Albert the Great (c. 1193–1280) and the Configuration of the Embryo: Virtus Formativa (Palgrave Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Medicine) [1st ed. 2023] 3031240227, 9783031240225

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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN MEDICINE

Albert the Great (c. 1193–1280) and the Configuration of the Embryo Virtus Formativa

Amalia Cerrito

Palgrave Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Medicine

Series Editors Jonathan Barry Department of History University of Exeter Exeter, UK Fabrizio Bigotti Institute for the History of Medicine Julius Maximilian University Würzburg, Germany

The series focuses on the intellectual tradition of western medicine as related to the philosophies, institutions, practices, and technologies that developed throughout the medieval and early modern period (500-1800). Partnered with the Centre for the Study of Medicine and the Body in the Renaissance (CSMBR), it seeks to explore the range of interactions between various conceptualisations of the body, including their import for the arts (e.g. literature, painting, music, dance, and architecture) and the way different medical traditions overlapped and borrowed from each other. The series particularly welcomes contributions from young authors. The editors will consider proposals for single monographs, as well as edited collections and translations/editions of texts, either at a standard length (70-120,000 words) or as Palgrave Pivots (up to 50,000 words). Associate Editors Alexandra Bamji, University of Leeds Carmen Caballero-Navas, University of Granada Ivano Dal Prete, Yale University David Gentilcore, University of Leicester Klaus-Dietrich Fischer, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz Guido Maria Giglioni, University of Macerata Benjamin Goldberg, University of South Florida Georgiana Hedesan, University of Oxford John Henderson, Birkbeck University Brooke Holmes, Princeton University Martin Kemp, University of Oxford Ian MacLean, University of Oxford Cecilia Martini-Bonadeo, University of Padua Heikki Mikkeli, University of Helsinki William Royall Newman, Indiana University Bloomington Vivian Nutton, Centre for the Study of Medicine and the Body in the Renaissance Antoine Pietrobelli, Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne Aurélien Robert, Centre d’Etudes Supérieures de la Renaissance Tours Hester Schadee, University of Exeter Giovanni Silvano, University of Padua Michael Stolberg, Julius Maximilian University Würzburg Alain Touwaide, Institute for the Preservation of Medical Traditions John Wilkins, University of Exeter Fabio Zampieri, University of Padua Fabiola Zurlini, Studio Firmano for the History of Medicine and Science Editorial Board Justin Begley, University of Helsinki Andreas Blank, Alpen-Adria Universität Klagenfurt Silvana D’Alessio, University of Salerno Hiro Hirai, Radboud University Nijmegen (Netherlands) Luca Tonetti, La Sapienza University of Rome Ruben Verwaal, University of Durham Alun Withey, University of Exeter Giulia Martina Weston, The Courtauld Institute of Art, London

Amalia Cerrito

Albert the Great (c. 1193–1280) and the Configuration of the Embryo Virtus Formativa

Amalia Cerrito Centre for the Study of Medicine and the Body in the Renaissance (CSMBR) Universities of Pisa and Florence Florence, Italy

ISSN 2524-7387 ISSN 2524-7395 (electronic) Palgrave Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Medicine ISBN 978-3-031-24022-5 ISBN 978-3-031-24023-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24023-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cgm, 597, fol. 260r, South Germany 1485 This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To Enrico

Acknowledgments

This book began life as a Ph.D. dissertation, discussed at the University of Pisa and the University of Florence in 2021. Here, a revised version is presented, which has benefited from the outstanding competence and guidance of my supervisor prof. Stefano Perfetti (University of Pisa), whom I thank for his consistent support. I also wish to express my gratitude to the members of the doctoral committee, prof. Amos Bertolacci (IMT, Lucca), prof. Alessandro Palazzo (University of Trento), and prof. Fabrizio Amerini (University of Parma) for their careful reading and insightful remarks. The generous support of the series editors, Jonathan Barry and Fabrizio Bigotti, contributed to bring this volume to fruition. I wish to thank them for their invaluable help in realizing this project. This volume also profited from the comments of three anonymous referees, which I thank for their accurate suggestions. In this book, I explore a significant corpus of Latin texts taken from Albert the Great’s works. For a smooth reading, I decided to present them in English translations (most of which are mine, except where otherwise indicated, and offered here for the first time). When a conflict arose between maintaining the style and tone of the original or offering its contents in a clear form to the contemporary reader, I chose the second option without hesitation. Of course, the corresponding Latin texts will be given in the footnotes.

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Contents

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Albert the Great’s Embryology: An Interdisciplinary Approach The Christian-Neoplatonic Background of Albert the Great’s Doctrine of Virtus Formativa 2.1 The Doctrine of Inchoatio Formae: The State of the Art 2.2 The Origin of Albert’s Doctrine on the Virtus Formativa Between Platonic and Aristotelian Metaphysics 2.3 The Virtus Formativa and Divine Providence Virtus Formativa and Human Embryology 3.1 The Virtus Formativa and the Formation of the Embryo: Medical and Natural-Philosophical Sources The Virtus Formativa and the Animation of the Embryo in the Twelfth- and Thirteenth-Century Theological Discussions 3.2 Albert’s Doctrine of Virtus Formativa: Between Traducianism and Preformism 3.3 Bodily Design and Dynamics of Transmission: The Seminal Fluid 3.4 Localization and Dynamics of Configuration: The Heart The “Heart” of Plants: The Virtus Reformativa

1 13 16

26 31 45

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52 59 74 81 85

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The Transmission of Genetic Inheritance 4.1 The Formative Power and the Transmission of Essential and Accidental Characteristics 4.2 Albert on the Nature of the Female Seed 4.3 The Female Formative Power and the Case Study of the Wind Eggs ( ova venti) 4.4 The Biological Reason Underlying Kinship ( Consanguinitas)

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Final Remarks

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89 93 101 114

Bibliography

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Index

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About the Author

Amalia Cerrito (Siracusa, 1993) obtained her Ph.D. in Philosophy at the University of Pisa and the University of Florence (2021). She has published on the interaction between natural philosophy and biblical exegesis in Albert the Great and on commentary techniques in his De vegetabilibus et plantis. Her recent publications are mostly devoted to the theoretical background of Albert’s natural philosophy and to the influence of Neoplatonism on Albert’s zoology, botany, and embryology. In 2021, her Ph.D. research was awarded a Santorio Award for Excellence in Research. Since 2018, she is a member of S.I.S.P.M. (Italian Society for the Study of Medieval Thought) and a “cultore della materia” in the History of Medieval Philosophy at the University of Pisa. Since 2022, she is an Associate Member of the Centre for the Study of Medicine and the Body in the Renaissance (CSMBR) of Pisa.

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CHAPTER 1

Albert the Great’s Embryology: An Interdisciplinary Approach

The notion of virtus formativa, i.e., formative power, a shaping force responsible for crucial dynamics in the formation and configuration of living beings, plays a central role in the history of embryology. This notion originated in the second century C.E. in the medical works of Galen, and, during the following centuries, went through several theoretical modifications.1 What is the nature of this power? Is it conveyed by the seed? Does it have a causal nexus with the soul of the embryo? In answering these questions, medieval thinkers, both from Arabic and Latin traditions, discuss at length the nature of this power.2

1 Diana Stanciu, “The Sleeping Musician. Aristotle’s Vegetative Soul and Ralph Cudworth’s Plastic Nature”, in Blood, Sweat and Tears—The Changing Concepts of Physiology from Antiquity into Early Modern Europe, eds. Manfred Horstmanshoff, Helen King, and Claus Zittel, 713–750 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012). 2 Formative power will remain a pivotal notion in the debates on the generation of living beings up to medical humanism in the Renaissance. See Hiro Hirai, “Semence, vertu formatrice et intellect agent chez Nicolò Leoniceno entre la tradition arabo-latine et la renaissance des commentateurs grecs”, Early Science and Medicine 12 (2007): 134–165, id. Medical Humanism and Natural Philosophy. Renaissance Debates on Matter, Life and the Soul (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011), and id., “Soul, Formative Power and Animal Generation in Renaissance Medical Debates”, in Animals: New Essays, ed. Andreas Blank, 45–76 (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 2016).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Cerrito, Albert the Great (c. 1193–1280) and the Configuration of the Embryo, Palgrave Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Medicine, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24023-2_1

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Among thirteenth-century Latin authors, the Dominican master Albert the Great (c. 1193–1280), within his commentaries on Aristotle and his theological works, gave this notion an innovative and extensive treatment that crossed the boundaries between theology and philosophy, physics and metaphysics, medicine and natural philosophy. Accordingly, it takes an interdisciplinary approach on behalf of the historian of ideas to truly understand its pivotal role in Albert’s thought. Why was a thirteenth-century Dominican theologian interested in such themes? What was the purpose of his embryological inquiries? Albert the Great’s interest in the embryological discourse must be framed within the thirteenth-century cultural fervor originating from the institutional development of the university. Articulated into four faculties (i.e. Arts, Theology, Law, and Medicine), medieval universities had an institutionalized canon of texts on which the teaching was based. Each faculty had specific textbooks establishing not only the sets of fundamental notions to acquire but also jargons and literary genres.3 The faculty of Arts was conceived as preparatory to the others. Grammar, logic, metaphysics, ethics (or practical philosophy), and natural philosophy were meant to be preliminary to Theology, Law, and Medicine. The teaching at the Faculty of Arts was mostly based on the systematic analysis and discussion of the Aristotelian corpus, which by the first half of the thirteenth century had been almost wholly translated into Latin.4 Even though institutional boundaries between the four university faculties were neat and the intellectual domains of their disciplines well

3 For example, the textbook of the faculty of Theology was the Book of Sentences (Liber Sententiarum) by the theologian Peter Lombard which, in its four books, gathers material from the Bible and the theological and biblical-exegetical works of the Fathers of the Church. To obtain a degree in Theology, each candidate had to write his own commentary on the Book of Sentences, thus contributing to a specific literary genre. Cf. Philip W. Rosemann, Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vols. 2–3 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010). The same can be said about the Summae theologiae, i.e., systematic manuals of theology, which were also instrumental to practical and didactical needs, and about the Summae related to the teaching at the Faculty of Law, that were conceived as summaries of the Corpus Iustinianeum, i.e., the textbook of reference in jurisprudence. For a comprehensive study on teaching techniques in medieval universities, see Olga Weijers, In Search of the Truth: A History of Disputation Techniques from Antiquity to Early Modern Times (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014) and Luca Bianchi, La filosofia nelle Università. Secoli XIII–XIV (Scandicci, Firenze: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1997). 4 Cf. Weijers, In Search of the Truth, and Bianchi, La filosofia nelle Università.

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defined, in Scholastic literature one finds several examples of trespassing, confluence, and dialogue between different fields of knowledge.5 Such interaction of disciplines is at work in the “embryology” of several authors from different perspectives and academic backgrounds. According to the current definition, “embryology” is a specific branch of biology that studies physiological, chemical, and anatomical factors involved in the formation and development of the living being. In the thirteenth century, “embryology” or even “biology” as independent disciplines did not exist. The investigation of the dynamics and factors involved in the formation of the embryo was the prerogative of physicians as much as theologians and artistae.6 5 Cf. the collective volume edited by Spencer E. Young (ed.), Crossing Boundaries at Medieval Universities (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011). The volume explores the crossing of boundaries between faculties, disciplines, intellectual doctrines, and literary genres, which takes place within Universities. Such interactions are also investigated in Andrea Padovani, “The Metaphysical Thought of Late Medieval Jurisprudence”, in A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, vol. 7, The Jurists’ Philosophy of Law from Rome to the Seventeenth Century, eds. Andrea Padovani and Peter G. Stein, 31–78 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007). Another place of a confluence of disciplines is the debate on the “truth of human nature” (veritas humanae naturae), i.e., the imperishable core of corporeal identity that, according to the Catholic faith, will be reconstituted at the time of resurrection. To define the truth of human nature, theologians resort to the medical concept of radical moisture (humidum radicale), i.e., a material supply present in the body since conception, that fuels the bodily processes. Cf. Walter H. Principe, “De veritate humanae naturae: Theology in Conversation with Biology, Medicine, and Philosophy of Nature”, in Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy: Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (S.I.E.P.M), vol. 3, eds. Simo Knuuttila, Rejo Työrinoja, and Sten Ebbesen, 486–484 (Helsinki: Yliopistopaino, 1990). On the concept of “radical moisture” in the Latin Middle Ages, see Michael R. McVaugh, “The Humidum Radicale in Thirteenth-Century Medicine”, Traditio 30 (1974): 259– 283, Chiara Crisciani, “Aspetti del dibattito sull’umido radicale nella cultura del tardo medioevo (secoli XIII-XV)”, Arxiu de Textos Catalans Antics 23/24 (2004): 333–380, Chiara Crisciani and Giovanna Ferrari, “Introduzione”, in Arnaldi de Villanova Opera Medica Omnia, vol. 2, Tractatus de humido radicali, ed. Michael R. McVaugh, 319–571: esp. 330–331 and 342 (Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona-Fundació Noguera, 2010), Elisabeth Moreau, “Radical Moisture”, in Encyclopedia of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Marco Sgarbi (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02848-4_403-1, 2005), and Gianna Pomata, “Innate Heat, Radical Moisture and Generation”, in Reproduction: Antiquity to the Present Day, eds. Nick Hopwood, Rebecca Flemming, and Lauren Kassell, 195–208 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 6 The intertwining of competencies in the medieval discussion on embryogenesis is well documented by Romana Martorelli-Vico, “Introduzione”, in Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia II. 13, De formatione Humani Corporis in Utero, ed. Ead., 3–48 (Firenze: Sismel— Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2008).

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Within this cultural framework, Albert the Great stands out for his interdisciplinary approach to human generation which is strictly connected to his intellectual endeavor as magister theologiae at Cologne. When, in 1248, the Dominican Order entrusted Albert with the foundation and organization of the Studium generale of Cologne (i.e., a university for Dominican friars), he modeled the curriculum studiorum after the Aristotelian corpus (as in the Faculty of Arts), updated and receptive of the philosophical debates of the time. He was convinced that Dominican friars should be knowledgeable both in theological disciplines and in liberal arts. Thus, for the benefit of his students, he commented on the entire Aristotelian corpus, shaping a sort of teaching program on the Aristotelian philosophy for his Dominican confrères.7 Far from being purely Aristotelian, Albert’s philosophical commentaries do not just explain the philosophy of Aristotle, but (especially in

7 For a detailed report of Albert’s teaching at Cologne, see Kenneth F. Kitchell and Irven M. Resnick, “Introduction”, in Albertus Magnus , On Animals : A Medieval Summa Zoologica, translated and annotated by Kenneth F. Kitchell Jr. and Irven M. Resnick, 2 vols., 1–42: 13–18 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). For an overview of Albert’s literary production, see ibid., 19–21. See also Irven M. Resnick, “Albert the Great: Biographical Introduction”, in A Companion to Albert the Great. Theology, Philosophy and the Sciences, ed. id., 1–11 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), and James A. Weisheipl, “Albert’s Works on Natural Science (libri naturales ) in Probable Chronological Order”, in Albertus Magnus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays 1980, ed. id., 565– 576 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1980). In recent years, several studies have examined the re-use of philosophical doctrines and notions in biblical exegesis, which was (along with fighting heresy) one of the Dominican friars’ primary tasks. Stefano Perfetti, “Biblical Exegesis and Aristotelian Naturalism: Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and the Animals of the Book of Job”, Aisthesis 11 (2018): 81–96, and id. “Filosofia naturale e trasformazione morale. Alberto Magno interprete del ‘Cantico della Vigna’ (Isaia, 5, 1–7)”, in Edizioni, traduzioni e tradizioni filosofiche (Secoli XII–XVI). Studi per Pietro B. Rossi, eds. Luca Bianchi, Onorato Grassi and Cecilia Panti, 341–352 (Canterano, Roma: Aracne Editore, 2018) detail how the Aristotelian zoological corpus (within the Dominican learning program conceived by Albert the Great) also became an instrument within biblical exegesis. In Amalia Cerrito, “Botany as science and exegetical tool in Albert the Great”, Aisthesis 11 (2018): 97–107, I illustrate the parallel interdisciplinary approach as regards Albert’s reuse of botanical knowledge (as deployed in his own De vegetabilibus ) in interpreting crucial biblical passages. In a forthcoming study, I show how Albert interweaves biblical, theological, and philosophical sources to discuss heresies on the extraordinary generation of Jesus, see Amalia Cerrito, Faith and Natural Philosophy in Albert the Great’s Account of the Generatio Christi (Münster: Archa Verbi- Subsidia: 2023, forthcoming).

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the digressive sections) also give voice to alternative theoretical doctrines on human generation, such as Galen’s.8 In the thirteenth century, scholastic thinkers had many gateways to get in contact with Galenic doctrines: the Latinizations of Galen’s works (either from Greek or Arabic), the doxographic mediation of Patristic works (such as Nemesius of Emesa’s De natura hominis , translated first by Alfanus of Salerno c. 1080 and then by Burgundio of Pisa c. 1165), and the debates to be found in Arabic authors.9 Along with the Latinized Aristotle, Latin translations from the Arabic of Avicenna’s and Averroes’ works were also available. These not only offered different templates for those who committed to commenting on the Aristotelian corpus, but they also contributed to develop some theoretical and philosophical issues arising from Aristotelian philosophy.10 From Avicenna’s Abbreviatio super de animalibus , Albert acquires information about the medical thought of Galen and its discrepancies with Aristotelian natural philosophy.11 Following Avicenna’s footsteps, Albert oftentimes takes the opportunity to enhance and modify some Aristotelian doctrines on human generation.

8 Miguel de Asúa, “War and Peace: Medicine and Natural Philosophy in Albert the Great”, in A Companion to Albert the Great. Theology, Philosophy, and Sciences, ed. Irven M. Resnick, 269–298 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), investigates Albert’s techniques of integration of extra-Aristotelian sources (mostly medical) within the Aristotelian conceptual framework. He shows that the most straightforward technique is the digressio, i.e., a textual section expressly devoted to illustrate the state of the art by integrating Aristotelian discourse and theories taken from medical authorities such as Avicenna and Galen. 9 Cf. Brian Long, “Arabic-Latin Translations, Transmission and Transformation”, in Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Galen, eds. Petros Bouras Villatanos and Barbara Zipser, 343–358 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2019). Anna Maria Urso, “Translating Galen in the Medieval West: The Greek-Latin Translations”, in Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Galen, 359–380. 10 As pointed out by Isabelle Moulin, Albert the Great’s way of commenting on Aristotle lies in between “a free appropriation of fundamental Aristotelian theses […] (which was Avicenna’s approach) and the closer explanation of the Aristotelian text (which was Averroes’ approach)”: Isabelle Moulin, “Albert the Great Interpreting Aristotle: Intimacy and Independence”, The Journal of Medieval Latin 18 (2008): 158–170, 160. 11 For more on Avicenna’s approach to the disagreement between physicians and

philosophers, see Gotthard Strohmaier, “Avicenna Between Galen and Aristotle”, in Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Galen, eds. Petros Bouras-Vallianatos and Barbara Zipser, 215–226 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2019), and Tommaso Alpina, “Exercising Impartiality to Favor Aristotle: Avicenna and ‘the Accomplished Anatomists’ (As.h¯ ab al-Tašr¯ıh. al-Muh.as..sil¯ una)”, Arabic Science and Philosophy 32/2 (2022): 137–178.

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While claiming to be merely offering a systematized presentation of Aristotle’s thought, Albert is eager to criticize and question several doctrines, allowing his own theoretical standpoint to emerge more or less explicitly. Through amplification, glosses, and digressions, Albert introduces extraAristotelian sources within an Aristotelian epistemic framework, making room for his reformulation of Galenic doctrines, such as that of virtus formativa. In Albert’s works, Galen is presented as the foremost authority in medical matters and is often involved in discussing anatomy, reproduction, disease, and humoral complexion.12 As rightly pointed out by Nancy Siraisi, in the pages of scholastic medical and philosophical authors, one finds more widespread knowledge of Galenism than of Galen.13 Indeed,

12 Whether Albert had direct knowledge of Galen’s works is still an open issue. It is

puzzling to determine what Galen’s work he directly knew and referred to. The editors of the Quaestiones super de animalibus and the De animalibus note that all the references to Galen are drawn from Avicenna’s works. However, Albert might have had first-hand knowledge of the De complexionibus (i.e., the I and II Books of Galen’s De temperamentis ). Cf. Ephrem Filthaut, “Prolegomena”, in Alberti Magni Quaestiones super de animalibus, ed. id., xlvi–xvii (Münster: Aschendorff, 1955). During the twelfth century, this text was translated into Latin twice: from Arabic by Gerard of Cremona, and from Greek by Burgundio of Pisa, Cf. Cristina D’Ancona, “La trasmissione della filosofia araba dalla Spagna musulmana alle università del XIII secolo”, in Storia della filosofia nell’Islam medievale, ed. Ead., vol. 2 (Torino: Einaudi, 2005). For an overview on the rediscovery of the Aristotelian corpus in the Latin West in Latin translations, see Jozef Brams, La Riscoperta di Aristotele (Milano: Jaca Book, 2003), id., “Der Einfluß der Aristoteles Übersetzungen auf den Rezeptionsprozeß”, in Albertus Magnus und die Anfänge der Aristoteles-Rezeption im lateinischen Mittelalter von Richardus Rufus bis zu Franciscus de Mayronis, eds. Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood, Mechthild Dreyer, and Marc- Aeilko Aris, 27–43 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2005) and Pietro B. Rossi, “L’entrata dei libri De animalibus nel Medioevo Latino”, in La zoologia di Aristotele e la sua ricezione dell’età ellenistica e romana alle culture medievali, eds. Maria M. Sassi, Elisa Coda, Giuseppe Feola, 237–268 (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2017). On the reception of Galen’s thought in the Latin West, see Monica H. Green, “Gloriosissimum Galienus: Galen and Galenic Writings in the Eleventh- and Twelfth-Century Latin West”, in Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Galen, eds. Petros Bouras-Vallianatos and Barbara Zipser, 319–342 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2019). 13 See Nancy Siraisi, “The Medical Learning of Albertus Magnus”, in Albertus Magnus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays 1980, ed. James Weisheipl, 379–404 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1980). On the reception of Galenism in the Thirteenth-century theological and philosophical circuits, see also Mark D. Jordan, “The Disappearance of Galen in Thirteenth-Century Philosophy and Theology”, in Mensch und Natur im Mittelalter, eds. Albert Zimmerman and Andreas Speer, 703–717 (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2013).

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thirteenth-century Galenism encompasses a variety of writings of stricter or looser Galenic inspiration, but heavily influenced by other sources, such as Arabic physicians. Albert was sufficiently acquainted with this material to offer his students a coherent summary of Galenic doctrines, even those with which he disagreed or that were clearly at variance with Aristotelian philosophy. His extensive knowledge of contemporary medical sources is evident in several passages scattered in his natural-philosophical works, as well as theological and biblical-exegetical writings, where medical learning finds its way as an exegetic tool.14 Despite his overall interest in medicine, none of Albert’s writings was meant to be overtly medical in purpose.15 Albert has a personal conception of medical learning and its usefulness for natural-philosophical investigation. Whereas other contemporary authors disqualified medical learning because of its ultimately practical scope, Albert considered medical doctrines as a necessary but subsidiary of philosophical inquiry.16 Philosophy and medicine both deal with the principles of life and death. However, they proceed differently in investigating the causes: while philosophers proceed from universals to particulars, those physicians who use philosophical argumentation can ascend from particulars toward universal causes. Albert’s importance to the history of medieval medicine is not due to his contribution to the development of medical science by empirical investigation but to the fact that he demonstrated how the new Aristotelian natural philosophy could benefit from integrating medical sources.17 14 See Cerrito, “Faith and Natural Philosophy”. 15 Nevertheless, among Albert’s works, the Quaestiones super de animalibus (i.e., the

report by Conrad of Austria of lectures given by Albert at Cologne in 1258) is one of the most relevant for its relationship with the literary genre of medical quaestiones. As pointed out by scholars, Albert’s treatment and selection of questions is modeled after medical questions. Other questions discussed by Albert will recur in later scholastic medical treatises and commentaries. See Siraisi, “The Medical Learning of Albertus Magnus”, 394, Benedict M. Ashley, “Peter of Spain, Albert the Great and the Quaest. de animal”, Physis 34 (1997): 49–65, and de Asúa, “War and Peace”, 270–271. 16 See, e.g., Albertus Magnus, De somno et vigilia I, 1, 1 (ed. Borgnet, 123a). 17 In Albert’s works, one finds several passages referring to personal observation or

experiences of reliable witnesses, which, according to some scholars, contributed to laying the groundwork for experimental science. In Cologne, Albert was in contact with several learned physicians from whom he drew information about their practice and incorporated it into his works. Cf. Kitchell and Resnick, “Introduction”, 29–31. The most considerable number of personal observations or references to experiments are present in Albert’s

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Thus, Albert the Great’s Aristotelianism is very personal and strongly influenced by the development of disciplines alien to the Aristotelian conceptual framework.18 Moreover, his natural-philosophical and medical investigation considers the theological implications arising from adopting some philosophical doctrines, such as that of embryonic development. Greek and Arabic natural philosophy and medicine explained embryonic formation as a progressive development of bodily and psychic functions. This explanatory model, however, was at odds with the theological assumption that God only infuses the rational soul into the embryo when its body is fully configured. If life manifests itself in growth––the dividing line between animate and inanimate things––what is responsible for the dynamics of the configuration of the living embryo before its ensoulment? Motivated by theological issues, Albert reorganizes the naturalphilosophical and medical theories on embryonic development drawing upon Greek, Patristic, and Arabic sources. He develops an embryological doctrine that combines the medical and natural-philosophical model of epigenesis with the Christian tenet of the creatio ex nihilo of the human soul, infused in the embryo only when this is perfectly formed. Such a model has been defined as “epigenetic creationism” and ascribes the embryo’s vital activity before the ensoulment to a sort of proto-nutritive soul deriving from paternal generative power.19 It will be shown that this power corresponds, more precisely, to the virtus formativa, in its

De mineralibus , cf. Paul Hossfeld, Albertus Magnus als Naturphilosoph und Naturwissenschaftler (Bonn: Albertus Magnus Institut, 1983), 80. However, it is worth stressing that such empirical observations lack the repeatability typical of the experimental Galilean science. 18 For a detailed analysis of Albert’s Aristotelianism, see Fernand Van Steenberghen, The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1955), 176–179. For a focus on Albert’s “Aristotelianism Transformed” within the Books on Animals, see Stefano Perfetti, “La disseminazione del sapere sugli animali e l’iperaristotelismo di Alberto Magno”, in La zoologia di Aristotele e la sua ricezione dell’età ellenistica e romana alle culture medievali, eds. Maria M. Sassi, Elisa Coda, Giuseppe Feola, 269–298 (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2017), and id., Nature imperfette. Umano subumano e animale nel pensiero di Alberto Magno (Pisa: ETS, 2020), 7–11. On the diverse approaches to the Aristotelian Books on Animals and the dissemination of zoological knowledge in the thirteenth century, see id., “I libri de animalibus di Aristotele e i saperi sugli animali nel XIII secolo”, in Animali pensati nella filosofia tra medioevo e prima età moderna, ed. id., 47–68 (Pisa: ETS, 2012). 19 Cf. Katja Krause, “Albert the Great on Animal and Human Origin in His Early Works”, Lo sguardo. Rivista di filosofia 18/2 (2015): 205–232.

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instrumental function preliminary to the ensoulment, which shapes and organizes the body fittingly to the soul. In one of his essays on William Harvey’s biological ideas, Walter Pagel devotes some pages to Albert’s doctrine of virtus formativa, as it stands in the De animalibus . The scholar recognizes the independence of the formative power from both embryo’s and parents’ soul. The formative power “is prior to and independent of the soul, and particularly of anything acting on or entering the sperm from outside such as in particular the soul of the father or mother.”20 Adam Takahashi investigated the metaphysical premises of this notion, showing its divine origin. Through the mediation of the celestial bodies, the virtus formativa is infused by the First Intellect into the seed, where it is stored as a potential form. This power belongs to the animate and inanimate material substrates and guarantees the regularity and purpose of every natural process.21 Although inspired by Aristotelian epistemic principles, Albert’s natural-philosophical investigation is framed within a Neoplatonic-Christian outlook.22 The natural processes depend on a system of causal and ontological levels that emanate from God’s Creation and connect the entire universe to the First Cause.23 The order of nature is a product of the divine intelligence: in every natural being, natural causes and principles mirror the archetypal model of the divine intellect.24 In this perspective, Albert’s philosophical-natural investigation does not exclusively aim at analyzing causes and principles of change but also at identifying what guarantees proportionality in “model-copy” dynamics. The natural principle that performs this task is the formative power or virtus formativa. The notion of formative power dissolves several theoretical tensions from different fields of knowledge. From a metaphysical-theological point 20 Cf. Walter Pagel, “William Harvey Revisited”, History of Science 9/1 (1970): 1–41. 21 Cf. Adam Takahashi, “Nature, Formative Power and Intellect in the Natural

Philosophy of Albert the Great”, Early Science and Medicine 13 (2008): 451–481. 22 Cf. Alain de Libera, Albert le Grand et la philosophie (Paris: Vrin, 1990), 130–141. 23 Cf. Guy Guldentops, “Albert the Great’s Zoological Anthropocentrism”, Micrologus

8 (2000): 217–235. 24 Cf. Leen Spruit, “Albert the Great on the Epistemology of Natural Science”, in Erfahrung und Beweis. Die Wissenschaften von der Natur im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert, eds. Matthias Lutz-Bachmann and Alexander Fidora, 61–75: 62–64 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007).

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of view, it accounts for the relationship between the uniqueness of the act of creation and the emergence of the variety of natural forms. The formative power is able to reproduce natural forms by mirroring the archetypical model because the divine Providence guides it. From naturalphilosophical and medical standpoints, the formative power combines the natural-philosophical and medical epigenetic models within the theological creationism of the human soul. Moreover, it gives a new theoretical instrument to integrate medical doctrine on the female contribution to the generative process within Aristotelian natural philosophy. This book reconstructs Albert’s notion of virtus formativa. Crossing boundaries between theological works and philosophical commentaries, this is a key concept in explaining the dynamics of transmission of genetic inheritance. Formative power is a border notion between metaphysics and physics, theology and natural philosophy, ethics, and biology. For this reason, I will not investigate its occurrences in chronological order but according to an interdisciplinary and theoretical approach, exploring the dialectic relationship of this notion with theological, philosophical, and medical issues. The main body of the book is divided into three parts. Chapter 2 (The Christian-Neoplatonic background of Albert the Great ’s doctrine of virtus formativa) describes the metaphysical and theological foundation of the notion of formative power. At variance with Aristotle, who conceived matter as an indeterminate passive substratum, Albert maintains that matter has something of the form that allows the material substrate to tend to the form. This movement toward the form is described in terms of virtus formativa, which operates in the very first stages of substantial change, activating it. Even though the formative power cooperates in matter-form binding, it has no ontological continuity with the substantial form. It does not persist in the change process, whereas matter and form do. When the matter reaches its form, the formative power disappears. Such power, pertaining to each material substrate since Creation, is an instrument of divine Providence, by which God guarantees regularity in the generation of inanimate and animate things. Chapter 3 (Virtus formativa and human embryology) deals with the development of the notion of formative power in dialog with naturalphilosophical, theological, and medical doctrines on human generation. As the analysis of passages from Albert’s theological and naturalphilosophical works will show, the formative power does not require any soul in actuality to perform its formative tasks. The virtus formativa is

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instead an instrumental power preliminary to the soul in actuality and in possession of the bodily design fitting to the soul as an instrument. Attention will also be devoted to the dynamics that allow the virtus formativa to acquire the bodily design from the parent and transmit it to the child. Chapter 4 (Albert the Great on the transmission of genetic inheritance) investigates the role of formative power in Albert’s doctrine of genetic inheritance and kinship. In order to account for the child’s inheritance of somatic traits (even accidental) from both parents, Albert develops a theoretical distinction between “formative” and “informative” power. The latter belongs to the female’s seed. As much as the male’s formative power, the female’s informative principle also transmits bodily resemblance, guaranteeing genetic continuity between mothers and offspring. The theoretical treatment of the transmission of maternal traits sheds new light on Albert’s position on the nature of the female contribution in the framework of the so-called “dispute between philosophers and physicians”. Furthermore, the doctrine on the transmission of genetic information from parents to children finds its application in ethical discourse to explain the foundation of kinship based on biological reasons.

CHAPTER 2

The Christian-Neoplatonic Background of Albert the Great’s Doctrine of Virtus Formativa

The virtus formativa is an interdisciplinary key notion that Albert the Great repeatedly deals with in his writings. He tends to ascribe its origin to the medical tradition and, more precisely, to Galen.1 However, as stated in Chapter 1, Albert’s formulation of this notion is built on his personal synthesis of Galenism and Aristotelianism on human generation influenced by a Christian-Neoplatonic outlook. Due to its transversal character, the notion of “formative power” crosses the boundaries of the embryological framework. Takahashi’s pioneering study on the metaphysical foundation of Albert’s natural philosophy shows the pivotal role of the formative power in every natural process. The Dominican master does not resort to this power exclusively to explain human or animal embryogenesis, but also to account for the formation of inanimate things, like minerals and stones. This power is instrumental in assisting the natural process of formation and transmutation of mineralia, by guaranteeing that this is teleologically oriented, thus significantly more effective than the alchemists’ attempts to replicate the work of nature. Within inanimate things, the formative power functions as an efficient cause that carries out its operation by orienting the material substrate. Although its field of operation is far from it, this power too is 1 Cf. Infra, Sect. 3.1.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Cerrito, Albert the Great (c. 1193–1280) and the Configuration of the Embryo, Palgrave Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Medicine, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24023-2_2

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a direct offshoot of the First Intellect, from which ultimately all natural forms originate.2 As one will see in this chapter, Albert’s doctrine of formative power relies on the redefinition of the Aristotelian physical principles of substantial change. Along with matter and form, Albert also includes the formative power. Albert’s investigation of the dynamics involved in substantial change is strongly influenced by his Christian-Neoplatonic outlook, according to which each natural process is triggered by an intertwined system of causalities descending from God’s Creation.3 In this perspective, natural beings and natural processes are indirectly connected to the First Cause, i.e., God. From God, a hierarchically ordered universe proceeds. The whole natural realm is ordered in grades of perfection descending from the First Cause: at the top of the hierarchy are the spiritual beings (i.e., angels) and the celestial intelligences. The latter move the cosmic sphere and illuminate the following order of being, i.e., the intellectual forms or human forms. These are joined to bodies, though they do not depend on their body to exist. The human soul stands in between material and spiritual beings. Finally, the lower order embraces all the natural forms that are entirely embedded into matter. These are further arranged into a hierarchy ordered with animals at the top, followed by plants, minerals, and the forms of the elements.4 The formal structures found in animals, vegetables, and minerals are all descending gradations patterned after the archetypes of the Divine mind.5 Each being reflects the light of the First

2 Cf. Adam Takahashi, “Nature, Formative Power and Intellect in the Natural Philosophy of Albert the Great”, Early Science and Medicine 13 (2008): 451–481. 3 Christian Neoplatonism and natural philosophy intertwine, for instance, in Albert’s treatment on the human being. Guy Guldentops, “Albert the Great’s Zoological Anthropocentrism”, Micrologus 8 (2000): 217–235. 4 Cf. Thérèse Bonin, Creation as Emanation: The Origin of Diversity in Albert the Great’s on the Causes and the Procession of the Universe (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2001) and Mark Führer, “Albert the Great”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/ entries/albert-great/, 2022. 5 As highlighted by Stefano Perfetti, the very fact that Albert’s natural philosophy is framed within “the wider metaphysical-theological macro-structures of a Christian creationism understood in Neoplatonic terms” allows Albert to pursue a philosophical inquiry on animals by following the epistemological criterion of the scale of perfection. In particular, by comparing human perfection and animal imperfection, the Dominican master

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Cause and bears traces of its origin, which mirror the archetypical models in the Divine intellect.6 Accordingly, Albert’s philosophical-natural investigation does not exclusively aim at analyzing causes and principles of change but also at identifying what guarantees proportionality in “model-copy” dynamics. And the formative power comes into play here. When dealing with such an interdisciplinary notion, which bridges theological, metaphysical, and physical tenets, one must negotiate with the variable and often periphrastic lexicon associated with the formative power. After all, not even Albert himself uses a univocal terminology when dealing with the notion of virtus formativa. Terms related to it are variable and often fitted to a particular context. The Latin syntagm virtus formativa is mainly employed to discuss human embryogenesis, both in Albert’s natural-philosophical works such as De vegetabilibus , De animalibus , and De mineralibus , and in his Summa theologiae and Ethica. However, in his commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics, the Dominican master prefers to use the syntagms privatio, potentia/aptitudo ad formam, inchoatio formae. In contrast, in his neoplatonically nuanced theological works, he opts for materia cum quantitate or meritum materiae. This chapter will offer both a brief reconstruction of the doctrine of inchoatio formae as it appears mainly in Albert’s Physica, and an overview of the studies that, over the last forty years, have tried to frame this doctrine, whether in a Platonic or Aristotelian perspective. By adopting a broader standpoint, which also includes Albert’s theological works (i.e., Summa theologiae and De divinis nominibus ), it will be shown explores themes such as the difference between human and animal behavior, communication, cognitive skills, and learning abilities. Stefano Perfetti, Nature imperfette. Umano subumano e animale nel pensiero di Alberto Magno (Pisa: ETS, 2020), 7–61: 8. 6 Cf. Leen Spruit, “Albert the Great on the Epistemology of Natural Science”, in Erfahrung und Beweis. Die Wissenschaften von der Natur im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert, eds. Matthias Lutz-Bachmann and Alexander Fidora, 61–75: 62–64 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007). In a recent study, I investigated the relationship between archetype and natural processes in Albert’s treatment of natural fatherhood: along with pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Albert conceptualizes divine fatherhood as the exemplary cause of lower levels of paternities. Through Creation, God provides every biological form of fatherhood (from plants to humans) with the ontological structure (ratio) of material generation patterned after His exemplarity. Cf. Amalia Cerrito, “Paternitas naturalis and Paternitas divina: Albert the Great on Matthew 6,9 and Luke 11,2”, Divus Thomas 122/2 (2019): 59–78.

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that Albert’s doctrine on formative power is better understood when framed within his personal synthesis of Christian theology and Arabic Neoplatonism. The formative power finds its theoretical relevance within the theological framework of divine providence, where it is deemed an instrument through which God orders the natural world.

2.1 The Doctrine of Inchoatio Formae: The State of the Art In the thirteenth century, the syntagm inchoatio formae appeared in the discussions on the dynamics of substantial change. Generally speaking, it indicates a “beginning of the form” that exists potentially in matter and passes from potentiality to actuality by the agency of the generative agent. This concept combines two different sources. The first one is the Aristotelian doctrine of substantial change, according to which matter acquires a substantial form by the agency of an efficient cause that educes the form from the potentiality of matter. When discussing the dynamics of eductio formarum, medieval thinkers were concerned with determining what the origin of the potentialities of the matter is. To avoid postulating a creation ex nihilo of the substantial form (and, thus, reducing generatio to creatio), some thinkers resort to Augustine’s doctrine of rationes seminales , or rationes causales , i.e., the germs for all the kind of beings and processes which would be ever realized in time, which were placed by God in the matter at the time of Creation.7 The immanence of seminal reasons 7 This doctrine originates from Augustine’s attempt to harmonize the theological tenet

of God’s simultaneous creation of all things with the biblical narrative of a six-day creation in Genesis. On Augustine’s theory of rationes seminales , see Jules M. Brady, “St. Augustine’s Theory of Seminal Reasons”, The New Scholasticism 38 (1964): 141–158. On Augustine’s doctrine on creation, see Simo Knuuttila, “Time and Creation in Augustine”, in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, eds. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, 103–115 (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). The concept of inchoatio formae was discussed by several thirteenth-century authors, such as the Bonaventure (1221–1274) and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), Henry of Ghent (c. 1217–1293), Giles of Rome (d. 1316), and the James of Viterbo (1255–1308). Cf. Antoine Côté, “Simplicius and James of Viterbo on Propensities”, Vivarium 47 (2009): 24–53, Anna Rodolfi, “Matière, forme et génération: la discussion entre Henri de Gand et Roger Marston autour des raisons séminales”, in Materia: nouvelles perspectives de recherche dans la pensée et la culture médiévales (XII e –XVI e siècles), eds. Tiziana Suarez-Nani and Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, 57–74 (Firenze: Sismel—Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2017), Mark Gossiaux, “James of Viterbo on Seminal Reasons as inchoationes formarum”, Vivarium 59 (2021): 52–78, Antonio Petagine, Il fondamento positivo del mondo. Indagini francescane

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(or “beginning of form”) in matter better accounts for the coming-to-be of the substantial form in the generative process. In Albert’s works, the syntagm inchoatio formae describes the predisposition, or a tendency toward the form, inherent to matter, and ontologically independent from the form in itself. This principle occurs both to explain the substantial change and the dynamic of the configuration of the embryo. Scholars debate the ontological status of this principle. Does it belong to the metaphysical or physical domain? What kind of relationship does the inchoatio formae have with matter and form? To fully grasp the state of the art, it is worth outlining the essential points of Albert’s doctrine of inchoatio formae. Albert’s doctrine of inchoatio formae relies on the semantic redefinition of the Aristotelian notion of privation.8 Aristotle resorted to this notion mainly to explain substantial change. However, in his works, the meaning of “privation” (stér¯esis ) ranged from (i) an absence or loss of a certain quality to (ii) a predisposition or aptitude of matter to receive the form.9 One of the most detailed analyses of the notion of privatio can be found in Albert’s commentary on Aristotle’s Physica (1251–1252),10 where he analyzes the theoretical difficulties faced by those philosophi who

sulla materia all’inizio del XIV secolo (1300–1330 ca.) (Canterano, Roma: Aracne Editore, 2019), and Sylvain Roudaut, La mesure de l’être: Le problème de la quantification des formes au Moyen Âge (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2021). Thomas Aquinas’ interpretation of Albert’s doctrine of inchoatio formae will be dealt with in infra, Sect. 3.2. 8 Cf. Bruno Nardi, “La dottrina d’Alberto Magno sull’«inchoatio formae». Rendiconti della classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche”, Accademia dei Lincei VI/12 (1936): 3–38, reprinted in id. Studi di filosofia medievale, 85–93 (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1979). 9 Aristoteles, Metaphysica XII, 2, 1069b 3–24. Cf. Frank A. Lewis, “Form and Matter”, in A Companion to Aristotle, ed. Georgios Anagnostopoulos, 162–185 (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), and Ursula Coope, “Change and Its Relation to Actuality and Potentiality”, in A Companion to Aristotle, 277–291. 10 For the chronology of Albert’s works, I follow the Zeittafel (Chronologie nach

der zeitigem Forschungsstand). In Albertus Magnus und sein System der Wissenschaften, ed. Albertus-Magnus-Institut, 28–31 (Münster: Aschendorff 2011). On the concept of privatio in Albert’s Physica, see David Twetten, Steven Baldner, Steven C. Snyder, “Albert’s Physics”, in A Companion to Albert the Great . Theology, Philosophy, and Sciences, ed. Irven M. Resnick, 173–220, esp. 174–175 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013).

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did not grasp the dual meaning of privatio.11 Among these, the Platonici (i) neither recognized the mixture of matter and privation (“privationem materiae permixtam non viderunt”) (ii) nor did they make a proper theoretical distinction between privation and matter (“nec distinxerunt ‹privationem› a materia”).12 In Albert’s view, privation and matter are metaphysically distinct since, by way of abstraction, one could remove any formal determination from matter (privation included), therefore reaching the knowledge of matter as pure potentiality. However, from a physical perspective, privation is combined with matter as there is no material substrate that is totally devoid of formal determination. These two errors led the Platonici to conceive physical matter as deprived of any formal determination, a static matter, that acquires forms created from nothing. («Est autem inconveniens ipsam produci ex substantia materiae, et ideo alterum concesserunt, quod fit videlicet ex nihilo»).13 Similarly, the Platonici did not recognize the fundamental role of privation in generation and corruption. Privation leaves a trace in matter, an aptitudo ad formam, which makes matter the actual subject of change: Privation means absence (nihil ponit ) but cannot be reduced to virtually nothing (omnino nihil ) since it leaves in the subject a predisposition (aptitudo) producing the principle of change. Once the matter accomplishes the form, that predisposition is cast off, albeit the privation and predisposition

11 Albert’s references to philosophical schools (e.g., Platonic, Peripatetics, or Stoics) are only loosely in line with our historiographical and doctrinal categories. Among the Platonici, Albert often includes Galen and Avicenna, whereas Peripatetics may cover Averroes and Avicenna, as well. As Snyder reconstructs, the philosophi against whom Albert is arguing might correspond to the Greek materialists (whom Albert also calls Epicureans) and Platonists (also called Stoics). Cf. Snyder, “Albert the Great, Inchoatio formae”, 64–66. 12 Albertus Magnus, Physica I, 3, 16 (ed. Hossfeld, 70: 81–84). On Albert’s interpretation of the Platonic concept of matter, see Antonio Petagine, “Aporie del ‘subiectum’. La critica di Alberto Magno alle concezioni della materia di David di Dinant e di Platone”, Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 4 (2007): 609–654. On Albert’s ‘antiplatonism’ see Alain de Libera, “Albert le Grand ou l’antiplatonisme sans Platon”, in Contre Platon. Tome I: le Platonisme dévoilé, ed. M. Dixsaut, 247–271 (Paris: Vrin, 1993). Alain de Libera, “Albert le Grand et le Platonisme. De la doctrine des Idées à la theorie des trois états de l’Universel”, in Proclus and his influence in Medieval Philosophy, eds. Egbert Bos and Pieter A. Meijer, 89–199, esp. 100–104 (Leiden, New York, Köln: Brill, 1992). 13 Ibid. (ed. Hossfeld, 71: 27–29).

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to other forms remain in the matter. As shown above, the matter is the subject of change and movement thanks to a privation embedded in it.14

By itself, privation is not responsible for any activity of becoming. However, it cannot be considered a complete absence of quality. Indeed, when privation is combined with matter, it impresses a predisposition to the form (aptitudo ad formam) thanks to which the process of change is made possible. In the generation of the substance, when matter reaches its form, the privation disappears, making room for the actualized form. Anna Rodolfi pointed out that Albert, from a metaphysical standpoint, recognizes just two principles of change (matter and form). In contrast, from a physical point of view, one can count three of them (matter, form, and privation), given that privation is necessary to activate substantial change.15 […] there are three principles of the species and two in the number. I do not mean the number of the essences where one is the essence of privation, and the other is that of matter, but rather as the number of principles qua they start the change, insofar as they are embedded in it, same in number, and different as real subjects.16

14 Ibid., I, 3, 9 (ed. Hossfeld, 54: 40–47): «privatio […] nihil ponit, et tamen non est

reducibilis in omnino nihil, eo quod relinquit aptitudinem in subiecto, gratia cuius efficitur principium motus, quae quidem aptitudo abicitur, cum adepta est materia formam, licet remaneat iterum in materia privatio et aptitudo ad formam aliam. Et gratia illius privationis quae immixta est materiae, supra ostendimus quod materia subicitur motui et mutationi […]». 15 Cf. Anna Rodolfi, Il concetto di materia nell’opera di Alberto Magno (Firenze:

Sismel—Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2004), 105–108. Albert discusses again the principles regulating substantial change in Summa theologiae II, I, q. 4, art. 5 (ed. Borgnet, 90), in the quaestio «Utrum Aristoteles duo principia vel tria posuerit?». Albert answers: «Patet etiam quod duo sunt numero, scilicet materia et forma: tria autem sunt secundum rationem: quia privatio nihil numero addit super materiam, quod sit actus ens, nisi rationem informitatis formabilis». 16 Albertus Magnus, Physica I, 3, 9 (ed. Hossfeld, 54: 74–81): «Et hoc modo dictum est quod sunt tria principia specie et duo secundum numerum, et non intelligitur de numero essentiarum, quia alia est essentia privationis et alia materiae, sed potius de numero principiorum, in eo quod principiant motum; non enim principiant ipsum, nisi in quantum sunt sibi permixta et eadem numero et subiecto per esse differentia».

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Even if privation were interpreted as a lacking of form (carentia formae), it would still be a principle of being from a temporal point of view since every process of change starts from a lack of form.17 If, as we said, privation can be understood in two ways, namely, as ‘absence’ and as a predisposition left in the subject, i.e. the beginning of form (inchoatio formae), a beginning (inchoatio) in which the form is in formal potency, in both ways privation is a principle in a certain respect.18

As Albert stresses, privatio is a physical principle of being because it numerically identifies with matter. In turn, matter can be defined as a subject of change only insofar as it is endowed with a tendency toward form. However, the type of being related to matter and privation differs: while the aptitudo ad formam is progressively perfected, matter remains substantially identical throughout the process of change. For such reason, privation cannot be counted among the metaphysical principles of change since it does not persist identically throughout the change process as matter and form do: […] the predisposition to the form (aptitudo ad formam) means a certain species of principle, albeit what is separate from matter is not counted among the principles. Matter and form are the principles that persist throughout the change process, and are counted among the number of principles.19

Although privatio does not persist in the process of substantial change, it is nevertheless a principle at least from a physical-temporal point of view, since it begins (principiat ) the substantial change.20 The action of privation takes place in a temporal range going from matter’s movement toward the form to the actualization of the complete form: 17 Ibid. I, 3, 10 (ed. Hossfeld, 56: 45–50). 18 Ibid. (ed. Hossfeld, 56: 40–45): «Si enim privatio accipiatur dupliciter, ut diximus,

scilicet pro ea parte qua nihil ponit, et pro ea qua relinquit aptitudinem in subiecto, quae est inchoatio formae in ipso, in qua inchoatione forma est in potentia formali, utroque modo ipsa secundum aliquid principium est». 19 Ibid. (ed. Hossfeld, 56: 64–67): «Et sic ‹aptitudo ad formam› dicit speciem principii quandam, licet separatum a materia non numeretur inter principia. Sed principia manentia in motu et numerata numero principiorum sunt materia et forma.» 20 Ibid. I, 3, 4 (ed. Hossfeld, 44: 6–11).

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Form is more principle than matter, because, albeit temporally posterior, it is conceptually and essentially (secundum rationem) prior to matter: form moves the matter as an efficient cause, whereas matter, in its mutations, desires the form. [...] So the first principle is form, matter is the next, and last is privation.21

“Form is more principle than matter” since it has a nobler ontological status. Nevertheless, from a temporal perspective, matter is antecedent to the completely actualized form, otherwise, this would not have any substrate to act on. It follows that, as regards the time-line of realization, form is posterior to matter, and privation antecedent to both, given that the substantial change begins from matter’s desire toward form. Albert’s argumentation on the double meaning of privatio echoes his previous commentary on pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite’s De divinis nominibus (c. 1249) where, by employing images borrowed from the Christian-Neoplatonic thesaurus, he distinguishes two types of privation. One is the lack of proper perfection (carentia perfectionis debitae), such as the privation of the human form ( forma humanitatis ) in a dead body. The second is the privation of form/good ( forma vel bonum) which is however accompanied by a seminal predisposition to it, and this is the privation proper of matter. In the first case, privation is bad (malum) since it entails the corruption of the body. In the second case, privation is instead something good which is about to begin (bonum inchoatum), given that it causes matter’s desire toward its form and the beginning of this movement.22 In Albert’s view, privation is thus an accidental principle

21 Ibid. I, 3, 10 (ed. Hossfeld, 56: 68–74): «Et forma quidem magis est principium quam materia, quae secundum rationem prior est ipsa, licet tempore sit posterior, cum propter ipsam moveatur materia ab efficiente et materia in motu suo desideret formam […]. Primo ergo principium est forma et posterius materia, postrema autem privatio». 22 Id., De divinis nominibus IV, 158 (ed. Simon, 243: 59–68): «[…] privatio formae vel boni est cum aptitudine et seminario ad bonum, et haec privatio est in materia inquantum materia nec est malum, sed bonum incohatum. Dicitur et alio modo privatio ipsa carentia perfectionis debitae tantum, et haec privatio est corruptio sicut privatio formae humanitatis in cadavere; et haec quidem privatio malum est, sed non est in materia inquantum materia. Et secundum primum modum privatio est causa desiderii in materia et est principium […]».

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of generation (principium per accidens ) without which generation cannot take place.23 Scholars have variously interpreted Albert’s notion of privatio. Rodolfi suggested that privation could be considered as a sort of intermediary principle that promotes matter-form binding. This brings to actuality the potential form already present in matter that, in turn, persists numerically and substantially identical throughout the change process.24 Steven Baldner has interpreted privation as an incipient proto-form related to a form yet to be attained. In Baldner’s view, privatio, aptitudo ad formam, and inchoatio formae are related concepts that Albert employs to describe the formal instrumental principle that cannot be found apart from matter and that, at the same time, does not share its nature.25 Moreover, as underlined by Jimena Paz Lima, the notion of privatio meets the need to account for substantial change to be continuous and teleological.26 Even though the inchoatio has no ontological continuity with the actualized form, it accounts for how a change process is aimed at acquiring one form rather than another. In doing so, the inchoatio behaves as a formative power, ensuring that matter shall be proportioned to the form to be acquired. Once its formative task is fulfilled, the inchoatio formae disappears, making room for the actualized and complete form.27 From a theoretical standpoint, Albert often invokes the theory of inchoatio formae as an alternative to the Avicennian doctrine of the “giver of form” (dator formarum). According to the latter, matter, shapeless and passive, becomes the substratum for the substantial change only thanks to the forms emanated by the lowest of the celestial intelligence, i.e., the Moon.28 In this way, the role of natural agents in generation and 23 Id., De divinis nominibus IV, 55, (ed. Simon, 163: 39–42): «[…] generans genera-

tionis causa est per se, quamvis privatio cooperetur ad generationem quasi principium per accidens, sino quo tamen generatio esse non posset». 24 Cf. Rodolfi, Il concetto di materia, 107. 25 Cf. Twetten, Baldner, Snyder, “Albert’s Physics”, 178. 26 Cf. Jimena Paz Lima, “Materia e incoación según el pensamiento cosmológico de

Alberto Magno”, Ideas y Valores 65/2 (2016): 35–50. 27 Cf. Rodolfi, Il concetto di materia, 108, and Twetten, Baldner, Snyder, “Albert’s Physics”, 178. 28 On Albert’s interpretation of Avicenna’s dator formarum see Alain de Libera, Albert le Grand et la philosophie (Paris: Vrin, 1990), 120–131, Id., Métaphysique et noétique:

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corruption is significantly scaled down: their task is to complete a process that originates outside the changing subject. On the contrary, in order to explain the dynamics involved in generation, Albert prefers to adopt the Aristotelian principle according to which each natural being has the principle of change in itself.29 Therefore, the processes of generation and corruption of matter do not entirely depend on an efficient external cause, and thus exclusively on celestial intelligences. Albert distinguishes different levels of formalitas: the quasi-formal principles of the substantial change with which matter is endowed, and the informative action of the celestial intelligences presiding over the generative process.30 Although these do not cause the material natural forms, they stimulate those forms already present in matter to begin with, securing the regularity of natural processes. Over the last forty years, scholars have mostly debated whether Albert’s doctrine of inchoatio formae should be framed from a Platonic or Aristotelian perspective. In his pioneering pages of the 1930s, Bruno Nardi stressed the Platonic and Neoplatonic nuances of Albert’s conception of matter. In Nardi’s interpretation, Albert would describe matter as an active principle of generation, endowed with its own formalitas, being, and intelligibility independent from the substantial form. In this view,

Albert le Grand (Paris: Vrin, 2005), 129, 161–166; and Dag N. Hasse, “Avicenna’s ‘Giver of Forms’ in Latin Philosophy, Especially in the Works of Albertus Magnus”, in The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Methaphysics, eds. Id. and Amos Bertolacci, 225–249 (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2012). In Avicenna’s view, God’s creative action makes use of intermediaries (such as the system of celestial intelligences). The sublunary world results from a process of emanation that starts from God and passes through the causality of the celestial intelligences according to a rigid concatenation. The proper emanative process ends at the tenth and final intelligence (the Moon), the dator formarum, which provides the formal determination of the sublunar world. See, for example, Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, IX, 5 (ed. Van Riet, 489–490). See also Snyder, “Albert the Great, Inchoatio formae”, 65–71. 29 According to Michael W. Tkacz, Albert argues against the attempt to reduce the causes of natural substances to something outside of nature itself also to preserve the possibility of a scientific research program based on Aristotle’s libri naturales. Tkacz highlights that “only if natural substances are intelligible in terms of their proper physical causes, Albert realized, is a revival and extension of those programs of an empirical investigation initiated by the early Peripatetics possible”. Michael W. Tkacz, “Albertus Magnus and the recovery of Aristotelian form”, The Review of Metaphysics 64 (2011): 735–762: 740. 30 Cf. Rodolfi, Il concetto di materia, 120.

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the inchoatio formae would be the formal predisposition that belongs to matter prior to its configuration under any natural form. In this perspective, Albert’s view would be at variance with Aristotle’s, who defines matter as a passive, purely potential principle of change. As Nardi suggests, Albert’s inchoatio formae should be rather interpreted in continuity with Augustine’s doctrine of rationes seminales , according to which matter is endowed with incipient, active, though indistinct, forms, which progressively develop into distinct forms/functions.31 However, Paul Hossfeld and James Weisheipl advocate for Albert’s overall faithfulness to the Aristotelian doctrine on matter and form, as he repeatedly stresses that matter, even if endowed with the “beginning of forms”, remains pure potentiality and, thus, a passive principle of substantial change.32 As Steven Snyder pointed out, both perspectives hold. There is no inconsistency between claiming that matter possesses the inchoatio formae, and that matter is purely potential. In itself, matter is a pure potentiality since it can be impressed and shaped by any natural form. However, matter as the subject of change within a substance is open to receiving certain substantial forms, not others. The beginning of form is the foundation for substantial change which accounts for the order and regularity of natural generation. Thus, inchoatio formae, “is the name Albert gives to the receptivity of matter in really existing composites”.33 Anna Rodolfi rightly warns: the fact that Albert develops the doctrine of inchoatio formae independently from the Aristotelian matter-form model of explanation does not mean that, ipso facto, this can be placed into a Platonic framework.34 As already mentioned, in Albert’s works, the doctrine of the inchoatio formae is always opposed to the PlatonicAvicennian doctrine of the dator formarum. However, at the same time, it also establishes the theoretical foundation for the Aristotelian doctrine 31 Cf. Bruno Nardi, “La dottrina d’Alberto Magno sull’ «inchoatio formae»”. 32 See Paul Hossfeld, “Erste Materie oder Materie im allgemeinen in den Werken

des Albertus Magnus”, in Albertus Magnus —Doctor Universalis 1280–1980, ed. Gerbert Meyer and Albert Zimmerman, 205–234 (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1980), and James Weisheipl, “The Axiom Opus naturae est opus intelligentiae and Its Sources”, in Albertus Magnus—Doctor Universalis 1280–1980, ed. Gerbert Meyer and Albert Zimmerman, 441–463, esp. 455–457 (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1980). Weisheipl also argues that the doctrine of inchoatio does not refer to prime matter but to secondary matter, although Albert rarely uses the expression materia secunda. 33 Cf. Snyder, “Albert the Great, Inchoatio formae”, 81. 34 Cf. Rodolfi, Il concetto di materia, 123.

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of the eductio formarum, which resolves the open issue of the absolute separation between matter and form, typical of the Platonic tradition.35 The immanence of incipient forms in matter is the necessary condition for the “bringing forth” of forms from the potentiality of the matter.36 Rodolfi agrees with Snyder in interpreting the inchoatio as instrumental to the explanation of the univocity and regularity of the generation of secondary substances. However, she specifies that this is based on a physical conception of matter that does not correspond to that of being a pure passive substance, at least as Aristotle understood it.37 As Rodolfi demonstrates, Albert makes a clearcut distinction between potency (potentia) and essence (essentia) of the matter, which mirrors a distinction between a physical and a metaphysical investigation of the matter. Whereas from a metaphysical standpoint, through a pure act of abstractio, one can reach the knowledge of the essence of prime matter as pure potency by removing all its formal definitions, from a physical perspective the knowledge of matter is based on the theoretical premise according to which the material substrate of generations and corruptions is never completely devoid of formality. Rather, it naturally tends to the acquisition of forms. As Albert repeatedly states, matter devoid of all its formal definitions is exclusively an abstract concept that does not find a counterpart in physical reality.38 Henryk Anzulewicz has clearly shown that, despite the limited number of translations of Plato’s dialogues available in the thirteenth century, Albert had a clear notion of the main tenets of Plato’s “philosophical system”.39 Furthermore, even though he was perfectly aware of the discrepancies between Aristotelian and Platonic doctrines, he was not keen to dismiss Platonic solutions in favor of the Aristotelian standpoint.

35 Cf. Alain de Libera, “Albert le Grand ou l’antiplatonisme sans Platon”. 36 Cf. Rodolfi, Il concetto di materia, 123, note 74. 37 Ibid., 122. 38 To qualify matter as a mere conceptual content (namely, devoid of formal definitions),

Albert uses the Latin expression in intellectu. Cf. Snyder, “Albert the Great, Inchoatio formae”, 72. 39 Albert knew Plato’s philosophy through the complex indirect late-ancient earlymedieval Platonic traditions championed by the likes of Apuleius, Augustine, and Boethius. Cf. Michel Lemoine, “La tradition indirecte du Platon Latin”, in The Medieval Translator. Traduire au Moyen Âge, 5, eds. Roger Ellis and René Tixier, 337–346 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996).

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He rather reformulates, reinterprets, and integrates Platonic doctrines within an epistemological framework, which is itself an exercise of transformed Aristotelianism.40 The following pages will clarify that this integrative strategy is the foundation of Albert’s doctrine of inchoatio formae.

2.2 The Origin of Albert’s Doctrine on the Virtus Formativa Between Platonic and Aristotelian Metaphysics In line with the tendency to interpret the doctrine of inchoatio formae within either a Platonic or an Aristotelian framework, Paz Lima has recently put the “inchoatio formae” in continuity with Plato’s theory of forms.41 Even before being present in composite matter, the inchoatio formae would pre-exist as a paradigmatic idea in the celestial intelligences. The same incipient forms would, then, exist as formative powers of matter, as reverberations or imitations (resultationes/imitationes ) of the paradigmatic forms. Thus, the formative movement of the incipient forms is linked to the paradigm conceived by the celestial intelligence which causes and actualizes the incipient forms of matter. However, as demonstrated by Rodolfi, Albert clearly distinguishes the role of the celestial intelligences as regulating principles of natural processes from the formal predisposition belonging to matter independently from and before any celestial activities. The celestial bodies ensure the regularity of the process of generation and corruption, but they do not cause the inchoatio formae which is already present in matter.42 Paz Lima’s argument is mainly based on a passage from Albert the Great’s Liber de natura et origine animae (1258), a short treatise written immediately after De animalibus , where he investigates the origin and

40 Cf. Henryk Anzulewicz, “Die platonische Tradition bei Albertus Magnus. Eine Hinführung”, in The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages. A Doxographic Approach, eds. Stephen Gersh and Maarten J. F. Hoenen with the assistance of Pieter Th. Van Wingerd, 207–277: esp. 270–271 (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2002), and id. “Metaphysics and Its Relation to Theology in Albert’s Thought”, in A Companion to Albert the Great . Theology, Philosophy, and Sciences, ed. Irven M. Resnick, 553–561, esp. 557 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013). 41 Paz Lima, “Materia e incoación”. 42 Cf. Rodolfi, Il concetto di materia, 122.

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the nature of the soul, and its relation to the body within a ChristianNeoplatonic framework. In this work, the Dominican master frames the dynamics of generation (already dealt with in his commentary on Aristotle’s De generatione animalium, i.e., the XVI book of his De animalibus ) within the broader context of the theory on the origin of natural forms, eventually highlighting the role of the prime intellect as the ultimate origin of natural forms. As Anzulewicz argues, in the Liber de natura et origine animae Albert highlights the epistemological differences between the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophical positions on the relationship between matter and form. In doing so, Albert tries to combine Platonic and Aristotelian views on the origin and nature of natural forms.43 According to Paz Lima, by resorting to the distinction between forma in re (potentially universal essence in things) and forma ante rem (the type of a thing in the mind of God), Albert would deem the form ante rem as a paradigm in the divine mind and the forma in re, as the forma inchoata or virtus formativa in the matter.44 Such distinction is inspired by the theoretical treatment of Albert’s De praedicamentis (1254–1257), a commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge. Porphyry had raised several problems on the ontological status of the universalia (general concepts such as genera and species): are they real or empty inventions of the intellect? If they exist in reality, are they corporeal or incorporeal? In handling these questions, Albert makes a conceptual distinction between the form that can be considered and grasped by human intellect apart from a thing (ante rem), and the form that can be considered in a thing (in re) when individuated in the matter.45 43 Anzulewicz shows how Albert, in his De natura et origine animae, displays the difference, in method and content, between Plato and Aristotle, concerning their respective understanding of form in its relationship with matter, and of form in general and its relationship with the compound. See Anzulewicz, “Die platonische Tradition bei Albertus Magnus”, 239. 44 Cf. Paz Lima, “Materia e incoación”, 46. 45 The same distinction will appear later in Albert’s Metaphysica (c. 1264), where

the form ante rem is defined as a universal prior to the form in re, not in time, but by nature since the ante rem form is deemed as the formal cause that constitutes the being of the thing. Literature on the so-called “medieval problem of universals” is vast, for a general introduction to the topic, see Klima Gyula, “The Medieval Problem of Universals”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2022 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/universalsmedieval/. On Albert’s discussion of the universals, see Alain de Libera, “Théorie des

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It is worth examining the passage of the Liber de natura et origine animae at issue: Platonists distinguished two kinds of forms. One is the example and paradigm of a thing, which exists before the thing (ante rem), i.e., a form of the intellect operating in nature, this form immaterially (immaterialiter), changelessly (immobiliter), and simply (simpliciter) pre-possesses all the differences of forms […]. They were called forms for their capability of forming, while those forms that are in the matter were defined as ‘images’ of those true forms […]. Although the Peripatetics maintain that the forms are brought forth from the matter, nevertheless the formative power of each formed thing does not derive from the matter. This is because, what moves and what is moved cannot be the same, any more than what gives the forms and what is formed. The formative power comes, rather, from the efficient Prime mover. […] Therefore, there are three kinds of forms: [i] forms existing before the thing (ante rem), which are the formative causes of things […], [ii] forms fluctuating in the matter, which are the perfection of matter, [iii] forms which, through intellectual abstraction, are separated from the thing according to species, genus, and most general genus in whatever type of things. The first kind is the form prior to a thing (ante rem). The second is the form in a thing (in re), which is the end ( finis ) and completion (terminus ) of the material potency attained by the operation of the generating agent. The third is the form derived from a thing (post rem).46

universaux et réalisme logique chez Albert le Grand”, Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 65(1981): 55–74, Ralph McInerny, “Albert on Universals”, The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy (1979): 3–18, Timothy Noone, “Albert the Great on Metaphysics”, in A Companion to Albert the Great. Theology, Philosophy, and Sciences, ed. Irven M. Resnick, 543–552: esp. 622–623 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), id., “Albert and the Triplex Universale”, in A Companion to Albert the Great, 619–626, and Michael W. Tkacz, “Albert the Great on Logic, Knowledge, and Science”, in A Companion to Albert the Great, 507–540. 46 Albertus Magnus, De natura et origine animae, 1, 2 (ed. Geyer, 4: 50–88): «Ex hac autem et huiusmodi consideratione Platonici duas dederunt formarum differentias. Quarum una est ante rem, quae est sicut rei exemplar et paradigma, quae est forma intellectus moventis in natura, quae forma est universaliter et immaterialiter et simpliciter praehabens omnes formarum differentias, quae secundum materiae diversificatur differentias. Et ideo illas quae primae sunt, formas a formatione et virtute formandi vocaverunt, eas autem quae sunt in materia, vocaverunt illarum formarum verarum imagines […]. Et licet formae secundum Peripateticorum sapientiam de materia educantur, tamen virtus formativa uniuscuiusque rei formate non est ex materia, eo quod non idem potest esse movens et motum neque formans et formatum, sed potius formativa virtus ex efficiente et

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According to Albert’s interpretation of the Platonic doctrine on the origin of the forms, natural generation involves just two kinds of forms: the archetypal forms, which exist in the Intellect prior to their realization in nature, and their images, which are in the matter as reverberations of the immutable and immaterial forms. Albert agrees with such a distinction, though he tries to harmonize it with the Aristotelian doctrine of the eductio formarum, according to which natural forms (except for the human soul) are brought forth from the potentiality of matter by the natural agency. This means that nothing can be drawn from what does not contain it yet. Albert specifies that the reverberations of the forms that bring matter to perfection, cannot derive from the substrate in which they are embedded. A natural principle cannot be agent and patient at the same time: it follows that the formative power that establishes to what extent and the purpose of the change process must differ from the subject of change, i.e., matter. Here, Albert is tacitly referring to the theoretical treatment of privation of his Physica where, he deems privation as a formal principle instrumental for the change process, which is, however, metaphysically distinct from the matter in which is embedded. Metaphysically speaking, only matter and form are counted as principles of substantial change, because they persist identically throughout the entire process. The formative power is temporary: it begins the change process, impresses onto the matter the predisposition to the form, and then, once the matter has achieved its form, disappears. Given its provisional nature, the formative power cannot metaphysically identify with matter but must originate from the outside, i.e., from the Prime mover. In this Neoplatonic-Aristotelian synthesis, both the Platonici and the Aristotelici maintain that the Intellect plays a key role in determining natural forms in matter, though, they differ in describing its action in nature:

movente est primo. […] Et tunc resultant tria formarum genera. Unum quidem ante rem existens, quod est causa formativa rerum, praehabens simpliciter et immaterialiter et immobiliter omnes diversitates tempore existentium. Aliud autem est ipsum genus formarum, quae fluctuant in materia et materiae sunt perfectio. Tertium autem est genus formarum, quod abstrahente intellectu separatur a rebus secundum modum speciei et generis et generalissimi in quolibet genere rerum. Et horum trium generum primum quidam est ante rem, ut diximus. Secundum autem est in re et est terminus potentiae materialis et finis, quem attingit operatio generantis. Tertium autem est post rem».

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The difference between Plato and Aristotle is more linguistic than theoretical: Aristotle demonstrates that the natural forms derive from the Intellect bestowing the formative power by which they are brought forth from matter to the formative form (ad formam formantem), because they are all inside as beginning of form (per inchoationem). Plato and Pythagoras meant the same, but they were unable to describe the potency of matter, i.e., the beginning of the form ( formae inchoatio). For this reason, they claimed that forms are not resident in matter but are bestowed by a first giver [i.e., the Giver of forms], they specified that matter deserves the form, by labeling as ‘right of matter’ (meritum materiae) what Aristotle used to call beginning of form, potency, or privation ( formae inchoationem sive potentiam sive privationem).47

Echoing his previous treatment on the principles of substantial changes, Albert claims that Platonists were misled in their argumentation because they did not recognize the immanence of incipient form (inchoatio formae) in matter. They conceived matter as a passive and static substrate, that acquires forms created from nothing. Therefore, to account for the realization of forms in matter, they posited the intervention of the “giver of forms” (dator formarum) bestowing complete forms according to the right of matter to receive them (meritum materiae). According to the Aristotelian standpoint, the Intellect does not bestow a complete form, rather a formative power that brings out the beginning of forms (inchoatio formae) embedded in matter. The two philosophical schools agree in postulating a correlation between the form which is bestowed and the matter receiving it. In Albert’s interpretation, the right of matter to receive a form (meritum materiae) and the formative power of the beginning of form coincide. The juxtaposition of meritum and inchoatio formae is connected to an adage attributed to Plato and circulating in Scholastic works between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries: «Plato dicit quod formae dantur secundum merita materiae». 47 Albertus Magnus, De natura et origine animae, 1, 2 (ed. Geyer, 5: 45–58): «Nec est differentia inter Platonem et Aristotelem in re aliqua, sed tantum in modo, quoniam Aristoteles probat quod formae naturales sint ab intellectu conferente virtutem formativam, qua ad formam formantem educuntur de materia, eo quod in ipsa sint omnes per inchoationem. Sed Plato et Pythagoras idem quidem dicere intendebant, sed nescierunt exprimere materiae potentiam, quae est formae inchoatio. Et ideo dixerunt a datore primo dari formas et non esse in materia, sed tamen materiam mereri formam, meritum materiae vocantes quod Aristoteles vocavit formae inchoationem sive potentiam sive privationem».

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At least three sources intertwine here: (i) the Avicennian doctrine of the dator formarum, (ii) the tension between the role of the universal soul conferring forms to nature and the fact that matter strives to be joined to form (as in Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae), and (iii) a reference to a crucial tenet of Plato’s Timaeus.48 The Platonic Demiurge, being good and devoid of envy, wanted all things to be similar to him, to the extent that each nature would be capable of happiness, so the giver of forms bestows forms on material realities in proportion to the attitudes of each.49 Therefore, in Albert’s interpretation meritum materiae and inchoatio formae express the connection between the form/the formative power bestowed by the Intellect/Giver of forms and the right of matter to receive it. When ascribed to matter, these syntagms describe the same physical principle responsible for matter’s suitability to the form and for the teleological orientation of the change process.

2.3

The Virtus Formativa and Divine Providence

Theoretical strategies aimed at synthesizing the Platonic and Aristotelian views on the virtus formativa play a crucial role in several theological works of Albert as well. In his commentary on the pseudo-Dionysian De divinis nominibus and his Summa theologiae (c. 1271–1274), he connects the intertwining of celestial and sublunar causality to the broader theological framework of divine providence. Every natural being expresses a secundum proportionem bond with God and realizes it according to its bodily capacity. The forma inchoata or virtus formativa guarantees the link between the archetypal structure and its realization in nature. As pointed out by Anzulewicz, Albert already attempts synthesis between Greek and Arab Neoplatonism in some earlier writings, such as De IV coaequaevis (1242) and the commentary on De divinis nominibus 48 Cf. Alain de Libera, Le Commentaire de l’Évangile selon Jean. Le Prologue (chap. 1, 1–18), texte latin, avant-propos, traduction et notes par Alain de Libera, Éduard-Henri Weber, Émile Zum Brunn (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1989), 328–329, id. Albert le Grand et la Philosophie, 217, See Avicebron, Fons Vitae (ed. Baeumker V, 34, 319, 20, V, 32, 317, 13–18, V, 17, 289, 19–22). See Plato, Timaeus a Calcidio traslatus, 29e, 22, 19–20: «Itaque consequenter cuncta sui similia, prout cuiusque natura capax beatitudinis esse poterat, effici voluit». 49 Cf. Alessandro Palazzo, “Albert the Great’s Doctrine of Fate”, in Mantik, Schicksal und Freiheit im Mittelalter (Beihefte zum Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, 70), ed. Loris Sturlese, 65–95 (Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau, 2011).

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(1249), gradually developing an interpretative model of the doctrine of emanation compatible with the theological concept of creatio ex nihilo. In doing this, he not only interweaves the Arabic idea of flow with the Greek idea of procession but also puts at the core the univocity of emanative causality, thus presenting a first sketch of the more mature metaphysics of the flow to be found in his later De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa (1264–1267).50 In his commentary on De divinis nominibus , while examining the procession of creatures from God within a neo-Platonic framework, Albert deploys a two-stage argument: first, he gives the Arab-Neoplatonic emanation theory an Aristotelian coloration, then he reconciles it with the theological concept of creation.51 The Dominican rejects the Platonic and Avicennian conceptions about the origin of forms, emphasizing that it is against faith to suppose that forms create other completely new forms out of matter. The intervention of a “giver of forms”, or dator formarum, in order to explain the generation of natural forms, is ultimately incompatible with the truth of faith since it presupposes not only the eternity of matter but also a production from nothing (creatio ex nihilo) not done by God52 :

50 The De causis et processu universitatis is a commentary on the Liber de causis (a Neo-Platonic metaphysical work) which Albert considers authentically Aristotelian. This work, fueled by theoretical elements drawn from pseudo-Dionysius, strongly influenced Albert’s understanding of Aristotle. For more on this topic, see Henryk Anzulewicz, “Die Emanationslehre des Albertus Magnus: Genese, Gestalt und Bedeutung”, in Via Alberti. Texte- Quellen- Interpretationen, eds. Ludger Honnefelder, Hannes Möhle, and Susanna Bullido del Barrio, 219–249 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2009). See also Thérèse Bonin, Creation as Emanation: The Origin of Diversity in Albert the Great’s on the Causes and the Procession of the Universe (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2001). On the relationship between philosophy and theology in Albert’s account of celestial causalities, see David Twetten, “Albert the Great, Double Truth, and Celestial Causality”, Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione Filosofica Medievale 12 (2001): 275–358. 51 Albert is commenting on [Ps.-] Dionysius Areopagita, De divinis nominibus , PG 3 641D. 52 Cf. Henryk Anzulewicz, “Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita und das Strukturprinzip des Denkens von Albert dem Großen”, in Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter. Internationales Kolloquium in Sophia vom 8. bis 11 April 1999 unter der Schirmherrschaft der Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, eds. Tsocho Boiadjiev, Georgi Kapriev, 251–295: 258 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), and Anzulewicz, “Die platonische Tradition bei Albertus Magnus”, 235, on Albert’s criticism against the eternity of matter, see ibid., 239, and Rodolfi, Il concetto di materia, 132–133.

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Concerning the procession of things from the First Principle, Plato’s theory differs from Aristotle’s. Plato claimed that all forms derive from the giver (a datore), and the same was held by Avicenna who labels ‘intelligence’ what Plato called the ‘giver of forms’. […] However, since intelligence cannot host particular forms, it contains them as universal forms in a way of unity (uno modo) and, then, diffuses into matter, in a way of unity for its part, through the motion of the orb of the Moon. Nevertheless, the forms are not received by matter in the same way, but the material part that is most distant from the mover receives less of the species, and, being thick and dense, becomes earth. The closer an element gets to the orb of the Moon, the more it receives a noble form among those of the elements. […] And this is what Plato meant when he claimed that all forms are given by the giver according to the right of matter. They did not want, however, the same number of forms that are in the intelligence to come to be in matter, but to have new ones created by them in matter, with nothing of them pre-existing, because they believed that creation is nothing more than producing a thing without presupposing anything prior to its essence.53

According to Albert’s interpretation, the Platonici hold that forms in nature mirror a correlative universal form within the Intelligence or the mind of the “giver of forms”. The form is given and realized in natural beings according to the receptive capacity of matter. Depending on the greater or lesser proximity to the prime mover, the material substrate receives one form rather than another. The Platonic-Avicennian idea of the dator formarum, an external agent that creates forms from nothing and introduces them into matter which, albeit adequately prepared to receive them, remains an inert, passive substrate, unable to interact with

53 Albertus Magnus, De divinis nominibus , 2, 44 (ed. Simon, 72: 35–40, 73: 13– 22 and 28–35): «[…] de processione rerum a primo est duplex opinio, unius quarum auctor fuit Plato, alterius vero Aristoteles. Plato quidem dixit formas omnes esse a datore, et hoc idem dixit Avicenna, nominans intelligentiam id quod Plato datorem formarum appellaverat. […] Quia tamen in intelligentia non possunt esse formae particulares, sunt in ipsa ut universales uno modo, et explicat eas in materiam uno modo ex parte sui per motum orbis lunae. Tamen non eodem modo recipiuntur in materia, sed pars materiae, quae magis elongata a motore recipit minus de specie et est constricta et densa et efficitur terra, et secundum quod elementum approprinquat ad orbem lunae, recipit nobiliorem formam quantum ad formas elementorum. […] Et hoc est quod Plato dixit, quod formae omnes dantur a datore secundum meritum materiae. Non autem volebant, quod illae eadem numero formae quae sunt in intelligentia fierent in materia, sed quod creabantur novae ab illis in materia, in qua nihil earum praeextitit, quia secundum eos creatio nihil aliud est quam factio rei non preaesupposito aliquo suae essentiae».

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the form, is certainly not akin to Albert’s theological horizon.54 However, thanks to a theoretical remodeling of the concept of meritum materiae, he is able to assimilate the second stage of the Platonic-Avicennian model, explaining natural generation in the light of correspondence between form and the right of matter to receive it.55 To clarify the procession of things from God, instead, Albert deems Aristotle’s opinion more akin to the Catholic faith.56 Albert explains that the First is the efficient, formal, final, and exemplary cause of all things and, therefore, even of the forms one finds in matter. To demonstrate the relationship between the exemplary nature of the First and the diversity of forms in matter, Albert appeals to teleology in nature: The First, the efficient cause of all things, contains exemplary forms of all things. We see that every nature is for the sake of something and that regularly attains its end ( finis ) through natural movements and operations. 54 Avicenna resorts to the notion of appropriate preparation, according to which matter, following the influence of the celestial spheres, is endowed with a design (rasm, in Arabic) which, together with the balance of the complexion, determines the right of matter to receive one particular form rather than another. On the affinities and analogies between Albert’s and Avicenna’s explanatory models, see Olga Lizzini, “Flusso, preparazione appropriata e inchoatio formae: brevi osservazioni su Avicenna e Alberto Magno”, in Medioevo e filosofia: per Alfonso Maierù, eds. Massimiliano Lenzi, Cesare A. Musatti, and Luisa Valente, 129–150: 133–135 (Roma: Viella, 2013), and Ead., Fluxus (fayd). Indagine sui fondamenti della metafisica e della fisica di Avicenna (Bari: Edizioni di Pagina, 2011), 19–22. 55 Elsewhere too, Albert interprets the meritum materiae as the reciprocal proportion between the qualities of the mixed body and the configuration of the heavens. The more the body moves away from this proportion, the more obscure the participation in the goodness of the divine ray will be, and therefore its form will be less noble. Cf. Albertus Magnus, De divinis nominibus , 4, 35 (ed. Simon, 141: 17–41): «Dicendum […] quod radius divinae bonitatis occumbit totus in anima sensibili […]. Causa autem, quare occumbit radius, est materia sua, et dico materiam suam corpus suum, cuius est perfectio, quoniam secundum se totam extrahitur de potentia materiae. […] Quando enim corpus mixtum accedit ad aequalitatem similem aequalitati caeli, ut dicit Avicenna, consequitur formam similem intelligentiae, quae est forma caeli, quae est anima rationalis, homo enim est temperatissimae complexionis inter animalia, et ideo habet optimum tactum. Quanto vero plus receditur a tali aequalitate, consequitur formam ignobiliorem et obscuriorem participationem divini radii, quia formae dantur secundum meritum materiae, ut dixit Plato». 56 Id., De divinis nominibus , 2, 45 (ed. Simon, 73: 41–43): «Et ideo sequimur opinionem Aristotelis, quae magis videtur catholica. Dicit igitur Aristoteles in XI Metaphysicae quod primum se habet in habitudine triplici causae ad res, scilicet efficientis, formalis, exemplaris et finalis […]».

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This would not happen if the intentions of all natural perfections did not pre-exist in a guiding principle: if an archer did not conceive the purpose of the arrow’s movement and did not direct it to it, he would not hit his target. Such forms are not introduced in matter from the outside but pre-exist in there in potency.57

Natural beings reach their end since they are guided by a preliminary purpose (intentio) that directs them to their natural perfection. Similarly, matter is directed toward the form by the aptitudo or intentio that is already inherent and does not come from the outside. For the First Principle, by creative activity, produces matter with its incipient forms: Once we have added that the First, for the effectiveness of His agency, produces all reality in matter and form, so that the potentialities for form (potentiae ad formas ) shall be in the matter by creation, this position will correspond to the Catholic doctrine. In this perspective, we understand what Dionysius says here, namely that the First proceeds (procedit ) in all that He causes in an exemplary and efficient way, but not in an essential way (essentialiter), even though some moderns argue that the essence of each form is created, and its existence is due to the action of nature.58

In order to harmonize Aristotelian doctrine and Catholic faith, one has to postulate that the potentiae ad formas also exist in the world per creationem. They are what ensure that matter shall be teleologically directed toward its proper form. By the act of creation, just like He did with irrational animals, God gave purpose and direction to these potential forms. Therefore, they are not introduced into matter from outside, nor

57 Id., De divinis nominibus , 2, 45 (ed. Simon, 73: 48–62): «[…] oportet in primo, quod efficienter causat omnes res, esse formas omnium rerum exemplares. Videmus enim omnem naturam esse propter aliquid et certitudinarie consequi suum finem per motus et actiones naturales; et hoc non posset esse, nisi intentiones omnium perfectionum naturalium praeexisterent in aliquo dirigente, sicut si sagittator non conciperet finem motus sagittae ac dirigeret in illum sagitta non feriret ad aliquid rectum. Huiusmodi autem formae non inducuntur in materiam ab extrinseco, sed praeextiterunt in ea in potentia». 58 Ibid. (ed. Simon, 74: 7–18): «Cum autem huic positioni addiderimus, quod primum

propter efficaciam suae actionis producit totam rem secundum materiam et formam, erit opinio catholica, et tunc potentiae ad formas erunt in materia per creationem. Et secundum hoc intelligitur quod hic dicit Dionysius, quod primum procedit in omnia causata exemplariter et efficienter et non essentialiter, licet quidam modernorum dicant, quod essentia omnis formae est per creationem, sed esse est per actionem naturae».

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are they created anew by the agency of the intelligences, rather they exist, along with matter and form, since the Creation.59 Albert stages a short question to clarify how it is possible that diversity in natural forms stems from a unique act of creation. One of the opponents wonders where the diversity of living forms come from («Si res diversimode se habent ad ipsum, unde venit ista diversitas?»), as it seems unlikely that this would derive directly from the First Principle, which univocally embraces the forms of all things («quia modus ipsius est uno quo se habet ad omnes res»). The same opponens puts forward a two-sided hypothesis: the diversity of the being of creatures could depend either (i) on the diversity of forms (ex parte formarum) or (ii) on the diversity of matter (ex parte materiae). This latter option is excluded a priori, since the opponens relies on the premise that a single matter exists, acting as a substrate for the generation and corruption of all creatures.60 From a theological standpoint, Albert solves the issue of the diversity of natural forms in relation to the First Principle by appealing to the concept of participation. Alain de Libera stresses that, by bringing about causal unification in God (the efficient, formal, and final cause of creation), Albert laid the foundations to explain the relationship between Creator and creatures in terms of an analogy of reception secundum subiectum.61 Although God and all his perfections are transcendent, they are nevertheless participated in by creatures insofar as they are capable of receiving them: When it is said that God is present in all things in one way while things are not with Him in one way, it must be understood that He is not far from anything and that He gives all things the condition of being and permanence in being, but things do not receive it in one way but in different ways and degrees. The procession from Him is unique but there are many ‹ways

59 Cf. Anzulewicz, “Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita und das Strukturprinzip”, 258. 60 Albertus Magnus, De divinis nominibus , 3, 7 (ed. Simon, 105: 32–44): «Praeterea,

si res diversimode se habent ad ipsum, unde venit ista diversitas? Non enim potest esse a primo efficiente, quia modus ipsius est unus, quo se habet ad omnes res. Si autem dicatur, quod est diversitas ex parte formarum, adhuc redit eadem quaestio, unde sit diversitas formarum, cum omnes sint ab uno principio. Si autem dicatur, quod est ex parte materiae, hoc non potest esse, quia materia est una omnium generabilium et substractis ab ipsa omnibus formis non remanet in ipsa aliqua diversitas, ergo videtur quod deus se habet uno modo ad res, ita res uno modo assunt ei» (italics mine). 61 Cf. de Libera, Albert le Grand et la Philosophie, 95–100.

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of receiving him›: many because some things participate only in being, others associate living with being, others also associate perception, others, then, make use of reason, others, then, add to all this the intellect, participating in the goodness of the First as far as the creature can participate. What is unitary is shared in different ways. Intellectual and rational realities participate differently in His wisdom, and the sensible realities participate through an obscure reflection, it is like the Sun, acting in the same way on all lower realities, which, however, do not receive it to the same extent.62

In nature, the diversity of beings is due, then, to the capability of receiving being from the First. All the natural forms derive from the First Cause with a unique act of procession, these, however, diversify in their mode of existence according to their capacity for existence. This is made clear by the fact that in nature, life manifests itself according to gradations, as expressed by the chain of vivere, sentire, ratiocinari, and intelligere. As already mentioned, according to Albert’s metaphysics, a hierarchically ordered universe proceeds from God’s creation. All the creatures are ordered into grades of perfection. In the sublunary world, those beings that participate in intellectual and rational activities are at the top of the hierarchy, they are followed by beings performing only sensitive functions. The lowest grade is occupied by creatures able only to perform vegetative activities. Contrary to the second argument of the opponens, Albert argues that, secundum philosophiam, the diversity of existence depends precisely on matter and explains how the relationship with the procession of forms and the capacity for receiving them works: Philosophically speaking, the cause of diversity is matter with quantity (materia cum quantitate). From quantity, matter obtains differences in

62 Albertus Magnus, De divinis nominibus , 3, 7 (ed. Simon, 105: 45–61): «[…] cum dicitur: deus adest omnibus uno modo, omnia autem non uno modo assunt ei, sicut intelligendum est, quod ipse non abest ab aliqua re, dans omnibus esse et permanentiam, res vero non recipiunt uno modo ab ipso, sed diversimode, et secundum unam processionem eius et secundum plures, secundum plures quidem, quia quaedam participat tantum esse, quadam vero cum hoc vivere, quaedam vero cum his etiam sentire, quaedam vero ulterius ratiocinari et quaedam cum his etiam intelligere, partecipantia de bonitatibus primi, quidquid partecipabile est a creatura, secundum unam vero diversimode, sicut sapientiam ipsius aliter participant intellectualia et aliter rationalia, et secundum obscuram resonantiam sensibilia, sicut etiam sol eodem modo agit in inferiora, quae non eodem modo recipiunt ipso».

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position, and according to the different position of its parts, it receives different forms. That portion of matter which is perfectly proportionated to the celestial movement that inflames and destroys receives heat and rarity (caliditatem et raritatem) and the noblest form, i.e., the form of fire. The more distant matter is, the less noble the form it receives. If, however, we speak according to theology, we should add to this another cause, namely the wisdom of the First Artisan, from whose government the diversity of forms derives.63

From a philosophical perspective, the diversity of natural forms depends on two causes: (i) the quantity of matter and (ii) the geographical place (situs ) where such form takes place. Due to an analogical relationship with the formae inchoatae in matter, the heavenly motion fosters the nobility of the form to which that particular matter tends. Secundum theologiam, too, the diversity of natural forms is due (i) to matter with its formae inchoatae (or cum quantitate) and (ii) to the celestial intelligence as ordering agents of generation and corruption. From the theological point of view, however, the causal system that explains the functioning of generation and corruption in the sublunary world is framed within an ordering cause embracing all celestial motions, i.e., the sapientia primi opificis, the order of the divine Providence, source of the manifold manifestations of being. Albert concludes the quaestio by arguing that the formae inchoatae belong to matter from the moment of creation, their realization within a form is not an occasional, supererogatory donation. Instead, it is the result of harmony between the impulse received by the celestial intelligences and the incipient form already present in matter. The celestial intelligences regulate and guarantee the continuity of generation according to 63 Ibid. (ed. Simon, 105: 74–85): «[…] secundum philosophiam loquendo causa diversitatis est materia cum quantitate. Ex quantitate enim materia sortitur diversum situm, et secundum diversum situm partium eius recipit diversas formas: quae enim perfecte proportionatur prope motum caeli, cuius est inflammare et dissolvere, recipit caliditatem et raritatem et formam nobiliorem, quae est forma ignis, et secundum quod plus elongatur, recipit formam minus nobilem. Si autem loquamur secundum theologiam, oportet huic addere aliam causam, scilicet sapientiam primi opificis, ex cuius ordinatione est diversitas formarum». Cf. also ibid. (ed. Simon, 102: 73–81): «[…] sicut dicit Philosophus in XVI de animalibus, eadem virtus quae prius est formativa corporis, efficitur postmodum conservativa et regitiva, sed non habet actum regentis et conservantis, nisi prius expleverit actum formantis, cum igitur per huiusmodi dona quasi formetur res in esse a virtute divina, videtur quod actus providentiae, cuis est conservare, non habet locum nisi post dationem horum donorum».

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the divine providential design. However, they are not the cause of the forms which are already present—albeit confusedly and indistinctly—in sublunar matter. In his Summa theologiae, Albert further discusses the correlation between celestial and natural causality clarifying the relationship between these and divine providence. Inspired by the argumentative style and contents of the twelfth book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Albert once again reviews the divergent philosophical opinions concerning the origin of natural forms and the principles governing their coming-to-be.64 The first position, attributed to Anaxagoras, postulates the existence of latent forms (latentia formarum) in matter.65 According to the Atomists, forms are nothing but movements resulting from the configurations of atoms (motus figuras atomorum consequentes ).66 A third philosophical opinion, loosely ascribed to Socrates and Plato, is the doctrine of a dator formarum which bestows onto matter the semina from which natural forms develop.67 The fourth and final position, on the one hand, encloses 64 Id., Summa theologiae II, q. 4, art. 1 (ed. Borgnet, 80a). Albeit in his commentary on Metaphysica Albert takes advantage of Avicenna’s and Averroes’ previous commentaries and shows his awareness of the disagreements between the two, this passage from his Summa theologiae does not seem to acknowledge the criticism raised by Averroes against Avicenna about the role of the dator formarum in natural generation. On the reception of the contrast between Avicenna and Averroes in Albert’s Metaphysica, see Amos Bertolacci, “Avicenna’s and Averroes’s Interpretations and Their Influence in Albertus Magnus”, in A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, eds. Fabrizio Amerini and Gabriele Galluzzo, 95–135 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014). As regards Averroes’ criticism regarding the role of the dator formarum in natural generation, see Gad Freudenthal, “The Medieval Astrologization of Aristotle’s Biology: Averroes on the Role of the Celestial Bodies in the Generation of Animate Beings”, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 12 (2002): 111–137. 65 Albertus Magnus, Summa theologiae II, q. 4, art. 1 (ed. Borgnet, 80a): «Quidam posuerunt latentiam, sicut Anaxagoras, et sui sequaces: et dixerunt omnia in omnibus esse infinite, sicut infinitus sanguis in aqua, et infinitum vinum in vite et in humore vitis, et infinitum oleum in oliva et in humore olivae, et infinitos homines in homine et in humore hominis, et semen hominis esse homines parvos, non distinctos per membra […]. Hi dicebant generationem non esse mutationem de non esse in esse, sed segregationem distincti et manifesti de latenti et occulto». 66 Ibid., 80b: «Alii dixerunt, sicut Democritus et Leucippus, et eorum sequaces, quod principium omnium atomi sunt, in vacuo ab aeterno discurrentes, et formas esse omnium non nisi figuras, et actus formarum sive ad vitam, sive ad caeteros actus, non esse nisi motus figuras atomorum consequentes […]». 67 Ibid., 81a: «Post dictas opinionis de formis, […] supervenit Socratis et Platonis opinio, dicentium omnes formas esse a datore formarum efficienter, formaliter autem a

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and expands the doctrine attributed to Anaxagoras, according to which matter is a receptacle for indistinct and confused forms, on the other hand, it incorporates Empedocles’ doctrine of the two cosmic forces, love and strife, responsible for the dynamics of natural generation.68 Albert overcomes this plurality of theories on the origin of natural forms by presenting his own inchoatio formae doctrine (which, however, he ascribes to Aristotle). The union of matter and form is due to the principia formalia et effectiva of matter which, according to the analogical bond with form, direct matter to the acquisition of this or that form.69 These formal and productive principles perform their configurative action by using as their instrument the heat of celestial motions and the elemental mixture in order to transmute matter into a particular species: According to him (i.e., Aristotle), these principles derive from three sources: [i] from the heat or celestial power, which embraces the power of the First mover, of the second mover, of the third, and so on, this power is inserted into matter as a reflection of the celestial light in matter and, thanks to such power, those principles which are in matter move and alter it toward this or that species. [ii] It also derives from the powers of the elements, such as the heat of the fire that digests and purifies matter, the spiritual humidity of the air that blows in it and conveys the power throughout, the bodily humidity of the water which coalesces all the parts of matter, and the earthly dryness which keeps together shape and firmness ( figura et consistentia) of the parts of matter. [iii] Finally, it derives from the formative power whose origin is in the generating individual

formis per se existentibus, quarum sementem dator formarum facit, et diis deorum tradit […]». 68 Ibid., 81b–82a: «Post ista Anaxagorae venit tractatus, qui dixit, quod omnium materia erat confusum quid et chaos ex omnium formis indistinctis et non continuatis ad propria subjecta […]. Empedocles autem et Melissus et collega eorum Parmenides dicebant, quod distinguens oportuit esse in materia: supponebant enim, quod omne distinguens in aliquo, in ipso est si naturale est: et ideo dicebant, quod lis et amicitia distinguebant formas in mixto, separando et congregando: amicitiam enim dicebant congruentiam cognatorum ad unum et idem constituendum naturaliter convenientium: litem autem disconvenientiam oppositorum repugnantium ad unum et idem constituendum». 69 Ibid., 82a: «Omnia haec superveniens correxit Aristoteles, dicens formam esse in

materia in potentia formali et effectiva: quamvis enim materia secundum quod materia est, nullo modo potest esse causa formae, sicut nec e converso forma potest esse causa materiae secundum esse et substantiam: tamen in materia sunt quaedam principia formalia et effectiva, quae faciunt materiam esse huius materiam vel illius secundum analogiam quam habet ad hanc formam vel illam».

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and resides in the seed from which the generation takes place. In this, there is concatenation (complexus ), like that of fate: power and information from the formative power move almost instrumentally (quasi instrumentaliter) through the elementary powers. The elementary powers have an instrumental disposition, depending on the celestial powers. And, over all these realities, the First cause rules, according to the providential design which brings every single thing into being, producing the donkey with one reason (ratio), the horse with another, as Augustine claims, except for the rational or intellectual soul that God, the First cause, produces in His image and likeness, and not in image or likeness of celestial, or elementary, or formative powers of generating individuals.70

Through a concatenated system of formal determination, the principia guide the matter to acquire three kinds of forms (elementary, compound, and animated), whose formal actions follow one or the other. (i) The simplest is ad imaginem vel similitudinem virtutum coelestium. The heat of celestial powers triggers the formal and productive principles present in matter which, in turn, modify the material substrate, directing it toward one form or another («principia quae sunt in materia movent et mutant materiam ad hanc speciem vel illam»). (ii) A more complex natural form is the one which is produced in the image and likeness of the virtutes elementales. Using the heat

70 Ibid., 82b: «Et haec principia secundum eum colliguntur ex tribus, [i] scilicet ex calore vel virtute coelesti, in quibus est virtus motoris primi, et motoris secundi, et tertii et sic deinceps: quae virtus immittitur materiae per respectum luminis coelestis ad materiam, et virtute cuius principia quae sunt in materia, movent et mutant materiam ad hanc speciem vel illam. [ii] Colligitur etiam ex virtutibus elementalibus, sicut calore ignis digerente et purificante materiam, spirituali humido aeris spirante in materia et undique deferente virtutem, corporali humido aquae continuante partes materiae, et terrestri siccitate contintente in figura et consistentia partes materiae. [iii] Colligitur etiam ex formativa quae est ex generante in semine ex quo fit generatio. Et est in his complexus sicut in fato: formativa enim movet virtute et informatione quasi instrumentaliter virtutibus elementalibus. Virtutes elementales instrumentaliter se habent ad virtutes coelestes. Et in his omnibus principatur causa prima secundum providentiam qua singula producit ad esse, alia ratione producens asinum, et alia equum, ut dicit Augustinus: praeter hoc solum, quod animam rationalem sive intellectualem secundum seipsum producit prima causa Deus ad imaginem et similitudinem suam, non ad imaginem vel similitudinem virtutum coelestium, vel elementalium, vel formativarum generantium».

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produced by the mixture of elementary forms, these act on matter, guaranteeing the mixture of the compound. (iii) The most articulated natural form, the living one, is the work of the virtus formativa present in the generative seed («formativa est ex generante in semine ex quo fit generatio»), which uses instrumentally the virtutes elementales in order to configure a natural form “in the image and likeness of the formative powers of generating individuals”. Such a chain of multi-layered formal determinations of matter acts within and according to the broader framework of divine providence and fate («Et est in his complexus sicut in fato […]»).71 Building on the Boethian definition of fatum as complexio causarum, Albert connects the form as the order of existence and life of the lower realities with the higher divine providential plan.The causal chain of fatum establishes the vinculum between the various natural phenomena, which guarantees stability, regularity, and harmony in the lower realities.72 Natural forms, therefore, are neither latent in matter nor created ex nihilo by the giver of forms: they are in matter as virtus formativa. Such virtus is not only a formal disposition toward elementary or very simple compounds (such as minerals and stones) but also toward those more complex forms, i.e., the animated beings. Even the virtus formativa in the seed of men (whose rational soul is the only one not to be brought forth from matter but created directly by God) is disposed and proportioned to the human form and not to the form of another animal.73 Within this horizon, phenomena of spontaneous generation and generation through putrefaction (in which material and formal principles are 71 Ibid. 72 Cf. Palazzo “Albert the Great’s Doctrine of Fate”. According to Albert, the basic

propensities, shared by every living being, consist of self-preservation and giving continuity to the species. Plants, animals, and humans accomplish these goals in different ways and according to an increasing level of complexity. Non-human living beings perform selfpreservation-oriented functions not as agents of their actions but guided by nature, and ultimately oriented by divine providence. See Amalia Cerrito, “Alberto Magno e la logica del vivente”, in Nature imperfette. Umano subumano e animale nel pensiero di Alberto Magno, ed. Stefano Perfetti, 101–126 (Pisa: ETS, 2020). For an overview on Albert’s doctrine on divine providence see Mikko Posti, Medieval Theories of Divine Providence 1250–1350 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2020), 69–77. 73 Albertus Magnus, De divinis nominibus , 4, 12 (ed. Simon, 355: 16–23).

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not easily distinguishable) also find their meaning. For the purposes of this reconstruction, it is helpful to clarify the theoretical framework that supports the justification of generations of this type of substance. These phenomena occur because any realization of form in matter, even within “spontaneous generation”, is the result of the agreement between the generating (be it equivocal or univocal) and the actual principles of matter. These are not bestowed, when needed, by a superior and universal agent but are resident in the world per creationem. Albert explains that the Providence of the First Cause bestows (dat ) the being through a creative act, providing matter with residing generative principia.74 There would be no generatio ex putrefactione if the matter of generable beings were not previously endowed with principles capable of reproducing a convenientia, i.e., suitability, with the generating individual. The elaboration of the doctrine of inchoatio formae connects and resolves several theoretical tensions: on the one hand, it proposes an alternative to explanatory models of natural generation that saw matter as a receptacle of latent forms, already complete and in actuality, and on the other, it overcomes all models based on the absolute separation between form and matter (inert and deprived of any possibility of interaction with formal action). In Albert’s theological outlook, this latter model is also incompatible with the contingent character of natural generation. Postulating a completely formless matter implies occasionalism: all mundane formal determinations would be caused by ad hoc interventions of God or other superior agents whose action would be the proper cause of the necessary relationship with the effect. For Albert, the fact that the dynamics of natural generation are only possible and not necessary functions as a fortiori macro-argument to avoid deterministic or occasionalistic drifts.75 In other words, if even the dynamics by which natural

74 Albertus Magnus, Summa theologiae, II, tr. 1, q. 1 (ed. Borgnet, 82b-83a): «[…] dicit Aristoteles in XI primae philosophiae quod omnis generatio est ex convenienti. Et hoc multipliciter ibidem probatur in commento, tam in generatis univoce, sive per se, quam in generatis aequivoce, sicut ex putrefactione, et monstris quae per occasionem fiunt. In omnibus enim haec principia influxa sunt in materia generabilium, ex quibus ipsa materia fit conveniens ad hanc formam vel illam: et per quae ipsa forma producitur in esse. Et si quis subtiliter hoc inspiciat, prima causa in his principatum tenens, ex providentia sua et largitate bonitatis eius, in omnibus dat esse formae per creationem, quia creatio est proprius actus eius». 75 In all his theoretical treatments of fatum, Albert specifies that the influence of fate does not necessitate human behavior. Fate does not determine, rather it inclines: its action

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forms are determined in matter, although guided by divine providence, are capable of equivocal generations, a fortiori, the influence of fatum both on generation and on the human soul is not necessitating. Albert’s notion of virtus formativa resolves this tension. As has been shown, the system of formal determination of matter, although connected to the influence of fatum, allows configurations that do not conform to the order of nature (such as spontaneous or monstrous generations) but are, nevertheless, not alien to it. In Albert’s philosophical and theological perspective, both the regularity and the very contingency of natural generation are guaranteed by the virtus formativa. Through a transversal analysis of Albert’s works (and negotiating the variable lexicon that he uses to deal with the inchoatio formae), it is possible to articulate its basic tenets. In matter, right from the creative act, there is a formal propensity, an inchoatio formae, which expresses different degrees of complexity. This is connected to the divine providential plan and not infused by the motion of the heavens, with which, instead, it manifests an analogical bond of suitability (convenientia). The beginning of form is antecedent to the complete form but is not identified with it, the inchoatio formae disappears once matter reaches its proper form, it is a principle of material production, a virtus formativa.

does not determine the human intellect or the matter of lower beings (such as plants or animals). See Palazzo, “Albert the Great’s Doctrine of Fate”, 69 and id., “Dupliciter autem ponitur fatum. La questione sul fato nella tarda Summa theologiae di Alberto Magno”, Divus Thomas 122/2 (2019): 219–261.

CHAPTER 3

Virtus Formativa and Human Embryology

In his metaphysical and theological works, Albert the Great describes the virtus formativa as a productive form that, even though devoid of ontological continuity with the soul in actuality, allows the matter to acquire the configuration suitable to its substantial form. When the matter acquires its proper shape, the formative power disappears, making room for the completely actualized form. Created by God and infused into the matter at the time of Creation, the formative power can reproduce different virtual contents, reflecting the archetypical model. Its formative movement is guided by the divine Providence, which guarantees the proportionality in “model-copy” dynamics and, thus, the emergence of a variety of natural forms.1 Albert’s doctrine of formative power further develops in dialogue with the natural-philosophical, medical, and theological embryological doctrines available in the thirteenth century. At the time, the study of the configuration of the living being was not confined to a single discipline but was the place of confluence between different fields of knowledge.2 Natural philosophy and medicine explained embryonic formation as a 1 See supra, Sects. 2.2 and 2.3, passim. 2 Cf. Maaike Van der Lugt, “Formed Fetuses and Healty Children in Scholastic

Theology, Medicine and Law”, in Reproduction: Antiquity to the Present Day, eds. Nick

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Cerrito, Albert the Great (c. 1193–1280) and the Configuration of the Embryo, Palgrave Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Medicine, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24023-2_3

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progressive development of bodily and psychic functions (i.e., epigenesis). This explanatory model, however, was at variance with the theological assumption that only God infuses the rational soul into the embryo when its body is fully configured. What is, thus, responsible for the dynamics of the configuration of the embryo before its ensoulment? Albert the Great stands out among the thirteenth-century Latin authors for his attempt to answer these questions through an interdisciplinary approach. His embryological doctrine aims at combining the medical and natural-philosophical model of epigenesis with the Christian doctrine of the creatio ex nihilo of the human soul, infused into the embryo only once perfectly formed.3 To overcome the inconsistencies between the theological and natural-philosophical explanations, Albert focuses on the dynamics of configuration of the embryo. This allows him to explain how the morphological and functional structures are handed down from generator to generated, without presupposing the transmission of the soul. The principle responsible for these dynamics is the virtus formativa. Albeit Albert presents himself as a mere interpreter of Aristotelian natural philosophy, in his commentary on De animalibus (1258), he introduces sources, doctrines, and notions that go beyond Aristotelian epistemology. This happens mainly within the discussion on human generation, where, through digressions, amplifications, and glosses, Albert voices doctrines on generation alternative to that of Aristotle.4 Albert also takes the opportunity to reformulate Galenic doctrines, such as that of virtus formativa. He aims to update the Aristotelian corpus by making it receptive to thirteenth-century philosophical and theological debates. The Hopwood, Rebecca Flemming, and Lauren Kassell, 167–180 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 3 Cf. Katja Krause, “Albert the Great on Animal and Human Origin in His Early Works”, Lo sguardo. Rivista di filosofia 18/2 (2015): 205–232. The first, pioneering, investigation on Albert’s embryology, as it is presented in his De animalibus , was offered by Joseph Needham, A History of Embryology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934), 86–91. 4 In their study on Albert’s embryology, Luke Demaitre and Anthony Travill claim that Albert’s theory of animal generation is essentially Aristotelian. Nevertheless, they recognize Albert’s progressive effort to incorporate within the Aristotelian epistemological framework, the recently available Galenic sources indirectly obtained through the mediation of Arabic authors. Luke Demaitre-Anthony Travill, “Human Embryology and Development in the Works of Albertus Magnus”, in Albertus Magnus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays 1980, ed. James Weisheipl, 405–440, esp. 416–417 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1980).

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embryological discourse offers a unique theoretical space where doctrines and concerns from different disciplines fruitfully interact. This chapter reconstructs how Albert gives a coherent account of embryo morphogenesis that harmonizes theological and philosophical perspectives by creatively resorting to medical and natural-philosophical explanatory models of human generation. To fully understand the novelty of Albert’s doctrine of formative power, the first two sections will offer a reconstruction of the medical and natural-philosophical sources about the formative power and an overview of such notion within twelfthand thirteenth- century theological discussions on human embryology. The last three sections will deal with Albert’s reformulation and development of the doctrine of formative power by investigating his natural philosophical and theological works.

3.1 The Virtus Formativa and the Formation of the Embryo: Medical and Natural-Philosophical Sources Within Albert’s De animalibus libri XXVI (which are, partly, a paraphrastic commentary on Michael Scot’s Latin translation from Arabic of Aristotle’s History of Animals , Parts of Animals , and Generation of Animals ), the Latin syntagm virtus formativa occurs quite often.5 However, Albert does not provide a precise and univocal reconstruction of this notion, and the authorial attribution is inconsistent depending on the context. In certain passages, Albert attributes the authorship to Avicenna, and in others, to Galen, Theophrastus, or Porphyry.6

5 The digitalized Stadler’s edition of Albert’s De animalibus is available at Alberti Magni e-corpus (http://albertusmagnus.uwaterloo.ca). In the De animalibus, the Latin syntagm virtus formativa in the nominative case appears over fifty times. The number of mentions significantly rises if one considers related syntagms, semantic variants, and inflected forms. 6 Cf. Albertus Magnus, De animalibus XVI, 1, 4 (ed. Stadler, 1074): «Haec autem verba sumpsit Avicenna ab eo philosopho quem Theodorum Arabes et Graeci vocant: hic enim dixit semen habere animae actum, quem actum quidam vocant animam. Actum autem hunc vocant formativam animati impressam semini ab anima generantis»., ibid., IX, 2, 3 (ed. Stadler, 714): «[…] dicimus quod in veritate mulier aliqua in coitu et conceptu emittit aliquando humorem album viscosum et philosum, quem sperma muliebre vocat Galienus, et cui dat virtutem informativam, non formativam, sicut in antehabitis scientiae animalium libris ostendimus»., ibid., III, 2, 8 (ed. Stadler, 346): «[…] antiquissimi

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But Albert never attributes it directly to Aristotle, as if to warn of its extraneousness to Aristotelian embryology. Indeed, in Aristotle’s doctrine of human generation, there is no mention of a formative power pointedly devoted to embryonic formation. According to Aristotle, the formation of the embryo is a kinetic process: by way of the seed, the nutritive soul of the father communicates the motus nutritivus to the nutritive soul of the embryo, ensuring its growth and preservation. The various stages of embryonic development do not depend on a particular power deriving from the paternal semen which is capable of generating or forming the embryo but on the nutritional soul of the embryo itself.7 The first reference to a formative power, as dynamis diaplastik¯e of the seed, can be traced back to Galen. Located in both male and female seminal vessels, the dynamis shapes the embryo’s body.8 Galen’s tripartite system of dynameis (i.e., virtus vitalis, virtus naturalis, and virtus animalis ) establishes a correspondence between the immaterial faculties of the soul and the body. The virtus vitalis is located in the heart and pertains the vegetative activities, the virtus naturalis, located both in the liver and in the generative vessels, has the function of the conservation of the individual and of the species, the virtus animalis, located in the brain, is responsible for sensation and movement. In this system, the formative power is a specific function of the virtus naturalis that manages

Aristotelis discipuli sicut Theofrastus et Porfirius distinxerunt inter virtutem informativam et virtutem formativam, dicentes quod virtus informativa, sive quod melius dicitur informabilis, est virtus in qua forma formatur, et est in materia […]». 7 Cf. David Lefebvre, “Looking for the Formative Power in Aristotle Nutritive Soul”,

in Nutrition and Nutritive Soul in Aristotle and Aristotelianism, eds. Giouli Korobili and Roberto Lo Presti, 101–126 (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter 2021). For an accurate reconstruction of Aristotle’s doctrine on generation, see Andrea Falcon and David Lefebvre, Aristotle’s Generation of Animals . A Critical Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 8 Cf. Roberto Lo Presti, “Informing Matter and Enmattered Forms: Aristotle and Galen

on the ‘Power’ of the Seed”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 5 (2014): 929– 950, esp. 943–944. On the anatomy of the reproductive organs in Galenic thought and its reception in the Middle Ages, see Danielle Jacquart and Claude Thomasset, Sexualité et savoir médical au Moyen Âge (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985), 67–84 and James Wilberding, “Embryology”, in A Companion to Science, Technology, and Medicine in Ancient Greece and Rome, ed. Georgia L. Irby, 329–342 (Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell, 2016).

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the molding of the embryo’s bodily parts, assigning them their proper functions and specific complexions.9 In the thirteenth century, Galen’s notion of the molding faculty of the seed circulated in the Latin-speaking world thanks to Constantine the African and to the translation from Arabic into Latin of Avicenna’s works. Even though Albert is not a physician, he devotes several passages of his works (both philosophical and theological) to discussing medical authorities and doctrines, showing a thorough knowledge of the most significant medical texts available at the time.10 In particular, he was familiar with the major contemporary medical textbooks such as Constantine the African’s Pantegni, a compendium of Hellenistic and Islamic medicine (for the most part, a translation from the Kit¯ ab al-Malaki by Persian physician Haly Abbas).11 Moreover, before commenting on Aristotle’s treatises on animals, Albert was already acquainted with the 9 Cf. Robert J. Hankinson, “Philosophy of Nature”, in The Cambridge Companion to Galen, ed. id., 210–241 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) and Diethard Nickel, Untersuchungen zur Embryologie Galens (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag: 1989). On the distinction and localization of the faculties of the soul in medical and philosophical thought, see Heinrich von Staden, “Body, Soul, and the Nerves: Epicurus, Herophilus, Erasistratus, the Stoics, and Galen”, in Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind–Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightment, eds. John P. Wright and Paul Potter, 79–116 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), and Romana Martorelli Vico, “Anima e corpo nell’embriologia medievale”, in Anima e corpo nella cultura Medievale, eds. Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, 95–106 (Firenze: Sismel – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 1999). 10 Scholars still debate on where and how Albert acquired his medical knowledge. Several references scattered in his works suggest that he became acquainted with medicine at the University of Padua before joining the Dominican order. However, there is no evidence supporting Albert’s attendance of medicine courses. According to Siraisi, it is most likely that Albert learned medical doctrines through personal study. It is worth remembering that the Dominican Order, especially in its early years, was not hostile at all to medical learning, as demonstrated by the extensive medical knowledge of Albert’s confrères Roland of Cremona (ca. 1178–1259) and Guerric of St. Quentin (ca. 1225– 1243/1245). On Albert’s medical learning, see Nancy Siraisi, “The Medical Learning of Albertus Magnus”, in Albertus Magnus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays 1980, ed. James Weisheipl, 379–404 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1980). On Roland’s and Guerric’s medical training, see, respectively, Ayelet Even-Ezra, “Medicine and Religion in Early Dominican Demonology”, The Journal of Ecclesiastical History 4 (2018): 728–745, and Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964). 11 See Erik Kwakkel and Francis Newton, Medicine at Monte Cassino. Constantine the African and the Oldest Manuscript of His Pantegni (Turnhout: Brepols, 2019), and Brian Long, “Arabic-Latin Translations, Transmission and Transformation”, in Brill’s Companion

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structure and contents of Avicenna’s Canon medicinae, from which he draws anatomical information useful to supplement Aristotle’s teaching. In his Pantegni, Constantine offers the first translation of the Galenic dynamis diaplastik¯e in terms of virtus formativa. Following Galen, Constantine explains that two virtues manage the entire embryonic development, namely the virtus mutabilis , and the virtus formativa. The virtus mutabilis acts on the material substance of the embryo offered by both parents: it elaborates the paternal seminal fluid (sperma) and the maternal menstrual blood (menstruum), converting them into the substance of the embryo. When the first substance is formed, the virtus formativa shapes ( format ) each organ and assigns (designat ) it to its proper functions.12 In his Canon medicinae and his Abbreviatio super de animalibus , Avicenna frequently mentions a formative power (in Arabic, q¯ uwa mus.awwira) as a faculty of the soul that shapes the bodily matter according to specific purposes and uses.13 In the Latin version of the Canon, Avicenna refers to the virtus informativa imprimens, i.e., the power of forming and imprinting configuration and bodily features. All the formative tasks of this power follow God’s instructions (praeceptio

to the Reception of Galen, ed. Petros Bouras Villatanos and Barbara Zipser, 343–358 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2019). 12 Constantinus Africanus, Pantegni IV, 2 (ed. Basel 1539, 81–82): «Generativa duas habet virtutes ministrantes, una vocatur mutabilis, prima et secunda, altera vero formativa virtus. Mutabilis primae generativae est necessaria ad mutandam substantiam spermatis et menstrua in quorumlibet membrorum foetus substantias. […]. Differunt mutabilis prima et secunda, quia prima spissat sperma et menstrua et in substantiam membrorum mutat. Secunda sanguinis substantiam membrorum formatorum mutat essentiam eiusdem assimilans. […]. Virtus formativa format et designat singula membra suae formae competentia, et ea perforat et concavat, lenit et asperat, solidat ubicumque sunt necessaria». 13 See Tommaso Alpina, “Exercising Impartiality to Favor Aristotle: Avicenna and ‘the Accomplished Anatomists’ (As.h¯ ab al-Tašr¯ıh. al-Muh.as..sil¯ una)”, Arabic Science and Philosophy 32/2 (2022): 137–178, esp. 165–167. As pointed out by Alpina, in Avicenna’s Canon medicinae the formative faculty is called al-q¯ uwa al-mus.awwira, i.e., ‘imprinting faculty’, and is the principle responsible for shaping and setting up the organs. In his psychological work Liber de anima (Kit¯ ab al-Nafs ), the Persian philosopher uses the same term for one of the internal senses, i.e., the form-bearing faculty. On Avicenna’s embryology, see Carmela Baffioni, “L’embryologie islamique. Entre héritage grec et Coran: les philosophes, les savants, les théologiens”, in L’embryon: formation et animation. Antiquité grecqué et latine, traditions hébraïque, chrétienne et islamique, eds. Luc Brisson, Marie-Hélène Congourdeau, and Jean-Luc Solère, 213–231 (Paris: Vrin, 2008).

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sui Creatoris ).14 In Avicenna’s view, both male and female seeds are endowed with the virtus informativa which performs two opposite functions. While the male formative power impresses onto the embryo the resemblance (intendit ad similitudinem) to the father, the female formative power receives (intendit in recipiendo) this impression allowing the expression of such resemblance.15 In his Abbreviatio super de animalibus, Avicenna specifies that the female formative power is also responsible for the formation of the gestational sac which ensures the embryo’s protection and development.16 In his Commentarium Magnum on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Averroes too refers to a virtus formativa of the male seed. Taking cues from Aristotle’s statement about the divine origin of the intellect (GA II, 3, 736b 28–30), he attributes to the action of the virtus formativa a movement comparable to that of the intellect, which performs its function even without bodily tools at its disposal. Averroes points out that the power he is referring to does not correspond to the formative power identified by Galen. The “medical formative power” “does not act through the operative intellect, but rather it operates through its specific instruments (per instrumenta terminata) and its own organs (per membra propria)”. On the contrary, in Averroes’ view, the formative power operates through the heat of the semen, not as the substantial form of the embryo in actuality, but qua connected to the celestial intelligences from which it derives.17 14 Avicenna, Liber canonis medicinae I, fen. 1, tr. 6, cap. 2 (ed. Venetiis 1507, fol. 22r): «Virtus vero informativa imprimens est illa ex qua, praecepto sui Creatoris, procedit membrorum lineatio et ipsorum figuratio […]». 15 Ibid., III, fen. 20, tr. 1, cap. 3 (ed. Venetiis 1507, fol. 352r): «Virtus enim formativa in spermate masculi intendit informando ad similitudinem eius a quo separatum est. […] Et virtus informativa in spermate mulieris intendit separatim in recipiendo formam ad hoc quod recipiat eam secundum similitudinem eius a quo separatum est». 16 Id., De animalibus IX, cap. 2 (ed. Venetiis 1508, fol. 41v): «[…] dicere quod ipsa sit asperitate facta quae sit cooperiens materiam ex omni parte in decoctione matricis non est remotum valde: quoniam, si in spermate sit virtus maturativa et informativa, tunc illa virtus erit potens generare membranam sicut est potens generare ossa et venas et nervos». 17 Averroes, In Metaphysicorum libros VII, 10 (ed. Venetiis 1552, VII, f. 85): «Et ideo dicit Aristoteles in libro de Animalibus quod ‹hae virtutes› sunt similes intellectui, quia agunt per actiones intellectuales. Et istae virtutes assimilantur intellectui in hoc, quod non agunt per instrumentum corporale. Et in hoc differunt istae virtutes generantium quas Medici vocant formativas a virtutibus naturalibus, quae sunt in corporibus animalium. Istae enim agunt non actione intellectus operativi, sed agunt per instrumenta terminata et membra propria. Et ideo dubitat Galenum et dicit […] utrum ista virtus sit creator, aut

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The Virtus Formativa and the Animation of the Embryo in the Twelfth- and Thirteenth-Century Theological Discussions Between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the medical notion of virtus formativa circulated alongside theological discussions on the dynamics involved in the configuration and animation of the embryo. From the Latin translations of Greek-Arabic medical and natural-philosophical works, Christian thinkers gradually inherited a model of embryonic formation as a gradual development of bodily and psychic functions. This explicative model, however, was at variance with the theological assumption that God infuses the rational soul into the embryo when the body is fully formed. What determines the formation and operation of the vital activities of the embryo before its ensoulment? Based on more or less direct knowledge of medical and naturalphilosophical doctrines on human generation, twelfth- and thirteenthcentury theologians showed a plurality of approaches in discussing the configuration and the vital activities of the human embryo before its ensoulment.18 Undoubtedly, the embryo performs certain vital operations (like feeding and growing) even before being animated. Divergent positions arise, though, in identifying the principle responsible for these operations.19 In his Dragmaticon (c. 1144–1148) and De philosophia mundi (c. 1120), William of Conches (c. 1085–1154), a learned member of the Cathedral School of Chartres, refers to Constantine the African’s account of formative power.20 By describing step by step the different configuration stages of the embryo, William holds that, during the seventh month non. Sed universaliter non agit nisi per calorem, qui est in semine: non ita quod sit forma in eis, sicut anima est inclusa in corporibus coelestibus». 18 For a reconstruction of the medieval models of formation and development of the embryo, see Demaitre and Travill, “Human Embryology and Development”, Romana Martorelli Vico, Medicina e filosofia. Per una storia dell’embriologia medievale nel XIII e nel XIV secolo (Milano: Guerini e Associati, 2002), and ead., “Introduzione”, in Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia II. 13, De formatione Humani Corporis in Utero, ed. ead., 3–48 (Firenze: Sismel – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2008), 24–47. 19 Cf. Maaike Van der Lugt, “L’animation de l’embryon humain et le statut de l’enfant à naître dans la pensée médiévale”, in L’embryon: formation et animation, 233–254. Cf. also Fabrizio Amerini, Aquinas on the Beginning and End of Human Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 58–63. 20 As clerics trained both in liberal arts and theological disciplines, the members of the so-called ‘School of Chartres’, investigated the universe and nature by intertwining several

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of pregnancy, the formative power, whose duty is to convey the human configuration (virtus formativa, cuius est officium humanam figuram conferre), prepares the body to receive life.21 In William’s view, only after the formative task is fulfilled (post operationem informativae), does God create a new soul and infuses it into the embryo.22 In later thirteenth-century discussions, Aristotelian and medical doctrines on human generation intertwined with multifarious explanatory models of embryogenesis coming from the theological tradition. Theologians had access to the embryological theories, which were not the result of genuine interest in such a topic but were formulated in response to doctrinal and anti-heretical concerns.23 These theories were gathered

Platonic sources (such as Plato’s Timaeus in Calcidius’ translation, Macrobius’ Commentary on the Dream of Scipio and Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy) and medical learning. Before the recovery of the Aristotelian corpus in the thirteenth century, the Platonic tradition offered a more systematic outlook on reality. In his Dragmaticon (a dialogue on natural-philosophical topics) and in Philosophia mundi (a natural-philosophical and scientific encyclopedia), William of Conches integrates Platonic cosmology with medical– physical theories of the four elements (and he is strongly influenced by Galenic doctrines, as they appear in Constantine’s works). Cf. Willemien Otten, “Opening the Universe: William of Conches and the Art of Science”, in From Paradise to Paradigm. A Study of Twelfth-Century Humanism, ed. id., 83–128 (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2004). On the influence of medical texts in William’s philosophy see Italo Ronca, “The influence of the Pantegni on William of Conches Dragmaticon”, in Constantine the African and Ali ibn al-Abbas al-Mangusi: The “Pantegni” and Related Text, eds. Charles Burnett and Danielle Jacquart, 266–285 (Leiden: Brill, 1994). 21 Guillelmus de Conchis, De philosophia mundi IV, XIII, 20–21 (ed. Maurach-Telle,

107): «[…] Tertia septimana ad ipsum conceptionis humorem se demergunt, quarta in quadam liquida solidate velut inter carnem et sanguinem coagulatur, quinta vero, si puer septimo mense nasci debeat, sin autem in nono, septima incipit virtus formativa, cuius est officium humanam figuram conferre. […]». Cf. also id., Dragmaticon VI, IX, 3, 25–27 (ed. Ronca, 213): «Quinta vero si puer in septimo mense nasci debet, sed si in nono septima, incipit operari vis formativa, conferendo humanam figuram illi materiae. […] Formatis vero membris, assimilatis et concavatis, incipit aer subtilis per arterias discurrere motumque et vitam conferre». 22 Id., De philosophia mundi IV, XXXIII, 51: «Auctoritate Augustini hoc probatur, qui dicit: “Cotidie creat deus novas animas”. Tempus vero coniunctionis illius cum corpore a nullo diffinitur. Nobis tamen post operationem informativae et concavativae virtutis videtur, tunc enim naturalis virtus per membra potest discurrere, sine qua vita non potest esse nec anima in corpore». On the relationship between formation and animation of the embryo in William’s thought, see Van der Lugt, “L’animation de l’embryon humain”, 238–239. 23 Cf. Bernard Pouderon, “L’influence d’Aristote dans la doctrine de la procréation des premiers Pères et ses implications théologiques”, in L’embryon: formation et animation.

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in Peter Lombard’s (1100–1160) Liber sententiarum (c. 1155–1157), the standard theology textbook. Peter Lombard offers a comprehensive sourcebook on theological and biblical-exegetical issues by collecting patristic citations (primarily from Ambrose, Hilary of Poitier, and Augustine).24 Of course, in Peter’s pages, the embryological discourse was scattered within broader theological discussions (on topics such as the resurrection of the body, the Baptism, the creation of Adam and Eve, the generation of Jesus, and the transmission of original sin).25 Wherever Peter Lombard hints at a physiological explanation, thirteenth-century theologians take the occasion to further develop and corroborate embryological discourse by creatively using the newly available medical and natural-philosophical sources.26 To account for the pre-animation vital activities, theologians resort to the vicarious role of the virtus patris or the virtus matris.27 The paternal Antiquité grecqué et latine, traditions hébraïque, chrétienne et islamique, eds. Luc Brisson, Marie-Hélène Congourdeau, and Jean-Luc Solère, 157–183 (Paris: Vrin, 2008). 24 On the structure and content of Peter Lombard’s Liber sententiarum, see Philipp W. Rosemann, Peter Lombard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). In Lombard’s Sententiae, the most prominent authority in embryology is St. Augustine with his doctrine of rationes seminales (borrowed from the Stoics’ physical doctrine of logoi spermatikoi), according to which the generative seed contains latent potencies ordered to inform the indeterminate matter and promote the development of the embryo. On Augustine’s theory of rationes seminales, see supra, Sect. 2.1, footnote 7. The thirteenth-century development of the Augustinian doctrine will be dealt with later. See Demaitre and Travill, “Human Embryology and Development”, 406–407. 25 See, e.g., Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae II, dist. 18, ch. 7 (ed. Quaracchi, 392), quoting Gennadius: «Animas hominum non esse ab initio, inter ceteras intellectuals naturas, nec simul creatas, sicut Origines fingit, dicimus, neque cum corporibus per coitum seminari, creationem vero animae solum Creatorem nosse, eiusque iudicio corpus coagulari in vulva et compingi atque formari, ac formato iam corpore animam creari et infundi, ut vivat in utero homo ex anima constans et corpore, et egrediatur vivus ex utero, plenus humana substantia». 26 The same theoretical approach is attested in the thirteenth-century theological discussion on the transmission of original sin. See Luciano Cova, Peccato originale. Agostino e il Medioevo (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2014). See also my forthcoming study devoted to the theoretical treatment of leprosy in thirteenth-century theological discussions on the transmission of original sin, Amalia Cerrito, “Leprosy and Inherited Diseases in 13th-Century Discussions on the Original Sin” (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023, forthcoming). 27 Cf. Van der Lugt, “L’animation de l’embryon humain”, 248, ead., Le ver, le démon et la Vierge. Les théories médiévales de la génération extraordinaire. Une étude sur les rapports entre théologie, philosophie naturelle et médicine (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2004), 79–89, and Amerini, Aquinas on the Beginning and End of Human Life, 58–63.

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virtue corresponds to the formative power, which is considered either an instrumental agent of generation or an efficient cause of both the nutritive and sensitive functions of the embryo. The maternal virtue is deemed as the power nourishing and promoting the embryo’s development within the womb. In his Summa theologiae (c. 1232–1234), Roland of Cremona (c. 1178–1259), the first Dominican master entrusted with teaching theology at the University of Paris, describes the formative power as the principle responsible for the teleological orientation of the embryo’s configuration process.28 In Roland’s view, to configure bodily parts proportionally to the available matter, the formative power follows the intentio naturae universalis (i.e., universal purpose of nature). When pondering over Aristotle’s principle, according to which nature does nothing in vain, Roland claims that even the production of a sixth finger of the hand is intended by nature. When the formative power of the seed has additional matter at its disposal to configure organs, one more finger is shaped.29 As regards the pre-animation vital activities of the embryo, Roland attributes them to the maternal vegetative power. The embryo does not feed and grow; thanks to its own vegetative power. Rather, it is nourished

28 Roland explicitly ascribes the origin of the notion of formative power to Galen, cf. Rolandus Cremonensis, Summa III, 22, 3 (ed. Cortesi and Midali, 81): «[…] Galienus dicit quod sententia de virtute informativa venit ad Aristotelem, cum alii nescirent determinare, et ipse dixit quod erat virtus divina». Among early-thirteenth-century theologians, Roland stands out for his extensive knowledge of natural philosophy and medicine. This is mirrored in his theological and exegetical works, which show deep interaction between liberal knowledge and theological issues. Cf. Even-Ezra, “Medicine and Religion”. It is not clear whether Roland actually taught and practiced medicine at the University of Bologna before teaching theology in Paris, cf. Ephrem Filthaut, Roland von Cremona O.P. und die Anfange der Scholastik im Predigerorden: ein Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte der älteren Dominikaner (Vechta: Albertus Magnus Verlag, 1935), 10–19. 29 Rolandus Cremonensis, Summa II, 326, 32 (ed. Cortesi and Midali, 445): «[…] sextus digitus fuit vanus et superfluus […] quantum ad intentionem naturae universalis […]. Non fuit autem vanus, vel superfluus, quantum ad naturam particularem, quae erat in semine, quia superhabundans erat in semine materia de qua debant fieri digiti. Si natura particularis posuisset totam illam materiam in quinque digitis, turbatus fuisset ordo informative, et praetera nature universalis, quia quilibet digitus habet in sua oppositione nervorum qui nascitur de nucha, sicut dicitur in libro de interioribus Galieni, unde fit quilibet digitus secundum quod natura universalis. Vel etiam informativa fecit illos nervos et non fecit exire illos nervos a nucha, ut deberent portare tantam materiam».

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within its bodily continuity with its mother, as if it were part of her body (sicut quoddam membrum matris ).30 In his theological and biblical-exegetical works, the Franciscan theologian Bonaventure (1221–1274) frequently mentions formative power drawing from the Latin version of Avicenna’s Canon medicinae.31 He assigns to this power two different but complementary tasks, namely, to configure the human body and to bring it to completion.32 This power pertains to the generative seed that, along with the sustainment of the womb, is responsible for the organization of the human body.33 In his theological works, Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), Albert’s disciple par excellence, frequently refers to the virtus formativa as a power of the seed that, by instrumentally using corporeal spirits and heats, is

30 Id., Summa II, cap. 134, art. 3 (ed. Cortesi and Midali, 189): «[…] embrio non crescit, vel vegetatur, nisi vegetatione matris sue. Quia, antequam infundatur ei anima rationalis, est sicut quoddam membrum matris, quoniam continuatur matrici embrio per cotiledones». 31 Bonaventura de Balneoregio, Commentarius in Ecclesiasten XI (ed. Quaracchi, vol. 6, 89): «[…] Avicenna etiam ipse dicit quod vis formativa membrorum est vis divina». Cf. Avicenna, Liber canonis medicinae I, fen. 1, tr. 6, cap. 2 (ed. Venetiis 1507, fol. 22r): «Virtus vero informativa imprimens est illa ex qua, praecepto sui Creatoris, procedit membrorum lineatio et ipsorum figuratio […]». Danielle Jacquart has shown that Bonaventure’s allusions to medical theories, though rare, are on the mark. Along with Avicenna’s Liber canonis medicinae, in his commentary on the Book of Ecclesiastes, Bonaventure also resorts to Isaac Israeli’s De urinis, see Danielle Jacquart “Medicine in Some Thirteenth-Century Biblical Commentaries, with a Flashback on Augustine’s De genesi ad litteram”, in Professors, Physicians and Practices in the History of Medicine. Essays in Honor of Nancy Siraisi, eds. Gideon Manning and Cynthia Kestinec, 31–56, esp. 41–42 (Cham: Springer, 2017). On the life and works of Bonaventure, see Marianne Schlosser, “Bonaventure: Life and Works”, in A Companion to Bonaventure, eds. Jay M. Hammond, J. A. Wayne Hellmann, and Jared Goff, 9–60 (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2014). 32 Bonaventure recurs to this notion within the broader theological discussion of the assumption in heaven. Cf. Bonaventura de Balneoregio, In II Sententiarum, dist. 8, art. 2, q. 1 (ed. Quaracchi, vol. 2, 214): «Eiusdem virtutis creatae est corpus formare et informare, quia vis formativa est ab informativa sive perfectiva». Ibid. (ed. Quaracchi, vol. 2, 215) «Non etiam est ibi vere organizatio, quae competit corpori humano, quae quidem est a virtute formativa, cum seminibus delata […]». 33 Id., In IV Sententiarum, dist. 43, art. 1, q. 5 (ed. Quaracchi, vol. 4, 893): «Quaedam ‹animalia› completam ‹organizationem habent›, ut animalia sensibilia perfecta et gradientia, ut equus, et talia non potest nisi per vim formativam influxam cum decisione seminis, et tale est corpus humanum, quod non potest naturaliter organizari nisi adsit semen et debitum vas suscipiens, scilicet matrix».

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responsible for the configuration of the embryo.34 In a study on the disappearance of Galenism in the thirteenth century, Mark Jordan maintains that Thomas Aquinas had little direct knowledge of medical theories beyond what he learned from Albert’s work.35 In particular, Jordan claims that Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine on human generation mainly relies on Albert’s embryology, as it is expounded in his Summa de creaturis (c. 1240), a theological work that was written almost ten years before his commentaries on Aristotle. For the purpose of reconstructing the circulation of the notion of formative power within theological circuits, it is useful to analyze how Thomas Aquinas interprets and perceives Albert’s doctrine of formative power and its relation to the embryo’s configuration and animation. In Thomas Aquinas’ view, neither the maternal nor the paternal soul can be responsible for the vital activities of the embryo since these cannot depend on a principle external to it.36 Those who maintain that the formative power transmitted via the paternal seed is responsible for the configuration of the embryo consider virtus formativa as a sort of anima in fieri. According to this, the formative power is an emerging form that gradually evolves from a vegetative into a sensitive soul. This power further develops through the action of God, eventually evolving into

34 Cf. Mark D. Jordan, “Medicine and Natural Philosophy in Aquinas”, in Thomas von Aquin: Werk und Wirkung im Licht neuerer Forschungen, ed. Albert Zimmerman, 233–246 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012). 35 Cf. id., “The Disappearance of Galen in Thirteenth-Century Philosophy and Theology”, in Mensch und Natur im Mittelalter, eds. Albert Zimmerman and Andreas Speer, 703–717 (Berlin-Boston: De Gruyter, 2013). 36 Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae I, q. 118, art. 2, ad. 2 «[…] aliqui dixerunt quod operationes vitae quae apparent in embryone, non sunt ab anima eius, sed ab anima matris, vel a virtute formativa quae est in semine. Quorum utrumque falsum est: opera enim vitae non possunt esset a principio extrinseco, sicut sentire, nutriri et augeri. Et ideo dicendum est quod anima praeexistit in embryone a principio quidem nutritiva, postmodum autem sensitiva et tandem intellectiva». Cf. Bruno Nardi, “L’origine dell’anima umana secondo Dante”, Giornale critico di filosofia italiana 12 (1931): 433– 456, reprinted in id., Studi di filosofia medievale, 9–68 (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura: 1979), 22–24 and 33, and Amerini, Aquinas on the Beginning and End of Human Life, 61.

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the rational soul of the embryo.37 According to Aquinas, this explicative model wrongly entails a change of the substantial forms, susceptible to qualitative and quantitative development.38 If the formative power transmitted by the father first evolved into a vegetative soul, then into a sensitive one, it follows that the soul in itself would be capable of changing species according to subtraction or addition of functions.39 Thus, the virtus formativa is neither a vehicle of the soul nor soul in fieri. It is an instrumental and transitory power that takes charge of the bodily configuration, preparing it to be ensouled by the rational soul.40 Transmitted by the paternal seed, the formative power causally depends on the father’s soul. It is a sort of “formal continuant” that remains identical throughout human embryogenesis.41 It has been suggested that in discussing the role of the formative power in the human generation, Aquinas questions the embryology of his master Albert the Great, who extensively resorts to this notion to explain the

37 Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae I, q. 118, art. 2, ad. 2: «Et ideo alii dicunt illa eadem anima quae primo fuit vegetativa tantum, postmodum, per actionem virtutis quae est in semine, producitur ad hoc quod fiat etiam sensitiva, et tandem perducitur ad hoc ut ipsa eadem fiat intellectiva, non quidem per virtutem activam seminis, sed per virtutem superioris agentis, scilicet Dei deforis illustrantis […]». 38 Cf. Nardi, “L’origine dell’anima umana secondo Dante” and Amerini, Aquinas on

the Beginning and End of Human Life, 61. 39 Thomas De Aquino, Summa theologiae I, q. 118, art. 2, ad. 2: «Sed hoc stare non potest. Primo quidem, quia nulla forma substantialis recipit magis et minus, sed superadditio maioris perfectionis facit aliam speciem in numeris. Non est autem possibile ut una et eadem forma numero sit diversarum specierum». 40 Robert Pasnau suggested that Aquinas’ notion of formative power, in loose analogy to today’s DNA, could be conceived as a kind of project potentially encapsulated in the male semen that guides the formation of the organic body in the image and likeness of the paternal one. Fabrizio Amerini rejected this reading, given that once the virtus formativa has fulfilled its formative task, the formative power does not persist in the individual as the DNA does. Cf. Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study on Summa Theologiae Ia 75–89 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004), 100–104, Amerini, Aquinas on the Beginning and End of Human Life, 86– 97. For a further counterargument to the comparison between formative power and DNA, cf. also Carl Vater, “The Role of the Virtus formativa in St. Thomas Aquinas’ Account of Embryogenesis”, The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 1 (2018): 113–132. 41 Cf. Amerini, Aquinas on the Beginning and End of Human Life, 62. As Amerini suggests, it appears that Thomas was willing to distinguish the virtus formativa ruling the formation of the body from the power of the soul responsible for the vital activities of the embryo, see ibid., 90–91.

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embryo’s vital activities.42 In Aquinas’ view, Albert sees the virtus formativa as an emerging form that reaches its perfection through a continuous movement. On the contrary, for Aquinas, human generation results from subsequent and discontinuous generations and corruptions of substantial forms.43

3.2

Albert’s Doctrine of Virtus Formativa: Between Traducianism and Preformism

Albert’s doctrine of virtus formativa offers an alternative to two theories available in the thirteenth century, namely preformism and traducianism, both connected to the authoritative theological figure of Augustine of Hippo.44 In line with the Augustinian doctrine of the rationes seminales (according to which matter is endowed with the germs for all the kinds of beings and processes which progressively develop into distinct functions and forms), preformists maintain that the semen contains a downsized version of all the offspring’s organs. They only need to grow.45 Traducianism affirms that the soul forms inside the body through propagation from parent-to-child (ex traduce) to justify, in this way, the communication of species and form between what generates and what is generated.46 42 Cf. Nardi, “L’origine dell’anima umana secondo Dante”, 22–24, and Amerini, Aquinas on the Beginning and End of Human Life, 61. 43 Cf. James Weisheipl, “The Axiom Opus naturae est opus intelligentiae and Its Sources”, in Albertus Magnus - Doctor Universalis 1280–1980, ed. Gerbert Meyer and Albert Zimmerman, 441–463, esp. 458–459 (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1980), Amerini, Aquinas on the Beginning and End of Human Life, 80–84, and Thomas M. Ward, “John Buridan and Thomas Aquinas on Hylomorphism and the Beginning of Life”, Res Philosophica 93 (2016): 27–43. 44 For an introduction to preformistic doctrine and texts in the thirteenth century see Étienne Gilson, La philosophie de saint Bonaventure (Paris: Vrin (2nd Edition), 1978), 236–253. 45 On Augustine’s theory of rationes seminales , see supra, Sect. 2.1, footnote 7. The Franciscan masters Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure conjecture that the male seed might possess an active germ (or ratio seminalis ) from which the vegetative and sensitive soul develop. Created by God, this active germ is enclosed within the matter since the act of Creation. Cf. Nardi, “L’origine dell’anima umana secondo Dante”, 40–41. 46 Augustine dealt at length with the problem of the origin of the human souls in De genesi ad litteram libri duodecim. In there, the idea that all human souls come from Adam’s soul by propagation is presented. For more on Augustine’s doctrine on

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When occasionally dealing with human generation, Augustine is interested in explaining how original sin can be transmitted, by way of generation, from parents to children.47 At the time, there was no conceptual device comparable to today’s DNA, or was Augustine’s theory of the inherited guilt (culpa) and its transmission via libidinous procreation based on a coherent biology of the dynamics of physical transmission of somatic traits, rather, it was patterned on Roman succession law. This disciplined consanguinity by resorting to the image of the tree: the father is the trunk (stipes ) or the root (radix) from which the rest of the parental ramifications (rami) develops. Even though this model is not based on a biological explanation, Augustine adopts it to explain how original sin is inherited from the paternal lineage.48 Original sin is a peccatum hereditarium contracted by birth and passed on from father to offspring, through the chain of generations.49 In Augustine’s view, the entire human nature contained in Adam’s loins (lumbi) was spoiled and corrupted by the fall. Therefore, human seminal nature (ratio seminalis ) is transmitted from generation to generation in this corrupt condition.50 But what is the actual vehicle of original sin?

the origin of the soul, see Roland Teske, “Augustine’s Theory on the Soul”, in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, eds. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, 116–124 (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 47 On Augustine’s doctrine on original sin, see William E. Mann, “Augustine on Evil and Original Sin”, in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, 40–48 and Cova, Peccato originale. 48 Cf. Maaike Van der Lugt, “Les maladies héréditaires dans la pensée scolastique (XIIe–

XIVe siècle)”, in L’hérédité entre Moyen Âge et Époque moderne. Perspectives historiques, ed. ead. and Charles de Miramon, 273–320 (Firenze: Sismel-Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2008), and Valerio Marotta, “Metafore della cittadinanza e dell’appartenenza. La nozione di ius originis nella patristica latina fino a sant’Agostino”, in Pensiero giuridico romano e teologia cristiana tra il I e il V secolo, ed. Giovanni M. Vian, 113–131 (Torino: Giappichelli, 2020). 49 See Augustinus Hipponensis, Contra Iulianum Imperatorem I, 48 (English trans., by R. J. Teske, 76): «The sins of our parents […] are ours by the law of propagation and growth (per hoc iure seminationis atque germinationis )». For the theoretical framework of Augustine’s doctrine of original sin, see Lenka Karfíková, Grace and the Will According to Augustine (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2012). 50 According to Cova, Peccato originale, 110–111, rather than sketching a biological model of transmission, Augustine employs the juridic metaphor of hereditas exclusively for rhetorical purposes.

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What the father materially transmits to the son is the seed. On this point, all the Fathers of the Church agree. The topic of discussion is, however, what the seed transmits. This theme leads to the elaboration of two opposite doctrines: creationism and traducianism of the soul. According to Tertullian, parents generate both the soul and the body of the embryo. From parents’ souls, a germ of the embryo’s soul is detached and transmitted by the seed.51 On the contrary, Augustine claims that what the seed conveys is not a soul but a resemblance to the body (similitudo corporis ). Only God has the power to create the rational soul and to ensoul the embryo. In this view, original sin is transmitted by the semen that forms a corrupted body which, in turn, corrupts the soul created by God. In the following centuries, the Augustinian metaphorical explanation of the transmission of original sin as a peccatum hereditarium was interpreted as a biological and physical continuity between Adam and the whole of humankind.52 Even though original sin belongs to the soul, it is the material substrate that corrupts the body, which, in turn, corrupts the offspring’s soul.53 The physical shift of this model is due to Peter Lombard’s Liber Sententiarum, where the twelfth-century theologian claims that original sin does not derive from the parent’s soul but from the concupiscence of the reproductive act which infects and corrupts the body. It is by mere contact with the flesh produced by sexual desire that the soul itself, in turn, becomes infected.54 51 Cf. Tertullianus, De anima, 25–27. E.g., «Porro vitam a conceptu agnoscimus, quia animam a conceptu vindicamus, exinde enim vita, quo anima. […] Et quando collocabitur corporis semen, quando animae? […] Nam etsi duas species confitebimur seminis, corporalem et animalem, indiscretas tamen vindicamus et hoc modo contemporales eiusdemque momenti». 52 For an overview on the medieval reception of Augustine’s thought, see Martin W. F. Stone, “Augustine and Medieval Philosophy”, in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, eds. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, 253–266 (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 53 Cf. Alain Boureau, “Hérédité, erreurs et vérité de la nature humaine (XIIe –XIIIe siècles)”, in L’hérédité entre Moyen Âge et Époque moderne. Perspectives historiques, eds. Maaike van der Lugt and Charles de Miramon, 67–82, esp. 72–74 (Firenze: SismelEdizioni del Galluzzo, 2008). 54 Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae II, dist. 31, cap. 3–4 (ed. Quaracchi, t. 1, pars 2, 506.8–28): «Non igitur secundum animam, sed secundum carnem solam, peccatum originale trahitur a parentibus. […] In concupiscentia igitur et libidine concipitur caro formanda in corpus prolis. Unde caro ipsa, quae concipitur in

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In the thirteenth century, the availability of Aristotle’s naturalphilosophical lexicon helped thinkers to see Augustinian discussions on original sin under new perspectives. In his commentary on Lombard’s Liber Sententiarum (c. 1243–1246), Albert deals with traducianism in these terms: According to the Catholic faith and the philosophers, no soul is transmitted through propagation from parents (ex traduce), neither that of plants nor that of animals and human beings. But a mistake in the science of nature has spread contrary views. For, some argue that the spiritual matter, from which the soul of the animal and plant comes to be, is transmitted with the seed. This, however, has never been supported by any philosopher, as is evident by reading their works: for example, books XV and XVI of Aristotle’s De animalibus and ‹the corresponding parts in the Abbreviatio› of Avicenna, where Aristotle’s claims are paraphrased.55

In line with the Catholic faith, the philosophi reject the hypothesis of the transmission of the soul through the seed. Neither the soul of plants, nor that of animals, nor that of humans are transmitted from the generator to the generated. Albert attributes a sort of category mistake to those who support the transmission of the soul since they understand the materia spiritualis (i.e., the most subtle matter) that composes the seed as a physical vehicle of the soul. They are misled by a wrong understanding (ex malo intellectu) of the natural dynamics of transmission between the generator and generated. The spiritual matter of the seed does not convey the soul but a formative power. This is erroneously understood as a power of the embryo’s soul (virtus animae), according to the principle that there cannot be any power without a soul in actuality.56 On the contrary—as vitiosa concupsicentia, polluitur et corrumpitur, ex cuius contactu anima, cum infunditur, maculam trahit qua polluitur et fit rea, id est vitium concupiscentiae, quod est originale peccatum». 55 Albertus Magnus, Commentarii in IV Sententiarum libros II, dist. 18, art. 8 (ed. Borgnet, 324b): «[…] secundum Catholicam fidem, et secundum Philosophos, nulla anima est ex traduce, nec plantae, nec bruti, neque hominis. Et per errorem scientiae naturalis inductae sunt opiniones contrariae: dicunt enim quidam quod materia spiritualis descinditur cum semine, ex qua fiunt anima bruti, et vegetabilis: et hoc numquam aliquis Philosophus sensit, sicut patet in libris eorum, Aristotelis in libris XV et XVI de Animalibus, et Avicennae qui exponit Aristotelis verba omnino per alium modum». 56 Ibid. (ed. Borgnet, 325b): «[…] Aristoteles seipsum explanat in libro XVII de animalibus, et Avicenna et Averroes exponunt, quod virtus animae dicitur ibi anima: et haec est

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Albert states—there are two kinds of “power of the soul” (virtus animae): (i) the one that emanates from the soul in the body (effluxa ab anima in corpus ) and (ii) the effective one (effectiva), that exercises its efficient causality using the heat of the material and immaterial components involved in the generative process.57 The virtus formativa carried by the seed is of this second type: it is not a power emanated by the embryo’s soul, rather, it rests on (innititur) the heat of the leading (dirigens ) material element, the heat of the sky moving toward the substance and the species (motivus ad substantiam et speciem), and, eventually, the heat of the soul that determines the complexion and configuration of the organs (complexionativus et formativus organorum). This entails that, at least in the very first stages of the embryo’s development, the formative power transmitted by the seed does not require any soul in actuality in the changing subject.58 Albert’s later Summa theologiae (c. 1271–1274) has a question devoted to the possibility of transmission of the soul (Utrum animae sint ex traduce, una ex alia, sicut corpus ex corpore). The first argument in favor argues that the virtus formativa cannot derive from a corporeal substance (i.e., the seed) since it seems to perform the same power of the soul (actus animae) in shaping, configuring, and ordering the organs of the embryo. For these reasons, one can conclude that the embryo’s soul derives from the generating soul.59 Moreover, one can frequently see that offspring inherit the same behavior (mores ) of their fathers. Since behaviors pertain

virtus formativa, quae datur semini a virtute genitalium complete, dispositive etiam a corde, et hepate, et cerebo, et materialiter a toto corpore: et haec vocatur anima propter actum animae. Si dicis, quod virtus non est sine subiecto: et ideo si est ibi virtus, ibi est subiectum: dico, quod argomentum provenit ex malo intellectu naturalium […]». 57 Ibid.: «[…] virtus animae est duplex: scilicet effectiva sive effluxa ab anima in corpus: et huius subiectum in semine spiritus corporalis seminis est, quae innititur calori, ut dicit Aristoteles, scilicet primus elementi qui dirigens est, et secundus, coeli, qui est motivus ad substantiam et speciem, et tertius animae qui est complexionativus et formativus organorum». 58 Ibid.: «Et haec virtus ‹formativa› bene est sine subiecto». 59 Id., II Summa theologiae q. 72, 3 (ed. Borgnet, 38): «Videbant quod virtus formativa

in semine, non potest esse ex ipso semine: cum ergo oporteat quod habeat principium in natura: et cum non possit aliud esse nisi anima generantis, videtur quod sit ab anima generantis. Cum enim in semine agat actus animae formando, figurando, disponendo membra, non potest esse nisi anima, ut dicebant».

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to the soul, offspring must derive their soul, too, from their fathers.60 This is confirmed by the fact that sometimes fathers also transmit their temper to their progeny (e.g., iracundia, incontinentia), a temper that can be traced back up to the ancestors (avi).61 All these arguments hint at a biological continuity between father and progeny that could be explained either through the transmission of the soul or by supposing that the formative power transmitted by the seed is a small and indistinct animal (parvum et indistinctum animal ) possessing all the information necessary for the bodily configuration of the embryo and the sustenance of its vital activities. However, as Albert points out, the virtus formativa does not actually contain the body parts of the embryo, but virtually, i.e., in the form of spirit, through which it penetrates the female matter, just like the leavening agent ( fermentum) spreads through the dough or the rennet clots milk: However, in the XVI book of the De animalibus , arguing against Plato, who claimed that the seed is a small animal (parvum animal ), Aristotle wants to give the reason why the formative power is in the seed of the male. He explains that it enters the female seed just like a spirit enters a body, the rennet enters the milk, when it spiritually penetrates the milk and spreads everywhere, and like the yeast ( fermentum) penetrates in the dough.62

While the analogy between the embryonic development and the process of turning milk into cheese dates back to Aristotle (GA, II, 4, 739b 20–26), the comparison to the leavening process is drawn from the Gospel of Matthew 13:33 (“The Kingdom of Heaven is like yeast 60 Ibid.: «Adhuc, ad hoc inducebant signum: quia saepe videmus, quod in minoribus filius imitatur patrem: principium autem morum in anima est: relinquitur ergo, quod anima filii traducatur ab anima patris». 61 Ibid.: «Hoc videtur confirmari per hoc quod dicit Aristoteles in III Ethicorum, ubi probat, quod […] iracundus pater saepe generat iracundum filium: incontinens autem saepe continentem […] sicut ille patrem suum traxerat avum trahentis». 62 Ibid., q. 70 (ed. Borgnet, 26a): «Sed in XVI de Animalibus intendit Aristoteles

reddere causam, loquens contra Platonem, qui dicebat semen esse parvum animal, quomodo virtus formativa est in semine maris, quod dicit intrare in semen foeminae sicut spiritum in corpus, et coagulum in lac, quod spiritualiter penetrat in ipsum lac, et comprehendit ipsum totum: et sicut formantur in causam, quod similiter penetrat in pastam».

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that a woman took and mixed into about sixty pounds of flour until it worked all through the dough”).63 Both in theological and physiological contexts, Albert frequently resorts to the action of dough’s leavening agent ( fermentum) to explain how the action of the virtus formativa acts through the spirits in a material compound.64 In his perspective, the Aristotelian analogy of milk and rennet and the biblical example of dough and yeast clarify the dynamics linking formative power and embryonic development. Just like yeast or rennet, the virtus formativa acts on a material compound external to it, thus, it does not contain the form of the living being or downsized body parts prior to their development. The formative power at work in the seed stands in for the soul when the embryo is not yet ensouled. Just as the craftsman uses his tools to shape his product, the virtus formativa forms the embryo’s body using the natural heat involved in the generative process.65 These are the heat of the sky (calor coeli), the heat of the generating soul (calor animae generantis ), and the heat of the womb (calor matricis matris ). All these heats have an instrumental role through which the formative power prepares the body to be animated by the rational soul. In doing so, it reproduces

63 On the analogy with cheese in Aristotle, see Sandra Ott, “Aristotle Among the Basques: the ‘Cheese Analogy”, Man (N.S.) 14 (1979): 699–711. 64 Cf. Albertus Magnus, Super Matthaeum, 6, 9 (ed. Schmidt, 176: 12–15), id., Summa theologiae II, q. 110 (ed. Borgnet, 312). For the theological and metaphysical premises of this analogy, see Amalia Cerrito, “Paternitas naturalis and Paternitas divina: Albert the Great on Matthew 6,9 and Luke 11,2”, Divus Thomas 122/2 (2019): 59–78, 71. In his commentary on the Book of Job, when explaining the nature of the two animals mentioned in Job, 40–41 (namely, Behemoth and Leviathan), Albert relies extensively on the physiology of sexual reproduction to show how sin is rooted in the lowest level of man’s animal nature. In this context, Albert offers a detailed account of the dynamics involved in sexual reproduction, resorting to the metaphor of rennet and milk to explain the mechanism of interaction between male and female sperm. Cf. Stefano Perfetti, “Biblical Exegesis and Aristotelian Naturalism: Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and the animals of the Book of Job”, Aisthesis 11 (2018): 81–96, esp. 91–92. For an overview on the medieval notion of spirit, see James Bono, “Medical Spirits and the Medieval Language of Life”, Traditio 40 (1984): 91–130. 65 Albertus Magnus, Summa theologiae II, q. 70 (ed. Borgnet, 26a): «Et per has simil-

itudines vult ostendere Aristoteles, qualiter formativa contenta intra viscositatem seminis, operatur ad operationem corporis organici animae. Dicit quod primo operatur cibando, digerendo, quae sunt operationes vitae, non animae quae sit in semine, sed formativae quae est ut artifex, eo quod habet instrumentum calorem coeli, et calorem animae generantis, per quod descinditur semen, et calorem matricis matris».

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step by step the bodily operations of the soul (operatur ad operationem corporis organici animae)66 : i. it exercises the actus vitae (i.e., vital operation) pertaining to the vegetative soul and the operations of nourishment and digestion (prima operatur cibando, digerendo, quae sunt operationes vitae),67 ii. it forms the organs necessary for the sensitive soul ( format membra sensitiva, in quibus perficiuntur operationes sensuum),68 iii. it configures the organs that concern the exercise of the highest faculties of the soul, such as imagination and reason (distinguit membra pertinentia ad operationes animales animae rationalis ).69 Using the heats instrumentally, the virtus formativa shapes, distinguishes, organizes, composes, and brings to perfection the body which, only once completed, is finally endowed with the rational soul created by God.70 The argumentation of Albert’s Summa theologiae schematizes what he already elaborated in his De animalibus (c. 1258–1262). There, Albert had clarified the relationship between animation and embryonic formation.71 The vegetative and sensitive powers are potentially in the seed, 66 Albert upholds this argumentation also in the following question, cf. ibid., q. 72 (ed. Borgnet, 38b): «Et quod supponunt, falsum est: formativa enim in semine non facit actus et operationes animae. Actus enim et operationes essentiales animae sunt vivificare, continere et perficere ad esse animati: et nullum eorum actuum facit formativa in semine […]. Sed sicut ante determinatum est, formativa est in semine sicut artifex in artificiato». 67 Ibid., q. 70 (ed. Borgnet, 26a): «Dicit quod primo operatur cibando, digerendo, quae sunt operationes vitae, non animae quae sit in semine, sed formativae quae est ut artifex […]». 68 Ibid.: «Et secundo, eisdem caloribus et eadem virtute, quae est in semine sicut artifex, format membra sensitiva, in quibus perficiuntur operationes sensuum[…]». 69 Ibid.: «Et tertio, eadem vis formativa eisdem caloribus distinguit membra pertinentia ad operationes animales animae rationalis […]». 70 Ibid., q. 72 (ed. Borgnet, 38b) «Hoc enim triplici calore formativa dirigendo, figurando, distinguendo, ordinando, componendo, operatur ad perfectionem corporis: quo perfecto solus infundit animam Deus, maxime rationalem, quam de nihilo creat per seipsum». 71 On Albert’s exegetical approach to the Aristotelian Book of Animals, see Henryk Anzulewicz, “Albertus Magnus und die Tiere”, in Tiere und Fabelwesen im Mittelalter, ed. Sabine Obermaier, 29–54 (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), Stefano Perfetti, “La disseminazione del sapere sugli animali e l’iperaristotelismo di Alberto

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not because they are transmitted by the father’s soul but as being exerted by the formative power via the instrumental natural heats. Since we stated that the vegetative and sensible souls are in the semen in that given way, we will add that both are present anteriorly and potentially. This potency we call “formative”, along with the powers of the spirit, the heat, and the sperm, about which we have spoken. Afterward, they are rendered active at the end of the generation when the embryo is completed. […] These souls come to be in the matter, even though we do not concede that they, being souls, enter the semen, having been transfused into the male semen, as Plato maintained. What is transfused is the act of the male soul and a likeness of the powers of his members but not, properly speaking, a soul. […] For such reason, it is absurd to ask how the formative power enters the sperm from the outside. This is what Plato asked when he said that the sperm was given this power by the giver of forms from the outside. For the spirit is bodily and is not part of the species and form through which a thing is what it is […].72

As Albert clarifies, what the father transmits to the offspring—properly speaking—is not a soul but rather a likeness of the bodily powers (similitudo virtutuum membrorum) and of the functions of the soul (actus animae) of which the virtus formativa is both vicar and carrier. The virtus formativa is not an extrinsic power infused in the sperm by the “giver of forms” (dator formarum), but it is led by the semen from potentiality to

Magno”, in La zoologia di Aristotele e la sua ricezione dell’età ellenistica e romana alle culture medievali, eds. Maria M. Sassi, Elisa Coda, Giuseppe Feola, 269–298 (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2017), and id., Nature imperfette. Umano subumano e animale nel pensiero di Alberto Magno (Pisa: ETS, 2020), 7–60. 72 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus XVI, 1, 12 (ed. Stadler, 1095): «Cum autem dicto modo vegetabilem et sensibilem dicamus esse in semine, dicemus quod ambae prius insunt in potentia quam potentiam vocamus formativam cum virtutibus spiritus et caloris et spermatis de quibus diximus: postea autem efficiuntur in actu in fine generationis, quando conceptus est completus. […] istae animae fiunt in materia, quamvis non concedamus eas secundum quod animae sunt, intrare in semen transfusas in semine maris sicut dixit Plato: quod enim transfunditur actus animae, est maris et similitudo virtutum membrorum eius et non anima proprie loquendo. […] Propter quod etiam absurdum est inquirere qualiter formativa intret in sperma ab exstrinseco, sicut quaesivit Plato dicens hanc virtutem esse datam spermati a datore formarum extrinsecus. Hic enim spiritus corporeus est nec est pars speciei et formae per quam res est id quod est […]». English translation (modified) by Kenneth F. Kitchell Jr. and Irven M. Resnick, in Albertus Magnus, On Animals. A Medieval Summa Zoologica (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 1190.

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actuality.73 It does not pertain to the species and form, nor is it properly a material part of the embryo. Albert explains that the formative power has the same relationship with the embryo that the rennet has with the coagulated milk. The coagulant (coagulum) is not a part of the coagulated milk. Only when it is poured in, the rennet enters the milk, mixing with it. In the same way, the formative power enters into the embryo’s material substrate, deriving from the mixture of the feminine seed (gutta) and menstrual blood.74 In his Ethica (1262), Albert discusses again the dynamics of embryonic formation and the principles responsible for its very first vital activities. In the first book of the Latin translation of the Nichomachean Ethics, appears the syntagm principium plantativum, i.e., an irrational part of the soul common to every living being that feeds.75 Albert offers an extensive discussion on the nature of this principle and its working in the very first stage of embryonic development by resorting to all the philosophical and theological sources at his disposal. Following Aristotle, Albert holds that the plantativum belongs to all living beings and is a power that regulates the processes of nutrition and growth. He specifies, though, that this power ensures that the nourishment is absorbed, digested, and converted into the substance of the organs according to the material peculiarities of each kind of living thing (secundum substantiam et quantitatem et necessitatem materiae est obligatum ad hoc).76

73 See supra, Chapter 2, passim. 74 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus XVI, 1, 12 (ed. Stadler, 1098–1099). 75 Aristoteles, Ethica Nichomachea I, 1, 1102 a 32. In Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica

I, XV (ed. Kübel, 76): «Irrationalis autem hoc quidem assimilatur communi et plantativo, dico autem causam eius quod est nutritiri et augeri, talem enim virtutem animae in omnibus quae nutriuntur, ponet aliquis utique et in embryonibus, eandem utique hanc et in perfecti, rationabilius enima quam aliam aliquam». 76 Albertus Magnus, Ethica I, 9, 4 (ed. Borgnet, 143): «Irrationale autem duplex est. Irrationalis enim partis quaedam pars assimilata est communi, quod scilicet in omnibus vivis inest, quae vivunt organica et physica: et assimilatur plantativo: quia sicut plantativum in continua nutrimenti acceptione, et nutrimenti digestione, et nutriti additione, secundum substantiam et quantitatem et necessitatem materiae est obligatum ad hoc: unde tales operationes facit quamdiu vivit, naturae aliqua increpatione vel suasione, removetur ab eis. Dico autem plantativum quod est causa et principium eius quod est nutriri et augeri». See also, id. Super Ethica I, XV (ed. Kübel, 82): «[…] plantativum, scilicet nutritivum, quod est commune omnibus viventibus, cuius operatio est nutrire et augere».

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This specification is connected to the description of the principium plantativum that appears in Greek Patristic sources such as De natura hominis of the Greek theologian Nemesius of Emesa (350–420 C.E.)77 and De fide orthodoxa of John of Damascus (675–749 C.E.).78 These works contain information about Galenic and Aristotelian anatomical, physiological, and psychological theories, which are reformulated in a Christian outlook. Both Christian authors refer to the principium plantativum as the power of the irrational part of the soul shared by every living being.79 According to Nemesius, this power pertains to the power of the soul in charge of nutrition, growth, and reproduction. The plantativum is described as the power of producing ( facere) and shaping (plasmare) the body.80 The same description is echoed in John of Damascus’ treatment, where the plantativum power is further characterized as 77 Nemesius’ De natura hominis , i.e., On human nature, written circa 400, is the first Christian anthropological treatise that systematizes the most notable philosophical, medical, and theological doctrines. Burgundio of Pisa’s twelfth-century Latin translation, although mistakenly attributed to the Cappadocian Church Father Gregory of Nyssa, had a widespread circulation in the thirteenth century. Cf. David Lloyd Dusenbury, Nemesius of Emesa on Human Nature: A Cosmopolitan Anthropology from Roman Syria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021). 78 The Syrian John of Damascus (seventh to eighth centuries), one of the last Greekspeaking Church Fathers, was the author of Source of Knowledge. Its third part, entitled Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith (Ekdosis akribes t¯es orthodoxou piste¯ os ), a systematic summa of the dogmatic writings of the early Church Fathers, was translated into Latin by Burgundio of Pisa (c. 1153–1154) as De fide orthodoxa, i.e., On the orthodox faith, and became a model for all subsequent scholastic Christian theology. Cf. Vassilis Adrahtas, “John of Damascus”, in The Wiley Companion to Patristics, ed. Ken Parry, 264–277 (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2015). For a focus on the Latin reception see, ibid., 268–269. 79 With the syntagm principium plantativum the Latin translators of medical texts blended two similar Greek expressions, namely the Aristotelian to threptikon and the Galenic to phytikon. The first one indicates the nutritive-reproductive power of the soul. The second one describes the nutritive power of the soul once it is actualized in the liver, where it starts the process of nutrition. See Vivian Nutton, “Greek Medical Astrology and the Boundaries of Medicine”, in Astro-Medicine: Astrology and Medicine, East and West, eds. Anna Akasoy, Charles S. F. Burnett, and Ronit Yoeli-Tlalim, 17–32 (Firenze: Sismel – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2008). 80 Nemesius Emesenus, De natura hominis , cap. XIV (ed. Verbeke and Moncho, 91– 92): «Dividunt autem et aliter in virtutes vel species vel partes animam, in plantativum quod et nutritivum et passivum vocatur et in sensibile. […] Aristoteles autem in Physicis quidem quinque dicit esse partes animae: plantativum et sensibile et motivum secundum locum et concupiscibile et excogitativum, plantativum dicens quod nutrit et augere et generare facit et plasmat corpus. Vocat autem plantativum et nutritivum totum a portiori parte vocans, a nutrient a quo et aliae partes plantativi existentiam habent. In Ethica vero

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an irrational faculty of the soul that, in performing the tasks of shaping and feeding the body, is guided by nature, not by rationality (non ratione gubernantur, sed natura).81 Albert has these sources in mind when discussing the position of “someone” (aliquis ) who, given the kind of activities the plantativum performs, has considered it a rational power of the soul that persists in the living being from the embryonic stage through to completion.82 Indeed, the rationality of the plantativum in governing the living processes of animated beings is involved from the very first stages of embryonic life: What we call embryos are seeds fertilized by the wombs (matrices ), in which (as explained in the De animalibus ) the male drop (gutta) enters the female drop just like a spirit enters the body. Through the power of the peculiar spirit that enters the viscosity of the seed, it sets in order (dirigit), cleans (purgat ), and purifies (purificat ) the female drop which contains it. From such cleaning, the spirit draws around the first membrane (pellem) that embraces the combined seeds, to prevent that the spirit released by the union of the seeds dissolves. Folded on itself thanks to the membrane, the spirit pours into the substance of the seeds, moving up and down and back again. Through these movements, the spirit starts to pulsate, until the beat that gives life to the living is activated.83

in duo prima et generalissima dividit animam, in rationale et irrationale, subdividit autem irrationale et in obediens rationi et in inoboediens». 81 Iohannes Damascenus, De fide orthodoxa, De homine II, 12 (ed. Buytaert, 118): «Oportet cognoscere quoniam rationale naturale principatur irrationali. Divididuntur enim virtutes animae in rationale et irrationale. Irrationalis vero partes sunt duae, haec quidem inobediens est rationi, scilicet non suadetur ratione, illa vero obediens est et persuabilis ratione. Ergo inobediens quidem et quae non persuadetur ratione est zodicum (id est vitale), quod et pulsativum vocatur seminativum, sive generativum, et plantativum quod et nutritivum vocatur, huius autem est et augmentativum, quod et plasmat corpora: haec enim non ratione gubernantur, sed natura […]». 82 Albertus Magnus, Ethica I, 9, 4 (ed. Borgnet, 143): «Talem autem animi virtutem sive potentiam aliquis rationabiliter ponit esse in omnibus quae nutriuntur, tam in plantis quam animalibus, et eamdem hanc potentiam ponit esse in embryonibus et animalibus perfectis». 83 Ibid.: «Embryones vocantur concepta a matricibus semina, in quibus (sicut in libro Animalium determinatum est) gutta masculi intrat in guttam foeminae sicut spiritus in corpus: et per virtutem proprii spiritus qui intrat in viscositatem seminis, continetur, dirigit, purgat et purificat guttam foeminae, et ex purgamento pellem circumducit, intra quam

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Here, Albert articulates step by step, since conception, the process of embryonic formation borne by the plantativum. The male seed penetrates the female’s, much like a spirit entering a body, and purifies it. First, from the purified female’s seed a membrane (pellis ) forms that store the product of the union of two seeds (semina sic unita). This organ corresponds to the gestational sac, which plays a central role in the embryo’s development. It ensures that the spirit derived from the union of the parental seeds does not disperse and evaporate (ut … evaporare non possit ). The spirit is thus folded on itself (ut … reflectatur in seipsum) and poured (reversatur) in the substance of the union of the two seeds. In doing so, the spirit accomplishes precise movements: it goes from the bottom to the top and vice versa. Thanks to these movements, the embryo’s heart starts pulsating until the heartbeat is perfected. At this stage, the embryo is alive. It needs nourishment to restore the “radical moisture“ (humidum radicale) originally received from the parental seeds and to sustain the formation and development of the body parts.84 The radical moisture, a material supply present in the body since conception, fuels the bodily processes that involve the consumption of vital heat. Even though it slowly consumes, leading to the death of the individual, the radical moisture can be partially restored by the humidum nutrimentale, an addition of humidity necessary for vital activities.85 In Albert’s reformulation of the doctrine, even before being completely formed, the embryo is endowed with the power to restore the radical moisture.86 The power to attract and convert nourishment does not depend on the natural heat that consumes (consumptivus ) and separates (distractivus ) but relies on the heat as an instrument of the soul. For this

semina sic unita concluduntur, ut spiritus resolutus ab unione seminum evaporare non possit, sed veniens ad pellem reflectatur in seipsum, et intra substantiam seminum revertatur, et sic de imo moveatur ad sursum et de surso ad imum, et talibus motibus pulsare incipiat, et pulsum perficiat, in quo pulsu vitam influat vivo». 84 Ibid.: «Cum autem spiritus non resolvatur nisi ex humido radicali, necessarium est

humidum ipsa resolutione diminui: et nisi restituatur, statim deficiet spiritus resolutus ab ipso. Non restituitur autem nisi per humidum alimenti». 85 On the concept of ‘radical moisture’ see the bibliography quoted supra, Chapter 1, footnote 5. 86 Albertus Magnus, Ethica I, 9, 4 (ed. Borgnet, 143): «Est igitur de necessitate quod in ipso semine ante formationem sit tractus alimenti ad restaurationem humidi resoluti».

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reason, the principium plantativum responsible for all these operations is the anima plantativa of the embryo.87 Albert ascribes this opinion to the Platonic tradition and, in a broader sense, to those who hold the preformist doctrine. In Albert’s view, this opinion relies on a misconception regarding the nature of the principium plantantivum that guides the configuration and sustenance of the embryo. In the seed, there is not a rational power of the soul in actuality (ut actus ) but rather a soul as an artisan (ut artifex).88 To clarify the functioning of the anima ut artifex, Albert resorts to a parallel with artificial products. The ax and the hatchet can cut thanks to the action of the craftsman who uses these instruments according to the artistic form (ad formam artis incidunt ). If no artistic form is involved (sine forma), the same instruments are more likely to randomly destroy.89 The same happens in nature: the divine light (lumen divinum) informs every second cause up to the proximate causes so that all the powers (virtutes ) are collected (congregantur) in the center of the embryo. These powers operate according to the impression received from the intellectual form, the way the ax and the hatchet are moved by the intellect and power of the craftsman.90 For this reason, rather than being a rational soul, the plantativum is actually a natural power that acquires its rationality directly from the First Intelligence (i.e., God). This natural principle produces, shapes, and puts in order the different organs of the human embryo, preparing it to be ensouled by the rational soul created by God. Only in this sense can

87 Ibid.: «Iste autem tractus ‹alimenti› non est caloris ut calor est: quia calor ut calor est

consumptivus et distractivus: oportet ergo quod sit caloris ut instrumentum animae est. Principium igitur in semine trahens anima est. In embryone ergo plantativa anima est». 88 Ibid.: «Sed in hoc deviavit Plato, quod seminibus dixit animam inesse ut actus: propter quod dicere cogebatur semina esse parva animalia. Veritas autem est secundum Peripateticorum sententiam, quod anima est in semine ut artifex et non ut actus». 89 Ibid.: «Sicut enim in artibus se habet, quod ars in dolabra et securi et ascia est: et ideo ad formam artis incidunt: et si sine forma artis moveantur, scindunt et destruunt». 90 Ibid.: «Ita est in omni natura divinum lumen, quod inundat super omnes causas secundas usque ad proximas, ita quod omnium virtutes in centro conceptae congregantur, et omnes informatae et motae primo lumine intellectuali et divino operantur ad formam intellectivae propriae, sicut dolabra movetur in forma et virtute artificis qui est primus motor eius».

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one conclude that the plantativum is a rational or an intellectual power of the seed.91 The very fact that the plantativum pertains to plants and animals demonstrates that it cannot be deemed a rational power of the soul. It rationally guides the vital operations of every living being before the actualization of the soul. If it were an operative power of the soul in actuality, even plants and animals would be intellectual beings.92 Usually, to explain the vital activities of living beings in their very first embryonic stage, and so before their animation, Albert resorts to the notion of the formative power, whereas in his Ethica, he ascribes these functions to the principium plantativum. Is such rephrasing a lexical inconsistency or a trace of a theoretical adjustment? On the one side, by deeming identical the virtus formativa and the principium plantativum, Albert aims to harmonize the terminology of theological and natural-philosophical explanatory models of embryonic development. On the other side, by exploring the possibility of considering the plantativum the soul in actuality of the embryo, he wants to speak in the same terms as those who hold the preformist doctrine, aiming at detailing the genesis of their error, and thus dismissing their argumentation: Ancient authors called ‘soul’ the ‘intellect as an artisan’ (ut artifex). Later on, though, recognizing that ‘soul’ was equivocally used both for that meaning and to designate the soul in actuality (ut actus ), they changed 91 Ibid.: «Et ideo dicit Aristoteles, quod totum opus naturae ibi est opus intelligentiae. Intelligentia movet per intentionem et per modum artis […] et ideo diversas facit formas membrorum, et diversa continuat ad unum eorum ubi natura non perficere potest. Propter quod dicit etiam Aristoteles quod intellectus est in semine, eo quod ibi est virtus intelligentiae propriae et fortuna». According to Takahashi, Albert deems the potential form hidden in the semen as flowing from the Prime Intellect to the seminal fluid thanks to the mediation of celestial intelligences. Each natural thing is univocally produced by the formative power, though, deriving from the First Intellect, preserves the archetypical form and end of every natural being. Cf. Adam Takahashi, “Nature, Formative Power and Intellect in the Natural Philosophy of Albert the Great”, Early Science and Medicine 13 (2008): 451–481. On role of the celestial intelligences in natural generation and their relationship with the formative power see, supra, Sect. 2, passim. 92 Albertus Magnus, Ethica I, 9, 4 (ed. Borgnet, 144): «Propter quod non tantum in semine hominis, sed in seminibus omnibus plantarum et animalium est anima ut artifex intellectualis, et non ut actus: quia si sicut actus inesset omnium vivorum, semina essent intellectualia: et quando generata sunt ipsa viva, intellectum haberent hanc animam quae inest ut artifex et non ut actus in seminibus».

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their way of speaking. They called ‘formative power’ the soul like an artisan that resides within and ‘soul’ the one in actuality which resides within. They did this especially because they recognized that even Plato, who stands out among other philosophers, fell into error, misled by this equivocal use of the term.93

According to Albert’s interpretation, the Antiqui (probably, the Aristotelians) were perfectly aware of the intellectual nature of the soul as an artisan (anima ut artifex). However, since the term “soul” has an equivocal meaning, they modified (mutaverunt ) their argumentation, distinguishing the soul that works as a craftsman in the seed from the soul in actuality of the future living being. The first one is labeled virtus formativa, and the second one is called anima. The genesis of the error of those who maintain preformistic doctrine lies, thus, in the employment of the term anima to describe both the activities of the formative power in the early stage of embryonic formation and the vital functions of the soul in actuality of the embryo. It was the equivocal meaning of the term anima that misled Plato and those who maintain that the embryo has a soul right from conception.

3.3 Bodily Design and Dynamics of Transmission: The Seminal Fluid The formative power is responsible for the transmission of the morphological and functional structure of the bodily parts of the embryo, reproducing in the offspring the similarity of species and form with the generating body. How does the virtus formativa acquire the bodily design from the father? What are the material and formal vectors that transmit structures and functions? According to Albert, the acquisition of the bodily design results from a process that begins in the parent’s body. The vector of transmission is the seminal fluid.

93 Ibid.: «Antiqui animam intellectum vocabant ut arteficem. Posterius autem, videntes quod anima aequivoce dicitur de tali, et de ea quae est ut actus, mutaverunt dictiones. Et illam quidem quae inest ut artifex, vocaverunt virtutem formativam. Aliam quae inest ut actus, vocaverunt animam: praecipue quia viderunt quod etiam Plato qui inter Philosophos super alios multus emicuit, propter hanc aequivocationem deceptus erravit».

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Albert’s theoretical treatment of the origin and functions of the seminal fluid is part of a debate dating back to Greek medicine.94 Alcmaeon of Croton and the Hippocratic author of the Nature of Man maintained that the seminal fluid follows a path originating from the brain and the spinal column.95 Moreover, the author of On Seed and the Nature of the Child describes the seminal fluid as coming from the entire body of the generator, thus containing powers from each part of the body that are necessary for the configuration of a new living being.96 This theory is known as “pangenesis”. In his Generation of Animals , Aristotle questions both the brain-spinal genesis and the pangenesis of the seminal fluid, arguing in favor of its blood-origin.97 In his view, the seminal fluid derives from a blood-like substance that is previously formed out of the residue

94 For an overview of the debate on the seminal fluid, see Conway Zirkle, “The Early History of the Idea of Inheritance of Acquired Characters and of Pangenesis”, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 35 (1946): 91–151 and Jacques Jouanna, “La postérité de l’embryologie d’Hippocrate dans deux traités pseudo-hippocratiques de la médecine tardive (Sur la formation de l’homme et Sur la génération de l’homme et la semence)”, in L’embryon: formation et animation. Antiquité grecqué et latine, traditions hébraïque, chrétienne et islamique, eds. Luc Brisson, Marie-Hélène Congourdeau, and Jean-Luc Solère, 30–31 (Paris: Vrin, 2008). 95 Alcmaeon of Croton was an early Greek medical and philosophical author who devoted several pages to the physiology and anatomy of sensory activity and embryo development. The chronology of his literary activity is dated between 500 and 450 BCE. For an introduction of Alcmaeon’s thought see Carl Huffman, “Alcmaeon”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2021 Edition), https://plato.sta nford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/alcmaeon/. Cf. Franco Giorgianni and Antonietta Provenza, “Una voce per un “lessico della genetica”. Generazione e aspetti dell’ereditarietà dai Presocratici a Galeno: le nozioni principali e la terminologia tecnica”, Medicina nei Secoli Arte e Scienza 27/3 (2015): 1111–1158. 96 Cf. Tage U. H. Ellinger, Hippocrates on the Intercourse and Pregnancy (New York: Henry Schuman, 1952), Ian Lonie, The Hippocratic Treatises: On Generation, on the Nature of the Child and Diseases IV (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1981), and Michael Boylan, “The Galenic and Hippocratic Challenges to Aristotle’s Conception Theory”, Journal of the History of Biology 17 (1984): 83–112. In the Hippocratic treatises, also the female’s seed was thought to contribute to the conception of the child, see Lesley Dean-Jones, Women’s Bodies in Classical Greek Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 153–160, and id. “Female Patients”, in The Cambridge Companion to Hippocrates, ed. Peter E. Pormann, 246–262 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 97 Aristoteles, De generatione animalium I, 17, 721b 13–27. Cf. Pierre-Marie Morel, “Aristote contra Démocrite. Sur L’Embryon”, in L’embryon: formation et animation. Antiquité grecqué et latine, traditions hébraïque, chrétienne et islamique, eds. Luc Brisson, Marie-Hélène Congourdeau, and Jean-Luc Solère, 43–57 (Paris: Vrin 2008).

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of nourishment.98 This is a useful residue (chr¯esimon perítt¯ oma) formed in the digestion of the heart.99 In line with Aristotle, Albert deems the seminal fluid as the residue of the digestion process.100 Nevertheless, he also discusses alternative theories on the origin of the seed. Albert ascribes to Hippocrates the brain-origin theory of the seminal fluid: the seed follows a path that, starting from the brain, leads to the spinal column and, thus, to the kidney, causing pleasure during the emission.101 On the contrary, Galen maintains that the seminal fluid is the residue of the fourth digestion. It exudes from all bodily members, but especially from the brain since Galen placed in the brain the noblest power of the soul.102 Even though Albert argues in favor of the Aristotelian blood-origin theory of the seminal fluid, he does not entirely dismiss the pangenetic theory.103 The position of those who hold that the seminal fluid comes from the entire body is not entirely false (non usquequaque est falsum).104 This does not mean that the seminal fluid “comes from the body parts in 98 Aristoteles, De generatione animalium I, 17, 726b 10. 99 Ibid., 724b 21. Between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, medical and natural-

philosophical Latin-speaking authors were intrigued by the manifold theories available about the origin of the seminal fluid. See Jacquart and Thomasset, Sexualité et savoir médical, 73–84. 100 Cf. Albertus Magnus, De animalibus III, 2, 8 (ed. Stadler, 343): «Generaliter autem loquendo de humore qui sperma vocatur, dicimus quod sperma est superfluum quod separatur a quarta digestione, quando iam celebrata in venis tertia digestione humor distillare incipit a venis in membra et non est adhuc coagulatus et assimilatus et unitus membro particulari». 101 Ibid. (ed. Stadler, 348): «Ypocras autem Cohus sperma omne dixit descendere a capite per duas venas quas spermaticas vocavit: et sunt post aures continuatae cum nucha in superiori parte coniunctionis capitis et colli et deinde perveniunt ad renes, et ideo delectatio coitus sentitur in renibus […]». 102 Ibid.: «Galienus autem dixit se nescire utrum hoc sit vero quod dixit Ypocras. Sed quod probabilius de hac sententia dici potest esse quod sperma, quod est superfluum quartae digestionis, exsudat ab omnibus membris, sed maxime a capite, […] eo quod in capite sunt vires animae nobiliores». 103 Cf. Demaitre and Travill, “Human Embryology and Development”, 419–420. On the contrary, according to Steven Epstein’s interpretation, Albert decidedly rejects the pangenetic theory. Cf. Steven A. Epstein, The Medieval Discovery of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 104 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus , XV, 2, 10 (ed. Stadler, 1054): «Dictum tamen Stoycorum et medicorum quod sperma exit a toto corpore, non usquequaque est falsum […]».

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the way a part comes from a whole” but rather that it comes from the fourth digestion of the humor that has received the power of absorbing (virtus assimilationis ) the resemblance from the whole body.105 Albert’s endorsement of the pangenetic origin of the seed is based on logical evidence: if the assimilation of the nourishment is universal and especially pertains to the uniform parts (i.e., tissues) that, in turn, constitute the organic parts of the body, it follows that its residue comes from the entire body.106 In this process of assimilation and absorption, the testicles play a leading role. According to Aristotle, they are the organ that stores the seminal fluid. On the contrary, Galen deemed the testicles and the female seminal vessels as the site of the generative power.107 According to Albert, the testicles store the virtus formativa and draw the shape from the bodily members to store it.108 The resemblance absorbed from the bodily parts is impressed in the seminal fluid, the substratum upon which the formative power acts.109 As Albert explains, two powers are at work in this process of acquisition of the bodily design, namely the generative and nutritive powers. The seminal fluid acquires the generative power from testicles, while the nutritive power is drawn from the nourished bodily members. The nutritive power is subordinated to the generative one: […] there are two powers in the sperm, one of which obeys the other, namely, the generative one from the testicle and the nutritive one from the members from which it has been drawn. The sperm […] is a superfluity of

105 Ibid.: «Sed nos non dicimus quod ideo exeat a membris sicut pars exit a toto, sed potius descinditur a quarta digestione quae iam virtutem assimilationis a membris accepit antequam membris imbibatur et uniatur». 106 Ibid.: «[…] et quia assimilatio est universalis, praecipue membris similibus ex quibus ubique per totum componuntur membra composita instrumentalia, ideo universaliter secundum illum modum dicitur a toto corpore sperma descindi». 107 Cf. Jacquart and Thomasset, Sexualité et savoir médical, 76. 108 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus IX, 2, 3 (ed. Stadler, 718): «[…] virtus formativa

datur spermati secundum aliquos a testiculis, et quod testiculis trahit a toto corpore per modum ventosae per suam caliditatem […]». 109 Ibid.: «Sperma enim, sicut in antehabitis diximus, est superfluitas quartae digestionis: et illa est quae est in membris facta ad similitudinem membrorum: propter quod sperma est humor membris assimilatus et iamiam sigillandus formis et figuris membrorum, sed nondum sigillatus […]».

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the fourth digestion. And that which is made in the members is made into a certain similarity with them. For this reason the sperm is a humor assimilated to the members, soon to be impressed with the forms and shapes of the members, but not yet so impressed. Thus, it is readily obedient to the formative power for undertaking the form of each member.110

Once ingested, the food is transformed into a humor ready to be absorbed by all bodily parts. Therefore, the residue of this assimilation process is a humor that preserves the resemblance to the bodily parts it nourished before digestion. By the action of the formative power, the seminal fluid is ready to be impressed (sigillatus ) by the shapes of the organs. Thus, the humor produced by the virtus nutritiva takes on the form of each member it nourishes since it obeys the virtus formativa. The formative power uses the seminal fluid as a material vector to transmit a bodily design resembling the generator.111 The virtus formativa does not contain the bodily parts before their formation, as if they were hidden. It is instead the principle of the formative movement and the configuration of the organs (principium motus formationis et facturae membrorum) belonging to the changing subject.112 For a comprehensive reconstruction of the relationship between the seminal fluid and the formative power, it is worth considering Albert’s

110 Ibid.: «[…] duae virtutes sunt in spermate, quarum una oboedit alteri, generativa videlicet quae est a testiculo, et nutritiva quae est membri a quibus attractum est. Sperma enim […] est superfluitas quartae digestionis: et illa est quae est in membris facta ad similitudinem membrorum: propter quod sperma est humor membris assimilatus et iam sigillandus formis et figuris membrorum, sed nondum sigillatus: et ideo virtuti formativae est oboediens facile ad omnis membri formam suscipiendam […]». English translation by Kitchell and Resnick, in Albertus Magnus, On Animals, 815–816. 111 In his reconstruction of the medieval sources of William Harvey’s biology, Walter

Pagel offers a brief, still accurate, overview on Albert’s doctrine on seminal fluid and its relation with the formative power. According to Pagel, in Albert’s view the sperm would be “an epitome of the virtues of the paternal organs and is produced by the testicles from metabolic superfluities of the organs”. See Walter Pagel, “William Harvey Revisited”, History of Science 9/1 (1970): 1–41, esp. 22–23. 112 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, XV, 2, 10 (ed. Stadler, 1054) «Tunc enim ad

similitudinem virtutis membrorum sigillatur a virtutibus membrorum quae sunt sibi extrinsecae. Sic ergo quoad originem primam istae virtutes sunt extrinsecae, sed subiecto sunt intrinsecae […]. Inpossibile enim dicere, quod formet, et faciat per virtutes omnium membrorum latentes in ipso: possibile autem erit quod formet et faciat membra per id quod principium motus formationis et facturae membrorum est in ipso […]».

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De vegetabilibus (1256), a paraphrastic commentary on the pseudoAristotelian De plantis , which has a strict kinship with Albert’s De animalibus . In the thirteenth century, a De plantis circulated which was attributed to Aristotle. In fact, it was written by the Greek erudite Nicolaus of Damascus (first century C.E.).113 In his De vegetabilibus , Albert tacitly questions the theoretical foundation of the De plantis, offering original discussions on plants’ reproduction, growth, and nutrition inspired by the rigorous epistemology of the De animalibus .114 In several places, Albert justifies the addition of theoretical sections or textual adjustments by referring to the confusing argumentation of the text he is commenting on. This is the case of the reproduction of plants, where Albert makes extensive use of his own doctrine of formative power. In discussing the properties of the plant seed, Albert claims that it is similar to the embryo produced from the mixture of male and female individuals: semina and concepta have whatever is needed to start growing.115 Expanding on the embryo/plant seed analogy, Albert specifies that the substance of vegetative seed develops thanks to two powers: the formative 113 On the pseudo-Aristotelian De plantis see Henry Hugonnard-Roche, “PseudoAristote, De plantis ”, in Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, ed. Richard Goulet, 499–505 (Paris: CNRS-Éditions, 2003). In the thirteenth century, this work was available in Alfred of Sareshel’s Latin translation. Cf. James R. Long, “Alfred of Sareshel’s Commentary on De plantis: A Critical Edition”, Medieval Studies 47 (1985): 125–167. 114 Albert does not explicitly question the authorship of this work. Nevertheless, his commentary bears several traces of what I have labeled pragmatic disavowal. This consists in: (i) a massive reorganization of structure and content of the De plantis , to the benefit of the argumentative flow and consistency, (ii) the inclusion of rich integrative sections (both theoretical, pharmacological, and agricultural), (iii) criticism addressed to style and argumentation of the text. In doing so, Albert rewrites the De plantis just as Aristotle should (or could) have done. I have discussed this topic in several articles: Amalia Cerrito, “Botany as Science and Exegetical Tool in Albert the Great”, Aisthesis 11 (2018): 97– 107, ead., “Alberto Magno e il De plantis: ricostruire la botanica perduta di Aristotele”, in Ricerche di Storia della Filosofia e Teologia Medievali. Raccolta di Saggi in onore di Marco Arosio, vol. 5, ed. Marco Martorana, Rafael Pascual, and Veronica Regoli, 9–28 (Roma: IF Press, 2019), and ead., “Disclosing the Hidden Life of Plants. Theories of the Vegetative Soul in Albert the Great’s De vegetabilibus et plantis ”, in Vegetative Powers: The Roots of Life in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Natural Philosophy. «Archives Internationales d’Histoire des idées», vol. 234, ed. Fabrizio Baldassarri and Andreas Blank, 105–122 (Cham: Springer, 2021). 115 Albertus Magnus, De vegetabilibus I, I, 7 (ed. Meyer-Jessen, 26): «Sed sexuum vires sunt in seminibus embryis sive impraegnationibus. Embrya autem sive impraegnationes dico concepta semina».

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power that performs the same activities as the virtus formativa animalis, and the substantia farinalis that sustains the configuration of plants’ organs and external configuration.116 The more the natural form to be produced is complex, the more the process of the generation of seed is specialized. A plant’s seed just stems from the material substrate which composes the whole body of the generating plants. This is because, in plants, the two components necessary for germination (i.e., formativa and substantia farinalis ) are scattered throughout the body and not confined to one single organ.117 In the case of humans, the seminal fluid originates from the overall porosity of the body and assimilates the resemblance of the male- and female-generating bodies. However, this is because the testicles, by infusion of divine power (per virtutem divina), receive the formative power which is in charge of bringing forth the human form from the potentiality of matter.118

116 Ibid., VII, 1, 9 (ed. Meyer-Jessen, 618): «De seminis autem natura virtute iam in praecedentibus dictum est. Sed quod hic attendendum est hoc est quod seminis substantia duo continet. Quorum unum est virtus formativa, quam habet et cum calore et spiritu, qui instrumentaliter formativae ‹vires› serviunt, calor quidem digerendo et segregando et subtiliando, spiritus autem vehendo virtutem. Alterum autem, quod habet semen, est substantia farinalis, quae, immixto sibi humido, suscipit formationem et figurationem in plantam et plantae organa». In his analysis of the botanical terminology employed in Albert’s De vegetabilibus , Timothy Sprague has interpreted the substantia farinalis as the endosperm of the embryo, a cellular reserve that surrounds the seed and from which all the nourishment is taken to support the formation of the plant in the early stages. Cf. Timothy Sprague, “Botanical Terms in Albertus Magnus”, Kew Bulletin 9 (1933): 440–459, esp. 446. 117 Ibid., I, 1, 7 (ed. Meyer-Jessen, 27): «Quia tamen non invenimus aliquam operationem nobilem in plantis nisi generationem, et generatio immediate fit a viribus sexuum permixtis, ideo natura in una et eadem planta miscuit masculinum et femininum, quia tota planta concipit semen fructuum et pullulationum propter suae substantiae homogeneitatem». 118 Ibid., I, 1, 13 (ed. Meyer-Jessen, 49): «Et ideo, cum semen, ex quo educuntur tales formae (i.e., animales), descenderit per totam corporis spongiositatem, et assimilatum fuerit toti corpori generantis active vel passive, tunc nihilominus ultra hoc oportet, quod attrahatur ad vasa seminaria, in quibus a testiculis infundatur ei virtus divina, quae formativa vocatur. Et in hoc solo gradu formarum exigitur distinctio sexus. Et quaecumque forma est in toto incorporea, ita quod nec sit virtus in corpore aliquo operans: ista procul dubio non ex materia educitur, sed ab extrinseco principio aliquo datur generatis. In materiam tamen infunditur assimilativa et informativa per virtutem divinam in testiculis existentem».

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3.4 Localization and Dynamics of Configuration: The Heart Once transmitted from father to offspring, the formative power settles in the first member in the actuality of the embryo, i.e., the heart, which contains simultaneously (simul ) all the other members in potency.119 When the fetus (conceptum) is formed by the male seed out of the female substance, it needs to support and preserve itself (habet regere se).120 “As much as a son who leaves his father’s house takes along part of his father’s substance with him” to manage (procurat ) his own, in the same way, the substance received from the parents (substantia parentum) is converted into the heart’s substance of the embryo (substantia cordis ), providing the substratum for the formative power.121

119 Id., De animalibus XVI, 2, 1 (ed. Stadler, 1115): «[…] quia cor est tamquam sedes huius virtutis ‹formativa quae est in semine›, fit cor prius inter alia membra in actu, licet in potentia omnia simul sint in eo». Albert holds the same in his Metaphysica I, 4, 12 (ed. Geyer, 64: 49–60): «Eodem modo formativa, quae est in semine, primo quidem in corde se ponens, una quidem est secundum substantiam et formam et substantiali operatione formam suam, quae vitae forma est, communicans, spiritum accipit instrumentum, per quem sicut suae virtutis vectorem cunta distincte producit. In se enim una existens et per spiritum applicata et influxa spiritibus et humiditatibus et caloribus et locis et complexionibus membrorum, ex unoquoque istorum distincte producit hoc membrum quod est cerebrum, vel hoc quod est hepar, vel hoc quod est oculus vel pes vel manus». 120 Id., De animalibus XVI, 2, 1 (ed. Stadler, 1115): «Conceptum enim adunatum et coagulatum et formatum semine maris ex gutta feminae, quando efficitur unum aliquid in se distinctum, habet regere se sicut fillius qui exit a domo patris. Filius enim exiens a domo patris partem fert substantiae secum et illam primam multiplicat et sic procurat domum.» 121 Ibid.: «Sic igitur primum quod est in substantia parentum, convertitur in substantia cordis». Also in his theological works, Albert resorts to the same analogy to explain how the substance received from parents is converted into the first substance of the vital organs (membra radicalia) of the embryo. Cf. Id., Commentarii in IV Sententiarum II, dist. XVIII, art. 8 (ed. Borgnet, 325): «[…] quia semen assimilatur filio egredienti de domo patris, qui partem substantiae secum portat, et illam negotiando multiplicat: ita semen partem substantiae ex qua fiunt radicalia secum adducit, et partem aliunde attrahit ex semine matris vel sanguine menstruo: et illud nutrimentum est ad formationem organorum […]»., and id., Summa de creaturis II, art. 3, q. 17 (ed. Borgnet, 161a): «Et ideo dicit Philosophus circa finem libri XVI de Animalibus, quod semen assimilatur filio egredienti de domo patris: ille enim cum egreditur, partem cibi sumit quam portat secum de domo patris, et in domo propria per lucrum et negotiationem multiplicat cibum illum, ut sufficiat sibi. Sic semen humidum quoddam in quo salvatur virtus formativa, trahit secum de corpore masculi generantis: et cum est in matrice, negotiatur circa sanguinem

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The role of the heart in the living processes is a controversial theme that Albert has widely addressed. He faces the problem of reconciling philosophical and medical explanations of the structure and functions of the heart. According to Aristotle, the heart is the source of heat, the precondition for the vital and cognitive activities of the living being. He also maintains that the heart is the source of the blood vessels and the nervous system. On the contrary, in Galen’s view, the heart is only one of several major organs essential for vital activities.122 Albert discusses at length the points of difference between Aristotle’s and Galen’s theories on the nature of the heart. It has been shown that if he usually attempts a reconciliation between the two perspectives,

menstrui extrahendo purius ex eo ad multiplicationem sui humidi, ut ex eo possit perfici formatio suorum organorum». 122 The question of the so-called ‘hegemonic organ’ is part of the broader so-called controversia inter philosophos et medicos in which medieval Latin authors engaged, alternatively supporting Greek, Arabic, and Latin traditions, and their heterogeneous doctrines, mostly in contrast with each other. In addition to the question of the hegemonic organ, another major point of contrast between Aristotelian and Galenic traditions was the nature of the female contribution to the generative process. Cf. Per-Gunnar Ottosson, Scholastic Medicine and Philosophy. A Study of Commentaries on Galen’s Tegni (ca. 1300–1400) (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1984), 219–239, Anthony Preus, “Galen’s Criticism of Aristotle’s Conception Theory”, Journal of the History of Biology 10/1 (1977): 65–85, Jöel Chandelier, “Medicine and Philosophy”, in Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy Between 500 and 1500, ed. Henrik Lagerlund, 735–742 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), Adrian Thatcher, Redeeming Gender (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 21–23, and Rebecca Flemming, “Galen’s Generation of Seeds”, in Reproduction: Antiquity to the Present Day, eds. Nick Hopwood, Rebecca Flemming, and Lauren Kassell, 95–108 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

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on several crucial issues he argues in favor of the Aristotelian position.123 Thus, Albert maintains that the heart is the primary organ.124 Nevertheless, he does not dismiss the Galenic distinction of veins from arteries, which originate from the heart and the liver, respectively.125 He assigns them the function to let the virtus formativa flow, allowing the accomplishment of its formative movement. The heart is the first organ shaped by the formative power, which gives it both a “hard” (dura) and “soft” (mollis ) composition. This twofold composition fits two different functions: the heart’s hardness (duritia) holds open the ventricle, allowing the passage of the formative power, and the heart’s softness (mollitia) helps the division and branching of arteries and veins.126 These parts let the formative power circulate throughout bodily parts, allowing their progressive configuration.127 For this reason, the formative power configures the heart, veins, and arteries simultaneously:

123 On Albert’s conciliatory approach in the controversia inter philosophos et medicos, see Siraisi, “The Medical Learning of Albertus Magnus”, 379–404, Miguel de Asúa, “War and Peace: Medicine and Natural Philosophy in Albert the Great”, in A Companion to Albert the Great. Theology, Philosophy, and Sciences, ed. Irven M. Resnick, 269–298: esp. 290 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), Luciano Cova, “Seme e generazione umana nelle opere teologiche di Alberto Magno”, in Summa doctrina et certa experientia: studi su medicina e filosofia per Chiara Crisciani, ed. Gabriella Zuccolin, 237–256, esp. 249 (Firenze: Sismel – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2017) and Evelina Miteva, “Iam patet igitur veritas eius quae dixit Aristoteles et causa deceptionis Galieni. Philosophers vs. Medics in Albertus Magnus’Account on Conception”, in Irrtum-Error-Erreur, ed. Andreas Speer and Maxime Mauriège, 107–122 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018). 124 On the discrepancies between Aristotle and Galen on the role of the heart, Albert

has at his disposal both Avicenna’s De animalibus and Averroes’ De corde, see Siraisi, “The Medical Learning of Albertus Magnus”, 399. 125 Cf. Wilberding, “Embryology”. 126 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus III, 1, 4 (ed. Stadler, 294): «[…] vena oritur a

corde, et virtus formativa facit eam duram iuxta cor, ut duritia foramen et ventriculum retineret apertum qui est versus epar. In alia autem extremitate facit eandem mollem, ut magis ibi oboediret divisioni et ramificationi». 127 Id., De motibus animalium I, 2, 2 (ed. Borgnet, 271): «[…] formativa quippe virtus in semine existens primo format cor sibi in sedem et domicilium, et ex illo porrectis lacertis et venis et arteriis superiora fabricat et inferiora. Quod autem est principium substantiae, ipsum est etiam principium operationis et motus aliorum membrorum. Oportet igitur cor esse principium omnium motuum».

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Although we could, as we said, refute the statements of the physicians and prove those of the first master, there is another way in which the statement of Aristotle can stand. Namely, we might say that the formative power in generation is in the spermatic material. Then, as we will say in what follows, the sperm makes the heart out of the better and finer material and, from the rest of the material, it makes the other noble members, doing so all at once and not successively. Neither does it make the brain and afterward produce the nerves out of it, but rather derives the material for the brain and nerve all at once from the heart.128

Here, Albert is discussing the point of contrast between Aristotle and Galen on the temporal realization of the bodily organs. While they agree that the heart, i.e., the source of the blood, and its conduits must be formed at first, they differ in the role assigned to the liver. According to Galen’s tripartite theory of the soul, in the liver the appetitive part of the soul is located: this is responsible for the formative and growth activities of the living being. This is the reason why the liver should be configured prior to other bodily parts.129 Albert solves the issue by appealing to the unity of the substantial form: the soul is a power from which all the bodily powers flow. Since the soul is embedded in the body, it is necessary that it would be located in that organ from which the other members originate. The soul, with respect to the act and power of life (actus vitae et potestas ) is in the heart, since it is the point of origin of all the other organs.130 The formation of the vital organs of the embryo happens all at once (simul ) and not successively. The formative power, indeed, makes the

128 Id., De animalibus III, 1, 4 (ed. Stadler, 295): «Licet autem, sicut diximus, refellere possimus dicta medicorum et probare dictum magistri primi: tamen etiam alius modus est quo potest stare dictum Aristotelis, quod videlicet dicamus, quod virtus formativa in generatione est in materia spermatis: et tunc sicut dicemus in sequentibus, ex subtiliori et meliori facit cor, et ex residuo materiae simul quidem non successive facit alia membra nobilia, et non facit cerebrum et postea ex ipso producit nervus, sed simul ex corde derivat materiam cerebri et nervi […]». English translation by Kitchell and Resnick, in Albertus Magnus, On Animals, 363–364. 129 Cf. Nickel, Untersuchungen zur Embryologie Galens, 74–79. 130 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus III, 1, 4 (ed. Stadler, 295): «[…] anima quidem,

secundum se est una virtus, a qua fluunt omnes virtutes membrorum. Cum enim ipsa sit organica, oportebit unum est membrum in quo sita omnes effluat a se virtutes: et sicut ipsa est principium virtutum, ita necessario erit illud membrorum principium organorum. Constat autem animam secundum actum vitae et potestatem esse in corde».

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heart out of the noblest material substance at its disposal and then shapes the other members (such as the arteries, veins, brain, and nerves) out of the remaining substance. This demonstrates the continuity between the brain and the heart at least as regards the configuration process. The “Heart” of Plants: The Virtus Reformativa The central role of the heart in the formation of the living being is claimed, too, in Albert’s De vegetabilibus , where he discusses the morphology and physiology of plants. Generally, the roots are considered the most important organ of plants, corresponding to the mouth and heart of animals.131 Following the Aristotelian division of animal parts into uniform parts (i.e., tissues) and non-uniform parts (i.e., organs, composed of uniform parts and performing specific vital functions), Albert explains that, in plants, roots are non-uniform parts in their composition, but they are uniform parts regarding their function. Roots are actually arranged to sustain the individual plant by distributing the nourishment among organs and tissues.132 As Albert claims: “All the uniform parts of plants refer to the root as if it were the father who takes care of them (pater et procurator), from whom they receive the substance of food and powers. Through the peculiar task of each one, these parts convert such substance in wealth and continuity of the species”.133 Not every principal part is non-uniform. But a non-uniform part sometimes has a function, sometimes it does not, unless it is ordered to the species and the preservation of the species. E.g., the trunk and the root have the function of sustaining, although they both are non-uniform parts. Twigs and branches are not arranged to accomplish a function related to the 131 For further reflections on the analogy of plant roots to animal mouth see Luciana Repici, Uomini capovolti. Le piante nel pensiero dei Greci (Roma and Bari: Laterza, 2000). 132 Albertus Magnus, De vegetabilibus et plantis II, I, IV, 62 (ed. Meyer-Jessen, 126). 133 Ibid., II, 1, 4 (ed. Meyer-Jessen, 127): «[…] omnes partes plantae compositae

referuntur ad radicem sicut ad unum patrem et procuratorem, a quo recipiunt substantiam nutrimenti et virtutis, quam propriis et deputatis sibi officiis convertunt in lucrum et in divitias speciei et perpetuitatis, […]». I discuss the analogy between roots and paterfamilias in Cerrito, “Disclosing the Hidden Life of Plants”, 114–115.

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sustainment of the individual plant, but their function is ordered to the production of leaves, blossom, and fruits, which all are for the sake of the species.134

In Albert’s reconstruction, the root contains two powers: the virtus nutritiva formatorum and the virtus reformativa abscisorum: The root contains the power to nourish the formed parts and the power to form and re-form parts that have been cut off. According to the Peripatetics, only the nutritive power is in the hearts of animals, and if any animal part happens to be cut off, the heart has not the power to form it again, except in the case of some smaller animals.135

Shared by every animal, the first is the power to nourish the bodily member, the second is the power to form again damaged or amputated bodily parts, proper to all plants but only to a few animal species. The virtus reformativa of plants corresponds to the formative power placed in animals’ hearts. While animals’ formative power is unable to form again damaged bodily parts, except for animals very simple in their bodily composition, plants’ virtus reformativa can fully restore the body of plants. Why can plants and certain species of animals fully restore their damaged bodily parts? Albert’s explanation seems to hint at a connection between the formative power and the physiological process of “restoring of what is lost” (restauratio deperditi).136 As previously shown, in Albert’s view, every living being exerts the power of restoring the radical moisture, regardless of the stage of its development. This is the reason why, even before 134 Albertus Magnus, De vegetabilibus et plantis II, I, IV, 62 (ed. Meyer-Jessen, 126): «[…] non omnis officialis pars est composita, sed composita aliquando habet officium, et aliquando non habet, nisi ad speciem et ad salutem speciei ordinetur, sicut stipes habent officium sustendandi et radix, cum utrumque istorum sit pars composita. Virga et rami non ordinantur ad ufficium, quod ad substantiam individualem plantae pertineat, sed ad frondendum et florendum et fructificandum, quae omnia sunt propter salutem speciem». 135 Ibid., V, 1, 6 (ed. Meyer-Jessen, 310): «In radice enim est virtus nutritiva formatorum et virtus formativa et reformativa abscisorum, sed nutritiva sola secundum Peripateticos est in animalium cordibus, et siqua abscinditur de membris animalium, ex virtute cordis non reformantur, nisi in valde paucis animalibus». 136 On the concept of ‘radical moisture’ see the bibliography quoted supra, Chapter 1, footnote 5.

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being animated, the human embryo can convert nutrimental moisture into sustainment for its bodily development, thus partially restoring the radical moisture gained from the parental seminal fluid.137 In Albert’s view, the effectiveness of the restoration of the radical moisture is inversely proportional to the complexity of the bodily constitution. A complex and differentiated body, composed of many uniform and nonuniform parts, requires just as much diversity in the nutritional supplies. Plants and very few animals are endowed with very simple bodily composition, mainly constituted of uniform parts, therefore, they can almost completely restore their radical moisture.138 Indeed, plants’ radical moisture is easier to be restored since it is similar to the humor of the soil and of the water from which they absorb their nourishment.139 Moreover, in plants and simplest animals, the formative power is not distributed throughout all body parts—as it is in animals with a higher degree of organic differentiation —but it is stored in one single organ (i.e., the roots or the heart).140 This is because the formative power cannot configure something in the foot through the same principles (principia) used for the hand. For this reason, in those animals, the formative power which configures as far as it can the nutrimental moisture into uniform part is not located in one single

137 Cf. supra, Sect. 3.3, passim. 138 On Albert’s doctrine of the restoration of damaged bodily parts see Stefano Perfetti,

“Rigenerazione degli animali? Alberto Magno tra Parva Naturalia e De animalibus ”, in Vita longa. Vecchiaia e durata della vita nella tradizione medica e aristotelica antica e medievale. Atti del Convegno internazionale (Torino, 13–14 Giugno 2008), eds. Chiara Crisciani, Luciana Repici, and Pietro B. Rossi, 149–167 (Firenze: Sismel – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2008). 139 Albertus Magnus, De generatione et corruptione I, 3, 8 (ed. Borgnet, 383b): «Tamen si aliquid est simile in partibus habens humorem radicalem terrestrem et aquaticum, sicut plantae, et quaedam animalia, sicut cancri: quaedam membra formalia aliquandiu recrescunt eis ex humido nutrimentali». 140 Ibid.: «[…] virtus formativa propter similitudinem partium, non est distributa in membris, sed in uno membro quod est cor, vel id quod est in loco cordis in animalibus, et radix in plantis, et ex isto formantur omnes partes. Sed in animalibus magnam diversitatem habentibus in membris, non potest hoc esse […]».

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body part. This is because, in other animals, the formative body parts once cut off do not grow again.141

The very fact that the virtus reformativa remains in the root with the virtus nutritiva means that it constantly has at its disposal the material substance to restore and form again damaged or cut off body parts. Instead, the formative power of animals has the role of configuring a body whose composition is highly differentiated. It follows that it contains just as many principia to configure each bodily part since it “cannot use the same principles to configure the hand and to form the foot too”. On the contrary, the body of plants, mostly composed of uniform parts, lacks several vital organs (like the brain, liver, stomach, and so on). It follows that the virtus reformativa of plants does not require specialized principles to configure their bodies. As Albert underlines, the fact that plants’ bodies can be fully restored does not mean that plants can reproduce numerically identical to themselves.142 The principle responsible for the configuration of the plants’ body parts (damaged or not) is the formative power that neither belongs to the essentia of plants, nor to their soul. It is “the cause and the origin of their bodily configuration”.143

141 Ibid.: «[…] quia formativa virtus non per eadem principia quibus utitur in manu, potest aliquid formare in pede: et ideo virtus formativa quae format humorem nutrimentalem in simili membro quantum potest, non sita est in uno membro in talibus animalibus: et ideo membra formativa in aliis abscissa non recrescunt». 142 Id., De vegetabilibus et plantis V, 1, 6 (ed. Meyer-Jessen, 309): «Si autem tota absciditur planta, adhuc virtus formativa quae est in radice format aliam. Dubitatur tamen, an planta sit manens eadem secundum formam, quae tota abscissa formetur in similem ex eadem radice». 143 Ibid. (ed. Meyer-Jessen, 310–311): «[…] virtus quae est in radice non est quae formaliter quiescit in subjecto stipitis et ramorum, et dat eis esse plantae et rationem, sed potius est causa et origo formae illius».

CHAPTER 4

The Transmission of Genetic Inheritance

This chapter aims to reconstruct Albert’s theoretical treatment of biological inheritance and kinship (consanguinitas ) and the key role played by the formative power in its dynamics. By shaping, composing, organizing, and bringing to perfection the embryo, this power allows the handing down of morphological and functional structures from parents to offspring. The virtus formativa is an instrumental and transitory power that acquires the virtual design from the generating body and realizes the similarity in species and form between the generant and the individual to be generated. As shown in Chapter 3, in Albert’s view, the acquisition of the bodily design results from a gradual digestive process performed in the male parent’s body. What conveys this virtual design is the seed, a residue that comes from both the uniform and non-uniform parts, from which the formative power acquires not only shape and functions but also accidental aspects, e.g., diseases, deformities, somatic traits (e.g., hair color, eye color, legs shape, arms shape, etc.) and moral qualities. But what model of genetic inheritance has Albert in mind? In the thirteenth century, the parent-to-child transmission of accidental traits was discussed within different fields of knowledge. From a philosophical standpoint, medieval thinkers primarily took care to explain how such features are handed down from parent to child without resorting © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Cerrito, Albert the Great (c. 1193–1280) and the Configuration of the Embryo, Palgrave Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Medicine, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24023-2_4

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to a preformist explanatory model of human generation. In theology, the dynamics of parent-to-child transmission of genetic inheritance were an integrating part of discussions on the passing down of original sin.1 In medical texts, physicians investigate which factors are involved in transmitting diseases and deformities through the generative process.2 In Medieval Latin parlance, terms like hereditas , heredare, or hereditarius do not belong to the semantic sphere of genetic causation but primarily to that of succession law.3 However, they are attested in medical texts between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, referring to those diseases conceived as deriving from parents via the generative process. For example, Avicenna’s Canon medicinae and Constantine the African’s Pantegni refer to gout, syphilis, and leprosy as diseases that either pass from “person to person” or that are “inherited through the seed”.4 The discussions on the dynamics of inherited disease were, though, not as detailed as the observation of contagion.5 This vagueness mirrors the absence of a well-defined pathological category. It was only at the end of the thirteenth century that physicians began to devote specific categorizations to inherited diseases, differentiating them from other pathologies.6 1 Cf. Alain Boureau, “Hérédité, erreurs et vérité de la nature humaine (XIIe -XIIIe

siècles)”, in L’hérédité entre Moyen Âge et Époque moderne. Perspectives historiques, eds. Maaike van der Lugt and Charles de Miramon, 67–82 (Sismel-Edizioni del Galluzzo: Firenze, 2008). 2 Cf. Maaike Van der Lugt, “Les maladies héréditaires dans la pensée scolastique (XIIeXIVe siècle)”, in L’hérédité entre Moyen Âge et Époque moderne. Perspectives historiques, ed. Ead. and Charles de Miramon, 273–320 (Sismel-Edizioni del Galluzzo: Firenze, 2008), and Laetitia Loviconi, “Réflexions autour des maladies héréditaires dans les traités médicaux des XIVe et XVe siècles”, Annales de démographie historique 137 (2019): 49–73. 3 Cf. Van der Lugt, “Les maladies héréditaires dans la pensée scolastique”, and Valerio Marotta, “Metafore della cittadinanza e dell’appartenenza. La nozione di ius originis nella patristica latina fino a sant’Agostino”, in Pensiero giuridico romano e teologia cristiana tra il I e il V secolo, ed. Giovanni M. Vian, 113–131 (Torino: Giappichelli, 2020). 4 Cf. Van der Lugt, “Les maladies héréditaires dans la pensée scolastique”, 281–282. See Avicenna, Liber canonis medicinae, fen 2, doctr. 1, c. 8 (ed. Venetiis 1507, 27v): «Et sunt egritudinum quedam que in semine hereditantur sicut albaras alba et tinea naturalis et podagra et ptisis et lepra.» 5 Cf. Luke Demaitre, Leprosy in Premodern Medicine: A Malady of the Whole Body (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 155. 6 Cf. Van der Lugt, “Les maladies héréditaires dans la pensée scolastique”, 306–312, and Loviconi, Loviconi, “Réflexions autour des maladies héréditaires”.

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Between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, some theologians employed the analogy with leprosy, the inherited disease par excellence, to explain how Adam’s sin can be inherited by birth and transmitted from parents to offspring.7 In the thirteenth century, the Latin expressions leprosus generat leprosum or leprosus est de leproso summarized such a doctrinal position and were often invoked to support arguments on the transmissibility of accidental characteristics from parents to children, both in theological and philosophical fields.8 To describe the dynamics involved in the parent-to-child transmission, Albert never uses terms related to the Latin verb heredare. Nevertheless, he is deeply interested in explaining how somatic traits, accidental features, disease, and resemblance could be inherited through the generative process. In his theological works, Albert does not resort to the leprosus generat leprosum argument in discussing the transmission of original sin though he does in the natural-philosophical framework, to support the theory according to which very frequently parents’ defects redound in the offspring, and according to different degrees. In Albert’s view, a leper parent always generates a leper offspring because the res innaturales (i.e., physical defects) of parents are also handed down throughout the entire genealogical group through the chain of generations.9 Despite the overall interest of physicians, philosophers, and theologians in biological inheritance, there was no unanimity on the dynamics and factors involved in passing down accidental somatic traits, diseases, and deformities from parents to offspring. From Greek medicine and natural philosophy, medieval thinkers inherit several arguments in support of the idea that accidental traits are somehow inherited and conveyed via the generative process. In his history of hereditary in Antique medicine and natural philosophy, Carlos Lopez-Beltràn

7 Cf. Van der Lugt, “Les maladies héréditaires dans la pensée scolastique”. 8 I discuss this topic in Amalia Cerrito, “Leprosy and Inherited Diseases in 13th-

Century Discussions on the Original Sin” (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023, forthcoming). 9 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus XXVI, 9, 1, 6 (ed. Stadler, 698): «Adhuc autem

frequentissime accidit, quod occasiones parentum resultant in natis aut aeque fortes aut forte fortiores, sicut quod podagricus generat podagricum et leprosus leprosum et aliquando cancrosus aut melancolicus de melancolia corrupta generat leprosum. Universaliter enim loquendo res innaturales parentum communicantur aliquando toti generationi per generationem succedentem sibi.»

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groups these arguments into three kinds: (i) resemblance between parents and offspring, (ii) combinations of different characteristics resulting from hybridizations, (iii) occurrence of deformity and disease patterns in family history.10 The fact that features and pathologies are not always preserved within families and broader genealogical groups, Lopez-Beltràn observes, challenges models of generation that are based on the predictability of the resemblances between generating and generated individuals.11 Indeed, one of the fundamental tenets of the Aristotelian theory of reproduction (unanimously accepted by medieval thinkers) is that the generating individual generates something alike in form and species. Perfectly successful embryogenesis produces a male offspring that resembles the father. However, the progeny might display some accidental traits alien to the paternal ones. It follows that whereas the essential features of the species are always predictable (for, a human being always generates a human being), the inheritance of secondary and accidental traits follows irregular, variable, and diversified patterns within the same genealogical group. Moreover, if the male seed, according to the Aristotelian view, is the unique active and formative agent in the generative process, how can the passing on of the maternal somatic traits be explained?12 In this theoretical framework, Albert develops his doctrine on genetic inheritance. As will be argued, to overcome the difficulties of combining the Aristotelian theory on parent-to-child resemblance with a model of bilateral kinship, Albert draws a theoretical distinction between male and female formative power. Endowed as they are with distinct functions, these powers interact with each other, allowing the expression of secondary accidental traits in the embryo, such as sexual distinction. The theoretical treatment of the transmission of maternal traits sheds new light on Albert’s position within the framework of the so-called 10 Cf. Carlos López Beltrán, “Forging Heredity: from Metaphor to Cause, a Reification Story”, Studies in the History of Philosophy and Science 25/3 (1994): 211–235, and id., El sesgo hereditario. Ámbitos históricos del conception de herencia biológica (México: Estudios sobre la Ciencia, 2004). 11 Cf. López Beltrán, “Forging Heredity”, 214–215. 12 Scholars still debate Aristotle’s view on the extent of the female genetic contribu-

tion to the reproduction, see David Henry, “Aristotle on the Mechanism of Inheritance’ [‘Mechanism’]”, Journal for the History of Biology 39 (2016): 425–455, Jessica Gelber, “Form and Inheritance in Aristotle’s Embryology”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 39 (2010): 183–212, and Robert Mayhew, The Female in Aristotle’s Biology: Reason or Rationalization (Chicago-London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014).

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“dispute between philosophers and physicians” on the female contribution to the generative process. The formation of the so-called “wind eggs” (ova venti), i.e., unfertilized eggs produced by female birds, will be a case study aimed at demonstrating that the female seed exerts a formative power that ensures life and growth. Albert’s doctrine on the inheritance of resemblance intertwines with the theoretical treatment of the juridical concept of consanguinity (consanguinitas ).13 Albert progressively develops an explicative model where the doctrine of biological inheritance merges with the juridical concept of kinship.

4.1 The Formative Power and the Transmission of Essential and Accidental Characteristics In the fourth book of the Generation of Animals , Aristotle attempts to coherently elucidate the dynamics of biological inheritance by investigating different circumstances of the occurrence of resemblance. The offspring could resemble his/her parents more than other members of his/her family, or he/she could partially or univocally resemble the mother/father as to different bodily parts. Alternatively, the offspring may not preserve any features of its parents, resembling its ancestor or failing to bear any likeness to the human form at all (i.e., monsters). The occurrence of the distinct types of resemblance is due to the male seed agency and its level of efficacy in governing the generative process. In the father’s seed, there are different powers (dynameis ) that physically transmit the organism’s form in the generative process.14 In the corresponding section of his De animalibus , Albert deals with the causes and the dynamics that pass on similarity from parents to children, taking into account alternative theories. On the one hand, following Aristotle, the question of the inheritance of somatic traits is explained in terms of antagonism between the male and female contributions to the 13 Cf. Charles de Miramon and Maaike Van der Lugt, “Sang, hérédité et parenté au Moyen-Âge: modèle biologique et modèle social”, Annales de démographie historique 137 (2019): 21–48. On the juridical model of consanguinitas , see Frank Roumy, “La naissance de la notion canonique de consaguinitas ”, in L’hérédité entre Moyen Âge et Époque moderne. Perspectives historiques, eds. Charles de Miramon and Maaike Van der Lugt, 41–66 (Sismel-Edizioni del Galluzzo: Firenze, 2008). 14 Cf. Henry, “Aristotle on the Mechanism of Inheritance” and Gelber, “Form and inheritance in Aristotle’s embryology”.

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generative process: as far as the formal principle, i.e., the male’s, is effective in limiting the disobedience of the material principle, the child will resemble the father. On the contrary, resemblance to the mother results from the weakness of the formal principle, which is incapable of prevailing over the material principle.15 On the other side, in Galenic embryology, one of the empirical arguments advanced to prove the formative agency of the female seed is the resemblance between mothers and children: the latter could not inherit maternal somatic traits if the female’s seed were not formal and active as much as the male’s.16 By combining Aristotelian and Galenic perspectives on this topic, Avicenna scales down the role of the female seed in the embryo’s bodily configuration and reformulates the Aristotelian theory of the inoboedientia materiae in terms of the degree of resistance of the menstruum to receive the form. The maternal contribution to the child’s configuration is merely to oppose, with varying degrees of success, the process of configuration. Even though Albert’s standpoint is close to Avicenna’s, Galenic key concepts are not entirely dismissed: the menstrual blood possesses specific qualities whose complexion (resulting from several factors such as dietary habits, climate, age, and bodily constitution) influences how generative matter interacts with the male’s seed. As pointed out by Miramon and Van der Lugt, it is quite likely that Albert here is trying to overcome the difficulty of combining the Aristotelian theory on parents-to-child resemblance with a bilateral kinship system in which paternal and maternal descent have equal rights.17 Thus, he progressively abandons the Aristotelian explanatory model and flattens the difference between the male and female agency in the configuration of the child. Male and female seeds are endowed with different formative powers, each with peculiar tasks that are equally responsible for the offspring’s bodily configuration. Albert tackles the issue of the transmission of somatic traits and the similarity between parents and children by distinguishing three different

15 Cf. Eduard Frunzeanu, “Le corps et la ressemblance parentale (XIIe-XVIe siècles)” (https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00430558, 2009), 3. 16 Cf. Michael Boylan, “Galen’s Conception Theory”, Journal of the History of Biology 1 (1986): 47–77. For an overview on Galen’s doctrines on reproduction and embryology, see Armelle Debru, “Physiology”, in Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Galen, eds. Petros Bouras-Vallianatos and Barbara Zipser, 263–282, esp. 278–280 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2019). 17 Cf. de Miramon and Van der Lugt, “Sang, hérédité et parenté au Moyen-Âge”, 30.

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possibilities of resemblance, i.e., (i) to the father, (ii) to the mother, and (iii) to any other relative of the genealogical line. All of them result from the harmonic proportion (ex armonica proportione) between the complexion of the male seed to the “nature of the child”, i.e., the matter offered by the mother. The reason for all these things is taken from the harmonic proportion of the complexion of the sperm to the nature of the one conceived and vice versa. At one time, the power of the male, which is in the sperm, prevails and bounds perfectly, due either to the power of the sperm considered in and of itself, or because it is reduced through age to a tempered state, or for some other reason. When tempering of this sort occurs, then it happens that the animal necessarily generates on account of this sort of complete proportion.18

Although paternal semen by itself plays an efficient role, its virtus spermatis could nevertheless weaken for many reasons. However, when the power of the seed perfectly prevails (vincens ) and bounds (terminans ) the embryonic matter, it produces a contemperatio (i.e., proportionality in the mixture) between “who generates” and “who is generated”. When this proportionality in the mixture occurs, it necessarily happens that “who generates” begets something completely proportional to itself. According to Albert, the virtus spermatis and its complexio, understood as the ability to act on the embryonic matter, result from the virtus formativa, which is the primary cause of similarity.19 As demonstrated in Chapter 3, by attracting and preserving the virtutes of all the organs of the generative agent and transmitting them to the sperm, the virtus formativa configures the organic parts of the embryo 18 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus XVIII, 2, 2 (ed. Stadler, 1206): «Causa autem

omnium istorum accipitur ex armonica proportione complexionis spermatis ad naturam concepti et e contrario. Aliquo tempore virtus maris quae est in spermate, est perfecte vincens et terminans aut propter virtutem spermatis in se consideratam, aut quia per aetatem reducitur ad temperamentum aut propter aliam aliquam causam: et cum talis accidit contemperatio, necessario tunc accidit animali generare propter complementum huiusmodi proportionis.» English translation (slightly modified) by Kenneth F. Kitchell Jr. and Irven M. Resnick (1999), in Albertus Magnus, On Animals. A Medieval Summa Zoologica (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 1295. 19 Ibid.: «Intentio enim una et eadem est in omnibus dictis sermonibus. Virtus enim formativa est primus motor in spermate et sperma est subiectum illius: et in ipso est virtus membrorum.»

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in the image and likeness of the paternal one. Thus, the virtus formativa is the first mover of the generation, and the seminal fluid is exclusively a subiectum in which the paternal body’s virtual resemblance in powers, structures, and functions is impressed. It follows that the seminal fluid is just a material vehicle, not the primum movens of generation. In Albert’s view, the stronger effectiveness of the motus formativus carried by the seminal fluid entails a prevailing resemblance to the father, both in male and female offspring. The reproduction of resemblance occurs when the generation is accomplished in an essential rather than accidental way. In this case, the resemblance to both parents and to the ancestors (avi) is produced.20 When the male virtus spermatis is predominant in the formative process, though, the offspring will resemble the father completely, as if another father comes into existence or as if the father had begotten another self into his son («quasi alter pater existens, ac si pater in filio se alterum genuisset.»).21 Resorting to the Avicennian explanatory strategy on the menstrual blood resistance in receiving the form, Albert claims that the action of the male seed upon the female matter is effective unless the female superfluitas opposes (impediat ) the formal action with disobedience (inoboedientia materiae).22 Nevertheless, he specifies that, more precisely, the transmission of maternal somatic traits happens because the female matter draws to itself (trahat ad se) the male’s operationes spermatis: If, however, the matter should draw the operation of the sperm to itself, then the resemblance will be to the mother. This can occur in three ways. First, it may occur in the principal and secondary members at the same time or it may be that the matter drawn sperm to itself in a principal member, but that sperm is not found in the secondary members. In this case the one born will be like the mother in complexion of the heart and in sex, but will resemble its father in the other members. If it should happen to

20 Ibid. (ed. Stadler, 1207): «[…] generatio similitudinis fit quando generatio fit modo essentiali et non accidentali: tunc enim semper fit similitudo ad parentes aut ad avos […].» 21 Ibid.: «[…] quoniam sicut diximus si vincat sperma omnino, erit similis patri quasi alter pater existens, ac si pater in filio se alterum genuisset.» 22 Ibid. (ed. Stadler, 1206): «Ex hac igitur causa debet inveniri prima causa similitudinis vel dissimilitudinis. Cum bene cocta est superfluitas quae est sperma, tunc bene et convenienter potest facere in superfluitatem, quae est menstrui, et complebitur forma embrionis ad similitudinem et formam maris si materia per inobedientiam non impediat: et hoc fit ex motu maris.»

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the contrary that the sperm leads the matter in the creation of the heart and not in the other members but rather is drawn off by the material, then the one born will resemble the father in the heart and in sex, but will resemble the mother in its other members.23

The resemblance to the mother can occur in three ways: (i) the offspring could be alike in principal and secondary members, (ii) one could manifest similarity just in the principal but not in secondary members, (iii) and, eventually, the offspring could resemble its mother just in the secondary members and not in the principal members. In the second case, the offspring will be alike to its mother both in complexion and gender: this is because the complexion of the heart (complexio cordis ), the first organ to be formed, determines the following gender distinction of the embryo. Conversely, when the paternal seed leads the matter in creating the heart (ducit materiam in cordis creatione), then the offspring will resemble its father both in heart complexion and gender, meanwhile, it resembles its mother in the other secondary members. In this passage, too, Albert highlights the heart’s central role in the dynamics of the configuration of the embryo. The heart is the place where the formative power is placed and from which the rest of the body configuration begins. The complexio cordis, alternatively resulting from the mother’s or father’s complexiones, is decisive for the sexual distinction of the embryo. The bilateral model of transmission of resemblance developed is also employed by Albert to explain what determines the gender distinction of the embryo.24 As he reports, the cause of sexual differentiation is usually ascribed to the amount of heat of the female womb and of the male seed

23 Ibid. (ed. Stadler, 1207): «Si autem materia trahat ad se spermatis operationem, erit similitudo ad matrem. Et hoc potest esse tripliciter: aut in membro principali et secundariis simul, aut in principali quidem ad se trahit materia, sed in secundariis non invenitur sperma: et tunc in complexione cordis et sexus similis erit partus matri et in aliis membris similis erit patri. Si autem e contrario fiat quod sperma ducit materiam in cordis creatione et non in membris aliis, sed potius trahitur a materia, tunc erit partus in corde et sexu similes patri et in membris aliis similis erit matri.» English translation (slightly modified) by Kitchell and Resnick, in Albertus Magnus, On animals, 1296. 24 Ibid., XVIII, 2, 9 (ed. Stadler, 1240): «Et est digressio declarans faciliori compendio omnia quae supra in hoc libro inducta sunt, et de gradibus virtutum generationis, et quot gradibus deficit consanguinitas.»

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and to the side of the womb where the embryo settles in.25 As much as these conditions contribute to determining the sex of the embryo, Albert urges, they are not the universal causes of embryonic sexual differentiation. Twin births confirm this: if the heat and the side of the womb were the universal causes of sexual differentiation, one single womb could not generate male and female offspring at the same time, as often happens in twin births.26 The same applies to the heat of the male sperm: «when we say that a cold sperm produces a female, it does not follow that a hot sperm always produces a male and not a female».27 Those who hold that the heat and the position in the womb are the causes of sexual distinction err, since they consider a remote precondition as a proximate cause.28 Now the proximate and essential cause of this should be sought in the passive, material principle of the embryo and in the operative principle which is in it. When the material generated is digested and is warm, and the effective principle is digesting the warm thing proportionally, then, most often, a completed male will be generated. If, however, the matter is not submissive and if too the active power is weak, it will, to be sure, generate one in the same species as those generating but not a completed one. And

25 Ibid. «De causa igitur masculinitatis et femininitatis hic dicimus, quod quamvis calor dextrae partis et calor matricis auxilierunt ad masculinitatem, tamen hoc non est causa universalis sexus huius in concepto: secundum hoc enim in eadem matrice eiusdem complexionis non simul generaretur mas et femina.» For an overview of the main medieval explanatory models on the sexual differentiation of the embryo, see Joan Cadden, Meanings of Sex Difference in the Middle Ages. Medicine, Science and Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 130–134. 26 Twin births are discussed by Albert in the IX book of his De animalibus , in tune with Avicenna’s De animalibus and Liber canonis medicinae. For the purposes of this investigation, it has to be noticed that Albert clearly distinguishes male and female responsibilities in causing twin births. The female responsibility is much broader and is divided into three main operations: (i) intermittent ejaculation of the semen in successive impulses, producing generative matter in excess, (ii) movement of suction exerted by the cervix on the male sperm, (iii) and finally, coital movements that trigger/activate movement of the womb itself. Cf. Gabriella Zuccolin, I gemelli nel Medioevo. Questioni filosofiche, mediche e teologiche (Como-Pavia: Ibis, 2019), 67–68. On the relationship between the complexio and the individual identity of twins, see ibid., 54–67. 27 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus XVIII, 2, 9 (ed. Stadler, 1240): «Amplius cum dicimus quod sperma frigidum causat et facit feminam, non sequitur propter hoc quod per contrarium sperma calidum semper faciat marem et non feminam.» 28 Ibid.: «Sed error istorum fuit in hoc quod remotum ponebant causam esse rei propinquam et convertibilem cum re ipsa.»

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it will furnish for it the instruments suited to an uncompleted generation these being the womb and the vulva, acting passively and materially in generation.29

The proximate causes of sexual distinction are neither the womb nor the sperm, but the «passive material and the operative principle» of the embryo. The operative principle is the paternal virtus formativa, while the passive material corresponds to the complexion of the female seed (complexio spermatis feminae). By taking advantage of the weakness of the formative power, the female seed draws to itself the virtutes spermatis masculi, thus conveying the maternal somatic traits. The greater effectiveness of the material principle is evident when mother and child share the complexio cordis and, therefore, the same gender. When the sperm moves and goes through the matter, whether it be entirely submissive or not, first to be formed is the principal member whose complexion all others follow naturally. And from the complexion of this one, the testicles and the seminal vessels for the male or the female sex are formed afterward. This is because the seminal vessels are second in principality and are beneath the heart, which is more principal than all others.30

Although the formative power conveyed by the male sperm is formally responsible for the configuration of the heart, its complexio determines that of the organs subsequently formed from it. The seminal vessels (vasa seminaria) are secunda in principalitate, and their subordination is also

29 Ibid.: «Causa proxima huius et essentialis debet quaeri in principio passivo materiali embrionis et in principio operativo quod est in ipso. Quando materia quae generatur est digesta et calida et principium effectivum sit digerens calidum proportionaliter, tunc frequentius generabitur masculus completus. Si autem materia fuerit inobediens aut etiam virtus activa debilis, generabit quidem ad eamdem speciem generantium, sed non completum: et aptabit ei instrumenta non completae generationi convenientia: et haec sunt matrix et vulva passive et materialiter ad generationem operantia.» English translation (slightly modified) by Kitchell and Resnick, in Albertus Magnus, On Animals, 1237. 30 Ibid.: «Cum autem sperma movet et revolvit materiam, sive si omnino oboediens vel

non, primum formatur principale membrorum cuius complexionem omnia alia sequuntur secundum naturam: et ab illius complexione postea formantur testiculi et vasa seminaria sexui maris vel feminae, eo quod vasa seminaria secunda sunt in principalitate et sunt sub corde quod est principalius omnibus.» English translation (slightly modified) by Kitchell and Resnick, in Albertus Magnus, On Animals, 1327–1328.

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reflected in their distribution within the body, i.e., below the main organ, i.e., the heart. In Albert’s reformulation of the Aristotelian ideas, the resemblance to a particular individual (ad personam or personalis ) from the paternal line is ascribed to the virtus formativa of the seminal fluid. In contrast, the resemblance from the maternal line is attributed to matter and to the socalled virtutes personae matris, i.e., the passive attitude and/or resistance to the action of the formative power and the ability to oppose to it: On the reason for resemblance, one should know that resemblance is to nature and to a person, as we said above. The first is called natural and the second personal. This second is twofold, namely, common (communis ) and specific (propria). […] The specific is that which resembles a single person of its genus in a determinate way, from whom the generation takes its formative power and movement. For this reason, if the sperm overcomes perfectly and is acting in the power of the person of the father, then there will be a perfect resemblance to the father. And if the material overcomes perfectly and is passive in the power of the person of the mother, then the act of the active powers will be in her only in accordance with the power and faculty of the mother and the offspring will thus resemble the mother perfectly.31

In this passage, Albert distinguishes the natural resemblance (ad naturam) from the individual resemblance (ad personam). The latter is twofold, i.e., common (communis ) and specific (propria). The specific resemblance pertains to the genus of the single person and, on the paternal side, is ascribed to the formative power: acting in virtue of the individual father (in virtute personae patris ), it conveys the resemblance. Inversely, when the matter, though passive, prevails over the male formative power, it conveys the resemblance to the mother, according to the

31 Ibid. (ed. Borgnet, 1241): «De causa tamen assimilationis hoc scire oportet quod assimilatio sit ad naturam et ad personam sicut diximus superius: et prima vocatur naturalis et secunda vocatur personalis. Et heac secunda est duplex, communis scilicet et propria. […] Propria autem quae est determinata ad unam personam sui generis a qua generatio ista habet virtutem formantem et motum: propter quod si fuerit sperma perfecte vincens et in virtute personae patris operans, erit perfecta assimilatio ad patrem. Et si materia vincat perfecte et in virtute personae matris sit patiens, actus activarum virtutum non erit in ea nisi secundum virtutem et facultatem matris: et ideo perfecte partus assimilabitur matri.» English translation by Kitchell and Resnick, in Albertus Magnus, On Animals, 1328.

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power and function belonging to her (secundum virtutem et facultatem matris ). All these arguments result from Albert’s attempt to reconcile the Aristotelian theory on parents-to-child resemblance (which ascribes the occurrence of the different types of resemblance to the degree of efficacy of the male seed in governing the generative process) with a model of bilateral agency, in which male and female seeds exert equipollent but different formative powers in the bodily configuration of the embryo. Even though Albert attempts to scale down the female’s formative task, the very ability to oppose the male formative power makes the female’s seed, at least, an interactive principle. Therefore, the greater and less predisposition of matter to receive the form plays an interactive role, though not entirely active, in the transmission of maternal somatic traits and the gender distinction of the embryo. The passive resistance of matter to receive the form, the inoboedientiae materiae, is described in terms of the interaction of two principles, i.e., matter and form, which, in their co-implication, allow the manifestation of diversity in nature and, thus, its conservation.

4.2

Albert on the Nature of the Female Seed

When it comes to describing the female contribution to the generative process, Albert’s language is quite periphrastic. This suggests a theoretical conflict between factual evidence and metaphysical premises. The formal principle (i.e., the male’s formative power) is the only one responsible for the bodily configuration of the embryo. Nevertheless, one can often experience that children inherit somatic traits and female sexual organs. To solve this impasse, Albert introduces a distinction between male virtus formativa and female virtus informativa. In 1931, within a wider study on Dante’s philosophical sources, Bruno Nardi published the first pioneering investigation on the distinction between formative and informative power. Given that these syntagms occur several times in Dante Alighieri’s works, the scholar aimed at reconstructing their possible sources, finally attributing to Albert the Great the first distinction between the two variants.32 Whereas most Scholastic 32 Cf. Bruno Nardi, “L’origine dell’anima umana secondo Dante”, Giornale critico di filosofia italiana 12 (1931): 433–456, reprinted in id., Studi di filosofia medievale, 9–68 (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura: 1979). E.g., Dante Alighieri, Divina commedia,

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authors do not seem interested in the difference between the formative and informative virtus, using both syntagms interchangeably, Albert develops a theoretical distinction between virtus formativa and virtus informativa. The introduction of a female virtus informativa sheds new light on Albert’s position within the so-called “dispute between philosophers and physicians”, as regards the female contribution to the generative process.33 On the one side, physicians held that the female emits a seed that is formative and operative as much as the male seed. On the other side, philosophers maintained that the female does not contribute actively to the generative process. There is just one active agent in this process, the male one that, by way of his seed, carries out the entire formative process. The female merely offers the material basis for conception and her womb to nourish the embryo during the development process. As pointed out by literature, Albert does not explicitly take sides, and he prefers to reconcile, as far as possible, these contrary positions. Albert’s approach to the question of the “hegemonic organ” of the body has been already shown in the third chapter of this work: if, on major issues, he argues in favor of the Aristotelian position, nevertheless he does not dismiss tout-court Galenic explanatory elements (e.g., the central role of veins and arteries), combining them within the Aristotelian epistemology.34 Scholars have variously interpreted Albert’s approach to the question of female contribution to the generative process. Maria Burger argues that, when dealing with Mary’s role in the generation of Jesus, Albert’s early work De incarnatione (1242–1245) is faithful to the Aristotelian position. On the contrary, Miguel de Asúa holds that Albert tacitly adopts the Galenic position here, while the conciliatory approach will be introduced only in later works of maturity. Evelina Miteva, while agreeing with de Asúa, suggests that, in the absence of direct observation of the embryogenetic process, Albert had to rely on Aristotle’s theoretical biology rather than on Galen’s “experimental” embryology. Luciano Cova, on the other hand, does not limit Albert’s conciliatory attitude to his biological works

Purgatorio XXV, 89: «Tosto che loco lì la circunscrive, la virtù formativa raggia intorno così e quanto ne le membra vive […].» 33 On the so-called controversia inter philosophos et medicos, see supra, Sect. 3.5 note

221. 34 Cf. supra, Sect. 3.5, passim.

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of maturity and highlights partial anticipations in Albert’s earlier works.35 However, de Asúa also argues that Albert, going beyond a mere conciliatory intent, attempted, on the one hand, to validate the Galenic theory and, on the other hand, to save Aristotle’s littera by interpreting it through the “Galenic lens”.36 In Albert’s De animalibus , the integration of the Galenic doctrine on the female contribution within the Aristotelian philosophical system is deployed in three stages: (i) first, Albert presents several non-Aristotelian theories about the female contribution (not exclusively of Galenic origin), (ii) secondly, he underlines the points of contrast with Aristotelian and non-Aristotelian positions, (iii) finally, by making theoretical adjustments, he presents a unified doctrine. At first, Albert presents those theories that, at variance with Aristotle, argued for the existence of two seminal fluids. Sperm is divided into sperm of the man or woman, that is, male and female. There was an argument (altercatio) among the ancients whether these two share the name of sperm univocally. Those following the Stoics—such as Plato, Speusippus, and Apollo, and their follower, Galen, along with his imitator Constantinus — have said that the name sperm belongs to each of them in a single sense (per unam rationem). They say this, asserting that the generative power belongs to male and female according to a single sense and that each of them has the organs necessary for generation, that the sperm of each of them actually posseses the formative power, and that this is located in the spirit contained within the viscosity of each sperm.

35 Cf. Maria Burger, “Albert the Great. Mariology”, in A Companion to Albert the Great. Theology, Philosophy, and Sciences, ed. Irven M. Resnick, 105–136: 123 (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2013), Miguel de Asúa, “War and Peace: Medicine and Natural Philosophy in Albert the Great”, in A Companion to Albert the Great, 269–298: 290, Luciano Cova, “Seme e generazione umana nelle opere teologiche di Alberto Magno”, in Summa doctrina et certa experientia: studi su medicina e filosofia per Chiara Crisciani, ed. Gabriella Zuccolin, 237–256: 249 (Firenze: Sismel-Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2017), and Evelina Miteva, “Iam patet igitur veritas eius quae dixit Aristoteles et causa deceptionis Galieni. Philosophers vs. Medics in Albertus Magnus’ Account on Conception”, in Irrtum-ErrorErreur, ed. Andreas Speer and Maxime Mauriège, 107–122 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018). 36 Cf. Miguel de Asúa, The Organization of Discourse on Animals in the Thirteenth Century. Peter of Spain, Albert the Great , and the Commentaries on De animalibus, Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Notre Dame: Indiana, 1991), 170–174.

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But they do say that the power of active formation is stronger in the male sperm than in the female.37

In Albert’s interpretation, the “two seeds” dispute results from a linguistic issue. Ancient philosophers and physicians disputed whether the term sperma could be univocally ascribed both to male and female contributions to the generative process. Albert gathers the theories of those who could be defined in a broader sense as “Platonists” in the first group. Among them, Galen, «along with his imitator Constantinus» maintains that the term sperm belongs univocally (per unam rationem) both to the male and the female. This is because the sperm of each generator is actually endowed with the formative power, though the virtus activa formationis is stronger in male sperm than in the female. Then Albert proceeds by presenting the “Aristotelian” position and emphasizes the points of contrast with the Platonic-medical: Aristotle and the whole Peripatetic school oppose this, saying that two causes never come together for the same effect of nature, causing in one and the same sense of the word “cause”. That which has been born is one and the same in nature and can therefore not have two things effecting its generation in one sense of the word “cause”. It would, however, be one

37 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus III, 2, 8 (ed. Stadler, 344): «Sperma autem dividitur in sperma viri et in sperma feminae sive in sperma masculium et in sperma femininum. Et fuit altercatio inter antiquos, utrum univoce haec duo nomen spermatis participarent. Et quidam sequentes Stoycos, sicut Plato et Speusippus et Apollo et tandem sequens istos Galienus et huius imitator Constantinus dixerunt spermatis nomen utrique per rationem unam convenire, asserentes virtutem generativam secundum unam rationem convenire masculo et feminae et utrumque eorum organa generationi debita habere et spermata utriusque virtutem formativam active habere, et hanc esse in spiritu qui intra viscositatem utriusque spermatis contintetur. Sed tamen cum hoc dicunt virtutem activae formationis esse fortiorem in spermate masculi quam in spermate feminae.» English translation (slightly modified) by Kitchell and Resnick, in Albertus Magnus, On Animals, 419. Interestingly, to describe the dispute between physicians and philosophers, Albert employs the term altercatio that, in ancient Roman law, designated that part of a criminal prosecution (quaestio) in which, after the prosecutor’s exposition and the defense’s replies, there was a debate of accusations and responses on each single points. Cf. Stefano Perfetti, “Forme del dibattito filosofico prescolastico: per una preistoria latina della disputatio”, in Insegnare e disputare. La vita intellettuale e universitaria nel Medioevo, ed. Elisa Coda, 27–49 (Roma: Carocci, 2023).

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and the same sense if either of the sperms shared a formative power with respect to efficient cause.38

Peripatetics are unwilling to acknowledge the existence of a female sperm or to attribute that term to the female contributions. This is because «two causes never contribute to the same effect of nature». Therefore, in their mind, the formative power belongs exclusively to the male sperm because the offspring cannot be generated by two efficient causes with the same purpose (intentio). If both male and female seeds were to be endowed with the same purpose, i.e., forming the offspring, the formative power would apply to both. But this would also imply that the female could generate by herself, making the male’s sperm superfluous since the embryogenesis takes place within the female body.39 In this way, Albert prepares the ground for the integration between the two opposite positions: he aims to distinguish the two seeds on account of two different levels of formalitas, thus introducing his own doctrine of the inchoatio formae/virtus formativa: Furthermore, if what they said were true, there would be no similarity between the female’s desire for the male and the desire of matter for form and the desire of the base for the good. For we know from the things which have been well established in the Physics, that matter has no inherent active power leading toward the good. Rather, in matter, there is the possibility of becoming and, in the form, there is the entire power of effecting that which has the possibility of becoming in matter. Averroes and Avicenna follow this view, as do all those who have studied natural matters well and acutely. Some physicians, however, are ignorant of reason

38 Ibid. (ed. Stadler, 345): «Adhuc autem opposuit Aristoteles et omnis schola Perypatheticorum, dicentes numquam ad unum et eumdem naturae effectum concurrere duas causas per unam et eamdem intentionem causae causantes. Natum autem in natura est unum et idem: et ideo non potest habere duo efficientia generationem ipsius per unam causae intentionem. Esset autem una et eadem intentio, si utrumque spermatum secundum efficientem causam virtutem participaret formativa.» English translation by Kitchell and Resnick, in Albertus Magnus, On Animals, 419–420. 39 Ibid. «Adhuc autem omino superflueret sperma masculi: quae enim esset causa, quod natura non perficesset sperma feminae, ut sic operaretur ex uno et non indigeret duobus, cum melius et compediosus sit operari ex uno quam ex duobus.»

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and philosophy. They offer the opinion of Galen even though it is not their business to offer an opinion on one or the other.40

The argument of those who maintain that both male and female seeds are endowed with the same formative power does consider the «female’s desire for the male and the desire of matter for form». Resorting to the theoretical treatment of privation of his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Albert claims that matter has no inner active power leading toward the form (materia virtutem active nulla penitus habet ad formam), but rather is endowed with the “possibility of becoming” which the form, by way of its effective power, brings to actuality. It follows that like in every material substrate, also in the female seed there is an inchoatio formae. According to Albert’s reconstruction, all those who studied nature well and acutely (bene et subtiliter), such as Avicenna and Averroes, follow this “Aristotelian” view. On the contrary, physicians who ignore this philosophical perspective prefer Galen’s sententia. Albert’s solution to the dispute on the “two seeds” is strongly influenced by Avicenna, who, in his De animalibus , already had pointed out the equivocate meaning of the term sperm when this is also attributed to the female contribution. For the Persian physician, the male and female seeds are not comparable from a formal point of view, though they are coimplicated since the female seed, even though devoid of formative power, is a necessary condition for the action of the male formative power.41 Expanding on the Avicennian solution, Albert claims that the term sperma cannot be univocally attributed to both male and female seed, not even if taken in the temporal axis of prius and posterius. Indeed, even

40 Ibid.: «Adhuc autem si verum esset quod dicunt, non esset similitudo desiderii feminae ad masculum desiderio materiae ad formam et desiderio turpis ad bonum. Scimus enim ex hiis, quae in Physica bene determinata sunt, quod materia virtutem activam nulla penitus habet ad formam, similiter autem neque turpe ad bonum, sed in materia est posse fieri et in forma tota virtus efficiendi illud quod fieri potest in materia: et tunc sequitur Avenroys et Avicenna et omnes qui in naturis bene et subtiliter studuerunt. Medici autem quidam ignari rationis et philosophiae. Galieni praeferunt sententiam, licet non ad eos pertineat de uno vel de alio proferre iudicium.» English translation by Kitchell and Resnick, in Albertus Magnus, On Animals, 420. 41 Cf. Romana Martorelli Vico, Medicina e filosofia. Per una storia dell’embriologia medievale nel XIII e nel XIV secolo (Milano: Guerini e Associati, 2002), 17–18.

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though the “beginning of form” of the female seed is prior to the actualization of the form, this only means that the inchoatio formae is an imperfect form of the perfect form to be actualized: Let us then say with Aristotle that the name ‘sperm’ is not used univocally for the two sperms of the male and female. Neither is taken in the sense of earlier or later, nor is it used according to the sense (ratio) of perfect or imperfect if perfect and imperfect are taken according to the same active or passive power. Rather, this name is used equivocally concerning the two sperms. For although there may be a confused beginning of form in the female sperm, it is nevertheless only in the sperm as a confused beginning of form in matter. Therefore, it is in it according to passive and not active potency.42

In this passage, Albert is condensing his previous treatment on the physical principles of the generative process, i.e., privation (or inchoatio formae), matter, and form. From a temporal perspective, the material principle is prior to the form since, otherwise, this would not have any substrate on which to act, as concerns the realization in time, the form is thus posterior to the matter. The inchoatio formae is antecedent to both matter and form, since the substantial change begins from matter’s desire toward the form.43 In this perspective, the female seed, as much as it possesses a confused beginning of form (confusa inchoatio formae), remains a passive principle and not an active power of the seed, such as the male formative power. In the following passage, Albert clarifies the reference to the confusa inchoatio of the female seed in discussing the distinction between virtus formativa and informativa attributed to Theophrastus and Porphyry:

42 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus III, 2, 8 (ed. Stadler, 345): «Dicamus igitur cum Aristotele, quod nomen spermatis non univoce dicitur de duobus spermatibus maris et feminae, neque dicitur secundum prius et posterius secundum rationem perfecti et imperfecti, si perfectum et imperfectum secundum eadem virtutem accipiantur activam vel passivam. Sed dicitur nomen illud de duobus spermatibus secundum aequivocationem: quoniam licet in spermate feminae sit formae quaedam confusa inchoatio, tamen haec non est in ipso nisi sicut confusa inchoatio est formae in materia, et ideo secundum passivam potentiam est in ipso et non secundum activam. […].» English translation by Kitchell and Resnick, in Albertus Magnus, On Animals, 420. 43 Cf. supra, Sect. 2.1, passim.

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This is also the reason why the earliest followers of Aristotle, like Theophrastus and Porphyry, distinguished between the informative power and the formative power. They said that the informative power, which would be better called informable, is that in which the form is formed and is in the matter. The form, however, possesses in itself the formative (that is forming) power. They attributed the formative power to the male seed and the informative to that of the female. For, even though each power has form, one has a form that is determinate and acts through its species, the other, however, gives nothing at all to the matter except this: that what is formed can come to be from the matter by a power which is ordered and inchoate.44

The two philosophers distinguished the virtus formativa, i.e., the power to configure and shape organs, from the virtus informativa (which could be better labeled as ‘informable power’), i.e., the power of being configured and shaped, attributing the first to the male seed and the second to the female seed.45 This distinction is based on having identified the confused inchoatio in the female seminal fluid, which is the passive material power in which the form is configured (est virtus in qua forma formatur). In Albert’s view, male and female seeds, as material substrates

44 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus III, 2, 8 (ed. Stadler, 346): «Haec est etiam causa, quod antiquissimi Aristotelis discipuli sicut Theofrastus et Porfirius distinxerunt inter virtutem informativa et virtutem formativa, dicentes quod virtus informativa, sive quod melius dicitur informabilis, est virtus in qua forma formatur et est in materia. Forma autem secundum se habet virtutem formativa sive formantem: et formativam quidem dederunt spermati masculi, informativa autem dederunt spermati feminae: cum tamen utraque habet forma, se una determinatam agentem per speciem suam, alia autem nichil omnino dat materiae nisi hoc quod ex ipsa hoc quod formatur possit fieri potentia ordinata et inchoata.» English translation (modified, in tune with Robert Sharples, Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence. Commentary vol. 5. Sources on Biology [Leiden-New York-Köln: Brill, 1995], 179) by Kitchell and Resnick, in Albertus Magnus, On Animals, 420–421. 45 Albert usually refers to Theophrastus as a continuator of the Aristotelian philosophy, and, especially, of the doctrine on generation. As to the Neoplatonic Porphyry, even though he composed several philosophical and natural-philosophical treatises, most of them got lost and just a few were directly known in the thirteenth century. Apart from Boethius’ Latinization of his Isagoge, i.e., an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories , which may be the reason why Albert mentions him along with Theophrastus, Scholastic thinkers had indirect information on Porphyry’s doctrines, through the mediation of Arabic authors. Nevertheless, in the extant sources, neither Porphyry nor Theophrastus deal with the distinction between formative and informative powers. Cf. Sharples, Theophrastus of Eresus, 107–114.

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of generation, are equally endowed with the beginning of forms, though they differ as to their formative agency. After having outlined the essential theoretical elements of the philosophical and medical positions on female seed, Albert makes some theoretical adjustments to the medical position aiming at including it within the Aristotelian framework: We begin following our view, which we think is also that of Aristotle and all the Peripatetics, and say that is it true that during intercourse and conception a woman does emit a certain white, viscous, threadlike humor, which Galen calls the woman’s sperm. To this he attributes the informative power, not the formative power, as we have shown in previous books on the investigation of animals. We, however, attribute to this humor only the power of a suitable material and we say that it has neither any creative nor any formative power, differing in this from Galen. Because it is only a suitable material, it has only the name of “sperm” equivocally, for the name sperm, as we showed in the second book of our Physics, means efficient and formative cause. Therefore, too, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and all the Peripatetics gave it the name of menstrual blood as suited its powers rather than the name of “sperm”. They use the term “menstrual blood” generally for everything which is in the womb in a material way, serving the conceptus. We therefore agree with Galen in that we grant that this is the most suitable material for the radical members. But we differ from him in not giving it the formative or informative power, and we thus say that it is only called sperm using an equivocal name, for the generative power is not in it but rather in the man’s sperm.46

46 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus IX, 2, 3 (ed. Stadler, 714): «Incipientes igitur secundum nostram opinionem, quam Aristotelis et omnium Perypatheticorum esse putamus, dicimus quod in veritate mulier aliqua in coitu et conceptu emittit aliquando humorem album viscosum et philosum, quem sperma muliebre vocat Galienus, et cui dat virtutem informativam, non formativam, sicut in antehabitis scientiae animalium libris ostendimus. Nos autem huiuc humori non damus nisi virtutem materiae convenientis et dicimus eam non habere aliquam virtutem facientem vel formantem: et ideo etiam Aristoteles et Theofrastus et omnes Peripathetici potius dabant ei nomen menstrui, cum cuius virtutibus convenit, quam nomen spermatis, vocantes generaliter menstruum omne quod est materialiter deserviens ad conceptum. Convenimus ergo cum Galieno in hoc quod concedimus illud esse materiam convenientorem ad membra radicalia: differimus autem ab ipso in hoc quod non damus virtutem formantem vel informantem, et per consequens dicimus non vocari ipsum sperma nisi nomine aequivoco, quia virtus generativa non est in ipso, sed in spermate viri.» English translation (slightly modified) by Kitchell and Resnick, in Albertus Magnus, On Animals, 812.

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Resorting to the theoretical distinction between “formativa” and “informativa”, Albert makes concessions to the medical position. It is possible that, during the coitus, the female produces certain humor that, in some way, permeates what is conceived. However, this humor does not exercise any productive or configurative power (virtus facientem vel formantem). The female’s humor exercises nothing but the power of suitability with the form (virtus materiae convenientis ). Therefore, what Galen defines as “female sperm” (sperma muliebre) corresponds to the humor albus whose power is not formative but, rather, a virtus informativa, i.e., a power of being well predisposed and proportionated to the form.47 Nevertheless, Albert agrees with Galen in deeming this humor albus, with its capacity of being informable, as the most suitable matter for the embryo’s principal organs (membra radicalia), such as the heart. Indeed, as shown in the previous section of this chapter, the complexio cordis of the embryo’s heart (which is the first organ in actuality) could equally result from the mother’s or father’s complexions and determine the sexual distinction accordingly. However, Albert differs from Galen since he is unwilling to acknowledge any kind of formative power—taken in an active sense––to the female seed. Thus, he concludes that the term sperma, as the vehicle of generative power, belongs exclusively to the male and is only equivocally ascribed to the female seed. As Albert clarifies, the humor albus produced by the female during the coitus is more suitable to be converted into the substance of the embryo than the menstrual blood because the humor which nourishes bodies is the blood, which becomes white (albus ) through the last digestion in the female body.48 However, the nourishing material offered by the female

47 According to Danielle Jacquart and Claude Thomasset, “Albert le Grand et les

problèmes de la sexualité”, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 1 (1981): 73– 93, esp. 83, when discussing the Galenic doctrine on female contribution, Albert is quite cautious in endorsing some of its aspects. However, the adoption of the doctrine of female seminal vessels (albeit disambiguated and scaled-down) shows how, in Albert’s view, the Galenic theory is more effective in explaining the dynamics of natural generation. 48 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus IX, 2, 3 (ed. Stadler, 717): «[…] materia autem

convenientior sit id quod in coitu emittit mulier, et ideo non vero nomine sperma, sed sanguis menstruus vocetur, quoniam sanguis vocatur humor materialiter corpus nutriens, sive sit rubeus sive etiam ultima digestione in membris hominis sit dealbatus. Si autem placeat alicui quod hunc humorem sperma velit nominare, concedat tamen quod non in eadem rationem convenit ei in qua convenit spermati vero masculino.»

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cannot be considered as being endowed with a weak or imperfect formative power since, in that case, this power would function, albeit weakly, without the cooperation of the male seed, thus the female would be able to generate by herself, which is impossible.49 Given all these reasons, if one would still label the female humor sperma, one should at least grant that this does not suit the female in the same sense that it suits the male.50 The same theoretical approach to the question of the “two seeds” can be found in Albert’s commentary on the Gospel of Luke (Super Lucam, c. 1264–1268), where he discusses the role of Mary in the generation of Jesus.51 In his biblical commentaries, Albert frequently resorts to his natural-philosophical knowledge to interpret biblical passages and theological issues. Natural philosophy helps interpret the poetical language of the Bible, giving a fresh foundation to allegorization or moralization, and it amplifies realistic aspects of the biblical verse.52 Natural-philosophical doctrines, argumentations, and notions are often subtly reformulated and reused to prove the truth of the biblical text, as is the case of Mary’s

49 Ibid.: «Probabiliter ergo vocatur humor coitus feminei convenientiam habens materiae ad conceptum plus quam sanguinis menstruus. Si enim diceretur quod habet virtutem informativa, sed debilem et ideo imperfectam, absque dubio quando est in matrice etiam absque spermate viri deberet agere aut debiliter aut fortiter.» 50 Ibid.: «Si autem placeat alicui quod hunc humorem sperma velit nominare, concedat tamen quod non in eadem rationem convenit ei in qua convenit spermati vero masculino.» 51 For an overview of medieval interpretation on Mary’s role in Jesus’ conception and generation, see Maaike Van der Lugt, Le ver, le démon et la Vierge. Les théories médiévales de la génération extraordinaire. Une étude sur les rapports entre théologie, philosophie naturelle et médicine (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2004). As regards the biblical-exegetical tradition, see Troy W. Martin, “Animals impregnated by the Wind and Mary’s Pregnancy by the Holy Spirit”, Annali di Storia dell’Esegesi 31/2 (2014): 11–24. 52 Albert’s biblical-exegetical works show a variety of interactions between exegesis, natural philosophical, and theological disciplines. As Stefano Perfetti’s studies put it, biblical commentaries were the place of confluence where every scientific field (natural philosophy included) found its veritative telos. Cf. Stefano Perfetti “Biblical Exegesis and Aristotelian Naturalism: Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and the Animals of the Book of Job”, Aisthesis 11 (2018): 81–96, id. “Filosofia naturale e trasformazione morale. Alberto Magno interprete del “Cantico della Vigna” (Isaia, 5, 1–7)”, in Edizioni, traduzioni e tradizioni filosofiche (Secoli XII-XVI). Studi per Pietro B. Rossi, eds. Luca Bianchi, Onorato Grassi and Cecilia Panti, 341–352 (Canterano, Roma: Aracne Editore, 2018). For a detailed study of how Aristotelian thought inspired medieval scholars to take a fresh look at the interpretation of the Scriptures, see Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964).

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contribution to Jesus’ embryogenesis. Unlike any other, Jesus’ conception takes place without a carnal union, therefore, lacks that paternal seed, whose formative power usually manages the entire embryonic development.53 To prevent the attribution to Mary of any active role (a possible heretic argument), he stages a sort of “quaestio” between philosophers and physicians, wondering whether Mary performs an efficient causality in Jesus’ generation: One asks whether the Virgin Mary brought something of a causal agency in the conception ‹of Jesus›. Some claim that the generative matter that results from the mixture of the sexes has a twofold form: one is the formative, which derives from the substance of the father, the other is the informative, which derives from the substance of the mother. They argue that the formative acts and operates by itself (per se), distinguishing, converting, forming, and configuring the blood, whereas the informative acts and administers in a subordinate manner (subagit et tunc subministrat ). Such is Galen’s position.54

According to the medical argument, the generative matter comes from the mixture of male and female seeds. The product of this mixture has two forms accomplishing different functions: the virtus formativa, derived 53 Albert wonders to what extent the human generation of Jesus can be explained through comparison with ordinary generations. In the absence of a seed configuring the embryo, a different account is required for his conception and formation in Mary’s womb. To solve this theoretical “impasse” arising from the seedless generation of Jesus, Albert opts for a parallel with the botanical generative model (pullulatio floris ). I discuss the interaction between natural philosophy and medicine in Albert’s account of the generatio Christi in Amalia Cerrito, “Faith and Natural Philosophy in Albert the Great’s Account of the generatio Christi” (Münster: Archa Verbi- Subsidia: 2023, forthcoming). In ead., “Botany as Science and Exegetical Tool in Albert the Great”, Aisthesis 11 (2018): 97– 107, I show how Albert reuses his botanical doctrines and alphabetical entries to interpret physiological processes or plants mentioned in the Bible. 54 Albertus Magnus: Super Lucam 1, 31, (ed. Borgnet, 72b): «Quaeritur utrum in conceptione Beata Virgo aliquid efficientis causae contulerit? […] Et dicunt quidam quod in materia generationis quae fit ex commixtione sexuum, duplex est forma: una quarum dicitur formativa, et haec est de substantia patris: et alia autem est informativa quae est de substantia matris. Et dicunt quod formativa agit et operatur per se, distinguendo sanguinem, et convertendo, et formando, et figurando: informativa autem subagit et tunc subministrat. Et haec est sententia Galieni.». On the ways of reading the Gospels in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, see Beryl Smalley, The Gospels in the Schools c. 1100–1280 (London and Ronceverte: The Hambledon Press, 1985).

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from the paternal substance, acts and operates upon the menstrual blood, and the informativa, derived from the maternal substance, provides the substratum to the action of the male seed (subagit et tunc subministrat ). In this perspective, Mary’s seed, like that of any other female, possesses an informative power, although less powerful than the male seed. The female formative action is subordinated and secondary to the male’s agency. On the contrary, according to the philosophical argument, rather than carrying a less powerful formative power, Mary’s seed is endowed with the “beginning of form” (inchoatio formae) to be brought forth from the matter by the male seed: However, this is not the doctrine of Aristotle and his followers in natural science (scientia naturalis ). They claimed that the formative power is only in the drop (gutta) of the father, whereas the drop of the mother does not contain any formative or informative power but only an indistinct, confused, and indeterminate form. Therefore, the female drop neither acts, nor administers in a subordinate manner (subministrat ), but receives the action of the male drop (sed agitur in eam per guttam viri). The drop of the male enters the drop of the female just like the spirit enters the body. This is because the drop of the father, after being converted into spirit, is contained within the viscosity of the maternal drop, and there it operates by distinguishing, converting, forming, configuring, and performing other operations.55

In such a view, the male seminal fluid is the sole bearer of any formative power. It penetrates the female seed, much as a spirit entering a body, and operates distinguishing, converting, forming, and shaping the obscure (confusa), undefined (indeterminata), and indistinct (indistincta) “beginning of the form” enclosed in the female seed.56 55 Albertus Magnus: Super Lucam 1, 31, (ed. Borgnet, 72b): «Non tamen est sententia Aristotelis, et Philosophorum, qui secuti sunt eum in scientia naturali: sed potius quod sola virtus informativa est in gutta patris, nec aliqua vis formativa vel informativa est in gutta matris, nisi forma confusa et indeterminata et indistincta: et ideo nihil agit penitus nec subministrat, sed agitur in eam per guttam viri: gutta enim viri intrat in guttam femminae, sicut spiritus corpus: quia etiam gutta patris convertitur in spiritum, et intra viscositatem guttae maternae continetur: operans distinguendo, convertendo, formando, figurando, et caeteras operationes in ea faciendo.» 56 Albert’s exegesis echoes the argumentation of his Ethica (1268), where he articulates step by step the action of the formative power of the male seed at work in the embryo since conception, see Albertus Magnus: Ethica (ed. Borgnet, 143): «Embryones vocantur

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According to Albert, both the medical and the philosophical arguments arrange male and female seeds into a hierarchical order in which the female contribution is subordinated to the male’s. On the one side, Galen marks the action of the male formative power by the chain of changes (distinctio, conversio, formatio, figuratio). In contrast, the female power is described by the Latin verbs subagere and subministrare. The prefix sub- clearly indicates an activity that is subordinate to the male power. It follows that, even if Mary’s seed were formative or contained the “beginning of form”, it could not produce any substance by itself. In Albert’s view, this entails that whatever line of argument heretics would take, it would be impossible to attribute to Mary an efficient agency in the generation of Jesus.

4.3

The Female Formative Power and the Case Study of the Wind Eggs (ova venti)

According to Albert’s theoretical treatment, the female seed, like any other material substrate, is endowed with the power of configuration that remains inactive until the male formative power triggers the potential forms contained in the matter. However, some types of generation of animals challenge this explanatory model, which is based on the interaction between male and female formative power. This is the case of the generation of the so-called “wind eggs” (ova venti). Ovum venti (i.e., wind egg) is the Latin syntagm which indicates the unfertilized egg that some oviparous animals, the hen in particular, produce without the presence of the male. According to a popular explanation widely reported by Greek and Latin authors, the wind would excite the vulva of female birds in flight, thus stimulating the production of generative material in them.57 In the third book of Generation concepta a matricibus semina, in quibus (sicut in libro Animalium determinatum est) gutta masculi intrat in guttam foeminae sicut spiritus in corpus: et per virtutem proprii spiritus qui intrat in viscositatem seminis continetur, dirigit, purgat et purificat guttam foeminae, et ex purgamento pellem circumducit, intra quam semina sic unita concluduntur, ut spiritus resolutus ab unione seminum evaporare non possit, sed veniens ad pellem reflectatur in seipsum, et intra substantiam seminum reversatur […].» 57 See e.g., Gaius Plinius Secundus, Naturalis Historia, X, 80, 166: «Inrita ova, quae hypenemia diximus, aut mutua feminae inter se libidinis imaginatione concipiunt aut pulvere, nec columbae tantum, sed et gallinae, perdices, pavones, anseres, chenalopeces. Sunt autem sterilia et minora ac minus iucundi saporis et magis umida. Quidam et vento

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of Animals, Aristotle argues that the oviparous can produce spontaneous conceptions (ku¯emata automata), which are like “windy and of zephyr” (hyp¯enémia kai zephýria), because the females of this species abound with menstrual residue to be transformed into a sterile egg.58 Wind eggs are much smaller than fertilized eggs since, as Aristotle explains, they are incomplete.59 Fertilized eggs are composed of (i) a white substance, i.e., the albumen, which contains the generative principle, (ii) and a yellow substance, i.e., the yolk, more abounded, from which the chick-embryo draws its nourishment. Albeit incomplete, the unfertilized eggs display the same distinction between those two substances. As far as concerns the origin of the two substances of the egg, Aristotle rejects the hypothesis that the albumen derives from the male and the yolk from the female: both substances, in fact, derive from the maternal generative matter.60 Therefore, according to Aristotle, the production of eggs (either fertilized or not) demonstrates that the female, up to a certain degree, performs a productive power.61 However, what is produced by female birds, without the male contribution, is not an animal in potency. This is so because the power to bring to being the sensitive soul belongs exclusively to the male. Nevertheless, the wind egg is endowed with a basic vital principle since everything that is able to grow is alive.62 Albert shows a great interest in the phenomenon of non-fertilized eggs: they offer a benchmark to validate his theories about female contribution to the generative process. Following Aristotle, he specifies that the production of wind eggs is exclusively borne by the female, independently putant ea generari, qua de causa etiam zephyria appellant.» and Isidorus Hispalensis, Etymologiarum sive Originum libri XX, XII, VII, 81: «Ova autem quaedam inani vento concipiuntur, sed non sunt generabilia, nisi quae fuerint concubitu masculine concepta et seminali spiritu penetrata.» For a broader reconstruction on the references to wind eggs in Greek and Latin authors, see Conway Zirkle, “Animals Impregnated by the Wind”, Isis 1 (1936): 95–130. 58 Aristoteles, De generatione animalium, III, 1, 749 a 35-b3. 59 Ibid., 750b passim. 60 Ibid., 751b 25–28. 61 On the theoretical implications of attributing a productive capacity, albeit limited,

to female birds, see Mayhew, The Female in Aristotle’s Biology, 45–47. Among various examples, he deems the “wind eggs” argument as evidence of a notion of female generative material, that is no longer inert and passive, but rich and, to some extent, even productive. 62 Aristoteles, De generatione animalium, II, 5 741a6-32. Cf. Mayhew, The Female in Aristotle’s Biology, 45.

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from coitus. In his De animalibus , he devotes several pages to the causes producing the ovum venti, explained in contrast with the characteristics of the ovum completum. The complete egg that came in contact with the male seed, has three properties: (i) its albumen is whiter than that of an unfertilized egg due to the purity of the male substance, (ii) it is thicker, to better retain the spirit and formative warmth within itself and prevent it from evaporating too easily, (iii) it stores the spirit and the formative heat (calor formativus ) in its acute pole, from which expands throughout the albumen (i.e., the organic substance of the chick-embryo) and to the yolk (i.e., the suitable food for growth and nutrition of the organs).63 Conversely, the ovum venti is devoid of the properties and powers conveyed by male seminal fluid, namely the formative power which shapes the egg and leads it toward the animal species: A wind egg, however, is bereft of such sperm and entirely lacks something that might form it and lead it to its nature (species ). It is very like the material of a house to which the hand of the artisan has not been laid.64

The ovum venti, entirely devoid of (omnino destitutum) the formative and leading power toward the nature (formante et ad speciem deducente), possesses all the matter necessary for producing a complete animal. As regards the origin of this matter, Albert specifies that, although in all eggs there are two humiditates, one albuginosa and one citrina, the wind egg shows an abundance of albumen, which derives entirely from the female

63 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus VI, 1, 3 (ed. Stadler, 446): «Quod autem diximus in prehabitis, semen maris mutare et complere ovum usque ad exitum, probatur ex hoc, quod si frangitur ovum completum, invenitur semen galli in ovo tres habere proprietates: [i] in colore enim est albius, quod puritatem suae demonstrat substantiae: [ii] in substantia autem est multo spissius quam sit albugo cetera, et hoc est ut retineat intra se spiritum et calorem formantem, ne exalare de facili possit: [iii] in situ autem pertingit per albuginem totam usque ad vitellum et illi ex parte acuminis ovi infingitur, ut virtus sua sit quidem in albugine, ex qua fit pulli substantia, et pertingat usque ad vitellum, ex quo fit creaturae cibus conveniens, quamdiu est in testa ovi.» 64 Ibid.: «Ovum autem venti tali spermate destitutum omnino caret formante et ad speciem deducente et non est nisi sicut materia aedificii ad quam non accedit manus artificis […].» English translation (slightly modified) by Kitchell and Resnick, in Albertus Magnus, On Animals, 531.

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generative matter.65 Inversely, there is a smaller amount of humiditas citrina, or yolk (vitellum), since this is merely functional for nourishment (paratur in cibum) and the fetus’ protection as if it were a gestational sac (secundina). Albeit the gestational sac (or yolk) is always surrounded by albumen, a substance deriving from the female semen which, thanks to the power of the womb and seminal vessels, is attracted to the substance of the egg, the yolk itself is an incomplete thing for producing an offspring (res incompleta ad partum).66 To configure an offspring, the action of the male semen (sperma maris ) is always required, which keeps together (tenet ) and sustains (sustentat ) both yellow and white humor stored in the egg. Only the sperm of the male keeps together and sustains the humors. […] The principle which is from the sperm of the male is separated out in eggs and stands on the side where the eggs absorb a humor from the womb. It is positioned in the egg extending out from the white (where the entire sperm of the male is located) up to the yellow yolk from which the nourishment is absorbed when the members are being formed and completed.67

Quite precisely, Albert describes the position of the male formative power within the material composition of the egg offered by the female. Originally, the male formative principle of the male seed is separated from the generative matter. Once in the eggs, it places itself on the same side of the generative humor, i.e., the white subtance, or albumen. From this point, it spreads out from the albumen toward the yolk, which 65 Ibid.: «Licet autem dixerimus ova duarum esse humiditatum, albuginosae quidem et citrinae, tamen quaedam ova venti inveniuntur, in quibus non est nisi albugo, et haec fiunt, quando in materia coitus habundant gallinae ex aliquo cibo singulariter materiam coitus operante […].» 66 Ibid.: «Non est autem visum fieri ovum venti ex sola citrina substantia, quoniam haec paratur in cibum et non circumducitur ei nisi secundina, qua distinguitur ab albugine, et est res incompleta ad partum nisi circumducatur albugo, quae est sperma feminae virtute matricis et testiculorum attracta ad ovi substantiam.» 67 Ibid., XVII, 1, 2 (ed. Stadler, 1152): «[…] Sperma autem maris tenet et sustentat

humores tantum […]. Principium autem quod est ex spermate maris, separatur in ovis et stat ex parte illa qua ova sugunt humore ex matrice. In ovo autem positum est pertingens ex albumine ovi: in qua totum sperma maris situm est usque ad vitellum citrinum, ex quo sugitur nutrimentum quando formantur et complentur membra.» English translation (slightly modified) by Kitchell and Resnick, in Albertus Magnus, On Animals, 1244.

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is functional for nourishment and protection of the embryo until the configuration of the chick is perfected. In Albert’s view, the very fact that the ova venti are exclusively produced by the female questions the Aristotelian teaching on the absolute passivity of the material principle in the generative process. As a matter of fact, the configuration and humoral composition of unfertilized eggs are similar to that of the complete egg (in figura et humiditatibus similitudinem […] habent ).68 This similarity between fertilized and unfertilized eggs could be better explained by following the Galenic position that deems the female contribution to be as active and formative as that of the male. In order to prevent any temptation to assign a formative and active principle to the female, Albert offers a detailed examination of the differences and similarities between the complete egg and the ovum venti. Albeit the latter exhibits shape and humoral properties similar to a fertilized egg, it differs quantitatively and qualitatively from a complete egg. Given that it lacks the male’s contribution, it is not only devoid of the power leading toward its completion but also of the matter carried by the male seed. Moreover, the ova venti are more humid (humidiora) and tasteless (insipidiora), because, lacking the male formative power, the watery humidity (humiditas aquosa) is not digested and converted into a bodily substance.69 Therefore, to explain the formation of the unfertilized egg, the adoption of the Galenic explanatory model should be excluded. Indeed, if the female semen, albeit to a lesser extent, would be endowed with the same formative and coagulative powers as the male semen, the unfertilized egg should undergo some modifications during the brood. This, however, does not affect in any way the properties of the albumen or the yolk. These remain in their original configuration.70

68 Ibid. VI, 1, 2, (ed. Borgnet, 445): «Ova autem venti voco ea quae in figura et humiditatibus similitudinem quidem habent ovorum, sed deficiunt a semine masculi.» 69 Ibid.: «[…] sunt etiam ceteris humidiora aquosa humiditate et insipidiora, ideo quod deest in eis digerens et complens semen maris […].» 70 Ibid.: «[…] et quando aliquod ovorum venti ponitur sub gallina, non alterabitur per incubationem, sed albugo remanebit alba et vitellum remanebit citrinum: per quod scitur falsum dixisse Galienum in eo quod dixit quod semen feminae coagulat in generatione et format, licet minus coagulet et formet semine maris.»

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Indeed, though present in the first formative stage of the eggs’ configuration, the female heat is then dispersed in the wind and does not persist in the egg to form the chick. The two humiditates of the unfertilized eggs (i.e., yolk and albumen) could be further coagulated by boiling or by cooking (epsesi et optesi). However, these operations do not lead to the configuration and the completion of the chick: They are called wind eggs because heat can dissolve them into wind but cannot form them into a chick. As we said, these can be rendered solid by epsesis and optesis but cannot be formed. They are the material of chicks, but they lack their particular formative agent ( formans ). This is like the mixture of the female sperm with the menstrual blood in other animals, for from this matter nothing at all is generated. In matter such as this, there is nothing in potency, for, as we said in Physics, potency to form, which is in material, is there through some beginning of form and formative agent (per formae et formantis aliquam inchoationem).71

Devoid of its own formative principle (proprio formante destituita), the matter out of which eggs are configured cannot generate something by itself. This is because the substance present in the eggs cannot generate a complete form that is not previously there in potency. By resorting to his previous reformulation of the Galenic doctrine on the nature of the female seed, Albert specifies that albumen and yolk correspond to the female sperm and the menstrual blood. The first one is more suitable to be converted into the substance of the embryo because it possesses the virtus informativa, i.e., a power of being well predisposed and proportionated to the form. In the matter offered by the female bird, as in matter of any sort, one does not find a complete form in potency but a formal beginning that may come into being only through a formative agent. Without such formative agency, the inchoatio formae would be unable to configure anything by itself.

71 Ibid., IV, 1, 2 (ed. Stadler, 445): «Dicuntur autem ova venti eo quod calor ipsa resolvere quidem potest in ventum, sed non formare in pullum: haec ova coagulabilia sunt epsesi et optesi, sed non formabilia, sicut diximus: sunt enim materia quidem pulli proprio formante destituita, quae est sicut permixtio spermatis feminae cum sanguine menstruo in ceteris animalibus, ex qua materia nichil omnino generatur: et in tali quidem materia non est potentia aliquid, eo quod, sicut dicimus in Physicis, potentia formae, quae est in materia, est per formae et formantis aliquam inchoationem.» English translation (slightly modified) by Kitchell and Resnick, in Albertus Magnus, On Animals, 530.

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Albert’s theoretical interest in the generation of unfertilized eggs derives from the fact that they crystallize the powers of the generative material provided by the female. Albeit incompletely and imperfectly, the female is able to organize and configure matter similar to that of a complete egg, thanks to its own formative power. However, if the female informativa cannot bring to completion the offspring without the male contribution, which is the only one able to draw the sensitive soul from the potentiality of matter, one could wonder whether, besides configuring and shaping the egg, the female formative power could also be responsible for its first vital activities. Indeed, following Aristotle, Albert claims that, although the ovum venti is not intended to be an animal, it is alive because, up to a certain point, it feeds and grows. To define the ontological status of the ovum venti, blocked in its transition toward the animal species, Albert introduces a hierarchy of formal levels in generation. The lowest is that of material forms, which do not require any external agent for their realization apart from the operations of the elementary forms already present in matter. As Albert points out, these forms are not souls (rationem animae non habent ), but just elementary forms enclosed and completely absorbed by matter (clausae et abstortae in materia).72 At the second level, one finds forms that, although partially embedded in matter, are endowed with different natural powers (agunt non unum per potentiam naturalem sed plura), such as nutrition, growth, and reproduction. The vegetative form belongs to this level of forms that, by reason of the simplicity of their operations, do not need a distinct agent acting outside the matter in which the seed is planted. Indeed, the efficient cause of plant generation acts inside the matter (in materia mixtum agens ) and shares its substance and being. However, this does not mean that the ‘what generates and forms’ is undistinguishable, at least conceptually, from ‘the power by which the form is configured’ (alia ab eo quod formatur), i.e., the material principle.73 This distinction between material and formal principles in plants’ generation is, though, purely conceptual 72 Ibid., XVI, 1, 17 (ed. Stadler, 1111–1112). 73 Ibid.: «Propter quod in tali quidem generatione talis formae est quidem virtus

generans et formans alia ab eo quod formatur: sed tamen in eadem materia est illa virtus permixta sicut in libro de Plantis diximus virtutes istas esse coniunctas in unum.» Cf. also Albertus Magnus, De vegetabilibus IV, 3, 1 (ed. Meyer-Jessen, 256).

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since these two power are joint within a single individual (virtutes istas esse coniunctas in unum).74 The wind eggs belong to the second level of forms. The third level of forms gathers those which carry out powers of the soul that are not entirely embedded in matter, such as the operations of the sensitive soul that is able to grasp sensible forms through abstraction. This type of form is the product of two distinct agencies: the male, who acts formally, and the female, who provides the generative matter.75 Following Aristotle, Albert maintains that the male causes the sensitive soul in the animal but not the vegetative one. For this reason, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the female soul can cause the vegetative operations of the wind eggs independently from the male. In line with the tendency to integrate Galenic doctrine within Aristotelian discourse, Albert resorts again to the distinction between formative and informative powers already elaborated in discussing the ‘two seed’ theory: […] the enabling and effective principle could be in the female for the vegetative soul but is no way in it for the perfect sensible soul. For the

74 For further reflections on Albert’s doctrine on the generation of plants, see Amalia

Cerrito, “Disclosing the Hidden Life of Plants. Theories of the Vegetative Soul in Albert the Great’s De vegetabilibus et plantis ”, in Vegetative Powers: The Roots of Life in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Natural Philosophy. «Archives Internationales d’Histoire des idées», vol. 234, ed. Fabrizio Baldassarri and Andreas Blank, 105–122 (Cham: Springer, 2021), on Albert’s commentary on the pseudo-Aristotelian De plantis , see ead., “Alberto Magno e il De plantis: ricostruire la botanica perduta di Aristotele”, in Ricerche di Storia della Filosofia e Teologia Medievali. Raccolta di Saggi in onore di Marco Arosio, vol. 5, ed. Marco Martorana, Rafael Pascual, and Veronica Regoli, 9–28 (Roma: IF Press, 2019) and Marilena Panarelli, “Albert the Great’s De vegetabilibus and its unique position among the medieval commentaries on De plantis ”, in Π ερ`ι ϕυτ îν. Greek Botanical Treatises in the West and in the Est, eds. Maria Fernanda Ferrini e Guido Giglioni, 137–162 (Macerata: Edizioni Università di Macerata, 2020). 75 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus XVI, 1, 17 (ed. Stadler, 1111): «Sed sunt quaedam formae quae habent operationes et passiones in nullo communicantes cum materia: sicut est anima sensibilis quae accipit formam sensibilis sine materia sicut recipit cera figuram anuli praeter materiam anuli auream vel argenteam, et movet nuntio sibi facto de motu appetitus per huiusmodi formam quam sine materia accipit: et illae formae non possunt esse absortae et omnino coniunctae cum materia, propter quod etiam id quod formaliter est generans et agens huiusmodi formas oporte esse distinctum a materia: et cum materia sit in femina, oportet quod activum generationis huiusmodi animalium sit extra eam: et ideo oportuit creari masculum: et hoc est quod dicit Aristoteles quod masculus est propter animam sensibilem in animalibus, et non propter vegetabilem […].»

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habitual ability (habitualis habilitas ) in the woman’s sperm is called informative power by Galen, and this is what Aristotle speaks of when he says that a wind egg is alive potentially but that a bird does not come from it and that the drop (gutta), conceived in the woman’s womb, lives potentially the life of a plant, but no live young is created from it without the sperm of the man or male.76

The female power capable of causing the very first vital activities of the ovum venti, and, thus, of the vegetative soul is the virtus informativa, a material potency belonging to the female generative substrate in which is configured the form.77 Rather than the menstrual blood, this is the most suitable matter for forming the embryo’s principal organs (membra radicalia). Therefore, the virtus informativa is a habitual disposition belonging to the female semen to acquire a specific form. Accordingly, the ovum venti is produced by the action of female informative power, which allows this to live, at least potentially, a vegetative life (vivit potentia vita plantae). In Albert’s view, the ovum venti is alive but, at the same time, indeterminate. This is because the nutritive power belongs to everything capable of being ensouled, regardless of the actual realization of the form. As Albert points out, the nutritive power of the unfertilized egg is the same as that of plants and animals: it follows that, in his view, the exercise of nutrition is independent of achieving natural perfection.78 Albeit unfertilized eggs cannot be perfected and achieve the animal form without the male’s formative power, they can nourish thanks to the female informative power.79 76 Ibid. (ed. Stadler, 1111–1112): «[…] et habilitans quidem et effectivum principium posset esse in femina ad animam vegetabilem, sed ad sensibile perfectam non est in ipso aliquo modo: et huiusmodi habitualis habilitas in spermate mulieris a Galieno virtus informativa vocatur: et hoc est quod dicit Aristoteles quod ovum venti vivit potentia, sed non egreditur ex eo avis, et quod gutta concepta in matrice feminae vivit potentia vita plantae, sed non procreatur ex ea animal sine spermate viri vel maris.» English translation (slightly modified) by Kitchell and Resnick, in Albertus Magnus, On Animals, 1206. 77 Cf. supra, Sect. 4.2. 78 Albertus Magnus, De animalibus , XVI, 2, 2 (ed. Stadler, 1118): «Huius autem

signum est in ovis venti: haec significant quod id quod femina generat, habet potentiam perveniendi ad aliquid incompletum et indeterminatum. […] In omnibus autem in quibus est anima in potentia, necessario inerit per aliquem modum virtus nutritiva quae videtur talibus ovis inesse communi modo quo est in arboribus et animalibus.» 79 Ibid.: «Et si tunc quaeratur quare in tali ovo non formantur membra et animal totum, dicemus secundum praedicta, quod talis formatio membrorum indiget anima sensibili eo

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In a Neoplatonic-Dionysian tone, Albert specifies that the power of nutrition belongs to all things that derive from the heat of the soul. In this view, the female virtus informativa, derived from the mother’s soul, is the first principle of life: But the power of the nutritive soul is in the females as it is present in all who possess life, because, according to Dionysius the philosopher, it is present in all things due to the soul’s heat, this being the first principle of life. Thus these eggs are completed in the womb with respect to nourishment and growth much as fructification, generation, growth, and the nourishment of trees are completed through the vegetative soul […]. Because wind eggs are like trees, they are therefore laid completed and for this reason, after they have been perfected, they are not changed or altered by copulations. For they are truly not like an animal and they are thus not completed through the formation and neither does a live young come out of them. Thus they are not simply like trees nor yet are they entirely like animals, which are both generated by and generate through the means of copulation.80

As Albert concludes, on the one hand, the wind eggs are similar to trees (arbores ) since they are not produced by coitus (as it happens in plants’ generation) and, once generated, do not undergo modifications or alterations in their substance. On the other hand, they cannot be considered proper animals since they are not brought to completion by a male agent. Therefore, the ovum venti crystallizes a form in transition, which is neither absolutely (simpliciter) similar to plants nor completely (omnino) comparable to animals generated through coitus.

quod membra animalium alterius modi operationum organa sunt quam organa plantarum […].» 80 Ibid., XVII, 1, 6 (ed. Stadler, 1167–1168): «Virtus autem animae nutritivae est in feminis sicut est in omnibus habentibus vitam, eo quod ipsa, ut dicit Dionysius philosophus, in omnibus est ex calore animae qui primum est principium vitae: et propter hoc in nutrimento et incremento complentur in matrice ista ova, sicut completur per animam vegetabilem fructificatio et generatio et incrementum et nutrimentum arborum […]. Quia igitur ova venti sunt sicut arbores, ideo ovantur completa: et propter hoc postquam perfecta sunt, non mutabuntur ex coitu neque alterantur: quia vero non sunt sicut animal, ideo non completur per formationem neque exit ex eis animal aliquod: et sic neque sunt sicut arbores simpliciter neque etiam omnino sicut animalia generata et generantia per coitum.» English translation (slightly modified) by Kitchell and Resnick, in Albertus Magnus, On Animals, 1258.

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4.4 The Biological Reason Underlying Kinship (Consanguinitas) Between 1250 and 1252, a few years after the foundation of the Dominican Studium generale in Cologne (1248), Albert completed his first commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics . Almost ten years later, in 1262, Albert composed an “augmented” paraphrase of the same Aristotelian work, entitled Ethica.81 According to Jean Dunbabin, the 1262 Ethica gives free rein to a wide-ranging theoretical investigation, free from the concern to demarcate the boundaries between philosophical and Christian ethics.82 Whereas the earlier Super Ethica was a first attempt to define the sphere of moral philosophy in an Aristotelian key,83 in the later Ethica, Albert delves into several issues that were also relevant for theological reflection. The impact of Albert’s own experience of commenting and expanding on Aristotle’s De animalibus on the agenda of his later Ethica has been little investigated. Already in Super Ethica Albert showed a tendency to intertextuality, interspersing his commentary with notions and reflections inspired by Aristotle’s natural philosophy. This trend becomes systematic in Ethica, where the Dominican often refers to the contents of his “biological” augmented commentaries to address moral issues, such as friendship between relatives (amicitia parentalis ). In the frame of book VIII of Nicomachean Ethics , dedicated to the distinct types of friendship, Aristotle claims that the friendship between relatives originates from the father, from whom the rest of the family bonds derive. The love between parents and children is connected to the awareness on behalf of the generative agent of being the origin “from whom” the generated child comes. For parents, this awareness is immediate. On the other hand, children love their parents as the source of their being, but the awareness of being “derived from” the parents is acquired

81 Cf. Martin J. Tracey, “Albert’s Reading of Aristotle’s Moral-Philosophical Treatise on Pleasure vis-à-vis Three Recent Perspectives on His Thought”, in Albertus Magnus. Zum Gedenken nach 800 Jahren: Neue Zugänge, Aspekte und Perspektiven, ed. Walter Senner, 311–325 (Berlin: Akademia Verlag, 2001). 82 Cf. Jean Dunbabin, “The Two Commentaries of Albertus Magnus on Nichomachean Ethics”, Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiéval 30 (1963): 232–250. 83 Ibid. 246 and Jörn Müller, Natürliche Moral und philosophische Ethik bei Albertus Magnus (Münster: Aschendorff, 2001).

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only over time. Therefore, they develop their love for their parents only after some time. Children begin to love their parents as they develop the intellect and sensus that allow them to understand the relationship of derivation. According to Aristotle, the father loves his children as a part of him: he feels more the relationship of belonging with the generated according to the principle that «what derives from someone belongs to the one from whom it derives», as teeth and hair belong to the person who owns them.84 Without providing any further explanation, Aristotle points out that mothers love their children more than fathers.85 When commenting on this passage in his Super Ethica, Albert claims that the friendship between father and son belongs to the category of natural friendships: Even though the nature is propagated from the principle of propagation throughout all the descendants, love (dilectio) is not transmitted beyond a certain degree. Since propagation requires both the father and the one who derives from him, i.e., the offspring, thus, the first friendship (amicitia) goes from the father to the offspring, then, since from one many are produced who have a relationship to the one, i.e., brothers, thus, secondly, the friendship among brothers rises.86

This passage does not differ much from the Aristotelian argument that traces the origin of the rest of the family bonds back to the father. Albert agrees with Aristotle in indicating the father as the principle of propagation: the father is «the one from whom the son derives», while the son is «the one who derives from». The parent-child derivation is the first degree of amicitia parentalis , from which the rest of familial relationships, such as that between siblings, will arise. However, although nature

84 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics VIII, 1161 b11. 85 Id., Ethica Nichomachea, in Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica VIII, XII (ed. Kübel,

643): «Sed et moltitudine temporis, hi quidem enim confestim natos diligunt, hi autem procedentes temporibus parentes intellectus vel sensus accipientes. Ex his autem manifestum propter quae amant magis matres.» 86 Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica VIII, XII (ed. Kübel, 639: 66–74): «[…] quamvis

natura a principio propagationis propagetur in omnes posteros, dilectio tamen non transmittitur ultra gradus determinatos, et quia in propagatione oportet esse, qui est pater, et illum qui est ab illo, sicilicet filius, ideo primo surgit amicitia, quae est patris ad filium, et quia ab uno produncuntur plures, qui omnes habent relationem ad unum, scilicet fratres, et ideo secundo consurgit amicitia fratrum […].»

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stems from the principle of propagation, following a gradation, love (or parental affection) cannot be transmitted beyond a certain degree. What does it mean that “the son is he who comes from the father?” And what do the father and son actually share? “Something”/“whatever” (quidquid) is passed on from parent to child: […] it seems that nothing of the father is in the offspring, and thus that he does not love him as something of himself. For, whatever is in the father, this is form or matter. However, the father’s form is not in the offspring since the humanity (humanitas ) of the one differs in number from the humanity of the other. Nor is the matter the same in both because if it is understood as a designated matter, nevertheless several impossibilities follow: because, if there is always an equal emission according to quantity, it would be inevitable that the generation of human beings (humana generatio) had ceased a long time ago.87

Understanding that quidquid as form or matter, taken individually, entails multa impossibilia in nature: the father cannot transmit the individual form since the humanitas-form of the son is distinct from that of the father. Furthermore, he cannot even convey the matter which, qua signata, belongs exclusively to the son. Then Albert wonders if that quidquid transmitted from father to son could be blood and nourishment since, by definition, the seminal fluid from which the generative process starts is the product of paternal digestion: If you say, with Aristotle, that the father’s blood and nourishment are in the offspring, i.e. that the sperm is always the superfluity of blood nourishment, I will reply that nourishment and blood are just potentially a part of the father. Thus, only what could have been in the father would be in the offspring, and this is a very weak familiarity (valde parva coniunctio).88

87 Ibid. (ed. Kübel, 640: 6–15): «Tertio videtur quod nihil quod est patris est in filio, et sic non diligit in ipso aliquid sui. Quidquid enim est in patre, est aut forma aut materia, sed forma patris non est in filio, quia humanitas unius est distincta secundum numerum ab humanitate alterius, nec iterum materia est eadem in utroque, quia aut accipitur materia signata et sic sequuntur multa impossibilia, quia oportet si fiat aequalis decisio semper secundum quantitatem […].» 88 Ibid. (ed, Kübel, 640: 33–39): «Si dicas quod sanguis patris et nutrimentum est in filio, secundum quod dicit Philosophus, quod semper sperma est superfluum nutrimenti sanguinei, contra: nutrimentum et sanguis sunt tantum potentia pars patris, sic ergo non esset in filio, nisi id quod potuit in patre esse, et haec est valde parva coniunctio.»

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That indeterminate quidquid is both matter and form, aliquid idem in both father and son. However, the shared matter is not identical but rather propinqua, i.e., familiar or proximate, the similarity in the form is instead guaranteed by the virtus informativa of the seed that guides the matter to reach the appropriate configuration: Something identical is in the father and in the offspring, namely, matter and form. In the offspring, there are both the proximate matter (materia propinqua) underlying (substans ) form and the form, which is the formative power leading to the due form and quantity. In the father, instead, there is neither matter assigned to the father form in actuality, nor is there a form ordered to his matter but as if in a seed. For, the seed emitted by the generating parents, materially speaking, is the residue of the nourishment and is wholly in potency (not only in material potency but also with power, insofar as the seed hosts the formative power made effective by the soul of the father and similar to himself).89

The virtus informativa guides the embryonic matter to its appropriate configuration not qua soul of the embryo but as an emissary of the paternal soul. For, although materialiter loquendo the seminal liquid emitted by both generative agents (semen ‹quod› emittitur a generantibus ) is the residue of the digestion, it does not contain exclusively the material potency of the whole body of the embryo, but rather a material potency combined with a virtus informativa which, once activated (effecta) by the paternal soul, is self-sufficient for the formation of the body of the embryo.90

89 Ibid. (ed. Kübel, 640: 63–75): «[…] aliquid idem est in patre et in filio quod est materia et forma, in filio quidem materia propinqua substans formae et forma, quae est virtus informativa ducens ad debitam formam et quantitem, in patre vero est non materia designata sub patris forma in actu neque forma designans materiam patris, sed sicut in semine. Semen enim quod emittitur a generantibus, materialiter loquendo superfluum nutrimenti est, et hoc quidem est in potentia totum, non tantum in potentia materiali sed simul cum hoc in virtute, inquantum in semine est virtutis informativa effecta ab anima patris et similis sibi […].» 90 In this passage, Albert speaks in the plural of the emission of the seed by the generative agents. While it is possible to understand the expression «semen emittitur a generantibus» as a generic way to refer to (male) generants within processes of generation and corruption, I believe, instead, that the plural here refers to the fact that both male and female generants emit a seed that is the product of the last digestion.

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As for the mutual love between parents and sons, Aristotle described it as an asymmetrical affection: while the father loves his offspring immediately, the offspring needs first to acquire sensus and ratio in order to reciprocate parental love. At first, Albert would seem not to worry about this asymmetry, addressing the question very briefly in these terms: The reason of love in natural friendship is just the propagation of nature. Consequently, the father loves his offspring, even in absence of any further reason of love. And since by nature the father is more familiar to the offspring than the contrary (because something of the father is in the offspring, as said above, and not the contrary), it follows that the father by nature (naturaliter) loves his offspring more.91

Almost passing over Aristotle’s claim that only with the attainment of maturity does the child begin to feel affection for his/her parents, Albert focuses on specifying why the father’s love for his son is natural and immediate.92 This is because «something of the father is in the offspring», that is, that union of matter with form: the matter is propinqua, i.e., familiar, while the form is the virtus formativa of the seed that guides the familiar matter to the achievement of the appropriate configuration. Albert’s intent to incorporate natural philosophy into ethical discourse is already evident. The amicitia naturalis between parents and children is a relationship based on biological reasons ruled by the virtus formativa, which becomes a determining factor not only for the generation but also for determining parental friendship, i.e., the foundation of all the rest of social relationships. From virtus formativa also «surgit amicitia» in its most radical and deep form. In his later Ethica, where the moral and anthropological discourse is intertwined with natural notions developed in his biological commentaries, Albert frames the transmission of genetic contents within a “biological rationalization” of consanguinitas . In book VIII (tr. 3, chap. IV), 91 Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica VIII, XII (ed. Kübel, 641: 6–14): «Amicitia naturalis non respicit aliquam rationem amabilis nisi naturae propagationem. Unde pater diligit filium, etiam si nulla ratio alia amoris sit in ipso, et quia magis propinquus est pater filio quam e converso secundum naturam, quia aliquid patris est in filio, ut dictum est, et non e converso, ideo plus naturaliter diligit filium.» 92 Most medieval commentators neglect the association between consanguinity and

natural love, cf. de Miramon and van der Lugt, “Sang, hérédité et parenté au Moyen-Âge”, 29.

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Albert builds on the eighth book of Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea to discuss the theme of the amicitia parentalis : Now, such is that care and friendship relating to economic goods that is also called paternal friendship, although it differs from royal friendship as to the extent of the benefits. [...] In all realities, whenever the substantial efficient cause is joined to the effect, it produces it, otherwise, it would not be true that, once the immediate and per se cause is removed, the effect is also removed and that, once the immediate cause has been posited, the effect is also posited: if it were not the case, all demonstrations and all that is established in philosophy would dissolve. For such reason, whether alive or dead, the father is always in the children and continues to produce them and to form their being, nourishment, and the whole conduct of life. There is nothing comparable to such benefits. Fathers are the cause of existence, nourishment, and learning ability. And it is for this, mainly, that they are considered beneficial. […] Therefore, the paternal good is, by nature, the principle of the children, while the progenitors are, universally and according to nature, the principle of progeny.93

Of all the types of friendship, the parentalis, Albert explains, is the one that brings the most benefits, given its natural origin. The reason is that the father, causa substantialiter efficiens, remains always conjoined to his effect and continues to form, configure, and support every aspect of his offspring’s life. The father is the offspring’s causa essendi, nutrimenti et disciplinae. For this reason, the amicitia parentalis is the one that provides the greater benefit. But how can the father remain joined to his effect as an efficient cause, continuing to perfect it even once separated from it (even after the fatheras-individual has died)? The reason for this long-lasting causality is the same that explains how consanguinitas is transmitted. Whereas in his 93 Albertus Magnus, Ethica VIII, 3, 4 (ed. Borgnet, 544–545): «Talis autem cura et amicitia est oeconomicis etiam quae paterna vocatur, quamvis differat magnitudine beneficiorum amicitia paterna et amicitia regalis. […] In omnibus enim causa substantialiter efficiens conjuncta est effectui et semper efficit: quia aliter non esset verum quod causa immediata et per se destructa destrueretur effectus, et posita poneretur effectus: et sic periret demonstratio, et totum quod in philosophia est determinatum: et propter quod pater in nato semper est, semper faciens et formans esse, nutritionem, et totius vitae regnum, sive mortuo patre separato, sive non. Illis autem beneficiis nihil simile est. Causa enim essendi et nutrimenti et disciplinae sunt patres: et in hoc existimantur maxime benefici esse. […] Secundum naturam igitur paternum bonum principativum est filiorum, et progenitores universaliter secundum naturam principativi nepotum […].»

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previous Super Ethica, Albert maintained a more ontological-metaphysical perspective (addressing the theme of the father-son derivation in terms of matter and form), now, in his Ethica, the question is treated by deepening the more biological aspects of paternitas: For, the father’s seed residing in the power of his heart, a universal power, is virtually all that the father is. Therefore, Plato said that the seed is a small animal and a small man. Aristotle, on the other hand, ‹believing› that ‹the seed› potentially is ‹a human being› but not in actuality, said that the seed is “something of the father” but not the father or a man, however, when all that the child is unfolds in reality, what potentially was is identical to what is in actuality, even if their existence does not coincide, and for this reason too, it is said that the son is “something of the father”. But since the same seed is not potentially the father but the son, for this reason, the son cannot love the father as something of himself that exists, but he loves him in the awareness of being something that exists starting from him. For, everything that the son is derives from the father, not only thanks to his agency but also within the totality constituted by form and matter: all this, in fact, belongs to the father.94

The seed contains all the paternal virtus. However, one must not think of the seed, à la Plato, as a small animal or a small man already actually existent. On the contrary, the virtus of the paternal seed potentially is «all that the son is». Even if one takes as identical both the seed as-«what the child potentially is» and the seed as «what the child is in act», one should nevertheless keep in mind that the «all that the child is», derives from the father not so much as an efficient cause (not tantum effective) but according to a totality made up of matter and form in need to be actualized. And the principle of paternitas is precisely this totality of matter and form, proper to the father and transmitted by the seed.

94 Ibid., 3, 6 (ed. Borgnet, 547): «Semen enim patris in virtute cordis, cujus virtus universalis est, virtute totum est quod pater est. Propter quod Plato dixit, semen patris esse parvum animal et parvum hominem. Aristoteles autem quia potestate et non actu est, dixit aliquid patris esse, et non patrem vel hominem. Quando tamen potestate totum est quod filius est, et idem est id quod est in potestate et id quod est in actu, quamvis esse non sit idem: et propter hoc etiam filius dicitur esse aliquid patris. Quia autem idem semen non est potestate pater, sed filius, propter hoc filius non potest diligere patrem ut aliquid sui existentem, sed diligit eum ut aliquid existens ab illo. Totum enim quod est filius, a patre est, non tantum effective, sed secundum totum constitutum ex forma et materia: hoc enim totum patris est.»

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In light of these considerations, Albert paraphrases the Aristotelian text on the asymmetrical love of parents and children for each other (parents love their children immediately, while children only after the acquisition of ratio and sensus ) and proposes four original arguments in favor of the greater strength of parental love for their children than filial love for their parents: In fact, parents know their offspring with more certainty than children know they are derived from such parents. Some say this happens because only those procreated in a legal marriage are properly sons. In fact, in this condition, the wife cannot deceive her husband, nor the husband can deceive his wife, and the parents immediately know that the offspring is born since the law states that “the father is considered to be the one whom a legal marriage proves to be such”. On the contrary, children do not immediately know that they were born to such parents. At most, they believe it, relying on those who report it. Thus, they do not know that they are the offspring of their parents with the same degree of certainty with which the parents know that they are their offspring. It follows that parental love for their children is stronger than the other way around.95

In the first argument, Albert argues that the cause of the immediate and stronger love of parents is their greater awareness of being the origin from which the offspring derives. On the contrary, the awareness of being children derives from an act of trust (ex fide) in the parents’ words by which the children understand that they are derived from them. The greater parental awareness arises not only from a biological but also from a legal bond. As Albert points out, citing a typical brocard of scholastic jurists, the parentage can be ascertained thanks to the principle of legal presumption of paternity (even regardless of the actual biological paternity). To support this argument, Albert claims that, after all, if from a strictly biological point of view, the father is the one who takes care of 95 Ibid.: «Parentes enim magis et melius sciunt natos qui sunt ex ipsis, quam geniti sciant quod sunt ex parentibus. Hoc autem dicunt quidam quod ex hoc contingit, quod non proprie filii sunt nisi ex legali procreati matrimonio. In tali enim natura nec uxor fraudat virum, nec vir uxorem, statim sciunt parentes natos esse filios scilicet: propter quod lege sancitum est quod “Pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant”. Et contra autem filii non statim sciunt quod nati sunt talium parentum: quinimo ex fide dicentium hoc credunt: et sic non habent aequalem scientiam quod sint parentes eorum qualem habent parentes quod isti sint nati eorum. Propter quod sequitur, quod fortior est dilectio parentum in filios quam e converso.»

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bringing the generative process to perfection by generating a being of the same species, paternitas does not consist only in the formal transmission via the seed, but also involves guiding the passage of the child from puer to homo: «For this reason»—Albert adds—«Aristotle distinguishes two explanations, i.e., the passage from what is a man potentially to a man in actuality, and the one from child to adult.»96 Indeed, the father is not only the causa essendi but also causa disciplinae of the child, which allows the passage from childhood to adulthood. In the second argument, the explanation of parental love is more based on physiological reasons. One has seen that Aristotle’s argumentation aimed at translating parent-children attachment as a sort of belonging: like teeth and hair, children derive from the substance of the person to whom they belong. Albert feels that Aristotle’s reference to body parts is perhaps too ambiguous and, despite playing an illustrative role, could be misunderstood. To put it in the right light, one must consider the analogy between the paternal generating agency, which possesses what it leaves something of itself in, and those acts of the biological generation that imply a process of formation inside and from their principle: Furthermore, the father is more attached to the son than the son to the father. For, the nature of that from which the generation began [id quod est a quo genitum est ], corresponding to the father, is more attached [magis approximat ] to the generated [genitum] than what is produced or generated is attached to what generated or produced it. Indeed, what derives from something else is attached to its origin, like the tooth to the jawbone or the hair to the scalp or whatsoever is attached to what possesses it to the point that this thing forms inside it and arises from it. However, the generant is more attached to what is generated than what is generated to the generant. For, the generant is attached in having something of itself [aliquid sui] in what is generated. What is generated, on the other hand, has nothing of its own with which to be attached to the generant, i.e., the principle from which the generation began. Even if one intends “to be attached” from the visual angle of what derives from the principle, however ‹the generated› is much less attached. It is like the way the jawbone is attached to the tooth rather than the tooth to the jawbone, or the scalp is attached to the hair rather than the hair to the scalp. They are

96 Ibid.: «Propter quod duas rationes distinguit Aristoteles, scilicet de potentia hominis in hominem, et de puero in virum.»

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both excellent parallels: both the tooth and the hair are distinguished from what they derive from, while transforming inside it and arising from it.97

Here, the reason for parents’ stronger attachment toward their children is ascribed to the fact that the generant, i.e., the reality from which the generation began (id quod est a quo genitum est ), leaves something of itself in what is generated. This corresponds to the formative power, formerly possessed by generating body, then infused through the seed in the generated body. It is there that the embryo is formed and generated. Then, it is the parent who is more attached to the offspring than the other way around (just as it is more the craftsman who is more attached to the artifact than the artifact to the craftsman). The same holds for the teeth-jawbone and hair-scalp relationships, both considered «excellent parallels». However, how exactly does the generating-generated derivation physiologically work? To explain this, Albert expands on the physiological premises of the analogy with bodily parts: A parallel can illustrate the fact that both are distinguished from what they derive from, however much they transform inside it and arise from it. The tooth forms in the jawbone from the nutritional moisture and, for this reason, it re-grows several times and can be renewed. Instead, the jawbone is formed by the formative faculty out of radical moisture, that is why it does not re-grow after sustaining injuries […]. Similarly, the generated individual is in a parent and comes from a parent. Hence the two terms are analogous and, consequently, parents are more attached to the offspring than the offspring to parents, and, also, the father is more attached than

97 Ibid.: «Adhuc autem magis approximatur pater filio quam filius patri. Genito enim magis approximat id quod est a quo genitum est, hoc est, pater, quam factum sive genitum approximet generanti sive facienti. Quod enim ex aliquo est, propinquum quidem est ei a quo est, sicut dens mandibulae, vel capillus capiti, vel aliquod quodcumque propinquum est ei quod habet ipsum, ita quod in ipso formatur et nascitur ex ipso. Plus tamen approximat generans genito, quam genitum generanti. Generans enim approximat aliquid sui habens in genito. Generanti autem quod dicitur esse id a quo genitum est, genitum per aliquid sui nihil approximat: et si approximare dicitur per hoc scilicet quod ab ipso est, tamen multo minus approximat. Sicut et mandibula plus approximat denti, quam dens mandibulae: et caput plus approximat capillo, quam capillus capiti. In his enim conveniens exemplum est: quia utrumque distinguitur ab eo a quo est, cum transformetur in ipso, et sit ab ipso.»

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the mother since the forming agent is more attached than the lovable to what is formed.98

In the physiological processes forming the bodily parts, one can distinguish “forming from” and “forming in”. For example, the tooth forms from the nutrimental moisture and in the jawbone. Due to its reparative properties, the nutrimental moisture allows the teeth to grow back several times. The jawbone, on the contrary, forms from the humidum radicale by the virtus formativa, now, since the radical moisture is only partially restorable, the jawbone that underwent a particularly severe fracture cannot grow back. Resorting to the teeth-jawbone relationship, Albert claims that the child not only derives «from the parent» but is also «in the parent». Albert’s explanation is somehow reticent and remains between the lines. However, one can try to integrate it with traits from the discussion of De animalibus dealt with in the previous chapter of this book. The virtus formativa forms the jawbone from the humidum radicale, in turn this, nourished by the humidum nutrimentale, produces the teeth. From the physiological point of view, the substance of the jawbone is more attached to the radical substance than that of the teeth that derives from the humidum nutrimentale. In the same way, the seed derives from the paternal radical moisture, which, together with the virtus formativa, is responsible for forming the embryo’s body. Therefore, as to its humoral component, the embryo derives from the paternal humidum radicale and this is the reason for the stronger paternal attachment. The third argument further explains why parents’ affection for their children is stronger than that of children for their parents by building on some Aristotelian tenets. A synopsis may be helpful to realize how Albert’s theory has progressively shifted toward more physiological schemes: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics :

98 Ibid. (ed Borgnet, 547–548): «In his enim conveniens exemplum est: quia utrumque distinguitur ab eo a quo est, cum transformetur in ipso, et sit ab ipso. Dens autem de humido nutrimentali formatur in mandibula: et ideo recrescit aliquoties et crescit continuo redivivus. Mandibula autem de humido radicali formatur a formativa: et ideo non recrescit amputata. […] Et similiter natus non nisi in parente et de parente. Et ideo extrema sunt convenientia. Ex quo sequitur parentem propinquorem esse nato, quam natum parenti. Et iterum patrem parentem propinquorem esse quam matrem, sicut formans propinquius est formato quam amabile.»

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Parents love their children as soon as they are born, children love their parents only over time, when they have acquired understanding or perception. These considerations also explain why mothers love more.99

Albert, Super Ethica: The reason of love in natural friendship is just the propagation of nature. Consequently, the father loves his offspring, even in absence of any further reason of love. And since by nature the father is more attached to the offspring than the contrary (because something of the father is in the offspring, as said above, and not the contrary), it follows that the father by nature (naturaliter) loves his offspring more.100

Albert, Ethica: Parents love their children as soon as they are born: for, the affection toward them is transferred with the nature. Children do not love their parents immediately but over time, when they have acquired understanding or perception of the parental good. These considerations also explain why mothers love their children more than fathers do. For a long time, mothers retain children enclosed (clausos ) inside themselves and provide (ministrant ) much blood in their formation, then, when children are already formed and born, mothers provide them milk foods (lactis alimenta). On the contrary, the father speedily gives the seed of formation (semen formationis ) and does not provide anything else to their being (ulterius ad esse non ministrat ). Therefore, the mother loves her children more warmly ( ferventius ), while the father more stably (constantius ).101

99 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, VIII, 12, 1161 b23–24 (Grosseteste’s Latin version in Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica, ed. Kübel, 643): «Sed et moltitudine temporis, hi quidem enim confestim natos diligunt, hi autem procedentes temporibus parentes intellectus vel sensus accipientes. Ex his autem manifestum propter quae amant magis matres.» 100 Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica VIII, XII (ed. Kübel, 641: 6–14): «Amicitia naturalis non respicit aliquam rationem amabilis nisi naturae propagationem. Unde pater diligit filium, etiam si nulla ratio alia amoris sit in ipso, et quia magis propinquus est pater filio quam e converso secundum naturam, quia aliquid patris est in filio, ut dictum est, et non e converso, ideo plus naturaliter diligit filium.» 101 Id., Ethica VIII, 3, 6 (ed. Borgnet, 548): «Parentes confestim natos diligunt: affectus enim in eos transponitur cum natura. Nati non statim diligunt parentes, sed procedente tempore, cum intellectum sive sensum accipiunt boni parentalis. Ex his autem ulterius manifestum est propter quam causam matres magis amant natos quam patres. Diutius enim clausos retinent et multum ministrant in sanguinis in formatione: et jam

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As one can see from the synopsis, Albert progressively arrives at a biological interpretation of the Aristotelian passage. In his 1262 Ethica, Albert focuses on a series of issues that he had preferred to leave out in his previous 1250–1252 Super Ethica. In the first place, he addresses the question of the manifestation of love toward parents only after the acquisition of sensus and intellect. He adds that the affection (affectus) of parents toward children is somehow transferred through the generative process, in the way that the similarity in nature between generating and generated is transmitted. Albert’s wording «transponitur cum natura» is, at the same time, suggestive and ambiguous. The arguments analyzed so far point to understanding it as justifying a spontaneous genesis of the affection between parent and child, which derives from their biological relationship. This reading is further validated by analyzing how Albert deals with maternal love. While in his Super Ethica he neglected Aristotle’s statement that the children «amant magis matres», in the Ethica he further explores the topic and explains that the mother-child relationship originates and strengthens in the gestation period. From the very first moments of life, a nutritional relationship is established between the embryo and the mother, which continues even after childbirth with breastfeeding. Therefore, it seems that maternal love originates from the fact that the mother provides nourishment and substance in all the formative phases of the child. The hypothesis of interpreting the expression «affectus transponitur cum natura» as an affection that originates from the most primitive phases of the parent-child relationship is further confirmed by comparing paternal and maternal love. While the father provides the seed for the generative process and does not take care of any other formative function in the intrauterine phase, the role of the mother is more industrious: Mothers love their children more than fathers. Although at the beginning of their union, the pleasure (delectatio) of both is equal, however, in the entire process of gestation and nutrition, the mother’s cares are much more demanding than those of the father. But there is also another cause: mothers know that children are their own more than fathers do. In fact, a mother can get pregnant by a stranger and the suspicion that this might happen reduces paternal love. Something similar occurs in the relationship

formatis et natis ministrant lactis alimenta. Pater autem confestim semen dat formationis, et ulterius ad esse non ministrat. Ferventius ergo diligit mater, pater autem constantius.»

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between a benefactor and a beneficiary. The benefactor knows the quality and quantity of his gift and knows if he used or not his own substances, the recipient, on the other hand, may also suspect that the benefactor has not used his own assets. For this reason, the beneficiary loves the benefactor less than the benefactor loves the beneficiary.102

Mothers are like benefactors, who, much more than beneficiaries, are aware of the nature (de quali) and quantity (quanto) of the benefit they bring to the beneficiary. Although at conception (in principio commixtionis ), father and mother feel affection toward the child in equal measure, maternal care toward the child is more demanding both in terms of function and in terms of time than the paternal one, limited to fecundation. Indeed, maternal supplies of substance and nourishment are ordered to the formation and growth of the offspring and are at work from the gestational period until the weaning of the child. Moreover, unlike the principle of legal presumption of paternity, which can ascertain the parentage between father and child, even regardless of an actual biological generation, the principle of maternity is based exclusively on the biological continuity between mothers and children. Mothers could get pregnant outside the legal marriage without losing their bond with their offspring. The same does not apply to paternal love, which a suspicion of infidelity might reduce. It follows that, whereas the paternal love does not originate only from the formal transmission via the seed but also from a legal bond, the maternal love springs from the biological origin only. The passages examined so far allow us to reconstruct the basic structure of Albert’s theoretical choices. On the one hand, a clear naturalistic option aims to place the father-son relationship on a physiological and natural level. But it must immediately be added that Albert maintains a reasoned balance with the moral aspects of the relationship when he

102 Id., Ethica IX, 2, 5 (ed. Borgnet, 581): «Matres magis sunt amatrices filiorum quam patres. Quamvis enim in principio commixtionis aequalis patris et matris sit delectatio: tamen in ea quae deinceps est pregnatione et enutritione, laboriosior est cura matris quam patris. Est autem et alia causa eiusdem, quod matres magis sciunt suos esse filios quam patres sciant esse suos. Ex alieno enim semine potuit concipere: quae suspicio diminuit in dilectione patris. Hoc autem omnino simile est in benefactore et beneficiato. Benefactor enim scit de quali et quanto et quam suo benefacit: beneficiatus autem suspicari potest quod non de suo benefacit, et propter hoc minus diligit benefactorem quam diligatur a benefactore.»

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emphasizes the extension of the principles of paternitas even beyond the generative act, with a father who continues to bring his son to perfection, encouraging the transition from childhood to adulthood. The social aspect of parental affection is also confirmed by how Albert treats the topic of affection between siblings. Following Aristotle, the origin of the fraternal relationship is sharing the same blood and the same root («unus et idem sanguinis, et una et eadem radix»). However, the relationship between siblings is consolidated not only thanks to being peers and living in the same family unit, as Aristotle stated, but also to sharing education, for which «the same character is shared by those who are instructed by the teaching of the same educator […]».103 In fact, at the beginning of the treatise on the paternitas naturalis Albert had characterized the father as the offspring’s causa essendi, nutrimenti et disciplinae. Physiology and ethics converge on the last ratio of Albert’s chapter on amicitia parentalis . By pondering on genetics, the Dominican justifies on a physiological basis a norm in force at his times, i.e., the one establishing the extent to which the degrees of kinship subsist. («Quot autem gradus sint vinculum consanguinitatis dissolventes, lege determinandum est»). The legislation to which Albert refers had been promulgated by the Fourth Lateran Council, promoted by Pope Innocent III in 1215, which reduced from the seventh to the fourth the degree of kinship within which marriage is prohibited.104 The Council Fathers had already highlighted the correlation between the reduction of consanguinitas to the

103 Ibid. (ed. Borgnet, 548): «unius moris sunt, qui unius paedagogi instituuntur disciplina […]». Cf. the parallel passage of Albert’s De animalibus XII, 1, 5 (ed. Stadler, 1354): «Adhuc soli homini convenit passiones ordinare virtutis ordine, et continere ea quae sunt in sensu moventia, ad limitem rationis. Similiter autem cum amica sibi sint animalia, non habent amicitiae speciem nisi quae est similis illi quae delectationis est vel connutritorum vel collecteneorum quam ethayricam Graeci appellant. Homo autem amicitiam habet secundum omne genus amicitiae.» 104 Canon law historians still debate the reasons for reducing the degree to which marriage between relatives is prohibited from the seventh to the fourth. Cf. Christof Rolker, “Two Models of Incest. Conflict and Confusion in High Medieval Discourse on Kinship and Marriage”, in Law and Marriage in Medieval and Early Modern Times, eds. Per Andersen, Kirsi Salone, Helle Møller Sigh, and Helle Vogt, 139–159 (København: DJØF, 2012). According to de Miramon and Van der Lugt, “Sang, hérédité et parenté au Moyen-Âge”, 27, of all the possible explanations, the biological is the weakest since, in medieval medicine and physiology, the blood has a subordinate role compared to the semen.

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fourth degree and the four humors and the four elements that compose the body.105 It is worth considering Albert’s argument in detail: How many degrees dissolve the bond of consanguinity must be determined by law. However, if we think of it in analogy to what happens in a single human being, this bond dissolves in the fifth degree. Because the seed from which the generation originates is determined for the parts of the body by four digestions. Now, consanguinity is like the body of man where the trunk or the ancestor is like the heart, the others are like the other parts that derive from the heart. According to the Peripatetics’ view, the first thing that arises from the heart is the vein, the second is the branching of the vein to a specific part, the third is the branching of the vein toward the member receiving the benefit of nourishment. Therefore, the first digestion, as Aristotle states, is under the heart chamber and from this receives nourishment, shape, and movement: that motion which is proper to the motion of nourishment, the one by which it tends to the nutrition of the body and to a member as its own place of destination, like the iron is moved toward the magnet. This form is determined in the vein and stretches either downward or to the right or to the left or forward or backward, in three diameters and at right angles, as the nourishment moves throughout the body. When the vein branches itself, it goes toward that area of the body, whatever it is, in which the member within which it must feed is located. The assimilation goes from one member to the one being fed and not to another. If it went beyond, it would go beyond the similitude with the body.106

105 Cf. Concilium Lateranense IV, costitution 51, in Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta (1973): «Prohibito quoque copulae coniugalis quartum consanguinitatis et affinitatis gradum de caetero non excedat […]. Quaternarius enim numeros bene congruit prohibitioni coniugii corporalis […], quia quatuor sunt humores in corpore, quod constat ex quatuor elementis». Also in his earlier De bono, Albert shows a tendency to integrate theoretical treatment with juridical norms. Speaking of the role of circumstantiae in human action, Albert deals in detail with the bonum ex circumstantia: see Stanley B. Cunningham, Reclaiming Moral Agency. The Moral Philosophy of Albert the Great (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 63. 106 Albertus Magnus, Ethica VIII, 3, 6 (ed. Borgnet, 549): «Quot autem gradus sint vinculum consanguinitatis dissolventes, lege determinandum est. Si tamen simile sumatur ad ea quae fiunt in homine uno, in quinto dissolvitur. Quia semen ex quo fit generatio, quatuor digestionibus membris corporis determinatur. Consanguinitas autem sicut corpus hominis est, in qua stipes sive praedux est sicut cor. Caeteri autem sicut membra caetera a corde. Primum autem quod oritur a corde secundum Peripateticorum sententiam, vena est. Secundum autem venae divisio ad determinatam partem. Tertium vero determinatio

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While the conciliar document justifies the reasons for limiting kinship at the fourth degree via a generic reference to the number of humors in the body, Albert prefers another physiological analogy, namely, the four digestions aimed at producing the seminal fluid from which generation begins. Consanguinity ends at the fourth degree because the semen, its vector, is the result of four digestions. Furthermore, consanguinity can rightfully be compared to the human body in which the heart, the first organ formed by the formative power, is the central point from which the rest of the organs derive. Albert thus goes on to describe the formation starting from the heart to the veins, which are essential for the sustenance of the organic parts: (i) first of all, the vein forms, (ii) the vein then branches off toward specific parts, (iii) once the branching has been determined, the veins transport nourishment to every single organic part. The first digestion occurs “under the heart chamber” (sub medio thalamo cordis ), i.e., below the rib cage, where the nourishment is attracted through a peculiar movement. The branching of the veins in every direction (vel deorsum, vel in dextrum, vel in sinistrum, vel ante, vel retro) traces three diameters (secundum tres diametros ). The geometric characteristic of the diameter consists not only in always passing through the center but also in dividing the circumference into congruent and symmetrical parts. Thus, Albert explains that the subdivision of the veins follows this geometric logic since it is the one that guarantees that nourishment is transported from the center (the heart) throughout the body. That nourishment is useless to nourish any part of the body is directed extra corporis

venae ad membrum quod accipit nutrimenti beneficium. Prima ergo digestio, ut dicit Aristoteles sub medio thalamo cordis est: et ex hoc accipit nutrimentum, formam et motum, qui proprius motus nutrimenti est hic quo tendit ad corpus quod nutritur, et ad membrum sicut ad propositum suum locum, sicut ferrum movetur ad magnetem. In vena vero determinatur haec forma et dirigitur ad tendendum sive vel deorsum vel in dextrum, vel in sinistrum, vel ante vel retro, secundum tres diametros et angulum rectum quo nutrimentum movetur et in toto corpore. In subdivisione autem venae motum accipit ad unum situm, quicumque est ille, in quo scilicet membrorum est in quo nutriri debet. A membro autem accipit ad membrum quod nutritur et non ad aliud assimilationem: et si dirigatur ulterius, extra corporis similitudinem dirigetur.» Cf. Id., De animalibus XXI, 1, 2 (ed. Stadler, 1324): «Amplius hoc ipsum ostendit figura corporis. Cum enim diametri tres constituant omne corpus, perfectius et naturalius erit corpus quod dyametrorum mensuram naturalium participat. Dyameter autem longitudines mensurat a sursum in deorsum et in solo homine idem est sursum quod est sursum mundi, et idem deorsum quod est deorsum mundi. Similiter autem est de dyametro latitudinis. Solus enim homo inter omnia animalia latum habet corpus secundum mensuram suae quantitatis latitudine proportionata […].»

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in the form of useful residue, i.e., the seminal fluid, to convey the similarity. Here, Albert is condensing his De animalibus ’ treatment on the relationship between the seminal fluid and the bodily design. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, in Albert’s view, the seminal fluid results from the digestion of the nutrimental moisture. It is a humor that preserves the resemblance to the bodily parts it nourished before digestion. By the action of the formative power, the seminal fluid takes on the resemblance to the form of each member it nourishes.107 At this point, Albert has all the elements necessary to conclude the analogy between consanguinitas and the human body: «Since kinship is like a body, in which the torso is the heart, and the other parts are like the organs, for this reason, the legislator has established that consanguinity is observed up to the fourth degree and dissolves at the fifth.»108 The analyses conducted so far should clearly show that Albert’s immersion in paraphrasing Aristotle’s books De animalibus (1258–1262) plays a decisive role in his 1262 Ethica. The former attempt at a biological explanation of the consanguinitas of the Super Ethica is enriched and completed in the Ethica where the notion of virtus formativa has a crucial role in the transmission processes. However, it is not advisable to give in to the temptation of an anachronistic reading of Albert’s doctrine of inheritance, given that the Dominican never entrusts the task of transmission to blood. As illustrated before, his interest in the dynamics of consanguinitas is limited to the theory of generation and the processes that allow the virtus formativa to reproduce a virtual content in the embryonic matter, in the image and likeness of the parents. If in his De animalibus Albert aims at presenting a bilateral kinship model that explains how the transmission of genetic content from parents to children is possible, in his Ethica, he arrives at a vertical and descending model, concentrated on the descendants in the male line. This change of perspective seems connected to an ex post justification arising from theological concerns, e.g., to justify biblical genealogies or the descent of all humanity from Adam.109

107 See supra, Sect. 3.4. 108 Albertus Magnus, Ethica VIII, 3, 6 (ed. Borgnet, 549): «Et quia parentela est sicut

corpus, in qua stipes cor est, alii autem sicut membra: propter hoc lator legis dixit quod in quatuor gradibus attenditur consanguinitas, et in quinto dissolvitur.» 109 Cf. de Miramon and Van der Lugt, “Sang, hérédité et parenté au Moyen-Âge”, 32.

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Albert’s explanation of consanguinity and the transmission of similarity had little diffusion in subsequent authors, who not only ignored his biological rationalization of consanguinity but also seemed uninterested in explanatory models based on the physiology of the human body. However, Albert influenced all the following commentators of Aristotelian Ethics in their discussions on the differences between paternal and maternal love and their respective strengths.110

110 Ibid., 31.

CHAPTER 5

Final Remarks

Albert the Great’s theoretical treatment of embryogenesis is a privileged point of view for understanding his method and intellectual endeavor. Albeit mainly formulated within natural-philosophical commentaries on Aristotle, Albert’s embryological discourse takes into account several theological concerns as well. If God infuses the rational soul into the embryo only when the body is complete, what then guides the formation of the fetus? What is responsible for its very first vital activities? What is, ultimately, the embryo’s ontological status before the infusion of the rational soul? To answer these questions, Albert focuses on the dynamics of transmission and configuration of the living, explaining how the morphological and functional structures are handed down from parent to child without presupposing the transmission of the soul. The principle responsible for these dynamics is the virtus formativa, a power residing inside the matter that, according to multiple levels of complexity, guarantees the material configuration of every natural entity, from inorganic to organic beings. According to these different levels of complexity, in the case of human generation, the virtus formativa specializes to the point of taking the lead in the transmission of accidental genetic contents. The development of this notion is a result of constant striving to organize stratified positions into a framework of theoretical coherence. This © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Cerrito, Albert the Great (c. 1193–1280) and the Configuration of the Embryo, Palgrave Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Medicine, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24023-2_5

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effort is an ongoing commitment on behalf of Albert throughout his intellectual production. His works, particularly his Aristotelian commentaries, display a deep interchange of textual materials, which vouches for Albert’s theoretical stances in their plastic and ever-evolving nature. To overcome the unilaterality of an analysis conducted according to chronological criteria or delimited by individual disciplines, this piece of research has adopted an intertextual and, inevitably, interdisciplinary methodological approach. It was the goal of this transversal and interdisciplinary exploration and analysis of Albert’s works to show how the notion of virtus formativa goes well beyond the boundaries of embryological discourse and that its formulation responds to (at least) three theoretical tensions. From a metaphysical-ontological point of view, the notion is functional to explain how the regularity and purpose of natural generation are connected to the divine providential plan. From a physical point of view, the virtus formativa explains the intertwined dynamics between matter and form in the generation of living substance, overcoming the absolute separation between matter and form typical of Platonism and its Arabic interpretations. From a theological point of view, the doctrine of inchoatio formae / virtus formativa is proposed as an alternative to the doctrine of traducianism of the human soul, providing a coherent definition of the ontological status of the embryo and explaining its formation as a gradual passage from the imperfect to the perfect. From a metaphysical point of view, the notion of virtus formativa coincides with that of an incipient form ( forma inchoata). In this book, I have tried to negotiate the variable lexicon employed by Albert in describing the principle responsible for the matter’s suitability to the form in the process of change. The syntagms meritum materiae, forma inchoata, potentia, privatio, and virtus formativa describe the same physical principle of generation that cooperates in matter-form binding in the first stage of substantial change. The formative power, however, has no ontological continuity with the substantial form, since it does not persist in the process of change, whereas matter and form do. When the matter reaches its form, it disappears. The formative power is, therefore, an instrumental principle of generation, preliminary to ensoulment, that shapes and organizes the body fittingly to the soul. This can happen because the virtus formativa possesses the bodily design fitting to the soul as an instrument.

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At variance with the doctrine of the dator formarum, Albert postulates the incipient forms as already present in matter since the Creation. On account of the analogy with the impulse received from the celestial intelligences, the incipient form stimulates the realization of a form in matter, guaranteeing regularity, purpose, and order to the generation of the substance without presupposing the ad hoc donation of a giver of forms. The formative power of matter establishes the right to receive a specific impulse toward form and, thus, to determine the right of matter to receive ‘the condition of being’ from God and, then, to participate, by degree, in His good. This power of matter is not an indeterminate formative capacity open to any form. It is instead a power that guarantees that the process of change is aimed at the acquisition of a specific substantial form, with which the formative power manifests an analogical bond of suitability (convenientia). In dialog with the manifold medical, natural-philosophical, and theological doctrines on embryogenesis available in the thirteenth century, the notion of virtus formativa is enriched. This notion resolves the theoretical tensions between the theological tenet of a human soul created ex nihilo, and the physical and medical explanatory model of epigenesis, which explains the embryonic development as a passage from the imperfect to the perfect both of bodily and psychic functions. Albert combines those perspectives and develops his “epigenetic creationism” model, which ascribes the embryo’s vital activity before the ensoulment to the virtus formativa. In the generative process, what the father transmits to the offspring is not a soul but rather a likeness of the bodily powers and functions of the soul which the virtus formativa, before the animation of the embryo, both carries and performs. However, this power does not evolve in the embryo’s soul: it is just the principle of organization and configuration of the body preliminary to and before the reception of the soul itself. The vector of this power is the seed which, resulting from the digestive process, can virtually acquire morphology, function, and accidental traits from the generating body. Once in the embryo, the virtus formativa is localized in the heart, from which it starts the material realization patterned on the bodily design acquired from the parents. The simpler the body to be formed is, the more effective the formative power, as confirmed by Albert’s treatment of the virtus reformativa plantarum. Contrary to what happens in animals, the formative power of plants is not exclusively involved in the initial configuration of the animated body but remains for the entire duration

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of the plants’ life, potentially restoring damaged bodily parts. This is because, in Albert’s view, the possibility of forming body parts again is inversely proportional to the complexity of the bodily constitution. Since the formative power of animals is appointed to configure a body that is highly differentiated in composition, it contains both principia to shape uniform parts (e.g., bone and flesh) and non-uniform parts (i.e., organs). Unlike this, the formative power of plants, endowed with a very simple body composition mostly constituted of uniform parts and lacking several vital organs (like the brain, liver, and stomach), does not require specialized principles to configure the body. The more articulated and specialized body to be formed is that of animals, whose configuration requires the contribution of the female virtus informativa. Due to the difficulty of isolating a univocal lexicon associated with the notion of virtus formativa, scholars failed to recognize the theoretical distinction between virtus formativa and virtus informativa. Such a distinction plays a central role in Albert’s discussion on the female contribution to the generative process. In his attempt to integrate, as much as possible, medical doctrinal elements within the Aristotelian framework, Albert reformulates the so-called Galenic doctrine of the “two seeds”. He agrees with Galen in recognizing that the female produces a certain humor albus which becomes part of what is conceived, though he denies that this performs any active configurative task in the embryo’s development. The female’s humor is endowed with nothing but the virtus informativa, which is the power of being suitable to the form and, thus, of being predisposed to be informed by a specific form. As the “wind eggs” (i.e., unfertilized eggs) case study has revealed, the female virtus informativa is a vegetative principle that ensures the ova venti to live, at least, a vegetative life, thanks to the power of nutrition and growth. In discussing the ontological status of the unfertilized eggs, Albert introduces a hierarchy of formal levels in the generation. Within this ontological grid, the ovum venti is described as a sort of in transition form: it is stuck in its way toward the animal form since it is devoid of male formative power but, at the same time, it potentially lives a vegetative life since, up to a certain point, it feeds and grows. Although the female informativa does not convey the animal form, it offers a generative material more suitable for the principal organs of the embryo. Just like the male virtus formativa, the female one is also conveyed by the seed, which resulting from a similar process of assimilation and digestion,

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allows this power to preserve the model and transmit it to the embryo, guaranteeing genetic continuity between mother and son. The introduction of the notion of female formative power is decisive for overcoming the difficulty of reconciling the Aristotelian theory of parents-to-child resemblance with a bilateral kinship system. Aristotle explained the inheritance of somatic traits in terms of antagonism between the male and female contribution: as far as the formal principle, i.e., the male’s, is effective in limiting the disobedience of the material one, the child will resemble the father. On the contrary, the resemblance to the mother results from the weakness of the formal principle, which cannot prevail over the material principle. Resorting to the Avicennian argumentative strategy of the inoboedientia materiae, (i.e., the stronger or weaker resistance of the menstrual blood to receive the form), Albert describes the causes of resemblance as a mutual interaction between the male formative power and the so-called virtutes personae matris, i.e., the passive attitude and/or resistance to the action of the formative power and the ability to oppose this. The very possibility of opposing to the male formative power makes the female seed, at least, an interactive principle. Male and female seeds are endowed with different formative powers, each with their tasks, though, equally responsible for the bodily configuration of the offspring. Albert’s doctrine of the transmission of genetic contents from parents to offspring finds its application in the ethical discourse to explain the establishment of the amicitia parentalis , the origin of the rest of the family relationships. These themes are widely discussed in the Super Ethica (1250–1252) and the Ethica (1262). Through a parallel investigation of those two works, it has been shown how Albert progressively develops a doctrine on kinship following physiological patterns. The influence of Albert’s commentary activity on the De animalibus is evident in his later Ethica, where physiology and ethics converge in Albert’s discussion of the lex consanguinitatis promulgated by the Fourth Lateran Council, promoted by Pope Innocent III in 1215, which establishes the extent to which the degrees of kinship subsist. While the conciliar document justifies the reasons for limiting the kinship at the fourth degree via a generic reference to the number of humors in the body, Albert prefers another physiological analogy, namely, the four digestions aimed at the production of seminal fluid from which generation begins: consanguinity ends at the fourth degree because the semen, its vector, is the result of four digestions.

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As far as this has been continuously reworked, the notion of virtus formativa shows its systematic feature and hidden ultimate sense only through an investigation of Albert’s works as a whole. Adopting a transversal methodological approach has allowed this piece of research to analyze, as precisely as possible, the notion of virtus formativa in its plastic and ever-evolving nature. Albert’s genius in explaining the complex dynamics of transmission regulating life’s insurgence is undeniable. The configuration process requires that several agents and patients participate in the realization of life. Intelligences, elementary qualities, and generating individuals play the role of activating and serving instrumentally in the configurative process, however, they can never lead the configuration of the embryo from the inside. The virtus formativa is a principle immanent to the matter and nature of the embryo whose realization’s design preserves only a virtual connection with the impulse received from the agents of the generative process. The Neoplatonic vision of nature and the ontology of pseudoDionysius the Areopagite influence how Albert looks at nature and delves inside its structures. Every type of natural generation preserves the indicia of the exemplary production from which it stems and is, in its essential elements, a resultatio of the divine creation. What guarantees the link between model and reproduction is the virtus formativa. Bestowed by God onto the creative act and shared by all creatures, this is the power that ensures the isomorphic relationship between model and reproduction, thus guaranteeing the order of nature.

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Index

A Abbreviatio super de animalibus , 5, 50 Adam and Eve, 54 Albert the Great, 2, 4, 5, 7–11, 13–15, 17, 18, 23–26, 31, 32, 42, 44–46, 58, 65, 73, 79, 83, 101, 103, 111, 112, 121, 139, 143 Alcmaeon of Croton, 75 Alexander of Hales, 59 Alfanus of Salerno, 5 Alfred of Sareshel, 79 Ambrose, 54 amicitia parentalis natural friendship, 124, 125, 129, 138, 147 Anzulewicz, Henryk, 25–27, 31, 32, 36, 66 aptitudo ad formam, 20 Apuleius, 25 Aquinas, Thomas, 4, 52, 54, 56–59, 65, 111

Aristotle, 2, 4, 5, 10, 15, 17, 23–25, 27, 30, 32–34, 39, 40, 46–49, 51, 55, 57, 62, 64, 65, 68, 75–77, 79, 82–84, 92, 93, 102–104, 106–109, 113, 115, 120–122, 124–126, 128–130, 132, 134, 136, 138, 139, 141, 143, 147 arteries, 83, 85, 102 Augustine, 24, 25, 41, 54, 59–61 Averroes, 5, 18, 39, 51, 62, 83, 105, 106 Avicebron, 31 Avicenna, 5, 6, 18, 22, 33, 34, 39, 47, 49–51, 56, 62, 83, 90, 94, 105, 106

B Baldner, Steven, 17, 22 Boethius, 25, 53, 108 Bonaventure, 16, 56, 59 brain, 75, 76, 84, 85, 88, 146

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Cerrito, Albert the Great (c. 1193–1280) and the Configuration of the Embryo, Palgrave Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Medicine, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24023-2

167

168

INDEX

Burgundio of Pisa, 5, 6, 69 C Canon medicinae, 50, 56, 90 Categories , 108 Commentarium Magnum, 51 Consanguinitas kinship, 89, 93, 97, 124, 128, 129, 138, 141, 142 Constantine the African, 49, 52, 90 continuity, 10, 11, 22, 24, 26, 38, 42, 45, 56, 61, 64, 85, 137, 144, 147 convenientia bond of suitability, 43, 44, 134, 145 creatio ex nihilo, 8, 32, 46, 145 D Dante Alighieri, 101 dator formarum giver of forms, 22–24, 30–33, 39, 40, 67, 145 De animalibus , 6, 9, 15, 26, 27, 46, 47, 51, 62, 64, 66, 68, 70, 76, 77, 79, 81, 83, 84, 87, 91, 93, 95, 98, 103, 104, 106–110, 116, 121, 122, 124, 134, 138, 140, 141, 147 De causis et processu universitatis , 32 De divinis nominibus , 15, 21, 22, 31–37, 42 De fide orthodoxa, 69, 70 De mineralibus , 8, 15 De natura hominis , 5, 69 De philosophia mundi, 52, 53 De plantis , 79, 121 De praedicamentis , 27 De somno et vigilia, 7 De vegetabilibus , 4, 79, 80, 85, 86, 88, 120, 121

De vegetabilibus et plantis , 15 dispute between philosophers and physicians, 11, 93, 102 DNA, 58, 60 Dragmaticon, 52, 53 Dunbabin, Jean, 124

E eductio formarum, 16, 25, 29 emanation, 23, 32 ensoulment, 8, 46, 52, 144, 145 epigenesis, 8, 46, 145 Ethica, 15, 68–71, 73, 113, 124, 125, 128–130, 135–137, 139, 141, 147 ethics, 2, 10, 124, 138, 147 exemplary cause, 15, 34

F fate, 41–43 father, 9, 48, 51, 58, 60, 61, 64, 67, 74, 81, 85, 92–97, 100, 110, 112, 113, 124–133, 135–137, 145, 147 fatherhood, 15 female seed, 64, 93, 94, 99, 101, 106–110, 113, 114, 119, 147 First Cause, 9, 14, 37, 43 forma ante rem, 27

G Galen, 1, 5, 6, 13, 18, 47–51, 55, 76, 77, 82–84, 102–104, 106, 109, 110, 112, 114, 122, 146 Galenism, 6, 13, 57 generatio ex putrefactione putrefaction, 43 Generation of Animals , 47, 48, 75, 93 generation of Jesus, 4, 54, 102, 111, 112, 114

INDEX

gestational sac, 51, 71, 117 Giles of Rome, 16 God, 8–10, 14–16, 23, 31, 32, 34–37, 41–43, 45, 46, 50, 52, 53, 57, 59, 61, 66, 72, 143, 145, 148 Gospel of Luke, Super Lucam, 111 Gospel of Matthew, 64 Gout, 90 Gregory of Nyssa, 69

H Haly Abbas, 49 Harvey, William, 9, 78 heart, 48, 71, 76, 81–87, 96, 97, 99, 110, 130, 139–141, 145 heartbeat, 71 heat, 38, 40, 41, 51, 63, 65, 67, 71, 82, 97, 116, 119, 123 Henry of Ghent, 16 Hilary of Poitier, 54 History of Animals , 47 Hossfeld, Paul, 8, 18–21, 24 humidum radicale radical moisture, 3, 71, 86, 87, 133, 134 humor albus , 110, 146

I inchoatio formae, 15, 20, 22–24, 26, 30, 31, 40, 43, 44, 105–107, 113, 119, 144 inheritance, 10, 11, 89–93, 141, 147 inherited disease, 90, 91 intellect, 1, 9, 15, 27, 28, 37, 44, 51, 72, 73, 125, 136 intentio, 35, 55, 105 Isaac Israeli, 56 Isagoge, 27, 108 Isidorus Hispalensis, 115

169

J James of Viterbo, 16 John of Damascus, 69

K kidney, 76 Kit¯ ab al-Malaki, 49 Kit¯ ab al-nafs , 50

L law, 60, 90, 131, 138, 139 leprosy, 54, 90, 91 Liber de causis , 32 Liber de natura et origine animae, 26–28 Liber Sententiarum, 2, 61, 62 liver, 69, 83, 88, 146 Lopez-Beltràn, Carlos, 91, 92

M male seed, 51, 59, 71, 81, 92, 93, 95–97, 101, 102, 108, 111, 113, 116–118 Mary Virgin Mary, 102, 111–114 Maternity, 137 matter and form, 10, 14, 17, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 29, 35, 36, 40, 101, 107, 127, 130, 144 medicine, 2, 3, 7, 8, 45, 49, 55, 75, 91, 112, 138 meritum materiae, 15, 30, 31, 33, 34, 144 metaphysics, 2, 10, 26, 32, 37 mother, 9, 56, 93–97, 99, 100, 110, 112, 113, 123, 134–137, 147

N Nardi, Bruno, 17, 23, 24, 57–59, 101

170

INDEX

natural philosophy, 2, 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 46, 55, 91, 111, 112, 124, 128 Nature of the Child, 75 Nemesius of Emesa, 5, 69 Nicolaus of Damascus, 79 Nicomachean Ethics , 124, 134 non-uniform parts, 85, 146 nutritive soul, 8, 48, 123

O On Seed, 75 original sin, 54, 60–62, 90, 91 ova venti wind eggs, 114, 117–119, 123, 146

P Pantegni, 49, 50, 53, 90 Parts of Animals , 47 Paz Lima, Jimena, 22, 26, 27 Peter Lombard, 2, 54, 61 Physica, 15, 17–19, 29, 106 Plato, 25, 27, 30, 31, 33, 34, 39, 53, 64, 67, 72, 74, 103, 104, 130 Pliny, 114 Porphyry, 47, 107, 108 preformism, 59 principium plantativum, 68, 69 privatio privation, 17–22, 29, 30, 106, 107 propagation principle of propagation, 59, 60, 62, 125, 126, 128, 135 proportion, 31, 34, 95 Providence, 10, 16, 31, 38, 39, 42–45 pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, 15, 21, 148

Q Quaestiones super de animalibus , 6, 7

R rational soul, 8, 42, 46, 52, 58, 61, 65, 66, 72, 143 rationes causales , 16 rationes seminales , 16, 24, 54, 59 reproduction of plants, 79 resemblance, 11, 51, 61, 77, 78, 80, 91–97, 100, 101, 141, 147 restauratio deperditi, 86 Rodolfi, Anna, 19, 22–26, 32 Roland of Cremona, 49, 55

S School of Chartres, 52 seminal fluid, 50, 73–78, 80, 87, 96, 100, 108, 113, 116, 126, 140, 141, 147 sensitive soul, 57, 59, 66, 115, 120, 121 Siraisi, Nancy, 6, 7, 49, 83 Snyder, Steven, 17, 18, 22–25 soul in fieri, 57, 58 spinal column, 75, 76 spirit, 64, 65, 67, 70, 71, 103, 113, 116 spontaneous generation, 42 Studium generale of Cologne, 4 Summa theologiae, 15, 19, 39, 44, 55, 57, 58, 63, 65, 66 Super Ethica, 68, 124, 125, 135, 136, 141 Syphilis, 90

T Takahashi, Adam, 9, 13, 14, 73 Tertullian, 61 testicles, 77, 78, 80, 99 Theophrastus, 47, 107–109 traducianism, 59, 61, 62, 144

INDEX

U uniform parts, 77, 85, 87–89, 146 V vegetative soul, 58, 66, 121–123 veins, 83, 85, 102, 140 virtus formativa formative power, informative power, 1, 6, 8–11, 13, 15, 27, 28, 31, 42, 44–47, 50–53, 56–59, 63–67, 73, 74, 77, 78, 80, 81,

171

83, 84, 86–89, 95, 96, 99–102, 105, 107, 108, 112, 128, 134, 141, 143–146, 148 virtus mutabilis , 50 virtus reformativa, 86, 88, 145 W Weisheipl, James, 4, 6, 24, 46, 49, 59 William of Conches, 52, 53 womb, 55, 56, 65, 97–99, 102, 109, 112, 117, 122, 123