African Values, Ethics, and Technology: Questions, Issues, and Approaches [1st ed. 2021] 3030705498, 9783030705497

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African Values, Ethics, and Technology Questions, Issues, and Approaches Edited by Beatrice Dedaa Okyere-Manu

African Values, Ethics, and Technology

Beatrice Dedaa Okyere-Manu Editor

African Values, Ethics, and Technology Questions, Issues, and Approaches

Editor Beatrice Dedaa Okyere-Manu School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics University of KwaZulu-Natal Pietermaritzburg, South Africa

ISBN 978-3-030-70549-7    ISBN 978-3-030-70550-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70550-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Alex Linch shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

Former Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah once said, “It is clear that we must find an African solution to our problems.” Nearly 50 years ago, Nkrumah envisioned that Africa would be a hub of science, technology and innovation. It has been my contention for a long time that Africa must rise to the challenges of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and cease being a passive recipient. With the rapid and far-reaching impact of artificial intelligence (AI), there is a corresponding exigency for explorations of ethics, justice, fairness, equity and equality. The dominant value system should not determine the principles underpinning AI systems and the development of technologies. Falling into the trap of adopting value systems that are inherently different from Africa is a form of epistemic injustice. There needs to be ‘fit for purpose’ and alignment between AI and related technologies and the African context. Africa has long had multiple legacies of wholesale adoption of Western values. To echo Joseph Conrad, we have lapsed in this regard ‘under western eyes’. It is salient to assert that Africa itself is not homogenous. What is clear is that AI is a significant lever that can address the inequities on our continent. Africa needs a seat at the dining table to drive AI and related technologies as well as define the parameters for an ethical framework. If we are not alert to this impending danger, we will find ourselves trapped and log-jammed in a value system that does not cohere or relate to our continent. This book entitled African Values, Ethics, and Technology: Questions, Issues, and Approaches with a stellar list of notable scholars in the field of African philosophy and ethics represents a worthy contribution to the debates and enables a deep probing of fundamental issues that bedevil the v

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system. The United Nations in the Strategy on New Technologies urges that with the adoption of AI and other frontier technologies—like the Internet of Things, cybersecurity, blockchain, robotics, autonomous vehicles and nanotechnology there must be responsibility. The cross-section of chapters confirms that AI cuts across all sectors, and there is a need for deep exploration of the ethical considerations from an African perspective. Emphasising the need for us to be active players, the iPhone 10 uses face recognition to unlock it, but surprisingly it is not as effective when recognising the faces of Africans and Asians. Some voice recognition devices invented do not recognise Xhosa clicks and register them as noise. These are illustrations of gaps in technologies and merely scrapes at the surface of the enormity of the task at hand. Africa has to rise, and this book represents a significant contribution to the development of new knowledge embedded and rooted in Africa. Johannesburg, South Africa

Tshilidzi Marwala

Acknowledgements

The successful completion of this project is due to the contribution and insights of a number of people. Therefore, I wish to thank all the contributors to this volume for their hard work, professionalism, invaluable contributions and support. Many thanks go to reviewers and editors in particular Philip Getz, Tikoji Rao Mega Rao and colleagues for their patience and tireless efforts in shaping this manuscript. I would also like to thank Professor Tshilidzi Marwala, Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the University of Johannesburg (UJ) for writing the Foreword. Finally, I would like to acknowledge with gratitude the support and love from my family.

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Contents

1 Introduction: Charting an African Perspective of Technological Innovation  1 Beatrice Dedaa Okyere-Manu Part I The Fourth Industrial Revolution and African Ethics  15 2 The Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) and Africa’s Future: Reflections from African Ethics 17 Munamato Chemhuru 3 Africa in the Fourth Industrial Revolution: A status quaestionis, from the cultural to the phenomenological 35 Malesela John Lamola Part II African Values and Technology  53 4 African Reasons Why AI Should Not Maximize Utility 55 Thaddeus Metz

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5 Values and Technological Development in an African Context 73 Bernard Matolino 6 African Cultural Values, Practices and Modern Technology 89 Ovett Nwosimiri Part III Technology, African Ethics and Sexual Relations 103 7 Shifting Intimate Sexual Relations from Humans to Machines: An African Indigenous Ethical Perspective105 Beatrice Dedaa Okyere-Manu 8 The Death of Isintu in Contemporary Technological Era: The Ethics of Sex Robots Among the Ndebele of Matabo123 Herbert Moyo Part IV Technology, African Values and Human Relationship 137 9 The Importance of a Neo-African Communitarianism in Virtual Space: An Ethical Inquiry for the African Teenager139 Thando Nkohla-Ramunenyiwa 10 The Ambivalent Role of Technology on Human Relationships: An Afrocentric Exploration155 Sophia Chirongoma and Lucia Mutsvedu 11 Interrogating Social Media Group Communication’s Integrity: An African, Utilitarian Perspective173 Elias G. Konyana

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Part V Bioethics, African Values and Technology 187 12 Bioethics and Technology: An African Ethical Perspective189 Wilfred Lajul 13 The Use of Sex Selection Reproductive Technology in Traditional African Societies: An Ethical Evaluation and a Case for Its Adaptation217 Samuel Awuah-Nyamekye and Joseph Oppong 14 Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Indigenous Akan Ethics: A critical Analysis229 Stephen Nkansah Morgan Part VI African Religious Values and Technology 245 15 The Impact of Technologies on African Religions: A Theological Perspective247 Nomatter Sande 16 Technologization of Religion: The Unstoppable Revolution in the Zimbabwean Mainline Churches263 Martin Mujinga Index281

Notes on Contributors

Samuel  Awuah-Nyamekye is Associate Professor of Religion and Environment in the Department of Religion and Human Values at the University of Cape Coast (UCC) in Ghana. His research interest is in the area of looking at the possibilities of integrating indigenous ecological knowledge which has religio-cultural underpinnings into the modern means of solving environmental problems of today. Another area of interest is Religion and Development. Munamato  Chemhuru  is an Alexander von Humboldt fellow in the Department of Philosophy and Systematic Pedagogics at the Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, KU, Eichstätt, Germany (2020–2022). He teaches Philosophy at Great Zimbabwe University and is also a senior research associate at the University of Johannesburg (2018–2023). His research interests are in the area of Social and Political Philosophy. He has edited a book, African Environmental Ethics: A Critical Reader (2019), published by Springer. Sophia  Chirongoma is a senior lecturer in the Religious Studies Department at Midlands State University, Zimbabwe. She is also an academic associate/research fellow at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion (RITR) in the College of Human Sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA). Her research interests and publications focus on the interface between culture, ecology, religion, health and gender justice.

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Elias  G.  Konyana is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy (Ethics) in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies in the School of Arts, Culture and Heritage Studies at Great Zimbabwe University. His research interests are in Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, Law, Culture and Development. Wilfred Lajul  is Professor of Philosophy at Gulu University in northern Uganda. He was the head of Department of Philosophy at Makerere University, Uganda. His research interests are in African Philosophy, Ethics and Human Rights. His latest book, which is being published by Makerere University Press, is on Acholi philosophical worldview in the writings of Okot p’Bitek. Malesela  John  Lamola is an associate professor at the University of Johannesburg’s Institute for Intelligent Systems and the founding chairperson of the Research Group on Africa, Philosophy and Digital Technologies (APDiT). He obtained his PhD from Edinburgh University and an MBA from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (Daytona Beach, USA). His research interests are on the intersection between Social Philosophy in the context of the emergence of African Modernity and the Philosophy of Science and Technology. Prior to his return to fulltime academic life he managed a proprietary private equity investment portfolio that included holdings in aviation and internet technologies. Tshilidzi Marwala  is the Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the University of Johannesburg. He has received in excess of 45 honours and awards, including the Order of Mapungubwe and was the first African engineer to be awarded the National Research Foundation’s President’s award. Prof. Marwala’s research interests are multi-disciplinary and include the theory and application of computational intelligence to engineering, computer science, finance, social science and medicine. As a B-rated researcher, he has published nine books, over 300 papers in journals, proceedings, book chapters and magazines and holds three international patents. He is an associate editor of the International Journal of Systems Science (Taylor and Francis Publishers) and has been a reviewer for more than 40 ISI journals. Bernard Matolino  is Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. His research interests are in African philosophy, particularly African political theory. His latest book is Afro-Communitarian Democracy (2019) with Lexington.

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Thaddeus Metz  recently joined the University of Pretoria as Professor of Philosophy and is known for interpreting the African tradition analytically. Metz has published more than 250 works in value theory, comparative philosophy and philosophy of religion, with his next book, A Relational Moral Theory, forthcoming with Oxford University Press in 2021. Stephen Nkansah Morgan  is currently a lecturer with the department of philosophy and classics of the University of Ghana where he teaches a wide range of philosophical courses at both graduate and undergraduate levels. Morgan holds a PhD in Ethics from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, and Master in Philosophy and Bachelor of Arts degrees in Philosophy, both from the University of Ghana. His research interests are in social and political philosophy and African philosophy broadly construed. Herbert  Moyo  is an associate professor at the University of KwaZulu-­ Natal in the School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics. His research interest is in the study of religious practices and their socio-economic, political and religious impact on communities. Michael Mujinga  is the Academic Dean at United Theological College. He is also a research associate/research fellow at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion, University of South Africa (UNISA). His research interest is in Eco theology, gender, migration and African theology. Lucia  Mutsvedu holds a Bachelors’ degree in Counselling from Zimbabwe Open University. She also holds a certificate in Strategic Management in HIV/AIDS from the University of Zimbabwe. She is pursuing a master’s degree in Child Rights at Africa University. Her research interests are anchored on human rights, especially children’s welfare and the impact of technology on human relations. Thando  Nkohla-Ramunenyiwa  is a post-doc fellow in the School of Computing at the University of South Africa. Her research interest includes Ethics, Philosophy of Technology, Political Philosophy and Feminism. Ovett  Nwosimiri  holds a PhD in Philosophy from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. His primary areas of research are in philosophy and ethics, particularly African philosophy, African epistemology, philosophy of race, epistemology, existentialism and applied ethics.

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Beatrice Dedaa Okyere-Manu  obtained her Doctoral degree in Ethics Studies from the University of KwaZulu-Natal in 2011. She is Senior Lecturer in Applied Ethics and the head of Ethics Discipline at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Her research focuses on various applied ethical issues in Africa. She has written articles in some key academic journals, including the South African Journal of Philosophy, International Studies in Philosophy of Science, Alternation and others. She is a co-editor of Intersecting African Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Western Knowledge Systems: Moral Convergence and Divergence (Cluster publications, 2018). She has contributed chapters in a number of edited books published by Palgrave Macmillan US in 2015, Fortress Press in 2014, Walter de Gruyter in 2015 and Springer in 2019. Okyere-Manu has also presented conference papers at local and international conferences in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Ghana, Basel, Geneva, Berlin and Cumberland in the UK. Joseph Oppong  is a lecturer at the Department of Religion and Human Values, University of Cape Coast. His research interest includes issues on Ethics, Theology, Religion and the Environment. Nomatter  Sande holds a PhD in Religion and Social Transformation from the University of KwaZulu Natal (South Africa). Nomatter is a Practical Theologian and a research fellow at the Research Institute for Theology and Religion (RITR) in the College of Human Sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA). Research interest includes disabilities studies, Pentecostal theology, religious violence, peace and gender.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Charting an African Perspective of Technological Innovation Beatrice Dedaa Okyere-Manu

This book offers ethical reflections on the current innovative technologies from an African perspective. The world has currently entered a new age of industrialization where humans are augmenting their intelligence with innovative technological developments. There is no doubt that these technologies have transformed the world and have potentially played and continue to play positive roles in humanity’s life through their many applications. Examples of the different types of available technologies include, but are not limited to, educational technology, information technology, nanotechnology, biotechnology, bioengineering, psychotechnology, robotics and artificial intelligence. The introduction of these technological developments has created a world that has enabled people to have different experiences that would have otherwise been impossible. It must be noted that technology is constantly evolving with new and improved innovations which continue to affect some aspects of human

B. D. Okyere-Manu (*) School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. D. Okyere-Manu (ed.), African Values, Ethics, and Technology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70550-3_1

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life. Evidently, the dominant producers of these innovative and technological developments are from the western cultural background and values, suggesting that the design and development has been advanced without Africa and specifically African cultural values that distinguish them distinctly from other societies in mind. This disregard raises a number of ethical and moral implications for Africans who are among the major consumers of these technologies. These implications are what the book explores. The book comprises chapters from notable researchers who have interest in the interface of technological developments and African values and ethics. The contributors are scholars from various academic institutions across Africa, namely, University of KwaZulu-Natal, University of Johannesburg, University of Pretoria, Midlands State University in Gweru-Zimbabwe, Great Zimbabwe University, University of South Africa, Africa University in Zimbabwe, Makerere University-Uganda, University of Ghana-Legon, University of Cape Coast-Ghana and United Theological College. They are scholars from the following backgrounds: Computer Science, African Ethics, Applied Ethics, African Philosophy and African Religions whose methodologies and questions are different; however, one thing they all agree on is that there is a need to reflect theoretically on these technological developments.

A Brief History Over the years, the world has experienced various forms of revolutions in the form of industrialization. There have been first, second, third and currently the world is experiencing the fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR). These revolutions have resulted in different generations experiencing the world differently. This term Industrial Revolution was coined to describe the development which took place in England and America in the eighteenth century. To Rodrik the following are examples of the different stages of industrialization and its effect on human life: “New social categories, urbanization, a change in economic structures and globalization” (2014: 4). In order to fully understand the fourth Industrial Revolution which is currently being experienced, a brief introduction of the three prior industrialization is in order. The first Industrial Revolution was popularized by English economic and historian Arnold Toynbee (Bezanson 1922: 343). It saw parts of the world changing from being predominantly rural to being more industrial and urban. This transition included

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advancements in the fields of agricultural activities which brought about major economic and political changes for countries across the globe (De Vries 1994: 254). One of the major inventions of the first Industrial Revolution was the steam engine which made it possible for industrial activities to be done quicker and generate more produce in less time. De Vries adds that Industrial Revolution soon spread across Europe and industries which included coal, iron and the use of steam trains in railroads became increasingly popular (1994: 255). The second Industrial Revolution took place during the nineteenth century. Haradhan Mohajan has reiterated Robert Gordon (2000) who has explained that: The period 1860–1914 is referred to as the Second Industrial Revolution (IR2) or the US IR due to the invention of a large number of new technologies, such as electricity, internal combustion engine, the chemical industries, alloys, petroleum and other chemicals, electrical communication technologies (telegraph, telephone and radio), and running water with indoor plumbing (2020: 1–2).

This era brought about an improvement in existing industries and an expansion into new ones. Joel Mokyr believes that “the second Industrial Revolution turned the large technological system from an exception to a commonplace” (1999: 2). The birth of new industries included the use of steel, electricity and telecommunication. The growth and expansion of the use of rail roads resulted in the movement of people and ideas being able to spread across many cities and countries. The introduction of new technological systems in the second Industrial Revolution allowed for better networking and communication which resulted in a new wave of globalization (Baldwin and Martin 1999). The third Industrial Revolution is referred to as the era of information technology or the digital revolution. It took place in the twentieth century, and it was fuelled using synthetic fibre, televisions, water and air transport. The internet, personal computers, social media and information being readily available are some of the advancements that came about with the third Industrial Revolution (Greenwood 1997). The fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) expands on the digital revolution and has created new ways in which technology can improve societies, the environment and the human body. Klaus Schwab, founder and executive chairman of the World Economic Forum, describes the fourth Industrial Revolution as a world where individuals move between digital domains and offline reality with

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the use of connected technology to enable and manage their lives (Miller 2016: 3). This era has brought about emerging fields of technology which include robotics, quantum computing, 3-D printing, artificial intelligence and self-driving vehicles. Klaus Schwab believes that “it (the fourth industrial revolution) is characterized by a fusion of technologies that is blurring the lines between the physical, digital and biological spheres” (2017). The 4IR in many ways has brought major advancements to humanity; however, some scholars argue that it may bring about consequences which have not been predicted or considered before. On a positive note, Schwab posits that it is able to change the global economy as well as improve the lives of many (Schwab 2017). The latest revolution represents a paradigm shift that is changing almost every aspect of human life as well as industries and institutions on the globe with a new wave of development that is characterized by the digitization of our society. The 4IR is only at its beginning stage, and given the advancements which it has already brought about, it is evident that we have not yet seen the full effects, both positive and negative. There is no doubt that these technological innovations will continue to transform how humanity live their lives. In addition, it will also continue to alter how organizations and institutions operate and how they affect society.

The Need for an Ethical Reflection on Technological Innovations from an African Perspective It is believed that what separates us from these innovative machines is emotional capacity, and a recent study by a software company Calabrio revealed that about 79% of 3000 consumers surveyed preferred human to digital (O’Shea 2018). The advancement of such technologies introduces us to new concepts, theories, critical and ethical questions that cut across culture, religion, environment, healthcare, capabilities and intelligence and nearly every aspect of human life. Despite their numerous benefits, there is no doubt that these innovative machines have the potential to affect us negatively. Among other things, there is the general fear that with these technological innovations, traditional employment will be affected, especially in professions where machines can accomplish given tasks more efficiently and successfully than humans (Alexandru and Petroşanu 2013). Beyond this, virtual communications through emails and video chats have

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replaced face-to-face human interactions, a major feature of the African society. It must be noted that the dominant producers of these innovative technological developments are from the western cultural background, suggesting that the design and development was advanced without African society and for that matter African cultural values in mind. These cultural values are put in place as checks and balances to guide the way of life of a given society and in fact, “no group of people can survive without a set of values which holds them together and guarantees their continued existence” Etuk (2002: 22). For Africans, cultural values occupy a critical place in the indigenous knowledge systems, and these values have sustained the various communities over time. Idang adds that African cultural values can be seen as “all the material and spiritual values of the African people in the course of history and characterising the historical stage attained by Africa in her developments” (2009: 142). They inform the way Africans live as well as determine the acceptable and unacceptable way of life. Idang continues that cultural values within the African context can be grouped under the following headings: social, moral, religious, political, aesthetic and even economic values of a culture (2015: 103–106), and Kanu (2010) adds that despite the intrusion of western ideologies in Africa, some important African values such as sense of good human relation, sense of community, sense of hospitality, sense of respect for authority and the elders, sense of extended family and sense of religiosity have remained resilient social values. Makgoba extends this point by adding that no matter where Africans found themselves, they are linked by shared values that are fundamental features of African identify and culture. These, for example, include hospitality, friendliness, the consensus and common framework seeking principle, ubuntu, and the emphasis on community rather than on the individual. These features typically underpin the variations of African culture and identity everywhere. The existence of African identity is not in doubt (1997: 197–198).

Clearly, some of these values are slowly but surely being compromised by the current wave of technology. Ruth Bulus Iganus and Andrew Haruna add that “through modern changes in this globalized world, the African traditional setting or ways of managing crisis cannot remain intact, but they are by no means extinct. In times of crisis, they often come to surface or people revert to them in secret” (2017: 1), relating this to technological advancement in Africa, the question that needs to be answered is whether

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the values listed above are robust enough to adjust and remain relevant? If they are, then what moral principles therein are useful to assist in navigating through this technological era? These and many more questions will be answered by the chapters in this book. Essentially, it ethically explores how most of these values will either survive or be eroded by the new wave of technological advancement in Africa. Especially that these technologies promise a new way of life from those that Africans are used to, how will the principles embedded in these values help the African people navigate this new era? What are the ethical implications of the various innovative technologies on the African cultural values and practices? Which of African values are likely to be made absolute and which are will remain resilient and relevant? Which traditions and/or values would be improved by these technologies? How do Africans embrace these new technologies without losing their “Africanness”?

Shape of the Book In this volume, African scholars are reflecting on the impact of these foreign innovative technologies on African development. Essentially, these technologies require of us to re-examine our African cultures, values and practices in order to determine where they preside over technology as well as where technology can impact positively on them. Based on the above discussion, the aim of this volume is to focus attention on two main elements. First, the moral questions and issues emerging from the introduction of these technologies in the everyday world of the African and the African continent. Second, to explore the ways that these innovative technologies can define or redefine what it means to be human in terms of reshaping the way we look and understand the African community and ourselves. Specifically, it will focus on the broad spectrum of intelligent robots, machines, and systems and its implication on humans with specific reference to the African context, traditions, values and ethics. While there are many discussions and reflections on the above issues from western perspectives, very little has been done from African perspectives. This volume, therefore, seeks to bridge that gap by bringing together in one book reflections and discussions, questions, issues, and approaches that rely on African cultural values and ethics to reflect on these technological developments and how they affect or can affect different aspects of lives as Africans and as global citizens. The contributors to this

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volume are women and men situated geographically, culturally and intellectually on the continent of Africa. This book is divided into six parts and the sixteen chapters are grouped under the following themes: The Fourth Industrial Revolution and African Ethics; African Values and Technology; Technology, African Ethics and Sexual Relations; Technology, African Values and Human Relationship; Bioethics, African Values and Technology; and African Religious Values and Technology. The book begins with a chapter that gives the background and introduces the whole book. This is followed by the first part that focusses on the fourth Industrial Revolution and African ethics. This part is divided into two chapters, all of which address the critical question surrounding the conception of the moral status of the 4IR within the African contest. In Chap. 2, Chemhuru Munamato describes the fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) as an unescapable reality, to him, this is because its accompanying technological investments is completely changing the way human lives and interact on different levels. Chemhuru argues that even though this presents a great opportunity for Africa, the use of these technologies has implications on human and the environment. Therefore, the need for introspection of the relationship that ought to exist between humans and technology. John Malesela Lamola in Chap. 3 asserts that the socio-industrial development of 4IR is unequal and this has a critical implication not only because it was designed and manufactured in a different cultural and geographical setting to Africa, but it presents a “socio-ontological and epistemological crisis” because “technology does frame human self-representation and modes of sociality.” Looking at this problem through the lens of “transformative anti-colonial,” Lamola argues that the status quo constitutes a “status quaestionis” which he systematically interrogated in his chapter. Thaddeus Metz begins the second part: “African Values and Technology,” which is divided into three by arguing the reasons why artificial intelligence should not maximize utility. For him, utilitarianism cannot make adequate sense of the ways that human dignity, group rights, family first and (surprisingly) self-sacrifice should determine the behaviour of smart machines. Following on from Metz is Chap. 5 by Bernard Matolino. In this chapter, Matolino challenges Africa to wake up and “revisit the spirit that dominates the African’s construction of her views and commitments to the world” in order for her to be part of the visible innovators or developers of modern technological innovation instead of being a consumer. In his

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chapter, Matolino strongly argued that “technology is a phenomenon of a spirit of a people who are modernizing or have become modern.” Modernization, for him, is a process that is generated from deliberate processes people engage in when they evaluate what is inadequate about their current experiences. In order to overcome those experiences, they “seek new ways of being.” He further argues that not until Africa has overcome its past experiences as well as dealt with its own internal struggles, the idea of modernization and technological development will be a mirage. Ovett Nwosimiri in Chap. 6 concludes part II of the book by challenging Africans to embrace these technological advancements to their own advantage. He specifically implores traditional healers in the African context to take advantage of modern technology to disseminate some of the vital healing knowledge procedure to modern society. He believes that because information is a vital part of human life, traditional healers should not keep knowledge from modern society but make it available for anyone everywhere and at any time. Using the Yoruba indigenous divination of Ifá, as an example, Nwosimiri argues that vital indigenous knowledge is lost with the unavailability of a number of traditional healers. He further asserts that mobile and information technology software systems can be designed in a way that will deliver a hands-on way to envisage procedures of carrying out Ifá divination procedures or consultations. He emphasizes that combining some African cultural practices with modern technology will benefit modern African societies. Beatrice Dedaa Okyere-Manu begins the third part which focusses on Technology, African Ethics and Sexual Relations. Writing from an African indigenous perspective, she explores the implications of the introduction of sex robots in Africa as well as the features of indigenous African values that might be compromised with the emergence and increasing use of sex robots. She argues that African traditional religious beliefs and values have shaped indigenous people’s responses to issues around sex and sexual ethics. Thus, the introduction of sex robots within African indigenous communities presents an ethical dilemma because it does not only undermine the sacredness attached to sex and sexual relations but also would eventually erode the indigenous African communities. On the one hand, the development and introduction of sex robots on the African continent will compromise values that have guided African communities over the years. On the other hand, living in a technological era and a globalized world, the community has no control of the individual’s sexual choices because they are able to satisfy the needs of some individuals. She

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further posits that responding to this dilemma may mean breaking the cultural barrier of silence around sex and sexual relations and, in so doing, speaking openly in the public arena about them and the positive roles that these new technologies can play in this regard. In Chap. 8, Herbert Moyo echoes the work of Okyere-Manu, by focusing on empirical responses of the people of Matabo in Zimbabwe emanating from fieldwork. To this indigenous community of people, mechanizing the natural is wrong; therefore, marriage to a robot is unheard-of. From the interview, they likened robots to witchcraft which is a taboo in most communities in Africa. They also mentioned that the consequences of such marriage will bring curses on the community because its aim is to kill the communitarian spirit of isintu (Ubuntu), a value that is cherished in the community. Again, from the interview the respondents further mentioned that because robots cannot give birth, marriage to them will be a hindrance to continuity of the family and the community; therefore, they will not accept such marriage, because acceptance may mean to go against the ancestors and thereby breaking the cycle of Ndebele life. Turning attention to part IV on Technology, African Values and Human Relationship, Thando Nkohla-Ramunenyiwa’s chapter, the first of part IV, argues that the introduction of technology in the form of smart phones has both negative and positive influence on the African teenager. Nkohla-­ Ramunenyiwa in this chapter argues that the South African household is more exponentially influenced by the impact of technology and globalization. She argues that “this external influence has invited itself into the internal value system upon which African households have been historically and systematically built over many generations.” Responding to this challenge, Nkohla-Ramunenyiwa concludes that “solidarity and collective confrontation is needed to ground African teenagers and youth into a neo-communitarian approach to such challenges.” Sophia Chirongoma and Lucia Mutsvedu in Chap. 10 discuss the positive and negative impacts of technology on human relationships. Specifically, this chapter emphasizes how technology can be perceived as a two-faced creature which can either make or break people’s lives. Whilst modern technology has immensely aided in connecting people, communities and nations as well as facilitating smooth global interactions, some extremist ethnic religious and social groups have also manipulated the cyberspace to pursue their selfish agendas. There have been escalating reports of cyberbullying, cyber terrorism and numerous forms of cybercrimes, especially in the economic sector. The authors concluded

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that when using ICT, individuals should always guard against eroding the African fibre of Ubuntu/Unhu. Elias G.  Konyana’s chapter, the last in part IV, discusses how social media group communication has become the new norm even for rural Ndau people in Chipinge Zimbabwe. Highlighting the numerous advantages that this shift in communication presents, Konyana, by means of a brief explanation of the historical practice of Ndau family court (dare remumuzi), brought our attention to how this new norm is slowly replacing “the erstwhile valuable social fabric” of some of the Ndau people of Chipinge. Basing his arguments on an autoethnographic methodology, he argued that these platforms have encouraged the younger generation to sometimes act in ways contrary to how they would have acted in a face-­ to-­ face family court, compromising the integrity of the group. He explained that the family court’s (dare remumuzi) aim has been to bring families together to deal with fundamental family issues including solving cases of family violence and petty misunderstandings. Even though with the migration of the majority of the Ndau younger generation to urban cities and outside the country, this new norm has been very helpful; it has also been a platform for disrespecting the elderly. He further challenges the Ndau community that “culture is dynamic and this means that social media group communication has become the new norm that families have to embrace,” as well as find ways to deal with insubordination, disrespectfulness and even absence from the platform. Part V of the book consists of three chapters that focus on Technology and Bioethics in Africa. In Chap. 12, Wilfred Lajul scrutinizes the relationship between bioethics and biotechnology in Africa. He posits that even though scholars have argued that the central problem of biotechnology lies in the overall attempt to control living nature on an erroneous mechanistic view, Lajul argues that the “problem is instead, ethical and geographically discriminative”; this is because certain parts of the world, like Africa, are affected more negatively by the impacts of biotechnology on life than in other parts of the world. For him, “the relationship between technology and organic life, by the use of biotechnology, has great ethical implications for developing countries, like the sub-Saharan Africa.” He concluded that what might be problematic with biotechnology is the unchecked venture into genetic engineering in which the DNA of natural objects is altered with the possibility of deriving synthetic life, which never existed in nature. Secondly, in order to regulate biotechnological practices, we need a different philosophical principle other than those suggested by

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western philosophy and lastly, the type of bioethics that is meaningful for Africa is that which can regulate biotechnological practices on realistic grounds. In Chap. 13, Samuel Awuah-Nyamekye and Joseph Oppong argue that even though the employment of technological advancement such as assisted reproductive technologies promises to be the answer to infertility in most marriages, bringing joy and happiness, they raise a number of religio-cultural value questions. They expose the practices such as “levirate,” traditional healers’ intervention, as well as traditional adoption as the traditional Akan society’s ethical way of dealing with childlessness. They further argue that at “the heart of the attempt to resolving the issue of infertility in marriages was the understanding that any discussions of the sexual, reproductive and relational ethics of African marriage must take the entire family or community into account.” They concluded that these modern reproductive technologies throw a challenge to African ethical values and practices; therefore, a critical analysis is made to find out the extent to which these technologies have played out in the indigenous Akan milieu. Stephen N. Morgan ends this section in Chap. 14 by debating the cultural impact and moral acceptability or otherwise of the use of sex selection reproductive technology on the cultural traditions and values, given that most African cultures are patriarchal with a strong preference for the male child. Arguing from an ethico-cultural perspective, Morgan first presented some traditional methods of sex selection in history and across the world as well as modern-day techniques. He further engages in a discussion of the ethics of sex selection where he deals with some of the arguments made in support and against the use of sex selection technology. In this discussion, he identifies family balancing, post-pregnancy sex-­selective abortion as the argument in support for sex selection. The arguments against include playing God, sexism, discrimination and an infringement of human rights, with the possibility of bringing harm to society. But as Morgan shows, because of the patriarchal nature of the African society, traditional cultures’ use of sex selection reproductive technology even for non-medical purposes must be controlled. The final part of the book, which focusses on Africa Religious Values and Technology, consists of two chapters. In Chap. 15, Nomatter Sande brings a new perspective to the theme of the book by arguing that the agenda of technological advancement, particularly human enhancement, is not new in Africa, particularly among the Shona indigenous people from

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Zimbabwe. He argues that there are a number of indigenous practices which are similar to modern-day human enhancement technological procedures such as doping, embryo screening and hormonal treatment to prevent ageing. For example, he likened gene doping to “the concept of Mangoromera (fighting powers), which were bestowed upon an individual to increase their fighting abilities.” Again, he believes that pre-implantation genetics is similar to the treatment of changing sex. He further emphasizes that the Shona believe that the traditional healers have been endowed with powers from vadzimu (ancestors) who are able to enhance gender selection, ageing and longevity, through the used herbs and other ritual activities. Sande concluded that since the indigenous procedures and the modern technological procedure have similar goals of improving the lives of people, its acceptability within the Shona people will be easy. Chapter 16 is Martin Mujinga’s “Technologization of religion: The Unstoppable Revolution in the Zimbabwean Mainline Churches.” The chapter challenges the Zimbabwe Council of Churches to embrace the global technological revolution to maintain and grow its congregations, especially the youth of the church into the future. Mujinga argues that the mainline churches’ failure to embrace modern technology such as Facebook and Twitter, particularly during this era of COVID-19, has and will continue to see the youth moving to Pentecostal churches who seem to have advanced in what he calls the “unstoppable revolution.” He further discussed the reasons why he believes that such an embrace will sustain the future of the church.

Areas Identified for a Future Research Agenda In seeking to bring together in one book a reflection of the ontology of innovative technological development from the West to the African context is an ambitious project. This is because not only is the volume charting a new terrain in the academia, but the issues that require reflections are vast. For this reason, in this first volume of my on-going project, inevitably, there are some important areas that may have been neglected. As indicated by some reviewers and authors, there is therefore the need for a deeper ethical reflection on the relationship between technology, African ethics and gender, African values, disability and technology and many more. These neglected areas need to be included to give shape to a more comprehensive ethical analysis of the impact of these technologies in Africa. Therefore, this calls for another volume to include more areas.

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Conclusion The place of innovative technology within the African context is being taken up by African scholars as they reflect on the interface between African values and ethics. There is no doubt that Africa has benefited tremendously from the current 4IR as it is among the major consumers. However, the position of this book is that because these innovations have and continue to be designed and created in a context different to that of the Africa, there are some aspects that may compromise the African value system. As the chapters of this book attest, a detailed research and reflections of the interface of technological innovations and the African values is crucial. Thus, the preoccupation of this book is to highlight the African ethical values that stand to be challenged and those that need to be maintained within the current 4IR.

References Alexandru, P., & Petroşanu, D. M. (2013). The Impact of 3D Printing Technology on the Society and Economy. Journal of Information Systems & Operations Management, 7(2), 360–370. Baldwin, R.  E., & Martin, P. (1999, January). Two Waves of Globalisation: Superficial Similarities, Fundamental Differences. NBER Working Paper No. w6904. Available at SSRN. Retrieved June 21, 2020, from https://ssrn.com/ abstract=147244 Bezanson, A. (1922). The Early Use of the Term Industrial Revolution. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 36(2), 343–349. De Vries, J. (1994). The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution. The Journal of Economic History, 54(2), 249–270. Etuk, U. A. (2002). Religion and Cultural Identity. Ibadan: Hope Publication. Gordon, R.  J. (2000). Does the “New Economy” Measure up to the Great Inventions of the Past? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(2), 49–74. Greenwood, J. (1997). The Third Industrial Revolution: Technology, Productivity, and Income Inequality (No. 435). American Enterprise Institute. Idang, G. E. (2009). The Mind-Body Problem in African Culture. From Footmarks to Landmarks on African Philosophy. Lagos: Obaroh and Ogbinaka Publishers. Idang, G. E. (2015). African Culture and Values. Phronimon, 16(2), 96–111. Iganus, R. B., & Haruna, A. (2017). The Strength of African Culture in Managing Family Crisis in a Globalized World. Anthropology, 5(4), 1–5. Kanu, M.  A. (2010). The Indispensability of the Basic Social Values in African Tradition: A Philosophical Appraisal. OGIRISI: A New Journal of African Studies, 7, 149–161.

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Makgoba, M.  W. (1997). MOKOKO, the Makgoba Affair: A Reflection on Transformation. Florida Hills: Vivlia Publishers & Booksellers. Miller, D. (2016, September). Natural Language: The User Interface for the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Opus Research Report. Mohajan, H. (2020). The Second Industrial Revolution has Brought Modern Social and Economic Developments. Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 6(1), 1–14. Mokyr, J. (1999). The Second Industrial Revolution, 1870–1914. In V. Castronovo (Ed.), Storiadell’ Economia Mondiale (pp. 219–245). Rome: Laterza Publishing. O’Shea, D. (2018). Study: 79% of Consumers Want Human-Driven Customer Service. Retrieved September 12, 2019, from https://www.retaildive.com/ news/study-­7 9-­o f-­c onsumers-­w ant-­h uman-­d riven-­c ustomer-­s er vice/ 527111/ Rodrik, D. (2014). The Past, Present, and Future of Economic Growth. Challenge, 57(3), 5–39. Schwab, K. (2017). The Fourth Industrial Revolution. New York: Crown Business.

PART I

The Fourth Industrial Revolution and African Ethics

CHAPTER 2

The Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) and Africa’s Future: Reflections from African Ethics Munamato Chemhuru

Introduction The utility of the technologies of the fourth industrial revolution (4IR) to African communities is clear to see. Recently, from the first quarter of 2020, after the impact of COVID-19 on teaching and learning worldwide, most African universities quickly embraced online teaching, learning and research. However, suppose that the fourth industrial revolution takes us to the level where medical practitioners, teachers, engineers and scientists are completely replaced by machines, robots and artificial intelligence systems. If that happens, is it not clear that the fourth industrial revolution

M. Chemhuru (*) Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe Department of Philosophy and Systematic Pedagogics, Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Eichstätt, Germany Department of Philosophy, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. D. Okyere-Manu (ed.), African Values, Ethics, and Technology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70550-3_2

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is taking humanity to a stage where these machines1 ought to be responsible for certain operations in human lives such as in biomedicine, agriculture, 3D printing, use of lethal and chemical weapons, militarised robots and drones, among others? Would it not make sense therefore, if possible, to rethink and consider a new ethical value-system that would incorporate these technologies into the moral worldview? The essence of the fourth industrial revolution in Africa is subject to different interpretations. Most influential interpretations of the potential of the fourth industrial revolution to Africa, especially from political leaders, are quick to appeal to the benefits that Africa stands to realise in the various areas that it lags behind compared to its counterparts in the global North. As a result, it is observed that less attention is being paid to critical and creative thinking which the fourth industrial revolution brings with it (Broadbent 2019). In this chapter, I argue that within the putative grand salvation from the fourth industrial revolution in Africa, there ought to be a robust engagement with the critical ethical questions, effects and consequences that are brought by the technological advances that go with the fourth industrial revolution on the African value-systems. In 2014, a group of researchers from different disciplines such as science, philosophy, computer science, anthropology and engineering tried to “demonstrate that African philosophy can be a key to African innovation and development” (Verharen et al. 2014: 3). However, these thinkers settle for the view that “values are not reducible to facts” (Verharen et al. 2014: 7), thereby somewhat confirming that there must be a fundamental gap between science and ethics. Yet, it must be emphasised that neither is science value-free, nor is ethics completely devoid of consideration of facts as I will show. In this chapter I advance African ethical values as bridging the supposed gulf between science and ethics within the fourth industrial revolution. I consider the nexus between science and ethics differently from, for example, Verharen et al. (2014) by considering African ethics as compatible with the journey towards the fourth industrial revolution. Alexander Broadbent (2019) has articulated some critical philosophical reflections on the promises of the fourth industrial revolution although his take on the revolution itself is somewhat pessimistic. For him, “beyond the scope of our immediate environment, most of our predictions about the fourth 1  The italicisation of the word is deliberate because it is absurd to think of how machines could be human moral counterparts or moral agents in their own right.

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industrial revolution are wrong” (Broadbent 2019). However, unlike Broadbent, I take an optimistic view of the fourth industrial revolution. I establish why it might be positively understood within the context of African ethics which I see as being accommodative of technological advancement. My chapter is divided into three broad sections. In the first section, I define the fourth industrial revolution as a new world order in various ways and situate it within the African context especially with regard to its potential impact on human social life. In the second section, I consider the opportunities and prospects of Africa’s future economy in the light of the fourth industrial revolution. In the last section, I bring the African understanding of the human person and Africa’s ethical value-systems into conversation with the issues raised by the impact of the fourth industrial revolution on Africa. I raise these ethical issues so that human beings could at least appreciate the need for critical ethical reflection as they also stand to benefit from the technological advancements associated with the fourth industrial revolution. I propose ways by which some of these ethical challenges might be understood and solved by appealing to humanist and teleological views that are salient in the African philosophy of existence.

The Fourth Industrial Revolution and the New World Order The fourth industrial revolution is mainly unfolding within the twenty-­ first century. This revolution refers to the kind of human and technological development currently being witnessed in which information technology, networks, the internet of things, robotics, big data, superintelligence, virtual reality and artificial intelligence are now almost in charge and changing the way human beings do things every day. At the same time, this revolution is creating what could be referred to as a ‘new world order’, one characterised by the interface between human beings and these various information and communication technologies. Unlike the previous industrial revolutions (IRs), the fourth industrial revolution is different because of its impact, velocity and scope (see Schwab 2016: 8). In terms of its impact, pace and scope, the fourth industrial revolution is more than just technological advancement. It is about technology actually doing things for, and replacing human beings and ultimately redefining the human person as well as traditional conceptions

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and approaches to ethical theorising. Hence, it is urgent that human beings ought to consider the social impact of the fourth industrial revolution on humanity and even the environment at large. As Cath et al. see it, “digital technologies and AI in particular are developing very rapidly. The direction of such fast innovations needs to be steered socio-­ politically, in terms of where we want to go, rather than how quickly we want to get there” (Cath et  al. 2018: 507). In the same vein, the consideration of the fourth industrial revolution from an African ethical perspective is part of the mission to examine how far these technologies can take humanity without also compromising on human ethical values, lives, relations and the environment at large. By harnessing together human and technological capabilities, the fourth industrial revolution is actually creating a totally different moral world. It is effectively bringing together human beings and some sort of ‘moral agents’ into a totally new ethical world. According to Cath et al., “we are creating the digital world in which the future generations will spend most of their time” (Cath et al. 2018: 508). Because of the creation of this totally new digital world order, this fourth revolution not only creates opportunities for Africa’s development but also perpetuates inequality in society as more and more technologies assume the roles that humans used to do (Mpofu and Nicolaides 2019: 2). In addition, as a result of the inclusion of technologies into the human domain, this revolution also leaves human beings in some kind of a dilemma on whether, for example, robots, computers and drones that perform similar tasks to those performed by human beings, ought to be taken as agents and subjected to moral scrutiny and ultimately be given moral status in their own right when they do things rightly or wrongly just like human beings who have responsibility for whatever they do. However, this might sound preposterous because “the concept of moral status is the idea of something being the object of a direct duty, i.e., owed a duty in its own right, or is the idea of something that can be wronged” (Metz 2019: 11). In view of this understanding, technologies might not have direct moral status, or even moral status at all, but such ethical questions remain unresolved because of the intrusion of disruptive technologies into human lives through the fourth industrial revolution. The above ethical questions, though seemingly absurd, arise because the fourth industrial revolution is unfolding at a much faster pace than expected and effectively impacting human lives, interactions and the environment in different ways. This revolution is also unfolding in such a

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way that synthetic intelligence is narrowing the gap between humans and machines making it possible to rethink the ethical questions of what sort of relations ought to exist between these. Accordingly, the founder and executive chairman of the World Economic Forum, Klaus Schwab, who first used the term fourth industrial revolution (4IR) at the 2016 World Economic Forum, notes that “in its scale, scope and complexity, … the fourth industrial revolution is unlike anything humankind has experienced before” (Schwab 2016: 7). Within the African context, what is particularly interesting about this fourth industrial revolution is that it is not leaving Africa behind, unlike the other previous industrial revolutions. This time the African continent seems to have positioned itself for the fourth industrial revolution as could be witnessed by the acceptance of the various technological advancements in various sectors of Africa’s economy. As a result, there is need to strengthen the fourth industrial revolution’s development promise for Africa while at the same time minimising its conflict with African ethics in general. This is why I consider in the next section, the revolution’s development prospects for Africa and its future economy, before I lastly focus on the revolution and its ethical implications particularly from an African ethical perspective.

The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Africa’s Future Economy When the industrial revolution (IR) started in Great Britain in the mid-­ eighteenth century, Africa lost its opportunity for industrial development because it was left behind in the process. The African Development Bank Report observes that “the [African] continent was unable to harness the opportunities of the Industrial Revolution (IR) and has yet to make the most of the Digital Revolution” (AFDBR 2019: 7), although it is now positioning itself for the fourth industrial revolution. This perhaps explains why Africa “is home to 16% of humanity but produces only 4% of global GDP” (AFDBR 2019: 26). This predicament in which Africa finds itself in, is mainly due to the two closely connected processes of slavery and colonialism. Because of Africa’s colonial history, the continent lost the chance to develop itself like its counterparts in the global North (see Táíwò 2010: 22). As a result, it is still home to poverty, hunger, diseases, droughts and inequality. For example, “poverty is still a very widespread

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phenomenon in Africa and human development indicators are the lowest on the planet” (AFDBR 2019: 26). However, notwithstanding the role of colonialism to Africa’s underdevelopment, it must also be noted and acknowledged that the political leadership in post-colonial Africa has also been partly to blame. According to Kabou, we must admit that through corruption and nepotism, post-colonial Africa in general has somewhat refused development (Kabou 1993). For all these reasons to do with the colonial past and the problem of bad governance which have inhibited Africa’s development, it therefore makes sense presently to try to situate, analyse and position the African continent within the context of the fourth industrial revolution so that it is not left behind again. The advent of the fourth industrial revolution presents an opportunity for Africa to confront some of these problems resulting from Africa’s historical circumstances and those of its own making such as bad governance in the post-colonial era. So far it is clear that Africa is already reconfiguring and positioning itself in order not to miss the opportunities presented by the fourth industrial revolution. South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa avers that “the fourth industrial revolution represents the great tectonic shift of our time. It is creating new opportunities for improving people’s lives. Disruptive technologies like machine learning, artificial intelligence, and big data are changing the way we live, the way we work and do business, and the way we govern” (Ramaphosa 2020: 71). In line with this view, some of the sectors that stand to benefit from this revolution include education, medicine, agriculture, transport, industry and governance. However, there is a serious need to critically consider the economic and ethical questions around what the fourth industrial revolution through the various technologies associated with it entails for Africa, and how it will affect human communities and the environment. Unlike the economic questions to do with efficiency, productivity and employment and unemployment dynamics, the ethical/philosophical questions have not received much attention within the discourse of the fourth industrial revolution and its impact in Africa. I will engage in that discussion in the next section. However, it must be emphasised that even if humans embrace the technologies associated with this revolution, they still consider them as disruptive technologies because of the manner in which they both positively and negatively impact on human life, society, the environment and the future per se. Mpofu and Nicolaides contend that “all revolutions are by nature disruptive, but the fourth holds the power to produce whole new industries or sectors while entirely destroying

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others” (Mpofu and Nicolaides 2019: 5). Concerning the same view, Njuguna Ndung’u and Landry Signé contend that: The fourth industrial revolution characterised by the fusion of the digital, biological, and physical worlds, as well as the growing utilisation of new technologies such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing, robotics, 3D printing, the Internet of Things, and advanced wireless technologies, among others—has ushered in a new era of economic disruption2 with uncertain socio-economic consequences for Africa. (Ndung’u and Signé 2020: 61)

Notwithstanding the disruptive impact of the fourth industrial revolution’s technologies to existing human and environmental relations, Africa cannot afford to miss the opportunities presented by it to solve its problems. For example, it is noted that “as at 2015 sub-Saharan Africa had the highest concentration of the world’s poor, with 41.3 percent of the people living under the poverty line … Relentless population growth and climate change also present two major threats to continued economic progress” (Begashaw 2020: 10). In order to be able to solve these and other problems bedevilling the continent such as population growth, poverty, disease, death, hunger, drought and underdevelopment, Africa ought to embrace and positively make use of the fourth industrial revolution. It must infuse the technological investments associated with the fourth industrial revolution and artificial intelligence systems such as genetic engineering, blockchain and quantum computing positively in order to improve its agriculture, healthcare, transport and education in the light of its growing population. For example, the AFDBR (2019: 7) recommends that “with Africa’s population expected to double by 2050 to 2.4 billion people, it is essential that we grasp the leapfrog opportunity offered by the fourth industrial revolution to make the transition from the agrarian era”. However, this should not be taken to imply that the fourth industrial revolution ought to be taken as a mantra that is to be accepted without questioning just because of the fear that Africa can be left behind again. Critical questions can still, and ought to, be asked concerning the manner in which this revolution might change Africa’s future. The question of how the fourth industrial revolution will change Africa’s future economy is very critical and complex. Because the fourth industrial revolution is mainly characterised by new approach to human 2

 My emphasis.

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knowledge, it involves breaking of the traditional boundaries between technology, human beings and the natural world in general. As a result, the fourth industrial revolution is slowly but surely transforming traditional approaches and industries such as farming, healthcare, economy and education. For Schwab, “governments and institutions are being reshaped, as are systems of education, healthcare and transportation among others” (Schwab 2016: 7). Consequently, Africa stands at the threshold of a tantalising opportunity due to technological advancement in these various sectors and the economy at large. However, still, for some, the fourth industrial revolution brings with it different opportunities and threats to individuals, organisations and the continent at large. Notwithstanding some of these fears, the fourth industrial revolution promises to have massive impact on human life and work considering its potential to usher a new era of the internet of things, robotics, virtual reality and artificial intelligence. In an article that was part of the World Economic Forum on Africa, Cathy Smith (2019) observes that: In Africa, fourth industrial’s potential is limitless. Its technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) and the internet of things (IoT), offer a new vision for economic growth, innovation, development and human well-being. It can solve a host of business and societal challenges, from providing better healthcare and basic services to creating more efficient governments, and helping business become intelligent enterprises that drive growth and prosperity.

Overall, as the fourth industrial revolution stands to positively contribute to Africa’s future economy as I have argued here, it also has another ethical dimension that cannot be easily ignored. The philosophical effect of the fourth industrial revolution is that it closely brings humans, the environment and technology into interface with each other, thereby creating some kind of ethical controversies that cannot be easily ignored. For example, taken together, the implications of the fourth industrial revolution are that it has the potential to make redundant most of the work that human beings do every day. At the same time, this invites us to rethink the ethical questions of whether humans ought to continue with business as usual in a world of interconnections between humans and technology and in which technology has almost usurped most of the roles formerly filled by human beings, in the process surpassing or outperforming humans. One might therefore wonder whether the fourth industrial revolution is

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also not narrowing the broader ethical realm such that it might be necessary to reconsider the moral questions within the fourth industrial revolution. Most (if not all) normative ethical theories would devote little time and space to consideration of technological artefacts. It is only when the latter become relevantly human-like that questions around moral status and ethical considerability arguably arise. In the next section, I therefore consider implications of the fourth industrial revolution to Africa from an African ethical perspective.

The Fourth Industrial Revolution and the Moral Questions from an African Perspective At the core of the fourth industrial revolution are the ethical issues that could be raised in the way this revolution is taking place in Africa and elsewhere. These ethical issues are raised because of the interface between technology and humans. Considering that technology is now venturing into the human social realm, naturally ethical questions arise. I must admit that the word ‘ethics’ has a variety of meanings attached to it, but here I would like to loosely understand it as referring to “lived and practised beliefs about right and wrong, good and evil” (Prozesky 2009: 4), within the context of the fourth industrial revolution in Africa. This is why I will sometimes take the liberty to use ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ interchangeably although morality ought to be understood as the subject matter of ethics (Gyekye 2013: 204). In this section, I examine the implications of the fourth industrial revolution from the perspective of African values or ethics as informed by the African understanding of human persons emphasising on communal, relational, harmonious and teleological existence. I contextualise ethical questions that are invoked by the fourth industrial revolution within an African ethical worldview, although such critical ethical issues are also topical at a global scale. In the end, I seek to show how the African view of existence and ethics might be understood within the context of technological developments associated with the fourth industrial revolution. With the advent of the fourth industrial revolution, the disruptive impact of technology on humans, organisations and industries cannot be overemphasised. However, less attention has been paid to the impact on human values and ethics in particular. This revolution is changing people’s moral lives and ethical relations in significant ways. In some sense, this

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industrial revolution could be understood as leading humans into an exclusively technologised world that is somewhat amoral. This is because machines seem to be largely replacing human beings in so far as we can see the work that used to be done by humans now being assigned to technologies such as autopilots, robots and drones while independent actions cannot be morally evaluated. It is pointless to hold these autonomous technologies responsible for harms that they create to humans because these artificial intelligent systems cannot act freely as in having freewill and that they cannot know, as in being aware of what they are doing (see Coeckelbergh 2019: 6–7). Yet these technologies are programmed and controlled by some responsible moral agents, human beings. Paradoxically, the same machines can sometimes be designed, programmed and controlled in such a way that they also can even morally control human beings to do the morally right. Philbeck et  al. (2018: 11) observe that “the opportunities and threats created by emerging technologies require leaders across business, government and civil society to understand the importance of values and ethics in technological development”. According to such a view, the fourth industrial revolution must consider the African communitarian, welfarist, humanistic and teleological orientation of existence because these also accommodate human development so long as it does not harm African ethics. By African ethics, I mean the ideas of right or wrong, good or bad as informed by the African belief systems, cultural values and the conception of existence in Africa emphasising human welfare, humane and teleological living. As a result, the duty to design machines to behave ethically remains at the core of such African ethics. African communitarian ethics and culture are mainly based on some fairly anthropocentric view of existence because of its emphasis on the understanding of a person by appealing to how other persons construe the same. Typified by John Mbiti’s (1970: 141) famous dictum “I am because we are”, persons define each other and exist for each other despite all other reality, organic or inorganic, that exists besides human persons. Menkiti (2004: 324–331) also sees “group solidarity a key [and] perhaps the defining feature of African traditional life”. According to this view, existence and meaning of life is understood by reference to how human persons relate with each other as humans and ultimately seek to advance their communal existence, welfare and purpose by making meaning out of the surrounding world. Understood in this way, this view of existence and meaning of life places more emphasis on promoting human beings’ existence and their wellbeing to be at the centre of their moral universe.

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Accordingly, African ethics arguably embraces the fourth industrial revolution in so far as it advances human knowledge and wellbeing. Although Gyekye does not consider the fourth industrial revolution, he shares a similar view as he argues that “the pursuit of empirical knowledge—knowledge based on experience and observation, and generally oriented toward the attainment of practical results—underpinned a great deal of the intellectual enterprise of the traditional setting” (Gyekye 2013: 49). African ethics cannot therefore be understood to be in principled conflict with technological advances within the fourth industrial revolution although there are some ethical controversies about the use of such technologies that would need to be addressed. For example, there is still debate on the use of full body scanners that are used at security checkpoints like the airports. Some strongly feel that such technologies not only expose humans to long-term health effects resulting from radiation activity of the scanners but also are a violation of human rights and human dignity. According to Metz, “to have a dignity is to be entitled to respectful treatment” (Metz 2012: 21). From the perspective of ubuntu, such respectful treatment is on the basis of being a human person existing in community with others and possessing purpose for existing. It is therefore against unhu ethics for a human being’s body to be subjected to some sort of exposure like what actually happens during the full body scanning where it is as good as someone is undressing one through the scanners. Accordingly, it is my view that the appeal to ubuntu could at least help us to construct socially acceptable principles of machine ethics based on respect for humanness, human rights and human dignity all of which ubuntu emphasises. For some, the fourth industrial revolution might seem to render ethical reflection redundant and paradoxical at the same time. This is because within this revolution, there appears to remain a very thin line between human beings and machines such that human responsibility might be shouldered by machines. In such a scenario, humans feel that they do not have a duty to take responsibility for actions that would have been done by machines. It therefore becomes paradoxical to think of how machines might assume agency and responsibility. Bo Xing and Tshilidzi Marwala (2017: 1) consider this dilemma as “the convergence of man/woman and machine”. Looking at the influence of the fourth industrial revolution closely, it is as good as machines are now within the existential and moral realms of human beings. As a result, the nexus between human beings and machines might be construed as difficult to regulate, especially from an ethical perspective if one considers the following truisms: Machines are

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not human beings because they do not possess reason, sentience and purposive lives while humans do. Second, machines do not have moral or ethical standing because they are not subject of a life, whereas human beings have. Third, there cannot be any meaningful moral or ethical reciprocity between human beings and machines because they are not moral counterparts. Accordingly, Verharen et al. concluded that powerful ethical systems stand in stark contrast to the descriptive systems of science and technology that take the form of This is how things stand, or This is what happens when … Science and technology present descriptions of how things are. Ethics presents descriptions of how things ought to be. This is the classical gulf between facts and values, between the is and the ought. (Verharen et al. 2014: 7)

However, it is important to observe that despite these attempts to see a divide between science and ethics, machines are and remain the products of human beings. And hence, their operations and ethical impact on human life cannot be unchecked because they are automated and made intelligible by human beings. This view is even strengthened by the wide acceptance that science (both natural and social) ought to be guided by ethical considerations because it does not work in a social vacuum. This explains the existence of ethical committees in, for example, faculties of medicine and business schools. From the above view, the envisaged gulf between science and morality cannot be acceptable so long as technology remains a human product. Gyekye appeals to African culture and addressed this dilemma as he argues that “like science, technology—which is the application of knowledge or discovery to practical use—is also a feature or product of culture. It develops in the cultural milieu of a people and its career or future is also determined by characteristics of the culture” (Gyekye 2013: 48). In fact, all these technologies are products of human intelligence, human reasoning and the activity of the human brain. This is why we can at least authoritatively argue against the production of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons for war. Such technology is in conflict with an African view of ethics which is humanistic in orientation. By humanist ethics, I mean the kind of ethics which advances human life, wellbeing, and humane living and responsibility with technological advances (see also Dzobo 2010: 227). From this kind of ethics, there is emphasis on the promotion of life not only for humans but also on all aspects that exist as they are one way or the other

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teleologically connected with each other (see also Tempels 1959: 46). So, understood in this way, African ethics is compatible with the spirit of the third industrial revolution except that it does not accept technologies that exist in conflict with the essence of what it means to exist as an interconnected community that is guided by harmonious-communitarian living among all beings. Such African ethics tries to close the ‘responsibility gap’ between artificial intelligent systems and human beings because of the understanding that such systems are products of responsible human beings who are guided by unhu in whatever they invent. What is apparent so far is that a complex relationship between human beings and technology is being created by the fourth industrial revolution in Africa. This complex relationship creates the problem of whether human beings should look at the fourth industrial revolution as being intrinsically superior to human values and ethics. It is a challenge to think of whether technology could be intrinsically superior to African values such that we can abandon them in place of technology. There seems to be a serious challenge of how to best accommodate technological advancements within the framework of African ethics, moral reasoning and decision making. For Philbeck et  al. (2018: 5), “a more balanced and empowering perspective recognises technologies as capabilities that interpret, transform and make meaning in the world around us. Rather than being simple objects or processes that are distinct from human beings, they are deeply socially constructed, culturally situated and reflective of societal values”. Accordingly, from this view, even if the African continent remains impoverished, necessitating African societies and cultures to position themselves for human and technological development in light of the opportunities presented by the fourth industrial revolution, they cannot do so by compromising on human value-systems. Despite technology being clearly superior in terms of its performance over humans, there is still need to question its purported intrinsic superiority of technology over humans because it is a product of human beings and that it ought to work towards improving human welfare, wellbeing and their ultimate purpose in life. Such a view could be considered as the teleological view of existence where the end or purpose of life is considered to be the promotion of the good life. According to Aristotle, “every art and every inquiry and similarly every action as well as choice is held to aim at some good. Hence people have nobly declared that the good is that which all things aim” (Aristotle 2011, NE Book 1: 1094a). This kind of thinking also influences African teleological ethics which also aims at the promotion of the good, especially,

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life. This explains why, for example, despite promises for safe and painless abortion and euthanasia, these practices are still unacceptable in most African communities. Similarly, African teleological ethics accepts technological advancements within the third industrial revolution as long as they advance the purpose of life, which according to Matthew Izibili, “the principle of the value of life requires that one respects life, that one does not unthinkingly destroy or alter forms of life” (Izibili 2005: 386). The fourth industrial revolution is making it possible for human beings to perform a lot of tasks easier than they would have. Through artificial intelligence and its power of prediction, some the daily routines and tasks that humans ought to do could be completely altered. For example, according to the World Economic Forum founder, Schwab, it is expected that by the year 2025, “10% of the world will be wearing clothes connected to internet … [while] an artificial intelligence machine will be on a corporate board of directors … [and that the] first transplant of a 3D-printed liver will be successful” (Schwab 2016: 30). While these projections might be exciting in terms of the level of advancement and sophistication that seems to come with the fourth industrial revolution, one pertinent moral question that remains unanswered concerns whether the essence of being human would make sense after all. Of course, some existentialist philosophers like Sartre might have also denied the idea of human essence as such. However, one important ethical dilemma which remains the way in which this advancement and sophistication is replacing the essence of being human and what it means to be because artificial intelligence and its sophistication would have penetrated into the realm of humanity. This is what prompts Philbeck, Davis and Larsen to think that “the lack of more critical comprehension of technologies, and their moral roles in society, reduces our ability to make informed decisions about the development and application of powerful and new approaches, particularly with those technologies that blur the lines between human and technological capabilities” (Philbeck et  al. 2018: 5). This explains why currently there is debate on whether or not to accept technology like mobile smart phone applications in contact tracing in the light of the coronavirus pandemic currently threatening the whole world. The use of such technologies might have very serious implications on people’s privacy, security, freedom and liberty of the human persons and the community as a whole, considering the questions of storage, security and responsibility for such information.

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Conclusion I have not argued that my view of African ethics is accommodative of everything to do with the fourth industrial revolution. Some would still object the view that African ethics can even be compatible with trends in technological advancement characteristic of the fourth industrial revolution. An analysis of my view with these objections can be undertaken elsewhere in order to determine which one might be defensible. However, my appeal to the humanist and teleological character of African ethics might as well be taken as the starting point for positively embracing the fourth industrial revolution in Africa. Acknowledgements  This research was fully funded by the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung/Foundation.

References African Development Bank Report. (2019, October). Unlocking the Potential of the Fourth Industrial Revolution in Africa. Aristotle. (2011). Nicomachean Ethics: Book 1 (R. C. Bartlett & S. D. Collins, Trans.). In Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Begashaw, B. (2020). Strategies to Deliver on the Sustainable Development Goals in Africa. In B.  S. Coulibaly (Ed.), Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent 2020–2030 (pp. 9–13). Washington, DC: Brookings Institute. Broadbent, A. (2019). Power of Prediction: Why the Fourth Industrial Revolution Won’t Happen. Daily Maverick. Retrieved August 12, 2020, from dailymaverick. co.zw/opinionista/2019-­0 2-­2 8-­p ower-­o f-­p rediction-­w hy-­t he-­f ourth­industrial-­revolution-­wont—happen/ Cath, C., Wachster, S., Mittelstadt, B., Taddeo, M., & Floridi, L. (2018). Artificial Intelligence and the ‘Good Society’: The US, EU, and UK Approach. Springer Science, 24, 505–528. Coeckelbergh, M. (2019). Artificial Intelligence, Responsibility Attribution, and a Relational Justification of Explainability. Science and Engineering Ethics., 1–18. Retrieved June 6, 2020, from https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-­019-­00146-­8 Dzobo, N. K. (2010). Values in a Changing Society: Man, Ancestors and God. In K. Wiredu & K. Gyekye (Eds.), Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1 (pp. 223–240). Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Gyekye, K. (2013). Philosophy, Culture and Vision: African Perspectives. Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers.

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Izibili, M. (2005). Environmental Ethics: An Urgent Imperative. In P. O. Iroegbu & A.  O. Echekwube (Eds.), Kpim of Morality Ethics: General, Social and Professional (pp. 383–390). Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books. Kabou, A. (1993). Weder arm noch ohnmächtig: Eine Streitschrift gegen schwarze Eliten und weisse Helfer [Et si l’Afrique refusait le developpement?]. Trans. M. Brüninghaus & R. Renschler, with an Introduction by R. Renschler. Basle: Lenos Verlag. Mbiti, J. S. (1970). African Religions and Philosophy. London: Heinemann. Menkiti, I.  A. (2004). On the Normative Concept of a Person. In K.  Wiredu (Ed.), A Companion to African Philosophy (pp. 324–331). Malden: Blackwell. Metz, T. (2012). An African Conception of Human Dignity: Vitality and Community as the Ground for Human Rights. Human Rights Review, 2012(13), 19–37. Metz, T. (2019). An African Theory of Moral Status: A Relational Alternative to Individualism and Holism. In M.  Chemhuru (Ed.), African Environmental Ethics: A Critical Reader (pp. 9–27). Cham: Springer Nature. Mpofu, R., & Nicolaides, A. (2019). Frankenstein and the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR): Ethics and Human Rights Considerations. African Journal of Hospitality, Tourism and Leisure, 8(5), 1–25. Ndung’u, N., & Signé, L. (2020). The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Digitisation will Transform Africa into a Global Powerhouse. In B. S. Coulibaly (Ed.), Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent 2020–2030 (pp. 61–66). Washington, DC: Brookings Institute. Philbeck, T., Davis, N., & Larsen, A. M. E. (2018). Values, Ethics and Innovation: Rethinking Technological Development in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Geneva: World Economic Forum. Prozesky, M. H. (2009). Cinderella, Survivor and Saviour: African Ethics and the Quest for a Global Ethics. In M. F. Murove (Ed.), African Ethics: An Anthology of Comparative and Applied Ethics (pp.  3–13). Scottville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. Ramaphosa, S. (2020). A National Strategy for Harnessing the Fourth Industrial Revolution: The Case of South Africa. In B.  S. Coulibaly (Ed.), Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent 2020–2030 (pp. 71–73). Washington, DC: Brookings Institute. Schwab, K. (2016). The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Geneva: World Economic forum. Smith, C. (2019). Revolutionary Technology will Derive African Prosperity—This is Why. World Economic Forum. Retrieved June 11, 2020, from weforum.org/ agenda/2019/09/why-­the-­4ir-­is-­a-­fast-­track-­to-­african-­prosperity/ Táíwò, O. (2010). How Colonialism Preempted Modernity in Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

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Tempels, P. (1959). Bantu Philosophy (Trans. Rev. C.  King) Paris: Présence Africaine. Verharen, C., et al. (2014). African Philosophy: A Key to African Innovation and Development. African Journal of Science, Innovation and Technology, 3(1), 3–12. Xing, B., & Marwala, T. (2017). Implications of the Fourth Industrial Age on Higher Education. The Thinker, 73, 10–15. Retrieved May 14, from http:// www.thethinker.co.za/resources/73%20xing%20and%20marwala.pdf

CHAPTER 3

Africa in the Fourth Industrial Revolution: A status quaestionis, from the cultural to the phenomenological Malesela John Lamola

Introduction Under the prevailing ideology of the globalisation of the so-named Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR), modern technologies are expressly produced for global consumption. However, the scientific paradigm that shapes the nature and use of these technologies, including their digitalisation of human life, is derived from a geo-economic base that is constituted by a particularised political and geo-cultural circuity (Law and Lin 2017). Since the First Industrial Revolution, the Euro-American epistemic tradition and intellectual heritage have ascended into a position of a hegemon on scientific research and technological innovation, whilst Africa remains trapped in the status of a net importer and consumer of this technology that happens to be moulding its self-knowledge and social character. The framing and problematisation of this geo-economic reality, with a highlight

M. J. Lamola (*) University of Johanesburg, Johanesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. D. Okyere-Manu (ed.), African Values, Ethics, and Technology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70550-3_3

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of its cultural genealogy and epistemic ramifications, is the objective of this chapter. I here seek to register that the critical explication of cultural and political dynamics relating to the production of knowledge and the design of technological artefacts is the most urgent task of contemporary African Social Science and Philosophy. Drawing from categories derived from the philosophical-­ phenomenology method, I aim to demonstrate that for Africa, which for purposes of this chapter is framed and affirmed1 as both a geo-political and a geo-cultural collective entity, the “consumption” and use of these technologies that are designed with alien cultural assumptions, and from an asymmetrical techno-economic position, render the collective intentionality2 of Africans vulnerable to a myriad of socio-ontological pathologies. The urgent imperative for systematic interrogation of this status quo, I argue, constitutes a status quaestionis on Africa’s socio-­ historical place in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Compared to preceding technoscientific developments that are typically conceived as a linear series of successive global industrial revolutions, the Fourth Industrial Revolution has a deliberative direction and a distinctly socio-philosophical character.3 As authoritatively articulated by Klaus Schwab, founder and chairman of the World Economic Forum and a global proponent of “The Fourth Industrial Revolution” (2015, 2016): 1  This affirmation is asserted in disagreement with postulates that question the existence of Africa as a locus of socio-political and geo-cultural analysis, such as Mudimbe (1988) and Appiah (2018). 2  “Collective intentionality refers to intentions, beliefs, commitments and actions that people have and do collectively. The collective intentionality approach to social ontology then holds that collective intentionality is not merely a local curiosity, one among many kinds of social phenomena, but has constitutive relevance for social and institutional reality in general” (Laitenn 2017: 147). 3  The First Industrial Revolution, as a fundamental change in the global economy that is occasioned by a breakthrough in technological knowledge erupted in England around the 1750s, ignited by the steam engine, lasted for over a century. The subsequent development, the Second Industrial Revolution was marked by further innovation in energy, the invention of electricity and the oil combustion engine that enabled mass factory production and transportation. This is dated from the 1870s well into the twentieth century. The marker of the transition from the Second to the Third Industrial Revolution is the enhancement of computing power. From thence, due to the revolutionary effects of the internet since the late 1960s, the lines between the Third and the Fourth Industrial Revolution are blurred (see Rifkin 2011). The latter is distinguishing itself with its application of artificial intelligence as a “tool” of not only optimising economic production but also modes of human sociality and being (Schwab 2016).

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The fourth industrial revolution … is not only about smart and connected machines and systems. Its scope is much wider. Occurring simultaneously are waves of further breakthroughs in areas ranging from gene sequencing to nanotechnology, from renewables to quantum computing. It is the fusion of these technologies and their interaction across physical, digital, and biological domains that make the fourth industrial revolution fundamentally different from previous revolutions (Schwab 2016: 8).

Of critical concern is that the scientific paradigm that is systematically inaugurating this revolution in the re-engineering of the human, the digitalisation of human existence and modes of sociality, is driven by culturo-epistemic presuppositions that are exclusively and ethnocentrically informed by the Western intellectual heritage with its self-endowed belief in its centrality, universality and supremacy (see Lyotard 1984; Bostrom 2005; Floridi 2014). It is thus perplexing to read echoes of the anthropological vision of this epistemological hegemony in the national technology policy strategies of African states, such as the recent report of the “South African Government-European Union Strategic Dialogue Partnership on 4IR”. This partnership is proclaimed as premised on embracing the Fourth Industrial Revolution “as representing new ways in which technology becomes embedded within societies and the human body” (SA-EU Conference 2018: 10). The ramifications of the ideology driving this technological movement justify the call for the urgent decentring of this self-universalising Eurocentric model of thought in Science, Technology and Innovation (STI). Tandem to the entanglement of postcolonial African political authorities into neocolonial arrangements of power and (strategic?) oblivion to the social and human complexities accompanying artificial intelligence (AI) technology,4 much of academic knowledge on the African continent remains trapped in an epistemological framework and a pedagogic canon that persist in its ties with the colonial legacy of this Occidental tradition (Eze 1997: 339–344). What is still battling to emerge as an African Philosophy remains preoccupied with foundational ethnographical and ideological commitments that occlude the political dangers latent in the ideological interests that are latent in artificial intelligence. There is a lacuna of a discursive practice of African Philosophy of Science and 4  The epochal phrases “artificial intelligence” and “Fourth Industrial Revolution” do not appear at all in the 52-page African Union’s Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa 2024 (African Union 2014).

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Technology that is crafted from endogenous African epistemological and ethical frameworks, and more specifically, an Afrocentric critical corpus on the ramifications of the Fourth Industrial Revolution for African peoples and societies. Seminal reflections such as that by Paulin Hountondji (1990) and Kwame Gyekye (1997) have laid the foundation, but no structured formulations of contemporary African philosophical theories of technology are forthcoming. This chapter, however, is in the tradition of a position paper. It aims at only being a declaration and description of the problematique of the ramifications of how artificial intelligence technologies are designed and produced, and exogenously proliferated into Africa. I tentatively raise a range of issues as provocations for further systematic elaboration. These issues, I must declare upfront, are raised from or as revealed by the critical prism of an anticolonial Africanist phenomenological practice, as opposed to an abstract “postcolonial” social epistemology. The hope is to stimulate transformative research projects that will contribute to the recuperation of Africa’s cultural sovereignty, global posture and self-representation within this technological era. ​The import of discussion unfolds through, firstly, a justification of the instance of the status quaestionis herein adumbrated. This is followed by an elaboration of the epistemic and ontological issues that stem from the cultural and political factors which I discern to be intertwined into the technological process. Given the culture-centric leitmotif of my disquisition, I conclude with pertinent reflections on the question of an appropriate theoretical approach for an Afrocentric techno-science in the context of a multi-cultural and globalising world.

The Challenge of Technology for Africa The consensus in techno-science literature on the sociology and philosophy of technology is that technology qua technology is neither culturally nor politically innocuous. As an exemplary trail, Harry Woolf edited an anthology in 1964 on Science as a Cultural Force, Don Ihde (1993) published on “Technology as a Cultural Instrument”, Albert Borgmann (2006) on “Technology as a Cultural Force” and Arun Kumar Tripathi edited a special issue of the journal AI and Society with the theme “Hermeneutics and technological culture” (Tripathi 2017). Around the same time as Woolf’s Euro-American project, Kwame Nkrumah had monumentally alerted of the intellectual-cultural challenges laden in

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Africa’s emergent path towards technological advancement as a sovereign power in, inter alia, “The African Genius” (1963). The crux of our immediate problem, however, is best crystallised by Patricia Fara (2009) in her observation pertaining to science, which mutatis mutandis is applicable to technology, that “what counts as scientific depends not only on the natural world but also on who is doing research—and where and when … scientific, commercial, and political interests are intertwined” (Fara 2009: xvii). In corroboration, Shoshana Zuboff (2019) has detailed how a capitalistic culture of surveillance of human beings for not only their control but also the commodification of their life as producers of data which is monetised for commercial ends, has become the hallmark of twenty-first-century social existence (see also, Jameson 1984). I will demonstrate that the processes of the innovation and production of technological artefacts, as well as the flows of their distribution, are not dictated by only political and commercial motives; they are also driven by culturally vested interests which are often overtly expressed and at some instances unwittingly so. This is crucial, for as alerted by Bertasio (1993), “any scientific-technological event immediately assumes a great relevance because it involves central cultural elements on which culture itself rests: rationality, utility, ethics, freedom, sociality” (p.  249). This cultural element, in which “culture” is understood in its broadest sense that includes its meaning-giving function to human life as a shared existence, sheds light on the complexity of human-technology interaction. It leads to my elucidation of how technology moulds human subjectivity and the implications of this for the Africa that is enmeshed into technologies it does not produce. I thus alert that given the nature of the epistemic and socio-ontological vulnerabilities that Africa is exposed to amid this exuberant technological revolution that is shaping modern society, there is an imperative and urgency to subject the prevailing ecosystem of digital technologies to the prism of an Africanist anticolonial critical evaluation. The political dimension of technology (see Coeckelbergh 2016) and the economic geography of the current flow of technological knowledge, innovation and distribution underscore that the epistemic imperative alluded above is, in fact, a social-ontological crisis. The prevailing global power matrix that is governing the systems of scientific innovation and production of technological artefacts and systems operates at the detriment of the epistemic sovereignty of societies with the geo-economic positionality such as that of practically all African countries. There is a well-entrenched grand-narrative, in fact, an interpretative archetype according to which the

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global kaleidoscope of the direction of sophistication in technological advancement is understood. According to this gestalt, the movement of technological innovation and production is routinely visualised through a heuristic of a geographic-economic centre-periphery axis. The industrially advanced countries are the centre, the Global North. They are the vortex of research and innovation in science and technology. The periphery is the countries of the erstwhile Third World. In the parlance of the centre’s grand-narrative of grading the capacities of humans to consume technologies they produce, this periphery that happily5 self-identifies as the “Global South” is referred to as the “Emerging Market”. Various indices and studies indicate that within this Global South, except sparse but notable sparkles of “world-class” technological outputs in Asia and South America, sub-Saharan Africa6 epitomises the slackness of the economic and technological sophistication of this periphery. Towards a critical postcolonial evaluation of this situation, Ramon Grosfoguel, a leading Latin American exponent of the decoloniality movement that explores this as a colonial power matrix7 that stems from a history of European sub-humanisation of non-European peoples, pondered: “We went from the sixteenth-century characterization of ‘people without writing’ to the eighteenth and nineteenth-century characterization of ‘people without history,’ to the twentieth-century characterization of ‘people without development’ and more recently, to the early twenty-first century of ‘people without democracy’” (Grosfoguel 2007: 214). I add that the people of the periphery, in particular Africans, are now gazed as a “people without science and technology”. In this regard, it is astonishing that this framing that questions the historical legacy and possibility of an African technoscientific practice even finds a place in African Philosophy texts, as exemplified by Kai Horsthemke’s  See, for example, Maldonado-Torres (2011), de Sousa Santos (2014).  According to the Oxford Insights global index of government readiness for artificial intelligence, not one of African countries made it into the top 50. https://www.oxfordinsights. com/ai-readiness2019 (Accessed 16 June 2020). 7  “The heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical-political decolonization of the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live under the same ‘colonial power matrix’ … Although ‘colonial administrations’ have been almost entirely eradicated and the majority of the periphery is politically organized into independent states, non-European people are still living under crude European/EuroAmerican exploitation and domination. The old colonial hierarchies of European versus non-Europeans remain in place and are entangled with the ‘international division of labour’ and accumulation of capital at a world-scale” (Grosfoguel 2007: 219). 5 6

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(2017) feature in Afolayan and Falola’s The Palgrave Handbook of African Philosophy (2017: 585–603). The universities established as leading institutions in the production of scientific and technology research and the academic publications venerated for the validation of these research outputs are part of this epistemic-economic vortex of “the First World”. Here the orthodoxy of what is scientific is pontificated and canonised. Indigenous knowledge systems and technoscientific paradigms, models and vocabulary continue to be marginalised and rejected as the heterodoxy of science. As the consequence of this epistemic regime, the epochal artificial intelligence technologies that define the current (socio-)industrial revolution are purposed, designed and manufactured from the global economic “centre”, a geo-epistemic locale that is not only alien to Africa but also hierarchically self-imposing. As the meaning of being human continues to be reshaped by this scientific revolution, the question of the position of Africa in the global scheme of the production and consumption patterns of these technologies emerges as a veritable status quaestionis, a theoretic crisis compelling a systematised critical inquiry, for an anticolonial African Philosophy and Science. Writing from the experiential point of India, Tripathi posed two searing questions that are germane to all non-Western consumers of AI technologies. He asked, “Have we access to the technologies that we need?” and “Do we need the technology that we have?” (Tripathi 2017: 146). These are questions about xenocentric science and technology which Western-technology-consuming Africans have to answer. Questions such as these compel an anticolonial techno-science inquiry to note and probe as to whose existential needs motivate endeavours of scientific research, and also, how these technological products reach and affect those they were in the first instance not meant for (Hountondji 1990).8 Any well-travelled technophilic resident of Africa is aware that technological innovations from the global industrial centres enter the “African market” in a pattern resembling a wave. It is not uncommon to notice some gadgets or latest version of a computing software programme or cell phone in a shop in California, Dubai or Shanghai, which would only reach 8  Socio-ethical contestations around development of the Square Kilometre Array (SKA) radio astronomy project on the semi-arid Karoo, on the traditional land of the !Xam of the Kalahari, as an international science project whose scientific methods and results are alienated from the epistemological universe of the !Xam, is a case in point (see Walker et al. 2019).

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and gain social currency in Africa a year or later. And some of these innovations and gadgets never even reach Africa. Who decides which of the array of technologies flowing from Silicon Valley and the manufacturing hubs of China reach Africa, and which are to be withheld? Market forces? In any case, the fundamental question remains: were these technologies not designed for the cultural realities from which they were manufactured, attuned to the specific cultural proclivities and needs of their designers and producers? Granted globalisation, the posthuman universal nature of human needs and the pragmatism of global market economics: why is it presumed that these technological devices and systems (such as social media platforms) are seamlessly appropriate for the life values and social challenges obtaining in African communities? Or is it assumed that Africans will readily adapt themselves to these technologies? Are these technologies not portended to remould African Being into that of the cultural ontology from whence the technologies originate, given the body of evidence on the symbiotic mutual-production of technology and society? (see Harbers 2005). Deriving from these cryptic reflections on the extra-technological dimensions of the technological process, the outline of the status quaestionis herein declared can be summarised as consisting in the following series of plausible research questions: noting that due to the prevailing global economic matrix of power technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution are conceptualised, designed and produced in the industrially advanced global centre, in cultural locales that are alienated against Africans, what are the implications of the participation (consume/relate/use) of African societies as socio-epistemic collectives in the current artificial intelligence technological revolution?

The Ontic-Ontological Ramifications of Technology Articulated poignantly, the foregoing elaboration of the constitutive crisis of our status quaestionis is: how can the inexorable effects of a scientific-­ technological paradigm in whose formulation Africans have not participated nor contributed, and is yet shaping their being, be countervailed? This is a matter which, notwithstanding the “position paper” nature of this chapter, requires our immediate attention, which I now turn to briefly shine the light on.

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At issue, at least for the academic discipline of philosophy, is the ontology of technology. What, in essence, is technology? And how does our conception and understanding of it relate to its effects in our lives? Classical (Western!) philosophy of technology has traditionally viewed technology through the premise of “the tool”, and as such, as an Object, and the human user, as the Subject who decides the shape and applications of this tool in line with her requirements (historically, of course, the focus has been on “HIM”). Technology has been conceived of as a scientific practice and skill in the making of these instruments that enable human life in its ever-changing environments. This opened up a recognition of the locus of technology as a force that unveils the processes of meaning-­making, self-representation and self-situation for both its producers and users. This hubris of this field of philosophical inquiry has fascinated modern philosophers since Martin Heidegger’s text The Question Concerning Technology (Heidegger 1977 [1954]: 13–35), but is now being creatively applied to societal context by phenomenologists of technology (see Verbeek 1993, 2005), computational semioticians (Gudwin and Gomide 1997) and sociologists (Webster 1995). Heidegger’s seminal contribution, deriving from his existentialist thought, was a postulation that technology, as techne, is a mode of self-­ making know-how.9 This established that technological objects are not mere objects (noumena) but part of the reality that is ineluctably ready-at-­ hand, that enmeshes the human user into a process of self-understanding, revealing her world. Technology has an ontic-ontological dimension and impact on human being: it enables the user to self-actualise and self-situate as a being-in-the-world, as it reveals (poeisis) what characterises a given time/period in which one becomes their umwelt (Heidegger 1977 [1954]: 24). Building on this Heideggerian philosophical tradition in the age of the computer and artificial intelligence, Peter-Paul Verbeek and others set out to reverse the Subject-Object classical schema of the phenomenological method (see Lindberg 2019). Verbeek would explicate that “when technologies are used, they co-shape human-world relationships: they make possible practices and experiences, and in so doing, they play an active role in the way humans can be present in their world and vice versa” 9  “For technology does not go back to the techne of the Greeks in name only but derives historically and essentially from techne as a mode of altheueina, mode, that is, of rendering beings manifest”, Heidegger in “Letter on Humanism” (Heidegger 1985 [1947]: 293).

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(Verbeek 2005: 140). Technological objects share the human subject’s intentional (intentionality) space. Drawing attention to this “technological intentionality” which is at play during the interlocution and interface between humans and machines, especially intelligent devices, Verbeek (2005: 125–146), Ihde (2003: 131–144) and others (Harbers 2005) inaugurated the phenomenological sovereignty of the Object, the tool. They were labelled themselves “post-phenomenologists”. They have mounted an argument and research programmes that prove the power of technology to shape and frame both our living spaces and our self-­ consciousness (see Walker et al. 2019). The veracity of their theorisation has amply been demonstrated in human interaction with human-like robots (humanoids), in the way they just evoke psychic-emotive responses from us. Think of sex robots. The same theory applies to the electronic bots that harass us into wearing our safety seatbelts in our modern automobiles (see Coeckelbergh 2018). The post-phenomenological valorisation of the ontology of technological objects has immensely profound implications for a socio-­cultural polity that has no control over the production of the technologies that it is using—technologies which, in turn, shape its collective self-­perception, self-actualisation and self-situation in the world. As I alert below, in such a case, an ontological disequilibrium sets in between the collective intentionality of this socio-cultural polity and that of an alien geo-culturally imbued technological intentionality. An asymmetry in existence occurs between the human user and the technological device, in which the latter assumes greater power, even at least as a mysterious object. The culturally disadvantaged user is simultaneously alienated and mesmerised by an object that imposes itself as instrumental for the efficiencies of her life. Accordingly, a postcolonial critical theory that is premised on this post-­ phenomenological articulation of technology cannot but consider the implications of the global economic standing of African societies that have not, or cannot, deliver technological innovations of global significance. What are the psychological dynamics of their wonder and fascination at these imported smart devices and systems that are running their lives beyond comprehension and control? Are these technologies fetishes imbued with alien powers, emblems of the superior intellectual capabilities of foreign cultures, and commercial and political powers? Does this not cement a vicious circle of negative self-representation and ascriptions of “backwardness” at both the personal and national levels? These are the ontological ramifications of technology as human society advances deeper

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into the Fourth Industrial Revolution, a situation that makes the position of Africa in the global scheme of the design, production and consumption of technology gravely acute. For Africa, the dangers of the operation of the dynamic of the technological-ontic asymmetry described above as the plausibility of the ontological disequilibrium between an artefact and the user are vividly laden in socio-technological systems. The case of socially placed robots that are designed with physiological-aesthetic features that resemble non-­Africans, but are meant for deployment and use in African homes, emblematically illustrates this phenomenon. The design and deployment/purchase/use of socially situated human-like robots raise a multitude of profoundly theoretical and ethical challenges on the present and future modes of appropriation of technology by Africans. The velocity of the conundrum they present range from aesthetics to politics, that is, the politics of how the humanoid robots are made to look, to the nature of the social roles they are made to assume in the human space, and how, in turn, this affect the self-perception of their African user (see Lamola 2020). The point foregrounded in this status quaestionis is that an African disquisition around AI has to move beyond protestations against bias in algorithms and the socio-aesthetics of humanoids, that is, how their “look” portends gender and racial stereotypes in society, to how they phenomenologically affect the psychic-ontology of their “users”. Taking on from the critical research already published on the racial bias on algorithms, as epitomised by Ruha Benjamin’s Race After Technology (2019), an extended probing should interrogate the intellectual-­ontological ramifications of the geo-political and geo-cultural origins of all technological devices that are presented exogenetically to peoples of African descent. This is the type of inquiry that thrusts Black and African existential phenomenology into the arena of philosophy of technology, extending work such as that of Lewis Gordon (2000). An illustrative inquiry in this regard would be the question of whether a socially disempowered black rural African woman could feel looked down upon, undermined of bullied by a white-male like a robot (see Sparrow 2019). How are the poor and marginalised relating to the machines they have to fiddle with every time they have to get their desperately needed remittances from the bank? Most of the voice bots are in languages which they are not conversant in, which are spoken by persons associated with social positionalities that are not normally friendly with them.

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With a cultivated hermeneutic of suspicion—proper to persons in the socially marginalised global periphery of the techno-economic arena— there is the need to instinctively ask at all times: where was this gadget designed and manufactured? Which problems was it directed to solve, and how was it to enhance the existence of the beneficiaries of that solution in their environment?

The Singularity of an African Contribution From an ideological-methodological perspective, the Afrocentric position ventilated thus far could provoke the standard retort about the need to guard against cultural chauvinism in science, and the moral responsibility of African postcolonial thought to take the reality of the cosmopolitan nature of the modern world into account. These are sentiments traditionally championed by Kwame Anthony Appiah (2018). Two important, albeit subliminal, contestations are latent in these concerns. The first one is, why must we have a specialised, exclusively African discourse whilst dealing with science (and technology)? What is so peculiar about Africa? The second contestation pertains to the nature of the methodological complexity involving a situationally “particular” and a “universalist” epistemology. Both of these contestations were comprehensively addressed by Aimé Césaire as discursive themes in a manner that still retains perennial valence in his 1956 letter of resignation from the Communist Party of France. On the implicit question of the Afrocentrism we have suggested throughout our foregoing discussion, Césaire wrote: We … have come to grasp, in our consciousness, the full breadth of our singularity [peculiarity], and are ready to assume on all levels and in all areas the responsibilities that flow from this coming to consciousness. The singularity of our “situation in the world,” which cannot be confused with any other. The singularity of our problems, which cannot be reduced to any other problem. The singularity of our history, constructed out of terrible misfortunes that belong to no one else. The singularity of our culture, which we wish to live in a way that is more and more real. What else can be the result of this but that our paths toward the future—all our paths, political as well as cultural—are not yet charted? That they are yet to be discovered, and that the responsibility for this discovery belongs to no one but us? (Césaire [1956] 2010: 151)

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The paucity of a robust singularly Afrocentric sociology and philosophy of technology that will feed the spirit of endogenous innovation is a challenge that awaits tackling by Africans, conscientised to solve African problems in an African way. What about the danger of this leading to a closed particularism that is impervious to the demands for collaboration and the universal principles and procedures that define scientific enquiry? Again, the sagacity of Césaire on this matter remains unsurpassed: Provincialism? Not at all! I am not burying myself in a narrow particularism. But neither do I want to lose myself in an emaciated [disembodied] universalism. There are two ways to lose oneself: walled segregation in the particular or dilution in the “universal.” My conception of the universal is that of a universal enriched by all that is particular, a universal enriched by every particular: the deepening and coexistence of all particulars. (Césaire [1956] 2010: 152)

African self-experience, knowledge systems and ways of life have been interrupted and violated by the history of Western Modernity. This includes the historical plunder of African human capital by the Trans-­ Atlantic Slave Trade. An emergence from this reality, which temporally is by no means “historical”, in the past, as prevailing vestiges of neo-­ colonialism attest, demands an unapologetic search for both intellectual and material tools for the self-recuperation of Africa. This sense of confident urgency has been immortalised by Cesaire’s erstwhile pupil and protégé, Frantz Omar Fanon, in his last published words in the closing paragraphs of The Wretched of the Earth: Come, then, comrades, the European game has finally ended; we must find something different. We today can do everything, so long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed with the desire to catch up with Europe. (1962: 312) … Let us decide not to imitate Europe; let us combine our muscles and our brains in a new direction. Let us try to create the whole man, whom Europe has been incapable of bringing to triumphant birth.

Significantly, he added: Humanity is waiting for something from us other than such an imitation, which would be almost an obscene caricature… (314) … But if we want humanity to advance a step further, if we want to bring it up to a different

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level than that which Europe has shown it, then we must invent and we must make discoveries … For Europe, for ourselves, and humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man (314–315).

Fanon makes a distinct statement and offer of a new “particular”, a new way of conceiving the human, a new way of thinking which is offered relative to a pre-existing one which he adjudges as deleterious. The relevance of this Fanonian “radicalism” for the discipline of technology is corroborated by the fact that the anticolonial “particular” exposited by Cesaire was articulated more explicitly in 1906 by South African nationalist, Pixley Ka Seme (Seme 1906), in his iconic “The Regeneration of Africa” award-winning speech at the University of Colombia (in Karis and Carter 1972: 69–73), a speech which Kwame Nkrumah deemed significant to read in full at the 1962 First Conference of Africanists (Ngqulunga 2017: 17). Against the exuberance of a New  York City in the throes of the Second Industrial Revolution and his Zululand still under colonial subjugation, Seme courageously asserted that “the African is not a proletarian in the world of science and art” (Karis and Carter 1972: 69). He proceeded to declare that “the regeneration of Africa means that a new and unique civilisation is soon to be added to the world” and that “the most essential departure of this new civilisation is that it shall be thoroughly spiritual and humanistic—indeed a regeneration moral and eternal” (Karis and Carter: 71). Both Fanon and Seme maintained that there is a unique and irreplaceable place for a particular, countervailing African world view with its peculiar philosophy of science and technology: this, Africa owes the globalising world.

Concluding Reflection This chapter has endeavoured to register the conditions for a status quaestionis on the state of Africa in the light of how the global economic and attendant ontic-ontological consequences accompanying the Fourth Industrial Revolution are intertwined. Veering into a methodological prism grounded on the utilisation of the philosophical-phenomenology method, I have isolated these psychic-ontological effects of technology as the compelling reason for the urgency to engage in an anticolonial, as opposed to a mere “postcolonial” technoscientific appraisal of the current

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import and cultural appropriation of artificial intelligence technologies in Sub-Saharan Africa. A key conclusion of this reflection is that the peculiar historical and current geo-cultural position of Africa, which justifies for an Afrocentric focus on the 4IR, is impelled by a conviction that despite the cultural and epistemic pillage of her past, Africa has resiliently retained an intellectual prowess necessary to contribute to the world from her inexhaustible and unique heritage. As proclaimed by Nkrumah, in his first speech at the foundation summit of the Organization of African Unity, Addis Ababa, 24 May 1963, and archived in the African Union’s Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa 2024: We shall accumulate machinery and establish steel works, iron foundries and factories; we shall link the various states of our continent with communications; we shall astound the world with our hydroelectric power; we shall drain marshes and swamps, clear infested areas, feed the undernourished, and rid our people of parasites and disease. It is within the possibility of science and technology to make even the Sahara bloom into a vast field with verdant vegetation for agricultural and industrial developments. (African Union 2014: 5)

This re-energised focus should ensure that Africa’s contribution to STI (Science, Technology and Innovation) ipso facto de-centres mainstream scientific discourse and technological innovation, and pluriversalise10 these into a multi-cultural open-ended global project, such as is idealised by Patricia Fara in her Science: A four hundred years history (see Fara 2009: xv–xviii). The Afrocentric perspectives alluded to in this chapter, in the spirit of Fanon, must resolutely be self-affirming and bold experiments on ways and means of infusing an African perspective on the theoretic considerations on the design philosophies, engineering, education and distribution of technology. This new approach should be achieved through catalysing several multi-disciplinary and inter-linked studies drawn through both qualitative and quantitative methodological practices that can produce tangible results, that is, paradigms that can cogently theorise the ramifications of the fourth industrial on African self-knowledge and social ontologies. 10  A break with the universal, ethnocentric epistemological approach, to a multi-cultural, pluriversal one.

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References Afolayan, A., & Falola, T. (Eds.). (2017). The Palgrave Handbook of African Philosophy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. African Union. (2014). Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa 2024 (STISA-2024). Retrieved May 10, 2020, from https://au.int/sites/ default/files/documents/38756-­d oc-­s tisa_science_tech_innovation_ strategy.pdf Appiah, K. A. (2018). The Lies that Bind: Rethinking Identity. New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation. Benjamin, R. (2019). Race After Technology: Abolitionist Tools for the New Jim Code. Cambridge: Polity Press. Bertasio, D. (1993). The Role of Culture in the Technological Advancement Process. AI & Society, 7(3), 248–252. Borgmann, A. (2006). Technology as a Cultural Force. Cahiers Canadiens de sociologie, 31(2), 351–360. Bostrom, N. (2005). A History of Transhumanist Thought. Journal of Evolution and Technology, 14(1), 1–25. Césaire, M. (2010). Letter to Maurice Thorez, Paris, October 24, 1956, trans. Chike Jeffers. Social Text, 103(28), 2, 152. Coeckelbergh, M. (2016). Technology and the Good Society: A Polemical Essay on Social Ontology, Political Principles, and Responsibility for Technology. Technology in Society, 52, 4–9. Coeckelbergh, M. (2018). Why Care About Robots? Empathy, Moral Standing, and the Language of Suffering. Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science, 20, 141–158. De Sousa Santos, B. (2014). Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide. New York: Routledge. Eze, E. C. (1997). Toward a Critical Theory of Postcolonial African Identities. In E. C. Eze (Ed.), Postcolonial African Philosophy: Critical Reader (pp. 339–344). Oxford: Blackwell. Fara, P. (2009). Science: A Four Thousand Year History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Floridi, L. (2014). The Fourth Revolution: How the Infosphere is Reshaping Human Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gordon, L. R. (2000). Existentia Africana: Understanding Africana Existential Thought. New York: Routledge. Grosfoguel, R. (2007). The Epistemic Decolonial Turn: Beyond Political-­ Economy Paradigms. Cultural Studies, 21(2–3), 211–223. Gudwin, R.  R., & Gomide, F.  A. C. (1997). Computational Semiotics: An Approach for the Study of Intelligent Systems—Part I: Foundations—Technical Report RT DCA 09–DCA-FEEC-UNICAMP, 1997. Retrieved August 2, 2020, from www.dca.fee.unicamp.br/~gudwin/ftp/publications/rep1_97.pdf

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PART II

African Values and Technology

CHAPTER 4

African Reasons Why AI Should Not Maximize Utility Thaddeus Metz

Introducing the Question of How to Programme Artificially Intelligent Automated Systems How should automated systems governed by artificial intelligence (AI) be programmed so as to act in accordance with sound moral norms? For instance, how should one programme a self-driving car that learns in the course of navigating streets? How should one programme a robot that is able to provide nursing to patients or domestic labour to family members, upon adapting to their various idiosyncrasies? How should one programme a military weapon that takes advantage of the way soldiers tend to engage in battle? How should one programme a device that could mine underground on its own, changing its direction and method of extraction upon updating calculations of which kind of ore is likely to be in which place? In asking how to programme these systems so that they do the right thing, one need not presume that the machines count as moral agents in any robust sense. Instead, it is perfectly sensible to view them as lacking

T. Metz (*) University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. D. Okyere-Manu (ed.), African Values, Ethics, and Technology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70550-3_4

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moral agency and instead as being mere tools of their designers, who are human persons and hence moral agents. If a self-driving car is not disposed to stop for pedestrians, it is not the car that has performed a culpable wrong, but the one who made it (or, more carefully, the one who had let it onto the street upon knowing, or having had a duty to know, how it was made). The question is in the first instance about how those making automated systems governed by artificial intelligence should construct them, supposing they know they will be deployed in social contexts (and not merely contained in a laboratory). It appears that the dominant answer to that question has been a utilitarian one, according to which a machine ought to be programmed so as to do what, in the light of available data and processing power, is expected to maximize what is good for human beings and to minimize what is bad for them in the long run (Shulman et al. 2009; Majot and Yampolskiy 2014; Marwala 2014, 2017; Hibbard 2015; Oesterheld 2015, 2016; Kinjo and Ebina 2017; Bauer 20201). As I indicate below, this approach has the advantages of appearing to capture the nature of rational choice, to be impartial and hence morally attractive, as well as to be amenable to being formalized and coded. Utilitarianism is a characteristically western conception of moral-­ practical reason, having been advanced in various of its respects by classic philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, Blaise Pascal, Jeremy Bentham, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill, and continuing to guide much thought about ethics and public policy in the twenty-first-century American-­ European-­Australasian context. In this chapter, I appeal to characteristically African values to question the moral aptness of programming AI automated systems to maximize utility. Although I draw on perspectives that are particularly prominent in contemporary sub-Saharan ethics, and hence (presumably) in the worldviews of the ‘traditional’ peoples and cultures that inform them, the objections to utilitarianism will, at a certain level of abstractness, resonate with those from a variety of moral-philosophical backgrounds, particularly from the Global South. Utilitarianism prescribes a number of immoral actions in the light of some plausible beliefs common 1  For unusual or tangential applications, there are Grau (2005), who deems utilitarianism apt for robot-robot relations, even if not for robot-human interaction; Gloor (2016), who urges that AI be used primarily to avoid extremely bad outcomes for human beings, and not to produce particularly good ones; and Bonnefon et al. (2015, 2016), who argue that western people are generally utilitarian about how self-driving cars should be programmed.

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in African ethical thought, and supposing that moral actions are necessarily rational ones, these criticisms also implicitly cast doubt on the apparent rationality of utilitarianism. Although there is recent literature on how one might apply AI to resolve problems in Africa and on ethical issues facing AI’s application to Africa (e.g. World Wide Web Foundation 2017; Access Partnership 2018; Gwagwa 2019a; Sallstrom et al. 2019; Ormond 2020), there is literally nothing as yet on how one might do so in the light of indigenous African values as distinct from western ones. By ‘African’ values, I mean ones salient in the massive sub-Saharan region of the continent, that is, beliefs about morality found amongst many indigenous black peoples (as opposed to, say, those of Arab descent in the north) over a long span of time and not found amongst many other societies around the world.2 Recently, one scholar has noted ‘the need to define African values and align AI with them’ (Gwagwa 2019b), but has not yet sought to meet the need, while another has said that ‘African cultural values need to be taken into account when defining a framework for AI on the continent’ (Spini 2019), but has not developed such a framework. Here I aim to make some headway when it comes to heeding these calls. I do not do so for reasons of relativism. It is not my view that the values that should govern technology in a certain society are necessarily those held by most in that society. I believe that majorities can be mistaken about right and wrong action, as nineteenth-century Americans were in respect of slavery. Instead, I draw on under-considered African ethical perspectives in the thought that any long-standing philosophical tradition probably has some insight into the human condition and has something to teach those outside it. Many of the values I identify as ‘African’ will, upon construing them abstractly, be taken seriously by many moral philosophers, professional ethicists, and the like around the world, especially, but not solely, outside the West. In the following, I begin by defining my target, saying more about what the nature of utilitarianism is, explaining why theorists have been drawn towards it, and illustrating what it would look like when applied to AI automated systems (section “Utilitarianism in the Context of AI”). Then, I advance, on African grounds, four major objections to 2  Such a definition of what ‘African’ means entails that in order to count, a value need neither be held by all those in Africa nor be held only by those in Africa. For more on what geographical labels plausibly mean, see Metz (2015).

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programming AI automated systems to maximize utility, arguing that doing so would fail to respect human dignity (section “Human Dignity and AI”), inadequately uphold group rights (section “Group Rights and AI”), violate a principle of family first (section “Family First and AI”), and counterintuitively forbid certain kinds of self-sacrifice on behalf of others (section “Self-sacrifice and AI”). Although one might have thought that utilitarianism expects a lot from a moral agent, I argue that it cannot even get that right, for it forbids one from helping others when helping oneself would do the most good impartially construed. I conclude by briefly noting some avenues for future research, such as considering what African grounds there might be to question the other major western moral theory, Kantianism (section “Conclusion: From Utilitarianism to Kantianism”).

Utilitarianism in the Context of AI In this section I tell the reader what I mean by ‘utilitarianism’ and related terms such as ‘maximize utility’, show why it has been taken so seriously by ethical theorists, and give some examples of how it might inform AI automated systems. This section is therefore largely expository, saving critical discussion for later sections. As will be familiar to many readers, utilitarianism is the doctrine that for any action to be rational and moral, it must be expected to maximize what is good for human beings (and perhaps animals) and to minimize what is bad for them in the long run.3 By standard utilitarianism, what is good for us is subjective, a matter of either pleasant experiences, satisfied preferences, or positive emotions, and what is bad consists of pain, dissatisfaction, or negativity. Subjective well-being is taken to be the only thing good for its own sake or at least the only sort of good that should be action-guiding for us as moral agents. Everything else on earth, at least in the mineral and vegetable kingdoms (again, potentially excluding the animal kingdom), is at best of merely instrumental value for being of use to foster our subjective well-being.4 3  I therefore address act-utilitarianism in this chapter, setting aside rule-utilitarianism, which has been much less influential in AI circles. I believe that many of the objections to the former apply to the latter, but it takes extra work to demonstrate that. For one advocate of rule-utilitarianism in the context of AI, see Bauer (2020). 4  There are of course those who pair a consequentialist combinatorial function with an objective account of final value, with an early advocate being Moore (1903) and a more recent one being Railton (1984). I believe the Afro-centric objections made below to classic

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Now, on the face of it, everyone’s well-being matters equally, such that one would be objectionably biased to leave out anyone’s interests when considering how to act. It would also appear irrational to leave out anyone’s interests when making decisions, for a given person’s subjective well-being has just as much value in itself as anyone else’s. Furthermore, it is prima facie rational to produce as much of what is good for its own sake as one can; every bit of well-being that one could promote provides an agent reason to promote it, making it irrational to do anything less than the best one is in a position to do. Morality, too, seems to counsel maximizing what is good for us and minimizing what is bad, for surely it is preferable from the moral point of view to do all one can for the sake of humanity. This consequentialist account of moral-practical reason is compelling, and it is not surprising to find it, or at least various elements of it, invoked in a wide array of western contexts. For instance, it appears to capture the logic of many everyday decisions that at least ‘modern’ western people make. When deciding whether to use a bicycle or a car to get to work, they naturally attend to the results of the two options, not merely for themselves, but also for others. Riding the bike would be painful and would take longer, and yet it would be beneficial in the long run in respect of one’s health and hence one’s happiness. Taking the car would be more pleasant and quicker, but it would cost more money and pollute the environment, risking lung cancer to others. Utilitarianism prescribes choosing whichever option would have the most good outcomes with the least bad outcomes in the long term, impartially weighing everyone’s interests given available information. People do not always in fact choose in that way, but, for the utilitarian, they should, as doing so would be prescribed by a consistent application of the logic they themselves tend to use to make decisions. When it comes to state officials, those governing people living in a certain territory, it is common to appeal to what is called in public policy circles ‘cost-benefit analysis’. Since all citizens matter equally, those who make and carry out the law should do so in ways that are going to maximize benefits and to minimize costs, taking the good of all citizens impartially into account. Consider that it would be patently unjust for those with political power to use government resources such as jobs and money to utilitarianism apply with comparable force to objective consequentialism, at least if it includes agent-neutrality (and so is unlike Sen 2000).

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benefit themselves, their families, or a certain racial group at the expense of the general welfare. Still more, at least the maximizing element of utilitarianism has been dominant in western economics for at least three centuries, with actors in market exchanges seeking to obtain the most amount of profit or goods and with the least amount of expense. Of course, in the context of markets, people are motivated by self-interest and not the interests of all. However, Adam Smith has famously argued that even if one’s intention is not to benefit others when maximizing profit for oneself, in the long run that practice often enough ends up benefiting society more than other courses of action one could have undertaken, ‘as if by an invisible hand’. Beyond these considerations of the nature of rationality and morality, programmers and those who work with them or otherwise think about programming are drawn towards utilitarianism because it appears quantifiable and hence able to be coded (as noted in Anderson and Anderson 2007: 18; Oesterheld 2015).5 Clearly, some pleasures are greater than others and some preferences are stronger than others. Utilitarians believe that, in principle, we could assign cardinal values to such states, ascribing real numbers to degrees of subjective well-being and woe. While that is of course difficult for a human being to calculate, artificial intelligence might be in a terrific position to estimate how much pleasure versus pain a given course of action would be expected to produce and to identify the one with the highest net balance (Anderson et  al. 2005; Anderson and Anderson 2007: 18). Applied to, say, a self-driving car, it would be natural for a utilitarian programmer to have it minimize the number of people killed. It would be irrational and immoral, so the argument goes, to favour the interests of, say, the driver as opposed to pedestrians. Instead, everyone’s interests count equally from the moral point of view, meaning that the car ought to be directed to do whatever would produce the greatest pleasure and the least pain in the long run, which presumably would come from killing one person instead of three, supposing those were the only options available. It might seem as though a utilitarian weapon would be nonsensical. After all, utilitarianism is impartial, with a person’s nationality making zero difference to her moral standing as capable of subjective well-being, whereas during a time of war one is expected to take sides, that is, to place 5  For a dissenting perspective, that it would be impossible to programme enough information for a machine to account for long-term results, see Allen, Varner, and Zinser (2000: 256).

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the lives of the soldiers from one’s country ahead of those of others. However, it is worth considering the point that we should in fact want programmers to develop weapons that would serve only just causes such as rebutting aggression as well as ones that would not treat enemy soldiers, even those fighting for an unjust cause, as though they do not matter at all. Having expounded utilitarianism and why it has been attractive, one might wonder what in the world is wrong with it. Despite its strengths, the African philosophical tradition provides strong reason for thinking that it has irredeemable weaknesses.

Human Dignity and AI Although utilitarianism ascribes a moral status to every individual human being that is alive and either is sentient, has preferences, or exhibits emotions, it does not accord them a dignity. The former amounts to the view that for whichever being is capable of subjective well-being, there is pro tanto moral reason to promote its welfare. The latter is the idea that a person has a superlative non-instrumental value that merits respect. To have a moral status, and hence to be owed dutiful treatment directly, does not imply that one is a person who is good for its own sake to a degree higher than anything else in the world. In addition, for there to be moral reason to promote an individual’s well-being differs from there being moral reason to avoid degrading a person. Improving others’ well-being does have a place in African thought, but most often insofar as doing so can sometimes be a way of expressing respect for people who have a dignity. Traditionally speaking, sub-Saharans tend to believe that our dignity is constituted by either vital force or group membership. Vital force is an imperceptible energy that has come from God and permeates everything in the universe in varying amounts and complexities, where, of perceptible beings, human persons have the most (Wiredu 1996: 157–71; Ilesanmi 2001; Deng 2004; Iroegbu 2005; Etieyibo 2017). From this perspective, it is not our quality of life that matters fundamentally for morality, as per utilitarianism, but rather the fact of life itself; our nature is sacred for exhibiting a certain quantity or quality of divine energy. Other times African thinkers maintain that persons have a dignity by virtue of membership or relationship. One scholar remarks, ‘The dignity of human beings emanates from the network of relationships, from being in community; in an African view, it cannot be reduced to a unique,

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competitive and free personal ego’ (Botman 2000), while another says, ‘(T)he human person in Africa is from the very beginning in a network of relationships that constitutes his alienable dignity’ (Bujo 2001: 88). There are different views on precisely which relationships matter, with some holding that they are ones with a clan or a specific community that has cared for one or that you have cared for (Cobbah 1987; Ikuenobe 2016), and others suggesting the relevant relationships are with the human species as a whole (perhaps Gyekye 2010: sec. 6). Both views are controversial from a cross-cultural perspective. For example, western philosophers would be inclined to ground our dignity on our capacity for autonomy, while thinkers in the Judeo-Christian-­ Islamic tradition would maintain that it is constituted by a God-given soul (i.e. a spiritual substance as opposed to an imperceptible force). Although a specific and defensible account of what it is that gives us a dignity would be useful when articulating a comprehensive ethic, it is unnecessary to consider utilitarianism’s implications for AI. So long as individual persons have a dignity that merits respectful treatment, regardless of what confers that dignity on us, a moral agent will be forbidden from treating persons merely as a means to the greater good. That is, a typical dignity-based ethic will accord human rights to each person, where to have a human right is for others to have a duty not to subordinate or harm a person that should be upheld even if not doing so would promote a marginally greater amount of value in the world. It is well known that a utilitarian ethic has difficulty accounting for human rights. Here is a classic example from contemporary Anglo-­ American ethics (Nozick 1974: 28–30). Imagine that a mob angry about an apparent crime will severely beat and then kill two innocent people unless you, the sheriff in town, frame, corporally punish, and execute one innocent person. From a utilitarian perspective, it would be rational and moral for you to do terrible things to the person, if that were indeed the only way to prevent others from doing terrible things to a larger extent. However, from a human rights perspective, you should not, for doing so would degrade the person. Instead of treating him as though he is valuable for his own sake, it would treat him as though he has a merely instrumental value for the reduction of bad outcomes in the world. Of course, utilitarians are initially inclined to reply that the case is inaccurately described. They will suggest that the outcomes of a sheriff harming and killing one innocent person would likely be worse in the long run than letting two innocents be harmed and killed by others. After all, upon

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the sheriff framing an innocent person, the criminal is still free to commit crime again, and when people discover that the sheriff has done so, the criminal justice system will be weakened, allowing all the more murders to take place down the road. However, it is not unfair to suppose, for the sake of argument, that there was in fact no crime committed, but that the sheriff was not in a position to convince members of the public of that in time before rioting. In addition, it is reasonable to imagine, also for the sake of argument, that no one would ever discover that the sheriff has framed an innocent party for the non-existent crime. It is intelligible to ask what the right thing to do would be under these conditions, where a human rights perspective will look compelling to many African ethicists and to many other adherents to the idea of human dignity around the world. What does a human rights framework mean for how to programme AI automated systems? It would involve directing them to treat persons in certain ways that are incompatible with maximizing utility. For example, consider a self-driving car. The most basic version of what is widely known as ‘the trolley problem’, often applied to self-driving cars (for just one influential example, see Awad et  al. 2018), appears to tell in favour of utilitarianism.6 In that case, the car has the two options of either, say, striking two pedestrians if it continues forward or veering in another direction where it would strike one pedestrian. Here, it appears that it would be right for the car to strike the one, which lends prima facie support to utilitarianism. However, upon reflection, the support is weak, as there are many other situations in which it would intuitively be a human rights violation to kill one so as to save two. For example, imagine that the self-driving car happens to have two critically injured passengers in it and that they will die unless they get to the hospital in time. Suppose further that the only way to get them to the hospital in time would be for the self-driving car to mow down one pedestrian. It appears that respect for the person’s dignity forbids killing him in order to save the lives of two others. In short, he has a human right to life that should be observed when programming a self-­ driving car.

6  For the view that the trolley problem is importantly distinct from the self-driving car controversy, see Nyholm and Smids (2016).

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Group Rights and AI Although it is characteristic of African moral thought to ascribe a dignity to individual persons, it is likewise characteristic of it to maintain that certain kinds of wholes merit moral consideration. There are some sub-­ Saharan theorists who appear to believe only in group rights, such that, say, a family or clan alone has rights and the individual has none, or at least none that could ever conflict with them (e.g. Ake 1987). However, much more common is the view that there are both individual rights and collective rights, which might come into conflict with each other and need to be balanced in some way. Consider, for example, the African (‘Banjul’) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Organization of African Unity 1981), which includes many rights of individual human beings alongside those ascribed to a people, which is probably best understood as a nation (or perhaps a country). The latter include rights of a people not to be dominated and to resist domination (Article 20), and rights of a people to natural resources, socio-economic development, and an environment necessary for that (Articles 21, 22, 24). Similarly, see the Charter for African Cultural Renaissance (African Union 2006). It too accords individuals many rights to access and develop their culture, but alongside them the document speaks of African peoples evolving, being provided resources, and being enriched (Preamble and Articles 3 and 5), the rights of minorities to their cultures (Article 5), and the cultural advancement of African states (Article 18). It is natural to think of the talk of duties with respect to peoples, minorities, and states as group-based. However, it is a contested matter, amongst philosophers and related thinkers around the world, whether to ascribe moral rights to groups as distinct from their individual members. Some, particularly in the West, maintain that what might appear to be group rights are ultimately the rights of the individuals who compose them. While a well-developed theory of rights to culture, to development, and to resist domination would be welcome, it is not necessary in order to cast doubt on utilitarianism. Supposing that such rights exist, regardless of what ultimately grounds them, we find reason to resist programming AI automated systems in a utilitarian manner. To see this point, consider the right of a people to resist foreign domination of it and what such a right entails for how to programme a smart automated weapons system. Above I suggested that a utilitarian weapons

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system would naturally be deployed to rebut aggression, but that is not always so. Sometimes aggression that is intuitively unjustified would serve to maximize utility in the long run, and sometimes rebutting such aggression but failing to maximize utility in the long run is intuitively justified. Such seems to be the case when the aggression is undertaken by a much greater majority than the non-aggressing minority being suppressed. Suppose that powers beyond Africa use their might to enslave a small sub-­ Saharan people, forcing it to extract minerals and related resources to drive foreign economies. Utilitarianism could permit such imperialism and forbid resistance against it, if the numbers who flourished from it were great and the numbers who suffered from it were small. However, if the dominated people rose up against its taskmasters, it would be apt for a smart automated weapons system to assist it, despite the fact that doing so would fail to maximize utility. Whereas a utilitarian weapon would operate on the side of the oppressor, a morally justified weapon would operate on the side of the oppressed, regardless of the numbers involved.

Family First and AI In the previous section I noted that many African ethicists believe in human, that is, individual rights while also accepting some kind of collective rights. Here, I somewhat similarly note that many African ethicists believe that morality has an impartial dimension while also contending that it has a partial one, where the partiality is antithetical to utilitarian reasoning. Ascribing a dignity to individuals, at least in virtue of their vital force or membership in the human family, entails a certain kind of impartiality, egalitarianism, or cosmopolitanism. That is, everyone matters from the moral point of view, such that a moral agent can have obligations to help others regardless of, say, their religion or nationality. As Kwame Gyekye has pointed out (2010: sec. 6), it is such impartial moral thought that plausibly explains the widespread traditional practice of welcoming visitors to an African village. Hospitality to those one does not know makes good sense if all human beings have a dignity that demands honouring. However, there is an additional salient part of African ethics that is instead partial, directing one to aid those related to you before aiding others or aiding the former to a greater degree than the latter. ‘Family first’ and ‘charity begins at home’ are widely accepted (e.g. Wiredu 1992: 200; Appiah 1998; Ramose 2003: 385–86; Molefe 2019: 84–86) and

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indicate that sub-Saharan morality is well understood as including special obligations of beneficence. If one had to choose between saving the life of one’s mother or that of a stranger, a characteristic African view would entail that one would do wrong not to save one’s mother. For utilitarianism, in contrast, one should flip a coin to decide whom to save if the outcomes of either option would be the same, or one should save the stranger if the outcomes of doing so would be marginally better than saving one’s mother. Traditionally speaking, it was blood relations that determined who has priority when it comes to aid (on which see Appiah 1998). That, however, is a controversial basis for grounding duties to help others. More common these days is the view that, having related communally with others for a long while or to a strong degree (as with family or colleagues), one owes more of oneself and one’s resources to them than to others. Regardless of the precise way in which people must be related to the moral agent in order to be prioritized, so long as priority should be accorded to those related to her in some way or other––as many readers will agree–– utilitarianism is suspect. It follows that when programming AI automated systems, from an African perspective one ought to do so in a way that respects partial duties. If there is a robot in the home, while it should be programmed to be hospitable to visitors, it should also be programmed, at least as a default, to save the life of one’s mother before that of a visitor who is not a member of the family or particularly close to it. A utilitarian robot, in contrast, would calculate the expected utility of saving one’s mother compared to saving the visitor, and the calculations might not go in favour of mum, particularly if she is old and sick and the visitor is young and healthy. Similar remarks apply to contexts in which there is relationality, even if to a less intense degree than that encountered in a family. For example, suppose a doctor has had a long-standing relationship with a particular patient and has programmed a robot to nurse him while staying in a hospital. It would be wrong for the doctor instead to allow the robot to disregard this patient’s needs, whenever doing so would be necessary to care for a patient of another doctor with marginally greater needs.

Self-sacrifice and AI Here I discuss the last major respect in which values that are African, while also being attractive to readers from a variety of backgrounds, are incompatible with utilitarianism and in a way that would have a bearing on

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programming AI automated systems. It concerns the permissibility of making sacrifices of one’s own welfare for the sake of others. It is well known that it is typical for an African ethical perspective to prescribe strong and substantial duties to help other people. That is particularly true in respect of family members, as per the previous section. However, even more impartial interpretations of African morality place heavy demands on a moral agent to improve others’ quality of life. For example, Gyekye’s influential moderate communitarian ethic prescribes doing all one can to promote the common good, that is, to meet the needs of everyone (albeit in ways that do not violate certain individual rights), without any distinction drawn between what is beyond the call of duty and what is not (1997: 35–76). Kwasi Wiredu’s interpretation of African morality in terms of sympathetic impartiality and the Golden Rule similarly expects a lot (1996, 2009: 15–16); putting oneself in others’ shoes, one will come to see that they would be glad if one aided them in significant ways. Such an approach to positive obligations might seem to dovetail neatly with utilitarianism, for it, too, is known for demanding much of a moral agent. However, two Anglo-American philosophers long ago noted respects in which utilitarianism would actually forbid you from doing what is best for others in the long run; that is when the most good in the world would be produced if one instead directed benefits towards oneself (see Nozick 1974: 41 on ‘utility monsters’ and Slote 1985 on ‘agent-sacrificing permissions’). Consider two cases to illustrate the concern (from Metz 2013: 188–89), after which I indicate what it might mean for AI automated systems. For a first case where the most good and least bad in the world would result if subjective well-being were conferred on oneself and woe were placed on others, consider a mother and son who are both hungry. Suppose that maximizing values of nutrition, taste, and the like prescribes mum eating a portion of food that has become available. Even so, it would surely be permissible for the mother to decide to give the food to her son. For a second case, imagine that a vicious canine is chasing you and a young woman, whom you do not know, and that minimizing fear, pain, and missed appointments prescribes outrunning, if not tripping, the woman so that the dog gets to her. Even so, it would be permissible for you instead to draw the dog towards yourself, enabling the woman to escape. In both cases, utilitarianism would forbid you from helping others, but for many

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African ethicists, and more generally intuitively, the right thing to do would instead be to help them. Consider how the permissibility of making sacrifices for others, despite a net loss of subjective well-being in the world, could influence the way to programme smart machines. Basically, any time one is in charge of how such a machine is deployed, one should be able to opt to direct it to save others before oneself. Consider a high-ranking military official who can choose a programme for a weapons system in a battlefield. He might direct it to discount his life relative to the lives of two other soldiers, even if the world would be in marginally better shape, in terms of net welfare, with him in it compared to them. Or if one is able to determine how to direct the life-saving procedures of a care robot in the home, one could set them to save the life of one’s sickly child before oneself, in case of, say, a fire. Surely, such programming would be morally permissible, contrary to the dictates of utilitarian reasoning.

Conclusion: From Utilitarianism to Kantianism Utilitarianism has been the most common western ethic invoked when considering how to programme artificially intelligent automated systems, while Kantianism (Powers 2006; Ulgen 2017; cf. Allen et al. 2000), or at least some kind of deontological approach informed by western values (Anderson et  al. 2005; Anderson and Anderson 2007), has been the runner up. If the project here has been found attractive by many readers, it is worth thinking about how it might be extended. If characteristic African values ground powerful objections to programming smart machines according to the principle of utility, might they have similar implications for doing so according to a principle of respect for autonomy (or an ethic of prima facie duties)? At this stage, the answer in the light of the specific argumentation in this chapter seems equivocal. Kantianism, after all, accepts the ideas that human dignity grounds human rights (section “Human Dignity and AI”) and also that one may sacrifice one’s happiness in order to help others achieve their ends (section “Self-sacrifice and AI”). However, it might be that the other two African reasons to reject utility maximization apply with comparable force to Kantianism. That is, if one believes that there are collective rights, it might be that they are not reducible to the dignity of individual persons (section “Group Rights and AI”). And if one believes that there are special obligations, it might be that they are not a function

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of promise making or accepting benefits from a cooperative scheme, the central ways that Kantians account for positive duties to specific individuals (section “Family First and AI”). It is worth considering in future work whether these African values provide grounds to doubt that AI should act in accordance with Kantian duty or whether there are other resources in the sub-Saharan ethical tradition to ground such doubt.7

References Access Partnership. (2018). Artificial Intelligence for Africa: An Opportunity for Growth, Development, and Democratisation. Retrieved May 11, 2020, from https://www.accesspartnership.com/artificial-­intelligence-­for-­africa-­an-­ opportunity-­for-­growth-­development-­and-­democratisation/. African Union. (2006). Charter for African Cultural Renaissance. Retrieved May 6, 2020, from https://au.int/en/treaties/charter-­african-­cultural-­renaissance. Ake, C. (1987). The African Context of Human Rights. Africa Today, 34, 5–12. Allen, C., Varner, G., & Zinser, J. (2000). Prolegomena to Any Future Artificial Moral Agent. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 12, 251–261. Anderson, M., & Anderson, S.  L. (2007). Machine Ethics: Creating an Ethical Intelligent Agent. AI Magazine, 28, 15–26. Retrieved August 12, 2020, from https://www.aaai.org/ojs/index.php/aimagazine/article/view/2065. Anderson, M., Anderson, S. L., & Armen, C. (2005). Towards Machine Ethics: Implementing Two Action-Based Ethical Theories. Retrieved July 15, 2020, from https://www.aaai.org/Papers/Symposia/Fall/2005/FS-­05-­06/FS0506-­001.pdf. Appiah, A. (1998). Ethical Systems, African. In E.  Craig (Ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Awad, E., Dsouza, S., Kim, R., Schulz, J., Henrich, J., Shariff, A., Bonnefon, J.-F., & Rahwan, I. (2018). The Moral Machine Experiment. Nature, 563, 59–64. Bauer, W. (2020). Virtuous vs. Utilitarian Artificial Moral Agents. AI & Society, 35, 263–271. Bonnefon, J.-F., Shariff, A., and Rahwan, I. (2015). Autonomous Vehicles Need Experimental Ethics: Are We Ready for Utilitarian Cars? Retrieved October 4, 2020, from https://arxiv.org/pdf/1510.03346v1.pdf.

7  For comments on talks based on prior drafts of this work, I thank Professor Tshilidzi Marwala and audience members at a debate between myself and Professor Marwala about his essay ‘On Rationality: An Artificial Intelligence Perspective’ that was organized by Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Study in 2019, as well as audience members at the 4th Centre for Artificial Intelligence Research (CAIR) Symposium in 2019.

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CHAPTER 5

Values and Technological Development in an African Context Bernard Matolino

Introduction Technological development as a human episode or ongoing human activity signifies development and innovation. It signifies development in the sense that any form of technological advancement is effectively movement from a lesser to a better state in respect of the area affected by that technology. It signifies innovation in the sense that it shows the creative (possibly unlimited) capacity for the human mind to process facts, overcome challenges, and bring forth new and helpful aids to human life. However, modern technological development has been neither widely nor equally distributed among all human groups. Certain groups or people have dominated in all areas relating to modern technological innovation. Africans, particularly in the modern era, have not been recognizable innovators. Their participation has been limited to the position of end users/consumers. This state of affairs brings into focus a number of troublesome questions centering on the reasons or explanations for such a

B. Matolino (*) University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. D. Okyere-Manu (ed.), African Values, Ethics, and Technology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70550-3_5

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lack of visibility in technological innovation. In light of this state of affairs, this chapter seeks to achieve two ends. Firstly, I present an argument linking technology to modernity. Secondly, I seek to show that Africans were left out of modernity. As a consequence of this, I shall seek to demonstrate the point that Africans need to develop a new attitude to modernity. This may include a shift in how African conceptualize development.

Africa’s Global Standing Anyone who is interested in Africa’s global standing must either have the strength and patience not to quickly tire or be embarrassed by the consistency of Africa as a bad performer in all measurable indices of human development. Ranging from life expectancy to disposable income, from electricity to clean water supply, from nutrition to infant mortality, from state-of-the-art communication systems to tarred roads, Africa consistently ranks one of the lowest regions in the world. Slow or absent development coupled with technological backwardness has been a feature of Africa’s social and economic systems for a very long time. There are two ways of accounting for Africa’s state of affairs. One approach would seek to place all blame on the history, reality, and effects of colonialism. Colonialism as a political, economic, and social event that altered the way Africa was moving, did permanent harm that may be impossible to reverse, this school would argue. Yet a contrasting view would seek to argue that the majority of problems Africa is faced with are internally generated. Not only have we impoverished ourselves, we have even fallen from the measures that we inherited from our former colonizers (Nwinya 2015: 236–237; Matolino 2019: 144–147). What this debate shows is the awareness of the problem that exists among Africans. However, there is divergence of what the real cause of that problem is. I will not seek to trace the merits of this debate (once again), but I cite it here to demonstrate the consensus that exists on the problem of development in Africa. What I will seek to do in this section is to outline how the issue of development may be thought of as a recalcitrant problem for modern Africa. Two notions that are important for the discussion I have in mind are development and modernity. I think these two issues, for our current purposes, are concomitant. If we look at the modern world’s history, it begins with the enlightenment. That age characterized by a reliance on human reason and the willingness to ask and answer questions from a purely

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human perspective authored how history was to unfold and how that history was to affect all human beings (Gottlieb 2017: ix–x). Ultimately, Westerners (read the white race) emerged as drivers and beneficiaries of this process as they became responsible not only for innovation and processes attendant to it but also for how human history unfolded. Through laying a leading role in determining the course of modernity, they had to innovate, and through use of technology, they became masters of their own situation and of the fate of other humans. Thus, modernity was both social and political on one hand, yet it was also an epistemological commitment to a particular interpretation of reality (Eisenstadt 2010: 3). I think there are two ways of looking at modernity. The first is the actual transition that happens when people’s lives and systems shift from one mode to another. Such a shift is characterized by moments of visible change that involves improvements in ways things are done, makes completion of tasks easier, and develops the environment people live in by ridding it of obstacles and dangers. Its most visible moment is the creation of new things, things that work and things that the ordinary people appreciate. When compared to the past, the difference is made clear by the introduction and usage of gadgets. But modernity is not just about the improvement of life through multiplication of gadgets and similar inventions. It is also about the spirit that is behind such developments— what Agbakgoba refers to as “value base of a society” (2005: 82). This second way of looking at modernity leads us to serious questions about what it is that makes modernity arise for a particular people at a particular time and place. Why was modernity, or its major features, not always with humanity right from the beginning? I think what can be said is that the spirit, in the sense intended by Max Weber (1930), of modernity depends on circumstances of its own past; it needs to be cultivated by those circumstances so that it can emerge as a response to those circumstances and as a search to overcome those very same circumstances. A society that is modernizing or a modernized society is necessarily a developed society or is necessarily a developing society (not in the sense that this term is used to describe Africa). A developing society is one that is evolving from its old ways and systems toward newer, more effective, more efficient, and more reliable ways (Taylor 1995: 26). Earlier, I referred to the spirit of modernity; we could also think of the spirit of development. We could talk of a spirit of development as signifying things that are opposite to a spirit of underdevelopment or stagnation. If a society is not infused with the spirit of modernity, it will not develop. Even if it is the

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case that such a society has reached the height of its civilization, if it is not open to modernizing, then it can only deteriorate. This also applies to a society that is rather too satisfied either with its past achievements or with its past glories. If such a society is not open to the possibility of improving itself through constantly modernizing its systems and developing itself, it will also be faced with the distinct reality of deteriorating.

Technology and Modernity Above I referred to the spirit of modernity. Talking of a spirit as responsible for something as precise as technology may seem inappropriate, yet what I will seek to do in this section is to draw an appropriate relationship between the spirit of modernity and whatever technological innovation we see. One of the most important things for humans, whether as individuals or as a group, is attitude. Attitude to life, attitude to events, attitude to reality, and attitude to interpreting things around us is important as it can direct us in certain ways at the exclusion of others. This attitude does not just come about from nothing. Rather, it is a combination of views that are rooted in experience as well as what people hope for. It is a combination of what is known and what is hoped for. It always relies on the authority of justifiable sources that constitute a people’s culture. Let us call this attitude a way of being for a people. Loosely, this way of being can be referred to as a spirit. What is imbued in a people is what we refer to as a spirit. Each and every people or each and every individual has, normally, a single spirit—unless they are schizophrenic. This spirit is shaped by values and belief systems that the group or the individual relies on to either make sense of life or as a guide in the pursuit of defined goals (Ujomu 2008). A spirit of freedom and innovation will enable individuals to view life differently from a spirit of fear and uncertainty. A spirit of free enterprise will allow individuals to do things that are not possible under a spirit of traditionalism, and so on. The particular life that people live or the conditions they have created for themselves under the life they live is then owed to what I have described here as a spirit. If, for example, we talk of a spirit of modernity, we are essentially referring to the basic cultural outlook and associated value systems that are consistent with the key features of modernity (as an epoch different from any other). Thus, for a people to be said to be modern, they should not only exhibit outcomes of modernity but underlying values of modernity. While we might be tempted to think that modernity and its values are the same, I will suggest that the

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sense I am working with creates a distinction between them. Values, on my present account, precede their phenomenon. I then take it that modernity is a phenomenon of certain values. If the modernity itself is associated with values or if we come across people speaking of modernity’s value, as if modernity itself was responsible for a certain cluster of values, then we should understand the latter to be a product of the effect of the root cause of modernity. Here is the chain I hope to establish; first are a set of values that are oriented in a particular direction. When those values become the dominant spirit, they then produce a phenomenon. That phenomenon is what is known as modernity. Modernity itself, in keeping with its original values, produces distinct effects. These effects are consistent with modernity’s founding spirit or values—that period we call the enlightenment. If the founding values were absent, then the phenomenon of modernity itself and all its effects could not have come into being. Admittedly, the enlightenment had a dark side to it. As philosophers of race such as Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (1999) have pointed out, the obsession with “man” which led to the need to account for differences in those men led to racist views. One of the most visible tragic moments of this visible difference is the slave trade. The dehumanization of African people through an elaborate scheme of capturing and enslaving fellow human beings so they could be transported to far-off lands where they were auctioned to lifelong suffering is the greatest stain on the enlightenment. If at all there was a spirit of modernity, then the spirit became evil as the great nations responsible for the modernization of the world were always tempted to fall into a trap of their project’s dark side. The very same people, again in the name of modernity, were to be responsible for colonialism and other atrocities committed in the name of the modernizing mission (Mungwini 2014: 17). The underlying spirit which was characteristic of the enlightenment, as seen in its quest to conquer the other, overcome natural obstacles, and develop new ways of understanding the human condition, is what continues to drive humanity up to this day. Our expansionist ideas can be seen in space missions, recent questions about the possibility of life on Mars, the desire to manipulate processes that are considered natural—such as aging, overcoming natural limitations such as distance and time— through the creation of fast and accurate connectivity, the desire to preserve ourselves by developing all sorts of efficiencies in drugs and medical procedures, the ability to travel in large numbers to any part of the world,

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the centralization of commerce and industry, and at to dependence on all these processes. The activities also extend themselves to other forms of security that humans seek to secure as seen in genetically modified food, and what drones can be used for in delivering vital supplies to remote areas. In recent years we have seen these processes speed up, impressively, from automobiles that are able to drive and control themselves to iPhones that can perform a myriad of functions, from finding direction to on-line shopping, to banking processes that are done from the comfort of one’s home to ever improving world connectivity; the world is truly anyone’s oyster. What all these processes have in common is the placement of the human at the center of processes that overcome some perceived challenges. The human is a beneficiary of not only a convenient and easy life but one who is always the beneficiary of these processes. Let us return to the enlightenment to illustrate the point I have in mind. The race that saw itself as advanced and capable of bringing about change (through its own initiative) was also the race that placed itself at the center of processes and truths that it ultimately deemed exclusive to itself. This, of course, had deleterious consequences when such self-prioritization led to questions of racism, bigotry, chauvinism, and speciesism. It also led to really bad historically known processes and outcomes that we all now consider to be backward. In today’s world we see the same sort of development with the trajectory that our obsession with development has taken. Since the idea of development is rooted in a specific understanding of the modern person as an overcomer of obstacles, a plotter of progress, and one whose reason is absolutely to be trusted, our pursuit of that ability to conquer and make things work for ourselves has turned to be disastrous. Global warming is our generation’s greatest recklessness in pursuit of development. In keeping with the spirit to conquer and to be ahead of everything, we have basically exhausted all the earth has to give and it is beginning to turn against us. Our emissions are unsustainable, our consumption of natural resources is unsustainable, our numbers are becoming unsustainable, and our technologies are also becoming unsustainable. As if this is not enough, the so-called superpowers of this world are defined not by the extent of their generosity but by their ability to amass weapons of mass destruction that they gladly make the rest of humanity know that they possess and are willing to deploy if they are threatened.

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Technology itself has been used in drone attacks to wipe out humanity and wreak havoc in cities and other places where people call home. This is the conquering spirit of modernity—a spirit that, of course, has a positive side to it but also a spirit that has a negative side to it. I think what we should be able to distinguish is, of course, the bad and the good side of that spirit. But importantly, we must understand how modernity and its effects are connected to this spirit. We must also understand what purpose they ultimately serve. They do the bidding for a people who primarily have a motive to create and perpetuate difference while also seeking opportunities to conquer whosoever they have identified as the other. This is what we see with technological development this day. If we were to approach merely as a thing in itself, we would not be able to understand what its originating source aims at. But if we fully understand its originating source, then we understand how technology as an off-shoot of modernity is an aid to expansionism.

Africa’s Exclusion from Modernity If the basis or foundation of technology I presented above stands, what then can we say about Africa’s exclusion from such a spirit. Even if we were to acknowledge the effects of what being made to be the other had on Africa, what can we say about the spirit that I have been referring to as responsible for modernity and its off-spin technology? I think the first thing to acknowledge is that the spirit of modernity has not taken root on the African continent. There is need to explain what this does not mean. There is a difference between innovation of any kind and innovation that proceeds from the modern spirit. Africa has always been an innovative place. In traditional societies, there were innovations that people came up with to make their lives more efficient, pleasant, and tolerable. For example, they developed weapons, agricultural methods, and communication methods that were suitable to their needs. Without innovation they would not have been able to develop to the level of humanity they did. However, what must be conceded is that Africa before the arrival of colonialism was largely a pre-modern place that had a different spirit to the one of modernity. For a society to be pre-modern does not mean that it is not human. As the leading light in African philosophy, Kwasi Wiredu (1980) demonstrates, even the most advanced of societies today were pre-modern once. To be pre-modern merely suggests that the prevailing spirit is different from its

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modern counterpart. While for Europe the transition to modernity was internally generated, for Africa it was forcibly imposed. Could this be responsible for the everlasting nature of Africa’s failure to develop the spirit of modernity? My question is different from a question on the effects of colonialism as an oppressive system that blatantly denied black people their right to be free and pursue whatever they would. Rather, what my inquiry is interested in is why Africa has failed to develop, even when Africa acknowledges that it needs to do so. I am interested in inquiring why Africa is unable to foster either a variant of the Western spirit of development or a superior spirit to development when Africa has been partially exposed to the spirit of development thereof. Or is it the case that the spirit of development remains hidden and inaccessible to Africans for one reason or another? If it is the case that the spirit is hidden from the African, can the African at least understand that such a spirit is inaccessible to him and what the reasons for that inaccessibility could be? What, for example, makes a country such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo remain trapped in poverty when it has resources that none of the developed countries has? I will suggest that the reason for Africa’s inability to modernize and develop as well as develop related technologies is owed to the refusal by Africa to embrace the spirit of modernization. The first reason for that refusal is very basic and indisputable; the spirit of modernization targeted the African in ways that enslaved and degraded them. When the African reacted against this spirit, s/he was doing what was logical and what was supposed to be done in the face of degradation. What we must understand is that the African concentrated on one aspect of the spirit, its negative side and whatever its connotations were, and forgot to look at the positive side of the spirit. Modernization as an idea is not bad or negative in itself. Modernization is a search for newer ways of doing things. When modernization has been particularized, as the enlightenment and its consequence, then it might have a side to it which is regrettable or evil. We could think of a separation between the technical side of modernization and its social and political side. Modernization, if concerned with efficient ways of doing things, will not make a separation between races. What is efficient for white people will be efficient for black people. However, we can politicize things and reserve efficient stuff for white people only while neglecting to spread that efficiency to benefit black people. Black people can, therefore, react against this politicization and may make modernization the target of their opprobrium.

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In place of the enlightenment spirit and its consequence of modernization, Africans deliberately searched for a counter to that trajectory. The sources for that counter came from two places, and both places have proven to be problematic for different reasons. The first place Africans looked at was their own traditions and what the traditions were capable of doing for them. First, they tried to use these traditions as a counter to what the spirit of modernity took to be fundamental truth about humanity. What this resistance involved was a comparison of two systems. The African system insisted on the idea of collective identity and development which was in contrast with the dominant European’s individualistic placement of identity in humanity. When Africans invoked their traditions, they did so to show that there was another valid way of looking at the world which was different from the European—a different spirit of engaging reality. Second, Africans found alignment politically and ideologically with a different set of Europeans from their colonizers as well as other people from different parts of the world who also believed, as they did, in some collectivist outlook. That collectivism implied that collective development could be organized successfully by centrally managing the affairs of all members of society. Since there was a serious difference in approaches to understanding the world, or even the spirit relied on in interpreting that world, Africa was now placed in an invidious position. It was characterized by a series of spirits that presented themselves as capable of shaping the destiny of Africa, and it is from here that Africa had to shape its own version of modernity. The spirit developed, I am afraid, was to become incoherent and schizophrenic, against Nkrumah’s hopes. The point, then, is not that the African is not predisposed to a modern spirit, but that the African has been overwhelmed by contradictions that his background has provided. In order to navigate through these confusions and contradictions, the African needed time. But the time the African spent on the political side of working out what his spirit was meant a delay in attending to the other side of the spirit—development.

Need for Africa to See Development Anew I have chosen to emphasize on development as opposed to its consequence, technology, for reasons I hope can easily be appreciated. Technology is by nature transient, but its foregrounding is what enables its occurrence. For Africa to compete technologically, there is need for it to

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shift its commitment to ideas of development and their underlying informant: modernity. My point of departure has been that Africa is not modern enough; hence the real question becomes, how can Africa modernize? Before attending to how Africa can modernize, it is imperative to say something about Africa’s relationship with technology. By and large, Africa has emerged as a consumer of technological innovation. Whatever inventions from Africa, they tend to have no impact beyond their immediate environment and place of origin. What could be the possible explanation for this inability to develop technologies that are relevant to the needs of African people? I will answer this question through considering medical technology. There is no doubt that Africans, both in their traditional set-up and in their modern existence, have knowledge of medicine. They know how to attend to illnesses through accurate diagnosis of the ailment as well as equally accurate prescriptions (Alem 2019). Deep knowledge of medicine is a preserve for specialists such as herbalists and seers. However, there are other processes and things such as plants that are known by ordinary people to have a certain effect. At times people swear that certain forms of African medicine are the best at dealing with particular ailments, and there are always more than enough individuals to testify in support of such claims. To an observer who does not know what to make of the efficacy of traditional African medicine (including some Africans), there is maybe just not enough information to go with to influence how they make up their minds. The problem is that the spirit behind the practice of African medicine is hidden behind a veil of inaccessibility. This form of inaccessibility can only be removed when an individual has been initiated into the secretive powers of its practice. This is not the same as training to be a medical doctor, for example, which is a publicly available form of science for whoever is interested in understanding it. The real difference between these two approaches lies not in their practice and presentation since I believe that their presentation and practice is only a phenomenon of something deeper—their spirit. The spirit of Western medicine which is rooted in science follows a different path of reasoning from the spirit of traditional medicine. The difference is that the spirit of science seeks to live up to rules of repeatability and publicly demonstrable affirmation. The spirit is one of shared information which is open to challenge and proofs according to standards that are acceptable to whosoever is interested in the subject matter or claims of efficacy. The spirit of traditional African medicine is one that does not necessarily prioritize proofs or living up to rules of provability. Rather, it emphasizes

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rules of workability in its prioritization of results as opposed to what is publicly replicable or publicly open to dispute or affirmation. The consequence of these differences is that Western medicine has a chance of replication and open participation while its African counterpart tends to be hidden and limited in its spread. This does not mean that Western medicine is more efficacious than traditional Western medicine, in treating diseases. Where the real difference lies is in the efficacy of the spread of the Western method. Because of its tendency to be open to criticism, affirmation, or disputation, it is likely to be strengthened and progress on these grounds than African traditional medicine. The growth of the latter is, theoretically, likely to be rapid while the growth of the former is not. Again, this has nothing to do with commitments to the substantive abilities of either of these traditions but everything to do with the methods of each of these traditions and how they relate to openness. Western medicine’s errors are laid bare, and its little achievements are recorded so that the next generation of researchers can build on them. On the contrary, African medical experts literally die with their knowledge or clandestinely pass it on. To return to our question, how Africa can modernize, we must look at the spirit underwriting African attitudes and how it can be adjusted to pursue a modern agenda that can produce a technological effect. This inquiry is not equivalent to seeking ways in which we can make Africa live up to some set of existing standards of modernity and technological achievement. It is not a question of what Africa can achieve in relation to what other people have already achieved or whether Africans can take the direction that other people have already taken. Rather, the question of Africa’s modernization has to be inward looking (Verharen et al. 2014). The process to modernize, as I have already argued, is an internal initiative that seeks to respond to a set of circumstances that a people deem no longer relevant or usable to their circumstances. This point was well made by Wiredu (1980) when he identified the three evils besieging Africa: authoritarianism (permanent control of life and politics including leading people to do things against their will), anachronism (relying on modes that have outlived their usefulness), and supernaturalism (the need to rely on supernatural explanations for a natural code). These evils have spun off other evils that lead to stymying and limiting of the possibility of African people and their spirit. The political and social scene in Africa is one that has been characterized by a series of self-defeating and unhelpful attitudes and practices that have cemented themselves into the character of the African spirit. From

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politics of dictatorship to societies that are so underdeveloped and stagnant, the African mind has become accustomed to the regularization of misery as a way of life. Political dissent and attempts at creating new systems are crushed by a burdensome political and social authoritarianism that leaves no room or possibility for innovation. The public spirit that is widely promoted by either open force or enculturation is one that does not reward or facilitate innovation or the habit of openly questioning established systems. Even scientists and academics are not spared the wrath of displeased powers. Thus, the spirit that is prevalent is one that is at odds with development and innovation. It is not a spirit that can be channeled toward understanding what Africa needs and how Africa can authentically respond to its own needs by using its resources maximally. The dominant spirit in Africa, then, needs to be modern. A major part of the move toward modernity requires that Africa examines its own underlying and foundational principles that are responsible for how it is governed and how its citizens experience life on a daily basis. We may call this an examination of the African spirit. Many a time when talk of the examination or understanding of such a spirit comes up, there is always tendency to valorize the traditional aspect of what Africa is or interpretative essences of African reality. However, there is little attempt at linking that tradition to either change or to what needs to be done in order for change to be effective. In order for change to happen, there is need for an appreciation of the importance of motion as a necessary component of being African. That motion is not an anti-thesis of what being African is. Rather, it is a spirit of what it is to be human. To be human is always to be engaged in motion from one state to another. The problem with Africa is that it has encountered forces that were harmful to its state or motion. The reaction to these forces generated another set of problems that have now been compounded in what we identify as post-colonial Africa. The post-colony has created a spirit of its own that is not able to integrate its past with the deleterious effects of colonialism. This has led to a spirit that is almost half-confused as evidenced by the abandonment of traditional values, abandonment of colonial values, and abandonment of anything usable which is now replaced by corruption, mismanagement, theft, bribery, and social and political decay. It, therefore, is not an exaggeration to say Africa has reached its lowest point. As it has reached this point, it is now important for the continent to find ways to be free from both its history and its own inability to go beyond itself. It has to be freed from the imprisonment of any essentialism

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of what it should be to be African and embrace the possibility of becoming afresh. The process of starting afresh and being a new entity will involve a genuine march toward modernity. This process will prize the desire to question all frames of reference that are easily taken as African and reliable. It will question what aspects of being African are worth keeping and what aspects have to be rid of. It will find and challenge all aspects of so-called African reality that have been responsible for detaining the African spirit at a level that is beneath its genuine possibility and standards. This process is to a great degree political and social. Structures of society matter in determining how people interpret their lives and what they can make of those lives. The current African legacy, generally, has been a demand that there must be a conformity to systematization of some spirit that valorizes what it is to be African. When a claim is made that someone’s conduct is not African, there is an implicit suggestion that there is something fundamentally African that is there to be accessed and that deserves to be defended. This could be one of the major drawbacks of being African—a constant hankering after a fixed mode of being that demands that all systems must align with its fixed understanding of life. But what does this essentialization serve? What is its purpose? If it were to be proven that there is a traditional sense of being African, what is Africa’s current state likely to benefit from such a discovery? One of the most readily available explanations is that the rediscovery of Africa’s past will help it to navigate its present and future. It is argued that there are enough resources in our past to enable us to formulate responses to our contradictory and damaged situation. Africa’s social and political systems as trustworthy determinants of the future of Africans must, therefore, be based on a trustworthy past. I think this is where the problem that needs to be overcome resides. There is a pre-determined relationship with the past that demands that Africans must show interpretative loyalty to that past. That loyalty involves developing concepts that are either a continuation with the basic tenets of that past or an affirmation of that past. Whatever we do in the present must be shown to be a re-invocation of the past so that the present can be set in motion toward the future. Such an approach downplays the significance of the effect of the disruption of colonialism as a historical fact which has altered our course of life forever. In addition, all references and attempts at the usage of the past have proven to be as elusive as anything that African have attempted in the post-colony. There have been aggressive

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and politically backed attempts at seeing the image of Africa through its past, and these attempts have ultimately ended in failure. An important promising trajectory would be one that sees a growth of epistemologies that contest what it is to be African and how those experiences can be genuinely owned by Africans as their own. Such an attitude will lead up to the opening of Africans themselves responding to their particularized situations to the best of their ability. They will take responsibility for their current state of affairs, and if allowed will be entrepreneurial in finding ways of overcoming whatever obstacles are placed before them. If the central authority genuinely allows citizens to make choices about everything relating to their destiny and lives, then Africa may begin to fully modernize in ways that suit it. This will be possible as Africans will seek innovative and relevant processes that suit both their present and are able to secure their future.

Conclusion What I have sought to demonstrate is that technology is a phenomenon of a spirit of a people who are modernizing or have become modern. Modernization is a process that is generated from deliberate processes people engage in when they evaluate what is inadequate about their current experiences. In order to overcome those experiences, they seek new ways of being which lead to what I have described as development. The idea of development is movement from one state of being to another, which can be characterized as progress. The phenomenon of this progress can be seen in the technological advancement that a people make. That technological advancement is actually a representation of a spirit and orientation toward life. Unless Africa adjusts its own spirit to align it with its own internal process and dynamic of modernization, technological development will not only remain elusive but also ill-fitted for any meaningful use for Africa beyond avaricious consumption of what is available on the world market.

References Agbakgoba, J.  C. A. (2005). Theoretical Consideration on the Impact of Worldviews on Development. Journal of Philosophy and Culture, 2(2), 75–86. Alem, A. (2019). African Systems of Thought: Whether They Fit Scientific Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy and Culture, 7(2), 14–25. https://doi. org/10.5897/JPC2018.0024.

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Eisenstadt, S. N. (2010). Modernity and Modernization. Sociopedia.isa, pp. 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1177/205684601053. Eze, E.  C. (1999). Philosophy and the “Man” in the Humanities. Topoi, 18(1), 49–58. Gottlieb, A. (2017). The Dream of the Enlightenment: The Rise of Modern Philosophy. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Matolino, B. (2019). Afro-Communitarian Democracy. Lanham: Lexington Books. Mungwini, P. (2014). Postethnophilosophy: Discourses of Modernity and the Future of African Philosophy. Phronimon, 15(1), 16–31. Nwinya, S.  C. (2015). Philosophy and the Development of the Third World: Exploring the Power of Ideology. International Journal of Research in Arts and Social Sciences, 8(1), 233–241. Taylor, C. (1995). Two Theories of Modernity. The Hastings Center Report, 25(2), 24–33. Ujomu, P. O. (2008). Africa’s Political Justice Problem and the Politics of Justice in the Development Architecture. CODESRIA-APISA-CLACSO Occasional Paper Series. Retrieved June 1, 2020, from https://www.codesria.org/IMG/ pdf/03_Philip_Ogo_Ujomu.pdf?1244/eb53c8549cabb9126ad88b8d4ff2c cdf0ecbcced. Verharen, C., et al. (2014). African Philosophy: A Key to African Innovation and Development. African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development, 6(1), 3–12. https://doi.org/10.1080/20421338.2014.902565 . Weber, M. (1930). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London: George Allen & Unwin. Wiredu, K. (1980). Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER 6

African Cultural Values, Practices and Modern Technology Ovett Nwosimiri

Introduction In recent times, modern technology has completely transformed societies and proved its vitality and viability in information sharing acquisition processes. Information is a vital part of human life and society. A lack of (good) information can collapse a system or society. With the aid of modern technology, people and cultures have evolved greatly. Technology has transformed some societies, their methods of communication, education, art and literature, and business. This is evident in the way people use technology in modern time. To this end, languages, communication and ways of receiving information have changed due to modern technology. Modern technology has allowed the delivery of information in place and time that was out of reach before. Based on this, some aspects of African cultural practices, like traditional healer’s consultation process, can possibly use technology to provide and deliver more reliable information to people in need of it. Thus, some African cultural practices can be combined with

O. Nwosimiri (*) School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. D. Okyere-Manu (ed.), African Values, Ethics, and Technology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70550-3_6

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modern technology information and can be made available to individuals when needed at anytime and anywhere. In this chapter, I direct my attention to African cultural values and modern technology, with the aim of showing the importance of combining some African cultural practices and modern technology in a way that will benefit modern Africa, thereby making some cultural practices readily available to people, so that they can be used when needed. It is important to underscore that this chapter is philosophical in orientation, and existing published materials like books and articles in academic journals on African philosophy, African culture, technology and modern technology will be used as opposed to empirical findings. This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I will discuss the idea of culture, African culture and African cultural values. In what follows, in the second section, I will discuss what modern technology is. The final section aims at showing the importance of combining some African cultural practices and modern technology in a way that will benefit modern Africa, thereby making some cultural practices or processes readily available to people.

African Cultural Values: An Overview According to Stuart C.  Bate (2002), there are six common descriptive understandings of culture. These six descriptive understandings of culture are (1) culture as a way of life, (2) culture as something that can be learned, (3) culture as involving language, (4) culture as dealing with symbols that include rituals and myths, (5) culture as giving meaning to our lives and (6) culture as communication. From the aforementioned, it will be right to define culture as a way of life of some people, and its importance varies from society to society. Gabriel E. Idang defines culture as “a patterned way of life shared by a particular group of people that claim to share a single origin or descent” (2015: 98). Culture as people’s way of life embraces a wide range of human phenomena, customs, practices, beliefs, moral codes, knowledge, arts, and any other capabilities and habits of people within a society. Culture, therefore, refers to the heritage of people that differentiates them from other people. It is important to underscore that a simple way to think about culture is to think about the discrepancy between nature and nurture. In this case, nature refers to our genetics and biological makeup, and nurture refers to how our environment and

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surroundings help shape our identities. A combination of these notions gives us culture. There can be no people without a culture. This implies that the essence of people exists in their culture. Every human being grows into and within the cultural tradition of his or her people. “Every human being who grows up in a particular society is likely to become infused with the culture of that society, whether knowingly or unknowingly, during the process of social interaction” (Idang 2015: 99). Culture stems from people’s daily and social interactions with each other and with their interactions with the physical and spiritual world. These interactions and different practices help in the transfer of culture from generation to generation. It is important to note that culture is not static but dynamic. People interact with people from different cultures and, in the process, assimilate and borrow ideas from the other cultures. The result of this integration is change. Based on the above, the question of interest is, what is African culture? African culture can be defined as “all the material and spiritual values of the African people in the course of history and characterizing the historical stage attained by Africa in her developments” (Idang 2009: 142). Ezedike also defined African cultures as [t]he sum total of shared attitudinal inclinations and capabilities, art, beliefs, moral codes and practices that characterize Africans. It can be conceived as a continuous, cumulative reservoir containing both material and non-­ material elements that are socially transmitted from one generation to another. African culture, therefore, refers to the whole lot of African heritage. (2009: 455)

It is evident from the above quote that African culture represents the totality of the African ways of life. I would like to emphasize that we do not wish to argue that the whole of Africa has one homogenous culture. There are many countries in Africa, and within each country, there exists a variety of cultures and traditions that differ in some respects. Nevertheless, with regard to the idea of what African culture is, there are some deep underlying affinities running through these cultures which justify the existing generalization. I do not intend, within the pages of this chapter, to present all the different African cultures that exist in Africa. Rather, I intend to present a brief overview of African cultures. With the above in mind, it is essential to note that there are various cultures in Africa, and some examples of these cultures are the Igbo,

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Yoruba and Hausa cultures (Nigeria); the Akan, Ewe Ga-Adangbe cultures (Ghana); the Zulu, Xhosa and Pedi cultures (South Africa); the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Maasai cultures (Kenya) and so on. All the above cultures together form what is known as ‘African culture.’ Despite the various cultures that exist in Africa, Idang notes that “Africans do share some dominant traits in their belief systems and have similar values that mark them out from other peoples of the world” (2015: 100). For instance, a culture in Nigeria would be closer to a culture in Ghana in terms of rituals. The same can be said to other cultures in other parts of Africa. Idang rightly notes that “cultures of traditional African societies, together with their value systems and beliefs are close, even though they vary slightly from one another” (2015: 100). Thus, African culture “is one of discipline. It insists that the individual should be seen in the light of the whole—family, group, community, the past, and the future generations” (Anyanwu 1983: 24). Here, it is essential to note that the sense of community is one of the African cultural values and practices. Other African cultural values and practices include the sense of hospitality, good relations, sacred and religion, sanctity of life, respect for elders and authority, morality, language, proverbs and time, and so on. Almost all of the African cultural values are derivative of the African communitarianism. This means that African cultural values and practices are the main foundations of the African community, and they are of great significance. People of African ancestry are related by the cultural values and practices they share. These cultural values and practices are the characteristics of African identity. Let us take, for example, religious value. The belief in gods and rituals plays a pivotal role in African culture because they tend to seek immediate mystical answers. African religions hold that there is one creator and there exist other gods responsible for other things such as rain, fertility and so forth. This is evident is some of the traditional stories. According to Mbiti: [e]very African who has grown up in the traditional environment will, no doubt, know something about this mystical power which often is experienced, or manifests itself, in form of magic, divination, witchcraft and mysterious phenomena that seem to defy even immediate scientific explanations…. (1990: 189)

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Africans consult gods based on their conviction that the gods know and have the answers to all their problems. For example, only the gods can answer the question as to when and why a child died or the destiny of the child. In Yoruba culture, when a child is born, it is common or natural that the parents of the child would go to the Ifá1 priest to have Ifá reveal to them what the child’s path through life might be. Individuals also consult Ifá on diverse occasions. For example, when things are not going the way the individual expects or has planned, when an individual is about to embark on a new adventure and when an individual is ill (Taiwo 2004: 306), Africans go to the gods for anything and make sacrifices to the gods either as thanksgiving or solicitation. They are dedicated to their religion. This, I think, is why Mbiti says that Africans are notoriously religious (1969: 1). Just as with other cultures, African culture is not static. It is dynamic, which means that it changes from within and outside. W.  Emmanuel Abraham asserts that “since its beginnings in Africa, human culture has responded to great changes in its physical and social environments by creative adaptations and adjustments; but today, the changes and challenges facing African cultures are at their most acute and most pervasive yet” (1992: 30). The idea of change is a reason for which most of the important African cultural values and practices have been tampered with. Hence, it will be right to say that during the process of change, some of the values and practices in the African cultures will be either combined with the values and practices in other cultures or slightly reformed or lost totally. But, of course, we should bear in mind that Africans are somewhat impervious to change. The impervious nature of Africans makes it less likely for Africans to accept a change, especially a change that demands a total rejection or replacement of their cultural values and practices.

1  Ifá ancestry can be traced to the Yorubas. Yoruba is an ethnic group in South Western Nigeria. Some parts of the Republic of Benin (Dahomey) and Togo are Yorubas. Ifá is known by the Yorubas as the deity of wisdom and intellectual development, and Ifá divination shapes individual interpretations of experience. According to Ovett Nwosimiri, “the Yorubas believe that Ifá’s wisdom, knowledge, and understanding transcend the past, present, and future” (2020: 89).

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Modern Technology: An Overview In etymology, according to Thomas J. Misa, technology “refers to a body of knowledge about the useful arts” (2003: 7). Technology can be defined as a systematic application of useful arts, devices, systems, tools, materials, procedures and knowledge to several practical tasks. Each of the above-­ mentioned items is capable of efficiently accomplishing its tasks when properly applied. Like cultural values, technology can be considered as one of the primary foundations of any human society. The reason for this is “because the material existence and survival of the human society depend on the ability of humankind to make at least simple tools and equipment, and to develop techniques essential for the production of basic human needs such as food, clothing, shelter, and security” (Gyekye 1997a: 32). What this simply shows is that the idea of technology begins from the little things, tools and equipment we develop that we can use to produce and sustain our various needs. The concern for such needs, as Kwame Gyekye puts it, “was naturally more immediate than the pursuit and acquisition of the systematic knowledge of nature—that is, science” (1997a: 32). Apparently, technology is a product of culture. According to Gyekye, technology “develops in the cultural milieu of a people, and its career or future is also determined by the characteristics of the culture” (1997a: 32). Before the modern times, simple technological tools such as hoe, axe and cutlass that involve techniques were made by craftsmen. Goldsmiths, coppersmiths, cloth-weavers, potters, carpenters and woodcarvers were present for the survival of human society. Also, human abilities and technical activities such as “food production, processing, and preservation techniques were developed, and so were techniques for extracting medicinal potencies from plants, herbs, and roots” emerged (Gyekye 1997a: 33). Given this, Gyekye said that a number of the above-mentioned human abilities and technical activities in time multiplied industries. This multiplication is because of people’s daily and social interactions with each other. This interaction amongst people of different cultures brings about the idea of assimilation and borrowing between cultures. Because of this, there was aspiration within cultures to become modern. To this end, cultures made attempts to change, develop and modernize their values and practices (technology). As a result, premodern cultures were convinced to discard and reshape some of their traditional ways (including technology) in favour of modern ways in the name of development. Thus, this brings about the idea of modern technology.

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The term ‘modern’ is frequently considered as a replacement for ‘latest.’ In other words, it is a synonym for the word ‘latest.’ In this regard, something that is considered to be the latest is presumed to be certainly the finest or the best at that point in time. Given that technology is a product of culture and that it is simple technological tools such as hoe, axe and cutlass, modern technology is an improved version that trumps the above-mentioned. Modern technology can be understood as the point at which our useful arts, devices, systems, tools, materials, procedures, knowledge and so on are now at the bearings they seem to be heading and what their continuous development might mean for us. Modern technology has completely transformed societies and proved its vitality and viability in information sharing acquisition processes. Modern technology has been very significant for the people of the world by bringing society close to each other. For example, the use of “internet, now accessible through both computers and mobile phones, include e-mail, instant messaging services, chat rooms, forums, social networking sites, interactive online gaming networks, and Web-logs (blogs)” (Watt 2010: 142). Technology has transformed some societies, their methods of communication, education, art and literature, and business. This is evident in the way people use technology in modern time. For example, people can now use their computer and mobile phones to make telephone calls and send messages (Watt 2010: 142). Also, communication technology has beneficial effects on language and literacy skills (Watt 2010: 141). Due to technology, languages, communication and ways of receiving information have changed. The advent of mobile communication has changed the very nature of public settings by providing new prospects for individuals to connect with those that are distant. With the aid of modern technology, people and cultures have evolved greatly. Modern technology has allowed the delivery of information in places and times that were out of reach before. It has brought many countries in the world closer together. To this end, modern technology reveals and forms our self-understanding and our way of being in the world.

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Combining African Cultural Practices and Modern Technology Modern technology has become the quintessence of modernity. Just as Philip Brey puts it, “technology is a central means by which modernity is made possible. It is a catalyst for change and necessary condition for the functioning of modern institutions” (2003: 54). There cannot be modernity without technology and there cannot be technology without modernity. In his book Tradition and Modernity (1997b), particularly in Chaps. 8 and 9, Kwame Gyekye explains that for more than a century, the notion of modernity has been very significant for the people of the world, like the notion of development. Societies in the world have, with no exception, aspired to become modern. This aspiration of becoming modern is visible in the social, cultural and political lives of many in different societies. As far as the history of human civilization goes, Africans have made attempts to modernize their societies and develop some of their traditional systems from within. There have been interactions between African people and people from different continents, which prompted the idea of cultural integration. The idea of a culture acquiring knowledge from other cultures and the assimilation of this knowledge into its culture, practice and value systems are common and widespread. Likewise, within our various cultures, we assimilate knowledge and ideas in small bits consciously or unconsciously from other cultures. This clearly shows the modernization and development within a culture. And this gives way for the presence of change and integration of knowledge within cultures. Modern technology appears to be a catalyst to the change they seek or as a mere means through which the change is realized. According to Gyekye: [t]he extensive and sustained understanding of the acquisition of modern technology insistently requires adequate cultivation of science and the scientific outlook. The acquisition of a scientific and technological outlook will, in turn, require a new mental orientation on the part of the African people, a new and sustained interest in science to provide a firm base for technology, a new intellectual attitude to the external world uncluttered by superstition, mysticism, and other forms of irrationality; the alleged spirituality of the African world, which in the precolonial world was allowed in many ways to impede sustained inquiries into the world of nature, will have to come to terms with materiality: that is, the physical world of science. This is not to suggest by any means that a spiritual life must be abandoned, it is to suggest, rather, that, as… Caesar’s world must be clearly demarcated from God’s (1997a: 36).

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It can hardly be denied that modern technology is among the central pillars of modernity and that, currently, it is a distinctive element of the global culture. Since Africans also aspire to be modern by changing some aspects of their cultural values, it follows that they cannot help but to accept modern technology. To this end, “Africa will have to participate significantly in the cultivation and promotion of this aspect of human culture, if it is to benefit from it fully” (Gyekye 1997a: 36). Modern technology has a major role in defining, shaping and transforming African cultural values and practices. Information technology, for example, will affect fundamental shifts in cultural values and practices. This will help in making some of the aspects of African cultural practices to be readily available to people so that they can use them when necessary. Knowledge of some procedures of traditional healers, for instance, “qua scientific knowledge, must be rescued from the quagmire of mysticism and spirituality and brought to the glare of publicity, and its language must be made exoteric and accessible to many others” (Gyekye 1997a: 37). African cultural values (practices) and modern technology can be combined in such a way that they will serve their purpose, which is giving the necessary information that an individual seeks. In this case, one would complement the other to make information readily available to the people in need of it. In this way, they will have great relevance and impact on the social life of the people, given that they will both quickly meet the demands of the people. Thus, the combination of both will deal with specific problems of human survival because, when combined, they can immediately be seen “as having direct connections with societal problems and as being appropriate to meeting certain basic or specific needs” (Gyekye 1997a: 37–38). When this happens, one might possibly ask, is there any need to combine both when each can still serve its purpose independent of the other? And even if there is a need for that, how can African cultural values and practices complement modern technology? As a response to these questions, I may say that people and culture and cultural practices have evolved greatly, and some of the things we see and witness in premodern times are not there or not readily available as they used to when needed. Let us take Ifá divination system as an example. Ifá divination, according to Wande Abimbola, is Ifa and related systems of divination based on the stories and symbols of the Odu such as dida owo (divination with the sacred divining chain called opele) and etıte-ale (divination with the sacred palm nuts), eerındınlogun

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(divination with the sixteen cowries), agbigba (divination with a divining chain slightly different from opele), and obi (divination with kola nuts) (2001: 141).

Ifá is recognized as the repository of the Yoruba traditional body of knowledge. Ifá divination cannot be what it is without the divinatory procedures, the rituals and outcomes. According to Peek (1991), the throwing of bones and shaking of the basket, divination apparatus and so on, which appear so haphazard, make the divinatory enterprise unique and, ultimately, so effective. To this, Abimbola (2000) notes that some of the equipment that is used during the consultation of Ifá, such as the beaded objects, performance, opa orere and the use of musical instruments, have been replaced, because most of them are no longer being produced in Africa. This, I believe, is a salient point that clearly shows that resources are becoming outdated, less available, reshaped or non-existent, and thus the importance of combining African cultural practices and modern technology to preserve and modify some of the equipment. This suggests the idea that African cultural practices are in constant flux. Drawing from all of the above replacements and other changes, Abimbola mentioned in his work, asserting that “the interesting thing is that change or deliberate creativity is built into and has become an integral part of the tradition of Ifa” (2000: 176). The Ifá literary corpus is the store-house of the Yoruba culture; in it, the Yoruba comprehension of their fundamental experiences—the experience of life itself and their understanding of their environment—can always be found (Abimbola 1975: 32; see also Abimbola 1977: 73–89). The Ifá literary corpus demands an oral performance because the client must be present before the Ifá priest who has to chant the poems from the relevant ‘Odu’ very clearly to the hearing of the client and that of any other person present. The Odu has 256 chapters. The Ifá priest knows the manipulation of all the 256 chapters known as ‘Odu Ifá,’ because every Ifá priest is required to properly study the literature of Odu, one after the other, and to memorize as much of this text as possible (Eze 1998: 174). The 256 odus are divided into two categories, the major 16 chapters are known as Oju Odu and the minor 240 chapters known as Omo Odu or Amulu Odu. The combination of the major 16 and the minor 240 will provide us with a complete chart of the order of priority in the Ifá divination system (Adegbindin 2010: 23).

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The Ifá priest usually chants verses from the Odu when consulted. The ordinary Yoruba patronizes the Ifá priest not only because they believe in the predictions (past and future) and pronouncements of Ifá but also because of the aesthetic satisfaction which they draw from listening to poetic narratives and chants. This chant is in the form of poetry which is exceptionally rich in style and language. The 256 Odu is very important in the Ifá divination system, and it “is regarded as praise songs to Esu” (Eze 1998: 174). It is also worth noting that the whole of the literary corpus known as ese Ifá is based on the Odu. Given the above, and the fact that what qualifies as technology is a systematic application of useful arts, devices, systems, tools, materials, procedures and knowledge, Ifá divination is technological, a device that is used for forecasting the future and for various other purposes. Thus, given that Ifá divination can be seen as a device, it can easily be combined with modern technology. In this case, some of these procedures can be developed further into a mobile or computer application and raised to a level that we make it readily available to people on cell phones and laptops (computers) as an application so that it will be readily available to people when needed. Another possible alternative is to create a helpline that people can quickly use when they need an Ifá priest (diviner) if they opt not to use the mobile or computer applications. Mobile and information technologies have a major role in defining, shaping and transforming cultural practices. Mobile and information technology software systems can be designed in a way that will deliver a handson way to envisage procedures of carrying out Ifá divination procedure or consultation. But one might say that this is not necessary. I am inclined to think that this position is true if it means that African cultural practices do not have to be subservient to modern technology. However, I must disagree with the position that seeks to isolate African cultural practices from modern technology or the modern world, because modern technology is a product of culture and culture is dynamic. It will be more rewarding to humanity if different cultural values and practices are combined with the idea of balancing different cultural practices. Thus, the combination of both African cultural practices and modern technology would not necessarily change African cultural practices if properly combined. Languages and ways of communication have changed over time. Given that information is a vital part of human life, it is needed for survival, and when quickly passed or is readily available, it will go a long way to help individuals. Modernized African cultural practices can benefit from

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modern technology by using modern technology to make some of the information needed by individuals available to them when it is most needed. Here, both African cultural practices and modern technology will be combined to achieve the same outcome. As previously noted, in situation where people decide not to use the mobile or computer applications, a helpline can be created where people can quickly call or use when they need an Ifá priest (diviner). Thus, it is important to underscore that a proper combination of African cultural practices and modern technology will produce the desired outcome, which is to assist and help individuals with the information they seek. In this way, a quicker and readily outcome will be achieved. Both modern technology and African cultural practices are parallel tools that answer to the different needs and interests of people. Like modern technology, African cultural practices “serve to introduce unity into diversity, simplicity into complexity, order into disorder, regularity into anomaly” (Horton 1995: 304). Finally, in line with Gyekye (1997a: 41), I would like to underscore that modern technology can and has transformed human society. This social transformation due to the combination of African cultural values (practices) and modern technology involves change, as noted earlier, not only in African ways and patterns of living but also in African values and practices. In this case, Africans will have to decide whether the (new) values and practices spewed out by (modern) technology are the kinds of values and practices we need and would want to cherish (Gyekye 1997a: 41–42). Modern technology is made by humanity, and not humanity for modern technology. This means that “human beings and their welfare should be the center of the focus of the modern technological enterprise” (Gyekye 1997a: 42), which is why some traditional practices need to be made readily available to people, anytime and anywhere. The combination of African cultural values and practices and modern technology should be able to coexist with the concern for the interests of the (African) people in the technological society. Thus, it should be possible for “African people to embark on the [modern] ‘technologicalization’ of their society without losing the humanist essence of their culture” (Gyekye 1997a: 42).

Conclusion In this chapter, I directed my attention to African cultural values and modern technology, with the aim of showing the importance of combining some African cultural practices with modern technology in a way that will

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benefit modern Africa, thereby making some cultural practices or processes readily available to people so that they can be used when needed. This was achieved firstly by discussing the idea of culture, African culture and African cultural values; secondly by discussing the idea of modern technology; and lastly by showing the importance of combining some African cultural practices in a way that will benefit modern Africa.

References Abimbola, W. (1975). Sixteen Great Poems of Ifa. Paris: UNESCO. Abimbola, W. (1977). Ifá Divination Poetry. New York: Nok Publishers. Abimbola, W. (2000). Continuity and Change in the Verbal, Artistic, Ritualistic, and Performance Traditions of Ifa Divination. In J. I. I. I. Pemberton (Ed.), Insight and Artistry in African Divination (pp.  175–181). Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press. Abimbola, W. (2001). The Bag of Wisdom: Osun and the Origins of Ifa Divination. In J. Murphy & M. Sanford (Eds.), Osun Across the Waters: A Yoruba Goddess in Africa and the Americas (pp.  141–154). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Abraham, W.  E. (1992). Crisis in African Culture. In K.  Wiredu & K.  Gyekye (Eds.), Persons and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, I (pp. 13–35). Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Adegbindin, O. (2010). Ifá and the Consequences of Literacy: A Philosophical Analysis. Lumina, 21(2), 1–23. Anyanwu, C. (1983). The African Experience in the American Marketplace. Smithtown, NY: Exposition Press. Bate, S.  C. (2002). Human Life is Cultural: Introducing Anthropology. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications. Brey, P. (2003). Theorizing Modernity and Technology. In T. J. Misa, P. Brey, & A.  Feenberg (Eds.), Modernity and Technology (pp.  33–71). Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Eze, E. C. (1998). The Problem of Knowledge in “Divination”: The Example of Ifa. In C.  E. Eze (Ed.), African Philosophy: An Anthology (pp.  173–175). Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Ezedike, E.  O. (2009). African Culture and the African Personality. From Footmarks to Landmarks on African Philosophy. Somolu: Obaroh and Ogbinaka Publishers. Gyekye, K. (1997a). Philosophy, Culture, and Technology in the Postcolonial. In E. C. Eze (Ed.), Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader (pp. 25–44). Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Inc..

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Gyekye, K. (1997b). Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Horton, R. (1995). African Traditional Thought and Western Science. In A.  Mosley (Ed.), African Philosophy: Selected Readings (pp.  301–338). New York: Prentice-Hall. Idang, G.  E. (2009). The Mind-Body problem in African Culture. In A. F. Uduigwomen (Ed.), From Footmarks to Landmarks on African Philosophy. Lagos: Obaroh and Ogbinaka Publishers. Idang, G. E. (2015). African Culture and Values. Phronimon, 16(2), 97–111. Mbiti, J. S. (1969). African Religions and Philosophy. London: Heinemann. Mbiti, J. S. (1990). African Religions and Philosophy. New York: Doubleday Anchor. Misa, T.  J. (2003). The Compelling Tangle of Modernity and Technology. In T. J. Misa, P. Brey, & A. Feenberg (Eds.), Modernity and Technology (pp. 1–30). Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Nwosimiri, O. (2020). Ifá Divination System as an Embodiment of both the Internalist and Externalist bases of Justification in African Epistemology. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions, 9(1), 79–96. Peek, P. M. (1991). Introduction: The Study of Divination, Present and Past. In P. M. Peek (Ed.), African Divination Systems: Non-Normal Modes of Cognition (pp. 193–212). Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Taiwo, O. (2004). Ifá: An Account of a Divination System and Some Concluding Epistemological Questions. In K.  Wiredu (Ed.), A Companion to African Philosophy (pp. 304–312). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Watt, H. J. (2010). How Does the Use of Modern Communication Technology Influence Language and Literacy Development? A Review. Contemporary Issues in Communication Science and Disorders, 37, 141–148.

PART III

Technology, African Ethics and Sexual Relations

CHAPTER 7

Shifting Intimate Sexual Relations from Humans to Machines: An African Indigenous Ethical Perspective Beatrice Dedaa Okyere-Manu

Introduction A conversation at an international airport in Africa that attracted the attention of a number of passengers provided the idea for this chapter. The catalyst for the conversation was an incident between a customs officer and a male passenger over the contents of a suitcase. The suitcase was not properly closed and its contents fell out, including a sex robot. The incident, in turn, sparked an interesting conversation among the passengers who were waiting to board the plane. They discussed the use and relevance of sex robots within the African context. While a large number were arguing against their use because sex robots were new to them, a handful of younger, more curious passengers were fascinated and argued for their use despite the financial cost involved. Among the issues raised by a few of

B. D. Okyere-Manu (*) School of Religion Philosophy and Classics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. D. Okyere-Manu (ed.), African Values, Ethics, and Technology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70550-3_7

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the elderly passengers was the fact that sexual relationships with machines are an entirely foreign concept and should not be encouraged on the soil of Africa because not only will it corrupt young people and destroy marriages and procreation, it is also an abomination to the ancestors and a humiliation to humankind. The conversation, which was more of a heated debate, ended once the passengers had boarded the plane. This debate informed the decision to investigate sex robots and their implications within the context of African indigenous sexual ethics. This chapter, therefore, is situated within the broader theme of emerging technology and African cultural values. The aim is to explore the implications of sex robots as well as the features of indigenous African values that might be compromised with the emergence and increasing use of sex robots. One such feature is the fact the indigenous African people are conservative and place a high premium on the sacredness of sexual relations. The chapter is divided into the following sections: first, it explores indigenous African value systems that are common to all Africans. It notes that while Africans are not a homogeneous group of people, all 54 countries, however, share some common distinctive values. The second section examines the African cultural understanding of the issues of sex and sexual ethics. This is followed by a brief discussion of the emergence of the sex robot to fulfil sexual cravings as well as its potential for other uses. The fourth section analyses the implications of the human–sex robot relationship through the lens of African values embedded in the indigenous African value systems and highlights those values that are likely to be compromised by the use of sex robots. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn.

Indigenous African Value Systems This section provides a foundation for the chapter by exploring the values, ideas, models and principles that are born out of the indigenous African ontologies. The African traditional culture is communal which suggests a communion of souls in which the individual is considered part and parcel of the community (Senghor 1964: 24). This view is what Kwame Gyekye (1997) refers to as radical communitarianism. However, other philosophers such as Michael Onyebuchi Eze believe in moderate communitarianism, which posits that there is an interrelationship between the individuals in the community. For Eze (2008: 386), the individual and the community co-exist. Matolino (2014), on the other hand, raises objections to these approaches and argues for what he calls limited communitarianism. For

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him, the approaches do not give the individual the attention he or she deserves and contends that the individual takes precedence over the community (Matolino 2014: 161). The individual versus community debate is an extensive one, which will not be expanded on here. Rather, the chapter’s aim is to highlight the values and principles within this communitarian system. As noted above, the sense of community is one of the central African values. Other values, among many, include the ethic of ubuntu which encompasses the sense of hospitality and the sense of good relations (caring) with one another, and respect for elders and authority. I will limit the discussion to ubuntu as it is the main indigenous African value that most Africans identify with, and it embraces all other cultural values in Africa. Johann Broodryk (2002: 4) defines ubuntu as “a comprehensive, ancient worldview which pursues primary values of intense humanness, caring, sharing and compassion, and associated values, ensuring a happy and quality community life in a family spirit or atmosphere”. It is seen as the standard for measuring behaviours in African culture, and is understood through the traditional saying: Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu which means “A person is a person through other persons” (Shutte 2001: 2). “I am because you are” suggests that the individual cannot live alone but depends on the community because when a misfortune happens it affects the entire community. Mbiti (1969: 108) expressed this beautifully: “Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual.” Ubuntu, therefore, determines how the individual ought to behave. Characteristics associated with Ubuntu in the literature include having harmonious relations with others, belongingness, sharing identity with the community and showing solidarity with others. Among the objections raised against ubuntu are those by Kwame Gyekye (1998). He argues that ubuntu tends to whittle down autonomy of the person; that it makes the being and life of the individual person totally dependent on the activities, values, projects, and practices, and the ends of the community; and, consequently, that it diminishes his/her freedom and capability to choose or question or reevaluate the shared values of the community. (Gyekye 1998: 318)

For Gyekye (1998), ubuntu uplifts the community to the point where individual freedom is often overlooked. Therefore, the individual in the

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African community owes his/her action to the bigger community. The inference of the foregoing discussion is that African culture embraces and encourages communalism—where the individual is accountable to the community in terms of his or her actions. Thus, the individual is guided by the rules and regulations set by the community through its values and practices. The next section examines indigenous African values and beliefs around sex and sexual ethics.

Sex and Sexual Ethics in Indigenous African Thought Communities all over the world interpret the principles and values of sex and sexual ethics and relations differently. For indigenous communities in Africa, issues around sex and sexual ethics are perceived as sacred. Mbiti (1990: 144) has noted that: Africans consider the proper uses of sex to be sacred and must therefore be safeguarded…. African peoples are very sensitive to any departure from the accepted norm concerning all aspects of sex. This is a fundamental religious attitude since any offence upsets the smooth relationships of the community which include those who have already departed. For that reason, many of the offences must be followed by a ritual cleansing whether or not the offenders are physically punished, otherwise misfortunes may ensue.

A strong inference that can be drawn from the above quotation is that culturally, issues around sex are perceived as sacred and any deviation from acceptable practices is deemed a serious misdemeanour which must be punished. In most African cultural communities, sexual dishonour is deemed a sin not only against the gods but also against the ancestors and the community as a whole, and thus deserves punishment. To avert the anger of the beings in the spiritual realm, the offenders have to be cleansed and, in such instances, they are declared outcasts and banished from the community. The entire community will be warned not to have anything to do with the outcasts. The punishment administered by the ancestors may include the individual having abnormal children, or a series of miscarriages, or being plagued with incurable diseases and conditions. More severe punishment may be abject poverty or even death. In some cases, the punishment or curses from the ancestors are extended to the entire community, for

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example, continuous famine, spells, lightning striking people dead, floods, outbreaks of incurable diseases and unexplained deaths. However, as noted by Mbiti (1990) above, offenders would also have to be cleansed and this is done by animal sacrifices offered to the gods and ancestors and, in some instances, denouncing the offence in public. Depending on the community, offenders could, sometimes, be forced to pay a large sum of money, and in most cases, they would only be accepted back into society after severe punishment or, in some cases, once they have appeased the gods and ancestors by slaughtering animals. In order to prevent any of the above from happening, issues around sex and sexual ethics are considered as taboo and private. This belief is deeply entrenched in indigenous traditional and cultural practices and Awusabo-­ Asare et  al. (1993: 87) cited Manuh et  al. that there is scarcely any communication, even between married couples, on sex-related issues. Until recently, most Africans could not openly discuss issues around sex and sexual relations more especially with children, and this discussion had to wait until the appropriate age just before marriage (Alaba 2004: 8). In fact, even the names of one’s “private parts” are not mentioned in conversation. As Kayode (1986: 51), referring to traditional African society, points out: It is certainly not easy to talk about sex. This is probably because it is not customary to do so. Most African parents never talk about sex relations to their children. As far as they are concerned this is a realm considered completely a taboo.

As a taboo, sex and sexual relations are not mentioned in day-to-day communications. In most African communities, euphemisms are used to represent genitalia because they are perceived as vulgar. For instance, among the Yoruba in Nigeria, the female organ is referred to as oju ara obinrin (the eye of a woman’s body) while the male organ is called nnkan omokunrin (a man’s thing) (Alaba 2004: 11). Among the Akan in Ghana, the male organ is called obarima dua (the male’s stick) and the female Akosua Kumaa. Mudhovozi et al. (2012: 131) draw our attention to the following: “Because sexual behaviour has the potential to both cause harm … communities developed codes of conduct relating to when, where and with whom sexual relationships might take place”. These three authors believe that the time, place and the beings involved in the sexual act, and the relationships, are considered serious ethical issues. It is for this reason

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that issues of adultery, rape, bestiality and other forms of sexual relations were seen as taboo. As noted, for fear of misfortune, bad omens or curses from the gods and ancestors, and issues to do with sex and sexual ethics are clouded with taboos and stringent unwritten rules. The aim of the taboos and the stringent unwritten rules is to prohibit certain acts and to instil moral guidance or law in the community to guard against improper sexual practices. Cassier (1972: 106) has observed that: The taboo system was the only system of social restriction and obligation in the early stages of human development. It was, the cornerstone of the whole social order. There was no part of the social system that was not regulated and governed by taboos.

Explaining further the taboos among most traditional African communities, Quentin Gausset has argued that for taboos to be everywhere then there has to be a reason and logic for this—they were not put in place by chance (Gausset 2002: 631). As outlined above, there are various acts around sex and sexual relations that are considered taboo, and Ansah (1989: 249) states that: [S]ex taboos form a code of sexual conduct that any deviation from it is deeply detested. The code stipulates time or manner of having sex and also the person with whom one may or may not enter into sexual relationship.

In addition to the sacredness and taboos discussed above, sex and sexual ethics or relations in African indigenous values are linked to reproduction and sustenance of marital relationships. Mbiti (1976: 146) draws our attention to the fact that: In African societies sex is not for biological purposes alone. It has also religious and social uses. For procreation and pleasure sex plays an important and obvious role in any normal marriage and in any society of the world. There are African peoples among whom rituals are solemnly opened or concluded with actual or symbolic sexual intercourse between husband and wife or other officiating persons.

With the above understanding, sex before marriage is considered an abomination; in fact, a child born out of wedlock is frowned upon and the male offender is made to pay “damages”. Damages may be in the form of

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cash or cattle. The female offender, on the other hand, loses her pride and glory and thus becomes a shame to her family (Idowu 1982: 157). This suggests that for most Africans, the appropriate context to engage in sex and sexual relations is within marriage and the ultimate purpose is to bear children as a sign of blessings from both the gods and ancestors. Childbearing, therefore, becomes a very important aspect of each marriage relationship. For example, a person continues to live after death as long as there is a close family, such as children, to remember them. Furthermore, John Mbiti warns that a person vanishes into thin air and their immortality is destroyed if they have no one to remember them and keep them in personal immortality. Children, therefore, become the means of attaining immortality (Mbiti 1969: 26–27). Scott and Mercer (1994: 86) cite Mutambirwa, who points to a similar belief among the indigenous Shona people in Zimbabwe. They believe that a childless individual’s spirit wanders on earth as evil, aggrieved or haunted because they are not accepted into the spiritual world. It is for this reason that most indigenous African men embrace polygamous lifestyles. The desire for a boy child who will inherit him and keep him in personal immortality may also push a man to find a second, third or even fourth wife if the existing wife or wives bore him only girls. In addition, more children are perceived as fruitfulness and wealth (Mbiti 1969: 26–27). Again, the belief concerning sex and sexual relations that is common amongst indigenous African communities is the importance of semen in sexual intercourse. Semen is seen as “life”. In some communities, it is perceived as a “gift of self” which is very important in every marital relationship (Van Dyk 2001: 8). This gift is only to be given to the individuals in the relationship. The inference, therefore, is that if semen is life then it must be allowed to do that for which it was created for. Thus, the receptor has to be human with the aim of procreation; any receptor other than human is deemed an abomination. A number of scholars including Heald (1995), Ngubane (1977) and Schoepf (1992) have documented the cultural beliefs surrounding the importance of semen in East Africa, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and among the Zulus in South Africa. They emphasise that not only does semen give life but it is also necessary in nurturing the growing foetus in that it contains “important vitamins” that are needed for the natural development of the foetus. It also provides for “the continued physical and mental health, beauty and future fertility of women” (Van Dyk 2001: 8). Given such an understanding, anything that blocks this process is perceived as

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bringing the human race to an end. This explains why a number of African communities are in opposition to the use of condoms and why others have large number of children. Furthermore, there is also the concern of the timing of sexual intercourse. Ayantayo (2002: 56) explains that the reason why sex at night seems to be the approved time for intercourse for most couples is that traditionally the day is considered the time for work and since hard work is seen as an important value, sex during the day is perceived as interfering with work. Only lazy people engage in sexual activities during the day. Linked with this is the belief that since sex is a private affair, it must be done secretly in order to prevent under-aged persons from being exposed to it. Among the consequences of having sex at the wrong time, especially during the day, is the belief that in the event of pregnancy the baby will be an albino, which is perceived as a curse. In addition to the above, rape, homosexuality and bestiality are perceived as taboo in most communities, especially the Yoruba in Nigeria. Participating in such activities is “regarded as mental illness” (Abogunrin 1989: 280). Thus, for most indigenous African people, any sexual acts other than with the opposite sex in a marital relationship are an abomination. Such acts are considered serious offences because the end results are a disruption to the smooth running of the community. As a consequence of the seriousness attached to the above-mentioned offences, any individual who is found guilty is harshly dealt with not only by the community but also by the ancestors and gods. For example, Mbiti (1976: 147) states that: When adultery is discovered it is severely dealt with: in some societies the guilty person (particularly a man) would be whipped, or stoned to death, or made to pay compensation or have his head or part of his body mutilated.

It must be noted that indigenous African sexual ethics are anchored on African traditional religious values, and in spite of the punishments appearing harsh, they contributed to sexual discipline in the past. The points raised so far underscore, to a large extent, the sacredness indigenous African communities attach to human sexuality and while the above forms of punishment have been overtaken by events such as the introduction of Christianity, globalisation as well as migration, most Africans still hold on to these values secretly (Sanneh 1980; Izugbara in Tamale 2011). It is acknowledged that while these African indigenous sexual ethics have

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served indigenous African communities in the past, their relevance in the current globalised society can be questioned. Whether relevant or not, I believe that they continue to play a role in such communities, albeit, often surreptitiously.

Emergence of Sex Robots The recent advancement of artificial intelligence and the technological development of sex robots (also referred to as “sexbots”) has sparked public interest particularly around issues of “ethics, robot emotions and personalities, intelligent electronic sex hardware, affective, gender, psychological, sociological and philosophical approaches, among others” (González-González et  al. 2019: 1). It must be noted that human interaction with machines is not a new phenomenon. Kate Devlin (2015) and Genevieve Lively (2019), for example, draw our attention to the fact that the relationship between humans and their artificial counterparts goes: back to the myths of ancient Greece, where sculptor Pygmalion’s statue was brought to life with a kiss. It is the stuff of legend and of science fiction— part of our written history and a part of our imagined future. (Lively 2019: 326)

However, the current sex robots are not fiction, but are machines designed solely to have sex with humans (Levy 2009). Danaher (2017: 12) provides a succinct definition of sex robots stating that they “are robots with humanlike touch, movements, and intelligence that are designed and/or used for sexual purposes”. Chantal Cox-George and Susan Bewley add that they are “realistic mannequins with variable ages, appearances and textures, and customisable oral, vaginal and anal openings” (Cox-George and Bewley 2018: 1). According to Sinziana Gutiu: The sex robot looks and feels like a real woman or man who is programmed into submission and which functions as a tool for sexual purposes. The sex robot is an ever-consenting sexual partner and the user has full control of the robot and the sexual interaction. (Gutiu 2016: 2)

In short, sex robots are humanlike dolls whose sole purpose is to be used as sex objects. There are different types of sex robots on the market including female, male and childlike dolls. They come in different sizes

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and different colours representing different races. Since the emergence of sex robots, the industry has grown and in 2007, Jenny Kleeman noted that the industry was already estimated to be worth “US$30 billion” (Kleeman 2017). Cox-George and Bewley (2018: 1) point out that “four companies sell adult sexbots priced between US$5 000 and US$15 000”. Despite what could be considered exorbitant prices, the industry is thriving because it has captured the imaginative interest of many. However, there have also been concerns raised by religious groups and feminist scholars. John Danaher, for example, describes how organisers wanted to host the “Second International Congress on Love and Sex with Robots” in Malaysia in November 2015. Being an Islamic country, the authorities opposed hosting the conference (Danaher 2019). The Inspector-General of Police was quoted as saying that “there was nothing ‘scientific’ about the topic of the conference and that sex between humans and robots was ‘illegal in Malaysia’” (Rees 2015 in Danaher 2019: 134). Kathleen Richardson, a feminist and an ethicist, has argued that the development and introduction of these robots in society has the potential to encourage humans to objectify and commodify women, specifically sex workers (Richardson 2015). This understanding motivated her and her colleague, Erik Brilling, to launch the “Campaign against Sex Robots” in September 2015 (Richardson 2015). Others, such as Gutiu (2016: 186), have raised the issue of consent saying that “Sexbots diminish the social and legal importance of consent by commoditizing females in the context of a uni-directional sexual relationship”. As noted above, there are different types of sex robots and González-­ González et  al. (2019: 3) draw our attention to the fact that “Most of them are customizations according to male fantasies. But nowadays men and women can purchase male and female sexbots from different realistic sexbots with AI in the marke[t]” (González-González et al. 2019: 3). The authors provide three examples of sex robots: Roxxxy …[who] incorporates articulated skeleton, customizable hair, eyes and skin color, with a heartbeat and circulatory system, and personality … Harmony… [who] can recite poetry or make jokes, can remember the favourite food, films and music of his/her owner, and can be programmed to be witty and charming, and … has 18 different types of personalities (i.e. jealous, moody, frigid, etc.), 42 different nipple options, as well as an optional transgender penis extension … [and] Henry … [who] … is designed for women and gay men users, and is the male version of Harmony,

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with a range of penis sizes. His creators say that they focus [o]n the human need of companion[ship] more than the sexual relations. (González-­ González et al. 2019: 3)

Experts such as Francis Shen have pointed out that “sex robots are rapidly becoming a part of the national conversation about the future of sex and relationships” and may well become “mainstream” (Shen 2019). As early as 1983, a report in the UK Guardian newspaper outlined the possible impact of technological developments on New York sex workers: In 1983, the Guardian newspaper reports that New York prostitutes share some of the future of other workers—those technology developments may put them out of business. All the peepshows now sell substitutes—dolls to have sex with, vibrators, plastic vaginas and penises—and as one groused in New York, ‘it won’t be long before customers can buy a robot from a drug store so they won’t need us’ (Levy 2009: 215)

Apart from their potential to impact the livelihood of sex workers, various other potential uses or “benefits” of sex robots have been identified including the treatment of erectile dysfunction and paedophilia and the prevention of sexual aggression against women and children (Bame 2017). Cox-George and Bewley (2018: 1) add that sex robots have the potential to boost free-market profits and also serve as “harm limitation”. Ian Yeoman and Michelle Mars summarised the futuristic potentials of sex robots according to four major themes, namely, safer sex, therapeutic potential, potential to treat paedophiles and sex offenders, and changing societal norms (Yeoman and Mars 2012). However, as González-González et al. (2019: 1) point out, scientific evidence for the benefits of sex robots is lacking. Yeoman and Mars (2012: 366) believe that “Robot sex offers a solution to a host of problems associated with the sex trade” including a reduction in human trafficking, sex tourism and sexually transmitted infections. The inference here is that they have the potential to reduce the abuse of women and children. Having briefly discussed the emergence of sex robots, their types and their potential uses or “benefits”, the next section looks at sex robots through the lens of indigenous African cultural values.

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African Cultural Values That Stand To Be Tested in the Face of Sex Robots Discussion in the preceding sections and the unfolding developments around sex robots indicate the gradual, world-over shifting of sexual relationships from humans to machines. A study in the USA revealed that given the opportunity, one out of four men would have sex with a robot, and 49% of the participants mentioned that sex with robots will be a normal practice in the next 50 years (Bame 2017). Africans are not exempt(ed) from this shift in sexual relationships given that issues around sex robots captivate interest among younger and older generations alike (as noted in the introductory anecdote). As a result of the increasing popularity of sex robots, there is the possibility that they may have already made their way into the homes of some Africans but because issues around sex and sexual relations are strictly private, this possibility is highly unlikely to be public knowledge. Despite the increasing availability of sex robots on the market and the increasing recognition of their potential uses or “benefits”, there are still a number of ethical questions and implications regarding their use particularly in the indigenous African communities, and these are outlined below. What role can indigenous African communities play in the era of the sex robot? How can indigenous African sexual ethics help in stemming the tide of sex robots? What are the possible ways sexual ethics can inform the use of sex robots? How can sex with robots contribute to the enhancement of the lineage of African communities? What will become of the African race in the future? What effect will sex robots have on African marriages? These are but some of the questions arising from the emergence of this technology and an attempt will be made, not necessarily to answer the questions but to put them into perspective. As discussed, indigenous African communities see issues around sex and sexual relations as sacred. If sex is viewed as a gift from the gods and the ancestors, then it stands to reason that sexual relations with sex robots will undermine the ethical values that have served the indigenous people for generations. For the indigenous communities, sex is a gift given to humans for their companionship and sexual pleasure. It is, therefore, incomprehensible that this gift should be shared with a machine. The fact is that robots are not human, and because sex with anything other than humans is seen as taboo, it will be correct to say that sex with a robot is

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equally taboo. In the understanding of indigenous communities, such an act may be abhorrent to the ancestors and the gods. Secondly, sex with robots would not only undermine the sacredness attached to sex and sexual relations but would also eventually erode the indigenous African communities. As has been noted in the above discussion, such communities are communal in nature and place a high premium on procreation and, as Beatrice Okyere-Manu (2016: 281) has noted, large families and communities are perceived “as an important source of productive energy in nation building, war, etc.”. In addition, as indicated, childbearing is perceived as a means of attaining immortality and also a source of fruitfulness and wealth. The implication, therefore, is that with sexual relations shifting from humans to robots, there would be no one to continue the family and community lineage into the future. Noah Komla Dzobo adds that: Historically, the emphasis upon having many children in Africa was not a sign of irresponsible parenthood. It was a way of fulfilling an understanding of the essence of human existence which involves full participation in the creativity of humanity and the passing on of the creative power of life from one generation to another through the process of marriage and procreation. (Dzobo 1992: 232)

Clearly, if children are a heritage of African indigenous communities, then the implication is that this new sexual practice is non-African in terms of norms and values and its introduction could, at best, undermine and at worst, eliminate the future of indigenous African communities. Thirdly, given that semen is perceived as “life” and “a gift of self” from a husband to a wife with the aim of procreation, the flow of it into a receptor other than human is unacceptable. This will also be seen as taboo because it is disrespectful to the gods and ancestors in the spirit world as well as living beings. It challenges the immortality perceptions carried by the indigenous communities. The individual’s relationship with the community has been discussed at the beginning of this chapter and highlighted was the fact that the individual owes his or her actions to the community. Thus, the increasing availability of sex robots is, without doubt, likely to challenge the concept of ubuntu. Even though sexual issues are considered private, most indigenous African communities are sensitive to departures from accepted norms.

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As has been established in the preceding sections, sex with a robot is likely to be a detested practice in indigenous African communities. So, practically, what does the emergence of sex robots mean to indigenous African communities? As noted, African traditional religious beliefs and values have shaped indigenous people’s responses to issues around sex and sexual ethics. Clearly, the current situation presents an ethical dilemma to modern African communities: on the one hand, the development and introduction of sex robots on the African continent will compromise values that have guided African communities over the years. On the other hand, living in a technological era and a globalised world, the community have no control over the individual’s sexual choices. Responding to this dilemma may mean breaking the cultural barrier of silence around sex and sexual relations and, in so doing, speaking openly in the public arena about sex and sexual issues and the role of modern technologies, such as sex robots, in this regard. As Lively (2019: 330) has rightly noted, “How we relate to sex robots in the future will be coded by what we relate—by our narratives—past, present and future.”

Conclusion The chapter has exposed the African values that stand to be tested with the emergence of sex robots. It has highlighted that sex robots threaten the core values, beliefs and principles held by indigenous communities relating to sex and sexual relations. As emphasised, African indigenous values and beliefs around sex and sexual relations include the fact that sex is a gift from the gods and the ancestors and, therefore, sacred. This sacredness is seen in the prescription of the place, the time and even the persons involved in the sexual encounter. The values and beliefs also include the perception that semen is life and should thus fulfil the purpose for which it exists. Even though the development and increasing availability of sex robots have the potential to resolve a number of social and ethical issues, they are in conflict with the cherished sexual ethics that have guided indigenous African communities for generations. This presents an ethical dilemma to African indigenous society.

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Richardson, K. (2015). The ‘asymmetrical’ Relationship: Parallels between Prostitution and the Development of Sex Robots. SIGCAS Computers and Society, 4(3), 290–293. Sanneh, L.  O. (1980). The Domestication of Islam and Christianity in African Societies. Journal of Religion in Africa, 11, 1–12. Schoepf, B.  G. (1992). AIDS, Sex and Condoms: African Healers and the Reinvention of Tradition in Zaire. Medical Anthropology, 14, 225–242. Scott, S. J., & Mercer, M. A. (1994). Understanding Cultural Obstacles to HIV/ AIDS Prevention in Africa. AIDS Education and Prevention., 6(1), 81–89. Senghor, L. S. (1964). On African Socialism. New York: Praeger. Shen F. (2019, February 12). Sex Robots Are Here, But Laws Aren’t Keeping Up With the Ethical and Privacy Issues They Raise. The Conversation. Retrieved April 26, 2020, from https://theconversation.com/ sexrobots-­are-­here-­but-­laws-­arent-­keeping-­up-­with-­the-­ethical-­and-­privacy-­ issuesthey-­raise-­109852. Shutte, A. (2001). Ubuntu: An Ethic for a New South Africa. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications. Tamale, S. (2011). Researching and Theorising Sexualities in Africa. In S. Tamale (Ed.), African Sexualities—A Reader. Pambazuka: Cape Town. Van Dyk, A.  C. (2001). HIV/AIDS Care and Counselling: A Multidisciplinary Approach (2nd ed.). Cape Town: Pearson Education. Yeoman, I., & Mars, M. (2012). Robots, Men and Sex Tourism. Futures, 44, 365–371.

CHAPTER 8

The Death of Isintu in Contemporary Technological Era: The Ethics of Sex Robots Among the Ndebele of Matabo Herbert Moyo

Introduction The basics of Isintu are continuously under threat from Westernization and technological development such as the development of sex robots. Isintu is primarily communalism and is philosophically based on concepts of continuity through birth, life, death and rebirth. Isintu influences human sexuality and marriage as vehicles of the continuity of humanity through the birth of children. This concept of continuity is a core philosophical value of the Ndebele that is justified through the observation of nature. The development of sex robots is a threat to the communalism and the concept of continuity. Sex robots are yet to give birth to children as humans do for continuity of life. Sex robots are replacing the need for other human beings for intimacy. People no longer need other human

H. Moyo (*) University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. D. Okyere-Manu (ed.), African Values, Ethics, and Technology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70550-3_8

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beings to indulge in sexual pleasure. Using Isintu ethics, I interrogate the ethical challenges that emanate from the substitution of human beings with sex robots among the Ndebele. Isintu thrives on human-to-human relations; when human relationships suffer, Isintu suffers. Isintu is linked to the concept of umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (a person is a person because of other people). This chapter introduces the concept of Isintu as the theoretical framework for the chapter. I will go on to explain my research methodology. The research methodology will be followed by presentation and discussion of data. The chapter concludes that the Ndebele are not yet ready for the introduction of sex robots.

Motivation This chapter is motivated by my pastoral experience with one participant who is married to both a sex robot and a human being. The participant regarded me as a kind of a pastor who can introduce him and his sex robot to his wife. The participant agreed to be part of this research project as long as he remains anonymous. The participant thinks that he is not the only one who finds himself in such a predicament where he is secretly married to a sex robot to protect his marriage with his wife. I will call him Mr MM. Mr MM says that he found himself very lonely in a foreign country having left his wife in Zimbabwe. He was introduced to sex robots by Facebook friends. He managed to buy a sex robot which kept him company and sexual satisfaction in the absence of his wife. He thought that when going back to Zimbabwe he would not talk about the sex robot. However, having been with the sex robot for four years, he realized that he is now in love with it. He now wants to take the sex robot as a second wife. Now he wanted to introduce the sex robot to his wife and family in preparation for the customary marriage. This is the story that has led to this study in a bid to understand the position of the people of Matabo on sex robots. I think there will be a second study to find out what the church in Matabo thinks about the sex robot. Following an extensive discussion with Mr MM, I am yet to introduce the sex robot to his family. The outcome of this study will inform the how of informing Mr MM’s wife, the family and eventually the whole community of Matabo. In order for him and I to understand the dynamics involved in getting married to a sex robot for people in Matabo, we agreed to carry out this research to gather the views of the Ndebele people.

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The Concept of Isintu It is important to understand the Isintu in order to understand the position of the Ndebele on sex robots. Marriage leading to the birth of children is viewed as the basis for the continuity of a family lineage and consequently the community. Anything with the potential to harm the continuity of the community is ubuthakathi (witchcraft) and cannot be entertained. Sex robots have such a potential and it is ubuthakathi. The philosophy of life for the Ndebele is what I call Isintuism. Isintuism is the basis for communalism amongst the Nguni, especially the Ndebele of Matabo in Zimbabwe. In the Ndebele worldview, there is life to be lived with a variety of rituals, observances and behavioural patterns that can be referred to as customs, tradition, culture or religion by those doing anthropology, sociology and philosophy of religion. Isintuism is the foundation of Ndebele norms and values. Isintuism uses art, taboos and idioms to define principles and values that constitute philosophies underpinning acceptable human character or behaviour such as Ubuntu. Communalism is a basic value in the construction of communities which can be epitomized by the idiom, “Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu.” The deviation from Isintu can result in the loss of Ubuntu. The concept of Ubuntu has been made popular in the academic world by John Mbiti (1970). Ubuntu is an ethical concept that shows adherence to Isintu which manifests itself through communalism, using the humanness of individuals who constitute a community. Isintu is the living out of one’s life as a continuous practice of beliefs, customs and culture. In a way, everyday life is a way of practising Isintuism. There was no difference between culture, religion and Ubuntu. In fact, Ubuntu is an expression of Isintu. Isintu requires other human beings, hence communalism. Ubuntu then becomes the ethic that drives the consciousness of the communally shared life-giving values such as relatedness, respect, communalism, hospitality and interdependency. These communal values are passed on through generations for the well-being of the individual, the wider community and the environment. Isintu is the worldview that is expressed through ubuntu. Mqhayi says Ubuntu is for the “black people throughout Africa south of the Sahara” (Mqhayi 1931: 134). In everyday life if one does things according to the traditional way, then it is said “Uyenza isiNtu.” This may be a ritual or being dressed in what is viewed as traditional attire (unxibe isiNtu). Sticking to tradition is Isintu. Ntu is also connected to unity and kindness (ubuntu), hence communalism. This feature of being communal makes

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one know that no-one lives as an island, one is part of his family and community, hence the saying “umntu ngumntu ngabantu” (a person is a person through persons). This is emphasized by Setiloane (1986: 13) who says, “The whole African traditional life-style with its age-sets, rites of passage, several generations living together, is built on the principle ‘You cannot be human alone’. Motho ke motho ka batho (Sotho for ‘a person is a person through others’): Our humanity finds fulfilment only in community with others.” Isintuism is a communalist worldview where people learn to share almost everything. Anyone who is individualistic is described as being without ubuntu (akanabuntu). Isintu will be dead in this kind of a person. The community is composed of both good and bad people, life-giving forces and life-denying forces; spirits (both good and bad), magicians, sangomas, ancestors and witches are part of the community. Communalism extends beyond the visible to the invisible. Being in community may mean to say you appease human beings and spirits. You get protection from bad spirit using your good spirits. Cosmologically, the Ndebele believe that everything is cyclic, implying endlessness, continuity and perpetuity of cycles in nature including human life. People are born to grow and live life so that they can die and go back to where they came from. In this worldview, death is seen as a journey back to the ancestors or to the land of the living dead. For the Ndebele, the circle is a basic shape for the house (the hut), cattle kraal, water well and yard, just to mention a few. Phathisa Nyathi (Interview 2020: 1 March) says that the Ndebele people looked up in the sky and saw that the created order is a circle. The moon, the sun, the stars and the earth are all circles. Nyathi says the human body is also made up of circles, the mouth, the eyes, the nostrils, all the body openings are all circles. He further says that the body in itself including limbs are cylindrical implying that they are a pile of circles. Therefore, the creator produced nature in the form of circles; the Ndebele also created whatever they were creating in the form of circles. Systems such as seasons, months of the year, the days of the week, the sun, the moon dying and resurrecting systematically every month are all cyclic. The moon is one central thing that the Ndebele look at with wonder. It is born, and it grows to full moon. Then it starts to diminish and die. When it dies, one knows that it will come back again renewed and young. Then it goes through the same cycle again. Nyathi then likens the cycle of the moon to the menstrual cycle of a woman and then to the life

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cycle of a human being. There is this continuous cycle of life, death, life and life. Nyathi and Chikomo say A people’s worldview and cosmology are a result of the interaction between nature and culture. Africans observed nature and got inspired by it…The seasons of the year were repetitive, cyclical and characterised by birth, death and rebirth. Summer is symbolic of life; however, it is not a permanent phenomenon. Autumn follows and life wanes and declines. Winter follows autumn and is symbolic and an approximation of death, a period of total rest in readiness for the next lively stage…Spring is part of the cycle and holds promise for a new life. Trees develop buds and flowers blossom. This is the time when trees begin the all—important process of developing seeds, which give life to new trees; this is continuity of a species. For the Africans this marks the beginning of a new year—a nature—determined period that lies behind the process of fertility, continuity, perpetuity, immortality, endlessness and infinity. (2016: 7)

Nyathi and Chikomo (2016) say that the cycles of nature are repeated indefinitely. Nyathi and Chikomo view this as an inherent cyclical birth-­ growth-­death-rebirth that lies behind eternal life. “Perpetual life or continuity is assured through this circle of life” (Nyathi and Chikomo 2016: 7). The diurnal cycle equally conveys the same idea of continuity through perpetual regeneration and renewal. The sun rises in the morning, which can be equated to the beginning of spring and summer which promise the beginning of life and growth. The sun gives life to creation. Nyathi and Chikomo (2016: 7–8) argue that “if the sun perpetuated, i.e. did not set, life on earth would be obliterated by the scorching heat. In order to perpetuate life, the sun sets and night falls. Temperatures drop. Night, the absence of the sun, is equivalent to death. If the sun did not rise in the morning life would be doomed.” Planets live in community. There is so much interdependence in nature. Nature does not survive in isolation from other nature. The Ndebele are emulating nature, hence the circle and communalism. Bringing in sex robots disturbs this life, death and life cycle or and even threatens the extinction of humanity.1

1  I do understand that sex robots can give birth to children if the female sex robot can be used as an incubator for test-tube children. Wives of sex robots can also fall pregnant through artificial insemination. This a ray of hope, though it brings in new challenges of such questions of lineage and ancestor-ship.

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According to Nyathi (Interview 2020: 1 March), Isintu is located in music, art, dancing, musical instruments, poetry, tools and rituals which all demonstrate the idea of continuity, perpetuity, infinity, fertility, imperishability, immortality, endlessness and perpetuity. For him, Isintu is what should be called the way of life for the Ndebele people of Zimbabwe. The philosophy of Isintu is the endlessness of life.

The Context of the Study The study is located among the Ndebele people of Matabo in Zimbabwe. The Ndebele are a hybrid group of people whose Isintu is reflective of their Nguni South African background of their ancestors of this community who were Zulus who migrated from Zululand under the leadership of Mzilikazi in the late nineteenth century. Matabo is an area in the Midlands province bordering Matabeleland South Province. For the Ndebele, Isintu is a way of life for both the living and the living dead (Moyo 2019). Isintu permeates life from the womb and continues into life after death; isintu is the total Ndebele worldview with all the rituals, principles and values. The Ndebele are Zulus who travelled northwards from South Africa in the nineteenth century. In 1823, Chief Mzilikazi Khumalo had a conflict with King Shaka Zulu over the spoils of war in what is presently known as KwaZulu-Natal. This conflict was caused by Mzilikazi’s refusal to hand over loot from a raiding expedition, resulting in Shaka sending an army to demand the cattle from Mzilikazi. Mzilikazi refused to hand over the cattle and instead he fled across the Drakensberg Mountains, eventually settling North of the Limpopo River in an area called Mthwakazi which was originally occupied by the San and the Khoi-khoi (Nyathi 1994). As these Zulus travelled northwards, their vocabulary became richer (or polluted) by picking words from the ethnic groups with whom they interacted, such as the Sotho, Tswana, Nambya Shona and the Lozwi. Therefore, the Ndebele of Zimbabwe speak what some people would call corrupted dialect of Zulu. The Isintu of the Ndebele is a conglomeration of the customs and traditions of the different ethnic groupings that make up the Mthwakazi kingdom. Isintu as a way of life is based on specific rituals about rites of passage that are meant to sustain life and relationships for individuals, families, the community for the living to the living and the living to the living dead. In the Ndebele worldview, death does not end life but continues it in the realm of the ancestors. Death does not affect the personality of the dead

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person but only changes the living conditions; thus, the dead are merely the “living dead” (Ngubane 1977). Indeed, the ancestors (abaphansi) continue to live and interact with the living (Moyo 2019). This concurs with Setiloane’s (1986) observation that the African understanding of community includes the extended family of the living and the living dead. For example, when a person dies, “the Zulu would say useye koyise-mkhulu (he/she has gone to be with the forefathers); when a Zulu says the praise-­ songs of the living dead-he would end by saying asifi siyalala (we do not die but sleep)” (Ngobese 2009). Life amongst the Ndebele is highly rooted in Isintu, making it very difficult to separate culture from religion and god. The Ndebele traditional cosmology is dynamic as it recognizes and integrates the duality of the mind and body, magic and rationality, order and disorder, negative and positive powers, and individual and communal consciousness. Family relationships, communal relationships, relationships with nature and relationships with strangers are part of the Isintu observances to appease continually the spirit world. When things do not work out in life, one is forced to seek an understanding of their relationship with the spirit world. Isintu borders around the theology of retribution. If the spirit world is happy, then inhlanhla (luck) flows to those who relate well to others and the environment. On the contrary, those who do not relate well will have umnyama (bad luck) resulting in misfortune and ill health. However, at the centre of Isintu is progeny for the continuity of the family lineage and the community. This is why barrenness and impotence are seen as enemies of Isintu as they limit the continuity of the family and community, respectively, to the next generation.

Research Methodology Methodologically, I used an ethnophilosophical approach to understand the Ndebele knowledge systems and beliefs that are embedded in Isintu as it pertains to the advent of sex robots. Since Isintu is a term that envelopes traditions, culture and worldviews of a community, an ethnophilosophical method is relevant as an approach in search for the Ndebele views on sex robots. Ethnophilosophy in this chapter embodies indigenous knowledge systems of the Ndebele that inform their understanding and interpretation of new realities such as sex robots. Ethnophilosophy is communal wisdom captured in idioms, proverbs, myths and taboos is a repository of knowledge for understanding human life in relation to nature and the spirit

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world. According to Bodunrin (1984), ethnophilosophers derive their philosophy from a people’s myths, idioms, culture, traditions, folklore, folk-wisdom and beliefs. Ethnophilosophy is primarily concerned with communal belief and thought systems. I have chosen to use this approach primarily for this very reason that ethnophilosophy deals with communal worldviews instead of individual worldviews for the purposes of trying to see the place of sex robots in Matabo. The ideal of ethnophilosophy is to locate the foundation of African convictions that determine the dos and the don’ts and the communal relationships. Oruka also sees ethnophilosophy as an effort to identify facets of communal wisdom as opposed to individual reasoning to a point where “idiosyncrasies of the traditional or communal African customs, poems, taboos, religious, songs, dances, etc. easily come up as undeniable candidates for what is required” (2003: 121). I gathered data for this chapter through Zoom focus group discussions. I had three focus groups. Each focus group had ten people who volunteered to participate from my WhatsApp invitation posted on 13 April 2020. Sampling was purposive as I sent my WhatsApp invitation to Ndebele cultural experts such as educators, spirit mediums and guardians of culture in the form of traditionalists that have access to both rural and urban life. I extended my invitation to Zimbabweans from Matabo who are in the diaspora with the hope that they may have been exposed to sex robots. The invitation included community leaders in Matabo such as Kraal heads, the Chief and members of the court of these offices. I received 31 positive responses. In this chapter, participants will not be identified, except the Chief Bankwe who insisted that he be identified in the study. However, the Chief did not participate in the focus group discussion. I had an in-depth interview with him on his views about sex robots which lasted for 35 minutes. One participant living in the diaspora has a second wife who is a sex robot.2 I call this participant Mr MM. During the focus group discussion, I introduced the subject of study by narrating the experiences of Mr MM who is sending me as a mediator between himself and his wife on his decision to have a second wife in the form of a sex robot. This narrative is then followed by the guiding questions. The guiding questions were as follows:

2  I will not mention the country of residence for each of these two participants for confidential purposes.

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• What is your advice to Mr MM on his decision to introduce his sex robot as a second wife? • As a Ndebele person from Matabo, what your views about sex robots? • Could mutual love be achieved between humans and sex robots? • What are the advantages and disadvantages of sex robots?

Data Presentation and Discussion The four focus groups met once for about two hours as noted above. There was no need for further meetings as the outcome from the three focus groups was the same, raising five key issues. 1. All the three groups and the Chief concurred that Mr MM must not introduce the sex robot to anybody in Matabo, including his wife and the rest of his family. The argument by participants was that “this is unheard of that a Ndebele man can get married to sex robot.” They described the behaviour as madness and they offered to find a human being from wherever he is in the diaspora. The groups also argued that Mr MM is aware that he is not in love with the sex robot the same way as he is in love with his wife. Mr MM says that he bought the sex robot to protect his marriage in Zimbabwe. In essence the robot is part of Mr MM’s property, as argued by Richardson (2018) that human robots are tools that cannot be loved the same way we love human beings. According to Richardson the presence of sex robots is heralding the death of love, therefore it is clear that Mr MM was abusing the sex robot. The robot is a toy that keeps him company in the absence of, and not a substitute for, a normal human being. He bought the sex robot and did not pay Lobola (bride price). The ancestors of Mr MM will not recognize the sex robot as a wife at all as ilobolo among the Ndebele is linked to rituals for linking the spouse’s families at a spiritual level. Then marriage without ilobolo is consequently not marriage in Isintu. The discussions on the narrative of Mr MM showed that the Isintu worldview of Matabo is not yet ready for sex robots. This concurs with Scheutz and Arnold (2016) who also argued, in a different context, that society is not yet ready for sex robots. The focus groups also linked the sex robot phenomenon to witchcraft. The argument was that this person has something that looks like a human being which he is able to talk to and have sex with and that

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in the Isintu worldview is ubuthakathi (witchcraft). The groups said that Mr MM has a lot of explaining to do. The Chief Bankwe kept on saying “ngumhlola lowu” (this is very unusual and borders on madness, witchcraft that is a precursor of evil to befall the community), which must never be allowed. “Sleeping with a doll that is a talking machine, that should not be done. Isintu does not allow something like that. One who does such a thing will be mentally sick, or one that has been bewitched or he will be the one practising witchcraft. I will never allow such an abomination in my community” (Chief Bankwe telephonic interview on 29 April 2020). 2. The focus groups concluded that sex robots do not have a place in Matabo where marriage is a link between two families, thereby extending communalism by increasing the circle of one’s relatives. Sex robots perpetuate human isolation as a person can now live alone with a robot and behave as if they are living with a human being. Isintu is founded on communalism and robots, and other technologies seem to be on a mission to promote individualism. The groups said that there are a lot of single people seeking partners, then why would one seek a non-human for a wife or husband? One group said that sexual relationships with robots are the same as bestiality. The group said that bestiality is better than having sex with a sex robot because an animal was created by God to have sex, unlike having sex with a machine. The groups agreed that there must be a difference between machines and human beings. It is unfair to develop machines that make technological gadgets to be treated like us humans to an extent that at times they earn more money than humans do. McLaren (2012) has argued that the mechanizing of the natural is collapsing the boundaries between people and machines. Sex robots fall under this sphere of the mechanising the natural and therefore must be treated with caution. 3. The three focus groups took a swipe on sex robots in the area of reproduction. Isintu thrives on the continuity of the family and the community. According to the focus groups, sex robots cannot fall pregnant and therefore are a hindrance to continuity of the family and the community. In the Isintu system, marriage is meant to complete the cycle of birth, growth, life, death and rebirth. One who gets married to a robot will not be able to have biological children. The discussions agreed that this a complex phenomenon as it can be argued that some of the sex robots can act as incubation tubes to

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give birth to babies that the robot and the male husband can parent. However, in the Ndebele community, there is an insistence on the normal birth of children as opposed to the mechanized birth of children which may not be easy to report to the ancestors. In general, it came out that sex robots are not acceptable as they break the cycle of Ndebele life. 4. In fact, culturally sex robots can be a taboo and can be mistaken for witchcraft. This applies even raising the subject of sex robots; one gets viewed with suspicion as being a witch. Witches are said to use human-like objects to cause misfortune, illness and, at times, death to others. These human-like objects have different names such as Undofa or umatholwane or ntokolotshi (zombie) which is human-like thing with the spirit of a person raised from the grave by powerful witches for sinister uses (Shoko 2013: 25). The description of the sex robot can easily be confused as umatholwane, and the owner will be seen as a witch. Shoko (2013: 25) further explains that “witchcraft is nonspiritual but is linked with spiritual entities like zvitupwani3 (‘witch crones’) who have no physical identification but are used in this practice.” This isituhwane is a feared phenomenon which is owned by witches. The isituhwane is at times visible while in most cases it is not visible. The sex robot, according to the focus group, can be classified as an isituthwane owned and used by witches. 5. In the Isintu context, the subject of sex is still not freely discussed; it is an issue for the private sphere. For example, you hardly find shops selling condoms in Matabo as people will not freely buy condoms from another person. Condoms are distributed freely by being placed in public facilities where there is privacy for those wishing to collect them such as toilets, bathrooms and corridors in hospitals. Imagining that the sex robot is eventually accepted in Matabo, which shop will sell these? The groups noted that even if the sex robots are given out for free, they are too big for the potential buyers to hide away from the community from the place of acquisition. So, sex robots are not acceptable and it may not even be feasible to own one. This may change in the future as more and more people get exposed to the global community like Mr MM (see Lee 2017). This is a future that is not yet very near.

3

 Zvitupwani is a Shona word for what the Ndebele call izituhwane.

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Conclusion In conclusion, the Isintu context of Matabo is not yet ready to accommodate sex robots. The robot is not able to procreate, which is central to the worldview of the Ndebele when it comes to marriage. In isintu the life cycle of human beings is enabled continuity by procreation. Anything that threatens this cycle of birth, growth, life, death and rebirth is not acceptable among the Ndebele people of Matabo. Further on the failure to procreate by the sex robot threatens communalism which depends on the continuity of families and, consequently, communities. The marriage to a sex robot in the mindset of a Ndebele consequently results in failure to give birth, hence a threat to communalism. In addition, the sex-robot is bound to be confused with isituhwane or undofa, which are associated with witchcraft. Witchcraft also goes against communalism as it usually leads to misfortune, sickness and death, thereby threatening continuity and communalism. The Ndebele people of Matabo are not yet ready for sex robots.

References Bodunrin, P.  O. (1984). The Question of African Philosophy. In R.  A. Wright (Ed.), African Philosophy: An Introduction. Lanham: University Press of America. Lee, J. (2017). Sex Robots: The Future of Desire. New York City: Springer. Mbiti, J. S. (1970). African Religions and Philosophies. New York: Anchor Books. McLaren, A. (2012). Reproduction by Design: Sex, Robots, Trees, and Test-Tube Babies in Interwar Britain. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Moyo, H. (2019). The Ritualization of Death and Dying: The Journey from the Living to the Living Dead in African Religions. In K. D. Timothy, L. Bregman, & M.  Gottschalk (Eds.), Death and Dying: An Exercise in Comparative Philosophy of Religion (pp. 114–124). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Mqhayi, S. E. K. (1931). Ityala Lamawele. Loved ale: Loved Ale Press. Ngobese, W.  R. M. (2009). The Continuity of Life in African Religion with Reference to Marriage and Death Among the Zulu People. Pretoria: University of South Africa – PhD Dissertation. Ngubane, H. (1977). Body and Mind in Zulu Medicine. An Ethnography of Health and Disease in Nyuswa-Zulu Thought and Practice. London: Academic Press. Nyathi, P. (1994). Igugu LikaMthwakazi: Imbali YamaNdebele, 1820–1893. Gweru: Mambo Press. Nyathi, P., & Chikomo, K. (2016). Echoes from the Past: Interpreting Zimbabwe’s Decorative Symbols. Luveve – Bulawayo: Amagugu Publishers.

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Oruka, O. H. (2003). Four Trends in current African Philosophy. In P. H. Coetzee & A.  P. J.  Roux (Eds.), The African Philosophy Reader (pp.  260–275). New York: Routledge. Richardson, K. (2018). Sex Robots: The End of Love. Cambridge: Polity Press. Scheutz, M., & Arnold, T. (2016). Are We Ready for Sex Robots? In In 2016 11th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) (pp. 351–358). IEEE. Setiloane, G. (1986). Introduction to African Theology. Johannesburg: Skotaville Publishers. Shoko, T. (2013). Healing in African Traditional Religion: Examining the Implications for HIV Within the Context of Zimbabwe. In E.  Chitando & C. Klagba (Eds.), In the Name of Jesus: Healing in the Age of HIV (pp. 91–112). Geneva: World Council of Churches Publications.

PART IV

Technology, African Values and Human Relationship

CHAPTER 9

The Importance of a Neo-African Communitarianism in Virtual Space: An Ethical Inquiry for the African Teenager Thando Nkohla-Ramunenyiwa

Introduction In Africa, the concept of nuclear family exists, but the most commonly used concept of family is the extended family. The structure of the extended family is quite unique in that it does not always comprise just grandparents, but also includes aunts, uncles as well as cousins, as mentioned by Amos (in Seidl-de-Moura 2003: 68). The African family typically extends beyond relatives and extended family, to the community. Mabovula (2011: 38) puts forth a number of fundamental keywords which provide insights into what African communitarianism is all about. She presents phrases such as “ethic of reciprocity”, “collective existence”, “collaboration and solidarity”, and words such as “intersubjectivity” and “cooperation” amongst other terms to provide an illustration of such a community. In fact, these words suggest that African communitarianism values the co-­ existence of community members. These words also embrace the idea that the importance of acknowledging the existence of others is because each

T. Nkohla-Ramunenyiwa (*) School of Computing, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. D. Okyere-Manu (ed.), African Values, Ethics, and Technology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70550-3_9

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individual person plays an important role in the holistic functioning of society. Moreover, there is a strong sense of interdependence in order for the functionality of society as a whole to be progressive. For progress to be achieved, the wellness of the society from an individual and a collective perspective is required, as one cannot expect a society of unwell citizens to move forward. The wellness of society is a collective effort, where cooperation and respect are the fundamental pillars of such a community (Mabovula 2011: 38). This chapter will explore these fundamental pillars informing the wellness of African society by exposing how the African teenagers are being influenced by the digital communities which they access through their communication technology devices. The methodological approach that this chapter will use is a critical approach, which acknowledges that social relations and phenomena are not far removed from challenges. In the context of this chapter, a critical approach will be used to analyse the ethical challenges that come with the introduction of smartphones within the African home. In terms of theoretical framework, Karl Marx and Max Weber’s input on alienation in the context of a capitalism will be instrumental in addressing consumerism as a by-product of modern-day life and in the context of technology. In their consumerism, African teenagers find that they are moral agents who are engaging in a structure. For this, Oelofsen’s (2016: 2) notion of communitarianism will be useful, where in the African context, this term is founded on nurturing interpersonal relationships with the intent of growth. With this interpersonal nature comes an interdependence that acknowledges not only the dependence people have on each other, but also the idea that the wellbeing of the individual is fundamental for the wellbeing of the collective. This means that the value of African communitarianism for the African teenager is at the risk of being compromised. As a result, the development of a neo-African communitarianism perspective could be essential to address the notions of alienation, consumerism and agency of African teenagers in the midst of the introduction of smartphone technology within the African community.

African Communitarianism In addition to the already mentioned characteristics of communitarianism, another important element which deserves to be mentioned is the political dimension of the term. Discussing members of society, whether it is collectively or as individuals, subliminally carries a political narrative of the

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individual or individuals concerned. All the members of the African community who co-exist with each other and are interdependent see each other through the acknowledgement of others. In addition, they are also naturally political beings by virtue of being “political, rational animals” in their differentiation from other species in nature. Masolo (2004: 493–494) introduces communitarianism in Africa as being unique from the rest of the world in that the conception of communitarianism is due to the emancipation of Africans from colonial rule. Although this view is still superseded by African communitarianism being a lifestyle for Africans on a day-to-day basis, the political aspect of it is quite contextual and serves as an important tool for “emancipatory politics”. Its nature as a political tool still lives on through figures of speech and African idioms (Masolo 2004: 493–494). Bringing this perspective even closer to home is the South African context where communitarianism was a tool used to stand up against colonialism during Afrikaner and British colonialism. Here the unity and solidarity of native South Africans were motivated by the fight against a system that was foreign to their worth and human dignity. Through segregation of the native families, this government echoed the society setup of the Industrial Revolution where native migrant workers relocated to the city to make ends meet for their families. Richter and Morrell (2006: 153) echo this sentiment, stating that the problem of absent fathers’ dates as far back as the migrant labour system introduced by the apartheid government in South Africa. The national, racial segregation permeated into other relationships on an ethnic front (such as the Xhosa and Zulu), and systematic segregation of ethnic groups into provinces which discouraged solidarity and unity amongst the indigenes. This did not stop freedom fighters from different ethnic groups from uniting in secret to fight the enemy with the spirit of solidarity and communitarianism. Oelofsen (2016: 4) extends the communitarian discussion further from a South African perspective. She does so through Desmond Tutu’s popular South African rainbow nation metaphor. In the same way that a rainbow represents different colours which together form a colourful unity, so does race in South Africa, where different races are indicative of racial diversity with the hope of unity and co-operation. This metaphor by Tutu addresses the socio-political standing of South Africa’s post-apartheid years to denote the racial reconciliation and integration in post-racial segregation. This could perhaps be the outlook that could inspire the divisions existing in today’s digital communities.

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Digital Community The introduction of communication technological devices in South African homes, not exclusively, came with the introduction of the digital community. Consequently, this could easily be viewed as a further extension of the family. Digital in the term “digital community” denotes a community that is not physical and described by Horsfield (2002: 5) as a space which is not physically accessible because of its intangible, unconstrained nature. This digital society also echoes the sentiments of solidarity and unity amongst those who relate with each other and use the platform for the same cause. To illustrate this is a new moms app Baby Centre, where a community of new mothers join and the new mothers unite, strengthen and support each other. This solidarity and reconciliation are unlike the one described by Oelofsen; it is one where there is a breakdown of social and physical boundaries, which potentially makes such communities more susceptible to having bigger population than actual, physical countries. The danger of this feature is that if there are communities that come together for wrong reasons on social media, they can have a negative impact on a much greater scale. Accordingly, this is what raises concern for parents whose teenagers are constantly engaging with others in virtual space. The breaking down of physical and social borders creates a form of unity and solidarity, but the intentions of each member of the digital community are not always clear and sincere because of the nature of the space. As a result, any forms of unity that may be considered to exist in this space in most cases become compromised.

Technological Virtuality as a Variant of Capitalism Horsfield (2002: 5) sees technological virtuality as being digital and accessed through communication technology devices such as smartphones, tablets, computers and so on. The term “accessed” used by Horsfield implies entering this digital space and using agency within it. Although the agency is disembodied in terms of the absence of the body, it does require moral consciousness in its agency. Hughes and Lang argue that such a space has different set of values not necessarily used in the real world and hence influence their behaviour (2003: 180). Thus, social media platforms are examples of virtual spaces which have their own terms and conditions. What is socially acceptable or unacceptable in tangible, physical societies do not always correlate with what is acceptable or

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unacceptable on social media. For example, on social media platforms, people can navigate that space using a fake identity to lure someone into a romantic relationship. This is quite common in virtual spaces more than it is physically. This behaviour has been condoned by social media platforms as this may affect their profitability, in the sense that if the creators of these platforms place restrictions on users, it will discourage users from using that platform. Further, users will opt for another social media platform that does not restrict them. So, in addition to protecting their profitability, the owners and creators of social media platforms also engage in fierce competition. Profitability and fierce competition are attributes of capitalism, which makes technological virtuality a variant of capitalism. Jaeggi (2016: 46) confirms this by stating that capitalism is a social and economic order that has become internationally dominant and it is still thriving through technological development to attain its profits. It engages in a free labour market mechanism which is more profitable because there is no regulation; it is a competitive market with no government intervention. This makes technological virtuality breeding ground for capitalist-driven anarchy, where users navigating this space conform to individualism, self-­ preservation and satisfaction at any literal or figurative cost, and encourages consumerism which results in alienation. In fact, Weber marks this as an inevitable feature of modernity introduced by the Industrial Revolution which with years has become identifiable as a system that confines the modern human being into a “steel-hard house” metaphor (1919: 79). The importance of this metaphor is that it illustrates steel as flexible but hard, creating an illusion of a system that allows “freedom” that comes with confinement (akin to virtual space as well). Further, this “steel-hard house” is a “lifeless machine” that possesses a “congealed spirit”, (Scott 1997). Scott (1997) presents the idea that steel is an element that is flexible at any temperature, making it “material of high industrialism”, and could arguably represent modernity at a more advanced level. So, the “steel-hard housing” metaphor could be interpreted as a confined structure in which modern humankind has been placed, like the hard case that cocoons as well as contains humans and their agency. The Communist Manifesto (1848) by Marx reveals the agency of humans within the socially constructed class system. Marx was moved by the working life of the proletariat and described how the proletariat was exploited by the capitalistic system brought on by the Industrial Revolution.

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Agency in this regard is now discussed in the light of structure; hence, the dualistic debate of agency/structure comes into being, which is further elaborated in Weber’s interpretation of human agency in the class system. Weber contextualised the class system based on modernity. Weber used the metaphors “iron cage” and “steel-hard housing” to describe modernity (1919: 79). Iron represents the early phase of modernity, which is the Industrial Revolution in Britain. As modernity developed over the years, it has become more flexible like steal but more restrictive. Scott further explored the Weberian idea of modernity, revealing how Weber associated modernity with the inception of capitalism, a social structure likened to “a lifeless machine” possessing a “congealed spirit” (1997). As a variant of capitalism, virtual space also fits this metaphor where its limitlessness, intangible nature presents a seemingly free, unlimited space that allows human beings the freedom to navigate it when it is in fact a limited movement within the confinement of a “steel-hard house”. The teenagers who navigate this space religiously do not realise that they put so much of themselves into this “lifeless machine” that does not always bring them returns that give them life. Instead, because of the “congealed spirit”, a spirit that used to be alive and well, it has transformed into stagnancy that sustains the lifelessness of the machine. This enablement becomes the survival mechanism of the “steel-hard house”. An example of enablement in the context of teenagers engaging in the virtual space is these teenagers being consumers of communication technology devices which provide them access to this space. The more the space is accessed, the more it is fed. Correspondingly, the more these teenagers navigate virtual space, the more they keep it “alive”, and in the process of killing their satisfaction as they continue being consumers of technological virtuality, they cannot get enought of it. Given the above, capitalism stemming from technological virtuality cannot be removed from the impact it has on consumerism affecting mental virtuality (which follows in the next section) as well as alienation affecting spiritual virtuality.

Consumerism and Mental Virtuality The notions of consumerism and alienation in virtual space brought on by capitalism will be illustrated through data captured from a PhD research. A total of 21 teenagers from Pietermaritzburg South Africa were interviewed in two focus groups. Starting off with consumerism, Nkohla-­ Ramunneyiwa (2017) captured the following utterances by some of the

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teenagers between 16 and 18 years old regarding smartphones and consumerism: Andiswa stated that she uses her phone at school, even during class and does not even hide the fact that she does so. Peter and Siya stated that like Andiswa, they take their phones to school and also use their phones during class time. Siya even goes even further and uses his phone every second during class time. Jessica shared that she uses her smartphone so much that her mother confiscated it as it was negatively affecting her studies.

The following was concluded from the focus groups regarding smartphones and consumerism: 50% of the interviewed teenagers were on their smartphones every day. This is followed by 28% of students who were on their smartphones all day. This means that the former and latter figure of pupils, which is a total of almost 80%, spent time on their smartphones every day. Just over 10% of the pupils spent a few hours a day on their smartphones, and lastly just over 5% of pupils used their smartphones during weekends and school holidays. (Nkohla-Ramunenyiwa 2017: 106)

These figures expose the high level at which teenagers in Pietermaritzburg consume their time and money, through the purchase of data, in order to navigate the virtual space. As a by-product of capitalism, this also illustrates that consumerism amongst teenagers in their use of communication technology devices is real. The “steel-hard house” constructed by modernity and kept alive by capitalism is what keeps consumers in this constant cycle of consuming. Like a hamster on a wheel, this repetitive cycle does not equate to repetitive fulfilment. Helen Sweeting, Abita Bhaskar and Kate Hunt aver that consumerism involves a consumption where the object of consumption is perceived as something that can bring fulfilment (2012: 802). This perception is unfortunately not the case for the consumer as an individual, but for the system of capitalism, the fulfilment is obtained by keeping the system alive. The use of the word fulfilment is quite important in this case because it introduces an important layer of consumerism that is worthy of being explored, and this is mental virtuality. Consumerism can be identified as being mentally virtual because the behaviour of a consumer stems from the mindset. Gupta et al. (2020: 32) states that the rise of technological development has affected the manner in which customers and marketers receive and process information and

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knowledge. This in essence means that consumerism taps into the mind and or psyche of the individual as a consumer. It is quite interesting that Gupta equally mentions marketers as they are the ones who capture the minds of the consumer through the use of advertisements. This again affirms the nature of consumerism being that of mental virtuality because marketers know that if they capture the mind of the consumer they have won. One of the strategies that marketers use to enter the mind of the consumer is to be consistent, consistently visible to the consumer on different mediums, being consistent on how the brand is displayed, in quality service and so on. All of these make a mental impression on the customer, which is what makes them a consumer in the first place. When African teenagers are on the receiving end of the consistency of such marketing regarding a high-end smartphone, that will accelerate their experience of virtual space, then the consistency in marketing has excelled infiltrating the mental virtuality of the teenager. As a group of teenagers who are subjected to this infiltration, they end up sharing the same belief about the high-end smartphone, that it is the best smartphone on the market, which is what capitalism wants to achieve. Further, Schull (1992: 730) argues that a shared belief within a group of people, especially in their human psyche, is coined as an ideology. The 80% of the Pietermaritzburg teenagers who were interviewed are on their smartphone most of the day accessing virtual space, and they share the belief that it is worthwhile to spend that much time and money being immersed in a communication technology device. Consequently, these teenagers become physically and mentally alienated from their communitarian environments.

Alienation and Spiritual Virtuality This physical and mental alienation experienced by African teenagers is the kind of alienation that Marx expresses, but Marx does so from the context of political economics. Kalekin-Fishman and Langman (2015: 918) outline the Marxist view on alienation by stating that the division of labour brought by capitalism aggravated the gap between the owners of production and workers. The more workers invest their time and labour into the capitalistic system where the owners keep bearing fruits from this, the more workers are alienated physically and mentally from their support structures which are family, from their own dreams and aspirations, and from their own wellbeing. This creates an even greater rift between the

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workers and owners of productions which will be almost impossible to bridge. In fact, Weber reiterates these thoughts on the alienating capitalist system, stating that this system is perpetuated through bureaucratic and administrative systems (which exist in workplaces). These systems identify the very human beings who constitute them, as mere objects that keep the system going, and by doing so, they give off so much of themselves but do not receive much reward and value in return. This not only speaks to the dehumanizing of modern human beings, but also infringes on the freedom of movement of human beings (Kalekin-Fishman and Langman 2015: 918). From this Marxist view of alienation, it is quite clear that the political-­ economic interpretation of alienation touches on a lot of aspects of the worker as a human being, the physical-biological being, the mental health, spirituality and the human being within the context of family (as a support structure). The teenager as a consumer of communication technology devices and accessing virtual space technologically also faces alienation on all these levels. This will be discussed in more detail in the next section. For now, attention will be drawn back to the teenagers in Pietermaritzburg. According to Nkohla-Ramunenyiwa (2017), the following was revealed by the Pietermaritzburg teenagers regarding the theme of alienation: Themba honestly expressed how he chats with his friends on his smartphone in the presence of his siblings who also do the same. In the presence of his mother, he prefers to chat with his friends in the comfort of his room. The rest of the pupils were equally divided between chatting in the bathroom or “it depends”. The following was concluded regarding the issue of alienation and smartphones: Twelve of 21 pupils (about 58%) preferred to chat with their friends in the privacy of their bedrooms. This was followed by five pupils (26%) chatting with their friends on their smartphones anywhere. (Nkohla-Ramunenyiwa 2017: 121)

From the above findings, it is clear that over 80% of the pupils agree that they are either removed physically and or mentally from people around them when they chat on their smartphones. When Themba mentions how he physically removes himself when his mom is around, which could be telling of how his experience is shared amongst siblings as digital natives but is not a shared experience with his mother. The serious issue is

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the latter, because the mother is considered as an elder in communitarian terms, put in high regard because as a parent she can pass down African value systems from grandparents to the child. Masango (2006: 931) affirms this by stating that African value systems are entrenched in living together, youth learning from elders who pass down values to them, hence putting elders at high regard by respecting and honouring them. This, for Masango, is one of the fundamentals of African spirituality. Thus, alienation, especially physical alienation from elders, compromises one of the important aspects of African spirituality and also affects the identity of the African teenager.

Analysis: Virtuality as Breeding Ground for Teenager Identity Capitalism, consumerism and alienation discussed previously seem to be getting the attention of the African teenager and how he or she identifies himself or herself. The ability of all three phenomena to take on virtual nature requires attention, because virtual nature is limitless, not time-­ bound, intangible and immeasurable. Anything of such nature can have an exponential impact on teenagers, and it seems capitalism, consumerism as well as alienation have this kind of impact because of their ability to be virtual. All of these forms of virtuality seem to be fighting for a spot in the mind of the African teenager, in a manner that is constantly affecting his or her agency, which consequently affects their identity. It is as if there is a virtual warfare in the mind of the teenager. This warfare is contesting the African communitarianism which the African teenager should be grounded in, which is premised on solidarity, interdependence and intersubjectivity to name a few. African teenagers who are entrenched in social media via their communication technology devices expose themselves to a life outside of their value system, home, community and continent. They find themselves trying to fit a mould that does not correlate with their shape, identity and who they are. Buckingham (2007: 6) elaborates how in the quest of defining identity, one needs to have a sense of individuality. For an African teenager in virtual space, this individuality could mean one of two things: firstly, their individuality in terms of who they are as a young African in a communal setting, entrenched in a virtual space that is foreign to them in terms of their ancestry. Secondly, their individuality could be drawn from who they are in their coming of

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age during their adolescent years to their adulthood. To have virtual space thrust into this dynamic amongst them and their peers is a unique feature that millennials are experiencing. What is also worth mentioning is that the “steal-hard house” mentioned by Weber dictates and confines their view of themselves, which is being nothing more than a consumer, consuming time and money on a system that sees them as an object they can benefit from to keep the system alive. This dynamic of consumerism is that teenagers see themselves as consumers, they are always giving off themselves and they are not getting worthwhile returns. Instead, the African spirituality and value system of African teenagers is constantly compromised. Why is virtuality so important in the articulation of this study? The importance of virtuality as highlighted by Levy (1998: 97) includes the following three main processes which have contributed to the development of humanity: (1) Virtualisation linked with signs This kind of virtualisation is one which uses language (and music) as a mode of detaching humanity from current time and transporting them into a space where reality can be analysed and questioned. Creatives are the persons who usually engage in this kind of virtuality. This includes writers of movies who narrate stories, whether based purely on fantasy or real events; these stories transport viewers into a different world that is detached from their reality and tangibility. Children experience this too through animated stories that transport them to a different world. This also applies in music videos, where signs and symbols are used by the directors to communicate a message to the viewers. This form of communication has contributed to the development of humanity. (2) Virtualisation associated with technology. Social media platforms have been mentioned already in this chapter as a space in which human beings extend themselves through the use of technology. In addition to social media platforms are video games which also do this. Video games illustrate the creativity of the designers of these games who are able to transport the game user into a different world, where there are signs and languages within these games that help the game user to navigate this creative space. If these are video games about the use of drones in warfare, then it provides the gamer an experience of a real-­life phenomenon but through a cre-

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ative space that is physically detached from the user. This is one of many examples which illustrate how virtuality, especially in the midst of developing technology, keeps enhancing the creativity of humanity. (3) Virtualisation associated with social relations. For this, the example that Levy uses is how a contract drafted for two people is a virtual reality, as it is based on the pre-emption of how the reality of the relationship between those who have signed a contract will end up. This does not always depict the reality of the actual relationship between the parties involved. Another example is the South African constitution and other laws in the world. They capture a virtual reality in black and white which comes across as pre-empting occurrences captured in that law or constitution, or even the drafting of policies. This could be seen as a development, in some not all cases, for humanity. In this chapter, number two and three are observed in light of the African teenager engaging in virtual spaces introduced by technology, and at the same time, this teenager is confronted by the virtualisation associated with the social relations within his or her African context. This experience in the midst of adolescent years can have a particular impact on how the identity of the African teenager is forged, considering the dominant force of capitalism which is accompanied by consumerism and alienation.

Towards a Neo-communitarian Approach In the same manner in which ancestors of African teenagers used African communitarianism as a means of solidarity and collective activism to stand up against an external influence, African teenagers should also use communitarianism as a form of solidarity to deal with the virtual warfare they are faced with in their experience of virtual agency. They could create support groups online, where they discuss as African teenagers all over the continent how they can stand together, even if it is virtually, and embrace their value system in the midst of this external virtual challenge that is compromising and imposing on their African value system. The solidarity would be one of a greater scale as they have the technology to create a geographically larger base to do this, a technology that is not boundary restricted and can create some African Teenage Renaissance online. African Renaissance is defined by Van Amerom and Buscher (2005: 2) as a rebirth

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of Africa that will encourage Africans to look for African means to deal with the problems that Africa is faced with as a continent. The challenge that these teenagers are faced with is how technology has been embraced and accepted into their personal spaces of their homes, and to an extent, it has become blurred when it comes to it being an external or an internal influence. Modern homes, including African homes, view technology as being part of the home. They have the technology their ancestors did not have to create a platform through which a borderless African village can be created, so that African teenagers are able to stand in solidarity in large numbers to deal with the challenges they are facing as Africans who are coming of age. In the case of the Pietermaritzburg teenagers who were interviewed, the researcher realised that a solidarity is needed amongst them too, within their community. This is because the legacy of division and segregation brought on by apartheid in South Africa is a legacy brought on by capitalists in both the physical and virtual spaces that South African teenagers engage in. Being one of the most unequal society in the world, South Africa as a nation is faced by the segregation brought on by a capitalistic system, which means that even the introduction of technology in South African homes stumbled upon an existing socio-economic segregation. This socio-economic division even within the focus groups of the interviewed teenagers was evident, where some were coming from township schools and households headed by single mothers, and others from nuclear family structures and attending schools in the suburbs. This further divided the interviewees into the kind of communication technology device they used to access virtual space, translating into a digital divide. This multi-layered segregation and divide that is further aggravated by technology could do with a neo-communitarian outlook that will enable African teenagers to carry on the legacy of their ancestors who stood together in solidarity to face challenges that compromise the roots of African communitarian value system.

Conclusion The African continent has for a long time been faced with challenges which have required it to have a great sense of unity and solidarity amongst her people. Colonisation as one of the legacies which have majorly impacted Africa on a broad continental and also national, personal level has shaken the roots of African communitarianism. These roots have been

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shaken to the point that the mentality of the African became the more serious space that has caught the destabilising stigma that colonisation has brought to African shores. The fragmentation of the mental space of the African was more effectively done through non-tangible, unconfined means, which is why capitalism accompanied by consumerism and alienation are discussed in this chapter as tools which had a virtual infiltration in the headspace of the African. With the African teenager coming of age and still trying to find himself or herself, this mental warfare has come prematurely for them to overcome it alone. This is why the solidarity and collective confrontation of such a challenge is needed to ground African teenagers and youth into a neo-communitarian approach to such challenges.

References Buckingham, D. (2007). Youth, Identity and Digital Media. USA: MIT Press Reader. Gupta et al. (2020). Digital Analytics: Modeling for Insights and New Methods. Journal of Interactive Marketing, 51(2020), 26–43. Horsfield, P. (2002). The Ethics of Virtual Reality: The Digital and its Predecessors. Paper Presented at ‘Virtual Reality and Communication Ethics’ Conference, Urbana Champaign, USA, November 2. Hughes, J., & Lang, R. (2003). If I Had a Song: The Culture of Digital Community Networks and its Impact on the Music Industry. The International Journal on Media Management, 5(3), 180–189. Jaeggi, R. (2016). What (if anything) is Wrong with Capitalism? Dysfunctionality, Exploitation and Alienation: Three Approaches to the Critique of Capitalism. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 54, 44–65. Kalekin-Fishman, D., & Langman, L. (2015). Alienation: The Critique that Refuses to Disappear. Current Sociology, 63(6), 916–933. Levy, P. (1998). Becoming Virtual: Reality in the Digital Age. Michigan: Plenum Trade, University of Michigan. Mabovula, N. N. (2011). The Erosion of African Communal Values: A reappraisal of African Ubuntu Philosophy. Inkyayiso Journal of Human Science, 3(1), 38–47. Masango, M. J. S. (2006). African Spirituality that Shapes the Concept of Ubuntu. African Spirituality, 27(3), 930–943. Masolo, D. A. (2004). Western and African Communitarianism: A Comparison. In K.  Wiredu (Ed.), A Companion to African Philosophy (pp.  483–498). Malden: Blackwell. Nkohla-Ramunenyiwa, T. (2017). Virtual Ontology, Moral Responsibility and Agency: The ethical Implications of Mobile Communication Technology Use

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on Parenting style in Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. University of KwaZulu-­ Natal PhD Thesis. Oelofsen, R. (2016). Afro-communitarian Implications for Justice and Reconciliation. Theoria: A Journal of Social and. Political Theory, 63(146), 1–19. Richter, L., & Morrell, R. (2006). Baba: Men and Fatherhood in South Africa. Cape Town: HSRC Press. Schull, J. (1992). What Is Ideology? Theoretical Problems and Lessons from Soviet-type societies. Political Studies, 40(4), 728–741. Scott, A. (1997). Modernity’s Machine Metaphor. The British Journal of Sociology, 48(4), 561–575. Seidl-de-Moura, L. M. (2003). Parenting in South America and African Contexts. IntechOpen: London Sweeting, H., Bhaskar, A., & Hunt, K. (2012). Consumerism and Well-being in Early Adolescence. Journal of Youth Studies, 1(6), 802–820. Van Amerom, M., & Buscher, B. (2005). Peace Parks in Southern Africa: Bringers of an African Renaissance. Journal of Modern African Studies, 43(2), 1–24. Weber, M. (1919). Politics as a Vocation. In H.  H. Gerth & C.  Wright Mills (Eds.), Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (pp. 77–128). London: Routledge.

CHAPTER 10

The Ambivalent Role of Technology on Human Relationships: An Afrocentric Exploration Sophia Chirongoma and Lucia Mutsvedu

Introduction Information and Communication technology (ICT) refers to technologies that enable people to access information using telecommunications. Since the world has been turned into a global village, there are many reasons why people need to be technologically literate. In the twenty-first century, digital communication has become one of the fastest and most reliable modes of communication. Life has been made better and sweeter by the use of technology. However, modern technology also comes across as a double-edged sword; whilst on the one hand it gives us connectivity, on the other hand it can exert undue emotional stress (Mitchell 2012). The multi-faceted sword of technology highlights both the positives and the negatives. There are countless examples of how technology can either add

S. Chirongoma (*) Religious Studies Department, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe L. Mutsvedu Africa University, Mutare, Zimbabwe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. D. Okyere-Manu (ed.), African Values, Ethics, and Technology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70550-3_10

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value to people’s lives whilst on the other hand it can destroy lives. For instance, Church & de Oliveira (2013) emphasize the need to be computer literate, particularly because over 60% of the world’s job market is technology-driven. Families have not been spared by the technology bug. The widespread usage of technology has brought about vast benefits for both adults and children. Hence, technology has heavily impacted on social interactions (Tufekci, 2014). Drawing insights from Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model and the African ethic of Ubuntu/Unhu, this chapter focuses on delineating the pros and cons of ICT in our contemporary times. The chapter concludes that if properly utilized, ICT can do a lot of good for families and communities. Contrariwise, if abused, ICT can do more harm than good.

Theoretical Framework In an endeavour to deliberate on the impact of ICT on human relationships, the discussions in this chapter are guided by Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model. According to this framework, human relationships are shaped by individual characteristics and a range of nested contextual systems of schools, adults, neighbourhoods and society (Swearer et al. 2010). Furthermore, this model considers the broader scope of society as a platform for social interaction. The thrust of Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model is anchored upon the fact that human beings do not live in isolation. This is informed by the immutable fact that people move and react according to what the environment gives them. Hence, the model hinges on the pivotal role of human relationships. For instance, family relationships are examined from the contextual systems that surround an individual. In light of the essence of this model, using it to reflect on the ambivalent role of ICT on social relationships, particularly family relationships, which is the focus of discussion in this chapter, seems appropriate because our focus is on exploring how social interaction is shaped by various environmental factors. In particular, we are examining how appropriate use or abuse of ICT has a major bearing on social relationships. Additionally, since our discussion on how ICT impacts on human relationships is located in the African context, the chapter also draws insights from the African ethic of Ubuntu/Unhu. Adopting the Ubuntu/Unhu ethic as a lens used to evaluate the positive and negative impact of ICT on

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social relations in the African context is also helpful because it provides a framework upon which we can proffer some recommendations on responsible, productive and beneficial use of ICT.  By tapping into the ethical values and norms enshrined in the Ubuntu/Unhu philosophy, it also helps in providing important guidelines on how to safeguard against encroaching on the human rights and dignity of others through inappropriate or irresponsible use of ICT. As noted by Muyingi (2013: 561), “the concept of Ubuntu is the key to an understanding of traditional African ethics. It means weight, solidity, and consistency, as in the Hebrew notion of the Kabod of Yahweh.” The term Kabod is interpreted as “glory” and it is derived from “deb” in the word “Kabed” which means weighty or heavy. Similarly, Gerald (1968: 555) explains that Kabod can also be paraphrased as “awe inspiring Glory, which incorporates power, majesty, might and wealth. It’s [Kabod] often associated with the word Yahweh (God).” In Bantu languages, Ubuntu or Unhu means “humanness”, “humanhood” or the essence of being human (Murove 2014). Thus, the values that define humanness like compassion, caring and respect are linked with the outcomes of happiness in a family and community spirit (Broodryk 2004:31). At heart, Ubuntu is essentially a “community-based mindset” whereby the welfare of the family and community is considered to be greater than that of the individual within the group (Kwamwangamalu 1999:24–42). For this reason, the essence of traditional African ethics particularly as practiced before the dawn of the colonial era was based on an attitude towards life which is based on human dignity and respect of the self which is interconnected with that of others (Mabovula 2011:4–6). The ideology of Ubuntu aims to eliminate the concept of individualism whose objective is to promote and achieve selfish interests of the individual at the expense of the community (Broodryk 2004). Consequently, our decision to adopt the Ubuntu/Unhu ethic to complement Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model is informed by the need to locate the discussion in the African context so as to articulate what it means to behave as one who has Ubuntu/ Unhu when utilizing ICT.  Furthermore, we seek to elaborate on how, when African communities embrace the values of Ubuntu/Unhu in their use of ICT, they will add value to human relationships.

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Modern Technology as the Cog That Holds Human Communities Together People use ICTs to gather, share, distribute and exchange information using computers, computer networks and telecommunication equipment (ESCAP, 2001). As noted by Ratheeswari (2018: 45), “ICTs are making dynamic changes in society. Most companies have tapped into technology to run their businesses.” Families have also adapted to ICT use. ICT use has become widespread and Africans are no exception. There is a sudden need to become technologically savvy. William Powers, author of Hamlet’s Blackberry cited in Hatch (2011), describes technology as a huge room, where everyone can reach anybody by continuously poking until one reciprocates. No one can escape this giant room. Currently, ICT lies at the centre of social interactions. For the youngsters, technology is what makes the world tick. McGrath (2012: 6) observed that it is very rare to see children who are not glued to their gadgets even when they are at a restaurant. The interconnectedness between children across the world is made possible by technology. They make friendships on the internet and learn to keep relationships as they navigate through life.

ICT Facilitates More Effective and Versatile Educational Resources and Tools Technology has a huge impact on education. As the world becomes more “plugged in,” the use of ICT as a medium of educational instruction has become more common and popular. ICT use has immensely contributed towards bridging the gap between the classroom and the learning process in the wake of the prolonged schools’ closure due to the COVID-19 epidemic. Weiswasser (1999) highlights how ICT use contributes towards boosting the learners’ intellectual ability. Getting exposure to solving problems and building positive relationships is the order of the day, especially in the African culture, where children are expected to take up roles on the basis of the evolving capacities. Hatch (2011) opines that children who have good access to technology become more efficient as they are able to assimilate information quickly. Similarly, Prensky (2008a, b) advocates for a new pedagogy where children navigate and experiment with only minimum guidance from their teachers. By managing relationships in their classrooms, learners are also enabled to build positive relationships in and outside their home. Weiswasser (1997) asserts that the augmentation

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of sound, animation and narration helps to develop children into avid readers. When children grow up in a confined environment, their vocabulary is limited. ICT use provides them with vast experience and knowledge whence they can tap from in order to develop their language skills. Their vocabulary is also enriched; their imagination is widened as they navigate through different sources of information. Diversity of culture is shared as they make use of technology to communicate and share experiences.

Technology and Family Relationships Technology has been interwoven in our lives forever; it plays a pivotal role in maintaining family ties (Hatch 2011). Human beings are interactive beings and communication is the glue that holds relationships together. Communication within the family helps to cement relationships. For instance, constant communication between couples through various forms of technology solidifies the relationship. As family members and friends either watch movies or listen to music together, this helps to renew and revive relationships (Punie 2007). Hence, ICT helps to nurture and maintain the various social bonds. The families constitute the society since a society is a fragmented family. For anyone to be relevant, knowledge of technology should be at their fingertips. The individual is considered to be at the centre while society forms the overarching wall to the individual (Chisholm 2014). It is important to ensure a good emotional balance of one individual in the society because that one person impacts both the family and the broader society. Ensuring a balanced relationship in the society as a whole can help to curb thievery, rape and other types of crime. Oneness and togetherness cultivate the spirit of Ubuntu/Unhu, thereby fighting against individualism and replacing it with collectivism. This coheres with Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model which emphasizes that human relationships are anchored on the individual in relation to the society as a whole. Families are also aided to stay connected and to offer each other the much-needed support through the use of modern-day technology. This is particularly true for most African families where several family members have dispersed to either work or to study abroad. In the absence of technology, it would have been practically impossible for such families to maintain contact. Despite being separated by vast expanses of space, family members and friends are tapping into the power of technology to ensure that they stay connected. They are able to share life’s moments of joy and

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sorrow through virtual connection. Through the use of technology, family members are able to pray together, cry together, as well as celebrating life’s milestones together. That way, most family relationships have stayed afloat even though they will be staying miles apart. Smith et  al. (2009) reiterate that communication is a symbolic and transactional process in a quest to share information. Through the use of ICT, family members in the diaspora are able to keep abreast with the current state of affairs back home in terms of the social, political and economic developments. This is particularly important during the current COVID-19 global epidemic where besides travelling being restricted, it is also not safe to travel from one country to the other. Hence, more people who used to regularly travel from one part of the world to the other are basically relying on virtual contact as they strive to maintain ties with their loved ones who are so far away. Most of those in the diaspora are able to send the much-needed material and financial support to their families back home through the channels made possible by ICT use (Oiarzabal and Reips 2012). This feeds into the spirit of Ubuntu/Unhu. Swanson (2007: 55) articulates this point in the following words: “Ubuntu is borne out of the philosophy that community strength comes out of community support, and that dignity and identity are achieved through mutualism, empathy, generosity, and community commitment.” The Zimbabwean case is illustrative here. Due to the untenable socio-economic and political situation, a considerable portion of the Zimbabwean population has since moved to the diaspora. Through utilizing ICT, most Zimbabweans in the diaspora are able to sustain their families back home through diaspora remittances. For most Zimbabwean families, if it were not for the regular support provided by their family members and friends in the diaspora, they would have been living in abject poverty. Worse still, for those with terminal medical conditions whose medical needs require either foreign currency or medication from outside the country, they would have probably endured unbearable pain or even death. Thus, Zimbabwe is a classic case whereby ICT helps to reinforce community bonds in the manner prescribed by Ubuntu/Unhu.

Technology and Business Transactions ICT can also be used to conduct business deals and to fulfil numerous work tasks online whilst saving valuable time and money (Punie 2007). Business partnerships and group collaborations have been running

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smoothly across the globe through extensive ICT use, particularly via teleconferencing. There are various forms of teleconferencing and the most commonly used are (i) audio teleconferencing (ii) video teleconferencing and (iii) we teleconferencing (Talebiana et al. 2014; Faraj and Zarif 2009). Utilizing platforms such as zoom conferencing and Microsoft teams is contributing towards sustaining business deals and necessary meetings for the development of the global economy. Through the click of a button, business requisitions and payments can be processed. Furthermore, corporate leaders are able to effectively and smoothly run corporations from anywhere in the world through the use of ICT. Others are also establishing and running their businesses from home which helps them to strike a balance between business and family commitments. Hence, if one wishes to establish a successful business entity, using technology becomes a necessity rather than a luxury. Thus far, our discussion has been revolving around the positive impact of ICT, however, ending there would be presenting an incomplete story. Granted, there are as many advantages wrought by the use of ICT as there are disadvantages. Below, we turn to delineate some of the downsides of ICT particularly in light of family relationships in Africa which is the main focus of our chapter.

The Downside of Technology on Children’s Education As much as ICT has a lot to offer in terms of enhancing children’s learning capacity as noted in foregoing paragraphs, conversely, it also has a potentially bad influence on children especially when they are exposed to it at an early stage (Lepičnik-Vodopivec and Samec 2012). Many times, the online content is not suitable for children. This makes them susceptible to developing antisocial behaviours which undermine their social development (Kirkorian et al. 2008). If not properly monitored and left unregulated, children’s use of ICT can be so addictive such that it deprives them of real-­ life experiences in society (Plowman et al. 2010). This has the detrimental but unintentional effect of undermining their right to play with other children. According to UNICEF (2019), children have an inalienable right to play, hence, having an opportunity to play, especially in a safe space, should not be treated as a luxury for children (Zosh et al. 2017.) The right to play cultivates in children the essence of collectivism over

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individualism. If children grow up with antisocial tendencies due to excessive use of ICT, it will hinder their capacity to participate in the Ubuntu/Unhu communal solidarity.

Technology Can Intrude on Families’ Quality Time The use of technology can also rob families of quality time. As iterated by Hank (2007), ICT use creates an increased social distance between family members. In some families, both parents and children will be oblivious of each other whilst they are immersed in ICT. They end up feeling that talking to another family member is a waste of their “quality time” which they would rather channel towards ICT use (Turtiainen et  al. 2007). Some siblings grow up detached from each other because they spend most of their time fixated on their respective gadgets. In a family set up, one child will be texting on their phone, another one will be on Facebook while the others will be playing video games. In some instances, children can have bitter fights over the use of gadgets. This has far-reaching repercussions on family members’ social interactions, which has ripple effects on the preservation of African norms and values. For instance, among the Shona people in Zimbabwe, greeting a visitor with a handshake is considered as an important gesture of hospitality. Regrettably, some children become so hooked to their gadgets such that they may even fail to properly greet visitors in their home. Hence, whenever one outlines the advantages of technology, one should never underestimate the power of the same knife bringing its own cons by destroying the African norms and values enshrined in our communal relationships. With the infiltration of ICT, to a larger extent, the spirit of umuntu/ unhu (humanness/humanity/human kindness) which was embedded in African communities since time immemorial is slowly fading away. ICT use has entrenched the concept of privatization in several households (McGrath 2012). Communication among married couples has been obstructed because of the so-called smartphones. Instead of cherishing their quality time together, some married couples will be busy texting on their phones or watching pornographic material which sometimes tempts them to engage in extramarital affairs. Even when travelling in the same car, many a time, the body will be present, but the mind will be so far away. Most of their conversations will be mechanical. The closeness and intimacy between some married couples has been disrupted as they focus

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more on cementing relationships with the outside world through the use of technology. ICT use has inadvertently contributed to an increase in divorce rate in the modern world because information spreads like veld fire. Within minutes, someone in England will have gotten hold of what transpired in Zimbabwe a few minutes earlier. In ancient times, infidelity was only discovered through physical contact whereas these days, WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter are the bearers of both good and bad news. This is affirmed by Church et al. (2010) who note that the social media has become part of our lives such that daily domestic routines are no longer given precedence as before. Modern-day technology has also ushered in a change of roles. Whereas in the traditional African society, women used to be in charge of household chores, nowadays, several women have joined the corporate world. Others have even climbed high up the corporate ladder consequently impinging on the amount of time spent at home with their spouses or children. This also often impacts on their ability to squeeze in time to assist their children with schoolwork nor will they find enough time to mould their children’s character and behaviour. The same applies to some husbands and fathers; due to competing work commitments, they barely find an opportunity to spend quality time with their families. When they arrive at home after work, they will be glued to their gadgets catching up with and responding to messages at the expense of family interaction. The use of technology has replaced the vital features of communication (Hatch 2011). In the olden days, all the children in the neighbourhood would gather to play several outdoor games. In contemporary times, most children prefer their “me” time consequently promoting individualism which is an antithesis of African collectivism. For instance, in the traditional Shona community, people never used to address each other with their first names. Instead, there was a form of respect in the essence of any relationship. They would always use honorific terms such as mukoma (elder brother), vakoma (elder sister), munin’ina (younger brother/sister). However, with the influence of technology, some Shona people have since adopted the Western individualistic manner way of addressing each other as iwe (you) or calling each other by the first name. This has negatively impacted on the indigenous African perspective of respect and togetherness. Resultantly, the African fibre of valuing relationships has been lost.

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Technology and Pester Power As children get more “plugged into” various technological toys and gadgets, they also begin to exert pressure on their often-unwilling parents whom they coerce to buy the latest devices on the market (Tompkins 2009). Even though most parents might initially try to decline the requests, unfortunately, the younger generation has mastered the skills of “pester power.” They will arm-twist their parents into buying them the latest gadgets. It is regrettable that often times, the parent-child relationships are anchored upon the appliances bought by the parents rather than genuine and natural love. Most of the time, children bargain with their parents saying, “mummy/daddy, if I excel in my exams, can you buy me the latest play station?” or “mummy/daddy, if I wash your car, will you replace my broken smart phone/laptop?” It is deplorable that some children do not realize that they can still build a solid relationship with their parents even without including goodies in the matrix. It is also lamentable that even after parents have bought these devices for their children, instead of drawing them closer, they often widen the natural distance between the parents and the children. This is mainly because half of the time, the children do not want any disturbances from their parents when they are using these gadgets. Hence, most middle- and upper-class families are in turmoil as they are failing to regulate the use of technology which has indeed taken over and replaced the power of physical interaction. This unfortunate outcome of ICT use has torn the family fibre asunder.

Technology and Cyberbullying Another dark side of the introduction of ICT is the fact that it has also ushered in the dreadful monster, cyberbullying. Hinduja and Patchin (2019: 2) define cyberbullying as “wilful and repeated harm inflicted through the medium of electronic text.” This is when individuals fight online or in the cyberspace. Not only children but adults as well have been embroiled in nasty online fights. Half of the time, children will be communicating with their friends and relatives throughout the world, using diverse online platforms. Often times, conflicts arise on those platforms. Since time immemorial, bullying has always been part of our lives but the advantage was that it was limited to proximity. Hence, even if individuals got so angry with each other but if they could not see each other in person, then the fight would have to wait for face-to-face interaction.

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Conversely, most contemporary fights are done in the cyberspace. Patchin & Hindujah (2010) aver that technology provides fecund ground for cyberbullying. Children are more predisposed to cyberbullying as they navigate several online facilities. As children spend more time exploring online resources, there are high chances of getting entangled in emotional wars fought in the cyberspace. This has dire consequences to their relationships with other children of their age or even older ones. Some children will become emotionally withdrawn, others will suffer from anxiety attacks and worse, some can develop suicidal tendencies. The emotional disturbances encountered by children as a result of cyberbullying will cascade into the family set up resulting in family disequilibrium. Bennett & Hay (2007) affirm that the family remains the seed for children’s cognitive, communicative and social skills. The family becomes a complete whole made up of parts which if one part is destabilized, the whole entity is disturbed. In a family set up, the sadness of one child has ripple effects on the siblings, let alone the parents. Sickness or death in a family destabilizes the whole family interactions. Lalor et al. (2009) also concur that the family remains the source of strength, inspiration, love and security, hence as the age-old adage goes, “an injury to one is an injury to all.” Likewise, the harmful effects of cyberbullying on one individual can cause chaos in the whole family. Another aspect of cyberbullying has to do with the ones who perpertrate it. Several studies have focused more on the family set up or family experiences as a major cause of cyberbullying in most youth and adolescents. Jansen et al. (2011) identify several factors as key drivers for aggression and bullying. These include lack of parent-child attachment, absence of love and care from other people which usually a child gets from their own parents. Furthermore, Jansen et al. (2011) observed that adolescents lacking parental love or from single parented families may be deprived of opportunities which enhance the social skills and capabilities, leading them to victimization or influencing them to engage in bullying others. Similarly, Osofsky (1995) tenders that most perpetrators of bullying activities develop such traits due to past traumatic experiences, world views, personality and views handed down by society via parental socialization and family experiences. According to Jansen et  al. (2011), children from single unmarried parents are likely to suffer as victims of bullying. The same authors have also concluded that socio-economic and emotional problems resulting from family breakup are some of the factors leading adolescents to vent out their bottled-up emotions through bullying others at a later

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age. Furthermore, Hoff and Mitchell (2009) argue that the quality of the relationship between parents and children also play a greater role in making their children aggressive which can manifest in cyberbullying. Relationships are being destroyed and lives have been lost as a result of children fighting against each other online. What is even more lamentable is the fact that some adults expose children to cyberbullying as they terrorize them by spreading rumours online. The propensity is that when any human being gets hold of a video on social media, the next thing is to make sure that the video circulates globally. The contemporary world has engaged in digital fighting, and unfortunately, it has dire consequences on the livelihoods of the younger generation. Cyberbullying can lead to emotional and mental instability which predisposes one to mental health problems (Michel and Heirman 2011). Once the emotional aspect is disturbed, the likelihood of building sound relationships is almost impossible. Good relationships within families are built on strong emotional balance. The disequilibrium of the emotional state impacts negatively on human relationships and so there is a need to maintain positive relationships within a family set up. Clearly, cyberbullying is an affront of all that the African ethic of Ubuntu/Unhu propounds for. As such, there is an urgent need for African communities and all other members of the global community to make concerted efforts in fighting against the abuse of ICT through cyberbullying.

Technology and Generations ICT by its very nature is very novel. It evolves at a very fast pace and the most recent ICTs typically require a lot of resources, time and experience in order to operate them (James 2002). On one hand, the younger generations are able to cope because they grew up during the ICT era. The older generations have less computer literacy and are slow to learn (in the fewer cases where they learn), but are mainly computer illiterate such that they get isolated from younger generations (Hodavand 2008). Whereas in the old days, the older generations would provide counselling and guidance due to the knowledge and experience, in the era of ICT (i) they are excluded and (ii) contemporary knowledge rests in ICT and with the younger generations. The children are often so advanced that they can access some online sites that adults do not have control over (Roberts et al. 1999). This causes the older generations to be moribund as counsellors since they are unable to interact meaningfully with younger

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generations who typically scorn them for lack of ICT knowledge. This undermines the concept of Ubuntu and systematically destroys the supporting pillars for socio-psychological support between the generations, often leading to social decay. This generational gap in terms of being technologically savvy has a huge bearing on family relationships. The children are way ahead in understanding how gadgets operate, leaving the parents and other caregivers to trot behind. In one of the seminars on “Cyberbullying awareness” held at a certain private school in Harare, Zimbabwe, one young fellow who participated shared the following insights: My mom or dad will never beat me to technology. I am the one who changes the TV channel when they are stuck; I pay for their DSTV subscription online because they haven’t figured out how to do it. Before they grab my phone to see what I have been up to, I will have erased everything; as a result, they can’t protect me from social media. It’s my responsibility. (Interview with the author, 22 May 2019)

The above citation sums up the reality of most family dynamics when it comes to ICT use not only in Africa but also globally. It is a pity that instead of striving to cement family relationships, most children are busy trying to understand technology so that they can keep abreast with what is going on in the world. Technology has indeed shifted our younger generation’s minds to be fixated towards understanding how it functions rather than focusing on what families can do to stand together.

Use of Technology Barricades Direct Physical Interactions The use of virtual communication has posed a major barrier to the usual physical interactions which were the norm in traditional African communities. Actually, for most indigenous communities, interacting on a one-on-­ one basis is regarded as the best mode of communication. This is also especially important when it comes to life’s crucial moments, for instance when visiting someone who is sick, bereaved, or congratulating them on an important milestone in their life. In the traditional African society, all these moments necessitated that all the loved ones who are from nearby and from afar would gather around their relative or friend, either to celebrate together or to express their solidarity in times of crisis. However, in

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the contemporary times, most of these physical interactions have since been replaced by virtual contact. For instance, instead of travelling locally to visit a friend, a relative or even a parent in the rural areas, some people have resorted to simply making a phone call to check on their loved ones. As such, it is common to hear people saying, “Mum and dad are fine. I spoke to them yesterday.” Hence, the use of modern technology has indeed erected a thick wall on the meaningful physical interactions which used to play a pivotal role in maintaining social ties within the traditional African communities. Communicating via text messages can also unduly strain relationships in the event that another party has misconstrued the message. Relationships may unnecessarily suffer due to a simple miscommunication which can result in unwarranted conflicts and disagreements. This point is affirmed by Mekawi (2013) who argues that face-to-face interactions are important particularly when it comes to resolving conflicts. Another disadvantage of using text messages is that it does not give any room to enrich discussions through non-verbal communication (Wood 2016). Actually, the essence of non-verbal communication is often lost when people use technology. On a face-to-face basis, it is easier to reach a conclusion because non-­verbal communication helps to establish the real status quo. As such, the use of technology indeed reduces face-to-face interactions, thereby creating a lacuna in our relationships as Africans who thrive on communal interactions.

Conclusion In conclusion, the objective of this chapter was to illustrate that the use of ICT in our contemporary African communities has brought about both huge benefits and an almost equal amount of challenges. This makes ICT to be perceived as a double-edged sword. The theoretical framework guiding the discussion was informed by insights drawn from Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model and the African ethic of Ubuntu/Unhu. Whilst acknowledging that it is not possible to exhaust all the challenges and opportunities which are brought about by ICT in human societies, the chapter has tried to focus on some of the common examples within the African context. Some of the examples were drawn from the Shona people in Zimbabwe, which is the indigenous tradition for both authors. It has been noted that technology has the power to build or to destroy families and communities depending on how it is used. The chapter also illuminated how some of the negative effects of ICT use are capable of causing such

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deep-rooted harm while the positives are capable of bringing about some of the most beneficial aspects to human society. The contemporary world has to use technology, bearing in mind that the ICTs are causing dynamic changes in society. The corporate sector has embraced technology as an efficient resource for running their businesses. Families have also adapted to this new technological bug. However, parents, children and the society as a whole should be encouraged to use ICT wisely so that it can positively contribute towards upholding and building relationships for the benefit of future generations. When using ICT, individuals should always guard against eroding the African fibre of Ubuntu/Unhu. This entails responsible and reasonable use of ICT to build solid families, businesses and communities. ICT should never be used as a weapon for disrupting social relationships or to perpetrate cyberbullying.

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Oiarzabal, P.  J., & Reips, U. (2012). Migration and Diaspora in the Age of Information and Communication Technologies. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 38(9), 1333–1338. Osofsky, J. D. (1995). The Effects of Exposure to Violence on Young Children. Am Psychol, 50(9), 782–788. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066x.50.9.782. Patchin, J. W., & Hinduja, S. (2010). Cyberbullying and self‐esteem. Journal of School Health, 80(12), 614–621. Plowman, L., McPake, J., & Stephen, C. (2010). The Technologization of Childhood? Young Children and Technology in the Home. Children and Society, 24(1), 63–74. Prensky, M. (2008a). Students as designers and creators of educational computer games: Who else?. British Journal of Educational Technology, 39(6), 1004–1019. Prensky, M. (2008b). The Courage to Change: Guiding Teachers to the New Paradigm. Educational Technology, 48(3), 64–64. Retrieved March 2, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/44429584 Punie, Y. (2007). Learning Spaces: An ICT-enabled Model of Future Learning in the Knowledge-based Society. European Journal of Education, 42(2), 185–199. Roberts, D. F., Foehr, U. G., Rideout, V. J., & Brodie, M. (1999). Kids and Media @ the New Millennium. Retrieved August 3, 2020, from http://www.kff.org/ entmedia/upload/Kids-­Media-­The-­New-­Millennium-­Report.pdf. Smith, K. M., Pattia A. Freeman, & Ramon B. Zabriskie. (2009). An Examination of Family Communication within the Core and Balance Model of Family Leisure Functioning. Family Relations 58:79-90. Retrieved September 15, 2020, from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1741-­3729. 2008.00536.x/pdf. Swanson, D. M. (2007). Ubuntu: An African Contribution to (Re) Search for/ with a ‘Humble Togetherness’. Journal of Contemporary Issues in Education, 2(2), 53–67. Swearer, E., Vaillancourt, T., & Hymel, S. (2010). What Can Be Done About School Bullying? Linking Research to Educational Practice. Educational Researcher, 39(1), 38–47. Talebiana, S., Mohammadia, H.  M., & Rezvanfar, A. (2014). Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in Higher Education: Advantages, Disadvantages, Conveniences and Limitations of Applying e-learning to Agricultural Students in Iran. Procedia—Social and Behavioral Sciences, 152, 300–305. Tompkins, J. (2009). Staging the Imagined City in Australian Theatre. In D. J. Hopkins, S. Orr, & K. Solga (Eds.), Performance and the City. Performance Interventions. London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-0-230-30521-2_11.

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CHAPTER 11

Interrogating Social Media Group Communication’s Integrity: An African, Utilitarian Perspective Elias G. Konyana

Introduction It is indisputable to say that communication has been the mainstay of humanity and indispensable for all human activities in different social settings from time immemorial. It is the vehicle through which human endeavours are expressed, evaluated and appreciated. Communication, be it traditional or modern, has the purpose of, among many, promoting peaceful co-existence, understanding and self-awareness among human beings. In recent years however, there has been a “communication revolution” which has seen the entire communication spectrum changing significantly with the introduction of new technology in the form of smartphones, laptops, iPads and other related gadgets. The new technology enhanced the creation of social media platforms such as Twitter, Instagram, Facebook and WhatsApp. The use of social media platforms has literally infiltrated all

E. G. Konyana (*) Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, School of Arts, Culture and Heritage Studies, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. D. Okyere-Manu (ed.), African Values, Ethics, and Technology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70550-3_11

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kinds of social assemblages, be it at family, community or corporate levels. Currently, most people with smartphones, for example, belong to at least one, if not several, social media groups through their different or same social media accounts. Apparently, it is evident that social media groups have come to fill in the gap created by the long distance between family and friends when members either separate or are not together for a while. In this regard, social media group communication has kept families, friends, workmates and businesses in constant and consistent interaction, regardless of the long distance between them. However, it is regrettable to note that social media group communication has come with a wide range of challenges particularly for the rural folk with families in towns and cities in Zimbabwe and abroad where effective communication, at least at the family and community level, has suffered the most. One case that has fallen victim to the negative effects of social media group communication is that of the Ndau people in rural communities of Chipinge in Zimbabwe. The African social values embedded in the essence of the family court system (dare remumuzi) among the Ndau people in particular have been disproportionately affected. In this chapter, an interrogation of the ethics of WhatsApp group communication using an auto-ethnography lens is proffered. In this chapter I argue that, while WhatsApp group communication has become trendy and so indispensably useful, it has also shattered the essential and valuable African traditional family court system. The chapter presents the advantages of social media group communication and the challenges thereof. In the final analysis, I maintain that, while social media group communication is the current worldwide means of human communication, it has destroyed the erstwhile valuable social fabric of some of the traditional communities such as the Ndau people of Chipinge.

Methodological Issues The study is anchored on autoethnography as a qualitative research method of data collection and analysis. Autoethnography is an approach to research and writing that seeks to describe and systematically analyse (graphy) personal experience (auto) in order to understand and explore cultural experiences (ethno) (Ellis 2004; Holman 2005). Although autoethnography is not a new research method per se (Salmons 2020), I realised that this method provides a suitable avenue for data collection, given the difficulties involved with accessing participants and sites during the

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lockdown-­induced travel restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Being of Ndau origin and working and staying in town but with the opportunity to visit parents and other relatives who live in the rural areas, I observed that social media group communication has been a challenge for the rural folk. So, in this study, I am using my personal experiences to inform my understanding of the ethical integrity of social media group communication.

Social Media: Definition, Description and Context Social media is a fairly new phenomenon as a means of communication. Simpson and Weiner (2018: 514) define social media as “interactive forms of communication that allow users to network with and publish to each other by means of electronic gadgets connected to the Internet.” Manning (2014: 1158) also defines this phenomenon as “the term often used to refer to new forms of media that involve interactive participation.” Furthermore, Dollarhide (2019) defines social media as computer-based technology that facilitates the sharing of ideas, thoughts and information through the building and use of virtual networks and communities. From the definitions above, a simple description of how social media works becomes possible. Thus, social media can be described as the use of websites, mobile phones and computer or digital applications that are designed to allow people to share content quickly, efficiently and in real time. For Manning (2014), all social media involve the use of some sort of digital platform, whether that be mobile or stationary. In other words, social media can be understood as Internet, web-based electronic communication platforms which use modern technical gadgets such as mobile smartphones, tablets, iPads or computers to enable communication among and between people through space. Usually, at the barest minimum, a personal account and profile must be created to allow for the beginning of the potential for interaction with others. That aspect in and of itself sets social media apart from traditional or conventional face-to-face mode of communication where personal profiles are not required.

Types of Social Media According to Qi and Deng (2018), social media platforms may be divided into six types which include collaborative projects, content communities, social networking sites, virtual game worlds and virtual social worlds. Of

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all these types, this chapter focuses on social networking platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and WhatsApp which are currently being used for various social communication purposes. As Baruah (2012) puts it, a social networking site provides a web-based platform for building social networks or social relations amongst people to share interests or activities. In essence, social networks provide a means to interact over the Internet, over the e-mail and even more recently over mobile phones. It must also be borne in mind that currently many people own and can use the mobile phone to enhance their social media communication and this is why this chapter focuses on the use of the WhatsApp Group communication as it relates to families living in rural community.

The Social Media Theory Erving Goffman (1922–1982) is credited for putting forth a theory of social interaction that he referred to as the dramaturgical model of social life (Qi and Deng 2018). For Goffman, social interaction may be likened to a drama arena and people in everyday life to actors on a stage, each playing a variety of roles. Through the concept of dramaturgy, Goffman implied that human life or existence is like a never-ending play (drama) and that people are the actors in that drama, playing different but significant roles. This means that at every level of interaction, particularly through communication, every member assumes different but significant social roles which either compliment or counteract others’ roles. Thus, the theory suggests that all society is analogous to a theatre in which actions, in terms of human interactions, are the crucial proceedings. Some of the examples of human actions are expressed through politics, religion, communication, social movements or travels, rituals and ceremonies. Thus, social media group communication is one such dramaturgic aspect of society which is as dynamic as it involves people of different dispositions and capabilities coming together for a particular cause at any given time or occasion.

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What Is Social Media (WhatsApp) Group Communication? A WhatsApp Group is formed when different WhatsApp individual account holders connect their contacts (phone numbers) to create a community or group for a specific purpose. Usually, the group is created by one person, called an administrator, who either sends out a link inviting his or her contacts to join, or he or she can simply add the contacts onto the group on his or her own. This social media, like all the others, uses Wi-Fi or cellular connectivity. Thus, WhatsApp Group communication refers to the interaction between members in a group of individuals who join their individual WhatsApp Messenger accounts together, be it at work, family or friendship level, for purposes of sharing messages (texts), pictures, audios and even videos with each other. According to Chhiber (2018), WhatsApp is the most commonly used messenger around the world. Essentially, the purpose of a WhatsApp Group is to establish collective conversations with others, and to conveniently stay updated with colleagues, family and friends. While communication between two people is called a dialogue, communication between three or more people automatically becomes group communication. This means that WhatsApp Group communication applies to groups containing between three and as many people as may come together as possible. In the majority of cases, however, quality WhatsApp Group communication involves a facilitator or administrator who controls the group. Group members have to have a clear sense of belonging, share group goals and exercise mutual respect for others for effective communication.

The Dawn of WhatsApp Group Communication Among the Ndau At this point, a short description of the situation that obtained in Ndau community before the inception of social media communication in general, and WhatsApp Group communication in particular, is necessary. Before the use of social media communication, the primary purpose of a group in Ndau1 traditional society was to share information communally. 1  Zimbabwe has several ethnic Shona groups such as the Zezuru, Karanga, Manyika and Korekore. The Ndau is one of them and this group is concentrated in the south-eastern dis-

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In much of traditional Ndau community, groups also existed at family, village and chieftainship levels. These groups involved members who would often physically come together for discussion whenever it was necessary to do so. At any given opportunity, this form of group communication started with a seating arrangement for all members invited to the meeting or discussion. The group leader convening the meeting would present the issue under consideration and group members would then make their contributions, deliberations or give feedback. Members take turns to speak as they are given chances to do so by the group leader. Both verbal and non-verbal aspects of communication were very important during the group communication. It is important to contextualise group communication among the Ndau people because of the different cultural significance communication means to different groups. For this reason, a brief background about the Ndau people is necessary. The Ndau people are located in the south-eastern region of Zimbabwe along the border with Mozambique and their culture, among other issues, has been a subject of academic discourse in recent years (MacGonagle 2007; Konyana 2016: 43–57; Sithole 2018: 24–31; Muyambo 2018: 51–60). Reference to the sources cited here suffices as evidence of ongoing research on the Ndau people’s culture and more. As indicated from the onset, this chapter focuses on interrogating the integrity of Ndau group communication and thus it does not dwell on who the Ndau are per se. The Ndau people, like most of their Shona contemporaries’ groups, value communication at both interpersonal and family levels. Communication is an essential component of Ndau family life and this means that it has to be meaningful and effective at all times. It is regarded highly as an aspect of everyday existence. At interpersonal level, communication is usually verbal, and is expected to be clear and candid, leaving neither doubt nor room for misinterpretation. For example, when adults are talking to each other, whether they have met on the way or one has visited, the statements are supposed to be clear and audible to allow each of them to understand what they are saying or expressing. The use of gestures, particularly hands and face, is very important to aid in driving the message home. Further, Gotosa and Kadenge (2017) maintain that communication is very important in conflict resolution, particularly in dealing trict of the country bordering with Mozambique. In this chapter focus is on the Ndau as a case study, making reference to the advent of social media communication to those living in rural communities but have families in towns and cities in Zimbabwe and abroad.

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with gender-based violence among couples. The use of proverbs, modal verbs, enclitics, tag questions, totems, hedges, silence and the inclusive pronunciation becomes imperative. However, these communication strategies do make great impact whenever they are employed physically and in a communal setting such as a family group or court. This setting creates an atmosphere of closeness, security and communal belonging. When family members communicate in these ways, then there is assurance that social equilibrium is not only achieved but also maintained. For the Ndau, these culture-specific polite group communication strategies have the potential to curtail possible aggression or violence between interactional parties.

The Utility of WhatsApp Group Communication in Ndau Community The introduction of social media communication into mainstream Ndau community happened in 2009 during the Government of Nation Unity (GNU) in Zimbabwe formed in February 2009 (Mukuhlani 2014). The GNU brought some stability in the financial sector following the introduction of the multi-currency system which brought an end to the unprecedented and uncontrollable hyper-inflationary period which ravaged the country from 2005 up until early 2009. It was during the GNU (from February 2009 to 2013) when a number of people managed to acquire personal assets, including smart cell phones that could be used for social media communication, among other purposes. This was made possible because civil servants and other employees in the private sector were earning salaries in United States dollars (US$) which stabilised their buying power (Mukuhlani 2014: 173). However, it was not until around the year 2015 that the use of WhatsApp became widespread in Zimbabwe. WhatsApp usage, nevertheless, started recently in most rural communities in the country owing to the recent access to smartphones by most people living in rural areas and the presence of numerous Mobile Phone Signal boosters that were installed in the remote areas of the country by the cellular network providers. It is right to say that the inception of WhatsApp Group communication has had consequences on the Ndau status quo. Social media, from its inception, has shown without doubt that it has the incredible ability to facilitate change, for the good or bad, in the communication spectrum. The introduction of mobile phones transformed Ndau community. At the

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very beginning of the communication revolution in Ndau community, families bought mobile phones and would struggle to get connected to networks because network boosters were few and installed far away from most of Ndau rural communities.2 Undeterred by distance and intermittent network connectivity, people would continue to communicate with family and friends within Ndau community and beyond. However, within a few years, network providers improved services and made connectivity problems a thing of the past for many people across Ndau communities. This enabled the people to have access to a variety of social media platforms. Social media immediately transformed Ndau community and gave it more impetus and capacity to join the global world of communication. It has become a vehicle for globalisation in the sense that it has facilitated fast interpersonal and group communication over substantial distances. In other words, social media has revolutionised communication and made it easy and effective disregarding distance between participants. The advent of the Internet and technological gadgets such as laptops, smartphones, iPads and tablets has indeed modernised communication in general and group communication in particular. Until recently, family or community members who wanted to communicate with each other at the same time needed to move themselves to a shared physical location for that purpose. In the context of the Ndau traditional rural society, members would converge at a common meeting place, which could be usually at a traditional family courtyard (dare remumuzi) or community courtyard (dare remunharanda), on a given day and time for discussion. During the meeting, members would enjoy the corporation of and closeness to each other provided by the face-to-face or physical interaction. However, currently, technology has made it unnecessary for people to travel or relocate as in the past so that they talk with each other. The material cost of travel has changed to being that of buying bundles and electricity to recharge the communication devices. It is clear that, since the inception of new technology and globalisation, social media has facilitated communication between individuals and groups in many ways. As has been mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it is important to highlight some of the major benefits of social 2  There were only two Mobile Phone Signal boosters in all of Chipinge district in 2009 when social media communication started in Ndau rural community. The district is 5220 km2 and has a total population of 298,841. From this population, 291,313 people live in rural areas, with only 7528 staying in urban setup.

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media communication. First, social media communication allows physically separated people to interact in real time, in what is known as a synchronous3 manner. Just the possibility that distant people can see and hear each other simultaneously when they are separated by hundreds or thousands of kilometres often inspires people to want to use social media. This means that group communicating through social media frees members from the constraints of place and time which, until recently, used to apply to all human interactions before the inception of communication technology. In this way, social media group communication actually saves considerable money and time which people used to spend in travelling over distances. Social media also allow people in different places to collaborate on group projects or family meetings even if they are located in different places. As information related to tasks emerges over time, people can sustain their focus and attention on individual and shared responsibilities. Social media permit people to keep contact with each other when they are not meeting formally. Once a person is in a social media group, they apparently assume the same status with all the others in the same group with them. Issues that they discuss in the group make them equal participants. Thus, electronic availability of all members in a group makes it possible for them to enjoy a sense of proximity and familiarity with each other as they tackle whatever tasks under discussion. This is what Wolf (2015) also alludes to, with reference to a company, where he says, On social media, all employees can interact with high level officers and managers, engage in instant messages and discuss content with other employees, exchange and communicate ideas, enjoy and practice informal bonding, feel closer to each other, in a word, form friendships (https://www.govloop. com/community/blog/5-­benefits-­social-­media teamwork/).

This is to say that social media group communication brings everyone to the same level of interaction regardless of position or status in the organisation or group itself. In the case of a discussion that requires members to search for more information, social media enable group members to quickly access such information from other sites and share it with other members in the discussion. Visiting the numerous Internet sites can make 3  In computing and communication circles, this term refers to a situation where a wave travels at a constant frequency and is received by different people at the same instant.

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it possible for members to enlarge their understanding of the topics they are dealing with in their group. All through social media group communication, members benefit and enjoy equal status by focusing attention primarily on messages instead of individual statuses such as titles, age and personal attire, all of which come with being together physically. This has made Ndau community more diverse than ever before. The young and the old, men and women, have all become part and parcel of social media group communication in a more social manner than in the past.

Social Media Group Communication Within Ndau Families A family can be understood as a small unit or group of people living together, or even separately, but bound by the desire for mutual cooperation, safety, security and progress. A family is also usually bound by mutual love, care, concern, sacrifice, deep commitment and attachment, among other responsibilities. Communication is a key enabler for family cohesion and belongingness. However, since a family consists of different persons/ members, with multiple thoughts, visions and interests, there are bound to be clashes or differences on certain things. However, as Labh (2019: 89) observed, it is fortunate that “for many families, senior and experienced members intervene and bring the necessary solutions by turning discords into accords and contestations into resolutions.” When it comes to social media group communication, particularly among people living in rural communities like most of the Ndau, there are some challenges that the new technologically enhanced mode of communication has brought. In this section, I argue that, while social media group communication might have brought ease of communication among the Ndau, as pointed out in the previous section, it also brought with its practical application challenges in particular. One of the major areas of Ndau communal life that has been adversely affected is that of dealing with cases of domestic disputes. Previously, when misunderstandings broke out within a family, there were various cultural levels at which people would attempt to intervene with the aim of solving them and mend relations between the aggrieved parties. The different levels, according to Bourdillon (1991: 127), corresponded “with a hierarchy of courts and courts of appeal. In the past, the hierarchy ranged from a family meeting, to meetings presided by village or ward headman and finally the chief.”

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The meetings referred to here are known in Shona and also in Ndau Language as courts (matare; singular: dare). At all social levels, a court or dare may be linked to a social media group of people who come together for a particular purpose. In the case of a dispute or a serious quarrel in the family, the family court (dare remumuzi) has to be convened by the senior men and women of the family, with the head of family or some other senior close relatives presiding. If the case is so serious that it cannot be solved at family level, then it is referred to a higher court or dare for arbitration. Following the dawn of social media group communication in Ndau rural community, there has been a great shift from the norm. Where any family or Village Head would invite senior members to a meeting to try and solve conflict within the family or community, this is becoming difficult because some family members no longer see the value of physically coming together for such purposes. This is a new trend that is slowly growing among the people, especially the young who live in towns and cities, as an influence from the Western culture which promotes individualism. The behaviour clearly raises issues to do with the Ubuntu code of conduct relating to respect for community social cohesion where communities navigate complex social issues collectively (Bourdillon 1991). However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, travelling from one location to another, especially from towns and cities to rural communities, has been restricted by lockdown regulations which discourage extensive movements and gatherings. Thus, when there is conflict in a family and members have a social media family group, they attempt to deal with their issue on the social media at the family group level. The head of the family may introduce the issue on the platform and invite members to contribute on how to solve the conflict. Since the leader has no direct control over the group members’ participation or contribution, members can post or send any messages they deem fit; there seems to be no censorship online. Some messages or comments, however, may hurt others and there is no room to quickly retract them or show compunction over that. In the process, members may fracture relationships and wreck reputations through their use and misuse of words and statements. A member may hastily compose a few intemperate words or comments intended to be taken as constructive but open to multiple interpretations. Such a mishap has the potential to create lasting conflict and problems within the family group. Under the traditional family court (dare remumuzi), cases of irritating comments can easily be controlled by the family head or leader who has the privilege to

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provide counsel to members by his or her mere presence. This is possible during a physical family court meeting because the sitting arrangement at such a meeting is very important. For instance, the head of the family of ten sits in a conspicuous position to draw the attention of all members. With a virtual or social media group communication, it is impossible for the head of family to display that kind of influence and control. It is important to note that social media group communication may encounter other kinds of dangers relating to the timing for a family group to convene a meeting to discuss any pertinent issue. For one thing, social media communication can present a huge time sink because most users sign in to their accounts during the night or first thing in the morning. This means that during the rest of the day members would be busy with other things which may make it difficult to convene. Apart from the timing itself, some members may not be keen to participate in family meetings and they simply exit the group. It is difficult to convince an unwilling member to remain in the family group once they have decided to withdraw from the family group. From this research, it emerged that social media group communication has not presented rural communities with the opportunity to keep families close together or attend family meetings because the younger generation is not keen on engaging in family matters electronically, yet they also do not often afford to travel back to their rural areas to attend to extended family matters. Social media group communication also makes it easy to distribute hurtful or dubious material. Misunderstandings can spread quickly and widely via electronic media, and they can be difficult to correct once people’s feelings have been hurt or inflamed. At times it also happens that members engage in a heated virtual family meeting and end up distributing exaggerated materials related to the previous misunderstandings. In such case, it is possible for families to end up ripped apart and disunited than ever before.

Conclusion This chapter has endeavoured to illustrate the advantages and challenges of social media group communication on a family for people living in rural communities. In the first place, the chapter defined and explained the phenomena of social media and group communication while linking them to the traditional dramaturgical model of social life. It further interrogated the probity of social media group communication with particular

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reference to Ndau family setup where the use of a Ndau family court (dare remumuzi) was presented. The main argument has been that the concept of a family court (dare remumuzi), whose major function is to deal with fundamental family issues including solving cases of family violence and petty misunderstandings, has been threatened with obscurity following the introduction of social media. It has been critically explained that, while social media group communication has indeed made general communication easy, particularly where distance is involved, there are integrity issues associated with social media group communication, with special reference to Ndau families living in rural areas. The chapter highlighted that social media group communication for families may work very well only for as long as the younger generation is willing to remain participants in such groups. However, it has been noted that culture is dynamic and this means that social media group communication has become the new norm that families have to embrace.

References Baruah, T. D. (2012). Effectiveness of Social Media as a tool of communication and its potential for technology enabled connections: A micro-level study. International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 2(5), 1–10. Bourdillon, M. (1991). The Shona Peoples. Gweru: Mambo Press. Chhiber, U. (2018). Why Using WhatsApp for Team Communication is Not a Good Idea. Retrieved April 12, 2020, from https://medium.com/@utkarshchhiber/ why-­u sing-­w hatsapp-­f or-­t eam-­c ommunication-­i s-­n ot-­a -­g ood-­i dea-­ f49bd387b98e Dollarhide, M. (2019). Social Media Definition. Investopedia. Retrieved April 12, 2020, from https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/social-­media.asp Ellis, C. (2004). The Ethnographic I: A Methodological Novel about Autoethnography. Walnut Creek, CA: Alta-Mira Press. Gotosa, K., & Kadenge, M. (2017). Some Reflections on Politeness Strategies among Shona Speaking Couples of Zimbabwe. Journal of Sociology and Asocial Anthropology, 7(2), 92–100. Retrieved March 12, 2020, from https://doi. org/10.1080/09766634.2016.11885705/ Holman, J.  S. (2005). Autoethnography: Making the Personal Political. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (3rd ed., pp. 763–792). SAGE Publications Ltd. Konyana, E. (2016). When culture and the Law meet: An ethical analysis of the interplay between the Domestic Violence Act and the traditional beliefs and ­cultural practices of the Ndau people in Zimbabwe. Ph.D. Thesis, Petermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal.

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Labh, N. (2019). Buddhist Approach to Harmonious Family and Stronger Bond. In T. Thich Nhat (Ed.), Family and Society: A Buddhist Perspective. Noi Bai-­ Vietnam: Hong Duc Publishing House. MacGonagle, E. (2007). Crafting Identity in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press. Manning, J. (2014). Social Media, Definition and Classes of. In K. Harvey (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Social Media and Politics (pp.  1158–1162). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Mukuhlani, T. (2014). Zimbabwe’s Government of National Unity: Successes and Challenges in Restoring Peace and Order. Journal of Power, Politics and Governance, 2(2), 169–180. Muyambo, T. (2018). Indigenous Knowledge Systems: A Haven for Sustainable Economic Growth in Zimbabwe. Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, 10(3), 172–186. Qi, J., & Deng, S. (2018). Theories of Social Media: Philosophical Foundations. Engineering, 4(1), 94–102. Salmons, J. (2020). Self and Social: An Interview About Autoethnography. Social Science Space. Retrieved May 15, 2020, from https://www. socialsciencespace.com Simpson, J., & Weiner, E. (2018). The Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sithole, E. (2018). Identity Consciousness among the Ndau People in Zimbabwe: Unravelling Mysteries, Misconceptions and Justifications. African Identities, 16(4), 412–428. Retrieved May 15, 2020, from https://doi.org/10.108 0/14725843.2018.1473148. Wolf, D. (2015). 5 Benefits of Social Media for Teamwork. Retrieved March 12, 2020, from https://www.govloop.com/community/ blog/5-­benefits-­social-­media-­teamwork/

PART V

Bioethics, African Values and Technology

CHAPTER 12

Bioethics and Technology: An African Ethical Perspective Wilfred Lajul

Introduction In this article, I will discuss the ethical implications of bioethics and biotechnology to Africa. Some conceptual clarifications will be given besides identifying the problem at stake and the methods used to resolve it. Under literature review, I will look at both the Western and African bioethical and biotechnological paradigms. African ethical perspectives will be identified in discussing and scrutinizing the relationship between bioethics and biotechnology in Africa, and later drawing conclusions and making recommendations.

Conceptual Clarifications The key concepts to clarify are bioethics, biotechnology and African bioethics.

W. Lajul (*) Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Gulu University, Gulu, Uganda © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. D. Okyere-Manu (ed.), African Values, Ethics, and Technology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70550-3_12

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Bioethics The term bioethics is constituted of two aspects: biology and ethics (Mohan 2017). Though Mohan thinks “Bioethics employs ethical theories in philosophy in order to address some of the problems encountered in the field of clinical medicine” (2017, 34), this may not be correct. This is because, the problems encountered in the field of clinical medicine are basically the questions of medical ethics and not necessarily of bioethics. Bioethics lays special emphasis on the question of life and in as far as the biological sciences are concerned with the preservation of life. Bioethics investigates the ethical implications of xeno-transplantation, synthetic and artificial life. It probes into its meaning for human life and the diversity of life in the human environment. It equally questions the ethical implications of genetic modifications, alterations and manipulations on nature and the human environment. South Korean “Bioethics and Biosafety Act” (BBA 2005) highlights three cardinal points in as far as bioethics is concerned: (1) To enhance the health and quality of life of human beings; (2) To allow the development of life sciences and biotechnologies that can be used to prevent and cure human diseases; (3) To protect human dignity and to prevent harm to human beings by ensuring life sciences and biotechnologies are developed in accordance with the principle of bioethics. Bioethics is then centrally about values and principles that enhance the health and quality of human life. It also seeks to prevent and cure human diseases, and to protect human dignity and prevent harm to human life. Other authors like Onuoha thinks that “Bioethics deals with the ethical problems arising from the developments in life sciences and biotechnologies” (2007, 4). Andoh vaguely states that bioethics has to do with “[…] wider cultural and social consultations that privilege all discourse about everyday life issues. It has made exponential progress in addressing moral issues in science, technology and medicine in the world” (2011, 67). These ways of defining bioethics are too wide since it mixes bioethics with medical ethics. Besides, while biotechnologies are the techniques and skills used to promote, enhance, manipulate and apparently create new technologies, bioethics is basically about the rightness or wrongness of those techniques and skills that provide, protect and promote life in animals, plants and microorganisms. It is distinct from medical ethics which investigates the relationship between the physician and the patient, because bioethics accentuates the relationship between science and life.

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Biotechnology Biotechnology, in the language of Bull et al., is “the application of scientific and engineering principles to the processing of materials by biological agents to provide goods and services” (1982, 18). While technology is a scientific activity, biotechnology is the application of scientific and engineering activity to biological materials (Bull et al. 1982). The implication is that the purpose of technology is to facilitate biotechnology in the process of providing goods and services. In the same publication, Bull et  al. (Appendix, I, 59-60) give other definitions. Most of these definitions point to the view, positions and theoretical base of those proposing them. Though I want to endorse the United Nation’s definition that biotechnologies are techniques and skills that use biological matter and processes to generate new and useful products, I disagree that such products are always useful. The claim that such products are often new is acceptable, but that such products are always useful is not correct to point. For instance, if it is true that the current Covid-19 virus is a result of biotechnology, then one wonders how such product can be useful. Evidence of the existence of bioweapons in the world today are not lacking (Read, Ainscough 2002; Carus 2017). Some of the biotechnological techniques include genetic modification, hybridization, interbreeding and manipulation of individual genes in humans, animals, plants and microorganisms. Even though the intended claims of the biotechnologists are positive, the products of their activities are definitely not always positive. This is where the central issues of bioethics come from, the rightness or wrongness of biotechnology.

African Bioethics Bioethical and biotechnological theories common in the world are derived from Western philosophy, deprived of other non-Western perspectives. Onuoha notes that “bioethics has established itself in North America, Europe and in parts of Asia, […] yet, many of the assumptions implicit in a Western autonomy-based approach to bioethical problems may not be shared by non-western cultures” (2007, 13). In particular, Onuoha identifies the African social dimension as the perspective that is glaringly missing in this Western-dominated philosophy. Comparing Western and African perspectives, he draws dichotomies between autonomy versus paternalism and individual versus community.

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In most of the West, Onuoha writes, “the principle of autonomy implies that every person has an absolute right to self-determination. However, the person is viewed as a ‘relational self’” (2007: 13), from the African perspective. It is a self for whom social relationships rather than individualism provide the basis for moral judgement within the African culture. While these observations made by Onuoha are correct, the emphasis in this chapter is how these philosophical perspectives are used to ethically judge the rightness or wrongness in biotechnology using ethical principles. Centrally, what creates the difference in perspectives are the African way of understanding nature, humanity and God. In the Western paradigm, God has no place and nature is taken as an object of manipulations. In the African perspective, while individuals remain unique, autonomous and free, they cannot exist independently of other human beings, nature and God. This social dimension changes the way biotechnology should operate and bioethical values should be evaluated.

Problem at Stake The problem under investigation is to identify the proper philosophical theories behind biotechnological practices and the right ethical principles that should guide biotechnology in Africa. Bioethics is the ethical issues arising from human efforts to create and maintain the life and health of living things. Technologies are the techniques and knowledge systems required in the process of developing products, apparently, for the good of living things. Biotechnology, on the other hand, is the technological use of biological matter and process to generate new products through methods like genetic modification, hybridization, inbreeding and manipulation of individual genes in humans, animals, plants and microorganisms. Though authors like Batalion (2000) thinks the central problem with this approach lies with the attempt of modern science to control living nature on erroneous mechanistic view, in this chapter, I think the problem is deeper. It is not just an attempt to control nature on wrong mechanistic principles, but it is also an attempt to control nature on erroneous philosophical principles. The human person, for instance, is understood in this Westernized philosophy as an individual, autonomous, self-propelling and independent of others and nature itself, including God. The view in this chapter holds that the human person is a relational being that is linked to other humans, to nature itself and to the immaterial world, including God.

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Biotechnology, in its current Westernized perspective, does not only ignore the existence of God, but also distorts that concept of the human person, and identifies nature with purely mechanistic principles. This creates a much bigger problem in the area of ethics, which will undermine the deeper philosophical base to understand and judge the rightness or wrongness of the human effort to create and maintain the life and health of living things. At a deeper level, biotechnological practice is beginning to endanger the very life and health of living things it is purporting to maintain. This is also contrary to the view of the United Nations that biotechnology creates new and useful products. I think, some of the biotechnological products are not useful, especially for the creation and maintenance of the life and health of living organisms.

Methods The methods used in this chapter are basically analytical. It is in the analysis of the different literature that will help to identify the answer to the problem under investigation. Through the review of literature, I will be able to identify the Western and African biotechnological and philosophical paradigms, from which discussions will be made to draw out the findings proper to this chapter. While the different literatures in various ways have talked about these issues independently, I will try to tie some of them together to show their interconnectedness. Some authors have already dealt with some of these issues, but my particular interest, as stated above, has not been tackled. It may be necessary to mention some of these authors. Batalion (2000), for instance, mainly criticize Western biotechnological practices from a purely mechanistic point of view. In my effort, I do not ignore this mechanistic approach but go beyond it to investigate also the philosophy behind biotechnological practice. Some authors dealt with bioethical matters alone or their relationship to Africa (Gbadegesin 1998; Callahan 1999; Maura 2004; Coleman 2017; Tangwa 1996, 2010; Andoh 2011; Behrens 2013, 2017; Chuwa 2014; Kanu 2016; Metz 2017; Frimpong-Mansoh and Atuire 2019). Other authors handled both bioethical and biotechnological issues alone and, in some cases, in their relationship with Africa (Batalion 2000; Tangwa 2004; Schuurman 2011; Amin 2013; Lumun 2013; Engwa 2014; and Bostrom 2006). The interest of this chapter will be to deal with both bioethical and biotechnological matters in relation to Africa.

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Literature Review Western Bioethical and Biotechnological Paradigms Maura believes that there are challenges with contemporary Westernized bioethics. The main contemporary challenge is the “[…] secular, principle-­ based, Western bioethics that has dominated national and international debate for three decades” (2004: 158). He argues that bioethics in the West places “emphasis on rights and duties over the development of character and virtue, as well as for its relative inattention to social, religious, and cultural features of moral experience and moral agency” (Maura 2004: 158). On the basis of this secular approach, Western philosophy is preoccupied with the maximization of individual autonomy and derivation of singular principle-based bioethics. Other voices from Africa, Asia and Latin America question the adequacy and credibility of this approach. Maura thinks that the real problems are beyond bioethics since it embraces an international philosophical approach borrowed from the West. The issue at stake is not only emphasis on “[…] rights versus responsibilities, on autonomy versus beneficence, but the international dominance of an approach to ethical issues in health and medicine that is drawn principally from Western philosophical traditions” (Maura 2004: 159). He thinks these philosophical traditions are principally drawn from Kantian deontology and utilitarianism. In moral philosophy, deontology is the normative ethical theory that the morality of an action should be based on whether that action is itself right or wrong under a series of rule rather than on the consequences of the action (Mifflin 2016; see also Waller 2005). This Western philosophical paradigm is centred on the individual and his or her interests. This individual is ontologically unique, free, autonomous and self-propelling. Whatever is done to this individual is right or wrong in itself regardless of his or her connectedness to other individuals, nature and the spiritual world. This latter dimension is completely missing from this philosophical paradigm. On the other hand, rightness or wrongness in biotechnology is often judged on the basis of its effects on human life. This approach ignores other more basic philosophies underpinning biotechnological practices. However, Bull et  al. (1982) identify three main activities or areas of biotechnological involvement: microbiology and biochemistry, genetic manipulations and engineering that warrant ethical considerations.

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Microbiology and Biochemistry Talking about microbiology and biochemistry, Bull et al. rightly observe that the uniqueness of biotechnology lies in “the application of biocatalysts as agents of chemical transformation. […]. When developing a process, it is necessary to select an appropriate biocatalyst, optimize its structure, its properties, and the environment in which it will be required to function” (1982: 22). Bull and his colleagues acknowledged that “the most significant of these catalysts […] are microorganisms and enzymes while cells and tissues of higher organisms, in most cases, are at early stages of development” (1982, 22). Perhaps that was then in 1982, but today the greatest danger created by biotechnology in the area of microbiology and biochemistry is tampering with the cells and tissues of higher organisms, which at that time was just at the stage of being developed. The implications of biotechnology to the higher organisms have become more complex since microorganisms and enzymes are also related to higher organisms, because they can affect the life and health of other higher organisms. Besides, the impact of biotechnology to the environment was, at time, minimally known. Bull et  al. note that “In microorganisms the ability to modulate cell structure, chemistry and function has evolved most fully and in a biotechnological context such “phenotypic variability” is both exploitable and a source of difficulties” (1982: 24). This means that although a lot of success has been recorded in the area of microbiology, the phenotypic1 unpredictability is not only possible but also problematic. So, the outcome of microbiology and biochemistry, in general, is problematic since it is not easy to determine the resultant characteristics of organisms that come from the interaction of its genetic constitution with the environment.

Genetic Manipulations In as far as genetic manipulations are concerned, Bull et al. recognize two methods, that is, the cell fusion and the in vitro recombinant DNA methods: “Both techniques allow the ‘species barrier’ to be overcome and for new combination of genes to be produced” (1982: 25). The artificial 1  The characteristics of an organism that results from the interaction of its genetic constitution with the environment (Bull et al. 1982, 77).

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method uses genetic manipulation while the natural method uses evolutionary processes. In the artificial methods, genes are altered giving rise to new mutants whose properties differ from their parent organisms using mutagen, which are chemical or physical agents on the basis of a variety of scientific mechanisms. Meanwhile, the natural method uses evolutionary processes aided by natural selection (1982). Pontecorvo (1976) finds a problem with the exclusive use of mutagenesis. He recommends a combination of mutagenesis, which he terms prehistoric, with the natural one. He points out that industry often has adopted a “prehistoric” strategy by using exclusively mutagenesis and that lessons should be learned from the natural evolutionary methods, which supplements the prehistoric method with the natural one. The view in this chapter is that a greater ethical problem is created by artificial genetic manipulation or mutagenesis other than by the natural evolutionary methods. Rajnikant (2012) defines mutagenesis as “[…] a powerful method directed towards mutating genes or engineering genome for functional analysis” (2012, ix). Meanwhile, Sanders thinks that though mutagenesis is a powerful method, it is also a slow and natural method by which living organisms, through evolution, adapt themselves to their environments. I think by calling mutagenesis a powerful method, Rajnikant was probably referring to artificial mutagenesis through which humans try to control and bend this inborn ability of living things to their will. I think a better understanding of mutagenesis is that it is both a natural and artificial method through which living organisms undergo genetic mutation. Sean Sanders (2012) maintains that: It is a truism that to survive, we must be able to change. This, too, is the essence of evolution on the most fundamental biological level: without the innate ability for DNA to undergo mutation, it would not be possible for organisms to adapt and survive changes in their environment. Since humankind achieved an understanding of this mutagenesis process and its power, we have been trying to control it and bend it to our will. (Sanders 2012, 2)

From the above text, I can draw that mutation is a necessity for the survival of living organisms since it is only when such changes take place can living organisms adapt themselves to survive in their different environments. This change requires that DNA undergoes mutation. Evolution is the natural means by which living organisms change their DNA structures.

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Evolution is then an example of natural mutagenesis. However, we get artificial mutagenesis when humans try to control this natural process and bend it to their will. Artificial mutagenesis follows the modern method of science. Centrally, that is where the problem with biotechnology lies. Artificial mutagenesis attempts to make living organisms adapt themselves for survival through external interventions by use of mutagens. It is in this genetic manipulation through human intervention that lies the seedbed of scientific success or peril to living organisms. In this subsists the ethical question of the relevance of biotechnology to the sustenance of life and health in living organisms. Genetic Engineering While genetic manipulation is the artificial intervention into what would be a natural genetic mutation in living organisms, genetic engineering goes beyond genetic manipulation. This is done on the basis that biological organisms do not only have the natural abilities to mutate genetically, but humans can induce such mutation using techniques and skills to engineer such changes, which can result in the creation of a new brand of living organisms that did not exist previously in nature. Bull et  al. think that the real danger with genetic engineering is in opening up new horizons in biotechnology, by placing emphasis on biological aspects creating novelties just for the sake of novelties, with little relevance to sustaining the life and health of living organisms. In my view, the real danger is not that genetic engineering is opening up new horizons of little value to human beings but in trying, not only to control, but also to change and create new organisms that did not exist originally in nature. This is done without due regard to what these might mean to other existing living organisms. These newly created living organisms might not only be irrelevant but may as well be dangerous to the health and life of humans and other living organisms. This is one of the main concerns bioethics tries to protect human life against. Hansen (2000) identifies genetic manipulation with conventional breeding, and distinguishes it from genetic engineering. Genetic engineering, according to Hansen, differs profoundly from conventional breeding. As a general rule, conventional breeding develops new plant varieties by the process of selection, and seeks to achieve expression of genetic material which

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is already present within a species. […] Conventional breeding employs processes that occur in nature, such as sexual and asexual reproduction. The product of conventional breeding […] are not new for the species. The characteristics have been present for millennia within the genetic potential of the species. (Hansen 2000, 1)

To the contrary, genetic engineering is a process through which genetic material is inserted into the host organism with the help of a gene “gun”, a bacterial “truck” and a chemical or electrical treatment. Hansen confirms that genetic engineering works primarily through insertion of genetic material, followed up by selection. This insertion process, however, does not occur in nature (Hansen 2000). Genetic material is inserted into the host plant cell and then with the help of genetic elements; this genetic material is inserted into the chromosomes of the host plant. “Engineers must also insert a “promoter” gene from a virus as part of the package, to make the inserted gene express itself” (Hansen 2000: 1). This process alone is profoundly different from conventional breeding, as seen above. Hansen (2000) adds that beyond the process described above, genetic engineering techniques have added new elements. (i) In genetic engineering, the primary goal is to permit genetic material to be inserted from unprecedented sources. (ii) Genetic material is also inserted from species, families and even kingdoms which could not previously be sources of genetic material for particular species. (iii) It can even insert custom-­ designed genes that do not exist in nature. As a result, Hansen concludes that “[…] we can create what can be regarded as synthetic life forms, something which could not be done by conventional breeding” (Hansen 2000, 1). The implications of synthetic life on natural life are completely unknown. The real problem with biotechnology subsists in this aspect of genetic engineering, which calls for more questions than answers. Ainscough (2002) describes genetic engineering as giving birth to biowarfare and bioterrorism, while Carus (2017) gives a short history (from prehistory to the twenty-first century) of what he calls biological warfare.

African Bioethical and Biotechnological Paradigms In this section, I will look at African bioethical and biotechnological philosophical paradigms. By paradigms, I mean patterns of thinking in the area of bioethics and biotechnology.

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Bioethics Tangwa (1996) begins by citing the central problem in developing an African bioethical perspective. This, according to him, is found in the poor understanding of a theory, which according to Western philosophy, must be one, correct, rationally justifiable ethical principle from which everything must be derived. In this sense, Africa cannot claim to have any bioethics until they are able to derive one such ethical principle (1996). In Tangwa’s view of such a unique ethical principle, on which everything is infallibly derived, is a myth. He says, “This conviction is compatible with and, in fact, leads naturally to undue exaggeration, dogmatism, extremism and intolerance which, in turn, engender crusading and fanaticism” (1996: 193). His preference is for, what he terms, philosophy of diversity. The philosophy of diversity is the accommodation of varied and peaceful apparently contradictory elements. This philosophy is typical of “African cultures, worldviews, systems of thought, religions and philosophies [which] are characterised by diversity and, left to themselves, united in their tolerance and liberalism, live and let live attitude, non-aggressivity, and non-proselytising character” (Tangwa 1996: 185). This philosophy of diversity is glaringly missing from Western philosophical worldview, that is reductionist, since it wants everything to be understood in the same way under the same philosophical principle in the name of “justification, proof, coherence, consistency, certainty, etc.” (Tangwa 1996, 185). Robert C. Solomon (1980) calls this philosophical attitude ‘transcendental pretence’. This implies that Western philosophy is “sub specie universali [universal sub-species], if not sub specie aeternitatis [eternal sub-species], and as the only rational and universally valid ones” (Tangwa 1996: 185). Absolutism in theory making, unlike flexibility in theory construction, can be beneficial since it can protect one from invasion by foreign ideas but it can as well be dangerous because it can prevent one from escaping from the self-made cocoon (Tangwa 1996). Typically, Western philosophy has absolutized some of its philosophical ideas in self-made cocoons and finds it very difficult to open up to embrace foreign philosophical ideas. This attitude of theoretical absolutism is demeaning to African philosophical attempts at presenting alternatives to Western philosophical worldviews. Tangwa goes on to identify some of the unique African bioethical perspectives. The Nso’ people of Cameroon “do not look on themselves as privileged creatures with a God given mandate to subdue,

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dominate and exploit the earth and the rest of creation. They do, however, consider human well-being as the aim, end and purpose of morality” (Tangwa 1996: 189). The implication is that biotechnological practices emanating from and permitted by Western bioethical practices place humans as privileged creatures with God-given mandate to subdue, dominate and exploit the earth and the rest of creation. The Nso’ bioethical approach only places human well-being at the centre, as the end or purpose of morality. This does not licence humans to do whatever they want with the rest of creation. I would add that humans are at the centre, according to other African philosophical worldviews, because they are linked to God, to their ancestors, other human beings and nature itself. This ethics does not permit, for instance, the creation of synthetic life as Western genetic engineering does. Doing this would be tantamount to playing God in the arrangement of created things. Tangwa adds that “The tie between nyooiy, the earth, and the people who live on and cultivate the earth is a close one and is expressed in moral and ritual terms” (Tangwa 1996: 190-91).2 Tangwa (1996) seems to highlight four elements of African bioethics according to the Nso’ people. The basic principles of this ethics are life (procreation), well-being, community and human limitation. To support this, he writes: “the Nso’ value children so highly as to consider procreation one of the main purposes of life. Every Nso’ person would prefer his/her own death to that of his/her child. Bongkpumo (I prefer being the one to die) is a very common name in Nso’” (1996: 194). The second is well-being. He contends that “The Nso’ also value well-­ being so much that they prefer death to irremediable suffering. A si ngeh bong kpu (death is preferable to suffering) is a common Lamnso’ saying” (1996: 194). The third is community. “The Nso’ also value the community so much that they subordinate the individual to the community” (1996: 194). And lastly, the principle of human limitations. He believes that the Nso’ constantly emphasize their own limitations, ignorance, moral weaknesses and culpability vis-à-vis other human groups. “Almost every second Nso’ person is likely to bear the name No’kika (what do Nso’ people know?), Veirbe (where are we?), Verjai (we erred)” (Tangwa 1996: 194). 2  For details, one can read what Tangwa calls “Nso’ Metaphysical Conceptions and Worldview” (Tangwa 1996, 188-193).

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African bioethics, according to the Nso’ people of Cameroon, seems to promote the sacredness of human life, which no one should tamper with, especially the life of the younger generations who are the safety valves for the future. This ethics is centred on the importance of human well-being as the end and purpose of life. This cannot take place in the absence of the community support that is the guarantee for both human life and human well-being. Since humans are limited by nature, they rely also on the protection of the gods and their ancestors. Some of these basic bioethical principles are contradicted by Western theories and principles of ethics. Western ethics, as we have seen earlier, emphasizes individuality, autonomy, rights and self-propensity of the individual. The overall well-being of human beings, life and the concomitant support derived from the community are neatly ignored in this Western ethical paradigm. Where I do not agree with Tangwa is in placing an exaggerated importance on the community. The exaggeration of the importance of the community comes when Tangwa maintains that Nso’ people’s ethics, “subordinates the individual to the community” (1996:194). In as much as the community is important in most African cultures, they equally honour and respect individual differences. That is why a child or a young person is valued in their own right, since without these individuals, the entire community, however important it is, cannot be constituted. It is the individuals that constitute the community. Andoh (2011) contends that for Africa to realize the required skills to develop proper African bioethics, Africans need the following three skills: knowledge of the traditions of ethics, religious and secular; social perceptiveness and self-knowledge. He identifies bioethics that would be proper to Africa, with that based on African traditional ethics. Those most traditional African ethical principles, which would be useful in building African bioethics, should include, among others: principle of life, understanding of the human person, and the religious values and principles. African bioethics is engraved on their deep understanding of “the existence of the person in the strong living chain of ancestors and the lives which are to come in the future. The deep religious sense and rich expressions of interiority which are essential for fostering moral values and principles” (Andoh 2011: 74). African bioethics should then be based on the principle of life, as the greatest gift to humans, with the accompanying respect for life, love for life and procreation. Secondly, it must be based on the concept of the human person as having a living chain with the past (ancestors), the

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present (other living beings) and the future (those to be born). Thirdly, the deep sense of interiority, derived from their religious experiences and values. What Andoh did not articulate is the human connectedness to nature, that is, both animate and inanimate nature. Biotechnology The Nuffield Council of Bioethics (NCB) notes that the promises and expectations about future biotechnologies are “too often drawn from a few successful biotechnologies, sometimes in very different sectors” (2012: 38). They observe that “great caution needs to be taken when assigning predictive value to such models that simplify the contingencies and nonlinearity of emergence and innovation” (2012: 38). NCB concludes that biotechnological policies and practices are not only methodologically problematic, since they rely often on very few success stories in completely unrelated sectors, but also the rush to premature scientific commitments basing on particular outcomes as criteria of success. Consequently, caution and scepticism, which is not becoming anti-­ science, could be the appropriate attitude to adopt in trying to practice biotechnology (2012: 38). In line with Mugabe (2002), I agree that while NCB advocates for caution in methodology and practice in biotechnology, Africa, as one of the developing regions of the world, has a unique problem. This problem comes from a divided view about biotechnology: with one side taking biotechnology as the long-awaited saviour of Africa, and on the other side, taking biotechnology to be the worst devil that has ever confronted Africa. Just like Mugabe, my view is to avoid these extremes. Mugabe, while acknowledging the potential of biotechnology to transform the African economic landscape, identifies the intense debate about the potential contributions of biotechnology to developing countries in these words: Today this debate has stayed at two extremes: one that perceives biotechnology as the source of solutions to many of the economic, social and environmental problems that developing countries are confronted with, and the other extreme that treats the technology with considerable suspicion as a technology that will bring more ills to the countries. While those in the former position espouse the development and application of biotechnology, the latter group calls for its demise. It is in the context of these two extremes

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that Africa has to find its own place in the biotechnology revolution. (Mugabe 2002: 1)

This means that protagonists advocate for the application of biotechnology in Africa while the antagonists advocate its demise. According to Mugabe, African perspective must take the middle ground, avoiding the extremes of either side. Though, to a great extent I agree with this perspective, I disagree that pointing out at the weakness of biotechnology constitutes a denial of its use or required caution, as NCB has mentioned above. The strength or weaknesses embedded in biotechnology itself should be grounded on the right principles of ethics other than just taking a middle ground. A mere convenience in attempting to create an equilibrium between acceptance and rejection of biotechnology is a weak position. It should be the principles of ethics or African ethics, for that matter, to judge the rightness or wrongness of biotechnology, not just an a priori position taken to avoid confrontation. Mugabe, in maintaining this so-called middle position, bases his view on what he calls “the strategic policies and institutional arrangements that would enlarge Africa’s prospects of maximizing benefits from biotechnology while at the same time minimizing its risks” (Mugabe 2002, 1). From an ethical point of view, this would not be different from utilitarianism, which seeks to maximize benefits and minimize risks. It is this philosophy of convenience that I disagree with. Utilitarianism is already known to have its own weaknesses, since it cannot justify that maximum benefit from biotechnology will always remain beneficial for Africa even in the long run. Equally, will those minimum risks always remain threats for Africa? Besides, what has utility value for the vast majority of Africans may not always remain so or is right for everybody. Despite differences in opinion among African authors, I believe that ethics in general and African ethics in particular places emphasis not only on the usefulness of biotechnology, but also on its rightness or wrongness. To confirm this, Mugabe writes: Biotechnology has no inbuilt logic to cause harm to or to generate benefits for humanity. It is a social construct whose development and application largely rely on human beings. Indeed, what is crucial is to establish systemic and long-term measures that will enable society to reap benefits from the technology and to address any negative impacts it may cause. (Mugabe 2002: 1)

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Mugabe’s concern here is that the rightness or wrongness of biotechnology depends on human constructs other than on the nature of biotechnology itself, since biotechnology has no capacity, or “inbuilt logic”, to cause harm or good. This statement is problematic as we shall later see. Otherwise, Mugabe rightly notes that African biotechnology is centred on two major principles, namely the principle of technological capability and that of cumulative evolution. The first principle emphasizes that technological capability of Africa should be created, mobilized and articulated within the policy and organizational linkages, so that risks in biotechnological research and development are managed (Mugabe 2002). Mugabe presents the second principle, which emphasizes that innovative technological change in Africa is a cumulative evolution that grows within the social, socio-economic as well as environmental contexts (Mugabe 2002). In conclusion to this section, I can say that African biotechnological paradigm is centred on the capability building and the social, socio-­ economic and environmental contexts. If African bioethics is to be rightly placed, then it has to take into consideration African technological capacity building and its risks management. Besides, it should be placed in social, socio-economic and environmental contexts. What I want to underscore is the fact that, all of these should be understood within the guidelines of African metaphysics and ethical principles as we shall see below.

African Ethical Perspectives Reiss defines ethics as, “the branch of philosophy concerned with how we should decide what is morally wrong and what is morally right” (2010, 7). Lajul simply defines morality as behavioural “patterns of practice of given societies” (2011:126). This means, morality is the standards of right and wrong of an individual or groups of individuals in society. It becomes understandable why Schuster (1972: 116) thinks it is an attitude of man. So, while morality is a human attitude towards what they consider to be right or wrong, ethics is the critical and rational justification of what they consider to be right or wrong. It is then second-order morality, a critical look at what different societies and individuals within them consider to be right or wrong. African ethics or moral philosophy is the derivation and identification of meaning and standards of human behaviour within the symbiotic human

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relationships with self, others, nature and the spiritual world. This is because, as Lajul (2011) observes, whatever one does to others individually affects society and whatever members of society do collectively affects every member of that society including the environment in which they live. African bioethics for that matter can only be understood on the basis of African metaphysics. This metaphysics understands the agent of human behaviour as an individual that is ontologically linked to others, to God and to nature. It is only within this ethics that we can understand and ethically judge biotechnology. Such standards of right and wrong would be not only meaningful but also relevant to Africa and its development. In this philosophy, we shall judge biotechnology, not only on the basis of its impact on human society, but also on the basis of its harmony with African ontological principles within which an individual is unique and at the same time a member of society. This technology should be in line with the harmony within an individual, harmony with others, nature and the world around the individual, both spiritual and the material world.

Findings and Discussions The discussion will take these two lines: one, on the relationship between Africa and biotechnology and two, between Africa and bioethics. I will analyse the place of Africa in the era of biotechnological practices and the African pattern of thinking in international bioethics.

Africa and Biotechnology Though biotechnology has been defined as the techniques and skills used to promote, enhance, manipulate and create new products, I found out that there are tendencies to define it in extremely negative or positive terms. The proponents define biotechnology as innovative skills and techniques of distinction to produce beneficial products for the good of man. However, the antagonists depict biotechnology as unfortunate skills and techniques, not only to manipulate but also to distort nature and the manifold lives within it. Other authors tend to create some balance between these extreme views. This way of understanding biotechnology may not be the right way to go. Biotechnology should be defined on the basis of deeper philosophical principles that underpin it. The tendency to define biotechnology on the basis of its products, whether positive or negative, is not, in my view, the right approach, because any technology will have its

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own positive and negative products impacting on life. The approach taken in this chapter is to judge the rightness or wrongness of biotechnology on the basis of deeper philosophical principles that underpin this technology. The philosophical basis of biotechnology, in my view, is borrowed from Western philosophy. For Tangwa, this Western philosophy is a “transcendental pretence” (1996: 185). This pretence is to assume that every reality must be reducible to a single all-encompassing theoretical principle from which every explainable phenomenon must be derived. In this pretence, emphasis is put on universality, justification, proof, coherence, consistency, certainty and rationality. We well know that knowledge can be derived from a combination of complex activities. Knowledge of reality is derived not only from rationality but also from human feelings and from a combination of human activities like reason, emotions and faith. For Tangwa, reliance on singular philosophical principles as the basis of understanding reality is wrong. We need what Tangwa calls philosophy of diversity. In my view, the problem is not really with philosophical principles, whether singular (Western philosophy) or diverse (Tangwa). In line with Western philosophy, there are principles within the philosophy that underpin biotechnology. But unlike Western philosophy, this principle is not singular but diverse, in line with Tangwa, and still better, broad enough to include all that can be explained and precise enough to be consistent with the different parts. Agreeing with Tangwa, such principles can be derived from African metaphysics. African metaphysics then, like any other metaphysical traditions in the world, do also have its principles. The difference is that African metaphysical principles are based on a much broader context and concept than the narrow philosophical concept and context of Western philosophy. For instance, in Western philosophy, any philosophical principle must have the narrow characteristics of justifiability, coherency, consistency, certainty, rationality and criticality. In African metaphysics, in as much as these philosophical qualities are necessary, they do not exclude emotions and faith in deriving them. What is more central, in my opinion, is the philosophical basis of biotechnology. In my view, the Western philosophy behind biotechnology is derived from “Kantian Copernican Revolutionary Theory”. In the Preface of the second edition to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant, after acknowledging the works of great scientists like Galileo Galilei, Torricelli and Stahl, states that through their works “a light dawned on all those who study nature” (Kant 1998: 109). He further wrote that:

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They [these scientists] comprehended that reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own design; that it must take the lead with principles for its judgments according to constant laws and compel nature to answer its questions, rather than letting nature guide its movements by keeping reason, as it were, in leading-strings. (Kant 1998: 109)

This means that to compel nature to give answers to human problems, humans must use their own reason or rationality. This is to stop following the leading-strings of the laws of nature. In this philosophical theory, just like the scientists did to breakthrough, humans must begin to obey its own self-designed laws. With these self-designed laws, humans can approach nature to compel it to give answers to human problems. Highlighting this “Kantian Copernican Revolution”, Kant himself wrote: We should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus’ hypothesis. Failing of satisfactory progress in explaining the movement of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all revolved round the spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest. A similar experiment can be tried in metaphysis, as regards the intuition of objects. If intuition must conform to the constitution of the objects, I do not see how we could know anything of the latter a priori; but if the objects (as objects of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility. (Kant, 1927: 22)

An example of a thinker that started this scientific breakthrough was Copernicus. Copernicus noticed that by saying it is the Sun (stars) that moved around the Earth, there has been no scientific breakthrough. He hypothesized that suppose we take the Earth [from where the spectator experiences the movements of celestial bodies] to be the one moving around the Sun, there might be better hope to understand the movement of celestial bodies. Galileo Galilei was the first scientist that built a telescope to prove this hypothesis, which was amazingly correct. So, till then, it was believed that for humans to know of the objects in this world, our ideas of the world must conform to the realities in the objective world. Now, the novelty Kant introduced was to say instead of trying to conform our ideas (which are mental) to the objective world, we must make the objective world to conform to the rational ideas designed by humans. In this, we shall breakthrough in the area of metaphysical knowledge.

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In even clearer terms, Kant himself wrote: Reason, in order to be taught by nature, must approach nature with its principles in one hand, according to which alone the agreement among appearances can count as laws, and, in the other hand, the experiments thought out in accordance with these principles yet in order to be instructed by nature not like a pupil, who has recited to him whatever the teacher wants to say, but like an appointed judge who compels witnesses to answer the questions he puts to them. (Kant 1998: 109)

The implication is that instead of being taught by nature, reason should compel nature to give answers to questions designed by human reason. Reason may learn something from nature but it should not be like a child learning from his or her teacher. Reason must approach nature like its judge, compelling it to answer questions made by the judge himself. Commenting on this text, Lajul maintains that Kant concluded that it was possible that the laws of nature could be manipulated and that new knowledge could be derived from them that could be used to solve human problems. It took modern scientists to actually prove that this was not only a possibility, but a reality. (2014: 47)

Actually, biotechnology is the development that came on the basis of this Kantian philosophical theory. It is in human ability to manipulate nature or to force nature to give answers to the needs of humans that modern scientists can talk of genetic engineering. African metaphysics differs substantially from this philosophy since, in African metaphysics, humans are only part and parcel of nature and are ontologically related to other human beings, nature itself and the spiritual world. The central disagreement is on the licence given to humans, by Kant and subsequent philosophers and scientists to manipulate the laws of nature. This is inconsistent with African metaphysics, and it is the basis adopted by this chapter. Western biotechnological practice is then derived from this Kantian theory suggesting that humans should not only discover the laws of nature and learn from it, but should manipulate the laws of nature. The manipulation of the laws of nature was found by later scientists to be possible in two ways, namely through genetic manipulations and through genetic engineering. While genetic manipulations, according to

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Hansen (2000), aims only at developing new varieties within already existing organism, genetic engineering goes beyond to create organisms with no semblance in nature. Genetic manipulation employs processes that occur in nature but genetic engineering involves insertion of genetic material from, possibly, custom-designed genes that do not exist in nature. Genetic manipulation emphasizes characteristics that are not new for the species, while genetic engineering, using gene gun, inserts into the chromosomes of the host organism, genetic materials that are often foreign to the host organism. The real problem with biotechnology is actually derived more from genetic engineering other than genetic manipulation, in the sense explained by Hansen (2000). The synthetic life, which is one of the products of biotechnology, is often created through genetic engineering, which could cause real problems for the preservation of life and health of living organisms. Some of these problems are seen in the areas of genetically modified foods, environmental damages and creation of synthetic life in plants, animals and microorganisms.

Africa and Bioethics We have already noted that bioethics, in general, studies the values and principles that enhance the quality of human life through skills and technologies that prevent or cure human diseases, besides protecting human dignity and the health of other living organisms. We have also seen that the science that calls for the need of bioethics, as an academic discipline, is biotechnology. This said, we still have to discuss the implications of what Maura (2004) noted concerning Western bioethics as incapable in regulating the activities of biotechnology because of Western secularism. In Western secularism, God is completely kept out of the picture and nature is treated as a physical object for scientific investigation. Natural objects are treated as pure matter, with no relation to the environment, human life and the life of other living organisms in the world. In my view, secularism is one of the reasons why Western bioethics cannot meaningfully regulate activities of biotechnology. Maura adds that Western philosophy glorifies in the autonomy and sanctity of individuals with rights and freedom to do whatever they want. It is the world of individuals without any beneficence and social responsibilities. This thinking pushes Western bioethics to a narrow perspective, since it cannot criticize

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the activities of these autonomous and free individuals. Scientists, who are the master brain behind biotechnology, work to generate new and useful products, in the language of the United Nations (2002). Western ethics then glorifies in the genius of these scientists and their findings. Scientific innovations are looked at with helpless admiration, since nothing can be said or done against them. The social interests and common good, like the environmental protection, which is required for the maintenance of life and the health of living organisms, are completely ignored. For Batalion (2000), Western bioethics is practically ineffective because the central problem is the attempt by biotechnological scientists to try to control nature on wrong mechanistic principles. As mentioned earlier, mechanistic principles treat nature as part and parcel of mechanistic world order, so do not go beyond the physical world. Apparently, humans can do anything with any object in this world. I have already mentioned earlier that the problem seems to be more. It is not just this wrong mechanistic view with which biotechnologists approach the world and nature, but a wrong philosophy, which is purely individualistic, utilitarian and secularist. The type of bioethics that can alleviate the world from this narrow reading of ethics is African metaphysics, which places ethical judgements on the right philosophical principles. This philosophical principle is derived from the view that humans are both individuals who are autonomous, free and self-propelling, but they are also ontologically related to others, nature and the spiritual world. Jimoh and Thomas note that “The self of the subject and the objective world outside the self are united as one in a relationship in which the self of the subject vivifies and animates the objective world” (1995: 55; see also Pope Benedict XVI 2009: 69; Pope Francis 2015: 7778). Instead of vivifying and animating the world, some biotechnological practices tamper with the natural world in which we live in the name of modern science. While in 1971 Pope Paul VI regretted the tragic pending consequences of unchecked human activities leading to ecological degradation, he equally warned that the extraordinary technological advancements exhibited at his time, even more so at our time, must be accompanied with authentic social and moral regulations, less human technological advancements, will turn against man. Today, there are glaring signs that technological advancements are beginning to turn against man himself through the effects of human activities. In fact, we need the right type of bioethics to check on some of these human activities, Pope Paul VI referred to.

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African bioethics bases its argument on one main pillar, African metaphysics. In this metaphysics, nature is taken to be sacred and it has an ontological relationship with humanity, other human beings and God. This metaphysics highlights that the human person is a corporate individual. This means that human beings are individuals who are autonomous, free and self-propelling but at the same time, they are ontologically related to others, nature and the spiritual world. I can give one simple example to substantiate. In as much as animals breathe out carbon dioxide which is consumed by plants, plants in their turn breathe our oxygen, which is consumed by animals. From the philosophical point of view, it is clear that humans are not as autonomous as they are portrayed to be in Western philosophy; they are equally and strongly related to other human beings and to nature which they exploit and at the same time depend on in terms of the environment. It is this metaphysics that can base strong bioethics that can contend with some aspects of biotechnology that are destructive and not respectful of this philosophical principle.

Conclusions and Recommendations Conclusions The first conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that biotechnology is a scientific innovation that can no longer be stopped. What can be done is to regulate its activities for the good of the world, human life and the life of other living organisms. In as much as biotechnology has several benefits for humanity, it equally has the potential to undermine the life and health of living organisms. My finding is that what might be problematic with biotechnology is the unchecked venture into genetic engineering in which the DNA of natural objects are altered with the possibility of deriving synthetic life, which never existed in nature. Other methods in which changes may take place in the natural composition of living organisms without creating synthetic life that has no semblance in nature is less damaging to human life and the life of other living organisms. As noted earlier, for natural objects to survive different environmental challenges, there is need for natural objects to adapt themselves or to be helped to adapt themselves to suit the different environmental challenges facing the life of living organisms. This means that some form of biotechnology cannot be avoided.

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The second conclusion is that to regulate biotechnological practices, we need a different philosophical principle underpinning bioethics, other than those suggested by Western philosophy. The weakness of Western philosophical paradigms lies in depending on a narrow ambit of philosophical thinking considering any philosophical principle to be rational, consistent, universal, critical and verifiable. While these principles are normal and proper to philosophy in general, and to Western philosophy in particular, we should be aware that it is not all about philosophy in general and African philosophy in particular. Other schools of philosophy, like African philosophy, think a philosophical worldview must also recognize the role of human feelings, emotions and human faith. These are not anti-reason but supplementary to human reason. It is the absence of these dimensions of human philosophical knowledge that has narrowed and stifled Western philosophy. Such a narrow reading of philosophical principles would automatically exclude religious views and human feelings from consideration, thus narrowing the scope of philosophical thinking and subsequently, ethical principles. In Western philosophical thinking, humans are described in a very narrow and limiting way. To be human, in this philosophy, we must be individuals, rational, free, autonomous and self-propelling. This philosophical thinking limits other ways of understanding the human person. African philosophy, among other world philosophies, places emphasis on the social and ontological dimensions of human personhood. In this ontology, humans are connected to one another, to nature and to the spiritual world. This deeper metaphysical understanding of the human person renders better grounds to understand the type of bioethics that would be relevant to regulate biotechnology. Indeed, bioethics understood in the African sense would regulate biotechnology in a much better way, since it would not allow the biotechnologists to tamper, manipulate or engineer nature to the extent that can cause ecological and social disharmony. Lastly, the type of bioethics that is meaningful for Africa is that which can regulate biotechnological practices on realistic grounds. We are well aware that biotechnology does not only benefit humans and other living organisms but it also has the potential to cause damage to human life and to the life and the health of other living organisms. This can only happen when bioethics is centred on the value of the human person, who is not only an individual that is free, autonomous and self-propelling, but also socially connected to other human beings. Such bioethics does not take nature to be a mere mechanistic object of exploitation by man, but an

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entity that contains life, supports life and is the habitat for the life and health of all living organisms. Such bioethics will vivify life instead of undermining life in the universe. Recommendations My recommendations are basically two, one for other researchers, and the other for biotechnological practitioners. For other researchers, I think that it is time to do more work in the area of bioethics and biotechnology. In the context of global warming, nobody can claim to be anymore safe in this universe. The fact that global warming is caused by human activities is not disputed, but what is still highly disputed is what aspect of human activities is really more dangerous to the human environment. My conviction is that one of the impactful activities caused by humans is unregulated biotechnology. It is only human study on bioethics that can unveil this weakness and propose regulatory principles and measures to check the unbridled biotechnological activities. Secondly, scientists who are involved in biotechnological practices should exercise self-restrain, not to limit their knowledge, but to subject their scientific innovations to ethical regulations for the good of human life and the life and health of all living organisms. To appear novel is great, but to practice restrain for the good of the world and the life and health within the world is nobler.

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Schuster, J. (1972). Ethics. In W.  Brugger & K.  Baker (Eds.), Philosophical Dictionary (pp. 117–118). Spokane, Washington: Gonzaga University Press. Schuurman, E. (2011). Technology and Religion: Islam, Christianity and Materialism. KOERS, 76(2), 373–386. Tangwa, B. G. (1996). Bioethics: An African Perspective. Bioethics, 10(3), 185–200. Tangwa, B. G. (2004). Bioethics, Biotechnology and Culture: A Voice from the Margins. Developing World Bioethics, 4(2), 125–138. Tangwa, B. G. (2010). Elements of African Bioethics in a Western Frame. Mankon, Bamenda (Cameroon): Langaa Research & Publishing CIG. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). (2002). Key Issues in Biotechnology. New York and Geneva: United Nations Publications. Waller, N. B. (2005). Consider Ethics: Theory, Readings, and Contemporary Issues. New York: Pearson Longman.

CHAPTER 13

The Use of Sex Selection Reproductive Technology in Traditional African Societies: An Ethical Evaluation and a Case for Its Adaptation Samuel Awuah-Nyamekye and Joseph Oppong

Introduction Some studies have been carried out in Ghana with respect to Assisted Reproductive Technology (Anaeke 2015), but not in relation to indigenous Akan1 ethics. Some of them considered Assisted Reproductive Technology as an option for infertility in Ghana (Asante-Afari 2019). Furthermore, there has been a study that traces the origins and development of Invitro Fertilisation (IVF) in Ghana as a highly transnational undertaking (Gerrits 2016). However, their major findings on the  By ‘indigenous’ Akan we mean those Akan whose forebears founded settlements where they are found today and are prepared to follow the customs and traditions of their forebears. 1

S. Awuah-Nyamekye (*) • J. Oppong Department of Religion and Human Values, University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast, Ghana e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. D. Okyere-Manu (ed.), African Values, Ethics, and Technology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70550-3_13

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modern-day technologies on the Ghanaian society are different from this current study. Our research points out that the biggest challenge of Assisted Reproductive Technology is that it has made procreation impersonal and many children born out of this arrangement long for their missing parents, may feel bad about money changing hands as part of their conceptions and feel incomplete because they do not know one of their parents. This is known as Third-party reproduction (see Morse 2018). According to Morse (2018), third-party reproduction means the use of sperm or egg belonging to another person who will not be involved in the raising of the child. In her view then, infertile heterosexual couples, same-sex couples or individuals can achieve their ‘reproductive goals’ by using donor gametes. This process, she rightly asserts, “involves redefining parenthood and systematically separating the child from one of his/her parents” (Morse 2018: 242). However, for the indigenous Akan, procreation was not perceived as impersonal but rather personal and involving. Clearly, these modern reproductive technologies present a challenge to African ethical values and practices. Hence, the aim of this chapter is to provide a critical analysis of Assisted Reproductive Technology in an effort to find out the extent to which these technologies have played in the indigenous Akan milieu. In the ensuing sections we will interrogate the indigenous Akan ethics and as well find out if the Akan of Ghana’s view about procreation accepts or rejects the reproduction technologies that we find in our midst today. In speaking of assisted reproductive technologies, we are referring to the modern medical interventions that enable childless couples or persons to become parents. It separates reproduction from intercourse. By Akan Ethics, we mean the indigenous systems of rules or codes of behaviour or principles that are enshrined in the culture of the Akan. These codes of behaviour or principles are found in their customs, traditions, wise sayings, myths and taboo among the people. In doing that, our guiding principle will hinge on the people understudy’s religio-cultural life or worldview. And by worldview, we mean what Kraft defines as the set of culturally structured assumptions, values and commitments/allegiances underlying a people’s perception of reality and their responses to those perceptions (Kraft 1999: 20). Another explanation of worldview which we also find germane to the current discussion is the one Bauman et al. (2011) posited as “a set of basic assumptions through which one views reality, usually shared among members of a community and often heavily influenced by religion” (Bauman et al. 2011: 235).

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Materials and Methods Study Site The study was conducted in five (5) of the sixteen (16) regions in Ghana where the Akan are found: Bono, Bono-East, Ahafo, Ashanti and Central, within the period of six months (October 2019–March 2020) In this study, fifteen couples were interviewed. Among these were three who had given birth; five who were childless; three who had employed one or the other forms of the modern-day technology for childbirth and four who had adopted the traditional approach (the levirate, adding on an extra wife and adoption) to resolving infertility in their marriage.

Conceptual Framework The study is based on the interpretation of natural law from the perspective of biologism. Biologism is considered as a “way of interpreting the so-called natural law according to which the biological structure of the art of intercourse is assigned a special kind of oughtness” (Flynn 1997: 76). Those who tend to subscribe to biologism are of the conviction that there is a moral law in the way the art of intercourse is structured and this law (of nature) demands humans’ obedience so that humans ought not to procreate apart from the art of intercourse. Thus, this theory is against anything artificial that would interfere with the sexual relation between spouses. A proponent of this position is Leon Kass who is so critical of the reproductive technologies (Kass 1972). We believe that choosing biologism as a theory will be very appropriate and helpful in the study. There are other extreme views in favour of reproductive technologies that envision the rational control of nature as a great and major breakthrough by science. They indeed hail the new reproductive technology as a victory over the unpredictable aspect in human reproduction. One of such proponents is Joseph Fletcher (Fletcher 1974). There is still a third position that can be considered as a kind of a balance between the two extremes we have already presented. This view agrees with the first in that it also accepts reproduction achieved through sexual intercourse without technological assistance as natural and good. In addition, this third view supports the medical breakthrough, development and use of the new reproductive technologies and argues that they can be morally justifiable depending on the circumstances and other reasons

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offered. This position posits that it is very natural for humanity to fashion a culture in an attempt to overcome some of the limitation components of that culture (Callahan 1972).

Akan Religio-cultural Setting/Worldview We believe providing this background information is necessary in situating this study within its proper context. In other words, this background information will enable the reader to fully appreciate the influence of religion on the lives of the Akan in order to understand them as a people. The Akan by nature are religious just as other traditional Africans are (Parrinder 1961: 9; Mbiti 1969: 1), although this claim has been challenged by scholars such as Platvoet and Rinsum (2003). However, Platvoet and Rinsum’s claim has been discounted by Olabintam (2003). And again, anyone who is more familiar with the African will not doubt the religious nature of the African. This is the more reason why it is said that the line between the traditional/indigenous African and for that matter, the Akan secular and religious life is rarely distinguishable. Religion permeates all their activities, be they social, political, economic and other spheres of their lives. Religious rituals preceded marriage ceremonies and during the period of pregnancy. This is to ensure that the pregnancy is carried to term. Immediately after birth, rituals are performed to ensure the safety of the mother and the new-born baby. Even out-dooring and the naming of the new baby have religious undertones. All that the above implies in the life and thought of the Akan is that religion has a key role to play in procreation. This explains why the childless couples will seek religious interventions in their quest to resolve their plight. For the traditional/indigenous Akan, procreation is a virtue and it is one of the most cherished things in their life and thought. It is also believed to be a blessing from the Supreme Being, gods and the ancestors. This explains why abortion is not tolerated among the indigenous Akan. And more so, when there is any reason to suspect a marriage to be unfruitful all that is humanly and spiritually possible is done during the contraction and even after marriage to resolve the situation. This accounts for the use of prayer, libation and other rituals to make a marriage fruitful.

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Results From our discussion with our key informants, we deduced that marriage is a union between a man and a woman after the couples have gone through all the procedures recognised in the society for such a purpose. Or it is the union between a man and a woman who have agreed to stay as husband and wife. Marriage is also contracted according to the customs of the ethnic groups to which the couples belong or society in which they live. Marriage is a very important institution in Africa because through it, kinship is widened and the survival of the human race as a whole is kept alive. It is important to note that in traditional African societies, and for that matter, the Akan of Ghana, marriage is not limited to the two partners alone, but to the entire members of the two families involved. In fact, the Akan understanding of the institution of marriage can be perceived in the summary of Mbiti’s assertion (1969) on African marriage: For African peoples, marriage is the focus of existence … is a drama in which everyone becomes an actor or actress and not just a spectator. Therefore, marriage is a duty, a requirement from the corporate society, and a rhythm of life in which everyone must participate. Otherwise, he who does not participate in it is a curse to the community, he is a rebel and a law breaker. Failure to get married under normal circumstances means that the person concerned has rejected society and society rejects him in return. (Mbiti 1969: 133)

In our traditional societies because of the importance attached to the institution of marriage, elaborate preparations in the form of puberty rites are made before young people enter into it. During the puberty rites, the young are educated in matters of sex, marriage, procreation, family life and responsibilities of adulthood and other marriage related issues.

Main Reason for Marriage On the question as to whether in Akan traditional setting marriage confers on the spouse the right to have a child of their own, we received various responses. For instance, majority of our respondents were of the opinion that marriage in Akan society is for procreation first and foremost. They added that for them, marriage is more about procreation and not companionship as pertains in the western world (Sarpong 1974; Kunhiyop 2008;

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Mbiti 1969). Others particularly, who were in childless marriages were of the opinion that a childless marriage is an unfulfilled marriage; hence couples must go to every extent to ensure that their marriages are fulfilled by way of having children. In the words of a woman who has been in marriage for over six years without a child, “I sometimes have a feeling that I am under a curse or an attack from witches” (Personal Communication, January 20, 2020). For this reason, my husband and I have solicited assistance from many diviners but to no avail. We wanted to find out why she and her husband would not want to adopt a child. The husband gave a deep sigh and said awoo ne woyam (to wit, your child should be the product of your own groin). According to him, the obligation placed on your own biological child to cater for you during your old age is far greater than that of an adopted child.

Akan Traditional Ways of Resolving Childless Marriages In an attempt to find out how couples in traditional Akan society resolved the issue of childlessness in their marriages, the following were some of the responses we received. For some it was through adoption while others proposed a ‘levirate’ practice where an impotent man had his brother or relation come to his rescue by impregnating the wife on his behalf (this, however, was a secret arrangement). With regard to adoption, four of the couples interviewed intimated that they had to adopt from their immediate family to resolve the issue of childlessness in their marriages. This confirms the findings of Astuti’s study (1998). Some of the respondents also pointed to the practice of adding on a second (or third) wife. Again, Sarpong’s (1974) and Caldwell and Caldwell’s (1990) studies had similar findings. Furthermore, others pointed to the practice of consulting a spiritualist or medicine man/woman for a solution to their childless marriage. For example, one respondent said, “my husband and I had to consult a traditional priest in our village who helped us to make a baby of our own” (Personal Communication, February 7, 2020). According to some of our interviewees, the decision to resolving the issue of infertility is a mutual one taken by the couple. Two of our interviewees informed us that they and their spouses had to decide together when they realised that they were having an issue with procreation after five years of marriage. However, for many of our male interviewees, it is

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the sole responsibility of the man in the childless marriage to come up with the decision to addressing it. A few others also asserted that the decision would most likely come from the husband and friends of the couples in the childless marriage. One interviewee said, “the pressure from our family members and close friends was unbearable and so it pushed us into finding a solution to this pressing problem of childlessness by adopting a close relative’s child” (Personal Communication, October 17, 2019).

Interviewees’ Understanding of the Modern-Day Reproductive Technologies In our effort to find out our interviewees’ understanding of the modern-­ day reproductive technologies, some pointed out that they were medical procedures that actually separated procreation from intercourse. One interviewee said, “it is the modern-day approach to resolving the issue of childlessness through human intervention.” (Personal Communication, October 24, 2019) Another interviewee explained that “it was a medical way of manipulating eggs and sperms to achieve pregnancy outside the womb” (Personal Communication, November 13, 2019). A few did not have any idea of the modern-day reproductive technologies.

Respondents’ Preference of Modern-Day ARTs In our bid to find out our interviewees’ preference of modern-day ARTs in the event where they were confronted with infertility in marriages, one of them preferred Artificial Insemination because it is the most popular and the success rate is very high (Personal Communication, December 9, 2019). This respondent said, “my wife and I had a child through this procedure a few years ago and I consider it to be the most popular among all the modern-day ARTs and the success rate is very high” (Personal Communication, January 15, 2020). One other respondent settled on In vitro Fertilisation. Three couples appeared not to have had any idea about the modern-day Assisted Reproductive Technologies. Ten other couples we interviewed would not settle on any of them because they were of the view that it makes procreation impersonal and that there were some elements of the technologies that were irreconcilable with Akan ethics and morality. On reminding our interviewees that adoption also has this impersonal element, they claimed that even though traditional adoption and the

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levirate practice had some impersonal undertones as well, at least as it is practised in the Akan setting, the couples know the parentage of the child who is being adopted or the man who is engaged to resolve the issue of childlessness in the marriage.

Elements in Modern-Day Reproductive Technologies Irreconcilable with Akan Ethics As a follow-up question to the assertion that some elements of modern-­ day ARTs are irreconcilable with Akan ethics, we wanted to find out the responses of our interviewees. One interviewee stated that “a medical procedure where a donor’s sperm or egg is used makes procreation very impersonal and the child to be born out of this procedure may be considered as an ‘outsider’ and not a full member of the family” (Personal Communication, October 15, 2019). Another interviewee averred that “the modern-day ARTs gives room for the unmarried to have children and this has no place in Akan ethics” (Personal Communication, November 24, 2019). Yet, another posited that, “this modern-day technology separated sex from procreation and this was incompatible with Akan ethics” (Personal Communication, February 4, 2020). What was generally confirmed by all our key informants was that a human person or every person is composed of four interconnected elements, all of which must work in tandem to ensure peace and wellbeing in the individual. These are okra (soul) from the Supreme Being, sunsum (spirit), nton or ntoro (father-­ spirit) the two are derived from one’s father and mogya (blood) from one’s mother. Therefore, modern-day technology such as artificial insemination by donor distorts this strong belief of who a person is in the Akan worldview. The Akan say agya sunsum kata ne mma so, which literally means a child is protected by his or her father’s spirit. So, if a woman undergoes artificial insemination by donor this spiritual bond between the husband and the child (ren) is removed.

Discussion The interviewees demonstrated clearly that from the Akan perspective, marriage was basically an institution that was established to bring about procreation. This implies that in indigenous Akan society, marriage and child birth are inseparable.

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This is quite evident from their submission on the Akan understanding of marriage. Fecundity or procreation is very paramount in marriage. Their position is supported by the works of scholars like Samuel Kunhiyop (2008), Sarpong (1974) and Mbiti (1969). These scholars affirm the fact that marriage from the African perspective and by extension the Akan society is basically an institution that is established first and foremost to bring about procreation is supported by their religion and religion has a huge influence on their worldview or culture. It is for this reason that some scholars have argued that Africans, and the Akan for that matter, have a religious culture. This is in contrast to the understanding of marriage as we have it from the western world (Kunhiyop 2008), where marriage is seen to provide companionship and not essentially to take care of procreation. It is for this reason that an Akan couple will go to every length to resolve the issue of childlessness in their marriage since the institution of marriage hinges on procreation. We dare point out that childlessness brings about stigmatisation, abuses, frustration, discrimination and psychological problems in the Akan society and by extension the modern-­ day Ghanaian society. It is therefore understandable as our interviewees indicated in their responses the extent to which the childless Akan couple would go to resolve the issue of childlessness. They employed traditional adoption, a ‘levirate’ practice and consultations of traditional medicine men/women or spiritualists to help them overcome their childlessness. As researchers, we can infer from the responses of our respondents that where the childless couple employed the ‘levirate’ practice, it was a foregone conclusion that the man was the problem in the sense that he was impotent, or had a low sperm count so they had to employ a male figure outside the marriage to have the problem resolved. We would want to believe that in situations where they went for another woman, it could be deduced that the woman in the marriage was the problem, hence the need to get a new woman to procreate. This leads to polygamy and this is corroborated by Sarpong (1974). In resolving the issue of childlessness, the couple finds joy, satisfaction and acceptance by the larger society in which they live. Having family members and close friends offer support to the childless couple points to the fact that as Mbiti asserts, “at the heart of the attempt to resolving the issue of infertility in marriages was the understanding that any discussion of the sexual, reproductive and relational ethics of African marriage must take the entire family or community into account.” (Mbiti 1969: 133). Thus, for the indigenous Akan, procreation was not perceived as impersonal and a personal problem for the couple involved in the

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marriage but a communal problem and thus the family gets interested in finding a panacea to the situation. Compassion, sympathy and care for the plight of the childless couple were the motivating factors that underlined the secret arrangement that childless couple enter into and not money as we see it playing out with the medical interventions in the form of assisted reproductive technologies. We dare to say that majority of our interviewees had good knowledge of the modern-day ARTs and were even able to give us their own choices when it came to preferences. Only a few did not have a good knowledge of modern-day ARTs. It is important to point out that majority of our respondents would not consider them as a way of resolving childlessness in their marriages. They pointed to the fact that some of the elements in the medical procedures are irreconcilable with Akan ethics and morality and also they separated sex from procreation. This collaborates research findings of scholars such as Shannon (2004), Cahill (1990) and Asante-­ Afari (2019). We cannot overlook the fact that Artificial Insemination of the donor gives rise to an accumulating deceit upon society both in the registration of birth records and in relationships (Dunstan 1973). This fact affirms what our respondents pointed out to since it borders on truthfulness and credibility which are cherished values in Akan ethics (Ackah 1988; Sarpong 1974). A critical analysis of this technology reveals that truth is violated, credibility is undermined and this, in fact, is a serious ethical issue that cannot be overlooked. Furthermore, since Artificial Insemination of the donor involves the introduction of the third-party gamete, the practice undermines the concept of family and could have negative psychological effects on the man or the potential child. This supports the objection that most of our respondents had for the ARTs. Akan ethics considers the family as the close-knit entity; therefore, it would be very difficult for the traditional Akan to welcome and endorse a child whose parentage is not one that is acknowledged by the norms of the wider society. Some of the technologies like artificial insemination by the donor (AID) make reproduction an impersonal affair and this is irreconcilable with Akan ethics. This, in a way affirms or gives credence to the ‘awoo ne woyam’ belief expressed by many of our interlocutors (to wit, your child should be the product of your own groin). Another important reason why many indigenous Akan do not accept modern reproduction system is their strong belief that it is the father’s spirit that protects his children so

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adopting or accepting another man’s sperms (Artificial Insemination) separates the man and the so-called child(ren) spiritually. Again, parents are immortalised in their children so child birth is something that is crucial and paramount in traditional Akan religio-cultural view.

Conclusion Our study was to analyse how assisted reproductive technologies have played out in the indigenous Akan milieu. Even though the modern medical procedures do assist infertile couples and single persons to have their dreams of having children been fulfilled in the Akan traditional setting, because of their religio-cultural context, they tend not to embrace the medical breakthrough as a panacea to childlessness. They perceive procreation as personal and involving. They tend to reject assisted reproductive technologies because the procedures are irreconcilable with some elements of Akan ethics.

References Ackah, C. A. (1988). Akan Ethics. Accra: Ghana Universities Press. Anaeke, O.  I. (2015). Assisted Reproductive Technologies in Ghana: An Ethical Appraisal. An Mphil thesis submitted to the Department of Religion and Human Values, UCC. Asante-Afari, K. (2019). Acceptability and Experiences with Assisted Reproductive Technology in Ghana. A Doctoral thesis submitted to the Department of Population and Health, University of Cape Coast. Astuti, R. (1998). “Cattle Beget Children”—But Women must Bear Them. Fertility, Sterility and Belonging among Women in Swaziland. In H. J. Tieleman, Scenes of Change: Visions on Developments in Swaziland. Paper presented at the Seminar ‘Social Sciences in Swaziland’ Free University Amsterdam, February 1986. The Netherlands: African Study Centre. Bauman, W.  A., Bohannon, R.  R., II, & O’Brien, K.  J. (2011). Grounding Religion: A Field Guide to the Study of Religion and Ecology. London and New York: Routledge. Cahill, L. S. (1990). What is the ‘Nature’ of the Unity of Sex, Love and Procreation? In E.  Pellegrino et  al. (Eds.), Gift of Life: Catholic Scholars Respond to the Vatican Instruction (pp. 137–148). Georgetown: University Press. Caldwell, J. C., & Caldwell, P. (1990). Cultural Forces Tending to Sustain High Fertility. In G. Ascadi, G. Johnson-Ascardi, & R. Bulutao (Eds.), Population

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Growth and Reproduction in Sub-Saharan Africa: Technical Analysis of Fertility and its Consequences (pp. 199–214). Washington, DC: The World Bank. Callahan, D. (1972). New Beginnings in Life: A Philosopher’s Response. In M. Hamilton (Ed.), The New Genetics and the Future of Man. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. Dunstan, G. R. (1973). Moral and Social Issues Arising from Artificial Insemination of the Donor. Law and Ethics of Artificial Insemination of the Donor and Embryo Transfer. Ciba Foundation Symposium 17 (New Series). New  York: Associated Scientific Publishers. Fletcher, J. (1974). The Ethics of Genetic Control: Ending Reproductive Roulette. Garden, NY: Anchor Press. Flynn, E. P. (1997). Issues in Medical Ethics. Kansas City: Sheed & Ward. Gerrits, T. (2016). Artificial Reproductive Technologies in Ghana: Transnational Undertakings, Local Practices and ‘More Affordable’ IVF. Reproductive Biomedical and Society, 2, 32–38. Kass, L.  R. (1972). Making Babies—The New Biology and the ‘Old Morality’. Public Interest, 26, 18–56. Kraft, C. H. (1999). Culture, Worldview and Contextualisation. In R. D. Winter & S. C. Hawthorne (Eds.), Perspectives on the World Christian Movement (3rd ed., pp. 384–391). Pasadena: William Carey Library. Kunhiyop, S. (2008). African Christian Ethics. Grand Rapids: Zondervan. Mbiti, J. (1969). African Religions and Philosophy. London: Heinemann. Morse, J. R. (2018). The Sexual State: How Elite Ideologies are Destroying Lives and Why the Church was Right All Along. Charlotte, NC: Tan Books. Olabintam, K. (2003). Is Africa Incurably Religious? II: A Response to Jan Platvoet and Henk van Rinsum. Exchange, 32(4), 322–339. Parrinder, E. G. (1961). West African Religions: A Study of the Beliefs and Practices of Akan, Ewe, Yoruba, Ibo and Kindred Peoples. London: The Epworth Press. Platvoet, J., & Rinsum, H. v. (2003). Is Africa Incurably Religious? Confessing and Contesting an Invention. Exchange, 32(2), 123–153. Sarpong, P. (1974). Ghana in Retrospect. Tema, Ghana: Ghana Publishing Cooperation. Shannon, T. A. (2004). Reproductive Technologies: Ethical and Religious Issues. In T.  A. Shannon (Ed.), Reproductive Technologies. New  York: Rowman & Littlefield. Walters, L. (1997). Reproductive Technologies and Genetics. In R.  M. Veatch (Ed.), Medical Ethics (pp. 209–238). Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett Publishers.

CHAPTER 14

Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Indigenous Akan Ethics: A critical Analysis Stephen Nkansah Morgan

Introduction Sex selection reproductive technologies allow parents to choose the preferred sex of their children before they are born without leaving that decision to chance. Giving this possibility, how does it impact on traditional African cultures known to be mostly patriarchal and with a strong preference for male children? How can these indigenous societies ensure that the use of these technologies does not lead to an increase in gender stereotype, gender discrimination, female feticide and further entrench patriarchy? Thus, through a critical evaluation of existing literature, the paper attempts an ethico-cultural discussion of these questions and makes a case for restrictive use of sex selection technology in African societies. There is a dearth of literature dealing with the use of technology in prenatal sex selection of a child in sub-Saharan Africa. This may be because such technologies are not common or widespread on the continent even

S. N. Morgan (*) Department of Philosophy and Classics, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. D. Okyere-Manu (ed.), African Values, Ethics, and Technology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70550-3_14

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though there is some evidence that many African families often attempt to influence their chances in conceiving a child with their preferred sex. Globally, a couple’s chances of conceiving a child with either of the two sexes are around 50%; typically, 102–106 boys are born for every 100 girls (The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 2003). Thus, without postnatal sex selection, slightly more boys are born than girls (Ritchie and Roser 2019; Population Reference Bureau 2013). However, sub-­ Saharan Africa presents a slight variation; Amadu Jacky Kaba reports that black women or women of sub-Saharan Black African descent tend to give birth to more females than males (Kaba 2008). This is against the backdrop of the existence of a high degree of son preference in most traditional African communities (Mudau and Obadire 2017; Milazzo 2014; Sternke 2010). However, even though there are reports that son preference often fuels sex-selective abortion or infanticide of female foetuses in some parts of rural China, India and other Asian countries (Whittaker 2011), there is little evidence to suggest that traditional African women resorted to sex-­ selective abortion or infanticide of foetus. The evidence, instead, tends to suggest that human life is highly valued in traditional African societies hence, abortion of any kind is frowned upon except in situations where the life of the woman is at risk or in those situations where the pregnancy could lead to extreme shame and suffering for the woman involved (Ogar et al. 2016; Bleek 1990). Rather than resorting to abortion or infanticide, most men in traditional African societies resort to polygyny when they are unable to have a male child with their wife (Ampofo 2004). Given this evidence, the chapter argues that modern sex selection technologies are more likely to be culturally acceptable to traditional African families and could be a tool that reduces some of the gender inequalities and social burdens suffered by traditional African women. Before dealing with the main arguments of the chapter, I will first do a brief presentation of some traditional methods of sex selection in history and across the world then look at some of the modern techniques of sex selection. This will be followed by a discussion of the ethics of sex selection where I will deal with some of the arguments made in support and against the use of sex selection technology. It is important to mention that by sex selection technology, I exclude post-pregnancy techniques, such as the use of prenatal screening through ultrasound, amniocentesis or chorionic villi sampling, which lead to selective abortion or infanticide. These are mostly considered unethical if not done for medical purposes (Whittaker 2011). Instead, by sex selection

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technology, I will be referring to modern techniques of sex selection such as Sperm Sorting and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis PGD, which is accompanied by In Vitro Fertilization (IVF). These modern techniques are not associated with abortion or infanticide. They are arguably more ethically acceptable albeit they have their own ethical conundrums, some of which will be mentioned in due course. I also use the terms sex and gender interchangeably to mean the same thing.

The Technology of Sex Selection The strong preference for children of a particular sex has been with us since antiquity. Historically, there have been many theories on how the male and female sex are determined, and many methods have been employed in a bid to attain these sex preferences. The concept of sex determination was controversial even among the ancient Greek philosophers. The pre-Socratic philosopher, Parmenides, for example, thought that the sex of a child was conditioned on the baby’s position while in the womb. Thus, the baby will turn out a male if it positions itself on the right side of the womb but female if it is on the left (Stévant et  al. 2018; Mittwoch 2005; Jones 1992). Anaxagoras concluded that it was the man who determined the sex of the child, but also argued that sperms from the man’s right testicle produced male children while sperms from the left testicle produced female children (Stévant et al. 2018). It is said that this belief led to men tying off their left testicle before they copulated. Others will go as far as getting their left testicles removed to increase their chances of conceiving a male child (Jones 1992). Aristotle, who disagreed with the left-right position hypotheses, was of the view that men were highly responsible for determining the sex of a child. He argued that the sex of child could be as a result of the velocity or robustness of the sexual intercourse. (Jones 1992.) Inductively, it will mean that more robustness and vigour in one sexual performance will lead to a male child while the less robustness will result in a female child. He also believed that facing north during sexual intercourse would result in the conception of a high number of males (Bennett 1983). With reference from the book of Leviticus in the bible, some Jewish scholars also taught that pre-sex selection of a child was possible through the proper timing of orgasm during copulation. Thus, they held that one is likely to get a male child if the woman reaches orgasm first and a female child if the man should reach orgasm first. Meanwhile, if both couples

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attain orgasm simultaneously, then they will produce twins. Furthermore, there was and perhaps still is a widely held conception that the kind of food eaten by the woman before copulation and during her period of conception can help determine the sex of the child (Jones 1992). Traditional biological methods for preselecting a child’s sex across the globe can be as varied as they are obscure. Jones (1992) further reports of some symbolic methods for preselecting sex that includes the hanging of the man’s trousers on the appropriate bedpost during copulation in some part of Pennsylvania in the United States of America. There is also the belief in the Spessart Mountains of Germany that a man should take an axe to bed when copulating with a woman while singing a specific song. An odder belief noted by Jones is the view that raping one’s wife increases the likelihood of having a male child since it is a show of manliness.

Modern Improved Natural Techniques Over time, there have been some improved natural methods that mostly rely on applying physiological knowledge in the preselection of a couple’s preferred gender. These methods include the Shettles Method (1960), Whelan Method (1977) and the Billings Method. These three methods require accurate tracking of the ovulation cycle of the woman to know when conditions are most favourable to receive sperms that will augment the survival chances of either the X-sperms or Y-sperms depending on which one is the desired outcome. There is also the “preconception dietary interventions method”, which is based on the conception that certain types of food can influence a woman’s reproductive tract’s pH, thus making it more conducive for either the X-sperms or the Y-sperms to thrive depending on the desired sex of the child (Rai et al. 2018). As a result, to conceive a girl, Rai et al. further note that the woman is encouraged to consume more of foods rich in calcium and magnesium but low in potassium. In the case of a boy, the woman is recommended to eat foods rich in sodium, potassium and protein. Other modern natural methods include ‘Smart Stork’, which combines multiple factors and approaches, including the tracking of the woman’s menstrual cycle and the use of the recommended diet. There is also ‘GenSelect’, a method that uses a kit that helps the woman to measure her physiology, including her ovulation cycle, making the timing of copulation more accurate. This method makes use of diet recommendations as well. Apart from these methods, others resort to

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the use of local or indigenous herbal medicines to help in their preselection of their children.

Modern Scientific Techniques The focus of the chapter is on the use of modern scientific technology in prenatal sex selection. Modern sex selection technologies involve the scientific engineering of the semen in a laboratory to make modifications in the seminal fluid to make it more enriched in X-sperms or Y-sperms depending on the preferred sex of a child (Rai et  al. 2018). These sex selection reproductive technologies became more accessible in the early 90s (Kudina 2019). It is important to note that there are medical and non-medical (social) reasons for the use of sex selection technologies. Rai et al. (2018) note that sex selection technology was mainly envisaged to deal with genetically linked diseases. However, these days, social reasons for gender sex selection have taken over. The ethical issues in the medical use of sex selection technologies are not as controversial as their non-­ medical uses as only few will consider the attempt by a parent to prevent the transfer of certain genetic diseases linked to specific sex to their children as ethically unjustified. It has been noted that there are a number of identified genetic diseases such as haemophilia and Duchenne muscular dystrophy that affect only males (The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 2003) Thus, for families that have a history of such diseases, using sex selection technology to choose the sex with the minimum chance of being affected is generally considered justified. It is the non-medical or social use for sex selection technologies that may prove to be ethically controversial. The non-medical reasons for carrying out sex selection may include family balancing, that is, to have a family that has children of both sexes; to restore a family after the demise of a child with another child of the same sex; to satisfy a general preference for children of one sex over another, among others (The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 2003). Modern sex selection techniques available include Sperm Sorting and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD).

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Sperm Sorting It has been scientifically shown that the male sperm bears either an X chromosome or a Y chromosome while the female eggs carry only an X chromosome. Consequently, a female child is conceived when an X-bearing sperm fertilizes the egg, and a male child is conceived when a Y-bearing sperm fertilizes the egg. Based on this, the science of sperm sorting is to make it possible for the semen to contain a higher quantity of either X or Y-bearing sperm to augment the odds of bearing a child of one’s preferred sex (The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 2003). There are two main methods in the sperm sorting technique, namely Ericsson and MicroSort methods (Kudina 2019; The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 2003). In the Ericsson Method (1970), sperms are allowed to swim through a protein of serum albumin. The sperms are then separated or selected based on their swimming ability or their mass or density factor (Kudina 2019; Rai et al. 2018; The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 2003). The MicroSort Method (1995) works by introducing sperms to a fluorescent dye. The spermatozoa are passed through a flow cytometer which binds to chromosomal DNA. Sperm sorting or selection is then made possible based on cell fluorescence or brightness. The X-bearing sperms glow more brightly than the Y-bearing sperms. This method is known to be very useful for selecting girls (Rai et al. 2018; Kalfoglou et al. 2013; Sternke 2010; The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 2003). Sperm sorting technique on its own does not lead directly to pregnancy. The sorted sperm must go through accompanying procedures of intrauterine insemination, in  vitro fertilization (IVF), intracytoplasmic sperm injection or self-insemination before pregnancy can be expected (Kudina 2019; Sternke 2010).

Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) PGD was mainly made to help patients who were considered to be at risk of bearing children with severe hereditary or genetic conditions such as Haemophilia (Liao 2005). PGD requires the extraction of one or two cells from an embryo once the embryo develops eights cells, which often happens on the third day of fertilization. The extracted cell is then analysed to see if it has the required genetic characteristics (Kudina 2019; Whittaker 2011). In the case of sex selection, Liao (2005: 116) gives us the process

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as follows: first, the woman is given medicine (gonadotropins) for her to superovulate, that is, produce many eggs. As determined by ultrasound scans, the woman’s eggs are collected once they are mature. The eggs are then fertilized in the in vitro fertilization lab. There is wait for the healthy embryos to split and create eight different cell embryos, which is often at day three. A biopsy is conducted on these eight embryos to establish their sex and in some cases, if there associated genetic diseases. Next, when the embryo considered healthy and with the preferred sex is identified and separated, it is then moved into the uterus of the woman. Meanwhile, the remaining embryos are typically thrown out. Although PGD is very popular, probably because it offers an upper selection efficacy than sperm sorting, it is also very costly (Kudina 2019; Rai et al. 2018).

The Ethics of Sex Selection Technology The use of any technology to further human needs or make human life better is not ethically neutral. This is mostly because although most technologies are made with the good of humanity in mind, they tend to be abused by their human users for their selfish gains. The use of sex selection technologies is crucial because it has the potential to sway what may be considered ‘the natural order’ of sex at birth. If left unchecked, sex selection technologies have the propensity to produce a gender-biased sex ratio in the world population, which may have some adverse effects for the human population. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, there is no denying the tremendous positive impact technology has had and continues to have on the lives of its people and their everyday ways of life. However, although I argue in this paper for the use of sex selection technology in sub-Saharan Africa, unregulated use of sex selection technology can entrench an already existing detrimental cultural practice given the fact that traditional Africa is known for being patriarchal and the existence of the son-preference phenomenon in some places. Generally speaking, most people who advocate for sex selection technology do so on the basis that its use can lead to what is known as family balancing, a practice by which (married heterosexual) couples try to increase the probability of having an additional child of a gender less represented among their current children. Whittaker (2011) refers to it as “gender variety” and notes that those who subscribe to the accessibility of sex selection technologies argue that since family balancing is the aim of most parents rather than the superiority of one sex, family balancing

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should not be viewed as discrimination. Her claim might hold for the West but may not entirely be the case for traditional sub-Saharan African societies where the phenomenon of son preference is quite high and still exists in many places. In this situation, unregulated use of sex selection technologies has a high potential of leading to gender preference for boys. While family balancing may be considered a good reason for the acceptability of sex selection technologies, those who are against its adaptation for social purposes do so based on what I call induced population unbalancing, which can be described as an ‘unnatural’ shift in the gender-­ balance of the world population caused by an over preference for children of a particular gender. Rai et al. (2018) point to a 2013 survey in Germany that indicates that 25% of reproductive medicine specialists fear that preimplantation sex selection could lead to a likely change in the current sex ratio. Looking at the patriarchal nature of many global societies, it is feared that sex selection may create a global population where there is a shortage of women. As things stand, there is enough empirical data from countries with strong son preference such as India, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey and China, to indicate that the non-medical use of sex selection favours the male gender the more (Whittaker 2011). The fear is that the introduction of sex selection technology can make the ability to discriminate against girls worse than it already is, especially if effective measures have not been put in place to address the structured and systematic gender bias existing against women, and the preference for boys. To this, Whittaker (2011) notes that: The harms caused by practices of gender discrimination form the basis of ethical argument against non-medical sex selection in all forms. The practice of selecting embryos on the basis of sex alone (whether this is prior to or during pregnancy) is sexist and discriminatory, with the potential to cause social harm. For this reason, it is justified to restrict reproductive autonomy and liberties in this case. (Whittaker, 201: 611)

As can be seen from this quote, the fear that sex selection technologies can fortify an already existing gender discrimination remains a crucial point used to reject sex selection technologies. However, it is my goal in this chapter to show that regulated use of sex selection technology will, instead, help to deal with gender-based discrimination, especially in traditional African societies.

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Another argument in favour of sex selection technologies is the position that these technologies can help avoid post-pregnancy sex-selective abortion, including infanticide, in a situation where a couple or woman does not give birth to the desired sex (Puri and Nachtigall 2010). Sex selection technologies take away the moral guilt of having to resort to abortion and infanticide since they have very little chance of error in terms of getting a child of one’s desired sex. This notwithstanding, there are attempts to link sex selection technology techniques to some of the ethical challenges in the abortion debate, particularly with the practice of discarding unused embryos in the PGD procedure (Elenberg and Howe III 2019). It is also argued that couples relate better with children of their desired sex and that not getting a child with their preferred sex often leads to a long-term frustration on the part of the parents, which they may eventually pass on to the child in terms of care and the parent-child relationship. Thus, the argument is that couples who get their desired child are typically more inclined to offer proper care and provisions for the child. While sex selection technologies are argued, on the positive side, to offer parents their preferred choice in terms of the sex of a child, the critics fear that allowing people to predetermine their child’s sex is “playing God” (Kalfoglou et al. 2013). The fear is that allowing this to happen may be giving humans too much power, and make humans initiators of something of which there is no predicting how far it will take us, especially with the emerging practice of designer babies and eugenics (Kudina 2019). This fear, as I see it, is a genuine expression of concern for some of the dire ethical implications of the practice of unregulated use of technology in reproductive science, hence the need for a well-regulated use. The use of sex selection techniques has also been described by many as sexist, discriminatory, and an infringement of human rights, with the possibility of bringing harm to society. At the same time, others argue that denying women the use of these technologies is an unjustifiable restriction of their reproductive autonomy and liberties when they should be given the choice and power of the use of their bodies. To this, Kudina (2019) notes that those who argue for the use of sex selection technologies posit that women ought to have the freedom in making reproductive choices devoid of government interference to the degree that these choices do not limit the freedoms of others. There are also those whose concern with sex selection technologies has to do with the excessive physical burden and the medical risk they pose to the health of women (Whittaker 2011).

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Patriarchy and Male-Child Preference in Africa Whereas in the West, the issue of whether or not sex selection for non-­ medical purposes should be permitted hinges primarily on women’s reproductive rights, choices and their autonomy over their bodies (see, e.g. Kudina 2019 and Puri and Nachtigall 2010), these reasons will not be sufficient reasons to make a case for the non-medical use of sex selection technologies in Africa. In Africa, talks on rights and individuality come in second place to the respect and attainment of communitarian cultural values. As already mentioned, the desire to choose the sex of one’s child has been with us since primordial times and possibly in almost all cultures (Balen 2006). Nevertheless, the manifestation of and passion for this desire are highly culturally motivated when it comes to sub-Saharan Africa. Although the place and power of women in Western societies have been enhanced extensively over the last century (Balen 2006), the same cannot be entirely said of sub-Saharan African societies where we continue to witness the abuse and subjugation of women and a disregard for their rights. Sub-Saharan Africa is mostly known to be predominantly patriarchal (Shoola 2014), and it is its patriarchal nature that contributes to the subjugation of women. Mudau and Obadire (2017) discovered that because of patriarchy, many South African women are controlled in many aspects of their life, including their reproductive choices process, which includes the decision on the number of children they want to have (See also Ampofo 2004). Men, thus, largely determined the family size. Ampofo (2004) also hints that among patrilineal groups, such as the Ewe of Ghana, for instance, “the sexual and procreative services” of the wife are offered to her husband in exchange for care and upkeep. In sub-Saharan Africa in particular, the preference for sons and its associated prejudice against the girls and women, in general, are common. The preference for sons places tremendous pressure on the women whom, even though, from the medical point of view, are not the determinant of the sex of the child, bear most of the blame, guilt and humiliation for not bearing a male child. It is commonly presumed that gender preferences are associated with the kind of cultural values concerning men and women’s social positions and roles. The patriarchal nature of traditional African societies places a higher social value on men than women. The preference for sons in traditional African societies is motivated by many culturally induced reasons. One of these reasons has to do with the long-held view that male children are needed for the continuation of the

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family or clan’s lineage or family name (Amoo et  al. 2019; Mudau and Obadire 2017). The male child after marriage transfers his family name to the children but the girl does not. Similarly, more boys mean more hands to help on the farms and increase the labour force (Amoo et al. 2019). Furthermore, Rossi and Rouanet (2015) report that one key drive for gender or sex preferences is the traditional structure of family systems. They note that because men are the focal points in the traditional social order, often too much investment in daughters is regarded as an investment in someone’s family’s daughters-in-law. More so, Rossi and Rouanet (2015) identified that while parents consider male children as insurance against old age because they are the ones who stay in the family’s house when daughters are married off into other families, mothers, especially, yearn for a son because their status in the community gets boosted significantly when their sons get married. Often, if a woman fails to get a son for the husband, the husband is made to divorce her or marry a second wife. A third wife will come in should the second one also fails (Mudau and Obadire 2017; Ampofo 2004). As reiterated by Ruth Mace and Rebecca Sear, “the probability that a man takes a second wife is strongly, negatively correlated with the number of children, particularly sons, that his first wife had” (Mace and Sear 1997: 500). Thus, this can be taken as evidence that men wish to continue to reproduce until they have at least one son. Mace and Sear further state that the decision to remarry is solely decided by the man, and often leaves the women quite unhappy. Eventually, the wife who can bear the man a son will become the favourite and receive all the social praise, and this is regardless of the number of daughters the other wives may have. Relatedly, Ruth Mace and Rebecca Sear (Mace and Sear 1997) report that in some parts of Africa, the birth interval for women with no son was quite shorter than for those with at least one son, thus underscoring the male-child preference of many traditional African men.

A Case for Regulated Use of Sex Selection Technology in Africa My argument for a regulated use of sex selection technologies in Africa is premised predominantly on what has been exposed in the previous section. The preference for sons can be seen as the catalyst that drives polygyny relationships in patriarchal sub-Saharan African communities, a

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relationship which, as Mace and Sear (1997) note, does not make the women happy. Thus, with the availability of these sex selection technologies, African couples who are unable to bear male children can resort to their use to attain their heart’s desire whether for self-fulfilment or as a fulfilment of a family or cultural obligation. This should not be taken as an argument against the tradition of polygyny but what this means is that men will not be forced into polygyny just because their wives have failed to give them a male child who is regarded as a continuity of the family lineage or heir to a kingdom. This proposal is within the purview of what was referred to earlier on as family balancing or gender variety. To regulate the use of sex selection technologies, I argue that the technologies should be made available only to those who want or need to have a balanced family and not be used as a basis of discrimination against female children. By a balanced family, I am implying a family with at least one child of each gender. What this means is that before a couple is permitted to use sex selection technologies as an option, they ought to prove that previous attempts at having children the natural way have produced only children of one gender. This will guard against any gender-discriminatory use of the sex selection technologies and in the process avoid all the fears sceptics have concerning what I have called an ‘induced population unbalancing’, which is an ‘unnatural’ shift in the gender-balance of the world population. Léonie McSweeney (2011) had observed that due to the existence of son preference, families of all-female children are more inclined to have several more children than they would have had otherwise, all in the attempt to have a male child. McSweeney further observed that in many cases, couples’ inability to have a male child leads to disruption of the family and extramarital affairs that may lead to HIV infections. She also observed that the inability to bear a male child was the leading contributor to divorce (see also Milazzo 2014). These are matters of common knowledge which show the extent to which son preference can influence the traditional family structure. However, with the acceptance of the use of sex selection technologies, one can see how these problems can be addressed or reduced to the very minimum. Couples with all-female children can use the technologies to get at least one male child, which will mean they will not have to have more children than they may ordinarily want to. It does not mean extramarital affairs or divorces will be eliminated entirely with the introduction of these technologies, but it means that a woman’s inability to bear a male child will no longer be the reason for these affairs or divorces should they happen. Thus, I have reasons to

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believe that sex selection technologies can at least reduce the frequencies of extramarital affairs and divorces especially when dealing with traditional sub-Saharan African communities, which believe in the sacrosanctity of the marriage institution. That is to say, once the two leading causes of divorce in these traditional communities, that is, extramarital affairs and the inability to bear a male child, are eliminated through the acceptance of the use of sex selection technologies, we can predict a more stable marriage institution. Related to the above, it has been observed that son preference affects the fertility behaviour of women with adverse outcomes to women and children’s health and well-being. Rossi and Rouanet (2015) observe that couples often are inclined to reduce birth spacing as long as they have not had a male child. They consider this to have strong implications for gender inequality since, on the average, girls would be weaned earlier than boys. In addition, they observed that the pressure on women to bear a male child pushes them to put their lives at risk to guarantee that enough sons are born to their husbands. Resultantly, the introduction of sex selection technologies can help lessen these social pressures on women to produce male children. It can also improve women’s reproductive health and afford the mothers latitude to practise proper birth spacing, hence offering more reproductive freedom.

Conclusion My preoccupation in this chapter has been to argue for regulated or controlled non-medical use of sex selected technologies in sub-Saharan African communities. I have argued that the acceptance of these technologies can help deal with many reproductive health hazards faced by women in African communities and lessen the social burdens placed on them by cultural and social structures fuelled by the prevalence of son preference that is ultimately driven by the patriarchal attitudes of these African communities. My case for regulated use of sex selection technologies concurs with the position of Whittaker who asserts that “given the widespread understanding of the pervasive and detrimental effects of gender stereotyping recognized by world bodies and their definitions of sex selection as socially harmful, it seems that a limitation upon liberty is justifiable and consistent with human-rights principles” (Whittaker 2011: 611). In addition, and in the context of traditional African communities, regulated use of sex selection technologies will not only enhance the liberties of women

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but also preserve the traditional family system and the sacrosanctity of the traditional marriage institution.

References Amoo, E.  O., Olawole-Isaac, A., Ajayi, M.  P., Adekeye, O., Ogundipe, O., Olawande, O., & Ogundipe, A. (2019). Are There Traditional Practices That Affect Men’s Reproductive Health in Sub-Saharan Africa? A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis Approach. Cogent Social Sciences, 5(1), 1–17. Ampofo, A. A. (2004). Whose ‘Unmet Need’? Dis/Agreement About Childbearing Among Ghanaian Couples. In S. Signe Arnfred (Ed.), Re-Thinking Sexualities in Africa (pp. 115–134). Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksell Tryckeri AB. Balen, F.  V. (2006). Attitudes Towards Sex Selection in the Western World. Prenatal Diagnosis, 26, 614–618. Bennett, N. G. (1983). Sex Selection of Children: An Overview. In N. G. Bennett (Ed.), Sex Selection of Children (pp. 1–10). New York: Academic Press. Bleek, W. (1990). Did the Akan Resort to Abortion in Pre-Colonial Ghana? Some Conjectures. Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 60(1), 121–131. Elenberg, F., & Howe, E. G., III. (2019). The Possible Dangers of Prenatal Non-­ medical Sex Selection in Regard to in vitro Fertilization. Madridge J Women’s Health Emancipation, 3(1), 56–59. https://doi.org/10.18689/ mjwh-­1000112. Jones, O.  D. (1992). Sex Selection: Regulating Technology Enabling the Predetermination of a Child’s Gender. Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 6, 1–62. Kaba, A.  J. (2008). Sex Ratio at Birth and Racial Differences: Why Do Black Women Give Birth to More Females Than Non-Black Women? African Journal of Reproductive Health, 12(3), 139–150. Kalfoglou, A.  L., Kammersell, M., Philpott, S., & Dahl, E. (2013). Ethical Arguments for and Against Sperm Sorting for Non-medical Sex Selection: A Review. Reproductive Biomedicine Online., 26, 231–232. Retrieved June 26, 2020, from https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23337421/. Kudina, O. (2019). Accounting for the Moral Significance of Technology: Revisiting the Case of Non-medical Sex Selection. Bioethical Inquiry, 16, 75–85. Liao, S. M. (2005). The Ethics of Using Genetic Engineering for Sex Selection. Journal of Medical Ethics, 31, 116–118. Mace, R., & Sear, R. (1997). Birth Interval and Sex of Children in a Traditional African Population: An Evolutionary Analysis. London: LSE Research online. Retrieved July 20, 2020, from http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/687/1/BirthInterval_ JBS29(4).pdf.

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McSweeney, L. (2011). Successful Sex Pre-selection Using Natural Family Planning. African Journal of Reproductive Health, 15(1), 79–84. Milazzo, A. (2014). Son Preference, Fertility and Family Structure: Evidence from Reproductive Behaviour Among Nigerian Women. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6869. Mittwoch, U. (2005). Sex Determination in Mythology and History. Arquivos Brasileiros de Endocrinologia & Metabologia, 49(1), 7–13. Mudau, T. J., & Obadire, O. S. (2017). The Role of Patriarchy in Family Settings and Its Implications to Girls and Women. South Africa, Journal of Human Ecology, 58(1-2), 67–72. Ogar, J. N., Ogar, T. E., & Anyim, N. M. (2016). Selected Issues in Biomedical Ethics and Its Social Implications: African Consideration. International Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Studies, 3(2), 2394–6296. Population Reference Bureau. (2013). When Technology and Tradition Collide: From Gender Bias to Sex Selection: Fact Sheet. Retrieved June 25, 2020, from https://www.prb.org/sex-­selection-­factsheet/. Puri, S., & Nachtigall, R. D. (2010). The Ethics of Sex Selection: A Comparison of the Attitudes and Experiences of Primary Care Physicians and Physician Providers of Clinical Sex Selection Services. Fertility and Sterility, 93(7), 2107–2114. Rai, P., Ganguli, A., Balachandran, S., Gupta, R., & Neogi, S. B. (2018). Global Sex Selection Techniques for Family Planning: A Narrative Review. Journal of Reproductive and Infant Psychology, 1, 1–3. https://doi.org/10.108 0/02646838.2018.1508871. Ritchie, R., & Roser, M. (2019). Gender Ratio. Retrieved June 25, 2020, from https://ourworldindata.org/gender-­ratio#gender-­ratio-­across-­the-­world. Rossi, P. & Rouanet, L. (2015). Gender Preferences in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Fertility Choices. ffhalshs-01074934v2f. Retrieved July 1, 2020, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275281179_Gender_ Preferences_in_Africa_A_Comparative_Analysis_of_Fertility_Choices. Shoola, T. (2014). The Effect of the Sub-Saharan African Gender Divide on the Rights and Status of Women in a Globalized World. International ResearchScape Journal: Vol. 1, Article 7. Retrieved June 25, 2020, from https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/irj/vol1/iss1/7. Sternke, L.  M. (2010). Ethical Considerations of Non-medical Preconception Gender Selection Research. Online Journal of Health Ethics, 6(1), 1. https:// doi.org/10.18785/ojhe.0601.03. Stévant, I., Papaioannou, M.  D., & Nef, S. (2018). A Brief History of Sex Determination. Molecular and Cellular Endocrinology., 468, 3–10. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.mce.2018.04.004.

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The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology. (2003). Sex selection. Postnote. No. 198. Retrieved June 25, 2020, from https://post.parliament. uk/research-­briefings/post-­pn-­198/. Whittaker, A.  M. (2011). Reproduction Opportunists in the New Global Sex Trade: PGD and Non-medical Sex Selection. Reproductive BioMedicine Online 2011, 23, 609–617.

PART VI

African Religious Values and Technology

CHAPTER 15

The Impact of Technologies on African Religions: A Theological Perspective Nomatter Sande

Introduction The technological age is promoting a paradigm shift in diverse areas of life. The new age of civilisation and human enhancement technologies is opening new possibilities of improving humanity. Athar (2008: 59) defines enhancement technologies as “the science and art of externally applied procedures aimed at improving human appearance, behaviour or capacities”. Notably, human enhancement technologies include, but are not limited to, brain-enhancing smart medicine, for improved focus, doping, embryo screening, ageing technology and implants to improve moods. The question that arises is: which form of the enhancement technologies is compatible with African Traditional Religions? It is inaccurate to discuss the African traditional religions univocally; therefore, this study focuses on the Shona people in Zimbabwe. The constant improvement of human enhancement technologies poses new questions about what it means to be human, and whether being human is static or dynamic? Chiefly, human enhancement technologies

N. Sande (*) College of Human Sciences, Research Institute for Theology and Religion (RITR), University of South Africa (UNISA), Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. D. Okyere-Manu (ed.), African Values, Ethics, and Technology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70550-3_15

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bring new competition with African traditional religions to give meaning and reshape what it means to be human. This demonstrates that humanity has an insatiable desire to be better than their current position. However, the ethical premises of enhancement technologies and African traditional religions are different. For instance, the African traditional religious cosmovision views humanity as a result of divine creation and scientists view humanity as part of the animal species. The marriage between religion and science has been a difficult one, particularly on the rejection of transhumanism. African Traditional Religions strive to safeguard their domain of religion by upholding its metaphysical character by preserving both the meaning of humanity and how to improve people’s lives. The new punch coming from the technological developments triggers a thought about the fusion of technology and African spirituality. There is a connectivity of technological notions, biological life and African spirituality. Existing scholarship indicates that there are both opportunities and threats from the emerging technologies (Philbeck et al., 2018; Broadbent 2019). On the other hand, scholars such as Verharen et al. (2014) and Dzobo (2010) argue that there is a connection between African ethics to the agenda of the fourth industrial revolution. Further, “technology is the application of knowledge or discovery to practical use” (Gyekye 2013: 48). However, not many scholars have reflected on how enhancement technologies are mirrored on African Traditional Religions, particularly the Shona culture—the gap that this study seeks to fill. The African personhood is enshrined in the idea of unhu (being or becoming). Therefore, this study uses the personhood concept to explore how enhancement technologies are mirrored within the Shona culture of Zimbabwe.

Theoretical Framework: Transhumanism Theory This study used the transhumanism theory to understand the relationship between technology and religion. Transhumanism is an intellectual movement striving to transform human conditions using sophisticated technologies that help with intellectual, physiological and moral functioning (Bostrom 2005). Transhumanists argue that the current position of humanity is an elementary level of development and is improvable through the use of applied science. Central to their belief is the notion that humans may eventually transform themselves. Therefore, the transhumanism philosophy shows that intelligent technology helps human nature to grow towards the trans-posthuman condition.

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From a religious perspective, human enhancement technologies are simply tools being used by humans to liberate themselves from the divine spiritual destiny. Religious people believe that for generations humanity has been trying to nullify and resist the Supreme Being, by replacing what religion can offer with technology and any other means possible. Jaokar (2012) cited in Schussler (2019: 95) argues that new theories of personal development “use technology as a tool—iPods, smartphones, Augmented Reality (AR) glasses or different applications—to reduce anxiety, stress, depression, to implement positive thinking or to stimulate creative and successful thinking etc.”. While, there are numerous occasions that the technology has improved the lives of people by solving their inherent or acquired capabilities, the central question is: to what extent does one alter, or enhance the nature of a human being? The nature and meaning of what it is to be human is contested from a technical, cultural and religious perspective. From an African philosophical perspective, human nature is that which is independent of human choice. The African Traditional religions view the creation and development of the human being as a product of a supreme being. The nature and how a person relate to others is an important aspect involving the concept of unhu (cardinal values, belief systems). According to Samakange and Samukange (1980) personhood, hunhuism, is a philosophical concept, which unlocks human social relations. Agar (2010) has argued that radical enhancement focuses on improving human attributes and abilities beyond what is currently possible for human beings. Therefore, this study uses human enhancement technology not as ‘therapeutic’ but as an ‘enhancement’. Broadly, ‘therapy’ involves prevention, cure or restoration to a normal physiological function, while ‘enhancement’ is an alteration of traits to go beyond the normal functioning (Lustig 2009: 42).

Human Enhancement Technology and Shona Culture Enhancement technologies are diverse including but not limited to gene doping and mapping; cognitive enhancement; pre-implantation genetics; and ageing and longevity (Williams 2006). The study focuses on these aspects to explore the extent to which they can be mirrored within the Shona culture.

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Gene Doping and Mapping As part of the enhancement technological processes, gene doping or ‘gene editing techniques’ aim is to enhance the human body. According to Coenen (2009), through enhancement technology genes are inserted which are responsible for increasing red blood cells, aerobic capacity which helps with the intake of insulin-like growth factor-1. Enhancement technology provides medicines and gene transfers enhancing abilities such as sports performance. Within the Shona culture, gene doping can be linked to the concept of mangoromera (fighting powers) which were bestowed upon an individual to increase their fighting abilities. A person with mangoromera (fighting powers) was fierce and known for their fighting skills. Kean et al. (2016) posit that traditionally mangoromera were given so that one could be a brave fighter. The administration of the medicine included kutemerwa nyora (razor blade marks) by traditional healers. According to Kwayedza (2015), n’anga (traditional healers) give medicine by kutemera nyora or applying herbs. These herbs are said to enhance skills and powers to fight. However, at times these powers would manifest in violence. Ideally, the Shona unhu does not condone violence. However, munhu chaiye (a good person) was supposed to observe peace, justice and have social responsibility. This means that unhu resolves conflict, bringing harmony to society. In addition, in African Traditional Religion as practice among the Shona’s, there are manhood enhancement concoctions that most men, at their advanced ages, take to ensure that they remain sexually active. These herbs are enhancement ‘technologies’ meant to make men continue to sexually satisfy their wives, especially in polygynous marriages. Similarly, women in the same cultural background are also said to use certain herbs to ‘dry’ their sexual organs (vaginas) for them to remain tight. The belief is that when they are tight, it brings more pleasure during sexual intercourse. In polygynous marriages, wives with loose and watery vaginas are less preferred by husbands. This promotes the application of these enhancement technologies. These acts pose several ethical and moral questions regarding unhu. All these acts can be or are attempts to go beyond the limits of nature just as science is trying to achieve. Notably, some of these herbs have negative effects on the person upon whom they are applied. Another notable gene doping and gene mapping example can be noted in sports. Most athletes seek to enhance their performance by doping. In

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the Shona culture, persons with the gift of musical performance were highly esteemed because of their ability to perform skilfully. Musical performance is both a ‘talent’ and a gift from the divine. One area where talent was considered was playing Mbira. Mbira could be learned as art and musical performance or as a gift from vadzimu (ancestors). Naylor (2020) argued that the Shona people have played Mbira for over 1000 years. The Shona people believe that personal life development is guided by improving one’s devotional life to the deities. Sandel (2007) argued that there is an intrinsic relationship between ‘giftedness’ and ‘solidarity’, once one is aware of their gifts, they endeavour to develop their capacity of seeing themselves as sharing a common fate. One can therefore argue that the skill of playing mbira can be related to enhancement technologies in that, it is a common knowledge among the Shona’s that, this special skill is induced spiritually upon individuals by the ancestors and that explains why such people are able to perform beyond the norm. What this suggests is that the gene doping can be physical or spiritual. The perception is that spiritual enhancement is done either through the intake of traditional medicine (muti) or secretly through enchantment. From the above discussion it is clear that the role of gene doping in enhancement technology and the Shona concepts are similar. They both strive to enhance powers to perform better than the normal human being using medicine. This resonates with the transhuman models of personal development, which put human nature on the spotlight, showing levels of successful individuals, or humanity measuring up using technology. Gene doping is a concept of self-discovery and testing the extent to which humanity can perform. According to Tracy (2011), the more knowledge people acquire the more competitive they become. However, this is contrary to unhu, which encourages human beings to give kindness, courtesy and friendliness. These values discourage gene doping in a way. In general, the Shona concept of personhood has no place for selfishness or self-­ centredness. According to Rukuni (2007: 17), unhu is “a higher level of consciousness”, is contrary to the Western worldview where enhancement technology is rampant. From the African moral thought perspective, Menkiti (2004) cited in Molefe (2016: 40) argues, “the western philosophy of personhood reduces personhood to individualistic properties, whereas the African focuses on the communal features”.

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Cognitive Enhancement Cognitive enhancement refers to “the amplification or extension of core capacities of the mind through improvement or augmentation of internal or external information processing systems” (Bostrom and Sandberg 2009: 311). Notable examples include memory or learning, intelligence, mental imagery and language ability. The functioning of the human brain and mind is a growing field within the field of neuroscience (Illes 2010). Enhancement technologies yearn for improvement of the brain and advocate for a healthy human being. Brain enhancement is involved intellectual manipulation, which includes but is not limited to improving memory, mental concentration and cognitive ability in senile dementia. The Western worldview believes that the source of knowledge is either reason, experience or the senses. There is a difference between the Western and African epistemology. According to Battle (2009: 135) “African epistemology begins with community and moves to individuality”. Therefore, knowledge within the Shona people does not reside in an individual but the community. An individual’s problem, such as barrenness is not only an individual calamity but the communities. This is the genesis of the African communitarian summed up by Mbiti’s (1969: 214) maxim: “I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am”. According to Mbiti, this is the morality of conduct rather than a morality of being. Similarly, Okyere-­ Manu and Konyana (2018) refer to this as umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu [A person is a person through other persons]. According to Ramose (1999), the ubuntu philosophy is like an African tree of knowledge. He further explains that ubuntu flows into all notions of existence and epistemology justifying ‘wholeness’ and ‘oneness’. Unlike the enhancement technology which stimulates the brain cells, the African Traditional religions are not scientific but more oratory. Listening to elders’ stories and their life experiences transmitted knowledge. Proverbs and idioms are channels used to communicate African epistemology. It is out of this thinking that Maimela (1985: 66) argues thus: [A]n African is fully made aware that the individual’s life and the pursuit of life are not attainable in isolation and apart from one’s fellows because life is something communal and is possible only in a network of mutual interdependencies between an individual and his/her community.

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What this points to is that in all life’s pursuits, an African will always strive for the maintenance of a dynamic relationship with his/her extended family, clan, tribe, ancestors, God and nature. This resonates with the findings of Menkiti (2004) who argued that the idea of group solidarity is the defining trait for African traditional life. Like cognitive enhancement, life skills are considered paramount in Shona culture. Cognitive enhancement is mirrored in the Shona culture through the use of trade skills an individual can acquire. In the Shona culture, people who are highly skilled are called mhizha (artworker, craftsman or blacksmith) and they were responsible for sustainable livelihoods and collective survival of the land. The concept of belongingness is linked to the ivhu (soil). Most Shona people identify themselves as vana vevhu (children of the soil) and they are bound to help one another. Mangena (2014: 83) citing Mujere (2011: 1125) argues that Zimbabweans are sons and daughters of the soil because “rukuvhute rwedu rwuri muvhu reZimbabwe (our umbilical cords are buried in the Zimbabwean soil)”. All this cognitive intelligence is believed to come from the guidelines from the sages. Therefore, the Shona cognitive enhancement seeks to open room for self-transformation and perpetual progress to life. Progress of life within the Shona people is communal than an individual desire for progress. Mboti (2015: 126) argues that Unhu makes people “morally and humanely dependent on each other”. If Mboti’s propositions are anything to go by, then Shona cognitive enhancement does not cause individualisation of society. Hence, the African traditional religion and spirituality use the traditional-metaphysical paradigms to interpret life and how to improve brain and the society. In the Shona culture, hunting skills are enhanced by divine power. One who is skilled to hunt is known as hombarume. The Shona people believe that mashavi (alien spirits) are responsible for giving skills to people. According to Bourdillon (1998: 243) “in some areas, all skills are associated with alien spirits”. Citing the Ndau people of Chipinge district in Zimbabwe, Bourdillon argues that the Ndau believe that everyone has a number of secret mashave, which he honours in private and from which he obtains all his personal talents: such spirits simply convey skills and rarely come out by possessing their hosts. In some cases, rituals are used to activate the power to enhance hunting skills. Thus, the African traditional religion believes in cognitive enhancement, which help humanity to achieve a better way of living. The Shona people look down upon people who are not responsible in society. They describe such a person as munhu

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pasina (useless person). Wiredu (2009: 16) argues, “to be called a person is to be commended. Inversely, to be called a non-person is, in general, to be downgraded”. It is the moral of ‘unhu’, which makes munhu (human being) to share belongingness with others. What this means is that munhu (human being) goes beyond being a physiological entity. For one to be considered munhu (human being) there should be qualities, which promote harmony. Mararike (2012: 10) argues that “to the socialisation process through which a person learns his way of life in accordance with the expectations of his society—whole person/munhu ane hunhu … a result of deliberate and purposeful socialisation”. Western cognitive enhancement includes dealing with the brain to improve moods. Medicine is used to boost one’s emotional well-being and help individuals move out of mood swings. The Shona people see moods as part of life. However, the Shona people believe that the dialogue between spiritual beings and human beings regulates behaviour. Other moods are caused by change of moon seasons. Regardless of these causatives, one should not shun their responsibilities. According to Boesak (2006: 176) unhu “is manifestation of a vision”. A person who lacks responsibility for his behaviour is called munhu asina musoro/rombe (senseless, insensitive and bad person). Such a person is said to be in sin, which is the destruction of the stability of the community, and therefore, the refusal to love and have fellowship with one’s fellows (both the living and the dead), the denial of that which makes for life here and now (Maimela 1985). The success of an individual is directly linked to their unhu (character). Therefore, cognitive enhancement within the Shona culture makes people to pride themselves with the notion of the community, which is that the community should share the burden together, and no one is prejudiced. The Shona people believe that success and making it in life does not only happen. Vadzimu (ancestors) are generally responsible for the living members’ predicaments as well as fortunes (Bourdillon 1998). Such a philosophy is contrary to the western cognitive enhancement, which gives an individual the right to choose the area in which they want to achieve. Shona cognitive enhancement uses sacred orality and rituals to both prescribe and proffer direction to how humanity should progress. By nature, human beings have a desire to transform themselves. Cognitive enhancement maximises on these and aims to promote societies. As put forward by Naam (2005), turning our back on technologies is like turning our backs on our true natures. While the Shona culture encourages the

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cognitive enhancement for success in life, it has to be achieved in a humane way. Pre-implantation Genetics In addition to the above there are enhancement technology that controls or edit the future offspring (Coenen 2009). What is common with this approach is the ‘designer babies’. For example the media popularised Jian-­ Kui as one of the ‘designer babies’ (Kolata et  al. 2018). In a similar research, Li et al. (2019) mentioned embryo screening, where there is a deliberate controlling of sex of off-springs. Other physical modification which involves the immune system includes age-related medical conditions, using benign prostrate hypertrophy, osteoporosis and presbyopia. Pre-implantation genetics have resemblances with some of the practices in the Shona culture. The Shona people believe that genes are transferred through family lineage. In some circles, this process is called nhodzera dzerudzi’ (family resemblance). If one stimulates their genes using dope, it should consider the good of others. According to Mboti (2015: 126), “an action is right to the extent that it maximizes harmony”. From the Western pre-implantation genetics perspective, the genetic engineering provides humans with the opportunity to have control over their own biology. Ishii (2015) argues that enhancement technology has the ability to insert a genome from gametes, a fertilised egg or first embryo division that can be passed to the following generations. Among the Shona people, the notion of prenatal diagnosis and gender selection is prevalent. For instance, whenever a couple desired a child of a certain sex, they could consider remedy from traditional healers who would perform kuuchika (the treatment of changing sex). Some of the treatment can involve therapeutic sex with healers, often in the context of spiritual and physical cleansing and may involve the tactile manipulation of affected women’s external genitalia and inner reproductive tract and specific traditional healers were cited as being well known for kuuchika or the successful treatment of infertility (Runganga et  al. 2001). Infertility or barrenness is not only a misfortune but also a calamity in an African worldview. Any infertile couple is never taken lightly in society. Although the woman is quickly blamed for such a calamity, the African community is at pains to ensure the couple bears a child, especially a boy child. The couple is taken through several rituals, where at times there is unprecedented abuse. Society tends to have a blind eye to such abuses as the couple’s

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problem becomes the society’s as well. Individual choices or preferences are secondary to community. The burden of families is shared by the society therefore; the interest of the community is put ahead of the individual. What matters here is not the means to an end but the end to the means. Furthermore, the institution of marriage among the Shona of Zimbabwe is a very important institution. For Bourdillon (1998: 36) marriage is essentially a contract between two families. Noteworthy is the notion of a contract between two families and not two individuals (the bride and the bridegroom). This resonates with the communitarian nature of African communities as espoused by the dictum: umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (Okyere-Manu and Konyana 2018). The Shona believe that successful marriages have the blessings of ancestors and giving birth is believed to be a gift from the ancestors. Therefore, the decisions for marriage and fertility involve the interventions of vadzimu (ancestors). The Shona people discouraged people from marrying relatives because it was a taboo and an incest relationship (Aschwanden 1982); even now this practice is still seen as a taboo. This included marrying someone with the same totem as you. Such a position would make people preserve quality genes. Family unity and lineage includes the intervention and approval of vadzimu. In some cases, some families would go to the n’anga to ask if they are marrying into a good family. Such approaches resemble human cloning and genetic mapping. Shona’s believe that motherhood is fulfilled by females bearing children. The failure to have children is frowned upon. This belief confirms and affirms the autocratic and patriarchal nature of the Shona societies, which deny in public the undeniable reality of man’s impotence, which they try to manage secretly by letting in relatives to bear the impotent man’s children (Gelfand 1992). Mostly, the religions and human philosophies of Ubuntu are responsible for building African communities, values and personhood. Besides the debate about genetics, it is important to understand how the issues of ethics are treated. The Western medical ethics principle focuses on respecting the individual autonomy to make choice, including the best human enhancement technologies to use. The problem of this approach is that it decreases solidarity amongst the weak and people who are vulnerable. Therefore, the Western concept of ethics is literal. On the other hand, the Shona ethics are embedded in the notion of ’unhu’. The unhu ethics is both transcendental or upward looking, and literal. What this means is that the Shona people’s choices do not only confine to their interactions between humans, but this involves spiritual Mwari. Shona

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Unhu, like Ubuntu, “emphasises responsibility rather than right… personal and individual interests tend to be submerged in the common weal, and responsibilities become more important than individual rights” (Bennett and Patrick 227). The spiritual world of the Shona people includes midzimu (ancestors) and mashavi (alien spirits). Maimela (1985) is insightful by arguing that in African Traditional Religions, a person is created by God even though this belief is not often expressed in explicit theological jargon. In African cosmovision, God, known by various names in Africa, is often remotely involved in the day-to-day activities of people. Those close to human beings are h(is/er) juniors, the divinities and ancestors. Bourdillon (1998: 277) affirms this belief when he submits that this high God is “too remote and his interests are too broad for him to concern himself with private individuals and their problems”, an idea refuted by Shoko (2007: 39) who argues that “God is not a remote God but an active one”. He is approached by the Karanga as the Mwari cult at Matonjeni. Shoko  (2007) accepts that ancestors (vadzimu) control the lives of the people by providing health and wealth but behind the ancestors is God who is a powerful Supreme being. Ageing and Longevity Enhancement technologies have medicine that helps to reduce ageing and increase longevity. This aspect is prevalent amongst the Shona people. The Shona people believe that vadzimu are responsible for providing a good life. This is affirmed by Shoko (2007) who traces the Karanga people’s health and well-being to ancestors. The need for ageing and longevity by the Shona explains why traditional healers occupy a very important and strategic position among the Shona. Their services are sought whenever the abundance and sustenance of life are threatened. The belief of the existence of traditional healers assures that the Shona people have experts to cater for their health and health-related problems, be they physical, mental or spiritual. This three-tier (Machinga 2012) needs proper diagnosis and the traditional healer excels in addressing the holistic health issues for humanity. Chavunduka (1994) argues that the traditional healers deal with religious, spiritual and cultural issues that affect health. This explains why traditional healers are still functional in Shona communities despite the fact that many have turned to Christianity. The traditional healer’s activities can be equated to enhancement technologies for they ensure that their clients live longer.

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Thus, ageing and longevity are embedded within rituals. Other religions such as Christianity and Buddhism encourage positive thinking and declarations of blessing as sources for longevity. However, in Zimbabwe “an elusive and declaratory divine rhetoric is peddled within Pentecostal churches promising supernatural ways of achieving prosperity” (Sande 2017: 55). From the Shona cultural perspective, vadzimu (ancestors) are responsible for everything that happens to humanity including divine healings, miracles, wisdom, marriage and fertility. Some people use medicine so that they can live longer. These people do not die even if they grow old. They age to an extent that vanodzirwa nendowe (bodies are plastered by cow dung) so that they can keep warm. The Shonas believe that human life is sacred, even if one can be sick or old, they cannot be killed. This shows that life should be preserved at all costs.

Conclusion This study explored the extent to which enhancement technologies are mirrored within the Shona cultural practices. Transhumanism is a movement striving to transform the lives of humanity and this resonates with the agenda of enhancement technologies. However, the relationship between technology and religion is always challenging. For instance, the suspicion is that enhancement technologies seek to replace religion. The findings of this study show that the Shona people have an approach to improve the lives just like the enhancement technologies. The major difference is noticed when it comes to some ethical considerations. The Western ethical paradigm is literal, while the Shona use both transcendental and literal paradigms. The agenda for the enhancement technology is mirrored by how hunhuism supports the lives of the Shona people. A person’s nature and how a person relates to others is an important aspect involving the concept of unhu (cardinal values, beliefs systems). Therefore, the Shona people base their improvement of life by emphasising socio-­ cultural issues. The agenda of the technological advancement is visible within the Shona culture practices and it is sustained by the notion of personhood.

References Agar, N. (2010). Humanity’s End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement. Cambridge: MIT Press.

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CHAPTER 16

Technologization of Religion: The Unstoppable Revolution in the Zimbabwean Mainline Churches Martin Mujinga

Introduction Although societies have embraced the current trends of educational technology, information technology, biotechnology, robotics and artificial intelligence, this innovation was received with mixed feelings in the religious fraternity. Pentecostal churches technologized religion fast while the majority, if not all, mainline churches1 in Zimbabwe did not regard 1  This word mainline church is very controversial. Whatever division is there with African Indigenous Churches, Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal churches is open to political opportunism (Conradie and Klaasen 2014: 10–11). In this chapter, mainline churches will refer to those churches that share their origins, history, faith, spirituality and practice whether ethical or liturgical with global partners. These are Anglicans, Lutherans, Baptists, Reformed Churches and Methodists. “These denominations have been referred to as settler, colonial, mission, multiracial and ecumenical churches” (de Gruchy 2014: 16). Settler churches refer

M. Mujinga (*) Department of Systematic Theology and Ecclesiology, University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. D. Okyere-Manu (ed.), African Values, Ethics, and Technology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70550-3_16

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technologization2 of religion as a major priority. This chapter was motivated by the post-mortem of the Zimbabwe Council of Churches3 (ZCC) pastors on one of their e-Leaning social media platforms. These clergy were part of every Tuesday and Thursday e-Learning programmes that began in April 2020 to discuss the theological, moral, social, economic and ethical implications of COVID-19 and the church’s response to the pandemic. The aim of this chapter is to analyse these responses to find out the extent the technologization of religion has impacted mainline churches. The case study on the ZCC will answer questions such as in what ways has technologization of religion been a challenge to the mainline churches? How should the churches respond to the technologization of religion? What steps should the mainline churches take to retain their lost glory by using technology? The chapter will conclude by challenging mainline churches to fully embrace technology because it is an unstoppable revolution, it attracts young people, it reaches millions of people at the same time, it is a cheaper medium of engagement and it is a new culture that forms part of entertainment since a number of people spend most of their time on technology. If managed well, technology improves the revenue base for mainline churches.

Methodology This qualitative research used case study methodology. In research, a case study is a multifaceted investigation conducted in great detail and often relies on the use of several data sources (Feagin et al. 1991). A case study is also regarded as an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life context based on an in-depth investigation of a single to how these denominations were planted as a result of European immigration and settlement in Africa (2014). Colonial entails the churches’ relationship to the colonial enterprise and to the colonial authorities with whom they had a cosy relationship with (de Gruchy 2014). Mission churches denote the fact that each of these churches began extensive mission programmes among indigenous people to such an extent that they have become black majority churches. Mainline churches originated from the schisms in Europe and rooted in Africa and yet, they all try to maintain their historical ties with the western world. These churches are also called protestant or traditional because in Zimbabwe they came as partners to the colonizers in 1891 (Thomas 1985). 2  Mahmood et al. (2018: 115) define technologization, as the process of integrating technology into teaching-learning practices within and outside classroom. 3  Zimbabwe Council of Churches comprise of 26 mainline churches and 10 para-church organizations (see Tarusarira 2020; Chitando 2020).

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individual group or event to explore the causes of underlying principles (Press Academia 2018). The ZCC was chosen as a case study notwithstanding the fact that all religions and religious organization were affected by lockdowns which were imposed by governments globally as a measure to minimize the spread of COVID-19, but, on the hypothesis that, this is the organization that was more perturbed by the propagation of the gospel through technology given that they were reluctant to technologize religion. Data for this research were gathered through both primary and secondary sources. Secondary sources include print literature while the targeted primary source was the e-Learning social media platform (WhatsApp) created by the ZCC to share experiences, motivate, teach and encourage pastors during the COVID-19 lockdown period and beyond. The WhatsApp group comprised 253 pastors. This chapter was motivated by the post-mortem of the pastors on the topic Covid-19 scenarios and implications for the Church.4 The presentation was randomly selected because it was addressing scenarios and implications for the church during the COVID-19 era. WhatsApp responses by pastors on this platform were randomly selected, transcribed and analysed using thematic data analysis. Thematic data analysis involves finding dormant themes that are emerging from the data or the phenomenon. Eight post-mortem responses representing member churches were randomly selected for analysis. The names or phone numbers of the sampled responses were not captured individually, but their information was analysed as a representation of the participants. This was done in order to apply the research ethics where participants’ rights and privacy have to be respected by researchers.

Technologization of Religion Since in education, technologization is teaching through technology, technologization of religion refers to applying technology to religion. This topic has not received much attention in the mainline churches in Zimbabwe in particular although the need to technologize religion has been long overdue. Christodoulou (2018) researched on the connectedness of religion and technology from a Cyprus context. In her article titled

4  The presenter will remain anonymous because of the demands of research ethics to maintain his integrity and opinions. He will be referred to as the Presenter.

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“Technopolis as the technologized kingdom of God, fun as technology, and technology as religion in the 21st century,” she argued that, Technology is the religion of the 21st Century and is the new Kingdom of God, or the technologized or technological Kingdom of God, where God is a technological God, and religion is a technologized religion. The religion of previous times was a sacred and serious religion, while religion of the 21th century is characterized and ruled by fun. God is one of the technologies of technology, and fun is another one. These two technologies merge with one another, and God becomes fun, while fun becomes God. The one thing that has remained the same is the fact that God is still reigning, and people are still religious, though in a much different sense. (Christodoulou 2018: 119)

In explaining the above statement, Christodoulou (2018: 119) mentions that no matter how societies believed in God during the sacred religion era (Biblical), their belief is never in the same God in the era of technologized religion. The meaning of the term God has changed. It is impossible to be the same God even if the arrangement of letters in “God” remains the same. In this era, as culture has evolved, Christodoulou believes that the God we believe in is close to being synonymous with the term fun (2018: 119). Fun is God because religions themselves are trying to embrace fun in order not to lose believers; they sing in churches, they are becoming more tolerant, they advise how to care for one’s body, they are becoming cooler, they are accepting marriages between homosexuals and so on (Christodoulou 2018: 121). Christodoulou’s assertions were buttressed by Nhemachena (2019: 2) who mentions that in the past, technology used to be an appendage to human beings; however, human beings are, in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, becoming appendages to technology—this is a ritual of reversal in the twenty-first century. The arguments of the two scholars call for the need to research on the technologization of religion.

How Technologization of Religion Impacted the Mainline Churches in Zimbabwe The Zimbabwean Government declared the first three weeks of lockdown from March 28 to April 19, 2020 as a measure to control COVID-19. The lockdown had detrimental effects on the general populace given the depleted socioeconomic and political environment in the country. The

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religious fraternity was confronted with a “monster” of the pandemic that it had never imagined. Churches, mosques and all places of worship were closed. For Christians, faith was thrown into a crisis as offerings, rituals, fellowships, healing ministry, prophecy, praise and worships, sermons and pastoral visitation all came to a hold. Financially, churches were crippled and missionally; they lost touch with their members. The impact was worse on the mainline churches because they had not been exposed to technologizing of religion unlike most of the older Pentecostal churches like the Apostolic Faith Mission, (AFM) and the Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa (ZAOGA)). The technologization of religion in Zimbabwe had been taken to greater levels by newer Pentecostal churches, like the United Family International Church, Spirit Embassy, His Presence Ministries, Heartfelt International Ministries, Prophetic Healing and Deliverance Ministry, and Goodness and Mercy Ministries. Biri (2013) asserts that the moment Pentecostal churches entered the religious space, they embraced the use of television, internet facilities, print media and cell phones beyond the pulpit (see also Asamoah-Gyadu 2005; Faimau and Behrens 2016; Kgatle 2018). Biri (2013) agrees with Togarasei (2012) that prophetic churches embraced the use of media technology to spread the Gospel faster and wider. In Zimbabwe, Pentecostal churches took advantage of emerging technologies to evangelize and expand to the diaspora. Relatedly, in Nigeria, Omotayo (2016) observes that information and communication technologies have been accepted as one of the most significant forces of modernization. The results revealed that the majority of Pentecostal churches in Ibadan adopted information and communication technologies, for the sole purpose of propagating the gospel. In Singapore, Pentecostal churches framed technology in a manner that not only legitimizes the technologization of religious practice but also demands the integration of information technologies into religious practice (Kluver and Cheong 2007: 1123). Three countries cited as examples demonstrate that the penetration of technology into every sphere of people’s lives suggests that technology had to be embraced (Magezi 2015). This was a big challenge to mainline churches in Zimbabwe who had been trivializing this media as ungodly. Mainline churches believe in one-on-one pastoral care and counselling, and the lockdown disbanded this ministry. More importantly, the lockdowns were imposed during the Lent periods few weeks before the Easter season. In the global Christendom, Easter is a time of big gatherings and

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meetings and yet church doors and sanctuaries were closed. COVID-19 brought fear, hopelessness, heart brokenness and meaninglessness of life to most people. In this predicament, mainline churches in Zimbabwe could not reach their members to give them hope and redefine the meaning of life in the circumstance they found themselves. The only way to reach their members was through technology. Most mainline church clergy and preachers stampeded on the social media to reach the unreached congregants with sermons and teachings. Unfortunately, the rush had two pronged problems. On the one hand, the clergy and the preachers lacked technological skill to make plans to reach the unreachable congregants and on the other the members were not used to receiving the gospel message through technology. These two challenges reaped poor missional results for mainline churches in Zimbabwe. Most mainline church congregants viewed the closing of churches, banning of fellowships, pastoral visitations and church gatherings as the destruction of the essentials of religion. Some members started to watch gospel TV channels where most preachers were from Pentecostal traditions. Some went to their archives to pull out old CDs of their pastors in order to listen to sermons, but the process ended up being monotonous. Some denominations like the Methodist Church in Zimbabwe introduced live streaming programmes; however, given the cost of data bundles, not all members listened to the sermons and teachings. The vacuum continued to widen between pastors and their congregants. Still, other members resorted to forwarding whatever Christian message they received to their fellow congregants but some of the messages, especially videos, were expensive to download. Since people were generally anxious about COVID-19, this resulted in most members using social media platforms to convey the news about the pandemic, ignoring the gospel messages. According to one pastor from the ZCC WhatsApp group, smartphones of most mainline church members were bombarded with gospel messages unfortunately, very few of those came from their pastors. The other one shared that lockdowns detached mainline churches’ ecclesiastical momentum and they lost touch with their members. In order to rescue the mainline churches from the newer forms of evangelism that were potentially detrimental to the ministry the ZCC created an e-Learning WhatsApp group as a platform and a panacea to the depressed pastors for psychosocial support, education, motivation and empowerment. The e-leaning platform included presenters from both

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pastors and lay people drawn mainly from legal, theology and medical backgrounds. Some of the topics included: . Christian ethics in the time of Covid-19: A new world order? 1 2. Zimbabwe beyond 40: implications for the Church 3. How the Ministry of Health and Child and Child Care is handling the Covid-19 pandemic and what the government expects from the Church 4. Covid-19 scenarios and implications for the Church 5. Ecumenical leadership in the post Covid-19 Era 6. United we must remain as we face Covid-19. Understanding our times and knowing what to do 7. The meaning and essentials of the Christian faith in the context of Covid-19. The essentials of our faith: pre, during and post Covid-19 pandemic 8. Jesus’ ethics in the context of Covid-19. Lessons for the Zimbabwean Church. This e-learning platform was also a social media podium, an administrative group and a platform to comfort and encourage each other. Since this study was motivated by the topic titled Covid-19 scenarios and implications for the church, it is important to give a brief summary of what the presenter was grappling with.

Summary of the Presentation “Covid-19 scenarios and implications for the church” The presentation was a pre-recorded audio which was texted to the WhatsApp group platform. Each audio was between two to four minutes long. The presentation was given at a stipulated time where all group members would be active, thereby making it a live presentation. As argued earlier, this study was presented to the ZCC e-Learning platform on April 15, 2020. The aim of summarizing the paper is to draw from the presentation, where he challenged mainline churches to be “E” Electronic churches or suffer extinction. For the Presenter, mainline churches must adapt to the current times and reach where they hitherto could not reach through technology, to communicate, assess, analyse and respond to critical issues of life (Presenter 2020). He argued that the church is the biggest economy

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while the informal sector is the biggest employer (2020). By calling the church the biggest economy, the Presenter envisaged the church membership and all the offering that are collected every Sunday. He argued that “if all the offerings were counted together, the church would be very rich” (2020). He also mentioned that for the church to be an “E” church, it must be an evolving church because any church that does not evolve becomes stagnant and obsolete. Mainline churches are present in the community and absent on technological platforms. Technologically, mainline churches have a lot to embrace they are to remain relevant in the near future (2020). The Presenter challenged mainline churches to share resources, train the clergy on how to use technology to distribute information, collect, collate, assess and survey their relevance in the twenty-first century and to offer comfort to their congregants who may be grieving through hearing the voice of their pastors. Presenter (2020: 2) also reiterated that: Mainline churches have been behind in developing technologies to changing demographic. We must link together those who have need of new methods of communication with those who have technological expertise and design new methods so that we merge the various media to broaden the church’s outreach to the community and hasten our responses to their needs. In addition to using new technology to administer the word and stimulate worship, it is needed by the church to survey, research, assess, distribute, teach, advocate and combat fake news with factual messages. However, the church must take care to prohibit the dehumanizing side of technology in communication. Technology must not be allowed to replace the personal touch, rather it must be developed in such a way as to enhance interpersonal ministry.

Post-Mortem of the Presentation by ZCC Clergy The presentation brought a lot of challenges that were not fully discussed because the presenter’s time was over. He however, randomly responded briefly to some of the questions. The major interest of this chapter is to analyse the randomly selected post-mortem responses that were done by the ZCC pastors the following day after the presentation. In this chapter, eight post-mortems were sampled according to the criteria discussed in the methodology. Speaker 1 asked the pastors some pertinent questions including: What were the key highlights for the presentation, what issues would need follow-up and how should the ZCC improve the

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platform. Below are some of the randomly selected responses from the participating pastors in ZCC WhatsApp forum: Speaker 2 wrote that “The church has to migrate to ‘E’ church which includes use of technology to reach people and to evolve so as to cater for the needs of people. I think it is time the church applies for a radio license. It could reach more people.” Speaker 3 also mentioned that “It is high time we use the technologies of our time.” Speaker 4 further comments that “Very true, prophetic churches occupy space at Zimbabwe Television and radio stations isu tirimubako Lit. We are in the cave.” Speaker 5 also said that “United Faith International Church of Prophet Emmanuel Makandiwa and Prophetic Healing and Deliverance Ministry of Prophet Magaya run Television stations as individual churches we cannot fail as a team like this. My proposal is: Immediate term-Facebook, WhatsApp strategically designed and programmed, Medium term-Utilisation of current radio and TV and stations, this is very expensive though and Long term-A ZCC radio and TV channel, huge funding required for this, wide advertising market to sustain it and a lot of prayer and fasting to achieve this.”

Analysis of the Pastor’s Responses From the responses of the ZCC pastors to the presentation and the post-­ mortem, three themes have been identified, namely, optimism verses scepticism, fear of the unknown and missing in action. Optimism Versus Scepticism Mainline churches are both optimistic and sceptical. On the one hand, the pastors were optimistic because they had realized the positive impact of technologizing religion during COVID-19. On the other hand, they were sceptic because they were ill-prepared to embrace technology so fast. Magezi (2015: 1) identified three types of pastors and how they relate to technological usage in Zimbabwe. The first identity is that of the pastor who is at par with the world. He is a technology embracer and is as sophisticated as the congregational members. He is a networker and entrepreneur. This pastor fits well in the newer Pentecostal churches. For example, the United Family International Church has its own free channel called Christ tv.co, while Prophetic Healing and Deliverance Ministry owns

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Yadah TV. The churches take advantage of people who spend more time on the social media platforms and internet and they preach to them. When lockdowns were introduced, most mainline church Christians resorted to listening to newer Pentecostal churches’ gospel channels. This shift from the traditional gospel messaging left mainline churches with a challenge to regroup their members in the context of compulsory social distances enforced by the government as a measure to curb COVID-19. The second identity according to Magezi (2015: 1) is that of a pastor who is trailing society and technology. He is a cautious technology embracer and is a confused technology consumer. The third identity is that of a pastor in isolation. He is a technology objector, and is unconnected, ignorant and feels that God is somewhat an enemy of technology (Magezi 2015: 1). Magezi categorically states that the second and third categories comprise those pastors whose churches seldom use technology in their worship services. They view Information Communication Technology as a secular tool with little or no place in formal worship. These churches are hierarchical with centralized decision-making. While members of these churches use technology in other areas of life, they do not use it in the church (Magezi 2015: 1). For Magezi, there is very little appreciation of the contribution of technology in the church’s public worship. He gave examples of churches like the Roman Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Anglican, End Time Message Church and Bible Believers. Magezi also stressed that the worship services of these churches are static and prayers are drawn from liturgical books. Members view their church as a sacred place that should not be influenced by the world. There is very limited use of technology in church during worship services (Magezi 2015). The fact that the church is viewed by mainline churches as sacred does not allow them to consider any other platform as worthy of propagating the gospel than physical gathering. One of the pastors from the ZCC group agreed with Magezi that the second and the third characters resemble the mainline church pastors. This was confirmed by Speaker 1, in his response to the presentation. He said: Mainline churches had been afraid of technology and yet the upcoming ‘one-man band’ churches have embraced technology for some time. How do we harness technology in such a way that we still remain faithful to the Gospel but at the same time be on the cutting edge of the digital world? How do we enter this digital world without fear but also without compromising Christian ethics?

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The above response shows both optimism and scepticism; optimism in the sense that there is a conviction that technology has to be embraced; scepticism in the sense that the responses are guided by the traditional thinking of the mainline churches where they believe that the God of Abraham and the God of the twenty-first century are the same though, the spelling God remains the same (Christodoulou 2018). Fear of the Unknown The response by Speaker 7 shows that mainline churches are afraid of balancing technology and faith as well as technology and Christian ethics. The Speaker highlighted that: The mainline churches have been on analogue for so long. The new players took advantage and harnessed technology. They have had a significant impact. You can find their churches and the preachers on Instagram, Twitter, Facebook and the www.org platforms only to mention a few. We have not been that innovative. At least some of us are now visible on Facebook because of the lockdown. My prayer is after this lockdown we must continue meeting the wider community through the same channels being used now. Our congregants meet other preachers on those platforms. Some more education and use of those platforms will enhance our ministry. Let us break away from some of the traditions and go where the current generation is found. Innovation and adventure are fundamental for ZCC now.

This attitude of fear of embracing technology answers why mainline churches cannot preach, pray or do counselling sessions on social media, said one pastor. The other pastor mentioned that the other challenge is the lack of technical skills by most mainline church pastors themselves to conduct live stream sermons or conduct Zoom or Virtual meetings. In addition, the lack of appreciation of media technology by congregants, as noted by Magezi (2015) is also another challenge. These challenges are there in spite of the fact that some of the mainline congregants are champions in educational technology, information technology, biotechnology, robotics and artificial intelligence.

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Missing in Action Speaker 8 mentioned that “let’s start by establishing a ZCC Facebook service every Sunday with member churches rotating, this is one way of increasing our visibility and making a difference. Pentecostal churches are far advanced in technology than us.” This response shows that mainline churches are visible through social amenities and Christian social responsibility and yet they are fast becoming denominations of the old people because young generations have embraced modernized forms of worship which the traditional churches are yet to appreciate fully. Mainline churches have failed to lure younger acolytes. This failure by mainline churches to attract most young people to their worship services has been presented as a cause for concern by one pastor. She mentioned that “as mainline churches, we are compelled to incorporate new devices into our traditional services.” Another pastor stated that “online church websites should become ubiquitous, creating a high-profile internet presence which provides resources for members and an overview of the church’s beliefs and practices for potential converts.” The two responses demonstrate that ZCC pastors have realized their gap in the religious fraternity. One pastor also pointed out that “chances are that after lockdowns, mainline churches’ membership will dwindle further because we are struggling to learn and to implement the use of technology.” It can be argued that technologically savvy religion will have its critics who will label the new mode of worship as ungodly; however, every innovation in style of worship seems irreverent to the conservative. Despite its purported drawbacks, technologization of religion is proving to be a highly efficient and popular means of spreading spiritual insight and messages to the faithful, and a chief means by which religion in general will adapt and flourish in order to maintain the values and ethics of Christianity. From the contributions of the pastor on the platform, “mainline churches are now commonly called traditional churches because they have remained stagnant in their traditional drums, rattles and tambourines.” The churches are now identified with old people who love uniforms more than their spiritual life. Young people have migrated to newer Pentecostal churches and they are turning to the internet to find personal, social and religious information, and ecclesiastical institutions that are devoting resources to improving their presence on the web. In a world where humanity everyday becomes more interconnected, Bolu (2012: 80) argues

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that the global visibility of churches is clearly linked to their commitment to the worldwide web.

Proposed Recommendation for the Mainline Churches Although technology is good, Togarasei (2012) warns than there is a possible negative effect of media technology appropriation, such as the commodification of the Christian religion, privacy and cost of using some of the media, such as social platforms. From the findings of this research, it cannot be denied that mainline churches have to fully embrace technology or cease to exist. Seven justifications had been proposed as way forward. First, mainline churches need to embrace technology in order to increase their membership. According to ZimStat (2014), by 2014, 79 percent of the population were Christians, the largest being the Apostolic sect with 32 percent, followed by the Protestants with 17 percent. They were followed by the Pentecostals with 15 percent while the Roman Catholics had 9 percent, and the other Christian groups with 6 percent. The Inter Censal Demography Survey by the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (2017) found out that 84 percent of the Zimbabwean population aged 15 years and above were Christians. The largest proportion being the apostolic sect with 34 percent, followed by the Pentecostal churches with 20 percent and the Protestants with 16 percent. An analysis of these figures shows that Christian population increased from 79 to 84 percent. The Apostolic group increased from 32 to 34 percent, Pentecostals increased from 15 to 20 percent to become number two while Protestants decreased from 17 to 16 percent. For a long time, mainline churches have been dominating the religious space and were receiving accolades for their contribution to the religio-­ political and socioeconomic lives of Zimbabwe (Mushava 2016). However, the mainline churches’ statistics continue to decline as evidenced above. One of the reasons is their failure to inculturate and Africanize the gospel resulting in African Independent Churches taking advantage of this weakness to attract membership (Daneel 1987). In addition, mainline churches were reluctant to rejuvenate their traditional and Eurocentric theology, dogmas and liturgy bequeathed by the missionaries. Pentecostalism entered this vacuum space and embraced technology in their worship (Togarasei 2012; Biri 2013). The emergence of the Coronavirus and the

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subsequent lockdown of most countries worldwide to fight the pandemic wrong-footed mainline churches. Their theology, dogmas and liturgy did not pass the test of time. Reaching their membership and fellowships became difficult because the churches had not technologized their practice. In order to increase membership, mainline churches must embrace technology very fast. The second point to note is that there is need to attract the youth to mainline churches since they spend most of their time on social media, especially Facebook. Facebook appears to play a key role in the health and subjective well-being of people of faith because believers can share scriptures on the platform (Kgatle 2018). Facebook is considered a very important means to get societies closer to each other. It allows users to create a simple, digital extension of their personal relationships and friendships. This social media platform is also regarded as a social utility that helps people communicate more efficiently with their friends, family and co-­ workers (Kgatle 2018). One pastor said, “When church activities are boring, youth easily switch to the Facebook. They can be diverted from the attention of the preacher and attend other services while in church or chat with their friends on WhatsApp.” Apart from the youth, many mainline churches now have members in the Diaspora who love to hear the gospel being preached in their mother language. Without technology, this is not possible. The reasons cited for widely using technology by the youth and the Zimbabweans in Diaspora are the “need to connect with broad membership” as well as a “desire to attract and be relevant to young Christians,” said one pastor. Third, mainline churches need to be visible and relevant. The church is a society within a broader society. Wherever the society goes, the church must be there. Choosing to remain in the four corners of a building to preach to those present will compromise its visibility while digitalization will put the church on the world map. Fourth, the use of technology by mainline churches also helps their members remain connected to their church and can also continuously give their offering which in turn boost the finances of the church. For example, in Zimbabwe, cash circulation is a big challenge, and most people use mobile money transfer means line EcoCash, owned by Econet Wireless, TeleCash, a mobile money platform of Telecel, OneMoney owned by Netone mobile network. These money transfer platforms use Biller Codes and it is easy for churches to lose revenue when they do not have a Biller Codes for EcoCash, TeleCash and OneMoney because most church

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members will be having money in the phone and yet the pastor is invisible. During lockdown, members do not need to travel to church but simply need to use these money transfer facilities to give their offerings since offerings and faith are attached together in the mainline churches. Fifth, technology is a new culture that mainline churches have to embrace in order to enhance Christian values and ethics. Technology is beneficial to religion because it enhances the communal aspects of religion, and detrimental to religion when it degrades these communal aspects. Mainline churches need to appreciate that technology is the new culture that is available and trivializing it is being irreverent and not accepting the reality of cultural dynamism. Sixth, the use of technology is good because it shapes the narratives of religious authority, religious identity and religious communities. In the history of the church, mainline churches were the first to use technology. During the mediaeval period, many people learned the stories of scripture through the medium of stained-glass windows but the printing press increased literacy and enabled the scriptures to be printed widely (Latourette 2005). Direct access to the scriptures changed the nature of authority of the clergy; all believers were now recognized as equally important before God. The invention of the printing press also brought far-­ reaching cultural and social changes, helping launch the Protestant Reformation and with it, significant changes to church structure, authority and worship. The reading of the Bible from the phones, tablets and singing from PowerPoint is not a new thing that the mainline churches should shun. Seventh, social media tools are an effective platform that can be used for evangelical purposes. There is no better or more cost-effective method to reach millions of people than via social networking sites like Facebook, YouTube, Vimeo, Instagram, Radio, Television, Email, WhatsApp, Podcast, Zoom and Twitter. Social networks are crowd pullers, and many people spend a majority of their time on these platforms. It is sad to note that while the Church has what the world needs, mainline churches keep themselves in the four corner walls of the church. By utilizing technology, mainline churches can make the word of God become accessible to many of their members. Everyday people are using technology for shopping, socializing, to conduct business and so on. This means that mainline churches have to migrate from the rigidity of shunning technology in order to stay relevant in the twenty-first century. This rigidity of the

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mainline churches has caused some pastors to be caught between innovation and policy, more often, policy takes the centre stage.

Conclusion Technologization of religion has received much appreciation from Pentecostal churches and reservation from mainline churches. Mainline churches continue to receive accolades from the Zimbabwean government because of the social amenities they have like schools, hospitals and orphanages. Unfortunately, the future of the mainline churches is bleak. Mainline churches have a choice to either embrace the new culture of technology to fit in the Fourth Industrial Revolution or become obsolete. The research concludes that mainline churches should fully embrace technology because it is an unstoppable revolution, it attracts young people, it reaches millions of people at the same time, it is a cheaper media of engagement, and it is now the new culture and form of entertainment since a number of people spend most of their time there. In addition, technology also promotes the values and ethics of Christianity in a world or religious competition by maintaining its members not to practise syncretism. Technology also improves the revenue base for churches and this in turn helps the needy members who are left vulnerable by the socioeconomic and political environments of Zimbabwe.

References Asamoah-Gyadu, K.  J. (2005). Of Faith and Visual Alertness: The Message of “Mediatized” Religion in an African Pentecostal Context. The Journal of Objects, Art and Belief, 3(1), 333–356. https://doi. org/10.2752/174322005778054078. Biri, K. (2013). Religion and Emerging Technologies in Zimbabwe: Contesting for Space? International Open & Distance Learning Journal, 1(1), 19–27. Bolu, C. A. (2012). The Church in the Contemporary World: Information and Communication Technology in Church Communication for Growth: A Case Study 2012. Journal of Media Communication Studies, 4(4), 80–94. Chitando, E. (Ed.). (2020). The Zimbabwe Council of Churches and Development in Zimbabwe. Palgrave Macmillan. Christodoulou, M. (2018). Technopolis as the Technologized Kingdom of God, Fun as Technology, Technology as Religion in the 21st Century. God sive Fun. Germaniquues, 74, 119–132. https://doi.org/10.4000/ceg.3019.

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Conradie, E., & Klaasen, J. (2014). The Quest for Identity in So-called Mainline Churches in South Africa. Stellenbosch: SUN Press. Daneel, Inus. 1987. Quest for Belonging. Gweru: Mambo Press. Faimau, G., & Behrens, C. (2016). Facebooking Religion and the Technologization of the Religious Discourse: A Case Study of a Botswana-Based Prophetic Church. Heidelberg Journal of Religion on Internet, 11. https://doi. org/10.17885/heiup.rel.2016.0.23628. Feagin, J.  R., Orum, A.  M., & Sjoberg, G. (1991). A Case for the Case Study. London: UNC Press. de Gruchy, J. (2014). The Quest for Identity in the so-called ‘mainline’ Churches in South Africa. In E. Conradie & J. Klaasen (Eds.), The Quest for Identity in the So-called ‘mainline’ Churches in South Africa (pp.  15–31). Stellenbosch: SUN Press. Kgatle, M. S. (2018). Social Media and Religion: Missiological Perspective on the Link Between Facebook and the Emergence of Prophetic Churches in Southern Africa. Verbum et Ecclesia, 39(1), 1–6. https://doi.org/10.4102/ve. v39i1.1848. Kluver, R., & Cheong, P. H. (2007). Technological Modernization, the Internet, and Religion in Singapore. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 12, 1122–1142. Latourette, K. S. (2005). A History of Christianity Vol. 1. Peabody: Prince Press. Magezi, V. (2015). Technologically Changing African Context and Usage of Information Communication and Technology in Churches: Towards Discerning Emerging Identities in Church Practice (A Case Study of Two Zimbabwean Cities). HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies, 71(2), 1–8. https://doi. org/10.4102/hts.v71i2.2625. Mahmood, A.  S., Khattak, N., Haq, N., & Umair, S. (2018). Technology Integration and Upgradation of Higher Secondary Education: Need of the Hour in Pakistan. In Handbook of Research on Mobile Devices and Smart Gadgets in K-12, Education by Amar Ali Khan & Sajid Umair (pp.  115–133). IGI Global. Retrieved August 4, 2020, from https://digitalcommons.fairfield. edu/education-­books/48/U. https://doi.org/10.4018/978-­1-­5225-­2706­0.ch009. Mushava, S. (2016). Mainline Christianity: Key Development Partner. The Herald, April 22. Nhemachena, A. (2019). Humanisation of Research in the Fourth Industrial Revolution? Implications of a Posthuman/Postanthropocentric Turn on Africa. Keynote address on the Namibia University of Science and Technology Research Days, 29 and 30 August, pp. 1–6. Omotayo, F. O. (2016). Adoption and Use of Information and Communication Technologies by Pentecostal Churches in Ibadan Nigeria. Journal of Librarianship and Information Science, 49(2), 222–233.

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Press Academia. (2018). Case Study Research Design Featured Snippet from the Web. Retrieved November 2, 2019, from https://www.pressacademia.org › definition-of-case-study. Retrieved December 10, 2019. Tarusarira, J. (2020). The ZCC and ‘Crisis’ Ecumenical Groups. In Ezra Chitando (Ed.), The Zimbabwe Council of Churches and Development in Zimbabwe (pp.  65–78). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-­3-­030-­41603-­4. Thomas, N. E. (1985). Church and State in Zimbabwe. Journal of Church and State, 27(1), 113–133. Togarasei, L. (2012). Mediating the Gospel: Pentecostal Christianity and Media Technology in Botswana and Zimbabwe. Journal of Contemporary Religion, 27(2), 257–274. Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency. (2017). Inter Censal Demography Survey. Harare: UNFPA. ZimStat. (2014). Extended Analysis of Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS): Religion. Harare: Unicef. Retrieved November 10, 2019, from http://www. zimstat.co.zw/wp-­c ontent/uploads/publications/Social/Health/ MICS2014/Religion.pdf.

Index1

A African bioethics, 191, 202, 203, 206, 207, 213 African communitarian, 26, 153, 254 African community, 6, 94, 110, 142, 143, 257 African Ethics, v, 7, 8, 17–31 African Independent Churches, 277 African innovation, 18 African personhood, 250 African perspectives, 6, 193 African Religions, 249–260 African Renaissance, 152 Africa’s ethical value-systems, 19 Akan Ethics, 220, 231–244 Amniocentesis or chorionic villi sampling, 232 Ancestor, 129n1 Artificial Insemination, 225, 228, 229 Artificial intelligence (AI), v, 17, 22–24, 30, 36n3, 37, 37n4, 38, 40n6, 49, 115, 265, 275

Autoethnographic, 10 Autonomous vehicles, vi B Billings Method, 234 Biomedicine, 18 Biotechnology, 10, 191, 193, 195–197, 199, 200, 204–208, 210–215, 265, 275 Blockchain, vi, 23 Bride, 8, 133 Bridegroom, 258 C Cognitive enhancement, 256 Collective confrontation, 9, 154 Communal, 25, 26, 108, 119, 127, 131, 132, 150, 164, 170, 181, 184, 228, 254, 255, 279 Conrad, Joseph, v

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. D. Okyere-Manu (ed.), African Values, Ethics, and Technology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70550-3

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INDEX

Consumers, 41, 75, 146, 147, 151 Coronavirus, 277 Cyberbullying awareness, 169 Cybersecurity, vi Cyber terrorism, 10 D Designer babies, 239, 257 Development, v, vi, 6–8, 12, 18–22, 24, 26, 29, 30, 36n3, 40, 41n8, 75–77, 80–88, 95n1, 97, 98, 112, 113, 115, 116, 120, 125, 142, 145, 147, 151, 152, 163, 192, 196, 197, 204–207, 210, 219, 222, 250, 251, 253 Digital world, 20, 274 Discriminate, 238 DNA, 10, 197, 198, 213, 236 E EcoCash, 278 E-Learning, 266, 267, 270 Embryo, 12, 236, 237, 249, 257 Ethical issues, xvi, 19, 25, 111, 120, 194, 196, 235 F Facebook, 12, 126, 164, 165, 175, 178, 273, 275, 276, 278, 279 Family name, 241 Family or clan’s lineage, 241 Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR), v, 7, 17–31 G Gender or sex preferences, 241 Genetic engineering, 199–200

Genetic manipulation, 211 GenSelect, 234 God, 11, 99, 134, 159, 194, 195, 201, 202, 207, 211, 213, 239, 255, 259, 268, 274, 275, 279 Group communication, 10, 175–187 H HIV infections, 242 Hombarume, 255 Human enhancement, 12, 249, 251, 258 Human knowledge, 24, 25, 27, 28, 38, 96, 98, 99, 102, 108, 109, 250 Humans, 6, 7, 20–22, 24–30, 40, 43, 44, 78, 80, 107–120, 125, 133, 134, 145, 193, 194, 198, 199, 202, 203, 209, 210, 212–215, 221, 239, 250, 251, 257, 259 Hunhu, 256 Hunhuism, 251, 260 I Immune system, 257 Indigenous African communities, 118 Information technology, 8, 19, 101, 265, 275 Intelligence, xiv, 21, 28, 30, 57, 58, 62, 115, 254, 255 In vitro fertilization (IVF), 233, 236 Isintu, 134 K Kantian Copernican Revolutionary Theory, 208 Kuuchika or the successful treatment of infertility, 257

 INDEX 

L Levirate, 11, 221, 224, 226, 227 Lockdown, 177, 185, 267–269, 275, 278, 279 M Machines, 27 Mainline churches, 280 Marwala, Tshilidzi, vii, 27, 71n7 Mashave, 255 Menkiti, I. A., 255 Mhizha, 255 Mogya (blood), 226 Moral acceptability, 11 Motho ke motho ka batho, 128 Munhu, 252, 256 Munhu asina musoro/rombe, 256 N Nanotechnology, vi, 37 The natural order, 237 Ndau people of Chipinge, 10, 176, 255 New Technologies, vi Nkrumah, Kwame, v, 38, 48 O Okra (soul), 224 Ovulation cycle, 234 P Patriarchy and male-child preference, 240–241 Pentecostal churches, 12, 260, 265, 265n1, 269, 273, 276, 277, 280 A person is a person through others, 128

283

Physical modification, 257 Polygyny, 232, 241, 242 Post-pregnancy techniques, 232 Preconception dietary interventions method, 234 Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), 233 Prenatal diagnosis and gender selection, prevalent of, 257 Prenatal screening, 232 Procreation, 108, 112, 113, 119, 136, 202, 203, 220, 222–229 Protestant Reformation, 279 Q Quantum computing, 23 R Reproductive technology, 11, 219–229 Revolution, 12, 17–27, 29–31, 36–39, 41, 42, 48, 175, 182, 205, 250, 266, 280 Rituals, 92, 94, 100, 110, 127, 130, 133, 178, 222, 255, 256, 258, 260, 269 S Sacrosanctity of the marriage institution, 243 Science, v, xvi, 18, 28, 38–41, 41n8, 46, 48, 49, 84, 96, 98, 115, 192, 194, 199, 204, 211, 212, 221, 236, 239, 249, 250, 252 Sex and sexual ethics, 8, 108, 110–112, 120 Sex ratio, 237, 238 Sex selection, 231, 239

284 

INDEX

Shettles Method, 234 Shona ethics, 258 Shona people, 12, 113, 164, 165, 170, 249, 253–260 Smart Stork, 234 Social media, 10, 42, 144, 150, 151, 165, 168, 169, 175–187, 266, 267, 270, 271, 274, 275, 278, 279 Solidarity, 9, 26, 109, 141, 143, 144, 150, 152, 153, 164, 170, 253, 255, 258 Sperm sorting, 236 Spiritual and physical cleansing, 257 Successful marriages, 258 Sunsum (spirit), 226 Supreme Being, 222, 226, 251

3D printing, 23 Traditional healers, 11 Transhumanism theory, 248, 250 Tripathi, Arun Kumar, 38 Twitter, 12, 163, 165, 173, 175, 176, 178, 273, 275, 277, 279

T Technological advancements, 19, 21, 29, 210, 212 Technological advances, 18, 27, 28 Technological developments, 6, 25, 115, 117, 248, 250 Technological innovations, 41, 44 Technologies, v, vi, 6, 7, 9, 11–13, 17–20, 22–24, 26–30, 35–44, 49, 78, 80, 82, 84, 99, 101, 118, 120, 132, 134, 155, 157, 190, 192, 209, 211, 217–233, 235–243, 247–260, 266–273 Technologization of religion, 12, 265–266, 278, 280 Technology, v, 8–12, 37, 37n4, 42–46, 49, 76–79, 84, 89–103, 155–169, 189–215, 217–220, 230, 232–236, 266, 268, 270, 272, 274, 277–280 TeleCash, 276, 278 Teleological ethics, 29, 30 Therapeutic sex, 255, 257

V Vadzimu, 12, 251, 253, 256–260 Virtual Reality, 19, 24

U Ubuntu, 9, 10, 107, 109, 125, 127, 156–162, 164, 166–170, 183, 185, 256, 259 Ultrasound, 230, 232, 235, 237 Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, 124, 126, 252, 254, 256, 258 Unhu, 10, 156–162, 164, 166, 168, 170, 253, 255, 256, 258

W Western bioethics, 194, 196, 209–212 Whelan Method, 232, 234 X X chromosome, 234, 236 X-sperms, 232–235 Y Yoruba indigenous divination, 8 Y-sperms, 232–235 Z ZimStat, 275, 277 Zoom or Virtual meetings, 273, 275