Ageing in the Crisis: Experiences from Greece (4) (Soziale Gerontologie) 3643909845, 9783643909848

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Fred Karl (Hg.)

Ageing in the Crisis Experiences from Greece

Soziale Gerontologie

Lit

Fred Karl (ed.)

Ageing in the Crisis

Ageing in the Crisis Experiences from Greece edited by

Fred Karl

LIT

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

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Table of Contents Introduction Fred Karl......................................................................................................

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Elderly poverty and deprivation under austerity in Greece Stefanos Papanastasiou, Christos Papatheodorou......................................

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Pensioners and pension reforms during the Greek crisis Platon Tinios................................................................................................

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Population ageing, household expenditure and economic exclusion Ioannis Kostakis, Frank Stevens..................................................................

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The impact of financial crisis on health and ageing Alexandra Foscolou, Demosthenes Panagiotakos.......................................

61

The prevalence of mental disorders within the elderly population in Greece Antonios Politis, Marina Economou, Christos Theleritis............................

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The family, the elderly and the crisis Antigone Lyberaki........................................................................................

87

Intergenerational relations in the family: Grandparenting styles in Greece today Anna Pagoropoulou-Aventissian, Angeliki Skamvetsaki, Dimitra Vardalachaki................................................................................... 123 The need for civil society in Greece Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos................................................................................ 141 Active and healthy ageing in a time of crisis and lessons from civil society: Experience from 50plus Hellas 50plus Hellas............................................................................................... 157 Demographic trends and sociological reflections Fred Karl...................................................................................................... 191 Authors' list................................................................................................... 197

Introduction Fred Karl Ageing in a time of crisis In Western countries, the discourse on the ageing of the population is associated with the term “crisis”. According to this view, older people are regarded as a costly burden and governments respond with measures such as budget and pension cuts and health and social care cut backs. Yet when considering economic crises, ageing is not the main causal variable. During prosperous periods of economic growth in the EU and cultural change in society, the financial and health situation of older cohorts generally improved, and in gerontology the potential of older people was highlighted. A more positive age stereotype began to emerge during this time, which in general did not match the hard reality of the heterogeneity and social inequality common in older age. Social characteristics (socio-economic position, gender, education, occupational and ethnic background) are paramount to understanding how people's lives progress, and how people themselves experience their personal ageing process and life potentialities. There is a lot of variability in how people respond to the challenges of ageing. Ageing in itself is not the problem, either at the societal or at the personal level. Older people make many contributions to the community as paid and unpaid workers, as consumers, and traditionally as carers for their children and grandchildren. In some countries an above average proportion of voluntary sector activities is carried out by older people. Ageing per se is not a crisis, but depends on the relationship between the environment and the individual, framed in the context of historical and current social and economic conditions. The experiences of some Eastern European countries after 1990 show how economic crises affect life expectancy. In Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and some Baltic states, life expectancy fell in five years from around 70 to less than 67 years1, especially for men, mainly because of their unhealthy lifestyle. But what about ageing during long periods of crisis, when external conditions become worse and act against 'healthy ageing'? This has been the case during the great financial crisis of 2008 and beyond, caused by the dynamics of 1

Karl, F. (2012): Age, life expectancy and fertility in Russia (in German). In: Karl, F. (ed.): Transnational und translational. LIT: Berlin, p. 45-56. See also: Berlin Institute for population and development (2017): Europe's Demographic Future. Where the Regions are headed after a Decade of Crises. Berlin, p.28.

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capitalist profit, a crisis that spilled over from the United States of America to Europe and exacerbated home-made fiscal problems in the EU-countries. This crisis may be considered as an ongoing test for the stability of life situations in developed countries, and as a test for the adequacy and resilience of the positive image of ageing. In a transnational perspective it is important to look specifically at the experiences of countries that were most shaken by this crisis, although there is no guarantee, even for wealthy nations, that the rise of unfavorable developments would not have negative consequences on welfare, health and life expectancy. In the European Union, despite the potentials of an internal market, a persistent asynchronicity in the life conditions of the citizens has appeared, both within and between different countries. This is reflected in growing income inequalities, which are a leading cause of increasing socio-economic inequalities that affect health and well-being. Among the Southern member states this is most marked in Greece and the forecasts for the future are not optimistic. Greece is suffering from a severe economic crisis, although problems already existed before the emergence of the global fiscal crisis. The effects of the externally imposed austerity politics were and are especially hard for specific groups like the poor and uninsured, the unemployed, the precarious workers, the chronically ill and many others, among them special segments of the ageing population. Austerity politics have caused even further reliance on informal support networks and burdened the capacity of families to cope. In the case of Greece pensions, as a percentage of GDP, are the highest in Europe, reflecting the decline in GDP and the fact that pensions are substitutes for other undeveloped categories of public social spending, such as unemployment benefits and social care2. Pensions are the main source of income for many Greek households, especially during the crisis. Many older people's pensions were used to finance the needs of all family members and played an important role in stabilizing the family; but older people themselves now face special health risks, with unmet needs due both to reduced pensions and to increased co-payments within a worsening health service system3. In a situation where citizens are losing confidence with the political system and with the political parties, it is necessary that they themselves become engaged in the promotion of their own interests and for solidarity with others. Greece is 2

https://data.oecd.org/socialexp/social-spending.htm#indicator-chart Portinou, S., Voulgari, A., Sarikakis, X. (2012): Older people in Greece and the economic crisis (in German). In: Karl, F. (ed.): Transnational und translational. LIT: Berlin, p. 37-44. 3

Introduction

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struggling to change the clientelistic structures in politics and in the administration and, to this end, all citizens are challenged by the need for an active Civil Society, in which older people have to find their own role. The chapters in this book The contributions for this book represent an up-to-date description of social and health problems and the modes of reaction of governments and citizens. In the first chapter “Elderly poverty and deprivation under austerity in Greece”, Papanastasiou and Papatheodorou provide empirical material on the social conditions of Greek older people and other groups of the population. It shows that the widely used 'at-risk-of-poverty indicator' incorporates some pitfalls because of its relative nature. The authors instead prefer the 'material deprivation indicator' which captures the lack of resources necessary to lead an adequate life. Different results emerge in research, depending on the choice of measurement instruments. Whilst with the relative index poverty amongst older people has halved in the time of crisis (due to the overall reduction in incomes in the country), the material deprivation indicator, with its concrete every-day-requirements, demonstrates a consistent increase in the poverty rates of older people in the crisis. The way in which pensions represent a key link in the dynamics of the crisis, is demonstrated by Tinios. The author takes a look at the genesis of the Greek pension system and presents a history of former governments' unwillingness to face the challenges. The reforms undertaken so far concern current and future pensioners in different ways. The last pension reform is assessed with an outlook on a possible alternative. Kostakis and Stevens verify the drastic fall in net income and consumption of Greek households from the beginning of the economic crisis. Concerning the older population, consumption in some sectors is falling, but expenditures on medical expenses are increasing. This is a result of the strong influence of the financial crisis on health and ageing, as Foscolou and Panagiotakos document in the next chapter. Financial and economic uncertainty is linked with a reduction of healthy life expectancy. In this context, Politis, Economou and Theleritis provide an overview on the prevalence of mental disorders (depression, dementia and others) within the elderly population in Greece. Lyberaki discusses the role of the family and of older people, concentrating on the crisis period from 2007 to 2015 with data from a comprehensive European survey of people 50 years and older. The family always filled the gaps in social protection, but with declining incomes and reduced pensions the solidarity within families changed direction: the 65plus age group received less financial help

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from their (adult) children and gave to them still more than before. The results also demonstrate that gender gaps in income and care were reinforced. Pagoropoulou-Aventissian, Skamvetsaki and Vardalachaki deal with the psychological effects of the economic crisis on grand-parenting styles and intergenerational relationships in the family. Due to the effects of austerity politics multi-generational household arrangements are becoming increasingly common, and a growing number of grandparents, especially grandmothers, see themselves forced to support the families of their children. The qualitative study of the authors uncovers problems of dysfunctionality and stress that arise in these narrow relationships. Outside of familial entanglements, charity organizations and churches mobilize people for social welfare responsibilities. In his chapter about Civil Society in Greece Sotiropoulos demonstrates that there are also informal self-help groups and organizations of volunteers who address social problems and gaps in social welfare. He considers it necessary for the bottom-up, civil-society-based participation to become stronger. In the field of inter-generational projects a lot of initiatives and good practices can be acknowledged. The authors' team of 50plus Hellas describe projects and policy work in the fields of lifelong and later-life learning, healthy ageing and human rights. Based on their experience, they identify the challenges to which Greek political parties, administrations, governments and citizens of all ages should respond. The last chapter, written by the editor, examines demographic projections and reflects some sociological features of the 'structural transformation of age'. He draws attention to the next generations growing old in Greece and highlights some ambivalences in ageing policy. Acknowledgements This book could not have been created without the previous learning partnership projects, funded by the EU-Grundtvig program, in which a lasting friendship between actors from several countries emerged. The German group, the NGO 'Association for the promotion of applied gerontology (VFG)', had been the initiator to investigate the topic 'Ageing in the crisis' in Greece, to recruit authors, and to finance the printing of the book. The Greek partner, the Hellenic Center for Mental Health and Research, took over the active host role for an author meeting in Athens in April 2017, to discuss the structure of the book and the findings till then. Special thanks in this context have to be given to Argyro Voulgari and Sophia Portinou. Likewise Judy Triantafillou and Elizabeth Mestheneos of the NGO 50plus Hellas and authors of other chapters were intensive partners in giving feedback to the book project. Best thanks to all of them!

Elderly poverty and deprivation under austerity in Greece Stefanos Papanastasiou, Christos Papatheodorou

1. Introduction Since the outburst of the 2007-08 world economic crisis, Greece has been undergoing an intense and prolonged recession resulting in overwhelming socioeconomic implications. Yet, as Papanastasiou and Papatheodorou (2017) have shown, it is not the recession itself, but the structural adjustment and the austerity enforced by the foreign creditors (EC, ECB, IMF) bringing about the most devastating outcomes for the Greek society. As in many other indebted countries across the globe (e.g. see ILO, 2014), the cost of fiscal consolidation has been passed on to the citizens-tax payers (i.e. fewer jobs, less income, slashed social protection, etc.). As consequence, a new generation of impoverished and severely deprived people has emerged, as the structural adjustment via domestic devaluation culminates in Greece. Among those people, the elderly population is greatly stricken by the austerity measures in various ways (material and non-material) (Ortiz & Cummins, 2013). The Greek elderly – mostly pensioners – have sustained major blows in their standard of living due to vast cutbacks in public and social spending. The belt-tightening process of a large part of the elderly manifests itself in the face of dramatic losses in their disposable income. Such losses mean that the elderly face growing out-of-pocket expenses on services (healthcare, long-term care, etc.) that used to be provided for free or as social benefits. Moreover, the living standards of many elderly with incomes just above the poverty line are deteriorating mainly because they are no longer eligible for social benefits (AGE Platform Europe, 2012). This chapter provides empirical evidence on the dramatic worsening of the living and welfare conditions of the Greek elderly because of the across-the-board austerity measures imposed by the foreign creditors. To this end, the next section is devoted to explaining the current state-of-affairs of the elderly in Greece after the consecutive reforms dictated by the three Memoranda of Understanding signed between the Greek governments and the international lenders. The following section is dedicated to clarifying the data and methodological parameters underlying the empirical analysis. The last-but-one section is concerned with the empirical exploration and critical assessment of the elderly’s living and welfare conditions over recent years. The last section is aimed at summing up main findings and providing concluding remarks.

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2. Economic crisis and social provisions for the elderly Prior to the eruption of the crisis, social provisions earmarked for the elderly population accounted for more than half of all social allowances in Greece. By and large, this figure was higher than the respective average ones for the EU-15 and the EU-28, although at the same period, old age and survivor benefits as percentage of GDP in the country did not vary from the relevant aggregate figures for the total EU. This is partway accounted for by the fact that the older people have represented a higher proportion in the Greek population than in the EU (Adam & Papatheodorou, 2016). Pensions were the mainstay of the Greek social protection system, providing households with almost 24% of their disposable income on average. Other social transfers (e.g. family, sickness, unemployment, housing, social assistance benefits) were marginal, accounting for barely around 3% of the average household disposable income. The generosity of the social protection system was largely detected in the pension rights of public sector employees (in the civil service and the utilities sector) and professionals (judges, lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, engineers and architects). In contrast, workers in the private sector outside banking and own-account workers were left without any great privileges (Matsaganis, 2013). The pension system in Greece was highly fragmented and polarized with extreme inequalities occurring in various aspects (i.e. replacement rates, pension levels, retirement age, contributions, etc.) (Papatheodorou, 2009). Nevertheless, Law 3655/2008 restructured and lessened the insurance funds, integrating them into IKA-ETAM, the fund to which most employees are associated. Another distinguishing trait of the Greek social protection system is the excessive reliance on familism to make up for a whole host of deficiencies and gaps. Thus, the Greek pensioners, mostly males, have traditionally been up to the task of protecting the dependent household members – women, children, handicapped, unemployed men – due to the absence of decent welfare state provisions (Papanastasiou & Papatheodorou, 2017). Nevertheless, pension reforms and cuts as prerequisite for the bailouts granted under the three Memoranda have dramatically altered the landscape since 2010. The austerity measures prioritized the reform of the pension system by altering the structure of the entire system (Petmesidou, 2013). Successive reforms increased the retirement age at 67, extended the minimum contribution period for full pension to 40 years, decreased the amount of various main and auxiliary pensions, merged the various auxiliary pension funds into one and abolished public financing of auxiliary pensions. It is worth-noting that even researchers advocating in favor of fiscal consolidation acknowledge that between 20102015 the existing pensions were cumulatively reduced to disenchanting levels

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(e.g. see Tinios, 2016). In contrast, by elaborating income taxation data over the 2008-2012 period, Giannitsis and Zografakis (2015) sketch a rather optimistic view of the Greek elderly’s socioeconomic affairs at least for those at the bottom of the income scale, insofar as they find evidence of improvement in incomes of low pensioners till the 6th decile, contrary to those above the 6th decile of whom a significant part has sustained drastic income cuts. Nevertheless, the dataset used is rather inappropriate for such an analysis due to extensive tax evasion in Greece, whereas the findings presented are largely overturned when Eurostat’s data are employed. Moreover, since 2016, the main pension is made up of two parts: the national pension set at €384 at the full rate and financed from the state budget and the contributory pension computed based on the average reference wage over the entire working life, the length of contributions and the replacement rate. To qualify for a national pension, it is necessary to be 67 years old and have lived in Greece for at least 15 years, whereas, to qualify for a full pension of €384, it is necessary to have contributed for 20 years. The final reform provides for the gradual abolition of the social solidarity benefit (EKAS) by December 2019, an increase in social security contributions for employees (1% for employers and 0.5% for employees) and for professional occupations, freelancers and farmers (contribution of 20% of monthly income) as well as further cutbacks in replacement rates (ETUI, 2017). In addition, the 2016 pension reform leads to drastic income cuts for widows and pushes a large portion of population further into impoverishment. Widows’ pensions have been cut down to 50% of the deceased’s pension and new more restrictive age-based criteria have gone into effect. Presently, more than 1.2 million Greek pensioners live on less than €500 per month. The average pension is calculated at €722 per month, whereas the supplementary pension average is at €170. As of 2017, pensioners’ income decreased more due to cuts in the poverty allowance for low pensioners (EKAS). Despite the general increase of the retirement age, 700.000 pensioners are between 51 and 65 years old. This has to do with the retirement of members of armed forces and other groups of uniformed personnel that retire after 25 years of service. One more reason is the mass early retirement of civil servants after 2010, with 25 years of service. With joblessness being steadily over 23%, many unemployed prefer to go into retirement even on low pension to escape the pointless job search in the Greek labor market (IDIKA, 2017).

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3. Data and methodology The aforesaid developments run contrary to the prioritizations of the EUROPE 2020 strategy aimed at promoting the so-called inclusive growth. Within this strategy, the member states have set an overarching target to reduce the number of people facing poverty risk or social exclusion by 20 million. At risk of poverty or social exclusion, abbreviated as AROPE, refers to the situation of people either at risk of poverty or severely materially deprived or living in a household with very low work intensity. The AROPE rate, that is, the share of the total population which is at risk of poverty or social exclusion, is the headline indicator to monitor the EU 2020 Strategy poverty target. However, this AROPE indicator is less relevant for the elderly, as its third component (that is, living in a household with very low work intensity) does not apply to households composed only of people aged 65 or over. In contrast, the other two components (that is, the at-risk-poverty and the material deprivation rate) are more suitable to depict the socioeconomic situation of the elderly. The at-risk-of-poverty indicator captures the share of people with an equivalized disposable income (after social transfers) below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalized disposable income. Two remarks on that indicator need to be made: it is relative measure, so for example changes in the income of those aged below 65 can affect the level of the poverty line and hence the at risk of poverty levels of those aged 65+, even in the absence of absolute changes to income levels for people aged 65+. It is also income based, so does not take account of the wealth of pensioners or the value of non-monetary benefits they may receive (Eatock, 2016). On the other hand, the material deprivation indicator captures the inability to afford some items considered by most people to be desirable or even necessary to lead an adequate life (to meet this criterion, a person must be unable to afford at least three of nine items). The list of those items is as follows: to pay rent, mortgage or utility bills, to keep home adequately warm, to face unexpected expenses, to eat meat or proteins regularly (or vegetarian equivalent), to go on holiday, a television set, a washing machine, a car and a telephone. This metric avoids the issues with relative measures and has been developed to give a wider perspective (Eatock, 2016). The chosen EU-14 countries analysed throughout this chapter have been grouped into four welfare clusters (Social-democratic, Conservative-Corporatist, Liberal and South-European) according to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare regime typology and the relevant academic debate on the welfare state of the south European countries (Leibfried, 1993; Ferrera, 1996; 2000; Papatheodorou & Petmesidou, 2004; 2005).

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Lastly, the data source used in this chapter is the survey on income and living conditions (abbreviated as EU-SILC). The EU-SILC was launched in 2003 and expanded in 2005 to cover all (then) 25 member states. The EU-SILC provides annual data on the two socioeconomic indicators defined earlier. The surveyed population includes all private households. The results presented in this chapter cover the data collected between 2003 and 2015 (since each year collects income data for the previous fiscal year, those data cover the income period from 2002 to 2014). 4. Empirical findings Over the abovementioned period, as shown in Figure 1, old age provisions as expressed in PPS (purchasing power standards)2 have always been lower in Greece than the corresponding average figures for the EU-15 or even the EU27. Those provisions had almost reached the average EU-27 level in 2009, but then they sharply dropped and especially after 2012, the year the Memorandum 2 came into effect. This comes as strong evidence of the dismantling-downgrading of the Greek pension system as precondition for the bailouts and its alleged future viability considering rather common EU challenges (economic, demographic, etc.). Also, over this time-span (2002-2014) and as shown in Figure 2, the elderly’s mean equivalent income in PPS has sustained major fluctuations. During this period, elderly males were better off than females. Since 2003, the income in question had been rising until 2009, the year the economic crisis manifested itself and the austerity policies began to be implemented. After that year, nonetheless, the elderly witnessed a rapid decline in incomes, reaching in 2014 similar levels as the ones in 2002. This finding marks a retrenchment in living standards for the elderly population in Greece as result of major cuts in pensions and other social allowances.

2

The PPS is an artificial currency unit that makes it possible to compare certain economic aggregates, such as income and consumption, between countries and across time, by adjusting for differences in price levels and purchasing power. In other words, one PPS can purchase the same quantity of goods in each country. PPS estimates for EU countries are provided by Eurostat and calculated by dividing the economic variable of each country in national currency by the respective purchasing power parities (PPP) (Eurostat-OECD, 2012).

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5. Concluding remarks The empirical findings presented above reveal the worsening of the Greek elderly’s living standards since the onset of the economic crisis and the realization of austerity programs in the country. The picture is getting even more disappointing for the elderly’s socioeconomic state-of-affairs when comparing Greece with other EU countries. As many other social categories in Greece, the older people have seen their real incomes being dwindled as result of phasedowns in social entitlements and allowances. What is more, the Greek elderly have sustained even greater income losses incurred by the abolition of various social provisions – mostly in-kind ones – increasing the out-of-pocket expenses to meet vital needs (e.g. healthcare, long-term care, transport, etc.). A tangible upshot of fiscal consolidation is the steady transformation of the Greek social protection system into a liberal one. This can best be illustrated by the abolition and curtailment of certain social transfers, on the one hand, and the introduction of the Social Solidarity Income (SSI), on the other. The SSI scheme is targeting households facing extreme poverty and, in that sense, is denotative of the foreign and domestic policymakers’ drives when it comes to social policy design. Thus, social policy’s main goal is being shifted from promoting comprehensive welfare to merely dealing with extreme sorts of social risks through targeted and means-tested social provisions (Papatheodorou, 2017). As Greece has eventually been returning to the bond markets and the foreign lenders have been imposing extra austerity measures stretching all the way to 2060, the elderly’s and their dependent members’ socioeconomic future is not looking much optimistic. The 15th June 2017 Eurogroup statement on Greece implies that, among other across-the-board austerity measures, poor pensioners will annually forfeit one of their twelve monthly pension payments as result of a reduction in the threshold above which income tax is withheld (Varoufakis, 2017). This is just one of the many envisioned plans of the foreign creditors to further squeeze the real incomes of the Greek citizens and thus further realize the domestic devaluation of the Greek economy. At the end of the day, the lenders’ core objective can be summarized as Greece’s structural adaptation to the accumulation regime of contemporary capitalism. This regime presupposes a flexible mode of regulation within which Greece’s fiscal adjustment needs to be seen not as isolated phenomenon but as part-and-parcel process for the reproduction of the dominant economic paradigm in the 21st century.

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References Adam, S. and Papatheodorou, C., (2016), “Dismantling the feeble social protection system of Greece: Crisis and austerity measures consequences”, In Challenges to the European welfare systems, (eds.) K. Schubert, P. de Villota and J. Kuhlmann, 271-300. New York: Springer. AGE Platform Europe, (2012), “Older people also suffer because of the crisis”. www.age-platform.eu/images/stories/en/olderpeoplealsosufferbcofthecrisis-en.pdf. Eatock, D., (2016), “Elderly people and poverty. Current levels and changes since the crisis”, European Parliament Research Service, Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586599/EPRS_BRI(2016)5 6599_EN.pdf. Esping-Andersen, G., (1990), The three worlds of welfare capitalism, Oxford: Policy Press. European Trade Union Institute, (2017), “Pension reform in Greece”, Available at: https://www.etui.org/ReformsWatch/Greece/Pension-reform-in-Greece-backgroundsummary. Eurostat-OECD (2012) “Eurostat-OECD Methodological Manual on Purchasing Power Parities”, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/std/prices-ppp/PPP%20manual%20revised%202012.pdf Ferrera, M., (1996), The "Southern Model" of welfare in social Europe, Journal of European Social Policy, Vol, 6, pp. 17-37. Ferrera, M., (2000), “Restructuring the welfare state in Southern Europe”, In Kuhnle, S. (Ed.): Survival of the European welfare state, London: Routledge, pp. 131155. Giannitsis, T. and Zografakis, S., (2015), “Greece: Solidarity and adjustment in times of crisis”, Macroeconomic Policy Institute, Hans-Boeckler-Foundation, Available at: https://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_imk_study_38_2015.pdf. IDIKA, (2017), System for Pensions Control and Payment “HELIOS“, Available at: http://www.idika.gr/anakoinwseis. International Labor Organization, (2014), “Social protection for older persons: Key policy trends and statistics”, Available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--dgreports/dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_310211.pdf. Leibfried, S., (1993), “Towards a European welfare state? On integrating poverty regimes into the European Community”, In Jones, C. (Ed.): New perspectives on the welfare state in Europe, London & New York: Routledge. Matsaganis, M., (2013), The Greek crisis: Social impact and policy responses, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/10314.pdf. Nolan, B., Esping-Andersen, G., Whelan, T., & Wagner, S., (2011), “The role of social institutions in intergenerational mobility”, In: Persistence, privilege, and parenting. The comparative study of intergeneration mobility, (eds.): T. M. Smeeding, R. Erikson and

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Stefanos Papanastasiou, Christos Papatheodorou

M. Jäntti, New York: Russell Sage, pp. 331-68. Ortiz, I. & Cummins, M., (2013), “The age of austerity: A review of public expenditures and adjustment measures in 181 countries”, New York/Geneva: Initiative for Policy Dialogue and the South Centre, Available at: http://policydialogue.org/files/publications/Age_of_Austerity_Ortiz_and_Cummins.pdf. Papanastasiou, S. & Papatheodorou, C., (2017), “The Greek Depression: Poverty outcomes and welfare responses”, East-West Journal of Economics and Business (forthcoming). Papatheodorou, C., (2009), Inequalities and deficiencies in social protection: The welfare system of Greece, In K. Schubert, S. Hegelich, & U. Bazant (Eds.), The handbook of European welfare systems (pp. 225–243). London: Routledge. Papatheodorou, C. (2014). Economic crisis, poverty and deprivation in Greece. In S. Mavroudeas (Ed.), Greek capitalism in crisis. Marxist analyses, London: Routledge, pp. 179–195. Papatheodorou, C., (2017), “Poverty and austerity in Greece of the crisis: Strengthening neoliberalism and dwindling the social protection system”, Available at: http://eekp.gr/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Παπαθεοδώρου-Περίληψη.pdf. Papatheodorou, C. & Petmesidou, M., (2005), “Inequality, redistribution and welfare regimes: Comparing Greece to other EU countries”, In Argeitis, G. (Ed.): Economic changes and social contradictions in Greece: The challenges in the beginning of the 21st century, Athens: Typothito - G. Dardanos, pp. 213-254 (in Greek). Papatheodorou, C. & Petmesidou, M., (2004), “Inequality, poverty and redistribution through social transfers: Greece in comparative perspective”, In Petmesidou, M. & Papatheodorou, C. (Eds.): Poverty and social exclusion, Athens: Exantas, pp. 307-366 (in Greek). Petmesidou, M., (2013), Pensions, health care and long-term care: Annual National Report 2013, Available at: http://socialprotection.eu/files_db/1443/EL_asisp_CD13.pdf. Tinios, P., (2016), “Misperceptions, misstatements, misunderstandings. Technical clarifications on Greek pensions”, London: Hellenic Observatory, LSE, Available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/CMS%20pdf/HO %20staff%20in%20Prees/Misunderstandings.pdf. Varoufakis, Y., (2017), “The annotated 15th June 2017 Eurogroup statement on Greece: Extending (again) the extending-and-pretending Eurogroup policy on Greece’s neverending crisis”, Available at: https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/The-Annotated-15th-June2017-Eurogroup-statement-on-Greece.pdf.

Pensioners and pension reforms during the Greek crisis Platon Tinios Introduction: A tangle of paradoxes Pension reform was the first law of the first bailout in June 2010. Unlike other measures, this was praised by the IMF (in August 2010), as a “landmark pension reform, which is far-reaching by international standards” (IMF, 2010), and later, ’as one of the main achievements of the program’ (IMF, 2013). Six years and four pension reforms later, another restrictive pension law was in 2016 the centrepiece of the third bailout, implemented this time by an ostensibly antiausterity government. In between those dates more than twelve separate pension cuts were insufficient to curtail the rise of pension spending – which climbed in 2016 to almost 19 per cent of GDP – by far the highest in the EU. Nevertheless, all the legislative flurry is seemingly unable to give any reassurance to pensioners that they have seen the end of pension cuts; the 2016 reassurances were directly contradicted by a further law twelve months later. To add to the confusion, government claims that ‘pensions have been cut by 40 per cent’ are seemingly at odds with official statistics showing that the relative pensioner poverty is half what it was in 2010. This did not prevent the government from raiding again those pensions that had been most affected, while giving out a pension supplement in December 2016 to those pensioners least affected by the cuts. Pre-crisis reform inertia has been replaced by apparently ineffective activism. Discussion without action was replaced by action without discussion. This chapter navigates through the fog: Pensions before, during and, most probably, after the crisis were, are and will be close to the eye of the storm. They form a key link in the dynamics of the crisis, and also play a complex role in the finances of individuals and families. This chapter builds on those micro/macro interactions to reconcile paradoxes and explain mechanisms behind the political economy of pensions: how the situation of individuals impinges on the big picture of the economy, and vice versa. In this account differences between perceptions and reality play a pivotal role. A brief presentation of the pre-crisis conundrum is followed by an outline of the logic and practice of the repeated pension changes following the bailout. The situation at the end of the second bailout and the period of negotiation is dealt with in greater detail, to provide background for the 2016 reform and its aftermath, but also to motivate some tentative conclusions. The chapter ends with a consideration of a possible alternative. A timeline at the end of this document

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outlines the main events, focusing on bailout-era changes. Pre-bailout inactivity: Pensions bankrupt the state The Greek pension system was designed in the 1930s around IKA, the State social insurance and pension provider for the private sector. Being a direct contemporary of US Social Security, it shares many of its design and financing features. Two differences, however, can explain its weakness and illustrate its downfall. Firstly, pensions were used by all governments to buy political influence; they became a key instrument in ‘clientelistic deals’1. In consequence, in Greek pension law the general rule ended up as the exception: For example the rule setting out general retirement ages (65 for men, 60 for women) was used by only 15 per cent of all men applicants, while 85 per cent used some more favourable exception. Secondly, organisational fragmentation, provided the means through which these deals could take place. The pensions system, as a result, fragmented by occupation, pension tranche, mode of finance and cohort2 to form a confusing kaleidoscope defying easy description. The end result was expensive (high percent of pensions to GDP), ineffective (high old age poverty) and discriminatory (across genders, generations, occupations). Demography was layered on to pre-existing design issues from the mid-80s on. By that time it was obvious that the Greek baby boom would combine with drops in fertility to create a ‘perfect storm’, expected (even then) to climax in the 2010s. Warnings, notably by a Committee headed by Prof. John Spraos in 1997, were shrugged off by pointing out that pensions were guaranteed by the State. As the Chairman of the Trade Union Confederation characteristically put it, at the time, ‘The social insurance system will only collapse after the collapse of the State Budget’ (quoted in Palaiologos, 2014, p 80). Attempts at pension reform took place in 1990/2, 1998, 2001 and 2008. These settled some side issues, but never tackled more than a fraction of the problem. In the meantime, structural issues, as predicted, were raising costs further. Pension deficits were piling up with increasing speed. These, after 1992, were not 1

For example in the troubled political times of the 1960s, hairdressers were ‘bought off’ by including them as a ‘heavy and hazardous occupation’, entitling them to early retirement. 2 Fragmentation: by occupation = different occupations had different providers, contribution rates, retirement ages etc. By pension tranche = each employee is entitled to a primary pension, an auxiliary pension and a separation payment, all delivered by different bodies; by mode of finance = some providers levy proportional contributions, others a head tax, some are subsidized by the State or receive a tied tax. By cohort = pension reforms affect new workers and leave older ones unaffected. So we have ‘pre-1983’, pre1993, pre-2010, now pre-2015 etc.

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27

met by increasing contribution rates but, instead, were all paid by government grants. The grants, in turn, added to external borrowing, especially after 2001. It was in this way that the prophesy of the Trade Union Chairman regarding State Budget collapse came to pass in 2009. The State had to be bailed out, just before the first bailout-era pension bill in July 2010. The former Minister of Labour, Tasos Giannitsis, stated the obvious by saying that the bailout would not have happened if pensions had been reformed. (Giannitsis, 2016). The first two bailout periods: Pension dualism and insecurity Under the tutelage of the troika the first pension reform bill (law 3863/10) introduced to post-bailout pensions their distinctive characteristic of generational dualism: For the future generation, there was clarity. A new, uniform, streamlined system based on common rules was introduced. The new system remains 100% State run, financed entirely through current contributions (PAYG), paid by compulsory payroll taxes and government grants3. It emphasised poverty protection through a flat-rate basic pension; this was combined with a somewhat closer link between contributions and entitlements. Pensions were, as before, calculated as a percentage of average final salary (‘defined benefit’ pensions). Far from being, as it was accused by some, a neo-liberal innovation contrary to the European Social Model, the new system was more of a revamped 1960s-style social insurance-type system, of the type common across Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. For the current generation, i.e. roughly those to retire in the next 15 or 20 years, the situation was chaotic. All governments after 2010 attempted to protect incumbents, and chiefly those of the Greek baby boom generation, which was due to retire by the 2020s4. For this group retirements, supposedly, proceeded based on pre-crisis, 2009 entitlements – notwithstanding that those entitlements were responsible for pension deficits. In a tug of war between Greek politicians and the troika, those entitlements were in some cases even expanded (as in the case of ‘mothers of underage children’), while in others retrenched (invalidity pensions, review of the ‘heavy and unhygienic industries’). In the latter case, as in 3

The new system affected everyone, but only in the sense that all future entitlements after 2011 were under new rules. In the case of pensions, they would be have been calculated on a pro rata basis. That is, when someone was to retire in 2016 with 40 years’ contributions, 5/40ths of his pension would have been calculated under new rules and 35/40ths under old. This was never tested, but it would mean that the new system would be, in practice, irrelevant to anyone younger than say, 45. 4 The Greek baby boom is known locally as the ‘Polytechnic generation’ – i.e. the people who came to political maturity after the downfall of the junta in 1974.

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all others, there was an evident desire to delay implementation as much as possible. For example, in 2012 the iconic case of hairdressers was finally withdrawn from the list of heavy occupations. However, this law affected only hairdressers with less than ten years’ tenure; all hairdresser retirements to 2025 or so remained unaffected. As the crisis in the labour market deepened, the unchanged conditions of access to pensions encouraged an exodus into retirement, seen as a safe haven compared to employment. This was combined with unemployment and with reluctance to pay contributions, amounting almost to a wholesale rebellion on the part of contributors. As no new borrowing was allowed, the resulting deficits overruns could not be financed. They could only be paid for by raids on existing pensions (called ‘pensions-in-payment’). These were cut on ten different occasions between May 2010 and 2014. The retired generation thus did not escape scot-free. Pension cuts and other changes affecting the current generation could be interpreted as standing in for a necessary process, through which unsustainable promises handed out pre-crisis are brought back down to earth. Given that the real economy had shrunk by 25% since 2008, it would be unnatural if pensions did not participate in the nation-wide downward adjustment. To use this reasonable claim this, however, would have entailed a measure of self-criticism that the Greek political class was unwilling to make. Instead, pension cuts were blamed on the crisis or on fiscally-focused pressure by the troika. Cuts were presented as unrelated to the pension system, which had repeatedly been declared ‘viable’. The decision by all Greek governments to invest in blame avoidance as a communication strategy explains the reluctance to engage in discussion about what was happening to pensions or about the direction in which they were heading. The situation was only made worse by a Supreme Court decision in early 2015, ruling pension cuts since 2012 as unconstitutional. The Court did not opine that cuts are per se unconstitutional; rather that the post 2012 cuts were insufficiently justified5. This ruling added to the confusion, by placing another question mark on the legal status and future prospects of current pensions. Thus, on the eve of the third bailout in 2015, Greece could hardly be thought to have ‘a’ pension system. It, rather, was trying to balance a pair of systems reacting against each other in an unstable ‘danse macabre’. On the one hand, there was a relatively clear and less generous system of the new generation. On the other there was a highly unstable system for incumbents: They were still theor5

This was in apparent contradiction with an earlier ruling of the same court, that earlier cuts from 2010 to 2012 could go ahead.

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etically entitled to pensions amounts on pre-crisis rules - as if the crisis had never happened. Once that amount had been worked out, it was subjected to each of the ten cuts successively. In the pay slips that every pensioner received regularly, each cut was itemised, the names given to each emphasising its temporary nature. Existing pensioners lived in fear that they would once again be in the firing line, should finance prove inadequate. Their fear was justifiably stoked by the sombre fiscal fact that the pension bill is the largest budget item and is entirely within the government’s control. If for whatever reason a future government was short of cash, pensions could (as before) be the quickest and easiest fix. The bailout score-card So, pensions in 2014 presented many of the problems of a half-finished project. These problems would only become worse if the project was abandoned, as it sometime threatened to be. Greek governments had to manage a deteriorating situation, whilst at the same time remaining committed to a blame avoidance strategy. Their reaction was to stop the flow of data on the Greek pension system – limiting all communications to those for the exclusive use of the troika and the occasional leak to the press (when things seemed to be going well). For example the Social Budget, a regular annual publication since 1962 was discontinued in 2010; the Helios system, trumpeted in 2012 as a regular monthly publication of pensions paid out, was stopped in 2015. Commentary had to wait for publications emanating from Brussels or from the troika. (e.g. IMF, 2017)6. Despite the flurry of pension reforms, key indicators were anything but reassuring. Greece had the most expensive system in Europe. It had climbed to the top place of pensions as a percent of GDP, absorbing 17.7 per cent of GDP in 2012 and almost 18.5 per cent in 2016 – despite reforms and pension cuts. The acceleration of ageing after 2015 would pose further challenges to a situation seemingly already out of control. The preoccupation with pensions obscured other social problems which remained unaddressed. Pensioners were in the 1990s and early 2000s the group of the population facing the largest threat of poverty. However, that situation was ameliorated after 2005, and dramatically reversed after the crisis. Given that pension cuts were concentrated above the poverty line, low pensions remained largely unaffected. As a result, pensioner relative poverty was slashed by a half (from 19.5 to 11%) between 2010 and 2014 (Figure 1), a fall which continued unabated to 2016. In contrast, relative poverty shifted to other groups (families, the unemployed) for whom Greek social protection was largely silent. It is sig6

Even so, data published by outside bodies was angrily rebuffed – on a simple say-so.

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nificant that policy commentary appeared unaware of this reversal. The power of political advocacy of a well-organised group such as pensioners prevailed over the power of statistics. Figure 1: Relative poverty for Pensioners and other groups 2008-2016 (based on 60% threshold) Greece: At-risk-of-poverty rate (%), persons 18+, by activity status 50 40 30

44.0 36.8

38.1

38.5

26.5

27.4

18.4

19.0

45.8

33.3 26.0 20.3

20

30.0

46.3

30.3

45.9

28.4

44.8

Unemployed 47.1

26.2

Other Inactive 25.4

Retired 9.7

19.9 14.3

12.4

11.5

10.8

10 8.1

8.1

8.2

7.1

8.7

9.3

8.5

8.2

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

0

8.4 Employees 2016

Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC 2008-2016, based on Georgiadis 2016

Pensions remained dominant in the determination of the public-sector deficit. Government direct transfers to the pension system were the largest in the EU. According to the IMF (IMF, 2017), pension contributions by the insured population and employers fell short of pensions payments by over 10 per cent of GDP in 2015; the difference had to be made up by various kinds of grants from the state budget, themselves paid for by taxation. In the next country in line, Austria, the equivalent figure was less than half that, around 5 per cent of GDP, whereas the Eurozone average was well below 4 per cent7. This observation by itself is sufficient to keep pensions in the fiscal firing line; as long as the pension system cannot stand on its own feet, the prospect of more cuts cannot be ruled out. At the end of the second bailout, the ND/PASOK government reneged on its obligation to make public a mid-term review of the prospects of pensions. Hiding from discussion could not disguise the key fact that the pension system, for 7

The Government retorted that this figure includes in the total payments to civil servants’ pensions which are paid directly from the budget. However, as it has never attempted to quantify or justify that figure, it has only itself to blame.

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what it was, cost a lot and delivered little. Granted that income security at old age ought to be the objective of pensions, the Greek system produced almost total insecurity, shrouded in a veil of secrecy and obfuscation. No-one could give any assurance to current 50-year olds even of the order of magnitude of their entitlements when they were to retire ten years hence. On the other side of the equation, the contribution base seemed also to be in freefall. The crisis is easy to cite as the proximate cause; however, it is also likely that deeper, structural, forces were also at work. The third bailout and the 2016 law: Negotiation, defiance, reform The year 2015 did not begin auspiciously. The outgoing coalition in January avoided its duty to issue the first (partial) pension reform under its own new rules. The incoming anti-austerity activists were committed to roll back changes, making up for cuts and starting discussion from scratch; this was to take place in the autumn of 2015, after the end of negotiations with the lenders. In the meantime everything was placed on hold and early retirement accelerated. The debacle of summer 2015 led to a third bailout. Action stemming early retirement was a prior action for negotiations to conclude. Retirement ages were raised abruptly and almost in a step fashion to equalize all to 67 for both genders by 2022 (62 for long service)8. However, those who had vested rights by August 2015 were unaffected. Thus dualism in retirement ages was maintained, chiefly affecting women. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which accompanied the bailout accorded pension adjustment very high priority, speaking of generational justice in the strategic preamble9. In the detailed recommendations it committed the government to resume with the implementation of the reform, to respond to the Supreme Court decision on post-2012 pension cuts, and to fold the dedicated pensioners’ safety net (EKAS) into a new general safety net. The government was allowed the leeway of proposing measures of equivalent effect. To this effect, a Committee of Experts was formed after the September 2015 elections and reported in late October. The Government’s proposals were released in January and the law was passed 8

In the private sector, an early retirement subsidy was abolished: high minimum pensions were used applicants to increase pensions low due to few contributions; henceforth minimum pensions can be accessed only by individuals over 67. In the public sector, incumbents had been protected by an array of minimum retirement ages, some lower than 50. All these were raised to 67 with a small number of steps. 9 The MoU talks of the “the need for social justice and fairness, both across and within generations”.

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in May 2016 (law 4387/16), some seven months behind schedule. The proposals bore little resemblance to the Experts’ report, yet were a far cry from the original SYRIZA aim of rolling back changes and starting afresh. Indeed, notwithstanding their presentation as a rupture with the past, the law is best understood as a completion of the adjustment-era reforms. The organizing principle of the 2016 law was the spread of common rules and of organizational consolidation. These were applied to areas which had been left unfinished by the changes to 2010. Consolidation was extended in three dimensions, presented here in descending order of importance. First, consolidation between generations. Most pension reforms change regulations for distant retirements and protect those of the near-term. As the system for new entrants was already in place, the 2016 law had to stand this principle on its head: A slightly more general version of the 2010 new system was applied across the board. The result should be substantially the same system for all generations, full uniformity to be attained within a relatively short period of three years10. This starts already by 2016, as new retirees from 12 May 2016 on are only entitled to pensions calculated under new rules. These rules were substantially those of the ‘new system of 2010’: career average income replacement, a basic pension for all and a proportional pension on Defined Benefit (DB) lines. Differences were a basic pension higher by €24, and marginally more generous accrual rates. All existing arrangements were retrospectively swamped by the new system, affecting all past contribution payments. Existing pensioners will have their own entitlements recalculated under new system rules by 2018; if there is a difference between that and their current entitlements, the difference will be called as a ‘personal bonus’. The personal bonus was to be offset by any future increases or indexation; its abolition was thus accepted in principle, regardless of protestations at the time that no more cuts were planned11. In any case, under the proposals, in a short period of three years it would be possible to claim that all generations participating in the social insurance contract are subject to the same rules. Consolidation could also be able to sidestep the vexed problems of past pension cuts: There will be a reduction relative to expectations for new retirees – who will be few in number due to the wave of early retirements in 2015 to forestall pension age increases. The question whether current pensioners will suffer further cuts was postponed, according to the 10

The most controversial question in pension reform, retirement ages had already been dealt with as a prior action and was hence not an issue. The law in cases comes close to retrospective legislation. 11 No calculations were offered, official or otherwise.

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law, until 2018. Finally, the younger generation escape with a marginally more generous system than they started out with12. Second, consolidation in revenue structures. Consolidation of entitlements would be irrelevant without equivalent normalisation in the way contributions are collected. Under the 2010 reform each day of employment from 2011 was earning rights under new system rules. This left the pre-existing, widely disparate contribution rates stranded: The same benefit (in terms of accrual rate) was nominally ‘purchased’ with wildly different rates – ranging from less than 10 per cent for farmers, 20 per cent in the private sector, to over 45 per cent in the electricity industry. We can distinguish three types of issues raised. In the case of employees, for instance, workers in previously generous funds continued paying inflated contribution rates, even after their generosity had been abolished. The National Bank was charging itself contribution rates in excess of 50 per cent (to reflect its historic privileged status) whereas workers at Eurobank were being charged half that, 26 per cent. All employee rates are to be normalised, after a period of transition. The case of the self-employed was equally paradoxical: their entitlements were supposedly calculated in a manner equivalent to employees, applying accrual rates to concepts of lifetime incomes. The latter, however, were entirely theoretical, as contributions were still collected with a system of insurance classes, under which everyone paid the same euro amounts, whether they ran kiosks or department stores. Farmers were on a class of their own, paying extremely low amounts of contributions and enjoying exceptionally high subsidies from the State. Finally, some, chiefly in the free professions but also in the media, still relied on tied taxes to pay for their pensions. Lawyers, for instance, relied on a charge on conveyancing and other legal actions, engineers collected a surcharge on all public works, journalists a percentage on advertising turnover. This type of revenue (‘nuisance charges’) is independent of work input and shifts costs to unconnected third parties. For revenue consolidation, to work, a common contribution base must be defined and then uniform percentage rates applied to it. Thus entitlements will result identically for all occupations. The proposals move in that direction by specifying that the contribution base must be the (previous year’s) taxable income for the self employed. On this will be applied the same proportional rates currently used for employees. The equalization of employee’s rates is promoted in principle, but is pushed back – through a gradual process which is not completed until 2020. Many implementation issues were postponed until early 2017, 12

This is counterbalanced by vesting rules denying any pension to people – mainly women - with fewer than 15 years’ contributions.

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causing widespread protests. Contributions in 2017 are levied using 2015 declared income (at least while tax returns have not been processed); given that self-employed incomes were falling, this provision amounts to authorising the State to collect compulsory interest-free loans. All self-employed income would pay at the full rate, including part-time earnings earned by salaried employees to supplement their income (which were previously exempt). Given that the new pensions have an EUR 2000 ceiling, for those with a long career or with above average earnings the extra contributions will not lead to a pension increase – for them the contribution is a pure tax. Third, consolidation in administrative structures. This has two facets: Firstly, consolidation of all protection tranches. Greek old age protection was fragmented ‘horizontally’ into primary pensions, auxiliary pensions and separation payments. The demarcation between the three was never clear; all were mandatory, state-run, PAYG and Defined Benefit. Though the issue had been raised in the Experts’ report, the law backed away from full integration (see the text box on auxiliary pensions). Secondly, consolidation of pension providers belonging to the same tranche. The necessity of this had long been accepted and providers had been folded into larger umbrella organisations. Within these organizations, providers had retained their independent organization. What remained, therefore, was to proceed with functional consolidation so that the umbrella organisations would behave more like unitary structures rather than loose confederations. The law creates a single body, the Unitary Institution for Social Security, known by its initials as EFKA, in which all primary pension funds (including civil servants) will be incorporated in one directorate, separation funds in another and health insurance in a third, under single management and with common support structures. Auxiliary pensions retain their independence. EFKA began operations in January 2017. Consolidation, whether that applies to entitlement rules, contributions or to administrative structures should in time bring benefits in streamlining procedures, in administrative simplification, and reduction of compliance costs. To grasp the magnitudes involved, IKA currently had approximately 800 different ways to compute entitlements; these should be replaced by a single algorithm. The saving will be greater if contribution collection were assigned to tax offices. Consolidation should free up personnel, in the pension funds, the central administration but also in private businesses; these can be redeployed to more productive uses. However, the implementation process so far has yielded no savings, nor are any budgeted – despite the obvious economies of scale. Instead, organisational consolidation seems to be progressing in 2017 in a blaze of negative pub-

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licity, swamped by administrative problems13. The end of the line? Financial sustainability Every Greek pension reform, and this is no exception, contends it offers a definitive solution to the ‘pension problem’. This is typically phrased in the form ‘Pensions have been saved as a result of our brave intervention’. This claim was disproved in all past pension reforms in Greece, and most dramatically for bailout era pension reforms. Governments faced with a major problem, ‘solve’ only the parts that are easily reachable and leave further change for the future in a process of ‘reform by instalments’. So, the key question to answer: Is law 4387/16 the end of the line, or is it one more stop in a longer course of pension reform? The answer to this question must be sought in two directions: Firstly within the law’s own logic, are the changes financially sustainable, or is more correction in store? Secondly, taking a wider view, even if the law is financially sustainable, is it economically viable, in the sense of supporting long term growth and welfare? Examining financial viability, does the money exist to honour pension promises as reformed by the law? The (definitive) answer to this type of question is typically supplied by actuarial studies balancing anticipated promises with existing and potential finance. However, no numbers were publicly released by the government. The proposals were described in Parliament (and not released) by means of a partial projection, with no public indication of costs or benefits. Indeed, all financial information regarding pensions remains a closely held secret. In consequence, we must seek an answer using qualitative arguments. An answer, of sorts, exists in the very long term– about the situation in the distant future. This is studied by the EU Ageing Working Group which published projections in 2015 for all 28 EU Member States. Those projections (compiled with the never-implemented 2010 reform in mind) showed that expenditure was contained. Given that the ‘new system’ of the 2016 law is substantially that of 2010, it would be surprising if anything changed14. The IMF (from 2013) had conceded that problems existed in the medium term, though not in the long. 13

One such are chronic delays in issuing new pensions. No pensions under the new law had been issued by February 2017. There were reports in the press of electronic records being lost in the transition. 14 There exists, however, greater uncertainty. Already pensions as % of GDP are two points higher than in the projection. Other uncertainties involve the cessation of early retirement, or the replacement of the current head tax for the self-employed with a new proportional system. It will be surprising if a review in a few years does not lead to major changes.

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The question, then moves to the medium term and affects people close to or above retirement age. ‘Will we have to find either new cuts or impose more taxes this year and next?’. It translates as ‘Will there be need for another pension reform’? In other words, does the reform give 50+ year-olds any assurance that they can resume with their (revised) life plans? Throughout negotiations, the government tried to preclude immediate pension cuts15. This pledge was honoured for lower pensions; in some cases they even increase. Those with above average pension felt cuts in auxiliary pensions and in some higher primary pensions in autumn 2016. To underline arbitrariness further, a one-off rise was offered to low income pensioners in December 201616. The question of whether further cuts are previewed is unexpectedly complicated: New pensioners from 2016 will have their pensions calculated as if they had always been contributing to the new system, rather than to the older regimes they (thought) were in force17. For the majority, and especially for hitherto privileged groups, this means much lower pensions. Strictly speaking this is not a cut, but merely a drastic denial of expectations. For a few lucky people (especially those with few years of contributions, some farmers, perhaps others), there might even be increases. Existing pre-2016 pensioners will have their pensions recalculated with the new rules. Amounts in excess of that will continue being paid as ‘temporary’ bonuses to be offset by future increases, should there ever be any. So, the 2016 law postdates decisions to cut pensions to 2018, after the expiry of the bailout18. The Government was careful in 2016 to offer no forecast of what it expected to happen. This allowed it to raise hopes that recalibration can even mean pension rises. For those optimistic enough to believe government forecasts of the end of austerity, the recalibration will be an opportunity to disburse a ‘growth dividend’. At the same time, the lenders could have been free to think of recalibration as the first step to further retrenchment. This fudge was originally planned to persist until 2019 or later; so long as no 15

The law was also designed to preclude rises in pensions caused by the Council of State decision ruling post 2012 cuts unconstitutional. This is avoided through the ruse of recalibrating old pensions in a way that yields an overall expenditure close to that of 2014. 16 See figure 2 for relative poverty rates. Those who had suffered extensive cuts suffered new ones, whereas those whose pension was not cut received the one-off bonus. 17 The future tense is used as, at the time of writing in June 2017, no new pensions had been issued, mainly due to the time taken for technical details to be dealt with. 18 And, in this way, theoretically away from interference by the lenders.

Pensioners and pension reforms

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data were released the two diverging interpretations could exist side by side. However, following previous practice in the 16-month stand-off regarding the second assessment of the programme, pension cuts were placed as before in centre stage. The point at issue was how far the 3.5% overall primary surplus foreseen for 2019 in the current bailout agreements was realistic, without additional measures. The IMF (followed in short course by the other institutions) followed the consolidation logic of the government’s own pension law and suggested that the ‘personal difference’ be abolished in 2019. They proposed that the 2016 law should be implemented fully for existing pensioners, rather than waiting for the same result to happen through gradual erosion. According to the Fund’s calculation would improve sustainability, by reducing outlays by 1 per cent of GDP. To deal with the stand-off the Government finally passed law 4472/17 in May 2017, committing the government to cut all personal differences by 2019, subject to a proviso that the resulting fall should be no bigger than 18%. The same law extended cuts to auxiliary pensions, which had originally been treated differently. Law 4472/17 should be seen as more than the last in a series of pension cuts. Instead it is symbolically important in completing the process that had started in 2010. By abolishing the difference between new and old pension rules, it ensures that the same new pension rules apply to the entire population. The 2010 law introduced for new rights only; the 2016 law extended it to all new pensioners; the 2017 ensures its retrospective application to all pensioners. Abstracting from questions of implementation, the original target (of more than 60 years ago) of a uniform system operating with common rules can be seen to be finally (after 2019) realised. What would this last change mean for existing pensioners? Our only information was the publication of the IMF’s own expectation in February 2017, based on government supplied data: Page 44 of the IMF’s special report on pensions (IMF, 2017), contains a colour- coded three-dimensional figure showing how pension cuts will depend on age, years of contribution and size of pension19. According to that, some lucky 5% of pensioners would see their pensions rise; the remaining unlucky 95% could see receipts fall by up to 50 per cent (and whose pension falls will be capped to 18%). Those most affected will be those who had high pensions based on few years (presumably due to having paid high contributions)20. 19

The colour stands in for a fourth dimension – the extent of rise and fall of pensions depending on combinations of the other three dimensions. 20 The IMF’s calculations did not include reductions to auxiliary pensions. What tran-

38

Platon Tinios

The legislated cuts in 2018 could move the system closer to financial viability, possibly by the 1% of GDP that the IMF calculated, possibly by a different figure. Would this be sufficient to guarantee that no further changes are necessary? Though formal actuarial projections would still need to be conducted to prove this claim, the probability is that in a purely accounting sense, ‘the money would be there’. Translating this in economic terms, this means that ‘if things remain as they are currently, that is if people continue behaving as today, then expenditures will be close to revenues’. If, in other words, world remains as it is today, the books will balance. Financial sustainability might be assured. But, will the world be the same? What of economic sustainability? Economic sustainability and the future A deeper disagreement with the proposed reform is that it is appropriate to the kind of world that in future years will become a distant memory. The new system implemented by Laws 4387/16 and 4472/17 corrects many of the problems of the old system, but introduces a system appropriate to the conditions of the mid-20th century, rather than those to be faced in the mid-21st. The reform reproduces a system that is too statist, too large and too inflexible. Such a system would be appropriate for the heyday of 20th century mature capitalism, characterised by large enterprises and steady and predictable careers. In the reality of insecurity and fluid developments already present in Greece and likely to dominate in future, it will prove woefully inadequate. This critique is not theoretical. It encompasses two issues currently being experienced during the implementation of Law 4387/16. The first such issue are the assurances given to pensioners and how they affect future growth prospects. A large national debt mitigates against growth by hypothecating future output – stretching well into the 2030s – far into the future. Debt relief corrects this by allowing long term investment plans to take place free of this very large ab initio handicap. The idea is that they allow growth to take place, which hence makes the servicing of debt much easier. Debt relief is a win-win project for lenders and debtors. The same argument applies equally to the hypothecating arising due to definedbenefit pension promises. These give rise to implicit debt which is every bit as harmful to future growth as the explicit debt. What is needed is a new kind of deal between the insured population and producers. This can turn the former into stakeholders, who share in macroeconomic risks, rather than inflexible spired in fact is more complicated as it includes the 18% cap on primary pension cuts, which is counterbalanced by other cuts in auxiliary pensions. What will turn our is anyone’s guess.

Pensioners and pension reforms

39

bondholders. This means that more of the pension promises must be phrased as a contingent rather than an absolute claim on future output. In other words, pensioners can be told ‘If there is future growth, you will share in it’. In terms of pension structure this means moving towards a partnership between pensions and investment, out of which both can emerge as winners. The second issue has to do with how to organise social protection for flexible production, what is known as the gig economy. Law 4387/16 treats all self-employed as salaried workers and forces them to insure to the same extent. This should translate into higher pensions in the future but also necessitates the imposition of very high non-wage costs on current production. Indeed, lawyers, the free professions and all self-employed are subject to 26.7% contributions (rising up to 38%) without any exemptions. These translate into a punitive tax on labour21. This is likely to lead either to relocation of enterprise, growth of the grey economy or will lead to income falls. In any case, it is likely to discourage the gig economy and entail a major growth loss. The revenue base of the system is already disappearing, while recourse to government grants is growing every year, despite the cuts. Successive crisis-era governments have reinforced the redistribution function of the pension system, protecting pensioners more than any other group during the crisis. This combined with other features of the system which prevented reciprocity between contributions and entitlements to delegitimise the payment of contributions on the part of contributors, especially young ones. Thus the problems on the revenue side are much more than a reflection of the crisis; they are indicative of a deeper malaise, to do with the objectives and structure of the pension system. In any case, the confused discussion currently taking place ‘discovers’ in the new self-employed contributions drawbacks which have always held for employees: This serves as a reminder that the entire system is already too expensive and distortionary. Rather than seeking to exempt one group, and keeping the problems intact for those who can’t complain, the conclusion must emerge that the entire system is to blame22. So, the proposals leading to L4387/16 surprised people not so much for being new, as for applying across the board what was already in force for employees. 21

Opposition to the reform has focused on contributions, which are discussed independently of entitlements. Employees are subject to the same rates; contributions have to be high because pensions are high. The objection is thus due to compulsory over-insurance. 22 This is the key point of Panageas and Tinios, 2017, who argue for a replacement by a multi-pillar system in order to restore reciprocity and to distance pensions from appearing as a punitive tax on labour.

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In doing so, it underlines that the entire reform path since 2010 is to blame. It is not a choice between the PASOK/ND and the SYRIZA systems; all are problematic in the same way. The externally supervised pension reform process has fixed some problems, and endowed Greece with a rigid, 20th century-type State pension system of the kind being abandoned everywhere. The State is monolithically dominant, financing is exclusively pay-as-you-go, pensions and hence contributions are high, while there is very little flexibility to depart from the new norms. A multi-pillar system? What is needed, under this light, is a 21st century system channelling the role of the State towards social policy rather than income replacement and allowing flexibility to meet the challenges of the new economy. A fresh start would be served by a multi-pillar scheme, in which roughly the same total pension entitlement is apportioned between three different sources, distinguished by the different kind of solidarity that is dominant in their logic. The system can be fine-tuned to limit non-wage costs and stands a chance of convincing young contributors that things have changed. Ensuring that the transition period is short is of crucial importance. The pension system as it stands is a major obstacle to recovery. It must be put right. References Börsch-Supan, A. and Tinios P. (2001), The Greek Pensions System: Strategic Framework for Reform, in Bryant, R.C. and N. Garganas and G.S. Tavlas (eds) Greece’s Economic Performance and Prospects, Bank of Greece and Brookings Institution, σελ.361-443 Economic Policy Committee (ΕPC) (2015), 2015 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the EU-27 Member States (2013-2060), European Economy, 2 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2015/pdf/ee3_en. pdf Georgiadis, Th. (2016). ‘∆ιαπιστώσεις για την επίδραση της κρίσης στην εισοδηµατική κατάσταση των συνταξιούχων και του πληθυσµού εργάσιµης ηλικίας στην Ελλάδα’. In: Αναγνώστου-∆εδούλη, Α. and Παπαρρηγοπούλου-Πεχλιβανίδη, Π. (eds.) Η Κοινωνική Ασφάλιση ως Προϋπόθεση Οικονοµικής Ανάπτυξης και Κοινωνικής Συνοχής: Ασφαλιστική Μεταρρύθµιση και Κρίση, σελ. 121-148 εκδόσεις Παπαζήση Giannitsis, Τ. (2016), Το ασφαλιστικό και η κρίση, Πόλις International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2010), Greece: Staff Report on Request for StandBy Arrangement, IMF Country Report No. 10/110, Washington, DC International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2013), Greece: Ex post evaluation of Exceptional Access under the 2010 Stand-by Arrangement, IMF Country Report 13/186, June 2013 International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2017), Greece: Selected issues, IMF Country Report 17/41, February 2017

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Lyberaki, A. Tinios, P. (2012), Labour and pensions in the Greek crisis: The Microfoundations of Disaster, Südosteuropa. Zeitschrift für Politik und Gesellschaft, (60) 3, pp 363‐386 Nektarios, M. (2012), Greece: The NDC paradigm as a Framework for a Sustainable Pension system, in R. Holzmann, E. Palmer and D. Robalino (eds), Non-Financial Defined Contribution Pension Schemes in a Changing Pension World, Volume 1: Progress, Lessons and Implementation, Washington DC, World Bank pp 259-277 OECD (2009), (2011), (2013), (2015). Economic Surveys: Greece: Paris Palaiologos, Y. (2014). The Thirteenth Labour of Hercules: Inside the Greek crisis, Portobello, London. Panageas, S. and Tinios, P. (2017). Pensions: Arresting a race to the bottom. In C. Meghir, C. Pissarides, D. Vayanos, N. Vettas (eds) Beyond Austerity: Reforming the Greek Economy, MIT Press, Boston Mass. Simeonidis, G. (2015) The Greek Pensions Reform 2010-2014: A leap forward, March 2015 http://www.actuaries.org/oslo2015/papers/PBSS-Simeonidis.pdf Tinios, P. (2012), Τhe pensions merry-go-round: End of a cycle?, in S. Kalyvas, G. Pagoulatos and H. Tsoukas (eds) From stagnation to forced adjustment: Reforms in Greece 1974-2010, C. Hurst & Co, London, pp117-132 Tinios, P. (2015), “Off-the-Shelf Reforms” and their blind spots: Pensions in postmemorandum Greece”, in R. Gerodimos and G. Karyotis (eds) The Politics of Extreme Austerity: Greece beyond the crisis., Palgrave., pp 66-76 Tinios, P. (2016), Το Ασφαλιστικό του 21οu αιώνα; Ανάγκη αναστοχασµού για µια νέα αρχή, (The pension issue of the 21st century: A need for reconsideration for a fresh start) Study submitted to the Athens Chamber of Industry and Commerce (EBEA), January 2016. Tinios, P, (2016b), Towards a new social contract: Greek pensions halfway through adjustment, LSE Hellenic Observatory policy paper, April 2016.

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APPENDIX What are auxiliary pensions and what is happening to them? All employees since 1983 had to pay for auxiliary pensions, in order to receive a second pension of about 20 per cent replacement, but otherwise indistinguishable from primary pensions: compulsory, mandatory, pay-as-you-go, defined benefit, provided by State bodies. Auxiliary providers tend to be less mature, more fragmented and richer. Nevertheless, Greek governments have consistently tried to keep auxiliary pensions separate from primary. They were excluded from the 2010 reform on the grounds that they ought not to receive subsidies. This fiction created a major funding problem, ‘dealt with’ by consolidating (almost) all funds in one, ETEA, in 2012. As some funds were generous and ran deficits and other were parsimonious and had smaller ones, unification resulted in extending the life for the spendthrift rich funds (representing influential groups, chiefly in the public sector). The 2012 law attempted to introduce strict reciprocity between contributions and pensions. It thus applied the Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) system, retrospectively from 2001. However, this decision was overturned, when it was stipulated that NDC would start only after 2014. The chief gainers were the two most generous funds: custom officials and tax civil servants. So, their pensions can be paid for a few years more, using contributions of other occupations with less generous systems. Getting one occupation to pay for the others cannot balance the books for long. To stick to the story that auxiliary insurance does not rely on the state, the ‘zero deficit clause’ was inserted. Under this clause, if there is a deficit in one year, balance is attained by cutting all pensions by an equal amount. Interestingly, pensions can only go down, and can never rise again. The zero deficit clause was applied in 2014, when pensions were cut by 5.3%. No data justifying that figure were ever released, creating the suspicion that the cut warranted was larger. This, however, only creates pressure for bigger cuts in later years. So, auxiliary pensions in late 2015 were a one-way-bet downwards. Given their rapid deterioration, they are no more than a pay-while-you-can, or even a pay-whatyou-grab system. The Committee of Experts formed by the government suggested in October 2015 that they should be incorporated into primary pensions. This proposal was overruled and auxiliary pensions are retained, though contribution rates were increased by 1 pp to 7%. Nevertheless, this did not improve finances: higher auxiliary pensions were extensively cut in late 2016, while more cuts are expected in future, including as part of the cuts pre-announced for 2019 by law 4472/17. In consequence, after seven years of reform the two questions of why separate auxiliary pensions exist and whether they will still exist in ten years’ time remain essentially unanswerable.

Pensioners and pension reforms

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A Timeline of pension reform 1934-2018 Phase

Date

Description

Pre-history

1934

Law founding IKA on social insurance lines. A compromise permits fragmentation.

1950-1970

Refounding and expansion of system. 1st IKA deficit 1958

1980s Ineffectual combatting of deficits leads to the crisis

1990-1992

1997

2001 2008 2008 Undeclared crisis

First bailout

Oct. 2009 June 2010 July 2010

2011

Deficits become endemic. Stabilization programme 1985-87 fails to include structural reform. Government grants to pension providers introduced. Two major reform bills under ND Government. ‘New’ system introduced for post 1992 labour market entrants. Last contribution increase. ‘Spraos Committee’ shocks by suggesting that system will collapse by 2007. Ignored, on the grounds that the pension system is supported by the State. Greek entry in the Euro. Reform by PASOK Minister T.Giannitsis withdrawn. Reform under ND government; ‘decorative’ consolidation. 1st year of negative growth in Greece. ND declares Greece is safe from the crisis. New PASOK government. ‘Greek Statistics’ episode ushers in the Greek crisis First Bailout agreed. First pension cut in May. Pension law 3863/10. New system for the young generation; increase in pension ages to 65; incumbents protected. Various implementation laws, including Disability, Heavy and Hazardous Occupations. Early retirement builds up with government blessings.

44

Platon Tinios

Phase

Date

Description

2012

Second bailout. PSI cuts privately-held debt Reserves of some pension funds also hit. Supreme Court Decision declares pension cuts to 2012 constitutional. Further rises of retirement ages to 67. Major cuts in pensions. Law governing auxiliary pensions introduces ‘zero deficit clause’. Zero deficit clause leads to 5.2% cuts across the board cut to auxiliary pensions. Obligation by government to review and to suggest corrective action ignored. ND/PASOK government neglects to issue first ‘new pensions’. New government committed to overturn changes. All implementation placed on hold. New Supreme Court ruling: pension cuts after 2012 unconstitutional, for being insufficiently justified. The Government only has enough cash to either pay pensions or to pay back the IMF. Chooses to pay pensions. Referendum called. The EU’ insistence to abolish the low pension safety net cited as reason. EU President insists Commission misrepresented. Decision to proceed to 3rd bailout despite referendum result. Prior actions passed increasing retirement ages drastically to apply immediately and increasing pensioners’ health insurance contributions. 3rd MoU voted with cross-party support. Key requirement to deal with generational justice. Detailed pension reform needed by October 2015.

2012 Second bailout

2012

2014 Nov 2014 Jan. 2015 Jan 2015 Mar 2015

June 2015

July 2015 Third bailout July 2015 July 2015

Aug 2015

Pensioners and pension reforms

Phase

Date

Description

Sept 2015

Elections won by SYRIZA; same coalition as before. Government-appointed ‘Committee of Sages’ issues report calling for a ‘new social contract’ and a fresh start. Government distances itself from the report. Government proposals unveiled. Negotiations with the institutions. Passage of Law 4387/16. New system rules to be applied to all new pensioners from 12 May. Pensioners pensions to be recalibrated by 2019 and excess gradually cut. Self-employed pay contributions on income declared for tax at 26+%. 1st assessment of bailout completed. Pension cuts trickle in in as the new rules are implemented. One-off solidarity benefit granted to pensions below EUR 850. Details of implementing new system of pensions gradually appear. Unified single pension fund EFKA begins operating. Law 4472 applies L4387 rules to all current pensioner by 2019. 2nd assessment concluded (16 months late). End of 3rd adjustment programme. The cut of existing pensions under L4472 signals full implementation of the 2010 new system to the entire population.

Oct 2015

Jan 2016 Third bailout

45

May 2016

June 2016 Late 2016 Dec 2016 Early 2017 Jan 2017 May 2017 June 2017 End 2018

Population ageing, household expenditure and economic exclusion Ioannis Kostakis, Frank Stevens

Introduction Life-cycle hypothesis denotes that the private consumption patterns of an individual are premeditated based on one’s anticipated income over the course of their life. We could say that this hypothesis combines the traditional Keynesian theory with more modern consumption models, assuming that households try to smooth their consumption over time. Greece faces a sustained low rate of fertility combined with a migration phenomenon resulting in a decrease of the population in general but especially of the younger age group. Along with these developments, advancements in medicine have an important impact causing elderly people, now the substantial baby boom generation, to live longer (Disney 1996). Demographically, a low fertility rate (far below replacement level) and an increasing life expectancy lead to an increased average age of the population, thus having dramatic consequences for the social and economic structure of the country. These issues have drastically altered the age composition, dubbed as the “double aging process” (Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou 2002). Literature and research (Harper and Leeson 2009; Bloom et al. 2010) have shown that by 2050 two billion people will be over the age of 65 and that the total number of elderly consumers will outnumber young consumers globally. Europe has already reached this turning point and by 2030 half of the population will be over the age of 50, whereas one quarter of the total population will be over 65. In Greece, based on the Hellenic Statistical Authority (2016), the fertility rate by 2050 will be at 1.66, while life expectancy is expected to reach an average of 86.5 years old. The total population is estimated to reach 11.5 million people. High ageing can be seen as the main demographic feature of importance. Currently less than 20% of the population is over 65 years old, but it is expected that by 2040 this percentage will rise to about 29%. The Greek economy will face severe issues with respect to its production, the demand of goods and services as well as the labor market. When considering the countries long-term issues in conjunction with the current economic situation and its prognosis it is reasonable to imagine why this topic is a significant concern for Greek as well as European interest groups.

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In conjunction with the aforementioned concerns, Greece especially faces numerous additional challenges. Greece entered the most severe economic downturn in its modern history in 2009. All principal indicators have shown a significant economic deterioration while serious negative influences on the psychological and physical health of households have been observed (Zavras et al. 2013). Giannitsis and Zografakis (2015) even have developed an ‘index of despair’ to try to describe these influences as statistics. In contrast with previous research, this survey aims at investigating the existing age dependant differences regarding consumer behavior in a period marked by austerity measures implemented by the so-called ‘Troika’. To be more specific, the purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the dynamic interrelation between an ageing population and household consumption. There may be huge challenges and opportunities1 based on this new situation. Household consumption varies between age groups and each new generation does not behave the same as previous ones in the same age group. Future generations, like any, need to adjust their consumption and saving behavior during their life course. There are also two other specific objectives of this analysis. The first objective is to describe the range of household consumption values across age groups specifically focusing on elderly people. The second objective is to focus on identifying the factors that affect consumption patterns within the age groups and finally to reverberate the ways that socioeconomic characteristics of a population mediate with preferences and priorities for consumption management. This chapter is structured in three parts. First, the theoretical background on consumption behavior and economic exclusion with special focus on the impact of age will be presented. Second, some key facts regarding the ageing patterns of population in the past and as projected for the future will be discussed. Population ageing, general household consumption and economic exclusion It is already known that developed countries are in an unprecedented demographic transition with regards to an ageing population (Prskawetz et al. 2013; Orlická 2015; Bös 1989; Fougère and Mérette 1999; Bettendorf et al. 2011; Clark and Deurloo 2006). In the macroeconomic environment, ageing will lead to a population buildup where there are a smaller proportion of workers and more retirees. This result gives rise to much concern about fiscal sustainability schemes and systems. Retirement money is paid out of the current income created by younger generations on the basis of a social contract (Kune 2001). The costliest services such as healthcare must be consumed simultan1

For example, Holzmann (1988) says that the effects of future population ageing can be exacerbated by many other factors that are in principle accessible to policymaker’s control.

Population ageing, household expenditure and economic exclusion

49

eously with its production also. A high proportion of expenditures for the elderly must therefore be provided from current production indicating that retirees’ consumption is always part of the current working population capital stock (Little 2009). Furthermore, data provided by Giannitsis and Zografakis (2015) clearly indicates that the majority of pensioners have seen a reduction in their income from 2006 to 2013. The current economical state of affairs for Greece is acute. Enormous fiscal deficits and high debt-to-GDP ratio are only two of the important fiscal issues that Greece faces. However, unlike previous crises, the current economic crisis fostered research not only into the financial aspects of it, but also into psychological and social aspects among households and consumers (RolandLévy et al. 2010; Gangl et al. 2012; Voon and Voon 2012; Giannitsis and Zografakis 2015). Granted that many economists have characterized this consolidation as successful, the psychological state of Greek citizens has reached its lowest level and pessimism amongst Greek consumers surpasses their European counterparts. Non-affordability, violence, health issues and a surge in suicides are only some of the problems that Greeks battle recently. Demographic forecasts have led to severe budgetary problems and proposed solutions such as the increase of retirement age, pension reductions and rising social security contributions impinge upon the already strained citizens (Ben and Ward 2007; Weyerstrass and Neck 2013). The aforementioned issues do not only have an impact on macro-economy but also on the elderly citizens. Generally speaking, they face social and economic exclusion. By economic exclusion we mean the inability of an individual to participate in the basic economic functioning of the society in which she/he lives (Tsakloglou and Papadopoulos, 2001). Based on Room (1995) exclusion has also some very interesting characteristics: i) it is multidimensional, ii) it is dynamic, iii) it has a neighborhood dimension, iv) it is relational and v) it implies a major discontinuity in the relationship of the individual with the rest of society. All these issues show that the ageing population phenomenon is a very complicated issue that affects not only consumer behavior but also the economies at a macroeconomic level, changing how its production function is organized (Lévesque and Minniti 2006). When looking at microeconomic level, consumers try to maximize their utility subject to their budget constraint. It is known that, per household, consumption is mainly dependent on gross per capita income (Kaus 2013) while uncertainty (a prominent element in current day Greece) is its main characteristic. According to the conspicuous–consumption theory, households may consume highly observable goods to signal their wealth to others (Perez-Truglia 2013). How-

50

Ioannis Kostakis, Frank Stevens

ever, it is also of high interest that ageing may have an independent impact on the level and structure of the private consumption function (Rivera-Batiz 1999). We know that the structure of private consumption changes as age increases (Walder and Doring 2012), consequently the priorities within a household are altered and the categories of private consumption change as well. Previous research confirms that various expenditures including recreation, durable goods and education dramatically decrease, while food, services and health expenditures increase as people advance in years. Some empirical findings: Population ageing, facts and future The empirical part of this study is based on household budget data from 2009/10 to 2014/15 retrieved from the Hellenic Statistical Observatory. The data is comprised of six annual cross-sections of budget surveys relevant for Greek households. Although many households have been recorded in multiple waves, it is very difficult to track specific households over time. Thus, the empirical analysis was based on pooled, unbalanced data without the capacity to account for unobserved heterogeneity. The dataset has a net sample-size of 23,479 private households respectively and proportionally allocated to the regions based on NUTS I Eurostat categorization. Expenditure data were used as proxy for consumption goods and services that are also aggregated into the 12 categories based on the international classification of individual consumption according to purpose (coicop2). Apart from Greek data, OECD graphs illustrate the circumstances by comparing economic characteristics of Greece and other European countries. The ageing population and the problem The demographic problem is a new and complicated matter. Table A (in the annex) illustrates the distribution of Greek population with respect to gender and age group. In Greece the key components of population ageing issues are very low fertility, uncontrolled migration and the striking regional differences with respect to population dynamics. Based on Hellenic Statistical Observatory and by describing the percent of population distributed by age categories through time we can see that there is a dramatic fall for the 0-14 year old group and a huge increase in the elderly group. By 2050 the 65+ age group will represent 32.1% of the 2

01: Food and non-alcoholic beverages; 02: Alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics; 03: Clothing and footwear; 04: Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels; 05: Furnishings, household equipment and routine household maintenance; 06: Health; 07: Transport; 08: Communications; 09: Recreation and culture; 10: Education; 11: Restaurants and hotels; 12: Miscellaneous goods and service.

Population ageing, household expenditure and economic exclusion

51

total Greek population while the working group age will shrink from the current 67% to 54.9%. In addition, the 80+ age group also increases over time. All this information shows us that fiscal problems of insurance and pension systems have started to become increasingly severe. The population and their expenses over time The next step is to assess the path of private consumption during this period. During all periods final private consumption increases reaching 160,000 million Euros after the emergence of the global financial crisis (2009), as expected, there is a dramatic fall when strict monitoring from the “Troika” with respect to fiscal policy measures commenced. In this light it is relevant to discuss the consumption throughout the main categories based on Eurostat household consumption decomposition/ categorization as a percent of GDP in Greece through time. Regarding the categories of expenditure for the Greek household the main groups of expenditure are housing, food, transport, restaurant and hotel costs. When looking at the data for 2009 retrieved from the Hellenic Statistical Authority and calculating the average budget share by household, the highest share is reached in the category of housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels with an amount of 13.2%, followed by food and non-alcoholic beverages with 11.3%, transportation at 9.9% and restaurant and hotels with 9.6%. In contrast the lowest expenditures are observed in education with only 1.4% followed by communication at 2.4%. Household consumption behavior however varies across life-cycle stages due to the different needs of the consumer as age increases. We subsequently illustrate the different economic characteristics alongside several compositions of age groups. Table 1 gives an overview of household net income and consumption levels between the three main age groups after the onset of the economic crisis (2009 and 2014) and in 2004 (the year of Olympic Games in Greece) for comparison reasons. The data basically shows that, as can be expected, during the time when people are part of the workforce they have the highest income. As life cycle theory indicates, it is confirmed that young generations have negative savings, spending more than their income, while the current working baby boom generation shows a steep rise both in net income and consumption expenses in 2009. Contrary to the theory however, there is a negative saving level. Also noteworthy is that oldaged households have the highest average savings within all periods of research. This does not mean however that all elderly people are well-off. The inequality as observed by Giannitsis and Zagrofakis (2015) shows that a large proportion of the elderly still struggle to balance income and expenses. The income is below that of total consumption for roughly 50% of the elderly population.

52

Ioannis Kostakis, Frank Stevens

Table 1: Average net income and consumption expenditures of Greek households by age 2004 Age of household representative 10), while 54% and 70% scored above the depression cut-off of five, respectively. In a following study, Michopoulos et al. (2010) have assessed 200 selected patients for major depression, 65 years old and over, hospitalized in Surgery and Internal Medicine Departments of Attikon Hospital, by means of SCID-I/P, HADS, BDI and GDS15; twenty eight (14%) of the patients were diagnosed with major depression. In the report by Peritogiannis et al., (2013) 46.5% of the elderly patients, that were served by the Epirus Mobile Mental Health Unit, suffered from affective disorders. In a recent population study by Skapinakis et al., (2013) the prevalence of depression in the older age group was 5.56% vs 1.38% in the younger group, p < 0.001; however, this age effect greatly reduced and became non-significant with the inclusion into the model of the presence of a comorbid chronic medical condition. In the study by Kleisiaris et al. (2013), in 200 elderly patients of 4 nursing homes in Heraklion of Crete, the prevalence of depressive symptoms was 58.5%. In the study by Michelakos et al., (2013) depression symptomatology was found slightly higher among women in the VELESTINO study (38% vs. 36%). In the study by Stylianidis et al., (2014) prevalence, sociodemographic and comorbidity patterns of mental disorders were assessed in the general adult population of Evia Island, Greece. The prevalence of affective disorders for participants over 60 years of age was 17.72%. Especially, for subjects over 75 years of age the prevalence of affective disorders was 21.6% compared to 16.6% of those 60-74 years of age. Argyropoulos et al., (2015) found a high percentage (48.1%) of the members of open daycare centers for older people in urban area of Patras and semi-urban area of Tripolis, to suffer from both moderate and severe depressive symptoms. Georgakis et al. (2016) in a study which investigate the association of cognitive impairment and depression with all-cause mortality and cardiovascular-specific mortality among communitydwelling elderly individuals in rural Greece, up to 49% of participants were

78

Antonios Politis, Marina Economou and Christos Theleritis

found to present with depression as assessed with the Geriatric Depression Scale. There was a large percentage of participants (31.3%) with comorbidity of depression and cognitive disorders. Anxiety Disorders In a recent population study by Skapinakis et al., 2013 the prevalence of anxiety in the older age group was 9.44% vs. 4.64% in the younger group (p < 0.001); however, this age effect greatly reduced and became non-significant with the inclusion into the model of the presence of a comorbid chronic medical condition. Furthermore, Stylianidis et al. (2014) found the percentage of anxiety disorders to be 15.7% for participants over 60 years of age). Neurocognitive Disorders One of the most common problems for a large percentage of the elderly is the decrease of cognitive or ‘mental’ capacities such as failing memory, language deficiencies, attentional lapses, deficient executive functioning etc. Globally, cognitive impairment affects up to 18% of the elderly individuals (Rait et al., 2005) with diagnostic criteria for dementia being fulfilled for 5% to 7%. (Prince et al., 2013). For what concerns Greek epidemiological studies, Gournas et al., (1992), assessed 251 elderly residents of 2 boroughs of greater Athens, and found the prevalence of organic mental disorders to be 5.6%. In the study by Argyriadou et al. (2001) total of 176 (36.1%) of the 488 elderly subjects from the Chrisoupolis health centre (HCCh) and open center for the elderly had an MMSE score 1km

Σ

Nord.

2.6

1.2

96.3

100

4.2

1.0

94.9

100

Cont.

7.6

12.8

79.6

100

12.9

9.2

77.9

100

South.

30.3

14.0

55.7

100

30.4

11.4

58.2

100

Greece

21.4

24.3

54.3

100

26.6

15.8

57.6

100

East.

33.6

14.7

51.7

100

35.1

10.4

54.5

100

Total

18.0

13.3

68.7

100

20.8

9.9

69.3

100

Source: SHARE Wave 2 (2007) and Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 2017.

So, the family in Greece (as in other Southern countries) plays an important role to cushion the crisis. Dealing with unemployment of young family members is a case in point. The proportion of 50+ in the South and in Greece who have a child 18-32 in unemployment increased between 2007-2015 by more than 10 pp, reaching 30% (author’s findings based on wave 2 and wave 6 data analysis). Nevertheless, the share of unemployed children who co-reside with their parents remained almost stable in Greece (78% in wave 2 and 73% in wave 6) as well as in the Southern group of countries (68% in wave 2 and 71% in wave 6), though of course their number increased. This counter-intuitive finding may be

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a reflection either of a “Boomerang effect” (children who have moved out of the household and came back to it during the crisis) or of a well-entrenched “prolonged adolescence” (delaying the age of leaving the parental home). Money transfers Financial help given As the crisis had its primary victim the incomes of the working age population (50-64) in Greece, this has affected their ability to offer financial help to others (Table 15). Those 65-80 decreased overall giving financial gifts (28% gave financial gift in wave 2 while 24% in wave 6). However, but increased it towards their children (14% to 20%) – through cutting back transfers to grandchildren. Table 15: (%) of persons 50+ who gave financial gift EUR 250 or more, by age, cross sectional wave 2 & wave 6, Greece: to whom? Gave financial gift EUR 250 or more Wave 2: Financial gift given to: Age

Child

Wave 6: Financial gift given to:

Parents

Grandchild

Others

Child

Parents

Grandchild

Others

50-64

29.8

2.8

2.6

6.2

23.9

0.6

0.0

6.1

65-80

14.4

0.5

8.4

5.0

19.6

0.1

0.7

3.7

80+

3.9

0.0

7.4

2.1

10.6

0.0

0.9

3.4

Total

20.5

1.5

5.5

5.2

20.2

0.3

0.4

4.8

Source: SHARE Wave 2 (2007) and Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 2017.

Financial help received Receiving financial transfer among the oldest old has also been remarkably cut back in Greece. Greece had the highest proportion of 80+ who received financial transfers by far (20%); in 2015 this fell to 13% (still the highest, albeit closer to other countries’ outcomes (Table 16). So, it seems that fewer persons 80+ receive income transfers during the crisis because their children could no longer afford to supply them with financial assistance.

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Care and care gaps Rather counter-intuitively, the care gap – the percent of needy people who receive no care – did not increase during the crisis. Informal care continues to address almost half of the care needs and contributes to a lower care gap compared to elsewhere in Europe. Interestingly, care gaps do not differ significantly across different types of households (persons living alone vis-à-vis persons living as a couple or family), but the care mix (between formal and informal) does. Relying exclusively on informal care is most prevalent among persons living with their spouse or with of other family members, compared to single-person. The latter rely more on formal care arrangements (Table 17). Table 16: (%) of persons 50+ who received financial gift EUR 250 or more, by age, cross sectional wave 2 & wave 6, Greece: from whom? Received financial gift EUR 250 or more w2: Financial gift received from: Age

Child

w6: Financial gift received from:

Parents

Grandchild

Others

Child

Parents

Grandchild

Others

50-64

3.4

2.5

0.9

2.2

2.4

0.9

1.2

7.7

65-80

9.1

0.0

0.5

1.1

5.3

0.4

1.1

1.5

80+

18.4

0.0

0.3

1.5

10.8

0.0

0.4

1.4

Total

7.5

1.2

0.7

1.6

4.8

0.6

1.0

4.4

Source: SHARE Wave 2 (2007) and Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 2017.

Table 17: Persons 65+ with at least one ADL limitation: (%) who have received any care/help and care mix of care received, by type of household, Greece, cross sectional analysis wave 2 & wave 6 Greece, persons in-need-of care who received care Wave 2: Mix of care received Prof P/Inf Inform Total

Wave 6: Mix of care received Prof P/Inf Inform Total

Family

4.1

9.1

56.6

69.8

2.3

19.1

58.7

80.1

Single

7.6

10.5

48.6

66.6

10.9

31.0

35.8

77.6

Total

6.3

10.0

51.5

67.8

7.0

25.6

46.1

78.8

Source: SHARE Wave 2 (2007) and Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 2017. Note: Prof = only professional, P/Inf = both professional and informal; Inform = only regular informal. Family = couple / family.

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5. A Case study: women living alone vs men living alone A family-based welfare system is likely to have an overwhelming blind spot: those without a close family to call on. It is to those that we focus, as a kind of case-study. The probability of living alone increases with age, by gender, while and is a notable North-South: People aged 50+ who live alone (single-person households) increase with age and characterise women more than men. Moreover, for all sub-groups, the Nordics have the highest proportion of persons who live alone, followed by the Continental group and by the South (Kohli et al. 2005; Reher, 1998). Greece has the highest gender gap among the 80+: Among the oldest old (80+) 18% of men and 64% of women in Greece live alone (Table 18). It is worth pointing out that while the Nordics and the Continental countries have a higher share of women aged 80+ who live alone (78% and 68% respectively), Greece displays by far the highest gender gap in the proportion of persons aged 80+ who live alone (46pp in Greece compared to 30 pp in the Nordics, Continental and Southern countries). Table 18: Persons living alone, by gender, age and group of country, wave 6 (%) of persons who live in a single-person household

wave 6

50-64

65-80

80+

Men

Women

W-M

Men

Women

W-M

Men

Women

W-M

Nord.

20.1

25.8

5.7

23.9

41.8

17.9

47.5

77.7

30.3

Cont.

21.7

20.4

-1.2

21.0

37.5

16.6

37.1

68.4

31.3

South.

13.8

17.2

3.4

16.3

32.1

15.8

27.0

55.9

29.0

Greek

11.5

14.7

3.3

11.4

33.6

22.1

17.9

64.0

46.1

East.

11.3

19.3

8.0

13.2

31.6

18.4

31.5

49.1

17.6

Total

17.6

19.4

1.8

18.5

35.1

16.7

32.8

62.4

29.7

Source: SHARE Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 2017.

Income status In Greece women living alone are less likely than men to belong either to the poorest or to the richest 25% (Table 19). Interestingly, Greece has the highest gender gap in the top 25% of income among people living alone across Europe, which means that women are underrepresented among the richer groups. This might partially be explained by the relatively high incidence of derived pension rights (survivors’ pensions) as the main income source of women living alone in Greece, whereas most of women elsewhere rely on own-pension income (often higher compared to survivors’ pension- see Betti et al. 2015).

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Table 19: Men and women who live alone to income quartiles, w6 Representation of men and women living alone to income quartiles Poorest 25%

Middle 50%

Top 25%

Men

Women

W-M

Men

Women

W-M

Nord.

36.2

47.8

11.6

48.2

44.4

-3.8

Men 15.6

Women 7.8

W-M -7.8

Cont.

28.9

36.3

7.3

48.3

50.0

1.7

22.8

13.7

-9.1

South.

21.4

20.5

-0.9

43.8

60.0

16.2

34.7

19.4

-15.3

Greek

28.3

23.5

-4.8

39.2

61.0

21.8

32.6

15.5

-17.0

East.

24.7

15.4

-9.3

45.0

63.8

18.8

30.2

20.8

-9.5

Total

27.1

29.7

2.7

46.7

54.4

7.7

26.2

15.9

-10.4

st

Source: SHARE Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31 2017. Notes: (1) Income quartiles are defined based on the income distribution of the sample aged 50+ in each country. A value > 25 in the ‘poorest 25%’ denotes that this population group is over-represented among the ‘poorest 25%’ of 50+ population in each country.

Living alone is associated with income vulnerability in Greece for women, but not for men (for all age groups). The relative income position of women in single-person households lags behind the average income in Greece, for all age groups: income of women aged 50-64 who live alone corresponds to 77% of the average income of the 50+ population in Greece, while the corresponding figure for women aged 65-80 and 80+ is 87% and 74% (Table 20). Table 20: Relative income position (country average =100), by age and gender wave 6

50-64 Men

Relative income position (country average =100) 65-80 80+ Women

Men

Women

Men

Women

Nordics

96.9

88.1

79.7

70.1

65.3

55.5

Cont/tal

102.6

88.4

90.7

80.5

92.2

74.1

Southern

110.2

115.6

112.4

90.7

103.3

86.4

Greece

81.8

77.2

115.1

86.7

80.7

74.1

Eastern

91.8

92.9

127.3

97.2

117.2

110.9

113.9

95.4

102.7

84.6

99.0

80.0

Total

Source: SHARE Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 2017. Note: Mean equivalent income = 100 for the 50+ population in each country, and in each wave. Values > 100 indicate income status above the average of the 50+ populations and vv.

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For men the picture is slightly different: men aged 65-80 who live alone have income that is 15% higher compared to the average income of the persons 50+. Moreover, Greece has the highest gender gap in income for persons 65-80 who live alone (24%) (based on author’s analysis using SHARE data – evidence not reported in Table 20). The gender gap among single-person households is also reflected in households’ expenditure in Greece, where the gender disadvantage is more remarkable among women aged 50-80, compared to the oldest women (80+). Living alone in Greece is associated with more intense loneliness than in other countries, and for women much more than for men. Based on the R-UCLA loneliness Scale (ranging from 3 which stands for not lonely to 9 which stands for very lonely), (Russell et al. 1978, 1980) one out of four women (24%) who lives alone in Greece falls into the 9th scale (very lonely). This figure is more than twice higher compared to men in the same age in Greece (10%) and four times higher compared to the corresponding figure of women elsewhere in Europe (6%). It appears that loneliness makes elderly women in Greece feel vulnerable, left out and isolated to a greater extent than in other countries. This is more pronounced for widows than for divorced women of the same age (Table 21). Table 21: (%) of women aged 65+ who feel isolated from others, among women who live in single-person household, by marital status, wave 6 Feeling isolated from others All countries Women 65+ living alone: Wave 6

Often

Greece

Some of the time

Hardly ever/ never

Often

Some of the time

Hardly ever/ never

Never married

46.8

45.6

7.6

50.6

44.4

5.0

Divorced

27.6

57.5

14.9

29.5

58.3

12.3

Widowed

22.1

60.8

17.2

25.9

60.3

13.8

st

Source: SHARE Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31 2017.

Depression Based on the EURO-D depression scale (ranging from 0 –stands for ‘not depressed’- to 12 which stands for ‘very depressed’ (Dewey and Prince, 2005; Prince et al. 1999). Table 22 provides evidence on cases of depression among 65+ persons who live alone, by gender, across Europe (score of 4 or higher is categorized as a potential case of depression). A North-South gradient

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in depression incidence is evident for both men and women. Depression in the South among older persons who live alone is higher compared to Continental Europe or to the Nordics. In all country groups – except for the Nordics – the ‘case of depression’ of persons aged 65+ is higher among women than men. As regards the gender effect in Greece, 49% of women 65+ who live alone fall into ‘case of depression’ category, while the men’s figure is 20pp lower (28%). The contrast between people living alone and those of the same gender living with their families is also noteworthy. A ‘living alone handicap’ can be expected where living alone is a minority or exceptional case. This presumably explains why that handicap is more marked in the South and East for women. Interestingly, however, there is no such handicap for men in Greece, though the numbers involved are relatively small. Table 22: EURO-D, persons aged 65+ by gender, type of household and group of country, SHARE wave 6 % Chronically depressed > 3 dimensions in Euro-d depression scale

Wave 6 Persons 65+

Men living alone

Women living alone

Men not living alone

Women not living alone

Nordics

16.9

24.1

10.2

20.9

Cont/tal

25.1

38.1

18.4

33.4

Southern

35.5

48.8

22.9

43.0

Greece

27.6

49.1

26.2

40.4

Eastern

39.4

56.4

28.2

48.3

Total

28.6

42.5

20.8

38.2

st

Source: SHARE Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31 2017.

Life satisfaction A similar mechanism should affect life satisfaction, measured on a scale 1-10 in response to a standardised question. Table 23 explores differences across broad regions, by gender and by living alone. The well-known finding of higher scores the further north one goes is reproduced. Of greater interest is that there is a clear ‘living alone handicap. Greece shows uniformly low scores, but a smaller differentiation as between living alone or with a family than other countries of the South and East.

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Table 23: Mean value of Life satisfaction scale (0-10), by gender, type of household and group of country, SHARE wave 6 Wave 6

Mean value of Life satisfaction scale (0-10)

Persons 65+

Men living alone

Women living alone

Men not living alone

Women not living alone

Nordics

8.0

8.3

8.6

8.7

Cont/tal

7.4

7.5

7.9

7.9

Southern

7.1

7.0

7.8

7.4

Greece

6.8

6.5

7.1

6.9

Eastern

6.9

6.5

7.5

7.2

Total

7.3

7.3

7.8

7.6

Source: SHARE Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 2017.

Informal support and care More women than men living alone in Greece receive informal care/help from a person outside the household. As expected, the proportion who live alone in Greece and receive informal care/help increases with age and women’s rate exceeds men in all ages except for the youngest (aged 50-64) (Table 24). Table 24: (%) who receive informal (unpaid) care/help from a person outside the household, by age and gender, persons 50+ who live alone, w6 All countries

Wave 6

Age

Gender

Greece

almost daily

almost every week

almost every month

almost daily

almost every week

almost every month

5064

Men

1.3

4.9

4.7

5.0

4.2

6.5

Women

2.1

7.0

6.3

1.3

4.1

1.9

6580

Men

6.1

8.6

4.7

4.3

4.8

4.0

Women

5.2

13.6

5.7

6.8

14.2

7.6

Men

16.2

16.1

7.9

18.8

19.8

6.7

Women

19.3

23.6

6.9

26.4

18.5

10.7

80+ st

Source: SHARE Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31 2017.

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As a result, the care gap (defined as the proportion of persons who do not receive either any informal care from a person outside the household or any professional care) for men living alone is larger than for women living alone in Greece, as is the case elsewhere (with the notable exception of Eastern European countries). What differentiates Greece slightly is that there is no big difference between men and women as regards the incidence of care gap (unmet need for care). If we compare the loners with people living with their family, women 65+ in Greece and in the Eastern countries are facing a larger care gap relative to men (the opposite is the case in the Nordics and the Continental European countries) (Table 25). Table 25: Care gap, persons aged 65+ by gender, type of household and group of country (%) Care gap (not receiving any type of care): persons 65+ with 2+ adl limitations by type of household

Wave 6 Persons 65+

Men living alone

Women living alone

Men not living alone

Women not living alone

Nordics

21.4

10.9

33.2

36.4

Cont/tal

22.8

11.7

25.4

15.9

Southern

33.9

16.5

22.2

15.9

Greece

20.8

18.3

10.3

14.0

Eastern

24.1

30.2

21.5

20.5

Total

25.5

15.5

23.4

16.9

Source: SHARE Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 2017.

6. Cohort effects during the crisis (evidence from the panel 2007-2015) One of the advantages of analysing longitudinal panel data such as SHARE is that it is possible to gauge the developments in the lives of the same individuals through time. Hence, in this section I am going to examine only the panel data by distinguishing among three age groups in 2015: those younger individuals (under 65 in 2015) making their bumpy way towards retirement, people muddling through retirement during the crisis (between 65 and 80 in 2015) and the older seniors who had all been in retirement at the beginning of the crisis. The basic story of this section rests on two observations: first, incomes declined more for the oldest and more for women compared to men. And second, this dramatic overall picture is composed by diverging trends. Hence, the overall narrative is about financial hardship and deeper polarisation (Table 26).

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Table 26: Change in median income (in Euro) between wave 2 and wave 6, by age group, panel sample Greece Panel w2w6 Age in w6

Income in wave 2 (in EUR)

Income in wave 6 (in EUR)

Change (%)

Median

CV*

Gini

Median

CV*

Gini

w2-w6

50-64

6430

1.15

0.54

6150

1.00

0.50

-4.4

65-80

7811

1.32

0.46

6720

1.03

0.42

-14.0

80+

7682

1.06

0.43

6000

0.99

0.40

-21.9

50+

7546

1.24

0.48

6440

1.02

0.45

-14.7

50-64

5556

1.28

0.57

6200

0.92

0.50

11.6

65-80

8023

1.27

0.48

7200

1.08

0.43

-10.3

80+

8000

1.01

0.45

6720

1.04

0.39

-16.0

50+

7668

1.24

0.50

7052

1.05

0.45

-8.0

50-64

7200

1.08

0.54

6056

1.04

0.50

-15.9

65-80

7682

1.37

0.44

6480

0.95

0.41

-15.6

80+

7311

1.07

0.42

5400

0.78

0.39

-26.1

50+

7508

1.25

0.48

6020

0.97

0.45

-19.8

All persons

Men

Women

Source: SHARE Wave 2 (2007) and Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 2017. Note: In the case of men just 14% of the panel sample aged 50-64 in wave 6 is below the age of 60. In the case of women the corresponding proportion is 30%. * CV stands for coefficient of variation, a measure of relative variability, estimated as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean (average).

This overall picture involves a high polarisation: as Table 27 shows there are winners and losers, irrespective to the overall trend. There is considerable ‘noise’ in the changes – evidenced by a wide disparity between comparisons of the income of the middle person in the distribution (the median) and the average (the mean); the latter, being more prone to influence by extreme values, shows larger falls in all cases (not reported). One ought to note that the dispersion of incomes in 2015 is much reduced – coefficients of variation are lower by a fifth, while overall income inequality also falls (though less dramatically). Thus falls

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in average incomes combined were larger for higher incomes leading to lower inequality. The average fall is comprised, perhaps surprisingly, by sharp and diverging movements. Some 40% say their income fell by more than a third; this is counterbalanced by 27% who say their income rose by 30%. Intermediate categories have lower shares of the population. The picture, nevertheless, is one of considerable income mobility. The paradox thus lies in the contrast: On the one hand, the income distribution is changed in the direction and rates expected from aggregate information and the cross-section analysis. On the other, there is considerable individual movement around these trends. The positions in the income distribution change less than the identity of the people who fill them. It is also worth noting that younger respondents are more likely to be among the gainers in the crisis – signifying most probably that that group had more possibilities to adapt and react to macroeconomic changes. In contrast, those with limited capacity to react and/or more inflexible needs, such as the oldest old, fare worst. Table 27: Categories based on change in income between wave 2 and wave 6, by age group in wave 6, panel sample Greece w2-w6

Categories based on the change in mean income (wave 2 and wave 6) > -30%

-30% to -15%

-15% to -5%

-5% to 5%

50-64

40.7

7.6

4.9

2.6

65-80

38.0

13.1

8.9

80+

41.8

11.5

50+

39.6

11.3

5% to 15%

15% to 30%

> 30%

Total

3.1

5.2

35.9

100

5.7

4.0

4.8

25.6

100

11.0

9.1

3.7

4.2

18.7

100

8.3

5.6

3.7

4.7

26.8

100

st

Source: SHARE Wave 2 (2007) and Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31 2017.

How can the apparent paradox of widespread mobility be explained? First, it should be noted that the presence of ‘noise’ at the individual level is a general feature of panel data. In the incomes of particular individuals there are many specific and time factors not fully captured by the questionnaire. This is reflected in relatively low ability to track the data in econometric equations; R2 (a measure of how close the data are to the fitted regression line) for cross-section data are frequently around 20% or lower. A similar phenomenon can be seen in other countries in the SHARE sample: the difference being, that elsewhere in the EU, there are more people whose income rise by more than 30% – which underlies the average differences. The second difference is that the entire sam-

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115

ple is some eight years older in 2015 – this means among other effects, a deterioration in health, changes in marital or work status – all factors with a major influence at the individual level, an effect which is normally cancelled in crosssection data. Incomes, in particular, are likely to have been affected by average replacement rates in different pension systems (affecting those retiring between the two waves) and falls in income for those relying on income from housing or from property. Granted these observations, the group that appears most affected is the older group with the least capacity to react. This is despite the evidence that pensions were sheltered from cuts relative to other incomes. Perhaps more significantly, this is the group that must necessarily rely most on the informal, family based welfare state. The family, as mentioned in the introduction, is assaulted both from the demand and the supply side. Thus the group relying more closely to the informal state is likely to be more exposed. This expectation is borne out in Table 28, which performs the same analysis for some subgroups according to whether they changed status between the two waves. Those better off were those who were working in wave 2 but had the option to opt for (early) retirement; they were able to retain their income position. Those employed were able to keep their losses down to under 10%. Those retired in both waves and homemakers suffered most – drops of around 20%; for them income shocks were combined with a lower capacity to react. Table 28: Change in median income between wave 2 and wave 6, by change in employment status, panel sample Greece Income in wave 2

Income in wave 6

Change (%)

Employed in both waves

6,840

6,200

-9.4

Employed in w2; retired in wave 6

8,023

8,036

0.2

Retired in both waves

8,154

6,640

-18.6

Homemaker in both waves

7,000

5,609

All persons

-19.9 st

Source: SHARE Wave 2 (2007) and Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31 2017.

The analysis so far has indicated that the mechanisms leading to income loss between 2007 and 2015 are complex and varied. Around the overall picture of income shocks and striving to cope there are many separate stories. Some of these undoubtedly are due to individual initiative, solidarity or even luck. However around those, there are the overall systemic effects which are due to the mode of operation of specific institutions: the labour market, health care, so-

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cial protection or the pension system. A first step to unravel these complex effects is to relate outcomes between 2007 and 2015 to a multitude of factors. A multivariate econometric equation, based on the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) methodology would allow for the simultaneous influence of many factors and would serve to isolate any separate effects. The procedure followed is to try to ‘explain’ 2015 incomes of particular individuals relying primarily on the same individuals’ income and other characteristics in 2007. If the income falls were imposed across the board at an equal percentage, one would expect a perfect correlation, where the coefficient of the ‘causal variable’ – i.e. 2007 income – would be equal to the extent of fall of incomes3. Given that the equation is specified using logarithms, the fall would be measured in percentage terms4. Other variables should capture the extent to which people sharing a particular characteristic were more fortunate than the average (positive values) or more unlucky (negative values); the size of the coefficient measures the average percentage impact of sharing that characteristic. For example, a value of -0.10 for being depressed means that those showing signs of clinical depression in wave 2 suffered on average income falls higher by a tenth than they would have, taking into account their income, education, gender and other characteristics. Table 29 presents two specifications, which explain around a third of the total variance in the sample. Specification A allows for differential effect for poorer and richer. A number of observations are in order: The link between wave 2 and wave 6 income is not simple. A person who in wave 2 was 10% richer will be only 4.3% as rich in w6.5 However this rate is increased by a third for poorer individuals and reduced by 20% for richer ones, showing that income cuts were larger in percentage terms for the richer 25% and smaller for the poorer 25%. University education acts to temper the effect on those with higher income; this large effect may well be standing in for affiliation with the public sector. Those who were already pensioners in 2007 suffered by a third, even taking into account their income and other characteristics. The self-employed fare worse than salaried employees. The equation confirms decisively what every person over 50 knew in Greece from experience: that if one could get early retirement they would be well-advised to do so. Those who retired within the crisis period are 16 per cent better off, ceteris paribus. Workers with a degree who retired early 3

The equation explains household income, and therefore gender cannot be expected to play a role, as income within households is held to be equal by construction. 4 In technical terms, it is elasticity. 5 Conversely someone with 90% of any given income in wave 2 is likely to have improved their relative position in w6, being 95.7% as rich as before.

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are predicted to be almost immune from the crisis, while they might even had proved net gainers6. Table 29: Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates on the determinants of income in wave 6, panel sample wave 2- wave 6, Greece Greece Panel sample w2-w6 Y= Log of income in wave 6

Specification A Coef.

Std. Err.

Log of household's income in w2

0.430

0.022

Home owner in w2

0.014

0.027

Income in wave 2: Bottom 25%

0.336

0.037

Income in wave 2: Second quartile

Specification B Coef. **

Std. Err.

0.340

0.016

-0.012

0.027

**

**

f

f

Income in wave 2: Third quartile

-0.038

0.029

Income in wave 2: Top 25%

-0.207

0.037

**

HHOLD with a Pensioner in w2

-0.284

0.037

**

HHOLD with a Salaried employed w2

-0.053

0.034

HHOLD with a Self-employed w2

-0.175

0.049

Employed in w2; retired in w6

0.159

0.037

Aged 65+ in wave 2

0.025

0.033

Presence of person 75+ in the hhold

-0.071

0.023

Presence of children aged < 18 in hh

-0.328

0.036

**

-0.092

0.033

**

**

-0.172

0.048

**

**

0.159

0.036

**

0.048

0.032

**

-0.077

0.023

**

-0.412

0.063

**

-0.349

0.060

**

Education: tertiary

0.415

0.031

**

0.395

0.030

**

Single-person hhold (w2)

-0.119

0.030

**

-0.090

0.029

**

SPHUS: < very good health in w2

-0.133

0.030

**

-0.123

0.030

**

At least on ADL limitation in w2

-0.144

0.048

**

-0.178

0.048

**

Clinically depressed (eurodcat scale > 3) in w2

-0.103

0.027

**

-0.113

0.027

**

Suffered from 2 or more chronic diseases in w2

-0.039

0.025

Constant term

5.732

0.214

R-square

0.313

**

-0.047

0.025

*

6.598

0.158

**

0.285

**= significant at 1% *= significant at 5%. Source: SHARE Wave 2 (2007) and Wave 6 (2015), Release: 6.0.0, March 31st 2017.

6

They would be better off by 0.415+0.159-0.053, which would almost certainly outweigh the income effect.

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The other variables of particular interest in Table 29 are those related to pre-existing need in wave 2. The thing that these conditions have in common is that they reduce the ability to react to change, mainly due to physical inability. This applies to bad health (self-assessed health less than good), the need for care (ADL>1), or a state of clinical depression (EUROD>3), two or more chronic diseases. All these factors are very statistically significant and have sizeable impact in being associated with income falls. The presence of a person 75+ or the presence of children similarly signal greater social need, and hence greater vulnerability, also reflected in falls in income. The above conditions would, in principle, generate the reaction of the welfare state and social services, who are called to address the shortcomings. In Greece, the absence of adequate social services implies those needs remain unaddressed; even worse, their incidence is associated with major income falls. In this situation, where the family would normally step in to deal with gaps in social protection, the group most at risk would be those without a family to call on. Indeed, the individuals singled out in the previous section – those living alone are shown to be especially vulnerable – even if all their other characteristics are taken into account. Individuals living alone are worse off by 12%. The examination of how particular individuals fared in the crisis gives strong prima facie support to the central thesis of the paper – that the informal welfare state was sorely tried by the crisis. It attempted to react but its reaction, given that needs were rising whilst capacity was shrinking, remained inadequate to deal with the challenge. 7. Conclusions This chapter is about ageing, the family and the crisis in Greece. At the beginning I discussed the characteristics of the strong family tradition and its role in filling the gaps of social protection in pre-crisis times. The long and deep recession created a new context for the family and its role in social protection: its financial resources were depleted, tax obligations to the state increased dramatically, rental incomes fell while pensions were cut again and again. The SHARE micro-data gives us a unique opportunity to see what the crisis meant for Greek people – independently of ideological and other presuppositions. A random sample of people aged 50+ in 2007 and 2015, it captures the crisis period, while allowing us to benchmark what happened in Greece to what was occurring elsewhere in Europe. The SHARE data showed solidarity remained strong, albeit it had changed direction: it moved away from the older citizens towards children in need, mainly due to rampant unemployment. There is no clear indication of health deteriora-

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tion, but there is a reinforcement of gender gaps in financial and care needs. The case study of elderly women living alone suggested that gender disadvantages are stronger among women during the crisis, while the role of informal networks of support remain of paramount significance in delivering help and care required. Lastly, the examination of the sub-sample comprising the same individuals before and after the crisis suggests that while financial hardship increased for all age groups, this was felt more acutely by people born in the late 1940s and 1950s who had to move towards retirement in the crisis. People caught by the crisis in their 50s had a harder time to cope. An interesting and rather unexpected finding is that financial distress characterises the averages in all age groups, but under this general trend there is considerable variation. It appears, thus, that while around 40% experienced very severe declines in their income, another (smaller group) of 25% saw significant improvements in their incomes. The macroeconomic data suggest that old age poverty relative to other groups declined. To some extent this was a result of policy. Both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance are on record suggesting that pensions should be protected because ‘grandmothers give pocket money to their unemployed grandchildren’. In this way they accept the basic premise of the familial welfare state, that the family is the main provider of social protection; indeed it can be claimed that they go one step further, perhaps surprisingly for the left-wing – the family should be the main provider. Minister of Labour, Achtsioglou, in a letter to the Financial Times (17 February, 2017) was forthright: “Greek pensions act as surrogate for other parts of the social safety net, filling their gaps”, such as healthcare, disability, family/children and housing benefits. Why the government should acquiesce with this surrogate function and not try instead to introduce a social safety net is left open. It remains to be seen which types of families will prove to be less scathed and more resilient after the crisis, whenever that takes place. But, to do so we must wait for future waves of SHARE data.

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References Attias-Donfut, C., Ogg, J. & Wolff, F.C. (2005). “Family support”. In: A. Börsch-Supan et al. (Eds.) Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. First Results from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, Mannheim: Mannheim Research Institute für the Economics of Ageing, pp. 171-178. Betti, G., Bettio, F., Georgiadis, T., & Tinios, P. (2015). Unequal Ageing in Europe: Women's Independence and Pensions. Palgrave Macmillan, NY. Bettio, F., & Villa, P. (1998). A Mediterranean perspective on the breakdown of the relationship between participation and fertility. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 22 (2): 137-171. Bettio, F., Simonazzi, A., & Villa, P. (2006). Change in care regimes and female migration: the ‘care drain’ in the Mediterranean. Journal of European social policy, 16 (3): 271-285. Börsch-Supan, A., M. Brandt, C. Hunkler, T. Kneip, J. Korbmacher, F. Malter, B. Schaan, S. Stuck, S. Zuber (2013). Data Resource Profile: The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). International Journal of Epidemiology. DOI: 10.1093/ije/dyt088. Commission of the European Communities (2012). Pension Adequacy in the European Union 2010-2050, Report prepared jointly by the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion of the European Commission and the Social Protection Committee. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Coomans, G. (2001). “The role of women in labour markets in ageing societies”. In: I. Kikilias, C. Bagavos, P. Tinios & M. Hletsos (Eds.) Demographic Ageing, Labour Market and Social Protection: Trends, challenges and policies, Athens: National Institute of Labour and Sakkoulas publications, pp. 106-122. Dewey, M. E., & Prince, M. J. (2005). “Mental health”. In: A. Börsch-Supan et al. (Eds.) Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. First Results from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, Mannheim: Mannheim Research Institute für the Economics of Ageing, pp. 108-117. Ferrera, M. (1996). The 'Southern model' of welfare in social Europe. Journal of European social policy, 6 (1): 17-37. Ferrera, M. (2005). The Boundaries of Welfare. European Integration and the New Spatial politics of Social protection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Figari, F., Matsaganis, M., & Sutherland, H. (2013). The financial well-being of elderly people in Europe and the redistributive effects of minimum pension schemes. Rivista italiana degli economisti, 18 (2): 149-174. Heady, C., Mitrakos, T. & Tsakloglou, P. (2001). The distributional impact of social transfers in the European Union: evidence from the ECHP. Fiscal Studies, 22 (4): 547565. Giannitsis, Τ. (2016). The pension problem and the crisis, Athens: Polis.

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Kasimis, C., & Kassimi, C. (2004). Greece: a history of migration. Migration Information Source 1, No. 6. Kohli, M., Künemund, H., & Lüdicke, J. (2005). “Family structure, proximity and contact”. In: A. Börsch-Supan et al. (Eds.) Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. First Results from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, Mannheim: Mannheim Research Institute für the Economics of Ageing, pp. 164-170. Lyberaki, A. (2009). “Is there any care gap: Who cares for whom and how?”. In: A. Lyberaki, P. Tinios and A. Philalithis (Eds.) Life 50+: Health, ageing and pensions in Greece and in Europe, Athens: Kritiki (in Greek), pp. 371-394. Lyberaki, A. (2011a). Migrant women, care work, and women's employment in Greece. Feminist economics, 17 (3): 103-131. Lyberaki, A. (2011b). “Gender Aspects of the Economic Turndown and Financial Crisis”, Directorate General for Internal Policies. Policy Department C: Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional Affaires: Gender Equality, European Parliament, Brussels. Lyberaki, A. & Tinios, P. (2005). “Poverty and Social Exclusion: a new approach to an old issue”. In: A. Börsch-Supan et al. (Eds.) Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. First Results from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, Mannheim: Mannheim Research Institute für the Economics of Ageing, pp. 302-309. Lyberaki, A. & Tinios, P. (2012). “The crisis as handmaiden of social change: adjusting to the 21st century or settling old scores?” in Anastasakis, O. & Singh, D. (eds) Reforming Greece: Sisyphean task or Herculean challenge?, South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX), St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, pp. 100-110. Lyberaki, A., Papadoudis. G. and Tinios, P. (2009). “Family cohesion and socioeconomic status: A primary investigation”. In: A. Lyberaki, P. Tinios and A. Philalithis (Eds.) Life 50+: Health, ageing and pensions in Greece and in Europe, Athens: Kritiki (in Greek), pp. 347-370. Lyberaki, A. & Tinios, P. (2015). “A ‘Fairweather Welfare State’? Formal and informal social protection and the Greek crisis”. In: R. Gerodimos and G. Karyotis (Eds.) The Politics of Extreme Austerity: Greece and the Eurozone crisis, Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 106-122. Lyberaki, A. & Tinios, P. (2010). “The supply and demand of solidarity in practice: comparative microeconomic analysis of care practices to and by people over fifty in Europe”, In: M. Petmesidou and Ch. Papatheodorou (eds,) Social Reform and Changes in the Private-Public mix in the field of Social Protection, Athens: Ellinika Grammata, (in Greek), pp. 438-469. Lyberaki, A., Tinios, P., Mimis, A., & Georgiadis, T. (2013). Mapping population aging in Europe: how are similar needs in different countries met by different family structures?. Journal of Maps, 9 (1): 4-9. Matsaganis, M. (2011). The welfare state and the crisis: the case of Greece. Journal of European Social Policy, 21 (5): 501-512. Nektarios, M. and Georgiadis, T. (2009). “Aged in Europe: Ownership and value of as-

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sets”. In: A. Lyberaki, P. Tinios and A. Philalithis (Eds.) Life 50+: Health, ageing and pensions in Greece and in Europe, Athens: Kritiki (in Greek), pp. 329-346. OECD (2013). Greece: Reform of Social Welfare Programmes, OECD Publishing Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264196490-en Palaiologos, Y. (2016). The Thirteenth Labour of Hercules: Inside the Greek crisis, Updated with a new epilogue Portobello, London. Prince M.J., Reischies, F., Beekman, A.T., Fuhrer, R., Jonker, C., Kivela, S.L., Lawlor, B.A., Lobo, A., Magnusson, H., Fichter, M., Van Oyen, H. (1999). Development of the EURO-D scale -- a European Union initiative to compare symptoms of depression in 14 European centres. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 174 (4): 330-8. Reher, D.S. (1998). Family ties in Western Europe: persistent contrasts. Population and development review, 24 (2): 203-234. Russell, D., Peplau, L. A., & Ferguson, M. L. (1978). Developing a measure of loneliness. Journal of personality assessment, 42 (3): 290-294. Russell D. Peplau LA, Cutrona CB: The revised UCLA Loneliness Scale: Concurrent and discriminant validity evidence Journal of personality and social psychology, 39 (3): 472-480. Simonazzi, A. (2009). Care regimes and national employment models. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 33 (2): 211-232. Spraos Committee (Committee for the Examination Economic Policy in the long term) (1997). Economy and Pensions: A contribution to the social dialogue, Athens: National Bank of Greece. Tinios, P. (2015). ‘Employment and social developments in Greece’. Report prepared for the European Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, European Union, Brussels. Tatsos, N. (2001). The Shadow Economy and Tax evasion in Greece. Athens: IOVE and Papazisis publishers (in Greek). Zaidi, A. (2010). Poverty risks for older people in EU countries - an update. Policy Brief. Vienna.

Intergenerational relationships in the family: Grandparenting styles in Greece today Anna Pagoropoulou-Aventissian, Angeliki Skamvetsaki, Dimitra Vardalachaki

This study is aimed at exploring the five types of involvement of the grandmother with the family of her daughter or, interchangeably, her daughter- inlaw. In the past seven years, Greece has been in austerity, so the relationships in the greek family have been influenced dramatically. A survey is currently being conducted, having recruited 160 participants to-date. More than half of them are pairs of grandmothers and daughters, and the rest of them pairs of grandmothers and daughters-in-law. The type of involvement, e.g. surrogate parents, involved, fun seeker, formal, distant, is being investigated across two dimensions, grandmaternal marital status, e.g. married or widow, and employment status of daughters and daughters-in-law. Both dimensions appear to impact both the way a grandmother engages with her adult children/children-in-law and childrearing practices in the family. Another area that is being investigated concerns whether grandmothers and their daughters and daughters-in-law are satisfied with the new arrangements of their duties. It seems that old and young women alike agree as to the type of involvement preferred in their family. On the whole, the older generation looks like accepting the new state of affairs, and adapting to the new roles she is invited to play in the young family. Greek grandmothers take over the duties of childrearing, even if they declare that many times they feel oppressed by them. Introduction Ageing is usually neither the best of times in one’s life span, nor is it the worst. Ιt is not a tragedy, either, despite all kinds of pains or losses, nor is it a triumph, despite survival over many adversities. It is rather a mixed experience filled with ambivalence and contradictions. If there is a single term that could sum up the whole ageing experience, it would be bitter-sweet, aptly captured by the the greek term «χαρµολύπη» (joyful sorrow), a state particularly praised in the Greek cultural tradition. Being a grandparent gives people a sense of continuity and immortality. It makes them feel connected to the future. By recognizing familiar traits and resemblances in their adult children and grandchildren, it is as if parts of them are continuing now and forever. At the same time, they are the ones who offer their grandchildren a sense of history and grounding in the historical past. It is a symmetrical relation: just as grandchildren provide grandparents with a future, so the latter provide the former with a past.

124 Anna Pagoropoulou-Aventissian, Angeliki Skamvetsaki, Dimitra Vardalachaki

Emotional ties across the three generations are so powerful, that determine the mental health of the family to a great extent. All members of the nuclear or extended family feel that they have to protect and nourish them. Whatever they say or do to one another has the power to hurt, as well as to heal. And whatever mistakes people make, of omission, or merely of oversight, can affect the others’ feelings, or even change their lives. As a family member, everyone is vulnerable to being hurt by his/her loved ones, and also is fearful of hurting them, so they watch their words and monitor their actions in a prudent way. In this context, adult children in the Western societies nowadays commonly prefer to live apart from their parents, when married. The choice of living arrangements called “intimacy at a distance” seems to be the most balanced and wise one. It allows people to feel autonomous and independent, with well-defined boundaries. It also facilitates the process of differentiation of the younger generation from their parents, and their own personal growth. The two sets of grandparents can live close enough to take and give affection, and far enough to let their adult children lead their own lives according to their lifestyle and preference. However, the onset of the severe financial crisis that has been unfolding in Greece throughout the recent years has brought a great deal of hardship and insecurity in Greek families. Many people have lost their jobs, a good number of others have been forced to move abroad and make a new beginning there, sometimes leaving their spouse and children behind and visiting them only occasionally, whilst still others have made the decision to move back to their family of origin and share the same household with their parents or parents-inlaw for financial reasons. Many young mothers have chosen or been forced by circumstances to get a new job, often under hard, unfavorable conditions, in order to help their family and raise their children in these difficult times. In many such cases, grandmothers have proven to provide valuable, irreplaceable help in both practical and emotional terms. Hence, this paper aims to provide a broad overview of how exactly grandmotherhood and intergenerational relationships are affected by the crisis, and report some preliminary findings from a research project currently being implemented in this direction. Grandparents: Gender, roles, and styles In general, grandchildren bring in their grandparents’ lives love, laughter, joy, a burst of fresh energy, and a sense of optimism and purpose. On the other hand, grandparents often provide maturity, knowledge, emotional grounding, and genuine, unconditional affection to the younger generations. Many grandparents seem to enjoy their new role, and eventually develop a grandparenting style that fits them best.

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In our experience, this style seems to vary depending on gender: grandfathers, for example, may serve as nurturers, by providing encouragement and support to the young family in the times of crisis. They may also serve as mentors, by teaching, demonstrating skills, developing talent, providing advice, and speaking confidentially with a son or a son-in-law. As role models, they provide examples of hard work and family loyalty, whilst as playmates or a co-readers they offer children their company in a generous manner, providing a friend to play with, teaching them new games, reading fairy tales, or telling stories from their own and family past; every now and then, they may even play the magical role of wizard, so that the children get mesmerized by their tricks, truly believing that grandpa has pulled a coin out of his ear. Last but not least, grandfathers may also assume the role of a hero, representing an authority figure to whom a child or adolescent may turn to when in trouble, or when s/he carries a burden too big to share with anyone else, especially parents, who s/he fears will be punitive rather than understanding instead. In these cases, the hero grandfather functions as an emotional safety net, resolving the issue(s) concerned in the best possible, socially acceptable, perhaps even most discrete manner. However, it is usually grandmothers rather than grandfathers that are closest and assume the greatest burden of care vis-à-vis their grandchildren, and this is the reason why this study has decided to focus exclusively on them. Some general characteristics include a tendency to indulge their grandchildren, form egalitarian relationships with them, up to the point of permitting them to call them by their first name instead of “grandma”, and often assume or are forced to assume tasks and roles which are too demanding for their health and coping resources, or too different from their own goals and priorities. When such role strain occurs, many grandmothers choose to set strict boundaries to their adult children, opting for a formal engagement style as defined by Bernice Neugarten and Karol Weinstein (1964) in their now classic study of the role of grandparenthood. This formality is by no means meant to imply utter lack of interest in or affection for the grandchildren – on the contrary, formal grandmothers are often seen to indulge their grandchildren, give them treats, or occasionally offer their caregiving assistance to their daughters or daughters-in-law; rather, the formal aspect refers to the relative distance such grandmothers wish to keep from child rearing, and their parallel tendency to respect the couple’s boundaries and not offer unsolicited advice. In addition to formal grandparenting, Neugarten and Weinstein (1964) identified four other grandparenting styles that grandmothers (and grandfathers) may follow. The first of these is the distant one which, as its name implies, refers to grandparents who are well-meaning and maintain a benevolent overall posture,

126 Anna Pagoropoulou-Aventissian, Angeliki Skamvetsaki, Dimitra Vardalachaki

but only have fleeting contact with their grandchildren, e.g., during birthdays and feasts, but afterwards tend to disappear from their lives. In contradistinction, surrogate grandparenting, a style adopted extensively by grandmothers in Greece and other Mediterranean countries, too, refers to (a) the assumption of extensive childcare responsibilities, often to the point of assuming the role of the actual mother, who may then end up playing a more secondary role in the upbringing of her own child(ren); and (b) a tendency towards overinvolvement in the life of their children or children-in-law, as the two case examples that follow will amply demonstrate. From a family systems perspective, therefore, surrogate grandmothering would be considered a probably dysfunctional engagement style, as would be the formal and distant ones for the exact opposite reason, depriving the younger generations from the genuine support and wisdom of old age. The last two grandparenting styles described by Neugarten and Weinstein (1964) include the fun seeking and the reservoir-of-family-wisdom ones. The latter is a relatively rare modality corresponding to authority figures dispensing wisdom and advice, i.e. it condenses several features from the various grandfather types described earlier, and is indeed encountered mostly amongst grandfathers. On the contrary, fun seeking grandparents usually maintain a more informal relationship with their grandchildren, enjoy playing with them on a regular basis, and can be seen to spend considerable time doing fun activities with them in their free time. Grandparenting and family structure Greece is a collectivist culture in the grips of a still ongoing transition to individualism. Accordingly, whilst most new families tend to favor a nuclear model, more extended family forms are still quite popular too, especially in their modernized urban version (Mylonas, Gari, Giotsa, Pavlopoulos, and Panagiotopoulou, 2006). In this arrangement the family is constituted not only by the two spouses and their child or children, but also other relatives and close persons, such as grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins, neighbours, and friends. Consequently this kind of family includes two or more nuclear families connected with bonds of kinship. The classic extended family is often called “family of three or four generations”, because it contains at least three generations (grandfathers, parents and children) that usually live if not under the same roof, then surely in the same street or in the same neighbourhood, maintaining regular contact. This extended network of people constitutes a synergistic team in which everyone contributes in their own particular way(s). The head of the family – usually the father, grandfather, brother – handles financial matters and is the administrator of the

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family property, but not the single owner. Integration ensures support to all members at all times but especially in times of need, and is based on an ethic of absolute devotion to the group, so that a key value is placing the interest of the family above any personal feelings and concerns, sacrificing the latter if necessary to promote the well-being and interests of the entire system. Grandmothering styles Grandfathers and grandmothers in Greece do not have a fixed and socially prearranged role within their family, though they are generally expected to be supportive if and when the need arises. The fact that they are the parents’ parents suggests they are generally more experienced in handling children, but this does not automatically grant a right of intervention in a nuclear family context. In our experience, grandparents tend to help their adult children in various different ways. Some provide financial support, many more try to help by offering assistance in childcare or various domestic tasks like cooking, whilst certain others focus on providing moral support in today’s climate of economic downturn and socio-political crisis. The closer contact that this help usually entails often promotes exceedingly dysfunctional relationship patterns, two characteristic examples of which are provided by way of illustration below. Case study A: Enmeshed boundaries between mother and adult daughter Persephone and her mother, Niovi, are respectively 36 and 64 years old; she is the second and last child of her own original family, got married at the age of 32, and has recently had her first child. The relationship between the two women appears to be excellent at first sight but, on closer investigation, one can discern several traces of enmeshment rather than real, healthy intimacy. Due to the fact that Persephone does not trust outsiders and does not have enough money to hire a nanny to help her with her baby, she finds that she needs her mother more and more at home: the mother obliges without a second thought, eagerly changing all her plans in order to be close to her daughter who needs her. When Persephone has visitors at home, her mother is always present, too; when visitors ask about her labor and overall first child experience, Niovi interrupts her daughter and, without missing a beat, takes over herself (“Oh! We have had a great childbirth, and now our baby is in great health!”) using first person plural forms, providing in this manner a solid example of just how merged this mother-daughter pair are. Persephone doesn’t react. She has not yet been differentiated from her mother. From a more general perspective, one could say that in Persephone’s perfectly reasonable plea for help with the baby, Niovi finds the opportunity to penetrate deep into her daughter’s life via the assistance she is offering on a range of

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fronts (e.g. cooking for the couple, taking care of both parents and the baby), essentially leaving her grandmother role behind and getting back into the role of being a mother once again e.g. a surrogate type grandmother in contrast, Persephone regresses to the role of the child, instead of being the young, independent, and responsible adult she is meant to be. In addition, and as is commonly observed in such cases, grandmothers like Niovi tend to treat their sons-in-law the same way they treat their children, infantilizing both and contributing to an increase in tension between the couple: here, for instance, Niovi spends countless hours in Persephone’s house each day with the latter’s permission, leaving little room for her daughter and her husband to interact away from her presence. She speaks on their behalf, looks after them, and substitutes Persephone through her conscious or unconscious need to be again the wet-nurse, the mother, the all-important one. It is clear how this pattern can only become increasingly reinforced if Persephone does not rebel against the situation and does not struggle to differentiate herself from the mother; at this point, the latter’s husband could act in a saving way, pulling his wife away from her mother so that she gets pleasure from the married life as well as maternity in an adult way. Case study B: Rigid boundaries between the family and the outside world Here the family consists of a paternal grandmother (Rhea), a middle-aged couple (Demetra and Menelaus), their adult son (Telemachus), and adolescent daughter (Electra), all living in Athens. Electra is 18 years old, has just had her graduation exams and is getting ready to submit her university application. She wants to study Psychology, but her grades are not good enough to secure her a place at the university in her hometown, though she can probably be accepted at the university of Thessaloniki or Crete, both at considerable distance from the home hearth. The conflicts at home regarding this choice are intense. Her parents insist strongly that Electra must follow on her father’s footsteps and become a school teacher, just as her elder brother Telemachus has already done. The father has also chosen to follow his own father’s profession (school teacher), and so have his other two brothers, too. The scene to be described takes place over Sunday lunch, with grandmother Rhea being co-present. Responding to a question posed by the latter, Electra expresses her preference for the field of study she wants to pursue: the father and mother don’t want to listen and show their intense annoyance. Rhea takes a stand and states, “Take it from me! I have brought up three children and all three have become high-school teachers. You will do the same. I know – I am more experienced. You will become a high-school teacher, not one of those women who are interested in paramedical treatments” (alluding to her daughter-inlaw who has recently been visiting a homeopathic doctor).

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All of a sudden Demetra becomes obviously irritated with Rhea and starts to contradict herself, telling Electra now that she does not “mind if you study Psychology that much – it’s your own choice, but I don’t agree with your leaving right now and going that far away – I want you to stay close to me; you are too young, where are you going to go, and how are we going to afford your being there?” Telemachus then tunes in ,“I wonder how it ever came to you to study Psychology! And, after all, where do you want to go? – don’t you see the situation here?” This incident showcases just how complicated and poor the boundaries are in this family, too, with alliances opportunistically shifting all the time depending on what suits their members at each and every moment. Here, for example, we notice Demeter altering her initial position after Rhea’s statement, reinforcing the gap between Electra and her brother in the process. Moreover, poor differentiation and limit setting on the side of Menelaus enables the rigid, irrational views of the older generation to impact his entire family but most important of all his young daughter, whilst Demetra herself betrays the latter, too, in her attempt to defend herself against Rhea’s oblique attack. At the end, Electra acquiesces to this collective assault on her desire, feeling deeply confused and oppressed within. Objectively speaking, Electra’s parents would indeed find it difficult to pay for their child’s studies away from home; however, it seems to us that the financial hardship this family would be facing in such an event was not the key factor in what has taken place. Menelaus and Demetra themselves have not really clarified what they themselves want and why they have opted for the choices they have made in their life – it is noticeable that there is not even a single argument as to why their daughter should be a high-school teacher apart from the fact that this is her father’s occupation! The young woman feels nonplussed and even worse guilty about her intention to want something new and different, whilst her family considers her to be ungrateful for not taking the situation of the family into account. Impact of current socioeconomic crisis The great economic crisis that has been affecting Greece since 2009 appears to be leading to a corresponding crisis in family relationships, with more and more young mothers forced either to work longer hours, seek employment even if their children are still at quite a tender age, and/or rely extensively on their mothers or mothers-in-law for childcare as they cannot afford a nanny, as might have previously been the case. Multi-generational household arrangements are thus becoming increasingly common (Bellas, 2012; Chrisafis, 2011; Lyberaki & Tinios, 2012), and a growing number of grandmothers find themselves under

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intensifying pressure to support their daughters and daughters-in-law in their childrearing and domestic duties. The way each grandmother responds to this hitherto unknown frame depends on a range of factors (e.g. her personality, nature of pre-existing relationship between herself and her children, etc), but on the whole it would be safe to say that a good number of inter-generational relationships are becoming more tense, enmeshed, and dysfunctional, especially given the well-documented, crisis-related rise in feelings of distress, anxiety, and depression amongst individuals facing financial difficulties (e.g. Efthymiou, Argalia, Kaskaba, & Makri, 2013; Stylianidis, 2015), and the guilt many mothers may, or seem to, experience for “abandoning” their babies and young children to enter the workforce. Against this background, we have recently launched a new research project purporting to describe and understand the psychological effects of this still unfolding crisis on grandparenting styles, roles, and family relationships. Our preliminary hypotheses are as follows. 1. Grandmothers marital status influences grandmothering style. 2. Daughter/daughter-in-law employment status (i.e. employed vs unemployed) influences grandmothering style. 3. The increased caregiving demands addressed to grandmothers by their daughters/daughters-in-law today may either be congruent with grandmaternal personality, values, and lifestyle choices, or may alternatively be experienced as intrusive and overwhelming, proving to be a cause of significant strain with adverse consequences for a grandmother’s sense of well-being and mental health, e.g. excess levels of stress, depressive symptomatology, etc. Method Sampling: Recruitment for our research is based on random sampling, leading to a current data set comprised of 80 mother-daughter pairs (50 mother – daughter and 30 mother-in-law – daughter-in-law pairs. Psychometric Tools and Preliminary Analysis Data collection is being based on a questionnaire specifically developed for the purposes of this study, aiming to capture the different ways in which mothers interact with their own mothers and mothers-in-law. In fact, there are two versions of this instrument – one addressing the grandmother subpopulation, the other daughters and daughters-in-law; both questionnaires are currently in the process of being validated, thus validity and reliability cannot be documented at this stage.

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Structurally, each questionnaire consists of two distinct parts: the first one involves various demographic details like marital and employment status, number of children, educational level, and living conditions of the grandparents. There are also two open questions, inviting individual views on the reasons of any conflict between grandmothers and their daughters or daughters-in-law, as well as any changes that participants would wish to make in their current relations with the other member of their pair, so that they may eventually become able to reconceptualise their relationship and improve its (dynamics and) quality in the (near) future. The second part comprises 50 proposals separated in 10 groups of 5 statements, with each group covering a particular domain of interaction between grandmothers and daughters or daughters-in-law. Within each of these ten groups, each of the five statements has been formulated so as to reflect key aspects of a particular grandmother involvement type according to Neugarten and Weinstein’s (1964) five-way classification, so that the first option in each quintet describes a surrogate-type grandmothering posture; the second a reservoir-of-family-wisdom grandmother type; the third a fun seeking grandmothering style; the fourth a formal type of involvement; and finally the fifth distant grandmothering. All in all, the different interaction domains under consideration are as follows: (1) Overall relationship, (2) Financial matters; (3) Cooking, (4) Household tasks, (5) Babysitting, (6) Emotional involvement, (7) Parenting style and developmental goals, (8) Free time – Entertainment, (9) Inter-personal communication and dynamics (projection – identification), (10) Functional status of grandmother (e.g. health, vigour, mobility, emotional health, etc.). Finally, each of these statements is marked on a 5-point Likert scale, with '5' expressing the strongest possible degree of agreement with a particular statement and '1' expressing very poor agreement. Copies of the two questionnaire versions can be found in Appendix A at the end of this paper. The pilot data collected so far are currently being analysed both through qualitative and quantitative methods. The latter are presently oriented towards the exploration of the three research hypotheses mentioned earlier, that is (a) the relationship between grandparenting style, grandmaternal marital status, and daughter / daughter-in-law employment status, as well as (b) agreement between the two generations regarding their overall vision of their relationship and perceptions of grandparenting style.

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Discussion Although our research is still underway, an initial analysis of the data collected to-date coupled with a series of clinical observations suggest that on first sight, our three hypotheses appear to be confirmed. More specifically, grandmaternal marital status does indeed seem to relate to grandparenting style, with widowed grandmothers tending to form surrogateparent type relationships, whilst married ones tend to be formal or distant and standoffish. That is grandmothers, as long as they are still married and share their life with their husbands tend to reside in their own households, but when widowed, they frequently become incorporated into the families of their adult children, either moving in with them, or, alternatively, visiting very often. This seems to happen for two reasons: The first is that children usually wish to take care of their older, bereaved parent, provide practical and emotional support, and soothe her grief. In many cases, this behaviour appears to occur effortlessly and spontaneously, without any prior deliberation or conflict, since Greek culture supports close emotional bonds across the generations as already described and, in addition, the duty to protect and take care of one’s older, frail parent is deeply rooted in the Greek tradition. There is an element of apparent reciprocity here, with adult children “giving back” some of the care and support they themselves received from their parents as little children and adolescents. The second reason is along similar lines, but has more to do with the way widowed grandmothers tend to react in their new circumstances, and their oftobserved desire to feel useful again – in a way to give back something, make a contribution, and find in this new, close relationship themselves embedded. Widowed grandmothers may therefore feel that the only way out of their lonely life they are called to live, is to generously offer their services to their children. From a different perspective, however, all this is not as selfless and innocent as it might at first appear. Boundaries between the three generations become eroded and impaired, roles are getting more and more blurred, and grandmother over-involvement leads to dysfunctional dynamics. Adult children who accept such situations do themselves contribute to this state of affairs, either because they get accustomed to relying extensively on grandmaternal domestic help (home care, child care, etc.) or because, in addition to that, they also receive financial assistance through the grandaternal pension. Since such widowed grandmothers tend to substitute their daughter or daughter-in-law in household matters and make additional financial contributions, all family members end up feeling it is quite reasonable for her to enjoy a superior position within the household and have something to say about everything. Furthermore, this

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problem is further intensified in the context of the financial crisis: the pension cutbacks from 2009 onwards are now making it increasingly difficult for the elderly to live on an independent basis, whilst new families stand likewise increasingly in need of grandparental support due to low wages, long working hours, and the fast pace of everyday life. In some cases, the end result is a return to the parental home and the truly extended family model, as was known in the traditional greek community for centuries. Conversely, grandmothers who are still married tend to usually pursue formal or distant and detached grandparenting styles. That is, although such women derive great pleasure from interacting with their children and grandchildren and appear to be almost always willing to offer their help to their daughters or daughters-in-law, most of them continue in parallel to have their own household and take care of their husband. In many instances, such grandmother types can be seen to engage in leisure activities that make them happy, bonding at the same time with other people of their age, and deriving thereby a great deal of satisfaction, a sense of well-being, and perhaps also an experience of hitherto unknown freedom, without the usual pressures and commitments towards either family or work – elements that all tend to boost a positive attitude towards life, and help to more easily overcome any difficulties or negative emotions these women may be dealing with at the same time. A second major thread is the apparent connection between grandparenting style and daughter / daughter-in-law employment status that we observe in our data, in agreement with our second hypothesis. In more detail, if a daughter or daughter-in-law is working, then the corresponding grandmother more often than not tends to assume a surrogate grandparenting role due to a combination of factors as already described (e.g. long working hours of the young mothers, wages that keep steadily declining over the last seven years or so), and the concomitant difficulty of many young couples to afford domestic help services that would have been perfectly within their grasp prior to the outbreak of the country’s economic crisis. Or, in other words, asking their mother or mother-inlaw to assume a virtual full-time nanny role becomes an one-way street for many women under such tight circumstances. Depending on the particular family dynamics, this leads to many instances, where grandmothers become growingly intrusive and interfering, out of a mix of a genuine desire to help and offer advice. As a result poorly differentiated family roles, and also a feeling of entitlement follows, since they offer so much of their time and energy to this new home away from their own. The system boundaries tend thus to become ever more permeable in such cases, and relationships more and more strained, with chronic

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dysfunction setting in and impacting everyone adversely, but especially so the children of the family, who frequently evidence signs of confusion and disorientation. A third key feature is a certain dynamic tension we observe between two particular styles of grandparenting, the surrogate and formal ones, largely depending on the interplay between a grandmother’s personality, priorities, circumstances, etc., on the one hand, and the demands placed on her by her daughter or daughter-in-law, on the other. For example, many women starting off as surrogate-type grandmothers tend to flip over to a more formal or distant relating styles, if the enmeshed dynamics that tend to ensue are held in check, ultimately resulting in little room for the authority and influence they automatically expect to wield in their children’s home as part-and-parcel of their caretaking role. Interestingly, the daughters and daughters-in-law in many such scenarios are not aware of any boundary violations, do not experience their mothers or mothers-in-law as stepping into their own shoes or, even if they do acknowledge what is going on, resign and let it pass unchallenged due to lack of any other viable caretaking option, entrenching rather than curbing grandparental interference in the longer run and shifting, thus, away elder behavior further from the ideal “Aristotelian midspace”, which one could argue they could more easily follow under less oppressive circumstances. Finally, grandmothers pursuing a more distant mode of engagement often do so, not just out of a desire to enjoy their newly-found freedom (independence) from prior obligations, but also out of an inner conflict between their desire to keep playing an important role in their children’s life, and the pushy way their help is solicited, without any sensitivity or concern for their own needs. In such cases, distance and formality appear as a means to avoid aggravating the relationship with their daughter(s) or daughter(s)-in-law that would in all likelihood materialize what is experienced as frustrating and unavailable, essentially preferring the freer life that seems to open up ahead rather than resuming the more oppressive lifestyle that they recently left behind (which is what these women feel their daughters are asking them to do); perhaps it would not be farfetched to say that distant and formal modes of relationship are adopted by women who feel overwhelmed and suffocated by the caretaking and other needs of their children, and respond by withdrawing to manage and minimize their feelings of distress and suffocation.

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Concluding Remarks People in difficult economic and socio-political conditions often move towards extreme attitudes, something that has a further, clear impact on family relationships. What is taking place in many Greek families nowadays may therefore be theorized in terms of the Aristotelian golden mean, with individuals and systems alike being disoriented and deviating from the prudent behaviors that would guarantee balance, happiness, and a sense of well-being. In order for someone to pursue the middle way, the choice between the ellipse (cowardice) and the excess (audacity) has to be avoided. The courage to assume responsibility along with the role that corresponds to each developmental stage of his life has to be acknowledged. Consequently, new ideals for their actions and relationships characterized by flexibility, ingenuity and adaptability are expected from the younger individuals. In contrast, older people lack resilience, but gain in crystallized intelligence, experience and a basic virtue, wisdom. Based on the above we conclude that the pattern of behavior of the elderly so as to work as a model for the younger need to loosen the “knots” within the family so to avoid matters to drive themselves at the ends, letting the newer generation, the children of the family, to progresses smoothly. Regarding the five types of engagement (surrogate, involved, family warmth, formal and detached) we conclude that the middle way of engagement is healthiest, that is the family warmth type. In this type of engagement we find healthy boundaries between the three generations. Here the relationship is real, but the roles are not substitutable. A healthy and defined attitude in the developmental framework determines the way of life. According to Heraclitus a person’s character determines his/her life, is fate, God. As he said “Ethos is the Person’s Demon”.

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References Aventissian-Pagoropoulou, Α. (2000). Psychology of the third age, Athens. Aventissian-Pagoropoulou, Α. (2000). The senile depression, Athens. Bellas, C. F. (Ed.) (2012). Oikiaki ergasia kai koinoniki entaxi metanastrion stin Ellada tis oikonomikis krisis [Social integration of migrant domestic workers and the Greek economic crisis]. Athens, Greece: Panepistimio Aigaiou. Chrisafis, A. (2011, August 2). Greeks fall back on family ties amid debt crisis. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/02/greecefamily-ties-debt-crisis (08/02/2016) Christea-Doumani, M. (1989). The Greek mother before and today, Athens: Kedros. Efthymiou, K., Argalia, E., Kaskaba, E. & Makri, A. (2013). Economic crisis and mental health. What do we know about the current situation in Greece? Encephalos, 50, 2230. Kaklamani, R. (1984). The position of the Greek woman the family, in society, in the state, Athens: Kastaniotis. Kataki, Ch. (1998). The three identities of the Greek family, Athens: Ellinika Grammata. Kanellopoulos, K. (1984). The elderly in Greece, Athens. Kyriakidis, P. (1999). The family relationship, Ioannina. Lyberaki, A. & Tinios, P. (2012, November 27). Krisi, anergia, kai ta oikonomika tis oikogeneias: Anazitisi makrochronion taseon kai anatropon [Debt crisis, unemployment, and family finances: Looking for long-term trends and reversals]. Retrieved from: http://www.bankofgreece.gr/BoGDocuments/Lyb_Tin_BoG12_1.pdf (07/02/2017) Mylonas, K., Gari, A., Giotsa, A., Pavlopoulos, V. & Panagiotopoulou, P. (2006). Greece. In J. Georgas, J. W. Berry, F. J. R. van de Vijver, Ç. Kağıtçıbaşı, & Y. H. Poortinga (Eds.), Families across cultures: A 30-Nation Survey (p. 344-352). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press Neugarten, B. & Weinstein, K. (1964). The changing American grandparent. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 26, 199–200. Stylianidis, S. (2015, October 27). Quand l’ état s’ efface (Powerpoint slides). Retrieved from http://www.yapaka.be/sites/yapaka.be/files/page/15-10-27-nous_s_stylianidis.pdf (20/02/2017)

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APPENDIX The questionnaire The aim of this questionnaire is to extend your relationship with your children and especially with your grandchildren through various activities of everyday living. Please answer the questions having in your mind only your relationship with the family of your daughter of your daughter in law. We administrate the questionnaire. And now two open questions: (1) In every human relationship arising disappointments and frustrations. In which sectors do you think are created most of the conflicts between daughter and mother or daughter in law and mother in law and what is to blame for this? (2) If you could change some things in your today’s relationships with your children or grandchildren, which will they be, so that you could approach the standard of the person that satisfies you? Mother/Mother-In-Law Questionnaire Instructions: There are no wrong or right answers. From every quintet of statements below one item suits us most, whilst the remaining four provide less satisfactory descriptions. We try to be ourselves as best we can by selecting our answers according to this criterion, and avoid responding based on what we think would be socially acceptable. Acceptable for this questionnaire is whatever suits us and moreover whatever happens in real life. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Since I managed to get my daughter/son married I assumed the responsibility of a second home Whenever my children have problems they know they can address me. I seek the company of my grandchildren only as long as I find it pleasant. I believe that my child has to raise his/her children in the same way as I raised him/her. I strive to maintain distances and to be rather a good neighbor to my daughter/daughte-in-law. I consider it my duty to support my children financially. Whenever they face financial difficulties, they seek my help. I do not care about about their family finances. I give them presents that I like without asking them what they need. I do not wish to know their needs. I take care of the cooking for the family of my daughter/daughter-in-law. Basically they cook for themselves but whenever it comes to difficult recipes then it is I who takes responsibility for cooking Whenever I’ m in the mood, I cook something to please them. I invite them to dinner only during feasts and major occasions. We gather all together as a family only on rare occasions.

138 Anna Pagoropoulou-Aventissian, Angeliki Skamvetsaki, Dimitra Vardalachaki 16. My daily schedule includes providing domestic help to my duaghter/daughterin-law. 17. I offer regularly my help to my daughter’s / daughter’s in law home , if I am asked for it 18. I offer as many as I want and give me pleasure 19. I believe that my offer has to have limits 20. I offered them too many in the past and I do not want to keep it on. 21. I consider my grandchildren as an extension of my children. 22. I get involved energetically to their raising as long as I am asked for it 23. I get involved energetically to their raising to the limit I get pleasure from it 24. My grandchildren know that I love them from a distance 25. I don’t offer myself to keep/raise my grandchildren 26. The relationship with my grandchildren constitutes the most important emotional feeder 27. I have close relationship with my grandchildren but for emotional feeder I address to people of my generation 28. From the relationship with my grandchildren I seek for happiness, pleasure and family warmth 29. The relation with my grandchildren is typical and measured 30. I prefer to have my own company and leave my children and grandchildren choose their own 31. I try to convince my daughter./ daughter in law, that the upbringing of my grandchildren has to be the same as the one I had offered to my children 32. I would like her to follow the rules of upbringing children that I followed but I do not insist 33. The upbringing rules that I use for my grandchildren they formed with the personal selection and pleasure as the only criteria 34. I keep my grandchildren to a distance accepting the fact that their parents raise them up with their own way 35. I do not interfere in the way that my daughter / daughter in law, raise her children 36. I can not imagine that I could spend my holidays public holidays and celebrations without my grandchildren 37. It makes me happy to share my holidays, public holidays and celebrations with my grandchildren 38. I share my holidays, public holidays and celebrations with my grandchildren to the point that gives me pleasure 39. I welcome my children and grandchildren as visitors during my holidays, public holidays and celebrations. 40. I prefer to choose who accompanies me and not the company of my grandchildren during my holidays, public holidays and celebrations 41. My daughter does not resemble me 42. My daughter reminds me of my youth 43. My daughter resembles her father

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44. 45. 46. 47.

My daughter took all the positive elements of my character My daughter lives a happier life that the one I was living at her age I feel fully capable to meet the daily needs of my grandchildren I feel that I have the power to help and to offer to my children and grandchildren 48. I do not feel that I can offer them more than those I get pleasure from. 49. I feel that my health allows me to offer a few or minimum 50. At my age I am not a hundred per cent capable of taking care of myself. Questionnaire for the daughter / daughter in law Instructions: There are no wrong or right answers. From every quintet of questions we agree with one question eminently and the others they have smaller degree of agreement. We try to be ourselves as closest as possible by choosing our answers with this criterion and not trying to respond to the socially acceptable model. Acceptable for this questionnaire is whatever suits us and moreover whatever happens in real life. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

My mother/ mother in law, has to take care of her home and mine in parallel Whenever I have problems i know I can address to her. She seeks the company of her grandchildren only for as long as she finds it pleasant She believes that I have to raise my children with the same way as the one she used to raise me I feel that she is like a good neighbor because she maintains distances She considers it her obligation to support us financially Whenever i face financial difficulties i address to her She prefers not to know the financials of our home She makes us presents but nothing beyond this She does not want to participate in our financials She takes care of the cooking for my family Basically i cook for ourselves but whenever it comes to complexed recipes then she takes the responsibility of cooking Whenever she is in the mood she cooks something to make us happy (sweets , pies etc) She invites us to dinner only during grand occasions and feasts We gather altogether to dinner in rare occasions. Her everyday’s schedule includes services provision to our home She offers regularly her help, only if she is asked for it She offers as many as she wants and gives her pleasure She believes that her offer has to have limits She believes that she offered us too many in the past and that she does not want to keep it on. She considers her grandchildren as an extension of her children. She gets involved energetically to their raising as long as she is asked for it.

140 Anna Pagoropoulou-Aventissian, Angeliki Skamvetsaki, Dimitra Vardalachaki 23. She gets involved energetically to their raising to the limit she gets pleasure from it 24. Her grandchildren know that she loves them from a distance 25. She does not offer herself to keep/raise her grandchildren 26. Her relationship with her grandchildren constitutes her only emotional feeder 27. She has close relationship with her grandchildren but for emotional feeder she addresses people of her generation 28. From the relationship with her grandchildren she seeks for happiness and pleasure 29. The relation with her grandchildren is typical and measured 30. She has made new emotional bonds after the marriage of her children 31. She tries to convince me, that the upbringing of her grandchildren has to be the same as the one she had offered to her children 32. She would like me to follow the rules of upbringing children that she followed but she does not insist 33. She believes that the upbringing rules they formed with the personal selection and pleasure as the only criteria 34. She accepts the fact that her grandchildren are raised with a different way 35. She does not interfere in the way that I raise my children 36. She can not imagine that she could spend her holidays, public holidays and celebrations without her grandchildren 37. She makes her happy to share her holidays, public holidays and celebrations with her grandchildren 38. She shares her free time with her grandchildren to the point that gives her pleasure 39. She welcomes her children and grandchildren as visitors during her holidays, public holidays and celebrations. 40. She prefers to choose who accompanies her during her free time 41. I took all the positives and negatives of my mother 42. I would like to resemble my mother 43. I get psychologically affected from the relationship with my mother 44. I resemble more my father’s character 45. I feel my mother as a friend 46. She feels fully capable to meet the daily needs of her grandchildren 47. She feels that she has the power to help and to offer to her children and grandchildren 48. She does not feel that she can offer them more than those she gets pleasure from. 49. She feels that her health allows her to offer a few or minimum 50. At her age she is not a hundred per cent capable of taking care of herself.

The need for civil society in Greece Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos Introduction Civil society has been considered a major ingredient of democracy because it is associated with popular participation in and influence over decision-making (Putnam 1993, Diamond 1997, Warren 1999) and the implementation of individual and collective rights of citizens. If civil society is absent or weak, then democracy is rendered a formal procedure of periodic election of governments. The need for civil society arises from the wish and the demand for a richer democratic life. Yet, contemporary advanced democracies suffer from anemic democratic engagement and civic participation, evident in the relatively low electoral turn-out and the disaffection of citizens with democratic institutions (Pharr and Putnam 2000). Meanwhile, the development of civil society has been very uneven. In Eastern Europe civil society flourished in the early 1990s after transition from state socialism, but declined afterwards, while worldwide there has been a rise of global civil society (Kaldor 2003). In this context, while in the past the collective actors of civil society used to be recognizable formal organizations and institutions, such as labor unions and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), today there are also new social movements, informal groups and networks which choose to function outside typical institutional channels. Although policy makers may ignore such informal collective actors, the latter can have an impact on society and on policy making particularly when trust towards formal institutions is low. During such periods, for example, after a natural disaster or a grave economic crisis, policy makers may need the activation of both formal and informal collective actors, as the challenges which they face in order to overcome the crisis may be overwhelming. In some well-organized and well-resourced states, civil society’s involvement may not be necessary in crisis periods. However, in many other states, the need for civil society’s contribution to the delivery of social services or the provision of health care becomes evident. During periods of economic crisis, developed welfare states balance the negative social effects of the crisis by enlarging social transfers, such as unemployment and other welfare benefits. However, if a welfare state is undeveloped, then it may not be able to react to the negative social effects of the crisis, leaving large categories of the population unprotected.

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If as it happened in the case of the crisis in Greece, austerity policies are enforced in a protracted or sudden fashion, then, the provision of social protection by civil society may be an unintended effect of government policies which roll back the welfare state. Under neo-liberal governments, the same may be an intended effect of conscious policy choices of governments which want to outsource the provision of social welfare to NGOs and other associations offering social protection in lieu of state agencies. The latter instance is obviously problematic. A society which would assign all welfare state tasks to the non-state sector (private companies, NGOs), would be a society regressing back to the early modern or the pre-modern era. Thus, there are at least two instances, one unintended and other intended by state authorities, in which there is a need for active civil society. Civil society is needed to cover for the needs of vulnerable members of society, including the elderly. In either case there is potential for democratic engagement and civic participation in social policy. Leaders, participants and users of the relevant civic initiatives negotiate amongst themselves the scale, urgency and priority of social needs to be covered in ways in which typical bureaucrats and policy-makers would probably not be interested in promote. For example, social networks and self-help groups are known to favor an actor-oriented approach, i.e., an approach in which actors who stand to gain from the work of such groups also have a say. As it will be discussed further below with regard to radical social activism in the wake of the Greek crisis, there is also the possibility that civil society activists may be reluctant to engage with policy makers. Civic initiatives might fear that by engaging in any interaction with policy makers they would support government policies with which they disagree; or would legitimize state institutions which they consider as carriers of dominant social interests, be they bureaucratic, social class, gender, ethnic or other such interests. The crisis which burst out in Greece in 2010 and the repercussions of the crisis made such issues come to the surface. In the remaining of this chapter, I am going to briefly discuss the economic and social crisis. Then, I will shift to an analysis of three modes of civil society in Greece under the crisis: the considerate civil society, the empowered civil society and the uncivil society. Civil society was considerate when, after the crisis struck, took into account the circumstances, needs and feelings of people affected by the crisis. It was empowered when it mobilized against austerity politics. And it was uncivil when some segments of it resorted to racist and xenophobic as well as anti-parliamentary and destructive attitudes and activities. Finally I will outline dimensions of the case of Greece which may be paradigmatic of wider EU trends and end this chapter with conclusions on the continuing need for civil society in Greece.

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The economic crisis in Greece As noted in the introduction to this edited volume, Greece is undergoing a longterm crisis, partly owed to home-grown structural problems in combination with the global financial crisis and partly resulting from the effects of austerity politics. Structural problems were and still are evident regarding the slim industrial base of Greece’s economy, the mismanagement of its public finances, a patronage-ridden political and administrative system and a porous social safety net of the country’s welfare system. Owing to such domestic structural problems, Greece was facing problems of slipping economic competitiveness and a mounting public debt already before the onset of the crisis. The country’s disappointing economic performance would sooner or later have called for fiscal consolidation through some type of austerity programme. The decline of the economic and social situation did not result only from domestic causes. Greece's domestic obstacles to growth became complicated and aggravated by the worsening international economic climate, resulting from the global financial crisis which had started in 2008. In detail, Greece’s soaring public debt reached 129 per cent of the GDP in 2009 and was combined with an unsustainable budget deficit (-16 per cent of the GDP) and a negative accounts balance of (15 per cent of the GDP, Eurostat data). After realizing in 2010 that it could not raise funds on the international markets, the Greek government signed a first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the country's creditors in 2010. The European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have provided economic assistance to Greece continuously since 2010, in exchange for austerity policies, crystallized in additional MoUs, signed in 2012 and 2015, which were updated in 2016 and 2017 and extended to the end of 2018 / 2019. While such external funding was substantial, its implementation was accompanied by requirements not only to enforce severe cuts in wages, salaries, pensions, welfare allowances and government expenditure in general, but also to proceed with extensive institutional reforms in Greece's public sector, welfare system, labor market and product market (Giannitsis and Zografakis 2015). A hybrid scheme that brought together the IMF, the European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB), the so-called Troika, assumed the responsibility for overseeing this economic adjustment program in Greece, but economic, political and social developments did not evolve as predicted. In 2010-2011 many reforms designed in the first MoU were not implemented. Reform failure was owed to the immobility of the country’s political system, namely the reluctance of center-left governing elites and powerful interest groups to abide by the adjustment program, bureaucratic inertia, and mounting

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resistance by radical social movements. A short-lived right-wing/centre-left technocratic government was formed in 2011 and signed a second MoU in 2012. After the parliamentary elections of 2012 another coalition government, now with the support of a small pro-EU left party, was formed. All these governments managed to implement some of the reforms but at a high social cost, namely soaring unemployment and poverty (Matsaganis and Leventi 2014). By 2013, i.e., five years into the crisis (2009-2013), Greece had made progress regarding its current accounts and budget deficit, but unemployment hovered around 27 per cent and youth unemployment 28 per cent (Eurostat data). However, austerity policies caused deep economic recession: Greece’s GDP declined by 25 per cent in 2009-2014. With the exception of business elites and some segments of the liberal professions - which before the crisis had accumulated wealth through a combination of highly-paid services and tax evasion most socio-professional categories witnessed the model of economic production of Greece, along with their own living standards, crumbled before their very eyes. Meanwhile, the public debt’s ratio to the GDP had become prohibitively high, i.e., 175 per cent of the GDP. In 2014, the Greek economy grew by a slim 0.6 per cent, but growth became negative again in 2015 and in 2016, most probably owing to the erratic policies of the radical left/far right coalition government which had won the elections of January and September 2016, on a nationalist/populist pre-electoral platform. In the meantime, Greece experienced a very high unemployment rate (26 per cent in mid-2014 which had only climbed down to 23 per cent in December 2016; Eurostat data). Moreover, a deep social crisis became evident in growing poverty, inequality, lack of access to public health care and social services. Civil society in Greece before and after the onset of the crisis Before the economic crisis, Greek civil society was underdeveloped vis-à-vis political parties and the state (Mavrogordatos 1993, Sotiropoulos and Karamaggioli 2006 Huliaras 2015). Already at that time Greece needed a civil society which would be autonomous from any patrons, such as political parties and governments. Before the crisis the two major political parties were the centerright New Democracy (ND) and the center-left PASOK. Political party organizations penetrated the labour movement and the student movement through their collateral organizations. Meanwhile government ministers and their ministerial cabinets selectively supported certain NGOs instead of others on a purely patronage-based criteria. Thus, before the onset of the crisis, civil society in Greece was needed, but probably could not rise up to the challenge of disengagement from party and state organizations.

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However, some manifestations of voluntarism existed and periodically fluctuated, while there was uneven civic activism in selected policy sectors. Regarding voluntary organizations, Greeks tended to join professional associations and labor unions rather than charity, cultural, consumer or environmental associations (Sotiropoulos 2017). Before 2010 voluntarism fluctuated a lot. For example, volunteers appeared whenever earthquakes struck Greek cities. Voluntarism reached a peak before the Athens Olympics in 2004, when thousands of Athenians volunteered their skills and time before and during the Olympic Games. Moreover, in 1990-2010, Greek NGOs offered social assistance and medical help to vulnerable groups, including Muslim communities of socially excluded people in the centre of Athens and migrants reaching Greece even before the large refugee waves provoked by conflict in the Middle-East (Karakatsanis 2015). There was also an increase in activities of environmental NGOs and networks (Botetzagias and Koutiva 2015), which however was not able to alter the long-term indifference shown by central government authorities and also particularly municipalities towards environmental protection in Greece. Considerate civil society The economic crisis brought about a large scale change in Greek civil society. After the crisis erupted, some NGOs rose to meet the new challenges provoked by austerity politics, while many social solidarity groups emerged in a spontaneous, informal fashion. Almost all NGOs suffered a financial blow, as by 2012 the government had severed all funding to such organizations and individual membership in NGOs dropped abruptly. Yet, NGOs which possessed a more than rudimentary organizational structure and could rally volunteers to their cause mobilized to help the poor, the unemployed, and the homeless in Greek cities. Not-for-profit foundations, funded by the heirs of large Greek ship owners (Niarchos, Onassis, Latsis), intervened and started training volunteers, funding volunteer activities and offering technical assistance to NGOs. Meanwhile informal, self-help groups and social solidarity networks have become active in wider range of activities (Clarke 2015, Vathakou 2015). Examples are the following: exchange of food and clothes; provision of food in soup kitchens; provision of health care in make-shift clinics; community and education work; and many self-help and solidarity activities, including entertainment and cleaning and tidying of public spaces (Sotiropoulos and Bourikos 2014, Polyzoides 2015, Skleparis 2015). In detail, social solidarity networks gathered momentum, particularly after the early months of 2011, as welfare state services were rolled back by the government which hurried to effect fiscal consolidation. Social solidarity became vital for at least three different groups: first, for private sector workers whose pay

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had been severely cut or who had been lost their jobs; second, for small and businessmen who curtailed their business activities owing to lack of demand and were themselves unable to pay their social insurance contributions; and, third, for the Greek youth realising that the crisis had come to stay and having no accesses to the shrinking labor market. Many among the aforementioned categories of the population victims resorted to survival strategies which included falling back on family networks. Essentially this meant that the elderly members of families intervened to resolve problems of cash shortage and housing of middle-age and young-age family members (Mavrikos-Adamou 2015). Further on, volunteer doctors and nurses established social clinics, hosted by municipal authorities across the country. They started seeing patients who could not afford to use private health care or who had lost access to the public health care system. Such clinics were complemented by social pharmacies, staffed by volunteer pharmacists. Informal groups obtained food, clothes or other essentials from businesses or households which could spare them and distributed them to families in need. In the same vein, producers of agricultural goods bypassed the usual distribution networks and travelled to city centres in order to sell their produce, at lower than usual prices, directly to consumers in cities. In neighbourhoods with high numbers of poor and unemployed residents, groups of high-school teachers volunteered to organise free tutorials for pupils whose parents could not afford the usual evening cramming schools in preparation for the university entrance examinations. Further on, in urban centres the Christian Orthodox Church and church-related organisations opened soup kitchens or expanded existing ones in order to take care of increasing demand, while other NGOs offered basic hygiene services and temporary shelter to the homeless. Finally, members of local communities, such as the solidarity and exchange network of Volos regularly exchanged goods and services. Other local groups, such as the ‘Atenistas’ group in Athens and the corresponding groups in other cities, focused on the day-to-day management of squares, playgrounds and gardens. Empowered civil society As the effects of the crisis began to bite in 2010, many Greek citizens reacted to the austerity measures by participating in large-scale demonstrations organised by parties of the opposition and trade unions. The death of three bank employees in May 2010, after their bank branch in central Athens had been torched by anarchists, somewhat abated protests. Later on anti-austerity rallies reached a

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peak towards the end of 2011 and 2012 (Diani and Kousis 2014, Kousis 2015). Rallies and strikes were called by trade unions and professional associations as well as a web of self-help and social solidarity networks. At this stage civil society was empowered in the sense that major political parties of the centre-right and the centre-left had lost the confidence of citizens, while smaller political parties on the right and the left had not been yet able to organize their own mobilisation and to influence civil society. Indeed, after the crisis erupted, trust in political institutions and particularly trust in political parties declined rapidly. Survey data show that in 2010-2015 the reported level of trust in political parties was less than 10 per cent (Eurobarometer surveys). Meanwhile, even though before the crisis there was some consultation on incomes and other policy areas initiated by the government and institutionalized in official collective agreements between representatives of business and labor, in the wake of the crisis, consultation with social partners ceased. The government passed successive austerity measures without prior consultation with representatives of unions and associations of any kind. As citizens saw that channels of typical political participation were blocked they resorted to atypical, unconventional means of participation. Such unconventional mobilisation of civil society included violent protests, periodic occupations of squares and government buildings and general strikes, called by the General Confederation of Workers of Greece (GSEE) representing employees of private sector and the state-owned enterprises and also the Confederation of Unions of Civil Servants (ADEDY). Strikes did not produce any change in government policy as the government’s hands were probably tied by the fact that state coffers were empty and banks were on the brink of collapse. Thus, it was almost unavoidable that whoever was in power would follow some kind of austerity policy, although – under ND and PASOK coalition governments – the mix of policies reflected a political bias in favour of the upper income groups, business elites, liberal professions, and public sector employees and workers. Strikes were unproductive not only because Greece’s economy was essentially steered by representatives of the creditors rather than domestic authorities, but also because strikes were very frequent. The weapon of strike was overused by trade union representatives and had limited or no impact on the plans of decision makers. As trust in political institutions plummeted and unions’ demonstrations became largely symbolic, new types of civil society mobilisation emerged. Two examples stand out. One was the Greek ‘indignant people’ movement, formed after the model of Spanish ‘indignados’. The Greek ‘indignados’ gathered on a daily basis in the central squares of Greek cities between May and July 2011

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(Simiti 2014, Leontidou 2015). The ‘indignant people’ movement was a reaction to the unresponsiveness of the government and the lack of consultation with social partners before the government adopted austerity policies. Yet, the movement oscillated between legitimate protest and violent anti-parliamentarism and was divided between leftist and rightist camps (out of which the parties of Independent Greeks and Golden Dawn drew voters). Still, it was a genuine and massive, albeit short-lived, manifestation of civic activism. A second example was the ‘Won’t Pay’ movement which flourished in the autumn of 2011 and the winter of 2011-2012. It was a reaction to price hikes in the toll fees required for using the national highways and to a new landed property tax which, for reasons of quick and efficient tax collection, was included in the electricity bills sent to Greek households. Such movements appealed to citizens who used to be the two largest political parties, the ND and PASOK. Feeling betrayed by the two parties, citizens radically changed their political preferences. In the twin national elections of May and June 2012, ND and PASOK, which between 1981 and 2009 used to command on the average 75 per cent of the total vote between them, saw their electoral influence plummet to a combined share of around 40 per cent of the vote. Simultaneously, the vote for the erstwhile small radical left party Syriza soared from the level of five per cent in the elections of 2009 to 27 per cent in June 2012. Since the beginning of the crisis Syriza had held an unwavering anti-austerity stance and had declared that upon coming to power it would reverse the MoUbased policies. The part became a force behind the emerging civic activism and was cardinal in the mobilisation of citizens with a wide-ranging socio-economic profile (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou 2013). It was not uncommon to see groups, normally uninterested in street politics, such as relatively well-paid civil servants, pharmacists or taxi-drivers, staging protests and turning increasingly towards the left-wing opposition. Syriza was also very popular among the young, who were suffering the brunt of recession and the austerity measures, being hit by unprecedented levels of unemployment. Since long before the crisis, trade and student unions had been dominated by political parties and were involved in PASOK- and ND-led mobilisations, including strikes, demonstrations and occupations of government buildings. After the start of the crisis the peak of such protests, when parties of the opposition, trade unions and professional associations joined forces, occurred three times, in June 2011, September-October 2011 and February 2012, which corresponded to three definitive moments in the formation of the austerity policies (Kousis 2015). Thus, much civil society activism took a decidedly anti-governmental

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character and anti-austerity political parties, primarily Syriza, first rode on such protests and then contributed to their growth. While these protests were organized by unions, parties of the left and self-help and solidarity networks and aimed to roll back austerity, one should make a distinction between wider mobilization of citizens against government's economic policies, on the one hand, and mobilization in defense of narrow interests, on the other. For instance, well-paid employees of state owned enterprises were protagonists in the defense of social rights, but essentially wanted to defend their own niches of the labor market and the specific, occupation-based regimes of pension and health care which they had carved out for themselves, with the complicity of past, patronage-ridden, governments. Indeed powerful and less powerful interest groups rose in defense of “closed shop” regulations. After 2010 there were endless strikes of lawyers lasting for several months in a row, periodic closures of pharmacies by pharmacy shop owners who benefited from government-regulated very high profit rates, and repeated, violent blockades in major highways, squares and ports by taxi owners and truck owners who wanted to prevent access of newcomers to their market niches. In brief, after reaching a certain threshold the empowerment of civil society overflowed the banks of both conventional and unconventional political participation and reached extremes bordering on uncivil society. Uncivil society Uncivil society, a concept which is very hard to define, denotes activities which are disruptive and threatening, including racism, xenophobia and anti-democracy (Kopecky and Mudde 2003, Glasius 2010). Based on the case of Greece, one can include in uncivil society informal groups from across the political spectrum, which are far different form typical civic associations pursuing social solidarity and the defence of political and social rights. In the case of civil society mobilization during the crisis in Greece, recurrent uncivil patterns stood out: personal physical attacks against politicians, including former government ministers of PASOK and ND, multiplied as the crisis escalated. Squatters, who had for a long time occupied buildings in the center of Athens, consolidated the occupation of public and municipal property. The occupied buildings were not necessarily used to the benefit of wider community. At times they served as hideouts of violent far left or anarchist groups and as depositories of petrol bombs and other such materials, useful for the orchestrated attacks against the parliament, state universities, central headquarters of centrist and right-wing political parties, and other buildings housing democratic institutions. For instance, in the large-scale demonstrations against the austerity measures of the second MoU in February 2012 radical protesters set alight

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about forty buildings in central Athens, such as shops and movie theatres. Moreover, extreme leftist and anarchist protesters, armed with sticks and Molotov bombs, systematically infiltrated demonstrations of trade unions and student associations, often succeeding in creating havoc in the centers of Greek cities. In addition on the far right of the political spectrum there emerged neighborhood-based anti-immigrant groups, organized by the neo-nazi Golden Dawn. They diffused xenophobia and exercised violence against migrants, whom they chased and attacked physically whenever possible. It is now well known that groups of Greek citizens monitored the presence of foreign migrants in the vicinity of their home (e.g. in a few neighbourhoods of central Athens). With the support of Golden Dawn they offered food and other consumer goods to people in need only if they were Greek, barring non-Greeks from such social assistance. Such racist mobilization ‘from below’, clearly destructive for parliamentary democracy and civil society itself, was tolerated by Greek authorities. The latter reacted belatedly only after the assassination of a popular left-wing rapper by a Golden Dawn militant in September 2013. Then Greek judicial authorities persecuted the leadership of Golden Dawn, without however achieving to stem the popularity of the neo-nazi party which continuously polls in the third place in voting preference surveys. In the above instances of uncivil society emerging from the left and the right of the political spectrum, the police and prosecuting authorities limited themselves to defending some of the buildings or tolerated attacks (e.g., attacks against migrants). Before the outbreak of the crisis and increasingly after 2010), uncivil groups were often left unfettered to roam the central streets of Athens and - depending on their political ideology - either to attack migrants and refugees or to destroy private and public property. In short, there is a radicalised segment of civil society which pursues violent means of political intervention, incompatible with the rest of civil society and with parliamentary democracy. There is clearly no need for uncivil society, as there is for civil society, in times of crisis and beyond. Conclusions All the developments analysed in this chapter seem particular to the case of Greece, as the gravity of the crisis and its effects, along with the uneven development of civil society, set Greek society apart from other societies of EU Member States. Yet, seen from a different angle, the same case may be paradigmatic of wider trends currently affecting the EU.

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Developments in Greece as paradigmatic cases of wider trends in the EU During the crisis the extended Greek family as a social institution faced the double challenge of supporting vulnerable family members, hit by the crisis, and also confronting the spectre of an ageing society. Today Greece is a society where more and more resources over time will have to be dedicated not so much to the unemployed or the precariously employed members of young and middleage groups, but to the elderly, and their health and social needs. This is an obvious EU-wide policy dilemma. The dilemma of whom to support first has not been resolved in a consensual manner in Greece. By contrast, governments have reacted in an ad hoc fashion. For example, in a sudden move in December 2016 the head of the radical left/far right coalition, Prime Minister Tsipras, announced that his government would provide an one-off additional allowance, equal to a monthly pension, to all old-age pensioners receiving a pension lower than 850 Euros per month and regardless of any other income sources they may have. No provision was made for the young among the unemployed, at a time when youth unemployment was 47 per cent, the highest in the EU (Eurostat data). Thus, one dimension of the crisis is that it magnified an already existing cleavage between young and old age-groups in Greece, a cleavage known to exist in other European societies. Secondly, the economic crisis in Greece has rekindled the tension between two of the guiding principles of European integration, namely competitiveness versus social cohesion. In Greece under the crisis fiscal consolidation and a stimulus to competitiveness were necessary, if the country was ever to escape from the downward spiral of new debts being accumulated over past debts. Yet, social cohesion was completely neglected. The delicate balance between the two principles of competitiveness and social cohesion officially inspired EU's Agenda 2020, formed at the end of the decade of the 2000s. In of Greece, the balance was completely shattered. And thirdly, with regard to the Greek political system, the scale and duration of the economic crisis has combined with long-term currents of public opinion and developments at the party system level to produce new challenges for democracy. This is not a particular Greek phenomenon either. In Europe, the rise of populism and euroscepticism had preceded the collapse of Lehman Brothers (September 2008), the event that symbolized the start of the global financial crisis. Over the past ten years, we have witnessed the emergence and political consolidation of new collective actors, who are more or less hostile to the project of EU integration, as it currently evolves. Examples are national governments (the FDZ government of Viktor Orban in Hungary, the Law and Justice party government in Poland), political parties (the 'True Finns' in Finland, the

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far right Independent Greeks and the neo-nazi Golden Dawn in Greece) and even segments of social movements (e.g., radical factions of the 'indignados' in Greece). These are very different collective actors, but they share a few common traits. They use populist and/or ethnocentric political discourse and ride on the waves of disappointment with national and EU elites and institutions, which have proven unable to manage challenges, such as widening income inequalities within and among European societies and immigration waves towards Europe. Conclusions about the need for civil society in Greece Under crisis circumstances, there is a need for civil society to mobilize. Typically, charity organizations, NGOs and churches mobilize in order to assume social welfare responsibilities to a larger extent than before the onset of the crisis. Except for such formal, non-state organizations, there are also informal groups or networks of citizens who also step in and take up self-help initiatives or volunteer to cover gaps in social protection. There is a need for this type of bottom-up, civil-society-based participation, particularly when the welfare state fails to fulfill its task of social protection. Before the eruption of the economic crisis in Greece civil society was needed but it was rather weak vis-à-vis the state and political parties. Historical legacies of weak voluntarism, the economic dependence of NGOs on the state, and the politicisation of social movements all contributed to that weakness. Αfter 2010 in Greece civil society became partially autonomous from the government, as the latter started rolling back the provision of welfare services and in the same time alienated voters from different ends of the political spectrum who protested against austerity, often independently of and against major political parties. The need for civil society became evident, as the poor and socially excluded resorted to health, welfare and other services offered by self-help groups, informal social solidarity networks, and NGOs. The crisis proved to be an opportunity for NGOs to try to survive outside the net of protection and control which the state used to cast over them, before the eruption of the crisis, i.e. in the period in which selected NGOs depended on financial transfers by Ministries, such as the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a nutshell, there was a major change in the NGO sector, brought about by shortages and eventual spending cuts in state funds which used to be channeled to NGOs and a shift in the strategy of NGOs. The latter, instead of approaching state authorities, turned to not-for-profit foundations belonging to Greek entrepreneurs. In other words, the crisis has provided civil society with a chance to develop. Yet the fact that that civil society has started replacing the state in some policy sectors is quite problematic, because the state is tempted not to play its welfare

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role any more. A relatively recent example of this problem is the almost complete substitution of NGOs for state agencies in 2015-2017 with regard to receiving and supporting Afghani, Iraqi, Syrian and other refugees who land on the shores of Greek islands in the Aegean Sea after having crossed war zones and Turkey. There is clearly a need for civil society to help manage the inflows of refugee, but the fact that state authorities have reacted belatedly to this influx, which amounted to a real humanitarian crisis, speaks volumes about the very low administrative capacity of the Greek state and lack of quick reflexes, let alone planning and programming, on the part of the Greek government. Thus the crisis made the need for a robust civil society more urgent but also revealed the limits of state authorities in facilitating civil society development and checking or stopping uncivil society. Civil society in Greece has started maturing, but it is not possible to foresee whether this ‘coming of age’ of civil society will help change state-civil society relations. There is a possibility for developing a relationship on a more even footing between state and civil society. Such a relationship would entail a clearer legal framework for the functioning of civil society associations, which is presently lacking; a more detached stance on the part of political parties towards civil society associations; and a gradual rebuilding of relations of trust between citizens on the one hand and political and administrative institutions on the other. References Botetzagias, Iosif and Eirini Koutiva (2015), “When Best Is Not Enough: Greek Environmental NGOs and Their Donors Amidst the Economic Crisis”, in Jenny Clarke, Asteris Huliaras and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, eds., Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline, Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, pp. 125145. Clarke, Jenny (2015), “Solidarity and Survival: A Multidiscplinary Exploration of Volunteering During the Greek Crisis“, in Jenny Clarke, Asteris Huliaras and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, eds., Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline, Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, pp. 67-84. Diamond, Larry (1997), “Civil Society and the Development of Democracy”, online working paper 197/10, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Madrid : Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones. http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Publicacoes/13664_Cached.pdf. Diani, Mario and Maria Kousis (2014), “The Duality of Claims and Events: The Greek Campaign against the Troika’s Memoranda and Austerity, 2010-2012”, Μοbilization, 19 (4), 387-404. Giannitsis, Tassos and Stavros Zografakis (2015), “Greece: Solidarity and Adjustment in Times of Crisis”, Hans Boeckler Stiftung, Macroeconomic Policy Institute, Study no.

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38. http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_imk_study_38_2015.pdf Glasius, Marlies (2009), “Uncivil Society” in Helmut K. Anheier and Stefan Toepler, eds., International Encyclopedia of Civil Society, New York: Springer Verlag, pp. 15831588. Huliaras, Asteris (2015), “Greek Civil Society: The Neglected Causes of Weakness” In Jenny Clarke, Asteris Huliaras and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, eds., Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline, Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, pp. 9-27. Kaldor, Μary (2003), Global Civil Society: An Answer to War, Cambridge: Polity. Karakatsanis, Leonidas (2015), “NGOs, Minority Politics and Alterity in Pre-Crisis Athens: A Case Study from Gazi and Metaxourgeio“ in: Jenny Clarke, Asteris Huliaras and Dimitri Sotiropoulos, eds. Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline, Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, pp.193-213. Kopecky, Peter and Cass Mudde, eds. (2003), Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe, London: Routledge. Kousis, Maria (2015), “The Spatial Dimensions of the Greek Protest Campaign against the Troika’s Memoranda and Austerity, 2010-2013” in Marcos Ancelovici, Pascale Dufour and Héloïse Nez, eds., Street Politics in the Age of Austerity, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 147-173. Leontidou, Lila (2015), “Urban Social Movements in Greece: Dominant Discourses and the Reproduction of ‘Weak’ Civil Societies” in Jenny Clarke, Asteris Huliaras and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, eds., Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline, Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, pp. 85-106. Matsaganis Manos and Chryssa Leventi (2014), “Poverty and inequality during the Great Recession in Greece”, Political Studies Review, 12 (2), 209-223. Mavrikos-Adamou, Tina (2015), “Informal Relationships and Structures in Greece and their Effects on Civil Society Formation”, in Jenny Clarke, Asteris Huliaras and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, eds., Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline, Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, pp. 45-65. Mavrogordatos, George, Th. (1993), “Civil Society Under Populism”, in Richard Clogg, ed., Greece 1981-1989: The Populist Decade, London: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 47-64. Pharr, Susan J. and Robert F. Putnam, eds. (2000), Disaffected Democracies, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Polyzoidis, Periklis (2015), “NGOs and Social Welfare in Greece Re-Assessed: Comparative Insights and Crisis Repercussions“ in Jenny Clarke, Asteris Huliaras and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, eds., Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline, Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, pp. 109-124. Putnam, Robert D. (with Roberto Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti) (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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Simiti, Marilena (2014), “Rage and Protest: The Case of the Greek Indignant Movement”, GreeSEE paper no. 82, Hellenic Observatory, The London School of Economics and Political Science, http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/CMS%20pdf/ Publications/GreeSE/GreeSE-No82.pdf Skleparis, Dimitris (2015), “Towards a Hybrid ‘Shadow State’? The Case of Migrant/ Refugee Serving NGOs in Greece“, in Jenny Clarke, Asteris Huliaras and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, eds., Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline, in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline, Farnham Surrey: Ashgate, pp. 147-165. Sotiropoulos, Dimitri A. and Evika Karamaggioli (2006), “Greek Civil Society: The Long Road to Maturity”, Athens: Civicus and Access2Democracy. Sotiropoulos, Dimitri A. and Dimitris Bourikos (2014), “Εconomic Crisis, Social Solidarity and the Voluntary Sector in Greece”, Journal of Power, Politics and Governance, 2 (2), 33-53. Sotiropoulos, Dimitri A. (2017), Greek Civil Society and the Economic Crisis, Athens: Potamos editions (in Greek). Tsakatika, Mytro and Costas Eleftheriou (2013), “The Radical Left’s Turn towards Civil Society in Greece: One Strategy, Two Paths”, South European Society and Politics, 18 (1), 81-99. Vathakou, Eugenia (2015), “Citizens Solidarity Initiatives in Greece during the Financial Crisis“ in Jenny Clarke, Asteris Huliaras and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, eds., Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline, Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, pp. 167-189. Warren, Mark E., ed. (1999), Democracy and Trust, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Active and healthy ageing in a time of crisis and lessons from civil society: Experience from 50plus Hellas 50plus Hellas NGO1 2 Introduction and background Demographic ageing has occurred in all EU member states with Greece being amongst those with the highest rates. However the impact of demographic ageing in Greek society has yet to enter the centre stage of political and public debate during this long crisis period, despite the need for and challenge of improving the long term well being of older people. Population ageing has been exacerbated during the crisis both by reduced birth rates and by the almost half a million, mainly younger people3, who have emigrated to find work4, depriving the Greek economy of educated human resources, essential for its recovery, as well as reducing contributors to the social insurance funds5. High and long lasting unemployment has shaken the social insurance system, destabilized the pension system and left many pensioners below the poverty line6. Other issues of increasing concern over the crisis period are the overall low employment rate and persisting very high unemployment rate for older and less educated workers who face the highest risks of long term unemployment, non re-employment, and early exit from the labour market. Yet even these key issues for the Greek economy concerning its older workers, such as age-based discrimination, the need to create age-friendly environments in the workplace, or to upgrade or strengthen their skills have rarely entered policy debates, with widespread age discrimination undoubtedly contributing to this7. 1

Authors: Maria Delatola-Paganelis M.A., Ioannis Drymoussis Ph.D., Dimitris Kampanaros Ph.D., Maria Karampetsou M.Sc., Chelsea Lazaridou M.A., Elizabeth Mestheneos Ph.D., Georgia Michalopoulou, Georgos Pavlidis B.Sc., Myrto-Maria Ranga Ph.D., Nana Tsoumaki M.A., Judy Triantafillou M.D. 2 https://www.50plus.gr 3 Most of the people who emigrated are professionals and scientists aged 25-39. 4 Bank of Greece Economic News No. 43 (2016) (in Greek) 5 The social insurance funds have also been negatively affected by the increase in parttime and job rotation contracts, and undeclared, uninsured labour. 6 In 2015, Eurostat reported more than 1/3 of the population were at risk of poverty while 22.8% of those aged 65 were below the poverty line in 2015. However, very many unemployed households depend on the pension income of retired relatives. 7 The employment rate for older people (55-64) declined significantly from 42.8% in 2008 to 34.3% in 2015- the lowest in EU28. The unemployment rate for older people

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For pensioners, not only have old age pensions experienced multiple, consecutive, aggregate reductions, but increases in direct and indirect taxes have drastically reduced the disposable income of older adults with consequences for social participation (Economou et al. 2016). High and increasing rates of poverty and social exclusion among many pensioners, and persisting inequalities in health tend to be hidden by the fact that older people are not visible in public debate. A worrying development is the decline in healthy life years at age 65 especially for women8 (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2015) and in poorer and older age groups (Petmesidou et al 2014). This indirectly reflects rising levels of poverty associated with the drastic erosion of pensions and benefits, increased taxes, non-affordable house heating costs, increased health costs and reduced access to primary health and long-term care. Long-term care is a non-developed area of social protection and health care, almost absent in the National Reform Programmes, despite the significant increase in the proportion of the population suffering from chronic illness or health problems that limit their daily activities (Petmesidou, 2012). This indicates increasing numbers of people in need of support and long-term care which, in the absence of state provided services, continues to be provided by families with no support from the state and leading to a high rate of unmet needs for care (Bien et al., 2011). Other reactions to the crisis have been inevitable dependence on traditional familistic ties and the growth of civil society; whether as advocates, service providers or self-support organizations. Greece's increasingly urban and educated population has formed numerous NGOs and self help bodies, many to deal with the challenges created by the crisis. Yet despite the significant rise in civil society initiatives and social group mobilization9 the rapid deterioration of the quality of citizenship during the crisis has seriously undermined the strength of civil society. A major difficulty for any NGO, like 50plus Hellas, working on the issues of demographic ageing and its consequences, lies in its own legitimacy, its access to governing bodies and decision makers, its resources and the demonstrated efficacy of its programme outcomes. Civil society initiatives by, or dedicated to, older people have been few in (45-64) has risen from a negligible 3.5% in 2008 to 19.3% in 2016, with women in a worse situation. There is also one of the lowest participation rates of older workers in education and training (0.4%). 8 Between 2004-2012 HLY for women decreased from 9.8 to 7.3 and for men from 9.6 to 8.6 9 'Social Need’ or ‘Choice’? Greek Civil Society during the Economic Crisis, by Marilena Simiti, LSE, November 2015.

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Greece. 50plus Hellas, was founded prior to the crisis in 2006 as an NGO for and of older people in Greece, with the vision of promoting older people's interests and rights as well as their active participation in society. From its inception as an NGO the organisation was based on the idea of intergenerational cooperation, with the board, scientific committee and staff consisting of a wide variety of age groups, stakeholders10 and specializations. This multi-professional and age mix has proved one of the bulwarks of 50plus Hellas, enabling the wide range of experience and knowledge of the older members to be complemented by the energy and initiative of the younger ones and this has proved a vital element for its survival during the crisis. It was never designed to be a philanthropic welfare organization providing services, but one designed to focus on research, education, advocacy, policy issues and self help. Its founders11 had experience of working with the then fairly newly formed AGE Platform Europe (2002), an EU-wide supported association of older people's national organizations whose remit is to influence policy at EU and national level and to guard and advocate for the interests and needs of older people12. From the beginning the main objectives of 50plus Hellas had focused on improving opportunities for lifelong learning, combating social exclusion and age discrimination (especially in employment), facilitating exchanges between generations and promoting active and healthy ageing, in parallel with advocating for rights of access to good quality long-term care. The lack of regular direct national public or private funding led to a reliance on participation in EU programmes and projects, many of which fitted in extremely well with the objectives of the organization, but also influenced the types of programmes and activities undertaken. The lack of long term viability of relying on EU co-funded programmes as well as the effects of the crisis related state budgetary constraints made the organization look increasingly for projects that were fully funded and of immediate value to older people. During the past four years 50plus Hellas focused particularly on providing training on new technologies to older people with the support 10

Stakeholders include members from universities, research centres, municipal services, independent service providers. 11 The SEXTANT not for profit research company (1990-2005) had undertaken many European research projects concerned with older people and identified a large gap between research findings and the formation of evidence based policy and practice. 12 50plus Hellas is a member of AGE Platform Europe {http://www.age-platform.eu/} with members active in its work via expert groups, its Board and Council and the responsibility of president for a term. 50plus Hellas participates in policy making proposals and campaigns, such as “Towards an Age-Friendly EU” and “The Europe 2020 Strategy”.

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of a national telecommunication company, COSMOTE, and Local Authorities. Participation in other successful, mainly EU fully funded programmes such as GRUNDTVIG and ERASMUS, have led to the development of sponsored programmes for active and healthy ageing, developed mainly through the activities of volunteers. Whilst the founder members of 50plus Hellas were mainly professionals involved in various aspects of active ageing, the promotion of volunteer activity amongst the members was from the outset a major objective of the organization. The scientific committee of the organisation continues to provide information and support to national and EU level programmes and to cooperate and network with bodies involved with ageing issues. This also means that the expertise of the organisation is used effectively by projects which 50plus Hellas alone could not undertake as full partners, as well as via its participation as a user group. However there is a very limited cooperation with or lobbying of relevant public sector bodies or Ministries after attempts to promote a comprehensive national strategy for demographic ageing to successive Governments13 and to Greek MEPs received hardly any interest. This is not simply the result of the crisis, but the absence of appropriate institutional structure and thus problems arising from the lack of one or more civil service departments with any comprehensive powers to confront issues of and plan for demographic ageing. The crisis has simply exacerbated issues, with more people in both public and private sectors retiring early or losing their jobs in the context of a shrinking labour market and a lack of understanding of the potential of older people for the national economy and their actual contribution to Greek society14. Overall it seems that they are seen by governments as a heavy welfare burden and rarely as any kind of asset. Despite the Greek government having adopted the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing and its Regional Implementation Strategy15, this lack of understanding and antiquated approach has meant that 50plus Hellas turned increasingly towards practical actions, not only to ensure that the organization could achieve goals, but also to promote individual autonomy and help older 13

The 50plus Hellas “Position paper on Active and Healthy Ageing in Greece’’ (2013), received virtually no response. Nor have other policy documents or lobbying letters. 14 The SoFaCoDe study from Pavlidis, Chatzifilalithis, & Vivas (unpublished) conducted on cognitively and physically healthy older adults after the commencement of the financial crisis in Greece, provides clear evidence of Greek seniors’ contribution to the Greek society. 15 It was agreed upon by 159 governments (2002), but is not legally binding and its implementation is voluntary: www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/Madrid_ plan.pdf; https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/pau/RIS.pdf

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people deal with a changing society which is becoming increasingly digitalised. This helps ensure their social inclusion and ability to communicate with the society and younger generations, while also enabling them to learn free of charge at a time when they face successive, seriously reduced pensions over the crisis period. Current areas of project and policy work undertaken by 50plus Hellas This section presents selected main current activities of 50plus Hellas and demonstrates how they have been built on a foundation of preceding research work and projects. 1. Lifelong and later-life learning, ICT and inter-generational solidarity The replacement of traditional paper-and-pencil based activities by the Internet and the entry of new technologies into everyday life, fortifies inequalities in economic, cultural, social and personal domains (Helsper, 2012). This “digital divide”, “digital exclusion”, and “digital inequalities” depicts the unequal access to and distribution of digital resources. While currently older adults use the Internet less than younger individuals, the assumption is that this is a cohort effect (Friemel 2016). Nonetheless, amongst older people there are several age cohorts and some evidence shows that older adults, 80 years and over, are also low Internet users because of physical limitations such as vision, hearing, motor and dexterity impairments, and changes in cognitive abilities such as working memory, spatial cognition and attentional processes. Older people in Greece who had lower initial levels of education and low access to lifelong learning (EU, 2016) are a social group balanced between active participation in the society and social exclusion. A vision of lifelong learning, a concept extensively discussed in Europe since 1996, should play an important role in enabling people to participate in social, economic and cultural developments, yet opportunities through work or leisure have overall been limited. It is vitally important that older members of the society continue to learn, follow and participate in the social changes occurring. In times of economic crisis, lifelong learning has particular benefits for socially disadvantaged groups of people, such as older people, particularly when it promotes self organization and active participation. The value and contribution of learning is evident for the ageing process itself, keeping minds active, improving memory and health through the active pursuit of knowledge and experience (Bowling, 2008; Chaves et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2011). Lifelong learning also contributes to updating skills, whether for the labour market or for a more active use of free time, and a greater participation in the social life of the community (Jarvis, 2001; Luppi, 2009). Physical exercise, nutrition, brain training, social interaction as well as the use

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of new technologies, are some of a wide range of lifelong learning topics which can benefit and improve older people's quality of life. One of the first programmes by 50plus Hellas undertaken with older people in an Athenian community was The SEELERNETZ Project 2009-2010 (Seniors in Europe Learn in Networks), an EU Grundtvig project undertaken in five countries16. The goal was to investigate how to get older people to realise their own capabilities and capacities in taking control of their lives and improving them by participating in learning processes in social groups. Current educational processes exclude older people, many with very low rates of early education, or learning and training throughout their lives. Importantly, few programmes of lifelong-learning are connected with acquiring skills to improve the quality of life of older people, and even if they exist they are often not affordable or accessible, contributing to older people's further social exclusion at a time of rapid social and economic changes. The experiences gained led to recommendations and a handbook on the way in which seniors can better participate in learning processes and develop competencies in tackling everyday problems. Although self-organization seemed to be a good way of dealing with many issues related to the financial crisis, problems occurred after the completion of the project and the absence of the facilitator. It seems that older people in Greece are not used to taking part in such structures and they seemed to lose their self-esteem as soon as the facilitator was not present. Further research would perhaps give more explanations of the reasons these well established groups did not continue their cooperation. One such programme cannot overcome learned marginalisation and structures of inequality. An intense and positive learning experience, for 50plus Hellas as an organization and for the younger and older participants, was the Grundtvig EU co-funded Knowledge Volunteers' programme, TKV (2011-13), a lifelong learning programme implemented in Greece in the Municipality of Heraklion Attica, and later with Municipal services on the island of Tinos, with the aim of creating a network of trainers in ICT of volunteers of different ages. It created teaching tools for learning use of computers in larger groups, initially with students from the High School 'MANESIS" who were trained on how to teach IT and the use of the internet to older people. These students taught 20 pensioners from local municipal and Red Cross centres for older people, supervised by 50plus Hellas. The program benefited both "trainers" and their "trainees", activating students in voluntary work and familiarising older learners with new technologies and promoting inter-generational communication. The programme expanded in the subsequent school year, involving more schools, students and older people. 16

Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece and Romania

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The earlier participation by 50plus Hellas in these and other EU programmes 17 added to knowledge about adult education and training, and how to approach and motivate older people. This solid base helped lead to what is now the largest area of work for 50plus Hellas, called ACCESS TO THE DIGITAL WORLD programme. This seeks to introduce the use of ICT to older people, over 50 years of age. Starting modestly in 2012 with small classes in two Athens Municipalities, the programme has steadily expanded to its current scope of eleven Municipalities in the wider Athens area, many with several class groups running concurrently. Over 2500 older people have completed the free courses (June 2012 - Dec. 2016) and received their diplomas and within 2017 nearly another 5000 will become “digital”. The increasing success of the programme has eliminated any initial doubts that were discussed at the board meetings as to whether this was the direction that 50plus Hellas wanted to take as an NGO. The success of the programme came from the cooperation of 50plus Hellas with OTE Group, the largest telecommunications provider in Greece18 and implemented through its subsidiary company COSMOTE SA. As has happened in other countries, older adults 55 to 74 years of age are now the fastest growing group of Internet users in Greece, with numbers increasing drastically from 8% in 2009 to 31% in 2016 (Eurostat, 2017)19. Tutors were selected with educational experience, attending one-day training seminars delivered by two qualified Gerontologists who supervise the programme. Tutors followed the learning pace of the participants to promote knowledge acquisition through repetition, as well as to stimulate “learning by doing and by errors”. During the course, a printed guide was handed over to the participants to foster self-study at home. An innovation for Greece was the evaluation of the programme, conducted through an interventional study (pretest post-test design with random sample) regarding the perceptions, attitudes, fears, and expectations of middle-aged and older adults.20 17 PLEASE, FORAGE, MATURE were all programmes linked to aspects of lifelong and later-life learning 18 Currently Deutsche Telekom AG is the largest shareholder (40%) of the OTE group, with the Greek State holding 10%. 19 These figures compare with 53% of the age group 25-54 years in 2009, and 85% in 2016 using ICT. 20 An enriched and modified version of a test battery was applied, assessing technology readiness, technology acceptance, coping styles and resilience, self-efficacy, sociodemographic and personality characteristics, subjective physical performance, perceived barriers and attitudes towards technology etc. Among the 719 test participants, 451 individuals (mean age 64 years) filled in the extensive questionnaire

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Statistical analysis undertaken (T-tests, ANOVA) revealed statistically significant changes, with daily Internet use rising from 20.5% to 42.6% after the intervention21. The success of the project was based on the urgent need of the generations aged 50plus to participate in the digital world of today, and in these crisis years, from the commitment of a funding body to support such an initiative, as well as the accumulated expertise in 50plus Hellas. These elements were and are crucial for the continuation of the success of the initiative. Limitations occurred mostly because of bureaucratic procedures with the public sector affected by the crisis, and overcome by persons that believed in and supported the project. On the positive side, the crisis with the resulting high rates of unemployment, has meant that many well-qualified teachers are available to work in the project. The fact that the programmes are free of charge has also helped participation of older people whose pensions have been radically cut. It becomes clear that this important initiative, in light of the current difficulties of the financial crisis, serves as a counterweight to persistent social exclusion from our digitalised society experienced by older adults during the past eight difficult years. Undeniably it is a unique intervention that showcases the cognitive and psychological capabilities of older adults in Greece, with the aim of reflecting, and promoting a positive image of ageing (active ageing). before and after the twenty-four-hour training. According to the age distribution of the sample, 41.2% were aged 50-59 years, 36.8% were aged 60-69 years, and the remaining 22% were over 70 years. Among the active attendees, 73% were women and 27% men; 90.7% were retirees, and 77.1% were high-school graduates. 21 Daily searches for information on the Internet increased from 16.9% to 31.6%. Over one-third stated that: a) Internet improved their interpersonal communication with family and existing friends, and enabled them to gain new acquaintances, b) their selfefficacy and autonomy rose through the utilization of Internet, c) the development of ICT skills cultivated a sense of certainty, confidence and primary control, when facing everyday challenges, and d) they comprehended the safety issues concerning the Internet. The researchers found that 88% of participants believed the Internet offers endless opportunities to retrieve valuable information, to spend time creatively and constructively, and to participate actively in public, social and cultural life. Additionally, 87.2% thought that everyone above the age of 50 should learn to use the Internet to demonstrate active citizenship, and assure social inclusion. 88.2% asserted their preference for peer-group training, and stressed the importance of social interaction. Social support and motivation by family and social networks broke down their resistance, and influenced positively their willingness to acquire new knowledge. 78% argued that their intention to learn the use of Internet and new technologies was disassociated from the everyday obstacles imposed by the financial crisis. Finally, 75% reported that Internet use contributed positively to their psychological well-being, and reduced depression.

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2. Healthy and active ageing Focusing on improving physical, social and mental health is another area of activity for 50plus Hellas and this has led to both the initiation and expansion of the work of the volunteers' group. The formation of the volunteers' group by dynamic and committed members, one of whom had been involved in one of the first 50plus Hellas programmes on senior tourism22, started with the EU funded programme 'Active Body+ Active Mind = Healthy Senior' (2012–14). With volunteer groups from six countries23, learning was again the central concept of the programme. In Greece alone the project was presented to five different associations and more than 20 seminars given on improving well-being through a better, healthier lifestyle, including reflexology and supporting self-confidence. They also learned English and ICT and participated in cross-cultural exchanges which aided seniors to learn respect for other nations and cultures. It also aimed to help teachers improve the quality of teaching and learning in adult education. The Municipality of Ilioupolis embraced the project and more than 60 people over 50 years of age attended the classes given every two weeks for two years, benefiting from the opportunity to learn and compare diets, eating habits and lifestyles of seniors in different countries in order to find keys to health. It was a life-changing experience for many of them who had never had the opportunity to take part in a project like this, which included trips abroad, gaining knowledge of another language and culture and feeling encouraged and welcomed to participate in a European exchange. Teachers and staff members were inspired to develop their own work and create learning partnerships. It was a successful project with strong bonds of friendship developing amongst the participant countries, inspiring new lifelong learning projects. The enormous commitment and energy by the two main volunteers to the formation of volunteer support groups has been the reason for their success, though when they both moved to live in another area of Athens, the dedication of the volunteers in the original group declined and no one took this role over in the original Municipality. Thus there are very genuine problems in ensuring that volunteer groups of 50plus are supported to continue and transform such activities into sustainable projects, particularly in a time of socio-economic crisis. The popularity and success of the activities of the 'Healthy Senior' project formed the basis for its continuation in a 50plus Hellas led EU and Greek funded Lifelong Learning programme '4XF for Silver Safety' (2016-18), in collab22 23

Travel Agents: Over 55’s without frontiers 2008. Greece, Turkey, Slovakia, Portugal, Finland and Czech Republic.

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oration with partners from two other Member States24. The programme addresses every-day challenges that threaten the safety of older adults, while providing solutions with a view to empower them to cope successfully. The main goal is to help seniors take responsibility for their own safety and well-being; to stress the fact that their belief in themselves as being powerful, important and competent is the most important self-protection tool that they have. As the population of Europe ages, the need will increase for initiatives that improve quality of life for older adults and promote common European values. The 4xFs for Silver Safety stands for: Food safety, Fitness for physical safety, Focus on mental safety and Fraud, elements elaborated during the transnational meetings. The effects of the programme are noticeable in the adoption of healthier lifestyles, increasing self-esteem, confidence and sociability and the reduction of risks. It takes a holistic approach covering a wide range of everyday needs of older adults from a mental, physical and behavioural perspective. Although the target group of the project is older adults, it also invites professionals working with and on behalf of older adults in a paid or voluntary capacity (e.g. individuals who have older people in their classes or groups; run events that attract older people; work with seniors in public services, voluntary and community groups or private companies) as well as agencies and organizations that promote healthy and active ageing. The aim is to provide them with solutions in order to help seniors cope effectively and successfully with challenges that undermine their safety and well-being and helping them to face the impact of the crisis. Each partner country was expected to reach at least 500 participants through local seminars that will be organized in each partner country. 50plus Hellas has already reached 765 active members who are being invited to participate in future project activities. Participating professionals will continue to play a key role in disseminating the project's outputs, and are encouraged to use them in their own groups. The 4xF for Silver Safety Advisory Booklet, the main product of the project, will be available on-line from all partners’ websites providing guidelines for life-long safety. Again the crisis, which has affected the staffing of public services, led to bureaucratic delays in funding and the withdrawal of the Polish partner who could not cover the expenses for the first transnational meeting in Slovakia. Since its inception in September 2016, the project has been very successful, with the number of participants increasing impressively, a fact that highlights the need for such interventions. The reported feelings of insecurity amongst 24

Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia.

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older people25, arising partly from the crisis years, undoubtedly help account for the enthusiastic reception of the programme and consideration is being given on how to expand this programme to reach far more older people. 3. Human Rights and Advocacy This is a key area of concern for 50plus Hellas as ageism and social exclusion are issues for older people who tend to be vulnerable to unequal treatment. An innovative programme "Older people's knowledge of their rights as a shield against social exclusion in times of socio-economic crisis" was developed by a member of 50plus Hellas on the island of Tinos in 2009 to examine whether local older residents/citizens were aware of the concept of human rights and to discover how relevant these were in their daily lives. Older people's working groups from KAPI, KIFI and MFI service users (see below) discussed human rights and there were follow up personal interviews from KAPI members in 2017 on the effects of the current crisis on their lives and human rights. Poverty alleviation and the social integration of older people are the key aims of the Open Care Community Centres (KAPIs) run by Municipalities throughout Greece, including Tinos. Targeted at older people living independently they try to support and promote this independence. The Municipal KIFIs (Day-Care Centres) cater for older people with needs for care and support during the day, while the MFI (Elderly Care Units) provide residential care to the island's more dependent elderly26. The project aimed to answer the question whether the commonly accepted 'Rights of Older People' are understood and 'confirmed' in the eyes of older people themselves and to what extent these are fulfilled through the use of an island community's services. The responses of older inhabitants have special significance, as in addition to having to live within a circumscribed peripheral environment, which provides limited social opportunities, they also have to face their declining years coping with a general socioeconomic crisis. The first qualitative research study was conducted to obtain an in-depth picture of the knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of the older islanders about their rights. Group interviews were conducted with older service users on their rights for dignity, security/safety, independent living, privacy/existence of private space, mobility, education, information and communication ability, access to good quality health and social care and participation in social and cultural events, freedom of expression and decision making (including probate issues and death). 25

The Global Age Watch Index 2015, by Help Age International, reports the very low position of Greece in terms of safety and security. 26 In Tinos these are under the supervision of the Pan-Hellenic Holy Institution of Evangelistrias, Tinos.

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Individual interviews were conducted with service providers to give an 'organizational' perspective, to determine the extent and the ways of fulfilling the rights of the elderly, through the use of services in the island environment. The second follow-up qualitative research study conducted in early 2017 during the current time of deepening crisis, aimed to study the effects on the life of the island's elderly and to determine whether the social services were able to respond in any degree to the issues /problems that have been created by the crisis. An important finding is that the respondents, who in the majority are not highly educated, have an organized and clear picture of the coverage of their rights. Noteworthy was their highlighting of rights not covered to the extent they themselves would like. 'Our pensions have been cut radically and we have fallen into deep despair'. 'The poverty of pensioners has turned into misery, since we can no longer offer financial help to our children and grandchildren'. With regard to the second survey, as a feedback and continuation of the first, group interviews focused on the economic and social crisis of Greece, the influence on their rights as well as the means they exploit or the methods they apply to cope with it. As a counterweight to the economic crisis, the older people emphasised the importance of a resilient social fabric and 'the given traditional Greek ethical principles', which have begun, however, over the years, to be 'destroyed'. 'I'm talking about Greece ... because ... for us here on the island, if there was no social crisis, we'd manage to deal with the issue of the economic crisis. Instead, people blame everything on the economic crisis, which isn't necessarily the case'. '... previously there was the family, while in the last few years there is only egoism … each one considers himself as a single unit! Individualism! We only care about our own selves'. Interestingly, there were no observed differences between the responses of older people in the three different social facilities despite differences in age distribution and general health status. Specifically, participants from the KAPI were "older people of the 3rd age" (60-74), ambulatory, active and generally independent, whilst in the KIFI and MFI, participants are mainly "fourth age elderly '(75+), with long medical histories and needs for care. The right to work was linked with intergenerational solidarity. 'Worst of all is the division that has come between the generations, since now even 50-year-olds are considered old people unsuitable for work. It's very racist (ageist). On the other hand, there is a big exploitation of young people (low pay

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and long hours)'. 'We have to fight economic depression, we have to fight for our children; we who have lived through bad times have to show them optimism and courage.......even false optimism if necessary'. The Third Age islanders wanted to live with dignity, and expressed few demands. However, they did want to enjoy social benefits and policies of equivalence to those of other developed countries. Reference was made to the right to participate in social and cultural events and education. As the study clearly indicated, the right to education for older people is intertwined with that of participation in social and cultural events, the latter being thoroughly enjoyed by the elderly of Tinos in their daily life, who take advantage of all opportunities. The island's older service users expect to be given possibilities and opportunities for education together with their peers. Although education is not seen by the majority of older people in the same way as the claiming of other rights, it is considered by some as an excellent means of self-improvement and communication. 'Education also comes through conversation with others, it opens your mind and you see what the other person thinks about the problems that we all end up experiencing.' Specifically, lifelong learning, as experienced by the elderly, is regarded as "a chance to prove the strength of the human spirit." The very positive outcomes of engaging older people in the context of informal education is recognized as "brain training", as well as the increased "vitality" that results from the educational activity. In this phase of life, the "I want" of the elderly relates to supportive help and companionship ('I was cold and alone….I went out, I got soaked, but …..I needed company') but with a parallel emphasis on 'I don't want someone else to be in charge of my life' explaining the independence they seek to retain in certain areas. Scope for action on the two aforementioned Human Rights was undertaken in the KAPI through intergenerational solidarity activities. In general, intergenerational 'give and take' within the community promotes and consolidates, to a considerable extent a better quality of life for the members involved (children, adolescents, adults, elderly), with their various individual and group differences in each generation. Focusing on the 3rd age and above, seniors are often fertile ground for cultivating intergenerational actions and bringing through their own unique approach a direct positive effect on all residents of a community. On the island of Tinos, a few KAPI members conducted a 'Discussion and Communication' group, acting as a connecting link to other generations of the island, giving

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and receiving multifaceted benefits. This group action in the community emerged in the last three years after the members' wish to come into contact with the students of the island to discuss various issues. It was implemented successfully in various actions included working with children and adolescents in the re-iteration of fairy tales, traffic education courses and teaching new etechnologies, the latter in collaboration with the NGO 50plus Hellas through the European program 'The Knowledge Volunteers'. 'I have come to understand that we both give and receive love and support….in the classes that we are going to, we have seen that both the children and the teachers of the Primary School, take something from us, but also they give to us, so that we leave from there feeling fulfilled ... '. 'Is it the lessons, is it the advice, is it only our presence? I don't know, but I see in their eyes, in their behaviour, something is happening. And we in turn, since we don't have our grandchildren nearby, we are happy and we forget ourselves with them. ' 'Of course we give something, we offer joy and optimism to the other generations!' At another level of intergenerational solidarity, systematic visits to the Elderly Care Unit (MFI) are organised, where different generations of older people, exchange memories, experiences and opinions. 'In the Elderly Care Unit we leave our own sadness at home and then take their sadness away with us, so that in the end we give and take happiness.' Finally, the participation of the responsible service providers revealed the need for multifaceted interdisciplinary interventions in the design and implementation of social policy so that older people can be helped to enjoy their rights to the full, regardless of their place of residence. The conclusion is that living in a small island community and giving space to active seniors, provides numerous and significant inter-generational benefits. In the 'give and take' of the elderly with other generations there is a remarkable willingness to exchange knowledge, experiences, feelings and mutual support. The resilience and optimism of so many older Greeks in facing the difficulties of the crisis is reflected in these responses from the Tinos islanders and their profound understanding of human rights in old age. The social inclusion of older people without discrimination was also the focus of another programme concerned with the civic participation of older people through activation and self organization. This was the main objective of the Active Senior Citizens for Europe (ASCE) programme (2013-14)27, coordinated by 27

ASCE http://www.age-platform.eu/project/active-senior-citizens-europe-asce

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AGE Platform Europe and funded in Greece by the EU and the Open Society Foundation. The project aimed to inform older individuals about the policy making process that takes place within the EU. The underlying goal was to educate older people about their role in the policy making processes, and actions they can take in order to influence EU decision making processes. It aimed to contribute to the development of a sense of belonging to the common European ideals among older citizens, and the sense of them being able to influence decisions that shape their everyday social conditions. Ultimately the project aimed to encourage older adults to become active citizens and participate in the social dialogue at European level. The consortium partners, from eight member states28, developed a useful guide29 that describes the main governing bodies of the EU, the EU legal framework and political context, the EU actions to promote older people rights, as well as the decision making processes within the EU. Each partner delivered workshops describing these topics, inviting Members of the European Parliament to the event to state their position on older persons’ rights within the EU. The project offered a complete set of tools (i.e. guides, PowerPoint slides, brochures) ready for use by anyone wishing to organize seminars or events on this topic, targeting older citizens directly, as well as key individuals able to serve as “multipliers” e.g. social care workers, members of senior associations, and educators. The ASCE project in Greece was realized in a period of extreme social and political turmoil. Older pensioners were experiencing heavy pay cuts in their pensions, while their health benefits and access to health care were reduced significantly. These actions were part of the adjustment programs and reforms imposed by several Memorandums of Understanding signed between the Greek Governments and the Troika. Unfortunately, older adults felt that the EU had enforced these reforms with their many negative effects on their lives, and as a consequence they felt they were treated as less equal members of the EU and disempowered to influence political decisions in this context. As such, the implementation of the ASCE project in Greece was rather challenging. The results showed that there was no great awareness about the structure and the operation of the EU among older individuals, or those working in relevant governing bodies and supportive organizations and most seemed to be unaware that a political agenda for civil or human rights referring specifically to older individuals exists, and that they could have an active role in this. In the midst of the financial crisis, senior citizens in Greece did not seem to feel empowered to influence policy making decisions, nor have a sense of ownership of the EU. It was con28 29

Italy, Slovenia, Belgium, Slovakia, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Bulgaria. In a short version (in English) and in an extended form (in eight languages)

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cluded that similar actions need to take place in the future in order to promote older adults’ willingness to lobby and have their voice heard. A specific issue of concern to an NGO like 50plus Hellas committed to advocating for older people's issues, is the promotion of good quality long-term care and the prevention of elder abuse. Both have been main areas of work through the DAPHNE-EUSTACEA and WeDO projects all concerned with combating elder abuse and improving quality standards in care. In the 'DAPHNE-EUSTACEA' project (A European Strategy to Combat Elder Abuse, 2008-10)30 the target groups were older people in need of long-term care and assistance, their informal and formal carers and managers of services for older people. Under the co-ordination of AGE Platform, 11 partner organizations worked together on a project aiming to create ‘’A European Strategy to Combat Elder Abuse’’, which concerned the development of a common “European Charter of the Rights and Responsibilities of Older People in need of Long-term Care and Assistance”, written from the perspective of older people themselves in 13 languages. It also developed an Accompanying Guide or ‘tool-kit’ addressing each of the rights expressed in the Charter, explaining what they concretely mean and how they can be enforced. The subsequent WeDO European partnership on the Well-being and Dignity of Older People31 (2010-12), aimed at creating a lasting and growing partnership of organisations based on the EUSTACEA collaboration, committed to improving the well-being and dignity of older people. It established an informal network of organizations aiming to promote quality long-term care services in Europe, the 'WeDO partnership'. Using the Charter, WeDO organised national working groups to promote activities at national level, including training sessions on the prevention of abuse and the development of methods of better supporting actions against elder abuse. WeDO 2 (2013-2015), financed by the learning partnership, developed a Quality Framework for Long-term Care Services and a care training package in ten languages32, all of which were distributed and taken forward under the leadership of the Hellenic Gerontological and Geriatric Association, a member of the Greek WeDo network. The Charter33 and its Accompanying Guide34 were widely distributed in Greek in paper and electronic forms and certainly increased awareness of the issue of abuse, whether in the privacy of private homes or residential care. 30

http://www.age-platform.eu/project/daphne-eustacea Financed by DG Employment and Social affairs and the EC Life long Learning Programme Grundtvig 32 http://wedo.tttp.eu 33 www.age-platform.eu/images/stories/22204_AGE_charte_europeenne_ELv3.pdf 34 www.age-platform.eu/images/stories/22495_guide_accompagnement_EL_low.pdf 31

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The Greek WeDo network of approximately 17 bodies continued long after the end of the programme and remains a residual network where different partners periodically meet and cooperate. The good will and common purposes developed in the network were experienced as an enormously positive outcome in a context where the government had and has no public policies or actions to support long term care, confront abuse or help carers or older people. The financial pressures on all organizations, which obviously worsened with the crisis, means they cannot devote significant time and resources to lobbying on the issue of abuse, while the critical lack of government policy or policy makers constantly limit the way in which the valuable outcomes of these programmes have been used. However, there are currently some attempts to implement actions against abuse, including efforts at cooperation with the Ministry of Health to see how to help health professionals working in Primary Health Care to be aware and deal with abuse. 50plus Hellas was asked by a Greek private company, CMT PROOPTIKI, to give its expertise in another EU programme35 related to long term care. This was the INTERLINKS: Health systems and long-term care for older people in Europe36 project (2008-11) that concerned methods of improving the planning and delivery of long-term care services and addressed older people with care needs and their family carers, management and health and social care service providers, policy makers and relevant NGOs. In Greece, where the issue of long-term care has never been officially addressed, informal carers, predominantly family members, undertake the main burden of care for their sick and disabled relatives with minimal support services and no state recognition of their role, a situation reflected in many other member states. A consortium of 18 partners from 14 EU member states, the project developed an interactive Framework for long-term care based on an examination of how the different types of care for older people, both formal and informal, can be coordinated and managed to improve person-centred, good quality care. Reports variously discussed the interfaces between formal and informal care, and between health and social care; and the integration of prevention and rehabilitation in LTC; on the major issues of governance and financing and finally on quality assurance and management. The Greek team particularly focused on how informal, family carers can be supported to provide good quality care without damage to their own physical, mental and social health. Information from this report has been utilised by the 35

European Commission, Seventh Framework Programme, Grant no. 223037, and supported by the Austrian Ministry of Science 36 http://interlinks.euro.centre.org/project

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Athens University Department of Nursing and the Alzheimer Associations to construct training programmes to support family carers and help in the formulation of a National Alzheimer Plan. However, there has been no attempt at national level to recognise and address the increasingly urgent problems of longterm care and informal carers, as also underlined above in the WeDO project. The conclusion from all these activities is that participation in EU projects needs to be supported by an adequate national infrastructure in order to link and utilise the main findings for the benefit of the civil society. The relative flexibility of NGOs can be used to implement some of these findings more quickly and effectively, so they may play an important short term role in changing practices, but in turn this needs government commitment to become sustainable. 4. Policy initiatives Policy work by 50plus Hellas is mainly done in the Greek context through the many programmes and projects described above, covering a range of issues from human rights age discrimination and ageism, to poverty and social exclusion. Though attempts were made to discuss the policy implications at national level, there have been consistent difficulties in contacting relevant Government Officials or identifying MPs and MEPs with sustained or informed interest in ageing issues. In the EU context policy work occurs mainly through 50plus Hellas' participation in AGE-Platform Europe thematic Task Forces and the AGE Platform Council. The NGO undertakes essential work in the preparation of policy proposals, statements, declarations or reports and position papers37 38. Proposals on demographic ageing place emphasis on the implications of the economic and humanitarian crisis particularly for those member states mostly affected by the crisis. In line with AGE strategy, policy objectives focus, among others, on monitoring and influencing relevant EU socio-economic policies and promoting age-friendly environments at grass-root level to support active and healthy ageing. Another major objective is to improve understanding and knowledge of older people’s needs and expectations and the challenges they face in enjoying their rights. Policy responses primarily address the European level, though supplemented by country specific recommendations gathered directly from national member or37

For example, a) Toward a better recognition of and respect for older people’s rights in the EU, AGE General Assembly 2015 Declaration, b) ‘EU Strategy on Demographic Change – Embrace the potential of Europe’s ageing population’ AGE General Assembly 2014 Declaration 38 In consultation on pension issues with AGSSE (General Co-federation of Pensioners in Greece)

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ganizations including 50plus Hellas for Greece. These are prepared in the context of the European Semester framework in line with the objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy, strengthened recently by the European Pillar of Social Rights39 objectives supporting economic recovery and inclusive growth. Nevertheless, under the terms of the rolling EU/IMF Economic Adjustment programmes (MoUs) initiated in 2010, Greece has experienced an unprecedented process of structural reforms, most notably in the recent period. Although economic and social security reforms were long overdue, the rapidity of these changes focusing primarily on fiscal targets did not allow for a proper planning process. In order to avoid duplication with ongoing reforms, Greece is implementing its commitments in the context of the MoUs with its more extensive monitoring requirements under this programme that aims to restore macro-financial stability, growth and competitiveness40. The annual national reform programmes are not assessed separately since currently there is no obligation for their submission and therefore Greece does not receive additional country-specific recommendations in the framework of the European Semester. In this context, policy responses to the social impact of the crisis have often been misguided, inadequate or both. Welfare reform did produce some improvements, but most cuts were horizontal, causing hardship and disrupting health and social services rather than being specifically aimed at improving efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and transparency. 50plus Hellas proposed a cross cutting National Action Plan for Healthy and Active Ageing in Greece in 2013, including specific policy proposals and a unified single implementation mechanism. This was submitted successively to several competent Greek Authorities/ Ministries, informed Greek MEPs and a National Parliament Committee conference and posted in our website. Suggested policy proposals although much welcomed by a few officials, have received little attention in the public debate and the follow up to specific policy actions. 39

Communication on Establishing a European Pillar of Social Rights, COM (2017) 250 final, 26.4.2017 40 The Economic Adjustment programme for Greece (2015) places emphasis on strengthening the welfare system and improving social safety nets. In this, key actions include the development of a guaranteed minimum income scheme in 2014 with its pilot phase applied so far. On its implementation, the scheme ran only for 13 municipalities (one for each of the 13 Greek regions) and targeted individuals and families in extreme poverty. (NRP, April 2016). The programme has been amended and its complete roll out is expected in 2017 on the basis of the experience and the lessons learned from the pilot phase. Nevertheless taken into account the budgetary constraints this programme should aim at specific target groups such as children and older people in extreme poverty for the country as a whole.

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5. Other activities The scientific expertise of 50plus Hellas is increasingly called upon and the members seek to support the framework and objectives of the NGO through participation in research and collaborative projects, as expert advisers, co-partners, in user groups etc. A recent project is the Greek e-library on Gerontology and Geriatrics. The considerable research experience amongst 50plus members led to the development of a small library on the 50plus Hellas web site41 listing research and reports where there was participation by 50plus members. The need to develop the section to include research and work by others concerned with healthy active ageing in Greece, led to a successful application to the TIMA Foundation for funding of an e-library, under the auspices of the Hellenic Association for Gerontology and Geriatrics (HAGG), which is currently under development (Nov 2016 - Nov 2017). Age-friendly Healthy Cities: In line with work by AGE Platform Europe as well as WHO, 50plus Hellas as a member of AGE wanted to support work that would make Greek cities far more age friendly. The lack of resources or substantive links to the many Greek Local Authorities led to a decision to try and work with the Greek WHO Healthy Cities Network42. Invited contributions and attendance at meetings of the Network helped activate a sub group concerned with ageing issues. Again the limited resources of most local authorities means that the transfer of ideas and their implementation is a complex business where, however, a small NGO can be a catalyst for action. Concluding remarks Against this background of an ageing population, Greece through its policy makers, social partners, civil society organizations and individuals, needs to take concrete steps to meet the ever growing challenges of alleviating both the effects of the crisis and demographic ageing, by improving the long term health and well-being of older people. Long term health and welfare costs, the strain on human and financial resources for the care of the most vulnerable, and restrictions on health and social care budgets make it essential for all bodies and stakeholders to be involved in developing ageing policies, actions and programmes. However, as a civil society organization, limited resources and a lack of public funds for projects have been and will continue to be a major obstacle for developing the activities of 50plus Hellas. 41

https://www.50plus.gr/πληροφόρηση/βιβλιοθήκη http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/environment-and-health/urban-health/activities/healthy-cities 42

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The Policy and project work carried out by 50plus Hellas provides some examples of activities to support active, healthy ageing and supportive policies for those in need through frailty and poor health. The issue remains as to how civil society can be more effective in informing and influencing national stakeholders. Cooperation with European stakeholders facing the same or similar challenges of demographic change and limited budgets can be one road towards providing better conditions for improving the health, well being and welfare of older people. Currently we are not performing well in Greece with the Active Ageing Index43 ranking Greece the lowest amongst 28 EU countries; while the Help the Aged Global AgeWatch Index sees Greece also ranked the lowest amongst EU Member States and 79th out of 96 participating countries. Budgetary constraints will continue to restrict activity in the social field in the coming years and this will underline the necessity for smart, evidence based policy reforms to enable exit from the fiscal trap and the provision of better health and social care. This sad situation has to be understood more widely and older people have to become more active in defence of their own interests and needs by undertaking specific projects related to human rights, awareness raising, information, training, new technologies, cultural activities, social integration. A weak and fragmented civil society before the crisis has started to become a more organised civil society, recognizing the need to protect human rights, including rights to pensions, health care and social assistance. However, the voices of older citizens through the informal non-profit organizations are rarely heard before any relevant policy measures become final. The role of civil society needs to be upgraded by a coordinated structured dialogue recognizing its potential to improve social welfare of older generations, particularly those hard hit by the economic crisis. The importance of using the potential of older people in efforts to reach the goals of alleviating the impact of the crisis should be recognized, promoting a sustainable welfare state and supporting an inclusive growth. Volunteering in Greece is still underdeveloped, but full of potential as this chapter shows. Opportunities arise from EU policies and programmes or from various philanthropic organisations and social welfare foundations or age friendly companies which promote and support volunteering, have in recent years been received with enthusiasm in Greece particularly when facing problems associated with social welfare needs and a humanitarian crisis for many older people. However, funding of volunteering activities remains very limited, with often unclear criteria for selection. To maximise results it is essential to en43

http://www1.unece.org/stat/platform/display/AAI/VII.+About+the+project

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sure closer collaboration with all national NGOs in the field, learning from the ongoing experiences of the various volunteer and network bodies including the National Network of Healthy Cities. The work of empowering older people, working against ageism and creating positive images and attitudes to ageing cannot be simply implemented and yet is crucial to improving their health and well being. Furthermore, changes in attitudes amongst Greek older people, as well as politicians and policy makers, although very slow to occur are essential prerequisites in order to effectively influence the process of government and policy making. Against the background of an ageing population Greece needs to take concrete steps for meeting the growing challenges to alleviate the effects of the crisis and improve the long term well-being of older people. References Bank of Greece: Annual Report for 2015, pp 74-79, Feb. 2016 and Economic Bulletin Issue 43, pp33-58, July 2016 (in Greek) Bień B, McKee K, Döhner H, Triantafillou J, Lamura G, Doroszkiewicz H, Krevers B, Kofahl C. (2013) Disabled older people’s use of health and social care services and their unmet care needs in six European countries Eur J Public Health first published online January 18, 2013 Bowling, A. (2008) Enhancing later life: how older people perceive active aging? Aging and Mental Health, 12(3), p.293-301. Chaves, M.L., Camozzato, A.L., Eizirik, C.L. and Kaye, J. (2009) Predictors of normal and successful aging among urban-dwelling elderly Brazilians. The Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 64(5), p.597-602. Economou, C., Kaitelidou, D., Katsikas, D., Siskou, O. and Zafiropoulou, M. (2016) Impacts of the economic crisis on access to healthcare services in Greece with a focus on the vulnerable groups of the population. Social Cohesion and Development, 9(2), p. 99-115. Eurostat statistics explained. EU 2016 : http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Educational_attainment_statistics Friemel, T. N. (2016) The digital divide has grown old: Determinants of a digital divide among seniors. new media & society, 18(2), p. 313-331. Hellenic Republic, Hellenic Statistical Authority Press Release 03/07/2015 Life & Health Expectancy 2012 http://www.statistics.gr/documents/20181/986589/Health+Expectancy/c7e547e1-6ab34f90-914f-8e87a5feb418?version=1.0 Helsper, E. J. (2012) A corresponding fields model for the links between social and digital exclusion. Communication Theory, 22, p. 403–426.

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Jarvis, C. (2001) Travellers' tales: From adult education to lifelong learning and beyond: Proceedings of the 31st annual conference of SCUTREA. Studies in the Education of Adults, 33(2), p.95-99. Lee, P.L., Lan, W. and Yen, T.W. (2011) Aging successfully: A four-factor model. Educational Gerontology, 37(3), p.210-227. Luppi, E. (2009) Education in old age: An exploratory study. International Journal of Lifelong Education, 28(2), p.241-276. Pavlidis G, Chatzifilalithis S & Vivas B (2017) (unpublished). Cognitively healthy seniors’ social participation in Greece: Evidence from the SoFa Code study. Petmesidou M, Pavolini E & Guillén A-M (2014) South European Healthcare Systems under Harsh Austerity: A Progress–Regression Mix?, South European Society and Politics, 19:3, 331-352, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2014.949994 Petmesidou M (2012) ASISP Annual National Report for Greece: Pensions, Health Care and Long-term Care http://www.socialprotection.eu/files_db/1224/asisp_ANR12_Greece.pdf Simiti M (2015), ‘Social Need’ or ‘Choice’? Greek Civil Society during the Economic Crisis, GreeSE Paper No.95, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe and LSE.

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ANNEX I 50plus Hellas: Position Paper and Proposals for Active and Healthy Aging in Greece (2013, partly revised 2015) SUMMARY VERSION – Greek to English translation without Annexes, data sources, tables and bibliography INTRODUCTION The lack of a comprehensive National Action Plan to address the intersectoral consequences of aging in Greece is an incentive for 50plus Hellas (http://www.50plus.gr) to formulate specific policy proposals. These are the most important and urgent issues that need to be tackled with the right policy mix in a coordinated and effective way by the state. For the preparation of the National Action Plan, a single mechanism should be established with the assistance of the competent Ministries and bodies. In the context of the European Semester for Europe 2020, national governments should have and must organize and engage in a dialogue with representatives of civil society – non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – in the preparation of National Reform Programmes and National Social Reports. To this end, 50plus Hellas sent letters and the position paper in 2013 to the competent Ministries (Finance, Health, Labor) and again to Ministry of Health in 2015 and informed Greek MEPs, without any response. However, we look forward to developing constructive consultation in the future with the national authorities in charge of drawing up and implementing national programs. It should be also noted that 50plus Hellas, as an active member of the European Network AGE Platform Europe (http://www.age-platform.eu/en), deals with the process of dialogue at the level of the European Union as well as with issues of older people's rights. This report summarizes the positions of 50plus Hellas in four critical thematic units that are directly related to the aging of the population: • • • •

Health and Integrated Long-term Care Poverty, Pensions and Social Security Employment Lifelong Learning

In all of these thematic units we focus on cross-sectoral issues addressing inequalities and accessibility for older people, especially in the health and long-term care sector, a crucial issue for which no reference is made in the National Reform Programmes 2012 -2015 or Country Specific Recommendations 2012. For each subject, we present: • • •

The Positions and Goals of 50plus Hellas The Basic Challenges and The Proposed Policy Measures.

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We attach great importance to proposals to improve healthy aging and prevent dependence, as well as addressing the needs of vulnerable groups such as older people with needs for long-term care. Employability, longer working lives and upgrading skills are important issues directly related to active aging. Recognizing at the same time the budgetary constraints faced by the country, we note that several of the proposals have no extra cost. When funds are required, we emphasize the need for better mobilization of available resources, in particular the Structural Funds, including the European Social Fund, for the programming period 2014-20. In summary we stress the urgent need for the planning and implementation of a National Action Plan for Demographic Ageing in Greece, aimed at improving the quality of life of older Greeks and their families and with specific objectives as follow:

• Improvements in health status. • Better quality of health care and integrated long-term care. • Improvements in employment and wages, ensuring a better standard of living and • • •

the sustainability of the insurance and pension systems for present and future generations. Fight poverty by increasing the employability of older workers and their retention in the labour market. Promotion of life-long learning and training for the active inclusion and social contribution of older people. Optimal use of resources.

SECTION 1: HEALTH AND INTEGRATED LONG-TERM CARE 1.1 THE POSITION OF 50plus HELLAS Objective 1: Promote healthy and active ageing with the aim of maintaining autonomy as long as possible and increasing healthy life years (HLY). Objective 2: Ensure support and care for non-self sufficient older people, with the aim of integrating informal and formal care in a shared provision of long-term care. Even at this time of cutbacks on pensions, health and welfare services, it is critical for government policies to consider the current and future needs of older people for health and long term care. The proposals below suggest actions needed at national, regional and local levels with the aim of improving the quality of life of older citizens and their carers, reducing abuse, improving health status, developing a long-term care system and ensuring that health and care systems are socially and economically viable. 1.2 BASIC CHALLENGES It is vital for national policies to look at the current and future needs of the elderly for their well-being and long-term care, especially in the current crisis, which is characterized by cuts in pensions, health and social services. Given that age alone is not the causal factor for health care costs but the actual health status of the older population,

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demographic aging will inevitably continue to exert pressure to increase public health spending in order to ensure healthy aging conditions. The following proposals outline policy actions that need to be urgently promoted at national, regional and local level, with the following objectives:

• To improve the quality of life of both the frail elderly and their caregivers, • Improving their health status; and • Promoting the effective use of health resources. At the same time, policies need to contribute to the development of an integrated longterm care system and to ensuring the necessary conditions for health and care systems to be socially and economically viable. In order to shape the economic budget for integrated long-term care services, consideration should be given to the possibility of co-financing from the Structural Funds. 1.3 PROPOSED POLICY MEASURES Healthy ageing •

Primary health care (PHC): Broaden the role of the National Organisation of Primary Health Services (EOPYY) and improve efficiency, quality, fairness and easier access to free-to-user public medical services e.g. through primary health care teams within Health Centres and Open Care Centres for Older People (KAPIs) and the use of appropriate e-health technologies.

•

Focus on health promotion, disease prevention and rehabilitation programmes at local level to reduce disability and increase healthy life years. Provide information on the diseases related to ageing and known methods of prevention at Primary Health Care Centres (PHC), as well as information on local facilities concerned with prevention and maintaining good health.

•

Invest in ICT systems for home care specifically for those with chronic conditions in order to improve the quality of life and care for older patients, reduce emergency hospital admissions, serve those in harder to reach areas and reduce costs for the health system and patients.

•

Develop monitoring and control mechanisms of illegal remuneration practices by public sector doctors to effectively face the problem of informal (under-the-table) payments, which increase the real cost of health care for older people.

Long-term care •

• •

Develop a comprehensive national long-term care policy that would link informal (mainly family) and formal (professional) care providers in a shared provision of care for older people. Provide information on the services available and the rights of older people through Citizens' Advice Centres (KEPs) and the forthcoming e-library. Establish one-stop agencies at the local level as single entry points into the social care and welfare system.

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Local authorities should be encouraged to coordinate and develop partnership networks of service providers (public, private, NGOs) involved in care of older people, with pooled budgets to better use resources for developing integrated health and social care packages. Acknowledge up to two years of care work for older or disabled relatives, credited for social insurance requirements, to ensure family carers do not end up uninsured, and with inadequate pension coverage later in their life.

• Plan for the development of more services with comprehensive coverage, outreach services and 24-hour coverage throughout Greece that will be responsive to the needs of dependent older people and family carers.

•

Develop at local level respite care for programmed holidays and emergencies for family carers, targeting those caring for older people with behavioural problems and support for working carers and considering methods of offering social credit for voluntary work provided to carers

• Begin the process of ensuring social and health services work in an integrated man•

ner as partners to provide real quality help to family carers. Make care work more attractive by developing training and certification for both formal and informal care workers, including migrant care workers.

• Encourage the reorganization of assessment processes for disability benefits and •

pensions. Comprehensive needs assessment is essential for correct resource distribution and service allocation. Develop systematic quality evaluation and monitoring of services in order to improve their efficiency and cost effectiveness, as well as patient satisfaction.

SECTION 2: POVERTY, PENSIONS AND SOCIAL SECURITY 2.1 THE POSITION OF 50plus HELLAS Objective 1: Ensure the sustainability of insurance and pension systems for present and future generations. Objective 2: Address the poverty of older people whose situation has worsened with the crisis. 2.2 BASIC CHALLENGES Reducing the risk of poverty is a key objective of the Europe 2020 strategy. However, the current economic crisis and the resulting restructuring and reduction in budget spending have led to a significant increase in poverty for certain population groups. It is also noted that both the increase in wealth over the last 30 years and the recent cuts in social support have not been equally distributed throughout Greek society. The rise in socio-economic inequalities has led a larger proportion of the population into poverty, including a large proportion of retirees, especially older people. Population

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groups such as those with a small pension, long-term unemployed, low-wage earners over fifty, senior citizens with chronic health problems and their families are more severely affected by the austerity measures. They therefore need particular attention in the context of an integrated approach for third and fourth ages. Very often those with the least opportunities in life or less access to adequate education and good jobs continue to experience social exclusion until the end of their lives. In the view of the International Labor Organization (ILO), the widespread sense of social injustice in the imposition of austerity measures requires the government to take measures to increase contributions by the most favoured participants to the efforts of the country - banks, companies, industries, civil and religious organizations and other bodies that can and should contribute to the welfare system through taxation and contributions due. The non-viability and inequalities of pension systems and social funds and the need to address pension challenges and poverty are very important issues for current government policy and reforms. In this context, we would like to highlight some of the demographic changes and their implications for public policy and social justice in present and future generations of older people. 2.3 PROPOSED POLICY MEASURES •

Disparities in pensions remains an important issue that needs to be addressed to ensure social justice for present and future generations.

•

Recognizing the redistributive nature of the basic public pension systems (first pillar), the logic and basic structure of the first and second pillars as well as the cost and funding of pension systems should be made clear to every household in Greece. In particular, the high cost of early retirement should be highlighted for both the public and the private sector.

•

Encouraging increased employability and remaining longer in the labor market are crucial for the sustainability of pension funds and the State Budget.

• The Social Solidarity Allowance for Pensioners (EKAS) remains a critical policy tool for the survival of older retired people living on basic pensions. •

Poverty is not just about low income but also limited access to services and goods. Although it is not the only cause of social exclusion, access to education, training, health and prevention services are very important elements that can be used by governments to assess poverty inequalities.

•

According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) comments (2013), it is important, for reasons of social justice, for the government to ensure that individuals, institutions and businesses in a relatively better financial situation fully play their role in paying taxes and social security insurance contributions.

• At a time of significantly low wages and incomes, it is necessary for pensions to be calculated not only on the basis of the average income, but also to take into account the basic standard of living.

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SECTION 3: EMPLOYMENT 3.1 THE POSITION OF 50plus HELLAS Objective 1: Empowering and prolonging participation in the labor market are key contributors to the sustainability of the pension system, combating poverty and improving living standards. Objective 2: Ensuring appropriate structures to stimulate employment and remove inequalities in the labor market, raising awareness of changing stereotypes, assessing policies affecting older people to strengthen access to the labor market and improve the quality of working life. 3.2 BASIC CHALLENGES Demographic and socio-economic developments and the challenges facing older people in our country highlight the need to develop an integrated and coherent active aging strategy, guided by the Europe 2020 strategy and an appropriate policy mix. 50plus Hellas wants to contribute to this effort by proposing policy measures to stimulate the employment of older people, as well as younger people. In order to implement this strategy, the necessary resources must be ensured through the Structural Funds, in particular the European Social Fund. The low level of employability of older people, the early exit from the labor market, the large human capital gap between younger and older workers and the limited upgrading of their skills highlight the need to modernize and adequately specialize employment policies to meet the challenges of the demographic aging of the country's population, exit from the crisis and sustainable development. Key obstacles for older workers are: •

The increased difficulties of access to employment opportunities and particularly their reintegration into the labor market, either because they are long-term unemployed, or because they have lost their jobs a few years before retirement, or because they have to provide informal care to vulnerable family members, due to lack of alternative long-term care services.

•

Limited participation in education and training programs.

Limited opportunities for start-ups, especially for women, who may have considerable experience, but generally have a low level of education and poor access to capital. Establishing and achieving national employment targets, not only globally, but also by age and gender, is crucial to ensuring a sustainable pension system as well as a sustainable health and care system. •

The policy measures taken and presented in the NRP 2012 were geared to addressing the need for fiscal adjustment of the economy and secondarily to achieving national employment targets or effectively addressing rising unemployment and avoiding early retirement. The measures are, as a rule, of a horizontal nature, with no clear specificities, both for supporting workers, the human potential of older population

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groups and for combating poverty and ensuring a decent living in old age. The active involvement and contribution of the social partners and actors representing civil society in shaping and effectively implementing an integrated strategy for active aging is a major untapped resource in getting out of the crisis. The following policy measures are designed to address the challenges of older people in Greece. 3.3 PROPOSED POLICY MEASURES Job Offers •

Improving employability. Enhancing access to vocational training and career development by setting specific quantitative targets for people aged 45+.

•

Maintaining the ability to work by upgrading workers' skills within the enterprise and improving their opportunities for advancement.

•

Development and implementation of specific programs for the training of employees on targeted ICT issues, which are essential for working life and valuable knowledge for later life.

•

Improving quality of work (new specializations, modernization / organization of work), promoting gender equality in working life.

Early Exit from the Labor Market

•

Enhancement of disincentives - coupled with gradual elimination of early retirement in both the private and public sectors.

•

Provide financial and non-financial incentives to extend working life, such as appropriate additional fees and approaches to knowledge management, arrangements for transferring knowledge / experience between younger and older workers within the enterprise.

Removing Obstacles •

Removing disincentives to work. Expanding individual choices in terms of working life. The social partners must encourage and support businesses to develop initiatives for a more attractive work environment and therefore for a better working life.

•

Changing stereotypes and attitudes. Actions to combat discrimination (age, sex) and management of active aging in the workplace (special programs, information campaigns, transfer of good practices, etc.). Addressing youth unemployment without interlinking with early retirement or related schemes.

Job Demand

•

Provide incentives to older workers to extend their stay in employment, also taking advantage of the possibilities of flexible forms of employment - such as part-time, teleworking, intra-business mobility, also taking into account technological change from manual to non-manual occupations / specializations.

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•

Provision of personalized employment services for older people with the support of infrastructure and specialized personnel of the competent bodies (OAED) as well as support of Private Employment Services (Ν4052 / 2012).

• •

Improvement of working, hygiene and safety conditions.

•

Evaluate policy measures for their impact on age management at regular intervals and take measures to remove their negative consequences.

•

Harmonization of retirement practices between the private and public sectors.

Support small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to implement staff management policies that reflect the age structure of their employees, take into account demographic developments and take advantage of good practices. Institutional Issues

SECTION 4: LIFELONG LEARNING 4.1 THE POSITION OF 50plus HELLAS Objective 1: The promotion of lifelong learning (including training) is a key prerequisite for adapting to the knowledge and information society and the active participation and contribution of older people in society (employment, volunteering, etc.) and improving the quality of life. Objective 2: Ensuring effective access and the creation of training structures and programs of lifelong learning to older people results in a lesser burden on health and welfare systems and contributes to strengthening intergenerational relationships. 4.2 BASIC CHALLENGES The increasing population of over 50 year olds, early retirement and the non-use of the knowledge and experience of these age groups, combined with the lack of training programs, results in the marginalization and exclusion of substantive human resources and their potential contribution to society. The European Commission clearly states the importance of lifelong learning and training and urges all governments to prioritize these issues. 50plus Hellas argues that training and lifelong learning for people over 50 has not received due attention by Greek governments. Very small percentages of European funding have been absorbed in lifelong learning actions and programs in recent years, with very limited budgets for people over 50. No organization to date considers this age group to provide an excellent learning target. 50plus Hellas closely monitors developments in Greece and the EU and contributes with its lifelong learning actions and programs to the participation of older people in Greek society. Below are suggestions for improving lifelong learning and training in Greece.

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4.3 PROPOSED POLICY MEASURES Supporting active aging and the social participation of older age groups requires that all national and local governments place some emphasis on this area. Our suggestions:

•

Ensure a minimum percentage of the national budget for training and lifelong learning for people over 45.

•

Create a network of all active lifelong learning stakeholders as an advisory group on training and lifelong learning.

•

Training for the Greek Manpower Employment Organisation's (OAED's) competent departments and career guidance so that they can support adults for their professional transition in the middle of their careers.

•

Working with the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) and the Hellenic Confederation of Professionals, Craftsmen & Merchants (GSEVEE) to develop training programs for older people.

•

Training and co-operation with human resources managers, both in business and the public sector, to understand the educational needs of people over 45 with further training allowing them to be absorbed into the labor market.

•

Collection of data on the participation of older people in Lifelong Learning programs by Local Governments, to which responsibility for the structures and organization of Lifelong Learning has been transferred. The processing of these data by the Ministry of Education and the development of indicators to monitor developments in the LLL sector.

•

Setting a national target for all people of all ages to have effective access to ICT programs by 2020, by making use of structures and human resources (volunteers and non-volunteers) in schools and universities.

•

Developing learning programs and actions in local government to improve the skills and competences of older people, especially vulnerable groups of older people, harnessing them for their own benefit and that of the local community.

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ANNEX II September 2017 Between 2012 and 2017, 50plus Hellas contributed to AGE Platform Europe's work with UNECE on reviewing progress towards achieving the four goals of the Regional Implementation Strategy (RIS) of the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing (MIPAA) in AGE member countries. Goal 1: Encourage longer working life and maintain ability to work Goal 2: Participation, non-discrimination and social inclusion of older persons Goal 3: Dignity, health and independence in older age Goal 4: Enhance and maintain intergenerational solidarity Before the Ministerial Conference on Ageing: A Sustainable Society for All Ages: Realizing the potential of living longer 21 - 22 September 2017 Lisbon, Portugal, a Press release from AGE Platform stated: “We witness a gap between what governments think they are delivering and the real-life experiences of older people in those countries and therefore would like to reiterate our support to the recommendation by the UN Independent Expert on the rights of older persons, Rosa Kornfeld-Matte for establishing a binding legal instrument”, added Anne-Sophie Parent, AGE Secretary General. “We hope that at tomorrow’s ministerial conference our governments will commit to promote intergenerational solidarity to highlight the important societal value of older people. They should also challenge pervasive negative old-age stereotypes”, concluded Ebbe Johansen, AGE President. http://www.age-platform.eu/press-releases/madrid-international-plan-action-ageingbeyond-2017-uphold-full-spectrum-civil http://www.age-platform.eu/sites/default/files/AGE%20MIPAA%20Review%202016_ corrected.pdf https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/pau/age/Ministerial_Conference_Lisbon/Practical_infos/Synthesis_report_MIPAA15_Room_Document_with_Annex.pdf

Demographic trends and sociological reflections Fred Karl Population dynamics and the effects of the ageing process in Greece The trends of both lower birth rates and a higher life expectancy, reported in the chapters of this book, are also well known in Europe, but some things are specific to Greece. In other West European countries the baby boom of the 1950s and 1960s was followed by a dramatic drop in the fertility rate in the 1970s, due to the appearance of the contraceptive pill, women's increasing educational levels and changing cultural values. In Greece birth rates over the replacement rate (2,2 children per couple) were maintained until 1980 and the main drivers for the increase in its population were the enduring rise in life expectancy and different migration in- and outflows. After the Second World War and the civil war, thousands of Greeks emigrated to Australia, Canada and other states with a demand for labor. In the 1960s lowskilled Greek men and women of working age went to West Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium for “foreign worker contracts” in sectors like construction, agriculture and gastronomy. Between 1955 and 1977 approximately 14 % of Greece's population went abroad (Lianos & Cavounidis 2012). From the mid-1970s until the late 1980s, the outflow was reversed as many Greek emigres returned to the country. After 1990, with the opening of the frontiers and the breakdown of the old soviet Empire, Greece experienced an inflow of migrants – some of them were ethnic Greeks – mainly from Albania, Bulgaria and from some republics of the former Soviet Union. Due to this immigration the increase in the population continued. A new phase started with the global financial crisis. From 2008 onwards deaths consistently outnumbered births and the migration balance became negative, despite the inflow of migrants and refugees, as qualified young people left the country looking for work abroad (Cavounidis 2015, Triandafyllidou & Mantanika 2017), while the number of legal and illegal migrants (excluding asylum seekers) also declined since 2012 (Triandafyllidou et al 2014). The transitions in the composition of the population in Greece have been demonstrated with demographic projections from different organizations and authorities, such as the United Nations, the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), the Vienna Institute of Demography, Eurostat and the Hellenic Statistical Authority (Elstat), which, however, did not take into account the consequences of both the economic crisis and the current refugee

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inflows (Kotzamanis 2016). A research program “The demographic problem of Greece” by the Laboratory of Demographic and Social Analyses of the University of Thessaly, commissioned by the Research and Policy Institute DiaNEOsis, tried to solve this inadequacy. They explored eight different scenarios (Dianeosis 2016), all with the result of a drop in the population1. For the year 2050 the median age of Greece's population is calculated to reach 49-52 years (44 today), due to the low fertility rates. Nowadays the average age of women having their first child is nearly 35 years, limiting the time span for subsequent children. Demographic projections must be considered provisional, in view of the impact of globalization, climate change and unpredectable migration over the next decades. Aspects of the threefold ageing process For the society as a whole, we can speak about a threefold ageing process, occuring in most EU Member states, that takes into account (1) the absolute and (b) the relative increase of older people, as well as (3) the above average increase of very old people in the highest age groups. Some qualitative particularities emerge in this structural transformation of age. In gerontology a distinction is made between a third age and a fourth age (Laslett 1989), the latter being defined with the threshold of 80/85 years. Another distinctive mark is feminization due to the growing unequal sex/gender ratio in old age2. Very high age is associated with more vulnerability and creates a higher likelihood of special needs for support and care. Surprisingly the number of healthy life years3 of women is below that of men, though they live longer. Singularization, as in residing alone, is often a consequence of widowhood, but the term is also related to living alone as an ageing single. As described in the book, this trend of singularization has been interrupted by the crisis. Also the ageing of different ethnic groups living in a country generates new requirements and needs. All these aspects are reflected in social and health inequalities in old age, with more problematic life conditions for people living alone, for women, for immigrants and the very old. In addition to these objective trends, the subjective factor – the individual's 1

In Greece as elsewhere populations are shrinking rapidly in the rural regions above average, in contrast to the metropolitan regions. 2 E.g., at age 65plus, there are 78 men per 100 women, at age 85plus 66 men per 100 women (Hellenic Statistical Authority 2017). 3 About the construct „Healthy Life Years“ and results see Hellenic Statistical Authority 2015.

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perception of ageing – plays a special role in the structural change in ageing. The different categories of people in this phase of life do not necessarily see themselves as a common group of older people, even if they all are pensioners. The next generation of retirees Those who are now entering the retirement phase, or already have benefited from early-retirement-schemes, were born in the 1950s. As “children of the dictatorship” (Kornetsis 2013) they became mature during the period of the military dictatorship from 1967-1974. While some members of this generation may have adapted to these political circumstances, others experienced and participated in the student resistance4 against the junta and the global cultural changes of the sixties/seventies. There are no known studies tracking the life course of these cohorts to document any indications that they will form a new generation in the third age, due to the cultural changes experienced in their formative youth phase. In Germany and other countries, the “new elderly”, differing from the traditional life styles and values of their antecedants, are a recurrent issue in the media and in science (Karl 2012). In politics the emergence of groups of healthier and better educated older people led to an unjustified generalization in the form of a positively loaded age sterotype. Walker (2000) described the construction of old age in Europe through public policy and from this arose the construct of the “active, autonomous and responsible modern retiree” (Rudman 2006). This construct incorporates an ideological aspect as does the subsequent image and goal of 'active ageing'. This initially sympathetic ideal leads to some pitfalls (Dyk 2014; Młoźniak 2016), because it tends to become normative and is in danger of being instrumentalized by a policy only “to fill gaping holes in the safety net” (Minkler/Holstein 2008, p. 197). In North-American and Anglo-Saxon gerontology, the imposition of middle-age norms (being useful and usable) into old age is discussed under the term 'age imperialism' and is criticized as a new form of age discrimination. Older people's role “becomes one of work, or work-like activities, with an accompanying postponement or erosion of pension rights and an expectation of engagement in the voluntary sector” (Biggs 2004, p. 102). Instead of this, and recognizing that social and health inequalities are rising in society and are particularly acute in old age in terms of their effects on life expectancy and healthy life expectancy, it becomes apparent that it is necessary “to direct more socio-economic and political resources towards the most 4

The student resistance, concentrated in the Polytechnic High School of Athens, was shot down with tanks by special military forces in November 1973. The politically active students of this time belong to the birth cohorts *1949 to *1954 (Kornetsis 2013, p. 20). Named as the „Polytechnic generation“, they share this historical experience.

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vulnerable and frail members of the ageing population” (Formosa 2013, p. 32). The policy discourse until now does not take note of the meanings which the individuals themselves give to ageing and retirement (Dyk et al 2013). Therefore, the dominant top-down approach in active ageing programs runs the risk of not meeting the needs of the addressees. It must be supplemented by a bottom-up approach which represents the manifold heterogenity of older people and of their subjective worlds. Some examples of this diversity are described in this book. As far as the implementation of the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing5 is concerned, the political authorities in Greece are late with the development of an integrated action plan, compared to other countries. This delay could provide the opportunity not simply to adopt the concepts, but to modify them critically and implement a wide variety of actions in line with the specific needs of Greek older people during the crisis. To achieve these objectives, it is necessary to initiate a dialogue with civil society bodies representing the interests of Greek older people and to give weight to the already existing civil society initiatives in all areas that affect demographic ageing in Greece. References Biggs, S. (2004): New ageism: age imperialism, personal experience and ageing policy. In: Datland, S./ Biggs, S. (ed.): Ageing and diversity. Multiple pathways and cultural migrations. Bristol: Policy Press, p. 95-106. Cavounidis, J. (2015). The Changing Face of Emigration. Harnessing the Potential of the New Greek Diaspora. Migration Policy Institute, Washington DC. Dianeosis (2016): The demographic development of Greece 2015-2050 (in Greek). https://www.dianeosis.org/research/demography/ Dyk van S., Lessenich S., Denninger T., Richter A. (2013): The many meanings of “Active Aging”. Confronting Public Discourse with Older People’s Stories, in: Recherches sociologiques et anthropologiques, 44-1, pp. 97-115. Dyk, S. (2014): The appraisal of difference. Critical gerontology and the active-ageing paradigm. In: Journal of Aging studies, 31, p. 93-103. Formosa, M. (2013): Positive ageing in an Age of Neo-liberalism. In: Kriebernegg, U., Maierhofer, R. (ed.): The Ages of Life. Bielefeld: transcript. p. 21-35. Hellenic Republic (2017): Report “Implementation of the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing and its Regional Implementation Strategy. Athens: Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Social Solidarity. 5

See the National report of the Hellenic Republic (2017) and Annex II in the chapter of 50plus Hellas (in this book).

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Hellenic Statistical Authority (2015): Life & Health Expectancy 2012. Athens. Hellenic Statistical Authority (2017): Greece in figures. Athens. www.statistics.gr Karl, F. (ed) (2012): The Ageing of the „new elderly“ (Das Altern der „neuen Alten“, in German). Münster Berlin Zürich: LIT. Kornetsis, K. (2013): Children of the dictatorship. Student resistance, cultural politics, and the “Long 1960s” in Greece. Oxford: Berghahn. Kotzamanis, B. (2016): The population of Greece in 2050 (in Greek). Demographic News, no 27, 2016 http://www.demography-lab.prd.uth.gr/DemoNews/DEMONEWS_27.pdf Laslett, P. (1989). A Fresh Map of Life: The Emergence of a Third Age. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Lianos, T., Cavounidis, J. (2012): Migrant flows from and to Greece in the 20th century. Athens: Centre for Planning and Economic Research. Minkler, M., Holstein, M. (2008): From civil rights to civic engagement? Concerns of two older critical gerontologists about a 'new social movement' and what it portends. In: Journal of Aging Studies 22, p. 196-204. Młoźniak, I. (2016): Active Ageing: The Narratives Of Agency And Crisis. French Journal For Media Research n° 5/2016, 1-17. Rudman, D.L. (2006): Shaping the active, autonomous and responsible modern retiree: an analysis of discursive technologies and their links with neo-liberal political rationality. Ageing & Society 26, 181–201. Triandafyllidou, A., Dimitriadi, A., Maroufof, M., Yousef, K. (2014): Migration in Greece. Recent developments in 2014. Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy. http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Migration-in-Greece-Recent-Developments-2014_2.pdf Triandafyllidou, A., Mantanika, R. (2017): Migration in Greece: Recent Developments in 2016. Athens: European University Institute. Walker, A. (2000). Public policy and the construction of old age in Europe. The Gerontologist, 40, 3, 304–308.

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Authors' list Maria Delatola-Paganelis, MA, Tinos Island Health Centre & Scientific Council 50plus Hellas Ioannis Drymoussis, PhD, Former European Commission Executive & Scientific Council 50plus Hellas Marina Economou, Assistant Professor of Psychiatry, First Department of Psychiatry, Medical School, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Eginition Hospital. University Mental Health Research Institute (UMHRI), Athens Alexandra Foscolou, MSc, Department of Nutrition and Dietetics, School of Health Science and Education, Harokopio University, Athens Dimitris Kampanaros, PhD, Residential Care Home Director & Scientific Council 50plus Hellas Maria Karampetsou, MSc, Director of Social Policy, Municipality of Irakleion, Attiki & Scientific Council 50plus Hellas Fred Karl, Prof. of Social Gerontology (in retirement), University of Kassel, Faculty of Humanities, Germany Ioannis Kostakis, PhD, Harokopio University, Athens Chelsea Lazaridou, MA, Adult Educator, Physical Education and Sport Science, Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights & Scientific Council 50plus Hellas Antigone Lyberaki, Professor of Economics, Department of Economics and Regional Development, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens Elizabeth Mestheneos, PhD, Board of Directors & Scientific Council 50plus Hellas Georgia Michalopoulou, Holistic therapist and adult educator, Long Life Project Manager & Scientific Council 50plus Hellas Demosthenes Panagiotakos, Prof. in Biostatistics, Research Methods and Epidemiology, Department of Nutrition and Dietetics, School of Health Science and Education, Harokopio University, Athens George Pavlidis, BSc, Board of Directors & Scientific Council 50plus Hellas, Lecturer, University of Sheffield, International Faculty, City College

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Anna Pagoropoulou-Aventissian, Assistant Professor, Psychology Department, National and Kapodistrian University, Athens Stefanos Papanastasiou, PhD researcher, Department of Social Administration and Political Science, Democritus University, Athens Christos Papatheodorou, Prof. of Social Policy, Department of Social Policy, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens Antonios Politis, Assistant Professor of Psychiatry, First Department of Psychiatry, Medical School, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Eginition Hospital Myrto-Maria Ranga, PhD, Board of Directors, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) & Scientific Council 50plus Hellas Angeliki Skamvetsaki, Psychology Department, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, Associate Professor of Political Science, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Frank Stevens, MA, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands Platon Tinios, Assistant Professor, Department of Statistics and Insurance Science, University of Piraeus Christos Theleritis, MD PhD, Clinical Research Associate and Consultant, Division of Geriatric Psychiatry, First Department of Psychiatry, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Eginition Hospital Nana Tsoumaki, MA, Athina Education Consultants & Scientific Council 50plus Hellas Judy Triantafillou, MD, Board of Directors & Scientific Council 50plus Hellas Dimitra Vardalachaki, Psychology Department, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Soziale Gerontologie hrsg. von Prof. Dr. Fred Karl (Universität Kassel) Fred Karl (Hg.) Transnational und translational Aktuelle Themen der Alternswissenschaften Transnationale Perspektiven auf die Lebenssituation älterer Menschen in Brasilien, Russland, Griechenland und Bulgarien sowie Aspekte des Lebens und Sterbens türkischer Migranten in Deutschland sind Schwerpunkte dieses Bandes. Das Translationale, die Umsetzung von Wissen in Anwendung, wird hinterfragt, am Beispiel eines Versorgungsprojekts im Stadtteil und eines Konzepttransfers zur Qualifizierung im Umgang mit Demenz. Transnationale und translationale Projekte verändern die Beteiligten. Irritationen in der Begegnung mit zunächst Fremdem sind geeignet, Lernprozesse anzustoßen. Bd. 3, 2012, 120 S., 19,90 €, br., ISBN 978-3-643-11885-1

Matthias Kramer Potentiale der Angehörigenarbeit Eine quantitative Studie zur Integration Angehöriger im Pflegeheim Angehörige haben eine wichtige Funktion, der Pflegeheime zum Teil nur sehr begrenzt gerecht werden; häufig übernehmen auch Freunde und Bekannte einen klassischen Angehörigenstatus. Die empirische Studie stellt im Rahmen der sozialgerontologischen Forschung eine breite Potenzialanalyse aller Angehörigen dar und greift mit der Einbeziehung von Freunden und Bekannten auch neue inhaltliche Aspekte auf. Mit über 1.200 Befragungsteilnehmern erbringt sie bislang nicht vorhandene Erkenntnisse, die sowohl für die konzeptionelle Weiterentwicklung in der Praxis als auch in Theorie und Wissenschaft genutzt werden können. Bd. 2, 2012, 416 S., 39,90 €, br., ISBN 978-3-643-11722-9

Fred Karl (Hg.) Das Altern der „neuen“ Alten Eine Generation im Strukturwandel des Alters Die in den achtziger Jahren des vergangenen Jahrhunderts als „neue“ Alte etikettierten Älteren sind im achten und neunten Lebensjahrzehnt angekommen. Einleitende Beiträge betrachten kritisch die Kreation der neuenÄlten im Rückblick. Die wichtigsten Vorträge des Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Gerontologie zu diesem Thema werden dokumentiert. Ein ausführlicher empirischer Beitrag zu den Lebensverhältnissen und Lebensaktivitäten dieser Jahrgangsgruppe der vor und nach 1930 Geborenen verknüpft Ergebnisse aus der Sozialen Gerontologie, der Jugend-, Lebensverlaufs- und Konsumforschung. Bd. 1, 2012, 136 S., 19,90 €, br., ISBN 978-3-643-11819-6

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Demographic ageing should not be a crisis for either societies or individuals, though often reported as problematic. But what about ageing during long periods of crisis, when social and economic conditions worsen? The book takes a look at the experiences of Greece, the country most shaken by the severe financial crisis of the last years. In Greece many older people’s pensions were used to help finance other family members. The chapters describe the strong influence of the financial crisis in Greece on ageing, health and social relations and identifies the challenges to which Greek political parties, administrations, governments and citizens of all ages need to respond. It also gives an insight into inter-generational initiatives and projects in the fields of lifelong and later-life learning, healthy ageing and human rights. The authors represent the multidisciplinary field of economics, social policy, health and family research and civil society in Greece. The editor of this book has many years of experience in European learning partnerships and worked as a university professor of social gerontology in Germany.

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