Aid Power and Politics 9781138341258, 9781138341272, 9780429440236

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“What this volume does very well is fill a gap in the literature by bringing together an analysis of country and thematic policies and putting them firmly in the broader context of foreign policy and international relations. In the process, it improves our understanding of the politics of aid.” Andy Sumner, King’s College London, UK “This book offers a rich analysis of the domestic and international politics of foreign aid in a range of donor countries and several key crosscutting themes. It makes valuable theoretical and empirical contributions. I learned a lot from its historical perspectives and up-to-date examinations of the rapidly changing aid ecosystem.” Stephen Brown, School of Political Science, University of Ottawa, Canada

AID POWER AND POLITICS

Aid Power and Politics delves into the political roots of aid policy, demonstrating how and why governments across the world use aid for global influence, and exploring the role it plays in present-day global governance and international relations. In reconsidering aid as part of international relations, the book argues that the interplay between domestic and international development policy works in both directions, with individual countries having the capacity to shape global issues, while at the same time, global agreements and trends, in turn, shape the political behaviour of individual countries. Starting with the background of aid policy and international relations, the book goes on to explore the behaviour of both traditional and emerging donors (the US, the UK, the Nordic countries, Japan, Spain, Hungary, Brazil, and the European Union), and then finally looks at some big international agendas that have influenced donors, from the liberal consensus on democracy and good governance, to gender equality and global health. Aid Power and Politics will be an important read for international development students, researchers, practitioners, and policy makers, and for anyone who has ever wondered why it is that countries spend so much money on the well-being of non-citizens outside their borders. Iliana Olivié is a Senior Analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute, Spain, where she works on global development issues and coordinates the Elcano Global ­Presence Index. She is also an associate professor in the Department of Applied & ­Structural Economics & History, Complutense University of Madrid. Aitor Pérez, economist and political scientist, works as a consultant for UN agencies and international NGOs, conducting policy research and evaluation of aid-funded programmes in developing countries. He is also Senior Research Fellow at the Elcano Royal Institute.

Rethinking Development

Rethinking Development offers accessible and thought-provoking overviews of contemporary topics in international development and aid. Providing original empirical and analytical insights, the books in this series push thinking in new directions by challenging current conceptualizations and developing new ones. This is a dynamic and inspiring series for all those engaged with today’s debates surrounding development issues, whether they be students, scholars, policy makers and practitioners internationally. These interdisciplinary books provide an invaluable resource for discussion in advanced undergraduate and postgraduate courses in development studies as well as in anthropology, economics, politics, geography, media studies and sociology. Epistemic Freedom in Africa Deprovincialization and Decolonization Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni Foreign Aid in the Age of Populism Political Economy Analysis from Washington to Beijing Viktor Jakupec and Max Kelly Researching South-South Development Cooperation The Politics of Knowledge Production Elsje Fourie, Emma Mawdsley and Wiebe Nauta Aid Power and Politics Edited by Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez Participatory Arts in International Development Edited by Paul Cooke and Inés Soria-Donlan

AID POWER AND POLITICS

Edited by Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 selection and editorial matter, Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-138-34125-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-138-34127-2 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-44023-6 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by codeMantra

CONTENTS

Contributors ix Introduction 1 Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez PART 1

Aid in the framework of international relations theories 9 1 The politics of aid from the perspective of international relations theories 11 Bernabé Malacalza 2 Foreign aid’s motivations: theoretical arguments and empirical evidence 34 Gino N. Pauselli PART 2

The politics of donors’ aid policies, a country-based approach 51 3 The US elite consensus on aid 53 Henry de Cazotte 4 The UK: an aid superpower at a crossroads 73 Myles Wickstead

viii Contents

5 The Scandinavians: aid policy determinants and performances 89 Olav Stokke 6 Japanese development assistance: economic and political win-win proposals 116 Marie Söderberg 7 Spain: the rise and fall of a compliant donor 131 Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez 8 While the cat’s away, will the mice play? GovernmentNGO relations and the politics of aid in Hungary 149 Krisztina Szabó, Balázs Szent-Iványi, and András Tétényi 9 Brazilian cooperation policy: promotion of development and global projection 165 Guillermo Santander 10 Solidarity and security in the EU discourse on aid 179 Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez PART 3

Thematic agendas 197 11 Donorship in a state of flux 199 Nilima Gulrajani and Liam Swiss 12 The international politics of aid: ‘good governance’ and democracy promotion 223 David Williams 13 Gender inequality, aid agencies, and global norms 238 Lars Engberg-Pedersen 14 Old and new powers in development assistance in health 255 Eduardo Missoni and Fabrizio Tediosi 15 ‘We first’ and the anti-foreign aid narratives of populist radical-right parties in Europe 272 Margarita Gómez-Reino

CONTRIBUTORS

Henry de Cazotte, former director at the Agence Française de Developpement (AFD), has been Special Representative for Habitat III, Special Advisor to the Executive Coordinator of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development Rio +20, and Coordinator of the French Inter Department Task Team on the post-2015 process and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) p­ rocess. He has also worked for the AFD and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Brazil and Southern Africa. Currently, Henry de Cazotte is involved in diverse NGO sustainable development activities in France and abroad, including local sustainable development, and practices winegrowing in the Champagne region. Lars Engberg-Pedersen  is a Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for

I­ nternational Studies (DIIS). He works on international development cooperation and global norms. He has undertaken research on aid in fragile situations, aid management practices, and poverty reduction by local organisations, among other issues. As a practitioner, he headed the development cooperation of a major Danish NGO, and he advised on local government for a ministry in Burkina Faso. He has recently co-edited Rethinking Gender Equality in Global Governance: The Delusion of Norm Diffusion (2020). Margarita Gómez-Reino  is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia. She is currently part of the research project “Crisis económica, cambio social y nuevos actores politicos” (Economic crisis, social change and new political actors) funded by the Spanish Ministry for the Economy and Competitiveness (Research Grant CSO201347667-P). She has belonged to the international network Teampopulism since 2014. She has recently published Nationalisms in the European Arena: Trajectories of Transnational Party Coordination (2018).

x Contributors

Nilima Gulrajani is a Senior Research Fellow at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and an Associate at King’s College, Department of International Development. Her research applies organisational and management theory to study trends and practices in the field of international development cooperation. At ODI, she leads a programme of research centred on building donor capacity and investigating comparative trends and policy innovations in development management. Nilima has published extensively in peer-reviewed as well as policy and media outlets, and she currently serves as an editor of the journal Public Administration and Development. Bernabé Malacalza  is a Research Fellow at the National Scientific and ­ echnical Research Council (CONICET) based at the National University of T Quilmes (UNQ) in Argentina. He holds a PhD in Social Sciences from the Latin ­A merican Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO), an MA in International ­Economic Relations from the University of Barcelona, and an MA in International Relations and Negotiations from the University of San Andrés and FLACSO. He is a Professor at the PhD faculty in Economic Development at UNQ and he also collaborates with other postgraduate courses on international development cooperation. Eduardo Missoni  has decades-long experience in international development

c­ ooperation and global health, and is currently an Adjunct Professor at the Bocconi University and SDA-Bocconi School of Management, at the Milano-­ Bicocca University, and at the Medical School of the University of Pavia, Italy. He is also a member of the Faculty of the Geneva School of Diplomacy and has teaching duties at the Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública in Cuernavaca, Mexico. Gino N. Pauselli  is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science (International Relations) and a Benjamin Franklin Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania. Previously, he studied a Masters in International Studies at Torcuato Di Tella University (Buenos Aires, Argentina) and a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations at the University of San Andres (Buenos Aires, Argentina). He has been recipient of the Fulbright and the Juan Bautista Alberdi scholarships. He specialises in human rights, foreign aid, and foreign policy. His work has been published in top international journals, and he received the Argentine Society of Political Analysis award for the Best Paper on Latin American politics. One recent publication related to this proposal is “Teoría de las relaciones internacionales y la explicación de la ayuda externa” (in Revista Iberoamericana de Estudios de Desarrollo. 2013). Guillermo Santander  holds a PhD in Political Science and is a researcher at

the Complutense University of Madrid. He collaborates as a professor with several universities, participating in different postgraduate courses on international

Contributors  xi

development cooperation. He has collaborated as an expert consultant for the Spanish Agency of International Development Cooperation (AECID), the ­I beroamerican General Secretariat (SEGIB), UNICEF-Spain, and Oxfam. One ­recent publication related to this topic is “Perceptions, Identities and Interests in South-South Cooperation: The Cases of Chile, Venezuela and Brazil” (Third Word Quarterly. 2018, with J.A. Alonso). Marie Söderberg  is the Director of the European Institute of Japanese Stud-

ies and a Professor of Stockholm School of Economics. She has a PhD from ­Stockholm University in 1986. The title of her thesis was “Japan’s Military ­Export Policy”. A central focus of her research is Japanese foreign aid policy as well as Europe-Japan relations. Marie Söderberg is a board member and chairperson of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. She is the senior editor of the European Institute of Japanese Studies, East Asian Economics and Business Studies, a book series published by Routledge. She is also the Chairperson of EJARN’s (­European Japan Advanced Research Network) executive committee. Olav Stokke is currently a Senior Researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). For years, he headed NUPI’s department of development research and has also served as Research Director and Acting Director. During 1974–2008, he edited Forum for Development Studies. He was the C ­ onvener of the EADI Working Group on Aid Policy and Performance from 1979 to 2004. Over the years, he has published extensively on aid policy and performance. Major recent works include The UN and Development (2009) and International Development Assistance. Policy Drivers and Performance (2019). Liam Swiss  is an Associate Professor of Sociology at Memorial University in St. John’s, Canada. His research examines the role of foreign aid, violence against aid workers, Canadian aid policy, and women’s political representation in the Global South. His book The Globalization of Foreign Aid: Developing Consensus was published by Routledge in 2018. Other recent publications include “World Society and the Global Foreign Aid Network” (Sociology of Development 2(4): 342–374. 2016) and “A Sociology of Foreign Aid and the World Society” (Sociology Compass 10(1): 65–73. 2016). Krisztina Szabó  is currently doing her PhD on political economy of devel-

opment at the Central European University. She is a teaching assistant in the Institute of World Economy at the Corvinus University of Budapest. She is currently working on projects related to the effects of foreign aid with a particular focus on mechanisms linking understandings of security with development concerns. Between 2019 and 2021, she is doing a research (2019–2021) within a Horizon 2020 research project, POPREBEL, with the aim of understanding the recent rise of populism – in its various forms – in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

xii Contributors

Balázs Szent-Iványi  is a Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Aston University, Birmingham, UK, and also holds an Associate Professor position at Corvinus University Budapest, Hungary. His research focusses on the political economy of foreign aid, with an emphasis on how foreign aid decisions are made by donor countries. Fabrizio Tediosi is Group Leader for Health Policy and System Research at the

Department of Epidemiology and Public Health of the Swiss Tropical and Public Health Institute, and Privat Dozent (Associate Professor) at the University of Basel. András Tétényi is an Assistant Professor of economics at the Institute of World Economy of the Corvinus University of Budapest. He is the academic coordinator for the H-2020 Marie Skłodowska-Curie Innovative Training Network entitled FATIGUE (Delayed Transformational Fatigue in Central and Eastern Europe), and he is a researcher in the H-2020-POPREBEL (Populist rebellion against modernity in 21st-century Eastern Europe: neo-traditionalism and neo-feudalism) project where he is researching economic insecurity. His research interests are in the field of official development assistance policies of the Visegrád countries and drivers of asylum migration. David Williams is a Reader in the School of Politics and International Relations,

Queen Mary University London. He is the author of The World Bank and Social Transformation in International Politics: Liberalism, Governance and Sovereignty and International Development and Global Politics: History, Theory and Practice, both published by Routledge. Myles Wickstead  has had a long career in international development and

­d iplomacy, and has inter alia been responsible for British aid programmes in East Africa, represented the UK on the Board of the World Bank, and was B ­ ritish Ambassador to Ethiopia and the African Union. He is currently a Visiting Professor (International Relations) at King’s College, London. He has written ­extensively on Africa, aid, and development; his book Aid and Development: A Brief Introduction was published in June 2015.

INTRODUCTION Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez

Development Studies have traditionally approached aid from the viewpoint of its impact on partner or recipient countries.1 Assuming that aid tends to be (or must be) oriented to development goals, it is often analysed from a technical or managerial perspective and with a focus on its effectiveness for developing countries. To a lesser extent, aid policy has also been approached from the perspective of donor countries. In fact, the earliest studies on this topic linked aid policy to the high politics pursued by powerful nations in the context of the Cold War.2 More recent works on the emergence of new donors like China 3 likewise emphasise the political component of international assistance, and many relate aid to the exertion of regional or global power. For some reason, the literature on emerging donors appears to avoid the technical approaches dominant in other studies on aid.4 However, most analyses on traditional donors have pointedly explored the extent to which countries contribute aid according to ‘good’ or altruistic motives (based on recipient needs and/or merits), or else for ‘bad’ or selfish reasons (essentially the donors’ national interests). Implicit to the latter explanation are several ideas: aid-giving gives power to donors over recipients; that power can be used in the donor country’s best interest; and that interest is usually related to security or wealth, and may sometimes be seen as morally reprehensible. In general, the political grounds for giving aid are assumed, rather than explored. The political use of aid in the international arena can benefit from more nuanced, less normative analyses; also, it should be borne in mind that the study of the domestic politics of aid remains in an initial stage. Still, the fact is that politically relevant questions are elided by most development studies. How determinant are a donor country’s material interests in terms of aid policy? Do norms, values, and ideas matter for donor governments? Why is aid policy ­institutionalised? To what extent does it respond to domestic lobbies? Is international assistance subject to domestic political competition? What are the domestic

2  Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez

constituencies of aid in particular countries? How is aid being used to exert power regionally or globally? Do pressures and incentives from the international community condition aid policies at the national level?5 Aid Power and Politics seeks to offer responses to these questions by analysing the domestic political roots of aid, as well as the use of aid in international politics. In order to pursue this end, several chapters of this book refer directly to power and influence; also, in many cases, explanations are built around concepts such as ideas, norms, leaders, elites, lobbies, or narratives. The relevance of this book came to us in 2016, when it was observed that Spain had experienced cumulative cuts to its aid budget totalling 75% in less than a decade, with scant political reflection on the consequences of such a trend. It soon became obvious that the fundamentals of aid-giving were a relevant question for all countries in this particular moment in history, for two main reasons. On the one hand, we have seen a certain resurgence of nativism and nationalist movements, particularly in the US and Europe, made manifest (for instance) in the Brexit process and the Trump Administration. The appearance or rise of social and political groups that challenge a world order where aid is an integral part of international relations (IR) has forced the debate around aid back to its essentials, and to its political roots. On the other hand, implementation of the 2030 Agenda (adopted in September 2015) is challenging the aid system as currently composed. This Agenda has transitioned from an initial strong focus on the social dimension of development, and a North-South approach to aid relations, to a new focus that interlinks social development with its economic, political, and environmental dimensions, and that aims at building horizontal aid relations, thereby overcoming the North-South divide. If fully implemented, this Agenda would imply a revolution in the aid system as we know it (including its grounds, its objectives, its actors, and the instruments it employs). As part of this process, the definition of aid itself is being reconsidered. There is debate over whether the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) definition of aid is capable of encompassing all the varied forms of cooperation among nations that may entail a development component. In this sense, a more ample concept of total official support to sustainable development (TOSSD) might eventually replace the near universal concept of ‘official development assistance’ (ODA). This book brings together authors who have already addressed international assistance from a political rather than a managerial perspective, and whose intentions are explanatory rather than normative. The authors in Part 1 (Aid in the framework of international relations theories) elaborate on the questions posed above, drawing on the IR literature to advance their responses. In Chapter 1, Bernabé Malacalza notes that the boundaries of what could be called ‘the study of development cooperation from an IR perspective’ remain somewhat opaque, fragmented, and not clearly marked. His review of the pertinent literature p­ resents and classifies the main lines of research around the criteria of core concepts, research questions, levels and units of analysis, and foreign aid conceptualisations. The IR

Introduction  3

theories reviewed by Malacalza are grouped into six broad schools or c­ ategories, namely (i) realism and neo-realism; (ii) liberalism, n ­ eoliberal institutionalism, and the cosmopolitan perspective; (iii)  c­ onstructivism; (iv)  i­ nternational ­political economy; (v) structuralism and critical theories; and (vi) foreign policy analysis. In Chapter 2, Gino N. Pauselli underlines the same vacuum in the academic literature. His analysis on foreign aid motivations contains a review of four ­bodies of literature specifically intended to empirically test explanations on ­international aid: (i) the various contributions to the egoism-vs-altruism debate; (ii) the multiple-source model; (iii) the international political economy turn; and (iv) the behavioural revolution. Pauselli finds constructivism and realism to be very influential schools of thought in empirical research on the motives of aid but, in line with Malacalza, he concludes that the intersection between development studies and IR theory is still rudimentary. Part 2 (The politics of donors’ aid policies, a country-based approach) takes a closer look at a series of donor countries, both traditional and emerging, seeking to abandon this sometimes artificial divide. From this perspective, the authors examine the aid policies of the US (Henry de Cazotte, Chapter 3), the UK (Myles Wickstead, Chapter 4), the Nordic countries (Olav Stokke, Chapter 5), Japan (Marie Söderberg, Chapter 6), Spain (Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez, Chapter 7), Hungary (Krisztina Szabó, Balázs Szent-Iványi, and András Tétényi, Chapter 8), Brazil (Guillermo Santander, Chapter 9), and the EU (Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez, Chapter 10). Most of these studies find aid to be strongly influenced by high-level political guidelines that consider foreign policy goals of differing nature. For instance, US aid, as explained by de Cazotte, is driven by a cross-party consensus in which the concept of national security is central. While public opinion plays a negligible role in the US domestic politics of aid, military and diplomatic elites tend to be active supporters of this policy. Similarly, Japan has openly linked its aid to regional alliances based on security concerns, as explained by Söderberg. Adding to the literature on the use of aid for purposes of commercial promotion, her chapter also finds that Japanese aid frequently assisted small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in establishing themselves in less developed parts of the world. According to Wickstead, commercial objectives likewise conditioned British aid during the 1980s, following the UK’s conservative shift of 1979; however, his ‘history of a development superpower at a cross-roads’ goes further to unveil less tangible, more abstract motivations. Wickstead recalls that aid was used in the 1950s to shore up alliances in the East-vs-West battle of ideologies, while, in the 1980s, UK aid contributed to the dissemination of liberal ideas concerning economic reform and structural adjustment, also supporting democratisation in Eastern and Central Europe in the 1990s. More recently, over the past decade, several factors converged to support the UK’s outstanding commitment to ODA, including political ambition to preserve the nation’s global leadership

4  Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez

on development issues. According to the author, that leading role cannot be played in isolation from other aspects of IR; therefore, Brexit is putting the UK’s achievements as a development superpower at risk. Santander’s analysis of major emerging donor Brazil also connects aid with broader international strategies, specifically with the establishment of SouthSouth coalitions by a BRICS (Brazil – Russia – India – China – South Africa) country. These coalitions are not exclusively oriented to economic or security interests, but further intend to explore governance and cooperation alternatives to the existing multilateral system, still largely dominated by coalitions of the global North. In contrast to the above-mentioned studies, Stokke raises a completely different variable when exploring the drivers of aid policies in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. His study of the three Scandinavian countries finds the objectives and norms established by the UN to be the main driver of their aid policies, including their very early compliance with the 0.7 % target. Surprisingly, this has also been the case with Spain. In Chapter 7, we identify global norms as the main drivers of Spanish aid. In this sense, our analysis of the Spanish aid discourse and its international normative framework (as presented in DAC peer reviews) reveals that Spain has been a compliant donor, although (unlike the Nordic countries) it has lately been exonerated from compliance with quantitative aid targets due to the late 2000s financial crisis. This exception, together with a lack of relevant domestic drivers, has resulted in the most dramatic cut to aid disbursements in history. The study of the EU as a donor reveals that different (and even contradictory) sets of motives of aid can and do co-exist. This is evident when analysing the supra-national discourse (reflected in the EU Consensuses on Development), where differing views on the part of diverse member states, as well as from the EU institutions, have given rise to a balanced rhetoric on aid that includes solidarity, the construction of common goods, and the self-interests of donors. This mixture of motives and objectives (from social development to security) can also appear in individual member states, such as the Netherlands or France. As expressed in various works cited in Part 1 of this book, aid can indeed be considered a sort of IR with domestic roots. The role of national non-­ governmental organisations (NGOs) is discussed in several chapters in Part 2 (on the UK, the Scandinavians, and Spain), and this is proven to be determinant in the analysis of Hungarian aid by Szabò, Svent-Ivanyi, and Tétényi. These authors conclude that the nature of the relationship between governments and NGOs has had an impact on the significant influence that NGOs have exerted on ­policy-making in Hungary, particularly in recent years. The final section of this book – Part 3, Thematic agendas – employs a themebased perspective to reflect on the politics of aid. By looking at the interactions between donor and recipient countries within a given aid sector or issue, this section highlights the importance of aid in the introduction and dissemination of ideas across the world.

Introduction  5

Aid norms are at a turning point, or in a “state of flux”, as Nilima Gulrajani and Liam Swiss put it in Chapter 11. The principles of ‘donorship’ associated with the North-centric view of development cooperation are losing ground, while South-South cooperation (SSC) is being increasingly institutionalised, triggering a transition to ‘partnership’ in aid relations. This transition is of enormous political relevance, as these norms frame narratives on development, its problems, and desirable solutions, and they condition the ways in which states negotiate their roles and identities vis-à-vis the international community. David Williams focusses on aid as related to democracy and the promotion of good governance. His analysis in Chapter 12 shows how bilateral and multilateral aid has been used to promote democratic ideas in developing countries since the end of the Cold War, as advanced by Wickstead in his chapter on the UK. Williams examines the emergence of these objectives as central elements of the aid regime, linking this to the dominance of a ‘concert’ of liberal states, which is consistent with classic liberal theory summarised in Part 1. He also highlights certain problems of practice in this agenda having to do with the confrontation of the international liberal consensus with domestic politics in recipient countries. The liberal concert and its dominance in the aid regime might be challenged by the upsurge of new political movements and leaders, as explained by Margarita Gómez-Reino in Chapter 15 on the politics of nationalist populism and aid. However, Gómez-Reino differentiates two distinct national-populist agendas that share similar motives but have very different consequences on aid budgets. One is the anti-cosmopolitan agenda, which rejects cosmopolitan institutions and demands that donor governments spend money on their own territories and populations; the other is the nationalist agenda, according to which aid must be used to reinforce control over national borders and to promote national cultures abroad. Gomez-Reino finds that the former approach has already had consequences on aid expenditure in the cases of Finland and the Netherlands. Lars Engberg-Pedersen in Chapter 13 focusses on global gender equality norms and how they are addressed by seven large cooperation agencies of widely differing nature. He concludes that donor organisations cannot avoid addressing gender equality in their development cooperation, although sometimes they do so reluctantly, and in substantially different ways. The chapter highlights the idea that organisational origins, priorities, and pressures, as well as normative environments, tend to bias and dilute global norms on gender equality. Global health has gained enormous ground in the aid landscape over recent years. According to Eduardo Missoni and Fabrizio Tediosi, this is partly due to the appearance of new private actors. As explained in Chapter 14, these emerging actors and their extraordinary financial capacity have come hand-in-hand with an ability to shape health objectives, institutions, and instruments that are sometimes in conflict with consensuses built by way of inter-governmental fora. The various thematic agendas reviewed in Part 3 show how aid activities interlink with the dissemination of ideas and norms. When governments and inter-governmental and transnational actors contribute aid, all are influenced by

6  Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez

international norms and ideas, but they also exert influence in the elaboration of those norms and their implementation throughout the world, providing models for IR, domestic governance, health policy, gender equality, or border control. According to the country studies in Part 2, leading, participating in, or ­endorsing these normative frameworks is one facet of the motives for providing aid, although more material interests such as security or international trade can also influence this policy. The analyses of the eight very different donors that comprise Part 2 reveal that the domestic political seeds of aid are roughly the same everywhere: leadership (like that of Clare Short in the UK political landscape of the late 1990s), values (solidarity in Scandinavian countries, or liberal democracy in the US), compliance with international norms (as in Hungary and Spain), or the weight of domestic political actors and lobby groups (Administration, Government, NGOs, the business private sector, etc.) – as well as how these different aspects interact. We might conclude that varying measures and combinations of those ingredients result in different modalities of aid (both in shape and in volume) that, in the end, become the basic features of different development policies. As per Part 1 of this book, the political complexity of international assistance that manifests in in-depth analyses of donor countries and aid agendas can be viewed through different theoretical lenses while testing and feeding back these theories on the politics of aid. When considering aid as part of broader IR, the classical IR schools of thought become instrumental to identifying the motivations behind this policy and understanding some of its strategic guidelines. Additionally, analysis of the influence of political actors within each donor country, as well as in the global arena, can be supported by more recent theoretical and methodological developments that share the idea that foreign actions cannot be properly seen as only the interaction between monolithic states. We are grateful to the various people and institutions that have made this book possible. Helena Hurd, from Routledge, had the idea of going a step beyond our initial thoughts on the politics of aid and putting together a book on the power of aid. This came out of a conversation in late August of 2017, during the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI) general conference in Bergen, Norway, where the preliminary results of our research were presented. Her support, flexibility, and commitment have been key to launching this project, which soon received very positive response from the authors invited to contribute. We are especially thankful to all the co-authors for their chapters, for their generous involvement in peer reviewing, and for travelling to Madrid in October of 2018 to share ideas and to provide mutual feedback in a two-day workshop at the Elcano Royal Institute, where initial versions of most of the chapters were discussed; and where we have always been encouraged to approach aid analyses from this atypical perspective. During this seminar, we also benefitted from valuable input from aid practitioners from the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Spanish Government and Parliament, and international NGOs. Moreover, this workshop was made possible through financial support from the

Introduction  7

Elcano Royal Institute and from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and through the hard work of Manen Taibo and Malembe Dumont. Lastly, we thank Joseph Candora for his very thorough work with language editing – a demanding task in a collective book that features a great many ‘non-native-English speaking’ authors (including ourselves).

Notes 1 For a meta-study and summary of the aid effectiveness literature, see Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009). 2 A seminal work from this perspective is that of Morgenthau (1962). 3 These studies are relatively numerous for the BRICS. See, for instance, Deborah Brautigam’s works on China (Brautigam, 2010). 4 One reason may be that the study of traditional donors can rely on the vast, extensive database on aid provided by the OECD, which allows for quantitative impact analy­ sis. This is not a possibility in the assessment of emerging non-DAC donors, which necessarily requires a more qualitative approach likely to consider more and more complex explanations. 5 The lack of studies on the political dimension of aid has been highlighted by several authors. See, for instance, Dickson (1998), Neuman (1998), Hönke and Lederer (2013), and Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot (2015).

Bibliography Brautigam, D. (2010) The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, Oxford ­University Press, New York. Dickson, A. (1998) “Review: Development and IR”, Review of International Political ­Economy 5(2), pp. 362–368. Doucouliagos, H. & Paldam, M. (2009) “The Aid Effectiveness Literature: The Sad ­Results of 40 Years of Research”, Journal of Economic Surveys 23(3), pp. 433–461. Hönke, J. & Lederer, M. (2013) “Development and International Relations”, in Carlsnaes, W., Thomas Risse, T. & Simmons, B.A., (eds.), Handbook in International Relations, Ch. 31, Sage Publishing. Morgenthau, H. (1962) “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid”, The American Political Science Review 56(2), pp. 301–309. Neuman, S. (ed.) (1998) International Relations Theory and the Third World, St. Martin’s Press, New York. Szent-Iványi, B. & Lightfoot, S. (2015) New Europe’s New Development Aid. Routledge.

PART 1

Aid in the framework of international relations theories

1 THE POLITICS OF AID FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES Bernabé Malacalza

Introduction The investigation of aid concepts associated with International Relations (IR) requires systematic readings. Hence, broad and robust reviews in which a body of literature is aggregated and assessed are an inevitably necessary part of providing researchers with a wide-ranging spectrum of knowledge. Generally speaking, some works have allowed us to examine the IR literature on aid and certain of its conceptual propositions, as well as to identify themes that require further investigation (Holdar, 1993; Sanahuja, 1996; Schraeder et al., 1998; Hattori, 2001; Pankaj, 2005; Ayllón, 2007; Pauselli, 2013; Malacalza, 2014; Robledo, 2015). However, little has been assessed and summarised on the question of how IR theories can explain the ways states and other actors seek to shape aid politics and policies. The aim of this chapter is to systematise the theoretical IR knowledge that contributes to explaining the politics that shape aid, and to distinguishing ­between different standpoints and research agendas. In order to do this, we examine distinct groups of works within the IR literature and underscore how these theoretical perspectives have analysed the politics of aid, examining core assumptions and lines of enquiry that recur in this area in order to gain an overview of the various research agendas. The chapter is structured as follows. It begins by juxtaposing explanations of aid policies against the backdrop of IR theories, conceived from the beginning of the Cold War to present day. It then discusses the contributions and limitations of the various theoretical perspectives on foreign aid. Finally, the article illuminates the contrasts, connections, and complementarities among the various cognitive problems, levels of analysis, and mechanisms posited by the different lines of research.

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Study of the politics of foreign aid has been a contested issue among theorists since the early 1960s. However, although several systematic analyses have generated a certain amount of accumulated knowledge on the topic, the fragmented and multi-thematic nature of development cooperation studies makes it difficult to gain a clear picture of the range of theoretical debates in the field. With this as a starting point, the goal of this section is to sample the diverse ways in which the politics of aid have been explained since that time, within the framework of IR theories. Considering the conceptual frameworks provided by (1) realism and neo-realism, (2) liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism, and the cosmopolitan perspective, (3) constructivism, (4) international political economy (IPE), (5) structuralism and critical theories, and (6) foreign policy analysis (FPA), we point out that each research strategy has its peculiar contributions and limitations, depending on four different criteria. These are (a) the type of research question, (b) the conceptual boundaries and definition of the level of analysis, (c) the unit of analysis chosen as the focus of the work, and (d) the definition of foreign aid and its identified purposes.

Realism and neo-realism Realism has been the dominant conceptual lens for understanding the foreign aid regime of the Cold War era. Studies have mainly focussed on how US foreign aid was an instrument primarily driven by the security interests motivated by East-West competition.1 In realist and neo-realist analyses, international relations are conducted in a Hobbesian state of nature in which national security and self-preservation become the primary objectives (Schraeder et al., 1998, p. 296). Fundamentally important is the assumption that anarchy completely determines the goals that states choose to pursue. As result, realists emphasise systemic and structural determinants, and they repeatedly use the formula of ‘interest defined in terms of power’. Indeed, power is seen as the immediate aim of international politics, and it is associated with the idea of controlling the actions of others through influence (Morgenthau, 1950). From the perspective of many realist observers, foreign aid is governed by the structural power patterns in the international system. According to Baldwin (1966, p. 79), aid is an instrument of statecraft, like diplomacy, propaganda, or military action. It serves to promote diplomatic relations with recipient countries, to enhance stability within countries of strategic importance, to expand export markets and procure strategic imports, and to boost reputation in international forums, among other political and economic objectives. It can also provide moral (or rhetorical) justification for a donor’s allocation of resources. Hans Morgenthau (1962, p. 301) – the founding father of classic realism – helped pioneer articulation of the vision that foreign aid can be an appropriate weapon when interests abroad cannot be secured by military means, or by the traditional methods of diplomacy. He distinguishes six types of foreign aid, namely humanitarian, subsistence, military, bribery, prestige, and foreign aid

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for economic development. Of all these types, he claims that “much of what goes by the name foreign aid today is in the nature of bribes” and that, after the Second World War, bribery in the form of foreign aid was justified as supporting the ­economic development of the recipient (Morgenthau, 1962, p. 302). George Liska (1960) was another early realist who argued that foreign aid is a tool of ­political power for pursuing the national interest. In defining aid, he cites the basic tenet of political realism, that is, the continuous struggle for power as the essence of international relations (Liska, 1960, p. 14). Aid effects are also a particular focus of early realists, who were sceptical of the idea that economic development could actually be promoted through aid. ­Morgenthau (1962, p. 302) claims that there was no evidence of correlations ­between aid and economic development, social stability, democracy, or a ­peaceful foreign policy. Edward Banfield (1963, p. 11) follows this argument by pointing out that “only in the most backward countries can either kind of aid make a crucial difference, or perhaps even an important one”. Mason (1964, p. 26) also reminds us that aid should be driven exclusively by the mutual s­ecurity objective, “sufficiently persuasive to secure continuing support from the C ­ ongress and the voting public”. Although the early realists traditionally conceived the donor’s security concerns and alliances as the primary purpose of aid, a handful of historically ­oriented studies have examined the aid effects on the recipients, stressing that aid can serve political leaders’ survival, along with other political aspects of the ­recipient (Packenham, 1966; Black, 1968; Nelson, 1968; Eberstadt & Schultz, 1988; Hook, 1995). During the 1970s and 1980s, there emerged a keen interest in using formal empirical models based on regression analysis to explain the correlations between aid allocation patterns and characteristics of the ­recipient ­countries (Dudley & Montmarquette, 1976; McKinlay, 1979; Maizels & ­Nissanke, 1984). Authors writing from these perspectives gave further support to ‘the ­instrumental premise’ that bilateral aid donors have been driven primarily by their own interests: For example, the US has been motivated by securing UN votes in the G ­ eneral Assembly and France by consolidating a post-colonial sphere of ­influence (Wittkopf, 1973; Rai, 1980; Kuziemko & Werker, 2016). Hook (2008), for example, has explained how aid conditionality is used as a legitimate instrument to promote democratic regimes and free market economies in the developing world. Realists and neo-realists have proved very useful in explaining historical and systemic roots of foreign aid policies, by examining states as rational actors who engage in cost/benefit analysis of their actions within an anarchical international system. However, they have found it impossible to capture the non-monolithic nature of states, in which multiple domestic actors compete for resources and have the power to shape the interests at play in the execution of aid ­policy (­Packenham, 1966, p. 215). They are also imprecise around the content of ­national interests; that is, they do not give the concept operational meaning, thus accentuating the vagueness of the key terms (Lundsgaarde, 2012).

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Liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism, and the cosmopolitan perspective From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, liberal and neoliberal institutionalism approaches led to a different interpretation of international system from that offered by realists and neo-realists. Back in 1795, Immanuel Kant had outlined the conditions for perpetual peace in the international system: The first step is a domestic republican constitution; the second is the shaping of defensive arrangements and a peaceful confederation of democracies; and finally, a web of norms of “hospitality” and cooperation are required to stabilise the cosmopolitan system. In contrast to realist belief, liberals assert that “the international system can, and will, be transformed by peaceful and wealth-inducing cooperation” (Cederman & Rao, 2001, p. 819). For neoliberal institutionalists, international cooperation would be a result of the increasing necessity of states to answers to the challenges resulting from complex interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 1977). Robert Keohane, the central figure in the neoliberal school, provides an important point of departure, endorsing the concept of policy coordination to define international cooperation as a mutual adjustment process (Keohane, 1984, p. 64). In his words, this entails the “process through which policies actually followed by governments come to be regarded by their partners as facilitating realisation of their own objectives” (Keohane, 1984, pp. 63–64). Like realists, neoliberals share the view that states are rational actors ­m aximising their own self-interest. Where neoliberal institutionalism analysis ­d iffers from realists is in its stress on interactions, international organisations, rules, norms, and international regimes, and in the assumption that cooperation involves d­ ifferent types of reciprocity that vary among issues and over time (­A xelrod, 1984; Axelrod & Keohane, 1985). According to Krasner (1985, p. 4), an international regime contains “the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ ­expectations converge”. For John Ruggie (1983), who introduced the concept of international regimes into the literature of international politics in 1975, the international regime of finance and aid can be categorised as a quasi-regime. His reasoning is that there has been little coherence between the parts of the aid regime and the behaviours of Western donors. In turn, targets of foreign aid have served as aspirations rather than commitments for great powers. The loose character of aid rules and organisation does not make it fully comparable to other regimes. Interest in norms and interactions has not been limited to neoliberal institutionalism, but extends to the cosmopolitan perspective and the literature on global public goods (GPGs). For Held (2006), aid is a crucial factor in the case for cosmopolitan democracy and the creation of new political institutions, assuming the global entrenchment of rights and obligations for states in the globalisation era. For Kaul, Grungberg, and Stern (1999), Alonso (2002), and Barret (2007), aid is part of a state’s commitment to provide GPGs, such as the containment of

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pandemics or, since the 1990s, the fight against climate change. Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern (1999, pp. 2–3) have defined these as “goods, whose benefits or costs are of nearly universal reach or potentially affecting anyone anywhere”. This definition opened up a classification of three types of GPG, namely the natural global commons (such as the ozone shield or the atmosphere), human-made commons (such as the world’s knowledge stock, or universal norms and standards), and policy outcomes (such as financial stability, equity, peace and security, environmental sustainability, or health). In more recent times, however, this line of argument has been expanded to explain collective policy responses to the Millennium ­Development agenda (Kaul, 2005). Other contributions have offered different interpretations on how ideas shape foreign aid policies or international institutions. The relation between aid, democracy, and peace has been the starting point for Knack (2004), Brown (2005), and Cornell (2013), who see aid as a potential contribution to democratisation when focussing on electoral processes, the strengthening of legislatures and judiciaries as checks on executive power, or the promotion of civil society organisations and education. Others, however, have viewed these issues through theories around soft power and attractive power, emphasising aid’s role as an instrument of public diplomacy (Nye, 1990; Alexander, 2018). In sum, liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism, and the cosmopolitan perspectives have provided a framework for analysis of aid regimes, ideas, and institutions. It is also worth noting that certain ambiguities in the concept of regime have been avoided. As highlighted by Keohane (1984, p. 57), norms are often confused with rules and principles, when in fact all have very different scopes. A distinction needs to be drawn; while norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations, rules are more specific, referring to the specific rights and obligations of members, which can be altered more easily. Principles, in turn, define the purposes that their supporters are expected to pursue, while procedures provide ways of implementing those principles. Another subject that generates substantial debate and controversy is what is understood by the ‘universe of aid’, which is much broader and more complex than situations falling within the scope of regime theory. Relations within states necessarily involve civil society organisations, corporations, philanthropy, and local governments, among other actors.2

Constructivism Ethical and moral justifications for foreign aid have been the key concerns of the constructivist perspectives. From their viewpoint, narratives such as social justice or altruism take place both upstream and downstream from aid practices. This means that both material and discursive aspects of power are necessary for the understanding of social practices or intersubjective meanings that constitute social structures and actors alike. In constructivist analysis, anarchy in the international system is an intersubjective social convention, and there are different

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domains of international politics that are understood by actors as more, or less, anarchic (Hopf, 1998). An important element in constructivism is that domestic conceptions have an impact on shaping international practices. The seminal work of David H. Lumsdaine (1993, p. 5) is organised around the idea that moral conceptions affect international aid in three ways: (i) through the systematic transfer to the international level of domestic political conceptions of justice and attitudes towards poverty in the development of the social welfare state; (ii) through social and moral dialogue that constitutes international society; and (iii) through normative meaning implicit in international regimes and practices, where the principle of helping those in great need is implicit in the very idea of aid. According to ­Lumsdaine (1993, p. 23), specific expression of the norm can be distinguished in that countries with strong domestic social welfare programmes are the most generous donors of foreign aid. In the 1980s, a Canadian-Scandinavian research cooperation programme study of North-South relations and development cooperation endorsed the concept of humane internationalism as a point of departure for their analyses regarding the aid policies of Denmark, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden (Pratt, 1989; Stokke, 1989; Helleiner, 1990; Pratt, 1990). Olav Stokke’s (1989) work explains aid policies with reference to welfare policies, respect for human rights, and responsiveness to the needs of the Third World. Aid is understood as an expression of “a conviction that a more equitable world would be in the best long-term interests of the Western, industrial nations” (Stokke, 1989, p. 11). As a result, dominant socio-political norms as well as certain overarching interests of Western donors shape aid policies, a point also made in Chapter 5 of this book. Other scholarly articles have referred to empirical aspects of domestic politics that influence foreign aid policy (Noël & Thérien, 1995; Tingley, 2010; Brech & Potraf ke, 2014). Noël and Thérien (1995), for example, suggest a c­ orrelation between the prevailing social democratic traditions at home and the extension abroad of domestic conceptions of social justice and income redistribution. Another topic of interest for narrative-discursive perspectives is the relation ­between norms, discourses, and practices of aid (Engberg-Pedersen, 2018). Several studies have also interpreted aid through the prism of ‘securitisation’, which has been popularised in the study of international relations by the writings of the Copenhagen School (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998). For most scholars building on this tradition, securitisation of aid can be said to occur, for instance, when ­donors discursively justify aid in terms of national or international security (Petřík, 2008; Sanahuja & Schünemann, 2012; Brown & Grävingholt, 2016; and Chapter 10). Some controversies arise over the units of analysis and research methods employed in constructivist studies on aid. According to Lundsgaarde (2012, p. 5), the first point at issue here is that they often select the same cases, without taking into consideration “the substantial variation in the degree to which states have accepted or internalised benevolent development assistance norms”. In fact,

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the choice of Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Canada, or other donors from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as units of analysis assumes a level of coherence across policy areas that may not always exist outside the Western world. Another concern is that the choice in approach to the question of a moral dimension of foreign aid leads to controversy over epistemology and the use of scientific methods. Constructivist studies frame their enquiries as a search for a specific type of practice, taking discursive claims as an important clue; however, for positivist constructivists, altruism or moral values are hard to define, identify, and measure (Farias, 2018).

International political economy IPE emerged as a significant and heterogeneous field of study in the early 1970s. For Susan Strange (1994, p. 219), for example, the starting point of IPE is to ask: Cui bono? Who does it benefit? Who gains, and who loses? In her viewpoint, power is structural and relational; the structure of the international finance system is a result of an unequal path of distribution of power, and, at the same time, it contributes to its maintenance. According to Robert Gilpin (1975, p. 43), IPE comprises the systematic exploration of the interaction between states and markets to determine the distribution of power and wealth in international relations. Since economic forces shape the political interests of states, aid is likewise determined by those forces, as by lobbying groups and companies and the bargaining process within the state structure (Gilpin & Gilpin, 2001). In Gilpin’s (1987, p. 311) terms, the nature and patterns of aid have been influenced by “the donor’s desire to establish spheres of political influence, to bolster military security or to obtain economic advantage”. From this perspective, aid can be a “mechanism of stabilisation and dissemination of constitutive values for the maintenance of the world hegemonic order”, as Björn Hettne (1995, p. 154) makes clear. Efforts to broaden aid as a field of study within IPE have included works by other scholars. Under the influence of the sociological tradition of the Spanish school of IR, Sanahuja (1996) follows IPE’s socio-historical approach in his study of US aid in Central America. In his view, there is a dialectical relation between transformations in the international system and changes in aid policies; the aid system is hegemonic and hierarchical. As result, aid inflows barely offset outflows of indebtedness, capital flight, and repatriation of transnational company profits (Sanahuja, 2001, p. 7). Certain other theorists explain foreign aid as one component of a wider range of flows, including military assistance, arms sales, trade, multinational corporations’ transactions, foreign direct investment, capital flight, or tax evasion. They seek to understand this larger view of the whole in which aid is just one ­component, explaining the phenomenon from the perspective of recipient or Southern countries (Woods, 2005; Tandon, 2008). For David Sogge (2002), the

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focus should be on the role of counter-flows, upward redistribution, rent-­seeking, and hidden subsidisation of the donors. From his standpoint, aid operates “in the foreground, advertised as public largesse for the needy, while in the background substantial counter-flows work discretely in behalf of the wealthy” (Sogge, 2015, p. 3). This author argues that aid should be understood as a contradiction, or “a problem posing as a solution”. Certain other IPE analyses on the political economy of aid assume that development aid is a specific expression of economic diplomacy (de Haan, 2011). According to Okano-Heijmans (2011, pp. 29–30), economic diplomacy is “the use of political means as leverage in international negotiations, with the aim of enhancing national prosperity, and the use of economic leverage to increase the political stability of the nation”. This involves a mix of foreign policy objectives: financial, economic, and commercial tools, and (conversely) economic and commercial objectives and political tools in a given environment (Okano-Heijmans, 2011, p. 27). The conceptual framework of economic diplomacy facilitates distinction between ‘business’ and ‘power-play ends’. It also assumes that the state is neither the only player nor a coherent unity conducting economic diplomacy (Bayne & Woolcock, 2003). One thing IPE contributions have in common is their determination to unmask and interrogate power relations both within and beyond the aid realm. They take into account the questions of ‘what’ (instruments), ‘where’ (theatres), and ‘how’ (processes) in order to inform the question of ‘why’ (motivations) economic diplomacy exists as a strategy by which actors pursue different interests comprising economic and political motivations. IPE perspectives have provided interesting research on the structures of trade and finance, while issues relating to aid have received less attention. There is also room for debate over IPE’s tendency towards determinism and teleological conceptions, wherein economic diplomacy is considered as merely deriving from power and wealth motivations. One important limitation is that aid relationships are here viewed within the framework of an international system, rather than through a ‘local’ lens.

Structuralism and critical theories Structuralism and critical theories of aid comprise a very heterogeneous group of approaches on international relations, namely structuralism, dependency, neo-Marxism, imperialism, and underdevelopment theories; neo-Gramscian approaches; and post-structuralism and decolonialism. They look at the problem of the world order as a whole, giving proper attention to economic interests and social forces and seeing how they relate to the development of political and economic structures. Despite disagreement among theorists, they share the view that the normative and explanatory fields cannot be analytically separated from one another. Thus, structural approaches are a reflection upon what ‘world order’ may mean in any given or possible context, as well as an account of the potential for changing them (Shapcott, 2008, p. 328).

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Structuralism was influenced by intellectual and political developments of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s; and the structural turn in international relations was influenced by the legacy of decolonisation processes and tensions created by the political and economic subordination of the South to the North. Raúl Prebisch’s groundbreaking ideas on import substitution and creation of tariff barriers for products of advanced countries have served as guides, even though his position is considerably less radical than that of later structuralists. Subsequently, theories – dependency, core/periphery, and world-systems analyses – have a common point of departure: the idea that “North and South are in a structural relationship one to another; that is, both areas are part of a structure which determines the pattern of relationships that emerges” (Brown & Ainley, 2009, p. 151). From this conception, aid is seen as another capitalist tool used by the elite/core to exploit the marginalised/periphery (Weissman, 1975). Neo-Marxism, and theories of underdevelopment and imperialism, have also explained aid as an extension of highly exploitative North-South relationships that either “preserve or widen economic disparities between the capitalist centres and the Third World” (Schraeder et al., 1998, p. 296). Like realists and neo-­ realists, the neo-Marxist school sees aid as an instrument or vehicle of interests, or imperialism. Where structural analyses differ from realists is in their stress on the economic interest of capitalist centres. This phenomenon was termed ‘the development of underdevelopment’ by Andre Gunder Frank (1966). His work is focussed on the economic conditions of North-South relations, where foreign aid is only a small part of the process. By contrast, Theresa Hayter (1971) highlighted the idea of neo-imperialism in the sense that aid, on balance, did more harm than good to the poor of the Third World.3 The ‘neo‑Gramscian’ perspective, initiated by Robert Cox (1981), understands aid as one mechanism for maintaining hegemony in a particular historical structure. The notion of hegemony explains the origin, growth, and demise of world orders as particular configurations of material capabilities, ideologies, and institutions. World hegemony, in Cox’s terms, is expressed in the “universal norms, institutions and mechanisms, which lay down general rules for the behaviour of states and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries” (Cox, 1981, p. 172). Ideologies, in turn, are supported by historic blocs, or class alliances, led by internationally oriented class fractions (Cox, 1979). Cox identifies two broader ideologies of aid: the so-called establishment and market efficiency perspective, supported by experts in organisations such as the Trilateral Commission and parts of the directorates of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF); and what Cox terms the third-world forum focussed on equity and redistribution for promoting development (Holdar, 1993, p. 456). Last but not least, post-colonial and decolonial theories critique the very debate around what development is, and how this teleological narrative is built to maintain least-developed and developing countries as poor imitations of the core countries. According to Esteva and Babones (2013, p. 1), “development is at the center of a powerful but fragile semantic constellation. It shaped the dominant

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mentality of the second half of the 20th century, which can thus be legitimately called the era of development”. Post-colonial works also seek to portray the South not as the periphery that never reached development, but rather (under the conditions of possibility) as essential to the current success and condition of the North. Most commentators agree on one matter: Structuralism and critical theories have been useful mainly for tracing the origins of South-South discourse and for understanding ideas on world orders that feed international development cooperation in particular.4 They have provided interesting research on the issues of development, whereas issues relating to the politics of aid have received less attention from this direction. There is also room for debate over this school’s tendency to undervalue the state, considering it to be monolithic and derivative of its position within the system (strong states at the core and weak states around the periphery) (Cox, 1981, p. 127). Some scholars have further suggested that structuralism and critical theories should demonstrate lower levels of abstraction in order to take into account disparities and variations within the global South (Farias, 2018).

Foreign policy analysis Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, the behaviourist reaction to classic paradigm methods in IR led to the development of middle-range theories, or what was called later ‘Foreign Policy Analysis’ (FPA), a systematic overview of foreign policy-making subsystems through cross-national comparisons. Such enquiries have sharpened the focus on bureaucratic politics by providing insights into the linkages between problems faced within any issue-area and the nature of the ­decision-making employed to handle them. As Allison and Zelikow (1971) ­argued, among this field’s most important assumptions are that governmental decisions result from compromise, conflict, and the confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence; also that actors and domestic constituencies vary more widely from issue-area to issue-area; and that various factors impose limits on decision-making, including uncertainty, time constraints, and competing objectives and motives (Allison & Zelikow, 1971, pp. 162–163). Much of the literature relating to aid policy-making has led to the conclusion that foreign aid is not the same tool at all times (Morley & Morley, 1961; ­Montgomery, 1967; Hughes, 1978). Viviani (1979) observed that politics are present in the balance between security, economic, and commercial motives, in terms of which recipients should get the most aid, the weight to be given to recipient countries’ needs, and the extent to which domestic constituencies can influence the aid budget. Ruttan (1996) has illustrated that the complexity and ambiguity of US foreign aid are born of twin traditions of American thought, realism, and idealism. This dialectic has led to the launching of aid programmes with multiple and often contradictory purposes, also suggesting that competing ideas and norms on aid, political institutions, interests, and the organisation of governments in managing their aid shape different and sometimes contradictory aid preferences. Van der Veen (2011, p. 2), for instance, argues that aid purposes

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are multiple, competing, and changing; “aid can serve goals from security (e.g., fighting terrorism), to financial gain (promoting exports), to humanitarianism”. What are the domestic sources of support for foreign aid? Specifically, how do donors’ domestic political and economic coalitions shape aid policies? Another argument made by middle-range theories is that the distribution of authority in the aid arena is fragmented, with numerous departments and executive agencies having responsibilities for managing portions of the aid budget. Lancaster (2007, p. 61) reminds us that a constituency for aid took shape “inside and outside governments, reinforced by a variety of international organisations that discussed, debated, and pressed the donors’ governments to expand the quantity and quality of their aid”. Lundsgaarde (2012, p. 56), for example, has proposed a model that attributes policy outcomes to the interaction of factors (preferences and resources of societal actors), institutional setting (interest intermediation and dispersion of governmental authority), and preferences of governmental actors. Alongside civil society organisations, many other groups take an active interest in advocacy, including business groups, aid contractors, farmers, and ethnic interest groups (see more on this in Chapters 3, 4, and 8). Unlike international system-based approaches, which tend to reduce donors’ policies to a monolithic state with a single interest, FPA gives us keys to unlocking the black box of aid by examining how the nature of the different motivations of these distinct actors and their interests actually shape unique types of aid policies. On the one hand, understanding the domestic interaction of bureaucracies and politicians, citizens, businesses, or interest groups is necessary to gain a more complete knowledge of the politics of aid. On the other hand, however, this approach is very much focussed on domestic influences rather than the interaction between domestic and international realms. This makes it difficult to reconstruct the causal process whereby inputs from a specific international context emerge. Another criticism of research on the influence of domestic politics on aid outcomes is that it often presents a static view of the political process, being almost entirely based on deviant cases, such as the US, Denmark, or Switzerland, something that this book intends to avoid in Part B. However, some recent studies based on emerging powers and South-South development cooperation have appeared in the academic literature (Hirst, 2010; Mawdsley, 2012; Pinheiro & Milani, 2015; Malacalza, 2015; Varrall, 2016; Farias, 2018).

Conclusions: towards a research agenda in IR on the politics of aid This chapter has reviewed numerous works central to the research agenda on how IR can explain the politics of aid, examining core assumptions and lines of enquiry that recur in this area. Table 1.1 summarises the main findings of the literature review, which reflects different perspectives, each containing a particular mix of research questions and goals, levels and unit of analysis, and foreign aid definitions and purposes.

Theoretical roots

Research topics

•  Liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism, and the cosmopolitan perspective

Power, influence, International regimes, international UN voting, institutions, global political and governance, GPGs, economic Millennium interests, Development Goals, geopolitics, democratic peace, international soft power, public security, US diplomacy, role of containment ideas strategy and the Cold War, bribes Realism, Neoliberal Neo-realism institutionalism Complex interdependence theory Regime theory Institutionalism Liberal internationalism Global Public Goods theory The cosmopolitan school

• Realism and neo-realism

TABLE 1.1  I R theoretical perspectives on foreign aid

• International political economy

Power and market, Moral dimension economic of foreign aid, statecraft, social justice, counter-flows, humane international internationalism, finance, welfare states, international securitisation trade, economic of aid, social diplomacy, democracy financial diplomacy, aid diplomacy International Constructivism Political Humane Economy Internationalism Theory of school hegemonic Copenhagen school stability

•  Constructivism

• Foreign Policy Analysis

Neo-Marxism and theories of underdevelopment and imperialism, Neo-Gramscian Structuralism/ Dependency theory Post-structuralism, post-colonialism, decolonialism

Behaviourism Middle-range theories Foreign policy analysis Bureaucratic politics model Public policy analysis Theories on decision-making

Bureaucratic World orders, politics, domestic dependency constituencies, theory, hegemonic Policy-making, regimes, power and governmental social structures processes, parliaments, political parties and civil society, aid budgets

• Structuralism and critical theories

Research questions

IR core concepts

Instruments of foreign policy Interests defined in terms of power Mutual security Geopolitics and geo-economics Cold War Power and influence States as rational actors Empirical questions Why is aid given? What purposes did governments pursue with their aid? And why did they choose those purposes and not others? (Morgenthau, 1962)

Issue-area Foreign policy making Bureaucratic politics model Domestic constituencies of aid Negotiations Coalitions

(Continued)

Empirical questions Empirical questions Empirical questions Empirical questions Why do aid policies Cui bono? To whom What are the To what extent differ across mechanisms for is it a benefit? can aid policies national settings maintaining Who gains be explained and why do they hegemony in a and who loses? with reference change over time? particular historical (Strange, 1994) to dominant What are the structure? (Cox, socio-political domestic sources 1981) norms, welfare of support for state ideologies foreign aid? How and international and when does the practices? donor’s domestic (Lumsdaine, political and 1993) economic forces influence its ‘aid effort’? (Lancaster, 2007)

Aid dependence Hegemony World order Social forces, Social Movements Imperialism Neo-colonialism Power and social structures

Empirical questions Why do actors interact and create international institutions/ regimes in order to tackle common challenges within a specific issue-area? (Keohane, 1984)

Economic diplomacy Aid diplomacy Economic and political interests Counter-flows Economic statecraft Foreign economic policy

‘Like-minded’ donors Welfare states Social democratic parties Humane internationalism Identity International practices Norms Securitisation

International regimes Norms and rules Global Public Goods States as rational actors Policy coordination. Global governance Ideas, beliefs, and democratic peace

Research goals

To explain how political interests are reflected in patterns of aid allocation among developing countries

Normative questions Normative questions Normative questions Are there good and What are the How should the political bad aid policies? international aid consequences regime be changed What are the that a foreign aid policy coherence to create better policy should challenges in conditions for serve? donor countries? implementation of our global development commitments? To explain the To investigate To investigate the different domestic evolution of the motivations influence, norms and rules of of economic international a regime over time diplomacy norms, and (long-term patterns in its wealth the inherent of behaviour), and power meanings using the concept dimensions. of various of international international regime both to practices, taking explore continuity discursive and to investigate claims as an change in the world important clue political economy (Lumsdaine, (Keohane, 1984, 1993). p. 64)

•  International political economy

Normative questions What are the political purposes that a foreign aid policy should serve?

•  Constructivism

• Liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism, and the cosmopolitan perspective

• Realism and neo-realism

•  Foreign Policy Analysis

Normative questions What can be done to encourage the change of the aid regime?

Normative questions What are the most desirable bureaucratic designs in each context? How can crossgovernmental coordination be improved? To understand To unmask and variations in aid interrogate power commitments relations within across countries and beyond the and over time; aid realm, looking examining how at the problem of societal actors, the world order in governmental the whole, giving actors, and the proper attention institutions that to social forces and regulate their processes and seeing interactions how they relate to influence the development development aid of states and world policy orders

•  Structuralism and critical theories

Level of analysis

System level States as rational actors

To probe what To identify the is known and extent to unknown about which different aid’s deployment outcomes of ‘upstream’ foreign aid can be explained with reference to the basic values and ideologies predominant in these countries as varieties of humane internationalism (Stokke, 1989) System and state levels System level System and Intermediate State and system World hegemonic Economic levels level orders and core/ diplomacy as Domestic Regimes as periphery (Northa process with forces (social intervening South) relations different tools democracy, variables, between welfare state, states and system political parties, legislative power and elites’ values) and international practices (Continued)

State level Bureaucratic politics processes (governmental agencies, aid organisations and domestic constituencies)

Great powers’ foreign policy Cases: American foreign policy, Soviet foreign policy

“The transfer of money, goods and services from one nation to another” (Morgenthau, 1962, p. 301)

Unit of analysis / Cases

Foreign aid definition

• Realism and neo-realism

•  Constructivism

•  International political economy

•  Structuralism and critical theories

•  Foreign Policy Analysis

Domestic agents All financial flows Inter-state interactions Elite discourses and All economic (aid, trade, foreign Cases: Western donors diplomacy flows practices Cases: International (also emerging direct investment, (trade, finance, Cases: Scandinavian regime of aid and donors) capital flight, tax investments and countries, finance, OECDevasion) aid) Canada, the DAC regime, Cases: US hegemony Cases: US Netherlands, European Union in world order, economic European Union global South, social diplomacy, movements. China, India, Russia, others “The gift of public “Mechanism of “Economic “Concessional “Cooperation takes resources from stabilisation and diplomacy is a economic place when the one government dissemination foreign policy assistance, policies actually to another (or to of constitutive practice and direct and followed by one an international values for the strategy that is indirect, from government organisation or maintenance of the based on the the developed are regarded nongovernmental world hegemonic premise that democracies to by its partners organisation), order” (Hettne, economic/ the Third World as facilitating sizable and sustained 1996, p. 54). It commercial (less developed realisation of their over time, an also serves as a interests and countries)” own objectives, important purpose contra-hegemonic political interests (Lumsdaine, as the result of a of which is to instrument of reinforce one 1993, p. 38). process of policy help improve the non-governmental another and coordination” human condition in organisations and should thus be (Keohane, 1998, countries receiving social movements seen in tandem” pp. 51–52) the aid” (Lancaster, (Okano-Heijmans, 2007, p. 1) 2011, p. 34)

• Liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism, and the cosmopolitan perspective

Aid is subordinated to foreign policy

Source: Author’s elaboration.

Foreign aid’s Political and purposes security interests of donor countries Aid policies are instruments driven primarily by the strategic interests of nation-states (Morgenthau, 1962)

Foreign policy / Foreign aid nexus

Aid is subordinated to foreign policy

Aid is subordinate to the foreign policy of the hegemon. It is also seen as a contra-hegemonic instrument of social forces Political and economic Political and economic Moral and Mutual interests interests of the interests, power, humanitarian Development hegemon and wealth values cooperation Aid is seen as a tool Aid is seen as a form Aid is a result of is a result of of imperialism, of economic welfare state the increasing with the donor diplomacy. The ideologies that necessity of policy states’ aid policies main purposes of legitimise the coordination among being determined aid are power and sharing of wealth states to answer by the economic wealth (Okanowithin the to the challenges interests of their Heijmans, 2011) donor societies, originated national capitalist and that also by complex classes (Hayter, influence their interdependence 1971) foreign policy, (Keohane, 1984) using aid to alleviate world poverty and to share the wealth between rich and poor countries (Lumsdaine, 1993)

Aid as an international Aid as an regime that serves autonomous global governability practice with its own purposes and dynamics

Aid as an outcome of a political governmental process within an issue-area of foreign policy with its own dynamics Multiple purposes Foreign aid is used for four main purposes: diplomatic, developmental, humanitarian relief, and commercial. The purposes of aid are frequently as much the result of what happens inside of a donor government’s borders as what happens outside them (Lancaster, 2007)

28  Bernabé Malacalza

A key finding is that the IR literature on determining the nature of the politics of aid has (at the very least) three main strands. First, foreign aid might be seen as ‘the carrot’, a technique of statecraft, meaning it should be considered as subordinate to foreign policy. Many analysts focus on aid as an instrument to explain observed patterns of foreign policy. This approach is fundamental to realism and neo-realism, but it is also a key issue in many studies from IPE and structuralism, and from critical perspectives. Second, aid might also be seen as an autonomous status divorced from the geopolitical rationale. Foreign aid, in this view, is an end in itself, carrying its own justification, both transcending and independent of foreign policy. Many scholars making this assumption have observed that aid typically involves an international regime with its own principles, norms, and rules, along with a moral obligation to help the poor citizens of poor countries. Central to this conception are constructivist approaches on aid, and it is a key element in many neoliberal approaches on aid regime. Finally, aid might be an outcome of a political governmental process involving actors at multiple levels: the individual decision makers, the bureaucracy, and the interest groups. Many middle-range theorists working on decision-making are identified with this idea – that is, foreign aid is neither subordinate nor independent; rather, it is a constituent part (an issue-area) of the changing domestic politics of foreign policy. This chapter has further provided an overview of the level of analysis problem. When the level of discussion is that of the international system, states are treated as rational, unitary, and monolithic actors in pursue of a self-evident, immutable, and synoptic national interest. This is fundamental to realism and neo-realism, to neoliberal institutionalism, and to structuralism and critical theories. In contrast, IPE and FPA have shown a determination to penetrate the politics of aid, where multiple controversies over aid purposes have arisen. Understanding the interaction of the bureaucracy and politicians, citizens, businesses, and non-governmental organisations is necessary to gain a more complete knowledge of the politics of aid; however, the literature review highlights few published articles on the interaction between international systems and domestic forces. Research in these areas would help in the consideration of all sorts of pressing concerns in order to explain changes in aid policies. The literature review has drawn distinctions between different perspectives, but once we move beyond this theoretical plurality, affinities also exist. Perspectives are not incompatible; rather, they can contribute, each at their own level of analysis, to understanding historical contexts different from their own core concepts. The task then for development cooperation studies is to highlight how international structures have different significance depending on the way in which specific agents, or domestic constituencies, relate to them. This focus on the interaction between agency and structure is necessary to bypass theoretical and traditional disputes and instead try to interpret each concrete situation, in

Politics of aid  29

the spirit of analytical eclecticism and interdisciplinary research. According to Katzenstein and Sil (2008, p. 118), the value–added of eclectic scholarship thus lies not in neglecting existing research traditions but in self–consciously engaging them in pursuit of empirical and conceptual connections that recognise the complexity of international life in ways that no single research tradition can. Finally, the chapter has attempted to show that little research in IR has been dedicated to explaining the political-institutional factors behind the organisation of development cooperation in Southern countries. To take this research agenda further, we must improve our empirical and theoretical understandings of what we are witnessing in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Also important is to move beyond the state by examining how non-state actors (from businesses to civil society and social movements) shape development cooperation policies. It is worth noting that there is a need to better comprehend the political dynamics in recipients or partners, rather than viewing countries as objects of aid and examining their politics through the donor’s lens.

Acknowledgements This manuscript benefited immensely from the insightful comments of my colleagues Iliana Olivié, Aitor Pérez, Monica Hirst, Gabriela Villacis, and Camila Amorim Jardim. I am especially grateful to José Antonio Sanahuja and Gino Pauselli for offering attentive feedback during the early stages of this project. I have endeavoured to incorporate many of their suggestions into this chapter, but it goes without saying that any mistakes are my own. This work was supported by the Consejo N ­ acional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), ­Argentina, and the Universidad Nacional de Quilmes [grant number PUNQ 1403].

Notes 1 Chapters 3 and 6 on the US and Japan refer to the link between international aid and security. 2 On the link between aid and democracy promotion, and the liberal perspective. 3 On the relevance of norms, discourse, and agendas for aid practice, see Part 3 of this book. 4 See, for instance, the Brazilian approach to South-South cooperation in Chapter 9.

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2 FOREIGN AID’S MOTIVATIONS: THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE1 Gino N. Pauselli

Introduction International Relations (IR) as a field aims to explain interactions between states and the causes and effects of variables located at the international level. Over the past 50 years, three schools of thought have stood out as the main paradigms in this field. Although contemporary research has moved beyond the paradigm debate, many studies can still be classified as part of a framework derived from these schools. Paradigms provide the content and direction, and the underlying purpose and logic, for many contemporary studies on foreign aid. IR as a discipline offers a wide variety of theories with a high level of sophistication and a large amplitude of issues (Snidal & Wendt, 2009, p. 4). However, the study of foreign aid represents less than 5% of the total academic production within the discipline (Sharman & Weaver, 2013). As seen in Chapter 1, many of these studies find their arguments’ roots in either Realism, Marxism, Liberalism, or Constructivism – the four main IR schools of thought (Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al., 2017). These theoretical paradigms are used here to assess various bodies’ empirical literature on aid. The end of the Second World War is widely used as a breakpoint in the international political economy literature, as well as in the study of foreign aid. The  imposition of a new international order led by the US, the political and ideological rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union, and a concurrent decolonisation process provided bases for a proliferation of studies on the political economy of international relations. Cox, Keohane, Nye, and Strange became the leading scholars in this novel subfield (Cohen, 2007). In parallel, scholars started to study the new phenomena of foreign aid. Morgenthau (1962) inaugurated the Realist vein in which foreign aid is seen as a foreign policy tool oriented towards increasing the donor’s influence or power. But for several decades, the study of

Foreign aid’s motivations  35

foreign aid remained largely absent from mainstream IR literature, focussed instead on the strategic rivalry of the Cold War. The eventual end of the Cold War saw an increased number of publications devoted to study of the causes of foreign aid. Among such explanatory studies, according to Tezanos Vázquez, a portion of the literature tested econometric models of aid allocation, although few contributions led to theoretical models of geographic aid allocation (2008). Furthermore, most of these studies relied on formal models brought from economics and did not identify the causal mechanisms that could explain the relationship between an independent variable and a dependent variable – a fundamental aspect of theory development and testing. While such models certainly contribute to the academic debate on understanding foreign aid, their contribution remains isolated from the discipline of IR, and they provide no contribution to theoretical development. Mearsheimer and Walt (2013) have noted the declining attention that IR scholars have been paying to theory. In the social sciences, theory is important for many reasons: It is capable of giving order and meaning to wide-ranging phenomena, without which disconnection would prevail; it serves to make explicit the assumptions implicit in research design, and to make clear the dimensions and implications of a given study; it is an instrument for understanding not only uniformities and regularities, but also contingencies and irrationalities (Thompson, 1955); it allows identification of the causal mechanisms that explain a recurring behaviour; and it is essential for generating systematic hypotheses as well as their proper testing (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2013). The proliferation of ‘simplistic hypothesis testing’, which emphasises the discovery of well-verified empirical regularities, is corroborated by a recent survey of more than 12,000 IR scholars around the globe. The aim of this chapter is to review the scholarly literature that has sought to answer the following questions: (i) Why do countries spend economic (material and non-material) resources on the well-being of non-citizens outside their borders? (ii) How can we account for the main trends, regularities, and changes of development cooperation practices? (iii) What are the main explanations of this phenomenon in the IR literature, along with their methodological implications? Thus, the chapter discusses scholarly contributions to the explanation of foreign aid, organising the literature into four main sets of arguments: (a) selfish and/or humanitarian explanations, (b) multiple sources of foreign aid, (c) the political economy of foreign aid, and (d) the micro-foundations of foreign aid. The review concludes with some final remarks to highlight the value of incorporating IR theories into explanations of foreign aid. The main theoretical paradigms in IR can be summarised through four schools of thought, usually recognised as the most influential in the field: ­Realism, ­Marxism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. Scholarly studies influenced by Realism see international reality through the lens of a state’s primary, m ­ aterial interests – usually linked to maximisation of its survival, security, or power (Morgenthau, 1948). Classical Realism and Neorealism share the idea that the international relations are a competitive arena for power, security, and survival, but they disagree

36  Gino N. Pauselli

over why this should be the case. Classical Realism argues that states’ pursuit of security or power is a consequence of human nature, characterised as selfish and egoistic. Meanwhile, Neorealism states that the anarchical structure of the international system is the factor that generates competition among its units (states), no matter the nature of humans or the institutional design of each state (Waltz, 1979). Since both versions of Realism see IR as based on the constant pursuit of power or security through the utilisation of foreign policy tools, Realist studies understand foreign aid as another instrument by which states seek to increase their relative power in the international system or to maximise their security.

Selfish and humanitarian motivations Before the end of the Cold War, diverse scholarly studies argued that foreign aid was the consequence of political competition between the capitalist and communist worlds. In Realist terms, this was not because ideological competition demanded that states use their economic resources to buy other states’ favours, but rather because the nature of IR makes states behave in this way. The works of Baldwin (1966) and Morgenthau (1962) on foreign aid are the exemplary manifestations of this tradition. The main problem faced by the Realist school in explaining foreign aid in the post-war period was the impossibility of demonstrating convincingly that a tool whose purpose was to help less-­developed ­nations was, in reality, used to advance donors’ interests. While anecdotal evidence did indeed exist, no systemic analysis showed a causal relationship between donors’ interests and the foreign aid provided. The same problem was faced by the Marxist school, which predicted that foreign aid would be used as a tool to expand capitalism world-wide and maintain dominance by the US and other Western industrial capitalist countries over the Third World. Difficulties in effectively concluding in favour of such Realist or Marxist explanations can be traced to the diversity of reasons why states provide foreign aid. In other words, if the US gave millions of dollars to Egypt in order to pacify the Middle East, was this stronger evidence for an interest-based explanation of foreign aid than the millions provided by Nordic countries, considering their smaller economies? And what may be said of small (but already incipient) instances of South-South technical cooperation? How might the Marxist school solve this puzzle? By the late 1980s and early 1990s, a series of studies argued that behind foreign aid was the acceptance by citizens of industrialised states of certain ethical obligations to other states, and that these obligations would, in turn, be fulfilled by their governments. These cosmopolitan values were labelled ‘humane internationalism’ (Pratt, 1989), which further included a conviction that a more equitable world would be in the donors’ real long-term interests, as well as an assumption that meeting such international responsibilities was compatible with the maintenance of socially responsible national economic and social-welfare policies. In other words, there is no contradiction between national interests and more cosmopolitan values. This humane internationalist view of foreign aid is an

Foreign aid’s motivations  37

example of a constructivist explanation of foreign aid in terms of IR. Constructivism argues that beliefs, values, and identities are the main drivers of countries’ behaviour in the international arena. In this case, belief resides in the existence of a moral obligation that requires wealthy countries (and donors who self-identify as wealthy) to provide resources to poorer countries. In his study, Cranford Pratt analysed the foreign aid policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden and argued that social values which supported the domestic welfare systems in those countries were the primary expression of a lively social concern with moral principles. Thus, the norm followed by those countries had domestic roots based on their historical, social, cultural, and political contexts (Pratt, 1989). One example of the humane internationalism school of explanations for f­oreign aid is the classic book by Stokke (1989), who identified four determinants of foreign aid provision by humane internationalist countries – Canada, D ­ enmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. These determinants were the dominant socio-political values identified with the welfare state, the opportunities provided by the state for domestic economic interest groups to i­nfluence ­policy decisions, the influence of NGOs, and the level of foreign policy ­commitment to international and global solutions to poverty. In a later work, Stokke (2005) stated that the behaviour of large and smaller donors can be theoretically categorised (as ­Realism for the former and humane internationalism for the latter). In this respect, the smaller donors, whose Official Development Assistance (ODA) transfers tend to correlate positively with levels of distress in recipient states, are more likely to adhere to the normative values and declared aspirations of the aid regime. However, these arguments do not exclude the possibility that ­humane internationalism in foreign aid might coexist with more selfish and e­ goistic behaviour by the same donor states in other policy areas. Accordingly, Pratt stated that even in the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, the influence of humane internationalism had little impact on these states’ North-South trade and investment policies, also failing to moderate the policies of the North through the Like-Minded Group (Pratt, 1990). After the end of the Cold War, David Lumsdaine (1993) published the most influential constructivist study on foreign aid. His book engaged in a strong critique of Realist explanations of foreign aid by arguing that selfishness and survival pressures are not absolute and, thus, that foreign aid cannot be accounted for on the basis of the economic and political interests of the donor countries alone. Instead, foreign aid is a consequence of three ideational factors. The first factor is composed by the beliefs, values, and practices of moral discourse and domestic political life, and these ideas tend to be transferred to the state’s understanding and conduct of foreign affairs. As a researcher, Lumsdaine argues that one can capture these ideas by looking at whether a state has a strong social-welfare programme, and by examining opinion polls in the assumption that they can reflect the general beliefs and values of societies, and that social-welfare programmes are also a consequence of these ideas.

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The second factor influencing foreign aid is the influence of international society on state behaviour. According to Lumsdaine (1993), a country tends to be influenced both in its international dealings and in its domestic political institutions by its experience and role in international society. This variable highlights the influence of social interaction between actors and how emulation can be an important force in shaping a state’s actions. Finally, Lumsdaine argues that foreign aid is also explained by changes in international norms and practices – for example, in the emergence of an international norm to help those in great need. The evidence provided to support his evidence is based on a correlation between the level of development of recipient countries and the amount of aid given, the lack of correlation between the amount of aid provided and the political importance to donors, and the correlation between the size of a donor’s aid budget and the size of its domestic social-welfare programmes. However, skeptics may still argue that a correlation between foreign aid decisions and broadly defined variables does not necessarily show a causal relationship. Scholars convinced by Lumsdaine’s argument may counter the purpose of this study is not to prove a causal relationship, but rather to demonstrate that a logic of appropriateness is in play (Fearon & Wendt, 2002); or else that this is a constitutive theory that accounts for the properties of things through reference to the structures by virtue of which they exist (Wendt, 1998). Quantitative methods have also been used to provide empirical support to these claims. In a now-classic article, Alesina and Dollar (2000) argued that the direction of foreign aid is dictated by political and strategic considerations. Empirically, they found that a colonial past and political alliances are the major determinants of foreign aid, in line with realist expectations of countries’ behaviours in the international system. In the last half-decade, multiple studies inspired by the self-interest-­versushumanitarianism debate have been published. The evidence provided by these works has been disproportionally in favour of Realist explanations of foreign aid: It is a foreign policy tool at the service of the donor’s interests. Studies on new donors such as Brazil, China, India, and South Africa have concluded that these construe foreign aid as a strategic policy instrument to advance their interests (Carbonnier & Summer, 2012). Lawrimore and Vreeland (2018) test whether Australia rewards members of its voting bloc in the Bretton Woods institutions with more foreign aid. After analysing data from 50 years of Australian foreign aid, they conclude that the country pursues a selfish foreign aid policy, giving as much as ten times more annual aid to bloc members than to other developing countries. Peterson and Scott (2018) analyse the calculations behind the US allocation of democracy assistance over the 1981–2009 period. They argue that both the opportunity for successful democratisation and goals related to containing and countering political opponents are central to foreign aid decisions on democracy promotion. Recently, arguments about the sources of foreign aid have tried to go beyond the Realist-constructivist debate between selfish or altruistic motivations.

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The  following section reviews a method of understanding foreign aid that emerged at the end of the Cold War, when both Realist and Marxist explanations lost ground, given that foreign aid increased when that East-West rivalry ended.

The ‘multiple sources of foreign aid’ model By the end of the 1990s, a third line of thought on the sources of foreign aid had emerged. Its purpose was to break ranks with the dichotomous debate between explanations citing self-interest or humanitarianism. According to this logic, previous models were poorly equipped to explain foreign aid because the factors that shape aid policy vary, both over time and among donors. In their influential article, Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor argued that “the origins of the foreign aid policies of the northern industrialized democracies are complex and varied” (1998, p. 319). Despite clear similarities in terms of political regime and development, in the four countries analysed – the US, France, Japan, and Sweden – ­foreign aid policies were found to have been influenced by different combinations of foreign policy interests, and no two cases among those analysed were alike. One of the most influential scholarly works on the subject has been Carol Lancaster’s book Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics, where she identifies four categories of domestic political forces shaping foreign aid: ideas, political institutions, interests, and the aid organisation. Lancaster argues that the structure of government (especially the role of legislatures in their power to demand accountability from the executive, in the access they give to interest groups, and in their ability to legislate aid policies) and even electoral rules can affect aid-giving by influencing how and when aid issues appear on the national political agenda, and how they are handled (Lancaster, 2007). Furthermore, according to Lancaster, interests are the most dynamic factor in aid-giving; she argues that foreign aid exists due to a norm that says that the governments of rich countries should help better the human condition in poor ones. But this norm does not predict the volume of aid provided by donor governments, its allocation to particular countries, or even its uses from one year to the next. In several instances, the study reveals the mediating role of domestic politics as it shapes the purposes of aid. But it also presents cases where international events and external pressures affected both ideas and interests within aid-giving countries and so, over the long run, influenced the purposes of aid. This book gives a perfect example of how foreign aid can be said to have multiple sources: both domestic and international, combining material, ideational, and institutional factors. Since Lancaster, other works have been published following the idea that explanation of foreign aid cannot be reduced to a single most relevant factor. In this regard, Van der Veen’s (2011) groundbreaking book Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid classified foreign aid goals into seven general categories, where each frame can be used by policy-makers to explain and defend aid policy. In other words, there is no single factor that can explain foreign aid decisions in donor countries; each decision might be motivated by a different goal and, therefore, requires a

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different explanation. Six of the seven frames proposed by Van der Veen can be broadly be classified into the distinction between self-interest and humanitarianism. Security, power/influence, wealth/economic self-interest, and enlightened self-interest compose the first group, while obligation/duty and humanitarianism compose the second. The seventh frame, reputation/self-affirmation, can be seen as both a self-interested goal (increasing the donor’s international soft power, establishing an identity that is well received by the international community) and a humanitarian goal (reinforcing an established identity associated with a humanitarian duty towards less-developed countries). By analysing the content of legislative debates over foreign aid, Van der Veen shows that the salience of each frame is correlated with a certain explanatory variable that, in turn, shapes policy choice. In looking at the records of policy debates among legislators, he contributes to the understanding of how to approach the measurement of the internal frames of individual-policy makers. Moreover, the dominant frames in national discourses are often shared across the political spectrum within a given country, and changes over time in the relative importance of each frame will depend on the specific foreign aid experiences of donor states. In his attempt to classify foreign aid frames, Van der Veen shows that ideas matter for policy, even when human beings behave rationally to achieve their ends (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). In this regard, Van der Veen’s work can be classified as constructivist, although departing from previous explanations of foreign aid: Here, ideas are the main drivers of policy decisions. Furthermore, the empirical evidence he provides falls short of showing a causal relationship between frames and actions. Specifically, the central role of ideas should be supported by a theory of how ideas emerge and change. More importantly, given that the unit of analysis in this case is a set of legislative discourses, it remains unknown whether culture (sets of beliefs and ideas) structurally constrains and affects policy decisions (Wendt, 1999) or whether ideas are advanced by ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Sikkink, 2011). This is probably among the most important challenges for every research project inspired by constructivist arguments, excepting cases in which the argument is not about causality but about the co-constitution of people and their societies (Lebow, 2009), which is not true in this instance. The ‘multiple sources of foreign aid’ explanation has also been advanced to explain the behaviour of new donors. Santander and Alonso (2017), for example, argue that South-South development cooperation (SSDC) models shaped by Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela are related to the foreign policy frameworks defined by each country. When at the service of international economic integration, SSDC can be functional to the expansion of a political and ideological model, or to the pursuit of greater global projection. The main shortcoming of these ‘multiple sources’ explanations is that they are extremely difficult to falsify. By combining realist, liberal, and constructivist frameworks, the motivations for foreign aid can be found in a country’s relative position in the international system, domestic institutions and actors, and ideas

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and beliefs held by domestic actors or accepted at the international level. Because foreign aid can be the consequence of many different factors, the research must find evidence that would reject the influence of all those factors simultaneously. Such evidence does not exist, and thus any new explanation supported by evidence would just add ‘another motivation’ to the already long list of factors influencing foreign aid. In other words, following the Popperian epistemological tradition (Popper, 1959), a theory that cannot be falsified is not a theory. Thus, the challenge for these theories is to be able to demonstrate what type of evidence would falsify their claims.

The political economy turn Putnam’s two-level game inaugurated the study of IR as an interaction between domestic politics and the international arena in which building domestic coalitions is essential for any foreign policy decision (Putnam, 1988). Meanwhile, Rogowski’s explanation of international trade as a competition between actors’ preferences based on their location in the international economy boosted the study of the political economy of foreign policy (Rogowski 1987). A political economy explanation is based on the idea that political outcomes are the result of rational decisions by actors based on their interests, and of the institutions that aggregate actors’ preferences. Furthermore, the interests of actors are usually taken for granted given their position in the local, domestic, or international economy. Although these scholarly works can easily fit into the ‘multiple sources’ category, here they are separated in order to highlight two assumptions that differentiate them. First, the single most important motivation for foreign aid giving is the aggregation of rational actors’ preferences within a certain political system with particular institutions. The ‘multiple sources’ arguments usually give nearequal weight to alternative explanations. Second, these works fit more clearly into the liberal school of thought in IR. Here, ideas are not relevant – material capabilities are usually endogenous to an actors’ interests. Domestic institutions are key instances that constrain actors or permit them to pursue their interests. Theories linking domestic institutions with foreign policy orientations and decisions can be traced back to Kant’s notion of Perpetual Peace. More recently, scholars have provided empirical evidence that democracies are more pacific among themselves than are the elements of any other dyad (Doyle, 1983), due to the audience costs they generate (Fearon, 1994), increased inter-dependence (Oneal & Russett, 1999), or the institutional design of their political systems (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999). Political economy explanations of foreign aid study why rational states and actors decide to provide foreign aid if they are somehow benefiting by doing so. Furthermore, they incorporate institutions into their explanations as an aggregation mechanism. In other words, it is necessary to identify the actors who favour increases in the quantity and quality of aid distributed, to examine the nature of the obstacles they face in advancing their policy goals,

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and to identify how political institutions shape the interactions between the actors demanding aid and those supplying it. In sum, most studies under this framework assume that the state is not independent of societal actors (Moravcsik, 1997). In an influential article, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) developed their selectorate model and argued that a donor’s willingness to grant aid depends on the size of the government’s support coalition. In the selectorate theory, incumbents face political rivals and need to maintain the support of their coalition or be deposed. In order to buy coalition support, leaders allocate the state’s available resources into private goods and public goods. The bigger the coalition, the more likely the government will give aid, because returns from aid are a form of public good for the donor’s selectorate. In this theory, aid-for-policy deals are rational allocations of resources and efforts, by recipients and donors alike, that advance the interests of political elites in each nation. Humanitarian need does not motivate the decision to give aid. Another argument that highlights domestic coalitions and foreign aid, Milner and Tingley’s (2010) distributional argument of foreign aid, got its inspiration from theories of international trade. After analysing the votes regarding foreign aid in the US House of Representatives over 25 years, they argued that domestic politics do matter, especially the distributional consequences of economic aid. Specifically, the economic characteristics of a given district and its left/right ideological predispositions influence support for aid by that district’s representative. Independently of the domestic coalitions formed, political regimes can have an impact on their own. Fust (2008) studied how political institutions in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries affect their foreign aid policies, finding that variations in the quality of democratic voice and accountability explain a large part of the difference regarding the development orientation of these countries. It has also been argued that a state’s orientation affects the provision of foreign aid. Dietrich (2016) builds an explanation of foreign aid based on national orientations around the role of the state in the delivery of goods and services. She argues that donor differences in aid delivery are predicated on national orientations in this regard – foreign aid officials from governments with neoliberal economic policies tend to bypass when the public sector in the recipient country poses high risks for aid delivery. In donor countries where the organisation of the political economy emphasises a stronger state in service delivery, officials stress the importance of the public sector for the recipient country’s long-term development and, thus, manage risks through direct involvement in the implementation of government-to-government aid. According to this argument, countries that place a high premium on market efficiency outsource aid delivery in poorly governed recipient countries to improve the likelihood that aid will reach the intended service beneficiaries. In contrast, states whose political economies emphasise a strong state in service provision support state international provision of aid. Lundsgaarde (2013) developed a society- and state-based approach to explaining foreign aid. His model advances an argument on what type of development

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policy states are required to pursue, and how states process those demands to ­convert them into policy decisions. Development NGOs, economic i­nterest groups, and state bureaucracies are the primary actors examined. According to his argument, at the societal level, the resource base and cohesiveness of ­development NGOs and the preferences and unity of the business community are determinants of the nature of the demand for (or against) pro-poor aid transfers. At the level of the state, the institutions that determine how the relations between interest groups and governmental actors are structured can enhance or hinder the extent to which societal actors are able to affect aid policy. Finally, Lundsgaarde shows that the authority of an aid agency in the policy system can shape a donor’s poverty reduction emphasis by looking at the position of development agencies in relation to other governmental actors. The informational theory developed by Heinrich (2013) states that donors can pursue both selfish and humanitarian aid policies. However, assuming that a ­donor’s society values aid with humanitarian goals, news coverage about the recipient will condition the extent to which the winning coalition can evaluate and credit the leader for helping poorer countries. This, together with incentives to buy policy concessions from the recipient country, jointly shapes the donor ­leader’s optimal foreign aid allocation. Using statistical methods, Heinrich provides empirical support to the argument that selfish aid policies are more likely when the recipient has policies of interest to the donor, and aid motivated by humanitarianism becomes more likely as news coverage of misery in a recipient country increase. Finally, the question of who controls a government is significant. ­K avakli (2018) showed that domestic politics, and especially the political party in power, has had a large impact on Turkey’s priorities in giving aid. ­Turkish aid used to be determined by international alignments and co-ethnicity, but since the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) party took power, trade goals and cultural ties have been the main drivers of Turkey’s foreign aid flows. In sum, political economy arguments do not consider the state as a monolithic actor (Milner, 1997) and they highlight the preferences of societal groups, taking from the state any type of agency on foreign aid policies. However, these arguments do not problematise the preferences of actors. In order to advance on their explanations, they assume them as given. In other words, actors are rational, and all of them seek to maximise a similar utility function. Realists would respond that actors’ preferences could be modelled as a function of their material capabilities and their position in the international system, while constructivists would argue a need to problematise actors’ preferences and to consider that they may behave irrationally ( Jervis, 1976). The contemporary behavioural revolution in IR seeks to fill that void.

The behavioural revolution The current decade has been witnessing a behavioural revolution in IR. With origins in psychology, psychological models using survey experiments are now

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gaining traction in the field. The defining characteristic of this revolution has been the use of empirical research on preferences, beliefs, and decision-making to modify choice- and game-theoretic models (Hafner-Burton et al., 2017). In contrast to structural theories of foreign policy, where the public has no place, recent foreign aid studies have looked at the sources of support by individuals for development aid policies. Unlike Realism, Liberalism, or Marxism, which take preferences as given, these new scholarly works discuss the origin of preferences and motivations of individuals to support foreign aid. Milner and Tingley (2013a) have argued that attitudes towards aid are more consistent and structured than many believe, although they appear to be structured by both material and ideological influences. They propose a sustained research agenda that includes survey experiments to better causally identify whether material or cultural factors drive attitudes towards aid. Their research suggests that citizens in donor countries may in the aggregate have fairly stable preferences about aid, and that these are driven by both material and cultural factors. They also find weak support for multilateralism, and deep partisan divisions. Reflecting elite discourse, public opinion is divided across two competing rationales – burden sharing and control – when faced with the choice between multilateral and bilateral aid channels. As domestic groups’ preferences over aid policy diverge from those of multilateral institutions, maintaining control over aid policy becomes more salient, and support for multilateralism falls (Milner & Tingley, 2013b). Recently, Heinrich and Kobayashi (2018a) proposed a model of foreign aid that centres on the accountability relationship in democracies between citizens and their government. According to this theory, the locus of policy choices resides in the domestic politics of donors and in the preferences of the public. Unlike previous research, which assumes that citizens’ preferences on foreign aid are essentially humanitarian, they argue that a public can also be selfish, privileging the material benefits produced by aid and discounting the moral considerations of such benefits. Thus, only in the context of intense media coverage does the donor government withdraw aid from repressive regimes that provide few policy benefits and refrain from punishing those that provide valuable goods. The authors examine evidence in survey experiments, and their results suggest that donor citizens are not only moral, but keen on obtaining benefits; they hesitate to punish repressive but valuable recipients. Accountable donor governments translate such citizen preferences into aid policy by giving less aid to repressive regimes that are not providing benefits in exchange for aid. However, donor governments refrain from conditioning aid on recipients’ human rights practices when faced with losing such benefits from the recipient country. In another study, Heinrich and Konayashi (2018b) call into question the ­m icro-foundations of recent theories of foreign aid and show that the public does indeed have a strong aversion to providing aid to ‘nasty’ recipient regimes. But, in contrast to the conventional assumption, the public also appreciates the instrumental benefits that aid helps them (as individuals or as a country) acquire.

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Using survey experiments, they found that people value the morally guided as well as the political use of aid, and that moral concerns carry far more weight, supporting one aspect of the conventional view. They find no evidence that aid withdrawals mitigate voters’ moral ire about aiding ‘nasty’ regimes, as has been assumed by other studies. Voters seem to prefer increased engagement with repellent regimes rather than a weakening of ties. Thus, their results suggest there are dual motives in voters’ evaluations of foreign aid policy: Individuals want to see foreign aid used in a moral way, but they also appreciate some tangible benefits in return. However, when comparing both moral and selfish individuals’ preferences, the negative effects of intolerable policies such as mass human rights violations by the recipients are much larger in magnitude than those of the benefits of aid giving. The behavioural revolution has brought new insights around how individual preferences on foreign aid are formed, and what their determinants are. However, it remains unclear how these preferences aggregate into the political realm, or whether they are at all significant. Does the public really matter in foreign aid allocations? An argument could be made that this might be true in the case of democracies, and traditional donors are democracies. However, a considerable share of donors feature no domestic democratic institutions, making the role of public opinion less relevant. And even if public opinion is indeed relevant to explaining foreign aid, what might its weight be vis-à-vis other factors in understanding the amount and geographical distribution of foreign aid? These questions can hardly be answered merely by looking at the determinants of public opinion’s support for foreign aid. While the factors that influence an individual’s support for or opposition to a generous aid budget might be known, this offers no clear prediction of their effect on the total amount of resources allocated by a country to development cooperation, or the share given to each recipient country or multilateral institution.

Conclusions Foreign aid is among the most important capital flows entering developing countries. The emergence of new foreign aid donors raises many questions, even as it highlights old ones, such as the reasons and motives that compel a country to allocate scarce resources to development projects in another country. Multiple explanations have sought to clarify the existence of foreign aid, but less attention has been paid to how foreign aid fits general explanations within the field of IR. This chapter has argued that studies of development cooperation can greatly benefit from making explicit their inherent assumptions about IR and foreign policy, and how these relate to the existence of foreign aid. Schools of Realism and Constructivism have exerted the strongest implicit influences on scholarly explanations of foreign aid, as is evident from the traditional debate between self-serving and altruistic motives. More recently, the liberal school of thought in IR gained prominence by incorporating multiple factors

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that influence foreign aid, and by studying foreign aid as a political economy phenomenon. The influence of Constructivism has also been noted in the more sophisticated and methodologically driven behavioural revolution, studying the micro-foundations of foreign aid support. The theoretical schools of thought in IR are a helpful tool for providing more coherent and persuasive explanations of foreign aid. Furthermore, understanding the main assumption and drivers of development cooperation is not simply a fruitful academic exercise that can expand the explanatory power of IR theories – it also serves in developing more realistic evaluations of foreign aid efficiency. If, for example, foreign aid is a function of donors’ self-interests, then it makes sense to evaluate foreign aid in consideration of whether it has proven conducive to boosting development in the recipient country.

Note 1 A previous version of this chapter was presented at the ‘Aid Power and Politics’ workshop organised by the Real Instituto Elcano, 16–17 October 2018, Madrid, Spain. I thank Iliana Olivié, Aitor Pérez, and Bernabé Malacalza for their valuable ­comments. All mistakes are mine.

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Milner, H.V. & Tingley, D. (2013b) “The Choice for Multilateralism: Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy”, Review of International Organizations 8(3), pp. 313–341. Moravcsik, A. (1997) “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics”, International Organization 51(4), pp. 513–553. Moravcsik, A. (2010) “‘Wahn, Wahn, Überal Wahn’: A Reply to Jahn’s Critique of ­Liberal Internationalism”, International Theory 2(1), pp. 113–139. Morgenthau, H. (1948) Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. Alfred A. Knopf, New York. Morgenthau, H. (1962) “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid”, American Political Science Review 56(2), pp. 301–309. Oneal, J.R. & Russett, B. (1999) “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992”, World Politics 52(1), pp. 1–37. Pauselli, G.N. (2013) “Teorías de las relaciones internacionales y la explicación de la ayuda externa”, Revista Iberoamericana de Estudios de Desarrollo 2(1), pp. 72–92. Peterson, T.M. & Scott, J.M. (2018) “The Democracy Aid Calculus: Regimes, Political Opponents, and the Allocation of US Democracy Assistance, 1981–2009”, International Interactions 44(2), pp. 268–293. Popper, K. (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Routledge, New York. Pratt, C. (1989) Internationalism under Strain. The North-South Policies of Canada, the ­Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Toronto University Press, Toronto. Pratt, C. (1990) “Has Middle Power Internationalism a Future?”, in Pratt, C. (ed.), Middle Power International. The North-South Dimension, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, pp. 143–167. Putnam, R.D. (1988) “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International Organization 42(3), pp. 427–460. Rathbun, B. (2010) “Is Anybody Not an (International Relations) Liberal?”, Security Studies 19(2), pp. 2–25. Rogowski, R. (1987) “Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade”, American Political Science Review 81(4), pp. 1121–1137. Santander, G. & Alonso, J.A. (2017) “Perceptions, Identities and Interests in South-South Cooperation: The Cases of Chile, Venezuela and Brazil”, Third World Quarterly, pp. 1–18. Published online: www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2017.1396533 Schraeder, P.J., Hook, S.W. & Taylor, B. (1998) “Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows”, World Politics 50(2), pp. 294–323. Sharman, J.C. & Weaver, C. (2013) “Between the Covers: International Relations in Books”, PS: Political Science & Politics 46(1), pp. 124–128. Sikkink, K. (2011) The Justice Cascade. How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics, W. W. Norton, New York. Snidal, D. & Wendt, A. (2009) “Why There Is International Theory Now?”, International Theory 1(1), pp. 1–14. Stokke, O. (1989) Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty. The Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Stockholm. Stokke, O. (2005) “Norwegian Aid Policy”, in Hoebink, P. & Stokke, O. (eds.), Perspectives on European Development Co-operation. Routledge, New York. Tezanos Vázquez, S. (2008) “Modelos teóricos y empíricos de asignación geográfica de la ayuda”, Principios: Estudios de Economía Política 10, pp. 5–39.

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Thompson, K.W. (1955) “Toward a Theory of International Politics”, American Political Science Review 49(3), pp. 733–746. Van der Veen, A. Maurits (2011) Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Wallerstein, I. (1996) “The Interstate Structure of the Modern World System”, in Smith, S., Booth, K. & Zalewski, M. (eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 85–107. Waltz, K. (1979) Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley Publications, Reading MA. Wemheuer-Vogelaar, W., Bell, N.J., Navarrete Morales, M. & Tierney, M.J. (2016) “The IR of the Beholder: Examining Global IR Using the 2014 TRIP Survey”, International Studies Review 18, pp. 16–32. Wendt, A. (1998) “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations”, Review of International Studies 24(5), pp. 101–117. Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

PART 2

The politics of donors’ aid policies, a country-based approach

3 THE US ELITE CONSENSUS ON AID Henry de Cazotte

Introduction In the US Congress, members both Democrat and Republican who share a keen interest in international development have been allies since the 1930s. While their other viewpoints may diverge, basic acceptance of the need for development goes unchallenged. Engaged NGOs and businesses appear relatively independent in comparison with a state that links development assistance with defensive and diplomatic affairs. This sphere of action has largely been spared controversy, being presented as one of the US foreign policy tools to ensure national security. In fact, the consensus on official development assistance has been more akin to status quo, appearing to hinge on the exclusion of development aid from public debate. The most visible mechanisms of development policy are the major and regular Presidential Initiatives (as on HIV/AIDS or Energy/Africa), which enjoy greater media coverage and are used to support aid programmes as a whole. Although intellectual circles are actively involved with development questions, foreign assistance is really only a concern for the interested elite: the public knows little about US development policy and, thus, neither supports nor condemns it. This chapter explores the drivers of such consensus following the approach of foreign policy analyses as explained in Chapter 1.1

The US consensus In the United States, bipartisan agreement has underpinned foreign policy since the end of the Vietnam War, especially in terms of the use of soft power to influence world affairs and to attain global balance. Development aid has been a key component in the US soft power toolbox, along with support for the Bretton Woods institutions.

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The modern history of US assistance (1961–2000) is extremely instructive. Since enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy, the US has juggled priorities and directives to sustain an equilibrium between Development, Diplomacy, and Defence. These ‘3 Ds’ have been driven by dynamics within the US National Security Council, with which the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) came to be associated. Democratic and Republican presidents alike have supported US development aid, although Congress has at times proved difficult to manage. Political analysts have conceded that, much like many other factors, the causes of poverty and development gaps generate risks that impact global affairs and ultimately threaten the security of the country. Since the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, national security considerations (formally laid out in the Policy Development Directive of 2008–2009) have guided all government actors. Other stakeholders, meanwhile, have referred to their own fundamental principles, be they moral or economic. Both Congress and the Executive branch are convinced that US assistance is a worthwhile investment – a unilateral commitment – but with no recognition of international goals: thus, the tool serves as a linchpin of US influence world-wide and comes at little cost, being seen as a good “value for money” effort. This perspective has endured as foreign policy has been built over the long term: the rigid institutional and historical strategies of Congress and the military complex are impervious to short-term adaptations. The consensus has been constructed “organically”, in line with political developments, under the rationale of national security, and at the President’s instigation, US assistance has been able to forge alliances among actors. Republican and Democrat leaders have thus formed bipartisan alliances and have retained control over US institutions with international influence, increasing assistance by way of linkages between development aid, diplomacy, and ­defence: the “3 Ds”, driven by US global leadership. Major presidential initiatives, representing part of each Executive’s political legacy, have fuelled this global vision. Meanwhile, elite segments of civil society and the business ­ecosystem have exerted powerful influence on international subjects, albeit without gaining much foothold in public opinion; even when it maintains its distance from public policy action, US aid adheres to the above-described consensus.

Recent evolution of public aid policies Republican- and democrat-driven continuity for global development The four successive administrations of Presidents G.W. Bush and Obama helped to transform and firmly root an Aid System freed from Cold War influences and infused by the forward-looking possibilities of the UN Millennium Development Goals. This could not have been possible without the multiple efforts towards consensus that prevailed throughout the period.

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The US Global Leadership Coalition (USGLC), founded in 1995, brought t­ogether prominent personalities campaigning for strong diplomacy, development, and defence. Its aim was to modernise USAID, to make it more effective, transparent, and partnership driven. The coalition organised b­ ipartisan ­consensus-building and helped to educate representatives and leaders from ­Washington, DC, and the states. It encouraged a ‘civilised’ approach to i­nternational affairs – a stance that was further strengthened after 11 September 2001. It was felt that development had to be extricated from ties to military activity – it was time to leave behind Cold War stereotypes and interventionist ­exceptionalism – and this goal enjoyed the backing of senior military personnel. Moreover, businesses were keen to strengthen the rule of law abroad, to bolster US commercial expansion. On the moral side, other actors intervened. Bill Gates engaged decisively to improve global health (with a focus on Africa), as detailed in Chapter 14. The Global Development Alliance (2000), supported by Secretary of State Colin Powell and USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios, rallied both USAID and development actors to promote partnerships. President G.W. Bush, a Republican, was deeply affected by messages concerning “Africa’s poor” and childhood health. These issues were supported by the evangelical community, which had a strong worldwide presence, and by faith-based NGOs that encouraged a firm moral stance. However, the events of 9/11 strongly affected the sometimes idealistic spirit of the American mind-set. National security proponents pushed for giving priority support to countries with the greatest chance of a democratic future. Private sectors offered help to bring greater stability. These new messages convinced the Republican Congress, and by late 2001, President G.W. Bush, with Afro-American Secretaries of State Powell and Rice, saw the adoption of a National Security Strategy based on the “3 D” approach of diplomacy, development, and defence. This was followed by dramatic increases in financial 2 and human resources for the State Department and USAID, along with tighter controls on USAID’s activities, illustrated by three congressional acts (2007–2009) that imposed efforts to improve accountability and evaluation, also requiring more data on development impacts. Although there was willingness to pursue a gradual untying of aid, the beneficiaries of aid budgets were mostly US institutions. Partnerships with companies, civil society, and NGOs were the main conduits, and these grew in number and in size.3 Meanwhile, the state embarked on some reflection around the concept of “transformational diplomacy”, which aimed at integrating ­development actions. However, development still seemed inextricably embedded in questions of national security: the fight against HIV/AIDS, the Afghan crises, the war in Iraq, conflicts in Pakistan and the impact of the global economic and financial crisis at the end of the period were all placed on the same footing, while the principle of “Make America Safer” determined allocations of financial resources. In 2005, 21% of US assistance transited through the Department of Defense. As an operational agency, USAID had positive relations with the military, mainly with

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respect to humanitarian actions and key target countries, but economic justifications for development assistance were clearly absent. On the opposition side, the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network (MFAN, a bipartisan coalition headed by Gayle Smith) prepared for the possibility of a Democrat winning the presidency in the 2004/2008 election, and it rallied Bush administration officials and development experts in view of pursuing reform. This network’s vision of the world was based on notions of interdependence and the need to bring other actors on board; their call was for partnership and burden-sharing, particularly in multilateral terms. According to MFAN, development assistance ought to focus on places vital to US strategic interests, which would necessitate revisiting strategies and resource allocation priorities. USAID needed to build stronger capacities, knowledge, and evaluation tools. However, principles of Official Development Assistance (ODA) were not the guiding force here; instead, US assistance was to be used as a tool to complement diplomacy – it would be one component in strategic dialogue, especially with emerging powers, in debates around global development. Building on Republican achievements, President Barack Obama, a Democrat elected in 2008, opted for a political strategy that encouraged some of Congress’ favourite themes, formalising them into founding documents and legislative acts and putting the Legislative branch at the forefront of these initiatives. In tandem, he made development a core pillar of his foreign policy4 and built on the unchallenged legacy of the Bush presidency, enabling bipartisan ties and backing. He would gradually step up expansion of major programmes in strategic countries by focussing on economic aspects with potential multiplier effects, encouraged by military leaders. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton further cemented the “3 D” pillars, while development questions gained more prominence on the National Security Council (NSC) under the umbrella of a “value-based” and integrated national security strategy. The Department of Defense pushed for stepping up foreign assistance appropriations, rather than entrusting development work to the military. Better inter-agency coordination was pursued. In Congress, the two parties engaged in discussions on US economic interests strengthening their influence overseas, thus leading the legislators to favour tied aid, which rose to twice the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) average. Innovative health economist Rajiv Shah from the Gates Foundation took the helm at USAID and pushed for strengthening the strategic relevance of that institution. An important decision was taken to give the USAID Administrator a seat (albeit non-permanent) at Cabinet and NSC meetings, while USAID further enjoyed the support of Congress.

The presidential initiative: a tool with authority channels the consensus President Bush’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) proved a landmark decision in 2003, benefiting from support by religious groups, civil society, and

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Congress, and it ensured the country’s lasting leadership on global health issues. Bush then went on to found the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC, 2004) and the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI, 2005). He also extended the Development Credit Authority and launched the Feed the Future initiative. Earlier, in 2002, Congress had established the Food Education and Children Nutrition Programme. At the multilateral level, the White House also used the Bretton Woods institutions and UN bodies as tools for US influence. Congress adopted the m ­ ultilateral treatment of debt relief. After opting out of the Kyoto Protocol, Bush crafted his own process called the Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and ­Climate Change (2007), an alternative to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNCCC), which nonetheless played a notable role in climate negotiations. Bush re-established ties with the UN by paying a p­ ortion of outstanding US dues, helped by wealthy media mogul Ted Turner, who contributed to the deal by donating US$1 billion for his Better World C ­ ampaign. Funding for the UN agencies was gradually resumed. President Obama’s initiatives were launched in 2009: his Global Health Initiative expanded the PEPFAR and PMI programmes, with health appropriations to triple over six years, and future ‘bipartisan’ programmes were inspired by this model. The Feed the Future platform (2012) was extended to include global food security, with a fivefold increase in appropriations. The Global Climate Change Initiative, announced in 2010, was intended to be part of Obama’s lasting legacy. During Obama’s second term, the pace accelerated, as foreign assistance was often the only subject around which bipartisan congressional policy could be built, with “moral duty”5 remaining a key driver over commercial or defence considerations. Bipartisan networks including the MFAN, the USGLC, and the Global Development Council (established in 2014) were in full force. In 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry and USAID Administrator Shah presented the Joint Strategic Plan for International Development, combining diplomatic strategies and sustainable development with performance targets. Obama mobilised the scientific community and public-private coalitions and finalised alliances and initiatives including: Food Security and Nutrition; Power Africa (2013); Better than Cash, Young Leaders, which made full use of social networks; and First Lady Michelle Obama’s Let Girls Learn programme. The Power Africa and Feed the Future initiatives led to the Electrify Africa and Global Food Security Acts in 2016. Three supplementary Foreign Aid Acts all demonstrated that Washington could indeed concretise common goals.

Innovating with civil society actors, a supporting groundswell Alliance with the private sector, a key tool for developing consensus, was prioritised to leverage private-sector innovation and resources. Strategic dialogues within a highly organised, bipartisan civil society provided sufficient space to address global affairs. A systemic approach to development gained strength, with

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priority placed on collective action, strategic partnerships, and consultations with the private sector and multi-partner platforms. Such alliances helped to establish a broad consensus on priorities and policy, even though heavy strategic commitments (such as those with Pakistan or Afghanistan) remained dominant in various front-line countries. The financial sector became involved due to the numerous initiatives (against corruption, for transparency) taken to regulate international development, through the Dodd-Frank Act, introduced in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. At the UN, the State Department worked on the Sustainable Development Goals and demonstrated leadership in key areas: innovation, governance, and the necessary paradigm shift. Gayle Smith, UN Ambassador Samantha Power, and National Security Advisor Susan Rice teamed up to address domestic concerns: violence, social justice, inequality, along with firmer stances against corruption, for transparency, and in protection of global civil society. They linked climate change with development (Sustainable Development Goals - SDG 13) as the climate negotiations progressed. The US embraced the multilateral processes launched in the wake of the 2011 UN Climate Change Conference in South Africa, the 2012 Rio+20 ‘Earth Summit’, and the G8/G7 and G20 Summits of that time to help consolidate a global consensus: adoption of the 2015 UN goals and agreements and inception of numerous climate, energy, biodiversity, and nutrition coalitions. The country retained world leadership on global health matters, including child mortality, as well as in issues of gender. The US pursued a committed climate strategy: agreement with China in 2015 and ratification of the Paris Agreement in 2016. In July 2016, President Obama emphasised that: “In a city that doesn’t agree on much, we can all agree on the imperative of smart development”.6 Also: “Whoever the next president is, development has to remain a fundamental pillar of American foreign policy and a key part of our work to lift up lives not just overseas, but here in the US.”

US consensus-builders The Executive branch plays a tricky score to produce consensus At the White House, the NSC is the engine of US foreign assistance policy and the locus of coordination: it is here that linkages among the “3 Ds” are formulated, where the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, and others define and arbitrate the positions, and where, until 2016, the USAID Administrator was on an equal footing with the National Security Advisor. At the same time, the Council on Environmental Quality, another body within the Executive Office, became deeply involved in global environmental issues. At USAID, the involvement of a plurality of societal actors has fostered better recognition from Congress and supported USAID’s perspective that a correlation exists between poverty, conflict, and instability, thus encouraging a soft power

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approach to development aid. Promoting sustainable growth has justified the agency’s increased power and image, although Congress has maintained a heavy hand in terms of control. Organised links among a generation of congressional actors, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), NGOs, religious forces, businesses, foundations, universities, Silicon Valley, and diaspora groups have left their marks. This ecosystem (which is “not only bipartisan – it’s been non-partisan” 7) has helped in drafting legislative amendments to support US assistance. Encouragement is given to this “committed and slightly crazy community” (G. Smith),8 which contributes to designing models and initiatives and can offer support to the presidency. The Global Development Council, the Advisory Council on Voluntary Assistance, and the Global Development Lab are some of the conduits for discussion, bringing together all actors and taking into consideration that civil society as a whole contributes more international resources than do major government agencies. US public aid relies on this large and increasingly independent private aid ‘market’ and puts substantial resources into shoring up those alliances. On the downside, internal fragilities hamper the institution, given that procurement processes face powerful lobbies, human resources tend to be short term, and support from public opinion is largely absent (most people being uninformed). The Treasury, supporting international financial institutions, is the ‘last defender’ of multilateral development in the US context. Under pressure from US actors, the Treasury has integrated environmental, social, and development considerations by intervening in the supervision of institutions. Ultimately, it is up to the NSC to mobilise the Treasury Secretary to support US leadership in international development financing circles.9 Thus, the Treasury’s position is ­a mbivalent – all-powerful when it comes to imposing its views on multilateral and financial institutions, yet fragile for want of support for its actions, whether from Congress or from civil society and the general public. The Congress generally demands compelling justification and sees “little return for the American people” as the multilateral Bretton Woods institutions seem to live in a world far from domestic priorities. The Treasury therefore faces the tough jobs of countering pressure from groups opposed to the World Bank’s activities, and of pre-empting forceful opinions from Congress that might jeopardise financing interventions. Among the other government departments, a pivotal role is played by the Department of Defense. A coalition of interest has formed within the military and among veterans around human rights and development, with clear views on the respective roles of civil and military power. The Secretary of Defense has ­implemented substantial assistance in strategic countries, including for natural disasters, and has at times been keen to disengage and yield a greater role to ­USAID. Other governmental actors include the Department of Agriculture, which provides transport for US food aid, and the Department of Health and Human Services, which looks after PEPFAR and supervises the CDC for HIV/AIDS and other pandemics. Others include the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which partner with CSOs and interact with Presidential Initiatives.

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The MCC, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Peace Corps, and others all play their distinct roles in the US government development ecosystem, often being used as innovative tools to challenge traditional USAID practices and processes: involvement of the private sector and civil society, ­indicator-based scorecards, incentive-and-reward systems, untied aid, and priority for Africa. Congress has been keen for the MCC to apply its assessment criteria stringently, so as not to deviate from its main ODA purpose of poverty reduction.

Congress, as lawmaker and main decision-maker, has secured the trans-partisan values surrounding foreign assistance The two chambers of the US Congress (Senate and House of Representatives) occupy a very distinctive place in the overall system, guaranteeing certain continuity across 70 years of debate on foreign assistance policy. The established consensus relies on the idea that partisan politics should be kept out of foreign policy debates. If international assistance were actually brought to the table, the vulnerabilities and tensions surrounding it would come to light. Congress approves funding for foreign assistance without referring to international standards, as this would be irreconcilable with the US’s conception of independence. Moreover, Congress never forgets that these resources are, first and foremost, monies from the American taxpayers. Congress’ power here derives from its increasing control over, and its capacity to initiate, Foreign Assistance, complementing or substituting the Executive branch. Notably, members of Congress act through the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate’s State, Foreign Operations, and Related Affairs Appropriations Subcommittee. In the House, numerous related caucuses are grouped by country, region, or theme. Members listen to the different viewpoints oscillating between proponents of US leadership on global issues and poverty reduction, and those who would prefer to limit foreign assistance to fostering political stability in states and societies. Public opinion does not count, as it is mostly consensual: hostility to foreign assistance remains marginal and only comes into play when touching on burning domestic policy issues such as abortion, family planning, or climate change. Republicans see foreign assistance as soft power for the purposes of national security, while the Democrats view it as serving economic and human development, the promotion of the private sector, and climate issues. No interest is shown in holding an overarching debate on the purpose of aid. Most often, only a handful of countries, flagship initiatives, or special interests are addressed. Whenever necessary, members reach bipartisan consensus to support policy but always keep the notion of moral responsibility well at bay. The House of Representatives and the Senate are thus playing a complex score, but one that is vital to producing consensus. The annual budgetary documents are grouped together under the label ­“Foreign Assistance”, which goes far beyond aid as such, covering military and security cooperation and development and humanitarian relief. The most contested

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budget chapters concern military and security-related matters, the level of resources allocated to disengagement, justification for funding to Pakistan, or needs relating to Russian expansionism, and not necessarily humanitarian or development issues. Foreign assistance continues to function under a 1985 authorisation bill, which has been readapted little by little; the original Foreign Assistance Act, although amended, was passed in 1961. Only PEPFAR and the MCC are governed by specific legislation. The appropriations bills that allocate resources follow a long road, but these have been passed almost entirely on a b­ ipartisan basis, and usually by unanimous consent. The debates are tougher, as the Congress questions more issues and members finalise their approval only once their specific constituency’s concerns have been taken on board.

The influence of lobbies and development partners USGLC: a unique and effective tool for strengthening bipartisanship The USGLC, a multi-stakeholder non-profit coalition, supports the consensus that keeps diplomacy, development, and defence on equal footing in order to maintain foreign assistance budgets. Aid is one of the key tools for protecting national security. This Coalition’s governance has powerful advisory councils: one has been chaired by Colin Powell and has included former Secretaries of State and World Bank Presidents, and the other is co-chaired by Admiral J. Stavridis and General A. Zinni, along with 175 retired three- and four-star generals. The Coalition promotes civilian tools to support national security, the economy, international prosperity, and humanitarian values by reducing poverty, hunger, and infectious diseases and by improving education and opportunities for women and girls. It also champions the effectiveness of aid, disseminating simple messages targeting Congress and other vectors of influence. Upon each change of government, it reports on the state of the development consensus, which e­ nables it to weigh in on decision-making and to make roadmap proposals for legislative ­consensus-building. The USGLC publishes a directory of the top 100 government positions that shape global development and diplomatic policy, underscoring the importance of those appointments. For the parties, this intensive congressional lobby supplies an assurance of constancy around international assistance. Its members may have diverging views, but compromises are reached as all agree on the basics and on the pragmatic goal of maintaining government funding. The ­USGLC is a high-performing tool within the country’s political system.

NGOs and foundations: largely autonomous major players and a fast-growing model The power of civil society is another of the assets for US presence abroad. Large NGOs have a powerful role in this sector, and their activities mobilise billions of dollars. The combined 2016 international budget of the 200 US NGO members

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of InterAction was estimated at US$18 billion, 24% of which was government funding,10 although NGOs are generally freeing themselves of government funding and are now 80% self-financing. Together they stand as the fourth largest international donor, much unlike Hungarian NGOs (see Chapter 8). Some have no ties with government whatsoever, somewhat diminishing the role of USAID and taking the initiative in seeking co-financing for their projects. Contrary to B ­ ritish NGOs (see Chapter 4), their interaction with society is not ­‘citizen-based’, but relies mostly on churches that act at the community level. InterAction, a platform for advocacy and education on development and humanitarian assistance, rallies a broad diversity of actors whose opinions and political stances may be poles apart. Yet when dealing with the authorities, InterAction speaks with a single voice. These NGOs position themselves in favour of poverty reduction, where they have a clear advantage, and they are keen to demonstrate that they act on an equal footing with other stakeholders (in a sort of division of labour). InterAction also spawns specific coalitions which, for example, helped in their active engagement throughout Obama’s presidency, contributing to the partnership approach, helping multi-stakeholder coalitions of varied interests and to develop major advocacy purposes. These NGOs are positioned as much on the left as on the right of the political spectrum. They necessarily deal with concepts of national security, as development aid is niched within the soft power foreign assistance budget. They are able to craft messages centred on safeguarding national security, or on opening markets and opportunities to US firms, aligning on government positions, playing to their conservative and centrist membership. Large environmental NGOs have become full-fledged actors in the US ­development ecosystem, operating on the international stage within their different areas of expertise. These NGOs have become pivotal actors in major negotiations thanks to their contacts with universities and their alliances with foundations. Their significance has been felt in recent UN debates, where they clearly supported the Secretary of State. At times they join forces to run major programmes, with or without government backing, as evidenced by their action on the federal Clean Power Plan or in the extension of biodiversity reserves. They are fervent proponents of volunteer initiatives for sustainable development such as those with connections to local political leaders like New York’s Michael Bloomberg or California’s Jerry Brown. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation is an exceptional case, intervening internationally by way of actions that mobilise US$2.6 billion a year.11 It has recently recused its official “foundation” status on account of its size, flexibility, responsibilities, influence, and close partnerships with bilateral and multilateral institutions. The Gates Foundation is 10–20 times the size of any comparable foundation, putting it on equal footing with some states; this financial weight gives it the ability to influence the entire US and international ecosystems. Serving as a moral compass, it enjoys substantial clout vis-à-vis government and ­multilateral bodies.

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In addition to funding programmes, the Gates Foundation also plays a leading role in the funding of research, think tanks, advocacy, lobbies, and education and communication networks. The Foundation intends to remain at the leading edge, with priorities set on health, food security, economic models and incentives, etc. With bases located in the capitals of the main donor countries, it is able to track ODA both directly and through the advocacy NGOs it funds. Often invited to major world events, it has expanded its thinking to include security issues and is fostering relations with the defence world. Finally, it calls on the business sector to invest in and contribute to development objectives. A precursor of the Gates Foundation, the United Nations Foundation, is not part of the UN system but was founded by billionaire Ted Turner as a reaction to the negative US attitude towards the UN. So far, this foundation has delivered US$1.4 billion to support UN projects and has played a pivotal role in fostering a stronger relationship between the US Congress, the White House, and UN agencies, also reaching out to public opinion through its Better World ­Campaign. The Stanley Foundation (of Iowa) is another US foundation that promotes support for the UN (climate change, denuclearisation, human rights). Other entities including the Ford, Hewlett, Buffet, Walton, Soros, Packard, Moore, MacArthur, Rockefeller, Pew, and Cargill Foundations, as well as the ­Clinton Global Initiative (CGI), have for decades played a constant role in promoting openness outside the US. They still stand as references and are a distinctive feature of the US ecosystem. The Ford Foundation is socially engaged and promotes ­grass-roots community action; the Rockefeller Foundation focusses on climate change and sustainable development and supports resilient cities; the Pew Charitable Trust analyses information and is a major knowledge hub for ocean conservation; the David and Lucile Packard Foundation is deeply involved in population concerns and in maternal and child health; CGI promotes issue-centred private-sector engagement; and the Open Society promotes democratic governance. Their combined global budgets (excluding the Gates Foundation) totalled US$1.6 billion12 in 2014. With flexible tools to hand, these foundations are able to replace the federal government if need be, for instance, by reorienting existing programmes. However, foundations may lack constancy, having no long-term financial obligations. Some politicians create competition between government and these philanthropic foundations, which could conceivably lead government to offload (onto foundations) those issues that it no longer wants to tackle itself; this has been a serious concern as related to humanitarian issues.

The diversified role of business Leading US corporate entities view international assistance with a favourable eye, as a tool for stability and the rule of law. Many have joined the USGLC coalition, which may serve as a policy spokesperson and deal directly with Congress. The US Chamber of Commerce acts internationally through its Global Business Coalition to promote cooperation, and companies communicate their

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corporate responsibility messaging via the World Business Council for Sustainable ­Development (WBCSD) and the World Economic Forum (WEF).13 Many firms have entered into USAID partnerships, while civil society has drawn closer to the corporate sector. Over the past 15 years, certain innovating businesses have run major USAID projects, thereby forming a support base. Private-sector actors have a very broad range of international development motivations to choose from commercial interests and support for the EXIM Bank, food aid lobbies by merchant marine carriers and agricultural exporters, defence of the development agreements implemented for USAID (US$3.6 billion/year),14 promotion of corporate and social responsibility (‘shared responsibility’), and philanthropy. The for-profit actors who earn their living from USAID contracts are active lobbyists. These are known as International Development Contractors (IDCs) or ‘Beltway bandits’, being located inside Washington, DC’s central zone. Because they implement a hefty portion of traditional ODA funds, they adapt in line with policy changes. When USAID’s operations were privatised, these IDCs provided support by grouping actors into major programmes, integrating subcontractors from the non-profit world. When USAID Administrator Shah attempted to redirect agency funds to local beneficiaries in 2012, the IDCs set up the Council of International Development Companies to defend their own interests. More worryingly, many of these firms have been taken over by private military conglomerates, which are now able to roll out an “integrated military–development offer” and to profit from conflict prevention, the conduct of war, reconstruction, and peace-keeping. The size of these firms relative to US agencies may lead to multiple conflicts of interest and imbalances. Silicon Valley does not interact in any significant way with traditional ODA actors, although close and growing contacts have formed between tech and ­government. A private and innovative aid industry is flourishing, ‘saving the world’ without supervision or coordination by official development assistance. Meanwhile, some businesses wave the flag of protectionism. In their view, the US (unlike China or other countries) has written the rules in a game that offers them fewer rewards than in the past, especially as country beneficiaries seem to be hostile to US interests. Unfair market competition is an oft-­recurring theme that US firms address through the strategic US–China dialogue on aid. ­A merican firms (infrastructure, facilities, consultancies, products) no longer enjoy the support of the World Bank, as they are felt to be overly expensive. Large American Corporations are no longer allies of the Bretton Woods institutions, as direct benefits have been reduced, though they do reap other indirect ­advantages. This trend also partly explains why bilateral US initiatives encounter corporate support through large public-private coalitions such as Power Africa.

New actors and new ways of acting to support development Initiatives and institutions are mushrooming thanks to a growing interest in international development questions. The new economy is keen to take part in promoting a

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performance-based foreign assistance system, seeking a return on social investment along with the notion of global responsibility as encouraged by Bill Gates at Davos. This is a far cry from the conventional aid ecosystem. The platforms designed for the major development goals and for climate change challenges have served as vehicles for scaled-up private-sector initiatives, and they count US firms among their stakeholders. A host of financial companies are taking part in the Climate Investor Summits and contributing to the Paris Agreement’s voluntary initiatives; some pension funds and insurers are pulling their stakes out of the carbon industries and looking to invest in sustainable infrastructure. Recent corporate initiatives for social and environmental reporting have also raised awareness. Production chains are now scrutinised by consumers, and major retailers are making changes in order to have their value chains certified as virtuous. Development is turning into a ‘project market’ in which competition inevitably comes into play and where the drive for impact is what counts most. The time has gone when government alone could be expected to launch major actions. Today, it is a matter of instigating initiatives and ensuring that they receive ­government support – hence USAID’s initiatives to encourage networking among universities, innovation hubs and start-ups, online participatory financing platforms, and the ‘solutions’ industry. This landscape is energised by an American spirit of initiative, new technologies, the dynamism of universities, and by the space left open by institutional conservatism and by USAID’s difficulty in reforming itself – to some extent, the agency has served as a “counter-model” (less so, recently). These private initiatives are taking up the baton of international US influence and becoming part of the ‘do good’ movement.

The media and opinion leaders have low impact on public opinion The media show scant interest in international subjects, although major newspapers that serve the elite do publish articles on strategic development issues, praising bipartisanship and alternating between calls for greater accountability and constructive proposals. Social networks may be more effective in structuring public opinion, for instance, via messages channelled by the celebrity world, which is actively engaged in many environment and development issues. On the other hand, many websites opposed to foreign aid also pursue an active communications strategy. Their stock-in-trade is to denigrate the federal government, disseminating propaganda that promotes fierce isolationism. They argue that “the United States is being attacked in the UN by the very countries we are helping” (threatening employment, business, and Americans’ quality of life) and that this funding must therefore be stopped.15 Public opinion in the US is neither very informed nor educated on the subject of international relations. The needle swings between more or less isolationist positions, depending on the international or domestic crisis. On development

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subjects, US thinking is above all compassionate and humanitarian. A number of traditional as well as more recent studies show that public opinion did not fundamentally change over the course of the 20th century, being moderately favourable to financing aid; citizens feel relatively passionate about ‘causes’ such as hunger, population, gender, the environment, the oceans and biodiversity, children, water, and education – to which they continue to donate. But even when a moral discourse prevails, local interests will still come first, and international solidarity is waning. Other legitimate domestic issues crowd out international concerns, altogether reducing the popular base on which US aid policy depends. For this reason, “Aid for the American people” became an official discourse on development assistance that references both the domestic setting and the impact that foreign aid policy has on citizens’ lives. According to this line of thinking, aid needs to respond to the “global challenges facing America” and not those “facing the world”; it needs to focus foremost on national issues that help to tangibly frame development questions within the domestic context.

Think tanks and universities: a milieu teeming with policy innovation capacity US think tanks are world leaders, and Washington, DC, concentrates worldclass intellectual expertise on questions of development. The Center for Global ­Development (CGD), the Brookings Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the World Resources Institute are often in the spotlight, but a host of others are active, including the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the International Republican Institute, or the Carnegie Council for International Peace. Large foundations fund powerful intellectual resources, and think tanks can rely on universities in the Washington, DC, area, where institutes reflect in depth on global questions, security, and defence. The forerunner of today’s think tanks was the Overseas Development ­Council, established in 1969, which enabled creation of the pivotal CGD, buoyed by founder Nancy Birdsall and its highly reputed Commitment to Development Index. The CGD is continually engaged in debates and research on development models, agency processes, promising innovations, and structures to be changed. Politically engaged institutes like this have been covering more ground as opposition movements detrimental to the consensus have intensified. Think tanks are capable of producing powerful advocacy for development aid financing, especially around sector-based and cross-cutting subjects. They are also able to support international and US policymaking processes, and to provide global perspectives on questions of planetary resources. They serve as ­information-relays and as analysts, superb idea-builders and proposal-creators. By working with think tanks, USAID has fine-tuned its frameworks for accountability and performance metrics. Think tanks develop measurement and dissemination tools that inform dialogues with administrations and prepare policy positions, as on topics of international negotiation (climate, SDGs, development)

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or on modernising US assistance. Because they work with government and constantly invite exchanges with intellectuals, experts, and stakeholders, think tanks are often where transparency and pressures towards real accountability for public policies emerge. Now that think tanks have become common, whether with bipartisan or differing opinions, competition has been fostered, seeking to influence a variety of positions. The conservative Heritage Foundation think tank and others strongly advise cuts to funding for international organisations. This rhetoric focusses on the need to reduce wasteful spending and to protect national interests, but without laying a finger on defence. Allocation of US aid to international organisations has to meet the requirement of being a “vital and necessary” (Schaefer, 2017) service rendered to US citizens. Voices from US universities such as Amartya Sen, Joseph Stiglitz, Jeffrey Sachs, Esther Duflo, Abhijit Banerjee, Tim Lovejoy, and many others are heralded worldwide. But when it comes to development questions, domestically, the Gate’s Foundation messages resonate with the US elite, enhancing the academic messages. Bolstering the credibility of aid, imposing requirements for the evaluation of results, and harnessing scientific evidence are core arguments to counter endless criticism from the right concerning ‘white elephants’, money wasted, and the like. Academics bring valuable tools for communicating with policy-makers. Senior government officials and leaders of the major development-related institutions move in line with changes in government: among two former USAID Administrators, Raj Shah now heads the Rockefeller Foundation while Gayle Smith drives ONE, an international campaigning and advocacy organisation. Elisabeth Cousens, former deputy ambassador to the UN, is the director of the UN Foundation. At universities, the Gates Foundation, NGOs, the World Resources and Brookings Institutes, and former leaders from the World Bank, IMF, and UN abound. This active elite mobility largely explains the continuity of policies, regardless of changes in government. More fundamentally, this mobility helps to give successive administrations, agencies, Congresses, and society as a whole a shared vision of the US role in the world. Other figures taking the stage like Elon Musk, Al Gore, Carl Pope, or Mark Zuckerberg have adopted a full-blown approach, much like that of former presidents. Bill Clinton’s Global Initiative and Jimmy Carter’s Carter Center Foundation both engage in the form of private initiatives. Financiers cum philanthropists Michael Bloomberg and Warren Buffett are taking up the baton from the ­Turners and Rockefellers.

Washington, DC: the world’s multilateral capital and its influence on US policy The World Bank and the IMF are only two blocks away from the White House. On Pennsylvania Avenue, development experts and stakeholders from all corners of the planet cross paths, and the US agencies are a stone’s throw away. How

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do these worlds interact? There is a tacit understanding that the presidency of the World Bank and the IMF’s chief economist (second in command there) are always nominated by the US government, which unofficially “designates” the Bank president subject to the agreement of large emerging countries. The proximity of the Treasury Department is also felt, sometimes insidiously, its influence over-interpreted by staff in the corridors and decision centres of these two global institutions. There is a constant back-and-forth of staff assignments between the Treasury or State Departments and the Bank, and these officials also defend US policies. The US agencies, along with the State Department and the Treasury, regularly follow closely all of the Bank’s activities, region by region and country by country. The saying at the Bank goes: “Who pays, says”. Moreover, Congress can impose its own views, as on societal issues like family planning, sexual and reproductive health and rights. The influence of Congress on the votes to replenish the World Bank’s International Development Association is decisive. The selection of the last four World Bank presidents since Bush’s presidency depends on political and personal alliances with the US President in power, reflecting a mode of governance that might be challenged today, were the rules to be rewritten. Yet these special relationships are also useful in safeguarding the interests of the Bretton Woods institutions. The Bank mirrors a certain ­A merican mind-set, and many of its US and foreign collaborators have graduated from the same university programmes. On the other hand, the thousands of Washington-based development experts at the World Bank Group, the Inter-American Development Bank, and other international agencies or institutions appear to have little impact on US positions on development policy. The Bank’s intellectual influence on US politics is minimal and – rather like the Washington development ecosystem itself – the Bank remains in its own world, isolated from the structures of the US.

Conclusions The 16 years of continued Foreign Assistance policy under Presidents G.W. Bush and Obama built foundations for another leap forward. Through interactions with congressional Republicans and Democrats, and its ties to political power and administration, the development ecosystem facilitates the personal engagement of leading figures and provides firm backing for congressional stances and a base for bipartisanship. Placing Development at the “same level” as Diplomacy and ­Defence – a remarkable achievement – was possible only with deep military support and leadership from the State Department and NSC members. This ­collective approach undergirding the US consensus on aid, whatever the differing viewpoints, is unique. Personal engagement by US presidents with development policy further shows that US assistance is expected to develop large, broad-based initiatives. In 2012, the elite members of the USGLC proposed six main drivers of ­bipartisan stakeholder consensus: strengthening civilian power within government agencies; promotion of effectiveness-driven results and transparent aid;

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promotion of leveraging effects with the help of the private sector; maintaining sufficient budget resources to tackle the “significant economic challenges facing the US in the years ahead”; improving coordination among US public players; and defining priorities for up-scaling. Renewal of the development discourse may be urgently needed in light of today’s regressive trends: isn’t it time to go beyond the defensive stance centred on national security or the moral imperative? Traditional aid messaging no longer fits the bill; the focus should be on investment, and on acting together. International solidarity must be restored. The time may come in an uncertain future when the US Foreign Assistance is redefined to prevent the resurgence of old norms that prevailed before G.W. Bush’s presidency. The cherished bipartisan consensus on aid is cracking, and its foundations (links to national security) are crumbling. The elite group that built the prevailing strategy and enabled action to concretise is now disbanding. The international responsibilities and soft power influence of the US are currently eroding.

Notes 1 The following is an edited excerpt from the US chapter of the report “Seeking Agreement on ODA”, commissioned in 2017 by public authorities in France, in the context of their own reflections on building national consensus on aid. Broadening support in France could perhaps be fostered with best practices from other major donors. The research goals in the report focussed on describing the various consensuses on aid and finding their determinants, with examples from the US, the UK, and Germany. The methodology included more than 100 interviews, a review of the abundant literature, and development of an innovative “consensus indicator” to compare country factors and to assess main determinants. The entire report can be downloaded from the Agence Française de Développement website, where the list of persons interviewed and the consensus tool methodology and results can be found. This chapter does not comment on recent developments (i.e., the Trump presidency) (de Cazotte 2018). 2 The budgets doubled between 2000 and 2010. 3 The Global Development Alliance programme during 2001–2008 totalled US$11.5 billion, including private contributions. 4 2010 Policy Directive on Global Development. 5 Lawson, CRS, 2016. 6 President Barack Obama, remarks made at the White House Summit on Global ­Development, July 2016. 7 Gayle Smith, Opening remarks at White House Summit on Global development, July 2016. 8 Ibid. 9 For example, by its involvement in the preparation of the 2015 Addis Ababa ­Financing Development Conference, or by taking up thematic issues such as ­fi nancial inclusion. 10 Source: InterAction, Giving USA, The Annual Report on Philanthropy. 11 Source: Foundation Center. 12 Source: Foundation Center. 13 World Business Council for Sustainable Development, World Economic Forum. 14 Source: Congressional Research Office. 15 See, for example, the controversy on aid to Pakistan in D. Markey (Council on Foreign Relations), “Stop Writing Pakistan Blank Checks”, Foreign Policy, ­February, 2016.

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Sachs, Jeffrey D. (2018) A new Foreign Policy, Beyond American Exceptionalism, Columbia University Press, New York. Schaefer, B.D. (2017) Trump’s Plan to Reduce UN Spending Is a Step in the Right Direction, Commentary, Budget and Spending, The Heritage Foundation. Sengupta, S. (23 January 2017) “Trump Revives Ban on Foreign Aid to Groups That Give Abortion Counseling”, The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes. com/2017/01/23/world/trump-ban-foreign-aid-abortions.html Stanfield, J.R. & Bloom Stanfield, J. (2011) John Kenneth Galbraith, Palgrave M ­ acmillan, Basingstoke. The Heritage Foundation (2016) Blueprint for Balance: A Federal Budget for 2017, Budget and Spending Report, Heritage Foundation, Washington DC. Truman H.S. (1949) Inaugural Address in Washington DC. Available at: http://www. bartleby.com/124/pres53.html U.S. Department of State and USAID (2014) Strategic Plan FY 2014–2017. Available at: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/223997.pdf U.S. Global Partnership Coalition (2012) Report on Reports: Agenda for Advancing Smart Power America’s Global Interests. U.S. Global Partnership Coalition (2012) The Global Plum Book: Influential Positions in the U.S. Government on Global Development and Diplomacy. U.S. Global Partnership Coalition (2017) Building a Better, Safer World. USAID (2010) Memorandum of the United States, OECD/DAC Peer Review of the United States. USAID (2016) Memorandum of the United States, OECD/DAC Peer Review of the United States. Wehner, P. (24 January 2017) “Why I Cannot Fall in Line Behind Trump”, The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/21/opinion/sunday/whyicannot-fall-in-line-behind-trump.html?mcubz=0 White, D.W. (1999) The American Century: The Rise and Decline of the U.S. as a World Power, Yale University Press, New Haven CT. Whitehouse, S. (Senator) & Wachtell Stinnett, M. (2017) Captured: The Corporate Infiltration of American Democracy, The New Press, New York. World Resources Institute (2017) articles on the policy of Donald Trump, www.wri.org. WWF International (2015) “Financing for Sustainable Development”, WWF Position Paper. Yacoubian, B. (10 March 2017) “Trump’s Cuts to USAID Would Imperil the United States”, Foreign Policy. Available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/10/trumpscutsto-usaid-would-imperil-the-united-states

4 THE UK: AN AID SUPERPOWER AT A CROSSROADS Myles Wickstead

Introduction The terms ‘aid superpower’ and ‘development superpower’ were first used to describe the UK in mid-2011, by then Secretary of State for International Development Andrew Mitchell, MP. He made these remarks as part of a case for protecting the budget of the Department for International Development (DFID) and for moving towards the target of 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) devoted to official development assistance (ODA). Apart from the Department of Health, this was the only department within the UK government to see increased expenditure at that time; other international departments (notably the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office) had their budgets cut. Two years later, the UK became the first G7 country to reach the 0.7% target. This chapter is a foreign policy analysis (see Chapter 1) that sets out how the history of UK aid and support for international development are closely linked to the evolution of Britain’s position on the world stage. In absolute terms, the UK’s global profile has lost considerable prominence over the last 100 years; but as we shall see, the UK has continued to punch above its weight. The nation could reasonably claim to be an aid superpower in 2011; this had been true for some considerable time before that, and it is still true. The UK’s ability to maintain such a status in future will depend crucially on decisions yet to be taken over just what sort of country it wants to be: outward-looking and internationally minded, or inward-looking and nationalistic. The UK finds itself at a crossroads, and the country has not yet decided which way to turn. In a recent issue of The Economist, in a piece entitled ‘Downhill all the way’, the Bagehot column (dedicated to UK affairs) had this to say: It is hard to look at British politics these days without worrying that this is a country in decline. In 1900 the British Empire covered two-thirds of the

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planet, the City of London reigned supreme, and Britain both imported and exported more than any other country. Today Britain is a shadow of its former self: inward-looking and anxiety-ridden, stagnant and expensive, split down the middle and fearful of the future. (The Economist, 28 July 2018, p. 22) This was not the first time such concerns had been expressed, but they feel particularly acute at a time when Brexit divides the nation. Of course not all those in favour of Brexit want to turn their backs on the rest of the world – many see opportunities to strengthen foreign relationships, particularly within the Commonwealth. While many continue to embrace the notion of an outward-­ looking, global Britain whose very identity is shaped by its relationships with other nations and peoples, a substantial number – frustrated that the UK is no longer a world power, and no longer feeling in charge of their own destiny – ­believe that the only way to preserve ‘British values’ is to lessen exposure to outside influence. As former UK Prime Minister John Major memorably stated, over a quarter-century ago, such a response to change and the perceived erosion of national identity is tantamount to practising “some sort of phantom grandeur, a clanking of unusable suits of armour” (Major, speech to Conservative Group for Europe (CGE, 22 April 1993).

From 1940 to 1970: an emerging multilateral/bilateral aid infrastructure in a changing world The story of the UK as an aid superpower must be seen in the broader context of Britain’s place in the world, and that story can be said to have begun in the early 1940s. As the tide of war turned in favour of the UK and its allies, the nation began to envision a post-war world, and how a new global political and economic order might be underpinned by institutions which would help preserve stability and minimise the risks of future conflict. This led to the creation of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), commonly known as the World Bank. The UK became (along with the US, Russia, China, and France) one of the five permanent members of the key political organ of the UN, the Security Council, and had its own seat on the IMF and World Bank boards. This remains the case, affording the UK special status and power within those organisations, and thus an ability to shape world affairs, which (some would argue) magnifies the country’s influence disproportionately, giving the UK certain superpower attributes in spite of its comparative political and economic decline. In addition to domestic challenges faced by the UK after the Second World War – not least reconstruction of the country’s physical and human infrastructure, and improvement of its economic competitiveness – two key international priorities emerged. The first was the growing ideological rift between East and

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West, and the increasing potential for this war of ideas to lead to real-world conflict. The second was the dissolution of the British Empire and the granting of independence and the right to self-determination to the former British colonies. Alongside traditional political and military power, aid was to become an important element in the new equation; from the beginning, the allocation of aid and economic assistance by the UK was closely linked to ideology and broader political objectives, whether through the direct allocation of resources or by bringing political power and influence to bear. We shall see how the institutional and ideological framework around aid and development changed within the UK over time – but it is worth noting here that there has always been a strong moral dimension to the aid debate, often with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) seeking to persuade successive governments to make this the cornerstone of their aid and development policies. The Charter of the United Nations, signed in mid-1945, clearly established the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, signalling the start of a process of decolonisation that gathered momentum through the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. Article 55a of that charter specifically commits the UN to promoting “higher standards of living, full employment and conditions for economic social progress and development”. This commitment had particular implications for the UK, as many of its former colonies were soon to gain independence, starting with India and Pakistan in 1947. The first of the UK’s African colonies to gain independence was Ghana in 1957, followed by many others in the early 1960s. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, visiting Africa in early 1960, recognised the inevitability of a shift in the relationship between the UK and that continent: The most striking of all the impressions I have formed since I left London a month ago is of the strength of the African national consciousness. In different places it may take different forms, but it is happening everywhere. The wind of change is blowing through this continent. Whether we like it or not, the growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact. (Macmillan, speech in South Africa, 3 February 1960) The nature of this changing relationship was already reflected in the evolution of the ‘Commonwealth of Nations’ (now usually referred to simply as the Commonwealth). Under a process which began with the London Summit of 1949, most of the former colonies became part of this group, though some chose to leave, while others sought to maintain and even strengthen links with the UK by becoming ‘Dependent Territories’. UK bilateral aid programmes had a particularly strong focus on the Commonwealth countries, especially during the Cold War period, reflecting the fact that some were among the poorest in the world, and in recognition of their particular relationship with the UK, as well as the desire to keep them on the right side of the East/West ideological divide.

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The Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 had already made clear that the development of colonies and their peoples were to be at the centre of the development relationship; this marked a shift from the 1931 Colonial ­Development Fund Act, which had established that priority in selecting projects for support should be those promising “the greatest and speediest benefit” to the UK. Support under the 1940 Act was confined to the colonies, and levels of expenditure were necessarily modest due to the ongoing war. But with the end of the war and the subsequent decolonisation process, a clearer framework for implementation of aid and development began to emerge. The Colonial Office and the Colonial Service were established, and mechanisms and schemes for the provision of administrative and professional/technical support were set up. These support services fell under the umbrella of a new Department for Technical Cooperation, established in 1961 and essentially a service organisation for other government departments that were taking the lead on international policy. The Conservative Government of that time produced two White Papers in the early 1960s (Cmnd Paper 774, 1960; Cmnd Paper 2147, 1963), setting out for the first time a coherent account of UK overseas aid policies to both ­Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries, and covering both bilateral and multilateral support. The 1963 White Paper in particular recognised that “over a large part of the world, poverty and malnutrition still persist; disease and illiteracy are still widespread; and the increase in population exerts a remorseless pressure on resources”. As Ireton notes, the 1963 White Paper showed considerable foresight in suggesting that “although the era of aid, viewed in the perspective of history, may be a transitory one, it does not follow that it will be short, still less that its end is in sight” (Ireton, 2013, p. 24). A new Labour Government under the leadership of Harold Wilson was elected in 1964 and implemented its commitment to create a new Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM); Minister Barbara Castle was given a senior ­Cabinet-level appointment. Another White Paper, called simply ‘The Work of the New ­M inistry’, was published in 1965, followed by the Overseas Aid Act (1966). A series of changes to other government departments dealing with international issues took place in the following years: the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office were integrated to become the Commonwealth Office in 1966, and then merged into the Foreign Office to become the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). By the end of the 1960s, some of the key elements were in place to give the UK the potential to become an aid superpower. With the ODM, aid and development now had a Ministry at Cabinet level, on an equal footing with other departments. The ODM was responsible for both policy and implementation and would lead on multilateral as well as bilateral aid, giving it a breadth of activity unusual in the donor community; in most other countries, these roles tended to be split among three or four different government departments and/or implementing agencies. The Overseas Aid Act effectively gave the Minister the power to do whatever he or she wanted. The new Ministry started pressing on certain

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key issues which had begun to feature in other fora (particularly the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD-DAC), in relation to both aid quality (e.g. concessionality of flows and the tying of aid) and aid quantity (as discussions were coalescing around a new target for aid flows). In 1969, the DAC adopted the concept of ‘official development assistance’ (ODA), and a report chaired by former Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson recommended that donor governments should spend 0.7% of their Gross National Product (GNP) on ODA – a target subsequently adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1970, to be reached by the middle of that decade, also announcing the advent of the Second United Nations Development Decade. These efforts to improve the quality and quantity of ODA were particularly supported by certain countries – Sweden was the first to reach the 0.7% target, in 1974, soon followed by the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark (see Chapter 5). In one sense, these countries were the first aid superpowers, meeting and indeed exceeding internationally set targets on aid quality and quantity; and their influence continues to be very positive. In another sense, however, the term ‘superpower’ would not apply here. In terms of overall volume, the absolute resources these countries make available for ODA are comparatively modest. They do not hold permanent positions of influence within the UN or the Bretton Woods Institutions and they lack voting power. Above all, perhaps, they are not major players on the world stage across the full range of international policy and power (diplomacy, defence and security, soft power, as well as international development). This is a question to which we will return later as we examine whether the UK has been, is, and is likely to remain an aid superpower.

From 1970 to 1997: UK aid, domestic political priorities, and international shifts The UK was certainly not an aid superpower in 1970, in spite of the creation of the ODM, increases to the volume of ODA, and a focus on aid quality and effectiveness. Following the election of a new Conservative Government that year, the ODM became the Overseas Development Administration and part of the FCO. This had little impact on the aid programme, for good or bad; the available resources remained more or less constant in real terms, there were no major shifts in policy, and in practice the Overseas Development Administration was able to get on with its work, largely without hindrance. The opposition Labour Party made it clear that aid remained a priority, stating in that party’s manifesto before the 1974 election that they would move towards the 0.7% target and focus efforts on the poorest people in the poorest countries (the Conservative Party manifesto, meanwhile, did not mention aid). The Labour Party was elected to government, re-instated the Overseas Development Administration as the ODM, and set out and developed its aid commitments in a new White Paper published in 1975.

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That White Paper, entitled ‘More Help for the Poorest’ (Cmnd Paper 6270, 1975), committed the UK to focussing its future ODA on the poorest people in the poorest countries. This followed naturally from the Labour Party ­m anifesto and from a 1973 speech given by the President of the World Bank, Robert McNamara, in which he made a strong case for the international community, including the World Bank, to focus its efforts on supporting integrated rural development as the optimum way of ensuring that the world’s poorest people be lifted out of poverty. The White Paper endorsed that focus (and reiterated its support for the World Bank group in general, and for the International ­Development Association, or IDA, in particular); it was similarly positive regarding the work of the UN development system; and it examined the development work of the European Economic Community, which the UK had joined in October 1972. The paper urged the European Economic Community (EEC) to broaden its support for countries outside the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group and to do more for the poorer countries of Asia; looking beyond aid, it further argued for better trade access and arrangements for developing countries. However, despite reiterating the government’s commitment to the 0.7% target, the 1975 White Paper made no commitment to a timetable for achieving that goal. Nevertheless, the aid budget increased during the years this Labour Government was in power (1974–1979), eventually growing by 6% in real terms and with similar increases planned for subsequent years into the early 1980s, on the basis of which the ODM made various forward commitments, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Thus, the implications of the election of a new Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher, committed to heavy cuts in public expenditure on the basis of a manifesto which made no mention of aid, looked potentially severe – and so they proved. These effects manifested themselves in a number of ways. First, and unsurprisingly, the ODM once again became the Overseas Development Administration and was folded back into the FCO. Second, very significant budget cuts were imposed – a 6% cut in real terms for the 1979/80 fiscal year, and a 14% cut for the following three years of the Public Expenditure period. Because the Ministry for Overseas Development/Overseas Development Administration had always held responsibility for both multilateral and bilateral aid, it had some flexibility to transfer resources within the larger envelope; but because increased commitments had already been made to IDA, and further increases to the EC aid budget were foreseen, a very significant reduction was made in the bilateral programme. Third, following an inter-departmental review, the ­government announced in a Parliamentary Statement in February 1981 that: “We believe that it is right at the present time to give greater weight in the ­a llocation of our aid to political, industrial and commercial considerations alongside our basic development objectives”. Within the UK bilateral programme, increasing weight was given to supporting British companies in the developing world

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through the provision of soft loans and export credits alongside aid funds, in particular through the Aid and Trade Provision (ATP) programme (strongly associated with the Thatcher administration, although initially put in place by the previous Labour Government). One consequence of these significant changes and cuts was to mobilise UKbased NGOs, the Churches, and certain academics to create a new ‘Campaign for Real Aid’. The NGOs were able to activate their significant supporter base, many of whom were ready to approach their Members of Parliament to make their concerns felt. One effect of this drive became very evident in November 1984, when there was a debate in Parliament on the famine in Ethiopia – the first time such human suffering had been seen on a global scale, due to television coverage. This debate coincided with figures from the most recent Public Expenditure round, showing that further cuts in real terms to the aid programme had been planned for the coming years. A number of Conservative MPs abstained on a vote, and from that time onwards, the aid budget was never at serious threat of further extensive cuts; neither, however, were significant extra resources forthcoming for the duration of the Conservative Government, in spite of continuing efforts by the Overseas Development Administration and Ministers. At the end of the 1980s, the political and economic context for aid changed significantly as a consequence of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The rationale for using aid to promote ideological objectives fell away, though it was still used to promote reforms in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern and Central Europe, towards such ends as strengthening parliamentary democracy, promoting economic reforms, and advancing human rights through, for example, greater independence of judiciaries from central governments. The UK, both via bilateral technical assistance programmes and through the EU, strongly supported these efforts, and London became home to the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which provided financial support for projects and programmes in the region. This signalled a shift for aid programmes globally. If support for the countries of Eastern and Central Europe depended on their setting out clear reform agendas, promoting human rights, democratising, and demonstrating that policies should benefit local populations as a whole (and not just ruling elites), then a strong case for aid conditionality could be made for developing countries. And this proved to be the case; bilateral programmes in particular shifted towards technical support through governance and social development advisors for strengthening the process of democratisation, and for ensuring that the benefits of development reached the poorest and most marginalised sections of the population. Global Summits held in the early and mid-1990s focussed on how to ensure that interventions into education, health, and nutrition reach those same groups, and a framework was provided for a new set of International Development Targets (IDTs), discussed and refined in the DAC and designed to address global poverty.

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From 1997 to 2005: the emergence of the UK as an aid superpower In May 1997, a General Election in the UK saw the Labour Party elected to power with a significant majority. The party manifesto had been very clear: poverty would be the main focus of the British aid programme; a new DFID would be created, headed by a Cabinet Minister, to return development issues to the heart of government decision-making; and commitment to the 0.7% UN target would be maintained, reversing a decline in aid spending. When Labour assumed government, DFID was set up immediately, and work began on a new White Paper to set out its priorities. The global IDTs were particularly important in the UK context, forming the core around which the White Paper – ­‘Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the Twenty-First Century’ (Cmnd 3789, ­November 1997) – was developed. Perhaps for the first time, the UK now aspired to global leadership on international development issues. The country committed to focussing its international development programme on progress towards fulfilment of the IDTs – the key target being to reduce by one-half the proportion of people in the world living in absolute poverty, with other key targets around primary education and basic health. It also undertook to make all future financial support available in the form of grants, and to abolish the tying of aid to UK goods and services. The 1997 White Paper committed the UK government to ensuring that “the full range of Government policies affecting developing countries, including environment, trade, investment and agricultural policies, takes account of our sustainable development objective”. DFID thus became an increasingly significant player within the British government system. The new Secretary of State, Clare Short, found powerful international allies in her Norwegian, Dutch, and German counterparts, all of them being women. They comprised the informal but influential ‘Utstein Group’ (named after a meeting at Utstein Abbey in Norway). Clare Short also built strong alliances elsewhere, as with Jim Wolfensohn, the then President of the World Bank. Such alliances were crucial in the effort to establish the UK as an aid superpower, but the necessary first step was to commit the government as a whole to reducing poverty in poorer countries, with an increasingly cross-Departmental approach within Whitehall. The 1997 White Paper states very explicitly that it is not only concerned with aid but with sustainable development for the benefit of all, clearly setting out the UK’s potential role: This is a White Paper which reflects Britain’s unique place in the world and our opportunity to adopt a new international role. No other country combines membership of the Group of Seven industrialised countries, membership of the European Union, a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations (UN) and membership of the Commonwealth. Our

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particular history places us on the fulcrum of global influence. We should not over-estimate what we can do by ourselves. We should not under-­ estimate what we can do with others. In no area is this more true than in development. Helping to lead the world in a commitment to poverty elimination and sustainable development is an international role in which all the people of Britain could take pride. (Cmnd 3789, 1997, p. 20) With Prime Minister Tony Blair and Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown fully behind this vision, the UK played an increasingly active role on the international stage. It strongly supported the UN Millennium Declaration agreed in September 2000, which focussed on the responsibilities of UN member states and the rights of their peoples. A new White Paper produced in 2000 (designed to complement rather than replace the 1997 document) set out the government’s commitment to work with others to ensure that globalisation worked in favour of reducing poverty. The UK also strongly supported the creation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and in 2002 the UK Parliament passed the International Development Act, which reinforced the focus of the programme on reducing poverty and addressing the needs of the poorest people. It is perhaps worth noting here that the cross-party International Development Select Committee (IDC), comprising Parliamentarians from across the political spectrum, has also played an increasingly significant and positive role in holding successive governments to account vis-à-vis the quantity and quality of aid programmes. A Select Committee on Overseas Aid (subsequently the Select Committee on Overseas Development) had been established in 1968; the IDC was set up in 1997 to “examine the expenditure, policy and administration of the newly separate Department for International Development (DFID)”. This Parliamentary engagement, together with the deep support of civil society organisations, faith-based groups, academia, and think tanks involved in international development, has certainly strengthened the case for the superpower status of UK aid. The events around 2004 and 2005 illustrate very well the scope and reach of the UK as an aid superpower, combining government reach and commitment, intellectual fire-power, and the campaigning strengths of the NGO community, all together raising the priority of international development in general and Africa in particular within the international agenda. Prime Minister Blair was persuaded that these priorities should be the focus of the 2005 G8 discussions, to be hosted by the UK, and that the best mechanism for achieving this would be to create the ‘Commission for Africa’ (CfA), launched in February 2004. This comprised 17 commissioners, 9 of them from African nations, whose basic remit was to generate new ideas for a strong and prosperous Africa, leveraging the 2005 British presidency of the G8 and of the European Union and supporting African initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development and the

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African Union (AU). The Commission’s Report – ‘Our Common Interest’ – was produced in March 2005 (see Wickstead, ‘Aid and Development’ pp. 52–57). Their arguments were well received, but other forces were also at work between publication of the Report and the G8 Summit, which made the likelihood of endorsement even greater, while the UK was able to exert influence due to its status as an aid superpower. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of March 2005 set out clear principles of country ownership of development programmes and the need for better harmonisation of policies and programmes among donors – all of which was entirely consistent with the CfA recommendations. The European Commission produced an Africa strategy that was similarly consistent with the CfA Report, and the decision was taken within the European Union in May 2005 that long-standing members of the EU would meet the 0.7% target by 2015, and that new member states would reach 0.33% on the same timetable. The year 2005 also saw the culmination of the ‘Make Poverty History’ (MPH) campaign, representing a high point for such campaigns in the global North and demanding action in respect of what was happening in the global South. Neither before nor since had such a strong alliance existed between the British government and international NGOs based in the UK (at a time when public support for NGOs was at a peak) working on a shared agenda to overcome poverty. The campaign focussed on the three key themes of aid, trade, and debt, all of which loomed large in the CfA Report. Specifically, the campaign argued that the international community should deliver on its aid commitments to Africa by increasing flows from around $25 billion per annum in 2004/05 to around $50 billion by 2010 (based on expenditures largely in support of education, health, and infrastructure investments, as analysed and set out in the CfA Report). Other proposals of the campaign were to liberalise trade and to grant 100% debt relief to the poorest, highly indebted countries. The African Union Summit, which took place shortly before the G8 Summit at Gleneagles, endorsed the recommendations of the CfA Report in their entirety, committing AU members to fulfil Africa’s side of the bargain. The Gleneagles Communique also endorsed the key recommendations in the CfA Report as well as the headline objectives of the MPH campaign on trade liberalisation, debt relief, and enhanced aid. The debt relief package was the most successful; it was very specifically linked to policy changes on health and education which would reinforce progress towards the MDGs, and as a result, millions of children who had previously been unable to attend school or access health services were now able to do so. Less progress was made on the aid increase than had been committed to at Gleneagles, in part because of the global financial crisis of 2008 – which also signalled the start of the diminution of the importance of the G8, and indeed of aid generally, as other countries became more politically assertive and more economically powerful. But in 2005, having exerted its influence in the G8, the OECD-DAC, the Bretton Woods Institutions, and through partnerships with Africa, the UK was unquestionably an aid superpower.

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The global financial crisis and a changing world order Just as the fall of the Berlin Wall had changed the political and economic context of aid dramatically, while the release of Nelson Mandela (a few months later) had fostered a spirit of optimism, so too the global financial crisis that began in 2008 hastened another shift from the old order. Historically, global economic growth had been led by the developed countries; now, increasingly, ‘emerging’ and ‘developing’ countries were taking on that role. They did so on their own terms, eschewing the conditionality which had been a particular feature of bilateral aid and which now became marginal in most (though not all) countries. The emergence of countries like China and India as aid donors (in some cases while continuing to be aid recipients) reconfigured the international dynamic. It was increasingly recognised that, although aid continued to matter (and very much so, in some countries), other policies likewise impacted heavily on the development of less-developed economies: trade, migration, international tax rules, security, etc. The notion of ‘policy coherence for sustainable development’ was not new, but its profile was significantly raised – not least with the launch in 2003 of the Center for Global Development’s ‘Commitment to Development Index’ (CDI) ranking donor countries against these broader criteria. The Index has been traditionally dominated by European countries, in particular Scandinavia, while the UK has always been ranked in the top ten (it was eighth in 2018). This high ranking has been due in part to its achievement of the 0.7% ODA/GNI target in 2013 – the first G8 country to do so. Interestingly, fulfilment of the 0.7% target was achieved under a coalition government with Conservative Prime Minister, David Cameron, determined to shed the image of the Conservatives as “the nasty party”. He personally believed that this was the right thing to do, and he and Secretary of State Andrew Mitchell spoke of the “golden thread” of long-term development which depended on stable government, the rule of law, human rights, transparency, and accountability. Commitment to the aid goal was subsequently signed into law following unanimous support for a Private Members’ Bill in 2015 (by Liberal Democrat MP Michael Moore). While the UK as a whole remained divided and polarised over aid – a debate sharpened by the climate of austerity in the wake of the financial crash and its impact on, for example, social services – Members of Parliament (led by the IDC) remained broadly supportive of continuing the UK’s leading role in aid as well as in defence, diplomacy, and soft power, because they believed this approach to be both effective and consistent with what they saw as traditional British values. In July 2012, Prime Minister Cameron was invited by the UN Secretary-­ General to co-chair (with Presidents of Liberia and Indonesia) a ‘High-Level Panel’ tasked with producing a report as the first step in deciding what would succeed the MDGs. This Panel reported in May 2013, following a widespread consultative process and concluding that the post-2015 agenda would be universal; that the key objective was to ‘leave no-one behind’; that (given the

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significance of climate change, less apparent 15 years earlier) the new goals would have to integrate economic, social, and environmental action; and that peace and good governance lay at the heart of progress, attended by partnership and mutual accountability. The High-Level Panel (HLP) Report was well received, and, in that same year, the UK met its 0.7% target (subsequently enshrined in law). The UK’s superpower status, at least for the time being, remained secure.

The UK and the sustainable development goals The HLP Report led in September 2015 to agreement on: ‘Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’. This document included a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 Targets, a certain unwieldiness having been the price of consensus, framed by the less ungainly superstructure of People, Prosperity, Planet, Peace, and Partnerships (the ‘5 Ps’). The UK – although preferring a more abbreviated set of Goals and Targets – worked hard to develop this consensus. In a policy paper published just two months later, in November 2015, and entitled ‘UK Aid: Tackling the Global Challenges in the ­National Interest’, a newly elected Conservative Government in Britain (no longer in coalition with the Liberal Democrats) re-committed itself to the 0.7% target, linking this more strongly with the drive towards the SDGs, “both through our own action and through our leadership in the international community”, and supporting ‘global public goods’ such as the fight against climate change. The policy paper further explained why this was in the national interest, noting that: “Addressing all of these issues will also benefit the UK’s security and prosperity”; and it undertook to spend at least 50% of the programme in “fragile countries or regions”. So far, so good. And yet there was some nervousness in the UK aid and development community around such issues as how the term ‘national interest’ might be interpreted. Also of concern was the paper’s commitment to developing a cross-government strategy which would direct a significant proportion of the aid budget outside DFID to other government departments, in particular towards expansion of the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) and the creation of a new ‘Prosperity Fund’. Finally, some were troubled by mention of reforming the aid rules “to modernise the definition of ODA at the OECD”. Even so, in spite of these concerns, the prospects for international development, in general, and for the UK as a major player seemed bright at the end of 2015. Not only had the SDGs been agreed in New York, but also the Financing for Development Conference in Addis Ababa a few months before and the Paris Climate Change agreement in December 2015 all suggested that internationalism was alive and well.

Approaching the crossroads The result of the UK referendum in June 2016 on continuing membership in the European Union suggested something very different: that many in the UK felt the answer to what they saw as their increasing marginalisation was to retreat from

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globalisation, specifically by leaving the EU – a proxy for and symbol of that acute marginalisation arising from austerity measures put in place following the 2008 financial crisis. Indeed, some of that sense of marginalisation – and the beginning of anti-aid sentiment – can perhaps be traced as far back as the 1990s, when even as the UK was supporting the former Soviet bloc countries of Eastern and Central Europe, citizens of those nations were migrating to the UK in increasing numbers (‘to take our jobs’). The fallout from the 9/11 attacks further encouraged suspicion of foreigners and anti-aid sentiments – Why should the UK support people who wished their country harm? It may be that the very description of the UK as an ‘aid superpower’ provoked a reaction, as domestic incomes fell and the quality of public services declined. And alongside all this there were others raising genuine concerns about the potential risks of aid dependency and worries about aid in some cases distorting markets and disempowering those not benefiting directly from those resources. Whatever the cause, public support in the UK for the aid programme (and for international NGOs) fell to lower than it had ever been before. On her visit to Africa in August 2018, Prime Minister Theresa May renewed a commitment: We will remain a global champion for aid spending, humanitarian r­ elief, and international development. We will continue our commitment to spend 0.7 per cent of gross national income on official development assistance. And we will not falter in our work to deliver the Sustainable Development Goals. Still, political uncertainties in the UK and negative public opinion cast some doubt over whether such welcome commitments would be delivered in practice, regardless of any potential loss of influence arising from Brexit. Interestingly, in the Multilateral Aid Review carried out in 2011 and repeated in 2016/17, the budgeted programmes of the EU scored high in terms of effectiveness, and the European Development Fund, negotiated separately outside the EU budget, scored even better. Some would argue that those high scores were attained (at least in part) because of UK influence. As one of a series of papers looking at the potential implications of leaving the EU, the government in 2017 produced ‘Foreign Policy, defence and development: A future partnership paper’. This document notes that the UK is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a leading member of other international fora such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the G7, the G20, the Organisation for Economic Co-­operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Commonwealth. All of which is true; but as and when the UK departs the EU, the case for its preserving a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, for example, will certainly be weakened, as will its influence across the entire range of international issues.

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Throughout its history, the DFID and its predecessors have been fortunate to operate under Ministers, whether Labour or Conservative, who were very committed to the cause of international development, and who were prepared to build alliances (including sympathetic Prime Ministers and Chancellors of the Exchequer) to protect the aid budget. One exception to this was in 2016/17, when Priti Patel was appointed as Secretary of State for International Development (soon after the EU referendum) and remained in that post for the next 18 months. There were serious concerns that she would press for the DFID to be integrated into a Department for International Trade and Development, as well as for changes to the DAC rules, for example, and advancing development considerations subservient to other political and commercial interests. For unrelated reasons she stood down as Secretary of State near the end of 2017. Her successor, Penny Mordaunt, made it clear that she would not seek major changes to the DAC rules; that the government would continue to fulfil the 0.7% commitment; that the SDGs would remain a clear focus for the UK aid programme; and that DFID would remain a separate department. While such undertakings are welcome, the febrile political atmosphere suggests that none of those commitments can be taken for granted in the medium or long term.

Conclusion: where next for the UK as an aid superpower? Much uncertainty remains, and at the time of writing, it is impossible to judge where this might all end. The biggest uncertainty is, of course, around Brexit and (if it goes ahead) the terms on which it will proceed. It would in theory be possible for the UK to remain part of the European Development Fund (EDF), which would send a strong and positive signal about the country’s willingness to work closely with EU member states and with the European Commission in this area of international policy. But there are other concerns – a recent report by the Parliamentary International Development Committee recommended that no further ODA funds be made available outside DFID without assurances that funds would go to poverty reduction and have the economic development of poorer countries as their primary focus, and that quality of spending of those funds meets DFID standards. The current government has rejected recommendations that DFID should have oversight of the entire UK ODA budget, and also that the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) should have the responsibility to examine the totality of the cross-Government funds, as well as other blended ODA/non-ODA programmes (Government response to IDC Report, HC1556, 12 September 2018). The UK cannot be considered an aid superpower in isolation from other aspects of British international policy. In ‘The Price of Freedom’ (Cargill, 2018), the British Foreign Policy Group argues that the UK should consider committing to a 3% target which would incorporate the 0.7% ODA commitment and the NATO 2.0% commitment, leaving 0.3% to increase the UK’s efforts on diplomacy and soft power. Only by remaining a world leader on all these

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fronts – and by maintaining its position within the global financial and political institutions – can the UK realistically aspire to continue its role as an aid/ development ­superpower, not only in terms of the quality and quantity of its aid programmes, but in its influence over a range of policies that affect developing countries and emerging economies. Whatever people think of its policies, and whether or not those policies are perceived as right or wrong, there has historically been little question about the UK’s ability to formulate and implement them effectively. There have, of course, been questions in the past – over the handling of the Suez crisis, for example – where for relatively brief periods of time, this effectiveness has been questioned; but as a result of the continuing uncertainties around, and handling of, Brexit, those questions now run deeper, and remain unanswered. This has undoubtedly already had an effect on the UK’s reputation across the board, including on those soft power institutions with a global reach like the British Council, the BBC and leading Universities which make a significant contribution to the UK’s reputation as a superpower. It is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for those countries which aspire to superpower status to develop a reputation for competence; never in recent UK history has that reputation been so seriously at risk. The country is indeed at a crossroads, and its future direction remains unclear. The choice is between the UK turning inward and reducing its international engagement, or turning the other way and continuing to recognise that its standing in the world and ability to influence events are enhanced, not diminished, by working in partnership with others. Only by taking this turn at the crossroads will it be able to remain – not least through the quality and volume of its aid programme – ‘Global Britain’.

Acknowledgements The author would like to thank the editors, Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez, and the co-authors of this book – particularly Henry de Cazotte – for their helpful comments and suggestions. He is also grateful to Mann Virdee (PhD candidate, University of Birmingham) and Penny Lawrence (former Deputy Chief Executive of Oxfam UK) for their useful feedback on an earlier draft of this chapter, and to a number of others who have given helpful comments on later drafts. His former colleague Barrie Ireton’s book on DFID and its predecessors, noted in the Bibliography, was a particularly helpful source for historical material.

Bibliography Cargill, Tom (May 2018) ‘The Price of Freedom? A 3% GDP target for securing UK international interests’, British Foreign Policy Group. Available at www.bfpg.co.uk Commission for Africa Reports. Our Common Interest (2005) and Still Our Common Interest (2010). Available at www.commissionforafrica.info

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The Economist (28 July 2018) International Development Select Committee Report: Government Response. Available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/ cmintdev/1556/1556.pdf Ireton, Barrie (2013) Britain’s International Development Policies: A History of DFID and Overseas Aid. Palgrave Macmillan. Macmillan, Harold, Speech to South African Parliament, 3 February 1960. Accessed at www. thoughtco.com (29 September 2018). Major, John, Speech to the Conservative Group for Europe, 22 April 1993. Accessed at www. johnmajor.co.uk (22 September 2018). White Paper Cmnd 774 (1960) Assistance from the United Kingdom for Overseas Development. White Paper Cmnd 2147 (1963) Aid to Developing Countries. White Paper Cmnd 6270 (1975) The Changing Emphasis in British Aid Policies: More Help to the Poorest’. White Paper Cmnd 3789 (1997) Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century. Wickstead, Myles A (2015) Aid and Development: A Brief Introduction. OUP.

5 THE SCANDINAVIANS: AID POLICY DETERMINANTS AND PERFORMANCES Olav Stokke

Introduction Official Development Assistance (ODA) is a relatively new public activity. It was first conceived in the late 1940s and facilitated by two international trends in the post-Second World War environment: the struggle by colonised nations for their independence, and the Cold War that arose between the victorious allies. The decolonisation process brought new states from the South into the United Nations (UN), changing the formal power balance within that world organisation and putting the need for economic and social development in the South high on the international agenda. During the Cold War, the major powers – East and West – used development assistance as an instrument in their fight for world hegemony. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the UN established international norms, objectives, and rules of the game for this policy area.1 The declaration of the first UN Development Decade (DD1, the 1960s), followed by the adoption of an international development strategy for that decade, and including a volume target, triggered the involvement of the Scandinavian governments of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. In the 1970s, these were among the first to meet the volume target set for DD2 – 0.7% of gross national product (GNP) in ODA – and they then immediately began moving towards the 1% target set for their own development assistance. How can this be explained? What was driving their aid policies? The study of foreign policy cum international relations has traditionally been anchored in realist paradigms – safeguarding and expanding the power of nations.2 This paradigm has since been challenged, both generally, by way of the study of foreign policy, and more specifically through study of the foreign policies of small- and medium-sized countries, including those of Scandinavia, especially in terms of their aid policy. Altruistic, cosmopolitan, and moral values also apply.3

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The questions posed above – not necessarily easy to answer – inform this chapter. It is thus necessary to examine the justifications that Scandinavia’s individual governments have given for their aid policies, along with the objectives and principles set for their aid-related activity; equally important is the need to scrutinise the extent to which their stated policies have been implemented. Any policy field may have special features of its own, as this field most certainly has. Nevertheless, aid policy constitutes part of these countries’ broader domestic and foreign policies, influenced by their geopolitical situation, resources, and experiences, and even by their national traditions and predominant values – including foreign policy traditions, alignments, and interests.4 Although major policies tend to continue over time, changing political and economic environments affect interests – and may even change values. Governments tend to adapt to such changes. This chapter starts with the early post-war years and explores policy trends over time. However, it does not aim at relating the full story of the aid policy of the Scandinavian countries over time – the perspective is narrowed to certain central aspects of their policies that may help in answering the main research question set: What have been the main drivers of their ODA policies?

The beginning of the road The Second World War hit the Scandinavian countries in different ways. S­ weden succeeded in maintaining its neutrality, while Nazi Germany occupied both Denmark and Norway – with Norway’s government-in-exile residing in the UK. These experiences affected their distinct economic and material situations following the war, as well as their post-war policies. They became ardent supporters of the UN, also in terms of security policy. Norway’s then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trygve Lie, was elected the first UN Secretary General, succeeded by Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden. Before the Second World War, the Scandinavian countries had been committed to neutrality. However, in the early post-war years, marked by increasing East-West tensions, Denmark and Norway elected to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while Sweden maintained its foreign policy of neutrality/non-alignment. During those early years, the three nations’ economic policy alignments also differed. The nascent European economic integration process (‘the Six’) attracted strong interest in Denmark, which became member of the European Economic Community in 1973; Norway became an associated member, while Sweden stayed outside the union until 1995. Nevertheless, during all these years, Nordic cooperation – both formal and informal – constituted an important pillar in their foreign policy, not least in terms of development cooperation. In the late 1940s, the UN established objectives and norms for this new policy field.5 The Scandinavian countries became involved from the start through modest contributions to the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA). During the Korean War of the early 1950s, they jointly provided a field hospital

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that developed into an educational hospital after the war’s end. Bilateral activities were also initiated: in Sweden, the Central Committee for Swedish Technical Assistance to Less Developed Areas (CK) was established in 1952; in Norway, an integrated fisheries development project in Kerala (India) constituted the main effort, resulting in the first-ever development project initiated by a small non-­ colonial country. The way in which these early initiatives emerged calls for attention. These two governments – both under Labour parties – were part of the drive and contributed most of the funding. In both cases, however, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society institutions constituted the backbone, combining fundraising with information and education.6 In Denmark, the Danish Association for International Cooperation proved central when it came to information and education activities, with financial support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From the very start, this broad ‘coalition’ among governments and civil society organisations (CSOs) – and the emphases given to information and education – became a trademark of the Scandinavian countries’ aid and development policy. However, the Scandinavian governments were late starters. As noted, the UN’s declared first Development Decade and the target set for development assistance made a difference. The three governments – all Social Democratic at that point – appointed committees to come up with a proposal for aid policy. During 1961–1962, these governments (and parliaments) set their aid policies for the first time.7 Norms and guidelines set for this new activity by the UN in 1949–1950 constituted the basis. Sweden and Norway explicitly anchored their stated policy in domestic values, such as the solidarity norm on which the welfare state was based. The Swedish ‘bible’ on development assistance stated that such assistance emerged from a sense of moral duty and international solidarity. “Swedish aid needs no other motivation” (Prop. 100, 1962, pp. 5–6). It considered this assistance to be instrumental in achieving the government’s overarching peace objective: its support of the political sovereignty of new states – reflecting Sweden’s neutrality policy in foreign affairs. For Denmark and Norway, which had abandoned their neutrality policy by joining NATO in the late 1940s, development assistance was considered a way of mollifying domestic opposition to the change in security policy. The three governments justified the provision of development assistance by way of ideal and moral arguments. However, instrumental arguments at a high level of generalisation came also to the fore – assistance would serve mutual long-term economic interests, especially trade interests, in an expanding world economy.

The volume targets and their follow-up From the very beginning, the Swedish government related the volume target to ODA, and not to the combination of private and official transfers set by the UN

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for DD1. Eventually, the other two Scandinavian governments followed suit. However, all three governments were slow in following up on the target set for the 1960s – accepting it in principle but setting no deadline for meeting it. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, this changed, prodded by the parliaments. During these years – and even later – the issue of volume dominated the discourse and was central even in the performance value assessments. The three countries first adopted the international 0.7% target set for ODA, then set their own 1% targets and deadlines for meeting them, thereafter following up on those commitments through multi-year, stepped-up budgetary planning. In 1974, Sweden was the first member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to meet the 0.7% target, thereafter meeting its own 1% target almost immediately in the budget for 1975/1976. In its plan for 1974– 1977, the Norwegian government set out to meet the 0.7% target in 1975 and the 1% target in 1978. Denmark’s follow-up on the 0.7% target was bumpy, but that target was met in the budget for 1978, two years ahead of schedule. During subsequent years, Denmark froze its ODA at about that level. The political processes around these decisions provide deeper insights, as do the follow-ups. In Sweden and Norway, political parties competed on increasing their ODA targets and on meeting them faster. In Sweden, the Communists and the Liberals pressed for higher targets to be reached earlier; the Conservatives were somewhat divided, while the Social Democrats – also pressured from within the party to increase allocations – decided the ODA level as well as the tempo. All political parties represented in Parliament agreed to meet the 1% target. Similarly, in Norway. In the 1960s and into the early 1970s, Labour was the major driver – both in position and in opposition – eventually with strong support from the parties to the left and those in the middle. The Christian Democrats and the Liberals – along with the Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti, or SV) – opted for targets far above the 1% level, while the Conservatives put on the brakes. Labour decided the pace. In 1977, however, when Parliament decided to meet the 1% target in the budget for 1978, all these parties agreed – those wanting a higher target pointed out that 1% of GNP represented only a first step. In Denmark, governments and the main political parties sought consensus on development policy, including the volume target, but views continued to differ. In 1970, a majority on a government-appointed review commission looked beyond the 0.7% target, proposing that ODA be increased to 0.94% of GNP by 1980/1981, while a minority advocated for raising it to 1.19% (Report No. 565, 1970, pp. 39–45). The political parties in the middle and to the left both opted for increases. Situated in the middle, the strongly pro-aid Social Liberals (RV) played a central role in the outcomes. In 1972, an anti-aid political party – the Progress Party (FP) – entered the Parliament. The volume target remained on the political agendas of all three countries. A strained international and/or domestic economy – in terms of

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balance-of-payments or the employment situation – did have an impact on their ODA performances, but less than might be anticipated. In the 1970s, stepped-up budgetary allocations to meet the 0.7% target continued, by and large, although the economies came under pressure. Nevertheless, a strained economy did affect their development policy, as well as their volume targets.8 However, it also happened that policy-makers (political parties and even parliamentary majorities) managed to preserve ODA budgets even when cuts were being made elsewhere, with the argument that developing countries were being hit harder by an international recession. Naturally, outcomes of general elections will affect post-election policy and the post-election party-political balance. Post-electoral negotiations may yield unexpected results, as illustrated in the Norwegian case. The Conservatives, who had historically held back on ODA allocations, changed course in 1986 and again in 1990, as coalition governments headed by Conservative Prime Ministers presented the highest ODA budgets to date (1.17% of GNP). The explanation: for the Christian Democrats, ODA had been (and remains) a priority issue, and the Conservatives needed their support to form a government. In Denmark, meanwhile, the strongly pro-aid Social Liberals played a similar role for years, until the parliamentary election of 2001 changed the political balance. In Sweden, the strongly pro-aid Liberals exerted a similar influence in non-Socialist government coalitions.9 An overview of the performances of the three Scandinavian countries over the decades – continually above the 0.7% target and, at times, above the 1% target since the late 1970s – is provided in Table A.1(1).

The stated policies – justifications, objectives, and norms The 1962 “bible” – Government proposition 100 – had a long-term impact on Sweden’s stated development cooperation policy. In 1977, a government-­ appointed parliamentary commission restated that solidarity with poor countries constituted a sufficient motive for Sweden’s development assistance. The general objective was “to contribute to raising the standard of living of poor people by means of a direct attack on poverty and its causes”. It set forth the following four objectives: economic and social equalisation (the principal goal), economic growth, economic and political independence, and democratic development of society (SOU: 13, 1977, pp. 38–39; English translation by this author). Later, in 1988 and 1996, respectively, the sustainable use of natural resources and equity between men and women were added as major objectives. Into the new century, a white paper outlining the policy for global development stated that “Sweden should pursue a coherent policy […] based on a holistic view of what drives development and of the measures that are required to achieve equitable and sustained development on a global scale” (Gov. Bill 2002/2003, 122, pp. 61–63). Basically, the main motives and objectives, as expressed in the bill, followed the tradition of previous major policy papers.10

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The evolving stated objectives for Denmark’s development assistance were to promote economic growth, social improvements, and poverty alleviation. As set out in the Act of 1971, the main objective was to support the a­ uthorities of developing countries in their efforts to achieve economic growth as the ­basis for social progress and political independence. Readjustments in the mid-1970 brought the social aspects more strongly to the fore and emphasised the importance of involving women in development. The political parties to the left sought to ‘purify’ Denmark’s ODA by doing away with tied aid. In 1983, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the purpose of its aid was to support “activities aiming to create income opportunities for the poorer groups of the population and to meet basic human needs […], and through the development of the modern sector of the economy […] the necessary basis for a sustainable improvement in the conditions of the poor population groups” (DMFA, 1983, pp. 5–6).11 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, environmental concerns came strongly to the forefront.12 And with the Cold War coming to an end, the promotion of liberal political values – human rights, democracy, good governance – likewise gained prominence in the stated policy, in Denmark as elsewhere.13 Nevertheless, poverty reduction remained the stated prime objective (DMFA, 1994). Norway’s justifications and objectives followed similar patterns. During the initial years, governments anchored the policy in basic humane and Christian values embedded in Norwegian society. In the early 1970s, the Scandinavian accent grew stronger – assistance should promote social welfare and income distribution in addition to economic growth.14 The government’s basic argument in its support of key elements in UN resolutions calling for a new international economic order (NIEO) was one of justice. However, brakes were applied when basic Norwegian interests (shipping, agriculture) were threatened. In the mid1980s and into the 1990s, increased emphasis was given to human rights, improvement of the situation for women, and concern for the environment, along with a stronger emphasis on poverty alleviation.15 These concerns were shared by all the Scandinavian governments. The end of the Cold War brought liberal values – human rights, democracy, and good governance – more strongly to the fore in Scandinavian aid and development policy. Early in the new century, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) increasingly established the framework for stated policy – again with an overarching aim of fighting poverty based on solidarity. Policy guidelines provide additional insights. The discussion here is limited to norms considered particularly important to our purpose – those guiding the distribution between multilateral and bilateral ODA, between gifts and credits, the selection of main partners for bilateral development cooperation, and norms guiding actual cooperation with the partner countries. Several of these guidelines proved conflicting. During the early years, a high multilateral component of ODA – ­channelled especially through the UN system – was a trademark of the Scandinavian

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countries’ aid policy, and in the beginning an objective in its own right: to strengthen the UN system and thereby contribute to strengthening and maintaining peace. By removing the national flag from assistance, its quality was assumed to be improved. During these years, the countries considered multilateral assistance both unselfish and effective. In contrast to the DAC’s average (close to 90% distributed bilaterally), a large share of Scandinavian ODA was channelled multilaterally – declining in the 1970s to between 50% and 40%. This performance shifted over time, along with increasing confidence in the abilities and capacities of their own aid agencies. Still, the UN remained an important channel for their development assistance.16 Moving towards 2000, however, their multilateral assistance as a share of ODA approached the DAC average. Nevertheless, this share was based on a high ODA per capita vis-à-vis the DAC average (see Table A.1(3)). Norms guiding the selection of main partner countries for bilateral development cooperation also provide relevant insights. In 1970, Sweden established guidelines for this selection – that ODA should be concentrated on a few priority countries based on a combination of political regime criteria (countries whose governments aimed at structural changes that would create preconditions for a development towards social and economic justice) and needs criteria (the degree of poverty). Norway established similar guidelines for the selection of partner countries, including that the governments should respect human rights as defined by the UN. Denmark concentrated the grant component of its bilateral ODA into a selection of partner countries. The Scandinavian countries shared several partner countries among them. While the poverty criterion for the selection of partner countries – as related to GNP per capita – was broadly acclaimed, the regime criterion was controversial along a left/right axis. For several reasons, implementation was lax, and the criterion faded away in the 1980s, when the ODA became increasingly widely distributed in geographical terms.17 It might conflict with other guidelines, including the one prescribing that development cooperation should be a longterm commitment: abrupt changes in aid-relationships should be avoided. The ­follow-up enforcement of yet another political guideline prescribing that recipient governments were expected to respect human rights remained lax until the mid-1980s, and even later.18 Another signal policy that combined humanitarian, developmental, and foreign policy concerns is here noteworthy. In 1968, Sweden began providing ODA to South Africa’s neighbouring countries to bolster their independence vis-àvis the apartheid regime, as well as to refugees from racial oppression – from South Africa, Namibia, Rhodesia, and areas under Portuguese rule in southern ­A frica. More than this, the policy extended political, economic, and humanitarian assistance to liberation movements within these areas (Prop. 101, 1968, pp. 11, 94, 141). When these countries became independent, they were included among Sweden’s partner countries for development cooperation. Support was

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also provided to their regional cooperation through the Southern African Development Community (SADEC). In the early 1970s, the two Scandinavian NATO members, Norway and Denmark, followed suit.19 Nicaragua came to take a similar position in the foreign and development cooperation policies of these two NATO members, against warnings from the Conservatives. Another guiding principal is that development assistance should be provided on the recipient country’s own terms. In the early 1970s, the Scandinavian governments operationalised this principle through multi-year programming and commitments agreed to by donor and recipient governments. In the 1980s, however, first-generation aid conditionality – setting reforms of their economic policy as a condition for the provision of development assistance, ­orchestrated by the IMF from the early 1980s – changed that reality. Although the Scandinavian governments were late and reluctant in their follow-up of this conditionality, they did so in 1986 – with contributions to humanitarian operations as an explicit exception. The notion of the original guideline nevertheless stayed on. The conditions on which ODA is provided – as grants or credits – may serve as indicators of the generosity of the assistance. Overall, the ODA of the three countries has increasingly been provided on a grant basis – and in the case of Norway, from the very start. In the beginning, development credits to finance projects that generated economic returns made up about half of the bilateral ODA of Denmark and Sweden. Sweden after 1972 and Denmark a decade later provided most of their ODA as grants; the evolution of these trends is given in Table A.1(2).

A concern for self-interest and domestic business interests in particular In the early 1960s, the policy documents of the Scandinavian countries recognised the important role of investments and trade for development within developing countries – and that development assistance might also open opportunities for their own industries, entrepreneurship, and trade. OECD statistics on procurement tying of ODA have been a central indicator of self-serving interests. These overviews exclude parts of the ODA (such as administrative costs, assistance to refugees, technical assistance, and multilateral assistance), with variations over time. Other, more discrete political and administrative measures may be equally effective in ensuring a high ‘return-flow’ of ODA. The Swedish ‘bible’ argued that ODA should be ‘clean’ – geared to development within the developing countries, and not aimed at supporting Sweden’s own industries’ capacity to compete in the markets of developing countries. However, in the mid-1960s, procurement tying emerged as an alternative to ­cutting the planned stepped-up ODA allocations. In 1972, the government (­Social Democrat) introduced formal tying of a portion of the ODA programme. This represented a breach with the predominantly altruistic ideology, but not

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necessarily with previous practice – part of the ODA had already been informally tied. Subsequent non-Socialist governments followed suit. In the late 1970s and into the 1980s, several instruments were established to ensure a high return-flow of ODA, including so-called mixed credits. The concept of ‘broader cooperation’ served as the bridge-builder, involving the private Swedish sector.20 Such practices were not unique to Sweden. What was relatively unique, on the other hand, was the strong resistance from the ‘aid constituency’ arguing for ‘pure aid’, which at times even succeeded in modifying outcomes. In the late 1990s, however, formal tying declined. In 2002, the government (­Social Democrat) followed up on a DAC recommendation to untie ODA to Least ­Developed Countries.21 Nevertheless, pressure from Swedish economic interests continued. The government found that “the interest of global development policy and industrial policy coincide”.22 From the early 1960s onward, Denmark’s policy within this area was ­candid  – as noted, half of bilateral ODA (the development credits) became explicitly tied to ensure national broad support for the new policy project. In practice, much of the remaining bilateral component (grants) was also tied, including the technical assistance.23 In the 1990s, the government took several new initiatives to integrate the business community more strongly into the aid business by supplying policy advice and grants, among other measures. This concern for the country’s industrial (and agricultural) business interests continued into the new century. As observed by DAC, “Denmark’s support for private sector development steadily increased, with a focus on the value chain development […], small and medium enterprise development and finance, and an innovative financing model based on public-private partnership” (OECD, 2016b, p. 182). Denmark’s multilateral assistance was no exception, although less easy to steer – “Denmark gradually learned to flex its aid muscles by putting pressure on UN organisations to direct procurement activities to Denmark” (Brunbech & Olesen, 2013, p. 116). Up to the beginning of the 21st century, the major political parties were in general agreement on this policy – the quest for ‘pure aid’ was by and large restricted to smaller parties on the left. Public opinion polls more than indicated that the policy enjoyed strong support within the electorate.24 However, in the early years of the new century, Denmark untied most of its ODA.25 In 1967, the Norwegian government (non-Socialist coalition) established a principle of untied aid, well-based in liberal principles and strong shipping interests. However, several exceptions from this principle served Norwegian deliveries to aid-financed projects. The tension between norms and practice eventually became a core issue in the Norwegian discourse. The tying/untying profile – as recorded by OECD – is given in Table A.1(4a, b). The instruments intended to involve the private sector shifted over time. In the early 1960s, this approach began in the traditional way with incentives, funded from the ODA budget, to stimulate exports of commodities and

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guarantees against risks for investments. This intensified in the 1970s due to the stagflation of the international economy, which also hit Norwegian exports and especially the shipbuilding industry. The Labour government reactivated and increased funding of the existing mechanisms and established new ones, and the Conservatives agreed. In the early 1980s, new mechanisms followed to ensure a high return-flow of ODA.26 Negotiations on the composition of the country programmes constituted part of the process – becoming more discrete towards the 1980s, but perhaps equally as effective as formal tying, despite the principle of recipient-oriented ODA.27 During the second part of the 1980s and into the 1990s – with the economy under pressure, affecting the employment situation as well – Labour and non-Socialist governments alike explored how to increase the return-flow of ODA. However, an idealistically oriented aid constituency (NGOs, the Church of Norway, political parties in the middle and to the left) criticised the policy.28 While interest-organisations lobbied successfully through the corporative state (the government/public administration), the aid constituency lobbied through Parliament. Parliament often expressed a will of its own, at times across party lines and particularly in situations involving principles. The funding from the government’s ODA budget-line of the established mechanisms to ensure a high return-flow of ODA was, however, modest: the financial frames increased from 1.3% of ODA in 1984 to 3.3% in 1991. The actual spending of the means budgeted for was even less (Stokke, 1991, pp. 62–63). Although OECD statistics do not capture all forms of aid-tying – let alone all efforts to ensure its main purpose, namely a high return-flow of ODA – they do indicate trends. While 39% of Norway’s bilateral ODA was tied in 1990, that share was down to 2.3% in 2000.

Major changes in the domestic and international political environments We have seen that major changes in the national and international political environments impacted both policies and priorities. The neoliberal ideological renaissance within major Western countries in the 1980s, especially the US and the UK, impacted on aid policy, eventually affecting the policies of the Scandinavian countries as well. The end of the Cold War brought liberal political ideas to the fore – human rights, democracy, and good governance. The early 1990s also saw conflicts between ‘nationalities’ contained during the Cold War, flaring up, often with regional repercussions, sometimes destroying within weeks what had taken generations to build – as in former Yugoslavia, resulting in massive human misery and movements of refugees, also in-country-refugees. This made humanitarian assistance a higher priority, including within the Scandinavian countries. The complex emergencies also involved peace-keeping operations.29 These post-Cold War conflicts, and especially the massive refugee problems they generated, affected the composition as well as the direction of ODA. Also

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impactful at the turn of the century were new waves of refugees escaping longterm violent conflicts, especially in the Middle East (but also elsewhere), along with effects of the ‘war on terror’. The financial crisis of 2008 and its years of repercussions only added new concerns. With few exceptions, European rightwing nationalist political parties fuelled the discontent and increased their support from the electorates. Public attitudes towards ODA were gradually affected in negative ways, including within the Scandinavian countries (though with variations from one country to the next). In Denmark and Norway, nationalist, tax-protesting, and anti-ODA political parties had already been coalescing in the early 1970s. Into the new century, the Danish People’s Party (DFP) emerged as a major player in Danish politics, including its aid and development policy, finding its position outside (blue) coalition governments more convenient and equally influential as within the coalitions.30 Restrictive refugee and immigration policies were strengthened; nevertheless, Denmark maintained adherence to the 0.7% ODA target. A similar development took place in Norway. For years, the political influence of the Progress Party (Fremskrittpartiets, or FrP) was marginal, although it did represent a permanent protest alternative to the other parties, not least in terms of aid and development policy. In the mid-1980s, when other political parties were competing to raise ODA beyond (and, in some cases, far beyond) the 1% target, the FrP wanted to do away with the aid agency altogether and, in principle, terminate all ODA.31 This changed into the new century, particularly after 2013, when the party entered into the Solberg (minority) government (Conservatives and FrP) that was dependent on the parliamentary support of the Christian ­Democrat and Liberal parties, both strongly pro-aid. This coalition government, with the chair of the FrP as Minister of Finance, presented budgets that maintained the 1% ODA target – and the government probably would not have survived if it hadn’t done so. Although strong tensions remain, the DFP in Denmark and the FrP in ­Norway have been integrated into Danish and Norwegian government politics – in ­Denmark being part of a (“blue”) government coalition (although deciding to stay outside the government). In Norway, the FrP became a member of the Solberg government (minority, Conservatives, FrP) in 2013. In 2018, the Liberals joined this coalition government; and in early 2019, so did also the Christian Democrats (KrF), turning it into a majority government. The KrF became in charge of the Ministry of Development Cooperation and the Liberals in charge of the Ministry of the Environment – their respective prioritised policy areas. In Sweden, a different scenario emerged in the late 2018. The ‘normal’ mechanism of strongly pro-aid political parties in the middle of the political spectrum succeeding to maintaining the ODA target had applied for years. In the second decade of the new century, however, Sweden’s right-wing nationalist party (SD) increasing in parliamentary strength disturbed the established balance between the left and the right – neither side were able to form a majority government after the 2018 general election.32

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The elephant in the room in recent times has been these countries’ refugee, immigration, and integration policies. In the Scandinavian countries (as elsewhere in Europe), changes taking place within electorates regarding attitudes to immigration, and even refugee policies, have impacted on policies of the domestic parties – whether with or without the ‘assistance’ of the ­emerging ­nationalist parties. The relationships and power balances among the political ­parties have been affected as well, gradually involving the orientation of their ODA – ­especially in terms of assistance for refugees.

ODA as a foreign policy instrument Development assistance constitutes part of a country’s foreign policy and, in most countries, is administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), which traditionally holds prime responsibility for looking after and promoting the overall interests of the nation, including those of its firms and citizens. This administrative setting may not be without its complications. The objectives and norms of a new policy field might conflict with traditional objectives and norms, creating tensions within the system. During the early years of development cooperation (and even later), separate administrations of various kinds were set up by OECD countries to oversee this new policy field, including separate ministries, semi-autonomous agencies, development ministers responsible for aid policy within the MFA, and combinations of those models. The Scandinavian aid administrations reflected such variations, in different ways in each country and with modifications over time. The countries have from time to time had separate ministers (and deputy ministers) for development assistance. Denmark has followed the traditional pattern somewhat consistently – placing the aid administration within the MFA, at times with a separate section within the ministry. Sweden, in contrast, established a strong semi-autonomous aid agency (SIDA) outside the MFA for the implementation of much of its ODA and, as noted, other specialised agencies for part of its bilateral (commercial and research) assistance. In 1968, Norway established a semi-independent aid agency (Norad) under the MFA. In 1983, and for about a decade, most of this policy area resided under a Ministry of Development Cooperation, but it was later reincorporated into the MFA. Part of the rationale for both the Norwegian and Swedish concepts was to establish a slight distance between the ‘traditional’ interest-based foreign policy administration and the forming and implementation of aid policy, adapting it to the objectives and norms set for that policy area. The distinction between altruism and realism is not clear-cut. Altruistic objectives set for aid policy may be included in an extended concept of the national interest, and even defined as such. Consider the interest, especially of ‘smaller states’, in promoting a rules-based international system, including security, economic policy, and human rights. Development assistance has offered itself as a tool for governments to pursue such foreign policy interests. Concern for international common goods – and activities to follow-up on such concerns – may also be

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included in this extended-interest concept, as may concerns for the environment and climatic change, and even the (humanitarian) concern for victims of ­catastrophes caused by nature and man. Since the late 1980s, such objectives – ­a lways present – came increasingly to the forefront, influencing not only the stated but also the implemented aid policy of the Scandinavian governments. To this can be added the promotion of cherished liberal values within the three countries – democracy, human rights, and good governance. The promotion of peace has long traditions in the foreign policy of the ­Scandinavian countries – in the post-Second World War period, including the active promotion of and participation in peace-keeping forces under the auspices of the UN (Frydenberg (ed.), 1964). In the early 1990s, humanitarian concerns (again, always present) gained strength in response to the suffering that resulted from intra-state conflicts flaring up, with regional repercussions, inter alia, in the Horn of Africa, in southern Sudan, in the Great Lakes region in Central Africa, in Congo, and as already noted, in the centre of Europe (former Yugoslavia). Beyond providing humanitarian aid, particularly to refugees, the Scandinavian countries also participated in international peace-keeping and peace-enforcing operations. Part of the costs of these so-called complex emergencies (combining relief and military operations) found their way into the ODA budgets. This ‘securitising’ of aid became more prevalent into the new century. Iraq and then Afghanistan emerged as major recipients of Scandinavian ODA. In Afghanistan, Denmark and Norway participated with military forces in the USled ‘war on terror’.33 ODA followed in the wake of troops, justified by core arguments for ‘ordinary’ development assistance to assist in improving health and education, and especially conditions for women. The likelihood of sustainable development being achieved by ODA in such environments is certainly questionable, as was candidly ascertained by a public scrutiny of Norwegian contributions.34 This case is probably not unique to Norway, and it illustrates that the increasing securitising of aid may in fact strongly reduce the capacity of meeting the development aspirations of ODA.

Some concluding observations What have been the main policy drivers of the aid and development policies of Scandinavia’s governments? This question has guided the chapter, and we have sought answers in the countries’ stated and implemented policies. There is no single answer, but several. Nevertheless, at the end of the road, domestic societal values and norms stand out as prime drivers – most strongly reflected in stated policy. Solidarity norms constitute the foundation on which these countries built their welfare states, especially in the post-Second World War years. These norms, extended to the international society, have been their key justification for development assistance. As the governments of Sweden and Denmark stated, when they first formalised their aid policy in the early 1960s, no other justification was needed.

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And yet there is more to it. Profane interests were manifest from the very beginning, initially related to trade, then increasing as ODA volumes grew. Such concerns have been taken well care of by the governments – varying over time, more strongly and efficiently by some governments than others. Nevertheless, the main conclusion is that even their implemented policies tend to point in the same direction: they have been predominately altruistic. While industrial interests in these ODA-providing countries have been among the beneficiaries of development assistance, they have not been among the prime drivers. While this conclusion gives the brief overall answer to the research question posed, it does not pursue the natural follow-up question: What might be the implications for Scandinavia’s development assistance – including the ODA ­volume – should the more profane economic/commercial or security interests get the upper hand, moving aid away from its original value-based platform and its traditional mantle-bearers? That question lingers on. Over the years, nuances have emerged in the aid profiles of the Scandinavian governments, including in the justifications. Profane interests – especially those serving domestic industrial interests – became increasingly manifest in the policies implemented during the late 1970s and into the 1980s. Practices varied from one Scandinavian government to the next, as did the public attitudes towards those practices within these countries. Whereas hotly debated in Sweden and Norway, in Denmark the public and the main political parties found it quite natural (and part of the ‘contract’) to draw on the country’s own industrial resources in implementing the development assistance. However, these manifestations – given varying emphases by different ­governments within the three countries, varying over time – do not qualify as drivers of their aid policy, except in special cases. Governments did indeed respond to demands from domestic industrial and trade interests involving the composition and direction of ODA. At times, when the domestic economy came under pressure, they did so to prevent budgetary cuts from affecting the ODA volume. A broad-based ‘aid constituency’ – especially in Norway and Sweden – strongly protested against the so-called commercialisation of development assistance, arguing for ‘clean’ ODA and at times even succeeding in modifying the forms and magnitude of such mechanisms. The stated aid policies of the Scandinavian countries – beyond the ­justifications  – point in the direction of an altruistic development assistance ­policy. The predominant objectives set out – poverty alleviation in the first place, dominant throughout and, as refined over the years, with support for education and health development as primary instruments – clearly point in the direction of an altruistic policy. The emerging strong focus on women in development, accentuated in stated policies since the mid-1970s, reinforces this policy direction as well. The emphasis on democratic development and human rights – on board from the beginning, though laxly prioritised and implemented until the 1990s – also s­ uggests an altruistic policy, though this might conceivably be cast

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in terms of ideological interest, as the promotion of cherished Scandinavian values. Nevertheless, ­a lthough moving high-up on the stated political agenda in the 1990s and beyond (with good governance added), its share in ODA budgets has been modest. Other dimensions of their development and broader foreign policy, as discussed in the “ODA as a foreign policy instrument” section, may fit into a similar category – altruistic ends that also promote more long-term (enlightened) self-interests. This would be the case of the support, also by way of aid policy, for international and global common goods, as widely defined, including the core objective for development assistance: elimination of poverty, and especially absolute poverty. Policies to improve the environment and meet the challenges of climatic change fit into the “international common good” category. It was early picked up and strongly pursued by all the Scandinavian governments. In the mid-1980s and into the 1990s, stimulated by the Brundtland report (WCED, 1987) and further boosted by the Rio global conference on development and the environment in 1992, the environmental issue (emphasising sustainability) was raised to priority status. Denmark provided the most remarkable expression of this impact. In the 1990s, the country’s heyday as an aid provider, Denmark provided 1.0% and more of GNP in ODA, ranking first among OECD countries (Stokke, 2009, Tables A.7 and A.10). On top of this, in 1992 the government established a special fund to support environmental initiatives and emergencies, aiming at an additional 0.5% of GNI by 2002. However, by that date a ‘blue’ government coalition that relied on the parliamentary support of the DFP put its foot down, also reducing the ordinary ODA budget. Several of the guidelines established for their development policies – especially the one prescribing that ODA should be provided on the recipient countries’ own terms, particularly strong in the early 1970s – also point in the direction of an altruistic aid and development policy. In 1986, however, the Scandinavian governments reluctantly fell into line with first-generation aid conditionality orchestrated by the IMF. Although so-called positive measures were their preferred approach, this certainly affected the guideline negatively. Positive measures also characterised their second-generation conditionality – involving ‘Western’ ­liberal values, democracy, human rights, and good governance – and prioritised objectives set for their ODA.35 For Sweden, professing non-alignment, the foreign and development policies were mutually reinforcing. During the Vietnam War, Prime Minister Oluf Palme had few if any inhibitions in condemning US policy on moral and ­humanitarian grounds, or in providing humanitarian and development assistance to North Vietnam, at the cost of frosty relations with the US. The two NATO members faced a different reality. During the Cold War – and even after – security policy concerns mattered, also affecting their development cooperation policy, especially involving the selection of main partner countries. Nevertheless, they took an independent stance in certain signal issues like support

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for liberation movements in southern Africa, the later selection of independent states in this region governed by these movements as partners in development, and the assistance to (Sandinista) Nicaragua, justifying their policy in a NorthSouth perspective as opposed to the East-West perspective of the US. Especially Norway, under Labour as well as non-Socialist coalition ­governments – pushed the NIEO issue for years, also after President Regan had ended the dialogue in 1981. Security concerns, nevertheless, influenced part of their aid policy, as illustrated in the case of the Norwegian assistance to A ­ fghanistan and more indirectly in the “war on terror”. The so-called Norwegian engagement policy, pursued from the mid-1980s onward, involving peace negotiations among conflicting intra-state parties in developing countries around the world, and fuelled to a large extent by ODA, fits into this picture.36 Denmark’s ‘active multilateralism’ of the 1990s, going beyond its traditional aid policy to include active international peace-making and peace-keeping, also fits into this picture. Into the new century, this policy was substituted by the so-called international activism with Denmark joining the “coalition of the willing” in Afghanistan and Iraq, thereby downgrading its prior strong emphasis on the UN and turning part of its ODA into an instrument of traditional security policy.37 Based on the traditional development assistance policies of the Scandinavian governments, the conclusion has already been provided. It is reinforced by the foreign policy dimensions referred to above – the promotion of the broadly defined international common goods, the engagement policy and active multilateralism involving peace-keeping and peace-making. However, among the two NATO members, security policy concerns (‘realism’) have also rung loud and clear: in the ‘war on terror’, development assistance followed in the footsteps of soldiers, even though that assistance was directed to exposed groups and development purposes, such as education for women – priority areas in the countries development policies. The main conclusion of this study (that aid has been mainly altruistic) does not conform easily, if at all, with traditional realist paradigms of international relations. How can this be explained, and what, if any, might be the implications for development theory? Paradigms are instruments based on prior research and experience, serving to guide in the search for new insights – they do not provide answers. And yet they may be self-fulfilling – and even carry normative overtones, as in the case of the early realist school. The selection of sources and indicators to be used in research is all-important. The wider the net is cast, the richer the catch. To begin with the explanation: there are big countries and large, medium, and small countries. In international relations (IR), power relations depend on several general as well as more subject-specific factors beyond their economic and military strength, resources and skills. However, one dimension is particularly clear – the power basis is different for major (big) countries, rich in resources and

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for small, poor countries.38 The Scandinavian countries are all small countries. Participation in global or regional security (and other) alliances may, however, slightly diminish the implications of this simple distinction, depending on the policy area. We began in the introduction with the traditional realist paradigm, further developed into the 1980s, where the main emphasis is placed on the power to safeguard and expand national interests – security and economic interests in the first place, contrasting it with the paradigm of humane internationalism, developed in the late 1980s, emphasising also the power of cosmopolitan, ideal, and moral values. Cultural and ideological power also matters, even a country’s moral standing and respect. The importance of building and promoting this kind of ­image is no hidden secret among politicians or within ministries of foreign affairs. National interests carry weight also within the framework of humane internationalism, but the interest concept is broader, and the emphasis different from the traditional interest concept of the realist school. In this discussion, we have included the interest and efforts to build an international system ruled by law, to which ODA might contribute. This applies also to several of the international cum global common goods referred to – such as improvement/ preservation of the environment, meeting the threats of climatic change, fighting world poverty, and even the promotion of ‘Western’ values such as human rights, democracy/participation, and good governance – all, in the context of humane internationalism, considered enlightened national as well as international interests, with development assistance among the policy tools that can be used to pursue them. This discussion – pertinent to paradigms for the study of international ­relations  – is further developed elsewhere with special reference to international development cooperation.39 The paradigm of humane internationalism has a wider IR framework, encapsulating also, inter alia, peace-making and peace-keeping ­a spirations and efforts. Although related especially to a small-state foreign policy strategy in our context here, its framework is wider. A generous and predominantly idealist (altruistic) aid and development policy – and foreign policy more generally – may convert itself into ‘realist’ power. Within the Scandinavian countries, a generous ODA has become part of their identity – their self-image – although this has been challenged in recent years. The ‘moral’ power accrued through development assistance may even evolve into ‘realist’ power beyond the fields of humanitarian and development policy.40 Internationally, the contributions of the Scandinavian governments within this policy field have been highly commended – also indicating the kind of power transformation referred to: their development and aid policies have enabled them to play a role beyond the ODA policy area and to punch above their weight on the global stage.41

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Notes 1 For the early process, Stokke (2009: Part 1, pp. 29–129). 2 The roots of the realist school may be traced back to Machiavelli (1532). In the post-Second World War period, the classic of the realist approach is the seminal work of Hans Morgenthau (1948; also 1962, related specifically to the policy of foreign aid). This paradigm was further developed, inter alia, as by Kenneth Waltz (1959, 1979) and Robert O. Keohane (1984). For interesting overviews and discussions on the evolving academic discourse, particularly on development and development cooperation paradigms, see Chapters 1 and 2 in the present volume, by Bernabé Malacalza and Gino N. Pauselli, respectively. 3 For criticism of classical and neo-classical realism, inter alia, see Lumsdaine (1993) and Holm and Sørensen (1995). For an alternative paradigm, that of humane internationalism, see Pratt (1989, 1990) and, especially related to the policy of development assistance, Stokke (1989a, 1989b; as concentrated, 1996: 20–25). 4 Despite having worked for years on the development policies and performances of both Scandinavian and European countries – including very specific aspects of these policies – my first real effort to locate the basic policy determinants came in the late 1980s (Stokke, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c). Recently, the net has been cast wider, taking the aid polices of the OECD countries as the point of departure, and especially seeking the policy drivers of the four original front-runners (Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden) as well as those of the US (Stokke, 2019). This chapter draws on those works. 5 For an overview and analysis, see Stokke (2009: Part 1, pp. 29–129). 6 The first Swedish “aid agency” (CK) – a semi-public body – consisted of some 60 representatives of NGOs and civil society institutions, business and trade unions, government and Parliament. It started as a membership organisation. A vivid account of the start in 1952 was given by its executive secretary: “Altogether, 45 organizations were invited to become members of CK. They were all in the nature of nation-wide NGOs and represented the major associations and popular movements in the country”. Axel Gjöres was unanimously elected chairman, “because of his firm roots in the Swedish cooperative movement, which exercises a mighty influence in Swedish society” (Heppling, 1986, p. 17). The Norwegian Parliament unanimously established the Kerala project in June 1952, and in its concluding debate, “idealist and humanitarian justifications for the assistance dominated” (Pharo, 1986a, p. 54). In the spring of 1953, the campaign for the project inspired an almost full mobilisation of voluntary organisations, civil society, and the media. Official Norway took an active part as well, with the King, the Prime Minister, prominent politicians, and the Church of Norway at the helm. The campaign had a double purpose – fundraising and education – emphasising the moral obligation to assist. For vivid descriptions, see Pharo (1986a, pp. 106–111); Simensen (2003, p. 49) (English translation (quote from Pharo), this author). The opening of “The People’s Action for the underdeveloped areas”, organised independently from the project, was launched at Oslo City Hall and addressed by the King, the president of Parliament, the Minister of Justice (representing the government), and both the former and new Secretary Generals of the UN (Lie and Hammarskjõld). 7 The processes and outcomes are described and analysed in Stokke (2019: chapters 5–7 on the three Scandinavian countries), and in an extensive literature on each. 8 Sweden’s austerity programme in 1995, when it joined the European Union, may serve as an illustration. To reverse the build-up of public debts, the non-Socialist government and the Social Democrat opposition agreed to put brakes on public spending, this time not excluding the ODA budget. The cuts resulted in a decline of total disbursements from US$2 billion in 1992 (peaking at 1.03% of GNP), to US$1.7 million in 1999 (0.7% of GNP) (OECD, 2000). The 0.7% target prevailed for several years before Sweden again increased its ODA toward and then beyond the 1% target.

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9 For a detailed description and analysis, see Stokke (2019, chapters 5–7). 10 The policy should be based on human rights, “on Sweden’s solidarity with poor and vulnerable people in other countries and recognition of our shared responsibility for the future of the world”. The government singled out solidarity as the main justification, adding that this reflected “the basic values in accordance with which the Swedish society evolved”, which were also the values in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (ibid., pp. 18–19). 11 The introduction to the 1985 annual report stated that “Denmark’s development assistance is poverty-oriented, that is, concentrated on the poorest developing countries, and has as its primary aim to contribute to sustainable improvements in the economic and social conditions of the worst-off population groups in those countries” (DMFA, undated [1986], p. 9; English translation, this author). 12 A Plan of Action aimed at systematically integrating environmental aspects into ­Danish ODA as a cross-cutting issue (DMFA, 1988). In 1992, the concern was reflected in the establishment of a special fund (EDRF) with the ambition of making a difference within this policy area internationally – planning to reach 0.5% of GNI over a 10-year period (additional to the 1% ODA target). However, the project did not survive the change of government after the 2001 general election. 13 A human rights plan of action was adopted in 1988. In 1991, the head of Danida (the Danish International Development Agency) noted that human rights had become “one of the most dominant themes in Danish development policy”, adding that “Only a few years ago […] donors tacitly overlooked violations of human rights […] the human rights situation was not considered that important if the ODA reached the intended groups” (Haakonsen, 1991, p. 100; English translation, this author). For an overview and analysis of human rights in Denmark’s aid policy 1975–2010, see Midtgaard (2013). 14 The prime motive was to assist in reducing the gap between rich and poor countries and to improve the living standards and social and human rights in poor countries. In 1975, the Labour government stated that “the moral obligation to help human beings in distress in distant parts of the world lies in the fact that our ability to share and sympathise in the experience of others does not stop at national boundaries” (Norad, 1975, pp. 13–15). Some nine years later, a non-Socialist government (Conservatives, Centre Party, Christian Democrats) emphasised similar justifications (St.meld. no. 36 (1984–85), p. 19). This prime justification continued over time, independent of the party-political bases of governments. 15 The way the government and Parliament defined this poverty-orientation, elevated to a principle in 1991, underscores the emphasis: it meant “partly, that Norwegian aid shall be channelled to the poorest developing countries; partly, that [it] shall be used to promote social and economic development for the broader sections of the populations, and particularly for the groups that were most problematically situated. In this connection, it is important to direct attention towards the mechanisms that affect the development of poverty. In this context, the socio-economic structure is of importance and so is the extent to which the authorities promote a policy that is socially just and development-oriented” (St.meld. no. 51 [1991–1992], p. 174; English translation, this author). Parliament agreed (Innst.S. no. 195 [1992–1993], p. 38). 16 The Nordic governments took a strong interest in improving the UN as a development agency and in the reform efforts more generally (The Nordic UN Project, 1990, 1991a, 1991b). 17 The Norwegian case may illustrate the point. When established in 1972, the guideline was restricted to the selection of new priority countries (the older ones stayed on). The actual selection instead followed a “balancing” principle: “market-oriented” Kenya to balance “socialist” Tanzania; Pakistan to balance India (and subsequently, when Pakistan split up, Bangladesh to strike a balance); and, in 1977, Sri Lanka to balance “Socialist” Mozambique (the Conservatives being against the inclusion of

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18 19 2 0

2 1 2 2

2 3

2 4

25

Mozambique). Nevertheless, ODA has mainly been distributed to poorer countries and countries in need of humanitarian assistance. For Denmark, supra, note 13; for Norway, Stokke, 1995, pp. 167–176; for Sweden, Palmlund, 1986, pp. 122–124. The history of support by the Nordic countries for liberation movements in southern Africa is recorded and discussed in a series of volumes published by the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, inter alia Eriksen, 2000; Sellström, 1999. A fund for industrial cooperation (SWEDFUND) was established in 1978 to mobilise Swedish firms in so-called joint ventures in developing countries, funded from the ODA budget but administered outside SIDA. In 1981, the government reintroduced development credits (financed from the ODA budget) to boost Swedish exports to and entrepreneurship in (better-off ) developing countries (i.e. mixed credits). Less conspicuous efforts to the same end also materialised, included informal tying of ODA and a clear signal to the system to increase the return-flow of ODA, and to adapt Swedish deliveries (to the extent possible) to the objectives and norms set for its ODA. During the first five years of the 1980s, the formal tying increased from 15% to 25%, if settlements of debts were also included. For critical voices, see Edgren (1986, p. 61) and Jacoby (1986, p. 90). Gov. Bill 2002/03: 122: 56–57. Sweden reduced its tying from 6% in 1995 to 2% in 2005. Ibid., p. 52. “Swedish business possesses knowledge and experience, both in policy matters and practical implementation, that could be an asset to Sweden’s development assistance […]. Nowadays, many Swedish enterprises are among the world leaders in the field of environmental policy, corporate social responsibility, and non-corrupt business relations. The Swedish trade union movement’s experience in these areas should benefit the developing countries” (ibid., pp. 75–76, 52). However, Bertil Odén identifies areas in which Swedish self-interests have conflicted with the aims set for the development policy. He argues that coherence efforts had contributed to making Swedish aid more supply driven (Odén, 2009, pp. 29–31). Discussing the impact during the 1970s, Hans-Henrik Holm noted that agricultural interests were automatically cared for, while industrial organisations expressed dissatisfaction. Having kept a low profile until the mid-1970s, the Federation of Danish Industries (FDI) argued, in 1977, that supplies of Danish manufactured goods should be more extensively tied (Holm, 1982, pp. 125–144). In the 1990s, with increased difficulties in the Danish labour market, the national interest organisations (particularly the large organisations for agriculture, industry, and labour) exerted substantial and growing influence on the aid policy. The FDI, with the support of the trade unions, managed to ensure that a substantial reflux quota would continue to benefit Danish corporations – “Most of the time, no strong pressure was required: the political executive and the representative of labour saw no conflict of interests” (Olesen & Pedersen, 2010, pp. 891–892). In 1984, 80% of respondents were in favour, in principle, that aid should be provided in the form of commodities produced in Denmark. In the 1990s, a majority agreed that development assistance should be made more dependent on whether it served to promote Denmark’s industry (DUPI, 1985, p. 423; 1991, p. 468; 1993, p. 514). According to OECD, Denmark’s food aid and technical assistance were fully untied as of 2005 and 2008, respectively. “With 97% of its total aid untied in 2008–09, Denmark is in the top category of OECD donors with respect to untying aid” (OECD, 2011, p. 153). In 2015, all ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-­ donor refugee costs) was untied (OECD, 2016a, p. 185). Nevertheless, in its peer review, DAC struck a warning note, arguing that Denmark “needs to consider the balance between development and commercial objectives when working with, and through, the private sector”, noting that funds distributed by Denmark’s Investment Fund for Developing Countries were 100% tied (OECD, 2016b, pp. 14 (quote), 19).

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2 6 Pre-investment studies in Norway’s programme countries were subsidised (50%); a new mechanism (Norway’s Fund for Investments in Economic Development in Developing Countries – NORFUND) was proposed in 1975 and established in 1979, from which Norwegian firms could apply for loans on favourable terms (or guarantees for such loans) for industrial development projects in developing countries. 27 The practice compelled a reaction from Parliament. In 1981, Parliament stated that NORAD, as a rule, should buy at world market prices, adding, however, that in cases where special reasons might justify an exception, NORAD could choose Norwegian suppliers for commodity, programme, and project aid – “even if they should be up to 10% more expensive than what could be obtained elsewhere” (Innst. S. no. 255 [1980–1981], p. 6; English translation, this author). Contrary to Parliament’s intention, however, “up to 10%” tended to develop into a norm. 2 8 Within the non-Socialist government coalition, the Christian Democrats were strongly against the introduction of mixed credits, pressed for by the Conservatives. However, in 1984, the party agreed to introduce that mechanism, but on a trial basis and given a tight financial frame. On balance, the Conservatives, traditionally holding back, agreed to the highest ODA budget ever in relative terms – 1.17% of GNP. 29 For overview analyses by the present author, see Stokke (1996; 2005). 30 In Denmark, the Progress Party (Fremskridspartiet, or FP), established in 1972, entered Parliament after the general election the following year as the second-largest political party, obtaining 28 of the 175 seats. It was the first of the (extreme) rightwing nationalist parties in Europe to enter Parliament since the Second World War. However, its direct influence on policy was marginal – after the 1973 landslide election, it gradually lost electoral support. In 1995, the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, or DFP) began as an offspring of the FP. The DFP received a boost in the first general election in which it took part (1998), while the FP faded away, and the  DFP became a major player in Danish politics. It obtained 21.1% of the votes in the 2015 election, emerging as Parliament’s largest political party. 31 Consistency between stated and implemented policy was, however, lax. In the budget debate in Parliament in 1987, its spokesperson suggested the ODA budget be cut by NOK 3.1 billion – implying that the party accepted a budget that would provide 0.5% of GNP in ODA, far above the DAC average. Its support varied considerably from time to time, with its strength increasing from 3.7% in the 1985 general election to 24.1% in a public opinion poll three years later. 32 Established in 1988, emerging from extreme-right nationalist movements, Sverigedemokraterna (SD) obtained 0.1% of the votes in the 1991 general elections and 2.9% in 2006. In 2010, it obtained 5.7% of the votes and was for the first time represented in Parliament (20 of 349 members). In the 2014 general elections, it became the third-largest party in Parliament (9.7% of the votes and 49 MPs), further increasing in the (September) 2018 general elections (17.5% of the votes and 62 MPs). Its electoral platform included, among other things, anti-culturalism and a restrictive immigration and integration policy. A prolonged government crisis followed – only the Conservatives and the Christian Democrats were eventually willing to establish a (moderate) minority government that depended on support from the SD. In the end (mid-January 2019), the Liberals and the Centre Party shifted sides, tentatively accepting a government with the Social Democrat leader as the PM, conditioned especially on agreement of an economic policy. For the majority of Sweden’s political parties, relying on the support of the SD in a government position was unacceptable. 33 In the early years of this century, Denmark downgraded its prior strong emphasis on the role of the multilateral organisations, especially that of the UN system, shifting emphasis toward stabilisation and anti-radicalisation (Brunbech & Olesen, 2013, pp. 109–110); although “the central position of altruism as a dynamic impulse”

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34

35 3 6 37 38 39 40

4 1

(Olesen & Pedersen, 2010, p. 897) was not completely eroded. For the securitising of Denmark’s ODA, see also Stepputat et al., (2012, pp. 21–22). As to the development effects of the resources invested, the main conclusion of a major public evaluation of the Norwegian efforts in Afghanistan (2001–2014), headed by a former minister of foreign affairs, is very telling: the assistance had served to maintain and strengthen Norway’s security policy relations with the US – the key pillar of Norway’s security and foreign policy. Not much more had been achieved (NOU, 2016, 8, pp. 9, 193). For an overview and discussion of the conditionality problematic, with an emphasis on second-generation conditionality, see Stokke (1995a); for Norway’s policy, see Stokke (1995b); for Sweden’s policy, see Wohlgemuth (ed.) (1994). These foreign policy peace engagements have been hotly debated; for good discussions, see Hveem (2015), Liland & Kjerland (2003), and Østerud (2006), among others. For active multilateralism, see DMFA (1994) and others; for the international activism, see Brunbech & Olesen (2013). For an early discussion on small states in international relations, focussing on security policy, see Vital (1970). Inter alia, see Stokke (2019 also, 1989a, 1989c); and Pratt (1989; 1990). See, inter alia, a statement made in Parliament by Norway’s Minister of Development Cooperation, Anne Kristin Sydnes (Labour): development policy represented an important part of the image of Norway that was formed outside the country, where the country’s oil fortune was well known. “The development policy also counteracts a picture of Norway as a country where self-interest, materialism, and egoism rule the ground” (Proceedings of Parliament, 8 May 2000; English translation, this author). For a more general discussion of Norway’s foreign policy from this perspective, including its aid policy, see Matlary (2002), among others. A series of peer reviews by DAC may illuminate the point. Thus, in 2005: “Sweden is seen in the developing world as a committed partner. This reputation has permitted it to play a role well beyond the ODA volumes that it can provide” (OECD, 2005, p.  1). The 2013 peer review of Norway stated: “At the heart of Norway’s foreign policy lies its commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and individual human rights, combined with its dedication to open, tolerant societies”, adding that “[t]his concentrated effort enables Norway to punch above its weight on the global stage” (OECD, 2013, p. 16). The 2011 peer review of Denmark stated that it had “shown international leadership in climate change, gender equality, and women’s empowerment, pushing an ambitious agenda and achieving results …” (OECD, 2011a, p. 23).

Bibliography Brunbech, P. Y. & Olesen, T. B. (2013) ‘The Late Front-Runner: Denmark and the ODA Percentage Question, 1960–2008’, in Olesen, T. B. et al. (eds.) Saints and Sinners. Official Development Aid and its Dynamics in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. Akademika Publishing, Oslo, pp. 89–121. DMFA (1983) NOTAT om Danmarks statslige bistand til udviklingslandene for perioden 1. januar 1984 til 31. december 1988 (D.j.nr. 104.Dan.6/1.e.) (Denmark’s ODA, 1984–1988). Udenrigsministeriet (dated October, 1983; mimeo), København. DMFA (undated [1986]) Danmarks deltagelse i det internationale udviklingssamarbeide 1985. Udenriksministeriet, Danida, København. DMFA (1988) Handlingsplan: Miljø og udvikling. Handlingsplan for styrkelse af miljøaspektene i dansk udviklingsbistand. Den overordnede strategi. Udenriksministeriet, Danida, København.

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DMFA (1994) En verden i udvikling. Strategi for dansk udviklingspolitik frem mod år 2000 (Strategy for Denmark’s Development Policy towards Year 2000). Udenriksministeriet, Danida, København. DUPI (1985, 1991, 1993) Dansk Udenrigs-politisk Årbog 1984,1990, 1992. Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut/Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, København. Edgren, G. (1986) ‘Changing Terms. Procedures and Relationships in Swedish Development Assistance’, in Frühling, P. (ed.) Swedish Development Aid in Perspective: Policies, Problems & Results Since 1952, in Almqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm, pp. 47–63. Eriksen, T. L. (2000) Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa. The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala. Frydenberg, P. (ed.) (1964) Peace-Keeping – Experiences and Evaluation: The Oslo Papers. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo. Gov. Bill 2002/2003, 122 (2003) Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s Policy for Global Development. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm. Haakonsen, B. (1991) ‘Udvikling, demokrati og menneskerettigheder’, in Petersen, N. & Thune, C. (eds.) Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1990. DUPI/Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, København, pp. 100–107. Heppling, S. (1986) ‘The Very First Years. Memories of an Insider’, in Frühling, P. (ed.) Swedish Development Aid in Perspective: Policies, Problems & Results since 1952. ­A lmqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm, pp. 13–26. Holm, H.-H. (1982) Hvad Danmark gør … En analyse af dansk u-landspolitik, Politica, ­A arhus, pp. 125–144. Holm, H.-H. & Sørensen, G. (1995) ‘International Relations Theory in a World of Variation’, in Holm, H.-H. & Sørensen, G. (eds.) Whose World Order? Westview Press, Boulder CO and Oxford. Hveem, H. (2015) ‘Utviklingspolitikken i endring?’ (The Development Policy in Transition?) Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift, 31:1, pp. 5–28. Innst. S. no. 255 (1980–1981) Innstilling fra utenriks- og konstitusjonskomiteen om Norges ­samarbeid med utviklingslanda i 1979, Oslo. Innst. S. no. 195 (1992–1993) Innstilling fra utenriks- og konstitusjonskomiteen om utviklingstrekk i Nord-Sør forholdet og Norges samarbeid med utviklingslandene, Oslo. Jacoby, R. (1986) ‘Idealism versus Economics – Swedish Aid and Commercial Interests’, in Frühling, P. (ed.) Swedish Development Aid in Perspective: Policies, Problems & Results Since 1952. Almqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm, pp. 85–100. Keohane, R. O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Liland, F. & Kjerland, K. A. (2003) Norsk utviklingshjelps historie (3). 1989–2002: På bred front (The History of Norway’s Development Assistance, 1989–2002). Bergen, Fagbokforlaget. Lunsdaine, D. H. (1993) Moral Vision in International Politics. The Foreign Aid Regime, 1940–1989. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Machiavelli, N. (1532) Il Principe, Firenze (inter alia, Skinner, Q. & Price, R. (eds.) The Prince. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Matlary, J. H. (2002) Verdidiplomati – kilde til makt? (Value diplomacy – a source of power?) Universitetet i Oslo, Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet, Oslo. Midtgaard, K. (2013) ‘Human Rights in Danish Development Aid, 1975–2010’, in Olesen, T. B. et al. (eds.) Saints and Sinners. Akademika Publishing, Oslo, pp. 123–157.

112  Olav Stokke

Morgenthau, H. (1948) Politics among Nations. Knopf, New York. Morgenthau, H. (1962) ‘A Political Theory of Foreign Aid’, in The American Political Science Review, LVI, 2. The American Political Science Association, Menasha, Wisconsin. Norad (1975) Norway’s Economic Relations with Developing Countries. Norad (offprint of St.meld. no. 94 (1974–1975)), Oslo. NOU (2016:8) En god alliert – Norge i Afghanistan 2002–2014 (A Good Security Policy Ally: Norway in Afghanistan 2001–2014). Departementenes sikkerhets- og serviceorganisasjon, Informasjonsforvaltning, Oslo. Odén, B. (2009) ‘Policy for Global Development: Implementation and Changes’ in Odén, B. & Wohlgemuth, L. (eds.) Where Is Swedish Aid Heading? University of Gothenburg, School of Global Studies, Gothenburg, pp. 21–32. OECD (2000) Sweden. Development Cooperation Review (http://www.oecd.org/dac/ peer-reviews/sweden200odevelopmentco-operationreview.htm) [accessed 7 April 2016]. OECD (2005) DAC Peer Review of Sweden. OECD, Paris. OECD (2011a) Development Cooperation Report 2011, 50th Anniversary Edition. OECD Publishing, Paris. OECD (2011b) OECD Development Assistance Peer Reviews: Denmark 2011. OECD Publishing, Paris. OECD (2013) OECD Development Cooperation Peer Review of Norway 2013. OECD Publishing, Paris. OECD (2016a) Development Cooperation Report 2016. The Sustainable Development Goals as Business Opportunities. OECD Publishing, Paris (doi:10.1787/dcr-2016-en) [accessed 25 October 2016]. OECD (2016b) OECD Development Cooperation Peer Reviews: Denmark 2016. OECD Publishing, Paris. Olesen, T. B. & Pedersen, J. (2010) ‘On the side of the angels: altruism in Danish development aid 1960–2005’, European Review of History/Revue europeenne d’histoire, 17:6, pp. 881–903. Østerud Ø. (2006) ‘Lite land som humanitær stormakt?’ (Small Country as Humanitarian Big Power?), Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, 23:4, pp. 303–316. Palmlund, T. (1986) ‘Altruism and Other Motives’ in Frühling, P. (ed.) Swedish Development Aid in Perspective. Almqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm, pp. 101–125. Pharo, H. Ø. (1986a) Hjelp til selvhjelp. Det indisk-norske fiskeriprosjektets historie 1952–72. Volume I. Perioden 1952–60. Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, Oslo. Prop 100 (1962) Kungl. Maj:ts proposition nr 100 år 1962, Kungl. Maj:ts proposition till riksdagen angående svenskt utvecklingsbistånd; av den 23 februari 1962. Stockholm. Prop 101 (1968). Kungl. Maj:ts proposition nr 101 år 1968, Kungl. Maj:ts proposition till riksdagen angående svenskt utvecklingsbistånd; av den 15 mars 1968. Stockholm. Report No. 565 (1970) Betænkning om Danmarks samarbejde med udviklingslandene. Statens trykningskontor, København. Sellström, T. (1999) Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa. Volume I: Formation of a Popular Opinion (1950–1990). Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala. Simensen, J. (2003) Norsk utviklingshjelps historie. Volume 1, 1952–1975: Norge møter den tredje verden. Fagbokforlaget, Bergen.

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SOU: 13 (1977) Sveriges samarbete med u-länderna (Sweden’s cooperation with developing countries). Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet. St.meld. no. 36 (1984–1985) Om enkelte hovedspørsmål i norsk utviklingshjelp. Departementet for utviklingshjelp, Oslo. St.meld. no. 51 (1991–1992) Om utviklingstrekk i Nord-Sør forholdet og Norges samarbeid med utviklingslandene. Utenriksdepartementet, Oslo. Stepputat, F. et al. (2012) Dansk bistand som sikkerhetspolitisk instrument, 1992–2009. DIIS Report 2012: 01, Copenhagen. Stokke, O. (1989a) ‘The Determinants of Aid Policies: General Introduction’, in Stokke, O. (ed.) Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, pp. 9–31. Stokke, O. (1989b) ‘The Determinants of Norwegian Aid Policy’, in Stokke, O. (ed.) Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, pp. 159–229. Stokke, O. (1989c) ‘The Determinants of Aid Policies: Some Propositions Emerging from a Comparative Analysis’, in Stokke, O. (ed.) Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty. The Scandinavian Institute of International Affairs, Uppsala, pp. 275–322. Stokke, O. (1991) ‘Norsk bistandspolitikk ved inngangen til 1990-tallet’, in Grung, T. E. (ed.) Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Årbok 1990. Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, Oslo, pp. 43–77. Stokke, O. (1995a) ‘Aid and Political Conditionality: Core Issues and State of the Art’, in Stokke, O. (ed.) Aid and Political Conditionality. Frank Cass, London, pp. 1–87. Stokke, O. (1995b) ‘Aid and Political Conditionality: The Case of Norway’, in Stokke, O. (ed.) Aid and Political Conditionality. Frank Cass, London, pp. 162–200. Stokke, O. (1996) ‘Foreign Aid: What Now?’, in Stokke, O. (ed.) Foreign Aid Towards the Year 2000: Experiences and Challenges. Frank Cass, London, pp. 16–129. Stokke, O. (2005) ‘The Changing International and Conceptual Environments of Development Co-operation’, in Hoebink, P. & Stokke, O. (eds.) Perspectives on European Development Co-operation. Policy and Performance of Individual Donor Countries and the EU. Routledge, Abingdon and New York, pp. 32–112. Stokke, O. (2009) The UN and Development: From Aid to Cooperation. Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis. Stokke, O. (2019) International Development Assistance. Policy Drivers and Performance. ­Palgrave Macmillan, EADI Global Development series, London and New York. The Nordic UN Project (1990) Perspectives on Multilateral Assistance. Almqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm. The Nordic UN Project (1991a) The United Nations: Issues and Options. Almqvist & ­Wiksell International, Stockholm. The Nordic UN Project (1991b) The United Nations in Development: Reform Issues in the Economic and Social Fields. Almqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm. Vital, D. (1970) The Inequality of States. A Study of the Small Power in International Relations. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Waltz, K. (1979) Theory of International Politics. Addison-Westley, Reading MA. WCED (1987) Our Common Future. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York. Wohlgemuth, L. (ed.) (1994) Bistånd på utvecklingens villkår (Aid on Development’s Terms). Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala.

0.09 0.11 0.05 0.52

0.13 0.16 0.19 0.44

1965

0.38 0.32 0.36 0.34

1970 0.58 0.66 0.82 0.33

1975 0.74 0.85 0.79 0.38

1980 0.80 1.01 0.86 0.35

1985 0.94 1.17 0.91 0.33

1990

92 99 82 63

74.1 99.6 95.4 69.3

1975

80.7 100 98.6 75.6

1980 99.3 98.3 98.8 90.2

2006–07 98 99 95 84

1970 96.0 99.8 99.2 88.6

1975

Denmark Norway Sweden DAC

0.28 0.35 0.20 0.10

%

(0.13)

(0.33)

+EEC

1980

2 1 3

Rank 0.34 0.43 0.28 0.10

%

(0.13)

(0.39)

+EEC

1989–1990

2 1 3

Rank

0.36 0.22 0.19 0.05

%

0.96 0.87 0.77 0.27

1995

(0.23) (0.08)

(0.41)

+EU

1999–2000

1 2 3

Rank

97.3 100 99.0 (90.1)

1980

1.06 0.80 0.80 0.22

2000

100 99.8 100 92.8

27.9 28.3 30.0

%

1989–1990

Grant element

(3) Multilateral ODA for selected years, 1980–2014, as a share of GNP/GNI (averages) and ranking

Denmark Norway Sweden Total DAC

1970

Grants (%)

(2) Grants as a share of ODA commitments, and the grant element of total ODA commitments

Denmark Norway Sweden DAC

1960

(1) Trends in relative ODA performance, 1960–2015 (ODA as a percentage of GNP/GNI)

TABLE A.1  O verview data: ODA of the Scandinavian countries

APPENDIX

0.90 1.10 0.97 0.32

2010

20.8 34.0 27.6

14 13 11

Multi-bi Rank

2014

100 100 100 97.1

2007

0.81 0.94 0.94 0.33

2005

0.85 1.05 1.40 0.30

2015

32.6 8.5 21.4 44.8

(1.6) (9.9)

(4.5)

Partly tied

1975

26.3 17.9 15.6 –

Tied

(7.4)

Partly tied/ and EEC

1980

23.2 16.5 19.4 (36.2)

Tied

38.7 23.0 6.1 (17.7)

Source: OECD-DAC.

Denmark Norway Sweden DAC

Tied

(4.6)

Partly untied

1995

61.3 77.0 93.9 (77.7)

Untied 19.5 2.3 3.7 (16.2)

Tied

2000

10.9 (3.0)

Partly untied

Commitments (excluding technical cooperation and administrative costs)

80.5 97.7 85.4 (80.8)

Untied

(5.8) (10.2)

(7.4)

Partly tied/ and EEC

1985

(4b) Tying status of the bilateral ODA for selected years, 1995–2005 (percentages)

Denmark Norway Sweden DAC

Tied

Gross disbursements

(4a) Tying status of total ODA for selected years, 1975–1990 (percentages)

4.9 0.4 1.7 (6.5)

Tied

– 23.2 14.5 23.5

Tied

2005

(1.8)

95.1 99.6 98.3 (91.8)

Untied

– 36.7 53.1 (43.3)

Untied

Partly untied

– 0.0 0.0 (4.7)

Partly untied

Bilateral

1990

2014

90.4 100 85.8 80.6

Untied

40.5 40.5 32.9 (17.1)

Excl. EEC

Multilateral

[17.1]

[8.2]

Incl. EEC

6 JAPANESE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WIN-WIN PROPOSALS1 Marie Söderberg

Introduction Japan has often been considered the odd man out in development cooperation. Although the country has been a member of the Organisation for Economic ­Co-­operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) since 1964 and was the world’s largest donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA) during the 1990s, its aid approach has always been a bit different from that of other DAC donors. Recently, this has begun to change, and many donors are now following in Japan’s footsteps, implying a heavy emphasis on economic infrastructures: building roads, railways, ports, etc., rather than promoting social infrastructures. Historically, Japan’s assistance has also maintained close cooperation with Japanese private companies, a fact not well regarded by other DAC donors. So the question is raised: Why are other donors now turning in Japan’s direction? Part of the explanation has to do with 2030 Agenda and the S­ ustainable ­Development Goals (SDGs), adopted by all UN member nations in 2015. A number of new goals have been incorporated which may lead to a new aid ­architecture (or rather development cooperation architecture), requiring wider and deeper cooperation with non-DAC members and with sources such as p­ rivate industry and nongovernmental organisations. So what does all this imply for Japan’s development cooperation? What can be understood from formulations in the 2015 Japanese Development Cooperation Charter (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015) is that development cooperation is likely to become a political tool serving Japan’s external and domestic political interests, to an even larger degree than before. In this Charter, it is clearly stated that development cooperation should be dealt with through an entire-­ government approach, and not separately from other of Japan’s policies vis-à-vis developing countries. To a large extent, the document reads like an extension of

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Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s political platform in terms of diplomacy, security, and economics. Economic power has been an important tool for Japanese foreign policy, and this is very much tied to Japan’s post-war identity. Although the economy has been rather stagnant over the last two decades, Japan remains the third largest economy in the world. In the 1990s, the country sponsored a World Bank study known as the East Asian Miracle (World Bank, 1993) seeking to confirm the J­apanese model for Asian development. And although Japan’s economy is no longer booming, economic power is still the main tool in its international relations. Shifts in the world economy and power structures and Japan’s present need to deal with its own domestic economic problems have implications for the country’s political ­economy, which is currently adjusting to these new conditions. For Japan, economic diplomacy has long been a key concept when dealing with developing countries (Okano-Heijmans, 2013). Under the constitution adopted after the Second World War, Japan was prevented from sending its Self Defence Forces abroad or from solving international conflicts by military means, and this made development assistance an important tool in its international r­ elations2. At the domestic level, development assistance is also a tool to stimulate the Japanese economy, assisting small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in particular to establish themselves in less developed parts of the world. In this chapter, Japanese development cooperation is analysed from the perspectives of diplomacy, defence/security, and economy. We begin with a short historical background of Japanese ODA, taking these three perspectives into consideration, and then move into an analysis of the 2015 Charter and the external and internal forces that influence Japanese policy. In the conclusion, the role of development policy in Japanese diplomacy, defence and security, and economic policy will be analysed, taking geostrategic changes into consideration.

Historical background In 2014, Japan celebrated the 60th anniversary of its ODA programmes (Kato, Page & Shimomura, 2016). As the term ODA did not exist in 1954, one presumes that the reference was to foreign aid or economic cooperation programmes. Up until 1958, no distinction was made between “aid”, which originated as war reparations, and “economic cooperation”, a concept that includes official flows as well as private direct investment. In 1954, Japan became a donor by c­ ontributing US$50,000 to the Colombo Plan. Burma received reparations from Japan in 1954, the Philippines in 1956, and Indonesia in 1958, mainly destined to build infrastructures damaged by the war. Money was ‘tied’ and (despite representing war reparations) regarded as part of an economic policy to promote exports from Japanese industry. Major government economic cooperation began with the ‘yen loans’ of 1957, granted by the Export-Import Bank of Japan and based on conditions too severe to qualify them as ODA under the present definition (Söderberg, 1996, pp. 31–50).

118  Marie Söderberg

Japan joined the OECD and provided its first grant aid in 1969 – the same year that the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) introduced the concept of ODA. During the 1960s, almost all Japanese aid had been confined to Asia and overwhelmingly served commercial purposes. This changed with the oil crisis of 1973. When the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) placed an oil embargo on the US and its allies that had supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War, a Japanese mission, endowed with a diplomatic tool in the form of a huge aid package, was sent to placate angry Arab states. Aid thus became politicised, and a stable supply of natural resources became another motivation for Japanese aid policy. By the end of the 1970s, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) had two motives as justification for aid. One was that Japan should contribute to peace and stability in the world, and since it was a country without military power, this could only be achieved through economic aid. The second motive, related to the first, had to do with Japan’s image as a region poor in natural resources. Trade would be the means to obtain needed resources, and the building of infrastructures was a prerequisite for such trade. Thus, MOFA asserted that Japanese aid money should be spent on the building of infrastructures; humanitarianism was not mentioned as a rationale for aid until 1978, when MOFA announced it as one of five main considerations, the others being international economic security, Japan’s duty as an economic power, economic self-interest, and what was called “normal diplomatic necessity” (­Söderberg, 1996, pp. 31–50). In the early 1970s, when Japanese companies launched their first investment boom in Southeast Asia, they were insufficiently sensitive to workers’ conditions and environmental issues. Memories of the Second World War were still very much alive among certain recipient populations. When Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka made a tour of Southeast Asia in 1974, he was met by storms of protest in several countries and by demonstrators hurling eggs. Something needed to be done to improve the situation, and in 1977 Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda (in a speech in Manila, Philippines) announced a new national policy vis-à-vis Southeast Asia that was later dubbed “the Fukuda doctrine”. Fukuda said that Japan had no intention of becoming a military threat to anyone in the area, aiming only at equal partnership – a ‘heart to heart’ relationship – with the Southeast Asian countries. This was partly the rationale for a number of aid-­ doubling plans presented by Japan at the end of the 1970s. In 1989, Japan became the world’s largest donor of ODA and, with the exception of one year, continued to be so throughout the coming decade. This gave Japan the appearance of a responsible country with a strong social conscience, although statistical analysis reveals another picture. Despite its being the largest donor in absolute terms, Japan’s ODA as a percentage of Gross National Income was always well below the average of other DAC countries, the large size of ­Japan’s aid budget being a reflection of the size of its economy. Quality of aid, as measured by the DAC in economic terms, put Japan proportionally at the bottom of the list, as most Japanese aid came in the form of loans (Söderberg, 1996, pp. 31–50).

Japanese development assistance  119

Most of this went to Asia for the building of infrastructures in the form of roads, railways, ports, and power plants. Aid at the end of the 1980s was further justified through the security concept of ‘burden sharing’ (yakuwari buntan) with the US, according to which Japan was expected to take greater responsibility in aid to compensate the US for its global security role (Islam, 1991, pp. 191–230). Aid was in this way used to fend off US demands for increased Japanese military spending. With the end of the Cold War, this situation changed once again. The need to contain the communist threat decreased, and a wide range of new countries began applying for Japanese aid. It was in this climate that Japan announced its First ODA Charter in 1992.

Political conditions made clear in the First ODA Charter With this First Charter, Japanese ODA became more politicised, as well as more environmentally friendly, following an emerging trend of the time. The Gulf crises had called attention to the question of armaments in developing ­countries, and in 1991 Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu announced four principles for ODA which were further strengthened in Japan’s Official Development ­A ssistance Charter of 1992 (Söderberg, 1996b, pp. 133–45): • • •

•

Environmental conservation and development should be pursued in tandem; Any use of ODA for military purposes, or for aggravation of international conflicts, should be avoided; Full attention should be given to recipient countries’ military expenditures, their development and production of weapons and missiles of mass destruction, and their export and import of arms; Full attention should be given to efforts for promoting democratisation and the introduction of a market-oriented economy, as well as to the situation in terms of the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient countries.

The First Charter was well received internationally, but the characteristics of Japanese aid and the varied interests of the bureaucratic actors involved made it difficult to implement. Policy in general was formulated as a result of pluralistic conflict and consensus-building among four main bureaucratic actors that looked at ODA from different aspects: the Ministry of Finance (public finance and international monetary policy), the MOFA (diplomacy and foreign policy), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (trade and the national economy), and the Economic Planning Agency (Orr, 1990). For example, the building of a coal power plant in the Philippines in the 1990s (as well as many other infrastructure projects) was promoted by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, but this was at odds with the MOFA, seeking to profile Japan as environmentally friendly (­Söderberg, 1996, pp. 45–48). Japanese authorities claimed that trends in the various fields of the stated principles should be watched (Söderberg, 2001, pp. 116–117),

120  Marie Söderberg

and care should be taken to ensure fair and non-arbitrary application; but there were essentially only two ways to implement the Charter. Taking as an example the situation vis-à-vis the securing of basic human rights, development that proved to be in line with those principles could be promoted either by aid or by an increase of aid. In cases of severe violation of the principles, aid could be cut or reduced. Examples of positive promotion included donor meetings, such as that arranged for Mongolia, which at the time was moving towards a more democratic society and market-oriented economy; also, an international donor meeting for the rehabilitation of Cambodia; or the re-initiation of aid to both Vietnam and South Africa, also seen as increasing democracy. Additional efforts were made to assist five Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Uzbekistan, ­Turkmenistan, and Tadzhikistan) that appeared to be moving in the right direction. Seminars on democratisation were held in Japan for attendees from Africa and Latin America, but not from Asia, as this was considered too sensitive. War memories still lingered in Asia, and Japan did not want to intervene in other nations’ domestic affairs, which made implementation of the principles of democracy and human rights difficult. Examples of negative actions were Japan’s suspensions of ODA to Sudan due to human rights violations in 1992, to Sierra Leone after its 1992 coup, and to Niger and Guatemala when their constitutions were partially suspended in 1993. China was a tricky case: Japan stopped aid in 1989 following the incident at ­Tiananmen Square (before the Charter was adopted), but Japan was later the first country to resume aid to China, which by 1993 was the top recipient of Japanese aid. While China was moving in the direction of a market economy, its military spending was increasing, human right abuses persisted, and the nation was continuing its underground testing of nuclear weapons. In 1995, Japan decided to cut aid to China due to its nuclear policy, given strong public opinion within Japan against nuclear weapons. However, the cut was made only in grant assistance, which amounted to a mere 4 per cent of total bilateral assistance. This had no effect on Chinese nuclear testing, which proceeded according to schedule. Meanwhile, loan aid to China for building infrastructures and promoting trade under the auspices of Ministry of International Trade, Ministry of Finance, and Economic Planning Agency continued as usual. Such positive and negative actions raised questions about Japanese aid under the 1992 Charter; the case of China raised the question of whether Japan was truly ready to employ cuts to aid as a foreign policy tool against its main Asian neighbours, since such a move might have repercussions in other fields such as trade or foreign direct investment (FDI) (Söderberg, 2001, pp. 114–129; Takamine, 2006). Furthermore, certain characteristics of Japanese aid at the beginning of the 1990s (that it was request-based, emphasised self-help, and was loan aid for economic infrastructure) acted as hindrances for positive promotion of the principles enshrined in the Charter. One could hardly expect authoritarian governments to request aid for the promotion of democracy (Söderberg, 1996b, pp. 133–145).

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The worldwide trend in securitisation of aid enters the next Charter Globalisation, spurred by advances in information technology during the 1990s, accelerated economic integration and the rapid growth of certain developing countries. Flows of private capital increased, but at the same time the gap ­between those who reaped their benefits and those who could not also widened. Recognising this fact, the US increased its foreign aid after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, with the EU and several other donors quickly following suit. The Millennium Development Goals and their promise to reduce poverty by half by 2015 had been adopted by the UN and signed by more than 190 nations at the turn of the century. With this, the international donor community seemed to be moving more towards a coordinated approach (Sunaga, 2005). While the Japanese government was complacent with its role as the world’s biggest donor, the popularity of ODA was declining among the domestic ­population, who were suffering a protracted recession. Japanese citizens had also grown increasingly sensitive about their own security, partly due to the threat of North Korea and to the 9/11 attacks in the US, and to the subsequent war against terrorism centred in the Iraq. Nationalism had also surfaced in relation to China, where the economy was rapidly growing. Japan went into a prolonged recession in the 1990s and, at the end of that decade, the Liberal Democratic Party made administrative reforms a core part of its political reform. This opened up the potential for aid policy reforms as well. In 1999, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) that dealt with ODA loans was merged into the Japan Bank of International Cooperation ( JBIC), which provided other kinds of financing beyond aid. In 2001, the ­M inistry of International Trade and Industry was merged with the Economic Planning Agency to form the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (METI). In 2003, the legal status of the Japan International Cooperation Agency ( JICA) changed, making it semi-independent, and its new chairperson, Sadako Ogata, launched a thorough revision of the organisation. In August 2003, the Japanese government revised the ODA Charter. The Second ODA Charter stated that the objectives of Japanese ODA were “to contribute to peace and development of the international community and thereby to help ensure Japan’s own security and prosperity”. The first half of this statement was in line with DAC’s overarching principle that the primary objective of ODA is to promote development and welfare, while reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals were the joint objectives of all countries. At the same time, peace-building had come to be seen as a prerequisite to reaching those goals. The importance of security had become evident in the 1990s, when the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development was formed, producing guidelines for donors on these issues. In 2004, the Security System Reform was endorsed, specifying a number of recommendations for actions in order to promote peace and security as fundamental pillars of

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development, at both the personal/individual and state levels (Söderberg, 2010, pp. 99–116). The second half of the phrase (“to help ensure Japan’s own security and prosperity”) clearly reflected the national interest, and this can be seen as a way of popularising ODA on the domestic scene; but it was also indicative of the fact that Japan has always viewed ODA as a two-way flow that should assist both donors and recipients. The Second ODA Charter also spelled out a number of concepts and ideas that were expected to be upheld, such as (i) supporting self-help efforts;3 (ii) enhancing human security; (iii) assuring fairness; (iv) utilising Japan’s experience and expertise; and (v) partnership and collaboration with the international community. In the 2003 Charter, four priority issues were set out: poverty reduction, sustainable growth, addressing global issues, and peace-building. In a later, expanded priority for international cooperation adopted in 2007, some changes were made in the sense that poverty reduction was no longer mentioned as a priority issue, the fight against terrorism was added to the article on peace-­ building, and human security became a priority issue of its own (Söderberg, 2010, pp. 99–116). Meanwhile, Japan followed a general worldwide trend with the securitisation of aid. In 2008, the new JICA was launched. JICA, which had been Japan’s main instrument for technical cooperation, took over the ODA loans (‘yen loans’) traditionally provided by the JBIC as well as most of the grant aid provided by the MOFA. This made it the world’s largest aid agency for bilateral cooperation, encompassing diplomatic, development/security, and economic considerations, and this arrangement continues to the present day. While JICA remains the executing agency responsible for ODA implementation, it is the MOFA that holds responsibility for policy formation. ­Additionally, there are certain grants that the Ministry uses as diplomatic tools and which it itself implements. Country Assistance Programs that explicitly set out priorities are drawn up for major recipient countries. Country-based ODA Task Forces made up of overseas diplomatic missions participate in the formulation of assistance policies such as the Country Assistance Programs and Rolling Plans. ODA Task Forces include local officers of JICA and other related agencies, also holding policy consultations with the governments of developing countries and offering suggestions on possible collaborations. These Task Forces review aid schemes and engage in the formation and selection of ­candidate-assistance projects.

Geostrategic changes and the SDGs are reflected in the 2015 Charter In December 2014, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe won a two-thirds majority in the lower house election. This gave him carte blanch to continue his reform policies in the fields of both security and economics. Especially in terms of security, he had already undertaken sweeping reforms motivated by increased tensions

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in Northeast Asia due to the rise of China’s military power and North Korea’s continued development of nuclear arms. These changes would also spill over into the field of development cooperation.

The link between development and security In December 2013, Japan for the first time announced a National Security ­Strategy (Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, 2013b). This document included ­certain changes to the nation’s development cooperation policy. According to the security strategy, Japan would seek to step up its activities and in future make “proactive contributions to peace”, including through the “strategic utilisation of ODA”. The government led by Prime Minister Abe also inaugurated a N ­ ational Security Council, which formed a new secretariat in charge of planning and coordinating security issues, including the utilisation of some ODA funds. Japan’s Security Strategy puts an emphasis on strengthening the US-Japan alliance, where ODA had long played a role, as mentioned above. Already by the 1980s, there had been talk of ‘burden sharing’, with the US taking the military responsibility in wars and Japan assisting in peace-building efforts by providing ODA (Yasutomo, 1986). So far in the 21st century, two major interventions have unfolded, in Iraq and in Afghanistan, both under strong US leadership. In 2005–2006, Iraq became the top recipient of Japanese ODA, indicating that peace-building and the fight against terrorism were being given considerable space within the budget. Japan was not alone in this regard – Iraq was also a top recipient for aid from nine other DAC countries. Japan’s contribution was second only to that of the US. Concerning Afghanistan, Japan’s Self Defence Forces in 2001 conducted a re-fuelling mission for US vessels (and later for allied naval vessels) conducting anti-terrorism activities outside Afghanistan in the Indian Ocean (Midford, 2010, pp. 46–67). Japan hosted the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance (ICRA) to Afghanistan in 2002, and yet another donor conference in 2012. At first, Japanese ODA to Afghanistan was rather small in amount, but when the Self Defence Forces withdrew from re-fuelling missions in 2009, Japan pledged US$5 billion in ODA to Afghanistan, thus becoming a major donor. The use of ODA for national defence purposes, and as a tool for ‘burden sharing’ with the US, was nothing new, although it has not been explicitly spelled out before. Another stated objective in Japan’s new National Security Strategy is to improve the security environment of the Asia Pacific region. North Korea, with enhanced capability in Weapons of Mass Destruction, including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, is viewed as a threat. Likewise seen as threatening is China’s rapid advance in military capability, and its intensified activities in the East China Sea, including around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands,4 as well as developments related to the Chinese Air Defence Identification Zone announced in November 2013. The South China Sea is deemed especially important, given that certain of its sea-lanes are vital to the transportation of goods and to oil

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imports to Japan from the Middle East. As China advances its presence in the South China Sea, Japan has considered closer cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries to find legal solutions to similar territorial disputes with China. Japan has meanwhile been promoting multilateral regional security cooperation when it comes to maritime safety and anti-piracy activities. Besides m ­ ultilateral arrangements, Japan is working bilaterally on maritime security with many of the ASEAN countries, and ODA packages are often part of the deal. In 2006, ­Japan announced that it would provide Indonesia with three patrol boats financed through ODA. Although officials in charge of ODA were averse to this, aid is now gradually being used for ‘non-traditional’ security issues such as anti-terrorism and anti-piracy. When labelled law-enforcement issues, these ‘grey zones’ become ­eligible for Japanese ODA (Pajon, 2013, p. 5). Through aid money, the Japanese Coast Guard has provided education and training on anti-piracy for Southeast Asian countries; in 2013, the Philippine Coast Guard was promised ten patrol boats financed by Japanese ODA. This sort of assistance has thus become an important tool in Japan’s balancing strategy towards China. ODA assists these countries in building the capacity to defend themselves, also creating a network of security partners among the maritime countries confronting China. Furthermore, these developments have helped to make up for a relative US decline in that regard. It is no coincidence that many of Japan’s top recipients of ODA (Vietnam, ­Indonesia, the Philippines) are engaged in territorial disputes with China ­(Asplund, 2017). Although the patrol boats are meant for anti-piracy and safety of navigation, and not for challenging other states on territorial issues, Japan’s actions still send a political signal. The impetus given to ‘strategic use’ of ODA in Japan’s new security strategy makes it likely that more of this sort of aid will be delivered in the future. Since the 2015 reinterpretation of Paragraph 9 in the Constitution, which now allows Japan to participate in collective defence if vital interests are threatened, this is no longer considered a ‘grey zone’. Strategic use of ODA has a long history and can be seen in Japan’s relations with Myanmar (currently a top recipient of Japanese ODA). Except for some ­humanitarian assistance, Japanese ODA to Myanmar (as well as that of many other DAC donors) was suspended when a junta took power in 1988, but Japanese aid was reinstated after a few months. From 1997, the Japanese government began to behave more proactively towards what was labelled the “Myanmar problem”. The US and many Western countries have imposed sanctions to protest severe human right abuses in that country. This has increased the space of influence for China, which has provided huge amounts of foreign aid. Following the Depayin incident in 2003, when Aung San Suu Kyi and her followers were attacked by a gang armed with bamboo sticks and swords, and as many as 80 people were killed, Japan again froze its ODA. In November 2010, the Myanmar regime held general elections, with 25 per cent of seats being reserved for the armed forces (Gaens, 2013). Shortly afterwards, a number of military officers removed their uniforms to constitute a nominally civilian government.

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Since 2011, Japan has been more proactive and has, in fact, taken a leadership role in preparing other donors for re-entry into Myanmar. This helped the country to clear old payment arrears, a necessary condition for eligibility for new foreign aid, and this was accomplished in a series of operations in which the J­apanese ­government played a major role. At the time of President Thein Sein’s visit to ­Tokyo in April 2012, debt cancellation and a rescheduling of Japanese loans t­otalling 50 ­billion yen (US$600 million) was announced. In November 2012, ­Japan’s then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda pledged a new loan package of roughly US$600 million. In ­January 2013, Myanmar’s arrears to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank were cleared through bridging loans equal to US$900 million from the J­apan Bank for International Cooperation (Rieffel & Fox, 2013, pp.  46–47), making M ­ yanmar ­eligible for new loans from other donors as well. Concerning China, Prime Minister Abe during his October 2018 visit (the first by a Japanese Prime Minister in seven years, in commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China) also brought new initiatives in the field of development cooperation. While proclaiming the end of Japanese ODA to China, he at the same time proposed the establishment of a “development cooperation dialogue” to oversee joint infrastructure projects in other countries. The Japan Bank for International Cooperation and the China Development Bank will likewise launch a scheme to jointly finance infrastructure projects. During his visit to China, Abe trumpeted a new stage in the bilateral ­partnership, “switching from competition to collaboration”. He added, “Japan and China are neighbours and partners. We will not become a threat to each other”. The importance of free trade was stressed during the visit that took place amid turbulence in the global economy, with the US and China involved in an increasingly tense trade dispute (The Diplomat, 2018). By taking a friendlier stance with Chinese leaders, Prime Minister Abe is clearly hedging against US President Trump’s unpredictable policy tacks.

The link between development cooperation and domestic economic policy In Japan, there is a strong belief in development through industrialisation. This is the path the country has taken since its opening during the Meiji period at the end of the 19th century, and throughout its economic resurgence after the Second World War. When foreign aid was initiated as war reparations, beyond serving the recipient countries, it also served to assist a comeback for Japanese companies. The concept of foreign aid was often used interchangeably with that of economic cooperation, which implied that this was a two-way trade where both developing countries and the Japanese economy (as well as Japanese companies) should profit. This belief in development through industrialisation can be seen in the characteristics of Japan’s foreign aid to Southeast Asia during the 1970s through 1990s. More than any other donor, Japan placed (and still places) on its

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ODA a strong emphasis on so-called economic infrastructure – the building of roads, bridges, railways, power plants, ports, and other necessary prerequisites for industrialisation. Most of this was financed by loan aid rather than grants, and the loans are now being paid back by Southeast Asian countries as well as by China. Japanese industry, which during this period went through several stages of increased FDI, also profited by the improved infrastructures that permitted them to establish production in Southeast Asia. The appreciation of the yen following the 1985 Plaza Accord meant increased wages and production costs in Japan, and this, along with the opening of Chinese markets, led Japanese industry to establish even more production sites abroad. Japan’s large manufacturing companies played a central role throughout this period. Following the 2008 financial crisis, an increasing number of SMEs also began to establish overseas production bases, independently of large parent companies. Finally, another reason behind recent increases in outward Japanese FDI into Southeast Asia is that some companies have sought to avoid the risk of overdependence on production in China, thereby pursuing a strategy known as ‘China plus one’.5 Japan has meanwhile provided East Asia with cooperation that combines trade, investment, and ODA, and this mix has come to be seen as the Japanese ODA Model (Ohno, 2017). When the Liberal Democratic Party came to power at the end of 2012, Prime Minister Abe launched a new economic strategy known as ‘Abenomics’. This economic strategy (Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, 2013a) is aimed at increasing economic growth in the stagnant Japanese economy. Along with the three key tenets of Abenomics (expansive monetary policy, increased fiscal spending, and structural reforms), the strategy includes a global outreach action plan and sets specific numerical targets for infrastructure exports, accompanied by overseas expansion of SMEs, in particular the leading medium-sized enterprises. Abenomics also values “the strategic use of economic cooperation”. The new D ­ evelopment Cooperation Charter of 2015 makes it clear that Japanese ODA should be beneficial not only for developing countries, but also for Japanese companies. There are a number of new schemes for public-private cooperation being financed by ODA funds (Ohno, 2017), and many Japanese SMEs are trying to establish themselves in developing countries with the assistance of such schemes. However, the achievement of healthy economic growth, in particular in Southeast Asia, is deemed important not just for creating markets and production sites for Japanese companies, but also for creating strong and resilient countries that are able to act independently, without intimidation from other larger powers in the area.

The diplomatic link ODA has always been a good tool for making friends among developing countries. It is, after all, government-to-government assistance and as such it has given Japan access to high-level bureaucrats and politicians and opened space for influencing decision-makers, both in the immediate neighbourhood and through international organisations.

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Most of Japan’s ODA during the 1980s and 1990s went to Southeast Asia, and Japanese Prime Ministers commonly used what was called ‘gift-giving diplomacy’ (omiyage gaiko) during foreign visits, bringing with them all kinds of aid packages. Africa is also important from a diplomatic perspective, and it has received its share of Japanese foreign aid. In 1993, the first Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) was held to promote high-level dialogue ­between African leaders and development partners. Since that time, a number of TICAD conferences have taken place, and now various UN organisations are co-hosting these events. Also relevant is the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, which since 2000 has stepped up development activities between China and countries of the African continent. With increased economic growth in Africa, Japanese interest has grown, along with that of other nations. Moreover, the continent is important to Japan in another way: Africa is comprised of a great number of independent states, meaning a large number of votes when it comes to electing non-permanent members of the UN Security Council. Japan has held a non-permanent seat on the Security Council more often than any other country. It is among the largest contributors to the UN budget, and for years it has been pushing for changes to the structure of the Security Council in order to increase the number of permanent members. Japan itself is clearly aiming for such a seat, and for greater influence in the organisation; development cooperation can be used as a diplomatic tool to gain such influence.

Conclusions Since its initiation, ODA has been an important multipurpose political tool for Japan. Its use has varied over time and has depended on changes in the external environment, as well as on domestic politics. Still, the nation has always operated differently from other donors, with certain ‘Japanese’ characteristics including the heavy emphasis on loan aid, the focus on economic infrastructures, and the geographical emphasis on Asia. The 2015 Development Cooperation Charter outlines the road ahead for ­Japanese foreign aid. Avoidance of the term ‘ODA’ in this Charter’s title indicates that Japan now feels free to range outside the limited definition of foreign aid initially set by the DAC. At the same time, with the UN SDGs, development cooperation is changing. These goals are much wider than the prior Millennium Development Goals and are leading to substantial and worldwide changes in the field of development assistance. To achieve the SDGs, at least ten times the current outlay of money will be needed, and substantial increases from traditional donors are not expected. Sources other than traditional ODA must therefore be found. The OECD Development Assistance Committee is very well aware of this fact, and thus a redefinition of ODA is underway, along with substantial administrative changes to better address the SDGs. Some of the SDGs are in line with what Japan has always been proposing, but which until recently has been heavily criticised by other DAC members.

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Now we see a distinct pivot towards Asia, and in particular towards the ­Japanese approach to development assistance, which has represented a role model for many Asian countries. Japan’s belief in development through industrialisation is becoming mainstream, and suddenly Japanese thinking seems to match well with the UN SDGs. At the global level, Private Development Assistance – undertaken by private actors (foundations, corporations, voluntary and non-profit organisations) and provided with concessional financial terms where commodities and loans are concerned – has now reached a level roughly equivalent to net ODA (Desai, 2015). Private commercial flows in the form of trade and investment, as well as remittances, have expanded tremendously and have overtaken ODA in volume as well as in their importance for development in many countries. The private sector can be a powerful promoter of sustainable development, with companies providing jobs, infrastructure, innovation, and social services. The public sector, meanwhile, can leverage private sector contributions, helping to manage risk and providing insights into effective policy and practice (OECD, 2016). In the future, ODA is expected to be used strategically and intelligently to make investments in high-risk situations more attractive by spreading and sharing risk with private companies and by creating new incentives. Geostrategic changes and the influence of emerging donors such as China (not actually a new donor) play an increasingly important role. According to the JICA, China’s budget for foreign assistance is now the sixth largest in the world (Kitano & Harada, 2014). That growth in foreign aid has been having a significant impact on the global development community, with Chinese ­foreign aid (featuring conditions and characteristics different from those of DAC donors) becoming an alternative to existing aid. China is also taking initiatives on a multilateral level and has established, among other entities, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which over 50 countries have joined. How this will effect existing institutions (such as the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or the Asian Development Bank) remains to be seen. Furthermore, China is not the only emerging (or rather non-DAC) donor: Others include India, Brazil, and South Africa, to mention a few. All have their own conditions and characteristics for how aid is distributed. At the same time, the SDGs call on all countries to contribute and will lead to a wider variety of development cooperation efforts, thus giving Japan more freedom to cooperate with emerging donors, and not only with the DAC. Japan’s 2015 Charter prescribes a more strategic approach in which ‘quality growth’ is the first priority, and poverty is expected to be reduced through that growth. The Charter further entails that Japanese national interests should likewise be considered, along with increased cooperation between the public and private sectors in development issues. Development cooperation can thus be used to create economic growth in developing countries and to simultaneously support Japanese companies.

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The 2015 Development Cooperation Charter also states that the Asian region will maintain a close relationship with Japan, thus giving high relevance to its overall security and prosperity. This indicates that emphasis on this area in development policy will continue, although parts of the region have already grown quite wealthy. Japan will focus on ASEAN and continue its assistance to countries that have achieved a certain level of economic growth, to help prevent them from being caught in the “middle-income trap”. The Charter also states that development cooperation should be used to make “proactive contributions to peace”, and such cooperation will help to ensure Japan’s national interests, notably its own peace and security. According to the Charter, development cooperation should be pursued with Japan’s national security strategy in mind, meaning that Japanese development cooperation now has become an even stronger and more flexible foreign policy tool, depending on internal and external factors at play, as well as the interplay between the two. In the long run, the new ‘whole of government’ approach envisioned by the Charter will likely make development cooperation an integrated part of a more coherent Japanese foreign and domestic policy.

Notes 1 This chapter is partly built on an earlier publication by the author, “Japanese Development Assistance as a Multipurpose Political Tool”, in McCarthy, M. (ed.) Routledge Handbook on Japanese Foreign Policy (2018), Routledge, Oxon and New York. 2 See Chapters 1 and 10 for more on the aid-security nexus. 3 Meaning that recipient countries should be in the driver’s seat of their own development, and that Japan should only have a supporting role. 4 Japan today controls these islands, but China expresses territorial claims. 5 Manufacturing capacity is diversified beyond China, usually to countries in S­ outheast Asia.

Bibliography Asplund, A. (2017) ‘Aligning Policy with Practice: Japanese ODA and Normative Values’ in Asplund, A. & Söderberg, M. (eds.) Japanese Development Cooperation, the Making of an Aid Architecture Pivoting to Asia. Routledge, London and New York. Desai, R. (2015) Georgetown University, Private Aid and the Financing of Development, a Talk Given at Stockholm School of Economics Development Day 11 May 2015, online at: http://www.hhs.se/en/about-us/news/site-publications/2015/­fi nancefor-sustainable-development--conference-highlights-and-speakers-presentations/ [accessed 18 May 2015]. Gaens, B. (2013) “Political Change in Myanmar: Filtering the Murky Waters of ‘Disciplined Democracy’”, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, FIIA Working Paper. Kato, H., Page, J. & Shimomura, Y. (2016) Japan’s Development Assistance, Foreign Aid and the Post-2015 Agenda. Palgrave, Basingstoke and New York. Kitano, N. & Harada, Y. (2014) ‘Estimating China’s Foreign Aid, 2001–2013’, Tokyo, JICA-RI Working paper, online at: https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/ja/publication/ workingpaper/jrft3q0000000xgx-att/JICA-RI_WP_No.78_2014.pdf [accessed 15 Jan 2019].

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Islam, S. (1991) ‘Beyond Burden Sharing: Economics and Politics of Japanese ­Foreign Aid’ in Islam, S. (ed.) Yen for Development: Japanese Foreign Aid and the Politics of ­B urden-Sharing, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York. Midford, P. (2010) ‘Japan: Balancing between a Hegemon and a Would-be Hegemon’, in Söderberg, M. & Nelson, P. A. (eds.) Japan’s Politics and Economy; Perspectives on Change. Routledge, London and New York. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan’s Development Cooperation Charter (2015), online at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page_000138.html [accessed 21 Nov 2018]. OECD (2016), Development Co-operation Report 2016: The Sustainable Development Goals as Business Opportunities, OECD Publishing, Paris. Online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/ dcr-2016-en [accessed 21 Nov 2018]. Ohno I. (2017) ‘Network-Based Development Cooperation as a Way Forward for Japan’ in Asplund, A. & Söderberg, M. (eds.) Japanese Development Cooperation, the Making of an Aid Architecture Pivoting to Asia London and New York. Routledge. Okano-Heijmans, M. (2013) Economic Diplomacy: Japan and the Balance of National Interests. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden. Orr, R. M. (1990) The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power. Columbia University Press, New York. Pajon, C. (2013) ‘Japan’s ‘Smart’ Strategic Engagement in Southeast Asia’, Conference paper presented at The Asan Forum, 6 Dec 2013, online at: http://www.theasanforum. org/japans-smart-strategic-engagement-in-southeast-asia/ [accessed 15 Jan 2019]. Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet (2013a) Japan Revitalisation Strategy: Japan Is Back, online at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/documents/2013/1200485_7321. html [accessed 10 Aug 2016]. Prime Minister’s Office of Japan (2013b), National Security Strategy, online at: https:// www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html [accessed 15 Jan 2018]. Rieffel, L. & Fox, J. (2013) ‘Too Much/Too Soon, the Dilemma of Foreign Aid to Myanmar/Burma’. Report: Brookings Institution, Washington DC. Sunaga, K. (2005) ‘The Reshaping of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter’, No. 36, Discussion Paper Series, APEC Study Center. Columbia University, New York. Söderberg, M. (1996a) The Business of Japanese Foreign Aid: Five Case Studies from Asia. Routledge, London. Söderberg, M. (1996b) ‘Japanese Aid as a Foreign Policy Tool’, in Edström, B. (ed.) J­apan’s Foreign and Security Policies in Transition. Swedish Institute of International ­A ffairs (Utrikespolitiska institutet), Stockholm. Söderberg, M. (2001) ‘The Role of ODA in the Relationship’, in Söderberg, M. (ed.) Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century. Routledge, London. ­ elson, Söderberg, M. (2010) ‘Foreign Aid as Tool for Peace Building’, in Söderberg, M. & N P. A. (eds.) Japan’s Politics and Economy: Perspectives on Change. Routledge, London. Takamine, T. (2006) Japan’s Development Aid to China: The Long-running Foreign Policy of Engagement. Routledge, London. The Diplomat (2018) Online at: https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/abe-wants-new-erain-china-japan-relations/ [accessed 29 Oct 2018]. World Bank (1993) The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. Oxford University Press. Yasutomo, D. T. (1986) The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and Japanese Foreign Policy. Lexington Books, MA.

7 SPAIN: THE RISE AND FALL OF A COMPLIANT DONOR Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez

Introduction1 In this chapter, we explore the drivers of Spanish Official Development Assistance (ODA). Our study traces the evolution of this policy from its foundation in 1976, when Spain’s first ODA fund was established, until 2015, when Spain was expected to reach the 0.7% target, according to commitments made during the 2010s. Contrarily, however, 2015 was the year that cumulative cuts to the ODA budget reached a maximum of 74%. Our analysis has been inspired by other qualitative studies on the motives of aid in specific donor countries, and it connects to broader theoretical debates on the behaviour of countries in the international and global arenas. More specifically, we look at the case of Spain from two alternative theoretical perspectives reviewed in Chapters 1 and 2 of this book: realism and social constructivism. The chapter is structured as follows. First, we review prior research on ­Spanish aid that refers to its fundamental principles and ends, and we present our own research proposal framed by the following question: Has the evolution of Spanish ODA been driven by international norms, or by strategic decisions made at the national level? Second, to respond to this question, different sources of information are analysed and presented in chronological order: the official discourse contained in the preambles of Spain’s main legal and policy papers concerning ODA; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data on the actual performance of the policy; and peer reviews conducted by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of that organisation. Finally, we summarise our findings and conclude that Spain’s behaviour in the domain of foreign aid can be better understood from a constructivist perspective.

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How to explore the drivers of Spanish aid? Previous studies on Spanish aid With some exceptions, studies on the long-term evolution of Spanish development policy tend to assess its performance against a given set of criteria, such as the aid effectiveness agenda. They do not concentrate on the formation of such criteria in the domestic political arena, nor do they relate it to Spain’s positions in terms of world politics. Alonso (2005) analysed the evolution of Spain as a donor between 1979 and 2003 and highlighted improvements in its aid system, also providing numerous recommendations on the integration of instruments, geographical and sectorial orientations, technical capacities, and management abilities. He further identified weak political commitment as among the reasons for Spain’s shortcomings at that time, and he provided some policy recommendations for the government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, formed after the 2004 elections. More recently, Larrú and Tezanos (2012) have analysed the patterns of aid allocation in two periods that refer to the Zapatero governments (2004–2009) and those of his predecessor, José María Aznar (1997–2003). The analysis is conducted from the perspective of the EU and OECD principle of donor labour division, and it concludes that Spain has not followed a real specialisation strategy. In other quantitative works by Tezanos, sectorial distribution has been used to test whether Spanish aid is motivated by altruistic or egoistic drivers, following a tradition of the aid allocation literature. According to these works, Spain’s allocation has historically been influenced both by Spain’s own interests (such as the preservation of links with former colonies) and by recipient needs (Tezanos, 2008); in recent years, it has been reshaped by the influence of migration flows (Tezanos & Gutierrez, 2016). In addition to quantitative works, a few case studies have also found political factors influencing aid decisions in Spain. Maroto (2014) analyses Spain’s bilateral aid in its former Sub-Saharan colony, Equatorial Guinea, from 2009 to 2012. Based on its sector allocation, he concludes that “Spanish ODA does not hold as priorities either to meet the immediate needs of the poorest sectors of the population, or to promote a democratic and less corrupt state in Equatorial Guinea” (ibid., p. 1). The paper further concludes that the Master Plan of Spanish Cooperation had no effect on the implementation of this policy in Guinea, and the suggestion is made that the Spain’s bilateral relations are generally influenced by private investors’ interests. In contrast with Equatorial Guinea, Vietnam had very few historical linkages with Spain, but it became a relevant partner country for Spanish Cooperation in Asia. According to Olivié (2011), this development can neither be explained by Spain’s self-interest, nor by Vietnam’s neediness in comparison to other recipient countries. The article suggests that Spain followed the donor community to ­Vietnam, with a view to learning and to projecting a certain image, but at the same time exhibiting some herd behaviour.

Spain: a compliant donor  133

In conclusion, the literature provides different and sometimes contradictory descriptions of Spain as a donor. Some studies suggest that the preservation of linkages with former colonies and economic interests might indeed guide S­ panish aid, while others suggest that inertia, herd behaviour, and a lack of specialisation are determinant factors. In any case, studies on the motives of Spanish foreign aid are scarce and often scattered, with analyses focussed on aid management issues rather than aid politics. As explained in the following paragraphs, our research proposal concentrates on the political drivers of Spanish aid and complements the above-cited works by conducting a qualitative analysis on the evolution of the overall Spanish aid policy across the decades.2

Our analysis As elsewhere in the aid allocation literature, our research is framed under a ­d ichotomous question around the reasons why governments give money to pay for other countries’ development goals. While this literature distinguishes between selfish and altruistic motives, we draw on Chapters 1 and 2 of this book and consider other two possible political approaches to foreign aid. Firstly, like most of the country studies in this book, we take the realist perspective and consider the strategic use of aid as an instrument to achieve different goals set at the domestic level. In Table 7.1, we set out the kind of arguments that motivate an instrumental use of aid according to these country studies. In contrast with the above-mentioned studies, Stokke’s chapter on the three ­Scandinavian countries (Chapter 10) finds the objectives and norms established by the UN to be the main drivers of their aid policies, as well as of their early compliance with the 0.7% target. In the following analysis, we likewise consider the possibility of international norms on aid as being the main driver of this policy in Spain. In addition to the 0.7% target, we refer by ‘international norms on aid’ to the various written and non-written principles on aid that are internationally agreed upon and softly enforced through peer-pressure mechanisms at the OECD-DAC. In Table 7.2, we list the international norms that are explicitly considered by the DAC when assessing Spain’s compliance to international rules on aid according to its peer-review reports. TABLE 7.1  Foreign policy arguments motivating an instrumental use of aid

Argument

Country (reference)

National security

US (Chapter 3) Japan (Chapter 6) Japan (Chapter 6) Hungary (Chapter 8) Brazil (Chapter 9)

Trade and investment Coalition-setting in intergovernmental fora Source: Authors’ elaboration.

134  Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez TABLE 7.2  International norms on aid*

Year

Norm

Description

1972

0.7% Commitment

1992

Helsinki disciplines on tied aid

1995

Copenhagen 20/20 initiative

2000

Millennium declaration

The UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution stating that each advanced country should progressively increase its aid and exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net amount of 0.7% of its gross national product. Rules on tied aid credits limiting the use of concessional financing for projects that should be able to support commercial financing. Agreement at the World Summit for Social Development between developing and industrialised countries on the allocation of 20% of the budget in developing countries and 20% of ODA to basic social services. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the Millennium Declaration Goals.

* Norms evoked at the DAC peer reviews on Spain. Source: Authors’ elaboration from several sources (UNICEF, 1998; UN, 2000; OECD, 2005, 2016c).

To determine whether Spain’s behaviour in aid issues has been more influenced by international norms or domestic strategies, we review the history of this policy, focussing on three sources of evidence. First, we look at the stated policy (as Stokke has done in Chapter 10) and review the official guidelines on aid provided at the highest level of governance in Spain, in search of policy narratives relating aid expenditure either to instrumental arguments or to ­international ­obligations. Examined here are the legal and policy papers adopted by the Council of Ministers and the Parliament (multiannual plans, laws and ­decrees establishing institutions and funds, and regulations on the overall policy), which usually contain a preamble presenting the rationale of each policy development. We also include in our analysis some cross-party written agreements which lacked legal force, but which were signed by all political parties present in the Spanish Parliament (Table 7.3). Second, we take into account the implemented policy and triangulate the declared intentions of the Spanish government for aid policy with information available at the OECD-DAC. First, by drawing on OECD development statistics, we look at the evolution of Spanish aid budgets and check whether the official policy narrative correlates with actual performance.3 Second, we review the narrative reports on Spanish aid issued by the same organisation, and we summarise their assessment on its strategic orientation and its compliance with international norms. Third, we rely on additional sources of information to further elaborate on conclusions drawn from the above-described analysis, and to explore institutional

Spain: a compliant donor  135 TABLE 7.3  Spain’s principle norms and guidelines on aid, 1976–2015*

Year

Norm

1976

Decree adopting several measures on taxation, export promotion, and internal trade, and establishing the FAD First annual plan on international cooperation (PACI), including multiannual guidelines Decree establishing the Spanish cooperation agency, AECI Solidarity Pact International Cooperation Law Master Plan of Spanish Cooperation (2001–2004) Second Master Plan of Spanish Cooperation (2005–2008) State Pact against Poverty Third Master Plan of Spanish Cooperation (2009–2012) Law reforming the financial support system for business internationalisation (establishing the fund for business internationalisation, FIEM) Law establishing the fund for development promotion, FONPRODE Fourth Master Plan of Spanish Cooperation (2013–2016) Fifth Master Plan of Spanish Cooperation (2018–2021)

1986 1988 1996 1998 2000 2005 2006 2009 2010

2013 2018

* Legal and policy papers adopted by the Council of Ministers and/or Parliament. Source: Authors’ elaboration.

determinants of Spanish behaviour in development issues. These include administrative documents produced by the Spain’s government and by Spanish NGOs, semi-structured interviews with policymakers, and secondary sources.

Spanish aid discourse and reality The democratic transition (1976–1982) Spain began to extend aid in 1976, when the Fund of Aid for Development (FAD) was established along with the Inter-ministerial Commission for Development Aid. The country also joined the Inter-American Development Bank that same year, although Spain was at that time considered a developing middle-income country by the World Bank (WB) and an ODA recipient by the OECD (Arenal, 1994; Alonso, 2005). Establishment of the FAD was included in a decree on incentives for internal and external trade and presented as an urgent response to economic challenges of that time ( JdE, 1976). According to Arenal (1994, p. 188), in addition to the economic rationale of the FAD, this government “considered the need to put in place a cooperation policy like that of the Western countries, based on the idea that cooperation was a substantial dimension of a new foreign policy”.

136  Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez

The Gonzalez administration (1982–1996) When the Socialist Party led by Felipe González came to power in 1982, Spain’s activities in development cooperation amounted to US$500 million in the early 1980s (see Figure 7.1). They mainly consisted of tied loans funded by the FAD, which was managed by the Ministry of Trade with the support of commercial offices of Spanish Embassies. In the second half of that decade, several developments extended the scope of this policy and raised its profile. In 1986, the Inter-ministerial Commission on International Cooperation issued the first Annual Plan on ­I nternational Cooperation (PACI, from its Spanish name), and in 1988 the Spanish Agency of International Cooperation (AECI) was established in the ­f ramework of a r­ eorganisation of the Secretary of State for International Cooperation and Latin America (MAE, 1986; MRCSG, 1988). From 1988 onward, development funding in prioritised countries was framed ­u nder ­i nternational ­a greements designated as Conventions of Friendship and ­C ooperation (­A renal, 1994). As per Figure 7.1, these institutional developments ­a nticipated a s­ ignificant increase in aid budgets and the country’s ­a dhesion to the OECD. As mentioned above, Spanish cooperation adopted an annual programme for the first time in 1987. This plan, known as the PACI, informed the government’s 6,000.00

0.7

5,000.00

0.6

USD millions

0.4 3,000.00 0.3

% ODA /GNI

0.5

4,000.00

2,000.00 0.2 1,000.00

0.1

0.00 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

0

TOTAL ODA

FIGURE 7.1 

% ODA s/GNI

 he evolution of Spanish ODA, 1980–2015. Net disbursements, in T ­m illions of US$, at constant 2015 prices, and as a percentage of GNI.

Source: Authors’ elaboration from OECD (2018) data (Development Statistics, DAC 1 and DAC 4).

Spain: a compliant donor  137

forecasts on aid expenditure for the following year and provided some multi-­ annual guidelines containing a multi-purpose vision of aid. According to del Arenal (1994), in addition to the various benefits that may redound to Spain itself, aid responds to an ethical obligation of solidarity and must pursue not only the fulfilment of basic needs and economic growth, but also income redistribution, social justice, access to culture, and institutional development, so that a system of freedoms, progress, and social justice is fostered in beneficiary countries.4 In 1988, the decree establishing the AECI (MRCSG, 1988) linked its activities to implementation of the PACI and advanced two multi-dimensional goals: ­fostering economic growth and social progress as well as cultural, institutional, and political development in developing countries, mainly those with an ­H ispanic background; and favouring closer links of mutual understanding and cooperation among developed countries, mainly Latin-American countries and those belonging to the European Communities. A second set of guidelines on Spanish cooperation was adopted by a Commission of the Parliament in 1992 and likewise presented aid as a multi-purpose policy oriented to: economic growth in developing countries; security, peace, and stability; and reinforcement of Spain’s foreign relations (CdD, 1992). This last objective was described as including fruitful exchanges with other countries, political presence, awareness of Spain’s democratic experience, expansion of Hispanic culture, and international projection of the Spanish economy. Moreover, the Parliament agreed that most of Spain’s bilateral aid should consist of Spanish goods and services and Spanish human resources, and that the country’s under-representation in multilateral organisations and aid p­ rogrammes, including the European Development Fund, should be addressed by the ­government.5 Finally, the Parliament’s guidelines acknowledged the obligation of Spain to move towards the UN target of 0.7% of Gross National Product devoted to ODA.6

The Aznar administration (1996–2004) The first term of the Peoples’ Party government headed by President José María Aznar featured budgetary restrictions which affected aid growth. However, during Aznar’s second term, in the early 2000s, movement towards the 0.7% goal was initiated by the setting of intermediate targets, announced in public statements made at the Monterrey Conference on Development Finance and at the Barcelona European Council. Consequently, this administration significantly increased aid budgets from 2000 onward (see Figure 7.1). In addition, the institutional architecture of Spain’s aid policy was reinforced by the International Cooperation Law and the First Master Plan of Spanish Cooperation.

138  Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez

In 1998, the comprehensive International Cooperation Law was passed ( JdE, 1998). Although this legislation mainly covered the institutional aspects of policy, completing the work initiated by the decree that established the AECI, the motives behind aid were given new exposition. The preamble of this Law declared development cooperation to be a facet of foreign action by democratic states, also offering a vague declaration on the relevance of solidarity in an interdependent international society. That declaration included a reference to a principle in Spain’s constitution on peaceful relations and effective cooperation among the peoples of the Earth. Another article in the Law focussing on principles recalled the idea of solidarity and elaborated on the concept of development, referring to sustainability, equity, the defence of human rights, and fundamental freedoms, as well as to compliance with commitments adopted in international fora. By 2001, in compliance with the Law, two different programming tools were in place. While the PACI continued to gather into a single document the forecasts of the various ministries regarding aid expenditure for a given year, a multiannual plan was issued in order to set out strategic goals and priorities for several annual programmes. The First Master Plan recalled the solidarity principle of the aforementioned Law (MAE, 2000) and declared poverty eradication to be the overarching goal of Spanish cooperation, explicitly seeking alignment to dominant trends in the international donor community. The Plan also reviewed the history of Spanish aid. It mentioned the country’s transition from recipient to donor country, its entry into the DAC committee, and its position among ODA providers, relating these achievements to the country’s integration into the EU, NATO, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and UN summits. Both the Law and the Plan further argued that foreign aid in Spain was supported by a broad political and social consensus. In fact, in 1996, when the ­Peoples’ Party gained power, all political parties had signed the Solidarity Pact, a written commitment to increase the volume and quality of foreign aid following a citizens’ petition resulting from the so-called 0.7% mobilisations (Plataforma 0.7%, 2018). International agreement on the 0.7% target was the flag raised by that c­ itizens’ initiative during the 1990s, now considered a milestone in the appraisal of ‘new social movements’ in Spain following the transition to democracy (Alberich Nistal, 2007). This movement began with a small and informal group of citizens in Madrid who collected 6,000 signatures for a petition to Parliament to include an ODA expenditure of 0.7% of Spain’s GNI in the General Budget. Little by little, the movement attracted support from formal NGOs, other citizens, and media, by way of massive demonstrations and permanent encampments in front of official buildings, along with hunger strikes that had a strong impact on public opinion. By the time these mobilisations ended in 1996, parliamentary groups had endorsed the 0.7% commitment by signing the Solidarity Pact, and aid programmes had been put in place in regional and local governments as per similar citizen-driven petitions.7

Spain: a compliant donor  139

Spain’s 1998 DAC peer review acknowledged the Spanish government’s efforts to increase its overall aid budget (OECD, 1998). The DAC also considered as major qualitative improvements the consolidation of a cooperation policy framework, the increase of grants, and the decline of tied loans. However, Spain was encouraged to ensure greater consistency by the FAD in terms of the goals and principles of its overall aid programme. Four years later (OECD, 2002), a second review by the DAC commended Spain for its notable progress in establishing poverty reduction as the overarching goal of its policy, as well as for considering gender equality and the environment as mainstreaming priorities, refocussing on basic social needs, and launching a new micro-finance programme. Regarding Spain’s financial commitments, the report highlighted: the achievement of an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.22%, considered to be in alignment with its per capita income ranking; also a high-level commitment to reach of 0.33% by 2006, made at EU and UN fora; and a commitment made at the DAC to fulfil the Copenhagen 20/20 Initiative. At the same time, the 2002 DAC peer review stated that Spain “should improve the focus of its activities by sharpening the Master Plan to include a clearer hierarchy of principles and objectives with poverty reduction as the overarching goal across the entire aid system” (ibid., p. 11), making explicit reference to the FAD, debt conversion transactions, and the Scholarship and Culture Programmes. The review also encouraged deep reflection on Spanish cooperation’s contributions to poverty reduction in middle-income countries in a clear reference to the country’s focus on Latin America.

The Rodríguez Zapatero administration (2004–2011) Socialist José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero took power in the context of the Iraq War, which marked the end of a full consensus on foreign issues by Spain’s mainstream parties. Zapatero soon decreed the withdrawal of Spanish support to military operations in that country and declared a return by Spain to multilateralism. In the domain of aid, he raised the policy’s profile, making adjustments to the names of its main institutions8 and significantly increasing ODA budgets and long-term commitments in view of the 0.7% target. However, a negative trend in aid budgets was initiated in 2010, during Zapatero’s second term, with a €600 million cut in response to the financial crisis and international pressures on Spain to implement budgetary restrictions. Under his presidency, an additional law concerning development cooperation was passed that addressed the reform of Spain’s reimbursable aid. The Second Master Plan of Spanish Cooperation – the first by a Socialist ­government – deepened the narrative of its predecessor and declared the eradication of poverty to be a universal ethical imperative (MAEC, 2005). This Plan referred to the Millennium Declaration and agreements reached in the UN in general terms, crediting these as frameworks for the new Master Plan. In its ­preamble, the Secretary of State for International Cooperation, Leire Pajín,

140  Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez

adopted an ambitious commitment consisting of a doubling of the ODA budget and attainment of a 0.5% ODA/GNI target in four years. She further endorsed the DAC criteria of allocating 20% of bilateral aid to the least developed countries, and 20% to basic social needs. The Plan also renamed cooperation policy as ‘development policy’. A year after elaboration of the Second Master Plan and ten years after the Solidarity Pact, the Spanish NGO Plataforma 0.7% pushed for a new State Pact against Poverty, signed by all major political parties (CONGDE, 2006). Like the Master Plan, the opening statement of this Pact declared aid to be an ethical imperative; the Pact’s second statement acknowledged the importance of international commitments assumed by Spain along its democratic trajectory. These two principles, along with references to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the goal of poverty eradication, led to specific and measurable commitments including attainment of the 0.7% ratio by 2012, reductions in ratios of reimbursable aid and tied aid to a maximum of 5%, and temporary suspension of FAD’s replenishment. In other words, the Pact contained policy recommendations aligned to prior DAC reports and later implemented by subsequent Spanish governments. A few years later, immediately after the eruption of the international financial crisis but before it hit Spain’s public budgets, the Third Master Plan was adopted (MAEC, 2009). For the first time, this Plan was introduced by a preamble signed by the President of the Government. Rodríguez Zapatero reinforced the narrative of the previous plans by referring to the Millennium Declaration and presenting ODA as an ethical imperative. He also referred to the financial crisis, highlighting its effects on the most vulnerable populations, and he confirmed the country’s commitment to aid and its orientation towards poverty eradication, again insisting on the social and political consensus supporting that policy. Lastly, he acknowledged that development cooperation had become part of Spain’s identity and had increased the country’s legitimacy to intervene in international fora. As foreseen in the Third Master Plan, two laws concerning Spanish ODA were passed in 2010: the law establishing the Fund for Business Internationalisation (FIEM) ( JdE, 2010a), and the law establishing the Fund for the Promotion of Development (FONPRODE) ( JdE, 2010b). According to the preamble of the law introducing FONPRODE, the FAD had been conceived to promote ­Spanish exports, but had progressively adopted development goals, producing certain dysfunctions. This latest reform was based on the conviction that such distinct objectives required “instruments and human resources intentionally adapted to the efficient achievement of each purpose” (ibid., p. 1).9 This preamble also referred to the positions of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the OECD-DAC regarding tied aid.10 The 2007 DAC peer review of Spain commended the country’s aspiration to reach an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.7% by 2012. It found the Master Plan then in place (2005–2008) to be a major improvement over past policy and practice and highlighted several achievements: the new commitment to Sub-Saharan

Spain: a compliant donor  141

Africa, reflecting a sharpened poverty focus; increased and more strategic multilateral aid; and Spain’s humanitarian action strategy, reflecting international good practice. Four years later, the next peer review (OECD, 2011) acknowledged Spain’s “remarkable progress in improving both the quantity and quality of its development cooperation” and commended the country for sticking to its 0.7% commitment by 2015, despite the severe impact of the global economic crisis. Two budget cuts in 2009 and 2010 had reduced the ODA ratio from 0.45% to 0.43%, but the DAC review insisted that Spain’s development cooperation was driven by the government’s “commitment to fighting poverty, and by strong crossparty and public support based on a sense of solidarity with the world’s poor” (ibid., p.  1). Indeed, Spain had responded to pressure from its peers regarding reductions to tied aid and loans, refocussing on social sectors and poor regions (see Figure 7.2).

The Rajoy administration (2011–2015) Like his Peoples’ Party predecessor Aznar, President Mariano Rajoy in 2011 took up the mission of boosting Spain’s economy through restrictive budgetary policies. At that time, Spain’s economic difficulties were among the main challenges of the global financial system, and so related budgetary restrictions were implemented under the surveillance of the European Institutions and the International Monetary Fund. This difficult context was considered in the preamble of the Fourth Master Plan (the first adopted in the crisis period), which announced continuity in the overall approach of aid policy and the recovery of Spain’s financial commitments over the long term. However, the subsequent Fifth Master Plan – ­published in the wake of a 75% cut to the aid budget that dropped Spain to 25th position in the donor ranking – included no such political statement.11 During this period, no substantial institutional changes were made to the Spanish aid system. The Fourth Master Plan of Spanish Cooperation (MAEC, 2013) was prefaced by President Rajoy and by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Manuel García-Margallo. Rajoy recalled the country’s commitment to the 0.7% target but stated that this target was simply not reachable in Spain’s current economic context. In contrast with previous editions, Rajoy advocated a reduction of aid expenditure (as in other policy areas) and posited certain management criteria, suggesting that more could be done with fewer resources. Beyond that preface, the discourse seemed a continuation of previous Master Plans. Rajoy evoked solidarity and generosity as basic motives for international aid, and Minister García-Margallo insisted on poverty eradication as its main goal. They also referred to the different dimensions of development that had been highlighted in prior plans, such as inclusiveness and the prioritisation of aid for the most disadvantaged.

1991

Latin America*

Qualitative evolution of Spanish bilateral aid.

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Reimbursable aid*

* All variables presented as percentages of total bilateral aid. Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD (2018) data.

FIGURE 7.2 

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

1991

1991

1992

1992

1993

1993

1994

1994

1995

1995

1996

1996

1997

1997

1998

1998

1999 2000 2001 2002

Tied aid*

Productive and economic sectors*

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

2015

2015

2014

2014

2013

2013

2012

2012

2011

2011

2010

2010

2009

2009

2008

2008

Spain: a compliant donor  143

Despite the general continuity of the discourse, the preamble to this Fourth Plan included some references to new trends in international cooperation that could be interpreted as a new formulation of old narratives on commercial interests and historical linkages. These references were the catalytic value of aid in mobilising other resources, as in public-private partnerships, and the relevance of poverty in middle-income economies (i.e. Latin American countries). However, these considerations had no impact on the actual implementation of aid, according to Figures 7.1 and 7.2. The Fifth Master Plan, adopted in 2017, contained no narrative on aid whatsoever, nor did it include a high-level political statement as a preface, as in previous editions (MAEC, 2018). A follow-up report on the 2011 DAC peer review conducted in 2013 noted the accelerated decline of Spain’s ODA budget, but still found the country committed to scaling aid upward as soon as growth returned to the Spanish economy. The review also positively assessed the more realistic vision of the Fourth Master Plan (2013–2016), which announced geographic and thematic concentrations. Finally, the report had very positive words for the fall in the share of Spanish tied aid, from 23.99% in 2010 to an average of 10.58% in 2011–2012 (see Figure 7.2). As indicated by the review, this was due to the decision taken by Spain to stop computing its tied credits from 2011 onward under the Development Aid Fund as ODA, in line with the laws implementing FONPRODE and FIEM. Three years later, following a cumulative ODA cut of 68% between 2010 and 2014, the tone of the DAC peer review changed slightly for the first time, remarking that the Spanish ODA/GNI ratio (0.13% in 2013) was far below the DAC average of 0.29%, and that it represented a backslide to levels attained in 1988, before Spain joined the DAC. The OECD (2016b) report signalled a lack of clarity regarding Spain’s path towards the 0.7% commitment.

Conclusions As indicated by the documentary review, the narrative of Spanish aid has followed a fairly consistent evolution over time. While, in the early years under study, aid was presented as a multipurpose policy linked to both international obligations and national interests, the policy papers issued since the late 1990s have progressively avoided arguments of national self-interest. All adopt a similar narrative based on the solidarity principle, the ethical imperatives of donors, and the rights of aid recipients. Moreover, these papers have progressively reinforced the orientation of Spain’s aid policy towards the objective of eradicating poverty. The rejection of economic and commercial interests is probably the best single example of this evolution. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the promotion of Spanish goods, services, and professionals was considered an added value of international aid, compatible with the country’s solidarity and moral obligations. Not only were the FAD loans able to contribute to the internationalisation of the Spanish economy, but multilateral aid was expected to increase the presence and

144  Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez

influence of Spanish officials within international organisations. This approach was abandoned in the Master Plans and explicitly rejected in the FONPRODE law. The Master Plans also overlooked the value of aid programmes in terms of the preservation of cultural linkages among Spanish-speaking countries, an argument that had dominated the aid discourse in the early years of Spanish cooperation. OECD statistics on aid have further shown that aforementioned changes in the discourse did indeed have some effect on the actual implementation of Spanish aid. As per Figure 7.2, on the qualitative indicators of this policy, Spain sharply reduced tied aid, reimbursable aid, and aid allocated to economic and productive sectors. These reductions persisted even in the years following the financial crisis, despite budgetary restrictions and the country’s interest in reactivating its economy via exportations. Also, the portion of aid allocated to Latin American countries has followed a negative trend over the long run, while references to Spain’s historical linkages vanished from political declarations on aid. The above-described evolution, in terms of both policy narrative and practice, has responded to requests by Spain’s peers, and this has been acknowledged in evaluation reports from the OECD-DAC. The initial DAC reviews questioned the FAD loans and the focus of Spanish aid on Latin America, along with certain instruments clearly oriented to that region (such as the scholarship programme and cultural cooperation activities), while more recent reviews acknowledged the country’s compliance with the international doctrine on aid, as well as with specific recommendations set out by the DAC in previous evaluations, such as the rejection of tied aid instruments, the reliance on grants over loans, and increased priority for African countries. From a quantitative standpoint, the evolution of Spanish aid has gone through four phases. After an initial phase in which aid was barely above US$0.5 million, a significant but brief budgetary effort was made before Spain’s entry into the DAC in 1991. In a second phase, aid levels were maintained for several years. Next, from 2000 to 2008, aid experienced significant and sustained growth, while public statements were offered regarding intermediate targets towards achievement of the 0.7% commitment. Lastly, from 2011 to 2015, Spain’s aid budget was drastically reduced. These phases overlap with the political periods described in the “Spanish aid discourse and reality” section, and no correlation is evident between policy trends and political ideology or leadership. Both the rise and fall of Spanish ODA have occurred under Socialist and Popular governments alike, supported by distinct parliamentary coalitions involving nationalist parties from various regions (and, more recently, the emerging Ciudadanos party, integrated in the ­liberal-democratic family of European parties). This lack of correlation, along with the incremental evolution of this policy from a qualitative point of view, reinforces the idea that decisions on Spanish aid have not been conditioned by strategies around foreign issues elaborated at the national level. As a matter of fact, the policy rationale that has dominated plans and laws for Spanish cooperation

Spain: a compliant donor  145

and shaped their allocation was initially adopted in 1996 as a cross-party written agreement promoted by civil society, renewed in 2006, and framed under eventual adherence to the 0.7% commitment. While Spain has never reached the 0.7% target, its financial efforts have met DAC expectations. The DAC’s initial reports highlighted Spanish aid’s positive trend, as well as its ODA/GNI ratio in comparison to countries of similar income level. Later, these reports commended both the Aznar and Zapatero governments for their intermediate targets on the road to the 0.7% target (0.33% by 2006 and 0.5% by 2009), and for the timely achievement of those goals. Finally, when Spanish ODA was drastically reduced, the DAC exhibited understanding and did not question decisions clearly framed by broader budgetary reductions. Indeed, these reductions were requested and monitored by DAC members through the EU and IMF, as Spain’s financial soundness had become a more relevant international responsibility than its contribution to poverty eradication. DAC reports after the 2011 budgetary cuts were careful to accent Spain’s long-term commitments and its qualitative improvements. In conclusion, our findings show that the evolution of Spanish aid has not been driven by foreign policy decisions made at the national level. Conversely, we find that the long-term evolution of Spanish ODA has mainly responded to the country’s aim to comply with international norms, especially the 0.7% agreement, the OECD consensus on aid quality, and UN agendas such as the MDGs, oriented towards poverty eradication. From the perspective of the IR theories that inspired this analysis, our conclusion is that the behaviour of Spain in the aid arena can be better understood from a constructivist approach. This conclusion is consistent with other studies on Spanish aid showing that the country has lacked a specialisation strategy (Larrú & Tezanos, 2012) and strong political guidance (Alonso, 2005), while certain key decisions were made in accordance with the path taken by other donor countries, rather than in ­response to recipient needs or Spain’s own domestic interests (Olivié, 2011). Moreover, this conclusion connects with studies on other domains of Spanish foreign policy over recent decades. Arenal (2008) found Spain’s foreign policy during the democratic transition as fully oriented to normalisation. Despite the country’s success in this regard, and its integration into NATO and the European Union, Spain (along with Portugal) continues to be featured as a policy-taker rather than a policymaker (Börzel, 2002) or the ‘good pupil’ of EU integration (Molina, 2018).

Notes 1 The authors are grateful to Krisztina Szabó for her review and valuable input, as well as to the book’s coauthors for their comments, including specific suggestions from Olav Stokke, Gino Pauselli, Balazs Svent-Ivanyi, and David Williams. 2 Other academic works analysing Spanish aid from the perspective of its alignment to international policy frameworks are those by Sanahuja (2007), Martínez and Sanahuja (2010), and de la Iglesia-Caruncho (2011).

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3 This section focusses on variables recorded on the DAC database (volume, channel, geographical and sector allocation). 4 The first PACI was not published in the official journal of Spain, the BOE, and it has not been disclosed due to property rights issues, according to the AECID Library. 5 The guidelines as such were published along with a summary of hearings by the Parliamentary Commission, including with the Secretary of State for International ­Cooperation and Latin America, who enunciated three similar policy goals: international solidarity, foreign policy development, and export promotion. This ­presentation was consistent with several other hearings of high-ranking officials who informed representatives of Parliament on the synergies of aid with the missions of their departments and agencies. 6 Surprisingly, the Secretary of State highlighted that the country had already reached an ODA expenditure of GNI 0.35%. GNI had passed that of countries like the US and the UK. Representatives from local and regional governments quoted in the guidelines also referred to this 0.7% international commitment. 7 Spain is the most decentralised donor in the world, with more than 1/3 of its bilateral aid extended by subnational governments (Pérez, 2018). 8 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs added Cooperation to its name, the AECI added Development, and the Secretary of State for International Cooperation was separated from the department for Latin American countries. 9 The FAD came under the umbrella of the Ministry of Economy, as well as the FIEM, while the FONPRODE is managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ­Cooperation and its cooperation agency, the AECID. 10 Along with the FONPRODE law, another law establishing the Fund for business internationalisation (FIEM) was passed and excluded the possibility of reporting its funding as ODA. 11 Spain ranks 25th in the 30-member ranking of the DAC on aid effort (ODA/GNI). In a total ODA ranking, Spain ranks in the 16th position (OECD, 2016a).

Bibliography Alberich Nistal, T. (2007) ‘Asociaciones y Movimientos Sociales en España: Cuatro ­Décadas de Cambios’, Revista de Estudios de Juventud, ISSN-e 0211-4364, No 76 (dedicado a: Jóvenes, globalización y movimientos altermundistas), pp. 71–89. Alonso, J. A. (2005) ‘Spanish Foreign Aid: Flaws of an Emerging Framework’, in Stokke, O. & Hoebink, P. (eds.) Perspectives on European development cooperation: Policy and performance of individual donor countries and the EU. Routledge. Arenal, C. del. (1994) Política exterior de España hacia Iberoamérica. Editorial Complutense. Arenal, C. del (2008) Consenso y disenso en la política exterior de España. Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid. Börzel, T. A. (2002) States and Regions in the European Union: Institutional Adaptation in Germany and Spain. Cambridge University Press. CdD (1992) Informe sobre los objetivos y líneas generales de la política española de cooperación y ayuda al desarrollo. Congreso de los Diputados, Spain. CONGDE (2006) Pacto de Estado Contra la Pobreza. Coordinadora de ONG de Desarrollo de España y grupos políticos en el Congreso de los Diputados, Madrid. JdE (1976) ‘Real Decreto-ley 10/1976 por el que se dictan medidas fiscales, de fomento de la exportación y del comercio interior’, Boletin Oficial del Estado. España: Jefatura del Estado, A(16223), pp. 16566–16568.

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JdE (1998) ‘Ley 23/1998 de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo’, Boletin Oficial del Estado. España: Jefatura del Estado, A(162), pp. 22755–22765. JdE (2010a) ‘Ley 11/2010, de 28 de junio, de reforma del sistema de apoyo financiero a la internacionalización de la empresa española’, Boletin Oficial del Estado. España: Jefatura del Estado, A(157). JdE (2010b) ‘Ley 36/2010, de 22 de octubre, del Fondo para la Promoción del Desarrollo’, Boletin Oficial del Estado. España: Jefatura del Estado, A(257), pp. 1–90. de la Iglesia-Caruncho, M. (2011) ‘The Politics and Policy of Aid in Spain’, IDR3 IDS Research Reports, 2011(65), pp. 1–99. Larrú, J. M. & Tezanos, S. (2012) ‘Ayuda oficial espanola al desarrollo: Los retos de la especializacion geografica y sectorial’, Estudios de Economia Aplicada, 30(3), pp. 889–914. MAE (1986) Plan anual de la cooperación internacional 1987. España: Comisión Interministerial de Cooperación Internacional, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores. MAE (2000) Plan Director de la Cooperación Española 2001–2004. España: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores. MAEC (2005) II Plan Director de la Cooperación Española, 2005–2008. España: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación. MAEC (2009) III Plan Director de la Cooperación Española, 2009–2012. España: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación. MAEC (2013) IV Plan Director de la Cooperación Española, 2013–2016. España: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación. MAEC (2018) V Plan Director de la Cooperación Española, 2018–2021. España: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación (Consejo de Ministros). Maroto, J. M. (2014) ‘La ayuda oficial al desarrollo Española en Guinea Ecuatorial: Un análisis crítico’, Cuadernos Geograficos, 53(1), pp. 160–187. Martínez, I. & Sanahuja, J. A. (2010) ‘La cooperación descentralizada en España y el reto de la eficacia de la ayuda’, ICEI Paper 18. Molina, I. (2018) ‘Spain in the EU: eager to regain centrality’, in Pollak, J., Schmidt, P. & Kaeding, M. (eds.) The Future of Europe – Views from the Capitals. Palgrave Macmillan. MRCSG (1988) ‘Real Decreto 1527/1988, de 11 de noviembre, por el que se reestructura la Secretaría de Estado para la Cooperación Internacional y para Iberoamérica, con refundición de los Organismos autónomos adscritos a la misma’, Boletin Oficial del ­Estado. España: Ministerio de Relaciones con las Cortes y de la Secretaría del Gobierno, A(307), pp. 35998–36003. OECD (1998) Development Cooperation Reviews: Spain. OECD Development Assistance Committee. OECD (2002) Development Cooperation Review: Spain. OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC peer review). OECD (2005) Tied Aid: Ex Ante Guidance – OECD. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/ trade/xcred/tiedaidexanteguidance.htm [accessed 19 Dec 2018]. OECD (2011) Spain, DAC Peer Review. OECD Development Assistance Committee. OECD (2016a) DAC member profile: Spain – OECD. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/ dac/spain.htm [accessed 26 Sept 2018]. OECD (2016b) Development Cooperation Reviews: Spain 2016. OECD Development ­A ssistance Committee. OECD (2016c) ODA: History of the 0.7% target. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7679.1966.tb00206.x/ full. OECD (2018) OECD Statistics. Available at: https://stats.oecd.org/ [accessed 20 Dec 2018].

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Olivié, I. (2011) ‘Newcomers to Like-Minded Aid and Donor Darlings: The Strange Case of Spain in Vietnam’, Development Policy Review, 29(6), pp. 749–770. Wiley/ Blackwell (10.1111). Plataforma 0.7% (2018) www.plataforma07.org. Available at: http://www.plataforma07. org/historiadel07.html [accessed 19 Sept 2018]. Sanahuja Perales, J. A. (2007) ‘La política de cooperación española a partir de 2008: el reto de culminar las reformas’, Quórum: revista de pensamiento iberoamericano, 19, pp. 37–55. Tezanos, S. (2008) ‘Aiding Middle-Income Countries? The Case of Spain’, Oxford Development Studies, 36(4), pp. 409–438. Tezanos, S. & Gutierrez, D. (2016) ‘Reshaping Geographical Allocation of Aid: The Role of Immigration in Spanish Official Development Assistance’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 19(3), pp. 333–364. UN (2000) Millenium Declaration. Available at: http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm [accessed 19 Dec 2018] UNICEF (1998) Implementing the 20/20 Initiative: Achieving Universal Access to Basic Social Services. New York.

8 WHILE THE CAT’S AWAY, WILL THE MICE PLAY? GOVERNMENT-NGO RELATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF AID IN HUNGARY Krisztina Szabó, Balázs Szent-Iványi, and András Tétényi

Introduction In pluralistic societies, interest groups play an important role in forming g­ overnment policies. In the case of international development policy, a n ­ umber of stakeholders beyond government actors are present in policy processes, ­including non-­ governmental organisations (NGOs), businesses, think tanks, ­academics, and other experts. This feature has already been described in other chapters of this volume, as it is seized in both theoretical analyses of IR (surveyed in Chapters 1 and 2) and empirical studies (Chapters 3 and 4 on the US and the UK, respectively) on the behaviour of donors. All of these actors have particular views on how much aid the government should give, to whom, through what channels, and according to what norms. Interestingly, however, these actors’ impact on aid policy, and more broadly on the domestic politics of how international development policy is formulated, has received relatively little attention. Contributions in the literature have provided historical-institutional accounts of how aid policy develops in donor countries (see, e.g., Lancaster, 2006; Hoebink, 2011) and have examined the roles of legislatures (Milner & Tingley, 2010) and political parties in those processes (Heppel & Lightfoot, 2012). While some work has been done on the role of NGOs in the development policy processes of donor countries and organisations like the EU or World Bank (Elgström, 2000; Park, 2005; Szent-Iványi & Lightfoot, 2016), most of the literature tends to conceptualise NGOs as implementers of foreign aid projects (e.g. Nunnenkamp & Öhler, 2012; Sanchez Salgado, 2017), or else focusses on NGOs’ highly visible international campaigns (Busby, 2007) as opposed to their domestic policy advocacy. This chapter aims to contribute to this literature by examining the possible relationships that can emerge between NGOs and governments, and it raises the question of how the nature of this relationship impacts the ability of NGOs

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to shape the government’s international development policy. It uses an emerging European donor, Hungary, as a case study. While Hungary may not be a straightforward choice for examining donor government-NGO dynamics, it is surprisingly relevant as a case study. First, as a relatively new donor, Hungary provides lessons for other emerging donors, especially those from the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region, but also beyond. Second, as discussed below, there have been a number of significant changes in the relationship between the Hungarian government and NGOs over the past two decades, providing an interesting setting for examining how these changes have impacted on the influence of NGOs. Using insights from public choice theory and theories on government-NGO relations, the chapter presents a typology of these relations, and then applies it to the case of development NGOs in Hungary. Using an historical approach, the chapter focusses on the years between 2003 (when Hungary’s international development policy was launched) and 2018. Three main conclusions emerge from this exercise. First, the government created partnerships with large service-­provider NGOs, and it has generally co-opted or confronted smaller ones (see  below). Second, during most of the period, relatively little domestic political and public attention was paid to international development; thus, the government had little incentive to react to the advocacy demands of NGOs or to engage in any policy reform. Third, reform was possible only after the government realised how it could fit international development policy into its wider foreign policy toolkit and took ownership of the policy. The chapter is structured as follows. The “Theoretical considerations” section provides some conceptual insights on government-NGO relations. The ­“Relations between development NGOs and the Hungarian government” section uses those insights to analyse how relations evolved between the Hungarian government and development and humanitarian NGOs between 2003 and 2018. The final section offers some concluding remarks.

Theoretical considerations In theory, Northern NGOs generally play two key sets of roles in the field of international development. First, they deliver services, which include the implementation of projects aimed at promoting development and poverty reduction in poor countries, along with projects in their home countries aimed at raising awareness on poverty and the associated global challenges (Steinberg, 2006). ­Second, NGOs have a key role in holding the government to account. They monitor the activities of governments to ensure that they meet legal, ethical, and moral standards, as well as internationally agreed commitments (Najam, 2000). NGOs also aim to shape government activity and to prod public policies towards a vision they consider correct. NGOs can thus be conceptualised as interest groups and “para-policy organisations” with the aim of bringing together actors for the purpose of putting particular social visions into practice (Najam, 1999).

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Some NGOs rely exclusively on private donations (including volunteers) to fund these activities, while others may use membership fees or engage in commercial activity. NGOs may also bid for grants from the state or international organisations, and, in some cases, they may enter into longer-term formal or informal arrangements with the state. It is well documented in the literature that such reliance on the state can compromise their advocacy role (Mosley, 2012). Given the roles of NGOs, the relationship between them and governments is crucial and has an impact on the effectiveness of development NGOs in delivering international development objectives, and in influencing public policy strategies and means. One possible way of approaching this relationship is to compare how NGOs and the government prioritise policy goals, and how they choose policy instruments to achieve these goals. Hence, Najam’s (2000) theory of the “four Cs” is used as a framework, arguing that the position of an NGO relative to the government is best understood through the degree of similarities or discrepancies in the means and goals of the two actors. The interests, priorities, external influences, and resources of governments and NGOs may diverge in some policy areas and converge in others, leading to four potential outcomes: (1) both actors seek similar ends with similar means (cooperation), (2) they seek dissimilar ends with dissimilar means (confrontation), (3) both seek similar ends but prefer dissimilar means (complementarity), and (4) both actors prefer similar means but for dissimilar ends (co-optation) (Najam, 2000). In cases where there is agreement on the policy goals between the government and NGOs (cooperation or complementarity), we can expect certain forms of partnership to emerge between the two actors. Even if there are differences in the strategies applied (as in the case of complementarity), “ends trump means” (Najam, 2000); hence, the defining objectives are what determine the relationship between the two actors. If they share objectives, they are likely to gravitate towards an arrangement with the aim of achieving these goals. Salamon (1995) has argued that civil society and government are engaged primarily in a partnership in which government finances public services, while civil society (partially) delivers them. The compatibility between government and NGO goals means that the government can rely on NGOs to deliver its goals. From an economic perspective, it may also be more efficient for the government to delegate the delivery of certain services to non-governmental actors (Coase, 1988). In many cases, costs are high and efficiencies are low in public bureaucracies (Gronbjerg, 1997), making it more efficient to contract out services (Ferris, 1993). Young (1999, p. 37) claims that there are several instances when an NGO has better information to carry out service delivery efficiently: “contracting with non-profits that are knowledgeable about the individual communities in which they are based, government can overcome the information problem”. Steinberg (1997) argues that non-profit organisations benefit the government in terms of reduced opportunistic behaviour and reduced transaction costs of negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing a contract, as compared to for-profit actors. At the same time, he warns that these benefits are subject to a handful of other external and internal factors, such as the internal motivations

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of non-profit agents, the level of competition, and the structure of the contracts themselves. In line with this reasoning, Hansmann (1980) argues that due to problems of asymmetric information between contributors and service providers, people trust NGOs over for-profit organisations. In case of pursuing the same policy objective, NGOs are likely to conduct a constructive role in advocacy in which they support and incentivise the government to achieve the declared shared objectives. The power position of the government and NGOs, however, are far from symmetric, making perfect partnership and true collaboration rare. In case of co-optation, where there is no agreement between NGOs and the government on policy goals, but where both regard the necessary means in a similar fashion, a hierarchic relationship may develop between the two actors. Governments will generally provide public goods and services following the preferences of median voters or the dominant political coalition (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). As the preferences of citizens are not homogeneous, there are always some groups whose preferences vary substantially from those of the median voter and who are willing to provide additional levels of public goods by mobilising through the non-profit sector on a voluntary, collective basis (Young, 1999). Hence, substantial room is left for NGOs to fill the role of supplementing government services. Within this model, civil society follows and reacts to the actions of government, undertaking tasks and fulfilling demands left unanswered by the government, rather than serving as the initiator. Such preference of the same means but different goals can conceivably lead to mutual manipulation, or even some degree of confrontation, yet given that there is an inherent power asymmetry in favour of the government, NGOs are likely here to be constrained by the hierarchic relation. Nevertheless, there may be some positive effects of NGO attempts to influence government goals, since healthy dialogue, changing ideas, and continuous communication are necessary features of the policy marketplace. Many papers have proved that in some cases, NGOs are actually successful in these attempts (e.g. Lee & Lee, 2016). NGOs usually accept the hierarchic relation, since they either recognise their own limited capacities or else profit in some way from the similarities between means (e.g. in case of international development policy, the government may prefer to tie foreign aid to domestic procurement, from which national NGOs may also benefit). Finally, confrontation and an adversarial relationship occur between a government and NGOs when they agree neither on the ends nor the means. If co-optation is not possible, minorities whose views are not represented in public policy will organise themselves into NGOs with the aim of gaining more from public resources and pressing the government to more adequately serve their interests (Weisbrod, 1977). The government has no incentives to react to such pressures, given that it acts in accordance with the requirements of the majority. Yet, early contributions to the literature (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962) based on public choice theory proved that efforts by organised minorities on particular public policy issues can be substantial, and that such interest groups can quickly become determining actors. NGOs may promote their preferences through advocacy

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and demonstrate the efficacy of their own view of goals and means through the provision of a service funded by voluntary contributions. According to Young (1999), such a demonstration may eventually receive the support of a majority, at which point “government may undertake full-scale provision”. However, there is no guarantee that this will happen, as it depends on the ability of NGOs to solve problems of collective action and to ensure adequate resources and capacities (Olson, 1965). If NGOs are unable to solve such issues, confrontation can persist because the government has no incentive to react to minority demands. However, a government’s position may also shift due to factors outside NGO influence, such as rival interest groups (including for-profit businesses), changes in the dominant coalition, or external shocks on median voter preferences. These three positions (partnership, hierarchic/co-optation, and ­adversarial/ confrontation) are by no means mutually exclusive or steady over time. Governments may be more dependent on NGOs in certain sectors than in others. NGOs can provide services where the government is unable or unwilling; they may also possess specific expertise that is vital for policy-making processes or policy delivery. However, in areas where service provision is less prevalent, and NGOs are active mainly in terms of their advocacy roles, the relationship may be more adversarial. Such a relationship can also change over time, often as a result of changes in ­preferences and relative bargaining positions. These changes can originate from factors like shifts in the amount and structure of funds available to NGOs, or shifts in government (and voter) preferences, or changes to the historical attitudes of citizens towards charity, or to public support for NGOs and/or the government. Sometimes change is slow, but it can also be rather abrupt: the sexual abuse scandals at Oxfam (a large UK-based NGO) have contributed significantly to eroding the legitimacy of NGOs in the UK (BBC, 2018). Finally, because Hungary has been selected as a case study, it makes sense to look at the specificities of NGO-government relations in the CEE context. There is a nearly unanimous view that NGOs in the CEE region are subordinated to the government in most cases, and have a weak role in society (e.g. Wallace et al., 2012). Individual activism is weaker in CEE countries, and NGOs often experience difficulties when attempting to mobilise citizens for specific causes. In fact, NGOs seem to be detached from their grassroots and thus lacking in legitimacy, although they have developed skills for engaging with governments (Petrova & Tarrow, 2007). Accession to the European Union was an important element in terms of strengthening the role of civil society in the CEE countries in general, and the empowering of NGOs in particular; yet papers focussing on the positive and negative consequences of EU membership are ambiguous in their findings (e.g. Szent-Iványi & Lightfoot, 2016). On the one hand, NGOs have benefitted from the rights and responsibilities that national adoption of the EU’s acquis communautaire has afforded them (Roth, 2007). On the other hand, some find that accession has not led to a systematic empowerment of civil society and has not shifted the relation of NGOs and government towards stronger partnership (Börzel & Buzogány, 2010).

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It is unclear, however, how these characteristics from the CEE countries fit in with the Najam’s ‘four Cs’ model, or what specific NGO-government relationships have emerged. The following section investigates this issue, using the case of development and humanitarian NGOs in Hungary.

Relations between development NGOs and the Hungarian government The beginnings: 2003–2006 During the early years of Hungary’s international development policy, the government made efforts to develop a relationship based on partnership with the development NGO community. However, true partnership emerged only with a small number of large service-provider NGOs, and we find evidence of co-­ optation with smaller organisations. The government accepted its first “concept note” on international development policy in 2001, and the first foreign aid-funded projects began in 2003. While creating the new policy area was an explicit requirement of the EU accession negotiations, Hungary (and other CEE countries) received significant capacity-development assistance from established donors like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), mainly in the form of expert advice, training, and some seed funding (Szent-Iványi & Tétényi, 2013). The early years of this policy, as well as related difficulties and contradictions, are meticulously documented by Paragi (2011), who argues that political and public attention to international development policy was low. The government aimed at putting a minimal, tokenistic policy in place to meet the requirements of the EU acquis, but it had no clear plans on what to use the policy for, or how it should develop in the future. Amounts devoted to foreign aid were likewise low, with total bilateral aid averaging around US$37 million in 2004/2005. While there was little strategic direction during the early years of Hungary’s foreign aid policy, aid allocation patterns do reveal some trends. Hungary clearly favoured providing aid to countries in its broadly defined neighbourhood (i.e. in the Western Balkans and from the former Soviet Union). Some path dependency was also present, as Hungary provided relatively large amounts of aid to developing countries with which it had had close ties during the pre-1989 era, such as Vietnam and Yemen. The level of poverty or the quality of political institutions in recipient countries was not a determining factor in Hungary’s aid allocation (Szent-Iványi, 2012). These aid allocation patterns hint at some interests that may have guided Hungary’s foreign aid policy during the early period: the need to ensure regional stability and to maintain good relations with neighbours, as well as to support Hungarian ethnic minorities, especially in Serbia and Ukraine. There were clear government efforts to develop partnership with NGOs in the policy area, both in terms of policy-making and in the actual delivery of

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international development projects. The government created a Civil ­Advisory Board (CAB) as a forum for public participation in shaping international development policy, and CAB membership included NGOs, academics, trade unions, and representatives of political parties. Civil society organisations received funding from CIDA’s capacity-development programme, which assisted them in creating an umbrella advocacy group, the Hungarian Association of NGOs for Development and Humanitarian Aid (HAND). The government acknowledged HAND as the representative of development NGOs and gave it a formal consulting role in policy-making (Szent-Iványi & Lightfoot, 2016). Elsewhere, the government developed special relationships with a number of NGOs. Three large, faith-based NGOs – the Hungarian Interchurch ­Charity Service, the Baptist Charity Service, and the Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta – carried out significant domestic social care and charity activities and had, since the 1990s, amassed experience in delivering international ­humanitarian aid. The government was reliant on these NGOs, especially given that the political and public saliency of humanitarian assistance was higher than that of development assistance (Szent-Iványi & Lightfoot, 2016). Humanitarian emergencies received high media coverage, and Hungarians have shown a willingness to donate, especially in the wake of the 2005 t­ sunami in Southeast Asia. The goals and means of the government and the three NGOs aligned in  this case: all sought to save lives (while also building the international reputation of Hungary), and they agreed that humanitarian aid in the form of goods transfers (medicines, emergency supplies, etc.) was the most appropriate solution. The government also developed a close relationship with a fourth NGO, the Hungarian International Development Assistance Non-Profit Company (HUN-IDA), which was contracted to serve as the implementing agency of Hungarian international development assistance, charged mainly with the tasks of managing the financial and contractual aspects of international development tenders. Other NGOs at the time were mostly smaller organisations with limited capacities for humanitarian aid, and these were mainly involved in small-scale development projects, as well as awareness raising and development education within Hungary. The nature of their relationship with the government can be characterised more as co-option than partnership. During this early period, evidence gradually emerged that these organisations disagreed with the government’s views on the goals of international development. Although it did not pay much attention to the policy, the government had emphasised how it could be a vehicle for promoting Hungarian business interests aboard, by helping H ­ ungarian actors gain a foothold in foreign markets (see Paragi, 2011). The smaller NGOs, on the other hand, made clear their preference that foreign aid should serve poverty reduction and the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was able to co-opt these through an agreement on the means of international development: tied aid. The government issued regular calls for proposals for international development projects, where

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only Hungarian actors (including NGOs) were eligible to apply. This represented a valuable source of financing for NGOs, especially because businesses proved less interested in such calls. Meanwhile, the hierarchical relationship of co-­optation was also clearly visible from the workings of the CAB. According to Paragi (2011, p. 214), the CAB “responds to the initiatives of the MFA, instead of being a creative and pro-active body formulating proposals without any explicit invitation”. Thus, the CAB appeared to be a formal body, without actual influence on policy. Therefore, during this early period, the government developed relationships of partnership with the larger development NGOs, as it needed to rely on them for delivery of its international humanitarian obligations; while it co-opted smaller NGOs by providing them with a source of financing through an annual call for proposals. All NGOs were rather optimistic about the future during this period, and advocacy by HAND concentrated more on technical issues, such as the workings of the annual calls for proposals, and less on the substance of the government’s international development policy. This meant that there was no pressure on the government to change the way the policy had been envisioned in the 2001 concept note.

Austerity and confrontation: 2006–2011 This status quo began to change after the 2006 elections, which saw the re-­ election of the governing social-liberal coalition. Due to years of irresponsible fiscal policy, the government’s budget deficit soared to above 9% in 2006, and it was forced to implement austerity measures (Benczes, 2011). Given the low political salience of international development, bilateral aid was one of the areas cut back – by 2008, the budget had been slashed to around $15 million. Importantly, this meant that the funding for the MFA’s annual call for proposals was also cut significantly, decreasing the government’s available resources for co-optation. Furthermore, in order to showcase itself as a firm ally of the US, Hungary began operating one of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan in 2006. This proved to be a huge undertaking for such a relatively small and inexperienced donor, swallowing significant portions of the country’s remaining bilateral aid budget. The years after 2006 proved to be a difficult time for smaller NGOs. The large humanitarian NGOs had diversified funding streams and managed to maintain their partnership with the government due to their roles as service provides, even managing to win reconstruction contracts in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, smaller NGOs experienced significant funding issues and increasingly began shifting towards alternative sources of funding: they became more active in applying for EU funding, although they were less competitive than their peers from Western European countries, and had difficulties succeeding in these (Szent-Iványi 2014). Nonetheless, they came into a position where they were much less dependent on the government than previously.

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This clearly had an impact on their advocacy, as lower dependence on the government allowed them to be more vocal and critical of policy issues, leading to a more confrontational relationship. The differences between these NGOs and the government in terms of how they viewed the goals of international development became much more apparent, and with the dwindling of resources for co-option, so did the differences in their views of means. These differences were starkly expressed in 2007, when HAND published its first AidWatch R ­ eport (Kiss, 2007), presenting a large number of demands to the MFA and more broadly to the government. These included a sharpening of the poverty focus of aid; increased transparency; reductions in the number of recipient countries; and reforms to the system to introduce greater strategic coherence (see Szent-Iványi & Lightfoot, 2016). Confrontation intensified in the following years, with regular clashes b­ etween HAND and the MFA on issues like the purposes of aid, the volume of aid, and access to data on aid. However, the wider government still paid very little attention to foreign aid, and most confrontations occurred between HAND and MFA officials, with other ministries or political actors rarely involved. This lack of interest meant that the MFA was unable to bring the demands of the NGOs on board, as many required wider government approval (such as increasing the aid budget, or reforming the structure of the aid system). Nor did the MFA have any strong incentives to carry out reforms on issues it might have impacted, given how the NGO community was unable to apply significant pressure: despite their much more active advocacy and publications, NGOs were unable to generate any public interest or support for international development (Szent-Iványi & ­Lightfoot, 2016). In fact, with the onset of the global economic crisis in 2008, which hit Hungary especially hard (Benczes, 2011), people became increasingly preoccupied with their own financial circumstances. HAND’s work was also made more difficult by collective action problems. Existing splits in the development NGO community became more apparent in this period, reflecting the fact that the large NGOs were still treated as partners by the government. Around 2005, the Hungarian Interchurch Charity Service and the Baptist Charity Service left HAND, which was significantly weakened by the loss of two of its largest members (Szent-Iványi & Lightfoot, 2016). The smaller NGOs also seemed resentful of HUN-IDA’s role and pointed to irregularities in the public procurement process, through which HUN-IDA was awarded its position, and they began confronting the MFA on this issue (Miklósi, 2007; Paragi, 2011). Further cuts were enacted to the bilateral development budget in 2010, which meant that the MFA was not able to publish a call for proposals from NGOs that year (Kiss, 2011). This again revealed the low priority that the government placed on international development. The fact that no progress had been made in meeting the demands of the NGOs was evident, as the 2012 AidWatch Report (Hódosi, 2012) essentially reiterated all the issues mentioned in the 2007 edition.

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Global opening: 2011–2016 The years between 2011 and 2016 can be characterised by the government’s discovery of development assistance as a foreign policy tool. Thus, a perhaps unexpected complementarity began to emerge between the government and development NGOs. One of the hallmarks of the foreign policy of the rightwing government led by Viktor Orbán after 2010 was to search for new international partners, both in the business sector and in politics, to diversify Hungary’s EU-centred economic relations (Tarrosy & Morenth, 2013). The policy, called “Global Opening”, aimed at improving relations with countries that had been “neglected” in recent years, and at raising Hungarian presence in the international arena and enhancing Hungarian activity in tackling global challenges (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). Improvements in relations between Hungary and developing countries were achieved by way of a series of high-level visits, and by opening new embassies, for instance, in certain African countries (e.g. Angola, Ghana, Nigeria). In addition, the Hungarian government sought to increase its development assistance in order to improve the visibility of Hungary in developing countries. An important achievement was the drafting and eventual acceptance of the first Hungarian law on international development (Act XC of 2014), which entered into force on 1 July 2015. The goal of the act and a related strategy document (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014) was to promote human and minority rights, sustainable development, and international security. The strategy also heavily focussed on business opportunities for Hungarian companies and claimed that “[aid] can provide market access for certain segments of the H ­ ungarian private and public sector (e.g., education, health) while promoting scientific and technological development” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014, p. 7). Opportunities for Hungarian businesses were to be achieved mainly through a stronger programme of tied aid, and improvement of H ­ ungary’s visibility through a higher education scholarship programme (Stipendium Hungaricum) available to citizens of the Global South. These two major programmes finally fostered government ownership of international development policy (Tétényi,  2018). They also indicate how the government’s motivations for providing foreign aid changed, with business interests firmly at the centre. Aid data show that total expenditures grew considerably between 2013 and 2016 (from US$128 million to approximately US$200 million), and the share of official development assistance (ODA) in gross national income (GNI) increased from 0.1% to 0.17%. Bilateral tied aid was set to increase in 2018 from US$2.15 million to almost US$30 million. In addition, the Stipendium Hungaricum programme budget reached US$19 million in 2016 (HAND, 2017). The government was firmly the driver of these reforms, which should not be seen as reactions to NGO demands but rather as changes in the government’s attitude towards international development. Nonetheless, development NGOs were strongly involved in deliberation of the law and strategy on international

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development in 2013 and 2014, and these documents aligned to some extent with the aims of the NGO community. The reforms met some of their longstanding demands, such as providing a legal basis for international development or increasing transparency (HAND, 2014). Furthermore, Hungary also began increasing spending in low-income countries – another longstanding recommendation of the NGO sector (HAND, 2017). The share of African countries in total bilateral aid, for example, increased from 5% to 11.5% between 2011 and 2016. Many other emerging and developing countries – including Turkey, Nigeria, Jordan, India, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and Laos – also received significant increases (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018). This convergence between NGO and government views on the ends and means of international development policy appeared to signal a new era of partnership. This was also evidenced by the fact that NGO criticism of the reforms and the newfound political attention were rather muted. Most NGOs were simply happy that, after years of stagnation, something was actually happening. While some of the changes, such as the emphasis on using foreign aid to promote business interests, did not resonate with their views, NGOs were not overly critical. Many NGOs, including smaller ones, further benefitted from becoming implementing partners of the MFA (rebranded as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, MoFAT, in 2015) in small-scale (tied) development projects in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo or Tanzania. Larger development projects, however, remained almost exclusively the realm of large NGOs like Hungarian Interchurch Aid, which appeared to have emerged as the government’s most favoured NGO.1 HAND (in a 2017 AidWatch Report) did ask for greater cooperation between NGOs and the MoFAT – a sign that their partnership was perhaps not as strong as it could have been. However, NGOs gained an important role in the implementation of development assistance, and the government has heeded at least some of their policy-level concerns. Thus, there was some evidence of the emergence of a mutually beneficial partnership, going beyond co-optation.

Repression after 2016? Although the relationship between development NGOs and the government improved after 2011, the Orbán government’s broader actions during the same period have been characterised as ‘democratic backsliding’. This process and its logic and motivations have received significant international media attention and have been well documented in the scholarly literature (Greskovits, 2015; Cianetti et al., 2018; Krekó & Enyedi, 2018; Szuleka, 2018). A key element of Hungary’s democratic backsliding relates to the government’s increasing hostility towards civil society and the restrictions it has been placing on the activities of NGOs. Paradoxically, while the Hungarian government was increasing its cooperation with NGOs in the field of development cooperation, it was labelling a particular set of NGOs as operating against the interests of Hungarians, especially after 2015.

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Since 2015, the Hungarian government has spent around €100 million to convince voters that Hungarian-born billionaire-philanthropist George Soros seeks to bring millions of illegal migrants into Europe, with the aim of destabilising the continent (Krekó & Enyedi, 2018). Soros is depicted in the government media as a funder of NGOs that do his bidding and support migration. According to the government’s logic, NGOs that receive funding from Soros – who directs a considerable part of his fortune towards the promotion of open society and support for advocacy groups – aim to destabilise both Hungary and Europe as a whole. This has resulted in stigmatisation and smear campaigns against NGOs, which is particularly worrying as these attacks deprive them of their legitimacy and local acceptance, in turn, hindering their ability to function and to perform their advocacy role. There are a number of tools that a government can employ to limit the activities of civil society (Van der Borgh & Terwindt, 2012), including administrative restrictions, stigmatisation of NGOs, limiting the space for dialogue, intimidation of civil society activists, restrictions in access to funding, and criminalisation. Following Russia’s example, the government introduced legislation in 2017 (Act LXXVI of 2017), which compels all NGOs receiving more than $25,000 in foreign funding to state this income on their website. According to the Hungarian Helsinki Committee and the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (2017), this interferes with these organisations’ freedom of expression, affecting their right to a good reputation by requiring NGOs to self-identify with seemingly negative labels. In 2018, government activists placed stickers on the office of the Hungarian Association for Migrants, identifying it as an organisation supporting immigration (Mérce, 2018). Furthermore, the ­government has gone beyond measures aimed at stigmatisation: the 2018 ‘Stop Soros’ law makes assisting ‘illegal’ migrants a criminal offense (The Guardian, 2018). Furthermore, the 2018 tax code (Act XLI of 2018) introduced a special immigration tax, payable by entities providing immigration-support services in Hungary. Beyond NGOs working with migrants, the repression against NGOs has so far mainly impacted human and civil rights groups, especially those engaged in advocacy. As even the largest and most well-respected NGOs2 receive significant portions of their income through EU grants, they are required to list themselves as NGOs funded from abroad, and this can be used against them in future smear campaigns. Development NGOs are in a similar situation, but the large faithbased organisations have been mostly left alone. These large NGOs are still key providers of humanitarian aid delivery and development assistance in which the government has little capacity. Furthermore, the existence of large, faith-based NGOs fits well with Hungary’s post-2017 international development policy, centred around the new ‘Hungary Helps’ programme, which heavily emphasises Christian solidarity as well as addressing the root causes of migration. Therefore, while the government has maintained partnership with key service delivery development NGOs, it has entered into a new, repressive relationship with many others, especially those engaged in advocacy. Particularly worrisome is that segments of the pro-government media are quick to label any civil organisation as a Soros-organisation that raises its voice against government policy (Magyar Idők, 2018). ‘Useful’ NGOs, on the other hand, are tolerated and even

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supported. How this general attitude by the government against NGOs will impact the post-2011 emerging partnership with NGOs in the field of international development policy is as yet unclear. With the government increasingly emphasising the role of aid in combating what it sees as illegal migration, divergence may again result in terms of how the government and NGOs view the goals of international development policy.

Conclusions The chapter has sought to explain the nature and evolution of the relationship between the Hungarian government and NGOs active in the field of international development policy between 2003 and 2018, with a view to exploring how this relationship has impacted the ability of NGOs to shape this policy area. During this 15-year period, the relationship has gone through many changes, including forms of partnership, confrontation, and co-optation. Some NGOs have been consistently more favoured by the government than others: large, mainly faithbased humanitarian NGOs have been able to provide services that the government could not, and such organisations retained a close relationship with the government throughout the period. Smaller NGOs, however, have at times held clearly different views than the government on the goals and means of international development, and this has led to various degrees of co-option and confrontation. Despite their more vigorous advocacy at times, NGOs have achieved very little in terms of influence, mainly due to the low public and political salience of international development in Hungary. Lower-level government officials have been able to disregard NGO demands, as these organisations have been unsuccessful in mobilisation and hence unable to mount significant pressure. Attempts by NGOs to fulfil their advocacy role and to generate debates with ministry officials have had little success. The chapter has indicated that the only time significant changes became possible in the policy area was when the government recognised aid’s potential as a powerful tool to promote Hungarian political and business interests in developing and emerging economies, and therefore, took ownership of aid.

Notes 1 This is also shown by the fact that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s wife is one of ­Hungarian Interchurch Aid’s goodwill ambassadors. 2 For a list, see: http://civil.info.hu/kulfoldrol-tamogatott-civil-szervezetek. These include such well-known brands as WWF, Red Cross, Hungarian Interchurch Aid, Hungarian Baptist Aid, Greenpeace, UNICEF, etc.

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9 BRAZILIAN COOPERATION POLICY: PROMOTION OF DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL PROJECTION Guillermo Santander

Introduction Brazil has been one of the main protagonists of South-South cooperation over the last two decades, mobilising its resources and capabilities to other developing countries. Its already prominent role experienced a significant boost with the arrival of President Lula da Silva to power in 2003 and a commitment to so-called New Developmentalism, which became a key element of Brazilian foreign policy. Unlike the developmentalism of the mid-20th century, which was markedly national in character, this new conception sought to transcend and complement that vision with an international dimension. During the mandates of Lula and Rousseff (2003–2016), this strategic view reinforced the connection between the promotion of international development and the pursuit of national interests (Amorim, 2010; Ayllón, 2013; Mercadante, 2013). This shaped a Brazilian cooperation model that can be explained only by addressing elements of its foreign policy, as well as policies linked to domestic dynamics and the prevailing political project. Regarding the latter, a portion of the existing literature includes analyses of how internal factors and interests have affected Brazilian cooperation policy. These include a set of domestic factors in close relation to the varied motivations presented by a wide range of actors who participate in the definition of Brazilian politics. This includes, for example, the Presidency and its use of cooperation as a source of internal legitimacy, strengthening its role in domestic agenda-setting as well as its profile abroad. It would likewise include the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade, the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES), and Brazilian companies, all of which perceive how international cooperation can be useful in encouraging trade and the opening of markets abroad; also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (known as Itamaraty), seeking international influence and defending Brazilian interests abroad; along with a very dynamic and mobilised civil society, directed towards advancing

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issues related to the progress and well-being of Brazil’s population (Dauvergne & Farias, 2012; Duarte, 2013; Milani & Duarte, 2015; Burges & Chagas, 2017). Bearing in mind this plurality of concerned actors, the present chapter focusses on how Brazilian development cooperation has played a crucial role as a tool in the nation’s foreign policy, contributing to a search for greater international projection consistent with its national vision and interests. The chapter is structured as follows: after introduction, the “Main features of Brazilian development cooperation” section presents the main facts and features that have defined Brazilian cooperation policy. The “Brazil, multilateralism, and multipolar governance of the international system” section analyses the importance of multilateralism, and the significance that Brazil has placed on international organisations in terms of its cooperation policy. The “In search of regional hegemony: Brazil and the promotion of Latin American integration” section focusses on the impulse that Brazil has given to Latin American integration, and its implications in terms of regional hegemony. The “Brazil and extra-regional alliances” section examines the dynamics of extra-regional alliances that Brazil has led in recent years alongside other emerging powers. In the final section, conclusions are derived from the preceding analysis.

Main features of Brazilian development cooperation A clear commitment to the promotion of international development began with Lula’s arrival in 2003, into a context where cooperation with countries of lower or similar income had already become a very important modality of Brazilian foreign policy. The South-South axis served as one of the fundamental strategic pillars of Brazil’s international projection (Ayllón & Costa, 2010; John de Sousa, 2010; Ramanzini & Ayerbe, 2015). Based on principles of ‘non-interference’ and ‘respect for sovereignty’, Brazil channelled a large part of its ‘solidarity diplomacy’ through its cooperation-for-development policy, deploying a wide range of resources (financial as well as technical) and placing them at the disposal of other developing countries (Ayllón, 2010). The shortcomings of statistical registration systems on Brazilian cooperation prevent the compilation of detailed and updated data on amounts disbursed in recent years. However, data from reports by the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) and follow-up work carried out by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) yield some interesting estimates (IPEA, 2010, 2012, 2016; OECD-DAC, 2017). Based on these sources, between 2005 and 2013, Brazil mobilised an annual average of $460 million, with certain outstanding peaks (as in 2010, due to peace operations and aid mobilised to Haiti following a devastating earthquake) (see Figure 9.1). These figures refer only to those interventions most directly linked to cooperation for development, excluding (for instance) the financial cooperation provided by organisations such as BNDES. As a matter of fact, according to DAC, a strict review of these interventions would yield somewhat lower figures for Brazilian cooperation, reducing it to $316 million in 2013; even

Brazilian cooperation policy  167 1,000

923.37

900 800 700

588.35

600 500 400 300

314.23

359.47

406.73

424.91

2008

2009

513.77 396.80

218.92

200 100 0

2005

FIGURE 9.1 

2006

2007

2010

2011

2012

2013

Evolution of Brazilian cooperation, 2005–2013 (millions of dollars).

Source: IPEA (2010, 2014, and 2016).

so, the country would remain among the most prominent South-South cooperation providers in the region for this period (OECD-DAC, 2017). Beyond the data, one characteristic feature of Brazilian cooperation is its wide coverage, across multiple dimensions: the countries with which it cooperates, the sectors where it is present, the actors involved, and the instruments used. Altogether these result in a highly versatile and wide-ranging model (Ayllón, 2010; Ramanzini et al, 2015; Santander, 2016; Santander & Alonso, 2018). In terms of geographical location, Brazilian cooperation involves numerous countries, both within its regional vicinity and elsewhere. According to South-South reports from the Ibero-American General Secretariat, Brazil displays the greatest geographical diversification of cooperation in Latin America. At the same time, a large part is directed towards countries in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the Portuguese-speaking ­African nations, where Brazilian cooperation has long maintained privileged relationships due to historical and cultural ties (Lechini, 2006; World Bank IPEA, 2012; Abdenur & Rampini, 2015). Over and above this extensive historical trajectory, Brazilian connections with Sub-Saharan Africa have intensified significantly over the past decade, influenced by competition with China and by perceived opportunities that Africa can offer to companies and loan policies (White, 2013). Brazilian cooperation also shows wide coverage in sectorial terms, working across a broad range of thematic areas: agriculture, health, infant mortality, and the fight against HIV/AIDS being among the most important. Other areas where Brazilian cooperation has been active include urban development, ­e-government, modernisation of legislative processes, regeneration of urban areas, labour relations, and maintenance of water supplies, to mention but a few examples (IPEA, 2010; Ayllón, 2013). This breadth has allowed Brazilian cooperation to promote both small actions in its regional environment and large projects in regions near and far. Examples

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of the former include the technical exchanges carried out with Guatemala and Venezuela in application of the Bolsa Família Program, aimed at fighting poverty, or with Colombia and Peru in the field of clean technologies. One example of the latter is the ProSavanna Project to improve, diversify, and modernise agriculture in order to increase productivity and production in Mozambique. Although this project has received much criticism for its impact on local communities, Brazil enjoys additional support from Japanese cooperation, making ProSavanna a triangular project. It aims to create new agricultural development models while taking into account natural environmental and socio-economic aspects, strengthening the capabilities of Mozambican farmers to reduce poverty and heighten food security and nutrition. The project covers an estimated 11 million hectares of land in 19 districts of the country, affecting more than 600,000 local producers. Brazilian cooperation’s interest in such highly diverse thematic areas drives one of its other characteristic features, which is the engagement of a variety of actors within the cooperation system (Cabral & Weinstock, 2010a). South-South cooperation in Brazil involves the participation of a broad set of national entities, enterprises, and civil society organisations; however, this multi-actor mix can at times entail significant articulation and coordination problems among participants (Almeida et al., 2010; Ayllón & Costa, 2010; Ayllón, 2013; Milani & Duarte, 2015; Santander, 2016; Santander & Alonso, 2018). Finally, from a more operational point of view, Brazilian cooperation is highly versatile, making use of a wide variety of forms and instruments, both technical and financial, as well as numerous modalities of cooperation, whether bilateral, multilateral, regional, or triangular (Figure 9.2).

Technical Cooperation; 7.11% Educational Cooperation; 5.81% Scientific and Technological Cooperation; 5.36%

International Organizations; 53.80%

Humanitarian Cooperation; 10.72%

Support for Refugees; 0.27%

Peacekeeping Operations; 16.92%

FIGURE 9.2 

Distribution of Brazilian development cooperation (2005–2013).

Source: IPEA (2010, 2014, and 2016).

Brazilian cooperation policy  169

In sum, this diversified geographical allocation, the numerous thematic areas for the sharing of knowledge and resources, the diversity of actors involved, and the instrumental versatility with which it operates all testify to a wide-ranging cooperation policy in Brazil. This feature is strongly linked to the country’s ambitions to become a regional leader and significant global force, requiring Brazil to adopt a broad-ranging cooperation policy involving a wide variety of national actors and organisations, all of which show strong interest in participation. Based on these general features, the development cooperation policy implemented by Brazil has proved functional to its national political project as well as to its foreign policy objectives, making special efforts along three strategic lines of action related to multilateralism, regionalism, and extra-regional alliances.

Brazil, multilateralism, and multipolar governance of the international system A fundamental element to understanding Brazilian development cooperation policy is the high degree of support and commitment traditionally shown towards multilateral organisations (Santander, 2016; Santander & Alonso, 2018). This commitment should be viewed in consideration of the importance that Brazil has given to reforming the international architecture, and to the governance of globalisation from a more multipolar, democratic, and representative perspective than that currently prevails (Burges, 2008, 2009; Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2009; Abdenur, 2011; Christensen, 2013). Thus Brazil has sometimes made use of its development cooperation policy to seek or consolidate the support of other countries within international organisations. Moreover, the country’s concern for good management and governance of global affairs, and its significant role in addressing them, has led Brazil to mount strong efforts (both diplomatic and in terms of human and financial resources) within numerous international and global institutions. On the one hand, the commitment that Brazil has shown the United Nations as a main actor in that system’s multilateral cooperation is worth noting, and the importance of UN agencies to Brazilian foreign policy can be observed at different levels. First, as mentioned, Brazil mobilises many of its resources and international cooperation through various UN agencies, funds, and programmes. Second, it has played a very active role in promoting Brazilian staff within such institutions, as well as in all areas related to reform of the UN system in order to increase efficiency, transparency, and operability. As is well known, a main concern for Brazilian diplomacy has been reform of the Security Council, to which the country seeks permanent membership. The development cooperation implemented by Brazil has also tried to be useful in this regard. Brazil’s interest in a position on the UN Security Council is linked to its claim that the Council needs to adapt to modern times and should be structured in accordance with changes and rebalances of power that have occurred in the international system. It also relates with Brazil’s intention to take a more prominent role on the international stage, aiding the

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country’s efforts to consolidate itself as a global player (Cabral & Weinstock, 2010b; Santander, 2016; Santander & Alonso, 2018). Third, it should be stressed that Brazil’s interest in reforming the UN Security Council is further related to the importance that Brazilian foreign policy gives to the promotion of peace and international security – areas in which Brazil has been particularly active and assertive (Amorim, 2012). One example of this is the crucial role played by Brazil in the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2005, aimed at supporting stability and development in post-conflict situations. At the same time, Brazil has taken part in recent years in a considerable number of peace missions. It is currently involved in missions being carried out in Western Sahara (MINURSO), Haiti (UNSTAMIH), Cyprus (UNFICYP), Lebanon (UNIFIL), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), Abyei (UNISFA), Liberia (UNMIL), South Sudan (UNMISS), and the Ivory Coast (UNOCI), giving some idea of the importance of this issue to Brazilian foreign policy. Through active involvement in matters related to peace and security within the UN, Brazil has tried to influence fundamental issues such as: (i) deepening the connection between security and development; (ii) seeking greater involvement and participation of civil society actors in this area; and (iii) assigning a more prominent role to women in terms of peace and security. Fourth, the centrality that Brazilian foreign policy assigns to the United ­Nations system is visible in the key role the country has assumed in promoting development initiatives within the UN, such as the International Alliance Against Hunger, promoted by President Lula in 2004 and supported by Chile, France, and Spain (Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty, 2004). Also prominent are Brazil’s support for implementing certain innovative development-financing mechanisms, and the important role Brazil has played in environmental issues, and in the international development agenda. Clear examples of the above include the celebration of UN conferences as relevant as the Earth Summit (1992) and Rio + 20 (2012), held in Rio de Janeiro, where significant progress was made on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its related Goals. Brazil’s commitment goes well beyond the resources and efforts mobilised within the United Nations system; its foreign policy has also been intensely active through other multilateral organisations and institutions, especially those most relevant to global governance (Santander, 2016; Santander & Alonso, 2018). Two are worth mentioning: the International Financial Institutions and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Brazil has concentrated much effort into reforming the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and others to achieve a more equitable distribution of the voting shares that influence governance of their respective executive boards. Although like other emerging powers, Brazil has been unable to significantly increase its decision-making capacity within these organisations, mainly due to resistance from the US, it has nonetheless made certain progress by expanding its own voting share. Even more relevant, however, is the role Brazil has played within the WTO, an organisation of special interest to Brazilian foreign policy. As one of the main

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exporters of agricultural products on a global scale, Brazil has been central in trade negotiations within the WTO (Amorim, 2010). A clear sign of mutual WTO interest in Brazil was the creation of the G-20, promoted by President Lula in September 2003 (Ramanzini & Mariano, 2013). This was vital for ­Brazilian diplomacy, as the G-20 “changed the balance of power of the WTO negotiations” and allowed Brazil to promote liberalisation measures for global agricultural markets, as well as to encourage the issue of development on the WTO agenda (Mercadante, 2013). Brazil’s successes here, together with those of India and South Africa, helped drive important changes in WTO agreements on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), introducing more favourable conditions for developing countries and allowing generic drug production for the treatment of HIV/AIDS outside of patent markets in cases of “health emergency” ( John de Sousa, 2008).

In search of regional hegemony: Brazil and the promotion of Latin American integration Over the past two decades, the commitment to expand and deepen regionalism in Latin America has been a constant trend of Brazilian foreign policy, again involving a set of factors where domestic and international elements are interrelated. On the one hand, to a large extent, Brazil links progress in Latin America to strengthened regionalism (Santander, 2016; Santander & Alonso, 2018). The mechanisms for deepening regional integration and governance are conceived as elements to promote stability and prosperity in Latin America, at the same time generating a more favourable context for Brazilian economic, political, and social interests. On the other hand, certain Brazil’s national policy objectives can only be achieved through international cooperation: the management of some natural resources (including the Amazons), or the fight against transnational criminal networks – two fundamental issues in Brazil’s national political agenda, requiring collective responses on a regional scale (Soares de Lima & Hirst, 2006; Amorim, 2010). Finally, greater regional integration would strengthen Latin America’s position vis-à-vis the international system, once again advancing Brazil’s goal to consolidate its potential as a global player due to its weight in the region. In short, Brazil “recognizes that it is becoming stronger and more influential in global affairs by working closely with its neighbours and by promoting peace and security in the region” (Amorim, 2010, p. 227). In this sense, Brazil’s encouragement of Latin American integration has been aimed at extending into different dimensions (Santander, 2016; Santander  & Alonso, 2018). First, attempts were made to deepen economic integration through participation in initiatives such as Mercosur, although with erratic results. Similarly, in 2009 Brazil tried to promote, along with Venezuela, the Banco del Sur (Bank of the South). Established with a mandate to act as a development bank in the region, and to provide financial support to public and private

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companies in its member countries, this institution has sought to present itself as an alternative to multilateral financial institutions. However, among other reasons, the greater political priority that Brazil awarded the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) of the BRICS nations (as discussed below) led to a certain paralysis of the former initiative. Second, Brazil struggled to move forward with the process of regional integration from a social and political perspective. Worth noting here is the institutional progress promoted within Mercosur itself, through creation of mechanisms such as the Fund for Structural Convergence (FOCEM), aimed at strengthening ­cohesion and reducing asymmetries among its member countries (­Desiderá, 2015), or through strong commitments to promote and consolidate regional ­governance mechanisms like the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) (2008) or the Community of Latin America and Caribbean States (CELAC) (2010). ­A lthough President Temer in April 2018 suspended the country’s p­ articipation in UNASUR, that regional organisation had served from its foundation to strengthen Brazilian leadership in the region, by means of a diplomatic policy largely based on soft power (Abdenur, 2011; Valença & Carvalho, 2014). Finally, Brazilian efforts to deepen Latin American regional integration has had a territorial and physical dimension. This has impacted on several energy-­ integration initiatives that have failed to prosper, but other examples like the Initiative for the Integration of Regional South American Infrastructure (IIRSA) enjoyed strong Brazilian support for its incorporation into UNASUR’s South American Council of Infrastructure and Planning. This highlighted the strategic interest of Brazilian foreign policy in the physical integration of the region, and in the connection of its infrastructures, which would ultimately entail significant economic and commercial benefits at home. The inter-oceanic route and the opportunities it creates to deliver goods via the Pacific is a clear example of this, along with advantages related to energy connection and the implications in terms of power so derived.

Brazil and extra-regional alliances Together with multilateralism and regionalism, another element key to under­ standing Brazilian development cooperation policy is the importance that the country gives to South-South relations – particularly with other emerging ­powers – in order to achieve reforms in the rules and architecture of the international system. Thus, establishing alliances with countries that share an interest in building alternative governance and cooperation mechanisms, distinct from those of the classic multilateral system (traditionally dominated by Northern countries), became a fundamental pillar of Brazilian development cooperation (Schirm, 2012; Santander, 2016; Santander & Alonso, 2018). This led Brazil to promote selective coalitions with emerging countries, to achieve more effective influence within an international system in need of “a less unequal pattern of power distribution (…) which contributes to overcoming

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the persistent political and economic asymmetries that have marked international politics and the world economy in recent decades” (Costa, 2012, p. 176). Through what might be defined as ‘variable geometry diplomacy’, Brazil became a driving force for alternative relationships and frameworks among countries of the South. In addition, due to its interregional scope, Brazil’s participation in such initiatives has allowed it to exercise a form of leadership that ranges beyond Latin America, again with an eye to reinforcing its role and prominence as a global player. However, notably, unlike other initiatives deemed highly important in their historical moment (e.g. the New International Economic Order, or the G-77), this ‘new generation of international coalitions’ involves fewer countries and is much more selective in the issues it addresses (Costa, 2012, p. 178). Two issues have acquired special relevance in recent years: the initiative that brings together Brazil, ­Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the so-called BRICS), and the 2003 IBSA initiative joining India, Brazil, and South Africa. First, with respect to the BRICS, Brazil’s participation stems from its desire for greater international projection, and for the establishment of alliances with other emerging powers seeking to promote change in the international system. One example of this is the country’s participation in the NDB and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), both seeking to become pillars of a new international financial architecture, providing an alternative to hegemonic institutions like the IMF and World Bank, controlled by Northern powers. Second, the creation of IBSA was based on common interests, identifying ‘trilateral cooperation’ as a useful tool for promoting economic and social development in member countries (IBSA, 2003), and this is reflected in three dimensions where Brazil has worked to promote development through the alliance (Santander, 2016; Santander & Alonso, 2018). The first consists mainly in the establishment of technical cooperation schemes among the three countries, which have established working groups through which they exchange knowledge and successful experiences around common sectorial areas of interest.1 Some areas where technical cooperation has occurred include issues related to the use of renewable energies, biofuels production, the use of information and communication technologies, and the fight against HIV/AIDS ( John de Sousa, 2008; Santander 2011). Asecond dimension concerns the IBSA Fund, which finances cooperation actions in other developing countries, with an annual disbursement of $1 million per year for each of the three member countries (WWICS, 2009). Although this fundingis limited, the IBSA Fund aims to alleviate poverty and hunger in countries of the South, to develop practices that can be extrapolated to other countries, and to build development partnerships. This makes the IBSA Fund agenuine South-South cooperation mechanism, as compared to initiatives such as the BRICS (Lechini, 2006; White, 2009). The IBSA Fund also counts onUNDP support to manage and execute cooperation projects, and it works based on demands received from recipient countries. In its first decade of activity, the IBSA Fund concentrated its work mainly

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in Africa  (45.3%), with a significant presence in Asia (18.8%), the Arab States (18.4%), and Latin America (16.9%). Guinea-Bissau, Palestine, and Vietnam have been the main recipients by a number of projects; other beneficiaries have included Cambodia, Cape Verde, Laos, Guyana, Sudan, South Sudan, Burundi, Haiti, and Sierra Leone (IBSA & United Nations, 2014). In sectorial terms, ­agriculture (31.1%), health (26.1%), and housing (18.3%) have been the main areas ­a llocated resources by the IBSA Fund, whose project portfolio embraces the matic areas as varied as water, solid waste management, youth and sport, governance and security, and renewable energies, among others. Finally, the third dimension where Brazil works to promote development through IBSA is in coordination and political dialogue with India and South ­A frica. The features that characterise the countries of this group – each with great weight and influence in their respective regions, on three different c­ ontinents – give the initiative significant capacity for transformation and political incidence in the international system. This is especially the case for issues of special interest and impact as regards these three countries’ development opportunities (Santander, 2016; Santander & Alonso, 2018). A clear example would be the success, mentioned above, of these countries within the WTO regarding the production of generic drugs to fight HIV/AIDS. In addition, it must be stressed that IBSA defends multilateralism, even as it promotes reform in international institutions. In this way, and in harmony with Brazilian foreign policy, IBSA defends changes to organisations such as the UN system (and its Security Council) towards a more representative and legitimate multilateral system, in accordance with the contemporary multipolar order (Alden & Vieira, 2005; Flemes, 2010). All of this makes IBSA an important initiative for Brazil’s development cooperation policy, not just for its potential as a mechanism of technical cooperation among members, or as a financier of project in other developing countries, but also due to its ability to influence multilateral fora and the governance of the international system.

Conclusions Brazil has played a leading role in the growing relevance shown by South-South cooperation over the last two decades. Especially following Lula da Silva’s arrival to power in 2003, Brazil began to mobilise more resources and capabilities to promote development in other Southern countries. To a great extent, this represented the internationalisation of a development policy that sought to transcend national borders in the framework of its own political and strategic agenda. Brazil’s expanding role was accompanied by a simultaneous process of opening and diversification of actors in national development cooperation policy, including broad participation by organisations within South-South cooperation activities implemented by the country. This helps explain the extensive scope and coverage (geographical, sectorial, instrumental) elicited by Brazilian ­cooperation over the period: organisations such as EMBRAPA, FIOCRUZ, and BNDES, but

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also companies and civil society actors, have participated actively in this policy. Thus, Brazil’s development logic – oriented to sharing with other developing countries the knowledge and resources of multiple national entities – has coexisted with a domestic logic as in other countries reviewed in this book (see Chapter 3 on the US and Chapter 8 on Hungary). This domestic logic is related to the openness of said policy to numerous interest groups, visions, and strategies of national actors who perceive the process as an opportunity to expand and internationalise their activities. Yet it must be said that some practices of Brazilian South-South cooperation over the last decade – especially certain forms of tied aid and financial cooperation linked to the purchase of Brazilian goods and services – have received strong criticism for their uncertain development orientation. All this activity was shaped a highly dynamic cooperation policy where different visions and interests have coexisted. At the same time, Brazil proved to be able to implement a strong South-South development cooperation policy functional to its national agenda and political project. Thus, policy was aimed at promoting development in countries witha similar or lower income level, but it was implemented through a cooperation model based on three main pillars which, to a large extent, were oriented towards increasing Brazil’s own influence and projection as a global player. The first pillar implied a strong commitment to multilateralism, explained by two fundamental factors: its usefulness as a soft-power mechanism, and the opportunities it has offered to Brazilian staff in accessing senior positions at multilateral institutions. The second pillar was the move towards regional hegemony, and this relied on a strong commitment to regionalism and Latin American integration as mechanisms for development and stability, in consideration of the political, economic, and energy interests at stake, and with consequent implications for various national actors and entities (Brazilian Development Bank, PETROBRAS, the agro-industrial sector, others). The third pillar implied a widening of extra-regional alliances, linked to the desire for transformations in the architecture of the international system, and in the structure of global governance, establishing partnerships in different spheres with other emerging powers where shared interests were perceived. Activities promoted within the BRICS and IBSA illustrate this third dynamic. It can be argued that, with certain nuances and oscillations that range beyond the focus of this chapter (e.g. Brazil’s lowered activism in the international arena since the arrival of Rousseff in 2011), the elements highlighted here were most relevant to shaping Brazilian development cooperation policy during the ­2003–2016 period, essentially covering the mandates of Lula and Rousseff. Although changes to these trends had been noted since 2015, it was Temer’s ascendance to the Presidency in 2016 that marked a redirection of the main lines of Brazil’s cooperation policy, which is now undergoing a process of redefinition and whose effects will be a concern for future study, especially with the arrival of President Bolsonaro to power in 2019. Nevertheless, based on all that has been stated, there is good reason to conclude that the shaping of Brazilian aid policy (influenced also by actors and by

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national dynamics) did not rely solely on the promotion of development in other countries; rather, as we have seen, Brazil’s policy of cooperation for development played a key role in its aim to gain regional influence and to consolidate itself as a global player. The form that such future dynamics may take is another matter, depending on the correlation of forces among various domestic visions and interests, and on the opportunities and shortcomings that a changing international context will generate.

Note 1 Working groups exist in the following areas: agriculture; culture; defence; education; energy; environment and climate change; health; human settlements; information society; public administration; public finance; science and technology; social development; commerce; transport; and tourism.

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Ramanzini, H., Mariano, M. & Almeida, R. (2015) “As diferentes dimensões da cooperação Sul-Sul na política externa brasileira”, in Ramanzini, H. & Ayerbe, L. F. (eds.), Política Externa Brasileira. Cooperaçâo Sul-Sul e Negociaçôes Internacionais. Cultura Académica, pp. 15–52. Sao Paulo. Santander, G. (2011) “La cooperación Sur-Sur: experiencias de interés e implicaciones para el sistema internacional de ayuda”, Revista Sistema no 220, Madrid, pp. 59–78. Santander, G. (2016) Identidades e intereses en la Cooperación Sur-Sur. Los casos de Chile, ­Venezuela y Brasil. La Catarata, Madrid. Santander, G. & Alonso, J. A. (2017) “Perceptions, Identities and Interests in South– South Cooperation: The Cases of Chile, Venezuela and Brazil”, Third World Quarterly, doi:10.1080/01436597.2017.1396533. Schirm, S. (2012) “Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance”, in Fels, E., Kremer, J. F. & Kronenberg, K. (eds.), Power in the 21st Century. International Security and International Political Economy in a Changing World, Springer, pp. 211–236. Berlin. Soares de Lima, M. R. & Hirst, M. (2006) “Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities”, International Affairs, vol. 82, no. I, pp. 21–40. Valença, M. & Carvalho, G. (2014) “Soft Power, Hard Aspirations: The Shifting Role of Power in Brazilian Foreign Policy”, Brazilian Political Science Review, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 66–94. Vigevani, T. & Cepaluni, G. (2009) Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times. The Quest for Autonomy from Sarney to Lula. Lexington Books. Lexington. White, L. (2009) “IBSA Six Years On: Co-operation in a New Global Order”. SAIIA Policy Briefing no 8. South African Institute of International Affairs. White, L. (2013) “Emerging Powers in Africa: Is Brazil any Different?”South African Journal of International Affairs, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 117–136. World Bank-IPEA (2012) Bridging the Atlantic. Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa South-South Partnering for Growth. World Bank-IPEA. WWICS (2009) Emerging Powers: India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) and the Future of South-South Cooperation. Special Report. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC.

10 SOLIDARITY AND SECURITY IN THE EU DISCOURSE ON AID Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez

Introduction1 Securitisation of aid has been addressed by the academic literature, particularly since the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, which impacted the pattern of aid allocation by the US and by a number of multilateral donors such as the World Bank. De facto or discursive securitisation of aid implies that donors take a defensive approach to international relations in general, and to development assistance in particular, focussing on the preservation of national interests such as ‘homeland security’. Contrary to this, however, in discourses on aid, which are based on the principle of solidarity, or on the need to build global common goods, the world beyond one’s national borders is viewed not as a source of threat, but rather as an opportunity. The Great Recession in Europe that commenced in 2009 (and its consequences in terms of rising inequalities and the loss of confidence in formal institutions and political representation), complicated by conflicts in the Middle East, and by subsequent flows of migrants and refugees crossing (or attempting to cross) the Mediterranean Sea, has renewed the debate around aid securitisation (Miles, 2012), particularly in reference to European donors. For instance, there are rising concerns in the charity sector that a deepening of the securitisation logic might manifest an increasing proportion of refugee costs in relation to total Official Development Assistance (ODA) in countries such as Germany or Denmark. Aid narratives are expressed through forms of communication both external (multilateral organisations, partner countries) and internal (political parties, charities, society as a whole). In the latter, persuasive discourse can be key to the survival of aid budgets, if domestic stakeholders see their interests and/or values reflected in the aid narrative. As Brown et al. (2016) put it: “Securitisation can be interpreted as a response to new, post-Cold War security concerns, but it can also

180  Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez

be seen as a discourse strategically adopted by aid proponents to justify already rising aid budgets to sceptical politicians or voters” (Brown et al., 2016, p. 327). Because different groups do not necessarily share the same interests and values, coexistent and contending discourses on aid are not difficult to find. This chapter explores the aid narrative of the European Union and, in particular, a presumed shift towards securitisation. The case of the EU is relevant for many reasons. The Union as a whole is the world’s largest donor, delivering over half of aid globally, as well as a leader in terms of both ODA funds and political impulse. Also, when compared to other Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors, the EU is (or has been) seen as a particularly constructivist donor, aimed at alleviating world poverty and building regional and global governance structures. For these reasons, a shift in the EU’s aid paradigm towards security might represent an important U-turn. The chapter is structured as follows. The “Why do countries give aid in the first place?” section reviews the literature on aid allocation; the “Is aid being securitised, according to academic literature?” section reviews the literature on aid securitisation. The “How to define the narratives of EU aid? Methodological aspects” section poses the research problem in methodological terms: using a content analysis technique, we explore the extent to which the aid narrative (in official documents of the EU institutions, Germany, the UK, France, and the Netherlands) has shifted from a social development paradigm (targeting poverty eradication on grounds of North-South solidarity) to a sustainable development paradigm (implementing the 2030 Agenda on the basis of global common interests) and/or to a security paradigm, for the sake of donors’ national interests. The “Results: is the securitisation of the EU aid narrative a reality?” section summarises the main results, and the final section presents our conclusions.

Why do countries give aid in the first place? The case for aid by donor countries has been analysed by the academic literature mainly through the lens of aid disbursements: the pattern of geographical allocation of aid of a given donor shows whether rich/developed countries award resources to certain poor/developing countries, and not to others, according to their own self-interests (self-centred motives) and/or according to characteristics of the recipient country, specifically its needs or merits (altruistic motives).2 These are therefore mostly empirical studies that are, moreover, conducted from the viewpoint of the donor. This line follows a seminal work by Dudley and Montmarquette (1976), who designed a model for econometric analysis of the causes of international assistance, and by McKinley and Little (1978a, 1978b, and 1979), who analysed whether German, British, and American aid during the 1960s was given out of self-interest or in order to meet recipients’ needs. ­McKinley and Little concluded that motives of self-interest clearly prevailed over recipient needs, opening the door to a series of studies that have analysed the relative importance of these two sets of factors and their evolution over time.

Solidarity and security in the EU  181

A great many of these analyses come to the conclusion that the national interests of donors prevail when it comes to the international allocation of aid. Donor interests may be different in nature: the colonial past experience of nations ­(Alesina & Dollar, 2000); geographical proximity (Szent-Ivanyi, 2012); or political, security, investment, and/or trade interests – as evidenced in voting patterns at the United Nations, in donor payoffs vis-à-vis global health issues, or in the use of aid as a tool for containing migration, or for counterterrorism activities (Maizels & Nissanke, 1984; Schraeder et al., 1998; Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Berthélemy, 2006; Lundsgaarde et al., 2010; Szent-Ivanyi, 2012; B ­ outton  & Carter, 2014; Bermeo & Leblang, 2015; Bermeo, 2017; Kisangani & Pickering, 2015; Heinrich et al., 2017; Steele, 2017; Braun & Zagler, 2018). This pattern also applies to humanitarian aid (Narang, 2016). Moreover, bilateral interests appear to dilute when aid is transferred via multilateral channels, according to various authors (see, for instance, Berthélemy, 2006). Other studies focus on the lack of relevance of recipient needs and/or merits as criteria for allocating international assistance (Alesina & Weder, 2002; Birdsall et al., 2003; Neumayer, 2003; Hoeffler & Outram, 2011; Heinrich et al., 2018). Still other studies are not quite so conclusive about the prevalence of donors’ interests (or the non-prevalence of recipient needs or good governance) in the allocation of international bilateral assistance. This is the case with Mosley (2006) and Dreher et al. (2011) when analysing emerging donors. In that same vein, according to Petrikova (2016), emerging donors show a similar pattern to that of traditional donors when it comes to incorporating human rights into their aid decision processes. Taking another view, Isopi and Mavrotas (2006) and Clist (2011) claim that there is no uniform behaviour among donors. More recently, a second body of literature seems to have emerged. These works introduce a more complex (and therefore more accurate and/or nuanced) view on the dynamics behind geographical distribution. Here it is assumed that a single donor (or, more precisely, various institutions or channels within that single donor) might be allocating ODA to different recipients for different reasons (Dollar & Levin, 2006; Metzger et al., 2009; Dreher et al., 2010; Loman et al., 2011; Nunnenkamp & Öhler, 2011; Dreher et al., 2012). As for the EU, when analysing aid to Mediterranean countries, Reynaert (2011) finds that support for market-oriented reform is the main goal of such aid. Elsewhere, looking at the particular case of Vietnam, Hoang (2014) concludes that the EU supports that country for a combination of reasons, including the donor’s economic and political interests and the high standards of governance shown by the recipient. According to Kim and Jensen (2018), the human rights records of potential recipients significantly predict the amount of EU aid disbursements. In short, the literature on the motives for aid remains far from conclusive. First, various reasons may simultaneously explain the allocation pattern of the donor community as a whole, or even of a single donor. Second, reasons of security (the fight against terrorism, containment of migration flows, prevention

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of conflict via support of autocratic governments) are feasible rationales among the set of political variables that can determine the volume, nature, and international allocation of aid. Third, such security concerns might also be behind the geographical pattern of EU aid, despite the fact that they coexist with ‘nobler’ motivations such as the human rights record of recipient countries. Fourth, given the potential for mixed motivations, and on the basis of the academic literature on aid allocation, a process of aid securitisation may be currently underway, affecting the EU both as a donor and as a global political actor.

Is aid being securitised, according to academic literature? The debate on the eventual securitisation of aid has transcended the public and political debate and is being addressed by the academic literature. The conceptual basis for securitisation lies in what has been called the security-development nexus (see, for instance, Faust & Messner, 2004; Keukeleire & Raube, 2013). If the assumption is made that security is a pre-condition for development, and if there is acceptance of the proposition that development leads to security, the natural policy response would be to interlink external security and development cooperation policies and tools. It is precisely this political interlink that opens the door to aid securitisation: there is a risk that development objectives may be crowded out by security aims in this holistic external approach (Faust & Messner, 2004). Aid securitisation became a hot topic after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Miles, 2012; Brown et al., 2016). An increasing number of academic studies on aid securitisation have been published in the last couple of decades, and several of these focus precisely on the EU as a global political actor. Such is the case with Furness and Ganzle (2016), who explore the securitisation of EU external action at three different levels: (1) the aid discourse, (2) the institutional setting, and (3) and the Union’s aid allocation. At the discourse level, they sum up the contents of a series of institutional documents and political statements and come to the conclusion that the development-security nexus is increasingly present in the EU narrative (although this may not necessarily mean a securitisation of aid). In that same vein, and also referring specifically to the EU, Keukeleire and Raube (2013) observe the securitisation of EU development policy through four lenses: (1) the discourse; (2) policy instruments; (3) policy action; and (4) institutional frameworks. As regards the discourse, in line with Furness and Ganzle (2016), the authors here summarise the contents of key institutional EU documents and come to similar conclusions. Orbie and Del Biondo (2015) explore whether EU aid to Chad has been securitised, and they conclude that it has not. Although democratic governance tools of the EU were indeed contaminated by security concerns, development cooperation and humanitarian aid appear not to have been. Brown et al. (2016) gather the conclusions of a collective book on the securitisation of foreign aid that examines major donors (the US, the UK, Japan, France, Canada), including the EU. Following a similar methodological path as the above-mentioned studies, they observe a trend towards securitisation of aid

Solidarity and security in the EU  183

that manifests in changing patterns of (1) the aid discourse; (2) aid allocation; and (3) institutional aid arrangements. Securitisation of aid would also figure in the displacement of other development agendas, such as that around issues of gender. In all of the mentioned cases, research techniques are based on the authors’ summaries and interpretations of official documents, bolstered by semi-­structured interviews. One study by Petrikova and Lazell (2017) conducts qualitative discourse analysis of official documents. Their study focusses on multilateral agents (more precisely, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Commission, and the World Bank), codifying official texts such as World Bank’s World Development Reports. They come to the conclusion that within the development policy discourse, the approach to conflict-affected states consists of two interrelated assumptions. The first is that underdevelopment and conflict in the global South are mutually reinforcing, and that there can be no security without development, and vice versa. The second assumption guiding all three institutions is that development aid can be used to enhance security and to prevent conflict in the global South. Previous studies on this topic indicate episodes of securitisation. However, several questions remain unanswered, and some debates remain open. First, although different studies have analysed the EU as a donor from the perspective of securitisation, the research techniques applied (authors’ summaries and interpretations of official documents) rely heavily on the analysts’ own perceptions and criteria. In this sense, it might be useful to employ a standardised technique of content analysis, in a similar vein to that of Petrikova and Lazell (2017). Second, although several articles point to the 9/11 terrorist attacks as the trigger of aid securitisation, in the case of Europe, other more relevant triggers may also pertain. There is a general perception that the Great Recession of 2009 and its consequences (increases in inequalities, lack of confidence in official institutions and political representation, lower profile of the international agenda in relation to domestic issues, etc.), along with conflicts in the Middle East and their impact on migration flows and refugees, might well have been more important factors for Europe than the 2001 terrorist attacks. Third, the documents reviewed in this section offer snapshots. If the question is the extent to which the aid discourse is being securitised, then we are referring to an evolving process, and the narrative needs to be explored across several years. Fourth, the trend towards securitisation is necessarily a narrative journey – a departure from some other aid concepts or motives. In this sense, it could be revealing to explore the shift from the paradigm of social development.

How to define the narratives of EU aid? Methodological aspects Who or what is Europe as a donor? EU development cooperation is the result of both bilateral programmes by EU member states and non-EU multilateral programmes, as well as member states’

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contributions to EU institutions that are channelled to third countries as Official Development Assistance (ODA). These EU institutions (such as the European Commission or the European Investment Bank) act as an additional donor in the sense that they, too, have political priorities, as well as a pattern of geographical and sectorial distribution of aid. Moreover, given the significant share of funds channelled through EU institutions, these also represent a relevant European (and world) donor. One way of exploring an eventual shift in the narrative of EU aid would be to dig into this narrative for all 28 member states, plus that of EU institutions. However, the EU comprises donors of very different sizes. ‘Big’ donors are those larger countries (in economic and demographic terms) that deliver higher volumes of ODA, and whose narrative might have a stronger impact, both in the global development system and in shaping the discourse and behaviour of EU institutions. Therefore, analysis of the discourse of a selection of relevant donors might result in a fairly precise idea of where EU aid is headed overall. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) figures, the top eight EU donors by volume of disbursement throughout the 2000–2017 period were Germany, the EU institutions, the UK, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, and Spain. These seven member states account for over 84% of total ODA channelled from EU countries and institutions in this period. Therefore, there is a strong concentration of aid in a small number of donors, and this manifests in the fact that the top five donors (Germany, the EU institutions, the UK, France, and the Netherlands) together deliver 86% of total EU aid. When limiting EU aid to that of the top member state donors (Germany, the UK, France, and the N ­ etherlands – excluding that of supra-national institutions), this share represents 66% of total aid disbursed by member states. Thus, it could be said that analysis of these four countries’ narratives might give us a good sense of the overall ­European discourse of international cooperation. Moreover, these four donors all happen to be strongly committed to aid policy. Still, the fact that a country delivers a high proportion of aid might be related to its size, but it does not necessarily imply that the volume represents a relevant part of their domestic economy. For instance, in the non-EU cases of the US, Japan, and China – all of them big aid players on the global scene – ­d isbursed aid does not represent an important share of the national budget. This is not, however, the case for Germany, the UK, France, or the Netherlands, all of which support aid budgets that are above the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) average in relation to the sizes of their economies. G ­ ermany’s and the Netherlands’ aid budget are at 0.61% of their Gross National Income (GNI), therefore doubling the DAC average. The British aid budget is even higher (0.7% of GNI). The French budget (0.43% of its domestic economy) is below that level, but still well above the DAC average (Table 10.1).

Solidarity and security in the EU  185 TABLE 10.1  ODA budgets of major EU member state donors

Germany UK France Netherlands Total EU (excluding EU institutions) DAC average

ODA in volume (millions of current US$)*

ODA as % of GNI (in 2018)

227,023 216,618 173,423 92,914 1,074,618

0.61 0.70 0.43 0.61 0.31

Source: OECD and authors’ calculations. * Total, 2000–2017 period.

In short, Germany, the UK, France, and the Netherlands are the most relevant European donors in the sense that they together deliver 66% of total aid channelled by EU member states. We can thus infer that these are likewise the most relevant political actors in terms of shaping the aid discourse in Europe. Moreover, they are committed donors, indicating that aid is a non-negligible aspect of domestic politics in these four countries. We can therefore further assume that their aid narratives represent important communication tools with their own domestic societies.

What should we be analysing? As in previous studies on this same topic, we now explore the aforementioned aid narratives present in political and official documents (more precisely, in the key strategic and/or planning documents of international development cooperation). Identification of these documents can be conducted via the DAC peer review, a mechanism established by the OECD. Periodically, a given DAC donor is evaluated by two peers from the same group, and the publications that synthetise these evaluations identify the key strategic documents guiding the donor’s aid policy (Table 10.2). As noted, we intend to explore the extent to which the aid discourse has evolved as a result of the recent economic crisis and the ongoing refugee and migrant crises. For each donor, we found it necessary to select two strategic documents: one pre-dating the economic crisis and one from the post-crisis period. The shifting concept of aid is expected to represent a departure from a previous paradigm – in this instance, the pre-existing paradigm of social development, summarised in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) approved in 2001, and echoed in national development cooperation strategies of the early 2000s. For each donor, we have chosen one strategic document from the early 2000s and another more recent one, preferably published after 2013 (Table 10.2).

186  Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez TABLE 10.2  Key EU aid strategic documents

Germany

UK

France

Netherlands

Charter for the Future – One World, Our Responsibility, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2014. Poverty Reduction – a Global Responsibility. Program of Action 2015, The German Government’s Contribution toward Halving Extreme Poverty Worldwide, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2001. UK Aid: Tackling Global Challenges in the National Interest, HM Treasury, Department for International Development, 2015. Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor. White Paper on International Development, Department for International Development, 2000. Comité Interministériel de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement (CICID). Relevé de conclusions, 2018. Relevé de conclusions du Comité Interministériel de la Coopération Internationale et du développement (CICID), 2002. A World to Gain: A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2013 Mutual Interests, Mutual Responsibilities Dutch Development Cooperation en Route to 2015, Directorate-General for International Cooperation, 2003.

Source: Authors’ elaboration.

Moreover, it could be argued that the EU’s overall strategic approach to development is synthetised in the Consensus and the New Consensus on Development (EU, 2005 and 2017). These documents might serve as guidelines for the behaviour of the EU institutions as donors; above all, they are the result of long-term negotiations involving member states as well as EU institutions. In this sense, these are likely the texts that best reflect the ‘feeling’ of the EU as a group, beyond the very important ideological differences among the various states (on aid, but also in general). Using a technique similar to that of Petrikova and Lazell (2017), and in order to prevent the text analysis from becoming a personalised reading, we have coded these ten selected texts. Our approach is slightly different from Petrikova and Lazell’s in the sense that we are not looking for relations between concepts (for instance, between security and development), but rather exploring the prevalence of certain ideas in relation to others. More specifically, we seek in these texts evidence of the extent to which the social development paradigm (synthetised in the MDG agenda, in force between 2000 and 2015) has evolved into its own ‘natural successor’, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), approved in 2015; or else the extent to which it has shifted towards a security agenda now affecting EU development cooperation. It is therefore necessary to establish a series of codes corresponding to each of these three paradigms (Table 10.3).

Solidarity and security in the EU  187 TABLE 10.3  Paradigms of development and families of codes

  1 Social development agenda or paradigm

2

1.1

Poverty / Poverty eradication

2.1

1.2

Hunger / Food security / Malnutrition

2.2

1.3

Gender

2.3

1.4

Education

2.4

1.5

Health

Sustainable development agenda or paradigm Economic development / Job creation / Decent work Political rights / Human rights / Governance Environmental sustainability / Climate change Equity / Inequality

3

Security agenda or paradigm

3.1

Terrorism / Counterterrorism / Radicalisation

3.2

Migration / Border control / Mobility / Refugees / Displacements Failed or fragile states or countries

3.3

3.4

3.5

Conflict / Conflict prevention / Post-conflict intervention Stability / Instability

Source: Authors’ elaboration.

It can be said that some objectives and goals belong to more than one agenda. For instance, the fight against hunger was part of the MDGs (paradigm 1), but is also included in the SDGs (paradigm 2). Likewise, peace can be considered an aspect of security (paradigm 3), but it is also SDG number 16 (paradigm 2). By establishing families of codes, our aim is to seize the key ideas that define them. The MDGs were largely an agenda of social development (1), where donors were expected to focus on poverty (1.1), hunger (1.2), gender (1.3), education (1.4), and health (1.5). Although the MDGs also included environmental targets, it was not until approval of the SDGs that the environmental and climate change agenda (2.3) became an essential (perhaps the most important) part of the global development agenda. Unlike the MDGs, this paradigm of sustainable development (2) is also characterised by the fact that it acknowledges the complex nature of development processes, not limited to their social facet. The social dimension of development goes hand-in-hand, necessarily, with economic development – interpreted in this paradigm as a process of sustained and sustainable development leading to the creation of decent work (2.1) – and with political development (2.2). The SDGs are also recognised by their emphasis on inequality (2.4) (Sachs, 2012; Le Blanc, 2015). Lastly, as regards the security paradigm (3), this assembles certain key concepts previously defined by the academic literature reviewed above: concepts of terrorism and radicalisation (3.1), migrations and refugees (3.2), failed or fragile states

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(3.3), conflicts and their prevention (3.4), and stability (3.5) (Orbie & Del Bianco, Brown et al., 2016; Furness & Ganzle, 2016).3 Apart from the general objectives or paradigms of development, donors’ strategic texts generally indicate motives for aid that could be somehow linked to either altruistic or selfish sets of motives, as identified by the academic literature (see the “Why do countries give aid in the first place?” section of this chapter). In this sense, the paradigm of social development responds, in general terms, to a North-South logic where donors (usually in the global North) have a moral responsibility, a legal obligation, and/or a feeling of solidarity towards the global South (code 4: solidarity / moral obligation / responsibility). This North-South logic is broken (or at least reshaped) in the sustainable development paradigm, which places stronger emphasis on global public goods (such as climate) and, therefore, on the need for collective action and efforts that lead to the fulfilment of common interests (code 5: common goods / common efforts / common interests / global public goods). As for the security paradigm, it operates under a North-South logic (similar to the social development paradigm), where international relations should aim at protecting national interests (code 6: self-help / self-interest / national interest). Although certain motives tend to be connected to certain paradigms, they are not necessarily bound to one another (as we shall see in the particular case of the Netherlands). As a result, we have set distinct codes for these three motives that will be analysed separately in the following section.

Results: Is the securitisation of the EU aid narrative a reality? This question can be answered in different ways. One possible straightforward and simple approach is to explore the two EU Consensuses on Development (European Commission, 2006 and 2017), given that these were negotiated by all member states, plus the European institutions, and should therefore reflect the approach to social and sustainable development and to securitisation by the EU as a whole. Both these texts have been coded following development paradigms (­ Table 10.3), as well as by way of codes on the motives of aid (codes 4–6). As a result, 125 paragraphs were labelled (62 in the first Consensus and 63 in the second). Because one paragraph or quote can be labelled with more than one code, this resulted in 300 assigned labels. Although the New European Consensus on Development is more ­security-biased than the 2005 version, the increase in the proportion of ­references is slight – only 0.4 percentage points. Indeed, the main narrative shift is from the social development paradigm (prevalent in the MDG era) to the sustainable development paradigm (aligned with the SDG agenda); texts coded with code family 2 have increased from 38% to almost 56%, matched by an equivalent drop in the prevalence of texts coded with code family 1, which decreased from 47% to 29% (Table 10.4).

Solidarity and security in the EU  189 TABLE 10.4  Development paradigms for aid in EU discourse (quotes by code, % of total

coded text)

2005 Consensus 2017 Consensus

Social development paradigm

Sustainable development paradigm

Security paradigm

Number of quotes

Number of assigned labels

47.1 28.8

38.0 55.9

14.9 15.3

62 63

121 170

Source: Authors’ elaboration. Note: The total record for each paradigm is the result of the sum of quotes labelled with second-level codes (for instance, 1.1) and those labelled with the more general paradigm label (for instance, 1).

The number of references to the motives of aid is comparatively very small: there are only five references to these motives in the 2005 Consensus and four in the more recent 2017 Consensus. Solidarity, responsibility, and/or moral obligation are the main reasons for aid in the EU discourse, representing three references out of every five in the 2005 text, and two out of every four in the 2017 text. In both texts, only one reference was made to common goods, common efforts, common interests, and/or global public goods as a motive for aid. Likewise, just one reference was made in each text to self-interest. These results might appear to be counter-intuitive, according to political declarations reflected in the media by EU institution officials and political representatives of certain member states. Moreover, our results are not aligned with the conclusions of prior studies on security in the aid discourse in Europe. The explanation for this might lie in the fact that the Consensuses on Development were the result of negotiations between all 28 member states as well as the EU institutions, reflecting highly varied political sensibilities vis-à-vis external action as a whole, and aid in particular. As a consequence, our results are likely to reflect a relatively balanced and stable narrative. In addition, these results may thus be compatible with more securitised aid narratives in certain specific EU donors. All eight strategic texts from the top EU donors (Table 10.2) were coded with the same method used for the EU Consensuses on Development. In so doing, 705  paragraphs were labelled. As one paragraph or quote can conceivably be labelled with more than one code, this resulted in 1,224 assigned labels in total (including codes for paradigms and codes for motives). Given the different formats and structures of these eight texts, the number of quotes per document varies greatly: from a maximum of 173 coded paragraphs (in Germany’s document for the earlier period) to only 10 quotes in France’s document for that same period (Table 10.5). Here again, the results are analysed as a proportion of assigned labels per document. For instance, in the case of the Netherlands, 60 paragraphs were labelled with paradigm codes in its strategic document from the first period. As different objectives can coexist within one paradigm, as well as in different paradigms, several paragraphs were labelled with more than one code. Therefore, the earlier Netherlands document includes

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101 references to development paradigms scattered across its 60 paragraphs: of these, 42 refer to the social development paradigm, 40 to the sustainable development paradigm, and 19 to the security paradigm. On average, quotes labelled with the security paradigm are now at 25.6% of the total coded text, up from 17.4% in the early 2000s. This increase in the reference to security matters in strategic aid documents comes at the expenses of the social development paradigm, which lowers its profile, from 41.5% of total quotes to 36.8% (although clearly remaining relevant) (Table 10.5). As for the sustainable development paradigm, its weight is significant in both periods. Although the sustainable development paradigm is more aligned with the current development agenda (the SDGs), its weight decreases from the first to the second period (from 41.1% of total assigned labels to 37.6%). These results can be further reinforced by way of t-Student tests applied to the relative prevalence of the paradigm codes (Table 10.6). Although the difference between the social and sustainable development paradigms does not appear to be significant (particularly in the first period), the difference between the sustainable development paradigm and the security paradigm and between the social development paradigm and the security paradigm is very significant in both periods. TABLE 10.5  Development paradigms in EU member state discourses (quotes by code, % of total

coded text) 1st period

Social Number Sustainable Number Security Numberof Total Number of development of codes development of codes paradigm codes number paragraphs paradigm paradigm of codes

Netherlands 41.6 UK 34.1 Germany 44.0 France 46.2 Average 41.5 Total

42 59 124 6

39.6 49.1 45.0 30.8 41.1

40 85 127 4

18.8 16.8 11.0 23.1 17.4

19 29 31 3

101 173 282 13 569

60 147 173 10 390

2nd period

Social Number Sustainable Number Security Number development of codes development of codes paradigm of codes paradigm paradigm

Total Number of number paragraphs of codes

Netherlands UK Germany France Average Total

38.0 38.6 28.0 42.6 36.8

166 171 143 68 548

63 66 40 29

38.0 27.5 52.4 32.4 37.6

63 47 75 22

24.1 33.9 19.6 25.0 25.6

40 58 28 17

86 111 67 51 315

Source: Authors’ elaboration. Note: The total record for each paradigm is the result of the sum of quotes labelled with second-level codes (for instance, 1.1) and those labelled with the more general paradigm label (for instance, 1).

Solidarity and security in the EU  191 TABLE 10.6  t-Student tests applied to the prevalence of development paradigms

Social development paradigm (period 1) 0.96256 Sustainable development paradigm (period 1) Security 0.00514 paradigm (period 1) 0.35095 Social development paradigm (period 2) Sustainable development paradigm (period 2) Security paradigm (period 2)

Sustainable development paradigm (period 1)

Security paradigm (period 1)

Social development paradigm (period 2)

Sustainable development paradigm  (period 2)

0.03016

0.61048

0.93212

0.08619

0.03034

0.24077

Source: Authors’ elaboration.

Moreover, the differences in prevalence of the different paradigms across both periods are also significant, particularly in the case of our research objective, which is the security paradigm (with a t-Student factor close to zero). Therefore, all three paradigms – social development, sustainable development, and security – coexist in the development narrative; a feature consistent with the fact that aid can be multi-purpose, as described in Chapter 2. What has changed from one period to the next is the weight of those three groups of elements in terms of the aid discourse. This coexistence is evident in both time and space: for each and every donor, all paradigms show a prevalence of at least 11.0% (the weight of the security paradigm in Germany’s strategic plan for the first period) and not greater than 52.4% (the weight of the sustainable development agenda in Germany’s strategic plan for the second period). The recent strategic document with the strongest security flavour is that of the UK (33.9% of total quotes), followed by that of France, the Netherlands, and ­Germany. This reveals a strong change for the UK with regard to the first period – references to the security paradigm in the earlier document were at only 17% of total (see Chapter 4 on the UK). In terms of that first period, the heaviest security narrative was that of France, followed by the Netherlands, the UK, and Germany. All four donors are found to have strengthened their security narratives, although to different degrees. The increase in the share of quotes labelled with the

192  Iliana Olivié and Aitor Pérez

security code family totals 17.1 percentage points for the UK, 8.6 for Germany, 5.3 in the case of the Netherlands, and 1.9 in France. As already mentioned, families of codes bring together labels related to distinct goals of development assistance (from poverty eradication to migration control) as well as to motives behind aid. Aid can be the result of a moral responsibility on the part of donors (paradigm 1), or of a sense of partnership in building global public goods (paradigm 2) or of the promotion of national interests (paradigm 3). As in the two EU Consensuses for Development, motives for aid are here found to represent only a minor part of the strategic discourse by individual donor states. Only 107 quotes out of a total 1,224 referred to the motives of aid (for the four donors as a whole) (Table 10.7). The distributions of these quotes across periods and donors yield very interesting results. First, a significant increase is observed in the overall number of references to the motives of aid: 23 in the first period, and 84 in the second. Therefore, it would seem that recent political events in Europe call for clear justifications on the part of donors of why public funds should be channelled for development purposes. Second, this increase is concentrated into selfish motives: solidarity as a motive has nearly doubled (from 5 to 9), the argument of common goods has likewise increased (from 9 to 17), while reasons of self-interest have skyrocketed, from 9 references to 58. Third, not all selected donors make the case for aid with the same insistence, and not all of them point out selfish reasons with the same intensity. The argument of self-­ interest is expressed in the second period by the Netherlands and the UK almost exclusively. France’s narrative of aid scarcely addresses its motives (0 references in the first period, 2 in the second, both referring to common goods). Similarly, TABLE 10.7  Motives of aid in EU member state discourses (number of quotes by code)

1st period

Solidarity / Moral obligation / Responsibility

Common efforts / Common goods / Common interests / Global Public Goods

Self-help/ Self-Interest

Total

Netherlands UK Germany France Total

3 1 1 0 5

0 5 4 0 9

3 4 2 0 9

6 10 7 0 23

2nd period

Solidarity / Moral obligation / Responsibility

Common efforts / Common goods / Common interests / Global Public Goods

Self-help/ Self-Interest

Total

Netherlands UK Germany France Total

3 5 1 0 9

8 2 5 2 17

32 26 0 0 58

43 33 6 2 84

Source: Authors’ elaboration.

Solidarity and security in the EU  193

motives of aid are limited to just 13 references in the German documents (7 in the first period, 6 in the second). Notably, despite the fact that selfish motives are (in very general terms) more present in the security discourse, while moral responsibility tends to be associated with the social development paradigm, references to national interests need not be limited to matters of security and defence. In fact, the Dutch strategy argues mainly for commercial interests: “These developments call for a new aid, trade, and investment agenda. At international level, we are pursuing three important aims. First, to eradicate extreme poverty (‘getting to zero’) in a single generation; second, sustainable, inclusive growth all over the world; and third, success for Dutch companies abroad” (MFA, 2013, p. 6).

Conclusions The aim of this chapter has been to explore whether the European narrative on aid has in recent years tended to place a greater emphasis on security in making the case for aid (sometimes called ‘securitisation of the aid discourse’). Although the European Consensuses on Development (texts that gather and balance the distinct political views of aid from all EU member states, as well as from the EU institutions) do not reveal a clear securitisation of aid, individual strategic documents from the key European donors clearly do. This is not a feature that is exclusive to the EU. As detailed in Chapter 3, security is a key component in the case for aid in the US. Moreover, there is a strong emphasis on the part of various donors that may correspond to distinct political cycles in different European states. In line with the conclusions of Chapters 1 and 2 of this book, our results further show that aid arguments need not to be exclusive, even when very different: social and sustainable development, security, self-interest, and solidarity can all coexist in aid narratives. Indeed, they actually do: what appears to have changed between the early 2000s and the present is that different emphases have been given to different paradigms and motives. This raises the interesting question of who these documents are written for; clearly, the design processes of the diverse documents under review and the political debates around them might be very different. While the EU Consensuses on Development have been debated internationally, among peer nations, individual strategies might conceivably be negotiated with (and written for) domestic political stakeholders. In that regard, important shifts in the aid narratives of certain donors might be linked to changes in governing party or administration, as well as to changing social, economic, and political climates at the national level.

Notes 1 The authors are grateful for very valuable comments from this book’s co-authors, particularly specific suggestions by Olav Stokke, Gino Pauselli, and Balazs Svent-Ivanyi. 2 For a more comprehensive survey of this literature, see Chapter 2 of this book.

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3 Both Brown et al. (2016) and Furness and Ganzle (2016) associate the ‘whole-of-­ government approach’ with a discourse of securitised aid. However, it could be ­a rgued that this concept, linked to the agenda on policy coherence for development, might be reflecting a sense of coherent external action towards a single set of goals that could be aligned with any of the three paradigms (and not exclusively with the third). Therefore, we have not included this concept in our list of codes.

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PART 3

Thematic agendas

11 DONORSHIP IN A STATE OF FLUX Nilima Gulrajani and Liam Swiss

Introduction Nearly 70 years after implementation of the Marshall Plan to reconstruct Europe, the institutionalisation of development assistance – despite its many sceptics and naysayers – proceeds unabated, becoming increasingly complex and heterogeneous year after year. In 2016, development assistance totalling US$142.6 ­billion was spent by aid donor countries to address development, humanitarian aid, and refugee assistance globally, with more than 140 countries eligible to receive aid. This record high for development spending does not include the additional ­billions spent by new- or emerging-donor countries, private foundations, NGOs, and others engaging in development activities outside of the Official Development Assistance envelope. In this chapter, we argue that development assistance from both established donors and emerging aid providers is shaped by development norms of donorship and partnership, respectively. ­Despite the longer history and articulation of donorship norms, the challenge posed by emerging partnership norms has left donorship in a state of flux (Gulrajani & Swiss, 2017). In this chapter, we sketch an outline of the development norms of donorship and partnership, the challenge posed to donorship by recent global trends and by partnership norms in South-South Cooperation (SSC), and the growing normative convergence across the North and South binary. We begin in the “Development norms and their diffusion” section with a theoretical exploration of how development norms diffuse and shape aid actors and processes. We show how donors/partners – both established and e­ merging – are influenced by and are contesting the norms of aid. Building on recent research revealing the processes through which aid donor policies and practices are influenced by global norms and models (Fejerskov, 2015; Gulrajani & Swiss, 2017; Swiss, 2018), in the “Good donorship in the North” section we show

200  Nilima Gulrajani and Liam Swiss

that Northern aid actors are influenced by donorship norms that seek to respect quantitative aid targets and qualitative commitment to the principle of developmentalism. In the “Trends decentring donorship norms” section, we point to trends that are diminishing the primacy of donorship as the guiding normative framework of Northern development cooperation. In the “Southern principles of partnership: a challenge to donorship” section, we explore how the normative principle of partnership − framed by solidarity, horizontality, and r­ eciprocity − guides and governs Southern development cooperation actors in a way that contests donorship norms and leaves them in a state of transition. In the “Trends decentring partnership norms” section, we suggest that partnership norms are likewise destabilising, hinting at a certain normative convergence across the North-South binary that straddles donorship and partnership.

Development norms and their diffusion Questions around aid in past research have most often touched upon how, where, and why aid is allocated (Briggs, 2018; Fløgstad & Hagen, 2017; Fuchs, Dreher & Nunnenkamp, 2014; Koch, Dreher, Nunnenkamp & Thiele, 2009), how effective it is (Bigsten & Tengstam, 2015; Gehring, Michaelowa, Dreher & Spörri, 2017), and the politics of aid (Lancaster, 2007; Molenaers, Dellepiane & Faust, 2015; Molenaers, Gagiano, Smets & Dellepiane, 2015; Swedlund, 2017). Less attention has been paid to the role aid plays in the diffusion and implementation of global norms and their associated policy models (Swiss, 2016a, 2016b), or to the ways in which aid donors and other development actors are shaped by development cooperation norms (Cold-Ravnkilde, Engberg-Pedersen & Fejerskov, 2018; Fejerskov, 2018; Swiss, 2018). This chapter addresses the latter case, the emergence, evolution, and contestation of development norms of donorship and partnership – especially given the rise of a class of new actors in the field of development cooperation (Gulrajani & Swiss, 2017). A classic definition of norms is “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 891). International organisations, entrepreneurs, and State actors all play a role in generating, diffusing, and helping internalise international norms within States, as well as between them (Finnemore, 1993; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Sociological institutionalism, particularly World Society Theory as developed by John Meyer and his students, considers norms to be the “universalistic (world) models” by which States “routinely organize and legitimate themselves” (Meyer, Boli, Thomas & Ramirez, 1997, p. 148). In World Society accounts of norm/model diffusion and internalisation, models of appropriate behaviour are disseminated by a range of actors and organisations transnationally or supranationally leading to increased isomorphism between states and other organisations (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Lechner & Boli, 2005; Meyer et al., 1997). Surprisingly, given the role of international actors, organisations, and transnational processes in spreading and supporting global norms/models, little attention has been paid to foreign aid actors

Donorship in a state of flux  201

and practices in this process (Cold-Ravnkilde et al., 2018; Fejerskov, 2018; Swiss, 2016a, 2016b, 2018). Indeed, foreign aid’s role in the spread and institutionalisation of global norms has often been taken for granted by prior aid research. Over time, global development had become an organisational field within which States negotiate their role and identity vis-à-vis the international community, while simultaneously attempting to pursue their interests. Further, the field of development cooperation is subject to global normative pressures deriving from actors and processes occupying positions within the field itself (Fejerskov, 2015; Kühl, 2015; Peterson, 2014; Swiss, 2011, 2012, 2016a, 2016b; Swiss & Longhofer, 2016). Donor norms are diffused through their negotiation and contestation in venues such as the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee and its associated regular meetings and peer review processes; through high profile global conferences and their respective agendas; and through mimicry processes between and among donors (Swiss, 2018). Through these diffusion pathways, norms are ideas that become widely shared and that tend to go largely unquestioned, assumed to be ‘common sense’. As Fukuda-Parr and Shiga (2016) write: Normative frameworks in development aid serve to create a narrative that define and communicate the problem of development in a particular way, identify key problems and justify a specific policy approaches and set of interventions being financed. (p. 5) These norms define and regulate State behaviour through the logic of normative appropriateness, as well as through the logic of utilitarian consequences ­( Bernstein & Cashore, 2012, p. 591). States are both rational actors and social constructions, adapting to the norms of global development for the sake of their own legitimacy or reputation, but also seeking material gains in their national interest (Timofejevs Henriksson, 2014; see also the section on Constructivism in Chapter 1). What is meant by ‘legitimacy’ in this context? In the context of norms, we can distinguish legitimacy in two ways: the legitimacy attained by becoming a development donor/partner (the logic of appropriateness), versus that attained by being a legitimate development donor/partner (the logic of utilitarian consequences). These legitimacies are reflective of different aims for donors/ partners and have different implications for the development community. For example, to be a Northern donor is to be a governmental actor investing concessional national financial resources – or foreign aid – towards the goal of global development. As we shall show, identity as a donor is formally enshrined in the provision of Official Development Assistance (ODA). A country can be a donor either by creating the bureaucratic apparatus for its own bilateral aid programme or by channelling aid funding through the multilateral system, although donor identity is arguably stronger as a bilateral provider. A donor will be influenced by ‘donorship’ development norms that, in turn, inform its policies, approaches, and operational modalities.

202  Nilima Gulrajani and Liam Swiss

Good donorship in the North The history of bilateral donorship starts with Article 551 of the UN Charter articulating the functions of a post-war international order committed to the principles of international economic and social cooperation. In January 1949, US President Harry Truman problematised underdevelopment in Point Four of his inaugural speech as “poverty”, “disease”, and “misery”. Point Four had been inspired by a suggestion to expand a modest US aid programme to Latin ­A merica into a larger national programme for poorer countries (Lumsdaine, 1993). In the 1950s, the US actively sought to promote foreign aid as an obligation of all developed States, rather than shouldering aid as its own exclusive burden (Lumsdaine & Schopf, 2007). Paul Hoffman, former Marshall Plan administrator, was charged with selling the sponsorship of aid programmes to European countries that had sought US aid a decade earlier. Lumsdaine and Schopf (p. 224) suggest that doing so “redefined the nature of the world order, making sense only in the context of a new concept of what it is to be a State and of what the international realm is”. Through foreign aid, one purpose of a State was now to assist all countries’ transitions to prosperity and eventually to participate as a provider of aid; this had become “a mandatory part of developed country status” (Lumsdaine & Schopf, 2007). By the end of the 1960s, almost all European countries had commenced some kind of aid programme. New organisations and development professionals emerged, professing commitment to global economic justice and international cooperation (Rist, 2002, p. 88). The transition from being a Marshall Plan aid recipient to being an aid provider underscored a post-Second World War development concept that implied social responsibility extending beyond national borders (Lumsdaine & Schopf, 2007, p. 224). Wealthy Western democracies were expected to provide development assistance, and they derived legitimacy on the global stage by assuming this donor form (see for instance Chapters 4, 5, and 7 of this book on the UK, the Scandinavian countries, and Spain). This legitimacy awarded by becoming a donor was also a strategic interest, as States sought to cement their reputational status and their economic and political significance. Donorship implies possession of sufficient power, skills, and resources to resolve the problems of poverty and development in other states. On the other hand, legitimacy as a donor (or ‘good donorship’, as we characterise it here) is more closely tied to development norms related to effectiveness, generosity, and influence. Acquiring the identity of bilateral donor is a global norm anchored in N ­ orthern traditions to which many States still adhere. The expectation that nations will pursue a donor model once a certain level of national income is reached has real implications for State legitimacy on the global stage. Under the norm of donorship, a ‘developed’ country is expected to share its wealth, expertise, and privilege through the bureaucratic apparatus of a government agency/mechanism that engages with ‘less-developed’ countries and/or the multilateral system. This

Donorship in a state of flux  203

norm appeals to donors on two levels, both by conforming to a global standard of appropriate behaviour for an advanced nation and by advancing the donor nation’s own material interests. While the achievement of national foreign policy or commercial aims through a bilateral aid programme may be real objectives (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Morgenthau, 1962) as might the desire to spread humanitarian ideals and altruism (Lumsdaine, 1993), adherence to donorship norms is also fundamentally about the imperative of fostering a nation’s reputation and securing legitimacy as a modern developed State. To be a donor implies possessing the hard power to ‘gift’ resources to others, as well as the softer skills and capacities required to deploy these resources towards resolving global challenges. Norms of good donorship are neither cast in stone nor clearly identifiable in any single document or set of guidelines. Still, these norms directly shape countries’ behaviours. Indeed, prior research has shown how norms of good donorship in the North and/or among established Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors shape donor countries (Gulrajani & Swiss, 2017). We argue here that good donorship in the North centres on the provision of aid in support of a norm of developmentalism. The principles and practices of good donorship, which derive from this norm, include adherence to the definition and obligations of Official Development Assistance and the generous provision of aid inspired by the attainment of altruistic, globalist, and humanitarian aims. Good donorship thus hinges on the provision of ODA, which has a very specific definition 2 outlining “what counts” as ODA, who is to provide it and how, and the criteria of its developmentalist aim of promoting “economic development and welfare”. Furthermore, the DAC clearly outlines what cannot be covered as ODA, including military aid, promotion of “donor security interests”, and commercial instruments such as export credits (OECD, 2018a). Good donorship norms expect ODA provision by a donor bureaucracy, and countries are encouraged to be generous in their development assistance – expectations closely associated with the 0.7% ODA as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) target, and with total overall ODA volumes. While few DAC donors manage to meet the 0.7% target, the DAC and the UN have crafted a norm of aid generosity where good donorship is associated with “more generous” ODA support. In this respect, countries that meet or exceed aid targets are frequently lauded and held to be role models for the donor community to follow, while those countries that fail to meet targets or that manifest stagnant or shrinking aid levels are called out by the donor community for their flagging generosity. For example, the 2018 OECD-DAC peer review of Canada’s development cooperation makes a specific point of criticising the nation for its lack of progress towards increased ODA budgets, or towards setting a path to achieving the 0.7% target. The fact that this features as part of the peer review assessment, even when subsequent Canadian governments have made clear their reluctance to strive for these targets, is indicative of how central these expectations of generosity are to the norms of good donorship. In the northern donor context, all ODA provision is welcome, but good donorship is equated with more generous financial commitments.

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Fragile States

Multilaterals

FIGURE 11.1 

Globalism

Developmentalism

LDCs

Developmentalism in good donorship norms.

Source: Authors’ elaboration.

The idea of good donorship references not only the levels of ODA, but also the developmentalist aims and content of that ODA. In particular, good donorship has become interchangeably associated with three interrelated principles of developmentalism: (i) provision of aid to the poorest countries, or those most in need, in order to leave none behind (altruism); (ii) support to the global development agenda through strategic and consistent support of multilateral actors and aid and global public goods (globalism); and (iii) humanitarian assistance to combat crises, as well as development support for fragile or conflict-affected states (humanitarianism). These principles combine to form an ideology of developmentalism that underscores good donorship practice by the North. Figure 11.1 conceptualises the intersection of these principles as they relate to one another in the expectations of good donorship, and the practices that reflect them through the provision of ODA to least-developed countries (LDCs), fragile states, and multilateral actors.

Altruism: aid for the poorest Despite realist arguments that aid is primarily about donor self-interest, the principle of altruism underscores the developmentalism embedded in donorship norms. Donors are expected to channel their ODA to those countries where

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efforts to fight poverty are most needed. Often this is equated with ensuring that more ODA be devoted to so-called LDCs, even when large pockets of poverty persist in middle-income countries. Though research shows that aid does not always reach the poorest (Briggs, 2018), the notional aim of fighting poverty and altruistically providing assistance to those worst off has long been acknowledged as the aim of development aid (Lumsdaine, 1993). On the global stage, the principle of altruism was reflected in the Millennial Development Goals (MGDs). Currently, the policy language of Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) speaks of “Leaving No One Behind”. In the DAC total ODA to LDCs routinely hovers between 25% and 30% of all DAC ODA, with some members nearing or exceeding the disbursement of 50% of their ODA to the poorest countries in the world. In 2016, for instance, the DAC donors allocated 27% of their ODA to LDCs, with Ireland demonstrating the most altruistic aid allocation, providing 45% of its ODA to this category (OECD, 2017). Official Development Assistance to those peoples and countries considered most in need remains a key principle underlying the developmentalism inherent in the good donorship norms of the North.

Globalism: aid for the global development agenda and multilateral actors Alongside altruism, good donorship norms also espouse a principle of globalism, requiring donors to support key multilateral actors, global agendas, and various global public goods. Bilateral donor countries thus frequently augment their core support to multilateral agencies through targeted funding of specific development initiatives and programmes. The delivery of DAC ODA through multilateral channels is viewed as a key strategy for achieving developmental goals. In 2015, the OECD issued the report “Multilateral Aid 2015: Better Partnerships for a Post-2015 World”, which underscored this link and made clear the expectation that DAC donors and other aspiring donor states need to channel ODA through multilaterals to support the SDG agenda (OECD, 2015). Indeed, the report highlighted that as of 2013, 41% of DAC ODA was delivered via either core or supplementary (earmarked) funding of multilateral bodies and programmes. A similar embrace of globalism is embodied in much of the SDG agenda, including SDG 17’s focus on building global partnerships for development, and the responsibilities of donors to finance those international partnerships.

Humanitarianism: aid for crises and fragile states Good donorship norms also reflect the principle of humanitarianism through the expectation that legitimate donors will respond to humanitarian crises and the challenges of post-conflict or fragile states through their ODA. Clearly intersecting with the principles of altruism and globalism noted above, the investment of ODA in humanitarian crises and fragile states involves both the funding of LDCs

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and channelling aid through multilateral actors. The DAC’s report “States of Fragility 2018” emphasises the expectation that donors focus on fragile contexts and humanitarian crises. In 2016, this resulted in more than 65% of earmarked DAC ODA being allocated to the “58 fragile contexts” identified in the report (OECD, 2018b). With nearly two-thirds of ODA reflecting these humanitarian principles, the association of good donorship with an ability and willingness to deliver ODA in increasingly challenging contexts has been enshrined into Northern donorship norms.

The diffusion of donorship How do donorship norms arise and spread? The primary norm setter and broker in the case of good donorship is the OECD’s DAC. The DAC serves as a clearinghouse for all things related to foreign aid, setting the definitions for what counts as Official Development Assistance and tracking/evaluating the performance of the DAC’s 30 members. Through discussion and collaboration by its members and the expertise and guidance of its secretariat, the DAC forms the key venue through which donorship norms are formulated and promulgated (Gulrajani & Swiss, 2017; Kim & Lightfoot, 2011). Apart from the formal definitions of ODA outlined above, and the various reporting criteria associated with it, DAC guidelines and policy statements, as well as peer review reports where DAC members regularly evaluate each other’s donor performance, combine to form the core content of good donorship norms and reflect mechanisms through which they are spread and enforced. Indeed, DAC peer review is essentially a compliance instrument used to put the non-binding ‘soft laws’ of good donorship norms into effect (Paulo & Reisen, 2010, p. 543). Although not all bilateral donors are DAC members, the DAC legitimises the idea that a developed country will have a bilateral aid programme, also making clear its expectations for how that programme will look and operate. For this reason, several non-DAC donor countries have been seen to report their ODA to the DAC in an effort to adhere to facets of the donorship norm and the legitimacy it provides (Gulrajani & Swiss, 2017). Likewise, the legitimacy of DAC membership has driven accession to the organisation by several of its newest members. The Republic of Korea, for instance, used ODA targets associated with DAC membership to help spur increases in its ODA effort and the institutionalisation of its donor role, with one former President of its donor agency referring to Korean ODA as a “kind of membership fee to international society” (Lumsdaine & Schopft, 2007, p. 232). A second distributor of norms is the EU, comprised of 27 Member States3 and an executive arm known as the European Commission (EC)4. The EU has been active in development since the beginning of European integration with the management of the first European Development Fund (EDF) in 1958. Collectively, the EU is the largest source of ODA and is a member of the DAC, like which it has played a significant role in setting and spreading donorship

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norms (Gulrajani & Swiss, 2017). For example, in 2002, the Council of the EU committed its member states to significantly increase foreign aid volumes and tasked the Commission with monitoring commitments, which were adopted in the form of non-binding ‘soft law’ and with implementation largely dependent on the political will of member states, new and old. Members were expected to increase their ODA/GNI to the level of 0.33% by 2006. After new members acceded to the EU in 2004, a distinction between the ‘new’ and ‘old’ members was established, with the latter expected to reach ratios of 0.17 ODA/GNI by 2010 and 0.33 ODA/GNI by 2015 (Timofejevs Henriksson, 2014, p. 439). Though a directive, these targets were not binding, and several EU members (new and old) failed to attain the 0.33% target in the prescribed time. In this respect, the norms of donorship promoted by actors like the EU might be more aspirational than achievable for many donors, but it remains clear that the EU is a strong contributor to the creation and spread of good donorship norms around aid generosity and humanitarian commitments. Good donorship norms have also been strongly shaped and spread by ­a genda-setting through the United Nations. The most notable examples include the ‘development decades’ of the 1960s and 1970s and, more recently, the ­M illennium Development Goals and Global Goals for Sustainable Development. In both sets of goals, the role of aid is addressed most explicitly in the context of establishing/reinforcing a global partnership for development, with many implications for donors, including that ‘good donors’ will be generous donors. In order to achieve global goals – so the logic goes – an expanded resource base will be required. Not surprisingly, then, more aid is prescribed by both sets of goals, albeit with the SDGs adding levels of nuance to the quantitative targets, including leveraging aid to obtain financing from private sources. SDG 17 aims to revitalise this partnership and sets an associated target that donor countries implement fully their official development assistance commitments, including the commitment by many developed countries to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of ODA/GNI to developing countries and 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries; ODA providers are encouraged to consider setting a target to provide at least 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries. (UN, 2015) Like earlier guidelines and recommendations, both the MDGs and the subsequent SDGs reinforce the need for greater donor generosity in order to fully support the global development agenda. Developed countries are expected to support development by maintaining a commitment to aid, and also expect to gain legitimacy through aid donorship. The more aid a donor can provide, and the more developmental that aid, in practice, the greater the donor country’s legitimacy.

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Trends decentring donorship norms While the SDGs clearly maintain aid as a strong development norm, fiscal austerity has heaped political pressures on the purpose of foreign aid as provided by the North to the South. Traditional donors are being pushed and pulled to look “beyond aid” to meet the challenge of global inequality and poverty reduction. At one level, the new financial reality is that official aid represents a decreasing share of total financial flows to many (wealthier) developing countries. Alongside this, there are concerns about aid’s effectiveness in tackling the structural conditions and root causes of underdevelopment, meanwhile generating unintended consequences like dependency and corruption. Just as the legitimacy of the act of aid-giving dwindles, so too do the power and influence of traditional internal and external champions of development assistance dwindle. At one level, this includes development agencies within their domestic bureaucratic systems which are being increasingly merged into foreign affairs departments (as in Canada, Australia, and Iceland), or else sidestepped by other governmental departments with greater political capital and potential expertise in topics beyond aid, such as climate change or migration. The Development Assistance Committee also struggles to uphold norms that are being increasingly contested, such as what is or is not included as ODA, or the criteria for ODA eligibility. The result is greater examination of the DAC’s purpose and mandate, modalities and working methods (DAC High-Level Panel, 2017). There is also growing space for ambiguity in the link between aid and overseas development impact, as well as greater recognition of the development challenges at home. While the Millennium Development Goals focussed the task of international development squarely on the reduction of poverty and social deprivation, the SDGs indirectly widen that singular focus to include a broader range of 17 equally weighted objectives linked to 232 indicators. This offers a broader definition of development that reflects the recent economic history of emerging and middle-income economies and their growing influence on global norms. Yet the causal pathways and inter-linkages between these goals and the reduction of poverty and inequality are not fully mapped or understood. The SDG framework widens the range of possible activities in the name of global development, but without offering a framework for assessing the comparative merits or value of that wide array of interventions in variable contexts. Without prioritisation, specificity, and targeted assessment, the breadth of the 2030 agenda allows for donorship norms to evolve and extend beyond their altruistic, multilateral, and global elements. Moreover, the universal applicability of the SDG framework also puts pressures on developed countries to address the challenge of underdevelopment within their own borders. This more insular approach is further enhanced by globalisation trends that increase the transmission speed and scope of crises, resulting in more acute domestic sensitivity to the effects of pandemics, terrorism, and climate change that can no longer be isolated through physical distance. Instead of needs-based allocation, donors are increasingly engaged in

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targeting development within their own regions to strategically reduce their vulnerability to adverse spillover effects (Blodgett Bermeo, 2018). A shifting geography of global poverty is starting to upend the traditional binary distinction between aid provider and aid recipient. Over the last 15 years, 35 low-income countries have grown to achieve middle-income status. The proportion of people living in extreme poverty across the world is projected to fall from 11% in 2013 to 5% in 2030 (Manuel, Desai, Samman & Evans, 2018). While 400 million people are expected to still be living in extreme poverty by 2030, 84% of those will be concentrated in fragile states, and 56% in LDCs. Donors are thus asking what role they should assume in wealthier Middle-Income Countries (MICs), and whether it makes sense to deliver scarce concessional resources to States with the capacity to mobilise resource from alternative sources. To the extent that emerging markets represent lucrative investment and trading destinations for Northern states, as well as geopolitically valuable allies in a fractured global system, development spending is once again becoming more openly and deeply intertwined with public diplomacy, which, in turn, shifts the objectives and purposes of aid (Gulrajani, Mawdsley and Roychoudhury, forthcoming). Meanwhile, the proliferation of MICs as providers of development cooperation themselves is a visible and prominent trend (see, for instance, Chapter 9 of this book on Brazil). Development cooperation resources from non-DAC providers (broadly comparable with what the DAC defines as ODA) have been estimated at US$32 billion (gross) in 2014, representing 17% of the current DAC total (Benn & Luijkx, 2017). According to a 2017 survey, the proportion of developing countries providing development cooperation increased from 63% to 74% between 2015 and 2017 (UN, 2018b). This proliferation is without a doubt generating competitive pressures on DAC donors (Gulrajani & Swiss, 2018). Non-DAC providers are not limited by strict ODA definitions or any other internationally agreed-upon metric, whether quantitative or qualitative, for their development cooperation. Calculations of the comparative size and terms of non-DAC development spending are inevitably provisional, and further complicated by blurred distinctions between aid-like flows, other forms of soft financing, and other official flows (Bracho, 2015, p. 19). This gives some latitude for using ‘development’ branded resources to achieve commercial, trade, and geopolitical aims. Among all of these trends, it is the growing power and presence of those MICs engaging in SSC that provides perhaps the greatest challenge to the normative moorings of DAC donors. This is because Southern development norms, anchored in longstanding principles associated with partnership, have now acquired legitimacy and prominence as an alternative framework to donorship.

Southern principles of partnership: a challenge to donorship The identity of Southern countries in international relations is historically situated in various geopolitical reactions to the colonial experience: the first Afro-Asian summit in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955; the Non-Alignment

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Movement established at Belgrade in 1961; the creation of the Group of 77 developing countries in 1964; the ‘New International Economic Order’ of the 1970s; the 1978 United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries. In all of these encounters, the foundations were set for an enduring collective self-awareness of nations as the global South, and SSC represents a tangible expression of this identity set against a hierarchical, extractive, neo-liberal global North. Through SSC, contemporary States of the South have projected ideational power, drawing on hallmark principles that distinguish them from established donors (Mawdsley, 2012, 2015). This is especially the case for the Southern ‘BRICS’ countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) that do not report to the DAC and earn greater power and influence by adopting ‘anti-donor’ narratives. These principles include (1) shared developing country perspectives that are the basis for solidarity and valued development expertise; (2) horizontality that rejects hierarchical donor-recipient relations and recognises claims to sovereignty and non-interference; and (3) reciprocity from which mutual benefits to all parties can be derived. These three principles form the bedrock for the ‘partnership’ norms governing relations between Southern providers and recipients of development cooperation.

Solidarity among developing countries The first underlying principle for SSC is solidarity − a shared identity as developing countries deriving from a common historical experience. Injustice, exploitation, and shared experiences as subaltern regions both during and after the colonial era are the foundations for this collective sense of kinship among Southern development actors. This identity can be invoked to push for common and coordinated positions on a wide set of global issues, including multilateral governance reform, an equitable intellectual property regime, and climate change mitigation. Collective positions are seen to enhance bargaining positions and to support cooperation. Though there remain considerable differences and inequities within a broad category of developing countries that includes both China and Chad, these disparities tend to be elided in the Southern rhetoric of friendship. Solidarity among developing countries is also the basis for claims to contemporary expertise in development activities. This knowledge is situated in developing countries’ shared historical experiences as underdeveloped colonies, and in subsequent domestic development trajectories (Mawdsley, 2012). This has elevated in particular the idea that SSC is much more than financial investment, being a critical way for facilitating non-financial cooperation (UN, 2018b).

Sovereign horizontality The horizontal power of States is a foundational SSC principle that challenges hierarchical donor-recipient relations of the North. This is true even if questions remain about the veracity of this horizontality; for example, tied aid, a

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common practice by Southern providers, seems to preserve a vertical component. ­Mawdsley (2012) suggests horizontality as a symbolic regime is propagated through statements, speeches, and declarations, and in ritualised shows of respect and equality at various high-level meetings and forums. In contrast, donorship norms predicated on an understanding of aid as charity implicitly rest on a power differential based on unreciprocated giving from the generous rich to the needy poor, compelling an endless cycle that sustains the inferiority of the receiver. By contrast, horizontality recognizing equality between States is an implicit acknowledgement of a State’s right to sovereignty and self-determination. For example, policy ­conditionalities – a feature associated with unequal North-South relations – are rejected by SSC providers, as they represent interference in the internal affairs of another country. At the same time, there can be different kinds of intrusion into affairs of the recipient State, for example, in geopolitical conditionalities where assistance is provided in exchange for foreign policy support (Woods, 2008).

Mutual benefits through reciprocity State equality and solidarity contribute to the construction of development relationships based on the principle of reciprocity. Reciprocity is a tangible way to override power asymmetries between the provider and recipient of assistance (Fukuda-Parr & Shiga, 2016; Mawdsley, 2012). Through the principle of reciprocity, partners are recognized as sites of opportunity and promise, capable of both receiving and offering diplomatic gifts and economic opportunity. Such mutual benefits (or ‘winwins’) are the positive corollary to reciprocity. Win-win outcomes service the needs of poorer donors to suppress the financial costs of international cooperation, as well offering a plausible political argument to defend overseas investments against those who point to high levels of poverty at home (Mawdsley, 2012; Rowlands, 2012). Overall, the collection of these principles indicates a set of norms associated with a partnership between equals, anchored to ideas of solidarity and reciprocity; this Southern conception of development cooperation is defined by the ­donor’s identity and their relationship with the recipient (Fukuda-Parr & Shiga, 2016). The normative framework of SSC recognises its distinctiveness to ­Northern donorship approaches, enshrines respect for fellow sovereign nations, and seeks mutual benefits in any interaction. The symbolic representation of these norms requires the rejection of certain kinds of language, including relations between ‘donor and recipient’ dominated by ‘aid’. It is also formally institutionalised in the Nairobi (2009) outcome document of the High-level United Nations Conference on SSC. Much of the power of partnership norms derives from the fact that they are welcomed by States at the receiving end of cooperation. In other words, the rejection of the charitable basis of donorship is, in fact, legitimate in the eyes of recipients (Fukuda-Parr & Shiga, 2016). Indeed, a recent AidData study showed that among recipients, many SSC partners (Taiwan, China, Brazil, South Africa)

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were perceived to have as much or more influence as several of the established DAC donors (Custer, Rice, Masaki, Latourell & Parks, 2015). The dual status of Southern countries as providers as well as recipients is widely accepted; their role as providers is deemed necessary, appropriate, and potentially an indictment of DAC donorship norms as ineffectual or outdated (Mawdsley, 2015; Woods, 2008). Partnerships norms partly contribute to greater recognition and respect for Southern providers by recipients, and increasingly by DAC donors. The rapid and successful projection of Southern ideational power in international development is, in turn, remaking the international order, perhaps best exemplified by the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB). At the same time, this rebalancing is both partial and resisted, potentially creating a new set of transnational elites that further mutual interests in capital extraction, uneven accumulation, and political entrenchment (Mawdsley, 2015). This raises the question of how sizable the gap might be between the normative structures of partnership and donorship. Mawdsley (2015) hints that they may only offer slightly different variations of a moral narrative, while others suggest the differences are not one of fundamental principles but of their interpretation (Chandy & Kharas, 2011; Kragelund, 2015). Either way, there is a sense that, as partnership consolidates its grip as a legitimate alternative to donorship, it too is being destabilised.

Trends decentring partnership norms A number of trends can be understood to be unsettling the normative stability of the partnership framework. Mawdsley (2019) suggests that the success of SSC in the last decade is an important driver of change. For example, she highlights how highly visible forms and scales of partnership – including large infrastructure projects, but even humanitarian missions – can be contentious interventions from which external criticisms and concerns may grow, and where greater scrutiny may be demanded. As the awareness of domestic audiences increases around what their governments are investing in overseas, this can be problematic if set against the backdrop of high poverty levels or unmet domestic expectations. In some cases, success has also meant overextension of finances, programmes, and promises, resulting in exposure to bad debts (as in the case of both India and China) and reduced appetite for risk. Weak institutional capacity of domestic channels and the failure of demand-driven cooperation has fragmented, scattered, and reduced the overall effectiveness of SSC (Besharati, 2013, p. 19). The success of SSC also elevates global expectations of Southern partners’ capacity and commitment to deliver on developmental norms. Such an expectation led to the DAC trying to engage Brazil, China, and India at the 2011 B ­ usan Summit, and that summit’s outcome document, which initiated the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC). DAC members sought

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Southern engagement by appealing to their identity as donors, with practically the same responsibilities as the North (or at most certain voluntary commitments). However, the Southern preference was to be identified as “partners”, precisely because this identity required no formal obligations as “donors” (Bracho, 2017). A fragile accord emerged where Southern actors agreed to sign on not as donors or partners but as “providers” of development assistance. This allowed for bespoke “differential commitments” of the global South, which could be fulfilled at an unspecified future date (and thus, a less robust variant of common but differentiated standards where Southern targets would be specified based on collective objectives). Ultimately, the breakdown of consensus between North and South on commitments moved the GPEDC towards a loose international aid regime based on voluntary actions. As SSC matures, such expectations of formal global burden-sharing are likely to grow, even if contested by the South. Southern countries’ reluctance stems from the unfulfilled developmental promises of the North coupled with their own historical record of engagement in developing countries, which has led them to conclude that the North should assume greater obligations of donorship than the South (Besharati, 2013). Lastly, there is reason to believe that SSC is no longer as distinctive as it once was. There is a growing sense of at least partial convergence, as DAC actors increasingly borrow from partnership and Southern providers look to donorship for guidance and institutional strengthening. Ideational differences, to the extent that they exist, are likely to diminish. At one level, countries like Japan and Korea have often been outliers in the DAC, partly due to their unique historical post-war industrial development trajectories (Fukuda-Parr & Shiga, 2016; Kim & Gray, 2016; Lumsdaine & Schopf, 2007). And yet the trends unsettling donorship are convincing DAC donors of all persuasion that framing development as mutually beneficial may also offer the opportunity to enhance their competitiveness and credibility. This has led some to suggest that ODA is undergoing a process of ‘Southernisation’ (Asmus et al., 2017; Bracho, 2015; Fejerskov, Lundsgaarde & Cold-Ravnkilde, 2016; Mawdsley, 2019). As Southern providers fail to assume responsibilities, traditional donors fee less pressure to keep their own commitments. […] [P]artly in response to this ‘disloyal competition’, a number of traditional donors have begun to relax the traditional standards, undermining the DAC-induced barrier between ODA and commercial activities. […] As co-opting the Southern providers is clearly failing, ‘copying them’ now seems a viable, respectable option. (Bracho, 2015, p. 41) On the other hand, Southern partners are more active in fora and embedded in relationships that increase their contact points with DAC donors. For example, triangular cooperation can act as a stimulus for convergence, with donors like Brazil and South Africa perhaps more open to socialisation than are China and

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India (Gulrajani & Swiss, 2018; McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012). This can illustrate the value of engagement with progressive developmental issues favoured in donorship (Bracho, 2015; Kragelund, 2015; Li & Carey, 2014; Mawdsley, 2019). For example, Kragelund argues that Southern donors are essentially copying the forms, modalities, and sectors of their former donors (Kragelund, 2011). He argues that, increasingly, it is China that is playing by DAC rules in Africa, conforming to their ‘progressive’ development standards (Kragelund, 2015, p. 256). This raises questions about SSC’s ability to champion horizontal relations as it embraces relations more akin to that of a typical donor and recipient, suggesting that claims of Southern solidarity and mutual benefit may obscure the realpolitik of their motivations (Mawdsley, 2012).

Convergence to a hybrid normative framework While the normative framework for Northern and Southern donors has historically diverged, there appears to be growing ideological convergence that reduces the scope and scale of this binary. An emerging set of development norms borrow from both partnership and donorship narratives and respond directly to the destabilising forced within each. Isomorphic pressures cutting across the North-South axis are prompting searches for new sources of legitimacy that can buttress claims to serve as modern States capable of delivering development (Gulrajani & Swiss, 2018). However, this drive for legitimacy is manifesting itself differently depending on whether States come from Northern or Southern traditions. For Southern actors, it is the professionalisation of their institutional apparatus and the desire to ensure credibility as effective partners that are increasingly driving their orientation. For Northern states, legitimacy appears to emerge from a dilution of developmentalism to highlight the possibility of ‘win-wins’ among equals, set against a narrative of moving ‘beyond ODA’ as a major source of development finance. Southern donors appear to be pursuing legitimacy by adopting institutional forms that have continuities with donorship, while Northern donors appear to be pursuing legitimacy by shifting away from the functions and structures more conducive to the principles of developmentalism.

SSC: aiming for legitimacy as a donor The institutional architecture of Southern development cooperation is arguably in a state of consolidation. Existing agencies are evolving and being reinforced, and new agencies are being established. Most recently, the government of China announced plans to establish an agency for international development cooperation in order to consolidate development policy coordination (UN, 2018b). This follows from India’s creation of a Development Partnership Administration (2012) within the Ministry of External Affairs to improve coordination and effectiveness. New budget lines, regulatory frameworks, and

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institutional homes within the bureaucracy are all strong symbols of professionalisation. Such action consolidates the identity as a provider of development assistance internationally, even as States of the South explicitly reject the label of ‘donor’ (Gulrajani & Swiss, 2018). Nonetheless, the act of formalising the provision of development signals the legitimacy of Southern nations as modern, developed States capable of sharing their knowledge and experience with others. This also has repercussions for an international system that is adapting to accommodate their growing presence and visibility. For example, many United Nations organisations have established and/or strengthened specialised units and set up programmes with dedicated human and financial resources to promote SSC (UN, 2018a). Consolidation is also prompting closer examination of the Southern architecture of assessing performance and results. Traditionally, SSC has underlined its differences with Northern cooperation in terms of processes, generating assessments of quality that highlight activities or outputs rather than results or ­outcomes. For many Southern partners, processes and results are intertwined, as can be seen by the indicators now being proposed to assess SSC success (­Table 11.1). Yet even this formulation with clear targets represents greater formality and articulation of this Southern approach to quality and performance. Ibero-­A merican countries have perhaps gone furthest in this regard, establishing a shared set of evaluation procedures and standards. Meanwhile, Southern experts and researchers are exploring the monitoring and evaluation framework for SSC (Besharati, 2013; Besharati, Rawhani & Rios, 2017). From this have resulted some of the first concrete tools to evaluate the quality of South–South processes, TABLE 11.1  Common indicators for assessing development cooperation based on SSC

principles Principle

Indicators

Horizontality

The extent to which partners participate and share responsibilities during the project cycle. The share borne by each participating partner of the same two costdata items (executed or budgeted). Demand-driven The extent to which the project fits the partner’s needs. The extent to which the project presents a proper match between partners. The extent to which SSC partners are able to adapt when facing changes. Mutual benefits / Integration of knowledge into relevant systems and policies. ownership Incorporation of new technology into wealth-generating processes. Efficiency The ratio between the budgeted and executed costs per project (or action). The average time lapse between the approval of initiatives and their commencement. Source: Esteves (2018).

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practices, and relations, although these have yet to be formally ­endorsed by States in a multilateral process. Nonetheless, this desire for greater impact can potentially challenge critical principles of SSC, most notably that of non-interference. Exposure to difficulties has increased awareness of the limits to respect for sovereignty, particularly when the credibility, reputation, and long-term sustainability of projects are at stake (Kragelund, 2015; Mawdsley, 2019). Still, the growing desire to establish assessment systems with associated criteria is an important effort towards formally institutionalising SSC and ensuring its ongoing legitimacy as a provider. This gives some indication of the pragmatic turn in SSC that currently seeks to deliver on outcomes, quality, and promises (Mawdsley, 2019).

Conclusions: Northern donors moving away from donorship? We are beginning to see Northern donors derive legitimacy by shifting the developmental basis of their donorship norms. The first prominent shift of note is that ODA levels are no longer viewed as a fail-safe metric of donor commitment to development. At one level, this recognises the ways in which ‘beyond aid’ policies can be critical determinants of development outcomes (Center for Global Development, 2018). However, it is fair to say that the new aid narrative has more significantly captured the imagination of those who seek to mobilise alternative sources of finance towards the SDGs. In the context of an estimated SDG financing gap of US$2.5 trillion per annum ­( UNCTAD, 2014), the international development community is placing particular and increasing emphasis on blending ODA and non-ODA sources of finance. For most bilateral donor countries, blending refers to the investment of ODA into private sector instruments (PSIs) (e.g. equity, debt, guarantees) to crowd in additional private capital flows (Attridge & Engen, 2019). Traditionally, such investment has been reported as ODA and/or has not qualified as ODA. The current reform of ODA at the DAC is seeking to incentivise increased ODA investment in these types of PSIs, with a view to catalysing additional private finance towards the SDGs. Expectations have arisen of more investment in PSIs now being counted as ODA, both due to the potential loosening of DAC rules and to an increasing desire to provide aid ‘catalytically’, as per the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (2015) (Mawdsley, Murray, Overton, Scheyvens & Banks, 2018). Beyond debates around what ODA can achieve, and what it should include, there are also growing questions about the developmental norms of humanitarianism and altruism. The emphasis that DAC donors now place on principles likes mutual benefit and reciprocity echoes the methods used by Southern providers. Although the approaches of DAC donors and Southern providers are not strictly comparable, a degree of convergence can be noted between the two. The ‘trinity of development cooperation’ comprised by aid, trade, and investment and embedded in principles like reciprocity, and the joint use of financial and

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non-financial instruments, are central to SSC and are becoming a more explicit modus operandi for DAC donors (Gulrajani, Mawdsley and Roychoudhury, forthcoming). Japan was one of the earliest proponents and practitioners of this trinity approach to development cooperation, though the country was seen as something of an outlier in the DAC. Now it seems that DAC donors are moving towards Japanese norms and approaches. Although strong distinctions between ODA and SSC and/or Northern and Southern identities persist at a normative level, at the operational level there is reason to claim gradual convergence and intermingling between partnership and donorship. DAC donors are also increasingly beholden to the idea of reciprocity, which allow benefits to be legitimately obtained. A common dilemma for DAC bilateral donors nowadays thus seems to be how to craft a development policy that balances domestic economic advantages, geopolitical priorities, and recipient needs (Milner & Tingley, 2013). A dual strategic focus on global development and domestic benefits, and the reciprocity that exists between them, rests ultimately on a moral claim that donors can maintain a principled commitment to development, even as they satisfy their own domestic interests (Gulrajani, and Calleja, 2019). There is a new insistence that donors need not be ashamed in welcoming domestic dividends, with the assumed belief that such benefits do not detract from the primary purpose of economic development and welfare, which is the legal basis for investments qualifying as ODA in the first place. In other words, all parties and objectives can benefit, even without the existence of a strong sense of solidarity. The potential mutual benefits of reciprocity aside, this transition is not without its risks. In particular, the potential for Northern donor interests to subsume the development priorities of recipient countries can also limit the ability of recipients and other local groups to contest development aims that are vested with explicit donor commercial or political interests. In cases where foreign policy interests of donors outweigh the potential developmental outcomes of an aid investment, this push for reciprocity poses a risk that development may be subordinated to other donor interests (Gulrajani, 2017). Some argue that applying traditional donorship norms to SSC is both impossible and unfair (Besharati, 2013, p. 37). But this may not matter, as common ground increasingly exists to suggest that a new hybrid normative framework is emerging. Both SSC partners and aid donors will continue to attain the legitimacy derived from being aid providers. In this respect, hybrid norms will derive from practices adhered to and expected of both Northern and Southern actors, thus challenging both the past norms of donorship and of partnership in fundamental ways. With the hybridisation of aid norms, we are more likely to see greater agreement between North and South about what constitutes a good ­development partner and the challenges to prior approaches will be significant. Therefore we are perhaps left with more questions than answers about the future of donorship and partnership norms: Can traditional donors stay true to their principles, even as they seek to advance their national interests? Can SSC partners maintain the

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principles of solidarity and sovereignty, even as they seek to institutionalise their donor bodies and the provision of ODA? As a hybrid normative framework consolidates itself, answers to these questions will become clearer and prove a fruitful line of investigation for future research.

Notes 1 Quoted here: With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: a higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; b solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and c universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. (United Nations General Assembly, 1945) 2 ODA Is defined by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are provided by official agencies, including by state and local governments, and where each transaction is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, being concessional in character and conveying a grant element of at least 25% (calculated at a rate of discount of 10%). 3 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and UK (original EU members underscored). 4 The EC is responsible for proposing legislation, implementing decisions, upholding the EU’s treaties, and the general day-to-day running of the Union.

Bibliography Alesina, A. & Dollar, D. (2000) Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? Journal of Economic Growth, 5(1), pp. 33–63. Attridge, S. & Engen, L. (2019) Shifting the financing needle in Low Income Countries (LICs): understanding blended finance in an LIC context. Overseas Development Institute. London. Benn, J. & Luijkx, W. (2019) Emerging providers’ international co-operation for development, (April). Retrieved from: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/workingpaper/ 15d6a3c7-en Bernstein, S. & Cashore, B. (2012) Complex global governance and domestic policies: Four pathways of influence. International Affairs, 88(3), pp. 585–604. doi:10.1111/ j.1468-2346.2012.01090.x Besharati, N. (2013) Common Goals and Differential Commitments: The Role of Emerging Economies in Global Development. Besharati, N., Rawhani, C. & Rios, O. G. (2017) Framework for South-South Cooperation (March).

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Bigsten, A. & Tengstam, S. (2015) International coordination and the effectiveness of aid. World Development, 69(0), pp. 75–85. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.12.02 Blodgett Bermeo, S. (2018) Targeted Development: Industrialized Country Strategy in a Globalising World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Boli, J. & Thomas, G. M. (1997) World culture in the world polity: A century of international non-governmental organisation. American Sociological Review, 62(2), pp. 171–190. Bracho, G. (2015) In Search of a Narrative for Southern Providers. The Challenge of the Emerging Economies to the Development Cooperation Agenda. DIE Discussion Paper 1/2015. Bonn: German Development Institute. Retrieved from: https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/ media/DP_1.2015.pdf Bracho, G. (2017) The Troubled Relationship of the Emerging Powers and the Effective Development Cooperation Agenda. Retrieved from: https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/ DP_25.2017.pdf Briggs, R. C. (2018) Poor targeting: A gridded spatial analysis of the degree to which aid reaches the poor in Africa. World Development, 103, pp. 133–148. doi:10.1016/j. worlddev.2017.10.020 Center for Global Development (2018) Commitment to Development Index. Retrieved ­October 1, 2018, from: https://www.cgdev.org/commitment-development-index-2018 Chandy, L. & Kharas, H. (2011) Why can’t we all just get along? The practical limits to international development cooperation. Journal of International Development, 27(5), pp. 739–751. Retrieved from: http://doi.org/10.1002/jid Cold-Ravnkilde, S. M., Engberg-Pedersen, L. & Fejerskov, A. M. (2018) Global norms and heterogeneous development organizations: Introduction to special issue on New Actors, Old Donors and Gender Equality Norms in International Development Cooperation. Progress in Development Studies, 18(2), pp. 1–18. doi:10.1177/1464993417750289 Custer, S., Rice, Z., Masaki, T., Latourell, R. & Parks, B. (2015) Listening to Leaders: Which Development Partners Do They Prefer and Why? Williamsburg, VA: AidData. Retrieved from: http://aiddata.org/listening-to-leaders DAC High-Level Panel (2017) A New DAC in a Changing World : Setting a Path for the Future, Report of the High-Level Panel (HLP) 1, ( January 2017) pp. 1–18. Fejerskov, A. M. (2015) From unconventional to ordinary? The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the homogenizing effects of International Development Cooperation. Journal of International Development, 27(7), pp. 1098–1112. doi:10.1002/jid.3149 Fejerskov, A. M. (2018) Development as resistance and translation: Remaking norms and ideas of the Gates Foundation. Progress in Development Studies, 18(2), 126–143. doi:10.1177/1464993417750287 Finnemore, M. (1993) International organizations as teachers of norms: The United ­Nations educational, scientific, and cutural organization and science policy. International Organization, 47(4), pp. 565–597. Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K. (1998) International norm dynamics and political change. International Organization, 52(4, International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics), pp. 887–917. Fløgstad, C. & Hagen, R. J. (2017) Aid Dispersion: Measurement in Principle and Practice. World Development, 97, pp. 232–250. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev. 2017.04.022 Fuchs, A., Dreher, A. & Nunnenkamp, P. (2014) Determinants of Donor Generosity: A Survey of the Aid Budget Literature. World Development, 56, pp. 172–199. doi:10.1016/j. worlddev.2013.09.004

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Fukuda-Parr, S. & Shiga, H. (2016) Normative Framing of Development Cooperation: Japanese Bilateral Aid between the DAC and Southern Donors. JICA-RI Working Paper No. 130. Tokyo: JICA Research Institute Retrieved from: https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/publication/workingpaper/jrft3q00000063lo-att/JICA-RI_WP_No.130.pdf. Gehring, K., Michaelowa, K., Dreher, A. & Spörri, F. (2017) Aid Fragmentation and ­Effectiveness: What Do We Really Know? World Development, 99, pp. 320–334. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.05.019 Gulrajani, N. (2017) Bilateral Donors and the Age of the National Interest: What Prospects for Challenge by Development Agencies? World Development, 96, pp. 375–389. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.03.021 Gulrajani, N. and Calleja, R. (2019) Understanding Donor Motivations: Developing the Principled Aid Index. Overseas Development Institute Research paper. London. Gulrajani, N. & Swiss, L. (2018) Donor proliferation to what ends? New donor countries and the search for legitimacy. Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue canadienne d’études du développement, pp. 1–21. doi:10.1080/02255189.2019.1543652 Gulrajani, N, E. Mawdsley and S. Roychoudhury. (Forthcoming) The new development diplomacy in India. ODI Research Report. London: Overseas Development Institute. Kim, S. & Lightfoot, S. (2011) Does ‘DAC-ability’ really matter? The emergence of nonDAC donors: Introduction to policy arena. Journal of International Development, 23(5), pp. 711–721. doi:10.1002/jid.1795 Kim, S. & Gray, K. (2016) Overseas development aid as spatial fix? Examining South Korea’s Africa policy. Third World Quarterly, 37(2), pp. 649–664. doi:10.1080/014365 97.2015.1108162 Koch, D.-J., Dreher, A., Nunnenkamp, P. & Thiele, R. (2009) Keeping a low profile: What determines the allocation of aid by non-governmental organizations? World Development, 37(5), pp. 902–918. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.09.004 Kragelund, P. (2015) Towards convergence and cooperation in the global development finance regime: closing Africa’s policy space? Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 28(2), pp. 246–262. doi:10.1080/09557571.2014.974141 Kühl, S. (2015) The diffusion of organizations: The role of foreign aid. In H. Boris, K. Fatima & W. Tobias (eds.), From Globalization to World Society. Neo-Institutional and Systems-Theoretical Perspectives (pp. 258–278). London: Routledge. Lancaster, C. (2007) Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lechner, F. J. & Boli, J. (2005) World Culture: Origins and Consequences. London: Blackwell. Li, X. & Carey, R. (2014) The BRICS and the International Development System: Challenge and Convergence? Lumsdaine, D. H. (1993) Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949–1989. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lumsdaine, D. & Schopf, J. C. (2007) Changing values and the recent rise in ­Korean development assistance. The Pacific Review, 20(2), pp. 221–255. doi:10.1080/ 09512740701306881 Manuel, M., Desai, H., Samman, E. & Evans, M. (2018) Financing the End of Poverty. ODI Report. London. Mawdsley, E. (2019). South–South Cooperation 3.0? Managing the consequences of success in the decade ahead. Oxford Development Studies, pp. 1–16. doi:10.1080/1360081 8.2019.1585792 Mawdsley, E. (2012) The changing geographies of foreign aid and development cooperation: Contributions from gift theory. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, pp. 256–272.

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Mawdsley, E. (2015) Development geography 1: Cooperation, competition and convergence between “North” and “South.” Progress in Human Geography, (Silvey 2010), pp. 1–19. doi:10.1177/0309132515601776 Mawdsley, E., Murray, W. E., Overton, J., Scheyvens, R. & Banks, G. (2018) Exporting stimulus and “shared prosperity”: Reinventing foreign aid for a retroliberal era. Development Policy Review, 36(S1), pp. O25–O43. doi:10.1111/dpr.12282 McEwan, C. & Mawdsley, E. (2012) Trilateral development cooperation: Power and politics in emerging aid relationships. Development and Change, 43(6), pp. 1185–1209. Meyer, J. W., Boli, J., Thomas, G. M. & Ramirez, F. O. (1997) World society and the nation-state. The American Journal of Sociology, 103(1), pp. 44–181. Molenaers, N., Dellepiane, S. & Faust, J. (2015) Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid. World Development, 75, pp. 2–12. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.04.001 Molenaers, N., Gagiano, A., Smets, L. & Dellepiane, S. (2015) What determines the suspension of budget support? World Development, 75, pp. 62–73. doi:10.1016/j. worlddev.2014.09.025 Morgenthau, H. (1962) A political theory of foreign aid. The American Political Science Review, 56(2), pp. 301–309. OECD (2015) Multilateral Aid 2015: Better Partnership for a Post-2015 World. Retrieved from Paris: http://www.oecd.org/dac/multilateral-aid-2015-9789264235212-en.htm OECD (2017) Development Co-operation Report 2017: Data for Development. Retrieved from Paris: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/development-cooperation-report-2017_dcr-2017-en OECD (2018a) Official Development Assistance: What is ODA? Retrieved from Paris: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/What-is-ODA.pdf OECD (2018b) States of Fragility 2018. Retrieved from Paris: http://www.oecd.org/dac/ stats/What-is-ODA.pdf Peterson, L. (2014) A gift you can’t refuse? Foreign aid, INGOs and development in the world polity. Studies in Emergent Order, 7, pp. 81–102. Rist, G. (2002) The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith (P. Camiller, trans. 2nd ed.). London: Zed Books. Rowlands, D. (2012) Individual BRICS or a collective bloc? Convergence and divergence amongst “emerging donor” nations. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 25(4), p. 629. doi:10.1080/09557571.2012.710578 Swedlund, H. J. (2017) The Development Dance: How Donors and Recipients Negotiate the Delivery of Foreign Aid. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Swiss, L. (2011) Security sector reform and development assistance: Explaining the diffusion of policy priorities among donor agencies. Qualitative Sociology, 34(2), pp. 371–393. Swiss, L. (2012) The adoption of women and gender as development assistance priorities: An event history analysis of world polity effects. International Sociology, 27(1), pp. 96–119. Swiss, L. (2016a) A sociology of foreign aid and the world society. Sociology Compass, 10(1), pp. 65–73. Swiss, L. (2016b) World society and the global foreign aid network. Sociology of Development, 2(4), pp. 342–374. Swiss, L. (2018) The Globalization of Foreign Aid: Developing Consensus. London: Routledge. Swiss, L. & Longhofer, W. (2016) Membership has its privileges: Shared international organizational affiliation and foreign aid flows, 1978–2010. Social Forces, 94(4), pp. 1769–1793. Timofejevs Henriksson, P. (2014) Europeanization of foreign-aid policy in Central and East Europe: The role of EU, external incentives and identification in foreign-aid policy adoption in Latvia and Slovenia 1998–2010. Journal of European Integration, 37(4), pp. 433–449. doi:10.1080/07036337.2014.987140

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12 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF AID: ‘GOOD GOVERNANCE’ AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION David Williams

Introduction One of the most obviously ‘political’ elements of the project of international development since the end of the Cold War has been the use of aid, both bilateral and multilateral, to promote ‘good governance’ and ‘democracy’ in developing states. Both ideas, and to some extent the practices associated with them, have a history that goes back further, but it was only after 1989 that they become central to the policies and practices of Western and multilateral aid agencies. While there are differences between these two objectives, there existed throughout the post-Cold War period a remarkable consensus within the aid regime, at least in policy terms, that a key determinant (perhaps the key determinant) of development success was the implementation of broadly ‘liberal’ forms of governance.1 The centrality of these policies and their (sometimes limited) traction within developing states reflected the ways in which the international order itself was changing in the decades following the end of the Cold War. The most important feature of this new order was the dominance of a ‘concert’ of liberal states led by the US.2 The promotion of good governance and democracy by this liberal concert was enabled by their geopolitical and economic dominance, but it also embodied particular (liberal) ways of thinking about politics and development (see references to liberal International Relations theory (IR)). This complicates any simple opposition between ‘self-interested’ and ‘altruistic’ motivations for aid giving, and between ‘realist’ and ‘liberal’ explanations for such provision. The states of this liberal concert certainly believed that democracy and better governance in developing countries would further their own interests, but they also believed that such goals would likewise be in the interests of developing countries. As may be obvious to any observer, international politics is no longer so clearly dominated by this liberal concert, and there is

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evidence that recent changes are being reflected within the aid regime, with potentially significant consequences for both good governance and the promotion of democracy (see Chapter 11 on the emergence of new donors and aid norms, and 15 on the national-populist discourses). This chapter explores the international politics of good governance and democracy promotion in four stages. The next section briefly reviews the policies themselves, their origins, and concrete attempts at implementation. The subsequent section relates these policies to the dominance of the liberal concert of states. This is followed by an exploration of certain political problems that became evident in the pursuit of these objectives. The chapter concludes by considering the ways in which ongoing changes in international politics may be affecting the agendas of good governance and democracy promotion.

Good governance and democracy promotion The term ‘good governance’ first came to prominence in the context of international development through a 1989 World Bank report, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (World Bank, 1989; for a discussion, see Williams, 2008, ch. 3). The report stated that “underlying the litany of Africa’s development problems was a crisis of governance” (p. 60). Better governance, the report argued, would require a broad project of “political renewal” (p. 6), meaning reform of government institutions, reduction of corruption, and the establishment of predictable and honest administrations and a “stable, objective and transparent judicial system” (p. 55). But better governance also meant strengthening the accountability of governments, by “encouraging public debate and nurturing a free press, encouraging the decentralization of government to make it more responsive to local needs, and ‘empowering’ civil society and non-governmental organizations” (pp. 6 and 59). It is easy to forget how controversial this idea was at the time, both inside and outside the World Bank (Williams, 2008, ch. 4). Nonetheless, through a series of arguments and reports, the promotion of good governance within developing states became a central part of the World Bank’s agenda, far beyond the specific conditions that characterised many Sub-Saharan African states (World Bank, 1992, 1994). Almost all bilateral and multilateral aid donors followed the Bank in endorsing the ideas associated with good governance, including some which were not so obviously dominated by Western states (see, e.g. African Development Bank, 1999).3 The concrete practices that flowed from this have been broad and diverse (Williams 2008a, ch. 5, 2011, ch. 7 and 8). In the early years, most efforts were devoted to the ‘supply side’ of good governance. These focussed on such issues as the reform of government budgeting and accounting systems, with particular concern over transparency and reporting, along with programmes of legal reform that involved not merely the rewriting of laws but reform of judicial and police services, and programmes designed to encourage or reinforce the decentralisation of government functions in an effort to improve local service delivery

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(Grindle, 1997; Trebilcock & Daniels, 2008). More recently, there has been an increased emphasis on the ‘demand side’ of good governance, underpinned by the argument that unless citizens demand better government performance, politicians and bureaucrats have little incentive to provide it (World Bank, 2010). This has led to quite extensive efforts to organise and mobilise community and non-governmental groups, especially in marginalised communities, to hold the State and local governments to account, and to provide necessary information to these groups about government policies and practices. The promotion of good governance is not identical to the promotion of democracy. While affinities clearly exist in terms of the language used and in some of the practices involved, there are also important differences. Indeed, while the World Bank has argued that it cannot advocate for multi-party democracy due to stipulations in its founding Articles of Agreement, there are reasons that the Bank has shied away from democracy promotion.4 Chief among these is the fact that being governed ‘democratically’ is not necessarily synonymous with being governed ‘well’ (i.e. in a way that promotes economic development and the effective delivery of public services). The World Bank has maintained a more focussed concern on the actual practices of government, and given its experiences in developing countries over the 1970s and 1980s, the institution has acquired a somewhat sceptical attitude towards the developmental benefits of democracy. To take just one example, in the period immediately prior to multi-party elections in ‘new democracies’, incumbent administrations almost always increase government spending – often with serious macro-economic consequences (Brender & Brazen, 2005). Western bilateral donors did not feel so constrained, however, and almost all of them, the US in particular, embraced the idea of democracy promotion (Carothers, 2004, section 2). The National Endowment for Democracy was founded in 1983 in the context of the more aggressive anti-communist policies associated with the Reagan Doctrine (Carothers, 1991; see also Scott, 1996). But by the late 1980s, democracy promotion had become increasingly estranged from its Cold War origins, and following the end of the Cold War it became central to US relations with many nations around the world (Carothers, 1999). In its 1991 ‘Democracy and Governance’ policy paper, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) claimed it would support the strengthening of democratic representation, political participation, and human rights, and encourage “democratic values” through its aid programmes (USAID, 1991). The 1992 Freedom Support Act stated that an “historic opportunity” existed to “integrate the independent states of the former Soviet Union into the community of democratic nations” (White House, 1992). Other donors adopted similar positions (Carothers, 1994). Nor was this mere rhetoric (although there were clearly rhetorical elements): US aid for democracy promotion nearly tripled from 1991 to 1995 (Carothers, 1999, pp. 50–52). Over the past decade, the US has spent $2–$3 billion annually on various forms of democracy promotion (Lawson & Epstein, 2017, p. 14).

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Again the concrete practices that resulted from these objectives were broad and diverse (Carothers, 2004, section 3), including various more or less ­coercive measures such as economic sanctions or the use of ‘political conditionalities’, along with traditional forms of assistance through discrete project funding. ­Efforts have been made on both the supply and demand sides. On the supply side, much of the focus has been on constructing democratic institutions, involving the establishment of new legal frameworks, the rewriting of laws (and, at times, entire constitutions), the promotion of multi-party democracy (by direct financial and technical assistance to political parties), the funding of voter registration schemes, and the funding and monitoring of multi-party elections. On the supply side, efforts have involved democracy education programmes, the funding of ‘third sector’ organisations such as NGOs and civil society groups, and support for media outlets (Ottaway & Carothers, 2000). Both the notion of good governance and the project of democracy promotion have much longer histories that range beyond the parameters of this chapter. The US’ concern with democracy promotion goes back at least to the aftermath of the Second World War, and arguably to the early 20th century (Smith, 2002). Concerns over improving the ‘capacity’ of developing countries to deliver services to their populations had been the goal of many technical assistance programmes from the 1950s onwards. At the broadest level, the idea that ‘progress’ could be helped or hindered by particular political and institutional conditions traces back to Enlightenment thinkers such as Adam Smith or Thomas Paine. Before locating these policies within the international order that emerged in the wake of the Cold War, it is worth pausing to reflect on how truly ambitious this agenda was. Intervening in the internal political affairs of other states, whether by covert or overt means, has been a long-standing practice in international politics, even if it is often deemed an illegitimate breach of the norms associated with sovereign statehood (Lawson et al., 2013). Even so, attempts to universalise a particular model of how societies ought to be governed have been much less common.5 This is partly due to mutual acceptance of political pluralism as a pre-condition for any relatively stable system of international politics, since the acceptance of ‘spheres of influence’ limits the ambitions of even revolutionary states, and since other states are generally powerful enough to deter or defeat such ambitions. This was true even during most of the Cold War period,6 which suggests that something very unusual occurred after 1989 to make the institution of worldwide liberal governance a tangible ambition.

Good governance, democracy promotion, and the liberal concert While the end of the Cold War did not directly produce the idea of good governance and the project of democracy promotion, there seems little doubt that the policy dominance of these aims and consensus among bilateral and multilateral aid agencies was the product of profound shifts in international politics that accompanied that event.7 To students of international politics, this may appear

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obvious (for an early statement, see Morgenthau, 1962). After all, as a mechanism of interstate relations, how could aid provision not be shaped by changes in the ways those relations are structured? (Williams, 2011, pp. 5–8). But recognition of this point is not so widely shared within or outside the aid regime, and the implications of this are profound, suggesting that whatever the processes of policy formulation at work within the aid regime, aid policies and practices are essentially shaped by the prevailing structures of international order. As we shall see, this, in turn, has significant bearing on what we expect the future of such policies to be. One of the most important characteristics of the international order developed after the Cold War was the unprecedented political, military, and economic dominance of the US and its allies. At least three elements of the dominance of this ‘liberal concert’ are vital to understanding the pursuit of good governance and democracy promotion. First, dramatic shifts in relative power provided the enabling conditions for a more expansive set of foreign policies, and for a more ambitious political reform agenda. The collapse of communism in Eastern ­Europe and later in the Soviet Union itself dramatically changed the geopolitical landscape. During the 1990s, China was experiencing rapid economic growth, but starting from a low base (China’s GDP nearly tripled during the 1990s; yet by the end of that decade, it had reached only one-twelfth of its 2017 GDP). In addition, China’s military expenditure was a fraction of that of the US, while Russia’s GDP actually fell during most of the 1990s. In this situation, US foreign policy was increasingly “unbound” (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003). As a result, the idea that other states might have legitimate ‘spheres of interest’ lost ground: the US used its aid programmes to encourage democracy and market liberalisation in the ‘transition’ economies of central and Eastern Europe; it became directly involved in the Balkans conflict in early 1990s; and it pushed for the expansion of NATO membership, and of the NATO mission, as evidenced by the Kosovo operations, and culminated in the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. However right or wrong these invasions may have been, there was no doubt that they had been made possible by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The European Union, too, used its newly dominant position on the continent to push eastward in ways that would have been impossible only a decade earlier. Alongside these changes was the continuing economic weakness of many (perhaps most) other developing countries. The 1980s and 1990s were a period of considerable economic and political turmoil in many developing states, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Combined with the disappearance of Soviet sources of aid funding, this had the effect of converting Western donors and multilateral organisations into the only significant sources of much needed aid for 15 years following the Cold War (China’s aid programme at that time being relatively small). Thus, Western aid agencies were given an unprecedented opportunity to pursue political reform in developing countries. However, changes in the relative distribution of power and capabilities only shape what can be done in international politics; they do not determine what actually will be done. To explain this, other motivating factors must be examined.

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The second element at play is ideological, and for the US, this point is clear, though not uncontested. Analysts from across the political spectrum have identified the roles that the US’ self-image (as the liberal exemplar) and its own understanding of its place in the world (as destined to lead) have played in its hegemonic political tendencies (Niebuhr, 2008 [1952]; Williams, 1959; Layne, 2006; Doyle, 2012). These attitudes were evident even in the US’ role at the end of the S­ econd World War, but its liberal imperial ambitions weren’t given full expression until after the Cold War. The eastward expansion of the E ­ uropean Union later evidenced similar ambitions, as new member states were required to conform to various political prerequisites as a condition of membership (Schimmerlfennig & Scholtz, 2008). The pursuit of liberal forms of government worldwide was further legitimated (in the eyes of liberal states) by liberalism’s ‘triumph’ over its only significant (European) alternative (Fukuyama, 1992). In this situation, liberalism became the language of politics, and it seemed plausible (at least to some) that the creation of liberal governments across the globe could lead to a ‘new world order’ (Bush, 1991; Anderson, 2000). The third element is what we might call ‘the will to govern’ (Williams, 2008b). This is partly related to the relatively simple notion that the dominant states felt themselves responsible for dealing with both international and regional problems. Hegemons tend to take that view, and indeed they are often encouraged by other states reluctant to shoulder the costs of such a project. However, in the era of ‘globalisation’, there was a growing sense among the states of the liberal concert that ‘problems’ were multiplying, and as Ayoob and Zierler have argued, an equally growing sense that some of the most serious threats to their economic, political, and security interests came from the global South – a sense that was dramatically clarified for US policymakers by the events of 9/11 (2005, p. 32). As the White House declared in 2002, “The United States today is threatened less by conquering states than we are by weak and failing ones” (White House, 2002, p. 61). This argument was a darker alternative to the ‘end of history’ and ‘new world order’ visions of the post-Cold War period, but it led to similar conclusions, because it meant that the particular ways in which developing states did or did not govern their sovereign spaces became a matter of significant concern to Western states. And for nearly all the problems or ‘threats’ that the liberal concert perceived as emanating from developing countries, one part of the ‘solution’ would be better governance, and often some form of democratic politics. In this way, self-interested concerns on the part of the liberal concert to protect themselves from perceived threats only reinforced their ambition to reform governance and politics in developing countries, adding impetus to the use of aid agencies in the pursuit of those projects (Williams, 2008b).

Problems of practice It has since become clear that the practice of actually instituting ‘good governance’ and democracy in developing states is not without complications (Burnell,

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2007; Jahn, 2012). In terms of the international politics of aid, three problems stand out. The first is that despite the remarkable consensus at the policy level among Western donors and multilateral agencies, the various practices and priorities of these donors ‘on the ground’ often created significant difficulties. It is here that the domestic political and institutional imperatives of aid agencies gain importance (Lancaster, 2007). This was certainly not a new problem (Cassen, 1986, ch. 7), but as aid agencies adopted this ambitious political reform agenda, and as they involved themselves in increasingly detailed interventions designed to tackle perceived ‘threats’, the problem of conflicting priorities and practices was exacerbated. In the poorest states, there were often 30 or more official aid donors and many more Western NGOs involved in simultaneous activities (World Bank, 2000, ch. 6). All pursued their own projects and priorities, often emerging from their own domestic political and institutional settings, and relatively little thought was given to how these might fit into an overall strategy. On top of this, the multiple donors all had different demands in terms of accounting, auditing, and procurement. Given the often limited capacity of governments in developing countries, this placed a tremendous burden on local bureaucrats, and many governments had trouble even keeping track of the amounts of aid they were receiving. Undoubtedly, this lack of coordination had significant impact on the ability of donors to improve governance or to promote democracy, and outcomes may even have been deleterious on both counts. Government ministries would sometimes spend more time satisfying the demands of their donors than they did governing, and recipients often felt scant ‘ownership’ of reform programmes, which may explain why the results of development projects have frequently been disappointing over the medium and long term (World Bank, 2000, pp. 176–178). Some attempts were made to deal with such problems. The emergence of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Process (PRSP) in the late 1990s sought to improve the ‘ownership’ of reform programmes on the part of developing country governments and civil society groups; in some countries, this operated as a mechanism for better donor coordination (Craig & Porter, 2003). The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 spelled out steps that donors and recipient governments should take to harmonise their policies and improve accountability (OECD, 2005). This agenda was strengthened through the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, which focussed on creating more effective partnerships between donors and recipients in the distribution of aid, and through the 2011 Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, focussed on integrating ‘new’ donors into country coordination mechanisms (OECD, 2008, 2011). All these initiatives have had certain positive effects, but it is fair to say that significant problems persist (Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; for case studies, see McGee & Heredia, 2010; Carbone, 2013; Sjostedt, 2013). In large part, this is due to a basic political paradox associated with the good governance and democracy promotion agendas. The point of these projects was to move governments in developing countries to relate to their own societies in different (more effective, more accountable) ways; but the more external actors

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became involved, the more local governments were concerned with satisfying the demands of donors, diverting their attention away from domestic society. And the more that recipient governments came to rely on Official Development Assistance (ODA), aid agencies, and Western NGOs to deliver social services, the lower the incentive to develop an effective social contract between a government and its citizens – essential for underpinning both improved governance and ­effective democracy (see Adam & O’Connell, 1997; De Waal, 1997; Herbst, 2000; Nugent, 2010). Finally, while donor nations sought to push for political ­reform in developing countries, they were at the same time ultimately accountable (both politically and financially) to their own governments and societies, which sometimes led to demands for short-term ‘results’ at the expense of longer-term and more sustainable commitments. The second problem in the practice of aid was that while donors were reasonably clear on what they wanted to achieve, they were much less clear about what actually worked – and this was true both in terms of good governance and democracy promotion.8 Donors’ lack of experience in this regard meant that many of the projects pursued were ‘experimental’ in nature, and even when they proved successful, there was no guarantee that success could be repeated in different political, social, and economic contexts. Here a premium was placed on ‘learning lessons’ from prior projects, and while this sort of language is ubiquitous within the aid regime, it is not at all clear that Western donor states had developed mechanisms to truly learn from such lessons. Domestic political and institutional pressures on aid agencies often meant that little emphasis was given to such learning, and there was sometimes little scope to put learned lessons into practice.9 As Thomas Carothers remarked, “many practitioners and observers wonder whether the field [of democracy promotion] is adopting smarter methods over time and achieving better results, or just repeating itself in an endless loop of set approaches and inflated but never-fulfilled expectations” (Carothers, 2015, p. 60). Furthermore, as aid agencies began to work in these areas, they often found themselves confronting unforeseen and sometimes intractable complications. For example, efforts to improve the transparency of government budgeting (to reduce corruption and increase accountability) ran into a more basic obstacle: information-collection systems within many developing countries are often very poor ( Jervis, 2013; OECD, 2017, ch. 4). To enshrine democratic rights into a country’s constitution was one thing, but to actually enable people to exercise those rights ushered in a host of new problems in which donors became embroiled: distribution and security of voter ID and registration systems; poor physical and communications infrastructure; and the enforcement of citizens’ rights despite chronically underfunded and sometimes corrupt police and judicial systems. ­Finally, the achievement of effective governance and a functioning democratic political system have historically been the result of a wide range of political, economic, sociological, and international factors, often interacting in complex ways over very extensive periods of time. Aid donors did not always

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spend much time and effort in consideration of this fact (Carothers, 2015).10 Rather, they continued to work on a bewildering array of often isolated projects, thanks in part to the domestic imperative to achieve ‘results’. There was no guarantee that any number of small-scale projects, no matter how successful, would actually add up to anything like the large-scale changes that the implementation of good governance and effective democracy necessarily entail. The third problem in practice was that while governance reform and the promotion of democracy were clearly focussed on the ways that politics operated in developing countries, this agenda was frequently pursued without a well-­ developed ‘political sense’. Donors often did not realise, nor did they pay sufficient attention to the ways in which attempts to intervene in the processes of governing in developing countries would become part of those countries’ ­politics. Political reform projects inevitably empowered certain people, groups, or organisations at the expense of others, shifting the balance of political forces within society, while actors inside developing countries became adept at soliciting external resources. When this happened, other individuals and organisations in recipient societies were likely to engage in strategies to maintain their power or standing, and to thwart or subvert donor objectives. Political changes will ­a lways produce winners and losers, and whatever one may think of the opponents of political reform, such actions can come as no surprise. Donors failed to reflect on how people inside these states would respond to interventions, and they often presumed that the politics of these recipient societies would be more amenable to externally driven change than was actually the case. In the current context, what may have been the most important aspect of such political naivety by aid donors relates to how their agendas for political reform were perceived by other states: it is a common failing to imagine that others will perceive you as you perceive yourself. This tendency was particularly evident among liberal states, whose ideological commitments often blind them to the fact that those who do not share their attitudes will rarely view the export of liberal forms of governance as selfless acts (for ­classic perspectives, see Carr, 2001 [1939]; Niebuhr, 2008 [1952]).

Conclusion: good governance and democracy promotion in a changing world As mentioned above, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic and political weakness of many developing and ‘transition’ states left the liberal concert relatively free to pursue the agendas of good governance and democracy promotion. But the pursuit of these projects eventually elicited responses, particularly from China and Russia (and in the Russian case, a direct response in Ukraine). Neither nation saw the promotion of these liberal goals as simply or even largely about improving the lot of developing countries; rather, they saw attempts on the part of the liberal concert states to extend and exercise their hegemony over other states, and both Russia and China have come to use their own growing power to counter this trend. Partly as a result of such responses, the international political

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situation is changing, and the relative international dominance of the liberal concert is no longer assured.11 Meanwhile, domestic political, economic, and social changes within the states of the liberal concert have emerged, as the US, Britain, and Europe all wrestle with the social, economic, and political consequences of globalisation and the 2008 financial crisis. This has been accompanied by an inward turn, casting doubt on the willingness of these states to further project the liberal imperial hegemony of the post-Cold War period. Furthermore, the dominance of their liberal political and economic ideas has been called into question, especially in the wake of the financial crisis, but also given the development ‘success’ of China and other states that do not conform to the liberal model. There are indications that these political changes are now being reflected the policies and practices of international development, with potentially significant consequences for good governance and democracy promotion. This is most evident in the rise of ‘new’ donor states, most importantly China (Woods, 2008; Brautigam, 2009; Greenhill et al., 2013).12 The relative significance of these emerging donors has grown enormously, particularly in Sub-­Saharan Africa. Unlike the Western donors, they have not been concerned with remaking politics in developing states along liberal lines, i­nstead concentrating on the provision of aid for infrastructure development, often in exchange for access to natural resources (including land). As China’s Second Africa Policy Paper stated, “China respects African countries’ independent choice of the way to development… It never interferes in African countries’ internal affairs, never imposes its will on them, and attaches no political strings when providing aid to Africa” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006).13 The growth of aid resources from these new donors has ushered in a ‘new age of choice’ for developing countries and dramatically reduced the (­a lways ­limited) ‘leverage’ that Western donors once had over many developing country governments (Greenhill et al., 2013). In addition, and partly as a result of the declining relative power and significance of Western aid agencies, many developing country governments have imposed restrictions on Western NGOs and on democracy promotion organisations (see Carothers, 2006). In 2015, for example, the National Endowment for Democracy was banned from operating in Russia (see Ambrosio, 2016). There have also been signs of change within the Western aid regime. The stress on infrastructure development characteristic of China’s aid programme has been mirrored by the World Bank and in the provision of aid by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) members; this is a tacit acknowledgement of the Bank’s increasing need to respond to recipient demands – rather than the other way around – thanks in part to the availability of other sources of aid and the growth of other sources of finance (Harman & Williams, 2014). Also in recent years, voices within Western aid agencies have begun to acknowledge that the liberal orthodoxy is no longer securely grounded, sometimes directly challenging its viability (Lin, 2010).14 Even within the World Bank there has been some

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recognition that its promotion of ‘good governance’ has not been especially successful, being a good deal more difficult than previously imagined (World Bank, 2017, pp. 29–32). Likewise, the democracy promotion agenda is becoming less secure. The Trump administration seems less convinced that the US ought to engage in democracy promotion, proposing radical cuts to the National Endowment for Democracy budget (Roglin, 2018). Even prior to Trump, the US had largely given up on democracy promotion in the Middle East, despite (or because of ) the vast sums spent on this agenda since the early 2000s (Hassan, 2018). And given the internal crises at play in the EU, including the question of how to deal with certain increasingly illiberal member states, the Union’s willingness or ability to continue pushing this agenda is far from clear. Finally, the very idea of a ‘liberal concert’ has come under pressure as the rhetoric (and unpredictability) of US foreign policy pronouncements foments more division within this group than at any time since the end of the Cold War; in the most extreme scenario, this division threatens to unravel the institutional basis upon which the power of the liberal concert has rested. It would be foolish to predict the future of ‘good governance’ and democracy promotion, and given that these aims reflect the ways in which the liberal concert states view themselves and their relations with others, it is unlikely that these goals will be forsaken anytime soon. Any number of contingencies might again shift the relative political and economic power of the liberal concert. But considering that the provision of aid will always be shaped by the prevailing structures and practices of international order, there is reason to expect that changes will continue over time. Whatever happens, a perspective that can recognise the significance of prevailing international and political structures and practices vis-àvis the project of international development will stand as a corrective to much of the existing literature, and may serve as vital to a better political understanding of aid provision.

Notes 1 ‘Liberal’ is of course a protean term (Bell, 2014), but it seems beyond doubt that the policies and practices associated with good governance and democracy promotion are recognisably ‘liberal’ in nature (Williams, 2008a). 2 This characterisation is borrowed from Ayoob and Zierler (2005). The term ‘concert’ is rather old-fashioned, but useful, capturing the sense of shared commitment among a number of states to a particular set of institutions, practices, and objectives while remaining cognisant of the ways in which these states’ relations with one another may be looser than a formal alliance, and at times characterised by certain (albeit lowlevel) disputes or tensions. For a more formal discussion, see Jervis (1985). 3 I am very grateful to Marie Soderberg for reminding me that the one partial exception here is Japan. See Chapter 6 in this volume for a discussion. 4 Article IV(10) of the Articles of Agreement states that the “Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; not shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned”. 5 The partial exceptions are revolutionary states such as France and Russia, leading to the suggestive claim that the liberal concert itself had revolutionary aims.

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6 Towards the end of the Cold War, the US did indeed become more assertive (in ­A fghanistan and Poland, for example). For a discussion, see Scott (1996). 7 While the 1989 report was published in the same year as the collapse of communism in most of Central and Eastern Europe, preparation of the report began in 1987. Moreover, the National Endowment for Democracy was founded in 1983. 8 This has also been true for many other donor objectives over the years, notably economic ‘liberalization’. 9 The World Bank is better at this than are the bilateral aid agencies. One example is Blum (2014), and the fact that this paper was published in 2014 gives evidence to the broader point being made. 10 There are some exceptions, notably DFID’s ‘Drivers of Change’ project. For further information see https://www.odi.org/publications/5399-mapping-political-contextdrivers-change. The fact that this project appears to have had little discernable impact on British aid policy reinforces the point. For a general discussion, see Migdal (1988), and for a discussion of the African context, see Herbst (2000). 11 We need to be careful here: there are many dramatic, often exaggerated claims being made about America’s ‘decline’. For a nuanced discussion, see Kiely (2015). 12 Of course, China is not actually a ‘new’ donor, having had (for example) an aid programme in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s. 13 The last part is not quite true, as China normally requires its aid recipients to abide by the ‘One China’ policy (i.e., no diplomatic relations with Taiwan). 14 Lin was Chief Economist at the World Bank from 2008 to 2012.

Bibliography Adam, C. & O’Connell, S. (1999) ‘Aid, Taxation and Development in Sub-Saharan ­A frica’, Economics and Politics, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 225–253. African Development Bank/African Development Fund (1999) ‘Bank Group Policy on Good Governance’, November 1999. Ambrosio, T. (ed.) (2016) Authoritarian Backlash: Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union. Routledge, London. Anderson, P. (2000) ‘Renewals’, New Left Review 1, Jan–Feb, pp. 1–20. Ayoob, M. & Zierler, M (2005) ‘The Unipolar Concert: The North-South Divide Trumps Transatlantic Differences’, World Policy Journal, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 31–42. Bell, D. (2014) ‘What is Liberalism?’, Political Theory, vol. 42, no. 6, pp. 682–715. Blum, J. (2014) ‘What Factors Predict How Public Sector Projects Perform? A Review of the World Bank’s Public Sector Management Portfolio’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper WPS 6798. World Bank, Washington, DC. Brautigam, D. (2009) The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Brender, A. & Brazen, A. (2005) ‘Political Budget Cycles in New versus Established ­Democracies’, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 52, no. 7, pp. 1271–1295. Burnell, P. (2007) ‘Does International Democracy Promotion Work?’, German Development Institute Discussion Paper, 11/2007. German Development Institute, Bonn. Bush, G.H.W. (1991) Speech to Congress, 6 March. Washington, DC. Carbone, M. (2013) ‘Between EU Actorness and Aid Effectiveness: The Logics of EU Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa’, International Relations, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 341–355. Carothers, T. (1991) In the Name of Democracy: US Policy towards Latin America in the Reagan Years. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. Carothers, T. (1994) ‘The Democracy Nostrum’, World Policy Journal, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 47–53.

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Carothers, T. (1999). Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC. Carothers, T. (2004) Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC. Carothers, T. (2006) ‘The Backlash against Democracy Promotion’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 2, pp. 55–68. Carothers, T. (2015) ‘Democracy Aid at 25: Time to Choose’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 59–73. Carr, E. (2001 [1939]) The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1939. Perennial, New York. Cassen, R. (1986) Does Aid Work? Report to an Intergovernmental Taskforce. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Craig, D. & Porter, D. (2003) ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A New Convergence’, World Development, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 53–69. Daalder, I. & Lindsay, J. (2003) America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC. De Waal, A. (1997) Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa. James Currey, Oxford. Doyle, M. (2012) Liberal Peace: Selected Essays. Routledge, London. Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man. Free Press, New York. Greenhill, R., Prizzon, A. & Rogerson, A. (2013) ‘The Age of Choice: Developing Countries in the New Aid Landscape’, Overseas Development Institute Working ­Paper 364. Overseas Development Institute, London. Grindle, M. (ed.) (1997) Getting Good Government: Capacity Building in the Public Sectors of Development Countries. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Harman, S. & Williams, D. (2014) ‘Development in Transition’, International Affairs, vol. 90, no. 4, pp. 932–935. Hassan, O. (2018) ‘The Terminal Decline of American Democracy Promotion in the Middle East’, in Clementi, M. et al. (eds.), US Foreign Policy in a Challenging World. Springer, New York. Herbst, J. (2000) States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lesson in Authority and Control. Princeton University Press. Princeton, NJ. Jahn, B. (2012) ‘Rethinking Democracy Promotion’, Review of International Studies, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 685–705. Jervis, R. (1985) ‘From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation’, World Politics, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 58–79. Jerven, M. (2013) Poor Numbers: How we are Misled by African Development Statistics and What to Do about It. Cornell University Press, Cornell, NY. Kiely, R. (2015) The BRICS, US ‘Decline’ and Global Transformation. Palgrave, London. Lancaster, C. (2007) Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development and Domestic Politics. Chicago University Press, Chicago, IL. Lawson, G., MacMillan, J. & Little, R. (eds.) (2013) ‘Intervention and the Ordering of the Modern World’, Review of International Studies, Special Issue, vol. 39, no. 5. Lawson, M. & Epstein, S. (2017) ‘Democracy Promotion: An Objective of US Foreign Policy’, Congressional Research Services Report, R44858, May 31. Washington, DC. Layne, C. (2006) The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present. Cornell University Press, Cornell, NY. Lin, J. (2010) New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development and Policy. World Bank, Washington, DC.

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McGee, R. & Heredia, I. (2010) ‘Paris in Bogotá: The Aid Effectiveness Agenda and Aid Relations in Columbia’, IDS Working Paper 342. Institute of Development Studies, Brighton. Migdal, J. (1988) Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006) Government of the People’s Republic of China, ‘­China’s Africa Policy’, January 12th, Beijing. Morgenthau, H. (1962) ‘A Political Theory of Foreign Aid’, The American Political Science Review, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 301–309. Niebuhr, R. (2008 [1952]) The Irony of American History. Chicago University Press, ­Chicago, IL. Nugent, P. (2010) ‘States and Social Contracts in Africa’, New Left Review, vol. 63, pp. 35–68. Nunnenkamp, P. Ohler, H. & Thiele R. (2013) ‘Donor Coordination and Specialization: Did the Paris Declaration Make a Difference?’, Review of World Economics, vol. 149, no. 3, pp. 537–563. OECD (2005) ‘The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness’. Available at: www.oecd.org/ dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm OECD (2008) ‘Accra Agenda for Action’. Available at: www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/ parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm OECD (2011) ‘Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness’. Available at: www.oecd. org/development/effectiveness/busanpartnership.htm OECD (2017) Development Cooperation Report 2017: Data for Development. OECD, Paris. Ottaway, M. & Carothers, T. (eds.) (2000) Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC. Roglin, J. (2018) ‘The Trump Administration wants to Dismantle Ronald Reagan’s “Infrastructure of Democracy”’, The Washington Post, March 4. Scott, J. (1996) Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy. Duke University Press, Durham, NC. Schimmerlfennig, F & Scholtz, H. (2008) ‘EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange’, European Union Politics, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 187–215. Smith, T. (2002) America’s Mission: The US and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy, 2nd edition. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Sjostedt, M. (2013) ‘Aid Effectiveness and the Paris Declaration: A Mismatch between Ownership and Results Based management?’, Public Administration and Development, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 143–155. Trebilcock, M. & Daniels R. (2008) Rule of Law Reform and Development: Charting the Fragile Path of Progress. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. USAID (1991) USAID Policy: Democracy and Governance. USAID, Washington, DC. White House (1992) Freedom Support Act. Public Law 102–511. Available at: www.gpo. gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-106/pdf/STATUTE-106-Pg3320.pdf White House (2002) National Security Strategy of the United States of America. ­Washington, DC. Available at: www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf Williams, D (2008a) The World Bank and Social Transformation in International Politics: Liberalism, Sovereignty and Governance. Routledge, London. Williams. D. (2008b) “‘Development’ and Global Governance: The World Bank, ­F inancial Sector Reform and the “Will to Govern”’, International Politics, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 212–227.

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Williams, D. (2011) International Development and Global Politics: History, Theory and Practice. Routledge, London. Williams, W. (1959) The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. Norton, New York. Woods, N. (2008) ‘Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent Revolution in Development Assistance’, International Affairs, vol. 84, no. 6, pp. 1205–1221. World Bank (1989) Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank (1992) Governance and Development. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank (1994) Governance: The World Bank’s Experience. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank (2000) Least Developed Countries Report 2000. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank (2010) Demanding Good Governance: Lessons from Social Accountability Initiatives in Africa. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank (2017) World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law. World Bank, Washington, DC.

13 GENDER INEQUALITY, AID AGENCIES, AND GLOBAL NORMS Lars Engberg-Pedersen

Introduction Gender inequalities continue to be a pervasive feature in both developed and developing countries. Yet, significant improvements such as the constitutional acknowledgement of women’s right to vote in democratic elections have been realised in most countries. Some argue that such improvements have been brought about by the diffusion of global gender equality norms, under the presumption that most countries accept such norms once a critical number subscribe to them (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). This chapter discusses the extent to which global prescriptive norms represent effective means to address gender inequalities, doing so in the context of organisations engaged in development cooperation, as these can be seen as carriers of global norms (Swiss, 2016). The chapter is limited to addressing whether and how development organisations engage with global norms on gender equality, not whether these norms have an impact on concrete development activities or on people’s lives. The main concern here is the extent to which global gender equality norms are diluted, supported, or strengthened in such organisations. The analysis is based on seven case studies undertaken as part of a research programme on global norms and development organisations. The cases have been selected to cover some of the diversity in contemporary development ­cooperation and include Mexico’s Agency for International Development Cooperation (AMEXCID) (Mexico), Danida (Denmark), Islamic Relief, Oxfam GB, South Africa’s Development Cooperation, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and the World Bank.1 This selection of development organisations comprises both newer and older organisations; governmental, non-governmental, and multilateral institutions; and agencies from the global South and North. As such, the organisations cover a wide range of large aid agencies taking a comprehensive

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view on development. Within this sub-field of aid agencies, conclusions reached based on the selected organisations suggest broader tendencies. The chapter does not provide a comparison of these organisations through the use of a single analytical framework in seven different case studies, but instead offers a set of tentative conclusions based on explorative case studies focussing on particular processes in specific organisational situations. The ambition is to identify opportunities and obstacles for global gender equality norms to influence development organisations. The analysis advances a set of propositions. First, it suggests that global norms on gender equality have become an unavoidable issue for large, non-specialised aid agencies regardless of their particular historical background and development. Second, the specific characteristics in terms of organisational culture and history significantly influence how gender equality norms are taken on board. Third, organisational pressures and priorities as well as structures often provide a decisive context for norm entrepreneurs within the organisations, facilitating or undermining their efforts to promote gender equality. Fourth, norm engagement by specific organisations is significantly confined by the normative and political environments in which they exist. The conclusion is that global norms have been effective in putting gender equality on the agendas of development organisations, but that the specific ways in which these organisations handle issues of gender inequality depend on a number of conditions which may change and, in some cases, may essentially empty the norms of content. I begin with a discussion of the relationship between global norms and aid agencies and address the limited extent to which gender equality norms constitute a coherent set of normative propositions. Subsequent sections analyse the significance of global gender equality norms in the seven selected organisational contexts. The first section on organisational origins discusses the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the World Bank, and Islamic Relief, emphasising how their organisational cultures and historical backgrounds influence the ways they address gender equality. Next, with a focus on Oxfam and Danida, the analysis finds relatively contingent factors affecting the role of global gender equality norms, whereas the cases of South Africa and AMEXCID demonstrate the importance of the normative environment in which those aid agencies operate. The conclusion summarises the argument and discusses the political nature of donor organisations’ engagement with global gender equality norms.

Global norms and aid agencies There is little doubt that global norms and ideas have had an enormous impact on international development cooperation (Swiss, 2018; Chapter 11 and section on constructivism in Chapter 1). UN organisations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund in particular have struggled to determine the agenda in development cooperation through flagship publications and numerous other documents, high-level meetings, world conferences, etc.

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( Jolly et al., 2009; Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012). One may describe this struggle as attempts to establish a dominant ‘frame’, “which makes favoured ideas seem like common sense, and unfavoured ideas as unthinkable” (Bøås & McNeill, 2004, p. 2). Development cooperation is full of jargon and buzzwords (Cornwall & Brock, 2005; Cornwall, 2007) and these are definitely not without consequences as they direct attention towards some issues and away from others, and may rule out questioning by way of inherently positive connotations. National aid agencies and large civil society organisations have also engaged strongly in this normative struggle (Boli & Thomas, 1999), despite their less global origins; for instance, through the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-­ operation and Development (OECD), international development cooperation is organised so that peers can meet, exchange, and compete on development policies and practices (Manning, 2008; Eyben, 2012). As a consequence of international negotiations, global norms stipulating how and with what objectives international development cooperation should be organised have increasingly emerged since the late 1990s. The Millennium Development Goals of 2001 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of 2015 are significant examples of attempts to agree on what development is about and what objectives should be pursued. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 seeks to establish principles for good practices in cooperation and for what instruments to use. While this declaration had some momentum in its first years, it has since lost importance, indicating that global norms created through international agreements may not become as significant as intended. Nevertheless, it is obvious that significant efforts are being invested in creating a framework for development activities and that development actors are expected to adhere to the global norms. At the same time, a large number of new and diverse actors have entered development cooperation, which has become less and less a relationship between rich and poor countries and rather a field of organisations with significantly different backgrounds (financial institutions, philanthropic foundations, public authorities, citizens’ organisations, religious agencies, etc.) based in dissimilar cultures and pursuing various objectives in addition to development. While some have talked about the end of foreign aid, the sheer number of new actors suggests that the death of development cooperation is far from imminent. Thus, global prescriptive norms regarding development are agreed upon in a context of growing heterogeneity of development organisations which, one supposes, will reduce the diffusion of the norms, but is this in fact the case? Do so-called new donors simply disregard global norms, seeing them as irrelevant to their purposes? Or might it be that development organisations deliberately translate global agreements into their own specific context and thereby change the norms? Or do global norms diffuse and homogenise different development organisations without their active participation (‘behind their backs’, so to speak)?

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The ambiguous normative regime on gender equality Gender equality is part of a larger human rights agenda aiming to promote equal access, participation, and opportunities for men and women alike. Since 1975, four United Nations World Conferences and a number of conventions and declarations have resulted in international and regional commitments to eliminate discrimination against women. These agreements have provided frameworks stimulating the consideration of gender equality in all types of development initiatives across the globe. However, gender equality has been described as an “empty signifier that takes as many meanings as the variety of visions and debates on the issue allow it to take” (Verloo & Lombardo, 2007). Accordingly, the term allows for interpretation, ‘translation’, and very diverse activities supposed to strengthen gender equality. This has to do with the deeply embedded political and cultural ideas that the word ‘gender’ refers to in any society. Few other social relationships are as thoroughly associated with identity, belonging, and the fundamental values of every human being. Moreover, gender relations typically describe the roles, rights, and duties that establish hierarchies, political influence, and marginalisation. The emotionally fundamental nature of gender relations and the fact that they cut across both public and private spheres, as well as their allocation of advantages and disadvantages, make them very difficult to change, even though they are far from fixed. They evolve gradually, but deliberate attempts to change them are typically met with substantial reactions. For this reason in particular, one may expect that globally agreed norms on gender equality are likely to be reworked and sometimes resisted when they are translated into the various policies and practices of development organisations. This gives way to the question of whether, due to the multiplicity of interpretations and positions on gender equality, we are in fact witnessing the emptying of global norms, despite the existence of international frameworks and agreements. Apart from rather few, very specific issues (e.g. women’s suffrage), global gender equality norms consist of relatively diffuse, changing, sometimes contradictory, and often contested ideas about gender equality. They are as much about condemning particular practices of gender-based violence, discrimination, and marginalisation as they are about endorsing what gender equality might be. They also concern the means (e.g. mainstreaming and empowerment) that may help create gender equality. The norms are diffuse in the sense that they can be interpreted in different ways (Krook & True, 2012; Van Eerdewijk & Roggeband, 2014; Zwingel, 2016). For example, the question of whether women’s equal access to the labour market should imply parental leave for men may be interpreted very differently in distinct societies. Moreover, the very fundamental notion of gender equality may be differently understood as equal rights and opportunities, as making room for different gender identities, or as deconstructing gender stereotypes (Verloo & Lombardo, 2007).

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Furthermore, gender equality norms are changing (Van Eerdewijk & R ­ oggeband, 2014). Also in the field of labour markets, prescriptive norms have moved from emphasising the protection of women to viewing such practices as further marginalising women (Zwingel, 2016). Likewise, norms regarding women’s political participation have changed from a focus on suffrage and access to political office to an equal number of political positions for women and men (Krook & True, 2012). ­Another example is women’s empowerment, which in 1995 was meant as a ­challenge to power relations in the Beijing Platform for Action but which has since become ‘smart economics’ seen to accelerate economic growth, not least as promoted by the World Bank (Eyben & Napier-Moore, 2009). An example of the contradictions between different aspects of these norms is the relationship between gender-balanced decision-making and gender mainstreaming, particularly as a consequence of their respective development since Beijing (Krook & True, 2012). While gender mainstreaming was then seen as a broad encompassing framework for many elements in gender equality, it has become a more technical term in development cooperation associated with the implementation of projects and programmes. It draws attention away from political processes and suggests that gender equality can be achieved with technical means in depoliticised development activities. Gender-balanced decision-making, on the contrary, is a clear political objective, implying that more women and fewer men will have a seat at the table. The issue of sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) is especially contested (Kabeer, 2015). In international negotiations, the issue continues to provoke resistance from a so-called unholy alliance composed of the Vatican, certain Islamic states, sometimes the US, and recently Russia, whereas other countries (e.g. Denmark) regard it as a primary concern to promote. The fact that one of the targets of SDG 5 refers specifically to SRHR is counted as a major achievement by some, given that the annual sessions of the Commission on the Status of Women repeatedly constitute a battleground, with SRHR among the most fiercely debated issues. However, the phrasing of the SDG target clearly indicates that the precise meaning of SRHR may easily change, since it calls for universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights as agreed in accordance with the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development and the Beijing Platform for Action and the outcome documents of their review conferences. (emphasis added) This is virtually an invitation to alter the contents of this norm. All in all, it is not possible to fix a particular meaning of global gender equality norms (Zwingel, 2020). They do not constitute a coherent, unambiguous body of ideas about gender relations. Even so, this is not to say that ‘anything goes’. Certain practices and institutions are at odds with most (though not necessarily all) interpretations of gender equality norms. One may describe global gender equality norms as an ambiguous normative regime, open to interpretation,

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seeking to address gender-based discrimination; but despite the formal international agreements that it builds upon, the regime covers a wide range of interpretations, some of which clearly disagree over what can be described as acceptable or unacceptable gender-related practices. This obviously weakens the regime. If a politician belonging to a major party in a radio broadcast in Mexico in 2014 could state: “Just like women, the laws were made to be violated” (Sørensen, 2018), then the strength of the global normative regime is clearly questionable. And when women’s rights to control their own bodies are disputed in international negotiations with references to ‘the sacredness of family’, the limitations of the regime are evident (Kabeer, 2015). Still, the regime remains an expression of normative ideas that many subscribe to and, significantly, it represents ideas that are difficult to avoid addressing, at least for organisations seeking legitimacy in the field of international development cooperation. The elusive nature of gender equality norms means that they are constantly an object of political oppositions. Some actors seek to sharpen and include more issues into dominant understandings of global gender equality norms, while others want to restrict the number of issues covered by the norms or to water down particular points. This means that norm engagement in individual aid agencies is a highly political endeavour emphasising particular interpretations over others. Significantly, given the contested nature of many gender equality norms, those elements of the regime that development organisations opt to emphasise as global norms only acquire ‘depth’ if enacted and addressed in different contexts. However, despite this political character of norm engagement, the politics are arguably confined. Whereas women’s movements and feminists in the 1980s and 1990s employed notions of gender equality and women’s empowerment in order to raise political demands for structural change of inequalities, those notions have now been so thoroughly embraced by international organisations that all transformative life seems to have been squeezed out of them. When gender equality becomes a matter of convincing parents to send their girls to school, and women’s empowerment becomes a matter of increasing their ‘risk appetite’ as producers, the transformative power of the initial notions has diminished. This has led some to suggest the need for “a far more realistic view of the limits of enlistment of bureaucratic institutions – governments, UN agencies, donor bureaucracies – in the task of social transformation” (Cornwall & Rivas, 2015, p. 397). The following analysis supports the political nature of aid agencies’ engagement with global gender equality norms, while the broader political character of that engagement will be discussed in the conclusion.

Organisational origins Organisations are full of practices, well-established ideas, common approaches, shared reactions to particular categories of problems, regular rituals and formally adopted rules, regulations, guidelines, manuals, etc. They consist of particular structures that emphasise certain aspects of their work instead of others. All this

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favours certain ways of thinking while hampering others. Particular concerns, ideas, and arguments are promoted that significantly frame how an issue like gender equality is addressed (Mosse, 2004). Accordingly, organisations engage with global norms on gender equality within a dense social fabric of right and wrong, important and irrelevant, easy and difficult. These issues are strongly influenced by how the respective organisations were set up and with what fundamental purpose. Thus, the origins of organisations shape organisational culture and constitute a central question when analysing how organisations take up new ideas, norms, and practices (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). While organisational culture is not given once and for all, it rarely changes abruptly. It matters, therefore, whether an organisation was originally created as a ministry undertaking diplomatic relations with other nations, as a bank lending money or as a religious charity. This is evident in the case of the World Bank, where gender equality was framed as ‘smart economics’ in a way that was particularly appealing to the dominant logic of economists ( Jones, 2018). Around 2000, a number of micro-­ economic studies appeared emphasising gender in relation to the allocation of resources within households, making gender a legitimate research subject among micro-­economists. Later, over the next decade, economists at the World Bank began to focus on different evaluation techniques, including randomised control trials, and micro-economic concerns increasingly dominated the Bank’s knowledge production. When economists were brought into the gender group in order to produce the Gender Action Plan in 2006, not only had an overall positive relationship between women’s activities and development outcomes already been established, but gender had become an important and acknowledged issue in the analysis of micro-economic processes. However, the way that gender-­related issues were framed at the Bank clearly sought to fit its original purpose and organisation. Gender was interesting not in itself, except insofar as it helped to explain resource allocation and development outcomes. Such analysis is in agreement with others noting how issues are adapted to economic language at the Bank (Sarfaty, 2009, 2012; Mosse, 2011), but Ben Jones makes an important contribution to this literature by emphasising that certain changes at the World Bank were necessary to enable a renewed focus on gender. The Gender Action Plan came about not merely due to global norms on gender equality or energetic efforts by norm entrepreneurs (who had been at the Bank for quite some time); another important condition for enabling the plan was the increased significance of micro-economic analyses, along with the growing attention paid to the ‘visibility’ of development, to which gender strongly lends itself. The idea of women as responsible producers, or as the handmaidens of social transformation, which has a fairly long genealogy in the development sector, became entangled with an expanding catalogue of images, and of places – websites, reports, online videos, social media accounts – to put those images in the 2000s. ( Jones, 2018, p. 173)

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To this one may add that the first decade of the 2000s were also a period when the role of the Bank was increasingly being questioned, with many countries decreasing their dependency on World Bank lending. Accordingly, the Bank had to demonstrate its worth as a knowledge bank, and this required adding the issue of gender equality to its own historical identity. Similarly, gender equality norms have had to assimilate to the dominant organisational culture characterised by ‘quantitative impact measurement’ and ‘technology-as-progress’ mantras at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation ­(Fejerskov, 2017, 2018). With the help of strong norm entrepreneurs and support from top management, gender was taken up by the agricultural team in the global development section and turned into a Gender Impact Strategy in 2008. Although all grant proposals from that time on were charged with considering gender issues, this was not always taken seriously; and because the norm entrepreneurs were well aware that a document alone would not change staff practices, they engaged in numerous meetings and dialogues with programme staff to bring attention to gender. Various high-level positions were then established implying relatively unambiguous management support of the issue. However, gender equality proponents were careful to frame their concerns in line with the foundation’s origin and basic orientation as something ‘right and smart’ to do, not in a moral sense, but rather through the aim of increasing impact and results. Institutionalising gender equality notions should thus not be perceived by the programme officers as a new requirement being imposed, but rather as a logical extension of the foundation’s mission and nature. (Fejerskov, 2017, p. 593) Again, however, the careful translation of global norms on gender equality by hardworking norm entrepreneurs proved insufficient. Around 2005, the Gates Foundation was expanding its activities and considered establishing a third pillar, Global Development, in addition to its work in the US and on global health issues. On top of this, philanthropist Warren Buffett elected to offer a ‘gift’ of $30 billion to the foundation, requiring a substantial increase in its activities. To build its new portfolio, the foundation reached out to peer organisations and quickly realised that gender was seen as central in agricultural development. Without that disbursement pressure, it is far from certain that gender equality and women’s empowerment would have been taken up at the foundation at the time and in the way they were. The origins of the organisation in question have also marked the ways in which Islamic Relief Worldwide has approached gender equality. Despite the fact that this NGO – one of the largest Muslim NGOs in the world today – has changed fundamentally, both quantitatively and qualitatively, since its creation by two medical students in 1984, its original purpose of channelling religious alms and donations to needy Muslim communities (as basic relief and support for

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the celebration of religious holidays) has framed how norm entrepreneurial staff members have sought to promote gender within the organisation. The qualitative change that enabled their endeavours consisted of a gradual move in the late 1990s and early 2000s from a charity of relative isolation from Western NGOs and official donors to an organisation characterised by “an internal desire to engage in bridge-building, long-term approaches to aid provision, the inclusion of new kinds of staff, and the emergence of new Muslim donors” (Petersen, 2018, pp. 6–7). This resulted in the introduction of a Gender Analysis in Programming Manual in 2007 and, two years later, a Gender Justice Policy. Nevertheless, ­Marie Juul Petersen has identified three simultaneous processes characterising global gender equality norms in the organisation: bridging, thinning, and parallel co-existence. Norm entrepreneurs have done much to bridge global ideas about gender equality with their conservative Muslim counterparts, both by downplaying potentially provocative elements and by challenging religious ­authorities to rethink common Muslim ideas and interpretations of the Qu’ran. However, and particularly during the move from headquarters to country programmes, gender equality norms have been weakened to the extent that anything even slightly related to women has come to be described as gender-­related activities. Moreover, clearly distinct normative ideas about women, ­gender, and family co-exist within the organisation, due in part to organisational structures and insufficient communication across departments. In addition to the question of origin, it is interesting to note that the (re)introduction of attention to gender equality norms has been facilitated by other changes in all three organisations. One may speculate that, even without such changes, those organisations would have engaged more seriously with gender-­related ­issues at some point, given their need to be perceived as legitimate actors by their peers in the field of international development cooperation, and given the relative strength of the global normative regime on gender equality, or pressure by women’s organisations, advocacy groups, and stakeholders. The question here is related to another observation: namely that the increased interest in gender at these three organisations took place around 2006. This is somewhat surprising as several authors have described the first years of the new millennium as a low point in international attention to gender equality, reflected in the simplistic Millennium Development Goal on gender equality and women’s empowerment established in 2001 ­(Kabeer, 2015; Zwingel, 2020). Thus, either it was pure coincidence that all three ­organisations directed attention to gender equality at the same time due to various organisation-specific changes or the organisations were quick to pick up new international tendencies.

Organisational pressures and priorities Another issue influencing how organisations engage with global norms on gender equality has to do with informal pressures and priorities. These are strongest when an organisation’s survival is being questioned, but they may also play a

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significant role when new opportunities emerge or sudden contextual changes challenge the organisation. Pressures and priorities are expressed by management in more or less direct ways, and staff are often adept at picking up even subtle, indirect hints of management preferences. In any case, such informal instructions often trump official policies and priorities. In particular, new projects and policy initiatives are likely to be shaped by organisational pressures and priorities, which may, therefore, affect how global norms are addressed by staff members. Danish development cooperation has emphasised gender equality since the mid-1980s, although with different emphasises and orientations. Four different policy papers on gender equality have been published since 1987, and one particularly challenging issue has been to balance the mainstreaming of gender considerations into all projects and programmes with activities directly addressing women’s concerns (Engberg-Pedersen, 2016). When the latest policy had to be drafted in 2013, a significant concern was to position Danish aid in relation to international trends and global norms. However, framing this endeavour was a clearly perceived management preference for a lean policy with as little use of financial resources and human capital as possible, given that Danida’s administrative resources had been cut for several consecutive years. Thus, the policy did not include fundings for activities directed towards women, and the global norm on gender mainstreaming was adapted to fit a policy of strategic mainstreaming, implying that gender should be considered whenever new programmes are developed, but not necessarily in subsequent activities (Engberg-Pedersen, 2018). An example of how a sudden new opportunity may create a new context for taking up global norms of gender equality is the $30 billion grant made by ­Warren Buffett to the Melinda and Bill Gates Foundation in 2006 (Fejerskov, 2017). The grant not only enabled new activities, it actually created pressure to take up new issues very quickly. As norm entrepreneurs were already seeking to promote gender concerns within the foundation, the grant provided a golden opportunity to move the agenda forward. However, disbursement pressures may also have the opposite effect, as gender-related activities often do not move important amounts of funds. Thus, a sudden need to use large unspent resources may draw attention away from gender equality. Informal pressures and priorities are also one reason for the observation that organisations sometimes delink frontstage rhetoric from backstage activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Campbell, 2004). Formal policies that emphasise gender equality may not automatically turn into a strong emphasis on such equality in concrete development programmes. As already noted, gender equality has been a significant official priority in Danish development cooperation for many years. Yet, several evaluations have pointed to the limited success of Danida when it comes to seriously addressing gender equality across its diverse activities. While this may have diverse explanations, organisational pressures and priorities have rarely supported a focus on gender mainstreaming, and this is something that staff members are quick to notice.

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At Oxfam GB, recent pressures and priorities have been concerned with restructuring and funding. The various Oxfam affiliates are engaged in a restructuring process that will last into 2020 and create a confederation structure, with country organisations being accountable to Oxfam International through its head office in Nairobi. This is a huge transformation of the Oxfam family with fundamental implications for the distribution of power and influence. As Emma Crewe (2018, p. 6) notes: “By 2014, the process of internationalizing (‘2020’ in Oxfam speak) had become so complex and demanding that meetings set up to discuss gender often required half the time to be spent exchanging news about 2020”. Any attempt to engage with global norms on gender equality was accordingly bound to be assessed against its implications for the restructuring. Likewise, resources have become increasingly tight in Oxfam GB, meaning that the marketing department has exercised more and more pressure on gender advisors to provide images of Oxfam GB’s gender work that can be seen as complying with the ideas of its major funders. As these include the general public and large foundations as well as professional development organisations, ideas about ‘proper’ gender work differ among funders, none of them having much to do with how ambitious gender advisors want to promote gender justice. This entails tension and compromise where funding pressures significantly circumscribe how gender justice can be perceived, pursued, and communicated. As noted above, organisational culture does not change rapidly. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, for example, is thoroughly shaped by its origins in the private sector and a strong belief in technology as a means of progress (­Fejerskov, 2017, 2018). Such cultures are not easily challenged or transformed. Organisational pressures and priorities, on the other hand, are of a different nature, as they may go through much more rapid change. Change in leadership or rapid contextual alterations may increase or diminish the pressures and priorities quickly, suggesting that the organisational conditions for engaging with global norms on gender equality may differ substantially over time within the same organisation. The timing of new ideas is therefore important, and norm entrepreneurs may benefit from postponing norm engagement until a change of the informal pressures and priorities has occurred.

Normative environments Organisations do not exist in a void, but relate to other organisations and actors, particularly in their various fields of operation. Often there are no relations of authority between them, but as they typically share challenges, concerns, constraints, and practices, a set of values and ideas about how to operate are likely to emerge and characterise the field (Meyer & Scott, 1983). This normative environment may come about not only as a consequence of peer organisations interacting, but also through meetings and discussions with actors representing clients, suppliers, media, academia, etc., who have a legitimate concern with how an organisation operates. Not least in development cooperation, it is noteworthy

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how significant the influence of the normative environment is. When the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation first began to finance development activities, it made a point of isolating and distancing itself from other development organisations. However, only a few years passed before Bill & Melinda Gates appeared as special guests at high-level meetings, international conferences, etc., and the foundation started to heed many of the conventional ideas in development cooperation (­Fejerskov, 2015). Sometimes organisations will have to manage several normative environments, which can be challenging if they disagree with each other. For instance, tying aid is internationally seen as bad practice because it i­ncreases the costs of receiving aid, whereas domestic companies may put pressure on ­bilateral aid agencies to make more use of this instrument. In South Africa, particularly under the rule of Jacob Zuma, the normative environment for engaging with gender equality in South-South cooperation has been ambiguous and contentious (Cold-Ravnkilde, 2019). Despite the fact that South Africa is internationally known for its progressive constitution, laws, and institutions when it comes to gender equality, it has been difficult to make use of these qualities in its development cooperation. This is not least due to tensions regarding gender equality in the normative environment of South Africa’s international development activities. On the one hand, modern, liberal forces see gender justice as a crucial challenge because of the very high levels of violence against women, maternal mortality, etc., in South Africa not only internationally, but also compared to other African countries. On the other hand, strong, patriarchal actors challenge gender equality as un-African and an expression of Western imperialism. When Jacob Zuma was on trial for rape, women from the Women’s League of the African National Congress (ANC) demonstrated outside the courtroom in his support. Thus, not even the women’s movement has been able to unite behind their constitutional rights. Moreover, a major concern in South Africa’s foreign policy is to win the support of other African countries and, accordingly, to avoid challenging them on issues that are not deemed existential. This means that gender equality has been addressed in a mostly pragmatic way when the issue has emerged in South Africa’s development cooperation. In the case of AMEXCID, the normative environment has been just as significant. Although Mexico almost exceeds South Africa in respect of the levels of violence against women, amounting to a feminicide pandemic, and although patriarchal views are widespread in the normative environment of the aid agency, AMEXCID has used this national experience to engage with gender equality and to turn the issue into an important element in its policies and activities (Sørensen, 2018). Mexico’s gender-related South-South cooperation seeks to appeal to progressive domestic constituencies, the international donor community, and targeted partner countries in the region. A significant difference between Mexico and South Africa is that the women’s movement is much more united in the former and has been able to influence development cooperation. Thus, whether and how to engage with global gender equality norms vary greatly across these situations, and it is noteworthy that conflicting normative environments may

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also be internalised in different parts of an organisation, as in the case of Islamic Relief, where the ideas and concerns of mainstream development live side by side with traditional practices of Islamic aid (Petersen, 2018). Accordingly, there is an ambiguous relationship between normative environments and how organisations take up gender equality norms, but the studies summarised here strongly suggest that these environments provide an important framework for norm engagement.

Conclusion Gender-based inequalities are pervasive and persist even in relatively progressive societies. Appalling practices of violence, abuse, discrimination, isolation, and ostracism all reflect that gender is perceived as distinguishing people as ­superior or inferior, as having opportunities or being barred from them, as ­being valuable or being a burden. However, things change, and in many places, ­gender-based ­inequalities are being actively reduced. In a global-historical perspective, improvements may even be viewed as significant; but for those who suffer ­gender-based discrimination, the slowness of change is intolerable. Since the Second World War, many international discussions have focussed on establishing prescriptive norms in different aspects of life. With a focus on human rights, many have sought to reduce inequalities among people based on their social characteristics. Numerous conventions, declarations, and agreements have addressed gender-based inequalities in particular, and together these have manifested a normative regime which nevertheless remains far from coherent or unambiguous. This regime is weakened by internal contradictions, open to interpretation, and the object of political contention. Nevertheless, it seems unavoidable in the current era that development organisations address gender equality and women’s empowerment. The normative regime is sufficiently strong to have substantially influenced the field of development organisations, which have become increasingly concerned with normative issues since the late 1980s. Adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its associated Goals at the United Nations General Assembly in 2015 has only reinforced that development. Despite the relative strength of the normative regime on gender equality, numerous other factors also influence norm engagement at the organisational level. This chapter has examined three such factors which, generally, appear to weaken and dilute the normative regime. The historical origin of many development organisations (with backgrounds ranging from the financial or entrepreneurial to the religious or diplomatic) may reside well outside the concern for gender equality. When this is the case, it becomes very difficult to address a political issue so profoundly entrenched as gender inequality. Development organisations tend to engage with the normative regime in a way that, whether deliberately or unintendedly, transforms an issue into something more amenable to their original purpose and orientation. Moreover, development organisations operate in a complex political setting, sometimes characterised by significant resource constraints (or the reverse in the case of Warren Buffett’s gift to the

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Gates Foundation), which create strong organisational pressures and priorities, pulling organisations in directions other than those called for by formal policies. Staff are very sensitive to such informal priorities, the heeding of which may be decisive in terms of career opportunities. In organisational contexts that may be struggling with gender i­nequalities internally, instigation of a strong and continuous focus on gender issues represents a challenge in itself. Finally, the normative environment of development organisations may effectively mitigate engagement with global gender equality norms. When this environment is characterised by intense political clashes where gender equality is disputed for whatever reason (including reasons only marginally related to gender, as in South Africa or Russia), development organisations have a hard time even addressing the issue. On the other hand, a conducive normative environment may facilitate serious ­engagement with the normative regime, stimulating efforts to move the regime in new directions. These observations suggest that certain global norms diffuse into the field of large, non-specialised aid agencies as normative issues that need to be addressed. The normative idea that gender inequalities are intolerable and should be eliminated is accepted in all the studied organisations, implying that norm diffusion at this level actually takes place. However, when it comes to the specific contents of gender inequalities and how they should be addressed, significant differences emerge. Some interpret them as a matter of enhancing women’s economic opportunities, others as directing development activities towards women, and still others as a call for eliminating discriminating social structures. These varying interpretations question the extent to which the concept of norm diffusion adequately characterises how gender inequalities are addressed. Thus, one may distinguish between the diffusion of normative issues and situation-specific engagement with the contents of these issues (Engberg-Pedersen et al., 2020). To what extent do these conclusions confirm the view that there exist “limits of enlistment of bureaucratic institutions – governments, UN agencies, donor bureaucracies – in the task of social transformation”? (Cornwall & Rivas, 2015, p. 397). On the one hand, they clearly confirm that claim: development bureaucracies operate in a web of structures that tend to undermine serious attempts to stimulate social transformation. The above-mentioned issues point to only some of these structural conditions. Another fundamental question is whether it is both useful and possible for foreign actors to change profound, cultural, and political issues. There is little doubt that the political influence of development organisations has been exaggerated in many contexts, but irrespective of their influence, this analysis supports a less optimistic take on their role by noting the considerable structural conditions that shape how they engage with global gender equality norms. To regard development bureaucracies as relatively straightforward ‘carriers’ of global norms would be a questionable assumption. On the other hand, it is tempting to raise an unanswerable question: How might gender inequalities look in the absence of an international normative regime on gender equality and a plurality of development organisations? Some

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might argue that, for instance, the World Bank’s translation of women’s empowerment into ‘smart economics’ constitutes a blow to the cause, and that women would in general be able to progress without the international community’s attempts to support gender equality. However, such an argument would underestimate the importance of international agreements and organisations to which local actors may refer to in their particular struggles to promote gender equality. It further disregards the considerable pressure that women’s movements and a few development organisations have exercised on international discussions, and how that has continuously put new issues on the agenda, unpaid care, and domestic work being among the more recent. While there are good reasons to expect more from development bureaucracies, this chapter indicates that part of the dissatisfaction with these organisations may be due to exaggerated expectations that development organisations never will be able to fulfil. Thus have Cornwall and Rivas reasonably concluded: “This, in turn, has reinforced the importance of grassroots feminist organising as a motor of change” (2015, p. 397).

Note 1 Two issues of Progress in Development (volume 18, issues 2 and 3, 2018) present articles analysing the case studies and this chapter is based in part on Cold-Ravnkilde et al. (2018).

Bibliography Barnett, M. & Finnemore, M. (2004) Rules for the world: International organizations in global politics. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. Boli, J. & Thomas, G. M. (eds.) (1999) Constructing world culture: International nongovernmental organizations since 1875. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA. Bøås, M. & McNeill, D. (2004) ‘Introduction: Power and ideas in multilateral institutions: Towards an interpretative framework’, in Bøås M. & McNeill, D. (eds.) Global institutions & development: Framing the world?, pp. 1–12. Routledge, New York. Campbell, J. L. (2004) Institutional change and globalization. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Cold-Ravnkilde, S. M. (2019) ‘Contested norms in fragmented institutions: Gender equality in South Africa’s development cooperation’, Progress in Development Studies, vol. 19, no. 3. Cold-Ravnkilde, S. M., Engberg-Pedersen L. & Fejerskov, A. M. (2018) ‘Global norms and heterogeneous development organizations’, Progress in Development Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 1–18. Cornwall, A. (2007) ‘Buzzwords and fuzzwords: Deconstructing development discourse’, Development in Practice, vol. 17, no. 4–5, pp. 471–484. Cornwall, A. & Brock, K. (2005) “What do buzzwords do for development policy? A critical look at ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘poverty reduction’’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 7, pp. 1043–1060. Cornwall, A. & Rivas, A.-M. (2015) “From ‘gender equality’ and ‘women’s empowerment’ to global justice: Reclaiming a transformative agenda for gender and development”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 396–415.

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Crewe, E. (2018) ‘Flagships and tumbleweeds: A history of the politics of gender justice work in Oxfam GB, 1986–2015’, Progress in Development Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 110–125. Ecker-Ehrhardt, M. (2012) “‘But the UN said so…’: International organisations as discursive authorities”, Global Society, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 451–471. Engberg-Pedersen, L. (2016) ‘Policy making in foreign aid: Gender equality and Danish development policy’, Journal of Development Studies, vol. 52, no. 7, pp. 933–949. Engberg-Pedersen, L. (2018) ‘Do norms travel? The case of gender in Danish development cooperation’, Progress in Development Studies, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 153–171. Engberg-Pedersen, L., Fejerskov, A. M. & Cold-Ravnkilde, S. M. (eds.) (2020) Rethinking gender equality in global governance: The delusion of norm diffusion. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK. Eyben, R. (2012) ‘Struggles in Paris: The DAC and the purposes of development aid’, European Journal of Development Research, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 1–14. Eyben, R. & Napier-Moore, R. (2009) ‘Choosing words with care? Shifting meanings of women’s empowerment in international development’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 285–300. Fejerskov, A. M. (2015) ‘From unconventional to ordinary? The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the homogenizing effects of international development cooperation’, Journal of International Development, vol. 27, no. 7, pp. 1098–1112. Fejerskov, A. M. (2017) ‘The influence of established ideas in emerging development organisations: Gender equality and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’, Journal of Development Studies, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 584–599. Fejerskov, A. M. (2018) ‘Development as resistance and translation: Remaking norms and ideas of the Gates Foundation’, Progress in Development Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 1–18. Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K. (1998) ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, International Organization, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 887–917. Jolly, R., L. Emmerij & Weiss, T. G. (2009) UN ideas that changed the world. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN. Jones, B. (2018) ‘”A more receptive crowd than before”: Explaining the World Bank’s gender turn in the 2000s’, Progress in Development Studies, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 172–188. Kabeer, N. (2015) ‘Tracking the gender politics of the Millennium Development Goals: Struggles for interpretive power in the international development agenda’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 377–395. Krook, M. L. & True, J. (2012) ‘Rethinking the life cycles of international norms: The United Nations and the global promotion of gender equality’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 103–127. Manning, R. (2008) ‘The DAC as a central actor in development policy issues: Experiences over the past four years’. Discussion Paper Discussion Paper 7/2008. Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, Bonn. Meyer, J. W. & Rowan, B. (1977) ‘Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony’, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 83, no. 2, pp. 340–363. Meyer, J. W. and Scott, R. W. (1983) Organizational environments: Ritual and rationality. Sage, Beverly Hills, CA. Mosse, D. (2004) ‘Is good policy unimplementable? Reflections on the ethnography of aid policy and practice’, Development and Change, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 639–671. Mosse, D. (ed.)(2011) Adventures in aidland: The anthropology of professional international development. Berghahn Books, Oxford. Petersen, M. J. (2018) ‘Translating Global Gender Norms in Islamic Relief Worldwide’, Progress in Development Studies, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 189–207.

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Sarfaty, G. (2009) ‘Measuring justice: Internal conflict over the World Bank’s empirical approach to human rights’, in Clarke, K. & Goodale, M. (eds.) Mirrors of justice: Law and power in the post-Cold War era, pp. 131–148. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Sarfaty, G. (2012) Values in transition: Human rights and the culture of the World Bank. ­Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA. Swiss, L. (2016) ‘A sociology of foreign aid and the World Society’, Sociology Compass, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 65–73. Swiss, L. (2018) The globalization of foreign aid: Developing consensus. Routledge, London. Sørensen, N. N. (2018) ‘Diffusing gender equality norms in the midst of a feminicide pandemic: The case of AMEXCID and decentralized Mexican South-South cooperation’, Progress in Development Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 95–109. Van Eerdewijk, A. & Roggeband, C. (2014) ‘Gender equality norm diffusion and actor constellations: A first exploration’, in Van der Vleuten, A., Van Eerdewijk, A. & Roggeband, C. (eds.) Gender equality norms in regional governance: Transnational dynamics in Europe, South America and Southern Africa, pp. 42–64. Palgrave Macmillan, ­Basingstoke, UK. Verloo, M. & Lombardo, E. (2007) ‘Contested gender equality and policy variety in Europe: Introducing a critical frame analysis approach’, in Verloo, M. (ed.) Multiple meanings of gender equality: A critical frame analysis of gender policies in Europe, pp. 21–49. Central European University Press, Budapest. Zwingel, S. (2016) Translating international women’s rights: The CEDAW Convention in context. Palgrave Macmillan, London. Zwingel, S. (2020) ‘Gender equality norms in international governance – actors, c­ ontexts, meanings’, in Engberg-Pedersen, L., Fejerskov, A. M. & Cold-Ravnkilde, S. M. (eds.) Rethinking gender equality in global governance: The delusion of norm diffusion, pp. 41–70. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK.

14 OLD AND NEW POWERS IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN HEALTH Eduardo Missoni and Fabrizio Tediosi

Introduction Development Assistance in Health (DAH) has always been an important component of Official Development Aid (ODA). The aid system’s attention to health has been driven by multiple and diverse motivations, such as humanitarian concerns about the health of the poorest populations, security concerns about the spread of epidemics, the recognition that health is a key determinant of economic growth, labour force productivity and poverty reduction, and – although less emphatically – the fulfilment of a fundamental human right. Health has also been at the forefront of the debate on aid effectiveness. Beginning in the mid-1990s, sector-wide approaches (SWAps) were pioneered in the health sector, aimed at increasing ownership, aligning donor policies to the priorities and systems of beneficiary countries, harmonising donors’ activities and approaches, and allowing greater predictability of aid. In the health sector, as in other aid domains, the inefficiencies of the global aid architecture are evident. However, the complexity of the health sector, the large number and diverse nature of development partners active in health, the dependency on policies in other sectors to achieve health outcomes, the major role of the private sector in both financing and delivery, and the structural nature of most health needs have stimulated innovative ideas and approaches. These include the establishment of powerful Global Public-Private Partnerships (GPPPs) and the use of innovative financing mechanisms. As a result, in 2006 the health sector was proposed as a “tracer sector” for the Organisation for Economic Co-­ operation and Development Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) to monitor overall harmonisation and alignment progress in application of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2006). More than ten years later, the health sector now presents interesting examples of the interaction of a growing number of actors in transnational aid.

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After a brief summary of the recent evolution of DAH, we analyse DAH by way of the following perspectives: trends in predominant ideas and resources (and their sources), leadership, institutions, DAH channels, and policy networks.

Origins and evolution of development assistance in health Until the mid-1980s, the evolution of global health policies largely coincided with the role of the World Health Organization (WHO) on the global scene; afterwards, the WHO was obliged to progressively negotiate its role with a number of emerging global actors. Despite the WHO’s holistic definition of health as a “state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (WHO, 1946), global action and DAH were until 1978 oriented towards disease control and eradication programmes, such as the large-scale treatment of syphilis and programmes to eradicate malaria and smallpox. At that time, the WHO and global health policies were also strongly influenced by the politics of the Cold War. Malaria eradication campaigns and top-down interventions closely aligned with the political interests of the US in promoting modernisation and winning “hearts and minds” in the battle against Communism (Packard & Brown, 1997). The Soviet Union seceded from the United Nations system in 1949 due to a belief that the UN and WHO were dominated by the US (Lee, 2009). In 1957 the Soviet Union and other communist countries returned to the WHO, and two years later the global smallpox eradication programme was launched, bringing together the interests of the two most powerful global players and making history as the only successful eradication programme for a human disease to date (Brown et al., 2006). In line with the ‘basic needs approach’ emerging in the 1970s, the WHO shifted towards strategies more attentive to the development of basic health services, community participation, and the immediate health needs of populations. Under the leadership of WHO Director-General Halfdan Mahler in 1977, the World Health Assembly (WHA) adopted the goal of “Health for all by the year 2000”; the following year, with the Declaration of Alma-Ata, P ­ rimary Health Care (PHC) was identified as the best strategy towards that objective. PHC was viewed not only as an integral part of each country’s health system, but also as important for the social and economic development of all nations. The Alma-Ata Declaration was aimed at promoting equity and community participation through a focus on prevention, appropriate technologies, and an integrated inter-sectorial approach to development (Alma-Ata, 1978). However, this broader developmental focus was soon challenged by several influential stakeholders, and the Alma-Ata Declaration was criticised for being too broad and idealistic. Just one year after Alma-Ata, a workshop entitled “Health and Population in D ­ evelopment” was hosted by the Rockefeller Foundation in Bellagio, Italy, and supported by the World Bank; in attendance were the Vice President of the Ford Foundation, the Administrator of United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Executive

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Secretary of UNICEF. This meeting engendered the “selective Primary Health Care” approach which consisted of a series of interventions that were low cost, pragmatic, and limited in scope (Walsh & Warren, 1979; Brown et al., 2006). ­Selective PHC significantly narrowed the original approach and concentrated instead on the application of certain measures to be aimed at preventing and managing a few high-burden diseases (Walsh & Warren, 1979). Under the strong influence of international organisations and bilateral agencies, this soon resulted in the reorganisation of health systems into so-called ‘vertical programmes’. The fragmentation of public health activities detached these programmes from development programmes in other sectors (education, environment, etc.). With international agencies focussed on specific, often autonomous, and disease-oriented programmes, instead of cooperation and sharing among actors, competition often arose even when distinct agencies were working towards similar objectives. This disease-oriented (rather than health-oriented) approach was often more concordant with the political and administrative needs of main donor countries and organisations, which exerted strong influence on the choices of beneficiary countries. This notably reductionist, centralist approach was soon to become the dominant mind-set. The 1980s brought new actors and new challenges to the global health scene. The debt crisis of the 1980s and the advent of neoliberal policies played a critical role in moving the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (and their respective agendas) onto the global stage as major political players in the realms of crisis management, international development funding, and policy-making (including health), especially for low-income countries. Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were imposed on individual countries as a condition for ODA. Developing countries were pushed to adopt Health Sector Reforms to address the collapse of their health systems. These Health Sector Reforms prescribed the introduction of user fees for health services and encouraged their privatisation, promoted the introduction of private insurance schemes, and fostered the decentralisation of health care management (Italian Global Health Watch, 2008). These reforms remained the central topic of the international debate for the rest of the decade. Alongside its growing influence, the World Bank soon became the largest international donor in the health sector in middle- and low-income countries. In the mid-1990s, the World Bank began exploring new approaches to link sector lending to Sectorial Investment Programs (SIPs). This new approach was then shared with other bilateral and multilateral donors, and in several countries a SWAp was adopted, with the health sector piloting the change. This was in line with the criteria included in the OECD-DAC’s ‘Shaping the 21st Century’ document, which recommended that donor countries shift the focus of their ODA from an individual and fragmented project-aid approach to new forms of programme aid in support of the national strategies and policies of recipient countries. Coordinated interventions, integrated with national plans and

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possibly financed directly by supporting countries’ national budgets (i.e. General Budget Support), would increase the efficiency of aid as a whole, emphasise the ownership of the partner country, and reduce the burden of negotiating and managing separately with each donor (OECD-DAC, 1996). The integration of health interventions into wider inter-sectorial development and poverty-fighting approaches was further reaffirmed by a reference document on health initiatives jointly produced by the WHO and OECD in the context of the fight against poverty (OECD-DAC, 2003). However, leadership by the WHO as the “directing and coordinating authority on international health work” (WHO, 1946) was increasingly challenged by numerous other players now claiming a role in the field of global health. WHO Director-General Gro Harlen Brundtland, in contrast with the broad outlook that she advocated, supported in practice vertical initiatives via GPPPs to address a variety of diseases and health issues, including the Stop TB Initiative, Roll Back Malaria, the Malaria Medicine Initiative, the International Partnership against AIDS in Africa (IPAA), the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), and the Global Alliance for vaccines and immunizations (Gavi). The WHO’s promotion of partnerships and other interactions with the corporate sector represented an important shift in organisational policy (Deacon et al., 2003). Considering the increased dependence of the WHO on private funds, Ford and Piedagnél (2003) anticipated that those interactions could potentially further undermine WHO independence. The role of WHO is still debated. Considering that we live “in times of multiorder and chaotic pluralism”, some authors suggest that the WHO should act as a ‘meta-governor’, and that the complex task of deliberative priority-setting should be fully supported (Van Belle et al., 2018).

DAH trends and influences Recent trends in DAH have resulted from several factors. In order to unpack the dynamics behind these changing trends and the consequent implications for global health governance, their inherent complexity must be considered. Drawing from a framework inspired by Harmer et al. (2013) and loosely adapted from the literature on International Relations, we analyse DAH trends by addressing two interrelated questions: (a) What has changed in terms of predominant ideas, material capabilities and resources, and the global burden of disease?; and (b) How have new trends materialised, in terms of sources, leadership, leading institutions, DAH channels, and policy networks?

Trends in predominant ideas, material capabilities, and the global burden of disease The dominant thinking that has inspired DAH in recent decades can be ascribed to several interrelated ideas and cultural attitudes: first, an increasing trust in the

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role of the private sector and, to a lesser extent, the potential of financial markets to generate resources for development. The notion of partnership as social responsibility for development, shared among advanced as well as less-advanced countries, came to extend beyond traditional bilateral and multilateral actors to include the corporate sector and civil society, and this was translated into new organisational arrangements and the establishment of GPPPs. Second, a technological approach to global health challenges has gained importance. This approach is based on the assumption that deploying medical technologies in low-income settings is crucial to improving the health of populations. Although there has been some recognition of the distal and social determinants of health, and of the role of effective and efficient health systems in improving health outcomes (CSDH, 2008), the focus on medical technologies has often prevailed. Third, the idea has arisen that the sustainability of DAH can only be ensured through reductionist approaches focussed on short-term results, mainly as regards specific diseases. This short-term approach is evident in the proliferation of disease-specific and/or global health initiatives defined by short-term targets and monitoring frameworks. The proliferation of disease-specific initiatives clearly contrasts with growing awareness of the need for strengthened health systems. These initiatives have often disregarded the principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results, and mutual accountability adopted in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 (OECD-DAC, 2005). Despite the re-emergence of universal access to care as an important policy objective (the so-called Universal Health Coverage (UHC) movement), DAH modalities continued to be inspired by the same narrow approach. WHO resolutions in 2005 and 2011 promoted the support for elevating UHC higher on the global health agenda, and UHC became WHO’s pivotal target in the UN’s 2015 Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) number 3, as part of the 2030 Agenda. The DAH industry has grown in terms of resources. The latest report on Global Health Financing trends from the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME, 2018) shows a dramatic increase in DAH over the past three decades and the changing relevance of sources and institutions that channel DAH. However, in the last few years this DAH trend has plateaued, and the growth phase in resources has probably come to an end (Figure 14.1). A major factor in bringing health back to the global policy agenda was the HIV/AIDS epidemic, along with a few other infectious diseases. The fact that HIV/AIDS also affected high-income countries (unlike other diseases common in the global South) undoubtedly contributed to the epidemic eliciting global attention. Apart from HIV/AIDS, attention remained selectively focussed on malaria, ­t uberculosis, and a few other infectious diseases. Conditions such as ­m alnutrition, diarrhoea, and acute respiratory illnesses, all of which had ­attracted strong attention in the past, and whose mortality rates remained very high, appeared to have been forgotten – as was the emerging burden of non-­ communicable d­ iseases (NCDs) (IHME, 2018).

260  Eduardo Missoni and Fabrizio Tediosi 45000

40000

35000

30000

25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017*

FIGURE 14.1 

Development assistance for health 1990–2017 (millions of US$).

Source: Authors’ elaboration, from IHME (2018) data.

Security concerns have likewise been influential in framing global health since the 1990s. In the year 2000, for the first time in its history, the UN Security Council showed an interest in health-related issues and included the theme of HIV/AIDS on its agenda, thus contributing to a renewed link between health and the security agenda. Later, the spread of emerging and re-emerging diseases (such as Avian influenza in 1997; SARS in 2002; H1N1 ‘swine flu’ in 2009; Ebola in 2014–2016; and most recently Zika in 2016; among others) continued to play a major role in the securitisation of global health (McInnes & Lee, 2012). The poorest population groups, living mainly in low- and middle-income countries, suffer most of the global burden of disease, and this is still mainly attributable to communicable diseases (GBD, 2013). However, successful reductions of infant and other mortality rates that cause demographic change have been attended by an epidemiological transition, with a rising burden of diseases attributable to NCDs. NCDs now represent the highest burden of disease globally, accounting for 72% of all global deaths, and with 78% of NCDs occurring in low- and middle-income countries (WHO, 2018b). NCDs challenge both health and welfare systems, due to the high cost and duration of their treatments. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development now includes a target (SDG 3.4)

Old and new powers in global health  261

of one-third reduction in premature mortality caused by NCDs. In addition, a Global Partnership goal (SDG 17) emphasises once again the multi-stakeholder approach (UN, 2015a). However, alliances with the private sector in the fight against NCDs may pose an unprecedented challenge, not only because powerful corporations exert heavy influence on government health agendas, but especially due to the fact that key risk factors for NCDs are strongly associated with unhealthy patterns of consumption and other choices that are likewise heavily influenced by the corporate sector, with inevitable conflicts of interest (Collins et al., 2018).

Sources of DAH and channels, leadership, institutions, and policy networks The aforementioned changes have both resulted from and triggered further changes in the role of policy influencers. As described, policies inspiring DAH were heavily influenced by a few global players in the 1980s, fostering substantial re-directions. First, US-led organisations such as the World Bank, UNICEF, the ­Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, and USAID all played a relevant role in promoting the selective PHC, with supportive arguments from academia (Walsh & Warren, 1979). Later, when WHO’s focus was on improving the planning of national health expenditures to support policies for integrating PHC, the World Bank advocated for the introduction of user-fees at government health facilities, and UNICEF launched the Bamako Initiative introducing community pre-payment schemes and revolving drug-funds replenished by charging patients for medicines (Lee & Goodman, 2002). In the early 1980s, strong pressure was put on the WHO by its largest contributors, amounting even to financial coercion as in the 1985 case of the US suspending payment of its assessed (obligatory) contributions over disagreement with the WHO’s regulatory approach to confronting harmful market strategies (e.g. with the introduction of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes, or the establishment of the Essential Drug Program) (Walt, 1994; Lee, 2009). In 2002, Dodgson, Lee, and Drager drew up an initial map of global health governance, trying to position actors according to their influence in terms of authority and leadership. In their map, the “WHO and the World Bank are shown as central because they represent the main sources of health expertise and development financing, respectively” (Dodgson et al., 2002). Along with these two institutions, at the centre of their map they placed the US, arguably the single most influential governmental actor. A decade and a half later, the scenario is quite different; thus, we have redrawn Dodgson and his co-authors’ map and the result is an extremely crowded centre with actors old and new, and with increased and often interlinked external influences on traditional actors (Figure 14.2).

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Individuals

Media Epistemic communities

Social Movements UNFPA Religious groups

NGOs

UNAIDS

IMF

WTO GPPP

Industrialised countries BRICS USA BMGF WHO

Research institutions

UNICEF

ILO

Developing countries

GAVI G8

Transnational Companies

UNDP

The Global Fund ATM World Bank

CENTRE FIGURE 14.2 

Global health governance.

Source: Missoni (2017); adapted from Dodgson et al. (2002). Note: Arrows show increased centrality of actors; actors in boxes were not present in the original map.

The US remains the most significant donor for DAH. It has been argued that “US involvement in global health generally is motivated as much or more by concerns to protect national interest (or regime interest) than by humanitarian, human rights, or security objectives” (MacLean & Brown, 2009). The priority given to domestic interests might also obviously apply to many (if not all) other countries. Indeed, after analysing the UK’s engagement in global health, Herrick (2017) concluded that there is a clear trade-off between achievement of results through targeted aid and programmes to countries that will deliver the best return on investment, and aid to countries and regions in greatest need, thus highlighting “the strategic nature of the geopolitics underpinning the UK’s global health investment” (Herrick, 2017). Clinton and Sridhar (2017) have shown the consolidation of influence across global institutions in terms of the roles played by a few donors, specifically the US, the UK, and the Gates Foundation: “This consolidation is clearly evident in the creation of [the Global Alliance for vaccines and immunizations (Gavi)] and in the disproportional role each have from a financing perspective in Gavi, the Global Fund, and WHO” (Clinton & Sridhar, 2017).

Old and new powers in global health  263

The World Bank remains the largest funding agent of DAH within the UN system, and the second largest funder overall (Sridhar et al., 2017). Unlike the WHO, the World Bank is able to influence decision-making at country level, through substantial financial incentives and by engaging with Ministers of ­Finance and across sectors to reach health goals. At the global level, the Bank recently introduced new financing mechanisms to coordinate and focus funding streams from international donors. One example of this is the Global Financing Facility (GFF), designed to bridge the funding gap for addressing preventable death and disease among children and women, driving new pushes for tobacco taxation, improvements in road safety, and a variety of nutrition initiatives. Another is the establishment of a Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility to address the need for rapid response measures in case of epidemics (Loewenberg, 2015). Other wealthy OECD countries also influence global health priorities and policy-making through their participation in WHO and other multilateral contexts, including through the governance of GPPPs. The G7/G8 group of nations has also been established as an influential collective actor in global health. In 2000, at their Okinawa summit under the Japanese presidency, the G8 group highlighted the fight against certain infectious diseases, and the group proved pivotal in the launch of the Global Fund to fight HIV/ AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM) at their Genoa summit the following year (Missoni, 2017). In those same years, the European Union’s focus fell on accelerated action to control infectious diseases, highlighting the importance of partnerships with pharmaceutical companies and drug markets (Commission of European Communities, 2000). In the wider context of global health governance, including coordination and priority-setting, the emergence of new actors with significant political and economic power has come as a result of the above-mentioned, unresolved structural weakness of the WHO, which is still struggling to define its role in the new context. Member states may have one set of priorities as expressed within the WHO’s governing fora, but their funding of the WHO and other institutions may reflect a different set of priorities. In particular, the largest donors show inconsistencies between their global health and development cooperation policies. In terms of the latter, they declare a commitment to principles of aid effectiveness, requiring a reduction of existing aid fragmentation; at the same time, they undermine those principles by promoting and supporting a plethora of new players (Lidén, 2014). Also, large donors’ bilateral ODA remains the most significant flow of DAH, further contributing to fragmentation and inconsistencies at the country level. Only a few bilateral donors engage in SWAps focussed on strengthening health systems and adopting approaches consistent with aid effectiveness principles. In practice, the implementation of SWAps presented considerable challenges. Tensions implicit in donor-partner asymmetries became evident, coordination mechanisms sometimes required additional technical assistance to address local institutional weaknesses, and the pooling of finances did not become the main

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route for financing. Most donors participating in SWAps maintained parallel project aid; few if any SWAps engaged all donors; and a number of donors (although supportive of SWAps) were constrained by their own administrative rules from providing direct financing, thus participating in pooled funding or using the partner country’s national systems for procurement or monitoring (Hill et al., 2012).

Emerging countries Among the emerging actors in this field, the total financial contributions to global health by the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South A ­ frica) in 2010 were estimated at around US$5.6 billion (Fan et al., 2014; ­Blanchet et al., 2014) – see Chapter 11 on the increasing influence of emerging donors in the aid agenda. Undoubtedly the BRICS have attempted to build strategic coordination in areas of global governance, and in health they have been seeking a coordinated strategic relationship with the WHO (Acharya et al., 2014; Gautier et al., 2014). On the other hand, even though the Ministers of Health of these five countries now regularly meet to share visions and concerns, their joint statements and communiqués appear not to have great influence over global health policies. Also unclear is whether the BRICS share sufficient problems and interests to lead a coherent collective action. Gill and Benatar (2017) openly dismiss “the idea that [the BRICS] are significantly influencing global health as a unified political bloc, despite evidence of some cooperation on finance and in health, with one or two BRICS countries supporting specific health initiatives”. A recent analysis of the BRICS’ engagement in the global movement for UHC showed that while most BRICS countries have implicitly supported this movement, they seem to act more as individual countries than as an allied group. These findings suggest that the BRICS are unlikely to form a unified political bloc that will transform global health governance. However, their involvement in global health as individuals may give greater voice to low- and middle-income countries, supporting the emergence of multiple centres of power in global health (Tediosi et al., 2016). Individual contributions by the BRICS and other non-DAC countries are difficult to estimate, but the most relevant contribution is undoubtedly that of China, which is rapidly expanding its financing of DAH projects and technical assistance. Partnerships between China and other low- and middle-income countries have led to new, lower-cost product pipelines for new drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics. To date, however, China’s contributions to multilateral initiatives have been minimal, and limited transparency around that nation’s health- and development-related activities prevents proper tracking and measurement of the impact of China’s official health financing activities in Africa (Grépin et al., 2014). The BRICS are also members of the wider G20 group (the 19 largest economies plus the European Union). In the G20 agenda, health is mainly framed among security and socio-economic issues. In Brisbane, Australia, in 2014, response to the Ebola virus outbreak was included in the group’s agenda, and an

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appeal was made to governments and international financial institutions to provide assistance, also in terms of strengthening health systems in order to improve countries’ capacities to respond to epidemics (G20, 2014).

Philanthrocapitalism Among sources and influencers of DAH, independent foundations initiated by wealthy individuals or their families (the Rockefeller Foundation, the Wellcome Trust, the Ford Foundation, the UN Foundation, the Aga Khan Foundation, etc.) have often played and continue to play an important role. However, with the advent of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in 2000, the order of magnitude of “philanthrocapitalism” (Birn, 2014) leapt from millions to billions of dollars, causing a very significant shift in the global DAH scenario. With capital exceeding US$40 billion invested in the stock market, and with an annual donation volume of US$5 billion (about one-third of which goes to health activities) (KPMG, 2018), the Gates Foundation was in 2017 the single largest donor to global health initiatives (8.7% of total DAH) after the US and the UK (IHME, 2018). The Gates Foundation is also the second largest contributor to the World Health Organization (WHO, 2018a) and among the largest contributors to numerous GPPPs. Out of 23 global health partnerships analysed by Buse and Harmer (2007), seven relied entirely on funding from the Gates Foundation, which was also the largest single donor in another nine (Buse & Harmer, 2007). The Gates Foundation is further represented on the boards of directors of two major GPPPs: Gavi and the GFATM. The influence on global health policies by the Gates Foundation (and earlier by the Rockefeller Foundation) goes beyond direct grant-making, and there has been criticism of their power to distort global priorities, including through Bill and Melinda Gates’ personal relationships with and privileged access to political elites (McCoy et al., 2009; Birn, 2014; Martens & Seitz, 2015). In addition, the Gates Foundation “has changed how institutions are held accountable, given that it is a philanthropic body substantively different from government representatives” (Clinton & Sridhar, 2017).

Global public-private partnerships The most striking change to global health governance and DAH with respect to the past was undoubtedly the emergence of GPPPs. The GPPP formula emerged at the turn of the 21st century, gaining special momentum through the launch of the Global Alliance on vaccines and immunizations (Gavi), established in 2000 with initial funding of US $750 million from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. In addition, commercial partners have played a disproportionate role in the governance of new GPPPs, as compared to prior assumptions around the resources they would mobilise. An analysis of 23 GPPPs in global health showed that, together with academics, most of the decision-makers involved came from

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the corporate sector. Thus, the underrepresentation of constituencies from lowand middle-income countries in the governing bodies of GPPPs – with an average membership presence of only 17% in the sample of 23 partnerships – is another key concern (Buse & Harmer, 2007; Ruckert & Labonté, 2014). Over the past few years, GPPPs have reviewed their strategies to broaden the funding of activities meant to strengthen health systems. For instance, in the case of the GFATM, while these three diseases are to be addressed “in ways that will contribute to strengthening health systems” (GFATM, 2012), the latest GFATM strategy (2017–2022) includes as a strategic objective the building of resilient and sustainable systems for health (GFATM, 2018). Despite this stated approach, ‘horizontalising’ the Fund will remain “challenging, because the ‘specificities’ that make the Global Fund so successful and attractive, are precisely those that also impede moves toward Health System Strengthening (HSS)” (Steurs et al., 2018). These specificities include the Fund’s three-disease mandate, while challenges include: dissonance and ambiguity among partners around issues such as HSS; the need to ‘quantify the saving of lives’, leading to a narrow focus on selected, measurable interventions; and the ‘global’ centralised structure, without country offices, limiting knowledge of local contexts and the possibility to participate in health sector planning meetings or donor coordination groups (Steurs et al., 2018). Also observed has been a tendency by GPPPs to impose limits on countries’ sovereignty: access to global funds is allowed only according to globally determined priorities – often distinct from national priorities – and only if certain conditions are respected (e.g. private sector involvement in decision-making and implementation) (Missoni, 2004; Missoni & Pacileo, 2009). In these ways, GPPPs have contributed to transforming the organisational landscape of global health. To overcome the increasing DAH fragmentation linked to the mushrooming of global health initiatives focussed on priority diseases, and to reframe the discourse on coordination in the health sector according to the global Aid Effectiveness Agenda, an International Health Partnership (IHP) was proposed in 2007. This IHP initiative was launched by the British government and later implemented as IHP+, with the ‘plus’ signifying the addition of a range of similar initiatives aimed at accelerating achievement of the health-related Millennium Development Goals, in line with the Paris Declaration. The IHP+ opposed the emphasis on selective (i.e. vertical) approaches, focussing instead on horizontal health system strengthening and the coordination of global health actors at all levels, in order to provide solutions to issues including fragmented DAH, weakened Ministries of Health, and dysfunctional health systems. In 2016, the IHP+ was transformed into UHC2030 to respond to the health-related SDGs, also expanding its scope to include the goal of UHC. While the new partnership would continue the work on improving effective development cooperation in countries receiving external assistance, it would also broaden the scope to focus on health system strengthening and domestic spending in all countries.

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The initiative grew from 26 partners in 2007 to 66 partners in 2016, including governments, international organisations, civil society organisations, and global philanthropies. Although encouraged to join as partners, the business sector, academia, and media organisations have not as yet signed the UHC2030 Global Compact. Positive changes in practices among IHP+ signatories have been reported, together with progress in strengthening national planning processes, mutual accountability, and donor alignment with national budgets. However, a lack of progress has been documented in the use of recipients’ reporting and information systems and financial management and procurement systems (Moon & Omole, 2017).

Global policy networks Lastly, global health leadership is interconnected and influenced by global policy networks comprised of individual and institutional interactions, both ­formal and informal, by a relatively small, tightly integrated global élite group of ­policy-makers, technical advisers, and scholars (Lee & Goodman, 2002). ‘­Revolving door’ careerism has facilitated movement by those individuals within the few institutions leading the debate. A typical career pattern would be Ph.D training and then a faculty position in a prominent academic institution; project funding from a donor agency such as the World Bank or USAID; and a move to the donor agency as a staff member or technical adviser and/or recruitment by one of a small number of consultancy firms that have worked closely with donor agencies. (Lee & Goodman, 2002) More recently, given its power and influence, the Gates Foundation has become an additional point of ‘revolving door’ entry (Martens & Seitz, 2015).

Conclusions DAH has changed dramatically over recent decades characterised by the increased relevance of health in global development policies. The changes analysed in this chapter have highlighted the main trends, ideas, modalities, and leadership characteristics affecting DAH. These dynamics have been further affected by transformations in socio-economic conditions, politics, and the decisions of emerging powers. The predominant ideas that have been shaping DAH are related to the acceleration of the neoliberal process of globalisation and to the progressive deregulation and liberalisation of trade regimes. Meanwhile, changing health needs related to epidemiologic transitions (i.e. the increased burden from NCDs) have not received due attention.

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Health no longer depends solely on the situation of the specific country where a population resides. It is also determined by global forces acting outside the control of individual states, thus making it an issue related to foreign policy, global security, international trade, overall sustainability of development, democratic governance, and human rights (McInnes & Lee, 2012). The increased burden from NCDs and its association with the dominant modes of production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services calls for a response that goes beyond conventional biomedical health care approaches. Upstream social, economic, and environmental causal processes need to be addressed by implementing public health policies in all sectors. Some authors from the global South have suggested the need for a counterhegemonic approach to global health (Franco-Giraldo, 2016), but it is difficult to imagine the reorientation of current DAH actors to such a perspective. In this context, DAH can play only a limited role. However, Agenda 2030 and its indivisible SDGs may yet lead to an integrated inter-sectorial and systemic approach at the country level, focussed on the health impacts on local populations rather than mere outputs. Supporting the development of efficient, universally accessible health care systems are only one important aspect of such an approach. Strengthening partners’ policy-making and regulation capacities and providing the resources needed to control certain social determinants of health will also be indispensable to building the overall sustainability of development. The pillars of aid effectiveness remain donor adherence to principles, such as ownership and alignment, and strong coordination of DAH at the country level. However, the future of DAH will largely depend on the overall evolution of global health-related governance processes, as well as the roles played at multiple levels by an increasing number of very diverse actors and interactions that impact the vast array of social, economic, environmental, and political determinants of health.

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15 ‘WE FIRST’ AND THE ANTI-FOREIGN AID NARRATIVES OF POPULIST RADICAL-RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE Margarita Gómez-Reino

Introduction Since the 1960s, scholars have been noting the rise of a populist wave across the globe (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969; Mudde, 2013).1 In the European Union over the past three decades, the family of radical-right populist parties has gained strength in at least 21 of the 28 member states. These parties share narratives against immigration, defending their ‘own people’ against the presence of foreign persons and cultures in European countries. Today, radical-right populist parties are relevant both politically and in terms of policy in numerous European states, and they are represented in political institutions and even in certain national governments. Populist radical-right party agendas and narratives in Europe are heavily skewed towards limited domestic policies (Meguid, 2005).2 In principle, populist radical-right parties share the defense of their own peoples; however, foreign issues are also politicised (Schori Lange, 2007). Among the main foreign policy issues included by populist parties in their agendas are those related to the European Union and NATO, Turkey’s potential membership in the EU, and others. Euroscepticism has become a common feature that unites these parties against the development of an EU that encroaches on national sovereignty. Recently, populist party agendas have been introducing a secondary issue – foreign aid narratives relating to their positions vis-à-vis official development assistance (ODA). These narratives fit within the security paradigm (see Chapter 10), linking national interests and foreign aid. Often upset by the agreed-upon for OECD countries goal of devoting 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) to international assistance, they have targeted its existence in hopes of undoing the prior mainstream consensus on foreign development aid. And yet, as we will argue, these narratives around ODA are not homogenous. Populist radical-right parties in

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Europe oscillate between an anti-cosmopolitan view that demands a mere reduction of aid, and a view that projects national goals onto ODA, seeking to increase foreign aid while tying it to immigration policy goals. Furthermore, foreign development policy is not ‘above parties’. Scholars have analysed the impact of partisanship on the foreign aid policies of mainstream political parties in OECD countries. According to Thérien and Nöel (2000), ­social-democratic parties may influence the level of development assistance in some countries where the relationship between leftist partisan strength and foreign aid operates indirectly through welfare state institutions and social spending. In the same vein, Green and Licht (2018) find that domestic political preferences influence foreign aid and differentiate left-internationalist from conservative parties. Notwithstanding, the influence of partisan politics on foreign development aid is difficult to single out.3 The chapter is structured as follows. The following section presents a conceptual framework for analysing populist narratives on foreign aid for development, along with our research questions. Next an empirical analysis is made of foreign aid narratives and party positions in their respective systems. The subsequent section links the narratives on aid with the influence exerted by populist parties on national governments. The final section reassesses the anti-foreign aid narratives and the complexities of the causal links between populist agendas and foreign aid, describing the current open-ended scenario in which ownership of foreign development aid is not clear.

Literature review and research questions Concept-stretching abounds in the field of populism studies, but in the past decade, populism has largely been defined as a ‘thin’ ideology or, alternatively, a political discourse and style (Hawkins, 2009, 2010; Laclau, 2005). Here we take an ideational approach to populism which is best conceived in minimal terms as a unique set of ideas that understands politics as a Manichean struggle between a reified will of the people and a conspiring elite (Hawkins, 2009, 2010; Rovira et al., 2019, p. 3).4 The ideational approach underscores that populist radical-right parties are fundamentally characterized by a set of ideas and a programmatic outlook. Unlike mainstream parties that embrace broader ideologies, populist parties exhibit a ‘thin’ ideology – a limited set of ideas, easy adaptable to other ideologies in piecemeal fashion, similarly to Freeden’s conceptualization of nationalism (Freeden, 2003). The ideational approach in Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser covers an ample spectrum that treats the terms ‘discourse’, ‘frame’, ‘thin’ ideology, and ‘worldview’ as interchangeable (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019, p. 5). Populism has a chameleonic nature since it blends diverse ideas, leading Betz to distinguish between neoliberal and statist populist parties (Betz, 1993).5 The linkage between populism and other ideologies is important to explaining differences among party positions in other domains.

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Academics have produced a wealth of analyses about the family of populist radical-right parties which has expanded both geographically and electorally in Europe. The dominant narrative shared by these parties focusses on the threat of immigration to European societies as their core ideology, thus frequently earning them the label of anti-immigrant parties (Fennema, 1997). These parties are characterized by nationalism, xenophobia, and ethnocentric attitudes. Mudde (2007) suggests replacing the concept of nationalism with nativism, a concept imported from the US academic literature that refers to a nationalism characterized by ethnocentric attitudes in societies that experience ‘waves’ of migration. Critics, meanwhile, suggest that the concept cannot be distinguished from other forms of nationalism. In either case, the exacerbated nationalism in opposition to ‘the other’, and the populism that positions ‘the people’ against ‘the elites’, are both intrinsic to the ‘thin’ ideology that these populist parties exhibit. Here ‘thin’ ideology captures the malleability of populism as it includes varied programmes and policies.6 In conclusion, the positions of the radical-right or anti-immigrant parties ­regarding other policy domains beyond immigration can be very heterogeneous. Thus, it can be said that their foreign policy position was originally generally characterized by heterogeneity and diversification (Schori Liang, 2007). Our main concern here is to examine just one issue within foreign and security policies – foreign aid for development, as extended by European nations – and to answer the following questions: What are the main positions and preferences of populist right-wing parties on foreign development aid in Europe? What ­influence, if any, do populist right-wing parties have on foreign development aid in European countries? This chapter analyses the narratives and influence, both direct and indirect, of populist radical-right parties in cutting foreign development aid or in modifying its scope. The link between immigration and development aid of these parties’ agendas are potentially ‘heads and tails’ of the same populist ideology, and it is worth exploring how the changes impressed upon the traditional goals of official development aid in the context of the 2008 economic crisis and its aftermath might have been influenced by populist parties. Recently, scholars and pundits have been paying attention to the issue of development aid in foreign policy objectives in the context of the Great Recession, its aftermath, and the 2015 refugee crisis (Balfour et al., 2017; Ben Levy, 2017).

Narratives and programmatic positions on foreign aid As per the literature review, the core ideology of radical-right populist parties targets domestic issues, rejecting immigration and multicultural societies. They politicise the opposition between globalisation and anti-globalisation, as well as ethno-culturalism (with an emphasis on cultural homogeneity) based on the primacy of their cultural values (Western Civilization, Christianity). Accordingly, the distribution of resources is based upon national identity and cultural values. Slogans such as ‘Les français d’abord’, ‘Eigen volk eerst’, or ‘Prima gli italiani’ clearly express the utmost importance of ‘we first’ as a principle for political action and

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allocation of resources that is extremely effective due to its simplicity in the definition of priorities in domestic policies that target ‘our own people’. The populist narratives, xenophobic and nationalist, play with citizens’ fears of immigration and multiculturalism. Although these domestic policies are their primary target, populist parties are not single-issue parties: their programmatic profile has expanded their rhetoric to other policy areas, including foreign and security policies. A question open to debate is the extent to which these parties hold similar views of international relations beyond the common emphasis on nationalism, immigration, and increasingly rampant Euroscepticism. Foreign policy perspectives are rather heterogeneous in relation to domestic partisan positions, from US-Russia relations to the role of NATO, the wars in Iraq or Syria, or Turkey’s possible adhesion to the EU (Schori Lang, 2007). The European Union itself was a secondary concern for these parties until the early 1990s, but by the end of last decade, Euroscepticism had become a major feature of partisan politics. Populist radical-right parties form the Eurosceptic vanguard in the Union, rejecting EU bureaucracy and the existence of a common European political system that encroaches on national sovereignty (Edward & De Vries, 2009). The populist-nationalist narratives on aid, although similarly based on the ‘we first’ principle, present two different emphases on ODA expenditure. On the one hand, some populist parties in Europe adopt an anti-cosmopolitan discourse that rejects international institutions and proposes using foreign aid moneys to address domestic issues, keeping spending at minimum and devoted to humanitarian aid. On the other hand, nationalist agendas can accommodate the need for foreign aid required to reinforce the control of national borders and to promote national culture abroad. During the past decade, some populist radical-right parties have adopted positions regarding foreign development aid. In the aftermath of the Great Recession that began in 2008, a set of populist radical right parties in Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands advocated a strong reduction in their countries’ development aid budgets and demanded that funds to be exclusively tied to the management of humanitarian crises and emergencies. In 2015, Finland also followed this pattern. Conversely, the French National Front (FN), considered the party that developed a ‘master frame’ for the populist radical-right family (Van Hauwaert, 2013), has advocated a geographical focus of aid on Africa, to serve France’s interests, mainly through state support to French private investments on that continent, in exchange for a reversal of migration flows to Europe. The aim is not to reduce foreign aid per se, but rather to increase it to meet the 0.7% goal while attending to France’s national interests, and to ultimately control the migration flows ­t ypical of the security narrative. Thus, the security narrative appears in party positions around ODA. Parties such as the FN and Italy’s Lega Nord assert that assistance must be located at the points of origin of migrant flows, and not within the destination countries of Europe.

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It is amid the expansion of programmatic populist agendas that foreign aid for development must be inserted. Anti-foreign aid narratives that initially appeared in France, Denmark, Finland, the UK, and the Netherlands are based on the prioritisation of domestic policies and the reduction of aid to serve only emergencies and humanitarian actions. For some parties, the objective has been to reduce the percentage of foreign aid budgets to minimum, and always below the 0.7% target. Alternatively, another formula appears in the subordination of foreign development aid to national interests (such as the FN’s proposal of a special plan for Maghreb countries). Populist party campaigns have argued that foreign development aid should be designed to block immigration flows, demanding that humanitarian aid be funded through agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The refugee crisis in 2015 revealed some populist radical-right parties’ intention to establish a necessary link between development aid and immigration policy. Alternatively, some populist parties (Denmark’s Danish People’s Party (DPP), Austria’s Freiheitliche Partei ­Österreichs (FPÖ), Belgium’s Vlaams Belang (VB)) have proposed the inclusion of a readmission policy. As stated above, some populist parties have clearly stated their positions on the aid budget. The Dutch ‘Party for Freedom’ demanded “No more money for foreign aid” in its programme.7 In the same manner, the British United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) has supported reducing the budget for foreign aid. The programme of the True Finns in Finland in 2011 likewise called for a reduction in development aid, later implemented by the party as part of the coalition government in 2015. In Austria, since 2017, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has formally been an independent candidate nominated by the populist FPÖ, a member of the coalition government. Cuts to foreign aid were characteristic of the period in Austria (OECD, 2018), but political debates were marked by changes in domestic immigration policy, both in content and in the amounts dedicated. The coalition between Sebastian Kurz’s Popular party and Heinz-Christian Strache’s FPÖ in 2017 has also led to an even harder line on immigration. The FN deviates from the ‘standard’ budget-cut approach to foreign aid, with party leader Marine Le Pen (during the 2017 presidential elections) advocating 144 proposals. Among them, Le Pen proposed ‘true co-development’ with ­A frica based on aid, education, and security. Interestingly, the Front National did ­endorse the goal of 0.7% of GNI for official development aid. In Le Pen’s words, it was a situation not only of solidarity, but also of security (“We will raise aid up to 0.7% because it is a condition of our national security”). In this framework, aid is defined as the most efficient tool against threats of massive migration and terrorism, and it therefore fits within the security narrative.8 Other ­European parties, such as the recently successful Spanish Vox, explicitly use the same framework in their programme.9 Thus, the issue of ODA budgets has a­ cquired more political visibility since the economic and refugee crises, and the potential link between immigration and foreign aid policy has been made explicit by some populist parties.

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Influence of populist parties on government aid expenditure Once these ideas appear in populist party narratives and programmes, both in terms of the reduction of aid and the redefinition of foreign aid policy, they can have an influence on policy through the opening of political opportunity structures. The electoral success of populist radical-right parties in European countries has allowed them in varying degrees to exert a direct influence on governmental policy through government coalitions or external support for conservative or liberal minority governments. Table 15.1 shows the evolution of ODA in EU countries since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008. The table reflects the budget cuts (in percentage of GNI) decided by several European governments during the economic crisis in order to explore the extent to which those cuts to foreign aid (as official development aid) were the direct result of the presence of populist radical-right parties.

TABLE 15.1  Evolution of ODA efforts in Europe after the financial crisis ODA net disbursements

in current prices as percentage of GNI (%) Donor*

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Variation

Austria Belgium Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain Sweden UK Liechtenstein Malta Average

0.43 0.48 0.12 0.82 0.44 0.39 0.38 0.21 0.08 0.59 0.22 0.97 0.80 0.89 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.13 0.45 0.98 0.43 0.07 0.11 0.41

0.30 0.55 0.12 0.88 0.54 0.47 0.35 0.19 0.10 0.54 0.16 1.04 0.82 1.06 0.09 0.23 0.09 0.15 0.46 1.12 0.51 0.07 0.11 0.43

0.32 0.64 0.13 0.91 0.55 0.50 0.39 0.17 0.09 0.52 0.15 1.05 0.81 1.05 0.08 0.29 0.09 0.13 0.43 0.97 0.57 0.06 0.10 0.44

0.27 0.54 0.12 0.85 0.53 0.46 0.39 0.15 0.11 0.51 0.20 0.97 0.75 0.96 0.08 0.31 0.09 0.13 0.29 1.02 0.56 0.07 0.13 0.41

0.28 0.47 0.12 0.83 0.53 0.45 0.37 0.13 0.10 0.47 0.14 1.00 0.71 0.93 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.97 0.56 0.07 0.13 0.39

0.27 0.45 0.11 0.85 0.54 0.41 0.38 0.10 0.10 0.46 0.17 1.00 0.67 1.07 0.10 0.23 0.09 0.13 0.17 1.01 0.70 0.08 0.11 0.40

0.28 0.46 0.11 0.86 0.59 0.37 0.42 0.11 0.11 0.38 0.19 1.06 0.64 1.00 0.09 0.19 0.09 0.12 0.13 1.09 0.70 0.08 0.10 0.40

0.35 0.42 0.12 0.85 0.55 0.37 0.52 0.12 0.13 0.32 0.22 0.95 0.75 1.05 0.10 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.12 1.40 0.70 0.09 0.12 0.42

0.42 0.50 0.14 0.75 0.44 0.38 0.70 0.19 0.17 0.32 0.27 1.00 0.65 1.12 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.19 0.34 0.94 0.70 0.11 0.14 0.43

0.30 0.45 0.15 0.74 0.42 0.43 0.67 0.16 0.11 0.32 0.30 1.00 0.60 0.99 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.19 1.02 0.70 0.11 0.13 0.41

Source: DAC1. Data extracted on 11 February 2019 12:31 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat. * European countries with data available from 2008 to 2017.

−30% −7% 21% −10% −3% 11% 74% −26% 47% −46% 38% 3% −25% 12% 78% −34% 32% 23% −56% 4% 62% 60% 18% 0%

278  Margarita Gómez-Reino

The impact of the Great Recession was felt across the economies of the OECD and the European Union, and this financial context was less than ­propitious to ODA. To the best of our knowledge, still, no single direct link has been found between the economic crisis and the budget cuts. The refugee crisis beginning in 2015 further required governments to take decisions on aid. But as T ­ able 15.1 shows, the average percentage variation in ODA effort among ­European ­countries was 0% for the entire decade. Only Austrian and Dutch ODA took a significant cut (at 30% and 25%, respectively) over the period. European countries have traditionally differed about the resources allocated to ODA. In 2008, only Scandinavian countries devoted to above 0.7% of GDP to foreign aid. The most recent data (2017) reveal that four countries complied with the objective of 0.7% (the UK, Norway, Denmark (despite the cuts), and Luxembourg). As Table 15.1 indicates, many European countries suffered budget cuts in the 2008–2017 period, regardless of whether they had relevant populist radical-right parties or not. Thus, the so-called peripheral countries (Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece) all suffered heavy cuts in terms of outgoing ODA.10 Finally, there was a substantial continuity in the aid budgets of many countries. At the beginning of the crisis, the countries with the lowest budgets dedicated to ODA were Austria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. The most recent data (2017) show that these countries continue to dedicate the lowest proportion of their budgets to ODA. Also belonging to this group is Spain, where the budget for ODA decreased from 0.45% to 0.19% in the studied period (see Chapter 7 in this volume). It is important to distinguish two levels of direct influence of populist parties on aid (and any other policy areas): the influence in national governments where these parties are present, and the influence in political institutions at the EU level. Furthermore, populist radical-right parties can exert an indirect influence with their campaigns on public opinion, and as opposition parties suffering a cordon sanitaire, without the need to participate in government: the French FN, the British UKIP, and the Sweden Democrats all have influenced domestic political debates. Through political language and tone, populist narratives can feed fear, hatred, and xenophobia. The first road to direct policy influence is through participation in coalition governments, or by providing external support to mainstream minority governments. Out of all the currently relevant populist parties in Europe, two have officially entered national governments, chairing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Finland (from 2015) and Austria (from 2017).11 Agreements between populist radical-right parties and mainstream conservative and liberal parties had made possible the direct influence of the former in aid. In Italy, the Lega Nord had an impact on international assistance in the Berlusconi government, and later in the government formed by the Five Star Movement and the Lega Nord (the M5S-LN coalition government), but immigration remains to date the most ­politicised domestic issue, while foreign aid remains in the background as a very secondary concern (Verbeek & Zaslove, 2015).

Anti-foreign aid narratives  279

In turn, the influences that populist radical-right parties may have on the European Union depends on the institutions at stake, whether the European Council or the European Parliament. In the European Council, two parties in the government of two member states have had direct access to the European agenda: Finland (Finns Party (PS), the True Finns) and Hungary (Fidesz), with the later addition of the Austrian and Italian populist coalition governments.12 Second, the electoral success of populist parties in European elections has allowed political groups in the European Parliament to consolidate transnational collective actions such as the group for European Freedom and Direct Democracy, and the Group of Europe of Nations and Freedoms (Gómez-Reino, 2018). The size of both groups is not significant, and they currently suffer a cordon sanitaire in Parliament. In the European Parliament’s Committee for Development (DEVE), there are a total of 34 members and 34 alternates, but only two members and two alternates represent populist radical-right parties. Nevertheless, the influence of populist radical-right parties can always be indirect, to the extent that populist parties are able to push both conservatives and liberals further to the right and incorporate these issues.13 Table 15.2 summarizes the most relevant populist radical right parties in the EU, their structural positions in each party system (opposition or government), and their degree of influence in government positions (external or coalition member), along with the percentage of variation of ODA expenditure. The table provides mixed evidence on the negative influence that populist parties can have on aid expenditure; only three countries with populist-supported governments (Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands) reduced foreign aid in the post-crisis context. In the Netherlands, the coalition that supported the minority government in 2010–2012 signed an agreement with Geert Wilders’ Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) to support the government in exchange for greater control over immigration and cuts to foreign development aid. In Finland, a tripartite government was formed in 2015 between the liberal party, the centre party, and the True Finns. The leader of the True Finns, Timo Soini, was appointed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and foreign development aid was thereafter cut in half. Budget cuts to foreign aid in Finland were significant (see ­Table 15.1) although the overall impact of these cuts was diluted over the decade. In ­Hungary, Victor Orban’s government (Fidesz), currently in government, has radicalised its position on immigration and refugee issues over the decade and maintained a limited budget for foreign development aid. The case of Hungary is complex, and scholars debate the extent to which Fidesz belongs to the group of popular or populist parties, as the party shifted from popular positions to increasingly populist radical-right stances. Jobbik, the other Hungarian party belonging to the populist radical-right party family, remained in opposition during the decade. Thus, the presence of coalitions in government that incorporate populist radical-right parties (as in Austria, the Netherlands, and Finland) has played an

Fidesz/ Jobbik Front National

Lega Nord

PVV

Swedish N Democrats (SD) UKIP N

Hungary

Italy

Netherlands

Sweden

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

–2017 (2015)

12.9 (2014)

13.2 (2017)

37% (2018)

44.87 (2014) 16.67 (2014) 8.75 (2017)

17.7 (2015)

20.5 (2017) 5.84 (2014) 12.3 (2015)

% Vote general election (last)

27.49

9.67

13.2

5

6.2

51.48 14.67 24.85

9.8

19.7 4.26 26.6

Opposition

Cordon sanitaire

Coalition Government (2008) Coalition Government (2018) External government support

11%

Cordon sanitaire

VVD+D66+CDA+CU

VVD+CDA (2010–2012)

M5S+LN

Centre-right (2008)

62%

4%

−25%

38%

−3%

−30% −7% −10%

ODA*

47%

National Conservative party and Centre party

Venstre and Conservatives

Popular party

Other coalition members

Coalition gov. (2017–) Cordon sanitaire External government support Coalition government (2015) Government

% Vote 2014 Government/opposition European election

Source: Author’s elaboration. * Percentage of variation in ODA as percentage of GNI from 2008 to 2017 (see Table 15.1).

UK

France

Finns

Finland

N N Y

FPÖ VB DPP

Austria Belgium Denmark

Y/N

Party

Country

Influence in government between 2008 and 2017

TABLE 15.2  Most relevant populist radical-right parties in the EU, and variations in ODA, 2008–2017

Anti-foreign aid narratives  281

important role in negotiations of budget cuts to ODA. In the Netherlands, external support by the PVV to the Dutch minority government (the first Rutte government, formed by the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD) and Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA) in 2010–2012) led to a cumulative 20% reduction in the ODA budget for five years (receiving cuts from 2011 through 2014). In Finland, where 0.55% of the 2015 budget was spent on ODA, the coalition government including the True Finns cut the budget from to 0.59% in 2014 to 0.42% in 2017). In Denmark, the Danish People’s party granted external support to the minority governments formed by Venstra, LA, and the Conservatives (the three Rassmussen cabinets), pushing budget cuts to ODA. In Austria, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and current Prime Minister Sebastian Kurz (People’s party, PM since 2017) demanded that the EU stop aid to countries that refused to readmit persons whose petitions for asylum were denied, as was the case in Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia. Yet populist radical-right parties need not be in government to reshape perspectives on foreign development aid. In Sweden, even the centre-left government has recently considered how to redefine the budget for development aid to respond to the influx of immigrants. Ultimately, by the end of the decade under study, a new context for foreign development aid has helped to blur the boundaries between the discussion of official foreign aid and domestic immigration and refugee policies.

Conclusions The core ideology of radical-right populist parties in Europe has been dominated by the prevalence of national identity (‘we first’) and issues of immigration and its effects on European countries. Foreign development aid during the past decade has appeared in different forms in these parties’ agendas, from anecdotal budget cuts to a systemic, integrated view of how immigration and foreign aid are linked through security narratives, thus supporting the inclusion of foreign aid in party proposals. Populist right-wing parties have succeeded in public debates at both the domestic and European levels, polarising electorates and constructing interpretative frames on the principle of ‘we first’. As most recent scenarios suggest, foreign development aid can become exclusively tied to the costs of immigration, refugee, and asylum policies. Populist radical-right parties are largely eroding the principles that sustain foreign aid. Foreign development objectives, as initially intended, will not merely be postponed (as they were in 2015) to a new proposed date of 2030, but will be fundamentally changed in their nature and purpose. This chapter has shown that the most important factor for populist ­radicalright parties in influencing foreign aid policies has been the extent to which mainstream conservative and liberal parties have required their participation in coalition building, or else their external support to minority governments. Still, budget cuts to foreign aid in the post-crisis period have been inextricably linked

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to the ideologies attached to populist positions. In Denmark, the Netherlands, and Finland (relatively liberal) populist political parties have likewise prioritised budget cuts since the Great Recession. One area we have not investigated here is that of populist left-wing parties. The creation of the Podemos party in 2014 marked the appearance of a kind of radical-left populism in Spain, following in the steps of the Greek Syriza party. The leadership of Podemos has claimed to support the 0.7% development aid target. Populist parties of the left explicitly untie the knot between foreign development aid and the domestic immigration policies proposed by the populist radical right. However, despite the relative lack of radical-right populism in Spain (at least until 2018, with the success of Vox in regional elections in Andalusia), the country has experienced heavy budget cuts to foreign aid. From the beginning of the 2008 economic crisis, the percentage of GNI dedicated to ODA has decreased, to its present level of 0.19%. The case of Spain (as in Ireland, Portugal, and Greece) shows how, over the decade of the Great Recession and its associated austerity policies, reductions occurred in development aid without the pressure of right-wing populist parties. However, populist radical-left parties favour compliance with the objective of 0.7% of GNI to foreign aid, and they clearly separate it from domestic policies that seek to tackle problems associated with immigration and refugees.

Notes 1 The academic literature on populism is a booming industry. We limit the references here to certain relevant well-known pieces. 2 As Meguid underscores, these are ‘niche’ parties narrowing political appeals to a few issues. 3 On the influence of social-democratic parties and welfare institutions on aid, see Chapter 5 on the Scandinavian countries. Chapter 4 on the UK also shows historical differences between Labour and Conservative Governments in aid policy until the past decade, while Chapter 3 on the US finds that aid is not subject to party competition. 4 As Hawkins et al. put it, the ideational definition of populism has three parts: a ­Manichean cosmology, the people as a homogenous community, and the depiction of an elite as a corrupt entity (the combination of all three is required) (Hawkins et al., 2019, p. 3). 5 In his well-known work, Mudde elided these differences as he considers them secondary to the populist party ‘family’ (Mudde, 2007). 6 Thus, populist parties may also be divided between neoliberals and protectionists (see the contrast between the statist FN and the liberal Dutch PVV). 7 In a political context in which the party also demanded wider budget cuts to wind turbines, the arts, and public broadcasters. 8 Le Monde, 11 Apr 2017, Marine Le Pen: ‘Aid to Africa is the only block against immigration’. The FN leader agreed absolutely with the 0.7% ODA target. “It is not only a matter of solidarity; if that were the case, French aid to Africa wouldn’t have dropped to 0.37% under a Socialist government! We will raise aid up to 0.7% because it is a condition of our national security. French people must understand that this effort, around 16 billion euros each year, contributing to the security and prosperity of Africans, is the only efficient block against the threats of massive migration and

Anti-foreign aid narratives  283

terrorism, and it is a gauge of prosperity shared to long-term. […] Aid will respond to the necessities specific to the population – the most fragile, women in particular, in the Sahel, security, education, agriculture”. 9 Articles 21 and 100 of the Vox programme link development cooperation with the “nations of our common Hispanic historical community and channel migration flows”. Article 21 establishes aid to development to countries that accept readmission of illegal immigrants and criminals. 10 The Greek Syriza party (a coalition party of the radical-left populist family) was an exception, being in power during the period when budget cuts to aid were taken in Greece. 1 1 As stated above, the Austrian FPÖ nominated an independent to chair the Ministry. 1 2 The Hungarian Fidesz party has a contested relationship within the radical-right populist family. Scholars have included the country’s Jobbik party within the populist family, but Fidesz has undergone a process of radicalisation on issues such as immigration and is thus included here. 1 3 This is the opposite effect of mainstreaming the populist radical right, analysed by Akkerman, De Lange, and Rooduijn (2016), among others.

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