[os] ejus,” to refrain from striking his subjects. Doubtless this reflected things he had witnessed; but it also hints at a view of the majesty befitting the royal office, as embodying tota res publica, that was forward-looking.

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proporcio quod et ipse leviter repercuteretur, quia tota res publica offenderetur; sed sentiat aliqualem ruborem, vel forsam consiliarii ejus vel alii de latere suo aliqua ei dicent ut a similibus retrahatur. In aliis eciam multis casibus contrapassus seu talionis pena non observatur; si enim aliquis sine dolo per culpam hominem occiderit, non occidetur sed aliter punietur. Sic ergo in commutativa justicia quando attenditur nocumentum rerum fit proporcio arismetica per respectum ad quantitatem rei; quando de accionibus et passionibus tractatur, in ista proporcione habetur eciam respectus ad qualitatem persone et accionis et passionis, quia per has qualitates augetur vel minuitur quantitas nocumenti. Lib. 1 Cap. 14 [De justicia] Capitulum septimum Verum quia hec equalitas non posset semper observari in commutacionibus propter diversas indigencias hominum, quia non habent alii quod aliis expedit, ut quia vendens triticum eget vino et emptor non habet, adinventa fuit peccunia, per quam omnia mensurarentur.113 Nichil enim aliud est peccunia quam mensura omnium rerum quarum comercium est; nam sicut per mensuram metiuntur homines bladum et alia, ita per peccuniam metimur valorem omnium rerum.114 Quis enim sciret quot equos valet una domus, nisi per Cap. 14 tit. AB, om. JQ Capl̛m xvm H 113

adinventa fuit peccunia: EN 1133a20–31 ἐφ’ ὃ τὸ νόμισμ’ ἐλήλυθε, καὶ γίνεταί πως μέσον· πάντα γὰρ μετρεῖ/Sent. Eth. v.9.2 “Et ad hoc inventum est numisma, id est denarius, per quem mensurantur pretia talium rerum”. Scholastic and canonistic discussion of money and economics was extensive, and all of it took this passage and Pol. 1257a–1258b as its basis (Jourdain 1888, esp. 428–431; Langholm 1992; Roncaglia 2005, 27–37; for critique of Arist. see now Meikle 1995, replacing such negative evaluations as Finley 1970). The dominant themes were therefore theories of exchange (this passage on just price and the uses of money as medium of exchange and unit of measure) and value in use vs. value in exchange (the Pol. passage on “improper” or “unnatural” modes of aquiring wealth through commerce and usury, mirroring “a certain contempt for mercantile activity typical of the dominant classes in a society based on slave labour”, Roncaglia 2005, 27–28 n22). Medieval “theological economics” considered these as ethical and religious problems, analysing money and the market process not as part of any general theory of the mechanics of the economic system, but through the lenses of Patristic condemnations of wealth and private property, Aristotelian metaphysics, and canonistic concepts of volition and free choice vs. need (indigentia) and compulsion as the basis for fair exchange. Nevertheless, the real needs of society resulted in a “detailed casuistry” to defend commercial practices (e.g. Aquinas’s justification of loans at moderate interest in certain circumstances) and justify practical policies and institutions (notably, royal control of the currency) that considerably modified or contradicted Arist.’s premises (Wood 2002, esp. Ch. 3 “What is Money?”, 69–88). Strikingly, however, Cartagena’s following discussion of the topic shows no interest in such theological and philosophical questions; he ostentatiously ignores as technical niceties (“theorice […] ad determinandas aliquas difficiles questiones”, 43–44)

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lightly struck back, because he did not merely offend the person of the prince, but harmed the whole commonwealth, which is why the civilists call this crime lese-majesty, which is punished by the lex Julia with the most serious penalties, and in various other ways by various chapters of the law. If, on the other hand, the prince lightly strikes a plebeian, it would not be an equitable proportion for him to be struck back lightly, since that would offend the commonwealth as a whole; instead let him feel some shame, or perhaps his counsellors or other trusted companions will say something to him so that he refrains from such actions. There are many other cases in which reciprocity or retaliation is not observed; for example, if someone should kill a man by mistake and without malice aforethought, he will not be executed, but punished in some other way. Thus in commutative justice, when the question is the damage to property, an arithmetic proportion is made regarding the quantity of the thing; when it is a question of deeds and retaliations, this proportion also takes into account the quality of the person, the deed, and the retaliation, because these qualities increase or diminish the quantity of the offence. 1.14 [On justice.] Chapter 7 However, this equality cannot always be observed in transactions, due to the various needs of men; one does not have what the other requires, for example a seller of grain needs wine but the buyer has none. This was the reason for the invention of money, by which all things are measured. For money is nothing other than the measure of all things that can be traded; just as men measure wheat and other things with a measuring-stick, so with money we measure the value of everything. Who would know how many horses a house is worth if we

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the long questiones on indigentia as the origin of inequity in economic exchange by authorities such Geraldus, Burley, and Buridan—the root of the problem for theologians—, Aquinas’s logical quiddities (“sic denarius fit quodam modo medium, […] quasi dicat quae mensurat superabundantiam et defectum”, etc.), and even the legal sources on whether money is an artificial token or a commodity in itself (Dig. xviii.1.1, etc.; Cartagena takes the former view—Arist. is notoriously ambiguous—but, as he makes clear below, not on philosophical grounds but because he was thinking of contemporary “monies of account” like the maravedí). Sidelining all this, he expands upon strictly practical examples of the “summa utilitas” of money and how currency impinges upon public life and royal policy. bladum: non-class., and not in Aquinas; Du Cange i, 672 “Gall. Blé: sic autem appellabant quodvis triticum, etsi differet a frumento, […] puriori scilicet nec aliis granis mixto tritico.” The choice of this vulgarism instead of Aquinas’s triticum would seem motivated by Cartagena’s aim of an easy “pedestrian” style; though the word (< Frankish blād “leaf”) has no present-day vern. reflexes in Iberia except Cat. blat (Alcover & Moll 2002 s.v.), corde lists Bernard de Gordon 1495, f. 13vb Cap. 14 “el vino & blado”; Alfonso de Zamora (trans.), Morales de Ovidio, BNE Mss/10144 http://bdh.bne.es/bnesearch/detalle/bdh0000068653, f. 35v “el blado o el vino”.

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peccuniam metiremur? Aiunt enim, “domus illa valet mille, equus valet centum”, ergo illa domus valet decem equos. Et sic fit in omnibus rebus quarum comercium habemus. Res enim que habent valorem a natura apreciantur et extimantur per rem que non habet valorem a natura sed a lege hominum, nam peccunia a natura nullius valoris est; ad nullum namque usum est peccunia in quantum peccunia, quia licet ex auro posset fieri aliquid ad utensilia domus, tamen redactum in monetam ad nichilum prodest nisi ad expendendum, et si homines peccuniam acceptare nollent nullius prorsus valoris esset secundum naturam. Si enim omnes concordarent ut de peccunia non curaretur, nichil valeret; quod non est in aliis rebus, nam etsi universi principes statuerent quod tritico et vino non uteremur, nichilominus esset utile et valens ad sustentacionem hominum, nec humana lege posset valor ejus destrui. Monete autem valorem cotidie videmus mutari, inde est quod denarios vocamus numos; numus dicitur a nomos Grece, quod est “lex” Latine, unde sumitur numisma, quasi legisma, id est res valens a lege.115 Et hinc potuit habere ortum communis loquucio qua homines utuntur, solent enim dicere monetarum apreciatores cum monetam monete comparant, “Ista est melioris legis”, quasi dicant nulla earum valet a natura, sed ista habet majorem valorem a lege et per legem alteri est preponenda. Gradus autem valoris quos quirata seu denarios vocant ad legem semper referunt dicentes “meliorem legem istius quam illius in tot quiratis vel denariis”, quasi per legem sint gradus distincti, non per naturam.116 Quod eciam patet manifeste cum nonnulle gentes peccuniam non recipiant, ut in

16 omnes α homines Bβ (los onbres Mcast) | curaretur α (se non oviese cuydado Mcast) curarent Bβ 18–19 esset (esse J) utile ~ hominum α, om. B Mcast usus eorum esset necessarius β 19 ejus αB eorum β 27 in om. β (mejor es la ley […] en tantos quilates Mcast) 29 recipiant α -piunt Bβ 115

unde sumitur numisma: EN 1133a29–31 οἷον δ’ ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἐστί/Sent. Eth. v.9.5 “inde est quod denarius vocatur numisma: nomos enim ‘lex’ est, quia scilicet denarius non est mensura per naturam sed nomo, id est lege; est enim in potestate nostra transmutare denarios et reddere eos inutiles”.

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did not measure it by money? “That house is worth a thousand,” they say, “a horse is worth a hundred”, therefore the house is worth ten horses. And so it is with everything that we trade. Thus things that have a value by nature are priced and valued by a thing that has no value by nature, only by human law, for money is of no value by nature; of itself money has no practical use, because even if the gold could be made into some utensil for domestic use, once made into coinage it serves for no purpose except spending, and if men refused to accept money it would be entirely worthless by nature. If everyone agreed not to care about money, it would be worth nothing; it is not so with other things, for even if all the princes on earth were to decree that we should not use corn and wine, it would nevertheless be useful and valuable sustenance for men and its value could not be destroyed by human law. The value of coinage, on the other hand, we see being changed every day; that is why we call pennies “coins”; nummus “coin” comes from Greek nomos, which means lex, lēgis “law” in Latin, from which we get numisma, or so to speak legisma, i.e. “legal tender”. And this may have been the origin of the common expression men use when, for instance, currency experts comparing coin with coin pronounce, “This is more ‘legit’ ”, as if to say neither of them is worth anything by nature, but this one has more legal value and is preferable by law to the other. The grades of value called carats or pence are always referred to the law in this way: “this is so many carats or pence more legit than that”, as if to say, the grades are different by law, not nature. This is manifestly clear from the fact that several nations do not accept money, as

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melioris legis: counterbalancing a learned Gk etymology with idiom. de ley “(metal) de la cantidad de oro o plata señalada por la ley” (DRAE) is typical of Cartagena’s approach in this chapter. Pero López de Ayala, Rimado de palacio st. 616–620 made “moneda que es bien fabricada | de oro et de plata […] | rrica de buena ley” the third of nine “cosas […] con las quales tú verás | el grant poder del rey”. quirata: Du Cange vi, 611 “Quilatum, Scrupulus auri”; the form with -r- is unatt. in Lat., but correct; like Fr. and Eng. carat, It. carato, OSp. quirate (Marcuello 1987, 171 “y es de quirate tan alto”), it derives from Ar. ‫ قيراط‬qīrāṭ “weight of 4 grains” < Gk κεράτιον “little horn, carob; ⅓ of an obol”; Isid. Etym. xvi.25.10 “ceratin oboli pars media est”.

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insulis Canarie et eciam de gentibus Bragmanorum narrat Vicencius.117 Ista ergo peccunia fuit summe utilis ad commutaciones hominum. Est enim quasi quidam fidejussor inter homines; cum enim aliquis vendit triticum, datur sibi peccunia quasi si daretur sibi quidam fidejussor ad hoc ut quando eguerit tanta mensura tritici inveniat eam, seu vinum vel aliam rem que tantundem valeat sicut triticum quod vendidit. Ideo antiqui peccuniam vocabant fidejussorem, quia in commutacionibus quodammodo pro hominibus fidejubet. Nec obstat si forte precio rerum mutato rem tanti valoris non reperiat, quia illud evenit a casu; lucra enim que a fortuna et diversis humanis casibus proveniunt justicia commutativa non prohibet, dum tamen dolus vel fraus vel illicitus actus non interveniat. Hac ergo peccunia que mensura rerum est ad equalitatem observandam et justicie commutative et eciam distributive exercicium homines utuntur. Ex hiis que dicta sunt alique theorice elici possent ad determinandas aliquas difficiles questiones que circa mutaciones monete et materiam usurarum solempnes juriste in diversis locis tractarunt; sed quia proposito nostro non congruunt, ulteriora que intendimus attingamus.

30 insulis canarie α canarie insulis β canaria insula B | eciam om. β | Ista α Ideo β 31–32 quasi quidam αB quidam quasi β 32–33 fidejussor ~ quidam om. Bβ 35 peccuniam vocabant αB vocabant peccuniam β 41–42 homines utuntur α per homines fuit adinventa β hominis B 43 que haud intellegibile (pro quas?), sed sic constat in omnibus 45 attingamus α actendamus Bβ 117

Canarie: mentioned as a fable by Plin. HN vi.37.202–205 (insulae Fortunatae, one named “Canaria”) and Hor. Epod. 16.42–66, the Canaries were raided by Genoese and Iberian adventurers in the fourteenth century, and in 1344 Clement vi authorized Louis de la Cerda, admiral of France, to invade them, the licence being taken over in 1403 by Enrique iii of Castile when Béthencourt and Gadifer de la Salle established a toe-hold in Lanzarote. The Guanches’ simple lifestyle was thus well known long before Cartagena penned MV (Petrarca 1975, 498–499, Bk ii.xi “terra […] cuius pervetusta fama est et recens”, citing Hor. and the papal Bull), but the only earlier reference to their lack of money known

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in the Canary Islands and as Vincent also tells of the nations of Brahmans. But money has been extremely useful for human transactions. It is a sort of surety between men; when someone sells corn, he is given money as a sort of surety that when he should need an equal measure of corn he will be able to find it, or wine or some other thing worth the same as the corn he sold; hence the ancients named money fĭdĕjussor “a guarantor”, because in some way it stands surety for men in their transactions. Nor is it an objection if the price of goods happens to change and he cannot find a thing of the same value, because this is due to chance; commutative justice does not prohibit profits which come about by fortune and various human disasters, so long as deceit, fraud, or illicit practice are not involved. Hence men use this measure of things, money, to preserve equality and exercise commutative and also distributive justice. From what has been said one might deduce some theories for deciding certain difficult questions about manipulations of the coinage and the subject of money-lending [which (vid. app. crit.)] established jurists have discussed in various places; but as they are not relevant to our purpose, let us push on towards our ultimate goal.

to us is Boccaccio 1960, 205 “Ostensa sunt eis aurea et argentea numismata, omnino eis incognita”. Since the expedition related by Nicoloso was undertaken under the auspices of Afonso iv of Portugal, his account was doubtless known in Lisboa, where Cartagena might have picked it up; but the joint mention of Indian Brahmans suggests he may simply have attributed this well-known feature of Golden Age primitivism to both nations by conjecture (see below), to titillate the Portuguese royal dynasty’s well-publicized interest in overseas exploration. Soon afterwards, however the islands became a bone of contention between the two Crowns, which persuades us that this phrase cannot have been written as late as 1425 (Intro. § 1 n2). Bragmanorum: thirteenth-century Vincentius Bellovacensis 1591, i, f. 410 (Spec. naturale xxxi.131 De barbaris moribus Indorum) and in more detail iv, ff. 43[= 47]r–48r (Spec. historiale iv.66–71 De mutuis epistolis Alexandri et Didimi regis [Bragmanorum] super eorum philosophia) describes the ‘religio mirabilis et innocentia’ of India’s Bragmani or Brahmans; but he does not mention disdain for money.

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Lib. 1 Cap. 15 [De justicia] Capitulum octavum Premissis annectendum est quod justicie legali de qua supra scripsimus adjungitur quedam alia virtus que Grece dicitur epiqueya; ad cujus virtutis intelligenciam est attendendum quod leges disponunt in universali, ideo non possunt comprehendere omnes particulares casus qui in rebus humanis accidunt, unde et legiste dicunt, “plura sunt negocia quam vocabula”.118 Idcirco bonus legislator disponit futura prout communiter accidunt, sed de omnibus singularibus previdere non potest. Inde est quod iidem legiste dicunt, “ad ea que raro accidunt leges non adaptantur”.119 Nec enim possibile esset omnia comprehendere, quia ut canoniste aiunt, “Nulla juris sanccio, quantumcumque perpenso digesta consilio, ad humane nature varietatem et machinaciones ejus inopinabiles sufficit nec ad decisionem lucidam sue nodose ambiguitatis attingit.”120 Evenit ergo interdum aliquis casus in quo si justicia legalis observaretur magnum insurgeret inconveniens, ut in exemplo, ferunt enim in quadam civitate statutum fuisse ne peregrini muros ascenderent, et peregrinus ascendens capite puniretur; cum autem hostes in civitatem irruerent civibus ignorantibus, peregrini a casu transeuntes muros ascenderunt et civitatem ab hostibus defenderunt. Attenta igitur justicia legali capite puniri deberent, quod absurdissimum et inconveniens esset et contra justum naturale, quod vult ut benefactoribus non mala sed bona rependamus.121 Sed interveniet hic epiqueya, et quod legislator si previdisset statuisset, hoc bonus legis minister faciet; non enim legis

Cap. 15 tit. αB (c. vi[ii in marg. abscissum J), om. Q Capl̛m xvȷm H mesmos legistas Mcast) idem OBβ 118

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dicitur epiqueya: EN 1137a32–1138a3 περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἡ μὲν ἐπιείκεια πρὸς δικαιοσύνην/Sent. Eth. v.16.1 “hic determinat de epiichia […] Dicitur autem in Graeco epiiches quasi id quod est conveniens vel decens, […] observat intentionem legislatoris ubi dissonant verba legis”. Instead of Aquinas’s microscopic distinctions of the object, subject, and habitus of equity, Cartagena cuts to the chase with juridical texts. He returned to “epiqueya” and its specific political import for princes in the Prologue to Juan ii of De la clemençia (= Sen. Clem.; BNE Mss/5668, f. 3r s.v. espediente; see Fernández Gallardo 1993a, 130–134). legiste dicunt: Dig. xix.5.4 “Ulpianus Natura enim rerum conditum est ut plura sint negotia quam vocabula.” ad ea que raro accidunt leges non adaptantur: often cited, the phrase is not in CIC; jurists usually referred to Dig. i.3.5 “Nam ad ea potius debet aptari ius quae et frequenter et facile quam quae perraro eveniunt”, but leges 3–6 are similar: 3 “Iura constitui oportet […] in his quae ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον [ut plurimum] accidunt, non quae ἐκ παραλόγου [inopinato]”, 4 “Ex his quae forte uno aliquo casu accidere possunt iura non constituuntur”, 6 “Τὸ γὰρ ἅπαξ ἢ δίς [Quod enim semel aut iterum fit] […] παραβαίνουσιν οἱ νομοθέται [praetermittunt legislatores]”.

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1.15 [On justice.] Chapter 8 To the foregoing one should add that the legal justice of which I wrote above is joined by another virtue that in Greek is called epieíkeia. To understand this virtue we should recall that laws make universal rules, and so cannot include every particular case that chances to arise in human affairs; as the jurists also say, “there are more ways of occupying ourselves than words for them”. For this reason the good legislator makes future provision on the basis of how things commonly happen, but he cannot foresee every single eventuality. Hence the same jurists say, “the laws are not to be adapted for things that rarely happen”. Indeed, it would not be possible to include everything, for as the canonists say, “No sanction of the law, however carefully framed, is sufficient to cover the variety of human nature and its inconceivable machinations, nor attain a lucid solution of its knotty ambiguity.” Hence there sometimes occurs some case in which, if legal justice were to be observed, it would give rise to most unbefitting results. For example, they tell the story that in a certain city it had been decreed that no foreigners should go up on the city walls, and any foreigner who did so should suffer the death sentence. Now once, when enemies broke into the city without the knowledge of the citizens, some foreigners who happened to be passing through went up on the walls and defended the city from the enemy. By strict legal justice, then, they ought to have been punished with death, which would be utterly absurd and unbefitting and against natural justice, which enjoins us to repay benefactors not with bad things but with good. But here epieikeia will intervene, and the good minster of the law will do what the legislator would have decreed if he had foreseen it; he will not contravene

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ut canoniste aiunt: Clem. Proœmium, reading inopinales. Evenit ergo interdum: EN 1137b20–25 ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, […] τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ᾗ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης καὶ ἥμαρτεν ἁπλῶς εἰπών, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθέν […]· ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου. The example (“ut in exemplo, ferunt enim”) was added by Aquinas: legislator […] si a principio praescivisset, posuisset hoc in lege; sed non potuit comprehendere omnes casus particulares, sicut in quadam civitate statutum fuit sub poena capitis quod peregrini non ascenderent muros civitatis, ne scilicet possent dominium civitatis usurpare; hostibus autem irruentibus in civitatem, peregrini quidam ascendentes muros civitatis defenderunt civitatem ab hostibus, quos tamen non est dignum capite puniri, esset enim hoc contra ius naturale ut benefactoribus poena rependeretur. (Sent. Eth. v.16.9) It is repeated by others, e.g. Geraldus; Cartagena rewrites in more vivid style (Intro. §4, at n41).

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verbis observatis contra mentem ejus veniet, nam ut legiste dicunt, “in legem committit qui verba legis amplexus contra legis nititur voluntatem”.122 Est ergo epiqueya idem quod quid decens vel conveniens, et est habitus inclusus sub justo naturali et directivus justi legalis; nam ubi lex humana deficit, ille qui est epiques, id est habens istam virtutem secundum racionem naturalem, dirigit justum legale et suplet ubi lex deficit, illud exequendo quod bonus legislator conderet si scivisset. Hac autem virtute frequenter videmus uti in consiliis principum, et communis sermo concordare videtur; aiunt enim, cum aliquis singularis casus occurrit, “Non est bonum determinari per jura quia sequerentur illa vel illa inconveniencia, sed aliquam viam expedientem inquiri opportet.” Istud ergo expediens idem est quod epiqueya seu epiques. Sed hoc quis judex facere possit longa materia est et a nostro proposito aliena; sufficit enim quantum ad presentem intentum scire quod ille qui bene secundum hanc virtutem dirigit justum legale ubi deficit dicitur epiques, id est bono expedienti utens. Si vero dicendo expediens quod non esset quis deviet a justo legali, ut nonnumquam fit, non est ille epiques sed injustus; non enim passim hac virtute utendum est, sed cum manifestissima causa hoc petit, unde et legiste dicere solent, ut ab hiis que statuta sunt recedatur evidentissima utilitas esse debet.123 Et est proprium hujus virtuosi ad benigniora declinare, nam non pertinet ad epiques a justicia legali discedere ut graviorem penam irroget sed ut mitiorem, nec est rigorosus sed ad benignitatem declinat una quadam equitate utens quam solemus dicere arbitrium boni viri; est enim minorativus penarum.124 Non est igitur epiqueya justicia legalis, sed est quedam justicia seu habitus electivus secundum quem homo dirigit justum legale sumpta racione a justo naturali; et est medius inter justum legale secundum litteralem sentenciam legis et injustum illegale contra piam intencionem legislatoris, declinativus in punicionibus ad veniam et mediativus inter rigorem nimium et remissionem

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ut legiste dicunt: Novellae Theodosii viiii [= brev. iiii] “Non dubium est in legem committere [cf. n52, above] eum qui ~ nititur voluntatem” (Mommsen & Meyer 1905, ii, 23); cf. Sext. v.12.88, STh. ii-ii.120.1. et legiste dicere solent: Dig. i.4.2 “Ulpianus. In rebus novis constituendis evidens esse utilitas debet, ut recedatur ab eo iure quod diu aequum visum est.” rigorosus ~ minorativus penarum: eschewing acrivodikeos (Sent. Eth. v.16.12/EN 1138a1 ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀλλ’ ἐλαττωτικός), Cartagena opts for vulg. rigorosus (Du

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his intention by observing the letter of the law, for as the civilists say, “he who perverts the intention of the law by embracing the letter of the law commits a crime against the law”. Epieikeia, then, is the same as what is decent and fitting, and is a disposition included under the naturally just, and directive of the legally just; where human law fails, the man who is epieikes, that is, possessing this virtue according to natural reason, directs what is legally just and supplies what is missing in the law, executing what the good legislator would have decreed if he had known. We frequently see this virtue exercised in the counsels of princes, and common speech seems to agree; when some singular case occurs they say, “It is not good for this to be decided according to the law codes, because this or that unbefitting consequence would follow; instead some expedient way must be found.” This expediency is the same thing as epieikeia or the epieikes. What judge ay be competent to do this is a long matter, and alien to our intention; for the present purpose it is sufficient to know that the man who by using this virtue correctly steers legal justice when it fails is called epieikes, that is, one who chooses the expedient good. But if someone deviates from what is legally just by saying that something would be expedient when it is not, as occasionally happens, he is not epieikes but unjust; this virtue is not to be applied everywhere, but only when called for by the most manifest cause, for which reason the civilists usually also say that to justify departing from existing statutes there must be a very evident utility. And it is the property of a man with this virtue to tend towards the more benign remedy, for it is not typical of an epieikes to depart from legal justice in order to invoke a more serious punishment, but rather a more lenient one; he is not strict, tending rather to benevolence and using a certain equity that we usually call the discretion of the good man; so he favours lesser punishments. Epieikeia is not legal justice, therefore, but a certain justice or elective disposition by which a man rationally steers the legally just toward the naturally just; it is the mean between the legally just according to the letter of the law and the unlawfully unjust counter to the legislator’s pious intention, tending in punishments towards leniency and taking a middle course between excessive rigour and excessive remission, adhering to gnomitic reason and the gnomitic

Cange vii, 189 “apud Scholasticos”). For both terms cf. Guiral Ot 1500 v.18, f. 117rb “non atribodicaios .i. non rigorosus […] sed minorativus penarum”, who also follows up with legal texts (Sext. v.12.15 “Odia restringi et favores convenit amplìarì”, Dig. xxxxviii.19.5 “satius enim esse inpunitum relinqui facinus nocentis quam innocentem damnari”, etc.).

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nimiam, adhesivus racioni gnomitice et arbitrio gnomitico boni viri.125 Dicimus autem racionem gnomiticam illam eleccionem consilii que fit ut in paucioribus propter qualitatem casus occurrentis extra communem modum, ut in materia prudencie supra scripsimus. Ex hiis que dicta sunt, si bene advertantur, potuerunt racionem sumere multa que utriusque juris patres in diversis locis notant in materia dispensacionum et scandali et aliis materiis; ad hanc enim virtutem dispensaciones pertinere videntur, quia bonus princeps contra justum legale racione urgente dispensat. Lib. 1 Cap. 16 [De justicia] Capitulum nonum Ultimo suprascriptis adiciendum est quod ex eo quod supradictum est justiciam esse virtutem ad alterum, dubitaverunt antiqui an sibi ipsi posset quis injusticiam facere, ut pote si se ipsum occidat, an dicetur injustus?126 Duplex ergo consideracio in hoc haberi potest. Prima, hominis ad civitatem; et secundum hanc civitati injusticiam facere videtur quam privat suo cive. Ideo magne inhonoraciones cadaveribus talium olim fiebant tanquam injustorum secundum diversas consuetudines et statuta terrarum; hodie ecclesiastica sepultura privantur propter peccatum desperacionis. Secunda consideracio est sui ad se ipsum; et secundum hanc non est ibi vera injusticia particularis quia nichil aufert ab altero nec nocet alteri sed sibi ipsi, et quia volens patitur; volenti autem non fit injusticia particularis, ideo regula juris dicit, “Scienti et consentienti non fit injuria nec dolus”.127 Et licet non sit vera injusticia particularis,

50 ut AJ, suppl. in marg. O, om. Bβ Cap. 16 tit. αB (c. [ix in marg. J abscissum), om. Q Capl̛m xviȷm H 3 dicetur αB (si será dicho Mcast) diceretur β 7 hodie αB et hodie β 125

adhesivus racioni gnomitice: the sentence corresponds to Sent. Eth. v.16 (5 “epiikes est quidem aliquod iustum, sed non est iustum legale sed est quaedam directio iusti legalis; dictum est enim quod continetur sub iusto naturali”; 13 “epiikia est quaedam species iustitiae, et non est aliquis alius habitus a iustitia legali”), but the barbarism gnomiticus < gnomi is not in Aquinas, nor Du Cange, and Cartagena does not use it “in materia prudencie supra”, where he talks only of gnomi (i.6, at n74–75); it proves he is again following Geraldus, whose second questio on this passage he here quotes, this time exactly (Guiral Ot 1500 v.18 quest. 22, f. 117vb): sciendum quod epikeia est habitus electivus iuris per nullam legem determinati media inter iustum legale secundum litteralem sententiam legis et iniustum illegale contra piam intentionem legis, declinativus in punitionibus ad veniam et mediativus inter rigorem nimium et remissionem nimiam, adhesivus rationi gnomitice et arbitrio gnomitico boni viri.

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discretion of the good man. “Gnomitic reason” is what we call the choice of decision made in a minority of cases because of the unusual quality of occurrences out of the common mould, as explained above under the heading of prudence. What has been said, if it be well scrutinized, may have been the reason for many of the things marked by the fathers of civil and canon law in various places under the headings of dispensations and scandal, and others; dispensations appear to belong to this virtue, since the good prince dispenses in contravention of legal justice when reason urges it. 1.16 [On justice.] Chapter 9 Finally, to the above we must add that, from what I said about justice being virtue directed towards another, the ancients argued whether anyone could do injustice to himself. For example, if a man kills himself, can he be called unjust? There are two possible points of view in this matter. First, of the man in relation to his city; from this point of view he clearly does an injustice to the city by depriving it of a citizen; for this reason dishonourable outrages used to be inflicted on the corpses of such men, as outlaws according to the various customs and statutes of their countries; nowadays they are deprived of church burial for the sin of suicide. The second point of view is of him in relation to himself; and in this light there is no true particular injustice, since he takes nothing from another and hurts no one except himself, and because he suffers willingly; no particular injustice can be done to a willing victim, for as the rule of law says, “No injury or fraud can be done to a knowing and consenting man”. But though it is not a true particular injustice, it is nevertheless a metaphor or

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Geraldus used the word more vaguely in his De multiformi visione Dei 1.2.1, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Ms. Ott. lat. 280, f. 2v “talis cognitio […] dicitur gnomitica, quasi ‘experimentalis’ ” (Guiral Ot 2001, 92). an sibi ipsi posset quis injusticiam facere: EN 1138a4–1138b13/Sent. Eth. v.17. One might expect the problem of suicide—for Arist. involving “some dishonour” (τις ἀτιμία) but only “metaphorically” unjust—to have provoked Christian commentators; but they did not rise to the bait. Cartagena goes further than any with his mention of the Church’s denial of burial to suicides and its laws against taking Christ’s words on self-castration “propter regnum caelorum” (Mt 19:12) literally; and he returns to the attack in i.19 51–65 (n143). regula juris: Sext. v.12.27 (De regulis iuris); cf. Dig. xlvii.10.1.5 “nulla iniuria est, quae in volentem fiat”.

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est tamen methaphora seu similitudinaria injusticia, nam sicut in homine ad alterum est reperire duas personas, sic in homine ad seipsum est considerare duas potencias, intellectivam videlicet et sensitivam; cum ergo homo occidit vel vulnerat seipsum ex fervore ire seu ex desperacione vel ex impaciencia doloris vel tristicie, pars sensitiva irascibilis videtur injusticiam facere parti racionali, et secundum hoc videtur ibi esse quedam injusticia similitudinaria, unde in canone apostolorum prohibetur promoveri abscidens sibi virilia tanquam injustus et homicida sui ipsius (Quinquagesima quinta distinccione, c. Si quis absciderit).128 Sed vera et propria particularis injusticia non consistit in homine ad se ipsum, ut dictum est. Lib. 1 Cap. 17 De fortitudine. Capitulum primum Fortitudo est medietas quedam inter timores et audacias, importat enim quandam animi firmitatem per quam animus stat inmobilis contra timores periculorum.129 Est ergo fortitudo ille habitus electivus secundum quem homo se habet firme et intrepide circa pericula propter bonum. Objectum autem fortitudinis est illud quod terribile est, nam cum fortitudo sit circa timores et audacias moderandos, principaliter tamen circa timores, ut infra dicetur; et terribilia sunt que timemus. Sequitur quod fortitudo regat et moderetur passiones nostras circa terribilia. Terribile autem dicimus omne malum, unde et antique dictum est quod timor nichil aliud est quam expectacio mali, sumendo “expectacionem” inproprie et large, nam proprie sumpto vocabulo “sperare” dicimur bonum futurum, “timere” vero malum; sed expectacio large sumpta comprehendit expectacionem boni, que proprie dicitur “spes”, et expectacionem mali, que dicitur “timor”.130 Timere autem solent homines triplicem speciem malorum; prima est illorum malorum que sunt contra honestatem, secunda illorum que sunt contra bona exteriora, tercia illorum que contrariantur bonis personalibus.

18 ibi esse AJ esse ibi OBβ α est Bβ 128

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Cap. 17 tit. AJ Capl̛m pͥ mũ de forne O, om. BQ Capl̛m xviiȷm H

2 stat

in canone: Decretum D.55.4 Qui semetipsum abscidit non ordinetur “Si quis abscidit semetipsum (id est, si quis amputaverit sibi virilia), non fiat clericus, quia suus est homicida et Dei condicionis inimicus.” Fortitudo: EN 1115a7 μεσότης ἐστὶ [ἡ ἀνδρεία] περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη/Sent. Eth. iii.14.2 “Dicit ergo […] quod fortitudo est quaedam medietas circa [περί, rather than inter μεταξύ] timores et audacias. Importat enim fortitudo quamdam animi firmitatem per quam animus stat immobilis contra periculorum timores”. Henceforth Cartagena reverts to Arist.’s order in EN iii–iv, starting with courage (1115a–1117b/Sent. Eth. iii.14–18). From this point to the penultimate chapter of Bk ii his compilation stays closer to the structure of Aquinas’s

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an analogous form of injustice, for as in the relation of one man to another one finds two persons, so in the relation of a man to himself there are two powers to be considered, namely the intellective and the sensitive; thus when a man kills or wounds himself out of raging anger or desperation or inability to bear pain or depression, the irascible sensitive faculty seems to commit an injustice against the rational faculty, and by this token there seems to be some analogy to injustice. Hence the Apostolic Canons [c. 22–23] prohibit any man who castrates himself to be promoted to the priesthood “as lawless and a homicide of himself” (D.55.4 Si quis absciderit). But true and proper particular injustice does not consist in the relation of a man to himself, as I have said. 1.17 On fortitude. Chapter 1 Courage or “fortitude” is a certain mean between fears and rashness; it injects a certain mental firmness by which the mind stands unmoved against fear of dangers. Fortitude is therefore that elective disposition by which a man conducts himself firmly and fearlessly for the good in the face of dangers. The object of fortitude is that which is terrible, for though fortitude is about moderating fears and rashness, it chiefly concerns fears, as will be explained below; and terrible things are what we fear. It follows that fortitude rules and moderates our emotions regarding terrible things. “Terrible” is the name we give to every bad thing, whence the ancient saying that fear is nothing but the expectation of something bad, taking “expectation” in a broad and improper sense, since the proper expression is to “hope for” future good, but “fear” bad; yet taken broadly “expectation” embraces expectation of good, properly called “hope”, and expectation of bad, which is called “fear”. Now, men normally fear three sorts of calamities; the first are threats to good reputation, the second threats to external goods, the third those that threaten personal goods.

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commentary than the previous treatment; nevertheless, he continues to makes extensive use of Geraldus, as well as his own adaptations of the material to his and his addressee’s milieu (e.g. Intro. § 4, pp. 31–33 on this paragraph). expectacio mali: EN 1115a8–9 φοβούμεθα δὲ […] τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὁρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ/Sent. Eth. iii.14.4 “terribilia sunt quae timemus, […] ut universaliter dicatur ‘quaecumque mala’, unde et philosophi definiunt timorem dicentes quod est expectatio mali. Et sumitur hic ‘expectatio’ communiter pro quolibet motu appetitus in aliquod futurum, cum tamen expectatio proprie loquendo non sit nisi boni, sicut nec spes” (but προσδοκία is “apprehension”, not “hope”). Cartagena’s wording points rather to Guiral Ot 1500 iv.1, f. 55vb “expectatio respectu boni proprie dicitur, sed respectu mali improprie […] nisi large sumpta; […] tamen large sumpta potest sumi generaliter respectu utriusque”.

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Circa primam speciem non consistit fortitudo, ut si aliquis timet infamiam seu malam opinionem non dicetur timidus, nec si non timet dicetur fortis; laudamus enim virum fortem, sed virum qui non timet infamiam nec curat de ea non laudabimus, quinymo vituperabimus. Honesti enim viri et virtuosi solent esse verecundi et timentes infamiam, turpes vero infames et obsceni negligunt famam, unde Augustinus inpudentem et crudelem reputat illum qui contempnit famam suam (Undecima, questione tercia, c. Non sunt).131 Sed circa istum timorem et similes posset aliquis per accidens improprie dici fortis, ut si timore infamie non cessat ab operacione alicujus boni actus, quia per hoc videtur habere quandam firmitudinem animi; non tamen proprie in hoc consistit fortitudo, quia istud pertinet ad magnanimitatem, ut in materia sua dicetur. In secunda eciam specie malorum non est fortitudo, ut pote circa timorem paupertatis; nec enim opportet timere paupertatem, nam mala que non procedunt ex malicia nostra timenda non sunt. Illud autem timere et cavere debemus, ne culpa nostra in paupertatem et similia mala incidamus; sed paupertas ipsa timenda non est. Dato tamen quod quis non timeat paupertatem, nec propterea dicetur fortis. Pertinet enim illud ad quandam liberalitatem; et contingere potest, ymo sepe videmus, aliquos liberaliter expendere sua et non timere paupertatem futuram, esse tamen timidos ad opera bellica. Non ergo consistit fortitudo circa hujusmodi timorem.132 Est tercia species malorum quam contrariari bonis personalibus diximus, et ista contingunt multipliciter. Evenit enim istud malum interdum ex quadam invidia seu inimicicia, ut si aliquis timeret ne inimicus offendat uxorem suam vel filios vel amicos. Et non dicetur propter hoc timidus; iste namque timor non opponitur fortitudini, ymo quandoque inducit eam, cum propter istum timorem homo preparat et exponit se ad actus fortitudinis pro defensione suorum. Fortitudo ergo non expellit hunc timorem, quinymo fortes viri sepe timent et cavent ista. Non igitur in hiis est fortitudo, nec dicetur fortis qui ista non timet. Contingunt eciam interdum mala circa personam propriam, ut

24 ante improprie add. et β (ſp̱ Q) β | nec αQ neque Bβ 131

42 preparat ~ se α se preparat et disponit Bβ

44 sepe αB semper

non consistit fortitudo: EN 1115a10–16/Sent. Eth. iii.14.6 “Et primo, quod fortitudo non sit circa timorem infamiae. Fortis enim laudatur ex eo quod non timet, sed quaedam sunt quae oportet timere […]; timor non solum necessarius est ad honestatem conservandam, sed etiam […] qui huiusmodi malum non timet vituperatur quasi inverecundus.” Cartagena follows closely, except for the addition unde Augustinus: Decretum C.11.3.56

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The first sort is not something that concerns fortitude. If someone fears disgrace or bad reputation he will not be called a coward; and if he does not fear it, he will not be called courageous. We praise the courageous man, but we will not praise, but rather disparage a man who does not fear disgrace or care about it. Honourable and virtuous males normally have a sense of shame and fear disgrace, while base and obscene disgraceful ones disregard fame; hence Augustine reputes the man who despises his fame as impudent and cruel (C.11.3.56 Non sunt). Regarding this and similar fears someone might improperly be called courageous by accident, if for example from fear of disgrace he perseveres in doing some good act, because this gives a semblance of mental firmness, but this is not properly the sphere of fortitude, belonging instead to magnanimity, as will be said under that heading. The second sort of ills, for example to do with fear of poverty, is not the site of fortitude. One should not fear poverty, for evils not caused by our own bad ways are not to be feared. What we should fear and watch out for is not to fall into poverty and similar evils through our own fault; poverty itself is not to be feared. Yet even granted that someone does not fear poverty, he will not on that account be called courageous. That pertains to a certain liberality; it can happen, and indeed we often see examples, that people spend liberally without fear of future poverty, and yet are cowardly when it comes to warfare. So fortitude is not concerned with this kind of fear. The third sort of bad things are those which I said threaten personal goods, and they arise in many forms. Sometimes the threat comes from some kind of envy or enmity, for example if someone fears that an enemy may attack his wife or children or friends. He will not be called cowardly on this account; such fear is not opposed to courage, in fact it sometimes inspires it, as a man prepares to go out and perform acts of courage in defence of house and home driven by this fear. So courage does not expel such fear; on the contrary, courageous men often fear and watch out for these things. Fortitude does not lie in this, therefore, and someone who does not fear these things will not be called courageous. Again, threats sometimes concern our own person, for example when

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cum quis percutitur, verberatur, seu flagellatur; et nec in istis consistit fortitudo. Si enim aliquis audacter agrederetur actus illos ex quibus contingit aliquando inferri vulnera seu verbera vel aliquos dolores citra mortem, non ex hoc dicetur fortis; ut evenire solet in torneamentis et jostis, nam possibile est aliquem agredi torneamenta intrepide et se habere in eis expedite et viriliter qui forsam in actibus bellicis esset timidus, unde fertur in Gallia esse proverbium vulgare, “Sepe bonus torneator est timidus et coardus bellator”.133 Non quod semper sic accidat, nam plerumque boni torneatores sunt viriles bellatores, sed quia de necessitate non sequitur quod qui intrepide se habent ad illa ex quibus aliqua dampna oriuntur citra mortem sint fortes ad bellandum, ut cotidie videmus in luctatoribus. Nam sunt nonnulli qui audacter aggrediuntur luctas, in quibus cadentes sepe leduntur; non tamen essent fortes ad bellandum, loquendo de fortitudine que est virtus moralis. Non enim de viribus corporis tractamus, sed de fortitudine animi.

48 citra αB circa β (v. n133, et lin. 55 infra) 133

49 jostis A justis JO (v. app. min. var.) jocis Bβ

The chapter’s last paragraph much expands—259 words vs. Arist.’s 24, Aquinas’s 91—EN 1115a22–24 οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται, ἢ φθόνον ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλός ἐστιν· οὐδ᾽ εἰ θαρρεῖ μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι ἀνδρεῖος/Sent. Eth. iii.14.8, because this was the point relevant to Cartagena’s princely auditor. jostis: JO’s justis may seem a more likely rendering of Sp/Port. justas “jousts”, but A’s reading seems assured by β’s error jocis. The example is of course an addition (Aquinas merely says, “neque etiam aliquis dicitur fortis ex eo quod non timet flagellari”); its source is revealed by in Gallia esse proverbium vulgare: ATILF 2012 s.v. tournoyeur (tornoiëor) cites Nicole Oresme’s gloss of EN (c. 1370) “Et dit un expositeur yci endroit que il a en France un tel proverbe, ‘de bon tournëeur, couart guerrier’ ” (Oresme 1488 iii.14, f. 52vb/1940, 205); whether this was the actual French proverb is unclear, but the unnamed expositeur was Languedocian Geraldus Odonis (“from Lot/Occ. Olt”), whom Cartagena follows almost verbatim:

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someone is struck, beaten, or whipped; fortitude does not arise in this case either. If someone rashly undertakes acts of the kind that sometimes lead to sustaining wounds, blows, or other pains this side of death, he will not be called courageous for this; it usually happens so in tournaments and jousts, for it is possible for someone to undertake tournaments fearlessly and conduct himself skilfully and manfully in them, and yet perhaps be timid in acts of war. So it is that they say the French have a vulgar proverb, “Often a good jouster is a timorous and cowardly warrior”. Not that it always happens like this, for good jousters are mostly manly warriors; only that it does not necessarily follow that men who conduct themselves bravely in things where some non-fatal damage occurs will be courageous in war, as we can see any day in the case of wrestlers. Not a few of them recklessly undertake fights in which the falls often hurt; but they would not be courageous fighting in a war, taking ‘fortitude’ as a moral virtue. We are not dealing here with physical daring but mental courage.

Deinde ibi: “Nec si audet flagellandus”, dicit […] quod nec ille dicitur fortis qui audet aggredi illa in quibus et propter que flagellandus vel percutiendus est; sicut fit in torneamentis, ubi milites percutiunt et gravantur, tamen citra mortem. Et ideo illi qui in talibus sunt audaces non tamen propter hoc sunt fortes in bello, imo est proverbium in Galliis quod sepe bonus torneator est timidus et cohardus bellator. (Guiral Ot 1500 iv.1, f. 56ra) β’s “circa mortem” looks reasonable, but the source proves αB’s “citra” (“aquende” Mcast) correct. Retention of vulg. coardus (OFr. cuard, Prov. coart, Port. covardo < cauda “tail” + Goth. pejor. agent suffix -hart “turn-tail, rabbit”(?), OED s.v. coward; cf. Guiral Ot 1500, f. 60rb iv.1 quest. 4 “nec Philosophus nec aliquis commentator […] mentionem fecerit de cohardo; […] est valde commune […] in Galliis, ideo licuit hoc nomine uti”, and Frenchman Buridan 1513, f. 54vb, iii.17 “coardus”, “coardia”) was to keep the Gallic flavour (so it stumped B, as Gallia stumped β, app. min. var.). For Cartagena’s later critique of jousts in Doctrinal de los caballeros iii.Pról. see Fallows 1995. There he made no mention of France: “Y proverbio antiguo dicen que es que ‘a las veces el buen torneador es temeroso e cobarde batallador’ ” (Cartagena 2006, 266; Fernández Gallardo 2013, 80 n11).

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Lib. 1 Cap. 18 [De fortitudine.] Capitulum secundum Enumeratis sic omnibus premissis, restat quod fortitudo sit circa maxime terribilia.134 Dicetur ergo ille fortis qui est intrepidus circa maximum terribile, nullus enim illud melius sustinet quam fortis. Ultimum autem et maximum terribilium est mors, quia per eam homo perdit omnia bona presentis vite; nichil namque de bonis temporalibus remanet post mortem, sed remanent bona anime et eterna beatitudo ad quam suspiramus, si hanc in corpore meruit anima morientis. Circa istum igitur mortis timorem consistit fortitudo; non tamen circa omnia genera mortis, nam ex eo quod quis sustineat impavide mortem que ex egritudine venit vel in mari non dicetur propterea proprie fortis. Bene verum est quod fortes sustinent istam mortem melius quam alii nec turbantur inordinate; non sicut faciunt naute vel marinarii, qui interdum non timent pericula maris propter experienciam quia per artem suam se sperant posse salvari natando vel alias, nam fortis eciam si non speret evadere non habebit inordinatam perturbacionem sed pulcrius et virilius sustinebit periculum et timorem quam alius qui fortis non sit. Et licet hoc fortis faciat, non tamen in hoc proprie consistit fortitudo, sed vera fortitudo est cum quis sustinet mortem pro optimis rebus, ut quando aliquis se exponit ad mortem in bello pro fide catholica vel salute rei publice vel propter bonum virtutis, ut martires qui pro confessione fidei mortem fortiter sustinuerunt. Ideo de eis cantat ecclesia, “contempto suorum corporum cruciatu sevientem mundum Dei pro honore vicerunt” et alia multa que ad laudem fortitudinis pertinent.135

Cap. 18 tit. AOB Capitl̛m secundum de fortitudine J, om. Q Capl̛m xixm H proprie in hoc Bβ in hoc O 134

16 in hoc proprie AJ

circa maxime terribilia: the chapter relates EN 1115a26–1115b5/Sent. Eth. iii.14.9–15, but goes beyond the source to give a Christian and patriotic focus specifically relevant to Cartagena’s concern, marked first by citing a hymn on martyrdom to contest Arist.’s view of death as the end of good and evil (1115a26–27 πέρας γάρ [ὁ θάνατος], καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὔτ᾽ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι); and then adding an excursus on just war, i.e. the crusade to reconquer Iberia, its heroes and its heavenly rewards. As to the first, Aquinas also alludes to it by a couple of interpolations (“est terminus totius praesentis vitae et nihil post mortem videtur esse homini vel bonum vel malum de his quae pertinent ad praesentem vitam, quae nobis sunt nota, ea enim quae pertinent ad statum animarum post mortem non sunt visibilia”, 9), but Cartagena probably drew on Guiral Ot 1500 iv.1, f. 56ra “si tamen sit aliqua vita anime separate preter vitam quam habet in hoc mortali corpore non negatur hic, sed solum dicit […] ut existenti in vita presenti”, and ibid. quest. 8, f. 61v “Utrum martyrium sit opus [fortitudinis]” (yes “sine argumentis”, “pro defendenda fide”—

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1.18 [On fortitude.] Chapter 2 Having run through all the aforesaid, we are left with the fact that fortitude is about only the most terrible things. To be called courageous is to be brave in the face of the most fearsome threat, and no one bears this better that the courageous man. The ultimate and greatest of terrible things is death, because it robs man of all the goods of this life; nothing remains of our temporal goods after death. What do remain are the goods of the soul and the eternal beatitude to which we aspire, if the soul of the dying man has deserved it in his corporeal life. It is this fear of death, then, that concerns fortitude; not, however, every kind of death, because the fact that someone suffers death from illness or at death bravely does not mean that he will thereby be called properly courageous. True, courageous men suffer this kind of death better than others, without inordinate agitation; not in the way of sailors or mariners, who sometimes do not fear the dangers of the sea through experience because they expect to be able to save themselves by their skill at swimming or otherwise, for the courageous man will not show inordinate agitation even if he has no hope of escape but will suffer the danger and fear more nobly and manfully than one who is not courageous. But even though the courageous man does this, it is not properly what constitutes fortitude. True fortitude is when someone accepts death for the best things, as when someone accepts the risk of death in war for the Catholic faith or the salvation of the commonwealth for the good of virtue, like the martyrs who courageously suffered death to confess their Faith. Of them the Church chants, “despite excruciating tortures they vanquished the raging world for the honour of God”, and many other hymns in praise of fortitude.

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but “hoc magis pertinet ad theologos, quare relinquo”) and 9 “Utrum si non esset alia vita esset mors expectanda ex inclinatione fortitudinis” (answering the passage above in which the Philosopher “videtur sentire quod non sit alia vita”: men are not animals! To accept death “gratis, sine spe vite, videtur esse stultum”, and since every act of virtue is directed towards happiness, to sacrifice oneself in battle must imply a higher good and expectation of another life, which Arist. “sensit implicite, […] quamvis eam non exposuerit […]; locutus est de visione vulgari, non de visione sua”). The second point, on the other hand, with its historical examples of the Cid and the battle of Tarifa, is Cartagena’s own. cantat ecclesia: Sanctorale Romanum, Commune plurimorum Martyrum, Responsorium “O veneranda martyrum gloriosa certamina qui in suis corporibus pro Christo immania pertulerunt tormenta et ideo percipere meruerunt immarcescibilem aeternae gloriae coronam”, verse 3 “Despecta namque praesentis vitae luce contemptoque suorum corporum cruciatu saevientem mundum Dei pro honore vicerunt.”

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Fortem ergo indubie dicam illum qui morti et periculis bellicis pro defensione et exaltacione catholice fidei vel pro bono publico se exponit, ut de multis Hyspanie gloriosis principibus et aliis famosis militibus cronice narrant. In bellis enim interveniunt maxima et optima pericula—maxima siquidem quia faciliter in bello accidit mors, que est ultimum et maximum humanorum periculorum, optima eciam quia per illa tenditur ad bonum et salutem et salvacionem status publici. Loquor autem de bello justo, in quo laudabile et meritorium est mori, unde Leo papa ait:

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Omni terrore atque timore deposito contra inimicos sancte fidei et adversarios omnium religionum viriliter agere studete; novit enim omnipotens Deus, si quilibet vestrorum morietur, quod pro veritate fidei et salvacione patrie ac defensione Christianorum mortuus est, et ideo ab Eo celeste premium consequetur. (Vicessima tercia, questione octava, c. Omni)136

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Consistet ergo fortitudo in sustinendo viriliter periculum mortis propter bonum commune, et maxime in periculis repentinis, ut communiter sunt bellica; nam in aliis periculis ubi deliberacio potest precedere contingere posset quod quis simularet aliquem actum fortitudinis et in rei veritate fortis non esset, sed in repentinis non potest homo operari ex deliberacione, sed opportet quod operetur ex habitu jam acquisito. Ideo in hiis que repente accidunt premaxime ostenditur fortitudo. Et non solum fortis sustinebit pericula, sed eciam agredietur ea viriliter ubicumque laudabilis est fortitudo vel est bonum mori, ut pro exaltacione fidei catholice vel pro salute rei publice seu bono communi, ut dictum est. In aliis vero casibus fortis non aggreditur pericula; nec enim spectat ad fortem comedere audacter cibum nocivum postposito timore mortis vel pugnare cum fera bestia vel transvadare flumina periculosa, nam licet quando mors sibi inminet ex istis vel similibus casibus virilius sustinet periculum quam alius qui fortis non sit, non tamen ultro agreditur ista nisi forsam ex accidenti ad bonum publicum expediret, ut de Johanne Yrchano legitur, qui torrentem quem nullus de exercitu transire audebat primus pertransiit ut contra hostes pugnaret (primo Machabeorum, c. quintodecimo), et Georgius martir cum

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unde Leo: Decretum C.23.8.9, from a letter of Leo iv (pope 847–855) to the Frankish army.

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I would undoubtedly give the name “courageous”, therefore, to the man who risks his life in combat for the defence and glory of the Catholic faith or for the common good, as the chronicles tell us many glorious kings and other famous knights of Hispania have done. For in wars the greatest and best dangers occur—if indeed the greatest, because death is a likely accident of war, the ultimate and greatest of human perils, also best, because such dangers are part and parcel of the struggle for the good and safe-keeping of the public state. I am talking of just war, in which it is laudable and meritorious to die. As Pope Leo says: Set aside all terror and fear and strive to act manfully against the enemies of the holy Faith and opponents of all religions; for Almighty God always knows, if any of you dies, that he has died for the truth of the Faith, the salvation of our homeland, and the defence of Christians, and so he will receive from Him the prize of heaven. (C.23.8.9 Omni) Fortitude will consist, then, in manfully bearing the danger of death for the common good, and most of all in sudden dangers, as those in war generally are; for in other dangers where forethought is possible someone could simulate an act of courage without being truly courageous, but in sudden dangers a man cannot act with forethought but must do so from an acquired disposition. Hence fortitude is most outstandingly displayed in things that happen suddenly; and the courageous man will not only endure such dangers, but even charge manfully at them whenever courage is praiseworthy or it is good to die, for instance to exalt the Catholic faith or for the safety of the commonwealth or the common good, as I have said. In other contingencies the courageous man does not run at danger; it is not the courageous man’s part to set aside fear of death and rashly eat poisonous food or fight with a savage beast or wade across dangerous rivers, for although when death from these or similar contingencies hangs over him he confronts the danger more manfully than one who is not courageous, he does not deliberately run at them unless by chance it would ensure the public good, as we read of John Hyrcanus, who led the way across a torrent that none in the army dared cross in order to engage the enemy (1 Macc 15), and the martyr George fought with the dragon for the common good.

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drachone pro bono communi pugnavit.137 Et ut sanctos omittam, quos equare non possumus, eciam in aliis hujusmodi actus legimus quos imitemur. Nam milites Roderici de Bivar qui strenuitate operum Cid cognomen assumpsit leonem incuria custodis solutum ne dominum dormientem opprimeret viriliter expectarunt, et comitum illorum qui se timide absconderunt usque in hodiernum diem fuga turpis reputata est.138 Et prope tempora nostra accidisse a majoribus nostris audivimus, cum Christianorum exercitus sub Castelle et Portugalie illustribus regibus ultimis Ildefonsis (quorum alter abavus, alter attavus extitit Christianissimi principis domini mei consanguinei tui, proavus autem tuus) prope Tarifam contra ultramarinas citramarinasque Agarenorum potencias ad pugnandum accederent, ex catholicis militibus quidam fluvium nominatum Salado primi viriliter transierunt, quod ut strenuum factum ad virtutem reputatum est.139 Nec enim solum in periculis ferri, sed in omnibus mortis periculis fortis propter bonum viriliter sustinebit et agredietur; sine causa tamen non se exponet ultro periculis. Nec enim pertinet ad fortem jactancie causa exire ad pugnandum cum tauro, nam illud potius videtur esse juvenalis levitatis quam mature fortitudinis; opportet namque operantem ad tempus semper attendere et temporum qualitates advertere.

58 nostris om. β 137

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Johanne Yrchano: 1 Macc 16 (not 15):5–6 “vidit populum trepidantem ad transfretandum torrentem, et transfretavit primus, et viderunt eum viri et transierunt post eum.” The biblical text never calls Hasmonaean leader John “Hyrcanus” (the single occurrence of the name, at 2 Macc 3:11, refers to an obscure owner of some Temple moneys); it came from Joseph. AJ xiii.13–17 via Glossa ord. iv, 2373 ad 1Macc 16:23 “Hic quoque adversum Hyrcanos bellum gerens et devincens Hyrcani nomen accepit” (Rabanus Maurus, PL cix, 1213). Georgius martir: brought from the East by crusaders, the fable of St George and the dragon—usually taken to be about saving a damsel in distress, not a battle “pro bono communi”—is told in Jacopo da Varazze’s Legenda aurea, but Cartagena need not have used a written source; George’s feast on 23 April had recently been promoted to duplex by the Council of Konstanz (1415), and more to the point, he was a figure of special devotion for the royal dynasty of Avis after the Santo Condestável Nuno Álvares Pereira claimed his aid in the Portuguese victory over Castile at the battle of Aljubarrota in 1385, building a chapel in his honour there. In 1387 João i ordered the saint’s image to be carried in Corpus Christi processions and his white flag with red cross to be carried by Portuguese armies, making him the kingdom’s padroeiro in place of St James. Roderici de Bivar: the tale of the Cid’s lion, well known from Cantar de Mio Cid 2278–310 but here from Estoria de España § 929 (Díez Garretas 2000), is no less extraordinary than St George as an example of fortitude from the roll-call of saints and crusaders—not the

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Leaving aside the saints, whom we cannot equal, there are others of whom we read acts like these that we can imitate. For instance, the men-at-arms of Rodrigo de Vivar, surnamed the Cid for the hardiness of his deeds, manfully looked out to prevent a lion let loose by its careless guard from attacking their lord while he was asleep, while to this day the funk of the counts who timidly hid themselves is reputed base. And close to our own times we have heard from our elders how, when the Christian armies under the late Alfonsos, the illustrious kings of Castile and Portugal respectively (one of them the great-greatgrandfather of the most Christian prince my lord, the other his great-greatgrandfather’s father and your great-grandfather) met to fight against forces of Hagarenes from both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar near Tarifa, some of the Catholic knights manfully took the lead in fording the River Salado, a hardy deed famed as virtuous. The courageous man will undertake and suffer not only clashes of steel but all fatal perils for the sake of good; but he will not deliberately expose himself to danger without cause. It is not a courageous man’s part to boastfully go out and fight a bull, for that seems an act of juvenile levity rather than mature courage; one must always act in timely fashion and take good note of circumstances.

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Campeador’s gestas but his retainers’ plucky stand-off with an escaped zoo-animal and the lily-livered funk of the Infantes de Carrión. It is explicable only on artistic grounds: as forming a suitable diptych with the saint and his dragon, and to prepare for the Conclusio (n324). fluvium nominatum Salado: the battle of El Salado/Tarifa (1340), with its conclusive defeat of the forces of Marīnid emir Abū l-Ḥasan (“ultramarinas”) and Yūsuf i of Granada (“citramarinas”) by Alfonso xi of Castile and his father-in-law Afonso iv of Portugal, was much celebrated in epic poetry and chronicle, but Cartagena again selects a notably footling detail, the fording of the stream—four stanzas of over 300 dedicated to the battle in Poema de Alfonso xi (Victorio 1991, st. 1498–1806, at 1660–1664), ¼ page from 23 chapters on it in Gran crónica de Alfonso xi (Catalán 1977, ii, 427). Even the flattery of the genealogical parenthesis cannot hide the contrived nature of this effort to match John Hyrcanus. Agarenorum potencias: Cartagena’s chosen word for Andalusī Muslims (cf. Concl. 29, 61); oddly, he never uses Mauri, Sarraceni, etc., though Arabes crops up in Concl. 30. Like “Ishmaelites”, “descendants of Hagar” (Abraham’s Egyptian concubine, Ishmael’s mother) was an abstruse biblical term (Gen. 21) which, based on Gal. 4:21–31, came to denote enemies of the Faith, specially Muslims (e.g. Bartholomaeus Anglicus xv.34 s.v. Cedar, 1492, sign. 2R3v/1494, sign. 2i5r–v, citing Glossa ord. i, 219 ad Gen. 16:12). It was not current in vulgar speech; corde attests agarenos only × 16 pre-1500, 12 in biblical contexts, the rest cancioneros at the end of the century; likewise in cport, not before Camões.

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Lib. 1 Cap. 19 [De fortitudine.] Capitulum tercium Diximus terribile esse objectum fortitudinis, sed non est intelligendum indistincte. Est enim fortis instupescibilis et intimidus ut homo; illa tamen terribilia que sunt supra hominem bene timebit, ut si centum irruerent in unum vel simile quid eveniret quod humanas vires excederet.140 Timebit enim fortis talia ut opportet et secundum racionem et propter bonum, nam hoc est commune omnibus virtuosis, operari propter bonum. Et licet non fortes peccent multipliciter in hoc, vel quia timent timenda magis quam opportet vel minus, vel timent non timenda vel eo modo vel quando non opportet, ille tamen qui proprie et vere fortis est timet ad declinandum et audet ad agrediendum et sustinet expectando constanter, et operatur in pugnando viriliter illa terribilia que opportet, et cujus gracia et ut opportet et quando opportet, et prout racio indicat et dictat, habens se moderate et ordinate circa passiones timoris et audacie, semper propter finem bonum; hoc enim est commune tam fortitudini quam omnibus moralibus virtutibus. Fortitudo autem consistit in medio, et extrema sunt superhabundancia et defectus.141 Superhabundancia est duplex: aliqui superhabundant in non timendo, aliqui in audendo. Qui superhabundat in non timendo non habet nomen proprium, quia non dicemus eum intimidum, nam intimidus in bona significacione sumitur; dicetur ergo insanus, ut si aliquis nichil timeret, nec inundaciones aquarum nec terremotus nec incendia; et talis non posset de facili inveniri nisi esset aliquis furiosus, ferunt tamen apud quasdam gentes que dicuntur Celte aliquos reperiri hujus vicii.142 Qui superhabundat in audendo vocatur audax; et audaces solent esse superbi et fictores fortitudinis; desiderant enim reputari fortes cum non sint et volunt imitari eos sed non possunt,

Cap. 19 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m xxm H 140

141

9 proprie et vere α vere et proprie Bβ

Est enim fortis instupescibilis: this summarizes EN 1115b11–1116a15/Sent. Eth. iii.15 on the excess and defect of courage, but adds a further correction of the ancients’—he does not say Aristotle’s—error on suicide (n143). si centum irruerent in unum: not in Arist. or Aquinas, but probably—somewhat pumped up—from Guiral Ot 1500 iv.1, f. 56rb “terribile […] super hominem, puta occursus x hominum armatorum contra unum”. extrema sunt superhabundancia et defectus: surprisingly, this is Cartagena’s first explicit reference to the fundamental terminology of Arist.’s analysis of virtues as μεσότητες “means” between excess and defect, though the theory has been briefly alluded to in passing in the first line on fortitude (i.17 1 “Fortitudo est medietas quedam inter timores et audacias”). Arist.’s exposition of the idea fills much of EN Bk ii (1106a–1109b); Cartagena takes it for granted and omits it, content to cut straight to the ways of being over-bold (θρασύς/audax “rash”) or less than bold (δειλός/timidus “cowardly”). Hereafter the terms

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1.19 [On fortitude.] Chapter 3 I have said that the terrible is the object of fortitude, but this not to be understood without distinction. The courageous man is imperturbable and unafraid, as a man; but he will correctly fear terrible things beyond a man’s capacity, for instance if a hundred men attack one or some similar occurrence that exceeds human strength. The courageous man will fear such things as he should, both according to reason and for the sake of good; for to act for the sake of good is common to all virtuous men. Although those who are not courageous err in manifold ways in this respect, either because they fear fearful things more or less than they should, or because they fear things that are not to be feared or in an unfitting way or at an unfitting time, he who is properly and truly courageous fears to decline, dares to confront, and bears the waiting with constancy, and once in the fray manfully executes the necessary terrible acts for the sake of what is fitting both in the needful way and at the right time, as reason indicates and dictates, conducting himself in a moderate and orderly way regarding the emotions of fear and rashness, always for a good purpose; for this last is common to both fortitude and all the moral virtues. Fortitude, then, consists in the mean, and its extremes are excess and defect. The excess is of two sorts: some commit excess by not fearing at all, some by over-daring. The man who commits excess by not fearing has no proper name; we do not call him fearless, because “fearless” is used in a good sense; we might call him insane, as we would a man who feared nothing, not even floods, earthquakes, or fires. One could not easily find such a man unless he were some raging madman; they say, however, there is a nation called the Celts where men with this vice are to be found. The man who commits excess by over-daring is called “rash”. Rash men tend to be proud and feign courage; they long to gain repute as courageous even though they are not, and want to copy the courageous but cannot, as they do not have virtue. Hence it often happens that they

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medietas or medium (μεσότης), superhabundancia (ὑπερβολή), and defectus (ἔλλειψις) crop up frequently (× 34, 65, and 44 respectively), yet the fact that he did not consider it needful at any point to give his reader, even briefly, a justification of the central role of these terms in Arist.’s system is a striking measure of how little our compiler was concerned with the strictly philosophical aspect of EN. Celte: EN 1115b27 καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς/Sent. Eth. iii.15.9 “quibusdam qui vocantur Celtae, quod est nomen gentis”; but neither Aquinas nor Cartagena can have had much, if any, idea who these mad Celts were, which makes their retention in the latter’s text noteworthy since he tends to cut out such abstruse references.

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cum virtutem non habeant, unde evenit multociens quod sunt eciam timidi, temptant enim terribilia ut fortes videantur et cum sunt in periculo non sustinent et timent et fugiunt, quia virtutem fortitudinis non habent. Defectus autem est superhabundare in timore, et qui in timendo superhabundat quia timet quod non opportet nec ut opportet nec quando opportet dicitur timidus; et iste semper deficit in audendo. Nam licet qui deficit in timendo non semper superhabundet in audendo, et propterea scripsimus hec supraproxime ut duo vicia diversa, sed in superhabundancia timoris non est sic, nam quicumque superhabundat in timendo semper deficit in audendo. Possibile est enim quod aliquis nichil timeat, tamen non agrediatur terribilia; sed qui multum timet neccessarium est ut modicum audeat, quia audacie defectus provenit ex superhabundancia timoris. Ideo illa ponuntur ut duo vicia, istud ut unicum, quia dividi non potest et unum ex alio sequitur; sed manifestius apparet vicium hoc in timendo quam in non audendo, quia sunt actus apparentiores. Timidus est desperativus et non habet bonam spem; fortis econtrario est bone spei et medio modo se habet inter has passiones. Audaces vero et timidi tenent extrema. Proprium autem est audacis prevolare et velociter currere ad pericula, et quando est in periculo discedit; racio hujus est quia movetur ex passione, et motus passionis precedentis vincitur a difficultate imminente. Fortis econtrario ante pericula est quietus, nec velociter currit ad ea, quia non agit ex impetu passionis sed ex deliberacione racionis; sed cum est in ipso periculo et in operibus difficilibus est acutus et virilis, quia judicium racionis ex quo agit non vincitur ab aliqua difficultate. Sciendum est eciam quod ille qui mortem sustinet ut vitet molestias non est fortis, ut si quis se ipsum occidat vel ab alio occidi patiatur ut fugiat aliquid triste, puta inopiam vel egritudinem vel ne in manus hostium veniat, quia hoc provenit ex quadam molicie animi que est contraria fortitudini. Fortis enim non est molis animo, nec decet eum non posse sustinere laboriosa et tristia; nec eciam iste videtur sustinere mortem propter bonum honestum sicut fortis, sed fugiendo malum tristabile, quod potius est animi timidi, molis, et dejecti et imbecillis. Et hinc patet errasse multos de oratoribus antiquis, qui laudant ut fortes nonnullos qui se ipsos occiderunt,

25 evenit α evenit eis Bβ

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54 errasse αB errasse posse β

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actually turn out cowards; they attempt terrible things in order to look courageous, but once in danger cannot bear it and get frightened and flee because they do not have the virtue of fortitude. The defect, on the other hand, is excessive fear. The man who commits excess in fearing because he fears what he should not and in an unfitting way or at an unfitting time is called cowardly; he is always deficient in daring. Although the man deficient in fearing does not always exceed in daring, which is why I wrote just now that it is two different vices, excess of fear is never thus, for anyone who commits excess in fearing always falls short in daring. It is possible for someone to fear nothing and yet not confront terrible things; but he who fears much must necessarily dare little, as defect of rashness comes from excess of fear. Hence the former are classed as two vices, the latter as only one, since it cannot be divided and the one follows from the other; but this vice is made more manifest in fearing than in not daring, as the effects are more apparent. The coward tends to despair and does not have good hope. The courageous man, by contrast, is of good hope and conducts himself midway between these emotions, whereas the rash and the cowardly occupy the extremes. The property of the rash man is to jump the gun and run swiftly at dangers, and then when he is in danger to retreat; the reason for this is that he is motivated by emotion, and the preceding movement of emotion is overcome by the supervening difficulty. By contrast the courageous man is quiet in front of dangers and does not run swiftly at them because he does not act from a rush of emotion but with rational deliberation; once in the midst of the danger and difficult operations, however, he is sharp and manly because the rational judgment behind his actions is not overcome by any difficulty. We must also understand that a man who confronts death to avoid a sea of troubles is not courageous, for example if a man kills himself or lets himself be killed by someone else to escape some sorrow such as poverty, illness, or capture by the enemy, because this comes from some effeminacy of mind that is the contrary of courage. The courageous man is not effeminate of mind, and it does not become him not to be able to bear troublesome and unhappy things; nor does this other appear to bear death for an honourable good like the courageous man, but to escape some sorrowful ill, which belongs rather to a cowardly, effeminate, abject and feeble mind. From this it is clear how wrong many ancient orators were to praise as courageous

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ut Catonem, qui sibi mortem conscivit ne ad manus Cesaris deveniret.143 Et hoc concordat cum sacris doctrinis; molis namque et desperati et improbissimi peccatoris est seipsum occidere. Judas enim gravius dicitur peccasse cum desperando se occidit quam Redemptorem nostrum prodendo, unde Leo papa elegantibus verbis eum insequitur dicens:

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Sceleratior omnibus, o Juda, et infelicior omnibus extitisti, quem non penitencia revocavit ad Deum, sed desperacio traxit ad laqueum; expectasses consumacionem criminis tui, et donec sanguis Christi pro peccatoribus funderetur, et informis leti suspendium distulisses. (De penitencia, distincione tercia, c. Sceleratior)144 Lib. 1 Cap. 20 [De fortitudine.] Capitulum quartum Secundum ea que dicta sunt cognoscitur fortitudo vera. Sed quia paucissimi sunt fortes secundum hanc verissimam fortitudinem, est sciendum quod est et alia fortitudo que non est vera, assimilatur tamen in aliquo fortitudini vere et secundum hanc reperitur major numerus fortium. Hujus autem fortitu-

Cap 20 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m vicesimũ pͥ m H 143

patet errasse multos de oratoribus antiquis: Arist. argued that suicide to avoid “wearisome” things like poverty or love is not brave (EN 1116a12–15 τὸ δ᾽ ἀποθνήσκειν φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα [Vet. interp. “cupidinem”; Sent. Eth. iii.15.15 “cupidinem alicuius rei quam non potest habere”] ἤ τι λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δειλοῦ· μαλακία γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπονα [Vet. interp. “laboriosa”, Sent. Eth. “molestias”], καὶ οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν ὑπομένει, ἀλλὰ φεύγων κακόν. Prudery was perhaps one motive for Cartagena’s replacing ἔρως/cupido by “egritudinem vel ne in manus hostium veniat” (cf. Guiral Ot 1500, f. 57ra, who follows Aquinas in glossing “magna cupiditate alicuius rei quam non potest habere”, but adds: “sicut dicit Ovidius de remedio amoris”, i.e. Rem. am. 15–22 “At siquis male fert indignae regna puellae, | ne pereat, nostrae sentiat artis opem”, etc.); but his chief aim was to make Arist. seem to say something he never intended (i.16 n126): that suicide is always a sin. He thus contrives to impute error not to the Philosopher but to unnamed oratores. The suicide of Stoic Cato the Younger after defeat by Caesar in 46 bc (Plut. Cat. min. 68–72) was much debated in Antiquity, culminating in a famous passage in August. De civ. D. i.23–24, and from Dante and Petrarch onwards became a rhetorical topos among humanists (Baron 1935, 41–49; e.g. Manetti 1532 iv, 180–181) and their Iberian adepts (e.g. Santillana 1988, 247, 317, Proverbios (1437) st. 56 and Bías contra Fortuna (1448 or later) st. 122; Toledo 1993, 225 on Cato’s reading Pl. Phdr.); but by oratores Cartagena doubtless meant Cic. Off. i.112 (see Cartagena 1996, 256) and Sen. Prov. 2.8–12, on which he later wrote a gloss (1491, sign.

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some suicides like Cato, who killed himself so as not to fall into the hands of Caesar. This corresponds with sacred doctrine; suicide is the act of a desperate and utterly reprobate sinner. Judas is said to have sinned more gravely by killing him self in desperation than by betraying our Redeemer; so Pope Leo reproaches him in these elegant words: You distinguished yourself as more wicked and more unhappy than all mankind, Judas; repentance did not call you back to God, instead desperation dragged you to the noose. Would that you had awaited the consummation of your crime, and put off your ugly death by hanging until Christ’s blood was shed for sinners! (De penitencia, C.33.3.39 Sceleratior) 1.20 [On fortitude.] Chapter 4 What has been said reveals the nature of true fortitude. But since there are very few who are courageous with the truest fortitude, we must know that there is another courage which, though not true, is similar in some way to true fortitude, and of this kind there are a greater number of courageous men. There are

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i1r–v iv.3 s.v. Catón) that in Roca Barea’s view (2010, 60) shows him, “aun manteniéndose dentro de la ortodoxia, […] seducido por la virtud pagana que el suicidio de Catón tan bellamente encarna”. However, the gloss ends: “aunque Séneca esto habla hermosamente, ello es grand error, ca matar a sí mesmo no es de loar ni es acto de fortaleza ni de virtud; así segund la verdad cathólica como segund la doctrina delos philósophos, ante es acto de flaqueza” (see Blüher 1983, 137). In a gloss to De las siete artes liberales (= Sen. Ep. 88) Cartagena went further, professing to be shocked at Augustine’s constant harping on such “rag-and-bone” pagan errors in De civ. D.: Haze mençion de trezientas opiniones e poco menos; e por çierto de maravillar es cómo onbre cathólico […] pudo aver e leer tantos libros de gentiles. E por ende, él que quisiere ver toda esta ropa vieja de opiniones antiguas lea a sant Augustín en aquel libro, […] e por allí será ynformado […] cómo se muestra el error dellas. (Cartagena 1491, sign. e3r–f5v ii.12, at f4v, s.v. Pitagoras) “Ay muchos”, he says a leaf above, “que se deven cortar con segur porque son dañosos, como hazen alos árboles e vyñas que las podan [cf. reputare, n51 above] e les cortan lo superfluo” (sign. f3v, cap. 11 s.v. Latinos). unde Leo papa: Decretum C.33.3 De penitencia, dist. 3, c.39, from Leo i, Sermo 54.3 (PL liv, 320); Richter & Friedberg omit the second omnibus 52 and et 54. The mention of Judas and this legal text are supposed to conclude resoundingly that “hoc”—by this account, Arist.’s view of suicide—“concordat cum sacris doctrinis”.

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dinis non vere quinque sunt species: prima dicitur fortitudo politica sive civilis, secunda fortitudo militaris, tercia fortitudo furoris, quarta fortitudo spei, quinta fortitudo ignorancie.145 Prime fortitudinis tres sunt gradus, quorum primus est illorum qui sustinent pericula ut vitent obprobria et increpaciones que secundum leges timidis inferuntur et alias infamias et ignominias et adipiscantur honores qui secundum leges fortibus solent exhiberi. Et inde est quod apud civitates vel regna in quibus timidis inferuntur aliqua obprobria et fortibus exhibentur honores reperiuntur fortes secundum hanc fortitudinem, et interdum ex consuetudine hujus fortitudinis adipiscuntur fortitudinem veram. Et taliter aiunt fuisse fortes Hectorem et Diomedem et similes; refert enim Homerus quod cum Hector in uno prelio suis deficientibus moneretur ut fugeret, noluit dicens quod Polidamas quidam dux Trojanorum eum increparet, et propter vitandam increpacionem viriliter sustinuit; et Diomedes in alio prelio similiter a suis ad fugam monitus recusavit inquiens, “Dicet Hector concionando Diomedem fugisse ab eo”.146 Isti ergo qui fortiter agunt ut vitent obprobrium vel adipiscantur honores seu laudes non sunt fortes secundum veram fortitudinem, sed sunt fortes in primo et altiori gradu fortitudinis politice vel civilis. Est autem fortitudo politica in hoc primo gradu multum similis et propinqua fortitudini vere; nam sicut vera fortitudo operatur propter bonum virtutis, ita fortitudo politica agit propter verecundiam, que est timor de turpi, et propter desiderium boni honesti. Honor enim quem fortitudo politica querit est quoddam testimonium honestatis; sicut ergo vera fortitudo querit bonum et fugit turpe, sic politica querit honorem, qui est quid propinquum honestati, et fugit vituperium, quod est propinquum turpitudini. Et concordat bene cum hoc quod de Juda Machabeo legimus, qui cum verus fortis esset similia verba dixit illis que fortes politici Hector et Diomedes feruntur dixisse, nam cum in ultimo prelio quo cum Bachide pugnabat a militibus suis attente moneretur ut fugeret, recusavit dicens, “Absit a nobis ut fugiamus ab eis, et si apro[pi]averit tempus nostrum moriamur in virtute propter fratres nostros et non inferamus crimen glorie nostre” (primo Machabeorum, c. nono), et viriliter terribilia sustinens

33 apropiaverit (i.e. appropiaverit; se açercase Mcast) : apropriaverit ABβ apropinquaverit JO 145

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quinque sunt species: EN 1116a15 κατὰ πέντε τρόπους/Sent. Eth. iii.16.1 “secundum quinque modos”, the kinds of lesser or “untrue” courage. This chapter is on the three grades of the first kind, ἡ ἀνδρεία πολιτική, 1116a15–1116b/Sent. Eth. iii.16.1–8, somewhat simplified and reordered but keeping Arist.’s quotations of Homer (next n), to which Cartagena adds the further spice of a suitable (if apocryphal) biblical parallel (n147), a passing reference to the chronicles of Spanish chivalry, and a vulgar military technical term (n149). refert enim Homerus: EN 1116a20–35/Sent. Eth. iii.16.5, citing Hom. Il. 22.90–130 (Hector

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five kinds of this non-genuine fortitude: they are called first civic or political courage, second military courage, third the courage of rage, fourth the courage of hope, fifth the courage of ignorance. There are three degrees of the first courage. The first is that of those who suffer dangers to avoid the disgraces and rebukes inflicted by law on cowards and other infamies and ignominies, and to gain for themselves the honours that are customarily shown by law to the courageous. Hence courageous men with this courage are to be found in cities or kingdoms where certain disgraces are inflicted on cowards and honours shown to the courageous; and sometimes from the habit of this courage they acquire true fortitude. They say Hector and Diomedes and such men were courageous in this way; Homer recounts that when Hector was warned in battle by his retreating men to flee, he refused saying that Polydamas, one of the Trojan leaders, would reproach him, and to avoid the reproach manfully kept on; and Diomedes, likewise advised to fly by his troops in another battle, refused saying, “Hector will encourage his men by saying Diomedes ran away from him”. These who act courageously to avoid disgrace or to gain honours or praise are not courageous in the sense of true fortitude, but they are courageous in the first and highest degree of civic or political courage. Civic courage in this first degree is very similar and close to true fortitude; as true fortitude is exercised for the good of virtue, civic courage acts out of a sense of shame, which is fear of baseness, and out of a desire for the honourable good. This honour which civic courage seeks is a testimony of honourable feeling. Just as true fortitude seeks the good and flees baseness, so the civic seeks honour, which is the next thing to being honourable, and flees vituperation, which is the next thing to shamefulness. This accords well with what we read of Judas Maccabee, who as a truly courageous man said words similar to those that the civilly courageous Hector and Diomedes are said to have said, who, when in the last battle he fought against Bacchides he was diligently advised by his men-at-arms to flee, refused saying, “Far be it from us to do such a thing as to flee from them. If our time has come, let us die bravely for our brethren and leave no cause to question our glory” (1 Macc 9), and so, and Polydamas, 100 Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει) and viii.137–150 (Nestor and Diomedes, 148–149 Ἕκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ᾽ ἀγορεύων· | Τυδεΐδης ὑπ᾽ ἐμεῖο [φοβεύμενος]). The Iliad first reached the West through Latin translations in the fifteenth century, and became the object of Cartagena’s fervent interest in the 1440s (Morel-Fatio 1896, and see Echeverría Gaztelumendi 1993; Serés 1997), but it was not known to him in 1422, still less to Aquinas. They were familiar only with the crude 1070-line condensation Ilias Latina and reworkings of Ephemeris belli Troiani of “Dictys” and De excidio Troiae of “Dares” in Guido delle Colonne’s Historia destructionis Troiae and Romance versions derived from Benoît de Sainte-Maure’s Roman de Troie.

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occisus est.147 Differencia enim est hec: quod fortis verus operatur propter virtutem, fortis politicus propter honorem, qui est signum et quoddam premium virtutis. Et in hoc primo gradu politice fortitudinis fuerunt multi tam per universum orbem quam in hiis Hyspanie partibus qui propter honorem assequendum et fugiendum obprobrium mirabilia armorum opera peregerunt, quorum strenuis actibus cronice plene sunt. Secundus gradus fortitudinis politice est illorum qui timore alicujus pene pugnant, ut quia interdum principes puniunt fugientes a bello, sicut de Hectore fertur, qui militibus suis cum ad pugnandum exiret dicebat, “Si quis sine pugna discesserit, ego puniam taliter illum quod non possit fugere canes”, id est quod occideret eum et cadaver ejus mitteret canibus.148 Qui ergo propter similem timorem sustinet terribilia non est fortis verus, sed dicitur fortis in secundo gradu fortitudinis politice. Deterior autem est iste gradus primo, nam in primo pugnatur propter vitandum obprobrium turpitudinis et adipiscendum honorem, in hoc propter vitandum triste, id est penam. Tercius gradus hujus fortitudinis est quando aliqui pugnant propter neccesitatem imminentem, ut interdum fit quia duces belli percutiunt illos qui fugiunt vel quia exercitum circundant foveis vel muro quem vulgariter palenquum dicimus.149 Qui ergo fugerent si possent sed propter neccessitatem imminentem pugnant dicuntur fortes in tercio gradu politice fortitudinis; nec enim pugnant quia bonum, sed quia neccessarium est. Lib. 1 Cap. 21 [De fortitudine.] Capitulum quintum Secunda species non vere fortitudinis dicitur militaris; est autem hec quando quis exercet actus qui videntur fortitudinis propter experienciam armorum.150 Sunt enim aliqui milites qui sunt ita edocti et experti in armis quod multa que aliis hominibus inexpertis viderentur terribilia illos non terrent. Nam in preliis

36 hec AOB et suppl. J super lin. (es ésta Mcast), om. β 44 pugnandum ABβ pugnam JO 48 gradus om. β 49 ante pugnatur ins. gradu β Cap. 21 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m xxɩȷm H 147

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de Juda Machabeo legimus: 1 Macc 9:10–18, reading adpropiavit. Cartagena’s Vulg. may have been corrupt, but we correct the apodosis of Ω to distinguish appropiare “draw near” (non-class., Du Cange i, 333, and evidently unknown to the scribes) from the crass solecism appropriare “make one’s own, appropriate”. de Hectore fertur: EN 1116b34–35 (Arist.’s inaccurate recollection of Hom. Il. 2.391–393, in fact spoken by Agamemnon)/Sent. Eth. iii.16.7. Cartagena’s explanation of φυγέειν κύνας ἠδ᾽ οἰωνούς is a good deal clearer than Aquinas’ nebulous “ita male tractabo eum quod non erit sufficiens ad fugiendum canes”. muro quem vulgariter palenquum dicimus: according to DRAE, Sp. palenque, Port. palanque is from Cat. palenc “palisade” < pā(g)lus pal “stake, prop” + suff. -enc (Alcover & Moll

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manfully facing fearful odds, was killed. The difference is this: that the truly courageous man acts for virtue’s sake, the civilly courageous for honour, which is a sign and sort of prize of virtue. In this first degree of civic courage there have been many, both world-wide and in these parts of Hispania, who to gain honour and escape disgrace achieved marvellous deeds of arms, whose hardy acts fill the chronicles. The second degree of civic courage is that of those who fight from fear of some punishment, for instance because princes sometimes punish deserters from war, as Hector is said to have done; he would say to his men-at-arms as he went out to fight, “If any man runs away without fighting, I shall punish him in such a way that he will not be able to flee the dogs”, that is to say, he would kill him and throw his corpse to the dogs. Anyone who confronts terrible things for fear of such things is not truly courageous, but is called courageous in the second degree of civic courage. This degree is more abject than the first, for in the first one fights to avoid the disgrace of baseness and to acquire honour, in this one to avoid something grievous, namely punishment. The third degree of this courage is when men fight because of menacing necessity, for instance as sometimes happens because commanders execute those who desert, or because they surround the army with trenches or the sort of wall we call in the vernacular a “palisade”. Those who would run away if they could but fight because of overhanging coercion are called courageous in the third degree of civic courage; they fight not because it is good, but because it is necessary. 1.21 [On fortitude.] Chapter 5 The second kind of non-genuine courage is called military; it is the kind exercised when men commit seemingly courageous acts through experience of arms. There are some men-at-arms who are so trained and expert in warfare that many things that would seem terrible to the inexperienced do not terrify

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2002 s.v., citing Cròn. Jaume i, Eiximenis, Curial, Tirant), but Du Cange vi lists palencum, palenca, palancatum; as well as pallatium, palitium, palicia -itio, -iciatum, palissata, palizata “pale, palisade”, which lends credence to the view it derived from *palanca palanca, planche “plank”, of which Meyer-Lübke 1935, 532 §6455 finds over 100 reflexes in every Romance language. The significant fact is that Cartagena kept -qu-, despite giving the word a Lat. ending in -um; he intended the term to strike his readers with a jolt as deliberately “modern”, thus updating Aristotle. Secunda species ~ militaris: Arist.’s term is ἐμπειρία “experience”, EN 1116b3–23/Sent. Eth. iii.16.9–12, which this copies; but for Cartagena militaris meant “de cavallero” (Mcast), as he makes abundantly clear.

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sunt aliqua preparatoria et preambula preliorum que in se ipsis non sunt periculosa sed terrent inexpertos, ut strepitus equorum, fragor armorum, tubarum sonitus; cum enim magna acies equestris se movet, videtur inexpertis quasi quidam terremotus. Milites ergo qui ista sepe viderunt et sciunt equos dirigere, cum armis expedite se movere, ense et lancea percutere, scuto se obumbrare non timent ista, unde ut Vegetius dicit, “Nemo facere dubitat quod se bene didicisse confidit”, et pugnant cum aliis qui inexperti sunt sicut armati pugnarent cum inermibus.151 Isti ergo videntur fortes quia sustinent illa que aliis terribilia essent. Sed tamen si ad eum statum res devenit quod experiencia non sufficit quia periculum est tantum quod excedit periciam armorum, discedunt; nam quia audaciam ex eo habebant quod credebant se potentiores propter armorum periciam, cum vident periculum esse in promptu et non sufficere periciam armorum ad periculum evitandum, fugiunt. Fortes vero politici non sic, sed in periculis moriuntur, sicut in quadam civitate contigisse legitur ex qua milites et cives exierunt ad bellum et milites audacter agrediebantur in principio prelii, sed viso periculo fugierunt, cives vero omnes in prelio mortui sunt; quia fortis politicus eliget mortem potius quam turpiter ad vitam evadere, militaris autem econtra preponit turpem vitam morti honeste.152 Et intelligitur hoc de milite illo qui solum militari fortitudini nititur et politicam fortitudinem non habet. Nichil enim prohibet unum et eundem utramque fortitudinem habere, sicut fuerunt et sunt multi principes et alii duces, comites, et barones nobiles et plebei qui una cum experiencia armorum habuerunt et habent fortitudinem animi politicam vel forte eciam veram, quod singularius est. Tercia fortitudinis species est que provenit ex furore.153 Et non sumo furorem pro insania, sed pro ferventi et magna ira; nam sicut bestie fere cum vulnerantur vel vulnerari se timent ex impetu furoris inpulse irruunt in homines, sic interdum irati homines in magna pericula impetuose ruunt. Fortis autem verus non sic, sed ex eleccione cum magna virtute animi pericula sustinet.

9 cum α et cum β | virgulam transp. post ense J 10 ut AB et JOβ (e Mcast) 15 excedit αB (sobrepuja Mcast) excedet β 20 principio α principiis Bβ 22 eliget α eligit BQ elegit H 24 nititur AJ (se allega a Mcast) innititur OBβ 26 et sunt om. Bβ 151

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ut Vegetius dicit: this authority is taken from Sent. Eth. iii.16.9, quoting Veg. Mil. i.1 “Scientia enim rei bellicae dimicandi nutrit audaciam: nemo facere metuit quod se bene didicisse confidit.” fugierunt: H alone writes correctly fūgerunt (app. min. var.), but fŭgiērunt is frequent in medieval texts (e.g., at random, Muratorius 1723–1751, viii, 44d, 50c, 100b, etc.; Oliver von Paderborn 1894, app. crit. on 58, 70, 92, etc.; Kretschmer 2007, 76, 86, 87, etc.; DMLBS, Latham et al. 1975–2013, s.v. fugere [CL], –ire [LL] × 6; fugīre for fŭgĕre in biblical MSS,

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them. In battles there are, for instance, certain preparatory preambles to fighting that are not dangerous in themselves but terrify the inexperienced, such as the noise of the horses, the clash of weapons, the sound of trumpets; when a great battalion of cavalry is set in motion, it feels to the inexperienced like an earthquake. Knights who have seen it all before and know how to control their horses and ride in armour without encumbrance, striking with sword and lance and covering themselves with a shield are not frightened by these things. As Vegetius says, “No one doubts how to do what he is confident of having learnt well”; for them, fighting with inexperienced opponents is like armed men fighting with unarmed. Such men seem courageous, then, because they bear what other men would find terrible. However, if things come to such a pass that experience is no longer enough because the danger is so great that skill in arms cannot deal with it, they retreat; since their bravery came from a belief in their own superiority based on their skill in arms, when they see that danger is close at hand and that their skill in arms is not enough to avoid the danger, they flee. Men with civic courage are not like this; when in danger they choose death. This happened in a certain city where we read that the men-at-arms and civilians sallied out to war; at the start of the battle the men-at-arms charged boldly, but once they saw the danger they fled; but the civilians were all killed in battle. Thus the man with civic courage chooses death rather than shamefully escaping with his life, whereas one with military courage prefers shameful life to honourable death. This is to be understood as referring to the soldier who only relies on military courage and has no civic courage; there is nothing to prevent one and the same man having both kinds of courage, as was and is the case with many princes and other dukes, counts, noble barons and commoners who combine or have combined experience of arms with civic courage of mind, or perhaps even true fortitude, which is rarer. The third kind of courage is that which comes from rage. By rage I mean not madness but fervid anger; just as wild beasts charge at men from an onrush of rage when they are wounded or fear being wounded, so angry men sometimes rush impetuously into great dangers. The genuinely courageous man is not like this; he bears dangers by choice, with great virtue

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Rönsch 1875, 285 and the review by Ott 1874, 833–834); and one need hardly point out the likely interference from stress-pattern of Sp. huyéron < huír. There seems little doubt Cartagena wrote it, even if all his 33 other uses of the verb are regular (including fugere i.20 38, i.30 6, fugisse i.20 16). Tercia fortitudinis species: a perfunctory paraphrase of EN 1116b24–1117a9/Sent. Eth. iii. 16.1–6.

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Bene verum est quod furor coadiuvat ad fortitudinis actus, si previa racione dirigatur; est enim advertendum quod fortis verus vel politicus primo procedit ad agrediendum vel sustinendum pericula ex eleccione et ex deliberato judicio racionis, sed cum jam est in periculo supervenit furor. Impossibile namque esset, cum quis est jam in periculo belli et videt occidi suos et sentit se vulnerari, quin irascatur, sed tamen racio debet prevenire iram, non preveniri; unde et Homerus dicebat, “virtutem immitte furori”, hoc est ut furor regatur per virtutem.154 Nam virtus non debet servire furori, sed furor virtuti. Ira enim debet preveniri et regi per prudentem eleccionem et deliberatum et maturum judicium racionis. Bestie autem ex solo impetu furoris ducuntur; ideo non dicuntur fortes, sicut nec asini sunt fortes quia percussi a pascuis non recedunt, nec adulteri qui propter concupiscenciam venereorum aliqua periculosa agrediuntur. Isti vero qui ex furore ire operantur querunt aliquem finem, scilicet vindictam; irati enim solent vindictam desiderare, et punientes delectantur et quiescunt. Pugnaces ergo possent dici, sed fortes non, quia ex passione ducuntur, non a racione.155 Habent tamen aliquid simile vere fortitudini, quia sicut verus fortis operatur propter finem boni, ita isti propter finem vindicte; sed fortes non sunt, ut dictum est. Lib. 1 Cap. 22 [De fortitudine.] Capitulum sextum Quarta species fortitudinis non vere est que dicitur spei; et hec est quando aliquis propter solam spem victorie fortiter agit.156 Et sicut fortis non est ille qui ex ira operatur, sic nec ille qui propter solam spem victorie agit. Et hoc non est intelligendum quando quis sperat victoriam propter periciam et experienciam armorum, nam illud pertinet ad secundam speciem fortitudinis quam supra nominavimus militarem, sed quando aliquis ex frequentibus victoriis sperat se

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Homerus dicebat: EN 1116b24–35 ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμὸν, ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενα, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς· ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος “σθένος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ” καὶ “μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε” (Il. 16.529, 15.594)/Sent. Eth. iii.17.2 “inducit ad hoc exempla Homeri, qui admonendo quemdam dicit ‘virtutem immitte furori’, ut scilicet furor per virtutem animi reguletur, et ‘virtutem erige et furorem’, ut scilicet per iram virtus animi promptior ad actum reddatur.” The singular mistranslation of σθένος “strength” as virtus was the cause of this incoherent rendering of Arist. Pugnaces ergo possent dici: EN 1117a7–9 οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μέν, οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι δέ/Sent. Eth. iii.17.6 “possunt quidem dici pugnantes, sed non fortes”. The MSS divide equally between pugnaces and pugnantes, but irregularly: O and Mcast side with β against

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of mind. Very true, rage is a help in acts of courage, so long as it is previously directed by reason; we should note that the man of true or civic courage first proceeds to undertake or suffer dangers by choice and deliberate rational judgment, but once in the midst of danger, rage takes over. It would be impossible for someone already in the danger of war to see his men being killed and to feel himself being wounded without growing angry; nonetheless, reason should precede anger, not the other way round. As Homer would say, “instil rage with virtue”; that is, let rage be ruled by virtue. Virtue should not serve rage, but rage virtue; anger should be preceded and ruled by prudent choice and deliberate, mature rational judgment. Beasts are led only by the onrush of rage; therefore they cannot be called courageous. Asses are not courageous because they stubbornly refuse to stop grazing when beaten; nor are adulterers because they face certain dangers because of their sexual lust. But those who act from angry rage seek an end result, namely revenge; angry men normally desire revenge, and are satisfied and quietened down by vindictive retaliation. They can be called aggressive, but not courageous, since they are led by passion, not reason. All the same, they have something similar to true fortitude, because just as the truly courageous man acts for good ends, so these do for revengeful ends; but they are not courageous, as I have said. 1.22 [On fortitude.] Chapter 6 The fourth kind of non-genuine courage is that called the courage of hope; this is when someone acts courageously solely out of expectation of victory. As the man who behaves our of anger is not courageous, neither is he who acts solely from confidence of victory. This is not to be understood as referring to someone who expects victory because of his skill and experience in arms, for that belongs to the second kind of courage which I called “military” above, but to someone who from frequent previous victories hopes to obtain victory solely

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AJ, but B with AJ against β (app. min. var.) so the text cannot be decided on stemmatic grounds. The two were easily confused (pugnaces or -ates/-nãtes), and though Aquinas’ editors read pugnantes, they find the same dilemma in Sent. Eth.—it depends whether the trans. read μαχόμενοι pugnantes or μάχιμοι pugnaces (Aquinas 1969, i, pp. 172, 174 app. crit.; also Vet. interp. 425, app. crit.; so Aquinas 1478, sign. f3v “pugnantes”; c. 1482, sign. d7v “quidem depugnãtes [sic]”; but 1519, f. 48v “pugnãtes” in Aquinas’ gloss but “pugnaces” in all three of its texts of EN; Guiral Ot 1500, f. 57rb (Vet. interp.) and 58ra iv.2 “pugnantes [sic] et bene pugnantes”; others read pugnatores). We select the reading of AJ, the best MSS, which happens to be correct Lat. for what Arist. said and what Cartagena meant to say. Quarta species: EN 1117a9–22/Sent. Eth. iii.17.7–9. The précis is again very close to Arist.

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victoriam obtinere propter illam solam fiduciam et spem quam ex hoc sumpsit. Isti ergo sic bene sperantes assimilantur in aliquo vere fortibus, quia sicut illi aggrediuntur viriliter pericula, ita et isti; sed non sunt fortes, quia illi operantur ex eleccione et propter bonum, isti vero quia sperant se fore victores et nichil mali passuros, sicut contingit inebriatis, qui multiplicatis spiritibus propter vinum efficiuntur bone spei. Evenit autem, cum isti vident rem non procedere ut sperabant, fugiunt; fortis verus non sic, sed sustinet propter bonum viriliter terribilia, et non solum que apparent terribilia sed que in rei veritate terribilia sunt. Operatur enim fortis ex inclinacione proprii habitus. Ideo fortitudo vera maxime apparet in actibus repentinis, ut diximus; nam in aliis ubi potest precedere deliberacio potest homo aliqua contra inclinacionem animi operari, sed in hiis que repente accidunt opportet operari ex habitu interiori. Ideo facilius et manifestius apparet si est fortis vel ne cum terribilia subito occurrunt. Quinta fortitudinis non vere species est que dicitur ignorancie, ut quando aliqui aggrediuntur pericula ignorantes.157 Et isti assimilantur in aliquo supraproximis, quia nec isti nec illi credunt imminere sibi periculum in illo quod temptant; sed tamen sunt dissimiles quia ignorantes non credunt esse ea que aggrediuntur periculosa in se ipsis, sed fortes propter spem bene putant ea periculosa esse in se, sed non credunt periculosa sibi propter fiduciam vincendi quam habent. Deteriores autem sunt fortes per ignoranciam fortibus propter spem, quia ignorantes ex solo defectu sciencie ad pericula moventur, sperantes vero aliqualem dignitatem habent, in quantum ex consuetudine vincendi fiduciam sumpserunt. Hinc evenit quod ignorantes aggrediuntur pericula ignoranter, sed cum sciunt statim fugiunt; sperantes autem non statim cum sentiunt pericula fugiunt sed sustinent aliquantulum donec videant periculum esse tantum quod superet spem et fiduciam eorum, et tunc cum hoc sentiunt discedunt. Isti ergo omnes extimantur fortes quia faciunt aliquos actus similes actibus fortitudinis; non tamen sunt vere fortes, ut dictum est. Lib. 1 Cap. 23 [De fortitudine.] Capitulum septimum Supradictis annectendum est quod, licet fortitudo se habeat medio modo inter audacias et timores sustinendo ut opportet terribilia et aggrediendo ut debet ausibilia, principalior tamen laus fortitudinis est in sustinendo terribile; magis 10–11 et nichil mali passuros sicut contingit α et accidit simile β, et ~ qui om. B (et Mcast esperan ser vençedores, e en los muchiguados espíritos por vino son fechos) 19 si est α sicut β Cap. 23 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m xxɩɩɩȷm H 157

Quinta fortitudinis non vere species: EN 1117a23–28/Sent. Eth. iii.17.10–12, omitting only the example of Argives mistaking Spartans for Sicyonians, which would have been meaningless to Cartagena and his readers.

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on the basis of the confidence and hope he has gained from them. These hopeful men are in some respect similar to the truly courageous, because both alike manfully confront dangers; but they are not courageous, because while the former act from choice and for the good, these do so because they expect to win and not suffer any harm, rather like drunkards who by building up their spirits with wine become optimistic. However, it turns out that when these men see affairs are not turning out as they expected, they turn tail. The truly courageous man is not like this; he manfully bears terrible things for the good, and not just things that look terrible but those that really are terrible. Thus the courageous man acts from the inclination of his own disposition, and so true fortitude is most apparent in sudden acts, as I have said; in those where forethought is possible a man is able to do things against his inclination, but in those that happen suddenly he must act from an inner disposition. Thus it is easier and clearer to see if he is courageous or not when terrible things happen suddenly. The fifth kind of non-genuine courage is that called the courage of ignorance; this is when men confront dangers unknowingly. These are somewhat like the ones just mentioned, because they too do not believe there is any imminent danger in what they take on; but they differ from them in that unknowing men do not believe that what they undertake is dangerous in itself, whereas the over-confident are well aware that it is dangerous in itself, but do not believe it is dangerous to themselves because of their confidence of winning. To be courageous by ignorance is more abject than being courageous by hope, because the ignorant are moved to take on dangers solely from lack of knowledge, whereas the over-confidence at least have some dignity, insomuch as they derive their confidence from their habit of winning. The upshot is that the ignorant undertake dangers unknowingly, but when they find out they immediately turn tail; the hopeful, on the other hand, do not flee dangers as soon as they perceive them, but bear them for a little until they see the danger is so great that it overcomes their hope and confidence, and only when they realize this do they retreat. All these, then, are esteemed courageous because they perform certain acts similar to acts of courage; but they are not truly courageous, as I have said. 1.23 [On fortitude.] Chapter 7 To the aforesaid one must tack on that, though fortitude holds itself mid-way between rashness and fear by bearing terrible things as it must and undertaking daring things as it should, the most praiseworthy form of fortitude is bearing the terrible; a man is more commended for his fortitude if he remains

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namque commendatur ut fortis qui est imperturbatus in terribilibus quam ille qui bene se habet circa audacias agrediendo illa que aggredi debet; et hinc potest sumi solucio cujusdam contencionis quam sepe inter nobiles et armorum peritos insurgere videmus.158 Loquuntur enim quandoque in bellicis actibus et colloquendo disceptant quis est actus fortior, expectare vel aggredi? Omnibus ergo consideratis et cunctis recte proporcionatis, virtuosius dici potest expectare quam aggredi. Racio hujus est quia timor imminet homini ab aliquo fortiori contra ipsum insurgente, audacia consurgit ex eo quod quis extimat se potentiorem illo quem invadit. Difficilius autem est stare contra fortiorem quam insurgere in equalem vel minorem, et per consequens laudabilius. Et loquimur de aggressu illorum actuum quos aggredi debent fortes; nam si quis aggrederetur irracionabiliter aliqua supra humanam virtutem non dicitur fortis, quia illud ad audaciam pertinet, prout est vicium. Est autem actibus fortitudinis adiuncta tristicia, nam quia fortitudo consistit circa terribilia et circa ausibilia, que sunt difficilia, neccessario sequitur quod licet fortis verus operetur propter bonum et aliquantulum delectetur in consideracione boni, tamen in actibus dolorosis et difficilibus tristabitur. Nec enim possibile est hominem, licet fortem, cum sit carnalis, non tristari vel dolere cum vulneratur vel occiditur; illa enim delectacio quam habet in consideracione finis, scilicet boni et virtutis, propter circunstancias vulnerum et dolorum quodammodo evanescit. Et ex hiis concluditur falsam fuisse opinionem quorundam antiquorum philosophorum qui dicebantur Stoyci.159 Dicebant enim virtuosum nunquam tristari; et licet magne auctoritatis viri hanc oppinionem sequuti sunt, falsa est, quia de homine carnali loquimur, non de ferreo, qui quantumcumque virtuosus sit impossibile est quin doleat et tristetur, ymo quanto virtuosior, tanto magis tristabitur secundum consideracionem presentis vite secundum quam Stoyci loquebantur, quia virtuosus magis videtur perdere cum perdit vitam quam alius, quia dignior et felicior est vita ejus quam

24 quodammodo om. β β 158

27 loquimur αB loquitur β

31 alius αB aliquis qui virtuosus non sit

principalior tamen ~ in sustinendo terribile: EN 1117a29–b22/Sent. Eth. iii.18. The treatment in this final chapter is more expansive than the previous two (708 words to Arist.’s 280, Aquinas’s 1007). Cartagena first frames the debate in terms of an everyday discussion among men-at-arms (below), and then hints that he could gossip about well known (“cognoscimus […] audivimus”) past and present soldiers in Spain and elsewhere, good and bad (n161); but the marrow of it is the intervening Christian refutation of Stoic apatheia (n159). cujusdam contencionis quam sepe inter nobiles: did knights “often” dispute this topic? Unlikely as it may seem, they probably did to judge by a fifteenth-century reader who noted “Solucio questionis” in the margin of O. Soldiers of our acquaintance also

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unperturbed by terrible things than if he conducts himself well in daring to undertake the things he should undertake. This perhaps provides a solution to a certain contention we often see arise among noblemen and experts in arms; they sometimes discuss acts of war, and as they converse the argument arises about which is the more courageous: charging, or standing to receive a charge? All things considered and giving due weight to all sides of the question, waiting can be said to be more virtuous than attacking. The reason for this is that fear is inspired in a man when someone more valiant charges him, while daring arises from the fact that someone thinks himself stronger than the one he is attacking. So it is more difficult to stand against a more valiant enemy than charge an equal or lesser, and therefore more praiseworthy. I am talking about confronting the sort of acts that courageous men should undertake; if someone irrationally takes on things beyond human virtue he is not called courageous, for that is rashness, and thus a sin. There is, however, an attendant grief in acts of fortitude, for since courage involves terrible and daring things, which are difficult, it necessarily follows that although the truly courageous man acts for the sake of good and takes some delight in considering that good, he will suffer grief in the painful and difficult acts. It is not possible for a man, albeit a courageous one, since he is made of flesh, not to feel grief or pain when he is wounded or killed; that pleasure he takes in considering the end, namely good and virtue, is somewhat dispelled by the circumstances of wounds and pain. From this we may conclude that the opinion of certain ancient philosophers called the Stoics was false. They said the virtuous man never suffers grief; and although men of great authority have agreed with this opinion, it is false, for we are talking of men of flesh, not steel; however virtuous a man may be, it is impossible for him not to feel pain and grief. On the contrary, the more virtuous he is, the more he will feel grief from the viewpoint of this life, which is what the Stoics were talking about, for the virtuous man seems to lose more than any other when he loses his life because

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confirm it, and the “solution” too: it is worse to be shelled than to charge. However, Cartagena’s purpose was not to investigate the truth, but to engage his noble audience’s interest. dicebantur Stoyci: the Stoics arose after Arist.’s death; this allusion was added by Aquinas (Sent. Eth. iii.18.6, cf. EN 1117b9–11), who followed his master Albertus Magnus in doing so also at i.16.10 on 1100b22–33 “Stoici posuerunt tristitiam nullo modo cadere in virtuosum” (cf. August. De civ. D. ix.4–5) and seven other places, but rather than Aquinas’s words here (“supponebant Stoici […] quod nihil esset bonum hominis nisi virtus”) Cartagena takes up his earlier reference on Stoic ἀπάθεια “impassibility”, for the express purpose of refuting it. He adds colourful imagery (“homine carnali, non ferreo”) and a religious proof-text (next n) and argument (“ut puta mori pro fide catholica”), all leading to an ending specifically adapted to his lay readership.

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alterius non virtuosi. Secundum consideracionem autem vite future quam speramus virtuosi sepe desiderarunt et desiderant mortem propter vitam eternam consequendam, tristantur tamen et dolent in mortis articulo, unde et ipsa Veritas ait, “Tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem” (Mathei xxvi).160 Secundum hominem tunc Salvator noster loquebatur, secundum quem opportet in morte et vulneribus tristari et dolere; non tamen propter ea est minus fortis, ymo laudabilior, quia licet sentiat tristiciam et dolorem postponit ea propter bonum virtutis, potius eligendo unicum magnum opus cum illa difficultate operari, ut puta mori pro fide catholica vel pro bono communi, quam evadere et aliqua particularia bona facere. Et hinc solet sumi racio quare fortitudo est melior quam temperancia, quia per fortitudinem disponitur homo ad sustinendum tristia propter bonum, per temperanciam disponitur ad abstinendum a delectabilibus propter bonum; difficilius autem est tristia sustinere quam a delectabilibus abstinere. Ideo fortitudo preponitur temperancie, quia magna tristicia comitatur operaciones ejus. Nec enim in omnibus virtutibus est neccessarium operari delectabiliter, nam sustinere terribilia quod pertinet ad fortitudinem fit cum tristicia et dolore, sed est laudabilissimus actus quia racionis et virtutis vigor vincit tristiciam et postponit eam racioni et bono communi. In militari vero fortitudine non contingit hoc, quia milites non propter bonum commune sed propter predam vel parva stipendia exponunt vitam suam discrimini. Et intelligendum est semper, cum de defectu militaris fortitudinis loquimur, de illis militibus qui alias non sunt fortes. Possibile enim est quod aliqui sint fortes secundum veram fortitudinem vel politicam et insuper habeant fortitudinem militarem quia sunt experti et exercitati in armis, quorum multos fuisse in Hyspania legimus et in aliis mundi partibus, et eciam hodierna die nonnullos cognoscimus quos credimus esse fortes secundum fortitudinem veram vel saltem politicam et scimus eos magnam periciam et experienciam armorum habere; isti ergo multum sunt laudabiles. Sunt tamen alii in diversis partibus, ut audivimus, qui non pugnant propter bonum commune nec pro naturalitate patrie, cum extranei sepe sint, sed pro stipendiis solummodo; et evenit interdum quod pro parvis lucris hodie se exponunt periculo pro una civitate, et in crastinum erunt contra eam pro similibus stipendiis.161 Et isti, si alias non sunt fortes, in animo videntur fortes secundum militarem fortitudinem dumtaxat; nec enim propter aliud sed propter periciam armorum se fortes ostentant. Hec autem militaris fortitudo nullatenus comparatur vere vel politice fortitudini. 63 Et isti si AJ Et si isti O isti si B isti ergo si β 160

Veritas ait: Mt 26:38.

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his life is worthier and happier than that of a man who is not virtuous. From the point of view of the future life that we hope for, on the other hand, the virtuous have often desired and desire death for the sake of eternal life; still they feel grief and pain in the throes of death, for which reason the Truth Himself said, “My soul is deeply grieved even to death” (Mt 26). Our Saviour was speaking at that moment as man, for whom it is fitting to grieve and feel pain in death and wounds; yet he is no less courageous on that account—nay rather, more praiseworthy, because though he feels grief and pain, he puts them behind him for the good of virtue, choosing to do one great but difficult deed, that is, to die for the Catholic faith or the common good, rather than evade it and effect some private goods. This is the reason why it is usually asserted that fortitude is better than temperance, because fortitude disposes a man to bear grievous things for the sake of good, temperance disposes him to abstain from delightful ones for the sake of good; but it is more difficult to bear griefs than to abstain from delights. So fortitude is placed before temperance because of the great grief that accompanies its deeds. It is not necessary in all virtues to act with delight; bearing terrible things, which pertains to fortitude, is done with grief and pain, but is nevertheless a most praiseworthy act because the strength of reason and virtues overcomes grief and subordinates it to reason and the common good. In military courage, however, this does not happen when men-at-arms expose themselves to fatal danger not for the common good but for booty or small pay. When we speak of the defect of military courage, it is always to be understood of those men-at-arms who are not otherwise courageous. Some may possibly be courageous in the true or civic sense and in addition have military courage because they are experienced and practised in arms; we read of many who have been such in Hispania and other parts of the world, and even today we know some whom we believe to have true or at least civic courage, and know to have great skill and experience of arms; these, then, are highly praiseworthy. There are others in various regions, however, as we have heard, who do not fight for the common good nor for their native countries, as they may often be foreigners, but solely for pay; it sometimes happens that for small gains they expose themselves to danger defending a city one day, and attack it the next for the same pay. These men, if they are not otherwise courageous, seem to have courageous minds only so far as military courage is concerned; they show themselves to be courageous in no respect other than skill in arms. Such military courage is in no way comparable to true or civic fortitude.

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ut audivimus: no less than five conspiratorial 1st-pl. verbs (“legimus […] cognoscimus quos credimus […] et scimus”) betray the rhetoric; despite circumstantial claims (“in Hyspania

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Lib. 1 Cap. 24 De temperancia Capitulum primum De temperancia deinceps dicamus.162 Est enim in aliquo similis fortitudini, nam sicut fortitudo est circa passiones timoris et audacie, que sunt in parte irascibili, ita temperancia est circa delectaciones et tristicias, que pertinent ad partem concupiscibilem, in quibus omnibus communicamus cum brutis, nam animalia bruta timent mortem et gaudent delectacione ciborum et venereorum. Ideo iste due virtutes habent aliqualem similitudinem, quia utraque disponit nos ut recte nos habeamus in passionibus communibus nobis et brutis. In aliis vero in quibus non communicamus cum brutis, ut in honoribus et diviciis et similibus, alie virtutes nos regunt, ut justicia de qua supra scripsimus et relique de quibus infra dicemus. Est autem temperancia ille habitus electivus secundum quem tenemus medium circa delectaciones. Est eciam circa moderandas tristicias que proveniunt ex absencia delectacionum, sed principalius pertinet ad regendum delectabilia, ex eo quia efficacius agit res per suam presenciam quam per suam absenciam. Ideo licet circa utrumque consistat temperancia, principalius tamen circa regendam delectacionem quam circa fugandam tristiciam que ex absencia rei delectabilis venit. Intemperancia econtra est ille habitus electivus secundum quem quis sequitur delectaciones et fugit tristicias ultra medium racionis. Et cum in hac materia loquimur de tristicia, non est intelligendum de illa que provenit ex timore vel presencia actus terribilis, quia illud pertinet ad fortitudinem, ut diximus, sed de illa tristicia que provenit ex absencia delectacionum. Est juxta hoc sciendum quod delectacio est duplex: una est animalis, alia est corporalis. Racio hujus distinccionis est quia causa delectacionis est aprehensio rei amate. Quicumque enim aprehendit quod amat delectatur; quando ergo tale quid amatur quod non aprehenditur exteriori sensu, causatur quedam delectacio et hec dicitur animalis, quam communiter dicimus spiritualem; quando vero tale quid amatur quod consumatur in quadam corporali passione exterioris sensus, si aprehenditur causatur quedam delectacio que dicitur corporalis. Ut in exemplo, cum aliquis amat honorem seu disciplinam et aprehendit eam, delectatur per solam aprehensionem mentis

Cap. 24 tit. α, om. Q Capl̛m xxvm H 15–16 Ideo licet circa utrumque consistat (-stit A) temperancia principalius tamen α Ideo principalius est temperancia β Principalius tamen B (et Mcast por su ausencia; más prinçipalmente enpero)

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1.24 On temperance. Chapter 1 Next let us talk of temperance. It is in some way similar to fortitude, for as fortitude is to do with the emotions of fear and rashness, which are sited in the irascible faculty, so temperance is to do with pleasures and griefs, which belong to the concupiscent faculty. All these we share with beasts, for wild animals fear death and enjoy the delights of food and sex. Hence these two virtues have a certain similarity: each disposes us to conduct ourselves correctly in regard to emotions we have in common with beasts. In things we do not share with brutes, such as honours, wealth, and so on, we are ruled by other virtues like justice, on which I have written above, and the rest on which I shall speak below. Temperance, then, is that elective disposition by which we steer a middle course with regard to pleasures. It is also about moderating griefs that come from the absence of pleasures, but it more principally pertains to ruling pleasures, by reason of the fact that a thing exercises more of an effect by its presence than by its absence. Hence although temperance concerns both, it more principally concerns ruling pleasures than dispelling the grief that comes from the absence of a pleasurable thing. Intemperance on the contrary is that elective disposition by which someone chases pleasures and flees griefs beyond the rational mean. Whenever in this heading we speak of grief, it is not to be understood as that which comes from fear or the presence of a terrible act, because that pertains to fortitude as I have said, but the grief that proceeds from the absence of pleasures. In this connexion we should know that pleasure is of two kinds: one is mental, the other physical. The reason for this distinction is that pleasure is caused by getting hold of a loved thing. Whoever gets something he loves feels pleasure; when the thing loved is the sort that is not apprehended by an external sense, the kind of pleasure caused is called mental, or as we say in ordinary speech, spiritual; but when the thing loved is the sort that is enjoyed with some physical emotion of an external sense, getting it causes the kind of pleasure called physical. So, for example, when someone loves honour or learning and gets it, he feels pleasure solely by mental apprehension without any abstinence. Strikingly, the treatment makes very few changes but nevertheless, uniquely, is longer than the source (3719 words vs. Arist. 1287, Aquinas 2712). To an extent this is due to legal and biblical texts in the later chapters, but there are fewer than elsewhere, and fewer added examples. Mechanical but long-winded, the précis lingers morosely on any reference to realia seemingly just for the relief of it. If Cartagena worried his reader might be bored by a virtue so tangential to the noble and powerful, he could have been more concise; but it seems it was too much effort. The chapters come alight only when they touch on carnal pleasures specially prohibited to churchmen: venery, gluttony, perfume—his imagery betrays a repressed subconscious fixation on all three (next n; cf. Intro. §2 at p. 21 on his limpieza).

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sine aliqua corporali passione, et ideo hec dicitur delectacio animalis; cum vero aliquis desiderat cibum et aprehendit delectatur, sed hec delectacio consumatur comedendo quod fit per passionem corporalem, ideo dicitur corporalis. Circa animales autem delectaciones non consistit temperancia, quod patet discurrendo per omnia genera earum. Sunt enim delectacionis animalis tria genera, quorum primum est quod videtur continere quandam honestatem, ut in exemplis suprapositis; nam cum quis amat honorem vel disciplinam, aprehendendo delectatur. Licet ergo circa ista et similia sit reperire medium et extrema, hoc tamen pertinet ad alias virtutes, quia temperancia et intemperancia respiciunt aliquas delectaciones turpitudinem habentes; iste autem non sunt hujusmodi, licet interdum in eis erretur. Est aliud genus istarum delectacionum ut cum aliquis delectatur indebite in dictis vel factis hominum, ut sunt nonnulli qui gaudent audiendo fabulas et narrando rumores et totam diem vellent expendere in istis supervacuis et inutilibus; et isti dicentur garruli vel vani, non tamen intemperati per racionem suprascriptam, quia intemperancia non solum continet vanitatem sed eciam turpitudinem, isti vero non sunt ita turpes, licet sint inanes et vani. Est tercium genus illarum que consistunt circa res exteriores, ut puta cum quis inordinate contristatur in subtraccione peccuniarum vel gaudet ultra debitum in invencione earum; et circa hoc non consistit temperancia nec intemperancia, quia hoc vicium habet quandam inordinacionem appetitus, non tamen turpitudinem, quod pertinet ad intemperanciam ut supradictum est. Ordinare ergo appetitum in talibus pertinet ad alias virtutes, prout casus accidit, non ad temperanciam. Lib. 1 Cap. 25 [De temperancia.] Capitulum secundum Est ergo temperancia circa delectaciones corporales, non tamen circa omnes; nam circa delectaciones que proveniunt ex tribus sensibus exterioribus, ut si aliquis delectatur per sensum visus videndo colores vel aliquas ymagines vel litteras, non dicetur ex hoc temperatus vel intemperatus, nam licet in hoc sit dare medium et extrema, non tamen pertinet ad temperanciam, que consistit circa delectaciones vehementiores et fortiores.163 Similiter eciam in sensu 32 aprehendit αB aliquis (aliqs̅ Q) aprehendit eum β 36 continere α tenere Bβ sunt ABβ Cap. 25 tit. AJB Capl̛m terciũ scd’m O, om. Q Capl̛m xxvȷm H 163

47 sint JO

circa delectaciones corporales, non tamen circa omnes: EN 1117b28–1118b7/Sent. Eth. iii.19.10–20.5. The paraphrase is very close; there is no material addition, only little touches like 21–23 “audiendo cantilenam amatoriam non propter consonanciam vocis sed quia ad memoriam ejus ducitur aliquod illicitum concupiscibile pertinens ad tactum” (when 7–8 already quoted Sent. Eth. 19.13 “in melodiis, idest in consonantiis humanarum vocum, et hypocrisi, idest simulatione humanae vocis quae fit per musica instrumenta”); “pomorumvel rosarum vel flagrantium florum seu rerum bene olentium” for “pomorum vel rosarum

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bodily emotion, so this is called mental pleasure; but when someone desires food and gets it, he feels pleasure but this pleasure is enjoyed by eating, which comes about by a physical emotion and so is called physical. Now, temperance is not concerned with mental pleasures. This can be made clear by running through all the kinds of them. There are three kinds of mental pleasure. The first is anything that seems to contain some kind of honourableness, as in the examples above; when someone loves honour or learning, for instance, he feels pleasure in getting them, but although in respect of these and similar things a mean and extremes are to found, this belongs to other virtues because temperance and intemperance have regard to certain shameful pleasures, and these are not of that kind, even if one can sometimes go astray with them. The second kind are such pleasures as undue enjoyment of the deeds and sayings of men; for instance, there are some who delight in listening to stories and gossiping and would be happy to spend the whole day in such empty and useless diversions; they will be called idle chatterboxes, but not intemperate for the reason given above, because intemperance embraces not just idle emptiness but also shamefulness, but these people are not shameful in this way, however inane and idle they may be. The third kind are those to do with external goods, for instance some feels inordinate grief in letting go of money or undue joy in finding it; temperance and intemperance are not to do with this, because this vice involves some disorder of appetite, but not shamefulness, which is what distinguishes intemperance, as said above. Ordering the appetite in such matters belongs to other virtues as the case determines, but not to temperance. 1.25 [On temperance.] Chapter 2 Temperance therefore concerns bodily pleasures; however, not all of them. In respect of pleasures that come from the three external senses, for instance, if someone feels pleasure through the sense of sight by looking at colours or certain images or letters, he will not be called temperate or intemperate on that account, for although a mean and extremes may be given in this, it is not the task of temperance, which is concerned with stronger and more vehement vel thymiamatum, qui sunt species odorum” (19.13); “canes delectantur in odorando perdices” for “in odore leporum” (19.16, τῶν λαγωῶν); or substituting Arist. “Non est […] in aliis animalibus secundum hos sensus delectatio praeter secundum accidens” and Aquinas’s austere “sensus […] hominibus dantur propter cognitionem sensibilium, ex quibus proceditur ad cognitionem rationis; […] inde est quod homo delectatur in ipsa sensibilium convenientia secundum se consideratorum, etiam si non ordinentur ad sustentationem naturae” (19.17) by “ut quando videmus pulcras arbores vel viridia prata ex quibus nichil speramus comedere, […] vel odoramus diversos flores”.

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auditus, nam si quis delectetur ultra modum in audiendo melodias vel consonancias vocum seu musica instrumenta, non dicitur intemperatus; potest enim pertinere ad aliam virtutem vel vicium, non tamen ad istam.164 Idem est in delectacione per olphatum, nam si quis delectetur in odore pomorum vel rosarum vel flagrantium florum seu rerum bene olentium non dicetur ex hoc intemperatus. Quod tamen semper intelligendum est quando quis delectatur in istis secundum se consideratis, nam si per accidens delectaretur per respectum ad tactum vel gustum intemperatus dici potest, ut si aliquis delectaretur in odore unguentorum muliebrium vel aliquorum pulmentorum seu ciborum, non enim proprie et per se est illa delectacio odoratus, sed delectant per accidens quia per odorem illum trahitur ad memoriam aliquid quod est concupiscibile tactus vel gustus; quod patet, quia videmus esurientes gaudere odoribus ciborum, sed cum repleti sunt non gaudent illo odore. Delectacio ergo ista cum per accidens fit ad intemperanciam pertinet. Simile in visu et in auditu dici potest; si quis enim gauderet videndo cibum vel audiendo cantilenam amatoriam non propter consonanciam vocis sed quia ad memoriam ejus ducitur aliquod illicitum concupiscibile pertinens ad tactum, intemperatus dicetur. Circa hos autem tres sensus animalia bruta non delectantur per se sed per accidens; non enim canes delectantur in odorando perdices propter ipsum odorem sed propter cibum quem sperant, et odorando sentiunt cibum esse prope. Idem in auditu et visu, nam leo audita voce bovis vel capre vel videndo eos non gaudet propter visum vel auditum, sed quia videndo vel audiendo sperat se in brevi habere cibum. Et racio hujus est quia animalia bruta reguntur solo instinctu nature; ideo non delectantur nisi in hiis que pertinent ad sustentacionem nature propter quam dati sunt illis isti sensus, et ista sunt solummodo illa que pertinent ad generacionem per quam conservatur species et pertinentia ad sustentacionem per quam conservatur individuum. Hominibus autem dati sunt isti sensus propter cognicionem rerum sensibilium, ex quibus proceditur ad cognicionem racionis que movet hominis appetitum. Ideo homo delectatur in ipsa conveniencia sensibilium secundum se consideratorum, eciam si non ordinentur ad sustentacionem nature, quod contingit interdum in visu, odoratu, vel auditu secundum se, non habito aliquo respectu ad tactum vel gustum, ut quando videmus pulcras arbores vel viridia prata ex quibus nichil speramus comedere, vel audimus dulcem armoniam musicorum cum honesta significacione vocis, vel odoramus diversos flores arborum vel agrorum. Alia 7 delectetur αB delectatur β 164

delectetur: indic. seems called for, so at first β looks authentic; but Mcast “si alguno se deleyte” and Ω’s reading in the same construction in 10 confirm this subj. (vs. quando + indic. in 12–13, though see app. min. var.).

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pleasures. Similarly with the sense of hearing; if someone feels excessive pleasure in listening to melodies or part-songs or musical instruments, he is not called intemperate; this may pertain to some other virtue or vice, but not this one. It is the same with pleasure from smell; someone who feels pleasure in the scent of apples or roses or fragrant flowers or sweet-smelling things will not thereby be called intemperate. All this, however, is to be understood only when the person feels pleasure in such things considered in themselves; if by accident he were to feel a pleasure in respect of touch or taste, he can be called intemperate. For instance if someone were to feel pleasure in the scent of women’s perfumes or certain sauces or foods, this is not properly or per se a pleasure of smell; these things give pleasure by accident because the odour brings to mind some lustful pleasure of touch or taste; we see this clearly from the fact that hungry people delight in the smells of food, but when they are full they do not delight in the smell. When this kind of pleasure comes about by accident, then, it pertains to intemperance. The same can be said of sight and sound; if someone were to enjoy looking at food, or listening to a love ditty not because of the harmony of the voice but because it calls to mind some illicit lustful desire involving touch, he will be called intemperate. In regard to these three senses wild animals feel pleasure not per se but by accident; dogs do not feel pleasure in smelling partridges because of the scent itself but because of the food they are hoping for, and by the scent they sense that food is near. Likewise with hearing and sight; when a lion hears the voice of a bull or a goat or sees them it does not rejoice because of the sight or the sound, but because by seeing or hearing it expects shortly to have food. The reason for this is that wild animals are governed solely by natural instinct; therefore they only feel pleasure in things that pertain to natural sustenance, which is the reason they were endowed with these senses, and these things are only those which pertain to reproduction, by which the species is preserved, and those pertaining to sustenance, by which the individual is preserved. Men, on the other hand, were given these senses for the cognition of sensible things, from which we proceed to the cognition of reason that moves human appetite. Thus man feels pleasure in the harmony of sensible things considered in themselves, even if they are not ordained for natural sustenance, as occasionally happens with sight, smell, and hearing in themselves without regard to touch or taste, as when we look at beautiful trees or green pastures from which we do not hope to eat anything, or listen to the sweet harmony of musicians singing chaste lyrics, or smell the various blossoms of trees and fields. Other animals do not feel pleasure in such

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vero animalia non delectantur in istis; delectacio ergo horum trium sensuum secundum se non pertinet ad temperanciam vel intemperanciam, quia hec virtus consistit circa delectaciones in quibus reliqua animalia communicant, hee autem sunt tactus et gustus. Ideo iste delectaciones pertinentes ad tactum et gustum dicuntur serviles et bestiales, quia in eis communicamus cum bestiis. In istis igitur consistit temperancia et intemperancia, sed principaliter in tactu. Nam in gustu modicum peccat intemperatus, quia proprie ad gustum pertinet judicare de saporibus, sicut faciunt illi qui probant vina vel coqui qui condiunt pulmenta et miscent cibos cibis et experiuntur gustando an habeant convenientem saporem vel ne; et in hoc non multum delectantur intemperati, sed tota delectacio eorum consistit in usu quarundam rerum delectabilium, ut in sumpcione ciborum et potuum et usu venereorum, que pertinent ad tactum, in gustu vero non nisi in quantum ordinatur ad tactum, sicut de aliis sensibus dicebamus. Gustus enim viget in lingua, delectacio ciborum consistit in guture, unde ferunt quendam antiquum Grecum nomine Philosenum qui erat vorax ciborum orasse ut gutur suum fieret longius guture gruis, ut cibus in guture tardans diutius delectaret, ex quo juste reprehensus est.165 Circa hunc igitur sensum tactus consistit temperancia et intemperancia, ex quo sequitur, cum iste sensus sit communissimus omnium (quia in eo communicant omnia animalia nec inest homini in quantum est homo sed in quantum est animal), quod intemperancia est juste exprobrabilis et vituperabilis, nam delectari in talibus et diligere ea tanquam maxima bona est maxime bestiale; et hinc est quod vicia intemperancie habent maximam turpitudinem et per ea homo multum infamatur et vituperatur quia assimilatur bestiis.166 Ideo intemperatus recte comparatur jumentis insipientibus et similis factus est illis. Et non est intelligendum hoc de delectacione que fit per tactum in toto corpore, ut cum aliqui luctantur vel ludunt et contangunt se et calefiunt; illa enim delectacio liberalis est et bona, nisi per accidens ordinaretur ad aliquid turpe. Sed solum consistit temperancia et intemperancia circa delectacionem tactus que versatur in illis corporis partibus quas natura concessit ad usum ciborum et venereorum.

47 igitur αB ergo B | et intemperancia om. β 165

166

Philosenum: EN 1118a33 διὸ καὶ ηὔξατό τις [no name] ὀψοφάγος ὢν τὸν φάρυγγα αὑτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόμενος τῇ ἁφῇ/Sent. Eth. iii.20.3 “Quidam enim Philosenus nomine, Erixius patria”. quia assimilatur bestiis: a fifteenth-century hand noted in A’s margin: “Crisostomus super Math. [Serm. 25 In ascensionem Domini 3, PL l, 447] Comparatus est homo jumentis

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things. Hence the pleasures of these three senses in themselves do not belong to temperance or intemperance, because this virtue is concerned with the pleasures shared by the rest of the animal kingdom, namely of touch et taste. For this reason these pleasures pertaining to touch and taste are called servile and bestial, because we share them with the beasts. So temperance and intemperance concern these, but principally touch, because the intemperate man sins only moderately in taste because the property of taste is to make judgments about flavours, like wine-tasters or cooks who season sauces and blend foods and taste them to test whether they have the right flavour or not; the intemperate do not take much pleasure in this, their whole pleasure consists in the actual use of certain pleasurable things, for example the consumption of food and drink and practising sex, which pertain to touch, not taste, except insofar as it is subordinate to touch in the way I was saying about the other senses. The power of taste is in the tongue, whereas the pleasure of food is located in the throat; that is why they say a certain ancient Greek called Philoxenus who was a glutton prayed for his throat to become longer than the throat of a crane so food would give him pleasure longer by tarrying in his throat, for which he was justly reproached. Therefore temperance et intemperance concern this sense of touch. Since this is the most widely shared of all the senses (all animals have it in common and it exists in man not qua man but qua animal), it follows that intemperance is justly worthy of reproach and censure, for to take pleasure in such things and love them as the highest goods is the height of bestiality. For this reason the vices of intemperance attract the deepest shame; man suffers great infamy and censure for them, because he is “likened to brutes”; the intemperate man is rightly compared “to senseless beasts, and is become like to them”. This is not to be understood of pleasure that comes from touch in the whole body, for instance when men wrestle or play sports and touch each other and get hot; this is a gentlemanly, good pleasure, unless it leads by accident to something base. Temperance et intemperance only concern the pleasure of touch that is exercised in those parts of the body that nature has granted for eating food and practising sex.

etc. [Vulg Ps 48:13/NRSV 49:12] Pejus est comparari quam nasci. Naturaliter non habere racionem tollerabile est. Hominem racione decoratum irrationabili nature comparari voluntatis crimen est.” The same erroneous attribution to Chrysostom’s In Matthaeum is to be found, for example, in (ps.-)Bonaventura, Pharetra, seu Loci communes i.7 (1864–1871, vii, 19).

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Lib. 1 Cap. 26 [De temperancia.] Capitulum tercium Est ulterius sciendum quod sicut timor et tristicia ordinantur ad malum, nam timor est de malo futuro, tristicia de presenti, ita concupiscencia et delectacio ordinantur ad bonum, quia concupiscencia est de bono futuro, delectacio de presenti. Ideo sicut fortitudo se habet circa timores et tristicias in terribilibus, ut in materia sua dictum est, sic se habet temperancia circa concupiscencias et delectaciones in delectabilibus. Concupiscenciarum autem due sunt species: quedam sunt communes, alie proprie.167 Communes dicuntur ille que a natura omni homini conveniunt, ut desiderare cibum; omnis enim homo a natura concupiscit cibum et potum ad se sustentandum et lectum in quo requiescat, unde et Homerus dicebat quod tam juvenis quam senex desiderat lectum.168 Proprie dicuntur que sunt istis communibus addite, ut desiderare talem vel talem lectum vel cibum taliter preparatum, et iste dicuntur proprie, nam communis natura non inclinat ad hoc, quia non idem placet omnibus, unus enim concupiscit hoc, alius illud. Sed hee concupiscencie habent interdum aliquid naturale secundum personam concupiscentis, ut cum aliquis non solum ex adinvencione sua sed ex quadam inclinacione complexionis desiderat cibum taliter preparatum vel lectum taliter stratum, alius econtra, ut sepe videmus. Inest ergo in hiis aliquando aliquid naturale secundum consideracionem persone concupiscentis, non tamen naturale commune quod communiter conveniat toti generi humano. In concupiscenciis naturalibus pauci peccant, quia in hiis non peccatur nisi uno modo, videlicet quando quis plus accipit quam natura requirat. Contingit autem aliquando quod aliquis comedit vel bibit quicquid ei datur, sed tamen hoc facit usque ad superfluam repletionem, quia natura non concupiscit nisi quod supleatur indigencia, assumere ergo ultra indigenciam est excessus supra naturam. Et ideo tales vocantur castrimargi; Grece enim castrimargia idem est quod “furor ventris”, et sic isti videntur habere furorem ventris et in hoc communiter peccant homines multum bestiales qui non

Cap. 26 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m xxvɩȷm H requirit JO 167

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22 requirat ABβ (requiera Mcast)

Concupiscenciarum ~ species: again, closely based on EN 1118b8–1119a5/Sent. Eth. iii. 20.6–21.4, with an added canon law text, but one that introduces no fresh legal or religious slant. Homerus dicebat: EN 1118b11–12 πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ […] καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων/ Sent. Eth. iii.20.8 “Sicut etiam Homerus dicit quod omnis homo tam iuvenis quam crescens, idest adolescens, concupiscit lectum in quo requiescat”. Νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων means “in the prime of life”, not “young and old”, and εὐνῆς “bed” had nothing to do

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1.26 [On temperance.] Chapter 3 We should further know that, just as fear and grief are directed at the bad, since fear is about future evil and grief about present, so desire and pleasure are directed at the good, since desire is about future good, pleasure about present. So as fortitude behaves with respect to fears and griefs in terrible things, as explained in the relevant heading, so temperance behaves with respect to desires and pleasures in pleasurable things. There are two sorts of desires: some are general, others particular. The ones called general are those common to all men by nature, like wanting food. Every man by nature desires food and drink to sustain himself and a bed to rest in; as Homer would say, “young and old long for their bed”. Those called particular are additional to these general ones, for instance wanting such and such a bed or food prepared in such a way, and these are called particular because common nature does not incline us to them, since not everyone likes the same: one likes this, another that. But such desires now and then have a natural element, to do with the person who desires; for instance, when a man wants food prepared in a certain way or a bed made in a certain way not merely from his own invention but from some physical inclination of humours; and another man the opposite, as we often see. There is something natural in these, then, taking into consideration the character of the person who desires, but not the common nature that commonly met with in the whole human race. Now, few sin in relation to natural desires, because in these there is only one way to sin, namely by consuming more than nature requires. It sometimes happens that someone eats or drinks everything that is given to him, but goes on doing so after he is full; nature only desires enough to supply need, to fill oneself beyond need is therefore an excess above and beyond nature. Such men are called gastrimargs; in Greek gastrimargía means “belly-rage”, and they seem to have a rage in their bellies. This is a sin common to very bestial men who have no discernment in what they eat, like beasts, but

with resting, as Thetis made clear to Achilles (Hom. Il. 24.129–131 μεμνημένος οὔτέ τι σίτου | οὔτ᾽ εὐνῆς; ἀγαθὸν δὲ γυναικί περ ἐν φιλότητι | μίσγεσθ᾽ “Forgotten food and bed? Better sleep with a woman”); it took someone not a Catholic cleric to say so outright (Averroes 1550, f. 23r iii.11 “simul & adolescens & perfectus desyderat cum eis [i.e. cibum humidum aut siccum] coitum”—one monk still scratched plaintively in his MS “vel lectum”, but Grosseteste (almost) got it, glossing “lectum: scilicet conjugalem”: Aquinas 1969, n ad loc.). Mcast left the phrase out, so maybe he understood it. That an ancient Greek would have thought “sleep” an object of delectable concupiscentia is laughable, but Cartagena did not know Homer.

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discernunt cibos, sicut bestie, sed dumtaxat curant ut ventrem impleant.169 In propriis delectacionibus multi et multipliciter peccant secundum omnes circunstancias, nam illi qui excedunt in istis peccant interdum quia delectantur in hiis quibus non opportet, ut sumendo cibos non convenientes eis, vel si sint convenientes delectantur magis quam opportet vel absque discrecione et non secundum debitum modum, unde Gregorius ait: Quinque modis nos gule vicium temptat, aliquando namque indigencie tempora prevenit, aliquando tempora non prevenit sed cibos lautiores querit, aliquando que sumenda sunt expetit accuratius, aliquando autem et qualitas ciborum et tempus congruit sed intemperata quantitate sumendi mensuram refeccionis excedit, nonnunquam abjectius est quod desiderat et tamen ipso estu immensi desiderii deterius peccat. (De consecracione, dist. quinta, c. Quinque modis)170

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Isti ergo qui superhabundant in gaudendo quibus non opportet vel ut non opportet quod secundum naturam est odibile dicuntur intemperati, superhabundancia enim in hujusmodi delectacionibus dicitur intemperancia; ideo exprobrabilis et vituperabilis est, ut diximus. Et quemadmodum intemperancia excedit in delectacionibus, ita eciam excedit in tristiciis. Ad cujus clariorem intellectum est sciendum quod fortis laudatur in hoc quia sustinet tristiciam propter bonum, tollerat enim timorem et tristiciam imminentem ex periculis terribilium propter bonum, ut in materia fortitudinis dictum est. Temperatus vero non laudatur sic, sed diversimode; non enim laudamus temperatum quia sustinet tristiciam provenientem ex absencia delectabilium, sed quia non sentit eam. Verus autem temperatus non multum concupiscit delectabilia, ideo est promptus ad abstinendum ab eis. Intemperatus econtrario non vituperatur quia non tollerat tristiciam, ut timidus, sed quia magis tristatur quam opportet. Et de tristicia illa semper in hac materia loquimur que provenit ex absencia delectacionum, non de illa que insurgit ex presencia alicujus nocumenti, que pertinet ad fortitudinem; et quia effectus cujuscumque rei potior est qui consequitur ex presencia quam ex absencia, 169

castrimargi: EN 1118b19 διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι/Sent. Eth. iii.20.11 “dicuntur gastrimargi a gastir quod est venter, et margos quod est furor vel insania, quasi ‘furor vel insania ventris’ ”. For the spelling c-, unanimously transmitted by Ω, see Du Cange ii, 213 “castrimargia, Gulæ concupiscentia. […] Ingluvies, helluatio”, with attestations s. x–xiv (vs. iv, 42 gastrimargia); it is the form used in the Lexicon of 112 Gk terms appended to EN (Vet. interp., not Bruni as the catalogue says) in a s. xiv–xv MS from the friary of Santo Tomás in Ávila, BNE Mss/6442, f. 54r “Castimargi [sic]: quasi gulosi” (see Aquinas 1969, i, 259*–262*).

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only care about stuffing their bellies. In particular pleasures many sin, and in many different ways according to all circumstances; those who commit excess in these cases sometimes take pleasure in things they should not, like consuming foods that are not suitable for them, or if they are suitable taking more pleasure than they should, or without discretion and not according to the due mean. Gregory says: The sin of greed tempts us in five ways. Sometimes it circumvents the times of need; sometimes it does not circumvent the times but seeks too sumptuous foods; sometimes it searches out what to consume too carefully; sometimes again both the quality of the food and the time are fitting, but by the intemperate quantity of consumption it exceeds the limits of healthy refreshment; and not infrequently what it wants is more base but it sins more abjectly by the very frenzy of its uncontrolled longing. (De consecratione 5.22 Quinque modis) Those, therefore, who go to excess in enjoying things they should not or in ways they should not, which is odious to nature, are called intemperate, as excess in such pleasures is called intemperance; as such it is worthy of reproof and censure, as I said. And in the same way that intemperance exceeds in pleasures, so too it exceeds in griefs. To understand this more clearly we must know that the courageous man is praised because he bears grief for the sake of good, tolerating fear and imminent grief from dangers of terrible things for the good, as explained in the heading on fortitude. The temperate man is not praised in this way, but differently; we do not praise a temperate man because he bears the grief that comes from the absence of pleasurable things, but because he does not feel it. The truly temperate man does not desire pleasurable things too much, so he is ready to abstain from them. The intemperate man, by contrast, is not censured because he cannot tolerate grief, like a coward, but because he grieves more than he should. And in this heading we speak always of the grief that comes from the absence of pleasures, not that which arises from the presence of some harm, which pertains to fortitude; and since the effect that follows from the presence of any thing is stronger than from its absence, fortitude is more prin-

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ideo fortitudo principalius est circa tristiciam que insurgit ex presencia nocivorum et periculorum, temperancia econtra principaliter est circa delectaciones que ex delectabilium presencia sequuntur, secundario est circa tristicias que ex absencia delectabilium oriuntur, et has tristicias intemperatus multum sentit. Racio hujus est quia intemperatus concupiscit delectabilia omnia et appetit delectacionem propter seipsam, et ideo concupiscit omnia que delectacionem faciunt, presertim ea que maxime sunt delectabilia, in quorum comparacione non curat tantum de aliis minus delectabilibus. Nam verus intemperatus ex eleccione sequitur delectaciones, incontinens autem non sic, ut infra dicetur; inde est quod eleccio intemperati non regitur racione, sed ducitur a concupiscencia ut eligat delectabilia, et precipue que majorem delectacionem afferunt, super bona utilia et honesta. Intemperatus enim postponit utile et honestum ut delectacionem assequatur; ideo quando non consequitur delectacionem tristatur. Concupiscencia enim quando non adipiscitur rem concupitam est cum tristicia, et sic delectacio ingerit tristiciam, quod videtur contradicere sibi ipsi; sed non contradicit, nam delectacio non inducit tristiciam, sed absencia ejus, sicut cum navis perit propter absenciam gubernatoris non facit gubernator perire navem sed absencia illius. Lib. 1 Cap. 27 [De temperancia.] Capitulum quartum Sicut reperitur superhabundancia in delectacionibus, ita et defectus.171 Et quia sunt pauci qui in defectu peccent, ideo istud vicium non habet speciale nomen, nam multo major numerus est illorum qui sequuntur delectaciones ultra quam opportet quam illorum qui cessant ab eis plus quam deberent; sed potest nominari generali vocabulo insensibilitas. Illi ergo qui deficiunt in hoc dicuntur insensibiles. Nam eciam et reliqua animalia discernunt aliquos cibos et aliquibus delectantur, aliquibus non; et alique delectaciones videntur pertinere ad naturam generis humani. Si ergo aliquis est cui nichil sit delectabile, iste est longe a natura humana. Sed hos nunquam videmus et rarissime reperirentur;

Cap. 27 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m xxviij H Mcast) 171

9 reperirentur α reperiretur β reperientur B (se fallarán

ita et defectus: EN 1119a5–20/Sent. Eth. iii.21.5–9, with a legal proof-text, but again one with no special religious or legal content, and no change of substance.

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cipally concerned with the grief that arises from the presence of harmful and dangerous things, whereas temperance is principally concerned with pleasures that follow from the presence of pleasurable things, only secondarily with griefs that spring from the absence of pleasurable things, and these are the griefs the intemperate man most feels. The reason for this is that the intemperate man desires all pleasurable things and seeks pleasure for its own sake, and so he desires everything that gives pleasure, especially those that are most pleasurable, so that he cares comparatively less about other less pleasurable ones. For the truly intemperate man pursues pleasures by choice, unlike the incontinent man, as will be explained below; so it is that the choice of the intemperate man is not ruled by reason, but led by desire to choose pleasurable things, and above all the ones that bring greater pleasure, above useful and honourable goods. So the intemperate man puts the useful and honourable behind him to get pleasure; and when he does not obtain pleasure feels grief. Desire when it does not get the thing it desires leads to grief, and so pleasure brings grief, which seems self-contradictory; but it is not, because it is not the pleasure that causes grief, but its absence, just as when a ship sinks because of the absence of a rudder-man, it is not the rudder-man who makes the ship sink but his absence. 1.27 [On temperance.] Chapter 4 Just as excess is found in pleasures, so too is defect. Because there are few who sin by defect, this vice has no special name, for a far greater number of people pursue pleasures beyond what is fitting than retreat from them more than they should; but we could give it the general name of insensibility, and call those who are deficient in this insensible. Even the rest of the animals have some discernment in what they eat and take pleasure in some things, not others; and certain pleasures seem inherent to the nature of the human race. If there exists anyone to whom nothing is pleasurable, he is far removed from human nature.

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et loquimur de hiis qui non sentiunt delectaciones, non de illis qui abstinent ab eis propter aliquem finem honestum vel utilem, nam istud non est defectus nec quid vituperabile, sed laudabile.172 Temperatus autem habet se circa predicta medio modo; primo enim quantum ad delectaciones non delectatur in illis turpibus in quibus maxime delectatur intemperatus, ymo tristatur quando aliquid tale occurrit, et universaliter loquendo non delectatur in quibus non opportet, et in illis in quibus delectari opportet non delectabitur vehementius quam opportet nec quando non opportet. Secundo quantum ad tristicias non tristabitur superflue in absencia delectabilium. Tercio vero quantum ad concupiscenciam non concupiscit delectabilia absentia, quia non multum curat de eis, et si talia sunt que concupiscere debet concupiscet ea cum debita mesura, nec concupiscendo magis quam debet nec quando non opportet, nec secundum aliquam aliam circunstanciam excedet mensuram racionis. Utetur autem temperatus illis delectabilibus que expediunt ad sanitatem corporis vel ad bonam habitudinem ejus, scilicet ut sit promptus et expeditus ad ea que facere debet, honestate tamen semper servata. Et ista delectabilia appetet temperatus secundum debitam mensuram, quomodo et quando et quantum opportet. Si vero sunt alia aliqua delectabilia que non sunt neccessaria ad sanitatem corporis vel bonam habitudinem, appetet ea temperatus triplici condicione observata. Prima, si non sunt impeditiva sanitatis seu bone habitudinis, sicut nocivus vel superfluus cibus vel potus qui sanitati multum nocere solet, unde Jeronimus ait: Legimus quosdam morbo articulari et podagre humoribus laborantes proscripcione bonorum ad simplicem mensam et pauperes cibos redactos convaluisse, caruerant enim sollicitudine dispensande domus et epularum largitate, que et corpus frangunt et animum. (De consecracione, dist. quinta, c. Legimus)173

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34–35 epularum β puellarum αB (de moças Mcast) 172

hos nunquam videmus et rarissime reperirentur: sentences lifted verbatim from Sent. Eth. iii.21.5–6. except for this phrase (= “quia hoc raro contingit”, EN 1119a5–7 διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι/Vet. interp. “propter non multum fieri”). Culturally the shift is revealing: to change “such behaviour rarely happens” to “we never see such men and they would very rarely be found” was to view excessive mortification of normal human desires—consciously or not—from a specifically medieval Christian viewpoint, one that praised standing up to one’s neck in cold water, spending one’s life one-legged on a pillar, or having oneself walled up in a cave to live on beetles and forgo sex as acts of charismatic saintliness. Syntactically, however, the last verb is perplexing; what seems required is B’s fut. indic. reperientur “they will rarely be found”, which Martínez Gómez selects, but though Mcast gives pause, the

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But we never see such people and they would very rarely be found; I mean those who feel no pleasures, not those who abstain from them for some honourable and useful purpose, for that is not a defect, nor worthy of censure, but laudable. The temperate man holds himself mid-way between the aforesaid extreme. First, as far as pleasures are concerned he does not take pleasure in those base things in which the intemperate man most delights, on the contrary he grieves when anything like that occurs, and universally speaking he does not take pleasure in unfitting things, and in pleasures which are fitting he will not take pleasure more keenly than fitting or when it is not fitting. Second, as far as griefs are concerned he will not grieve excessively at the absence of pleasurable things. But third, as far as desire is concerned he does not desire absent pleasures, because he does not care much about them, and if they are such that he ought to desire them he will desire them with due measure, neither desiring more than he should nor when he should not, nor will he exceed the rational mean in any other circumstance. Thus the temperate man will enjoy those pleasurable things that are helpful to bodily health or his good repute, namely to be ready and waiting for the things he should do but always safeguarding his honour. And the temperate man seeks these pleasurable things in due measure, how and when and in the quantity that is fitting. If there are certain other pleasurable things not necessary to bodily health or good repute, the temperate man seeks them on three conditions. First, that they are not hindrances to health or good repute, like harmful or excessive food or drink, which is usually very harmful to health, for as Jerome says: We read of some afflicted by arthritis and inflammations of gout who have been brought back to health by good people’s prescription of simple meals and cheap food, as they had rid themselves of the cares of dispensing the household expenses and long dinners, which break both the body and the mind. (De consecratione 5.30 Legimus)

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stemma implies that both sub-archetypes had imperf. subj. Maybe it was meant as concessive (“even granted they rarely occur”, but standard is pres., e.g. sit hoc verum “(though I grant) this may be true”, aliquis dicat “someone may say”), optative (“and might they occur rarely!”, but standard is [utinam +] pres. or pluperf.), or vague hypothetical (“they would rarely be found—if you looked”). All are sub-standard, but the same occurs in i.30 46 “raro tamen hoc inveniretur”, so though one is tempted to posit corruption through a mistaken ͡ ), this parallel convinces us to select α’s reading. abbreviation (repˀiẽtur → rep̱ ietur Jeronimus ait: Decretum Pars iii De consecr. 5.30 (Jer. Adv. Iovinian. ii.12, PL xxiii, cols 301–302); α’s puellarum for epularum is silly (“superfluus cibus vel potus”; so largitate = big girls… to eat?), yet Richter & Friedberg find it in witnesses of Gratian. It is feasts, not girls, that do harm; surely Cartagena knew that?

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Secundo, si non sint preter bonum, id est preter honestatem, sicut delectacio adulteri vel alterius coitus preter matrimonialem. Tercio, si non sint super substanciam seu facultatem ejus, sicut si pauper vellet uti cibariis nimis sumptuosis. Nam ille qui sic se habet ut appetat delectaciones impeditivas sanitatis et bone habitudinis vel contrarias honestati vel excedentes divicias suas magis amat delectaciones quam dignum sit, quod non congruit temperato, qui amat eas secundum racionem rectam. Lib. 1 Cap. 28 [De temperancia.] Capitulum quintum Juxta premissa non est omittendum quod queri solet: quod est deterius vicium timiditas que opponitur fortitudini, aut intemperancia que opponitur temperancie?174 Et recte dicitur intemperanciam deteriorem esse timiditate, quod probatur duabus racionibus principalibus. Quarum prima est: laus et vituperium debentur actibus voluntariis, nam ex eo quod quis sine voluntate operatur nec est laudandus nec vituperandus, unde Augustinus ait, “Vasis ire Deus non daret interitum si non spontaneum inveniretur habere homo peccatum” (Vicesima quarta, quest. quarta, c. Nabuchodonosor, versu Vasis).175 Sequitur ergo quod quanto magis actus voluntarius est, tanto est magis vituperabilis si est malus. Si consideremus igitur timiditatem et intemperanciam, reperiemus magis voluntariam esse intemperanciam quam timiditatem, quod patet propter duo. Primo sic: unusquisque delectatur in eo quod voluntarie agit, tristatur vero econtrario in eo quod est sibi involuntarium; constat autem quod intemperatus agit propter delectacionem quam concupiscit, timidus agit propter tristiciam quam fugit, et horum duorum unum, videlicet delectacio, est delectabilis quia non solum delectatur ille qui delectacione actualiter fruitur, sed eciam ille qui delectacionem querit propter spem delectacionis consequende; reliquum vero, scilicet tristicia, est fugienda et per consequens involuntaria. Et sic magnifestum est quod intemperancia movetur ab eo quod est per se voluntarium, scilicet delectacione, et timiditas movetur ab eo quod est fugiendum et involuntarium, scilicet tristicia; plus igitur accedit ad voluntarium intemperancia quam timiditas, ergo exprobrabilior et deterior est. Patet eciam hoc idem secunda racione sic: tristicia provenit ex presencia alicujus contrarii et nocivi, ideo stupefacit et corrumpit naturam ejus qui tristatur. Inde est quod Cap. 28 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m xxɩxm H Mcast) .xxiij. β 174

4 duabus αB tribus β

8 xxiiij. αB (veynte e quatro

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Second, that they are not in contradiction to the good; that is, beyond decency, like the pleasure of adultery or any other copulation outside matrimony. Third, that they do not exceed his means or capacity, like a pauper wanting to enjoy over-sumptuous victuals. For he who behaves by seeking pleasures that hinder health and good repute, or contrary to decency, or exceeding his wealth loves pleasures more than is dignified, which does not become the temperate man, who loves them according to correct reason. 1.28 [On temperance.] Chapter 5 Besides the foregoing, we should not omit the frequent question: what is the more abject vice, cowardice which is opposed to fortitude, or intemperance which is opposed to temperance? Intemperance is correctly said to be more abject than cowardice, which is proved by two principal arguments. The first of them is: praise and blame are owed to voluntary acts, because the fact that someone does something involuntarily is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy, for as Augustine says, “God would not give ‘destruction to the vessels of wrath’ [Rom 9:22] if a man were not found to have sinned of his own volition” (C.24.4.22 Nabuchodonosor, verse Vasis [= 23.4.23]). It follows that the more voluntary the act is, the more blameworthy it is, if it is bad. If we consider cowardice and intemperance, then, we will find intemperance to be more voluntary than cowardice, which is clear for two reasons. First, every man takes pleasure in what he does voluntarily, but grieves over what is involuntary to him; it is agreed that the intemperate man acts because of pleasure that he desires, the coward acts because of grief that he flees, and of these two one, namely pleasure, is pleasurable because it not only delights the man who presently enjoys the pleasure but also the man who seeks the pleasure in the hope of getting pleasure; but the other, namely grief, is to be fled and consequently is involuntary. Thus it is manifest that intemperance is moved by what is voluntary per se, namely pleasure, and cowardice is moved by what is involuntary and to be fled, namely grief; intemperance is closer to being voluntary than cowardice, and therefore more reprobate and more abject. The same is also clear for this second reason: grief comes from the presence of something contrary and harmful, and so stupefies and corrupts the nature of the griever, so that the man’s

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sensus hominis ex tristicia impeditur a propria cognicione; multi enim, cum magnum periculum imminet, non bene vident nec audiunt. Sed delectacio causatur ex presencia convenientis, quod non corrumpit naturam, unde delectacio non stupefacit nec corrumpit sensum ejus qui delectatur. Sequitur ergo quod intemperancia, que operatur propter delectacionem, plus habet de voluntario quam timor, qui movetur propter tristiciam; et sic magis vituperabilis est. Secunda racio principalis est quia tanto aliquod vicium est magis exprobrabile quanto facilius vitari potest. Vitari vero potest unumquodque vicium per assuetudinem ad contrarium, sed facile est assuescere bene operari in hiis circa que est intemperancia, duplici racione: prima, quia delectabilia ciborum et potuum et aliorum hujusmodi in quibus intemperancia consistit occurrunt multociens in vita humana, ideo non deest homini occasio assuescendi bene operari si vult; secunda, quia assuescere bene operari in talibus non habet periculum, nullum enim periculum est si aliquis abstineat aliquando ab aliquo delectabilium, victus vel simili. In timiditate autem contingit econtrario, bellica namque pericula contingunt raro et cum eveniunt sunt periculosa; ideo non potest homo ita faciliter assuefieri ad actus fortitudinis sicut ad actus temperancie, quia in uno actu posset mori, quod non contingeret in actibus temperancie. Ideo intemperancia vituperabilior est, cum facilius vitari possit. Premissis addendum est quod voluntarium et involuntarium hominis reperitur diversimode in timiditate et in intemperancia. Nam in hiis que contra timiditatem sunt, universalia sunt voluntaria et singularia videntur quasi involuntaria; in hiis vero que ad intemperanciam pertinent est reperire contrarium, nam universalia sunt involuntaria et singularia sunt voluntaria. Quod declaratur per exempla. Cum aliquis vadit ad pugnandum et ad invadendum hostes, hoc facit ex voluntate, proponit enim in mente sua aggredi pericula et sustinere terribilia; cum vero devenitur ad singulare et est in presenti periculum bellicum et vulneratur vel depellitur, supervenit interdum ei tanta tristicia quod stupefit et proicit arma et alia turpiter agit, et ita illud quod in universali erat sibi voluntarium in singulari positum fugit, et sic videtur facere quodammodo contra voluntatem suam, in quantum ab exteriori principio homo inducitur ad hoc quod nolit quod prius volebat. In actibus intemperancie econtra, nam in universali involuntarii, in particulari sunt voluntarii; nullus enim universaliter considerando vellet esse intemperatus, sed singula quibus homo fit intemperatus sunt delectabilia, ideo intemperatus eligit delectacionem alicujus turpitudinis specialiter considerate. Et sic fit quod per vicium timiditatis homo nolit illa singularia quorum universalia volebat, et per vicium intemperancie vellit illa singularia quorum universalia nolebat. Et racio differencie sumitur

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cognitive senses are prevented by grief from working properly; many, in the face of great danger, cannot see or hear well. But pleasure is caused by the presence of something advantageous, which does not corrupt nature, so pleasure does not stupefy or corrupt the senses of the man who is pleased. It follows that intemperance, which acts for pleasure, is more voluntary than fear, which is moved by grief; and so is more blameworthy. The second main reason is that the more easy a vice is to avoid, the more reprobate it is. Every vice can be avoided by becoming habituated to its contrary, but it is easy to form the habit of acting well in the things that intemperance has to do with, for two reasons: first, because the pleasures of food and drink and other such things concerning intemperance occur many times in human life, so a man lacks no occasion to form the habit of acting well if he wants; second, because forming the habit of acting well in such matters has no danger, for there is no danger in someone sometimes abstaining from one of such pleasures, eating or the like. With cowardice the opposite is the case, because the perils of war happen rarely, and when they occur they are dangerous, so a man cannot so easily grow accustomed to acts of fortitude as to acts of temperance, because he could die in the space of a single act, which would not happen with acts of temperance. Hence intemperance is more blameworthy, since it can more easily be avoided. To the foregoing we should add that there is a difference between what is voluntary and involuntary for a man in cowardice and intemperance. In things that are against cowardice universals are voluntary and particulars seem more or less involuntary; in things that pertain to intemperance we find the contrary, for universals are involuntary and particulars are voluntary. This can be clarified by examples. When someone advances to fight and attack the enemy, he does this voluntarily, for he mentally proposes to confront dangers and bear terrible things; but when it comes down to particulars and the danger of war is actually present and he is wounded or thrown back, sometimes he is overcome by such grief that he is stunned and throws away his weapons and commits other shameful acts, so that what was voluntary for him in the universal, once converted into the particular, makes him flee. So the man seems to act in some way against his will, insofar as he is led by an external principle not to want what he first wanted. In acts of intemperance it is the other way round: the universal are involuntary, the particular voluntary. No one would wish to be intemperate, universally considered, but the particulars by which a man becomes intemperate are pleasurable; so the intemperate man chooses the pleasure of something shameful, considered particularly. So it is that through the vice of cowardice a man rejects particulars, the universals of which he wanted; but through the vice of intemperance he wants particulars, the universals of which he rejected.

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ex hoc quia tristicia que movet timorem pertinet ad involuntarium sicut delectacio que movet intemperanciam pertinet ad voluntarium; omnis autem affeccio anime circa singularia vehementior est, ideo circa singularia timiditas plus habet de involuntario, intemperancia vero plus de voluntario. Et ideo summe nocivum est in viciis intemperancie immorari in cogitacione per quam homo ad singularia descendit, quia ista alliciunt voluntatem et inclinant eam ad intemperanciam; nam omnes secundum universalem consideracionem abhorrent intemperanciam, sed intemperati in particularibus sequuntur actus ejus. Qui ergo temperatus esse desiderat a cogitacione particularium delectabilium toto posse abstinere laboret. Lib. 1 Cap. 29 [De temperancia.] Capitulum sextum Regi opportet et refrenari concupiscencias, et sicut puer insipiens castigatur sub manu pedagogi, ita concupiscencia debet regi per racionem.176 Et hinc est quod vocabula quedam in hoc sunt similia, nam dicimus castigari pueros cum ad bonum redducuntur, et vocamus quandam speciem temperancie castitatem, et dicimus puerum castigatum qui est reductus ad bonum et incastigatum illum puerum qui male conversatur, sic dicimus hominem castum qui secundum racionem se regit in hac specie temperancie et incestuosos aliquos qui non caste vivunt; ex quo patet quod sive castigacio dicatur a castitate sive castitas a castigacione, quod nomina sunt similia, quod non est putandum frustra factum fuisse, sed hoc ideo quia puer et concupiscencia sunt similes.177 Ideo si puer et concupiscencia non bene racione persuadeantur, perveniunt ad quoddam dominium et ad multum augmentum; ita quod dominabitur passionis appetitus qui est concupiscencia. Racio hujus est quia appetitus delectacionis est insaciabilis, quinymo quanto plus gustatur, plus concupiscitur eo quod secundum se est appetibilis. Et inde est quod sicut puero insipienti, ita eciam concupiscencie propria operacio auget conatum et desiderium in hoc quod est ei simile. Nam si puer insipiens dimittatur operari secundum insipienciam suam, magis in eo insipiencia crescet; et si homo concupiscencie satisfaciat,

Cap. 29 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m xxx H 6 sic α sic eciam Bβ, forte recte persuadentur Bβ 14 post insaciabilis add. et necquam β 176

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sicut puer insipiens castigatur: EN 1119a33–1119b18/Sent. Eth. iii.22.9–13. The précis is once more close, interesting to us only for the striking approach to etymology in the following long sentence (n177). vocabula ~ sunt similia: remarkably, the apparenly juvenile etymological word-play castitatem/castigatum reflects a similar ploy in the Gk (EN 1119a34–b4 τὸ δ᾽ ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἁμαρτίας φέρομεν· ἔχουσι γάρ τινα ὁμοιότητα […], κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀρεγόμενον); κολάζω “curb, chastise”/ἀκολασία “lack of control” were rela-

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The reason for the difference arises from the fact that the grief which moves fear pertains to the involuntary, just as the pleasure which moves intemperance pertains to the voluntary; but every affect of the soul is stronger in respect of particulars, so in respect of particulars cowardice is more involuntary, intemperance more voluntary. Thus in vices of intemperance it is highly harmful to dwell on the thoughts by which a man descends to particulars, because the latter tempt his will and incline it to intemperance; all abhor intemperance from the universal point of view, but the intemperate carry on practising it in particulars. Anyone who wants to be temperate, therefore, should labour with all his might to abstain from thinking about particular pleasures. 1.29 [On temperance.] Chapter 6 Desires must be ruled and reined in. As a silly boy is chastised by the hand of his teacher, so desire should be ruled by reason. This is why certain words for this are similar: we say boys are “chastised” when they are brought back to the path of good, and we call a certain kind of temperance “chastity”. Thus we call a boy who is brought back to the path of good “chastened”, and a boy who keeps loud company “unchastised”; and likewise a man who controls himself rationally in this kind of temperance “chaste,” and those who do not live chastely “unchastened”; from which it is clear that whether “chastisement” comes from “chastity” or “chastity” from “chastisement”, the names are similar, which one cannot think was done without a purpose, but by the same token that a boy and a desire are similar. If a boy and a desire are not properly corrected by reason they acquire some kind of mastery and grow unchecked; so the emotional appetite that is desire will become domineering. The reason for this is that the appetite of pleasure is insatiable, indeed the more it enjoys, the more it desires, by the fact that it is desirable in itself. So it is that, like a silly boy, desire finds its effort and longing actually increased by its own actions, in which they are alike; if the silly boy is allowed to act in his own silly way his silliness will grow, and

ted like—though in a more direct and relevant way than—castus “pure”/castigo “purge” (castum-ago, cf. purgo < purum-ago). But for Arist. the etymology was a fortuitous springboard (πότερον δ᾽ ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθὲν πρὸς τὰ νῦν διαφέρει), and Aquinas followed suit (Sent. Eth. iii.22.9 “Dicimus enim castitatem […] sicut et pueros disciplinatos dicimus castigatos. […] Et huiusmodi translationis [“metaphor”] ratio est quia habent quamdam similitudinem […]; sed quid horum nominetur ab alio non refert ad propositum”); whereas Cartagena’s observation, “non est putandum frustra factum fuisse”—God is the implied subj. of facere—reveals a different approach: the quintessential medieval principle “Etymologia est veriloquium” or nomen est omen; see Curtius 1948; Guenée 1980; Buridant 1998; Del Bello 2007. He reveals the same attitude elsewhere (nn207, 228, 281, and especially 284).

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magis concupiscencia crescet et dominatur, et precipue si concupiscencie vel delectaciones sint magne ex parte objecti, id est de rebus multum delectabilibus, et vehementes ex parte ejus qui concupiscit et delectatur quia multum ex eis afficitur, in tantum quod sepe impediunt hominis cogitacionem sive raciocinacionem; quanto autem magis remanet raciocinacio in homine, tanto concupiscencia minus potest dominari. Hinc ergo est quod, ex eo quia concupiscencie delectacio si sit vehemens facit augmentum sui ipsius, ideo opportet quod delectaciones et concupiscencie sint mensurate, non excedentes in magnitudine sive in vehemencia affeccionis, et sint pauce secundum numerum, et quod nichil conrarietur racioni, scilicet quod non concupiscat rem que concupisci non debet secundum racionem. Et illud quod ita se habet in concupiscenciis et delectacionibus, ut dictum est, dicimus bene persuasum et punitum, id est castigatum, a racione; sicut enim opportet quod puer vivat secundum preceptum pedagogi, sic debet vis concupiscibilis consonare racioni. Nam luctacio utriusque, tam pedagogi quam racionis, quam habent cum puero et concupiscencia fiunt ad bonum. Ille ergo qui vere temperatus est habet concupiscibile suum ordinatum secundum supradicta, nam concupiscit que opportet et sicut opportet et quando opportet prout ordinat racio. Lib. 1 Cap. 30 De continencia. Capitulum primum Quia temperancie de qua diximus videtur adherere continencia, que licet non sit perfecta virtus est tamen quoddam imperfectum in genere virtutis, ideo de ea aliquantulum dicamus.178 Et quoniam sunt multa que in ejus materia tractari solent que pertinent ad scientificam investigacionem quam hic principaliter non querimus, ideo ex omnibus illa dumtaxat sola sumamus que neccesaria sunt ad morum nostrorum direccionem. In primis ergo sciendum est quod illa que in moribus fugere debemus ad tria genera reducuntur, que sunt hec: incontinencia, malicia, et bestialitas. Differencia autem eorum sumitur ex hoc: ad quodcumque bonum opus operandum requiruntur duo, videlicet racio et rectitudo appetitus. Cum igitur aliquid

29 Et illud α Illud autem Bβ 34 ergo AJ vero O autem Bβ Cap. 30 tit. Rublica (Ruͣ A) de continencia capitulum primum AJ (v. n178) Capl̛m pͬ mũ de ꝯtinencia O (De continençia Mcast), om. BQ Capl̛m xxxɩͫ H 1 temperancie α ad temperanciam Bβ 2–85 imperfectum in genere ~ bestialis sicut de ad cap. 32 7 (reverso folio in subarchetypo) transposuit β 178

videtur adherere continencia: Sent. Eth. iv.17.17 adds to EN 1128b38 a passing reference to verecundia’s similarity to “continentia, quae cum sit laudabilis non est virtus, sed habet aliquid virtutis admixtum”, but EN’s discussion of ἐγκράτεια and ἀκρασία, self-control and its lack, makes “a new start” in 1145a15 (ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν) and occupies Bk vii, Arist.’s longest (1145a17–1154b34/Sent. Eth. vii.1–14); in MV, the fifth longest virtue. Martí-

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if a man satisfies his desire it will become dominant, specially if the desires or pleasures focus on great objects, that is, very pleasurable things, and are strong on the part of the one who desires and enjoys, because he is greatly affected by them, to such an extent that they often impede the man’s thought or reasoning. However, the more a man keeps reasoning, the less desire can dominate. So since desire gets greater in proportion to the strength of the pleasure, it is necessary for pleasures and desires to be measured, not excessive in magnitude or vehemence of affection and few in number, and that nothing contradicts reason; in other words, that he does not desire a thing that rationally should not be desired. Anything which in the matter of desires and pleasures is conducted in the said manner we call well corrected and scourged, that is “chastened”, by reason; just as a boy should live according to the instructions of his teacher, so the concupiscent faculty should bow to reason. For the wrestling of each, teacher with boy and reason with desire, are done for the good. The man who is truly temperate therefore has his concupiscent part ordered according to the above: he desires what is fitting and as and when it is fitting, as reason orders. 1.30 On continence. Chapter 1 Close to this temperance of which I have spoken seems to be continence, which although not a perfect virtue is nevertheless something not completely unlike a virtue; so let me say a little about it. Because there are many things that are usually treated under this heading that belong to scientific enquiry, which is not our principal object, I shall select from all of them only those that are necessary for our moral guidance. In the first place, then, we should know that things we should shun in our conduct can be reduced to three kinds, which are: incontinence, evil, and bestiality. The difference between them can be deduced from this: for doing any good work two things are required, namely reason and right appetite. When

nez Gómez takes AJ’s insertion Rubrica “Epígrafe” as part of the chapter title, as if to signal the special character of this intermission, though from a stemmatic point of view it looks more likely to be interpolated from a marginal note to the rubrisher. For Arist. the problem of ἀκρασία—behaving badly even when one knows it is wrong—represented a different approach to the analysis of virtue, from the point of view of passions rather than intellect. By contrast, Cartagena’s placement of it here as a companion to temperantia, shorn of “multa […] que pertinent ad scientificam investigacionem” (notwithstanding a good deal of drivel about the theory of humours; cf. n194, below), is designed to circumscribe the first Bk within Christian morality, “ad morum nostrorum direccionem”. Consequently he allows himself rather more freedom to change and add material (nn181–184, etc.), returning to his normal author-function after the dreary lull of temperance.

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horum duorum pervertitur, actus male fit et est fugiendus. Si ergo talis perversitas venit ex parte appetitus, ut racio pratica remaneat recta, vocatur incontinencia, ut cum aliquis habet rectam extimacionem de eo quod est faciendum vel vitandum sed propter passionem appetitus in contrarium trahitur. Si vero in tantum invalescat perversitas appetitus ut racioni dominetur et racio sequatur id in quo appetitus corruptus inclinat sicut principium quoddam extimans illud ut finem et optimum, et operetur perversa ex eleccione, talis disposicio vocatur malicia. Est tamen ulterius considerandum quod perversitas in unaquaque re venit ex eo quod corrumpitur contemperancia debita illius rei, sicut egritudo corporalis in homine venit ex eo quod corrumpitur humorum debita armonia. Similiter perversitas appetitus que interdum racionem pervertit consistit in hoc quod corrumpitur commensuracio affeccionum humanarum; et talis corrupcio contingit dupliciter, sicut patet de temperancia humorum, nam interdum corrumpitur consonancia humorum et inducitur infirmitas major vel minor secundum quantitatem corruptionis, interdum vero in tantum corrumpitur humana disposicio quod devenitur ad mortem. Simile est in actibus moralibus: quando pervertitur appetitus vel racio sed perversitas est intra humanum modum, dicitur incontinencia vel malicia humana, diversimode tamen, quia quando appetitus solus pervertitur et non racio dicitur incontinencia, quando appetitus et racio pervertuntur est malicia. Quando vero in tantum progreditur perversitas et corrumpitur contemperancia humanarum affeccionum ita quod progrediatur ultra limites humane vite in similitudinem affeccionum alicujus bestie, ut puta leonis, ursi, aut porci, vocatur bestialitas, sicut si ex parte corporis complexio alicujus hominis mutaretur in complexionem leoninam aut porcinam. Et sic ille homo qui habet appetitus perversos sed adhuc habet racionem rectam, sequitur tamen appetitus, est incontinens; ille in quo perversitas appetituum tantum invaluit quod eciam racionem pervertit et ex eleccione racionis perverse sequitur mala, est proprie malus; qui vero in tantum habet racionem perversam et appetitus ut excedat modum humane malicie et assimiletur bestiis que totaliter racione carent, iste dicitur bestialis, ut ferunt de quodam qui in tantam maliciam devenerat quod ventres feminarum scindebat ut conceptos in utero devoraret. Et est iste terribilis modus malicie, qui in paucis hominibus reperiretur. Forsam sunt aliqui apud barbaros illos qui racionalibus legibus non reguntur ex mala consuetudine ducti in maliciam bestialem,

23 post talis add. autem Bβ 23–24 nam interdum α interdum enim Bβ 27 sed α sed tamen β cum B 35 sed α sed tamen Bβ 36 ille α ille uero β ille ergo B 38 vero αB autem β

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either of these two is perverted the act becomes bad and is to be shunned. When this perversion comes from the side of appetite but leaves practical reason upright, it is called incontinence, for instance when someone has the right idea of what it to be done or avoided but is pulled in the opposite direction by an emotion of the appetite. But if the perversion of appetite is so strong that it overcomes reason, and reason follows the inclination of corrupt appetite as if were some principle that it regards as an optimum end and so commits perverse acts out of choice, this tendency is named evil. There is a last possibility to be considered, however, and this is that the perversion in either of the two comes from the fact that the thing’s due balance and congruity is corrupted, just as bodily illness in humans comes from the corruption of the due harmony of humours. Similarly the perversion of the appetite, which sometimes perverts the reason, consists in the fact that the balance and congruity of human affections becomes corrupted; and this corruption happens in two ways, as is clear from the tempering of the humours, for sometimes the harmonious complexion of the humours is corrupted and this is followed by greater or lesser illness according to the quantity of the corruption, but sometimes the human constitution is so corrupted that it ends in death. It is similar in moral acts: when the appetite or reason is perverted but the perversion stays within human limits it is called human incontinence or evil, but with the difference that when the appetite alone is perverted and not the reason it is called incontinence, when both appetite and reason are perverted it is evil. However, when the perversion progresses so far that the balance of human affections is corrupted to the extent of transgressing the bounds of human behaviour and takes on the appearance of some beast’s affections, for example a lion’s, a bear’s, or a pig’s, it is named bestiality, as if from the bodily point of view a man’s humoral complexion were to be changed in a lion’s or pig’s. So the man who has perverted appetites and still has right reason, but follows the appetites, is incontinent; the one whose perversion of appetites has grown so strong that it also perverts his reason so that he pursues bad ends by rational choice is properly evil; but the one who has such perverted reason and appetites that he exceeds the form of human evil resembles totally irrational beasts and is called bestial, like the man they say descended into such evil that he would slice open the bellies of women to eat their unborn babies. This is a terrible form of evil which one would find in few men. Perhaps there exist a few among those barbarians who are not ruled by rational laws, drawn into bestial evil by evil custom, or some others through

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vel aliqui alii propter amenciam vel ex continuacione perverse consuetudinis; raro tamen hoc inveniretur, sed ubicumque reperitur est terribile genus malicie.179 Et sicut iste tres disposiciones sunt male et fugiende, ita reperiuntur tres disposiciones contrarie bone et laudande. Contra incontinenciam est continencia; et sicut incontinens est ille qui sequitur perversitatem appetitus contra rectitudinem racionis, ita continens est ille qui habet appetitus perversos, non tamen sequitur eos propter racionem. Contra maliciam reperitur virtus; et sicut ille dicitur malus qui habet perversos racionem et appetitus et sequitur mala ex eleccione racionis perverse, ita ille qui habet racionem rectam et appetitus rectos et subjectos racioni et sequitur bona ex eleccione recte racionis et bona consonantia appetituum dicitur virtuosus, et erit hec virtus secundum casum; nam si hoc evenit in terribilibus dicitur fortitudo, si in delectabilibus temperancia, et similiter in aliis. Contra bestialitatem reperitur quedam alia virtus que appellatur eroyca; antiqui enim gentiles vocabant animas virorum insignium defunctorum quos deificabant eroas, et hinc dicitur virtus eroyca, id est virtus divina. Quando ergo aliquis ita excedit in virtute quod excellit modum communem humane virtutis, dicitur quodammodo vir divinus et habere virtutem

60 quos deificabant om. β 179

Forsam sunt aliqui apud barbaros illos: EN 1145a30–31 ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος· μάλιστα δ’ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐστίν, γίνεται δ’ ἔνια καὶ διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις (“deformities”; Vet. interp. “orbitates”)· καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπερβάλλοντας οὕτως ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν/Sent. Eth. vii.1.11–12: bestialis raro invenitur inter homines; et ponit tres modos secundum quos aliqui fiunt bestiales. Quorum primus est ex conversatione gentis, sicut apud barbaros qui rationabilibus legibus non reguntur, propter malam convivendi consuetudinem aliqui incidunt in malitiam bestialem. Secundo contingit aliquibus propter aegritudines et orbitates, idest amissiones carorum, ex quibus in amentiam incidunt et quasi bestiales fiunt. Tertio propter magnum augmentum malitiae, ex quo contingit quod quosdam superexcellenter infamamus dicentes eos bestiales. Cartagena relays this, but he transforms the mention of barbari by the addition of demonstr. illos. For Arist. βάρβαρος was simply an ethnic insult (“non-Greek”, hence bestial; he really meant just two kinds of bestiality, non-Greeks and—occasionally—sick evil-doers); for Aquinas the word was theoretical hearsay, and he tried to rationalize it (without laws, hence with “bad customs”, plus second and third categories, the insane and the superevil); whereas Cartagena’s “those” barbarians, i.e. ones known to his interlocutor, clearly hints, like the earlier mention of Canarian Guanches and Indian Brahmans (n117), at recent Portuguese voyages of exploration and encounters with non-European cultures, thus presaging the future ethnographic revolution that was to flow from Iberian overseas expansion—a field in which Spanish scholars and thinkers to come would far outrun Aristotle, Aquinas, and the humanists. In this sense illos works rather like the preceding ut

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madness or from persistently perverted custom; it would be rare to come across this, but wherever it is found it is a terrible kind of evil. Just as these three tendencies are evil and to be shunned, so we find three contrary good and praiseworthy tendencies. Against incontinence there is continence; as the incontinent man is he who follows the perversion of appetite against the rectitude of reason, so the continent one is he who has perverted appetites but rationally resists following them. Against evil there is virtue; as the man who has perverted reason and appetites and pursues bad ends by perverted rational choice is called evil, so he who has right reason and right appetites controlled by reason and pursues good ends by uprightly rational choice and harmoniously good appetites is called virtuous, and this will be the virtue appropriate to the case: if it emerges in regard to terrible things it is called fortitude, if in regard to pleasurable things temperance, and so forth in others. Against bestiality there is a certain other virtue named heroic; the gentiles of old named the souls of the distinguished dead whom they deified “heroes”, and this is the origin of the term “heroic virtue”, meaning divine virtue. When someone so excels in virtue that he exceeds the ordinary form of human virtue he is said to be in some way divine and to have heroic or divine virtue,

ferunt de quodam qui […] ventres feminarum scindebat: we cannot avoid asking, and are meant to ask: who was this “certain man” who devoured unborn babies, about whom “they” tell stories? The answer: actually a woman, EN 1148b19–20 οἷον τὴν ἄνθρωπον [“the female”; fem. ἄνθρωπος a contemptuous idiom for slaves, giantesses, etc.] ἣν λέγουσι τὰς κυούσας ἀνασχίζουσαν τὰ παιδία κατεσθίειν; identified by Byzantine scholiasts as the witch Lamia (Heylbut 1889–1892, iii, 427), but Geraldus understandably confused her with the infamous Sicilian tyrant Phalaris, who ate his own son and for good measure sodomized children too (ibid., Φάλαρις […] ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου φαγεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἀφροδισίων ἄτοπον ἡδονήν): Exemplificat de innaturalibus delectationibus, dicens: “Dico autem secundum predictos habitus homines bestiales, puta illum hominem qui dicitur feminas pregnantes rescindere et pueros nondum natos in matrum uteris devorare; vel eum qui dicitur gaudere talibus alimentis qualibus fama refert gaudere quosdam silvestres homines habitantes circa Ponthum”, id est circa regionem illam ubi fuerunt homines totaliter indomiti; fama namque refert gaudere quosdam istorum crudis cibariis, quodam autem carnibus hominum vesci, quosdam autem accommodare in convivium pueros ad delectationes sodomiticas et enormes permiscendas cum epulis; vel eos dicimus bestiales qui vivunt circa illum et in comitatu eius qui dicitur Falaris. (Guiral Ot 1500 vii qu.1 on lectio 6/ΕΝ 1148b15–1149a20, f. 145ra–b) He added wildly that these Pontic raw-meat-eating cannibal sodomite barbari “tempore Aristotelis habitabant circa Falarim”—in Sicily?—but that their modern equivalents were the “Rosiani” (Russians), who practised such disgustingly uncivilized customs as drinking cows’ milk and living not in cities but in forests near Poland. Cartagena’s cautious allusion to recently encountered Africans works on a rather different level.

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eroycam seu divinam, ut de Hectore Priamus pater ejus dicebat.180 Et isti sunt pauci, sed potest poni exemplum in aliquibus quorum Collaciones Patrum et hystorie eorum mencionem faciunt qui fuerunt singularissime et excellentissime virtutis, ut de abbate Sereno ibi legitur qui erat tam admirabilis castitatis ut humanum modum excederet, ferunt enim quod nullum prorsus carnis stimulum sentiebat, et de aliis similibus qui fuerunt adeo virtuosi quod humanam virtutem excedere videbantur.181 Et racio hujus est quia homo est quoddam medium inter substancias separatas, id est angelos et bestias; medium autem participat cum utroque extremorum. Quando vero homo ita se habet quod multum participat cum extremo superiori, nominatur ab illo extremo et dicitur vir divinus. Et concordat bene in hoc modus loquendi, nam cum videmus aliquem hominem excellentem in virtute, dicimus “Ille vir angelicus est”, non quod sit angelus, sed quod conversacio sua sit ita munda quod assimiletur angelice vite; nam et Johannes apostolus sacerdotes angelos vocat, quia vita sua deberet esse altissima et excellentissima supra communem, eciam bonam vitam aliorum (Apocalipsis, secundo et tercio c.).182 Et hinc est quod Jeronimus in sermone de assumpcione beate Virginis ait, “angelis cognata est virginitas”, et Ambrosius dicit, “Nupcie terram implent, virginitas Paradisum” (Tricesima secunda, quest. prima, c. Nupcie), mundicia enim virginalis solet laudari quasi

63 ut ~ dicebat om. β 67 ferunt enim quod α quia Bβ 79 post Virginis add. Marie β 180

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de Hectore: EN 1145a22, citing Il. 24.258–259 οὐδὲ ἐῴκει | ἀνδρός γε θνητοῦ πάις ἔμμεναι ἀλλὰ θεοῖο. Up to here the chapter reproduces Sent. Eth. vii.1.2–12 (597 words to Aquinas’s 888); all that follows was added by Cartagena with the specific purpose of Christianizing the virtue. Indeed, β’s omission of the two references to ancient polytheism in 60–63, which is also mirrored in Mcast, looks deliberate. de abbate Sereno: Cassian, Collationes Patrum 7 “Prima abbatis Sereni”.1–2 (PL xlix, cols 667–669): Summae sanctitatis et continentiae uirum nominisque sui speculum abbatem Serenum, […] cui ita est peculiari beneficio donum castitatis infusum ut iam se ne ipsis quidem naturalibus incentiuis inquietari uel in sopore sentiret; ad quam tamen carnis praecipuam puritatem […] gratia Dei adminiculante peruenerit, quoniam supra condicionem naturae uidetur humanae. Cassian’s work on the Desert Fathers was a founding text of Christian monasticism; hystorie eorum refers to a similar very influential work, Vitae Patrum (on Serenus, otherwise unknown, see iv.50, PL lxxiii, cols 844–845, which quotes Cassian). The rest of this chapter compiles from a variety of biblical, legal, and historical texts and everyday modi

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as Priam used to say of his son Hector. Such men are few, but one can take as an example some of whom mention is made in the Collations and stories of the Fathers who were of most singular and excellent virtue, for instance Abbot Serenus, of whom we read that he was of such amazing chastity that it exceeded any human measure, for they say he never ever felt any carnal itch of any kind, and others like him who were so virtuous that they seemed to exceed human virtue. The reason behind this is that man is a sort of mean between two separate substances, angels and beasts; however, the mean connects with both extremes. When a man’s conduct connects him more with the upper extreme he is named after that extreme and called a divine man. This well accords with the expression we use when we see some man who excels in virtue, saying “He is an angelic man”, not because he is an angel but because his way of life is so cleanly that is resembles the angelic life; so too the Apostle John calls priests “angels” because their life ought to be most exalted and excellent above even the good ordinary life of others (Rev 2 and 3). Hence Jerome in his sermon on the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin says, “virginity is kindred to the angels”, and Ambrose pronounces, “Marriages people the earth, virginity peoples Paradise” (C.32.1.12 Nupcie), for virginal cleanness is customarily praised as a kind

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loquendi to develop the Christian definition of “heroic” or, as Cartagena renames it, “angelic” virtue, as officially bestowed on martyrs and confessors, candidates for the honours of the altar—a definition that conjoins to Arist.’s single-line mention of ἀρετήν ἡρωικήν τινα καὶ θείαν (virtus eroyca, 62–63) the premiss of the Fall, so we are all prone to “appetitus perversos” and thus continentia, even if not “perfecta virtus”, becomes the most saintly. “Perhaps”, comment Hellerstedt & Fogelberg Rota (2015, 2), “the fact that Arist. did not discuss [ἀρετὴ ἡρωική] in great detail made it more useful […]; here was a grand idea […] only waiting to be commented upon.” Using it, as Albertus Magnus and Aquinas (STh. I-ii.61.4) did, “to present the decidedly Christian virtue of continence as superhuman”, or as Buridan did, to restrict it to nobles (1513, ff. 140rb vii, quest. 1 ad loc. “non est possibile prave natos ad tantum pervenire gradum excellentie ad quantum possunt pervenire bene nati, [qui] possunt excedere limites humane conditionis communiter accepte. […] Nichil enim aliud est heroica quam virtus […] quam in summo potest acquirere vir optime natus”) represented “something of a departure” from Arist. but was immensely influential, spawning a rich literature on heroic virtue from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment (ibid., 3–4; for aspects relevant here see Costa 2008; Tjällén 2015). Johannes apostolus sacerdotes angelos vocat: Rev 1:20 “septem stellae angeli [ἄγγελοι, lit. “envoys”] sunt septem ecclesiarum”. For this improbable but standard hermeneusis see Glossa ord. vi, 1469–1470 ad loc.

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quedam angelica excellencia.183 Quando vero homo ex medio suo declinat in extremum contrarium et descendit ad infimitatem bestialem taliter quod ita sit excellens in malicia sicut iste de quo diximus excellit in virtute, iste est bestialis, sicut de Nerone Cesare legitur, de quo Johannes Bocacius narrat nefandissima et horribilissima genera scelerum.184 Et ita communiter loquimur; si enim videmus aliquem hominem multum inprudentem totaliter deditum voluptatibus, male conversacionis, non socialem nec civilem, dicimus “Ille homo bestialis est”. Sed sub unaquaque specie istarum reperiuntur pauci; sed si contingit reperiri, eroici seu angelici sunt multum laudandi, bestiales autem nefandissimi sunt et fugiendi. Quando vero homo tenet medium et nec ascendit ad similitudinem angelicam nec descendit ad similitudinem bestialem sed conversatur bene vel male, tamen ut homo, tunc si habet perversam racionem et appetitus dicitur homo malus, si habet racionem rectam et appetitus bene moderatos et subjectos racioni dicitur homo bonus seu virtuosus, si vero habet racionem rectam et appetitus perversos et sequitur eos dicitur incontinens, si non sequitur sed perseverat in racione dicitur continens. Lib. 1 Cap. 31 [De continencia.] Capitulum secundum Est continencia habitus laudabilis, non tamen est perfecta virtus; incontinencia est vituperabilis, non tamen est pura malicia. Et hinc est quod in foro penitencie multo acrius punitur peccans per maliciam quam peccans per incontinenciam. Ex magna autem consuetudine continencie pervenitur ad virtutem, et ex magno usu incontinencie pervenitur ad maliciam. Nam cum homo assuescit vincere passiones, venit ad eum statum quod non sentit eas vel debiliter sentit; ita et cum aliquis assuescit succumbere passionibus et sequi eas, venit ad eum statum quod pervertitur ejus racio et sequitur eas ex eleccione. Nam bona consuetudo facit conformari concupiscenciam racioni, mala econtra facit conformari racionem concupiscencie, quod summe fugiendum est. Et hinc est quod ab antiquo dicitur, “optima forma vivendi eligenda est, quam jocundam

87 multum om. β Cap. 31 tit. αB, om. Q Capͫ 32m H 1 Est α Est autem Bβ (Es çiertamente Mcast) 1–2 post incontinencia add. autem Bβ (çiertamente Mcast) 9 mala α mala autem Bβ 183

Jeronimus: Ep. ad Paulam et Eustochium (PL xxx, 126) “bene angelus ad Virginem mittitur, quia semper est angelis cognata virginitas; profecto in carne praeter carnem vivere non terrena vita est, sed caelestis”. Cartagena meant this, and the whole paragraph, as a specific reply—rejecting, as always, any hint of criticism of Arist.—to a major controversy of the day, the objection discussed by many commentators that virginity might be identified not as a virtue but as the defect of temperantia, insensibilitas (i.27 5–12 n172); see Blažek 2008, and cf. STh. iii.30.2 in c. Ambrosius: Decretum C.32.1.12.

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of angelic excellence. When, on the other hand, a man slips from his mean towards the opposite extreme and descends into bestial lowness so as to excel in evil as much as he whom I spoke of excels in virtue, he is bestial, as we read for instance about the emperor Nero, of whom Giovanni Boccaccio tells the most unspeakable and loathsome kinds of crimes. And this is a common way of speaking; if we see some very imprudent man totally sunk in sensual pleasures, of evil life, unsociable and uncivil, we say “He is a bestial man”. There are few of either of these kinds; if they happen to be found, the heroic or angelic are greatly to be praised, the bestial are very unspeakable and to be shunned. But when a man steers midway and neither ascends to resemble an angel nor descends to resemble a beast but lives his life either well or ill, but as a man, then if he has perverted reason and appetites he is called an evil man, if he has right reason and well moderated appetites subjected to reason he is called a good or virtuous man, but if he has right reason and perverted appetites and follows the latter he is called incontinent, if the does not follow them but stands firm in reason he is called continent. 1.31 [On continence.] Chapter 2 Continence is a praiseworthy disposition, but not a perfect virtue; incontinence is blameworthy, but not pure evil. Hence in the forum of penance much more severe punishment is prescribed for the sinner through evil than for the sinner through incontinence. By long habits of continence one attains virtue, and by long practice of incontinence one becomes evil; for when a man becomes accustomed to defeating passions he reaches a state where he does not feels them, or only feels them feebly; likewise when someone becomes accustomed to succumbing to passions and giving in to them he reaches a state where his reason is perverted and he gives in to them by choice; for good habits make desire conform to reason whereas bad ones make reason conform to desire, which is greatly to be shunned. Hence the ancient saying, “choose the best way of life, which habit will make pleasant”; for the virtuous man acts in a light-

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Johannes Bocacius: De casibus illustrium virorum vii.4.10 (1983, ix, 602–604). Nero was the medieval byword for cruelty, not just for the crimes told by Roman historians but for his persecution of Christians and execution of Peter and Paul; Boccaccio’s presentation of him as a weak man corrupted by power marked a new “neo-humanist […] emphasis on the irrational and sexual [i.e. human] aspects” of it (Baraz 2003, 153–154). Yet despite citing Boccaccio’s work, which he was to translate months later (Intro. §1 n2), Cartagena sticks firmly to the old view of the emperor as a low beast (“infimitatem bestialem”, certainly the correct reading; cf. app. min. var.).

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reddet consuetudo”, virtuosus namque jocunde et delectabiliter operatur.185 Hoc est enim signum illius qui operatur ex virtute, quod agit delectabiliter, preterquam in virtute fortitudinis, quia in illa interdum concomitatur tristicia propter difficultatem actuum et pericula, ut in materia fortitudinis diximus. Est autem ulterius sciendum quod antique dubitatum est quomodo potest contingere quod aliquis propter passionem operetur contra racionem, nisi forsam ex ignorancia. Nam sciencia est habitus fortissimus anime; quod ergo quis propter concupiscenciam, que est in passione appetitus, adducatur ad operandum contra scienciam propriam videtur quodammodo inpossibile, tanquam si diceremus quod debilior vincit fortiorem. Sed tamen non est inpossibile nec inconveniens. Racio hujus est quia, licet quis aliquid sciat, non considerat in particulari. Ad cujus clariorem noticiam est animadvertendum quod sicut in illis que pertinent ad materiam speculativam, ita in hiis que pertinent ad opera racionis pratice homo procedit per quendam silogismum, ut in exemplo si volumus cognoscere an Ticius est animal, dicimus: “Omnis homo est animal, Ticius est homo, ergo Ticius est animal.” Et in hiis que pertinent ad solam scienciam hoc cognito non curamus amplius, sed in operabilibus post habitam cognicionem proceditur ad opus, ut in exemplo si homo vult aliquid gustare, silogizat quodammodo per istum modum: “Omne dulce est gustandum, hoc est dulce, ergo gustandum”, et statim procedit ad degustacionem, nisi sit aliquid quod prohibeat, nam in operabilibus habita conclusione confestim procedit homo ad opus nisi ex aliqua causa prohibeatur. Incontinens ergo bene scit proposicionem universalem, sed propter passionem non considerat particularem, quod declaratur sic: incontinens scit duas proposiciones universales, sed tamen propter passionem concludit sub particulari unius et non atendit particularem alterius, ut in exemplo, dato quod incontinens vellet comedere carnes in aliquo die Quadragesime sine causa legitima, ut sit actus illicitus, iste habet duos silogismos: unus, “Omnis cibus delectabilis est comedendus, cibus carnium est delectabilis, ergo comedendus”, et iste est silogismus concupiscencie; alius est, “Omnis cibus illicitus est respuendus, cibus carnium in Quadragesima 12 namque α enim Bβ 185

32 nam (sed AJ) in operabilibus α in operabilibus autem Bβ

ab antiquo dicitur: Martínez Gómez identifies the quotation as one of the examples of sententiae (common maxims) listed in the section on rhetorical tropes in [ps.-Cic.] Rhet. Her. (Rhet. nova) iv.17 “optima vivendi ratio est eligenda; eam iucundam consuetudo reddet”. It was often quoted by schoolmen and preachers (e.g. in sermons by Guillaume Perrault op, s. xiii, ap. Guillaume d’Auvergne 1674, ii, 23b, 364b, and his Summa virtutum ac vitiorum, in Casagrande 2009, 46n45—her study incidentally illuminates ways in which Cartagena’s treatment of continentia resembles theological discussions of patientia—and De eruditione principum v.5, Guillaume Perrault 1865, 429b; sermon of Jean Gerson, s. xv, Gerson 1706, iii, col. 1327; Alighieri 1845, 317 ad Dante, Purg. 4.1–12; etc.), so Cartagena

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hearted and pleasurable spirit. It is the sign of the man who acts from virtue to do things pleasurably, apart from the virtue of fortitude, because that sometimes involves grief because of the difficulty of its acts and the dangers, as I said in the heading on fortitude. We should know further, however, that in Antiquity it was debated how it can happen that someone should act against reason through emotion, unless perhaps from ignorance. For knowledge is a very strong disposition of the soul; that anyone should be lead through desire, which originates in an emotion of appetite, to act against his own knowledge seems somehow impossible; it is as if we were to say, the weaker defeats the stronger. Nevertheless, it is neither impossible nor illogical. The reason for this is that even though a man knows something, he does not consider its particulars. To make this clearer we should note that, as in matters of speculative knowledge, so in these that pertain to works of practical reason man proceeds by means of some syllogism. For example, if we want to know whether Titius is an animal, we say: “All men are animals, Titius is a man, therefore Titius is an animal”; and in matters of pure knowledge once we have recognized this we have no further interest. In matters of action, however, after recognition we proceed to deeds. For example, if a man wishes to taste something, he syllogizes somewhat in this fashion: “All sweet things are tasty, this thing is sweet, therefore it is tasty”, and immediately proceeds to taste it, unless something prohibits it, since in matters of action once a conclusion is reached man proceeds straight to the deed unless he is prohibited from doing so by some cause. Now the incontinent man well knows the universal proposition, but his emotion stops him from considering the particular. The explanation is this: the incontinent man knows two universal propositions, but through emotion he draws a conclusion from the particulars of one and disregards the particulars of the other. For example, say an incontinent man wanted to eat meat during Lent without legitimate cause. As this is an unlawful act, he has two syllogisms: one, “All pleasurable food is eatable, meat is pleasurable, therefore it is eatable”, and this is the syllogism of desire; the other, “All unlawful food must be spat out, meat is unlawful in Lent, therefore it must be probably culled it from a florilegium; it would have been most unlike him to omit Cicero’s name, had he been aware of it. The addition signals the start of a swifter and more pointed précis of the source. Skipping most of Aquinas’ technical matter, in this chapter he concentrates on the nub of Arist.’s argument, his refutation of the famous paradox of Socrates—who is not referred to, cf. ΕΝ 1145b23–26, 1147b14–15/Sent. Eth. vii.2.4–6, 3.1, 14, 18, 25—that no one intentionally does wrong, so akrasia does not exist (Pl. Grg. 509e μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν; Prt. 358c οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἔρχεται ἐπὶ ἃ οἴεται κακὰ εἶναι, etc.). He picks out select phrases and freely embroiders them with his own citations and examples (nn186–187).

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est illicitus, ergo respuendus”, et iste est silogismus racionis.186 Incontinens autem bene scit utramque proposicionem, sed tamen propter passionem concludit in particulari primi silogismi et non attendit particularem secundi, sicut si aliquis magnus peritus esset ebrius, licet in habitu haberet scienciam, tamen in actu non uteretur ea quia habet habitum ligatum durante ebrietate.187 Simile est in incontinente, qui licet habeat scienciam universalem, habet tamen habitum ejus ligatum in particulari propter passionem, et presertim in passionibus vehementioribus ut sunt ire et venereorum, que nedum faciunt transmutaciones animales, sed eciam transmutant disposicionem corporalem, et interdum in tantum procedunt quod faciunt aliquos verti in insaniam. Et hinc est quod incontinens videtur simulator seu ypocrita, nam loquitur recte quia bene scit ea que operari debet, sed operatur contrarium propter passiones; ideo videtur intuentibus quod loquebatur simulate.188 Sed non est sic, nam cum est extra passionem habet habitum sciencie solutum et liberum et loquitur recta non 45 ante tamen ins. sed Bβ 186

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46 uteretur O utitur A utetur JBβ

Ticius est animal: cf. n107, above. This ancient chestnut of a “paradox of implication” provoked a large literature, the logical problem it raises being hotly debated by nominalists and various schools of realists. The protagonist of the joke was normally “Socrates”, who could thus be proven to be an asinus, capra, etc. (see the texts in Iwakuma 1993, 135–150, along with 39 other occurrences of “Socrates” in the same volume). Cartagena adds it, in a simple but colourful prosopopeia (“dicimus”, “silogizat per istum modum”), just to explain the term syllogismus in Sent. Eth. vii.3.19: in speculativis anima solum dicit conclusionem, in factivis autem statim eam operatur; ut si opinio universalis sit quod omne dulce oportet gustare, opinio autem particularis sit […] quod ille qui potest gustare statim gustet, nisi sit aliquid prohibens. Et hoc quidem fit in syllogismo temperati, qui non habet concupiscentiam repugnantem rationi proponenti quod omne inhonestum est vitandum; et similiter in syllogismo intemperati, cuius ratio concupiscentiae non repugnat […] quod omne delectabile sit sumendum. His treatment is livelier than Aquinas, but the main change is the substitution of “aliquid prohibens” by in aliquo die Quadragesime: a single touch that, without undue emphasis, lends a Christian hue. si aliquis ~ esset ebrius: the sentence refashions EN 1147b9–12, shorn of its arcane reference to a pagan sophist: ταύτην [τὴν τελευταίαν πρότασιν] ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἐν τῷ πάθει ὤν, ἢ οὕτως ἔχει ὡς οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι ἀλλὰ λέγειν ὥσπερ ὁ οἰνωμένος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους (“as a drunk might recite the verses of Empedocles”—because Empedocles was a champion of temperance, or his thought so difficult)/Sent. Eth. vii.3.17 “ebrii et maniaci proferunt voce demonstrationes […] et dicunt verba Empedoclis, quae erant difficilia ad intelligendum quia metrice philosophiam scripsit”, 25 “Huiusmodi autem propositionem […] ille qui est in passione vel omnino non habet in habitu vel habet habitum ligatum ut non possit in actu scire, sed hoc modo loquitur de his sicut ebrius dicit verba Empedoclis.” non uteretur: hypothetical pres. conditionals (“if he were drunk he would not be using…”) classically take imperf. subj. in both protasis and apodosis. This fact technically makes O’s “uteretur”

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spat out”, and this is the syllogism of reason. The incontinent man well knows both propositions, then, but through emotion he concludes from the particulars of the first syllogism and overlooks the particulars of the second, like some great expert who, were he to get drunk, despite being knowledgeable by disposition would nevertheless fail to put his knowledge to use in the act, because while the inebriation lasts his disposition is manacled. It is the same with the incontinent man, who though he possesses universal knowledge has his disposition manacled in the particulars by emotion, specially in the case of the stronger emotions like anger and sex, which not only cause mental mutations but also produce changes in his physical make-up and sometimes go so far as to cause some to become insane. Hence the incontinent man seems a liar or hypocrite: he speaks rightly, because he well knows what he should do, but does the opposite due to emotions; so he seems to spectators to have been lying. Yet it is not the case, because whenever he stands outside the emotion his disposi-

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lectio facilior, but JBβ’s future indic. is hard to square with esset. Moreover, Mcast translates (with what Campos Souto calls “un cambio notabilísimo”, (H)ebreus for ebrius): “así como si algund grande sabio fuese judío, maguera que en hábito toviese la sçiençia, mas enpero en la obra non usase della porque tiene el hábito ligado durante la judería”. Though como si of itself determines this sequence of tenses in Sp. (in which the imperf. subj. is etymologically Lat. pluperf. subj.), the reading implies that Mcast’s α-branch exemplar read as O does. If so, O’s congener J could have misread utetur through omission of an abbreviation (utˀetur); Bβ likewise. On these grounds we tentatively adopt O here; but i.33 38–39 “si racio perverteretur non dicitur”, where O likewise reads diceretur (app. crit. and n195 ad loc.), makes A’s lone pres. indic. a possible candidate too. simulator seu ypocrita: Sent. Eth. vii.3.17 “Unde sic existimandum est quod incontinentes dicant huiusmodi verba quasi simulantes [EN 1147a9 τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους], quia scilicet aliud sentiunt corde et aliud proferunt ore.” Simulator does not occur in Sent. Eth., and ypocrita only twice (“id est, simulatam gerens personam”, iii.5.14, and in its primary meaning as repraesentator “performer”, vii.4.14, on EN 1148b8 κακὸν ὑποκριτήν “a bad actor”; cf. iii.19.13 “hypocrisi, idest simulatione humanae vocis quae fit per musica instrumenta”). But the word in our sense had entered the vernacular (corde × 42 pre-1500, of which 7 Alfonsine, the remainder s. xv; note Cartagena 1983 Cap. 18, p. 100 “Como el que trae ropas honestas para que piensen que es bueno, […] el ypócrita mentiroso es”; Palencia 1490, ii, f. 545vb “Ypocrisis en griego es simulaçión falsa que muestra lo que no es, y el ypócrita es simulador, dorador o dorado”). This was the point: to use a name readers could actually imagine the incontinent being—wrongly—called. Five years before, Leonardo Bruni took up the term for his savage satire of incontinent monks (soon transferred into Castilian, Campo 1998): Recte nimirum vos hypocritas vocavit qui huius significationem verbi a theatrali histrionum turba ad vestrum genus consortiumque traduxit! quippe nil aliud quam histriones estis, et alienas induti personas Deum simul hominesque deluditis; […] itaque eos Graeci quidem ὑποκριτὰς, quasi actores et simulatores alienarum personarum […] vocitarunt. (Oratio in hypocritas of 1417; Bruni 1996, 310–331)

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ficte sed ex corde; cum vero est in passione habet habitum ligatum et non considerat actualiter quod loquebatur, et operatur contrarium ejus quod laudabat, et sic putant homines eum esse ypocritam et simulate loquutum fuisse. Continens vero habet se econtra, quia concludit sub silogismo racionis et respuit silogismum concupiscencie; nam est permansivus in racione et vincit passionem adherens racioni, ideo laudabilis est.189 Lib. 1 Cap. 32 [De continencia.] Capitulum tercium Est ultra hoc sciendum quod, licet continencia et incontinencia sint circa omnes delectaciones, proprie tamen et simpliciter dicitur quis continens vel incontinens circa delectaciones illas que pertinent ad temperanciam et intemperanciam. Alii vero dicuntur limitative; ut si aliquis desideret honores ultra debitam mensuram racionis, et propter passionem hujus desiderii querat illos contra judicium proprie racionis, non vocabimus eum incontinentem simpliciter sed dicemus incontinentem honoris, et si simile faciat in peccuniis dicemus incontinentem peccuniarum, et si circa iram vocabimus incontinentem ire. Si tamen hoc faciat circa illas delectaciones quarum moderacio pertinet ad temperanciam (iste autem sunt delectaciones tactus, ut supra diximus), dicetur pure et proprie et simpliciter incontinens.190 Illum ergo qui circa delectaciones tactus sequitur concupiscencias contra judicium racionis dicemus incontinentem simpliciter, et econtra ille qui vincit has passiones propter racionem dicitur continens simpliciter; alii vero dicuntur cum adjeccione, puta honoris, lucri, vel ire, ut dictum est. In istis nulla adjeccione facta dicimus eos continentes vel incontinentes, nec enim vocabimus aliquem incontinentem libidinis vel gule, sed dicemus incontinentem nulla adjecta limitacione. Nam continencia et incontinencia est in eadem materia et circa easdem delectaciones circa quas est temperancia et intemperancia. Et concordat cum hoc communis usus loquendi tam cotidiani sermonis quam

61 ideo αB et ideo β Cap. 32 tit. AOB, om. JQ Capl̛m xxxɩɩȷ H 1 Est α Est autem Bβ 8 post circa iram huc transposuit i.30 2–71 β 10 diximus α dictum est Bβ (segund que es dicho arriba Mcast) 15 ut dictum αB velut dictum β | In αB Sed in β 189

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est permansivus in racione: the adj.—non-class., but cf. Cic. Inv. rhet. ii.164 “perseverantia est in ratione bene considerata stabilis et perpetua permansio”—is taken from Aquinas, not in the passage being compiled here but earlier, Sent. Eth. vii.2.12 “idem est continens et permansivus in ratione”. Such darting to and fro signals the free-style manner of compilation Cartagena is here adopting (next n). circa illas delectaciones ~ tactus: a rough summary of Sent. Eth. vii.3.6–9 “continens et incontinens non dicitur aliquis simpliciter circa omnia, sed circa […] delectationes tactus”, but the chapter treats Aquinas very freely; the next paragraph jumps to lectio 6 (“incon-

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tion for knowledge is free and unimpeded and he says the right things not out of pretence but from the heart; but when he is inside the emotion his disposition is manacled, he has no present recollection of what he said before and does the opposite of what he recommended, and so men think he is a hypocrite who feigned what he said. The continent man, on the other hand, behaves in the opposite way: he draws conclusions consistent with the syllogism of reason and spits out the syllogism of desire, for he is steadfast in reason and conquers emotion by sticking to reason, and so is praiseworthy. 1.32 [On continence.] Chapter 3 Besides this we should know that though continence and incontinence concern all pleasures, a man is simply and properly called continent or incontinent with regard to the pleasures that pertain to temperance and intemperance. The others are so called limitatively; for instance, if someone were to want honours beyond reason and because of the emotion of this desire sought them against the judgment of his own reason, we will not call incontinent simply, but say “incontinent in honour”, and if he does the same for money we will say “incontinent in money”, and if in relation to anger we will call him “incontinent in anger”. But if he does this in regard to the pleasures the moderation of which belongs to temperance (that is, the pleasures of touch, as said above), he will be called purely, simply, and properly incontinent. So we will call the man who follows his desires concerning pleasures of touch against the judgment of reason “incontinent” simply, and conversely he who conquers these emotions through reason is called “continent” simply; the rest are called with an extra epithet like “in honour”, “in financial profit”, or “in anger”, as I have said. In the former cases we call them continent or incontinent with no extra epithet; we shall not call someone “incontinent in lust or gluttony”, just “incontinent” with no limiting epithet, for continence and incontinence is in the same heading and concerns the same pleasures as those concerned in temperance and intemperance. This is in accord with the common way of speaking in both everyday speech and also the Scriptures; we often

tinentia irae est minus turpis quam incontinentia concupiscentiarum tactus”; n192) with odd phrases from elsewhere (vii.4.1 “utrum aliquis sit simpliciter incontinens vel omnes dicantur incontinentes particulariter”, 4.9 “magis peccat et vituperatur intemperatus […] persequendo superfluas delectationes et fugiendo moderatas tristitias”, 6.8 “pronitas ad iram de facili propagatur a patre in filium, quasi consequens naturalem complexionem”, etc.). In short, Cartagena has little concern for Arist.’s argument; he picks out what he wants, adding discreet Christian hints (“clericos et religiosos”, 20–24).

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eciam scripturarum; legitur enim et dicitur sepe clericos et religiosos continenciam profiteri et continentes esse debere, et licet non semper addatur in quo, pro presuposito habetur intelligi in delectacionibus tactus, quia circa illas proprie et simpliciter consistunt continencia et incontinencia. Est autem intemperatus deterior et vituperabilior quam incontinens, quia persequitur superfluas delectaciones et fugit moderatas tristicias non propter concupiscenciam, quia illam non sentit vel saltem sentit remisse, sed ex perversa eleccione racionis; incontinens vero hoc facit propter concupiscenciam, sed qui sine concupiscencia vel cum parva concupiscencia peccat multo amplius peccaret si vehementem passionem sentiret; ideo vituperabilior et pejor est.191 Et deterior est incontinenencia simplex quam incontinencia ire, propter duo: primo, quia iratus non videtur tantum deliberate peccare, nam ex quadam naturali complexione ad hoc sepe adducitur, multo enim magis et communius transfertur passio ire a patre in filium quam cetere passiones; secundo, quia iratus non procedit insidiose, sed palam desiderat vindicari, licet excedit modum. Incontinens autem in utroque se habet econtra, primo quia melius posset deliberare si vellet, secundo quia dolosior et fraudulentior videtur esse et magis insidiose peccat. Ideo turpior est, et hinc est quod antiqui vocabant Venerem “dolosam Ciprigenam”; Venus enim fuit quedam regina Cipri, ideo dicitur Ciprigena, id est in Cipro genita, et vocatur dolosa quia delectacio tactus que Veneri attribuitur dolosa est et quasi cum quodam dolo et insidiis animam captivat.192 Racionabiliter igitur exprobrabilior est quam incontinencia ire; licet ergo iratus peccet, tamen gravius peccat incontinens, quod sane intelligendum est nisi ex ira procederetur ad aliquod crimen enorme. Nam ista dicimus secundum se consideratis viciis, sed si aliquid postea additur attendi debet. 28 vero α autem Bβ | sed qui α (qͥ ue corr. A) qui autem Bβ 191

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ideo vituperabilior et pejor est: this refers back to the subj. of the main clause, intemperatus; the ambiguous intervening parenthesis on the incontinens makes it look as if he is the subj. of est here. Cartagena means to say, “the intemperate man is blameworthier because he calculatedly does wrong, and would act even worse if he were swayed by passion as well, whereas the incontinent man merely acts on his desires unthinkingly.” dolosam Ciprigenam: EN 1149b14–16 ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ’ ὁ θυμός, ἀλλὰ φανερός· ἡ δ’ ἐπιθυμία [Vet. interp. “concupiscentia”] καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην φασίν· δολοπλόκου γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς (“wile-weaving Cyprian-born”, ascribed to Sappho)/Sent. Eth. vii.6.10 “quidam dicunt de Venere loquentes, ‘dolosae Ciprigenae’; Venus enim fuit regina Cypri, unde dicitur Cyprigena, quasi in Cypro genita.” The passage from “Et deterior est incontinenencia simplex” to the end summarizes EN 1149b2–25 αἰσχίων […] τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατὴς/Sent. Eth. vii.6.1–13. It is remarkable that, from Aquinas’s 1126 words here (and 21,518 altogether), Cartagena should particularly have chosen to keep this sentence on the tricky wiles of Venus, complete with the titbit of her birthplace—few of his readers knew anything of Cyprus. Was this vital for the moral education of a prince? The mention’s peculiar

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read and hear that clerics et monks profess continence and should be continent, and though often we are not told in what, it is taken for granted we are to understand “in pleasures of touch”, because properly and simply these are what continence and incontinence concern. However, the intemperate man is more abject and blameworthy than the incontinent man, because he pursues superfluous pleasures and flees moderate griefs not from desire, since he does not feel it or only feels it mildly, but from perverted rational choice; the incontinent man, on the other hand, does this from desire, but a man who sins without desire or with little desire would commit much greater sins if he felt strong emotion, and so is worse and more blameworthy. And simple incontinence is more abject than incontinence in anger, for two reasons: first, because the angry man does not seem to sin so deliberately, as he is often led to it by some natural humoral complexion, for the emotion of anger is much more and more commonly passed from father to son than the rest of the emotions; second, because the angry man does not operate by stealth but openly desires vengeance, even if he exceeds the limit. The incontinent man, however, behaves in the opposite way in both respects, first because he could decide better if he wanted, and second because he seems more crafty and fraudulent and sins more stealthily. So he is more base, which is why the ancients called Venus “the crafty Cypriot”; Venus was a certain queen of Cyprus, hence “Cypriot”, i.e. born in Cyprus, and is called “crafty” because the pleasure of touch attributed to Venus is crafty and enslaves the soul with a kind of insidious craftiness, as it were. Reasonably, therefore, it is more reprobate than incontinence in anger; though the angry man sins, the incontinent man sins more gravely. To be sure, this means “unless from anger he were to progress to some enormous crime”; I refer to vices considered in themselves, but if they lead to something more it must be taken into account. gratuitousness is made more mysterious by failing to make clear that Arist. was quoting a well-known line of poetry for adj. δολοπλόκου “dolosae”, not—despite interpolated “hinc est quod”—because Aphrodite was relevant (merely paronomastic for “sexual desire”) and certainly not because of where she sprang from the waves. The explanation can only be literary; for a writer trying to make didacticism attractive, Venus was just too good to let go. fuit quedam regina Cipri: the mystery is somewhat compounded by the throw-away insertion quedam (cf. Aquinas): not the goddess, but a “certain” queen. It is significant, however, for it shows that, knowingly or not, Cartagena subscribed to the standard Christian and medieval Euhemeristic interpretation of the ancient gods that, drawing on Wis 14:12–21, rationalized mythological divinities as fables based on historical human personages. For Patristic and medieval testimonia from Lactantius and Isidore—Etym. viii.11.1 lists Venus among examples of the statement “Quos pagani deos asserunt, homines olim fuisse produntur”, but makes her a native of Paphos; also ibid. 76–80—to Vincent of Beauvais and Peter Comestor, see Cooke 1927; for the fortune of the idea in humanism, Seznec 1940.

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Lib. 1 Cap. 33 [De continencia.] Capitulum quartum Advertendum est ultra premissa quod circa incontinenciam reperiuntur duo vicia, unum dicitur incontinencia, aliud dicitur mollicies; et econtra duo boni habitus, unum est continencia, aliud est perseverancia.193 Quod declaratur sic: ut supra in materia temperancie dictum est, aliud est sequi delectacionem propter presenciam delectacionis, aliud propter fugandam tristiciam que provenit ex absencia ejus. Cum ergo aliquis habet racionem rectam, sed propter concupiscenciam sequitur delectacionem illicitam principaliter propter presenciam delectacionis, dicitur incontinens; si autem hoc facit ut non sustineat tristiciam quam ex absencia delectabilium sentit, dicitur mollis. Sic et econtra si aliquis sentit concupiscencias delectabilium sed refrenat eas, dicitur continens; si vero sentit tristiciam ex absencia delectacionum sed sustinet eam constanter propter racionem, dicitur perseverativus seu constans. Et licet ista superficialiter intuenti videantur esse idem, si tamen quis attente considerat diversa sunt, quia proprie continencia est refrenare concupiscencias propter racionem, sed perseverancia est tollerare propter racionem tristicias que ex absencia delectabilium veniunt; incontinencia econtrario proprie est ille habitus secundum quem homo, licet habeat racionem rectam, superveniente tamen passione sequitur delectabilia ex desiderio delectacionis; mollicies est cum hoc facit ad fugandum tristiciam quam sentit ex absencia delectacionis. Hiis eciam adjungendum est quod duobus modis contingit quem esse incontinentem: uno modo prevolando cum supervenit concupiscencia, alio modo consiliando et declinando ad partem concupiscencie. Et sic est duplex species incontinencie: una dicitur prevolacio, alia vocatur debilitas. Declarantur hec per exempla. Cum aliquis habet racionem rectam et sequitur concupiscenciam, potest hoc contingere dupliciter: uno modo sine deliberacione, quia statim superveniente concupiscencia sequitur eam sine aliqua raciocinacione, nec consiliatur nec disceptat apud se an sit bonum vel malum hoc facere sed confestim irruit in eam, et iste dicitur incontinens prevolativus; et sub hac specie contingit esse aliquos de illis incontinentibus qui sunt colerici vel melancolici, nam quia colera est humor subtilis de facili volat, et melancolia est humor frigidus et cum semel incenditur ferventius ardet sicut terra que cum incensa est vehemencius inardescit.194 Secundo modo contingit quod habens rectam Cap. 33 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m xxxɩɩȷ H, corr. manus altera in xxxɩɩȷȷͦ 1 est αB est autem β 18 delectacionis αB dileccionis β 23 incontinencie β (de incontinençia Mcast) continencie AJB incontinencie corr. super lin. O 193

duo vicia ~ duo boni habitus: this chapter weaves together matter on mollities/perseverantia picked out from Sent. Eth. vii.7.10–18; the point that chiefly engages Cartagena’s interest, however, is medical (next n).

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1.33 [On continence.] Chapter 4 Besides the foregoing we must note that there are two separate vices in regard to incontinence, one called incontinence, the other effeminate softness; and two opposite good dispositions, one being continence, the other perseverance. The explanation is as follows: as mentioned above in the heading on temperance, one thing is to seek pleasure because of the presence of pleasure, another to do so in order to dispel the grief that comes from its absence. When someone has right reason but seeks illicit pleasure by desire principally because of the presence of pleasure, he is called incontinent; if he does this not to suffer the grief he feels at the absence pleasurable things, he is called soft. By contrast if someone feels desires for pleasurable things but reins them in, he is called continent; if he feels grief at the absence of pleasures but bears it firmly through reason, he is called persevering or constant. Superficially these may seem to same to the onlooker, but if one considers them carefully they are different: properly speaking, continence is rationally reining in desires, perseverance is rationally tolerating griefs which come from the absence of pleasurable things; incontinence, on the other hand, is properly the disposition by which a man, despite having right reason, when overcome by emotion seeks pleasurable things from a desire for pleasure; effeminate softness is when he does this to drive away grief he feels from the absence of pleasure. To this we should add that anyone can be incontinent in two ways: one, by acting impetuously when overcome by desire, the other by first pondering and then coming down on the side of desire. So there are two kinds of incontinence: the first called impetuosity, the second named weakness. These can be clarified by examples. When someone possesses right reason and follows desire, it can happen in two ways. The first is without deliberation; as soon as the desire comes upon him he follows it without any rational thought, neither pondering nor disputing with himself whether it is good or bad to do but rushing straight into it. This man is called the impetuous incontinent; into this category fall the sort of incontinent men who are choleric or melancholic, because choler, being a thin humour, easily explodes and melancholy, being a cold humour, once lit burns more ardently, like earth which, once lit, catches fire more strongly. The second way is when a man possessing right reason at the onset of desire 194

colerici vel melancolici: Galenic “humourism”, the proto-physiological/astrological theory of temperaments caused by complexions of blood, choler, bile, and phlegm, regarded as scientific for 2000 years (Arikha 2007), is invoked to explain “headlong” akrasia (EN 1150b25–28 τὴν προπετῆ ἀκρασίαν) at Sent. Eth. vii.7.18, from which this is lifted. Fernández Gallardo 1999a, ii, 551–552 opines that the medical matter was adduced “sólo en calidad de ejemplo”, not as a “principio explicativo”, conjecturing that this “limitación” was “una suerte de cautela ante las posibles implicaciones deterministas”. The word exempla

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racionem superveniente concupiscencia consiliatur et altercat apud se, concupiscencia inclinante et racione resistente, et post disceptacionem declinat ad concupiscenciam, et iste dicitur incontinens debilis; et sub hac specie incontinencie dicuntur esse aliqui de incontinentibus sanguineis et flegmaticis, qui ex humiditate complexionis non prevolant nec irruunt tam cito in passiones. Repeto autem semper quod habet racionem rectam, quia si racio perverteretur non dicitur incontinens sed intemperatus.195 Lib. 1 Cap. 34 [De continencia.] Capitulum quintum Tanto deterior est incontinens quanto a minori passione vincitur, et tanto deterior mollis quanto minorem tristiciam non sustinet.196 Mollis autem deterior est incontinente, quia delectacio fortius operatur per presenciam quam per absenciam; difficilius ergo est refrenare et comprimere concupiscenciam delectacionis quam sustinere tristiciam ex absencia ejus. Ideo mollicies deterior est quam incontinencia quia facilius vitari potest, et vicium quod facilius vitatur deterius est si committatur; et similiter continens est melior perseverativo, quia continens vincit concupiscencias propter racionem, perseverativus tollerat tristiciam et non vincitur ab ea propter racionem, sed difficilius est vincere quam non vinci, ergo per consequens laudabilius. Ideo continencia et perseverancia sunt laudabiles, sed continencia laudabilior; et sub hoc vocabulo laudamus continentes, nam ista differencia que est inter continenciam et perseveranciam et incontinenciam et molliciem non potest faciliter sentiri in aliis, ideo vel dicimus eos continentes vel incontinentes non curando de hac subtilitate differencie. Inter incontinentes vero deteriores sunt debiles qui habent racionem consiliantem propter duo: primo, quia vincuntur a minori passione, nam prevolativi habent vehementiorem et velociorem passionem, tanto autem

39 dicitur JOBβ diceretur O Cap. 34 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m xxxv H 7 committatur (comitt- O; si se cometa Mcast) αB continuatur β

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2 quanto ABβ quia JO

(24) is indeed an addition (and A noted “Exemplum” in the margin), but the pl. shows it refers to both kinds of incontinence, prevolativa and debilis; on humours Cartagena elaborated unquestioningly and without scruple on Arist.’s three-word allusion to ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοί, as did Aquinas. sicut terra que cum incensa: the weird idea that earth can “burn” once lit is Aquinas’s. Did he mean terra, que “earth (all of it), which burns” (the “countryside”), or terra que “the (sort of) earth that burns”, i.e. histosol soils such as peat used as fossil fuel and prone to smouldering wildfires? No MS puts a virgule before que; Mcast was understandably perplexed enough to omit “sicut ~ inardescit” altogether. si racio perverteretur non dicitur: for the anomalous syntax of dicitur cf. n187 above on

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ponders and argues with himself, desire inclining and reason resisting, and after arguing and comes down on the side of desire. This man is called the weak incontinent; into this category of incontinence are said to be sort of incontinent men who are sanguine and phlegmatic, because due to the humidity of their complexion they are not impetuous and do not rush so quickly into passions. I repeat, however, that he always possess right reason, because if his reason were perverted he is called not incontinent but intemperate. 1.34 [On continence.] Chapter 5 The smaller the emotion by which an incontinent man is overcome, the more abject he is; and the smaller the grief an effeminately soft man is unable to bear, the more abject he is. However, the soft man is more abject than the incontinent, because pleasure works more strongly by presence than by absence; it is more difficult to rein in and repress the desire for pleasure than to bear grief at its absence, so effeminate softness is more abject than incontinence because it is easier to avoid and a vice that is more easily avoided is more abject if committed. Similarly the continent man is better than the persevering one, because the continent man rationally overcomes his desires, the persevering rationally tolerates grief and is not overcome by it, but it is more difficult to overcome than to avoid being overcome, and consequently more praiseworthy. Continence and perseverance are both praiseworthy, then, but continence more so. However, we praise them all with the name “continent”, because the difference between continence and perseverance and incontinence and effeminate softness is not easy to perceive in other people, so we either call them continent or incontinent without caring about the subtle differences. Among the incontinent, however, the more abject are the weak, who possess powers of rational decision. There are two reasons: first, because they are overcome by a lesser emotion, since the impetuous have more violent and swift emotion, but the

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non uteretur. Here too O reads more correct imperf. subj. diceretur; but on this occasion Mcast translates “si la razón se pervertiese, non es dicho incontinente”, confirming α’s reading. tanto deterior mollis: backtracking to EN 1150a32–b25 ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός/Sent. Eth. vii.7.10 “comparat mollem incontinenti et perseverantem continenti”, and skipping the rest of Bk vii (lect. 9–14), in order to prove that incontinence is less bad than intemperance Cartagena curiously elects to end on mollities “effeminacy” (ἡ μαλακία […] ὡς τὸ θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν, ut femeninum)—a vice so uspeakable Mcast had problems translating it (pp. 316n40, 319n49, 322 n61), H wrote violentiam instead in 13, and Bβ skipped over it in 50–51 (app. min. var). Was this directed at Duarte in some way?

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quis deterior est quanto a minori passione vincitur, ut dictum est; secundo, quia incontinens debilis preconsiliatur et audit racionem, sed tamen sequitur concupiscenciam, et sic videtur magis voluntarie peccare. Prevolativus non audit racionem, sed ex impetu passionis irruit in delectacionem, ideo minus malus est quam debilis. Sed intemperatus deterior est utroque propter duo. Primo, quia est impenitivus, nam ex eo quod peccat ex eleccione et sequitur delectaciones tamquam finem, non penitet quia non reputat se malum fecisse. Incontinens de facili penitet, quia habet racionem rectam in universali et bene reputat delectaciones illicitas non sequendas; licet post sequatur eas in particulari propter passionem, transeunte tamen passione remanet racio libera et faciliter penitet. Et hinc est quod intemperatus est quasi insanabilis, quia peccat ex quadam perversitate racionis et habet pro presuposito quod est bonum sequi quecumque delectabilia, sive illicita sive licita sint. Nam licet nullus generaliter considerando vellet esse intemperatus, ut supra in materia temperancie dicebamus, sed tamen delectabilia per que causatur intemperancia prosequitur intemperatus ex eleccione racionis tanquam finem, et non propter passionem sicut incontinens. Difficiliter ergo curatur; non enim sentit errorem, et quia errorem non videt non potest eum emendare nisi forsam ex longa consuetudine assuesceret abstinere a delectabilibus illicitis, nam posset reformari racio et reduci ad rectitudinem, sed hoc rarum et difficile est. Incontinens autem faciliter sanari potest, quia habet rectam racionem, et licet peccet superveniente passione, elapsa tamen sentit se errasse et penitet; ideo potest, si vult, preparare animum ad resistendum concupiscenciis cum advenerint. Secundo, quia intemperancia est malicia continua, quod patet, quia intemperatus peccat ex eleccione, ut diximus; ideo, sive sint passiones sive non, semper habet perversam racionem et est paratus ad sequendum delectabilia quecumque quando occurrerint. Incontinens vero non, sed dumtaxat superveniente passione. Deterior autem est malicia continua quam interpollata, sicut morbus corporalis pejor est continuus quam interpollatus, magis enim affligit corpus febris continua quam terciana.197 Sic intemperancia, que est malicia continua, est deterior quam incontinencia, que est quedam malicia interpollata. Concludendum ergo est

38 autem α vero Bβ 197

febris ~ terciana: these well-attested vulgar terms replace hydropisis et phtysis, epilentiae (Sent. Eth. vii.8.3, on EN 1150b32–34 ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ μὲν μοχθηρία τῶν νοσημάτων οἷον ὑδέρῳ καὶ φθίσει, ἡ δ’ ἀκρασία τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς); cf. n188. The term interpollata is also Cartagena’s; it does not occur in Aquinas or Geraldus, but is again attested in the vernacular (corde ×

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more minor the emotion someone is overcome by, the more abject they are, as I have said; second, because the weak incontinent decides first and listens to reason but still follows desire, and so seems to sin more voluntarily. The impetuous man does not listen to reason but rushes into pleasure at the impulse of emotion, so he is less bad than the weak. But the intemperate man is more abject than either of these, for two reasons. First, because he is impenitent; the fact that he sins by choice and seeks pleasures as an end means he does not repent, because he does not regard himself as having done wrong. The incontinent man easily repents, because he possesses right reason in universals and correctly regards illicit pleasures as not to be sought; even though emotion then causes him to seek them in particulars, when the emotion passes his reason is left free and he easily repents. Hence the intemperate man is almost incurable, because he sins from some perversion of reason and takes for granted that it is good to seek any kind of pleasures, licit or illicit. For although generally speaking no one would wish to be intemperate, as I said above in the heading on temperance, yet the intemperate man pursues as an end the pleasurable things that cause intemperance by rational choice, not from emotion like the incontinent man. So he is difficult to cure; he does not feel wrong, and since he cannot see his error he cannot correct it, unless perhaps he grows used to abstaining from illicit pleasures by long habit, for it would be possible to reform reason and bring it back to rectitude, but this is rare and difficult. The incontinent man, on the other hand, can easily be cured; he possesses right reason, and even if he sins when emotion overcomes him, once it has passed he feels that he has sinned and repents; so he can, if he wants, prepare his mind to resist desires when they arise. Second, because intemperance is a continuous evil, as is clear, because the intemperate man sins by choice, as we said; whether or not emotions are involved, his reason is always perverted and he is ready to follow any pleasures whatever when they present themselves. The incontinent man is not, except when emotion overcomes him. Continuous evil is more abject than intermittent, just as continuous physical disease is worse than intermittent, for instance a continuous fever afflicts the body more than a tertian fever. So intemperance, which is continuous evil, is more abject than incontinence, which is a sort of intermittent evil. We may

78 pre-1500, mostly but not always in medical texts, e.g. Villalobos, Sumario de la medicina con un compendio sobre las pestíferas bubas, BNE Mss/i1169, f. 18v “la fiebre […] es doble o senzilla, qualquiera daquellas la que no es continua será interpolada”, and × 62 in Bernard de Gordon 1495; but also Juan Fernández de Heredia, Villena, Ferran Manuel de Lando).

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ex supradictis quod intemperatus est deterior quam incontinens vel mollis, et pejor est mollis quam incontinens, et inter incontinentes pejor est debilis seu consiliativus quam prevolativus. Lib. 1 Cap. 35 [De continencia.] Capitulum sextum Est eciam sciendum quod ad molliciem pertinet ludus immoderatus.198 Homo enim non potest sustinere laborem continuum, ideo ludi adinventi sunt ad hominem recreandum et labores humanos et tedia que hominibus adveniunt sublevanda. Cum ergo aliquis ludit ultra medium racionis, ut sunt nonnulli quorum alii sunt multum dediti ludo scacorum, alii ludo alearum vel pile vel similibus (loquendo de ludo alearum quando fit propter delectacionem, non quando fit causa lucri, quia illud ad illiberalitatem pertinet, ut infra dicetur), hoc provenit ex quadam mollicie animi, quia homines qui habent molles animos et non sunt bene dispositi ad sustinendum laborem negociorum et occupacionum que in humanis actibus occurrunt sequuntur ludos ut remittantur a laboribus et quiescant. Ista ergo remissio, si immoderata est, pertinet ad molliciem; et ad hoc videtur eciam pertinere venacio nimia, non que causa utilitatis sed que causa delectacionis fit.199 Cum ergo in istis moderate se homo habet, considerata qualitate personarum, quia nonnulla que aliquibus licent aliis illicita sunt, et attentis circumstanciis rerum et locorum et ceteris que inexpressibiles sunt sed quilibet potest videre secundum casum si advertere voluerit, non est propter hoc viciosus, quia ista non impediunt virtutem, quinymo reddunt hominem saniorem et promptiorem ad exercicium virtutis; si autem immoderate sequatur, dicitur mollis.

Cap. 35 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m xxxvȷ H, corr. manus altera super lin. 198

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ad molliciem pertinet ludus immoderatus: EN 1150b16 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ μαλακός/Sent. Eth. vii.7.14 “Deinde cum dicit: ‘Videtur autem et lusivus, etc.’, excludit quemdam errorem. Posset enim alicui videri quod lusivus, idest qui nimis amat ludere, sit intemperatus, quia in ludo est quaedam delectatio; sed ipse dicit quod magis est mollis.” In a significant addition Cartagena goes on in the following sentences to expand Arist.’s single word παιδιά (Vet. interp. “lusus”) so as to make the topic directly relevant to his readers (next n). dediti ludo scacorum, alii ludo alearum: chess, dice, ball-games (Lat. pĭla, which he evidently added in the marg., app. min. var.; for this as mujeril, cf. Libro de Buen Amor st. 672, 861, 1629 “como pella a las dueñas”) were suggested by Guiral Ot 1500 vii qu.11, f. 148ra “lusivus […] est mollis, ludere enim ad scaccos vel ludis muliebribus insistere pertinet ad mollem qui sequitur mores muliebres”, but he also mentions sport “ad exercitium sicut tirocinia et astiludia”, which “non esset mollities”; cf. Oresme 1488 vii.12, f. 154rb:

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conclude from the above that the intemperate man is more abject than the incontinent or effeminate soft man, and the soft is worse than the incontinent, and that among the incontinent the weak or temporizing man is worse than the impetuous. 1.35 [On continence.] Chapter 6 We should also know that effeminate weakness includes immoderate play. Man cannot sustain continuous work, and so games were invented for his recreation and to lighten human labours and the boredom that they bring. So when someone plays beyond the rational mean, as there are many [who do], of whom some are very dedicated to chess, others to dice or ball-games or such things (talking of dicing when it is done for pleasure, not when it is done for gain, because that belongs to illiberality, as will be said below), this comes from some effeminacy of mind, because men who have soft minds not well disposed to bear the work of business and the occupations that occur in human acts pursue games to relax from their labours and rest. This relaxation, if it is immoderate, pertains to effeminate softness; in this category also seems to belong excessive hunting, not the sort for useful causes but the sort done for pleasure. When a man behaves moderately in such matters, bearing in mind the quality of persons because several things that are permitted to some are unlawful for others, and taking into account the circumstances of things, places, etc., which cannot be expressed but anybody who wants to note can see in any given case, he is not thereby bad, because these things do not hinder virtue, indeed they make a man healthier and readier to exercise virtue; but if he pursues them immoderately he will be called soft.

Glo. Et me semble que trois manieres de jeu son: une est en exercitacions corporelles comme luitter, courrir, et de tel jeu n’a cure le mol; mais l’autre est pour solacier et faire rire ceulx avecques qui l’ en converse […]; la tierce est a recreation et repos de solicitude e de labeur de corps, sicomme jeu de tables et de eschés; et ceulx qui aiment trop telz jeux, c’ est signe que ilz sont molz. Cartagena returns to games again in ii.24 (n293) to repeat the distinction between play and gambling (“causa lucri”); but here he adds, entirely of his own accord, not the laudable physical training of hastiludia “jousts” or lutter “wrestling”, but venacio, the strictly noble pastime (“considerata qualitate personarum”). Only a brave cleric could have dared suggest—there is not a breath of it in any of the scholastic commentators we have seen— that the lordly chase, in any quantity, might be mollis; furthermore, as Cartagena well knew, hunting causa utilitatis (i.e. by plebs) was prohibited by game-laws, though he chose to silence the facts as “inexpressible” but “easily ascertainable by anyone who cares to find out”. His point in calling excessive love of games and blood-sports “effeminate” was surely not satiric, but it nevertheless looks somewhat polemic.

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Ex supradictis bene consideratis poterit unusquisque cognoscere et judicare seipsum et discernere an sit temperatus vel intemperatus, continens vel incontinens, perseverativus vel mollis; et si incontinens, an prevolativus vel debilis. Et que viderit emendanda corrigere et emendare cum magna diligencia curet; melius est enim judicare seipsum quam judicari, unde Augustinus ait, “Judicet se ipsum homo voluntate dum potest et mores commutet in melius, ne cum jam non poterit preter voluntatem a Domino judicetur” (De penitenciis, dist. prima, c. Judicet).200 Hec de continencia dicta sufficiant ad cognicionem ejus et morum informacionem, omissis aliis que ad quandam inquisicionem sciencie pertinent. Explicit liber primus.

30 Explicit liber primus. AJβ, om. OB 200

unde Augustinus: after the Bk’s decidedly unexpected climax discussing matters as frivolous from Arist.’s viewpoint—though perhaps, for all that, of more concern to Cartagena’s readers—as board-games and hunting, this last paragraph concludes with a suitably rhetorical peroration admonishing moral reform (“unusquisque […] emendare curet”; note ́ annominatio of emendanda ~ emendare, rhythmic clausulae que vīdĕrĭt ē|mēndándă ~ cum magnā dĭlĭgénci̯ā cū́ret) and an ostentatiously Christian proof-text, Decretum C.33.3 [= De poenitentia], dist. 1.85 (Richter & Friedberg read conuertat for commutet).

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Having well considered what is said above, every man will be able to know and judge himself and discern whether he is temperate or intemperate, continent or incontinent, persevering or effeminately soft; and if incontinent, whether he is impetuous or weak. Let him very diligently take care to correct and emend what he will have found to emend; for it is better to judge oneself than to be judged. As Augustine says, “Let man voluntarily judge himself while he can, and change his conduct for the better, lest when he no longer can he be judged against his will by the Lord” (De penitenciis [C.33.3] dist. 1.85 Judicet). Let these remarks about continence suffice for recognizing it and informing our conduct, leaving aside the rest that belong to some scientific enquiry. End of Bk 1.

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Liber secundus

Prologus Multa sunt, prudentissime princeps, que ad bene vivendum conducunt, sed quod inter cetera prestat noticia virtutum est; nec enim recte vivere potest qui rectum quid sit ignorat.201 Et licet nostro pectori Dei operante clemencia inserta sit aliqualis cognicio virtutis et ad bonum infixa cupido (nam ut tu verissimo sermone dicere soles, cum in materia morum aliquid novi audimus, non quasi aliunde adductum sed quodammodo ex visceribus nostris et ex intimis affeccionum nostrarum extractum sentimus, et quod ignorancie nostre sera clauserat clavis altius sapientis aperire videtur, ut non ab re mirari cogamur quid cause est quod ipsi non videbamus quod intra nos inclusum vox edocentis ostendit), sed hunc ordinem interminabilis ordinum Moderator statuit ut quedam a nobis, quedam ab aliis discamus, ne discendi humilitas laude et meritis vacuetur. Disciplina ergo et studio opus est, quam ad rem cum a negociis abstrahimur ocium perutile est, dum tamen non sit ociosum. Quid enim melius nichil agens agere potest quam illud quod omnibus agendis proponi deberet? Si ergo se offert, amplectendum est; sin autem ocii oblacionem occupaciones impediunt, ab ipso negociorum acervo quadam cum violencia extorquere debemus. Et cum tam de exiguo tempore vite tam pregrandem partem alienis rebus impendimus, si non ampliorem saltem decimam temporis ut Deo frugum nostri interioris hominis cognicioni impendamus. Publium Scipionem (non illum qui Numanciam destruxit sed qui superior Africanus nominatus est) dicere solitum aiunt se nunquam minus ociosum quam cum ociosus, nec minus solum quam cum solus erat, quia in ocio et solitudine de se ipso et de arduis actibus cogitabat.202 Sed quid Scipione egemus, cum catholica domi

Liber ii Incipit secundus AJ Incipit liber secundus O, om. Bβ; in titulis paginarum l̛. sꝰ AH logus tit. AJ, om. OBβ 17 tam de αB de tam β 20 illum αB alium β 201

Pro-

rectum quid sit ignorat: a later s. xv hand adds in the margin of A a manicule and, in microscopic lettering in neat inverted pyramid shape, now very faded: “per ‘quid’ discerne sane per quid et simpliciter, nam si indistincte | accipias errare poteris †auctore deffen|ssio† Responderi et enim potest quod | aliquis recte vivere pos-|sit quamvis rec-|ti quiditatem | igno-|ret”. A fair point, but theological, anti-philosophical; Cartagena proceeds to grant virtus infusa, but steers a middle course by insisting too on virtus acquisita. See Intro. § 1, at nn13–14.

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Book 2

Prologue Many are the guides to living well, most prudent prince, but among the rest the one that stands out is knowing the virtues. The man who does not know what is right is cannot live rightly; and though some sense of virtue and imprinted longing for good has been planted in our breast by the action of God’s clemency (for as you often most truly say whenever we hear something new on the matter of conduct, we feel it not as though it were brought from outside but as somehow drawn forth from our own innards and the intimacy of our affections; and what the bar of our ignorance had bolted the key of a more profound sage seems to open, so we are constrained to wonder, not without cause, why we could not see for ourselves the thing hidden inside us that the voice of the instructor reveals), the boundless Moderator of the orders decreed this order: that we should learn s0me things from ourselves, some from others, lest the humility of learning be deprived of praise and merits. So discipline and study is necessary; for this purpose the leisure when we are drawn away from affairs is most useful, so long as it is not idle, for what better can an unoccupied man do than that which ought to take precedence over all other agendas? If it offers itself, therefore, it is to be embraced; and if our occupations hinder the opportunity for leisure, we ought to wrest it with some force from the pile of business. And since we spend such a preponderant part of such a short span of life on things external to us, let us devote at least a tithe of our time, if not more, to finding out about our inner man, as we do from the fruits of the land to God. They tell us that Publius Scipio (not the one who razed Numancia, but the elder one named Africanus) used to say he was never less idle than when he was idle and never less alone than when he was alone, because in leisure and solitude he would meditate about himself and hardy deeds. But what need have we of Scipio, when domestic Catholic

202

Publium Scipionem: Cic. Off. iii.1. The parenthetical distinction between Scipio Africanus and his adoptive grandson is added only for the nationalist glamour of the “invincible” (because all dead) Numantines as mythic “Spanish patriots”, elaborated in numerous chronicles (Jimeno Martínez & de la Torre Echávarri 2005, 46–51).

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habundent exempla? Quidnam aliud agebant principes gloriosi quorum strenuis operibus Hyspani solii gloria resplendet, cum a justis bellis vacarent que pro fidei catholice exaltacione gerebant, nisi se ipsos diligenter conspicere et ad divina opera instruere? Et ut ceteros taceam, Fernandus comes regibus par de cujus femore universi jam Hyspanie reges et tu ipse descendis, cum Castelle preesset, que tunc angustis limitibus coartata undique hostibus premebatur, inter nimias pressuras solitudinem interdum querebat et abditi montis spelunce quam Pelagius ille habitabat in Arlançe fluminis ripa (ubi post monasterium solempne construxit quod in hodiernum diem stat) segregatus a suis se conferebat ut solus divina cogitaret, que inter tumultum exercitus contemplari non poterat.203 Sed illius seculi angustie hanc nostro tempori latitudinem pepererunt! Omittamus hec, quia plena est exemplorum vetustas. Nec ista dixisse me putes ut te monerem, cum nec tante auctoritatis sim ut alios moneam, habundeque gratularer si meipsum monere sufficerem; sed ocium meum hiis induccionibus excito ne pretereat ociose, quia illustrium virorum exemplis eciam inferioris fortune homines ferventius incitantur. Tibi vero exortacione aliqua non arbitror opus esse, nam cum te Deus elevato ingenio dotaverit, tantam tu illi industriam adiecisti ut, licet tuam rem publicam indefesso labore gubernas, tibi tamen moderatum ocii tempus accommodas et diversa honerum genera que humeris tuis incumbunt tam prudenti divisione partiris ut horam sibi congruentem unaqueque occupacio recipiens aliam non impediat et vacans tempus ad solitarias cogitaciones et honesta studia supersit. Quod tanto virtuosius quanto singularius est; solent namque publicis rebus intenti sui quodammodo oblivisci, et cum multorum intricacione occupantur, a se ultra quam decet abstracti seipsos videntur deserere; econtra illi qui nimiam sui curam habent sepe sunt rei publice negligentes. Cum ergo hoc moderata alternacione fovetur ut propria publicis et publica propriis cum opportunitate temporis cedant, sui singularitate clarescit; sed nomen “proprie cure” non prout vulgus intelligit assumendum est, qui curare de se credit illos qui facultatibus ampliandis

25 resplendet A resplendent JOBβ 203

31 quam αB qua β

spelunce quam Pelagius ille habitabat: the fable of the boar-hunt that led tenth-century Fernan González to the Ermita de San Pelayo, his vow, subsequent defeat of al-Manṣūr at the battle of Lara, and supposed founding of San Pedro de Arlanza (Hortigüela, c. 40km SE of Burgos), based on the legend of Placidus/St Eustace and forged by monks of San Pedro to wrest the Castilian hero from association with Riojan San Millán (Keller 1955; Senra 2006; Larrañaga, Jular, Escalona, & Azcárate 2006), is told in Poema de Fernán González st. 225–278, 559–563, prosified in Estoria de España §690–691 (Marden 1904, 33–41,

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examples abound? What else did the glorious princes whose hardy deeds are the resplendent glory of our Hispanic soil do, when they were resting from the just war they waged for the exaltation of the Catholic faith, than diligently inspect themselves and prepare themselves for divine works? To leave aside the rest, Count Fernando, the equal of kings from whose loins the whole line of past kings of Hispania and you yourself descend, when he was leader of Castile, which confined within its narrow borders was then being pressed from every side by enemies, amid the excessive pressures would sometimes seek solitude and steal away from his men to betake himself to the remote mountain cave where that Pelayo lived on the banks of the River Arlanza (where he later built the solemn monastery that stands there to this day) in order to meditate alone on divine matters which he had not been able to contemplate amid the tumult of the army. And yet the confined straits of that age gave birth to the copious latitude of our time! Let us pass over these things, for olden times are full of examples. And do not think I have said all this to admonish you, when I have no such authority to admonish others, and would be more than pleased if I were able to admonish myself; but these inducements are my way of spurring my leisure not to pass idly, because even men of lesser fortune are roused to greater fervency by such examples of illustrious masculinity. You, however, I think need no such exhortation, for though God endowed you with exalted wit you have added to it such contrivance that, though you govern your commonwealth with untiring effort, you nevertheless arrange a moderate time of leisure for yourself and partition the various kinds of burden that rest on your shoulders so prudently that each occupation gets the hour that suits it without hindering any other, so leaving time vacant for solitary meditations and honest studies. And this is no less rare than virtuous; those devoted to public affairs tend somehow to forget themselves, and while they occupy themselves in the intricacies of a multitude of concerns seem to desert themselves, becoming excessively distracted away from their own affairs; or by contrast, those who have too much care of themselves often neglect the commonwealth. So when this matter is fostered with a moderate reciprocity so that private things give way to public and public to private at the opportune time, its very rarity makes it shine out. But the expression “care of oneself” is not to be taken as the vulgar understand it. They believe that “taking care of oneself” refers to those who watch out for chances to increase

82; 120–123, 136–137). Cartagena embroiders the tale with repeated visits (“interdum”) and far-fetched genealogy (“et tu ipse descendis”).

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invigilant, cum se attenta rei veritate non curent, sed sui ipsius curam gerere reor qui interiorem hominem curat illumque honestis doctrinis inbuit quibus post tam in ocio quam in negociis utatur.204 Quod te proculdubio facere eciam tacentibus testibus tua conversacio demonstrat; sed inter alia studia tua quibus intra cameram exclusa famulantium turba juxta laudabilem morem tuum solus ocio captato occuparis hoc unicum intersere, et virtutum doctrinas quas suprascripsimus et de quibus infra loquemur in hoc Memoriali repetita leccione perlege, quia non modicum ad vitam felicem coadiuvant. Recte enim quatuor virtutes quas premisimus, prudenciam videlicet, justiciam, fortitudinem, et temperanciam, moralis sciencie acerrimi scrutatores cardinales vocarunt, quia in eis ut in cardine humane vite janue revolvuntur. Nam post tres theologicas illas que ab alto ex sola divina misericordia infunduntur, quas non tractavimus sed tetigimus, hee quatuor quoad res humanas attinet obtinent principatum; quia etsi intellectuales in se eximie excellencie et spiritualis pulchritudinis sint, hiis tamen ad mores nostros potius opus habemus que ex more nomen sumentes morales dicuntur. Inter quas etsi precipue sint quas diximus, relique tamen de quibus confestim dicemus contempnende non sunt, que disponunt nos circa exteriora hominis bona et quedam alia que ad virtuosam conversacionem conveniunt. Unde etsi sciam bibliothecam tuam libris solempnibus habundare in quibus hec et alia latius et feliciori stillo continentur, presens tamen opusculum in forma memorialis compositum sentencias non meas sed philosophicas et aliquorum sanctorum sub brevi epilogo continens ad inbuendum animum comodissimum est. Nec arroganter hoc dictum existimes, quia si meipsum opusve meum laudarem jactancie, et merito ymo insipiencie reus judicari deberem; sed non composicionem laudo sed effectum et res que sub hac composicione traduntur, que laudem ab antiquis temporibus meruerunt. Quas et in aliis libris

58 alia α cetera Bβ 204

78 ymo om. β

interiorem hominem: Cartagena uses interior moralis disposicio and mores interiores at ii.24 36–40, and interiora bona at ii.12 38, ii.14 23. The contrast with “exteriora bona fortune” in the latter passages implies a Stoic position, but in fact all are quoted from Sent. Eth. iv.9–10, 16. Aquinas, however, uses the adj. only in straightforward physiopsychological ways (× 36, with sensus, visus, phantasiae, electio, dispositio, affectus, etc.; “interiora bona […] materialia et corporalia”, i.16), and to the question, “quid sit principalius in virtute morali: utrum electio interior vel actiones exteriores?”—Arist. does not use the inner/outer metaphor at all (EN 1178a34–b ἀμφισβητεῖταί τε πότερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, Vet. interp. “electio vel actiones”)—replies: “manifestum est quod ad omnimodam perfectionem virtutis moralis requiritur non solum electio,

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their means, when in actual fact this is not taking care of themselves; I think a man who takes care of himself is one who looks after his inner man and imbues him with honest doctrines that he can use afterwards, both in leisure and in business. That this is undoubtedly what you do is demonstrated by your way of life, even if the witnesses to it were silent. Yet amongst these other studies in which it is your laudable custom to occupy yourself, snatching some leisure to dismiss your crowd of attendants and shut yourself alone in your chamber, interpose this one only: to read through at repeated readings the teachings about virtues I have written above and about which I shall speak below in this Memorial, because they help lead in no small way to a happy life. Rightly did the most acute investigators of moral science name the four virtues in my opening book, namely prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, the cardinal virtues, because they are like the hinges (cardines) on which the gates of human life turn. After the three theological ones, which are infused from on high solely by divine mercy and which I did not treat but merely touched upon, these four occupy the leading place as far as human affairs are concerned; for though the intellectual virtues are of the highest excellence and spiritual beauty in themselves, for our conduct we have more need of these moral ones that take their name from mores ‘customs’. Now although the principal ones among them are these that I have said, the rest about which I shall talk in a moment are not to be despised; they dispose us in regard to man’s external goods and certain other things fitting for a virtuous way of life. And so, though I know your library is full of solemn books in which these and other thing are more broadly and more felicitously set out, the present little work composed in the form of a memorial containing a brief synthesis of apophthegmatic truths not of my composition but from philosophers and a few saints is most suitable for training the mind. Do not think I say this arrogantly; were I praising myself or my work I would rightly deserve to be judged guilty of boasting, or indeed of folly, but I am not praising my own synthesis, only the effect and matter transmitted within the synthesis, which have earned praise from ancient times. You will also find them sed etiam operatio exterior” (x.12.9). By contrast, Cartagena’s twice-repeated idea of the “interior man” is specifically religious, though also unorthodox (Intro. §2, at n28), and one whose implications to do with conscience are certainly alien to Arist. (conscientia does not occur at all in Sent. Eth.; cf. MV ii.21 48–50, quoting Gregory the Great from Gratian, “Quid enim si […] consciencia nos liberos esse demonstrat? Habemus Paulum [2Cor 1:12] dicentem, ‘gloria nostra hec est testimonium consciencie nostre’”; likewise “in foro penitencie”, MV i.7, i.31; etc.). Its use to justify the moderata alternacio of “propria publicis et publica propriis”—the premise upon which rests the entire project of Memoriale as a speculum principis—is therefore striking.

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invenies, nec enim moralis liber aliquis est qui magna ex parte cum hiis auctoritatibus non concordet; sed alii aliter tractaverunt, et ex hiis unusquisque que placebat excerpens aliisque doctrinis commiscens novum saporem invenit, ut coqui facere solent qui cibos ita subtiliter miscent ut qui sint sepe difficiliter cognoscantur. Qui scribendi modus etsi laudabilis subtilisque sit, ego in presenti illum sequutus non sum; nolui enim novis involucionibus antiqua mutare, sed que sub altitudine stilli obscura jacebant in planiorem loquendi modum et cothidianum sermonem deducere ut absque revolucione librorum legere valeas quod cum glosatorum crebris divisionibus et subdivisionibus legi solet. Quod si per totam moralem philosophiam fieret, sicut laboriosum ita forsam et utile foret; sed hoc professoribus suis dimittentes nos huic brevi labori quem cepimus, Deo auctore ejusque suffragio semper repetitis precibus invocato, finem ut sequitur imponamus. Lib. 2 Cap. 1 De liberalitate. Capitulum primum De liberalitate post hec dicendum est; nam sicut temperancia moderatur concupiscencias delectacionum tactus, ita liberalitas moderatur cupiditatem acquirendi vel possidendi res exteriores. Et est liberalitas medietas quedam circa peccunias; nec enim laudamus ut liberales illos qui se bene habent in rebus bellicis circa quas est fortitudo, nec in delectacionibus tactus circa quas est temperancia, nec in judiciis circa que est justicia, sed laudamus eos in dacione et accepcione peccuniarum, magis tamen in dacione quam in accepcione, ut infra dicetur.205 Et nomine peccuniarum intelligimus omnia illa quorum dignum precium potest numismate mensurari, ut domus, vinee, equi, vestes, et omnes res que denariis apreciari possunt. Et hinc est quod legiste dicunt peccunie appellacione omnes res contineri.206 Est autem circa hoc reperire duo extrema, scilicet superhabundanciam et defectum. Superhabundancia vocatur prodigalitas, defectus dicitur illiberalitas; medium tenet liberalitas, que est virtus moralis. Et dicimus illiberales illos qui student circa peccunias acquirendas vel conservandas magis quam opportet. Nomen vero prodigalitatis quandoque extendimus attribuentes ipsum intemperatis hominibus, vocamus

Cap. 1 tit. α, De liberalitate BQ Capl̛m scd̅ m H Dicimus autem β 205

3 Et est αB Est autem β

14 Et dicimus αB

est liberalitas medietas quedam circa peccunias: the remainder of MV is a straight compilation of Bk iv of EN, starting word-for-word at 1119b21–25 λέγωμεν δ᾽ ἑξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος. δοκεῖ δὴ εἶναι ἡ περὶ χρήματα μεσότης, and following Sent. Eth. iv.1–17 lectio by lectio. Cartagena still moulds the argument to his directive ends, omitting abstrusities and adding legal texts, Christian touches (e.g. the parable of the Prodigal Son, Lk 15:11–32, at 18–19 below), everyday examples, vulgar proverbs, etc.

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in other books, for there is no book on morals that does not in great measure agree with these authorities; but each has treated them in its own way, every writer excerpting what he liked and mixing it with other teachings so as to find a new flavour, as cooks customarily do when they mix foods so subtly that it becomes difficult to identify one from another. Praiseworthy and subtle as this way of writing may be, I have not followed it in the present case; I did not set out to refashion the old with new wrappings, but to reduce what lay hidden beneath their high style to a plainer way of speaking and everyday language so you can read what is normally read crowded with commentators’ divisions and subdivisions without having to turn the pages of endless books. If this were to be done for the whole of moral philosophy it might be useful, if somewhat laborious; but leaving that to the professors of the subject, with God’s guidance and with ever-repeated prayers to invoke His help, let us bring things to a close as follows. 2.1 On liberality. Chapter 1 We have next to speak of liberality; for as temperance moderates desires for pleasures of touch, so liberality moderates acquisitiveness in getting or possessing external goods. ‘Liberality’ or generosity is a certain mean with regard to commodities; we do not praise as generous those who conduct themselves well in matters of war, which are the concern of fortitude, nor in pleasures of touch, which are the concern of temperance, nor in judgments, which are the concern of justice, but praise them in regard to the giving and receiving of commodities, though more in the giving than the taking, as will be explained below. By the word “commodities” (pĕcūniae) we understand all those things whose worth or price can be measured in currency, for instance houses, vineyards, horses, clothes, and everything that can be valued in coins. Hence jurists say that all material things are included in the appellation “money”. In this regard there exist two extremes, namely excess and defect. The excess is named prodigality, the defect is called illiberality; the mean belongs to liberality, which is a moral virtue. “Illiberal” or ungenerous is the name for those who spend more effort on acquiring or keeping commodities than is fitting. The name “prodigality”, however, we occasionally extend by applying it to intemperate men; we

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legiste dicunt: Dig. l.16.178 “ ‘Pecuniae’ verbum non solum numeratam pecuniam complectitur, verum omnem omnino pecuniam, hoc est omnia corpora: nam corpora quoque pecuniae appellatione contineri nemo est qui ambiget”; 222 “‘Pecuniae’ nomine non solum numerata pecunia sed omnes res […] continentur.”

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enim interdum prodigos illos qui incontinenter vivunt et consumunt divicias suas in intemperancia ciborum vel venereorum, ut legitur in Evangelio de filio prodigo, unde et tales videntur esse pravissimi in hoc genere quia simul habent multa vicia, id est intemperanciam et prodigalitatem. Et quamvis quandoque tales vocentur prodigi, nomen tamen prodigalitatis non competit eis proprie, quia nomen prodigi impositum est ad designandum unum vicium, quod consistit in indebita corrupcione vel consumpcione substancie; nam prodigus dicitur quasi “perditus”, in quantum homo corrumpendo proprias divicias per quas vivere debet videtur quasi suum esse destruere, quod per divicias conservatur.207 Ille ergo proprie dicitur prodigus cui per se hoc convenit, quod consumat suas divicias quasi non habens curam debitam de eis; ille vero qui consumit suam substanciam propter aliquid aliud, ut pote propter intemperanciam, non per se est consumptor diviciarum sed per se est intemperatus, nam aliquando contingit quod eciam homines cupidi et tenaces propter vim concupiscencie bona sua consumunt. Et est juxta hoc sciendum quod actus liberalitatis est bonus usus peccunie. Usus autem peccunie consistit in emissione ejus que fit per sumptus seu expensas; accipere vero vel custodire peccunias non est uti peccuniis sed est possidere eas. Nam per accepcionem peccunie acquiritur ejus possessio, per custodiam conservatur; nam accepcio est sicut quedam peccunie generacio, et custodia est sicut quedam habitualis retencio. Generacio ergo seu retencio non est usus, quia usus significat aliquem actum rei, et sic usus peccunie non consistit in acquisicione nec in custodia sed in consumpcione; et hinc est quod legiste dicunt peccuniam usu consumi, quia consumpcio peccuniarum est usus earum.208 Et ex hiis concluditur quod magis pertinet ad liberalem dare peccuniam quibus opportet, quod est bene uti peccuniis, quam accipere unde opportet, quod est quodammodo bene generare peccunias, vel non accipere unde non opportet, quod est removere illiberalitatem. Probatur eciam hec conclusio quinque

24 perditus α per se perditus Bβ (como por sí perdido Mcast; vid. n207 infra) hoc α (justa J, om. est O) Est autem Bβ 37 et custodia αB custodia autem β 207

32 Et est juxta

nomen ~ prodigalitatis non competit: prodigalitas/illiberalitas = ἀσωτία/ἀνελευθερία (EN 1107b9–14); the sentence is from Sent. Eth. iv.1.8, which reverently takes EN 1119b33–1120a4 ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δι᾽ αὑτὸν ἀπολλύμενος, δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἀπώλειά τις αὑτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά as an argumentum etymologicum (cf. n177): “prodigus [ἄ-σωτος < σῴζω “lit. past saving; fig. profligate”] dicitur quasi ‘perditus’, inquantum scilicet homo corrumpendo […] videtur suum esse destruere [ἀπόλλυμι]”. quasi “perditus”: Bβ’s addition “per se perditus” is direct

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sometimes use the epithet “prodigal” for those who live incontinently and use up their wealth on intemperate use of food or sex, as we read in the Gospel regarding the prodigal son, so that such men also seem the most depraved of their kind, because they have multiple vices at the same time, that is intemperance and prodigality. But although such men are occasionally called prodigal, the word “prodigality” does not properly apply to them; the name was invented to designate only one vice, which consists in the undue wasting or consumption of wealth, for “prodigal” stands for “roué, ruined” (perditus), in that by wasting the wealth that should be his livelihood he seems as it were to destroy his own being, which rests on wealth. A man is properly called prodigal, then, when he has this trait per se, that is, uses up his wealth as if careless of it; one who uses up his means for some other reason, for instance through intemperance, is not per se a waster of wealth but per se intemperate, because it sometimes happens that even greedy and miserly men use up their goods from some attack of desire. In this regard we should know that the act of liberality is the good use of money. Use of money consists in spending it for costs or expenses; to get or hoard commodities is not to use them but to possess them. By receiving money one gets possession of it, by hoarding one keeps it; receiving is a sort of generation, and hoarding a kind of habitual retention, of money. Generation or retention is not use, then, because use signifies some physical act, so the use of money does not consist in getting or hoarding but in spending; hence jurists say that money is “used up” by spending, because the use of commodities is their consumption. From all this we may conclude that it pertains more to the generous man to give money for things he should, which is to use commodities correctly, than to get it whence he should, which is in some sense to generate commodities correctly, or not to receive it from sources he should not, which is to avoid

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from Arist. (δι᾽ αὑτὸν ἀπολλύμενος/Vet. interp. propter se ipsum perditus)—a revision? See Proleg. § 2(e). Generacio ergo seu retencio: EN 1120a8–9/Sent. Eth. iv.1.11. Generatio/γένεσις and corruptio/φθορά (cf. “corrumpendo” above, n207) were key terms in Aristotelian physics and crop up a dozen or so times in EN (e.g. 1104a27, 1160a31, 1173b6); the technical jargon is taken from Aquinas and marks these chapters’ scholastic approach. But Cartagena prefers legal language; legiste dicunt: Instit. ii.4 “his quae ipso usu consumuntur […], quibus proxima est pecunia numerata, namque in ipso usu adsidua permutatione quodammodo extinguitur.”

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racionibus.209 Prima, magis pertinet ad virtutem benefacere quam bene pati, quia benefacere est melius et difficilius; similiter eciam magis pertinet ad virtutem bene operari quam abstinere a turpi operacione, sed quando aliquis bene dat benefacit et bene operatur, quando vero recipit unde opportet bene patitur, quando non recipit unde non opportet non operatur turpe. Consequens ergo est quod ad virtutem liberalitatis magis pertineat bene dare quam bene accipere vel bene abstinere a mala accepcione. Secunda, operacioni virtutis debetur laus et graciarum accio, sed ista magis debentur bene danti quam bene accipienti; ergo virtus liberalitatis magis consistit in dando quam in accipiendo. Tercia, virtus est circa difficile, sed facilius est quod aliquis non accipiat aliena quam quod det propria, quia cum aliquis dat illud quod est sibi proprium quasi abscidit a se id quod est sibi incorporatum; ergo virtus liberalitatis magis est circa dacionem quam circa accepcionem. Quarta, sumitur ex communi usu loquendi, nam illi maxime dicuntur liberales qui bene dant, illi vero qui non accipiunt inordinate non multum laudantur de liberalitate sed de justicia, illi vero qui accipiunt unde opportet non valde laudantur; ergo liberalitas maxime videtur esse circa daciones. Quinta, inter omnes virtuosos maxime amantur liberales, non illa amicicia que est propter honestum sed illa que est propter utile, quia sunt hominibus utiles; sed utilitas eorum consistit in dando. Sequitur ergo quod liberalitas precipue sit in dacione. Lib. 2 Cap. 2 [De liberalitate.] Capitulum secundum Dat liberalis propter bonum finem et attendens debitas circunstancias, videlicet ut det quibus opportet et quando et qualiter et quantum racionabiliter dare debet, considerans semper in dacionibus rectam mensuram racionis; et dabit liberalis illa que dat delectabiliter, vel saltem sine tristicia.210 Hoc enim est commune omnibus virtutibus, ut actus earum sint delectabiles vel sine tristicia; et si actus alicujus virtutis habet admixtam tristiciam, ut in fortitudine contingit, virtuosus sentiet eam minorem et virilius eam sustinebit quam alius qui non sit virtuosus, ut in materia fortitudinis dictum est. Qui vero dat quibus non opportet vel non propter honestatem sed propter aliam causam licitam vel illicitam non dicitur liberalis sed vocabitur secundum qualitatem casus, attento fine propter quem dat; et si inhonestus est erit actus viciosus, si licitus

Cap. 2 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m 3m H 209

3–4 et dabit α dabit autem Bβ

quinque racionibus: Sent. Eth. iv.1.13–17, dividing EN 1120a9–23. The compilation is swift but close, despite biblical and legal allusions: 693 words to Aquinas’s 1388 in this chapter, of which c. 160 are Cartagena’s.

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illiberality. This conclusion is proved by five arguments. First, virtue is more concerned with benefiting others than being benefited, because to benefit is better and more difficult; similarly it also pertains more to virtue to act well than to refrain from base actions, but when someone gives correctly he benefits another and acts well, whereas when he receives from where he should he is benefited, and when he does not receive from where he should not he does not act basely. Consequently it pertains more to the virtue of liberality to give correctly than to get correctly or refrain correctly from bad acquisition. Second, the exercise of virtue deserves praise and thanks, but these are deserved more by the upright giver than the upright receiver; therefore the virtue of liberality consists more in giving than receiving. Third, virtue is about difficult things, but it is easier not to accept other people’s goods than to give one’s own because when someone gives something of his own, it is as if he cut off a part of himself; therefore the virtue of liberality is more about giving than receiving. Fourth, it is deducible from common usage, for the name “liberal” is above all applied to those who give well, whereas those who are not inordinately acquisitive are praised not so much for liberality as for justice, and those who receive from licit sources are hardly praised at all; therefore liberality seems mostly to be about giving. Fifth, of all virtuous men the generous are most loved, not with the love for what is honest but with the love for what is useful, because they are useful to men; but their usefulness consists in giving. It follows, then, that liberality primarily resides in giving. 2.2 [On liberality.] Chapter 2 The generous man gives for a good end and paying attention to the due circumstances, namely that he gives to those he should and when and how and how much he ought reasonably to give, always considering the right rational measure in his gifts; and the generous man will give what he gives with pleasure, or at least without grief. This is common to all virtues; their acts are pleasurable or without grief, and if the act of some virtue has an admixture of grief, as happens in fortitude, the virtuous man will feel it less and bear it more manfully than someone who is not virtuous, as explained in the heading on fortitude. But the man who gives to those he should not or not for honourable reasons but for some other cause, licit or illicit, is not called “liberal” but will be named according to the nature of the case, taking into account the purpose for which he gives; if it is dishonest it will be an act of vice, if it is licit it will not be a vice

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delectabiliter ~ sine tristicia: this chapter summarizes Sent. Eth. iv.2 (EN 1120a23–b24), following the sources’ order closely, but simplifying arguments and expanding examples.

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est non erit viciosus, sed nec ex hoc dicetur liberalis, ut si mercator det peccuniam ut melius vel liberius negocietur, licet non peccat in hoc si licite facit, non tamen propter hoc dicetur liberalis.211 Ille eciam qui cum tristicia dat, licet propter honestam causam det, non est liberalis, quia ex hoc ipso quod tristatur in dando videtur quod magis eligeret peccunias quam operacionem virtuosam honeste accionis, quod non pertinet ad liberalem. Non accipit autem liberalis unde non opportet, quia hoc non videtur competere homini qui non apreciatur peccunias; nec est promptus ad petendum, nam sicut in naturalibus dicitur illud quod est multum activum, ut ignis, est parum passivum, sic et in moralibus liberalis, qui est promptus ad bene faciendum donando, non vult de facili beneficia ab alio recipere, quod est bene pati.212 Et observat liberalis in accipiendo tria: primum, quod accipiat unde opportet, ut pote a propriis possessionibus vel redditibus vel ab aliis unde honeste et racionabiliter accipere debet, quia non querit peccunias tanquam per se bonum, sed quasi quid neccessarium ad dandum; ideo non querit eas unde non opportet. Secundum, quod non negligat procuracionem bonorum propriorum, quia vult habere unde sufficiat ad dandum aliis. Tercium, quod non det quibuscumque, sed retinet ad hoc quod possit dare quibus opportet et loco et tempore debito. Est autem proprium liberalis vehementer superhabundare in dacione, non quidem sic quod superhabundet a racione recta, sed ita quod dacio in ipso superhabundet retencionem, quia minus sibi relinquit quam aliis det; paucis enim in se ipso contentus est, sed quia vult multis providere opportet quod plurimis largiatur; non enim pertinet ad liberalem quod sibi soli intendat. Et comendatur liberalis secundum proporcionem substancie, id est diviciarum suarum, quia dacio non judicatur liberalis ex multitudine datorum sed ex habitu et voluntate dantis; unde possibile est quod sit liberalior qui minora dat quam qui majora, quia dat ex minoribus diviciis. Et solent esse magis liberales qui a parentibus divicias suscipiunt quam illi qui proprio labore eas acquisierunt, 22–23 Et observat α Observat autem Bβ 29 retinet αB (que non dé ~ enpero retiene Mcast) retineat β 32 det om. Bβ 34–35 Et comendatur α Comendatur autem Bβ 38 Et solent α Solent autem Bβ 211

ut si mercator ~ negocietur: from attento fine Cartagena adds an explanation of Aquinas’s bare statement, “secundum differentiam finis propter quem dat, ex quo moralia speciem et nomen sortiuntur” (Sent. Eth. iv.2.3, on EN 1120a27–29 ὁ δὲ διδοὺς οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ διά τιν᾽ ἄλλην αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλος τις ῥηθήσεται). He is fond of examples from the world of business, mercatura or negociaciones as he calls it here and elsewhere (cf. i.6 15, i.11 13, i.12 40, i.14 16–20, ii.5 25–35, ii.23 6), whereas mercator, mercationes occur only once each in Sent. Eth., in a Bk Cartagena does not touch upon, viii.9, 14. Is it too facile to impute this to his middle-class converso origins? Certainly it was not specifically relevant to his royal addressee.

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but nor for that reason will it be called generous, for instance if a merchant gives money to facilitate or increase his business, though he does not sin by this if he does it lawfully, will not be called generous on this account. Again, the man who gives reluctantly, even if he gives for an honest cause, is not generous, because from the very fact that he grieves in giving it seems he would rather chose money than the virtuous exercise of an honest action, which does not the character of the generous man. On the other hand, the generous man does not accept from sources he should not, because this does not seem to befit a man who does not prize commodities; nor is he ready to ask for things, for just as in physics we are told that any very active element like fire is very little passive, so also in moral matters the generous man, who is prompt to do well by giving, does not easily wish to receive benefits from another, which is to be benefited. In receiving, the generous man observes three rules: first, that he should receive from where he should, for example from his own properties or rents or from other sources from which he may honestly and reasonably receive, since he does not seek commodities as a good in itself but as something necessary for giving; hence he does not seek them where he should not. Second, that he should not neglect taking care of his own goods, since he wishes to have the wherewithal to give to others. Third, that he should not give to all and sundry, but save in order to be able to give to those he should and in the due place and time. It is typical of the generous man to surpass ardently in giving, not to the extent of irrational excess but enough that in his case giving exceeds holding back because he leaves less for himself than he gives to others; in himself he is content with little, but because he wishes to provide for many he must be bountiful to most; it does not befit the generous man only to look after himself. So the generous man is commended proportionately to his means, that is, his wealth, because giving is not judged generous by the size of the gifts but by the disposition and will of the giver; hence it is possible for a man who gives less to be more generous than one who gives more because he gives from smaller resources. Those who inherit riches from their parents tend to be more generous than those

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multum activum, ut ignis: the example was added by Aquinas, Sent. Eth. iv.2.5. Ubi tamen ignis [principium] activum, aqua passivum est: for Arist. the terminology had to do with the physical dynamics of elemental (inanimate) motion (δύναμις “potency” vs. ἐνέργεια “activity”—fire is active because it has the potential to rise, and actually does, water can be activated only mediately, by becoming air, Ph. 213a, 255b, etc.; Lang 1984), but it provided schoolmen with endless matter for strictly theological casuistry (e.g. Anselmus 1688, 331–332).

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quod duplici racione contingit. Prima est quia suscipientes divicias a majoribus suis non sunt experti indigenciam, unde non timent eam, ideo non metuunt expendere; illi vero qui eas acquirunt propter timorem paupertatis quam aliquando senserunt cessant ab expensis. Secunda est quia naturale est quod omnes diligant opera sua, sicut parentes diligunt filios et poete poemata sua; illi ergo qui acquirunt proprio labore divicias diligunt eas quasi sua opera, ideo magis conservant.213 Et hinc est quod in proverbium ducitur emendam esse domum a successore potius quam ab hedificatore, quia hedificator quodammodo diligit eam et magis apreciatur et carius vendit.214 Et licet aliquando contingit esse liberaliorem illum qui acquisivit quam qui successit, communius tamen est quod supradicitur racionibus suprascriptis. Non est autem facile quod liberalis homo ditetur, quia non de facili accipit nec multum custodit divicias sed magis emittit eas a se dando et expendendo, nec apreciatur eas propter se ipsas sed solum propter dacionem. Et hinc est quod plerumque homines vulgares et plebeyi, cum loquuntur de aliquo homine liberali, accusant fortunam quia non dedit divicias illi qui est multum dignus eis; sed errant, quia non est possibile quod ille habeat peccunias qui non multum curat habere, sicut in aliis rebus non est possibile habere illud de quo homo non curat. Et non dabit liberalis quibuscumque, nec quando non opportet, nec excedet secundum quamcumque aliam circumstanciam mensuram racionis, quia talis operacio non esset liberalis et per eam impediretur ab operacione liberali, quia consumendo inutiliter non haberet ad consumendum ubi opporteret; sed liberalis expendit secundum proporcionem proprie substancie et in ea que opportet.

46 in proverbium ducitur αB (se trae en proverbio Mcast) in proverbio dicitur β 54 vulgares et plebeyi om. β 57 Et non α non autem Bβ 59 quamcumque aliam AJ aliam quamcunque OBβ 61–62 sed liberalis α liberalis autem est qui β (Franco enpero es el que Mcast) 62 ea αB eis β 213

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et poete poemata sua: the closest thing to wit in MV, this is taken word for word from EN 1120b14 πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὑτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, at Sent. Eth. iv.2.9. proverbium: not from Aristotle or Aquinas, nor do we find it in legal sources or as a Latin proverb. Mcast is no help; the closest vulgar refranes are “Compra de quien heredó, y

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who acquired them by their own toil, which happens for two reasons. The first is that those who inherit wealth from their ancestors have not experienced need, and so do not fear it; therefore they do not fear to spend their riches, whereas those who acquire wealth through fear of poverty because they have felt it at some time back away from expenditure. The second is that it is natural for everyone to love their own works, as parents love their children and poets their poems; therefore those who acquire riches by their own toil love them as if they were their own works, and so are more sparing with them. Hence the proverb, “Better to buy a house from its inheritor than its builder”, because the builder somehow loves it and prizes it more, and so asks a higher price. Though it sometimes happens that a man who has made his money is more generous than one who has inherited it, what is said above is more common, for the reasons mentioned. However, it is not likely that a generous man should grow rich, because he neither lightly accepts riches nor much hoards them, but instead disburses them by giving and spending; nor does he prize them for themselves, but only for giving. So it comes about that very often vulgar and plebeian men, when the speak about some generous man, accuse fortune for not having given riches to one so worthy of them; but they are wrong, for it is not possible for someone to have money if he does not care much about having it, just as in other things it is not possible to have what one does not care to have. The generous man, then, will not give to all and sundry, nor when it is not fitting, nor will he exceed the rational measure in any other circumstance, because such practice would not be generous and would impede him from the exercise of liberality, because by such useless spending he would be left with nothing to spend where he ought; so the generous man spends in proportion to his own means and on the things that he should.

nunca al que lo sudó” (“que barato te lo dará, pues regalado lo recibió”). Correas lists “Konpra de kien eredó, no konpres de kien konpró, que sabe loke kostó. | Konpra kasa hecha [viexa Combet], i viña do nazka ierva” (BNE Mss/4450, pp. 532–533; Correas 1967, 428); the Comendador Griego (Núñez 1555, f. 27v) gives it in Port., “Compra casa feyta, e viña en panasqueyra [“overgrown field, weed patch (now “turnip-field, vulg. terra sertaneja”)”; cf. Cortes portuguesas, 1498 “Ytem em esta villa ha muytas e muy boas vinhas […] E agora de poucos tempos a esta parte as leixam perder e estam em panasqueiras”, cport]”, which he explains: “porque se avrán más barato que si las hiziessen de nuevo”.

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Lib. 2 Cap. 3 [De liberalitate.] Capitulum tercium Prodigus dicitur qui superhabundat proporcionem sue substancie expendendo vel dando.215 Et hinc est quod tyrampni, qui habent indeficientem habundanciam diviciarum quia usurpant sibi omnia que sunt communia, non dicuntur prodigi quia secundum multitudinem eorum que possident non est facile quod dando et expendendo proporcionem diviciarum suarum excedant.216 Differt autem liberalis a prodigo, quia liberalis dat et expendit secundum racionem rectam in quibus opportet attentis debitis circunstanciis; prodigus non sic, sed excedit proporcionem substancie sue. Differt eciam liberalis ab illiberali, quia illiberalis eciam cum expendit hoc facit cum tristicia, sed liberalis delectabiliter. Differt eciam liberalis a magnifico, quia magnificus se habet tantummodo circa magna, ut infra in materia magnificencie dicetur; liberalis vero tam in parvis quam in magnis expendit liberaliter, et sicut dat ubi opportet liberalis, ita accipiet unde opportet, ut dictum est. Nam ad liberalitatem pertinet decenter dare et decenter accipere, quia non bene concordaret indecens accepcio cum decenti dacione. Ideo non pertinet ad liberalem indecenter accipere; et si contingat quod liberalis aliquid de suis diviciis expendat preter ordinem et non attentis debitis circunstanciis, tristatur, sed tamen non excedit modum in tristando; ad omnem enim virtutem pertinet delectari et tristari in quibus opportet et secundum quod opportet. Est autem liberalis bene communicativus in peccuniis et promptus ad hoc quod peccunias suas quasi communes habeat cum aliis; potest namque substinere absque tristicia quod aliquis gravet eum in peccuniis quia non multum apreciatur eas. Magis vero tristatur liberalis si non consumit dando vel expendendo quod opportet quam si consumat aliquid quod non opporteat consumere; et racio hujus est quia magis ad ipsum pertinet dare quam accipere vel conservare. Prodigus vero in omnibus predictis peccat, non solum in dando et accipiendo sed eciam in delectando et tristando. Sunt ergo contrarie prodigalitas et illiberalitas. Prodigus enim superhabundat in dando et in non accipiendo et deficit in accipiendo, quia dat plus quam opportet et non accipit unde deberet. Illiberalis econtra deficit in dando

Cap. 3 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m 4 H 1 dicitur α est β sicut B (es así como Mcast) 7–8 non sic sed excedit αB autem non sed excedet β 9 sed liberalis α liberalis autem Bβ 15–16 et si contingat α si contingat autem Bβ 21 absque Jβ sine AOB 22 vero AJ autem OBβ 23 consumat JOβ (gaste Mcast) sum̄ at AB 28 et deficit α deficit (deff- H) autem Bβ 29 econtra α autem econtra Bβ 215

Prodigus dicitur: the chapter abbreviates Sent. Eth. iv.3 (EN 1120b24–1121a15) without novelty of note.

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2.3 [On liberality.] Chapter 3 We call “prodigal” the man who exceeds the proportion of his means in spending or giving. So tyrants, who have an unending abundance of riches because they usurp all common property for themselves, are not called prodigal because the multitude of their possessions makes it difficult for them to exceed the proportion of their means. The generous man differs from the prodigal because he gives and spends according to right reason on things he should with due attention to circumstances; the prodigal does not, but instead exceeds the proportion of his means. The generous man also differs from the ungenerous, because the ungenerous man even when he spends does so reluctantly, but the generous man with pleasure. The generous man also differs from the magnificent, because the magnificent man is concerned only with great things, as will be explained below in the heading on magnificence, whereas the generous man spends liberally both in small matters and in great. And as the generous man gives where he should, so too he will take from where he should, as has been said, for it pertains to liberality to give decently and receive decently; improper getting would not accord well with proper giving. Hence it does not pertain to the generous man to receive improperly; and if it so happens that the generous man spends some of his wealth out of order and without due attention to circumstance he grieves, but not excessively, for every virtue involves feeling pleasure or grief at the right things and for the right reasons. Again, the generous man is open-handed in sharing commodities and so ungrudging as to regard his commodities almost as common property; he can suffer someone to exact a charge on his commodities without grief because he does not much prize them. The generous man is more grieved if does not use them up giving or spending what he should than if he uses up something he should not; and the reason for this is that it pertains to him more to give than to get or keep. The prodigal, on the other hand, sins in all the above respects, not only in giving and receiving but also in feeling delight or grief at it. Prodigality and illiberality are therefore opposite. The prodigal goes to excess in giving and not receiving, and is deficient in receiving, because he gives more than he should and does not receive when he ought. The ungenerous man, by contrast, is deficient in giving

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hinc est quod tyrampni: EN 1120b25–27 διὸ τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἀσώτους· τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν. BH wrote tyranni correctly, but AJ’s reading implies that -mpn- was in the archetype. The spelling was designed to indicate a geminate and prevent -ñ- (-mn-, -nn-) being pronounced /ɲ/; cf. dampnum i.7, solempnes i.14, contempnit i.17, columpnas ii.8, etc.

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et superhabundat in accipiendo, nisi in parvis rebus quas interdum illiberalis dat et non curat accipere.217 Lib. 2 Cap. 4 [De liberalitate.] Capitulum quartum Deterior est illiberalitas prodigalitate propter tria.218 Primo, quia prodigalitas est sanabilior, quod contingit duplici racione. Prima, quia quanto quis magis accedit ad senectutem, tanto magis pronus efficitur ad retinendum et ad non dandum, quod evenit ex eo quia divicie appetuntur ut per eas humanis defectibus subveniatur, quanto ergo homo majores defectus sentit tanto magis querit subveniri; et quia hoc contingit in senectute, ideo communiter senes inclinantur ad non dandum et retinendum. Secunda est quia ex superflua dacione sequitur paupertas, et propter paupertatem impeditur prodigalitas, tum quia impossibile est dare illum qui non habet juxta regulam juristarum, “Nemo dat quod non habet”, tum eciam propter experienciam defectus, nam ex superflua dacione sentit prodigus dampnum et sentiendo interdum curatur.219 Secundo, quia prodigus de facili potest duci ad medium virtutis propter convenienciam quam habet cum liberali. Habet enim prodigus ea que habet liberalis, quia libenter dat et non de facili accipit; differt autem ab eo quia neutrum horum facit secundum quod opportet, id est secundum racionem rectam. Et ideo si perducatur ad hoc ut faciat predicta secundum quod opportet per aliquam assuefacionem vel per transmutacionem etatis vel fortune, scilicet ut det quibus opportet, erit liberalis. Et hinc est quod prodigus non est pravus secundum id quod pertinet ad virtutem moralem, que respicit appetitum hominis; superhabundare enim in dando et non in accipiendo non videtur esse appetitus corrupti nec animi non virilis, sed magis videtur esse quedam insipiencia quam malicia. Ideo deterior est illiberalis prodigo. Tercio eciam probatur quia prodigus, licet inordinate det, multis tamen prodest in dando, eciam si sibi noceat quia perdit substanciam suam. Et hinc est quod vulgares homines cum aliquem prodigum laudant solent dicere, “Non est malus nisi sibi ipsi”.220 Illiberalis vero nec aliis prodest, quia non dat, nec sibi ipsi, quia non expendit prout opportet; multo ergo melior est prodigus illiberali.

Cap. 4 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m qͥ ntũ H 217

26 vero α autem Bβ

in parvis rebus quas ~ non curat accipere: from a critical point of view JO’s “quas” ought to be lectio facilior vs. ABβ’s “que”, but no grammatical sense can be extracted from the latter. It is certainly strange that four copyists should have made the same peculiar error; if it was in the archetype, it was careless; the sentence in Sent. Eth. iv.3.8 reads “Illiberalis autem e contrario […] superabundat in accipiendo, nisi forte in parvis quae illiberalis dat”, implying that rebus was an insertion and the author or his amanuensis forgot to change que; or it was an erasure but (t)he(y) forgot to change quas—but all our MSS read rebus.

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but excessive in receiving, except in small things he sometimes gives and does not care to receive. 2.4 [On liberality.] Chapter 4 Illiberality is more abject than prodigality, for three reasons. First, because prodigality is more curable, which comes to pass in two ways: firstly, because the more one approaches old age, the more prone one becomes to hoarding and not giving, which happens because riches are sought as a way of supporting human needs and the more needs a man feels, the more he wants support; since this affects old age, old men commonly incline not to give and prefer to hoard. And secondly, because superfluous giving leads to poverty and poverty hinders prodigality, both because it is impossible for a man who has nothing to give, by the jurists’ rule, “No one gives what he does not have”, and also through the experience of need, because superfluous giving makes the prodigal feel damage and by feeling it he is sometimes cured. Second, because the prodigal can very likely be led back to a virtuous mean by what he has in common with the generous man. The prodigal has the qualities of a generous man: he willingly gives and does not lightly receive. However, he differs from him because he does neither of these as he should; that is, according to right reason. If he can be guided to do the former for the correct ends by somehow getting into the habit of it or by a change brought on by age or fortune so that he starts to give to those he should, he will become liberal. The prodigal is not bad as regards moral virtue, which concerns a man’s appetite; to commit excess in giving and not in receiving does not seem the mark of a corrupt appetite or unmanly mind, but more a kind of foolishness than evil. Hence the ungenerous man is more abject than the prodigal. Third, it is proven by the fact that the prodigal, though he gives inordinately, does good to many by giving, even if he does damage to himself by wasting his means. This is why the common people, when they praise some prodigal, are accustomed to say, “He harms no one but himself”. The ungenerous man, on the other hand, does good neither to others, since he does not give, nor to himself, since he does not spend as he should; so the prodigal is much better than the illiberal man.

218 219

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Whatever happened, Cartagena cannot have meant to write rebus que; we relegate the variant to app. min. var. Deterior est illiberalitas: the chapter abbreviates Sent. Eth. iv.4, with two minor additions (next nn). regulam juristarum: Dig. l.17.54 (De diversis regulis iuris antiqui) “Nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet”, enshrined in most civil codes as the Nemo dat rule. vulgares ~ solent dicere: the example is added to EN 1121a28–30/Sent. Eth. iv.4.5. Despite

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Est tamen sciendum quod multi qui sunt prodigi secundum superfluam dacionem sunt eciam secundum aliquid illiberales, quia accipiunt unde non opportet; et sub hac mixtura prodigalitatis et illiberalitatis, prout communius, est major pars illorum quos prodigos reputamus. Videmus enim nonnullos qui expendunt sua et aliena, quod contingit duplici racione: primo, quia prodigi dando consumunt de facili sua, unde ad hoc quod implere possint voluntatem suam circa superfluas daciones et expensas coguntur aliunde inordinate acquirere que non habent; secundo, quia magis dant ex quadam concupiscencia dandi quam ex racione recta, ideo volunt dare sed non curant qualiter dent aut unde habeant quod dant. Hinc est quod accipiunt indifferenter undecumque. Contingit eciam interdum prodigos deficere in dando, quia cum prodigus non det propter bonum nec observet debitum modum in dando, evenit sepe quod dat malis hominibus quos opporteret pauperes esse quia diviciis male utuntur, et moderatis viris et virtuosis nichil dat; et superhabundat in dando adulatoribus, histrionibus, lenonibus, vel aliis qui eum qualitercumque delectant, quibus dare non deberet, et deficit a dando bonis viris quibus dare deberet. Et hinc est quod multi prodigorum sunt intemperati, quod contingit eis propter duo: primo, quia prodigus est facilis ad consumendum sua, ideo faciliter consumit in actibus intemperancie, ut pote in cibis vel venereis, a quibus multi retrahuntur timore expensarum; secundo, quia cum prodigus non ordinet vitam suam ad bonum honestum, consequens est quod declinet ad voluptates, quia ista duo, scilicet honestum et delectabile, sunt propter se appetibilia. Honestum est appetibile secundum appetitum racionalem, delectabile est appetibile secundum appetitum sensitivum; cum ergo prodigus non curet de honesto quod est appetibile appetitui racionali, faciliter declinat ad delectabile quod est appetibile appetitui sensitivo; et cum a prosecucione delectabilium non abstineat propter expensas, sequitur quod prodigus facilius fiet intemperatus quam alius. Ex supradictis concluditur quod si prodigus vult curari et ponit aliquam diligenciam in se ipsum emendando, de facili curabitur et perveniet ad medium quod est liberalitas, scilicet ut det et abstineat ab accipiendo secundum quod opportet. Sin autem negligit emendari, de facili fiet intemperatus, ut dictum est; et sic difficiliter sanabitur, quia intemperancia raro curatur, ut in materia temperancie diximus.

the attribution to vulgares homines it seems not to be a vernacular saying, merely a somewhat patronizing social observation.

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Nevertheless, we should know that many who are prodigal in superfluous giving are also in some way illiberal, since they accept from when where they should not. This mixture of prodigality and illiberality, as it is rather common, accounts for most of those we regard as prodigal, for we see not a few people who spend both their own and others’ money. This happens for two reasons: first, because prodigals soon use up their own by giving, and so to fulfil their will as regards superfluous giving and spending are constrained to get what they do not have improperly from elsewhere; second, because they give more out of some desire of giving than for any right reason, they want to give dare but do not care how they give or where they get what they give; hence they get without scruple, from anywhere. It also sometimes happens that the prodigal are deficient in giving, for as the prodigal man does neither gives for good ends nor observes due measure in giving, it often comes about that he gives to bad men who should be poor because the misuse the riches, while giving nothing to moderate and virtuous men; he gives in excess to flatterers, performers, pimps, or others who somehow give him pleasure to whom he ought not to give, and fails to give to good men to whom he should give. Hence many among the prodigal are intemperate, which happens to them for two reasons: first, because the prodigal is not troubled about using up his goods, he willingly spends on acts of intemperance, for example food or sex, from which many are deterred by fear of expense; second, because since the prodigal does not order his life for honest good, the consequence is that he falls into lustful pleasures, because these two, namely the honest and the pleasurable, are desirable in themselves. Honesty is desirable by the rational appetite, pleasure is desirable by the sensual appetite; so as the prodigal does not care about the honest which is desirable to the rational appetite, he easily falls into the pleasurable which is desirable to the sensual appetite. And since he does not withhold from pursuing pleasure because of the expense, it follows that the prodigal more easily becomes intemperate than anyone else. From the foregoing we may conclude that if the prodigal man wishes to be cured and exercises some effort to correct himself, he will easily be cured and achieve the mean which is liberality, namely to give and abstain from receiving in the fitting way. However, if he neglects to correct himself, he will easily become intemperate, as I have said; then it will be difficult for him to get better, because intemperance is rarely cured, as I said in the heading on temperance.

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Lib. 2 Cap. 5 [De liberalitate.] Capitulum quintum Illiberalitatis vicium insanabile est propter duo.221 Primo, quia vita humana et res humane ut plurimum tendunt ad defectum, et senectus et quelibet alia inpotencia vel defectus facit homines illiberales, quia videtur homini quod pluribus indigeat et ideo magis cupit res exteriores per quas subvenitur humane indigencie, et sic quanto magis declinat ad senectutem vel ad aliquem defectum, tanto illiberalior fit. Illa ergo racio que facit prodigum de facili sanabilem, eadem reddit illiberalem non de facili curabilem. Secundo, quia illud ad quod homo naturaliter inclinatur non de facili tollitur ab eo; magis autem inclinatur homo ad illiberalitatem quam ad prodigalitatem, quod patet quia plures inveniuntur amatores et conservatores peccuniarum quam datores, et quod naturale est in pluribus invenitur; natura enim inclinat ad amorem diviciarum in quantum per eas vita hominis conservatur. Difficiliter ergo curatur illiberalitas quia est quodammodo naturalis. Et quoniam illiberalitas consistit in defectu dacionis, quia non dans ut opportet et accipiens unde non opportet dicitur illiberalis, ideo sunt multi modi illiberalitatis. Aliqui sunt integre illiberales, quia deficiunt in dando et superhabundant in accipiendo, et ista est integralis illiberalitas. Alii vero sunt qui superhabundant in accipiendo sed non deficiunt in dando, ut de aliquibus prodigis dicebamus, et ista est illiberalitas parcialis, quia non peccant in utraque parte liberalitatis sed tantum in una, videlicet in superhabundancia accepcionis. Alii vero se habent econtra, quia deficiunt in dando, non tamen superhabundant in accipiendo; et ista eciam est illiberalitas parcialis, et vocantur isti parci seu tenaces, quia retinent ultra modum nec darent quicquam, eciam minimum sine recompensacione, sed tamen non appetunt aliena nec reciperent ea indebite, ut sunt aliqui mercatores, quos reputamus probos et veraces, qui non fraudarent nec venirent contra promissionem suam, sed tamen non darent unum obolum sine aliqua recompensacione nec reciperent monetam auream deficiente uno grano.222 Ad quod videntur induci duplici racione:

Cap. 5 tit. αB (A in marg. vi, sc. per inversionem foliorum; cf. ii.6, tit.), om. Q Capl̛m sextũ H Illiberalitatis add. autem Bβ 2 et senectus α senectus autem Bβ 221 222

1 post

Illiberalitatis vicium: a précis of Sent. Eth. iv.5, with four important added examples (nn222–225). ut sunt aliqui mercatores: a vivid everyday example from business (cf. n211, above) replaces an abstruse explanation of a recondite term at EN 1121b22 οἷον φειδωλοὶ γλίσχροι κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι/ Vet. interp. “puta parci, tenaces, kiminibiles”, Sent. Eth. iv.5.4 “tales appellantur parci, eo quod parum expendunt, et tenaces, a defectu dationis quasi multum retinentes; dicuntur etiam kyminibiles [κίμβιξ “skinflint” > κυμινοκίμβιξ, + κύμινον

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2.5 [On liberality.] Chapter 5 Illiberality is an incurable vice, for two reasons. First, because human life and human affairs tend on the whole towards defect, and old age and any other impotence or defect makes men ungenerous, because a man thinks he needs more and so longs for more external goods to subvent human need; and so the more he declines into old age or some defect, the more ungenerous he becomes. Hence the very reason that makes the prodigal easy to cure renders the ungenerous man not easy to cure. Second, because it is not easy to take away a man’s natural inclinations; but man is more inclined to illiberality than to prodigality, as is clear from the fact that more lovers and hoarders of commodities are to be found than givers, and what is natural occurs in more people; nature inclines us to love riches, inasmuch as they preserve human life. It is difficult to cure illiberality, therefore, because it is somehow natural. And because illiberality consists in a defect of giving, as “ungenerous” is the name for someone who does not give as he should and receives from where he should not, there are many modes of illiberality. Some are entirely ungenerous, because they are deficient in giving and excessive in receiving; this is entire illiberality. There are others who practise excess in receiving but are not deficient in giving, as we were saying about some prodigals; this is partial illiberality, because they do not sin in both parts of liberality but only in one, namely excess of receiving. Others behave in the opposite way, because they are deficient in giving, but not excessive in receiving; this also is partial illiberality, and these are called stingy or miserly because they hoard beyond measure and would not give even the smallest thing without some recompense, yet do not covet other people’s goods and would not receive them illegitimately just as there are some merchants, for instance, whom we regard as respectable and truthful because they would not commit fraud or break their promise, but who nevertheless would neither give a single penny without some recompense nor accept a gold coin short of a single grain. They seem drawn to this by two

“cumin”], quasi ‘venditores cymini’, a quodam superexcessu tenacitatis, quia scilicet nec minimum aliquid darent absque recompensatione”; as John Donne put it (Sermon 63), “datores cyminibiles (as the canonists call them) that give mint and cumin for alms, a root that their hogs will not, a broth that their dogs will not eat”. The striking thing, however, is Cartagena’s careful parenthesis, “quos reputamus probos et veraces”; he does not damn merchants outright, as many might have, only “some” who are too penny-pinching (predictably, he makes no such concession to usurers, but see n224, below). A’s scribe got so carried away by this example that he wrote reputamos, in Spanish. grano: the smallest unit of weight, 1∕7000 lb. or 1∕4 carat.

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prima, propter quandam moderanciam morum, videlicet ne accipiendo ab aliis astringerentur quodammodo ad aliquid pravum operandum, et isti solent dicere, cum se excusant a defectu dandi, melius esse sua conservare quam aliena furari, quasi non sit medium inter hec, cum vir virtuosus et liberalis expendit recte sua sed non furatur aliena quia expendit et dat cum moderamine racionis; secunda, quia timent quod opporteat eos dare si accipiunt, non enim esset facile quod alii darent eis et ipsi nulli darent. Ideo nec dant nec accipiunt, ut nonnulli qui convivia recusant ne convivia parent, unde scriptum est, “Ad mensam magnam sedisti, scito quod talia te opportet preparare.”223 Quidam autem illiberales superhabundant in accepcione, ut dictum est, non curantes quid vel unde accipiant seu lucrentur, quorum quidam lucrantur de vilibus et servilibus operacionibus, alii de turpibus et illicitis, ut puta lenones vel similes, alii vero per improbam exaccionem, sicut usurarii qui saltem aliquid parvum volunt lucrari in aliquo multo quod dant vel mutuant; omnes enim predam accipiunt unde non opportet, scilicet de servilibus vel turpibus operacionibus, vel quantum non opportet, sicut usurarii qui accipiunt ultra sortem quam mutuarunt. Et ex hoc potest sumi quedam theorica ad determinandam mercurialem questionem juristarum qua queri solet an contractus usurarius sit viciosus ex natura rei et malicia convolutus, eciam si prohibitus aliqua lege non esset.224 Et recte determinandum est quod sic, et ultra multas et subtiles raciones eorum addi potest hec: omnis illiberalitas est vicium morale, sed usura est actus illiberalitatis, ut modo diximus, ergo usura est morale vicium, non ergo solummodo est usura illicita quia prohibita est, sed prohibita fuit quia illicita est. Ideo eciam si nulla lege divina vel humana prohiberetur, nichilominus viciosa et turpis esset.

31 esse ABβ est JO (suelen dezir ~ ‘Mejor es’ Mcast) Mcast) 223

224

38 post autem add. alii Bβ (otros algunos

ut nonnulli qui convivia recusant: Cartagena adds this striking—because banal—example (which β did not understand, app. min. var.) and pseudo-biblical text, unde scriptum est: Sir 31:12 “[de continentia] supra mensam magnam sedisti, non aperias super illam faucem tuam prior”; the second half of the phrase is from Prov 23:1–2 “quando sederis ut comedas cum principe diligenter adtende quae posita sunt ante faciem tuam […], si tamen habes in potestate animam tuam”, but translating instead LXX εἰδὼς ὅτι τοιαῦτά σε δεῖ παρασκευάσαι (Bible 2006), which was the version cited in August. Serm. 31 (PL xxxviii, col. 193), canon law texts, etc. quedam theorica ~ an contractus usurarius sit viciosus: this excursus on usury, explicitly called juridical, is Cartagena’s. The epithets “theoretical” and “mercurial” (see below) should not deceive us; like the next addition, this is in fact a vital step paving the way to Cartagena’s conclusion on liberality. His point is to make clear why usury is a moral as opposed to religious or criminal vice. That it was both the latter was self-evident, and Gui-

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reasons: first, by a certain moderateness of conduct, namely to avoid feeling somehow bound to commit some bad act by receiving from others, or as they usually say when excusing themselves for a defect in giving, better look after their own than steal from someone else, as if there were no mean between the two, as a virtuous and generous man spends his own rightly but does not steal from others because he spends and gives with rational moderation; second, because they are afraid if the receive they will have to give, as it would not be easy if others gave to them and they gave to no one. So they neither give nor take, like some who refuse banquets to avoid giving banquets, as it is written, “Are you seated at the table of the great? Know that you must prepare the like.” But some ungenerous men go to excess in receiving, as I have said, not caring what or from where they receive or profit; some of them make profits from low and servile activities, others from base and illegal ones, for instance pimps and such men, others again by vile exactions, like usurers who want to make at least a little something on any big thing they give or lend; all of them receive plunder from what they should not, namely servile or base activities, or an amount they should not, like usurers who get back with interest what they have lent. From this can be deduced some theories to settle the jurists’ textbook question, so often discussed, of whether a usurious contract is sinful by its nature and bound up with evil, even if it were not prohibited by some law. The correct answer is yes, and over and above their many subtle arguments one can add this one: all illiberality is a moral vice, but usury is an act of illiberality, as I have just said, therefore usury is a moral vice, therefore usury is not just unlawful because it is prohibited, but was prohibited because it is unlawful. So even if it were not prohibited by any divine or human law, it would still be sinful and base.

ral Ot spent a questio showing it was also “inhuman” (1500 iv qu. 20, f. 73), but the concern here is to portray it as “turpis”, i.e. low-class, which is why on this occasion he chooses to dismiss the jurists’ arguments as “subtleties” and not quote them (as at n113, above). mercurialem questionem: medieval “mercurial” referred not to a temperament but to Mercury’s role as patron of arts (Hor. Carm. ii.17.28 “Mercurialium [“scholarly”] custos virorum”) and specifically the three trivial arts (Alfonso x 1957–1961, i, 57 “en tod’ el trivio fue tan sabio este Mercurio que fallamos que a aquellas tres sciencias […] las llamaron los sabios ‘ministras mercuriales’ [Mercurialium ministrarum]”; Crónica troyana, c. 1490, BNE Mss/1733, f. 17v “las artes liberales […] que llamaron mercuriales”), hence “elementary” (Alfonso de Toledo, Invencionario, 1467, BNM Mss/9219, f. 125v “las reglas del Sesto [Sext.] a que llamamos ‘mercuriales’”), and here “trifling, illusory”. Mcast puts “la qüestión del miércoles”; maybe “Wednesday’s question” was equivalent vernacular jargon for a simplistic one?

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Isti ergo omnes qui se exponunt culpe et infamie gracia parvi lucri sunt proprie illiberales. Illi vero qui magna lucrantur et accipiunt unde non opportet vel que non opportet, sicut tyrampni qui predantur civitates et spoliant templa et maximas predas faciunt, possunt dici perniciosi in homines, impii in Deum, injusti et sacrilegi et transgressores legum; sed illiberales non sunt. Inconveniens enim esset dicere quod Hanibal vel similes dicerentur illiberales, quia illiberalitas importat quandam turpitudinem seu vilitatem que non competit magnis tyrampnis, licet deterius peccent.225 Dicuntur eciam illiberales aleatores qui lucrantur ex ludo taxillorum, quod patet quia turpiter lucrari volunt, nam ludunt cum amicis et vellent ab eis lucrari quibus esset conveniens dare. Latrones quoque et fures et sepulcrorum violatores et similes sunt injusti et avari, ut in materia justicie particularis diximus, et sunt eciam illiberales quia gracia lucri se exponunt infamie et magnis periculis, nam leges puniunt ista magnis penis. Omnes ergo accepciones hujusmodi sunt illiberales. Nominatur autem illiberalitas a privacione liberalitatis, quasi non liberalitas, quia pejus vicium magis opponitur virtuti; ideo illiberalitas, que est pejor prodigalitate ut dictum est, magis opponitur liberalitati, et quia per hoc vicium pluries corrumpitur liberalitas, nam magis inclinantur homines ad hoc vicium quod dicitur illiberalitas quam ad illud quod dicitur prodigalitas, ideo racionabiliter nominata est a privacione liberalitatis. Lib. 2 Cap. 6 De magnificencia. [Capitulum primum ] Conveniens est post liberalitatem tractare de magnificencia, quia magnificencia est quedam virtus circa peccunias, sicut et liberalitas.226 Sed inter eas est duplex differencia. Prima est quod liberalitas se extendit ad omnes operaciones que sunt circa peccunias, scilicet ad accepciones et daciones et expensas, sed magnificencia solum est circa expensas. Secunda differencia est quod in expensis magnificencia est solummodo circa magnas expensas, sicut ipsum nomen

56 spoliant αB expoliant β 64 sunt injusti α licet sint injusti B licet injusti sint β 65 et sunt αB sunt β Cap. 6 tit. O De magnificencia AJ, A in marg. v, per inversionem foliorum (cf. ii.5, tit.); om. BQ Capitulũ vij H 225

Hanibal vel similes: why Hannibal as an example of pernicious but liberal tyranny? He is never mentioned by Aquinas and Cartagena’s source is not revealed; a likely candidate (cf. n184) is Boccaccio, De casibus virorum illustrium v.10, who, following Livy xxi.4, described the Carthaginian general as “nostri orbis pestis ignisque validus”, “Romanorum hostis perpetuus”, yet still admired his “ingentia facta” and concluded, “quanto tetrius in finem venerit, tanto demonstra[vi]t clarius quae vires mortalium, quae Fortunae mobilitas”. Though deceptively off-hand, the exemplum is crucial: it drives home the distinctions of estate and class that govern MV ’s programme of virtue ethics and make it distinct from

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All these who expose themselves to blame and infamy for the sake of a little profit, then, are properly illiberal. Those who accept great profits and take from where they should not or what they should not, like tyrants who pillage cities and despoil temples and take huge plunder, may be called pernicious to men, impious toward God, unjust, sacrilegious, and lawbreakers; but they are not illiberal. It would be illogical to say that Hannibal or such men should be called ungenerous, because illiberality implies some baseness or lowness that does non fit great tyrants, however abjectly they sin. Illiberal is the name for gamblers who make profits from dice games, because they clearly want to make profit basely since they play with their friends and want to take profit from those they would do better to benefit. Likewise, robbers and thieves and desecrators of tombs and such men are unjust and avaricious, as I said in the heading on particular justice, and also illiberal because for the sake of gain they expose themselves to infamy and great dangers, for the laws punish these things with great penalties. All getting of these kinds is illiberal. Illiberality is named from the negation of liberality, non-liberality as it were, because the worse the vice the more it is opposed to the virtue; so illiberality, which is worse than prodigality as we have said, is more opposed to liberality. And because liberality is more often corrupted by this vice, for men are more inclined to this vice called illiberality than the one called prodigality, it is reasonably named from the negation of liberality. 2.6 On magnificence. [Chapter 1] After liberality it is convenient to treat magnificence, since magnificence is a virtue concerned with commodities, like liberality. But there are two differences between them. The first is that liberality extends to all the activities to do with commodities, namely receiving and giving and spending, but magnificence is concerned only with spending. The second difference is that in spending magnificence is only concerned with great expenses, as its name implies,

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Aristotle’s. Despite the closeness of Cartagena’s chapter-by-chapter rendering of Aquinas’s five lectiones, this concluding paragraph in fact implies that for a royal addressee liberality is simply taken for granted, irrelevant; the true question is illiberality, which it would be “unseemly” (inconveniens) to impute to princely figures, even ones so tyrannous as Hannibal. A lord is by definition liberal; were he not, he would belong to the banausic and vulgar ranks (turpitudinem seu vilitatem, overtly social terms) of niggardly shop-keepers, usurers, pimps, hustlers, and tomb-robbers. de magnificencia: μεγαλοπρεπεία is discussed at EN 1122a18–1123a33; Cartagena here guts Sent. Eth. iv.6.1–5, and the remainder of the lectio in ii.7.

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demonstrat, sed liberalitas potest esse eciam circa moderatas vel modicas. Nec est intelligendum quod magnitudo expensarum importet excessum in magnifico, scilicet quod magnificus faciat magnos sumptus taliter quod excedat racionem; sed magnitudo sumptuum magnifici est decens considerata persona facientis et qualitate operis in quo fiunt. Magnitudo enim expensarum est accipienda per respectum ad aliquid aliud, puta ad id in quo fiunt expense et ad personam expendentis, quia sumptus qui esset magnus alicui privato non est magnus principi, nec expense que essent magne pro edificacione domus private sunt magne in edificacione domus regie. Sic in aliis dissimilibus personis et dissimilibus operibus; ille vero qui expendit in rebus parvis vel eciam moderatis secundum quod dignum est non dicitur magnificus, dato quod multociens divisim expenderet multa in parvis rebus ita quod omnes ille expense congregate facerent aliquid tantum quantum est illud quod expendit magnificus, eciam si hoc faciat prompte et liberaliter, quia magnificencia denotat magnos sumptus, ut nomen sonat.227 Omnis ergo magnificus est liberalis, sed non omnis liberalis est magnificus, nam liberalitas est tanquam genus et magnificencia species; quia nichil aliud est magnificencia quam quedam magnitudo liberalitatis. Sunt autem magnificencie duo vicia opposita secundum defectum et superhabundanciam. Vicium quod opponitur ei per modum defectus vocatur parvificencia, quod vero opponitur ei per modum superhabundancie vocatur Grece banausia, a banos, quod est fornax, quia isti quasi in fornace omnia sua consumunt; vocatur eciam apirocalia, quasi sine experiencia boni, quia isti inexperti sunt qualiter opporteat bonum operari.228 Et non est intelligenda ista superhabundancia in magnitudine expensarum circa que opportet expendere, quia isti in hoc non excedunt magnificum, sed superhabundant in hoc quia faciunt magnos sumptus cum quadam preclaritate in quibus non opportet et sicut non opportet. Et hinc est quod medium et extrema in virtutibus moralibus non accipiuntur secundum quantitatem rei absolutam, sed per respectum ad racionem rectam. Nec enim dicitur superhabundancia si expendatur maxima quantitas peccunie, sed si exceditur racio; nam et magnificus maximas expensas faciet, tamen secundum mensuram recte racionis, ut infra dicetur.

17 dato quod α eciam si Bβ (aun si Mcast; n227, infra) Bβ (bien Mcast) 227

26 vero α autem Bβ

29 bonum α bene

dato quod: at first sight Bβ’s “eciam si” looks better, but it is lectio facilior—it leaves us with no explanation for α’s “dato quod”, and eciam si is repeated two lines below. Cartagena is quoting Sent. Eth. iv.6.4 “non dicitur magnificus; puta si multoties divisim expenderet […], nihilominus tamen magnificus non diceretur, etsi prompte et liberaliter”; this makes clear that “dato quod” + impf. subj. means “even granting he may spend”, the obscurity being due to omission of “nihilominus non diceretur”. Mcast is thus correct for both (app. crit.).

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but liberality can be about moderate or minor spending. We should not understand this to mean that the magnitude of the expenses implies excess in the magnificent man; that is, that the magnificent man makes great outlays to the extent of exceeding reason; the magnitude of the magnificent man’s outlay is suitable considering the person of the spender and the quality of the work on which it is spent. For the greatness of expenses is to be interpreted in respect of something else, namely against the object of the spending and the person of the spender, since an outlay which would be great for some private individual is not great for a prince, nor are costs that would be great for the construction of a private house great for the construction of a royal palace. And so it is with other dissimilar persons and dissimilar works; he who spends worthily on small or even moderate things is not called magnificent, even granting that the many sums he might spend on many separate occasions on small things, if all these expenses were added together, could come to a sum equal to what the magnificent man spends, and even if he does so readily et generously; because magnificence denotes great outlays, as the name suggests. Every magnificent man is generous, then, but not every generous man is magnificent, for liberality is as it were the genus, magnificence a species; magnificence is nothing other than a certain magnitude of liberality. There are two vices opposed to magnificence, by defect and excess. Its opposing vice by defect is named niggardliness, its opposite by excess is called in Greek banausia [“vulgarity”], from banos “furnace”, because such men consume all their goods as if in a furnace; it is also named apirocalia, [“ignorance of the beautiful, tastelessness”], that is “without experience of good”, because they have no experience of how one should exercise good. But this excess is not to be understood as consisting in the magnitude of expenditure on things one should spend on, because these men do not exceed the magnificent man in this; they commit excess because they spend greatly and with a degree of excellence on things they should not and in a way they should not. Hence the mean and the extremes in moral virtues are not to be understood as referring to the absolute quantity of things, but in respect to right reason. It is called excess not when a very great quantity of money is spent, but when it exceeds reason; for the magnificent man also spends the greatest sums, but according to the measure of right reason, as will be explained below. 228

banausia ~ apirocalia: EN 1122a30–22 ἡ μὲν ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια καλεῖται, ἡ δ᾽ ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία/Sent. Eth. ii.8 “vocatur apyrocalia ab a quod est ‘sine’ et pyros quod est ‘experientia’ et calos quod est ‘bonum’, quasi ‘sine experientia boni’; […] banausia a banos [βαῦνος] quod est ‘fornax’, quia scilicet ad modum fornacis omnia consumunt”. Such etymologies were given in Gk commentaries (e.g. Aspasius ad loc. ἐλήλυθε δὲ τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς πῦρ ἐργαζομένων· ‘βαύνους’ γὰρ ἐκάλουν τὰς καμίνους, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ πάντας τοὺς

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Lib. 2 Cap. 7 [De magnificencia.] Capitulum secundum Sunt sex proprietates magnifici.229 Prima, quod cognoscit proporcionem expensarum ad id in quo fiunt expense; potest enim magnificus ex virtute habitus sui considerare quid deceat expendere, et sic facit magnas expensas prudenter, quia ad omnem virtutem moralem requiritur quod prudenter operetur, ut in materia prudencie dictum est. Opportet ergo quod opus in quo fiunt expense sit tale quod sit dignum eis, et quod expense proporcionentur operi vel superhabundent, nam quia difficillimum est attingere medium, ideo si contingat declinare a medio semper virtus declinat in illam partem que minus habet de malo, sicut fortis si declinat a medio declinabit ad minus timendum, liberalis ad plus dandum; sic magnificus ad plus expendendum. Secunda, quod magnificus expendit talia magna et decentia propter bonum honestum sicut propter finem; nam hoc est commune omnibus virtutibus. Qui ergo propter famam hoc facit est similis magnifico, sed non est proprie magnificus, ut simile in fortitudine diximus. Tercia, quod expendit magna et decentia delectabiliter et prompte et sine difficultate et cum parva diligencia raciocinii, nam magna raciocinii diligencia pertinet ad parvificenciam. Quarta, quod magnificus magis intendit qualiter faciat opus decentissimum et optimum quam quomodo faciat cum minoribus expensis. Quinta, quod est liberalis, nam neccessarium est quod magnificus sit liberalis, quia ad liberalem pertinet expendere que opportet et sicut opportet, et hoc eciam magnificus facit, nam expendit circa magna et decentia opera, et hoc facit delectabiliter et prompte et propter bonum; sed tamen proprie pertinet ad magnificum ut circa ista faciat aliquod magnum; et sic magnificencia est quedam magnitudo liberalitatis, ut dictum est, et utitur liberalitate circa magna. Sexta, quod magnificus cum equalibus sumptibus faciet opus admirabilius et magis magnificum, nam cum intencio principalis sua sit circa magnitudinem operis et excellenciam ejus, consequens est ut faciat opus excellencius et preclarius quam alius qui non sit magnificus.

Cap. 7 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m octauũ H 1 Sunt α Sunt autem Bβ 11 expendit αB -det β (EN 1122b7 δαπανήσει/Sent. Eth. iv.6.7 “consumet”)

3 quid JO quod ABβ

χειροτέχνας, Heylbut 1889–1892, i, 104) and Byzantine lexica (Gaisford 1848, 187); for Cartagena they were mere superstition (n177). Not a word was understood; the copyists had a hard time (app. min. var.).

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2.7 [On magnificence.] Chapter 2 There are six properties of the magnificent man. First, that he recognizes the proportionate expense for the object of the spending; from the virtue of his disposition the magnificent man is able to calculate what he should spend and so makes his great expenditure prudently, because every moral virtue requires that it be exercised with practical wisdom, as was explained in the heading on prudence. The work on which the expenditure is made must be of a sort worthy of it, and the expense must be proportionate to the work or greater, for since it is very difficult to attain the mean, when virtue chances to deviate from the mean it always inclines to the side of the lesser evil; so if the courageous man deviates from the mean he will incline to fearing less, the liberal to giving more, and the magnificent to spending more. Second, that the magnificent man spends these great and appropriate amounts for some honest good as its end, for this is common to all the virtues. The man who does this for fame is similar to a magnificent man, but is not properly magnificent, much as we said about fortitude. Third, that he spends great and appropriate amounts pleasurably and readily and without difficulty and with little concern for calculation, for great concern for calculation is a sign of niggardliness. Fourth, that the magnificent man gives more attention to how he can make the most appropriate and best work than to how to cut costs. Fifth, that he is generous, for it is necessary the magnificent man be generous, as it pertains to the generous man to spend what he should and how he should, and this the magnificent man also does, for he spends on great and appropriate works, and does this with pleasure and readily and for the good; but it also properly pertains to the magnificent man in this respect to do something great; so magnificence is a certain greatness of liberality, as I have said, and exercises liberality on great things. Sixth, that the magnificent man with equal expenditure will make a more admirable and more magnificent work, for since his principal aim is for the greatness and excellence of the work, it follows that he will make a work more excellent and outstanding than someone else who is not magnificent.

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Lib. 2 Cap. 8 [De magnificencia.] Capitulum tercium In illis facit magnos sumptus magnificus que sunt maxime honorabilia, et horum sunt duo genera. Primum est quod pertinet ad res divinas, ut hedificare ecclesias vel monasteria, donare aliqua magna pro cultu divino, et alia hujusmodi que conferunt ad augmentum et ornatum divini cultus.230 Secundum est quod fit per respectum ad bonum commune, ut si faceret aliquem magnum pontem qui prodest rei publice vel murum vel similia, vel si alicui committeretur officium a re publica et in exequucione officii multa expenderet propter bonum commune, ut si aliquis crearetur dux exercitus et ut bene gubernaret exercitum faceret magnos sumptus propter bonum communitatis.231 Ista enim et similia pertinent ad magnificenciam. Considerabit autem magnificus non solum illa in quibus expendit sed eciam personam suam, si est princeps vel privatus, nobilis aut ignobilis, et an habeat magnas possessiones vel parvas; opportet enim quod expense sint bene proporcionate tam condicioni persone quam diviciis, ita quod expense non solum deceant illud opus in quo fiunt sed eciam deceant personam facientis. Et hinc est quod pauper qui parvas divicias habet non potest esse magnificus, quia non habet tot ex quibus possit convenienter multa consumere, et si temptet expendere ultra posse suum non dicetur magnificus sed insipiens, quia facit hoc preter dignitatem et preter id quod fieri opportet, quod non pertinet ad virtutem magnificencie quia secundum virtutem omnia fiunt recte. Illos autem decet facere tales sumptus qui habent magnas divicias, sive a progenitoribus suis vel alias per industriam suam acquisierunt, et qui secundum qualitatem persone hoc facere debent ut nobiles genere et in magnis honoribus constituti, nam isti habent in se quandam magnitudinem et dignitatem. Ideo ista proprie decent eos qui sunt magni et excellentes genere vel honore seu dignitate.

Cap. 8 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m ɩxͫ H 230

1 illis α illis autem Bβ

res divinas: EN 1122b19–1123a18/Sent. Eth. iv.7.1–13. Cartagena silently Christianizes (“ecclesias vel monasteria”) Arist.’s τὰ περὶ θεούς ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, whereas Aquinas explicitly announces the difference that divided Arist.’s gentile “demons” from God: Primum genus est eorum quae pertinent ad res divinas, puta cum aliqua donaria reponuntur in templis deorum, et praeparationes, puta templorum aedificia, vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Et etiam sacrificia [θυσίαι] ad idem pertinent; gentiles autem non solum colebant deos, idest quasdam substantias separatas, sed etiam colebant daemones [τὸ δαιμόνιον], quos dicebant esse medios inter deos et homines. […] Et loquitur hic Philosophus secundum consuetudinem gentilium, quae nunc manifestata veritate est abrogata; unde, si aliquis nunc circa cultum daemonum aliquid expenderet, non esset magnificus sed sacrilegus. (Sent. Eth. iv.7.1)

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2.8 [On magnificence.] Chapter 3 The magnificent man spends great sums on things that are most honourable, and these are of two kinds. The first concerns divine things, like building churches or monasteries, making great donations for divine services, and other things of this kind that contribute to the increase and ornament of divine worship. The second is anything done for the common good, for instance if he were to make some great bridge that benefits the commonwealth, or a town wall or something similar; or if someone were to be appointed to an office by the commonwealth and in the execution of the office were to spend great sums for the common good, for instance is someone were given command of the army and for the army’s good governance were to spend great sums for the good of the community. These and similar things belong to magnificence. However, the magnificent man will consider not only the object of his expenditure but also his own person, whether he is a prince or a private citizen, a noble or a commoner, and whether he has great or small possessions; for his expenses must be proportionate both to his status and his wealth, such that the expenditure not only befits the work on which it is employed but also the person who makes it. Hence a pauper who has small wealth cannot be magnificent, because he does not have enough to be able to spend a fitting amount, and were he to attempt spending more than he can, he will called not magnificent but foolish, because he does what is beyond his own worth and beyond what he should do, which does not belong to the virtue of magnificence because virtue demands that everything be done rightly. To spend such sums becomes those who have great riches, acquired either from their forebears or otherwise through their own industry, and who by the quality of their person ought to do this as nobles by birth and endowed with great honours, for these in themselves have a certain greatness and worth. So these things properly befit those who are great and excellent by birth or honour or rank.

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magnum pontem ~ vel similia: these acts of magnificence replace Arist.’s Athenian-style λῃτουργίαι of chorēgia (public choruses), paying for a trireme, or citizens’ symposia (EN 1122b23 οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἑστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν/Sent. Eth. iv.7.2 “aliquod officium […] a civitate, puta quod sit princeps trieris, id est exercitus navium vel galearum […], vel etiam quod convivium faciat toti civitati”). Geraldus Odonis, after a lengthy shot at clearing Arist. of demonism (“gentiles colebant plures deos […] quos vocabant universaliter demones, id est ‘peritos’ et ‘scientes’ […]; nunc autem apud modernos pro eodem habetur demon et cachodemon, quod communiter sonat in malum […]. Loquitur autem Philosophus secundum modum populi temporis sui, ipse namque unum solum Deum credidit, ut patet 8. Phisicorum & 12° Methaphisice”), does something similar, and is evidently Cartagena’s source (Guiral Ot 1500 iv.13, f. 75ra):

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Consistit ergo magnificencia, ut dictum est, circa res divinas vel communes seu publicas. Et licet circa hoc principaliter faciat magnos sumptus magnificus, secundario tamen faciet magnas expensas eciam in hiis que ad eum pertinent, si unum de tribus concurrat. Primo, si actus est talis qui semel accidit, ut pote si fiat miles vel nubat vel aliquem alium gradum assumat; quod intelligendum est si est talis actus qui secundum morem patrie fit cum sollempnitate, nam istum magnificus faciet sumptuosiorem et excellentiorem quam alius qui magnificus non sit.232 Secundo, si tota civitas vel princeps civitatis studet ad aliquid faciendum, ut si volunt recipere aliquem extraneum principem vel mittere ei aliqua dona, tunc magnificus tam in recipiendo hospites extraneos quam in mittendo dona principi et in aliis similibus actibus ad quos aliquando tota communitas studet se habebit sumptuosius et largius quam non magnifici, quia ista sunt quodammodo similia rebus divinis; nam sicut Deo offerimus dona non quia egeat eis “quoniam”, ut scriptum est, “bonorum nostrorum non eget”, sed propter reverenciam divine magestatis, sic principibus et magnis viris interdum offeruntur aliqua munera non propter indigenciam sed in signum excellencie sue.233 Tercio, si hoc tendit ad preparacionem domus sue; nam ad magnifi39 quoniam Aβ quia JOB | nostrorum ABβ meorum JO (cf. Ps 15:2, n233)

232

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sunt etiam honorabilia humana communia, puta si alicubi pro bellica preparatione vel pro ponte vel hospitali vel pro quocumque magno rei publice commodo oporteat largiri et contribuere […], vel esse trieris principem pro communitate, in cuius ingressu debeat ipse princeps magnifice festinare commilitones suos, vel etiam convivare civitatem in regressu cum de spoliis hostium fuerit ditatus abunde. This, however, intends merely to give an anachronistic explication of the text, whereas Cartagena elides Arist.’s words altogether to make way for acts directly relevant to his audience. Since he does the same above (n230) and thrice more below, along with a gratuitous biblical text (nn232–234), the design is palpable. si fiat miles ~ vel aliquem alium gradum assumat: EN 1123a1 τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον (Vet. interp. “puta nupcie et si quid tale”)/Sent. Eth. iv.7.8 “quae semel tantum fiunt, puta nuptiae, militia et si aliquid tale est”. Arist. naturally does not mention military service among the one-off occasions for lavish display; it was Aquinas’s addition, and Geraldus who clarified “acceptio militie” (loc. cit., f. 75rb). By taking militia as “knighthood” and developing this last hint into a specific reference to the ceremony of investiture, then changing anodyne aliquid tale into “taking some other rank”, Cartagena overtly modernizes (i.e. medievalizes) his message for, as he puts it above, “nobiles genere et in magnis honoribus constituti”. recipere aliquem extraneum principem vel mittere ei aliqua dona: Arist. says ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς (1123a2–3), which refers to diplomacy, on the face of it a topic specially attractive in the circumstances of MV ’s composition; but by converting it into receiving not ambassadors but a foreign princeps—picking up but making more concrete Sent. Eth. iv.7.9’s passing gloss, “honorifice suscipere aliquos extraneos, puta principes vel reges”—Cartagena transforms it into a reference to the medieval ceremonies of the royal entry. His source was perhaps again Guiral Ot 1500, f. 75rb

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Magnificence therefore concerns, as I have said, divine or public state matters. The magnificent man makes great expenditure principally on this; nevertheless, he will secondarily spend great sums also on things pertaining to himself, if one of three things favours it. First, if the act is one that happens only once, for instance if he is knighted or marries or takes some other rank; that is, if it is the sort of act which according to the custom of his country is marked with solemnity, for such the magnificent man will celebrate more sumptuously and more excellently than someone who is not magnificent. Second, if the whole city or the prince of the city is eager to do something, for instance if they wish to receive some foreign prince or send him some gifts, then in receiving foreign guests or sending gifts to a prince or other such acts to which the whole community sometimes applies itself the magnificent man will behave more sumptuously and generously than those who are not magnificent, for these are somewhat similar to divine matters; just as we offer gifts to God not because he needs them, for it is written, “He has not need of our goods”, but out of reverence for His divine majesty, so princes and great men are sometimes offered certain tributes not for their needs but as a sign of their excellence. Third, if it has to do with the appointment of his house; it befits the magnificent man to

“puta si civitas vel rectores civitatis debeant facere solemnes susceptiones peregrinorum magnatorum, sicut fiunt in adventu novo regum vel aliorum principum”. Nevertheless it was Aquinas who provided the defining addition, the parallel with divine honours: “aliquid simile cum his quae Deo consecrantur, […] non quia eis Deus indigeat, sed propter reverentiam”. By inserting a biblical text at this point, ut scriptum est: Ps 15:2 “Dominus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges”, Cartagena contrives to associate Aquinas’s merely expository following comment, “et magnis viris […] magis propter honorem quam propter indigentiam”—Cartagena changes honor to excellencia and inserts yet another reference to principibus—with the ancient and medieval “political theology” of sacral kingship. The idea of deifying rulers would by no means have struck Arist. as strange, but theories of unction, the royal touch, divine right, etc. were rigorously rejected in Iberia— indeed, though Cartagena makes implicit parallels between God and prince, he never says or implies that the prince is sacred. The point is more indirect; canonists and civilists used this same nexus of ideas to develop theories about the king’s body politic and the community that, while shaping late medieval political theories of nation, consensus, and the delegate aspect of kingly power (so contesting Ulpian’s adage princeps legibus solutus, Dig. i.3.31: Kantorowicz 1957, and for aspects directly treated by Cartagena, Lawrance 2013), led paradoxically, specially in Spain, to what Nieto Soria (1994, 188) calls “la definición de una fórmula de relación Dios-rey-reino, la atribución de una dimensión sagrada a la concepción del poder regio” (see also Nieto Soria 1987, 1992b; Burns 1992, Chap. 4 “The Shaping of Absolutism: Spain”, pp. 71–96; for the connexion with royal entries and reception of embassies, Nieto Soria 1992b, pp. 19–24). Thus Cartagena’s reformulations in this chapter, however slight and even if not consciously intended to suggest an overt link with sacral regalism, are highly revealing.

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cum pertinet habere decentem domum, quia hoc decet ad ornatum hominis. In edificiis vero faciendis magis intendet magnificus circa illa que sunt permanentia et diuturna quam circa aliquos ornatus fragiles; potius enim expendet ut faciat columpnas marmoreas quam fenestras vitreas, quia ista permanentia et diuturna sunt optima circa que intendit magnificus. Licet ergo magnificencia principaliter consistit circa res divinas et publicas, secundario tamen est circa illa que ad privatas personas pertinent si concurrit unum de tribus supradictis. Observabit autem magnificus debitam proporcionem sumptuum ad ea in quibus expendit, quia in singulis expendet id quod decet secundum qualitatem operis; manifestum est enim quod non congruit idem diversis operibus, aliud namque est congruum exhibere Deo, aliud hominibus, ideo alia structura debet fieri in ecclesia, alia in sepulcro vel in alio opere parvo.234 Sed tamen quodcumque opus sit, operabitur illud magnificus magnificentissimum in genere suo, in quo faciet sumptus secundum operis dignitatem. Tale enim factum quod in genere suo est magnum et habet sumptus convenientes non est de facili superabile, et hoc pertinet ad magnificum, facere opera que faciliter non possint superari. Lib. 2 Cap. 9 [De magnificencia.] Capitulum quartum Superhabundans qui vocatur banausus quasi in fornace consumens sua excedit magnificum non quidem in absoluta quantitate sumptuum, nam in hoc non exceditur magnificus, sed in expendendo preter id quod opportet, quia in superfluis sumptibus multa consumit et vult facere splendidos sumptus sine melodia, id est sine debita proporcione, ut sunt illi qui faciunt magna et nupcialia convivia histrionibus et comedis et donant eis multa et cooperiunt viam per quam transire debent purpura, sicut fertur de quibusdam civibus Grecie qui appellabantur Megares.235 Omnia hec et similia facit banausus non propter ali44 vero α autem Bβ | intendet Aβ intendit JOB (más mira Mcast) 45 expendet Aβ expendit JOB 46 ista permanentia om. β 48 est α est eciam Bβ 49 illa ABβ illas JO 53 namque α enim Bβ 56 enim αB autem β (enpero Mcast) Cap. 9 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m vıɩͫ H, corr. xm manus altera 234

235

aliud ~ Deo, aliud hominibus: EN 1123a9–10 ἐν ἑκάστοις τὸ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἁρμόζει θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ᾽ ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ/Sent. Eth. iv.7.12 “Manifestum est enim quod non idem […] congruit exhibere diis et hominibus, neque in templo et sepulcro construendo”. What a difference a letter makes! Deo for diis Christianizes; ecclesia for templum (used × 5 elsewhere) closes the circle and adds the touch of real life. sine melodia: the discussion closes with βαναυσία and μικροπρέπεια, EN 1123a19–34/Sent. Eth. iv.7.14–16, starting ὁ δ᾽ ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάναυσος […] πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἑστιῶν, καὶ κωμῳδοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαροῖ/ “vult splendidos sumptus facere praeter melodiam, idest praeter debitam proportionem (quod parabolice sive metaphorice dictum est), puta quia facit

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have a decent home, for this becomes his splendour. In building, however, the magnificent man will attend more to permanent and lasting structures than a few fragile ornaments; he will rather spend on the constructions of marble columns than glass windows, for these permanent and lasting things best fit the magnificent man’s intent. Although magnificence principally concerns divine and public matters, then, it is also secondarily about things pertaining to private persons if one of the three aforesaid conditions obtains. The magnificent man will also take due care to make his expenditure proportionate to the things on which he spends, spending decently on each one according to the quality of the work; for it is obvious that different works do not merit the same outlay; one thing is fitting to offer to God, another to men, so one structure is required for a church, another for a tomb or other small work. Whatever the work, however, the magnificent man will make it the most magnificent of its kind and will spend on it in keeping with the worthiness of the work. Anything made to be great of its kind and at fitting expense is hard to better, and this is the magnificent man’s character: to make works that cannot easily be outdone. 2.9 [On magnificence.] Chapter 4 The man who commits the excess of banausia, so to speak burning up his goods in a furnace, exceeds the magnificent man not indeed in absolute quantity of expenditure, for in that he does not exceed the magnificent man, but in spending beyond what he should. He wastes great amounts on superfluous expenditure and likes to spend lavishly to no tune, that is, without due proportion. Such are those who put on great nuptial banquets with performers and comedians, paying them great sums and covering the road where they must pass with purple, as they tell of certain citizens of Greece called the Megarians. The

nuptialia convivia histrionibus et comoedis, idest repraesentatoribus, multa tribuit et viam cooperit purpura, sicut faciunt Megares, qui erant quidam cives Graeciae.” It is striking that Cartagena chose to keep the meaningless reference to Megarian red carpet and weird Graecism melodia “due proportion”, when he was about to insert a long interpolation from canon law; this can only be explained by his love of outlandish words. Melodia was common enough in the vernacular as a musical term, perhaps already with the vulg. change of stress to -ía (corde × 81 pre-1500), but in a metaphorical sense rare (n42); cf. Cartagena’s mystic reflection on “cánticos non materiales mas spirituales de los ángeles”, Apología sobre el psalmo «Júzgame, Dios», 5° verso [= Ps 43/Vulg. 42:4] “a la cítola instrumental e material responda la harpa, cítola, e melodia de la puridad, limpieza del coraçón […] la melodia e concordia de nuestros pensamientos e deseos entrañales” (Cartagena 1487, sign. k7v; the first phrase and e concordia lacking in the Lat. original, BNE Vitr/18/3, f. 13v–14r).

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quod bonum sed solum ad ostentandum divicias, quia per hoc existimat quod habebitur in admiracione, unde Augustinus ait, “Donare res suas histrionibus vicium immane est, non virtus; et scitis de talibus quam sit frequens fama cum laude, ‘quia laudatur peccator in desideriis anime sue et qui iniqua egerit benedicitur’” (Distinccione octoagesima sexta, c. Donare), quod intelligendum est, cum “causa vane glorie pro exercicio sui vicii” donatur, non cum neccessitati eorum succurritur, nam licet “vicium fovendum non est, natura sustentanda est”, ut ibidem decretiste notant.236 Non tamen expendit banausus superflue ubique, sed quandoque deficit, quia ubi opporteret multa expendere ibi expendit pauca, et econtra ubi deberet expendere pauca expendit multa, quia non tendit ad bonum sed ad vanitatem. Parvificus est qui circa omnia deficit, et sunt quinque proprietates ejus. Prima, quod ut excuset expendere modicum perdit magnas expensas quas fecit, ut faciunt nonnulli qui cum aliquod magnum opus fecerint propter parvas expensas que requiruntur ad pulcritudinem et perfeccionem ejus dimittunt opus non bene factum. Secunda, quod expendit cum quadam timiditate illa que eum in sumptibus opportet expendere. Tercia, quod semper intendit qualiter possit minorem quantitatem expendere. Quarta, quod expendit cum tristicia. Quinta, quod reputat se omnia majora facere quam opporteret, videtur enim ei quod minus deberet expendere. Ista autem duo, scilicet superhabundancia que dicitur banausia et defectus qui dicitur parvificencia, sunt quidem malicie seu vicia propter hoc quod contrariantur virtuti et recedunt a medio; non tamen sunt opprobriosa, quia non inferunt aliquod nocumentum proximis, nec sunt multum turpia, quia difficile est in magnis sumptibus non recedere a medio. Sed inter se deterior videtur banausia quam parvificencia, quia parvificus facit illa que facit magnificus, licet non complete nec ut opportet, banausus vero non facit illa que facit magnificus quia non expendit circa materiam magnifici sed in aliis vanis ut ostentet divicias suas; ideo quia dissimilior est magnifico deterior est, nec obstat quod diximus in materia liberalitatis quod illiberalis est deterior prodigo, quia non est similis comparacio secundum bonitatem et maliciam parvificencie ad banau-

35 ut ABβ (segund conviene Mcast) ubi JO 236

decretiste notant: Decretum D.86.7 and commentators, Glossa ord. i, 545 ad loc. b-Talibus. The verse “Quia laudatur peccator ~ benedicitur” is from HB Ps 10:3 ‫ִכּי־ִה ֵ֣לּל ָ֭רָשׁע ַﬠל־ַתֲּאַ֣ות‬ ‫( ַנְפ֑שׁוֹ וּבֹ ֵ֥צ ַע ֵ֝בּ ֵ֗רְך ֘ ִנֵ֥אץ ְיה ָֽוה׃‬NRSV “For the wicked boast of the desires of their heart, those

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banausic or vulgarly ostentatious man does all this kind of thing not for some good but solely to show off his riches, because he thinks that by this he will be held in wonder; as Augustine says, “To give away one’s goods to performers is a monstrous vice, not a virtue, and you know how often such men are famed and praised, ‘For the wicked are praised for the desires of their heart, those greedy for gain are blessed’” (D.86.7 Donare), by which we are to understand, when they are given “cause for vainglory about the exercise of their vice”, not when they are given wages to alleviate their poverty, for although “vice is not to be fostered, nature must be sustained”, as the decretists note in the same place. The banausic man does not spend superfluously in all cases, however; occasionally he is deficient, because where he should spend much he spends little, and on the contrary where he should spend little he spends much, because he aims not at the good but at vanity. The niggardly man is one who is deficient in every respect, and he has five properties. First, to avoid spending a modest amount he loses great sums he has already spent, as a few do when, having made some great work, they finish it badly to save the minor expense required to beautify and perfect it. Second, he spends what he has to spend with a certain timidity. Third, he always looks for ways to spend as little as possible. Fourth, he feels grief at spending. Fifth, he thinks he does everything in greater style than should be needful, as it seems to him he ought to spend less. These two, then, namely the excess called banausia and the defect called niggardliness, are certainly evils or vices insofar as they are opposed to virtue and depart from the mean; but they are not ignominious, because they do not cause harm to one’s neighbours, nor are they very base, because in great expenditure it is hard not to depart from the mean. However, of the two banausia seems more abject than niggardliness, because the niggardly man does what the magnificent man does, just not completely and not as he should, whereas the vulgarly ostentatious man does not do what the magnificent man does because he does not spend on matters of magnificence but on other vain things to show off his wealth; so as he is more dissimilar to the magnificent man he is more abject. What I said in the heading on liberality to the effect that the ungenerous man is more abject than the prodigal is no objection to this, because in terms of goodness and badness the comparison between niggardliness and banausia is not

greedy for gain curse and renounce the Lord”), which is absent from the modern Vulg. but was formerly included at Ps 9:24.

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siam et illiberalitatis ad prodigalitatem.237 Racio hujus est quia illiberalis non dat quod opportet, parvificus vero dat quod opportet sed non quantum opportet, et illiberalis accipit unde non opportet, parvificus vero non culpatur in hoc. Deterior ergo est banausus. Quod intelligendum est, nisi parvificus esset eciam illiberalis, nam tunc secundum illiberalitatem diceretur deterior; sed nos loquimur de parvifico in quantum parvificus est. Lib. 2 Cap. 10 De magnanimitate. Capitulum primum Magnanimitas, ut ex nomine ejus apparet, est circa magna.238 Ille enim videtur esse magnanimus qui dignum seipsum extimat magnis, id est ut magna faciat et magna ei fiant, si tamen sit dignus; nam ille qui se dignificat magnis non secundum dignitatem, quia non est dignus eis, insipiens est, quia ad sapientem pertinet debitum ordinem in omnibus observare. Nullus autem magnanimus nec alius virtuosus est insipiens, quia virtus operatur secundum racionem rectam que pertinet ad prudenciam, ut in materia prudencie dictum est. Patet igitur quod magnanimus est ille qui magnis dignificat seipsum dignus existens. Cap. 10 tit. AJ Capitulum Primum O, om. BQ Capl̛m xȷͫ H 237

deterior videtur banausia: both Arist. and Aquinas end at the previous sentence (EN 1123a32–33 εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται κακίαι, οὐ μὴν ὀνείδη γ᾽ ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μήτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες/Sent. Eth. iv.7.16 “praedicti duo habitus sunt quidem malitiae […], non tamen sunt opprobriosi […] neque sunt multum turpes, eo quod difficile est in magnis sumptibus non recedere a medio”). Cartagena’s source for the addition is Geraldus, who dedicates two questiones to the highly relevant problems, “utrum sit nobilior [magnificentia] liberalitate” and “utrum parvificentia sit deterior quam banausia” (Guiral Ot 1500 iv qu. 22–23, f. 76r–v). The first makes an explicit link with the earlier discussion of why illiberalitas is worse than prodigalitas (mirrored by Cartagena’s “quod diximus in materia liberalitatis”, meaning ii.4–5) and concludes that magnificence is more “noble” than liberality because it operates “circa Deum, circa commune bonum, et circa alia supradicta opera insignia per que homo bene se habeat ad illa honorabilia bona […]; liberalitas vero non concernit magnitudinem”); the second argues that, despite the parvificus’s being more insanabilis than the banausus and loving money more than people, he is still less bad because parvificus autem facit quod oportet, faciens […] quod facit magnificus, quamvis aliter quia non complete nec ut oportet; […] quare banausus tanquam dissimilior magnifico videtur esse deterior, […] quia facit [pecunias] obsequi vanitati et superbie sue ostentans divitias suas; […] nisi forte dicatur quod [parvificus] reservat eas ex solo amore pecunie; tunc tamen non peccaret ut parvificus sed ut illiberalis et avarus, hoc autem loquimur de parvifico per se sumpto, sicut et Philosophus; quare banausus videtur deterior esse parvifico. Dicendum ergo ad primum quod non est similis comparatio secundum bonitatem et malitiam parvificentie ad banausiam et illiberalitatis ad prodigalitatem; quia illiberalis non dat quod oportet, parvificus vero dat quod oportet sed non quantum oportet, et illiberalis accipit unde non oportet, parvificus autem [non] (missing also in Guiral Ot 1482, sign. p9vb) inculpatur super isto peccato.

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the same as between illiberality and prodigality; the reason for this is that the illiberal man does not give what he should while the niggardly man gives what he should but not to a fitting amount, and the illiberal man takes from sources he should not while the niggardly man is not blameworthy of this. Therefore the vulgarly ostentatious man is more abject; that is, unless the niggardly man were also ungenerous, for then he would be called more abject on account of his illiberality, but we are speaking of the niggardly man to the extent that he is niggardly. 2.10 On magnanimity. Chapter 1 Magnanimity, as the name makes clear, is about great things. The man who is seen to be magnanimous is one who thinks himself worthy of great things; that is, of doing great things and having great things done to him, so long as he is worthy; for if he deems himself worthy of great things without any corresponding worthiness because he is not worthy of them, he is a fool, for the sign of the wise man is to observe due order in everything. No magnanimous nor any other virtuous man is foolish, because virtue operates according to right reason which pertains to prudence, as said in the heading on prudence. It is clear, therefore, that the magnanimous man is he who deems himself worthy of great

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Though Arist. and Aquinas regarded both extremes as innocuous, Cartagena clearly found it urgent to transcribe Geraldus’s argument condemning vulgar ostentation as worse than parsimony. For the prince’s benefit he attempts uneasily to balance Christian distrust of magnificence against the growing emphasis on lavish display of regal power in fifteenthcentury politics, reflecting the drive towards sacralization and the rey exhibido (Nieto Soria 1992b; see nn232–233 above). Magnanimitas: μεγαλοψυχία “proper pride” (Ross) is treated at EN 1123a34–1125a35/Sent. Eth. iv.8–11. Cartagena’s seven ensuing chapters on the topic make it the axis and centrepiece of Bk ii and the second most important virtue in MV after justice. At 4461 words his treatment is nearly 3 · 5 times as long as Arist.’s (1285) and 88·6% the length of Aquinas’s four lectiones (5037); by contrast, his five chapters on liberality (3223) are less than twice the length of Arist. (1633) and only 63· 7 % of Aquinas’s five lectiones (5053), his four chapters on magnificence (1852 words) only 2 · 7 times Arist. (818) and 67·6% of Aquinas’s two lectiones (2740). In point of fact, Arist. and Aquinas spend more time on liberality than on magnificence; and if Cartagena’s section on justice is longer than this one (5562 words), it is only 24 · 3 % of Aquinas’s and actually shorter than Arist.’s (6589). Magnanimity was thus the virtue that most engaged Cartagena’s attention, reflecting his specific focus on princely action (Fernández Gallardo 2001, 124–126). As for the substance, Strauss (1981, 36) observes: “there is a close kinship between Aristotle’s justice and biblical justice, but Aristotle’s magnanimity, which means a man’s habitual claiming for himself great honors while he deserves these honors, is alien to the Bible”. Cartagena duly expounds Arist.’s view but is constantly aware of its implicit clash with divine law, its potential confusion with superbia “(improper) pride” (nn241–242, 246, 249, etc.); he finally confronts the problem in ii.16.

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Ille vero qui est dignus parvis et illis seipsum dignificat potest dici moderatus, sed non magnanimus, quia magnanimitas consistit in quadam magnitudine, ut nomen sonat, sicut dicimus de pulchritudine, nam illi qui sunt parvi possunt dici formosi propter decenciam coloris et debitam commensuracionem membrorum, non tamen dicuntur pulcri propter defectum magnitudinis, quia pulcritudo proprie consistit in corpore magno. Est reperire in magnanimitate duo extrema, videlicet superhabundanciam et defectum. Ille qui superhabundat quia extimat seipsum dignum magnis cum sit indignus vocatur Greco vocabulo kaymus, id est fumosus, et dicitur vulgariter ventosus seu presumptuosus; sed si esset dignus magnis et extimaret se dignum adhuc majoribus non semper dicitur kaymus, quia difficile est mensuram certam attingere ut aliquis non majoribus vel minoribus seipsum dignum existimet quam sit.239 Ille vero qui deficit quia reputat se dignum minoribus quam dignus sit vocatur pusillanimus, sive sit dignus magnis sive mediocribus sive parvis, dum tamen adhuc minoribus se ipsum dignificet; sed maxime vocatur pusillanimus ille qui est dignus magnis et recusat intendere eis et intendit aliquibus minoribus, quia multo magis iste ad parva se deiceret nisi esset magnis dignus.240 Consistit quippe magnanimitas, quantum ad magna quibus seipsum magnanimus dignificat, in extremo; sed in quantum hoc facit secundum quod opportet consistit in medio, quia seipsum dignificat magnis secundum suam dignitatem. Medium enim virtutis non attenditur secundum quantitatem rei sed secundum racionem rectam, quia quantumcumque magnum sit opus quod homo faciat, dummodo a racione recta non recedat, propter hoc non exceditur medium virtutis. Unde, licet aliquis se extimet dignum maximis honoribus, si tamen dignus sit non est viciosus, ymo magnanimus, sicut et ille qui magna et sumptuosissima opera facit dicitur magnificus si faciat ut opportet, ut in materia sua diximus. Viciosi autem dicuntur qui superhabundant et deficiunt ab eo quod opportet secundum rectitudinem racionis. 13 dicuntur α (son dichos Mcast) dicentur Bβ alibi, n240) 239

22 pusillanimus ABQ pusillanimis JOH (et varie

kaymus, id est fumosus: EN 1123b8–9 ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν ἀνάξιος ὢν χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος/Sent. Eth. iv.8.5 “ostendit quomodo circa magna se habeant opposita vitia; […] ille qui aestimat seipsum dignum magnis cum sit indignus vocatur chaymus, idest ‘fumosus’, quem possumus dicere ventosum vel praesumptuosum”. The derivation of χαῦνος “spongy, metaph. empty” (LSJ “χαυνότης, ητος, ἡ, porousness, sponginess, […] of snow, of foam. […] ii. metaph., empty conceit, vanity, ἀνοήτου ψυχῆς Pl. Tht.175b”) from καπνός “smoke” is patent rubbish, conceivably influenced by καπνοῦ σκιά “shadow of smoke; nonentity, trifle” and confused with καῦμα < καίω “burning heat” (Sent. Eth. ii.9.1 ad 1107b22–23 ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη: “chaumotes, ex eo quod ardet in his quae pertinent ad appetitum honoris, nam cauma ‘incendium’ dicitur; sed quia

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things when he is in fact worthy. The man who is worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them can be called moderate, but not magnanimous, because magnanimity is based on a certain greatness, as the name implies. We say much the same about beauty; those who are small may be called goodlooking for their comely complexion and neatly proportioned limbs, but they are not called beautiful because of their defective size, because beauty properly depends on a large body. There are two extremes to be found in magnanimity, excess and defect. The man who commits the excess of thinking himself worthy of great things when he is unworthy is called in Greek kaymus “fumy” [sic, for chaûnos “empty (-headed)”], or in common parlance a presumptuous windbag; but if he were to be worthy of great things and thought himself worthy of still greater, he is not always called kaymous, because it is hard to hit the exact measure and avoid thinking one is worthy of greater or lesser things than one is. On the other hand, he who commits the defect of considering himself worthy of less than he deserves is called pusillanimous, regardless of whether he be worthy of great, middling, or small things, just so long as he deems himself worthy of less; but the term is mostly reserved for one who is worthy of great things but refuses to aim at them and aims at something less, because he would aim much lower still if he were not worthy of great things. Magnanimity is indeed itself extreme regarding the great things of which the magnanimous man deems himself worthy, but insofar as he does this as he should, it represents the mean because he deems himself worthy of great things in line with his own worth. The mean of virtue is not measured by the quantity of the thing but by right reason, for however great the work a man makes, the mean is not exceeded so long as he does not depart from right reason. Hence even if someone thinks himself worthy of the greatest honours it is no vice so long as he is worthy; on the contrary, he is magnanimous, just as the man who makes great and very costly works is called magnificent if he makes them as he should, as explained in the heading on that. Vice, by contrast, we ascribe to those who exceed or fall short of what is fitting according to rational rectitude.

240

capnos in Graeco idem est quod ‘fumus’, potest etiam si sic scribatur chapnotes dici quasi ‘fumositas’ ”). DRAE s.v. humear “1. echar humo; […] 4. engreírse, presumir”, but fumoso, though well att. pre-1500 (corde × 33, cport × 1) meant just “smoky”, not “vain, bombastic”; so Cartagena adds “vulgariter ‘ventosus’ ”; cf. Boosco deleitoso c.105 “a cobiiça da honrra hé ventosa” (Campos 1515, sign. g5vb); Arcipreste de Talavera ii.9 “vanagloria ventosa”; Palencia 1490, s.vv. flabri “ventosos & fablistanes”, inflare “Inflatus hinchado, ventoso, vano & sobervioso”, leuis “ligero, hueco, ventoso, vano”. Mcast puts “finchado”. pusillanimus: EN 1123b9–10 ὁ δ᾽ ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος. Pusillanimis/-us are haphazardly distributed across the MSS and none is self-consistent (e.g. J writes -is both

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Lib. 2 Cap. 11 [De magnanimitate.] Capitulum secundum Magnanimitas est circa honores; nam cum magnanimus seipsum dignificet magnis bonis, et inter humana bona exteriora maximum est honor (quod patet, nam Deo exhibemus honorem quia non est aliquid majus quod ei possimus exhibere, et videmus eciam quod hii qui in dignitatibus sunt maxime desiderant honorem, et virtuosis honor datur in premium quia homines nil melius habent quod dent), est ergo circa hoc magnanimitas. Magnanimus enim maxime dignificat seipsum honore, tamen secundum dignitatem suam quia dignus est. Pusillanimus deficit per respectum ad se, quia dignificat seipsum minoribus honoribus quam dignus sit, et eciam per respectum ad dignitatem magnanimi, quia dignificat se ipsum minoribus quam magnanimus sit dignus. Kaymus, id est presumptuosus, superhabundat autem per respectum ad seipsum, quia dignificat se majoribus quam sit dignus, non tamen superhabundat per respectum ad magnanimum, quia non dignificat se majoribus quam magnanimus sit dignus, nam illud difficile esset cum magnanimus sit dignus maximis, ut dictum est. Neccessarium est autem ut magnanimus sit optimus in aliis virtutibus, quia cum dignificet seipsum maximis bonis dignus existens, et majori bono semper melior sit dignus, consequens est quod ille qui maximis bonis dignus est optimus sit. Pertinet quidem ad magnanimum magnum operari in quacumque virtute, puta in fortitudine maximum actum fortitudinis agere; nam cum sit dignus maximo honore, sequitur quod agat maximos actus virtutum, alias non esset eo dignus. Est autem magnanimus humilis et docilis, nec spernit admonicionem corrigentis, quia ut ait Salomon, “Viro qui corripientem se dura cervice contempnit, repentinus ei superveniet interitus et eum sanitas non sequetur”

Cap. 11 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m duodecimũ H

3–4 possimus α possumus Bβ

times here, but corrects the second to -us), so what Cartagena wrote is uncertain. We select -us because it was Aquinas’s form (Sent. Eth. iv.8.5, etc.) and is commoner overall (Mcast “pusilánimo”), but both branches read pl. -es at 15 45, and α gen. -is at 16 75. Such variants might imply that pusillanimus was recognized as a barbarism by some, but seen in this context as a conscious scholastic coinage to make the word match magnanimus, in parallel with Gk μεγαλό-/μικρό-ψυχος.

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2.11 [On magnanimity.] Chapter 2 Magnanimity is about honours; for since the magnanimous man deems himself worthy of great goods, and of external human goods the greatest is honour (as is clear from the fact that we show honour to God because there is no greater thing we can offer him, and we also see that men of rank most desire honour, and honour is the prize given to the virtuous because men have nothing better to give), magnanimity is about this. The magnanimous man most deems himself worthy of honour, yet according to his worth, because he is worthy. The pusillanimous man errs by defect in regard to himself, because he deems himself worthy of lesser honours than he deserves, and also in regard to the dignity of the magnanimous, because he deems himself worthy of less than a magnanimous man deserves. The kaymous or presumptuous man, by contrast, errs by excess in regard to himself, because he deems himself worthy of greater honours than he deserves, but does not err by excess in regard to the magnanimous man because he does not deem himself worthy of greater [honours] than the magnanimous man deserves; for that would be difficult given that the magnanimous man deserves the greatest things, as I have said. All the same, it is necessary for the magnanimous man to be best in other virtues, for since he both deems himself and is worthy of the greatest goods, and the better is always worthy of greater good, it follows that the man worthy of the greatest goods is the best, and so it pertains to the magnanimous man to show greatness in every virtue, for instance in fortitude to perform the greatest act of fortitude; for since he is worthy of the greatest honour, it follows that he will perform the greatest acts in all virtues, otherwise he would not be worthy. Yet the magnanimous man is humble and amenable and does not spurn the reproof of a critic, for as Solomon says, “One who is reproved, yet remains stubborn, will suddenly be broken beyond healing” (Prov 29). Nor is it the act of a

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(Proverbiorum vicesimo nono).241 Nec pertinet ad magnanimum injusticiam facere, nam nullus operatur aliquid indecens nisi propter appetitum alicuius rei, sed magnanimus non apreciatur tantum quamcumque rem exteriorem ut propter eam aliquid turpe operari vellet. Ille vero qui se reputat magnanimum, cum non sit bonus et virtuosus, derisibilis est, quia malus non est dignus honore, cum honor sit premium virtutis; ideo impossibile est esse malum et magnanimum. Et ex hiis patet quod magnanimitas est quasi quidam ornatus omnium virtutum, quia per magnanimitatem omnes virtutes efficiuntur majores et ad eam pertinet operari magnum in omnibus virtutibus, et ex hoc crescunt virtutes, et quia non potest esse sine aliis virtutibus videtur superaddi eis tanquam ornatus earum. Ideo difficile est aliquem esse vere magnanimum, quia non potest hoc contingere sine bonitate virtutis et eciam sine magna virtute cui debeatur magnus honor; et quia hoc consequi est difficile, sequitur quod est rarum et difficile quod homo sit vere magnanimus. Lib. 2 Cap. 12 [De magnanimitate.] Capitulum tercium Dicitur ergo magnanimus maxime et principaliter ex eo quod bene se habet circa honores, ut dictum est. Intelligendum est eciam circa inhonoraciones, nam virtus eadem est circa opposita; sicut fortitudo est circa timores et audacias, et temperancia circa delectaciones et tristicias, sic magnanimitas circa

Cap. 12 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m xııȷͫ H 241

Est autem magnanimus humilis et docilis: the paragraph is a close précis of EN 1123b26– 1124a4/Sent. Eth. iv.8.11–13, except that in 1123b31–33 οὐδαμῶς τ᾽ ἂν ἁρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ φεύγειν παρασείσαντι, οὐδ᾽ ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα πράξει αἰσχρὰ ᾧ γ᾽ οὐδὲν μέγα, badly mistranslated by Vet. interp. “nequaquam utique congruit magnanimo fugere commoventem [sic! for “waving his arms”, dat. agreeing with μεγαλοψύχῳ] neque iniusta facere”, Aquinas compounded the error by reading commonentem (iv.8.13 “Videtur enim quibusdam quod ad magnanimum pertineat ut suo sensui semper innitatur et nullius alterius admonitionem sequatur […]; sed Philosophus dicit hoc esse falsum”; see Aquinas 1969, i, *254–255 “prorsus depravaret, cum non iam fortitudinis laude sed […] humilitatis magnanimum ornaret”). But Cartagena lifts the even more improbable deduction that Arist. meant to imply a magnanimous man’s need for “docile humility” (docilis never occurs in Aquinas) from Guiral Ot 1500 iv. qu.28, f. 83rb (n255) and iv.16 ad loc., f. 78rb, along with the biblical text: Quantum ad tertiam, dicit quod “nequaquam congruit magnanimum fugere commonentem”, sed esse sic humilem et docilem ut discipulum, quod nequaquam tantum presumat de sensu et valore suo quin amicorum commonitionibus et consiliis acquiescat, quod fieri non potest absque humilitate et docilitate; nec sapientia nec prudentia debet quenquam avertere ab auditione consiliorum, dicente Salomone, “qui sapiens est audit consilia“, Prover. 12° [Prov 12:15], et post 13° ‘astutus omnia

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magnanimous man to do injustice, for no one performs any unbecoming act except from appetite of some thing, but the magnanimous man does not prize any external thing so much that he would be willing to perform some base act for it. Anyone who is not good and virtuous but regards himself as magnanimous is ridiculous, for the bad man is not worthy of honour since honour is the reward of virtue; hence it is impossible to be bad and magnanimous. From all this it is clear that magnanimity is, as it were, a kind of embellishment of all the virtues. By magnanimity all the virtues are magnified, and its concern is to perform great acts in all the virtues; the virtues grow thereby, and because it cannot exist without the other virtues it seems as if added to them as their embellishment. It is difficult, therefore, for someone to be truly magnanimous, because this can only come about when accompanied by goodness of virtue, or rather, great virtue deserving great honour; and since this is difficult to achieve, it follows that it is rare and difficult for a man to be truly magnanimous. 2.12 [On magnanimity.] Chapter 3 The magnanimous man, then, is mostly and principally so called from the fact that he conducts himself well in respect of honours, as I have said. This is also to be understood in respect of dishonours, for virtue is the same in respect of opposites; just as fortitude is about fears and rashness, and temperance about

agit cum consilio’ [Prov 13:16], quia isdem ait, “Viro qui corripientem dura cervice contemnit repentinus superveniet interitus”, 29°. Greeks had the concept of ὕβρις (the word occurs at EN 1125a9, compiled at ii.14 38, at n252 below; Cartagena follows Vet. interp. and commentators in translating injuria, with a gloss that again disassociates the magnanimus from any suggestion he might insult anyone); even so, one doubts Arist. could have followed the idea that μεγαλοψυχία has anything to do with humility, or even that ancient Gk had a word for the latter, at least as a virtue (n250). Geraldus’s citation of Prov 12–13 was emblematic, for the chapters frame their dicta in resignation to a divine law intent on humbling human self-assertion of any kind (12:2 “qui bonus est hauriet a Domino gratiam, qui autem confidit cogitationibus suis impie agit”, 9 “melior est pauper […] quam gloriosus”, 18 “quasi gladio pungitur conscientiae”, 13.10 “inter superbos semper iurgia sunt”, etc.), capturing exactly the distinction between the biblical view and Arist.’s of which Strauss speaks (n238, above). Omitting the citations on the wisdom of listening to advice, however, Cartagena selects only the one that threatens punishment for spurning it, ut ait Salomon: Prov 29:1 (reading sequitur, literal for HB ‫ֶפַּתע ִיָשֵּׁבר ְוֵאין ַמ ְרֵפּא‬/οὐκ ἔστιν ἴασις; there is no fut./imperfective of ‫ ֵאין‬in Heb., but the waw-consecutive syntax anyway implies non sequetur, “will suddenly be broken beyond (lit. and there is no) healing” NRSV).

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honores et inhonoraciones.242 Et si contingit quod magnanimo exhibeantur magni et boni honores et pro bonis actibus, id est virtuosis, delectatur in eis moderate et non ultra modum. Racio hujus est quia quod aliquis immoderate delectetur aliquibus adeptis, hoc contingit ex eo quod ex insperato sibi adveniunt et admiratur ea quasi quedam maxima supra seipsum existentia; sed cum magnanimus adipiscitur maximos honores, existimat quasi quedam bona proprie sibi convenientia et adhuc minora quam ei debeantur. Considerat enim quod nullus honor exterius ab hominibus exhibitus est condignum premium virtutis, quia bonum racionis ex quo laudatur virtus excedit omnia exteriora bona. Non tamen propter hoc indignatur quia sibi minora exhibentur quam debeantur, sed recipit equanimiter, considerans quod homines non habent aliqua majora que ei retribuant; ideo delectatur in eis moderate. Quando vero contingit quod magnanimo exhibentur aliqui honores non propter virtutem sed propter alia, ut propter divicias vel propter aliquid aliud simile, vel si honoratur in aliquibus parvis honoribus, parvipendet eos, quia reputat se non esse talibus honoribus dignum; non enim sufficit virtuoso ut honoretur tanquam dives vel ob aliam causam preter quam propter virtutem. Et sicut non extollitur magnanimus in magnis honoribus, ita animus ejus non deicitur per contumelias, quia considerat injuste sibi inferri. Sic ergo patet quod magnanimus maxime laudatur circa honores et opposita, id est inhonoraciones. Et quamvis magnanimus principaliter sit circa honores, secundario tamen bene se habebit circa divicias et potentatum et omnia que pertinent ad bonam fortunam, in quantum propter ea aliquis honoratur. Et ideo tam circa ista quam circa infortunia magnanimus moderate se habebit, qualitercumque sibi accidat, itaque quod nec si sit bene fortunatus superflue gaudebit nec si infortunia patiatur superflue tristabitur. Racio hujus est quia honor est maximum inter omnia exteriora bona, quod patet ex eo quod tam potentatus quam divicie desiderantur propter honorem; volunt enim homines habere talia ut honorentur. Si ergo magnanimus ipsum honorem parvum quid existimat ut non superflue

8 ante aliquibus add. de Bβ 242

circa honores et inhonoraciones: a close paraphrase of Sent. Eth. iv.9 on EN 1124a4– b6, omitting only some 220 of Aquinas’s 1014 words and adding only the nagging terms superbi, superbia, arrogantia (36–37), which do not appear anywhere in Aquinas’s treatment of magnanimity, whereas in Cartagena’s √superb- occurs × 22, from the total of 26 in MV. Aquinas used the word only four times altogether, twice under fortitude of the audax, once under veracity of the eiron, and referring to high estate only in the final discussion of virtue and happiness at the end of EN, where Arist. points out that idiotae, “id est popula-

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pleasures and griefs, so magnanimity is about honours and dishonours. And if it happens that the magnanimous man is shown great and good honours, and for good (that is, virtuous) acts, he takes pleasure in them moderately and not beyond measure. The reason for this is that when someone takes immoderate delight in getting such honours, it happens because they come to him unexpectedly and he is amazed at them, as if they were too great for him; the magnanimous man, on the other hand, even when he gets the greatest honours regards them as goods that properly befit him, or even as less than he deserves. He considers no honour that men show him externally a condign reward for virtue, because the rational good for which virtue is praised exceeds all external goods. Nevertheless, he does not become angry that he is rewarded with less than is due; he receives it calmly, making allowance for the fact that men have no greater things to reward him with, and takes well moderated pleasure in them. However, when it happens that the magnanimous man is shown honours not because of his virtue but for other reasons, for example his wealth or something similar, or if he is rewarded with certain small honours, he spurns them as beneath his dignity; for a virtuous man is not satisfied by being honoured for being rich or any other cause than virtue. And just as the magnanimous man does not preen himself on receiving great honours, so too his mind is not downcast by insults, since he regards them as unjustified. Thus it is clear that the magnanimous man is most highly praised in respect of honours and their opposites, that is, dishonours. Although a man is magnanimous principally in regard to honours, he will also conduct himself well in regard to wealth, power, and everything that pertains to good fortune, inasmuch as one is honoured for these things. In regard to these things no less than to misfortunes the magnanimous man will conduct himself moderately, however things turn out for him; so he will neither rejoice too much if he has good fortune nor grieve too much if he suffers misfortunes. The reason for this is that honour is the greatest of all external goods, as is clear from the fact that both power and wealth are desired for honour’s sake; men wish to have these things so as to be honoured. If the magnanimous

rem et privatam vitam agentes”, are as capable of acting virtuously as powerful men, “quia potentes impediuntur a multis virtuosis actibus tum propter nimias occupationes et sollicitudines, tum etiam propter superbiam quam etiam superabundantia divitiarum gignit” (Sent. Eth. x.13.4 ad EN 1179a4–8 οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἧττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον). The latter was the passage that Cartagena had in mind, despite not including Bk x in his compilation; most notably in his Prologi, Conclusio, and at ii.16, as we see below (n255).

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gaudeat de ipso, multo magis alia reputabit parva, ita quod non gaudebit superflue de eis; et hinc est quod magnanimi judicantur a quibusdam esse despectores seu superbi, quia exteriora bona contempnunt, sed verus magnanimus non facit hoc ex superbia seu arrogancia, ut infra dicetur, sed ex virtute, quia sola interiora bona virtutis apreciatur. Verum licet in bonis interioribus magnanimitas consistat, exteriora tamen bona fortune aliquid videntur conferre ad magnanimitatem, in quantum propter ea aliqui reputantur digni honore, ut nobiles et potentes vel divites. Omnia enim ista consistunt in quadam superexcellencia, quia nobiles excedunt ignobiles in nobilitate, divites excedunt pauperes in diviciis, et sic in similibus.243 Omne autem illud quod superexcellit in bono est magis honorabile, quia honor est quedam reverencia que debetur superexcellenti bono; et quia magnanimus est, est dignus honore. Inde est quod talia faciunt homines magis magnanimos, prout honorantur a quibusdam vulgaribus hominibus qui sola hec bona cognoscunt; sed secundum rei veritatem solus bonus, id est virtuosus, est honorandus, quia honor est proprium premium virtutis. Si tamen aliquis habeat ambo simul, scilicet virtutem et bona fortune, fiet magis dignus honore, in quantum utroque modo est honorabilis, tam secundum rei veritatem propter virtutem quam secundum oppinionem hominum vulgarium propter bona exteriora. Ista eciam bona deserviunt ad operaciones virtutum, ut in magnificencia et in similibus virtutibus que non possunt exerceri sine prosperitate et habundancia rerum temporalium. Illi vero qui habent ista bona sine virtute non possunt se juste reputare dignos magnis honoribus; ideo nec recte dicuntur magnanimi. Racio est quia quod aliquis sit dignus magnis honoribus et quod sit magnanimus non potest contingere sine virtute perfecta, ut dictum est. Sed tales qui carent virtute propter excellenciam exteriorum rerum despiciunt alios et injuriantur eis et incidunt in similia mala, quia non est facile quod aliquis moderate ferat bona fortune sine virtute, nam hoc est magnum opus virtutis, ut aliquis cum moderacione se habeat in bonis fortune; unde cum illi qui carent virtute non possunt bene ferre fortunas, dum existimant quod simpliciter excellant alios quos in diviciis vel potencia excellunt, contempnunt eos, quia non reputant aliquam excellenciam esse operacionem virtutis. Ideo ipsi non curant operari aliquid boni, sed operantur quidquid eis libet. Volunt enim 41–42 vel divites. Omnia enim α (o ricos. Ciertamente todas estas cosas Mcast) et divites et omnia β vel divites. Omnia B 56–57 ideo ~ Racio est quia αB nam β 57–58 dignus ~ sit om. β 243

quadam superexcellencia: taken from EN 1124a20–24/Sent. Eth. iv.9.7, this is the first of six allusions in ii.12–16 to “superexcellence” (ὑπεροχή) vs. Aquinas’s two, here only. Cartagena immediately associates the term with nobility, power, wealth—that is, the class of his princely addressee; a social sense that it does not bear in Arist. or Aquinas, for whom

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man regards honour itself as so small a thing that he does not rejoice overmuch at it, much less will he esteem smaller things, and so he will not rejoice overmuch at them either. So it is that some people judge the magnanimous to be contemptuous or proud, because they spurn external goods; but the truly magnanimous man does not do this from pride or arrogance, as will be explained below, but from virtue, because he prizes only the internal goods of virtue. Yet although magnanimity depends on internal goods, the external goods of fortune seem to contribute to magnanimity insofar as some such as nobles, men in power, or the wealthy are held to be worthy of honour on that account. All these depend on some kind of special excellence, since nobles outdo the ignoble in nobility, the wealthy outdo poor men in wealth, and so on; but everything that specially excels in good is more honourable, because honour is a kind of reverence owed to specially excellent good; and because he is magnanimous he is worthy of honour. So it is that such things make men more magnanimous, as they are honoured by certain common men who only recognize these goods; but the truth of the matter is that only the good, that is virtuous, man should be honoured, because honour is properly the reward of virtue. However, if someone has both together, namely virtue and the goods of fortune, he becomes more worthy of honour, inasmuch as he is honourable in both ways, both in reality for virtue and in the opinion of common men for external goods. These goods also contribute to the exercise of virtues, for instance in magnificence and such virtues that cannot be practised without prosperity and an abundance of temporal goods; but those who have these goods without virtue cannot justly hold themselves worthy of great honours, and so cannot rightly be called magnanimous, the reason being that, as I have said, a man cannot be worthy of great honours, and so cannot be magnanimous, without perfect virtue. It is those who lack virtue who look down on others because of their ascendancy in external things. They insult them and fall into other such evils, because it is not easy for anyone without virtue to bear the goods of fortune moderately, it being a great work of virtue to behave with moderation amidst goods of fortune. Hence when those who lack virtue are unable to bear fortune correctly while they imagine they straightforwardly excel all others whom they outdo in wealth or power, they despise them, since they do not recognize any excellence in the exercise of virtue. Such men have no interest in doing some

it can be used of self-respect (ix.9), truth as an “amicus superexcellens” (i.6), the excess of goods of fortune that is “impeditiva felicitatis” (vii.13), or, as an adv., of the incontinent prizing unnecessary goods, and even of denigrating certain men as bestial, “superexcellenter” (vii.4, vii.1). The Gk word meant simply “prominence”, applied to hills, mathematical sums, or bumps on the skull as well as rank.

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imitari magnanimum, cum tamen non sint ei similes; imitantur autem eum in quibus possunt, non quidem in hoc quod operentur secundum virtutem, quod maxime facit magnanimus, sed in hoc quod contempnunt alios, non tamen eodem modo sicut magnanimus, nam magnanimus juste hoc facit quia contempnit malos et glorificat bonos, sed illi qui carent virtute contempnunt et glorificant indifferenter qualitercumque contingit, contempnendo interdum bonos et glorificando malos prout libet, quia non reguntur per virtutem seu moderamine racionis. Lib. 2 Cap. 13 [De magnanimitate.] Capitulum quartum Assignantur viginti proprietates magnanimo, quarum prima est quod magnanimus non est periclitans pro parvis rebus nec est amator periculorum, hoc est dicere quod non se exponit prompte et de facili ad pericula.244 Racio hujus est quia nullus se exponit periculo nisi propter aliquid quod multum apreciatur, sed magnanimus pauca in tantum apreciatur quod pro eis se vellet periculis exponere. Ideo non de facili nec pro parvis rebus pericula subit; pro magnis vero exponit se quibuscumque periculis, ut pro cultu divino vel pro salute communi vel pro justicia et similibus. Secunda est quod magnanimus, quando periculis se exponit, hoc facit vehementer, ita ut non parcat vite sue, quia non reputat dignum quod magis vellit vivere quam magna bona per mortem consequi. Tercia est quod magnanimus est promptus ad beneficia largienda et verecundatur ab aliis beneficia accipere. Racio hujus est quia beneficia dare est excellentis, recipere est ejus qui excellitur; sed magnanimus semper intendit ad hoc, ut superexcellat in bono. Ideo promptius dat quam accipit. Quarta est quod cum beneficia accipit, semper studet ut retribuat majora ut remaneat beneficians; sic enim ille qui incepit beneficia conferre erit beneficia recipiens in quantum plus acceperit quam dederit, et manebit magnanimus plura dans quam recipiens, quod semper vult.

74 moderamine αB moderanciam β 244

Cap. 13 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m xiiiȷ H

viginti proprietates magnanimo: the next two chapters follow EN 1124b7–1125a16/Sent. Eth. iv.10. Guiral Ot (1500 iv.16–17, at f. 78ra) totted up fifty “conditions”, though it tests patience to follow his crabbed calculations in reaching that number; Aquinas divides and subdivides too, but does not keep a running total, though his “properties” probably add up to twenty; whereas Arist.’s 43 lines, blithely unconcerned with scholastic logic-chopping, do not even bother to name the descriptions proprietates or conditiones. Compared to his two sources Cartagena’s treatment is a masterpiece of simplicity, almost as clear and to the point as Arist.; he lists and numbers the qualities 1–20 as a double Decalogue for the

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good, they merely do whatever they want. They aspire to imitate the magnanimous man, but they are not like him; they imitate him in the ways they can, but not in acting with virtue, which the magnanimous man does to the highest degree. As for despising others, they do not do it in the same way as the magnanimous man, for he does so justly because he despises bad men and glorifies the good, whereas those who lack virtue despise and glorify indiscriminately, regardless of circumstances, sometimes despising good men and glorifying the bad according to their whim, because they are not governed by virtue or a rational yardstick. 2.13 [On magnanimity.] Chapter 4 Twenty are the properties attributed to the magnanimous man. The first is that the magnanimous man does not take risks for small matters. He is not in love with danger, that is to say he does not readily or lightly expose himself to dangers. The reason for this is that no one exposes himself to danger except for something he greatly prizes, but the magnanimous man prizes few things so much that he would be willing to expose himself to dangers for them. Hence he does not undergo dangers lightly or for small matters; but for great ones, for instance for divine worship or the public good or for justice and such things, he exposes himself to all and any dangers. The second is that when the magnanimous man does expose himself to dangers, he does so wholeheartedly, even to the extent of risking his life, for he does not deem it worthy of him to prefer life to the achieving of great goods through death. The third is that the magnanimous man readily dispenses largesse, but is ashamed to take benefits from others. The reason for this is that giving benefits belongs to the man who excels, receiving them to one who is excelled; but the magnanimous man always strives to be specially excellent in good, and hence more readily gives than receives. The fourth is that when he receives benefits, he always takes care to return greater favours so that he remains the net benefactor, so that he who conferred benefits first ends up, by getting back more than he gave, as the one who is the recipient of benefits, and the magnanimous man still gives more than he receives, which is always his aim.

prince, while shunning such hair-raising barbarisms as microkindinos, retributivus, oditor, humaniloquus, etc. Its interest, however, lies in the brief but tell-tale interpolations where he doggedly gnaws away at the Christian bone of superbia (e.g. 37–40 below).

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Quinta est quod magnanimus videtur in memoria habere illos quibus dat beneficia et non eos a quibus recipit, quod non provenit ei ex eleccione sed ex quadam disposicione. Racio hujus est quia magnanimus est ita dispositus ut delectetur beneficia dando et invitus recipiat. Illa autem que nos delectant frequenter cogitamus et per consequens in memoria habemus, illa vero que non sunt nobis delectabilia raro cogitamus et sic non multum in memoria tenemus. Et hinc est quod magnanimus libentius cogitat beneficia que dedit quam que recepit; ideo magis ea videtur habere in memoria. Et hoc est secundum disposicionem ejus, sed secundum eleccionem magnanimus non obliviscitur beneficiorum receptorum, ymo est gratus et recordatur eorum et studet ad hoc ut majora recompenset, ut dictum est. Sexta est quod magnanimus delectabiliter audit beneficia que ipse contulit et non audit delectabiliter beneficia que recepit. Bene tamen delectabitur in amore ejus qui beneficia ei contulit, sed in hoc quod ipse beneficia recepit non delectatur; quod evenit ei ex racione suprascripta, quia libencius dat quam accipit. Ideo fertur quod quidam cives Grecorum, cum peterent auxilium ab Atheniensibus, non dicebant eis beneficia que eis fecerant, sed que ab eis acceperant, ut illos ad auxilium concedendum inducerent.245 Nec est intelligendum quod magnanimus audit libenter adulatores, sed delectatur cum vera dicuntur ei de beneficiis suis, non ex superbia, quia magnanimus humilis est, ut infra dicemus, sed ex consideracione proprie virtutis, omnia in Deum referendo.246 Septima est quod magnanimus exhibet se tanquam nullo indigens, et non de facili demonstrat indigenciam suam, in quantum non petit aliquid nec accipit, ymo est promptus ad ministrandum beneficia aliis. Octava est quod magnanimus exhibet se magnum et honorabilem ad illos qui sunt in dignitate et excellencia bonorum fortune, sed ad mediocres exhibet quandam moderacionem, non utendo magnitudine sua ad eos. Racio hujus 39–40 infra dicemus αB (ayuso diremos Mcast) supra diximus β (sc. ii.16 48 vel ii.11 22; sed cui bono mutatum?) 245

246

quidam cives Grecorum: Arist. alludes to two examples of captatio benevolentiae (EN 1124b16–17 καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διί, οὐδ᾽ οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ᾽ ἃ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ). The commentators tried ponderously to explain the Homeric (Il. i.503) and historical referents (Guiral Ot 1500 iv.17, f. 79va, Sent. Eth. iv.10.7); Cartagena perhaps rejected Thetis and Zeus as an impious pagan fable, but why keep the Laconians? He had no idea who they were (cf. n290); it merely paves the way for the next sentence. non ex superbia, quia magnanimus humilis est: added by Cartagena to Sent. Eth. iv.10.7; “omnia in Deum referendo” reveals not only a fundamental divergence from Arist.’s definition of μεγαλοψυχία, but also the reason for that divergence. For this he drew on Guiral Ot 1500 iv. qu.27 (n256 below), f. 83ra–b “Superbus enim amat se ut principium sui, magnanimus vero amat se ut effectum Dei […], et per hoc se convertit ad Deum”, and “Magnanimus

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The fifth is that the magnanimous man seems to keep in mind those on whom he may confer benefits, not those from whom he may receive them. In his case this proceeds not from conscious choice but from a certain innate character. The reason is that the magnanimous man is naturally disposed to take pleasure in giving benefits, but receives them unwillingly; we think frequently about things that give us pleasure, and consequently keep them in mind, whereas we rarely think about things that we do not find pleasurable, and so do not keep them much in mind. Hence it is that the magnanimous man more willingly thinks about the benefits he has given than those he has received, and so seems to keep them more in mind. This comes from his innate character; yet by conscious choice the magnanimous man does not forget the benefits he has received. On the contrary, he is grateful and remembers them and takes care to repay them with interest, as I have said. The sixth is that the magnanimous man takes delight in hearing of the benefits that he has conferred, but not in hearing of the benefits he has received. He will take correct pleasure in the love of someone who has conferred benefits on him, but does not take pleasure in the fact of having received benefits; this comes from the aforementioned reason that he more willingly gives than accepts. Thus it is told of certain citizens of Greece that, when they sought help from the Athenians, as a way of inducing them to agree to help they would mention to them not the favours they had done for them but those they had received from them. This does not mean that the magnanimous man willingly listens to flatterers; rather, he takes delight when he is told truths about his good deeds, not from pride, because the magnanimous man is humble, as I shall explain below, but out of consideration for his own virtue, referring all of this back to God. The seventh is that the magnanimous man presents himself as needing nothing, and does not lightly show his need, inasmuch as he neither asks for nor accepts anything; on the contrary, he is prompt to administer benefits to others. The eighth is that the magnanimous man presents himself as great and deserving of honour to those of high rank and pre-eminence in the goods of fortune, but to those of middling station he displays a certain moderation, not exercising his greatness towards them. There are two reasons for this. First,

vero non [appetit gloriam] sibi nec ut bonum proprium, sed in hoc quod honoratur, famatur, vel laudatur vult gloriam Deo, ut Deus glorificetur in ipso.” This argument, unconvincing though it be, is developed below in ii.16, where Geraldus’s questio is quoted verbatim (42–46, and nn257–258).

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est duplex. Prima, quia omnis virtus nititur ad id quod est difficile et honorabile; sed quod aliquis excellat in bono magnos viros est difficile et venerabile, quod autem aliquis excellat mediocres viros non est difficile. Ideo magnanimus exhibet se magnum et honorabilem ad magnos, quod est difficile, sed non ad mediocres. Secunda racio est quia exhibere se venerandum inter magnos viros pertinet ad quandam virilitatem animi. Ideo hoc facit magnanimus, sed velle sibi exhiberi magnam reverenciam ab infimis personis non est virile sed honerosum; ideo hoc non facit magnanimus quia viciosum est hoc, sicut reputaretur ad vicium quod aliquis exhibeat se fortem contra imbecilles et quod non aggrediatur difficilia que sunt honorabilia et in quibus alii precellunt.247 Nona proprietas est quod magnanimus est ociosus ex eo quod non se ingerit multis negociis, et tardus quia non de facili se ingerit eis, sed solum insistit illis actibus qui pertinent ad aliquem magnum honorem vel ad aliquod magnum opus faciendum; et ideo magnanimus est operativus paucorum, sed operatur magna et que sunt digna nomine magno. Et non est intelligendum quod sit ociosus in domo sua et quod nichil faciat, nam hoc non esset virtuosum, ymo se occupabit honestis occupacionibus; sed loquimur de occupacione negociorum humanorum, quia se intromittet de paucis negociis sed magnis. Decima est quod magnanimus est manifestus amicus et manifestus inimicus, et racio hujus est quia latenter amare vel latenter odire provenit ex aliquo timore; timor autem repugnat magnanimitati. Ideo manifeste odit et manifeste amat, unde Seneca ait, “fraudes et doli imbecillum decent”.248 Lib. 2 Cap. 14 [De magnanimitate.] Capitulum quintum Undecima est quod magis curat de veritate quam de oppinione hominum, nec enim propter humanam oppinionem recedit ab eo quod facere debet secundum virtutem.

Cap. 14 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m xv H 247

velle sibi exhiberi magnam reverenciam ab infimis personis ~ viciosum est: the paragraph reproduces Sent. Eth. iv.10.9–12, on EN 1124b18–24 πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον, except that for the same reason noted in n246, where Arist. says ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν/Vet. interp. “In illis [the high] venerari non invirile, in humilibus autem honerosum”, he hastens to replace humilibus (ταπεινοῖς “low”, n250) by infimis, onerosum (φορτικόν “tiresome, vulgar”) by viciosum. As for invirile (for ἀγεννές “low-born”; Gautier invile), Guiral Ot 1500 iv qu.25, f. 82va clutches at straws: “est passio communis mulierum, que summe […] admirari et laudari volunt”.

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because every virtue strives for what is difficult and honourable; for someone to excel great men in good is difficult and worthy of respect, but to excel men of middling station is not difficult. Hence the magnanimous man presents himself as great and deserving of honour to great men, which is difficult, but not to middling men. The second reason is that to present oneself as demanding respect among great men betokens a certain manliness of mind, and so the magnanimous man does this, but to wish to be shown great reverence from lowly persons is not manly but oppressive, and so the magnanimous man does not do this because it is a vice. In the same way it would be considered a vice for someone to make a show of his strength against the weak but not undertake difficult things which are honourable and in which others show greater mettle. The ninth property is that the magnanimous man is leisurely, in that he does not involve himself in numerous affairs, and tardy, because he does not lightly involve himself in them; instead he devotes himself only to those acts that pertain to some great honour or to doing some great work. Thus the magnanimous man is a doer of few things, but he does things that are great and worthy of great renown. This does not mean that he lazes at home and does nothing, for that would not be virtuous; on the contrary, he will occupy himself in honest occupations, but I am talking about occupying himself in human business; he will involve himself in few affairs, but great ones. The tenth is that the magnanimous man is openly a friend and openly an enemy. The reason for this is that to love covertly or hate covertly stems from some fear; but fear is incompatible with magnanimity. Hence he hates openly and loves openly, for as Seneca says, “deceits and subterfuges befit the weak man”. 2.14 [On magnanimity.] Chapter 5 The eleventh is that he cares more about truth than about men’s opinion. He does not back away from what he should do according to virtue for the sake of any man’s opinion.

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Seneca ait: Martinus Bracarensis, Formula vitae honestae c.2, thought to derive from lost works of Seneca and, as De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus, attributed to him in the Middle Ages (PL lxxii, 22–28, at 25a–b “Si magnanimus fueris […] neminem susurro appetas, neminem suffodias, palam aggredere […], nam fraudes et doli imbecillum decent”). Also adduced by Buridan (1513 iv qu.10, f. 81ra “dicit in libro suo de quattuor virtutibus, ‘si magnanimus fueris nunquam iudicabis tibi contumeliam fieri’”), the text sheds no particular light; it is simply a rhetorical flourish to end the chapter—but we should recall that the work was in fact Christian, not pagan.

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Duodecima est quod manifeste loquitur et operatur eo quod ipse est contemptivus aliorum, et inde est quod libere propalat sua dicta; nam occultare ea que homo facit vel dicit provenit ex hoc quod timet alios, sed nullus timet eos quos contempnit, quia ista duo convertuntur adinvicem, scilicet quod aliquis sit liber et propalativus et contemptivus. Nec est intelligendum quod magnanimus est contemptivus eo quod despiciat alios quasi privans eos debita reverencia, sed quia non apreciatur eos ultra quam debeat.249 Terciadecima est quod magnanimus in verbis suis non dicet falsum, quia veridicus est, nisi forte ex ludo aliqua yronice loquatur causa joci in societate aliquorum. Quartadecima est quod magnanimus non est promptus ad convivendum cum aliis nisi cum amicis. Racio hujus est quia ingerere se familiaritatibus omnium pertinet ad servilem animum. Inde est quod omnes blanditores qui volunt omnibus indifferenter placere sunt obsequiosi et serviles, id est ad serviendum parati, et econtra omnes illi qui sunt infimi et abjecti animi sunt blanditores, quod non decet magnanimum.250 Quintadecima est quod magnanimus non est promptus ad admirandum. Racio hujus est quia admiracio est de rebus magnis, magnanimus autem non reputat aliquid magnum eorum que exterius occurrere possunt, quia tota intencio sua versatur circa interiora bona que sunt vere magna. Sextadecima est quod non multum recordatur malorum que passus est, et racio hujus est duplex. Prima, quia non convenit magnanimo multa recordari, sicut nec admirari, nam eorum solemus multum recordari que tanquam magna admiramur; cum ergo magnanimus non sit admirativus, non erit recordativus, quod intelligendum est de actibus humanis, quia non multum apreciatur eos, ut dictum est. Secunda racio est quia ad magnanimum specialiter pertinet oblivisci malorum que passus est in quantum ea despicit, nam reputat ea talia a quibus minorari non potuit. Et hinc est quod aliqui oratores laudantes Jullium Cesarem ferunt quod nullius oblivisci solitus erat nisi injuriarum.251

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Nec ~ privans eos debita reverencia: once again added (“Nec est intelligendum”) for the reason noted in nn246–247, namely to avoid confusing the magnanimus with the superbus. obsequiosi et serviles ~ infimi et abjecti: EN 1125a1–2 πάντες οἱ κόλακες θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες, Vet. interp. “omnes blanditores obsequiosi, et humiles blanditores”/Sent. Eth. iv.10.18 “omnes blanditores, qui volunt omnibus indifferenter placere, sunt obsequiosi, idest ad serviendum parati; et e converso omnes humiles, qui scilicet sunt abiecti animi, sunt blanditores”. The care with which Cartagena expunges humiles, both here and at ii.13 52–56 above (n247), epitomizes in a word the purpose and process of his treatment of this virtue, and of MV in general. Gk ταπεινός “low, base, abject, mean” only acquired positive connotations in NTest Gk (Mt 11:29 “learn from Me; for I am gentle and humble in heart

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The twelfth is that he speaks and acts openly. This is because he is disdainful of others and so freely divulges what he has to say, since for a man to hide what he does or says comes from fearing others, but no one fears those he disdains; to be free and divulgative and to be disdainful are two sides of the same coin. This does not mean that the magnanimous man is disdainful in the sense of looking down on others as though to deny them due respect, but because he prizes them no more than he should. The thirteenth is that the magnanimous man will not tell lies, because he is truthful, except perhaps when he playfully speaks ironically when joking in the company of select companions. The fourteenth is that the magnanimous man does not readily associate with anyone other than his friends. The reason for this is that to mingle familiarly with all and sundry is a sign of a servile mind; so all flatterers who wish to please everyone indifferently are obsequious and servile (that is, prepared to serve), and conversely all those who are of low and base mind are flatterers, which does not become the magnanimous man. The fifteenth is that the magnanimous man does not readily show admiration. The reason for this is that admiration is reserved for great things, but the magnanimous man does not regard any of the external things that can arise as great, because his whole attention is fixed on internal goods, which are truly great. The sixteenth is that he does not much recollect ills he has suffered. The reason for this is twofold. First, because it does not befit the magnanimous to recollect many things, any more than it does to admire, because we normally recollect things we admire as great; as the magnanimous man is not an admirer, so too he will not be a recollector (understanding this to refer to human acts, which he does not much prize, as I have said). The second reason is that it is a special mark of the magnanimous man to forget the ills he has suffered, inasmuch as he looks down on them, for he regards them as the sort of things that cannot diminish him. So it is that some ancient orators recount in praise of Julius Caesar that he “customarily forgot nothing except insults”.

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[πρᾷός εἰμι καὶ ταπεινὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ]”, 18:4 “Whoever becomes humble [ταπεινώσει ἑαυτὸν] like this child is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven”, 23:12 “All who exalt themselves will be humbled [ταπεινωθήσεται], and all who humble themselves will be exalted”, Lk 1:52 “He has brought down the powerful [δυνάστας] from their thrones, and lifted up the lowly [ταπεινούς]”; and cf. the Beatitudes, Mt 5:3–11 “Blessed are the poor in spirit [πτωχοὶ τῷ πνεύματι] […] the meek [πραεῖς] […] those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake [δεδιωγμένοι]”, etc.). aliqui oratores: Sent. Eth. iv.10.20 “Unde de Iulio Caesare Tullius dicit quod nullius oblivisci solitus erat nisi iniuriarum”, from Cic. Lig. xii.35 “etiam te [Caesar], qui obliuisci nihil

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Decima septima est quod non multum loquitur de hominibus. Racio hujus est quia non multum apreciatur particulares res hominum, sed tota ejus intencio est circa communia bona et divina. Ideo nec multum loquitur de seipso nec de aliis, nec est sibi cure quod ipse laudetur nec quod alii vituperentur, unde nec multum laudat alios nec male loquitur de aliis, eciam si sint inimici, nisi aliquando forte propter injuriam sibi ab eis illatam repellendam.252 Decima octava est quod de neccessariis ad vitam humanam vel quibuscumque aliis rebus nec est plantivus, id est non multum conqueritur vel murmurat si ei desint, nec est deprecativus, id est non multum precatur ut ei exhibeantur, quia hoc pertinet ad illum qui studet circa necessaria vite consequenda quasi circa magna bona, quod non congruit magnanimitati. Decimanona est quod magnanimus est promptus magis ad possidendum quedam bona honorabilia et infructuosa quam alia que sint utilia et non sint tam honorabilia, quia ista magis videntur pertinere ad hominem sibi sufficientem qui non indiget nec curat multum aliunde lucrari, quod nonnulli intelligunt nedum de aliis bonis sed eciam de scienciis, videlicet quod magnanimus libentius insistat ad sciendum aliqua digna et honorabilia, licet non sint ita lucrativa, quam illa que sunt lucrativa si non sunt eque digna et honorabilia.253 Vicesima est quod motus corporalis magnanimi videtur esse lentus et vox ejus gravis et loquucio ejus stabilis, id est tarda. Et racio hujus est quia cum magnanimus ad pauca operanda intendat, non potest motus ejus esse festinus. Similiter et magnanimus non est contenciosus, quia nichil exteriorum bonorum multum apreciatur. Nullus enim contendit nisi pro aliquo quod magnum existimat; acuitas vero vocis et velocitas loquucionis accidunt propter contencionem. Patet ergo quod ipsa affeccio magnanimi requirit gravitatem vocis et tarditatem loquucionis et motus, et hoc provenit ex eo quia quando aliquis inclinatur naturaliter ad aliquam passionem, ut pote ad verecundiam, opportet et eum naturaliter habere talem colorem qui competat verecundie; unde si quis habet naturalem aptitudinem ad magnanimitatem, consequens est eciam quod habeat naturalem disposicionem ad ista accidentia que diximus. 49 ita AB, om. JOβ

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57 requirit α requirat Bβ

soles nisi iniurias—quam hoc est animi, quam etiam ingeni tui!”. An authority not added by Cartagena, then, but it seems unlikely he would omit Cicero’s name on purpose; his copy of Aquinas was perhaps corrupt (note AJ’s Jullium). Had he known it was Cicero, he might have guessed how unlikely it is that the comment was a simple compliment (“laudantes”). nisi aliquando forte propter injuriam: EN 1125a9 οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι᾽ ὕβριν/Sent. Eth. iv.10.21 “neque etiam male loquitur de aliis, nec etiam de inimicis, nisi propter iniuriam sibi ab eis illatam repellendam.” Cartagena’s vigilant interpolation of “by rare chance” shows his determination to erase pride.

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The seventeenth is that he does not gossip about men. The reason for this is that he does not much prize the private affairs of men; his who attention is given to the common good and divine matters. Thus he does not talk much either about himself or about others, and is not concerned either about being praised himself or about others being denigrated; so he neither praises others overmuch nor speaks badly of them, even if they are enemies, except perhaps occasionally to rebut some insult they have offered him. The eighteenth is that as regards the necessities of human life or any other such matters he is neither plaintive (that is, he does not much complain or murmur if he lacks them) nor scrounging (that is, he does not much beg to be given them), because this belongs to one who concentrates on getting the necessities of life as if they were great goods, which does not befit magnanimity. The nineteenth is that the magnanimous man is more ready to possess honourable but unfruitful goods than others that may be useful but less honourable, because the former seem more pertinent to the self-sufficient man who neither needs nor cares much to gain profit from others. Some understand this to refer not just to other goods but even to kinds of knowledge; in other words, the magnanimous man more willingly strives to know worthy and honourable things, even if they are less lucrative, than lucrative things that are not so worthy and honourable. The twentieth is that the magnanimous man’s bodily movement seems calm, his voice deep, and his speech steady (that is, unhurried). The reason for this is that, since the magnanimous man attends only to few activities, his motions cannot be hasty. Likewise the magnanimous man is not headstrong, because he does not much prize any external goods; no one is contentious about something unless he regards it as great, but a sharp voice and rapid speech denote contentiousness. It is clear, therefore, that the magnanimous man’s very frame of mind demands a deep voice and unhurried speech and motions, and this comes from the fact that when someone is naturally inclined to some emotion, for instance shame, he must naturally take on the colour befitting shame; hence if anyone has a natural aptitude for magnanimity, it must also follow that he has a natural tendency to these characteristics I have described.

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Lib. 2 Cap. 15 [De magnanimitate.] Capitulum sextum Deficiens a medio magnanimitatis vocatur pusillanimus, ille qui superhabundat vocatur kaymus, id est fumosus quem communiter vocamus presumptuosum, ut dictum est.254 Isti autem non sunt mali quantum ad hoc quod sint malefactores, non enim inferunt nocumentum alicui nec faciunt aliquod turpe; sed tamen sunt viciosi et peccant in hoc quod recedunt a medio racionis. Pusillanimus enim cum sit dignus bonis privat seipsum illis quibus dignus est, dum non conatur ad operandum vel consequendum ea que sibi congruerent, quod evenit ei ex hoc quia non reputat se dignum talibus bonis cum tamen sit dignus, et quodammodo ignorat condicionem suam; nam cum proprium bonum sit cuilibet appetibile, si pusillanimus cognosceret seipsum appeteret ea quibus est dignus, cum sint quedam bona appetibilia. Sed ignorancia hec non contingit ei propter insipienciam, nam pusillanimus non est insipiens, quia proprie pusillanimus est ille qui est dignus magnis et non se reputat eis dignum, et si insipiens esset non esset dignus magnis; sed evenit ei hoc ex quadam pigricia per quam non vult se ingerere magnis secundum suam dignitatem. Facit autem pusillanimitas homines deteriores. Singuli enim homines appetunt illa que conveniunt eis secundum propriam dignitatem, et ideo quando propter illam pigriciam pusillanimitatis non dignificant se ipsos evenit eis dupliciter detrimentum bonitatis sue: primo, quia propter hanc oppinionem recedunt ab ipsis operacionibus virtutum et adinvencionibus speculabilium veritatum quasi si indigni et insufficientes ad talia existerent, et ex hoc quod magna bona pretermittunt efficiuntur pejores, quia magnorum bonorum exercitacio facit homines meliores, ut si aliquis qui esset bene dispositus ad actus fortitudinis seipsum hiis dignificans temptat strenua opera armorum, semper fiet melior; si vero ex quadam pigricia seu pusillanimitate non se reputat dignum ad hec, cessabit ab eis et fiet deterior. Simile est in actibus sciencie et omnium virtutum. Secundo, quia per hanc oppinionem recedunt aliqui ab exterioribus bonis, ut dignitatibus seu honoribus vel diviciis, que instrumentaliter tanquam quedam instrumenta deserviunt interdum ad operaciones virtutum.

Cap. 15 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m xvȷ H 254

25 si vero α sin autem Bβ

Deficiens a medio magnanimitatis: discussion of its excess and defect conclude the treatment of magnanimity in EN 1125a16–35/Sent. Eth. iv.11. The chapter reproduces Aquinas, minus c. 150 words of scholastic padding (“Et circa hoc tria facit: primo […] secundo […] Circa primum tria facit”, etc.) and plus one brief added comment addressed to men-atarms (“ut si aliquis […] temptat strenua opera armorum”, 23–24).

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2.15 [On magnanimity.] Chapter 6 One who deviates from the mean of magnanimity on the side of defect is named pusillanimous, on the side of excess kaymous “fumy”, or as we commonly call him presumptuous, as I have said. These are not evil in the sense of being felons, for they neither inflict damage on anyone nor do anything base; nevertheless they commit vice and sin by erring from the rational mean. The pusillanimous man, despite being worthy of good things, deprives himself of those of which he is worth, since he attempts neither to do nor to obtain what befits him. This happens because he does not regard himself as worthy of such goods, even though he is worthy, but somehow fails to recognize his own nature; for since everyone seeks their own good, if the pusillanimous man knew himself he would seek the things of which he is worthy, as they are desirable goods. This ignorance does not befall him through foolishness, for the pusillanimous man is not foolish, since “pusillanimous” properly means one who is worthy of great things but does not regard himself as worthy of them, whereas if he were foolish he would not be worthy of great things; rather, it befalls him from some sort of indolence that makes him unwilling to involve himself with great things in accord with his worth. All the same, pusillanimity makes men more abject. Individual men seek what befits them according to their own worth; therefore when because of the indolence of pusillanimity they fail to dignify themselves, they suffer a twofold loss of goodness: first, because this opinion makes them back away from the very exercise of virtues and discoveries of observable truths as if they were by nature unworthy and incapable of such things, and so by avoiding great goods they become worse because the practice of great goods makes men better. For example, if someone who would be well equipped for acts of fortitude, thinking himself worthy of such things attempts hardy feats of arms, he will always become better; but if from some indolence or pusillanimity he does not regard himself as worthy for such tings, he will avoid them and become worse, and the same holds for the practice of knowledge and all the virtues. Secondly, because this opinion makes some back away from external goods like high office or honours or wealth that sometimes serve instrumentally as so many instruments for exercising the virtues.

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Kaymus vero seu presumptuosus est insipiens et ignorat suam condicionem, non quidem propter pigriciam sicut pusillanimus sed propter insipienciam; quod patet manifeste, quia isti presumptuosi non sunt pigri, quinymo conantur ad agendum et consequendum aliqua honorabilia ad que dignitas eorum non se extendit. Ideo quando deficiunt in operacione et consequucione eorum, redarguuntur ab hominibus. Solent autem isti kaymi seu presumptuosi ornare se vestibus excessive et incedere pompose et alia similia facere ad manifestandum excellenciam suam in exterioribus bonis fortune, et loquntur multa de se ipsis ut per hoc appareant hominibus honorandi. De istis duobus viciis, videlicet pusillanimitate et kaymote, id est presumpcione, magis opponitur pusillanimitas magnanimitati quam presumpcio. Racio hujus est duplex. Prima est quia virtus precipue ordinatur ut reprimantur humane inclinaciones ad malum; ideo vicium quod magis accidit nature humane magis opponitur virtuti, sed constat quod pluries accidit aliquos esse pusillanimes qui omittunt facere bona que possent quam quod se extendant ad faciendum bona que non possent, ideo pusillanimitas magis est contraria virtuti. Secunda racio est quia pusillanimitas est deterior ex eo quod facit homines deteriores, ut supradictum est, et quod deterius est magis opponitur virtuti. Ideo pusillanimitas magis est contraria magnanimitati quam presumpcio. Lib. 2 Cap. 16 [De magnanimitate.] Capitulum septimum Ultimo advertendum est, ne fallamur, quod licet magnanimus secundum supradicta videtur convenire in aliquibus cum superbo, non tamen est superbus, ymo longe differt ab eo.255 Quod declaratur sic: uterque, tam magnanimus quam superbus, est amator sui et uterque est contemptor proximi et uterque appetit excellenciam et uterque vult laudem, famam, et gloriam; sed multum differenter circa ista se habent.256 Nam quantum ad primum, differunt quia

35 et αB vel β 255

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videtur convenire in aliquibus cum superbo: this chapter is an addition to Aquinas, and of course to Arist., specifically addressed to an audience of lords. It summarizes Geraldus’s questiones, “Utrum omnis magnanimus sit superbus” and “Utrum sit humilis vel non” (Guiral Ot 1500 iv. qu.27–28, at f. 83r–84r; followed by “Utrum magnanimitas sit virtus”). As noted above (n242), √superb- occurs only four times in Aquinas; the relevant one is his commentary on ΕΝ 1179a1–16, which states that excessive wealth and rulership can be impediments to virtue, approving the view of Solon and Anaxagoras that the over-rich and powerful—Arist. does not mention “pride”—are not happy (Sent. Eth. x.13.4, quoted in n242). Influenced by the extensive medieval literature of treatises on vices, in which pride took a leading place, Cartagena is concerned not with happiness, but only to rebut

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The kaymous or presumptuous man, on the other hand, is foolish and ignorant of his own nature, not through indolence like the pusillanimous man but through foolishness. This is manifestly clear, because these presumptuous men are not lazy; on the contrary, they attempt to do and get certain honourable things beyond their true worth. Thus when they fall short in the execution or acquisition of those things, men criticize them. Yet these kaymous or presumptuous men customarily dress in excessively ornate style, assume a pompous gait, and do other such things to show off their pre-eminence in the external goods of fortune, and speak much about themselves so as to make themselves appear demanding of men’s respect. Of these two vices, pusillanimity and kaymousness or presumption, pusillanimity is more opposed to magnanimity than presumption. There are two reasons for this. The first is that virtue is particularly ordered to repress human inclinations to the bad. Hence the vice to which human nature is more prone is more opposed to virtue; but it obviously happens more frequently that people are pusillanimous by omitting to do the good things they could than that they stretch themselves to do the good things they cannot. Hence pusillanimity is more contrary to virtue. The second reason is that pusillanimity is more abject because it makes men more abject, as explained above, and what is more abject is more opposed to virtue. Hence pusillanimity is more contrary to magnanimity than presumption. 2.16 [On magnanimity.] Chapter 7 Lastly we should note, unless I am mistaken, that although according to the above the magnanimous man seems to have certain things in common with the proud man, in fact he is not proud; on the contrary, he is a long way from being so. This is explained as follows: both of them, the magnanimous and the proud, love themselves and both disdain their fellows and both seek pre-eminence and both want praise, fame, and glory; but they behave very differently in regard to these things. In regard to the first, they differ because the proud man loves

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Arist. (though he does not say—or perhaps think—this, only “ne fallamur”) so as to find a place for princely magnanimity within divine law (hence Deus × 10, and four biblical and Patristic texts). Quod declaratur sic: the first four paragraphs are lifted from Geraldus’s qu.27, the fifth from qu28. Arist. says μεγαλόψυχοι “may be thought” supercilious (EN 1124a20 ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι), and indeed that those possessed with an idea of their own superiority become “disdainful and insolent” (29–30 ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ), but explains that such elated fools merely “mimic” magnanimity—not because superciliousness is wrong in itself, but because they do not have the superiority they claim (1124b μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον, οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες […]· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι), whereas the truly

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superbus amat se ut principium suum, magnanimus vero amat se ut effectum Dei, et per hoc superbus est ingratus Deo, magnanimus gratus; et superbus amat se ut finem, magnanimus non amat se ut finem sed ut ad finem, et per hoc superbus se avertit a Deo, magnanimus se convertit ad Deum; et superbus amat se ut quoddam per se totum, magnanimus amat se ut partem tocius universi creaturarum Dei vel generis humani vel unius civitatis vel unius collegii, et per hoc superbus est invidus, magnanimus est benivolus ad alios.257 Differunt eciam in contempnendo, quia superbus contempnit proximum in bono, magnanimus in malo. Nam magnanimus contempnit in proximo falsam oppinionem et falsum judicium et malam et irracionabilem offensam et irracionabile odium, sic quod nec propter oppinionem aliorum dimitteret veritatem, nec propter offensam nec propter odium declinandum committeret aliquam turpitudinem. Superbus vero contempnit offensam racionabilem, sic quod propter eam non dimitteret vanitatem suam; contempnit quoque aliorum bona vera, ut bonos mores, bona opera, bona facta, bona dicta. Differenter eciam appetunt excellenciam, quia superbus appetit eam in honoribus formaliter sumptis et fallacibus reverenciis, ut de Phariseis Veritas ait, “Amant primos recubitus in cenis et primas cathedras in sinagogis et salutaciones in foro” (Mathei vicesimo tercio capitulo). Magnanimus vero appetit 20 quoque α etiam Bβ (cf. textum Geraldi, n257 ad fin.: “contemnit etiam”)

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magnanimous man rightly despises others because he has good reason (5 ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ, δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς). Though it seems at the outset as if Geraldus and Cartagena merely build on the first part of this position, Arist.’s last point shows their views are in fact incompatible, the difference lying in the Christians’ notion of humility as a virtue, or rather a religious imperative, and vanity as not just a vice but a sin. It is curious, then, that both churchmen were nonetheless so anxious to keep magnanimity among the virtues (Geraldus devoted a further questio to proving it is a virtue). Cartagena’s compromised political and interested motives for wanting to do so are obvious, given the social class of his audience, even so, his argument need not be dismissed, for this chapter, like the rest of MV, is not apologetic but “directive”; that is to say, he uses the point to inculcate a particular outlook, a specific idea for controlling or tempering the overweening power and pride of a belligerent aristocracy through a more co-operative, more universal, more religious concept of honour and hierarchy. quantum ad primum: Geraldus’s questio (Guiral Ot 1500 iv qu.27, f. 83ra), from which Cartagena quotes the corpus (“Dicendum”) almost verbatim, opens as follows: Questio xxvii. De quarto arguitur quod omnis magnanimus sit superbus. [1] Primo quidem quia omnis amator sui et contemptor Dei vel proximi est superbus; […] magnanimi enim despectores videntur. […] [2] 2° quia amor proprie excellentie est superbia, ut ait Aug. 5° de innocentia, sed magnanimus amat se et vult superexcellere. […] [3] 3° quia omnis vanigloriosus est superbus, ut ait Greg. in Mor., sed magnanimus videtur vanigloriosus. […] [6] 6° quia fugit humilitatem ut hic dicitur, quare superbus esse videtur.

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himself as his own cause, whereas the magnanimous man loves himself as an effect of God, so the proud man is ungrateful to God, the magnanimous man grateful; and the proud man loves himself as an end, the magnanimous man loves himself not as an end but for some end, so the proud man turns away from God, the magnanimous man turns toward God; and the proud man loves himself as something whole in itself, the magnanimous man loves himself as part of the whole universe of God’s creatures or the human race or a single city or corporation, so the proud man is envious, the magnanimous man wellwishing to others. They differ likewise in disdaining, because the proud man disdains his fellows for their goodness, the magnanimous man for their evil. The magnanimous man disdains his fellow man’s false opinion and false judgment and bad and irrational offence and irrational hatred, to such an extent that he would not abandon the truth for the sake of other people’s opinion or offence, nor commit some baseness to avoid their hatred. The proud man, on the other hand, disdains rational offence, and would not abandon his vanity for the sake of it; he also disdains the true goods of others such as good conduct, good works, good deeds, good words. They likewise seek pre-eminence differently, because the proud man seeks it in formal shows of honour and false acts of reverence; as Truth says of the Pharisees, “They love to have the place of honour at banquets and the best seats in the synagogues, and to be greeted with respect in the market-places” (Mt 23). The magnanimous man, on the other hand, seeks pre-eminences in true good Sed oppositum arguitur: 1° quia omnis superbus fugit commonentem, […] sed magnanimus non […] 2° quia nullus humilis est superbus, sed magnanimus est humilis. […] Dicendum ergo quod nullus vere magnanimus est superbus, quamvis convenire videatur in multis, cum uterque sit amator sui et uterque contemptor proximi, et uterque appetit excellentiam et uterque velit laudem, famam, et gloriam. Cuius causa est quia circa hec quatuor differenter se habent. Superbus enim amat se ut principium sui, magnanimus vero amat se ut effectum Dei. Item superbus amat se ut finem, magnanmus vero amat se non ut finem, et per hoc ille se avertit a Deo et iste se convertit ad Deum. Item superbus amat se ut quoddam per se totum, magnanmus vero se ut partem totius universi creaturarum Dei vel generis humani vel unius civitatis vel unius collegii, hinc ille invidus et iste benivolus ad alios efficitur. Differenter etiam contemnunt, quia superbus contemnit proximum in bono, magnanimus autem in malo. Magnanimus enim contemnit in proximo falsam opinionem et falsum iudicium et malam et irrationabilem offensam et irrationabile odium, sic quod nec propter opinionem nec propter iudicium dimitteret veritatem nec propter offensam nec propter odium declinandum committeret aliquam turpitudinem, […] superbus vero contemnit offensam rationabilem, sic quod propter eam non dimitteret vanitatem suam, contemnit etiam aliorum bona, puta bonos mores, bona opera, bona facta, bona dicta.

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excellencias in operibus bonis et veris; ideo superbus est vanus, magnanimus est bonus et virtuosus.258 Et superbus appetit excellere ultra propriam dignitatem, magnanimus non sic sed secundum dignitatem propriam; et superbus appetit excellere, si aliter non potest, cum aliorum depressione, ut saltim aliis depressis ipse appareat eminens et excellens, magnanimus vero appetit excellere pro sua et aliorum promocione, non enim appetit excellere ut excellat sed ut seipsum et alios usque ad ultimum de potencia ad bona opera animet, provocet, et promoveat, quod meritorium est, unde Apostolus ait, “Si quis episcopatum desiderat, bonum opus desiderat” (prima ad Thimoteum capitulo tercio), quod decretiste exponunt non ut presit sed ut prosit, quia desiderare preesse superbie est, desiderare prodesse ex karitate procedit, unde Augustinus ait, “Intelligat se non esse episcopum qui preesse dilexerit, non prodesse”, et post pauca “ocium sanctum querit karitas veritatis, negocium justum succipit neccesitas karitatis; quam sarcinam si nullus imponit, percipiende atque intuende vacandum est veritati; si autem imponitur, suscipienda est propter necessitatem karitatis” (Octava, questione prima, c. Qui episcopatum).259 Differenter eciam appetunt gloriam, quia superbus appetit eam sibi ut bonum proprium, magnanimus vero non appetit sibi nec ut bonum proprium sed in hoc quod honoratur, famatur, vel laudatur vult gloriam Deo, ut Deus glorificetur in ipso, et vult honorem ut bonum honorantis ipsum vel ut bonum aspicientis qui ex hoc animatur ut imitetur magnanimum. Concludendum est ergo quod nullus magnanimus est superbus et nullus superbus est magnanimus, ymo econtra omnis magnanimus est humilis, ut

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Differenter eciam appetunt excellenciam: the compilation of Geraldus continues (ibid., f. 83ra–b): Differenter eciam appetunt excellenciam, quia superbus appetit eam in honoribus formaliter sumptis et fallacibus reverenciis, magnanimus vero in operibus bonis et veris, et per hoc ille est vanus et iste bonus et verus. Item superbus appetit excellere ultra propriam dignitatem, magnanimus vero secundum propriam dignitatem; item superbus appetit excellere, si aliter non potest, cum amborum depressione, ut saltim aliis depressis ipse appareat eminens et excellens, magnanimus vero appetit excellere pro sua et aliorum promotione, non enim appetit excellere ut excellat sed ut seipsum et alios ad ultimum de potentia in bonis operibus animet, provocet, et promoveat. Differenter etiam appetunt gloriam, quoniam superbus appetit eam sibi ut bonum proprium, magnanimus vero non sibi nec ut bonum proprium sed in hoc quod honoratur, famatur, vel laudatur vult gloriam Deo, ut Deus glorificetur in ipso, et vult eam ut bonum honorantis ipsum vel ut bonum aspicientis qui ex hoc animatur ut imitetur magnanimum. Et sic patet quod nullus magnanimus est superbus et quod nullus superbus est magnanimus.

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works; so the proud man is vain, the magnanimous man good and virtuous. The proud man also seeks to be pre-eminent beyond his proper worth; not so the magnanimous man, who does so according to his proper worth. And the proud man seeks to be pre-eminent, if he cannot do it otherwise, by demeaning others, so that at least by demeaning others he may appear eminent and outstanding; whereas the magnanimous man seeks to be pre-eminent for his own and others advantage, for he does not seek pre-eminence for the sake of it, but so as to encourage, challenge, and lead himself and others to good works in the utmost possible degree, which is meritorious, for as the Apostle says, “whoever aspires to the office of bishop [epískopos ‘overseer’] desires a noble task” (1 Tim 3), which the decretists gloss “not to govern but to do good”, because to want to govern belongs to pride, to want to do good comes from charity, whence Augustine says, “Let him who loves to govern rather than to do good understand that he is no bishop”, and a little later, “the love of truth requires leisure, but it is the necessity of love to undertake just business; if no one imposes this burden we must remain free to find and contemplate truth, but if it is imposed we must undertake it through the necessity of love” (C.8.1.11 Qui episcopatum). They likewise seek glory differently, because the proud man seeks it for himself and as a good of his own, whereas the magnanimous man does not seek it for himself or as a good of his own; through the honour, fame, or praise accorded to him he wishes glory for God, that God may be glorified in him, and he wants honour as a good for the one that honours him or as a good for the onlooker who is thereby encouraged to imitate the magnanimous man. We may therefore conclude that no magnanimous man is proud, and no proud man is magnanimous; on the contrary, indeed, every magnanimous man

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Dicendum igitur simul ad tria prima obiecta [ad 1, 2, 3] quod aliter et aliter superbus et magnanimus sunt amatores sui et contemptores proximi, et appetitores excellentie et glorie, ut visum est. […] [ad 6] Ad sextam dictum est supra quod magnanimus non fugit veram humilitatem et liberam sed fugit falsam et servilem, per hoc tamen non deberet dici superbus, but is supplemented from Geraldus’s next questio, Guiral Ot 1500 iv qu.28, f. 83va: “contemnit excellentiam in honoribus, id est in illis reverentiis et signis fallacibus; non enim vult primos accubitus in cenis nec primas cathedras in synagogis nec primas salutationes in foro nec vocari ab hominibus ‘rabi’ sicut hypocrite superbi.” appetit excellere ~ dignitatem propriam: from the first lines above, but by chapter and verse: Veritas ait: Mt 23:6–7. Apostolus ait: 1 Tim 3:1. Augustinus ait: Decretum C.8.1.11 in c. (= August. De civ. D. xix.19).

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diximus.260 Ad cujus intelligenciam est sciendum quod verus humilis secundum duplicem comparacionem vilescit sibi ipsi, et secundum aliam duplicem comparacionem non vilescit sibi sed dignificat seipsum; quod declaratur sic. Primo, in quantum humilis comparat se ipsum ut cum qui bene passus est ad Deum qui benefecit ei et multa bona illi contulit, reputat se vilem in conspectu Dei; et hoc modo omnis magnanimus vilescit sibi ipsi, quia verecundatur beneficiatus existens pro eo quod beneficiari est superexcelli et beneficiare est superexcellere. Et hinc est quod ille magnanimus et humilis David dicebat, “ludam ante Dominum et vilior fiam plusquam factus sum, et ero humilis in occulis meis” (secundo Regum capitulo sexto).261 Secunda comparacio est in quantum humilis comparat illud quod nunc valet ad illud quod in futurum valere potest, et secundum hanc vilescit sibi ipsi; et hic idem est modus magnanimi, cui nichil est magnum in comparacione ejus quod esse potest.262 Et istud vilescere excitat multum hominem humilem ad bene agendum. Econtra secundum duplicem comparacionem non vilescit sibi ipsi sed dignificat se. Quarum prima est quando humilis comparat illud quod habet ad illud quod fuit et habuit ante noticiam sui, et secundum hanc non vilescit sibi, ymo se multum dignificans gracias agit Deo a quo accepit illud quod est et quod boni habet; et hoc idem facit magnanimus. Secunda, in quantum humilis comparat quantum nunc cum virtute et humilitate valet ad illud quod deserta virtute sine humilitate valeret, et secundum hanc non sibi vilescit, sicut nec magnanimus, ymo in hac comparacione multum se dignificat, ut magnanimus.

53 illi αB ei β 61 ejus α illius Bβ melius secundum secundam 260

261

62 secundum Ω (segund dos conparaçiones [sic] Mcast);

omnis magnanimus est humilis: this paragraph goes on to summarize the end of Geraldus’s second questio (Guiral Ot 1500 iv qu.28 ad 1, f. 83ra–vb, at 83va), having used other parts of it elsewhere (e.g. n241): Questio xxvii[i]. De quinto arguitur quod nullus magnanimus sit humilis. [1] Primo quia omnis vere humilis contemnit se et non dignificat se, magnanimus vero econverso se habet, quare non est humilis. […] Dicendum ergo [ad 1] ad primam quod humilis in duplici comparatione sibi vilescit et in alia duplici nequaquam sibi viilescit. Humilis namque comparans seipsum ut eum qui bene passus est ad Deum qui benefecit ei et multa bona contulit ei vilescit in conspectu Dei; et hoc modo sibi ipsi vilescit omnis magnanimus qui verecundatur beneficiatus existens pro eo quod beneficiari est superexcessi et beneficiare superexcedentis. David dicebat: Cartagena adds this text, 2 Sam 6:22 “et ludam et vilior fiam plus quam factus sum et ero humilis in oculis meis, et cum ancillis de quibus locuta es gloriosior apparebo.” It is not adduced as a proof-text, however, but as an exemplum: King David, a royal figure who was both “magnanimous” and “humble”.

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is humble, as I have said. To understand this we must know that the truly humble man is low in his own eyes by one twofold comparison, and by another twofold comparison is not low in his own eyes but deems himself worthy. The explanation is as follows. First, insofar as the humble man, as beneficiary, compares himself to God who has favoured him and conferred many goods upon him, he regards himself as low in the sight of God; and in this way every magnanimous man is low in his own eyes because he is ashamed to be a beneficiary, since to be benefited is to be surpassed in excellence and to benefit is to surpass in excellence; and so the magnanimous and humble David said, “therefore will I play before the Lord, And make myself more vile than I have done, and will be base in mine own sight” (2Kings [= Sam] 6). The second comparison is insofar as the humble man compares what he is now worth to what he can be worth in the future, and by this he is low in his own eyes; and the same is the way of the magnanimous man, to whom nothing is great in comparison to what he can be. This sense of lowness much arouses the humble man to do good. On the other side, by a twofold comparison he is not low in his own eyes but deems himself worthy. The first of them is when the humble man compares what he has to what he was and had before he knew himself, and by this he is not low in his own eyes but rather deems himself very worthy and gives thanks to God from Whom he received what he is and whatever good he has; and the magnanimous man does the same. Second, insofar as the humble man compares how much he is now worth with virtue and humility to what he wold be worth bereft of virtue and without humility, and by this he is not low in his own eyes, and neither is the magnanimous man; rather, by this comparison he deems himself very worthy, like the magnanimous man.

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Secunda comparacio: the summary of Geraldus (n260) resumes where it was interrupted: Item humilis comparans illud quod nunc valet ad illud quod in futurum valere potest vilescit sibi; et hoc est modus magnanimi, cu[i] nihil magnum est in comparatione ad illud quod esse potest. Istud ergo vilescere multum excitat hominem humilem ad bene agere. Item humilis comparat illud quod est et quod habet ad illud quod fuit et quod habuit ante notitiam sui, et hoc modo non vilescit sibi, immo se multum dignificans gratias agit Deo a quo accepit illud quod est et quod boni habet. Item humilis comparat quantum nunc cum virtute et humilitate valet ad illud quod deserta virtute sine humilitate valeret, et hoc non sibi vilescit; sic nec magnanimus, immo in hac comparatione multum se dignificat, ut magnanimus.

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Concludi igitur opportet ex suprascriptis quod magnanimitas est habitus electivus supponens habitum et bonitatem virtutum, prebens ornatum et majoritatem virtutibus, medians inter kaymotem, id est presumpcionem, et pusillanimitatem, et inter spem kaymi, id est presumptuosi, et desperacionem pusillanimis, secundum quem magnanimus dignus existens se ipsum dignificat et exponit altis officiis, arduis negociis, et quibuslibet bonis et magnis rebus agendis, et secundum quem est docilis et innocens et humilis et longanimus et equanimus et bene se habens circa bona honorabilia et mala inhonorabilia et circa fortuita prospera et adversa et circa pericula bellica et liberalia munera et urbanitatis signa et circa opera magnifica et amicabilia et veridica et eciam circa corporalem gestum et motum.263 Lib. 2 Cap. 17 De moderacione. Capitulum primum Est alia quedam virtus que nomen ab antiquo non habuit sed innominata est; possumus tamen eam ad clariorem intelligenciam vocare moderacionem.264 Et differt ista virtus a magnanimitate sicut liberalitas a magnificencia; ambe enim iste virtutes, scilicet liberalitas et moderacio, differunt a magnanimitate et a magnificencia sicut a quodam magno, nam sicut magnificencia est circa magnos sumptus, liberalitas vero eciam circa usum parvarum seu mediocrium diviciarum, sic magnanimitas est circa magnos honores sed ista virtus innominata quam moderacionem dicimus circa parvos seu mediocres honores. Et sicut in accepcione et dacione peccuniarum parvarum et mediocrium est medietas et superhabundancia et defectus, ut in materia liberalitatis dictum est, sic et in appetitu honoris parvi vel mediocris contingit aliquem se habere plus quam opportet, ut quia vehementius appetit honorem quam deberet vel 74–75 pusillanimis α pusillanimi β xvııȷ H 263

76 ante arduis ins. et. OBβ

Cap. 17 tit. AJ, om. OBQ Capl̛m

Concludi igitur opportet: this conclusion too is from Geraldus, namely the second half of his brief ninth questio on magnanimity, “Que eius diffinitio” (Guiral Ot 1500 iv qu.32, f. 84va): Alio autem modo potest sic dici iuxta sententiam Philosophi: quod magnanimitas est habitus supponens habitum et bonitatem virtutum, prebens ornatum et maioritatem virtutibus, medians inter chaimotem vel chaimiam et pusillanimitatem, et inter spem chaimi et desperationem pusillanimis, secundum quam magnanimus dignus existens seipsum dignificat et exponit altis officiis, arduis negociis, et quibuslibet bonis et magnis rebus agendis, secundum quem est docilis et innocens ac bene se habens circa bona honorabilia et mala inhonorabilia, circa fortuita prospera et adversa, circa pericula bellicosa, circa liberalia munera, circa urbanitatis signa, circa opera magnifica, circa amicabilia et veridica, circa magna nova et mala preterita, circa colloquia, circa domestica necessaria, circa corporalem gestum et motum. Hec autem omnia patent ex littera.

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We may conclude from the above, therefore, that magnanimity is an elective disposition presupposing a disposition and goodness of virtues, offering an ornament and increase of virtues, representing a mean between kaymousness (that is, presumption) and pusillanimity, and between the optimism of the kaymous or presumptuous man and the hopelessness of the pusillanimous, by which the magnanimous man who is worthy deems himself worthy and offers himself for high offices, hardy affairs, and the conduct of every kind of good and great affairs, and by which he is amenable, innocent, humble, broad-minded, even-tempered, and correctly behaved in regard to honourable goods and dishonourable evils, in regard to the luck of prosperity or adversity, in regard to the dangers of war, generous gifts, and the marks of politeness, in regard to magnificent, amicable, and truthful works, and even in regard to his physical bearing and movement. 2.17 On moderation. Chapter 1 There is another virtue, which had no name in antiquity and is unnamed; but for clearer understanding we may call it “moderation”. This virtue differs from magnanimity as liberality does from magnificence. Both of these virtues, namely liberality and moderation, differ from magnanimity and magnificence in the matter of greatness; for just as magnificence is concerns great expenditure but liberality also concerns the use of small or medium wealth, so too magnanimity concerns great honours but this unnamed virtue which I call moderation concerns small or medium honours. And just as there is a mean, excess, and defect in receiving and giving small and medium commodities, as explained in the heading on liberality, so too in the appetite for small or medium honour someone may behave with excess, for instance because he seeks honour more strenuously than he should or for the wrong reason or in

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Cartagena omits one or two phrases, but is careful to add “humilis et longanimus et equanimus”. virtus que nomen ab antiquo non habuit: EN 1125b1–25//Sent. Eth. iv.12. For Arist. and his glossators φιλοτιμία/philotimia and its extremes, both called ἀφιλοτιμία/aphilotimia, are a mere footnote to magnanimity; thus Guiral Ot 1500 iv.19, ff. 80va–81ra groups them together, and adds a questio, “Utrum euphilotimia sit virtus distincta a magnanimitate” (qu.34, ff. 84vb–85ra). It is Cartagena who names it moderacio, from its definition as “circa mediocres honores”—a term doubtless intentionally ambivalent, to make it simpler and less seemingly irrelevant to a princely reader; but with the exception of the name his conclusion is quoted from Geraldus’s final questio on magnanimity, “Diffinitio euphilotimiae” (Guiral Ot 1500 iv qu.35 f. 85ra; n265, below).

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ex causa indebita vel ubi non opportet vel magis quam opportet; interdum econtra appetit minus quam deberet. Quando ergo aliquis se habet medie circa parvos vel mediocres honores, videlicet quia appetit honorari quando et qualiter et in quantum opportet, dicitur tenere medium. Et sic patet quod circa hos mediocres et parvos honores est accipere medium virtuosum et extrema viciosa, sicut circa mediocres vel parvas peccunias. Apparet autem hoc ex communi usu loquendi; videmus enim quod quandoque vituperamus aliquem amatorem honoris quasi appetat honorem magis quam opportet et unde non opportet, et similiter quandoque vituperamus eum qui non est amator honoris quia putamus quod non vellit bona operari ex quibus honoretur. Econtrario eciam laudamus eum qui est amator honoris quasi virilem et habentem magnum animum et quasi amatorem boni, id est actus virtuosi cui debetur honor; et similiter laudamus interdum eum qui non est amator honoris quasi moderantem et temperantem seipsum et non excedentem suam condicionem. Cum ergo laudamus et vituperamus amatorem honoris, sequitur quod multipliciter dicitur amor honoris, nam non referimus laudem et vituperium ad eandem rem, nec enim unam eandemque rem laudaremus et vituperaremus, quia essemus nobis ipsis contrarii. Sed cum laudamus amatorem honoris habemus respectum ad hoc, quia studet circa illa quibus debetur honor, id est circa actus virtuosos, magis quam communiter alii multi studeant; et hinc est quod, laudando aliquando aliquos, dicimus quod laborant multum pro honore, quasi diceremus quod insudant actibus virtuosis quibus debetur honor. Quando vero vituperamus amatorem honoris habemus respectum ad hoc, quia magis cupit honores quam opporteat; et sepe vocantur isti ambiciosi, quia insistunt ultra quam deberent ad consequendum officia vel dignitates propter quas honorentur. Sunt ergo ista extrema vituperabilia in quantum appetitur honor plus vel minus quam opportet, medium autem est laudabile, scilicet appetere et contempnere honorem secundum quod opportet, id est secundum debitam mensuram racionis. Et quia ista medietas circa appetitum honoris est innominata, ideo extrema videntur esse dubia, in quantum quandoque laudantur, quandoque vituperantur, ut diximus; sed tamen cum sit dare extrema, scilicet quod aliqui appetant honorem magis et minus quam opportet, consequens est quod eciam aliqui appetant secundum quod opportet, quod pertinet ad racionem medii, et quia iste habitus medius est innominatus, nominatur plerumque nominibus extremorum, quia per comparacionem ad unum extremum videtur habere similitudinem cum alio extremo. Nam hec medietas per respectum ad contemptum honoris videtur esse superfluus amor

19 hoc αB hoc et β (Esto aun se demuestra del común uso Mcast)

33 aliquando α interdum Bβ

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the wrong circumstances or of a greater kind than is fitting; and sometimes, on the contrary, he seeks less than he should. Therefore when someone follows a middle way in regard to small or medium honours, namely by seeking to be honoured when and how and to the extent that it is fitting, he is said to keep to the mean. Thus it is clear that in regard to these medium and small honours we must accept that a virtuous mean and extremes of vice exist, as in regard to medium or small commodities. Common usage also makes this clear. We see that we sometimes criticize a lover of honour on the grounds that he seeks honour more than he should and from the wrong source, and similarly we sometimes criticize one who is not a lover of honour because we think he would be unwilling to do good acts for which he would be honoured. By contrast, we also praise a lover of honour as manly and high-minded and as a lover of good, that is of virtuous action worthy of honour; and similarly we sometimes praise one who is not a lover of honour as moderate, self-controlled, and not overstepping his station. Since we both praise and criticize the lover of honour, then, it follows that “love of honour” has multiple meanings, for we do not apply praise and criticism to the same thing; we would not praise and criticize one and the same thing because that would be to contradict ourselves. Whenever we praise a lover of honour we refer to the fact that he exerts himself in things that deserve honour, that is in virtuous acts, more than many others commonly do, and so it is that sometimes when praising certain men we say that they “labour hard on behalf of honour”, as if to say they sweat away at virtuous acts that deserve honour; whereas when we criticize a lover of honour we refer to the fact that he lusts for honours more than he should, and such men are often called “ambitious” because they devote themselves more than they should to acquiring offices or ranks to gain honour. The extremes of seeking honour more or less than is fitting are to be condemned, while the mean of seeking or disdaining honour in a fitting way, that is, according to due rational measure, is praiseworthy; but because this mean regarding the appetite for honour has no name, the extremes appear doubtful, being sometimes praised, sometimes criticized, as I have said; nevertheless, since it is possible to talk of extremes, namely that some people seek honour more or less than is fitting, it follows also that some people seek it fittingly, which pertains to a rational mean. But as this middle disposition is unnamed, it is most often called by the names of the extremes, since in comparison to one extreme it seems to have some similarity to the other extreme; thus compared to contempt of honour this mean looks like a superfluous love of honour, and compared to superfluous love of honour it looks like contempt

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honoris, et per respectum ad superfluum amorem honoris videtur esse contemptus honoris, sicut fortis per respectum ad timidum videtur audax et per respectum ad audacem videtur timidus, et liberalis per respectum ad prodigum videtur illiberalis et per respectum ad illiberalem videtur prodigus; et quia ista virtus non habet nomen certum, ideo extrema non videntur ei opponi, sed opponuntur sibi ipsis adinvicem, quia contemptus honoris opponitur amori honoris et amor honoris opponitur contemptui honoris. Sed ad planiorem ejus cognicionem possumus nominare istam virtutem moderacionem, ut suprascripsimus. Est ergo moderacio habitus secundum rectam racionem electivus et amativus et viriliter executivus boni honorabilis per hominem haberi possibilis mediocris vel parvi, medians inter excessivum et defectivum amorem honoris et inter invirilem diffidenciam et insipientem confidenciam, supponens aliqualem sufficienciam virium et virtutum, et inclinans ad frequenciam boni usus earum.265 Dicetur ergo moderatus ille qui se habet ut opportet et secundum debitam mensuram racionis circa parvos et mediocres honores; nam circa magnos honores non hec virtus sed magnanimitas consistit, ut dictum est. Lib. 2 Cap. 18 De mansuetudine. Capitulum primum Circa iram inveniuntur medium et extrema; et medium proprie acceptum est innominatum et fere eciam extrema, quia non expressis nominibus distinguntur; sed nominatur ista medietas mansuetudo, non ex vigore nominis, quia de proprietate vocabuli hoc nomen magis declinat ad defectum ire; dicitur enim aliquis mansuetus ex eo quod non irascitur quia manu assuetus, ad similitudinem bestiarum que iracundiam deponunt manibus hominum assuete.266 Ipse

59–64 Est ergo moderacio ~ usus earum om. Bβ 61 -ans inter usque ad ii.18 44 quod patet lacuna unius fol. J 66 virtus om. β Cap. 18 tit. AO (deficit in J), om. BQ Capl̛m xɩx H 265

Est ergo moderacio habitus: Guiral Ot 1500 iv qu.35 f. 85ra reads: Questio xxxv. De duodecimo etiam sine argumentis dupliciter dici potest. Uno modo, quod euphilotimia secundum descriptionem est rectum ac purum, firmum et efficax fiduciale desiderium boni per hominis sufficientiam possibilis obtineri; expone ut supra. Alio modo potest sic describi: quod euphilotimia est habitus secundum rectam rationem electivus et amativus et viriliter executivus boni honorabilis per hominem haberi possibilis, medians inter excessum et defectum philotimie et inter invirilem diffidentiam et insipientem confidentiam, supponens aliqualem sufficientiam virium et virtutum et inclinans ad sequentiam boni usus earum. The β branch cancelled the sentence, clearly on purpose (note consequent omission of “virtus”), but if this was an authorial deletion the reason is a mystery. That its original inclusion was deliberate, not some interpolated marginal gloss, is proven by the careful substitution of moderacio for euphilotimia and other adaptive touches.

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of honour, just as compared to a cowardly man the brave man looks audacious and compared to an audacious one he looks timid, or compared to a prodigal man the generous man looks ungenerous and compared to an ungenerous one he looks prodigal. So because this virtue has no certain name, the extremes appear not to be opposed to it, but rather to each other: contempt of honour is opposed to love of honour, and love of honour to contempt of honour. For its plainer recognition, then, we may call this virtue moderation, as I have written above. Moderation, therefore, is an elective disposition according to right reason, loving and manfully executive of the medium or small honourable good that is possible for a man to have, representing a mean between excessive and defective love of honour and between unmanly diffidence and foolish confidence, presupposing some sufficiency of powers and virtues and inclining to frequency in their good use. Hence the name “moderate” will be given to the man who behaves fittingly and according to due rational measure with regard to small and medium honours; for great honours are the concern not of this virtue but of magnanimity, as I have said. 2.18 On meekness. Chapter 1 Concerning anger we find a mean and extremes; properly speaking, the mean is unnamed, and more or less the same is true of the extremes because they are not distinguished by express names; but this mean is called meekness, not in this noun’s strict meaning, because the word’s real sense suggests rather the defect of anger; “meek” [mansŭētus] means someone who does not get angry, from “hand trained” [mănū assŭētus] like beasts that are tamed by men’s hands to lay aside their fury. The disorderly defect of anger is also unnamed, because

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medium ~ innominatum: πραότης and its extremes ὀργιλότης (iracundia) and ἀοργησία (inirascibilitas; Cartagena, “eciam dicitur mansuetudo”) are discussed in EN 1125b26– 1126b10/Sent. Eth. iv.13, from which the following two chapters are compiled. Cartagena simplifies Aquinas, using Geraldus to do so, but his chief concern is with the contradictions between (a) the Christian view of ira “anger” as a deadly sin; (b) “mildness” tending to “tameness”, as Sent. Eth. defines mansuetudo (“ad similitudinem bestiarum”), making it also a defectus; and (c) his peers’ concept of nobles as bellatores. Hence he adds legal sources and a lenthy exemplum in ii.19 to realign mansuetude with a ruler’s clemency. ex vigore nominis: one might expect rigore, but the witnesses are unanimous (apart from J, which lacks a leaf at this point) and Aquinas reads vi (iv.13.1 “cum tamen ex vi nominis magis declinet ad defectum irae”). Cartagena perhaps found vigore in his copy and took it in the legal sense “current validity, usage” (Mcast “en la fuerça del nombre”; Du Cange viii, 328 s.v. “consuetudo, usus”, citing charters of s. xiv “bonis usis et vigoribus”, “juribus et vigoribus”; vigorare “corroborare”, etc.).

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eciam defectus inordinatus ire est innominatus, quia dicitur aliquis mansuetus qualitercumque non irascitur, sive bene sive male. Medietas ergo dicitur mansuetudo et defectus ire eciam dicitur mansuetudo; superhabundancia vero vocatur iracundia. Est autem iracundia vicium seu extremum, quia importat quendam superexcessum ire, que est passio quedam que ex multis et differentibus rebus fit; et ita secundum harum diversitatem contingit in ira accipere medium et extrema. Ille igitur qui irascitur in quibus rebus opportet et in quibus personis et sicut et quando et quanto tempore opportet, talis homo laudatur et iste dicitur mansuetus, secundum quod nomen mansuetudinis accipitur in laudem; et assignantur mansueto sex proprietates. Prima, quod est inperturbatus, quia interius judicium sue racionis non perturbatur ab ira. Secunda, quod non ducitur passione ad irascendum, sed racioni et ejus ordinacioni subicitur in eo passio ire, ita quod in illis rebus et tanto tempore irascitur ut racio ordinat. Tercia, quod observat omnes circunstancias secundum quas opportunum est irasci et non irasci. Quarta, quod videtur magis declinare ad defectum ire quam ad excessum. Quinta, quod non est punitivus nec vindicativus. Sexta, quod est condonativus et remissivus offense et injurie.267 Est ergo mansuetudo habitus secundum racionem electivus et operativus moderaminis ire, medians inter plus quam opportet irasci et inter minus vel omnino non irasci et inter iracundiam et inirascibilitatem, reddens animum non perturbatum, non passione ire ductum, racione compositum et ordinatum, minus punitivum et magis venie donativum.268 Defectus a medio, licet non habeat speciale nomen, ut diximus, potest tamen vocari inirascibilitas per oppositum ad superhabundanciam ire que dicitur iracundia. Iste autem defectus vicium est, quod probatur triplici racione. Prima est: omne quod pertinet ad insipienciam est vituperabile, quia laus virtutis est in hoc quod operatur secundum rectam racionem prudencie, sed ad insipienciam videtur pertinere quod aliquis non irascatur in quibus opportet et eo modo et tempore et quibus personis irasci opportet, quod patet ex eo quia

11 superexcessum AOB excessum β 267

sex proprietates: added to Sent. Eth. iv.13.3 from Geraldus’s lectio (Guiral Ot 1500 iv.20, f. 85va): tangit sex conditiones mansueti que sunt iste: prima, quod mansuetus est imperturbatus et hoc ‘vult’ [EN 1125b34 βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος ἀτάραχος εἶναι], id est hoc exigit natura mansuetudinis. Secunda, quod passione non ducitur. Tertia, quod rationi et eius ordinationi subiicit quantum ad omnes circumstantias secundum quas opportunum est irasci et non irasci. Quarta, quod ad defectum ire magis quam ad accessum declinare videtur. Quinta, quod non est punitivus nec vindicativus. Sexta, quod est offense et injurie condonativus et remissivus.

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anyone who does not become enraged for whatever reason, good or bad, is called “meek”; hence the mean is called meekness and the defect of anger is also called meekness, while the excess is called rage. Rage, then, is a vice or extreme because it implies some over-excess of anger, which is an emotion that arises from many different things; and so according to this diversity of causes we must accept that anger has both a mean and extremes. Hence the sort of man who gets angry about the things he should, against the persons and in the manner and when and for the amount of time he should, is praised and called meek. By this measure “meekness” is a term of praise, and the meek man is assigned six properties. First, he is imperturbable, because the innermost judgement of his reason is not perturbed by anger. Second, he is not led to get angry by passion; in him the emotion of anger is subjected to orderly reason, so that he gets angry about the things and for the length of time that reason dictates. Third, he observes all the circumstances according to which it is appropriate to get angry or not. Fourth, he is seen to deviate more towards the defect of anger than its excess. Fifth, he is neither punitive nor vindictive. Sixth, he is forgiving and remissive of insult and injury. Meekness, therefore, is a rational elective disposition exercising control of anger, representing a mean between being more angry than one should and less or altogether not angry, and between rage and impassivity, rendering the mind unperturbed, not led by passion, composed and ordered by reason, less punitive and more willing to forgive. The defect from the mean, though as I said it has no special name, can be called impassivity in opposition to the excess of anger which is called rage. That this defect is a vice is proven by three reasons. First, everything that pertains to foolishness is blameworthy because what is praiseworthy about virtue is the fact that it acts according to the right reason of practical wisdom; but it seems foolishness for someone not to get angry at the things he should, in the way and at the time and with the persons he should be angry. This is clear because anger

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Est ergo mansuetudo habitus: likewise added from Geraldus, but this time from his second questio, “Utrum mansuetudo sit virtus differens a clementia” (Guiral Ot 1500 iv qu.37 in c., f. 86va): Dicendum ergo primo quod mansuetudo est moralis virtus, 2° quia differens a clementia. Primum probatur quia omnis habitus electivus laudabilis est virtus moralis; sed mansuetudo est habitus, ut patet per eius descriptionem collectam ex textu. Mansuetudo enim est habitus secundum rationem electivus et operativus moderaminis ire, medians inter plus quam oportet irasci et inter minus vel omnino non irasci, et inter iracundiam et [in]irascibilitatem [1482, sign. r7rb, et passim alibi in 1500] reddens animum non perturbatum, non passione ire ductum, recte [MV: rõe racione pro rcẽ recte] compositum et ordinatum, minus punitivum et magis venie donativum.

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ira causatur ex tristicia, que est sensus nocumenti; si igitur aliquis non irascitur in quibus opportet irasci, sequitur quod non dolet de eis, et ita quod non sentiat ea esse mala, quod pertinere videtur ad insipienciam. Ergo sequitur quod defectus ire est vituperabilis. Secunda racio est: ira est appetitus vindicte; qui ergo non irascitur in quibus debet irasci, consequens est quod non vindicet ea que debet vindicare, quod est vituperabile. Non est autem hoc intelligendum quasi non possit aliqua vindicta ex judicio racionis sine ira fieri, nam hoc falsum esset, sed quia motus ire excitatus ex judicio racionis facit hominem promptiorem ad recte vindicandum que vindicanda sunt, quod patet quia nisi appetitus sensitivus adjuvaret ad exequendum judicium racionis frustra esset in natura humana vis appetibilis, sicut in fortitudine diximus, in cujus actibus judicium racionis coadjuvatur per furorem supervenientem. Sic ira non debet prevenire judicium racionis, sed sequi et deservire ei in quibus et quando et quantum opportet. Tercia racio est quia ad servilem animum pertinet quod aliquis despiciat familiares suos et quod sustineat injuriantes sibi, ita quod non repellat injurias debito modo et cum moderamine racionis. Et hinc est quod legiste dicunt quod vim et injuriam propulsare licitum est “cum moderamine inculpate tutelle”.269 Hoc autem contingit ex magno defectu ire, quia per hunc redditur homo piger et remissus ad repellendum injurias; unde patet quod talis defectus ire est vituperabilis. Lib. 2 Cap. 19 [De mansuetudine.] Capitulum secundum Superhabundancia ire quam iracundiam dicimus evenit multipliciter secundum diversas circunstancias, videlicet quod aliquis irascatur quibus personis non opportet, et in quibus rebus non deberet, et magis quam opportet, et velocius prevocetur ad iram et majori tempore duret ira quam opportet.270 Omnes tamen isti excessus conjuncti non invenirentur in uno homine, tum propter molestiam quam ipse ex sua ira pateretur quam non posset tollerare, tum eciam quia esset aliis in tantum molestus quod non posset inter homines vivere; et sic

38 sequitur AO (síguese Mcast) patet Bβ (et Sent. Eth. iv.13.5) 40 consequens est AO (consiguiente que Mcast) sequitur β (et Sent. Eth. iv.13.6) Cap. 19 tit. αB, corr. iij in marg. J, om. Q Capl̛m xx H 269

legiste dicunt: this paragraph on mansuetudo’s defect summarizes Sent. Eth. iv.13.4–7, but strengthens the idea of “right” anger by citing Cod. viii.4.1 Unde vi recte possidenti “Recte possidenti ad defendendam possessionem, quam sine vitio tenebat, inculpatae tutelae moderatione illatam vim propulsare licet”. Canon law holds the same: X. v.12.18 Significasti nobis “vim vi repellere omnes leges et omnia iura permittant; quia tamen id debet fieri cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae, non ad sumendam vindictam sed ad iniuriam propulsandam.”

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is caused by grief caused by a sense of hurt; if someone does not get angry at things he should be angry about, it follows that he is not upset by them, and so that he does not feel them to be bad, which seems to denote foolishness. Hence it follows that the defect of anger is blameworthy. The second reason is: anger is an appetite for redress, so if someone does not get angry at the things he should be angry about it follows that he does not redress the things he should redress, which is blameworthy. This does not mean that it is somehow impossible for there to be any rationally judged redress without anger, for that would be false, but rather that the movement of anger aroused by rational judgment makes man more ready to correctly redress what should be redressed, as is clear from the fact that if the sensory appetite did not assist in carrying out the judgment of reason, man’s natural appetitive faculty would be in vain, as explained in fortitude, in the acts of which the rational judgment is assisted by the onset of fury. So anger should not prevent rational judgment but follow and serve it in the things and when and to the extent that is fitting. The third reason is that for someone to disdain his own household and put up with those that affront him to the extent of not repelling affronts in due manner and within rational bounds is a sign of a servile mind; hence lawyers say that it is lawful to fend off violence and insult “within the bounds of blameless self-defence”. But this comes about from a great defect of anger, which renders a man lazy and remiss in fending off affronts; whence it is clear that such defect of anger is blameworthy. 2.19 [On meekness.] Chapter 2 The excess of anger which we call rage comes about in many ways according to different circumstances, namely if someone gets angry with persons he should not and about things he ought not and more than he should, or if he is provoked to anger more quickly and his anger lasts more time than is fitting. However, these excesses are not all found together in one man, both because the trouble he would suffer from his own anger would be intolerable and also because he would be so troublesome to others that it would be impossible for him to live in

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Superhabundancia ire: this chapter resumes Sent. Eth. iv.13.8–15, with its distinction of three kinds of anger: ἀκρόχολοι veloces/cholerici, πικροί amari/melancholici, χαλεποί difficiles/graves (EN 1126a13–28; Guiral Ot 1500 iv qu.38 “Utrum species iracundie sint bene distincte”, f. 86v makes them four: velox, amara, acuta, difficilis). The last two are contemptibly vulgar (the second, melancholy, the one specially associated with those low dogs, scholars), but Cartagena regards the first as more aristocratic and relevant to his readers (“principes plerumque moventur per hanc speciem”); he expatiates upon it at length (nn271–272).

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est in omnibus aliis malis, quia non possent omnia mala integre esse in uno eodemque homine, nam destruerent eum, sed diversa mala sunt in diversis hominibus. Ista autem superhabundancia ire reducitur ad tres species. Quarum prima est illorum qui velociter irascuntur et quibus personis et in quibus rebus non opportet et magis quam opportet, sed velociter requiescunt ab ira nec ira eorum durat multo tempore. Et hoc est optimum in eis, quod accidit ex eo quod non retinent iram in corde interius sed statim prorumpunt exterius vel retribuendo vindictam vel qualitercumque manifestando iram suam per verba vel facta vel alia signa propter velocitatem motus ire, et sic ira exterius exalata requiescunt, sicut calor inclusus magis conservatur, et evaporans citius evanescit. Et ad hanc speciem ire maxime videntur disponi colerici propter subtilitatem et velocitatem colere; et isti sic superhabundantes vocantur Grece acrocoli, id est extremi in ira, quia sunt acuti et prompti ut irascantur circa omnia.271 Et hinc est quod ex eo quod principes plerumque moventur per hanc speciem ire ad irrogandum graviores penas quam in jure contineantur, statutum est in jure civili quod sentencia principis per quam mandat aliquem severius puniri quam consuevit non mandetur exequucioni usque ad triginta dies, ut sit spacium in quo transeat passio ire, que pia et racionabilis constitucio incepit a Theodosio Cesare propter quendam casum qui ei accidit quem narrat Ecclesiastica hystoria in hunc modum: Cum apud Thesalonicam sedicione exorta quidam vir ex militaribus impetu fuisset populi furentis extinctus, Theodosius repentini nuncii atrocitate succensus ad ludos Circenses invitari populum eique ex improviso circumfundi milites atque obtruncare passim, ut quisque occurrisset, gladio jubet et vindictam dare non crimini sed furori; ob hoc cum a sacerdotibus Ytalie redargueretur, agnovit delictum culpamque cum lacrimis professus publicam penitenciam in conspectu tocius ecclesie exegit, et in hoc

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vocantur Grece acrocoli: EN 1126a18–19 ὑπερβολῇ δ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκρόχολοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί· ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα, which Sent. Eth. iv.13.10 tries wretchedly to explain: “acrocholi, id est extremi in ira, ab acros quod est extremum et ethymos [!] quod est ira”. Aquinas was also guilty of the portentous drivel from the theory of humours (n194) to explain this swift or “choleric” kind of anger: “propter velocitatem motus irae […] calor inclusus magis conservatur, evaporans autem citius evanescit […] propter subtilitatem et velocitatem colerae” (likewise of the “bitter” or melancholic kind: “propter humoris grossitiem”, iv.13.11 = 53 below). Cartagena spares us the etymology (perhaps because Geraldus

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human society. And so it is with all other evils; not all evils could exist entire in one and the same man, since they would destroy him, but different evils exist in different men. However, this excess of anger can be reduced to three kinds. The first of them is that of men who get angry swiftly both with persons and things they should not and more than is fitting, but then swiftly calm down from their anger so it does not last long. The latter is the best thing about them; it happens because they do not bottle up their anger inside their hearts but instantly let it burst out, either by repaying the affront or by somehow showing their anger through words, deeds, or other signs due to the swift onrush of anger; and thus, having vented their anger outwardly, they calm down, just as heat is conserved by being locked in and then more quickly evaporates when released. This kind of anger is the one to which choleric men seem specially prone, due to the fineness and speed of choler or bile; those who suffer from this excess are called in Greek acrocholi, that is “extreme in anger”, because they are sharp and prompt to get angry about everything. This is why, because princes are often moved by this kind of anger to invoke heavier punishments than the law stipulates, it is a statute in civil law that any sentence by a prince that orders someone to be more severely punished than is customary may not be carried out for a term of thirty days, in order to give space for the emotion of anger to pass. This pious and reasonable constitution was established by the emperor Theodosius because of a case that happened to him, which is recounted in the Ecclesiastical History as follows: When a riot arose in Thessalonica, one of his soldiers was attacked and killed by the furious mob. Enraged by the sudden news of this atrocity, Theodosius had the people called to the Circus games and, surrounding himself in a moment with soldiers, ordered them to put to the sword every person they could find in every direction, avenging not the crime but the fury. So when he was upbraided by the priests of Italy, he acknowledged his crime and tearfully confessed his guilt by performing public penance in view of the whole church, patiently fulfilling the time allotted

guessed, even more wildly, “atrocholi [cf. αB, app. crit.] quasi indignativi, atros enim vel atris Grece dicitur ‘acumen animi’ Latine et colon dicitur ‘membrum’, et ideo dicitur atrocholus quasi ‘habens acumen membrorum spiritualium’, puta appetitus et intellectus”, f. 85vb), but he dishes up the medical pseudo-science intact; cf. Arist.’s plain, elegantly factual ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται […], παύονται δὲ ταχέως […] ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἀνταποδιδόασιν.

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sibi tempus ascriptum absque regali fastigio pacienter implevit, quibus omnibus illud quoque mirabiliter adjecit et leges sanxit in posterum ut sentencie principum super animadversione prolate in diem tricesimum ab exequutoribus differrentur, quo locus misericordie vel si res tulisset penitencie non deperiret. (Undecima, questione tercia, c. Cum apud)272

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Secunda species est illorum qui dicuntur amari, et istorum ira difficile solvitur et diu irascuntur, quia retinent iram in corde et tunc quiescit eorum ira quando retribuunt vindictam pro injuria illata, nam punicio facit quiescere impetum ire dum loco tristicie precedentis dat delectacionem, in quantum scilicet aliquis delectatur de vindicta; sed si hoc non fiat quod puniat, affliguntur graviter interius. Racio hujus est quia ex eo quod non manifestant iram suam nullus potest persuadendo iram eorum mitigare, quia ignoratur, et ad hoc quod ira digeratur requiritur longum tempus in quo paulatim tepescat et extinguatur accensio ire. Et tales qui sic iram retinent diuturnam sunt sibi ipsis molestissimi et precipue amicis, quia non possunt cum eis delectabiliter convivere; ideo vocantur amari. Et ad hanc speciem superhabundancie ire videntur maxime disponi melancolici, in quibus impressiones suscepte perseverant diu propter grossiciem humoris. Tercia species est illorum qui dicuntur difficiles seu graves, et isti sunt illi qui irascuntur in quibus non opportet et magis quam opportet et longiori tempore quam deberent et non desistunt ab ira donec crucient vel puniant illos quibus irascuntur, quia non est in eis diuturnitas ire ex sola retencione ire ut tempore digeri possit, sed ex proposito confirmato ad puniendum. Superhabundancia ire magis opponitur mansuetudini, que est virtus, quam defectus ire propter duo: primo, quia in pluribus accidit superhabundancia quam defectus, magis enim inclinatur naturaliter homo ad puniendum post injuriam sibi illatam quam ad remittendum, licet quando non est injuriam passus naturaliter inclinetur ad mansuetudinem; secundo, quia illi qui superhabundant in ira sunt magis difficiles ad convivendum, non enim possunt cum eis homines delectabiliter conversari. Et ideo sunt deteriores, unde magis contrariantur bono virtutis quam illi qui deficiunt ab ira. Non est autem facile determinare qualiter et in quibus vel qualibus rebus et quanto tempore et usque

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ex eo quod principes plerumque moventur per hanc speciem ire ~ statutum est: the purpose of adding this lengthy juridical quotation and its exemplum of Theodosius’s penance (imposed by Ambrose, though he is not named) is obvious enough—to establish the unlikely-seeming connexion between “meekness” and rulership—but is nevertheless carefully chosen; it not only sets out a legal imperative for clemency but also, since the result of the massacre of Thessalonica was to persuade the emperor to make Rome offi-

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him for this bereft of all royal pomp; to all of which he added the marvellous adjunct of ratifying laws that in future any sentences of princes about chastisement should be deferred for thirty days by the prosecutors so as not to lose an opportunity for mercy or, should the matter arise, for penance. (C.11.3.69 Cum apud) The second kind is that of those called “bitter”, whose anger dissolves with difficulty. They long remain angry, because they bottle up their anger in their hearts and it only calms down once they have exacted revenge for any affront inflicted on them, for punishment calms the impact of anger by replacing the preceding grief with pleasure, at any rate inasmuch as anyone takes pleasure in revenge; but if no way is found to punish, they suffer grave inward affliction. The reason for this is that, as they do not manifest their anger, no one can mitigate their anger by persuasion since it is unknown, and so the anger takes a long time digest while the heat kindled by anger is slowly cooled and extinguished. Those who bottle up anger for a long time in this way are most troublesome to themselves and especially to their friends, because they cannot pleasurably live together; so they are called bitter. This kind of excess of anger is the one to which melancholic men seem specially prone; any impressions they receive persevere for a long time due to the grossness of their humour. The third kind is that of those called “difficult” or “heavy”. These are people who get angry with those they should not and more than is fitting and for longer than they ought and do not desist until they torture or punish those they are angry against, because their long protracted anger comes not only from bottling it up so that it takes time to digest, but from a solid determination to exact punishment. Excess of anger is more opposed to virtuous meekness than defect of anger for two reasons: first, because the excess occurs in more people than the defect, since man is naturally more inclined to punish than to forgive when injury has been inflicted on him, even though when he has not suffered injury he may naturally be inclined to meekness; second, because those who commit excess in anger are more difficult to live with, for men cannot pleasurably associate with them. Hence they are more abject, and so more contrary to the good of virtue than those who are deficient in anger. However, it is not easy to determine how and at whom or what kind of things and for how long and to what point one

cially Christian and outlaw paganism, inscribes repentance for anger within the divine plan. narrat Ecclesiastica hystoria: Rufinus, Historia ecclesiastica ii.18 (PL xxi, 525), quoted from Decretum C.11.3.69.

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ad quem terminum sit irascendum, ymo difficillimum esset hoc judicare; sed ille qui parum recedit a medio vel in magis vel in minus non vituperatur, ymo quandoque laudantur tam deficientes quam excedentes. Sepe enim illum qui deficit laudamus et vocamus mansuetum, et eciam illum qui parum excedit interdum laudamus et vocamus virilem, quasi potentem et aptum ad principandum; sed per quantum et per qualem recessum a medio aliquis vituperetur vel non vituperetur non de facili potest racione determinari, quia hujus rei judicium consistit in singularibus secundum quod casus accidit, ideo per generalem doctrinam non potest expresse designari. Sed hoc est manifestum: quod medius habitus quem mansuetudinem dicimus, secundum quem irascimur quibus opportet et quantum et qualiter opportet et similiter secundum alias circunstancias, est laudabilis; et superhabundancia et defectus sunt vituperabiles, ita tamen quod si parum quis excedat vel deficiat tolerabile est, si plus vituperabile est, si multum valde vituperabile est, unde semper debet homo se ad medium trahere. Lib. 2 Cap. 20 De affabilitate. [Capitulum primum] In colloquiis humanis est triplex consideracio.273 Prima est in quantum homines colloquuntur et communicant adinvicem in actibus seriosis, hoc est cum colloquuntur in illis rebus que non pertinent ad aliquam negociacionem vel utilitatem partium, nec eciam ad jocum seu ludum, sed pertinent ad quandam delectacionem colloquendi, ut multociens homines faciunt cum amicis et aliis. Et in hoc modo colloquucionis possumus habere duplicem respectum: primus est in quantum homo colloquendo in istis actibus seriosis delectat vel contristat amicos vel alios colloquentes, et secundum hunc respectum est dare medium et extrema; secundus respectus est in quantum homo in istis colloquucionibus dicit verum vel falsum, et secundum istum respectum est dare medium et extrema. Secundus modus colloquiorum humanorum est cum loquimur in rebus ludicris, id est causa joci, et in hoc est dare medium et extrema. Et sic in colloquiis humanis reperiuntur tres virtutes, secundum quod sunt tria media.

70 laudantur AO (son alabados Mcast) laudatur JBβ 76 expresse designari α (non se puede señalar expresamente Mcast) determinari Bβ Cap. 20 tit. α, om. BQ Capl̛m xxȷ H 273

triplex consideracio: Chs ii.20–25 correspond to EN 1126b12–1128b9/Sent. Eth. iv.14–16 on Arist.’s three ἕξεις (“tres virtutes”, 13) related to sociability or “conversation” (ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν). In Arist. these are relevant for proving

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should get angry; on the contrary, this would be most difficult to judge. But he who deviates only a little from the mean, whether towards excess or towards defect, is not censured; indeed, both the deficient and the excessive are sometimes praised. Often, for example, we praise a man who is deficient and call him meek, and again we occasionally praise a man who is excessive and call him manly, as if to say powerful and well fitted to rule; but it is not easy to determine rationally by how much and by what sort of deviation from the mean someone is to be censured or not, since judgment in this matter depends on the chance singularities of the case; no general teaching can determine it exactly. Nonetheless, this is clear: the middling disposition we call meekness, by which we get angry with whom or what we should and how much and how we should, and so on according to other circumstances, is praiseworthy; while its excess and defect are blameworthy to the extent that if someone is a little excessive or deficient it is tolerable, if rather more it is blameworthy, if a great deal it is very blameworthy. Therefore a man should always try to keep to the mean. 2.20 On affability. [Chapter 1] In human exchanges there are three things to consider. The first is when men converse and show companionship in serious situations; that is, when they converse on matters that do not pertain to some business or utility of the parties concerned, nor to sport and play, but to a certain pleasure in conversing, as men often do with their friends and others. In this kind of exchange we can define two aspects: the first is the degree to which a man conversing in these serious situations delights or grieves his friends or other collocutors, and in this aspect we can define a mean and extremes; the second aspect is the degree to which a man in these conversations says what is true or false, and in this aspect we can define a mean and extremes. The second kind of human exchange is when we speak about playful things, for sport, and in this we can define a mean and extremes. And so in human exchanges we find three virtues, by which token there are three means.

the theory of the mean (1127a15–16), but the dispositions have less to do with virtue than what we call manners. Cartagena dutifully includes them, but shows most interest in the weird Greek terms, while searching for a moral lesson with seven legal and biblical texts on flattery and lies. The first topic is politeness, giving pain or pleasure, a mean between the excess ἄρεσκος “obsequious”/κόλαξ “flatterer” and the defect δύσκολος “churlish”/δύσερις “quarrelsome” (EN 1126b12–1127a12/Sent. Eth. iv.14).

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De singulis ergo videamus. Et quantum ad primam, advertendum est quod circa colloquia humana per que maxime homines adinvicem convivunt secundum proprietatem humane nature et universaliter circa totum convictum hominum qui fit per hoc quod homines sibi invicem communicant in sermonibus et in rebus, quidam videntur esse quasi hominibus placere intendentes, unde omnia laudant que ab aliis dicuntur et fiunt ad hoc quod delectabiles se eis exhibeant et in nullo contradicunt eis quibus convivunt ne eos contristent, extimantes quod opportet omnibus convivere sine tristicia; et isti dicuntur placidi. Alii vero se habent econtra, nam volunt contrariari omnibus que dicuntur vel fiunt quasi intendentes alios contristare et nichil curantes pretermittere ne alios contristent; et hii vocantur discoli et litigiosi. Et isti duo habitus, quia consistunt in extremo, sunt vituperabiles; sed medius habitus in istis est laudabilis, et est ille secundum quem aliquis acceptat ea que ab aliis dicuntur vel fiunt, vel eciam despicit et contradicit, secundum quod opportet. Iste autem medius habitus est virtus, et est innominata, nam non habuit nomen ab antiquo; sed possumus eam nominare secundum Thomam affabilitatem. Et sic communiter loquendo vocamus affabiles illos viros qui hanc virtutem habent, et assimilatur amicicie, quia communicat cum ea in actu exteriori maxime proprio amicicie, qui est delectabiliter convivere ad amicos. Ille enim qui est dispositus secundum hanc virtutem taliter se habet in delectabili convictu ad alios sicut dicimus competere amico cujus amicicia moderatur racione, quod pertinet ad amiciciam que est propter honestum. Sed ista virtus differt a vera amicicia quia ista est sine amore, qu[i] est passio appetitus sensitivi, et sine dileccione ad eos quibus colloquitur, que pertinet ad appetitum intellectivum, quia ex hoc quod acceptat ab aliis dicta vel facta sicut opportet vel respuit non sequitur quod afficiatur ad eos odio vel amore, sed hoc facit quia ita dispositus est secun-

16 maxime homines α homines maxime Bβ quia Bβ (porque es pasión Mcast) que α

37 qui conj. Martínez Gómez (v. infra, n274 ad fin.)

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Let us look at them one by one. As far as the first is concerned, we should note that in regard to the human exchanges in which men most socialize with one another according to the propensity of human nature, and universally in regard to all social intercourse where men share words and things with each other, there appear to be some who seem intent on pleasing men; they praise everything said or done by others so as to make themselves delightful to them and refrain from in any way contradicting those with whom they associate so as not to grieve them, opining that all should be convivial without grievance. These are called “complaisant”. Others, however, behave in the opposite way; they like contradicting everything that is said or done as if intent on grieving others and take no care to avoid grieving them. These are named “bad-tempered” or “argumentative”. These two dispositions stand at the extremes and so are blameworthy; the disposition midway between them is praiseworthy, namely one by which someone accepts what others say or do, or again disdains and contradicts it, as is fitting. So this middle disposition is a virtue; it is unnamed since it had no name in antiquity, but we can follow Thomas in calling it affability. In common parlance we call those men who have this virtue “affable”; it is similar to friendship, since it shares with it the external act most proper to friendship: socializing pleasurably with one’s friends. A man disposed to this virtue behaves in pleasurable social intercourse in such a way as we say befits a friend whose friendship is ruled by reason, which means friendship for honest ends. Yet this virtue differs from true friendship because it is without love, which is an emotion of the sensory appetite, and without affection for those being spoken to, which pertains to the intellective appetite, for the fact that he fittingly accepts or rejects what others say and do does not imply that he feels hatred or love for them; he acts thus because he is so disposed by the disposi-

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dum habitum huius virtutis.274 Nec est hoc intelligendum quasi affabilis non diligat alios, nam interdum diligit; sed illud provenit ex amicicia quam forte cum aliquibus habet, sed dicimus hoc quia ex consequencia hujus virtutis non sequitur quod diligat omnes quibus colloquitur, quod patet ex eo quia affabilis hoc observat non solum ad amicos sed communiter ad omnes, ignotos et notos, consuetos et inconsuetos, non quod uniformiter se habeat circa omnes, nam non esset congruum ut similiter loqueretur notis et ignotis, civibus et peregrinis, sed quod affabiliter loquatur et convivat omnibus cum quibus loqui et convivere debet. Et sic differt ab amicicia, ut dictum est, que consistit in illo convictu solummodo qui est inter amicos. Lib. 2 Cap. 21 [De affabilitate.] Capitulum secundum Sunt quinque proprietates viri affabilis.275 Prima, quod colloquitur omnibus sicut opportet. Secunda, quod tendit ad hoc quod sine tristicia et cum delectacione aliis convivat, et hoc reducit ad bonum honestum et utile quod est circa delectaciones et tristicias que fiunt in colloquiis in quibus proprie consistit convictus humanus, nam reliqua animalia communicant sibi ipsis in cibis et in aliis similibus, soli autem homines communicant in colloquendo. Tercia proprietas est quod interdum refuget delectare alium, ymo eliget contristare ipsum si forte non est sibi honestum, ut si alius loquitur verba turpia quibus non decet concordare, vel si loquitur aliqua in detrimentum ejus vel si dicit

Cap. 21 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m xxıȷ H 274

affabilitatem: Arist. states several times that this mean has no name; for convenience he calls it a sort of φιλία “friendship”, but it is not the same as the relation truly so called (to which Arist. devotes Bks viii–ix, and which Cartagena does not discuss), because it is based not on affection but on propriety, “the noble and expedient” (EN 1126b23–29 διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ […] ὡς ἁρμόζει […] τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον/Sent. Eth. iv.14.6, quoted here from “haec virtus differt a vera amicitia” to “ita dispositus secundum habitum”). As stated in 30, it was Aquinas who named it affabilitas, though not till the end of his lectio (Sent. Eth. iv.14.12 “cum tamen sit innominatus, licet apud nos possit affabilitas nominari”). Both he and Cartagena imply this was a current term (“apud nos”, “communiter loquendo”), but of corde ’s 17 attestations of afabilidad pre-1500 fourteen are from Cartagena’s own Oracional, where Cap. 19 is on “La séptima virtud se dize amistad o afabilidat, e que podemos dezir benignidat, e ésta es aquella con que omne […] se ha con los omnes benigna e amigablemente” (1983, 102), the other three from Martín de Córdoba, Jardín de nobles doncellas, 1468, ii.10 on the virtues of a señora or princesa, likewise drawn from Arist.; and the 16 attestations of afable are all later than MV. Compare Guiral Ot 1500 iv qu.39, ff. 87vb–88rb, at f. 88ra: Multi autem nostri temporis vocaverunt eam affabilitatem. […] Fuit etiam aliquando vocata urbanitas, quia viventes in urbe sciebant grate convivere et colloqui, viventes

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tion of this virtue. This is not to be understood as meaning that the affable man does not like others, for sometimes he does, but this comes from the friendship he chances to have for some of them; I say so because it does not follow as a consequence of this virtue that he likes everyone with whom he converses, as is clear from the fact that the affable man behaves like this not only to his friends but to all in common, known and unknown, acquainted and unacquainted; not that he conducts himself uniformly towards all, for it would not be consistent to speak in the same way to the known and unknown, citizens and foreigners, but because he speaks and converses affably with all to whom he ought to speak and converse. So, as I have said, it differs from friendship, which solely concerns social intercourse between friends. 2.21 [On affability.] Chapter 2 There are five properties of the affable man. First, that he converses with everyone as he should. Second, that he strives to be convivial without causing grievance and with pleasure, and directs this to the honest and useful good concerning the pleasures and grievances that arise in the exchanges that properly constitute human social life; for the other animals share food and other such things among themselves, but only men share by talking together. The third property is that he will sometimes avoid giving pleasure to another, and indeed will choose to grieve him, if perchance it is not honest for him, for instance if someone else uses low words that it would not be decent to repeat, or says things to his detriment, or if he says or does something contrary to the

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autem in rure sicut indocti ruditer et ingrate; […] vocatur etiam hodie vulgariter curialitas […] quia qui versantur in curiis sciunt pre ceteris gratiose convivere […], unde cum aliquem vocamus curialem intendimus ipsum laudare de ista virtute. […] Sed propriissime vocata est antiquitus facetia, […] et de ista commendat Gallicos Boetius in libro De disciplina scolarium […] quia secundum veritatem natio Gallicana super omnem nationem ad vitam facetam est prompta [citing the verse schoolbook Facetus]. The title of Geraldus’ questio is “Utrum habitus medius inter placiditatem et discoliam quem Philosophus vocat amicitiam sit virtus”, but his passage demonstrates how, if one demeans Arist.’s “friendliness” to the cultural relativity of “courtesy” or politesse, the moral argument soon degenerates into risible frivolity—a risk Aquinas and Cartagena also ran, though not so openly. quia ista est sine amore, qui est passio: as Martínez Gómez (2015, 488 n & app. crit.) points out, α “que” Bβ “quia” (Mcast “porque”) are errors for Aquinas’ “quia ista virtus est et sine amore, qui est passio appetitus sensitivi, et sine dilectione”. We suggest in Proleg. § 2 (o) that quia may have gone back to Cartagena’s copy of Aquinas; but for the sense we adopt her emendation. quinque proprietates: Sent. Eth. iv.14.8–12 “ponit proprietates quinque huius virtutis”; Geraldus counts “sex conditiones” (Guiral Ot 1500 iv.21, f. 87va), but both are smokescreens to make it look “philosophical”.

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vel facit aliquid contra propriam honestatem operantis; nam affabilis non laudabit ista, ymo reprehendet. Quarta proprietas est quod affabilis diversimode colloquitur et conversatur cum hiis qui sunt in dignitatibus constituti et cum quibuscumque privatis personis, et similiter diversimode cum magis vel minus notis et secundum alias diversitates personarum, singulis enim attribuit quod est conveniens. Quinta, quod affabilis per se quidem intendit delectare et renuit contristare, tamen aliquando parum contristat, considerans futura si preponderent presenti contristacioni quantum ad utilitatem et honestatem vel eciam quantum ad futuram delectacionem magnam cui locus paratur per presentem contristacionem, ut pote cum reprehendimus aliquem de aliquo quod dicit vel facit ut cessando ab eo consequatur honestatem vel utilitatem vel majorem delectacionem, ut plerumque accidit cum volumus corrigere amicos vel alios notos, sicut sepe reprehendimus infirmos quando volunt comedere cibum nocivum.276 Simile in aliis actibus morum; non enim hoc facimus animo contristandi eos, sed ut per parvam tristiciam quam in presenti eis ingerimus consequantur in futurum majorem delectacionem que ex sanitate vel ex honestate causatur; et hoc benefacit affabilis. Est ergo affabilitas habitus electivus convivendi et colloquendi hominibus quibus opportet et sicut opportet convivere ac colloqui ad delectacionem et contristacionem, medians inter plus et minus delectare et inter plus et minus contristare, et inter delectare numquam contristando et contristare nunquam delectando et inter placiditatem et discoliam, reddens hominem omnibus hominibus decenter colloquutivum et omnibus in spe boni delectabilem vel non contristabilem, et quibusdam casibus propter fugam mali moderate contristabilem, secundum quem personis differentibus differenter colloquimur, et secundum quem delectare simpliciter sumptum eligimus et contristare renuimus, et secundum quem delectacioni presenti preferimus interdum parvam contristacionem majora bona in posterum parituram.277

11 reprehendet αB reprehendit β (non alabará ~ reprehende Mcast) 32 colloquutivum α (conveniblemente fablante Mcast) affabilem Bβ (cf. Geraldum “decenter affabilem”, n277) 276

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ut pote cum reprehendimus aliquem: the example, with its medical turn, is added by Cartagena; though homely, it is an attempt to raise the gaze from mere manners to “honestatem vel utilitatem”. Est ergo affabilitas habitus electivus: added from Guiral Ot 1500 iv qu.39 in c., f. 88ra: Assumptum probatur ex eius descriptione que ex textu Philosophi colligi potest. Est enim habitus electivus convivendi et colloquendi hominibus quibus oportet et sicut oportet convivere ac colloqui ad delectationem et contristationem, medians inter plus

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good repute of the doer himself; for the affable man will not praise this kind of thing, rather he will rebuke it. The fourth property is that when conversing and socializing the affable man will differentiate between men of rank and any private persons, and likewise between those he knows more and those he knows less and according to the other differences between persons, paying each one the respect he deserves. Fifth, that per se the affable man intends to give pleasure and avoids giving grief, but nevertheless sometimes gives a little grief, if he considers that the future result in terms of utility or honesty may outweigh the present sense of grievance, or even in terms of the great future pleasure to which the present sense of grief will lead, for instance when we reprehend someone for something he says or does so that by ceasing from doing so he may achieve honesty, utility, or greater pleasure, as frequently happens when we decide to correct our friends or other acquaintances, as we often reprehend the sick when they want to eat some harmful food. As is true of other acts of good conduct, we do not do this with the intention of grieving them, but so that through the small grief we enjoin upon them for the present they may achieve in future the greater pleasure that is caused by health or honesty; in this way the affable man is a benefactor. Affability, therefore, is an elective disposition to socialize and converse with the men one should and in the way one should socialize and converse as regards pleasing and grieving, representing a mean between giving more or less pleasure and between giving more or less grief, and between giving pleasure without ever giving grief and giving grief without ever giving pleasure and between complaisance and bad temper, rendering a man decently sociable to all men and pleasurable, or at least not grievous to all, in hope of doing good, and in some cases to avoid evil moderately grievous, by which we converse differently with different persons and by which we choose to give pleasure, simply defined, and avoid giving grief, and by which we sometimes prefer a little grief to a present pleasure if it will bring about greater goods in future.

et minus delectare et inter plus et minus contristare, inter delectare nunquam contristando et contristare nunquam delectando, inter placiditatem et discoliam, reddens hominem omnibus hominibus decenter affabilem, omnibus in spe boni delectabilem vel non contristabilem vel in quibusdam casibus propter fugam mali moderate contristabilem secundum quam personis differentibus differenter colloquimur, secundum quem delectare simpliciter sumptum eligimus et contristare renuimus, secundum quem delectationi presenti aliter bone ac utili preferimus parvam contristationem bonorum majorum in posterum parituram.

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Ille autem qui superhabundat in delectando, si hoc non faciat propter aliud sed solum propter appetitum delectandi, dicitur placidus, ut diximus.278 Si hoc faciat propter adipiscendam peccuniam vel aliquid aliud quod peccunia extimari potest, vocatur blanditor seu adulator; et cavendum est cum hos audimus ne in superbiam efferamur, nam inter laudes et vituperia ad veritatem cordis recurrere debemus, unde Gregorius ait: Inter verba laudantium sive vituperantium ad mentem semper recurrendum est, et si in ea non invenitur bonum quod de nobis dicitur magnam nobis tristiciam generare debet, et rursus si in ea non invenitur malum quod de nobis homines loquntur in magnam debemus leticiam prosilire. Quid enim si non omnes laudant et consciencia nos liberos esse demonstrat? Habemus Paulum dicentem, “gloria nostra hec est testimonium consciencie nostre”; Job quoque dicit, “Ecce in celo testis meus.” Si ergo est nobis testis in celo, testis in corde, dimittamus stultos foris loqui quod volunt. Quid enim aliud detrahentes faciunt nisi quod in pulverem detraccionis sufflant et in occulos suos terram excitant, ut unde pulverem detraccionis perflant, inde magis nil veritatis videant? (Undecima, questione tercia, c. Inter verba).279

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Ille vero qui superhabundat in contristando vocatur litigiosus et discolus. Ista autem duo extrema sunt vicia et opponuntur et sunt contraria sibi ipsis adinvicem, sed non videntur opponi virtuti quia medium virtutis erat innominatum, ut supra scriptum est. Lib. 2 Cap. 22 De veracitate. Capitulum primum Habito secundo respectu ad ea que eveniunt in colloquucionibus humanis, id est ad veritatem, est reperire medium et extrema.280 Sunt enim aliqui qui superhabundant dicendo vel simulando de se aliqua gloriosa. Et qui in hoc peccat vocatur jactator, quod contingit dupliciter: uno modo quia simulat sibi inesse

Cap. 22 tit. αB (om. Capitulum primum A) De veritate O, om. Q Capl̛m xxıııȷ H, corr. manus altera xxiii 278

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dicitur placidus: Sent. Eth. ii.9.10 “Ille autem qui superabundat in hoc, si non faciat hoc nisi causa delectandi, vocatur placidus [EN 1108a28 ἄρεσκος]; si autem faciat hoc propter aliquam propriam utilitatem, puta propter lucrum, vocatur blanditor vel adulator [ibid. 30 κόλαξ]. Qui autem in hoc deficit et non veretur contristare eos cum quibus vivit vocatur litigiosus et dyscolus [31 δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος].” Gregorius ait: Decretum C.11.3.55, citing Gregory i, Epp. xi.2 Palladio presbytero §1093 (PL

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The man who gives pleasure in excess, if he does this not for some other end but solely from an appetite for giving pleasure, is called complaisant, as I have said. If he does it to get money or anything else that can be counted as money he is called a fawner or flatterer; and we must take care when we listen to them not to be carried away by pride. Amid praise and abuse we must rely on the truth of our heart, as Gregory says: Amid the words of those who praise or censure us we must always run things over in our mind; if we do not find there the good that is told of us it should cause us great grief, and again if we do not find there the bad that men say of us we should leap with great joy. What does it matter if not all praise us but our conscience is clear? We have Paul’s saying, “Indeed, this is our boast, the testimony of our conscience”; Job too says, “Behold, my witness is in heaven.” If therefore we have a witness in heaven, a witness in our heart, let us leave fools to say what they want in public. For what else do backbiters do other than puff themselves out in the dust of denigration and throw earth in their own eyes, so the more they blow out the dust of denigration, the less they see of the truth? (C.11.3.55 Inter verba). He who gives grief in excess, on the other hand, is called argumentative and bad-tempered. So these two extremes are vices and are opposed and contrary to each other; but they do not appear to be opposed to virtue because the virtuous mean has no name, as explained above. 2.22 On truthfulness. Chapter 1 In respect of the second facet of the things that affect human exchanges, that is truth, we can find a mean and extremes. There are some who commit excess in saying or feigning glorious things about themselves; a man guilty of this is named a boaster, which takes two forms: one, because he feigns having cer-

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lxxvii, 1120), who quotes 2 Cor 1:12 and Job 16:20 (Richter & Friedberg read unde plus for unde pulverem, 53–54). The addition of this legal text does not bear directly on the argument, but returns for “directive” purposes to the religious dictates of conscience and the problem of superbia raised under magnanimity (nn241, 255). secundo respectu ~ ad veritatem: the second of the three habitus related to conversation (n273) is truthfulness and its extremes, boastfulness and false modesty (EN 1108a19–22 περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς […] ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, ἡ δὲ προσποίησις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἀλαζονεία […], ἡ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία); it is treated at 1127a13–32/Sent. Eth. iv.15, compiled in the following two chapters.

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aliqua gloriosa que non insunt, alio modo quia simulat ea que insunt esse majora quam sint. Ille autem qui tenet contrarium extremum vocatur Grece eyron, et hoc similiter contingit duobus modis: uno, quia negat sibi gloriosa que insunt, alio modo quia dicit ea minora quam sint. Ille vero qui tenet medium dicitur Grece authochiastos, id est per se admirabilis, quia non querit magis esse in admiracione quam sibi conveniat secundum se, vel dicitur authophastos, id est per se manifestus, quia qualis est talem se manifestat; est enim verax in quantum de se confitetur ea que sunt non solum sermone sed eciam vita, quia exterior conversacio sua est conformis sue condicioni, sicut et sua loquucio.281 Et medium hoc est laudabile et extrema sunt vituperabilia, ex eo quod mendacium secundum se est pravum et fugiendum et veritas de se ipsa est bona et laudabilis.282 Unde Augustinus universa genera mendaciorum late prosequens ait: Primum genus est capitale mendacium et longe fugiendum, quod fit in doctrina religionis, ad quod mendacium nulla condicione quis debet adduci; secundum, ut aliquem ledat injuste, quod tale est ut nulli prosit et obsit alicui; tercium, quod prodest alteri ita ut obsit alii, quamvis non ad immundiciam obsit corporalem; quartum, sola mentiendi fallendique libidine, quod mirum mendacium est; quintum, quod fit placendi cupiditate, de suavi eloquio; hiis omnibus penitus evitatis atque rejectis sequitur

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Grece authochiastos: for the nameless mean between εἰρωνεία and ἀλαζονεία (EN 1127a13 ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὐτή) Arist. uses authekastos “lit. each himself; fig. one who is/means what they say” (ibid. 24 ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐθέκαστός τις, ὢν ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ), for which authochiastos (Vet. interp. “anthechiastos”, Aquinas MSS anthot(h)iastos, autochyat-, antosciast-, ancogchiast-, antethiast-, etc.; see app. min var.) and authophastos (anthopastos, anchophastas, etc.) were botched attempts, the translations and etymologies all fanciful: Sent. Eth. iv.15.5 “autochiastos, id est per se admirabilis [confused with *autothaumastos?], […] vel dicitur autophastos, id est per se manifestus [garbled from some gloss *autophantos < φαίνω “appear”]” (cf. Albertus Magnus 1891, 319b (iv.3.2) “aftecastos […] ab e[o] quod est af [to], quod idem est quod ‘secundum ipsum’, et […] hecaston, quod idem est quod ‘ostendere’ vel ‘manifestare’ […], nomen ejus qui in dictis et factis est non absconditus sed manifestus”, and his unpubl. Lectura super EN, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Ms. Vat. lat. 722 f. 73ra “antechastos ab añ [ante, pro αὐτή] quod est ‘per se’ et chastos quod est ‘manifestum’, quasi ‘per se manifestus’”, http://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS​ _Vat.lat.722). See Aquinas 1969, i, 264*–265*. mendacium secundum se est pravum et fugiendum: EN 1127a29–30 καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν/Sent. Eth. iv.15.7 “Et dicit quod mendacium secundum se est pravum et fugiendum, verum autem est bonum et laudabile; ad hoc enim signa sunt instituta, quod repraesentent res secundum quod sunt”, between

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tain glorious traits that he does not have, the other, because he feigns that what he does have is greater than it is. The man who occupies the opposite extreme is named in Greek eiron [“ironist”], and this too takes two forms: one, because he denies having the glorious traits he does have, the other, because he says they are less than they are. The man who occupies the mean is called in Greek authochiastos, “admirable in himself” [*autothaumastós?], because he does not seek to be admired as greater than befits him in himself, or authophastos, “manifest in himself” [autophanḗs?], because he is as he shows himself to be; he is truthful, then, in that he shows things about himself as they are not just in words but also by his way of life, because like his speech his external social behaviour conforms to his true nature. This mean is praiseworthy and the extremes are blameworthy, because lying is wrong in itself and to be shunned, and truth is of itself good and praiseworthy. As Augustine says, broadly discussing all the kinds of lies: The first kind is the deadly lie, and it should be given a wide birth; such a lie arises in religious doctrine, and under no condition should anyone be drawn to it. The second, to wound someone unjustly, which is a kind that benefits no one and harms someone. The third, which profits one in a way that harms another, though not to the extent of bodily defilement. The fourth, from pure love of lying and deceiving, which is an extraordinary lie. The fifth, which is made from a desire to please, by soft talking. Having utterly avoided and rejected all these, there follows the sixth kind, which

the first and second half of which Cartagena inserts the lengthy canon citing August. De mendacio, which heavily underscores Aquinas’s view that what Arist. meant was the “fundamentally determinative” religious idea of lying as intrinsically evil. This contrasted with his master Albertus (Flannery 2013, 139–142), who interpreted καθ᾽ αὑτὸ per se as meaning not “essentially” but “insofar as no greater reason arises for dispensing with it”, and opined that in civil as opposed to religious morality it may be prudent to lie in minus, i.e. by defect, not excess (Albertus Magnus 1891 iv, tract.3, cap.2 §91, pp. 319b–320a: if “ex aliqua adjuncta causa quae majoris in civilibus est utilitatis quam verum sit […] sicut si forte per mendacium salvatur vita hominis […] et non fit praejudicium alicuius civilitatis, […] prudentius est, quia inter duo mala minus malum eligendum”—such mendacia officiosa are not “bona”, but “de numero malorum tolerabilium a politico”). Aquinas countered this view in STh. ii-ii.110.3, and Cartagena’s legal text seems designed expressly to do the same—which is striking, because whether lying can be necessary for “politic” ends (August. De mendacio 1, PL xl, 487 “magna quaestio […] latebrosa et quibusdam quasi cavernosis anfractibus”) seems exactly the sort of point on which princely readers might have expected practical rather than “supernatural” direction.

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sextum genus, quod et nulli obest et prodest alicui, velut si quispiam peccuniam alicujus injuste tollendam, sciens ubi sit, nescire se mentiatur; septimum, quod et nulli obest et prodest alicui, velut si nolens hominem ad mortem quesitum prodere mentiatur; octavum genus mendacii est quod et nulli obest et ad hoc prodest ut ab immundicia corporali aliquem tueatur. Non est igitur mentiendum in doctrina pietatis, quia magnum scelus est primum genus mendacii detestabilis. Non est igitur mentiendum secundo genere, quia nulli facienda est injuria. Non est mentiendum tercio genere, quia nulli cum alterius injuria est consulendum. Non est mentiendum quarto genere propter mendacii libidinem, que per se ipsam viciosa est. Non est mentiendum quinto genere, quia nec ipsa veritas placendi causa hominibus enuncianda est, quanto minus mendacium quod per seipsum, quia mendacium est, utique turpe est. Non est mentiendum sexto genere, nec enim recte testimonii veritas pro cujusque temporali commodo ac salute corrumpitur, ad sempiternam vero salutem nullus ducendus est opitulante mendacio. Neque septimo genere mentiendum est, neque enim cujusque commoditas aut salus temporalis perficienda fidei preferenda est, neque se quisquam in recte factis nostris tam male moveri sentiat ut fiat eciam animo dejectior longeque a pietate remotior. Nec octavo genere mentiendum est, quia et in bonis castitas animi pudicicie corporis prefertur, et in malis quod ipsi facimus eo quod fieri sinimus nobis dampnabilius est. In hiis autem octo generibus tanto quisque minus peccat cum mentitur, quanto magis a primo recedit. Quisquis autem esse aliquod genus mendacii quod peccatum non sit putaverit decipiet se ipsum turpiter, cum honestum se esse deceptorem arbitretur aliorum. (Vicesima secunda, questione secunda, c. Primum)283

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Omne ergo mendacium de sui natura est turpe, et racio hujus est quia verba et signa adinventa sunt ad hoc quod representent res secundum quod sunt; et ideo si aliquis mentiendo representat rem aliter quam est, inordinate agit et viciose quia non utitur signis ad illum finem ad quem instituta fuerunt.284 Qui autem verum dicit agit virtuose, quia utitur verbis et signis ad debitum finem,

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unde Augustinus: Decretum C.22.2.8, citing August. De mendacio 14.25 and 21.42 (PL xl, 505, 516); the text here varies at several points from modern edns but resembles the version of the passage in Peter Lombard, Sent. iii.38 De triplici genere mendacii (PL cxcii, 833–834), who in fact opens by accepting the admissibility of “mendacia […] pro salute vel commodo alicuius, non malitia sed benignitate dicta”. verba et signa adinventa sunt ad hoc quod representent res: resuming Sent. Eth. iv.15.7 (n282). As Fernández Gallardo (2012a, 84 n346) notes, the belief that words were magically

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harms no one and benefits someone, for instance if someone lies that he does not know where the money of someone who is going to have it stolen is, though he does know. Seventh, which also harms no one and benefits someone, for instance if someone lies from unwillingness to betray a man being hunted to put to death. The eighth kind of lie is one that hurts no one and helps save someone from corporal defilement. Now no lie should be told in the doctrine of piety, because this first kind of detestable lie is a great crime. Then no lie should be told of the second kind, because no man should have injury done to him. No lie should be told of the third kind, because no man’s good should be sought at another’s expense. No lie should be told of the fourth kind, for love of lying, because this in itself is wicked. No lie should be told of the fifth kind, because not even truth itself should be announced by men for the sake of pleasing, much less a lie, which is already base in itself because it is a lie. No lie should be told of the sixth kind, for it is not right to corrupt the truth of testimony even for someone’s temporal benefit and safety, but no one should be led to eternal salvation by the help of a lie. Nor should any lie be told of the seventh kind, for not even someone’s temporal convenience or safety to be achieved is to be preferred to faith, nor should anyone feel himself so badly moved by our right deeds as to become more dejected in mind and far further from piety. Nor should any lie of the eighth kind be told, because even in good deeds chastity of mind takes precedence over modesty of body, and in bad what we ourselves do is more damaging to us that what we allow to be done. However, in these eight kinds the liar sins less the more he distances himself from the first; but anyone who thinks there is some kind of lie that is not a sin deceives himself basely, thinking he can deceive others and still be honest. (C.22.2.8 Primum) So every lie is by its very nature base, and the reason for this is that words and signs were invented to represent things as they are; so if someone represents a thing other than it is by lying he acts in a disorderly and vicious way, not using signs for their intended purpose. He who tells the truth, on the other hand, acts

“invented” to mimic things, disregarding all diachronic and synchronic evidence proving the essential arbitrariness of signs, reflected the same mystic concept of language as i.29’s remark on the “unthinkability” of any etymology being purposeless ( frustra factum, n177). “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God” (Jn 1:1): nominalists and realists might argue about semiology, the way words link to ideas (Haller 1962), but they all believed this.

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et tenet medium quia significat rem secundum quod est, nec majorem nec minorem. Veritas enim consistit in quadam equalitate que est medium inter magnum et parvum; qui vero mentitur est in extremo vel secundum superhabundanciam, si dicit plus, vel secundum defectum si dicit minus quam sit. Nec enim humilitatis causa mentiendum est, unde idem Augustinus ait:

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Cum humilitatis causa mentiris, si non eras peccator antequam mentireris, mentiendo efficeris quod evitaras. Veritas vite non est nisi te ita dixeris peccatorem ut eciam esse cognoscas; veritas autem ipsa est ut quod est dicas. Nam quomodo est humilitas ubi regnat falsitas? (eadem causa et questione, c. Cum humilitatis)285

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Lib. 2 Cap. 23 [De veracitate.] Capitulum secundum Ambo isti, scilicet jactator et eyron, sunt vituperabiles, sed vituperabilior est jactator qui excedit ad plus, quia videtur magis a vero recedere, quia in equali re continetur minus sed non majus, ut pote si habens decem dicat se habere quindecim, magis errat quam si diceret se habere quinque, quia in decem includuntur quinque, non tamen quindecim.286 Et hic non loquimur de illo qui loquitur veritatem vel mendacium in confessionibus judiciorum vel in negociacionibus, nam illud pertinet ad justiciam et mentiri in illis pertinet ad injusticiam, sed de illo veridico qui dicit verum vita et sermone in illis que non habent differenciam justicie et injusticie, sed dicit verum propter disposicionem habitus sui et quandam aptitudinem quam habet ad veritatem; unde iste virtuosus videtur in suis verbis et factis moderacionem habere vitando excessum et defectum, amat enim veritatem et verum dicit eciam in illis rebus in quibus non multum refert ad nocumentum vel profectum, et multo magis in illis in quibus dicere verum vel falsum facit aliquam differenciam ad nocumentum vel juvamentum 62 uite α in te Bβ (de la vida Mcast; v. n285, infra) 285

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idem Augustinus ait: Decretum C.22.2.9, from August. Serm. 181.iv.5 (PL xxxviii, 981). Richter & Friedberg print “euitaueras. Veritas in te”, but various witnesses and Gratian’s source Ivo Carnotensis, Panormia viii.128 (PL clxi, 1336) read vitae. β’s text looks correct at first sight, therefore, but in fact, as Q’s writing it as ȷnte and its presence in B indicate, in te was a correction, or misreading; the archetype certainly read uite. jactator et eyron: EN 1127a31–32 οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφότεροι μὲν ψεκτοί, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ὁ ἀλαζών/Sent. Eth. iv.15.7 “ambo sunt vituperabiles, sed magis iactator qui excedit ad plus, quia plus recedit a vero: in aequali enim invenitur minus, non autem maius.” Cartagena adds the arithmetical example, simple enough even for a prince to grasp, from Geraldus’s lectio a little lower down, on the passage corresponding to the last sentence of this paragraph, though Cartagena’s version works a good deal more clearly here (Guiral Ot 1500 iv.21, f. 89ra):

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virtuously, using words and signs for their right purpose, and keeps to the mean because he signifies the thing as it is, neither more nor less, for truth consists in a certain balance which is the mean between great and small; whereas he who lies is at the extreme either of excess if he says more, or of defect if he says less than it is. Nor should any lie be told for the sake of humility, for as Augustine also says: When you lie for the sake of humility, if you were not a sinner before you lied, by lying you will become what you were trying to avoid. It is not the living truth unless you call yourself a sinner in such a way that you actually recognize that you are; truth itself is that you say what is. How can humility exist where falsehood reigns? (same Causa and quaestio, c.9 Cum humilitatis) 2.23 [On truthfulness.] Chapter 2 Both of these, boaster and ironist, are blameworthy, but more blameworthy is the boaster who errs on the side of excess; he appears to depart further from the truth, because an equal object contains a lesser but not a greater; so if a man who has ten says he has fifteen he errs more than if he were to say he has five, since five goes into ten but fifteen does not. Here I am not talking about telling the truth or a lie in judicial confessions or business transactions, for that belongs to justice and lying in such things is a form of injustice, but about the truthful man who through his life and words tells the truth in things that do not involve a difference between justice and injustice, yet tells the truth by his own habitual disposition and some aptitude he has for truthfulness. This virtuous man is seen to exercise moderation by avoiding excess and defect in his words and deeds; he loves truth and tells the truth even in matters where it does not much matter in terms of harm or advantage, and much more so in those where telling a truth or a falsehood makes some difference in harming or help-

[Verax] preelegit […] dicere minus quam dicere magis, et specialiter quia quod est minus medio includitur in ipso, sed quod est maius medio non includitur in eo […]; tamen si dicat minus, negando amplius in idem reddit quantum ad mentiri. Si enim habens x tantum dicat uni, “Habeo xv”, et alteri dicat, “Non habeo nisi v”, tunc utrobique equaliter mentietur, quare sufficit ratio Philosophi. The ensuing sentence then returns again to EN 1127a33–b2/Sent. Eth. iv.15.8, making the vital point that these “means” of sociability (n273) concern not moral virtues as such, like justice, but “dispositions” (ἕξεις, habitus).

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alterius, et hoc ideo quia abhorret mendacium secundum se tanquam quoddam turpe, et non solum secundum quod cedit in nocumentum alterius. Talis autem vir laudabilis est; et si aliquando dificile sit omnino ad puntum dicere veritatem, magis vult declinare ad minus quam ad majus, quia hoc magis videtur pertinere ad prudenciam, eo quod homines superhabundanter de se ipsis loquentes efficiuntur aliis onerosi quia per hoc videntur aliis se velle preferre. Est ergo veracitas, prout est moralis virtus distincta ab aliis virtutibus de qua hic loquimur, habitus electivus manifestacionis vere propriorum bonorum, cum opportuerit faciende, non fingendo majora nec minora, medians inter eyroniam et jactanciam, reddens hominem moderatum et amatorem boni, veridicum et horrentem mendacium, laudabilem, et in incertis ad minora prudenter declinantem.287 Ille autem qui jactat de se que non sunt vel majora quam sint, non propter aliquem alium finem sed solum quia delectatur in hoc, videtur habere quandam similitudinem mali, alioquin non gauderet de mendacio; hoc enim ex inordinacione animi provenit, non tamen est omnino malus quia non intendit aliquam maliciam, sed est vanus in quantum delectatur in re que secundum se nec est bona nec utilis. Ille vero qui se jactat propter appetitum glorie vel honoris viciosus est, non tamen est multum vituperabilis, in quantum gloria et honor habent quandam affinitatem cum rebus honestis propter quas aliqui laudantur et vituperantur. Sed ille qui se jactat causa argenti vel cujuscumque alterius rei que peccunia extimari potest est magis deformis, quia propter minus bonum mentitur. Et omnes isti dicuntur jactatores, ex eo quod eligunt mentiri vel quia gaudent de ipso mendacio vel quia mentiuntur propter appetitum glorie vel lucri. Et potest cognosci ad quem horum finium jactent in hoc, quia solent illi qui de ipsa jactancia gaudent indifferenter de quibuscumque se jactare, quia solo mendacio jactancie delectantur; illi vero qui se jactant causa glorie fingunt talia que videantur laudabilia, sicut sunt opera virtutum, vel illa que conferunt ad felicitatem humanam, sicut nobilitas, divicie, et similia. Illi autem qui jactant se causa lucri fingunt talia in quibus audientes delectentur, alioquin nichil lucrarentur, et observant eciam quod sint talia de quibus se jactant quod si non sunt vera, possit hoc latere ita quod eorum mendacium non deprehendatur, ut pote in hiis que pertinent ad medecinam; quia 34 vituperantur α (son vituperados Mcast) honorantur Bβ 287

habitus electivus manifestacionis vere: as with magnanimitas (n263), moderatio (n265), mansuetudo (n268), and affabilitas (n277), the definition is from Geraldus, in the conclusion to his brief second questio, “Quid est veritas ut est moralis virtus, an sit veritas doctrine vel veritas iustitie vel veritas vite?”: Est ergo sciendum quod veritas, ut est moralis virtus de qua nunc agitur, est habitus electivus manifestationis vere propriorum bonorum, cum oportuerit faciende non

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ing another, but even in this case because he abhors lying as something base in itself and not just because it may lead to harming someone else. Such a man is praiseworthy, then; and if it is sometimes difficult to tell the whole truth in every detail, he prefers to understate rather than exaggerate it because it seems more prudent, for men who talk about themselves with excess become irksome to others by their apparent desire to put themselves first. Truthfulness, then, as the moral virtue of which I am here speaking distinct from other virtues, is an elective disposition to display one’s own goods truly, when it is fitting to display them, not feigning them as greater or less, representing a mean between irony and boasting, rendering a man moderate and a lover of good, truthful and horrified by lying, praiseworthy, and in cases of uncertainty prudently inclined to understatement. A man who boasts by attributing to himself things he does not have or that are greater than he has, not for some ulterior motive but simply because he gets pleasure from it, seems to have some likeness to a bad man, otherwise he would not rejoice in lying; this comes from some mental disorder, but he is not altogether bad because he does not do it with malicious intent, only because he is vain in getting pleasure from something that is neither good nor useful in itself. A man who boasts about himself from an appetite for glory or honour, on the other hand, is guilty of a vice; yet he is not very blameworthy, inasmuch as glory and honour have some affinity with honest things for which some are praised or blamed. But a man who boasts about himself for the sake of silver or anything else that can be counted as money is more ugly, because he lies for a lesser good. But whether they choose to lie because they rejoice in lying itself or because they lie from an appetite for glory or profit, these are all called boasters. One can tell which of these ends motivates their boasting from the fact that those who rejoice in boasting itself tend to make wild boasts about themselves regardless of the topic, because they boastfully delight in the mere lie, whereas those who boast about themselves for the sake of glory invent things that seem praiseworthy, like virtuous works, or things that confer human happiness, like nobility, wealth, and so on. However, those who boast about themselves for the sake of profit invent things to give their listeners pleasure, otherwise they would make no profit, and are also careful to ensure that the things of which they boast are such that the fact they are not true remains hidden so their lie will not be found out, for instance in

fingendo maiora nec simulando minora, medians inter yroniam et iactantiam, reddens moderatum hominem et boni amatorem, veridicum et horrentem mendacium, laudabilem, et in incertis ad minora prudentius declinantem. Hec omnia colliguntur ex textu. (Guiral Ot 1500 iv qu.41, f. 89vb)

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omnes desiderant sanitatem, et non potest de facili deprehendi utrum quis in medicando erraverit. Et sic in aliis scienciis et artibus, fingunt enim aliqua ex quibus lucrentur antequam deprehendatur mendacium, ut nonnulli qui se fingunt alquimistas et similes.288 Eyrones vero qui de seipsis dicunt minora quam sint videntur habere mores magis gratos quam jactatores, quia non dicunt talia gracia lucri sed quasi fugientes tumorem superbie et ne aliis molestiam inferant. Sed ex istis eyronibus quidam sunt qui de se negant ea que videntur ad magnam gloriam pertinere, sicut Socrates qui negabat se esse sapientem; quidam alii sunt qui in quibusdam parvis et manifestis volunt ostendere quod non fingant de se majora quam sint, et isti vocantur Grece blancopanurgi, quasi in quadam astucia simulacionis suas delicias habentes, et hii sunt de facili contemptibiles, quia nimis manifesta est eorum simulacio.289 Et quandoque talis defectus videtur pertinere ad jactanciam, dum per hoc volunt se ostendere meliores et magis moderatos, sicut illi qui deferunt vestimenta viliora et magis despecta quam deceret statum eorum, quia tam superhabundancia exteriorum quam eciam immoderatus defectus videtur ad jactanciam pertinere, in quantum per utrumque ostenditur quedam hominis excellencia, et hinc est quod clericis precipitur ne utantur fulgidis vestibus nec sordidis, quia ut Jeronimus ait, “Nec affectate sordes nec exquisite delicie laudes pariunt” (Quadragesima prima distincione in principio).290 Quidam vero sunt qui moderate utuntur hoc vicio eyronie, quia nec omnino negant de se gloriosa nec eciam assumunt aliqua nimis parva et despecta, sed utuntur hoc vicio in hiis que non sunt manifesta; et tales videntur

59 Et quandoque α quandoque autem Bβ α quod non Bβ 288

62 post superhabundancia add. eorum β

64 ne

alquimistas: EN 1127b16–20 καὶ ψεύστης ὃ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὃ δὲ δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους. […] οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσίς ἐστι τοῖς πέλας καὶ διαλαθεῖν ἔστι μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἰατρόν [Vet. interp. “puta medicum vel divinatorem sapientem”/Sent. Eth. iv.15.15 “Et ponit exemplum de duobus: scilicet de his quae pertinent ad medicinam, quia omnes desiderant sanitatem nec potest a quibuscumque deprehendi utrum aliquis in medicando erret; alia autem sunt quae pertinent ad divinationes futurorum, de quibus naturaliter homines sollicitantur et circa quae non de facili mendacium deprehenditur, et ideo illi qui iactant se propter lucrum praecipue fingunt se esse medicos vel sapientes in divinando”. Following a hint in Guiral Ot 1500 iv.21, f. 89ra, which rightly interprets μάντιν σοφὸν ἰατρόν as not two but three sorts of impostor—doctor for profit, divinator for vainglory, sapiens for the thrill of “scientia rerum hominibus incognitarum de qua non possit haberi experientia”—, Cartagena replaces Aquinas’s divinationes futurorum with alchemy, the “occult” science par excellence; not because educated men thought alchemy a lie but because, like

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medical matters, because everyone desires health and it is not easy for someone who has made a mistake in medication to be found out. So too in other sciences and crafts people invent things from which they can profit before the lie is found out, like those who pretend they are alchemists and such things. Ironists who use understatement when talking about themselves seem more pleasing characters than boasters; they speak in this way not for the sake of profit but as if wanting to shun swollen pride and avoid causing others annoyance. Among these ironists there are some who deny things about themselves that seem potentially very glorious; Socrates, for example, denied that he was wise; whereas there are others who are keen to show that they do not exaggerate about themselves in paltry and obvious things. The latter are called in Greek blancopanurgi, “having their delight in some astuteness of dissimulation”; they are simply contemptible, because their pretence is too obvious. Sometimes, indeed, this defect seems closer to boasting, an attempt to make themselves look better and more modest, like those who dress up in more humble and lowly clothes than befits their station; because an immoderate lack of external decorum seems no less boastful than an excess, in that both make some show of the man’s pre-eminence. Hence clergymen are instructed to wear neither resplendent nor sordid clothes, for as Jerome says, “Neither affected squalor nor fastidious luxury attract praise” (D.41.1). But there are some who practise this vice of irony in a moderate way, not altogether denying themselves some glory nor yet assuming too paltry and lowly a pose, but instead practising the vice in less obvious matters; and these seem gracious, as I have said. The boaster

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doctors, alchemists were popularly seen as quacks or crooks. The vulgar spelling with -qu(see app. min. var.; Ar. ‫ الـكيمياء‬al-kīmiyāʾ “chemistry” perh. < χυμεία “alloying”) implies he saw the term not as learnèd Hellenism but as homely vernacularism. blancopanurgi: EN 1127b27 οἱ δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ φανερὰ [προσποιούμενοι] βαυκοπανοῦργοι λέγονται καὶ εὐκαταφρονητότεροί εἰσιν/Sent. Eth. iv.15.17 “vocantur blancopanurghy [see app. min. var.] quasi in quadam astutia simulationis suas delitias habentes; panurghy enim Graece dicuntur astuti, blancon autem idem est quod deliciosum” (cf. LSJ “βαυκοπᾰνοῦργος, ὁ, humbug”, citing only this passage, < βαυκός “prudish, affected” + πάνουργος “ready to do anything, cunning, knavish”, e.g. the fox, Arist. Hist. an. 488b20). sicut illi qui deferunt vestimenta: EN 1127b28 καὶ ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται, οἷον ἡ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής/ Sent. Eth. iv.15.17 “sicut Laconii qui deferebant vestimenta magis despecta quam deceret”. This time (cf. n245) Cartagena removes the unintelligible Lacedaemonian Spartans, but for a purpose: he replaces them with Christian clerici and a dictum from Jerome’s famous Ep. 22.29 Ad Eustochium de custodia virginitatis (PL xxii, 415, where the last two words read “conveniunt Christiano”) quoted from Decretum D.41.1 d.a.c.

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esse graciosi, ut supradictum est. Magis autem videtur opponi veridico jactator, et deterior est quam eyron, semper enim pejus vicium magis opponitur virtuti. Lib. 2 Cap. 24 De eutrapelia. [Capitulum primum] Sicut in laboribus corporalibus homini expedit interdum desistendo quiescere, ita hominis anima aliquando indiget ut ab intencione animi qua rebus seriis intendit quandoque requiescat, quod fit per ludum; et ideo, cum ludus sit quedam requies hominis ab anxietate solicitudinum in hac vita et in conversacione humana, videtur habere racionem boni utilis.291 Sequitur ergo quod in ludis possit esse quedam conveniens colloquucio hominum adinvicem, ut scilicet homo dicat et audiat qualia opportet et sicut opportet. In talibus tamen multum differt dicere et audire, multa enim aliquis decenter audit que non decenter diceret. Ubicumque autem est differencia eorum que opportet fieri et eorum que non opportet, ibi non solum est medium sed superhabundancia et defectus a medio; et cum in ludo sit hujusmodi, sequitur quod circa ludum sit reperire medium virtutis et extrema. Illi qui superhabundant in derisione dicuntur Grece bomolochi, id est raptores templi ad similitudinem quarundam avium que olim volabant circa templum ut raperent intestina animalium immolatorum, ut milvi faciunt ubi peccora occiduntur, quia ita et isti bomolochi insidiantur ad hoc ut possint aliquid rapere quod vertant in derisionem.292 Hinc est quod tales sunt onerosi, quia magis student ad inducendum risum undecumque possint quam ad hoc

Cap. 24 tit. B De eutrapelia α; om. Q Capl̛m xxv H 3 et ideo cum ludus sit αB (E por ende como la burla sea Mcast) et jocum (jocum in loco Io̅ cum). Ludus enim fit β 291

requies hominis ab anxietate ~ in conversacione humana: the last of the three sociable dispositions of conversation (n273) is εὐτραπελία “wit”, with its extremes βωμολοχία “buffoonery” and ἀγροικία “humourlessness”, EN 1127b33–1128b9/Sent. Eth. iv.16. This first paragraph is a close paraphrase of Sent. Eth. iv.16.2; intentio animi is used in its etymological sense “mental strain, tension” and connects with the standard medieval view of entertainment as therapeutic (e.g. Olson 1982, 39–64, 77–83). Arist. stated that, while it is absurd to suppose that amusement is an end in itself or constitutes happiness, it may serve as “rest” in preparation for τὰ σπουδαῖα, serious ends (EN 1176b27–1177a10 οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι παιδιάν […]. οὐ δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας/Sent. Eth. x.9.12–15 “quaedam relaxatio et requies animae […] ut scilicet homo postea vehementius operetur”); as such it admits of a mean and extremes. Earlier commentators quite correctly saw the chief problem as being whether wittiness is really a moral “virtue” in the Christian sense, as opposed to an ἀρετή “excellence” in Arist.’s technical one (e.g. Buridan 1513 iv qu.19, ff. 88rb–89ra “Utrum eutrapelia sit virtus moralis”; Burley 1521 iv Pars 3 Tract. 4 Cap. 3, ff. 80vb–82rb Pars 1 Concl. 48 “Ostendit quod circa ludos potest esse virtus”; Guiral Ot 1500 iv qu.43, ff. 90vb–91ra “Utrum ludus possit esse virtutis opus”).

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seems more opposed to the truthful man and is more abject than the ironist, for the worse vice is always more opposed to virtue. 2.24 On eutrapely. [Chapter 1] Just as in bodily labours it is useful for a man to break off and rest from time to time, so a man’s mind sometimes needs an occasional rest from the stress of concentrating on serious matters. This is the function of play; and so, as play is a kind of rest for man from the cares and anxieties of this life and human society, it appears justified as a useful good. It follows that games can offer a fitting way for men to socialize together; that is, for a man to say and hear such things as he should, in a fitting way. However, in such matters there is a big difference between saying and hearing; one can decently hear many things it would not be decent to say. Now wherever there is a difference between what should and should not be done, there is not only a mean but also excess and defect from the mean; and since this is the case with play, it follows that regarding play we can find a virtuous mean and extremes. Those who mock to excess are called in Greek bomolochi, “temple robbers”, a simile from certain birds that used to fly around temples snatching the intestines of sacrificed animals like kites around a slaughterhouse, because in the same way these bomolochs lie in wait for anything they can snatch and turn to mockery. So these men are burdensome, because they are more intent on raising a laugh wherever they can than on saying honest things or not upset-

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For Cartagena’s purpose, however, the true interest lay in the topic’s bearing on courtly manners (“curiales et bene nutriti in domibus principum”, ii.25 10), the vital distinction between the “servile” jester and the noble or, as he calls him, “liberal” man; this is the axis of his second chapter. qui superhabundant ~ dicuntur Grece bomolochi: Sent. Eth. iv.16.3. Typically, medieval glossators preferred to encumber their texts with fatuous etymologies rather than find translations for Arist.’s terms on this habitus, though Lat. and the vernaculars abound in equivalents (scurrae, bufones, etc.); Oresme even did it in French, “doncques ceulx qui en rire ou jouer superhabondent et excèdent sont appellés bomoloches. Glo. Il signifie en grec le huart qui aguette pour ravir les entrailles des bestes ès boucheries”, “ceulz qui ne dient jamais aucunes choses risibles […] sont appellés agrestes”, “ceulz qui ès jeux se portent modereement […] eutrapeles, c’est à dire bien tournans. Glo. E[u en] grec c’est bien ou bon, et trapeles c’ est tournant […]. Et peust estre que de ce vint ce que l’en dit en françois ‘bon trupelin’” (1488 iv.25, ff. 87va–88vb/1940, 270). Whether they did so from obscure motives of decorum or for some other reason is not clear, but Cartagena is no exception, despite writing for a non-academic audience to whom the Greek words were mere flatus vocis—egg-shells and wind (see Intro. § 4, at n42). Only with vulgar-sounding graciosus towards the end of the next chapter (n294) does he relax his grip and start to use terms like curialis, trufator, connecting with the real life of his readers.

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quod dicant aliqua honesta vel que non turbent illum cui ingerunt convicium ex ludo, nec cessarent dicere turpia vel talia ex quibus aliqui turbentur, dum tamen homines ad risum inducant. Et cum hic loquimur de ludo, non intelligitur de illo qui fit propter lucrum, ut alearum vel taxillorum, nam ille ad illiberalitatem pertinet, ut in materia sua diximus, nec de illo qui fit causa cujusdam dissolucionis, non tamen cum risu, ut ludus pile vel scacorum vel similes, quia ille cum immoderatus est ad moliciem pertinet, ut in materia continencie dicebamus; sed intelligendum est de ludo seu joco qui fit ad risum seu solacium, ut cum dicimus vel audimus aliqua graciosa, nam honeste, bene, et moderate se habere in istis pertinet ad istam virtutem.293 Illi vero qui in hoc deficiunt quia nec ipsi dicunt aliquid quod ad ridendum provocet et sunt molesti illis qui dicunt, dum ex eo irracionabiliter turbantur, dicuntur Grece agrioti, id est agrestes et duri, quia non emoliuntur ludi delectacione. Illi autem qui moderate se habent in ludis vocantur Grece eutrapeli, id est bene vertentes, quia convenienter et secundum quod decet aliquando convertuntur in risum; et communiter vocamus istos graciosos.294 Et predicti motus, scilicet quod aliquis vellit facere risum superhabundanter vel diminute vel moderate, est quoddam indicium interioris moralis disposicionis; nam sicut per motus corporales exteriores discernuntur corporum disposiciones, cum enim videmus aliquem currere vel saltare discernimus an habeat membra sana vel ne, ita eciam per exteriores hominum operaciones discernuntur mores interiores.295 Verum quia sunt multi qui delectantur magis quam

39 eciam om. Bβ 293

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de ludo ~ qui fit propter lucrum: the interpolation on games (cf. i.35 n199 and ii.5 61–63, both referenced here: “ad illiberalitatem pertinet, ut in materia sua diximus; […] ad moliciem pertinet, ut in materia continencie dicebamus”) is dragged in by the ears—nothing to do with wit—ostensibly to explain the semantics of Lat. ludus but really to engage his readers. Gaming, though deprecated in ecclesiastical sources, was to generate a large and varied Renaissance literature, for and against (Strosetzki 1997), and with its connexion to otium was potentially a subject of great relevance to MV. Though normally associated with the degenerate classes, in Spain it could have more courtly associations, as evidenced by Alfonso el Sabio’s Libro de axedrez, dados e tablas (note that Cartagena does not add cards, introduced into Spain c. 1375); furthermore gambling, somewhat like prostitution, was a lucrative crown monopoly covered by special legislation, Ordenamiento de las tafurerías, though in the fifteenth century there were growing moves to curb it, especially for clerics (Wohlhaupter 1931; Carpenter 1988). It is striking, then, that Cartagena interpolates mentions of games three times, always in a negative light, but without adducing scriptural, religious, or legal authorities to declare it an outright sin; it seems he had strong views, but held back from a head-on attack—to avoid defamatory contumelia (ii.25 22–23)? agrioti: EN 1128a7–9 οἱ δὲ μήτ᾽ αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες μηδὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραίνον-

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ting the man they insult for a joke; they would not hesitate to use base language or say things that might upset some people, so long as they make people laugh. Since I am here talking about play, it is not to be understood as referring to games for profit like dice or board games, for that belongs to illiberality as I said in the relevant heading; nor to sports played for relaxation but not involving laughter like throwing the javelin or chess and so on, for that when indulged in immoderately belongs to effeminate weakness, as I started to explain in the heading on continence. It means rather play or joking for laughter or good cheer, for instance when we tell or listen to amusing things, for to behave honestly, well, and with moderation in such matters pertains to this virtue. Those who are deficient in this because they do not say anything to arouse laughter themselves and are a bore to those who do, as they get unreasonably upset by it, are called in Greek agrioti [sic, for ágroikoi] “hard-mouthed rustics”, because they are not softened by the pleasures of play. Finally, those who conduct themselves moderately in play are named in Greek eutrapeli, “well turning”, because they sometimes suitably and decently turn to laughter; in common speech we call them graciosos [“witty”]. The aforesaid impulses, that is to say wanting to cause laughter excessively, too little, or moderately, are a sort of sign of an inner moral state; for just as bodily states can be discerned from external bodily movements, as we can tell by watching someone running or jumping whether he has healthy limbs or not, so too men’s inner habits can be discerned from their external impulses. But because there are many who take more delight in play than they

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τες ἄγροικοι καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι (Vet. interp. “Qui autem neque ipsi utique dicunt aliquod ridiculum et dicentibus molesti sunt agrioi et duri videntur esse”)/Sent. Eth. iv.16.4 “agrii, idest agrestes, et duri quasi qui non emolliantur delectatione ludi”. No medieval source managed to transliterate agroici correctly (Burley 1521, f. 81ra “agrii”, Guiral Ot 1500, f. 90ra “agriora, id est agrestes et silvestres […] truffan jocum”; Lexicon, BNE Mss/6642, f. 54v “agͬoy agrestes”; and cf. app. min. var.). eutrapeli: EN 1128a9–10 οἱ δ᾽ ἐμμελῶς παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὔτροποι (Vet. interp. “moderate autem ludentes eutrapeli appellantur, puta bene vertentes”); the gloss et communiter vocamus istos graciosos may seem a concession to our critique in n292 above, but in fact comes from Arist. further on, a14–15 καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται ὡς χαρίεντες (Vet. interp. “et bomolochi eutrapeli appellantur ut [al. et] graciosi” = 40–44 below). The glossators all used the word, but Cartagena clearly wants readers to think of it as its vernacular homonym (Mcast “e comúnmente llamamos a estos ‘graçiosos’ ”; cf. Oresme 1488 iv.25, ff. 88ra/1940, 271 “les bomoloches ilz appellent eutrapelles et gracieux, mais […] ilz ne different pas petit. Glo. Mais grandement, car les ungs son vicieux et les autres vertueux”), and mercifully spares us the technicism epydissius (ἐπιδέξιος “tactful”). quoddam indicium interioris moralis disposicionis: EN 1128a10–12 τοῦ γὰρ ἤθους αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἤθη (Vet.

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opportet in ludo dicendo aliis convicia jocosa, ideo apud eos bomolochi vocantur eutrapeli quia sunt eis graciosi, superhabundant enim in ludo quem plures homines superhabundanter diligunt. Differunt tamen non parum bomolochi ab eutrapelis, ut ex dictis patet.

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Lib. 2 Cap. 25 [De eutrapelia.] Capitulum secundum Pertinet ad eutrapelum, id est habentem istam virtutem, tanquam ad illum qui est bene aptus et dispositus ad conversandum cum hominibus, quod dicat et audiat talia ludicra seu jocosa que congruant viro modesto et liberali, id est illi qui habet liberum animum a servilibus passionibus.296 Nam ubicumque est invenire aliquid quod decenter fieri potest, hoc pertinet ad virtutem; cum ergo in ludo contingat, aliquem audire vel dicere convenientia vel non convenientia.297 Quod patet ex differencia ludorum; nam diversus est ludus hominis liberalis qui propria sponte bonum intendit agere a ludo hominis servilis qui circa servilia occupatur, et ludus hominis disciplinati et docti qui discrete ludere scit, ut sunt aliqui curiales et bene nutriti in domibus principum, a ludo indisciplinati et insipientis qui nulla disciplina in ludendo refrenatur.298 Unde manifestum est quod ad medium habitum virtutis pertinet decentia in ludo dicere et audire, quod eciam maxime apparet ex eo quia tam in veteribus historiis et comediis poetarum quam in cothidianis colloquucionibus hominum contingit, cum aliqui turpia loquuntur, quod suspicantur audientes quod aliquod malum

Cap. 25 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m xxvȷͫ H

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3 congruant α congruunt Bβ | modesto ABβ honesto JO

interp. “Moris enim tales videntur motus esse, quemadmodum autem corpora ex motibus judicantur, ita et mores”). Cartagena’s sentence is verbatim from Sent. Eth. iv.16.6 except for “cum enim ~ sana vel ne”; but cf. Intro. § 2, at n28. talia ludicra seu jocosa que congruant viro modesto et liberali: EN 1128a18 τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἁρμόττει. The chapter is excerpted from Sent. Eth. iv.16.8–17; Arist.’s ἐλευθέριος/liberalis is correctly glossed not as moral liberalitas but “noble, free-born” vs. ἀνδραποδώδης/servilis “slavish, villein”. Bβ “congruunt” could be a revision (Aquinas “quae congruant”, but Vet. interp. “congruunt”); it strengthens the class distinction. Mcast understood modesto not in its modern sense but as “varón ordenado e liberal” (cf. JO), closer to Gk ἐπιεικής “reasonable” (LSJ; specifically “the upper or educated classes”, Arist. Pol. 1308b27 λέγω ἀντικεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς τῷ πλήθει); corde gives modest- × 41 pre-1500, all in the same sense (Villena 1994–2000, ii, 205 “modesto, siquier temprado”; Torre 1991, 311 “No seas modesto en las plaças e yntenprado en tu cabo”; Palencia 1490, i, f. 285r “Modestare es exerçitar algo […] con temprança, dende modesto […] quien guarda

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should by making insulting jokes about others, such people call bomolochs “eutrapelous” because they find them witty, for they exceed in a kind of play that most men love excessively. Nonetheless, bomolochs are a long way from being eutrapelous, as what is said above makes clear. 2.25 [On eutrapely.] Chapter 2 It pertains to the eutrapelous man (that is, one having this virtue), as one who is well suited and disposed to socialize with men, to say and hear such jokes or jests as befit a modest and liberal man, that is, one who has a mind free from servile emotions. Wherever one finds something that can decently be done, it pertains to virtue; as this applies to play, therefore, someone can hear or say fitting things, or unfitting things. This is shown by the different kinds of play; for the play of a liberal man who spontaneously strives to do good is different from the play of a servile man who devotes himself to servile concerns, and the play of a disciplined and educated man who knows how to play discreetly, like certain courtly, well-brought-up men in princely households, from the play of an undisciplined and foolish man who plays with unruly lack of restraint. It is therefore obvious that it pertains to the middle disposition of this virtue to say and hear decent things in play, which is indeed most apparent from the fact that both in the ancient stories and comedies of poets and in men’s everyday

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el modo de todas cosas”; Santaella 1499, f. 83v “Gravis […] modesto, maduro, sosegado, que no se mueve livianamente o con cada viento de tentación”, etc.); Cartagena no doubt took it thus too. cum ergo ~ convenientia: the sentence lacks a main verb; Aquinas wrote “ubicumque est invenire aliquid quod decenter fieri potest, hoc pertinet ad virtutem; sed contingit aliquem ludentem dicere et audire quaedam convenientia” (Sent. Eth. iv.16.9). The problem could be solved by reading “cum ergo in ludo, contingit” (for -gat), but if Cartagena’s copy of Aquinas was defective he may have construed the infinitives as still dependent on est invenire, so we print the apodosis Ω. ut sunt aliqui curiales ~ principum: added by Cartagena—curialis never occurs in Sent. Eth., Arist. would have had no word for it; nutriti = criados—and omitted by Mcast, this phrase scarcely requires comment. It was by such surreptitious “examples” that he adapted the text to his design on “curial” readers.

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habent in corde.299 Ideo non parum differt ad honestatem hominis utrum dicat in ludendo turpia vel honesta, nam honestus vir abstinere debet in ludo a turpiloquiis tam in dicendo quam in audiendo, quia ista non congruunt viro virtuoso, nec dicet convicia in ludendo virtuosus quia non intendit contristare audientem. Per que autem contristetur audiens vel ne non esset possibile determinari, quia diversis diversa sunt odibilia et delectabilia, et talia unusquisque libenter audiet que sunt sibi delectabilia; convicium vero est quedam contumelia, dum tale quid in convicio dicitur ex quo homo infamatur; et ista prohibent dicere legum conditores, tenetur enim accione injuriarum qui tale convicium 299

in veteribus historiis et comediis poetarum: EN 1128a22–24 ἴδοι δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμῳδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἡ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ ὑπόνοια (Vet. interp. “Videbit autem utique aliquis et ex comoediis veterum et modernorum; his quidem enim erat derisio turpiloquium, his autem magis suspicio”). Aristotle’s point was a literary distinction between Aristophanic and Menandrian-style Old and New Comedy: blunt ribaldry vs. innuendo. Medieval readers knew nothing of theatres and were constrained to employ guesswork; standard was Giovanni Balbi’s definition in his Catholicon (c. 1285): Comedia oda quod est cantus vel laus componitur cum comos quod est villa, et dicitur hoc comedia, id est ‘villanus cantus’ vel ‘villana laus’, quia tractat de rebus rusticanis et affinis cottidiane locucioni quia circa villas fiebat et recitabatur; vel dicitur comedia a comesacione, solebant enim post cibum homines ad audiendum eam convenire. […] Papias autem sic dicit: ‘Comedia est que res privatarum et humilium personarum comprehendit, non tam alto stilo ut tragedia sed mediocri et dulci, que sepe eciam de historica fide et de gravibus personis tractat’. Item dicit Papias, ‘Comedi dicti quia prius [= veteres] post comesaciones ad eos audiendos venire solebant homines; sed post [= moderni] aggressi gesta universorum et delicta corripientes in scena proferebant. Comicus a comedia […] Duo sunt genera comicorum […], sc. veteres qui joculatores extiterunt ut Terencius, novi qui et satirici quibus generaliter vicia carpuntur ut Persius, Juvenalis, et nudi pinguntur quia vicia denudent. (Johannes de Janua 1460, ff. [117]v– [118]r) Guiral Ot 1500, f. 90va clearly used this, though adding some sketchy knowledge of commentaries on Terence and inventing a social distinction between Old (rustic) and New (noble) adapted to the context in EN: Comedia est carmen villanum describens gesta levium et vilium personarum, habens prologum ad captandum audientiam, et processum ad inducendum admirationem, epystasim ad procurandum turbationem ad horam, et catastrophen ad concludendum finaliter risum et exhilarationem; […] postea vero forsan tempore Aristotelis comedie fiebant de gestis gravium personarum et corripiebant mores hominum et recitabantur in locis honestis, puta in cenis nobilium personarum. Igitur comedie veterum fuerunt reprobate et comedie modernorum approbate. We know Oresme used Geraldus (n133 above), but all this was lost on him (1488 iv.25, ff. 88rb/1940, 271): [Et differe le jeu de] celui qui est de franc courage d[u] jeu de celui qui est de servile condition ou nature ou maniere […]; et ce peust aussi apparoir par les comedies des anciens et par celles que l’ en fait a present. Glo. Il entent ici par comedies aucuns jeux

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conversations, when people use low language, the listeners suspect they have some evil in their hearts. Hence it makes a big difference to a man’s honesty whether he uses low or honest language in play; the honest man at play should abstain from both saying and listening to obscenities, because these are unfitting for a virtuous man, nor will a virtuous man make joking insults because he has no intention of aggrieving his listener. Whether or not something will aggrieve the listener would be impossible to determine, since different men find different things hateful or pleasurable and each will willingly listen to anything he finds pleasurable; but insults are a kind of vilification, if what is said in insult defames the man; the legislators outlaw saying such things, and anyone who makes such insults is liable to a civil action for damages. However, there

come sont ceulx ou ung homme represente Saint Pol, l’autre Judas, l’autre ung hermite et dit checun son personnage et ont aucuns roules et rimes, et aucune fois en telz jeux l’ en dit de laides paroles et ordes ou injurieuses et deshonnestes. “However inadequate this definition,” comments Menut (n4 ad loc.), “it does interpret the term in a manner to be easily understood by a fourteenth-century reader”; he even finds the comparison of Greek comedy with miracle plays “more nearly appropriate” than Oresme’s gloss on tragedy as “ditiez comme rommans, qui parlent et traictent d’aucuns grans faiz notables” (i.17, f. 17vb/137). Aquinas shows neither more nor less awareness of the kind of entertainment in question, but adds a much more misleading gloss re Old vs. New, based on attributing a moral implication—exactly the opposite of Arist.’s—to ὑπόνοια “covert meaning”/suspicio: tam in veteribus quam in novis comoediis, id est repraesentationibus collocutionum hominum adinvicem, quia si alicubi in talibus narrationibus occurreret aliquod turpiloquium, ex hoc quibusdam generabatur derisio, dum talia turpia in risum vertebantur, quibusdam vero generabatur suspicio, dum scilicet suspicabantur eos qui turpia loquebantur habere aliquod malum in corde. (Sent. Eth. iv.16.10) Cartagena set out to lift this sentence bodily into his text; however, being mystified not just by ancient Old and New Comedy but by the entire generic concepts of drama and the comic, he ventures two simplifications that apparently turn the grey muddle of the above stabs into inspissated gloom. First he splits comedie into two different uncomic things by stating—wildly—that veteres meant historie “old stories” or “histories” (cf. Lexicon, BNE Mss/6442, f. 54v “comediis recitatio laudabilium”) and “poetic comedies” (the only one he can have known was Dante’s Divina Commedia, not noted for comedy or for turpiloquia); then into three by conjecturing that novis must therefore be repraesentationes collocutionum—not dramatic dialogue, however, but another form of discourse altogether, cothidiane colloquuciones “conversation”; and finally confusing the issue further by making Aquinas’s phrase about “suspicion” refer to this latter, thus presenting Arist.’s point as being about not literary fiction but lying—audientes is no longer “audience”, but “listeners”. Cartagena’s contemporaries in Spain appear to have lagged way behind the thirteenth and fourteenth-century schoolmen in their comprehension of comedy (e.g. Pérez Priego 1978; Cátedra García 1983; Gómez Moreno 1990, 137–141); even by their standards, however, this suppression of the literary aspect seems surprising—or perhaps deliberate?

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dicit.300 Sunt tamen quedam convicia que non prohibentur que interdum dici possunt propter delectacionem vel propter hominum emendacionem, dummodo hoc fiat absque infamia. Ille ergo qui se habet in conviciando sicut graciosus et liberalis vir est sibi ipsi lex, dum per propriam eleccionem vitat ea que lex prohibet et utitur hiis que lex concedit, sicut Apostolus dicit quod opera legis facientes “ipsi sibi sunt lex, qui ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis” (ad Romanos c. secundo); et talis dicitur eutrapelus, et possumus eum vocare graciosum, ut diximus.301 Bomolochus autem non est tam malus sicut derisor, nam proprie loquendo derisor est ille qui deridet in malum alicujus cum intencione ei nocendi, de quo Salomon ait, “Abhominacio est Domini omnis illusor, et cum simplicibus sermocinacio ejus”, et “delusores ipse deludet” (Proverbiorum c. tercio). Sed bomolochus non intendit ad nocendum, sed finis ejus est procurare risum et solacium, quod procurat immoderate; est enim inportunus trufator et lusor, ut sunt nonnulli qui si alios faciant ridere non cessant dicere de aliis et sepe eciam de seipsis, quod viciosum est, unde idem Salomon ait, “risum reputavi errorem et gaudio dixi, Quid frustra deciperis?” (Ecclesiastes c. secundo), quod de immoderato gaudio vel risu intelligendum est.302 Et dicet bomolochus talia que vir graciosus seu eutrapelus nullatenus diceret et interdum talia que non audiret, nam turpiloquia non solum virtuosus non dicet sed nec eciam audiet libenter, quinymo prohibebit si potest vel, si prohibere non valet quia forsam dicuntur per majores viros et potentiores, non recipit sola-

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legum conditores: Dig. xlvii.10.2.64 “quodcumque quis fecerit vel dixerit ut alium infamet, erit actio injuriarum”, 66 “Convicium injuriam esse”; 10.13 “Qui turpibus verbis utitur […] injuriarum tenetur”, etc. Starting here at EN 1128a27–31 τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀόριστον; ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ. […] οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει· τὸ γὰρ σκῶμμα λοιδόρημά τι ἐστίν, οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἔνια λοιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν/Sent. Eth. iv.16.12–13 “hoc est indeterminatum, quid scilicet contristet vel delectet audientem ~ dum tale quid in convicio dicitur ex quo homo infamatur, et hoc prohibent dicere legispositores”, Cartagena picks phrases from Aquinas and freely embroiders them with no less than four legal and biblical proof-texts. The additions seem minor, but in fact they are calculated to render Arist.’s descriptive analysis a great deal more didactic and morally prescriptive. Apostolus dicit: Rom 2:14–15 “cum enim gentes quae legem non habent naturaliter quae legis sunt faciunt eiusmodi legem non habentes ipsi sibi sunt lex. qui ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis”; a tendentious expansion of EN 1128a31–32 ὁ δὴ χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἕξει, οἷον νόμος ὢν ἑαυτῷ/Sent. Eth. iv.16.13 “Ille enim qui se habet in conviciando sicut gratiosus et liberalis vir est sibi ipsi lex, dum scilicet per propriam electionem vitat ea quae lex prohibet et utitur his quae lex concedit.”

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are some insults that are not outlawed and may sometimes be pronounced for entertainment or for men’s improvement, so long as they are not defamatory. Hence the man who behaves wittily and liberally when exchanging insults is a law unto himself so long as he chooses by himself to avoid what the law prohibits and say what the law permits; as the Apostle says, the law-abiding “are a law unto themselves, which shew the work of the law written in their hearts” (Rom 2). Such a man is called eutrapelous, and we may name him witty, as I said. Yet the bomoloch is not as bad as the mocker, for properly speaking a mocker is one who mocks to the detriment of someone with the intention of harming him, of whom Solomon says, “For every mocker is an abomination to the Lord, and his communication is with the simple”, and “He shall scorn the scorners” (Prov 3). The bomoloch does not intend to harm, however, but aims to arouse laughter and good cheer, but arouses it immoderately; he is an importunate jester and buffoon, like some who if they make others laugh cannot refrain from joking about others and often even about themselves, which is a vice, for as Solomon also says, “Laughter I counted error, and to mirth I said: Why art thou vainly deceived?” (Eccl 2), meaning immoderate mirth or laughter. The bomoloch will say thing a witty or eutrapelous man would under no circumstance say, and sometimes things he would not listen to, for the virtuous man will not only not say obscenities but will not even listen to them willingly; indeed, he will prohibit them if he can, or if he cannot prohibit them, because perhaps they are said by men greater and more powerful than he, will feel not

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Salomon ait: Prov 3:32 and 34. trufator: deliberately vulgar, from Occ.-OFr. trufa, truf(l)e “truffle, fig. trick, jest” < LLat. tufĕra, class.tuber (Wartburg et al. 1929–, xiii/2, §384b tuber; ATILF 2012 s.v. truffe), whence truffer v., trufferie, truffeur/truffier/truffoiz n., truffeux, truffable adj., etc., It. truffa, MEng. tryfle, tryfler (OED s.v. trifle), Sp.-Port. trufa, and Lat. tru( f )fa, trufator (Du Cange viii, 198 s.v.). corde lists trufa, trufar, trufador × 73 from Berceo to 1500 (Fernan Pérez de Guzmán, Coplas de vic. y virt. “la disoluçión | de motes de trufadores”, Gen. y sembl. “non estoriadores mas trufadores”; trans. Eiximenis, L. donas “non pertenezca a persona religiosa seer juglara nin grant parlera nin trufadora”, etc.); common too was truhán × 68 (L. consol. España “albardanes, truhanes, e […] juglares”; Kuzari c. 1450, BNM Mss/17812 “oír burlas de truhanes [= Judah Halevi 1977, ii.60 ’‫צחבה‬ ‫ ד’וי אלהזל‬ṣuḥbat ḏawī l-hazl/1660, 126 ‫ חבורת הליצנים‬ḥăvurat ha-lēẓānim “the company of masters of jest/jokers”] y cantares enconados y otras cosas […] que corronpen la noble dispusiçión”; Palencia 1490, s.vv. colax “un truhán lisonjero”, scurra “truhán, tragón que suele seguir a otros […] escarneçiendo”), and this is what Cartagena meant—court jesters, an institution unknown to Arist. idem Salomon ait: Eccl 2:2.

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cium in hoc sed fastidium.303 Agriotus vero econtra ad istas colloquuciones que causa joci fiunt est totus inutilis, quia nec ipse dicit aliquid quod solacium inducat, et si alii dicunt semper est tristis; et hoc est vicium, quia ludus est quedam requies et est neccessarius ad vitam humanam ad relevandum multas anxietates que ex fragilitate humane nature hominibus proveniunt. Ideo uti ludo debite et moderate sicut quadam medecina est opus virtutis, et qui in hoc deficit vel superhabundat est viciosus. Concludendo ergo dici potest quod eutrapelia seu graciositas est habitus electivus ludi liberalis et moderati non injuriosi, non inportuni, non onerosi sed convenientis, honesti, et graciosi sufficientis et neccessarii ad vite recreacionem et requiem propter relevandum tedium et anxietatem, fastidium et fatigacionem, medians inter disposicionem viri agrestis ludere nullo modo volentis et disposicionem bomolochi, id est immoderate, injuriose, importune, onerose, et indiscrete ludentis.304 Iste igitur tres virtutes quas supra proxime diximus, videlicet affabilitas, veracitas, et eutrapelia, sunt circa colloquuciones humanas. Differunt tamen, quia affabilitas est circa delectacionem que fit in colloquiis que dicuntur seria, veracitas est circa veritatem manifestacionis propriorum bonorum, eutrapelia consistit circa ludicra et ea que pertinent ad jocum, ut ex suprascriptis patet. Lib. 2 Cap. 26 De verecundia. Capitulum primum Verecundiam in numero virtutum non posuimus, quia magis assimilatur passioni quam habitui.305 Cum ergo virtutes, ut supradiximus, sunt habitus electivi causati in homine, et verecundia sit passio, sequitur quod non sit virtus, quod probatur dupliciter. Primo, per diffinicionem ejus, nam verecundia est timor

64 suprascriptis ABβ supradictis JO (de las cosas sobredichas Mcast) Capl̛m xxvıȷ H 303 304

Cap. 26 tit. JOB, om. AQ

forsam ~ per majores viros et potentiores: “quinymo ~ fastidium” is added, again linking to court society. habitus electivus ludi liberalis: the paragraph is inserted from Guiral Ot 1500 iv qu.44, ff. 91ra–b “Quid est eutrapelia secundum descriptionem”, of which Cartagena quotes the first nine of nineteen lines: Dicendum quod eutrapelia secundum descriptionem est habitus electivus ludi liberalis et moderati, non injuriosi, non importuni nec onerosi sed convenientis, honesti, et gratiosi sufficientis et necessarii ad vite recreationem et requiem propter relevandum tedium et anxietatem, fastidium et fatigationem, medians inter dispositionem viri agrestis ludere nullo modo volentis et dispositionem bomolochi immoderate, injuriose, importune, onerose, et indiscrete ludentis.

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good cheer but disgust. The agriot, on the other hand, is totally useless in these exchanges that take place for the purpose of joking; he says nothing himself to induce good cheer, and if others do he remains gloomy; this is a vice, because play is a kind of rest and necessary to human life for lightening the many anxieties that the fragility of human nature lays upon men. Hence to use play in licit and moderate fashion as a sort of medicine is a work of virtue, and one who is deficient or excessive in it is guilty of vice. In conclusion, then, we may say that eutrapely or wittiness is an elective disposition for liberal and moderate play, not insulting, not importunate, not burdensome but appropriate, honest, and witty, necessary and sufficient for rest and recreation in life by relieving boredom and anxiety, disgust and tiredness, representing a mean between the character of a rustic man altogether unwilling to play and the character of a bomoloch, that is, an immoderate, injurious, importunate, burdensome, and indiscreet joker. The three virtues described just above, then, namely affability, truthfulness, and eutrapely, are about human social intercourse. They differ, nevertheless, because affability is about the pleasure that arises in exchanges we call serious, truthfulness is about truly displaying one’s own good, eutrapely is about jokes and things pertaining to jesting, as the above makes clear. 2.26 On bashfulness. Chapter 1 I did not include bashfulness in my list of virtues because it is more like an emotion than a disposition. Since virtues, as explained above, are acquired elective dispositions in man, and bashfulness is an emotion, it follows that it is not a virtue, which is proved in two ways. First, by its definition, since bashfulness

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verecundia: for Aristotle, the sense of shame (αἰδώς, EN 1128b10–35) is not a virtue but a fear befitting only the young. As Strauss (1981, 36) observes, this view was alien to biblical morality, like that on magnanimity (ii.10 n238, above); Cartagena’s two chapters (1193 words to Arist.’s 249, Aquinas’s 1046) are designed to correct it—though as usual he does not attribute fault to Arist., only to the Cynics (n312)—and to suggest that, despite having omitted verecundia from the list of virtues in i.8 1–4, “decency”, i.e. covering the parts of humanity that religion decrees “shameful”, is indeed a moral obligation. As such the chapters precisely match the function and approach of the conclusion to Bk i on continentia (signposted by Sent. Eth. iv.17.1 “Secundo, inducit simile de continentia, quae cum sit laudabilis non est virtus”, referring to Arist.’s last two lines, οὐκ ἔστι δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλά τις μικτή). The first follows Sent. Eth. iv.17 step by step, omitting ponderous divisiones, technicalities on nemesis, etc. and adding one amusingly by-the-way biblical text on doctors; it proves verecundia is not a virtue. The second, reversing this conclusion, is Cartagena’s own interpolation.

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ingloriacionis, id est confusionis que opponitur glorie, sed timor est passio quedam, ergo verecundia est in genere passionis. Secundo probatur idem per effectum verecundie, ad cujus intellectum considerandum est quod passiones sunt motus appetitus sensitivi, appetitus autem sensitivus utitur organo corporali, unde passiones omnes fiunt cum aliqua corporali transmutacione, inde est quod verecundia que est timor ingloriacionis et timor qui est circa pericula mortis habent se in generali similiter, in quantum utraque harum passionum indicatur per quandam transmutacionem corporalis coloris, sed in speciali differunt quia illi qui verecundantur rubescunt in facie, illi vero qui timent mortem palescunt. Racio hujus differencie est quia natura transmittit spiritus et humores ad locum ubi sentit defectum; sedes autem vite est in corde, ideo quando periculum vite timetur spiritus et humores recurrunt ad cor et exteriora quasi deserta palescunt, honor vero et confusio consistunt in exterioribus, ideo quando homo timet ingloriacionem per verecundiam recurrunt humores et spiritus ad exteriora et rubescit.306 Patet igitur quod verecundia et timor mortis sunt quedam corporalia in quantum scilicet habent corporalem transmutacionem annexam, quod videtur magis ad passionem quam ad habitum pertinere; sequitur ergo quod verecundia non est virtus. Et licet non sit virtus, congruit tamen juvenili etati. Racio hujus est quia juvenes propter fervorem etatis vivunt secundum passiones; ideo sunt proni ad multum peccandum et prohibentur interdum ab hoc propter verecundiam, per quam timent turpitudinem. Ideo verecundia decet juvenes; et hinc est quod solemus laudare juvenes verecundos. Etati vero senili non congruit verecundia; nullus enim laudat senem de hoc quod est verecundus, quia existimamus quod non opportet eum aliquid turpium operari pro quibus consuevit esse verecundia, tum quia propter longitudinem temporis deberent esse experti, tum quia cessante fervore etatis reputamus quod propter passionem non debeant aliquid turpe operari.307 Ad virtuosum autem non pertinet verecundia, cum enim verecundia sit respectu pravorum et virtuosus non operatur prava quia virtus est que bonum facit habentem et reddit bonum opus ejus; sequitur quod non competat virtuoso. Nec obstat si dicatur quod verecundia non solum est de hiis que secundum veritatem sunt turpia que contraria videntur virtuti, sed eciam de hiis que sunt turpia secundum oppinionem hominum, quia nichil differt

11 post similiter add. et β B quia cum β 306

32 cum enim α (cf. Sent. Eth. iv.17.7 “verecundia enim est”) cum ergo

natura transmittit spiritus et humores: the curious attempt at a scientific explanation of blushing and blenching by the theory of humours (nn194, 271) is Aquinas’s, and developed at length by Geraldus.

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is the fear of losing one’s reputation, that is, of an embarrassment which is the opposite of glory, but fear is an emotion, therefore bashfulness is a kind of emotion. Second, the same is proved by the effect of bashfulness. To understand this we must consider that emotions are impulses of the sensory appetite, the sensory appetite uses some physical organ, therefore all emotions are accompanied by some physical change; hence bashfulness, which is fear of loss of reputation, and fear, which is about dangers of death, behave in general in a similar way, inasmuch as both emotions are shown by some physical change of colour, but differ in particular because those who feel bashful go red in the face whereas those who fear death go pale. The reason for this difference is that nature transmits spirits and humours to the place where it feels a defect; the seat of life is in the heart, so when one fears one’s life is in danger the spirits and humours rush to the heart leaving the exterior parts pale, whereas honour and embarrassment consist in externals, so when a man fears loss of reputation bashfulness makes the humours and spirits rush to the exterior parts and he blushes. It is clear, then, that bashfulness and fear of death are physical things inasmuch as they are accompanied by a connected physical change, which seems to pertain more to an emotion than to a disposition; so it follows that bashfulness is not a virtue. Though it is not a virtue, it is proper to youth. The reason for this is that young people due to their fervent heat live by their emotions; therefore they are very prone to sin, but sometimes they are prevented from this by bashfulness, which makes them fear turpitude. Thus bashfulness befits the young; we tend to praise bashful youths. By contrast, bashfulness is not proper to old age; no one praises an old man for being bashful, because we judge it unfitting for him to do any of the base things that usually cause bashfulness, first because their length of life ought to make them experienced, and then because once the fervent heat of youth has passed we reckon they should not do anything base from emotion. Finally, bashfulness does not befit the virtuous man, since bashfulness concerns improper things and the virtuous man does not do improper things, since virtue is what makes its possessor good and renders his works good; it follows that it does not fit the virtuous man. It is no objection to say that bashfulness is not only about things that are truly base and clearly contrary to virtue, but also about those that are only base in men’s opinion; for

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nullus enim laudat senem ~ quod est verecundus: Arist. used different words, αἰδήμων verecundus “bashful” for the young, αἰσχυντηλός verecundabilis “disgraceful” for the old; but Aquinas ignored the distinction.

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ad propositum. Nam virtuosus neutrum horum operabitur, nec turpe secundum veritatem nec turpe secundum oppinionem, quia nedum a turpibus sed eciam ab hiis que suspicionem turpitudinis habent cessabit. Ideo non pertinet ad virtuosum quod de aliquo verecundetur; sed hoc est proprium hominis pravi, ut sit talis quod operetur aliquid turpium secundum veritatem vel secundum oppinionem. Nec eciam obstat si dicatur quod, licet virtuosus non habeat aliquid de quo verecundetur, est tamen ita dispositus ut si aliquid operaretur talium verecundaretur, quia nec propter hoc est extimandum quod verecundia competat virtuoso, quod probatur dupliciter. Primo, quia verecundia proprie loquendo non respicit nisi voluntarios defectus quibus debetur vituperium, sed hoc repugnat virtuti quod aliquis voluntarie operetur malum, ergo non competit ei verecundia (secus esset si verecundia foret eorum que involuntarie possunt accidere, sicut egritudo et similes defectus qui contra voluntatem accidunt homini, quia virtuoso et sano potest competere curare de medico propter infirmitatem que posset accidere, unde scriptum est, “honora medicum propter neccessitatem, etenim creavit eum Altissimus”, Ecclesiastici c. xxxviii; sed non sic competit virtuoso habere verecundiam propter turpitudinem, si evenerit, quia non potest evenire nisi vellit, nunquam autem volet virtuosus).308 Secundo, quia secundum hoc verecundia esset quoddam virtuosum ex supposicione, id est cum quadam condicione, scilicet quod verecundaretur si operaretur turpia, sed hoc non est de hiis que proprie conveniunt virtuti, quia actus virtuosi absolute et simpliciter conveniunt virtuosis, non condicionaliter, ut patet in hiis que circa omnes virtutes diximus. Nec eciam obstat si aliquis diceret quod ex eo quia non verecundari de turpi operacione est quid pravum, verecundari sit virtuosum, cum sit ei contrarium; nam hoc non sequitur, quia utrumque tam verecundia quam inverecundia presuponit operacionem turpem que non competit virtuoso, licet presuposita turpi operacione convenientius est quod ab ea quis abstineat propter verecundiam quam quod eam sequatur inverecunde. Cum ergo verecundia non inest virtuoso, sequitur quod non sit virtus.

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unde scriptum est, honora medicum: Sir 38:1(–15), expanding Sent. Eth. iv.17.12’s own addition, “eorum quae involuntarie possunt accidere, sicut aegritudo […], unde virtuoso etiam sano potest competere curare de medico propter infirmitatem quae posset accidere”. On the fondness for medical examples cf. nn194, 271, 276, 316, etc. In this case Vulg.’s

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our purposes this makes no difference, for the virtuous man will do neither of these kinds of things, truly base or reputedly base, because he will refrain not just from base things but also from those that have any suspicion of baseness. Thus it does not pertain to the virtuous man to feel bashful about anything; that is proper to the sort of depraved man who would do something base, whether truly or reputedly so. Furthermore, it is no objection to say that although the virtuous man has nothing to feel bashful about, nevertheless he is so disposed that if something of this kind were done he would feel bashful; this also is no reason to suppose that bashfulness befits the virtuous man, as is proven by two arguments. First, because bashfulness properly speaking only regards voluntary defects deserving of reproach, but it is incompatible with virtue for anyone to do evil voluntarily, so bashfulness does not befit him (it would be otherwise if bashfulness concerned things that can happen involuntarily, like sickness and such defects that happen against man’s will, because it can befall that a virtuous and healthy man seeks a cure from a doctor for a chance illness, whence it is written, “Honour the physician for the need thou hast of him: for the most High hath created him”, Sir 38; but it does not thereby befit the virtuous man to have bashfulness about some turpitude, if it arises, because it cannot arise unless he wills it, yet the virtuous man never wills it). Second, because by this account bashfulness would be something conditionally virtuous, that is, on the assumption that he would feel bashful if he did base things, but this is not properly compatible with virtue, because virtuous actus are suitable for the virtuous simply and absolutely, not conditionally, as is clear from what I have said about all the virtues. Nor is it any objection for someone to say that, since not to feel bashful about committing a base act is something depraved, to do the opposite and feel bashful is virtuous; this is a non sequitur, because both things, bashfulness and lack of bashfulness, presuppose some base act unsuitable to a virtuous man, even if, presupposing the base act, it is more fitting for someone to abstain from it through bashfulness than to pursue it bare-facedly. Therefore, since bashfulness does not exist in the virtuous man, it follows that it is not a virtue.

unfortunate mistranslation of LXX Τίμα ἰατρὸν πρὸς τὰς χρείας αὐτοῦ as “honora medicum propter neccessitatem” (NRSV “Honour physicians for their services”) makes the compliment sound double-edged, if not downright sarcastic, but it is unlikely that Cartagena, who seems impervious to humour, intended us to laugh.

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Lib. 2 Cap. 27 [De verecundia.] Capitulum secundum Intelligenda sunt hec ne erremus de verecundia proprie sumpta, ad cujus clariorem noticiam est advertendum quod verecundia potest sumi dupliciter: primo modo proprie et stricte, prout est timor de turpi, secundo modo large, prout est pudorari seu ingloriari, erubescere vel confundi.309 Secundum primum modum non potest cadere in virum virtuosum. Racio hujus est quia non timemus nisi propinqua vel ea que prope esse putamus, quod patet in morte, nam omnes sciunt se esse morituros sed non timent mortem quia putant eam esse longe, cum autem credunt eam esse propinquam, tunc timent.310 Cum ergo virtuoso non sit turpitudo propinqua, quinymo totaliter remota, quia durante virtute non operabitur aliquod turpe, consequens est quod verecundia proprie sumpta ei non competat. Est enim sciendum quod verecundia destruitur duobus modis, videlicet per descensum et per ascensum.311 Per descensum, ut cum descenditur ad tantam infimitatem viciorum quod verecundia ex toto perditur, ut contingit plerumque, quod sunt nonnulli qui in etate juvenili sunt

Cap. 27 tit. αB, om. Q Capl̛m xxvııȷ H (cf. i.30 83) 309

310

13 infimitatem A (baxeza Mcast) infinit- JOB infirmit- β

verecundia potest sumi dupliciter: in order to reverse Arist.’s estimate of shame Cartagena is obliged to introduce, as Fernández Gallardo (1999a, 600) puts it, “una sutil distinción en el concepto”; or, as one might say, a 180° reversal of its meaning. To do so he draws selectively on Guiral Ot 1500 iv qu.45 “Utrum aliquis simpliciter bonus studiosus sit verecundus”, ff. 91vb–92rb—but disagrees. pudorari: the verb, a vulg. back-formation from pudoratus (Vulg. Sir 26:19 “mulier pudorata”), is unatt. in L & S or Du Cange. We find it in Bolognese dictator Boncompagno da Signa, Boncompagnus (1215) iv.6.11 De statuto contra lenones et rufianos “pudoroso debent ludibrio pudorari”, and Blaise 1975, 751 s.v. pudoro cites one non-deponent eleventh-century ecclesiastical example, but it is distinctly rare. However, Geraldus uses both adj. and v. (n310) to introduce the required transition of verecundia → pudor, pudicitia, f. 91vb “vir bonus est modestus et honestus, quare erit etiam pudoratus et per consequens verecundus, cum idem sint pudor et verecundia”; cf. pudor, pudenda, 34–35, 45 below. non timent mortem quia putant eam esse longe: freely adapted from Guiral Ot 1500, f. 92ra: Hiis ergo premissis dicendum primo quod vir studiosus non potest proprie verecundari, id est timore in turpi actu deprehendi; 2° quod potest verecundari, sumendo ‘verecundari’ large secundum quod est pudorari, ingloriari, erubescere, et confundi. Primum probatur sic: primo quia omnis timens turpem actum est propinquius turpi actui. Timemus enim mala si non longe sunt sed prope, ut probat Philosophus 2° Rhetorice: ‘Que enim longe sunt valde nullus timet; sciunt enim omnes quod morientur, sed quando non prope mortem sunt nihil curant’ [Rh. 1382a25–27 τὰ γὰρ πόρρω σφόδρα οὐ φοβοῦνται: ἴσασι γὰρ πάντες ὅτι ἀποθανοῦνται, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἐγγύς, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν.] Sic ergo patet quod omnis timens est propinquius ei quod timet; sed vir bonus non est propinquius turpi actui, […] quare non timet turpem actum.

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2.27 [On bashfulness.] Chapter 2 We must understand all this to avoid any mistake about bashfulness properly so called, for the clearer knowledge of which it should be noted that bashfulness has two possible meanings: first in its proper and strict sense as a fear of shame, second in a broad sense as a feeling of modesty or disgrace, blushing or feeling embarrassed. In the first sense it cannot occur in a virtuous man. The reason for this is that we only fear things that are close to us or that we think imminent, as is clear with death, for everyone knows they will die but they do not fear death because they think it a long way off, yet when they believe it to be near they begin to fear it. Therefore since baseness is not close to the virtuous man, but rather totally remote, because so long as virtue lasts he will not do anything base, it follows that bashfulness properly so called does not befit him. We must know that bashfulness is destroyed in two ways, namely by descent and by ascent. By descent, when one descends to such depths of vice that bashfulness is lost altogether, as frequently happens, as there are not a few who in youth are bashful and abstain from base things through bash-

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verecundia destruitur duobus modis: a summary of Guiral Ot 1500, f. 92ra, before the previous passage: Pro evidentia responsionis premittenda sunt tria: primo quot modis dicitur verecundia, 2° quot sunt obiecta verecundie, 3° quot modis perditur verecundia. […] Perditur etiam dupliciter ex duplici causa, uno modo per descensum ad malum, alio modo per ascensum ad maius bonum, sicut continentia perdi potest per descensum ad incontinentiam et per ascensum ad temperantiam. Sic etiam iuvenis verecundus potest perdere verecundiam […] quia perdit appetitum honoris et honestatis […] per excessum alterius appetitus et per persecutionem eius, puta per appetitum delectationies vel pecunie; sic enim videmus puellas pudicas et verecundas fieri meretrices impudicissimas […]. Poterit etiam iste iuvenis perfecte virtuosus fieri per excessum bonorum operum; factus autem virtuosus per virtutem, prohibebitur ab his turpibus a quibus per verecundiam prohibebatur et per eam operabitur illa bona que propter verecundiam operabatur. In Cartagena the logical connexion (“Est enim sciendum …”) is hardly perspicuous, but becomes clear eventually. Unsurprisingly, in view of his addressee, he omits young girls descending into prostitution, taking refuge in pallid masculine generality (“in tantum […] inflamantur voluptatibus quod […] fiunt inverecundissimi peccatores”). But the end of this paragraph refers to, and then proceeds to rebut, Geraldus’s conclusion lower down, after the passage quoted above in n310, f. 92rb: Sic vir universaliter bonus non abstinet a turpibus propter verecundiam sed propter virtutem perfectam. Et posset argui a minori destructive [as Cartagena does], quia magis videtur quod vir temperatus uteretur continentia quam verecundia, cum melior sit continentia quam verecundia; et tamen non utitur ea, sed virtute perfecta, quare nec verecundia.

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verecundi et abstinent a turpibus propter verecundiam, post vero procedente tempore in tantum declinant ad vicia et inflamantur voluptatibus quod perdunt totaliter appetitum honoris et honestatis et fiunt inverecundissimi peccatores. Per ascensum perditur econtrario; contingit enim quod sunt aliqui qui a principio etatis ex verecundia declinabant a passionibus, postea ascendente etate in tantum viget in eis racio quod ascendunt ad virtutem perfectam et cessat in eis verecundia, quia jam non propter verecundiam sed propter bonum et virtutem declinant a turpibus. Nam ut in materia continencie dicebamus, ex longa continencia ascenditur ad virtutem et ex longa incontinencia descenditur ad maliciam. Secundo modo sumpta verecundia bene cadit in virtuosum; nam si virtuosus pateretur aliquam confusionem, licet sibi hoc adveniat sine aliqua culpa, tamen erubesceret. Nec enim sunt ferendi quidam ex antiquis philosophis qui dicebantur Cinici qui nitebantur astruere virtuosum de nullo prorsus debere erubescere, sed omnia palam agere et dicere que sine culpa fieri possunt; quod absurdissimum est, nam natura hominis docuit abscondere aliqua, licet culpam non habeant, ut sunt neccessaria nature, que viri virtuosi et modesti nedum operari publice sed eciam propriis nominibus non appellant, ymo cum opportet de talibus loqui quibusdam circumloquucionibus declarant, proprio vocabulo ex quodam pudore dimisso.312 Si enim virtuoso a casu pudenda revelarentur erubesceret, licet nulla ibi sit culpa; inde est quod quedam partes corporis dicuntur pudenda, quia naturaliter homines de eis verecundantur.313 Et nupcie dicte sunt ab obnubendo, quia pudoris gracia puelle caput suum obnubere, id est cooperire solent, unde Ambrosius ait:

25–26 virtuosus ABβ (el virtuoso Mcast) virtus JO 30 hominis docuit ABβ homines docuit J docuit homines O (demostró esconder los hombres Mcast) 312

Cinici: we have discovered no source in the commentators (Buridan, Burley, Geraldus, etc.) for this diatribe against the Cynics, “Conics”, or “cómicos” as Mcast calls them. They are never mentioned by Aquinas; where Cartagena found them is unclear, but his description derives ultimately from August. De civ. D. xiv.20: Hoc illi canini philosophi, hoc est Cynici, non uiderunt, proferentes contra humanam uerecundiam quid aliud quam caninam, hoc est inmundam inpudentemque sententiam? ut scilicet […] palam non pudeat id agere, nec in uico aut platea qualibet coniugalem concubitum deuitare. […] Vicit tamen pudor naturalis opinionem huius erroris; nam etsi perhibent hoc aliquando gloriabundum fecisse Diogenem, ita putantem sectam suam nobiliorem futuram si in hominum memoria insignior eius inpudentia figeretur, postea tamen […] plus ualuit pudor, ut erubescerent homines hominibus, quam error, ut homines canibus esse similes affectarent. The passage is quoted at the start of Walter Burley’s lengthy life of Diogenes, De vita et moribus philosophorum 50 (Knust 1886, 192–212; drawing on Diog. Laert. vi.20–81),

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fulness, but then as time goes on fall so deeply into vice and are so inflamed with lust that they totally lose their appetite for honour and good behaviour and become the most barefaced sinners. By ascent the loss comes about in the opposite way; it happens that there are some who in their earliest youth began to turn away from their emotions through bashfulness, and afterwards as they grow up reason grows so strong in them that they rise to perfect virtue and their bashfulness disappears, because they no longer turn away from base things through bashfulness but through virtue and goodness. As I said in the heading on continence, by long continence one ascends to virtue and by long incontinence one descends into evil. Taken in its second sense, bashfulness can well occur in the virtuous man; for if a virtuous man were to suffer some embarrassment, even if it happens through no fault of his own he would blush. We must not put up with those antique philosophers called Cynics who tried to affirm that the virtuous man should blush at nothing at all, but publicly say and do everything that can be done without blame; this is utterly absurd, because man’s nature has taught us to hide certain things, even though they are blameless, for example the necessities of nature which virtuous and modest men [avoid] not only doing in public but even call[ing] by their proper names, preferring when they have to mention such things to express them by certain circumlocutions, the proper word being banned from a sense of modesty. If a virtuous man were by accident to reveal his private parts he would blush, even though it was not his fault; this is why certain parts of the body are called pudenda [“shameful”], because men naturally feel bashful about them. Nuptials are so called from obnūbere [“to veil”], because girls customarily veil, that is cover, their heads for modesty’s sake. As Ambrose says:

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and Vincent, Spec. hist. iii.68–69 “De secta Cinicorum” (Vincentius Bellovacensis 1591, iv, f. 38r), but neither shows hostility to Diogenes’s asceticism, in keeping with the ambivalent attitude of the Fathers and medieval authors, who deplored indecency but admired the Cynics’ rejection of wordliness, since in this respect Christ himself was a Cynic (Matton 1996, esp. 243–248). Kinney 1996 further shows that the ambivalence was not lost on humanist and Renaissance writers. quedam partes corporis dicuntur pudenda: this argument—the key one—is from Guiral Ot 1500, f. 91vb “4°: Quia quicumque habet in se verenda pudenda et erubescenda, potest verecundari si contingat ea quocumque casu revelari; hoc enim experimur in nobis, et hoc experti sunt primi parentes post peccatum”. His reference to the Fall in Gen 2:25–3:21 is crucial; it pinpoints the rift between Christianity’s and Arist.’s approach to virtue ethics, the reason why theology and philosophy are ultimately irreconcilable (Intro. §1, at n14). Yet Cartagena does not take it up, preferring to suggest the taboo on nudity is “natural” and pass on to juvenile meanderings on women’s headgear. The moment demonstrates how little his real interest lay in philosophical argument.

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Nec illud ociosum est quod cum veniret Rebeca vidit Ysaach deambulantem, et cum interrogasset quis esset, cognito quod ipse esset cui duceretur uxor, descendit et caput obnubere suum cepit, docens verecundiam preire debere nupciis; inde enim nupcie dicte quod pudoris gracia se puelle obnuberent. (Tricesima, questione quinta, c. Nec illud)314

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Concludendum est ergo quod verecundia proprie sumpta, prout est de turpi, non cadit in virtuosum, sed erubescencia seu honestus pudor competit ei et decentissimus est. Lib. 2 Cap. 28 Brevis accumulacio virtutum Omnibus virtutibus ut supra scripsimus explicatis hoc brevissime annectendum est: quod virtutes et actus virtutum multis nominibus nuncupantur tam in libris quam in cothidiano sermone, sed sub hiis quas enumeravimus omnes fere contineri videntur, ut patet intuenti. Et gracia exempli illa que de presenti ad memoriam veniunt exprimamus.315 Devocio et oracio ex theologicis virtutibus descendunt; discrecio ad prudenciam pertinet, obediencia ad justiciam, nam obedire superiori nichil aliud est quam reddere quod ei debetur. Paciencia, si est in periculis mortis pro Deo et ejus fide catholica ut in martiribus contingit, fortitudinis est; si est circa adversitates mundanas, ut cum tolleramus infortunia patienter sine murmuracione et sine detraccione, ad magnanimitatem pertinet; si vero est circa tolleracionem aliquarum injuriarum ex quibus homines solent provocari ad iram, si fit moderate et debite, mansuetudinis est. Castitas conjugalis et castitas vidualis, pudicicia quoque et mundissima et pulchra virginitas sub temperancia sunt; parsimonia, sobrietas, abstinencia, et jejunium moderatum et discretum ad eandem temperanciam pertinent. Elemosinarum largicio ex liberalitate fit. Humilitas, equanimitas, et longanimitas sub magnanimitate sunt. Ut hoc apparere potest ex hiis que in materia cujuslibet virtutis diximus, ideo repetendum non est. Cap. 28 tit. α (Epílogo de algunos fechos de virtudes Mcast), post virtutum add. ut patebit in processu B, om. Q Capl̛m xxıx H 3 enumeravimus α (ennum- J) enumeramus Bβ 5 ante et ins. enim Bβ 13–14 et pulchra JOβ ac pulcra AB 314

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unde Ambrosius: Decretum C.30.5, referring to Gen 24:62–67 (65 “at illa tollens cito pallium operuit se”). The Abrahamic religions’ obsession with making women hide their hair may provoke our yawns—Cartagena must have known at some level that it has nothing to do with vice or virtue, only with submission to patriarchy—but his addition of this authority looks like a riposte to Geraldus’s conclusion, which he rejects, that for a “vir modestus et honestus” to feel verecundia would be ridiculously girlish (“ex passione pudoris, sicut puelle”). que de presenti ad memoriam veniunt: despite its ostentatiously casual introduction

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It is no coincidence that when Rebecca arrived and saw Isaac walking by, and when she asked who he was and found out he was the man she was to marry, she alighted and began to veil her head, teaching that bashfulness should precede nuptials; for they are called nuptĭae because girls covered themselves [obnuberent] out of modesty. (C.30.5 Nec illud) We may conclude, therefore, that bashfulness properly so called, as it concerns the base, does not occur in the virtuous man, but blushing for shame or honest modesty befits him and is most decent. 2.28 Brief accumulation of virtues Having unrolled all the virtues as I have written above, one may very briefly add this annex: that the virtues and acts of virtue are known by many names, both in books and in everyday speech, but almost all seem to be included in the ones I have listed, as will be clear to anyone who looks. Let me set out as an example those which presently come to mind. Devotion and prayer derive from the theological virtues; discretion belongs to prudence, obedience to justice, for to obey a superior is none other than to render him what he is owed. Patience, if it is in mortal dangers for God and His catholic faith, as happens with martyrs, belongs to fortitude; if it concerns worldly adversities, for instance when we bear misfortunes patiently without murmur or complaint, belongs to magnanimity; but if it concerns bearing certain injuries that usually provoke men to anger, if it is done moderately and correctly, is meekness. Conjugal chastity and the chastity of widows, maidenly modesty and most clean and beautiful virginity come under temperance; parsimony, sobriety, abstinence, and moderate and discreet fasting belong to that same temperance. Charitable alms-giving stems from liberality. Humility, equanimity, and broad-mindedness come under magnanimity. As this can be clearly gathered from what I have said in the heading on each and every virtue, there is no need to rehearse it.

(“gracia exempli”), this final epitome is carefully calculated; it reinscribes MV within the circle of Christian virtue ethics in a Ringkomposition that returns to the opening distinction between Arist.’s “natural” happiness and the beatitudo vera et eterna of Augustine’s City of God (26; cf. MV i.2 nn59, 61–62; Intro. § 1, at nn12–14). Hence it is no accident that the virtues which “happen to come to mind” include ones as alien to EN as devotion, prayer, obedience, patience, chastity, virginity (cf. n183), abstinence, fasting, alms-giving, and humility. Far from a passing afterthought, the chapter is thus an essential component, making clear the limits of medieval tolerance for Aristotelian virtue ethics; but Cartagena presents it in this apologetic way because the said virtues are overtly ecclesiastical, and hence at first sight tangential to his noble lay readership’s concern with magnanimous magnificence.

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Ad omnes ergo virtutes summo studio anhelandum et continuo labore insistendum est, ut animum nostrum tam mirabilibus diviciis ditemus. Nec enim sufficit scire nisi operemur, quia finis sciencie moralis non est scire sed operari; nam sicut infirmus, licet diligenter audiat medicum, si nichil faciat eorum que mandat male curabitur, sic infirmitatibus mentis animus eger non liberabitur si sciat que agenda sunt nisi operetur.316 Hee proculdubio sunt divicie vere que reddunt hominem felicem illa felicitate que in hac via haberi potest et dignum beatitudine vera et eterna illius superne civitatis Regnantis quam anima racionalis suspirans sperat; non enim habemus hic civitatem manentem, sed futuram inquirimus, in qua summo et eterno principe frui idem ipse nobis donet qui est Deus benedictus in secula seculorum, Amen. Conclusio Hec tibi, princeps illustris, mandato tuo parens ut vides scripsi, hiis terminis scribendo contentus quos statuit illa [hes]terna colloquucio tua que huic causam dedit composicioni.317 Fines enim illius confabulacionis observare curavi, fuitque profecto gratissimum michi ut primogenitam hujuscemodi scripturam meam primogenitus regis accipias. In qua brevitati non modicum detuli; sed nec brevius potui ut clare dicerem nec clarius loqui ut breviter explicarem, claritatem brevitate et brevitatem claritate contemperans. Non enim decebat sub nomine memorialis prolixitate verborum vagari, cum brevitas sit amica memorie, illique confusio et prolixitas plurimum adversentur; presertim cum non parum utile sit hiis quos fortuna altiori gradu constituens impedit prolixis scienciarum investigacionibus occupari aliqua sub compendio videre que neccessariora et pulcriora sunt ad vitam.318 Quid vero pulcrius magisve nec-

26 regnantis om. Bβ (aquella muy alta çibdad regnante Mcast; sed verisimilius “eius qui regnat”, sc. Dei) 29 seculorum om. α (bendicho en los siglos, amén Mcast) Conclusio Post expletum (impletum B) intentum opusculi sequitur conclusio αB (Conclusión de la obra Mcast), om. β Cº. xxx manus altera in H 2 hesterna : externa JOBβ exterma A (Mcast aquellas fablas de anteayer) 316

Nec enim sufficit scire nisi operemur: Arist. presents ethics as a practical subject, and he makes statements similar to this one elsewhere (EN 1105b2–5 πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα […] ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται/Sent. Eth. ii.4.5 “scientia parvam vel nullam virtutem habet ad hoc quod homo sit virtuosus, sed totum consistit in aliis, quae quidem adveniunt homini ex frequenti operatione virtuosorum operum”; 1152a8–9 ἔτι οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικός/vii.10.3 “Non enim dicitur aliquis prudens ex hoc solum quod est sciens, sed ex hoc etiam quod est practicus, idest operativus”). Consequently comparisons with the craft of medicine were among his favourites (medic-us, -ina, -are occur 102 times in Sent. Eth.; e.g. v.15.11–12, vi.1.3, etc.; see n308). Nevertheless, Cartagena’s concluding statement is his own, and leads directly into the overtly Christian final sentence.

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We must yearn with all our hearts for all the virtues, therefore, and study them with continual labour to enrich our minds with such marvellous riches. It is not enough to know them if we do not practise them, because the aim of moral science is not to know but to practise; as the infirm man, even if he diligently listens to the doctor, will hardly be cured if does nothing of what he orders, so the sick mind will not be freed from mental infirmities if it knows what to do but does not put it into practice. Without doubt these are the true riches that make a man happy with the happiness that can be had on this road, and worthy of the true and eternal beatitude of that lofty city of the Ruler which our rational soul sighs for with hope; for we have no permanent city here, but seek the future one, in which may that high and eternal Prince grant us to enjoy Himself who is the Blessed God for ever and ever, Amen. Conclusion This I have written for you, illustrious prince, in obedience to your order, as you see, content to write within the terms laid down by that colloquy of yours the other day that gave rise to this composition. I have been careful to keep to the aims of that confabulation; and it has been most pleasing to me that you, as the king’s firstborn son, should accept my firstborn writing of this kind. In it I have in no small measure deferred to brevity; but to be clear I could not write more briefly, to be brief I could not explain more clearly, so I balanced clarity against brevity and brevity against clarity. Any long-winded expansion of words would not become the title ‘memorial’, for brevity is the friend of memory, confused long-windedness its greatest enemy; but above all because, for those whom Fortune prevents from dedicating themselves to long-winded philosophical enquiries by granting them the highest rank, it is of no little use to see some of life’s more necessary and beautiful lessons in the form of a

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hesterna colloquucio: the readings externa and exterma are meaningless. One might be tempted to emend extrema “your last, latest discussion”, but Mcast provides the correct answer: hesterna and externa were both pronounced /estérna/. Omission of unaspirated h- and ex- for es- are regular in all the MSS; rather than a corruption, therefore, the apodosis was a spelling mistake, one that possibly even originated in Cartagena’s MS. brevitas ~ amica memorie: proverbial, and familiar to any medieval litteratus as the rubric of Disticha Catonis iv.49; it is quoted in a very similar context, for example, by Petrarch, De remediis utriusque fortune Pref. “Hec est enim vera philosophia, non que fallacibus alis attollitur et sterilium disputationum ventosa iactanctia per inane circumvolvitur, sed que certis et modestis gradibus compendio ad salutem pergit; […] ut, quia simul omnia vel legere vel audire et meminisse non potes, utilissimis quidem et, quoniam brevitas est amica memorie, brevissimis quoque te fulcias” (Petrarca 2002, 5). The conjunction of clarity with brevity was one of the most ancient of stylistic desiderata, but Cartagena

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cessarium sit quam direccio morum non sentio, quia imperia, regna, et ceteri mundi potentatus tunc saluberrimi fuerunt cum virtutibus de quibus inter nos extitit sermo eorum gubernatores gubernati sunt, tunc vero destructi et deserti sunt cum illorum rectores virtutes deseruerunt. Quod nedum sic evenire racio ipsa demonstrat, sed et enxempla antiquorum temporum manifestant. Assiriorum imperium quod inter reliqua diuturnitate et antiquitate temporis primatum tenuit, cum a Nino rege incepisset et longissima per tempora continuatis regibus currens usque ad dies Ozie regis Juda duravisset, propter effeminatam moliciem Sardanapali principis per Arbachum prefectum Medorum destructum est.319 Regnum vero Caldeorum quod sacra Scriptura tociens commemorat, cui famosus ille Nabuchodonosor prefuit, superbiente et lasciviente Baltasar ejus nepote in convivio illo quod in Daniele habetur sequenti nocte per Cirum et Darium eversum est.320 Nonne reges Romanorum expulsi sunt propter Tarquinii libidinem, qui castam illam matronam Lucreciam violenter oppresserat?321 Sed quid peregrina commemoro, cum monarchia Hyspanie sub gloriosis Gotorum principibus usque ad flumen Rodanum aucta propter lasciviam Roderici per expurcissimos Agarenos humiliata est et vestigiis sordidis Arabum nobilis et pulcra Hyspania conculcata tantis temporibus fuit, latitudoque imperii cui Rodanus terminus erat intra Pisoricam fluvium reclusa

17–18 post Assiriorum add. enim β

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18 temporis A (longura de tiempo Mcast) temporum JOBβ

makes an explicit link between the aim of a compendium and his chosen audience of those whom fortune (which, in a writer less careful of orthodoxy, could well have borne a capital letter) has raised to a rank that precludes “prolix” study. Yet, as he goes on to say, the clarity of ratio may still, for this same audience, be tempered by expatiating at length on exempla (16–17); the point at issue, therefore, is not exactly noblemen’s limited time—one imagines they had more of it than anyone else—but their short attention-span regarding scienciarum investigacionibus. Assiriorum imperium: periodizing universal history by empires was standard (Villa Prieto 2015, 77–86). The ultimate source here is Jer. Chron., translated from Euseb. Χρονικοὶ κανόνες, which dates the start of the Assyrian empire, the first, to the accession of Abraham’s contemporary Ninus, founder of Nineveh, in 2057 bc. According to Jerome it lasted 1240 years, to 820 bc when its 36th king Thonos Concoleros or Sardanapalus (no such king figures in the Assyrian King List; probably conflated from Aššurbānipal, who in fact died in 627 bc, but Nineveh did not fall until 612 bc) was conquered by Arbaces the Mede during the reign of Uzziah or Azariah, twelfth king of Judah (PG xix, 349, 435–438/Eusebius Caesariensis 1913, 20, 82–83). antiquitate temporis: flouting the rules of textual criticism, we select A’s temporis against the consensus reading temporum. The corruption arose from misreading tpo̅ ꝝ for tpor ̅ ρ or vice versa, but temporis makes much better sense (the “length of time”, not “antiquity of the times”). Admittedly this ought to make A’s lone variant lectio

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compendium. And what could be more beautiful or more necessary than guidance in human conduct, I cannot imagine; for empires, kingdoms, and the world’s other powers have always been most healthy when their governors have been governed by the virtues on which our conversation turned, but destroyed and abandoned when their leaders abandoned the virtues. That this happens is not just proved by reason itself, but also clearly shown by the examples of ancient times. The empire of the Assyrians, which held the first place among the rest for long duration and antiquity of time, since it began with King Ninus and ran for the longest of ages under successive kings lasting right up to the days of King Uzziah of Judah, was destroyed by Arbaces, prefect of the Medes, through the effeminate softness of Prince Sardanapalus. The kingdom of the Chaldees so often mentioned in Holy Scripture, which was led by the famous Nebuchadnezzar, was overturned by Cyrus and Darius the very night after that banquet in the book of Daniel where his grandson Belshazzar displayed his pride and lasciviousness. Were not the kings of Rome expelled for the lust of Tarquin when he violently raped the chaste matron Lucretia? But why recall foreign examples, when the monarchy of Spain, having spread to the banks of the Rhône under its glorious Gothic princes, was humbled by the filthiest Hagarenes because of Roderic’s act of lewdness; noble, beautiful Spain was trampled by the unclean feet of Arabs for so many ages, and the breadth of an empire that had once been bounded by the Rhône was cramped within the

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facilior, but we are persuaded not only by the supplementary evidence of Mcast, but also by a paleographical argument: the error came about by confusion with temporum in the line above. Regnum vero Caldeorum: Cartagena again follows the scheme of succeeding empires derived from Eusebius (1913, 100, 102, 123) in his account of the Chaldaean (Babylonian) kings Nebuchadnezzar and Belshazzar, Daniel’s prophecy of the writing on the wall, and their Persian successors from Cyrus to Darius. Lucreciam violenter oppresserat: King Tarquin’s rape of Lucretia, leading to the tyrant’s deposition and the founding of the Roman Republic (Livy i.57–60), was a popular topic for patriotic disquisitions in ancient and patristic literature (notably August. De civ. D. i.19); it was well known in medieval sources via Ov. Fast. ii.721–852, and underwent a strong revival as a rhetorical exemplum in the early humanist period from Dante, Boccaccio, and Petrarch to Salutati, Guarino, et al. (Klesczewski 1983; Jed 1989), echoes of which soon reached Spain (Morrás 2010). Cartagena’s weird deformation of the legend, ignoring Lucretia herself and turning its republican triumph into a lament for monarchy/tyranny, probably derived from the citation of August. in Decretum C.32.5.4 and its Glossa ord., which on the political aspect says merely, “pro quo Tarquinius rex et filius eius expulsi sunt de civitate” (Gregorius xiii 1582, ii, col. 2133; see Müller 1989). He inverted the story’s glorious moral to parallel Rodrigo (next n); but this remains an odd reading, and Cartagena must surely have known it.

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est?322 Cernis an caro precio empta est intemperancie regie una effrenata licencia, quam innumerabilium virorum sanguinis justi effusio, innocentium puerorum trucidacio, insignium templorum destruccio urbiumque famosarum eversio nondum plene exsolvere potuerunt? Et tantus numerus nobilium principum tantaque copia militum strenuorum, tam inmensus et continuus labor bellorum per septingentos annos perfecte reparare non valuerunt pregrandissimam cladem, cui occasionem prestitit unica scelesta libido; adhuc enim fines nostros incollunt hostium nostrorum reliquie, calamitatis antique indubii testes. Pertranseo hec quia sine lacrimis referri non possunt, et qui viciorum casum ex historiis tetigimus ascensum virtutum tangamus alternatim, namque hec narranda et ad memoriam reducenda sunt ut hinc facinorum odium insurgat, inde virtuosa foveatur fiducia. Ex debilibus autem regnis virtute adjuvante magna imperia prosilisse sepissime compertum est. Inter pastores Cirus in puericia regnare temptavit, sed procedente etate et fortificata virtute primus et maximus Persarum imperator fuit; et longa post tempora Macedonia, licet angusta Grecie provincia, sub Alexandro Philippi Asiam subiecit. Et Romana aquila, que intra centesimum lapidem fines suos claudebat, virtutibus herens alas suas ad hoc ultimum Occidentis et ad Caucasum montem Orientis extendit. Et ut culpam unius ex principibus nostris ediximus, sic aliorum virtutes non taceamus. Nonne ex artissimis et asperrimis Castelle et Asturiarum montanis ad quas majores nostri effugerant regna Hyspanie renata sunt? Et sicut propter vicia ex premaxima terrarum latitudine in antra angustissima se receptarunt, sic fervente virtute cum divino auxilio quod omnem virtutem excedit nonnumquam per patentia miracula demonstrato ex ipsis criptis montium descendentes regnorum limites extenderunt; cum enim duces nostri virtutibus studebant, eternus Remunerator virtutum invisibiliter semper et quandoque visibiliter adiuvabat, quod tam in campestribus preliis quam in obsidionibus civitatum plerumque accidisse notissimum est. Nam rex Legionis Remigius primus, cum apud Calagurram contra exercitum Agarenorum pugnaret et illorum immensam multitudinem ferre non valens terga vertere incepisset, ab hostibus circumdatus devotissimam et neccessariam oracionem profudit; et sequenti die apostolo Jacobo manifestissime apparente hostes a quibus pene victus 45 ante Cirus add. enim β 322

lasciviam Roderici: the regnum Visigothorum was established in Roman Aquitaine and soon annexed Hispania, but all Gaul except coastal Septimania (Narbonne) was lost to the Franks by the sixth century, so to claim that the kingdom lost to the Umayyads by Hrōþirīk/Rodrigo in 711 reached “as far as the Rhône” was sophistic flatus vocis; and the idea that the Muslim conquest halted at the Pisuerga (which rises in the province of Palen-

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River Pisuerga? Do you see how dear a price was paid for one unbridled licence of royal intemperance, which the spilling of the just blood of numberless men, the massacre of innocent children, the destruction of eminent temples and razing of famous cities has not yet been able fully to redeem? Such numbers of noble princes, such hordes of hardy men-at-arms, such immense and constant labour of wars for seven hundred years have not succeeded in perfectly repairing that most huge disaster, occasioned by a single wicked act of lust; even now the remnant of our enemies inhabit our borders as undeniable witnesses of that ancient calamity. I pass over these things, for they cannot be retold without tears; and having touched upon the histories of the downfall caused by vices, let us in their place touch upon the rise caused by virtues. For these must be recounted and remembered so as to arouse hatred of crimes and thereby foster virtuous confidence. It has very often been fount that with the aid of virtue great empires have sprung from weak kingdoms. Cyrus first tested rulership among shepherds in his boyhood, but as he grew and his virtue strengthened he became the first and greatest emperor of the Persians; and long afterwards Macedonia, a small province of Greece, conquered Asia under Alexander, son of Philip. The Roman eagle, its borders once confined within a hundred-mile radius, by embracing the virtues spread its wings as far as this last outpost to the West and the Caucasus mountains to the East. And since I have mentioned the guilt of one of our princes, let me not keep silent about the virtues of the others. Were not the kingdoms of Spain reborn from the narrowest and roughest mountain valleys of Castile and Asturias where our forebears had taken refuge? Just as vices led them to flee from a mighty breadth of lands to hide in the narrowest caves, so fervent virtue and the divine aid that surpasses all virtue, so often revealed through patent miracles, led them to descend from those same mountain grottoes and press forward the limits of their kingdoms. Whenever our generals cultivated the virtues, the eternal Rewarder of virtues came to their aid, always invisibly and sometimes visibly; we know very well how often this came to pass both on the battlefield and in sieges. When King Remigius i of Leon was fighting the Hagarene army at Calahorra and, unable to withstand their immense hordes, was about to turn tail, surrounded by the enemy he poured forth a most devout and necessary prayer; on the following day the apostle James appeared

cia and flows through Valladolid) was equally wishful thinking. The fable of Rodrigo’s lascivia with La Cava, on the other hand, Cartagena no doubt regarded as soberly historical; it provided a divine excuse for the “calamity” of defeat (God’s righteous—if entirely disproportionate—wrath; Cartagena 2004, 451 n13 ad loc.) and so, incidentally, the lynchpin of this peroratio.

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erat devicit, nefandissimumque tributum centum virginum quod turpissimus Muregatus concesserat tunc sublatum est, et cum illaritate cordis vota oblata sunt que hodierna die sacro atque devotissimo templo ubi ejusdem Jacobi corpus sanctissimum requiescit a fidelibus exsolvuntur.323 Unico autem prelio unam obsidionem addamus: cum Fernandus primus qui in Castella et Legione conjunctim regnavit Colimbriam obsidere proponeret, Roderici de Bivar qui Cid Campiator vocatus est consilium salubre sequutus primo Apostoli limina visitavit, post vero civitatem per septenium obsessam grandique miraculo previo expugnatam in potestatem Christianorum redegit.324 Nec in istis immoror, sed hec duo tanquam manifesta commemoro ut mente nostra nusquam et nunquam excidat quod paulatim augente virtute, quandoque prohibentibus viciis, ad hunc quem tenemus rerum statum accessimus. Ex illis namque antris et cavernis petrarum in vestris quasi prothoparentibus descendistis quotquot per Hyspaniam geritis principatum.

73 Nec αB nec enim β 323

rex Legionis Remigius primus: the legend of St James’ intervention in Ramiro i of Asturias’s supposed victory over ˁAbd al-Raḥmān ii at the mythical battle of Clavijo was fabricated in the twelfth century by Cluniac monks for the archbishop of Santiago de Compostela Diego Gelmírez to ensure the saint’s status as patron of Spain, and more importantly to enforce payment of the voto de Santiago tribute (“vota oblata” 66; Arcos 1771, to which add Domínguez García 2008, 67–78, and more broadly Fletcher 1984). As dean of Santiago Cartagena will have been well aware of the story behind this infamous extortion, in particular the pathetically spurious royal charter dated Calahorra a.d.8 Kal. Junii 872 e.s./a.d. 25 May 834 (hence apud Calagurram, though it is 59km from the supposed battlefield) and signed by Queen Urraca—in fact the wife of Ramiro ii of Leon, also recipient of an epiphany by the saint at the battle of Simancas a century later—and a laughable list of fake prelates and courtiers. It confected not only the dream-vision of the saint and his apparition on a white horse but also the equally apocryphal legend of King Mauregatus and his deal with ˁAbd al-Raḥmān i in 783 to pay the tributo de las cien doncellas (“in antiquis temporibus circa destruccionem Hispaniae a Sarracenis factam rege Ruderico dominante, quidam nostri antecessores pigri, negligentes, desides, et inertes Christianorum principes […] constituerunt eis nefandos redittus de se annuatim persolvendos, centum videlicet puellas”, Arcos 1771, Apéndice de los documentos §i, 1–4, with over 40 other medieval charters on the matter). Juan ii had confirmed the voto for the archbishop, dean (i.e. Cartagena), and chapter of Santiago only six months before (Valladolid, 5 Sept. 1421: ibid. §xlv, 83–84); however, in the false privilegio the king—who did not reign until 842, necessitating a further forged “x” to emend the date to 844—is called “Ranemirus” not Remigius, his opponents “Sarraceni” not Agareni, and Mauregatus is not named. The latter detail shows that Cartagena followed Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada’s De rebus Hispaniae cap. 66 (earlier Lucas de Tuy called him “Aurelius”, while later sources such as Poema de Fernán González inflated the number of virgins to 300), via Estoria de España §629–630.

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in full view, he defeated the enemies who had almost defeated him, and the utterly nefarious tribute of a hundred virgins so basely conceded by Muregatus was lifted. With glad hearts they offered up the vows which to this day are paid by the faithful to the holy and most devout temple where the most holy body of that same James is laid to rest. To this one battle let me add a single siege: when Fernando i who reigned jointly in Castile and Leon planned to besiege Coimbra, following the healthy advice of Rodrigo de Vivar, nicknamed El Cid Campeador, he first visited the Apostle’s abode and afterwards besieged the city for seven years, conquered it by the intervention of a great miracle, and returned it to Christian rule. I shall not linger on these facts, but I commemorate these two as manifest examples so that we never and nowhere forget how by the slow increase of virtue, sometimes impeded by vice, we reached the state of affairs we now enjoy. Those stone caves and caverns were the primal parents, as it were, from whom all you who reign as princes throughout Spain descend.

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Fernandus primus ~ redegit: the history of Fernando i of Leon’s conquest of Coimbra in 1064, complete with three-day vigil in Compostela and a “grande miraculum”, is told in Historia Silense (c. 1115) caps 87–89 (Smith 1988, 80–84 §16), but the protagonism of an at most twenty-year-old Cid, not mentioned in Gesta Roderici or any other early source, reflects what Peña Pérez 2010, para. 4 calls the transition from veracious history to a “memoria radicalmente inventada”. The added assertion that the siege took seven years shows the ultimate source for the legend was Estoria de España §807; for later writers its point became the chivalric fraus of its one-line interpolation on the dubbing as knight of Roderici de Bivar qui Cid Campiator vocatus est, a good century before investiture was thought of (Rodríguez Velasco 2002), and this fiction, along with the tale that it was the Cid who suggested the consilium salubre of enrolling St James’ help, was elaborated in the abbey of Cardeña’s Crónica particular del Cid cap. 14 (Velorado 1512, ff. 5v–6v), which Cartagena evidently knew. Was Coimbra chosen to gratify Cartagena’s Portuguese addressee? Not likely; the prominence given to Castile’s (and Burgos’s) national hero would have dampened his relish. Cartagena’s true inspiration seems once again (along with the Cid’s previous mention, n138) to be Santiago cathedral’s interest in the profitable cult of St James and Burgos cathedral’s interest in promoting its local celebrity. Colimbriam: it is odd enough that the scribes did not know the name Mauregatus, given the fame of the Clavijo legend (n323), but in this tale about Ruy Díaz (a name apparently so obscure to them that on his previous appearance in i.18 46 half of them read Cid as “ad”) some even had trouble recognizing that “Rodrigo de Vivar” had anything to do with Castile-Leon, writing in 57 “a castle and legion” and guessing Colimbria (common for Roman Conimbriga in medieval sources, alongside less frequent Conimbria, Coimbrica, etc.) might be “very co-libertine” (app. min. var.).

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80

85

90

95

memoriale virtutum

Quicumque ergo sit ille in cujus manus hic libellus noster devenerit (solent enim scripture ante multorum occulos devenire quos scribentes non cogitabant), non fastidiose nec cum supercilio virtutum monita legat, nemoque sibi blandiatur nec magnitudine potencie excellenciave dignitatis seu exuberancia diviciarum virtutes contempnendas putet. Nullus namque tam firmus principatus est qui principantium viciis non infirmetur, nec enim aliquis nisi racionis expers et cronicarum ignarus hesitare valebit viciis destrui et firmari virtutibus principatum. Nec ista narravi quasi nova tibi dicam, cum sciam tum excellencia judicii tui, tum noticia ystoriarum hec et alia profundius latiusque cognovisse, quia peregrinas interdum et domesticas cronicas sepe legis. Sed si quispiam sit qui forsam non audierit, cum hec nostra legerit audiat; tu vero per honestam vivendi viam quam ab ipsa puericia et ineunte etate ingressus es tanto alacrius et jocundiori gressu progredieris quanto crebrius ante mentis aciem penas pravorum et premia proborum reduxeris. Vale, optime princeps, et hoc ruralis solitudinis munus dignanter accepta, viridibus in pratis Azoye ruris quod nosti vernantium arborum sub umbra conscriptum.325 Explicit Memoriale virtutum.326

95 Explicit & concertatus sive correptus est. J Explicit memoriale virtutum editus a domino alfonso episcopo burgensi O Deo gracias. Explicit memoriale virtutum laus et honor deo patri virginique marie et omnibus sanctis Amen β Deo gracias Amen B, om. A 325 326

Azoye ruris: for a possible identification of the place see Intro. §2 n24. Explicit: on J’s “concertatus sive correptus est” see Proleg. §2, p. 37; correptus for correctus was common in medieval MSS (Du Cange ii, 581 “correptio, an idem quod supra correctio?”), no doubt because -ct- and -pt- were both pronounced /ʦ/ before front vowels.

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Into whosoever’s hands this little book may chance to fall (for writings usually end up being seen by many whom the writers never intended), let him not read these animadversions on the virtues with scorn or disdain; let no one flatter himself into thinking that his great power, pre-eminent rank, or exuberant wealth permit him to despise the virtues. No princedom is so firm that it cannot be shaken by the vices of its rulers, and no one who is not bereft of reason and ignorant of the chronicles can doubt that princeship is destroyed by vices and strengthened by virtues. I have not recounted these things to tell you anything new, since I know both from the excellence of your judgment and from your knowledge of history that you are already more deeply and more widely cognizant of these and other matters, as you occasionally read foreign and often read domestic chronicles. If there be anyone who perhaps has not heard, let him hear when he reads these words of mine; but you will progress all the more eagerly and with all the more joyful steps along this honest path of life upon which you have embarked from your very boyhood and earliest age, the more often you rehearse in your mind’s eye the punishments of the evil and the rewards of the good. Farewell, best of princes, and deign to accept this gift of rural solitude, composed beneath the shade of blossoming trees in the green countryside of Azoia that you know so well. End of Memorial of virtues

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Apparatus of minor variants We list here the trivial variants that do not affect the constitution of the text, i.e. copyists’ individual errors and spellings. Of the latter orthographic variations we have not sought to make a complete list—it would serve no critical purpose—but give examples to indicate the scale and nature of the variance, especially peculiarities that were typical of Iberian Latinity and scribal habits at that time and could therefore be original to Cartagena. i.Prol. 2 materia αβ materiam B | 3 nimium AJBβ nimirum O | ante subtiliter om. et H | disserebas αQ discernebas H non legissem B | 4 gynagiis A ginagiis JBβ gignasiis O | didiscisse Jβ didicisse AOB | 5 in post non suppl. in marg. O | 6 sed JOBβ set A passim | didiscimus JOBβ didicimus A | 7 At αB Ad β | me αBQ mͥ H | 8 hiis AOQ fere passim his JBH, sed -ii- aliis in locis | benigna αBH begnina Q | attendebas αB actendebas β | quod AJβ qͥ d .n. O | 8–9 virtuosi αβ virtuose B | 9 indicium αBQ iudicium H | 10 audire αQ dire H | 12 eciam J Ꝯꝛ O ectiam, ecciam Aβ passim | 12–13 prudencie tue testimonium AJβ testimonium prudencie tue O | 15 petieras J pecieras AOβ | 16 in αBH e ȷn Q | 17 devenerant AJBβ diversa O | 18 opponerem JOBβ opponeram A | 19 poscebas AJBβ ponebas O | enim om. B | 20 natura αβ nature B | post sapiencie ins. se β | 21 habet AOBQ haberet H | 24 adinveniunt AOB adinbeniunt Q adveniunt H | 25 aliquantulam OBβ aliquantulum A | temporis AJOβ corporis B | 26 studiis αβ studens B | 26–27 ad que AJ atque OBβ | 27 ocium JH ottium, occium, vel otium AOBQ passim | 28 aliquot αH aliquod Q | occupavi AJBβ occupari O | 29 scripsi AJBβ conscripsi O | 30 tamen libros AJβ libros tamen O | et om. O | 31 moderata αBQ moderat H | 32 lectura ejus AJBβ eius lectura O | conceperis αQ repereris H reperis B | 34 congerere AOBβ contingegerere J | 36 in illam αBQ nullam H | 39 visa om. β | jussa Aβ iusa O | abire noluerunt αB labore voluerũt β | 40 cognosces αB cognoscere β | 41 in suppl. super lin. Q | 42 impudentissimum Aβ imprud- O | 44 quicquam OBβ quidquam A | 46 accurate AOH auctt͛ e (auctoritate) Q | 47 repereris AB reperieris O reꝑreis Q reperis BH | 48 noveris scripsisse Aβ scripsisse noveris O | 50 stillo Jβ stilo ABO | 51 multos αB multis β | doctrinas JAβ doctrinã O | 52 exhortari J exortari AOβ | 54 percutiant AJβ percuciat O | 54–55 viam intelligendi AJβ (H suppl. uiã sub lin.) intelligendi viam O | 56 acclamare α aclamare Q (litteris -cl- compressis) adamare H | demonstrare AOβ -ostrare J | 58 sunt aliis AJβ aliis sunt O | 59 Hic αBH Hec Q | virtutis moralis αβ virtutes morales B | 61 exequamur JOBβ prosequamur A | et in αβ ac in B | 62 ante auxilio ins. suo β | 63 ad fin. add. &cͣ. β |

© María Morrás and Jeremy Lawrance, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004194502_007 María Morrás and Jeremy Lawrance - 978-90-04-19450-2 © Morrás Jeremy Lawrance, | doi:10.1163/9789004194502_007 ThisMaría is an open accessand chapter distributed under 2022 the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. Downloaded from Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:17:34PM via Open Access. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

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i.1 2 eorum om. B | 5 sive civitas AJBβ sive sit quedam civitas O | eciam suppl. super lin. post unum O | 6 hoc om. A | 13 quos αBQ quo H | 16 De 2° in marg. O | 20 De 3° in marg. O | 21 politicorum JOB pollit- Aβ | 22 policiarum J polliciAHQ politi- O politic- B | 29 trahere AJBβ contrahere add. super lin. O | potest om. β | 30 que est quedam equitas est JOBβ (que ad init. suppl. super lin. J) que est quedam equitas A | 33 idem om. O | sciencie ABβ jurissciencie corr. super lin. J | 35 Rethorice AJBQ retorice H rethorica O | 37 Et αB que β | 43–44 erudicionem αβ erudiciones B | 44 ut αβ nec B | 45 possit αB posset β | secula AJBβ tempora secula corr. in marg. O | faciendi αBQ faciendo H | 46 capitulo ultimo AJβ ultimo capitulo OB | sed AJBβ et O | 47 fere αBQ fecit H | 48 reduci JOBH redduci AQ | et αBH quod Q | 49 sit αβ sint B | immensa om. O | 54 intentus αβ intentos B | sic αBH sicut Q | 55 hii αBQ hi H | 57–58 moralium doctrinarum AJBβ doctrinarum moralium O | 59–60 nichil ~ racione om. B | 61 confert JOBβ conſet A | 63 aliquos qui αB aͥqͦs qͥ s Q aliqͥ s qui H | 65 ab his ~ manant suppl. in marg. O | i.2 2–3 premittendum AJBH pretermitt- O pretermit- Q | 3 brevissime est AJBβ est brevissime O | morales αBQ mortales H | 4 est ergo ABβ go est J, om. ergo O | 5 enim om. O | 6 supernaturalis αBH supͣ nat- Q | 10 istam JOβ ista A | Domini inmaculata AJBβ ĩmacľata dn̅ i O | 12–13 principia AOQ principa̟li̟ a corr. J principalia H | 13 hominis om. O | ad om. B | 15 divinitus suppl. in marg. O | 17 connaturalem AJBβ ꝯn̅ aliũ O | 20 divina revelacione AJβ divina revelacio H revelacione divina O | 21 hee AJ hec OQ habet H | 23 potest homo αβ homo potest B | 24 boni om. β | fieri potest AJBβ potest fieri O | 26 veram αQ ṿịṭạ̃ verã corr. H | 32 ante pinguis om. vel O | non dicitur αBQ an dicitur H | 33–34 que ad ~ parte sed suppl. in marg. J | 33 mencio fit AJBβ fit mencio O | 38 et om. O | 40 presertim om. O | i.3 2 ad corinthios om. B | 6 eciam om. O | in AOBβ dein corr. super lin. J | 7 alias αBH allias Q, et saepe sic | 7 nominamus AOBβ nominavimus J | ad fin. add. &cͣ H| i.4 4 principia Aβ (prinçipios Mcast) principialia JO | 6 alia JOBβ alie A | sunt AJBβ sicut O | ab aliis αBQ a suis H | 7 sunt ante agibilia suppl. super lin. J | 9 bene JOBQ ne A, ut bene regere om. H | 14 ille ~ intellectus suppl. in marg. Q | lumine α luĩe Q hũc H | 15 indemostrabilia AJQ indemonstr- OBH passim | 17– 19 vocatur ~ principiis om. Q | 20 iste AJBβ ista O | 21 dono OBβ dompno AJ | assequutus Jβ assecutus AOB, et saepe sic | 23 de ante similibus suppl. super lin. O | 24 perficit αBQ perficicit H | 25 bene faciendum O benefac- AJBβ | 27 preter αβ propter B | 28 perspicacitate αB prosperitate β | 31 et alia αβ alia B | 32 dicamus JOBβ dicimus A | 34 conferendo αBQ conferen et spatium H | pertinent αB pertinet β | María Morrás and Jeremy Lawrance - 978-90-04-19450-2 Downloaded from Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:17:34PM via Open Access. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

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apparatus of minor variants

i.5 1 potentem AJBβ prudentem O | 2 non αB om. H, et non suppl. super lin. Q, et post particulari add. solum ambo | 5 ante negociacionem ins. aliã for et postea del. punctis O | 9 habitus αBQ a̐itus, et adnot. obelisco in marg. H | 13 orietur αB oriretur β | 15 sic om. B | 16 ars licet AJBβ licet ars O | 17 autem om. B | 18 opus αBH oꝑꝰ (operis?) Q | 19 operante : adnot. in marg. vel agente O | 20 licet om. β | 21 sepe AJBβ (seppe AQ passim) semper O | actus prudencie remanet AJBβ remanet actus prudencie O | 23 aliquod om. B | hoc αβ tamen hoc B | 24 in aliis om. B | boni artifices αβ artifices boni B | 26 male transpos. ante utuntur H, om. Q | 28 autem om. O | 29 rectitudo αB vect- H nect- Q | 33 et bonum αβ ad bonum B | 33–35 Et pro tanto ~ exercicii suppl. in marg. inferiori O | 34 quia αβ quia ea que B | dissuetudinem JOβ desue- A | 36 perdi AJBβ ꝓdi (prodi), in marg. corr. ꝓcedi O | 38–39 nam omnis ~ imprudens suppl. in marg. J | 39 quinymo AJBβ (-ymmo, passim) ymo O | insanus αβ infamis B | 40 summe suppl. in marg. O | 41 Paulus suppl. in marg. post electionis J | 44 impossibile JOβ possibile A | i.6 1 comitantur OH com̅ it- A comitt- J ꝯmict- Q | 1–2 eubulia synesis JOQ eubulya synesys A enbulya sinesis H | 2 gnomȷ̃. Eubulia JO agnomyn. eubulya A gnomi Eubulia Q gnomienbula H gnotyn eubulia B | rectitudo consilii AJBβ consilii rectitudo O | 3 pertinet AJBβ oȝ (oportet) O | consiliacio αBQ consilio H | 4 proprie suppl. in marg. O | Primo ABβ primum JO | 6 scit αβ sit B | 8 finem rectum AJBβ rectum finem O | 9 intenderet αQ intendit H | 10 illum AJBβ illud O | 14 consilietur αQ consiliet H | finem suppl. in marg. O | 19 tempore convenienti AJBβ tempori convenientes O | Synesis Aβ Sinesis O Sinesys J | 21 humane vite AJBβ vite humane O | 22 de AJBβ maxime de O | in consilio JOβ et consilio AB | 24 assumere β assumm- α | 25–26 eleccio αB elacio β | 27 gnomi JBQ gnomy AH | 28–29 de inventis judicat AJβ judicat de inventis O | 30 pratica α practica Bβ | 36 ut Jβ (se obra segund Mcast) in A, om. O | 37 si ut AJβ si O | 39 prudencia suppl. in marg. post est O | 40 accessorie αH accessore Q | i.7 1 virtus moralis AJBβ moralis virtus O | 3 inclinacio om. O | 10 posset AOBβ possen͎ t corr. manus altera in J | 11 si om. Q | 15 errat JOB erat Aβ | magno bono αBH magno & bono Q | Nonne αB om̅ e β | 16 karitati AJ caritati Bβ castitati O | 17 integritati αβ integritatem B | 17–18 ac indiscretam om. O | 20 ergo om. O | 21 reguntur αBQ regunt H | 23 hinc αB hic β | 24 unam om. H | 25 videtur. Que αB, sine puncto Q Videtur que H | 26 vera αBQ dura H | 27 ille αβ ille et B | 29 aliquam αβ aliqualem B | 30 dici bene suppl. in marg. O | 34 potest esse αβ esse potest B | ergo JOBβ enim A | moralis virtus αβ virtus moralis B | 35 potest JOβ possit AB | 38 liberalitatem αB libertatem β | et non αBH non Q | 40 est deflenda AJBβ deflenda est O | 41 exponens AJBβ super O | 42 ait suppl. in marg. O | 43 quis αBQ qui H | 45 saltem αBH saltim Q | 46 nolit αBH nollit Q | eamdem corr.

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super lin. J | 47 affeccione αB effeccione β | ubi videt om. O | 48 sicque AJBβ sic O | etsi AJBβ si O | i.8 2 hee α hec Bβ | 4 eutrapelia JOBβ eutrapelya A | ergo om. Q | 6 inclinacio AJBβ operacio inclinacio O | 8 volens AJBβ volens opera O | et sic αBH sic Q | quod αQ qď ꝙ H | 15 et om. O | concupiscibili vel irascibili AJBβ irascibili vel concupiscibili O | 16 passiones ~ voluntate om. Q | 23 post gencium ins. et O | et om. B | sub se species AJBβ species sub se O | 25 post vero om. aliis Q | 28 proposito AJBβ proposito nostro O | 31 ante legalis om. justicia B | 36 violari AJBβ non violari O | 38 magnifeste AJQ manifeste OBH | intuenti αBQ intuendo H | 40 jus suum unicuique AJBβ unicuique jus suum O | 42 dicitur JOBβ sequitur A | 43 ex habitu om. B | 45–46 non est unica om. H | 46 virtus est JOH virtus Q virtus est. Nam justicia est communis virtus transpos. huc e 47 infra A | non est unica malicia om. B | 47 nam justicia est communis virtus et JOBβ Et justicia A | 50 sub AJBβ quod sub O | 50–51 laudantur omnes αβ omnes laudantur, et post virtutes ins. Lucas primo capitulo dicitur de Zacharia et Elisabeth. Erant autem ambo iusti ante deum incedentes in mandatis et justificationibus domini sine querela (Lk 1:6) B | 53 exprimimus αBH expͥ mꝰ Q | 54 ad fin. add. et sic de aliis B | i.9 1 Sed AJBβ Et O | 2 aliquis om. O | 3 hoc αβ hec B | 4 ergo om. O | 5 actibus temperancie AJBβ temperancia O | 6 coitu OBH coytu AJQ | 7 leges AOβ legen͎ s corr. puncto J | dicetur AJβ dr͂ O | 8 sunt JOβ sint A | 8 idem αβ ibidem B | in aliis αβ malus B | 8–10 Et secundum ~ virtutibus suppl. in marg. superiori legens justicia legalis non est O | 14 et om. O | neque ante Lucifer AJH nec Q nec O | 16 tendit ad conservandum bonum AJBβ ad bonum conservandum O | 17 illud om. O | septem suppl. in marg. O | 18 nomine om. O | 19 princeps om. O | 20 requiritur in eo major excellencia AJBβ debet habere maiorem excellenciam O | 21 virtutum om. O | illo AJBβ eo O illum B | 22 forsam AJBβ forsitan O | in illo αBQ de illo H | 27 homo AJBβ si est et suppl. ho in marg. O | 30 hominis AJBβ habitus O | 34 fortiter habet AJBβ habet fortiter O | 35 seipsum AJBβ se O | 39 enim suppl. in marg. O | ante abstinendo ins. per quietacionem (cf. 44) et del. superscribendo vacat J | 40 bene om. B | 43 post Sic om. et B | bene se AJBQ bene sic, suppl. se in marg. H se bene O | 43–44 in ~ disposicionem et αβ ad B | 45 intendit AJBQ, bis H uult O | 47 sed non sunt idem suppl. in marg. O | 50 justiciam AJBβ virtutem O| i.10 1 justum et equalem αBQ equalem et justum H | 2–3 ex habitu voluntatis habet AJBβ habet ex habitu voluntatis O | 3 habere om. O | 7 quilibet αB quilȝ H qͥ bꝰ Q | specialiter om. O | 8 moralem om. B | 8–9 injusticiam αB justiciam β | 9 legalem AJBβ illegalem O | quilibet om. B | 9 est αBH tamen Q | 11 mechatur

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αB mecatur β | 12 que est opposita AJβ quod est oppositum OB | ira AJBβ irã O | 16 non om. O | 17 et om. B | determinate virtuti αBQ indeterminate virtute H | hec om. B | 19 sed ~ opponitur AJBβ si ~ opponatur O | nisi om. β | 21 prout AJβ ut O | et om. O | 22 retinere αBH rectinere Q | debitum om. O | adnot. in marg. quid est yliberalitas O | 23 ubi expendeṇḍọre corr. super lin. J | 24 in marg. quid est avaricia adnot. O | 26 opponatur ~ justicia cui om. Q | 28 elemosinam JBβ helem- AO | 29 et om. O | 31 interdum om. O | 32 peccunias αQ pecunias H, et sic alias alii | 34 enim αBQ eum H | 35 quia α qui B, om. β | 37 injustus AJBβ et injustus O | 38 unum sumendo AJBβ sumendo unum O | 39 quam AJBβ ut O | 42 hec om. β | 46 Sic dicitur αB (En esta manera se dize Mcast) sicut β | 47 differunt αBQ differt H | sint αβ sunt B | 48 particulari αB legali sive particulari Q sive particulari H | ante pertinent add. que β | 51 enim om. Q | 54 enim αBQ cum H | 55 hic αBH hinc Q | dici potest AJBβ potest dici O | 56 nedum ABβ necdum JO, et sic alias alii | eciam om. O | 60 electivus om. H | 61 per αB propter β | 62– 64 transgreditur ~ homo om. per homoeoteleuton Q | 64 injusticia corr. super lin. J | 65 ille habitus αBQ habitus ille H | 66 capit AJBβ rapit O | 67 hoc om. Q | si quid α siꝙ̣qid corr. puncto Q sic quid H | 69 Deus ~ manum suppl. in marg. O | 72 eleccione ABβ elecne J electiue O | 73 virtutum om. O | 74 namque AJBβ enim O | yrundo AJQ irundo OBH | 75 post actus ins. virtuosus O | 77 ergo om. H | causato αβ tanto B | 78 particulari om. O | 79 et om. O | 80 similia αBH silli͠a Q | 81 quia suppl. super lin. J | 84 justiciam αB -cia β | 84–85 vicio avaricie AJBβ avaricie vicio O | i.11 1 Una est om. B | 5 post Videmus add. .n. O | 7 peccunias et om. O | 8 multa om. B | istis AOBβ istiu͎ s corr. puncto J | seu AJBβ vel O | 10 ab eo videntur AJBβ videntur ab eo O | 12 contribuunt om. β | in αB ad β | 13 gabellam AJBβ (alcavala Mcast) gabella O | 15 que αBQ quı H | sic om. β | commune αBH communi Q | 16 fit JOB sit A | 19 quia αβ qua B | 20 distribuunt ~ contribuentes om. B | 21 tenentur AJBβ debent O | equalitatis om. O | 23 particularis justicie AJBβ justicie particularis O | 25 commune ABH communi JOQ | 28 sic JOBβ sit A | justicie α justicia Bβ | 30 post Voluntarie ins. commutaciones O | 34 inicium αBQ uiciũ H | et om. O | 35 sic αBH si Q | 35–36 Involuntarie ~ subdividuntur ABβ Involuntaria ~ subdividitur O Involuntarie ~ subdividitur J | 37 ante violente om. involuntarie O | altero AJBβ alio O | 39 quantum JOBβ qͣ rtam A | ut AJβ, om. O et B | 45 quam in involuntariis om. H | 46 ad fin. add. &cͣ H | i.12 1 post hec om. est O | 2 observari AJBβ servari O | 3 Si enim sine αBH sine enim sine corr. Q | 6 proporcio om. O | 7 post fit om. et Q | 11 sunt AJBβ sint O | 13 libertate αβ liberalitate B | 14 in aliis preponunt AJBβ In aliis reputant equales. In aliis preponunt O | 19 distribuet AJBβ distribuit O | 20 velø corr. Q | 21–22 se

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habent centum αβ habent se centum B | 22 decem om. Q | 24 rei om. O | quotam JOβ cotam A totum B | dux excedit om. β | 27 observari αBQ observare H | 28 distribucionibus αβ distribucionis B | recte et bene AJβ bene et recte OB | 29 ante observatur verso folio repetit observari in justicia ~ recte et bene Q | ante satisfactum ins. bene O | 32 magna om. O | 33 tamen om. O | 39 post provinciarum ins. et B | namque AJBβ autem O | 40 in aliis qualitas αB .lrr. aliis β | personarum om. H | 44 ad ante pericula om. OB | 46 illi αB ille β | de om. A | 47 ipsam suppl. super lin. J | 47–48 propriis suppl. in marg. O | 48 et sic in similibus suppl. in marg. O | 52 attenditur AJB actenditur β attendenda est O | 53 accepcio personarum αβ personarum accepcio B | 60 justiciam distributivam αBH distributivam justiciam Q | 61 aliquam αB aliam β | 63 modis αBQ modos H | humanum judicium AJBβ judicium humanum O | metu JOβ metum AB | 68 quecumque αBQ quicũꝙ H | 70 ad fin. add. et sic de aliis B | i.13 2 observari α observare Bβ | 2–3 arismetica ~ attenditur suppl. in marg. J | 4 attendimus an AJBβ attenditur si O | 5 quisquis αBH qͥ sqͥ sꝙ Q | 6 animadvertendum AJBβ advertendum O | 9 ticius α ciciꝰ β socius B | per aliquem contractum habuit AJBβ habuit per aliquem contractum et in marg. corr. O | 10 seyo αβ socio B | est in lucro valentis [sic] centum suppl. in marg. J | seyus αβ socius B | 11–12 ticius ~ recurritur suppl. in marg. J. | ticius αβ alter socius B | 13 ante indebitum ins. si dubitatur B (cf. 14 infra) | 13 a ticio et dando seyo αβ ab uno et alteri dando B | 15 inequales α inequalis β inequalitatem B | 20 lucrum ~ habuit om. per homoeoteleuton Bβ | 21 sit AJBβ sic O | 22 fracta JOB fct͠a Q facta AH | sensit αB sentit β (v. n109) | 24 Aufert JOβ aufferret A auferat B | 25 equalitatem αBQ inequalitatem H | insuper αB et insuper β etiam O | 30–31 secunda inequalitas αBQ secundam equalitatem H | 32 quod om. β | vel αBQ et H | 34 acciones (accepciones H) diversas AJBβ diversas acciones O | vocant om. Q | 36 adverterit AJBβ adverteret O | 37 tamen om. O | reduci AJBβ duci O | sed αH et BQ | 38 sensit αB sentit β | 39 occisor αβ qui occidit B | sensit αBQ sentit H | 41 dampno αB dãpnũ Q dãnũ H | perdit αβ perdidit B | sentit Ω | 42 sentiunt JB senciunt AO sensiunt β | aliqualem consolacionem consanguinei AJBβ consanguinei aliqualem consolacionem O | 46 principem AJBβ ducem O | 49 aliqui de αBQ aliquȷd̟ ꝰ corr. H | 50 pitagorici AOH pigtagorici J pithagorici QB | 52 aliquando hoc AJBβ hoc aliquando O | 53 ridiculum JOBβ ruddiculum A | 54 post in del. pena O | 56 observanda AJBβ servanda O | 57 rei et αβ rei ad B | 62 vel om. H | 64 vel AJBβ et O | 66 et AJBβ enim O | 67 persone principis αβ principis persone B | 68 hoc om. B | vocant legiste AJBβ legiste vocant O | magestatis αQ maiestatis HB | 69 ȷuliam Bβ Ju. JO ȷulliam A | 70 autem om. O | percutit leviter AJBβ leviter percutit O | esset JOBβ sit A | 71 et om. O | 72 aliqualem αβ aliquem O equalem B | 73 In aliis eciam multis αBQ .lrr. aliis militis H | 74 seu talionis

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apparatus of minor variants

pena AJBβ vel pena talionis O | 76 justicia αBQ eccꝉia iustia corr. H | fit αβ sic B | 78 qualitatem JOBβ equalitatem A | 79 ad fin. add. et sic de aliis B | i.14 2 quod αB ꝙ͠ β | 3 emptor αβ emere B | ante adinventa add. ideo Q | 4 quam om. H | enim om. β | 5 comercium OBQ comertium J commercium AH, et sic alias | 6 metimur AJBβ meciuntur O | 7 equos αB et quos β | 8 metiremur αBQ metueremur H | 9 decem αβ centum B | 11 extimantur αβ existimantur B | 12 ad om. β | est peccunia αB peccunia est β | 12–13 in quantum peccunia suppl. in marg. O | 14 post redactum add. cum redigitur B | monetam αBQ moneta H | expendendum αB (gastar Mcast) expediendum β | 15 nollent αB nolent H nollet Q | 17 etsi αBH & Q | 21 a nomos om. β | 22 Et om. O | post loquucio repetunt valens a lege JO | 23 monetarum AOBβ -tarium J | apreciatores αBH (appre- AOB) apreciatore Q | 24 dicant AJBQ dicat OH | 26 vocant αB vocat β | 27 semper referunt AJBβ referunt semper O | 30 bragmanorum JOBβ vragm- A | 35 vendidit AOBβ vendit J | 40 Hac α Hec B Nec β | equalitatem αBH quali- Q | 41 commutative repetit H | 43 questiones om. H | 44 post solempnes add. solutiones B | i.15 1 annectendum AJBβ admittendum O | 2 Grece om. O | epiqueya αBQ (sic Mcast et De la clemençia; vid. n118 ad loc.) epyͥq̃ia H | 4 ante omnes ins. in β | particulares Aβ humanosꝑticľares corr. super lin. J | 5 et om. B | 5–6 legislator Bβ legis lator α passim | 7 ea om. H | 10 ejus om. β | 11 ad om. β | 13 insurgeret AJBβ surgeret O | ante exemplo om. in O | enim αBH enim ut Q | 14–15 et peregrinus ~ puniretur suppl. in marg. O | 15 civitatem αB civitate β | 16 transeuntes suppl. in marg. O | 17 puniri deberent AJBβ deberent puniri O | absurdissimum ABβ absurdum JO | 18 post benefactoribus add. nostris B | 20 hoc αB hec β | 21 ut αBQ et H | legem αB lege β | 23 decens αB dicens β | 30 sequerentur JOBβ sequeretur A (legens inconveniencia ut subst. sing.) | 31 epiques αBQ epyqueres H | 32 possit αβ posset B | longa αBQ longua H | 34 post dicitur ins. quod H | 35 deviet AOBβ deveniet J | 36 ut αβ et B | est om. H | 37 manifestissima AJBβ manifesta O | 39 ad benigniora αBH & ad begͥnȷora Q | 40 irroget αβ irrogent B | ut om. O | 41 est om. O | 42–43 minorativus penarum αB ĩmorativus β | 44 legalis αBQ a legales H | 45–46 sumpta ~ legale om. per homoeoteleuton β | 47 intencionem AJBβ sentenciam O | ante declinativus ins. et O | 55 dispensaciones αB dispensacionis β | 56 ad fin. add. &cͣ H, et sic de aliis B | i.16 3 pote αβ puta B | 4 haberi potest αβ potest haberi B | 6 inhonoraciones JOBβ ininhon- A | 7 terrarum suppl. in marg. O | 8 privantur AJBβ -atur O | 11– 12 et consentienti om. O | 13 in αBQ qñ H | 14 alterum ~ ad suppl. in marg. J | 16 seipsum om. β | 17 tristicie αβ -cia B | 21 absciderit α -dens Bβ | propria om. O |

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i.17 3 electivus om. β | 4 autem ABβ enim JO | 6 moderandos αβ moderandas B | ut om. β | 10 dicimur α dicimꝰ Bβ | 11 expectacio JOBβ spectacio A | 20 vituperabimus corr. super lin. O | 22 reputat αBH reputãt Q | 24 similes ABβ similem JO | dici αβ dicitur B | ut αβ uti B | 26 tamen om. O | 28 eciam om. O | 32 tamen αβ causa B | 33 enim αBQ tamen H | 36 consistit JOβ consistet AB | hujusmodi AOB huiͥꝰ J ho͞im (hominum) β | 37 contrariari αβ contrariam B | 38 contingunt αBQ contigit H | istud malum interdum αBH interdum istud malum Q | 40 suam om. O | 41 timor om. Q | 43 timorem AJBβ timore O | 44 hiis AJQ his BH istis O | 45 timet αQ timent H timeret B | interdum mala ABβ mala interdum J mala O | 46 quis om. β | 47 audacter AOBβ audater J passim | agrederetur AJQ aggredOBH | aliquando αβ alii B | 49 torneamentis et jostis (v. app. crit) AJBβ justis et torneamentis O | aliquem AJBβ aliqñ O | 50 torneamenta corr. super lin. O | se habere αβ habere se B | expedite αB experdite Q expedire H | 51 unde αB bene (videlicet bn̄ pro vn̄ ) β | in gallia αB ingalea β | 52 coardus AJβ co—ardus corr. linea O tardus B | 53 plerumque AJBβ sepe O | 54 qui om. β | ad suppl. super lin. Q| i.18 1 Enumeratis AJB (e- in marg. ad miniatorem advertendum J) Numeratis O Snumeratis culpa miniatoris Q Inumꝰatis H | 2 intrepidus αB intrepitu β | 3 enim JOBβ cum A | 4 quia om. A | 6 eterna beatitudo AJBβ beatitudo eterna O | 6–7 in corpore meruit AJBβ meruit in corpore O | 9 ante fortis add. vir Bβ | 10 sustinent AJBQ suscipiunt O sustinet H | 11 non sicut αβ nam sic B | 12 maris ABβ mortis JO | 13 alias AJBβ aliter O | eciam om. H | 18 ante salute add. pro O | 19 mortem AOBβ matremmortem corr. super lin. J | 21 vicerunt αB vincerunt β | 22 bellicis om. O | 23 catholice fidei AJBβ fidei catholice O | 24 cronice JOβ coronice AB | 25 et optima ~ maxima om. per homoeoteleuton Q | 27 illa AJBβ illã O | et salutem om. β | 29 Leo papa αB papa Leo β | 30 Omni AJBβ Oi͞uȝ O | 31 omnipotens om. O | 32 post salvacione add. fidei B | 34 Omni AJBβ Om̃ iuȝ O | 35 viriliter om. O | 37 contingere om. β | 38 simularet αB similare β | fortis non esset AJBβ non esset fortis O | 42 laudabilis est fortitudo AJBβ fortitudo laudabilis fuerit O | ut αβ et B | 43 salute αB exaltacione β | publice αBQ duplice H | 44 aggreditur AJBβ dietur O | 44–45 spectat α (conviene Mcast) expectat OBβ | 45 postposito JOBH posposito AQ | 46 transvadare AB transvadꝰe J transvadere Oβ | periculosa αBQ pericula H | 47 sibi om. O | 48 fortis non sit αBQ non sit fortis O | 49 ut αBQ et H | 52 pro bono communi pugnavit αBQ pugnavit pro bono communi O | omittam JOB omictam A obmictam β | 53 hujusmodi αB hoiͫ Q hoi͞m H | imitemur AOBH immittemur J imictemur Q, et sic alias | 54 cid α ad OBβ | assumpsit αBQ accepit O | 56 comitum αβ -tem B | 57 reputata AJBQ deputata O reputa H | prope αBH ꝓpͥ e Q | tempora nostra αβ ea tempore nostro B | accidisse om. O | 58 nostris om. β | 59 illustribus om. H | Ildefonsis αB Illefonsis β | 61 tarifam JOBβ cariſtam

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A | Agarenorum AJBβ agarenorumque O | 65 post bonum add. commune O | 66 non om. β | exponet αβ exponit B | 68 mature αB nature β | 69 qualitates aduertere αB qualitate aducꝰe β | i.19 1 post non om. est O | 5 et propter bonum om. H | 7 hoc αBH lihocet corr. Q | 8 tamen JOBβ autem A | 10 expectando JOβ spect- AB | 12 dictat JOBβ dicat A | 13 bonum suppl. in marg. O | enim est AJBβ est enim O | 16 defectus Aβ deffectus JO, et sic alias | 17–18 aliqui in audendo ~ proprium αBH non habet nomen proprium /Aliqui in audendo Q | 17 superhabundat AOBH suꝑhabundant J | 18 nomen proprium AJBβ proprium nomen O | eum om. B | 19 sumitur AJBβ accipitur O | 24 ante volunt om. et O | sed αβ si B | 26 cum AJBβ ut O | 28 superhabundare αB superhabundancie β | 29 nec ut opportet om. H | 30–31 Nam licet ~ audendo suppl. in marg. O | 31 superhabundet ABβ habundet JO | 32 ut om. O | est in marg. Q | 33 in audendo om. β | 34 ante tamen add. et β | agrediatur JOBβ agreditur A | 36 ut αBQ est H | 38– 39 apparentiores αB appenciores Q appensiores H | 39 bonam om. β | post fortis ins. autem O | 40 habet JOBβ habeat A | 41 prevolare AJBβ evolare O | 43 post Fortis ins. autem O | 44 quietus JOBβ quietis A | quia non AJBβ q̃ oi͞o O | 48 vitet AJBβ evitet O | 49 fugiat αBQ fugiat H | inopiam αBQ inopia H | 50 quadam αBQ quam H | 51 molis AJ mollis OBβ, et sic alias | 53 potius αBQ peius H | 54 animi timidi αB timidi animi β | dejecti AJβ eiecti O directe B | 55 qui αB quod β | 56 conscivit α constituit Bβ | 57 molis om. cum spatio H | et desperati suppl. in marg. O | 59 Leo papa αB papa leo β (cf. i.18 29) | 60 elegantibus JOBβ allegantibus A | 61 Sceleratior αBQ Scelerator H | 64 leti αβ loci B | penit. JOBβ penitenciis A | 65 sceleracior ABβ scelerator JO | i.20 5 fortitudo om. B | politica JO pollitica Bβ pollicita A, et varie alias | sive AJBβ seu O | 5–6 civilis αB caͣlis (causalis) β | 6 ante militaris om. fortitudo β | furoris α furor β ferox B | 7 ignorancie αH speignorãcie corr. Q est ignorancie B | 9 obprobria AOBQ oꝓpbria JH, sed obprobria infra | que secundum αBH secundum que Q | 10 et adipiscantur αβ ut adipiscantur B | 11 vel AJBβ et O | 14 fuisse AJBβ esse O | 16 moneretur αBH moneretur Q | 17 troȷanorum JOBβ trãſanorum A | 20 qui fortiter AJBβ viriliter, et qui suppl. in marg. O | 21 sed om. β | 23 similis αβ civilis B | 25 ante desiderium om. propter O | 26 boni honesti αβ honesti boni B | quem αBH que Q | 28 qui αB que β | 28–29 honestati ~ propinquum om. per homoeoteleuton Bβ | 30 que αBQ qui H | 31 cum om. O | in om. B | 32 a AJB, om. β cum a O | attente αB actente H antente Q | 33 post recuvasit add. se β | fugiamus JOBβ figiamus A | 39 hiis AJBβ aliis O | 40 fugiendum obprobrium AJBβ vituperium fugiendum O | armorum AOBβ amorum J | peregerunt αβ pegerunt B |

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42 fortitudinis politice AJBβ politice fortitudinis O | 43 ut αB et β | 45 possit αβ posset B | 46 occideret αB non occideret β | mitteret αBH imitteret Q | canibus αB cani Q eã H | 49 turpidinis αB fortitudinis β | 51 hujus om. O | 56 ad fin. add. et sic de aliis B | i.21 2 armorum JOBβ amorum A | 4 viderentur AJBβ videntur O | 6 strepitus αB extrepitus Q ex strepitus H | equorum AOBβ armorumequorum J | fragor armorum αBH frangor arborum Q | 6–7 tubarum sonitus JBβ turbarum sonitus A sonitus tubarum O | 7 acies AOBβ acties J | inexpertis αBQ ineptis H | 8 ista sepe α sepe ista β | post sepe ins. ita B | et om. O | dirigere AOBβ diruerigere corr. J | 9 ense et α ee̅ et BH et cum Q | 10 Vegetius J vegecius AOBH vegencius Q | 10–11 didicisse OB didiscisse AJ dĩdisse β | 11 aliis ABβ illis JO | inexperti αB in experti Q experti H | 12 inermibus BQ inhermibus α iermibus H | 15 nam quia αBQ namque H | 19 quadam civitate αβ civitate quadam B | legitur αBQ videtur H | 19–20 milites et cives ~ bellum et om. per homoeoteleuton Bβ | 20 agrediebantur JOBβ egred- A | 21 fugierunt αBQ fugerunt H | 26 comites αBQ et comites H, et deinde repetit | 27 plebei A plebeii H plebey JOBQ | 27–28 habuerunt ~ animi om. B | 28 singularius JOBβ singularis A | 29 Tercia JOBβ e̅ cͬcia A | furore. Et H, punctum om. αBQ | sumo furorem AJβ summo furore O Et ~ furorem om. B | 30 ante magna ins. pro B | 31 ex αB et β | 32 sic αBH sicut Q | 33 post sed om. ex B | 34 coadiuvat JOBβ quoadiuvat A | 36 ex eleccione αB per eleͦnẽ Q per electione H | 37 namque αβ nam B | 38 est jam AJBβ jam est O | 39 irascatur αB irascitur β | 40 Homerus αBQ honꝰius H | 41 servire AOBβ sevire J | 41–42 Ira enim debet preveniri αB Iram enim debet (obhec H) prevenire β | 43 ducuntur αB dicuntur β | 44 quia AB quiạ corr. puncto J qͥ O quiͣ H ͠ꝙ Q | 48 sed om. B | ducuntur AOB dicuntur Jβ | 49 tamen aliquid om. B| i.22 3 est om. Q | 5 illud om. β | 7 fiduciam et spem AJBβ spem et fiduciam O | 8–9 illi aggrediuntur viriliter Jβ, om. viriliter O agrediuntur viriliter illi A, om. illi B | 9 post ita om. et O | 11 multiplicatis αβ in multiplicatibus B | 12 vinum αβ bonum B | 13 ut AJBβ sicut O | sperabant JOBβ superabant A | fugiunt αBQ figunt H | 14 non om. β | 19 occurrunt AJBβ occurrant O | 20 fortitudinis species non vere est αB species fortitudinis non vere Q fortitudinis non est vere species H | que dicitur om. O | 23 credunt om. O | ante in ins. esse JO | 24–25 ipsis, sed ~ in se suppl. in marg. J, om. periculosa JO | 25 non om. B | credunt αB creditur β | 26 propter AJBβ per O | 25 sed α et Bβ | 30 cum AJBβ ut O | i.23 1 annectendum αβ annecta[n]dum B admittendum O | 3 principalior αB pincipalƺ Q principaliter H | fortitudinis om. O | 5 que om. β | 6 adnot. in

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apparatus of minor variants

marg. solucio questionis manus altera in O | contencionis α contempcionis β | 8 expectare αB spectare β | 10 dici potest AJBβ potest dici O | 12 quem αB qui β | 14 Et loquimur JOBβ loquitur A | 17 nam quia αβ quia nam B | 18 circa om. O | post difficilia add. et B | 19 fortis verus αβ verus fortis et B | delectetur in JOBβ delectetur non A | 20 tamen αBH tũ (pro tñ) Q | 20 dolorosis et difficilibus AJBβ difficilibus et dolorosis O | 22 enim om. O | 23 scilicet boni AJBβ boni scilicet O | 24 Et om. Q | 27 qui αβ quia B | 28 virtuosus JOβ virtuosius B vntusus A | 29 quanto AOBβ quantu͎ m͎o corr. super lin. J | magis om. β | 33 desiderarunt et αB desiderant et H, om. Q | 34 tamen ABβ autem JO | 37 vulneribus AJB in vulneribus Oβ | dolere JOβ dolore AB | non tamen αB tamen non β | 38 quia AJ qui OBβ | licet αβ liceat B | ea AJBβ eã O | 39 potius om. O | 41 particularia bona AJBβ bona particularia O | 42–43 sustinendum tristia αQ sustinendum tristiciam H sustinendam tristiciam B | 43 post disponitur add. homo O | 44 autem est αBQ est autem H | tristia αQ tristicia H tristiciam B | 44–45 delectabilibus αQ delectacionibus BH | 45 preponitur αBH preponit Q | 46 comitatur AB ꝯmitatur O cõmittatur Jβ | 48 actus AOBβ auctus J | 51 exponunt JOBβ ponunt A | 52 ante defectu om. de β | 53 alias AJBβ aliter O | 53–54 Possibile ~ sint fortes suppl. in marg. JO, sunt OB | 54–55 vel politicam ~ militarem α et secundum millitarem β, om. B | 56 fuisse in Hyspania αβ in Hispania fuisse B | 58–59 et experienciam om. B | 60 ut AJBβ prout O | audivimus αB audimus β | 63 pro similibus stipendiis om. B | 64 alias AJBβ aliter O | 65 dumtaxat αB dũ taxat enĩ β | 66 ostentant αβ ostendant B | 67 ad fin. add. et sic de aliis B | i.24 5–6 venereorum corr. super lin. manus altera in A | 6 due om. B | 8 ante aliis om. In β | 8–9 et diviciis AJBβ in diviciis O | 9 nos αB nõ β | 13 regendum αBQ regem dum H | 16 fugandam αB fugiendam β | tristiciam AJBβ delectacionem O | 19 hac om. β | 20 illa αβ illa tristicia B | 21 sed om. A | 22 delectacionum AJBβ delectacionis O | juxta OB iuſta J et iuxͣ β ante A | 23 post alia om. est O | 25 amatur αBQ animatur H | 27 consumatur αB consumitur β | 28 causatur om. β | 32 sed αBQ secundum (ſꝰm̃ pro ſȝ) H | 33 fit om. β | 35 earum αB ea β | delectacionis αB -cione H -cionẹis corr. Q | 36 post genera add. earum β | 38 medium αBQ remedium H | 39–40 et intemperancia respiciunt αβ respicit B | 41 post licet add. autem O | Est aliud AB Est autem JO Et ad β | 42 delectatur αB deteſtatur β | 49 hoc om. H | 52 Ordinare αβ ordinatio B | i.25 3 delectatur AJBβ delectetur O | 4 vel intemperatus om. B | 8 dicitur αβ dicetur B | 9 enim ABβ tamen JO | 11 flagrancium AJH fragrancium OBQ | 12 semper om. O | 12–13 delectatur αβ delectetur B | 13 delectaretur αβ delectetur B | 14 aliquis AJBβ quis O | 16 enim om. O | delectant α delectat Bβ | 17 ad memoriam om. H | aliquid AJBβ aliquod O | 18 esurientes αBQ exurientes H | 19 odoribus

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AJBβ odore O | odore. Delectacio om. JO | 20 intemperanciam AJBβ temperanciam O | Simile αB Simile enim β | post et om. in O | 21 si quis enim AJBβ si enim quis O | ante audiendo add. in A | 22 non αBQ nisi H | 24 hos autem αβ autem hos B | 27 audita αB auditu β | 28 vel audiendo om. H | 29 Et αBH Estt corr. super lin. Q | 30–31 ideo non ~ sustentacionem nature suppl. in marg. O | 31 dati αH dacti Q passim dicti B | illis isti αB illi B | solummodo om. β | 32–33 species ~ conservatur suppl. in marg. O | 33 Hominibus αB Nominibus β | 34–35 rerum ~ ad cognicionem om. per homoeoteleuton H, suppl. in marg. J | 34 sensibilium αQ insensibilium B | 35 Ideo om. B | 38 vel om. O | aliquo om. O | 38–39 tactum vel gustum ABβ gustum vel tactum JO | 40 dulcem armoniam αβ dulci armonia B | 42 delectacio ergo ABQ delectacio enim JO delectaco̅ ibus H | 43 non om. O | temperanciam vel om. O | 44 hee α hec Bβ | 45 Ideo iste αB iste ideo β | 45–46 tactum et gustum AJB tactum et ad gustum O gustum et tactum β | 48 proprie ad gustum ABβ ad gustum proprie JO | 49 judicare Ω, Mcast pertenesçe enseñar de los sabores (leg. indicare ut adnot. Campos Souto n30 ad loc.; sed non sic Mss. nostri) | coqui αBQ equi H | condiunt αB condunt β | 50 miscent ~ et experiuntur AJBβ miscendo ~ experiuntur O | 51 et om. B | delectantur αBQ delectant H | 52 post ut om. in Q | 53 venereorum corr. super lin. manus altera in A | 54 in gustu ~ tactum om. per homoeoteleuton Bβ | sicut α sic Bβ | 55 lingua αBH linga Q | 56 Grecum nomine αB nomine Grecum β | 57 ciborum orasse ut αB ut ciborum orasse β | 58 juste JOBβ iustei͎ corr. sub lin. A | reprehensus αBQ deprehensus H | 64 hinc αBQ hic H | 64–65 glossam add. manus altera in marg. A (n166) | 65 ea JOBβ eã A | homo multum J homo maxime O multum homo Bβ, om. multum A | assimilatur αBQ assimulatur H | 68 calefiunt αβ talia fiunt B | 69 liberalis est αB est liberalis β | 72 ad fin. add. & cͣ. β | i.26 1 Est JOBβ Est autem A | 3 ordinantur αBQ ordinatur H | 5 se habet temperancia αB habet temperancia se β | 10 juvenis quam senex desiderat AJβ juvenes tam senes desiderant OB | 14 illud αB id hoc corr. H hoc Q | hee αH hec BQ | 15 personam AJBβ consideracionem persone O (cf. 18 infra) | 18 aliquando om. Bβ | aliquid αβ aliquod B | 19 naturale αBQ naturalem H | 20 toti AB omnibus alias toti JO toto β | 22 quicquid JO quidquid Aβ | 23 superfluam αBQ -fluũ H | repletionem A -cionem Bβ -ctionem O -ccionem J | 26 et sic αβ cum sic B | 30 excedunt in istis AJBQ, om. istis H in istis excedunt O | delectantur om. β | sint ABβ sunt JO | 33 debitum modum AJBβ modum debitum O | 34 modis αBQ modos H | nos αB nõ β | 34–35 indigencie αBQ ingencie H | 35 aliquando ~ prevenit om., post sed ins. et B | 36 sumenda AJBβ assum- O | sunt om. β | expetit om. B | 37 congruit αB congruunt β | 38 nonnunquam αB ut nunquam β | 40 modis αβ morus B | 41 gaudendo αB gaudio β | non opportet vel αBQ nc (pro ut) nõ opportet ꝙ ſꝰm̅ vel H, vel ~ opportet suppl. in marg. J | 43–45 dicitur ~

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382

apparatus of minor variants

delectacionibus suppl. in marg. superiori O | 44 exprobrabilis αBH exprobabilis Q | 45 intemperancia αB temperancia β intemperancia corr. super lin. H | 45–46 delectacionibus ~ in om. per homoeoteleuton H | 46 cujus αBH ejus Q | clariorem intellectum αB intellectum clariorem β | 47 sustinet tristiciam propter bonum αB tristi propter bonum tollerat β | 50 ꝓvenientem (pro-) αB pꝰveniente (pre-) β | 51 eã αB ea β | Verus αB verius β | aut ᷆ αB enim OQ eû H | 52 est om. β | 54 illa suppl. in marg. J | 56 pertinet αB pertinent β | 58 principalius αB pͬ cipalꝰ Q pͬ cipalis H | 62 delectabilia omnia AJB, om. omnia O omnia delectabilia β | 66 incontinens αB incontinentes β | ut om. β | 70 ideo αβ idem B | consequitur α assequitur β | 70–71 tristatur AJBβ contristatur O | 71 concupitam αB occupatam β | cum AJBβ in O | 75 illius αBH eius Q | i.27 1 Et AJBβ sed O | 2 peccent αH peccu̅ jent corr. Q peccant B | 3 multo major αB major multo H major multũ Q | 4 potest αBQ po cum spatio H | 4–5 nominari αB maiori β, et post vocabulo ins. appelari Q | 6 et reliqua AJBβ alia O | 6–7 et aliquibus αβ et alia quibus B | 7 alique αβ alia que B | 10 hiis Oβ his J eis AB | non de illis AJBβ et non de hiis O | 12 nec AJBβ neque O | 13 autem om. O | predicta αBH predct͡a Q | enim αH in Q, om. BO | 14 ante non ins. et Q | 16–17 in quibus ~ quam opportet om. B | 16 in quibus non oportet et in illis repetit Q | 18 in om. β | 20 si αBQ sic si corr. H | 21 ea αBH eã Q | 23 excedet αβ excedit B | 24 ante bonam om. ad Q | expeditus AJBβ expediens O | 26 appetet αB appetit β | 27 et quantum αB et in quantum Q in quantum H | 27 alia aliqua A aliqua alia JOB, om. alia β | 28 bonam AJB ad bonam Oβ | 29 post habitudinem add. corporis O | Prima AJBβ primo O (cf. infra Secundo, Tercio Ω) | 30 seu JOBβ sicut A | habitudinis αBQ habitudine H | 33 proscripcione αB prescripcione β | 34 sollicitudine AOH solicitudine corr. super lin. J solitudine Q | dispensande α, om. β (spatium reliquit H) adipiscendo B | 37 sint αβ fiunt B (cf. 29 supra sunt Ω, 38 infra sint/sunt) | preter bonum αβ propter bonum B | bonum .i. preter suppl. in marg. O | id est αB et β | 38 alterius αBQ adˬulterius H | 38 sint αQ sunt BH | 40 ut appetat (-ectat Q) αβ uel appetit B | 43 secundum racionem rectam αβ sed ratione recta B | i.28 1 non ~ omittendum αβ vero ~ annectendum (i.e. legens u͠o pro n͠o) conj. B | post quod om. est O | 2 timiditas om. Q, timiditas ~ aut intemperancia om. H | 2 opponitur AOBβ apponitur J | 4 principalibus suppl. super lin. J | 7 si non AOBβ sinom J | habere homo AJBβ homo habere O | 9 quanto αβ, om. B | magis actus voluntarius est AJBβ actus magis est voluntarius O | est magis vituperabilis αB magis est vituperandus β | 9–10 si est αBH sicut Q | 10 reperiemus αBH reperiremus Q | 11 esse αBQ eciã H | 14 delectacionem AOB tristiciam [this word underlined, which cannot be shown] delectacionem sublin. manus forte altera J,

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delectacionem ~ propter om. per homoeoteleuton β | 15 videlicet AJBβ scilicet O | 15–16 delectacio est delectabilis αBQ delectacio͞e (pro delectacio e̅) delectabilis est delectabilis corr. male H | 16 actualiter α actuali Bβ | 18 scilicet αH scilet Q si B | 20 timiditas αB timiditae β timidita H | movetur om. O | 22 eciam hoc AJBβ hoc eciam O | 23 secunda racione αB secundo β | 24 et om. Q | 28 corrumpit αBQ eoꝝ ꝑdt se H | 30 vituperabilis αBQ vituꝑalis H | 32 principalis est αβ est principalis B | tanto JOBβ tantum A | aliquod vicium est αβ est aliquod vicium B | 32–33 exprobrabile αBH -babile Q | 33 vero (uo̅ ) αB eni̅ Q eu̅ H | unumquodque AJBβ quodlibet O | 34 est suppl. super lin. A | assuescere JBβ assuecere A assuefacere O | 35 circa que est intemperancia duplici racione αB que est circa intemperanciam duplex racio habetur β | 37 deest corr. super lin. A | 38 post operari ins. in talibus J | habet αBQ habent H | 39 enim om. O | si αB quod Q, om. H | aliquando om. O | ab αB in β | 40–41 bellica αBH bellicã Q | 41 namque suppl. super lin. J | 42 assuefieri α aſueſcꝰi Q aſſueſcꝰe BH | 43 quia αB quia nõ β | 43–44 quia ~ temperancie om. O, posset AJB possent β | 46 addendum αβ actendum B | 47 diversimode αBQ -modo H | ante intemperancia om. in OBQ | 48 voluntaria ~ quasi om. per homoeoteleuton B | 49 intemperanciam Aβ temperanciam JOB | 50 et αβ in his vero B | voluntaria αβ involuntaria et singularia intemperantia sunt voluntaria B | 53 vero AJB, om. O non β | devenitur JOBβ advenitur A | 54 interdum ei AJB ei interdum O interdum et β | 55 stupefit AJβ stupeſcit OB | illud αB istud β | 58 post prius add. non B | 59 post universali add. sunt β | 60 considerando om. Bβ | singula αBH singularia Q | fit AJBβ sit O | 61–62 fọṛṭturpitudinis corr. super lin. Q | 62 vicium αBQ inicium H | 63 nolit αH nollet B vellit Q | 63–64 et per vicium ~ nolebat suppl. in marg. J, volebat ~ universalia om. per homoeoteleuton β | 65–66 involuntarium ~ pertinet ad om. per homoeoteleuton A | 68 post vero plus add. habet O | 72 intemperati αβ intemperancia B | 73 esse α est B, om. β | 73–74 adnot. Noͣ. in marg. O | desiderat ~ laboret AOβ desiderant ~ laborent J desiderat ~ libere B | i.29 1 Regi α Regi autem Bβ | ante sicut om. et O | 3 quedam αBH qͦ dã Q | 2–3 in hoc sunt AJBβ sunt in hoc O | 5 et suppl. in marg. O | 7 incestuosos αβ cestuosos B | 9 quod nomina αB que nomina β | 13 qui est ~ appetitus om. per homoeoteleuton Bβ | 14–15 quynymo ~ est appetibilis suppl. in marg. J | 15 secundum AJBβ per O | eciam om. O | 17 insipiens AOBβ inspiciens J | dimittatur αB (dimict- H) dicatur Q | 18 insipiencia αB sapiencia β | crescet αβ crescit B | 18–19 satisfaciat ~ concupiscencie om. per homoeoteleuton A | 19 crescet αβ crescit B | precipue αβ principue B | 20 multum om. β | 22 hominis αβ homines B | cogitacionem αBH castigacionem Q | 22–23 raciocinacionem αB ranͦ eȝ Q racionẽ H | 23 raciocinacio JO racionacio ABβ | 24 minus potest AJBβ potest minus O | quia AJBβ quod O | 25 sit AJBβ est sit corr. in marg. O | 28 racioni αBH racionem Q | scilicet αB sed

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apparatus of minor variants

β | 29 Et illud α Illud autem Bβ | 30 persuasum corr. super lin. O | id est AJBβ et O | 31 enim om. O | 31–32 preceptum αβ precepta B | 32 vis αBH jus Q | 33 habent ABβ habet JO | et αβ aut B | 35 nam concupiscit αB concupiscit enim β | i.30 5 sola om. O | 7 est om. O | 8 hec om. O | et om. O | 9 bonum opus αβ opus bonum B | 10 ratio et rectitudo αB rectitudo et β | 12 remaneat AJBβ maneat O | 13 extimacionem αβ existimacionem B | 14 contrarium AOBβ contraͫhium corr. J | 15 ante tantum om. in JO | invalescat αB convalescat β | racioni αBH racionem Q | dominetur αβ -natur B | 15–16 sequatur αβ sequetur B | 16 extimans αβ existimans B | 17 et ante operetur om. A | 18 tamen α autem Bβ | 18–19 unaquaque αBQ unaqueque H | 19 contemperancia αβ temperancia B | 20 in homine venit AJBβ venit in homine O | 21 que Aβ quẽ J qm̃ O quantum B | 23–24 nam interdum ~ humorum suppl. in marg. J | 26 devenitur αβ devenietur B | 29 quando suppl. in marg. O | 30 pervertuntur αQ pervertitur B ꝑvꝰtitur et nõ rõ dicitur corr. punctis H | est AJBβ dicitur O | 34 complexio suppl. in marg. O | 37 appetituum corr. super lin. O | invaluit JOβ ualuit AB | 39 ut JOBβ uel A | 39–40 assimiletur αβ assimilatur B | 42 est αBQ cum H | 43 reperiretur ABβ reperitur JO | sunt AJBβ sint O | 43–44 racionalibus AJBβ racionabilibus O | 44 legibus αBQ legimus H | ducti αBQ lucti H | 45 aliqui AJBβ aliq͛ O | 46 inveniretur AJBβ reperiretur O (cf. n172) | 50 qui sequitur αBH qui habet appetitus perversos, non tamen sequitur (repetitum e 51–52 infra; om. non tamen H) β | 52 sequitur eos (illos O) αB eos sequitur β | sicut αB sic β | 53 perversos αβ perversas B | racionem etappetitus suppl. super lin. A | 55 et bona scripsit bis Q | 56 ante virtuosus add. esse Bβ | 57 dicitur ~ delectabilibus om. per homoeoteleuton β | ante temperancia add. dicitur O | 59 appellatur αBH vocatur Q | 60 quos deificabant JO quos hedificabant A (om. Bβ, v. app. crit.) | 61 excellit AJ excedit OBβ (per dittographiam, sc. edi legentes pro elli) | 63 ut JO et ut A (om. Bβ, v. app. crit.) | et isti suppl. super lin. A | 64 Collaciones αBQ collocaciones H | 65–66 et excellentissime suppl. super lin. J | 69 Et suppl. super lin. J | 70 id est αB et β | 71 cum αB in β | 72–73 et dicitur vir divinus om. O | 73 bene in hoc AJBβ in hoc bene O | 75 angelus ABβ angelicus JO | 76 et Johannes AJBβ iohannes et O | 78 c. JOBβ capitalis (pro -ulis) A | 80–81 Tricesima q. 2a (et add. q. ĩ H) β | 81 enim ABβ ergo JO | 83 extremum contrarium AJBβ contrarium extremum O | infimitatem AO infirmitatem JBβ | 85 Nerone αBQ Nerore H | Bocacius αB vocacius β | 86 et horribilissima om. O | loquimur αBQ loquitur H | 87 deditum αB dedicatum β | 89 Sed sub αB Sub tamen β | 90 sunt multum αB multum sunt β | 93 post racionem add. rectam β | 94 dicitur ~ et appetitus suppl. in ambobus marg. et om. bene O | ante habet add. autem H | post appetitus add. perversos β | 96 si α si autem Bβ | i.31 4 Ex AOBβ Estx corr. J | 5 Nam αB An β | 6–7 eas ~ sentit om. H | 7 post ita om. et B | succumbere JO subcumbere ABHQ | sequi AJBβ sequitur O | 9 María Morrás and Jeremy Lawrance - 978-90-04-19450-2 Downloaded from Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:17:34PM via Open Access. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

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conformari α conformare Bβ | mala α mala autem Bβ | 10 conformari racionem AJBβ racionem conformari O | 12 reddet αβ reddet B | 13 Hoc ~ operatur om. per homoeoteleuton β | 14 in illa αβ illam B | 17 nisi αBQ non H | 18 fortissimus αB fortitudinis β | 20 scienciam αBH conscienciam Q | 21 si om. O | 22 Racio huius est om. Bβ | 23 animadvertendum AJBβ advertendum O | 24 post ita add. et B | 24–25 opera racionis AOBQ operacionis ins. super lin. J oꝑaciones H | 26 an Ticius est αB ãticiꝰ est H auticiꝰ. Q | 29 proceditur αB -datur β | si α si enim Bβ | 30 Omne om. β | 31 aliquid αβ aliud B | 34 passionem αβ conclusionem B | 36 et om. O | 38 sit αβ si B | 39 Omnis suppl. in marg. O | 44 particulari αBQ ꝑticulã H | et non ~ secundi suppl. in marg. O | 45 scienciam AOBβ sciencia J | 46 quia JOBβ que A | 47 est in αB enim β | 49 nedum ABH necdum Q nõdum JO | 49–50 transmutaciones, transmutant AOBβ trasmutaciones, trasmutant J | 51 faciunt JOBβ facit A | 52 incontinens αBQ continens H | 54 simulate αβ simulatione B | post cum om. est β | 55 loquitur αB loquimur β | ante non add. et B | 59 vero α autem Bβ | i.32 3 delectaciones illas αβ illas delectationes B | 3–4 et intemperanciam suppl. in marg. O | 4 Alii AJβ alie OB | dicuntur α dicentur Bβ | 7 dicemus AJBβ vocabimus O | si simile faciat αB simile facit β | 9 illas delectaciones AJOβ delectaciones illas O | moderacioṇẹṣ corr. H (sc. culpa fol. interpolati) | 11 pure et proprie αBβ proprie et pure O | 12 Illum ergo αβ ille B | circa AOBβ contracirca corr. J | 14 continens om. β | 19 Et suppl. super lin. H | 20 usus om. B | 21 eciam om. O | scripturarum αBQ scripturã H | 23 pro presuposito α (-suppo- O) presuposito BQ proposito H | 24 et om. B | 25 persequitur αBQ proseq- H | 29 peccaret si αβ peccarent quasi si B | 30 vehementem ABβ venientem JO | Et om. β, deterior est om. H | 32 tantum AJBβ tam O | 34 ire αBQ r̅r (rerum) H | secundo αβ primo B | 35 vindicari αB vendicari β | 36 ante posset ins. et β | 37 ante dolosior ins. et β, 37–38 secundo ~ peccat om. B | 38 vocabant om. Q | 39 Ciprigenam αB cypͬ genã H cyprgenã Q | 40 Cipro αB ciprio H pͬ ncipio Q | et om. O | 41 captivat αBH captivãt Q | 42 exprobabilior ~ ergo α dici potest β, om. B | 43 peccet αβ peccat B | 44 aliquod αβ aliud B | 45 attendi debet αB actendere debet Q, om. H | ad fin. add. et sic de aliis B | i.33 1 quod αβ que H | 1–2 reperiuntur duo vicia αB duo vicia reperiuntur β | 2 unum αβ unus B | 4 supra suppl. in marg. post in O | aliud est AOβ aliud J, om. B | 6 ergo αBQ vero H | 7–8 presenciam delectacionis αβ delectacionis presenciam B | 9 mollis JOBH molis AQ fere passim, et alicubi alii | 10 sed αB et β | 11 sed αB et H sentit et Q | 12 perseverativus αB per se β | 16 econtrario om. JO | 16 superveniente αBQ superveniẽtẽ H | 19 absencia αBQ abũdancia H | 20 quem αBH aliquem Q | 21 supervenit AJBβ sic pervenit O | 23 dicitur AJBβ vocatur O | vocatur om. O

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386

apparatus of minor variants

| 23 declarantur hec AJBβ declaratur hoc O | 24 adnot. Exm in marg. A | rectam om. JO | 26 superveniente αBH sr̄veniet Q | raciocinacione JO racionacione AB racione β | 29–30 melancolici Aβ melancoli JO | 32–32 incensa est AJBβ semel incenditur per dittographiam O | 34 inclinante JOBβ inclinate A | i.34 1 et tanto α et Bβ | 2 minorem αBQ minor est (sc. mĩor ē pro mĩorẽ) H | 3 operatur om. O | post quam om. per H | 4 per absenciam αBQ absenciam H | ergo est αB est ergo β | 6 vitari αBQ vitam H | 7–8 melior perseverativo αB perseveratio β | 8 quia AJBβ ꝙ O | concupisciencias αBQ concupiscienciaȝ H | perseverativus αB ꝑseverãciꝰ β | 13 molliciem αBQ uiolenciam H | 14 vel om. O | 16 vincuntur αβ vincitur B | passione JOBβ passionẽ A | 19 preconsiliatur AJBβ consiliatur O | 20 non αB autem non β | 21–22 malus est αβ est malus B | 23 deterior αB debilior β | 25 finem om. Q | post malum ins. non Bβ | 28 transeunte αB transeunteȝ β, postea corr. Q | 31 delectabilia om. β | per que causatur αB percausatur H causatur, et in marg. suppl. per ante delectabilia Q | 36 eum JOBβ enim A | 36–37 assuesceret abstinere αB assuescꝰet. Abstinẽcia β | 37 nam AJBβ nõ O | 44 delectabilia αBQ delectacionem H | 45 vero non α autem non B autem β | 46 interpollata αB interpellata β, et sic passim infra | 46–47 sicut morbus ~ interpollatus om. O | 50 ͠ H | 50–51 vel ~ quam incontinens om. Bβ, suppl. quam αBQ quod (i.e. ꝙꝰ pro ꝙ) in marg. inferiori O | 51 et inter αBH ut inter Q | i.35 3 adveniunt AJBβ veniunt O | 5 multum om. O | ludo αBQ ludos H | 5–7 vel pile ~ causa lucri JO (vel pile ~ alearum suppl. in marg. J) quando fit propter delectacionem vel pile vel similibus loquendo de ludo alearum quando non fit causa lucri A et dico quando fit propter delectacionem non quando fit causa lucri Bβ, omnia sc. quia vel pile vel similibus in marg. archetypi auctoris additum est | 7 pertinet ut JOBH pertinet et A, om. Q | 9 non om. β | 11 si αβ quia B | 12 nimia αBH & nimia Q | 12–13 non que ~ sed que αB que non ~ sed β | 13 in istis moderate se homo habet AJBβ homo in istis moderate se habet O, post moderate ins. fit β, homo om. B | 15–16 inexpressibiles αB irreprehensibiles β (inre- Q) | 16 sed quilibet αβ ex quibus B | 22 perseverativus αBQ perseverans H | 24 est enim αB enim est β | seipsum om. O | post Judicet add. autem B | 25 ipsum om. Q | voluntate ABβ (et textus Decreti) voluntarie JO | commutet αB communicet β | 26 judicetur om. β | 27 prima om. B | Hec αBH Nec Q | 28 que αBQ qui H | 28–29 inquisicionem sciencie αB (inquisionem H) sciencie inquisicionem | 29 ad fin. add. &ca β | ii.Prol. 2 prestat αβ restat B | 3 notam add. manus altera in marg. A (n201) | 5 novi αBQ nō H | 5–6 audimus AJβ audivimus OB | 6 adductum AJBβ additum O | 8 altius sapientis JOB altꝰius sapientis A alcius insapientis β | 11 ut quedam αBQ ut quidam H | 12 meritis αβ uirtutis B | vacuetur AJBβ evacuetur O | est

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opus et studio opus est corr. manus altera in J | cum αBQ ē H | 13 abstrahimur αBQ abstrahũtur H | 16 occupaciones αB occii paciones Q ocii passiones H | 17 vite om. O | 18 rebus om. β | impendimus JOBβ impedimus A | saltem αB saltim β | 19 hominis om. H | cognicioni AJBβ agnicioni O | Publium αβ publicum B | 21 est om. β | 22 ante solitudine add. in β | 23 ante arduis om. de O | actibus AJBβ negociis O | egemus JOβ agemus AB | 24 agebant αB egebant β | 25 solii αBH soli Q | a om. O | 26 diligenter om. O | 27 par αBQ pax H | 29 preesset αBH presset Q | que αβ qui B | 30 solitudinem αBQ solicitudinem H | 31 habitabat αBH habitat Q | 34 tempori JOBβ pectori A | 37 ut te monerem suppl. in marg. O | 39 excito αBH exercito Q | ne αB non β | 40 fortune αBH doctꝰne fortũe Q | incitantur AJBβ excitantur O | 43 moderatum αB moderatu β | 44 prudenti AJBβ prudente O | 45 u̟ n̟a̟ aliam corr. punctis O | 47 quodammodo αBH ꝙadm˚ Q | 48 intricacione αQ intracione H | occupantur a se αB occuase Q occu ase cum spatio longiori H | 49 videntur JOBβ videantur A | sui curam AJBβ curam sui O | 50 rei αBQ in H | hoc αβ hec B | 50–51 fovetur α fovꝰetur H fovẽtur BQ | 52 non prout αβ ut B | 53 illos om. O | 59–60 unicum αBH vicim (vicium, vicinum?) Q | 60 intersere JOBH interſe A interſꝰere Q | de om. β | 61 perlege αB per legem β | 64 scruptatores corr. J | vocarunt αB vocaverunt β | quia αBQ qui H | ut αB et β | 66 hee α hec Bβ | 67 attinet JOB actinet AH abtinet Q | obtinent αBQ obtinet H | quia. quia per dittogr. H | 68 et αβ aut B | 69 nostros αβ meos B | 71 contempnende αBH cõtene͡pde Q | 72 post bona signum omissionis, sed sine supplemento J | alia AJBβ alta O | 73 bibliothecham (ins. -h- super lin. J, -techam A) tuam αB biblioteca tuã β | 74 stillo Jβ stilo AB studio O | tamen om. O | 75 philosophicas (ph͡icas) αBQ phisicas H | 75–76 aliquorum ABβ aliorum JO | 76 sanctorum αB sociorum β | 77 existimes αBQ extimes H | 77–78 opusve meum αB opus ne medium β | 80 libris om. β | 82 concordet αβ concordat B | 83 placebat AJBβ placebant O | doctrinis αBQ doctrini H | 84 coqui αBQ ceci H (cf. i.25 49) | 85 etsi αBH ut si Q | sit AJB sic Oβ | 87 altitudine αB altitudini Q altitudui H | 89 subdivisionibus αβ diversionibus B | ii.1 1–2 concupiscencias αB concupiscencia Q ꝯcupia̅ H | 2 cupiditatem αBQ cupiditate Q | 4 enim om. O | 4 illos om. B | 5–6 fortitudo ~ est om. per homoeoteleuton β | 7 tamen αB autem β | 9 ante equi ins. et O | 10 omnes ~ possunt αβ omnis ~ potest B | 13 dicitur om. O | 16 attribuentes ipsum AJBβ ipsum attribuentes O | 17 simul αB sim l [sic] Q simiꝉ H | 20 quandoque αBQ qͥ nqȝ H | 22–23 consistit αβ consistat B | 23 in indebita αB in debita β | 24 proprias αBQ ꝓpͬ aſas corr. H | 27 curam debitam α debitam curam Bβ | eis αBH illis Q | 33 seu β vel per O | 34–35 est possidere αβ vi possidere B | 36–37 peccunie ~ quedam om. B | 37 Generacio αβ reservacio B | seu αβ vel B | 40 peccuniam om. O | 45 conclusio om. β | 49 opportet αBH non opportet corr. Q | 49–50 patitur αBQ oꝑatur patitur corr. H | 50 post unde om. non JO | 51 pertineat α pertinet Bβ | 52 accep-

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apparatus of minor variants

cione αB excepcione β | Secunda αBH Secunde Q | 56 post quam om. quod β | quasi AJβ, om. O quod B | 57 id AJ illud OBβ | 59 maxime dicuntur AJBβ dicuntur maxime O | 62 esse circa αBQ circa esse, et postea corr. ordinem obelis H | amantur αBQ amatur H | 63 sed αB sic β | 65 ergo om. β | dacione αB dando β | ii.2 1 attendens AJBβ attendit O | 2 det αB de β | 5 virtutibus om. H | sint om. β | 7 sentiet JB senciet AOβ | 8 sit αBQ fit H | vero α autem Bβ | 9 propter suppl. in marg. O | 11 actus | 12–14 ut si mercator ~ liberalis om. per homoeoteleuton Q | 12 det AJBH dat O | 14 non tamen AJBH tamen non O | 15 liberalis αQ libera H licitum B | 17 accionis αBQ accepcionis H | liberalem AOBβ liberalitatem corr. J | 20 ante illud ins. quod β | 21 et JBβ ut A, om. O | liberalis suppl. in marg. O | 26 eas om. β | 30–31 non quidem αB autem non β | 31 srhabundet corr. super lin. J | sed ita quod αB sedita. Quod H sedicta quod Q | 32 retencionem JOBβ rectencionem A passim | 33 sed ABβ Et JO | multis AJBβ plurimis O | 34 intendat αBQ intendit H | 35 substancie corr. super lin. J | 37–38 qui minora ~ quia dat αBH quia minora ~ qui dat Q | 38 minoribus αBH om̅ ibus Q | 39 a om. H | 39 proprio labore eas AJBβ eas proprio labore O | 40 est om. Bβ | 43 senserunt αB censerunt β | cessant αBQ censant H | Secunda est quia αβ Secunda quod B | naturale AJBβ mnaturale corr. super lin. O | 44 omnes αβ omnis B | post filios ins. suos O | 47 a successore αBQ assuessore H | 47–48 quodammodo om. O | 49 quam αB quam illum β | successit αβ suscepit B | 49–50 communius B comunius AJ co͠iꝰ O co͠is H com͠is Q | post quod inrepsit extra ordinem fol. xliii (= ii.4 4–56 “ut per eas ~ curabitur et per-”) in A | 51 ditetur α dicetur Bβ | de om. β | 52 et expendendo om. H | 55 quia non dedit αβ que non dedit B | multum suppl. in marg. O | 56 curat αB durat β | 57 est ABβ esse J e̅e (est corr. in esse) O | ante habere ins. per dittographiam ꝙ ille habeat peccunias qui non multum, postea del. cum va-cat super lin. A | 61 ubi αβ unde B | 61–62 sed liberalis ~ opportet suppl. in marg. O liberalis autem B | 62 ad fin. add. et sic de aliis B | ii.3 2 tyrãpni J tyrãni BH tirãni O tirani Q cyrampni A | 8 eciam AJ autem OBβ | 9 expendit AJBβ expedit O | 10 post delectabiliter add. expendit β | eciam α autem Bβ | 11 vero α autem BH, om. Q | 13 liberalitatem AJBβ liberalem O | 15 decenti αB indecenti β | 16 aliquid αβ aliud B | 17 debitis om. O | 19 et secundum ~ opportet om. H | secundum αQ cereni B | 20 communes αβ communis B | 21 sustinere (substi- J) JOBβ abstinere A | 23 quam αB quasi β | consumat JOβ su͞mat AB | 24 opporteat αB oꝑtet Q oporteat corr. super lin. H | consumere αB consumare β | 25 quam αβ vel B | 26 ante dando om. in β | 30 quas JO que ABβ | ii.4 1 illiberalitas αβ illiberali B | Primo αB Primum β | 2 Prima α Primo B, om. β | 3 ad non αB non ad β | 4 quia AJBβ quod O | post appetuntur caret fol. transpos.

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ad ii.2 50 in A | 6 subveniri αβ subvenire B | 7 et αB sed β | 8 et propter α propter B quia β | post paupertatem add. autem Bβ | 9 qui αβ quod B | 11 interdum om. β | 12 Secundo α secundum Bβ | quia αβ quod B | 15 horum α eorum Bβ | 15–16 Et ideo suppl. super lin. J | 16 faciat αB sufficiant H sufficiat Q | 16 sicut oportet secundum quod corr. actutum O | 17 assuefactionem JOBH(-facio-)Q(asue-) asueſticionem A | ante transmutacionem (tras- JO) suppl. in marg. per O | 19 id suppl. in marg., sed post quod O | 20 superhabundare αB superhabundãcie (superabun- H) β | enim om. O | videtur αβ videntur B | appetitus αBQ appetus H | 23 quia αβ quod B | 25 cum ABβ quando JO | 29 aliquid α(secundum aliquid suppl. in marg. O)β aliud B | 31 reputamus AJBβ putamus O | 32 expendunt αBH expendant Q | primo αBQ Ꝓdigi H | 35 magis dant αB non dant magis β | 36– 37 aut unde ~ dant suppl. in marg. O | 38 eciam α autem Bβ | 39 observet αB obstet β | 40 quos αB quod β | 41 viris om. O | nichil dat AJB, om. O nichil dant β | superhabundat αB superhabundant β | 42 vel AJBβ et O | eum αB eos β | 43 deberet αB deberent β | et deficit ~ deberet om. per homoeoteleuton AQ, suppl. in marg. O et deficiunt ~ deberent BH | 44 eis αβ eos B | 45 faciliter AJBβ facile O | post consumit ins. ut B | 48 quod AJBβ ut O | 49 scilicet ~ delectabile om. Bβ | 50 racionalem α racionabilem Bβ | 52 racionali α racionabili Bβ | 56 perveniet αβ pervenit B | inter per- et -veniet inrepsit extra ordinem fol. xlv (= ii.5 46–6 22 “an contractus ~ liberalitas est”), conjunctum in eodem bifolio cum fol. xliii (cf. ii.2 49), in A | 59 curatur αBH sanatur sive curator Q | ii.5 1 Illiberalitatis αBH Aliberalitatis male suppl. miniator in Q | 2 tendunt αB tendit β | 3 facit AJBβ faciunt O | videtur αQ videntur BH | 4 magis scripsit bis H | 5 quanto α quantum Bβ | 5–6 aliquem defectum αB (deff- O) quem H impotenciam Q | 6 illiberalior αBQ liberalior H | fit om. β | 7 illiberalem AJBβ illiberabilem O | 8 ab αBQ quia H | 11 enim αB autem β | 13 naturalis αB liberalis β | 14 dans αBH dat Q | ut α ubi β unde B | 16 ista est αβ est ista B | 19 dicebamus om. β | 21–22 superhabundant om. β | 22 eciam est AJBβ est eciam O | illiberalitas AOBβ illiberalis J | 23 isti om. β | quicquam eciam AJBβ etiam quicquam O | 24 recõpensacione corr. super lin. J | 25 reputamus AOBβ reputamos J | 27 ante unum ins. nec O | obolum ABβ obulum JO | aliqua recompensacione AJBβ recompensacione aliqua O | 29 prima αβ primo B | 30 aliis αBQ eis H | aliquid αB aliquod β | 34 opporteat α oportet B oporteret β | 36 convivia αB comunia β, bis | post unde add. & J | 37 sedisti αBQ dedisti H | preparare ABβ parare JO | 40 illicitis JOBβ illicitus A | lenones corr. super lin. J | 41 improbam AOBβ impropiambam corr. super lin. J | usurarii αBQ usuram H | 41–42 aliquid parvum αB ad pravum β | 43–44 scilicet ~ non opportet suppl. in marg. O | 47 sit viciosus suppl. J super lin. | 46–ii.6 22 an contractus ~ liberalitas est transfert reverso fol. ad ii.4 56 A | 48 ante multas ins. et H | 49 eorum AJBβ ipsorum O |

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apparatus of minor variants

hec αB hoc β | 56 opportet sicut αB oportet sic Q oporteret sicu̟ t ̟ H | 57 in homines αB et homines β | 59 enim om. A | vel αB et β | 61 eciam αB autem eciam β | 64 quoque α eciam Bβ | 67 hujusmodi AOBβ hujus mundi J | 68 liberalitatis ABQ illiberalitatis H libertatis JO | 69 opponitur JOβ apponitur A | 70 opponitur JOBβ apponitur A | 72 ideo racionabiliter αB et ideo irracionabiliter β | ii.6 2 est post inter om. O | 3 quod αBQ quia H | 4 que ~ accepciones om. B accepciones et daciones AJBβ daciones et accepciones O | 5–6 expensis αB expensarum β | 6–7 nomen demonstrat αB demonstrat nomen β | esse om. β | eciam om. O | 8 importet α importat Bβ | 10 sumptuum om. O | 9 facienteis corr. et adnot. cruce in marg. manus altera in A | 13 est ABβ esset JO | 14 ante principi add. alicui O | domus domus bis A | 19 aliquid αβ aliud B | 20 liberaliter αB libera β | quia αBH qͣ m Q | 21 nomen sonat ABβ sonat nomen JO | 24 duo vicia opposita AJBβ opposita duo vicia O | 26 post vero opponitur om. ei O | 27 banausia a banos α bãnasia abanos Q bambasia abanos H uanbasia a banos B (bambasia a banos Mcast) | 27 sua om. B | 28 apirocalia H apirotalia AJB aꝑiotalia O (aprotalia Mcast) apilralreya Q | 29 opporteat αβ oportet B | 31 non suppl. in marg. O | 32– 33 et sicut non opportet om. per homoeoteleuton Bβ | 33 inter Et et hinc ins. ſꝰ ( forte pro scilicet) J | 36 racio om. H | faciet αBH facꝰet (faceret) Q | ii.7 1 Prima αβ Primo B | cognoscit αβ cognoscat B | 6 vel α vel eciam Bβ (cf. Sent. Eth. iv.6.7 “vel quod etiam superabundet”) | 7 difficillimun JOβ difficilium AB | 10 Secunda α Secunda est Bβ | 12 ante finem ins. bonum O | ergo αBQ autem H | 13 est similis αB similis est β | 15–16 raciocinii nam ~ diligencia suppl. manus altera in marg. J | 16 post Quarta add. est β | 18 post Quinta add. est B | 20 et sicut opportet suppl. in marg. O | 22 pertinet suppl. super lin. J | ut JOBβ & A | 22 aliquod αβ aliud B | 24 post Sexta add. est Bβ | equalitasbus corr. super lin. J | 25 admirabilius JOBβ admirabilis A | 26 principalis sua AJBβ sua principalis O | ii.8 3 ante donare add. vel β | 4 ornatum αB ornamentumtum corr. H ordĩatũ Q | 5 aliquem AH aliquãdoẽ corr. J aͦd (aliquod) Q | 6 publice JOβ publici AB | 6–7 committeretur αBH comicteret Q | 7 a re αBQ vt H | 8 crearetur αBH crearẽtur Q | 12 an AJBβ aut O | 13 post bene add. ordinate et B | 14 quam α quam eciam Bβ | 14 deceant JOBβ doceant A | opus om. O | 15 deceant JOBβ doceant A | 16 parvas AJBβ paucas O | 18 posse suum JOBβ possessiuum A | 23 hoc om. O | 25 vel JOBβ et A | 26 divinas αBH divicias Q | 27 faciat αβ facit B | 28 eciam om. Bβ | 29 ut pote αβ ut pute B (Sent. Eth. iv.7.8 “puta”, n232) | 30 alium αβ altum B | assumat αB assumant β | 32 magnificus faciet αβ faciet magnificus B | 33 studet α student Bβ | aliquid αβ aliud B | 35 hospites corr. super lin. J | in mittendo A(-mict-)OBβ immitendo J | 36 aliquando om. O | 37 magnifici αβ magnificus B | 38 quia αβ

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quod B | 39 ut om. A | eget AJBβ eges O (cf. Ps 15:2) | 40–41 interdum offeruntur aliqua munera AJBβ offeruntur aliqua dona interdum O | 41–42 excellencie sue αB sue excellencie β | 43 pertinet AJBβ decet O | 46 faciat αBH faciãt Q | quia αBQ qui H | ista permanencia om. Bβ | 49 pertinent αβ pertinet B | 51 expendit ~ singulis om. per homoeoteleuton H | expendet αβ (gastará Mcast) expendit B | decet αB dicet β | 58 faciliter non possint (possunt β possent B non se puedan Mcast) AJBβ non possit faciliter O | ii.9 1 banausus OQ bãnausus passim in hoc cap. AJ bãnosus H (sic; cf. ii.6 27) | consumens αBQ consumans H | 3 exceditur α extenditur Bβ | 4 splendidos αB splendi β | 5 id est αB et β | 5–6 et nupcialia αβ nupcialia et B | 6 conuiuia αBH comunia Q | cooperiunt αBH cooperunt Q | 7 transire debent AJBβ debent transire O | 8 appellabantur (apel- J) αβ appellebantur B | Omnia hec et αβ Hec B | 9 existimat AJBH extimat Q extimãt O | 13 octoagesima sexta, c. αB viij. c.º vj β | 15 sustentanda αBH sustenda Q | 17 opporteret AJBβ oȝ (oportet) O | 22 fecit AJBβ facit O | magnum opus αB opus magnum β | fecerint αβ fecerunt B | 25 que αB qua β | expendere om. β | 27 post se ins. cum tristicia B | omnia majora AJBβ majora omnia O | opporteret AJBβ oȝ (oportet) O | 27–28 videtur αBH videntur Q | 28 ei om. B | 30 quidem AJ quedam OBβ (cf. Sent. Eth., v. n237) | 33 non recedere AJBβ quod non recedatur O | se AJBβ hec O | post videtur ins. esse O | 34 que facit αβ que B | 35 banausus BQ bãnausus AJH banausius O hic, et in 43 infra | que facit αβ que B | 36 sed ~ vanis bis H | ostentet αB ostet H obstet Q | 37 quia om. O | 38 quod illiberalis om. H | 40 post illiberalitatis om. ad et prodigalitatem suppl. in marg. O | 41 parvificus ~ opportet om. H | 43 Deterior ergo JOB Deterior vero A Deterior β | eciam om. B | 44 nos αB non β | 45 ad fin. add. &ca β | ii.10 1 Magnanimitas αBQ Mananimitas H | enim AJBβ ergo O | 2 seipsum αBH se O se esse Q | extimat αβ existimat B, et sic passim | magna faciat ABβ faciat magna JO (cf. Sent. Eth. iv.8.2 ut magna faciat) | 3 dignificat αBQ damnificat H | magnis αβ (post quod repetit per dittographiam ut magna faciat et magna ei fiant et deinde del. O) magnus B | 4 eis suppl. J in marg. | post quia ins. virtus operatur secundum racionem rectam (cf. 6–7 infra) et deinde del. O | 5 in omnibus om. O | 6 nec alius αB negalius β | 8 post magnis add. dignitatibus B | existens αβ existat B | 11 dicimus αB (dezimos Mcast) diximus β | 15 magnanimitate αBH magnitudine Q | 16 dignum αBH indignum corr. punctis Q | 17 kaymus αB caymus β passim | 19 dignum adhuc αB adhuc dignum β | 21 existimet αBH extimet Q | 22 vocatur vocatur per dittographiam et deinde corr. A | 23 dignificet αβ dignificat B | 25 se om. β | 29 suam dignitatem AJBβ dignitatem suam O | 30–31 magnum sit opus αβ sit opus magnum B | 31 faciat /dũmodo JOB faciͣt dum homodo corr. A facit dũ modo β | 32 extimet AJβ estimet O existimet B | 33 sit non JOB sic non A non H, om. Q | et om. β | 36 ad fin. add. et sic de aliis B | María Morrás and Jeremy Lawrance - 978-90-04-19450-2 Downloaded from Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:17:34PM via Open Access. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

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apparatus of minor variants

ii.11 1 dignificet αBQ dignificat H | 3 aliquid αβ aliud B | 5 desiderant om. β | honor datur αB datur honor β | 9 minoribus αB moribus β | 10 minoribus αB minori β | 11 id est αB et β | 12 quam scripsit bis A | 13 quam αBH quod Q | 14 nam ~ dignus om. per homoeoteleuton O | sit αBH sic H | 17 dignificet AJBβ dignificat O | 18 consequens ~ dignus om. per homoeoteleuton B | 19 Pertinet αBH pertinẽt Q | quidem αB quedam β | 22 docilis JOBβ doctilis A | spernit JOBβ supernit A | 26 nam αβ non B | 28 vellet JOβ vellit AB | 29 malus Jβ magnus malus corr. O magnus AB | 31 quidam αB quedam β | 35 esse om. Q | ii.12 1 se habet αβ habet se B | 7 quod aliquis om. H | 8 ex insperato αB in sperato β | 9 admiratur αB admirantur β | 12 exhibitus corr. super lin. A | 17 exhibentur αBH exhibeantur Q | 22 honorbus corr. super lin. A | 23 inferri JOBβ inferi A | 24 id est om. H .i. honoraciones (confundens .i. cum ĩ) O | 27 propter om. B | ante tam ins. no (pro uo̓ , i.e. uero?) O nõ J | 28 infortunia JOBβ infortuna A, et sic infra | moderate se αB se moderate β | 28–29 accidat αβ accidit B | 29 infortunia JOBβ infortuna A | 33 quid αβ quod B | existimat ABβ extimat JO | 35–36 despectores αBQ despectiores H | 36 verus magnanimus α magnanimus verus Bβ | 39 consistat αβ consistit B | 42–43 ignobiles AOBβ ignobles J | 44 superexcellit AJBβ excedit, et suppl. super- in marg. O (cf. Sent. Eth. iv.9.7 “Omne autem illud quod superexcedit in bono”) | 46 est est α est Bβ | faciunt homines αβ homines faciunt B | 50 dignus honore αBQ magnus dignus H | 60 eis AOBβ eoͥ s corr. super lin. J | 61–62 sine ~ fortune suppl. in marg. O | 62–63 unde ~ bene om. B | 65 non om. β | 68 operentur αβ operetur B | 69 facit AJBβ faciet O | 71 ante contempnunt add. non H | 72 interdum AOBβ inter J | ii.13 1 Assignantur JOBH Asig- AQ | 4 aliquid αβ aliud B | 5 sed ~ apreciatur om. per homoeoteleuton β | in tantum AJBβ non tamen O | 6 subit JOB subiit Aβ | 9 est αβ racio B | 15 superexcellat JOB superexcellit A superexcedat β | 18 plus om. B | acceperit AJβ accepit O accipit B | quam dederit αβ quantum dedit B | magananimus om. β | 21 eos AJBβ illos O | 23 delectetur beneficia dando αB beneficia dando delectetur β | 24 memoria αB memoriam β | 24–26 illa vero ~ in memoria tenemus suppl. in marg., legens habemus pro tenemus O | 25–27 tenemus ~ in memoria om. per homoeoteleuton β | 26 magnanimus JOB magna minus A | 27 recepit α recipit B | ea om. O | 31 audit αβ auget B | 31–32 ipse ~ recepit om. per homoeoteleuton Bβ | 32 recepit αβ recipit B | 33 ipse om. Q | recepit αβ recipit B | 34 delectatur AJBβ delectabitur O | ei αβ ea B | 35 cum JOBβ quod AB | 36 atheniensibus JOBQ athanensibus H achamensibus A | 39 est suppl. super lin. J | 51 quia αβ quod B | 52–54 Ideo hoc ~ honerosum suppl. in marg. inferiori J | sed ~ magnanimus om. per homoeoteleuton H | 53 exhiberi αB exhibere Q | 54 non ante facit suppl. super lin. J | sicut reputaretur αB reputare-

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tur sicut β | 56 sunt αBQ est H | 59 aliquem magnum honorem AJBβ magnum honorem aliquem O | 62 esset ABβ est JO | 69 doli ABβ dolumͥ corr. J dolum O | imbecillum αBH imbecillem Q | ii.14 1 hominum αBQ hõi H | 2 enim αBQ eũ H | quod αB quo β | debet AJBβ decet O | 4 quod αB quod si β | 8–9 Nec est ~ contemptivus om. per homoeoteleuton O | 9 eo αB eos β | despiciat αB decipiat β | 11 dicet αBQ dicetur H | 12 causa joci in αB tam (i.e. tã pro cã) joci quam β | 14 convivendum αB conveniendum β | 18 qui bis A | animi sunt αB sunt animi β | 20 ad admirandum Aβ ad mirandum JOB | 24 et om. β | 25 Prima α Primo B Prima est β | 26 sicut ~ recordari om. per homoeoteleuton B | 29 est om. β | specialiter pertinet AJBβ pertinet specialiter O | 30 ea talia αB talia ea β | 31–32 Jullium Cesarem (cess- A) AJ julium cesarem OBβ | oblivisci αBQ oblivi H | 33 multum loquitur αB loquitur multum β | 33–34 loquitur ~ multum om. per homoeoteleuton O | 40 murmurat JOBβ murmurãt A | 43 quod non congruit αB que non congruunt β | 45 non sint αBH non sunt Q | 47 curat αβ curet B | 48 nedum de aliis bonis ABβ necdum de bonis aliis JO | 49 insistat αB insistet β | 50 si AJBβ sȝ (sed) O | 51 magnanimi videtur AJBβ vult O | 53 intendat αB intendit β | 54 et om. O | 55 magnum αB maximum Q maxime H | 56 et JOBβ ut A | 57 ipsa affeccio αBQ affectio ipsa H | 58 ex eo JOB ab eo A, om. β | 60 et α ad B, om. β | 61 magnanimitatem JOBβ magnamitatem A | eciam om. B (cf. Sent. Eth. iv.10.24 “consequens est etiam”) | ii.15 1 pusillanimus JABβ (passim in hoc cap., sed plur. -es 45) pusillanimis O | 3 sint AOBβ possint J | 6 dum α cum Bβ (cf. Sent. Eth. iv.11.2 “dum scilicet non conatur”) | 7 conatur αBQ cognatur H | 8 non om. β | bonis om. β | 9 nam cum α cum enim Bβ | 10 cuilibet AJBβ cuiuslibet O | cognosceret αB cognoscet β | appeteret αBQ appetere H | 11–12 non contingit αBQ ñ cogit H | 12 ei om. β | 13 non se αβ se non B | eis om. O | 14 pigricia αBH pigrigicia Q | 16 enim αBH ergo del. Q | 18 illam om. Q | 19 bonitatis sue αB sue bonitatis Bβ | hanc om. β | 20 adinvencionibus αH invencionibus B in ad invencionibus Q | 21 existerent om. β | 24 hiis αB habens (i.e. legentes hñs pro hijs) β | strenua α extrema Bβ | 27 Secundo JOβ secundum AB | 31 est αBQ et H | insipiens αBH incipiens Q | 33 manifeste αBH magni- Q, et sic semper | 34 ad que αB atque β | 35 quando ABβ quantum JO | 37 se suppl. super lin. J | 40 kaymote AOBβ kaymote (kaymotate, “kaymo-tas” pro “tes”) J | 40–41 presumpcione αB presumptuose Q presumptuose se H | 42 quia αβ quod B | 43–44 accidit ~ magis om. per homoeoteleuton Q | nature humane αβ humane nature B | 45 pusillanimes Ω (v. n240) | 45–46 quam ~ possent om. B | 49 magnanimitati AJBβ virtuti O |

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ii.16 4–5 uterque est ~ excellenciam et suppl. in marg. J est contemptor proximi suppl. sub lin., om. et uterque Q | 7 ante principium transpos. de 9 finem. magnanimus nõ amat, postea del. scribens va cat super lin. J | 8–10 Deo ~ gratus et magnanimus non ~ Deo om. per homoeoteleuta B | 13 invidus ~ benivolus αBH invictus ~ bñnivolus Q | 15 Nam om. H | 16 post malam om. et B | 16 propter αQB oportet H | 17–18 oppinionem ~ veritatem nec propter om. per homoeoteleuton Q | 18 committeret JHO(comitt-)B comicteret Q omitteret (o- pro ꝯ-) A | 20 quod αβ ut B | eam αB hoc Q, om. H | 21 ut α et Bβ | mores AJBβ honores O | 22 appetit AOBβ accipit al̅s apetit J | 24 primos αB primas β | 25 Mathei vicesimo tercio αB in titľo (i.e. in t pro mt) .xxiiiº (xxxııȷ H) caº. β | 26 bonis et veris αBQ (et veris suppl. super lin. A, om. et O) veris et bonis H | 27 excellere αβ excellentiam B | 30 vero om. O | 32 ante alios ins. ad Q | 33 promoveat αB provocat β | meritorium JOH meritorum ABQ | 34–35 capitulo tercio αβ tercio capitulo B | 36 preesse αBQ preest H | 39 quam αβ quamquam B | 40 vacandum αBQ vacuandum H | 43 ante magnanimus ins. sed, et vero ~ sed om. B | post appetit ins. eam O | 45 ad fin. ante bonum ins. ipsum β | 46 imitetur AOH imictetur Q immittetur J | 48 post omnis magnanimus ins. ymo &contra. omnis magnanimus est superbushumilis /& nullus superbus est magnanimus, et postea del. scribens va cat super lin. J | econtra αβ econtrario B | 50 sibi om. B | duplicem om. β, post comparacionem transpos. B | 51 post sibi add. ipsi O | 52 humilis αBQ humiles H | 56 David dicebat αBQ dicebat david H | 58 secundo αBQ vııȷͦ. H | Regum capitulo αβ regis B | 60 quod hanc corr. J | idem ABβ quidem JO | 62 humilem om. H | Econtra αB Contra β | 64 quando αβ quod B | habet ~ quod om. per homoeoteleuton B | 65 sibi om. JO | se om. O | 67–69 Secunda ~ magnanimus om. B | 68 valet αB valeat β | 71 suprascriptis ABβ (arriba escriptas Mcast) supradictis JO | 74 spem om. B | presumptuosi αβ presumptuosum B | desperacionem αBH -acio͞e H -acione Q | 75 quē JO q͠d. A quam β quia B | 76 bonis et magnis rebus AJBβ magnis bonis et rebus O | 77 longanimus AJBβ longanimis O | 78 bene se αBH se bene Q | mala JO magna AB magna et β | 79 ante prospera add. et O | 80 amicabilia αβ admirabilia B | veridica αB veridi β | 80–81 eciam circa corporalem α ẽ circa corpoͣ lẽ Q est cirporalẽ H circa corporalem B | ii.17 1 quedam suppl. super lin. Q | habuit αBH habȝut Q | innominata αβ nominata B | 5 a ante magnificencia om. OH | 6 eciam om. Bβ | 7 sed α et Bβ | 9 peccuniarum parvarum et mediocrium (-ocrum AQ) AJBβ parvarum et mediocrium peccuniarum O | 11 in om. B | 12 opportet JOBβ opporteat A | honorem quam deberet αB honores quam debere β | 14 aliquis se habet AJBβ se habet aliquis O | 23 honoretur om. β | post eciam add. quandoque Bβ | est JOBβ es A | 24 id est αB et β | 26 temperantem αβ contemperantem B | 32 id est αB et β | alii multi AJBβ multi alii O | 34 diceremus αB dicemus β | 39 opportet

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AJBβ opporteat O | 44–45 honorem magis ~ aliqui appetant suppl. manus altera in marg. J | 45 est quod αβ est ut B | 48 videtur ABβ videntur JO | 53 et ante quia om. β | 55 sibi αB sibimet β | 56 Sed α Et quia Bβ | planiorem ABβ pleniorem JO | [ii.17 61–ii.18 44 lacuna in J] | 62 invirilem A virilem O | 66 virtus om. β | ii.18 1 et medium ABβ ut medium O | 1–2 est innominatum AOBH ẽ innominatum est Q | 3 nominis (no͠is) OBβ hominis A | 6 que AOβ quia B | deponunt AOβ deponit B | 7 est OBβ est est A | 10 seu ABβ sive O | 13 et in AOB et β | 16 quod est AOB est quod β | 16–17 inperturbatus AOBH inperturbatρ (-tis, pro -tꝰ) Q | 19 passio ire AOβ passione B | 20 quas AOB quod Q, om. H | 21 et non irasci om. β | 25 minus om. QH | non om. β | 26 inirascibilitatem A irascibilitatem OBβ, et sic passim | 27 minus AOβ nimis B | 30 ad AOβ et B | ire om. Bβ | 34 irascatur AOβ et B | 43 quia AOβ quod B | excitatus AOBQ exitatus H | 44 ante vindicanda ins. recte β (caret phrasis in Sent. Eth. iv.13.6) | quia om. H [hic resumit A] | 45 sensitivus adjuvaret αB adjuvaret sensitivus β | ad om. B | 46 vis om. β | 47 Sic αB et sic β | ira om. B | 48–49 et quantum om. O | 50 injuriantes JOBβ injuriatores A | 51 moderamine αB moderacione β | 52 propulsare JOβ pulsare AB | 53 inculpate αBH In culpa Q | ii.19 2 irascatur αB irascitur β | 5–6 tum ~ tum JOβ cum ~ cum AB | 7 ante tantum om. in JO | 8 post est om. in B | possent JOBβ possunt A | 14 in om. JO | 14–15 ex eo quod AO ex eo quia JBβ (Sent. Eth. iv.13.10 “quod accidit quia”) | 15 retinent JOB retinet Aβ | interius om. A | 18 inclusus αB exclusus β | citius : cicius αBH scicius Q | 19 speciem AOBβ spem J | 22 principes ~ moventur ABβ princeps ~ movetur JO | 23 est αB est enim β | 24 puniri αβ perimere B | 27 quendam casum qui ei accidit quem αβ quamdam causam que ei accidit quam B | 31 Circenses αB crescenses β | invitari αBH invictari Q imitari B | 32 obtruncare JOBβ obtrucare A | quisque ABβ quisquis JO | 34 delictum αBH delictumque Q | 34–35 cum ~ publicam om. Q | 37 adjecit αβ abjecit B | 39 quo JOBβ ꝙ A | 42 irascuntur JOBβ irascantur A | quiescit αβ requiescit B | 44 scilicet αB si (pro .s.) β | 45 puniat αB puniãt β | graviter αBQ gravius H | 47 post ira ins. eorum O | 48 extinguatur JBH extingatur AOQ | 49 qui AOB que β | post sic add. sunt B | 49–50 molestissimi αB molessimi β | 50 eis AJBβ ipsis O | convivere αβ vivere B | 51 maxime AJBβ premaxime O | 52 melancolici αBH melanconici Q | in om. O | suscepte αBH supcepte Q | 55 in om. O | 56 crucient αB decucient β | 57 ire αβ ira B | 59 post Superhabundancia add. autem β | virtus αB metus β | 61 enim om. Q | 66– 67 determinare AJBβ terminare O | 67 qualibus AJBβ aliqualibus O | 70 quam excedentes om. B | 74 vel non vituperetur om. B | hujus ABβ hujusmodi JO | 77 quem ~ quem αβ quam ~ quam B | 80 parum quis ABβ quis parum JO | excedat αβ excedit H | 81 si plus vituperabile est suppl. in marg. O | valde om. B |

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ii.20 2 ante actibus om. in JO | seriosis JOBβ feriosis A | 3 colloquuntur α(coloquA, colloc- O) loquuntur Bβ | ante illis om. in O | 5 homines suppl. super lin. J | 6 hoc om. B | colloquucionis αBQ(colloquco͞is) colluſionis H | 11 colloquiorum α eloquiorum Bβ | 12 ludicris JOB ludicriis Aβ | 18 quod αB ut β | 19 et in rebus om. Q | intendentes in spatio suppl. manus altera in J | 21 contradicunt AJBβ contradicant O | contristent αB contristant β | 22 extimantes αβ existimantes B | 24 contristare α contristari Bβ | 25 discoli OBQ distoli AJH (et infra ii.21 31 distoliam) | 27 ille ABβ iste JO | 31 viros αB nos β | 31 hanc virtutem habent ABβ habent hanc virtutem JO | 32–33 amicicie qui αβ amicicie que B | 34 taliter om. B | 35– 36 moderatur ~ amiciciam om. B | 36 propter α prout Q prot BH | 38 appetitum AOBβ appetum J | 40 afficiatur αβ affatur B | 43 consequencia AJBβ frequencia O | 46 inconsuetos αH non consuetos BQ (Vet. interp. “consuetos et inconsuetos”, EN 1126b23 πρὸς […] συνήθεις καὶ ἀσυνήθεις, et sic Aquinas et Geraldus Odonis) | non om. B | 47 nam om. Aβ | 48 quod om. H | 49 in illo αβ nullo B | 50 convictu JOBβ -icto A | ii.21 6 aliis similibus αB similibus aliis (alliis Q) β | soli αB solum β | 8 ut om. Bβ | 8–9 loquitur ~ vel si om. B | 10 aliquid αβ aliud B | propriam honestatem αB honestatem propriam β | 16 parum α pravum B, om. β | 16–17 preponderent ABβ preponderet JO | 17–18 vel eciam ~ delectacionem om. O | 20 facit ut αBH facit uł Q | 25 ante honestate om. ex O | 26 causatur αB causantur β | 28 ac ABβ et JO | 29 delectare ~ minus om. H | 30 ante contristare ins. inter Bβ | 32 ante in spe add. homi̅bus JO | 35 delectare αBQ delectat H | ante sumptum ins. et β | 35–36 renuimus ~ preferimus AJBβ referimus O | 36 delectacioni αB delectacionem β | 38 faciat αβ facit B | 39 Si αβ Si autem B | 40–41 extimari αβ existimare B | 43 ait om. JO | 44 semper AJBβ sepe O | 46 rursus αB recursus β | invenitur αB inveniuntur β | 47 leticiam αβ noticiam B | 48 liberos esse αB esse liberos β | 52 aliud om. β | 53 detraccionis om. β | 54 inde α unde β | 56 discolus ABβ distolus JO | 58 videntur αβ videtur B | ii.22 2 est ante reperire JOβ et AB | 3 simulando JOBβ disimulando A | de suppl. super lin. J | 5 non insunt ~ ea que om. per homoeoteleuton β | simulat ea JOβ simulant ea A | 6 sint α sunt Bβ | 7 post uno add. modo β | 8 post alio om. modo Q, alioͦ H | sint αBQ sunt Q | 9 authochiastos H anthochiastos ABQ (anthochiascos Mcast) authothiastos J anthothiastos O | 10 authophastos JH antho- AOBQ | 11 talem αB talis β | 14 hoc om. β | 15 ipsa om. Bβ | 16 in marg. Nota univa genera mēdacioꝝ O | 20 post secundum add. est JO (Secundum autem August. et Decretum) | ledat αB ledatur β | 21 post tercium add. est O | 22 inmundiciam Bβ (ut in Decreto) mundiciam α | 23 mendacium est ABβ est mendacium JO | 25 sextum αBH sestum Q | et nulli ABβ est nulli JO | velut αB veluti β | 26 sit αB scit

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β | 27 et nulli ABβ est nulli JO | 29 ab αβ et B | 30 est om. B | mentiendum ABH mendacium JOQ | in om. O | magnum αBQ magis H | 31–32 igitur mentiendum αBH igitur mendacium Q | 32 secundo ~ mentiendum suppl. in marg. J, et om. est JO | 33 quia αβ quod B | 34 ipsam αβ ipsa B | 36 enuncianda α denuncianda Bβ | 37 post mendacium om. est β | 38 cujusque αBH cujuscumque Q | 39 ac salute α aut salute β ad salutem B | 40 ante ducendus ins. vero H | opitulante corr. super lin. J | Neque αB (necque A) nec β | 41 neque enim αB nec enim β | temporalis αBQ corporalis H | perficienda AJB, om. O perficiende β | 42 neque se JO nec se B neque si A nec sic se β | 43 moveri αβ moneri B | 45 post prefertur om. et O | facimus αβ fecimus B | 46 dampnabilius αB danãpbiliꝰ Q dampnabilis (dãna- H) OH | 47 peccat om. B | quanto αB quantum β | 48 esse αβ esset B | 51 Omne ergo αB ergo omne B | sui αβ sua B | 53 si αB cum β | representat AJBβ representet O | 55 quia αBH qui Q | 60 humilitatis αB humilitas β | mentiendum αBH menciendi Q | 62 efficeris αB efficieris (efic- Q) β | evitaras αBH -tarρ Q | 65 ad fin. add. et sic de aliis B | ii.23 2 equali re αBH equalitate Q | 3 pote αβ pute B | 5 ante de ins. et β | 7 justiciam ~ pertinet ad suppl. in marg. J | injusticiam αBQ injusticiam corr. A | 8 que AJBβ qui O | 13 vel α et Bβ | 13–15 et multo ~ juvamentum suppl. in marg. et antea repetit alterius O | 16 secundum αBH sed Q | 17 sit AOBβ estsit corr. super lin. J | puntum AJ punctum OBβ | 18 vult αBQ est H | 20 videntur αβ videtur B | 21 moralis virtus αB virtus moralis β | 23 opportuerit α oportuit Bβ (cf. textum Geraldi, n287) | nec ABβ vel JO (cf. textum Geraldi, n287) | 25 ante incertis om. in B | 27 sint αβ sunt B | alium om. JO | 29 provenit suppl. in marg. O | 30 intendit AOBβ incendit J | sed est AOBβ sed & J | vanus αβ bonus B | 34 se om. Bβ (cf. Sent. Eth. iv.15.12 “aliqui se iactant causa argenti”) | 35 alterius rei αβ rei alterius B | extimari αβ existimari B | deformis AJB difformis β defferens O | 36 minus αB minius corr. H nimis Q | jactatores αBQ jactores H | 37 quia om. Q | 38 finium αQ ſıuıum H summum B | 40 illi vero qui αB illa vero que β (cf. Sent. Eth. iv.15.14 “Illi vero qui iactant se causa lucri”) | 41 talia JOBβ alia A | 44 delectentur αB delectantur β | 45 sunt AJBβ sint O | possit hoc latere suppl. in marg. O | 47 potest de facili αB de facile β | 48 medicando AOB (en melezinar Mcast) meditando Jβ | artibus αβ actibus B | 48–50 enim aliqua ~ se fingunt suppl. in marg. manus altera in J | 50 alquimistas αB alchimistas β | 52 lucri AOBβ lucrari J | quasi JOBβ quia si A | 56 post quibusdam add. aliis (all- Q) β | 57 vocantur Grece αβ Grece vocantur B | blancopanurgi AJBH blancopauurgi O blancopamurgi Q (Vet. interp. “baucopanurgoi”, Sent. Eth. “blancopanurghy, -pamyrgy”, Geraldus “baucopamugi”, etc.) | 57–58 simulacionis AJBβ simulatores (pro simulato͞is) O | 58 nimis αB minus β | 60 volunt αB vult β | meliores αB melior β | 60–61 moderatos αB modestus β | 61 deferunt JOBβ differunt A | 65 affectate αβ affectare B | 66 pariunt αβ ꝑibũt H | 68 nimis αBH minus Q | 71 ad fin. add. et sic de aliis B | María Morrás and Jeremy Lawrance - 978-90-04-19450-2 Downloaded from Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:17:34PM via Open Access. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

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ii.24 tit. eutrapelya A passim | 1 hominis α homines B | 2 animi αB anime β | seriis αB his (his pro ßiis) β | 7 et sicut opportet om. B | 8–9 audit que non decenter om. per homoeoteleuton H | 11 hujusmodi αBH hoṇọṛui9modi corr. Q | 12 virtutis αB virtustis corr. H virtus Q | et om. A | 13 bomolochi ABQ bomoloci O bomoloti J boniolothi H | 15 inmolatorum AO(ĩmol-)BH imol- Q inmulatorũ J | 16 bomolochi OBQ bomolothi J bomolchi A boniolithi H, et varie alias | 16–17 aliquid om. B | 17 rapere αBH raperere Q | 18 quia αβ qui B | 19 quod AJBβ ut O | 20 ante dum ins. et Bβ | 21 homines om. B | non om. β | 22 fit om. β | 23–24 causa cujusdam dissolucionis αB propter lucrum dissolucionis cujusdam β | 25 continencie αBQ -tinenti H | 29 quia αβ quod B | nec αBQ neque H | 30 ex om. H | agrioti AJB arioti O agriori β, et sic infra | 30–31 agrestes αBQ agreste H | 32 eutrapeli JOB eutrapelli β entrapelli A | 35 vellit αB vellet β | superhabundanter αB habundanter β | 36 quoddam indicium αB quodam iudicium β | 36–37 ante disposicionis ins. . & A | 37 corporum ABβ corporis JO | 40 interiores αBQ exinteriores corr. H | multi αβ in multi B | 42 ante eis ins. in B | quem αB etiam quam β | 43 superhabundanter diligunt αB superhabundant β | ii.25 2 aptus αB actus β | 5 hoc om. B | 9 occupatur αB occupat β | 11 insipientis AOBβ insipientes J | qui αBH quia Q | 12 habitum αβ habitus B | decentia αBH dicencia Q | 13 eciam om. O | 14 ante comediis add. in B | in αBH et Q | 15 aliqui αβ aliqua B | 16 differt JOβ differunt AB | 18 in dicendo quam in audiendo AJBβ dicendo quam audiendo O | 19 dicet α decet Bβ | 20 ante autem ins. non β | 21– 22 et talia ~ delectabilia om. H | 23 in convicio ABQ convicio H in convivio JO | 24 enim om. β | 26 ante hominum om. propter Bβ | 28 vir est αβ est vir B | ipsi αβ ipsa B | 29 Apostolus dicit αB dicit apostolus β | 30 sibi om. B | ostendunt αBQ ostendit H | 31 talis dicitur αBH dicitur talis Q | eutrapellus OBQ entrapellus AJH | eum vocare αB eum notare H vocare eum Q | 32 graciosum JOBβ gra di̡ciosum A | 33 ille om. JO | 34 Domini α deum (deũ pro dñi) Bβ | 36 c. tercio αβ tercio c. B | 38 trufator JOBβ truftator A | ut αBQ et H | sunt om. B | ridere αB redire β | 39 idem αB ipse β | 40 reputavi errorem αB reputauit et post rel. spatium β | deciperis AOB decipis Jβ | Ecclesiastes αBQ ecclesie H | 40–41 c. secundo B | 41 de om. B | dicet αB dicit β | 42 et α vel β, om. B | 43 talia om. B | 45 quia α quod β que B | 46 colloquuciones JO(colloc-) locuciones ABQ lociones H | 49 requies αB letitia Q, om. H | humanam AOBβ humana J | relevandum ABβ repellendum JO | post multas ins. humanas β | 51 quadam αB quedam β | 54 injuriosi αβ vitiosi B | honerosi AOBβ onorosi J | 55 convenientis αB conveniens β | ante honesti add. et O | neccessarii αB neccessarium β | 56 propter αBH prompte Q | relevandum AOBH revelandum JQ | 57 agrestis αβ agrestes B | ludere nullo modo AJ nullo modo ludere OBβ | 59 ludentis αB ludentes β | 61 differunt ABβ differt JO | 62 dicuntur α dicitur Bβ |

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ii.26 1 Verecundiam αBQ Verecũdiͣ H | posuimus αB possumus β | 2 habitui JOBβ habitus A | post electivi add. et β | 3 quod om. B | 7 effectum αβ defectum B | 8 appetitus αBH appetiti Q | 9 unde ~ corporali suppl. in marg. J | 12 indicatur αB inducatur β | 14 differencie est αβ est differencie B | 16 quasi deserta palescunt αB palescunt quasi deserta β | post palescunt ins. per dittographiam Racio huius differencie est quia natura, postea del. scribens va-cat super lin. A | 19 rubescit αB rebuscunt β | 20 corporalem suppl. super lin. J | 25 ab αB ad β | 26 timent αBQ timꝰent H | | verecundia decet juvenes α, om. verecundia B decet juvenes verecundari β | 26–27 et hinc ~ verecundos repetit verso fol. J, om. B; ante verecundos ins. et β | 27 Etati αBQ Etate H | 28 existimamus ABH extimamus JO existamus Q (Sent. Eth. iv.17.7 “quia existimamus quod non oporteat”) | 37 hominum om. Bβ | 38 horum om. β | 39 nedum (necdum JO) a αB ne diuina β | 40 turpitudinis αB a turpibus β | 42 turpium αB turpe β (Sent. Eth. iv.17.10 “aliquid turpium”) | 43 eciam αβ enim B | obstat om. Q | 44 verecundetur α verecundatur B verecundosus verecundetur β | 44–45 est tamen ~ verecundaretur suppl. in marg. J | 45 nec om. β | extimandum quod JO estimandum quia A existimandum quod β existimandum quia B | 47–50 quibus debetur ~ defectus om. per homoeoteleuton O | 51 quia α que Bβ | 52 unde αβ bene B | 53 xxxviii. αβ x. B | 54– 55 evenerit αβ evenit B | 55 volet αH vellet BQ | 56 esset αβ esse B | 58 que JOBβ qui A | 60 nec αB neque β | 61 diceret αβ obstat dicere B | non suppl. super lin. J | 61–62 de turpi ~ verecundari om. B | 62 ante virtuosum ins. quid β, qui B | 63 ubicumque utrumque corr. J | 64 presuposita αβ presupositi B | ii.27 2 post est ins. timor de turpi per dittographiam (cf. 3 infra) β | 3 et om. β | stricte αβ distincte B | 5 modum om. Q | cadere in virum αBQ ca de reviꝝ H | 8 credunt αβ credant B | propinquam αBH propinqua Q | 10 aliquod αβ ad B | 11 ei αB et β | 12 descensum JOBβ decenssum A | ascensum JOBH accensum Q accenssum A | 13 descenditur αB descendit β | 14 etate αβ etati B | 16 declinant αBH declinat Q | ad αβ quo ad B | 17 et fiunt α et sunt BH sunt Q | 18 ascensum OB ascenssum AQ accensum JH | qui om. B | 22 et virtutem om. H | 24 maliciam αB vicium Q, spatium reliquit H | 26 sibi hoc AJBβ hoc sibi O | 28 cinici β conici JOB coniti A | 29 possunt JOβ possent B debent A | 39 ante quod cum veniret ins. quod cum venerit Q | Rebeca AJBH rebecha A rebbeca Q | Ysaach J Ysaac AOBH isaach Q | 41 caput AOBH capud JQ | obnubere suum α suum obnubere Bβ | 42 debere nupciis αB nupciis debere β | pudoris αB pudor β | 43 quinta c. αBH caº. 5° Q | ii.28 1 scripsimus suppl. super lin. J | explicatis AJBβ accumulatis O | 1–2 annectendum AOH annete- J annette- Q annecce- Q | 5 exprimamus αBQ reprimamus H | 7 obedire αB obediencie β | 8–9 contingit fortitudinis est αB est fortitudinis

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apparatus of minor variants

contingit et fortitudinem esse Q est fortitudinis contingit fortitudinis est H | 10 infortunia JOBQ infortuna AH | 10 sine murmuracione et om. H | 13 ante pudicicia add. & J | 15–16 Helemosinaꝝ largicio OBβ(Elem- H) Elemosinarum largicio suppl. super lin. J Elemosina & largicio A | 16 et longanimitas suppl. in marg. O | 17 magnanimitate ABβ longanimitate JO | 19 anhelandum OB annelAJβ | 20 ditemus AO ditemus suppl. super lin. J dicemus Bβ | 22 sicut infirmus αB infirmus sitn& Q infirmus sicut H | faciat αβ faciet B | 23 eger αB eget β | 23– 24 liberabitur AB liberaliterbitur corr. in marg. J curabitur β | 24 Hee AJ hec OBβ | 26 quam αB qua Q quia H | 27 racionalis αBH racionabilis Q | 28 futuram αBH fucturam Q | Concl. 1 parens om. B | 2 statuit αBQ stauit H | colloquucio αβ locucio B | 3 Fines αβ finem B finis Q | 4 ut αB et β | hujuscemodi αβ hujusmodi B | 5–6 sed nec JOBβ sed non A | 7 contemperans JOBβ et intemperans A | 8 prolixitate Aβ prolixitatẽ corr. manus altera delendo signum abbreviationis J | 10 impedit αB impendit β | 12 vero αBH enim Q | 13 sit fit Q | 16 nedum AOB necdum Jβ | 17 manifestant αBQ nifestant H | 19 a nino JO anino ABH anno Q | 19–20 continuatis αBH ꝯtumelisnuatρ corr. super lin. Q | 20 Ozie αB osie β | 21 moliciem AJBβ maliciam O | Sardanapali αB sardanapoli β | 23 ille om. B | 25 cirum αQ tyrũ H | 27 oppreserat ABβ cõpresserat JO | 29 Roderici αBQ roderi H | 30–31 fuit latitudoque αβ quam tantitudoque B | 32 an caro αβ anchora B | 33 innumerabilium αBQ numerabilium H | 34 insignium αB in sigͥnũ Q in signũ H | 38 prestitit αBQ pꝰstit H | unica αBQ vinea (vinea pro vnica) H | 39 incollunt AJ incolunt OBQ, om. H | 41 hec αB hoc β | casum αβ casura B | 42 ascensum αB accensum β | 43 ut hinc αβ in hunc B | 45 prosilisse αBH proselisse Q | 47 longa αBQ longua H | 49 centesimum JOB centissimum Aβ | 50 alas AOBβ alias J | 51 ut JOβ cum ut B, om. A | ediximus αBH & diximus Q | 53 effugerant αBQ fugerant H | renata αBQ regnata H | 54 premaxima αB maxima β | 56 criptis αB triptis H scriptis Q | 57 duces αB duce β | 58 quandoque ABβ quandoque corr. super lin. J | 60 accidisse om. O | ante notissimum add. notum est et B | 60–61 primus α primo Bβ | 63 punctum post circumdatus collocavit J | profudit αB perfudit β | 66 Muregatus αBH mugeratus Q | 67 in marg. Nota causam votorum sancti jacobi adnot. manus altera in O | hodierna αβ hodierno B | atque α ac Bβ | 69 cum et in suppl. super lin. manus altera in J | Castella α castello Bβ | 70 conjunctim JOBβ conjunc̅oni A | ͠ for colĩbriã) | obsidere Aβ Colimbriam α collibriam B coliberrima β (i.e. colibrĩa oſſidˁe et suppl. -b- super lin. manus altera J | 71 Cid αBQ Cidus H | campiator BH cãpiator O canpiator A cãpe̟a̟d̟o̟r̟iator corr. manus altera in J canpeator Q | 72 septenium αB (septẽn- O) septimβ | miraculo om. β | 73 immoror αBH ĩ memor Q | 74 post manifesta spatium cum linea reliquit O | 75 quandoque αBQ ẹṭq̅ doq̄ corr. super lin. H | 76 tenemus αB terreniꝰ β | 77 petrarum αBQ patrarum H | quotquot

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AOBH quod̟ tquod̟ t corr. manus, ut videtur, altera in J qͦ t Q | 78 geritis αB gentis β | 79 Quicumque αB Ɋ̸cũꝙ H quecũꝙ Q | in cuius αBQ uicinus H | devenerit JOBβ devenerint AB | 81 fastidiose JOBβ studiose A | 82 excellenciave αBQ excellencia ne H | 83 contempnendas αBH comptene͂das Q | namque αBQ enim H | 83–84 Nullus namque ~ infirmetur suppl. in marg. O | 84 nec αB necque β | 86 cum sciam tum excellencia AOB cum scienciaam tum excellencia corr. super lin. J cũ sciencia tum excellencia Q (videlicet sciã in exemplari) cũ excellencia cũ H | 87 tui tum αBH tui cum Q | 88 post interdum om. et AH | si suppl. super lin. H | 90 et ineunte αβ juvenili B | 91 progredieris αBQ progrediens H | 92 ruralis JOBβ ruraľ A | 93 quod om. Q | ad fin. Explicit & concertatus sive correptus est. J Deo gratias. Amen B Explicit memoriale virtutum editus a domino alfonso episcopo burgensi O Deo gracias Explicit memoriale virtutum laus et honor deo patri virginique marie et omnibus sanctis Amen β | ignouisse uelimus […] maculis quas aut incuria fudit, aut humana parum cauit natura. hor. Ars P. 347–353

“I am now doing an apparatus criticus to Euripides. Rather fun; except correcting the spelling. […] Only men of the highest moral character, religion, and social grace can produce one satisfactorily.” gilbert murray, correspondence with William Archer, c. 1901, ap. Lt.-Col. Charles Archer, “G.M.–W.A., 1895–1924”, in Essays in Honour of Gilbert Murray, ed. J.A.K. Thomson & A.J. Toynbee (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1936), pp. 36–37

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Index Names and toponyms are listed in their standard modern form in the language of origin, except for states, saints, popes, and classical authors (Juan ii of Castile, João i of Portugal, Abū lḤasan, Lisboa; but Venice (republic), Jerome, Clement vi, Horace). Medieval scholastic authors, however, tend to have various appellations other than given names (Albertus Magnus/Albert the Great but not Albrecht von Bollstädt, Aquinas/St Thomas, Bartolus/Bartolo da Sassoferrato, etc.); in these cases we follow The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (Cross & Livingstone 2005) and arlima at http://www.arlima.net/. Medieval Spanish names were also constructed differently from modern ones (enclitic first name + patronymic, followed for nobles or officials by clan name or toponym preceded by de); though bne catalogues by patronymic—the one form that could never have appeared in medieval sources (e.g. Pérez de Guzmán)—we list them by surname (Guzmán, Fernan Pérez de) since this has the advantage of grouping members of the same family together. Historical names are followed by brief notes; an asterisk * indicates cross-reference to another entry. A list of Greek lemmata follows at the end, its purpose being to identify the equivalents used to translate Aristotle’s terminology by Cartagena and the scholastic commentators. References in the text are to the Latin, not reduplicated in the translation. ˁAbd al-Raḥmān i ibn Muˁāwiya, al-Dāḵil (Umayyad emir of Córdoba 756–788) 366 ˁAbd al-Raḥmān ii ibn al-Ḥakam (Umayyad emir of Córdoba 822–852) 366 Abū l-Ḥasan ˁAlī ibn ˁUṯmān (Marīnid emir of Maḡrib-Ifrīqiya 1331–1351) 160–161 Acero Durántez, I. 29 Achilles (Greek hero at Troy) 191 Afonso iv of Portugal (Ildefonsus, re. 1325– 1357) 56, 143, 161 Agamemnon (Greek king at Troy) 170 Albertus Magnus op (St Albert the Great, c. 1200–1280, scholastic theologian, Doctor of the Church) 11, 24, 179, 211, 328, 329 Albornoz, Alfonso Carrillo de (d. 1434, card. Sant’Eustachio) 47 alchemy 336 Alexander of Macedon (356–323 bc) 143, 364 Alfonso x of Castile (re. 1252–1284) 257. works: Estoria de España 160, 234, 366– 367. Libro de axedrez, dados e tablas 340 Alfonso xi of Castile (Ildefonsus, re. 1312– 1350) 56, 161 See also chronicles: Gran crónica de Alfonso xi, and Poema de Alfonso xi Alighieri, Pietro (1300–1364, s. of *Dante,

auth. Lat. Commentum on Divina Commedia) 214 Aljubarrota, battle of (1385) 160 alms-giving 255, 359 Ambrose, St (Aurelius Ambrosius, c. 339–397, Doctor of the Church) 210, 212, 316, 356– 358 Anaxagoras (Ἀναξαγόρας, pre-Socratic) 296 Andrés, G. de 51 Anselm, St (c. 1033–1109, archbp Canterbury, Doctor of the Church) 41, 245 Anthonius decanus Rinfelden (owner of B) 42 Antolín, G. 46, 49 Antonio, Nicolás (1617–1684, antiquary, auth. Bibliotheca Hispana vetus 1696) 51 Aphrodite: see Venus Aquinas, St Thomas op (Tommaso dei Conti d’ Aquino, Doctor Angelicus, c. 1225–1274, scholastic theologian; his doctrines officially adopted by the Dominican Order 1278) 2, 7, 9, 15, 18, 24, 82, 86, 92, 94, 138– 139, 168–169, 208, 224 works: Sent. Eth. 6, 12, 13, 25, 31–38, 90– 91, 93, 94–96, 98–99, 100, 102, 104, 109, 111–116, 120, 122–123, 125, 126–128, 137, 140, 144–146, 148–149, 150–154, 156, 162–163, 166, 170–176, 178–179, 182, 184, 188, 190, 192, 194, 196, 198, 202–204, 208, 210, 215–220, 222–223, 225–226,

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index 228, 236–238, 240, 241–246, 248, 250– 251, 254–255, 259–269, 272–274, 276, 278, 280–284, 286, 288, 290–293, 295– 296, 305, 309, 310, 312–314, 318–319, 322–323, 326–333, 336–339, 341–343, 345–346, 349–350, 352, 360 STh. 7, 8, 9, 11, 17–18, 86, 90, 92, 94, 107, 146, 211, 212, 329 Aragon, Crown of 20, 25 Arbaces the Mede (satrap and putative founder of the Median empire c. 830 bc) 362 Arcos, Antonio Ponce de León y Spinola, xi duke of (1726–1780, esprit fort) 366 Arévalo, Rodrigo Sánchez de (1404–1470, bp Zamora, auth. Suma de la política) 36 Arikha, N. 223 Aristophanes (Ἀριστοφάνης, c. 446–c. 386 bc, poet of Athenian Old Comedy) 344 Aristotle (Ἀριστοτέλης ὁ Σταγειρίτης, 384– 322 bc, the Philosopher) 6–10, 17–18, 26, 29, 31, 37, 82, 86, 88, 90–91, 110, 131, 138, 208–209, 273, 344 Byzantine comm. 35, 209, 262 physics 241, 245 works: Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια 2, 7–12, 14, 17, 22–25, 31, 33, 35–38, 64, 67, 86, 88, 90, 93–96, 98–100, 108–109, 111–114, 122– 123, 126, 128, 133, 136–138, 140, 144–146, 149–154, 156, 162–163, 166, 168, 170–171, 173–176, 178–179, 182, 184, 188, 190, 192, 194, 196, 198, 202, 204, 208–210, 215– 217, 220, 223, 225–226, 228, 236, 238, 240–244, 246, 248–249, 251, 254, 259, 261–262, 264–266, 268, 272–275, 278– 282, 284, 286, 288, 290, 293, 295, 297, 304–305, 309–310, 313–314, 318–319, 322–324, 326–328, 332–333, 336–338, 340–342, 344, 346, 349, 359–360 EΝ: Vet. interp. (trans. *Grosseteste, rev. *Willem van Moerbeke) 31, 37–38, 64, 67, 93, 94, 166, 175, 192, 196, 208, 220, 228, 236, 241, 254, 266, 278–279, 288, 290, 328, 336, 341–342, 344 EΝ: Éthica de Aristóteles (15th-cent. compendium in Bodleian ms Span. D.1, etc.) 23–25 EΝ: Lexicon Ethicorum (s. xv, bne Mss/6442) 192, 341, 345

431 Οἰκονομικά (attrib.) 86–90 Πολιτικά 88–90, 128–129, 138, 342 Ῥητορική 86–90, 354 De bona fortuna (apocr.) 86–90 Arlanza, River (Arlança) 19, 234 See San Pedro de Arlanza Aspasius (Ἀσπάσιος, fl. c. 150, auth. of the oldest surviving Gk commentary on en) 261 Assyrian empire (Assirii) 362 Asturias 364 Athens (Athenienses) 286 Augustine, St (Aurelius Augustinus, Doctor Gratiae, 354–430, bp Hippo, Father of the Church) 9, 21, 41, 42, 45, 108, 120–121, 136, 152, 166, 198–199, 230, 256, 270, 298, 328–330, 332, 359, 363 works: De civitate Dei 115, 166–167, 179, 300–301, 356, 363 author-function 3–6, 14, 38–39, 80–82, 89, 96, 205 Averroes: see Ibn Rušd Ávila Friary of Santo Tomás 13, 192 Ayala, Martín Pérez de (1503–1566, archbp València, auth. Synodus diœcesana Valentiae 1566) 5 Ayala, Pero López de (1332–1407, canciller mayor of Castile 1398 and royal chronicler; auth. Libro rimado de palacio) 41, 141 Azariah: see Uzziah Azoia (site of completion of mv, prob. Santa Iria de Azoia, prov. Loures) 18, 368 Ermida de Alcolgulhe (Azoia, Leiria) 18 Pirescoxe, palace of 18 Azurara, Gomes Eanes de (1404–1474, royal chronicler, auth. Crónica da Tomada de Ceuta, Crónica dos Feitos de Guiné, etc.) 1 Babylonian empire: see Chaldaeans Bacchides (Βακχίδης/‫בגריס‬, Hellenic general of Seleucids vs. *Maccabees, 161bc) 168 Balbi, Giovanni op (Januensis, d. 1298, scholastic grammarian, auth. Catholicon) 344 ball-games 228 See gaming and gambling Baraz, D. 213

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432 barbarism (linguistic, stylistic) 33, 35, 36, 37, 65, 68, 148, 277, 285 barbarians: see βάρβαροι Baron, H. 166 Bartholomaeus Anglicus ofm (auth. De proprietatibus rerum, c. 1230–1240) 6, 37, 161 Bartolus (Bartolo da Sassoferrato, 1313–1357, Bolognese jurist) 125 Basel 42, 58–60, 65 Council of (1431–1437) 1, 23, 50 Kartause St Margarethental 42–43 Batalha, monastery of 18 Beer, R. 52 Bejczy, I. 9, 11, 14 Belshazzar (‫ֵבְּלַשׁא ַ֣צּר‬, Βαλτασαρ, d. 539 bc, acc. to Dan 5:2 the last k. of Babylon) 363 Benavente, Juan Alfonso de (Salamancan canonist, auth. Ars et doctrina studendi et docendi 1456) 4, 30 Benedetto di Anagni (Benedictus de Anania, humanist, corresp. of Guarino, Bruni, etc.) 49 Benoît de Sainte-Maure (s. xii, auth. Roman de Troie) 169 Benvenuto da Imola (c. 1320–1388, Bolognese scholar, auth. Lat. Commentum on *Dante’s Commedia) 107 Berceo, Gonzalo de (s. xiii, cleric and poet of *San Millán de la Cogolla) 36, 347 Bernard de Gordon (Montpellier prof. of medicine, auth. Lilium medicine 1305) 139, 227 Bernard of Clairvaux, St ocist (Bernardus Claraevallensis, 1090–1153, mystic) 41– 42 Béthencourt, Jean de (1362–1425, Norman knight, leader with *Gadifer de La Salle of an expedition to the *Canaries 1402) 142 Bias of Priene (s. vi bc, Greek sage) 12, 114– 115 Bible. ot: Gen 83, 161, 347, 357–358. Ex 4, 136. Lev 136. 2 Sam 302. 2 Chr 131. Job 326–327. Ps 4, 106, 113, 189, 266–267, 269, 270. Prov 155, 166, 256, 278– 279, 347. Eccl 88–89, 346–347. Jer 82. Apocr.: Sir 352–353, 354. 1 Macc 160, 170. nt: Mt 136, 149, 180, 291. Lk 238, 291, 373. Jn 331. Rom 83, 101, 131, 346.

index 1 Cor 94, 101. 2Cor 237, 327. 2Pet 90. Rev 211. Septuagint (lxx) 256, 353. Vulgata 4, 82, 83, 170, 269, 271, 352, 354. Glossa ord. 160–161, 211 Bizzarri, H.Ó. 15 Blažek, P. 212 Blüher, K.A. 167 Boccaccio, Giovanni (1313–1375, Florentine scholar-poet, auth. De casibus virorum illustrium) 1, 14, 15, 143, 212–213, 258, 363 Bologna 2, 6, 125 Bonaventure, St ofm (Giovanni di Fidanza, Doctor Seraphicus, 1221–1274, bp Albano, Doctor of the Church) 2–3, 45, 89, 189 Boncompagno da Signa (c. 1170–c. 1250, Tuscan teacher of dictamen) 354 Bonilla, R. viii Boosco deleitoso (anon. mystical treatise by a monk of Alcobaça, s. xv in.) 275 Braga, T. 22 Brahmans (Bragmani) 142–143, 208 Brams, J. 67 Brand, frau Margred genannt Lostorffin (owner of B) 42–43 Brewer, K. 92 Briggs, C.F. 15 Brunetto Latini (c. 1220–1295, Florentine notary and scholar, auth. Livres dou trésor) 7 Bruni, Leonardo (Leonardus Aretinus, 1369– 1444, chancellor of Florence, humanist, trans. en) 2, 6, 17, 22, 24, 28, 30, 37, 47, 86, 217 Bucci or da Carmagnola, Gabriele oesa (1430–1497, auth. Memoriale quadripartitum) 5 bull-fighting (pugnare cum tauro) 15, 160 Burgos 51, 367 Capilla de la Visitación 23, 47, 50–51, 56 Dominican friary of San Pablo 11 Buridan, Jean (Johannes Buridanus, c. 1295– 1361, Parisian theologian, pupil of Ockham, comm. en) 11, 139, 155, 211, 289, 338, 356 Buridant, C. 203 Burley, Walter (Gualterus Burlaeus, c. 1275– 1344, scholastic comm. en) 139, 338, 341, 356

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index Burns, J.H. 267 Bury/Aungerville, Richard (1287–1345, bp Durham, auth. Philobiblon) 45 Caesar (G. Julius Caesar, 100–144 bc, Roman dictator) 166, 290–292 Calahorra (Calagurra) 364–366 Campo, V. 47, 217 Campos Souto, M. vii–viii, 15, 16, 20, 22, 63, 67, 217 Canaries (insule Canarie) 1–2, 15, 142–143, 208 Gran Canaria 1 Lanzarote 142 cannibals 209 Cantar de Mio Cid 160 Cantera Burgos, F. 50 Carpenter, D.E. 340 Carré, A. 6 Cartagena, Alfonso de (1384–1456) biography: De actibus Alfonsi de Cartagena 50 bp Burgos 50, 56 converso 21–22, 244 dean of Santiago 14, 56, 67, 82, 366 heraldic arms 47, 50–51, 55, 65 surname 50 works: Allegationes super conquesta Canarie 1 Anacephaleosis regum Hispanie 5, 21 Apología sobre el Ps. Júzgame Dios 37, 52, 269 Caída de príncipes 1, 14 Confectio Catoniana 5 Conflatorium 5 Declaración sobre un tratado de S. Juan Crisóstomo 52 Declinationes super nova Ethicorum translatione 2, 22, 37, 82 Defensorium fidei Christiane 5 Doctrinal de caballeros 4, 16, 28, 82, 155 Duodenarium 5, 27, 28, 30, 82 Epistola ad comitem de Haro 5, 20, 27, 30 Libros de Séneca 166 Memoriale virtutum: see entry s.v., below. Oracional 5, 22, 28, 29, 31, 52, 217, 269, 322 Questio ortolana 5 Qüestión sobre la cavallería 5 Rethórica de Tulio 1, 29–30, 88–89

433 Tulio de los ofiçios 30, 59, 107 Tulio de senetute 1, 29, 82 Cartagena, Pedro de (1387–1478, bro. of Alfonso de *Cartagena, 3rd s. of Pablo de Santamaría, ennobled by *Juan ii 1440) 50 Carvajal, Lorenzo Galíndez de (1472–1528, royal chronicler of Emperor Carlos v) 1 Casagrande, C. 214 Cassian, John (c. 360–435, monk and mystic, auth. Collationes Patrum) 15, 23, 210 Castelo-Branco, Nuno Vasques de (d. 1447, monteiro-mor of *João i) 18 Castile (Castella) 1, 14, 19, 20–21, 25, 57, 82, 160, 234, 264, 366–367 Castilla Urbano, F. 18, 21 Castrillo González, C. 14, 52 Castro, A. 21 Castrojeriz, Juan García de ofm (confessor of Maria, w. of *Alfonso xi, trans. *Egidio Romano, De regimine principum for the future Pedro i) 29 Cátedra García, P.M. 345 Cato the Younger (M. Porcius Cato Uticensis, 95–46bc, Stoic republican vs. *Caesar, committed suicide after the battle of Utica) 26, 166 Caucasus mons (the mountains beyond the Black Sea dividing Scythia from India) 364 Celts (Κελτοί) 162–163 Cerda, Louis de la (Louis d’Espagne, 1291– 1348, amiral de France under Philippe vi, granted title rex Insularum Fortunatarum by *Clement vi 1344) 142 Chaldaean (Babylonian) empire (Caldei) 362–363 chastity 108, 202–204, 210–212, 330, 358– 359 Chenu, M.-D. 9 chess 228 See gaming and gambling Chirino, Alfonso (d. 1429, converso court physician of *Juan ii of Castile) 36 chronicles 19, 158, 161, 168, 170, 233, 368 Alfonsine 15, and see Alfonso x of Castile: Estoria de España. Crònica de Jaume i 171 Crónica particular del Cid 367

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434 Gran crónica de Alfonso xi 161 Historia Silensis/Legionensis 92, 367 Chrysostom, St John (Ἰωάννης ὁ Χρυσόστομος, c. 344–407, patriarch of Constantinople, exegete, Doctor of the Church) 189 Cicero (Tullius, M. Tullius Cicero, 106–143 bc, Roman orator) 1, 5, 15, 23, 26, 27, 30, 80, 83, 84, 86–88, 100, 215, 233, 292 works: De inventione 1, 86, 88–89 De officiis 1, 19, 107, 166 De senectute 1, 5 Paradoxa 100 Pro Ligario 291 Rhetorica ad Herennium (attrib.) 214 Tusculanae disputationes 5 Cid, Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar, el (c. 1043–1099) 26, 157, 160–161, 366–367 See also Cantar de Mio Cid; chronicles: Crónica particular del Cid Clavijo, “battle” of (apud Calagurram, supposed victory of ¨*Ramiro i of Asturias over *ˁAbd al-Raḥmān ii in 834 or 844) 366–367 Clement vi (Pierre Roger, pope 1342–1352) 142 Coelho, N.M.M.S. 18 Coimbra (Colimbria) 57, 366–367 Collationes Patrum: see Cassian, St John comedy 344–345 compilatio 2–7, 14–17, 25, 38, 89, 95, 150, 218, 238, 242 Cooke, J.D. 221 Córdoba, Martín [Alonso] de oesa (auth. Jardín de nobles doncellas 1468) 322 Correas, Gonzalo (1571–1631, grammarian and paremiographer) 247 Costa, A.D. de Sousa 6 Costa, I. 211 Crónica particular del Cid: see chronicles Crónica troyana 257 Cuenca i Almenar, S. 24 Curial i Güelfa (anon. Valencian chivalric romance c. 1450) 171 Curtius, E.R. 203 Cynics, Cynicism 7, 349, 356–357 Cyprus (Ciprus) 220–221 Cyprigena: see Venus Cyrus ii the Great (Kūruš, founder of Achaemenid empire, s. vi bc) 362–363

index D’ Avray, D. 92 Daniel (‫ ָדּ ִנ ֵיּאל‬, prophet) 362–363 Dante Alighieri (1265–1321, Florentine poet) 166, 214, 345, 363 Dares Phrygius: see De excidio Troiae Darius i the Great (Dārayavauš, c. 550– 486 bc, k. of Persia) 362–363 David (‫ ָדּ ִוד‬, k. of Israel c. 1010–970bc) 137, 302 De actibus A. de Cartagena: see Cartagena: biography Decembrio, Pier Candido (1399–1477, Milanese humanist, correspondent of *Cartagena) 59 De excidio Troiae (5th-cent. confection claiming to be an eye-witness account of the Trojan war by “Dares of Phrygia”) 169 Del Bello, D. 203 De Pace [da Sciacca], Andrea ofm (d. 1411, Provincial of Sicily, chaplain of Martí i of Aragon, auth. Viridarium virtutum c. 1397) 23 Devotio moderna 22 devotion (devocio et oracio, as a virtue) 358–359 Di Camillo, O. 22 dialogue, literary 5, 47, 345 Dias, J.J. Alves 22 dice 228 See gaming and gambling Dictys Cretensis see Ephemeris belli Trojani Díez Garretas, M.J. 29, 160 Díez Yáñez, M. vii–viii, 23, 39 Diogenes of Sinope (404–323bc, Cynic) 356–357 Diogenes Laertius (Διογένης Λαέρτιος, s. iii2?, auth. Βίοι καὶ γνώμαι τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ εὐδο κιμησάντων, source of Walter *Burley’s De vita et moribus philosophorum) 357 Diomedes (Greek hero at Troy) 168–169 Dionísio, J. 23 Disticha Catonis (s. iii–iv?, attrib. to Roman orator M. Porcius Cato Censorius) 361 Doig, J.C. 7, 9 Dominé, A.-S. 43 Domínguez García, J. 366 Donato, A. 7 Donne, John (1572–1631, poet) 255

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index Du Cange, C. Du Fresne 4, 5, 80, 83, 139, 141, 146–148, 170, 171, 192, 309, 347, 354, 368 Duarte of Portugal, Crown Prince (1391–1438, k. of Portugal 1433) 1, 2, 10–11, 14, 18–20, 25, 27, 29, 30–31, 41, 50, 52, 59, 63, 80, 88, 225 library 10, 22 works: Leal Conselheiro 23 Echeverría Gaztelumendi, M. 169 effeminacy 222, 224–225, 228–230 Egidio Romano oesa (Aegidius Romanus, c. 1247–1316, auth. De regimine principum) 22, 28, 29 Eiximenis, Francesc ofm (c. 1340–1409, bp Elna, theologian) 171, 347 Elias, N. 20 Empedocles (495–430 bc, pre-Socratic philosopher) 216 Enrique iii of Castile (re. 1390–1406) 142 Enrique iv of Castile (re. 1454–1474) 25 Ephemeris belli Troiani (Alexandrian jeu d’ esprit purporting to be a diary of the Trojan war by “Dictys of Crete”, the Middle Ages’s chief source on *Homer’s Iliad) 169 Escobar Chico, Á. vii, 10, 23 estates-theory 13, 129 See also Ständestaat Éthica de Aristóteles: see Aristotle etymology 36, 94, 126, 141, 202–203, 240, 261, 274, 314–315, 328, 331, 339 Eubel, K. 50 Euhemerism 221 Eulogius of Córdoba, St (martyred 859) 5 Euripides (Εὐριπίδης, c. 480–c. 406 bc, tragic poet) 114 Eusebius (Εὐσέβιος, c. 260–c. 340, bp Caesarea, auth. Χρονικοὶ Κανόνες, Παντοδαπὴ Ἱστορία, trans. by *Rufinus) 362, 363 Eusebius Cremonensis (d. c. 423, auth. Epistula de morte S. Hieronymi) 45 Fallows, N. viii, 155 Faria, Manuel Severim de (1584–1655, antiquarian) 22

435 Fernández Gallardo, L. vii–viii, 1, 5, 13, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 30, 38, 144, 155, 223, 273, 330–331, 354 Fernández López, J. 30 Fernando i the Great of Leon (re. 1037–1065) 367 Fernan González, count of Castile (Fredinandus Gundisalviz, c. 910–c. 970) 19, 20, 26, 234 See also Poema de Fernán González Finley, M.I. 138 Flannery, K. 329 Fletcher, R.A. 366 Florence (Florentini, republic) 6, 23, 53, 84 Floresta de filósofos (bne Mss/4515) 107, 112 Flórez, E. 50 Fogelberg Rota, S. 211 Foucault, M. 3–4 Foulché-Delbosc, R. 107, 112 Fradejas Rueda, J.M. 29 Fulgentius (Fabius Planciades, s. v–vi, mythographer) 199 Gadifer de la Salle (1340–1415, Norman knight, leader with *Béthencourt of an expedition to the *Canaries 1402) 142 Gaisford, T. 262 gaming and gambling 228–230, 258–259, 314, 338–340 Gellius, Aulus (c. 125–c. 180, miscellanist) 4 Gelmírez, Diego (c. 1069–c. 1149, archbp Santiago de Compostela) 366 genealogy 20, 235 Gennadius de Marseille (Massiliensis or Scholasticus, d. c. 496, ecclesiastical historian) 42 Geoffrey of Auxerre ocist (Godefridus Antissiodorensis, c. 1115–after 1188, secretary and biographer of *Bernard of Clairvaux) 41 George, St (Eastern martyr, patron saint of Portugal) 158–160 Geraldus Odonis ofm (Guiral Ot, 1285–1349, Doctor Moralis, theologian, auth. Expositio et questiones super en) 6, 11, 13–16, 33, 35, 38, 67, 92, 120–121, 127–131, 134, 137, 139, 145, 147–149, 151, 154–156, 162, 166, 175, 209, 226, 228, 256–257, 265– 267, 272–273, 278–279, 284, 286–288,

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436 Geraldus Odonis ofm (cont.) 296–298, 300–305, 308–311, 313–315, 322–325, 332–336, 338, 341, 344, 348, 350, 354– 358 Gerson, Jean Charlier dit (1363–1429, theologian, chancellor university of Paris) 214 Giordano, M.L. 22 Gómez Moreno, Á. 5, 345 González Fernández, R. 21 González Muñoz, F. 92 González Rolán, T. viii, 59 González Ruiz-Zorrilla, A. 92 Granada 20, 25, 161 Gregory i the Great, St (pope 590–604, Father of the Church) 15, 45, 106, 132, 192–193, 237, 326–327 Grosseteste, Robert (c. 1170–1253, bp Lincoln, scholastic theologian, trans. en) 191 Guadalajara 25 Guanches: see Canaries Guarino da Verona (1370–1460, humanist and Hellenist) 363 Guenée, B. 7, 203 Guido delle Colonne (c. 1220–c. 1290, auth. Historia destructionis Troiae) 169 Guillaume Perrault or Peyraut op (Guilelmus Peraldus, c. 1200–1271, preacher and theologian, auth. Summa de virtutibus et vitiis) 214 Guzmán, Fernan Pérez de (c. 1378–c. 1460, señor of Batres, poet) 5, 27, 28, 29, 347 Guzmán, Fernan Núñez de: see Núñez, Fernan Guzmán, Nuño de (c. 1407–c. 1472, auth. *Éthica de Aristóteles) 23 Hagarenes 14, 160–161, 362, 364, 366 Haller, R. 331 Halpom, B. 43 Hamesse, J. 5 Hankins, J. 17 Hannibal (247–182 bc, of Carthage) 258– 259 Haro, Pedro Fernández de Velasco, count of (1399–1470, camarero mayor of *Juan ii of Castile, i count of Haro 1430, bibliophile) 5, 20, 27, 29, 41, 44, 56 Hathaway, N. 3 Hector (Trojan hero) 168–169, 170, 210

index Heliodorus of Prusa (Ἡλιόδωρος, Neoplatonist, s. vi?, attrib. Παράφρασις τῶν ἨN, s. xiv) 35 Hellerstedt, A. 211 Henri de Gauchy (s. xiii, canon of Liège, trans. *Egidio Romano’s De regimine principum) 29 Henrique de Avis (the Navigator, 1394–1460, s. of *João i of Portugal, duke of Viseu) 1, 5, 31 Herakles (Greek demigod) 62 Heredia, Juan Fernández de (d. 1396, Master of Hospitallers of Rhodes, historian) 227 Hernansanz Serrano, A. vii, 39 heroic virtue 211 Heusch, C. 23 Heylbut, G. 35, 209, 262 Historia Silensis/Legionensis: see chronicles Homer (Ὅμηρος, s. ix? bc, Greek epic poet) 168–170, 174, 190–191, 210, 286 Horace (Q. Horatius Flaccus, 65–68bc, Augustan poet) 142, 257, 401 Hospital de la Vera Cruz, (founded by *Haro 1438 in Medina de Pomar, Burgos) 44 humanism 5, 9, 13, 20, 22, 28, 29, 33, 36, 37, 39, 47, 64, 65, 166, 208, 213, 221, 357, 363 humility 3, 13, 278, 279, 290, 298, 305, 359 humours, theory of (complexio) 190, 205, 206, 222–224, 314, 316, 350 hunting (venacio) 228–229, 230 Huppes-Cluysenaer, L. 18 Hyrcanus, John (Yrchanus, ‫יוחנן הורקנוס‬, Ὑρκανός, *Maccabee k. of Judaea 134– 104 bc) 158–160, 161 Ibn Rušd, Abū l-Walīd Muḥammad b. Aḥmad (Averroes, 1126–1198, Andalusī comm. en) 191 Ilias Latina (Lat. hexameter summary of Iliad, attrib. to P. Baebius Italicus, ad 60– 70) 169 interior man (interior homo) 10, 21–22, 32, 176, 232, 236–237, 282, 290, 340–342 Isabel de Portugal (queen of Castile, w. of *Juan ii, mo. of *Isabel i) 51–52 Isabel i the Catholic (re. 1474–1504) 51–52 Isidore, St (c. 560–636, archbp Seville, Doctor of the Church, auth. Etymologiae) 132, 221

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index Ivo of Chartres, St (c. 1040–1115, canonist) 332 Iwakuma, Y. 216 James, St ( Jacobus, Apostle) 14, 160, 364– 367 Jean de Saint-Victor (canon of Paris, auth. Memoriale historiarum c. 1335) 7 Jed, S. 363 Jerome, St (Eusebius Hieronymus, c. 342–420, Father of the Church) 56, 196–197, 210– 212, 336 works: Adv. Iovinianum 197 Chronicon 362 Epp. 212, 336–337 Regula monachorum (attrib.) 106 jesters (histrio, trufator) 252, 268–270, 338– 339, 346–347 Jiménez Calvente, T. viii, 5 Jimeno Martínez, A. 233 João i of Portugal (re. 1383–1433, fa. of *Duarte i, *Henrique de Avis) 1–2, 18, 25, 80, 160 John of Salisbury (s. xii, scholastic) 82 Jordan, M.D. 7 Jordi d’ Ornós (Georgius Vicensis, bp Vic 1424–1445, supporter of antipope Felix v at *Basel 1437, deposed by Eugenius iv) 42 Josephus (‫יוסף בן מתתיהו‬/Ἰώσηπος Ματθίου, T. Flavius Josephus, c. 37–c. 100, auth. Ἰουδαϊκὴ ἀρχαιολογία, Περὶ τοῦ Ἰουδαϊκοῦ πολέμου) 160 Jourdain, C. 138 jousting 15, 62, 154–155, 228–229 Juan ii of Castile (re. 1406–1454) 1, 25, 51, 56, 144, 366 Judah Halevi (‫יהודה הלוי‬, Abū l-Ḥasan alLāwī, 1075/85?–1141, Jewish poet and philosopher of Toledo, auth. Kitāb al-radd wa-l-dalīl fī l-dīn al-ḏalīl or al-Ḵazarī) 347 Judas Iscariot (d. c. 33, Apostle) 167 just war 156 Juvenal (D. Iunius Iuvenalis, s. ii, satyrist) 344 Kantorowicz, E.H. 267 Keller, J.E. 234 Kelley, D.R. 18

437 Kilwardby, Robert op (c. 1215–1279, archbp Canterbury, theologian) 3 Kinney, D. 357 Klesczewski, R. 363 knighthood, chivalry (milites, militia) 13, 20, 28, 128–129, 158–160, 172, 178, 266, 367 Knust, H. 356 Kohut, K. 15 Konstanz, Council of (1414–1418) 160 Kraut, R. 8 Kretschmer, M.T. 172 Kristeller, P.O. 42, 47 Kuzari (anon. Sp. trans. of *Judah Halevi, Kitāb al-Ḵazarī, from Judah b. Tibbon’s Heb. version, bnm Mss/17812, c. 1450) 347 La Cava (Florinda, da. of Julián, count of Ceuta, in legend raped by *Roderic) 14, 365 Lactantius (c. 250–325, Christian apologist) 221 Ladero Quesada, M.Á. 21 Lamia (mythological queen of Libya who became a child-eating daemon) 209 Lando, Ferran Manuel de (fl. 1450, cancionero poet of Sevilla) 227 Lang, H.S. 245 Langholm, O. 138 Lara, battle of (defeat of al-*Manṣūr by *Fernan González leading to the founding of *San Pedro de Arlanza) 234 law, canon 10, 17, 90 Clementinae 145 Decretum 17, 24, 30, 100–101, 106, 108, 110–111, 120–121, 132, 150, 152, 158, 166– 167, 192–193, 196–199, 212, 230, 270, 300–301, 314–317, 326, 330, 332, 336– 337, 358, 363 Liber Extra, 108, 312 Sext. 146–147, 148–149, 257 Glossa ord. 363 law, civil 10, 17–18 Codex Iustinianus 4, 17, 124–125, 136–137, 312 Digest 4, 17, 18, 83, 110, 112, 120, 136–137, 139, 144, 146–147, 149, 238–239, 250–251, 267, 344–346

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438 Institutiones 17, 110, 112, 240–241 Novellae Theodosii 17, 146 Lawrance, J. 1, 20, 23, 30, 44, 50, 51, 267 Leão, Duarte Nunes de (1530?–1608, jurist and humanist, ed. Crónicas del-rey D. Joaõ, o I deste nome, e dos reys D. Duarte e D. Affonso, posthumously publ. 1643) 1, 82 Legenda aurea (hagiographies by Jacobus de Voragine/Iacopo da Varazze op, c. 1260) 160 Leo i the Great, St (pope 440–461) 166–167 Leo iv (pope 847–855) 158 Leon, kingdom (Legio) 364–367 Leonor de Aragón (d. 1445, ma. *Duarte i de Portugal, exiled to Castile 1440) 23, 25 Lexicon Ethicorum: see Aristotle: en Lilao Franca, Ó. 14, 52 Lines, D.A. 13 Lisboa 18, 143 Livy (Titus Livius, 64 bc–ad 17, Roman historian) 14, 258, 363 Lohr, C.H. 13, 42, 86 Lopes, Fernão (c. 1385–after 1459, guardamor da Torre do Tombo and chronicler of *Duarte i of Portugal) 1 Lostorff[er]in: see Brand, Margred Lubac, H. de 93 Lucas de Tuy (Tudensis, d. 1249, bp Tuy, auth. Chronicon mundi) 366 Lucretia (d. 509 bc, Roman matron whose suicide after being raped by *Tarquin sparked the revolt by L. Iunius Brutus) 14, 362–363 lying 4, 298, 329, 345 Maccabees (‫חשמונאים‬, Μακκαβαῖοι, leaders of Jewish revolt against the Syrians, 167– 160 bc) 26, 158–160 Judah (‫ )יהודה המכבי‬168–170 Macedonian empire (333–330 bc) 364 Macrobius (Macrobius Ambrosius Theodosius, s. v, scholar, auth. Saturnalia) 4 Maluenda, Antonio de (relative of *Cartagena, owner of bne Mss/5568 Libros de Séneca) 51 Manetti, Gianozzo (1396–1459, humanist) 166

index manicules 41, 232 al-Manṣūr Ibn Abī ‛Āmir, Muḥammad (Almanzor, ḥājib of Caliph Hishām ii and regent of al-Andalus 976–1003) 234 Maravall, J.A. 21 Marcuello, Pedro (Aragonese poet, compiler of Cancionero on conquest of Granada 1492 in Chantilly, Musée de Condé Ms. 1339) 141 Marden, C.C. 234 Martin of Braga, St (Martinus Bracarensis, c. 520–580, archbp Bracara Augusta, monk, auth. Formula vitae honestae based on a lost work of *Seneca) 9, 15, 288– 289 Martínez Gómez, C. vii, 5, 39, 41, 42, 60, 61, 64, 67, 196, 205, 214, 320, 323 Martins, M. 6 martyrdom 156–160, 211, 358 Matton, S. 357 Mauregatus (Muregatus, k. of Asturias 783– 788) 366–367 See tributo de las 100 doncellas Mayans y Siscar, Gregorio (1699–1781, antiquarian and literary scholar) 36 medicine 37, 222–223, 226–227, 314–315, 324, 336–337, 348, 352–353, 360 Medina del Campo Treaty of (1431) 1 Megarians (Megares) 268–269 Meikle, S. 138 Memoriale virtutum diffusion 23–26 ordinatio 14–16, 51, 56, 82 parecbasis 18, 39, 120 sources 6, 11, 12–16, 17, 22, 31–33, 67, 82– 84 style: brevity 27, 33, 80, 82, 90, 236, 360– 362 exempla 2, 12, 15–16, 19, 39, 84, 98–99, 114, 116, 122–124, 126, 130, 134, 136, 144– 145, 182, 184, 200, 210, 214, 222–224, 234, 244, 254, 256, 258–259, 302, 316–317, 336, 358–359, 363 Graecisms 36–38, 102, 140, 144, 190– 192, 217, 260–262, 269, 274–275, 314–315, 328, 336–337, 338–339, 340– 341 imagery and metaphor 4, 6, 15, 36, 150, 179, 183–185, 268–269 rhythmic cursus 18, 33, 230

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index vernacularization 31, 33–34, 37, 170–171, 217, 226–227, 250–252, 336–337, 340– 341 tabula 41, 66–67, 73–78 title 5 Memorial de virtudes (anon. Castilian trans. of mv, 1474–1496) 13, 22, 51–52, 63, 80, 82–84, 88, 94, 96, 98, 100–104, 106, 108, 112, 116, 120–121, 124, 130, 132, 134, 140, 142, 144, 148, 155, 158, 168, 170–172, 174, 176, 184, 186, 191–192, 194, 196, 198, 204, 210, 212, 217–218, 222, 224–225, 238, 242, 246, 250, 254, 257, 259–260, 266, 272, 274–276, 282, 286, 304–305, 309–310, 312, 316, 320, 322–324, 330, 332, 338, 341–343, 348, 354, 356, 358, 360–361, 363 Menander (Μένανδρος, c. 342–c. 290 bc, poet of Athenian New Comedy) 344 Mendoza, Íñigo López de: see Santillana merchants, business (mercatura, negociacio) 122, 130, 244, 254–255 Meyer-Lübke, W. 171 Miguel, J. viii, 5 militia: see knighthood Minnis, A.J. 3, 5 miracle plays 345 Mohrmann, C. vii monarchy 20–21, 122, 124–125, 129, 362–363 absolutism 20 sacral kingship 266–267 money 122, 130, 138–143, 218, 238–240, 244, 246, 326, 330, 334 monks, monasticism 8, 19, 43, 46, 210, 217, 220, 234, 264, 366 Montoya, Pedro de (bp Burgo de Osma 1454– 1477, bibliophile, owner of ms O) 47, 58 Morel-Fatio, A. 169 Moreno, H. Baquero 1, 18 Morera, L.X. 20 Morrás, M. 5, 17, 20, 22, 38, 41, 52, 363 Mota, C. 23 Müller, W.P. 363 Muratori, L.A. 172 Murray, G. 401 Nascimento, A.A. 6, 30 Navarre 20

439 Nebuchadnezzar ii (Nabuchodonosor, Chaldean k. of Babylon c. 605–c. 562 bc) 198, 362–363 Neo-Gothicism 20, 362–364 Nero (Nero Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus, emperor of Rome ad 54–68) 15, 213 Nestor (Achaean hero at Troy) 169 Nicoloso da Recco (Genoese explorer of *Canaries for *Afonso iv of Portugal 1341) 143 Nieto Soria, J.M. 20, 267, 273 Nineveh 362 Ninus (legendary Assyrian k., founder of Nineveh and the first empire 2189bc) 362 Nogueira, padre João (respondent on *Azoia, prov. Leiria, in Memórias paroquiais instituted by P. Luís Cardoso after 1755 earthquake) 18 Nolte, Johann Friedrich (1694–1754, philologist and pedagogue) 4 Nominalists 216, 331 Núñez [de Toledo/Guzmán], Fernan (Pintianus, c. 1475–1553, Comendador Griego) 247 Numantines 232–233 O’Connor, W.R. 93 Olivares, Gaspar de Guzmán, count-duke of (1587–1645, valido of Felipe iv) 51 Oliver von Paderborn (Thomas Oliver der Sachse, c. 1170–1227, bp Paderborn, card.archbp Santa Sabina, scholastic) 172 Olivetto, G. 16, 51 Olson, G. 338 ordinatio 3–4, 14–15, 82, 99 Oresme, Nicole (c. 1320–1382, bp Lisieux, scholastic, trans. en) 154, 228–229, 339, 341, 344–345 orthography 57, 64–65, 249 otium (ocium) 10, 18–20, 82, 232–233, 234– 236, 288, 294, 300, 340 Ott, J.N. 173 Ovid (Publius Ovidius Naso, 43 bc–ad 17, Augustan poet) 26, 166, 363 Owens, J. 7

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440 Pace, Andrea de: see De Pace Pagden, A. 17, 23 Palencia, Alfonso de (1424–1492, pupil of *Cartagena, historian) 5, 217, 275, 342, 347 paradox of implication 216 Parkes, M.B. 3, 4, 14 Parra García, L. vii Paz y Melia, A. 41 Pelayo, St (Pelagius, cave-dwelling hermit of the *Arlanza valley who predicted the victory of *Fernan González) 19, 234 Peña Pérez, F.J. 367 Peregryn z Opola/Peregrinus or Pilgrim von Oppeln or Ratibor op (c. 1260–1333, auth. Sermones de tempore et de sanctis) 42 Pereira, Nuno Álvares, St (o Santo Condestável, 1360–1431, knight and mystic, victor at *Aljubarrota 1385) 160 Pérez Bayer, F. 51 Pérez de Urbel, J. 92 Pérez Priego, M.Á. v, 345 Pericles (c. 495–429bc, Athenian statesman) 100 Peripatetics 9 Persian empire (Persae) 363 Peter Comestor (Pierre le Mangeur, c. 1100– 1179, auth. Historia scholastica) 221 Peter Lombard (Magister Sententiarum, c. 1100–1160, bp Paris, scholastic theologian, auth. Sententiae) 3, 9, 330 Petrarch (Francesco Petrarca, 1304–1374, Tuscan scholar-poet) 9, 142, 166, 361, 363 Petrus de Rosenheim osb (Peter Wiechs, 1380–1433, prior of Melk, auth. Roseum memoriale divinorum eloquiorum) 5 Phalaris (Φάλαρις, tyrant of Akragas/Agrigento in Sicily c. 570–554 bc) 209 Philippe iv le Bel (k. of France 1285–1314, addressee of *Egidio Romano De regimine principum) 29 Philoxenus (Philosenus, s. of Eryxis, legendary glutton, perh. the parasite Philoxenus of Leucas, auth. of a dithyrambic Δεῖπνον) 188 Pina, Rui de (c. 1455–1522, guarda-mor da Torre do Tombo and chronicler of João ii and Manuel i of Portugal) 22 Pisuerga, River (Pisorica) 362, 364–365

index Placidus/St Eustace (Roman general converted while hunting by a vision of a crucifix between a stag’s antlers, martyred by roasting in a bronze bull; his legend, of Indian origin, is a folktale frequent in romance; removed from Roman calendar as “fabulous” 1969) 234 Plato (Πλάτων, c. 425–348bc, philosopher) 26, 30, 166, 215 works: Πολιτεία 59 Plautus (T. Maccius Plautus, fl. 200–184bc, Roman comedian) 84 Plutarch (Πλούταρχος, c. 46–120, Greek biographer and essayist,) 166 Poblete, J.A. 67 Poema de Alfonso xi (chronicle in cuaderna vía by Rodrigo Yáñez, 1348, incomplete) 161 Poema de Fernán González (cuaderna vía epic by a monk of *San Pedro de Arlanza, c. 1260) 234, 366 Polydamas (Polidamas, Trojan hero) 168– 169 Porter, C. 14 Portugal (Portugalia) 14, 20, 80, 82, 160–161 Prado, André do ofm (c. 1385–after 1450, master of theology at Rome, auth. Horologium Fidei for *Henrique de Avis c. 1450) 5–6, 30–31 Priam (k. of Troy, fa. of *Hector) 210 pride (superbia) 11, 162, 272–273, 280–283, 285, 286–287, 290, 293, 296–301, 326– 327, 336, 362 primitivism 143 proverbs 27, 107, 114, 120, 154–155, 238, 246– 247, 361 Pulgar, Fernando de (c. 1425–1500?, royal chronicler of the Catholic Monarchs, auth. Claros varones de Castilla) 21, 50 Pythagoreans (Pitagorici) 136 Rabanus Maurus osb (c. 776–856, abbot of Fulda, archbp Mainz, theologian and poet) 160 Rada, Rodrigo Jiménez de (Toletanus, c. 1170– 1247, archbp Toledo, auth. De rebus Hispaniae 1243) 366 Ramiro i of Asturias (Remigius, re. 842–850) 364–366

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index Ramiro ii of Leon (re. 931–951) 366 Ranero Riestra, L. vii Realists 216, 331 reason (racio, × 403; as a principle in ethics) 4, 5, 8, 10, 17, 86, 90–92, 100, 102–106, 146–148, 162–164, 174, 180, 186, 194, 198, 202–208, 212–218, 222–226, 248– 250, 260, 272–274, 308–312, 320, 356, 362 Reconquest (name given to the wars between al-Andalus and Christian kingdoms of medieval Iberia) 14, 19, 156, 364–367 Reichert, B.M. 11 reportatio 5 Rhône, River (Rodanus) 362 republican constitutions 14, 84–85, 124–125, 363 city-states (per modum communitatis) 84–85, 122–125 Roca Barea, M.E. 167 Roderic (Rodericus, Hrōþirīk/Rodrigo, last k. of Visigothic Hispania, d. 711) 14, 362– 364 Rodríguez de Castro, J. 50, 51, 52 Rodríguez Velasco, J.D. 367 Rönsch, H. 173 Rojo Orcajo, T. 47 Roman de Troie: see Benoît de SainteMaure Roman empire (Romani) 10, 118, 160 Roncaglia, A. 138 Rosemann, P.W. 3 Rosenstock, B. 21 royal entries, royalty: see monarchy Rufinus (Tyrannius Rufinus of Aquileia, c. 340–410, monk, trans. from Greek) 15, 317 Russell, P.E. 23 Sáenz de Aguirre, J. 3 Salado, El, River ( fluvius Salado, site of battle of *Tarifa 1340) 160–161 Salamanca 2, 14, 67 Salazar, A.M. 1 Salutati, Coluccio (1331–1406, chancellor of Florence, humanist disciple of Petrarch) 363 San Esteban, García de (chaplain and copyist of Pedro de *Montoya) 47

441 San Millán de la Cogolla (Visigothic monastery, prov. La Rioja, which laid claim to the patronage of *Fernan González) 234 San Pedro de Arlanza (Benedictine monastery, prov. Burgos, on the site of a hermitage founded by *Fernan González c. 912) 234 San Pedro de Cardeña (Cistercian monastery, prov. Burgos, claiming to house the tombs of the *Cid, his wife, and his horse) 367 Sanctorale Romanum 157 Santaella, Rodrigo Fernández de (1444–1509, cleric of Sevilla, auth. Vocabularium ecclesiasticum 1499) 343 Santamaría, Alfonso de: see Cartagena Santamaría, Alvar García de (c. 1380–1460, uncle of *Cartagena, cronista of *Juan ii of Castile 1406–1435) 1, 50, 82 Santiago: see James, St Santiago de Compostela 14, 366–367 Santillana, Íñigo López de Mendoza, marquis of (1398–1458, bibliophile and poet) 5, 25, 29, 41 Bías contra Fortuna 115, 166 Proverbios 25–26, 166 Qüestión sobre la cavallería 5, 28 Sappho (Σαπφώ, 630/612–c. 570bc, poet) 220 Saquero Suárez-Somonte, P. 59 Sardanapalus (mythic last k. of Assyria) 362 Scarpatetti, B.M. von 42 scholasticism 2, 9, 11, 31, 33, 36, 82, 89, 94, 138–139, 216, 229, 241, 276–277, 295 Scipio Africanus the Elder (P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, 236–183bc, Roman general, victor over *Hannibal) 19, 20, 26, 232– 233 Scipio Aemilianus (P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Numantinus or Africanus Minor, 185–129bc, victor over *Numantines 133bc) 232 Seneca (L. Annaeus Seneca Junior, 4bc– ad 65, Stoic philosopher of Corduba) 9, 15, 26, 51, 144, 167, 288–289 apocrypha: Proverbia 112 Formula vitae honestae: see Martin of Braga

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442 Serenus, abbot (Desert Father immune to temptations of the flesh, according to *Cassian) 210 Serés, G. 169 Serrano, L. 2, 50 Seznec, J. 221 Simancas, battle of (defeat of Caliph ˁAbd al-Raḥmān iii by Ramiro ii of Leon, 939) 366 Slote, M. 18 Smith, C. 367 social class 17, 20, 128–131, 138, 244, 256– 259, 282–283, 296–298, 340–342 Socrates (Σωκράτης, 470–399 bc, Athenian philosopher recorded by *Plato) 26, 96, 215, 216, 336 Solervicens, J. 5 Solomon (Salomon, ‫מה‬ ֹ ‫ְשֹׁל‬, s. of *David, k. of Israel c. 970–931 bc) 88, 276–279, 346– 347 Solon (Σόλων, c. 630–c. 560 bc, law-giver) 296 Solum, L.B. 18 Sophronius, St (Σωφρόνιος, c. 560–638, Patriarch of Jerusalem, auth. Βίος τῆς Ὁσίας Μαρίας τῆς Αἰγυπτίας) 45 Sousa, A. Caetano de 22 Spain (Hyspania) 13, 19, 20–21, 158, 170, 180– 182, 234, 362–365, 366 Spartans (quidam cives Grecorum) 176, 286, 337 specula principum 11, 12, 23, 28–29, 52, 88, 214, 237 Ständestaat 20, 124 Steinmann, M. 42 Stoics, Stoicism (Stoyci) 7, 9, 22, 166, 178– 179, 236 Strauss, L. 273, 349 Strosetzki, C. 340 Stückelberg, E.A. 43 Suárez Fernández, L. 1, 20 Suetonius (G. Suetonius Tranquillus, c. 69– c. 122, imperial historian) 4 suicide (desperacio) 7, 24, 148–149, 162, 166–167 Tarifa, battle of (prope Tarifam, defeat of *Abū l-Ḥasan and *Yūsuf i by *Alfonso xi and *Afonso iv in 1340) 157, 160–161

index Tarquin (L. Tarquinius Superbus, k. of Rome, deposed 509 bc for raping *Lucretia) 14, 362–363 Tate, R.B. 21 Terence (P. Terentius Afer, c. 190–159 bc, comic poet) 26, 344 Theodosius i the Great (Flavius Theodosius Augustus, Roman emperor 379–395) 314–317 theological virtues 9, 11, 15, 90, 94–95, 236– 237, 358 Thessalonica, massacre of (ad390) 314–317 Thetis (Nereid nymph, mother of Achilles) 191 Tirant lo Blanc (Valencian chivalric romance by Martorell and Galba., publ. 1490) 171 Titius and Sejus (Ticius, Seyus, generic names in Roman case-law) 132–133, 214–216 Tjällén, B. 211 Toledo, Alfonso de (bachiller en decretos of Cuenca, auth. Invencionario c. 1467) 257 Toledo, Alfonso Martínez de (1398–1468, archpriest, auth. Arcipreste de Talavera) 275 Toledo, Dr Fernan Díaz de (c. 1395–1457, converso bureaucrat, relator of *Juan ii) 2, 49–50 Toledo or Guzmán, Fernan Núñez de, comendador Griego: see Núñez, Fernan Toledo, Pero Díaz de (c. 1415–1466, nephew of Fernan Díaz de*Toledo, jurist, trans. Seneca and Plato for *Santillana) 2, 49– 50 Fedrón, 166 Torquemada, Juan de op (1388–1468, procurador of *Juan ii at the Roman Curia, card. of San Sisto, canonist and papalist) 50 Torre, Alfonso de la (fl. 1440–1460, bachiller at court of Carlos de Viana, auth. Visión deleitable c. 1453) 22, 24, 36, 342 Torre Echávarri, J.I. de la 233 tributo de las cien doncellas 366 Trinkaus, C. 9 tyranny, tyrants (tyrampni) 129, 209, 248– 249, 258–259, 363

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index Umayyad empire 362–364 Urraca Sánchez of Leon, queen (d. 956, w. of *Ramiro ii of Leon) 366 usury 138, 142, 255, 256–257, 259 Uzziah (‫ֻﬠ ִזּ ָיּהוּ‬, Οζίας, k. of Judaea, s. viii bc) 362 València 24–25 Valerius Maximus (fl. ad 14–37, rhetorician, auth. Facta et dicta memorabilia) 23 Valero Moreno, J.M. vii, 17, 23 Valle Rodríguez, C. del 41, 44 Vegetius (P. Flavius Vegetius Renatus, s. iv ex., auth. Epitoma rei militaris) 15, 172 Velasco, Pedro Fernández de: see Haro Venice (Veneti, republic) 84–85 Venus (goddess) 220–221 Vespasiano da Bisticci (1421–1498, Florentine bookseller and biographer) 23 Vetus interpres: see Aristotle Vian Herrero, A. 5 Vicensis, Georgius: see Jordi d’ Ornós Vicente de Burgos ofm (trans. *Bartholomaeus Anglicus s. xv ex.) 37 Vicini, Giovanni Tinto (fl. 1406–1434, auth. De institucione regiminis dignitatum) 47 Villa Prieto, J. 21 Villalobos, Francisco López de (1473–1549, medical writer and essayist) 227 Villena, Enrique de (1384–1434, maestre of Calatrava, polymath, auth. Traducción y glosas de la Eneida 1427–1434) 5, 15, 227, 342 Vincent of Beauvais op (Vicencius, Vincentius Bellovacensis, c. 1190–1264, auth. Speculum maius 1247–1259) 3–4, 6, 15, 142–143, 221, 357 Virgil (P. Vergilius Maro, 70–19 bc, Augustan epic poet) 26

443 virginity 210–212, 358–359 Visigothic empire (Goti) 362–364 Vitae Patrum (hagiographical collection on Desert Fathers, s. iii–iv) 210 Viterbo, S. 22 Vivar, Rodrigo [Rui] Díaz de: see Cid voto de Santiago (tax paid to *Santiago cathedral by pecheros of Leon-Castile) 366 war: see knighthood. just war 156–158, 234 Wartburg, W. von 347 Willem van Moerbeke op (c. 1215–c. 1286, bp Corinth, rev. *Grosseteste’s trans. of en) 67 Wohlhaupter, E. 340 Wood, D. 138 Woolf, C.N.F. 125 Yūsuf i of Granada, Abū l-Ḥajjāj (Naṣrid sultan 1333–1354, defeated at El *Salado 1340) 160–161 Zamora, Alfonso de (Alfonsus Zamorensis in decretis bachalarius, scribe/trans.? of Pierre Bersuire, Morales de Ovidio for *Santillana, bne mss/10144) 37, 139 Zamora, Juan Alfonso de (secretary of *Juan ii of Castile, ambassador to *João i of Portugal with *Cartagena 1422) 1 Zappala, M. 5 Zarco Cuevas, J. 51 Zedler, G. 43 Zurara: see Azurara Zurita, Jerónimo (1512–1580, chronicler, auth. Anales de la Corona de Aragón) 1, 51

Greek terms ἄγροικος (boorish, agriotus) 36–37, 338, 340–341 αἰδώς (shame, verecundia, pudicicia) 12, 349 ἀκρασία (incontinentia) 11, 204–205, 220– 226 ἀκρόχολος or ἀκράχολος (choleric, colericus vel acrocolus) 36, 313–315

ἀλαζών (braggart, jactator) 326–327, 336– 337 ἀλήθεια (truthfulness, veracitas) 326–328 ἀναλογία γεωμετρικὴ/ἀριθμητική (proporcio) 126–127 ἀνδρεία (courage, fortitudo) 11, 110–112, 150, 154, 166

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444 ἀγνοοῦντες (ignorant, ignorancie) 176 ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας (experience, militaris) 13, 170–172, 180 διὰ θυμὸν (passionate, furoris) 172–174 εὐέλπιδες (sanguine, spei) 174 πολιτική (civic, politica sive civilis) 168– 170 ἀοργησία (inirascibility, mansuetudo) 308– 309 ἀπειροκαλία (lack of taste, apirocalia) 36, 260–261 ἄρεσκος (obsequious, placidus) 319–320 ἀρετή (excellence, virtus) 7–8, 38, 92–93, 94, 112, 114, 338–339, 348–349, 360 ~ ἡρωική (heroica) 208–211 ἀριστοκρατία, ἀριστοκρατικοί (policias […] in quibus attendunt virtutem) 126–129 αὐθέκαστός (one who calls a thing by its own name, authochiastos) 36, 38, 328 Ἀφροδίτη: see Venus βάναυσος (vulgar, banausus) 36, 260–262, 268 βάρβαροι (barbari) 206–209 βαυκοπανοῦργος (humbug, blancopanurgus) 36, 38, 336–337 βωμόλοχος (buffoon, bomolochus) 36–37, 338–339, 341–342, 346, 348 γαστρίμαργος (belly-god, castrimargus) 36, 38, 190–192 γένεσις (generatio) 240–241 γνώμη (judgment, gnomi) 36, 38, 102, 104, 148–149 δημοκρατία, δημοκρατικοί (policias […] in quibus curant solum de libertate et omnes liberos reputant equales) 24, 126–129 δικαιοσύνη ( justicia) 11, 108–109, 114, 144 δίκαιον νόμιμον (legalis) 110–116 δίκαιον κατὰ μέρος (particularis) 110–111, 116–124, 148–150 ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς (distributiva) 124–126 ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι (commutativa) 124– 126 δύσερις (quarrelsome, litigiosus) 319–320, 326 δύσκολος (churlish, discolus) 36, 319–320, 323–326

index ἐγκρατεία (self-control, continencia) 11, 38, 204, 348–349 εἴρων (dissembler, eyron) 38, 280, 327–328, 332, 334–338 ἐλευθεριότης (liberality, liberalitas) 12, 240, 244, 342 ἔλλειψις (deficiency, defectus) 8, 162–163, 260–261 ἐνέργεια (activity, actio, operacio) 7, 38, 92– 96, 100, 244–245, 338 ἕξις (disposition, habitus) 8, 38 ἐπιείκεια (equity, reasonableness, epiqueya) 24, 34–37, 144–146, 342–343 ἐπιστήμη (knowledge, sciencia) 36, 94– 95 εὐβουλία (good deliberation, eubulia) 36, 38, 102–104 εὐδαιμονία (happiness, felicitas or beatitudo) 7–8, 24, 38, 92–93, 338 εὐτραπελία (tactful wit, eutrapelia, graciositas) 11, 36–38, 108, 338–342, 346–348 θηριωδία, θηριότης (bestialitas) 15, 188–190, 204–209, 212–213 καλόν, τὸ (the noble, fine, bonum) 7, 164– 166, 320–322, 328 κόλαξ (flatterer, blanditor) 290, 319–320 Κυπρογένεια, Aeol. Κυπρογένηα (Ciprigena) 16, 220–221 κωμῳδιοί παλαιοὶ/καινοί (Old/New Comedy, veteres historiae et comedie poetarum) 342–344 μεγαλοπρεπεία (magnificence, magnificencia) 11, 258–259 μεγαλοψυχία (proper pride, magnanimitas) 11, 272–273, 278–279, 286, 296–298 μελαγχολικός (melancholicus) 222–224, 312– 313 μελῳδία (melody, concord, melodia) 36–37, 186, 268–269 μεσότης (mean, middle, medietas, medium) 31, 150, 162–163, 238, 326–327 μικροπρεπής (niggardly, parvificus) 260– 261, 268–272 μικρόψυχος (unduly humble, pusillanimus) 276

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445

index νόμισμα (nomisma, peccunia) 140 νόμος (lex) 34–35, 112, 144–145, 346 νοῦς (intuitive understanding, intellectus) 95 ὀλιγαρχία, ὀλιγαρχικοί (policias […] in quibus preponunt divicias) 126–129 ὀργιλότης (irascibility, iracundia) 309–310, 314 Παράφρασις τῶν Ἠθικῶν Νικομαχείων: see Heliodorus of Prusa πολιτεία (constitution, policia) 36, 86, 126– 129 πραότης (good temper, mansuetudo) 110– 112, 290–291, 309–310 σοφία (theoretical wisdom, sapientia) 94– 95 στρατιῶται (soldiers, milites) 13 σύνεσις (understanding, synesis) 36, 38, 102–104 Σχόλια εἰς τὰ Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια (anon. Byzantine comm. on en) 35

σωφροσύνη (temperance, temperancia) 38, 100, 182

11,

ταπεινός (low, humilis) 6, 288, 290–291 τέχνη (craft, ars) 94–95 ὕβρις (insolence, violence, injuria) 154, 279, 292–293, 297 ὑπερβολή (excess, superhabundancia) 8, 162–163, 260–261, 274, 314 ὑποκριτής (actor, simulator seu ypocrita) 36, 47, 216–218, 301 φιλία (friendliness, affabilitas) 322–323 φθορά (corruptio) 240–241 φιλοτιμία (right ambition, moderacio) 11, 38, 304–305, 308 φρόνησις (practical wisdom, prudentia) 8, 36, 94–95, 100–101, 104–105 χαῦνος (vain, kaymus) 36, 274–276, 294– 296, 304 ψεῦδος (lying, mendacium) 328, 332, 336

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