Agonistic Democracy and Political Practice: Ways of Being Adversarial [1st ed. 2022] 3031059980, 9783031059988

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Agonistic Democracy and Political Practice Ways of Being Adversarial Fuat Gürsözlü

Agonistic Democracy and Political Practice

Fuat Gürsözlü

Agonistic Democracy and Political Practice Ways of Being Adversarial

Fuat Gürsözlü Department of Philosophy Loyola University Maryland Baltimore, MD, USA

ISBN 978-3-031-05998-8 ISBN 978-3-031-05999-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05999-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

I began thinking seriously about agonistic democracy roughly fifteen years ago when I first read Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy and Mouffe’s the Democratic Paradox. At the time I was writing a dissertation on democracy and violence. Mouffe’s hegemony-centered account of the social and her agonistic approach with its promise of pacification of antagonism through democratization changed how I considered the nature and aims of politics and democracy and thought about violence. Reading the works of William Connolly and Bonnie Honig helped me have a better understanding of different forms of agonistic politics and grasp the promises of agonistic thought. I recognized that despite their differences, some of which are significant, the commonalities between the works of agonistic thinkers allow us to view the agonistic approach as a distinct strand in contemporary political theory. Since then, I have been thinking about politics and democracy agonistically. As a critique of agonistic politics, both in the positive and negative sense, I’ve reflected on its possibilities and limits in order to have a clearer understanding of the agonistic approach. Along the way, I’ve taught agonistic democratic theory in my classes, given talks, and published on agonistic politics. Since agonistic democracy is a relatively new approach in democratic theory, I’ve received many challenging questions from friends, colleagues, and reviewers, who generously read my work, and

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audiences at my talks, and students in my seminars. Most of those questions were about the implications of the agonistic perspective for democratic practice and asking what the agonistic perspective can say about democratic political practices and experiences. How does the agonistic perspective respond to political polarization? How does agonistic democracy deal with illiberal and anti-democratic positions? Should the agonistic exchange be understood only in terms of confrontation between adversaries? Is agonistic democracy protest and activism friendly? How does the agonistic approach characterize movements such as the OWS or BLM? What would agonistic political parties look like? How does agonistic politics relate to peace, especially given that it views conflict, contestation, and struggle positively? Now I realize that these questions, and many others about agonism and practical politics, have deeply shaped how I approach the agonistic democratic framework and utilize it to make sense of contemporary politics. They encouraged me to think about the practice of agonistic politics and reflect on the positive contribution of the agonistic perspective to the way we view democratic practice. The result is this book about agonistic reflections on democratic practice. The purpose of this book is to further develop the practical dimension of agonistic democracy by mobilizing agonistic political thought toward a critical understanding of our contemporary political conjuncture. It aims to advance our understanding of the implications of agonistic democratic theory for the practice of democracy. In doing so, it explores the possibilities for sustaining agonism within the context of existing political structures. In that sense, the book aims to contribute to the discussions on the opportunities presented by agonistic thinking by critically exploring in what ways agonism offers new insights into the nature, aims, and limits of democratic practice and experience. Ultimately, I argue that approaching the political terrain from an agonistic perspective changes how we view the nature of democratic society and the question of exclusion, the nature of adversarial exchange, the place of political protest in democracy, the function of political parties, the nature of partisanship, and the concept of peace. In advancing my agonistic reflections on these subjects, I primarily draw on Mouffe’s agonistic democracy not because I view Mouffe as the only representative of agonistic democracy, but because her agonistic account of democracy provides the most comprehensive theoretical framework to reflect on democratic political practice. I often turn to a broad range of post-structuralist and agonistic scholars, and in particular to Connolly’s and Honig’s agonistic approaches, in order

PREFACE

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to develop the positions I advance in this book. As a result, I propose an agonistic perspective inspired by Mouffe and influenced by Connolly’s and Honig’s agonistic insights. The book consists of two parts and six chapters. Part I, Theoretical Interventions, includes the first two chapters that introduce the theoretical framework that guides my analysis of democratic practice. The first chapter identifies the origin of agonistic politics in Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Social Strategy and traces its development into a distinct approach in democratic theory. It draws a distinction between two strands of Mouffe’s thought: radical democratic politics and agonistic democracy. I argue that what is often considered to be one coherent theory are two distinct approaches to democratic politics and they are not always compatible. Having clarified the connection between hegemony and agonism and the differences between radical democracy and agonistic democracy, in Chapter 2, I turn the question of exclusion. Agonists argue that there is no order without exclusion. Agonistic democracy is not exempt from that. Agonistic democracy, however, is different from other political approaches in that it promises to be more democratic and inclusive. As such, it cannot simply justify its exclusions by invoking the value of stability and order. Not only this undermines its claim to make its exclusions contestable but also putting too much emphasis on stability and order stifles the spirit of democratic struggle. In response, I argue that it is essential to view hegemony as a continuum and draw a distinction between strong hegemony and weak hegemony. Agonistic democracy should establish itself as a weak hegemonic regime that keeps its political boundaries more fluid and porous and thus society more democratic and inclusive. Part II, Practical Considerations, includes Chapters 3–6. These four chapters focus on various aspects of democratic practice to articulate the implications of agonistic thinking for democratic politics. Chapter 3 explores sources of expanding modes of agonistic political exchange in a way that sustains and enriches democratic politics. It argues that adversarial exchange need not be confined to confrontation and should be expanded to include modified deliberation, storytelling, and creative political performances. Chapter 4 approaches political protest from the perspective of agonism. Mainstream theories of democracy view peaceful political protest and activism as democratically valueless and meaningless, harmful to democracy to democratic ideals, or, at best, having limited democratic value as corrective to non-ideal democratic conditions. By focusing on the recent public sphere movements, the chapter argues

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that the agonistic approach allows us to formulate the democratic value of peaceful public protest and recognize the purpose and meaning of activism. Chapter 5 offers a much-needed agonistic analysis of political parties. Drawing on Mouffe’s work, it offers an account of agonistic political party and argues that agonistic political parties have an important role to play in sustaining the agonistic dynamics of democratic politics. Finally, Chapter 6 examines the concept of peace from an agonistic perspective and suggests that the ultimate purpose of agonistic political practice is to create sustainable agonistic peace. The idea of agonistic peace I advance here is implicitly present throughout the book informing my agonistic approach. In the concluding chapter, I make this new idea of peace explicit and argue that the agonistic perspective provides the basis for a new concept of peace that goes beyond the negative and positive peace paradigm. I propose a concept of agonistic peace understood in terms of an equilibrium between the constituent political tensions of the democratic polity. I conclude by suggesting that a well-functioning agonistic democracy creates agonistic peace and agonistic peace is essential for keeping the agonistic dynamics of democracy alive. Baltimore, USA

Fuat Gürsözlü

Acknowledgments

I’d like to thank many friends and colleagues who have contributed to this project in various ways. First, I’d like to extend my gratitude to the late Bat-Ami Bar On. Ami introduced me to agonistic thinking, and, in particular, to the works of Hannah Arendt and Chantal Mouffe. Her advice in writing the earlier versions of the manuscript was invaluable. I am grateful to William Gay, Andrew Fiala, and Richard Boothby for reading and generously offering comments on specific chapters. I am very much indebted to Steven DeCaroli with whom I have discussed many themes in the book for reading several chapters and making extremely valuable suggestions. I had the opportunity to discuss parts of this project at various conferences and workshops. These include the New York Political Science Association, International Social Philosophy Conference, University of Baltimore Hoffberger Center for Professional Ethics Colloquium, and Northeastern Political Science Association Conference. I owe thanks to the participants and discussants at those meetings for their feedback. My endless thanks go to the Concerned Philosophers for Peace. I had the good fortune to attend the CPP conference in 2007 and since then I have been a part of the CPP group. I’ve discussed various parts of this project at CPP Conferences. Thanks to friends and audiences at Concerned Philosophers for Peace for offering encouraging and insightful comments.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Some sections of Chapters 3, 4, and 5 incorporate ideas introduced in my earlier publications. Elements of Chapter 3 appeared in “Democratic Potential of Creative Political Protest,” Critical Studies: International Journal of Humanities Volume 3 (Fall) (2017): 20–31, Chapter 4 in “Democracy and the Square: Recognizing the Democratic Value of Recent Public Sphere Movements,” Essays in Philosophy Volume 16:1 (2015): 26–42, and Chapter 6 in “Cultural Violence, Hegemony, and Agonistic Interventions Agonistic Interventions,” in Peace, Culture, and Violence, ed. Fuat Gürsözlü (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 84–105. Special thanks go to the Philosophy Department at Loyola University Maryland. I wish to thank all my colleagues in the department and our administrative assistant, Lisa Flaherty, for providing an ideal supportive work environment. I would like to thank Loyola University Maryland for providing support for this project. Loyola’s generous support includes a one-semester sabbatical, two summer research grants provided by the Office of Research and Sponsored Programs, and funds for travel to conferences. I’m also grateful to the editorial team at Palgrave Macmillan for their genuine interest in this project. I owe thanks to Madison Allums, Henry Rogers, and Geetha Chockalingam. Their understanding and patience have been especially invaluable during a global pandemic that has upended our lives. Thanks also to two anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions and comments. Finally, my deepest gratitude to my family. I want to thank my parents, Gönül Gürsözlü and Okyar Gürsözlü, for being a constant source of inspiration and for their support from thousands of miles away. To Selin Gürsözlü, I owe more than I could express. Without her generosity, support, and encouragement this book would not have been possible. It was her encouragement that gave me the confidence and courage to undertake such a large-scale project. Then came the pandemic and we’re in its third year. It is her support and faith in me that has kept me going all this time and made it possible for me to bring this project to its completion. This book is dedicated to her and to our miracle Poyraz who taught me to persist against all odds.

Contents

Part I Theoretical Interventions 1

Democracy: Radical or Agonistic?

2

For a More Democratic Agonistic Politics

3 41

Part II Practical Considerations 73

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Expanding Agonistic Engagement

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Agonistic Spaces and the Value of Political Protests

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5

What Should We Expect from Political Parties? An Agonistic Account of Political Party

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Thinking Peace Agonistically

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6

Index

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PART I

Theoretical Interventions

CHAPTER 1

Democracy: Radical or Agonistic?

The main aim of this chapter is to delineate the theoretical framework upon which the following chapters build. For this purpose, in the first part of the chapter, I begin with an overview of the main lines of Laclau and Mouffe’s anti-essentialist approach and clarify how it introduces the concepts of antagonism and hegemony. The theoretical approach Laclau and Mouffe advanced in Hegemony and Social Strategy (HSS) has deeply shaped Mouffe’s political thought and determined its trajectory.1 In particular, the notion of hegemony plays a key role in Mouffe’s thought and emerges as a central organizing concept that brings together Mouffe’s work including her most recent defense of left-wing populism. In the HSS, Laclau and Mouffe offer a post-structuralist reading of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony in an attempt to envision the conditions of possibility of left-wing political movement in late-capitalism. Understanding the constitution of society from the perspective of hegemony allows Mouffe to explore the possibility of a democratic and pluralistic political order under conditions of ever-present antagonism. This significant shift in focus also marks the origin of an often-overlooked bifurcation of Mouffe’s thought into radical democracy and agonistic democracy. When commentators consider Mouffe’s thought they don’t pay sufficient attention to the distinction between these two distinct approaches. That’s why they end up addressing these two theories as if they are two dimensions of one coherent theory. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Gürsözlü, Agonistic Democracy and Political Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05999-5_1

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The second aim of the chapter is to clarify the differences between the two approaches and present agonistic democracy and radical democracy as two distinct theories addressing different political problems and advancing different political goals. The idea of hegemony is central to both approaches, but the differences between them have significant implications for thinking politically. Thus, after providing an outline of the anti-essentialist perspective, in the second part of the chapter, I explicate the two strands of Mouffe’s political thought. Agonistic politics is not a means for achieving radical democracy, rather it provides the political terrain for hegemony struggle to play out democratically and peacefully. Within this democratic struggle, radical democracy is one political project among many others competing for hegemony. In the third part of the chapter, I further explore the main differences between the two approaches and clarify how they are related to each other. I suggest that once we understand the relationship between the two theories, we recognize that not only the project of radical democracy and agonistic democracy are distinct from each other but they are not necessarily compatible.

The Origin Anti-Essentialist Social Ontology Before we turn to Mouffe’s agonistic theory it is essential to visit the main ideas of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony advanced in the HSS. The theoretical approach they outline in the HSS and the new problems this new approach brings to the fore have shaped deeply the trajectory of Mouffe’s further research and informed all her subsequent work.2 The theory of hegemony and the ontology of social that underlies it lay the groundwork for radical democracy and later for Mouffe’s agonistic politics. The former is a reworking of what Laclau and Mouffe call “the socialist project” aiming to propose a new Left-wing project. The latter is an account of a liberal democracy understood as a regime that provides the political space for hegemony struggle to play out in a nonviolent way. As I show later in this chapter these two commitments are not necessarily compatible with each other and, more specifically, defending agonistic democracy doesn’t require a commitment to radical democracy. Mouffe’s radical democracy offers a radical democratic interpretation of the fundamental principles of liberal democracy—liberty and equality. In doing so,

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it constitutes one legitimate political strategy among many that exist in the political space created and delimited by agonistic democracy. To recognize the distinctiveness of Mouffe’s agonistic theory and its potential, we should return to the HSS and examine the origins of Mouffe’s agonistic politics.3 In the HSS, Laclau and Mouffe explore the possibility of a renewed “socialist project” that could include the demands of newly emerging social movements. Writing in the 1980s, Laclau and Mouffe point out that there exists a growing gap between the new social and political reality marked by democratic social struggles against sexism, racism, environmental destruction, and what traditional Marxist thought could account for.4 The emergence of new social and political identities and the politicization of different forms of subordination other than class subordination have led the Left into a theoretical crisis. Traditional Marxist thought concentrates on class antagonism as the primary societal antagonism that should be fought for emancipation. It grants ontological priority to the working class as historical agents of political change whose class position inevitably determines their political consciousness. And it affirms the centrality of the base-superstructure model defending economic determinism. Laclau and Mouffe argue that these fundamental commitments limit Marxist theory in such a way that it cannot account for the emergence of various forms of subordination that are not viewed as the expression of class relations.5 Thus, deconstructing the central categories of Marxist theory is needed in light of contemporary problems.6 To theorize how a relation of subordination becomes a relation of oppression and constitutes itself as a site of antagonism and to identify the possibility of collective action that aims to challenge relations of subordination, Laclau and Mouffe replace Marxist theory’s fundamental ontological and epistemological commitments with their unique combination Gramsci’s hegemony theory and post-structuralism.7 The result is a reformulation of socialism as radicalization of liberal democracy. At the heart of this new project lies the concept of hegemony and an account of the social as a discursive space. The main idea of the notion of the social as a discursive space is that the social space has no essence or underlying principle that constitutes it. Drawing on Ferdinand de Saussure’s structural linguistics that is based on two keys ideas that there is no relation of necessity between the sign which describes an object and the object itself and that a concept gains meaning only in relation to a system of differences, Laclau and Mouffe

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argue that “reality is not given to us; meaning is always constructed.”8 To explain the fact that every social configuration is meaningful Laclau and Mouffe turn to the concept of discourse.9 They note that discourse cannot be reduced to speech and writing, rather it includes both the linguistic and the non-linguistic.10 Conceived thus, discourse becomes an ontological category that renders our engagement with the external world meaningful.11 It refers to the “structured totality resulting from articulatory practice.” A discourse attempts to fix a meaningful whole by articulating a relation among elements defined as “any difference that is not discursively articulated.” Articulatory practices change the identity of elements by transforming them into moments understood as “the differential positions insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse.”12 It is important to underline here that the discursive character of objects doesn’t indicate a form of idealism.13 The idea that every object is constituted as an object of discourse does not refute the existence of an object as an entity, but means that “outside of any discursive context objects do not have being.”14 As situated beings we always encounter objects the way they are articulated within discursive totalities and not in their bare existence. The mere existence of an object doesn’t determine its identity. An object becomes meaningful only when it acquires a relational identity with other terms by occupying a differential position within a discursive totality that temporarily constitutes a structured system of positions thereby generating fixity of meaning out of the flow of differences. For instance, the spherical object that the term football signifies is considered to be a football “as long as it is integrated within a system of socially constructed rules.”15 The spherical object one kicks in the street or the one kicked by players in a football match are physically similar, but the meaning of the objects are different. This meaning of the object depends on the specific forms of discursive articulation since there is no necessary relation between the object and its identity. That’s what Laclau and Mouffe mean when they state that all identities are intrinsically relational and “there is no meaning that is essentially given to use.”16 It follows from this that no meaning or identity is fixed or unchanging. This denotes an understanding of the social that is open and precarious as it is always the product of contingent articulations. Laclau and Mouffe recognize that Saussure’s account of language theorized “as a system of differences without positive terms” is compatible with a structuralist approach where a term can only gain meaning in relation with other terms inside a closed system.17 This leads to a fully

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constituted structural space and brings to the fore an essentialist approach that identifies the underlying structures as the principle that constitutes and makes intelligible any possible social order. This perspective is in stark contrast with Laclau and Mouffe’s view that a fully constituted social is impossible. To defend the openness of the social, they need to explain what it is that prevents the “fixity of ultimate meaning.” Against the structuralist approach, Laclau and Mouffe defend the infinitude of the social. The idea is that any structural system “is always surrounded by an ‘excess of meaning’ which it is unable to master.”18 All discourse, they write, is deformed and subverted by a “surplus of meaning”—a field of discursivity—which overflows it. This means that “society” cannot be understood as “a unitary and intelligible object which grounds its own partial processes.”19 They note that their insistence on the impossibility of fixing ultimate meanings is shared by a number of thinkers from Heidegger to Wittgenstein and Derrida. For instance, they write, Derrida “starts from a radical break in the history of concept of structure, occurring at the moment in which the centre—the transcendental signified in its multiple forms: eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ousia, aletheia, etc.—is abandoned, and with it the possibility of fixing a meaning which underlies the flow of differences.”20 Defending the relational character of identity and rejecting the absolute fixation of such identities, Laclau and Mouffe describe the social as an infinite play of differences.21 A crucial point is that Laclau and Mouffe understand the social not only in terms of the infinite play of differences but also as an attempt to limit the play.22 So for them, the endless deferral of ultimate meaning in a chain of differences doesn’t mean that there is no fixation or meaning in the infinite play of differences. As they put it, neither absolute fixity nor absolute non-fixity is possible. It means that there can only be partial fixations. Following Lacan’s concept of point de capiton or master-signifier, which refers to privileged discursive points that structure or quilt a certain discursive field, Laclau and Mouffe call partial fixations nodal points.23 The promise of discourse is then precisely to dominate the field of discursivity and generate fixity of meaning.24 This is an impossible promise to deliver since the transformation of “elements” to “moments” is never fully achieved due to the infinitude of the field of discursivity. “Elements” as floating signifiers can never be completely articulated to a discursive chain. This brings to the fore the significance of “articulation” as a discursive practice which “consists in the construction of nodal points that

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partially fix meaning.”25 As such, the condition of possibility and impossibility of meaning, identity, and social order is discursive articulation as an attempt to constitute the field of differences as a sutured totality against and within the field of discursivity which prevents a final suture. It is in that sense the social is “the constitutive ground” of the existing—understood as a negative essence—and various social orders are “ultimately failed attempts to domesticate the field of differences.”26 The Necessity of Hegemony and the Inevitability of Antagonism For Laclau and Mouffe the social always exceeds attempts to constitute a social order, but, as the logic of articulation suggests, it is possible to act over the social through the institution of nodal points. What makes possible the institution of nodal points is hegemony. The concept of hegemony is the central notion in Laclau and Mouffe’s combination of post-structuralism and Gramsci’s thought. It acts as a hinge between Laclau and Mouffe’s anti-essentialist social ontology and their political theory. As used by Antonio Gramsci hegemony refers to the ideological dominance of the bourgeoisie over the working class.27 It explains how it is that the working class voluntarily accepts the bourgeoisie’s power over them. Thus viewed, Gramsci’s theory of hegemony offers an alternative to the production of relations of subordination through coercion. The main idea is that hegemony constructs an ideological and political consensus by operating as a mechanism of social power that naturalizes the worldview of the dominant groups. This consensus presents a particular account of social reality as universal while excluding, suppressing, or dominating other possibilities. Within this hegemonic formation, subordinated groups experience the relation of subordination as the way things “really” are. They voluntarily accept their subordination and support the social order and its institutions of civil society, which, in turn, reproduce and disseminate hegemonic power. In Laclau and Mouffe’s terms, relations of subordination don’t become a site of antagonism because the social reality generated by hegemony naturalizes these relations. Laclau and Mouffe keep the core ideas of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and employ it as the central explanatory category of the social while decoupling hegemony and class.28 It is important to underline that when Laclau and Mouffe argue that hegemony constitutes the social, their point is not that a hegemonic form of power takes over the center of the social and constitutes the social in

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its totality. According to them, the idea of a single nodal hegemonic point doesn’t make sense. In a closed system of relational identities, there would not be any need or place for contingent hegemonic articulations simply because the transformation of elements to moments would be complete. Within such a system of differences there would be nothing to articulate and hegemonize over.29 The key point is that the social is permeated by “undecidables” and hegemony is “a theory of decision taken in an undecidable terrain.”30 It is a response to the impossibility of fixity and non-fixity of meaning. What makes hegemony possible is precisely the structural undecidability and the open and incomplete character of the social. Thus viewed, it is an attempt to generate meaning out of contingency. Without hegemonic articulations there would be no meaning and order, and “we would be living in complete schizophrenia.”31 Given that the social is an infinitude, no hegemonic suture can account for the totality of the social realm. That’s the whole point of the idea of the impossibility of society: society cannot be a sutured into a self-defined totality. In that sense, “‘society’ is not a valid object of discourse.”32 Once the idea of hegemony as constituting the essence of the social rejected, it becomes possible to recognize that there can be multiple nodal points in any given social formation. The logic of hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe point out, necessarily introduces the concept of antagonism. Hegemony is an empty form, a type of relation of power that excludes and marginalizes other counterhegemonic discourses vying for hegemony. It is through negativity, division, and antagonism that a hegemonic formation constitutes itself as a totalizing horizon. A hegemonic formation is possible only on the basis of its own limits as it constitutes “what is beyond the limits as that which it is not.”33 Thus, what is beyond cannot be constructed as yet another difference but has to be constructed negatively. Hegemony articulates an ensemble of differences and constitutes itself as a totality only by transforming its limits to frontiers. Laclau and Mouffe define the experience of the limit of objectivity as antagonism. A relation of antagonism is not a simple opposition or a contradiction, but a presence that shows the limits of every objectivity, that is, in the case of antagonism “the presence of ‘Other’ prevents me from being totally myself.”34 Since the social is always precarious and contingent, antagonism becomes an intrinsic aspect of social and political order. It follows that antagonisms are not external to society, but are always internal showing the limit of the social order. In that sense, antagonism is what negates the hegemonic order. Every

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order is based on a particular structure of power relations that excludes other possibilities: to be hegemonic one form of power has to repress the other possibilities that can always be reactivated.35 This introduces the possibility that every hegemonic order can be challenged by practices that demand new articulations of power and establish a new hegemony.

The Bifurcation The Radical Democratic Project By bringing together insights from post-structuralism and Gramsci’s account of hegemony Laclau and Mouffe rework the fundamentals of leftist theory dominated by classical Marxism. Combining anti-essentialist social ontology and the idea of hegemony explain the possibility of meaning, identity, and social order while, at the same time, allowing them to theorize the possibility of contesting different forms of subordination and articulating an alternative hegemonic front. Laclau and Mouffe call this political project radical and plural democracy. At this point, we need to turn to the anti-essentialist notion of identity to understand the distinctness of the radical democratic project. When criticizing Marxism for its incapacity to grasp the specificity of new political struggles such as feminism, anti-racism, gay rights, and environmentalism, Laclau and Mouffe argue that it is the “class essentialism” at the heart of Marxist thought that prevents it from understanding these new struggles.36 Arguing that political identities are determined by one’s position in the relations of production which then determine one’s political consciousness, Marxism prioritizes the working class as agents of political change. Laclau and Mouffe’s point is that the essentialist notion of political identity prevents Marxism from viewing political identities as discursive articulations. They argue that there is no relation of necessity between one’s political identity and consciousness and the differential positions one occupies in society. Put differently, we can’t assume that the former is a natural outcome of the latter. The nature of political identity is similar to the nature of any hegemonic social order in that it has no essence that can be revealed. Identity is associated with a lack which is the condition of possibility of the constitution of identity itself.37 The notion of the subject should be understood in terms of the category of “identifications” or “subject positions.” This means that since there is no essence that precedes the subject’s identifications, “the history of

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the subject is the history of his/her identifications.”38 The identity of a social agent is “constituted by an ensemble of ‘subject positions’” within a discursive structure. “Identifications” are discursive positions that are the result of political articulations.39 It follows that subject cannot be the origin of social relations, rather it is entirely dependent on political articulations. Given the openness of every discourse, subject positions cannot be totally fixed.40 Any identity is a contingent suture at the intersection of identifications, an ensemble of partial fixations that are placed on the tension between fixity and non-fixity.41 It is “constructed by a diversity of discourses among which there is no necessary relation, but rather a constant movement of overdetermination and displacement.”42 What follows is a post-structuralist alternative to essentialism: an understanding of identity that is plural, precarious, and contingent and that depends on the various forms of identifications through which it is constituted. As Mouffe emphasizes, it is the anti-essentialist notion of identity that makes possible the formulation of the project of radical democracy.43 Recognizing that identity is constituted by a multiplicity of subject positions and that there is no relation of necessity between discourses that produce the identifications of the subject have significant implications on how Laclau and Mouffe theorize a new left political imaginary. First, it is important to recognize that there is nothing in the nature of relations of subordination that inevitably leads to the emergence of a political struggle against it. As such, struggles against subordination do not naturally or inevitably come about.44 To identify the possibility of collective action against relations of subordination, it is essential to transform relations of subordination to a site of antagonism, that is, relations of subordination should be transformed into relations of oppression.45 However, to constitute relations of oppression out of relations of subordination requires an interruption of the discourse of subordination by a discursive “exterior.” This is precisely what the discourse of democracy with its central ideas of equality and liberty has made possible. Laclau and Mouffe’s point is that “only from the moment when the democratic discourse becomes available to articulate the different forms of resistance to subordination that the conditions will exist to make possible the struggle against different types of inequality.”46 By making available the political vocabulary of liberty and equality the democratic revolution provided the discursive conditions for the rearticulation of relations of subordination as relations of oppression thereby transforming social relations which create a new political subjectivity in response to subordination.47

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Second, Laclau and Mouffe argue that if left politics is about challenging inequalities and relations of subordination, what needs to be done is to construct a new hegemonic articulation. This brings to the fore the need to establish a “chain of equivalence” among heterogeneous democratic struggles to form a hegemonic bloc that can transform the terms of the dominant political discourse and create a new common sense. The idea of “chain of equivalence” here doesn’t refer to a coalition politics among different subordinated groups, rather it is about creating an “equivalent articulation between the demands of women, blacks, workers, gays, and others.”48 The aim is to create a hegemonic link between subject positions—a link that is neither necessary nor precedes discursive articulation. Establishing a chain of equivalence transforms the identity of subjects in a way that they see an equivalence between the demands of other subordinated groups.49 Once equivalence between the demands of different groups is established, it creates solidarity among groups that enter into the chain so that they don’t see one group’s emancipation to be prior to another’s or pursue one group’s emancipation at the expense of another’s. Third, in defending the creation of a chain of equivalence between struggles against oppression the project of radical democracy locates itself in the field of the democratic revolution. The project of radical and plural democracy is about deepening and expanding the principles of equality and liberty by constituting a collective identity that takes equality and liberty as articulating principles transforming the social agent’s multiple identifications. It radicalizes the principles of equality and liberty by extending them to social relations.50 It aims to constitute a “we” as radical democratic citizens. The political struggle against subordination draws a political frontier and define an adversary thereby constituting a radical democratic identity “articulated through the principle of democratic equivalence.”51 The ultimate aim of radical democracy is the construction of a new common sense centering around radicalized versions of equality and liberty by creating a new form of hegemonic subjectivity through the generation of a chain of equivalence among struggles against subordination. Extending the sphere of liberty and equality to numerous relations in the social introduces the political task of recognizing and contesting multiple social relations in which subordination exists. This deep transformation in social relations and the constitution of a new common sense

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is how Laclau and Mouffe describe the political imaginary of the new leftwing political project of radical and plural democracy. We can expect this new political imaginary to be “radically libertarian and infinitely more ambitious in its objectives than that of the classical left.”52 Despite its radical break with the fundamental commitments of the conventional left, the radical democratic project does not require abandoning the left’s commitment to socialism. On the contrary, Laclau and Mouffe emphasize that “every project for radical democracy, necessarily includes, as we have said, the socialist dimension—that is to say, the abolition of capitalist relations of production.”53 Thus viewed, we can see radical democracy as a particular interpretation of liberal democracy coupled with socialism. The Road to Agonism The main aim of radical democracy is to introduce a political imaginary that can recognize the specificity of new struggles against subordination and identify the conditions of possibility of collective action that could challenge relations of subordination. The ultimate promise of radical democracy is the extension of equality and liberty to all aspects of social life; it is the dream of a society thoroughly shaped by equality and liberty. This promise can only be delivered by establishing the hegemony of radical democracy which requires the production of common sense in accordance with radical democratic ideals. The obvious challenge for radical democracy is the existence of other competitors who try to implement their hegemony. As Mouffe notes, “the liberal democratic tradition is open to many interpretations, and the politics of radical democracy is but one strategy among others.”54 To implement its hegemony, radical democracy needs to establish itself as the most reasonable political project that defines the common good and ultimately persuade people to identify with its account of citizenship. However, this is only one aspect of the hegemony struggle. It is important to recognize that the struggle for hegemony does not take place only among different interpretations of liberal democracy. There exist several non-democratic contenders that aim to disarticulate the hegemony of liberal democracy in order to install a non-democratic order. This twofold struggle for hegemony—the struggle between different interpretations of liberal democracy and the struggle between democratic and non-democratic projects—introduces the question about the nature and boundaries of the democratic terrain on which the struggle among various interpretations of equality and liberty can take place. Mouffe’s answer to this question is her theory of agonistic democracy.

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Agonistic democracy builds on the anti-essentialist theoretical framework advanced in the HSS. This framework offers a rethinking of the political in terms of the necessity of hegemony and the ineradicability of antagonism. The idea that each society is the product of precarious and contingent articulation of hegemony established in a context of contingency entails that every existing hegemony is vulnerable to the challenge of counter-hegemonic practices whose goal is to disarticulate the existing hegemony so as to establish its hegemony. The radical negativity that makes the positivity of the social order possible simultaneously undermines the stability of the social and thus “impedes the full totalization of society and forecloses the possibility of a society beyond division and power.”55 To understand the implications of this approach for democratic politics, it is best to visit the Derridean notion of “constitutive outside” and read it together with Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political.56 In a nutshell, the idea is that since every social objectivity is relational, it can only be constructed in relation to a difference that serves as a constitutive outside. The existence of an exterior, what is “outside,” is the necessary precondition for the existence of any objectivity. However, precisely because the positivity of any objectivity depends on something that exceeds it, the constitutive outside is also the condition of impossibility of objectivity. With respect to collective identities, the notion of constitutive outside means that the creation of a collective identity requires the designation of an other which constitutes an outside in relation to which the collective identity constructs itself. In short, the constitution of a “we” can only be possible by the demarcation of a “they.”57 This reveals the radical undecidability in the constitution of political identities. To theorize the destructive potential of the we/they demarcation Mouffe turns to Carl Schmitt. For Schmitt what is at stake in politics is the political which refers to the decision of who is on “our” side and who is against “us.”58 The friend/enemy distinction denotes the most intense association and dissociation and the most extreme antagonism. As Schmitt describes it, this relation implies the possibility of physical killing and combat. The political is not necessarily about real fighting and battle, but it is about the intensity of antagonism. Only participants are in a position to recognize and judge this extreme case of conflict and decide whether the adversary intends to destroy their way of life. The political enemy, Schmitt clarifies, doesn’t need to be evil or ugly or need not appear as an economic competitor, but they are “the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient

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for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.”59 Thus, Schmitt warns, every we/them grouping—religious, moral, economic, ethics, or another antithesis—has the potential to take on a political form. Schmitt’s concept of the political provides the crucial link between the anti-essentialist perspective and agonistic politics by allowing Mouffe to formulate the political as antagonism. Once we acknowledge that every collective identity implies the establishment of a constitutive outside, it becomes possible to recognize that the political is an ever-present possibility. At issue here is the very real possibility that any we/they relation can turn into a relation of friend/enemy. The point is not that the us/them relation is necessarily antagonistic. Mouffe highlights that many us/them groupings are simply about recognizing differences.60 Her point is to reveal what is at stake in the constitution of collective identities. As Schmitt puts it, other than the feeling of existential threat, there is no previously determined general norm that can decide the friend/enemy criterion. Thus, any us/them grouping could be a site for antagonism “if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friend enemy.”61 Following Schmitt, Mouffe notes that the friend/enemy relation becomes antagonistic when what was considered to be different is now “perceived as putting into question our identity and threatening our existence.”62 Recognizing that relations of friend/enemy can be triggered by any kind of we/them relation and that the possibility of antagonism can never be eliminated, Mouffe concludes that “the political belongs to our ontological condition.”63 A proper understanding of the political and, consequently, what is at stake in politics is precisely what non-agonistic models of democracy miss according to Mouffe. She is critical of both mainstream models of liberal democratic politics and post-modern approaches to politics. Despite their significant differences, these approaches lack a proper reflection on “the political” and hence they fail to take seriously the antagonistic dimension of politics. Post-modern approaches to politics imply the optimistic belief that “the political could absolutely coincide with the ethical under certain circumstances.”64 Most post-modern thinkers acknowledge the importance of “difference,” but they refrain from putting certain limits to pluralism. They envision democratic politics as a matter of “endless conversation in which one should constantly try to enter into dialogical relations with the ‘other.’”65 The underlying idea is that violence and exclusion could disappear if we take responsibility for the “other” and

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engage with their difference to start a dialogue. For Mouffe, this sort of pluralism is based on the “possibility of a plurality without antagonism, of friend without an enemy, an agonism without antagonism.”66 This vision views the domain of politics through the lens of “ethics” believing that the political could be completely subdued by the ethical. That’s why, Mouffe argues, the post-modern approaches to politics fail to come to terms with the political. Mainstream liberal democratic approaches theorize politics as a field of rational consensus where free and unconstrained public deliberation of all persons on matters of collective concern should take place. Different versions of this model—Rawlsian or Habermasian—all share the perspective that political questions have a moral nature which leads to the idea that they are susceptible to rational treatment. On Mouffe’s view, these approaches fail to acknowledge the negative aspect of human sociability due to their “rationalist view of human nature with its denial of the negative aspect inherent in sociability.”67 This optimistic account of human nature can be traced back to the Philosophes of the Enlightenment whose belief in a form of progress reflected by a trust in rational exchange as the outcome of developed human sociability led them to see antagonism and violent forms of behavior as eradicable. However, Mouffe writes, “the same movement that brings human beings together in their common desire for the same objects is also at the origin of their antagonism.”68 The idea of reciprocity that is central to liberal democratic theories only describes one side of human sociability and cannot be dissociated from the violence which is always present and threatens to disintegrate the social order. Mouffe’s point is that to develop the fiction of a social contract that successfully eliminates hostility and violence, it was necessary to deny the negative side of human sociability. This fiction provided the basis for a model of politics where “reciprocity could take the form of a transparent communication among participants.”69 Failing to offer a proper formulation of the nature of the political in its dimension of hostility and antagonism, liberal approaches end up devising various theoretical ways to make violence invisible. Such attempts illustrate Schmitt’s point that the liberal thought fails to see politics as a distinct domain and evades the political by collapsing it either into ethics or economics.70 By denying the nature of pluralism and the ineradicable conflict power and antagonism that pluralism entails, both post-modern and liberal approaches to politics end up advancing political ideals impossible to realize. The post-modern approaches involve a yearning for a harmonious

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togetherness of differences beyond antagonism and exclusion whereas the liberal approaches hope for a reconciliation of pluralism of values through the use of reason. In response to the two dominant approaches’ failure to take seriously the antagonism implicit in pluralistic democracy, Mouffe argues that the main question of democracy is how to domesticate the political understood as “the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human relations, antagonisms that can take many forms and emerge in different types of social relations” by politics which refers to “the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain order and organize human coexistence in conditions that are always potentially conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of the ‘political.’”71 What is required to respond to the political in its dimension of antagonism is a properly political approach that takes the ever-present possibility of antagonism seriously. Too much emphasis on impossible ideals weakens democracy’s capacity to come to terms with the political while intensifying already existing antagonisms and exacerbating latent ones in society. We need a politics that produces discourses, identities, and institutions that can respond to the ever-present possibility of antagonism. This brings us to Mouffe’s agonistic democracy. The Possibility of a Non-Hobbesian Political Order from Hobbesian Premises: Agonistic Democracy The inevitability of conflict and antagonism bring to the fore the urgent issues of stability, unity, and order. One might argue that responding to the permanence of conflict and antagonism calls for a version of Hobbesian approach. In order to keep stability and peace, it may be best to envision the possibility of a society ruled by an authoritative power that could maintain the unity of the people. It is clear that Mouffe doesn’t want to pursue that possibility. As Mouffe put it, we don’t have to commit to a Hobbesian order to have peaceful coexistence despite the inevitability of conflict and antagonism. Put differently, it is possible to derive non-Hobbesian consequences from Hobbesian premises.72 In fact, what makes Mouffe’s agonistic democratic position unique is that while taking seriously the permanence of conflict and the ever-present possibility of antagonism, she proposes a pluralistic democratic regime as a cure to the problem of peaceful coexistence. The main question then is how to envisage a pluralistic democratic order that can manage conflict and sublimate antagonism.

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At this point, we turn to the most original—and in my opinion the most compelling—aspects of Mouffe’s account of democracy: the concept of “agonism” and an account of a democratic regime that allows for agonistic confrontation among conflicting hegemonic positions. In a way by institutionalizing antagonism—albeit a limited one—and recognizing the positive dimension of conflict, agonistic democracy promises to make peaceful coexistence possible and strengthen pluralistic democracy. The key idea here is the “adversary.” Emphasizing the impossibility of transcending the “we/they” relation, Mouffe suggests that it is possible to construct it in a way that doesn’t destroy the political association. She calls this alternative way of perceiving the enemy an “adversary.” An adversary is different from a competitor where the antagonistic element could be overcome by reconciling the interests of those involved through negotiation or through deliberation.73 The adversary is not an enemy that should be destroyed, but someone “whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question.”74 As Mouffe indicates, the category of the adversary is best expressed by the real meaning of liberal democratic tolerance as it entails treating those who defend ideas we oppose as legitimate opponents. “Adversaries” are “friendly enemies” who are friends since they share the same symbolic space, but who are at the same time enemies since they seek to organize the common space differently. The category of “adversary” has a central place in agonistic democracy as it introduces the possibility of taming antagonism. Introducing the notion of the adversary splits the notion of “antagonism” into two. Antagonism proper refers to the struggle between enemies and agonism refers to the struggle between adversaries. Drawing a distinction between antagonism proper and agonism brings to the fore the question of what form of we/they would a tamed relation of antagonism entail.75 It is important to emphasize that within the framework of hegemonic politics, antagonism is a permanent category as any social relation could become the locus of antagonism. What is needed to make peaceful coexistence possible is the continual sublimation of antagonism. To tame ever-present antagonism calls for an institutional mechanism that fosters the construction of democratic identities, discourses, and practices. Mouffe locates this mechanism in the tension between the two constitutive logics of liberal democracy: liberty and equality. Mouffe argues that liberal democracy consists of the articulation of the tradition of liberalism with its emphasis on the rule of law, individual liberty,

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and human rights, and the democratic tradition with its emphasis on popular sovereignty and equality.76 The distinguishing feature of liberal democracy is that its constitutive traditions are irreconcilable with each other. The logic of democracy requires the constitution of a demos which denotes a common identity and therefore is based upon acts of exclusion/inclusion.77 The liberal tradition with its universalistic character challenges the decisions inherent in democracy about who will be included and who will be excluded. Mouffe envisions the constitutive tension of liberal democracy as an invaluable historical opportunity as it opens up the political space for the emergence of multiple interpretations of the principles of equality and liberty. Each interpretation offers a different articulation that denotes a different political common good, a different understanding of the type of social relations where the principles of equality and liberty should apply, and a different way of institutionalizing them.78 Each interpretation constitutes a different conception of citizenship—radical democratic, social democratic, neoliberal, liberalconservative, and so on—that proposes a different configuration of power relations and an alternative hegemonic order situated within the liberal democratic horizon. Liberal democratic politics “consists of a constant process of negotiation through different hegemonic configurations of this constitutive tension.”79 The paradoxical nature of liberal democracy and the different interpretations of its constitutive principles provide the privileged terrain of agonistic confrontation among adversaries.80 By bringing together agonism and liberal democracy, Mouffe shows that liberal democratic framework could accommodate struggles for hegemony without leading to the destruction of the political association itself. It follows that it is possible to defuse potential antagonism inherent in society without eliminating the pluralistic character of society or installing a Hobbesian order. To be sure, having a liberal democratic framework is not a guarantee for success understood in terms of sublimation of antagonism. Whether liberal democracy can successfully sublimate antagonism depends on how well agonistic dynamics of politics function which requires the availability of competing hegemonic projects. Mouffe here identifies a significant vulnerability at the heart of liberal democracy. There may be alternative political projects vying for power, but this doesn’t mean that contenders offer genuine alternatives and distinct hegemonic projects. This is the main reason why Mouffe is critical of third-way politics claiming to bring together the left and the right. It is

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important to remember that competition is not a struggle and competitors are not adversaries. Lack of genuine political projects hinders the agonistic dynamics of democracy thereby leading to apathy and dissatisfaction with political participation. When dissatisfaction sets in and collective passions cannot be given a democratic outlet, it lays the ground for the emergence of essentialist identities—nationalist, religious, and ethnic—and “the multiplication of confrontations over non-negotiable moral terms, with all manifestations of violence that such confrontation entails.”81 When these demands do not find expression within the democratic process, the result is the emergence of antagonisms that has the potential to destroy the political association. The only way to secure the hegemony of liberal democracy is to mobilize passions around democratic values by making available democratic forms of citizenship that have a real purchase on people’s desires and fantasies.82 Emphasizing the centrality of passions in politics is one of the distinguishing features of Mouffe’s agonistic politics. Contrary to the rationalist models of democratic politics that aim to purge “passions” from the space of politics, Mouffe argues that we need to recognize the political role of “passions” as a force that moves people. She is aware that mobilizing passions for political purposes works in both ways. If ignored and pushed outside the channels of democratic politics, collective passions could crystallize around identities that cannot be dealt with in the democratic process. But, if they can find an outlet in democratic politics, it strengthens people’s attachment to the democratic regime thereby reinforcing their allegiance and containing potential antagonism. What Mouffe suggests here is a way of creating affective bonds by mobilizing passions toward democratic designs. Proper mobilization of collective passions requires a conflictual picture of the world and opposed democratic camps with which people can identify. It is through identification with democratic collective identities that people are constituted as democratic subjects. That’s why Mouffe suggests that agonistic struggle among hegemonic projects is necessary to sublimate antagonism and to secure people’s allegiance to democracy. The hegemony struggle among various political projects creates forms of collective identifications strong enough to mobilize political passions around democratic designs and thus transform antagonism into agonism.83 Antagonisms can take many forms and can never be eradicated, but it is possible to sublimate antagonism by offering meaningful political alternatives that generate “forms of identifications conducive to democratic practices.”84 The unending process

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of agonistic contestation and the existence of competing interpretations of liberal democracy is the guarantee for keeping democracy healthy. As Mouffe puts it, far from jeopardizing democracy, a vibrant clash of democratic political positions is the very condition of existence of democracy.85 Mouffe envisions agonistic confrontation to be “played out under conditions regulated by a set of democratic procedures accepted by the adversaries.”86 Adversaries’ mutual commitment to the liberal democratic institutions and the ethico-political values of the liberal democratic regime makes agonistic politics possible and prevents agonism from escalating into antagonism. In providing the symbolic space between the adversaries, this mutual commitment constitutes the unity of the people thereby giving the people a common identity. Since the very specificity of modern democracy is its pluralistic character understood as the end of the substantive idea of good life, the identity of the agonistic democratic society cannot be considered in substantive terms. Drawing on Michael Oakeshott’s work, Mouffe describes this commonality in terms of “societas” which refers to a “civil association” where the bond between the agents is understood as a formal relationship that indicates a commitment to rules of engagement.87 To be a member requires identifying with the rules of civil intercourse.88 Seen from this perspective, to be a member of liberal democratic society one needs to accept the ethico-political principles of a pluralist democracy. What makes the identity of the liberal democratic political regime unique is that it is the expression of a “conflictual consensus” since there is a disagreement as to what these values mean and how best they should be implemented.89 As such, this is a consensus that always carries dissent with it. To be sure, the notion of a “conflictual consensus” introduces the question of whether agonistic politics can accommodate all kinds of dissent. This takes us back to the nature of hegemony and the inevitability of exclusion. A hegemonic order has to draw a political frontier and discriminate between legitimate demands that would be tolerated and illegitimate demands that have to be excluded. As the hegemonic approach carefully delineates, the grounds for exclusion are strictly political and not moral or natural. Some demands are excluded not because they are “evil,” but because they challenge the very existence of the institutions of the democratic political association. Antagonistic principles of legitimacy cannot coexist within the same political association since this introduces a serious threat to the existing hegemonic order. Mouffe draws a subtle

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distinction between those who demand a totally new form of hegemony and those who demand a different interpretation of the principles of liberal democracy: between those who reject the values of liberal democracy “outright and those who, while accepting them, fight for conflicting interpretations.”90 The category of the enemy “remains pertinent with respect to those who do not accept the democratic ‘rules of the game’ and who thereby exclude themselves from the political community.”91 In agonistic democracy, this is where the category of the enemy re-emerges. The possible enemy doesn’t threaten the society from the outside but emerges from within the ranks of the democratic society.92 Thus, Mouffe concludes, not all antagonisms can be transformed into agonisms and not “all positions be accepted as legitimate and accommodated within the agonistic struggle.”93 This is a dynamic and ongoing process of deciding who the enemy is and who should be excluded.

Radical Democratic Politics or Agonistic Democracy Having argued that despite their common origin in the anti-essentialist approach developed in the HSS, radical democracy and agonistic democracy are distinct approaches, now I delineate the fundamental differences between the two and how they are related. It is important to recognize the differences between the two approaches not only to grasp the distinctness of the agonistic approach but also because most commentators assume that the two approaches are different iterations of the same theory and they consider agonistic democracy as a version of radical democracy. In an earlier examination of the specificity of Mouffe’s agonistic democracy, I associated some ideas that are part of radical democracy with agonistic democracy.94 Now I recognize that this is a common mistake in literature on agonistic politics. It has led commentators to misinterpret Mouffe’s agonistic democracy and, consequently, criticize it for failing to deliver the promises of radical democracy.95 However, I admit that the confusion is not entirely unfounded. It is in part because both rely on Laclau and Mouffe’s anti-essentialist perspective that takes at its center hegemony and antagonism. Moreover, in most of her writings published in the 1990s Mouffe discusses both theories without clarifying the differences. For instance, in Return of the Political, where Mouffe begins to develop agonistic democracy, most of the chapters are devoted to radical and plural democracy and we find paragraphs on agonism in a chapter on

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radical democracy. And in some of her writings, Mouffe writes as if they are not two distinct theories.96 Although in her major writings since the Democratic Paradox such as On the Political, Agonistics, Podemos, and For a Left Populism, agonistic democracy clearly emerges as a distinct democratic theory, until recently Mouffe has not said much about the distinctness of the two approaches.97 Only in her most recent work, she draws a distinction between her agonistic conception of democracy and the radical democratic project and acknowledges them as two separate theories.98 However, the complex relationship between agonistic democracy and the radical democratic project is yet to be illuminated. Once we clarify in what ways the two theories differ from each other, it becomes clear that they have different practical political commitments and that they are not always compatible. Aims and Scope Since this is the only major difference between the two approaches clearly acknowledged by Mouffe, it is essential to quote her at length: In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, criticizing the classreductionism dominant in the Marxist tradition, we argued for a new understanding of the socialist project in terms of a radicalization of democracy. We advocated the creation of a chain of equivalences among democratic demands in order to extend the democratic principles to a wider set of social relations. Radical democracy, as we envisaged it, is clearly a political project, to be distinguished from other political projects, like the social democratic or the neo-liberal ones. The agonistic model of democracy, however, is something different. It is an analytical approach, formulated as an alternative to the aggregative and deliberative models. To give account of the ineradicability of antagonism and of the hegemonic nature of politics, a different approach was needed. How to envisage democracy within the framework of our hegemonic approach? How could a democratic order acknowledge and manage the existence of conflicts that did not have a rational solution? How to conceive democracy in a way that allows in its midst a confrontation between conflicting hegemonic projects? The agonistic model of democracy is my answer to those questions, and I see it as providing the analytic framework necessary to visualize the possibility of a democratic confrontation between hegemonic projects.99

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As Mouffe clearly states here, radical democracy and agonistic democracy are two distinct political projects responding to fundamentally different problems. Radical democracy is a left-wing political project that aims to radicalize equality and liberty such that they shape all aspects of social life. Radicalizing equality and liberty means that no sphere is immune from their application including numerous social relations where relations of domination and subordination exist. As such, radical democracy exclusively focuses on challenging relations of subordination. Different groups struggling to contest relations of subordination should recognize that they all share a common concern and thus create a chain of equivalences. The aim is to form a hegemonic link among different democratic demands in order to construct a “we” that constitutes a radical democratic identity. This, for Mouffe, is the only way to provide a hegemonic alternative to the existing hegemony that legitimizes and reproduces relations of domination and subordination. Agonistic democracy, on the other hand, proposes a liberal democratic horizon that constitutes the democratic terrain that makes possible the struggle between hegemonic projects. It responds to the permanence of conflict and division by bringing together agonism and democracy in order to harness conflict in a way that contains ever-present antagonism and secures the future of pluralistic democratic order. As should be clear from all this, the radical democratic project is among the many political projects vying for hegemony in a liberal democratic society whereas agonistic democracy aims to create the conditions for this hegemonic confrontation.100 Meaning of Democratic Citizenship It is important to underline that the principles of equality and liberty are central to both theories. The main difference is that radical democracy offers one particular interpretation of liberty and equality while agonistic democracy’s commitment is to the liberal democratic horizon. This difference is most obvious when we reflect on the way the two theories view democratic citizenship. From the perspective of radical democracy, a radical democrat is one who identifies with the radical democratic interpretation of liberty and equality.101 Being a radical democrat requires prioritizing liberty and equality in all aspects of social life. In that sense, it is a commitment to the radicalization of equality and liberty. It means that one recognizes the significance of all struggles against subordination

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and acknowledges the equivalence among them. The radical democratic conception of citizenship is the outcome of a common articulation among different democratic demands.102 Radical democratic citizens recognize the legitimacy of other competing liberal democratic projects, but this doesn’t prevent them from seeking to establish the hegemony of the radical democratic understanding of the common good.103 Like radical democrats, agonistic democratic citizens are committed to liberal democratic institutions and endorse equality and liberty as the constitutive principles of liberal democracy. They treat those who defend other liberal democratic projects as adversaries and thus recognize the legitimacy of other political projects. These are inevitable commonalities between the two approaches as they are both parts of the liberal democratic framework. The most significant difference between them is that one need not be committed to the radical democratic project to be an agonistic citizen. From an agonistic democratic perspective what matters is not who wins the democratic game but whether the agonistic dynamics of democracy are healthy. In a well-functioning agonistic democracy, the clash among different hegemonic projects mobilizes people toward liberal democratic designs. Such democratic interpellations are expected to motivate agonistic citizens to identify with a particular conception of democratic citizenship. The significant point from an agonistic democratic perspective is the existence of meaningful hegemonic identifications: liberal-conservative, social democratic, neoliberal, radical democratic, and so on. The agonistic approach does not prescribe which interpretation of democratic citizenship one should identify with. Agonistic democracy is neutral in the sense that it doesn’t favor any one of the competing political projects in the hegemonic confrontation. Radical democracy, however, cannot be neutral as it is one of the contenders struggling to establish its hegemony taking place within the framework of liberal democracy. For instance, as Laclau and Mouffe note, the project of radical democracy necessarily includes the abolition of capitalist relations of production.104 It follows that a radical democratic citizen is expected to defend a version of socialism. However, agonistic democracy cannot endorse a particular way of organizing the economy and prescribe citizens to endorse one mode of relations of production over another since that would be determining the outcome of the hegemonic struggle in advance of politics.105 This doesn’t mean that agonistic citizens cannot be socialists, rather it means that some agonistic citizens may identify with a radical democratic citizenship and thereby

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support socialism as the most reasonable way to organize the economy while others identify with another competing project that does not share socialist commitments. In short, all radical democrats are expected to have a commitment to the agonistic dynamics of democracy, but agonistic citizens are free to endorse any interpretation of liberal democracy competing for hegemony. Active Participation Both supporters and critics of Mouffe’s agonistic theory share the idea that an indispensable feature of Mouffe’s agonistic democracy is active political participation.106 Some commentators criticize agonistic democracy’s emphasis on direct active participation since, they point out, not all citizens would choose a life of active citizenship.107 Others note that the republican ideal of guaranteeing liberty through active participation is central to agonistic politics and thus Mouffe’s notion of citizenship is a republican one.108 The problem is that since commentators treat radical democracy and agonistic democracy as one theory, they do not recognize that radical democracy and agonistic democracy offer different perspectives on political participation. When we view these two theories as distinct theories, it becomes clear that the republican elements associated with agonistic democracy are part of radical democracy. In Dimensions of Radical Democracy, Mouffe criticizes liberal individualism by arguing that it has almost emptied the notion of citizenship and community. Mouffe’s question is given that the only viable alternative for the Left is radical democracy, “what kind of political identity does it require?”109 Part of her answer is that a radical democratic citizen “must be an active citizen, somebody who acts as a citizen, who conceives of herself as a participant in a collective undertaking.”110 For Mouffe, a defense of active participation requires a return to the civic republican tradition which envisions politics as a realm where we can perceive ourselves as participants in a community that secures liberty through political participation. So, it is clear that the account of democratic citizenship we find in Dimensions of Radical Democracy takes active participation as an essential aspect of radical democracy. For instance, Mark Wenman cites Dimensions to support his claim that “the citizen of agonistic democracy is an active citizen, somebody who conceives herself as a participant in the public life of society.”111 This interpretation leads him to argue that Mouffe’s position is comparable to Benjamin Barber’s

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republican notion of citizenship he advanced in Strong Democracy.112 Similarly, Gulshan Khan notes that such remarks by Mouffe reveal the closeness between the republican tradition and contemporary agonistic democracy.113 Khan points out the account of democratic citizenship Mouffe advanced in the Return of the Political where Mouffe praises the civic republican tradition’s emphasis on the value of political participation and its central role in community.114 Indeed, Mouffe argues that we should participate actively in government in order to guarantee our individual liberty. She states that we should “cultivate civic virtues and devote ourselves to common good.”115 However, it is important to note that Mouffe concludes that paragraph by stating that “this is crucial for a radical democratic project.”116 It is also important to highlight that the main question of “Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community” is “how we understand citizenship when our goal is a radical and plural democracy?”117 And, in the final section of the chapter referenced by Khan, the section entitled “A radical democratic citizenship,” Mouffe describes radical democratic citizenship in terms of application of liberty and equality to all areas of social life. All of this provides us with sufficient evidence that supports the point that Mouffe’s defense of active participation and her turn to civic republicanism should not be associated with agonistic democracy, rather it should be read in the context of radical democracy. My sense is that one reason why commentators so easily associate active political participation with agonistic democracy is that they see radical democracy and agonistic democracy as different dimensions of one coherent theory. Both radical democracy and agonistic democracy offer an account of citizenship thicker than the liberal individualist one that Mouffe harshly criticizes. What they share, however, is not active participation or civic virtue, rather an emphasis on political identification. Radical democratic citizens identify with the radical democratic interpretations of liberty and equality while agonistic citizens share an allegiance to the liberal democratic framework. The notion of agonistic citizenship is clearly thicker than the liberal individualist account of citizenship as what is at stake in the former is identification with a collective identity, a “we.” Mouffe argues that the liberal account of politics leaves no place for such a collective identification. Liberalism reduces citizenship to a legal status.118 Agonistic democracy understands citizenship in terms of a collective identification and affective investment. That’s why Mouffe emphasizes the necessity to mobilize passions politically and how

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a vibrant clash of real and meaningful political projects encourages people to identify with the democratic identities created by these hegemonic projects. As far as agonistic democracy is concerned the issue is not active participation, rather it is identification with liberal democratic projects. As such, another significant difference between agonistic democracy and radical democracy is that the kind of active participation radical democracy endorses is neither required nor defended by agonistic democracy. Active citizenship is an essential part of the radical democratic project, but not of agonistic democracy. Mutually Supportive or Tensional? In the light of what I have argued so far, I can clarify the relationship between Mouffe’s radical democracy and agonistic democracy. Given the lack of attention to the acute differences that separate the two approaches, it is not surprising that the tensions between them have not been explored. Treating the two approaches as dimensions of a coherent unity does not allow us to ask the question of how they are related and whether radical democracy and agonistic democracy are compatible.119 Once we view radical democracy as a particular interpretation of liberal democracy and agonistic democracy as the broader liberal democratic political terrain on which hegemony struggle takes place, we recognize that there is a complex relation between the two approaches. The first point that should be noted is that radical democracy clearly enhances the agonistic dynamics of democracy. Agonistic democracy requires the existence of genuinely distinct interpretations of the ethicopolitical principles of the liberal democratic regime. The clash between these political projects vying for hegemony encourage citizens to identify with democratic collective identifications thereby mobilizing people toward democratic designs. This is how the agonistic clash of hegemonic projects strengthens people’s allegiance to democratic institutions and keeps conflict within democratic limits. Accordingly, viewed from an agonistic perspective, the existence of a left-wing hegemonic project such as radical democracy that prioritizes contesting relations of subordination and radicalizes liberty and equality should be cherished as it is an invaluable contribution to agonistic politics. Furthermore, in actually existing democracies, Mouffe reminds us, agonistic dynamics of politics are not healthy precisely because there is no viable left-wing counterhegemonic project that can contest the neoliberal hegemony. When

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agonistic dynamics of democracy do not function well, people become apathetic as they believe that there is no alternative to the existing hegemony and turn to radical political movements to express their grievances, frustration, and anger against the current status quo. Mouffe rightly observes that the far-right in many countries has successfully harnessed these sentiments which gave rise to antagonisms that cannot be democratically dealt with. In order to temper these anti-democratic tendencies and redirect passions toward democratic projects what is needed is a meaningful hegemonic alternative to the neoliberal hegemony. That’s why Mouffe defends reviving the Left/Right distinction as an effective way to revitalize agonism. In the current political conjuncture reviving the agonistic dimension of democratic politics depends on the emergence of a sustainable left-wing political alternative. This much-needed counterhegemonic response could be offered by the radical democratic project if the radical democratic agenda constitutes a sufficiently stable hegemonic front that provides people with a meaningful alternative and create enthusiasm to unite people against the current hegemony. As such, it is reasonable to suggest that in the current political context radical democracy could play a significant role in recovering the agonistic dynamics of democracy. In that sense, the radical democratic project makes agonistic politics possible.120 The relationship between radical democracy and agonistic democracy, however, is not always supportive. The second point that should be emphasized is that in a healthy agonistic democracy radical democracy cannot fully achieve its political aim of becoming hegemonic. And if radical democracy fulfills its goal of becoming hegemonic, this is an indication that agonistic dynamics of democracy are at risk. There is a fundamental tension between the two approaches, and in that sense they are not compatible. Recall that in agonistic democracy different liberal democratic projects compete for hegemony. The project of radical democracy is not an exception as it aims to establish its hegemony. This entails shaping the common sense in a way that only the radical democratic interpretation of equality and liberty appears to be reasonable. However, the successful hegemony of any political project and conception citizenship would weaken the agonistic dynamics of democracy. This is precisely the problem with the current hegemony of neoliberalism: the issue is not the existence of neoliberal perspective, rather what undermines agonistic politics is the strong hegemony of neoliberalism.

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Recognizing the tension between agonistic democratic politics and the radical democratic project, but failing to recognize their distinctness, Andrew Schaap argues that it would be a strategic mistake for radical democracy to accommodate both left-wing and right-wing positions.121 The radical democratic project proposes a reconstitution of the political association from the perspective of radicalization of equality and liberty. So, from the perspective of radical democracy, any political approach that doesn’t recognize the deep problems with capitalism would be viewed as an adversary—a friendly enemy. Agonistic democracy with its emphasis on a vibrant hegemonic competition among different political projects would be willing to accommodate political positions that radical democracy cannot such as capitalism. From a radical democratic perspective then an agonistic democracy that is willing to accommodate capitalist democracy could only serve to legitimize capitalism.122 Indeed, that is why radical democrats are harshly critical of agonistic democracy.123 Schaap is critical of agonistic democracy because he believes that it is not doing enough to marginalize right-wing political projects. For him, “the point of democratic agonism should be to re-signify the terms in which political conflict is represented in order to transform the existing social order such that the claims of the right no longer register as persuasive or meaningful.”124 What commentators miss is that it is not agonistic democracy’s aim to favor one political project over the other in the hegemony struggle. The liberal democratic framework is open to many interpretations and none of these interpretations can claim a privileged role as being the “true” interpretation.125 Commentators who criticize agonism for not favoring a side, and in particular not favoring their side, do not see the crucial point that agonistic democracy provides the terrain on which struggle among various political strategies can take place.126 In other words, situated within the liberal democratic horizon, agonism constitutes the playing field while remaining neutral with regards to who has the upper hand. A well-functioning agonistic democracy requires the existence of different political projects ranging from democratic right to democratic left. Here lies the fundamental tension between radical democracy and agonistic democracy. The ultimate goal of radical democracy is to establish a strong hegemony and become sedimented into what is considered as “common sense.”127 Thus viewed, radical democrats are bound to view the neutrality of agonistic politics toward all liberal democratic projects suspiciously. However, the aim of agonistic democracy is

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not to favor any one project, but to secure the agon and keep the hegemonic contestation alive. This means that no liberal democratic project should have a strong hegemony since that would inevitably weaken the agonistic dynamics of democracy thereby risking the stability and survival of democracy itself. Yet, it is strong hegemony that any political project including radical democracy strives for. Hence, what is ultimately good for agonism is not desirable for radical democracy and what is ultimately good for radical democracy is not always desirable for agonistic democracy.

Conclusion Agonistic democracy and radical democracy are two distinct political theories. They originate from the anti-essentialist perspective advanced in the HSS, but they address different problems and have different political goals. In the current political conjuncture, the project of radical democracy can enhance agonistic politics immensely given the lack of a left-wing political alternative to neoliberalism. By offering a left-wing definition of the common good and a corresponding conception of citizenship, radical democracy provides a much-needed counter-hegemonic project to revive the agonistic fight. But the left-wing alternative that challenges neoliberalism and revives the agonistic struggle does not have to be radical democracy. There are other left-wing possibilities that can offer a counter-hegemonic project. In fact, in response to the rise of right-wing populist movements, Mouffe has recently changed her position and advanced a left-wing populist position as a counterforce. This does not mean that Mouffe abandoned the radical democratic project, rather she seems to believe that in the current political context left-wing populism is better suited to challenge right-wing populism. She writes, “we are no longer in a phase where we are able to push for a radical democratic agenda; we now need to defend our basic democratic institutions.”128 The point is that neither agonism is a political strategy for achieving radical democracy nor agonistic democracy depends on radical democracy to exist. These are two distinct political approaches that can coexist and support each other, albeit in a tensional way. A too successful radical democracy can significantly weaken the agonistic dynamics of politics whereas a healthy agonistic democracy means that adversaries of radical democracy are alive and active. Agonism is neutral with respect to the hegemonic struggle between liberal democratic projects and it should treat radical democracy

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as one liberal democratic project among many. One can commit to both. Yet, they should recognize that at some point they might have to decide which one to prioritize and which to sacrifice.

Notes 1. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 2001). Henceforth referred to as HSS in the rest of the chapter. 2. Mouffe has recently underlined this continuity in her work. See Chantal Mouffe, For a Left Populism (London: Verso, 2018), and Chantal Mouffe, “Left Populism Over the Years,” interview by Rosemary Bechler, Open Democracy, September 10, 2018, https://www.opende mocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/left-populism-over-years-chantalmouffe-in-conversation-with-rosemar/. 3. It is important to recognize the differences between the two theories as they each have different political priorities and commitments. 4. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, vii. 5. Íñigo Errejón and Chantal Mouffe, Podemos: In the Name of the People (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2016), 20–21. 6. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, ix. 7. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 85 and 153; Errejón and Mouffe, Podemos, 19. 8. Nico Carpentier and Bart Cammaerts, “Hegemony, Democracy, Agonism and Journalism: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe,” Journalism Studies, no. 7 (2006), 967. 9. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, “Post-Marxism Without Apologies,” in New Reflections on the Revolutions of Our Time, ed. Ernesto Laclau (London: Verso, 1990), 102. 10. Laclau and Mouffe, “Post-Marxism without Apologies,” 104; Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 107–108. 11. Mark Wenman, Agonistic Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 183. 12. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 105. 13. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 105; Laclau and Mouffe, “Post-Marxism Without Apologies,” 104. 14. Laclau and Mouffe, “Post-Marxism Without Apologies,” 104. 15. Laclau and Mouffe, “Post-Marxism Without Apologies,” 104. 16. Carpentier and Cammaerts, “Hegemony, Democracy, Agonism and Journalism: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe,” 967. 17. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 113.

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18. Ernesto Laclau, “Impossibility of Society,” in New Reflections on the Revolutions of Our Time, ed. Ernesto Laclau (London: Verso, 1990), 95. 19. Laclau, “Impossibility of Society,” 95. 20. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 112. 21. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 112; Laclau, “Impossibility of Society,” 95. 22. Laclau, “Impossibility of Society,” 91. This point is particularly relevant in the final chapter of this book where I draw a distinction between my account of agonistic peace and post-modern accounts. 23. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, ix and 112. 24. Laclau and Mouffe emphasize that a discourse that cannot generate any fixity of meaning is the discourse of the psychotic. 25. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 113. 26. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 96. 27. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971). 28. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 65–71. 29. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 134 and 142. 30. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, xi. 31. Carpentier and Cammaerts, “Hegemony, Democracy, Agonism and Journalism: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe,” 967. 32. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 111. 33. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 144. 34. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 125. 35. Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Verso, 2005), 18. 36. Errejón and Mouffe, Podemos, 15–16. 37. Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993), 76. 38. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 76. 39. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, xi. 40. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 115; Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 77; Errejón and Mouffe, Podemos, 17. 41. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 76; Chantal Mouffe, “Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community,” in Dimensions of Radical Democracy, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: Verso, 1992), 237; Chantal Mouffe, “Democratic Politics and the Question of Identity,” in The Identity in Question, ed. John Rajchman (London: Routledge, 1995), 33. 42. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 77. 43. Mouffe, “Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community,” 237. 44. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 152; Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 18; Mouffe, For a Left Populism, 42.

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45. For Laclau and Mouffe a relation of subordination refers to relations in which “an agent is subjected to the decisions of another.” In that sense they simply identify a positional differential between situated agents. See Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 153–154. 46. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 14. 47. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 153–154 and 159; Mouffe, For a Left Populism, 41. 48. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 78. 49. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 19. A relation of equivalence is not a relation of identity, and hence it doesn’t erase difference. The new identification defines a political frontier and the common adversary. It is the recognition of the common struggle against domination and the common adversary that makes the chain of equivalence possible. As Mouffe puts it, “it is only in so far as democratic differences are opposed to forces or discourses which negate all of them that these differences can be substituted for each other.” See, Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 84. 50. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, xviii; Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 84–85; Chantal Mouffe, “Preface: Democratic Politics Today,” in Dimensions of Radical Democracy, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: Verso, 1992), 2–3. 51. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 84; Mouffe, “Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community,” 236–237. 52. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 152. 53. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 192. 54. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 21. 55. Mouffe, For a Left Populism, 89. 56. Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), 12 and 21; Mouffe, On the Political, 14. 57. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 12–13; Mouffe, On the Political, 14– 15; Chantal Mouffe, Agonistics (London: Verso, 2013), 5 and 45. 58. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, tran. George Schwab (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 27. 59. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 27. 60. I think this is a point many critics of Mouffe do not recognize. See, Mouffe, On the Political, 15; Mouffe, Agonistics, 15. 61. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 37. 62. Mouffe, On the Political, 16; Mouffe, Agonistics, 5. 63. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 3; Mouffe, On the Political, 13. 64. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 107fn31. 65. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 129. 66. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 134. 67. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 132; Mouffe, On the Political, 2–3.

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68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88.

89. 90. 91. 92.

93. 94.

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Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 131. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 131. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 70. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 101. Caroline Bayard, Sev Isajiw, and Gary Madison, “On the Itineraries of Democracy: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe,” Studies in Political Economy, no. 49 (1996), 146; Mouffe, Agonistics, xii. Mouffe, On the Political, 20–21. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 102. Mouffe, On the Political, 19. Errejón and Mouffe, Podemos, 89. Mouffe, “Democratic Politics and the Question of Identity,” 36. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 114. Mouffe, For a Left Populism, 15. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 103. Mouffe, Agonistics, 8. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 104; Mouffe, On the Political, 28. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 103–104; Mouffe, On the Political, 30; Mouffe, Agonistics, 8–9. Mouffe, On the Political, 28. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 6; Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 103. Mouffe, Agonistics, 9. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 66. See Gulshan Khan’s discussion of the concept. Khan notes that Mouffe offers a solution to the question of social cohesion in a pluralistic society by offering an alternative that can “enable citizens with very different value systems—traditional Christians or Muslims or secular humanists— to identify sufficiently with one another as citizens to enable them to adopt relations of civility while retaining their substantive differences.” Gulshan Khan, “Critical Republicanism: Jürgen Habermas and Chantal Mouffe,” Contemporary Political Theory 12, no. 4 (2013), 324. Mouffe, Agonistics, 13. Mouffe, On the Political, 121. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 4. Stefan Rummens, “Democracy as a Non-Hegemonic Struggle? Disambiguating Chantal Mouffe’s Agonistic Model of Politics,” Constellations 16, no. 3 (2019), 379. Mouffe, Agonistics, 13. See Fuat Gürsözlü, “Agonism and Deliberation: Recognizing the Difference,” Journal of Political Philosophy 17, no. 3 (2009), 356–368. Here I treat agonistic democracy and radical democracy as part of the same theory and attribute one of the key features of radical democracy to agonistic democracy.

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95. See, for instance, Mark Wenman, “Laclau or Mouffe? Splitting the Difference,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 25, no. 5 (2003), 581–606; Monique Deveaux, “Agonism and Pluralism,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 25, no. 4 (1999), 1–22; Khan, “Critical Republicanism: Jürgen Habermas and Chantal Mouffe”; Gürsözlü, “Agonism and Deliberation: Recognizing the Difference.” 96. See, for instance, Bayard, Isajiw, and Madison, “On the Itineraries of Democracy: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe”; Mouffe, “Preface: Democratic Politics Today”; Mouffe, The Return of the Political. 97. Some of Mouffe’s writings contribute to the ambiguity here. For instance, in On the Political she writes that agonistic democracy aims for a “profound transformation of the existing power relations and the establishment of a new hegemony. Therefore, it can be properly called ‘radical’.” Mouffe, On the Political, 52. 98. Chantal Mouffe, “By Way of a Postscript,” Parallax 20, no. 2 (2014), 154. 99. Mouffe, “By Way of a Postscript,” 154. 100. Mouffe, “By Way of a Postscript,” 154; Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 21. 101. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 70. 102. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 18–19. 103. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 85. 104. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 192. 105. Mouffe, “By Way of a Postscript,” 154. 106. Deveaux, “Agonism and Pluralism,” 2–5; Khan, “Critical Republicanism: Jürgen Habermas and Chantal Mouffe,” 331–333; Wenman, Agonistic Democracy, 206–208. 107. Deveaux, “Agonism and Pluralism,” 2; Andreas Kalyvas, “The Democratic Narcissis: The Agonism of the Ancients Compared to that of the (Post)Moderns,” in Law and Agonistic Politics, ed. Andrew Schaap (Burlington: Ashgate), 34. 108. Khan, “Critical Republicanism: Jürgen Habermas and Chantal Mouffe,” 331; Wenman, Agonistic Democracy, 205–212. 109. Mouffe, “Preface: Democratic Politics Today,” 3. 110. Mouffe, “Preface: Democratic Politics Today,” 4. 111. Wenman, Agonistic Democracy, 207. 112. Wenman, Agonistic Democracy, 207. See Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), xiv. 113. Khan, “Critical Republicanism: Jürgen Habermas and Chantal Mouffe,” 331. 114. See Mouffe, The Return of the Political, esp. Chapter 4 “Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community,” 60–73.

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115. 116. 117. 118. 119.

120. 121.

122. 123.

124. 125. 126. 127. 128.

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Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 63. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 63. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 60. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 51. For instance, Wenman writes that in a radical democracy agonistic citizens would view each other as adversaries and despite their fundamental differences of value and interest, they accept the rules of liberal democratic association. See, Wenman, “Laclau or Mouffe? Splitting the Difference,” 600. This way of depicting the relation between the two approaches reinforces the idea that the two distinct political approaches form a coherent unity. Kalyvas, “The Democratic Narcissis,” 35. Andrew Schaap, “Political Theory and the Agony of Politics,” Political Studies Review, no. 5 (2007), 63. See also, Keith Breen, “Agonism, Antagonism, and the Necessity for Care,” in Law and Agonistic Politics, ed. Andrew Schaap (Burlington: Ashgate), 139. Schaap, “Political Theory and the Agony of Politics,” 63. See Alejandro Vazguez-Arrojo, “Agonized Liberalism: The Liberal Theory of William E. Connolly,” Radical Philosophy, no. 127 (Sept/Oct 2004), 8–19. See also Schaap, “Political Theory and the Agony of Politics”; Breen, “Agonism, Antagonism, and the Necessity for Care.” Moreover, because commentators do not recognize radical democracy and agonistic democracy as two distinct theories, they end up claiming that agonistic democracy is inconsistent. Schaap, “Political Theory and the Agony of Politics,” 63. Mouffe, “Democratic Politics and the Question of Identity,” 38. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 21. Mouffe, “Democratic Politics and The Question of Identity,” 41. Carpentier and Cammaerts, “Hegemony, Democracy, Agonism and Journalism: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe,” 970.

References Barber, Benjamin. Strong Democracy. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984. Bayard, Caroline, Sev Isajiw, and Gary Madison. “On the Itineraries of Democracy: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe.” Studies in Political Economy, no. 49 (1996): 131–148. Breen, Keith. “Agonism, Antagonism, and the Necessity for Care.” In Law and Agonistic Politics, edited by Andrew Schaap. Burlington: Ashgate, 2009. Carpentier, Nico, and Bart Cammaerts. “Hegemony, Democracy, Agonism and Journalism: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe.” Journalism Studies, no. 7 (2006): 964–975.

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Deveaux, Monique. “Agonism and Pluralism.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 25, no. 4 (1999): 1–22. Errejón, Íñigo, and Chantal Mouffe. Podemos: In the Name of the People. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2016. Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from Prison Notebooks. Edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New York: International Publishers, 1971. Gürsözlü, Fuat. “Agonism and Deliberation: Recognizing the Difference.” Journal of Political Philosophy 17, no. 3 (2009): 356–368. Kalyvas, Andreas. “The Democratic Narcissis: the Agonism of the Ancients Compared to that of the (Post)Moderns.” In Law and Agonistic Politics, edited by Andrew Schaap, 15–41. Burlington: Ashgate, 2009. Khan, Gulshan. “Critical Republicanism: Jürgen Habermas and Chantal Mouffe.” Contemporary Political Theory 12, no. 4 (2013): 318–337. Laclau, Ernesto. “Impossibility of Society.” In New Reflections on the Revolutions of Our Time, edited by Ernesto Laclau, 89–92. London: Verso, 1990. Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. London: Verso, 2001. Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. “Post-Marxism Without Apologies.” In New Reflections on the Revolutions of Our Time, edited by Ernesto Laclau, 97–134. London: Verso, 1990. Mouffe, Chantal. Agonistics. London: Verso, 2013. Mouffe, Chantal. “By Way of a Postscript.” Parallax 20, no. 2 (2014): 149–157. Mouffe, Chantal. “Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community.” In Dimensions of Radical Democracy, edited by Chantal Mouffe, 225–239. London: Verso, 1992. Mouffe, Chantal. “Democratic Politics and the Question of Identity.” In The Identity in Question, edited by John Rajchman, 33–46. London: Routledge, 1995. Mouffe, Chantal. For a Left Populism. London: Verso, 2018. Mouffe, Chantal. “Left Populism Over the Years.” Interview by Rosemary Bechler. Open Democracy, September 10, 2018. https://www.opendemoc racy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/left-populism-over-years-chantal-mouffe-inconversation-with-rosemar/. Mouffe, Chantal. On the Political. London: Verso, 2005. Mouffe, Chantal. “Preface: Democratic Politics Today.” In Dimensions of Radical Democracy, edited by Chantal Mouffe, 1–16. London: Verso, 1992. Mouffe, Chantal. The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso, 2000. Mouffe, Chantal. The Return of the Political. London: Verso, 1993.

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Rummens, Stefan. “Democracy as a Non-Hegemonic Struggle? Disambiguating Chantal Mouffe’s Agonistic Model of Politics.” Constellations 16, no. 3 (2019): 377–391. Schaap, Andrew. “Political Theory and the Agony of Politics.” Political Studies Review 5, no. 1 (2007): 56–74. Vazguez-Arrojo, Alejandro. “Agonized Liberalism: The Liberal Theory of William E. Connolly.” Radical Philosophy, no. 127 (Sept/Oct 2004): 8–19. Wenman, Mark. Agonistic Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Wenman, Mark. “Laclau or Mouffe? Splitting the Difference.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 25, no. 5 (2003): 581–606.

CHAPTER 2

For a More Democratic Agonistic Politics

Agonistic democracy is neutral toward liberal-democratic projects fighting to define the common good and vying for hegemony. It reveals its partisan commitment when it comes to defending the liberal democratic regime. Put differently, agonistic democracy cannot be indifferent when what is at stake is the stability of the liberal democratic regime and the perpetuation of the democratic struggle. The very existence of agonistic democracy requires a particular ordering of political values and establishing their hegemony. This implies that in an agonistic democratic regime other political values and alternatives to liberal democracy will suffer.1 Not only they will have difficulty establishing themselves as strong alternatives to the liberal democratic ordering of values, but those who pose a threat to the stability of the regime will be excluded. The liberal democratic regime like any type of hegemonic political regime is the result of a temporary stabilization of power. And thus, it will constantly be challenged by those it excludes. This brings to the fore the everpresent possibility of antagonism and the possible disintegration of the liberal democratic regime. Hence, the fragility of liberal democracy and the never-ending need to maintain and secure its hegemony. The issue is that too much emphasis on order and stability can permanently banish the excluded from the democratic order while stifling the spirit of democratic struggle. The former is in tension with agonistic democracy’s claim to denaturalize power and make exclusions contestable, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Gürsözlü, Agonistic Democracy and Political Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05999-5_2

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and the latter is in tension with its promise to sublimate ever-present risk of antagonism. These points are important as agonistic democracy is not just another hegemonic regime, but one whose distinctness lies in its promise of a more democratic, inclusive, and peaceful society established through the well-functioning of its agonistic dynamics. As such, it cannot afford to sacrifice its democratic spirit and its commitment to the democratic struggle in order to secure the stability and unity of the democratic order. Prioritizing stability and order makes it harder to foster the democratic ethos required to keep the agonistic dynamics of democratic politics healthy. Once agonistic democracy generates a militant democratic attitude and thus agonistic citizens’ allegiance to the democratic regime takes the form of dogmatic devotion, it becomes difficult to recognize the contingency and ambiguity of its political boundaries. This leads to the naturalization of agonistic democratic regime’s political frontiers and essentialization of its identities. I suggest that an agonistic democratic approach should pursue a more subtle approach in response to the question of exclusion. To take the question of exclusion seriously, agonistic democracy should pay attention to how it responds to its exclusions. My suggestion here is to consider hegemony as a continuum. Once we view hegemony as a continuum between absolute fixity and non-fixity, we recognize that there are different forms of hegemonies. Some hegemonies are more entrenched—strong hegemony—and some are less—weak hegemony. To keep its promise of a more democratic, inclusive, and peaceful society, agonistic democracy should avoid the tendency to develop into a hegemonic order in the strong sense. Establishing itself as a weak hegemonic regime is the only way for agonistic democracy to maintain democratic flexibility and sensitivities and to foster affective attachment to liberal democratic regime at the same time.

The Question of Exclusion Viewed from the perspective of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony exclusion is an inevitable dimension of any hegemonic articulation. To constitute itself as a distinct formation any type of hegemonic articulation has to have a constitutive outside in relation to which it defines its identity. It follows that the positivity of agonistic democracy requires a constitutive outside and thus it excludes some identities, perspectives, demands, and, in general, other hegemonic alternatives. Within this framework the

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question of common identity that unites the agonistic democratic regime introduces a twofold risk: on the one hand, embracing pluralism without defending a commonality introduces the possibility of disintegration of the society as a result of exacerbation of differences while, on the other hand, endorsing a too strong form of unity leads to homogenization thereby undermining the pluralistic order.2 Agonistic democracy seeks to strike a balance between the two positions by proposing a common identity—a “we”—that is “strong enough to institute a ‘demos’ and yet compatible with religious, moral and cultural pluralism.”3 The common identity that is at the core of agonistic citizenship is constituted by citizens’ allegiance to the political values of equality and liberty—the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy. The irreducible tension between liberalism and democracy that is constitutive of liberal democracy provides the political terrain for the emergence of multiplicity of democratic political identifications.4 This allows agonistic democracy to defend a commonality that unites the agonistic democratic regime while, at the same time, accommodate genuinely distinct conceptions of democratic citizenship. As the liberal democratic nature of the collective identity defended by agonistic democracy already suggests, the sort of pluralism agonistic democracy implies is not a pluralism without limits. Mouffe is clear that not all antagonisms could be transformed into agonism and not all demands and identities could be accepted as legitimate.5 One of the distinguishing aspects of Mouffe’s agonistic approach is that it recognizes the necessity to put limits on pluralism and the moment of political decision this inevitability introduces.6 This is the meaning of the idea that a hegemonic regime is a case of “undecidable decided.” A liberal democratic regime cannot equate all values since its very possibility is based on a hierarchical ordering of political values.7 The fundamental values of liberal democratic regime provide the commonality that all legitimate conceptions of citizenship share. In doing so, it draws a political frontier and excludes those who reject the constitutive principles of the liberal democratic “we.” Defining the exterior to the agonistic democratic regime brings to the fore the primary hegemonic moment and the hegemony struggle it entails. At this point, we realize that in the context of agonistic democracy the hegemony struggle takes place on two fronts. Agonistic democracy creates the conditions for a hegemony struggle between competing accounts of liberal democracy. That’s the hegemony struggle that takes place within the boundaries of agonistic

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democracy. As Mouffe argues, the confrontation among these hegemonic projects is the main political mechanism that allows the transformation of possible antagonism to agonism. The more fundamental hegemonic moment is that agonistic democracy, as a hegemonic order, excludes rival political alternatives and shapes the common sense. By excluding other possibilities agonistic democracy draws a political frontier that defines and structures the symbolic order and determines the nature of what is acceptable, legitimate, and negotiable thereby deciding what sorts of conflict, demands, and identities will be allowed in a democratic society. The difference between the two forms of hegemonic struggle with respect to the question of exclusion is that the hegemony struggle within is more dynamic as it allows for contestation of internal boundaries. A particular liberal democratic project may have the upper hand and exclude other liberal democratic alternatives for a period, but rival liberal democratic projects could successfully contest its hegemony and replace it with an alternative democratic hegemonic project. For instance, neoliberalism has been successfully shaping the common sense and marginalizing its rivals for decades. However, as long as spaces of agonistic contestation are open, alternatives to the neoliberal hegemony can always find ways to contest the neoliberal order and present their accounts as the most reasonable organization of society. The contestability of existing hegemony through the openness of democratic spaces is precisely what agonistic democracy aims to secure and stabilize. The more fundamental hegemonic moment over the very boundaries of agonistic democratic regime does not allow this sort of contestability as what is at stake is the very existence of the agonistic democratic order. What Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony tells us is that antagonistic principles cannot coexist in the same political order since this would threaten the existing hegemonic order. This means that the demands of those who defend a totally new hegemony, and not a version of liberal democracy, cannot be part of the agonistic democratic struggle.8 The exclusion of anti-democratic formations is a political decision based on a pragmatic concern for the stability of the political order. Those who challenge the fundamental values of the regime will be characterized as the enemy and “thereby exclude themselves from the political community” unless they accept the ethico-political principles of the democratic regime and respect the democratic institutions.9 Thus viewed, in ideal agonistic democracy internal boundaries are always democratically contestable, but the constitutive boundaries of the democratic symbolic space would be as sealed as possible.

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There is a fundamental difficulty that needs to be addressed before we can further explore Mouffe’s position on the exclusions of agonistic democracy. The problem is that Mouffe’s views on the issue of exclusion are notoriously vague. Nowhere in her works does she clarifies the nature of such exclusions and what exactly excluding those who reject the fundamental values of the liberal democratic regime entails. Commentators offered different interpretations of what Mouffe means by exclusion. One plausible interpretation is that excluding the enemies of liberal democracy means symbolic and legal exclusion from the liberal democratic agon.10 Even if we accept this interpretation the problem persists since it is not clear what legal and symbolic exclusion from the democratic agon entails. Does this mean that anti-democratic views are to be excluded “while those who hold them retain the full rights and entitlements associated with citizenship?” or does exclusion entail infringing upon the rights of those defending anti-democratic views meaning that these “individuals and groups themselves lose their rights and entitlements?”11 I doubt the latter position could be supported by any version of agonistic democracy given that agonistic democrats are deeply committed to liberty and the value of contestation. Without radically distorting the fundamentals of the agonistic democratic framework, it does not look possible to construe exclusion in a way that requires suspending citizens’ fundamental rights. Agonism operates within a liberal democratic horizon and denying some citizens fundamental freedoms or intervening in their exercise turns any democratic regime into an “illiberal” one.12 However, it is also not clear how excluding certain views from the democratic agon would be possible without severely limiting fundamental rights and liberties of those who defend such views. The ambiguity persists. It is, however, important to be cautious here when interpreting what exclusion entails because the idea of exclusion introduces a political risk. It is always tempting to represent views that challenge the dominant hegemony as a threat to the political community and argue that they should be excluded. The obvious risk for agonistic democracy is that the dynamics of exclusion can be exploited by political forces who strive to solidify their position, rally their base, and marginalize adversaries. This includes the possibility of representing legitimate adversaries as enemies of the regime. After all, the hegemony struggle within is still a hegemony struggle. And using politically expedient but democratically pernicious tactics to win the democratic fight would not surprise anyone who pays attention to actual politics. Recognizing such vulnerability, agonistic democracy cannot draw

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its political frontiers too narrowly. I believe Mouffe’s response to Marine Le Pen’s the National Front supports this position. Mouffe acknowledges the complexity of the question of exclusion and refuses to draw the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate too narrowly when she writes, “I have been criticized a lot for my unwillingness to label Marine Le Pen as ‘extreme right’ and for sticking to my designation of right-wing populist. But strictly speaking ‘extreme right’ is an anti-liberal, anti-parliamentary right, that uses and incites violence and does not accept the democratic institutions. Marine Le Pen is not in that category. Of course, those extreme right parties do exist in Europe. But so far they are very marginal.”13 Despite Le Pen’s expressed intention to move the National Front to center-right, it is clear that some of the positions she defends, and in particular her views on pluralism, multiculturalism, and Islam are at odds with the principles of equality and liberty. However, Le Pen clearly condemns violence and expresses her commitment to the democratic fight.14 That’s why Mouffe avoids characterizing Le Pen’s farright National Front as a threat to liberal democracy. In doing so, she illustrates that the democratic agon should be open to radical views, even ones that many would be tempted to describe as harmful and dangerous. Mouffe’s response to the National Front brings to the fore the tension between the necessity to exclude those who threaten the fundamental values of the liberal democratic regime and agonism’s commitment to “make room for pluralism of cultures, collective forms of life and regimes, as well as for the pluralism of subjects, individual choices and conceptions of good.”15 Some commentators argue that Mouffe resolves this tension in a way that renders politics too frictionless. The concern is that Mouffe reduces “the subject matter of legitimate political dispute” in such a way that makes it easier for agonistic democracy to remain optimistic about its capacity to sublimate remaining conflicts into adversarial relations.16 Thus, in a sense, the claim is that it is agonistic democracy that exploits the inevitability of exclusion and the permanence of the category “enemy.” It is one thing to exclude terrorists and fascists, Keith Breen argues, but Mouffe’s agonistic democracy also excludes “multiculturalists and others who would use parliamentary means to institute legal frameworks conducive to the recognition of religious difference.”17 Accordingly, Breen concludes, Mouffe ends up defending “partisan politics with no real partisans.”18 Indeed, as Breen rightly points out, Mouffe argues against legal pluralism since she believes that it poses a risk to the permanence of

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the democratic political association. A democratic society, she writes, “cannot allow the coexistence of conflicting principles of legitimacy in its midst.”19 Granting an exception to some categories of immigrants in the name of pluralism misses the role of the political in the symbolic ordering of social relations. However, she adds that it is possible to accommodate those demands “whose satisfaction can be granted without jeopardizing the basic liberal democratic framework.”20 Despite rejecting a legal pluralism—something akin to the millet system employed by the Ottoman Empire—, agonistic democracy doesn’t categorically deny multiculturalist demands. From an agonistic perspective, the democratic fight is open to many different political movements including far-right and far-left approaches. Mouffe’s views on a far-right political movement such as the National Front indicate that we can expect agonistic politics to be as inclusive as possible. There is still a lot at stake in democratic politics where far-right and far-left parties struggle for hegemony. So, I doubt that the restrictions agonistic democracy places upon democratic politics sterilize the space of democratic politics the way Breen argues. Other commentators are critical of the very idea of delimiting the democratic struggle in advance of politics. Acampora, for instance, emphasizes that prioritizing agonism entails rendering democratic values contestable thereby avoiding its undemocratic exclusions. Democratic agonism, she describes, puts “its own value on the line and genuinely fight to legitimize the basis of its own hegemony.”21 The idea is that democratic agonism should be willing to face its opponents. Acampora’s criticism points to the fundamental tension between democratic agonism and agonistic democracy. And, as she recognizes, Mouffe’s is not a project of democratic agonism, rather it is a project of agonistic democracy. Agonistic theorists cannot endorse the kind of democratic agonism Acampora describes as it puts the democratic and pluralistic character of the political order at risk. Put differently, democratic agonism does not necessarily lead to democratic outcomes. Agonistic democracy brings agonism and democracy together by prioritizing democratic contestation.22 Putting emphasis on keeping the democratic agon alive requires defending the hegemony of democracy against those hostile to democratic norms. But, pace Acampora, despite its necessary exclusions, agonistic democracy’s fight to renew and legitimize its own hegemony never ends. The constitution of a democratic order is a continuous project that requires perpetual reenactment.23 And given the hegemonic construction

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of the democratic society, the terms of exclusion are perpetually renegotiated.24 This is the point of Mouffe’s repeated emphasis on the fragility of democracy and the necessity to renew and strengthen citizens’ allegiance to it. It should be emphasized, however, that it would be detrimental for agonistic democracy to foster an excessively confident democratic attitude when it comes to its necessary exclusions. Such an attitude is what Fred Dallmayr draws attention to when he focuses on Mouffe’s discussion of the distinction between the public and the private, and state and religion.25 For Mouffe, these distinctions are among the most fundamental achievements of the democratic revolution. These distinctions make the existence of pluralism possible and thus they cannot be challenged in the name of pluralism. For Mouffe, this brings to the fore “the problem posed by the integration of a religion like Islam, which does not accept these distinctions.”26 What troubles Dallmayr is Mouffe’s emphatic insistence on the relegation of religion to the private which is something, Mouffe writes, “we now have to make Muslims accept.”27 Mouffe also warns against the threat of the rise of various religious fundamentalisms of Christian origin rising in the US and France. She notes that the rise of Christian fundamentalism poses a threat to the democratic tradition. What Dallmayr seems to find worrying is not whether such religious approaches should be excluded to maintain the democratic and pluralistic order, rather it is what the statement “we have to make them accept” expresses. It implies a too confident attitude that reflects a too rigid perspective that disregards its hegemonic institution and fails to acknowledge its contingency. Agonistic democracy has to deal with the challenge of anti-democratic projects as the fundamental hegemony struggle never ends. But, the goal is to keep the enemy at bay while striving to be more democratic, inclusive, and pluralistic. This is precisely what Bonnie Honig points out when she suggests that we should pay attention to the tendency of every political order to remainder and to marginalize its remainders.28 The task of agonism, Honig emphasizes, is to contest the remainders that are suppressed, thereby making democracy more inclusive and open.29 The gist of what Honig and Mouffe defend here is similar, but the difference is that Honig’s approach warns us against the dangers of succeeding.30 What is at stake is not the exclusions of agonistic democracy or refusing the excluded to contest democratic values and institutions. The former is inevitable; the latter is a risk no political order would be willing to take especially given that the seeds of its destructing exist

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in the excluded alternatives waiting to be reactivated. What is really at stake here is whether the political attitude that accompanies the inevitable hegemonic exclusions of the agonistic democratic regime weakens the democratic attentiveness to political remainders and marginalizations of the political regime—the attitude that Honig urges us to maintain. So, the issue is the excessive self-confidence accompanying the political exclusions that can paralyze the kind of flexible, tolerant, and self-critical democratic muscles needed to render agonistic democracy more attentive to its exclusions and keep its agonistic dynamics healthy. The political attitude expressed by “we should make them accept our truths” and the underlying epistemological over-confidence is one that we should be wary of as that is what leads to the naturalization of remainders and obscures the operations of power that exclusion implies. The trouble with too much self-confidence is that it cultivates an anti-democratic attitude that prevents us from exploring possible ways of making democracy more pluralistic, inclusive, and democratic.31 There is a fine line between selfconfidence and dogmatism. Hegemonic regimes tend to degenerate into the latter. Agonistic democracy cannot degenerate into a dogmatic political order if it is to remain true to its fundamental values and establish itself as a sufficiently stable political regime. Given the dynamic nature of the social and the hegemonic nature of the democratic order, it is important to maintain a more modest approach toward our democratic achievements so as to avoid oversimplifying the terrain of politics and thus employing simple categorizations to make sense of a dynamic field marked with complexity and plurality.

Reflections on Exclusion Complexity and Ambiguity of Politics A political culture infused with a militant democratic attitude creates significant challenges for agonistic democracy. A militant democratic attitude is based on the assumption that the enemies of liberal democracy are clearly and easily identifiable and thus what needs to be done is to exclude them from the space of agonistic politics. This approach ignores the complexity of political decisions that should be made in a highly ambiguous and dynamic political context. The question of who exactly the enemy of liberal democracy is does not always have a clear answer. That’s why a political decision is called for. Hegemony already implies

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that the political decision of defining the enemy is not a one-time act. There is continuous renegotiation of political decisions, critical revision of previous decisions, and making of new decisions. There are less controversial situations such as the case of those who are willing to resort to violent means to overthrow democratic institutions to install a fascist or totalitarian political regime or the case of those who attempt to shut down agonistic political spaces by threatening and intimidating those who want to participate in the democratic struggle. I doubt that categorizing these positions as enemies of the democratic regime would be highly controversial. However, for instance, multiculturalists who defend a pluralistic legal framework because they believe this is what respecting cultural pluralism requires present a more difficult case and doesn’t lend to an easy categorization. The multiculturalists can construct their demands as an extension of their commitment to equality and liberty and they may even receive support from some agonistic citizens. It is one thing to exclude illiberal projects hostile to democracy or projects defending violence to undermine the hegemony of democracy, but it is another to exclude the multiculturalists who defend a pluralistic legal framework because they believe this is what liberty and equality requires. The larger issue is that given the complex and dynamic nature of society, we can only expect new ideas, demands, and identities to emerge. And some of those cannot emerge without challenging the established settlements and disturb dominant relations of power.32 There are many demands, identities, and projects situated in the ambiguous political space between what is legitimate and illegitimate, and what is acceptable and unacceptable. Mouffe seems to recognize this when she says that we need to distinguish the demands of multiculturalists according to their motive. She draws a distinction between those who are of strictly cultural customs and those with a directly political nature. She notes that the satisfaction of the latter would lead to the destruction of the basic liberal democratic framework. Mouffe states that the political decision here is a complex one and “that there will never be a definitive, clear-cut and satisfactory solution.”33 Thus, despite her rejection of legal pluralism, Mouffe acknowledges that “there are no doubt certain special cases, like that of the indigenous people, where exceptions can be made.”34 The important point is that such special cases are part of democratic politics. To recognize them and understand their complexity, we need our democratic reflexes and sensitivities to be healthy. These are the democratic skills that don’t allow us to make quick political

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categorizations and fall back to dominant interpretations of entrenched norms. The militant attitude that is too protective of the democratic order might lead to unnecessary marginalization of identities, demands, and projects that find themselves on the ambiguous space between legitimate and illegitimate, and acceptable and unacceptable. Thus, anything new or ambiguous could easily be viewed as a threat to the democratic order. To make the agonistic democratic order more democratic without risking its pluralistic character, agonistic democracy should be receptive to the multiplicity of voices that mark contemporary pluralist societies. For that, it is crucial that agonistic democracy successfully counters the tendency to naturalize its remainders and essentialize its identities both of which generate a militant democratic attitude. When Mouffe takes a more inclusive approach toward Le Pen’s the National Front or acknowledges possible legitimate exceptions to the multiculturalist demands, she exhibits the kind of democratic flexibility and sensitivity required to sustain a more democratic and inclusive agonism. Despite their extremist past and some of its current policies that are not compatible with an agonistic conception of democracy, Mouffe gives the National Front the benefit of doubt when she characterizes them as agonistic contenders in a hegemony struggle, and not as an enemy of liberal democracy. Similarly, as long as the multiculturalists are willing to play the democratic game and follow the rules of the agonistic democratic regime, their demands should not be excluded from the democratic struggle. This is the democratic reflex and sensitivity required to put agonistic democracy on a more democratic path. Militant Democracy and the Spirit of Agonism The way a democratic regime responds to the question of exclusion has implications on how the agonistic struggle between adversaries is played out. The worry is that having a too rigid view on its political boundaries and perceiving its exclusions to be natural foster a militant democratic attitude that introduces the possibility of stifling the agonistic dynamics of democracy.35 Recall that agonism is a relation of antagonism. Adversaries are friendly enemies, but they are still enemies. Adversaries propose their interpretation of the constitutive terms of the political association and the common good. The democratic fight is one of hegemony as each of them tries to implement a different form of hegemony.36 Some of the hegemonic projects are sufficiently close to each other which makes it

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possible for the proponents of these projects to form a friendly relationship. For instance, it is more likely for social democrats and democratic socialists to have a positive view of each other as they are ideologically closer. Those who are on the opposite ends of the political spectrum and ideologically far away from each other might not view each other that positively. When the ideological gap between political positions is too wide, there is always the risk that adversaries develop prejudice and distrust toward each other. Coupled with a militant democratic attitude it becomes easier for such groups to categorize their political adversaries as a threat to the democratic order. The increasing ideological gap between political adversaries tests the pacifying power of the common identity that unites agonistic contenders. As Andrew Schaap emphasizes, this is a serious challenge as the kind of political conflicts agonistic democracy wants to allow in democratic politics are the ones that are “likely to be perceived as a threat to democracy in a situation where the meaning of democracy is itself essentially contested.”37 Schaap underlines that “survival, stability and/or security of the political association are the values most often invoked in a situation in which the defenders of an ostensibly democratic regime want to suppress their opponents.”38 This is precisely when agonistic democracy relies on agonistic citizens democratic reflexes and sensitivities to keep the agonistic dynamics healthy. However, the militant democratic attitude creates a rigid and simple political reality that breeds dogmatic intolerance and fuels anxieties about the stability of the order. Despite identifying with democratic ideals and sharing a liberal democratic vision, agonistic citizens do not view their political opponents as legitimate contenders. Thus, it becomes harder to trust and tolerate adversaries. With weakened democratic reflexes and sensitivities, democratic citizens become averse to political contestation. Consequently, they grow more aggressive toward adversaries and, in particular, toward those who are placed on the opposite end of the ideological spectrum. Agonistic democracy requires a consensus on its fundamental values to function. And it needs to encourage citizens to develop allegiance to the liberal democratic institutions. As important as citizens’ commitment to the liberal democratic horizon is their understanding of the nature of this consensus: it is a conflictual consensus that comes with dissent. When agonistic citizens overlook that the consensus that brings them together is always open to multiple interpretations that are equally legitimate, it is an indication that agonistic dynamics of democracy is in decay. This

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is a risk agonistic democracy can’t take. The stability of the agonistic democratic order depends on whether agonistic contenders could resist the temptation to characterize their political opponents as enemy of the political regime. Agonistic democracy requires citizens to accept the limitations and particularity of their claims.39 The dogmatic attitude that emerges in response to the primary hegemony struggle over the boundaries and exclusions of agonistic democracy fosters the opposite of that, thereby threatening the hegemony struggle within. A significant challenge for agonistic democracy is whether agonistic citizens can keep their democratic reflexes and sensitivities alive while taking part in the hegemony struggle. A dogmatic attitude that is too defensive of the political order and certain of its achievements is not helpful as it makes it difficult for agonistic contenders to keep an already fragile relation between adversaries democratic and peaceful. The Fate of the Excluded The third issue I’d like to address with regards to the question of exclusion is the political status of the excluded in agonistic democracy. At this point, Mouffe’s criticism of how Rawls approaches the exclusions of political liberalism is particularly illuminating. While criticizing Rawls, Mouffe points out that by drawing a distinction between simple pluralism and reasonable pluralism, political liberalism excludes those who are unreasonable.40 The exclusion of the unreasonable from political liberalism allows Rawls to argue that an overlapping consensus around liberal democratic institutions among reasonable citizens is realistically possible. Mouffe criticizes Rawls not because political liberalism excludes the unreasonable, but because he presents what is a political decision as a requirement of morality and rationality. For Mouffe, when exclusions are construed this way, the political decision ceases to be contestable and those who challenge the liberal democratic order would be deemed as “irrational” or “unreasonable.”41 Despite their disagreement on the nature of exclusions of liberal democracy, Rawls and Mouffe acknowledge the implications of such exclusions and argue that there is nothing that can be done to avoid the consequences of a liberal democratic hegemony.42 For Mouffe, in a liberal democratic regime anti-democratic alternatives are “displaced and marginalized by the apparently irresistible march of liberal democracy.”43 It is inescapable that those who deny “our liberal democratic

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values” would experience the liberal democratic order as denying some of the defining features of their identity and their exclusion as coercive. Rawls is less hesitant to recognize the implications political liberalism’s exclusions. First, he states, political liberalism does not engage with the unreasonable.44 The boundary between the excluded and the reasonable is rigidly established once and for all. In a famous footnote in Political Liberalism, Rawls suggests that unreasonable doctrines should be contained like war and disease “so that they do not overturn political justice.”45 Rawls is not clear about what containment of the unreasonable entails, but he emphasizes that stability of the political liberal order depends on how well it produces and reproduces citizens committed to liberal democracy. What Rawls describes is a process of hegemonic transformation and democratic interpellation that aims to reform those whose way of life is in conflict with the basic values of the regime or who reject them outright.46 The process of hegemonic transformation takes slowly over time and within this process “simple pluralism moves toward reasonable pluralism.”47 Despite his reluctance to acknowledge the implications of the exclusions of political liberalism and deal with the question of how the liberal democratic order should treat the excluded, Rawls’ political liberalism introduces a political mechanism to integrate the excluded. One might have expected Mouffe’s agonistic democracy to offer a similar political mechanism that sketches how agonism should treat its exclusions and how agonistic democracy hopes to integrate the excluded into the democratic symbolic order. Yet, Mouffe’s theory does not say much about the fate of the excluded. David Howarth rightly points out that it is not clear what happens to “those demands, claims and identities that are excluded from a democratic symbolic order—those who remain antagonists rather than adversaries.”48 Simply put, what happens to the excluded in agonistic democracy remains unaddressed. Agonistic democracy cannot ignore the question of what happens to the excluded. There is clearly a tension between Mouffe’s claim that the political boundary between what is legitimate and illegitimate “should always remain open to contestation”49 and the political means the excluded are given to “mount an effective challenge to hegemonic institutions.”50 It is not sufficient to say that the excluded should be able to contest the grounds of their exclusion, rather it should be explained how in an agonistic democratic regime this can take place especially given that the excluded are excluded from the symbolic order.51 Importantly, Mouffe criticizes Rawls by arguing that “it is not enough to eliminate

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the political in its dimension of antagonism and exclusion from one’s theory to make it vanish from the real world.” And she continues, “it does come back, and with vengeance.”52 Here, we can direct a similar criticism to Mouffe on the question of exclusion: the enemies of agonistic democracy do not disappear when they are excluded from the democratic symbolic space. As Honig reminds us, if the remainders of a political regime “are not engaged, they may return to haunt and destabilize the very closures that deny their existence.”53 We need not regret the exclusions at stake here if they reject outright democratic institutions and remain committed to overthrowing them. But categorizing all those who disagree with the priority of liberty and equality over other political values as an enemy of liberal democracy is unlikely to encourage them to develop allegiance to democratic institutions. Such a rigid exclusion and the accompanying militant democratic attitude are more likely to intensify the resentment, anger, and hostility experienced by the excluded and turn them away from democratic politics toward anti-democratic alternatives. From the perspective of the excluded, their exclusion is inevitably viewed as an exercise of authoritarian power of an oppressive regime. They continue to experience the liberal democratic regime as coercive as they remain excluded from the democratic order thereby being relegated to second-class citizenship. I doubt that presenting the exclusions of the liberal democratic order as a political decision rather than a requirement of a moral or rational approach changes the way the excluded would experience their political status. It is essential for the agonistic democratic regime to find ways to integrate the excluded in the democratic order. At this point, it is crucial to emphasize that Rawls relies on the looseness of citizens’ identities when he defends his political conception of justice. The expectation is that over time a political liberal regime would be able to shape people’s identities and those who grow up in a political liberal society would develop allegiance to fundamental political institutions.54 Once people identify with a reasonable comprehensive doctrine, they can support the political liberal regime from within their comprehensive doctrines. That’s the idea of a political conception of justice that fits into various reasonable comprehensive doctrines as a module—an essential constituent part. For Rawls, this makes the stability of the political liberal regime possible.55 Agonistic democracy should follow a similar path of transforming those hostile to democracy through mechanisms of inclusion. At stake here is a

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process of hegemonic transformation. What makes this hegemonic transformation possible is that identity is not a homogenous unity or a fixed product, but always a dynamic site of identifications that are not always compatible. However, the excluded can be encouraged to develop an allegiance to democratic values only if they don’t develop a reactionary attitude towards the democratic order and the looseness of their identity persists. To be sure, it is also important to re-emphasize that there are those whose values and perspectives are deeply in conflict with the main commitments of the agonistic democratic order. There is not much that can be done to include the deeply reactionary anti-democratic as it is unrealistic to expect them to develop an allegiance to a liberal democracy regime. Agonistic democracy’s inability to make them feel at home should not be seen as a shortcoming, rather it should be viewed as the inevitable violence of agonistic democracy. The point here is not to challenge the unavoidable exclusions of agonistic democracy, rather it is to recognize the mistake of treating all the excluded—or those who will be excluded—in the same way. Among the excluded, there may be many who are responsive to democratic interpellations if they are not completely alienated from liberal democracy and turned away from democratic values by being relegated to second-class citizenship. For instance, those whose identity is sufficiently loose, those who do not experience the conflict between their identifications and liberal democratic values forcefully, and those who are opposed to some aspects of liberal democracy, but are not deeply hostile to it may have sufficient democratic tendencies that could encourage them to develop an affective attachment to the liberal democratic regime if they are approached the right way. Agonistic democracy can and should find ways to reach out to them. To encourage the excluded to develop allegiance to liberal democratic values, it is essential to envision the political boundaries of the liberal democratic regime as porous as possible. In particular, agonistic citizens should recognize the dynamic nature of the politically drawn line between legitimate and illegitimate demands, projects, and identities. The aim here is not to render the boundaries of agonistic politics genuinely contestable and allow the enemies of the democratic regime to contest the liberal democratic regime. Rather, it is to make political boundaries permeable to make democratic iterations possible by letting the excluded contest the terms of their exclusion. Put differently, the aim is to allow those who believe that they are unfairly excluded to have a political stage so

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that they can democratically contest their hegemonic exclusion. This way the excluded would be given a fair hearing and their demands be taken seriously by agonistic citizens. It is crucial to recognize the difference between letting the excluded challenge the political order and letting them challenge their exclusion. The latter is a democratic commitment that follows from the promises of agonistic democratic. I also believe that it has strategic benefits. When the excluded are allowed to contest their exclusion and agonistic citizens hear their demands, it changes the way the excluded relate to the liberal democratic order. This allows the excluded experience democracy as first-class citizens and changes how they see themselves as members of a liberal democratic society and how they see their relationship with agonistic democratic citizens. Making possible this sort of political environment requires countering the militant democratic attitude with a “gothic form of citizenship.” As Honig describes it, gothic citizens are passionately attached to political institutions while being deeply wary of them. I think the democratic attitude expressed by gothic citizenship strikes an invaluable balance between a strong commitment to democratic life and being attentive to the complexity, ambiguity, and remainders of politics. To make political boundaries contestable and prevent their naturalization, agonistic democracy should encourage an understanding of citizenship in line with the core aspirations of gothic citizenship. This attitude is consistent with the democratic commitments of agonism: it recognizes the fragility of democracy and the need to defend democratic institutions, which includes excluding those who should be excluded, while, at the same time, aims to minimize the exclusions of the agonistic democratic order and honors agonistic democratic commitment to inclusion and plurality by allowing the excluded to contest their exclusion. Viewed from a pragmatic perspective, minimizing the exclusions of the democratic order introduces the possibility of transforming potential enemies of democracy into allies invested in the liberal democratic order or preventing them from developing a hostile attitude toward democracy. Thus, it is essential that the drive for a naturalized order and political boundaries, and the pull of a militant democratic attitude be countered by a gothic form of citizenship that keeps our democratic reflexes and sensitivities alive.

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Mill and the Idea of Partial Exclusion Agonistic democracy distinguishes itself from other democratic approaches by acknowledging the inevitability of drawing a frontier and the political nature of its exclusions. Recognizing the role of hegemonic power in the constitution of a political regime, the agonistic democratic approach puts emphasis on the perpetuation of democratic contestation and the existence of democratic institutions through which dissent can be expressed. It is not possible to eradicate power, but it is possible to make it more democratic and contestable. It is in that sense that the agonistic perspective “can contribute to subverting the ever-present temptation existing in democratic societies to naturalize its frontiers and essentialize its identities.”56 This is how the agonistic approach can promise to be more receptive to the “multiplicity of voices” and “the complexity of their power structure.”57 The question then is how to draw political boundaries and thus to exclude while, at the same time, avoid naturalization of exclusion and essentialize its identities. A political theory, Stephen White writes, cannot begin with contestability, contingency, and partiality and then proceed to defend naturalization, reification, and unity.58 Not only agonistic democracy cannot claim to offer a pluralistic democratic order and then naturalize its political boundaries, but naturalizing its boundaries risks the agonistic dynamics of politics and the stability of the democratic regime. A rigid stratification oversimplifies the political terrain and reinforces a dogmatic attitude leading to illiberal and authoritarian outcomes. This sort of a political order becomes too settled and has the undertones of an authoritarian democracy operating under the disguise of a pluralistic democracy. That’s why it is important to consider the possibility of a democratic hegemony that does not fetishize itself and develop into a too-settled order. What is required here is to make the boundaries of agonistic space more porous to provide the excluded with opportunities to challenge the terms of their exclusion. The idea here is partial exclusion. I understand partial exclusion as political exclusion accompanied by a path for possible inclusion. So, the excluded would not be permanently banished from the democratic symbolic order as the democratic regime makes room for them to express their dissent and contest the terms of their exclusion, if not the fundamental values of the agonistic democratic regime. To render agonistic democracy more democratic and inclusive, it is imperative to offer the excluded the political stage for being heard which might

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lead to their inclusion. It is also important to understand how letting the excluded challenge the hegemonic relations of power can revive and strengthen democratic reflexes and sensitivities. In this context, I find it especially helpful to turn to Mill’s discussion of why opinions that are clearly pernicious should be tolerated. In his defense of freedom of speech, Mill argues that society shouldn’t silence the expression of an opinion because it may be right or may contain a part of the truth.59 These points, however, do not apply when the received opinion is clearly false or pernicious. This introduces the question of why such ideas should not be suppressed. To answer that question, Mill draws a distinction between a “living truth” and a “dead dogma.” He argues that in the absence of genuine contestation, even if the dominant opinion is the whole truth, “it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.”60 Those who hold it will have little comprehension of the grounds of the dominant opinion and of significance and meaning of the opinion itself. As Mill puts it, “instead of a vivid conception and a living belief, there remains only a few phrases; the essence is lost conclusion stays….Deprived of its vital affect on the character and conduct, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost.”61 Mill treats pernicious and false opinions as a “worthy enemy” that can contribute to the progress of society. Forgetting the grounds, meaning, and significance of dominant ideas mean that they have lesser power on the way people feel and act. When only the “shell and husk” of the meaning is retained and the essence is lost, it is hard for these ideas to “penetrate feelings and acquire a real mastery over the conduct.”62 It is not that people stop endorsing them, rather the issue is that these doctrines would have no hold on them as they merely have a habitual respect, but “no feeling which spreads from the words to the things signified and forces the mind to take them in and make them conform to the formula.”63 They would still believe in them without understanding their implications and grasping what it really means to follow them. Mill’s remarks on the toleration of pernicious ideas provide us with crucial insights about what an agonistic democratic regime should avoid in order to remain democratic and stable. From an agonistic perspective keeping the “shell and husk” and losing the “meaning” of democracy is a recipe for disaster. Agonistic democracy cannot afford to become dogmatic in the way Mill describes. If citizens lack a true understanding of the nature of democratic politics, it is just a matter of time for the agonistic struggle to take an intolerant turn. To deliver its promise of

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being a better political order, agonistic democracy needs a democratic citizenry whose democratic sensitivities and reflexes are healthy. That’s precisely why Mouffe presents agonistic exchange as a vibrant clash of distinct political projects offering people meaningful democratic political identifications. In identifying with a democratic political project, citizens are expected to identify with the values of the liberal democratic regime. However, when one blindly follows liberal democratic values without understanding their meaning and significance, one fails to appreciate the many different ways these fundamental values could be interpreted and how democratic conflict and struggle between different political projects is good for the liberal democratic regime. Lacking an understanding of complexity and ambiguity of democracy, agonistic citizens develop cognitive and affective numbness toward the political positions, demands, and concerns of others. In a political context where democratic dogmas prevail, it would be too optimistic to expect citizens to respond positively to a politics of incessant struggle and be able to respond democratically to the dynamic and complex nature of politics. That’s why agonistic democracy cannot become too ordered and sediment and thus degenerate into “shell and husk,” a democratic dogma. Mill’s prescription to retain the vitality of dominant doctrines and keep their meaning alive is to “have an enemy in the field.”64 This means that the dominant opinion should be “vigorously and earnestly” contested.65 Indeed, that’s surprisingly similar to Mouffe’s agonistic politics. The difference is that Mill describes a project that allows society to benefit from pernicious ideas by letting them contest the dominant doctrines whereas Mouffe’s agonistic democracy views its exclusions as a precondition for agonistic democratic politics. Put differently, seen from a Millian perspective, agonistic democracy fails to utilize a crucial democratic resource. This failure makes agonistic democracy vulnerable to the risk of degenerating into a dogmatic regime that introduces the possibility democratic numbness with its many undemocratic implications. To be sure, one way to revitalize democratic reflexes and sensitivities is to encourage a politics of contestation as described by Mouffe. My point is that an agonistic politics of contestation is not sufficient to prevent its fundamentals and identities from naturalizing and generating the kind of dogmatic attitude that risks the agonistic democratic order. Following Mill, it is possible to recognize that a democratic regime can benefit from allowing the excluded contest the terms of their exclusion. When

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contested, democratic ideals would have a more vivid place in our political imaginary. Agonistic citizens would gain a better understanding of the meaning and significance of democratic values. Accordingly, democratic values have more power over the way people feel and act as democratic citizens and experience democracy. As such letting the excluded contest their exclusion rekindles people’s passion for democracy and keep their democratic reflexes and sensitivities alive. The result is a more democratic and vibrant agonistic democracy; the alternative is a dogmatic democratic regime infused with a militant attitude conducive to the emergence of the kind of subjectivities likely to develop authoritarian tendencies.

Rethinking Hegemony as a Continuum The challenges presented by the question of exclusion and the need to respond to the possibility of a militant and dogmatic ethos bring to the fore the crucial, but undertheorized, idea of hegemonic continuum. Envisioning hegemony as a political continuum allows us to recognize different forms of hegemony. Most importantly, it becomes possible to distinguish strong forms of hegemony from weak forms. The latter occupies a space on the hegemony continuum between strong hegemony and non-fixity. My claim is that in order to function well agonistic democracy should seek to form a weak hegemony and avoid becoming hegemonic in the strong sense. For Laclau and Mouffe, the two extreme positions on the constitution of the social are absolute fixity and absolute non-fixity.66 The former is a fully sutured and self-defined totality whereas the latter refers to the infinite play of differences without any limits or fixations, hence no meaning, identity, and instituted society.67 Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony refutes the possibility of the two absolutes. Their main claim is that the impossibility of absolute meaning and absolute flow is what introduces the necessity of hegemony.68 By instituting nodal points as partial fixations hegemony generates relatively stable meaning and order out of contingency. It is what makes possible the social understood as the realm of sedimented social practices themselves given shape by hegemonic power relations.69 It is in that sense that any social order is an expression of particular relations of hegemonic power. The problem with this account of hegemony is that it describes hegemony as a uniform relation that always designates the same type of constellation of power relations. Accordingly, Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony recognizes only

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three moments: absolute fixity, absolute non-fixity, and hegemony. This account of hegemony doesn’t take into consideration the possibility of different forms of hegemony. This is surprising since the idea of variations of hegemony is already introduced by Mouffe’s description of hegemony as the mutual collapse of objectivity and power.70 How deeply the outcome will be entrenched and naturalized depends on the success and intensity of the coming together of objectivity and power. Thus viewed, the relation between absolute fixity, absolute flow, and hegemony should be envisaged as a continuum where one end is marked by absolute fixity and the other is marked by absolute flow. And across this continuum hegemony refers to the infinite variations between the two ends. This means that there is a great deal of variance across the continuum of hegemony. As such, we can identify infinite variations of hegemony depending on the depth of entrenchment and strength of objectivity. Mouffe and Laclau come closest to describing what I call ’strong hegemony”—a form of hegemony closer to the absolute fixity end of the hegemonic continuum—when they write that “a situation in which a system of differences had been so welded together would imply the end of hegemonic form of politics.” In that case, they add, “there would be relations of subordination or power, but not, strictly speaking, hegemonic relations.”71 For hegemony struggle to exist the social should be non-sutured and open: the more non-sutured and open character of the society increases the more the space for hegemonic politics expands. When a hegemonic articulation becomes deeply entrenched and social practices become increasingly sedimented, the possibility of challenging the existing hegemony almost disappears. To be sure, even under conditions of strong hegemony counter-hegemonic alternatives might emerge and revive the hegemony struggle. Although this is possible, it is not likely given that strong hegemony doesn’t leave many possibilities for the emergence of counter-hegemonic discourses. Consider, for instance, the hegemony of capitalism. It is not that there are no alternatives to capitalism, rather the hegemony of capitalism has made capitalist relations of power look so inevitable and natural that it has successfully rendered the alternatives unthinkable. Even those who are critical of capitalism argue that “there is no alternative,” and thus they end up offering a tamed version of capitalism as an alternative. This shows the impact of strong hegemony over common sense. A strong hegemony naturalizes a particular version of social reality which appears as the only sensible way of seeing the world.72 In this

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process, sedimented practices and ideas marginalize their alternatives in such a way that alternatives become unintelligible, unreasonable, or abnormal. People take for granted deeply ingrained values, ideas, and identities, thereby lacking the motive to reflect on and critically examine what they perceive to be normal, natural, and reasonable. A political regime that is hegemonic in the strong sense is a too-ordered society and it generates a common identity and unity that is rigid and dogmatic. This sense of identity and unity is almost fanatical in that it cannot tolerate even the slightest contestation as it perceives contestation threatening.73 That’s why strong hegemony is not hospitable to the democratic struggle over the nature of common identity and the common good. A democratic order that is hegemonic in the strong sense is not conducive to the emergence of agonistic democratic identities that are sensitive to the ambiguity of exclusion and that can tolerate adversaries and understand the conflictual nature of the fundamental of liberal democracy. As we move closer on the hegemony continuum toward absolute nonfixity, hegemonic relations of power become less entrenched. This is what I call weak hegemony. A weak hegemony is an expression of power since what is at stake is the constitution of the social order, shaping the common sense, and exclusion of alternatives. Unlike strong forms of hegemony, weak hegemony’s power over the social and the common sense is less intense. Its social practices are not yet fully sedimented, rather they are sufficiently settled so as to provide meaning, value, identity, and relative stability.74 As such, a weak hegemony’s sense of contingency has not yet vanished. Since the settlements of weak hegemony are not as naturalized and ingrained as strong hegemony, the social order is still flexible and open. Thus, weak hegemony makes it possible for agonistic citizens to reimagine dominant relations of power, envision alternative configurations, and reflect critically on the prejudices, remainders, and subjugations of the hegemonic relations that they inherit. In that sense, weak hegemony is more hospitable to democratic struggle and it is less likely to generate the reactionary attitudes that contestation of sedimented practices typically brings about. Two consequences follow for agonistic democracy. The first is that we can expect a democratic political culture under weak hegemony to be more conducive to the cultivation of tolerance and respect for the adversary. The dominant identities in weak hegemony would be able to recognize the legitimacy of the views of adversary, if not agree with or accommodate their positions, and engage with them democratically.

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The second is that agonistic citizens in weak hegemony would be more receptive to new demands, identities, and political projects. It is in that sense that such a political culture presents democratic possibilities for the excluded to contest the terms of their exclusion. This doesn’t mean that agonistic citizens are indifferent to the stability of liberal democratic order, rather it means that their democratic reflexes and sensitivities would be healthy and when contested, their responses would be less dogmatic and reactionary. This allows them to be more careful and attentive to the complexity and ambiguity of politics and thus allowing agonistic citizens to take seriously the demands and concerns of others. Agonistic citizens are expected to be affectively invested in the democratic order and be committed to “the maintenance, care, and promotion of agons—as public sites of contestation in whose absence agonism itself is unsustainable.”75 This is the kind of agonistic citizenship required to maintain agonistic democracy’s stability without sacrificing its democratic, pluralistic, and inclusive character. The gothic citizenship defended by Honig is more likely to emerge under weak hegemony as it provides citizens with meaningful and settled democratic identifications that are both flexible and sufficiently loose. So, under weak hegemony agonistic citizens’ affective investment in the democratic order does not prevent them from critically distancing themselves from existing democratic institutions. This provides the citizens with the space for critical engagement with the hegemonic operations of power and allow them to recognize the authoritarian tendencies of the institutions they support. The issue is that it is untenable to defend strong hegemony with regards to the political boundaries and exclusions of the democratic regime and expect to sustain a weak hegemony with regards to the hegemony struggle that takes place within the democratic symbolic order. The militant and dogmatic political ethos fostered by strong hegemony is bound to undermine the agonistic democratic struggle. To prevent agonistic democracy from degenerating into an authoritarian and oppressive order, it is necessary to maintain the vitality of its agonistic dynamics. This requires making the boundaries of agonistic democracy more open and porous to allow the excluded to challenge the terms of their exclusion and “sting democratic citizens like a gadfly,” thereby inviting them to think about the dominant terms and values of the democratic regime and reminding them the meaning, value, and the possibilities of the democratic order. The aim is to generate the kind of political environment that keeps democratic reflexes and sensitivities alive without eroding citizens’ commitment

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to democratic institutions. This is possible only when settlements of the regime do not sediment and become deeply entrenched. That’s why weak hegemony matters.

Conclusion Settlements tend to harden and sediment. When settlements naturalize, other political possibilities are hardly recognized as legitimate, dogmatism weakens democratic reflexes and sensitivities, and as a result agonistic democracy fails to deliver what it promises: a democratic and inclusive society that can process its conflicts peacefully and utilizes conflict positively in a way that strengthens the democratic character of society. For that reason, democratic citizens should be attentive to the authoritarian tendencies embodied in democratic institutions while defending the liberal democratic order that makes the agonistic struggle possible. What makes agonistic democratic order a better political order and worthy of citizens allegiance is that it always strives to be more democratic, inclusive, and peaceful. So, agonistic citizens should be careful not to sacrifice the democratic, inclusive, and pluralistic character of the democratic order to protect the democratic institutions themselves. Agonistic democracy can establish itself as a stable and sustainable political order only by remaining open, inclusive, and democratic. As such, it is not sufficient to establish the hegemony of democratic practices, values, and institutions, but the hegemony to be established should be weak hegemony.

Notes 1. Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993), 151– 152; Caroline Bayard, Sev Isajiw, and Gary Madison, “On the Itineraries of Democracy: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe,” Studies in Political Economy, no. 49 (1996), 199. 2. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 150; Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), 96. 3. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 55. 4. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 93. 5. Chantal Mouffe, Agonistics (London: Verso, 2013), 13. 6. See Chapter 1. Mouffe argues that this is what separates her theory from other agonistic approaches. 7. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 152. 8. Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Verso, 2005), 120–122.

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9. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 4. 10. Mark Wenman, Agonistic Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 247. 11. Matthew Jones, “Chantal Mouffe’s Agonistic Project: Passions and Participation,” Parallax 20, no. 2 (2014), 27. 12. Bat-Ami Bar On notes that an important aspect of illiberalism is “unjustified restrictions on freedoms that are central to liberalism, such as freedom of thought and expression.” See Bat-Ami Bar On, “But Is It Fascism?” Journal of Social Philosophy 50, no. 4 (2019), 410. 13. Chantal Mouffe, “Left Populism Over the Years,” interview by Rosemary Bechler, Open Democracy, September 10, 2018, https://www.opende mocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/left-populism-over-years-chantalmouffe-in-conversation-with-rosemar/. 14. “France President Emmanuel Macron Slapped in the Face,” BBC, June 8, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57402753. 15. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 151. 16. Keith Breen, “Agonism, Antagonism, and the Necessity for Care,” in Law and Agonistic Politics, ed. Andrew Schaap (Burlington, VT: Ashgate), 139. 17. Breen, “Agonism, Antagonism, and the Necessity for Care,” 139. 18. Breen, “Agonism, Antagonism, and the Necessity for Care,” 139. 19. Mouffe, On the Political, 122. 20. Mouffe, On the Political, 122. 21. Christa Acampora, “Demos, Agonistes, Redux: Reflections on the Streit of Political Agonism,” Nietzsche Studien 32 (2003), 384. 22. Chantal Mouffe, “Politics and Passions: The Stakes of Democracy,” Ethical Perspectives 7, nos. 2–3 (2000), 150. 23. Chantal Mouffe, “Liberal Socialism and Pluralism: Which Citizenship?” in Principled Positions: Postmodernism and the Rediscovery of Value, ed. Judith Squires (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1993), 81–82; Bonnie Honig, “Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in Democratic Theory,” American Political Science Review 101, no. 1 (2007), 3; Aletta Norval, Aversive Democracy: Inheritance and Originality in the Democratic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 185. 24. Mark Wenman, “‘Agonistic Pluralism’ and Three Archetypal Forms of Politics,” Contemporary Political Theory 2, no. 2 (2003), 182. 25. See Fred Dallmayr, Review of The Return of the Political, Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory 3, no. 1 (1996), 119. 26. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 132. 27. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 132. 28. See Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Bonnie Honig, “What

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29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

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Is Agonism for? Reply to Woodford, Finlayson, Stears,” Contemporary Political Theory 13, no. 2 (2014), 208–217. Honig, “What Is Agonism for? Reply to Woodford, Finlayson, Stears,” 211. Honig, “What Is Agonism for? Reply to Woodford, Finlayson, Stears,” 210. See Ed Wingenbach, Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 100. This is the main point of William Connolly’s “politics of becoming” that draws attention to the new and unforeseen such as a new religious faith, a source of moral inspiration, a new right and so on, that cannot exist without unsettling existing patterns. Connolly poses the question of how we judge these new constituencies that seek to challenge and modify the existing cultural and political terrain. See William Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Pres, 1995), xii; William Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 57; William Connolly, Pluralism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 121. Mouffe, On the Political, 122. Mouffe, On the Political, 122, my emphasis. See also Wingenbach, Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy, 100. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 104. Andrew Schaap, “Political Theory and the Agony of Politics,” Political Studies Review, no. 5 (2007), 68. Schaap, “Political Theory and the Agony of Politics,” 68. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 21. For Rawls unreasonable people reject the existence of reasonable pluralism and refuse to cooperate with others on terms all can accept. They don’t recognize that it is unreasonable to impose the whole truth of their comprehensive doctrine in politics and use the coercive power of the state to establish the hegemony of their comprehensive doctrine. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 50–54, and 138. Mouffe, On the Political, 121; Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 29. See Fuat Gürsözlü, “Political Liberalism and the Fate of Unreasonable Citizens,” Touro Law Review 30, no. 1 (2014), 35–56. Mouffe, the Return of the Political, 152. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 442, 447, and 480. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 64fn19. On the idea of hegemonic transformation in Rawls’ political liberalism, see my “Political Liberalism and the Fate of Unreasonable Citizens.” Rawls, Political Liberalism, 164.

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48. David Howarth, “Ethos, Agonism and Populism: William Connolly and the Case for Radical Democracy,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10 (2008), 179. 49. Mouffe, On the Political, 121. 50. Howarth, “Ethos, Agonism and Populism: William Connolly and the Case for Radical Democracy,” 179. 51. For Howarth, the question is “how this can be brought about: queries concerning the strategies, tactics and conditions of such projects and assemblages.” Howarth, “Ethos, Agonism and Populism: William Connolly and the Case for Radical Democracy,” 179. 52. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 31. 53. Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, 15. 54. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 142. 55. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 145. 56. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 105. 57. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 105. 58. Stephen K. White, Sustaining Affirmation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 2. 59. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. Elizabeth Rapaport (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), 50. 60. Mill, On Liberty, 38. 61. Mill, On Liberty, 38. 62. Mill, On Liberty, 38. 63. Mill, On Liberty, 40. 64. Mill, On Liberty, 41. 65. Mill, On Liberty, 50. 66. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 2001), 111. 67. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 112. 68. See Chapter 1 for a more detailed explanation of Laclau and Mouffe’s position. 69. Mouffe, On the Political, 17–18. 70. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 99. 71. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 138. 72. Fuat Gürsözlü, “Cultural Violence, Hegemony, and Agonistic Interventions Agonistic Interventions,” in Peace, Culture, and Violence, ed. Fuat Gürsözlü (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 84–105. 73. Iredell Jenkins, “The Conditions of Peace,” The Monist 57, no. 4 (Oct 1973), 520. 74. On the distinction between “sedimentation” and “settlement”, see my “Cultural Violence, Hegemony, and Agonistic Interventions Agonistic Interventions.” 75. Honig, “What Is Agonism for? Reply to Woodford, Finlayson, Stears,” 211.

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References Acampora, Christa. “Demos, Agonistes, Redux: Reflections on the Streit of Political Agonism.” Nietzsche Studien 32 (2003): 374–390. Bar On, Bat-Ami. “But Is It Fascism?” Journal of Social Philosophy 50, no. 4 (2019): 407–424. Bayard, Caroline, Sev Isajiw, and Gary Madison. “On the Itineraries of Democracy: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe.” Studies in Political Economy, no. 49 (1996): 131–148. BBC. “France President Emmanuel Macron Slapped in the Face.” June 8, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57402753. Breen, Keith. “Agonism, Antagonism, and the Necessity for Care.” In Law and Agonistic Politics, edited by Andrew Schaap. Burlington: Ashgate, 2009. Connolly, William. Pluralism. Durham: Duke University Press, 2005. Connolly, William. The Ethos of Pluralization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Pres, 1995. Connolly, William. Why I Am Not a Secularist. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. Dallmayr, Fred. “Review of The Return of the Political.” Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory 3, no. 1 (1996): 115–120. Gürsözlü, Fuat. “Cultural Violence, Hegemony, and Agonistic Interventions.” In Peace, Culture, and Violence, edited by Fuat Gürsözlü, 84–105. Leiden: Brill, 2018. Gürsözlü, Fuat. “Political Liberalism and the Fate of Unreasonable Citizens.” Touro Law Review 30, no. 1 (2014): 35–56. Honig, Bonnie. “Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in Democratic Theory.” American Political Science Review 101, no. 1 (2007): 1–17. Honig, Bonnie. Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. Honig, Bonnie. “What Is Agonism for? Reply to Woodford, Finlayson, Stears.” Contemporary Political Theory 13, no. 2 (2014): 208–217. Howarth, David. “Ethos, Agonism and Populism: William Connolly and the Case for Radical Democracy.” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10 (2008): 171–193. Jenkins, Iredell. “The Conditions of Peace.” The Monist 57, no. 4 (October 1973): 507–526. Jones, Matthew. “Chantal Mouffe’s Agonistic Project: Passions and Participation.” Parallax 20, no. 2 (2014): 14–30. Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. London: Verso, 2001.

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Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. Edited by Elizabeth Rapaport. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978. Mouffe, Chantal. Agonistics. London: Verso, 2013. Mouffe, Chantal. “Left Populism Over the Years.” Interview by Rosemary Bechler. Open Democracy, September 10, 2018. https://www.opendemoc racy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/left-populism-over-years-chantal-mouffe-inconversation-with-rosemar/. Mouffe, Chantal. “Liberal Socialism and Pluralism: Which Citizenship?” In Principled Positions: Postmodernism and the Rediscovery of Value, edited by Judith Squires, 69–84. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1993. Mouffe, Chantal. On the Political. London: Verso, 2005. Mouffe, Chantal. “Politics and Passions: The Stakes of Democracy.” Ethical Perspectives 7, nos. 2–3 (2000): 146–150. Mouffe, Chantal. The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso, 2000. Mouffe, Chantal. The Return of the Political. London: Verso, 1993. Norval, Aletta. Aversive Democracy: Inheritance and Originality in the Democratic Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. Expanded edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. Schaap, Andrew. “Political Theory and the Agony of Politics.” Political Studies Review, no. 5 (2007): 56–74. Wenman, Mark. Agonistic Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Wenman, Mark. “‘Agonistic Pluralism’ and Three Archetypal Forms of Politics.” Contemporary Political Theory 2, no. 2 (2003): 165–186. White, Stephen K. Sustaining Affirmation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. Wingenbach, Ed. Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy. Burlington: Ashgate, 2011.

PART II

Practical Considerations

CHAPTER 3

Expanding Agonistic Engagement

The question this chapter addresses is how we should understand political engagement to deepen and foster agonistic democracy. It is important to explore ways to expand agonistic political practice because the way agonistic engagement is typically described is insufficient to sustain the agonistic dynamics of democracy. I take seriously commentators’ concern that agonistic exchange may foster a political climate that undermines democratic politics. Here there are mainly two issues that should be considered. The first is the often-repeated claim that a politics of contestation could lead to escalation of conflict into violent conflict. The second issue is the emergence of affective polarization and ensuing intolerant agonism as a result of agonistic confrontation. I suggest that although the risks associated with agonism cannot completely be eliminated, it is possible to mitigate them. To develop a response from within the agonistic democratic discourse I draw on the works of Chantal Mouffe and William Connolly. They offer different strategies to contain the risks of agonistic politics, but their responses are incomplete and thus fail to address the issue. I argue that to mitigate the risks associated with agonistic politics it is essential to expand agonistic engagement so as to include modes of political practice other than democratic confrontation. I suggest that including modified deliberation, storytelling, and creative political practices to the agonistic repertoire of democratic political action supports the vibrant © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Gürsözlü, Agonistic Democracy and Political Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05999-5_3

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clash of perspectives and identities that is at the heart of agonistic politics. These modes of political practice help adversaries understand the authenticity and truthfulness of the opponent’s position thereby transforming the dynamics of political interaction in a way that keeps the political relation adversarial. But, to get there we need to recognize in what ways modes of political engagement other than confrontation sustain agonistic democratic politics.

Two Risks of Agonistic Politics Intensification of Conflict The most commonly raised issue against agonistic politics is the possible intensification of conflict due to the nature of agonistic exchange. All theorists of agonistic democracy agree that conflict and violence are inherent in politics. And despite their significant differences, they all propose agonistic politics as a way to manage conflict peacefully and mitigate violence. Many critics of agonistic politics argue that agonistic politics is more likely to encourage violence rather than contain it.1 They contend that agonistic politics possibly leads to the intensification of already existing conflicts in society or revives latent ones. An adversarial politics, they continue, that centers around an open clash of opinions, values, and identities could generate even more entrenched identities. Once challenged and disturbed, identities close upon themselves and harden “in an effort to defend their views, values, and ways of life.”2 As such, critics conclude, a model of politics that highlights identities and encourages contestation may lead to intensification of political conflict toward violence and even to civil unrest.3 This is the first risk of agonism. If this criticism holds, it weakens agonistic democracy’s claim to be a viable alternative to elite/leadership model of democracy and deliberative approaches to democracy. The violent reactions to contestation range from marginalization and intimidation to demonization and physical violence. The latter is the most visible and urgent. In most incidents, it is hard to predict when and where the members of a target group might be physically attacked. The perpetrators are not always the officials protecting the status quo, but sometimes they are ordinary “concerned” citizens or local mobs reacting violently to those who politicize and contest existing settlements. The risk of physical violence increases with agonistic politics’ emphasis on the pluralization of political sites by extending the domain

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of political contestation from spaces of institutional politics to various sites and relations over the social such as the workplace, family, religious institutions, educational institutions, and relations of race, sex, gender, nationality, and class. Agonistic confrontation and contestation take place wherever hegemony is constructed.4 Given the profoundly political character of civil society, the agonistic account of politics designates civil society and public spaces as a central terrain for agonistic struggle.5 Thus, streets, squares, public parks, universities, and other public spaces where resistance and disruption could take place become a stage for agonistic interventions. The issue is that encouraging agonistic clashes at the level of civil society immediately increases the risks of violent conflict. Consider some recent examples of violence such as the 2017 car attack in Charlottesville against peaceful protestors6 ; the 2020 attack on an activist in Maryland who was sucker-punched by an unknown passerby in the middle of the street because he was holding a Biden-Harris flag7 ; the 2020 clashes between those attending “A Million Maga Rally” and counter protesters in Washington DC that left four people stabbed and 33 arrested8 ; and the hateful and violent backlash to George Yancy’s NYT op-ed “Dear White People” including large amounts of hate mail and email, racist insults, verbal attacks in the national media, and even death threats.9 For the critics, these violent reactions remind the possible consequences of agonistic politics and encourage us to ask whether agonistic politics ends up risking too much. Such incidents illustrate how swiftly a politics of contestation could escalate and take an antagonistic turn, thereby introducing the question of whether agonistic politics is more likely to exacerbate conflict into violent conflict, rather than de-escalate and contain it. Intolerant Agonism The second risk of agonism is similar to the first in that it centers on the intensification of conflict.10 The main difference is that the second risk corresponds to an us/them grouping that is between antagonism—enemies, and agonism—friendly enemies. I call this third form of political relationship “intolerant agonism.” The main idea here is that too much emphasis on conflict and contestation over time deepens the differences between political adversaries leading to polarization and partisan isolation. Rather than producing a web of complex and dynamic relations

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with several points of identifications that offer people real democratic choices and meaningful freedom, agonistic confrontation may oversimplify the political terrain, reduce the complexity of political relations, and hardens identities, thereby bringing about dysfunctional agonism. The danger is what political scientists call “social sorting” and “affective polarization.” Social sorting is “the process by which individual’s social identities grow increasingly aligned with a partisan identity.”11 What happens is that one’s political identity, which is one of many attachments that constitute one’s identity, becomes the dominant one and slowly transforms other attachments into greater alignment with the partisan identity. The process of social sorting simplifies identities and reduces one’s plural and diverse attachments to a homogenous identity where partisan attachment shapes the others. This process makes partisan identities intensely visceral. Political identity begins to operate at an implicit level and partisan affect exerts “powerful influence on a variety of nonpolitical judgments and behaviors.”12 Social sorting has a significant impact on democratic politics.13 One develops a stronger partisan identity when one’s fundamental attachments—national, religious, racial, ideological—align with one’s partisan identity. A high degree of alignment means that individuals “strongly identify with their ingroups.”14 As such, they are less likely to be tolerant and more likely to be biased toward outgroups. The most negative outcome of the process of social sorting is “affective polarization.” The idea is that “partisans increasingly dislike each other without any direct or conditional connection to issue-based ideological disagreements.”15 It is important to emphasize that affective polarization is not the direct outcome of political division. This is a surprising outcome since polarization is usually understood in terms of increasing ideological divide. But, under conditions of affective polarization issue-based divisions might even shrink. Growing apart political adversaries see the other side as less relatable, trustworthy, and more hypocritical, selfish, and close-minded. They even refuse to socialize across the party lines.16 Any agreement or compromise between opposing partisans would be unlikely as partisans see politics as a zero-sum struggle, a matter of life and death. Political adversaries resist vehemently “to giving an inch to the other side.”17 It may be argued that insofar as political adversaries are committed to the rules of the democratic game, agonists need not be concerned about affective polarization. Agonistic politics encourage identification with a democratic political project and not necessarily engagement with political

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adversaries. In that sense, the elimination of the possibility of compromise should not be viewed as a significant problem as in an agonistic struggle winner takes all. At this point, it is important to recognize that the way the agonistic approach describes political identification should not be confused with the kind of political identification that results from affective polarization and social isolation. The latter turns political affiliation into a tribal affiliation. In agonistic politics, there should be a plurality of genuinely distinct political positions offering people meaningful identifications. By pluralizing political identities agonism both creates the crosscutting pressures on overarching political identities and makes political landscape more diverse and complex. The availability of a variety of collective political identities and the cross-cutting pressures they create are essential in tempering militant identities and preventing identities from developing into fanatical devotion. That’s why Mouffe argues that what makes agonistic public spaces unique is that people are exposed to other political narratives. This aspect of agonistic public spheres is mostly overlooked as agonistic exchange is defined in terms of hegemony struggle, contestation, and clash of opinions. However, as Mouffe emphasizes, it is crucial that agonistic struggle entails a vibrant and pluralistic contestation where “people are being bombarded by different views.”18 This is how people come to recognize the particularity of their positions and acknowledge the legitimacy of political opponents’ demands and projects. Mouffe expresses her concern about the oversimplification of agonistic publics when she criticizes the new media. As she notes, “it perversely allows people to just live in their little worlds, and not being exposed anymore to the conflicting ideas that characterize agonistic public space. Old and new media are making it possible to only read and listen things that completely reinforce what you believe in. Take for instance Fox in the United States….It reminds me a form of autism, where people are only listening to and speaking with people that agree with them.”19 The key idea here is that agonism fosters vibrant contestation and exposure to a broad range of political views and not partisan isolation. As Jenkins put it, a polarized and oversimplified political landscape encourages people to make mountains out of molehills and each political group sees issues as one of life or death.20 When society is divided into deep cleavages and intolerant agonism becomes widespread, compromises that could benefit the society and contribute to the de-escalation of the political discourse might be sacrificed due to the intense confrontation and

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distrust between adversaries. Thus, under conditions of affective polarization and intolerant agonism agonistic politics can hardly function in a healthy way and fulfill its promises.

Some Clarifications---Or a Brief Defense of Agonism Considering the risks of agonistic politics, it may be tempting to characterize agonistic democracy as a politics that irresponsibly embraces conflict. Before one concludes that way, I think it is worthwhile to reflect on why agonistic politics matters. The way I understand it agonistic democracy offers a theoretical framework that (i) acknowledges the contingency of foundations and the deep effects of pluralism on social and political life—the ontological dimension, (ii) understands political practice in terms of hegemony struggle and contestation -the practical political dimension, and (iii) prescribes an ethos of adversarial respect as the core of democratic engagement -ethico-political dimension. The interplay between the ontological and practical political is significant here. The ontological dimension of agonism rests on poststructuralism characterized by the critique of the principle of identity, post-foundationalism, and anti-essentialism. Accordingly, all versions of agonistic democracy are critical of universalistic assertions and share a political ontology that centers on the contingency of foundations. As Bonnie Honig succinctly describes, “in politics, in authorship, and in institutions it is not possible to get it right.”21 The central idea is that politics is always marked by difference, power, exclusion, and thus conflict. Every politics, settlement, agreement, consensus, or consolidation produces its own remainders and engenders resistances.22 These remainders are excluded and often rendered invisible within the hegemonic regime. This brings to the fore the idea that there is no place “free of power, conflict, and struggle, a place—an identity, a form of life, a group vision—unmarked or unriven by difference.”23 Put differently, since hegemonic articulations thoroughly constitute the context within which social relations and norms, identities, and institutions find their meanings, it is neither possible to eliminate power from politics nor to provide a rational definite solution to the questions of justice, grounding, and legitimacy of the political order. As such, the terrain of politics is purely contingent and permeated by undecidables.24 It follows from this

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that every order is political and “the result of the temporary and precarious articulation of contingent practices.”25 A social order is constituted through acts of power without which “the social could not exist.”26 The ontological dimension of agonistic democracy delineates why power, conflict, and exclusion are permanent and cannot be transcended. The practical political dimension of agonistic democracy offers a peaceful way to respond to the ontological dimension. Within this framework, democracy provides a contingent and fragile stage for the dynamic struggle understood as an unending process of contestation and articulation. Exposing the operations of power, challenging sedimented meanings and understandings, and creating spaces for resistance call for agonistic political practice. An agonistic politics allows those who are marginalized and silenced within the framework of dominant hegemony to find a political voice, critically articulate and challenge harms done to them while providing spaces for the emergence of new identities, and subverting extant social practices, identities, and conventions.27 It is by means of agonistic practice that identities resist homogenization and assimilation and constitute themselves as sufficiently stable, solid, and distinct movements.28 Since conflict can always take an antagonistic form, it is essential to produce democratic political identifications that encourage people to identify with democratic designs so as to keep conflict within the boundaries of democracy. A politics of contestation is the means to create a vibrant political world that offers people meaningful political choices thereby encouraging them to identify with democratic identities. That’s why an open and vibrant clash of opinions and identities is essential for renewing democratic commitments and domesticating potential antagonism. Despite its risks then agonistic political practice is indispensable for forging an affective link between people and democratic identities and making possible emancipation and inclusion.29 Agonists are aware that different identities respond differently to contestation of entrenched values, beliefs, and ways of life. Connolly acknowledges the first risk of agonism when he writes that agonistic politics may very well fuel resentment against differences.30 However, the dangers of agonistic politics, Connolly notes, are outweighed by the cruelty in a culture that refuses to recognize and engage with its violent transformation of difference into otherness.31 Mouffe reminds us that lack of agonism in politics leads to a citizenry dissatisfied with the capacity of democratic institutions to respond to their concerns, demands, and problems. Unable to

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find democratic channels to express their discontentment and democratic identifications that they can relate to, citizens could easily be lured by extremist positions. This is what allows the extremist parties to move to mainstream politics which brings about political polarization.32 Agonistic democrats propose agonism as the only viable way for creating democratic conditions under which hegemonic power can be exposed and challenged and potential antagonisms can be tamed. Agonistic politics offers a political project for pacifying society and rendering it more inclusive and pluralistic through democratization. To be sure, one may argue that encouraging agonistic political practice is no different from poking the beehive as it is almost certain that agonistic contestation generates a strong backlash. This objection is based on a “blissful ignorance.”33 The suggestion seems to be that to avoid possible backlash, the marginalized and excluded should tread cautiously when expressing the harms done to them and contesting hegemonic power that normalizes these harms. Yet, agonistic contestations cannot be rejected on the grounds that they make others uncomfortable, provoke a backlash, and sustain conflict.34 As Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote when his Birmingham Campaign was criticized for being unwise, untimely, unreasonable, and extreme, “Lamentably, it is an historical fact that privileged groups seldom give up their privileges voluntarily… We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppresser; it must be demanded by the oppressed.”35 King’s words sum up what is at stake in the dynamics between those who benefit from violent relations of power and those who experience violence. Revealing the true nature of hegemonic power relations, disturbing naturalized settlements, and undermining power structures that benefit some at the expense of others are all expected to generate a backlash. The process of contestation and disarticulation of hegemony is always painful for those who feel at home within the existing hegemony. The emergence of new oppositional forms of identification may induce panic and resentment.36 And the contested don’t sit idly when the fundamentals of their identity and their fundamental interests are challenged. They react and defend their way of life as hard as they can. However, the alternative is not to refrain from agonistic interventions to avoid the backlash. As King emphasizes the civil rights movement has not made a single gain without contestation and disruption.37 Without the determined agonistic interventions of those committed to the civil rights movement, it would

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have been impossible to consider any positive change in relations of race in the US. This is the painful path to democratic transformation. Agonistic politics should be celebrated for fostering new subjectivities and oppositional identities, giving voice to the excluded and silenced within the existing hegemonic framework, making visible what the existing hegemony obscures and obliterates, and making possible the emergence of existing alternatives to the dominant political framework.38 From all this we can conclude that those who criticize agonistic politics due to its risks are ignoring the point that contesting hegemonic identities and constructing oppositional identities and alternative political realities call for agonistic politics. Put differently, it is not possible to deal with these problems without turning to agonism. This doesn’t mean that we should ignore the possible risks of agonistic politics. Rather, it means that we should recognize the value of agonism and seek ways to mitigate its risks. Since the ultimate aim of agonistic politics is to make the never-ending dynamic hegemonic constitution less violent and more democratic, agonistic theorists should always seek ways to sustain agonistic democratic politics and contain its inherent tensions.

Possible Agonistic Responses: The Ethico-Political Dimension of Agonism In response to the risks of agonistic politics, agonists first stress that we should be careful not to conflate agonistic struggle with politics of enmity and polarization. Confrontation, and struggle can take many forms including violence and deep polarization, but agonistic struggle refers to the democratic fight between adversaries and not enemies.39 Second, they propose a democratic ethos to sustain agonistic politics. The idea is that in a healthy agonistic society such risks need not emerge strongly due to the prevalence of a democratic ethos. Mouffe reminds us that agonistic contenders should see the other “as an adversary, whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question.”40 The privileged terrain of agonistic confrontation among “friendly enemies” is reserved for those who express respect toward the other. Those who challenge the fundamental values of the liberal democratic order—liberty and equality—, and perceive the other as an enemy who must be destroyed should be excluded.41 Thus, the democratic ethos Mouffe proposes is based on tolerance and respect

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for the adversary and a commitment to equality and liberty as the fundamental values of the democratic regime. Once these democratic attitudes are widespread and those who reject these values are excluded from the democratic symbolic space, the risks of agonistic politics would not emerge as a significant problem. Connolly criticizes Mouffe by arguing that in a world of identity and difference a robust democratic politics that centers on agonistic clash of identities and forms of life needs the support of a more positive and constructive ethos.42 Connolly proposes a thicker democratic ethos based on the political virtues of “agonistic respect” and “critical responsiveness.” He defines agonistic respect as a “social relation of respect for the opponent against whom you define yourself even while you resist its imperatives and strive to delimit its spaces of hegemony.”43 For Connolly, agonistic respect is a social relationship that takes place between constituencies who “have already attained a place on the register of cultural recognition- that is, on the register of being.”44 Connolly maintains that agonistic respect is not sufficient to open up a welcoming space for those who struggle to modify existing relations of power in order to “move from an obscure or degraded subsistence below the field of recognition, justice, obligation, rights, or legitimacy to a place on one or more of those registers.”45 These movements are vulnerable as they may be judged by the old codes of interest, obligations, and principles, which are usually already part of the problem itself. The task of the political virtue of “critical responsiveness” is to create a new cultural space “through which the other might consolidate itself into something that is unafflicted by negative cultural markings.”46 The aim of Connolly’s “ethos of engagement” is to mitigate violence toward differences by opening up a reserve of judgment not entirely marked by the already existing ethico-political standards of judgment. This brief sketch of the two approaches brings to the fore the significance of a democratic ethos for agonistic politics. The problem, as many critics highlight, is that the democratic ethos that is required to support agonistic politics is not prevalent in existing societies.47 In the absence of a democratic citizenry that accept the terms of agonistic engagement, it is too optimistic to expect the risks of agonism not to emerge.48 Agonists acknowledge the point about the lack of a democratic ethos. In response, they note that it is precisely because the democratic ethos is not widespread that political conflict takes an antagonistic form.49 This response introduces the question of how the democratic

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ethos required to sustain agonistic politics could come about. Agonistic democrats have been heavily criticized for neglecting to provide a sufficient answer to this question.50 In an ideal society where the agonistic democratic ethos is widespread, the two risks of agonism may not arise forcefully, but the issue is to get there. And, critics argue, a lot remains unexplained here. Agonistic response to the second line of criticism is based on the idea that fostering a sense of contingency and openness in political life leads to the cultivation of adversarial respect. That’s why both Mouffe and Connolly argue that a healthy democracy calls for “vibrant clash of political positions and an open conflict of interests.”51 The unending process of contestation helps individuals recognize the role of alterity and otherness in the constitution of identity while producing diverse conceptions of democratic citizenship. On Mouffe’s view, the availability of contending forms of democratic identifications, practices, and language games together with the production of a conflictual view of the world provide the political terrain in which passions can be mobilized toward democratic designs. The key is to provide political outlets for the expression of dissent and collective passions by offering citizens genuinely different political projects. The hegemonic competition among different interpretations of liberal democracy offers citizens political identifications they can relate to and allows them to make sense of the political world. Tempted by these democratic projects, citizens are expected to identify with democratic political identities and not view extremist political positions as meaningful alternatives.52 For Connolly, a democratic politics marked by a spirit of agonism disturbs established commonalities, standards of evaluation, and settled identities while enabling anyone to face the strife and interdependence of identity/difference and to experience the entrenched contingency of identity. The recognition of the contestability of one’s own identity is a significant step in coming to terms “viscerally and positively” with the fact that one’s identity, faith, moral belief, and philosophy may appear profoundly contestable to others endorsing different sensibilities.53 Once political spaces for the expression of identity and difference are secured, the experience of democracy and experience of contingency foster each other. It is through agonistic politics that the democratic ethos comes about.54 The connection between agonistic politics and democratic identities reveals a deeper tension in the agonistic democratic framework. It is possible to respond to the risks of agonistic politics by cultivating the kind

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of democratic ethos that sustains agonistic politics. However, to cultivate such a democratic ethos we need to turn to agonistic politics which has the potential to generate the problems that it aims to respond to. Connolly offers a way to ease this tension when he proposes micropolitics of self-artistry.55 For him, the task of micropolitics of self-transformation is to deconstruct the self that has already been constituted by “recrafting vengeance, anxious, or stingy contingencies that have become entrenched and forging them into a distinctive form you can admire without having to treat it as a true copy of a universal model.”56 In that sense, it is possible to cultivate agonistic respect and critical responsiveness through self-artistry. Connolly’s point is that micropolitics of self-transformation contributes to the shaping of an intersubjective ethos of democratic politics. He emphasizes the relation between micropolitics and macropolitics by pointing out how public proposals are actually prepared through the molecular movements of micropolitics.57 Indeed, agonistic democracy may grow from the micropolitical level and influence political institutions and discourses of macropolitics. It is reasonable to assume that if a sufficient number of citizens take Connolly’s suggestion seriously and engage in practices of self-artistry and cultivate adversarial respect and critical responsiveness, agonistic politics may work its way up and have significant transformative effects on social and political structures.58 The issue, however, is not the effectiveness of micropolitics of the self in creating agonistic subjects or the connection between micropolitics and macropolitics, rather, it is to motivate a sufficient number of people, and especially those who are not bothered by how things are, to work on themselves.59 Put differently, why would identities whose very existence and stability rely on existing hegemonic relations, practices, and meanings examine these sedimentations when this examination, and the resulting transformation, may entail loss of meaning, stability, self-certainty, and privilege? Micropolitics of self-modification might be embraced by those who already experience the contestability of the fundamentals of their identity or those who are deeply troubled by hegemonic violence. But those whose identity and privilege are at stake lack the incentive to take up the hard work of selftransformation as the stakes are too high. This means that if the goal is to make the democratic ethos prevalent, agonistic democracy cannot merely rely on micropolitical practices. Thus, we’re left with agonistic politics as the most effective means to produce a democratic citizenry. It follows that

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the tension inherent to agonistic democratic framework remains unaddressed. This suggests that we should look for other ways to mitigate the risks of agonistic politics.

The Need to Expand Agonistic Political Engagement Agonistic political engagement is typically described in terms of a “vibrant clash of political positions and an open conflict of interests.”60 Accordingly, agonistic politics is free of the limitations of the idea of public reason. In a nutshell, the idea of public reason requires citizens to present one another reasons that they sincerely believe to be acceptable to others.61 The expectation is that when citizens advocate a political view in the public political forum, they are to bracket issues of identity and the good in order to transform their reasons into publicly acceptable ones. From an agonistic perspective, leaving out the issues of identity, existential issues, and the ideas of the good place impossible limitations on politics. Connolly points out that it is not possible to separate the issues of identity and the good life from the public political discourse since they inevitably “seep back into the public arena in one way or another whenever attempts are made to exclude them by procedural means.”62 Moreover, since what defines an acceptable reason is always determined within a particular hegemonic framework, the requirements of public reason end up legitimizing the hegemonic norms of reasonableness and acceptability. Within the hegemonic political discourse some reasons and perspectives are favored as legitimate and reasonable while others are marginalized or silenced.63 Agonistic alternative is to allow participants to frame their positions on their own terms without worrying about the pressures to conform to the disciplining norms of the hegemonic political discourse. This ensures that the distinctiveness of their reasons and perspective are not subsumed under hegemonic norms and they are heard in their “distinctive otherness.”64 The downside of agonistic interaction is that a vibrant clash of positions and interests that prioritize contestation and expression of positions in their own terms do not leave much space for genuine listening and understanding. Since the aim is to contest and ultimately to prevail, the only incentive to listen to the other side is to identify the “adversary’s position for weaknesses and potential tradeoffs.”65 A politics of contestation that takes place on these terms fails to

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take seriously the relevance of non-partisans and the significance of understanding and recognizing the authenticity of opponent’s perspective in sustaining agonistic dynamics of democracy. The Significance of Non-Partisans In a typical democratic society, some citizens strongly identify with a political project. They are called “partisans.” For real partisans switching sides is akin to religious conversion. Mouffe’s remarks about accepting the view of the adversary as an indication of “a radical change in political identity” provides us with an important insight into the nature of partisanship.66 However, in a typical democracy a sizable portion of the population are non-partisans.67 This group includes politically disinterested citizens who simply prefer to stay out of politics, the undecided who have various, and often conflicting, political tendencies with no clear political identification, and those who have some policy and ideological preferences but do not strongly identify with a political side.68 For this large group of non-committed citizens shifting political positions would not require a dramatic change in identity as their political identity is not fully associated with a political project. What may be unthinkable for strongly committed partisans—weighing different political options and possible political shifts, multiple-allegiances, and issue-based cross-identification—are not extraordinary to non-committed citizens. Recognizing that citizens who strongly identify with a political project or political party make up only a part of the citizenry brings to the fore the untapped democratic power of the non-committed. One of the main goals of agonistic adversaries is to recruit nonpartisans who have not chosen their side yet. To win the hearts and minds of the non-committed and to nudge them to identify with their political project, agonistic contenders need to be able to reach out to them. The political culture fostered by a vibrant exchange of positions and interests could draw the attention of moderates and mobilize their passions. However, failing to engage with the non-committed in a way that they can relate to could cost agonistic adversaries potential democratic allies. The agonistic focus on the struggle among hegemonic projects as a way of mobilizing passions around democratic objectives seems to overlook the point that non-committed citizens would identify with a hegemonic position only if it resonates with them. Put differently, the crucial link between collective political identifications and passions can only be established if

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agonistic parties create identifications, discourses, political positions that make sense to non-partisans. Indeed, it is important for agonistic adversaries to express and frame their political positions on their own terms, however, given that a democratic society consists of a plurality of different individuals, agonistic partisans should try to express political proposals and experiences in a way that others can understand and relate to.69 An agonistic politics may succeed in mobilizing and energizing the already existing partisan base, but an open clash of opinions and identities does not necessarily attract non-committed citizens unless there exists a communicative link that makes an affective connection possible. When this connection is missing, the intensity and possible aggression of agonistic exchange may even be off-putting for non-partisans. Moreover, dissatisfied by the inaccessible, remote and incomprehensible nature of agonistic democratic positions, non-partisans may feel abandoned, excluded, and marginalized. They become ideal targets for nondemocratic movements that offer a simplified political reality and provide simple and clear solutions to seemingly complex and overwhelming political problems. Thus, the agonistic recipe for defusing potential antagonism and deepening democracy by mobilizing passions around democratic design may fail if agonistic partisans cannot find ways to relate to the non-committed. The Significance of Genuine Understanding and Recognition of Authenticity The way political engagement is described within the agonistic democratic framework downplays the significance of authenticity and understanding in sustaining agonistic dynamics of democracy. Prioritizing contestation and limiting agonistic practice to confrontation, agonistic democracy does not give sufficient attention to how having a greater understanding of the opponents’ position and recognizing the authenticity of their concerns and experiences can transform political relationships and prevents political opponents from viewing each other as enemy. It seems to me that this is a missed democratic opportunity. Having a greater understanding of the opponent’s perspective does not refer to mutual identification or require adversaries to abandon their perspective.70 Rather, understanding is about grasping why the other defends the views they hold and why it is essential for them to contest the norms, positions, and values they contest. It is about making sense of what it all means to the other side.

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Understanding the adversary’s perspective reduces mutual ignorance and clarifies misunderstandings that often pave the way for negative stereotypes, insults, and insensitivity which, in turn, exacerbate conflict and contribute to polarization. Recognizing the authenticity of the adversary’s concerns is about realizing that the adversary’s political position arises from genuine convictions or harms they experience within the existing hegemonic framework. Such realization often reduces the feeling that one’s political opponents are unreasonable, ignorant, ill-intentioned, or manipulative. When we recognize that the goal of our opponents is not to cause intentional harm to us and that they genuinely see things differently due to their real concerns and experiences, it might change the way we view them. For instance, a college student who keeps a Confederate Flag on their dorm room wall may react when their roommate asks them to take the flag down due to its racist implications. However, when the student understands what the Confederate Flag genuinely means to the roommate, this may transform the way they view their roommate and the nature of conflict. Rather than ignoring the roommate’s demand and viewing it as a threat to their tradition and identity, which would typically generate a defensive response, they may be more open to engage respectfully. In response, they might share their perspective on what the Confederate Flag means to them by expressing that it stands for their heritage and it “is a symbol of family members who fought for what they thought was right in their time.”71 They may add that the flag is part of their tradition, ancestors, and family, and the stories they grew up listening to while making clear that they have no racist intentions. Although they may not be willing to take the flag down, they make clear that they understand the roommate’s concern and don’t challenge the principle of racial justice underlying it. As long as the two students share the same dorm room and they don’t change their respective positions, the disagreement would persist as they have opposing views on what the Confederate Flag symbolizes. If the college asks the student to take down the flag, the student who sees it as part of their heritage would feel a sense of loss and injustice; if the college doesn’t intervene and the student keeps the flag up on the wall, the other student will feel the same way. Either way one will experience a loss. However, the shifting attitudes toward each other, which is the outcome of developing a greater understanding of one another and recognizing the authenticity of the other’s experiences, may make losing to the other side more tolerable, if not acceptable. The newly forged relationship makes possible respectful

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disagreement and provides the space for processing the emotional aspect of loss without converting the other to an enemy. The expectation is not to change the political opponents’ mind or reach an agreement, but to transform the relationship between adversaries in a way that “makes us willing to accommodate rather than annihilate those with whom we disagree.”72 By allowing adversaries to express their positions on their own terms, agonistic politics already introduces the possibility of developing a greater understanding of adversaries’ perspectives and recognizing the authenticity of their experiences. But, since the agonistic emphasis is on contestation and confrontation, understanding and learning from the other’s situated knowledge have not received sufficient attention. This distracts away from the significant role understanding and recognition of authenticity can play in sustaining agonistic politics and mitigating its risks. That’s why it is crucial to expand agonistic interaction beyond the contours of contestation and confrontation and thus make possible relationship building among the adversaries.

Agonism Beyond Confrontation: Three Forms of Agonistic Engagement Modified Deliberation At first it might be surprising to suggest “deliberation” as a way of expanding agonistic political exchange and sustaining agonistic politics given that agonistic democrats have put forward the most trenchant criticism of deliberative democracy. Indeed, the deep differences between agonistic democracy and deliberative democracy and, in particular, the significantly different ways the two approaches understand the nature of politics and political engagement make deliberation an unlikely candidate for this task. At this point, it is important to emphasize that agonistic democrats don’t deny the importance of deliberation and exchange of reasons in politics, rather they disagree with the way deliberative democrats theorize deliberation and prioritize rational discourse as the central mode of democratic engagement. Deliberative democrats describe deliberation as a practice of argumentation oriented to agreement that is to be conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal individuals.73 Habermas states that “rational discourse is supposed to be public and inclusive, to grant equal communication rights for participants, to require sincerity and to diffuse any

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kind of force other than the forceless force of the better argument.”74 Ideally, these procedural constraints by excluding power, manipulation, and matters of private concern from the discussion, and by bracketing inequalities of status, make possible undistorted communication. During a discursive process based on the free exchange of arguments and counter-arguments, participants should be motivated toward mutual understanding and be moved by the force of the better argument. The goal of this normative dialogue is to reach a rational agreement on matters of general interest. Centering the practice of deliberation at the heart of democracy, deliberative democrats argue that the legitimating force of the democratic process results from the process of deliberation.75 The ideal of deliberation provides a model of argumentation with procedural constraints that should guide political discussion in the political public sphere. Deliberative democrats acknowledge the existence of empirical difficulties that prevent the full realization of ideal deliberative settings, but, they argue, this should not distract away from the goal of approximating actual processes of deliberation and decision-making to the ideal conditions of deliberation. Agonists have criticized the way deliberative democrats portray deliberation for several reasons, but the main issue with defining deliberation as ideal democratic interaction is that discourse is never free of power. Deliberative democrats fail to recognize how power shapes deliberative spaces, the meaning and intelligibility of the terms of discussion, and the way participants see themselves.76 Failing to consider the hegemonic context within which deliberation takes place, deliberative democrats theorize ideal deliberative spaces as free of power and propose this ideal as a model to be approximated, if not fully realized, within practical discourses. However, agonists argue, given the constitutive nature of power and hegemony, power cannot be eliminated from deliberative settings. As Norval notes, the ideals of deliberative equality and fairness “assume the existence of a framework of politics in which in principle every voice could be heard, without giving attention to the very structuring of those frameworks and the ways in which the visibility of subjects is structured.”77 So, the idea of developing a democratic model that relies on equal, free, and fair deliberative processes producing reasonable or fair outcomes does not hold.78 Moreover, identifying deliberation as the central political activity in a democracy ends up reinforcing the hegemonic discourses that silence and exclude some at the expense of others. Given that limits of intelligibility and acceptability are always determined within

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a particular hegemonic framework, those whose reasons concur with dominant social norms and dominant values will be perceived as more reasonable than those who contest the hegemonic framework.79 As Iris Young states failing to recognize how power operates and how hegemonic discourses mask the reproduction of power and injustice, deliberative democrats think that discourse is “innocent.”80 The agonistic critique of deliberation weakens the main deliberative claim that deliberative processes can provide rationally acceptable, and hence legitimate, political outcomes, but it does not follow from this that reason-giving is politically irrelevant. It seems that agonists’ sharp criticism of deliberation seems to have obscured that they do not give up on reason-giving in politics. Agonistic theorists recognize the value of political dialogue and rational argumentation as important aspects of political life.81 Theorizing the democratic role of deliberation from an agonistic perspective is significant not only because some degree of deliberation is inevitable in democratic politics, but also because a modified notion of deliberation can sustain and deepen agonistic politics. Rethinking the nature of deliberation by taking into consideration the nature of power and hegemony allows us to consider how deliberation can fit into the agonistic democratic framework. Such rethinking requires modifying some fundamental characteristics of deliberation so as to include agonistic elements. This modification requires discarding the strict opposition between rhetoric and logic,82 changing the aim of deliberation from agreement to expression of difference and recognition of distinctness, and allowing participants to describe their positions in their own terms and framing their positions from within their comprehensive worldviews. To clarify, the goal of modified deliberative settings is not to transcend individual perspectives, to reach an uncoerced consensus, or to produce legitimate outcomes.83 Rather it is to help adversaries understand the other side’s perspective and recognize the authenticity of their concerns and experiences. As construed by deliberative democrats, deliberation is “a procedure for being informed.”84 A typical deliberative setting involving exchange of arguments clarifies information.85 Listening to the arguments of others broadens the listeners’ perspective and help them become aware of perspectives they had not thought about or realized at the outset.86 It is in that sense that deliberation is a process of learning. Although gaining information on a particular issue is valuable, as Goi suggests, the exchange of reasons does not lend to a deeper understanding of the

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other’s perspective unless this particular position is considered as part of a larger framework that constitutes the worldview of participants.87 There is a difference between being informed and having an understanding of how an issue fits into or emerges from a particular worldview, what that issue means to those defending it, and how others would be affected by a proposal or policy. To understand background beliefs and value systems and how they shape the adversary’s position on a particular issue, participants should frame and express their positions from their perspectives and on their own terms. This is what modified deliberative settings offer. Only then it may be possible to overcome the lack of common ground and successfully convey particular experiences and perspectives so that others understand the depth of their disagreement and that most intractable conflicts are the result of deeper disagreements about fundamental values, lifestyle, and worldview. This is how it becomes possible to promote “the kind of understanding that does not reduce each position to an artificially ‘rationalized’ set of reasons but acknowledges the complexity of a perspective and its roots in authentic moral commitments.”88 Thus, modified deliberative settings allow the participants and the listeners “to establish the moral credibility” of the others by helping them recognize the authenticity of their moral and political commitments.89 Arguing that agonistic democracy can accommodate modified deliberation might raise some concerns. It might be suggested that modified deliberation does not successfully address the problem with deliberation. Since deliberation always takes place within a particular tradition that defines what is acceptable, reasonable, and intelligible, even a modified deliberation ends up enhancing the existing hegemony. And since it is not possible to deliberate everything, modified deliberation requires the exclusion of some perspectives.90 Moreover, modified deliberative settings require excluding extreme expressions of disagreement and particular views from confrontation.91 In limiting the political conversation this way, modified deliberation inevitably creates remainders. Undoubtedly, these are important objections against the idea that modified deliberative settings could well fit in the agonistic democratic framework. However, these concerns do not hold severely given the modified nature of deliberation and the role modified deliberative settings have in agonistic democratic politics. First, modified deliberative settings open up spaces to contest shared understandings and settlements by allowing participants to frame and express their positions on their own terms. There

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is no obstacle that prevents participants from formulating their positions in a way that reveals how hegemony constructs the common sense and how the background assumptions influence and limit the other’s perception of their position. Second, modified deliberative spaces do not function as the primary site of agonistic politics. Modified deliberation is among the many modes of political engagement in agonistic democracy and modified deliberative settings are among the many spaces for expression and contestation. In agonistic democracy, those marginalized by the hegemonic tradition should have plenty of opportunities to express themselves and challenge existing settlements.92 The goal here is not to propose an agonistic democracy centering on modified deliberation, rather it is to recognize how modified deliberation could sustain agonistic exchange and address its risks without sacrificing the adversarial nature of agonistic politics. Modified deliberative spaces create agonistic spaces where expression and contestation can take place together with having greater understanding and recognition of the authenticity of political opponent’s commitments and experiences. Storytelling Narrative has an invaluable role to play in agonistic democracy as it makes contestation possible by way of deepening understanding and revealing the authenticity of the other’s perspectives. By sharing their stories with the opponent and the larger public, political actors can contest other views and challenge entrenched settlements without provoking anger and generating enmity. This is because the narrative has the power to create new bonds and shared understandings while contesting extant relationships and meanings. Political narrative is a significant tool for the excluded to convey their experiences and gain recognition as legitimate political actors. That’s why historically excluded and marginalized groups have turned to political narrative to contest the hegemonic tradition which marginalizes and silences them by creating a context in which their perspectives and demands would appear to be unintelligible and unreasonable.93 To challenge the “impartial,” “natural,” “unbiased” perspectives and truths, the narrative offers situated and context-specific truths that emerge from lived experiences and real positions in the world. In that sense, by its very nature, the act of storytelling draws attention to the storyteller and gives voice to the silenced.94 As Young notes, for those who suffer from

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an injury or oppression and lack the terms to express their demands and perspectives within the prevailing discourse storytelling offers an invaluable political tool. By telling their stories, the excluded and the marginalized create a bridge between “the mute experience of being wronged and political arguments about justice” and reveal the violence of the prevailing discourse.95 As they tell stories publicly, they develop a counter-discourse that conveys a sense of wrong and defines the injuries they suffer as unjust. Young explains how women had suffered in silence before the creation of the discourse of sexual harassment. She notes that by expressing their experiences and injuries through telling stories publicly, women have successfully defined particular ways of acting as sexual harassment. Only then it became possible for the public to see harms that result from sexual harassment. It is possible to cite a myriad of examples that describe a similar dynamic from everyday sexism to undocumented immigrants’ experiences, from structural racism to experiences of people with disabilities. In such situations, stories offer a counter-discourse that challenges hegemonic understandings by revealing the violence of settled meanings and understandings. Those who perceive such settlements as natural fail to recognize in what ways they harm and marginalize others. They usually have no understanding of such issues nor have any idea that they exist. The political narrative presents a different reality that makes visible the suffering of others and challenges the naturalness of the dominant reality. In that sense, stories invite those who are ignorant about the suffering of the excluded, marginalized, and oppressed to pay attention to how others suffer under existing social and political arrangements and recognize other possibilities. In doing so, storytelling challenges the established mindset without antagonizing those who comfortably feel at home within the hegemonic tradition. This is why storytelling is crucial in mitigating the risks of agonistic politics: by revealing truths based on lived experiences, stories create a bond between the storyteller and the listener. What makes this bond possible is the authenticity of truths stories contain together with the non-coercive nature of the narrative. Stories invite the listener to adopt another’s perspective and thus reflect on the hegemonic in light of particular truths and experiences revealed to them. This invitation is not frontal or confrontational as typical agonistic contestation implies, rather it is suggestive.96 That’s why the bond storytelling generates between the narrator and the listener is not reactive and motivated by resentment or anger, rather it is a relationship that can

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evoke sympathy while maintaining the distance.97 That’s how stories can contest sedimented judgments, practices, and identities without inducing visceral entrenchments of hatred, disgust, or resentment. The invitation to suspend judgment and reevaluate the dominant mindset can obviously be rejected, however, conveying the authenticity of lived experiences and particular truths provides sufficient understanding that lays the ground for a relation of adversarial respect. Narrative not only makes it possible to relate to the particular experiences of others but also fosters greater understanding and recognition of authenticity by revealing what certain norms, values, principles, or policies mean to particular groups. In any liberal democratic society, there is a plurality of values, meanings, and identities. As such, it is reasonable to expect deep divergences and a lack of shared understandings and experiences. This lack of common ground coupled with the dispersed time and space of politics that minimize opportunities for exposure to political opponents grows the distance between “us” and “them”. The absence of shared space, time, and understanding generates segregated ideological worlds where we have no desire to leave our comfortable political silos and try to reach out to the other side. In the absence of any social or political exposure to the adversary, we grow more isolated from them. This loss of concrete sense of reality and move toward abstract representation of the adversary makes it easier to stereotype and scapegoat and encourages intolerance and hostility. In this context, the worry is that agonistic politics may contribute to the deepening of already existing divisions among political groups by exacerbating these dynamics. A political struggle with the abstract other escalates conflict and invites insensitivities, insults, and whatever politically and psychologically satisfies and secures those who identify with one side or the other. It is essential to humanize the adversary and recognize that their values, traditions, and identities are neither arbitrary nor malicious, but reasonable and right from their perspective. Narrative offers a cure. As Young notes, “narrative can serve to explain to outsiders what practices, places, or symbols mean to the people who hold them.”98 In that sense, stories help different groups to transcend their boundaries and bridge the gap between “us” and “them”. The goal is not to come to a full understanding as it usually is not possible given the irreducible differences in value and different histories that determine how one understands and prioritizes value and meaning. Rather, it is to recognize that the adversary may have good reasons for valuing what

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they value. It is to see that from their perspective it makes good sense to defend what they defend. In other words, storytelling makes understanding across differently situated people possible by revealing to them where the opponents are coming from.99 It is a process through which one acquires a sense of genuineness about the others’ intentions and perspectives. A good example that illustrates my point is the use of narrative in the “Black Pete” protests in the Netherlands. When anti-racist groups launched political protests against the blackface character, “Black Pete,” who according to Dutch folklore is St. Nicholas’s assistant, those who see “Black Pete” as part of their tradition reacted with anger.100 Dressing as “Black Pete” includes painting faces black, wearing afro wigs and thick red lipstick, imitating Afro Caribbean accent, and acting dumb and stupid. For Whites, this is part of the holiday fun and celebrations whereas for the anti-racism campaigners it is a racist practice that is demeaning and offensive to Black people. The struggle over whether to keep “Black Pete” in blackface sparked an intense political struggle over the identity of the country which took a violent turn.101 Supporters of Black Pete deny that “Black Pete” is racist by claiming that there is no link between Black Pete as he is not really Black. According to them, his face is just dirty because he comes down the chimney to deliver presents. Those who find it racist argue that this fails to explain the Afro wig, the lipstick, and so on, and more importantly, they point out that the term has gained a pejorative meaning in Dutch culture as it is used to describe and demean Black people. To better express their perspective and how “Black Pete’ harms Black people, anti-racist campaigners turned to storytelling. In one of the townhall meetings, one participant shared her family’s experiences with the others explaining how she and her family have been called “Black Pete” many times and how they all felt when that happened. She emphasized that they are fighting racism and not the tradition, but since the tradition is itself tainted, it needs to be modified. As expected, the townhall meeting ended with disagreement. One of the participants contacted later indicated that he was very moved by the stories he heard at the meeting. After hearing one of these stories, he said, he felt compelled to go up to the person who told the story and apologize to her. And they ended up talking for a long time. Yet, when asked whether that interaction has changed his opinion about Black Pete, his response was clear: “No, not yet. At this point, I don’t think we should change the tradition.”102 This

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exchange between the political adversaries shows the power of narrative in sustaining agonistic relations. The expected outcome is not agreement, rather greater understanding and recognition of the genuine nature of the other’s position. A narrative may not change one’s political perspective, but it has the potential to humanize the political opponent and transform how one views them. Creative Political Practices In the broadest sense creative political practices refer to unconventional and innovative ways of constructing and expressing a political viewpoint. What makes creative political methods significant is what they reveal about the political opponent. When the political adversary creatively expresses their viewpoint, this political action reveals an unexpected side of the political opponent that is often in contrast with how the dominant political narrative represents them. Recognizing the new and unexpectedly positive side of the political opponent confuses one as having a more complex view of the political opponent makes it difficult to think about them in terms of friend/enemy. This process of making the opponent’s representation positively ambiguous opens a new space for political engagement: a space that is not yet defined by existing understandings and meanings. To be sure this space exists only for a while as creative political practices temporarily suspend the power of existing imaginaries and thus this new space is bound to be defined by hegemonic definitions, meanings, and perspectives. However, before the existing political and social framework claims this space, the temporary suspension of extant meanings and representations can create “the dislocationary experience needed to provoke an engagement with the viewpoints of others.”103 Such temporary dislocation of existing imaginaries encourages one to give attention to the opponent, understand their concerns and demands, and recognize the authenticity of their viewpoints. This lays the groundwork for a more positive relationship between adversaries thereby introducing the possibility of cultivating adversarial respect. It becomes possible to see another as a legitimate adversary and possibly “acknowledge the presence of different perspectives as valuable contributions to public life.”104 Consider for instance the “Standing Man” from 2013 Istanbul Gezi Park protests.105 After the three-week occupation of the Gezi Park had ended with the police forcibly clearing the Gezi Park of the protesters, a

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protester staged an unexpected silent protest. The Standing Man, as the popular media named him, stood still in the middle of Taksim Square, the most popular square in Istanbul, for more than six hours in order to express his support for the Gezi Protests. During his political performance, he only moved once to unbutton his pants in case the police wanted to search him. From a legal standpoint, his act was not illegal as he was merely standing motionless in a public square, but his performance could be viewed as an act of resistance by demonstrating in public which would require a permit; from a political standpoint, by peacefully standing in silence in the most visible public space in Turkey, his political act has revealed the limits of the opponent’s narrative of the Gezi protests which represented the protesters as extremists, looters, and marauders.106 The democratic power of the Standing Man’s political performance rests on his creativity to explore this confusion. The Standing Man was yet another protester expressing his dissatisfaction with the government’s policies, but the way he staged his protest has made it difficult for the opponent to name him as enemy. Once supporters of Gezi Park protests recognized the political nature of the act of standing still, several of them joined the Standing Man. Within the next couple of hours, the number of people standing at Taksim Square went up to hundreds. The Standing Man has inspired similar protests across Turkey and around the world. In a deeply divided political climate marked by strained political relationships and mistrust, the Standing Man’s creative political performance was an act of resistance and a call for adversarial respect and tolerance.107 By conveying a contentious political viewpoint in a creative way that is less confrontational, the Standing Man’s political performance avoids provoking strong negative reactions in the opponent. In doing so, it renders his political perspective accessible to the political opponents as it does not arouse raw negative emotions that usually get in the way of hearing the other’s viewpoint. Thus, understanding the other’s perspective and empathizing with them remains a realistic possibility. To be sure, the point is not that creative political practices such as the Standing Man’s silent protest by themselves establish adversarial relationships in a context of deep division and conflict, rather it is that the proliferation of similar creative political practices can contribute to building bridges between political opponents and lead to the generation of a political climate that sustain agonistic relations. Such creative practices can contribute to the de-escalation of the conflict and open a new space for adversarial engagement.108

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It is important to note that the power of creative political performances lies in how they express, and not just what they express. As Young rightly notes there is a distinction between “what a discourse says, its substantive content or message, and how it says it.”109 The latter, Young writes, is “rhetoric.” It is about “the various ways something can be said.”110 The way I understand politics in the creative mode share significant similarities with Young’s description of “rhetoric.” For Young rhetoric includes the emotional tone of discourse—fear, hope, anger, joy, and other expressions of passion—the use of figurative speech—simile, metaphor, puns, and so on and playful, humorous, ironic, deadpan, mocking, etc. styles or attitudes produced by such figures—and other forms of political expression that do not involve speech such as “visual media, signs, banners, street demonstration, guerrilla theatre, and the use of symbols.”111 From an agonistic perspective, all these are valuable forms of expression and contestation. The distinction between creative political practices and rhetoric is that rhetoric does not necessarily involve creativity. In that sense, creative political practices constitute a subset of what Young calls “rhetoric.” It is the element of creativity that constitute creative political practices as a distinct category. Consider for instance a typical political protest against police violence: a group of protesters marches from point A to point B while chanting slogans. Now consider a thousand protestors expressing the same concern, but this time by staging a massive pillow fight. This is what protesters in Hamburg, Germany did to express their opposition to the local government’s declaration of parts of Hamburg as “danger zones,” which gave the police arbitrary stop and search powers in the danger zones.112 By choosing a very soft object to use in their protest, the protesters aimed to send a clear message to the public that they are peaceful protesters concerned about the police’s arbitrary power to search protesters.113 Political protest need not be creative, but when the creative element is present, it changes the relationship between those who perform the act and those who view it. Similarly, slogans, signs, and banners need not express any creativity. However, creatively constructed signs and slogan have the potential to tell a story without provoking the adversary. Consider the difference between a sign that reads “stop killer cops” and another one “Hands up, Don’t Shoot”—adopted by the BLM Movement as one of the defining slogans and symbolic gestures of the movement after Michael Brown was killed by a police officer in Ferguson. Both signs convey the idea that racial injustice has violent consequences. The former

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does that by making the association between police officers and killers which is likely to cause outrage and offend many people thereby cutting off channels of communication. The latter, however, conveys the same message by emphasizing the victim’s submission to the police and his nonthreatening position at the time of the killing which forces one to take the perspective of the victim. It is not the content of the message that changes when creativity is involved, but it is how the message is constructed and conveyed. And, this shift matters in agonistic politics. Creative protest allows us to express a contentious perspective in a less confrontational and aggressive way and thus it becomes possible to be oppositional without appearing jarring, alienating, and hostile to the political opponent. In doing so, it changes the way one perceives and reacts to the political opponent.114 Finally, it is important to recognize that one of the most crucial goals of creative political practices is to elicit emotions thereby producing the affect that can create a positively charged space for fostering and sustaining adversarial relations. The goal is to induce an affective response that does let one dismiss the political opponent too comfortably and easily. This is precisely the democratic promise of slogans such as “I can’t breathe,” a slogan originated from Eric Garner’s last words. It is a simple but powerful way of reminding the horror of Eric Garner’s death after being put in a chokehold by a police officer. Even if one is inclined to see Garner’s death from the perspective of a narrative that attempts to downplay or legitimize it, one would still be bothered by the slogan that reminds one of the circumstances of Garner’s death and conveys its horrific nature. Such creative practices reach the adversary at the affective level and loosen the grip of hegemonic narratives on one’s perception of the other. In doing so, emotionally charged creative practices make it possible to overcome the affective barriers that prevent one to engage with the other. A more recent example is the “Wall of Moms.”115 In response to the police violence against BLM activists, hundreds of activist moms concerned about the safety of BLM protesters joined the protests in Portland. Wearing all yellow t-shirts reading “mom is here,” they formed a human wall between the BLM protesters and the federal agents. “Moms” carried signs that read “schedule: bath time, bed time, fight fascists, defend black lives, repeat,” chanted “Feds stay clear! The moms are here!”. What started with a small group of moms have mobilized many

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moms across the country. The power of this movement resides in its effective use of moms’ unique place in our lives that transcends any political narrative. As a symbol of care, love, stability, and peace, mom’s presence in the protest undermines the political narrative that defines them as a bunch of “lowlives” or “looters.” Witnessing “moms” linked armin-arm forming a human barricade and singing “Hands up Don’t Shoot Me” as a lullaby reaches one at the affective level and arouses positive emotions which resists the powerful’s attempts to demonize the protesters as agitators, anarchists, and a malicious force determined to destroy the cities.116 It should be emphasized that especially under conditions of structural inequality where the powerful have more resources to shape and influence the political discourse, reaching political opponents at the affective level and generating a counter-narrative that contests the hostile representation of the underdog is essential for sustaining agonistic relations.117 Representing the political opponent is a significant part of politics. But, demonizing a political group and questioning their right to have a political voice tear at the seams of agonistic democracy. Such ways of representing the adversary fan the flames of intolerance and make it extremely unlikely for the supporters of the dominant perspective to perceive the other side as a legitimate adversary. It is unrealistic to expect the representatives of hegemonic power to refrain from using such politically expedient tactics to dismiss the adversary as they often benefit from intolerant agonism and polarization. That’s why it is important for the underdogs to make effective use of creative political practices to prevent the powerful from marginalizing them and excluding their demands from the political discourse. By using creative politics effectively, the underdogs introduce possibilities for the supporters of hegemonic perspectives to understand their views and recognize the authenticity of their concerns rather than quickly label them as enemy and take a reactionary attitude. Thus, it becomes possible to generate relations of adversarial respect and maintain agonistic dynamics of politics.

Conclusion Before concluding, it is important to briefly address two issues. The first is Mouffe’s recent acknowledgment of the positive value of creative politics. Mouffe suggests that artistic practices and critical art “can contribute to the creation of a multiplicity of sites where the dominant hegemony

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can be questioned.”118 Critical art “as constituted by manifold artistic practices” can make visible what hegemony obscures and excludes.119 In that sense, she notes, it gives a voice to those silenced within the existing hegemony and has the potential to unsettle common sense. In addition to this critical function, critical art can contribute to the construction of new forms of subjectivity and relations by “making us see things in a different way.”120 Making people perceive new possibilities and allowing them to participate in new experiences encourage them to question their unexamined beliefs and the existing configuration of power thereby creating a desire for change. As such, Mouffe concludes, artists and artistic activism have “an important role to play in the hegemonic struggle.”121 Mouffe’s theorization of artistic and cultural practices is valuable as it recognizes the value of artistico-activist practices in disrupting the hegemony of corporate capitalism and neoliberal order. However, when Mouffe theorizes the value of creative politics, she approaches it from the perspective of radical democratic politics. That’s why she emphasizes that the artistic form of activism should be seen as an important part of radical politics.122 As I’ve indicated in the first chapter, there are significant differences between radical democratic politics and agonistic politics. From the perspective of radical democracy, it is urgent to undo the neoliberal hegemony and, as a consequence, the value of creative politics reside in its capability to open little cracks in the neoliberal hegemonic order. This view is based on the idea that the existing hegemony is already undesirable and should be challenged. But it does not say much about what creative political practices could do for agonistic politics where agonistic contenders struggle for hegemony within the larger hegemonic framework of liberal democracy. Put differently, it doesn’t say much about what creative political practices can do to sustain agonistic dynamics when what is at stake is intolerant agonism, polarization, and potential antagonism. To be sure, it is possible to decouple Mouffe’s discussion of artistic activism from the way she envisions how they function to unsettle the neoliberal hegemony. Thus viewed, creative political practices, viewed as a means for agonistic interventions, offer a significant strategic political tool for marginalized and excluded people to effectively contest hegemonic power.123 Yet, Mouffe’s theorization of artistic activism does not recognize the value of creative political practices in sustaining adversarial relationships and how creative politics can address the risks of agonistic politics. This is one of the weaknesses of Mouffe’s agonistic approach that leaves it vulnerable to criticisms about the risks of agonistic democracy.

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She focuses on the importance of expression and contestation, but she doesn’t pay sufficient attention to the significance of reconnecting and rebuilding. It is important to take seriously the question of how agonistic contenders can express their viewpoints and contest their opponents in a way that promotes and deepens agonistic politics. It is essential to recognize the need to expand agonistic political practices so as to include less confrontational and threatening modes of political expressions that make it possible for political opponents to listen and understand the other side. Especially when politics of intolerance and reactionary positions take over and “rally around the flag” sentiment dominates democratic politics, it is necessary to find ways to communicate across rigid boundaries of political camps and closed identities. In such a context of strained relationships and deepened divisions, employing creative political practices can be an effective means of communicating across differently situated groups. Accordingly, they tone down the political discourse and form a more fertile ground for political negotiation and agonistic engagement. By creating a new space for political engagement, creative political practices encourage political opponents to reflect on and relate to another’s perspective. As such, it allows one to develop a greater understanding of the other and recognize the genuineness of their viewpoints. Once this relationship between political opponents is forged, it becomes possible for political opponents to recognize each other as legitimate adversaries. That’s why expanding agonistic political practice beyond direct confrontation is essential and creative political practices should be seen as an important dimension of agonistic politics. The second issue that should be addressed is the status of disruptive politics that do not aim to foster adversarial relations of respect. What I have in mind is political actions such as Rosa Parks’ refusal to surrender her seat to a White passenger or the Birmingham Campaign’s nonviolent direct-action program. The aim of disruptive politics is not to foster adversarial respect, but to disrupt the routine processes of the everyday and the pressures of hegemonic power in order to get people to think about the hegemonic relations of power and compel them to take conflict seriously. As King writes, the goal in Birmingham was not only to expose the violence of racist power structures as it had already been well-documented but also to “create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue.”124 And changing power balance and compelling unwilling parties

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to negotiate call for disruptive politics. Yet, when we shift our attention from disruptive politics to modified deliberation, storytelling, and creative political practice, and, in general, to oppositional political practices that can also be connective, this might seem to downplay the significance of disruptive politics. To put differently, too much emphasis on the possible risks of agonistic politics and expanding agonistic political practice in order to mitigate these risks seem to create a hierarchy among various ways of acting politically and prioritize the agonistic political practices that foster adversarial respect over those that don’t. At this point, it is important to clarify that my intention is not to create a hierarchy of political practices or underplay the significance of disruptive politics. Given the constitutive and pervasive nature of hegemony, disruptive politics can be viewed as an effective means for the excluded and marginalized to challenge the normalcy of everyday violence. It does not follow from this that politics should always be conducted in a disruptive mode. Once we acknowledge the value agonistic politics, it becomes crucial to recognize the different shapes agonistic political practice can take given the risks of agonistic politics. Expanding agonistic political practice provides different groups with a variety of tools to resist and challenge the hegemonic while offering a way to counter the risks of agonistic politics and sustain adversarial relations. The point is not to replace one with the other, but rather to supplement confrontational and disruptive politics with oppositional yet connective modes of political practice. In conclusion, it should be re-emphasized that even under non-ideal conditions the value of agonistic politics should be celebrated for what it can uniquely achieve. Embracing agonism doesn’t mean that we should overlook its possible risks. In a non-ideal world where adversarial respect and tolerance are not widespread, it may not be possible to eliminate the risks of agonistic politics. What matters here is then to identify ways to mitigate intolerant agonism, affective polarization, and violence in order to sustain agonistic democracy. That’s why expanding agonistic political practice so as to include modified deliberation, storytelling, and creative politics matter as they contest and connect. These political practices are crucial for regulating conflict in a positive and constructive way and keep it within the boundaries of democratic politics.

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Notes 1. Seyla Benhabib, “Introduction,” in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 3–18; Monique Deveaux, “Agonism and Pluralism,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 25, no. 4 (1999), 1–22; John Dryzek, “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia,” Political Theory 33, no. 2 (2005), 218–242. 2. Andreas Kalyvas, “The Democratic Narcissis: The Agonism of the Ancients Compared to that of the (Post)Moderns,” in Law and Agonistic Politics, ed. Andrew Schaap (Burlington: Ashgate, 2009), 35. 3. Andrew Schaap, “Political Theory and the Agony of Politics,” Political Studies Review, no. 5 (2007), 68; Kalyvas, “The Democratic Narcissis,” 34. 4. Chantal Mouffe, Agonistics (London: Verso, 2013), 89. 5. Chantal Mouffe, For a Left Populism (London: Verso, 2018), 47. 6. “Charlottesville: One Killed in Violence Over US Far-Right Rally,” BBC, August 13, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada40912509. 7. Kristen Griffith, “‘I Was Sucker-Punched’: Biden Supporter Allegedly Assaulted in Westminister After Rally,” The Baltimore Sun, December 7, 2020, https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/carroll/news/cc-ass ault-biden-rally-20201207-5vimiwvanng4bomjxhokwraorm-story.html. 8. Jason Slotkin, Suzanne Nuyen, and James Doubek, “4 Stabbed, 33 Arrested After Trump Supporters, Counterprotesters Clash in D.C.,” NPR, December 12, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/12/12/945 825924/trump-supporters-arrive-in-washington-once-again-for-a-mil lion-maga-march. 9. Bred Evans and George Yancy, “The Perils of Being a Black Philosopher,” The New York Times, April 18, 2016, https://opinionator.blogs. nytimes.com/author/george-yancy. See also George Yancy, “Dear White America,” The New York Times, December 24, 2015, https://opinio nator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/12/24/dear-white-america/. 10. In this section, I follow my discussion of risks of partisanship in “Democracy and Peace: Is Partisanship Good for Democracy?” in Peaceful Approaches for a More Peaceful World, ed. Sanjay Lal (Leiden: Brill, 2022), forthcoming. 11. Lilliana Mason and Julie Wronski, “One Tribe to Bind Them All: How Our Social Group Attachments Strengthen Partisanship,” Advances in Political Psychology 39, no. 1 (2018), 257. 12. Mason and Wronski, “One Tribe to Bind Them All,” 259. 13. See Liliana Mason, Uncivil Agreement (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2018).

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14. Mason and Wronski, “One Tribe to Bind Them All,” 257. 15. Mason and Wronski, “One Tribe to Bind Them All,” 259. See also Lilliana Mason, “Ideologues Without Issues: The Polarizing Consequences of Ideological Identities,” Public Opinion Quarterly 82, Special Issue (2018), 280–301. 16. Shanto Iyengar, Yphtach Lelkes, Matthew Levendusky, Neil Malhotra, and Sean J. Westwood, “The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States,” Annual Review of Political Science 22 (May 2019), 129–146. 17. Lilliana Mason, “Losing Common Ground: Social Sorting and Polarization,” Forum—A Journal of Applied Research in Contemporary Politics 16, no. 1 (2018), 57. 18. Nico Carpentier and Bart Cammaerts, “Hegemony, Democracy, Agonism and Journalism: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe,” Journalism Studies no. 7 (2006), 969. 19. Carpentier and Cammaerts, “Hegemony, Democracy, Agonism and Journalism: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe,” 968. 20. Iredell Jenkins, “The Conditions of Peace,” The Monist 57, no. 4 (October 1973), 523. 21. See Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 116. 22. Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, 2 and 10. 23. Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, 258. 24. Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), 17– 34, and 99–101. 25. Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Verso, 2005), 18; Laclau and Mouffe (1985), 134. 26. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 99. 27. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 20 (2014), 93; William Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 92–94, 192–193; Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, 2–5. 28. William Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Pres, 1995), xvi; Bonnie Honig, “Towards an Agonistic Feminism: Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Identity,” in Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1995), 159; Andrew Schaap, Law and Agonistic Politics (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 1. 29. See Thomas Fossen, “Agonistic Critiques of Liberalism: Perfection and Emancipation,” Contemporary Political Theory 7 (2008), 376–394. 30. Connolly, Identity/Difference, 167; William Connolly, “Beyond Good and Evil: The Ethical Sensibility of Michel Foucault,” Political Theory 21 (1991), 372.

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31. 32. 33. 34.

35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

48. 49.

50.

51. 52. 53.

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Connolly, Identity/Difference, 167 and 84. Mouffe, On the Political, 62–69. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this point. Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 107. This is how Young responds to those criticize politics of difference on the grounds that it produces conflict and hostility. Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” in A Testament of Hope, ed. James Melvin Washington (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 292. Connolly, Identity/Difference, 211; William Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 141. King, “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” 192. Mouffe, Agonistics, 93. Connolly, Identity/Difference, x; Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 101– 105. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 102. Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993), 4. William Connolly, “Twilight of the Idols,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 21, no. 3 (1995), 130. William Connolly, “Beyond Good and Evil: The Ethical Sensibility of Michel Foucault,” 381. William Connolly, Pluralism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 123. Connolly, Pluralism, 126. Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization, xvii. John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 58–59; David Schlosberg, “The Pluralist Imagination,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory, ed. John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, and Anne Phillips (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 151. Schlosberg, “The Pluralist Imagination,” 151. Connolly, Identity/Difference, 211; Andrew Schaap, “Agonism in Divided Societies,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 32, no. 2 (2016), 269–270. Dryzek, “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia,” 220–221; Schaap, “Agonism in Divided Societies,” 269; Kapoor (2002), 473; Deveaux, Agonism and Pluralism, 5. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 6; Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 30; Connolly, “Twilight of the Idols,” 135. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 104; Mouffe, Agonistics, 24–29. Connolly, Pluralism, 32.

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54. William Connolly, “Realizing Agonistic Respect,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 72, no. 2 (2004), 510–511; Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 103. 55. William Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist, 146. 56. Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist, 146. 57. Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist, 149. 58. Connolly states that if multiple constituencies endorsing diverse moral sources and metaphysical orientations “affirm without deep resentment the contestable character of the fundamental faith they honor most,” this provides an “existential basis for democratic politics.” Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist, 36–39. 59. Aletta Norval, Aversive Democracy: Inheritance and Originality in the Democratic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 204–205; Iris Marion Young, Review of Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, Political Theory 20, no. 3 (August 1992), 514. 60. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 6. 61. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 212–254. 62. Connolly, Identity/Difference, 161. 63. Andrew Schaap, “Political Theory and the Agony of Politics,” Political Studies Review, no. 5 (2007), 67. 64. Simona Goi, “Agonism, Deliberation, and the Politics of Abortion,” Polity 37, no. 1 (January 2005), 80. 65. Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 175. 66. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 102. 67. See, for instance, Louis Menand, “The Unpolitical Animal,” The New Yorker, August 22, 2004, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 2004/08/30/the-unpolitical-animal. 68. See, for instance, Yanna Krupkinov and John Barry Ryan, “The Real Divide in America is Between Political Junkies and Everyone Else,” The New York Times, October 20, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 10/20/opinion/polarization-politics-americans.html?action=click&mod ule=Opinion&pgtype=Homepage. 69. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 116. 70. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 127. 71. Ben Jones, “The Confederate Flag Is a Matter of Pride and Heritage, Not Hatred,” The New York Times, December 22, 2015, https://www. nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/06/19/does-the-confederate-flagbreed-racism/the-confederate-flag-is-a-matter-of-pride-and-heritage-nothatred. 72. Goi, “Agonism, Deliberation, and the Politics of Abortion,” 66.

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73. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, 72. 74. Jürgen Habermas, “Introduction,” Ratio Juris 12, no. 4 (1999), 332; Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 305–306. 75. See Bernard Manin, “On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation,” trans. Elly Stein and Jane Mansbridge, Political Theory 15, no. 3 (Aug. 1987), 338–368; Seyla Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,” in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 67–94; Jürgen Habermas, “Three Normative Models of Democracy,” in The Inclusion of the Other, ed. Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999), 239–253. 76. See Fuat Gürsözlü, “Agonism and Deliberation: Recognizing the Difference,” Journal of Political Philosophy 17, no. 3 (2009), 356–368. 77. Norval, Aversive Democracy, 101. 78. Norval, Aversive Democracy, 101–102. 79. Schaap, “Political Theory and the Agony of Politics,” 61–62. Many theorists argue that by identifying rational argumentation as the ideal mode of interaction deliberative democrats privilege particular groups over others. See Iris Marion Young, “Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy,” in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundary of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996), 120–126; Carol C. Gould, “Diversity and Democracy: Representing Differences,” in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundary of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996), 172; Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: The MIT Press), 77. 80. Iris Marion Young, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy,” Political Theory 29, no. 5 (2011), 685. 81. Chantal Mouffe, “Politics and Passions: The Stakes of Democracy,” Ethical Perspectives 7, nos. 2–3 (2000), 148; Connolly, Identity/Difference, x; Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, 200. 82. Mouffe, “Politics and Passions: The Stakes of Democracy,” 148. 83. Goi uses the term “modified agonal spaces.” I call “modified agonal spaces” deliberative because essentially those spaces are still deliberative spaces infused with agonistic elements. See Goi, “Agonism, Deliberation, and the Politics of Abortion”. 84. Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,” 71. 85. Manin, “On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation,” 351–352.

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86. Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,” 72. 87. Goi, “Agonism, Deliberation, and the Politics of Abortion,” 65. 88. Goi, “Agonism, Deliberation, and the Politics of Abortion,” 70. 89. Goi, “Agonism, Deliberation, and the Politics of Abortion,” 70. Goi discusses a case study on abortion to support her claim. She concludes that modified agonal spaces help participants to recognize the complexity of conflict and provide a better framework for sustaining a genuine dialogue. 90. Manin makes a similar point about how deliberation requires limiting possible proposals. See Manin, “On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation,” 356–357. 91. Goi, “Agonism, Deliberation, and the Politics of Abortion,” 75. 92. Goi recognizes the same point. See Goi, “Agonism, Deliberation, and the Politics of Abortion,” 75. 93. See Richard Delgado, “Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A plea for Narrative,” Michigan Law Review 87, no. 8 (1989), 2411–2441. 94. Lisa Disch, “Impartiality, Storytelling, and the Seductions of Narrative: An Essay at an Impasse,” Alternatives 28 (2003), 255–261. 95. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 72. 96. Delgado, “Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A plea for Narrative,” 2415; Disch, “Impartiality, Storytelling, and the Seductions of Narrative: An Essay at an Impasse,” 260. 97. Iris Marion Young, “Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy,” in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundary of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996), 131. 98. Young, “Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy,” 131, 132; Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 75. 99. Young, “Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy,” 132. 100. See “‘Black Pete’ protested as Dutch children hail St. Nicholas,” Reuters, November 19, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/usnetherlands-black-pete/black-pete-protests-planned-as-dutch-childrenhail-st-nicholas-idUSKBN1XQ0CY. According to the Reuters article, “In Dutch folklore, St. Nicholas travels once a year from Spain on a steamboat laden with presents. The appearance of his sidekick derives from a nineteenth century story by children’s author Jan Schenkman that was illustrated with pictures of a dark-skinned Spanish Moor”. 101. “Black Pete”. 102. “So Long Black Pete,” NPR, June 24, 2020, https://www.npr.org/tra nscripts/882816031. 103. Norval, Aversive Democracy, 101.

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104. Norval, Aversive Democracy, 102. 105. Andy Carvin, “The ‘Standing Man’ Of Turkey: Act of Quiet Protest Goes Viral,” NPR, June 18, 2013, http://www.npr.org/blogs/the two-way/2013/06/18/193183899/thestanding-man-of-turkey-act-ofquiet-protest-goes-viral. 106. “Gezi Park Protests,” Wikipedia, accessed December 10, 2021, https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gezi_Park_protests. 107. Nilüfer Göle, “The Gezi Occupation: For a democracy of public spaces,” Open Democracy, June 11, 2013, https://www.opendemocracy.net/nil ufer-gole/gezi-occupation-for-democracy-of-public-spaces. 108. During the Gezi protests, the protesters have adopted several creative political practices. I discuss some of these in the next chapter. Despite the police’s violent dispersal of the Gezi protesters, the Turkish government were compelled to recognize the legitimacy of the movement thereby turning them into legitimate adversaries. It is also important to note that during the protests the Turkish President agreed to suspend the Gezi Park redevelopment plans that includes reconstruction of a historical building to house a shopping mall. Gezi Park still stands. 109. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 65. 110. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 65. 111. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 65. 112. “US travel warning for Hamburg after police crackdown,” BBC, June 8, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25651806. 113. Fuat Gürsözlü, “Democratic Potential of Creative Political Protest,” Critical Studies: International Journal of Humanities 3 (Fall 2017), 21. 114. On the effectiveness of creative political protest, See Srdja Popovic, Blueprint for Revolution (New York: Spiegel and Grau, 2015); Larry Bogad, Tactical Performance: The Theory and Practice of Serious Play (New York: Routledge, 2016). 115. Dani Blum, “‘The Moms Are Here’: ‘Wall of Moms’ Groups Mobilize Nationwide,” The New York Times, July 29, 2020, https://www.nytimes. com/2020/07/27/parenting/wall-of-moms-protests.html. 116. Laurel Wamsley, “’They Just Started Waling on Me’: Violence in Portland As U.S. Agents Clamp Down,” NPR, June 20, 2020, https:// www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/ 07/20/893082598/they-just-started-whaling-violence-tension-as-u-sagents-clamp-down-in-portland. 117. On the significance of framing, see Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective (Lanham: MDL Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). 118. Mouffe, Agonistics, 104. 119. Mouffe, Agonistics, 92–93. 120. Mouffe, Agonistics, 97.

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121. Mouffe, Agonistics, 105. 122. Mouffe, Agonistics, 99. 123. For excellent examples, see The Center for Artistic Activism @ https:// c4aa.org, or The Yes Man’s creative activism @ https://theyesmen.org. 124. King, “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” 291.

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Menand, Louis. “The Unpolitical Animal.” The New Yorker, August 22, 2004. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/08/30/the-unpoli tical-animal. Mouffe, Chantal. The Return of the Political. London: Verso, 1993. Mouffe, Chantal. The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso, 2000. Mouffe, Chantal. “Politics and Passions: The Stakes of Democracy.” Ethical Perspectives 7, nos. 2–3 (2000): 146–150. Mouffe, Chantal. On the Political. London: Verso, 2005. Mouffe, Chantal. Agonistics. London: Verso, 2013. Mouffe, Chantal. For A Left Populism. London: Verso, 2018. Norval, Aletta. Aversive Democracy: Inheritance and Originality in the Democratic Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. NPR. “So Long Black Pete.” June 24, 2020, https://www.npr.org/transcripts/ 882816031. Popovic, Srdja. Blueprint for Revolution. New York: Spiegel and Grau, 2015. Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. Expanded edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. Reuters. “‘Black Pete’ Protested as Dutch Children Hail St. Nicholas.” November 19, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-netherlandsblack-pete/black-pete-protests-planned-as-dutch-children-hail-st-nicholas-idU SKBN1XQ0CY. Schaap, Andrew. “Political Theory and the Agony of Politics.” Political Studies Review no. 5 (2007): 56–74. Schaap, Andrew. Law and Agonistic Politics. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2013. Schaap, Andrew. “Agonism in Divided Societies.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 32, no. 2 (2016): 255–277. Schlosberg, David. “The Pluralist Imagination.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory, edited by John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, and Anne Phillips, 142–163. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Slotkin, Jason, Suzanne Nuyen, and James Doubek.“4 Stabbed, 33 Arrested After Trump Supporters, Counterprotesters Clash in D.C.” NPR, December 12, 2020. https://www.npr.org/2020/12/12/945825924/trump-suppor ters-arrive-in-washington-once-again-for-a-million-maga-march. Wamsley, Laurel. “‘They Just Started Waling On Me’: Violence in Portland as U.S. Agents Clamp Down.” NPR, June 20, 2020. https://www.npr.org/ sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/07/20/893082598/ they-just-started-whaling-violence-tension-as-u-s-agents-clamp-down-in-por tland. Wikipedia. “Gezi Park Protests.” Accessed December 10, 2021, https://en.wik ipedia.org/wiki/Gezi_Park_protests.

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Yancy, George. “Dear White America.” The New York Times, December 24, 2015. https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/12/24/dear-white-ame rica/. Young, Iris Marion. Review of Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. Political Theory 20, no. 3 (Aug. 1992): 511–514. Young, Iris Marion. “Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy.” In Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundary of the Political, edited by Seyla Benhabib, 120–136. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996. Young, Iris Marion. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Young, Iris Marion. “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy.” Political Theory 29, no. 5 (2011): 670–690.

CHAPTER 4

Agonistic Spaces and the Value of Political Protests

A persistent disappointment in democratic theory is the way two leading approaches to democracy—elite theory of democracy and deliberative democratic theory—treat political protest and activism.1 When considered through the lenses of elite democracy and deliberative democratic approaches, peaceful political protest and activism is democratically valueless, a threat to democratic ideals, something that needs to be put up with, or, at best, having limited democratic value as corrective to non-ideal democratic conditions. Political protest is a fact of our political reality, but a regrettable one that is not part of how democracy ought to function. I find mainstream democratic theory’s treatment of peaceful political protest hard to accept. The simple fact that there has never been democracy without political protest gives us good reasons to question the place of political protest in mainstream democratic theory. Simply put, we cannot tell the story of democracy without giving a central place to political protest and activism. Consider for instance some of the building blocks of US history from the Boston Tea Party to Montgomery Bus Boycott, from March on Selma to the Freedom Riders, and from anti-Vietnam War protests to the Stonewall Uprising. Many rights that shape contemporary democratic societies have been won with the help of courageous and persistent activism. Each democratic country has its historically significant protest movements that constitute important parts of the stories they tell about themselves. Given © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Gürsözlü, Agonistic Democracy and Political Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05999-5_4

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the central place of political protest and activism in the history of democracy, one would expect democratic theorists to reflect on the question of why political protest and activism might matter. Surprisingly, the proponents of mainstream democratic theories do the opposite and tell us what’s wrong with political protest and activism. Not only they fail to show how peaceful political protest fits into the democratic framework, but they also devalue political protest by depicting it as politics improper.2 This is especially disappointing at a time of increased activism with OWS and Black Lives Matter defining the political experiences of many politically active members of society. When supporters of these movements turn to democratic theory to make sense of their political experiences, they realize that it is the very ideals of democratic theory that devalue their political experiences and aspirations. Any activist who turns to political philosophy for guidance and meaning is bound to be disappointed when they recognize the incompatibility between their political experiences and reality and the world of mainstream democratic theory. The other reason why democratic theory’s treatment of political protest is disappointing is that it contributes to the marginalization of political protest. When dominant democratic discourses characterize political protest as politics improper and corrosive to democratic ideals, this reinforces the ironic place of political protest in existing democracies. On the one hand, the right to peaceful protest is recognized as a human right as defined by Article 20 of the UNDHR and instituted as a fundamental political right by liberal democratic constitutions, most famously by the First Amendment that secures the right of the people to peaceful assembly. On the other hand, there are strict limitations on time, place, and manner of protest. Political protest is a fundamental human right albeit a severely limited and selectively regulated one.3 Even in liberal democracies that characterize themselves as protestfriendly, the onus is always on the protesters to justify why they have to exercise their right to protest especially when they contest dominant powers.4 Representing democratic protesters as a potential threat to security and order, the dominant political culture too easily warrants the use of violence against protestors. Protesters are often discouraged and even “harassed with preemptive arrest, surveillance, and infiltrations.”5 In most demonstrations, the police look for excuses to intervene and disperse the protest.6 To contain protesters, they regularly use intimidating tactics and aggressive practices which only make violent confrontation more likely.7 When protesters resist and insist on exercising their democratic right to

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protest peacefully, the police use even more aggressive tactics such as firing smoke gas, tear gas, stun grenades, rubber bullets, and water cannons at protesters to disperse the demonstration. The result is the degeneration of the space of democratic activity into a space of violent confrontation and the reproduction of the “violent protesters” narrative.8 Many people reject the claims of protesters without even paying any attention to what they’re saying simply because they do not like the way protesters voice their concerns and press their claims.9 Powerful political actors artfully invoke the already existing tropes about political protest to discredit political movements that are opposed to them.10 The language the powerful use to characterize protesters is surprisingly similar: protesters have been called rioters, clowns, looters, vandals, anarchists, extremists, troublemakers, lowlives, and thugs.11 The point is that by failing to recognize the place of protest in democracy and depicting it as politics improper, mainstream democratic theory inadvertently ends up supporting the dominant political narrative that marginalize political protest and activism. In doing so, it contributes to the perpetuation of a political culture that is inhospitable to political protest thereby weakening the legitimacy of political activists most of whom contest entrenched relations of power, privilege, inequality, and marginalization. I suggest that the inability of mainstream democratic theory to understand the role of political protest in democracy is due to the way democratic theorists define the nature and aims of democratic politics and political practice.12 Overly occupied with issues pertaining to institutional politics and decision-making, the elite and deliberative theories rest on an account of politics that is too narrow to grasp the democratic meaning and value of political protest. I suggest that viewing public protest from an agonistic perspective reveals the shortcomings of the mainstream democratic theories while helping us recognize how public political protest expand existing democratic imaginaries by unsettling the common sense and challenging the “normal” and by displaying the possibility of an alternative political organization. To illustrate this point, I focus on various recent public sphere movements such as OWS, Istanbul Gezi Park, and BLM. I argue that approaching the recent public sphere movements and the emergent political forms within them from an agonistic perspective makes it clear that while voicing their critique of the status quo, political protesters stage an alternative vision of democracy. The aim is not just to influence institutional politics and political decision-making, but also to redefine the norms and terms that constitute the society and develop a

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language of resistance and counter-acting while creating political spaces for the emergence of new political identities. The agonistic perspective changes the way we understand the meaning and value of public political protest and clarifies why political protest is essential for a vibrant democracy.

Recent Public Sphere Movements and the New Forms of Creative Politics A wave of demonstrations and mass protests started in Iceland and Greece in 2009. It then spread to Tunisia and Egypt and triggered a cycle of protests in North Africa and the Middle East known as the Arab Spring in 2010 and 2011. In May 2011, the Spanish Indignados, also known as the 15-M movement, began with a series of occupations, sit-ins, and demonstrations. With Indignados’ adoption of protest camp as its main form of protest, the protest camp, which had been widely used during the Arab Spring, moved from North Africa to Europe. Began with mostly young Spaniards camping out in Madrid’s central square, Puerta Del Sol, the Indignados has evolved into a national movement spreading across Spain. Another influential protest movement that marked the early 2010s was the Occupy Wall Street. Inspired by the 15-M, OWS also adopted the protest camp model with protesters occupying Zuccotti Park, NY in September 2011. Similar to 15-M that had started in one location and turned into a national movement, Occupy Wall Street protests have spread to many other cities in the US and worldwide and has evolved into the Occupy Movement. When the wave of protests seemed to come to an end, protests in Turkey erupted in May 2013 with a small group of environmentalists occupying the Gezi Park in Istanbul. While the world was closely following the spread of protests—and the protest camp model—from Istanbul Gezi Park across Turkey, mass demonstrations and anti-government protests began in Bulgaria. In 2013, the most influential political movement of the second half of the decade began. Black Lives Matter began in response to police violence against Black Americans. It has attracted national attention in 2014 and by the end of the decade, it has evolved into one of the largest movements in the history of the United States.13 Each of these movements has different dynamics and responds to problems that are part of their specific contexts ranging from authoritarian power to privatization of the commons, from racial injustice to

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unequal distribution of wealth. Despite their differences, there is a striking similarity in the way these movements employed unconventional forms of political activism. In addition to the traditional forms of protest such as marches and rallies, protesters have staged forms of political protest that had at its core creativity and performance. Protesters occupied public spaces while using the occupied spaces as a stage for interaction, creativity, and performance.14 OWS, Gezi Park Protests, and Tahrir Square Protests are grounded in physical spaces and that’s why their names come from the space occupied: Tahrir Square, Gezi Park, Wall Street. The movements were organized horizontally with no centralized leadership. The protesters rejected the idea of representation and the hierarchical structure of traditional politics. The protests were accompanied by local forums where participants had the opportunities to freely express their concerns and share their experiences. The protesters transformed occupied public spaces into a collective space where they experienced a communal life. In both Occupy Wall Street and Gezi Park Protests, protesters created an autonomous infrastructure that involved a free food center, a free medical center, and veterinary, a vegetable garden, a performance stage, free wi-fi, a playground, free lectures, and a library. They shared and exchanged blankets, medicine, books, yoga mats, gas masks, and even mobile phone chargers.15 In Tahrir Square, protestors demonstrated with books and flowers in hand, protected the shopkeepers from looters, and swept the square clean at the end of the day. When Coptic Christians celebrated mass, the Muslims formed a circle around Christians to protect them; when the Muslims prayed Christians joined hands in a circle to protect the Muslims.16 In Sofia, rallies and demonstrations had a festival-like atmosphere. The protests in Sofia have become a part of the daily life of tens of thousands of citizens. People gathered in large numbers after work on weekdays and on weekends to join the protests and to socialize. Families came with their babies and strollers, others brought their dogs, and others had bikes and flowers. Protesters staged yoga protests, signed songs, played music, and shouted slogans with books in hand while others staged peaceful and disruptive forms of protest.17 The creative and playful nature of the Bulgarian protests can be understood even from its name. The acronym of the National Security Agency in Bulgarian (DANS) is pronounced as “dance” and that’s why the protesters named the movements “dance with me.” Taking the motto literally, many protesters danced during the protest which transformed it into a street party.18 In Gezi Park protests, humor was present in the songs, slogans, banners, and posters. It was a

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festival of satire, irony, and endless political jokes. Artistic performances with political themes such as street theater, stand-up comedy, concerts, games, and other creative political performances were part of “the Gezi spirit.”19 Similar to other public sphere movements, BLM is a loosely structured and decentralized political movement, but, different from them, it didn’t follow the occupy camp as its main form of protest. BLM began as an online community in 2013 with the hashtag (#BlackLivesMatter) which then turned into a national movement relying mainly on local marches and rallies as its fundamental form of protest.20 But, portraying BLM as a conventional political movement downplays the centrality of its creative tactics and performances to it. When describing BLM as a political movement we should pay attention to creative political acts such as the gesture of “Taking a Knee” and “Hands up Don’t Shoot” slogan and the gesture of raising hands up in the air. We should also consider the significant role of creative slogans such as “I can’t breathe,” and “Say Their Names,” or creative political performances including “The Mirror Casket,” projecting George Floyd’s hologram over the statue of Robert E. Lee in Richmond, the giant BLM mural in DC and another in Seattle, outbreaks of dancing mostly involving the Electric Slide and the Cupid Shuffle, and countless “die-ins.” These creative forms of protest were vital to BLM protests and have deeply defined the BLM Movement. In all these protests new forms of political action including creativity, artistic performances, humor, and irony were widespread and central to the protesters’ routinized repertoire of political action. What we see in the public sphere movements of the last decade is the emergence of creative politics as the central mode of expression. The question then is how we should understand the place of creative politics in democracy. Do actions such as exchanging and sharing blankets, collectively dancing the Electric Slide, or doing yoga in a public square have any democratic relevance, or are they simply meaningless performances with no political value? To understand the democratic value of this new wave of protest and to recognize the democratic relevance of the emergent political forms within these movements, it is important to answer these questions. In the next two sections, I approach these questions from the perspective of two dominant models of democracy—the Schumpeterian elite democracy and Habermasian deliberative democracy. I suggest that they have little to offer to understand the democratic relevance and significance of forms of protest that has inspired millions of people around the world and had profound effects on the political landscape.

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Political Customers and the Elite Primarily a book on economics that expounds on the thesis that capitalism is bound to collapse and be replaced by socialism, only two sections of Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy directly addresses democratic theory.21 In sections 21 and 22 Schumpeter criticizes what he calls the classical doctrine of democracy and then details his elite model of democracy. The novel account of democracy Schumpeter advanced in these brief sections has been greatly influential in democratic theory and became one of the most dominant approaches to democracy in the twentieth century. What makes Schumpeter’s account distinct is his minimalist view of democracy theorized from a realist perspective. However, the empirical assumptions he holds about human nature and the nature of politics lead him to defend a form of democracy that is minimally democratic and offers a severely limited understanding of political action that reduces democratic action to voting.22 Schumpeter’s main target in Section 21 of Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy is what he calls the classical doctrine of democracy.23 According to the classical doctrine, Schumpeter writes, democracy is an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will.”24 Schumpeter notes that the classical model is based on the idea that there exists a common good that we can all agree on. It assumes that this common good is easy to define and every rational person can be made to see it by means of rational argument. Once we accept this assumption about the nature of the common good, what follows is a model of democracy that views representatives as specialists who are elected by popular vote and whose job is to “voice, reflect or represent the will of the electorate.”25 The ultimate purpose of democracy is then to realize the common good as decided by the people. For Schumpeter, the major flaw of the classical model is that there is “no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all people could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument.”26 Different individuals and groups disagree over the most fundamental issues and the clash of ultimate values cannot be reconciled by rational argument. Put differently, ultimate values are beyond the mere range of logic and rational argument. In a paragraph capturing the spirit of contemporary politics, Schumpeter writes that “Americans who

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say ‘We want this country to arm to its teeth and then to fight for what we conceive to be right all over the globe’ and Americans who say, ‘We want this country to work out its own problems which is the only way it can serve humanity’ are facing irreducible differences of ultimate values which compromise could only maim and degrade.”27 A compromise may be possible in some cases, but not in others. And even if we agree on a particular political end, he adds, we would disagree on other issues such as the means to achieve those ends.28 For Schumpeter, what follows from all this is the conclusion that in the absence of a uniquely determined common good, the idea of general will expressing the common good loses its “ethical dignity” and “vanishes into thin air.”29 Having argued against the possibility of a uniquely determined definite common good that could be realized democratically and guide political decision-making, Schumpeter entertains the possibility that a rational public opinion or common will might emerge through the democratic process. It seems that what Schumpeter describes here is a process through which the people create and come to agree on a common good. The point is important because if it holds, this means that the democratic process is not a chaotic process with no rational unity, rather it is fully capable of producing a public opinion congruent with a public good. If a version of the classical model could produce desirable results, Schumpeter would have to concede that it is valid on normative and pragmatic grounds. For Schumpeter, the main difficulty with this account is that it assumes that individual wills that constitute the will of the people are each independent and rationally formed. This is the only way for the collective will of citizens to have ethical dignity and respect. Accordingly, each citizen should know “definitely what he wants to stand for. This definite will would have to be implemented by the ability to observe and correctly interpret the facts that are directly accessible to everyone and to sift critically the information about the facts that are not.”30 And finally, despite all the propaganda and influence of pressure groups, each individual should be able to arrive at a clear, prompt, and generalizable conclusion on particular issues using rules of logical inference. Schumpeter argues that such normative standards cannot be fulfilled and the expectation that individuals can have independent and rational preferences are entirely unrealistic. His point is that people are neither rational nor sufficiently informed to be able to make rational political judgments. Even the most educated are ignorant and fail to develop

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rational judgment when it comes to matters of politics. This ignorance persists even when citizens are presented with information as “the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field.”31 Schumpeter’s bleak assessment of citizens’ political competence is based on the assumption that when the typical citizen enters the political field, they become associative and affective. Not only do they argue and analyze in a way that they “would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of [their] real interests,” but “the typical citizen would in political matters tend to yield to extra rational or irrational prejudice and impulse” even when there are no outside forces trying to sway their opinion.32 The risk is that even if not physically gathered together, it is “terribly easy to work up into a psychological crowd and into a state of frenzy in which attempt at rational argument only spurs the animal spirits.”33 The ignorance and irrationality of a typical citizen would lead to more relaxed moral standards and “occasionally give in to dark urges.” Thus, Schumpeter warns, at times these ominous consequences could prove fatal to the nation.34 Leadership as an Alternative to Low-Levels of Citizen Competence The lack of common good and citizen political competencies rule out the possibility that citizens could rationally form a public opinion and guide political decision-making. At this point Schumpeter introduces the core idea of his democracy by defining democracy as an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people’s vote.”35 So, it is not that the people hold a clear and rational opinion on political issues and then choose representatives to carry out their will, rather, reversing the order between decision-making and the election of politicians, people do not directly decide on political issues as the deciding of issues is secondary to the election of those who then make political decisions. Here the role of the people is to select the political elite whose job is to lead and make political decisions. The true function of the electorate’s vote is to produce a government and accept political leadership. Thus viewed, the democratic process should be understood in terms of a competitive struggle among the political elite for power and office. Candidates make their bid for the office and voters simply accept or refuse them.36 As Schumpeter emphasizes, in reality, citizens “neither raise nor decide issues,” but “the issues that shape their fate are normally raised

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and decided for them.”37 The initiative, he states, lies with the candidate who makes the bid for the office as they select “from the incessant stream current problems” what is on the political agenda and produce political positions in response to such issues. In doing so, the political leader imposes their own will on the public. The will of the people does not shape the political process, but it is the product of it. Put differently, the popular will on any issue needs to be manufactured by political leaders.38 What does this mean for political action and, in particular, political protest? Schumpeter’s deep distrust of the political capabilities of people lead him to minimize their political role as much as possible. Given that people cannot be carried up the ladder of politics, it is best to keep the barriers between the people and the political elite intact.39 Democracy is not about deliberation or participation in the decision-making process, rather it is about the division of labor between the people and professional politicians elected by them. Citizens should respect this division of labor and understand that political action is the business of elected politicians and not theirs.40 Accordingly, citizens should let political professionals do their job and refrain from telling the political elite what to do. Not only citizens are incapable of action “other than stampede,” but they also should not interfere with making political decisions.41 Within this framework, citizens’ role is reduced to authorizing the political elite’s power to make political decisions through periodic elections. Political participation and action other than voting is undesirable and unwelcome. As Medearis rightly observes, Schumpeter’s elite democracy does not see any value in political participation.42 Once we separate the sphere of election and decision sharply and argue that they should only be connected by means of voting, there remains no room to describe other types of political action as democratically valuable and desirable. Citizens should express their dissatisfaction and preferences at the ballot box and not in the streets or squares or parks. As such, it is clear that from the perspective of elite democracy political protest is undesirable and has no democratic value. Political protest would be viewed as an unwelcome attempt to exert political pressure on the political elite and influence the political agenda. In that sense, political protest itself challenges the very principle of political division of labor that is at the heart of the leadership model. This is not to say that citizens should not have a right to protest. Schumpeter does not make that claim. But, it is clear that the leadership model of democracy and the political culture shaped by it

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cannot be hospitable to this type of political activity. Put differently, elite democracy views political protest as politics improper.43 Political protest might be characterized as disturbance or a perverse attempt to undermine the democratic process by trying to influence the decision-making process and instruct professional politicians about what they should do to contest the division of labor between the people and the political elite, thereby undermining the very foundations of elite democracy. Given the unwelcome place of political protest in elite democracy and its lack of theoretical tools to theorize the democratic value of protest and activism, it can’t see any democratic value in the emergent modes of politics in recent public sphere movements. At best, the elite approach to democracy would be silent when it comes to responding to new and creative ways public sphere movements use to stage their protest. Failing to recognize their democratic relevance, the creative forms of politics would be viewed as politically meaningless and worthless.

Deliberative Publics and the Difficult Case of Non-Deliberative Practices Deliberative democratic theory has a difficult and complex relationship with activism and protest. From Habermas’ earlier theorization of the discursive public sphere to recent iterations that are more sympathetic to non-deliberative modes of political activity, the normative ideals of deliberative theory limit the ways it can formulate the democratic value of political protest and activism. To theorize the democratic value of protest, the deliberative theorist should address the ineradicable tension between deliberative ideals and political protest by explaining how accommodating adversarial political activity does not undermine deliberative ideals or how it could promote deliberative goals. The former point is an expression of the deliberative worry about keeping deliberative settings rational, free of power and coercion; the latter is deliberative theorists’ response to possible unjust and harmful consequences of deliberation under non-ideal circumstances. Despite recent attempts to construe political protest and activism as valuable in advancing deliberative goals, I argue that due to the limitations of deliberative theory deliberative responses to political protest range between undesirable and contingently valuable. Deliberative democracy cannot attribute any genuine value to political protest and view it as an essential part of democracy. In 1964 Habermas wrote “laws that have obviously originated under the “pressure of streets” can scarcely continue to be understood in

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terms of consensus achieved by private persons in public discussion; they correspond, in more or less undisguised form, to compromises between conflicting private interests.”44 I believe the tension Habermas describes here between “pressure of streets” and “consensus achieved by private persons” accurately portrays how standard deliberative theory views political protest and activism. Understanding democratic politics as a collective decision-making process based on rational public discussion among equal and free individuals is the hallmark of deliberative democratic theory.45 Accordingly, political action is defined discursively as a process of exchange of reasons that aim at mutual understanding or consensus. This is where we can locate the origin of the thorny relationship between deliberative ideals and protest. To understand why deliberation has a privileged status in deliberative democracy and thus why stretching the limits of deliberative politics in order to include political protest is always a disputed matter, it is essential to focus on the way deliberative democracy views the connection between legitimacy and rationality. In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas expounds the thesis that under the condition of modern pluralistic societies in which collectively binding comprehensive doctrines—ethical, religious, or metaphysical— have disintegrated, legitimacy of political outcomes can only derive from the democratic procedure of opinion and will formation that secures rational outcomes.46 As Habermas describes it, through rational discussion the public sphere generates democratic opinion and enables collective will formation, which, in turn, channels the use of administrative power in the specific directions.47 Habermas notes that the legitimacy conferring power of the democratic procedure rests on the institutionalization of the corresponding forms of communication “under which the political process can be presumed to produce rational results because it operates deliberatively at all levels.”48 The assumption is that the deliberative political process is guided by the discourse principle—“just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons agree as participants in rational discourses” produce fair and reasonable outcomes.49 Within this democratic framework, the deliberative democratic process is understood in terms of the ideal procedure for deliberation and decisionmaking. Accordingly, ideal deliberation is to take the form of exchange of reasons, to be inclusive and public, “to grant equal communication rights for participants” such that everyone has the equal chance to introduce topics, to criticize or support a claim and to be heard, to

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require sincerity, and to be free of any external coercion.50 The goal of the procedural constraints is to make successful communication possible by excluding power and coercion, manipulation, and bracketing inequalities of status. As such, free and equal participants acting communicatively by aiming at mutual understanding can take an impartial standpoint and be moved only by “the forceless force of the better argument.”51 From the perspective of deliberative democracy, communicative reason “offers a guide for reconstructing the network of discourses that, aimed at forming opinions and preparing decisions, provides the matrix from which democratic authority emerges.”52 The aim of the deliberative political discourse is not to prescribe a particular political outcome, but to prescribe how participants should act in the political sphere and describe under what conditions the outcomes will have rational acceptability.53 The idea that legitimacy of political outcomes depends on the rationality of the democratic procedure is one of the central tenets of deliberative democracy. Once we affirm this connection and view the democratic process as a rational interaction between communicatively acting participants, there remains little room for attributing any positive democratic role to political protest and activism. The ideal of persuasion through the exchange of reasons is in direct conflict with political protest, which is expressive, oppositional, and confrontational. The deliberative ideal that rests on the “forceless force of the better argument” and aims to minimize coercion and power can hardly see any value in occupying public parks, marching in the streets, staging a “die-in” on a bridge that disrupts everyday traffic, or painting graffiti on public property since all these political activities imply coercion and express collective power to pressure political bodies to act in certain ways. Thus viewed, political protest remains external to the deliberative paradigm. This tension between deliberation and protest becomes especially intense given the central role Habermasian deliberative democracy assigns to the public sphere, and in particular weak publics that are placed at the periphery of the political system and viewed as the vehicle of public opinion.54 For Habermas, the weak public function as a sounding board for problems like “a warning system with sensors that, though unspecialized, are sensitive throughout society.”55 Weak publics are expected to convincingly and influentially thematize and dramatize neglected political issues so that parliamentary bodies recognize and consider them. Given the essential function of weak publics in deliberative democracy,

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one might expect deliberative theory to view political protest as an important part of the democratic process. Political protest and activism are effective means for bringing attention to issues invisible to the larger public and calling on the public and political bodies to address these issues. Yet, that is not a position deliberative theorists can comfortably endorse, at least not without modifying deliberative theory. Ultimately, the political public sphere is viewed as a site of deliberation and rational opinion formation and the deliberative approach is clear on the limitations and modes of communication that should be employed in the political public sphere.56 As such, once we approach recent political movements from the perspective of standard deliberative theory, the democratic value of the new forms of political action would be largely unnoticed. Singing in the square, reading books to the police, sweeping the occupied streets clean, and other creative political performances in public spaces are at best democratically irrelevant and thus have no democratic value. Disruptive, expressive, and confrontational political action and, in particular, the emergent forms of politics in recent protests would be viewed as an unfortunate part of democratic life that needs to be put up with. Reworking Deliberative Theory I Some proponents of deliberative democracy may object to the way I characterize deliberative theory’s approach to political protest by indicating that the Habermasian model is overly rationalistic and restrictive. For instance, John Dryzek notes that there is no need to restrict discursive democracy to the exchange of rational arguments. He maintains that political communication can be expanded so as to include other modes of communication such as testimony, performance, storytelling, and rhetoric.57 Similarly, Seyla Benhabib criticizes the way Habermas’ discursive model of public sphere “privileges rational speech over more evocative and rhetorical modes of public speech; and is prudish in that it minimizes the role of the body and the carnivalesque elements in public self-presentation.”58 She points out that these criticisms could be accommodated by formulating a less rationalistic version of the public sphere. The obvious difficulty for deliberative theorist then is to find a way to expand political communication beyond rational discourse without undermining the rationality of the discursive. At this point, Dryzek warns us

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about the coercive potential of non-rational modes of communication. To address this risk, he argues that admitted modes of communication should be “capable of inducing reflection,” non-coercive and “capable of linking particular experience of an individual group with some more general point or principle.”59 Benhabib’s worry is the possibility that a partial, affective, and situated mode of political action could induce arbitrariness, introduce power, and create capriciousness. To attain legitimacy, she concludes, the actions and policies of democratic institutions should be formulated in discursive language that “appeals to commonly shared and accepted public reasons.”60 Benhabib reminds us that both deliberations in public and articulation of reasons by democratic institutions should be governed by a moral ideal of impartiality understood as a regulative idea. In a similar way, Dryzek concludes, that whatever form of communication is admitted, they should be seen as supplements to rational argument, not as alternatives to it.61 The essential point is that despite their recognition of the need to expand political communication beyond deliberation, deliberative theorists can only attribute a limited democratic value to political protest and activism. Even when they are willing to accommodate non-deliberative modes of politics, and in particular political protest and activism, they have serious reservations about their corrosive effects on deliberative politics. The best they can offer is a deliberative yardstick to measure the democratic value of political protest and activism. Thus viewed, for instance, the emergent forms of protest in recent protest movements may be viewed as democratically valuable if they supplement the democratic process by inducing reflection on the issues excluded from the political agenda. Depending on the deliberative yardstick one prefers and how they view a specific political context, protest tactics may be characterized as worthless—or even harmful—or as supplementing deliberative practices and thus having limited value. Reworking Deliberative Theory II The two versions of the deliberative theory discussed so far show why deliberative theory has difficulty accommodating political protest. An important exception is advanced by deliberative theorists who turn their attention to “nonideal circumstances that characterize contemporary politics” and thus emphasize how non-deliberative practices could promote deliberation.62 I think within the deliberative democratic discourse this

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approach offers the most promising framework for adequately theorizing the role of political protest in democracy. This strand requires careful examination not only because it offers a more hospitable framework for political protest, but also because the way deliberative theorists rework standard deliberative theory reveals what really is at stake here for deliberative theory if it is to assign a significant place to political protest and activism. All versions of this strand of deliberative theory share the idea that circumstances of real world are not always conducive to successful deliberation. The main issue is that deliberation under conditions of inequality and power asymmetries reproduces the very social inequalities and power asymmetries that should be remedied to have successful deliberation.63 Deliberative theorists emphasize that in real-world politics deliberative arrangements may become a mechanism for legitimizing the institutions, procedures, and discourses that perpetuate injustice and deep wrongs.64 They propose political protest and activism as a possible cure. Bohman asserts that “deliberative inequalities” that persist in most public spheres and lead to deliberative failure can be corrected by means of collective action.65 Fung welcomes activism as “widespread inequality and failures of reciprocity can justify nonpersuasive, even coercive, methods for the sake of deliberative goals.”66 According to Fung’s “deliberative activism” in non-ideal circumstances citizens should “advance deliberation through persuasion when possible” but they need not limit their means to merely persuasion.67 Young argues that given that under conditions of structural inequality deliberative settings favor the powerful, it is not possible to address injustice and harm within deliberative settings. That’s why, Young notes, activists turn to oppositional and disruptive tactics such as picketing, guerrilla theaters, large street demonstrations, sit-ins, and so on in order to bring the pressure of collective action in direction of justice and exert power in the streets to bring about change.68 For Young, deliberative democrats should not be critical of activists’ tactics, on the contrary, a deliberative democrat may even join “the activist to protest outside exclusive and private deliberations.”69 Given the deliberative activist turn in deliberative theory, it seems that we finally have a deliberative theory that takes seriously the role of activism and protest in democracy. When we ask how valuable protest is for deliberative activism, however, we begin to see that despite giving an important role to protest in actually existing democracies, deliberative activists are not assigning a genuine democratic value to political protest.

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For the deliberative activist, activism has democratic value insofar as it makes institutions and situations “more hospitable to deliberative decision making.”70 The permissibility of non-deliberative action increases “as the conditions for deliberation deteriorate.”71 As Young puts it, the idea here is that deliberative theory should view protest and activism valuable when they work to “create open and inclusive deliberative settings.”72 Indeed, justifying non-persuasive and coercive political tactics is a remarkable deviation from the norms of ideal discourse even if it is merely defended for the sake of deliberative goals. But, this surprising shift should not obscure the fact that despite the significant difference between the deliberative activist approach and the standard deliberative approach, there is no disagreement or ambiguity when the issue at stake is the democratic ideal. As far as deliberative democrats are concerned, the discursive public sphere reflects the democratic ideal and ideal democratic action is deliberation. The deliberative activist position may justify non-deliberative political practices in non-ideal circumstances, but ultimately deliberative activism is deliberative first. As such, it affirms the privileged place of deliberation in democracy as politics proper and reproduces the hierarchy between deliberative and non-deliberative modes of politics. Within this framework, protest and activism have a place in democracy only because they might be capable of promoting deliberative goals in non-ideal contexts. They are still viewed as politics improper and yet, ironically, they are permissible and even necessary to correct deliberative inequalities and asymmetries of power. It follows that political protest and activism does not have any value in a democracy other than improving conditions for deliberation. In an ideal deliberative democracy, the deliberative activist would cease to support protest and activism and reject their permissibility. The standard deliberative view that construes non-deliberative modes of politics as an unfortunate fact of democratic life returns, but this version of deliberative theory upgrades the democratic status of protest and activism as they are convenient tools for paving the way for deliberation. Here we are offered another deliberative yardstick to measure the democratic value of protest and activism. Seen in this light, for instance, it can be argued that the creative tactics used by OWS or BLM or Gezi Park Protesters have democratic value if they generate sufficient pressures to rectify deliberative inequalities and bring about conditions of fair deliberation. The creative and disruptive tactics used by activists are permissible and meaningful insofar as they act like deliberative activists. I have some serious doubts that advancing deliberative goals capture

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the main intentions of political activists or that this approach adequately describes their political experiences.73 More importantly, it seems that in situations where activists’ goals are not to advance deliberative ends or they fail to support deliberative outcomes, their actions would be democratically valueless in which case their political tactics would be undesirable and lose permissibility. What should be emphasized here is that by recreating the hierarchy between deliberative and non-deliberative politics and assigning the latter a contingent value, this approach ends up reproducing the dominant view that activism and protest are politics improper. The contingent value of activism and protest and the ambiguity of the deliberative yardstick provide the powerful agents with the means to exploit the deliberative yardstick and marginalize protesters and represent them as unreasonable and anti-democratic. In the non-ideal world characterized by structural inequalities and power asymmetries powerful agents have the means to use such tools to discredit their critics and protect their privilege. It is not clear how one would measure the efficiency of protest in producing deliberative outcomes, but the powerful would welcome the opportunity to condemn activists and represent them as unreasonable troublemakers whose tactics have nothing to do with democracy and, in particular, with promoting deliberative ends. Clearly, this is not their intention, but deliberative theorists provide powerful political agents with resources to be used to delegitimize political protest. In this strand of deliberative theory, we see yet another failed attempt to understand the democratic value of protest.74

Contingent Agonism of Recent Deliberative Theory What is striking here is the great lengths deliberative theorists go to accommodate political protest and activism. First, they downplay the worries expressed by Dryzek and Benhabib about how power, emotion, and coercion undermine the rationality and thus the legitimacy of the democratic process. Deliberative activists don’t deny that protest and activism are coercive and non-persuasive, but they accommodate oppositional and expressive modes of politics by pointing out that deliberation takes place in a world that is already marked by structural inequalities and asymmetries of power. In justifying non-persuasive and coercion, the

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deliberative activist approach departs sharply from the standard deliberative theory. Second, they minimize the practical applicability of deliberative democracy. Bohman maintains that “the fact of large inequalities of social and cultural resources seems to make deliberation an impossible ideal for modern societies.”75 Young notes that deliberative theory should be viewed only as the critical theory that “exposes the exclusions and constrains in supposed fair processes of actual decision making,” rather than an ideal that should be put into practice in the constitution of political procedures.76 It is precisely because deliberation always takes place in the real world already marked by structural inequalities and asymmetries of power that deliberation loses its practical relevance. This version of deliberative theory assigns a democratic function to protest and activism, but it seems that the cost is too high for deliberative theory. Recognizing the limitations of deliberation, theorists invite agonistic elements into their theory. Yet, they cannot fully embrace agonism as they cling on to deliberative ideals. Thus, they are stuck between deliberative ideals and agonistic realities. This is most obvious in Iris Young’s reluctant agonism. Young acknowledges the ineradicable tension between deliberation and activism while refusing to dissolve the tension in favor of deliberative ideals. She reminds us that although these two modes of politics cannot occur together and the dissonance between them does not dissolve, we should affirm the value of both without prioritizing one over the other. She emphasizes that deliberative theory could assign value to activism as a necessary and effective tool in challenging structural inequality.77 But, she avoids reducing the value of activism to promoting deliberative ends as she argues that activism has a democratic function that deliberative democrats fail to understand. Her point is that shifting our focus from the realization of normative requirements of deliberation in existing democracies to the terms and content of deliberations provides us with a different view of the political landscape. For her, this shift in focus by bringing to the fore “the phenomenon of hegemony or systematically distorted discourses” reveals why activism has a democratic value other than promoting deliberative ends.78 What especially troubles Young is that since the idea of hegemony is outside of deliberative theory, the deliberative approach lacks the tools to address the idea of false or distorted agreement. Consequently, the deliberative perspective cannot thematize the value of oppositional and disruptive action in contesting the terms of discourse. It is not surprising that Young theorizes

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the public sphere as rowdy, playful, and disorderly and views confrontational, disruptive, expressive, and emotional action as a significant part of the democratic struggle. The result is a deliberative theory that offers a better framework for understanding the place of oppositional and disruptive action in a democracy than other deliberative approaches. To be sure, Young tames the agonistic elements in her theory by advancing a norm of “reasonableness.” The reasonable citizen, Young describes, “is obliged to try to persuade others of the justice of his or her claims.”79 Protest and activism are valuable to the extent that they are motivated by justice and aim to persuade and communicate specific ideas to the public.80 In doing so, Young offers another deliberative yardstick albeit one that seems more inclusive. My point is not that Young’s theory fully grasps the value of protest, rather that only by expanding the boundaries of deliberative theory in a way that includes ideas such as hegemony that Young can make the claim that without political protest and activism “democracy is insipid and weak.”81 I believe that Young is quite right to highlight the idea of hegemony. As I discuss in the next section, to understand the democratic value of political protest, and in particular the creative modes of politics, it is crucial to approach them from an agonistic perspective that takes seriously the idea of hegemony. The significant question here is what aspects of deliberative theory Young has to revise so that she can theorize the democratic role of protest and activism. Hegemony, coercion, power, and politics as struggle are among the key ideas of the agonistic approach and not the terms that are compatible with a deliberative account of politics. As it seems to me, when Young reconstitutes some key aspects of deliberative theory, she transforms it into a version of agonistic politics. This is precisely why Benhabib and Dryzek are critical of Young’s deliberative approach. Stressing how similar Young’s theory is to an agonistic account, Dryzek criticizes Young for pushing deliberative democracy toward that direction.82 Young doesn’t completely abandon the deliberative framework, but she is aware that she cannot fully embrace political protest and activism without sacrificing the privileged place of deliberation in deliberative theory and theorizing the public sphere agonistically.83 Young’s reluctant agonism shows what really is at stake for deliberative theory when the issue is to theorize why political protest and activism have a significant role to play in democracy. To formulate the democratic meaning and value of protest, Young had to modify the core of deliberative theory in

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such a way that it looks very agonistic. It is not that deliberative democrats do not reflect on the role of protest and activism, rather the limits of the theory and practice of deliberative theory allow them to offer a very limited place to protest and activism in democracy.

Hegemony and Agonism The two mainstream accounts of democratic politics I’ve examined so far do not help us understand the essential role of political protest and make sense of the democratic role of creative forms of politics. Schumpeter views active citizenship as a potential risk for democracy, and for that reason he advances a democratic politics that minimizes the role of citizens. It would be odd to expect the elite model to assign any significant democratic value to protest and activism. The deliberative theory, however, has evolved into an approach that aims to take seriously the role of oppositional and disruptive political activity. Unlike elite democracy that rejects the democratic role of protest outright, the deliberative perspective is at pains to accommodate protest and activism. And, yet the normative core of deliberative theory limits the value that theorists could assign to protest and activism. In failing to offer an adequate account of political protest both theories fail to capture an essential dimension of democratic life. That’s also why they both fail to recognize in what ways recent political movements and creative forms of politics that emerged in them are democratically valuable. If we are serious about recognizing the place of protest and activism in democracy and we are willing to understand the democratic relevance of the new political performances staged in recent protests, we should approach them from an agonistic perspective. Since I’ve already delineated the main ideas of agonistic democratic theory in the first two chapters, here I mainly focus on the concept of hegemony and the role of identity and passions in politics to illustrate how the agonistic perspective changes the way we view the place of protest and activism. The concept of hegemony is central to Mouffe’s anti-essentialist perspective. One of Laclau and Mouffe’s key contributions to democratic theory is the way they rework Gramsci’s concept of hegemony so as to detach it from class essentialism of Marxist thought and propose it as the primary organizing principle of the social. What is at stake here is the constitution of social reality. The main idea, as Mouffe notes, is that “reality is not given to us; meaning is always constructed. There is no

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meaning that is just essentially given to use; there is no essence to the social, it is always constructed.”84 The social order is simply the domain of sedimented political practices that are themselves shaped by relations of power.85 Society is “the product of a series of hegemonic practices whose aim is to establish order in a context of contingency.”86 In defining hegemony as a constitutive logic, Laclau and Mouffe break away from the tradition of political philosophy that represents hegemony in negative terms as something like ideology and false consciousness. For Laclau and Mouffe, since there is no meaning or truth outside of discursive contexts, the idea of false consciousness does not make sense. And a politics of truth that aims to overcome hegemony misses the point that one hegemony can only be replaced with another one as there is no outside to hegemonic construction. Put differently, there is no innocent discourse that captures the truth that manifests deeper objectivity.87 As Mouffe indicates, “all systems of social relations imply to certain extent relations of power.”88 Therefore, every order is political and an expression of a specific pattern of power relations. Mouffe and Laclau’s hegemony centered perspective radically changes the way we view the nature of politics and political action. First, the traditional conception of politics that designates the political system as the most important site of politics and focuses on public policy and decisionmaking is replaced with a broad notion of politics that focuses on the constitution of the society. Given that the category of hegemony includes every aspect of the social order, it is not possible to separate the social as a completely distinct realm from the political.89 Politics is ubiquitous and political sites are diffused across the surface of the social.90 The subject of politics exceeds public policy and decision-making and includes the norms, values, meanings, assumptions, and identities that constitute the political order. Political activity takes place where hegemony is constructed or unsettled including everyday social interactions and engagements as well as micropolitics of identity.91 A democratic politics that only focuses on issues of institutional politics would inevitably neglect the more fundamental political questions about the broader context within which institutional politics takes place.92 Second, given the nature of hegemony, what we recognize is the inevitability of exclusion and violence. Here we see that hegemonic articulations are Janus-faced. Without hegemonic practices meaning and social order is not possible, thus hegemony is always constructive. We depend on settlements and commonalities to make sense of the world and create

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meaning. And in that sense, settlements are unavoidable, necessary, and essential to human life.93 But, hegemony is “predicated on the exclusion of other possibilities.”94 In creating order, hegemony fixes meaning, structures society, and excludes alternatives. As Connolly puts it, each settlement contains “subjugations and cruelties within it.”95 This is the necessary violence of hegemony. The sedimented practices that constitute the social order “conceal the originary acts of their contingent political institution.”96 Hegemony constitutes what appears to us as the natural order at a given moment. That’s why, Mouffe notes, hegemony entails “the mutual collapse of objectivity and power.”97 What follows is that in any society there will be those excluded and marginalized since hegemony favors certain values, standards, and identities while inevitably determining the range of “acceptable” interpretations of the terms of the political discourse. The issue is that if the settlements that constitute social order sediment and, as Mouffe states, they are “taken for granted, as if they were self-grounded,” the exclusions of the hegemonic order would be too rigid.98 It follows from this that an important aspect of political activity is to reveal the contingent nature of the seemingly apolitical hegemonic articulations and contest the common sense that reproduces a particular account of reality. Only by exposing the contingency of naturalizations and contesting social patterns of representation, deeply entrenched values, and standards of judgment that shape the common sense and inform everyday practices, it is possible to address the violence of hegemony and prevent permanent closure.99 This is why the agonistic perspective views democracy as a process of democratization. Third, it follows from all this that politics is understood as a struggle. Since “every social order is the result of the temporary and precarious articulation of contingent practices, hegemony is never complete.”100 This means that it is possible to disarticulate sedimented practices and rearticulate an alternative hegemonic formation. To be hegemonic, “one form of power has to repress the other possibilities,” but the excluded possibilities can always be reactivated and form new articulations of power and install a new form of hegemony.101 Therefore, every existing order is vulnerable and susceptible to being challenged. The crucial point is that hegemony is contestable and reversible. Therefore, conflict and antagonism are intrinsic to any social order and counter-hegemonic forces introduce a serious threat to dominant hegemony. To clarify, the aim of hegemony struggle is not to overcome hegemony as such, which is an impossibility, but to install another form of hegemony. It is possible to

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disarticulate hegemonic practices and install another hegemonic formation, but it is not possible to do away with hegemony.102 So, hegemony struggle is not about unveiling “true reality” by overcoming hegemony, rather it is about the struggle among different hegemonic formations to shape the common sense. This struggle consists of the disarticulation of sedimentations of the hegemonic order and the rearticulation of an alternative hegemonic formation by “establishing the nodal points of a new hegemonic social formation.”103 Thus, fundamentally politics denotes the struggle between alternative hegemonic formations over the shaping of the social order and the common sense that accompanies it. Fourth, the hegemony perspective brings to the fore the importance of collective identities and the place of passions in politics. For Mouffe, this is one of the significant differences between her account of politics and the rationalistic framework that elite and deliberative models of democracies rely on. What the rationalist approaches to politics miss when they view democratic politics as a matter of individual interest or exchange of reasons is the constructed nature of identity. The central idea is that there are “no essential identities, but only forms of identifications.”104 This means that the social agent is constituted by forms of identification and the identity of the subject cannot be considered as the expression of a true self waiting to be actualized. Put differently, the subject is constructed by an ensemble of “subject positions” that are themselves discursively constructed. The identity of a subject is then dependent on specific forms of identifications that are temporarily fixed. In that sense, the identity of the subject is always contingent and unstable.105 Once we view identities as discursively constructed, we recognize that an important part of politics is the constitution of collective identifications. Given that the subject is the expression of a plurality of subject positions, the availability of subject positions, how they are constructed, and how they relate to other differences become the focal point of politics.106 The formation of collective identifications includes the political mobilization of a certain type of affects.107 Affect, Mouffe notes, “provides the motor for political action.”108 Identifying with a particular subject position shapes the way people view social reality and create specific beliefs, desires, and fantasies. When we talk about “leftwing,” “right-wing,” “progressives,” “conservatives,” “extremists,” so on, we refer to a particular way of viewing the political world and a particular affective investment. This affective energy is malleable and can be oriented in multiple directions. At the heart of democratic politics lies

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the struggle between hegemonic projects over people’s allegiance forged by means of their identification with a particular conception of collective identity corresponding to a hegemonic project.109

Agonistic Politics and the Centrality of Political Protest in Democracy What follows from these reflections is the significance of oppositional and disruptive political practices in democratic politics. Viewed from an agonistic perspective at the most fundamental level democratic political practice is adversarial as politics is mainly about the struggle between hegemonic positions which entails contesting and disarticulating existing hegemonic practices and rearticulating an alternative hegemonic project to replace hegemonic distribution of power.110 Within this framework oppositional and disruptive political practices have an essential place as they expose the naturalizations of the hegemonic order and unsettle the common sense, contribute to the construction of new collective identities and mobilize people, and express unimagined and unrecognized possibilities. In that sense, oppositional and disruptive political practices, and, in particular, political protest and activism as forms of adversarial politics, are not merely supplements to democracy or an unfortunate fact of democratic life, but rather they are integral to democratic life itself. From an agonistic perspective, democracy cannot function without agonistic spaces. Political protest and activism are effective means for creating agonistic spaces. Hence, the significant place of political protest and activism in agonistic form of democracy. It should be clarified that the democratic value of protest and activism cannot be reduced to how they influence the common sense and the broader society. When we view protest and activism from an agonistic perspective, we highlight the politics of the long-term over immediate political consequences. Hegemonic politics refers to a longterm struggle. The formation of an oppositional project and undoing hegemonic power is a process that doesn’t happen overnight. It doesn’t follow from this that trying to bring about immediate change by way of grabbing the attention of the public and putting pressure on political authorities do not matter. Political protest as collective display of power is an effective means for influencing decision-makers and policy outcomes and producing short-term results. Although such wins and losses are important, these should be seen as individual battles in an

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ongoing struggle for hegemony. This is not to overlook the significance of short-term political results, rather to emphasize the significant value of long-term influence on the social imaginary and the hegemonic context. It is important to protest police violence against Black people, but it is also important to transform structural racism that represents Black people as dangerous while contesting policing norms that allow the police to deploy lethal force too easily. One is about challenging a particular instance of hegemonic power while the other is about challenging the hegemonic discourses that authorize violent actions and make them look acceptable and legitimate.111 The key point is that both struggles are essential to agonistic democratic politics.112 If we understand political protest only in terms of its immediate influence on policy-making and political authorities, we would be missing something essential about the role of activism and political protest and why they matter in democratic life. It is the hegemonic social that shapes the limits of political intelligibility and acceptability and determines whether a particular issue or demand will be judged as meaningful, reasonable, and agreeable. Political protest and activism contribute to counter-hegemonic struggles that aim to bring about change by contesting, disrupting, and transforming the settlements of the existing social order. What is at stake here is the dissemination of opposing discourses and contestation of dominant representations, perspectives, and norms that shape the broader context within which political struggle is being waged. By situating political protest within the framework of hegemony struggle, the agonistic perspective helps us make sense of the democratic value of protest and offers a better framework to understand the nature of the democratic political activity. The agonistic approach reveals why a democracy without protest and activism can’t be a healthy democracy and why it should be seen as a dangerous utopia. When a society excludes and suppresses oppositional and disruptive political practices, not only the settlements of the social order sediment which naturalizes its remainders, but also it will not be possible to democratically mobilize passions which weakens the democratic character of the regime. That’s why for agonistic democrats opposition and conflict is not a sign of imperfection, but rather an expression of a healthy democratic life.113 Given the hegemonic nature of the social order and the inevitability of exclusion and power, it is only natural to expect people to protest which, in turn, deepens democracy.

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Thus viewed, the absence of political protest and activism in a democracy should be seen as a sign of political repression or strong hegemony both of which indicate that there is something deeply alarming about the nature of society.114

Recent Protest Movements from an Agonistic Perspective I’ve suggested that as opposed to the elite and deliberative forms of democracy, the agonistic approach views political protest and activism as essential moments of democratic activity. The two mainstream forms of democracy end up characterizing political protest as outside of ideal democratic life, meaningless and worthless, or at best, having limited value assuming that they further deliberative ends. Once we establish that the agonistic framework allows us to make sense of the meaning and value of political protest and activism, we can turn to the question of how the agonistic perspective changes the way we view the recent public sphere movements and the creative forms of politics that are central to these movements. By viewing democracy as a struggle over the hegemonic constitution of the society, the agonistic perspective shifts our attention from institutional politics to the more fundamental political issue of disarticulation of hegemonic practices and articulation of alternative ones.115 Seen in this light, it becomes clear that by unsettling the elements of common sense and disclosing the possibility of an alternative social organization, political protest and activism play a significant role in fostering oppositional identities and developing counter-hegemonic alternatives.116 It is from this perspective that the recent public sphere movements and the new creative forms of politics can be viewed as attempts to create the conditions for agonistic confrontation. They encourage people to question current hegemony and propose an alternative democratic order that is more pluralistic, inclusive, and democratic. In addition to using conventional methods of protest, the new political movements used creative forms of expression to voice their dissatisfaction with the status quo and stage their alternative vision of democratic society and citizenship in public spaces. Within this context, the aim of this type of performative and disruptive politics is not merely to influence electoral results or political decision-making, but to constitute a language of resistance and counter-acting and create political spaces for the emergence of new subjectivities. Ultimately, they

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contribute to de-identification with the existing hegemonic order and to the construction of an oppositional collective identity necessary to unite and mobilize the people. Viewed from an agonistic perspective the organizational structure of recent public sphere movements gains a significant democratic meaning.117 The Occupy Movement, the Indignados, Gezi Protests, and DANS with me in Bulgaria were organized by ordinary citizens who argued that democratic institutions fail to represent them. The protesters expressed the point that the political system is controlled by the political and economic elite and political parties cater to the interests of the wealthy, privileged and powerful. Refusing ordinary people a political voice, existing political institutions serve to maintain the status quo. To challenge the hegemony of democracy in its representative form and to show the possibility of an alternative democratic order the protesters organized horizontally, rejected leadership, and opened spaces for equal and inclusive participation. They contested existing democratic institutions by enacting an alternative form of democratic organization and citizenship. They didn’t just occupy public spaces, but they also organized the protest camps in such a way that showed the public what existing democracies were lacking. The protesters set up democratic assemblies in the occupied spaces and local neighborhoods which became sites for political discussion and democratic engagement. In these forums, every participant could express their views and join the political dialogue. The regulating norms were equality, openness, transparency, and inclusion: the qualities existing democratic institutions lacked.118 The aim of these democratic forums was to keep the spaces of everyday politics open for participation and expression and to demonstrate the possibility of a more inclusive and participatory democracy. Participants in these movements “wanted to create a consciousness and to show how things could be different.”119 In that sense, the very organization of the protest camp should be viewed as a political act that contributes “to a growing de-identification with the present order” and to the formation of oppositional subjectivities.120 I believe the way the protest camp model has functioned in recent public sphere movements is very similar to Mouffe’s description of Alfredo Jaar’s artistic interventions. Mouffe notes that Jaar’s creative work aims to unsettle common sense by posing apparently simple questions formulated “to trigger reflections that will arouse discontent with the current state of things.”121 Abandoning the authoritative mode of address, this type of creative intervention could “interpellate people by

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setting in motion a process that will make them questions their unexamined beliefs.”122 I think the same can be said about the creative protest forms used in recent public sphere movements. In performing their protest on the public stage, the protesters made the public aware of alternative ways of democratic existence, thereby encouraging them to question the naturalness of existing political institutions. In that sense, they should be viewed as agonistic interventions that aim to contest dominant understandings and mobilize people by creating a desire for change. The agonistic perspective brings to light the democratic relevance of many seemingly apolitical activities. The autonomous infrastructure at OWS and Gezi Park and the creation of communal life, the cooperative interactions between the Christians and the Muslims in Tahrir Square, the festival-like atmosphere in DANS with me and people coming to the protest after work with babies and strollers gain a new democratic meaning that cannot be recognized by traditional notions of democratic politics. Rejecting the militant factionalism that dominates the political landscape, the everyday interactions of the protesters offered a new source of democratic inspiration that fostered civility, inclusivity, and tolerance. Determined to challenge the politics of hatred and demonization and to offer an alternative, the protesters performed their vision of society by transforming public spaces into political stages “for the rehearsal of new forms of citizenship.”123 Practices such as demonstrating with flowers in hand, reading books to the police and offering them water, sweeping the square clean at the end of day are examples of fostering the language of peace, civility, and tolerance while rejecting the tactics of politics of antagonism that characterized the protesters as an extremist mob. Thus viewed, doing yoga in the occupied square, offering free lectures, staging political theater in public are not futile or apolitical activities, rather they are political practices that enact the core values of an alternative democratic vision and contribute to the constitution of a new collective identification that is more democratic, inclusive, and egalitarian. At stake here is the very possibility of subverting the dominant hegemony by way of performing an alternative order and creating spaces for the development of an agonistic project. It is not surprising then that failing to recognize that by staging an alternative vision of democratic existence, protesters were contributing to the development of an oppositional democratic project, many commentators and politicians questioned the democratic relevance and efficacy of this new form of protest.124

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In the same vein, approaching the creative tactics used in the Black Lives Matter protests from an agonistic perspective allows us to view them as innovative ways to subvert the hegemonic White power and construct a collective identity that is anti-racist at its core. For instance, as Yoganathan shows, the tactic of standing right in front of the police and staring into their eyes unflinchingly is an act of resistance and refusal to accept police intimidation. This persistent eye contact is a political tactic that aims to subvert the hegemonic power that historically defined Black people’s eye contact with the police as a provocative act with possible lethal consequences.125 Another tactic of subversion used throughout several BLM protests is the “Mirror Casket” Project. It is a sculpture and performance created in response to the death of Michael Brown. As defined by its creators, its aim is “to evoke reflection and empathy for the deaths of young people of color who have lost their lives unjustly in the United States and worldwide.”126 The community members carried a mirrored coffin from Brown’s death site to the police department in order to challenge the viewers “to look within and see their reflections as both whole and shattered, as both solution and problem, as both victim and aggressor.”127 One of the most commonly used protest form in BLM protests was “die-in.” BLM protesters have used “die-ins” as a form of protest to remind the public how many Black people die every year due to unnecessary police violence. The protesters simulate being dead by lying down on the ground—a bridge, highway, rail tracks, public square or a park, basketball court, and so on—as if they are dead and staying completely silent for a while in order to disrupt the routine of everyday life and draw attention to police killings of Black people. Finally, the night-time projection of George Floyd’s hologram on the statue of Robert E. Lee in Richmond is a significant symbolic expression of resistance and subversion of hegemonic power. The statue of the Confederate general which had already been covered with graffiti and phrases such as “Stop White Supremacy” was used as a public screen onto which an image of George Floyd’s head and shoulders projected. The stated aim of the project is to transform public spaces dominated by racist symbols into a message of hope and solidarity.128 Seen from the perspective of hegemonic struggle, “The George Floyd Hologram Memorial Project” is a call to continue to fight for racial justice. Given the violent and racist history the monument represents, it is a symbolic show of power that undermines the Confederate monument’s ability to promote White supremacy and intimidate Black People.129

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Such creative forms of protests should be seen as part of counterhegemonic struggles that aim to disrupt White supremacy and install an alternative hegemony that is not defined by whiteness. Through their creative political activities BLM protesters reveal the violence of systemic racism and how systemic racism operates by naturalizing whiteness and defining non-Whites as the Other. In doing so, the creative politics of BLM contributes to the constitution of a collective identity that is defined in terms of anti-racism and committed to subverting White supremacy. Uniting people around the common goal of actively opposing and countering systemic racism and oppression, the BLM has successfully mobilized passions politically and formed an anti-racist political movement. Moving an anti-racist political project from the margins of U.S. politics to the center, they have contributed significantly to the development of a genuine agonistic alternative. As such, the BLM protests and the creative political tactics activists employed have been a significant part of the formation of an anti-racist project that contests the existing hegemonic order.

Conclusion Understanding democracy in terms of an agonistic struggle over the hegemonic organization of society, the agonistic perspective sheds light on the democratic meaning of creative forms of protest that are central to recent public sphere movements and how they are politically relevant and democratically valuable. Viewed from this perspective, protest movements such as OWS, BLM, the Indignados, and Gezi Park, and the creative forms of protests emerged in these movements should be seen as agonistic interventions that aim to unsettle the common sense, contribute to the emergence of oppositional collective identifications, and mobilize passions politically. They create political spaces for the development of agonistic projects thereby making possible a genuine agonistic struggle. It doesn’t follow from this that political protest and activism can bring about the end of a hegemonic order. As Mouffe rightly emphasizes the hegemonic struggle requires a synergy between different forms of agonistic interventions including extra-parliamentary struggles and parliamentary struggles. The political consciousness that arises from public sphere movements should find institutional expression so as to effectively transform power relations and “the configuration of power within the institutional framework.”130 In the absence of such an alliance, the transformative potential

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of political protest will be “drastically weakened.” That’s why while recognizing the role of struggles outside traditional institutions, it is important to recognize the significance of agonistic engagement with institutions. It should also be emphasized that Mouffe’s elaboration of the value of extra-parliamentary struggles is most critical and concludes with a warning about their inability to provide a substitute for representative institutions.131 She clearly acknowledges the democratic value of protest and activism and yet she seems to prioritize parliamentary struggles over the extra-parliamentary struggles.132 She views parliamentary struggles as the main focus of agonistic politics as she designates the parliamentary space as the proper space for agonistic confrontation.133 And, political struggles and activism outside institutional politics are “valuable for enriching democracy.”134 Indeed, I believe Mouffe is quite right to emphasize the significance of engaging with political institutions and the risks of dismissing their role in transforming hegemony. But, as I have argued in this chapter, political protest and activism have a more essential role to play in agonistic politics. While arguing for the key role of political institutions, Mouffe does not seem to pay sufficient attention to the centrality of political protest and activism in agonistic democracy. To bring political protest and activism from the margins of democracy to the center, it is important to clearly emphasize that without political protest and activism democracy cannot be healthy. Protest and activism are not politics improper, rather they are essential parts of democracy. And to reveal the democratic value and meaning of political protest and activism and to understand why they are essential to democracy, we should approach them from an agonistic perspective.

Notes 1. This chapter is a rewritten and much expanded version of my “Democracy and the Square: Recognizing the Democratic Value of Recent Public Sphere Movements,” Essays in Philosophy 16, no. 1 (2015), 26–42. My description of recent political movements in section 1 follows my account in “Democratic Potential of Creative Political Protest,” Critical Studies: International Journal of Humanities 3 (Fall 2017), 20–31. 2. See, Jane M. Drexler and Michael Hames-Garcia, “Disruption and Democracy: Challenges to Consensus and Communication,” The Good Society 13, no. 2 (2004), 56–60. 3. Although such regulations should be “content neutral”, in real politics what we often see is that they are based on the opinions expressed

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5. 6. 7.

8.

9.

10. 11.

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and the political affiliation of the protesters. For instance, in Colorado Springs the police successfully tracked down all BLM protesters after they staged a protest on a highway blocking traffic and yet “they issued no citations to people at ‘stop the Steal’ protests, which blocked traffic during post-election unrest.” See Lance Benzel, “Judge Tosses Case Against BLM Protester Who Blocked I-25, Citing Free Speech,” The Gazette, November 3, 2021, https://gazette.com/premium/judge-tos ses-case-against-blm-protester-who-blocked-i-25-citing-free-speech/art icle_60436446-b596-11eb-a676-7f597c0e5c14.html. See Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Chapters 2 and 3; Iris Marion Young, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy,” Political Theory 29, no. 5 (2011), 675–676. See Larry Bogad, Tactical Performance: The Theory and Practice of Serious Play (New York: Routledge, 2016), 148. Ella Myers, Worldly Ethics: Democratic Politics and Care for the World (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 148 and especially fn26. Bogad, Tactical Performance, 148 and 162. Donatella Della Porto points out that what makes violent confrontation even more likely and protest more intense is the perceived external aggression “described by protesters as an act of war against a peaceful community.” She adds that this feeling forces “the community to join the front-line.” Donatella Della Porta, “Eventful Protest, Global Conflicts,” Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 9, no. 2 (2008), 19. As Bogad points out while activists are trying to tell a story with their actions and “fight the battle of the story,” things can all-too easily degenerate into the story of the battle. See Bogad, Tactical Performance, 148 and 162. Mike E. Warren, “What Should We Expect from More Democracy?: Radically Democratic Responses to Politics,” Political Theory 24, no. 2 (1996), 241–270. See also Young, Inclusion and Democracy, Chapter 2. Young, Activist Challenges, 675–676. See for instance, Peter Baker, “In days of Discord, a President Fans the Flames,” The New York Times, July 15, 2020, https://www.nyt imes.com/2020/05/30/us/politics/trump-george-floyd-protests.html? action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage; Safia Samee Ali, “‘Not by Accident’: False ‘Thug’ Narratives Have Long Been Used to Discredit Civil Rights Movements,” NBC News, September 27, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/not-accident-false2020, thug-narratives-have-long-been-used-discredit-n1240509; John Buell, “Occupy Wall Street’s Democratic Challenge,” Theory and Event 14,

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12.

13.

14. 15.

16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

29.

no. 4 (2011), http://doi.org/10.1353/tae.2011.0066; Nilufer Göle, “Gezi: Anatomy of a Public Space Movement,” Insight Turkey 15, no. 3 (2013), 7–14. I share John Medearis’ view here. See John Medearis, Why Democracy Is Oppositional? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 15–52. See also my “Democracy and the Square: Recognizing the Democratic Value of Recent Public Sphere Movements.” Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui, and Jugal K. Patel, “Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History,” The New York Times, July 3, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/ george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html. Göle, “Gezi: Anatomy of a Public Space Movement,” 12. Ilay Romain Örs, “Genie in the Bottle: Gezi Park, Taksim Square, and the Realignment of Democracy and Space in Turkey,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 40, no. 4 (2014), 7. Barry L. Gan, Violence and Nonviolence: An Introduction (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013), 94. Jeffrey C. Goldfarb, “Reflections on the Protests in Bulgaria,” accessed December 11, 2021, http://www.deliberatelyconsidered.com/2013/ 07/reflections-on-the-protests-in-bulgaria/. “Bulgaria’s ‘Dance with Me’ Protests,” Al Jazeera News Report, June 20, 2013, http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/201306202341-0022849. Nilufer Göle, “Public Space Democracy,” Eurozine, July 29, 2013, https://www.eurozine.com/public-space-democracy/. “8 Years Strong,” Black Lives Matter: Home, July 13, 2021, https://bla cklivesmatter.com/six-years-strong/. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1942). For some recent discussions of Schumpeter’s theory, see Sean Ingham, “Popular Rule in Schumpeter’s Democracy,” Political Studies 64, no. 4 (2015), 1071–1087; Gerry Mackie, “Schumpeter’s Leadership Democracy,” Political Theory 37, no. 1 (February 2009), 128–153. What Schumpeter calls the classical doctrines looks like a caricatured mix of Rousseau and Bentham. See Ingham, “Popular Rule in Schumpeter’s Democracy,” 1072. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 250. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 251. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 251. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 251. For instance, we might agree that health is desirable and “yet people would still disagree on vaccination and vasectomy.” See, Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 252. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 252.

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30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

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Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 253. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 262. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 262. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 257. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 262. For an alternative account of Schumpeter’s democracy see John Medearis, Joseph Schumpeter’s Two Theories of Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001). Medearis argues that Schumpeter offers two accounts of democracy—the transformational account and the elitist account— and the transformational account is neglected in favor of the elitist one reducing Schumpeter’s democracy to the latter. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 260. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 283. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 263. That’s why, Schumpeter concludes, “the psycho-technics of party management and party advertising, slogans and marching tunes,” and the political boss form the essence of politics.” Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 283. Medearis, Why Democracy Is Oppositional?, 31. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 295. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 283. See also Medearis, Why Democracy Is Oppositional?, 32. Medearis, Joseph Schumpeter’s Two Theories of Democracy, 105–106. As Medearis rightly observes, Schumpeter’s critique of the classical model undermines “any basis for crediting the agency of democratic movements.” See, Medearis, Why Democracy Is Oppositional?, 33. Jürgen Habermas, “Public Sphere,” in Jürgen Habermas on Society and Politics: A Reader, ed. Steven Seidman (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), 235. Seyla Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,” in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 69–70. Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 121; Jürgen Habermas, “On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy,” in The Inclusion of the Other, ed. Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999), 255. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 360; See also Jürgen Habermas, “Three Normative Models of Democracy,” in The Inclusion of the Other, ed. Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999), 239–253. Habermas, “Three Normative Models of Democracy,” 246.

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49. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 107. 50. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 305–306; Jürgen Habermas, “Introduction,” Ratio Juris 12, no. 4 (1999), 332. The deliberative public sphere described here is characterized by the ideal speech situation that Habermas advanced in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. See Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S. W. Nicholson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 88–89. 51. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 88–89. 52. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 5. 53. Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,” 72. 54. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 307. Fraser defines weak publics as “publics whose deliberative practice consists exclusively in opinion formation and does not encompass decision-making” whereas strong publics “encompasses both opinion formation and decision making.” Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: The MIT Press), 134. 55. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 359. 56. Jürgen Habermas, “Popular Sovereignty as Procedure,” in Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, ed. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 58–59. 57. John Dryzek, “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia,” Political Theory 33, no. 2 (April 2005), 224. 58. Benhabib shares Nancy Fraser’s criticism of Habermas. See Seyla Benhabib, “Models of Public Sphere: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jürgen Habermas,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), 118fn43. 59. Dryzek, “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia,” 224. 60. Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,” 83. 61. John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 5. 62. Archon Fung, “Deliberation Before the Revolution: Toward an Ethics of Deliberative Democracy in an Unjust World,” Political Theory 33, no. 2 (June 2005), 398. 63. James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), 112. 64. Iris Marion Young, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy,” Political Theory 29, no. 5 (2011), 670.

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65. Bohman defines deliberative inequalities “the asymmetries of public capabilities and functioning that persist in most public spheres.” See, Bohman, Public Deliberation, 109. 66. Fung, “Deliberation Before the Revolution: Toward an Ethics of Deliberative Democracy in an Unjust World,” 399. 67. Fung, “Deliberation Before the Revolution: Toward an Ethics of Deliberative Democracy in an Unjust World,” 399. 68. Young, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy,” 673. 69. Young, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy,” 678. 70. Fung, “Deliberation Before the Revolution: Toward an Ethics of Deliberative Democracy in an Unjust World,” 401. 71. Fung, “Deliberation Before the Revolution: Toward an Ethics of Deliberative Democracy in an Unjust World,” 400. 72. Young, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy,” 679. 73. See also Medearis, Why Democracy Is Oppositional, Chapter 1; Young, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy.” 74. Medearis rightly notes that that deliberative theory’s inability to recognize the place of democratic activism in democracy becomes “something of an embarrassment for deliberative democracy.” He concludes that deliberative cannot evade this problem “simply by retaining noncoercison as the democratic ideal while accepting coercion as ethically aberrant but necessary in the nonideal present.” See, Medearis, Why Democracy Is Oppositional, 50. 75. Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy; Deliberative Inequalities, 112. 76. Young, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy,” 688. 77. Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 67. 78. Young, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy,” 685. 79. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 48. 80. Young, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy,” 676; Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 48. For a criticism of Young’s norm of reasonableness, and in particular, how it limits the way Young views the political value of protest and activism, see Drexler and Michael Hames-Garcia, “Disruption and Democracy: Challenges to Consensus and Communication.” 81. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 48. 82. Dryzek, “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia,” 239fn6; Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,” 83. 83. As Dryzek notes “the reasonableness motivational norm would set her apart from many agonists.” See, Dryzek, “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia,” 239fn6.

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84. Nico Carpentier and Bart Cammaerts, “Hegemony, Democracy, Agonism and Journalism: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe,” Journalism Studies 7, no. 6 (2006), 967. 85. Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), 99– 100; Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Verso, 2005), 17–18. 86. Chantal Mouffe, For a Left Populism (London: Verso, 2018), 88. 87. Mouffe, For a Left Populism, 88. 88. Chantal Mouffe, Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993), 141. 89. See also Mark Wenman, “What Is Politics: The Approach of Radical Pluralism,” Politics 23, no. 1 (2003), 61. 90. Kirstie McClure, “On the Subject of Rights: Pluralism, Plurality and Political Identity,” in Dimensions of Radical Democracy, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: Verso, 1992), 123. 91. Mouffe, Agonistics, 89–90; Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 13; William Connolly, “The Power of Assemblages and the Fragility of Things,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10 (2008), 246; William Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), xvii. 92. Ed Wingenbach, Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 25. 93. Wingenbach, Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy, 7. 94. Mouffe, For a Left Populism, 88. 95. William Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 94. Connolly writes that “no order can enable everything to flower in the same garden” this is a “necessary injustice,” as Nietzsche would put it, within the practices of justice.” See, Connolly, Identity/Difference, 160. 96. Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Verso, 2005), 17–18. 97. Mouffe, On the Political, 17–18, and Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), 99. 98. Mouffe, On the Political, 17–18. 99. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 100; Mouffe, On the Political, 16–19; Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, 2, 204. 100. Mouffe, On the Political, 18. 101. Mouffe, On the Political, 18. 102. Mouffe stresses that this would be a chaotic situation. See Chantal Mouffe, Agonistics (London: Verso, 2013), 73. 103. Mouffe, For a Left Populism, 43; Mouffe, 79. 104. Mouffe, For a Left Populism, 72. 105. Chantal Mouffe, “Democratic Politics and the Question of Identity,” in The Identity in Question, ed. John Rajchman (London: Routledge, 1995), 33–34.

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106. As Mouffe notes, the creation of a collective identity, a “we,” requires the drawing of a frontier and demarcation of a “they” as its condition of possibility. Mouffe, Agonistics, 5 and 45; Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 12–13; Mouffe, On the Political, 14–15. 107. Chantal Mouffe, “By Way of a Postscript,” Parallax 20, no. 2 (2014), 155. 108. Mouffe, For a Left Populism, 74. 109. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 104; Mouffe, On the Political, 24–29. 110. Paulina Tambakaki, “The Tasks of Agonism and Agonism to the Task: Introducing ‘Chantal Moufe Agonism and the Politics of Passion,’” Parallax 20, no. 2 (2014), 3. 111. As Norval notes, only some demands make sense within a particular social order. Without dislocating existing imaginaries, the demands of those who resist and defend a new hegemonic distribution of power would be heard as “noise,” becoming invisible and having no business of being heard or seen. See Aletta Norval, Aversive Democracy: Inheritance and Originality in the Democratic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 100. 112. As Decreus, Lievens, and Braeckman show the difference between institutional effectiveness and symbolic effectiveness matter. A political movement that does not produce immediate institutional results may have significant symbolic effectiveness. See Thomas Decreus, Matthias Lievens, and Antoon Braeckman, “Building Collective Identities: How New Social Movements Try to Overcome Post-Politics,” Parallax 20, no. 2 (2014), 140. 113. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 104; Mouffe, Return of the Political, 6; William Connolly, “Twilight of the Idols,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 21, no. 3 (1995), 135. 114. For my discussion of strong hegemony, see Chapter 2 in this book. 115. It is important to re-emphasize that for Mouffe disarticulation of hegemonic practices is not sufficient to develop a counter-hegemonic project. A politics of contestation and disruption cannot form a counter-hegemonic project. Counter-hegemony is about disarticulation and rearticulation. An essential aspect of hegemony struggle is the constitution of an alternative project and the corresponding collective identification. See, Mouffe, Agonistics, 74 and 93. 116. See Decreus, Lievens, and Braeckman, “Building Collective Identities: How New Social Movements Try to Overcome Post-Politics.” On how collective political action promotes collective identity and produce new social relations, see Della Porta, “Eventful Protest, Global Conflicts,” 2. 117. For a discussion of the significance of the horizontality in the recent political movements in Spain and Greece, see Marina Prentoulis and

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118. 119.

120. 121. 122.

123. 124.

125.

126. 127. 128.

129.

130.

Lasse Thomassen, “Political Theory in the Square: Protest,” Contemporary Political Theory 12, no. 3 (2013), 166–184. Buell, “Occupy Wall Street’s Democratic Challenge.” Focusing on OWS, Decreus, Lievens, and Braeckman emphasize that the Occupy activists were very well aware of the symbolic importance of their protest. Decreus, Lievens, and Braeckman, “Building Collective Identities: How New Social Movements Try to Overcome Post-Politics,” 141. Decreus, Lievens, and Braeckman, “Building Collective Identities: How New Social Movements Try to Overcome Post-Politics,” 141. Mouffe, Agonistics, 95. Mouffe, Agonistics, 95. Decreus, Lievens, and Braeckman make a similar point and argue that OWS and Indignados should be seen as theatrical performances akin to artistic activism. See Decreus, Lievens, and Braeckman “Building Collective Identities: How New Social Movements Try to Overcome Post-Politics,” 141–145. Nilufer Göle, “Public Space Democracy.” See Buell, “Occupy Wall Street’s Democratic Challenge”; Marina Prentoulis and Lasse Thomassen, “Political Theory in the Square: Protest, Representation and Subjectification,” 167. Nimalan Yoganathan, “Black Lives Matter Movement Uses Creative Tactics to Confront Systemic Racism,” The Conversation, July 30, 2020, https://theconversation.com/black-lives-matter-movement-usescreative-tactics-to-confront-systemic-racism-143273. “The Mirror Casket Project,” accessed August 4, 2021, https://mirror casket.com/aboutus. “The Mirror Casket Project,” accessed August 4, 2021, https://mirror casket.com/aboutus. “George Floyd’s Family Gathers in Virginia to Unveil Hologram,” The Washington Post, July 29, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ national/george-floyds-family-gathers-in-virginia-to-unveil-hologram/ 2020/07/28/e91ffe22-d14f-11ea-826b-cc394d824e35_story.html. See Yoganathan, “Black Lives Matter Movement Uses Creative Tactics to Confront Systemic Racism.” On September 9, 2021, the Robert E. Lee Monument in Richmond was taken down. Following the removal of the statue, The Emancipation and Freedom Monument commemorating the Emancipation Proclamation and the abolition of slavery was installed on Brown’s Island in Richmond. See, Deepa Shivaram, “An Emancipation Statue Debuts in Virginia Two Weeks After Robert E. Lee Was Removed,” NPR, September 22, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/09/22/1039333919/new-ema ncipation-statue-richmond-virginia-monument. Mouffe, Agonistics, 77.

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131. Mouffe, Agonistics, 126. 132. I think for Mouffe artistic activism has more political significance than collective political protest. She views critical artistic practices as a significant “dimension of an agonistic politics” while her treatment of protest movements takes almost exclusively a critical form and aims to show why they will not be effective if they don’t work with representative institutions. See Mouffe, Agonistics, 126. 133. On the significance of parliamentary struggles for Mouffe’s agonism, see Chapter 5 in this book. 134. Mouffe, Agonistics, 126.

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Carpentier, Nico, and Bart Cammaerts. “Hegemony, Democracy, Agonism and Journalism: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe.” Journalism Studies 7, no. 6 (2006): 964–975. Connolly, William. Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. Connolly, William. “Twilight of the Idols.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 21, no. 3 (1995): 127–137. Connolly, William. “The Power of Assemblages and the Fragility of Things.” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10 (2008): 241–250. Decreus, Thomas, Matthias Lievens, and Antoon Braeckman. “Building Collective Identities: How New Social Movements Try to Overcome Post-Politics.” Parallax 20, no. 2 (2014): 136–148. Della Porta, Donatella. “Eventful Protest, Global Conflicts.” Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 9, no. 2 (2008): 27–56. Drexler, Jane M., and Michael Hames-Garcia. “Disruption and Democracy: Challenges to Consensus and Communication.” The Good Society 13, no. 2 (2004): 56–60. Dryzek, John. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Dryzek, John. “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia.” Political Theory 33, no. 2 (2005): 218–242. Fraser, Nancy. “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy.” In Habermas and the Public Sphere, edited by Craig Calhoun, 109–143. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993. Fung, Archon. “Deliberation Before the Revolution: Toward an Ethics of Deliberative Democracy in an Unjust World.” Political Theory 33, no. 2 (June 2005): 397–419. Gan, Barry L. Violence and Nonviolence: An Introduction. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013. Goldfarb, Jeffrey C. “Reflections on the Protests in Bulgaria.” Accessed December 11, 2021. http://www.deliberatelyconsidered.com/2013/07/ref lections-on-the-protests-in-bulgaria/. Göle, Nilüfer. “Gezi: Anatomy of a Public Space Movement.” Insight Turkey 15, no. 3 (2013): 7–14. Göle, Nilüfer. “Public Space Democracy.” Eurozine, July 29, 2013. https:// www.eurozine.com/public-space-democracy/. Gürsözlü, Fuat. “Democracy and the Square: Recognizing the Democratic Value of Recent Public Sphere Movements.” Essays in Philosophy 16, no. 1 (2015): 26–42. Gürsözlü, Fuat. “Democratic Potential of Creative Political Protest.” Critical Studies: International Journal of Humanities, no. 3 (Fall 2017): 20–31.

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Habermas, Jürgen. Between Facts and Norms. Translated by William Rehg. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996. Habermas, Jürgen. “Introduction.” Ratio Juris 12, no. 4 (1999): 239–235. Habermas, Jürgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Translated by C. Lenhardt and S. W. Nicholson. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990. Habermas, Jürgen. “On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy.” In The Inclusion of the Other, edited by Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff, 253–264. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999. Habermas, Jürgen. “Popular Sovereignty as Procedure.” In Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, edited by James Bohman and William Rehg, 35–66. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997. Habermas, Jürgen. “Public Sphere.” In Jürgen Habermas on Society and Politics: A Reader, edited by Steven Seidman, 231–237. Boston: Beacon Press, 1989. Habermas, Jürgen. “Three Normative Models of Democracy.” In The Inclusion of the Other, edited by Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff, 239–253. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999. Honig, Bonnie Honig. Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. Ingham, Sean. “Popular Rule in Schumpeter’s Democracy.” Political Studies 64, no. 4 (2015): 1071–1087. Mackie, Gerry. “Schumpeter’s Leadership Democracy.” Political Theory 37, no. 1 (February 2009): 128–153. McClure, Kirstie. “On the Subject of Rights: Pluralism, Plurality and Political Identity.” In Dimensions of Radical Democracy, edited by Chantal Mouffe, 108–127. London: Verso, 1992. Medearis, John. Joseph Schumpeter’s Two Theories of Democracy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. Medearis, John. Why Democracy Is Oppositional? Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015. Mouffe, Chantal. Agonistics. London: Verso, 2013. Mouffe, Chantal. “By Way of a Postscript.” Parallax 20, no. 2 (2014): 149–157. Mouffe, Chantal. “Democratic Politics and the Question of Identity.” In The Identity in Question, edited by John Rajchman, 33–46. London: Routledge, 1995. Mouffe, Chantal. For a Left Populism. London: Verso, 2018. Mouffe, Chantal. On the Political. London: Verso, 2005. Mouffe, Chantal. The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso, 2000. Mouffe, Chantal. The Return of the Political. London: Verso, 1993. Myers, Ella. Worldly Ethics: Democratic Politics and Care for the World. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013. Norval, Aletta. Aversive Democracy: Inheritance and Originality in the Democratic Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

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Örs, Ilay Romain. “Genie in the Bottle: Gezi Park, Taksim Square, and the Realignment of Democracy and Space in Turkey.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 40, no. 4 (2014): 1–10. Prentoulis, Marina, and Lasse Thomassen. “Political Theory in the Square: Protest.” Contemporary Political Theory 12, no. 3 (2013): 166–184. Samee Ali, Safia. “‘Not by Accident’: False ‘Thug’ Narratives Have Long Been Used to Discredit Civil Rights Movements.” NBC News, September 27, 2020. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/not-acc ident-false-thug-narratives-have-long-been-used-discredit-n1240509. Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper, 1942. Shivaram, Deepa. “An Emancipation Statue Debuts in Virginia Two Weeks After Robert E. Lee Was Removed.” NPR, September 22, 2021. https://www.npr.org/2021/09/22/1039333919/new-emancipationstatue-richmond-virginia-monument. Tambakaki, Paulina. “The Tasks of Agonism and Agonism to the Task: Introducing ‘Chantal Moufe Agonism and the Politics of Passion.’” Parallax 20, no. 2 (2014): 1–13. “The Mirror Casket Project.” Accessed August 4, 2021. https://mirrorcasket. com/aboutus. Warren, Mike E. “What Should We Expect from More Democracy?: Radically Democratic Responses to Politics.” Political Theory 24, no. 2 (1996): 241– 270. Wenman, Mark. “What Is Politics: The Approach of Radical Pluralism.” Politics 23, no. 1 (2003): 57–65. Wingenbach, Ed. Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy. Burlington: Ashgate, 2011. Yoganathan, Nimalan. “Black Lives Matter Movement Uses Creative Tactics to Confront Systemic Racism.” The Conversation, July 30, 2020. https://the conversation.com/black-lives-matter-movement-uses-creative-tactics-to-con front-systemic-racism-143273. Young, Iris Marion. “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy.” Political Theory 29, no. 5 (2011): 670–690. Young, Iris Marion. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

CHAPTER 5

What Should We Expect from Political Parties? An Agonistic Account of Political Party

Agonistic approaches to politics offer a distinct political vision that rests on the contingency of social order, the inevitability of remainders, and the value of conflict and contestation in democratizing society and mitigating violence. Agonists’ affirmation of contingency and continual contest seems to have created the impression that agonism only stands for disruption and agonistic democracy cannot be congruent with any institutional arrangement. Such an approach misses the point that agonists do not only emphasize contingency and democratic contestation, but also they recognize the significance of order, identity, and stability. The agonistic commitment to contest is a response to the tensions between order and exclusion, unity and plurality, solidarity and fragmentation, stability and disruption, and agreement and conflict.1 What makes agonism unique is not its attempt to resolve these tensions, but to valorize them in order to make society more democratic, inclusive, and nonviolent. Unless one associates agonism with an ethos of disruption and criticizes any attempt to propose a positive project, one will have to engage with the question of democratic political institutions.2 Without reducing agonism to institutional politics it is crucial to consider what political institutions could play an essential role in agonistic democracy and what political designs could be more conducive to agonistic politics. Engaging with the question of institutions also provides a response to the concerns that agonistic democracy © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Gürsözlü, Agonistic Democracy and Political Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05999-5_5

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does not constitute a real alternative to consensual models of democracy.3 Whether agonistic democratic theory will be treated as a corrective to political liberalism or deliberative democracy or whether it can offer a real alternative form of democracy largely depends on how successfully it can respond to the question of institutions.4 Thus, as some theorists have argued, the future of agonistic theory may depend on the theorization of the “implication of an agonistic politics for democratic institutions.”5 The problem here is that despite the growing number of works that offer different iterations of agonistic democratic theory, the literature addressing agonistic democracy and democratic institutions is slim.6 That’s why agonistic theory has often been criticized due to its “institutional deficit.”7 Although many agonistic theorists recognize the importance of institutions and institutional politics, only Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic democracy directly engages with the question of institutions. In her later work, Mouffe proposes a re-description of liberal democracy in terms of agonistic pluralism. For Mouffe, the ever-present possibility of antagonism in human relations determines the main task of democratic politics as defusing potential antagonism. Unlike Hobbes, Mouffe believes that an authoritarian order is not the only solution to the problem of ever-present possibility of antagonism.8 Drawing a distinction between “the political”—“dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human relations, antagonism that can take many forms and emerge in different types of social relations”—and “politics”—“the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain order and organize human coexistence in conditions that are always potentially conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of ‘the political’”—, Mouffe argues that agonistic form of democracy can domesticate potential antagonism.9 Thus, for Mouffe, a central promise of agonistic politics is the sublimation of the antagonistic potential by transforming antagonism—the struggle between enemies—into agonism—the struggle between adversaries who treat each other as legitimate opponents—.10 Mouffe situates agonistic democracy within the liberal democratic horizon since the liberal democratic tradition views political conflict as legitimate and provides the political terrain for the competition between various democratic projects.11 Viewing liberal democracy as constituted by two irreconcilable traditions—liberalism with its emphasis on liberty and democracy with its emphasis on equality—, Mouffe argues that the constitutive tension between these two discourses opens up the space for the emergence of different interpretations and

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amalgams of the values of equality and liberty. Within this framework, democratic institutions provide the political mechanism that “permit conflicts to take an agonistic form.”12 Thus, we can conclude that liberal democratic institutions play an essential role in shaping hostility and transforming antagonism to agonism. Despite her emphasis on the centrality of liberal democratic institutions to agonistic democracy, however, Mouffe does not offer a developed account of democratic institutions. The necessity of agonistic democratic political institutions is often invoked, but undertheorized. In On the Political, she briefly discusses the role of parliaments. In Agonistics, while criticizing the horizontalism of recent political movements, she suggests that “a pluralist democratic society cannot exist without representation.”13 And, in Podemos and For a Left-Wing Populism, she adds on to her brief remarks about the significance of political parties and also underlines the inevitability of representation.14 As commentators rightly point out, what we find in Mouffe’s work is “a series of specific but underdeveloped suggestions for conceptualizing democratic institutions.”15 Mouffe’s suggestions demonstrate the significance of democratic institutions and yet they are “frustratingly shallow.”16 The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the recently developing discussion on agonistic democratic institutions by focusing on the normative role of political parties in agonistic democracy. I argue that political parties have a central role to play in agonistic democracy. The specific suggestions we find in Mouffe’s theory for conceptualizing agonistic institutions don’t amount to a well-developed account, but they constitute a substantial account of political party. I suggest that once we examine the function of political parties in agonistic democracy, we recognize their essential role in agonistic politics. I first reconstruct an account of political party from Mouffe’s writings and explore why Mouffe places political parties at the center of agonistic politics. I then argue that the account of political party we find in Mouffe’s democratic theory is insufficient to sustain the agonistic dynamics of democracy as it addresses only a part of the political work that parties are expected to do. To fulfill its promise of pacifying society through democratization, agonistic democracy requires political parties that understand their great influence over the political landscape and commit to fostering liberal democratic institutions and agonistic solidarity. This calls for a thicker normative account of political party.

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The Role of Political Parties in Agonistic Democracy Failure of Traditional Political Parties A good place to focus on to understand the role of political parties in agonistic democracy is Mouffe’s critique of existing political parties. Examining Mouffe’s remarks on what existing parties have failed to do can help us identify what political function she expects political parties to perform in agonistic democracy. A persistent theme throughout Mouffe’s work has been the connection between the failure of existing political parties and the rise of extremist politics.17 Here Mouffe’s argument has two steps. The first is the growing tendency of political parties to move toward the consensual political center as a result of neoliberal hegemony. Mouffe’s point is that people’s profound dissatisfaction with democratic institutions in a growing number of liberal democratic societies is due to the “incapacity of established democratic parties to put forward significant alternatives.”18 The “third way” consensus at the center “deprives democratic citizens of an agonistic debate where they can make their voices heard and choose between real alternatives.”19 Blurring the frontier between the left and the right eliminated the possibility of an agonistic struggle between genuinely different political projects thereby drastically reducing citizens’ political choices and their power over political decisions. When there is no significant difference “between the programmes of right and left-wing parties” and citizens do not have any real choices among “significantly different policies,” they think that their vote does not matter.20 In this situation of “post-politics” elections simply offer a choice between the center-left and the center-right that reduce politics to a mere management of the hegemonic neoliberal order.21 Feeling excluded by the political elites and the “establishment”, an increasing number of people think that political parties do not take their interests into account and their demands cannot be heard through traditional political channels. The result is a loss of faith in traditional parties and dissatisfaction with the democratic process and institutions.22 The second step in Mouffe’s argument makes a connection between citizen dissatisfaction with the existing order and the rise of extremist politics. The key idea here is that traditional political parties’ failure to function as channels for the expression of people’s demands and resistances created a fertile ground for the emergence of extremist and populist

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political forces. When traditional political parties fail to give expression to emerging antagonisms in society by creating discursive frameworks that “allow people to make sense of the social world in which they are inscribed and to perceive its fault lines,” other political forces formulate these antagonisms.23 For Mouffe, this is precisely why anti-establishment parties in different countries have seen significant electoral successes. Successfully articulating people’s frustration with traditional parties and the democratic process and mobilizing their anger by fostering nationalist, racial, religious, or ethnic forms of identification, extremist movements offered people meaningful identifications, albeit antidemocratic ones. The danger is that collective identities created along such antagonistic lines of division can’t be managed by the democratic process.24 The result is the rise of extremism and populism with growing polarization of the political field.25 The fact that, for Mouffe, people’s dissatisfaction with the democratic process and the rise of extremist movements are due to the crisis of traditional political parties and their incapacity to revive agonistic dynamics of democracy indicates the significance of political parties in agonistic democracy. When Mouffe says “disaffection with democratic institutions” she means “disaffection towards political parties.”26 It is important to clarify that the problem is not political parties per se, but the current form parties have taken which does not allow agonistic confrontation to take place. The remedy is to revive the agonistic dynamics of democracy by making political parties more agonistic and representative. A healthy and vibrant democracy depends on the existence of political parties that play their role in the agonistic struggle.27 Parliamentary System and Agonistic Politics A second place to look at to formulate the vital role of political parties is Mouffe’s brief remarks on Elias Canetti’s approach to the parliamentary system. In The Return of the Political and later in On the Political Mouffe recommends the parliamentary system as an institutional model that encourages agonistic politics.28 As Mouffe states, Canetti indicates that the parliamentary system “exploits the psychological structure of struggling armies and should be conceived as a struggle in which contending parties renounce the killing of each other and accept the verdict of the majority on who has won.”29 The battle ends with the actual vote. The vote is decisive and replaces “the original lethal clash.”30 For Mouffe, Canetti’s approach illustrates the role parliamentary system can play in

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making possible agonistic confrontation. The parliamentary space is not one of rational discussion or interest promotion and negotiation, rather it should be viewed as a stage for the agonistic clash of opinions, conflicts, and divisions. As the contending parties defend their positions and oppose the other’s, no one believes that the majority decision confers any higher moral or epistemological value to the outcome. All involved parties understand that it is the clash of will against will. The outvoted party accepts the outcome not because the other side is wiser, more correct, more rational, or “he has ceased to believe in his own case, but simply because he admits defeat.”31 Mouffe indicates that Canetti’s approach shows how representative institutions, “if properly understood, can shape the element of hostility in a way that defuses its potential.”32 Political parties, she emphasizes, “can play an important role in giving expression to social division and the conflict of wills.” But, she adds, “if they fail their job, conflicts will assume other guises and it will be more difficult to manage them democratically.”33 What follows from Mouffe’s defense of Canetti’s views on the parliamentary system is the designation of the parliament as the primary site for agonistic politics and political parties as one of the primary political agents in agonistic democratic politics. This does not mean that the parliament is the sole space where agonistic politics takes place nor that political parties are the only significant agents in agonistic politics. Mouffe maintains that there are multiple agonistic spaces in civil society where democratic contestations can take place. The point is that Mouffe’s agonistic democracy gives priority to the parliament over other agonistic spaces in civil society and recognizes political parties as the most important political agent in agonistic democracy. This is why Mouffe is critical of the recent social movements that defend a strategy of “withdrawal from” traditional political institutions.34 Mouffe argues that the new consciousness that arises out of movements such as the Spanish Indignados, the Greek Aganaktismenoi, and various Occupy movements in Europe and North America “requires institutional channels.”35 Extra-parliamentary struggles have the potential to have an impact on the political discourse as they can make visible neglected issues and lead to the emergence of new subjectivities, but they lack the “systematic focus” required to develop specific proposals and effectively transform relations of power. That’s why they cannot provide a substitute for parliamentary struggle and representative institutions.36 Democratic political parties should work with social movements in developing demands and strategies. Yet, “the principal role

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should be that of the party.”37 Not only “parties are necessary for democracy,”38 but they should also be seen as the central political agents in agonistic politics. The Unique Political Function of the Political Party Mouffe’s emphasis on political parties brings to the fore the question of what political function they have in agonistic democracy. If political parties are central to agonistic democracy, what political task should they perform so as to sustain the agonistic dynamics of politics? Three broad points follow from the way Mouffe criticizes the failure of political parties and supports the parliamentary system: (i) political parties should produce different political projects thereby acting as institutional channels through which people can voice their demands and concerns, (ii) they should stand their ground and defend the interests of their constituents in the parliament, and (iii) they should work with social movements and bring their demands to the parliament. These three points outline the main lines of a Mouffean account of political party and describe the democratic function of political parties in agonistic democracy. Although these are indispensable political functions, they don’t reveal the real nature of the political task political parties are expected to perform. At this point, we need to pay close attention to the symbolic role parties play in agonistic democratic politics. The symbolic role of political parties refers to the constitutive and creative political work political parties perform in agonistic democracy. Here the way Mouffe describes the political party goes beyond the dominant account of political party that depicts the political party as a passive mechanism of political representation. According to the dominant account of political party, parties have a “unidirectional relationship between the forms of subjecthood existing in society and those in the political arena.”39 They passively represent existing political identities in society and express already existing societal conflicts and divisions. Viewed from an agonistic perspective, this approach fails to recognize the essential role political parties play in developing political subjectivities and how parties construct and develop discursive frameworks that organize the political landscape and shape collective political identities.40 This is the “symbolic function” of political parties. It becomes clear then that when Mouffe says political parties can “play an important role in giving expression to social division and the conflict of wills,” she is not endorsing

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the dominant account of the political party. What she means here is that political parties actively draw lines of political divisions and give shape to conflict.41 The consciousness of the social agent is not determined by their societal position, rather it is constructed by a diversity of discourses.42 Political parties by producing and maintaining discursive frameworks develop and maintain collective political identifications. They provide symbolic markers which help people situate themselves politically. What is at stake is a constitutive relationship between political parties and the people forged and sustained by the creation of collective forms of identifications. The symbolic role of political parties is a crucial dimension of agonistic democracy’s claim to domesticate possible antagonism. This brings us to one of the distinguishing features of Mouffe’s theory of democracy: the emphasis she puts on the role of passions in politics. For Mouffe, the lack of a proper understanding of the significance of passions in politics is one of the main problems with contemporary political theory. Characterizing passions as irrational and unruly, liberal political theorists view passions as a danger to liberal democracy. Emphasizing the destructive potential of passions, liberal theorists argue for a politics that excludes passion as much as possible.43 To be sure Mouffe acknowledges the destructive potential of passions, but she also argues that refusing to admit the role of passions in politics prevents us from envisaging a form of politics that responds to the problem of antagonism. In response to the liberal approach’s devaluation of passions, Mouffe’s agonistic project recognizes a promising and unexplored potential in passions. Emphasizing the positive role of passions in politics, agonistic democracy shifts our attention from finding ways to exclude passions from politics to the creation of political conditions under which passions can be mobilized democratically. Crucial to this framework is the nature of collective identities. Mouffe indicates that passions denote “a certain type of common affects that are mobilized in politics”44 The key link here is between the passions and collective forms of identification. Drawing on Freud’s analysis of the process of identification Mouffe argues that “the affective dimension is at the origin of collective forms of identification.”45 What is at stake in the creation of a collective identity is a libidinal investment. A power of some kind is what holds a group together and “the aim is to establish strong identifications between the members of the community, to bind them in a shared identity.”46 Mouffe argues that once we understand that a collective identity is the result of a libidinal investment, it becomes possible to

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explore the risks and promises of the role of passions in politics. The risk is that the creation of a collective identity, a “we”, requires the designation of a “they” which could take the form of friend/enemy under certain conditions.47 The promise is that it is possible to tame this destructive potential and disarm “the libidinal forces leading towards hostility which are always present in human societies” by fostering democratic forms of identifications.48 This is the idea of pacifying society through democratization. This brings us to the main claim of Mouffe’s agonistic democracy that a well-functioning democracy calls for an agonistic confrontation between democratic political positions.49 In the absence of a vibrant clash of democratic political positions, there is always “the danger that this democratic confrontation will be replaced by a confrontation between non-negotiable moral values or essentialist forms of identifications.”50 Current democratic political theory, Mouffe argues, is unable to respond to the diverse manifestations of passions since it does not acknowledge “passions” as the driving force in the political field. By focusing either on a rational calculation of interest or on moral deliberation and by interpreting democratic politics only in terms of individual actions, democratic theorists fail to recognize the significance of articulating collective political subjects.51 Mouffe’s agonistic democracy aims to utilize the link between collective identities and passions by way of democratic interpellations. If affects are “malleable and susceptible to being oriented in different directions,” it is possible to foster “affective libidinal attachments” in ways that will not threaten democratic institutions. It is therefore possible to construct we/they relations in terms of adversaries and prevent them from taking an antagonistic form.52 Defusing potential antagonism requires strengthening citizens’ allegiance to democracy which depends on two separate though related developments: the availability of democratic forms of identifications and the institutionalization of conflict through which agonistic confrontation could be played out. Mouffe approaches the problem of democratic identification in terms of availability.53 Democratic politics, Mouffe writes, “needs to have a real purchase on people’s desires and fantasies.”54 To create a collective political identity requires mobilizing the affective dimension. This is how it is possible “to create a collective will and to make people identify with a project.”55 Mobilization, however, requires politicization which “cannot exist without the production of a conflictual representation of the world.”56 A political world with opposed camps offers people meaningful points of identification, thereby “allowing

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for the passions to be mobilized politically within the spectrum of the democratic process.”57 Mouffe’s point is that “in order to act politically people need to be able to identify with a collective identity which provides an idea of themselves they can valorize.”58 Voting, for instance, is more than a defense of self-interest and has an important affective dimension which is the result of identifying with a political project. That’s why the partisan dimension of democratic politics must be valued and maintained. A partisan-free democracy erases the adversarial dimension of politics which “impedes the construction of distinctive political identities.”59 For people to be interested in politics and to identify with a political project, “they need to have the possibility of choosing between parties offering real alternatives.”60 This is precisely why Mouffe’s discussion of existing political parties has a critical tone. Existing political parties in liberal democracies by not performing their unique political task of proposing distinct hegemonic projects contribute to the weakening of democracy.61 At this point, it is important to recognize that Mouffe’s criticism of political parties is based on a normative argument for political party that is implicit in her work, but one she has not explicitly developed. According to this account of political party, the most significant political function of the political party in agonistic democracy is to offer distinct hegemonic visions and political discourses that create and shape collective political identities.62 It is these political frameworks that allow people to perceive the fault lines and conflicts in society thereby making sense of their social world. And it is these symbolic markers that help people “to situate themselves in the social world and to give meaning to their lived experiences.”63 Despite the claims to institutional deficit then Mouffe’s agonistic democracy identifies two key institutions as essential for agonistic democracy. One is the parliament and the other is the political party. As Mouffe’s discussion of Canetti makes clear, the parliament provides the symbolic stage for the clash of democratic political positions. To invoke Canetti’s metaphor, this is where the standing armies fight the democratic fight. Political parties are the main political agents in the democratic struggle. They provide institutional outlets for people to express their demands and concerns while, at the same time, generating and maintaining collective political identities each correspond to a distinct understanding of the common good and how society should be organized. Put differently, people, who see the political landscape through the political narrative provided by a political party, identify with that party and support their

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army. Within this democratic framework, political parties serve as institutional mechanisms through which “agonistic citizenship can be expressed and fostered without demanding direct engagement of all.”64 It is the political parties that make possible and sustain the vibrant clash between opinions and identities. If they fail to carry out their political function, agonistic democracy cannot deliver its promise of transforming potential antagonism to agonism. As such, the success of agonistic democracy depends on whether political parties perform their symbolic role of developing collective identifications and providing distinct political projects that shape conflict of wills and social divisions.

An Agonistic Account of Political Party Once we consider in what ways political parties sustain the agonistic dynamics of democracy, and in what ways undermine it, it becomes possible to reconstruct an account of political party from an agonistic perspective. In Mouffe’s agonistic democratic theory we find a substantial account of political party that designates political parties as central political agents. Understanding the crucial role of political parties in agonistic democracy allows us to ask the question of how political parties should perform their political function. What I have in mind is the distinction between the performance of function and performance of function in an excellent way.65 Given the significant role political parties are expected to play in agonistic democracy, we should ask what it means for agonistic political parties to perform their democratic function well. Asking the question of what it means for political parties to perform their function well question reveals that the account of political party we find in Mouffe’s theory is insufficient to sustain the agonistic dynamics of democracy. According to this account of political party, political parties have the political function to develop political discourses, generate genuine political projects, and shape collective political identifications. Yet, it is important to recognize that political parties can perform these functions in ways that do not necessarily strengthen the agonistic dynamics of politics. To address this gap between the account of political party we find in Mouffe’s writings and the political work parties should do to sustain the agonistic dynamics of democracy, we need a thicker normative account of political party. To develop a thicker normative account of agonistic political party, I focus on the fundamental idea that agonistic democracy can fulfill its promise of democratizing and integrating society

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only when agonistic institutions “create and sustain a stable context within which agonistic contestation can occur.”66 Stabilizing such a context requires preventing the moralization of the political discourse and the emergence of militant identifications. These two elements are fundamental to the generation and maintenance of agonistic solidarity. The key to formulating a thicker normative account of political party lies in understanding the core normative ideas that inform the way political parties organize the political landscape and generate political identifications, and more specifically, the way political parties represent outgroups and engage with their political opponents. Moralization of Politics For Mouffe, a significant source of moralization in politics is traditional political parties’ failure to provide distinctive forms of identifications around hegemonic projects. This has led to the emergence of right-wing populist parties with their “unacceptable mechanisms of exclusion where xenophobia usually plays a central role.”67 The other source, Mouffe points out, is the way political parties’ responded to the rise of far-right populism. Especially in Europe, and in particular in France, Belgium, and Austria, traditional parties quickly labeled right-wing populism as “extreme-right” which allowed the political parties to characterize themselves as the “good democrats.” According to Mouffe, securing one’s goodness through the condemnation of evil others is a perverse political strategy. It might help one to denounce others and have the higher moral ground, but it also infects politics with a moralistic discourse.68 And, Mouffe adds, there is a “direct link between the weakening of the political frontier characteristic of the adversarial model and the ‘moralization’ of politics.”69 Once the traditional parties denounced the rise of the far-right as an “evil extreme right”, the only alternative left to them was to unite in resisting it. In doing so, traditional political parties missed the opportunity to envisage the confrontation with right-wing populism in political terms, that is, “as adversaries to be fought politically.”70 The main issue is that when politics is “being played out in the moral register,” political divisions and collective identities are “formulated in terms of moral categories of ‘good’ versus ‘evil.”71 Viewing political opponent as evil turns them into enemy. And between enemies an agonistic exchange is not possible. What needs to be done is eradicate the “evil them.” Moralizing politics paves the way for political

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antagonism by multiplying essentialist identities and transforming democratic struggle into a confrontation among non-negotiable values “with all the manifestations of violence that such confrontations entail.”72 The political arena turns into a stage for the fight between the forces of good and evil and thus it becomes very difficult to contain such a fight and domesticate it democratically. This process undermines the agonistic dynamics of democracy thereby hindering the transformation of antagonism to agonism. As such, it leads to the degeneration of us/them to a friend/enemy grouping.73 At this point it is important to emphasize that as one of the primary political agents in agonistic democracy, political parties have the most influence over the political discourse and how political divisions take shape. To be sure, political parties do not have a monopoly on the organization of the political terrain. There are other significant political forces/agents in a democracy such as social movements and trade unions. We should also take seriously the role of the media in the creation of an agonistic public space.74 But given the significant role political parties play in giving shape to lines of divisions and conflict of wills, generating and maintaining political identifications, and staging the agonistic struggle, it is reasonable to suggest that political parties have a unique capability in organizing the political landscape and preventing the moralization of politics. For the agonistic democratic project to succeed, political parties should avoid moralizing politics and create political discourses which would allow for a fight between political adversaries. It is crucial for the success of agonistic democracy that parties serve their democratic function, but what is as important is how they play their role in the democratic struggle. Consider, for instance, the Syrian refugee crisis that has been affecting several countries. In many European countries and in the US and Canada a growing number of citizens have expressed their opposition to the number of asylum seekers being accepted by their countries. This created a new political division between those who argue that taking human rights seriously demand that countries accept as many refugees as they can and those who worry about the impact of refugees on their society, culture, and economy. Most centrist and left-wing parties have completely ignored the citizens’ concerns about the possible impact of immigration. The right-wing parties who took these concerns seriously turned to racist and xenophobic themes to construct the political discourse.75

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Thus, mainstream political parties’ inability to articulate a proper political alternative in response to the Syrian refugee crisis has contributed to the rising xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment which have resulted in violence.76 It is possible to articulate a political position expressing the voice of concerned citizens about immigrant without representing the refugees as evil outsiders willing to destroy the society and their way of life.77 Such a political position can initiate an agonistic debate around the meaning and shape of national identity, the benefits of immigration, and the significance of integration. Different positions on these issues would then encourage a clash of legitimate political positions between adversaries. However, no party has offered that political position thereby missing the opportunity to mobilize concerned citizens democratically. As the most influential democratic political agent in creating and shaping hegemonic political projects and regulating the agonistic exchange, political parties delineate the terms in which agonistic confrontation is carried out. The way political parties characterize their opponents and engage with them is crucial in whether the agonistic dynamics of politics would be undermined or sustained. Political parties’ commitment to adversarial exchange and keeping the terms of the agonistic debate political largely determines the nature of the political exchange and whether agonistic confrontation could fulfill its promise of transforming antagonism to agonism. Failing to offer political projects that allow the expression of conflict increases the possibility of antagonism, but the expression of conflict in moralistic terms brings about undemocratic outcomes as well. The result is profound polarization and deep mistrust between political opponents. To prevent democratic politics from degenerating into a fight between enemies, political parties should offer properly political projects and conduct politics in political terms thereby minimizing the depoliticizing effects of the moralistic attitude over the political terrain. Agonistic democracy needs political parties to “regulate democratic rivalry” from a properly political perspective and keep politics political.78 Militant Identities Moralization of politics is a significant source of intolerant agonism and antagonism, but it is not the only issue that political parties pay attention to if they are to create and sustain a stable political context for agonistic exchange.79 Another crucial issue they should take seriously is the rise

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of militant identities and ensuing authoritarian tendencies. The risk here is that even a properly political struggle between different liberal democratic projects could lead to intolerant agonism and antagonism. Indeed, Mouffe suggests that the hegemony struggle between political adversaries always carries the risk of antagonism that needs to be contained. Following Schmitt, she argues that any us/them distinction could take an antagonistic form and escalate into a friend/enemy grouping. That’s why Mouffe emphasizes that the category of adversary only sublimates antagonism.80 A political adversary is still an enemy, but a legitimate one. Agonism is a confrontation between friendly enemies and what is at stake here “is the struggle between opposing hegemonic projects.”81 What keeps the agonistic confrontation democratic and nonviolent is that it is “played out under conditions regulated by a set of democratic procedures accepted by the adversaries.”82 The essence of the friendship between enemies is their allegiance to the constitutive values of the political regime. But, the consensus on the ethico-political common ground is a conflictual consensus since there will always be disagreement about the meaning of these principles.83 It is precisely the hegemony struggle between different and conflictual interpretations of the ethico-political principles that constitute “the privileged terrain of agonistic confrontation among adversaries.”84 The idea is that as long as agonistic citizens are committed to the liberal democratic framework and understand that the ethico-political agreement is always accompanied by dissent, they can tolerate political opponents and not view them as enemies.85 Mouffe formulates her response to the possible degeneration of agonistic politics into intolerant agonism and antagonism in terms of a lack of sufficient allegiance to the liberal democratic horizon. Once we view the problem as one of insufficient allegiance, the solution then is democratic interpellations through the mobilizing of passions made possible by the agonistic confrontation among competing political projects. However, the problem militant identities pose does not stem merely from a lack of commitment to liberal democratic institutions and values. Rather, the issue is the result of a dogmatic devotion to a particular interpretation of liberal democracy. At stake here is the possible antagonism between those who already identify with a liberal democratic project. In this context, the possibility of antagonism emerges as a serious possibility when a particular political project and the corresponding form of political identification take a militant and authoritarian form. When a

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political identity becomes militant, its followers begin to see their legitimate political opponents as a threat to the stability and survival of the political association. As such, they believe in the need to suppress the political opponent and even encourage violence for the good of the political association. It is not that militant identities lack sufficient allegiance to liberal democratic values or that they reject democratic institutions to overthrow them. Rather, the militant identity warrants an exception to liberal democratic norms for the sake of the security, stability, and wellbeing of the political association. Different from the resentment, excessive self-righteousness, and overflowing pride that are expected outcomes of the moralistic approach, the issue here is the authoritarian tendency that makes the exception look acceptable and legitimate. How is it then that agonistic citizens’ allegiance to the liberal democratic framework fail to temper militant identities and prevent them from making an exception to the very norms they are committed to? To identify the political source of militant democratic identifications in agonistic democracy, it is important to recognize that equality and liberty—the constitutive values of liberal democracy—“can only exist through many different and conflicting interpretations.”86 This is because these concepts do not have any objective and fixed meaning. The aim of hegemony struggle is to fix the meaning of these terms thereby shaping the common sense in accordance with a particular interpretation of the common good and citizen identification.87 What follows is the question of what citizens really identify with when they identify with the ethico-political values of the regime. The ethico-political consensus among citizens, as Mouffe notes, “should be conceived as a discursive surface and not as an empirical referent.”88 The “we” of the liberal democracy requires the “correlative idea of the common good” conceived as a horizon of meaning that functions as a social imaginary. As Mouffe puts it, the impossibility of fully representing the social imaginary “gives it the role of a horizon which is the condition of possibility of any representation within the space that it delimits.”89 Thus, the commonality or the conflictual consensus refers to a horizon of meanings that can be interpreted in many different ways. The liberal democratic “we” that defines the identity of the political association is open to many different and conflicting interpretations. It follows that agonistic citizens’ allegiance to the democratic regime has two dimensions: identification with the liberal democratic horizon and identification with a particular democratic project. This introduces the

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possibility of militant democratic identifications that cannot be tempered by allegiance to the liberal democratic horizon. It is indeed possible that agonistic citizens develop strong allegiance to an abstract horizon of meanings without developing a strong attachment to a particular interpretation of liberal democracy. In that case, one’s commitment to the liberal democratic horizon generates a strong enough affective attachment that functions as checks on one’s other political identifications. But, if political identification is to provide citizens with a meaningful experience of democratic politics, as Mouffe envisions it to be, agonistic citizens should strongly identify with a particular democratic project. Only through identifying with a particular political project, citizens can make sense of existing conflicts and divisions and see themselves represented in politics. Accordingly, as identification with a particular political project grows stronger, it becomes possible for political identity to take a militant and dogmatic form in which case the tempering influence of the liberal democratic horizon would be less effective. Put differently, when a particular political project and collective political identity become a source of intense affective attachment, it could generate a partisan identity that overrides commitment to the liberal democratic horizon and justifies exceptions to the liberal democratic norms. At this point, the question that should be considered is how to prevent agonistic identifications from turning into militant identities and developing authoritarian impulses. When one identifies with a particular form of citizenship, this identification shapes one’s self-understanding.90 Libidinal attachment strongly ties one to a particular collective identity and provides an affective bond between the members of the same group. As Muirhead describes, in politics it is the loyal partisans “who cheer in joy and mourn in sorrow on election night.”91 It is the partisans who wish to have their way. It is the partisans who “will side with their party” no matter what the rivals propose.92 It is the partisans who consider accepting the view of the adversary as an act of betrayal. However, it is such strong identification with a political camp that makes the emergence of militant identities possible. There is no invisible hand that shapes the political terrain and tempers political identities thereby preventing them from becoming militant. Thus, there is a need for a political mechanism that can prevent the degeneration of agonistic forms of citizenship into militant and authoritarian formations. This brings to the fore the role of political parties in preventing the rise of militant identities. Political parties have the capability not only to offer stable collective identifications

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and political narratives that help citizen make sense of politics, but they also maintain and regulate these identifications and political discourses. By developing distinctive interpretations of the common good and offering political identifications political parties “politicize private identities and shape them into partisanships.”93 In doing so, agonistic political parties sustain agonistic interactions by creating and organizing agonistic citizens. Fostering citizens’ commitment to democracy and sustaining agonistic interactions require paying attention to the rise of militant identities and extremist tendencies. One aspect of this is to filter out antidemocratic forces and not bring them into the mainstream. This is the idea of political parties as gatekeepers.94 Once antidemocratic movements move from the fringes to mainstream politics, they gain more visibility and they are perceived as legitimate alternatives. That’s why political parties should not be reticent to keep extremists out of politics. A good example of filtering out extremist forces from mainstream politics is the Republican Party’s rejection of David Duke in both 1991 and 2016. In 1991, President George H.W. Bush urged the Republicans not to support David Duke who endorsed Nazism, denied the Holocaust, and had a record of racism. In a news conference before the election Bush said “it is inconceivable that such a person can legitimately aspire to leadership… I believe that David Duke is an insincere charlatan… and I believe that he should be rejected for what he is and what he stands for.”95 Duke’s Democratic opponent won with 61% of the vote. In 2016, when Duke wanted to run for the Senate, the RNC Chairman stated that Duke’s “hateful bigotry has no place in the Republican party and the RNC will never support his candidacy under any circumstance.”96 Duke received only 3% of the votes in 2016. In both instances, by not endorsing Duke, the Republican Party weakened Duke’s political position and prevented his malignant rhetoric to gain adherents. This is the kind of gatekeeping political parties should perform in response to militant identities’ attempts to infiltrate into the party and gain visibility. In addition to acting as political gatekeepers, political parties should avoid fostering political conditions that could give rise to militant identities. That’s why they should construct the political discourse and shape political identifications in a way that does not encourage militant devotion and authoritarian tendencies. Indeed, there will always be those ready to embrace authoritarian tendencies and those waiting for a favorable moment to promote their militant political agenda within the party. Even if such forces fail to take over the party, by presenting themselves as a

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viable strand within the party they can contribute to the shaping of the political discourse and provide “legitimate” points of identifications that could provoke the masses. It is the political responsibility of parties to contain and delegitimize these forces so that they do not fester the party and undermine agonistic dynamics of politics. This responsibility entails generating a political context where fanatical and dogmatic identification cannot easily flourish, and dissent and conflict would not be viewed as a threat. This is a demanding task since political parties are expected to create partisans who identify with their political projects while not encouraging dogmatic confidence and fanatical devotion. A healthy democracy requires committed partisans and not political fundamentalists with their dogmatic devotion and authoritarian impulses. When partisans’ commitment to a particular political project evolves into dogmatic and militant devotion, one begins to downplay the role of conflict and dissent in a well-functioning agonistic democracy. The resulting authoritarian impulse erodes one’s tolerance and respect for the adversary and encourages them to make an exception to democratic norms and deny the legitimacy of political opponents. This means agonistic dynamics are impaired and democracy is in peril. Given their great influence over the political landscape, political parties are the primary agents who can actively maintain a balance between failing to mobilize citizens and thus creating apathy and encouraging militant identifications with their authoritarian impulses thereby polarizing the society and creating hyperpartisanship. The means between the two political extremes is agonistic politics. To strike the mean, however, political parties should filter out militant identities and temper them by creating political discourses that do not allow them to flourish. Agonistic Solidarity The main promise of Mouffe’s agonistic democracy is that while sublimating antagonism democratically, it strengthens citizens’ allegiance to the liberal democratic regime. The agonistic democratic project of pacifying society through democratization relies on a strategy of political revitalization that requires the mobilization of passions and creation of agonistic public spheres. When the agonistic dynamics of democracy function well, societal conflict that could otherwise disintegrate the political association becomes a source of social cohesion. Within this framework

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political parties have an essential role to play. This brings us to the account of the political party that I’ve reconstructed from Mouffe’s writings: by proposing distinct political projects, generating partisan identifications, and staging political struggle political parties emerge as the most important political agents that keep the agonistic dynamics of democracy healthy. However, this account of political party is insufficient to support the agonistic dynamics of democracy as there is always the risk of polarization, fragmentation, and antagonism caused by the moralization of politics and the rise of militant identities. Given the significant influence they have over the domain of politics, political parties have the political responsibility to represent political opponents in terms of properly political categories and be vigilant about the rise of militant identities and authoritarian tendencies. This brings to the fore the core normative idea that should inform the way political parties perform their political function: the idea of agonistic solidarity.97 Agonistic solidarity refers to the political bond among democratic citizens. Citizens’ commitment to the constitutive values of the democratic regime is the foundation of agonistic solidarity since it creates a collective identity—a “we”. However, agonistic solidarity is not about citizens’ allegiance to the values of the democratic regime, rather it is the affective bond among citizens generated by their shared allegiance to the democratic regime. The distinction is important as it is possible to identify with the “we” without necessarily forming a political bond with some members of the “we”. Put differently, a sense of solidarity does not necessarily follow from citizens’ loyalty to a particular political association. A deep and shared commitment to the constitutive values of the political association is expected to generate a sense of common purpose and belonging among citizens.98 The goal here is not to weaken partisan commitment so as to create light partisan identities.99 It is to pluralize partisan identity by strengthening citizens’ loyalty to each other as equal members of the democratic polity. Agonistic solidarity tempers excesses of partisan commitment and prevents intolerant agonism by countering the affective investment of partisan identity with another political identification. Thus, agonistic solidarity creates crosscutting pressures on one’s partisan identity by introducing another affective dimension that has the sufficient power to counter strong partisan identification.100 When citizens view each other as equal members of the democratic society, they perceive each other as legitimate adversaries. Citizens’ allegiance to the democratic regime

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secures their commitment to the democratic process while agonistic solidarity ensures citizens’ commitment to engage adversaries democratically without making exceptions to democratic norms. This is an agonistic form of solidarity since despite their belonging to the liberal democratic regime and loyalty to each other, there is an unending political struggle among citizens over the identity, rules, and shape of the political association and over what solidarity among the members of the political association entails.101 In that sense, agonistic solidarity should not be understood as a kind of common bond that precludes and stifles political struggle and conflict, rather it is what keeps the struggle among citizens agonistic and democratic. Defining agonistic solidarity in terms of the political bond between citizens generated by their commitment to liberal democracy provides us with a normative idea about how political parties and partisans should perform their democratic function. In performing their democratic function political parties should demonstrate adversarial respect and be an exemplar of agonistic democratic agents. By performing their democratic function well, political parties encourage citizens to identify with a particular democratic political project while fostering their allegiance to the democratic polity and to each other. Their aim is to beat the adversary and win the elections by successfully constructing and presenting their political narratives and mobilizing the public. The ultimate goal is to shape the political discourse in a way that their version of the common good is perceived as the most reasonable one. However, in pursuing their political goals political parties should avoid weakening agonistic solidarity. Moralizing politics and encouraging a dogmatic and militant devotion to a particular political project undermine agonistic interactions and weakens agonistic solidarity. At times these political strategies might seem to be politically effective to unite and energize the party base. It is precisely at this point that political parties should recognize their political responsibility to uphold agonistic solidarity and resist the temptation to characterize the political opponent as an enemy of the regime or the people, as a traitor, moral disease, or an evil force.102 Consider, for instance, John McCain’s response to one of his supporters at a campaign rally during the 2008 US. Presidential Election Campaign. When someone in the audience made racist remarks about Barack Obama, McCain grabbed the microphone from his supporter and cut her off and said, “He’s a decent family man [and] citizen that just I just happen to have disagreements with on fundamental issues, and that’s what the

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campaign’s all about.” And when the audience booed his defense of Obama, McCain responded: “I will fight…But I will be respectful. I admire Sen. Obama and his accomplishments, and I will respect him.”103 This is an exemplary political behavior that strengthens agonistic solidarity. McCain could have easily let these racist remarks slide by remaining silent or added fuel to fire by repeating his supporter’s remarks to animate the crowd. But, his commitment to the liberal democratic institutions and adversarial respect prevented him from doing that. By inviting his supporters to respect his political opponent, McCain rejected characterizing his political opponent as an enemy thereby refusing to reproduce the malicious political discourse that damages the ethico-political ties among citizens of the political association. Agonistic politics aim to mobilize people and encourage them to identify with democratic political identities by offering them distinct and meaningful political projects. Emotions and passions are an essential part of the democratic political process. It is important to emphasize here that there is a crucial distinction between the agonistic mobilization of passions that encourages citizens to identify with a democratic project and the antidemocratic mobilization of passions that arouses emotions of fear, disgust, hatred, and contempt. The former mobilizes emotions positively that fosters and strengthens agonistic solidarity while the latter politicizes emotions in the wrong way by forming a hostile representation of the adversary and infecting the democratic discourse with animosity. Whipping up antidemocratic emotions and inflaming polarizing passions create mutual animosity and undermine adversarial relationships. Political mobilization of passions is possible without dehumanizing and demonizing the political opponent. Simply put, people should identify with a hegemonic political position not because it represents its opponents as malignant, dangerous, or subhuman, but because they believe that it offers a better description of what matters and what works, what the common good requires, and how the society should look like. This way of representing “us” and “them” does not undermine adversarial relations and agonistic solidarity. When skillfully done it unites citizens under the banner of liberal democracy. Political parties are both connective since they generate a sense of political collectivity among those who identify with a particular conception of citizenship, and divisive since they offer distinctive hegemonic projects and political identifications. The tension between these two tasks is inevitable. The short-term goal of political parties is to win and beat the

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opponent. However, they also have the responsibility to connect people by strengthening the political ties that unite them. This is a never-ending task as agonistic solidarity always gets tested and may erode under the pressures of political struggle. If not sufficiently renewed or damaged beyond repair, agonistic solidarity may not be able to absorb the intensity of democratic politics. What is at stake is the very fabric of democratic society.104 That’s why political parties, given their political capabilities, have a political responsibility to enhance agonistic solidarity. This is the long-term task of political parties. This means that in their pursuit of political power, political parties and partisans should not sacrifice agonistic solidarity. When political parties sacrifice agonistic solidarity for short-term political gain by mobilizing passions in the wrong way and fostering a dogmatic and militant devotion that characterize the political opponent as an enemy what follows is deep polarization, intolerant agonism, and antagonism. Political parties’ commitment to a particular version of the political association should not overwhelm their commitment to the democratic regime itself. When their political ambition leads to an attitude of win by any means possible, this is a sign that they are failing to fulfill their political responsibility. The idea of agonistic solidarity should always inform and constrain how political parties pursue their short-term goals. This is how political parties perform their political function well and take their democratic responsibility seriously.

Political Factions vs. Agonistic Political Parties The normative account of political party I’ve proposed here allows us to draw a political distinction between agonistic political parties and factions. Agonistic political parties defend distinct political projects that remain within the liberal democratic horizon. Despite their struggle for hegemony, agonistic parties are committed to equality and liberty and they view their opponents as an adversary. In a liberal democracy, there may be illiberal and antidemocratic political parties committed to challenging the hegemony of liberal democracy and ultimately aiming to replace liberal democratic institutions. Political enemies reject the values of liberal democracy outright and demand a totally new form of hegemony.105 Between agonistic political parties and political enemies there exists a third political possibility: a political faction. A faction, unlike a political enemy, is committed to the liberal democratic principles of the political

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association, but, unlike an agonistic political party, refuses to view political adversaries as equals and denies their legitimate right to partake in the agonistic struggle. A factionalized party then can be defined as a political party that exhibits intolerance and authoritarian tendencies despite their commitment to liberal democracy. The concept of political faction that follows from the agonistic account of political party advanced here is different from how factions are generally understood in political theory. According to the traditional understanding, factions are described in terms of the rise of private interests at the expense of the good of the political association. Thus viewed, the main difference between a political party and a faction is that a political party addresses the society as a whole whereas a faction aims to harness political power for the benefit of a particular social group.106 The notion of faction I propose draws the distinction between a political party and a faction on how a political party characterizes political opponents and engages with them. Both a faction and an agonistic political party defend a particular interpretation of the common good as the best political vision for the society. So, the distinguishing feature of a faction is not the content of the political project they defend. Agonistic political parties are committed to winning the hegemony struggle. Yet their devotion to a particular political project does not overwhelm their commitment to the shared norms of the democratic struggle. They are well aware that making exceptions to nonviolence, mutual tolerance, and adversarial respect paves the way for extreme polarization, intolerant agonism, and antagonism. They view political opponents as adversary who should be defeated democratically, and whose right to participate in the democratic struggle or right to freely express their political projects they should not question. They understand that when they represent the adversary as enemy and mobilize people in the wrong way by stoking fear, contempt, and hatred, they generate destructive collective identifications that are here to stay. Even if the party ceases to defend such malicious views, identities are sticky and representations do not wither away. They are aware that for those who see the political terrain through the lenses of the faction, it is not easy to switch from one reality that depicts a group as a threat to another one that characterizes the same group as an adversary. What is more likely is that feeling abandoned and resentful since their political party no longer represents them, these groups become easy targets for extremist movements.

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Factions, however, either intentionally ignore or fail to understand their significant political influence over the political terrain and the damage they can do to democracy when they undermine agonistic solidarity. Despite their commitment to liberal democracy, they believe that representing the adversary as evil enemy, fostering intolerance, and nurturing authoritarian tendencies are warranted to protect the society from its “internal enemies.” That’s why they don’t refrain from resorting to antidemocratic political tactics such as using vitriolic rhetoric, denying the adversary’s right to be heard, issuing veiled threats, creating a climate of fear and intimidation, encouraging violence, and so on. Viewed from an agonistic perspective, factions simply abuse and exploit agonistic public spheres. In doing so, factions erode democratic norms and practices that make the agonistic fight possible while damaging the very fabric of democratic society. Thus viewed, it is crucial to recognize that any political party, either right-wing or left-wing, has the potential to degenerate into a faction regardless of which democratic political project they defend.107 Agonistic democracy rests on the assumption that democratic societies are marked by conflict, and they are always already divided. By utilizing the positive potential of conflict, agonistic politics aims to manage divisions peacefully and foster agonistic solidarity. Factions undermine the integrative capacity of agonistic democracy as they give shape to these divisions from a moralistic and militant perspective. The result is a political context where extremist, illiberal, and antidemocratic strands in society rise and flourish. The ultimate risks are fragmentation, intolerant agonism, and antagonism. When a political party degenerates into a faction, the damage it does to society is long-lasting as the pernicious way they draw lines of conflict and the militant and authoritarian dynamics they encourage persist. So, even if the faction loses the democratic struggle and can be successfully contained, rehabilitating the agonistic dynamics of democracy and mending the bonds between adversaries take time. This is a process of political recovery that should be carefully managed by agonistic political parties. To be sure, one may argue that expecting political parties to behave responsibly and trusting them to perform their democratic function well is akin to trusting the fox to guard the henhouse. Although this is a point that cannot be overlooked, this doesn’t change the reality that the quality of democracy we live in largely depends on how well political parties perform their political function. All existing democracies are party democracies. And democracies depend on political parties to keep their agonistic dynamics alive. Therefore, we should take their

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democratic function seriously and explore what it means to have better political parties. Since political parties are here to stay, it is crucial to have an account of agonistic political party.

Conclusion The agonistic democratic approach works within existing political structures and aims to reveal their democratic potential in an attempt to reform them. The agonistic emphasis on political parties is based on the essential role they already play in democratic politics and their political capabilities. When political parties perform their political function well, they prevent the emergence of extremist identities that are incompatible with liberal democracy and temper militant democratic identities and authoritarian tendencies. With their great influence on the political discourse and collective political identifications, political parties have a significant role to play in fostering agonistic solidarity and creating agonistic citizens. That’s why the agonistic democratic approach puts emphasis on political parties.108 The fact that political parties at times behave irresponsibly does not mean that they do not have the capability and responsibility to perform their political function well. The account I offer here puts political parties under the spotlight in order to emphasize their political responsibility in keeping the democratic struggle agonistic and peaceful.109 If political parties are to play the crucial democratic role described here, they should take their democratic responsibility seriously and citizens should hold them responsible when they stray away from the democratic path. For that we need to understand what parties are capable of and what we can expect of them. This brings us to the idea of agonistic political party and the question of what it means for political parties to perform their democratic function well.

Notes 1. Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 200 and 223; Paulina Tambakaki, “The Tasks of Agonism and Agonism to the Task: Introducing ‘Chantal Mouffe’s Agonism and the Politics of Passion,’” Parallax 20, no. 2 (2014), 1.

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2. I have in mind theorists inspired by Rancière who are critical of any attempts to propose a particular set of institutions as this would be defending a police order. From this perspective, politics is about challenging the fundamental terms of the sensible and its repartitioning. Thus, any attempt to propose institutions would be offensive. See Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 30. 3. See Andrew Schaap, “Political Theory and the Agony of Politics,” Political Studies Review, no. 5 (2007), 56–74. 4. The former was the fate of communitarianism. Once liberal theory’s main rival, it has long been dismissed as a viable political vision. 5. See Schaap, “Political Theory and the Agony of Politics”; Thomas Fossen, “Agonism and the Law,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 38, no. 3 (2012), 327–331. 6. Ed Wingenbach’s Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy Is the First Work That Offers a Systematic Treatment of Agonism and Political Institutions. Wingenbach argues that a modified version of Rawlsian political liberalism is the best political framework that provides the conditions for that sustains agonistic dynamics of democracy. See Ed Wingenbach, Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011). For a recent discussion of how agonistic ideas could inform democratic designs, see Marie Paxton, Agonistic Democracy: Rethinking Political Institutions in Pluralist Times (New York: Routledge, 2019). 7. See Andreas Kalyvas, “The Democratic Narcissis: The Agonism of the Ancients Compared to That of the (Post)Moderns,” in Law and Agonistic Politics, ed. Andrew Schaap (Burlington: Ashgate, 2009), 15– 41; David Owen, “The Expressive Agon: On Political Agency in a Constitutional Democratic Polity,” in Law and Agonistic Politics, ed. Andrew Schaap (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 71–86. 8. Chantal Mouffe, Agonistics (London: Verso, 2013), xii. 9. Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), 101; Mouffe, On the Political, 31, 52; Mouffe, Agonistics, xii. 10. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 102; Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Verso, 2005), 20. 11. Mark Wenman, Agonistic Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 202–205. 12. Mouffe, Agonistics, xii. 13. Mouffe, Agonistics, 125. 14. Íñigo Errejón and Chantal Mouffe, Podemos: In the Name of the People (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2016), 112–113. 15. Wingenbach, Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy, 84. 16. Wingenbach, Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy, 85.

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17. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 1, 80, 114; Mouffe, On the Political, 26–30 and 69–70; Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993), 5. 18. Mouffe, On the Political, 69. 19. Mouffe, Agonistics, 119. 20. Errejón and Mouffe, Podemos: In the Name of the People, 99; Mouffe, On the Political, 66. 21. Chantal Mouffe, For a Left Populism (London: Verso, 2018), 17. 22. Mouffe, Agonistics, 119; Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 80. 23. Errejón and Mouffe, Podemos: In the Name of the People, 55 and 103. 24. Mouffe, On the Political, 30; Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 114; Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 5. 25. Errejón and Mouffe, Podemos: In the Name of the People, 99. Given Mouffe’s recent defense of Left-Wing Populism this point may be confusing. Mouffe’s defense of Left-Wing Populism should be read as a pragmatic and contingent defense of populism. For Mouffe, LeftWing populism emerges as the only viable political strategy to contest the current neoliberal hegemony and the growing power of Right-Wing Populism. The objective is to revive an agonistic political space while, at the same time, radicalizing democracy. See Mouffe, For a Left Populism. Bat-Ami Bar-On criticizes Mouffe’s defense of Left Populism as both futile and risky. See Bat-Ami Bar On, “But Is It Fascism?” Journal of Social Philosophy 50, no. 4 (2019), 2–3. 26. Mouffe, The Return of the Political; Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, xi, 7, 80, 114; Mouffe, On the Political, 28–30, 32, 66, 69, 70–71; Mouffe, Agonistics, 123–124. 27. Mouffe, For a Left Populism, 56–57. 28. In the Return of the Political she merely introduces the idea, but it is in On the Political that we find a more developed discussion of the role of political party from an agonistic perspective. 29. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 5. 30. Mouffe, On the Political, 22. 31. Mouffe, On the Political, 23. 32. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 5. 33. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 5; Mouffe, On the Political, 23. 34. Mouffe, Agonistics, 126. Errejón and Mouffe, Podemos: In the Name of the People, 85. 35. Mouffe, Agonistics, 115, Errejón and Mouffe, Podemos: In the Name of the People, 85. 36. Mouffe argues that political parties should channel social movements in a particular direction. In the absence of such channeling not only movements fail to engage with political institutions and thus cannot transform them, but also they may take a reactionary direction. For

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38. 39. 40. 41.

42.

43.

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instance, she observes, the 15 May Movement in Spain “would have come to nothing without Podemos, which finally managed to capitalize on all that energy.” See Errejón and Mouffe, Podemos: In the Name of the People, 70. White and Ypi also point out that social movements have the capacity to articulate political identities and act as carries of political memory, they cannot substitute political parties. See Jonathan White and Lea Ypi, “Rethinking the Modern Prince: Partisanship and the Democratic Ethos,” Political Studies 58, no. 4 (2010), 809–828. Chantal Mouffe, “Populism Is a Necessity,” The European, May 1, 2014, https://www.theeuropean.de/en/chantal-mouffe--4/8420-whythe-eu-needs-populism. Mouffe, “Populism is a necessity.” White and Ypi, “Rethinking the Modern Prince: Partisanship and the Democratic Ethos,” 816. Mouffe, For a Left Populism, 55–56. Muirhead and Rosenblum argue that parties draw lines of division and shape conflict of will. This aspect of the agonistic political party I reconstruct from Mouffe’s theory is similar to Muirhead and Rosenblum. See Russell Muirhead and Nancy Rosenblum, “Political Liberalism vs. “The Great Game of Politics”: The Politics of Political Liberalism,” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 1 (March 2006), 99–108; Russell Muirhead and Nancy Rosenblum, “The Partisan Connection,” California Law Review Circuit, no. 3 (2012), 99–112. There are, however, significant differences between the account of agonistic political party I advance here and Muirhead and Rosenblum’s account of political party. Mouffe’s approach is significantly different in the way it connects political passions and political parties and the role she attributes to political parties in pacifying society through democratization. For a brief discussion of the main differences between an agonistic approach to partisanship and Muirhead’s reasonable partisanship, see my “Democracy and Peace: Is Partisanship Good for Democracy?” in Peaceful Approaches for a More Peaceful World, ed. Sanjay Lal (Leiden: Brill, 2022), forthcoming. Mouffe, For a Left Populism, 56 and 88. This is a point Laclau and Mouffe developed in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. It is one of the fundamental ideas of Mouffe-s anti-essentialism. See Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 2001). See, for example, Cherly Hall, “Passions and Constraint: The Marginalization of Passion in Liberal Political Theory,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2002), 727–748. Michael Walzer argues that it is not possible to exclude passions from politics as passions are necessary for developing liberal commitments. See Michael Walzer, Politics and

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44.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

Passions: Towards a More Egalitarian Liberalism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004). Mouffe, “Populism Is a Necessity”; Mouffe, On the Political, 24. Mouffe draws a distinction between passions and emotions. She notes that the latter are usually attached to individuals. See Chantal Mouffe, “By Way of a Postscript,” Parallax 20, no. 2 (2014), 149 and 155. Mouffe, “Populism Is a Necessity”; Mouffe, For a Left Populism, 72–74. Mouffe, On the Political, 26. Mouffe, On the Political, 26. Mouffe, On the Political, 26, Mouffe, On the Political, 104; Mouffe, Agonistics, 7. Mouffe, Agonistics, 7. Mouffe, On the Political, 24. Mouffe, “By Way of a Postscript,” 156; Mouffe, For a Left Populism, 73. Mihaela Mihai, “Theorizing Agonistic Emotions,” Parallax 20, no. 2 (2014), 40. Mouffe, On the Political, 6. Mouffe, “Populism Is a Necessity.” Mouffe, On the Political, 25. Mouffe, On the Political, 25. Mouffe, On the Political, 25. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 5. Mouffe, On the Political, 29. Mouffe, On the Political, 126. This point is among the commonalities between the agonistic account of political party I propose here and Rosenblum’s and White and Ypi’s accounts of political party and partisanship. According to Rosenblum creating politically relevant lines of division and shaping political conflict are among distinctive political work political parties and parties do. See Nancy Rosenblum, “The Moral Distinctiveness of ‘Party ID’,” Cato Unbound, February 2, 2009, https://www.cato-unbound.org/2009/ 02/02/nancy-rosenblum/moral-distinctiveness-party-id. White and Ypi argues that the comprehensive, stable, and coherent political narratives that parties and partisans create help citizens make sense of politics render the political field manageable and formulation of public opinion possible. See Jonathan White and Lea Ypi, “Rethinking the Modern Prince: Partisanship and the Democratic Ethos,” 810–816. White and Ypi point out that in the absence of partisan competition “individuals and groups would act in an uncoordinated fashion and lacking a collective mechanism for articulating and expressing the claims their actions in the public sphere.” Among the tasks political parties perform include defining issues as problems, putting them on the political agenda, signaling alternatives, scrutinizing the presuppositions, and engaging

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63. 64.

65.

66. 67.

68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73.

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with the opponent. Jonathan White, Jonathan and Lea Ypi, “On Partisan Political Justification,” American Political Science Review 105, no. 2 (2011), 392. Mouffe, For a Left Populism, 56; Mouffe, On the Political, 25. As Wingenbach notes, “agonistic democracy requires political institutions to avoid politics devolving into scapegoating and warfare, and the institutions best suited to this task are likely to be somewhat distanced from the crowds or masses whose sovereignty democracy is meant to express.” Wingenbach, Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy, 125. This is a distinction introduced by Aristotle in relation to the human function. Aristotle argues that eudaimonia, described as human happiness, flourishing, and living well, can be understood in terms of excellent performance of human function. Aristotle recognizes that it is possible for one to perform the human function poorly. Consider for instance a flute player who is not good at playing the flute. A good flute player, Aristotle argues, is one who plays the flute in an excellent way. See Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 12–14. Aristotle’s distinction is relevant when we consider the democratic function of political parties. Political parties could perform their democratic function in many different ways that weaken the agonistic dynamics of society. However, I argue, good performance of democratic function enhances democracy. Thus, simple performance of function is not sufficient to sustain agonistic politics. Wingenbach, Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy, 99. Chantal Mouffe, “Religion, Liberal Democracy and Citizenship,” in Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World, ed. H. de Vries and L. E. Sullivan (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), 71. Mouffe, “Religion, Liberal Democracy and Citizenship,” 74. Mouffe, “Religion, Liberal Democracy and Citizenship,” 75. Mouffe, “Religion, Liberal Democracy and Citizenship,” 73. Mouffe, “Religion, Liberal Democracy and Citizenship,” 75. Mouffe, Agonistics, 8. Moreover, Mouffe emphasizes, when we characterize the political opponent as a “moral disease” or an “evil force”, we fail to pay attention to why such movements emerge and how they become successful. It is tempting to characterize the other side as immoral, corrupt, and deplorable which, for us, explains how it is that our political adversaries defend obviously wrong and offensive projects and policies. But such categorization doesn’t let one to come up with a proper political analysis of the other side and understand why they really defend what they defend. For instance, it is precisely due to their moralistic approach to the rise of right-wing populist movements that mainstream parties in

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74.

75.

76.

77.

78.

79. 80. 81. 82. 83.

Europe failed to offer a properly political analysis of the new political conjuncture and recognize that such parties articulate “real democratic demands” which are not considered by mainstream political parties. See Mouffe, Agonistics, 71. Nico Carpentier and Bart Cammaerts, “Hegemony, Democracy, Agonism and Journalism: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe,” Journalism Studies, no. 7 (2006), 968. A good example is Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric in 2016. To mobilize the white middle-class vote, Trump has claimed to give voice to their concerns. However, he did that by tapping into the already existing antiimmigration and xenophobic attitudes in society thereby radicalizing the anti-immigrant sentiment. See, Donald Brand, “How Donald Trump and Nativism Ruined the GOP,” Fortune, June 21, 2016, https://fortune. com/2016/06/21/donald-trump-nativism-gop/. This way of framing the concerns of middle-class Americans left no room for agonistic engagement as with the evil outsider -and insider- there is nothing to negotiate. See, for instance, “Big rise in German attacks on migrant homes in 2015,” BBC, October 9, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-eur ope-34487562; “Migrant Crisis: Finland Protesters Throw Fireworks at Buses,” BBC, September 25, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-34358410; “German Mayoral Candidate Reker Stabbed over Refugee Support,” BBC, October 17, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-34561531. On the value of the national identity, see David Miller, “The Ethical Significance of Nationality,” Ethics 98, no. 4 (1988), 647–662; Yael Tamir, Why Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019). These arguments can be used as a theoretical basis to develop a position that questions taking in too many refuges while not invoking racist and xenophobic discourses. I use Muirhead and Rosenblum’s notion here. They argue that political parties have two main functions: regulating democratic rivalry and rehabilitating democratic politics. See Muirhead and Rosenblum, “Political Liberalism vs. “The Great Game of Politics”: The Politics of Political Liberalism”; Muirhead and Rosenblum, “The Partisan Connection”; Rosenblum, “The Moral Distinctiveness of ‘Party ID’”; Russell Muirhead, “A Defense of Party Spirit,” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 4 (December, 2006), 713–727. For a discussion of intolerant agonism, see Chapter 3 in this book. Mouffe, Agonistics, 8. Mouffe, Agonistics, 9. Mouffe, Agonistics, 9. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 103.

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84. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 103. 85. As long as agonistic citizens have allegiance to the ethico-political values of liberal democratic regime, even religious groups can “intervene in the political arena in favor of or against certain causes.” See Mouffe, “Religion, Liberal Democracy and Citizenship,” 325. 86. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 103. 87. Mouffe, Agonistics, 8. 88. Chantal Mouffe, “Democratic Politics and the Question of Identity,” in The Identity in Question, ed. John Rajchman (London: Routledge, 1995), 36. 89. Mouffe, “Democratic Politics and the Question of Identity,” 36. 90. Mouffe, “Democratic Politics and the Question of Identity,” 38. 91. Muirhead, “A Defense of Party Spirit,” 723. 92. Jonathan and Ypi, “On partisan political justification,” 7. 93. Muirhead and Rosenblum, “Political Liberalism vs. “The Great Game of Politics”: The Politics of Political Liberalism,” 104. 94. This is the view defended in How Democracies Die. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Broadway Books, 2018). 95. Colbert I. King, “The GOP Once Knew What to Do about Problems Line Marjorie Taylor Greene,” The Washington Post, February 1, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/02/01/goponce-knew-what-do-about-problems-like-marjorie-taylor-greene/. 96. King, “The GOP Once Knew What to Do about Problems Line Marjorie Taylor Greene.” A good example of failing to act as a gatekeeper is the case of Marjorie Taylor Greene. By bringing a candidate who endorsed multiple conspiracy theories that depict the Democratic Party as a “cabal of Satan-worshiping, child-abusing, deep-state villains” and support violence against political opponents to the mainstream, the Republican Party failed to fulfill its political responsibility to protect agonistic rivalry and sustain agonistic dynamics of democracy. The main issue is that once such conspiracy theories move from the fringes to the mainstream and gain traction, there will be those who endorse them. And even if at some point the RNC rejects Greene, the harmful political positions she represented during her campaign will continue to exist as a legitimate political alternative for many who supported her campaign. 97. See my discussion of agonistic solidarity in “Democracy and Peace: Is Partisanship Good for Democracy?” in Peaceful Approaches for a More Peaceful World, ed. Sanjay Lal (Leiden: Brill, 2022), forthcoming. 98. This is an underdeveloped current in Mouffe’s thought. Mouffe argues that belonging to the political community requires the acceptance of the rules that prescribe norms of conduct. The political association is held together by the rules of civil intercourse. What Mouffe invokes but

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99. 100.

101.

102.

103.

104. 105. 106.

does not develop is the idea that the tie between the agents is “that of loyalty among to one another.” Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 66–69. Agonistic solidarity is an extension of citizen’s recognition of the conditions that specify their common concern, but it is different from one’s loyalty to a particular political association. It refers to the tie among citizens of the political association. See Muirhead, “A Defense of Party Spirit.” On the significance of crosscutting identities and the dangers of oversimplification, see Iredell Jenkins, “The Conditions of Peace,” The Monist 57:4 (October 1973), 523. See, for instance, Avery Kolers, “Dynamics of Solidarity,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 20, no. 4 (2012), 367. Kolers notes that solidarity is always agonistic since it involves political struggle. Political movements that clearly express their aim as undermining liberty and equality are deeply at odds with the liberal democratic regime and thus they should be characterized as illegitimate. However, in most cases, as Rummens points out, it is not clear when a political opponent “who disagrees about the proper interpretation of the values of liberty and equality becomes an enemy who is no longer committed to these values.” Rummens, “Democracy as a Non-Hegemonic Struggle? Disambiguating Chantal Mouffe’s Agonistic Model of Politics,” Constellations 16, no. 3 (2019), 388. As Rummens rightly observes, Mouffe does not provide a proper account of how to identify the potential “political enemy” of liberal democracy.” Rummens, “Democracy as a Non-Hegemonic Struggle? Disambiguating Chantal Mouffe’s Agonistic Model of Politics,” 388. The ambiguity about the political enemy of liberal democracy could very well be exploited by competing political forces since the way they depict their adversaries is often motivated by short term political gain. Such moments call for political judgment especially when the line between adversary and enemy is ambiguous and could be conveniently drawn for political gain. Emily Stewart, “Watch John McCain defend Barack Obama against a racist voter in 2008,” VOX , September 1, 2018, https://www.vox. com/policy-and-politics/2018/8/25/17782572/john-mccain-barackobama-statement-2008-video. See Gürsözlü, “Democracy and Peace: Is Democracy Good for Peace.” Mouffe, On the Political, 121. See Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book 2 chapter 3 and Madison, Letter X. This is also how White and Ypi define factions. For them, a faction is always oriented to private interest and factionalism involves efforts to harness political power for the benefit of one social group among several. See White, Jonathan and Lea Ypi, “On partisan political justification,” 382.

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107. In response to Mouffe’s defense of left-wing populism as a cure for right-wing populism, Bat-Ami Bar On rightly points out the authoritarian tendencies of populist movements. See Bat-Ami Bar On, “But Is It Fascism?” What follows from Bar-On’s discussion is the incompatibility between populism and agonistic democracy. This reveals another tension between Mouffe’s commitment to radical democracy as a left-wing project and her defense of agonistic democracy. 108. This does not mean that we can’t envision alternatives to political parties or to current democratic structures. But, as of now, there is no other viable political mechanism that can perform the political function that political parties perform. In the absence of a viable alternative to political parties, we should consider what we can expect of political parties. 109. I have argued that political parties should avoid exceptions to mutual tolerance and adversarial respect, moralize politics, encourage militant identities and authoritarian identities as all of these are detrimental to agonistic democracy. However, since the goal is to strengthen agonistic solidarity, it is also reasonable to argue that they should be ready to accept democratic defeat, should not undermine citizens faith in the democratic process, and should be able to resist the arrogance of power if they win an election.

References Bar On, Bat-Ami. “But Is It Fascism?” Journal of Social Philosophy 50, no. 4 (2019): 407–424. BBC. “Big Rise in German Attacks on Migrant Homes in 2015.” October 9, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34487562. BBC. “German Mayoral Candidate Reker Stabbed over Refugee Support.” October 17, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34561531. BBC. “Migrant Crisis: Finland Protesters Throw Fireworks at Buses.” September 25, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34358410. Brand, Donald. “How Donald Trump and Nativism Ruined the GOP.” Fortune, June 21, 2016. https://fortune.com/2016/06/21/donald-trump-nativismgop/. Carpentier, Nico, and Bart Cammaerts. “Hegemony, Democracy, Agonism and Journalism: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe.” Journalism Studies no. 7 (2006): 964–975. Fossen, Thomas. “Agonistic Critiques of Liberalism: Perfection and Emancipation.” Contemporary Political Theory 7 (2008): 376–394. Gürsözlü, Fuat. “Democracy and Peace: Is Partisanship Good for Democracy?” In Peaceful Approaches for a More Peaceful World, edited by Sanjay Lal, 8–29. Leiden: Brill, 2022.

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Hall, Cherly. “Passions and Constraint: The Marginalization of Passion in Liberal Political Theory.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 28, no. 6 (2002): 727–748. Kalyvas, Andreas. “The Democratic Narcissis: The Agonism of the Ancients Compared to that of the (Post)Moderns.” In Law and Agonistic Politics, edited by Andrew Schaap, 15–41. Burlington: Ashgate, 2009. King, Colbert I. “The GOP Once Knew What to Do About Problems Line Marjorie Taylor Greene.” The Washington Post, February 1, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/02/01/gop-onceknew-what-do-about-problems-like-marjorie-taylor-greene/. Kolers, Avery. “Dynamics of Solidarity.” The Journal of Political Philosophy 20, no. 4 (2012): 365–383. Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. London: Verso, 2001. Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. How Democracies Die. New York: Broadway Books, 2018. Mihai, Mihaela. “Theorizing Agonistic Emotions.” Parallax 20, no. 2 (2014): 31–48. Miller, David. “The Ethical Significance of Nationality.” Ethics 98, no. 4 (1988): 647–662. Mouffe, Chantal. The Return of the Political. London: Verso, 1993. Mouffe, Chantal. “Democratic Politics and the Question of Identity.” In The Identity in Question, edited by John Rajchman, 33–46. London: Routledge, 1995. Mouffe, Chantal. The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso, 2000. Mouffe, Chantal. On the Political. London: Verso, 2005. Mouffe, Chantal. “Religion, Liberal Democracy and Citizenship.” In Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World, edited by Henry de Vries and L. E. Sullivan, 318–326. New York: Fordham University Press, 2006. Mouffe, Chantal. Agonistics. London: Verso, 2013. Mouffe, Chantal. “By Way of a Postscript.” Parallax 20, no. 2 (2014): 149–157. Mouffe, Chantal. “Populism Is a Necessity.” The European, May 1, 2014. https://www.theeuropean.de/en/chantal-mouffe--4/8420-why-the-euneeds-populism. Mouffe, Chantal. For a Left Populism. London: Verso, 2018. Muirhead, Russell. “A Defense of Party Spirit.” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 4 (Dec. 2006): 713–727. Muirhead, Russell, and N. L. Rosenblum. “Political Liberalism vs. “The Great Game of Politics”: The Politics of Political Liberalism.” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 1 (March 2006): 99–108. Muirhead, Russell, and N. L. Rosenblum. “The Partisan Connection.” California Law Review Circuit 3 (March 2012): 99–112.

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Owen, David. “The Expressive Agon: On Political Agency in a Constitutional Democratic Polity.” In Law and Agonistic Politics, edited by Andrew Schaap, 71–86. Burlington: Ashgate, 2009. Paxton, Marie. Agonistic Democracy: Rethinking Political Institutions in Pluralist Times. New York: Routledge, 2019. Rosenblum, Nancy. “The Moral Distinctiveness of ‘Party ID’.” Cato Unbound, February 2, 2009. https://www.cato-unbound.org/2009/02/02/nancy-ros enblum/moral-distinctiveness-party-id. Rummens, Stephan. “Democracy as a Non-hegemonic Struggle? Disambiguating Chantal Mouffe’s Agonistic Model of Politics.” Constellations 16, no. 3 (2009): 377–391. Schaap, Andrew. “Political Theory and the Agony of Politics.” Political Studies Review no. 5 (2007): 56–74. Schaap, Andrew. Law and Agonistic Politics. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2013. Tamir, Yael. Why Nationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019. Walzer, Michael. Politics and Passions: Towards a More Egalitarian Liberalism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004. Wenman, Mark. Agonistic Democracy: Constituent Power in the Era of Globalisation. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. White, Jonathan, and Lea Ypi. “Rethinking the Modern Prince: Partisanship and the Democratic Ethos.” Political Studies 58, no. 4 (2010): 809–828. White, Jonathan, and Lea Ypi. “On Partisan Political Justification.” American Political Science Review 105, no. 2 (2011): 381–396.

CHAPTER 6

Thinking Peace Agonistically

The literature on the nature of peace almost exclusively focuses on the concepts of negative peace and positive peace. Understood as the absence of direct and physical violence, the concept of negative peace is what most of us mean when we say “peace.” By separating peace from its opposite, violence, the concept of negative peace offers a clear standard to distinguish when human relations are peaceful and when not. It highlights the moment when one chooses to use direct and physical violence to achieve an end and thus puts the emphasis on the agent’s intentional decision.1 This means that whatever reasons one has for choosing to use direct and physical violence, it is a decision that prioritizes another end, i.e. justice, equality, freedom, and so on, over peace. In that sense, negative peace does not allow individuals and institutions to comfortably justify their violent actions and policies and obscure the moment of decision by invoking the significance or urgency of another desirable goal. Using violence is an expression of a choice and one needs to take responsibility for that. It is for these reasons that many argued that we should understand peace negatively, as the absence of violence. However, when we define peace negatively, we may have to commit to the position that a society in which there is significant injustice, poverty, discrimination, fear, or oppression could be viewed as peaceful.2 We would be compelled to concede that unless there is actual physical violence, a society in which there is deep discord that is ready to escalate into physical violence would © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Gürsözlü, Agonistic Democracy and Political Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05999-5_6

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be a peaceful one. For these reasons, many peace philosophers have heavily criticized the idea of negative peace and stated that genuine peace refers to more than the absence of violence. Peace, they argue, should be understood positively as the presence of a desirable condition in which there is justice, harmony, unity, equity, stability, sustainability, order, or unity.3 The terms negative peace and positive peace were introduced by Johan Galtung to define the significant distinction between the two ideas of peace and argue for the need to define peace broadly.4 The idea of positive peace is not new. Many historical cultures and religions have described peace along the lines of positive peace by referring to harmonious relations, unity, agreement, and resolution of conflict.5 But, only in the twentieth century with many peace scholars arguing for the need to move beyond the negative peace paradigm the concept of positive peace has emerged as a strong contender in the field of peace philosophy. The concept of positive peace broadens our understanding of peace so as to include many harmful and violent relations. It is in that sense that peace scholars argue that positive peace is genuine peace. The concept of negative peace simply reduces violence to physical direct violence thereby leaving all other forms of violence unaddressed. Some peace theorists, however, criticize the concept of positive peace precisely due to its broad nature and argue that it blurs the boundaries between peace and other valuable concepts such as justice.6 Clearly there is a tension between the two ideas of peace. The concept of negative peace formulates a commonly held intuition about the nature of peace while the concept of positive peace enriches the way we understand peace by enlarging the boundaries of the concept of peace and challenging the dominance of negative peace. The two ideas of peace reveal two different dimensions of peace. It is these two concepts that dominate the peace discourse and shape the way we think about peace. I think there is more to peace than what the concepts of negative and positive peace describe and agonistic theory has something important to contribute to our understanding of the nature of peace. Approaching peace from an agonistic perspective allows us to see another dimension of peace that has so far not been given due attention. With its emphasis on the inevitability of conflict and exclusion and focus on contestation and agonistic struggle, it doesn’t seem that the world of agonistic politics can be comfortably associated with peace. The agonistic perspective does not promise a society free of conflict and violence, a world of harmony and unity, or enduring stability and order.

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Such ideals that describe the perfect human condition for most of us do not follow from the premises of agonistic theory. And so it seems that in a field defined by negative peace and positive peace, the agonistic perspective might not have much to contribute to our understanding of peace. Indeed, if we understand peace merely along the above lines, it is reasonable to argue that a concept of peace does not follow from agonism. It follows that we should dismiss agonism as a valuable approach to peace. But, what is precisely at stake here is whether we should limit our understanding of peace to negative and positive peace. I suggest that the unique perspective provided by agonistic theory changes the way we understand peace and reveal another dimension of peace. My sense is that the dimension of peace that the agonistic perspective implies cannot be reduced to the concepts of negative peace and positive peace. The concept of negative peace puts emphasis on direct physical violence and presents the absence of individual moments of violence as an ideal of peace. The concept of positive peace puts emphasis on structures that create violence and proposes desirable states such as presence of justice, harmony, and stability as an ideal of peace. The agonistic perspective concurs with the criticism of negative peace that it offers a limited account of peace. It recognizes the value of expanding the scope of peace as there are forms of violence other than physical violence such as exclusion, marginalization, and, oppression. Yet, agonism cannot define peace in terms of an ideal state as that would indicate the hegemony of a version of reality and naturalization of particular relations of power. One important change that comes with the agonistic perspective is a focus on the constitutive tensions of society such as stabilization and disruption, ordering and contestation, normalization and resistance, naturalization and politicization, sedimentation and subversion, and so on. A third concept of peace follows from the idea that while hegemony is inevitable, strong hegemony is not. The possibility of weak hegemony brings to the fore the significance of the process of continual negotiation between the constitutive tensions of society.7 What follows is an idea of agonistic peace that refers to the process of struggle understood as a dynamic equilibrium wherein the constitutive tensions of society are not resolved in favor of any side thereby keeping spaces of contestation alive. Thus defined, agonistic peace is neither a moment nor a state, but it is a fragile condition brought about by the perpetual struggle between the constitutive dynamics of society.

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In this concluding chapter, I first discuss Duane Cady’s and Johan Galtung’s positive peace approaches. Both Cady’s and Galtung’s accounts of positive peace share significant agonistic elements which is uncommon in the positive peace literature. I suggest that despite valuing conflict, recognizing its permanence, and viewing hegemony as a problem, Cady ends up proposing harmony and unity as an ideal of peace. Galtung’s concept of cultural violence brings the peace discourse closer to agonistic theory by expanding the concept of peace so as to include the elements of culture that create and normalize violence. Yet, failing to recognize the nature of hegemony, Galtung does not take hegemonic violence seriously. Second, I turn to post-structuralist peace theories and, in particular, agonistic peace approaches as developed by International Relations theorists. Here we find two dominant strands of agonistic peace. One relies on Mouffe’s agonistic theory and the other draws upon Foucault’s analysis of power. I do not disagree with the Mouffean agonistic peace concept as I think it follows from Mouffe’s theory and it could be described as an account of agonistic peace. However, this concept of agonistic peace doesn’t take into consideration the key role of hegemony in agonistic theory and thus it narrowly focuses on agonistic politics. In doing so, agonistic peace theorists overlook agonistic perspective’s most essential contribution to the discussion about the nature of peace. Their account of agonistic peace does not constitute another dimension of peace, rather operating within the negative peace framework, they defend Mouffe’s agonistic politics as an effective way to bring about negative peace. The Foucaultian inspired account of agonistic peace offers significant insights into how peace has the potential to constitute a disciplinary order. Thus, this approach urges us to pay attention to the operations of power in the constitution of a peaceful order. The issue with this account of agonistic peace is that it reduces peace to a politics of resistance and as a result empties the concept of peace in order to turn it into a critical strategy without any substance. I suggest that the agonistic perspective can produce a positive theory of peace without downplaying operations of power and the significance of contestation. In the final section, drawing on Mouffe’s anti-essentialist perspective and agonistic theory, I propose a concept of agonistic peace that identifies peace in the dynamic equilibrium between the constitutive tensions of society.

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Two Perspectives on Positive Peace Positive Peace as Harmonious Community A positive conception of peace matters, Cady writes, because it provides us with a clear vision that challenges the existing relations of power. In the absence of a positive conception of peace, we define peace negatively and “thus we are tempted to use any and all means necessary to preserve the status quo.”8 It is the dominant powers who benefit from such preservation. A positive conception of peace threatens established powers as it promises change. It portrays a vision of ideal society to strive for and introduces a critical tool that allows us to contest injustice, inequality, and oppression from the perspective of peace. As many peace theorists emphasize, however, defining such a vision is not an easy task. For most positive peace theorists, a society of positive peace is characterized by harmonious relations and a state of existence without conflict and division. It is clear that an account of positive peace that views harmony in terms of overcoming or transcending is not compatible with the agonistic assumptions about the permanence of conflict and its positive role in sustaining a democratic society. This is where Cady’s approach differs from traditional accounts of positive peace. His positive peace approach highlights that not only there have always been tensions, divisions, and conflicts in society, but there always will be. He points out that given the facts about human individuality, diversity, and self-concern are unalterable, conflict and division are inevitable aspects of society and human relationships. This is not a condition that we should try to overcome, rather it is something that should be appreciated as this diversity “affords richness and variety that can yield constructive relationships.”9 Cady is aware that division and conflict could take a destructive shape. He notes that societal division undermines shared purposes and mutual interests and thus inhibits possible cooperation by keeping people at odds with one another. What needs to be done to counter the pervasive forces of divisiveness is to cultivate a sense of unity. And this is how, Cady argues, we can build positive peace. The goal is not to try to overcome conflict and division, rather to foster a sense of commonness that “prevails over the divisiveness of conflicting interests, opposing purposes, disunity.”10 This is an ideal of harmony “anchored by a spirit of tolerance and respect.” Viewed in this light, “differences are seen as enhancing, broadening, and deepening possibilities for human experience rather than as threats that must be destroyed or dominated.”11

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Cady’s valorization of conflict and difference and his turn to tolerance and respect as the central ideas of an ethos that can tame the excesses of too much division portrays a surprisingly agonistic account. However, when we focus on how Cady describes the nature of commonness and harmony, we realize that Cady’s ideal community of positive peace is deeply at odds with agonistic assumptions about the nature of society. Despite his description of peace as a social accord that “celebrates plurality as a reflection of the multiplicity and complexity of the world,”12 the sense of commonness Cady proposes is expected to be strong enough to overcome divisiveness and estrangement of competing interests and cultural differences. The agonistic idea of letting inevitable conflict and division play out within a political context informed by tolerance and respect is now replaced with an ideal of harmony that implies a yearning for overcoming division and cultural difference.13 Within this positive peace framework, peacemaking is defined as agreement making. The goal is to promote mutual understanding in order to reconcile our deep differences. A harmonious and cooperative world is possible if we could foster a sufficiently strong sense of unity and community that overcomes our differences. Ultimately, Cady ends up advancing a cosmopolitan ideal when he states that the goal is to enlarge our moral vision by widening our sense of community such that the consciousness of the whole becomes our guiding perspective.14 It is not that Cady doesn’t recognize that some conflicts, and in particular ones about the fundamental principles of society, sometimes can only be resolved through struggle. But, for Cady, the reason why we cannot overcome conflict through discussion is because we have conflicting loyalties, that is, our sense of community is not strong enough to override our loyalties to family, kin, nation, ethnic group, race, religion, and so on. And the cure is an ideal of positive peace that encourages us “to orchestrate these conflicting loyalties into harmony by appealing to the broadest possible community and asserting that the good of the whole is to the ultimate advantage of each (rather than reverse).”15 This is where Cady’s positive peace theory parts way with the agonistic approach. At this point, we have to conclude that the ideal Cady proposes implies a society without conflict, division, and antagonism. It is a society that is fully cooperative and inclusive; a society where all differences are expected to identify with the perspective of the whole to curb the pull of particular attachments. However, this implies a society without power

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and division which is an impossibility according to the agonistic perspective. Antagonism, conflict, and division cannot be overcome and the need to deal with them will never disappear.16 Recognizing that any society is of a hegemonic nature requires abandoning “the hope for a perfectly reconciled and harmonious society.”17 Any “perspective of the whole” is politically constructed and there is no objectively existing perspective of the whole that is free of power. As such, any perspective of the whole, unity, or commonness is always an expression of power. Despite starting from agonistic premises, Cady misses an important opportunity to offer an agonistic account of positive peace and ends up embracing an ideal of a harmonious and cooperative community without conflict, division, and exclusion. Galtung’s Account of Cultural Violence Galtung conceives peace as the absence of violence. This means that to understand the nature of peace we should understand the nature of violence. One way to understand violence is to describe it as the use of direct physical force with the intention to cause harm or injury. This is called direct violence. If violence refers to direct physical violence, peace is understood negatively as the absence of direct physical violence. A narrow understanding of violence leads to a narrow account of peace. For Galtung, to theorize certain forms of harm and injury that are the result of the organization of society and its structures, we need an extended concept of violence. He calls this new concept “structural violence.” Discrimination, marginalization, and oppression are examples of structural violence. For instance, an incident of domestic violence can be understood as a simple crime, but in a society where domestic violence is an epidemic, violence is built into the structure. Structural violence shows up as “unequal power, uneven distribution of resources, and consequently as unequal life chances.”18 Direct violence is personal and visible whereas structural violence is less obvious and often invisible to society.19 Introducing the concept of structural violence challenges the traditional understanding of violence by removing the link between violence and acts of intentional agents and by locating violence in the social and political structures of society. This radical move paves the way for recognizing the significance of the cultural terrain: the roots of the roots, the deep culture, “the cultural genetic code that generates cultural elements and reproduces itself through them.”20

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Galtung develops this perspective in his later work and expands his account of positive peace by introducing a third concept of violence: “cultural violence.” According to this idea, violence is not only identified in the personal or the structural, but it can also be located in the social context that structures meaning and shapes how we perceive reality. Galtung defines cultural violence as “those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.”21 This sort of violence is even more insidious, pervasive, and difficult to detect than structural violence since we’re dealing with the symbolic and deeply entrenched elements of the culture. Galtung describes cultural violence as a permanence that operates by constituting the taken-for-granted assumptions, norms, and perspectives perpetuated within a society.22 For Galtung cultural violence operates in two ways. It changes “the moral color of an act from red/wrong to green/right to at least yellow/acceptable.”23 For instance, for most people murder is right when done to protect the country, but wrong when done to further individual interests. The other way cultural violence operates is by obscuring reality such that we fail to realize the violence of an act or fact, or at least we don’t see it as violent.24 Thus, cultural violence either constitutes reality or mystifies it by making what would otherwise be visible opaque.25 In doing so, cultural violence “makes direct and structural violence look, even feel, right - or at least not wrong.”26 Galtung identifies six cultural domains that should be studied to reveal how cultural elements in these domains legitimize and justify direct and structural violence. Most of his discussion here is devoted to “ideology” and “religion.” And the common theme is the constitution of identity that transforms its exclusions into otherness. He argues that constructing a steep Self/Other gradient by way of “inflating, even exalting, the value of Self; deflating, even debasing, the value of Other” sets the stage for structural violence.27 When the Other is dehumanized and converted into an “it”, direct violence becomes a “psychologically possible duty.”28 Generally, Galtung explains, we can identify a “causal flow from cultural via structural to direct violence.”29 As this outline of Galtung’s theory of violence illustrates, the concept of cultural violence and the perspectival shift that comes with it share significant commonalities with the agonistic perspective. Galtung’s emphasis on the contingency of meaning and reality, the broader context within which meaning is provided, the role of settlements in determining

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the way we perceive others, and on the possible violence of us/them division brings his theory closer to the agonistic framework. Despite this fundamental shift in perspective, however, Galtung doesn’t pursue the implications of the cultural turn in his theory of violence. Here there are mainly two issues. The first is Galtung’s turn to Gandhi to overcome the Self/Other division. The way Galtung proceeds is similar to Cady’s prescription of unity and harmony after embracing conflict and division. Recognizing that constitution of identity always means exclusion, which is a possible source of violence, Galtung draws on Gandhi’s idea of unity to develop his response. For Galtung, the idea of unity understood as “closeness against separation” should counter the steep Self-Other that pits us against each other and “drive wedges in social space.”30 When we enjoy closeness with all forms of life, and in particular with human life, any cultural element that could function as justification of violence would lose their effectiveness. Such violent elements would be rejected when they come in conflict with this higher and “harder” axiom. The most important ethical consequence of embracing the “sacredness of all life” would be enhancing all life and hence, the promise of transcending conflict, division, and violence.31 Thus, like Cady, Galtung envisions an ideal society from which fundamental conflict, division, and exclusion are eliminated. He presents a noble ethical ideal for individuals to seek, but this perspective misses the hegemonic constitution of society and the exclusion and violence that is an inevitable part of that constitution. Galtung’s perspective fails to recognize that the creation of a collective identity requires the designation of an other which constitutes an outside in relation to which the collective identity constructs itself. Thus, the constitution of an “us”’ is already predicated on the exclusion of a “they” that prevents the closure of identity.32 Given the relational character of identity, a pluralistic society can’t be understood as the “coexistence of one by one,” rather pluralism is a constitutive condition that includes “subversion and overdetermination of one by the others.”33 That’s why any ideal based on the promise of eradicating conflict and division would be illusory as conflict and division are constitutive of human relations. The “wedges in social space” that Galtung aims to overcome are not caused by our differences, rather our identities are the product of the contexts that are always already marked by conflict and division.34 Given that conflict and division belong to the fabric of society, an ideal of a peaceful society that promises harmony, unity, and reconciliation would be an impossible society.35

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The second point that should be addressed is the limits of Galtung’s theory of cultural violence.36 Galtung argues that to understand how direct violence and structural violence are viewed as right or acceptable, we should be looking at “the root of the roots.” That’s why he turns to the cultural terrain as the social context that produces meaning. But, once we turn to the production of meaning, we realize that the way cultural violence operates cannot merely be understood as some aspects of culture serving to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence. If what is at stake here is the creation of meaning and definition of the normal and the natural, the real issue is hegemony. Each culture has various violent elements that generate Self/Other gradients. For an aspect of culture to make direct and structural violence look right or acceptable, these cultural elements need to successfully shape the common sense. Put differently, cultural violence is possible only when such violent cultural elements become hegemonic. For instance, the examples Galtung discuss such as racism, sexism, or national socialism can’t legitimize structural violence and make certain relations and hierarchies look right and natural simply by articulating a particular perspective. Rather, they naturalize and normalize certain relations and hierarchies by becoming hegemonic. Only then they can deeply shape the common sense and legitimize structural violence. And, as Galtung recognizes, only with the institutionalization of the violent structure and the internalization of the violent culture direct violence becomes “repetitive, ritualistic, like a vendetta.”37 So, what really is at stake in cultural violence is the hegemonic institution of social reality that creates identities, hierarchies, interests, and institutions. Understanding cultural violence as the hegemony of a particular perspective that normalizes and naturalizes direct and structural violence brings to the fore the idea that any hegemonic perspective has the potential to justify violence. A hegemonic articulation constitutes social reality and the common sense thereby defining what is natural, normal, reasonable, acceptable, and so on. And generating such a criterion for evaluation—a scale of worthiness—inevitably excludes and marginalizes by depicting some as less worthy, i.e. less natural, less normal, less reasonable, than others. Those who are placed “lower down on the scale of worthiness” are at risk of being converted into otherness.38 Thus viewed, we recognize the violent potential of a peace culture where many elements of culture serve to justify and legitimize peace. Such a peaceful society can exist only if the peaceful elements of culture become hegemonic and thus exclude and marginalize violent elements. Thus, a peace culture as

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opposed to a violent culture would still be an expression of hegemony. It would favor some identities, norms, and institutions over others while naturalizing its exclusion and marginalization. Similarly, the idea of unity Galtung defends does not take us beyond hegemony, rather it constitutes a common identity that should help us resist the divisive power of our particularities by way of transcending separateness. And for this common identity to deliver its promise it has to be hegemonic. The point is that once a perspective successfully structures the common sense and erases its traces of contingency, it appears acceptable, inevitable, and right thereby normalizing the use of violence against those who resist hegemonic power and threaten the “natural” order of things. It follows from this that the violence of hegemony does not merely reside in the structuring of the social, but also in its naturalization of violence in the name of defending, securing and maintaining order, unity, harmony, stability, common good, and even peace. Galtung seems to recognize that any hegemonic articulation by generating Self/Other gradients can justify structural and direct violence. He seems to highlight the dangers of hegemonic power when he writes that “a major task of peace research, and the peace movement in general, is that never-ending search for a peace culture - problematic, because of the temptation to institutionalize that culture, making it obligatory with the hope of internalizing it everywhere.”39 I think despite being aware of the risks of hegemony probably because he considers the possibility of a society without hegemony where conflict and division could be transcended, Galtung does not develop the idea of hegemonic violence. By not pursuing the implications of cultural violence Galtung fails to recognize that hegemony could be a source of cultural violence and cultural violence is an expression of hegemony. He notes that an extended concept of violence leads to an extended concept of peace.40 By expanding the definition of violence so as to include cultural violence, we arrive at a more comprehensive account of peace that refers to the absence of direct, structural, and cultural violence. Although expanding the concept of peace to include cultural violence is a remarkable shift in perspective that changes the way we understand peace, Galtung doesn’t get to “the root of the roots.” His theory of cultural violence already implies hegemonic violence and yet he doesn’t make the connection between violence and hegemony. It is the post-modern peace theorists who propose a concept of peace that resists hegemonic violence.

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Post-Structuralist Accounts of Peace Having discussed the two positive peace accounts that despite taking conflict and division seriously end up prescribing an ideal community of harmony and unity, I now turn to post-structuralist theorists of peace, in particular post-structuralist accounts of agonistic peace. There are mainly two strands of agonistic peace. The first is based on Mouffe’s agonistic democratic theory, and the second draws upon a Foucaultian understanding of power and discipline. From Agonistic Democracy to Agonistic Peace Accounts of agonistic peace that are inspired by Mouffe’s theory offer a rethinking of the concept of peace by focusing on the goal of transforming antagonism—a relation between enemies—into agonism— a relation between adversaries. In a nutshell, the idea is that given the inevitability of conflict and the ever-present possibility of antagonism, it is essential to envision a type of society wherein conflict could be played out in a way that does not take a destructive and violent form. For Mouffe, envisioning liberal democracy in terms of agonistic pluralism provides that political terrain. By offering people meaningful democratic identifications and thereby mobilizing passions, agonistic politics can channel conflict in a way that subsumes antagonism. Confrontation among hegemonic projects that provide people with genuinely different visions of society is the key in taming conflict and transforming potential antagonism into adversarial relations. The key point is that conflict does not necessarily lead to antagonism, rather when properly managed it takes an adversarial form that does not destroy the political association. Adversaries—friendly enemies—are still enemies as they identify with genuinely distinct political identifications corresponding to different hegemonic projects, but they tolerate each other and view the political opponent as a legitimate adversary. It is the distinction between adversary and enemy that allows us to rethink peace in terms of agonism. Accordingly, agonistic peace refers to managing societal conflict and transforming antagonistic relations to agonistic relations through the creation of political spaces that make adversarial relations possible.41 Seen from this perspective, Mouffe’s agonistic theory changes the way we view conflict. Conflict is often depicted as an obstacle that should be overcome or transcended to have a peaceful society. But, Mouffe shows that not only a final resolution of

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conflicts is impossible, but also that conflict and confrontations are a sign of a healthy and pluralistic democracy.42 This brief overview of Mouffe’s agonistic democratic framework gives us a good idea about why international political theorists see an innovative approach to peace here and why there is a growing literature on agonistic peace. Mouffe’s agonistic theory offers an alternative to the dominant peace framework that aims to reconcile differences and resolve conflict by invoking rational self-interest or moral considerations.43 By emphasizing the ineradicability of conflict that define political identities, agonistic theory shifts the emphasis from ending conflict and producing harmonious relations to envisioning ways to democratically manage conflict in order to prevent it from taking a violent form. In doing so, the agonistic perspective introduces a new way of approaching society, human relations, and democracy. What needs to be done then is to focus on creating institutions and spaces for the expression of conflict, describing the nature of the common political framework that makes agonistic confrontation possible, democratizing the exclusions of agonistic politics, and understanding the shift in identities that comes with the transformation of antagonism to agonism, and so on. Indeed, I share the view that with the agonistic political theory comes a paradigm shift in the peace literature. But the version of agonistic peace presented by IR theorists captures only one aspect of this shift. The way Mouffe’s agonistic peace is described here does not offer a rethinking of the concept of peace, rather it offers a new way of building peace. As Strombom states, “the ultimate goal is to construct an understanding of peace constituted in such a way that society will not experience constant relapses to violence, but in which conflict can be mitigated and channeled through institutions which can keep violence from erupting.”44 This is negative peace viewed from an agonistic perspective.45 Such an approach offers a more realistic way of building peace that is in line with our actual political experiences. Yet, this account of agonistic peace theory is still predicated on the assumption that peace is negative peace. It is important not to conflate the core idea of peace with what is necessary to build a peaceful society.46 I don’t disagree with the way agonistic peace theorists interpret Mouffe’s agonistic democracy. Mouffe’s agonistic project offers a way of pacification of society by democratization. And this approach may very well be described as agonistic peace theory. My point is that agonistic theory provides the foundation for a distinct understanding of peace that cannot be reduced to negative or positive peace. By focusing too much

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on the transformation of antagonistic relations to agonism and not paying sufficient attention to the idea of hegemony that is an essential part of Mouffe’s agonistic theory, agonistic peace theorists remain within the negative peace paradigm and fail to see the broader account of agonistic peace that the agonistic framework implies. When we take into consideration the idea of hegemony, we realize that agonistic peace denotes a third concept of peace understood as a dynamic balance between the constitutive dynamics of society. Post-Modern Agonistic Peace Agonistic peace as described by post-modern peace theorists provides a substantial challenge to the way we ordinarily understand the nature of peace. Focusing on the relation between power and peace, post-modern peace theorists highlight the operations of power and the way power normalizes, disciplines, and constrains behavior.47 Emphasizing that peace should always be understood in its social-political context, they argue that what we call peace at any moment is an expression of relations of power that draws boundaries, excludes, and imposes violence. Peace is an “an essentially contested concept” that introduces another site for political struggle. What follows is that any form of peace “will inevitably be seen by some as hegemonic and oppressive.”48 Given that any project of peace has the potential to collapse “into patterns of power, domination, inequalities and exclusion,” failing to recognize how peace and power are intertwined would foster these hegemonic structures.49 The risk is to slide “all too comfortably back into familiarized hegemonic iterations of disciplinary order” in the name of peace.50 To resist the emergence of peace as a disciplinary order, it is essential to politicize the concept of peace by identifying how power operates and revealing the contested nature of peace.51 That’s why post-modern peace theorists highlight the significance of agonism as an essential strategy for resisting closure. Recognizing that peace itself does not offer any “failsafe protection from violence” and that any peace could constitute a disciplinary order, post-modern peace theorists turn to agonism to resist hegemonic structures.52 Shinko argues that Foucaultian agonism urges us to keep questioning any normative and structural elements of peace so as to contest a disciplinary order and prevent stabilization.53 A Foucaultian inspired agonism as permanent provocation and resistance encourages us to be wary of hegemonic power and its depolitizations that silence the

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exclusions and the marginalizations of the disciplinary order. Agonism then involves struggles of power to resist the individualizing force of the hegemonic order and to create spaces of freedom. Shinko notes that since resistance always unfolds within a larger political context that gives shape to individuals’ field of possibilities, agonism always pertains to the disruption and displacement of the social. Widening the site of struggle to include the social brings us to an account of civil order as “fundamentally a battle-order” marked with antagonism, confrontation, and struggle.54 Thus viewed, peace becomes war’s accomplice and a convenient tool for the stronger to institute a hegemonic order that secures and enhances their privilege and power. Drawing on Foucault, post-modern peace theorists emphasize the pervasiveness of power and inevitability of violence. They argue that any stabilization and blockage to the flow of energies should be resisted.55 The ultimate goal is to subvert the dominant structures in order to enable the “perpetual play of differences.” That’s why they situate agonism “at the war/peace nexus” as a strategy for constant resistance to instituted order.56 Within this framework, there cannot be any peace without agonism since a peace without agonism risks hegemonic violence. Drawing attention to the dangers of any overarching concept of peace, post-modern peace theorists offer a notion of peace without any substance. As Shinko puts it, “if peace is possible, we need to look for it within the terms of the agonistic exchange alongside its unfolding relations of intersubjectivity, emergent from with the terms of the struggle itself…. Agonism reclaims peace in all of its substantialness and refocuses attention on its contextualization within political life.”57 Peace is not a dream to come or a perpetual state, rather it is an instance that might be located in “the agonistic moment of hard-earned recognition and respect.”58 It refers to the moment of emancipation that can only emerge through political struggle. As such, it is not something that can be prescribed from the outside or something that can be sketched in advance of politics. I am sympathetic to the notion of peace inspired by Foucault’s analysis of power and understanding of agonism. The idea of agonistic peace that I propose has important commonalities with the post-modern agonistic peace, and in particular Shinko’s Foucaultian agonistic peace. In fact, my criticism of Galtung’s account of cultural violence is based on the idea that Galtung fails to theorize hegemonic violence. Viewing peace as a potential basis for a disciplinary order, post-modern agonistic peace

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theorists describe peace as open-ended and “forever out of our reach, illusive by definition, a dream too flatteringly sweet to be substantial.”59 By putting peace beyond our reach and defining it as an impossibility, they aim to address the dangers of peace. The issue with this approach is that what we’re offered here is not an account of peace, rather a strategy for deploying the analytic of agonism in order to prevent peace from turning into a disciplinary order. The reluctance to give peace any positive content is clear when Shinko writes, “if there is to be peace at all, it cannot proceed without agonism.”60 Thus, reclaiming peace with all its substantialness is immediately followed by the act of clearing all substance from the concept of peace when agonistic peace theorists associate peace with resistance and seek peace in the rare moment of emancipation. This seems why the post-modern agonistic peace project has been criticized as being ambiguous and not offering a recognizable form of peace.61 I share post-modern peace theorists’ concern about the dangers of universalism and hegemony, in particular how patronizing attempts to write peace for others and impose that peace upon them create violence in the name of peace.62 Yet, envisioning peace as a moment that pertains to contestation of domination and recognition of marginalized actors reveals only one aspect of agonistic peace. Agonistic theory can provide us with a more substantial account of peace than the one advanced by post-modern peace theorists. What is missing in the post-modern agonistic peace is the constitutive dimension of hegemony. Mouffe’s hegemony centered account of the social is extremely valuable here because she shows that resisting deeply rooted structures of dominance and exclusion does not take us to a society beyond hegemony. The idea is that hegemony is constitutive of the social and there is no society without hegemony. So, the goal cannot be to create a society beyond hegemony, rather it is to envision a society wherein the agonistic struggle could take place. It follows that agonism cannot be reduced to contestation and resistance to structural inequalities and power. It also entails the institution of an alternative hegemonic project to replace the existing one. The agonistic ideal is to institute a deeply democratic society that is aware of its political exclusions and hospitable to contestation. Foucaultian accounts of agonistic peace put too much emphasis on the moment of contestation and downplay the significance of a democratic order where agonistic struggle can take place. They emphasize the subversion of hegemony without recognizing the need for articulation, that is, the need for another hegemony.

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Once we acknowledge that “the play of differences” cannot be unlimited, there will always be a political boundary and hence exclusion, and some social organizations are more conducive to agonistic struggle than others, it becomes possible to envision how agonism leads to a positive account of agonistic peace. This perspective brings to the fore an account of agonistic peace that is not as comprehensive as positive peace but not as thin as post-modern agonistic peace.

Agonistic Peace as Equilibrium The two versions of agonistic peace provide us with valuable insights into how agonism changes the way we think of peace. Challenging positive accounts of peace that center on harmonious relations and view conflict as a problem, the Mouffean version of agonistic peace focuses on the positive potential of conflict and puts emphasis on transforming antagonism to agonism by way of channeling conflict constructively. Foucaultian versions of agonistic peace prioritize the political nature of peace to draw attention to how peace could be a source of discipline and violence. Within this framework peace is described in terms of the moment of emancipation resulting from agonistic contestation. Despite their significant contribution to the way we understand the concept of peace, these two accounts of agonistic peace fall short of adequately theorizing the sense of peace that follows from an agonistic approach. The Mouffean account relies on negative peace and offers a way to create a peaceful society and the Foucaltian approach overemphasizes the violent potential of peace and thus ends up resisting any positive account of peace that might follow from an agonistic approach. I suggest that we should understand agonistic peace neither as the absence of violence nor successful resistance, rather as an equilibrium between the opposite tensions that constitute society. The idea is to keep the opposite tensions alive in a permanent mode of renegotiation thereby avoiding the resolution of the opposites in favor of any one side. The account of agonistic peace I propose follows from the agonistic perspective’s acknowledgment of the necessity of settlements and recognition of the inevitable violence and exclusion that accompany each settlement. Agonists are well aware of the risks of social and political settlements and commonalities. In a nutshell, the idea is that any political order, and in particular any political settlement, creates and shelters remainders. These remainders tend to be normalized, marginalized, and

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depoliticized. In the process, they become more pervasive and dangerous as they shape the common sense in a way that makes these harms acceptable, necessary, legitimate, and invisible. In doing so, they cause tremendous suffering and violence. That’s why agonism is in part associated with politics of disruption. As Connolly succinctly put, “any set of enabling commonalities is likely to contain corollary injuries, cruelties, subjugations, concealment, and restrictions worthy of disturbances and contestation.”63 This is a point all agonists share. The crucial issue is that agonists’ commitment to the politicization of remainders and contestation of closure and naturalization does not mean that agonistic politics only involves politics of contestation and disruption with no positive project to offer. Connolly criticizes the idea that agonistic democracy should be understood as “a model in which no positive social vision is enunciated.” He notes that agonism could be described as politics of incessant contestation, but then he rejects that view when he writes, “I doubt that anybody actually endorses such a view.”64 Similarly, in response to the criticism that her agonism amounts to a police order in a Rancierian sense, Honig states that some orders are “worthy of being defended. Fought for. Preserved. That is, agonistic theory does not only criticize, and it does not, as such, stand apart from the messy work of actual political life.” Agonistic theory, she emphasizes, “does not fail to distinguish the better and the worse among the police orders.”65 Among the agonist thinkers, Mouffe offers the strongest criticism of the position that equates agonistic politics with disruption. Mouffe’s point is that such a perspective clearly misunderstands the role of hegemony in politics. Agonistic politics is not only about disrupting the existing hegemony, but also about articulating an alternative hegemonic order. For Mouffe, agonistic democracy is primarily understood in terms of the struggle between hegemonic projects over the constitution of the social.66 This leads her to situate agonistic democracy within the liberal democratic horizon as the constitutive tension between liberalism and democracy keeps open the political spaces wherein hegemonic contestation can play out peacefully and democratically. Agonistic democratic theorists view contestation and disruption as essential moments of politics. They also acknowledge that politics entails instituting an order, establishing a hierarchy of values, constituting a common identity, drawing frontiers, and so on.67 Agonists not only focus on challenging the remainders of settlements, but they take seriously the idea that it is these settlements that make any social order possible, organize human coexistence, and provide human life with a degree of stability

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and security.68 They draw attention to the dogmatization of identity and the violence that results from political tactics of self-assurance, but they acknowledge the indispensability of identity to human life. They’re committed to contesting subjugations and marginalizations within any social order, but they emphasize that we cannot do away with social order, tradition, institutional settings, the common good, standards of right and wrong, and so on.69 They highlight the dangers of hegemony, but they point out that there is no meaning or order without hegemony. Hegemony is an attempt to create stability and order in the midst of contingency.70 So, on the one hand, agonists address closure, naturalization, and sedimentation while, on the other hand, they recognize the need for social order, identity, tradition, and commonalities all of which have a tendency to sediment and marginalize their remainders. Thus, the idea that agonists “stand for nothing politically” and they merely embrace incessant contestation is not accurate. Affirming the perpetuity of contest, Honig writes “is not to celebrate a world without points of stabilization, it is to affirm the reality of perpetual contest, even within an ordered setting.”71 It is because agonists are committed to the perpetuation of the democratic contest that they stress the democratic value of political tensions that characterize political life.72 The fundamental constitutive political tensions of society such as stability and disruption, ordering and resistance, hegemony and politicization, commonality and individuality, identity and difference, harmony and liberty, closure and inclusion, and so on, should not be viewed as problems to be transcended or settled once and for all, rather they are essential moments of political life that keep each other in check. We should value and look for ways to maintain these constitutive tensions since by constantly pulling the society in opposite directions, they keep the democratic contest alive. Agonistic democratic theorists acknowledge that the political struggle for hegemony already requires a common symbolic space that makes the democratic struggle possible and that this common symbolic space cannot accept all demands as legitimate. Even a politics committed to democratic struggle and takes equality, pluralism, and inclusion as its fundamental values inevitably excludes some positions, and in particular, positions that are determined to undermine the democratic struggle itself.73 Agonists recognize the limits they put on the democratic struggle. They do not ignore or claim to resolve the tension between commitment to remainders and creating remainders as a result of defending an agonistic democratic order. Rather, they acknowledge the inevitability of remainders, embrace

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it, and envision ways to render them contestable. To re-emphasize, the aim is not to transcend power, hegemony, and violence, none of which is possible from an agonistic perspective, rather it is to establish forms of power and institutions through which democratic struggle can be played out agonistically and the remainders and marginalizations can be contested within the democratic framework. At this point, the distinction between sedimentation and settlement is important because it allows us to consider hegemony as a continuum moving along from strong to weak hegemony. Once we draw a distinction between “settlement” and “sedimentation,” it becomes possible to envision a form of hegemony whose values, identities, boundaries, and institutions are not deeply entrenched thereby leaving sufficient space for democratic struggle and the emergence of new positions and contenders. This is what I call weak hegemony. Hegemonic power in the weak sense is settled and thus it provides meaning, but not yet sedimented, that is, not naturalized. Depending on how deeply entrenched the democratic hegemony is and how strongly the constitutive political tensions are resolved in favor of democratic stability, identity, order, unity, and commonality, the degree of naturalization of the remainders of the agonistic democratic regime and hence its violent potential would be different. Since a weak hegemony is less entrenched and preserves its sense of contingency, it is expected to be more conducive to agonistic struggle and hospitable to the contestation of hegemonic power. An agonistic democratic regime then should constitute a weak hegemonic regime thereby preventing the naturalization of its frontiers and essentializing its values, institutions, and identities. It is important to emphasize that if agonistic democratic order’s settlements transform into sedimentations and turn agonistic democracy into a hegemonic regime in the strong sense, agonistic democracy’s capability to deliver its promises of inclusion, plurality, and peace would be severely diminished.74 The distinction between settlement and sedimentation and the possibility of weak hegemony allows us to formulate a new understanding of agonistic peace. The concept of agonistic peace follows from the idea that while hegemony is inevitable, strong hegemony is not. In the light of the agonistic understanding of the nature of society, politics, and violence, a new form of peace is required to make sense of social and political relations and our political condition. The concepts of negative and positive peace are important defining moments in the peace discourse as they help us grasp different dimensions of peace, but to capture the range of

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political possibilities on the hegemony spectrum corresponding to weak hegemonic power, we need a new form of peace. Put differently, the agonistic account of social and political reality compels us to formulate a new form of peace which cannot be understood in terms of peace as the absence of violence or the existence of harmonious and just relations. Agonistic peace constitutes the third dimension of the concept of peace by inviting us to think of peace as a dynamic equilibrium between constitutive political tensions of society. The emphasis here is not on contestation or constitution, rather the key idea is the dynamic process of political renegotiation. Agonistic peace exists where the fundamental political tensions are not resolved in favor of a political opposite and thus the balance between the constitutive political opposites is maintained. It is in that sense that agonistic peace can’t be reduced to the existence of democratic agon. Agonistic peace understood as the tensional balance between political opposites makes the democratic agon possible.75 The presence of agonistic peace indicates the existence of democratic spaces and a healthy democratic struggle between hegemonic positions. However, if the equilibrium between opposite tensions is disrupted and fundamental political tensions are resolved in favor of settlements—i.e. unity, order, stability—and thus settlements transform into sedimentations, society’s violent potential dramatically increases. There is a correlation between the violent potential of the democratic regime and the disruption of agonistic peace. Agonistic peace should be understood as dynamic equilibrium for two reasons. The first is that the tension between the political opposites involves change. For instance, the tension between stability and disruption may take different forms depending on a particular political context. At times stability prevails over disruption which is a sign of a society that is very defensive of its commonalities. In this society, we can expect political struggles to take place between those who aim to protect existing commonalities and those addressing the violence of commonalities and aiming to disrupt and transform them. At times disruption may prevail over stability which indicates a society where many settlements are politicized and contested at once. In such a society, we can expect some political struggles to be inspired by the idea of keeping the social and political order as fluid and open as possible while others defending the idea of unity and providing a common framework to have a more rigidly organized social and political life. The point is that the constitutive political tensions are never in a state of static equilibrium. Each tension is

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dynamic and constantly changes as a result of ongoing political struggles. There is no rest unless there is a final victor which indicates disruption of agonistic peace. The second reason why the tensional balance between opposites should be viewed as dynamic is because it conveys the idea that agonistic peace does not denote to a definite shape any constitutive tension might take. It would be unreasonable to make the claim that agonistic peace corresponds to one specific constellation on the hegemony spectrum. Not only because that point cannot be defined, but also because there are many points within the range of weak hegemony that maintains the tensional balance between the opposites. Agonistic peace represents a range of acceptable positions on the hegemony spectrum where the tension between the political opposites is healthy and not resolved in favor of one of the opposites. To clarify, the equilibrium at stake here does not prescribe which opposite should have the upper-hand and it doesn’t correspond to an exact balance between the two opposites. This range, for example, includes instances where commonality prevails over individuality and instances where individuality prevails over commonality. All of these are very well within the acceptable range of the equilibrium between political opposites. However, when a common identity dominates the political field and creates a too cohesive and homogenous society such as a society shaped by extreme nationalism, it fosters a suffocating culture for individual identities who are not in line with the common identity. Disturbing the equilibrium between opposites this way restricts democratic spaces and possibilities and makes political struggle too risky for those who contest hegemonic power. With respect to each constitutive political tension what matters is to keep the tension between the opposites within the acceptable range that does not shut down the agon. In the absence of an absolute winner that dominates the tension between the political opposites, the process of renegotiation continues. It is the tension between the perennial political tensions that constitute society that pulls the societal formation in various directions thereby opening up spaces for the democratic struggle. Accordingly, conflict, tension, and struggle do not undermine peace, rather they are constitutive of it.

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Conclusion The relation between agonistic democracy and peace can now be more clearly established. A well-functioning agonistic democracy as weak hegemony can generate the discourses, practices, institutions, and identities that are conducive to democratic struggle. Put differently, a healthy agonistic democracy makes possible the political struggle between adversaries vying for hegemony without itself naturalizing its political boundaries and essentializing its identities. In doing so, it contributes to the preservation of the dynamic equilibrium between the constitutive political tensions of society. In turn, the existence of agonistic peace fosters the agonistic democratic struggle since the constant renegotiation of the tensions between the political opposites assures the openness of social and political spaces. When agonistic peace is intact, we can expect agonistic politics to flourish and render society more democratic and inclusive. The existence of agonistic peace maintains the stability of democratic agons and in doing so it makes possible the renewal of democratic flexibility and impulses required to keep agonistic democratic politics healthy. It follows that a well-functioning agonistic democracy creates a sustainable agonistic peace and agonistic peace is essential for keeping agonistic democracy democratic and inclusive. We can now conclude that the ultimate goal of agonistic democracy is to create the conditions that are most conducive to the emergence of agonistic peace and restore the equilibrium between political opposites when disturbed. Supporting each other this way, agonistic peace and agonistic democracy can generate a sufficiently stable and democratic order that maintains itself over time through democratic struggle centering on the constitutive political tensions. A too successful hegemony leaves no space for the agonistic struggle; a too weak hegemony cannot institute a stable political order within which agonistic struggle takes place. For agonistic democracy to deliver its promise of a genuinely democratic and inclusive society, it should aim to keep the opposite political tensions in an equilibrium so as to maintain spaces for democratic struggle and contestation. Hence, the importance of agonistic peace. The rest is up to the contenders in the democratic struggle for hegemony.

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Notes 1. Conrad G. Brunk, “Shaping of Vision—The Nature of Peace Studies,” in Peace and Conflict Studies, ed. Charles P. Webel and Jorgen Johansen (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 18. 2. David Boersema, “Peace. Negative and Positive,” in The Routledge of Pacifism and Nonviolence, ed. Andrew Fiala (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), 116. 3. Webel, “Thinking Peace,” in Peace and Conflict Studies, ed. Charles P. Webel and Jorgen Johansen (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 67. 4. See, Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research 6 (1969): 167–199. 5. See, Webel, “Thinking Peace”; Wolfgang Dietrich and Wolfgang Sützl, “A Call for Many Peaces,” in Schlusseltexte der Friedensforschung, ed. Wolfgang Dietrich, Josefina Echavarria Alvarez, and Norbert Koppensteiner (Vienna: LIT, 2006), 282–301. 6. Brunk, “Shaping of Vision—The Nature of Peace Studies,” 18. 7. For a discussion of the concept of weak hegemony, see Chapter 2 in this book. 8. Duane L. Cady, From Warism to Pacifism. A Moral Continuum, second edition (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010), 79. 9. Cady, From Warism to Pacifism. A Moral Continuum, 82. 10. Cady, From Warism to Pacifism. A Moral Continuum, 82. 11. Cady, From Warism to Pacifism. A Moral Continuum, 85. 12. Duane L. Cady, “Hegemony as Violence,” The Acorn 11, no. 2 (Spring– Summer, 2002), 18. 13. Andrew Fiala makes a similar point when he argues that the way Cady describes harmony and unity imply overcoming conflict and difference. See Andrew Fiala, “De-polarization, Nonviolent Agonism, and the Anarchy of Difference,” in Peaceful Approaches for a More Peaceful World, ed. Sanjay Lal (Leiden: Brill, 2022), forthcoming. 14. Cady, From Warism to Pacifism. A Moral Continuum, 84. 15. Cady, From Warism to Pacifism. A Moral Continuum, 85–86. 16. Chantal Mouffe, Agonistics (London: Verso, 2013), 84. 17. Mouffe, Agonistics, xii. 18. Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” 171. 19. Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” 173. 20. Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” Journal of Peace Research 27, no.3 (1990), 301. 21. Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” 291. 22. William Gay, “The Role of Language in Justifying and Eliminating Cultural Violence,” in Peace, Culture, and Violence, ed. Fuat Gürsözlü (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 36.

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23. Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” 292. 24. Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” 292. 25. Yves Winter, “Violence and Visibility,” New Political Science 34, no. 2 (2012), 198. 26. Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” 292. 27. Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” 298. 28. Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” 298. 29. Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” 294. 30. Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” 302. 31. Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” 302. 32. Mouffe, Agonistics 5 and 45; Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), 12–13; Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Verso, 2005), 14–15. 33. Chantal Mouffe, “Democratic Politics and the Question of Identity,” in The Identity in Question, ed, John Rajchman (London: Routledge, 1995), 33. See also Chapter 2 in this book. 34. Mark Wenman, Agonistic Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 31; Ed Wingenbach, Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 74–75; Adrian Little, Enduring Conflict. Challenging the Signature of Peace and Democracy (New York and London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 75–76. 35. To clarify the problem is not the concept of harmony, but how positive peace theorists understand harmony that implies the possibility of overcoming conflict and division. 36. Here I draw on my discussion of the shortcomings of Galtung’s theory of cultural in “Cultural Violence, Hegemony, and Agonistic Interventions Agonistic Interventions,” in Peace, Culture, and Violence, ed. Fuat Gürsözlü (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 84–105. 37. Galtung, Cultural Violence, 302. 38. William Connolly, Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of a Political Paradox (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 64. 39. Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” 291. 40. Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” 183. 41. Lisa Strombom, “Exploring Analytical Avenues for Agonistic Peace,” Journal of International Relations and Development 23, no. 4 (2020), 947–969; John Nagle, “From the Politics of Antagonistic Recognition to Agonistic Peace Building: An Exploration of Symbols and Rituals in Divided Societies,” Peace and Change 39, no. 4 (Special Issue, 2014), 468–494. 42. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 32–34. 43. Nagle, “From the Politics of Antagonistic Recognition to Agonistic Peace Building: An Exploration of Symbols and Rituals in Divided Societies,” 485.

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44. Strombom, “Exploring Analytical Avenues for Agonistic Peace,” 951. 45. It is important to recall that negative peace is the absence of violence. Many negative peace theorists view conflict as permanent and emphasize that conflict should not be conflated with violence. See, Brunk, “Shaping of Vision—The Nature of Peace Studies,” 13–14. 46. For an example of peacebuilding, see Oliver P. Richmond, Peace. A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 96–97. 47. Oliver P. Richmond, “Peace in International Relations,” in Peace and Conflict Studies, ed. Charles P. Webel and Jorgen Johansen (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 41; Rosemary E. Shinko, “Agonistic Peace: A Postmodern Reading,” Millennium: A Journal of International Studies 36, no. 3 (2008), 478. 48. Richmond, “Peace in International Relations,” 39 and 44. 49. Ludwig Mikaël Gelot, “Reclaiming the Transcendence of Positive Peace Against the Violence of Post-Liberal Peace,” International Journal Of World Peace XXXV, no. 2 (June 2018), 35; Shinko, “Agonistic Peace: A Postmodern Reading,” 475. 50. Shinko, “Agonistic Peace: A Postmodern Reading,” 488. 51. Shinko, “Agonistic Peace: A Postmodern Reading,” 475; Richmond, “Peace in International Relations,” 45. 52. Norbert Koppensteiner, “Pagans and Nomads: The Postmodern Peaces of Jean-François Lyotard and Gilles Deleuze,” in The Palgrave International Handbook of Peace Studies: A Cultural Perspective, ed. Wolfgang Dietrich, Josefina Echavarría Alvarez, Gustavo Esteva, Daniela Ingruber, and Norbert Koppensteiner (Basingstock, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 541. 53. Shinko, “Agonistic Peace: A Postmodern Reading,” 475. 54. Shinko, “Agonistic Peace: A Postmodern Reading,” 487. 55. Koppensteiner, “Pagans and Nomads: The Postmodern Peaces of JeanFrançois Lyotard and Gilles Deleuze,” 541–544. 56. Shinko, “Agonistic Peace: A Postmodern Reading,” 487–488. 57. Shinko, “Agonistic Peace: A Postmodern Reading,” 489. 58. Shinko, “Agonistic Peace: A Postmodern Reading,” 490. 59. Shinko, “Agonistic Peace: A Postmodern Reading,” 489. 60. Shinko, “Agonistic Peace: A Postmodern Reading,” 489. 61. Gelot, “Reclaiming the Transcendence of Positive Peace Against the Violence of Post-Liberal Peace,” 32–34. Gelot’s main point is that the post-modern agonistic approach does not lead to any understanding of positive peace due to its emphasis on resistance and contestation. 62. Shinko, “Agonistic Peace: A Postmodern Reading,” 489–490; Richmond, “Peace in international relations,” 45. 63. Connolly, Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of a Political Paradox, 93.

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64. Connolly, Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of a Political Paradox, xxv. 65. Bonnie Honig, “What Is Agonism For? Reply to Woodford, Finlayson, Stears,” Contemporary Political Theory 13, no. 2 (2014), 211. Adrian Little also states that post-structuralist theorists need to “get their hand dirty” if they want to be politically relevant. When we turn to practical political concerns, he notes, political ordering and construction of an alternative are unavoidable. See, Little, Enduring Conflict. Challenging the Signature of Peace and Democracy, 15–16. 66. Mouffe, Agonistics, 11–18. 67. Wenman, Agonistic Democracy, 223. 68. Wingenbach, Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy, xvi, 7–8. 69. Connolly, Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of a Political Paradox, 94. 70. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 2001), 111. 71. Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 15. 72. Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, 201. 73. Mouffe, On the Political, 9; Mouffe, Agonistics, 13. 74. A deeply entrenched agonistic democracy cannot foster the democratic flexibility and impulses that is required to sustain the agonistic struggle among democratic contenders and to respond to the fluid and complex nature of political conflict. See, Chapter 2 in this book. As Little notes, the “agon is an inherently fluid space which will be inevitably characterize by shifting sands of changing membership, contested boundaries of political interaction and institutions, and evolving political arguments from the included political actors.” Little, Enduring Conflict. Challenging the Signature of Peace and Democracy, 205. 75. For instance, Fiala describes positive peace in terms of a “nonviolent and liberty-respecting agon.” See, Fiala, “De-polarization, Nonviolent Agonism, and The Anarchy of Difference,” forthcoming.

References Boersema, David. “Peace. Negative and Positive.” In The Routledge of Pacifism and Nonviolence, edited by Andrew Fiala, 116–124. London and New York: Routledge, 2018. Brunk, Conrad G. Brunk. “Shaping of Vision—The Nature of Peace Studies.” In Peace and Conflict Studies, edited by Charles P. Webel and Jorgen Johansen, 10–24. London and New York: Routledge, 2012.

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Cady, Duane L. “Hegemony as Violence.” The Acorn 11, no. 2 (Spring–Summer, 2002): 13–19. Cady, Duane L. From Warism to Pacifism. A Moral Continuum. Second edition. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010. Connolly, William. Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of a Political Paradox. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991. Dietrich, Wolfgang, and Wolfgang Sützl. “A Call for Many Peaces.” In Schlusseltexte der Friedensforschung, edited by Wolfgang Dietrich, Josefina Echavarria Alvarez, and Norbert Koppensteiner, 282–301. Vienna: LIT, 2006. Fiala, Andrew. “De-Polarization, Nonviolent Agonism, and the Anarchy of Difference.” In Peaceful Approaches for a More Peaceful World, edited by Sanjay Lal. Leiden: Brill, 2022, forthcoming. Galtung, Johan. “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” Journal of Peace Research 6 (1969): 167–199. Galtung, Johan. “Cultural Violence.” Journal of Peace Research 27, no. 3 (1990): 291–305. Gay, William. “The Role of Language in Justifying and Eliminating Cultural Violence.” In Peace, Culture, and Violence, edited by Fuat Gürsözlü, 31–63. Leiden: Brill, 2018. Gelot, Ludwig Mikaël. “Reclaiming the Transcendence of Positive Peace Against the Violence of Post-Liberal Peace.” International Journal on World Peace XXXV, no. 2 (June 2018): 27–52. Gürsözlü, Fuat. “Cultural Violence, Hegemony, and Agonistic Interventions.” In Peace, Culture, and Violence, edited by Fuat Gürsözlü, 84–105. Leiden: Brill, 2018. Honig, Bonnie. Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. Honig, Bonnie. “What Is Agonism For? Reply to Woodford, Finlayson, Stears.” Contemporary Political Theory 13, no. 2 (2014): 208–217. Koppensteiner, Norbert. “Pagans and Nomads: The Postmodern Peaces of JeanFrançois Lyotard and Gilles Deleuze.” In The Palgrave International Handbook of Peace Studies: A Cultural Perspective, edited by Wolfgang Dietrich, Josefina Echavarría Alvarez, Gustavo Esteva, Daniela Ingruber, and Norbert Koppensteiner, 525–547. Basingstock, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. London: Verso, 2001. Little, Adrian. Enduring Conflict. Challenging the Signature of Peace and Democracy. New York and London: Bloomsbury, 2014. Mouffe, Chantal. “Democratic Politics and the Question of Identity.” In The Identity in Question, edited by John Rajchman, 33–46. London: Routledge, 1995 Mouffe, Chantal. The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso, 2000.

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Mouffe, Chantal. On the Political. London: Verso, 2005. Mouffe, Chantal. Agonistics. London: Verso, 2013. Nagle, John. “From the Politics of Antagonistic Recognition to Agonistic Peace Building: An Exploration of Symbols and Rituals in Divided Societies.” Peace and Change 39, no. 4 (Special Issue, 2014): 468–494. Richmond, Oliver P. “Peace in International Relations.” In Peace and Conflict Studies, edited by Charles P. Webel and Jorgen Johansen, 36–45. London and New York: Routledge, 2012. Richmond, Oliver P. Richmond. Peace. A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Shinko, Rosemary E. “Agonistic Peace: A Postmodern Reading.” Millennium: A Journal of International Studies 36, no. 3 (2008): 473–491. Strombom, Lisa. “Exploring Analytical Avenues for Agonistic Peace.” Journal of International Relations and Development 23, no. 4 (2020): 947–969. Webel, Charles. “Thinking Peace.” In Peace and Conflict Studies, edited by Charles P. Webel and Jorgen Johansen, 65–74. London and New York: Routledge, 2012. Wenman, Mark. Agonistic Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Wingenbach, Ed. Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy. Burlington: Ashgate, 2011. Winter, Yves. “Violence and Visibility.” New Political Science 34, no. 2 (2012): 195–202.

Index

A Acampora, Christa, 47, 66 adversary, 12, 14, 18, 30, 63, 81, 82, 85, 86, 88, 92, 95, 97, 99–101, 175, 177, 179, 181–185, 210 friendly-enemy, 18, 30, 51, 81, 175, 210 affect, 17, 59, 76, 92, 100, 128, 140, 162, 169, 173 and affective investment, 27, 64, 140, 180 and collective identity, 12, 14, 15, 27, 43, 141, 144, 146, 147, 168–170, 177, 180, 207 and passions, 168, 169 and political identification, 27, 43, 60, 77, 79, 83, 86, 168, 171–173, 175, 177, 178, 180, 182, 186, 210 affective polarization, 73, 76, 77, 104 Agonism and antagonism, 16, 43, 44, 51, 75, 162, 163, 171, 173, 174, 210, 211, 215

agonism, 16, 18–22, 24, 29–31, 43–48, 51, 54, 57, 64, 73–83, 104, 135, 161–163, 171, 173–175, 201, 210–216 and adversarial respect/agonistic respect, 82, 184 and adversary, 101, 184 and agonistic peace, 210 and agonistic pluralism, 210 and antagonism, 102, 174, 175, 183–185 and conflictual consensus, 21, 52 and critical responsiveness, 82 and democratic ethos, 81–83 and institutional deficit, 162, 170 and intolerant agonism, 73, 75, 77, 101, 104, 175, 180, 184 and legal pluralism, 47 and liberal democracy, 4, 19, 28, 41, 49, 182, 185, 210 and multiculturalism, 46 and tolerance, 104, 145, 184 agonistic solidarity, 163, 172, 179–183, 185, 186, 193–195

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Gürsözlü, Agonistic Democracy and Political Practice, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05999-5

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230

INDEX

ambiguity, 42, 45, 49, 57, 60, 63, 64, 133, 134 antagonism, 3, 5, 9, 11, 14–24, 29, 41, 42, 55, 79, 80, 87, 139, 145, 162, 165, 168, 169, 173–175, 179, 180, 204, 205, 210, 213 anti-essentialism, 78 artistic activism, 102, 156, 157 authenticity, 74, 86–89, 91–95, 97, 101 and adversary, 88 and genuine understanding, 87 and truthfulness, 74 authoritarian tendency, 176 B Barber, Benjamin, 26, 36, 108 Bar On, Bat-Ami, 66, 188, 195 Benhabib, Seyla, 105, 109, 110, 130, 131, 134, 136, 151–153 Black Lives Matter, 120, 156 blissful ignorance, 80 Bohman, James, 132, 135, 152, 153 Breen, Keith, 37, 46, 47, 66 C Canetti, Elias, 165, 166, 170 chain of equivalence, 12, 23, 24, 34 citizenship, 13, 19, 20, 24–29, 31, 43, 45, 57, 64, 83, 137, 143–145, 171, 177, 182 agonistic conception of, 23 radical democratic conception of, 25, 27 republican conception of, 26 common identity, 19, 21, 43, 52, 63, 209, 216, 220 conflict, 14–18, 22–24, 28, 30, 44, 46, 47, 52, 54, 56, 60, 65, 73–75, 78–80, 82, 83, 85, 86, 88, 92, 95, 98, 103, 104, 107,

110, 128, 129, 139, 142, 161–163, 166–171, 173, 174, 176, 177, 179, 181, 185, 189, 190, 200, 202–205, 207, 209–211, 215, 220, 223–225 and contestation, 161 and harmony, 207 and peace, 74, 185 value of, 161 conflictual consensus, 21, 175, 176 confrontation, 18–21, 23–25, 44, 73, 74, 77, 81, 87, 89, 92, 94, 98, 100, 103, 104, 118, 119, 129, 130, 136, 143, 148, 149, 165, 166, 169, 172–175, 210, 211, 213 as agonistic engagement, 73 Connolly, William, 67, 68, 73, 79, 82–85, 106–109, 139, 154, 155, 216, 223–225 and agonistic respect, 82 and ethos of engagement, 82 and identity/difference, 82, 83 and micropolitics, 84 and politics of becoming, 67 and self-artistry, 84 and self-modification, 84 constitutive outside, 14, 15, 42 counter-hegemony/counterhegemonic struggles, 62, 142, 147, 155 creative politics, 73, 97–104, 111, 122, 130, 147, 167 creative protest, 100, 145 D Dallmayr, Fred, 48, 66 de-identification, 144 deliberative activism, 132, 133 deliberative democracy, 89, 122, 127–130, 133, 135, 136, 153, 162

INDEX

and deliberation, 89–91, 126, 128, 135 and deliberative fairness, 90 and legitimacy, 128, 129 and norms of deliberation, 90, 133 and power, 91 and rationality, 128, 129 deliberative inequalities, 132, 133, 153 democratic agonism, 30, 47 democratic interpellation, 25, 54, 56, 169, 175 depoliticization, 174 Derrida, Jacques, 7 disarticulation, 80, 140, 143, 155 and rearticulation, 140 disruptive politics, 103, 104, 137, 141–143 dogma, 59, 60 dogmatic attitude, 53, 58 domination, 24, 34, 212, 214 Dryzek John, 105, 107, 109, 130, 131, 134, 136, 152, 153

E emancipation, 5, 12, 79, 213 enemy, 14–16, 18, 22, 44, 46, 48–51, 53, 55, 60, 81, 87, 89, 97, 98, 101, 169, 172, 173, 175, 181–185, 194, 210 equilibrium, 201, 202, 215, 219–221 and peace, 201, 202, 215, 219, 221 and political opposites, 219–221 and tensional balance, 219, 220 essentialism, 11, 137 ethico-political principles/norms, 21, 28, 43, 44, 175 exception, 29, 47, 50, 51, 131, 176, 177, 179, 181, 184, 195 extra-parliamentary struggles, 147, 148, 166

231

F fascist regimes, totalitarian regimes, 50 Fiala, Andrew, 222, 225 Foucault, Michel, 202, 213 Fraser, Nancy, 109, 152 Freud, 168 and affect, 168 and identification, 168 Fung, Archon, 132, 152, 153 G Galtung, Johan, 200, 202, 205–209, 213, 222, 223 and cultural violence, 202, 205, 206, 208, 209, 213 and direct violence, 200, 205, 206, 208, 209 and hegemonic violence, 202, 209, 213 and negative peace, 200 and positive peace, 200, 202 and structural violence, 205, 206, 208 Gandhi, Mahatma, 207 and the idea of unity, 207 Gezi Park protests, 97, 98, 111, 121, 133 Goi, Simona, 91, 108–110 and modified agonism, 109 gothic citizenship, 57, 64 Gramsci, Antonio, 8, 10, 33 H Habermas, Jürgen, 89, 109, 127–130, 151, 152 and communicative reason, 129 and deliberation, 129 and discourse principle, 128 and legitimacy, 128 and the public sphere, 109, 127–130

232

INDEX

hegemony, 3–5, 8–10, 13, 14, 19–25, 28–30, 41–45, 47–51, 53, 58, 61–65, 75, 77–82, 90–93, 101, 102, 104, 135–140, 142–145, 147, 148, 164, 175, 176, 183, 184, 201, 202, 208, 209, 212, 214, 216–221 and antagonism, 3, 8, 9, 22 and exclusion, 21, 42, 44, 64, 139, 214 and fixity, 42, 62 and nodal points, 8, 61 and peace, 201, 209, 212, 214, 220 and strong hegemony, 29, 31, 42, 61–64, 143, 201, 218 and subversion, 201, 214 and violence, 50, 139, 208, 209, 218 and weak hegemony, 42, 61, 63–65, 201, 218, 221 as constitutive, 19, 90, 104, 138 as continuum, 42, 61–63, 218 Gramsci’s concept, 3, 5, 8, 137 hegemonic power, 8, 58, 61, 80, 101–103, 141, 142, 146, 209, 212, 218–220 hegemonic projects, 19, 20, 23–25, 28, 51 hegemony struggle, 62 Laclau and Mouffe’s concept, 3, 4, 8–10, 22, 42, 44, 61, 137, 138 of agonistic democracy, 29, 41, 43, 48, 53, 63, 221 of liberal democracy, 5, 13, 26, 44, 102, 183 Honig, Bonnie, 48, 49, 55, 57, 64, 78, 216, 217 horizontal democracy, 144 Howarth, David, 54, 68 hyperpartisanship, 179

I illiberal democracy (or illiberal projects), 50 immigration, 173, 174 inclusion, 19, 55, 57–59, 79, 144, 217, 218 Indignados, 15-M, 120, 144, 147, 166 intolerant agonism, 73, 75, 78, 101, 102, 104, 174, 175, 180, 183, 185 K Kalyvas, Andreas, 36, 37, 105, 187 Khan, Gulshan, 27, 35, 36 King, Martin Luther Jr., 80, 103, 107, 112 and contestation, 80 and disruption, 80 and emancipation, 79 and the Birmingham campaign, 80, 103 L Laclau, Ernesto, 3–13, 22, 25, 32–34, 36, 42, 61, 62, 68, 106, 137, 138, 189, 225 leadership democracy, 74 Le Pen, Marine, 46, 51 liberal democracy, 4, 5, 13, 18–22, 25, 41, 43, 45, 46, 51, 53–56, 63, 83, 162, 168, 175–177, 181, 183, 184, 186 and constitutive values, 176 and liberal democratic horizon, 19, 24, 30, 45, 52, 162, 175–177, 183, 216 and paradoxical union, 19 as horizon, 176 exclusions of, 53 hegemony of, 5, 13, 26, 41, 183

INDEX

M Manin, Bernard, 109, 110 Marginalization, 49, 51, 118, 119, 189, 205, 209, 213, 217, 218 Marx/Marxist thought, 5, 10, 137 Mason, Lilliana, 105, 106 McCain, John, 181, 182, 194 Medearis, John, 126, 150, 151, 153 militant democracy, 51 and dogmatic attitude, 60 and fanatical devotion, 77 and militant citizens, 177 and militant democratic attitude, 42, 49, 51, 52, 55, 57 and militant identifications, 172, 179 Mill, John Stuart, 59, 60, 68 and dogma, 59 modified deliberation, 73, 89, 92, 93, 104 moralization of politics, 172–174, 180 Muirhead, Russell, 177, 189, 192–194 N nationalism, 220 and national identity, 174 and Tamir, Yael, 192 neoliberalism, 44 non-partisans, 86, 87 and partisans, 76 non-committed citizens, 86, 87 Norval, Aletta, 66, 90, 108–111, 155 O Oakeshott, Michael, 21 oppositional politics, 104 and confrontation, 75, 103 and contestation, 52, 75 OWS/Occupy movement, 118–121, 133, 144, 145, 147, 166

233

P Parks, Rosa, 103 parliament, 163, 166, 167, 170 and Canetti, Elias, 165 as space of agonistic engagement, 82 partial exclusion, 58 Partisanship, 86, 105, 178, 189, 190 passion, 20, 27, 29, 61, 83, 86, 99, 137, 140, 142, 147, 168–170, 175, 179, 182 and affect, 168 and mobilizing passions, 20, 86, 87, 183, 210 and political identifications, 86 as destructive, 168 positive value of, 101 peace, 17, 101, 145, 199–205, 208–215, 218–221 agonistic peace, 33, 201, 202, 210–215, 218–221 and contestation, 200, 202, 214 and emancipation, 214, 215 and hegemony, 209, 214 and justice, 199–201 and non-violence, 161 and normalization, 201 and power, 202, 210, 212 and unity, and harmony, 202, 210 and war, 213 discipline, 210, 215 negative peace, 199–202, 211, 212, 215, 224 positive peace, 199–201, 203–206, 210, 211, 215, 218 post-modern, post-structuralist, 202, 209, 210, 212–214 pluralism, 15–17, 43, 46–48, 50, 67, 78, 207, 217 and agonistic pluralism, 162 and coexistence, 18 and constitutive pluralism, 207

234

INDEX

and division, 166 and exclusion, and violence, 138, 207 and reasonable pluralism, 54 and simple pluralism, 53 polarization, 76, 80, 81, 88, 101, 102, 165, 174, 180, 183, 184 and affective polarization, 76, 78, 104 and social sorting, 76 political improper, 118, 119, 127, 133, 134, 148 and Drexler, Monica and Hames-Garcia, Michael, 148, 153 and politics proper, 133 political participation, 20, 26, 27, 126 political parties, 86, 144, 163–168, 170–174, 177–186 agonistic parties, 183 and alternative hegemonic projects, 141, 214 and collective identities, 14, 141, 165, 169, 207 and crisis of democracy, 165 and extremism, 165 and factions, 183, 184 and failure of political parties, 167 and militant identities, 174–180 and moralization of politics, 172–174, 180 function of political parties, 163, 167 symbolic role of political parties, 167, 168 traditional parties, 164, 165, 172 populism, 3, 31, 165, 172, 188, 195 left-wing, 3, 4, 13, 24, 29–31, 140, 163, 164, 173, 188, 195 right-wing, 30, 31, 140, 164, 172, 173, 185, 188, 191, 195 post-structuralism, 5, 8, 10

protest, 96, 98–101, 111, 117–122, 126–137, 141–149, 153, 156, 157 advancing deliberative ideals, 127, 133 as a threat, 118 as counter-hegemony, 143, 147 as improper politics, 118, 119, 127, 133, 134 in non-ideal world, 117, 127, 133, 134 R radical democracy, 3, 4, 11–13, 22–31, 35, 37, 102, 195 Rancière, Jacques, 187 and police order, 187, 216 Rawls, John, 53–55, 67, 68, 108 and hegemony transformation, 54, 56, 67 and reasonable pluralism, 53 and simple pluralism, 54 and the unreasonable, 53, 54, 67 remainders, 48, 49, 51, 55, 57, 63, 78, 92, 142, 161, 215–218 and settlements, 216 of politics, 57 Republicanism, 27 Republican Party, 178, 193 resistance, 11, 75, 78, 79, 98, 120, 143, 146, 164, 201, 202, 212–215, 217, 224 Rosenblum, Nancy, 189, 190, 192, 193 S Schaap, Andrew, 30, 36, 37, 52, 66, 67, 105–109, 187 Schmitt, Carl, 14–16, 34, 35, 175 and antagonism, 14, 175 and friend/enemy, 14, 15, 175

INDEX

and the political, 14, 15 Schumpeter, Joseph, 123–126, 137, 150, 151 and political division of labor, 126 and political protest, 126, 137 second class citizenship, 55, 56 sedimentation, 68, 84, 140, 201, 217–219 and strong hegemony, 30 Self/Other, 206–209 settlement, 50, 63, 65, 68, 74, 78, 80, 92–94, 138, 139, 142, 206, 215, 216, 218, 219 and weak hegemony, 63 Shinko, Rosemary, 212–214, 224 social sorting, 76 societas, 21 Standing Man, 97, 98 and Gezi Park Protests, 97, 98 storytelling, 73, 93, 94, 96, 104, 130 Syrian refugee crisis, 173, 174

T third way, 19, 164

U undecidability, 9, 14

V violence, 15, 16, 20, 46, 56, 74, 75, 80–82, 94, 99, 100, 103–105, 118, 120, 142, 146, 147, 161,

235

173, 174, 176, 185, 193, 199–202, 205–209, 211–219, 224 and cultural violence, 206, 208, 209 and direct violence, 200, 205 and exclusion, 15, 215 and hegemonic violence, 84, 209, 213 and marginalization, 74, 201 and oppression, 199, 201 and physical attack, 74, 201, 205 and structural violence, 205, 206, 208 as permanence, 206 W Wenman, Mark, 26, 32, 36, 37, 66, 154, 187, 223, 225 White, Jonathan, 189–191, 194 Wingenbach, Ed, 67, 154, 187, 191, 223, 225 Y Yancy, George, 75, 105 Young, Iris Marion, 91, 93–95, 99, 107–111, 132, 133, 135, 136, 149, 152, 153 and agonism, 135, 136 and communicative democracy, 136 and rhetoric, 99 and storytelling, 94 Ypi, Lea, 189–191, 193, 194