African Migrants and the Refugee Crisis [1st ed.] 9783030566418, 9783030566425

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Olayiwola Abegunrin Sabella O. Abidde  Editors

African Migrants and the Refugee Crisis

African Migrants and the Refugee Crisis

Olayiwola Abegunrin  •  Sabella O. Abidde Editors

African Migrants and the Refugee Crisis

Editors Olayiwola Abegunrin University of Maryland Hyattsville, MD, USA

Sabella O. Abidde Department of History and Political Science Alabama State University Montgomery, AL, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-56641-8    ISBN 978-3-030-56642-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56642-5 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Olayiwola Abegunrin (June 6, 1944–April 14, 2020) Death is inescapable. Even so, some people have impacted our lives and the lives of many others so much so that we wish and pray they would never die, that they would never leave us. Olayiwola Abegunrin was such a man. Therefore, I mourn the passing of my teacher, my mentor, and my friend. But most importantly, I celebrate his life. It was a life well lived! Sun re o Ki Olorun fi orun ke Olayiwola omo Abegunrin. Ase!!!

Preface

This edited volume is the brainchild of Professor Olayiwola Abegurin. Unfortunately, he passed away on Tuesday, April 14, 2020, after a protracted illness. I had known Professor Abegunrin since the fall of 2005 when I began my doctoral studies at Howard University. In the intervening years, I sought his advice, opinion, guidance, and support on many matters. Other than family members, he was the only constant presence in my life during that period. He was the one who made my foray into academic research and publishing possible. He had a wide range of interests. He called me in early August 2018 to talk about this edited volume. I was not quite ready because I was working on other projects. Two weeks thereafter, I called him to say I will make room for this collective effort. So here we are. At the time we started work on this project, there was constant reportage of Syrian and Middle Eastern refugees finding their way to Europe and North America. Also, the voluntary and forced movement of an unusually high number of Africans to Europe and other parts of the world was dominating the news cycle in Europe, North America and elsewhere. The social media was awash with news of Africans, dead and dying, in the Sahara Desert and at sea while trying to reach their transit or destination. At the height of the crisis, some European governments were closing their borders or making entry difficult or impossible, while many of their citizens saw African immigrants and refugees as pollutants. This attitude and rejection of the Africans were not universal, though. Many countries and citizens of these countries accommodated and provided for the immigrants and refugees. But on the African continent, many governments were indifferent to the plight of their people, while other governments simply did not have the wherewithal to stem the tide of these voluntary and forced movements. But, beyond that, many governments were simply ineffective—lacking the capacity for good governance and the provision of political and economic goods. While many factors compel Africans to move, economics played the most prominent and important role in the lives of African migrants. The economic conditions in many African countries are such that it debases their humanity. It calls into question the legitimacy of many governments, it calls into question the sanity and humanity of many African leaders, and it also

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calls into the questions the international system—a system that allows or condones African leaders and elites as they maim, terrorize, and kill their people. Religious and ethnic conflicts, natural disasters, severe economic conditions, and political repression all contribute to the forced movement of people. Many governments cannot impartially adjudicate conflicts or provide for those affected by manmade or natural disasters. The despair and desperation in many states and societies force many Africans to seek safety, security, civil liberties, and other life’s necessities in places where such services are routine. However, beyond the cruelty and the absence of good leadership is a network of Africans and their foreign proxies who delight in and profit from the forced movement of people. While the Civil Society and other agencies have a role to play in reducing the flow of migrants and refugees, it is the responsibility of the 54 governments on the African continent to provide the conditions that discourage certain categories of migratory movements. Working on this edited volume has not been easy. In addition to the usual problems and challenges associated with edited books, I, as with Abegunrin, had suffered health crises—necessitating multiple trips to the emergency room of our local hospital. And of course, there were family and work issues to attend to. Nevertheless, through it all, this book had to be completed. It was that important. Hyattsville, MD, USA Montgomery, AL, USA

Olayiwola Abegunrin Sabella O. Abidde

Acknowledgment

No one writes a book without debts, appreciation, and acknowledgments. So, we would like to thank and acknowledge Lorraine Klimowich who diligently and patiently took us through the proposal and contract process. Her professionalism was beyond reproach. We would also like to thank Maria David and Faith Su for seeing us through the production process. And to Rockey Samuel Savita, thank you! Dr. Elisha Jasper Dung was very helpful with some of the formatting. Professor Alem Hailu (Department of African Studies, Howard University) and Dr. Paul Erhunmwunsee (Professor of Geography and former Chair Criminal Justice and Social Sciences at Alabama State University) were very generous with their feedback. We would also like to thank all the contributors who were very patient with us despite the many months of delays. And finally, our words of thanks and appreciation to the anonymous reviewers for their confidence in our work. Thank you! Olayiwola Abegunrin, PhD Sabella O. Abidde, PhD

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In the modern era—especially since the end of the Second World War in 1945—the countries that have benefitted the most from the influx of skilled and not-so-skilled migrants and refugees are Canada, Germany, the UK, Australia, the USA, and France.1 In essence, the recent migrant and refugee phenomenon are not new to western societies. Economic, political, and social tension in the Middle East and many parts of the South-South could, at any point in the next couple of years, induce another round of mass migration across national and international borders. The situation is especially dire in Africa, where a sizeable number of Africans leave on their own volition or are forced to reach Europe and North America for safety and security. Immoderations, malevolence, conflicts, and acute deficiency in Basic Human Needs have been common in many of these states and societies. Whether forced or self-imposed, Africans have been migrating in response to what is broadly classified as the pull-push factors of migration. What this means is that some are compelled to leave (push) because of endogenous factors such as wars, ethnic and religious conflicts, persecution, life-threatening dangers, or economic difficulties. Others are induced to do so because of exogenous (pull) factors such as the need to reunite with loved ones, promises of gainful employment, or the need for better education. And of course, the security and civil liberties that countries like the USA and Canada have to offer attract migrants. However, more specifically, there are several theories across academic disciplines that explain the exodus of people within and across borders, and these theories vary from discipline to discipline. Within these disciplines are scholars such as Akinlawon Mabogunje, Douglass S.  Massey, Nina Glick Schiller, Hein de Haas, Larry A.  Sjaastad, and George J.  Borjas. Their theoretical submissions—from neoclassical to state-­ centric—offer different hypotheses. Even so, they are not mutually exclusive, but rather complementary.

1  “Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision.” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2015.

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Despite the abundance of optimism and the recent counsel that one must not interrogate or view the continent from a single lens, one cannot but ask “what’s going on in Africa?” This, after all, is a continent where excesses, inhumanities, and illiberal regimes have forced an untold number of Africans to abandon the continent in search of economic security and political safety in distant lands. Many governments on the African continent are unable to provide Basic Human Needs, and neither are they responsive to the individual and collective needs of their citizens. This inability or failure to provide is chiefly responsible for the unemployment and poverty, crimes, violence, conflicts, and, by extension, the refugee, migrants, and displacement problems on the continent. The works of John Burton and Coate and Rosati2 confirm this argument. It is also instructive to examine Africa’s record of poor governance and weak institutions. Furthermore, we make two interrelated propositions (because we believe that the problems and solutions to these influxes lie with African governments). First, we propose that there will never be a lasting solution to the migrant and refugee crisis unless Africans can find a solution to the “leadership, governance, and institutional crisis” on the continent. Weak and fragile states do precipitate migration problems. Second, we propose that the African Problem will continue to multiply and worsen unless Africans can provide good governance predicated on the rule of law, accountability, and responsiveness. In the last several decades, African migrants have trekked the Sahara Desert eventually reaching and crossing the Mediterranean Sea—with the hope of reaching Europe, North America, and other safe havens. In their attempt to reach their destination, some are taken captive (as modern slaves or held in detention camps in places like Libya) while others lose their lives during the dangerous treks or drown at sea. While it is true that there are migrants and refugees from other parts of the world who are desperately trying to reach France, Italy, Germany, Spain, the UK, and North America, this project is principally concerned with migrants and refugees from Africa, and how African governments failed their people and in the process aggravating the migration situation. Specifically, we are interested in a series of stand-alone and interrelated questions. For instance: 1. How has Africa’s colonial past and its current relationship (neocolonialism, post-9/11 alliances and realities) contributed to the crisis? 2. What are the economic, political, and social factors that have contributed to the crisis? 3. What are the plausible short and long-term solutions to help stem the tide of mass migration? 4. Whether African states and institutions are complicit in the crisis. 5. The role and responsibility of non-governmental organizations, regional blocs, the United Nations, and the African Union in managing the crisis. 2  Burton, John Wear. Conflict: Resolution and Prevention. New York: St. Martin Press, 1990; See also Coate, Roger A., and Jerel A. Rosati. The Power of Human Needs in World Society. Boulder: L. Rienner, 1988.

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6. The fate of migrants crossing the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea and the associated Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) many are likely to suffer. 7. The human and civil rights (protections) refugees and migrants are entitled to under domestic and international conventions. Furthermore, some of our contributors have chosen to investigate the consequences of the influx of migration/refugees on European states and societies. This is important because, historically, migrant and refugee influxes do exacerbate and or put pressure on economic conditions, race and social relations, religious and cultural understandings, and on the welfare system of many of receiving countries. Paul Collier, for example, was quoted as saying migrants “poses a danger to social cohesion, risks diluting our culture, our national identity, and may undermine trust, cooperation, solidarity between members of the public.”3 We are not interested in stating the obvious or in the regurgitation of events, but rather we have gathered scholars across various academic disciplines to critically analyze events and phenomena supported by qualitative and quantitative data. Besides, we also interrogate events in Israel, Latin America, and the USA because the crisis has a worldwide implication. In Chapter 1—“Voluntary and Forced Migration: The Failure of Governance and Leadership”—Sabella Abidde argues that much of the problems facing states and societies on the African continent can be attributed to the failure of or the absence of good governance. He posits that many African states do not have the requisite leadership and institutions to deal with natural and manmade disasters, promote and grow the economy, foster civil liberties and human rights, and promote a sense of belonging. The dearth of leadership and good governance, Abidde argues, complicates their lives, dehumanizes them, and, in many cases, forces them to reject their citizenship. The aggregation of these injuries and deficiencies is what compels many to look for goods and services in foreign lands. In the final analysis, therefore, unless Africans can get the leadership and governance question right, states and societies on the continent will continue to suffer and, in the process, force some of its most agile, talented, and capable citizens to leave. In Chapter 2—“Public Policy and Migration in Africa: A Multi-Theoretical Approach”—Benjamin Adu Gyamfi, Comfort Tiwaa Kwarteng, and Enoch Appiagyei examine the impact of migration on Africa and the continent’s response to curbing the situation. They argue that though migration has some noted positive effects on the economy of Africa such as migrant remittances, its socio-economic impact on the African continent is remarkably disturbing. To curb the negativities of migration, the authors argue that there is a need for African states to put in place the right public policies that will create the required economic opportunities to help keep African professionals in the continent. However, there is limited research on the role of public policy as an effective tool in curbing the menace of migration in 3  Al Jazeera. “Transcript: Paul Collier on Immigration.” Immigration. Al Jazeera. January 20, 2016. Accessed May 01, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/headtohead/2016/01/transcriptpaul-collier-immigration-160104190604853.html.

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Africa. While they admit that several measures have been put in place to address the issue of migration, Africa’s effort should be directed at developing a holistic approach based on public policy such as youth employment, entrepreneurship, and greater continental integration, among others. Africa’s effort would not yield the desired results without the appropriate public policies put in place that would help that would tackle the root cause of the problem. Gino J Naldi and Konstantinos D Magliveras in Chapter 3—“Migration and Human Rights in Africa”—examine and analyze the protection afforded to migration by African human rights and other relevant instruments as well as by African multilateral institutions. While the focus was on legal migration, the rights of illegal/irregular migrants are also covered. The authors analyzes the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the Protocol to the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment; the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa; the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Resolution 114 on Migration and Human Rights; and the AU Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action (2018–2030). Moreover, the authors examine the work of the ACHPR Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons, and Migrants. The relevant decisions delivered by Africa’s judicial and quasi-­judicial organs about the human rights aspects of migration are also examined. In Chapter 4—“Political Economy of Transnational Migration and Challenges for Global Justice”—Zuzana Uhde analyzes the political economy of transnational migration within the framework of critical theory by studying structural causes of transnational migration driven by global interaction and transnational economy, with a particular focus on the political economy of extractive industry. As opposed to the current tendency to make a strict distinction between economic migrants and refugees, the author argues that the distinction lies rather between people who are to a variegated degree forced to leave due to different reasons and people who are in an advantaged position due to their skills, economic or social capital, and who have access to a significantly more flexible transnational mobility regime. In particular, the chapter focuses on Eastern Africa to understand to what extent and how the migratory dynamics are influenced by activities of wealthy countries and transnational corporations while unpacking the interactions between the interest in natural resources of global actors, state political elites, and local communities. In Chapter 5—“Migration and Human Rights in Africa”—Caroline Nalule posits that African states demonstrated their solidarity on and collective concern with forced migration and its peculiar manifestation in Africa soon after independence. Hence, the African Convention on refugees and, much later, the Convention on Internally Displaced Persons. Nalule went on to state that migration in a more general sense did not receive equal collaborative attention and that it was largely a preserve of sovereign states and, accordingly, a matter for national rather than regional law. Consequently, there is no comprehensive normative framework on migration in Africa. Nonetheless, the status quo appears to be changing, brought on by a series of developments, both

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internal and external to the continent. For instance, the economic integration among African states that have seen sub-regions embraces the free movement of persons. Most relevant is the African Union (AU) Migration Policy Framework and the legal instruments that touch on specific aspects of migration. In Chapter 6—“African Migrants in Poland, 1945–2019”—Katarzyna Marzeda-Mlynarska analyzes the phenomenon of African migrations to Poland and explores whether Poland is or may become an attractive place for migrants from Africa in the future. The chapter consists of three sections separated chronologically. The first is devoted to the historical context of African immigration to Poland, from the end of World War II to 1989. The section part of the chapter covers the period from 1989 to 2004—when Poland became a member of the European Union. The third section analyzes migration from African countries during Poland’s membership in the EU. With no colonial past, Poland was not an attractive destination for potential immigrants. However, since the 1970s, Poland has opened itself for immigration from developing countries, and as a result, a large group of African migrants moved to Poland. In Chapter 7—“Globalizing Forces on Migration? A Dual Process”—Franco Tomassoni and Pedro Ponte e Sousa insist that while the impact of globalization on migration has been studied in recent years, it is both unclear how globalization theory, with different elements and thus different perspectives, has explained the relationship between globalization and migration. Moreover, this has been mostly seen as a one-directional interaction, without proper consideration of its consequences. So, they address this issue in two streams: first, how globalization theories has studied and proposed (implicitly or explicitly) the relationship between globalization, migration, and the nation-state; second, drawing on concrete cases (namely, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Libya), how migration is understood in political terms, as an issue that was traditionally part of foreign policy agenda and strategies, has transformed into domestic politics of border and migration management. In Chapter 8—“Non-Recognition and Its Implication: African Asylum Seekers in Israel”— Nurit Hashimshony-Yaffe focuses on African asylum seekers who are mostly Sudanese and Eritreans who entered Israel between 2005 and 2013. Because of their unlawful crossing, Israeli authorities defined them as illegal migrants and “infiltrators,” which brought about hostile policies and public opinion against them. The policies examined are the non-removal regime, settlement policies, the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process and related legal actions, and the establishment of the Holot Detention Camp (2013). Nurit argues that migration policies and regulations meant to achieve the control of African migration flow have led to an unintentional result—the emergence of an African Labor Market and its subsequent marginalization. Additionally, since the State is not protecting asylum seekers’ rights, civil society organizations and African community organizations are taking its place. The Israeli case reflects a general global phenomenon and demonstrates the strength of civil society and the direct and indirect effects of migration policies on both refugees’ community and host society. Natia Mechitishvili, in Chapter 9, “Rise of Populist Parties in the Era of Migration Crisis,” insists that while the migration is not a new phenomenon, a series of events starting with the economic crisis in 2008 followed by the Arab Spring in 2010, Civil

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War in Syria in 2014, and other geopolitical issues led to the massive movement of people across Europe. During the migration crisis, with its peak in the years 2014–2015, an unprecedentedly large number of arrivals were reported to the EU, the largest since World War II. Despite the empathetic approach from certain countries, Europe was not ready to deal with the situation. For instance, voters’ support increased for populist parties that were conveniently using anti-migrant rhetoric in their election campaigns. Spain, for instance, elected multiple far-right politicians to parliament for the first time since the country returned to democracy in 1975, in Austria the leading party went into a coalition with right-wing Freedom’s Party. Populist parties came to power even in such democratic and “friendly” countries like Sweden, Finland, and Estonia. In Chapter 10—“African Migration to Brazil and Latin America in the Twenty-­ First Century: New Trajectories and Old Paradigms”—Roberto Rodolfo Georg Uebel tells us that in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, Brazil received about 50,000 migrants; and within the Latin American context, estimates point to the arrival of some two hundred thousand African migrants. The author discusses these new trajectories with the use of thematic cartography to propose the debate about integration and inclusion of African migrants in Latin American and Brazilian society. Based on field research on Brazilian borders and surveys with West African migrants, mainly Senegalese and Ghanaians, and Luso-Africans, Roberto Uebel draws a sociodemographic profile of the main immigration flow into Latin America, which has been contributing to the redefinitions of political and cultural boundaries of the subcontinent and its relationship with African nations. In Chapter 11—“Libya and African Migration to Europe”—Olubukola Adesina asserts that many people have fled the Middle East and Africa for various reasons into Europe and in so doing endure a long journey in extreme conditions. Despite increased reportage of the dangers associated with the journeys, as well as allegations of “slave trade” in Libya, many Africans still aspire to embark on the perilous journey across the Mediterranean. It is for these reasons that Adesina examines the dangers associated with crossing the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea and the conditions of migrants trapped in Libya as they make their way northward. John Hickman, in Chapter 12, “Evaporating Mediterranean: The Fate of Migrants in a Shrinking Sea Commons,” averred that international law in the form of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or 1951 Refugee Convention imposes contradictory rights and obligations on the states around the Mediterranean littoral which increasingly tend to dry it up legally as a territorial common. Hickman also explains how international law and international relations across the Mediterranean failed some of the planet’s most vulnerable as well as offering a theorization of what that humanitarian failure tells us about the possible future development of relevant international law. Chapter 13—“Criminalization in the Mediterranean: The Regulation of Refugees and Rescue Missions at Europe’s Southern Borders”—is by Isabella Alexander. Drawing on firsthand narratives from her extensive experience with African migrant communities and data from search and rescue organizations, she explores how the

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process of EU and North African coast guard collaboration would look like in practice and how states’ rights to establish border policy are eschewing international human rights laws that ensure all citizens basic rights to seek asylum. Drawing again on first-hand narratives from migrant communities and critical comparisons with other off-shore processing centers that have been established in recent years, she questions the potential implications of “off-shoring.” Furthermore, she examines the lessons learned from the exportation of border controls to third party states and highlights the potentially catastrophic effects of establishing processing centers in Algeria and Morocco, only months after the EU has deemed neighboring Libya unfit for resettlement or detention. In Chapter 14—“Skilled Female New Canadians and Mental-Health Challenges: Effect of Unemployment and Underemployment” —Felicia Nwalutu and Michael Onyedika Nwalutu set out to examine a series of questions: How does the unemployment and underemployment situation of skilled women immigrants affect their mental health conditions and their access to healthcare? What roles do gender, race, and income play in getting access to quality and specialized healthcare in Canada? What is the impact of unemployment and underemployment on the mental health of new female immigrants in Canada? In examining these questions, they used textual analysis and healthcare systems’ model to foreground new immigrants’ experiences in Canada and contend that new Canadians particularly of minority extraction often lapse into mental health conditions due to unemployment and related stress, and conclude that the difficulty of navigating and penetrating the Canadian job market grossly limits their integration into the economic mainstream and, consequently, their optimal productivity in the society. Chapter 15—“The Human Cost of the Refugee Crisis in Africa”—is by Elisha Dung and Augustine Avwunudiogba, wherein they examine the changing dynamics of the problem of human displacement in Africa. They do so by employing the political economy framework to examine the geography of the refugee crisis on the continent and explore the economic and socio-cultural challenges faced by refugees in their host communities, including culture shock, language barriers, crime and criminality, as well as health challenges. Based on the general overview of the refugee situation in Africa, the paper utilizes the numerous findings from the literature to elucidate entrenched beliefs about refugees on the continent. The authors also explore the decision of refugees to return based on the prevailing socio-economic condition in the host country versus the country of refuge, as well as the political climate in the returning countries. The chapter concludes by analyzing the role of governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in addressing some of the policy challenges relating to refugees in Africa, such as insecurity in refugee-­ populated areas, protracted refugee situations, modalities for the return and integration of the refugees, and the protection of the displaced people. According to Olayiwola Abegunrin, in Chapter 16, “The Political Economy of Transnational Migration: A Case Study of Nigerian Immigrants in the United States,” Nigerian immigrants that came to the USA at the end of the Second World War, between 1945 and 1980, were mostly concerned with the search of knowledge (in terms of educations, technical skills, etc). With the new immigrants, their focus,

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in addition to acquiring education and other skills, is the economic sphere in terms of running private businesses. Essentially, Abegunrin contends that many Nigerian immigrants are contributing immensely, not only to the economy of the USA but also to the American academic and healthcare sectors. The Africa continent is endowed with a rich amount of human and natural resources; yet, it is unable to transit steadily and in a sustained manner from agrarian to industrialized society. No amount of foreign aids and assistance will make a significant difference if Africans themselves do not try or if they continue to blame external forces for their sorry conditions. And indeed, no amount of foreign remittances by the African Diaspora will make a dent in the level of poverty and inhumanities if strong, decent, accountable, and humane governments and institutions are lacking. While economic and political conditions differ from one country to another, by and large what we have is a continent where a sizeable number of the people—especially those between the ages of 18 and 45—cannot wait to get out of their respective countries. Nigeria is an archetypal example of a country where, if embassies assured travel visas, fifty percent or more of the college students and graduates would leave on their own volition. The conditions are also dire for non-­ students. The practical reality of everyday life in many countries is that of misery and nothingness. And so—danger or no danger in crossing the Sahara Desert or the Mediterranean Sea—they leave in search of safety, security, and human needs in other societies. Olayiwola Abegunrin Sabella O. Abidde

Contents

Part I History, Rights, Policy and Protocols   1 Forced Migration and the Failure of Governance��������������������������������    3 Sabella O. Abidde   2 Public Policy and Migration in Africa: A Multi-Theoretical Approach����������������������������������������������������������������   23 Benjamin Adu Gyamfi, Comfort Tiwaa Kwarteng, and Enoch Appiagyei   3 Migration and Human Rights in Africa������������������������������������������������   55 Konstantinos D. Magliveras and Gino J. Naldi   4 The Global Border Industrial Complex and Eastern Africa: Analyzing the Political Economy of Transnational Migration������������   73 Zuzana Uhde   5 Migration and Human Rights in Africa: The Policy and Legal Framework in Broad Strokes������������������������������������������������   95 Caroline Nalule Part II Regional Perspectives and Implications   6 African Migrants in Poland 1945–2019 ������������������������������������������������  115 Katarzyna Marzęda-Młynarska   7 Globalizing Forces on Migration? A Dual Process ������������������������������  139 Franco Tomassoni and Pedro Ponte e Sousa   8 Non-recognition and Its Implications: African Asylum Seekers in Israel ������������������������������������������������������������������������  157 Nurit Hashimshony-Yaffe   9 Rise of Populist Parties in the Era of Migration Crisis������������������������  175 Natia Mechitishvili xix

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10 African Migration to Brazil in the Twenty-­First Century: New Trajectories and Old Paradigms����������������������������������������������������  187 Roberto Rodolfo Georg Uebel 11 Libya and African Migration to Europe������������������������������������������������  219 Olubukola S. Adesina Part III Impact, Cost, and Consequences 12 “Evaporating Mediterranean: The Fate of Migrants in a Shrinking Sea Commons”����������������������������������������������������������������  243 John Hickman 13 Criminalizing the Mediterranean Crossing: The Regulation of Migrants, Refugees, and Rescue Missions at Europe’s Southern Borders������������������������������������������������  261 Isabella Alexander-Nathani 14 Skilled Female New Canadians and Mental Health Challenges: Effect of Unemployment and Underemployment����������������������������������������������������������������������������  277 Felicia Ihuoma Nwalutu and Michael Onyedika Nwalutu 15 The Human Cost of the Refugee Crisis in Africa����������������������������������  295 Elisha J. Dung and Augustine Avwunudiogba 16 The Political Economy of Transnational Migration: A Case Study of Nigerian Immigrants in the United States����������������  315 Olayiwola Abegunrin

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Olayiwola  Abegunrin  earned his Ph.D. from Howard University in 1980  in African Studies, Politics, and International Relations. From 1986–1988, he was a Senior Lecturer and Chair, Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University; from 1982–1990, he was a Consultant in the Departments of Defense & Foreign Affairs, Nigeria. He was also a Visiting Professor at several institutions including the University of Zimbabwe, Harare, and the University of Khartoum, Sudan. He is the author, coauthor, editor, and coeditor of several well-­ regarded books and journal articles. Professor Abegunrin served on the advisory board of many journals, including Global Studies, Africa, African World, Africa Today, African Studies Review, Renaissance Universal Journal, and the Journal of Negro Education. His teaching interest was in the areas of African Politics, Theories of International Relations, Pan-Africanism and African Diaspora, U.S.  Foreign Policy towards Africa, Political Economy and Economic Development, and North– South Relations and Politics of Developing Nations. Professor Abegunrin was a member of the International Studies Association, the Royal African Society, London, and a Life Member of the African Studies Association. Sabella O. Abidde  is a Professor of Political Science and a member of the Graduate Faculty at Alabama State University. He holds an M.A. in Political Science from Minnesota State University Mankato, Minnesota, as well as an M.Sc. in Educational Administration and a B.A. in International Relations from Saint Cloud State University, Minnesota. He earned his Ph.D. (2009) in African Studies, World Affairs, Public Policy and Development Studies from Howard University. His regions/areas of interest are Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and China-­ Africa-­Taiwan Relations. He is a recipient of the 2020 MOFA-Taiwan Fellowship Eawarded to scholars interested in conducting archival research in Taiwan. He is the Editor of Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean: The Case for Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation (Lexington Books, 2018) and Coeditor of Africans and xxi

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the Exiled Life: Migration, Culture and Globalization (Lexington Books, 2017). Dr. Abidde is a member of the Association of Global South Studies (AGSS), the African Studies and Research Forum (ASRF), the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA), and the American Political Science Association (APSA).

About the Contributors Olubukola  Stella  Adesina  obtained her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Natal (now University of KwaZulu-Natal), Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. She is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. Her area of specialization is International Relations. She has publications in the field of International Relations and on issues of human security in both local and international journals. Isabella Alexander-Nathani  is an award-winning writer, documentary filmmaker, and cultural anthropologist. A leading expert on international human rights, she has spent the past decade living between the USA, where she is a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Departments of Anthropology and Film & Media Studies at Emory University, and North Africa, where she works to defend the basic human rights of the world’s largest population of migrants and refugees. For the past 3 years, she has been working undercover to capture the treacherous journeys of three families from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and Sierra Leone toward the promise of safer shores for her latest documentary film, The Burning. She is a regular contributor to NPR, CNN, and BBC, and her forthcoming book, Burning at Europe’s Borders: Migration in the Age of Border Externalization, is scheduled for release through Oxford University Press alongside her film in 2020. Enoch  Appiagyei  is a doctoral candidate, Graduate Teaching Assistant, and Researcher at the University of Calgary. He specializes in International Law and the Politics of International Security. Appiagyei holds a B.A. (Hons) and an M.A. in Political Science from the University of Ghana and the University of Manitoba, respectively. Augustine  Avwunudiogba  is an Associate Professor of Geography in the Department of Anthropology, Geography and Ethnic Studies, California State University Stanislaus. He holds a Ph.D. in Geography from the University of Texas at Austin and an M.A. in Geographical Studies from Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville. Dr. Avwunudiogba’s recent publications on Africa and Latin America include topics on environmental resource use and conservation as well as bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and forthcoming publications on the challenges of refugees and internally displaced persons and African migrants and the refugee crisis.

Editors and Contributors

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Elisha  J.  Dung  is an Associate Professor and Coordinator of Geography in the Department of Advancement Studies at Alabama State University, Montgomery, Alabama. He holds a Ph.D. in Geography from Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma. He also holds a Master of Arts in Geography from the University of Northern Iowa, USA. Dr. Dung teaches courses in World Regional Geography, Cultural Geography, Regional Geography of North America, Computer Applications in the Social Sciences, and the Geography of Africa. His most recent publications have been on African diaspora; bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean; African migration; and Caribbean out-migration. Benjamin  Adu  Gyamfi  is a Doctoral Candidate and Sessional Instructor at the University of Calgary. His research interests include Public Policy, Research Methods, Comparative Politics, International Relations, and African International Relations. He completed his M.A. at Brock University, M.A. (Theology and Mission) at the Akrofi-Christaller Institute, Ghana, and B.A. (Hons) in Political Science at the University of Ghana. Nurit  Hashimshony-Yaffe  (Ph.D.  Hebrew University Jerusalem) is a Senior Lecturer and Head of Community and Leadership Studies at the Academic College of Tel Aviv Yaffo, School of Government and Society. She teaches courses in comparative politics, African politics and history, and politics of environmental crisis. Her research focuses on community-based organizations among Africans in Israel as well as in East African pastoral societies (facing climate change). She was a Visiting Fellow at the African Studies Centre, Leiden University, the Netherlands. Alongside her academic activity, she is a social change activist. John  Hickman  is a Professor of Political Science at Berry College, where he teaches courses on comparative politics, research methods, and war crimes and genocide. Before earning a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Iowa, he earned an M.A. in Political Science from the University of Missouri, Columbia, and a J.D. from Washington University, St. Louis; served as a Woodrow Wilson Administrative Fellow at Florida A & M University in Tallahassee, Florida; and taught at Reitaku University in Tokyo. He is the author of the 2013 University of Florida Press book Selling Guantánamo: Exploding the Propaganda Surrounding America’s Most Notorious Military Prison, soon to appear in Europe in a Spanish language translation. Comfort Tiwaa Kwarteng  is a Doctoral Candidate and Research and Teaching Assistant at the University of Calgary. Her research interests include Public Policy (Health), Comparative Politics, Security, and International Relations. Kwarteng holds an M.A. from Brock University and B.A. in Political Science from the University of Ghana.

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Konstantinos  D.  Magliveras  is a practicing Lawyer and Professor of Law of International Organizations, University of the Aegean, Greece. He is also a member of the Committee on Nuclear Weapons, International Law Association. In September 2018, he appeared as amicus curiae before the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court in the case of The Prosecutor v Al-Bashir. He has published extensively in the fields of human rights, migration, and international criminal law. He is currently working on a coedited collected volume on the emergence of an African Union legal system. Katarzyna Marzeda-Mlynarska  is an Associate Professor in the Political Science Faculty, Maria CurieSklodowska University  – UMCS in Lublin, Poland. She is majoring in International Relations and Economics. Since 2005, has been employed in the Department of International Relations at UMCS, where she teaches courses on inter alia global political economy, international social policy, and economics of development. Her research interest concentrates on migrations, global governance, international development, food security, and foreign policy. She is the author of articles on migration crisis. Marzeda-Mlynarska was also the editor of a special volume of Teka (Faculty’s scientific journal) devoted to migration problems. In her current research project, she concentrates on relations among three phenomena: climate change, food security, and migrations. Natia Mechitishvili  is a Ph.D. student of Caucasian Studies with a research question in Migration Development at Ilia State University, Tbilisi, Georgia. She used to be a research fellow at the European Centre for Minority Issues. Now she is an affiliated board member at the Centre for the Studies of Ethnicity and Multiculturalism. In 2010–2011, she was an invited lecturer at the University of Georgia where she taught an introductory course in politics. Since 2010, she had been working at the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Tbilisi, as of 2013 she has been working at the International Centre for Migration Policy Development in Vienna. Gino J. Naldi  (LL.M, Ph.D. Birmingham) is a former university senior lecturer in law in the UK, specializing in Public International Law, International Human Rights, and EU Law. He is currently an independent scholar. He has written extensively on African affairs and is coauthor, with Professor Konstantin Magliveras, of The African Union: History, Institutions and Activities (Kluwer Law International, 2018). He is also the author of Constitutional Rights in Namibia: (Juta, 1995). He has contributed to various edited works and has published widely in learned journals such as the African Human Rights Law Journal, African Yearbook of International Law, Nordic Journal of International Law, and Zeitschrift für auslandisches öffentliches Recht und Volkerrecht. Caroline Nalule  is a lawyer and postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Oxford, Refugee Studies Centre, currently conducting research on a European Research Council Funded project titled “Refugees are Migrants: Refugee Mobility,

AU2

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Recognition and Rights.” She obtained an LLB from Makerere University, Uganda; an LLM in international human rights law from Lund University, Sweden; and a Ph.D. from the University of Witwatersrand, South Africa. Her PhD thesis addressed the migration rights of citizens in the East African Community. She has over 10 years’ experience within the fields of human rights and international law. Her research interests include public international law, international human rights law, citizenship and migration law, refugee law, and international criminal law. Felicia  Ihuoma  Nwalutu  holds a Ph.D. in history, women, and gender studies from the University of Lagos, Nigeria. She holds an M.A. and MSW in history and women studies and social work, respectively, from the University of Toronto, Canada. She was a Visiting Lecturer at the Institute of Museology, Jos Nigeria and has served as Chief Ethnographer at the National Commission for Museums and Monument, Benin City, Nigeria. Felicia has published locally and internationally. She reviewed for HNet Africa and has some book chapters and journal publications to her credit. Her research interests are in social work, mental-health, African and world history, women and gender studies, youth transnational migration, museum, and museology. Michael  Onyedika  Nwalutu  holds a Ph.D. in Sociology of Education from the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, OISE University of Toronto, Canada. He holds graduate degrees in Education, Marketing, and International Relations respectively. Michael served as a lecturer with the Federal University of Technology Owerri, Benin Extension, Nigeria. He co-reviewed for H-Net and has some book chapters and journal publications to his credit. Michael’s research interests are education and knowledge production, youth and transnational migration, globalization, anti-colonial and anti-racist theories, Indigenous world views, disability studies, psychology of children and adults with learning disabilities, and international relations. Pedro Ponte e Sousa  is a Ph.D. candidate in Global Studies in the Department of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, New University of Lisbon. He is a Researcher at the Portuguese Institute of International Relations (IPRI). Pedro has an M.A. in History, International Relations, and Cooperation from the University of Porto and a B.A. in Languages and International Relations from the same institution. His Ph.D. thesis concerns the relationship between globalization, global governance, and foreign policy in Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece). His research interests include foreign and security policy, foreign policy analysis, diplomacy, globalization, global governance, European Union, and Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece). Franco Tomassoni  is a Ph.D. candidate in Global Studies, Department of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, New University of Lisbon (FCSH-UNL). He is a Researcher at the Portuguese Institute of International Relations (IPRI). Franco has an M.A. in Political Science and International Relations

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from the same institution and a B.A. in Anthropology from the University of Bologna. His Ph.D. thesis concerns the relationship between the Portuguese colonial empire, African modernization processes, and the oil industry. His research interests include world history, logistic studies, political philosophy, political geography, and international relations. Roberto  Rodolfo  Georg  Uebel  holds a Ph.D. in International Strategic Studies (the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Brazil). He is Professor in the Department of International Relations at Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing (ESPM-Sul) and Faculdade São Francisco de Assis (UNIFIN). Roberto is Researcher at the Laboratory State and Territory (LABETER/CNPq) and Laboratory of International Studies (LEIn/CNPq). Zuzana Uhde  specializes in social/feminist theory and research of global interactions. She focuses particularly on transnational migration in relation to global justice, geopolitical economy and EU–Africa relations, and transnational care practices. She works at the Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences. She is the Editor-in-Chief of the journal Gender a výzkum/Gender and Research and a research fellow in the program Global Conflicts and Local Interactions. She has published articles in academic journals (Critical Sociology, International Feminist Journal of Politics, etc.) and collective monographs. Dr. Uhde received her Ph.D. from Charles University in Prague. She held Fulbright fellowship at UC Berkeley, USA, visiting fellowship at PUCRS, Brazil (2016), and other fellowships. In 2018–2019, she has been a visiting research fellow at the Makerere University, Uganda.

Abbreviations

ACHPR ACmHPR ACP AEC AfCFTA AMU AU AU-FMP CAPES CEN-SAD CMW

African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights African, Caribbean and Pacific African Economic Community African Continental Free Trade Area Arab Maghreb Union African Union The AU Free Movement Protocol Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel Community of Saharan and Sahelian States United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa COMIGRAR National Conference on Migration and Refuge CPLP Community of Portuguese Language Countries CRCT Community Resources Connections of Toronto CSD Civil Society Days DCIM Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration EAC East African Community EC European Commission ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EEC European Economic Community EU European Union FRONTEX European Border and Coast Guard Agency GDP Gross Domestic Product GETFUND Ghana Education Trust Fund IALSS International Adult Literacy and Skills Survey ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights IDP Internally Displaced Persons xxvii

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IGAD IMF IOM MHP MPFA NABCO NYEP OAU PALOP PEC-PG PIBA PPD PTSD REC REIO SADC SAR SCAR SINCRE SME SSNIT TNC UN UNCLOS UNDESA UNESCO UNHCR WB WTO YEA

Abbreviations

Intergovernmental Authority on Development International Monetary Fund International Organization of Migration Mental Health Promotion Migration Policy Framework for Africa Nation Builders Corp National Youth Employment Program Organization of African Unity Portuguese-Speaking African Countries Foreign Affairs Graduate Student Program Israel Administration of Border Crossings, Population and Immigration Postpartum Depression Posttraumatic Stress Syndrome Regional Economic Communities Regional Economic Integration Organization Southern African Development Community Search and Rescue Spanish Commission for the Assistance of Refugees National System of Registration of Foreigners Small and Medium Enterprises Social Security and National Insurance Trust Transnational Corporations United Nations United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees World Bank World Trade Organization Youth Employment Agency

List of Figures

Chart 10.1 Evolution of African immigration to Brazil – 2003/2010��������������� 189 Fig. 10.1 Map – Contingent of immigrants in Brazil by country of origin – 2003/2010 – Africa Prepared by: Geographer Jesica Wendy Beltrán Chasqui. Adapted by Roberto Rodolfo Georg Uebel (2018)������������������������� 191 Chart 10.2 Evolution of permanent African migration flows to Brazil – 2003/2010 ��������������������������������������������������������������������� 193 Chart 10.3 Main African sending countries of permanent immigrants to Brazil – 2003/2010�������������������������������������������������� 194 Chart 10.4 Evolution of temporary African migration flows to Brazil – 2003/2010���������������������������������������������������������������������� 195 Chart 10.5 Main African sending countries of temporary immigrants to Brazil – 2003/2010��������������������������������������������������������������������� 196 Fig. 10.2 African candidates selected by the PEC-PG program – 2000–2013��������������������������������������������������������������������� 197 Fig. 10.3 Luso-African flows and routes to Brazil – 2003/2010�������������������� 198 Chart 10.6 Evolution of Luso-African flows to Brazil – 2003/2010���������������� 199 Chart 10.7 Evolution of African immigration to Brazil – 2011/2016��������������� 201 Fig. 10.4 Map – Contingent of immigrants in Brazil by country of origin – 2011/2016 – Africa Prepared by: Geographer Jesica Wendy Beltrán Chasqui. Adapted by Roberto Rodolfo Georg Uebel (2018)������������������������� 204 Chart 10.8 Evolution of permanent African migration flows to Brazil – 2011/2016 ��������������������������������������������������������������������� 205 Chart 10.9 Main African sending countries of permanent immigrants to Brazil – 2011/2016 ������������������������������������������������� 206 Chart 10.10 Evolution of temporary African migration flows to Brazil – 2011/2016���������������������������������������������������������������������� 207

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List of Figures

Chart 10.11 Main African sending countries of temporary immigrants to Brazil – 2011/2016�������������������������������������������������� 208 Fig. 10.5 Map – Flows of West Africans migrants to Brazil between 2011 and 2016������������������������������������������������������������������ 210 Fig. 10.6 Map – Routes of Senegalese immigrants towards Brazil���������������� 212 Fig. 10.7 Police State action against West African immigrants selling irregular goods – Municipality of Novo Hamburgo/RS ����������������� 214 Fig. 13.1 Tourists enjoy a break in front of the “Barca Nostra” exhibit by artist Christopher Buchel at the Spring 2019 Venice Biennale. Photograph courtesy of Martin Herbert and copied with his permission������������������������������������������������������� 266 Fig. 13.2 Map of primary migratory routes between Africa and Southern Europe. Image is based on a 2012 version of MTM i-Map, which can be found at (www.imap-migration.org)��������������������������������������������������������� 270 Fig. 13.3 A sampling of the photographs collected for the author’s “Names not Numbers” campaign, which documents the names, faces, and individual stories of the 47 vicitms of the February 4, 2019 tragedy in the Mediterranean Sea and can be viewed in full at www.twitter.com/isabella_writes. Photographs courtesy of the victims’ families and copied with their permission�������������� 275 Fig. 15.1 Temporal pattern of refugees on a 5-year interval in Africa: 1988–2018���������������������������������������������������������������������� 298 Fig. 15.2 Spatial distribution of refugees in Africa: 1988–2018�������������������� 299 Fig. 15.3 Refugees as a percentage of the national population in Africa: 1988–2018 ��������������������������������������������������������������������� 301 Fig. 15.4 Refugees as a proportion of GDP in Africa: 1988–2018���������������� 303

List of Tables

Table 6.1 Diplomatic relations between Poland and selected African countries – agreements related to population movements������������������������������������������������������ 120 Table 6.2 Foreigners studying in Poland between 1952 and 1973������������������� 122 Table 6.3 Number of foreign graduates of Polish universities by the number of countries of origin and continents in the years 1950–2000�������������������������������������������� 127 Table 6.4 Number of citizens of African countries in Poland according to status 2019��������������������������������������������������� 131 Table 10.1 Ranking of African sending countries of migrants to Brazil – 2003/2010����������������������������������������������������������������������� 190 Table 10.2 Cooperation agreements signed between Brazil and the PALOPs – 2003/2010���������������������������������������������������������� 200 Table 10.3 Ranking of African sending countries of migrants to Brazil – 2011/2016����������������������������������������������������������������������� 203 Table 16.1 US trade in goods with Nigeria, 1985–2016 (All figures are in US million dollars on a nominal basis)��������������� 322 Table 16.2 United States: states with the largest Nigerian populations������������� 323 Table 16.3 Nigerian immigrants remittances from the United States to Nigeria, 1993–2010 (In millions of US dollars)���������������������������������������������������������������� 324

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Part I

History, Rights, Policy and Protocols

Chapter 1

Forced Migration and the Failure of Governance Sabella O. Abidde

Introduction In recent years, the conversation about Africa has largely centered on six issues: The idea that a new Africa is emerging due largely to positive economic data and the increase in western-style democracies. Also garnering attention is the Sino-African relations which seem to be confounding western capitals. And while globalization has been good in many respects, it has enabled corporations to dictate to, in some instances, usurp state power and sovereignty. Fourth, because of the nature of colonialism and the way independence was granted, neocolonialism seems to be the norm on the continent. The fifth observable phenomenon is the parade of weak leaders, a rapacious elite, and weak institutions – the combination of which have led to the asphyxiations of economic and political opportunities and the inability of states to deal with catastrophes, excesses, and conflicts. These have in turn have led to the sixth factor: the forced movement of Africans within and outside of the continent. According to the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are 70.8 million forcibly displaced people worldwide.1 Of these, South Sudan has the highest number of refugees in Africa estimated at 2.4 million. Why are these many people fleeing insecurities and inhumanities, and why are the conditions profoundly desperate in Africa? But more importantly, why are governments in Africa so ineffective in curbing the conditions that compel their citizens to risk their lives and safety in search of safety, economic security, and basic

1  “Refugee Statistics.” USA for UNHCR.  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Accessed February 9, 2020. https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-facts/statistics/

S. O. Abidde (*) Department of History and Political Science, Alabama State University, Montgomery, AL, USA e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. Abegunrin, S. O. Abidde (eds.), African Migrants and the Refugee Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56642-5_1

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human needs? When a government cannot perform its basic duties and responsibilities, it is evident that such a government is failing. We, therefore, contend that the failure of the state and its institutions, and the weak nature of leadership, is responsible for three related problems in recent times: the surging migration out of Africa, the refugee situation, and the internally displaced persons phenomenon. Many states in Africa gained independence on weak, fragmenting, and/or porous foundation – plagued, for example, by unhealthy ethnic rivalry, primeval grudges, disparate aspirations, and the greed and malevolence of leaders who had no idea how to govern a modern state. Within a decade or so, many of these states were torn or threatened by coups, ethnic conflicts, or outright civil wars. Ruth First averred that many of these entered independences more divided than united; therefore, the test of independence politics was to rest largely on the attempt of the parties and the politicians to devise a unifying political purpose for their countries and peoples.2 While a lot has changed in the intervening decades, African societies have yet to transit to a modern state where, for example, the rule of law and institutions are viable, impartial, and paramount. While there are exceptions – the beacons on the hill, i.e., Botswana and Senegal – what we have is a continent hunkered down by poor leadership and institutional failure: the failure of the decision-making process, the failure of public policy, and the failure to provide basic human needs. Their abysmal failures have in no small measure contributed to or helped worsened conflicts on the continent. Conflicts – resource-related, personality-driven, nationalism, ethnic, or religion-induced – are part of the human society, but most modern states have mechanisms in place to help prevent, ameliorate, or resolve them. This is where many African countries have gotten it wrong: their inability to provide political goods and services and their failure to carry out their constitutional duties and responsibilities.

Migration: The Global Picture Historically, humans have always been on the move. Their movement can be internal, regional, or across national and international borders. In Africa, for instance, there was the Bantu migration;3 in Europe, there was the Serb and the Irish migrations,4 including the German’s eastward expansion that is generally referred to

2  Ruth First. The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup Détat. London: Penguin Press, 1970. 3  Siso, Zedekia Oloo., Jan Bender. Shetler, and Peter Wanyande. Grasp the Shield Firmly, the Journey Is Hard: A History of Luo and Bantu Migrations to North Mara, (Tanzania), 1850–1950. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki Na Nyota Publishers, 2010. 4  Fitzgerald, Patrick, and Brian Lambkin. Migration in Irish History, 1607–2007. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

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as the Ostsiedlung migration.5 In the United States, there was, between 1910 and 1970, the Great Migration – the exodus of African Americans out of the southern region to mostly the northern region.6 Two interlocking theories account for migration: the pull-push factors of migration.7 At the basic level, the first half of the theory states that there are external factors that attract and pull people to leave their homeland for good and compelling reasons in foreign countries, i.e., uniting with spouses or parents, the prospect of economic advantages, and the chance at a quality education. Along the same line, some go abroad in search of greener pasture. This idea of going abroad – to increase one’s chance at a more favorable future – is what Africans proverbially refer to as the golden fleece (going in search of the golden fleece). On the other spectrum are the push factors: events and phenomenon that compel one to leave one’s homeland, i.e., escape from political and religious persecution, environmental and biological disasters, wars, and poverty. In more recent times, however, millions of people – especially the youths – have migrated because of the shrinking political and economic space.8 Whether one knows it or not, acknowledges it or not, moving from one’s homeland to a foreign land can be disorienting and even painful.9 The pain and the anguish are less for most who vacated in their pre-teenage or teenage years. For them, acculturation and assimilation are much easier. With time, the memory of the old country fades; cultural chips become less powerful or insignificant, and ties to friends and family may become loose or nonexistent. Essentially, therefore, they lose one country and gain another, lose one set of identity and gain another. They transfer their love and loyalty to their new country. Most will know one country and one country only. This is generally the case and the pattern unless of course a mother or a father or an influential relative kept the flame and the desire for the old country alive.10 Other than the movement within the continent, there is also the movement of Europeans into Africa, i.e., European settlers finding home in the northern, eastern, and southern regions of the continent. These movements and settlements 5  Brettell, Caroline B., and James Frank Hollifield. Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines. New York: Routledge, 2000. 6  Wilkerson, Isabel. Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of Americas Great Migration. London: Penguin Books, 2020. 7  Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz, and Josh DeWind. The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999. See also Brettell, Caroline B., and James Frank Hollifield. Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines. New  York: Routledge, 2015. 8  Abegunrin, Olayiwola, and Sabella Ogbobode Abidde. African Intellectuals and the State of the Continent: Essays in Honor of Professor Sulayman S. Nyang. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018. 9  Salman Akhtar. Immigration and Acculturation: Mourning, Adaptation, and the next Generation. Lanham, MD: Jason Aronson, 2011. 10  Abegunrin, Olayiwola, and Sabella Ogbobode Abidde. African Intellectuals and the State of the Continent: Essays in Honor of Professor Sulayman S. Nyang. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018.

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materialized primarily because of colonialism and postcolonial interest in Africa. The Germans, for instance, have a home in Namibia. And, of course, Indians and the Lebanese have also found a home in East and West Africa. One of the major movements of Africans outside of the continent is the forced movements of Africans during the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade to plantations in Europe and the western hemisphere. In the last 50 years, however, there have been other migratory periods. In the years following self-rule, many Africans left the continent in search of what was broadly referred to as the “golden fleece”: Citizens of colonial Britain – Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, and Uganda, for instance – left for Britain in search of education and other advantages that would enable them to climb social and bureaucratic ladders of their countries. This was also the case in Portuguese, Spanish, German-, and French-­ speaking African countries.11 During the coup years – a period that was characterized by military dictatorships, repression, and persecution – many Africans left the continent in search of enriching environs in places like the United States, the UK, and Canada. This was the period when many public and ivory tower-based intellectuals were forced or encouraged to leave. They were not seen as migrants or expatriates but as exiles. And in more recent times, many have left – and many more continue to leave because of the high rate of unemployment and the searing poverty that has come to engulf many parts of the continent. In addition to redundancy and poverty, millions also must contend with the lack of basic human needs and the many flashpoints that permeates significant portions of  the continent. The latter  movement coincided with the pull of globalization.12 Despite the growing incidences of xenophobia and nativism in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere in the world, migration has not slowed down. There is and will always be reasons for people to leave their place of birth either in fulfillment of dreams and aspirations or in reaction to a psychological or somatic dangers. Qualitative and quantitative analysis suggests that: The number of global migrants is increasing slightly faster than the world’s population: They represent 3.3 percent of all people today, compared with 2.6 percent in 1960…Numerically, there are 165 million more global migrants today than in 1960, and as their numbers have risen, their routes have changed. Nearly 7 in 10 international migrants (69 percent in 2013) live in the highest-income nations, mainly the U.S., Canada, and European countries. In 1990, fewer than 6  in 10 did (57 percent). The total in wealthy nations rose to 160 million in 2013 from 87 million in 1990.13

Globally, India is the highest source of emigrants, with 15.6  million in 2015. Its diaspora has more than doubled in size since 1990, followed by Mexico, (12.3 million), China (9.5  million), and the Philippines (5.3  million). Due to the conflict  Ibid, Abegunrin and Abidde.  Ibid, Abegunrin and Abidde. 13  Michael Dimock. “Global Migration’s Rapid Rise.” Global Migration’s Rapid Rise. July 05, 2016. Accessed February 19, 2020. “Global Migration’s Rapid Rise.” The Pew Charitable Trusts. Accessed https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/trend/archive/summer-2016/global-migrations-rapidrise#:~:text=Global Migration’s Rapid Rise, risen, their routes have changed. 11 12

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within its borders, Syria in 2015 became the world’s ninth-ranked sending country, with about five million people born there but now living in other countries. Many migrants have made their way to Europe, helping to fuel a sharp rise in refugees and adding to concerns with security. In terms of housing these immigrants, the United States stands apart from all other nations because it is home to a rising share of the world’s migrants and houses more of them than any other country: 45 million people born elsewhere now reside in the United States.14

Forced Migration There is a rich body of literature that interrogates exile and self-migration by continental and diasporic Africans.15 While exile connotes removal and forced relocation to a foreign land by regimes, events, or forces beyond one’s control and/or against one’s will, self-migration suggests voluntary and/or controlled departure from one’s homeland. Here and now, however, one makes no such differentiation. No such distinction is warranted because, within the African experience, both phenomena are the same – or at the very least, the lines are insignificant to muse over. Intellectuals like Ali Mazrui, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, and Wole Soyinka are members of a small class of whom it could be said fit the classical definition of exile.16 The prevailing economic, political, social, and environmental conditions in the continent, especially in the 1980s through the first decade of the twenty-first century, was such that many had left without being forced in the classical sense. It was, for many, a matter of survival either for oneself or the entire family. Others were lured by the possibilities and advantages they believed were in abundant supply on the other side of the Mediterranean, Indian, and Atlantic Oceans. Two victimized groups forced into exile are the internally displaced persons and the refugees. According to Erin Mooney, “when the issue of internal displacement emerged onto  Ibid, Abegunrin and Abidde.  Toyin Falola, and Adebayo Oyebade. The New African Diaspora in the United States. New York, NY: Routledge, 2016; Kane, Abdoulaye, and Todd H.  Leedy. African Migrations: Patterns and Perspectives. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013; Konadu-Agyemang, Kwadwo, Baffour K.  Takyi, and John A.  Arthur. The New African Diaspora in North America: Trends, Community Building, and Adaptation. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006. 16  Though a Kenyan, Mazrui left Makerere University in Uganda and went into exile fearing that President Idi Amin would retaliate against him for refusing his (Amin’s) offer of political appointment. Ngugi Wa Thiong’o (Kenyan) was forced into exile, first in Britain (1982–1989) and later the United States (1989–2002) by the Arap Moi government primarily because of his intellectualism which were considered anti-government. As with Wa Thiong’o, Soyinka has been in exile twice: After his clandestine meeting with the then secessionist/Biafra leaders, Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, he was detained and jailed by the General Yakubu Gowon’s admiration for almost 2 year in 1967. Upon his release in 1969, he went into self-exile; in 1994, however, he was compelled to go into exile by General Sani Abacha due in part to his political activities with the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) – a broad coalition of Nigerian democrats that called on Abacha to step down in favor of the presumed winner of the June 12, 1993 election, Chief M. K. O. Abiola. 14 15

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the international agenda in the early 1990s, no definition of ‘internally displaced persons’ existed. Yet, having a definition was essential for identifying the populations of concern and their needs, compiling data, and framing laws and policies designed to assist them. Two core elements of the concept of internal displacement were clear. One, was the involuntary nature of the movement. Two, was the fact that such movement takes place within national borders – a criterion which distinguished the internally displaced from refugees who, according to international law, by definition are outside of their country.”17 According to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998), internally displaced persons (IDPs) are “Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”18 Refugee, on the other hand, is a person who, “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”19

Governance and Leadership Aside from the residual effects of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and colonialism, two of the biggest challenges facing African states and its people are good governance and weak institutions. Even if these challenges have their origins in their colonial connection, many of these states have had ample time to resolves many of the problems and challenges associated with the governance and governing institutions. If Asian and Latin American countries in the Middle East can, why not states in Africa? The inability of Africans to get things right 30–60 years after independence is not only perplexing but is also unconscionable. Except for a few states in the continent, the majority are ineffective, unaccountable, and unresponsive. Many African leaders, including many of the elected ones, habitually violate the constitution and the rule of law. And many more engage in survival strategies just to remain in power, while others collude with foreign interests in plundering state resources. Furthermore, the disregard for good governance has, in many ways,  Mooney, E. “The Concept of Internal Displacement and the Case for Internally Displaced Persons as a Category of Concern.” Refugee Survey Quarterly 24, no. 3 (January 2005): 9–26. 18  “Internal Displacement.” IDMC. International Displacement Monitoring Center. Accessed April 20, 2020. https://www.internal-displacement.org/internal-displacement 19  Please see the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees. 17

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impacted the utility and effectiveness of institutions. Many African leaders seem not to understand that, through their redistributive role, institutions ensure fair distribution of wealth, resources, and power; moderate political excesses; address grievances and complaints; and also play a significant role in the confidence-­building processes.20 Because this understanding is lacking or weak in Africa, it gives rise to the exacerbation of grievances and the explosion of pent-up anger within the private and public sector and the general society. The absence of viable and independent institutions to check and moderate the behavior and pronouncements have contributed to the continent’s socioeconomic and political problems. Consequently, poverty and inequality, misappropriations and corruption, and many private and public ills have been institutionalized in places like Kenya, Cameroon, and Nigeria. Because of the endemic carelessness in governance, many states in sub-Saharan Africa cannot easily, readily, and effectively provide basic human needs such as nutritious food, clean water, medical care, education, good roads and bridges, uninterrupted power supply, security, and public infrastructure for most of its citizens. Many states cannot provide the goods, services, and environment that enable citizens to flourish and lead healthy happier lives. According to the World Bank Development Report of 1997, the first obligation of nation-states is to get the five fundamentals of development right. These “five fundamentals lie at the core of every government’s mission, without which sustainable, shared, poverty-reducing development is impossible:”21 1 . Establishing a foundation of law 2. Maintaining a nondistortionary policy environment, including macroeconomic stability 3. Investing in basic social services and infrastructure 4. Protecting the vulnerable 5. Protecting the environment. However, not all African states are scandalously wanting in the listed areas. Some states are better than others. Kudos can be given to to Botswana, Namibia, Senegal, Malawi, and Ghana. After a prolonged period of coups and countercoups and economic and social stagnation, Ghana, under the tutelage of Jerry Rawlings, made gains and reverted to multiparty electoral system. Today, Ghana is a multiparty democracy with a growing economy and a healthy political climate. However, taken together, progress has been slow, halting, and erratic all over the continent. Even resource-rich countries like Nigeria, Angola, and Mozambique have been slow to provide for their people.

 Leonce Ndikumana. “Institutional Failure and Ethnic Conflicts in Burundi.” African Studies Review 41, no. 1 (1998): 29–47. 21  “World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World.” New York: Published for the World Bank, Oxford University Press, 1997. 20

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The Emergence or Reemergence of Democracy Democracy, broadly speaking, is “the legal freedom to formulate and advocate political alternatives with the concomitant rights to free association, free speech, and other basic freedom of the person; free and nonviolent competition among leaders with periodic validation of their claim rule; inclusion of all effective political offices in the democratic process; and provision for the participation of all members of the political community, whatever their political preference.”22 Within the context of Linz’s definition, then, democracy is a new phenomenon in Africa: a postcolonial phenomenon Africans are trying to grapple with. However, as Chuka Onwumechili has argued, democracy is not new to the continent since African traditional societies were democratic long before the colonial era. The problem was that: …there are the practical issues which arise from the efforts made to impose foreign political models on societies with a different history and unique combination of indigenous traditions, economic conditions, and external constraints…there are theoretical questions…which relate to the methods, aims, and processes of liberalization and democratization in third-world countries….23

But since states in Africa are modeled after modern states in the Westphalia tradition, one could argue that many states in Africa make light of democracy as Juan Linz and Robert Alan Dahl24 see it. Even so, as the Cold War was coming to an end, states in Africa began to embrace western-style democracy. For some states in Africa, the embrace of democracy was the precondition for foreign aids, foreign direct investments, bilateral and multilateral agreements, military and security assistance, and precondition for being invited to exclusive gatherings in western capitals. Or, as Alex Thomson put it: Africa’s embrace of multi democracy in the 1990s can be explained by an agreement among all the players involved. State elites, who for so long were ideologically committed to more authoritarian forms of government, were now converted to pluralism. Similarly, civil society expanded its campaign for the same goal. It was also a period where the international community backed these political trends….25

The United States and her western allies strategically shifted their priority to democracy and freedom in Africa.26 This was also the message to states in the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Countries like the United States, which had once cuddled and supported despots and authoritarian regimes, were now disavowing them. Also, military regimes and all forms of nondemocratic systems of government were being condemned, not just at the United Nations but also wherever

 Juan Linz. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Boulder, Colo.: Rienner, 1999.  Chuka Onwumechili. African democratization and military coups. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998. 24  Robert A. Dahl. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989. 25  Alex Thomson. An introduction to African politics. New York, NY: Routledge, 2010. 26  Samuel Decalo. “The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in Africa.” African Affairs 91, no. 362 (1992): 7–35. 22 23

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American presidents and State Department officials went.27 Fortunately, many African states were receptive to western-style democracy. The unfortunate part was that many did not anticipate what the costs were going to be, and neither did they fully understand what it meant to be a democracy. Some countries equated democracy with conducting elections. They were not ready for the whole gamut of democratization and liberalization: a functioning constitution, rule of law, civil liberties, the expansion of the political space, the role and place of the civil society and the media, and so forth. And for many sit-tight presidents, they were not happy with the idea of giving up the presidency and the attendant trappings. The result was that many states and many presidents balked at the last minute and/or did not go through as fully and completely as they had promised or had been expected of them. What many African presidents failed to realize was that democracy is a culture, a way of life – a culture and a way of life that demanded sacrifices and a new way of thinking and governing. These, broadly speaking, are personal failures on the part of the said presidents. The other types of failure involve the failure to educate the people about their rights and responsibility before and after the election. Also, most voters do not pay attention to the party or candidate’s programs and promises – but instead, what gets their attention were ethnic, regional, and religious affiliations. There is also the failure to understand the concept of winner-take-all: in all elections, there will be winners and losers; whether one win or lose is temporary. There will be other electoral opportunities. Not understanding this and other concepts and ideas about democracy and elections have led to cheating, violence, and disillusionment. Third, in many cases, election bureaucrats are not properly trained on how to conduct free-­ fair elections. And even in places where they are professionally trained, many are party loyalists or are loyal to the candidate who may be a member of their ethnic group. What is also common in rudimentary democracies is the absolute need to win and the absolute need to remain in office. Therefore, incumbents – especially if they are members of the ruling party – do all they can to circumvent electoral laws knowing that they are likely to get away with it. Fifth, the courts, for the most part, are ill-equipped to resolve disputes in a fair, just, and timely manner. And of course, there are cases of judges and court officials who take bribes and other inducements for a predetermined outcome that favors the candidate with the deepest purse. What’s more, there seems to be a sense of general apathy among the electorate because, for the most part, the promises of change for a better tomorrow seemed not to have materialized: democracy has not brought economic growth and

 President Bill Clinton was constantly encouraging African countries to forsake authoritarianism in favor of democracy. In addition, the gory and unfortunate events of September 11, 2001, made democracy an urgent global goal for the United States and her allies. It should also be noted that, increasingly, African intellectuals and the new breed of politicians clamored for change in the political system of their respective countries. And finally, it could also be said that the military in various African countries became weary and wary of coups.

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development in the way and manner many had hoped for. At the very least, there seem to be no improvements in the governance and the provision of basic human needs. It could be that Africans (being new to this type of governing dispensation) have an unrealistic expectation of democracy, or their governments and governing institutions simply disappointed them. Whatever the case may be, in a place like Nigeria, the complaint is that democracy has given wings to economic inequality and worsened the already present ethnicity and primordial suspicion. In both the traditional and social media, there is the endless accusation of ethnicity, regionalism, and religious preferences whenever political appointments are made, when contracts awarded, or when elevations in the bureaucracy are announced. Despite the supposed disappointments that are associated with democracy, most Nigerians still prefer it to military rule. The preference for democracy is true of countries across the continent even if the change that is desired is manifesting at a painfully slow pace. There are several reasons for the spread of democracy. The simplest reason is that Africa, as with the rest of the world, is changing. And much of the change can be attributed to education, international travel, and globalization. Second, the continent’s teeming youthful population is beginning to demand democracy and good governance. Third, the elites are beginning to realize that they cannot maintain the status quo. Fourth, African leaders themselves are beginning to realize that they must do more for their people; otherwise, they will be swept away from power. Also, the pressure from western nations was getting to be too unbearable for African leaders to continue with their stale and stifling way. Also, the collapse of the Cold War – and the lessons of September 11, 2011 – could not be discounted. And finally, the new generation of African leaders – not necessarily in age, but in terms of ideas and worldview – seems to have realized that Africa must embark on this path if they are to transit from agrarianism to industrialization, from authoritarianism to democracy, and from poverty to prosperity. Finally, one cannot take too lightly the role and place of the civil society, and the fourth estate (the press) in the emergence and reemergence of democracy on the continent. They are the guardians of African society – helping to further and safeguard democratic ideas and ideals.

Current Trends in African Politics Even as Africans celebrate the decline of military regimes and one-party autocracies, the current trend in Africa politics is worrying – even if some of the trends are not new. For instance, the president-for-life phenomenon has been a feature of the continent’s political landscape since its independence. Many of its leaders either died while in office or were in office until they were swept away by coups, i.e., Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), Omar Bongo Ondimba (Gabon), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), João Bernardo Vieira (Guinea-Bissau), Lansana Conté (Guinea), Ahmadou Ahidjo (Cameroon), and Milton Obote (Uganda). Today, many African leaders have remained in office for an average of 25 years:

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Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (Equatorial Guinea, 1979–to date) Paul Biya (Cameroon, 1982–to date) Yoweri Museveni (Uganda, 1986–to date) Idrissa Deby (Chad, 1990–to date) Isaias Afwerki (Eritrea, 1993–to date) Denis Sassou Nguesso (Republic of the Congo, 1979–1992; 1997–till date) Paul Kagame (Rwanda, 2000–to date)

Second, elections have always been problematic in Africa: virtually every election since independence – at the local, state, and federal level – has been mired in violence, electoral malpractices, refusal of loser to abide by the result, and endless court cases. Electoral defeat has sometimes led to secessionist fervor or complaints of marginalization. The 2015 Presidential Election in Nigeria between the incumbent Dr. Goodluck Jonathan and, the challenger, General Muhammadu Buhari was, however, different. Within hours of the electoral body, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) declared Buhari the winner, and President Jonathan conceded defeat and publicly congratulated the new president.28 The most shameful trend – a trend that is also not new in African politics – is tenure elongation. Tenure elongation is a political practice whereby the president, colluding mostly with members of the parliament, manipulates the electoral laws and the constitution to enable him to serve beyond the original term limit outlined in the law. This reemerging practice has the potential to void many of the gains made by Africa’s emerging democracies and may contribute to the delegitimization of democratic principles. In 2006, President Olusegun Obasanjo schemed to have his tenure extended as it was going to end in 2007. Most of the citizens were against it and so was the Nigerian National Assembly.29 Eventually, though, he abandoned, moved, and left office at the end of his tenure on May 29, 2007. In The Gambia, President Yahya Jammeh also plotted to extend his presidency. He failed and was eventually sent into exile. Nevertheless, tenure elongation has been successfully carried out by many president-­for-life. Unless the perpetrators of tenure elongation are made to bear exorbitant cost for their extralegal acts, it will continue to be a staple of the African political space. To avert and/or discourage this propensity, other African states, in cooperation with the international community, must devise ways to discourage it by making it costly. This can be done by delegitimizing offending states and by directly penalizing heads of government and others who directly profit from this emerging trend.

 Alexis Okeowo. “The Best Thing Goodluck Jonathan Ever Did Was to Concede.” The New Yorker. April 1, 2015. Accessed August 11, 2017. https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/ the-best-thing-goodluck-jonathan-ever-did-was-to-concede 29  Craig Timberg. “Nigerian Senate Blocks Bid for 3rd Presidential Term.” The Washington Post. May 17, 2006. Accessed July 24, 2017. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/16/AR2006051600705.html 28

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Despite the sovereignty and noninterference clause in the charter of the African Union (AU), there is precedence: African states have, in the past, interfered in places where genocides and wars have taken place or are likely to take place. Also, there is political precedence for suspending countries that suspended legal constitutional arrangements. Also, subregional organizations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) breached its noninterference clause when it got involved in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire. These actions helped to stem the tide of instability in the continent.

Poor Governance as Driver of Forced Migration Other than the lucid and seminal explanation of How Europe Underdeveloped Africa,30 there are other factors responsible for the African condition. According to Claude Ake, these include the continent’s “social pluralism and its centrifugal tendencies, the corruption of leaders, poor labor discipline, the lack of entrepreneurial skills, poor planning, and incompetent management, inappropriate policies, the stifling of market mechanisms, low levels of technical assistance, the limited inflow of foreign capital, falling commodity price and unfavorable terms of trade, and low levels of savings and investments.”31 But more glaring are the questions of leadership and weak institutions. Poor leaders and weak institutions cross board, across the continent allow for rampant injustice and the predatory nature of some ethnic groups, and allow for the exploitative practices of private and public entities.32 In the words of Robert Rotberg, Africa has long been “saddled with poor, even malevolent, leadership: predatory kleptocrats, military-installed autocrats, economic illiterates, and puffed-up posturers. By far the most egregious examples come from Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Zimbabwe – countries that have been run into the ground despite their abundant natural resources. But these cases are by no means unrepresentative: by some measures, 90 percent of sub-­ Saharan African nations have experienced despotic rule in the last three decades. Such leaders use power as an end in itself, rather than for the public good; they are indifferent to the progress of their citizens (although anxious to receive their

  Rodney, Walter. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Washington, DC: Howard Univ. Press, 1982. 31  Ake, Claude. Democracy and Development in Africa. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1996. 32  Milner, Helen V. 1997. Interests, Institutions, and Information. New Jersey: Princeton University Press; Omeje, Kenneth. 2004 “State Failure and the Growing Insecurity in the Nigerian Oil Industry.” African Renaissance 1 (1): 114–23; and Forrest, Joshua B. 2004. Subnationalism in Africa: Ethnicity, Alliances and Politics. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher. 30

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adulation); they are unswayed by reason and employ poisonous social or racial ideologies; and they are hypocrites, always shifting blame for their countries’ distress.”33 Furthermore, the absence of viable and independent institutions to check and moderate the behavior and pronouncements of the elites have also helped to stunt the country’s socioeconomic and political development. It is these deficiencies that allow for political excess and economic immoderations and allow Africa leaders to recklessly navigate between and muddles public and private spheres. Through their redistributive role, institutions ensure fair distribution of wealth, resources, and power; moderate political excesses; address grievances and complaints; and also play a significant role in the confidence-building processes.34 The role of institutions in reducing risk and uncertainty; ameliorating injuries and grievances; and ensuring justice, fairness, and fair play is particularly important in an undeveloped society. Essentially, therefore, the problem of the continent is that of governance and failure of institutions. “An effective state is vital for the provision of goods and services – and rules and institutions that allow markets to flourish and people to live healthier and happier lives. Without it, sustainable development both economic and social development is impossible.”35 And where these are impossible, then people don’t feel safe and secured, and neither would they feel they belong in the nation. The result of this is that they will feel compelled to leave.

Commentary and Recommendation A lot has been written about the African continent, and much of it revolves around its religious and ethnic conflicts, wars, underdevelopment, and unconscionable poverty, coups and countercoups, and its weak and fragmenting states. For the most part – except in terms of its natural resources, cheap labor, and its expansive markets – the continent is almost an afterthought in global affairs. But, in recent times, media reports about the continent have revolved around its millions of migrants, refugees, and internally displaced citizens. While other regions of the world – i.e., Syria, Yemen, and Iraq – also have similar problems, Africa has consistently been on the news with an untold number of its citizens trekking the Sahara Desert and crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Despite the continent’s natural resources and its avowed gains, most of the people do not have ready access to basic human needs. And for most – especially for women and children – their constitutional entitlements and basic privileges are not guaranteed nor protected. The exploitation of women and children are still commonplace. Furthermore, Africa is home to the highest number of stark illiterates, the  Rotberg, Robert I. “Strengthening African Leadership: There Is Another Way.” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 4 (2004): 14. 34  Ibid, Ndikumana, Leonce. 1998. 35  Quoted in: Boafo-Arthur, Kwame. “Tackling Africa’s Developmental Dilemmas: Is Globalization the Answer? Journal of Third World Studies, spring 2003, Vol. 20, No. 1. 33

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infirm, and the exploited. This is the African condition. In this regard, the continent cannot speak to or claim to have made significant progress. Under such a debilitating condition, people are bound to want out to search for a better life and better living condition. The African condition was part of the discussion in Robert Kaplan’s 1997 book, The End of the Earth, wherein he said Africa was one of the most dangerous places on earth for anyone.36 The years immediately following independence were hopeful and promising ones for the continent. However, as John Isbister averred, “promises were not kept.”37 And so while much of the world had made measurable and significant progress, Africa, for the most part, has not which prompted Roel Van Der Veen to ask “why, despite the rising prosperity elsewhere in the world and widespread changes that took place on the continent itself, Africa failed to break free of poverty” and other fetidities.38 We do not intend to reduce the continent’s crippling challenges and self-­ immolating tendencies to a few choice words or even sound bites. Moreover, it is not the aim of this treatise to ignore or minimize the injurious and predatory role exogenous factors and concerns have played in the life of the continent. Africans must resolve their problems. Unfortunately, too many Africans  – encouraged by African leaders and elites and some scholars – have made it fashionable to blame slavery and colonialism for all that ails the continent. And then, there are the religious leaders who harp fatalism into the consciousness of their followers. Africans must take back their continent; they must take back their own countries. The West can help but only sparingly. Africans must do the bulk of the light and the heavy lifting. After all, it is their world and their lives. If Africans do not solve their problems, they would (a) continue to be taken advantage of by western and non-western countries; (b) they would make it easy to be recolonized or for neocolonialism to be embedded into the economic, political, social, and cultural space; (c) citizens from every sector and every enclave would come to view migration as the only option; and (d) the African condition would worsen to the point where many would be forced to leave the continent. And so, we suggest the followings, but not in any strict order:39

 Kaplan, Robert D. The Ends of the Earth: from Togo to Turkmenistan, from Iran to Cambodia – a Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century. New York: Vintage Books, 1997. 37  Isbister, John. Promises Not Kept: Poverty and the Betrayal of Third World Development. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, Inc., 2014. 38  Veen, Roel van der. What Went Wrong with Africa a Contemporary History. Amsterdam: KIT, 2004. 39  Much of these suggestions have been made elsewhere at various times over the years. See, for instance: Abidde, Sabella. “Reclaiming Africa: What Must Africans Do?” The African Executive. The African Executive, July 22, 2008. https://africanexecutive.com/article/read/3358; See also Abidde, Sabella. “What Does the World Owe Africa?” iNigerian.com, June 24, 2008. https://www. inigerian.com/what-does-the-world-owe-africa/ 36

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Fighting Corruption In many states and societies in Africa, the consensus is that there are a high predilection and incidence of administrative malfeasances and corruption. This is especially the case in places like Uganda, South Africa, and Nigeria where every government since 1975 has, in one fashion or another, waged war against political and economic excesses. But unfortunately, a myriad of other challenges – including weak institutions and poor governance – have made such efforts worthless and ineffectual. We, therefore, strongly recommend the Jerry Rawlings Approach or the Chinese Method in fighting corruption. This may be adjudged extreme; it is the only practicable solution.

Loans/Foreign Aid Most foreign aids are not aids in the real sense of the word since most of the allotted money/material/service never makes it to the intended enclaves, and even when they do, such aids never achieve the intended impact. Moreover, there is the insidious politics involved in foreign aids. Over the long run, foreign aids do not serve any real purpose. The corruption and politics of foreign aid aside, what good would it do any self-respecting people to continually depend on handouts? These aids are injurious to a country’s psyche: it encourages laziness and indolence and makes receiving countries dependent on donor countries. These are capitalist countries and not charity organizations, and capitalism is all about profit and self-interest. Additionally, African countries should shun loans – especially those with more than 1% interest rate over the life span of the loan.

Consolidate Nation-States There are countries in Africa that should not have been stand-alone nation-states in the first place. These are countries that are just too small, too poor, and lacking natural resources or technical know-how. Some of these countries should have formed confederations or, at best, teamed up with other countries to form one independent state. Unfortunately, flag independence does not pay workers’ salaries, pave roads, build schools and hospitals, eradicate diseases, and provide for public infrastructures and other life’ necessities. Now, decades after “political independence,” these countries do not have the wherewithal to administer their affairs as they are constantly in need of foreign aids and other forms of assistance from the West or from other countries that would listen to their pleas for help.

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Abolish the Military In virtually every African country, the military (navy, air force, and army and paramilitary) along with the police and security services are being used to oppress and punish the populace and is sometimes used to usurp constitutional rule. Only the police and the foreign intelligence service should be retained. No sub-Saharan African country truly needs an army. None! A small militarized peacekeeping unit may be constituted and controlled by regional bodies like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the continent-wide African Union (AU).

Reshuffle and/or Dilute Ethnicity Questions and references to ethnicity and religious affiliation should be deleted in all private and government documents, i.e., employment applications, voter registration cards, and school admission forms. In contesting elections, only residency and other qualifications should matter. Also, more than 50% of secondary schools must be boarding schools with no more than 60% of the student body being indigenes. Boarding schools help with the detribalization process.

Reverse Migration of Africans Oversea Africans must, on their own volition, return to their respective countries to help with the economic, social, and political process. For too long, the general argument has been that the political, economic, and social space is not conducive, secured, or big enough for all those who may wish to return home. This sort of reasoning is outdated, a copout. Some of the continent’s best and brightest are in exile, leaving some of the continent’s dumbest (and brightest criminals) to rule and to plunder.

Miscellaneous Suggestions Within and Outside of the Continent (1) Do not allow funds from African leaders and elites to be deposited in foreign banks and financial institutions, and do not allow any kind of investments, i.e., in real estate and the stock markets; (2) prohibit African leaders, along with their proxies and family members, from receiving medical treatments in foreign hospitals; (3) do not allow the children of these leaders and the elites to enroll in higher education  in western  countries; (4) except for meetings at such places as the United Nations, western nations should  decline all visa applications by African leaders,

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their ministers, and governors and immediate family members; (5) allow Africans to access western courts so African leaders can be sued when war crimes and crimes against humanity are committed; (6) update and strengthen the constitution and other legislation to allow for a true and complete check-and-balances of the three arms of government  within each African country; (7) update and strengthen the electoral laws and system; and (8) encourage the civil society and the fourth estate to live up to international standards.

Conclusion The migrant and refugee crisis stretching from Africa to Europe was not a new phenomenon. It garnered global attention in recent years because of the gory accounts and images of the vulnerable, the maimed, the dead, and the dying. Moreover, there is the unpleasant narrative of migrants and refugees invading European towns and cities and, in the process, diluting European culture, committing crimes, and straining the welfare system. Two decades into the twenty-first century, what we have in sub-Saharan Africa is continuity – the continuity of the old – instead of change and progress. Each year, an ever-increasing number of Africans are forced out of the continent. In some cases, they leave because the economic and political space is not large or absorbent enough to accommodate them; in other cases, they are forced to leave because of illiberal regimes seeking to curtain their civil and human rights. But more than anything else, they leave because of the lack of basic infrastructure, severe economic conditions, poor personal and human security, and a sickening and corrupt political system. And because many states across the continent have either failed or are failing, they are unable to carry out their constitutional duties and responsibilities. The African condition compels citizens to risk their lives in search of economic security and political safety in Europe, North America, and elsewhere in the world. Unless internal conditions improve, Africans will continue to be on the move – voluntarily or involuntarily.

Bibliography Abegunrin, Olayiwola, and Sabella Ogbobode Abidde. 2018. African Intellectuals and the State of the Continent: Essays in Honor of Professor Sulayman S.  Nyang. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Abidde, Sabella. 2008a. Reclaiming Africa: What Must Africans Do? The African Executive, July 22. ———. 2008b. What Does the World Owe Africa? iNigerian.com, June 24. https://www.inigerian. com/what-does-the-world-owe-africa/ Ake, Claude. 1996. Democracy and Development in Africa. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

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Akhtar, Salman. 2014. Immigration and Acculturation: Mourning, Adaptation, and the Next Generation. Lanham: Jason Aronson. Boafo-Arthur, Kwame. n.d. Tackling Africa’s Developmental Dilemmas: Is Globalization the Answer. Journal of Third World Studies 20(1). Brettell, Caroline B., and James Frank Hollifield. 2000. Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines. New York: Routledge. Dahl, Robert Alan. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press. Decalo, S. 1992. The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in Africa. African Affairs 91 (362): 7–35. Dimock, Michael. “Global Migration’s Rapid Rise.” The Pew Charitable Trusts https://www. pewtrusts.org/en/trend/archive/summer-2016/global-migrations-rapidrise. Accessed April 9, 2020. First, Ruth. 1972. The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup détat. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Fitzgerald, Patrick, and Brian Lambkin. 2008. Migration in Irish History, 1607-2007. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Forrest, Joshua. 2004. Subnationalism in Africa: Ethnicity, Alliances, and Politics. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Haas, Hein de, Mark J. Miller, and Stephen Castles. 2020. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. London: Red Globe Press. Hirschman, Charles, Philip Kasinitz, and Josh DeWind. 1999. The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Internal Displacement. IDMC. International Displacement Monitoring Center. https://www.internal-displacement.org/internal-displacement. Accessed 20 April 2020. Isbister, John. 2014. Promises Not Kept: Poverty and the Betrayal of Third World Development. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, Inc. Kane, Abdoulaye, and Todd H.  Leedy. 2013. African Migrations: Patterns and Perspectives. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Kaplan, Robert D. 1997. The Ends of the Earth: From Togo to Turkmenistan, from Iran to Cambodia – A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century. New York: Vintage Books. Konadu-Agyemang, Kwadwo, Baffour K.  Takyi, and John A.  Arthur. 2006. The New African Diaspora in North America: Trends, Community Building, and Adaptation. Lanham: Lexington Books. Linz, Juan J. 1999. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder: Rienner. Milner, Helen V. 1997. Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Mooney, E. 2005. The Concept of Internal Displacement and the Case for Internally Displaced Persons as a Category of Concern. Refugee Survey Quarterly 24 (3): 9–26. Ndikumana, Leonce. 1998. Institutional Failure and Ethnic Conflicts in Burundi. African Studies Review 41 (1): 29. Okeowo, Alexis. 2017. The Best Thing Goodluck Jonathan Ever Did Was to Concede. The New  Yorker, June 19. https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/ the-best-thing-goodluck-jonathan-ever-did-was-to-concede Omeje, Kenneth. 2004. State Failure and Growing Insecurity in the Nigerian Oil Industry: Nigeria. African Renaissance 1 (1): 114–123. Onwumechili, Chuka. 1998. African Democratization and Military Coups. Westport: Praeger. Refugee Statistics. USA for UNHCR. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https:// www.unrefugees.org/refugee-facts/statistics/. Accessed 9 May 2020. Rodney, Walter. 1982. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Washington, DC: Howard University Press. Rotberg, Robert I. 2004. Strengthening African Leadership: There Is Another Way. Foreign Affairs 83 (4): 14.

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Siso, Zedekia Oloo, Jan Bender Shetler, and Peter Wanyande. 2010. Grasp the Shield Firmly, the Journey Is Hard: A History of Luo and Bantu Migrations to North Mara, (Tanzania), 1850-1950. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki Na Nyota Publishers. Thomson, Alex. 2010. An Introduction to African Politics. London: Routledge. Timberg, Craig. 2006. Nigerian Senate Blocks Bid for 3rd Presidential Term. The Washington Post. WP Company, May 17. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/16/ AR2006051600705.html Toyin, Falola, and Oyebade Adebayo. 2018. The New African Diaspora in the United States. London: Routledge. van der Veen, Roel. 2004. What Went Wrong with Africa a Contemporary History. Amsterdam: KIT. Wilkerson, Isabel. 2020. Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of Americas Great Migration. London: Penguin Books. World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World. New York: Published for the World Bank/Oxford University Press, 1997.

Chapter 2

Public Policy and Migration in Africa: A Multi-Theoretical Approach Benjamin Adu Gyamfi, Comfort Tiwaa Kwarteng, and Enoch Appiagyei

Introduction This chapter, adopting a Multi-Theoretical Approach and with a prime focus on Ghana, seeks to critically examine the impact of international migration on Africa and the continent’s response to curbing the menace. Though international migration has some noted positive effects on the economy of Africa such as migrant remittances, poverty reduction, and reduction in unemployment, its socioeconomic impact on the continent is remarkably disturbing. The brain drain and brain waste of highly skilled professionals and other highly educated Africans through migration not only lead to loss of human capital but also Africa’s limited resources invested in higher and tertiary education go in the drain1 as the expected returns from this investment are hardly realized. This adversely impacts Africa’s socioeconomic development. Africa as a continent has since the postcolonial period hitherto continually suffered from mass migration – “the temporary or permanent move of individuals or groups of people from one geographic location to another for various reasons ranging from better employment possibilities to persecution”2  – and displacement

 Fernandez, Bina. “Borders and Boundaries: Containing African International Migration.” in Handbook of Africa’s International Relations, edited by Tim Murithi, 2014. Routledge International Handbooks. Oxfordshire, England; New York: Routledge, 2014, 134–144. ProQuest Ebook Central. 2  Hagen–Zanker, Jessica. “Why Do People Migrate? A Review of The Theoretical Literature.” Maastrcht Graduate School of Governance Working Paper No 28197 MGSoG/2008/WP002 (2008). Accessed September 27, 2019. https://mpra.ub.uni–muenchen.de/28197/1/MPRA_paper_28197.pdf 1

B. Adu Gyamfi (*) · C. T. Kwarteng · E. Appiagyei Political Science Department, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; enoch. [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. Abegunrin, S. O. Abidde (eds.), African Migrants and the Refugee Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56642-5_2

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resulting mainly from environmental stress, poverty, and violent conflict.3 Over the past two decades, the migration of Africans from the continent has increased considerably.4 While the portrayal of Africans as an “exodus” of desperate people escaping poverty at home in search of greener pasture abroad is overtly an exaggeration that tends to present Africa as a continent with an image of misery,5 migration in Africa is a real problem. However, both African states and the recipient countries do not genuinely have much interest in stopping international migration. Some African states sometimes have hidden agendas in their national policies and tacit programmatic encouragement of migration of lower-skilled and unskilled workers outside the continent6 as a way of reducing unemployment rates. Some African countries encourage emigration through policies as a mechanism for decreasing unemployment and generating remittances.7 Conversely, others, due to anti-colonial sentiment, heightened nationalism, protectionism, and xenophobia (such as Algeria, Egypt, and Côte d’Ivoire), discourage the emigration of their citizens as a means of controlling or curbing brain drain and restricting foreigners’ immigration8. Given the structural demand for affordable migrant labor, recipient countries alike are unwilling to stop international migration.9 Thus, the restrictive immigration policies such as tightening immigration requirements10 and increasing border controls11 by destination countries have consistently failed to curb Africa’s international migration.

3  Flahaux, Marie–Laurence, and Hein De Haas. “African Migration: Trends, Patterns, Drivers.” Comparative Migration Studies 4, no. 1 (2016): 1. Accessed September 13, 2019. https://comparativemigrationstudies.springeropen.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s40878–015–0015–6 4  Gonzalez–Garcia, Jesus, Ermal Hitaj, Montfort Mlachila, Arina Viseth, and Mustafa Yenice. Sub– saharan African Migration: Patterns and Spillovers. Washington, DC: Spillover Task Force, International Monetary Fund, 2016; see also; African Union. “African common position on migration and development.” Addis Ababa (2006). 5  Ibid Flahaux and De Haas 2016. 6  Ibid Fernendez 2014., see also; De Haas, Hein. “The myth of invasion: the inconvenient realities of African migration to Europe.” Third world quarterly 29, no. 7 (2008): 1305–1322. 7  Ibid, Flahaux and De Haas 2016. 8  Natter, Katharina. Fifty Years of Maghreb Emigration: How States Shaped Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian Emigration. DEMIG Working Paper, No. 21, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, 2014. Accessed September 28, 2019. https://www.migrationinstitute.org/ publications/wp–95–14. See also; Samers, Michael. The Production of Diaspora: Algerian Emigration from Colonialism to Neo–Colonialism (1840–1970). Antipode, 29, no. 1, (1997): 32–64.; Zohry, Ayman and Barbara Harrell–Bond. Contemporary Egyptian Migration: An Overview of Voluntary and Forced Migration, Working Paper C3, Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty. Brighton: University of Sussex, (2003). Ibid, Flahaux and De Haas 2016. 9  De Haas, Hein. “The myth of invasion: the inconvenient realities of African migration to Europe.” Third world quarterly 29, no. 7 (2008): 1305–1322. 10  Hatton, Timothy J., and Jeffrey G.  Williamson. “Demographic and economic Pressure on Emigration out of Africa.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 105, no. 3 (2003): 465–486. 11  Ibid, De Haas 2008.

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Though development and social transformation processes to some extent contribute to the migration of Africans beyond the continent,12 poverty and underdevelopment are the main drivers. That is, limited economic opportunities such as high cost of graduate education, high rate of unemployment, extreme poverty and income gaps are the main thrust driving the migration of highly trained, semiskilled, and unskilled Africans out of the continent. Other drivers of African migration include starvation, environmental degradation, and globalization resulting from the North-­ South divide that encourage flows. Thus, African migration is not exceptional nor fundamentally different from that elsewhere: most people in Africa generally migrate equally for work, family, or study as happens in other parts of the world13 with the expectation that their well-­being will improve.14 Accordingly, there is the need for African states to put in place the right public policies that will create the required opportunities to help retain African professionals and other categories of its labor force in the continent. However, there is limited research on the role of public policy as an effective tool in curbing the menace of international migration in Africa. This chapter, thus, seeks to help fill this gap by examining the practical implication of addressing Africa’s rising international migration. It mainly argues that, though several measures have been put in place to address the issue of international migration, Africa’s effort should be directed at developing a holistic approach based on public policy such as youth employment, social and education policies, and entrepreneurship, among others. Africa’s effort would not yield the desired results without the appropriate public policies put in place that would help to tackle the root cause of the problem. Thus, much attention should be paid to domestic policies that can address the concerns and grievances of those seeking to migrate out of the country. The rest of the chapter is structured into four main sections: the first section explicates the theoretical and methodological approach employed by the chapter. It reviews the main theoretical perspectives developed to explain international migration. The main aim is to first delineate the dynamics that interact to drive the migration of Africans out of the continent, thereafter making a case for a holistic approach needed to address the issue. The next section discusses the causes and effects of international migration in Africa, paying attention to Ghana. The third section analyzes Ghana’s policy response to the issue of international migration highlighting the setbacks of these policies and the practical ways the country can improve upon such efforts. The final section concludes the paper.

 Ibid, Flahaux and De Haas 2016.  Ibid 14   De.Haas, Hein. “Migration transitions: A theoretical and Empirical Inquiry into the Developmental Drivers of International Migration.” Working Papers, Paper 24. DEMIG project paper 1. Oxford: International Migration Institute (2010). 12 13

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Theoretical and Methodological Background To provide a holistic account of Africa’s migration, this chapter employs a Multi-­ Theoretical Approach. Migration is an intrinsically complex and patterned phenomenon,15 and the final decision of an individual to migrate is informed by several macro-level, meso-level, and microlevel analysis factors.16 Generally, migration is driven by three broad factors: economic,17 social,18 and political (institutional) factors.19 The main theoretical approaches to migration are the neoclassical (conventional) theories, dual labor market theory, the migration transition theory, world-systems theory, and the political perspective. The neoclassical theories commonly known as the conventional “push-pull” models20 argue that migration is negatively correlated with development. It conceptualizes migration as an inherent part of economic development21 driven primarily by existing differences in the levels of global wealth and human development.22 That is, as societies develop and income gaps and other geographical opportunity decrease, migration also decreases.23 The difference in per capita income (real incomes) of the destination and origin countries24 is an important economic factor that drives immigration.25 Geographic differences in the demand for and supply of

15  Castelli, Francesco. “Drivers of Migration: Why Do People Move?” Journal of Travel Medicine 25, no. 1 (2018):1–7. See also; Ibid, De Haas 2010. 16  Ibid, Castelli 2018. 17  Gonzalez–Garcia, Jesus, Ermal Hitaj, Montfort Mlachila, Arina Viseth, and Mustafa Yenice. Sub–saharan African Migration: Patterns and Spillovers. Washington, DC: Spillover Task Force, International Monetary Fund, 2016. See also; Hatton, Timothy J., and Jeffrey G.  Williamson. “Demographic and economic Pressure on Emigration out of Africa.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 105, no. 3 (2003): 465–486; Hatton, Timothy J., and Jeffrey G. Williamson. “What Fundamentals Drive World Migration?.” in Poverty, International Migration and Asylum, Boswell, Christina, and Jeff Crisp (eds.) pp. 15–38. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2005. 18   Kirwin, Matthew and Jessica Anderson. “Identifying the Factors Driving West African Migration”, West African Papers, N°17, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2018. Accessed September 18, 2019 https://doi.org/10.1787/eb3b2806-en. See also; Ibid, Flahaux and De Haas 2016. 19  Ibid, Flahaux and De Haas 2016. See also; Ibid, Kirwin and Anderson 2018. 20  Ravenstein, E. G. “The Laws of Migration.” Journal of the Statistical Society of London 48, no. 2 (1885): 167–235. Accessed October 4, 2019. See also; Ravenstein, E.  G. “The Laws of Migration.” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 52, no. 2 (1889): 241–305. 21  Hagen–Zanker, Jessica. Why Do People Migrate? A Review of the Theoretical Literature. Munich Personal RePEc Archive Paper No. 28197. Working Paper MGSoG/2008/WP002 22  Ibid, De Haas 2010. 23  Ibid, Flahaux and De Haas 2016. 24  Ibid, Gonzalez-Garcia et al. 2016. 25  Hatton, Timothy, and Jeffrey Williamson. 2002. “What Fundamentals Drive World Migration?” NBER Working Paper 9159, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.. See also; Ibid, De Haas 2010.

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labor lead to wage differentials in the destination and source countries.26 Generally, the recipient countries have a high equilibrium market wage resulting from a limited endowment of labor compared to capital. The countries of origin, conversely, have a low equilibrium market wage due to large endowment of labor relative to capital.27 The high market wages in the destination countries attract workers from countries with low market wages, such as those in Africa.28 Accordingly, international migration could be reduced by development in origin countries.29 Migration is, thus, inversely proportional to income and other opportunity differentials,30 hence, a function of wage differentials. The two main theories that fall under the conventional push-pull perspective are the neoclassical economics and the new economics of migration. Neoclassical economics31 focuses on microlevel decision processes to explain how economic factors influence the individual’s decision to migrate. It argues that migration costs and differentials in wages and employment conditions that exist between countries32 drive migration. It conceptualizes migration generally as an individual decision to maximize income.33 The new economics of migration theory34 that provides social choice accounts35 focuses on microlevel decision-making processes in a variety of markets – including labor markets – to explain migration. It conceptualizes migration generally as a household decision  – rather than an isolated individual decision36 – aimed at either minimizing the risks to family income or overcoming the constraints of capital on family production activities37 by diversifying their income sources.38 The members of a household together make decisions for the well-being

 Massey, Douglas S., Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor. “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal.” Population and development review 19, no. 3 (1993): 431–466. 27  Ibid. 28  Ibid. 29  Ibid, De Haas 2010. 30  Ibid. 31  Todaro, Michael P. “A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries.” The American Economic Review 59, no. 1 (1969): 138–148. See also; Harris, John R., and Michael P. Todaro. “Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two–Sector Analysis.” The American Economic Review 60, no. 1 (1970): 126–142. 32  Ibid, Massey 1993. See also; Ibid, De Haas 2010. 33  Ibid, Massey 1993. 34  Stark, Oded, and David E. Bloom. “The New Economics of Labor Migration.” The American Economic Review 75, No. 2 (1985): 173–178. 35  Faist, Thomas. The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces. Oxford: Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 2000. 36  Ibid, Massey 1993. 37  Ibid. See also; Ibid, Hagen-Zanker 2008. 38  Stark, Oded. “Migration Decision Making: De Jong, Gordon F. and Robert W. Gardner, Eds., (Pergamon, New York, 1981).” Journal of Development Economics 14, no. 1 (1984): 251–59. 26

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of the whole family.39 Thus, it explains how economic factors affect a particular household’s migration decision. Both the neoclassical economics and new economics of migration theory are microanalytic theories. While the former focuses on microlevel variables in the labor market and considers relevant decision-making unit to be the individual, the latter emphasizes micro-factors in various markets and sees households as the relevant decision-making unit. However, both conceptualize individuals and households to be homogeneous decision-makers and stress on the motives of individual migrants.40 As Massey41 explains, they are both essentially microlevel decision models that differ on: the units assumed to make the decision (the individual or the household), the entity being maximized or minimized (income or risk), assumptions about the economic context of decision-making (complete and well-functioning markets versus missing or imperfect markets), and the extent to which the migration decision is socially contextualized (whether income is evaluated in absolute terms or relative to some reference group).

Accordingly, while neoclassical economics explains how economic factors influence the decision of the individual to migrate, the new economics of migration theory focuses on the economic basis of a household’s migration decision. The dual labor market theory42 focuses on structural factors relating to the requirements of modern industrial economies43 to explain international migratory processes. It conceptualizes migration as embedded in the structural dependence that exists between the core and the periphery regions of the capitalist world economy.44 It argues that international migration is driven mainly by the intrinsic demand for labor – a chronic and unavoidable need for foreign workers45 by modern industrial societies.46 That is, a pull factor, a strong structural demand for labor in developed countries caused mainly by structural inflation explains international migration.47 Thus, the main driver of international migration is the “permanent demand for immigrant labor that is inherent to the economic structure of the developed nations.”48 Accordingly, the direction of migration flow is from the poor postcolonial developing countries to the countries with the most industrialized advanced economies.

 Ibid, Hagen-Zanker 2008.  Ibid, Faist 2000. 41  Ibid, Massey 1993. 42  Piore, Michael J. Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor Industrial Societies. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 43  Ibid, Massey 1993. 44  Ibid, Faist 2000. 45  Ibid, Piore 1979. 46  Ibid, Massey 1993. 47  Ibid, Hagen-Zanker 2008. 48  Ibid, Piore 1979. 39 40

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The migration transition theory49 sees migration as a natural consequence of the inherent economic and social changes resulting from the process of modernization.50 It argues that processes of modernization and economic development lead to an increase in immigration and a decrease in emigration.51 Accordingly, development and migration function is not fundamentally linear: levels of mobility and migration in poor countries generally increase with demographic and economic transitions and development.52 The access of people to knowledge, material resources, social education, networks, and media are mostly expanded by development processes.53 Thus, migration is a function of the aspirations and capabilities of people to migrate.54 The world-systems theory55 focuses on structural factors of economic globalization (global economy) and market penetration across national boundaries56 to explain migration. It explains how international economic factors, the disruptions, and dislocations in the world’s peripheries created by the neoclassical governments’ and multinationals’ capitalist expansion57 shape migration.58 It argues that international migration results from the economic and political organization of a growing global market.59 Migration is conceptualized to be the “natural outgrowth of disruptions and dislocations that inevitably occur in the process of capitalist development”.60 The postcolonial states in the periphery are less developed and are economically and politically penetrated by the world capitalist system.61 A mobile population with a high propensity to migrate abroad is created by the capitalist economic relations’

49  Zelinsky, Wilbur. “The Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition.” Geographical Review 61, no. 2 (1971): 219–249. doi:10.2307/213996. See also; Ibid, De Haas 2010; Clemens, Michael. Does Development Reduce Migration?–Working Paper 359. No. 359. 2014. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. Accessed September 19, 2019 http://www.cgdev.org/publication/does–development–reduce–migration–workingpaper–359 50  Ibid, Hagen-Zanker 2008. 51  Ibid, Zelinsky 1971. 52  Ibid, Flahaux and De Haas 2016. 53  Ibid. 54   De.Haas, Hein. “Migration transitions: A theoretical and Empirical Inquiry into the Developmental Drivers of International Migration.” Working Papers, Paper 24. DEMIG project paper 1. Oxford: International Migration Institute (2011). See also; De Haas, Hein. Migration theory: Quo vadis? DEMIG Working Paper, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, 2014. Accessed October 2, 2019 55  Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice. The Modern World–system. Studies in Social Discontinuity. New York: Academic Press, 1974. 56  Ibid, Massey 1993. 57  The world systems theory also considers colonialism as contributing to the disruptions and dislocations in peripheral parts of the world (Hagen-Zanker 2008, 7). 58  Ibid, Hagen-Zanker 2008. 59  Ibid, Massey 1993. 60  Ibid. 61  Ibid, Faist 2000.

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penetration into non-capitalist societies in the periphery.62 The socially uprooted population that has weakened attachments to their land with a high propensity to migrate is created by the new capitalist farming methods, land consolidation, and manufacturing plants.63 Thus, migration is a form of linkage that connects peripheries to the centers and is caused ultimately by the capitalist’s penetration of the periphery.64 In fine, the world systems theory considers international migration to be the natural result of the capitalist market formation in developing countries. Therefore, the penetration of the global economy into regions in the periphery is the catalyst for an international movement65 to advanced countries that have strong demands for foreign labor created by their structural characteristics.66 Political perspective67 focuses on political systems that regulate migration.68 It argues that migration and border control laws directly impact migration flows because it affects the right to cross the border of a state legally.69 The conceptualization of the phenomenon of “international migration” – the transfer of individuals from the jurisdiction of one state to that of another state – as a distinctive process is even made possible by the political “organization of contemporary world space into mutually exclusive and legally sovereign territorial states.”70 The laws or institutions of states sometimes influence migration decisions, regardless of economic considerations.71 As the principle of freedom of exit is generally acknowledged as a desirable norm and states have limited restrictions on people moving out of them, so also is the general universal unambiguous consensus that “every state has the right to restrict the entry of foreigners into their jurisdictions.”72 Thus, through migration laws, which may vary considerably from open to restrictive,73 the state controls the exit and entry of people.74 These laws are influenced by several factors such as national security concerns, national identity, multiculturalism, and profits, among

 Ibid, Massey 1993.  Ibid, Hagen-Zanker 2008. 64  Ibid, Faist 2000. 65  Ibid, Massey 1993. 66  Ibid. 67  Zolberg, Aristide R. “International Migration in Political Perspective.” in Mary M. Kritz, Charles B.  Keely, and Silvano M.  Tomasi. Global Trends in Migration: Theory and Research on International Population Movements. Staten Island, N.Y.: Center for Migration Studies, 1981a. 68  Thompson, Maddy. “Migration Decision–Making: A Geographical Imaginations Approach.” Area 49, no. 1 (2017): 77–84. 69  Ibid, Hagen-Zanker 2008. 70  Ibid, Zolberg 1981. 71  Hollifield, James F. “The Politics of International Migration.” in Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield, (eds). Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines New York: Routledge, (2000): 137–185. 72  Ibid, Zolberg 1981. 73  Ibid, Faist 2000. 74  Ibid, Zolberg 1981. 62 63

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others.75 Migration is, therefore, greatly shaped by destination countries’ policies regarding the admission and integration of migrants. As the theoretical review has shown, people move generally with the expectation that their well-being will improve.76 That is, people “voluntarily choose to migrate for the chance of a better life”:77 in search of “better jobs and pay, and the opportunity to send money home”78 and to study. Thus, it is likely for individuals to “act to maximize income while families minimize risk, and that the context within which both decisions are made is shaped by structural forces operating at the national and international levels.”79 That is, it is very possible that individuals engage in cost-­benefit calculation aimed at maximizing income while families seek to diversify labor allocations to minimize risk and that the socioeconomic context within which these two decisions are made is determined by structural forces that operate at the national level and the international level.80 Accordingly, the causal mechanisms or processes that underlie international migration operate concurrently on multiple levels.81 In sum, wage differentials, relative risks, recruitment efforts, market penetration, and migration laws are the broad factors that influence international migration. Migration is driven mainly by the desire of an individual to gain income, a household’s desire to diversify the risks to its income (household’s risk diversification), recruitment program to satisfy the demands of the employer for low-wage workers, and the international displacement of labor by market penetration within regions in the periphery.82 As such, for a deeper and better understanding and to provide a holistic explanation of Africa’s international migration, the chapter employs a Multi-Theoretical Approach that combines the theoretical insights from the different perspectives. Choosing the appropriate research design, method, and technique are of vital importance in every research project: it helps in deepening understanding and, hence, providing a deeper and better explanation of the social phenomenon under study. This chapter undertakes a qualitative case study of Ghana’s policy response to international migration. The qualitative analysis provides detailed understanding by taking into account the contextual factors of the phenomenon of study.83 Thus, it  Ibid, Hagen-Zanker 2008.  Ibid, De Haas 2010. 77  Ibid, Kirwin and Anderson 2018. 78  Ibid. 79  Ibid, Massey 1993. 80  Papademetriou, Demetrios G., and Philip L.  Martin. “Labor migration and Development: Research and Policy Issues,” in Demetrios G.  Papademetriou and Philip L.  Martin (eds.), The Unsettled Relationship: Labor Migration and Economic Development. New York: Green– wood Press, (1991) pp. 3–26. 81  Ibid, Massey 1993. 82  Ibid. 83  Snape, Dawn and Liz Spencer. 2003. “The Foundations of Qualitative Research.” in J Ritchie and J Lewis, eds. Qualitative Research Practice: A guide for Social Science Students and Researchers. Qualitative Research SAGE: London, 2003: 1–23. See also; Furlong, Paul, and 75 76

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is most suitable for addressing research questions that seek to understand and explain both social phenomena and their contexts as well as exploring complex issues and studying processes that happen over time.84 The chapter focuses primarily on Ghana not because its international migration experience is exceptionally different or unique from that of other African countries. Most Ghanaians migrate equally for work, family, or study as do people in other parts of Africa. The decision to focus on Ghana is primarily based on the recent efforts made by Ghana to bring African emigrants back to the continent. Ghana, recently recognizing the impact of migration on the socioeconomic development of Africa, declared 2019 as a “Year of Return” for Africans in the diaspora. The “Year of Return, Ghana 2019” campaign was formally launched by Ghana’s President, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, as a pan-African-inspired initiative to bring “the global African family to a birth-right journey home” to Ghana.85 Through the Office of Diaspora Affairs, the government aims at attracting Ghanaians and Africans living abroad back home to help in Ghana’s economic growth and development. More importantly, the government seeks to make Ghana more attractive for the youth and, hence, discourage migration by improving the Ghanaian economy and providing economic opportunities for the youth.86 The Ghanaian diaspora is considered by the government to transcend beyond the citizens of Ghana and their immediate relatives who live abroad to include all the people of African descent.87 The primary objective of this chapter is to gain a greater understanding of Ghana’s attempt at curbing international migration through public policy and thereby gain theoretical insight into the issue of international migration in Africa by situating the chapter within the larger African context. That is, the chapter seeks a greater understanding of the factors that drive international migration in Ghana, its effects, and measure taken to address the situation. Accordingly, while focused on Ghana, the study seeks to provide useful lessons for other African countries. David Marsh. “A Skin not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science,” in in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, eds., Theory and Methods in Political Science, (3rd Ed.). New  York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.; Palys, Ted., and Chris Atchison. Research Decision: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives. 4th Edition. Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2008; Stoker, Gerry, and David Marsh. “Introduction,” in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, eds., Theory and Methods in Political Science, (3rd Ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; Peters, Guy B. Institutional Theory in Political Science: The ‘New Institutionalism’. London: Continuum, 1999. 84  Ibid, Snape and Spencer 2003. 85  Ghanaweb. Ghana Proclaims 2019 as Year of Return. Diasporian News of Monday, 1 October 2018 by Paa Kwesi Forson. Accessed October 6, 2019 https://www.ghanaweb.com/ GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Ghana–proclaims–2019–as–Year–of–Return–689306# 86  Ghanaweb. Year of Return Ghana to attract 500,000 Diasporan Africans – Akwasi Agyeman. Diasporian News of Wednesday, 16 January 2019. Source: Graphic.com.gh, 2019a. Accessed October6,2019https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Year–of–Return–Ghana–to–attract– 500–000–Diasporan–Africans–Akwasi–Agyeman–715612 87  Ghanaweb. Government to Address Problems of the Diaspora – Awua Ababio. General News of Saturday, 6 July 2019b. Source: Ghananewsagency.org, 2019b. Accessed October 6, 2019 https:// www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Government–to–address–problems– of–the–diaspora–Awua–Ababio–761052

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Migration in Africa and Ghana: Determinants and Effects The globe has witnessed mass migration caused by various factors such as economic hardships, human rights violations, and political instability, among others, and this has attracted the attention of governments and other policy actors to manage migration. This implies that “migration is a complex social phenomenon that is influenced by economic, political, socio-cultural, historical, and geographical factors.”88 For instance, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) defines migration as “the crossing of the boundary of a political or administrative unit for a certain minimum period. It includes the movement of refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people as well as economic migrants.” Illegal migrants, also referred to as irregular migrants or undocumented migrants, are “people who enter a country, usually in search of employment, without the necessary documents and permits,”89 whereas legal migrants are people who enter a country with the required documents and permits. Nonetheless, it is imperative to know that legal migrants who overstay their visas in the host countries without renewing their permits become illegal migrants.90 UNESCO identifies two types of migration, namely, internal migration and international migration. Internal migration involves the movement from one region such as a province, municipality, or district to another within a country. Thus, the movement is limited within the boundaries of a state. International migration, on the contrary, is the territorial relocation of people between nation-states. It is categorized into temporary labor migrants, highly skilled and business migrants, forced migrants, family reunification migrants, and return migrants.91 International migration has received global attention due to the inherent problems involved in the large-­ scale movement. For instance, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) recorded approximately 244 million international migrants across the globe in 2015.92 Likewise, the 2017 report reveals that an estimated 258 million people are residing in a country other than their country of birth, representing an increase of 49% since 2000. The report further discloses an increased number of migrants living in developed countries from 9.6% in 2000 to 14% in

 Emmers, R.  Securitization. In A.  Collins (Ed). Contemporary security studies, (pp.  168–181) Oxford University Press, 2016. 89  UNESCO’s definition of migration and its explanations of internal migration and international migration can be found at http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social–and–human–sciences/themes/ international–migration/glossary/migrant/ accessed August 20, 2019. 90  Adolino, Jessica R., and Charles H.  Blake. Comparing public policies: Issues and choices in industrialized countries. SAGE, 2010. 91  See http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social–and–human–sciences/themes/international–migration/glossary/migrant/ 92  United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), Population Division. The International Migration Report 2015: Highlights. (ST/ESA/SER.A/375). New  York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, 2016. 88

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2017.93 This raises concerns about the increasing international migration and the problems faced by both the countries of origin and the recipient countries. Böhning94 identifies four distinct types of international (foreign) migrants: refugees, economic migrants, residual category of migrants, and derivative category of migrants. Refugees, according to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR 1968),95 refer to a group of “persons who leave their own country because of a well-founded fear of persecution because of race, religion, nationality, political association or social grouping.”96 That is, they are persons who are forced to flee their home country due to a threat of persecution against which they lack their own country’s protection.97 The economic category consists of economically active ­persons who emigrate for employment.98 The residual category comprises persons such as ministers of religion, students, retired persons, diplomatic and assimilated personnel, pilgrims, volunteers sponsored by charity or by public funds, and other persons who live entirely on their means.99 The derivative category refers to the children, parents, siblings, and spouse of some or all the three categories (economic, refugees, and residual).100 This chapter focuses on international migration and it encompasses the economic, derivative, and residual categories (i.e., it excludes the refugee category). Since this paper emphasizes migration out of the African continent to other parts of the world, it defines migration solely as the movement of Africans beyond the continent. The largest body of literature on migration in Africa focuses mostly on the causes of migration, drawing largely on both push and pull factors and the impacts (positive and negative) migration has on both the African and recipient states. Thus, African states continue to experience a high number of their citizens migrating

 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), Population Division. The International Migration Report 2017: Highlights. (ST/ESA/SER.A/404). New  York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, 2017. 94  Böhning, W.R. “Elements of a Theory of International Economic Migration to Industrial Nation States.” in Mary M. Kritz, Charles B. Keely, and Silvano M. Tomasi. Global Trends in Migration: Theory and Research on International Population Movements. Staten Island, N.Y.: Center for Migration Studies, 1981. 95  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. INF/29/Rev. 2. Geneva: UNHCR, 1968. See also Weis, Paul. The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux Preparatoires Analysed with a Commentary by Dr. Paul Weis. Accessed September 27, 2019 https://www.unhcr.org/protection/ travaux/4ca34be29/refugee–convention–1951–travaux–preparatoires–analysed–commentary–dr– paul.html 96  Ibid, Bohning 1981. 97  Guterres, António. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2011. Accessed October 6, 2019 https://www.unhcr.org/about–us/background/4ec262df9/1951–convention–relating–status– refugees–its–1967–protocol.html 98  Ibid, Bohning 1981. 99  Ibid. 100  Ibid. 93

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beyond the continent due to high rate of unemployment, low wages, poverty, insecurity, underdevelopment, lack of opportunity, and globalization, among others101 Likewise, several social and political factors within the African continent such as nepotism and corruption, political instability, poor governance, and human rights violations, among others, have been a source of motivation for most African migrants from the continent.102 Besides the push factors that induce migration in Africa, several pull factors in the host countries including job opportunities, high wages, salaries, education opportunities with scholarships, good governance, and developed economies,103 among others, continue to attract highly skilled professionals from Africa. For instance, Black and King104 argue that Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, which used to be countries of immigration in the western part of Africa, have now become countries of emigration due to the migrants’ search for economic opportunities as in the case of Ghana and escape from the conflict that befell Côte d’Ivoire. Migration affects both the sending African countries and receiving countries.105 Destination countries benefit from migration: it positively affects their growth,106 replenishes the labor market of destination countries107 faced with aging populations, provides extra tax revenues and social contributions to the host countries,108 and leads to knowledge transfer. The flux of migrants to the destination country also leads to accelerated economic growth as it increases the demand for commodities that in turn stimulates the increase in the production and the creation of employment.109 The knowledge and expertise of skilled migrants harnessed in the destination country help in its socioeconomic development.  African Union. “African common position on migration and development.” Addis Ababa (2006). Akokpari, John. “Globalization, migration, and the challenges of development in Africa.” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 5, no. 3 (2006): 125–153. See also; Akokpari, John. “Globalization, migration, and the challenges of development in Africa.” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 5, no. 3 (2006): 125–153.; Esses, Victoria M., Ulrich Wagner, Carina Wolf, Matthias Preiser, and Christopher J.  Wilbur. “Perceptions of national identity and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in Canada and Germany.” International journal of intercultural relations 30, no. 6 (2006): 653–669.; Labonté, Ronald, David Sanders, Thubelihle Mathole, Jonathan Crush, Abel Chikanda, Yoswa Dambisya, Vivien Runnels et al. “Health worker migration from South Africa: causes, consequences and policy responses.” Human resources for health 13, no. 1 (2015): 92. 102  Ibid, African Union 2006. 103  Nielsen, Rebecca. “Political Push Factors in Emigration: A Comparative Analysis.” Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies 25, no. 1 (2007): 4. 104  Black, Richard, and Russell King. “Editorial Introduction: Migration, Return and Development in West Africa.” Population, Space and Place 10, no. 2 (2004): 75–83. 105  Ibid, Gonzalez-Garcia et al. 2016. 106  Ibid. 107  Kritz, Mary M., and Charles B. Keely. “Introduction.” in Mary M. Kritz, Charles B. Keely, and Silvano M. Tomasi. Global Trends in Migration: Theory and Research on International Population Movements. Staten Island, N.Y.: Center for Migration Studies, 1981. 108  Ibid, Gonzalez-Garcia et al. 2016. 109  Academic Library.  World Economy and International Economic Relations. Online resource (free online college e textbooks), 2019. 101

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Migration provides Africa with foreign exchange reserves and revenue. Remittances from Africans abroad serve as an important source of foreign exchange to the government and a significant source of income to families in Africa.110 Remittances, which constitute one of the major sources of external finance,111 not only help in improving the strength of the local currency – by reducing macroeconomic fluctuations, especially when sent for investment purposes – but also contribute to poverty alleviation.112 Remittances, Gonzalez-Garcia et al.113 note, “have also proved remarkably resilient during economic downturns compared to foreign direct investment and official development assistance.” They sometimes overtake “foreign direct investment as the largest source of foreign exchange earnings.”114 These remittances sometimes serve as sources of capital investments that help in increasing productivity and job creation, hence, leading to a reduction in unemployment rates. Migration directly helps the origin countries in Africa to reduce the large pools of surplus labor, who are mostly unskilled and semiskilled.115 Migration also helps to stimulate economic growth and development in sending countries in Africa. Returning African migrants mostly come along with huge sums of money acquired through savings while abroad that serve as sources of capital investments. These investments help to increase productivity and create new jobs, thereby leading to a fall in the high rates of unemployment on the continent. Moreover, the various transferable skills, expertise, and modern sector experience of returning migrants116 play an important role in the economic development of African countries as they are infused into the various sectors of the economy. Scholars are divided on the effects of migration on Africa. Migration has been viewed largely by some scholars as a good phenomenon due to the positive impacts it has on both the origin and recipient countries such as migrant remittances, reduction in unemployment, migrant labor supply, and reduction in poverty, among others.117 However, others are of the view that the impact of migration of highly trained Africans from the continent outweighs the benefits derived from migration.118  Ibid, Fernandez 2014. See also; Ibid, Gonzalez-Garcia et al. 2016.  Ibid, Keeley, 1981. 112  Ibid, Gonzalez-Garcia et al. 2016. 113  Ibid. 114  Ibid, Fernandez 2014. See also; Ibid, Gonzalez-Garcia et al. 2016. 115  Ibid, Kritz and Keely 1981. 116  Ibid. 117   Islam, Asadul. “Immigration unemployment relationship: The evidence from Canada.” Australian Economic Papers 46, no. 1 (2007): 52–66. See also; Rutaremwa, Gideon. “Internal and international labor migration in Uganda: the contribution of remittances to household livelihoods.” Makerere University (2011). 118  Akokpari, John. “Globalization, migration, and the challenges of development in Africa.” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 5, no. 3 (2006): 125–153. See also; Ansah, Esi E. “Theorizing the brain drain.” African Issues 30, no. 1 (2002): 21–24.; Black, Richard, and Russell King. “Editorial Introduction: Migration, Return and Development in West Africa.” Population, Space and Place 10, no. 2 (2004): 75–83.; Miyagiwa, Kaz. “Scale economies in education and the brain drain problem.” International Economic Review (1991): 743–759.; Ojo, 110 111

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While African migration has spillover effects on both sending and receiving countries,119 its negative impact on the continent is great. Thus, instead of migration being beneficial to both recipient countries and the countries of origin in Africa, the former gains at the expense of the latter.120 For instance, the migration of highly skilled professionals from Africa continues to affect the continent’s development. The movement of the young educated, skilled, qualified, and productive Africans from the continent to other regions results in brain drain. This depletes Africa of its already scarce human capital121 required to stimulate economic growth and development in the continent. That is, it creates an inadequate human resource and shortage of the skills necessary to develop and promote sustainable development in the African state.122 Besides, migration of skilled Africans to other regions sometimes leads to “brain waste,” that results from migrants being “overqualified for the jobs they can get abroad, which results in loss of income and also reduces incentives to acquire education.”123 Consequently, the socioeconomic development of Africa remains hugely impacted since financial capital and ideas are moved out of the continent through the massive migration of its skilled professionals.124 Moreover, the outflow of people reduces the number of taxpayers which affects the tax revenues of the government.125 In addition, remittances if not directed at productive ventures often lead to inflation126 in origin African countries. Further, irregular migration results in a serious humanitarian situation where people are smuggled across deadly routes: many of them get abandoned in the desert,127 some get indefinitely trapped in detention centers in bleak conditions while others die in these detention centers, or some even capsize and get missing or eventually die at sea.128

Kenneth Olayinka. “International migration of health manpower in Sub–Saharan Africa.” Social science & medicine 31, no. 6 (1990): 631–637. 119  Ibid, Gonzalez-Garcia et al. 2016. 120  Ibid, African Union 2006. See also; Ansah, Esi E. “Theorizing the brain drain.” African Issues 30, no. 1 (2002): 21–24.; Miyagiwa, Kaz. “Scale economies in education and the brain drain problem.” International Economic Review (1991): 743–759. 121  Ibid, African Union 2006. See also; Ibid, Garcia–Gonzalez et  al., 2016.; Ibid, Kirwin and Anderson 2018; Ojo, Kenneth Olayinka. “International migration of health manpower in Sub– Saharan Africa.” Social science & medicine 31, no. 6 (1990): 631–637. 122  Ibid, African Union 2006. See also; Ibid, Ojo 1990. 123  Ibid, Gonzalez-Garcia et al. 2016. 124  Ibid, Black and King 2004. 125  Ibid, Fernandez 2014. See also; Lucas, Robert EB. Migration and Economic Development in Africa: A Review Of Evidence. 126  Ibid, Kritz and Keely 1981. 127  Ibid, Kirwin and Anderson 2018. 128  Ibid.

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Due to the negative impact migration has on Africa’s social and economic development, several scholars including, Labonte et al., Nielson, and Ojo,129 among others, have suggested different ways of managing migration in Africa. For instance, Labonté et al and Ojo130 explain the causes and consequences of skilled health workers migration outside of Africa to other parts of the world and Africa’s response toward managing migration. In South Africa, for instance, though the migration of skilled health workers has had both positive and negative impacts on the country, the South African government has adopted policies such as the new skilled health worker cadres and the Occupation Specific Dispensation (OSD) to help mitigate the negative effects of migration on the country.131 Likewise, Ojo132 suggests African leaders promote stable governments and prioritize sustainable social and economic development necessary to raise the standard of living of the people, provide basic infrastructures, and focus on technology, among others, to help prevent Africa’s emigration. There should also be a conscious effort on the part of African countries to promote good governance by improving upon their democratic practices and the functioning of their state security apparatuses. Ghana is not an exception when it comes to the issue of migration. The country has now been labeled a country of emigration133 due to the rapid migration of its highly educated professionals, students, and other semiskilled and unskilled workers in recent decades. Initially, migration in Ghana was characterized by internal migration  – rural-urban, North-South, and international migration which was largely within the African continent  – from Ghana to other neighboring African countries such as Botswana, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, and Nigeria, among others, in search for employment opportunities.134 However, Ghana experienced another phase of international migration in the mid-1980s where most of its citizens migrated to Europe and North America,135 and Ghana was ranked among the few

 Labonté, Ronald, David Sanders, Thubelihle Mathole, Jonathan Crush, Abel Chikanda, Yoswa Dambisya, Vivien Runnels et  al. “Health worker migration from South Africa: causes, consequences and policy responses.” Human resources for health 13, no. 1 (2015): 92. See also; Nielsen, Rebecca. “Political Push Factors in Emigration: A Comparative Analysis.” Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies 25, no. 1 (2007): 4; Ibid, Ojo 1990. 130  Ibid, Labonte et al. 2015. See also; Ibid, Ojo 1990. 131  Ibid, Labonte 2015. 132  Ojo, Kenneth Olayinka. “International migration of health manpower in Sub–Saharan Africa.” Social science & medicine 31, no. 6 (1990): 631–637. 133  Ibid, Black and King 2004. 134  Anarfi, J.  K., K.  Awusabo–Asare, and N.  N. N.  Nsowah–Nuamah. “Push and pull factors of international migration.” Country Report: Ghana. Eurostat Working Papers (2000). 135  Black, Richard, Russell King, and Richmond Tiemoko. “Migration, return and small enterprise development in Ghana: A route out of poverty.” In International Workshop on Migration and Poverty in West Africa, University of Sussex, United Kingdom, vol. 13. 2003. See also; Carrington, William J., and Enrica Detragiache. “How Extensive is the Brain Drain?” Finance and Development 36 (1999): 46–49.; Van Hear, Nicholas. “New diasporas: The mass exodus.” Dispersal and Regrouping of (1998). 129

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countries with a high number of its citizens migrating to Canada, United Kingdom (UK), United States (USA), and other parts of the globe.136 The major factors driving migration in Ghana include the search for education and training opportunities, availability of jobs with better remuneration and conditions of service, and access to necessities of life, among others, in the host countries.137 Moreover, inadequate opportunities for most tertiary education and lack of incentives for hard work in Ghana,138 among others, have contributed extensively to brain drain in Ghana, thereby largely impacting negatively on the country’s socioeconomic development. Most of the Ghanaian migrants are highly trained professionals,139 and out of these, the medical profession has experienced a higher rate of migration among its workers including doctors and nurses140 which in turn has resulted in a shortage of health personnel and increased the doctor/patient ratio in the country. Even though several measures have been put in place to address the issue of migration, there is limited research on the role of public policy as an effective tool in curbing the menace of migration in Africa. Given this, this chapter seeks to help fill this gap by examining the theoretical and practical implications of addressing Africa’s rising migration through a holistic approach based on public policy such as youth employment, entrepreneurship, and social policy, among others.

International Migration and Ghana’s Response Public policy is one of the tools Ghana can use to curb the menace of mass outward movement of its labor force to the advanced countries outside the continent. By adopting policies that promote economic growth and development141 and, hence, reduce income inequality,142 Ghana would be able to retain most of its active labor force. Moreover, providing equal socioeconomic opportunities to the people will

 Ibid, Anarfi et al. 2003.  International Organization for Migration (IOM). Mixed Migration Flows in the Mediterranean: Compilation of Available Data and Information, December, Le Grand–Saconnex, International Organization for Migration, 2017. See also; Nuro, E. A. “Brain drain from Ghana: Case of university lecturers.” Department of Geography and Tourism, University of Cape Coast (1999): 41–70. 138  Dovlo, Delanyo, and Frank Nyonator. “Migration by graduates of the University of Ghana Medical School: a preliminary rapid appraisal.” Human Resources for Health Development Journal 3, no. 1 (1999): 40–51. 139  Docquier, F., and A. Marfouk. “International Migration by Educational Attainment 1990–2000 (Release 1).” (2005). 140  Clemens, Michael A., and Gunilla Pettersson. “New Data on African Health Professionals Abroad.” Working Paper No.” (2006). 141  Ibid, Kirwin and Anderson 2018. See also; Ibid, Massey 1993. 142  Ibid, Massey 1993. 136 137

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help prevent the emigration of Ghanaians, especially the highly skilled professionals from the country.

Youth Employment Youth unemployment remains a major development challenge in Africa. There are more young people in the developing world, with 19% of the global youth population living in Africa.143 Africa’s population, generally speaking, is very young, with about 75,600,000 of the continent’s 1.216 billion people living in the continent aged below 25.144 These statistics present a serious challenge given the high levels of underemployment and unemployment in the region. In other words, with underemployment and unemployment higher in Africa than other continents, about 60% of the continent’s population who lie below or within the global youth age gap are unable to find meaningful employment, despite the continuous annual economic growth.145 As the pull-push theories suggest, this age group compared to others ­consequently are more likely to migrate to other parts of the world. Africa has witnessed a continuous rise in its annual economic growth.146 Paradoxically, this growth has not often been inclusive: little to no attention has been paid to the creation of employment opportunities for the young ones. While many African states have worked to promote formal skilled graduate employment through schemes such as the Virtual African Higher Education Observatory and the National Youth Service in Ghana, which both seek to develop employability skills among students and illiterate youth (African Development Bank, 1–2), there are no comprehensive policies in place to holistically address the issue at the root cause. Ghana is no exception. Though Ghana’s youth, relatively, have a high level of literacy and education, paradoxically, they suffer from high levels of unemployment. According to the World Bank, about 65% of Ghanaian youth are unemployed.147 It is with this in mind that the National Youth Employment

  United Nations. Department of Economic Social Affairs. Population Division. World Urbanization Prospects the 2011 Revision. Population Studies (New York, N.Y.); No. 319. New York: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2012. 144  UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa). African Youth Report 2009: Expanding Opportunities for and with Young People in Africa. Report ECA/ACGS/HSD/AYR/ 2009. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: UNECA, 2009. 145  Ibid. 146  World Bank. Development and the next generation. World Development Report. Washington, DC: World Bank 2007. Accessed October 7, 2019 https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/5989/WDR%20 2007%W20–%20English.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y 147   Avura, Francis Babongte, and Ato Ulzen–Appiah. Ghana Youth Employment Program Inventory, 2016. 143

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Program (NYEP) of Ghana now reformed into Youth Employment Agency (YEA)148 was established in 2006 under the National Youth Employment Scheme by a Legislative Instrument with clear funding sources to address the country’s youth unemployment.149 Its main mandate is to “provide jobs and create employment opportunities for the youth of Ghana.”150 To empower Ghanaian youth to enhance their significant contribution to the socioeconomic and sustainable development of the state, this initiative does not solely focus on the formal sector but also gives appropriate attention to the many young people who may be working but are underemployed or reaping little economic gain from their activities. The reasons for the high rates of unemployment and underemployment among young people in Ghana vary. These include lack of basic education and job-relevant skills, as well as lack of job search experience to facilitate job acquisition through working experience, and difficulties in obtaining information about career options.151 Put differently, given their age, compared to adults or older people, young jobseekers lack either the suitable soft and hard skills or both, and this makes it hard for them to gain meaningful employment. In addition to the low skill levels, other factors such as lack of access to finance, land, and social networks, among others, hinder the youth from gaining meaningful employment. Thus, to address this issue, the NYA (NYEP) employs Ghanaian youth between the ages of 18 and 35 years who are both literate and illiterate, able or disabled into the following modules: Graduate Internships, Youth in ICT, Youth in Agriculture, Youth in Sanitation, Community Police Assistants, Community Health Assistants, Afforestation and Community Teaching Assistants, and Youth in Apparel and Textiles.152 To briefly describe each module, Youth in Paid Internship module offers employment to graduates to gain hands-on experience to enhance their employability.The Youth in Community Service and Security offers employment opportunities for the youth by enhancing the human resource capacity of Ghana’s security services within beneficiary-cited communities.153 The Youth in Community and Health  The Youth Employment Agency was established by the government under the Youth Employment Act 2015 (Act 887) “to empower young people to contribute meaningfully to the socio–economic and sustainable development of the nation. Its objective is to support the youth between the ages of 15–35 years through skills training and internship modules to transit from a situation of unemployment to that of employment” (Youth Employment Agency 2019). https://www.yea.gov.gh/index. php, http://www.melr.gov.gh/wp–content/uploads/2015/12/Youth–Employment–Agency–Act.pdf 149  Ibid. 150  Ibid. 151  Ibid, Avura and Ulzen-Appiah 2016. See also; Anyanwu, John C. “Characteristics and Macroeconomic Determinants of Youth Employment in Africa.” African Development Review 25, no. 2 (2013): 107–29. 152  Coulombe, H., Temourov, M., & Wodon, Q. “Ghana’s National Youth Employment Program” in Wodon, Quentin. Improving the Targeting of Social Programs in Ghana. World Bank Study. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012. 153  Youth Employment Agency. Modules run by the Youth Employment Agency. Youth Employment Agency 2019. Accessed October 7, 2019. https://www.yea.gov.gh/index.php/yea–modules, https:// www.yea.gov.gh/index.php 148

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Assistants module aims at creating employment opportunities for the youth by increasing the staff strength of the Ghana Health Service while assisting in basic health care delivery to hard-to-reach communities.154 The Youth in Sports module trains the youth in various sports development management, while the objective of Youth in Entrepreneurship module is to equip the youth with entrepreneurial skills in creating small business owners who will in turn offer employment opportunities to others.155 As their names rightly suggest, the Youth in Agriculture and Afforestation and Youth in Sanitation and Coastal Assistants modules aim at the creation of employment opportunities for the youth through agriculture and maintenance of environmental cleanliness with special emphasis on beaches and coastal areas, respectively. The rationales for the Community Teaching Assistants and Youth in Apparel and Textiles modules are the employment of youth in rural areas that have insufficient teachers and the training of the youth in the art of textile and garment making to make them employable in the fashion industry, respectively.156 Lastly, while the primary objective of the Industrial Attachment is to offer employment opportunities to graduates to gain hands-on experience to boost their employability, the Youth in Information Communication Technology module targets and equips the youth with information technology skills set to make them employable for the contemporary competitive labor market which requires basic ICT skills.157 Thus, the National Youth Employment Program (NYEP) aims at, among other key things, skills development and training, entrepreneurship, apprenticeship, and direct employment. Although one cannot go blind at the implementation of the program, the program employed 95,000 youths in the various modules in 2007, with the number surging upward to about 133,000 unemployed youth in the various modules.158 Thus, this program has increased access to decent jobs by improving the employability and entrepreneurialism of young Ghanaians between the ages of 15 and 24, especially female, rural and migrant youth, and those in vulnerable situations.159 More recently, to deal with graduate unemployment and brain drain, the Nation Builders Corps (NABCO) program was initiated by the government of Ghana in 2017 under the Youth Employment Agency which has employed about 100,000 graduates (International Organisation of Employers 2018).160 As the above statistics rightly  Ibid.  Ibid. 156  Ibid. 157  Ibid 158  Assan, Joseph Kweku. “Ghana’s National Youth Employment Program: Lessons from the Program’s Recent Collapse.” 2015. 159  Ibid, Avura and Ulzen-Appiah 2016. 160  International Organisation of Employers. Employment Creation Programme In Ghana. A paper presented at the 5th Social Partners’ Summit for Employment in Africa held between 13 to 14 September 2018  in Abidjan, Cote D’ivoire, 2018. Accessed September 17, 2019. https://www. ioe–emp.org/fileadmin/ioe_documents/publications/Working%20at%20Regional%20Level/ Africa/EN/20180913–14_SP_Summit_–_Employment_Creation_Programme__Ghana_Ppt.pdf 154 155

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suggest, the youth are gradually being integrated into the labor market. Although the push and pull migration factors persist, these numbers of youths who would have otherwise migrated are now able to stay in the country. And while the long-term effectiveness of this program is yet to be seen, it is valid to argue that, with adequate fiscal help and adequate implementation of the program, the problem of youth unemployment would reduce, if not dealt with. The spillover significance of this is the reduction of the problem of brain drain in Africa. Though the National Youth Employment Scheme is provided as a viable solution to the problem of youth unemployment and migration in Ghana (Van Gyampo and Obeng-Odoom 2013)161, it has not been able to fully address the issue given the rising numbers of Ghana’s emigration.162 This is because it is not integrated with other policy programs such as social insurance and entrepreneurship aimed at curbing migration in Ghana. Thus, there is a need for a holistic approach that provides a comprehensive policy framework that would address the issue from the root.

Education The migration of Ghanaian students is largely motivated by the lack of opportunities for most tertiary programs163 in the country.164 The number of Ghanaian studying abroad is constantly rising.165 For instance, a report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) revealed that about 11.8% of Ghanaian students were enrolled in foreign universities in 2004 166 due largely to scholarship programs that are made readily available by the host countries. This chapter acknowledges that the government of Ghana has already put measures in place in the education sector to curb migration, and this includes tuition-­ free education for Ghanaian students in public tertiary institutions. For instance, reports from the International Organization of Migration emphasize government  Van Gyampo, Ransford Edward, and Obeng–Odoom, Franklyn. “Youth Participation in Local and National Development in Ghana: 1620–2013.” Journal of Pan African Studies 5, no. 9 (2013): 129–150. Accessed September 28, 2019 http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ ver=Z39.88–2004&res_dat=xri:bsc:&rft_dat=xri:bsc:rec:iibp:1420686555 162  International Organization for Migration (IMO). Global Migration Data Portal. Global Migration Data Analysis Center (GMDAC), IMO, 2019. Accessed October 7, 2019 https://migrationdataportal.org/?i=stock_abs_origin&t=2015&cm49=288 163  Tertiary education in Ghana generally includes university (undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate), polytechnic, nursing training, teacher training, and other postsecondary education. 164  Ibid, Dovlo, Delanyo, and Frank Nyonator, 1999. See also; Nuro, E.  A. “Brain drain from Ghana: Case of university lecturers.” Department of Geography and Tourism, University of Cape Coast (1999): 41–70. 165  See http://data.uis.unesco.org/# 166  International Organization for Migration (IOM). Migration in Ghana: A Country Profile 2009. International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2009. Accessed October 10, 2019. https://www. iomdakar.org/profiles/content/migration–profiles–ghana 161

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intervention in subsidizing the costs of education at the tertiary level to make tertiary education accessible to all Ghanaians. The IOM reports state: At the tertiary level, Ghanaian citizens are exempted from paying tuition in all public universities and polytechnics. In addition, they are able to access loan facilities from SSNIT and Students Loan Trust (with interest, in addition to having three SSNIT contributors as guarantors), in order to pay for residential and academic facilities as well as other costs. Graduate students in public universities receive bursary and thesis grants from the government in addition to loan facilities. Some institutions also grant study leave (with and without pay) to enable their staff to upgrade their knowledge and skills either at home or abroad. There are a number of private schools (basic to tertiary level) and those who could not enroll in the public institutions have this option.167

Despite the implementation of the above policies to curb migration, student migration is still on the rise in Ghana due, but not limited, to (1) the high costs of education with insufficient SSNIT loans coupled with compound interests168 and (2) the lack of scholarships at the graduate level. The SSNIT loans provided for students at the tertiary level are not enough to cater for the costs of education in Ghana.169 Likewise, these loans attract compound interests immediately the first installment is disbursed, and the interests associated with such loans put students into huge debts. Also, the high rate of graduate unemployment in Ghana affects the ability of graduates to pay off their SSNIT loans, and even those who gain employment right after their education find it very difficult to pay off their these  loans due to the high accrued interests and the low salaries and wages given to Ghanaian workers. Moreover, a student needs one guarantor who must be a SSNIT contributor to qualify for the SSNIT loans. This implies that students whose guarantors are not SSNIT contributors do not qualify for SSNIT loans and may find it difficult to finance their education. Not only that, but a guarantor also needs to be replaced when he or she goes on retirement. There is therefore the need for the costs of tertiary education to be made more affordable. Furthermore, scholarships should be given to the poor and the needy rather than to the wards of the worthy who could afford the costs of education. The available scholarship such as the Ghana Education Trust Fund (GETFUND) is not known to the general public. Besides, it is very difficult for the ordinary Ghanaians to access it even if they get to know of it.

 Quartey, Peter. Migration in Ghana: A Country Profile 2009. Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2009. Accessed September 18, 2019 http://www.iomdakar.org/ profiles/sites/default/files/Ghana_Profile_2009.pdf 168  SSNIT (Social Security National Insurance Trust) is a statutory public trust established under the National Pensions Act, 2008 Act 766, and mandated to administer the basic national social security scheme of Ghana. Detailed information about SSNIT can be found at https://www.ssnit. org.gh/about–us/ accessed August 10, 2019. 169  Ibid, Lucas 2006. 167

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Social Policy The government should put in place social policies and programs, mostly targeted at the aged, in the country. People do not want to leave their jobs even in old age because of inadequate, if not lack of, social programs that they could rely on to sustain their living while on retirement. Due to this, most people reduce their actual age for the fear that they might not be able to cater for themselves and their families when they go on retirement.170 Consequently, spaces in the existing jobs are not freed up to absorb the new graduates leading to massive unemployment.171 Thus, with the establishment of programs of social insurance172 such as unemployment insurance, the improvement in the existing health insurance benefits (including paid sick leave, occupational injury benefits, maternity, and other social insurance), and social security and old age contributory pensions (including disability and survivors) 173, the aged will be willing to retire. This will help in opening job vacancies for the youth.

Entrepreneurship Entrepreneurship plays a significant role in the economic development of any state. For instance, the establishment of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) is essential in contributing significantly to a state’s economy by reducing the rate of unemployment, alleviating poverty, and promoting economic growth. Several scholars including Chipika and Wilson, Harris and Gipson, and Monk,174 among others, emphasize the essence of entrepreneurship in achieving rapid industrialization and economic growth in various states. Africa, like other continents, has benefited massively from entrepreneurship due to the increased number of small and medium enterprises on the continent with Ghana, South Africa, and Uganda, among others, serving as

 Ogwumike, Fidelis O., and Isabella Aboderin. “Exploring the links between old age and poverty in anglophone West Africa: evidence from Nigeria and Ghana.” Generations Review 15, no. 2 (2005): 7–15. 171  News Ghana. 90% of graduates do not find jobs after first year – ISSER, 2017. https://www. newsghana.com.gh/90–of–graduates–do–not–find–jobs–after–first–year–isser/ accessed July 20, 2019. 172  Ibid, Massey 1993. 173  IndexMundi. 2017. Ghana – Social Insurance Programs: Adequacy of Social Insurance Programs (% of Total Welfare of Beneficiary Households). Accessed May 20, 2020 https://www.indexmundi. com/facts/ghana/social–insurance–programs 174  Chipika, Stephen, and Gordon Wilson. “Enabling technological learning among light engineering SMEs in Zimbabwe through networking.” Technovation 26, no. 8 (2006): 969–979. See also; Harris, Michael L., and Shanan G. Gibson. “Determining the common problems of early growth small businesses in Eastern North Carolina.” SAM Advanced Management Journal 71, no. 2 (2006): 39.; Monk, Richard. “Why small businesses fail.” CMA Magazine 74, no. 6 (2000): 12–12. 170

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concrete examples.175 The extended contributions of entrepreneurship in economic development have motivated the government of Ghana to integrate the study of entrepreneurship into the country’s education system. The aim  is  to provide a nuanced understanding of the course while encouraging students not only to prepare for white-collar jobs but also to become entrepreneurs by establishing their own small or medium enterprises with the acquired knowledge and skills to boost Ghana’s economy. Nonetheless, several factors including the nature of Ghana’s education system and lack of seed capital, among others, hinder the growth of entrepreneurship in Ghana. For instance, the education system in Ghana is too theoretical.176 Thus, students are deeply exposed to the theoretical knowledge of the courses studied compared to the practical aspect that will provide a nuanced understanding and enable students to think outside the box to meet the changing needs of society. Aside from the education system, financial constraints hinder entrepreneurship in Ghana.177 For example, graduates who have the intention of establishing their enterprises after the completion of their education are unable to do so due to the lack of capital and poor access to loans because of the collateral requirements by the financial institutions. Even those who manage to get the necessary capital are faced with high-interest rates, thereby making it difficult for such infant enterprises to grow. Thus, there are inadequate opportunities in Ghana to enhance the growth of entrepreneurship, taking into consideration the high number of students who graduate yearly from the tertiary institutions with the necessary entrepreneurial skills and knowledge. This has contributed to the high rate of unemployment in Ghana. It is therefore essential to create an enabling environment that will promote and sustain entrepreneurship in Ghana. The government should also open new trade and investment opportunities and improve capital markets.178 For instance, the government of Ghana should make capital readily available for graduates with an entrepreneurial mindset to establish themselves. Likewise, the government of Ghana and

 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: Economy Profile, (2010). https://www.gemconsortium.org/economy–profiles accessed August 03, 2019. See also; Small and Medium Industries Development (SMIDO). SMEs incentives and support schemes, Small and Medium Industries Development Organization Year 2002–03, industrial zone. Mauritius: Coromadel, (2004). 176  Ato Dapatem, D.  Over–emphasising on theory, bane of Ghana’s educational system– 2018 NSMQ winners. Graphic Online, Ghana News Headlines, (2018, September 20). https://www. graphic.com.gh/news/education/over–emphasis–on–theory–bane–of–ghana–s–educational–system–2018–national–science–and–mathematics–winners.html accessed June 17, 2019. 177  Cook, Paul. “Finance and small and medium–sized enterprise in developing countries.” Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship 6, no. 1 (2001): 17. See also; Gray, Kenneth R., William Cooley, and Jesse Lutabingwa. “Small–scale manufacturing in Kenya.” Journal of Small Business Management 35, no. 1 (1997): 66.; Levy, Brian. “Obstacles to developing indigenous small and medium enterprises: an empirical assessment.” The World Bank Economic Review 7, no. 1 (1993): 65–83.; Peel, Michael J., and Nicholas Wilson. “Working capital and financial management practices in the small firm sector.” International Small Business Journal 14, no. 2 (1996): 52–68. 178  Ibid, Massey 1993. 175

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financial institutions that provide start-up capital for entrepreneurship should put measures in place that will reduce the interest rates attached to such capital. This will motivate graduates to put their ideas into reality by establishing SMEs to help reduce the unemployment rate and promote economic growth. Moreover, it will help the government to regulate the labor market which will go a long way to help control migration flow.179 Lastly, graduates who have entrepreneurial skills but lack the necessary capital to establish themselves should be employed by the government and other private institutions to make use of their human capital.

Conclusion This chapter, adopting a Multi-Theoretical Approach and with Ghana as a case study, critically analyzed the impact of migration on Africa and the continent’s response to curbing the situation. It mainly argued that, though several measures have been put in place to address the issue of migration, Africa’s effort should be directed at developing a holistic approach based on public policy such as youth employment, entrepreneurship, social insurance, and education policies, among others. Africa’s effort would not yield the desired results without the appropriate public policies put in place that would help address the root cause of the problem. Though migration has some noted positive effects on the economy of Africa such as migrant remittances, poverty reduction, and reduction in unemployment, its socioeconomic impact on the African continent such as brain drain, decreased government revenue, and inflation is remarkably disturbing. Since several socioeconomic factors drive African migration, there is the need for African states to put in place the right public policies such as entrepreneurship, widened education opportunities, social insurance, and youth employment that will create the required economic opportunities to help keep African professionals in the continent. Another important mechanism that could be harnessed to curb African migration requiring further exploration is greater continental integration. Through the African Union (AU), African states could adopt holistic integrated policies that would help address the emigration of its skilled labor. Ghana’s “Year of Return” initiative could be a starting point.

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179

 Ibid.

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Miyagiwa, Kaz. 1991. Scale economies in education and the brain drain problem. International Economic Review: 743–759. Monk, Richard. 2000. Why small businesses fail. CMA Magazine 74, no. 6: 12–12. Natter, Katharina. 2014. Fifty Years of Maghreb Emigration: How States Shaped Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian Emigration. DEMIG Working Paper, No. 21, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford. News Ghana. 2017. 90% of graduates do not find jobs after first year – ISSER. https://www.newsghana.com.gh/90-of-graduates-do-not-find-jobs-after-first-year-isser/. Accessed 20 July 2019. Nielsen, Rebecca. 2007. Political Push Factors in Emigration: A Comparative Analysis. Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies 25 (1): 4. Nuro, E. A. 1999. Brain drain from Ghana: Case of university lecturers. Department of Geography and Tourism, University of Cape Coast: 41-70. Ogwumike, Fidelis O., and Isabella Aboderin. 2005. Exploring the links between old age and poverty in anglophone West Africa: evidence from Nigeria and Ghana. Generations Review 15 (2): 7–15. Ojo, Kenneth Olayinka. 1990. International migration of health manpower in Sub-Saharan Africa. Social Science & Medicine 31 (6): 631–637. Palys, Ted, and Chris Atchison. 2008. Research Decision: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives. 4th ed. Toronto: Thomson Nelson. Papademetriou, Demetrios G., and Philip L.  Martin. 1991. Labor Migration and Development: Research and Policy Issues. In The Unsettled Relationship: Labor Migration and Economic Development, ed. Demetrios G.  Papademetriou and Philip L.  Martin, 3–26. New  York: Greenwood Press. Peel, Michael J., and Nicholas Wilson. 1996. Working capital and financial management practices in the small firm sector. International Small Business Journal 14 (2): 52–68. Peters, Guy B. 1999. Institutional Theory in Political Science: The ‘New Institutionalism’. London: Continuum. Piore, Michael J. 1979. Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor Industrial Societies. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. Quartey, Peter. 2009. Migration in Ghana: A Country Profile 2009. Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration (IOM). http://www.iomdakar.org/profiles/sites/ default/files/Ghana_Profile_2009.pdf. Accessed 18 Sept 2019. Raineri, Luca. 2018. Human Smuggling across Niger: State-Sponsored Protection Rackets and Contradictory Security Imperatives. The Journal of Modern African Studies 56 (1): 63–86. Ravenstein, E.G. 1885. The Laws of Migration. Journal of the Statistical Society of London 48 (2): 167–235. ———. 1889. The Laws of Migration. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 52 (2): 241–305. Rutaremwa, Gideon. 2011. Internal and international labor migration in Uganda: The contribution of remittances to household livelihoods. Makerere University. Salt, J. 1987. Contemporary Trends in International Migration Study. International Migration. 25 (3): 241. Samers, Michael. 1997. The Production of Diaspora: Algerian Emigration from Colonialism to Neo-Colonialism (1840–1970). Antipode 29 (1): 32–64. Sassen, Saskia. The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow, 1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schiff, Maurice. 2005. Brain Gain: Claims about Its Size and Impact on Welfare and Growth Are Greatly Exaggerated, IZA Discussion Paper 1599. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). Skeldon, Ronald. 1990. Population Mobility in Developing Countries: A Reinterpretation. London: Belhaven Press. Small and Medium Industries Development (SMIDO). 2004. SMEs incentives and support schemes, Small and Medium Industries Development Organization Year 2002–03, industrial zone. Mauritius: Coromadel.

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Snape, Dawn, and Liz Spencer. 2003. The Foundations of Qualitative Research. In Qualitative Research Practice: A guide for Social Science Students and Researchers. Qualitative Research, ed. J. Ritchie and J. Lewis, 1–23. London: SAGE. Stark, Oded. 1984 Migration Decision Making: De Jong, Gordon F. and Robert W. Gardner, Eds., (Pergamon, New York, 1981). Journal of Development Economics 14, 1: 251–259. ———. 1986. Migration, Human Capital and Development. Greenwich: JAI Press. ———. 2006. Inequality and migration: A behavioral link. Economics Letters 91 (1): 146–152. Stark, Oded, and David E. Bloom. 1985. The New Economics of Labor Migration. The American Economic Review 75 (2): 173–178. Stark, Oded, and Yong Wang. 2002. Inducing Human Capital Formation: Migration as a Substitute for Subsidies. Journal of Public Economics 86 (1): 29–46. Stoker, Gerry, and David Marsh. 2010. Introduction. In Theory and Methods in Political Science, ed. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, 3rd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. The World Bank In Africa. 2019. Sub-Saharan Africa’s growth is projected to reach 3.1 percent in 2018, and to average 3.6 percent in 2019–20. Thompson, Maddy. 2017. Migration Decision-Making: A Geographical Imaginations Approach. Area 49 (1): 77–84. Todaro, Michael P. 1969. A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries. The American Economic Review 59 (1): 138–148. Todaro, Michael P., and Lydia Maruszko. 1987. Illegal Migration and US Immigration Reform: A Conceptual Framework. Population and Development Review 13 (1): 101–114. UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa). 2009. African Youth Report 2009: Expanding Opportunities for and with Young People in Africa, Report ECA/ACGS/HSD/AYR/ 2009. Addis Ababa: UNECA. UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS). 2019. Education: Outbound Internationally Mobile Students by Host Region. http://data.uis.unesco.org/#. Accessed 10 July 2019. United Nations. 2012. Department of Economic Social Affairs. Population Division. World Urbanization Prospects the 2011 Revision, Population Studies (New York, N.Y.); No. 319. New York: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. United Nations Children’s Fund. 2013. Ghana: Migration Profiles. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. https://esa.un.org/MigGMGProfiles/indicators/files/Ghana.pdf. Accessed 7 Oct 2019. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), Population Division. 2016. The International Migration Report 2015: Highlights. (ST/ESA/SER.A/375). New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), Population Division. 2017. The International Migration Report 2017: Highlights. (ST/ESA/SER.A/404). New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 2017. Learning to live Together: Migrant/Migration. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/ themes/international-migration/glossary/migrant/. Accessed 10 July 2019. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 1968. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. INF/29/Rev. 2. Geneva: UNHCR. ———. 2010. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2198 (XXI). Geneva: UNHCR. https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html Van Gyampo, Ransford Edward, and Obeng-Odoom, Franklyn.  2013. “Youth Participation in Local and National Development in Ghana: 1620–2013.” Journal of Pan African Studies 5 (9): 129–150. Van Hear, Nicholas. 1998. New diasporas: The mass exodus. Dispersal and Regrouping of. Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice. 1974. The Modern World-system. Studies in Social Discontinuity. New York: Academic.

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Weis, Paul. The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux Preparatoires Analyzed with a Commentary by Dr. Paul Weis. https://www.unhcr.org/protection/travaux/4ca34be29/refugeeconvention-1951-travaux-preparatoires-analysed-commentary-dr-paul.html. Accessed 27 Sept 2019. World Bank. 2007. Development and the next generation. World Development Report. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/5989/ WDR%202007%20-%20English.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y. Accessed 7 Oct 2019. ———. 2009. Ghana  – Job Creation and Skills Development: Main Report. Washington, DC: World Bank. Youth Employment Agency. 2019. Modules run by the Youth Employment Agency. Youth Employment Agency. https://www.yea.gov.gh/index.php/yea-modules, https://www.yea.gov. gh/index.php.Accessed 7 Oct 2019. Zelinsky, Wilbur. 1971. The Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition. Geographical Review 61 (2): 219–249. Zohry, Ayman, and Barbara Harrell-Bond. 2003. Contemporary Egyptian Migration: An Overview of Voluntary and Forced Migration, Working Paper C3, Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalization and Poverty. Brighton: University of Sussex. Zolberg, Aristide R. 1981a. International Migration in Political Perspective. In Global Trends in Migration: Theory and Research on International Population Movements, ed. Mary M. Kritz, Charles B. Keely, and Silvano M. Tomasi. Staten Island: Center for Migration Studies. ———. 1981b. International Migrations in Political Perspective, International Migration Review 15, no. 1 Supplement, 3–27.

Chapter 3

Migration and Human Rights in Africa Konstantinos D. Magliveras and Gino J. Naldi

Introduction “States have the right, as a matter of well-established international law…to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens.” This statement from the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy neatly encapsulates the rule of international law that every independent State, as an expression of its sovereignty, is entitled to admit or exclude foreign nationals, or aliens, from its territory.1 However, this right is not absolute as it may be tempered by treaty commitments or other international law bindings on the State.2 Hence expulsions or deportations must comply with human rights obligations such as due process requirements. Refugees, although not migrants strictu sensu, are protected by the principle of non-­ refoulement, which is universally recognized.3 In the specific context of the African

1  Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R., Appl. No. 27765/09, 113 (Feb. 23, 2012). See also Saadi v. Italy, 2008-II Eur. Ct. H.R., 207, 242. And Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 15, The position of aliens under the Covenant, 5, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3 (1997). 2  Ibid. 3  According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, non-refoulement is, in addition to a binding treaty obligation, a rule of customary international law and a human right, quoted in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R., Appl. No. 30696/09, 56 (Jan. 21, 2011). The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights describes non-refoulement as a principle “which has taken an increasingly fundamental character, as one of the cornerstones of international refugee law,” Doebbler v. Sudan, Comm. No. 235/2000, 27th Activity Rep. 2009, 150. Yet there does not appear to be a uniform approach to the interpretation and scope of the principle in state practice;

K. D. Magliveras (*) University of the Aegean, Rhodes, Greece e-mail: [email protected] G. J. Naldi Independent Scholar, Norwich, UK © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. Abegunrin, S. O. Abidde (eds.), African Migrants and the Refugee Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56642-5_3

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continent, which encompasses 55 countries, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 (African Charter) and the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment 2018 (Protocol on Free Movement) are the most pertinent legal instruments, adopted under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU), pertaining to migrants and to the regulation of migration.4 While the former treaty has been in force for more than 30 years now and there is considerable practice regarding its implementation and application, the latter has not yet come into force and no estimation can currently be made as to when this might happen.

 he Provisions of the African Charter on Human and People’s T Rights as Applied to Migrants by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights The provision of the African Charter of most immediate relevance to migrants is Article 12 thereof which secures various aspects of the right of free movement, including the right to enter and leave a country, although the right of entry is restricted to nationals only, rights which have also been incorporated to a greater or lesser extent in the Protocol on Free Movement.5 The African Commission on see Ellen D’Angelo, “Non-refoulement: The Search for a Consistent Interpretation of Article 33”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 42, no. 1 (2009): 279. 4  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 UNTS 217, all AU Member States except Morocco are contracting parties; Protocol to the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment, Jan. 29, 2018, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-treaty-protocol_on_ free_movement_of_persons_in_africa_e.pdf, not yet in force (currently ratified by four Member States). 5  African Charter Art. 12 states, “1. Every individual shall have the right of freedom of movement and residence within the borders of a State provided he abides by the law. 2. Every individual shall have the right to leave any country including his own, and to return to his country. This right may only be subject to restrictions, provided for by law for the protection of national security, law and order, public health or morality. 3. Every individual shall have the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other countries in accordance with the law of those countries and international conventions. 4. A non-national legally admitted in a territory of a State Party to the present Charter, may only be expelled from it by virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law. 5. The mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited. Mass expulsion shall be that which is aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious groups.” This provision is reflected in all material respects in other human rights treaties, cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 12, 13, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR); American Convention on Human Rights art. 22, Nov. 27, 1969, 1144 UNTS 123 (ACHR); Fourth Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 2–4, Sept. 16, 1963, ETS No. 46; Seventh Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 22, 1984, ETS No. 117; Arab Charter on Human Rights arts. 20–22, May 22, 2004, International Human Rights Reports 12 (2005): 893. See generally David Harris, Michael O’Boyle and Colin Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd ed. Oxford:

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Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) has described Article 12 as “a fundamental human right to all individuals within States.”6 The general principles asserted above have been endorsed by the African Commission: “Although governments have the right to regulate entry, exit and stay of foreign nationals in their territories, and…although the African Charter does not bar deportations per se…‘a state’s right to expel individuals is not absolute and it is subject to certain restraints’.”7 But before exploring Article 12 and its interpretation and application in greater detail, two things should be borne in mind. First, in keeping with other international instruments and with international jurisprudence, the rights guaranteed by the African Charter, with a few exceptions such as the right to vote, apply equally to non-nationals. Second, under Article 2 thereof, States are obliged to secure the rights protected by the African Charter to all persons within their jurisdiction without discrimination, including non-nationals, while some of these rights extend to persons regardless of their migratory status.8 Article 12(1) guarantees the right of individuals, of whatever nationality, to freedom of movement and residence within the territory of contracting parties.9 It thus applies to passports, travel documents, identity cards, and the like and ensures that applications for residence permits are not refused arbitrarily.10 But this right is Oxford University Press, 2009), 736; Alex Conte and Richard Burchill, Defining Civil and Political Rights: The Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (2nd ed. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 65. 6  Sudan Human Rights Organization and Sudan Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions v. Sudan, Comm. Nos. 279/03, 296/05, 28th Activity Rep. 187 (2010). 7  Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Angola, Comm. No. 292/2004, 24th Activity Rep. 79 (2008). 8  Ibid., 80; African Institute for Human Rights and Development (on behalf of Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea) v. Guinea, Comm. No. 249/2002, 20th Activity Rep. 68 (2005–2006); Kenneth Good v. Botswana, Comm. No. 313/2005, 28th Activity Rep. 163 (2009–10). This position reflects those set out under other human rights treaties, see ICCPR art. 2(1), General Comment No. 15, 1, 6; ACHR art. 1(1); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 5 (ECHR). Discrimination against the nationals of other Member States is prohibited by the Protocol on Free Movement art. 4(1). The African Charter’s insistence on non-discrimination is also manifested in Article 19 thereof, which extends the principle of non-discrimination to the community as a whole by proclaiming the equality of all peoples, i.e. a collective of individuals sharing certain bonds and identities, Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, Comm. No. 276/2003, 27th Activity Rep. 151 (2009). 9  The Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v. Sudan, Comm. No. 228/99, 16th Activity Rep. 60 (2002–03). The compulsory mass transfer of people from one contracting party to another has been held to breach this provision, Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, Comm. No. 227/99, 20th Activity Rep. 81 (2005–06). See also Protocol on Free Movement art. 6(1). 10  Open Society Justice Initiative v. Côte d’Ivoire, Comm. No. 318/06 160 (2015). Note the definition of “travel document” as “a passport which complies with the International Civil Aviation Organization standards for travel documents, or any other travel document identifying a person issued by or on behalf of a Member State or by the [AU] Commission which is recognized by the host Member State,” Protocol on Free Movement art. 1. It should be noted that in 2016 the AU Assembly introduced the African Passport, which will be issued by the AU Commission and

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predicated on the person constantly and fully abiding by the law. This implies, inter alia, that non-nationals must be lawfully within the territory, having complied with immigration requirements, and observing domestic legislation relating to aliens at all times.11 This supposition has been confirmed by the African Commission, which has stated that it would not dispute the right of the State to bring legal action against illegal migrants and to deport them if justified.12 However, as discussed below, this does not mean that non-nationals having the legal status of illegal migrants are without rights. Article 12(2) grants the individual the right to leave and return to a State subject to limitations imposed by law on the grounds of national security, law and order, public health, or morality.13 A person may, therefore, be detained and prevented from leaving the territory of a contracting party because of bail restrictions or in order to serve a lawful prison sentence. However, the African Commission has held that the rules of natural justice are applicable in these cases and that the State has the burden of proving that it is justified in invoking these conditions. The State has to prove that the individual does pose a real danger to law and order; a “likely” threat is too vague.14 A right to seek and obtain asylum is recognized by Article 12(3) and complements Article 2 of the OAU Convention on Refugees.15 The African Commission has stated that this provision of the African Charter includes “a general protection of all those who are subject to persecution, that they may seek refuge in another state.”16 The African Charter is notable for being one of the few international human rights instruments to confer a right to asylum, but it must be stressed that it does not bestow an automatic right to asylum but simply seek asylum in accordance with the domestic law of the relevant contracting party.17 Moreover, the wording of the

by Member States and which should be recognized throughout the continent as a valid travel document; see Assembly/AU/Dec. 607 (XXVII) (July 18, 2016). See further Protocol on Free Movement art. 10. 11  Conte and Burchill, id.; Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick, 737. See Seventh Protocol ECHR art. 1(1). 12  Rencontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l’Homme v. Zambia, Communication No. 71/92, 10th Activity Rep. 31 (1996–97). 13  Modise v. Botswana, Comm. No. 97/93, 14th Activity Rep. 94 (2000–01). See also Protocol on Free Movement arts. 6(1), 7(1)(c), 7(2). 14  Amnesty International v. Zambia, Comm. No. 212/98, 12th Activity Rep. 42 (1998–99). 15  Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 UNTS 45. Currently, the Convention had been ratified by forty-six States. The Protocol on Free Movement art. 24 allows States Parties to adopt additional special measures compatible with international obligations for the movement of refugees, asylum seekers and other vulnerable groups. 16  Organisation Mondiale contre la Torture et  al. v. Rwanda, Comm. Nos. 27/89, 46/91, 49/91, 99/93, 10th Activity Rep. 30 (1993–94). 17  Other such treaties are the ACHR Art. 22(7), the Arab Charter on Human Rights Art. 23, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Art. 18, Dec. 12, 2007, 2010 O.J. C 83/02. The European Court of Human Rights has observed that neither the ECHR nor its Protocols protect a right to political asylum, Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, id. On the African contribution to the evolution of

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p­ rovision is suggestive of a restrictive interpretation in that refuge seekers are required to have suffered actual persecution rather than having the more generous standard of a well-founded fear of persecution specified by refugee law.18 Article 12(4) protects a non-national, who is legally within another State, from arbitrary or summary expulsions; as such sanctions can only be legitimate by virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law.19 While this provision is broadly worded and fails to specify any procedural guarantees, such as the right to be given reasons against expulsion, the jurisprudence of the African Commission has provided clarification of its content and established the fundamental principle that expulsions must be consistent with the due process of law, including the elements of the right to a fair trial.20 While the African Charter does not prohibit deportations as such given that the State retains the authority to expel non-nationals, the State’s right to do so does not justify the manner in which it does so.21 Any measures taken must not therefore be to the detriment of human rights.22 State action must be rooted in a legal basis to make the process “predictable” and to avoid abuse of power.23 Accordingly, States must have domestic laws in place to govern such operations which is insufficient in itself however, since such laws must be compatible with international human rights standards.24 This conclusion has been upheld by the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court) which has invoked the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in this regard, specifically Article 13.25

the law on asylum, see Gino J. Naldi and Cristiano d’Orsi, “The Multi-Faceted Aspects of Asylum Law Applicable to Africa: Analysis for Reflection”, Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review 36, no. 1 (2014–15): 115. 18  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(a)(2), July 28, 1951, 189 UNTS 137. 19  See also Protocol on Free Movement art. 21(1). 20  Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Angola, 63–65; Organisation Mondiale contre laTorture v. Rwanda, 30; Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme et  al v. Angola, Comm. No. 159/96, 11th Activity Rep. 19–20 (1997–98); Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and the Institute for Human Rights and Development (on behalf of Andrew Barclay Meldrum) v. Zimbabwe, Comm. No. 294/2004, 26th Activity Rep. 116 (2008–09). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated that, “Due process of law is a right that must be ensured to all persons, irrespective of their migratory status”, Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., OC-18/03 (Sept. 17, 2003), 121. See also General Comment No. 15, 9. 21  Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Angola, 63; Rencontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l’Homme v. Zambia, 23; Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme v. Angola, 19–20. This is the position under the Seventh Protocol ECHR art. 1(1), Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick, 747, and under ACHR art. 22(6). 22  Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme v. Angola, 23; Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights v. Zimbabwe, 114. See also Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, 118. 23  Kenneth Good v. Botswana, 203. 24  Ibid., 203–4. 25  Anudo Ochieng Anudo v. Tanzania, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., Appl. No. 012/2015 (Mar. 22, 2018), 100.

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Arbitrary expulsions are therefore prohibited under Article 12(4).26 Furthermore, if the procedure for expulsion entails arrest and detention, the safeguards relating to deprivation of liberty are applicable, as is the right to have the case reviewed.27 The case of Kenneth Good v. Botswana is an instructive example that is illustrative of the interconnection between the different provisions of the African Charter.28 Good, an Australian national, was an academic at the University of Botswana who coauthored an article critical of the government. Good was declared an undesirable alien by the President of Botswana in accordance with the Botswana Immigration Act, which further stated that the decision could not be challenged on the merits, and was issued with a deportation order. An appeal before the Court of Appeal accordingly failed on the ground that the President’s actions were not subject to judicial review. The African Commission asserted the general principle that, under the African Charter, States must ensure that all persons under their jurisdiction, including non-nationals, must have access to competent judicial bodies with the capacity to be granted adequate relief in accordance with the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 7 of the African Charter.29 While Good did have access to the courts, they could not provide him with a remedy under domestic law. Domestic law prevented him from seeking an effective remedy and denied him the opportunity to have his complaint heard.30 The African Commission responded robustly to the Respondent State’s argument that it would be contrary to the public interest to have the President’s decision-­ making process aired in court, stating that the right to a fair trial is absolute and cannot be derogated from in any circumstance.31 If a person does pose a threat to national security, the case must be brought before a court; to do otherwise could lead to abuses with individuals detained or expelled on mere suspicion.32 The African Commission, therefore, found that the denial of a right to be heard amounted to a violation of Article 7(1)(a) and Article 12(4) of the African Charter. The African Commission proceeded to establish a correlation between the right to a fair trial and the right to receive information under Article 9(1) of the African Charter, so that Good had a right to be informed of the reasons for the actions taken against him.33 The African Commission also found a violation of the right to family life, guaranteed by Article 18 of the African Charter. Article 18 obligates States to refrain  Organisation Mondiale contre la Torture v. Rwanda, 30. See also Anudo Ochieng Anudo v. Tanzania, 101. See also General Comment No. 15, 10; Conte and Burchill, 74. 27  General Comment No. 15, 9–10. 28  Ibid., 7. 29  Kenneth Good v. Botswana, 163–64, 169–70. See also Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, Comm. No. 245/2002, 21st Activity Rep. 213 (2005–06). The right to a fair trial has been held a fundamental human right, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Libya, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., App. No. 002/2013 (June 3, 2016), 89. 30  Kenneth Good v. Botswana, 172–73. 31  Ibid., 175. 32  Ibid., 177. See also Amnesty International v. Zambia. 33  Kenneth Good v. Botswana, 193–94. 26

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from unwarranted interference with the family, in this context arbitrarily separating family members.34 The case of Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and the Institute for Human Rights and Development (on behalf of Andrew Barclay Meldrum) v. Zimbabwe is another informative example. The victim, Andrew Meldrum, an American citizen, was a legal resident of Zimbabwe where he worked as a journalist. After publishing an article critical of the Mugabe regime, Meldrum was served with a deportation order which was halted by the High Court pending consideration by the Supreme Court. The following year, Meldrum was informed that his work permit had been revoked and was issued with another deportation order, which allowed the authorities to deport him immediately without disclosing reasons. Meldrum was duly deported notwithstanding a number of High Court orders barring the deportation and requiring his release. The Respondent State challenged the claim that Meldrum had been deported arbitrarily on the ground that he had been declared a prohibited immigrant and the authorities had acted in accordance with the governing law. But the African Commission held that the State, in ignoring the court orders, had not acted in conformity with the due process of law and was thus in violation of Article 12(4).35 But the African Commission held further that the deportation of a person, who was a legal resident, raised additional issues under the African Charter. One such was whether the deportation was compatible with the principle of nondiscrimination enshrined in Article 2 of the African Charter. The African Commission found that the Respondent State’s explanation for Meldrum’s deportation was unconvincing, and it concluded that the only reason for his deportation was that he was singled out as a non-national, thus constituting a violation of Article 2.36 This discriminatory treatment also amounted to a denial of the right of equality before the law guaranteed by Article 3(1) of the African Charter.37 Furthermore, denying Meldrum the protection of the courts constituted a violation of the right to equal protection of the law under Article 3(2) of the African Charter.38 Aspects of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 7(1) of the African Charter were also found to have been breached. Meldrum was entitled to an effective remedy. In particular, the deportation in defiance of a number of court orders denied Meldrum the right to be heard by a competent court of justice and infringed the presumption of innocence.39 Neither in this case, nor in that of Kenneth Good v.

 Ibid., 212. See also Amnesty International v. Zambia, 58–59; Modise v. Botswana, 93. Interference with the family requires good reason, it being the “natural unit and basis of society”, African Charter art. 18(1). 35  Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights v. Zimbabwe, 113–16. 36  Ibid., 93–94. See also Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, id. 37  Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights v. Zimbabwe, 96–98. 38  Ibid., 102. 39  Ibid., 103–9. The African Commission also found that Meldrum’s freedom of expression, guaranteed by art.9 of the African Charter, had been violated, id., 112. 34

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Botswana, can it be said that the State authorities had acted in good faith, thereby compounding their failings. The findings by the African Commission in Organisation Mondiale Contre La Torture and the Association Internationale des Juristes Democrates and Others v. Rwanda were analogous in certain respects. The African Commission held that, by expelling Burundian refugees without allowing them to be heard by a competent court, Rwanda was in breach of Article 7(1) of the African Charter. Consequently, Rwanda had additionally violated Article 12(4) of the African Charter prohibiting the arbitrary expulsion of refugees from the country where asylum was sought.40 Article 12(5) is an important provision in that it prohibits the mass expulsion of non-nationals, described by the African Commission as “a special threat to human rights.”41 A number of prohibited grounds are specified, including nationality.42 Whatever the basis, nationality, race, ethnicity, or religion, mass expulsion “is generally qualified as discriminatory in this sense as it has no legal basis.”43 A link thus exists between this provision and Article 2 of the African Charter that enshrines the principle of nondiscrimination.44 Its scope extends to refugees and refuge seekers. In Organisation Mondiale contre la Torture v. Rwanda, the African Commission found that the expulsion of Burundian refugees based on their nationality breached this provision.45 Here, as elsewhere, the African Commission has stressed that the human rights obligations in the African Charter, including due process requirements, must be complied with.46 People are thus “entitled to submit reasons against the expulsion, have the case reviewed and be represented for these purposes before a competent

 Organisation Mondiale contre la Torture v. Rwanda, 30, 34.  Rencontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l’Homme v. Zambia, 20; African Institute for Human Rights and Development v. Guinea, 69. This prohibition is reinforced by the Protocol on Free Movement art. 20. Cf. Fourth Protocol ECHR art. 4; ACHR art. 22(9); EU Charter of Fundamental Rights art. 19(1). In the absence of a suitable definition of “mass expulsion” by the African Commission, it should be noted that the European Court of Human Rights has defined the comparable concept of “collective expulsions” as “any measure of the competent authority compelling aliens as a group to leave the country, except where such a measure is taken after and on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the particular cases of each individual alien of the group”, Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 166. 42  Organisation Mondiale contre la Torture v. Rwanda, 33; African Institute for Human Rights and Development v. Guinea, 43. 43  African Institute for Human Rights and Development v. Guinea, 67–69; Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Angola, 68; Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme v. Angola, 16. 44  Rencontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l’Homme v. Zambia, 21; Organisation Mondiale contre la Torture v. Rwanda, 32; African Institute for Human Rights and Development v. Guinea, 69. See also General Comment No. 15, 2. 45  Organisation Mondiale contre la Torture v. Rwanda, 32. See also African Institute for Human Rights and Development v. Guinea, 72. 46  Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v. Angola, 69–70. 40 41

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authority.”47 Rencontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l’Homme v. Zambia, which concerned the expulsion of over 500 illegal residents, was one such case where the African Commission expressed these fundamental principles.48 Finally, reference should be made to Resolution 114 on Migration and Human Rights, which the African Commission adopted in November 2007.49 Its importance lies in that it gives a broad definition of the term “migrants,” which, over and above workers, includes refugees but also internally displaced persons (IDPs). The purpose of the Resolution is to address several recommendations to the African Charter’s contracting parties. Thus, they are asked to ensure that domestic legislation on migration issues is not in conflict with international human rights standards and the relevant treaties. Moreover, if they have not already done so, they are expected to ratify and implement the African and universal instruments relating to migrants and refugees. Despite its title, the main focus of the Resolution appears to be the protection of the status of refugees and asylum seekers. To this end, parties are told, inter alia, to respect the principle of non-refoulement, to allow greater flexibility in the legal requirements for permitting asylum seekers to enter their territory, to abandon the notion of “safe third country”, and to respect the right of asylum seekers to contest the rulings concerning their status. It appears safe to assert that the Resolution has influenced the African Commission’s reasoning in its case law.

 he Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic T Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment Τhe above analysis has examined migration from the perspective of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the protection which is afforded pursuant to the African regional system. However, migration, as a freedom to be exercised by individuals, can also be regulated from the perspective of an economic activity that is pursued in the context of the so-called regional economic integration organizations (REIOs). A pan-African process to create such a REIO commenced in the early 1990s. It was rather heavily influenced by (what was then) the European Economic Community (EEC), the prototype of REIOs worldwide, a fact which probably explains the name given to it, namely, the African Economic Community (AEC).50  Ibid., 70. See N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, Eur. Ct. H.R., Appl. Nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15 (Oct. 3, 2017), 121. 48  Rencontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l’Homme v. Zambia, 23. 49  Resolution 114 on Migration and Human Rights, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 42nd Ordinary Session (Brazzaville, Republic of Congo, Nov. 15–28, 2007) http://www. achpr.org/sessions/42nd/resolutions/114/ 50  Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC Treaty), also known as Abuja Treaty, June 2, 1991, I.L.M. 30 (1991): 1241. Presently, the AEC Treaty had been ratified by fifty AU Member States. See specifically art. 4(2)(1). For analysis, see Gino J. Naldi and Konstantinos 47

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One of the principal areas of activity advanced by a REIO is the migratory flows of economic active individuals between participating States. In REIO parlance, it is referred to as “free movement of persons.” But in the case of the AEC, the continent was not yet ready to experience institutionalized migratory flows, which, by necessary implication, required the acceptance of uniform mandatory rules regulating immigration. This was reflected in Article 43 of the AEC Treaty. Pursuant to the first paragraph thereof, contracting parties agreed “to adopt, individually, at bilateral or regional levels, the necessary measures” to progressively bring about the free movement of persons and to ensure that the associated rights of residence and of the establishment would be enjoyed by their nationals acting within the AEC. Pursuant to the second paragraph thereof, contracting parties reserved the right to conclude a future Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment but left unspecified the time frame for doing so. Already in the late 1990s, it became apparent that the AEC was not going to be a successful project because the conditions necessary to ensure economic integration at a continental level did not exist. Thus, even though it was effectively neglected, legally speaking, the AEC Treaty was neither terminated nor abrogated, and consequently, it continued to exist, if in a state of limbo. In March 2018, the AU Member States took the momentous decision to revive economic integration by establishing an African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).51 However, this is not tantamount to creating a REIO, because, compared to a REIO, AfCFTA has a reduced scope which principally covers the area of free trade, namely, the setting up of a common (single) market where goods and services circulate without barriers. As regards specifically migration, the AfCFTA Agreement stipulates that its role is to facilitate the operation of the single market by ensuring that the movement of persons will not be obstructed, while the ultimate aim is to deepen the continent’s economic integration.52 It is important to observe that the term “free” was omitted from the reference to the movement of people.53 This might be explained by the fact that, two months earlier, AU Member States had concluded the Protocol on Free Movement envisaged in the aforementioned Article 42(2) of the AEC Treaty (Protocol on Free Movement).54 It follows that, in the drive toward continental Magliveras, “The African Economic Community: Emancipation for African States or Yet Another Glorious Failure?” North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 24, no. 3 (1999): 601. 51  Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area, Mar. 21, 2018, https://au.int/ sites/default/files/treaties/36437-treaty-consolidated_text_on_cfta_-_en.pdf, entered into force May 30 2019. It was concluded as part of the Pan African Vision of “An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa”, which is enshrined in Aspiration 2 of the so-called “Agenda 2063: The Africa we Want”. At the time of writing, twenty-eight AU Member States had ratified it, but it is expected that that number will increase in the months to come. 52  AfCFTA art. 3(a). 53  Note that AfCFTA art. 3(c) envisages another type of migration which concerns the movement of capital; according to it, natural persons will be allowed to move from one contracting party to another as this will “facilitate investments building” in the territory of contracting parties. 54  See supra note 4.

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economic integration, liberalized trade in goods and services is being pursued pursuant to the AfCFTA Agreement, while the free movement of persons is to be regulated under the Protocol on Free Movement. If the aim of the AU was that these two legal instruments (the AfCFTA Agreement and the Protocol on Free Movement) are applied and implemented in parallel, this is not going to happen because, as already noted, the former has already entered onto force, while no estimation can be made about the latter (presently, it requires another 11 ratifications to enter into force). It may also be instructive to note that there are other notable differences among the two instruments, for example, in the area of dispute settlement. Thus, the mechanism envisaged in the AfCFTA Agreement follows very closely the relevant mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO),55 while, according to Article 31 of the Protocol on Free Movement, disagreements regarding its interpretation, application, or implementation are to be settled by the traditional methods of peaceful resolution of disputes, failing which by three-member arbitration panels, whose decisions shall be final, or by the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights, when operational.56 The experience of the European Union (EU) suggests that considerable litigation is likely. The Preamble of the Protocol on Free Movement connects migration as an economic activity to migration as a human right by noting that the African Charter guarantees the right of an individual to freedom of movement and residence. This is of course laid down in the aforementioned Article 12 of the African Charter. The general clause on the prohibition of discrimination in the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which is laid down in Article 2 of the African Charter, has been reproduced in Article 4(1) of the Protocol on Free Movement. Thus, contracting parties are prohibited from discriminating against nationals of another party, who reside or have established themselves in their territory, on the basis of, among other factors, nationality, ethnic origin, social origin, color, sex, religion, language, political opinions, and wealth. However, a combined reading of the first and third paragraphs of Article 4 of the Protocol on Free Movement would reveal that contracting parties, acting as host countries, must have in place domestic policies and laws to cater specifically for the citizens of any other contracting party, when, by taking advantage of the Protocol on Free Movement, the latter reside in their territory and/or have established themselves therein. Thus, Article 4(2) allows contracting parties to maintain different rules on migration, depending on whether the African migrants being present in their territory have the citizenship of another contracting party or not. At first sight, this differing regulation might constitute unequal treatment and run against the  See the Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes, which was adopted together with the AfCFTA Agreement, supra note 51. 56  Presently, the instrument establishing the Court has received only seven out of the required fifteen ratifications. For analysis, see Gino J. Naldi and Konstantinos D. Magliveras, “The African Court of Justice and Human Rights: A Judicial Curate’s Egg” 9, no. 2 International Organizations Law Review (2012): 387–453. 55

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prohibition of discrimination. But, upon closer examination, it should be regarded as acceptable deviation because it stems from the fact that, unlike other REIOs (e.g., the EEC/EU) where all participating States must follow and be bound by the same exact rules, in the case of the AEC, only those AU Member States wishing to ratify or accede to the Protocol on Free Movement must accept the rules on the free movement of persons (and the associated right of residence) as stipulated in the Protocol. And only when all Member States finally become contracting parties to it will the same legal regime on the free movement of persons apply across the whole continent. To explain it further, the relationship between the AU Member States, on the one hand, and the Protocol on Free Movement, on the other hand, is laid down in Article 32 of the Protocol, which allows any of them to sign, ratify, and/or accede to it. However, there is no prerequisite that they must have already become contracting parties to the AEC Treaty before ratifying or acceding to the Protocol on Free Movement. It follows that there might be cases where Member States will subscribe to the Protocol’s rules on the free movement of persons even though they would not have accepted the rules concerning the other aspects of the regional economic integration advanced by the AEC (free movement of goods, free movement of services, etc.). This state of affairs is far from satisfactory. In the future, the relationship between the AEC, as a REIO, and the AU, as a primarily political international organization, which has embarked on creating a common market in goods and services through the operation of the AfCFTA Agreement, should be rectified. When the Protocol on Free Movement enters into force, the regulation of migration among the AU Member States will  depend on whether they have chosen to become contracting parties to it or not. This conclusion should be qualified by the provision of Article 4(2) thereof, which does not regard as prohibited discrimination that a contracting party, on account of reciprocity or in order to deepen integration in the continent, has opted to offer more favorable treatment (i.e., more rights than those provided for in the Protocol) to the nationals of specific contracting parties. Moreover, it is submitted that the legal systems of African States contain multiple regimes for the regulation of migration (i.e., for the movement of persons). Assuming that the Protocol on Free Movement has entered into force and depending on the circumstances of each State, there might be up to six such regimes. Should they prove to conflict with one another, issues of precedence could arise. This state of affairs reflects to an extent what the AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, told the 30th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in January 2018 when he urged them to adopt the Protocol on Free Movement: “[it will ensure] that Africans are no longer treated like foreigners on their continent, while others move about therein often freely.”57 In particular, the first regime would encompass the rules envisaged in the Protocol on Free Movement or those promulgated domestically under its authority and would concern the nationals of the other contracting parties. Given that the Protocol on

 Cited by Bernardo Mariano, “Free Movement of Persons in Africa: What are the benefits and challenges?”, IOM-UN Migration, October 12, 2018, https://medium.com/@UNmigration

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Free Movement will enter into force when 15 Member States have ratified it, initially, this regime would only cover this group of States. The second regime would be similar to the first one but would also encompass the additional privileges and benefits to be accorded to the nationals of certain of the contracting parties; this regime would be the logical outcome of the aforementioned Article 4(2) of the Protocol on Free Movement. The third regime would concern the rules pertaining to nationals of third States (whether African or not) with which the host country has concluded one or more bilateral agreements on the regulation of migration.58 The fourth regime would concern specifically those African states which participate in the African REIOs, collectively known as Regional Economic Communities (RECs).59 Some of these RECs have adopted legal regimes on the free movement of persons not only before the AEC Treaty (e.g., ECOWAS60) but also after it (e.g., COMESA,61 SADC,62 and EAC63). It follows that the fourth regime would concern the Member States of RECs, which have in place specific rules and regulations on migration/free movement of persons, and would be applicable to those nationals coming from the Member States of the relevant RECs. A fifth regime would concern the rules emanating from treaties that AU Member States have concluded with non-African REIOs, principally with the EU. Here, one  Generally, see International Organization for Migration, Regional Guidelines for the Development of Bilateral Labour Agreements in the Southern African Development Community, Maputo, Mozambique, 2016, https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/regional_guide_bilateral_ labour_agreements.pdf 59  Note that the AU recognizes the following eight RECs: the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA); the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); the East African Community (EAC); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 60   ECOWAS Protocol A/P.1/5/79 Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, May 29, 1979, http://documentation.ecowas.int/download/en/legal_documents/ protocols/PROTOCOL%20RELATING%20TO%20%20FREE%20MOVEMENT%20OF%20 PERSONS.pdf; a number of Supplementary Protocols have subsequently been adopted. Generally, see Olatunde J. Ojo “Integration in ECOWAS: Successes and Difficulties” in Regionalisation in Africa: Integration and Disintegration, ed. Daniel C.  Bach (Oxford: James Currey Publishers, 1999), 119–27; and Adepoju Aderanti, “Fostering Free Movement of Persons in West Africa: Achievements, Constraints, and Prospects for Intraregional Migration” International Migration 40, no. 2 (2002): 3–28. 61  COMESA Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, Right of Establishment and Residence, June 29 1998, http://www.visafree.ccpau.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/COMESAProtocol-on-Free-Movement-of-Persons.pdf. Presently, there are four signatory parties (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Zimbabwe) but only Burundi and Rwanda have ratified it. A Protocol on the Gradual Relaxation and Eventual Elimination of Visa Requirements has also been concluded. 62  SADC Protocol on Facilitation of the Movement of Persons, Aug. 18 2005, https://www.sadc.int/ files/9513/5292/8363/Protocol_on_Facilitation_of_Movement_of_Persons2005.pdf, not yet in force. 63  Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market, Nov. 20 2009, in force July 1 2010, http://eacj.eac.int/?page_id=748 58

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has particularly in mind the so-called Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, which are in force between certain North African countries, one the one hand, and the EU and its Member States, on the other hand, and which, at least in theory, adhere to democratic principles and safeguard human rights.64 The most progressive Euro-Mediterranean Agreement in the area of migration is the one concluded with Morocco.65 Reference should also be made to the so-called Cotonou Agreement, which was concluded between African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries and the European Community (now Union) and its Member States in 2000.66 In Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement, which deals specifically with the issue of migration, contracting parties, inter alia, “reaffirm their existing obligations and commitments in international law to ensure respect for human rights and to eliminate all forms of discrimination ….”. For several years now, the ACP countries and the EU have been negotiating a new treaty to succeed the Cotonou Agreement, and it is rather interesting that the ACP countries are disinterested in including Article 13  in the new treaty.67 Finally, a sixth regime would relate to the rules emanating from and/or implementing the provisions of international (non-African) treaties which deal with the process of migration and to the extent that they have been ratified by African states. This regime would apply to the (African and non-African) nationals of the contracting parties to this specific category of international treaties, of which the prime example is the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CMW).68An interesting aspect of the CMW’s operation is that it has established the namesake Committee, which is a body of independent experts reviewing its application by the contracting parties. One of the Committee’s tasks is to examine the reports which the latter have submitted for its consideration and which concentrate on the legislative, judicial, and

 Generally, see Konstantinos Magliveras, “Protecting the Rights of Migrant Workers in the EuroMediterranean Partnership” Mediterranean Politics 9 (2004): 459–488. 65  Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, signed in Brussels, February 26 1996, OJ L 70, 18.3.2000, p. 1. 66  Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou, June 23 2000, O.J. L 317/3, revised June 25 2005, O.J. L 209/27, revised June 22 2010, O.J. L 287/1, last amended by Council Decision 2017/435 of 28 February 2017, OJ L 67/31. The Agreement has been extended to December 31 2020 pursuant to Decision No. 3/2019 of the ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors of December 17 2019, 2020 O.J. L 1/3.  67  See Evita Schmieg, EU and Africa: Investment, Trade, Development  – What a Post-Cotonou Agreement with the ACP States Can Achieve, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Comment No. 1, January 2019, 3. 68  Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 UNTS 3. More than half of the current fifty-five contracting parties are African. Generally, see Konstantinos Magliveras, “Migrant Workers’ Rights in the EuroMediterranean Partnership: European Union and International Law Perspectives” Hellenic Review of European Law (International Edition) (2004): 43–83. 64

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administrative measures taken for the purpose of giving effect to the Convention.69 The parties’ reports in conjunction with the Committee’s observations and recommendations on them could paint an objective picture on the regulation of migration in those African States participating in the CMW as well as on the problems and challenges that they face.70 As has already been indicated, these various legal regimes on migration as well as the regulation of the status of migrants are subject to each time applicable rules on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Moreover, depending on the regime, the associated principles of democracy and the rule of law may also have to be considered in the domestic regulation of the process of migration. As regards specifically the sixth regime, it should be noted that the CMW is in fact a human rights instrument and forms part of the so-called “core” international human rights instruments.71

Conclusions As regards the protection of the rights and privileges of non-nationals (including migrants) in the African continent, Article 12 of the African Charter corresponds in all essential respects to analogous provisions in other (global and regional) human rights treaties; in some particulars, such as regarding asylum, it may be said to be more progressive. Its interpretation by the African Commission is consistent with the approach taken by human rights organs with respect to these comparable provisions. Accordingly, non-nationals have no right of entry or residence in another African country, which is a State prerogative, but once they are allowed entry and/ or residence, they acquire specific rights under the African Charter. Migrants and host countries are on a quid pro quo situation: the latter must protect these rights (domestic courts must also uphold them) and the former must follow and obey their rules and domestic legislation. While deportations or expulsions of non-nationals are not prohibited – States are always entitled to pursue their form of law and order – due process must be observed and States must steer clear of arbitrariness and act in good faith at all times. Consequently, even illegal migrants have been deemed to be right holders, so their treatment must be compatible with basic human rights. The legal position of migrants will no doubt be further ameliorated when the AEC Protocol on Free Movement enters into force. That the Protocol was attached to the AEC Treaty, a largely inoperative instrument for some 20 years now, that it was not adopted as a self-standing convention and that it fails to envisage its coming “into immediate effect in Member States,” the latter being the mandate given by the

 CMW arts. 73–74.  Most of these documents are available and searchable at https://www.refworld.org/publisher/ CMW.html 71  See https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx 69 70

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Executive Council in 2016,72 are no doubt worrisome developments. But as explained above, the rights of migrants in the various African countries may be protected by several domestic regimes and at different levels, while being under the watchful eye of an array of regional and global human rights bodies and entities, including the African Commission, the African Court, the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Human Rights Council, and the CMW Committee. All the above does allow the existence of a regulatory framework, which respects human rights and the fundamental freedoms of those migrating within Africa and could accelerate mobility in and the integration of the continent. It is important to bear in mind that the Protocol on Free Movement is not the final position on this issue; indeed it acknowledges that it should be achieved progressively. Article 26 thereof requires States to harmonize laws and policies, including those adopted in the context of REIOs. The Protocol consequently does not contain the detail that can be found in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which is the most advanced and sophisticated treaty of its type.73 It seems beyond doubt, as the EU experience demonstrates, that in order to achieve the free movement of persons the AU and its Member States will have to engage in a flurry of legislative activity.

Bibliography Aderanti, Adepoju. 2002. Fostering Free Movement of Persons in West Africa: Achievements, Constraints, and Prospects for Intraregional Migration. International Migration 40 (2): 3–28. Conte, Alex, and Richard Burchill. 2009. Defining Civil and Political Rights: The Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee. 2nd ed. Farnham: Ashgate. D’Angelo, Ellen. 2009. Non-refoulement: The Search for a Consistent Interpretation of Article 33. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 42 (1): 279–315. Harris, David, Michael O’Boyle, and Colin Warbrick. 2009. Law of the European Convention on Human Rights. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. International Organization for Migration. 2016. Regional Guidelines for the Development of Bilateral Labour Agreements in the Southern African Development Community. Maputo, Mozambique. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/regional_guide_bilateral_labour_ agreements.pdf. Magliveras, Konstantinos. 2004a. Migrant Workers’ Rights in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: European Union and International Law Perspectives. Hellenic Review of European Law (International Edition): 43–83. ———. 2004b. Protecting the Rights of Migrant Workers in the Euro Mediterranean Partnership. Mediterranean Politics 9: 459–488. Magliveras, Konstantinos, and Gino Naldi. 2018. The African Union: History, Institutions and Activities. 2nd ed. Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer.

 See Executive Council, Decision on the Mekele Retreat of the Executive Council, EX.CL/ Dec.908(XXVIII)Rev.1, January 25, 2016, 18. Continental free movement of people was subsequently discussed during the July 2016 Assembly Session in Kigali, Rwanda, see Konstantinos D. Magliveras and Gino J. Naldi, The African Union: History, Institutions and Activities (2nd ed., Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2018): 88. 73  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Title IV, Dec. 13, 2007, 2010 O.J. C 83/47. 72

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Mariano, Bernardo. Free Movement of Persons in Africa: What are the benefits and challenges? IOM-UN Migration, October 12, 2018., https://medium.com/@UNmigration. Naldi, Gino J., and Konstantinos Magliveras. 1999. The African Economic Community: Emancipation for African States or Yet Another Glorious Failure? North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 24 (3): 601–631. Naldi, Gino J., and Konstantinos D. Magliveras. 2012. The African Court of Justice and Human Rights: A Judicial Curate’s Egg. International Organizations Law Review 9(2): 383–449. Naldi, Gino J., and Cristiano d’Orsi. 2014-15. The Multi-Faceted Aspects of Asylum Law Applicable to Africa: Analysis for Reflection. Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review 36 (1): 115–152. Ojo, Olatunde J. 1999. Integration in ECOWAS: Successes and Difficulties. In Regionalization in Africa: Integration and Disintegration, ed. Daniel C. Bach, 119–127. Oxford: James Currey Publishers. Schmieg, Evita. 2019. EU and Africa: Investment, Trade, Development – What a Post-Cotonou Agreement with the ACP States Can Achieve. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Comment No. 1, January.

Chapter 4

The Global Border Industrial Complex and Eastern Africa: Analyzing the Political Economy of Transnational Migration Zuzana Uhde

Introduction Transnational migration is a topical issue that is high on the international political agenda. Recent debates aimed at formulating a comprehensive framework for the international politics of migration culminated in 2018 in the adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Secure Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees. While both documents use strong human rights language, they presuppose a nation-state-centered institutional framework, and their primary aim is to control and significantly reduce migration. As part of this, the division into two documents highlights a distinction between refugees and migrants and especially the so-called economic migrants. The negotiation process which started with the adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in 2016 was burdened with a heightening perception of migration as a security and terrorist threat. The global security market continues to benefit from a culture of fear of migration and is expected to grow at an annual rate of 8%.1 Indeed, far from merely responding to public demand, the major actors in the global border industrial complex actively promote this trend toward the securitization and militarization of migration management.2 1  Akkerman, Mark. “The Business of Building Walls”. Transnational Institute, Stop Wapenhandel, Centre Delàs, 2019. 2  Betts, Alexander. “The migration industry in global migration governance.” In The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration edited by Thomas GammeltoftHansen, and Ninna Nyberg Sørensen, New  York: Routledge, 2013; Lemberg-Pedersen, Martin. “Private security companies and the European borderscapes.” In The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration edited by Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, and Ninna

Z. Uhde (*) Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Sociology, Prague, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. Abegunrin, S. O. Abidde (eds.), African Migrants and the Refugee Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56642-5_4

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Europe is the fastest-growing market for border security and surveillance technologies. In recent decades, migration has become a priority issue for EU foreign policy, in particular focusing on relations with the African macro-region. The strategies of externalization and commodification of border control are applied systematically. The political declarations stressing the need to address the root causes and to help migrants in their country of origin are wrapped into strategies of exchanging development aid for further migration control. Under the weight of undeniable evidence of war refugees crossing the EU’s borders, the public discussion has shrunk to a need for compassion and refugees’ protection while leaving intact the structural underpinnings of the workings of the global political economy. The debate continues to presuppose a strict separation between refugees and the so-called economic migrants. Economic migration is depoliticized as an isolated problem (of individuals or states) that needs to be controlled and managed. In the European context, economic migration is symbolically represented by the figure of the poor African migrant who presumably comes to Europe in search of a better life. In this chapter, I analyze the political economy of transnational migration to shed light on the structural sources of transnational migration and how the geopolitical economy determines political responses to transnational migration.3 First, I analyze the political economy of global capitalism to understand to what extent and how migratory dynamics are influenced by the activities of wealthy countries and transnational corporations (TNCs) while unpacking the interactions between global actors (e.g.  transnational capitalist class, TNCs), state political elites, and local communities. I argue that global capital benefits from the economic order which produces the structural causes of migration and is also benefiting from today’s political responses to migration – militarization and securitization of migration management. I refer to the context of Eastern Africa4 to illustrate these dynamics. In the second part, I focus on the relationship between the emerging global migration governance and the institutionalized workings of global capitalism. I show how the migration management agenda is shaped by a global border industrial complex which is part of militarized capitalist accumulation. I discuss how this broader context is unfolding in Eastern Africa. I suggest that it is an inherent part of the governance of global capitalism which incorporates countries hosting refugees in a global surveillance system designed to hinder people’s mobility without any Nyberg Sørensen, New  York: Routledge, 2013; Akkerman, M. “The Business of Building Walls”, 2019. 3  The research was funded by the research programme Global Conflicts and Local Interactions (Strategy AV21) and institutional support of the Czech Academy of Sciences (RVO: 68378025). Furthermore, I want to thank for the institutional support of MISR during my visiting research fellowship at Makerere University in Kampala which made possible to develop this paper. 4  For the purpose of studying transnational migration in both regional and EU-Africa perspectives, I understand the context of Eastern Africa as IGAD region (Intergovernmental Authority on Development, comprising Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, and Kenya, which is sometimes referred to as the Greater Horn of Africa), with some important overlaps with eastern part of DRC. Moreover, I am not covering the whole region; rather, I refer selectively to specific issues in the region relevant to my analysis.

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systemic change in the structures of the global economy nor the transnational practices which generate different kinds of forced migration.

The Political Economy of Transnational Migration The prevailing interpretation of migration both within and from Africa highlights conflict and/or poverty-driven migration, assuming that underdevelopment, natural disasters, or the concept of failed states are the key causes while largely overlooking how these processes are embedded within the global economy and geopolitics. Connecting the analysis of transnational migration to the political economy of global capitalism highlights the complexities of the structural causes of African migration which go deeper than the commonly adopted isolationist interpretation of human mobility driven by internal civil wars, poverty caused by failed states, or political violence instigated by authoritarian regimes. In other words, it shows how inadequate a simple explanation at the level of the nation-state or international relations is and brings into the picture the non-state transnational actors, especially the transnational capitalist class and TNCs. Contrary to popular media, which focuses on a discourse of African migrants coming en masse to Europe, a slight majority of African migration is intracontinental. Africa accounts for only 14% of the total international migration, i.e., approximately 36.3 million out of 258 million.5 Nevertheless, the statistics typically focus on the overall stock of migration, not the number of people who are actually on the move in any particular year. In 2017, 53% of all international migrants from Africa stayed in Africa, slightly fewer than 19.4 million people. Specifically, in the case of Eastern Africa,6 71% of migrants stayed within the region, some 7.5 million people. In 2017, African countries with the largest number of migrants residing in the country were South Africa, Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda, Nigeria, and Ethiopia.7 In Europe as well, most migrants come from Europe – 63%.8 Out of the estimated 16.9 million international African migrants residing outside the continent, 9 million are living in Europe.9 Migration flow data is much less available. In 2017, there were a total of 186,768 registered new arrivals in Europe: the number of people coming from

5  UN. International Migration Report [highlights]. New York: OSN, 2017, p. 9. http://www.un. org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/ MigrationReport2017_Highlights.pdf. 6  UNCTAD has a slightly different methodology in defining the region of Eastern Africa than what I use in this chapter. In the UNCTAD report, it includes Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Mozambique. 7  UNCTAD. Economic Development in Africa Report 2018. Migration for Structural transformation. UNCTAD, 2018. https://unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/edar2018_ch2_en.pdf 8  UN, 2017. 9  Ibid, p. 11.

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Eastern Africa was limited, coming mostly from Eritrea and Somalia.10 IOM registered 832,989 people in East and the Horn of Africa as on the move in 2018.11 When we look at the number of forcibly displaced people, under the common understanding of the term, counting international refugees (25.9 million), asylum seekers (3.5 million), and internally displaced people (41.3 million), 84% live in developing countries, and 33% are being hosted in the least developed countries worldwide.12 In 2018, Eastern Africa hosted 3.6 million refugees and 7.6 million international migrants.13 Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya host the highest number of migrants in the region, who mainly come from Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and DRC. While it is true that the number of international migrants and forcibly displaced persons are growing, the EU does not shoulder the main responsibility globally. The use of the term “refugee crisis” to describe development since 2015 underscores the Eurocentric perspective from which the phenomenon of transnational migration is approached within the EU in general. The discursive construction of fear of African migrants and/or refugees is fed by racist sentiments which are translated into the institutionalized racism of the EU migration policy.14 Moreover, behind this construction of a threat of African migrants for the EU, we can also identify an economic interest which I will come back to later. The biased approach privileging the perspective of wealthy predominantly receiving countries both in international politics and migration research has been criticized by critical scholars. Efforts to introduce a more complex understanding of human mobility into the global migration debate, by emphasizing the focus on “root causes,” have been hindered by political bias. Stephen Castles and Nicholas Van Hear argue that “‘root causes’ approaches remained limited in at least three respects: first, they did not seek to address fundamental North-South inequalities; second, they remained based on the implicit assumption that the migration of poorer people was a bad thing that should be curtailed; and third, ‘root causes’ approaches remained poor cousins of the migration control measures, in the sense that governments were willing to spend far more on the latter.”15 Stephen Castles has argued that today’s migration studies face several institutionalized shortcomings which contribute to the legitimization of a biased real politics of migration: disciplinary

 The registered number of arriving migrants in Italy from the region of Eastern Africa was 3,764  in 2018 compared to 10,710  in 2017. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/migration-flowseurope-2017-overview 11  IOM. A Region on the Move. 2018 Mobility Overview in the Horn of Africa and the Arab Peninsula. IOM, 2019.  https://displacement.iom.int/system/tdf/reports/A%20Region%20on%20 the%20Move%202018%20for%20preview.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=573 12  UNHCR. Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2018. UNHCR, 2019. https://www.unhcr.org/ statistics/unhcrstats/5d08d7ee7/unhcr-global-trends-2018.html 13  https://migrationdataportal.org/regional-data-overview/eastern-africa 14  De Genova, Nicholas. “The ‘migrant crisis’ as racial crisis: Do Black Lives Matter in Europe?” Ethnic and Racial Studies 41, no. 10 (2018): 1765–1782. 15  Castles, Stephen, and Nicholas Van Hear. “Root Causes.” In Global Migration Governance edited by Alexander Betts, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 302. 10

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fragmentation and disconnection from contemporary social theory, a policy orientation and focus centered on receiving countries, the separation of research on forced migration (e.g., political, conflict, environmental refugees) from that on economic migration (labor migration), and other types of topic-related fragmentation, a taken-­ for-­granted analytical framework of methodological nationalism.16 In particular, receiving country bias and methodological nationalism go hand in hand. Methodological nationalism represents an often hidden assumption in the social sciences that ahistorically treats the nation-state as the self-evident unit of analysis and naturalizes the idea of territorial sovereignty of nation-states.17 From this perspective, migration appears to be a problematic deviation from the norm, posing a threat to a “domestic” society defined by the territorial borders. However, today’s international order is a historical product that is changing with continuing global interactions. Transnational migration is an inherent part of a global economy that brings about transnational practices and relations and in which some macro-­ regions benefit from practices that impoverish other macro-regions. States are not the only relevant actors; transnational corporations, local as well as transnational civil society actors, and local communities and groups shape the dynamics of cross-­ border mobility. Moreover, while most of the restrictive measures of migration policies are institutionalized at the level of nation-states and negotiated at intergovernmental fora, transnational economic actors have an increasing shadow influence on the process.18 The analytical starting point from which a particular issue is explored has fundamental implications, not only on what we see in a research viewfinder but also on how the resulting responsibilities are delineated. The bulk of migration research, however, still operates within the analytical framework of methodological nationalism which overlooks these transnational and global interactions. In doing so, it legitimizes policy measures which are, at best, limited to assisting a select few migrants while leaving intact the profoundly unjust global geopolitical arrangement. Civil conflicts and wars which spark displacement and migration are often falsely interpreted as if they are exclusively the result of internal state dynamics and ethnic conflicts. However, the causes of such economic or political conflicts are historically embedded in global geopolitics – a colonial past, the geopolitics of the Cold War, or the subsequent War on Terror – and are exacerbated by today’s global capitalism. Alison J. Ayers argues that the concept of civil war is not only ideologically  Castles, Stephen. “Understanding Global Migration: A Social Transformation Perspective.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36, no. 10 (2010): 1565–1586. 17  Beck, Ulrich, and Natan Sznaider. “Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a research agenda.” The British Journal of Sociology 57, no. 1 (2006): 1–23; Wimmer, Andreas, and Nina Glick Schiller. “Methodological nationalism and beyond nation-state building, migration and the social sciences.” Global Networks, 2, no. 4 (2002): 301–334;  Sager, Alex. Towards a Cosmopolitan Ethics of Mobility. The Migrant’s-Eye View of the World. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. 18  Betts, Alexander. “The migration industry in global migration governance.” In The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration edited by Thomas GammeltoftHansen, and Ninna Nyberg Sørensen, New York: Routledge, 2013. 16

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convenient but also “rests upon the highly problematic conception of the state as a reified entity, with interests and capabilities analytically separate from the totality of global social relations within which states inhere.”19 Thus, this problematic understanding of local violent conflicts is made possible only through the prism of methodological nationalism. Mwesiga Baregu20 argues that the majority of analyses of conflicts in the Great Lakes region work within a limited framework: they consider conflicts only as defined by territorial boundaries, have a limited understanding of other actors involved in the conflicts, and overlook the underlying structural causes and various actors’ interests and strategies, including those who are involved indirectly or invisibly. Ayer supports her critique of the concept of civil war through the case of Sudan. She argues that the methodological framework for the analysis of the Sudanese conflict must be based on three interconnected dimensions: “the technologies of colonial rule,” “the major role of geopolitics in fuelling and exacerbating conflicts within Sudan and the region,” and “Sudan’s terms of incorporation within the capitalist global economy.”21 The conflicts in DRC and the newly established state of South Sudan are other examples where analyses overemphasize the role of ethnic conflicts and failed or even nonexistent state institutions while downplaying the impact of global capitalism and the geopolitics of extractive industries. The establishment of a separate state of South Sudan was driven partly by the interest of key global players in oil reserves and other natural resources on its territory.22 As part of their geopolitical War on Terror, the USA supported South Sudan against al-Bashir’s government of Sudan.23 After separation, South Sudan gained most of the oil reserves on the territory of Sudan before secession which was largely under Chinese concessions. Shortly after separation in 2011, South Sudan’s state oil company Nilepet formed a joint venture with Glencore International Plc, a Swiss-­ domiciled corporation with links to the USA.  However, Chinese-owned oil companies remained dominant in South Sudanese oil concessions. The geopolitical rivalries over the control of South Sudanese oil have shaped the background of the continued violence.24 The conflict which started in 2013 is partially a consequence of these global interactions rather than exclusively an internal power struggle.

 Ayers, Alison J. “Sudan’s uncivil war: the global-historical constitution of political violence.” Review of African Political Economy 37, no. 124 (2010): 153–171, p. 155. 20  Baregu, Mwesiga, ed. Understanding Obstacles to Peace. Actors, Interests, and Strategies in Africa’s Great Lakes Region. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2011. 21  Ayers, 2010, p. 156. 22  Ibid. See also Shaoul, Jean. “Great Power Rivalries Over Oil Animate Sudan Secession Referendum.” World Socialist Web Site, 8 January, 2011. www.wsws.org/articles/2011/jan2011/ suda-j08.shtml. 23  Regionally, Uganda was a USA ally against al-Bashir and played an important role in arming the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) which became the South Sudanese government forces after separation from Sudan. 24  https://www.globalresearch.ca/civil-war-and-geopolitics-in-south-sudan/5607220 19

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The critical global political economy provides important insights into migration studies. It highlights the economic, cultural, and geopolitical context of capitalist globalization that is shaping today’s migration and challenges the strict distinction between refugees and economic migrants. This distinction itself is based on a naturalized idea of the nation-state as the primary actors in global politics. William Robinson challenges the understanding of a world economy as a competition of national capitals in the international arena and formulates a theory of global capitalism.25 He interprets contemporary development as a qualitative change accompanied by the disruption of national accumulation circuits and their reintegration into a new, global one characterized by global production and financial system. In other words, he argues that the world capitalist system was transformed into the global capitalist system. He substantiates his analysis by highlighting the increasing concentration and control of capital by transnational corporations and their cross-­ ownership by a transnational capitalist class who does not share any particular “national interest.”26 While the previous phase of capitalist development was characterized by an extensive enlargement and inclusion of macro-regions into a world economic system, an essential strategy of profit accumulation in the transnational and global economy has focused on intensive enlargement of capitalism. This intensive enlargement of capitalism is characterized by the marketization and commodification of areas of social life and practices that were previously excluded from the market relations.27 The two main strategies are, according to him, financial speculation and militarized accumulation.28 The state is no longer the fundamental organizing principle, but it is still the executive power of global capitalism. The global border industrial complex, which I will discuss later, uses the state apparatus and the construct of borders to generate profit for global capital. It is not a straightforward process, and Robinson highlights the competition between nationally and transnationally oriented elites. But he also shows that the rise of the BRICS countries does not contradict the proposition that the globalized economy does not primarily consist of competing national economies and capital. He argues that BRICS countries advance the system of global capitalism as the emerging transnational capitalist class from a different macro-­ regions attempt to influence global policies and integrate into global capitalism.29 He also shows that behind individual nation-state statistics is hidden a trend in which an international division of labor is being transformed into “a global division of labor in which core and peripheral productive activities are dispersed as much within as among countries.”30 Thus, for example, transnational migrants are included  Robinson, William. A Theory of Global Capitalism. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004; Robinson, William. Global Capitalism and the Crisis of Humanity. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 26  Robinson, 2014, chapter 1. 27  Robinson, 2004. 28  Robinson, 2014, p. 134. 29  Ibid, p. 37. 30  Ibid, p. 39. 25

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in a globalized labor market as cheap disposable labor. This structural exploitation is in the broader interests of capital and is enabled by state produced “illegality” and “deportability.”31 This analytical framework moves beyond methodological nationalism and is linked to the concept of a transnational capitalist class as conceived by critical theorist Leslie Sklair,32 who redefined the classical definition of capitalist class based on ownership of means of production to include other forms of capital besides economic, i.e., political, knowledge, and cultural. According to Sklair, the transnational capitalist class today includes not only the owners of the major corporations and the managers who run them (the corporate fraction) but also globalizing politicians and bureaucrats at international, national, and local levels who align with global capital (the state fraction), professionals in the global labor market (the technical fraction), and actors controlling the media (the consumerist fraction).33 This is the key to understanding the relationship between the state and other actors in today’s form of capitalist globalization. Julius Kiiza shows the relationship between different fractions of the transnational capitalist class in the case of Uganda. He argues that the neoliberal market policies in Uganda could only have been implemented through an alliance between international financial institutions and local politicians: “In the early years of reform, particularly the 1980s and early 1990s, the IFIs coerced Uganda to adopt pro-market economic and institutional reforms. However, donors made an effort to identify, strengthen, and incentivize a nucleus of pro-reformers within key government departments, particularly the ministry for finance and the Central Bank.”34 The group of globalizing politicians and bureaucrats who promote, in a concerted effort among all fractions of the transnational capitalist class, a global capitalist project through free trade agreements, neoliberal development projects, and policies and/or by inciting war conflicts, is, in fact, part of the transnational capitalist class. The state fraction of the transnational capitalist class allows TNCs to promote their interests on the inter-nationally organized political scene. Thus, the nation-state institutions still play an important role here. But the economic interests of the transnational capitalist class are increasingly global. The group of globalizing politicians and bureaucrats who promote, in a concerted effort among all fractions of the transnational capitalist class, a global capitalist project through free trade agreements, neoliberal development projects, and policies and/or by inciting war conflicts, is, in fact, part of the transnational capitalist class. The state fraction of the transnational capitalist class allows TNCs to promote their interests on the inter-nationally organized political scene. Thus, the

 De Genova, Nicholas. “Migrant ‘illegality’ and deportability in everyday life. “Annual Review Anthropology 31 (2002): 419–447. 32  Sklair, Leslie. The Transnational Capitalist Class. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. 33  Ibid, p. 17–23. 34  Kiiza, Julius. “New Developmentalism in the Old Wineskin of Neoliberalism in Uganda.” In Developmental Politics in Transition. International Political Economy Series edited by C. KyungSup, B. Fine, and L. Weiss, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 225. 31

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nation-state institutions still play an important role here. But the economic interests of the transnational capitalist class are increasingly global. It seems a paradox to argue that the business of border control and the migration industry is part of the transnational accumulation. Indeed, it presupposes the existence of borders and the nation-states’ claims to territorial sovereignty. However, the statist rhetoric is instrumental to unleash immense resources from public budgets and also from migrants. While originally, the term migration industry was used to describe a network of different actors assisting migrants and also taking advantage of their vulnerable position, Ninna Nyberg Sørensen and Thomas Gammeltoft-­ Hansen enlarged the understanding of the migration industry to include both the facilitation of migration and its control. They “define the migration industry as encompassing not only the service providers facilitating migration but equally ‘control providers’ such as private contractors performing immigration checks, operating detention centers and/or carrying out forced returns.”35 They identify different actors within the migration industry: transnational corporations and international agencies mainly involved in the externalization of border control and criminalization of migration; agencies facilitating legal migration; smaller businesses assisting migrants; illegal networks involved in smuggling or human trafficking; and NGOs and humanitarian organization which may be involved for nonprofit reasons but are still part of the industry, sometimes advocating for migrants’ perspective and sometimes legitimizing governments’ restrictive and securitization lenses.36 Through these networks, transnational migration is embedded within capitalist globalization, and through growing commodification of migration, it is complexly linked to global capital. First, global capital benefits from the economic order which produces the structural sources of transnational migration, and second, it benefits from the political responses to migration through privatization and outsourcing of the so-called migration management and securitization and militarization of border control. I suggest that the global border industrial complex is an appropriate concept to grasp this dynamic. While the migration industry comprises of a wide variety of actors, including small-scale enterprises and the shadow economy, I understand the global border industrial complex as a network of powerful individuals and TNCs linked not only to the governments’ migration and security policies and funds but also to the global financial capital which makes use of borders to shuffle off responsibilities toward local production and social reproduction and for produced global risks. Some forms of borders are profitable for transnational economic practices and global capital, enabling different illicit financial flows, e.g., tax evasion, trade mis-­ invoicing, capital flight, and also ever-rising profits from border management. It is not in the interest of the transnational capitalist class to have an unconstrained borderless world.

 Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas, and Ninna Nyberg Sørensen, eds. The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration. New York: Routledge, 2013. 36  Ibid, p. 10–12. 35

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The complex refers to the connection between different industries and global financial capital-forming networks and lobbying groups tied to local, national, and supranational political institutions. Nicole Trujillo-Pagán37 analyzes “the immigration industrial complex” in the USA, showing how immigration policies and their privatized enforcement are linked to the interests of transnational and global capital and its demand for precarious deportable labor. She argues that this is the foreseeable result, not an unintended consequence of US immigration policy. She identifies three forms of capital benefiting from the immigration industrial complex: the migration industry, in the sense of services facilitating migration, particularly of undocumented migration; US employers benefiting from the criminalization and exploitation of undocumented migrants; and the private US/global capital represented by companies providing border control and state agencies. Ultimately, even though she highlights the link to capital beyond the US borders, her focus still stops at the level of the nation-state, on “immigration.” Following Alison Ayers, in order to understand transnational migration within and from Africa, an analysis of the legacy of colonial history and the geopolitical influence of the main state powers in the region needs to be coupled with an analysis of global capitalism. Despite the stubbornly persistent myth that the African continent is receiving development assistance, loans, and investments, Africa remains a net creditor as more money continues to leave the continent. To a large extent, this is due to illicit financial flows, but it is also driven by legal channels.38 The region of Eastern Africa is still predominantly dependent on primary commodity production among which oil and other extractive industries play a significant role. The oil and precious metal industries are also two sectors with the highest illicit financial outflows through trade mis-invoicing from Africa, an estimated 70 billion USD and 50 billion USD, respectively, between 2000 and 2009.39 The illicit financial flows in Eastern Africa are largest from Ethiopia (22,065 million USD, cumulative between 2003 and 2012, counting hot money outflows and trade mis-invoicing) and Sudan (12,904 million USD in the same period), followed by Uganda (7,125 million USD).40 Global capital needs to keep borders in place as this helps prevent effective regional or transnational regulations to stop capital flight. The violent conflicts over resources or land and economic stagnation generating migration need to be seen in this context.

 Trujillo-Pagán, Nicole. “Emphasizing the ʻComplexʼ in the ʻImmigration Industrial Complexʼ.” Critical Sociology 40, no. 1 (2014): 29–46. 38  Ndikumana, Léonce, and James Boyce. Africa’s Odious Debts: How Foreign Loans and Capital Flight Bled a Continent. Zed Books, 2011. 39  UN ECA. “Illicit financial flows. Why Africa needs to ‘track it, stop it and get it’.” UN ECA, 2014. https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/illicit_financial_flows_why_ africa_needs.pdf 40  Kar, Dev, and Joseph Spanjers. Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2003–2012. Global Financial Integrity, 2014. https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/IllicitFinancial-Flows-from-Developing-Countries-2003-2012.pdf 37

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The nation-state as an institution still plays an important role, though. In several cases, in sub-Saharan Africa, the major state powers use their soft power to promote the interest of TNCs while making use of colonial history and the ensuing geopolitical hierarchy to maintain their influential position. However, it does not imply that these states serve the interests of their citizens (“national interest”); rather, they promote the interests of the transnational capitalist class which uses the nation-state apparatus. Many TNCs linked to one state are domiciled in other state for tax reasons and their ownership structure is not defined along the national lines. On the other hand, local and national elites play their role in the prolonging of conflicts and the implementation of structural adjustment programs. To say that global capitalism produces the structural causes of transnational migration does not mean that this provides a full explanation. Transnational migration is situated within a global geopolitical context in which global actors interact with local elites and groups. Nevertheless, the majority of migration research and migration data overemphasizes the local dynamic to the exclusion of any macro-social research. As I mentioned above, understanding transnational migration in the context of the global political economy problematizes the strict distinction between political migrants as refugees (deserving admission and legal protection) and the so-called economic migrants (not deserving admission). It is based on a false assumption that, while the first group has no other possibility but to migrate, the other group freely decides to leave their country of origin. Raúl Delgado Wise expands the concept of forced migration beyond the conventional understanding as referring to the group of refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced people and argues that the dynamics of global capitalism produce structural conditions in which “migration has essentially become a forced population displacement.” Specifically, forced migration according to him includes migration due to violence, conflict, and catastrophe; human trafficking; dispossession, exclusion, and unemployment; and deportations.41 This so-called economic migration is a form of forced migration. But not all transnational migrants can be considered forced migrants. When I speak about transnational migrants, I refer specifically to marginalized groups of migrants who are to various degrees forced to leave due to different reasons (conflicts, environmental changes, economic struggles, crimes, etc.). The distinction then lies rather between people who cross borders owing to different kinds of conflicts and hardship and people who are in an advantaged position due to their skills and economic, social, or political capital and who have access to a significantly more flexible transnational mobility regime. Today, the agenda for refugees’ protection is defensive, maintaining the problematic distinction between political refugees and economic migrants to preserve the limited protection of refugees which is already recognized in the international legal order. However, this pragmatic strategy carries a double risk of co-optation. Firstly, it promotes the protection of refugees by reproducing the exclusion of

 Delgado Wise, Raúl. “Is there a space for counterhegemonic participation? Civil society in the global governance of migration.” Globalization 15, no. 6 (2018): 746–761, p. 750–751.

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economic migrants. Secondly, it gives way to a neoliberal reframing of migrant protection which consequently weakens the protection of refugees as well. Branka Likić-Brborić42 shows that it brings about a business-run model finding a niche on the transnational labor market for refugees and repositioning them as weakly protected labor migrants.

 onvergence of Global Migration Governance C and Global Capitalism While the global migration agenda is operating in a nation-state-centered institutional framework, presupposing the perspective of the state and its claim to territorial sovereignty as a starting point, increasingly, non-state actors influence the discursive framing of human mobility and migration policies. Alexander Betts argues that “private actors may play important roles in the global migration governance through, for example, lobbying, corporate social responsibility (CSR), private rule-making and standard-setting, the development of voluntary codes of conduct, public-private partnerships, philanthropy, and innovation and the role of expert knowledge, for example.”43 There is not a fully developed supranational or global institutional framework governing transnational migration; nevertheless, we can speak about the emerging global migration governance which consists of several UN conventions and international legal norms as well as macro-regional or interstate agreements which regulate political responses to different categories of migrants.44 Fragmentation of the institutions and norms regulating different aspects of transnational migration is manifested in a continued effort to draw a strict line between different kinds of transnational migration, each covered by separate UN institution, e.g., refugees and displaced persons under UNHCR, migrant workers under ILO, and economic migration (understood as “voluntary”) under IOM.45 However, there is an overall trend toward a migration management approach in line with a neoliberal governance paradigm. Branka Likić-Brborić46 analyzes gradual changes in a discursive framing of global migration governance. She shows how the original focus of UN fora from the 1990s on root causes and the right not to migrate (for development) was narrowed to a technical and depoliticized approach of economic mobility responding to market demands (temporary and circular labor migration) and of migration management relying on securitization, militarization, and outsourcing of border controls

 Likić-Brborić, Branka. “Global migration governance, civil society and the paradoxes of sustainability.” Globalizations 15, no. 6 (2018): 762–778. 43  Betts, 2013, p. 46. 44  Betts, Alexander, ed. Global Migration Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 45  Likić-Brborić, 2018, p. 767. 46  Ibid. 42

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defined by the interests of the receiving wealthy states. In 2007, the Global Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD) was established, initiated by the UN High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, as a non-­binding forum and a space for regular intergovernmental negotiations of issues connected to transnational migration. While, initially, it was established outside of the UN and the negotiations over migration issues came to a deadlock, Stefan Rother argues that the GFMD laid the foundations for the UN-led process of negotiations of Global Compacts a decade later.47 Civil society actors can participate at Civil Society Days (CSD) and Common Space which is designated for deliberations between civil society, governments, and business actors. In 2018, the UN Network on Migration was established (bringing together several UN entities) to strengthen the connection between the UN and GFMD with a focus on implementing the Global Compact on Migration. However, the possibilities for civil society actors to significantly influence the outcomes of GFMD are quite limited.48 Aleksandra Ålund and Carl-Ulrik Schierup point to strategies of selective inclusion and “pacification through appropriation” of the human rights arguments as signs of co-optation. They argue that it is manifested in a shift from migrant labor rights toward moral migrant rights and by the marginalization of labor unions: “We could witness, on site, an already ambivalent positionality of the labor unions, becoming exacerbated by their progressive marginalization in the context of a covert process of inclusionary, but selective and subordinating, hegemony management by governments, business interests, powerful international organizations, and the chosen gate-keeping humanitarian INGOs.”49 However, mobilization of moral arguments shifts attention to protection and partial improvement of migrant conditions at the expense of migrants’ claims for global social justice and without systemic changes of the structures producing forced migration. In contrast, there is a growing influence of business actors. Besides a direct influence by the World Bank, World Economic Forum, and other prominent transnational business actors who participate at GFMD, the business logic of migration management is being implemented through different schemes of public-private partnerships, agenda-setting through private sponsoring of CSD, TNCs, and their lobby groups. Branka Likić-Brborić highlights the shift at the GFMD toward a neoliberal reframing of the migration-development nexus after the Swiss chair in 2011. This reframing is characterized by a dubious assumption of individuals-driven  Rother, Stefan. “Angry birds of passage – migrant rights networks and counter-hegemonic resistance to global migration discourses.” Globalizations 15, no. 6 (2018): 854–869. 48  Stefan Rother identifies inside-outside strategies of civil society actors as a way to participate at the GFMD meetings and avoid a trap of co-optation (Rother, 2018). In contrast to GFMD, World Social Forum on Migration creates the main alternative grassroots’ space. Some civil society actors try to navigate between “invited” and “invented” spaces to push through a counter-hegemonic discourse on migration (See  Ålund, Aleksandra, and Carl-Ulrik Schierup. “Making or unmaking a movement? Challenges for civic activism in the global governance of migration.” Globalizations 15, no. 6 (2018): 809–823). 49  Ålund, Aleksandra, and Carl-Ulrik Schierup. “Making or unmaking a movement? Challenges for civic activism in the global governance of migration.” Globalizations 15, no. 6 (2018): 809–823. 47

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development, described as a triple win – for sending and receiving countries, and for migrants, or 3R  – recruitment, remittances, and return.50 The goal is to control human mobility in line with a demand for precarious and cheap labor in receiving countries without concerns for migrants’ care and social needs in older age and social reproduction in general and to match it with the sending countries’ need for the inflow of cash through remittances. As a result, the negative consequences arising from the contradictions of global capitalism are put on the shoulders of individual migrants. Despite a misleading representation of migration as a matter of the state and international negotiations, Alexander Betts argues that global migration governance is not a statist model of governance but “polycentric,” which is co-constituted by different actors, including private economic actors operating at different levels, from local to national, to regional and global.51 Obviously, private economic actors have a significant influence on international labor mobility where different industrial sectors lobby for labor migration regimes adapted to their demands.52 But perhaps more hidden is the influence of private economic actors on an overall framing of forced migration, its so-called management, and suggested solutions. The enforcement of migration management requires an elaborate system of surveillance of human mobility, militarized border control, and deportation channels. On the surface, it seems that the security and military industries respond to the states’ demand. However, Martin Lemberg-Pedersen shows how in subtle ways private security companies under the guise of expert consultancy became the key actors in formulating EU’s policies of border control.53 Lemberg-Pedersen traces the activities of private security companies which, through lobby groups such as the European Organization for Security, Frontex’s Research and Development Unit, and the European Security Advisory Board, create a demand for security technologies and shape research and policy priorities. In addition, he also highlights the role of global financial capital (international banks, export credit agencies, or investment firms) in financing and profiting from the expansion of border control in a way that further limits the possibilities of development in poorer countries from which migrants come from. “The activities of these actors … show that the militarization of Europe’s borders is grounded not only in a desire to prevent immigration but also in European politics of supporting military and control exports with public funds, even if this leads to increased debt in especially developing countries.”54 His analysis shows how global capital uses the state apparatus and how through this process the states transfer power to transnational corporations. The increasing expansion of surveillance and border control which  Likić-Brborić, 2018.  Betts, 2013. 52  Schierup, Carl-Ulrik, Ronaldo Munk, Branka Likić-Brborić, and Anders Neergaard. Migration, precarity, & global governance. Challenges and opportunities for labour. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 53  Lemberg-Pedersen, 2013. 54  Lemberg-Pedersen, 2013, p. 153. 50 51

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started with the new millennium is thus slowly escaping democratic control. The global border industrial complex combines two strategies that William Robinson identifies as the main mechanisms through which global capital attempts to overcome the crises of overaccumulation: financial speculation and militarized accumulation.55 In fact, the global border industrial complex fuels the nation-state-centered securitization and enforcement of borders which is not an inescapable response to globalizing human mobility. It comprises of a variety of actors who both make use of borders, not only geographical but also symbolic between “us” and “them,” and also in different ways circumvent them. We can analyze the internal structure of the global border industrial complex through the prism of four fractions of the transnational capitalist class proposed by Leslie Sklair.56 The owners and managers of the main security and military corporations represent the corporate fraction. Given the technological demands of the industry, it is a concentrated circle of several main actors, e.g., Thales, Leonardo, Airbus, Boeing, Accenture, G4S, Sopra Steria, GMV, Atos Belgium, and Idemia.57 Politicians and bureaucrats at international, national, and local levels are important allies as the global border industrial complex feeds upon high levels of public spending on security and border enforcement. The state fraction creates a political demand for the products of the industry and introduces programs of state subsidies for the outsourcing of border control, transnational surveillance, and military equipment. The global professionals who develop new technologies in corporate research or implement partial programs through think tanks and agencies represent the technical fraction. Through the technical fractions, the global border industrial complex is linked to development and humanitarian agencies or the UN which are instrumental for the implementation on the ground. The implementation of the common project requires a legitimization narrative, and Sklair defines it as a culture ideology of consumerism propagated by the consumerist fraction through media. The ideological narrative of the global border industrial complex is based on a consumerist competitive culture which promotes the exclusion of migrants who are presented as a threat to the celebrated lifestyle. A hegemonic media contributes to manufacturing of the culture of fear of migrants and moral panic. They mobilize the racial category of blackness which has emerged  through colonial expansions and the advent of capitalism to represent racially classified “non-Europeans” as opposed to whiteness as a dominant geopolitical identity.58 De Genova argues that the increased fortification of Europe systematically produces a subordinate category of migrants through which it reinforces

55  Robinson, William. Global Capitalism and the Crisis of Humanity. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014, chapter 4. 56  Sklair, 2003. 57  Akkerman, 2019; Lemberg-Pedersen, 2013. 58  Mbembe, Achille. Critique of Black Reason. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2017.

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a racial formation of “European” whiteness built on colonial and postcolonial history and redesigned by global capitalism.59 Through the migration industry and the global border industrial complex, contemporary transnational migration is inherently connected to the transnational accumulation circuits and workings of global capitalism, and this is the case even though global capitalism is usually seen as defying borders and the industry is based on the reproduction of the concept of borders  – geographical (although not necessarily nation-state borders) and symbolic. It is, in fact, a selective enforcement of border control. By enforcing an ostensible solution to migration which is a consequence of the crises of global social polarization and ecological unsustainability as characteristic features of global capitalism60, the global capital makes use of borders for opening new markets of outsourced and privatized border control. The bordering processes are selectively targeted against marginalized migrants as racialized subjects. They do not target the mobility of capital and globally privileged classes. In fact, the EU’s strategies of exchanging development aid for migration control exemplify exactly this dual bordering process. Critical scholars have pointed out that many of the EU development schemes, e.g.  the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, EU–Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund, and other investment instruments within the European External Investment Plan (EIP), are primarily guided by the interests of European private investments and place conditions on beneficiary parties linked to the agenda of border control and migration management.61 There are not that many migrants coming from the region of Eastern Africa to Europe, but the region is the focus of the EU’s migration agenda precisely because of that. The fragile political situation in the region means that any additional conflict or political turmoil may force a large number of migrants and refugees residing in the region on the move.62 Since its establishment in 2014, the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (Khartoum Process) has become the EU’s main geopolitical framework on migration from Eastern Africa. It is an intergovernmental platform that focuses mainly on irregular migration and smuggling networks. The Khartoum Process continues the general trend of linking development cooperation to migration control based on a very limited understanding of the root causes approach. What is considered to be the root cause – underdevelopment – is, in fact, a manifestation of deeper structural layers within capitalist globalization. Moreover, in this framework, funding for development cooperation is becoming a hidden instrument of security politics. Through bilateral agreements, the EU provides funds

 De Genova, 2018.  Robinson, 2014; Sklair, 2002. 61  Kipp, David. “From Exception to Rule  – the EU Trust Fund for Africa.” Research Paper 13, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2018. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2018RP13_kpp.pdf 62  Dragsbaek Schmidt, Johannes, Leah Kimathi, and Michael Omondi Owiso, eds. Refugees and Forced Migration in the Horn and Eastern Africa. Trends, Challenges and Opportunities. Cham: Springer, 2019. 59 60

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to key gatekeeping countries, such as Sudan and Ethiopia.63 The goal is to strengthen border control as a presumed security strategy and to enhance the surveillance over African migrants through biometric registrations and other border surveillance systems to track the migrants. The results of this geopolitical strategy are migrants’ human rights violations and the closing of regional borders, further hindering regional development. While the EU is planning to increase the funding directed to issues linked to migration in the Multiannual Financial Framework, which is now being prepared for the years 2021–2027, most of it will be allocated to migration and border management and to development projects conditioned by migration control. As I have argued above, the global border industrial complex makes use of existing nation-states’ border regime to either circumvent the borders (through global trade and various offshore practices) or enforce them (through surveillance technologies and militarization of border control). The EU has been turning its attention to outsourcing its border controls to some African countries to manage the migration from Africa, but global border surveillance is also implemented by UN bodies and international NGOs providing assistance to forced migrants (e.g. IOM displacement tracking matrix, UNHCR biometric identity management system – BIMS). In both cases, the profits go to transnational corporations and the technologies are largely paid for from public budgets of the North-Atlantic macro-region. Developing countries are pressured to implement these technologies by conditioning development aid and financial assistance on the hosting of migrants and refugees. While the developed countries use the argument of territorial sovereignty to restrict cross-­ border mobility, there is a double standard in the application of the territorial sovereignty claim as many developing countries have to partially hand over their border management. For example, Uganda, one of the least developed countries according to the World Bank, is one of the top five countries worldwide, and number one in Africa, in terms of numbers of refugees it hosts. The UNHCR currently estimates that Uganda hosts 1.36 million refugees,64 with the majority coming from South Sudan (850,000) and DRC (380,000). In 2018, there was a major international political dispute over these numbers in which international donors accused the Ugandan government of manipulating the statistics to receive more financial assistance. After a demanding and expensive process of recounting and validation of refugees’ identities, the difference was found to be 350,000 individuals. However, counting the new arrivals in the meantime, the total number of refugees was 1.15 million (as opposed to 1.44 million before the recount).65 The difference is quite insignificant given the country’s porous borders, the constant movement of people from DRC and South Sudan, and the significant underfunding of refugees’ assistance. During the dispute,  Jakob, Christian, and Simone Schlindwein. Dictators as gatekeepers for Europe. Outsourcing EU Border Controls to Africa. Daraja Press, 2019. 64  https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/uga 65  Joint press statement. OPM and UNHCR announce the preliminary results of the verification exercise. 8 November 2018. 63

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as a result of pressure from donors, the Ugandan government had to give in to the implementation of a UNHCR biometric identity management system (BIMS) which it had previously refused to do. BIMS is part of an emerging global surveillance system that will allow for the tracking of every individual refugee once s/he is registered in the system. The BIMS is supplied by the Ireland-domiciled company Accenture66 and, the Ugandan government does not own or directly manage the data.

Conclusion Despite the current resurgence of nationalism, our social reality is fundamentally shaped by global interactions, and global issues or risks can hardly be effectively dealt with at the level of the nation-state. However, methodological nationalism’s cognitive bias brackets out transnational and global connections and falsely constructs normality within state borders. Transnational migration is a paradigmatic example of globally produced social processes. Understanding complex relations between transnational migration and the political economy of global capitalism leads to a rethinking of economic migration as a form of forced migration. A questionable distinction between political migration (refugees, asylum seekers) and economic migration persists as a reflection of the real politics of positive rights within the international human rights regime. The idea of territorial sovereignty of nation-­ states seems to be the major obstacle for comprehensive global migration governance. However, the claim to territorial sovereignty is changing in the globalized world. The ability of smaller and poorer states, in particular, to act against the global powers or large transnational corporations is limited. Moreover, the trend toward privatization of border control means that states are turning over several important issues concerning the border management and territorial sovereignty to TNCs. In this chapter, I argued that transnational migration is embedded within the global capitalist system in two ways. First, global capital generates profit from transnational practices that produce the structural causes of migration. Even though the causes of migration are often considered to be the result of internal state dynamics  – lack of economic development, ethnic conflicts, and environmental challenges – these are already manifestations of long-term developments in the global political economy and geopolitics. Eastern Africa is often portrayed in this way, highlighting failed states, ethnic violence, and poverty while ignoring the dynamics of the extractive industry and the historical involvement of the global powers in the region. Second, global capital benefits from current political responses to transnational migration which are characterized by outsourcing and privatization of border control. Again, Eastern Africa is a telling example of the enforcement of global 66  h t t p s : / / w w w. b i o m e t r i c u p d a t e . c o m / 2 0 1 5 0 5 / u n h c r- a c c e n t u r e - p r ov i d e - g l o b a l biometric-identity-management-system-to-help-refugees Accenture switched to Ireland from its accounting base in Bermuda in 2009. https://www. theregister.co.uk/2009/05/27/accenture_tax/

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surveillance and militarized border control which is being promoted as development cooperation tackling the root causes of migration. In this process, the concept of physical borders is transformed and also disconnected from its relation to the territory of the state. Borders are externalized with their enforcement being enacted from distant places. And they are also reterritorialized through different surveillance technologies. Importantly, the transnational capitalist class does not simply react to the demand for border security and militarization but uses the state apparatus to actively create the demand through soft strategies of political lobbying, expert consultations, and strategic incorporations. In both cases, the transnational capitalist class instrumentally uses the concept of borders while simultaneously circumventing them. The global border industrial complex provides an ostensible solution to transnational migration in the form of surveillance, military, and border security services while creating a rapidly growing and profitable market. The global border industrial complex is in turn closely linked to the interests of global financial capital which finances these immense operations. It is a combination of two dominant strategies to delay the crisis of overaccumulation inherent to capitalism: financial speculation and militarized accumulation. While it may seem counterintuitive at first glance that the border control industry is part of the transnational capitalist class, it is important to recognize that a dual bordering process is selectively targeted against racialized migrants while preserving the cross-border mobility of capital and globally privileged classes. The analysis of the political economy which lies behind current political responses to migration has normative implications for the definition of responsibilities for global justice and obligations toward forced migrants. I suggest that interpreting the international assistance for countries hosting migrants and refugees as a benevolent act based on moral obligations rather than responsibility based on the actions and negative impact of state powers and TNCs domiciled in their territories not only gives wealthy countries control over the global “management of migration” beyond their borders but also contributes to the shuffling off of responsibilities by TNCs and the transnational capitalist class for their transnational economic practices which generate the structural sources of migration.

Bibliography Akkerman, Mark. 2019. The Business of Building Walls. Transnational Institute, Stop Wapenhandel, Centre Delàs. Ålund, Aleksandra, and Carl-Ulrik Schierup. 2018. Making or Unmaking a Movement? Challenges for Civic Activism in the Global Governance of Migration. Globalizations 15 (6): 809–823. Ayers, Alison J. 2010. Sudan’s Uncivil War: The Global-Historical Constitution of political Violence. Review of African Political Economy 37 (124): 153–171. ———. 2013. Beyond Myths, Lies and Stereotypes: The Political Economy of a ‘New Scramble for Africa’. New Political Economy 18 (2): 227–257.

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Baregu, Mwesiga, ed. 2011. Understanding Obstacles to Peace. Actors, Interests, and Strategies in Africa’s Great Lakes Region. Fountain Publishers/International Development Research Centre: Kampala/Ottawa. Beck, Ulrich, and Natan Sznaider. 2006. Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences: A Research Agenda. The British Journal of Sociology 57 (1): 1–23. Betts, Alexander, ed. 2012. Global Migration Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2013. The Migration Industry in Global Migration Governance. In The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration, ed. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Ninna Nyberg Sørensen, 45–63. New York: Routledge. Castles, Stephen. 2010. Understanding Global Migration: A Social Transformation Perspective. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36 (10): 1565–1586. Castles, Stephen, and Nicholas Van Hear. 2012. Root Causes. In Global Migration Governance, ed. Alexander Betts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. De Genova, Nicholas. 2002. Migrant ‘illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life. Annual Review Anthropology 31: 419–447. ———. 2018. The ‘migrant crisis’ as Racial Crisis: Do Black Lives Matter in Europe? Ethnic and Racial Studies 41 (10): 1765–1782. Delgado Wise, Raúl. 2018. Is there a Space for Counterhegemonic Participation? Civil Society in the Global Governance of Migration. Globalization 15 (6): 746–761. Dragsbaek Schmidt, Johannes, Leah Kimathi, and Michael Omondi Owiso, eds. 2019. Refugees and Forced Migration in the Horn and Eastern Africa. Trends, Challenges and Opportunities. Cham: Springer. Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas. 2013. In The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration, ed. Ninna Nyberg Sørensen. New York: Routledge. IOM. 2019. A Region on the Move. 2018 Mobility Overview in the Horn of Africa and the Arab Peninsula. https://displacement.iom.int/system/tdf/reports/A%20Region%20on%20the%20 Move%202018%20for%20preview.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=573. Jakob, Christian, and Simone Schlindwein. 2019. Dictators as gatekeepers for Europe. Outsourcing EU Border Controls to Africa. Daraja Press. Kar, Dev, and Joseph Spanjers. 2014. Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2003–2012. Global Financial Integrity, https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/IllicitFinancial-Flows-from-Developing-Countries-2003-2012.pdf. Kiiza, Julius. 2012. New Developmentalism in the Old Wineskin of Neoliberalism in Uganda. In Developmental Politics in Transition. International Political Economy Series, ed. C. Kyung-­ Sup, B. Fine, and L. Weiss. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Kipp, David. 2018. From Exception to Rule – the EU Trust Fund for Africa. Research Paper 13, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/ contents/products/research_papers/2018RP13_kpp.pdf. Lemberg-Pedersen, Martin. 2013. Private security companies and the European borderscapes. In The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration, ed. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Ninna Nyberg Sørensen. New York: Routledge. Likić-Brborić, Branka. 2018. Global Migration Governance, Civil Society and the Paradoxes of Sustainability. Globalizations 15 (6): 762–778. Mbembe, Achille. 2017. Critique of Black Reason. Durham/London: Duke University Press. Ndikumana, Léonce, and James Boyce. 2011. Africa's Odious Debts: How Foreign Loans and Capital Flight Bled a Continent. London: Zed Books. Robinson, William. 2004. A Theory of Global Capitalism. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. ———. 2014. Global Capitalism and the Crisis of Humanity. New  York: Cambridge University Press. Rother, Stefan. 2018. Angry Birds of Passage – Migrant rights Networks and Counter-Hegemonic Resistance to Global Migration Discourses. Globalizations 15 (6): 854–869.

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Chapter 5

Migration and Human Rights in Africa: The Policy and Legal Framework in Broad Strokes Caroline Nalule

Introduction Since most African states gained independence, immediately then and for so long afterward, the focus was dealing with the armed conflicts that were rampant across the continent. Consequently, the legal framework that first emanated from the regional governing body, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), with regard to migration, dealt with specific aspects of the refugee problem in Africa.1 Forced migration and how to deal with displaced populations was a pressing problem reflective of the political developments, thus soliciting coordinated responses from the regional political body, the OAU, which later metamorphosed into the African Union (AU). It was later recognized that while the continental legal framework recognized and sought to address aspects of external displacement, there was an even larger population of internally displaced persons (IDPs), who without any legal and policy framework, not only internationally2 but also domestically were virtually lacking any form of protection and standards that would compel the respective governments to respond to their needs. Thirty-nine years after the adoption of the Refugees Convention, the AU, in 2009, adopted the Convention for the protection and assistance of IDPs in Africa.3

 The OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1969.  Suffice to note, the international community adopted the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in 1998, which were not legally binding. The AU Convention on IDPs, which was guided by the international guidelines, is, however, the first legally binding instrument adopted worldwide that seeks to enhance the protection of IDPs. 3  In the year the IDP Convention was adopted, there were 6,468,788 IDPs and people in IDP-like situations, compared with the 2,805,165 refugees and people in refugee-like situations in Africa. See UN Statistical Yearbook, 2009 available at https://www.unhcr.org/4ce5327f9.html accessed on 2 November 2019. 1 2

C. Nalule (*) Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. Abegunrin, S. O. Abidde (eds.), African Migrants and the Refugee Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56642-5_5

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A vast improvement on the Refugees Convention that tends to be very sketchy on the rights of refugees and attendant duties of the government, the IDP Convention has been lauded as an instrument that ‘provides a roadmap that dignifies the rights of peoples forced to flee at all points of their displacement’.4 Whereas there have been legal strides on the continent to address forced migration, there has been an inadequate focus on other aspects of migration generally, notably, the voluntary migration, regular or irregular, as well as its consequences. Migration, which is a key tenet of state sovereignty, has for so long been considered a matter of national rather than regional law. States could only facilitate the free movement of their nationals to other states through bilateral or multilateral agreements. Consequently, there has not been any comprehensive normative framework on migration in Africa. Owing to the many challenges and opportunities brought by migration, the situation has changed in the more recent years, and we begin to see series of policies and legal instruments pushing for a concerted African response to and approach towards migration governance. This chapter looks at the policy and legal framework that is governing migration in Africa, with a specific emphasis on the influence of human rights within the migration discourse on the continent. The chapter aims to examine the extent to which Africa’s approach to migration is human rights-based or oriented, following a purely legal approach. The main argument herein is that despite the various dimensions of migration and concomitantly diverse approaches to its governance in Africa, there is an overarching, at times far-reaching, influence of human rights. While not all aspects of migration are discussed, I intend to touch upon a select few that are currently topical but considered through the lens of the policy and legal framework.

African Policy on Migration and Its Human Rights Overtones The first comprehensive and focussed policy document on migration in Africa, emanating from the AU, is the Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA).5 Covering various themes on migration, the MPFA is, generally speaking, a human rights-conscious document. Virtually all its recommended strategies for managing migration in Africa and dealing with various migration-related issues contain a human rights component. For instance, under the theme of migration management, one of the recommendations is to ‘comply with international standards and law and secure migrants’ rights’. This includes, but is not limited to, respect and protection of the rights of all persons without discrimination, while criminalizing and 4  IDMC, ‘What the Kampala Convention means concretely for human rights in Africa and in the world’, available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/expert-opinion/what-the-kampala-convention-means-concretely-for-human-rights-in-africa-and-in-the accessed on 2 November 2019. 5  The MPFA was first adopted in 2006 but was later revised in 2016 to reflect new developments and trends.

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p­ rosecuting smugglers and traffickers.6 Regarding labour migration, states are urged to ratify, domesticate and harmonize international labour standards in the national arena. There is a specific emphasis on the need to provide for and protect the rights of women migrants, particularly domestic workers. Furthermore, concerning border management, the MPFA recommends that states implement the guidelines on human rights at international borders. To crown it all, an entire section on the human rights of migrants recommends, among others, the bolstering of these rights in accordance with international and regional human rights and related instruments. States are further urged to combat racism and xenophobia against migrants.7 The human rights language and overtones in the MPFA indisputably provide guidance on the ideal orientation of African countries on dealing with migration generally. Yet, considering that the MPFA is merely a framework document, its aspirations remain only visionary. It is not in any way binding on any state, neither was it meant to be, but its recommendations are not at all definitive. As I have previously stated, the MPFA ‘lacks concrete and practical propositions [as well as a roadmap] on how to attain its desired [objectives and] goals’.8 It is therefore hard to assess its impact on the migration policies of the individual states. Its most discernible influence so far has been the adoption of the regional framework on migration for the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD),9 which is modelled on the MPFA. How far the MPFA has provided the impetus for states to ratify relevant international instruments and domesticate the laws is hard to tell. Using the example of the international convention on migrant workers, only 24 of the 55 African states have ratified it so far, and out of these, 12 ratified after 2006, when the first MPFA was adopted.10 However, it is hard to tell whether their ratification was as a result of the MPFA. Therefore, despite its strong human rights orientation, the MPFA risks being a largely ineffectual document or having minimal impact. Its impact and effectiveness are hard to measure, more so in light of the prevailing situation whereby many African states seem to maintain their migration and related laws and policies or enforce practices in a character that does not reflect the spirit of the MPFA. Many of the practices decried in the MPFA, including but not limited to violations of rights of migrants, discrimination, xenophobia, irregular migration, migrant smuggling and human trafficking, are still much prevalent on the continent.  Ibid  Ibid 8  Nalule, C. ‘Migration in Africa: Filling in the Gaps and Strengthening the Regional Refugee Protection and Migration Regime’. A paper presented at the Sixth Forum of the African Union Commission on International Law. 4–5 December, Malabo, 2017b, Equatorial Guinea. Accessed on 9 November 2019. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:64e2351a-3629-476f-af04-3d74e3b04913 9  IGAD, IGAD Regional Migration Policy Framework, adopted in July 2012, available at http:// migration.igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Regional-Migration-Policy-Framework1.pdf accessed on 2 November 2019. 10  The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families entered into force in July 2003. Information on state ratifications is available at http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/internationalmigration/international-migration-convention/ accessed on 2 November 2019. 6 7

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 ormative Framework Governing Migration N and Human Rights The AU and its predecessor, the OAU, have adopted a number of legally binding instruments that provide a clear linkage between migration and human rights. First among these is the AU Constitutive Act (2000).11 Among its objectives are the protection and promotion of human and peoples’ rights12 and the promotion of cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples.13 Additionally, one of its many principles is the respect for human rights, among other values. How then do these provisions affect migration generally? First and foremost, all instruments, statements and policies emanating from the AU should reflect these objectives and principles. The MPFA as discussed above can be said to be very much in line with these objectives and principles. Where any instrument of the AU fails to reflect or tends to go against these principles and objectives, not only would it be challenged for the breach but also in case of an oversight or lacuna, the AU Constitutive Act would be the fallback in the relevant aspect. Secondly, the AU Constitutive Act makes a direct reference to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)14 and other international human rights instruments. Hence, all laws, policies and practices with regard to migration should uphold the rights guaranteed in these instruments. For purposes of a more detailed illustration and discussion, I shall restrict myself to the ACHPR, the regional human rights instrument adopted by the OAU in 1981. The ACHPR contains a general prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of ‘race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinions, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status’.15 This provision generally guarantees the rights of migrants or foreigners in any country in Africa. For all intents and purposes, they are entitled to all the rights and freedoms in the Charter, save where otherwise stated, specifically with regard to rights that are a preserve of citizens of a state. This is one of the principles that provide the basis for the condemnation of discriminatory and xenophobic practices against migrants. More specific is Article 12 of the ACHPR which provides for the freedom of movement. Paragraph one provides for an individual’s freedom of movement and residence within the borders of a state, provided he or she abides by the law. Any law-abiding person regardless of nationality enjoys this freedom. However, some countries, in their Constitutions, tend to restrict this freedom, wholly or in part, to

 African Union. Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000. Accessed on 1 November 2019. https://au.int/en/treaties/constitutive-act-african-union 12  AU Constitutive Act, Article 3 (h). 13  Ibid, Article 3 (k). 14  All states in Africa, except Morocco, have ratified the ACHPR, hence it is a largely regionally binding document. 15  ACHPR, Article 2. 11

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citizens.16 The practice, however, in most cases, belies strict application of the restriction, which if it were to be adhered to would greatly disadvantage migrants or foreigners. It may be argued that restricting the freedom of movement and residence to citizens is still in line with paragraph one of article 12, which contains the proviso that seemingly subjects the right to the laws of a country.17 With regard to cross-border migration, while an individual has a right to leave and return to his or her country, there is no corollary right to be admitted or enter into another country of which one is not a national. In other words, while one’s country is always obliged to receive back their citizen, another to which one is not a citizen is not so bound. Hence, the laws on deportation and denial of entry on various grounds and the need for entry permits or visas in other countries, save where there are, bilateral or multilateral agreements in place that do away with visa requirements, between or among specified countries. In recognition of the state’s authority over immigration, article 12 provides that a non-national legally admitted in a state may be expelled in accordance with the law. The expulsion of a lawful resident usually triggers other human rights provisions, such as the right to a fair hearing, as indeed the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACmHPR), the body with the mandate to oversee and monitor the implementation of the ACHPR, has held in a number of cases.18 Although article 12 focusses on persons legally present on the territory of a state, the protection for a fair hearing will also extend to those whose presence is deemed unlawful. Regardless of their legal status, the individual’s rights should be respected.19 The interpretation of this provision brings to mind one of the contemporary transgressions against human rights with regard to migrants trying to reach Europe via irregular means and how some of them have been left to drown in the Mediterranean rather than admit them on the territory of the state.20 The irregularity  Some examples are: The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 as amended, Article 29(2); The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania cap. 2, Article 17(1); The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda 2003 as amended, Article 23; The Constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010, Article 39(2). 17  Hansungule, M. ‘Towards a More Effective African System of Human Rights: ‘Entebbe Proposals’’. 2004. Accessed on 23 August 2020. https://www.biicl.org/files/2309_hansungule_ towards_more_effective.pdf 18  Rencontre africaine pour la défence des droits de l’Homme (RADDHO) v Zambia, Communication no. 71/92; Organisation mondiale contre la torture, Association Internationale des juristes démocrates, Commission internationale des juristes, Union interafricaine des droits de l’Homme v Rwanda, Communication no. 27/89–46/91–49/91–99/93; IHRDA (on behalf of Esmaila Connateh & 13 others) v Republic of Angola, Communication no. 292/04; Union interafricaine des droits de l’Homme, Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’Homme, Rencontre africaine des droits de l’Homme, Organisation nationale des droits de l’Homme au Sénégal and Association malienne des droits de l’Homme v Angola, Communication no. 159/96. 19  The point was emphasized by the ACmHPR in the RADDHO v Zambia case (ibid). 20  See for instance, AFP, ‘Italy’s Salvini lays down law for migrant rescue ships’ AFP, 19 March 2019 available at https://www.france24.com/en/20190319-italys-salvini-lays-down-law-migrant16

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of the migrants’ chosen pathways does not and should not in any way affect the upholding of their dignity as human beings and the attendant rights. Indeed, one of the greatest catastrophes of the prevailing so-called migration control system, both domestic and international, is the deliberate failure to distinguish between the dignity of the person and the desperate measures resorted to by any person who is for many reasons, including, and perhaps especially because of,  states’ protectionist attitudes, prevented from migrating through regular channels. The need for a fair hearing prior to expulsion has been further emphasized in instances of mass expulsion of non-nationals. Suffice to note that the ACHPR specifically prohibits the mass expulsion of non-nationals.21 Africa is not short of such examples, some being direct and blatant actions of the state, while others may be more or less indirect. The ACmHPR has condemned such acts, and it has been rather emphatic in its stance that expulsion pertains to an individual, as opposed to a group, who should be subject to the due process of the law before such a decision is reached. Mass expulsion tends to deprive individuals of this right and oftentimes also falls foul of the provision on non-discrimination.22 Whereas the cases brought before the ACmHPR have mainly challenged direct acts of states, yet another way of mass expulsion is that which may be indirectly condoned by states. In such cases, the state will fail to act to protect foreign nationals from targeted attacks that may compel them to exit from the state in question. Recently, there have been spates of xenophobic attacks on some non-nationals in African states, with limited action from the state authorities to stop the attacks, thus leading to the voluntary exit of non-nationals, albeit under fear of continued persecution. The one outstanding aspect of human rights under the ACHPR is the in-built accountability mechanism that is superintended over by the ACmHPR. Persons who allege violations of their rights by any state party to the ACHPR may bring a communication before the ACmHPR which will adjudicate upon the matter. While a number of states have been shamed through this mechanism, the powers of the ACmHPR to enforce its decisions, actually recommendations, against recalcitrant states are virtually non-existent.23 Nevertheless, the regional human rights regime has been bolstered by the establishment of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Court), which issues legally binding decisions that are subject to execution by the states.24 In spite of its shortcomings,25 the Court strengthens the rescue-ships accessed on 3 November 2019. 21  ACHPR, Article 12 paragraph 5. 22  ACmPHR decisions on cases of mass expulsion of non-nationals include: IHRDA v Angola, supra note 13; Union Interafricaine & others v Angola, supra note 13. 23  Viljoen, F. International Human Rights Law in Africa. 2nd ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012. 24  Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted on 10 June 1998, Articles 30–31. 25  Jalloh, C, Kamari M C, and V O O Nmehielle (eds.) The African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights in Context: Development and Challenges. Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2019.

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human rights regime and is definitely in a much better position in terms of authority to protect the rights of persons in Africa. Despite the virtual universal endorsement of the ACHPR by African states, violations of human rights of nationals and non-nationals alike still abound. While this may point to the inadequacies of the human rights regime, it may also be an indicator of the insufficiency of merely that regime to ensure the human rights of migrants. This brings me to the other significant aspects or areas on which the AU Constitutive Act has an elemental bearing, specifically with regard to promoting cooperation among states in all fields of human activity.

Economic Integration, Trade and Migration Rights African states seem to be enthusiastically embracing trade and economic integration in order to promote self-sufficiency and accelerate economic and social development. Moreover, steps towards African economic integration started earlier on culminating in the Lagos Plan of Action adopted in 1980. The Lagos Plan of Action has been referred to as the ‘blueprint’ for Africa’s long-term development,26 and rightly so because it lays the groundwork for the first African treaty on the subject, that is the treaty establishing the African economic community (AEC Treaty, 1991).27 According to the Treaty, the African economic community is to be established gradually through various phases with some of the major milestones as a free trade area, a customs union, a common market and a Pan-African economic and monetary union.28 Moreover, the AEC is to use regional economic communities (RECs) as its building blocks. The AU, as the successor to the OAU, took on the oversight role for the implementation of the OAU, and accordingly, it recognizes eight RECs as building blocks for the AEC.29 These are the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD),  East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It is worth noting that some of these regional arrangements predated the AEC, and most of them espouse the same integration milestones as the AEC, albeit at a sub-regional level. Therefore, some of these RECs, specifically the EAC and ECOWAS, are at a more advanced stage of  Adupa B. C. “Lagos Plan of Action”, I Abiola, & B Jeyifo (eds.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of African Thought. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 27  African Economic Community 28  AEC Treaty, Article 6. 29  In addition to the recognised eight there are also: The Mano River Union in West Africa; the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC); the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU); and the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU). Moreover all African countries belong to at least more than one REC. 26

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integration than the AEC. Moreover, what is common for all these RECs, and more pertinent to the topic under discussion, is that they all aim to establish a common market, which entails the free movement of factors of production, namely labour, goods, services and capital. Traditionally, persons that enjoy free movement in this context are those that are economically active, moving either to provide, labour or services, or moving goods. The point here is the removal of obstacles to free trade among nations. Free movement in this case refers to opening up a state’s borders to nationals of other states who are party to the same regional agreement. With the opening up of borders comes the removal of visa-requirements, and extending, without discrimination, the same rights of work, residence and establishment to non-nationals as with the nationals of the host member states. With time, the free movement of the economic person was extended to all persons. Within the European community, this extension was gradual, extending first to family members of the labourer or service provider and eventually to all persons in order to further strengthen regional integration. In Africa, while most RECs observe the traditional free movement of factors of production, they also provide for the free movement of all persons30 that are nationals of the member states, whether or not they are moving for economic purposes. In most cases, nationals of a member state may freely enter and reside on the territory of another state for a limited amount of time. Some RECs, such as SADC, provide for 90 days, while others, such as the EAC, may be longer (6 months). Within the RECs, migration of nationals has been facilitated with the free movement provisions. By and large, people are enabled to move freely among the region for various reasons, whether social or economic. The push for enhanced free movement of persons has received a further boost from the AU which in its ‘masterplan to transform Africa into a global powerhouse’, that is, the Agenda 2063, which has as one of its flagship projects, the African passport and the free movement of people.31 The aim of this project is essentially to promote economic and social integration among Africans. Normative strides have been made towards the realization of this goal by the AU’s adoption of two important instruments. The first of these is the Agreement establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA, 2018).32 This treaty is of relatively marginal importance, since it focusses more on trade-related aspects of integration with barely any elaborate provisions on the free movement of persons. Yet its significance lies in the fact that it has as one of its objectives the creation of a ‘single market for goods, services, facilitated by the free movement of persons in order to facilitate in deepening the economic integration of the African continent’33 ­(emphasis  For instance, the EAC Treaty, article 104 (1); Treaty of the SADC, Article 5 (2) (d); COMESA Treaty, Article 4 (6) (e); ECOWAS Treaty, Article 2 (2) (d). All these RECs have adopted protocols relating to the free movement of persons, although, presently, it is only in the EAC and ECOWAS where they are in force and being implemented. Note that most of the other REC Agreements not exemplified here do also contain some provisions on free movement. 31  Information available at https://au.int/en/visa-free-africa, accessed on 4 November 2019. 32  Adopted on 21 March 2018 and came into force on 30 May 2019. 33  AfCFTA, Article 3 (a). 30

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mine). Reading this paragraph, there is no doubt that the  AfCFTA espouses the traditional economic rationale for the free movement of persons. In other words, without intra-regional trade, there would be no free movement of persons. Yet such a rationale does not give full effect to the AU’s far-reaching objectives for promoting this freedom. Since states, however, seem to be more receptive of the AfCFTA, going by the relatively short time within which it came into force, its endorsement of the free movement of persons may provide the necessary window to further expand its application to free movement rights universally as provided in the AEC Treaty and the AU free movement protocol. Thus it complements and lends greater significance of the second treaty that was adopted – the Protocol to the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community relating to the Free Movement of Persons.34 The AU Free Movement Protocol (AU-FMP), in line with the objectives of the AEC Treaty and the AU’s larger integration objectives as spelled out in its Agenda 2063, aims for the actualization of free movement of persons and the implementation of the rights of residence and establishment (what I collectively refer to as ‘migration rights’35 for all citizens of Africa). The protocol adopts a phased approach to the realization of these rights, including the progressive abolition of visa requirements and granting the right of free entry and exit of nationals of African states in all member states. It also provides for the introduction of the African passport, among other things. The protocol holds many prospects in promoting migration of Africans within the continent especially with the removal of commonplace  visa requirements. It has been noted that Africans are even more disadvantaged than North Americans, as the former need visas to travel to at least 55% of the other African countries.36 The AU-FMP, if ratified and implemented by all African states, will definitely shift the balance and open up many prospects for migration and migrants generally within the continent. The AU-FMP has been made under the auspices of the AEC Treaty, which is essentially all about economic integration, and thus it is arguable that the AU-FMP perpetuates the economic rationale for migration rights. The key question that arises is how do these economic freedoms relate to human rights? There has been a debate as to whether economic freedoms should be translated as human rights, with some strongly arguing that they should,37 while others  Adopted on 29 January 2018, but yet to come into force as it has not yet received the required minimum number of ratifications. 35  Nalule, C. ‘Advancing Regional Integration: Migration Rights of Citizens in the East African Community’. Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, School of Law, 2017a. 36  Landau, L & Kihato, C. W. ‘Foresight reflection paper on the future of mobility and migration within and from Sub-Saharan Africa’. 2018. Accessed on 30 October 2019. https://espas.secure. europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/Foresight%20Reflection%20 Paper%20Sub-Saharan%20Africa_V01.pdf 37  Petersmann, E. U. “Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration.” European Journal of International Law 13, no. 3 (2002): 621–50. 34

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o­ pposing any conflation of the free movement provisions under economic treaties with the right to free movement under human rights treaties.38 While I agree that the economic freedoms, including the free movement of persons, are not quite at par with the human right to freedom of movement, the former set of rights can be more effective and better promoted when approached from a human rights perspective.39 And this is the same point that the AU-FMP seems to sharply, and yet subtly, make in a rather surprising twist in stance, which also alludes to the hybrid nature of these rights. In article 30, the AU-FMP provides that persons whose rights have been denied under the Protocol may refer the matter to the ACmHPR. This provision casts an entirely different light on the nature of rights provided for under the Protocol. The inevitable consequence of this provision is a shift from a purely economic rationalization of the migration rights to an approach that favours a human rights interpretation and application of these freedoms and rights. Otherwise, the ACmHPR would be hard-pressed to justify any interpretation of these rights that do not uphold the rights espoused in the ACHPR.  Moreover, a human rights interpretation of what would otherwise be pure economic rights and freedoms seems to have already been endorsed by regional courts within a couple of RECs, specifically by the East African Court of Justice and ECOWAS Court of Justice. Both courts have had to adjudicate upon matters brought under their respective regional free movement protocols. In each case, the petitioner was a citizen of a member state of the respective REC, but yet was denied entry into another member state, in alleged violation of the free movement of persons provisions under the respective REC treaties and protocols. In each case, the petitioners not only argued that their rights under the free movement protocol were violated but that also the freedom of movement under the ACHPR was equally violated. In both cases, the respective courts did not dismiss the applicability of the ACHPR on a matter that would otherwise be governed under the economic integration regime but acknowledged its relevance. In the case before the EACJ, the court found a violation of both the free movement of persons provisions under the EAC Treaty and a violation of the freedom of movement under the ACHPR.40 The ECOWAS case, however, while it acknowledged the relevance and applicability of the ACHPR to the case regarding denial of the freedom of movement under the ECOWAS free movement protocol, dismissed the case on the ground that it was time-barred.41 What these cases reveal is that migration rights as espoused

 Alston, P. ‘Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann’. European Journal of International Law 13, (2002): 815–44. 39  Ibid, Nalule, 2017a 40  Nalule, C. ‘Defining the Scope of Free Movement of Citizens in the East African Community: The East African Court of Justice and Its Interpretive Approach’.Journal of African Law 62, no. 1 (2018): 1–24. Samuel Mukira Mohochi v The Attorney General of Uganda, EACJ Reference No. 5 of 2011. Paras. 104–108. 41  Femi Falana & another v The Republic of Benin & others, ECW/CCJ/APP/10/07. 38

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within regional integration treaties are of a hybrid nature.42 Article 30, therefore, alters the nature of an otherwise purely economic right to a right capable of a human rights interpretation and therefore justiciable before the continental human rights bodies, that is the ACmHPR and by extension the African Court to which the ACmHPR can bring cases, whose function is to implement a human rights instrument, the ACHPR. In terms of enforcement, regional courts, whose primary function is the adjudication of matters under regional trade agreements, are incrementally taking on the role of promoters and protectors of human rights of citizens within the respective regional communities.43 This intersection of the trade and human rights regimes is most conspicuous in the area of migration and the migration rights espoused within Africa’s economic integration regime. The strides made in promoting migration on the continent within a human rights tradition notwithstanding, there are also some challenges that come along with open borders. I shall only discuss a couple of what I consider some of the significant and pressing challenges.

Migrant Smuggling and Human Trafficking Although the African states are very much protective of their territorial integrity and national sovereignty, tightened migration control at the border points being just one manifestation of this protectionism, the porousness of the borders and inefficient border management seem to have facilitated human trafficking and migrant smuggling. Partly due to the various restrictions on regular migration, such as strict exit and entry requirements imposed by most countries, human traffickers and smugglers seem to have flourished by taking advantage of those who cannot migrate through regular channels.44 Human trafficking and migrant smuggling seem to be rather rampant across many regions of Africa.45 One of the steps the AU has taken in an attempt to seek solutions to the problem is adopting in 2006 the AU Commission Initiative against Trafficking (AU.COMMIT).46 The AU.COMMIT is more or less a campaign to curb human trafficking, and just like the MPFA, it only goes as far as urging states to take necessary steps to combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking and implement any prior action plans  Helfer, L. R. ‘Subregional Courts in Africa: Litigating the Hybrid Right to Free Movement of Persons’. International Journal of Constitutional Law 16, no. 1 (2018): 235–53. 43  Gathii, J.  T. ‘Mission Creep or a Search for Relevance: The East African Court of Justice’s Human Rights Strategy’. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012. Accessed on 23 October 2019 https:// doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2178756. See also; Helfer, 2015; Nalule, 2018. 44  Ibid, Landau and Kihato, 2018 45  Davy, D. ‘Unpacking the Myths: Human Smuggling from and within the Horn of Africa’. Danish Refugee Council & Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, 2017. 46   More information available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Trafficking/Dakar_ Protection_Kapp-Marais.pdf, accessed on 5 November 2019. 42

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adopted to that effect. In other words, it is a soft document that does not raise any binding obligations on states. In fact, if anything, the AU’s interventions, or rather the nature of them, in preventing and eradicating human trafficking and smuggling, seem to rather expose the weaknesses in the AU’s sphere of influence, even among its members. This is one of the areas where the AU lacks a focussed and concerted approach and response to a widely spread and acknowledged problem. A clear illustration of this weakness is that there is no treaty or binding regional instrument that seeks to address this specific problem in its various facets and contextual manifestations in Africa. There are, however, a couple of thematic instruments that contain provisions obliging states to prevent trafficking of women and children and punish the perpetrators of such acts.47 What the AU rather does, through the MPFA, is to urge member states to ratify and domesticate the relevant international instruments that prohibit organized crime, migrant smuggling and human trafficking. Suffice to note that most of the African states have ratified some or all of these international instruments,48 although the bigger challenge lies in their domestication and implementation. The ACmHPR, too, through its special mechanisms has responded, albeit intermittently, to specific human smuggling and trafficking issues. Perhaps its strongest statement was its resolution on mixed migration flows adopted in 2018 following the breaking story on migrants held in slave-like conditions in Libya.49 While with the opening up of borders under the free movement regime, these illicit practices may be curbed, as there may be less demand for smugglers, African states have been rather slow in ratifying the AU-FMP.  Therefore, owing to the porous borders among African states coupled with ineffective border practices often fraught with corruption, there is surely a need for a strong and legally binding framework that is specifically designed to deal with the unique variations and dimensions of the smuggling and trafficking problem in Africa, which is undoubtedly a grave concern.50 African states seem to be more responsive to regional

 See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, Article 4 (2) (g); The African Charter of the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Article 29. 48  The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, has been ratified by 51 African states, while only one state is a signatory. The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25, has been ratified by 49 African states, while 2 are signatories. The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25, has been ratified by 40 African states, while 4 are signatories. Information available at https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro/UNTOC.html, accessed on 31 January 2018. 49  See ACmHPR, Resolution on Mixed Migratory Flows, Challenges of Protecting Migrants and the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and all forms of Violence in North and Sub-Saharan Africa, ACHPR/RES.398 adopted at the 62nd session of the Commission. Available at https:// www.achpr.org/sessions/resolutions?id=407, accessed on 5 November 2019. 50  African Centre for Strategic Studies, ‘Africa lags in protection against human trafficking’ 27 July 2018, available at https://africacenter.org/spotlight/africa-lags-in-protections-against-human-trafficking/, accessed on 26 October 2019. 47

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i­nstruments than international instruments in some cases, for instance, with the OAU Refugees Convention, the ACHPR, to mention but a few. Therefore, there is a gap that still needs to be filled from a policy and legal perspective in specifically addressing migrant smuggling and human trafficking in Africa.

The Labour Export Market Yet another area in which the AU’s influence appears to be largely inconsequential is with regard to labour export of mainly low-skilled and semi-skilled workers, specifically to the Arab states. Labour export is still very much a matter of national sovereignty and domestic regulation, yet it is an area where African states have demonstrated weak protection and oversight for their citizens abroad. Despite the ostensibly strong human rights protections espoused in regional instruments and domestic constitutions, as well as the MPFA rhetoric,51 most African countries have demonstrated a weakness in negotiating better terms for their citizens whom they export under labour agreements with the receiving states. Furthermore, they have also failed to provide adequate protection for them against the myriad violations that some of them are exposed to in destination countries,52 despite calls for further protection.53 While some governments have attempted to protect their citizens by banning migrant labour to some Arab states, others seem to focus more on remittance benefits that boost the country’s income.54 This is yet another area where human rights actors and interventions under the African human rights regime may prove more effective in making governments comply with their obligations and  The AU also adopted the Joint Labour Migration Programme (JLMP), a coordination of the AU Commission, the International Labour Organisation, the International Organisation for Migration and the Economic Commission for Africa. It was adopted by the AU Heads of State and Government in January 2015, with the ‘overall objective of improving the governance of labour migration to achieve safer, orderly and regular migration in Africa as committed in relevant frameworks of the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Commissions (RECs), as well as international labour conventions and other cooperation processes’, see https://au.int/jlmp accessed on 7 November 2019. However, the JLMP does not seem to address issues of protection of Africans that migrate outside the continent under labour export programmes. 52  Jureidini, R. ‘Ways Forward in Recruitment of Low-Skilled Migrant Workers in the Asia-Arab States Corridor’, 2019. Accessed 7 November 2019. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/ public/%2D%2D-arabstates/%2D%2D-ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_519913.pdf 53  Missionaries of Africa, ‘Labor Export of Human Trafficking: Tackling the Labor Laws in Uganda’ available at http://www.missionariesofafrica.org/2018/12/labor-export-or-human-trafficking-tackling-the-labor-laws-in-uganda/, accessed on 7 November 2019. 54  Atong, K, Mayah, E, & Odigie, A 2019, ‘Africa Labour Migration to the GCC States’. Accessed November 7, 2019. https://www.ituc-africa.org/IMG/pdf/ituc-africa_study-africa_labour_migration_to_the_gcc_states.pdf. See also; Jureidini, R 2019, ‘Ways Forward in Recruitment of Low-Skilled Migrant Workers in the Asia-Arab States Corridor’. Accessed 7 November 2019. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/ public/%2D%2D-arabstates/%2D%2D-ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_519913.pdf 51

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duties towards their citizens, hence making them more accountable. Otherwise, outside the human rights regime, existing domestic and regional mechanisms do not seem to have had much real effect.

Pastoralist Communities Usually, the discussion on migration tends to focus on forced or voluntary migration, and not much attention seems to be given to the nomadic pastoralist communities whose way of life is defined by migration. There are a number of nomadic communities across the continent and, in most instances, they happen to be cross-­ border communities as well. The communities usually live in remote and largely undeveloped areas, and there are some that have been worst hit by changing weather patterns, which has further aggravated their already vulnerable position. The AU and some RECs, specifically IGAD, have recognized the need to develop specific policies and initiatives for pastoralist communities, which is quite remarkable, as they have been marginalized for long, both nationally and regionally. The AU has specifically adopted the Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa: Securing, Protecting and Improving the Lives, Livelihoods and Rights of Pastoral Communities. One, and the first, of the objectives of the framework, is to ‘secure and protect the lives, livelihoods and rights of pastoral peoples and ensure continentwide commitment to the political, social and economic development of pastoral communities and pastoral areas’. It is quite noble that the framework seeks to respect and protect the communities’ right to culture and way of life, assisting them to cope with contemporary challenges, while at the same time taking advantage of new opportunities. What seems amiss, however, is that the entire free movement discourse seems to ignore these predominantly migratory communities, who from time immemorial and by their very nature have been crossing borders with or without migration controls. While the AU-FMP makes provision for border communities and obliges states to facilitate their free movement, this does not necessarily include pastoralist communities. In fact, if we were to go by the economic rationalization of free movement, pastoralists are not covered, as they do not qualify as labour, and neither are they moving goods, services or capital in the economic sense. In this way, the free movement regime in Africa tends to ignore the social dimension of the integration objective, or it rather views it in a narrow sense. Pastoralists are a very important part of the African population and ought to be included within the migration discourse. Accordingly, the MPFA and any migration-related instruments, either from the AU or the RECs, should include aspects of the policy framework for pastoralists, in promoting their right to culture while simultaneously including them in the economic development grand plan. Ignoring the free movement of pastoralist communities could arguably amount to a denial of their right to practice their culture, way of life and a means of their livelihood and survival.

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Conclusion Migration in Africa, both within and outside the continent, seems to be on the rise. People move for various reasons, but the current focus seems to be on those that are forced by hardships of various kinds ranging from political to economic to seek a better life and opportunities elsewhere.55 African states have recently, especially from the noughties, taken steps to harness migration for development in Africa by specifically trying to facilitate voluntary migration on the continent. Even if mainly for economic reasons, they are at the same time conscious of the need to curb migration-­related evils and challenges. Although a comprehensive migration policy framework has been adopted for the continent, it is a mere policy document, without much substantive or practical effect on the lives of the people whose rights it seeks to promote and protect. Some positive and progressive steps have been made through the adoption of specific legal frameworks that aim to promote and facilitate aspects of migration in Africa, specifically with regard to the free movement of persons, but these treaties do not cover the gamut of migration-related issues covered by the MPFA. Although the migration regime especially under the course of economic integration seems to garner more support and prompt progressive action from states, on its own, it may be inadequate to protect the rights guaranteed within the respective regional legal frameworks. I have argued that the migration discourse and approach in Africa are increasingly being influenced by the human rights regime. Regional courts that have been primarily set up to adjudicate upon matters within the economic integration sector have turned to the African human rights framework to better protect the migration rights of citizens within their region of influence. Arguably and more predictably, migration in Africa, regardless of its primary rationale (which may not necessarily be human rights oriented), will virtually entirely become a human rights issue. Although the human rights regime in Africa also suffers from its weaknesses, it has proven to be a necessary and indispensable complement to the migration regime and the economic integration process. In fact, with the stance of the AU-FMP, there is no doubt that the approach to migration rights on the continent is a human rights approach. The RECs and their courts specifically serve to further strengthen and reinforce the human rights regime in their spheres of influence. Therefore, currently, it is only within the African human rights regime, despite some of its weaknesses, that migration rights and rights of migrants seem to be more assuredly protected and guaranteed.

 Betts, A. Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017. See also; Mixed Migration Centre 2019, “4Mi Snapshot: Young People on the Move from East Africa.” Accessed on 9 November 2019. http://www.mixedmigration.org/resource/4mi-snapshot-young-people-on-the-move-from-east-africa/

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Bibliography Adupa, B.C. 2010. Lagos Plan of Action. In The Oxford Encyclopedia of African Thought, ed. I. Abiola and B. Jeyifo. New York: Oxford University Press. African Union. 2000. Constitutive Act of the African Union. https://au.int/en/treaties/constitutiveact-african-union. Accessed on 1 Nov 2019. ———. 2010. Policy framework for pastoralism in Africa: Securing, protecting and improving the lives, livelihoods and rights of Pastoralist Communities, https://au.int/sites/default/files/ documents/30240-doc-policy_framework_for_pastoralism.pdf. Accessed on 7 Nov 2019. ———. 2018. Agreement establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area. https://au.int/en/ treaties/agreement-establishing-african-continental-free-trade-area. Accessed on 2 Nov 2019. ———. Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action (2018–2030). https://au.int/ sites/default/files/documents/35956-doc-au-mpfa_2018-eng.pdf. Accessed on 29 Oct 2019. ———. 2018. Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment. https://au.int/en/ treaties/protocol-treaty-establishing-african-economic-community-relating-free-movementpersons. Accessed on 2 Nov 2019. Alston, P. 2002. Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann. European Journal of International Law 13: 815–844. Atong, K, E. Mayah, and A. Odigie. 2019. Africa Labour Migration to the GCC States. https:// www.ituc-africa.org/IMG/pdf/ituc-africa_study-africa_labour_migration_to_the_gcc_states. pdf. Accessed on 7 Nov 2019. Betts, A. 2017. Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Davy, D. 2017. Unpacking the Myths: Human Smuggling from and within the Horn of Africa. Danish Refugee Council & Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat. Frouws, B., and C. Horwood. 2017. Smuggled South: An Updated Overview of Mixed Migration from the Horn of Africa to Southern Africa with Specific Focus on Protections, Risks, Human Smuggling and Trafficking. Danish Refugee Council & Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat. Gathii, J.T. 2012. Mission Creep or a Search for Relevance: The East African Court of Justice’s Human Rights Strategy. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2178756. Accessed on 23 Oct 2019. Hansungule, M. 2004. Towards a More Effective African System of Human Rights: ‘Entebbe Proposals’. https://www.biicl.org/files/2309_hansungule_towards_more_effective.pdf. Accessed on 23 Aug 2020. Helfer, L.R. 2018. Subregional Courts in Africa: Litigating the Hybrid Right to Free Movement of Persons. International Journal of Constitutional Law 16 (1): 235–253. Jalloh, C., M.C.  Kamari, and V.O.O.  Nmehielle, eds. 2019. The African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights in Context: Development and Challenges. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. Jureidini, R. 2019. Ways Forward in Recruitment of Low-Skilled Migrant Workers in the Asia-Arab States Corridor. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/%2D%2D-arabstates/%2D%2Dro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_519913.pdf. Accessed 7 Nov 2019. Kyeyune, M. 2019. Government Rejects Ban on Labour Export. Daily Monitor. Landau, L., and C.W. Kihato. 2018. Foresight reflection paper on the future of mobility and migration within and from Sub-Saharan Africa. https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/ default/files/generated/document/en/Foresight%20Reflection%20Paper%20Sub-Saharan%20 Africa_V01.pdf. Accessed on 30 Oct 2019. Mixed Migration Centre. 2019. 4Mi Snapshot: Young People on the Move from East Africa. http:// www.mixedmigration.org/resource/4mi-snapshot-young-people-on-the-move-from-eastafrica/. Accessed on 9 Nov 2019.

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Nalule, C. 2017a. Advancing Regional Integration  : Migration Rights of Citizens in the East African Community. Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, School of Law. ———. 2017b. Migration in Africa: Filling in the Gaps and Strengthening the Regional Refugee Protection and Migration Regime. A paper presented at the Sixth Forum of the African Union Commission on International Law. Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/ uuid:64e2351a-3629-476f-af04-3d74e3b04913. Accessed on 9 Nov 2019. ———. 2018. Defining the Scope of Free Movement of Citizens in the East African Community: The East African Court of Justice and Its Interpretive Approach. Journal of African Law 62 (1): 1–24. Organization of African Unity. Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, 1991. https:// au.int/en/treaties/treaty-establishing-african-economic-community. Accessed on 2 Nov 2019. ———. African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, 1981. https://au.int/en/treaties/africancharter-human-and-peoples-rights. Accessed on 2 Nov 2019. Petersmann, E.U. 2002. Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration. European Journal of International Law 13 (3): 621–650. Viljoen, F. 2012. International Human Rights Law in Africa. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Part II

Regional Perspectives and Implications

Chapter 6

African Migrants in Poland 1945–2019 Katarzyna Marzęda-Młynarska

Introduction Africans have never been an important group of foreigners in Poland. Their presence was usually incidental, their number never exceeding several thousands. Although the number of foreigners coming to Poland has been rising since the 1990s and Poland is increasingly often seen by African immigrants as a destination country, citizens of African states constitute a small percentage in this group, often treating Poland as a stopover on their migration path. History has without doubt had a huge impact on Poland, being a destination country by migrants from Africa. Throughout its over millennium-long history, Poland was an area of mass migration movements that shaped its ethnic and nationality composition. Of special import in this context was its geographical situation and geopolitics, whose fundamental element was the expansion to the East. Consequently, the population movements taking place in Poland’s territory were largely intracontinental. Located on “the fringe” of Europe, Poland remained a long way away from the processes of the modern era; it did not take part in geographical discoveries or the later colonization of overseas areas, firstly, because the political elites were not interested in these processes and secondly, because Poland lost independence in the late eighteenth century (and only regained it in 1918), which coincided with the period of increased rivalry between Western European powers over territories in Africa, Asia, and in both Americas. It can, therefore, be said that at the political (foreign policy) level Poland showed no interest nor, because of being partitioned, was able to show interest in Africa, which could have justified subsequent migration movements. Nevertheless, at the social level, there were repeated contacts between Poles and Africans in different K. Marzęda-Młynarska (*) Institute of Political Science and Administration, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. Abegunrin, S. O. Abidde (eds.), African Migrants and the Refugee Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56642-5_6

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historical contexts and periods. In his study on the origins of the African diaspora in Poland, Krzysztof Wittels points out that the first records on Africa and Africans in Polish historical sources date back to the fifteenth century.1 It should be stressed that Polish society was aware of the existence of the far-away continent and the “otherness” of its inhabitants, yet this knowledge was largely confined to a narrow circle of representatives of the nobility, aristocracy, and clergy. Originally, its sources were the accounts of participants in the crusades, research expeditions, and commercial or missionary activities and, in the partition periods, also the accounts of émigrés who had personal contact with Africa or Africans. With time, Africans themselves began to appear on Poland’s territory, initially – as an element of court fashion (eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) – both in the art (“Africanism” being in vogue in painting and decorative art) and in a more physical dimension: the fashion for African servants, and in later periods – for sportsmen, actors, and musicians.2 A qualitative change in Polish–African relations came after Poland regained independence in 1918. The change especially concerned the sphere of official political contacts and visits at the diplomatic level.3 This period also saw the crafting of the first “institutionalized” colonial program in Poland. Although it was authored by the Maritime and Colonial League (Liga Morska i Kolonialna), a mass social organization, it expressed the aspirations of the independent state to have its overseas colonies.4 The essence of the League’s colonial program was the intent to solve the country’s urgent demographic issues (rural overpopulation) and economic problems, as well as to enhance Poland’s position and prestige in the international arena, by gaining territories in Africa.5 With no real chances of success, the “dream” about colonies in Africa never came true and ended with the outbreak of World War Two. The new international order that emerged after the war meant radical changes in world politics, including the end of the colonial era. A new stage opened in the mutual relations between Poland and African countries; the result being a slow influx of African immigrants to Poland. The goal of the chapter is to analyze the phenomenon of African migrations to Poland and to answer the question of whether Poland is or can be an attractive place for African migrants in the future. The subject of analysis, it should be stressed, is only migrations from the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and does not include the

1  Krzysztof Wittels, “The Beginnings of the African Diaspora on the Vistula,” in Africa in Warsaw. A History of the African Diaspora on the Vistula, eds. Paweł Średziński and Mamadou Diouf, (Warszawa: Fundacja Afryka iInaczej, 2010): 13–32. 2  Wittels, “The Beginnings of the African Diaspora on the Vistula,” 23–25. 3  Krzysztof Wittels, “Africans in Warsaw between the Wars,” in Africa in Warsaw. A History of the African Diaspora on the Vistula, eds. Paweł Średziński and Mamadou Diouf, (Warszawa: Fundacja Afryka iInaczej, 2010): 47–60. 4  Tadeusz Białas, The Maritime and Colonial League 1930–1939, (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1983). 5  Krzysztof Wittels, “The Maritime and Colonial League in Warsaw,” in Africa in Warsaw. A History of the African Diaspora on the Vistula, eds. Paweł Średziński and Mamadou Diouf, (Warszawa: Fundacja Afryka inaczej, 2010): 85–96.

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Arab countries in North Africa. The chapter consists of three parts. The first part presents the historical context of African immigration to Poland from the end of World War Two to 1989. It should be emphasized that at that time Poland was a communist country without a colonial past, which determined the level of African migrations. First, because of the absence of historical ties, it was not an attractive destination for potential immigrants. Second, the influx of migrants from Africa to Poland was subject to strong political and ideological influences in that period. From the 1960s, Poland opened its borders to immigration from developing countries, because of which the first group of African migrants arrived in Poland. However, this movement was the outcome of bilateral agreements signed by Poland and was confined mainly to students, some of whom decided to permanently stay in this country. The second part of the chapter covers the period from 1989 to 2004, when Poland applied for membership of the European Union (EU), which significantly changed the perception of it as a destination country for immigrants from Africa. This part of the chapter analyzes the evolution of Poland’s immigration policy, the size and kind of migration from Africa, the identification of the main African immigration communities in Poland, and the geographic structure and origin of immigrants. The subject of analysis in the third part of the chapter is migrations from African countries since Poland’s accession to the EU. The analysis covers the number and origin of African immigrants and motives for migration (economic, political, and educational), Poland’s migration policy in the context of the EU’s migration policy and migration crisis, and the attitude of Polish citizens to immigrants from Africa.

African Migrants in Poland (1945–1989) After World War Two ended, Poland found itself in the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, which had a decisive impact on its migration policy and relations with other countries. This policy was based on strict control and no freedom of migration movement, which was treated instrumentally and included the ideological struggle. A special area of interest by the authorities was emigration. Restrictions applied, however, not only to Polish citizens seeking to go abroad6 but also foreigners traveling in Poland. The policy of Poland’s communist authorities towards Africans and African countries striving to gain independence was largely ideological and propagandistic, since the support for the struggle for liberation from colonial rule was treated as a duty of the socialist countries. From the moment it was established, People’s Poland  – as was emphasized in official communiqués  – treated “attentively and sympathetically” the struggle of subjugated countries for independence, offering

6  Dariusz Stola, A Country with No Way Out? Migrations from Poland in 1949–1989 (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IPN, 2010).

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them moral and political support as well as undertaking specific actions for the elimination of the colonial system.7 Support was expressed in different ways: from special resolutions and statements made by the party and state authorities to the organization of support rallies and practical diplomatic measures.8 The objective of those activities was to increase the influence of socialism in the “reawakening” parts of the world. Support for independence aspirations of the African colonies became a perfect part of the struggle against Western imperialism, which was the main pivot of communist ideology. In the press of that period, Africans were presented as friends, revolutionaries, and ordinary citizens, which was consequent upon the policy of the whole Eastern Bloc towards African countries that freed themselves from colonialism. Bartosz Nowicki, curator of the exhibition that opened in April 2018, entitled  “Afro-PRP [People’s Republic of Poland]. The Image of the Africans in the Polish Press Photography (Afro-PRL. Wizerunek Afrykanów w polskiej fotografii prasowej 1955–1989)” observes: Propaganda was an important element strengthening ‘Polish-African friendship.’ The press, inter alia, by means of photographs, presented People’s Poland as a country in which persons of African origin were perceived as equal members of society, and the visiting African guests were treated with due respect.9

Anti-colonial rhetoric was expressed not only in the official speeches by the party and state authorities but also in diverse non-governmental campaigns, such as the International Days of Solidarity with the young people in colonial and subjugated countries or the special Lumumba scholarship fund for African students studying in Poland.10 In the 1960s and 1970s, Poland played host to specially invited representatives of national-liberation movements from African countries: Johnson Moya (a member of the Executive Committee of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union); Kenneth Komor (representative of the People’s Party of Bechuanaland  – now Botswana); Emil Appolus and Antonio M.  Baya (representatives of a national-­ liberation organization of Namibia); Simpson Ktambanengwe (representative of the Zimbabwe African National Union); and Daniel G. da Costa, Daniel Chipende, Tayeb Monsauzi, and Agostinho Neto (representatives of the National Movement for the Liberation of Angola).11 A special expression of support for the liberation struggle of Africans was the involvement of People’s Poland’s authorities for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the former Belgian Congo. The 7  Władysław Góralski, “Poland and Decolonization of Asia and Africa (1946–1979),” Przegląd Orientalistyczny, no. 2 (1981): 95–154. 8  Paulina Codogni, “Africans in Warsaw in 1945–1975,” in Africa in Warsaw. A History of the African Diaspora on the Vistula, eds. Paweł Średziński and Mamadou Diouf, (Warszawa: Fundacja Afryka Inaczej (2010): 114–130. 9  Afryka.org, “Afro-PRP (People’s Republic of Poland). The Image of the Africans in the Polish Press Photography 1955–1989, April 19, 2018,” accessed August 1, 2019. http://afryka.org/ afro-prl-wizerunek-afrykanow-w-polskiej-fotografii-prasowej-1955-1989/ 10  Codogni, “Africans in Warsaw in 1945–1975,” 115. 11  Góralski, “Poland and Decolonization of Asia and Africa,” 102.

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Belgian-inspired political crisis in that country, underlying Belgium’s desire to retain control over its rich natural resources, ultimately resulted in the murder of the first Prime Minister of independent Congo – Patrice Lumumba. In response to these events, the authorities of communist Poland undertook a series of actions at the international level, appealing, for example, to the UN forum for the solution to the conflict and then for an explanation of the circumstances of Lumumba’s murder. The diplomatic activities of the Polish government were accompanied by mass demonstrations organized in Poland against Belgium’s colonial policy, which were intensified after the killing of Lumumba.12 Relations between communist Poland and African countries assumed different forms. The decolonization process was conducive to the establishment of diplomatic relations and the creation of the legal and treaty base to regulate many areas of cooperation, including the cultural and scientific sphere, as the grounds for the citizens of African states coming to study in Poland. The period of Poland’s heightened diplomatic activity occurred in the 1960s and 1970s when many African countries were regaining their independence.13 The data on the subject are presented in Table 6.1. While the development of diplomatic relations and official visits by representatives of African countries were of huge propaganda significance to Poland’s communist authorities, they did not translate into increased contacts of ordinary Polish citizens with Africans. Special opportunities in this field were offered during the period of communist rule by cooperation in science and education, which was an important channel for the migration of citizens of African countries to Poland. Its principal goal was to develop personnel for the newly emergent African states and to promote socialism in Africa by African students returning home after having studied in Poland. In addition to college studies, the educational offer addressed to representatives of the fraternal developing countries also contained special courses. For example, in 1962 the Main School of Planning and Statistics in Warsaw started the only postgraduate program in the Eastern Bloc in economic planning for economists from developing countries, which was attended by many students from Africa.14 It should be stressed that many leaders and representatives of the political elites of African countries obtained their education in Poland, for example,

 Ibid  Edward Pałyga. “The Development of Diplomatic Relations with African States,” Przegląd Orientalistyczny, no. 2 (1981): 149–153; See also; Krzysztof Szczepanik et al. eds., et al. eds., Poland’s Diplomatic Relations. A Guide. Vol. 4: Africa and the Near East. Warszawa: Akson, 2010; Eugeniusz Gajda, Polish Foreign Policy in 1944–1974, (Warszawa; Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1974), Zygmunt Łazowski ed., Poland’s Relations with West Africa, (Warszawa: Dialog, 2004); Władysław Góralski, “Poland and Decolonization of Asia and Africa (1946–1979),” Przegląd Orientalistyczny, no. 2, (1981): 95–104; Jerzy Prokopczuk, “Poland’s Economic and Political Cooperation with Developing Countries,” “Sprawy Międzynarodowe” zeszyt 7–8, (July – August 1969): 49–60. 14  Kazimierz Starzyk, “Advanced Course In Planning for Economists from Underdeveloped Countries,” Africana Bulletin, no 2 (1965): 102. 12 13

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Table 6.1  Diplomatic relations between Poland and selected African countries  – agreements related to population movements Country Angola

Date of establishment of diplomatic relations 21 November 1975

Benin (former Dahomey)

15 June 1962

Cameroon

14 March 1972

Democratic 30 June 1960 Republic of Congo Ethiopia 28 December 1945

Ghana

31 December 1959

Guinea

29 June 1959

Kenya

13 December 1963

Mali

12 May 1961

Niger

1 July 1971

Nigeria

30 May 1962

Senegal

18 June 1962

Agreements related to population movements Agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation (28 April 1977) Agreement on cultural cooperation (5 March 1965) Agreement on reciprocal visa waiver for holders of diplomatic and official passports (11 May 1982) Agreement on cultural cooperation (26 April 1963) Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation (28 November 1967) Agreement on cultural cooperation (1 December 1965) Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation (1 December 1965) Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation (19 April 1961) Agreement on cultural cooperation (17 January 1964) Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation (30 January 1959) Agreement on cultural cooperation (10 March 1966) Agreement on cooperation in the field of archaeological research (22 April 1968) Cooperation agreement on health protection and medical science (26 January 1978) Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation (20 April 1964) Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation (2 November 1961) Agreement on cultural cooperation (2 November 1961) Agreement on cultural and technical cooperation (9 November 1961) Agreement on economic, scientific and technical cooperation (7 May 1970) Agreement on scientific and cultural cooperation (16 June 1976) Agreement on cultural cooperation (18 June 1962) Agreement on economic, scientific and technical cooperation (18 June 1962) (continued)

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Table 6.1 (continued) Country Sudan

Date of establishment of diplomatic relations 25 July 1956

Tanzania

15 January 1962

Agreements related to population movements Agreement on cultural, scientific and technical cooperation (17 October 1967) Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation (15 May 1965)

Source: K. Szczepanik, et al. eds., Poland’s Diplomatic Relations. A Guide. Vol. 4: Africa and the Near East, (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akson, 2010)

Agostinho Neto, the President of Angola, and Alpha Oumar Konare, the President of Mali. The first students from African countries appeared in Poland as early as the 1950s, and their number grew systematically in the following decades. While in the 1950s there were only four of them, in the late 1970s this number reached about two thousand.15 For example, in the academic year 1967/1968, there were 500 African students from 23 countries in Polish universities, including students from Sudan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Congo. The preferred fields of study were medicine, engineering, economics, and agriculture.16 The national structure of the African students changed in different periods. Between 1950 and 1960, students from Sudan prevailed; in the next decade of 1961–1970, the largest group were students from Ethiopia, Ghana, and Nigeria, while in 1971–1980 these proportions were again reversed: the percentage of students from Sudan and Ethiopia decreased, and the percentage of students from Nigeria and Kenya rose. Between 1981 and 1990 the Nigerians, Ethiopians, and the Sudanese were the largest in numbers,17 the Nigerians being one of the largest nationality groups among African students (Table 6.2).18 It was very important for the communist authorities to present the image of Poland as a country open and friendly to visitors from Africa. In the years 1962–1972, a special periodical “The Polish Review” was issued and distributed solely in Africa and Asia; it published materials on the life of Africans in Poland to encourage citizens from African countries to come to People’s Poland.19 In 1962, the Polish-­ African Friendship Society was also founded; its goal was, on the one hand, to

 Afryka.org, “Afro-PRP (People’s Republic of Poland). The Image of the Africans in the Polish Press Photography 1955–1989.” 16  Zygmunt Komorowski, “ Poland’s Participation in the Formation of African Personnel and in Scientific Research Conducted in this Domain,” Africana Bulletin, no. 15 (1971): 135–142. 17  Bogusław Szymański, “Education of Africans in Poland” in Poland’s Relations with West Africa, ed. Zygmunt Łazowski, (Warsaw: Dialog Publishing House, (2004): 115–118. 18  Michał Chilczuk, “Fifty Years of Educating international Students in Poland,” Kontakt no 1–2 (2001): 5–18. 19  Afryka. org, “Afro-PRP (People’s Republic of Poland). The Image of the Africans in the Polish Press Photography 1955–1989.” 15

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Table 6.2  Foreigners studying in Poland between 1952 and 1973

Continent Asia Africa South America North and Central America Europe Australia

Number of foreigners studying in Poland 2283 1112 172 221 478 1

Percentage of foreigners from a given continent in the total number of foreigners studying in Poland 53.5 26.1 4.0 5.2 11.2 –

Source: W.  Dembowski, “The Centre for Communication with Foreigners, Graduates of Polish Universities - its objectives and tasks,” Kontakt, no. 1, (1994)

popularize the knowledge about African countries in Poland, and on the other, the knowledge about Poland in African countries.20 There is no doubt that the popularity of studies in Poland among students from Africa increased, but their numbers remained very small as compared with the Western European countries. Despite intensive propaganda measures and official information channels, the level of knowledge about Poland and its inhabitants among Africans remained very low. Of decisive importance in this context were such factors as language barriers and social networks. The poor knowledge of Polish among African students and of English and French among ordinary citizens of People’s Poland was not conducive to contacts and integration – only the most tenacious of the Africans who learned Polish or started a family decided to stay permanently in Poland. The lack of migration networks, a major factor that attracted African migrants to former colonial powers, such as Great Britain and France, did not encourage them to go to Poland. Interesting in this context is the similarity of individual histories of Africans who came to Poland to study. To many of them, the main motivation for going to Eastern Bloc countries was the desire to gain education rather than study in a specific country. The more so, in practice they were sent to the countries that were ready to accept them at a given moment,21 which fact meant that coming to Poland was merely a coincidence in many cases. The last significant group of African students who came to Poland as part of international cooperation was at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s. However, as Paulina Codogni observes, “it was the beginning of the end of the influx of Africans to Polish universities as part of cooperation with individual African countries.”22 This did not however mean the termination of this form of migration.  Błażej Popławski, “A History of A Certain Association. On the Beginnings of the Activity of the Polish-African Society in Warsaw,” in Foreigners in Warsaw in 1945–1989, 189–202, ed. Patryk Pleskota (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IPN, 2012): 189–202. 21  Paweł Średziński and Mamadou Diouf eds., Africa in Warsaw. A History of the African Diaspora on the Vistula, (Warszawa: Fundacja Afryka inaczej, 2010): 179–249. 22  Codogni, “Africans in Warsaw in 1945–1975,” 128. 20

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On the contrary, after 1989, students from Africa continued to come to Poland, but an increasingly large group consisted of refugees and economic migrants, which was a significant novelty to Poland throwing off the yoke of communism.

African Migrants in Poland in 1989–2004 The collapse of communism in Poland began the process of the entire transformation of the state’s political system, including its migration policy. By opening up to the world, Poland was included in the global processes of population migration, which turned from an academic issue into an element of the new reality. To many scholars, the years 1989–2004 were a dividing line clearly separating the patterns of mobility and circumstances in which migrations took place from the earlier and later periods.23 This was a period of dynamic changes both in the factors determining migration processes in Poland and the state’s migration policy. Firstly, the communist legacy of supervision and control over any international mobility was rejected. Secondly, while remaining a country of emigration during the period in question, Poland also became a transit country for many migrants, including those from Sub-Saharan Africa, and some even a destination country. Thirdly, new, previously unknown forms of migration appeared: refugees and economic immigrants. Migrations from the Sub-Saharan African countries to Poland between 1989 and 2004 can be analyzed in terms of push and pull factors. The first group (push) indisputably comprises phenomena and processes that permanently condition the quality of life in Sub-Saharan African countries, e.g., demography, economy, wars and conflicts, human rights, and the natural environment. The majority of analyses highlight the dynamic birth rate in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, which is not accompanied by equally dynamic economic growth, thereby leading to a “surplus” of population – a reservoir of potential emigrants seeking a better life in the other parts of the world. The demographic factor is connected with economic issues. The lack of opportunities to satisfy one’s own needs with the simultaneous awareness of the higher standard of life and development chances in the other parts of the world is the most frequent reason for migration. An inherent element of the landscape of Sub-­ Saharan Africa is also conflicts and wars contributing to an increase in forced migration and in the number of refugees as well as the related questions of human rights violations. Comparatively, new factors determining potential migrations from Sub-­ Saharan Africa in the future are environmental questions, including air, water, and soil pollution, deforestation, desertification, reduction of animal population, and

 Katarzyna Andrejuk and Agnieszka Fihel, “Migrations in Poland between 1989 and 2004,” in 25 Lectures on Migrations, edited by Magdalena Lesińska, Marek Okólski, eds. Magdalena Lesińska, Marek Okólski (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Scholar, 2018), 197.

23

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climatic changes.24 These are obviously general factors that do not necessarily affect all countries in the region. It should be also observed that the reasons why citizens of individual African countries leave may differ significantly as does the scale of migrations. On the other hand, the question remains about the pull factors attracting migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa to Poland in the period in question. One of them is, without doubt, the geopolitical situation of Poland and the proximity of the border with Germany, because of which, in the early 1990s, Poland became a “gate to Paradise” for many migrants from all over the world. The liberalization of the rules of foreigners’ entry into Poland after the period of “barbed wire entanglements” and the signing by Poland of agreements on visa-free traffic as well as the relatively easy possibility of illegally crossing the frontier caused Poland to become an attractive place for migrants from different parts of the world, including Africa, who wanted to find their way to Western Europe in the 1990s. Symptomatic in this context is the example of a several-hundred-strong group of foreigners, mainly from African and Arab countries, who were expelled from Sweden in early 1990 after they had illegally entered its territory from the territory of Poland.25 Another important factor that attracted foreigners to Poland in the 1990s was also good opportunities for financial success, associated with the process of system transformation. Such chances were offered by Poland’s dynamically developing economy with its large and tolerated grey area.26 Also symbolic in this context is the history of Poland’s largest marketplace, called “the Europe Fair (Jarmark Europa),” functioning in Warsaw at the 10th-Anniversary Stadium (Stadion Dziesięciolecia). As Maciej Ząbek, a researcher of the African diaspora in Poland, observes, many Africans decided to stay in Poland not because they were unable to go to the West but because they achieved financial success. The Stadium thus became practically the largest and definitely the most effective institution offering actual integration to hundreds of immigrants and refugees from Africa in Poland.27 And despite the fact that after 1989 Poland was treated by Africans mainly as a transit country, the number of those who settled in Poland without attempting further mobility rose.28 An equally important pull factor was the reform of Poland’s migration policy, especially the introduction of a range of regulations addressed to specific migrant categories, particularly refugees, which caused a significant increase in the number

 Sławomir Łodziński, Jan J. Milewski, eds., To the Table of the Wealthy. Migration Movements in Africa and Their Significance to Poland, (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Wydziału Geografii i Studiów Regionalnych UW, 1999). 25  Sławomir Łodziński, “Foreign Residents. The Prospects of Policies towards Immigrants in Poland,” in To the Table of the Wealthy. Migration Movements in Africa and Their Significance to Poland, eds. Sławomir Łodziński and Jan J.  Milewski (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Wydziału Geografii i Studiów Regionalnych UW, 1999): 173. 26  Łodziński, “Foreign Residents,” 193. 27  Maciej Ząbek, “Citizens of African Countries in Poland” in Poland’s Relations with West Africa, ed. Zygmunt Łazowski (Warszawa: Dialog, 2004): 112. 28  Andrejuk and Fihel, “Migrations in Poland between 1989 and 2004,” 203. 24

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of Africans seeking refuge in Poland and also trying to legalize their stay in this way. The literature on the subject distinguishes three stages of reform: • the stage of institutionalization (1989–2001), in which the legal–institutional system developed in the form of adjustments to international solutions, including those concerning refugee status, and in response to intensified migration flows (readmission agreements), • the stage of Europeanization (2001–2004), consisting in adjusting Polish legal solutions to European Union norms, e.g., in the fields of border control, visa policy, and admission, • the stage of stability (from 2004), characterized by the further development of the institutional and legal system in the area of migration policies.29 From the standpoint of African migrants, of special importance was the question of the adoption of international regulations on refugee status. It should be stressed that People’s Poland did not ratify the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, and the law of the communist state did not contain the concept of refugees. Before November 1990, there were neither legal nor organizational solutions on how to deal with foreigners applying for refugee status to Polish authorities.30 Following the ratification of the relevant Geneva Convention in September 1991, provisions were introduced into the Polish legal system that applied to foreigners seeking refugee status and being granted such status. In many cases, application for refugee status or asylum enabled citizens of African countries who entered Poland’s territory illegally from the former Soviet countries, chiefly Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania, to legalize their stay in it. In addition, in the situation of tightening the migration policy in the context of future accession to the EU, potential migrants from Africa had two solutions: come to Poland to study and try to obtain a permanent residence permit while studying there or apply for asylum and refugee status,31 which is now widely practiced by economic migrants arriving illegally in Europe, who do not meet the refugee criteria in the meaning of the Geneva Convention. Except for refugees, the data on the number of African migrants in Poland in the 1990s is incomplete and obtained at random. The first applications for refugee status began to be considered in Poland in 1992.32 African citizens were among the first  Magdalena Lesińska, Maciej Duszczyk, “Migration Policy” in 25 Lectures on Migrations, eds. Magdalena Lesińska and Marek Okólski (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Scholar, 2018): 261. 30  Marek Szonert, “The Activity for Refugees by the Migration and Refugees Department of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration,” in To the Table of the Wealthy. Migration Movements in Africa and Their Significance to Poland, eds. Sławomir Łodziński and Jan J.  Milewski (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Wydziału Geografii i Studiów Regionalnych UW, 1999): 213. 31  Maciej Ząbek, “Contemporary Migration s in Africa,” in To the Table of the Wealthy. Migration Movements in Africa and Their Significance to Poland, eds. Sławomir Łodziński and Jan J.  Milewski (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Wydziału Geografii i Studiów Regionalnych UW, 1999): 118. 32  Maciej Kuczyński, “Refugees and the Refugee System in Poland,” in Europe  - Poland  – Migration, eds. Sebastian Wojciechowski and Radosław Fiedler (Poznań: Wydawnictwo UAM, 2003): 70. 29

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applicants, and although they never dominated the statistics, they were a noticeable group that accounted for on average 10% of all applications. The geographical ­origins of African applicants were shaped by the political events of the time. In 1992, the largest number of applications were submitted by Ethiopian citizens, in 1993 and 1994 by Sudanese, and in 1995 and 1996 by Somalians. Altogether in 1992–2000, refugee status was granted to 296 Africans, of whom the largest group was the citizens of Somalia (174) and Ethiopia (58).33 An important channel of migration to Poland by citizens of African countries between 1989 and 2004 was to enter the country to study. Admittedly, in comparison with the period of People’s Poland, the character and legal basis of such visits changed, but, taking only the number of graduates into account, a significant increase in interest in Poland among citizens of African countries should be noted (Table 6.3). A geographical analysis of foreign graduates of Polish universities shows that citizens of African countries rank first (along with Asian graduates) in terms of the number of obtained university diplomas. The indisputable leader in 2000 was Nigeria with 423 graduates, followed by Sudan with 311, Ethiopia 128, and Ghana 116.34 Although the preferences of African students as to universities in Poland remained unchanged, the most preferred university centers were the University of Warsaw, Jagiellonian University, technical universities in Warsaw, Wrocław and Krakow, and the Warsaw and Wrocław Medical Universities – there was a change in the preferred fields of study. In addition to traditional study programs, medicine and engineering, there was a growing interest in social science subjects (business, management, political science), whereas a significantly declining interest in agricultural studies was reported.35 Additional opportunities in educational flows were offered by a scholarship program, initiated in 1995 by the Polish National Commission for UNESCO, meant for university graduates from African countries. The first group of 30 scholarship holders arrived in Poland in 1996. The program provided an opportunity to serve a short, individual six-month internship in selected subjects at Polish academic centers. After the success of its first edition, the program was continued in successive years.36 Most difficult to determine is the number of economic migrants from African countries who stayed in Poland between 1989 and 2004. This stems partly from the fact that they were granted a different status and secondly from the lack of appropriate methodology. What’s more, according to many scholars, the existing data do not fully reflect the reality of that time, because many Africans in Poland did not

 Kuczyński, “Refugees and the Refugee System in Poland,” 71–77.  Chilczuk, “Fifty Years of Educating international Students in Poland,” 13. 35  Ibid 36  Grzegorz Waliński, “Scholarship Programs of the Polish National Commission for UNESCO.” Kontakt, no. 3–4, (2001): 12–16. 33 34

1950–1960 Number of graduates 120 338 – – – 458

Number of countries 8 2 – – – 10

1961–1970 Number of graduates 471 266 211 53 – 1001 Number of countries 8 6 6 1 – 21

1971–1980 Number of graduates 1137 1314 393 81 – 2925 Number of countries 9 15 13 8 – 45

1981–1990 Number of graduates 577 1220 725 316 2 2840

Source: M. Chilczuk, “Fifty Years of Educating International Students in Poland,” Kontakt, no. 1–2 (2001): 15

Years Continent Europe Asia Africa Americas Australia TOTAL

Number of countries 14 20 35 19 1 89

1991–2000 Number of graduates 3229 1764 1145 418 4 6560

Table 6.3  Number of foreign graduates of Polish universities by the number of countries of origin and continents in the years 1950–2000 Number of countries 34 35 45 17 1 132

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legalize their stay. At the same time, since they were few in number, they did not show very high group tendencies and did not form close-knit immigrant communities.37 The years between 1989 and 2004 were also a period of the development of the attitudes of Polish society towards foreigners coming to Poland, particularly to those who were different in terms of physical characteristics. A comparison of research conducted in 1988 and 1998 showed an observable increase in openness towards foreigners and, consequently, a drop in restrictive attitudes. In the 1990s, the Poles were compelled to look at migration problems as citizens of a migration country in which foreigners were not only guests but also rightful members of society. What’s important, research demonstrated that the element of racial (anthropological) difference in the contact of Poles with foreigners – so essential in Western European countries – did not play a significant role according to the opinions of Poles. Only 12% of those surveyed in 1998 were against the arrival of foreigners with different skin color. Surveys also confirmed that the majority of intolerant attitudes were generally towards persons having different social and political views rather than those of a different racial, national, or social background.38

African Migrants in Poland After 2004 Membership in the European Union and the Schengen Area opened a new stage in migrations to and from Poland. The absence of border control and the possibility of free travel to other EU countries undoubtedly produced a growing interest in Poland among potential migrants. Even though a significant increase in the influx of migrants from Africa after 2004 was not reported, Poland is increasingly often seen as a destination country. In addition, its dynamic economic growth coupled with a record-low unemployment rate places Poland among attractive destinations, both to migrants from neighboring EU countries and from non-European areas. The Europeanization of Poland’s migration policy and the adoption of international protection standards by the Polish legal system resulted in a considerable diversity of the forms of foreigners’ legal stay in Poland. Foreigners from outside of the EU may stay in Poland based on visas, work permits, declarations of employers to employ a foreign employee, international regulations (refugee status, tolerated stay, subsidiary protection, a residence for humanitarian reasons), and permanent or temporary residence cards. However, the diversity of status causes many difficulties in establishing the exact number of foreigners staying in Poland. According to the 2011 census data, i.e. 7 years after Poland gained EU membership, 86,000 foreigners were living in the country; of these, 55,000 lived  Łodziński, “Foreign Residents,” 191.  Ewa Nowicka and Sławomir Łodziński, “Change or Stability. The Poles towards Themselves and Others in the Nineties,” in Europe  - Poland  - Migration, eds. Sebastian Wojciechowski and Radosław Fiedler (Poznań: Wydawnictwo UAM, 2003): 13–24. 37 38

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permanently. They accounted therefore for less than 1% of Poland’s population.39 Three years later, at the end of December 2013, the number of foreigners staying in Poland rose to 121,000, excluding citizens of EU countries, which still placed Poland in the group of countries with the lowest ratio of migrants to the total population. Over half of this group were citizens of neighboring countries and former Soviet republics, Ukraine (37500), Russia (12.500), Belarus (11,000), and Armenia (5000). There were also relatively large numbers of Vietnamese (c. 13,500), Chinese (5000), Turks (2700), Indians (2600), and Americans (2500).40 Africans, 5400, accounted for less than 5% of all foreigners, and citizens of Sub-Saharan African countries accounted for less than half of all Africans, i.e. ca. 2,300 thousand persons.41 The picture of Poland as an immigration country changed considerably after 2013. By the beginning of 2018, an almost fourfold increase in the number of Ukrainian citizens holding residence cards in Poland was reported along with a twofold increase in the number of cardholders from other countries. According to the data of the Office for Foreigners, as of 1 January 2018, 325,000 foreigners lived in Poland, over half of whom were Ukrainian citizens. However, the number of issued residence cards does not entirely express the dynamics of the influx of foreigners to Poland after 2013. For example, in 2017 Polish offices registered over 1.8 million employer declarations to employ a foreigner and over 235,000 work permits issued, in the vast majority of cases to Ukrainians. The largest number of foreigners from non-European countries consisted of Vietnamese, Americans, and citizens of China, India, and Nepal.42 Even though there was a significant increase in the number of residence permits issued to foreigners in Poland after 2013, the Office for Foreigners data shows that the trend does not apply to migration from Africa. The number of citizens of African countries who held valid documents entitling them to stay on Poland’s territory in 201943 ran at a level of slightly over 2500; 689 persons held permanent residence permits; 1772 held temporary residence permits; 24 persons were given residence for humanitarian reasons; 33 were refugees; 5 held tolerated stay; and 19 received subsidiary protection.44 With respect to the citizens in each category, citizens of Nigeria, the Republic of South Africa, Cameroon, and Kenya were most numerous

 Agata Górny and Marta Kindler, “Foreigners in Poland at the Outset of the 21st Century,” in 25 Lectures on Migrations, eds. Magdalena Lesińska and Marek Okólski (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Scholar, 2018): 221. 40  Konrad Pędziwiatr, “Immigrants in Poland and Immigration Challenges,” Indos, no. 1 [184], Biuro Analiz Sejmowych 15 January (2015): 2. 41  Data of Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration – number of people having valid residence cards for 9.12.2013 – the country division. 42  Górny and Kindler, “Foreigners in Poland at the Outset of the 21st Century,” 221–222. 43  Data for September 22, 2019. 44  Office for Foreigners. “Statistics.” Accessed September 6, accessed September 6, 2019, https:// migracje.gov.pl/statystyki/zakres/polska/typ/dokumenty/widok/tabele/typDokumentu/18/ rok/2019/ 39

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in the permanent and temporary residence category, citizens of Somalia in the refugee category, citizens of Rwanda, Cameroon, and Congo in the category of humanitarian reasons, citizens of Sierra Leone in tolerated stay category, and citizens of Senegal in the subsidiary protection category. The main country of origin of ­immigrants of all kinds is Nigeria, whose citizens account for almost one-third of all immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa with the second position being occupied by Zimbabwe and the third by the Republic of South Africa. It should be stressed that while Nigerian citizens were always in the lead of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, the second largest group has varied. For example, in 2012 these were citizens of Cameroon, Kenya, and Angola. The overall figures are presented in Table 6.4. The small influx of migrants from Sub-Saharan African countries is a subject of interest for many researchers in Poland. In the attempts to explain this phenomenon, hypotheses are tested that take into consideration both changes in the distribution of push and pull factors and barriers encountered by African immigrants upon arrival in Poland.45 Paradoxically, the analysis of factors according to the push–pull model confirms the high migration potential of Sub-Saharan Africa and the relative attractiveness of Poland as a destination country, which does not, however, translate into the scale of population movement. Researchers point out that in the case of Poland much more important can be internal factors that block integration and, consequently, the influx of Africans, such as the attitudes of Polish society, considerable cultural differences, lack of knowledge of Polish language, climate, and the lack of a developed migration network.46 These observations are confirmed by immigrants. Surveys conducted in 2009 among students from Africa and representatives of non-­ governmental organizations that help Africans living in Poland showed that the respondents experienced a feeling of cultural alienation and an inability to establish closer social ties resulting from the ignorance of Polish citizens. Many emphasized that they felt the lack of acceptance by Poles due to their skin color was the issue and, in extreme cases, in acts of verbal and physical aggression.47 At the same time, according to many respondents, the distance and dislike on the part of Polish citizens did not necessarily stem from racist attitudes but rather from ignorance and negative stereotypes of Africa reinforced by the media. The veracity of the thesis is verified by a 2016 report on the monitoring of the Polish media on Africa and its inhabitants, which confirmed that it is still presented as a poor, underdeveloped, and dangerous continent, which largely translates into the way Africans are seen by Poles.  Marta Danecka and Emilia Jaroszewska, “African Immigrants in Poland. A Contribution to the Analysis of Factors that Block Their Inflow and Integration,” Kultura i Społeczeństwo, no. 3 (2013): 157–184; See also; University of Warsaw Institute of Social Policy. “The Integration of Citizens from African Countries in Poland in Light of Qualitative Studies.” Final Report on Statutory Research 2012, (Warszawa, 2013). 46  Danecka and Jaroszewska, “African Immigrants in Poland,” 162–163. 47  University of Warsaw Institute of Social Policy. “The Integration of Citizens from African Countries.” 45

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Table 6.4  Number of citizens of African countries in Poland according to status 2019 Residence due to Status Permanent Temporary Tolerated Refugee humanitarian reasons Country Total residence residence stay status Angola 119 15 103 – 1 – Benin 7 3 4 – – – Botswana 1 1 – – – – Burkina Faso 8 1 7 – – – Burundi 2 1 1 – – – Cabo Verde 3 – 3 – – – Cameroon 170 48 119 – – 3 4 – – – 4 – Central African Republic Chad 2 – 2 – – – Comoros 1 – 1 – – – Congo 140 24 107 – 6 3 Côte d’Ivoire 31 4 26 – – 1 DR Congo 41 8 31 – 1 – Equatorial 2 – 2 – – – Guinea Eritrea 12 2 5 – 1 – Eswatini 2 – 2 – – – Ethiopia 73 18 51 – 4 – Gabon 5 1 3 – 1 – Gambia 32 13 18 – – 1 Ghana 1 – – – – 1 Guinea-­ 4 1 2 – – 1 Bissau Guinea 41 16 22 1 – 2 Kenya 143 29 113 – – – Liberia 4 2 1 – – 1 Madagascar 25 7 18 – – – Malawi 5 – 5 – – – Mali 21 8 12 – – – Mauritius 28 – 28 – – – Mozambique 20 2 18 – – – Namibia 12 3 9 – – – Niger 4 – 4 – – – Nigeria 775 316 453 1 4 – Rwanda 97 2 91 – 1 3 Senegal 64 17 40 – – 1 Seychelles 2 1 1 – – – Sierra Leone 10 8 – 2 – –

Subsidiary protection – – – – – – – –

– – – – 1 – 4 – – – – – – – 1 – – – 1 – – – – 1 – 6 – – (continued)

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Table 6.4 (continued)

Status Country Somalia South Africa South Sudan Sudan Tanzania Togo Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe TOTAL

Residence due to Permanent Temporary Tolerated Refugee humanitarian reasons Total residence residence stay status 23 10 2 – 8 – 210 66 144 – – – 1 1 – – – – 44 10 30 – 1 2 49 20 26 1 – 2 19 8 9 – – 1 33 12 20 – – 1 26 2 23 – – 1 226 9 216 – 1 – 2542 689 1772 5 33 24

Subsidiary protection 3 – – 1 – 1 – – – 19

Source: The Office for Foreigners statistics: https://migracje.gov.pl/en/

The way of perceiving African migrants and the Polish attitudes towards them was, without a doubt, greatly influenced by the migration crisis of 2015 and the way it was reported on. The dominant narrative in media accounts was based on the stereotype of the alien/barbarian storming the borders of the European Union. The use of the analogy to ancient Rome and the metaphor of the besieged fortress significantly translated into a growing dislike of immigrants, including those from Africa,48 which was confirmed by opinion polls; a 2016 survey on the integration of citizens of African countries in Poland revealed a new tendency in the way foreigners were viewed. On the one hand, the declining interest of Poles in other cultures and an increase in the declared distance and reserve towards foreigners were observed and, on the other, the focus on cultural differences and lifestyles as well as xenophobic views.49 The traditional channel of migration of Africans to Poland that remained after its entry into the European Union was to come and study at Polish universities. It is estimated that for 10 years (2008–2017) the number of African students rose fourfold from 630 to 2500. The continuing relatively high attractiveness of studies in Poland is motivated by three factors: the competitive cost of studies and living as compared with Western European countries and the US, attractive fields of study and scholarship offers as well as the good reputation of Polish universities, and the international recognition of their diplomas. There is also an observable change in the way of acquiring information on the educational offer in Poland. While an important source of information is still the close family and friends studying in Poland, the importance of the Internet and information to foreign candidates placed  Paweł Średziński, Africa and its people in the Polish media. Report on the Polish media monitoring, (Warszawa: Fundacja Afryka Inaczej, 2016). 49  The public opinion research results on the integration of citizens of African countries in Poland, (Warszawa: Fundacja Afryka Inaczej, 2015). 48

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on the websites of the universities is growing. Symptomatic in this context are the words of a social activist for the African diaspora in Poland, Adeniyi Aderibigbe, who said that the number of students from Africa in Poland was going to increase because Poland was opening up to the African continent, which is manifested in the growing availability of information and increased possibilities of studying in English.50 A new draft policy on migration published in June 2019 will be conducive to the influx of foreign students, including those from Africa, because it highlights the need to intensify efforts to attract foreign students by speeding up and simplifying visa procedures and formalities as well as those concerning residence documents and permits.51 Much less favorable is the situation of economic immigrants from Africa. For many years, they found employment mainly in the trading sector, which was made possible by the “Europe Fair,” which functioned in Warsaw until 2010. Its closure connected with the preparations for the 2012 European Football Championship co-­ hosted by Poland and with the construction of the National Stadium meant the loss of many jobs. Although many Africans living in Poland engage in trade, other businesses are gaining in importance, e.g., catering, sports, or music business. Studies on the African diaspora in Poland show that the main barrier to access to the job market is the lack or poor knowledge of Polish. For that reason, Poland is not seen by economic migrants as an attractive destination country, because they can choose between countries whose languages they use in daily life, such as England or France. An additional difficulty is the inability to find one’s bearings in the new environment, which is compounded by the lack of migrant networks and assistance by those who have overcome such problems. In the case of refugees, a serious obstacle is the lack of documents and, consequently, the inability to confirm their education or qualifications. This prevents many migrants from continuing education and seeking jobs in accordance with their profession. As a result, African immigrants often perform work below their qualifications and capabilities, which translates into low earnings.52 Of great importance in this context are the circumstances of their arrival in Poland. Students and graduates from Polish universities are far more successful in the job market, owing to the qualifications obtained, and can find work in companies where the knowledge of Polish is of secondary importance. The circumstances of arrival also largely determine the socio-economic status of immigrants from Africa. Studies show a great diversity in this respect. African refugees and economic immigrants staying in Poland are divided into two categories.  Pulshr, “During 10  Years the Number of African Students in Poland Increased Four Times,” accessed September 6, 2019, https://www.pulshr.pl/ edukacja/w-10-lat-liczba-studentow-z-afryki-wzrosla-w-polsce-czterokrotnie-potencjal-jestogromny,63947.html 51  Section for Migration, the Ministry of the Interior and Administration’s Migration and Refugees Department, “Poland’s Migration Policy,” Project of June10, 2019. 52  University of Warsaw Institute of Social Policy. “The Integration of Citizens from African Countries,” 18–19. 50

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The first category is persons with stable and legal employment, who have a family and support in the migration of the Polish network. Such persons more often see their future in Poland and decide to seek permanent residence. The second category are persons without a permanent income, who do odd jobs, often below their qualifications, and are alienated and poorly integrated into Polish society. To such persons, Poland is usually a stopover on the way to the Western European countries.53 Despite the unfavorable demographic situation and the high demand for employees in many economic sectors, the draft of Poland’s new migration policy anticipates a selective approach to receiving economic migrants from the countries outside of the EU. It will be based on the constant mechanism of making all decisions on a foreigner’s entry into and stay in Poland’s territory conditional on the position that his/her country of origin occupies in a special list of countries ranked according to the level of risk to Poland’s security. The risk will be estimated based on such criteria as cultural, linguistic, and religious proximity; ties with Poland; the presence of radical, political, or religious movements; internal conflicts and the possibility of transferring them outside; levels of crime, poverty, and epidemiological hazard; and the impact of fundamentalist ideologies on inhabitants.54 Because of the foregoing criteria, there is no doubt that an element of Poland’s new policy towards economic immigrants is to curb the influx of citizens from non-European developing countries, including Sub-Saharan Africa. The low number of African immigrants in Poland prevents building a strong migration network based on informal friendly, family, and descent ties. This gap is partly filled by the formal network made up of immigrant organizations and facilities connected with a given region, e.g., clubs, shops, and restaurants. Although there are many non-governmental organizations in Poland that are concerned with Africa, most of them are oriented towards humanitarian activities in African countries and cultural exchange rather than the integration of Africans living in Poland. This group comprises small associations and foundations promoting good Polish-­ African relations, interested in developing cultural, economic, and tourist cooperation, and involved in overcoming stereotypes of and in assistance to Africans. They are established by Africans themselves or in collaboration with Poles and operate mainly in Poland’s capital, Warsaw, where there is the largest number of African immigrants. The most active are: the Kenyan-Polish Forum (Forum Kenijsko-­ Polskie), European-African Association for Friendship, Cooperation and Development (Europejsko-Afrykańskie Stowarzyszenie Przyjaźni, Współpracy i Rozwoju), Foundation “Africa Another Way” (Fundacja “Afryka Inaczej”), Foundation for Somalia (Fundacja dla Somalii), and the Somali Association in the Republic of Poland (Stowarzyszenie Somalijskie w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej). There are also local committees of African community in the larger cities that seek to intensify the activities of African immigrants in public life and politics and to

 Ibid., 74.  Section for Migration, the Ministry of the Interior and Administration’s Migration and Refugees Department, “Poland’s Migration Policy,” Project of June 10, 2019.

53 54

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integrate them with local communities. Their work focuses on such issues as human rights, employee rights, rights of sports competitors, media coverage of Africa, and acts of racial and ethnic discrimination. Despite the fact that those organizations have operated for a relatively short period, their activity shows a successful integration of African immigrants and the high efficacy of their actions. It should be also stressed that actions for immigrants are one of the many areas of the activities of the committees, in addition to promoting African culture and educational activity. An important factor conducive to the integration of the African community in Poland is the development of the network of restaurants and stores with products from Africa, although it is also largely confined to Poland’s capital.55

Conclusion Its membership in the European Union decidedly changed the way Poland was seen by migrants, but, paradoxically, this did not have a significant effect on the number of immigrants from Africa. Therefore, when trying to answer the initial question of whether Poland is or may become an attractive place to African migrants in the future, it is necessary to distinguish between the perspective of global migration processes and the perspective of an individual person. With the adoption of the first perspective, the answer is obvious. In view of the current migration trends and the “migration complementarity” of Poland (labor shortage, the aging society) and African countries (the high birth rate and high migration potential), Poland is and will be in the future an attractive destination country for African migrants. However, from the perspective of the individual person, the answer is not so obvious. While Poland is and may in the future be an attractive place for African students, this is not the case with economic immigrants, who have limited possibilities of finding jobs without knowing Polish, just as they have poor chances for successful integration and adaptation to living in Poland. In addition, the planned changes in Poland’s migration policy oriented towards attracting foreign economic migrants from specific countries and with specific qualifications will not be conducive to economic migrations from Africa. The attractiveness of studying at Polish universities with small interest at the same time in Poland as a destination country also suggests that it is only a “stopover” to many Africans rather than a place of permanent settlement. Although the arrival in Poland is in many cases the result of a conscious choice (students and economic migrants) or necessity (refugees), it seldom involves the prospect of a longer stay. Poor knowledge of Polish, low qualifications or lack of documents to confirm them, lack of a support network, wrong integration activities, negligible social aid, and most of all the lack of support by the immigration network and weak ties with Polish society influence the decision to leave Poland. And despite the

55

 Danecka and Jaroszewska, “African Immigrants in Poland,” 177–182.

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opinion of many experts and Africans themselves that the influx of immigrants from Africa to Poland will slowly intensify, many of the latter will not see their permanent future in Poland.

Bibliography Afryka org. Afro-PRP (People’s Republic of Poland). The Image of the Africans in the Polish Press Photography 1955–1989, April 19, 2018. http://afryka.org/afro-prl-wizerunek-afrykanow-wpolskiej-fotografii-prasowej-1955-1989/. Accessed 1 Aug 2019. Andrejuk, Katarzyna, and Agnieszka Fihel. 2018. Migrations in Poland between 1989 and 2004. In 25 lectures on migrations, ed. Magdalena Lesińska and Marek Okólski, 197–207. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Scholar. Białas, Tadeusz. 1983. The Maritime and Colonial League 1930–1939. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie. Chilczuk, Michał. 2001. Fifty Years of Educating international Students in Poland. Kontakt 1 (2): 5–18. Codogni, Paulina. 2010. Africans in Warsaw in 1945–1975. In Africa in Warsaw. A History of the African Diaspora on the Vistula, ed. Paweł Średziński and Mamadou Diouf, 114–130. Warszawa: Fundacja Afryka Inaczej. Gajda, Eugeniusz. 1974. Polish Foreign Policy in 1944–1974. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej. Góralski, Władysław. 1981. Poland and Decolonization of Asia and Africa (1946–1979). Przegląd Orientalistyczny 2: 95–154. Górny, Agata, and Marta Kindler. 2018. Foreigners in Poland at the Outset of the 21st Century. In 25 Lectures on Migrations, ed. Magdalena Lesińska and Marek Okólski, 221–234. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Scholar. Jerzy, Prokopczuk. 1969. Poland’s Economic and Political Cooperation with Developing Countries. Sprawy Międzynarodowe 7–8: 49–60. Komorowski, Zygmunt. 1971. Poland’s Participation in the Formation of African Personnel and in Scientific Research Conducted in this Domain. Africana Bulletin 15: 135–142. Kuczyński, Maciej. 2003. Refugees and the Refugee System in Poland. In Europe  – Poland  –Migration, ed. Sebastian Wojciechowski and Radosław Fiedler, 67–78. Poznań: Wydawnictwo UAM. Łazowski, Zygmunt, ed. 2004. Poland’s Relations with West Africa. Warszawa: Dialog. Lesińska, Magdalena, and Maciej Duszczyk. 2018. Migration Policy. In 25 Lectures on Migrations, ed. Magdalena Lesińska and Marek Okólski, 251–264. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Scholar. Łodziński, Sławomir. 1999. Foreign Residents. The Prospects of Policies towards Immigrants in Poland. In To the Table of the Wealthy. Migration Movements in Africa and Their Significance to Poland, ed. Sławomir Łodziński and Jan J. Milewski, 173–212. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Wydziału Geografii i Studiów Regionalnych UW. Łodziński, Sławomir, and Jan J.  Milewski, eds. 1999. To the Table of the Wealthy. Migration Movements in Africa and Their Significance to Poland. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Wydziału Geografii i Studiów Regionalnych UW. Danecka, Marta and Emilia Jaroszewska. 2013. African Immigrants in Poland. A Contribution to the Analysis of Factors that Block Their Inflow and Integration. Kultura i Społeczeństwo 3: 157–184. Nowicka, Ewa, and Sławomir Łodziński. 2003. Change or Stability. The Poles towards Themselves and Others in the Nineties. In Europe – Poland – Migration, ed. Sebastian Wojciechowski and Radosław Fiedler, 13–24. Poznań: Wydawnictwo UAM.

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Office for Foreigners. Statistics. https://migracje.gov.pl/statystyki/zakres/polska/typ/dokumenty/ widok/tabele/typDokumentu/18/rok/2019/. Accessed 6 Sept 2019. Pałyga, Edward. 1981. The Development of Diplomatic Relations with African States. Przegląd Orientalistyczny 2: 149–153. Pędziwiatr, Konrad. 2015. Immigrants in Poland and Immigration Challenges. Indos 1 (184)., Biuro Analiz Sejmowych: 1–2. Popławski, Błażej. 2012. A History of A Certain Association. On the Beginnings of the Activity of the Polish-African Society in Warsaw. In Foreigners in Warsaw in 1945–1989, ed. Patryk Pleskota, 189–202. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IPN. Pulshr. During 10 Years the Number of African Students in Poland Increased Four Times. https:// www.pulshr.pl/edukacja/w-10-lat-liczba-studentow-z-afryki-wzrosla-w-polsce-czterokrotniepotencjal-jest-ogromny,63947.html. Accessed 6 Sept 2019. Section for Migration, the Ministry of the Interior and Administration’s Migration and Refugees Department, “Poland’s Migration Policy,” Project of June 10, 2019. Średziński, Paweł. 2016. Africa and its people in the Polish media. Report on the Polish media monitoring. Warszawa: Fundacja Afryka Inaczej. Średziński, Paweł, and Mamadou Diouf, eds. 2010. Africa in Warsaw. A History of the African Diaspora on the Vistula. Warszawa: Fundacja Afryka inaczej. Starzyk, Kazimierz. 1965. Advanced Course in Planning for Economists from Underdeveloped Countries. Africana Bulletin no. (2). Stola, Dariusz. 2010. A Country with No Way Out? Migrations from Poland in 1949–1989. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IPN. Szczepanik, Krzysztof, et al., eds. 2010. Poland’s Diplomatic Relations. A Guide. Vol. 4: Africa and the Near East. Warszawa: Akson. Szonert, Marek. 1999. The Activity for Refugees by the Migration and Refugees Department of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration. In To the Table of the Wealthy. Migration Movements in Africa and Their Significance to Poland, ed. Sławomir Łodziński and Jan J.  Milewski, 213–223. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Wydziału Geografii i Studiów Regionalnych UW. Szymański, Bogusław. 2004. Education of Africans in Poland. In Poland’s Relations with West Africa, ed. Zygmunt Łazowski, 115–118. Warsaw: Dialog Publishing House. The public opinion research results on the integration of citizens of African countries in Poland. Warszawa: Fundacja Afryka Inaczej, 2015. University of Warsaw Institute of Social Policy. 2013. The Integration of Citizens from African Countries in Poland in Light of Qualitative Studies. Final Report on Statutory Research 2012. Warszawa. Waliński, Grzegorz. 2001. Scholarship Programs of the Polish National Commission for UNESCO. Kontakt 3–4: 12–16. Wittels, Krzysztof. 2010a. The Maritime and Colonial League in Warsaw. In Africa in Warsaw. A History of the African Diaspora on the Vistula, ed. Paweł Średziński and Mamadou Diouf, 85–96. Warszawa: Fundacja Afryka Inaczej. ———. 2010b. Africans in Warsaw between the Wars. In Africa in Warsaw. A History of the African Diaspora on the Vistula, ed. Paweł Średziński and Mamadou Diouf, 47–60. Warszawa: Fundacja Afryka inaczej. ———. 2010c. The Beginnings of the African Diaspora on the Vistula. In Africa in Warsaw. A History of the African Diaspora on the Vistula, ed. Paweł Średziński and Mamadou Diouf, 13–32. Warszawa: Fundacja Afryka inaczej. Ząbek, Maciej. 1999. Contemporary Migration s in Africa. In To the Table of the Wealthy. Migration Movements in Africa and Their Significance to Poland, ed. Sławomir Łodziński and Jan J.  Milewski, 70–122. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Wydziału Geografii i Studiów Regionalnych UW. ———. 2004. Citizens of African Countries in Poland. In Poland’s Relations with West Africa, ed. Zygmunt Łazowski, 108–114. Warszawa: Dialog.

Chapter 7

Globalizing Forces on Migration? A Dual Process Franco Tomassoni and Pedro Ponte e Sousa

Introduction Migration and populational flows occupy the center of the public debate. Migratory flows are also connected with the idea of globalization. Within the European Union (EU), the migration debate divides public opinion and political parties. During the summer of 2015, Europe faced a big influx of migrants, especially from Africa and Middle Eastern countries. Nevertheless, the globalization–migration nexus is still not clear. Its impact upon the political geography of the EU is particularly unclear. What we argue in this chapter is that the rationality that lies beyond this political geography is the same that governs the globalization process. Highlighting the main critical point of this geography and analyzing to which extent it addressed migration flows, we propose an operational concept of globalization by stretching those rationalities that govern it. Thus, while the relationship between globalization and the EU results in a political geography that is very far from being flat, as many intendments over globalization often state, its migration nexus could be grasped only within its performativity over the political landscape. This dual process encompasses those globalizing forces that displace different degrees of sovereignty over and beyond the EU borders, and how it molds a globalized migration process due to the same rationality that governs globalization. How can  one define the relationship between migration and globalization? Which form does the nation-state take within this relationship? We argue that the globalization process incorporates its very opposite; paradoxically, the more globalization expands itself, the stronger are those tendencies that push for fragmentation or a step back from (and within) the global governance mechanisms. Just to provide an example, while China’s economic growth and the increase in its geopolitical power is an effect of the globalization process, within the traditional leaders of this F. Tomassoni · P. Ponte e Sousa (*) Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. Abegunrin, S. O. Abidde (eds.), African Migrants and the Refugee Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56642-5_7

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last wave of globalization (the USA and Western Europe), those pursuing unilateralism and isolationism emerge strengthened. In some cases, like the USA under Trump presidency or Italy under the coalition government formed by Lega and the Five Stars Movement, those tendencies become hegemonic, as they can define governmental agendas and push (or even succeed in the) withdrawal from global agreements, like the USA on climate and environment signed in Paris in 2015. Migration is the field where these two opposite tendencies are particularly evident, and it may offer the opportunity to grasp larger tendencies that encompass globalization and the nation-state. Through the case of Southern Europe, we suggest that: first, along the globalization process, nation-state’s functions have been reorganized in different ways, one of which is its mediation role between globalization and migration; second, this mediation role is different on a case-by-case basis. Three main factors determine each case: the geopolitical, cultural, and economic contexts of each country. We find that the point of view of Southern Europe – our case study – offers some advantages to reflect on the mediation role of the nation-state. Concretely, countries such as Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain, are at the same time the frontiers of Europe and its outpost. Along the borders of these countries, the delimitation between Europe, the EU, and what stands outside are overlapped. These delimitations shape different political areas from which a repertoire of political sovereignties emerges. The lack of consensus on economic policy, defense policy, and foreign policy, within the EU, makes clear that the nation-state does still exist and plays an important role, although, at the same time, sovereignty is shaped by globalization. This is directly linked to our third point: the importance of migration in remaking the nation-state, which concerns the organization of state bureaucracy. Those state institutions traditionally dedicated to managing internal affairs are called to intervene on foreign policy, overtaking the importance of those traditional bureaucracies, like the ministries of foreign affairs. At the same time, dealing with globalization means dealing with citizenship policies and human rights, whose matrix stands outside the borders of the nation-state, but which concrete actuation depends on the state machine. Thus, from the point of view of migration, globalization (re)enforces the territorial governance. As a consequence, from southern Europe, migration seems like a phenomenon that reorganizes not only the functions of the nation-state but also reshapes the EU integration process, while rearticulating the relationship between centralized sovereignty, its external projection, and the local powers. Our take on geography, spatiality, and temporality, in the way that the rationale of globalization matches political geography of Europe and its migration politics/ policy, comes not from a “space of flows” or “non-places” but from that of “places.” Rather than the ahistorical or timeless assessment of phenomena and practices, we argue that “these spaces occupied a historical present that was part of a longer trajectory of change and development,” that time and space have an evolving context and construction. Thus, the political geography of Europe is constructed by the production of space on the ground; in other words, it cannot be disconnected from the concrete geopolitical, cultural, and economic contexts that account for it. In

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short, this global space faces a compression of both time and space, but the different processes of that compression led to the political landscape of the present, rather than simply focusing on flows and mobilities. These exist in and are facilitated (or constrained) by a larger context that explains them, and at the same time, that very context can be more easily understood when looking into a more specific group of flows and mobilities, such as that of contemporary migration in Southern Europe.

Fear and Migration: A Political Geography of Europe Within the realm of theory, a clear understanding of the globalization–migration link is hard to grasp, and generally, it aims only to a partial perspective. Hence, theories should be used as a picklock to open problems within a specific object. To introduce a concrete description and analysis of the architecture of the European Union (EU) and provide a provocative insight to the issue, we suggest a quotation from a manual for the public debates elaborated for the candidates of one of the most successful political parties in Italy: the Five Stars Movement (M5S). Prepared by Gian Roberto Casaleggio, the eminence grise of the Movement, as a guide for the participants of M5S to talk shows and public debates, the manual states that: “Migration inspires emotions. Primarily fear and anger. On TV, explaining agreements or solutions more or less realistic is useless. People are in the grip of emotions; we cannot expect them to follow any rationality. Let’s give vent to anger and fear.”1 We totally reject the distance between a deep investigation and the superinfection of the public discourse highlighted by the quotation, usually linked with an apology of ignorance and the exploitation of feelings and emotions, as described in that quote. However, we can draw from it a preliminary question: Which is the effect of the EU political geography and its migration policies within those dimensions of anger and fear? Which relationship does it have with globalization? Looking for an answer to these questions, we find the first insight of our argument: the globalization process as a dialectic process brings within itself its very negation, not as a pure dialectical product, but because, as we will see, the globalization process has not been global enough, but rather has reorganized the borders of Europe. Since the EU southern states represent a “classical” in-between condition, they display a paradox; within them, this condition comes together with full sovereignty recognized by the international community and affirmed through the regional integration process. Furthermore, this “in-between” condition sometimes is considered as a whip hand, but mostly as a plight. This is quite evident through the focus on what has been called the refugee crisis – the italic underline that there is no neutrality in the adoption of that significant – and its impact on EU politics and policy. This crisis is coupled with the sovereign debt  crisis and confirms the identity of EU

1  Giuliano Da Empoli, Gli ingegneri del caos: teoria e tecnica dell’Internazionale populista (Venezia: Marsilio, 2019), 124.

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southern countries as Europe’s “others within.” Indeed, despite the differences among them – despite its economic instability, Italy is still the third biggest economy of the eurozone, while Greece and Portugal sit on the least positions of this ranking – they all fit the definition of semi-periphery states. Central and marginal, their political systems and their participation within the international community (including the defense and military sector), as well as their economic organization, are inextricable from the west. Their crisis has an impact on the continental integration process, but this latter increases their internal instability and shapes border politics. The Iberian countries are directly connected with the north–western African countries, one of the main entrance gates for those migrants that trail the Sub-­ Saharan route. While Portugal faces the Atlantic and is not bathed by the Mediterranean Sea, Spain is directly linked with Morocco, not only for the country’s geographical proximity but especially for its colonial relation, formally ended in the 1950s. The European borders’ governance, thus, uses those countries as filters, by operating a selective entrance policy. Perhaps, it is not therefore superfluous to draw the attention to the colonial heritage of these countries. Spain represents a destination for those migrants who share the Spanish language, mainly South American migrants. Portugal also hosts citizens from Brazil and those from its former African colonies, such as Angola and Mozambique. Also, in this case, the existence of a common language influences directly the migrant flux. Not only language but a broader network, composed by family legacies, economic (formal and informal) circuits, solidarity associations, and the already mentioned shared colonial past, also influences the migrant flux. Italy shows a deep singularity. The country stands in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea and represents a bridge between Western and Eastern Europe. In the north, it borders with northern–central Europe, and its eastern side faces the former Yugoslavian countries, the Balkans – an area which previously belonged to the Eastern Bloc and even before to the Ottoman Empire. The Italian Adriatic Sea coast is “shared” with different states. Among them are Montenegro, Bosnia-­ Herzegovina, and Albania which are EU candidates and are about to implement EU legislation in their national juridical system. The Balkan route, as the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) states, has been one of the main migratory paths into Europe during the refugee crisis of 2015. Most of the migrants influx tried to get directly to central Europe, but an important part attempted to cross the Adriatic Sea, rediscovering an old route, previously famous for the migration from Albania to Italy during the 90s.2 However, it is the southern side of Italy that represents one of the hottest EU borders. The southernmost Italian border, thus also a European one, is the island of Lampedusa, which is situated just 167 km from the Tunisian coast and 355 km from Tripoli, Libya. The two Northern African countries are also the main terminal of the Sub-Saharan routes, and Italy is the first “safe 2  There is substantial documentation regarding those routes; among it, we suggest the documentary La nave dolce, relating the history of 1992 shipment between the Durazzo (Albania) port to Italy, of more than 15.000 migrants in a single boat.

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country” – an expression in international law that regulates asylum rights3 – migrants sail to. Italy is the entrance gate to the EU, but at the same time, its Mediterranean position turns it in the European safeguard and filter. Due to those social and political upheavals known as the Arab Spring, throughout Northern African countries, but also in Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen, the Middle East and Northern African region have changed its face. New regimes and political authorities emerged from those experiences. While the consolidation of new geopolitical stability, that has to be achieved in combination with the guarantee of social and human rights, seems far to come, two main consequences have already emerged. With the overthrow of Ghaddafi by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) hand, a new agreement between the EU and the new Libyan Government has been signed. Nonetheless, the frailness of the infrastructural power of the Libyan state is well expressed by the disputed sovereignty over its territory. A second consequence arises from the turbulent situation in Turkey and its relationship with the southeastern countries with whom it shares a border. As a European external gatekeeper, Turkey stands ahead of a migration route from Asia and Middle East countries. From here, there are two ways for migration to flow through: first, the already known Balkan routes; second, the route that passes through the easternmost Greek islands. Like Italy, Greece is a peculiar country within this political geography. The country has been through the most dramatic debt crisis within the eurozone and had the tragic explosion of the refugee crisis during the summer of 2015. Greece is the meeting point of three regions: the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, and Southern Europe. No country could be categorized as an in-between more than Greece, not properly western, but of course European; Christian, but not Catholic neither Protestant; and part of an Islamic and multi-ethnic empire for many centuries. Due to the Cyprus issue and to agreements with Turkey in the first decades of the twentieth century, Greek regional politics has been constantly turbulent, and to tensions with Turkey, we should add also the refugee crisis. Greece, like Italy, represented the eastern frontier of the world that the Cold War made, the same frontier that ideally the project of the EU should have dissipated. Concerning migration, these general geographical coordinates should be understood within a deeper consideration of the political history of the European integration process. The traditional account on the EU integration process usually starts with the Marshall Plan, a recovery plan designed after WWII in Washington which subordinates USA loans to a common effort of coordination among those European countries’ beneficiaries of that loans. A further passage was the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. In 1957, the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community and approved four principles of freedom in mobility: of capital, goods, people, and services. It is difficult to argue if this integration process has been inter-governmental rather than supra-national, or both, but an easing on national border controls has only been agreed to in 1985 at 3  María-Teresa Gil-Bazo, “The Safe Third Country Concept in International Agreements on Refugee Protection Assessing State Practice,” Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 33, no. 1 (March 2015): 42–77, https://doi.org/10.1177/016934411503300104

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Schengen (Luxembourg), among French, German, and the Benelux countries. This treaty has been extended to other countries, and now encompasses 22 states among those 28 members of the EU.4 This expansion is better understood in combination with those EU policies that regulate migration. In June 1990 in Dublin, in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the European Community statesmen signed an agreement to regulate the external arrivals. Due to a proposal formulated by the French and British delegations, the responsibility to accept or reject migrants and refugees, and for processing asylum seekers, rests with the State through which the migrant first joins European Community territory. This Dublin agreement has been modified first in 2003 and later in 2013. With the Dublin Convention, the Schengen Area is encompassed by a vigilant ring of surveillance exerted by the entrance/border states and equipped with a rapid intervention force, a European border force known as FRONTEX. Thus, the European political geography meets the EU integration process and results in an articulated scenario, composed by different groups. First is the group of those 22 states which are Schengen members. Inside this group is where the principle of the freedom mobility for people is further accomplished. Nonetheless, the free-movement law is only applied to EU citizens but not to those migrants that legally reside in an EU country. Here, we find a double policy because these “legal migrants” do not enjoy the transferability rights of employment and residency, valid for European citizens. Second, it is possible to find another division among those states which are part of the EU but not of Schengen. On one hand, we find Ireland and the United Kingdom, which show that the principle of free movement of people is not an unconditional value, a principle of European integration. The same could not be argued for those states, such as Romania and Bulgaria, which are in the process to join the Schengen area. On the other hand, we find states that, despite not being EU member states, are encompassed by the EU free-movement law. Schengen Area, thus, extends beyond the EU borders to countries like Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland. Thus, a non-EU citizen from these countries enjoys the right to freedom movement which an EU citizen from Cyprus or Romania, just to give an example, cannot enjoy. In other words, these northern periphery states are treated as more European than a southern or eastern EU member. Finally, there is the group of those European states which are neither EU members nor part of the Schengen area: five Balkan countries and former Soviet countries, such as Russia or Ukraine. This last heterogeneous group shows that if the ideal of the EU integration process was to overthrow national borders, it has moved more to the direction of a continental heparinization and has, in some measure, reproduced the distinction between Western and Eastern Europe, something that echoes Cold War times. This political geography has been deeply impacted by the refugee crisis of 2015. The Dublin Convention failed to organize an EU system for asylum seekers. As stipulated by this convention, a refugee must submit the request to the entrance

4  In total, the Schengen agreement currently includes 26 countries, with four of those countries not being members of the EU.

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country and remain there until its examination. Kouvelakis describes the process in the following manner: “Failing this, the applicant is liable to be returned to that country, or ‘Dublinized’, so becoming an outcast shunted from one country to another, according to procedures essentially designed to forestall ‘asylum shopping’, as EU officials cynically term it—choosing the most lenient state in which to lodge their claim—let alone any appeal to the asylum rights guaranteed by the European Convention.”5

Due to the pressure of migration, which increased as a consequence of different geopolitical earthquakes, such as the Arab Spring, Europe developed a reallocation mechanism and enhanced the southern border states’ detention and reception capacity – especially Greece, Italy, and Spain. “A border-control device,” argues Giuseppe Campesi,6 for “those entering EU territory are caught in a social sorting apparatus that, while allowing limited possibilities of movement to some, trap others in an archipelago of detention and reception facilities at Europe’s territorial edges.” Here, we can find a concrete use for those feelings of fear and anger that the eminence grise of the Italian M5S wrote down in its manual. Instead of regulating fluxes, the main national policy went towards expanding detention capacity and further in the assimilation of migrants, asylum seekers or economic migrant, to the semantic camp of illegal. It is now clearer how southern EU countries developed within the unilinear European geography. They play the role of buffer states, filtering migration fluxes for the rest of the European northern countries. However, even more important is to recognize the manifestation of two contradictory movements. Generally, these geopolitical dynamics are the responsibility of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Opposite to this “tradition,” in this case, migration exploded within the political stage of each EU member state. Thus, alongside this brief reconstruction, it is possible to also trace those developments that transformed an international issue in a matter restricted to the internal political agenda of the nation-state. To this extent, it is possible to underline the entrance of the ministries of the internal/home affairs within the stage of international politics. Globalization and migration, thus, entered the national borders, but at the same time, those borders, far from being overthrown, have been redesigned. Here, we made clear how the EU political geography addressed migration. Prior to that, it is convenient to draw our attention to two decisive aspects. First, it is important to refer to the operative character of this EU political geography. In other words, it is important to understand how those agreements and missions of borders surveillance, which involve the EU, its southern states, and the neighboring states, work. Second, after having described to which extent EU geography molded migration, it is important to trace the opposite dynamics: how the globalization process shaped EU policies towards migration.

 Stathis Kouvelakis, “Borderland,” New Left Review, no. 110 (2018): 5–33.  Giuseppe Campesi, “Seeking Asylum in Times of Crisis: Reception, Confinement and Detention at Europe’s Southern Border,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 37, no. 1 (2018): 69. 5 6

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 U and Gatekeeper States: The Mediterranean Sea E and the Sovereignty Expanded European borders are thus hypercritical as well as unilinear. They are not simple lines through which different sovereignties are separated. Its border does not work just to exclude migrants but are semipermeable and designed to be mobile. It is exactly this elasticity that could be a metaphor for globalization. Yet, if there is some level of difficulty on globalization theory to grasp migration as a phenomenon, it arises from their inability in understanding concrete policies. Indeed, far to be a homogenization process, globalization is contentious and disputed. The mechanism that governs EU elastic borders operates in agreement with other states, and it explains its mobile sovereignty. Again, through this elasticity, it is possible to grasp the importance that domestic politics hold in addressing foreign policy orientation. The vigilant ring and buffer states internal to the EU borders face other countries which, in compacts with the EU power, engage the same functions. The two main gatekeepers have already been mentioned: Turkey and Libya. In 2008, to contain immigration, Berlusconi – Italian Prime Minister at that time – led the European negotiation with the Libyan Government, which accepted and silenced the network of the detention center in Libya soil and allow Italy to return migrants to their country. With the new Libyan regime, in the aftermath of NATO’s military intervention in 2011, a new agreement with the EU was achieved. It consolidated these detention centers, with support of the EU, which have been integrated within the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM), which was under the formal control of the Ministry of the Interior. The EU’s Valletta Summit on the migration of 2015 – during the hardest day of what has been called the refugee crisis – agreed to fund DCIM as well as the Libyan Coast Guard, to scare off migrant boats. Noteworthy is that both, the DCIM’s detention camps and Libyan Coast Guard, where factually managed by local militias.7 Thus, migrant traffickers became a recognized political authority due to the double action of NATO and the EU. What is interesting is to underline that also in this case a concrete international agreement has been made under the flag of Italian internal security. Nevertheless, the most evident case of the disruption effect of this military offensive is the case of the Middle East, with consequences that have been concentrated upon the European elastic border between Greece and Turkey. There is no need to go back to European colonial domination over Middle Eastern countries. It is sufficient to recall the invasion of Afghanistan and the attempt to break up Iraq and Syria. The migration of an important part of the population – we should remark that just a small part of it tries to get to Europe – is a consequence of this attempt. In 2015, there was a convergence of geopolitical factors within this region which led 7  Nello Scavo, “Trattativa nascosta. Il viaggio del boss in Italia: Bija visitò altri centri migranti.” Avvenire, October  5th 2019, https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/Pagine/il-giallo-del-negoziato-segreto-migranti-libia-trafficanti?fbclid=IwAR01UWRJlBck4ey4UyJdOnlmC59jHSWdUiZVHqB2 sdAwjzcDJPjmzptXFDg

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to a mass exodus; over spring and summer that year, the Syrian army was losing terrain, but there was a reversal of fortune after the Russians entered the conflict.8 Greece is the outpost of the southeastern EU flank. Since this position, its role has been determinant for the negotiation of the EU–Turkey agreement of 2016. Both Turkey and Greece, as has been said, are on a key point of the “Balkan route.” From autumn of 2015, the countries along this path into EU began to close the border, in accordance with the Austrian Government and with some members of the German Government opposing to the Merkel’s open-door policy and finally due to the pressure of the countries of the Visegrad group – Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. However, this route has been definitively closed with the EU– Turkey agreement in March 2016. Greece territory became an open detention camp, with refugees held in the Greek’s nearest island to Turkey. The Alexis Tsipras government saluted it with relief. Indeed, Turkey agreed to prevent “illegal” crossing from its coast, but Erdogan took back €3 bn to boost the settlement of refugees within Turkish’ borders, a new round of negotiation for the EU accession process, and the promise to lift EU visa restrictions to Turkish citizens.9 This agreement led to a mass rejection of migrants. Both agreements, the Libyan and the Turkish one, signed by the EU, highlight an expansion of the EU sovereignty. A clear hierarchy emerges; there is a core, represented by the center–western European countries, then there is a ring of EU member states, which accomplish the surveillance function, and finally, there are the buffer states, Turkey and Libya, which ensure detention, and work as a first filter for the migration flux. However, this mechanism has not been conceived to erect impermeable frontiers or to keep impossible migrant crossings. Rather, it has been implemented to decide which route migrants could trail and to determine its temporality.

8  It is also important to mention the geopolitical situation on Iraq and Afghanistan during 2014, marked by the drawdown of the western military forces in Afghanistan due to their inability to keep its ground and the resumed bombing over Iraq, after the USA lost Ambar and Mosul to ISIS. 9  European Commission - Press release, “European Commission opens way for decision by June on visa-free travel for citizens of Turkey,” May 4th 2016, https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ IP-16-1622_en.htm. See also: Jennifer Rankin, “European commission set to approve Turkish citizens’ visa-free travel,” The Guardian, May 3rd 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/ may/03/european-commission-turkish-citizens-visa-free-travel-schengen; “Migrant crisis: EU-Turkey deal comes into effect,” BBC News, March 20th 2016. https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-35854413

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 lobalization, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs’ G Competencies, and the Internationalization of Other Ministries The statement that globalization has somewhat changed the nation-state is so much repeated, as it remains unexplored. Nevertheless, this is true to both structure and content, form and substance, which can most accurately be seen in specific issues, their rise in the agendas or the change in ownership by political, administrative, or bureaucratic actors. We argue that, with the process of globalization, the internationalization of public policies led to traditionally domestic policies (and those that promote/manage such issues) gain greater traction in international political arenas – as is the case of migration, but also those issues usually perceived as the realm of other state’s activity are increasing concerns for other states, and activity on many of those issues requires indeed the state machine (such as citizenship policies or the promotion of human rights). Thus, globalization also creates incentives towards (re) enforcing territorial governance. Foreign policy and diplomacy changed, regarding its main actors and arenas where they are developed, due to globalization. First, the rise of interconnections and the realization that public policy is not only local or national led to the dissemination of international relations’ departments in virtually every ministry to deal with their increased international activities. This is caused by the slow but steady rise of global policy and transnational administration10 but, more importantly, to the rise of cooperation, sharing best practices, and coordination. While this is true for all countries, it is particularly relevant for those involved in regional integration processes, such as the EU. This has led to a greater level of participation by the Prime Minister’s cabinets in foreign policy, taking into account the need for coordinating different governance areas, a role which the Ministries of Foreign Affairs could not fully carry out. Also, the explosion of issues perceived as transnational/international, in their scope or impact, led to an enormous rise of summits with heads of state and/or governments, in short, the so-called summit diplomacy.11 This has led to traditionally internal, domestic public policies being increasingly considered as international, as having to be dealt with in a higher arena. This gave   Kim Moloney & Diane Stone, “Beyond the State: Global Policy and Transnational Administration,” International Review of Public Policy 1, no. 1 (2019): 104–118. 11  Iver B. Neumann, Foreign Policy in an Age of Globalization, in Theorizing Foreign Policy in a Globalized World, eds. Gunther Hellmann & Knud Erik Jørgensen (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 45–57. Neumann also states that: “Globalization is characterized by a proliferation in the number of and kinds of agents that are pertinent to the making of foreign policy. (…) The work of the state’s diplomats increasingly involves mediating between a wider slate of agents (…). Diplomats used to mediate across state boundaries but are now increasingly mediating across a plethora of different social and political boundaries. The domestic/foreign distinction is a correlate of state boundaries. If then state boundaries are relativized, so too is the domestic/foreign distinction. The distinction is increasingly hard to uphold, and it is becoming less relevant in an increasing number of contexts.” Neumann, “Foreign Policy,” 51. 10

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such issues a greater platform and visibility, which had a smaller level on strictly domestic politics, and gave rise to new narratives and perceptions of these phenomena. Returning to the case of migration, internal/home affairs ministries have now an international dimension, overstepping on the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and discussing these issues with little to no coordination with those. Thus, they have gained a seat in international politics. The same could be said for threats and risks, as these are increasingly non-military (in other words, not a state or group of states threatening the territorial integrity of another); ministries of internal/home affairs have also overtaken ministries of defense in dealing with such threats and risks, which are regularly more transnational than before, but also less state-led. The EU itself has fostered this process12 in creating regular coordination meetings, between both national civil servants and political actors in specific policy areas, and has propelled them to “go international” as a way to garner knowledge, stage, and even pressure on other political actors at home (and thus, gain a greater political stage there as well, having as consequence a greater politicization of that issue). Yet, globalization also means dealing with inherently international issues, such as citizenship policies or (the promotion of) human rights. Traditionally perceived as occurring outside the state’s borders, these were perceived as being the affairs of another sovereign state, and thus, intervening in any shape or form was seen as an unlawful, illegitimate, and best-avoided intromission into the policy and politics of that state. However, that also changed; citizenship policies in themselves are largely about how a person may acquire or lose citizenship of one country, and the issue of (the integration of) migrants, refugees (under the refugee crisis), and the rising statelessness due to gaps in nationality laws has led to the realization that, while these issues are international, they require concrete actuation on the state machine to be dealt with. The same goes for human rights and migrants and refugees, which the entire strategy of buffer states and detention camps, with limited to no response to the local militia and organized groups, attention, or interest in human rights. As we have described above, a number of international agreements in this field have been achieved led or promoted (almost exclusively) by internal home/affairs

 Spence explains how diplomatic activity in the EU has changed under globalization, where technical domestic policy has surpassed the ministries for foreign affairs traditional action: “National diplomats in bilateral missions within the EU [European Union] are often outflanked by international departments of domestic lead ministries. The diplomatic systems of the member states have gradually been attuned to match the fact that foreign policy between the member states is no longer about ‘high’ politics, but rather encompasses the wide gamut of policy-making traditionally falling under the category of domestic or ‘low’ politics. The subject matter of bilateral diplomacy in the EU is now decidedly ‘domestic;’ and it is certainly not the bureaucratic property of diplomats. National diplomats in the EU now only co-decide with domestic ministries. They may provide formal coordination of domestic policy inputs to EU policy, but the detailed policy process is technical, and thus escapes them. In addition, final decisions are taken in a European mould and with the cooperation of officials working for the EU institutions”. David Spence, “EU Governance and Global Governance: New Roles for EU Diplomats”, in Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?., eds. Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking and William Maley (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 65

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ministries. There is also the case of “hot returns”13 which are a hallmark example of a state acting in violation of European regulations and international law, and for which Spain was seriously criticized.14 The cases of Greece as an open detention camp (in a part of its territory), the relief for the EU–Turkey agreement, and the developments of Italy (plus EU)–Libya agreement, provided above (see the previous section), are clear examples of the internationalization of internal/home affairs ministries, how the EU propelled their (individual) action and validated it and how globalization means not only the internationalization of migration but also (re) nationalizing its response. In short, globalization changes political action and policy reach, and that is particularly visible in the field of migration. It somewhat changes the nation-state and its sovereignty, which do not disappear under global politics; it reorganizes state bureaucracy, the mission and action of ministries and agencies, their arenas, and some specifics in their agendas. Thus, globalization not only promotes a broad deterritorialization but also reinforces territorial governance on migration. The “territorial boundedness of nation-states”15 did not disappear; while it was changed by cross-border mobility and facilitated by globalization, it remains a relevant feature of international politics, and it even gained further traction regarding phenomena which are not easily (or in dealt in the interest of that government/state) managed and dealt with, due to inability/incapacity of other states, the higher mobility under a global landscape, or the inefficacy of regional/continental/global agreements. As we concluded above, this leads to a greater role of those ministries responsible for such issues (namely, internal/home affairs ministries), domestically and abroad; more independent action and both the ability to reach international agreements and to act countering European or international law are increased, alongside a very strengthened role in political discourse.

 “The term “hot returns” refers to the illegal expulsion of persons on the spot and without carrying out the legally established procedures or meeting the international obligations.” Margarita Martínez Escamilla et al., “‘Hot Returns’: When the State Acts outside The Law – A legal report,” June 27th 2014, https://eprints.ucm.es/27221/1/HOT%20RETURNS.%20WHEN%20DE%20STATE%20 ACTS%20OUTSIDE%20THE%20LAW.%20Legal%20report.pdf, p. 1. 14  Escamilla et  al., “‘Hot Returns’. See also: María Martín, “La ONU reprende a España por devolver en caliente a un menor,” El País, February 19th 2019, https://elpais.com/politica/2019/02/18/actualidad/1550518864_545088.html 15  Catherine Wihtol de Wenden. “Globalization and International Migration Governance.” IMIS Beiträge, no. 42 (2012): 75. 13

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 lobalization, Logistics and New Form of Capitalist G Organization: A New Insight towards Globalization– Migration Link The thread of this reasoning started with the description of the European political geography, then has focused on how the integration process molded and configurated it, further we have seen its attitude towards migration fluxes, and finally we have shown the concreteness of this policy, underlining its operational character. We have briefly highlighted that alongside this process, it is possible to identify the internationalization of matters of the domestic public policy, as well as its opposite: the nationalization of international dynamics. Before turning to this point, it is probably important to stress another issue: to which extent has globalization defined the EU attitude towards migration? To answer this, it is important to reformulate our common understanding of globalization. As stated in the introduction, more than underline limits within those theories of globalization that seem to encounter difficulties in grasping migration as a phenomenon or to those sociological approaches on migration which offer just a partial understanding over globalization, we state that globalization is a useful category only if we treat it as a processual one. It is through this angle that we put forward the proposal to perceive the globalizing forces of migration as a dual process. Concretely, the big issue of globalization has been covered for not less than 30 years, the center of sociological and political debates, within academic circles as well as in mass media. It is commonplace that globalization and fluxes are linked; so common that, as we have seen, the EU itself stated as its foundational program increasing freedom influxes of capital, goods, people, and services. At the same time, it is exactly on fluxes that misunderstandings have arisen. To view globalization as an operational category and couple it with those recent approaches on logistics rids us of this misinterpretation. Logistics also ascertain the centrality of fluxes, but under its lens, there is the rootedness of fluxes, their articulation, and their channels that trail the world. In other words, those fluxes produced geographies far from being flat, and EU political geography, thus, is a reaction to this rationality. We could preliminarily state that there could be a vast repertoire of combinations between state sovereignty and this logistics of globalization. The EU, for example, shows a variety of these possible combinations. On one hand, we find that the sovereign state is still in power to define which foreign citizen is accepted, and who is not. But at the same time, this filtering mechanism works only within an expansive process of EU sovereignty within its member states, and beyond its borders. On the other hand, we could not underestimate the friction between the rationality of globalization and the form of a sovereign state. These frictions, again, emerge with great emphasis if we focus on migration fluxes and human mobility, but the circulation of goods and services are not immune to these tensions. Thinking logistically, we argue that the semi-permeability of the EU borders, the buffer zones created through the expansion of its sovereignty, and its hierarchization encounter globalization exactly within the rationality that logistics create. Let’s

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move our attention, just for a while, to the logistical rationality proper of food delivery services. This rationality implies the delivery of food due to a mechanism defined by the two keywords: just-in-time and to-the-point. The general function of the EU political geography created similar rationality. By defining quotas of migrants and refugees, by “storing” migrants within buffer zones, and by activating its border-control device – just to recall the expression used by Campesi –, the EU is ready to encounter this logistical rationality. Indeed, if we look at that field of studies collected under the title of migration management, we find out that from it an ideal type of migration flux emerges. It is a flux that temporality corresponds as more as possible to the needs arisen from the political economy of the hosting society, and which geographical direction is logistically addressed.16 This temporality and spatiality correspond, thus, to a migration just-in-time – where time is accorded with a customer need or a hosting society – and to-the-point – delivery food where the customer wants or allows a migration flux to one direction rather than another. It is possible to recognize, thus, that this rationality, incorporated within the EU political geography, matches delivery rationality of migration, which would be simply unthinkable without a mobility structure of border and frontier mechanism.17 We can now continue to weave our argument. As we have said, this rationality is in friction with the so-called sovereigntist. The claim of the Visegrad group that led to sealing down the Balkan route is a concrete example of these tensions. Thus, we find that this tension between globalization and nation-state, which we have stressed as the combination of the internationalization of home affairs, and the nationalization of the global politics, is more complex; it is, indeed, tension over the same rationality of the migration-globalization nexus.

Final Remarks This chapter aimed to assess the relationship between globalization and migration, as mediated by the nation-state. The main objective has been to provide a distinct perspective to that study, in the sense that it was more focused on explaining how contextual elements provide pathways for different flows and mobilities to occur. The case study was represented by the dynamics of migration from the MENA area, especially through Italy-Libya and Greece-Turkey, to the EU, mainly in the context of the refugee crisis.

 For a critical approach, see: Christina Oelgemöller, The Evolution of Migration Management in the Global North, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2017), 34–45; 52–65, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315644547; Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud, The Politics of International Migration Management (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 17  Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, The Politics of Operations: Excavating Contemporary Capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019); Niccolò Cuppini and Irene Peano, Un mondo logistico: sguardi critici su lavoro, migrazioni, politica e globalizzazione (Milano: Ledizioni, 2019). 16

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The theoretical aim of the chapter has been, first, to understand the issue of migration, in the context of globalization, under a less-than-common proposal from political geography, and, second, to assess the relation between globalization, the hierarchy of states, and the EU response to threats of mass immigration from the South. The theoretical section addressed questions relating to how to explain the “in-­ between” condition of Southern European states, a recent history of the different flows and movements of migrants to those countries, and explored whether and how this can be related to the process of globalization. It identified the significance of focusing on (political, cultural, and economic) contextual elements rather than a simplistic consideration of current flows and movements and provided for the identification of the main EU political geography elements and thus, the development of a very unilinear European geography. It also highlighted the tension between theoretical and empirical assertions with globalization and migration studies. Representing this proposal empirically, we find that the case of southern EU countries as gatekeeper states and countries like Libya and Turkey as buffer states was particularly illustrative of these dynamics. It reconstructed the dynamics of migration through these countries and explained the expansion of EU sovereignty and state hierarchy in the region. Further, we subscribed the notion that globalization changes the relationship between foreign policy (namely, its ministry) and domestic policy (whose ministries become increasingly international), with consequences to politics, at home and abroad and that globalization also changes how the response to certain issues is perceived, incentivizing a national response and, thus, (re)enforcing territorial governance. Finally, we argue that, due to the limitations of both globalization studies and migration studies, globalization is a useful category if we treat it as a processual one, and for that recent approaches on logistics are helpful, allowing for both the centrality and the rootedness of fluxes and that logistics is a tool that grants us a unique opportunity to assess the rationality of the EU political geography. Summing up, this chapter comprises an inquiry into the impact of globalization on migration from the point of view of Southern Europe and under the framework of EU political geography, but also that dealing with globalization and migration, on flows, movements, and contexts outside the borders of the nation-state, but depends on the state machine and, thus, globalization ends up reinforcing the territorial governance. This stands in contrast with univocal views on deterritorialization – and thus reaffirms the scientific relevance of a situated analysis18 – or global governance which is fairly mainstream regarding globalization. Indeed, this research adds to those that argue that globalization does not produce a flat world. Also, hints into ways through which the very European integration process is inscribed in the very  For an ethnographic attempt to reaffirm the relevance of a situated analysis, against those claims that argue the loss of the value of site analysis, see: Rahola, Federico. “Urban at Large: Notes for an Ethnography of Urbanization and Its Frictious Sites,” Etnografia e Ricerca Qualitativa, 3 (2014): 379–400.

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process of globalization. Thus, it reproduces and reinvents the same rationality of that process; there is productive friction19 between the two, as the EU is at the same time a product and produces globalization. Such rationalities are fairly visible when dealing with the issue of migration, as it processes globalization and its arenas – internationalizing the domestic, and vice-versa, making the international domestic.

Bibliography Campesi, Giuseppe. 2018. Seeking asylum in times of crisis: Reception, confinement, and detention at Europe’s southern border. Refugee Survey Quarterly 37 (1): 44–70. https://doi. org/10.1093/rsq/hdx016. Cuppini, Niccolò, and Irene Peano. 2019. Un mondo logistico: sguardi critici su lavoro, migrazioni, politica e globalizzazione. Milano: Ledizioni. da Empoli, Giuliano. 2019. Gli ingegneri del caos: teoria e tecnica dell’Internazionale populista. Venezia: Marsilio. de Wenden, Catherine Wihtol. 2012. Globalization and International Migration Governance. IMIS Beiträge 42: 75–88. Escamilla, Margarita Martínez, et. al. “Hot returns:’ When the state acts outside the law – A legal report”, June 27, 2014. https://eprints.ucm.es/27221/1/HOT%20RETURNS.%20WHEN%20 DE%20STATE%20ACTS%20OUTSIDE%20THE%20LAW.%20Legal%20report.pdf. Accessed 31 Oct 2019. European Commission – Press release, “European Commission opens way for decision by June on visa-free travel for citizens of Turkey”, May 4, 2016. https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ IP-16-1622_en.htm. Accessed 31 Oct 2019. Geiger, Martin, and Antoine Pécoud. 2011. The Politics of International Migration Management. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Gil-Bazo, María-Teresa. 2015. The safe third country concept in international agreements on refugee protection assessing state practice. Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 33 (1): 42–77. Kouvelakis, Stathis. 2018. Borderland. New Left Review 110: 5–33. Martín, María. La ONU reprende a España por devolver en caliente a un menor. El País, February 19, 2019. https://elpais.com/politica/2019/02/18/actualidad/1550518864_545088.html. Accessed 31 Oct 2019. Mezzadra, Sandro, and Brett Neilson. 2019. The politics of operations excavating contemporary capitalism. Durham: Duke University Press. “Migrant crisis: EU-Turkey deal comes into effect”, BBC News, March 20, 2016. https://www.bbc. com/news/world-europe-35854413. Accessed 31 Oct 2019. Moloney, Kim, and Diane Stone. 2019. Beyond the state: Global policy and transnational administration. International Review of Public Policy 1 (1): 104–118. Neumann, Iver B. 2015. Foreign policy in an age of globalization. In Theorizing foreign policy in a globalized world, ed. Gunther Hellmann and Knud Erik Jørgensen, 45–57. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Oelgemeoller, Christina. 2017. The evolution of migration Management in the Global North. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. Rahola, Federico. 2014. Urban at large: Notes for an ethnography of urbanization and its frictious sites. Etnografia e Ricerca Qualitativa 3: 379–400.

 For an overview on the concept of friction see: Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2005).

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Rankin, Jennifer. 2016. European commission set to approve Turkish citizens’ visa-free travel. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/03/european-commission-turkishcitizens-visa-free-travel-schengen. Accessed 31 Oct 2019. Scavo, Nello. 2019. Trattativa nascosta. Il viaggio del boss in Italia: Bija visitò altri centri migranti. Avvenire. https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/Pagine/il-giallo-del-negoziato-segreto-migrantilibia-trafficanti?fbclid=iwar01uwrjlbck4ey4uyjdonlmc59jhswduizvhqb2sdawjzcdjpjmzptxfdg. Accessed 31 Oct 2019. Spence, David. 2008. EU governance and global governance: New roles for EU diplomats. In Global governance and diplomacy: Worlds apart? ed. Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking, and William Maley, 63–84. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Tsing, Anna Lowenhaupt. 2005. Friction: An ethnography of global connection. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chapter 8

Non-recognition and Its Implications: African Asylum Seekers in Israel Nurit Hashimshony-Yaffe

Introduction Climate change, conflicts, wars, political and religious prosecution all contribute to the incidence of mass migration. Each forms part of our global scene. Open borders have made population movement easier, with the ensuing urgent need for the world to act. Indeed, Granting asylum is one of the most ancient and shared gestures of solidarity in the history of humankind. It has helped save lives, build and rebuild nations, and preserve our sense of humanity. But in today’s deeply divided world, humanity is losing ground. The language of politics has become ruthless, giving license to discrimination, racism, xenophobia. Refugees and migrants have become the catalysts of a “dehumanization” trend - whose sole purpose is immediate political gains. People uprooted from their homes by brutality and war are branded as a threat, instead of deserving of compassion.1

As of the turn of this century, Israel became a destination for African migrants. Soldiers along the southern border were surprised to come upon Africans crossing it. They provided them with initial shelter and transported them to Beersheba, the nearest city, where students from Ben-Gurion University at first catered to their needs on a humanitarian basis. Over time, and as more Africans continued to arrive, they were picked up along the border and transported by bus to Tel Aviv. In this main city, located in the center of the country, they started to find their way, supported by social networks of peers who arrived earlier.

1  Third Committee of the General Assembly, 73rd Session, October 31, 2018. Statement by Filippo Grandi, https://www.unhcr.org/admin/hcspeeches/5bdb0a184/third-committee-general-assembly-73rd-session.html

N. Hashimshony-Yaffe (*) The Academic College of Tel Aviv Yaffo, Tel Aviv Yaffo, Israel e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. Abegunrin, S. O. Abidde (eds.), African Migrants and the Refugee Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56642-5_8

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As of 2005, African asylum seekers arrived in Israel by foot from Sudan and Eritrea, crossing into the country from Egypt after having marched through the Sinai desert. During their long journey, many were kidnapped by smugglers and abused by intermediaries.2 They entered without authorization, not through a border crossing. The presence of tens of thousands of African asylum seekers forced not only Israeli society but also the government to react. Over and beyond the initial extension of emergency humanitarian assistance, no inclusive migration policy was in place for arrivals who were not Jewish. Israel’s Declaration of Independence (1948) defines the country as the home of the Jewish people from around the world. Its official migration policy is a direct result of this definition, that is, it is exclusively designed for Jewish migrants. Warfare with neighboring Arab countries and a sense of emergency have characterized Israel ever since its establishment. Territorial conflicts and tense internal relations between democracy and nationalism have always defined its nature and its state–society relations. Consequently, it was unprepared for non-Jewish migration. Israel’s policy towards African asylum seekers has been the focus of much research ever since flows of African migrants started entering the country. The subject has been analyzed legally,3 generally,4 as a global phenomenon of African migration,5 and out of concern for the human rights of the refugees.6 This chapter is based on policy analysis and focuses on the portrayal of the lives of the Africans in Israel as workers. Defined as illegal migrants by the state and as asylum seekers by themselves, the author will examine how certain policy measures generated the conditions to create a marginal African labor market between the years 2005–2013, its characteristics, and, finally, the effects of these factors on Israeli society as a whole.

2  Lijnders L., S. Robinson. “From the Horn of Africa to the Middle East: Human Trafficking of Eritrean aAlum Seekers across Borders.” Anti Trafficking Review 2 (2013): 137–154. See also; PHR, Physicians for Human Rights. November 19, 2010. Desert Hell- The Journey of Refugees through the Sinai Desert. Tel Aviv: Physicians for Human Rights. 3  Ziegler, Reuven (Ruvi). “No Asylum for ‘Infiltrators’: The Legal Predicament of Eritrean and Sudanese Nationals in Israel.” Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 29, no. 2 (2015): 172–191. 4  Yaron H.  N. Hashimshony-Yaffe and J.  Campbell. “‘Infiltrators’ or Refugees? An Analysis of Israel’s Policy Towards African Asylum-Seekers.” International Migration 51, no. 4 (2013): 144–157. 5   Avineri S., L.  Orgad, A.  Rubinstein. Coping with Global Migration:Israeli Strategy for Immigration Policy (a Proposal). Jerusalem: Mezila, (2009): 62–64. [Hebrew]. See also; FurstNichols R., K.  Jacobson. African Migration to Israel- Debt, Employment and Remittances. Feinstein International Center, Boston: Tufts University, 2011. 6  Ben- Dor, A. “Asylum-Seekers and Refugees- Unwanted Guests in Israel.” Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Human Rights Clinique. 2008. http://www.law.tau.ac.il/Heb/?CategoryID=499&Articl eID=723. [Hebrew]. See also; Kritzman-Amir, T. and Yonatan Berman. “Responsibility Sharing and the Rights of Refugees: The Case of Israel.” Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 41, no. 3 (2010): 619–649.

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 cope of Mass Migration and Policy Issues Prior S to the Early 2000s Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and up until the early 2000s, only small groups of non-Jewish migrants arrived in the country, among them a group of Vietnamese in 1977 and 1979, of Bosnians in 1992, and Kosovar Albanians in 1999. In these cases, ad hoc decisions were made, and asylum was granted on a humanitarian basis. Viewing the data by year of entry in the table below, based on the publications of the Israel Administration of Border Crossings, Population and Immigration (PIBA),7 one can see the sharp rise over time in the number of illegal (non-Jewish) migrants, most of whom crossed into the country through the Israeli– Egyptian border. Before 2006, only 2731 migrants entered Israel. By the end of 2015, this figure had increased to 64,365, of whom some 46,437 still resided in the country, while the remainder had left. By the end of the first quarter of 2019, during that period there were no new entries; the number of migrants still in Israel had declined to 33,121.8 The majority (98%) of the illegal migrants residing in Israel are Africans. Of these, 74% are Eritreans, 19% Sudanese, while the remaining tiny percentage, 6–7%, are from other African countries. Most Africans in Israel today are males, with females comprising a small minority.9 Table showing rise over time in number of illegal (non-Jewish) migrants

Illegal entries to Israel

Prior to 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2731 5065 8769 5217 14,680 17,300

2012 10,438

2013 2014 2015 43 21 220

The ad hoc response to this humanitarian crisis, adopted by Israel initially, in the 1970s, and remaining in force up to the late 1990s, was feasible as long as the number of asylum seekers was low and did not jeopardize official policy with regard to the right to asylum.10 However, it ceased to be feasible when large numbers of refugees started to arrive, as of 2000. 7  See yearly data publications https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/foreigners_summary_2013/ he/2013_summary_foreignworkers_report.pdf, https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/foreign_workers_stats/he/sum_2014_final.pdf and https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/foreign_workers_stats/he/summary_2015_new.pdf Although the data it presents may be criticized as incomplete and as inconsistent at times, it is the only official source of information. 8  https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/foreign_workers_stats_q1_2019/he/577455ZARIM-2019-5.pdf 9  ASSAF. “Welfare Services to Asylum Seekers in Israel.” 2014. Tel Aviv. [Hebrew]. 10  Gavizon, R. “Introduction.” In Unauthorized Immigration as a Challange to Israel, by Ruth Gavizon and Meir Elran, 11–16, 2013. Tel Aviv: The Institute for National Security Studies and Metzilah. [Hebrew]

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The global scene of forcibly displaced people, whose numbers rose sharply between the years 2009–2018, from 43.3 million to 70.8 million, included 3.5 million asylum seekers (awaiting decision) and 25.9 million UNHCR-recognized refugees in 2018.11 Affected by regional conflicts, forcibly displaced people became a major aspect of globalization, forcing both countries of origin and host countries to cope with new migration flows. In the countries of origin, the main concern was the fate of those left behind, both material (the effect on the well-being of family members left behind) and non-material (as in the disruption of family life). Top host countries include Germany, Sweden, the USA, and African countries, such as Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda, as well as Lebanon, Turkey, and Pakistan. This shows that host countries are not always developed countries and that not only do migration routes across the globe but they also traverse the continent of origin (Africa is a case in point). Migration routes are geographical paths that can be mapped, while at the same time describing the mutual relationship between developed and less-­ developed countries, between diasporic and home-based communities, and between individuals and society. Whether democracies or not, all host countries must cope with changing needs and develop new, more inclusive policies. Israel became a host country to African migrants due to its close, overland connection to Africa, turning into the only host country outside of that continent that can be reached by foot. Changes in global migration patterns raised the controversial issue of workers’ rights as human rights. It pointed to the delicate interface of forced, irregular migration and work migration12 and to the way the categorization of migration types may influence migrant labor markets. In this chapter, I will base myself on the analyses of migrant worker vulnerability in Ireland13 and in the USA14 to present the phenomenon in Israel. Earlier researchers investigated the topic of Africans as migrant workers in Israel,15 while others focused on religious organizations among Africans in Israel16 and on the nature of business and economic activities within the African communities.17 Nurit Hashimshony-Yaffe and Hadas Yaron-Mesgena examined social  UNHCR data https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/  Cholewinski, Ryszard. Study on Obstacles to Effective Access of Irregular Migrants to Minimum Social Rights. Council of Europe Publishing, 2005. 13  Deirdre, Toomey. “Employment Rights for Migrant Workers in Ireland.” International Migration and Integration 16 (2015): 249–263. 14  Doyle, Kevin J. “Workers’ Rights as Human Rights.” Working USA; Armonk 8, no. 4 (2005): 512–516. 15  Rosenhek, Z. “The Politics of Claims- Making by Labour Migrants in Israel.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 25, no. 4 (1999): 575–595. See also; Wurgaft, N. “Police! Open Up!Migrant Workers in Israel.” Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2006. [Hebrew]. 16  Sabar, G. “African Christianity in the Jewish State: Adaptation, Accomodation and Legitimation of Migrant WOrkers Churches 1990–2003.” Journal of Religion in Africa 34, no. 4 (2004): 407–437. 17  Barak-Bianco, A. Eating Places of Refugees from Eritrea and Sudan in South Tel-Aviv: Ethnic Enteprenuership in Limbo. University of Haifa: Thesis Submitted to the University of Haifa Israel, 2013. 11 12

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organization within the African communities in Israel, 2015.18 One of the questions raised by the mass flow of African migrants to Israel related to their everyday life in the country. This chapter will fill a gap by contributing substantially to the understanding of labor and employment issues. It should be noted here that failure to grant recognition to asylum seekers, as discussed below, does not negate the importance of employment as a major aspect of the lives of African asylum seekers, given the fact that work is a basic need.

I sraeli Policy Towards African Asylum Seekers Between the Years 2005–2015 In its early years of independence, Israel passed the Law of Return (in 1950),19 granting Jews worldwide the right to come and settle in Israel. Two years later, in 1952, it passed the Citizenship Act, according to which Jewish immigrants became Israeli nationals on arrival in the country. While the moral obligation towards the Jewish people was part of the Law of Return and embedded in the nation-state nature of the country, no such obligation existed with respect to non-Jewish migrants.20 During those same years, Israel signed the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (also known as the 1951 Refugee Convention). It subsequently accepted the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which became effective in 1967. These two documents reflect universal consent to provide shelter for refugees. Israel signed out of concern for World War II refugees, and as an expression of the nation-state’s moral obligation to the Jewish diaspora. Both international documents protect asylum seekers from persecution while ensuring their right to housing, education, social security, and employment. To assure non-discrimination and the work rights of asylum seekers, both the Convention and the Protocol state that wage earners and the self-employed, without exception, shall enjoy the “most favorable treatment as possible and, in any event, not less favorable than that accorded to other aliens in the same circumstances.”21 This refers to all matters of daily life, including work rights, such as salary, ­overtime,

 Hashimshony-Yaffe, N. and Yaron-Masegena H. “In the Absense of States: Transnationalism and Asylum- Eritrean Refugees in Israel.” African Diaspora 8 (2015): 121–146. 19  https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/return.htm 20  Richmond, N. “Israel’s Law of Return Analysis of its Evolution and Present Application.” Dickinson Journal of International Law 12 (1993): 95–133. See also; Lustic, I. “Israel as a non Arab State: The Political Implication of Mass Migration of Non- Jewish.” Middle East Journal 55, no. 3 (1999): 417–433. 21  UNHCR. “Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.” Geneva., December, 2010. https://cms.emergency.unhcr.org/documents/11982/55726/Convention+relating+to+the+St atus+of+Refugees+%28signed+28+July+1951%2C+entered+into+force+22+April+1954%2 9+189+UNTS+150+and+Protocol+relating+to+the+Status+of+Refugees+%28signed+31+Januar y+1967%2C+ent 18

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and holiday pay, and all social security benefits (maternity leave and provision for sickness, disability, unemployment, old age, and death). Testing of the reality on the ground raises doubts as to the existence of adequate provision of these rights. Israel committed itself to the principles of non-racialism and non-punishment enshrined in the UN Refugee Convention. However, the principles of non-racialism, as well as the need to protect workers’ rights, have not been incorporated into domestic law.22 Israel’s immigration and citizenship procedures continue to be based on two alternative tracks, the first applicable exclusively to Jewish immigrants and the second to everyone else,23 with the refugees being referred to as “others.”24 Under these circumstances, African workers are not receiving “the most favorable treatment as possible.” In the early 2000s, the main policy acts regulating migrants were passed ad hoc, targeted to blocking illegal entry by fencing the previously open border between Israel and Egypt. There is wide consent among researchers that these decisions were directed at making the lives of Africans in Israel more difficult, intending to discourage further arrivals.25 Based on a comprehensive analysis and chronology of the legal predicament of Eritreans and Sudanese in Israel,26 this chapter emphasizes the effects of four specific policies on the African community in Israel and, in particular, on the African labor market. These policies, which were in force between the years 2005–2015, can be identified, among others, as crucial to understanding the development of the daily life of African asylum seekers in Israel as unrecognized refugees. (a) Non-Refoulement Policy Israel’s acceptance of the principle of non-refoulement (2007–2012) granted Sudanese and Eritrean asylum seekers temporary group protection, based on the recognition that their lives were at risk. The principle derives from the abovementioned UN 1951 Refugee Convention,27 which declares that no state shall return refugees to their country of origin if this endangers their lives. In May 2012, after South Sudan seceded from the north and declared its independence, the non-­ refoulement policy was canceled for South Sudanese asylum seekers, and 700 were

 Ziegler, (Ruvi) Reuven. “A Matter of Definition: On “Infiltrators” and “Asylum Seekers” in Israel.” The Israel Democratic Institute. January 26, 2011. https://en.idi.org.il/articles/3940 23  Ibid, Ziegler 2015. 24  Kritzman-Amir, T. “Otherness” as the Underlying Principle in Israel’s Asylum Regime. ExpressO., 2009. http://works.bepress.com/tally_kritzman_amir/3/. See also; Kritzman-Amir,T. and Yonatan Berman. “Responsibility Sharing and the Rights of Refugees: The Case of Israel.” Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 41, no. 3 (2010): 619–649. 25  Ibid, Ben-Dor, 2008. See also; Ibid, Lijinder and Robinson, 2013; Sabar G., Elizabeth Tsurkov. “Israel’s Policies toward Asylum-Seekers:” IAI Working Papers., 2015. http://www.iai.it/sites/ default/files/iaiwp1520.pdf.; Berman, Y. and Ziegler, R. “Immigration Detention in Israel.” Chap. 16 in Immigration Detention: The Migration of a Policy and its Human Impacts, by Nethery Amy and Stephanie J. Silverman, 154–162. London and New York: Routledge, 2015. 26  Ibid, Ziegler 2015. 27  Ibid, UNHCR 2010. 22

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deported to their country of origin.28 The non-refoulement principle indeed protects Sudanese and Eritreans from deportation for a certain period. However, it rules out the possibility of their seeking asylum on an individual basis.29 This principle soon became the focus of many Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) appeals. In two respects, the non-refoulement policy has indirectly shaped the boundaries of the African community in Israel: (a) The distinction between Africans from Sudan and Eritrea who are (partly) protected, and between all others from that continent of origin, who are not, has created an African community with a majority of Eritreans and Sudanese; (b) The absence of legal work permits, even for those protected by the principle of non-refoulement and possessing temporary residence permits, has determined the nature of the livelihoods of Africans in Israel. These two outcomes, outlined above, will be enlarged on in the three additional policies identified and described below. (b)  Migrant Settlement Policies As noted in the introduction above, the African asylum seekers arriving in Israel were, over time, transported to Tel Aviv, where they settled in its southern neighborhoods. The geographical boundaries of the African community there were established spontaneously upon their arrival in that city. In search of shelter, they initially slept in Levinsky Park, near the Central Bus Station. They relied on mutual help and soon were sharing apartments with other Africans in the neighborhood, which as a matter of course held the lowest socioeconomic status. The reaction, expressed in strong resistance by local Israeli residents, was not long to follow.30 The best-known settlement-related policy, initiated in February 2008 and short-­ lived, was the “Gedera-Hadera” rule. To put a halt to the mass settlement of African asylum seekers in the Tel Aviv area and of dispersing them throughout the country, holders of 2(A)5 visas (“Conditional Release Visas”) were instructed to head at least 40 km south (the distance to Gedera) or 50 km north (the distance to Hadera), to more peripheral areas. The decision to bar asylum seekers from living in Tel Aviv was based on the government’s need to deal with the large number of foreigners residing in that area and with the accompanying public unrest. The policy was not officially published. Instead, when asylum seekers applied to renew their visas, the new instructions were typed in them without prior notice. It should be mentioned here that a few months later, in December 2008, another similar policy, also short-­ lived, was announced, prohibiting African asylum seekers from staying in Eilat. A full seven years later, on August 25, 2015, the Minister of the Interior yet again announced a “new” settlement policy, preventing asylum seekers released from the Holot Detention Center by court order from resettling in Tel Aviv or Eilat.31 This  See Ministry of Foreign Affairs document cited in Haaretz, May 15, 2012. http://www.haaretz. co.il/misc/article-print-page/1.1708042 29  Ibid, Ziegler 2011. 30  This was the situation mainly in Tel Aviv, since interaction between Israelis and Africans in other parts of the country was rare (Natan 2012). 31  http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4693725,00.html 28

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regulation, too, like its predecessors, was short-lived and, following a court appeal, was rescinded a short while after being instituted.32 (c) Refugee Status Determination (RSD) Procedure The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) oversaw asylum application procedures in Israel, including the provision of identification documents, and advised the Ministry of the Interior on the matter until 2008. Following the Government of Israel’s decision no. 3434, the Israel Administration of Border Crossings, Population and Immigration (PIBA) was established under the Ministry of Interior, in mid-2009, together with an RSD unit that was responsible for all asylum processes. According to official reports, the asylum-granting procedure was based on a detailed case-by-case examination; in the course of which, the application was forwarded to a special humanitarian committee, which determined whether to grant refugee status. Between its inception in mid-2009 and 2012,33 the PIBA’s RSD unit received a total of 15,141 applications from asylum seekers, 11,044 of whom it interviewed. However, it granted refugee status to a mere 22. At the beginning of 2014, out of a total of 250 applications, 60% were approved, none of whom were Sudanese or Eritrean. In contrast, at the global level, the refugee recognition rate for the same period was 84% for Eritreans and 64% for Sudanese.34 Given the fact that Sudanese and Eritreans form the majority of all asylum seekers in Israel, these comparative figures raise questions about the local procedure. Over the years, the PIBA divided African asylum seekers into three categories, based on the type of visa they held: (a) A/5 visa, which is a temporary residence permit issued for a limited period to migrants not eligible for citizenship according to the Law of Return. Holders of A/5 visas receive a temporary identity card and can work and receive social benefits. The A/5 visa was issued to a minority of African asylum seekers, comprising 500 Darfurians from western Sudan and another 100 from other origins; (b) B/1 visa, which grants non-permanent status entailing temporary residence status and includes a work permit. One thousand Eritreans had a B/1 visa; (c) The majority of Africans, holding 2(A)5 “conditional release” temporary resident visas, which were provided with the increasing number of entries and contained the remark, “This temporary permit does not constitute a work permit.”35 Officially, 2(A)5 visas do not guarantee their holders any rights beyond their being entitled to reside in Israel for a limited period, certainly not the right to work. Unofficially, an informal agreement exists between the UNHCR and the PIBA (and its RSD unit) to turn a blind eye and not penalize employers who hire holders of

 The full details of the court appeal can be found in http://www.acri.org.il/pdf/petitions/hit5616. pdf [Hebrew]. 33  Reported in https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/education/.premium-1.2211091 34  https://www.idi.org.il/articles/3149 35   Israeli Government desicion no. 2104. See https://www.gov.il/he/departments/ policies/2010_des2104 32

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2(A)5 visas, thus enabling the latter to work.36 This unofficial policy is important. However, due to its very nature, it imbues in workers a sense of insecurity. (d) The Prevention of Infiltration Act and the Establishment of the Holot Facility During 2009–2010, political voices from right-wing party politicians began to be heard. Prime Minister Netanyahu, the Minister of the Interior at the time, Eli Yishai, and Deputy Health Minister Litzman censured the Africans in Israel as suffering from diseases, such as hepatitis, tuberculosis, and AIDS. An official letter37 from the Knesset Research and Information Center mentioned one of the main reasons for entering Israel was the search for work. Another Knesset report (Natan, 2010) also refers to the high rate of infiltrators’ participation in crimes, especially in Tel Aviv. These anti-African public declarations led to legal steps, namely amendments to the Prevention of Infiltration Act and the establishment of the Holot Detention Facility. The original Prevention of Infiltration Act,38 enacted in 1954, targeted terrorists entering Israel illegally to carry out attacks. Amendments Nos. 3 and 4 to the Prevention of Infiltration Act determine that anyone failing to enter Israel via a border station, that is, anyone entering illegally, can be detained summarily, without trial, and that this also applies post factum, that is, to those already living in the country. Since most Africans in Israel entered illegally, the Prevention of Infiltration Act labeled an entire population as “infiltrators,” while the term originally was used to describe terrorists crossing the border illegally during the 1950s. Amendments Nos. 3 and 4 to the Prevention of Infiltration Act,39 which was enacted in 2012–2013, authorized the automatic detention of “infiltrators.” Amendment No. 5, which replaced Amendment No. 4  in December 2014, determined a minimum automatic 3-month detention period and a maximum 20-month detention period for migrants who could not be deported. These amendments served as instruments in the hands of the government to tackle illegal entrance to Israel. As Prime Minister Netanyahu declared, “It is not about refugees… It is about illegal work infiltrators….”40 The Holot Detention Facility  was established in December 2013 under the abovementioned legal amendments. Its construction alone cost over 100 million Israeli shekels,41 while an additional 200 million Israeli shekels went on other expenses,  See also HCJ 6312/10, as well as letter from the Knesset Research and Information Center to Nitzan Horowitz MK, dated February 2, 2012. The Aid Organization for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Israel (ASSAF) also published a letter of information for employers. See http://assaf. org.il/he/sites/default/files/meida_maasikim_sugei_ashrot_1.pdf and Natan 2011. 37  See https://fs.knesset.gov.il/globaldocs/MMM/df566b58-e9f7-e411-80c8-00155d010977/2_ df566b58-e9f7-e411-80c8-00155d010977_11_10515.pdf [Hebrew]. 38  https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/Law01/247_001.htm [Hebrew]. 39  https://fs.knesset.gov.il/19/law/19_lsr_301620.pdf [Hebrew]. 40  See https://www.maariv.co.il/news/new.aspx?pn6Vq=E&0r9VQ=EKHFG 41  For government decisions regarding the establishment of the Holot Detention Facility, see https:// www.gov.il/he/departments/policies/2011_des3936 https://www.gov.il/he/departments/ policies/2013_govdec960 36

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and its yearly operation cost approximately 100 million shekels.42 It was located in a remote location in the Negev desert close to the Egyptian border. The detention orders issued following the establishment of the Holot facility were issued mainly to young men without children, irrespective of whether they were students, workers, or unemployed. Detainees were provided with food, shelter, and health services and were not allowed to work. They also were subject to a curfew between 10:00 PM −6:00 AM and were required to attend three roll calls a day, with failure to show up liable to result in a jail sentence. Since, officially, the facility was not a prison, detainees had no judicial review option. They were indeed offered an alternative, along with financial support: that of returning voluntarily to Africa. This “voluntary leave” option was sharply criticized as available while being held in a detention facility and therefore not necessarily affording the conditions for a truly rational choice should asylum seekers decide to accept it.

The African Labor Market Analysis of the outcome of these policies shows that although their original purpose was to regulate migration by legal and institutional means, each of them contributed to the exclusion and marginalization of the African population, constituting steps in the creation of an African labor market. The Non-refoulement  The non-refoulement policy defined the temporary nature of the protected status of African asylum seekers, as it caused instability and uncertainty. It created a split within the community between Eritreans, Sudanese, and South Sudanese. Moreover, even those applicants who were granted temporary protection did not receive work permits. It was a major step towards separating the human right to asylum from the right to work. Even if short-lived, the migrant settlement policies outlined above, which forced the migrants to move to areas with little economic potential and offering no social support, tightened the boundaries of the African community and further differentiated it from society at large. As noted, at the time these policies constituted a response to growing unrest among old-timers in Tel Aviv’s low socioeconomic neighborhoods, their aim was also to reframe the African asylum seeker issue as a matter of center-periphery. The immediate response of the migrants (South Sudanese and Darfurians) was to settle in yet a third location, Arad. Located 140 km south of Tel Aviv, it is a small town that, due to its remoteness, may seem out of reach of the state. Although the purpose of the RSD procedure was to regulate the asylum application process, it became a source of mistrust between Africans and the government of Israel. For 42

 See Elizabeth Zorkov, Policy Towards Asylum Seekers, in Haaretz.

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most, applications were not even examined and, of those that were, the majority were rejected. These new determinants aggravated the sense of social insecurity already present among asylum seekers.43 The amendments to the Prevention of Infiltration Act, with the ensuing establishment of the Holot Detention Facility, had wide repercussions and gave rise to legal and social activism within both the migrant community itself and Israeli society as a whole. The imprisonment of asylum seekers there adversely affected the lives of the detainees. They lost their places of work, the ability to make their living, and enjoy self-dignity as free people. It also resulted in a weakening of the community from which they were taken and to a decline in its earning capacity as a whole and its well-being. Over and beyond the loss of places of work, another adverse outcome was the closure of small private businesses owned by Africans and catering mainly to the community, where they played a vital role, creating a local public space independent of state authority.44 Within the Holot facility itself, inmates soon began to protest against the Israeli detention policy and started a hunger strike. This was followed by a “pilgrimage” to Jerusalem, in December 2013, when 200 detainees walked out of the facility and made for the road heading to Jerusalem. They walked the 180 kilometers there, spending the first night of their march at a bus stop, and being hosted by a kibbutz on the second night. Once arrived in Jerusalem after their long arduous journey (it was winter, and snowing), they made for the Knesset (Israeli parliament), the very place where the law enabling their detention was passed. The political response to the protest was “Just as we are determined to protect our borders, we’re determined to enforce the law.”45 A few hours later, immigration police officers were already placing the African marchers on buses, back to detention. A month later (January 5, 2014), 1,500 African asylum seekers gathered in the coastal city of Eilat, declaring a 3-day work strike. From Eilat, they moved north to Tel Aviv, where their protest developed into a mass demonstration, with approximately 30,000 participants, the largest ever by migrants in Israel. They assembled in the very central Rabin Square, where they were supported by many Israelis.46 This wave of sympathy was in stark contrast to the hostile environment the Africans had previously encountered in Tel Aviv, in its southern neighborhoods.

 Hotline, for Refugees and Migrants. “Progress Report on the Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in Israel.” Tel Aviv. 2013. [Hebrew]. 44  During a visit to the community in Ashdod, on June 16, 2014, I noticed many Sudanese-owned stores were closed. 45  “African Refugees Protest Detainment in Israel.” New York Times (December 17, 2013) http:// www.nytimes.com/2013/12/18/world/middleeast/african-refugees-protest-detainment-in-israel. html?_r=2 46  http://www.jpost.com/National-News/Tens-of-thousands-of-asylum-seekers-march-in-Tel-Avivdemanding-rights-337119 43

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African detainees and Israeli civil society organizations petitioned the HCJ, arguing against the unconstitutional nature of the Prevention of Infiltration Act and its amendments in that it violated Israeli Basic Law: Liberty and Human Dignity.47 The HCJ acknowledged the problematic nature of African migration to Israel and, on August 11, 2015, handed down a new ruling, determining a 12-month limit for detention in the Holot facility, applicable only to new illegal arrivals in the country, and ordered the immediate release of 1200 of the 1700 detainees then being held there. The importance of this ruling lies in its shortening the previously determined detention time limit, from 20 months to 12 months. It forced the facility to introduce changes in its functioning, while the political response was a renewal of the legislation process. It is of note that the facility continued to operate until 2018, shutting down on March 14 of that year. The establishment of the Holot Detention Facility was followed by the enforcement of the law against employers of African workers, who were charged with illegal employment.48 The labeling of African asylum seekers as infiltrators is critical because defining migrants as “illegal” was not only to associate Africans with terror activity but also, as noted by the European Council in other cases, because (it) can be easily forgotten that such migrants are human beings who have the right to recognition everywhere before the law, as reiterated in international human rights law, 14 and who possess fundamental rights despite their illegal or irregular status.49

An attempt to identify asylum seekers as migrant workers may point the way to offering migrant workers an appropriate framework for assistance. This attempt received attention in the aforementioned HCJ decision and may point to a general issue in world migration, namely, when is the distinction between work migration and forced migration applicable? We have shown how the situation deteriorated from temporality, with limited protection for certain African asylum seekers, during the non-refoulement policy period, to exclusion and marginalization during the RSD procedure period, coupled with the legislation and control manifest in the Prevention of Infiltration Act and its amendments, with the ensuing establishment of the Holot Detention Facility. We have further shown how, until 2015, policy decisions accentuated the exclusion of the African asylum-seeking community. Officially categorizing Africans in Israel as

 For Court Appeal HCJ 7146/12, see https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?pat h=HebrewVerdicts%5C12%5C460%5C071%5Cb24&fileName=12071460.B24&type=4 HCJ Decisions 8425/13 and 7385/13 (September 22, 2014) http://elyon2.court.gov.il/ files/13/850/073/M19/13073850.M19.htm An unofficial translation into English can be found in https://www.refworld.org/cases,ISR_ SC,54e605334.html 48  The only exception was an order not to enforce the policy in cases of individuals who could not be subject to deportation (Reif, Blum, and Hochman 2014, 17). 49  Although not a member state of the Council of Europe, Israel has observer status. See https:// www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/our-member-states 47

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illegal workers and infiltrators, rather than as asylum seekers, was and remains a major instrument in undermining their work rights.

Employment and Violations of Work Rights As shown above, all these official measures led to the identification of Africans as migrant workers, and consequently not eligible for asylum (a status that could also have granted them work rights). Although their identification as migrants, or foreign, workers, as opposed to asylum seekers, was designed to lower their status, it can be viewed as an official response to the work issue. According to the Israeli 1991 Foreign Workers (Prohibition of Unlawful Employment and Assurance of Fair Conditions) Law,50 foreign workers are recruited by employment agencies in Israel and abroad and must have both a visa and a work permit before entering the country. Foreign workers are only allowed to work in specific sectors, such as personal care, agriculture, construction, welding, industrial professions, hotels, and ethnic cooking. The purpose of the law was, utilizing this occupational control, to match the policy for admitting workers into Israel with the needs of the local labor market and to enable workers to be recruited abroad solely for sectors in need of working hands. The Freedom of Occupation basic law was designed to ensure equal opportunity for all workers, irrespective of their legal status. It was intended to guarantee work rights and, theoretically, could have assured those of the African community in the country. However, since foreign workers in Israel are required by law to regulate their status before their arrival and also to enter legally – two conditions that African migrants do not comply with – the latter are not entitled to benefit from the rights accorded to work migrants who are legally defined as foreign workers. At the same time, the Israeli labor market cannot benefit from the workforce already in the country. In this context, it is worth noting that neither the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, as an international agreement to which Israel is a signatory, nor the Israeli 1991 Foreign Workers Law referred to above guarantee African asylum seekers in Israel their rights at work. Given this absence of legal protection, Africans in Israel do not have access to asylum. They are left with no alternative, as a matter of survival, but to enter marginal labor markets where their very illegality leads to the abuse of their rights. Once inside Israel, the need for immediate income led African asylum seekers to work as day laborers, as chik-chak (Hebrew for “immediate”) workers. The Sudanese, who were the first arrivals, soon found jobs, mainly through intermediaries, in restaurants and hotels as cleaners, dishwashers, odd jobbers, and the like, as

50

 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=36145

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well as in construction as unskilled laborers.51 The main job opportunities were spread by word of mouth within the community. Without work permits and with too many different status determinants, the African asylum seekers’ right to work was at the mercy of ad hoc policy. This led to other violations of their work rights, the most common being failure to pay protective employee benefits or to make pension allocations (30% of all complaints received by Hotline for Refugees and Migrants) and verbal dismissals, without prior notice (24% of all complaints), with the latter enabling “employers to avoid paying severance benefits.”52 Failure to pay overtime and withheld pay comprised another 13% of the complaints lodged by refugees to the hotline. Additional common complaints included failure to pay medical insurance, noncompliance with minimum wage requirements, ineligibility for compensation for work accidents, layoffs during pregnancy, and the like. Failure to pay pension allocations exemplifies the exacerbated situation created by the absence of appropriate legislation, given the fact that Israeli pension funds will not accept non-Israeli citizens.53 Not having an identity card, and hence of an identification number or any other official means of identification, constitutes another obstacle, since workers cannot formally sign for their social rights. In short, current policy enables employers to violate worker rights without being held accountable, while the language barrier (illiteracy in Hebrew) constitutes an additional hindrance to integration and to understanding the rules of the game. Business ownership and self-employment among Africans is another path of employment. The opening of small ethnic-clothing stores, internet cafes, restaurants, kindergartens, and beauty salons as micro-businesses serving the community and located within it can all be viewed as community-based initiatives. Ethnic restaurants are a popular local business venue. They serve as a safe public sphere for community gatherings and as a reminder of home culture.54 Their importance is as a source of pride, and they lend a sense of independence and self-control rare in the lives of the Africans in Israel. At the same time, their owners, as cultural and ethnic entrepreneurs, suffer from a lack of business management know-how, over and beyond the obvious licensing and procedural problems that come with their illegal status. The main challenge faced by African business owners and the self-employed is to obtain the substantial capital necessary to enter the market full-scale and hence

 Based on interviews held by the author in Tel Aviv with Noa Kaufman (May 22, 2014), Ilana Pinshaw (June 9, 2014), and Gershon Gelman (October 23, 2014). See also Pinshaw 2014; Reif, Blum, and Hochman 2014; Villar 2014. 52  Kaufman, N. Refugees and Asylum Seekers and Employment. Tel Aviv: Kav LaOved Workers Hotline, 2013. [Hebrew]. See also; Villar, M. “Violations of Contract Workers’ Labour Rights. A Summary of complaints to Kav La Oved 2013–2014.” Kavlaoved.org.il. http://kavloved.org.il/en/ wp-vontent/uploads/2014/09/Contrct-Workers-Report-2014.pdf 53  The issue was first raised in 2008 and a solution was promised. However, until 2014, pension benefits were only allocated, if at all, upon termination of employment. 54  Ibid, Barak-Bianco 2013. 51

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extricate themselves from their small, low-income client base. Another obstacle, related to the inability of holders of 2(A)5 visas to sign for their social rights, is that neither can they legally register with municipal and tax authorities. This situation leads African entrepreneurs to depend on Israelis to join them, with accompanying instances of their being deceived and abused.55 An example of another type of community-­based workplace initiative, offering an alternative model of employment, is the African Refugee Women’s Collective, Kuchinate, in Tel Aviv, where small groups of female asylum seekers design and produce baskets and carpets by hand with recycled cotton fabric.56 It has an on-site shop. The collective, which is part of ARTS (African Refugee Therapeutic Services), was established to facilitate the psychological rehabilitation of African women in Israel and stresses economic empowerment as crucial to regaining human dignity. Kuchinate represents a different type of workplace in the African labor market scene, both in the way it came into being and in its goals, as well as in the fact that it employs solely women. Due to all these factors, it constitutes an island of stability in the vulnerable African work market in Israel.

Conclusion Early asylum decisions were based on humanitarian considerations that were widely accepted by Israeli society. In the early 2000s, the approach changed from humanitarian-­oriented political action to practical-legal, from a “non-policy” period of ad hoc decisions to taking major measures to close the Israeli–Egyptian border. These latter steps drastically lowered the number of unauthorized entries to Israel. However, the aspiration that they would enable the State of Israel to redefine its approach to migration, leading to more inclusive migration policy, did not materialize. In this chapter, I focused on some of the official decisions made and measures are taken about Africans as asylum seekers and workers without rights, to highlight their wider socio-political impact. These policies are liable to have indirect, less visible, far-reaching negative repercussions on Israeli society as a whole and to affect other parts of society. Political action was not restricted to formal decisions. It was accompanied by declarations, as noted above, by leading political figures, such as Prime Minister Netanyahu, Eli Yishai (at the time, Minister of the Interior), Minister of Culture and Sport Miri Regev, Deputy Health Minister Litzman, and other Knesset members, delegitimizing the right of Africans to asylum. It is important to note that these declarations fanned the flames, instigating growing hostile public opinion and racism.

 Pinshaw, I. “High Stakes: African Asylum Seeker Entrepreneurs in Israel.” The Broker. October 28, 2014. http://www/thebrokeronline.eu/Blogs/Employment/High-stakes-African-asylum-ssekeentrepreneurs-in-Israel 56  See www.kuchinate.com 55

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The first and clearest outcome of this political action, both formal and informal, was the building of metaphoric walls within Israel between Africans and Israelis, in particular in the southern neighborhoods of Tel Aviv. The second major outcome was the marginalization of the African labor market. Official measures are taken to reduce the volume of new arrivals in the country ended in the violation of work rights. Further steps are taken excessively bureaucratized visa application procedures and made visa extension a nightmare.57 The 20% Deposit Law,58 enacted in 2017, which withholds 20% of paychecks until workers leave the country, followed the same pattern of restricting the livelihood options of the Africans in Israel. Subsequently, in 2019, the government refused to sign the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. Without labor unions to protect one’s rights, the marginalization of African workers is liable to spread. What at first sight may seem to be a problem unique to this group, due to their illegal status, has the potential on turning into an integral characteristic of an unprotected labor market. This is highly relevant as Israel has long suffered from the delegitimization of labor unions, and organized labor is constantly under threat. The third outcome of the abovementioned political action is the lasting impact on Israeli society (and politics). With no real aid mechanisms, Africans reside in the lowest socioeconomic neighborhoods, without hope on the horizon of extricating themselves from their predicament. This situation continues to serve as a fertile background for a hostile, intolerant political environment. In fact, the racist attitude originally expressed towards “others,” such as African asylum seekers in Israel, may have spread towards black people as a whole. A case in point is that of 18-year-old Ethiopian Jew Salmon Teka, who was shot dead by a police officer in June 2019. Ethiopian Jews are not African asylum seekers. Being Jewish, they are full-fledged Israeli citizens according to the Law of Return and the Israeli Citizenship Law. Despite that, they have always suffered from racial discrimination. This racist attitude towards black people is worthy of strong criticism by politicians and policymakers alike. In this context, it is of note that a mass protest of Ethiopian Jews against discrimination and abusive attitudes by police officers followed hard on the heels of the shooting of Salmon Teka and that today (September 2019), several months after the event, a bottom-to-top social movement is coming into being, focusing on the development of a discourse based on collaboration and mutual respect in Israeli society. This could be the first, promising step towards a more inclusive society and represents the fourth, most important, unanticipated outcome of the political action outlined above, that of civil society awakening, firstly to assist asylum seekers at the borders and secondly to further social activism and advocate the cooperation of human rights organizations with community-based African organizations in Israel. The power of the civil arena as a tool for social change cannot be overestimated. The

57 58

 Rozen, S. To Make the Procedure More Efficient., 2014. Tel Aviv: Kav LaOved. [Hebrew]  https://hotline.org.il/en/information-about-the-new-deposit-law/

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increase in the number of local civil society organizations constitutes a ray of hope for a better society and is worthy of further research. This Israeli case study sheds light on the dynamics of policy formation against a global background of mass population movement and a local one of Middle East unrest. It is one example of a much broader phenomenon. It also challenges the applicability of the current definition of migrants (as asylum seekers or migrant workers) to contemporary global political events. The present-day categorization of migrants needs to be reevaluated to protect not only asylum seekers but also migrant workers.

Bibliography ASSAF. 2014. Welfare Services to Asylum Seekers in Israel. Tel Aviv. [Hebrew]. Avineri, S., L. Orgad, and A. Rubinstein. 2009. Coping with Global Migration: Israeli Strategy for Immigration Policy (a Proposal), 62–64. Jerusalem: Mezila. [Hebrew]. Barak-Bianco, A. 2013. Eating Places of Refugees from Eritrea and Sudan in South Tel-Aviv: Ethnic Entrepreneurship in Limbo. University of Haifa: Thesis Submitted to the University of Haifa Israel. Ben-Dor, A. 2008. Asylum-Seekers and Refugees- Unwanted Guests in Israel. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University of Human Rights Clinique. http://www.law.tau.ac.il/Heb/?CategoryID=499&Artic leID=723. [Hebrew]. Berman, Y., and R.  Ziegler. 2015. Chap. 16: Immigration Detention in Israel. In Immigration Detention: The Migration of a Policy and its Human Impacts, ed. Nethery Amy and Stephanie J. Silverman, 154–162. London/New York: Routledge. Cholewinski, Ryszard. 2005. Study on Obstacles to Effective Access of Irregular Migrants to Minimum Social Rights. Council of Europe Publishing. Deirdre, Toomey. 2015. Employment Rights for Migrant Workers in Ireland. International Migration and Integration 16: 249–263. Doyle, Kevin J. 2005. Workers’ Rights as Human Rights. Working USA; Armonk 8 (4): 512–516. Duman, Y.H. 2015. Infiltrators Go Home! Explaining Xenophobic Mobilization Against Asylum Seekers in Israel. Journal of International Migration and Integration 16 (4): 1231–1254. Furst-Nichols, R., and K.  Jacobson. 2011. African Migration to Israel- Debt, Employment and Remittances. Boston: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Gavizon, R. 2013. Introduction. In Unauthorized Immigration as a Challange to Israel, ed. Ruth Gavizon and Meir Elran. Tel Aviv: The Institute for National Security Studies and Metzilah. [Hebrew]. Hashimshony-Yaffe, N., and H. Yaron-Masegena. 2015. In the Absence of States: Transnationalism and Asylum- Eritrean Refugees in Israel. African Diaspora 8: 121–146. Hochman, O. 2015. Infiltrators or Asylum Seekers? Framing and Attitudes. Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies 13: 4. Hotline, for Refugees and Migrants. 2013. Progress Report on the Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in Israel. Tel Aviv. [Hebrew] Kaufman, N. 2013. Refugees and Asylum Seekers and Employment. Tel Aviv: Kav LaOved Workers Hotline. [Hebrew]. Kemp, A., and R.  Raijman. 2008. Migrants and Workers: The Political Economy of Labour Migration in Israel. Jerusalem: Van Leer Institute, Hakibutz Hameuchad Pub. [Hebrew]. Kritzman-Amir, T. 2009. “Otherness” as the Underlying Principle in Israel’s Asylum Regime. ExpressO. http://works.bepress.com/tally_kritzman_amir/3/.

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Kritzman-Amir, T., and Yonatan Berman. 2010. Responsibility Sharing and the Rights of Refugees: The Case of Israel. Geo Wash Int’l L Rev 41 (3): 619–649. Kritzman-Amir, T., and Y. Shumacher. 2012. Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the State of Israel. Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 6 (3): 97–111. Lijnders, L., and S.  Robinson. 2013. From the Horn of Africa to the Middle East: Human Trafficking of Eritrean Asylum Seekers across Borders. Anti Trafficking Review 2: 137–154. Lustic, I. 1999. Israel as a non Arab State: The Political Implication of Mass Migration of Non-­ Jewish. Middle East Journal 55 (3): 417–433. Natan, G. 2011. Enforcement of the Prohibition of Employment of Infiltrators and Asylum Seekers. Jerusalem: Knesset Research and Information Center. [Hebrew]. ———. 2012. Geographical Distribution of Infiltrators and Asylum Seekers in Israel. Jerusalem: Knesset. http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m03052.pdf. [Hebrew]. ———. 2010. Issues Regarding Infiltrators and Asylum Seekers from Africa in Israel. Jerusalem: Knesset Research and Information Center. [Hebrew]. PHR, Physicians for Human Rights. 2010. Desert Hell- The Journey of Refugees through the Sinai Desert. Tel Aviv: Physicians for Human Rights. Pinshaw, I. 2014. High Stakes: African Asylum Seeker Entrepreneurs in Israel. The Broker. October 28, 2014. https://www.thebrokeronline.eu/high-stakes-african-asylum-seekerentrepreneurs-in-israel/ Reif, M., D.  Blum, and O.  Hochman. 2014. Asylum Seekers in Israel- Employment Policy and Implications. Rupin Academic Center The Institute for Immigration and Social Integration. [Hebrew] Richmond, N. 1993. Israel’s Law of Return Analysis of its Evolution and Present Application. Dickinson Journal of International Law 12: 95–133. Rosenhek, Z. 1999. The Politics of Claims-Making by Labour Migrants in Israel. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 25 (4): 575–595. Rozen, S. 2014. To Make the Procedure More Efficient. Kav LaOved: Tel Aviv. [Hebrew]. Sabar G., Elizabeth Tsurkov. 2015. Israel’s Policies toward Asylum-Seekers: IAI Working Papers. http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1520.pdf Sabar, G. 2004. African Christianity in the Jewish State: Adaptation, Accommodation and Legitimation of Migrant Workers Churches 1990–2003. Journal of Religion in Africa 34 (4): 407–437. Strangers in Israel- Data. Israel-Ministry of Interior 2015. https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/foreign_workers_stats/he/sum_2014_final.pdf. [Hebrew] UNHCR. 2010. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Geneva., December, 2010. https://cms.emergency.unhcr.org/documents/11982/55726/Convention+relating+to+th e+Status+of+Refugees+%28signed+28+July+1951%2C+entered+into+force+22+April+195 4%29+189+UNTS+150+and+Protocol+relating+to+the+Status+of+Refugees+%28signed +31+January+1967%2C+ent Villar, M. Violations of Contract Workers’ Labour Rights. A Summary of complaints to Kav La Oved 2013–2014. Kavlaoved.org.il. http://kavloved.org.il/en/wp-vontent/uploads/2014/09/ Contrct-Workers-Report-2014.pdf Wurgaft, N. 2006. Police! Open Up! – Migrant Workers in Israel. Tel Aviv: Am Oved. [Hebrew]. Yaron, H., N. Hashimshony-Yaffe, and J. Campbell. 2013. “Infiltrators” or Refugees? An Analysis of Israel’s Policy Towards African Asylum-Seekers. International Migration 51 (4): 144–157. Ziegler, (Ruvi) Reuven. 2011. A Matter of Definition: On ‘Infiltrators’ and ‘Asylum Seekers’ in Israel. The Israel Democratic Institute. January 26, 2011. https://en.idi.org.il/articles/3940 Ziegler, Reuven (Ruvi). 2015. No Asylum for ‘Infiltrators’: The Legal Predicament of Eritrean and Sudanese Nationals in Israel. Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 29 (2): 172–191.

Chapter 9

Rise of Populist Parties in the Era of Migration Crisis Natia Mechitishvili

Introduction The paper examined the results in the national parliamentary elections in Europe to see the share of populist parties in the parliament at the national level. The countries with a significant rise of right-wing parties were identified. The success of those parties was linked to the current situation within the country regarding economic performance, geographical location, number of migrants, and refugees. After doing this, the possible correlation was questioned. The questions – what were the main concerns of the local electorate, as well as what were the top topics in the party’s election campaign? – were reviewed. The results of the recent EU parliamentary elections1 were also analyzed. To do so, media articles and other coverages, public speeches, and statistical data as well as reports from IOs and various think tanks, together with academic papers from individual researchers and the practitioners, were referenced. The paper shows that there is indeed the rise of populist tendencies coinciding with the migration crisis. Migration is the biggest concern of the European electorate, which explains the biggest turnout at the 2019 EU parliamentary election over the last two decades. All right-wing parties that made a considerable success at the national parliament used anti-migration rhetoric in their election campaigns. Clearly, the crises are not over, even though the EU–Libya and EU–Turkey deals together with increased border control have curbed the number of asylum seekers; the push factors of the migration, i.e. conflicts and poverty, are not solved, and we see that the populism is still on the rise. Thus, the issue is relevant; ongoing and

 May 2019.

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what is more alarming, it is unpredictable. The consequences go in many directions being it political, economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian.

Migration Crisis The year 2015 was a culminating year in the migration crisis reaching the number of migrants almost 2 million people.2 The majority of them arrived by sea and only a small percentage arrived by land, mainly via Turkey and Albania. Not only is the number colossal but the nature of migration has changed too. Traditionally, most migrants seeking entry to Europe through irregular channels were individual males. Today, however, whole families are making the journey together, in some cases with elderly or disabled relatives and often with very young children; according to UNHCR, 13% of new arrivals in 2015 were women and 18% children. Serious drives of migration are political unrest in the Middle East, namely Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and Africa, in Libya, Egypt, and Algeria, economic poverty in Balkans, minority issues in Kashmir and Rohingya. The migration crisis has led to severe multidimensional consequences at the political, economic, social, and humanitarian levels. One of the direct or indirect outcomes of the migration crisis could be Brexit. Panicked by the imposed relocation quota and an uncontrolled number of migrants, the UK decided to leave the EU, causing division of opinions among its population and leaving more than 16 million people unhappy with the referendum results.3 It also puts an end to the political career of two British Prime Ministers, David Cameron and Theresa May, with a third newly elected Boris Johnson, thus creating political instability in the country. The number of foreign investments has declined; the national currency has devalued; free movement of goods and people has become unclear thus influencing negatively its economy; and last but not least, Brexit might turn the question with North Ireland politically explosive. Increased border control, imposed walls within the Schengen Area and blocking illegal routes caused many migrants to look for alternative routes and seek help among smugglers, taking an often radical and dangerous journey. Driven, determined people continue to make the journey, regardless of how lethal it might be. As part of that process, smugglers become more in-demand, and journeys are more dangerous. According to the IOM, only in 2015 more than 3100 people have died when trying to reach Europe. The situation in the EU has changed a lot. If in 2015 the main concern was to widen the rescue operations as much as possible covering also widest geographical areas, now the rescue operations are punitive,4 arguing that 2  According to IOM 1.3 million people arrived in Europe in 2015, while Frontex that is monitoring irregular routes too reported 1.8 million. 3  https://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results 4  Italy’s Salvini recently introduced a high fine for rescuing migrants at the sea; Greece plans to block boat carrying refugees.

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it encourages further emigration and serves as a pull factor. The major destination countries in Europe for irregular migrants from North Africa and Middle East  Malta, Italy Greece and Spain have recently often been harshly critised for lacking solidarity and violating human rights by not allowing migrant rescue ships to dock. When being reproached by other countries and on the first place by France for not taking refugees, at the same time benefiting from EU financial support, the southern countries on their defence claim that they need more money to sustain received migrants as well as they asked for deployment of  more personnel from Frontex to ensure smooth registration of status seekers at their borders. Among other concers are increased criminality and insecurity as a result of increased migrants.    Under the Dublin regulation, the migrant can claim the status only in the country of entry, and the status can be granted only there. This imposes a huge burden on southern European countries, such as Greece and Italy and to a lesser extent Malta and Spain too. They have been continuously expressing their discontent asking for help from the EU and demanding reconsideration of the Dublin regulation and introduction of the refugee relocation quotas that would put an end to the disproportionate responsibilities that Dublin imposes on them. The EU proposed to change the rule, but there was a big protest and even counter-reaction especially from V4 countries.5 The obligatory quota even created counter-reactions, and some countries not only used in the verbal rhetoric but also in radical actions, such as imposing border controls within the Schengen zone. Today, the Dublin system still functions under the same first-country-of-arrival rule. The incapacity to reform the regulation is puzzling. With an overall unauthorized crossing of about 100,000 migrants annually, the number of migrants is eminently negligible within the 500 million EU population. Hence, not only there are clear diverging interests among the member states, more importantly, the populist and right-wing wind blowing over Europe in recent years has contributed to foster the belief that migration flows are massive and inherently corrosive of the national tissue.6 The EU responded to the crisis by signing bilateral agreements to the countries of origins, giving them financial funds with the promise that they will keep the migrants in their detention centers. It also established stricter border control. However, when legal migration corridors are tightened and countries’ borders become more closed, people do not stop coming; they just change their route. As part of that process, smugglers become more in-demand, and journeys are more dangerous. Driven, determined people continue to make the journey, regardless of how lethal it might be. Inhuman living conditions and violation of human rights at the detention centers remain alarming.

 the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.  See https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/opinion/why-are-we-not-reformingthe-dublin-regulation-yet/ 5 6

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People’s movement is not anything new, and the world has already experienced massive migrations during WWI coinciding with Russian Revolution and conflict between Greece and Turkey, after WWII, and finally with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nor is xenophobia a new phenomenon in Europe. Yet, the recent rise of populist and right-wing parties in the European countries gives a grounded doubt that it relates to the migration crisis and an increased number of foreigners arriving in Europe either in search of better economic perspectives or asulym status. It is noteworthy to mention that the populist Freedom Party of Austria FPO is not a new one; it was established in the 1950s and was a base for the Nazi party though with a different name. It is not coincidental that the party took populist stands after the collapse of the iron curtain when people from the Soviet Block could freely cross the borders, and they started to arrive in Europe. It was after the unification of Germany that its populist party Die Linke became stronger. Sweden Democrats have its roots in neo-Nazism, but it rebranded itself in recent years and first entered parliament in 2010. It opposes multiculturalism and wants strict immigration controls. As with many of the countries featured here, though, the picture is complex. Sweden has welcomed more asylum seekers per capita than any other European country and has one of the most positive attitudes towards migrants. The far-right Finns Party was built on immigration policy entirely. Estonia’s far-­ right Conservative People’s Party, EKRE, won its first seats in parliament in the 2015 election, and since then it doubled its share in the parliament reaching 18%. Like populist parties across Europe, EKRE has highlighted immigration as a key battleground issue. Mass migration hardly seems a major concern for Estonia, which has not been on any route to Europe taken by refugees and migrants from the Middle East and Africa, but EKRE has suggested that by allowing any migration at all, Estonia will be vulnerable to future pressure from Brussels to resettle many more refugees.7 This party is especially popular by using hostile xenophobic language. Its leader, Martin Helme, once said that only white people should be allowed to move to Estonia; one of its members when talking about refugees tweeted that the final solution is needed. Several factors are fuelling populist trends; one among them is security/terrorism, economic factor/unemployment, and crime. Security factors became an active factor in migration-related rhetoric after the 11 September terrorist attack. Security and terrorist threats are often used against migrants, which on its turn also creates a hostile climate among the population. Economic reasons, such as unemployment, in the south, Greece and Italy, were also used against migrants. 65% of Italians and 72% of Greeks, where the unemployment rate is high believed that migrants take away their jobs; in Hungary and Poland majority (over 70%) believe that refugees

7  See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/21/racism-sexism-nazi-economics-estoniafar-right-in-power-ekre

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are engaged in terrorism; and in Sweden, almost half of the population believe that refugees are to blame in crime commitments more than other groups.8 The Italian Government has introduced a new security decree, drafted by Salvini, which would mean NGO rescue boats bringing migrants to Italy without permission could face fines of up to 50,000 Euro. If we consider the number of asylums or migrants as one of the indicators shaping public attitude, then Poland would not fall in this criterion, nor would Estonia. Both countries have a considerable number of migrants from neighboring Ukraine and Russia. Ukrainians in case of Poland and Russians in case of Estonia, both have tense political relations to them sparkling hostility among the local population and serving as a justification not to repeat the same old mistake and let more foreigners come. As we know, Poland refused to take any quota from asylum seekers from Syria and other conflict zones, and it is not a destination country for conflict-fled people either. However, there are a considerable number of Ukrainians mainly economic migrants living and working in Poland, but as already indicated vast majority of those are working legally under contracts or work as seasonal laborers. They refill the labor shortage caused by the emigration of polish to other EU countries after the accession to the EU (UK, Germany, and Austria).9

What Bothers Europeans? It is not climate change, unemployment, and education, not even Brexit that bothers Europeans most, but migration. Thirty-four percent of respondents in the new Eurobarometer survey view immigration as the most pressing problem, down six percentage points from last year. However, the issue topped the list of issues in 21 member states, with Malta, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, and the Netherlands having the highest proportion of respondents ranking it most problematic.10

8  See https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-meanmore-terrorism-fewer-jobs/lede-chart-1/ 9  See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/18/whole-generation-has-gone-ukrainian-seekbetter-life-poland-elect-presidentgood 10  See https://www.dw.com/en/migration-more-worrying-than-climate-change-for-europeanssurvey/a-49904437

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182

United Kingdom Independence Party Perussuomalaiset (Finns Party) Fremskrittspartiet (Progess Party) Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) Movimento 5 Stelle (5 Star Movement) : high danger

Direction ?

Democratic contribution ?

Sexist ?

Homophobic ?

Anti-Semitic ?

Slovakia

Islamophobic ?

Slovenská Národná Strana (Slovak National Party) Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) Front National (National Front) Partij Voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom) Lega Nord (Northern League) Sverigedemokratema (Sweden Democrats) Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party)

Xenophobic ?

Greece Hungary Bulgaria UK Austria

Racist ?

Chrysi Avgi (Golden Dawn) Jobbik Ataka (Attack) British National Party Freiheitlichen Partei Osterreichs (Austrian Freedom Party)

Extremist past ?

Country Violent ?

Party

Hostile to representative democracy ?

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Belgium France1 The Netherlands Italy Sweden Denmark UK Finland Norway Germany Italy

: medium danger

: low danger

Source: counterpoint, 2019

It is characteristic for populist leaders to have anti-position; they are meant to be against the establishment of universally accepted norms; thus they afford themselves to have bad manners, to talk without censorship, politically incorrect, and often use hate speech. Worth to remember, Estonian politician from EKRE tweeting that the current refugee situation is alarming, the final solution is needed, whereas the final solution is a reference to the holocaust. Or the Austrian FPO party member (by coincidence the vice-mayor of the Austrian town where Adolf Hitler was born) who published a poem in the local newspaper where he compared rats with refugees.

What Next? Italy’s Salvini, putting himself as an informal and de facto leader of Europe’s far-­ right alliance, came with an initiative to create a Europe-wide union of populist-­like-­ minded parties, where he invites everyone who wants to take back national power from Brussels and keep its doors safely locked to the migrants. To this occasion, he organized a gathering in Milan just before the EU May elections. The motto of the

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conference and a future alliance was “Towards a Commonsense Europe. People Rise Up.”11 The European right-wing parties seem enthusiastic about the initiative and expressed their readiness to join the alliance. However, there are few but weighty questions that they do not share. They need to agree on EU budget relocation, tax policy, refugee quotas, and relations with Russia. EU strict fiscal policy supporters and other economically well-doer Northern European countries come against Southern European countries torn by the economic crisis. They also differ in their positions regarding refugee quota distribution, again Southern European border countries affected by a high number of arrivals versus Visegrad countries who refuse to take any imposed quota obligations, and last but not least, relations to Russia. It is common or even given as a rule that European far-right politicians have good and sometimes extremely good relations with Vladimir Putin (it is enough to remember Mr. Putin dancing at the wedding of Austrian foreign minister where he flew on his private plane last year). However, not all European far rights are keen on Russia. Polish PiS and Estonian EKRE are categorically anti-Russia which is going to be a challenge within this to be born populist alliance of Europe. Salvini said the new political movement of right-wing and social conservatives will replace the former Paris–Berlin axis dominating the EU. However, the nomination of Germany’s Ursula von der Leyen as an EC president is a good sign, because it is now that Europe needs a visionary leader and maintenance of strong French–German axis within the Union.

May 2019 EU Parliamentary Elections With more than 50%, the May 2019 EU parliamentary elections showed the highest turnout in 20 years compared to last elections in 2014 with around 42%.12 It is not necessarily to be so, yet it gives a grounded doubt to link this with the migration crisis. It is obvious that Europeans are concerned if not panicked. Both populist and right-wing parties have received more seats in the EU Parliament, but the increase is insignificant. Neither as populists expected and hoped, nor as liberals feared.

 See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/08/matteo-salvini-launches-campaign-toforge-far-right-alliance 12  Source: European Parliament in collaboration with Kantar. 11

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Therefore, if we ask how dangerous their presence and this increase until the next elections in 2024 would be, one could assume, not much. They do not necessarily impose colossal direct danger on the future of Europe or European solidarity and integrity of the concept of the Union; however, they may greatly influence the work of the EU and curb its efficiency. Even though the European Parliament is not the decision-making body of the EU and it even does not initiate legislation, it does reject or approve the legislative initiatives from the European Commission; it is entitled to reject or approve the EU budget and appointees of the European Commission. Therefore, the presence of Europe skeptic forces and their right of veto might hinder legislative procedure which is already often criticized when talking about the efficiency of EU functioning.

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Conclusion The paper concludes that the populist trends became stronger in the 1980s and 1990s after the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the unification of Germany both serving as drivers for people’s movement. However, a considerable increase in the anti-migrant sentiment is observed in recent years since 2015, which coincides with the refugee crisis. Looking at the populist parties’ performances, xenophobic (anti-­ migrant), especially anti-Islamic, and anti-EU rhetorics are present, and the threat from an influx of strangers is among the topics in their election campaigns if not the number one. As long as the conflicts continue, and as we can see they do, even more, potential conflicts emerging in the face of India–Pakistan over Kashmir, or North Korea, people will continue moving in search of safety or a better life; migration crisis will remain in foreseeable future. The drop of arrivals following the stricter border control and bilateral agreements with countries of origin did not stop people to move; they rather changed the route and itinerary often taking dangerous ways of addressing smugglers, which makes the urge of coherent EU migration policy and remedies even more urgently needed.

Bibliography Alonso Sáenz de Oger, Sonia, and Sara Claro da Fonseca. 2011. Immigration Left and Right. Party Politics. SAGE Journals 18. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068810393265. Building Walls, Fear and Securitization in the European Union, Ainhoa Ruiz Benedicto, Pere Brunet, September 2018. Davis, Lewis, and Sumit S. Deole, eds. 2017. Immigration and the Rise of Far-Right Parties in Europe. CESifo DICE Report 15 (4): 10–14. Europe and right-wing nationalism: A country-by-country guide, BBC, 2019., https://www.bbc. com/news/world-europe-36130006. Accessed 20 June 2019 Europe’s populists are waltzing into the mainstream, the Economist, 2018, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/02/03/europes-populists-are-waltzing-into-the-mainstream. Accessed 13 Aug 2019. Fanny, Arendt, and Annika Consiglio. 2016. The European Migrant Crisis and the fortune of rightwing populist parties. Are mainstream parties’ policies fueling Europe’s rightwing populist parties? Lund University, Department of Political Science. Fliehen nach Europa, The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2019, Swaantje Marten, Larissa Volkenborn, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/migration-flucht-der-fluechtlingenach-europa-16018868.html. Accessed 10 Aug 2019. Matteo Salvini launches campaign to forge a far-right alliance, the Guardian, 2019, Shaun Walker, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/08/matteo-salvini-launches-campaign-to-forgefar-right-alliance. Accessed 12 Aug 2019. Matteo Salvini tries to unite Europe’s nationalists, the Economist, 2019, https://www.economist. com/europe/2019/04/08/matteo-salvini-tries-to-unite-europes-nationalists. accessed 13 Aug 2019. Migration and migrant population statistics, Statistics explained https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ statistics-explained/pdfscache/1275.pdf.

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Migration policy: three things to know about ‘Fortress Europe’, Overseas Development Institute (ODI)., https://www.odi.org/blogs/9995-migration-policy-three-things-know-about-fortresseurope. Accessed 1 Aug 2019. The Adults Are Back in Charge of Greece. And They Are Really Right-Wing, The New  York Times, Matthaios Tsimitakis, 2019., https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/opinion/mitsotakis-greece-election.html. Accessed 1 Aug 2019. The migration crisis? Facts, challenges and possible solutions, Overseas Development Institute, October 2015, Victoria Metcalfe-Hough. Tracing the Effects of the EU-Turkey Deal, The Momentum of the Multi-layered Turkish Border Regime, Gerda Heck, Sabine Hess, movements, Vol. 3, Issue 2/2017. Why are we not reforming the Dublin Regulation yet? Euractiv, Luigi Achilli, 25 October, 2018., https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/opinion/why-are-we-not-reformingthe-dublin-regulation-yet/. Accessed 15 Aug 2019.

Chapter 10

African Migration to Brazil in the Twenty-­ First Century: New Trajectories and Old Paradigms Roberto Rodolfo Georg Uebel

Introduction In the last two decades, Brazil has seen deep changes in its political, economic, social, and cultural structures. Related to these changes, the country’s immigration profile also perceived structural and conjunctural changes. If in the early 2000s Brazil envisioned a progressive government and a timid immigration flow, where Africans were in the last positions of Brazilian migration statistics, in 2019/2020 the scenario would be different: a far-right and anti-immigration government and a considerable African immigrant population is one of the largest groups in the country. Four governments, three global sporting events, new immigration law, and an unprecedented strategic insertion in Latin America and Africa have marked these two decades of Brazil, the new destination for African migrations in the southern hemisphere. Elevated to an alternative post to traditional destinations, such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and countries of the European Union, especially France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal, Brazil also presented different ways of welcoming, integrating, and aggregating African immigrants to its society and its political, economic, social, and cultural structures. In this sense, this chapter presents the panorama of African migration to Brazil at the beginning of the twenty-first century, as well as to address the trajectories of its main groups, such as West Africans and Luso-Africans and to identify the old paradigms still present in the reception of migrants and refugees from the Global South in a country of the same hemisphere. Thus, we have divided the chapter into two sections, along with this brief introduction and concluding remarks. The first section will be dedicated to analyzing African immigration and its nuances during the administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010), while the second section will focus on the analysis of Dilma R. R. G. Uebel (*) Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing (ESPM), Porto Alegre, Brazil © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. Abegunrin, S. O. Abidde (eds.), African Migrants and the Refugee Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56642-5_10

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Rousseff’s government (2011–2016). The perspectives, analyzed outcomes, and scenarios of the governments of Michel Temer (2016–2018) and Jair Bolsonaro (2019-present) will be addressed in the concluding remarks. In addition, we will also present subsections that will analyze the specific cases that stood out in these trajectories, such as that of Luso-Africans and West Africans and the Brazilian government agendas for such flows. Finally, we will use as tools of analysis the thematic cartography, presidential speeches, and documentary research on official migration data, to translate them into a language that allows the identification of these new trajectories and old paradigms. This chapter is a result of research developed at the Graduate Program in International Strategic Studies of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil and was funded with public resources from the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES).

 rofile of African Immigration in Brazil During the Lula da P Silva Government Thus, President Lula da Silva emphasized that his Government, despite its budgetary constraints, is prepared to offer to its African partners the capacity to formulate and implement public policies in the most diverse areas, as well as the appropriate technologies to the average level of development of African countries. To this end, he mentioned the launch of the Brazil – Africa Action Program, which foresees the expansion of projects already in progress and the launch of new cooperation projects with African countries.1

Although little significant quantitatively, 15,811 immigrants between 2003 and 2010, African immigration to Brazil (or in Brazil) has interesting numbers; it was the second group that grew the most in the period, 160.94%, less than one percentage point difference to the first group, of Central Americans; it represented 4.71% of Brazil’s immigration contingent in the period.2 These indicators, albeit modest, represent a subjectivity of international migration that is very present in the flows of the first decade of the twenty-first century, that is, during the Lula da Silva administration: the changing trend in the choice of preferred destinations to migrate, that is, the transfer of the attraction pole from the European Union/USA/Canada to the southern hemisphere, namely Brazil and Argentina. Recently, Herédia3 identified that not only Brazil but all the countries of 1  Silva, Luiz Inácio Lula da. “Comunicado Conjunto da Visita Oficial de sua Excelência Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Presidente da República Federativa do Brasil à República Democrática de São Tomé e Príncipe.” 2003. Accessed September 25, 2019. https://concordia.itamaraty.gov.br/ detalhamento/5053 2  Uebel, Roberto Rodolfo Georg. “Política externa migratória brasileira: das migrações de perspectiva à hiperdinamização das migrações durante os governos Lula da Silva e Dilma Rousseff.” PhD diss., Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, 2018. 3  Herédia, Vania Beatriz Merlotti. Migrações Internacionais: o caso dos senegaleses no Sul do Brasil. Caxias do Sul: Quatrilho Editorial, 2015.

10  African Migration to Brazil in the Twenty-First Century: New Trajectories and Old… 189

the La Plata Basin (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay) noticed a high growth in immigration from African countries, with the most diverse nationalities. Chart 10.1 below illustrates, therefore, the evolution of African flows to Brazil between 2003 and 2010, which we will analyze later in a divided way: between permanent and temporary flows. The first point to be highlighted from the reading of Chart 10.1 is the turning point and trend change in 2009, that is, the economic crisis that started in 2007 affected, since 2008, not only the general and European flows but also that of Africans destined for Brazil, since their primary options, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, were all in an economically restrictive scenario to migrate. Even after the “immigration outbreak” of 2009, the 2010 data point to a larger contingent than 2008 and with a growth trend line, which will be seen during much of Dilma Rousseff’s administration, to be discussed in the next section. The second point worth mentioning is the cost of migrating from one side of the ocean to the other, especially when the country of origin has no income and purchasing power indices that allow for emigration, as is the case in most African countries. In this sense, we will see in Table 10.1 the ranking of the countries of origin that sent the most migrants to Brazil during the mentioned period, pointing to a trend towards diversification of maintenance, that is, new flows, but with the maintenance of traditional migrations in a trend of growth, whether by educational, family, or employment ties. Among the top 15 countries in the ranking, it is possible to observe that all are Portuguese-speaking, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Sao 4,276

4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000

2,492

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500 0

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Chart 10.1  Evolution of African immigration to Brazil – 2003/2010 Source: Data obtained from the Federal Police through the Access to Information Law. Organized by the author

190 Table 10.1 Ranking of African sending countries of migrants to Brazil – 2003/2010

R. R. G. Uebel

Country of Origin Angola Cape Verde Guinea Bissau Mozambique Nigeria South Africa Senegal Morocco Egypt Republic of Congo Sao Tome and Principe Democratic Republic of Congo Cameroon Algeria Ghana Kenya Tunisia Côte d’Ivoire Tanzania Libya Zimbabwe Ethiopia Gabon Guinea Liberia Madagascar Zambia Sudan Namibia Sierra Leone Benin Uganda Mauritius Togo Burundi Burkina Faso Rwanda Malawi Equatorial Guinea Somalia Gambia Niger Eritrea

2003– 2010 4.636 1.992 1.718 1.377 1.247 1.082 473 421 338 286 248 209 205 190 162 145 126 108 74 62 57 54 45 44 43 40 40 38 36 36 35 28 26 26 21 19 16 14 11 11 9 9 8

Ranking 1° 2° 3° 4° 5° 6° 7° 8° 9° 10° 11° 12° 13° 14° 15° 16° 17° 18° 19° 20° 21° 22° 23° 24° 25° 26° 27° 28° 29° 30° 31° 32° 33° 34° 35° 36° 37° 38° 39° 40° 41° 42° 43°

10  African Migration to Brazil in the Twenty-First Century: New Trajectories and Old… 191 Table 10.1 (continued) Country of Origin Mali Botswana Mauritania Central African Republic Chad Lesotho Eswatini Comoros Djibouti Seychelles Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic South Sudan Total

2003– 2010 8 7 7 7 6 3 3 2 2 1 0 0 15.811

Ranking 44° 45° 46° 47° 48° 49° 50° 51° 52° 53° 54° 55°

Source: Data compiled by the author from the information obtained through the Access to Information Law from the Federal Police. The data are extracted from the National System of Registration of Foreigners (SINCRE)

Fig. 10.1  Map – Contingent of immigrants in Brazil by country of origin – 2003/2010 – Africa Prepared by: Geographer Jesica Wendy Beltrán Chasqui. Adapted by Roberto Rodolfo Georg Uebel (2018)

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Tome and Principe; the only exception is Equatorial Guinea, in 39th position, which would only adopt Portuguese as an official language in 2014, and the country still has Spanish, French, Igbo, Fangue, Bube, Kombe, and Anobonese as its official languages. Significant in the period were also the traditional flows of South Africans and Nigerians, the Anglo-African flows, and those of the Egyptians, Moroccans, and Algerians, the Afro-Islamic, who have had traditional communities in Brazil since the nineteenth century. The migrations that stood out during the Lula da Silva administration, albeit in a budding way, were those of Senegalese, Congolese (Democratic Republic of Congo and Republic of Congo), Cameroonians, and Ghanaians. It is precisely in these countries where Brazil had a well-placed strategic insertion through its foreign policy. However, such flows would dominate the immigration ranking and refuge requests only at the beginning of Dilma Rousseff’s second government. Thus, the map in Fig. 10.1 below shows the countries of origin of African migration to Brazil and their geopolitical and geoeconomic specificities. Therefore, the map of Fig. 10.1 allows us to infer that in addition to cultural and linguistic proximity, another element that contributed to the choice of African immigration towards Brazil was the geographical location of the countries of origin: those closer to the Atlantic coast sent more immigrants to Brazil than those located in East Africa, except for Mozambique and Egypt. Considering the division made by the traditional literature and the categorization of the Federal Police of Brazil concerning migratory flows, we chose to analyze immigration from two references: (a) permanent immigration; (b) temporary immigration. By permanent immigration, we mean the cases in which immigration is definitive and mainly motivated by economic and labor issues, that is, the immigrant has no intention of returning to his country in the medium and long term. Temporary immigration comprises a variety of components and motivations: student immigrants and temporary visa holders, refugees categorized as labor immigrants, people victims of human trafficking awaiting relocation, and formerly irregular or undocumented migrants awaiting regularization or deportation. However, both categories are relevant in the sense that often a temporary immigrant becomes a permanent immigrant, and the same is true in the opposite direction, an immigrant who imagined himself/herself definitive, sometimes in the process of Brazilian naturalization, by changing motivations transforms his/her stay in something temporary and within a stipulated time to leave Brazil, as the case of the Ghanaians during the second Rousseff administration. Thus, it is appropriate to start the discussion with the permanent immigration, whose number of Africans that immigrated to Brazil between 2003 and 2010 was 6436, belonging to a stable flow during the period, peaking only in 2009, following the general trend of migrations, as shown in Chart 10.2 below. Brazil’s investments in Africa have been the drivers of immigration from that continent since the Lula da Silva administration, as seen in the substantial increase in the flows over its first year of government, since then flows have never been lower than 2003.

10  African Migration to Brazil in the Twenty-First Century: New Trajectories and Old… 193 2500 2111 2000

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Chart 10.2  Evolution of permanent African migration flows to Brazil – 2003/2010 Source: Data compiled by the author from the information obtained through the Access to Information Law from the Federal Police. The data are extracted from the National System of Registration of Foreigners (SINCRE)

Demographically, African immigrants in the permanent category are much lower than those from other parts of the world, including Asia, but what is worth highlighting in this immigration profile is the predominance of flows from countries with historical ties with Brazil, covering, especially, the period of slavery, since the African continent was the main base of the Portuguese black-slave trade between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. Angolans and Nigerians lead the ranking of permanent immigration and, unlike the temporary one, are linked to the historical and traditional flows between Africa and Brazil, which were enhanced, according to Rizzi and Silva,4 after the shift of Brazilian foreign policy towards the continent during the Lula da Silva administration. This shift involved the opening of embassies, and subsequent increase in investments by Brazilian companies on the continent – now investigated for corruption – such as Odebrecht, Queiroz Galvão, OAS, and Andrade Gutierrez, also financed by Brazilian state funding from the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES), in addition to the activities of state companies as Petrobras and Embrapa in that continent, with the hiring and exchange of African labor force. Finally, Chart 10.3 illustrates the main immigrant groups of permanent Africans in Brazil in the period under review, to corroborate the information thus far collected.

4  Rizzi, Kamilla Raquel and Isabella Cruzichi da Silva. “A CPLP como mecanismo de atuação do Brasil no Atlântico Sul: a ampliação da cooperação, os desafios e a possibilidade de liderança.” Revista Brasileira de Estudos Africanos 2, no. 4 (2017): 32–63. https://seer.ufrgs.br/index.php/ rbea/article/view/79143/47055

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Democratic Republic of Congo; 2.39%

Cape Verde; 3.65%

Egypt; 3.34%

South Africa; 4.33%

Angola, 16.64%

Morocco; 4.60% Senegal, 5.92% Nigeria; 15.34%

Mozambique; 5.92% Guinea Bissau; 6.46%

Chart 10.3  Main African sending countries of permanent immigrants to Brazil – 2003/2010 Source: Data compiled by the author from the information obtained through the Access to Information Law from the Federal Police. The data are extracted from the National System of Registration of Foreigners (SINCRE)

Of the ten largest groups, we note that the presence of permanents from Portuguese-speaking countries amounts to 45.26%, that is, the linguistic and cultural component can be stated as the main motivator of permanent immigration to Brazil, especially if we consider the inter-Atlantic Muslim connections that motivated the flows of Moroccans, Egyptians, and Senegalese. In the case of migrations of Nigerians, South Africans, and Congolese from the Democratic Republic of Congo, their countries of origin received investments from Brazilian infrastructure, oil, and mineral extraction companies of billion-dollar sums, which required, besides the operational labor, the specialization of technicians from those countries, which justified an initial temporary migration, transformed into permanent immigration, with the improvement of the Brazilian economy and its labor market for professionals of these fields. Regarding Lusophone immigration, the extensive investments and cooperation programs between Brazil and the Portuguese-speaking African Countries (PALOP) were decisive in choosing this country over Portugal or Canada for the permanent establishment of nearly three thousand Luso-African families in Brazil. Representing two-thirds of total African immigration to Brazil from 2003 to 2010, temporary flows grew much more significant and steadily than permanent flows, possibly due to offers of possibilities for temporary migration, such as

10  African Migration to Brazil in the Twenty-First Century: New Trajectories and Old… 195 2500 2163 2000

1771 1404

1500 1099 1000

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Chart 10.4  Evolution of temporary African migration flows to Brazil – 2003/2010 Source: Data compiled by the author from the information obtained through the Access to Information Law from the Federal Police. The data are extracted from the National System of Registration of Foreigners (SINCRE)

scholarships for undergraduate and graduate students, professional exchanges, and nascent issues of refuge and political asylum. From this data, Chart 10.4 represents the evolution of total growth in temporary African flows between 2003 and 2010, which has grown by 250% over the eight years, almost 2.5 times the average growth in the rest of the world. Like the mobility parameters of other parts of the world, temporary immigration of Africans had a positive turning point in 2009, given the external economic constraints and Brazil’s largest projection to Africa, with massive investments by government and Brazilian companies in the continent. As a result, the total migration contingent for the period 2003 to 2010 was 9876 temporary immigrants. It is noteworthy, the presence of almost all African nationalities in the immigration contingent of Brazil, except for only three countries of origin: Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Seychelles, and South Sudan; during the Rousseff administration, all African countries would have at least one immigrant in Brazil. Also noteworthy is the predominance of Luso-African immigrants – Equatorial Guinea would only be a member of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) from 2014 – in the first seven positions, together accounting for 74.54% of all temporary African immigration stocks. Not even Portugal presented such indicators,5 although it is geographically closer to the PALOP than Brazil.

5  Santos, José Rebelo dos, Maria Filomena Mendes, and Conceição Peixe Rego. “A imigração Africana em Portugal nos últimos vinte anos: oportunidades e ameaças no mercado de trabalho.” 2012. Accessed September 25, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10174/8886

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Sao Tome and Principe; 2.23%

Republic of Congo; 1.62%

Morocco; 1.33%

Egypt; 1.31%

Nigeria; 2.77%

South Africa; 8.57%

Angola, 29.39%

Mozambique; 10.62%

Guinea Bissau; 13.89%

Cape Verde; 18.74%

Chart 10.5  Main African sending countries of temporary immigrants to Brazil – 2003/2010 Source: Data compiled by the author from the information obtained through the Access to Information Law from the Federal Police. The data are extracted from the National System of Registration of Foreigners (SINCRE)

These issues reinforce the argument that Brazil, in looking at possibilities for economic and geostrategic gains in the Global South, had prioritized culturally closer countries before moving to equally fruitful agreements with more distant countries, such as those of BRICS and the Forum of East Asia–Latin America Cooperation. Permanent and temporary immigration, therefore, are the result of such efforts and strategic insertions overseas. In this context, Chart 10.5 explains the most important information from the previous table. Not represented in the previous chart, but which will be highlighted in the six years of the Rousseff administration, are the Kenyan, Senegalese, Cameroonian, and Tunisian groups, all motivated to migrate for political rather than purely economic or labor issues. Thus, it would be possible to mention the use of the term “rediscovery” of Africa by Brazil, and the rediscovery of Brazil by Africans. If by the end of the nineteenth-century migration was forced and permanent, under the practice of slavery, two centuries later the scenario emerges from the imaginary perspective of a “Brazilian dream” by African students, researchers, and technical-­ specialized professionals. The strategic insertion of Brazil and the attraction of the country to potential immigrants occurred in the African case, through cooperation and scholarship programs and the “publicity” of the country through the migration and international

10  African Migration to Brazil in the Twenty-First Century: New Trajectories and Old… 197

Fig. 10.2  African candidates selected by the PEC-PG program – 2000–2013 Source: Divisão de Temas Educacionais (Divisão de Temas Educacionais. “Histórico do PEC-PG.” Accessed September 25, 2019. http://www.dce.mre.gov.br/PEC/PG/historico.php)

labor networks as an alternative to the United States, the European Union, and other traditional destinations. Finally, before going to the section of Luso-African immigration, we reiterate the importance of programs, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Graduate Student Program (PEC-PG), which has been in force since 1981, which offers scholarships of graduate studies for foreign students and researchers. According to data provided by the Foreign Ministry: “African countries account for about 20% of applications, especially Mozambique, Cape Verde and Angola.”6 During the Lula da Silva administration alone, 182 scholarships were granted, as shown in Fig. 10.2; if considered the family members that migrate along with the beneficiary, the figures would reach 546 temporary migrants on average, that is, a significant contingent within the annual total of temporary migrations of Africans. Based on these issues, the next subsection will discuss the migrations from the Luso-African countries, the PALOPs, and their importance in the composition of Brazil’s new immigration profile, based on the Lula da Silva administration’s shift of Brazilian foreign policy.

Luso-African Immigration As we saw in the previous section, Luso-African immigrants dominated the ranks of permanent and temporary immigration in Brazil throughout the Lula da Silva administration. With just under 10,000 Luso-African immigrants, Brazil has witnessed an increase in such flows, as shown in the thematic map of Fig. 10.3, from the very increase of Brazilian investments in Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, and Sao Tome and Principe. Also, during his term, Lula da Silva visited all the Portuguese-speaking African countries at least once, and his chancellor Celso Amorim more than once.  Divisão de Temas Educacionais. “Histórico do PEC-PG.” Accessed September 25, 2019. http:// hdl.handle.net/10174/8886 6

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Fig. 10.3  Luso-African flows and routes to Brazil – 2003/2010 Source: Data compiled by the author from the information obtained through the Access to Information Law from the Federal Police. The data are extracted from the National System of Registration of Foreigners (SINCRE)

In addition to the international economic crisis, which disadvantaged major destinations, such as Portugal, France, and Spain, Brazil’s strategic role in Africa served as the main ingredient for changing trends in transoceanic Luso-African migrations. Luso-African flows, the term chosen to name immigrants from the PALOPs, had some peculiarities regarding the routes used and intensity. Directly, only Angolans had an uninterrupted air connection with Brazil from flights from Luanda to Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. However, among all cases, the use of the airports of Lisbon, Madrid, Paris, and Johannesburg stands out by immigrants from other Luso-African countries. In this context, it is possible to affirm that the migration routes of that region are in line with the traditional Portuguese, Spanish, and French routes since at the beginning of the twenty-first century; the transcontinental maritime migration was in complete inactivity. We will see in the next section that, despite this element, new migrations from Senegalese and West Africans have now re-signified the Brazilian land borders, an issue that had not happened in the case under discussion. The previous question on migratory routes also serves as a basis for understanding the high cost of migrating from an African (or Asian) country to Brazil, at a time when the country’s infrastructure and strategic positioning were deeply remodeled and revised, after decades of stagnation and endogenous orientation. Thus, the quantitative evolution of the Luso-African migration to Brazil accompanied more conservatively African and international general patterns, although it continued to lead both the temporary rankings as permanent, as previously discussed. Chart 10.6 clarifies this information.

10  African Migration to Brazil in the Twenty-First Century: New Trajectories and Old… 199 Evolution of Luso-African flows to Brazil - 2003/2010 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 0 Angola Cabo Verde Guiné Bissau Guiné Equatorial Moçambique São Tomé e Príncipe

2003 245 126 95 3 110 7

2004 291 151 100 0 132 36

2005 386 152 168 1 166 68

2006 521 245 169 2 134 21

2007 516 322 111 2 129 26

2008 588 341 229 1 143 16

2009 1,186 410 576 1 299 50

Angola

Cabo Verde

Guiné Bissau

Guiné Equatorial

Moçambique

São Tomé e Príncipe

2010 903 245 271 0 264 24

Chart 10.6  Evolution of Luso-African flows to Brazil – 2003/2010 Source: Data compiled by the author from the information obtained through the Access to Information Law from the Federal Police. The data are extracted from the National System of Registration of Foreigners (SINCRE)

But what motivated this increase in Luso-African immigration to Brazil? There are three main reasons, which even differ from the trends of immigration from other origins, namely: (a) Brazil’s strategic insertion in Africa: derived from the shift of Brazilian foreign policy, focusing on actions in the Global South and South–South cooperation, providing new investments in infrastructure and technical, scientific, and educational partnerships between the PALOPs and Brazil. (b) Boosting of the global migration scenario, with the diminishing economic and labor attractiveness of the main destination countries of the Luso-Africans, such as Portugal, Spain, and France. (c) Significant increase in cooperation agreements and granting of scholarships and fellowships for Africans, because of the Brazilian government’s domestic policies to promote education and research.

200 Table 10.2 Cooperation agreements signed between Brazil and the PALOPs  – 2003/2010

R. R. G. Uebel Number of Country Agreements Angola 46 Cape Verde 29 Guinea Bissau 21 Equatorial Guinea 9 Mozambique 67 Sao Tome and Principe 30 Total 202 Source: Concordia System of International Acts, Division of International Acts, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Available at https://concordia.itamaraty.gov.br/. Accessed on September 19th, 2019

Only between Brazil and the PALOPs, 202 cooperation agreements were signed between 2003 and 2010 (Table 10.2), which makes this issue the main source of immigration flows from those countries towards Brazil. Except for Equatorial Guinea, which would become a full member of the CPLP only in 2014, Brazil signed more than two dozens of agreements with each of the Luso-African countries, coincidentally following one logic: the countries that have the most signed cooperation agreements were the ones that most sent immigrants to Brazil in the period. These topics would undergo a profound positive transformation from the Rousseff administration, a new turning point (the previous one was from Cardoso to Lula da Silva), with the increase in the number of Luso-African immigrants, as well as students and health professionals from that region working in Brazil, which we will discuss in the next section.

 rofile of African Immigration in Brazil During P the Rousseff Government Brazil and Africa not only do we have a cultural, social and historical root from the point of view of our nation, I believe we are the country that has the largest number of Africans in its formation, but also because we are, we were part of the same great continent.7

With 21,850 immigrants from Africa, Brazil observed in the period from 2011 to 2016 a 38% growth in the contingent compared between the Dilma Rousseff and

7  Rousseff, Dilma. “Discurso da Presidenta da República Dilma Rousseff na Cerimônia de Abertura da III Cúpula América do Sul-África.” 2013. Accessed September 25, 2019. http://www. itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas/presidente-da-republica-federativa-do-brasildiscursos/4693-discurso-da-presidenta-da-republica-dilma-rousseff-na-cerimonia-de-abertura-daiii-cupula-america-do-sul-africa

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Lula da Silva governments and a 226% growth in annual flows, between 2003 and 2016. Although quantitatively lower, African immigration has sparked a real revolution in political, academic, and institutional debates about Brazil’s role in the new global migration agenda, including related topics in public health, security and defense, and xenophobia. During the first National Conference on Migration and Refuge (1ª COMIGRAR), organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice, which became the only edition in 2014, the representatives of African immigrant associations and diplomats from the countries of that continent were the most prominent in the discussions of the proposals of what was projected as the new Brazilian migration law. Despite the distance of thousands of miles between Brazil and Africa, as well as an entire ocean, the cultural, ethnic, political, and economic relations between them are historical, profound, and at the core of most social clashes that today affect the Brazilian political agenda. From racial quotas in universities and public tenders to the process of recognizing quilombola communities, the role of African immigration has brought about significant changes in dealing with public affairs concerning African descendants and foreigners. Issues, such as the formulation of specific refugee admission policies at Brazilian federal universities, the granting of special work permits, and the standardization of migratory processes, directly permeated the flows of these 21,000 immigrants, who, unlike in previous years, were part of more heterogeneous mobilities and were

Evolution of African immigration to Brazil - 2011/2016 6,000 5,226 5,000 3,960 4,000

3,000

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Chart 10.7  Evolution of African immigration to Brazil – 2011/2016 Source: Data obtained from the Federal Police through the Access to Information Law. Organized by the author

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motivated by political, educational questions and issues resulting from the first government of Lula da Silva. Thus, Chart 10.7 represents the evolution of the annual flows of African immigrants towards Brazil and points out that, as with the overall global flows, African immigration peaked in 2014 and has started to decline ever since, indicating other adjacent scenarios that we will discuss later in the specific case of Senegalese and West African immigrants. The data in Chart 10.7 show a small growth between 2011, which resumes 2010, the last year of the Lula da Silva government and its Africa agenda, and 2013, before the 2014 boom, with the entry of the 5226 immigrants that year, many benefited from the semi-regular migration of World Cup visas, which we will see in the next section. It is necessary to remember that the cost to make the Africa–Brazil crossing, exclusively by air, is expensive and restrictive to the great flows, such as the Latin Americans, therefore, those who migrated to Brazil, contrary to common sense and what the press widely published at the time, migrants came from a well-educated African middle class that thought of Brazil as the best alternative to the European Union, Canada, and the United Kingdom, that is, a perspective migration. In this context, among the 21,000 African immigrants who chose Brazil as a destination country, we will find the most varied motivations within the perspective of choice, such as study opportunities, employment in Brazilian multinationals, political persecution in the country of origin, and refuge and including people who are victims of human trafficking, but all these perspectives will be shown following Brazil’s strategic insertion in Africa through its foreign policy. Table  10.3 below presents the ranking of the countries of origin that most sent African migrants to Brazil during the period. Unlike the previous period, the predominance of immigrants from PALOP nationals is now more evident, aggregated by new components: immigrant networks from West African countries, such as Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, Benin, and Cameroon, among others. The “Brazilian Eldorado” that presented itself was unique to these nationalities and subregions, while immigrants from other parts of the African continent, such as the east and center, did not appear in the total contingent significantly. The data presented also allows us to question the exaggerated sensationalism and wide coverage given by the Brazilian press, especially that of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, in southern Brazil, regarding the temporary flows of Senegalese and Ghanaians during the 2014 World Cup, held in Brazil. With headlines that bordered on cheap and appealing sensationalism, widely circulated newspapers, such as Correio do Povo and Zero Hora, reported demographically irrelevant facts, such as the arrival of small groups of Africans at Porto Alegre Bus Station.8

8  Uebel, Roberto Rodolfo Georg. “Panorama e perfil da imigração senegalesa no Rio Grande do Sul no início do século XXI.” Boletim Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul 1, no. 28 (2016b): 56–77. https://revistas.fee.tche.br/index.php/boletim-geografico-rs/article/view/3731

10  African Migration to Brazil in the Twenty-First Century: New Trajectories and Old… 203 Table 10.3 Ranking of African sending countries of migrants to Brazil  – 2011/2016

Country of origin Angola Mozambique Guinea Bissau Cape Verde Nigeria South Africa Egypt Morocco Senegal Ghana Democratic Republic of Congo Benin Cameroon Tunisia Algeria Sao Tome and Principe Mauritius Republic of Congo Kenya Libya Côte d’Ivoire Zimbabwe Togo Guinea Tanzania Ethiopia Namibia Madagascar Sierra Leone Sudan Gabon Zambia Uganda Burkina Faso Seychelles Liberia Mali Burundi Central African Republic Malawi Niger Rwanda

2011– 2016 7.258 2.218 1.747 1.593 1.456 1.335 799 662 547 544 460 371 310 282 264 233 223 199 148 121 117 94 90 62 60 55 51 48 48 48 43 40 38 36 29 28 23 20 17 16 15 15

Ranking 1° 2° 3° 4° 5° 6° 7° 8° 9° 10° 11° 12° 13° 14° 15° 16° 17° 18° 19° 20° 21° 22° 23° 24° 25° 26° 27° 28° 29° 30° 31° 32° 33° 34° 35° 36° 37° 38° 39° 40° 41° 42°

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Table 10.3  (continued) Country of origin Somalia Chad Equatorial Guinea Mauritania Eswatini Botswana Comoros Djibouti Lesotho Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic Somaliland South Sudan Total

2011– 2016 14 11 9 9 9 6 3 3 2 1 0 0 21.850

Ranking 43° 44° 47° 48° 49° 50° 51° 52° 53° 54° 55° 56°

Source: Data compiled by the author from the information obtained through the Access to Information Law from the Federal Police. The data are extracted from the National System of Registration of Foreigners (SINCRE)

Fig. 10.4  Map – Contingent of immigrants in Brazil by country of origin – 2011/2016 – Africa Prepared by: Geographer Jesica Wendy Beltrán Chasqui. Adapted by Roberto Rodolfo Georg Uebel (2018)

10  African Migration to Brazil in the Twenty-First Century: New Trajectories and Old… 205 Evolution of permanent African migration flows to Brazil – 2011/2016 2500 2126 2000

1780

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Chart 10.8  Evolution of permanent African migration flows to Brazil – 2011/2016 Source: Data compiled by the author from the information obtained through the Access to Information Law from the Federal Police. The data are extracted from the National System of Registration of Foreigners (SINCRE)

During the Dilma Rousseff administration, African immigration therefore also aroused the interest of public officials and Federal Administration institutions, such as the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the judiciary itself, through the Federal Prosecution Service and the Office of the Attorney General of the Union, as pointed out by Silva9 in his dissertation. From an almost realistic perspective on international relations, the new Brazilian Government found itself at the middle of a debate that had been going on since Celso Amorim’s chancellery, but it would have the maturity to materialize only – and only even – in 2014, the most propitious year to elaborate a federal government response to the demands of the Brazilian population and the immigrant population, including the Africans. The map in Fig. 10.4 below illustrates the countries of origin of African immigration to Brazil and their geopolitical and geoeconomic specificities. Thus, we began the discussion through permanent immigration, whose number of African immigrants in Brazil between 2011 and 2016 was 7820, or 35% of total flows, and we observed an anticyclicality: steady growth, boom, and decline, as shown in Chart 10.8: Although smaller than temporary flows, as under the Lula da Silva administration, permanent immigrants of African origin followed the same trend as African general and continental flows: steady growth between 2011 and 2013, a boom in

9  Silva, César Augusto da. “A política brasileira para refugiados (1998–2012).” PhD diss., Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul., 2013.

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2014, and a decline from then on. Ventura10 in her work explains that immigration of skilled professionals to Brazil would be cyclical as long as the country’s growth cycle lasted, unlike other countries, such as France, Spain, and Italy, for example, which continued to receive high flows of migrants even during the Euro crisis in 2012. For the Brazilian case, there is a combination of two points: (1) the characteristics of the perspective migrations themselves; and (2) immigrant information networks already established in Brazil. Regarding the characteristics of perspective migrations, we understand a set of skills and peculiarities, such as the ability to foresee scenarios that may or may not be conducive to migration, the knowledge of the conjuncture of the country that will be chosen as a destination, and some know-­ how or previous experience of migrating. That is, the African immigrants who established Brazil as a destination had knowledge, albeit limited, about the country they would settle in, which ultimately explains the decline in annual flows from 2014 and the boom of that year itself. Just

South Africa; Cape Verde; 2.99% 3.61% Mozambique; 4.44% Guinea Bissau; 4.63%

Angola, 34.14%

Morocco; 4.72% Ghana; 4.72% Egypt; 4.76% Senegal, 6.06% Nigeria; 13.63%

Chart 10.9  Main African sending countries of permanent immigrants to Brazil – 2011/2016 Source: Data compiled by the author from the information obtained through the Access to Information Law from the Federal Police. The data are extracted from the National System of Registration of Foreigners (SINCRE)

 Ventura, Deisy. “Entre falácias e fronteiras: migrações e refúgio nas relações internacionais contemporâneas.” 2017. Accessed September 25, 2019. http://www.encontro2017.abri.org.br/ programacao

10

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for this fact has become unjustifiable, the argument that many chose to follow with the asylum request, it was a well-planned perspective migration, a labor migration. Compared to the previous period, there is a significant change in the positions of the Senegalese and Ghanaians, who came to occupy, respectively, the third and fifth position in the statistics of permanent migration; formerly, they occupied the fifth and fourteenth, indicating new phenomena and partly justifying the shift of academic discussions about these two groups in recent years. However, despite this change in the ranking, it is necessary to observe the isolated leadership of the permanent migrations of Angolans and Nigerians to Brazil, which compared to the previous period, significantly increased their presence in the country (Angolans) or maintained stable participation (Nigerians). The nationalities that reduced their annual migratory presence were precisely those from other PALOPs compared with 2003–2010, an indication that the economic recovery of Portugal and the change in the immigration policy of Canada, their main destination countries, favored the resumption of migration for both, leaving Brazil as a less preferred alternative, especially if we consider the decline of the Brazilian economy from 2014 with the successive crises. Traditional flows, such as South Africans and Mozambicans, were at very low levels during the Dilma Rousseff administration, probably also due to the retraction of her government’s foreign policy projection towards Africa as a whole, although the epigraph of this chapter shows a different position of the then-president.

Evolution of temporary African migration flows to Brazil - 2011/2016 3500 3100 3000 2455

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Chart 10.10  Evolution of temporary African migration flows to Brazil – 2011/2016 Source: Data compiled by the author from the information obtained through the Access to Information Law from the Federal Police. The data are extracted from the National System of Registration of Foreigners (SINCRE)

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Infrastructure works and the insertion of Brazilian companies in the African continent, mainly financed by Brazilian government resources, such as those from BNDES, were summarily impacted by the scandals and allegations of corruption in the context of Car Wash Operation (Operação Lava Jato), which almost interrupted completely their operations in Africa and therefore cease the migratory flow of African workers towards Brazil. Thus, Chart 10.9 illustrates the main groups of permanent African immigrants in Brazil during the period under review, to contribute to the discussions raised so far. If previously Angolans and Nigerians shared much of this contingent, now the predominance of permanent Angolan immigration to Brazil is evident. In the context of Angolan perspective migrations, the situation of political, economic, and social crises in that African country was the major factor in the emigration of many of its nationals. Another significant change, which we have already discussed throughout this section, was the greater presence of the non-PALOP groups, namely Senegalese, Egyptians, Ghanaians, Moroccans, and South Africans. In fact, the linguistic and cultural proximity that had once bridged Brazil and those countries was no longer a reason for expensive and time-consuming migration and without the prospect of better opportunities in Dilma Rousseff’s Brazil. On the other hand, the immigration of these “new groups” was justified, as we have already discussed, by a combination of factors, among them, the facilitation Morocco; 2.08% Benin; 2.40% Nigeria; 2.78%

Democratic Republic of Congo; 1.70%

Egypt; 3.04%

South Africa; 7.51%

Angola, 32.71%

Cape Verde; 9.69%

Guinea Bissau; 9.87%

Mozambique; 13.34%

Chart 10.11  Main African sending countries of temporary immigrants to Brazil – 2011/2016 Source: Data compiled by the author from the information obtained through the Access to Information Law from the Federal Police. The data are extracted from the National System of Registration of Foreigners (SINCRE)

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arising from visas for the 2014 World Cup, which allowed visa-free admission into Brazilian territory, even though it could never guarantee job opportunities or refuge, while it was not the purpose of such a visa. To finalize and start the discussion on the temporary immigration of Africans, the above data corroborate our assertion that mostly Senegalese and Ghanaians migrated with a perspective of permanence to Brazil, supported by the aforementioned visa exemptions; however, with the dynamization of the crisis, it became unsustainable to stay in Brazil. Representing approximately 65% of African migration flows, temporary immigration has also accompanied a dynamic of growth, boom, and decline, as well as permanent ones. In 2016, for example, the figure was lower than 2011 levels, indicating that if permanent immigration were no longer advantageous, temporary immigration would be even less interesting, particularly for students and temporary professionals from multinationals. Chart 10.10 below represents this evolutionary process participating in the global phenomena we are presenting. Despite this decline, which had once made Brazil an active player on the international migration agenda and routes, the stock of African temporary immigrants in 2016 was 261% higher than in 2003, again, very significant indicators for a country that was crawling in the global migration scenario. Therefore, the total migratory contingent for the period from 2011 to 2016 was 14,026 temporary immigrants. Only five nationalities had more than 1000 temporary immigrants in Brazil between 2011 and 2016: Angolans, Mozambicans, Guineans (Guinea-Bissau), Cape Verdeans, and South Africans, the same composition as the period previously studied. Luso-Africans also predominated in postgraduate scholarships and work permits, as we will see later. Even so, the presence of Luso-Africans was less represented than between 2003 and 2011, since they were 75% and now 64%. As with permanent immigration, it seems to be evident that new nationalities were part of the African immigration group in Brazil, as Chart 10.11 explains. The predominance of Luso-Africans can also be explained by the maintenance of cooperation agreements between Brazil and those countries of origin during Dilma Rousseff’s first term. In the second term, which was only to contain the internal upheavals and the storm of approaching impeachment, Africa became practically forgotten by the president and the Foreign Ministry as well. If during the Lula da Silva administration Africa was “rediscovered” by Brazil and the country was “rediscovered” by the Africans, in the administration of his successor, conditioned forgetfulness was put into practice on the one hand, and the then alternative of “Brazilian dream” had become a “nightmare” for those who would migrate, that is, a mistaken perspective migration. Nevertheless, between the lines of cartography and its formative data, the big data, as contemporary literature highlights, phenomena may go unnoticed to the critical eye of the researcher of international strategic studies, but not by the press and common sense. Thus, we are talking about the migrations of Senegalese and West Africans, whose peculiarities have portrayed a quantitatively irrelevant, but sociologically outstanding panorama that we will discuss in the next subsection.

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Fig. 10.5  Map – Flows of West Africans migrants to Brazil between 2011 and 2016 Source: Prepared with Excel by the author from data of Federal Police (2019)

Senegalese and West African Immigration Senegalese immigration from other West African countries has been widely discussed and analyzed in recent years by authors, such as Tedesco and Mello and Herédia,11 and we have discussed it in previous publications,12 with new information and updates on the topic. However, it is imperative to discuss here the relation of this phenomenon with the Brazilian foreign policy for migration and the incursion of the concept of perspective migrations within the trajectories of West African immigrants, since we have the strong presence of the Brazilian governmental character in the promotion, even though subjective, of these flows. Between 2011 and 2016, about 3500 immigrants from Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, and Guinea migrated to Brazil, in addition to the Luso-Africans. Although numerically irrelevant compared to Angolans – they  Tedesco, João Carlos and Pedro Alcides Trindade de Mello. Senegaleses no Centro-Norte do Rio Grande do Sul: imigração laboral e dinâmica social. Porto Alegre: Letra&Vida, 2015. 12  Uebel, Roberto Rodolfo Georg. “Análise do perfil socioespacial das migrações internacionais para o Rio Grande do Sul no início do século XXI: redes, atores e cenários da imigração haitiana e senegalesa.” Master’s thesis, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, 2015. See also; Ibid, Uebel, 2016b. 11

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do not even represent 50% of total Angolan immigration – the two dynamics and provocations to the debate on the reformulation of Brazil’s immigration policy agenda were extremely relevant, as well as the consequences for society, like the growing xenophobia among Brazilians, as in the press and its sensationalist approach. The map in Fig. 10.5 below shows the intensity of these flows from the West African coast, as well as quantitative information about these interesting groups from the perspective of Brazilian migration studies, since this is another peculiar immigration to a peculiar Brazil. Why were these migrations motivated by subjective government action? First, it should be recalled that the flows from these countries, except for Nigerians, were very unimpressive until 2014, when they experienced a real boom, according to the terms of the current literature on migration studies. That is, perspective immigration could only be influenced by a much stronger external variable that would make Brazil a more attractive alternative than the European Union and Canada. Second, and here we insert the answer to the previous question, is the occurrence of two events that complemented each other and created the point of attraction for Senegalese and West Africans: the 2014 World Cup and visa exemption for all nationalities, a fact that would be repeated at the Rio de Janeiro 2016 Olympics and would facilitate the entry of Cubans, Venezuelans, and Syrians into Brazil as well. According to a report published in 2014, and widely reflected in the Brazilian press, these immigrants: All of them entered the country with a tourist visa, granted based on the World Cup General Law - which allows them to stay in the country for ninety days. According to nun Maria do Carmo dos Santos Gonçalves, who helps organize the shelter at the Nossa Senhora Aparecida Seminary, no African had tickets to the World Cup matches. “They came to work, some came in with their body clothes,” she says.13

The permanence of the ninety days guaranteed by the World Cup tourist visa, the “World Cup visa”, was the key element that allowed the considerable arrival of West Africans in the Brazilian territory between 2013 – when this activity began – and 2014, the year of the soccer event in Brazilian cities. Moreover, if we look at the general data presented in the first tables of this chapter, we see that West African inflows declined immediately after 2014, even with the creation of solid care networks for these immigrants, as well as associations created by themselves and their families. An example is a case of Brazilian immigrants in Oceania, who in some ways followed a fast dynamic and boom, also provided by national and regional social and work networks  – Argentines and Uruguayans also migrated to Australia and New Zealand with some intensity. However, when faced with scenarios of manual, unskilled, and informal labor, unlike West Africans, they did not return to Brazil at first glance.

 Zylberkan, Mariana. “Ganenses usam Copa para pedir refúgio e ficar no Brasil.” Revista Veja, 2014. https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/ganeses-usam-copa-para-pedir-refugio-e-ficar-no-brasil/

13

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Fig. 10.6  Map – Routes of Senegalese immigrants towards Brazil Source: Prepared by the author from data of Federal Police (2019)

Another could argue that the immigration of Japanese Brazilians, which is also very peculiar and temporal, according to the economic and labor scenarios of Brazil and Japan, is a case like the one we are discussing here, however, forgets an indispensable element: the familiar, bloody, and historical relationship inherent in these flows. The West Africans we are discussing did not have these previous ties with Brazil, and most of them did not create it from their arrival in Brazil.14 Access to these World Cup Visa data was not provided for any nationality, despite our constant requests within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Tourism, but it is possible to have an estimate with the following information: The Ministry of Justice's most recent survey shows that 8,767 Ghanaian visas were issued during the World Cup and 2,529 have effectively entered the country since then. Of these, 1,397 have already left Brazil and 1,132 remain here. Refuge requests sent to the National Committee for Refugees reach 180.15

 They are not considered here the historical and ethnic ties between Brazil and Africa and the African-Brazilian portion of the population, arising from the slave period between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, almost early twentieth century. What is under discussion is regular twenty-first century migratory flows, based on economic, labor, and political motivations, totally different from the forced slave migrations of the past. 15  Domingues, Fernanda. “Ganenses com visto para a Copa tentam vida no Brasil.” R7, July 20, 2014. https://noticias.r7.com/brasil/ ganenses-com-visto-para-a-copa-tentam-vida-no-brasil-20072014 14

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The data, although different from those we obtained from the Federal Police, indicate that yes, it was the grant of the World Cup visa that allowed the occurrence and admission of these immigrants in Brazil. Regarding the routes, the map of Fig. 10.6 represents the main trajectories towards Brazil. Besides the routes presented in the map in Fig. 10.6, after its elaboration, which was based on information obtained from the Senegalese immigrants themselves – and which also illustrates the routes of the other West Africans, with small variations – other trajectories were discovered, such as this one: The gateway to the country was the airports of Sao Paulo (SP), Porto Alegre (RS) and Natal (RN), the latter the only destination with direct flights from the African country to Brazil. The others made connections at airports in South Africa, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates until they landed in Brazil. From the capitals, they went by bus to Caxias.16

Claiming political motivations, which were not confirmed by the consultations of the Ministry of Justice and Brazil’s diplomatic missions in Africa, West Africans sought refuge and political asylum in Brazil before their World Cup visa stay expired. Thus, in addition to being perspective immigration, it was essentially based on labor and economic ambitions. As the intensity was ephemeral and statistically irrelevant compared with other flows  – for example, the number of Portuguese or American citizens who immigrated to Brazil was 42% higher in 2014 – what justified its broad exposure were four factors, which we will now address: 1. Excessive media exposure: The approach of the Brazilian press, from more conservative vehicles, such as Veja magazine, to even more progressive ones, such as Carta Capital, was based on exaggerated sensationalism and mixed with traditional media humanitarianism of the Brazilian press. Weekly special reports, reporters sent to immigration shelters on Brazilian borders, daily news with irrelevant figures, such as the arrival of Senegalese in municipal bus stations, hint to the risk of Ebola virus spreading in Brazil by immigrants (in the same year there was a pandemic of the disease in the world) gave the tonic that allowed the exposure of such groups in Brazil, in addition to their visibility by skin color, black, and an allusion on the part of the Brazilian common sense with the migration crisis of the Mediterranean. 2. Rise of episodes of xenophobia and the sentiments of aversion to immigrants: not infrequent were the joking and prejudiced comments of Brazilians, including African descendants, on social networks and on-site interactions regarding the arrival of West Africans in the country, covered with racist practice’s elements in Brazil and with the aforementioned media exposure. In this context, episodes of physical aggression against Africans, hate speech by politicians – including the current President Bolsonaro – and hostilities of ordinary citizens (self-described as “good citizens”) were commonplace since 2014 and mixed with the instability given the unstable political landscape, in effect until the time this chapter is writ-

16

 Ibid, Zylberkan 2014.

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Fig. 10.7 Police State action against West African immigrants selling irregular goods  – Municipality of Novo Hamburgo/RS Source: Jornal NH apud Uebel (2015)

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ten. Although once considered a cordial society,17 Brazilian society has unfortunately shown several episodes of intolerance towards African and Latin American immigrants, especially, which served as a source of interest for the theme within the academy, since, quantitatively, it was immigration with small numbers. 3. State and Governmental Agenda: The arrival of these new immigrants and the consequent exposure mentioned in the two previous topics also induced the sensitivity of the Brazilian state and government institutions, which were already in a deep debate regarding Haitian immigration since 2010. In this sense, the performance of public policies was verified in two ways: (a) reception and insertion in the labor market, especially the active cooperation of religious institutions, NGOs, and third sector agencies; and (b) strengthening of law enforcement, harassment, and vexation of those West Africans who practiced informal and irregular commerce, the popular and historic street vendors, as well depicted by the police state in Fig. 10.7. 4 . Re-signification of land borders: The arrival of these immigrants across the northern borders of Brazil with Bolivia, Peru, and, to a lesser extent, with the three Guyana not only redesigned their role in transborder relations but also re-­ signified them as to their importance of migration flows towards Brazil. Apart from traditional borderland migration and mercosurean immigration, Brazil has never seen international migration flows in its land borders. The regular flows until the twentieth century were by the sea and after World War II by air. The municipality of Brasiléia, the state of Acre, bordering Cobija, Bolivia, where we were in field research in 2014, portrayed well the Brazil of new land migrations, such as that of West Africans. Not only the municipal infrastructure was rethought but also the federal attention and logistics, with the temporary displacement of agents of the Federal Police, customs authority (Receita Federal), Ministry of Foreign Relations, Ministry of Justice, and Armed Forces to receive and host these immigrants, who were already in a second wave, since the first was of the Haitians. It can be noted, therefore, how the dynamics of immigration from the West African coast was decisive for the shift and subsequent rupture of Dilma Rousseff’s foreign policy for migration and for the years to come, which would lead to a decrease in the general flow of African immigration in Brazil due to the worsening economic and labor environment in Brazil, as well as the rise of a far-right and anti-­ immigration government since January 2019.

Conclusion If Dilma Rousseff did not fulfill her eight years in office, it is also possible to infer, as we discussed in this chapter, that migrations to Brazil would also break a transition cycle, contrary to what was thought at the time. It was during her administration 17

 Holanda, Sérgio Buarque de. Racines du Brésil. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1998.

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that the first Brazilian Government attempted to create a national immigration policy occurred since the time of the Empire, with the realization of first National Conference on Migration and Refuge (COMIGRAR) in 2014, and also the end of the agenda of public migration policies, with the paralysis of the Rousseff administration at the end of 2015, with the opening of her impeachment trial in the House of Representatives. During this period from 2011 to 2016, in addition to these two turning points, other factors contributed to the African migration reaching visibility not previously seen, but which was already drawing in the last year of the Lula da Silva administration. This visibility can be defined by the social insertion of immigrants, mediatization of their arrival, and integration, and by ethno-racial issues linked to xenophobia. The immigration of Africans created an environment of rediscussion of Brazilian foreign policy for migration within the Rousseff administration. After the governments of Emperor Pedro II and President Lula da Silva, it was the Rousseff administration that gave the most attention to migration issues in a broad sense. This scenario, in the end, would create the basis for the update of the migration law, which had been in force since the civil-military dictatorship, with the Foreigner’s Statute. It is in the last moments of Dilma Rousseff’s government that the passage of the new migration bill gains acquiescence in parliament, in a modified way and changed by the future chancellor of President Michel Temer, then-Senator Aloysio Nunes Ferreira. From a country that was observing the growth of immigration flows, migrations quickly transformed Brazil into a country of foreign emigration and international remigration. The project of a reference immigration policy turned into a modern Migration Law, however, modified in its humanitarian and multicultural principles and promulgated by an unelected, unpopular president who was averse to what was being discussed in the governmental field of migration, since 2003, i.e., an example of the rupture; for this reason, our quantitative analysis focused until 2016. Thus, the period of growth of African immigration flows to Brazil can be explained as a combination resulting from the actions of the previous administration with other issues that are beyond the direct and objective action of the Brazilian Government (but subjectively led by it): (1) the country’s participation in humanitarian missions in Africa; (2) the More Doctors Program; (3) cooperation and scholarship programs; (4) the promotion of the country by migration and international labor networks as an alternative to the United States, the European Union, and other traditional destinations. Brazil’s virtuous cycle in all fields ended definitively in 2014 and will be substituted by a conservative government in the following years. Raised these issues, it can be concluded, therefore, that the migrations of Africans to Brazil in general during the Dilma Rousseff government, 2011 to 2016, were motivated by such factors: (a) continuity of previous flows; (b) Brazil’s position as the only facilitated and immediate alternative; (c) subsidized migration from a strategic insertion plan. Considering this, we can say that Brazil, despite all the political, institutional, economic, and social tensions it has felt since 2014, has reached a new level in the way of dealing with the immigration issue, with the recent phenomenon of West

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African immigration. If Dilma Rousseff assumed the government with the continuation of the treatment and agenda of Lula da Silva, who, in turn, continued with that of Cardoso, although adapted and now participating in the “active and haughty foreign policy,” her migratory foreign policy would suffer a rupture and change in the passage to Temer’s interim government. Thus, in this context, it emerges another characteristic of contemporary African immigration in Brazil: its rapid dynamics and the unaccompanied at the same time by governmental institutions. It is immigration that brings with it a boom, quick insertion, and capillarization in the host country and society and that, with the same speed, emigrates or remigrates to other countries, if the previously dreamed and wished success is not achieved. In this way, African immigration happened during the Rousseff administration from the opportunities of work, income, and social security and was immediately interrupted when the first indications that the Brazilian scenario would change  – which eventually materialized  – into a worse scenario than that in their home countries. That said, we also query the mainstream thinking in other studies on recent immigration to Brazil, which stated that immigrants were the first to be fired, especially in the southern region of the country, in the leather, footwear, and metallurgy industries. This statement is not at all wrong, but incomplete: African immigrants, as well as Latin Americans, were the first to foresee and feel the effects of the crisis that would settle in Brazil, except for Venezuelans, who had no other alternative. This explains the declines in all rankings, from irregular immigration to asylum requests and issuing of visas, as shown in the data discussed in this chapter. Finally, with the election of Jair Bolsonaro’s far-right government, which has in its conservative agenda the policy of border and migration control, African immigration in Brazil tends to become another temporally restricted phenomenon with new flows interrupted for the next few years. The country is no longer attractive again, as it presents anti-immigration government structures while its economy, cooperation programs, and prospects for immigration are no longer attractive as at the beginning of the century, hence the return of the old paradigms.

Bibliography da Silva, Luiz Inácio Lula. 2003. Comunicado Conjunto da Visita Oficial de sua Excelência Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Presidente da República Federativa do Brasil à República Democrática de São Tomé e Príncipe. Accessed 25 Sept 2019. https://concordia.itamaraty.gov.br/ detalhamento/5053. da Silva, César Augusto. 2013. A política brasileira para refugiados (1998–2012). PhD diss., Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. de Holanda, Sérgio Buarque. 1998. Racines du Brésil. Paris: Éditions Gallimard. Divisão de Temas Educacionais. Histórico do PEC-PG. Accessed 25 Sept 2019. http://hdl.handle. net/10174/8886.

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Domingues, Fernanda. 2014. Ganenses com visto para a Copa tentam vida no Brasil. R7, July 20, 2014. https://noticias.r7.com/brasil/ganenses-com-visto-para-a-copa-tentam-vida-nobrasil-20072014. dos Santos, José Rebelo, Maria Filomena Mendes, and Conceição Peixe Rego. 2012. A imigração Africana em Portugal nos últimos vinte anos: oportunidades e ameaças no mercado de trabalho. Accessed 25 Sept 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10174/8886. Herédia, Vania Beatriz Merlotti. 2015. Migrações Internacionais: o caso dos senegaleses no Sul do Brasil. Caxias do Sul: Quatrilho Editorial. Rizzi, Kamilla Raquel, and Isabella Cruzichi da Silva. 2017. A CPLP como mecanismo de atuação do Brasil no Atlântico Sul: a ampliação da cooperação, os desafios e a possibilidade de liderança. Revista Brasileira de Estudos Africanos 2 (4): 32–63. https://seer.ufrgs.br/index.php/ rbea/article/view/79143/47055. Rousseff, Dilma. 2013. Discurso da Presidenta da República Dilma Rousseff na Cerimônia de Abertura da III Cúpula América do Sul-África. Accessed 25 Sept 2019. http://www. itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas/presidente-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil-discursos/4693-discurso-da-presidenta-da-republica-dilma-rousseff-na-cerimonia-de-abertura-da-iii-cupula-america-do-sul-africa. Tedesco, João Carlos, and Pedro Alcides Trindade de Mello. 2015. Senegaleses no Centro-Norte do Rio Grande do Sul: imigração laboral e dinâmica social. Porto Alegre: Letra&Vida. Uebel, Roberto Rodolfo Georg. 2015. Análise do perfil socioespacial das migrações internacionais para o Rio Grande do Sul no início do século XXI: redes, atores e cenários da imigração haitiana e senegalesa. Master’s thesis, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. ———. 2016a. O imigrante como objeto, a fronteira como um portão: como a mídia impressa percebe o imigrante haitiano e o papel das fronteiras no Brasil e no Rio Grande do Sul. Tempo da Ciência 23(46): 115–131. http://e-revista.unioeste.br/index.php/tempodaciencia/article/ view/16132. ———. 2016b. Panorama e perfil da imigração senegalesa no Rio Grande do Sul no início do século XXI. Boletim Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul 1(28): 56–77. https://revistas.fee.tche. br/index.php/boletim-geografico-rs/article/view/3731. ———. 2018. Política externa migratória brasileira: das migrações de perspectiva à hiperdinamização das migrações durante os governos Lula da Silva e Dilma Rousseff. PhD diss., Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. Ventura, Deisy. 2017. Entre falácias e fronteiras: migrações e refúgio nas relações internacionais contemporâneas. Accessed 25 Sept 2019. http://www.encontro2017.abri.org.br/programacao. Zylberkan, Mariana. 2014. Ganenses usam Copa para pedir refúgio e ficar no Brasil. Revista Veja. https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/ganeses-usam-copa-para-pedir-refugio-e-ficar-no-brasil/.

Chapter 11

Libya and African Migration to Europe Olubukola S. Adesina

Introduction Europe has long been a favored destination for migrants due to its apparent promise of safety and a better life. While some are fleeing armed conflict, insecurity, and human rights violations, others seek international protection on account of religious, ethnic, or political persecution, persecution due to their sexual orientation or gender identity, or to escape different forms of sexual or gender-based violence. Some make these journeys to reunify with family members in Europe, while others are seeking employment or education opportunities. Africans form a large percentage of migrants to Europe. Many Africans embark on the journey to Europe for various reasons including social and economic disparities, conflict, and crime in several African countries. As the continent with the fastest population growth rate in the world, though the continent is making significant economic gains, most of its countries have failed to translate these gains into sustainable livelihoods for its teeming population. Thus, many European countries continue to play host to both regular and irregular migrants. As noted by Van Mol and de Valk,1 patterns of migration from, toward, and within Europe underwent significant changes and further diversification starting in 1990. The collapse of the Iron Curtain and the opening of the borders of Eastern Europe induced new migration flows across Europe. The end of the Cold War, as well as the wars in the former Yugoslavia, led to new flows of asylum seekers to Western Europe. Penninx observes that migrants:  Van Mol, C., de Valk, H. “Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic Perspective”. In Integration Processes and Policies in Europe, edited by B. Garcés-Mascareñas and R. Penninx, 31–55. New York: Springer, Cham (IMISCOE Research Series), 2016. 1

O. S. Adesina (*) Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. Abegunrin, S. O. Abidde (eds.), African Migrants and the Refugee Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56642-5_11

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come to Europe from all over the world in significant numbers: expatriates working for multinational companies and international organizations, skilled workers from all over the world, nurses and doctors from the Philippines, refugees and asylum seekers from African, near Eastern and Asian countries, from the Balkan and former Soviet Union countries, students from China, undocumented workers from African countries, just to single out some of the major immigrant categories.2

Intra-European Union movements were eased considerably by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty’s abolition of borders. At the same time, entrance into the EU became progressively restricted due to the unification of the European markets, which imposed strict border controls and visa regulations. These controls on the entrance of foreigners went hand in hand with increased irregular migration.3 Migrants’ countries of origin as well as their migration motives became increasingly diversified, and migration into the EU remains largely associated with active measures of access restriction and border control. North African countries have long been points of departure to Europe, both for their citizens and for persons in transit. In recent years, it has become a gateway for irregular migration into Europe. It is very difficult to precisely quantify irregular migration flows into, though, and from North Africa.4 Düvell (2008) noted that the hidden population of irregular migrants is very difficult to quantify, and existing figures are often implausibly low or unbelievably high. The problem of quantitative estimates is a significant one for North Africa, as for other geographical areas. As Jandl5 has noted concerning studies carried out in Europe, many methodologies exist for estimating the size of populations of irregular migrants living in a country and/or the number of irregular entries, and often these methodologies produce very different estimates of the same phenomenon. Thus, statistics usually reeled out concerning migrants and refugees are estimates. Nonetheless, this does not remove from the fact that there are intense migratory flows to Europe and some other developed countries. According to a 2009 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report, about 65,000 illegal migrants landed in Italy, Malta, and Spain in 2006. In 2007, about 40,000 illegal migrants arrived in those three countries, representing about 23 percent of all the illegal bor-

2  Penninx, R. “Introduction”. In the Dynamics of International Migration and Settlement in Europe: A State of The Art” edited by R. Penninx, M. Berger, and K. Kraal, 7–17. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006. 3  Bade, K.  J. Europa En Movimiento: Las Migraciones Desde Fi Nales Del Siglo XVIII Hasta Nuestros Días. Barcelona: Crítica. 2003. See also; Bonifazi, C. “Evolution of Regional Patterns of International Migration in Europe”. In International Migration in Europe: New Trends and New Methods of Analysis, edited by C.  Bonifazi, M.  Okólski, J.  Schoorl, and P.  Simon, 107–128. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008; Castles, S., De Haas, H., and Miller, M. J. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 4  Düvell, F. “Clandestine Migration in Europe”. Social Science Information 47, no. 4 (2008): 479–497. 5  Jandl, M. The Estimation of Illegal Migration in Europe. Studi Emigrazione/Migration Studies 41, no. 153 (2004): 141–155.

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der crossings detected by the EU that year.6 According to the same source, the migrants were mainly from sub-Saharan countries, with a large proportion coming from Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Senegal. In 2016, 181,400 refugees and migrants reached Italy, while 153,800 did in 2015, reflecting a significant increase. As of the end of April 2017, the majority of people reaching Italy’s shores from Libya were from Nigeria, Bangladesh, Guinea, Ivory Coast, and The Gambia.7 Due to this increase in the number of people entering the EU and the absence of a consensus in the bloc, many refugees are stuck in Italy. For this reason, Italy’s government announced in June 2017 that the country had reached a “saturation point” and asked other member countries to share its burden. The intense migratory flows, commonly called the “refugee crisis,” experienced in Europe have put to test the mechanisms of European countries’ immigration, border, and asylum policies and their capacity to deal with a humanitarian crisis. In reaction to this crisis, the European Union and some of its member states bilaterally have put in place several policies in their attempts to prevent sub-Saharan migrants from crossing the two main physical obstacles on their way to Europe, namely, the Mediterranean and the Sahara.8 Although sometimes accompanied by humanitarian justifications citing the dangers and loss of life faced by the migrants, these policies were mostly aimed at pushing governments and security forces of “transit countries” to intercept irregular migrants. The routes often taken by the irregular migrants and refugees are often dangerous, putting them at continuous risk. On 9 November 2017, a German newspaper, Der Tagesspiegel, listed the names of 33,293 migrants who died on their way to reach Europe.9 Yet, despite increased reportage of the dangers associated with the journeys, as well as allegations of “slave trade” in Libya, many irregular migrants from Africa still aspire to embark on the dangerous journey across the Sahara and the Mediterranean. This chapter examines the dynamics of migration through Libya as a gateway to Europe. It examines the dangers associated with crossing the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea, the conditions of migrants trapped in Libya, as well as international responses to this migration crisis.

6  UNODC. “Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment”. 2009. Accessed August 28, 2019. https://www.unodc.org/nigeria/en/transnational-trafficking-andthe-rule-of-law-in-west-africa_-a-threat-assessment.html 7  UNHCR. “Sea Arrivals Dashboard January–April 2017”. Regional Office for Southern Europe, Italy. 2017. Accessed August 30, 2019. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/56593 8  Tubiana, J., Warin, C. and Saeneen, G.M. Multilateral Damage: The Impact Of EU Migration Policies On Central Saharan Routes. CRU Report. The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2018. 9  Kraus, R. “Heart-wrenching newspaper feature lists names of 33,000 dead refugees”. 2017. Accessed August 28, 2019. https://mashable.com/2017/11/10/der-tagesspiegel-list-of-deadrefugees/

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Migration to Europe Due to strict immigration policies in destination countries, harsh terrain, and the urgency of many to escape their circumstances, migrants and refugees from sub-­ Saharan Africa often pay smugglers to assist them in crossing the Sahara Desert to reach Libya and Tunisia and proceed to Europe by boat.10 The trip to Europe costs several thousands of dollars and may take years to complete, as many migrants remain in hubs along their route to work to afford the next leg of their trip. For most of the migrants who landed in Italy in recent years, the southern or eastern shore of the Mediterranean was for them the last leg of a long journey that began in the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan), other sub-­ Saharan African countries (in particular Nigeria, Mali, Ghana, and the Gambia), the Middle East (Iraq), and even further East (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India). Many of them are then smuggled by sea to Europe typically comprising what the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) calls mixed migrants, that is, refugees and economic migrants, using the same routes and resorting to the same smugglers to reach the same destination.11 Reitano, Adal, and Shaw point out that: It is estimated that in 80 percent of these cases, the journey is “facilitated” by migrant smugglers and criminal groups that who provides a range of services such as transportation, fraudulent identification, corruption of border officials and settlement services. Smugglers in transit countries coordinate with smugglers in source countries to act as guides, escorting individuals across the Sahara Desert, heading towards the coast. Although some smuggling networks are organized criminal structures, many are loosely linked chains of individuals, which make it challenging for authorities to dismantle.12

Three major migratory routes traverse the Mediterranean Sea from Africa to Europe: the Western Mediterranean (into Spain), the Central Mediterranean (into Malta and Italy), and the Eastern Mediterranean (into Greece).13 For the Western route, the main source countries are Mali, the Gambia, and Senegal. The Western route often connects in the Sahel with the Central route, for which the source countries are Nigeria, Ghana, and Niger. For the Eastern route, its sources are from Somalia, Eritrea, and Darfur in South Sudan and tend to cut north through Sudan and Egypt and then along the northern coast of Africa. All of these routes converge in the Maghreb, and recent years mostly in Libya, for the sea crossing to Italy, which is currently the major route for refugees and migrants seeking to reach Europe.

 Fargues, P., and Bonfanti, S. “When the Best Option Is A Leaky Boat: Why Migrants Risk Their Lives Crossing The Mediterranean And What Europe Is Doing About It”. 2014. Accessed August 19, 2019. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33271/MPC_PB_2014-05.pdf?sequence=1 11  Ibid, UNHCR, 2017. 12  Reitano, T., Adal, L., and Shaw, M. Smuggled Futures: The Dangerous Path of the Migrant from Africa to Europe. Geneva: Geneva: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2014. 13  Ibid. 10

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Of the three major migratory routes into Europe, the Central Mediterranean route has become the most used route in recent years. Migrants and asylum seekers use the Central Mediterranean route to enter the EU irregularly, with Italy and Malta as the main destination countries. Many refugees and migrants have, however, sometimes chosen to move to other countries outside Europe after crossing the Mediterranean. Several migrants and refugees get to know about the Central Mediterranean route from a variety of sources, including their communities, those who have previously made the journey, and individuals and groups they meet at particular points en route or in major transit hubs.14 New information and communication technologies, along with social media platforms, facilitate access to and spread of information across and throughout networks. Migrants and refugees who reach Europe often call, text, or use social media to contact those in Libya, who in turn often call family and friends in their countries of origin and relay information about their journey. This information then spreads throughout the relevant communities. The presence of existing social networks also contributes to the onward movement, with many refugees and migrants arriving in the EU in search of family members. The EU Directive on Family Reunification, which lays out the right to family reunification for third-­ country nationals, further encourages movement.15 The journey through the Central Mediterranean route to Europe is fraught with dangers, as migrants and refugees departing from North Africa attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe, transiting through Libya. Hundreds of people die each year crossing the Mediterranean Sea, in overloaded fishing boats or rubber dinghies run by smugglers. In essence, stricter immigration policies in Europe have encouraged the development of smuggling and trafficking networks in Libya. We need to note the difference between smuggling and trafficking. According to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000, Art. 3(a), smuggling is defined as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident,” while trafficking is defined as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of

 Altai Consulting. “Leaving Libya: Rapid Assessment of Municipalities of Departures of Migrants in Libya”. 2017. Accessed August 19, 2019. http://www.altaiconsulting.com/wp-content/ uploads/2017/08/2017_Altai-Consulting_Leaving-Libya-Rapid-Assessment-of-Municipalitiesof-Departure-of-Migrants-in-Libya.pdf 15  Danish Refugee Council. “Right to a Future: Empowering Refugees from Syria and Host Governments to Face a Long-Term Crisis”. 2015. Accessed August 19, 2019. https://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/research-publications/right-to-a-future-empowering-refugees-fromsyria-and-host-governments-to-face-a-long-term-crisis/ 14

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giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.”

The Niger-Libya Migration Route Niger is the main transit country for sub-Saharan migrants heading to Libya and to a lesser extent to Algeria and then eventually to Europe. By 2017, the majority of refugees and migrants who entered the European Union had departed from Libya, and it was estimated that 90 percent of arrivals in Libya had traveled through Niger.16 Initially, once the migrants get to Niger, access to Libya is relatively easy. The main routes to Libya and Algeria depart from Niger, more specifically from Agadez, an ancient crossroads of trans-Saharan trade routes that in the 2000s became a key hub for immigration from sub-Saharan Africa first to Libya and more recently to Europe. Although migration routes have evolved in response to economic, security, and policy changes, descriptions of the main itinerary across Niger to Libya by migrants and authors since the early 2000s remain very similar. Migrants from all over West Africa meet at Agadez, having normally reached it by bus through Niamey, Niger’s capital, or Zinder  – this is often the case for northern Nigerians, who follow the ancient trade route that linked Kano with Niger and continued across the Sahara. Once in Agadez, they contact the city’s smugglers, who take them in trucks or pickups into Libya – mainly to the Sebha oasis – or, in fewer cases, to Tamanrasset in southern Algeria.17 Migrants tend to undertake the trip in several stages, usually stopping in other Nigerien towns such as Dirkou and Madama, working there to save money to continue their journey, which can sometimes take several months. The last leg of the trip across Niger takes migrants to Sebha in Libya. The IOM estimated at least 333,891 migrants transited through northern Niger toward Libya, and to some degree to Algeria, in 2016, making it a peak year. In 2015, Niamey passed a new law on the “illegal trafficking of migrants,” which involved several legal challenges.18 First, most migrants transiting through Niger originate from ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), a 15-member-state zone allowing its 350,000 million residents freedom of movement – without visas – and trade across its borders. Niger itself is a member and clearly benefits from those freedoms. But the new law de facto violates ECOWAS residents’ rights to enter and travel within Niger. Further, given that there is practically no government in Libya, there is no proper Libyan visa system or border control which could prevent those West African  Puig, O. “Niger: The New European Border”. 2016. Accessed August 15, 2019. https://elpais. com/elpais/2016/09/02/planeta_futuro/1472813469_175898.html 17  De Haas, H. “Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU: Historical Roots and Current Trends”. 2006. Accessed 15 August, 2019. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ trans-saharan-migration-north-africa-and-eu-historical-roots-and-current-trends 18  Ibid, Tubiani, Warin and Saeneen, 2018. 16

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migrants from entering Libya.19 Although the destination of migrants crossing the Libyan border is not, in principle, Niger’s responsibility, the new law de facto prohibits exit from Niger, or ECOWAS, into Libya  – thus opening another legal gray zone. Until implementation of the 2015 law began in mid-2016, migrants were traveling openly in buses legally operated by private companies, such as Rimbo, to and within Niger, as far as the Saharan transit town of Agadez. There, the difficulty of the roads across sandy plains obliged them to board the back of pickup trucks, which were operating openly and no less legally. Drivers were picking up their passengers from buses at Agadez autogare (bus station) and then waiting for the weekly military escort allowing them, every Monday, to travel safely along the first stretch of the road to Puits Espoir (Hope’s Well), in the middle, or even as far as the Dirkou oasis, midway to Libya  – a stretch of road long made dangerous by chronic banditry.20 When Niger began to enforce the law in mid-2016, the authorities targeted the transport of migrants from Agadez and onward north, despite the fact the town lies 1100 km from the Libyan border. Between mid-2016 and April 2018, Niger’s security forces arrested more than 282 drivers, car owners, “coaxers” (intermediaries), and “ghetto” owners housing migrants, and confiscated 300 to 350 vehicles, in Agadez and on the road to Libya. During the first half of 2017, when enforcement of the new law was at its peak, nearly 10,000 foreigners were sent back to the border or expelled from Niger.21 Thus, to avoid arrest, smugglers resorted to driving on various new or little-used roads or travel at night, when government officials would have closed for the day. They avoid hubs such as Agadez and Dirkou, escaping government control along the normal route. The main new axes appear to skirt Agadez on all sides to reach and follow international borders, including the Niger-Algeria border and the Niger-­ Chad border, up to the border with Libya.22 Such itineraries are partly resurrecting older contraband itineraries used during the period of the UN air traffic embargo against Libya in the 1990s. They also partly merge with existing drug trafficking routes, reportedly occasioning new ties between drug traffickers and migrant smugglers, since both activities are now seen as similarly criminal. The journey between Agadez and Sebha is very dangerous, as it involves crossing the Sahara Desert. Migrants have to survive on little water and food, crammed into trucks or pickups to the point that deaths from asphyxiation are not uncommon.23 Vehicle breakdowns in the desert can result in the death of their passengers, who often run out of food and water before finding assistance. Migrants are also

 Ibid.  bid. 21  Zandonini, G. “The Monday That Changed Migration in Niger”. 2018. Accessed August 15, 2019. https://openmigration.org/en/analyses/the-monday-that-changed-migration-in-niger/ 22  Ibid, Tubiani, Warin and Saeneen, 2018. 23  Ibid, Puig, 2016. 19 20

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exposed to bandit attacks, and some are abandoned by their smugglers in the middle of the desert. Survivors recount gory tales of what they passed through on these journeys. For instance, Jimoh Aisha, a Libya returnee to Nigeria, narrated that they were tightly packed in the vehicle that conveyed them and many of them died before they could reach their destination. The bodies of those that died were thrown away on the road as they had to keep moving. She stated that to quench their thirst, “she resorted to feeding on her menstrual blood. Aisha, who is a devoted Christian, said that her period had never been so heavy before; the blood gushed out heavily while she was in the desert and she drank it to stay alive. The other ladies who were on the same journey with her did the same in order not to die of thirst.”24 Despite the high risks, thousands of migrants have traveled through Agadez every year since the early 2000s. During the first 18 months after the migration law became enforceable in mid-2016, 38 migrants died in the desert every month, versus 11 each month in the previous 18 months. Each year, the peak month for mortality appeared to be June: 40 migrants died in Niger in June 2015, 55 in June 2016, and more than 130 in June 2017. Further, in 2017, the peak period for mortality was not limited to June, with more than 70 migrants dead monthly in May, July, and October.25 The main beneficiary of transit migration has undoubtedly been Agadez, Niger’s main migration hub, which economy is now highly dependent on migratory flows. It had been a tourist destination until security deteriorated, and in 2013 many of its numerous travel agencies were offering smuggling services to migrants, often led by former Tuareg rebels or former migrants.26 State actors have also been alleged of complicity in the smuggling business, sometimes run smuggling networks themselves, and the Nigerien military is reported to have escorted migrant convoys at times of insecurity.

Libya: A Transit Hub Libya was, and remains, a key actor when it comes to sub-Saharan migration to Europe – both for migrants and for Europe’s attempts to control their flow. For many years, Libya has been an attractive launching point for the migrant flows streaming into Europe. The country has long been a transit and destination country for individuals fleeing conflict and persecution or seeking an escape from extreme poverty; lack of access to economic, social, and cultural rights; and other human rights violations. Libya’s geographical proximity to southern Europe and its lawlessness makes it an attractive launchpad for human traffickers cashing in on migrants hoping to get  Popoola, T. “Libya Returnee Shares Horrid Detail of Desert Life, Says She Drank Her Blood To Survive”. 2019. Accessed September 10, 2019. https://www.legit.ng/1260963-libya-returneeshares-horrid-detail-desert-life-drank-blood-survive.html 25  Ibid, Tubiani, Warin and Saeneen, 2018. 26  Ibid, Altai Consulting, 2017. 24

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to Europe.27 Its colonial association with Italy makes it particularly attractive to Ethiopian and Somali migrants as a doorway to southern Europe. Historically, the discovery of oil in Libya in 1957 led to large numbers of migrant workers from across the Middle East, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa to come to the country and work in emerging economic hubs across Libya. Also, several severe droughts and violent conflicts in the Sahel Region triggered other refugee and migrant flows to Libya – mostly Nigerien Tuaregs and also Tubu refugees.28 From the 1970s to the 1990s, the government under Muammar Gaddafi shifted to Pan-Africanism, and this encouraged migration from Arab countries and later from the entire African continent to meet manpower needs in sectors such as agriculture and construction. Immigrants were attracted by the country’s relative wealth and its open door policy, which granted them visa-free entry. Beauge and Burgat stated that: Between 1970 and 1982, while the total Libyan population increased by 1.6% from less than 2 million to over 3 million, the active working population grew by 2.7%, from 450,000 to over 1,200,000. This increase is mainly due to the foreign workers whose proportion in the total active labor force increased from 11% to 50% even though the proportion of active Libyan labor force remained stationary at 20%.29

During this period, migrants came with various skill levels, working in oil fields, but equally in the construction and agricultural sectors.30 Indeed, it has been shown that through the 1970s and 1980s, foreign workers from Northern Africa were instrumental in the development of both the formal and informal economies of Libya. Several bilateral agreements were negotiated to ease the employment of foreign workers, and a blind eye was turned on the recruitment of undocumented immigrants.31 These bilateral agreements included The agreements on agriculture manpower (1971) and circulation of persons and establishment (1988) with Niger, The convention of establishment with Tunisia (1973), The labor agreement with Morocco (1983), The convention in the field of work and the use of human resources with Algeria (1987), and The labor agreement with Jordan (1998) among others. While some managed to regularize their situation if their employer supported their application for a residence permit, the majority continued to work in the country irregularly, tolerated by a general lack of controls.

 Mafu, L. “The Libyan/Trans-Mediterranean Slave Trade, the African Union, and the Failure of Human Morality”. Sage Open 9, no. 1 (2019): 1–10. 28  Bredeloup, S. and Pliez, O. The Libyan Migration Corridor. Florence: European University Institute/Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2011. 29  Beauge, G. and Burgat, F. The Question of Migration in Libya. Maghreb-Machrek 112 (1986): 56–68. 30  Paoletti, E. “Migration and Foreign Policy: The Case of Libya”. The Journal of North African Studies 16, no. 2 (2011): 215–231. 31   Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism initiative. “Invisible Labour: Women’s Labour Migration to Libya”. 2017. Accessed August 17, 2019. http://www.mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/028_invisible-labour.pdf 27

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Gaddafi’s initial attempts to rely on Pan-Arab solidarity links failed; he then turned instead to sub-Saharan Africa, positioning himself as an “African leader” in a diplomatic move that culminated in 1998 with his creation of the Community of Saharan and Sahelian States (CEN-SAD). The existing migration routes that connected Libya with the Sahel and West Africa were expanded and consolidated as a result and became linked with East Africa’s migration system. Workers from Sudan or Ethiopia now migrated to Libya, and refugees from Darfur and Eritrea began to take the route to Libya as well. Whereas less than 40,000 sub-Saharans lived in Libya according to the 1995 census, their numbers peaked at 1.5 million in 2000 according to Libyan officials.32 Around 2000, the government began fearing that too many foreigners had come, saturating the market for jobs. In a country with just over five million people, well over one million non-Libyans had arrived. The government blamed them for rising crime, new disease, and social tension. Around the same time, European governments began pressuring Libya to control illegal migration. In September 2000, a clash between a group of Libyans and foreign workers, mainly from Chad and Sudan, led to the killing of at least 50 sub-Saharans. The Libyan government responded by introducing stricter immigration regulations, and large-scale arrests of immigrants by the police ensued.33 This was accompanied by a new, widespread practice of arbitrary detention of sub-Saharans in prisons and camps, where abuses and torture were common (leading in some instances to death in custody). Refugees and asylum seekers, at risk of persecution or death in their countries of origin, were also deported. Gaddafi’s government, which had previously supported an “open door” policy toward its African allies, decided to work more closely with European states to tackle irregular migration across the Mediterranean. According to Bredeloup and Pliez: Libya was compelled to reach a paradoxical balance between 1) an open-door policy welcoming migrant from Sub-Saharan Africa, and 2) its involvement in international discussions on illegal immigration control in Mediterranean countries. In short, Libya needed to combine the two axes of its foreign policy: developing relations with Africa  – a policy inherited from the embargo years  – and discussing sanction-lifting with partners in the EU.34

In 2007, it imposed visas on both Arabs and Africans and adopted normative changes concerning stay and labor, turning an unknown number of immigrants into “irregulars” suddenly. Large-scale expulsions were carried out, and foreign nationals lost free access to public health and education. In addition, stricter controls were applied to their visa and work permits. Most of the expelled were sub-Saharan Africans.35 In 2008, Libya signed a “Friendship, Partnership, and Cooperation” Treaty with Italy

 Ibid. See also Bredeloup and Pliez, 2011.  Ibid, De Haas, 2006. 34  Ibid, Bredeloup and Pliez, 2011. 35  Ibid. 32 33

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that included provisions on joint maritime patrols, the delivery to Libya of naval units, and allowing the pushback to Libya of irregular migrants intercepted in international waters. This bilateral legal framework is considered to be a typical example of the “externalization” of the EU border.36 This trend culminated in 2010 with the adoption of a law on combating irregular migration which allowed for the indefinite detention, forced labor, and deportation of those considered irregular aliens on the Libyan territory.37 The criminalization of irregular entry, stay, and exit, coupled with the absence of any legislation or practical infrastructure for the protection of asylum seekers and victims of trafficking, has resulted in mass, arbitrary, and indefinite detention becoming the primary migration management system in the country.38 This system, which lends itself perfectly to corrupt practices, has paved the way for horrendous violations to be perpetrated in places of detention, in which refugees and migrants are at the mercy of authorities, militias, and armed groups, often working seamlessly with smugglers for financial gain. The lack of any judicial oversight of the detention process and the near-total impunity with which officials operate has facilitated the institutionalization of torture and other ill-treatments in detention centers. The fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 in Libya and the resulting descent of the country into a civil war led an increasing number of migrants from West Africa to seek to move on to Europe by crossing the Mediterranean. Since Gaddafi’s fall, the Western-backed regime in Tripoli has failed to establish control over the country leading to the terrorist group ISIS setting up camp in Libya.39 Without central governmental control, the activities of criminal networks that have profited from human trafficking and the slave trade have been unabated. Migrants and refugees in Libya are frequently robbed, and smugglers may force them to pay more money than originally agreed upon. Many continue to use smugglers within Libya due to the number of checkpoints that have to be crossed. Some of them become indebted to smugglers through “pay-as-you-go” arrangements, leaving them vulnerable to abuse and trafficking. Children, in particular, may be forced into begging or theft by traffickers.40 In southern Libya, many men, women, and children migrants work under the control of smuggling groups, even when they are not physically detained by these groups. Migrants also experience indentured labor through kidnappings and arbitrary detention by traffickers and armed groups, some of whom operate official detention centers  Klepp, S. “Italy and its Libyan Cooperation Program: Pioneer of the European Union’s Refugee Policy?” 2010. Accessed August 18, 2019. https://www.mei.edu/publications/ italy-and-its-libyan-cooperation-program-pioneer-european-unions-refugee-policy 37  Ibid, Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism initiative, 2017. 38   Amnesty International. “Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion: Abuses Against Europe-Bound Refugees and Migrants”. 2017. Accessed August 18, 2019. https://www.amnesty.org/download/ Documents/MDE1975612017ENGLISH.PDF 39  Ibid, Mafu, 2019. 40  Ibid, Altai Consulting, 2017. 36

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and force migrants to work, in many cases, without payment, on farms, in houses as domestic workers, and in construction, or collecting rubbish.41 Also, women migrants may be forced to work as sex workers. Migrants in Libya have restricted access to services due to their irregular status, limited access to economic resources, and widespread discriminatory practices. In terms of access to housing, price barriers, security concerns, overcrowded shelters, and scarce amenities are among the key challenges faced by migrants. Regarding healthcare, the lack of medical supplies and medical staff, discriminatory treatment, and high healthcare costs constitute the biggest challenges facing migrants’ access.42 Furthermore, there is a burgeoning “slave market” along migrant routes into Libya where sub-Saharan migrants are “being sold and bought by Libyans, with the support of Ghanaians and Nigerians who work for them.” According to Tinti,43 “migrants have become a commodity to be captured, sold, traded, and leveraged. Regardless of their immigration status, they are hunted down by militias loyal to Libya’s U.N.-backed government, caged in overcrowded prisons, and sold on open markets that human rights advocates have likened to slave auctions.” The international community was shocked in November 2017, when some video footage was released showing abuse of migrants in Libya including practices similar to slavery.44 The UN Security Council condemned the slave trading as “heinous abuses of human rights which may also account for crimes against humanity” and called upon “all relevant authorities to investigate such activities without delay to bring perpetrators to account.”45 The shocking revelations led to international condemnation and demands by human rights groups for the United Nations (UN) intervention and the prosecution of the culprits. In June 2018, the United Nations applied sanctions against four Libyans (including a Coast Guard commander) and two Eritreans for their criminal leadership of slave trade networks.46

 OHCHR. “Detained and Dehumanized: Report on Human Rights Abuses against Migrants in Libya”. 2016. Accessed August 17, 2019. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/ DetainedAndDehumanised_en.pdf 42  REACH. “Refugees and Migrants’ Access to Resources, Housing and Healthcare in Libya”. 2017. Accessed August 17, 2019. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/reach_ lby_report_merf_december_2017_0.pdf 43  Tinti, P. “Libya: Nearly There, but Never Further Away”. 2017. Accessed August 18, 2019. https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/libya-nearly-there-never-further-away 44  Mixed Migration Hub. “Libya”. 2018. Accessed August 18, 2019. http://www.mixedmigrationhub.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Country-Profile-Libya.pdf 45  Levenson, E. “Libyan Slave Trade: UN Security Council Condemns “Heinous Abuses” of The Libyan Slave Trade”. 2017. Accessed August 17, 2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/07/world/ un-security-council-libya-slavery/index.html 46  Elbagir, N. and Said-Moorhouse, L. “Unprecedented UN Sanctions Slapped On ‘Millionaire Migrant Traffickers’”. 2018. Accessed August 18, 2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/07/ africa/un-sanctions-migrant-traffickers-intl/index.html 41

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Detention of Migrants and Refugees in Libya Due to the challenge of tackling smugglers, Libyan officials focus largely on managing migration flows. Irregular migrants are detained after being rescued at sea, stopped at checkpoints, or arrested during raids. Though after arrest they were meant to be charged to court, in practice they remain in detention (usually for several months) until they are either released or expelled or they voluntarily return to their countries of origin, without a judicial order.47 Detention has, therefore, become a major humanitarian issue in Libya, with Libyan officials and facilities overburdened, while migrants are held in precarious conditions or shuffled between centers. According to data provided by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Libya’s maritime authorities have intercepted and taken back to Libya about 14,377 people so far in 2018.48 Over half of those who attempted the crossing were returned to Libya, where they were immediately placed in detention centers. Detention centers are run by the Department for Combating Irregular Migration (DCIM). Although they formally report to the Ministry of the Interior, in actuality, many of these detention centers are run by armed groups and are beyond the purview of government control. Detention centers in Libya tend to be overcrowded and under-resourced. They lack formal registration processes and access to a legal process, lawyers, and judicial authorities for detainees. As of November 2018, nearly 6000 foreign nationals  – mostly of African origin  – were being held in centers across the country.49 Human rights abuses are widespread in many of the migrant detention centers in Libya including torture, rape, and extortion. Detained migrants report being beaten, stolen from, and abused by guards in the detention centers as well as being exposed to contagious diseases due to unhygienic conditions. Detained women and children migrants are mainly held at Al Jawiya prison in Misrata. They are typically held in conditions similar to those at other detention centers and under the watch of male guards, leaving them vulnerable to sexual violence and abuse.50 However, sexual abuse in Libya does not solely affect women. Migrant boys and men in Italy also reported being subjected to sexual abuse while in Libya. Rape is used as a method of “punishment” for disobedience.51 Some reported being raped in private, while a few have been subjected to rape and sexual abuse in front of the other detainees. Rape and sexual abuses in Libyan detention centers are not limited to women. A migrant who spoke to Oxfam recounted almost dying from

 Ibid, Altai Consulting, 2017.  Amnesty International. “Libya: EU’s Patchwork Policy Has Failed to Protect the Human Rights of Refugees and Migrants”. 2018. Accessed August 18, 2019. https://www.amnestyusa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/Libya-Public-Statement.pdf 49  Ibid. 50  Ibid, Mixed Migration Hub, 2018. 51  Beşer, M. E and Elfeitori, F. “Libya Detention Centres: A State of Impunity”. 2018. Accessed August 20, 2019. https://aybu.edu.tr/gpm/contents/files/GPM_RaporEenesBeser.pdf 47 48

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the beatings he received while trying to resist rape in an underground prison, adding that traffickers “regularly rape men.”52 There have also been reports of migrants being forced to rape each other. Filming is also used as blackmail.53 It is quite possible that sexual abuse of migrant men in Libya is being underreported, due to the strong cultural taboos.

 fforts by Europe to Address Irregular Migration E and the Migration Situation in Libya In 2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel enacted an “open border policy,” and Europe took in over a million refugees in that year alone. But with the growing tide of nationalism and isolationism sweeping Europe and the United States, European countries, including Germany, have since sought to prevent increased migration by strengthening borders, halting refugee programs, and even ejecting and deporting some of the migrants who had previously arrived. With the launch of the European Agenda on Migration in May 2015 and the subsequent Valletta Summit, stricter entry regulations have been advocated54 as a tool to stem inflows of migrants and asylum seekers, while financial resources have been increasingly allocated to border control activities. In February 2017, EU leaders agreed on new measures to reduce irregular arrivals along this route. They committed to increasing cooperation with Libya and to tackling migrant smugglers. The EU also established a joint migration task force with the African Union and the UN in November 2017. This task force aims to pool efforts and enhance cooperation to respond to migration challenges in Africa and in particular Libya. The EU also works closely with some African countries to tackle the root causes of migration through development cooperation with the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the European External Investment Plan, conflict prevention, and state-building and a Migration Partnership Framework.55 In June 2018, EU leaders called for further measures to reduce illegal migration on the Central Mediterranean route and agreed among others to:

 Oxfam. “Media Briefing: You Aren’t Human Anymore”. 2017. Accessed August 17, 2019. https://www.oxfamnovib.nl/Files/rapporten/20170808%20mb-migrants-libya-europe-090817-en_ EMBARGO.pdf 53  Graham-Harrison, E. “Migrants from West Africa Being ‘Sold In Libyan Slave Markets’”. 2017. Accessed August 19, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/10/ libya-public-slave-auctions-un-migration 54  Cassarino, J. and Giuffré, M. “Finding Its Place in Africa: Why Has The EU Opted For Flexible Arrangements On Readmission?” 2017. Accessed August 17, 2019. https://www.nottingham.ac. uk/hrlc/documents/pb-1-finding-its-place-in-africa.pdf 55  European Commission. “EU Cooperation on Migration in Libya”. 2018. Accessed August 17, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/eutf-noa-libya.pdf 52

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• Step up efforts to stop migrant smugglers operating out of Libya or elsewhere • Continue to support Italy and other frontline EU countries • Increase their support for the Libyan Coast Guard, humane reception conditions, and voluntary humanitarian returns • Enhance cooperation with other countries of origin and transit as well as voluntary resettlement Furthermore, between 2014 and 2018, the European Union has mobilized about €338 million on migration-related projects in Libya, €318 million under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, and €20 million as bilateral assistance56 to fund programs addressing challenges in Libya. These programs are funded through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. Some of the EU’s measures include training of Libyan Coast Guards, protection and assistance for migrants and refugees, support for local communities in Libya, and improved border management in Libya. In particular, Italy has implemented a series of measures to close off the migratory routes through Libya and across the Mediterranean, including boosting the capacity of Libyan maritime authorities, in particular the Libyan Coast Guard, to intercept migrants and refugees and bring them back to Libya. These measures – together with deals negotiated by Italy with local authorities and militias in key smuggling cities, the criminalization of NGOs carrying out search and rescue operations at sea, and the imposition of a new policy by Italy to refuse disembarkation to people rescued in the high seas  – have reduced the numbers of people arriving in Italy. In December 2018, Italy adopted new legislation, called the “Salvini Decree,” that restricts access to protection for refugees and migrants and hardens border security intending to deter irregular immigration. The new legislation resembles measures taken by the Trump administration in the United States to restrict access to humanitarian protection as a way to advance an anti-migration agenda. A key provision of the new legislation is the abolition of one of three layers of protection previously available to asylum seekers: residence permits granted on a discretionary basis for humanitarian reasons not covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention or by EU legislation. The law also introduces new restrictions on access to other types of residence permits and related rights. While its main purported goal is to “tackle illegal immigration more effectively,” it has been seen as a move primarily designed to reduce the overall number of immigrants and asylum seekers in Italy – and to deter new arrivals – through increased restrictions.

56

 Ibid.

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 ow Effective Are These Measures at Addressing H Contemporary Migratory Dynamics? While European governments have largely achieved their objective of blocking refugees and migrants from crossing into Europe via the Central Mediterranean Route, these policies, however, have in turn left thousands of refugees and migrants to languish in Libya without regular status, either in detention or living undocumented in the shadows, at risk of violence and exploitation by armed groups. They have also damaged the integrity of the overall search and rescue system, increasing the death rate among people engaging in the sea crossing.57 The situation in the Mediterranean is an extremely complex one. The intense politicization of issues that should be humanitarian in nature, and the reluctance of member states to share responsibility, has made finding solutions even more difficult. While states have the right to control their borders and ensure security while cooperating with neighboring countries to this end, this cannot come at the expense of people’s human rights whether at sea or on land. Effectively protecting these rights requires the full implementation of member states’ obligations, under international maritime law, human rights law, and refugee law, which should be read as being consistent with each other.58 According to Restelli,59 rather than deterring irregular migration, the use of restrictive entry and asylum regulation as a migration management tool tends to push more people into irregularity. A recent study of 29 European destination states covering the period between 2008 and 2011 found that in the presence of relevant push and pull factors (such as conflict, unemployment, and persistent demand for labor), restricting access to international protection and to visas, rather than reducing the number of new arrivals, led more migrants and asylum seekers being deflected into irregularity. Thus, policy responses to migration management need to account for the complex and nuanced nature of migratory processes rather than assuming that shrinking access to legal paths will deter people from moving. For as long as the reasons for migration are still there, people will continue to move around the world. In the case of Africa, economic crises, poor governance, and exploitation by the rest of the world will continue to be push factors for many. It is correct to say that poor governance and high levels of corruption make Africa’s leaders unaccountable and therefore accomplices in the exodus of people fleeing from wars, poverty, and human rights violations. It has also been argued that African leaders are to blame for the Libyan slavery.60

 Ibid Amnesty International, 2018.  Council of Europe. “Lives Saved. Rights Protected”. 2019. Accessed August 17, 2019. https:// rm.coe.int/lives-saved-rights-protected-bridging-the-protection-gap-for-refugees-/168094eb87 59  Restelli, G. “The Policy Tap Fallacy: Lessons from the Central Mediterranean Route on How Increasing Restrictions Fail To Reduce Irregular Migration Flows”. 2019. Accessed August 18, 2019. https://reliefweb.int/report/italy/ policy-tap-fallacy-lessons-central-mediterranean-route-how-increasing-restrictions-fail 60  Ibid, Mafu, 2019. 57 58

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While some African states like Kenya, Ghana, Senegal, Rwanda, Botswana, and Tanzania have recorded impressive economic growth rates and with that political stability in the last few years, the same cannot be said of many others. In Nigeria, many of the young men and women who seek to leave the country daily, in search of economic survival, fall into either the push or pull categories. Forced migration induced by push factors is a function of prolonged conflicts, such as the Niger Delta crisis, the Boko Haram insurgency, and election violence, among others. Better economic conditions and the search for better lives account for why Nigerians and other Africans continue to move en masse to other parts of the world, despite the associated negative consequences  – including the modern slave trade to which West Africans are subjected to in Libya. It has been argued that Africa is not solely responsible for its woes and that the continent is being exploited by the rest of the world. According to the Global Policy Forum: The Global South is being drained of resources by the rest of the world and it is losing far more each year than it gains. Africa alone loses $192 billion each year to the rest of the world. This is mainly in profits made by foreign companies, tax dodging and the costs of adapting to climate change. Whilst rich countries often talk about the aid their countries give to Africa, this is in fact less than $30 billion each year. Even when you add this to foreign investment, remittances and other resources that flow into the continent, Africa still suffers an overall loss of $58 billion every year. The idea that we are aiding Africa is flawed; it is Africa that is aiding the rest of the world.61

In the same vein, Curtis and Jones62 note that Africa is rich – in potential mineral wealth, skilled workers, booming new businesses, and biodiversity. Thus, its people should thrive, and its economies prosper. Yet, many people living in African countries remain trapped in poverty, while much of the continent’s wealth is being extracted by those outside it. African countries received $161.6 billion in 2015 – mainly in loans, personal remittances, and aid in the form of grants. Yet, $203 billion was taken from Africa, either directly – mainly through corporations repatriating profits and by illegally moving money out of the continent – or by costs imposed by the rest of the world through climate change. They further stated that: • African countries receive around $19 billion in aid in the form of grants, but over three times that much ($68 billion) is taken out in capital flight, mainly by multinational companies deliberately misreporting the value of their imports or exports to reduce tax. • While Africans receive $31 billion in personal remittances from overseas, multinational companies operating on the continent repatriate a similar amount ($32 billion) in profits to their home countries each year.

 Global Policy Forum. “Development Aid to Africa Negligible In Comparison To Illicit Outflows”. 2014. Accessed August 18, 2019. https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/21/development/52662-development-aid-to-africa-negligible-in-comparison-to-illicit-outflows62  Curtis, M. and Jones, T. “Honest Accounts 2017 – How the World Profits from Africa’s Wealth”. 2017. Accessed August 18, 2019. http://www.cadtm.org/Honest-Accounts-2017-How-the-world 61

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• African governments received $32.8 billion in loans in 2015 but paid $18 billion in debt interest and principal payments, with the overall level of debt rising rapidly. • An estimated $29 billion a year is being stolen from Africa in illegal logging, fishing, and the trade in wildlife/plants. There are other ways in which the rest of the world extracts resources from Africa, but for which figures are not available; for example, trade policies mean that unprocessed agricultural goods are often exported from African countries and refined elsewhere, causing the vast majority of their value to be earned abroad. The figures show that the rest of the world is profiting from the continent’s wealth  – more so than most African citizens. Yet rich country governments simply tell their publics that their aid programs are helping Africa. Thus, money is leaving Africa partly because Africa’s wealth of natural resources is simply owned and exploited by foreign, private corporations. In only a minority of foreign investments do African governments have a shareholding; even if they do, this tends to be small, usually around 5–20 percent.63

Conclusion Migration is a complex process, and there is no easy solution to its effective management. Since 2014, thousands of migrants and refugees have died in the Mediterranean in their attempt to reach a safe shore. At the same time, states’ search and rescue operations have been reduced, resulting in the rescue of refugees and migrants in distress at sea taking much longer, or sometimes coming too late altogether. This has contributed to making the Central Mediterranean route even more dangerous. Restrictive measures have also allowed trafficking in human beings and smuggling to flourish. In addition, the European Union and individual European states are continuing to outsource border controls to third countries to keep refugees and migrants away from European coasts. This includes funding, equipping, or training border guards of countries with notoriously bad human rights records. While this approach has led to a reduction in arrivals on Europe’s shores, it has also come with a terrible human cost. Not only do migrants continue to die at sea, but in some cases, they are intercepted and brought to countries – like Libya – where they are often subjected to torture, rape, slavery, exploitation, or indefinite and unlawful detention.64 More needs to be done to manage migration globally. The framing of migration management as a “crisis” has been used to justify extraordinary and exceptional measures, which can be characterized as rapid, informal, and flexible policy instruments at odds with the rule of law and the fundamental rights of refugees and other 63 64

 Ibid.  Ibid, Council of Europe, 2019.

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migrants.65 The expansion and multiplication of borders – physical, technological, and mental – is seen as the cause of long and fragmented journeys, denying access through legal routes and particularly problematic for persons seeking international protection. As Ansems de Vries, Carrera, and Guild66 argue, the fractured and complex journeys of migrants, and the dramatic effect of increasingly coercive policies where migrants are pushed back from one country to another and borders become extended zones of a hold-up, pushback, and/or violence, fundamentally undermine the potential for settlement. Essentially, efforts prioritizing mere deterrence will have limited success and have proven detrimental effects on fundamental rights, including deaths at the border. Countries of destination should take into account that the protection of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants traveling by sea forms an integral part of international human rights, refugee, and maritime laws. States have clear obligations to aid any person found in distress at sea, to rescue people in distress, and to ensure that their rights are upheld. Policymakers should focus their efforts on how to maximize the potential benefits of immigration rather than regarding it as a problem to be solved. Aligning with the recommendations of the Council of Europe,67 considering the serious human rights violations against refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants in Libya, including those intercepted at sea, the following steps are crucial. There should be an urgent review of all cooperation activities and practices with the Libyan Coast Guard; identify which of these impacts, directly or indirectly, on the return of persons intercepted at sea to serious human rights violations; and suspend these until clear guarantees of human rights compliance are in place. Also, European countries should postpone any additional support to the Libyan Coast Guard until steps are taken showing their human rights compliance. They should continue to support the efforts of international organizations in securing the release of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants from places of detention in Libya, urgently pledge places for UNHCR’s evacuation scheme, and facilitate the creation of safe humanitarian corridors. Moreover, African leaders should make their countries conducive for their citizens to reduce the push factors of migration. To do this, they must demonstrate a high sense of integrity and purge themselves, and the countries, of corruption. With highly skilled, low-skilled, or semiskilled citizens remaining unemployed or underemployed for a long period, the tendency is there for a continuous search for greener pastures. The pressure to emigrate will only fade when there are better living conditions and opportunities and when people are not trying to escape poverty and misery.  Baldwin-Edwards, M. “Between A Rock and A Hard Place: North Africa as a Region of Emigration, Immigration and Transit Migration”. Review of African Political Economy 108 (2006): 311–324. 66  Ansems de Vries, L., Carrera, S. and Guild. E. “Documenting the Migration Crisis in the Mediterranean”. 2016. Accessed August 15, 2019. https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/LSE%20 No%2094%20DocumentingMigration.pdf 67  Ibid, Council of Europe, 2019. 65

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References Altai Consulting. 2017. Leaving Libya: Rapid Assessment of Municipalities of Departures of Migrants in Libya. http://www.altaiconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/2017_AltaiConsulting_Leaving-Libya-Rapid-Assessment-of-Municipalities-of-Departure-of-Migrantsin-Libya.pdf. Accessed 19 Aug 2019. Ansems de Vries, L., S.  Carrera, and E.  Guild. 2016. Documenting the Migration Crisis in the Mediterranean. https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/LSE%20No%2094%20 DocumentingMigration.pdf. Accessed 15 Aug 2019. Amnesty International. 2017. Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion: Abuses Against Europe-­ Bound Refugees and Migrants. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ MDE1975612017ENGLISH.PDF. Accessed 18 Aug 2019. ———. 2018. Libya: EU’s Patchwork Policy Has Failed to Protect the Human Rights of Refugees and Migrants. https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Libya-PublicStatement.pdf. Accessed 18 Aug 2019. Bade, K.J. 2003. Europa En Movimiento: Las Migraciones Desde Fi Nales Del Siglo XVIII Hasta Nuestros Días. Barcelona: Crítica. Baldwin-Edwards, M. 2006. Between A Rock and A Hard Place: North Africa as a Region of Emigration, Immigration and Transit Migration. Review of African Political Economy 108: 311–324. Beauge, G., and F.  Burgat. 1986. The Question of Migration in Libya. Maghreb-Machrek 112: 56–68. Beşer, M.E., and F. Elfeitori. 2018. Libya Detention Centres: A State of Impunity. https://aybu.edu. tr/gpm/contents/files/GPM_RaporEenesBeser.pdf. Accessed 20 Aug 2019. Bonifazi, C. 2008. Evolution of Regional Patterns of International Migration in Europe. In International Migration in Europe: New Trends and New Methods of Analysis, ed. C. Bonifazi, M. Okólski, J. Schoorl, and P. Simon, 107–128. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Bredeloup, S., and O. Pliez. 2011. The Libyan Migration Corridor. Florence: European University Institute/Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Cassarino, J., and M.  Giuffré. 2017. Finding Its Place in Africa: Why Has the EU Opted for Flexible Arrangements on Readmission?. https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/hrlc/documents/pb1-finding-its-place-in-africa.pdf. Accessed 17 Aug 2019. Castles, S., H. De Haas, and M.J. Miller. 2014. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Curtis, M., and T.  Jones. 2017. Honest Accounts 2017  – How the World Profits from Africa’s Wealth. http://www.cadtm.org/Honest-Accounts-2017-How-the-world. Accessed 18 Aug 2019. Council of Europe. 2019. Lives Saved. Rights Protected. https://rm.coe.int/lives-saved-rights-protected-bridging-the-protection-gap-for-refugees-/168094eb87. Accessed 17 Aug 2019. Danish Refugee Council. 2015. Right to a Future: Empowering Refugees from Syria and Host Governments to Face a Long-Term. Crisis. https://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/researchpublications/right-to-a-future-empowering-refugees-from-syria-and-host-governments-toface-a-long-term-crisis/. Accessed 19 Aug 2019. De Haas, H. 2006. Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU: Historical Roots and Current Trends. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/trans-saharan-migration-north-africaand-eu-historical-roots-and-current-trends. Accessed 15 Aug 2019. Düvell, F. 2008. Clandestine Migration in Europe. Social Science Information 47 (4): 479–497. Elbagir, N., and L. Said-Moorhouse. 2018. Unprecedented UN Sanctions Slapped on ‘Millionaire Migrant Traffickers’. https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/07/africa/un-sanctions-migrant-traffickers-intl/index.html. Accessed 18 Aug 2019. European Commission. 2018. EU Cooperation on Migration in Libya. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/eutf-noa-libya.pdf. Accessed 17 Aug 2019.

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Fargues, P., and S. Bonfanti. 2014. When the Best Option Is A Leaky Boat: Why Migrants Risk Their Lives Crossing The Mediterranean And What Europe Is Doing About It. http://cadmus. eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33271/MPC_PB_2014-05.pdf?sequence=1. Accessed 19 Aug 2019. Global Policy Forum. 2014. Development Aid to Africa Negligible in Comparison to Illicit Outflows. https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/21/-development/52662development-aid-to-africa-negligible-in-comparison-to-illicit-outflows-. Accessed 18 Aug 2019. Graham-Harrison, E. 2017. Migrants from West Africa Being ‘Sold In Libyan Slave Markets’. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/10/libya-public-slave-auctions-un-migration. Accessed 19 Aug 2019. Jandl, M. 2004. The Estimation of Illegal Migration in Europe. Studi Emigrazione/Migration Studies 41 (153): 141–155. Klepp, S. 2010. Italy and Its Libyan Cooperation Program: Pioneer of the European Union’s Refugee Policy? https://www.mei.edu/publications/italy-and-its-libyan-cooperation-programpioneer-european-unions-refugee-policy. Accessed 18 Aug 2019. Kraus, R. 2017. Heart-Wrenching Newspaper Feature Lists Names of 33,000 Dead Refugees. https://mashable.com/2017/11/10/der-tagesspiegel-list-of-dead-refugees/. Accessed 29 Aug 2019. Levenson, E. 2017. Libyan Slave Trade: UN Security Council Condemns “Heinous Abuses” of The Libyan Slave Trade. https://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/07/world/un-security-council-libyaslavery/index.html. Accessed 17 Aug 2019. Mafu, L. 2019. The Libyan/Trans-Mediterranean Slave Trade, the African Union, and the Failure of Human Morality. SAGE Open 9 (1): 1–10. Mixed Migration Hub. 2018. Libya. http://www.mixedmigrationhub.org/wp-content/ uploads/2018/05/Country-Profile-Libya.pdf. Accessed 18 Aug 2019. Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism initiative. 2017. Invisible Labor: Women’s Labor Migration to Libya. http://www.mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/028_invisible-labour.pdf. Accessed 17 Aug 2019. OHCHR. 2016. Detained and Dehumanized: Report on Human Rights Abuses against Migrants in Libya. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/DetainedAndDehumanised_en.pdf. Accessed 17 Aug 2019. Oxfam. 2017. Media Briefing: You Aren’t Human Anymore. https://www.oxfamnovib.nl/Files/rapporten/20170808%20mb-migrants-libya-europe-090817-en_EMBARGO.pdf. Accessed 17 Aug 2019. Paoletti, E. 2011. Migration and Foreign Policy: The Case of Libya. The Journal of North African Studies 16 (2): 215–231. Penninx, R. 2006. Introduction. In The Dynamics of International Migration and Settlement in Europe: A State of The Art, ed. R. Penninx, M. Berger, and K. Kraal, 7–17. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Popoola, T. 2019. Libya Returnee Shares Horrid Detail of Desert Life, Says She Drank Her Blood to Survive. https://www.legit.ng/1260963-libya-returnee-shares-horrid-detail-desert-lifedrank-blood-survive.html. Accessed 10 Sept 2019. Puig, O. 2016. Niger: The New European Border. https://elpais.com/elpais/2016/09/02/planeta_ futuro/1472813469_175898.html. Accessed 15 Aug 2019. REACH. 2017. Refugees and Migrants’ Access to Resources, Housing and Healthcare in Libya. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/reach_lby_report_merf_december_2017_0.pdf. Accessed 17 Aug 2019. Reitano, T., L. Adal, and M. Shaw. 2014. Smuggled Futures: The Dangerous Path of the Migrant from Africa to Europe. Geneva: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime. Restelli, G. 2019. The Policy Tap Fallacy: Lessons from the Central Mediterranean Route on How Increasing Restrictions Fail to Reduce Irregular Migration Flows. https://reliefweb.int/report/

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italy/policy-tap-fallacy-lessons-central-mediterranean-route-how-increasing-restrictions-fail. Accessed 18 Aug 2019. Tinti, P. 2017. Libya: Nearly There, but Never Further Away. https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/ libya-nearly-there-never-further-away. Accessed 18 Aug 2019. Tubiana, J., C. Warin, and G.M. Saeneen. 2018. Multilateral Damage: The Impact of EU Migration Policies on Central Saharan Routes, CRU Report. The Hague: Clingendael Institute. UNHCR. 2017. Sea Arrivals Dashboard January – April 2017. Italy: Regional Office for Southern Europe. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/56593. Accessed 30 Aug 2019. UNODC. 2009. Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment. https://www.unodc.org/nigeria/en/transnational-trafficking-and-the-rule-of-law-in-west-africa_-a-threat-assessment.html. Accessed 28 Aug 2019. Van Mol, C., and H. de Valk. 2016. Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic Perspective. In Integration Processes and Policies in Europe, IMISCOE Research Series, ed. B. Garcés-Mascareñas and R. Penninx, 31–55. New York/Cham: Springer. Zandonini, G. 2018. The Monday That Changed Migration in Niger. https://openmigration.org/en/ analyses/the-monday-that-changed-migration-in-niger/. Accessed 15 Aug 2019.

Part III

Impact, Cost, and Consequences

Chapter 12

“Evaporating Mediterranean: The Fate of Migrants in a Shrinking Sea Commons” John Hickman

Introduction The most heartbreaking images in the news coverage of the current migrant and refugee crisis are of frightened, miserable men, women, and children huddled aboard dangerously overloaded, scarcely seaworthy vessels and of recovered bodies of those drowned in attempting to cross from North Africa to Southern Europe. The Mediterranean Sea is the cradle, crèche, and highway of more civilizations than any body of water in human history. Stretching 4000 miles west to east from the Pillars of Hercules to Gaza and 800 kilometers south to north from the Dalmatian Coast to Tripolitania, strewn with more than 3300 islands, noted for its balmy weather and calm seas, it has long served to connect rather than separate the peoples living in its basin. The sea links the entire Atlantic World, the Middle East, Western Eurasia via the Black Sea, as well as the Indian Ocean via the Red Sea. History records that people have sailed its waters to explore, trade, proselytize, raid, flee, and migrate for more than three millennia. Technological advances, political repression, regional war, and climate change have pushed and pulled people to sail it time and again. That escaping from privation and violence now prompts migrants and refugees to attempt to cross its waters from North Africa to southern Europe is an unfolding chapter in that long history. What is new is that modern states are deploying extraordinarily sophisticated coercive and ideological bureaucratic apparatuses to stem such movement. Today, formal territorial sovereignty over the shores and nearby waters of the Mediterranean is asserted by eight states in the Global North, including Spain, France, Monaco, Italy, Malta, Cyprus, and Britain (because of the two British Overseas Territories of Gibraltar and Akrotiri and Dhekelia), and Israel; by nine

J. Hickman (*) Department of Political Science, Berry College, Mount Berry, GA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. Abegunrin, S. O. Abidde (eds.), African Migrants and the Refugee Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56642-5_12

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states in the Global South, including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey; and by five states in the post-communist Global Intermediate, including Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Albania. Arguably, proximity makes Portugal a ninth state in the Mediterranean Global North. Surrounding these 23 coastal states is a second ring of states in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East tied closely to the coastal states. Events in Libya affect Switzerland, events in the Democratic Republic of Congo may affect Belgium, etc. Multiple transportation links mean that migrants and refugees from Africa may seek to enter Europe in different ways, including by air and over land. They may attempt to fly directly to countries of refuge or to join the stream of migrants and refugees from the Levant, Southwest Asia, and South Asia who attempt to ride and walk to countries of refuge through the Balkans. However, attempting to enter southern Europe via water, often in unseaworthy vessels, will continue to be the method chosen by many of the most desperate. What drives this population movement? The conventional answer is that Africans migrate because of poverty and flee because of violence. Despite imagery popular in the news media of the Global North, in which migrants as a faceless army of impoverished Africans driven toward Europe by hunger produced by drought in the Sahel, empirical evidence suggests that migration from Africa to Europe comes from across Africa and that the volume of migrants is greatest from countries with comparatively higher levels of development.1 Consistent with “migration transition theory,” economic development permits mobility in search of opportunity domestically or in neighboring African countries, especially in West Africa where intra-­ African migration is striking in scale, thereby prompting more of the ambitious to emigrate to Europe or elsewhere.2 Although such generalizations may accurately describe the ordinary migration largely ignored in the news coverage from the Global North, those who attempt to cross the Mediterranean in small boats appear motived more by desperation rather than by ambition. The conventional answer that refugee flight in Africa is motivated by armed conflict appears well-founded. The series of wars that have raged in the countries around the African Great Lakes since the mid-1990s; Islamist terrorism in northeastern Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and northern Cameroon; and political repression in Northwest Africa and especially Eritrea have generated waves of refugee flight.3 Some of the conflicts are “never-ending wars,” conducted by entrepreneurial warriors often operating with international sponsors or accomplices, who perpetrate most of their violence against civilians by robbing them, exploiting raw materials, smuggling goods, trafficking drugs, or holding hostages for exchange.4 The majority of refugees, like a majority of economic migrants, have moved to neighboring countries rather than attempt to enter Europe.

 Flahaux and De Hass, “African Migration,” 22.  Ibid, 2, 19. 3  Rutz, “From Failing States to Migration,” 127. 4  Welzer, Climate Wars, 101–102. 1 2

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Distinguishing the refugees from the migrants who risk setting across the Mediterranean Sea in small boats may be difficult, not the least because humans rarely make momentous calculations based on a single motivation. The refugee may aspire to a better life, and the migrant may aspire to a safer life. Moreover, economic migration and refugee flight may be linked by a similar cause. Though underreported in the English language press, Africa is already suffering from the effects of climate change in the form of drought caused by food deficits.5 Africans forced into poverty by climate shocks are made available for recruitment by political extremists.6 Moreover, Africa will be disproportionately affected by climate change: access to water will diminish, farming and fishing yields will suffer, and mosquito-borne diseases will become endemic in regions where they are now uncommon.7 Migrants and refugees have rationally selected the exit option over the loyalty or voice options, the three possible responses to firms, organizations, and governments in evident decline that were identified by Albert O.  Hirschman.8 As a side note, Hirschman was himself a Jewish German national in exile from Nazi Germany who fled from France as a refugee under a false identity via Portugal to safety in the United States.9 “Decline” is inadequate to describe the poor performance of many African states whatever the cause or causes. The accelerating pace of economic development and urbanization together with the affective strength of ethnic identity and the weakness of legal norms mean not only rampant corruption but a desire to escape its parasitic grip by moving to a society with stronger legal norms. The humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean Sea may be better understood as three related but geographically separate humanitarian sub-crises. The first is in the waters of the Atlantic Ocean and Western Mediterranean Sea between Morocco and Spain and includes the two Spanish colonial enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. The second is in the waters of the Central Mediterranean Sea between Italy, Malta, and Libya. The third is in the waters of the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey. The first two sub-crises overwhelmingly involve African migrants and refugees. The third involves primarily Middle Eastern and South Asian migrants and refugees. Yet a fourth sub-crisis involves African migrants who have entered Israel by air or land and not by sea. This chapter focuses on the first two, hereinafter referred to as the Central Mediterranean and Western Mediterranean and Atlantic sub-crises for the sake of simplicity. These are described at length in the next two sections of the chapter. What they detail is the politics of the interdiction of migrants and refugees at sea as an extension of border control by states in the Global North. The penultimate section outlines the problématique of the relationships between international and supranational law and immigration policymaking in the externalization of border control into the Mediterranean Sea.

 Neslen, “Climate Change ‘Cause of Most Under-Reported Humanitarian Crises’.”  Gerretson, “How Climate Change is Fueling Extremism.” 7  Welzer, Climate Wars, 35–36; Burke, et al. 8  Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, 106–107. 9  Adelman, Pariah. 5 6

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Central Mediterranean Sub-crisis With the 14th longest coastline on the planet due to a very irregular coastline, Italy is the inevitable destination for many migrants and refugees leaving Tunisia and Libya. It is the relationship between Italy and Libya that is at the heart of the Central Mediterranean sub-crisis. “…Italy’s relationship with Libya was substantively very different from those between Libya and other European states, and perhaps bears some similarity to the relationship of Germany and Israel—the former brutalizer whose prey had managed to escape and make good. Not only did Italy feel some collective guilt for what it had done in Libya, but it also wanted to profit from good relations. The two countries fundamentally had, despite the ugly history, more in common than not on some levels.”10 In addition to geographic proximity, Italian interest in Libya was motivated by the same impulse that led other former colonial powers to focus attention on their former colonies.11 On August 30, 2008, in Benghazi, Libya, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi signed the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya, a.k.a. The Treaty of Benghazi. Under the agreement, Italy offered Libya compensation for decades of colonial rule in the form of funding for infrastructure, education, and health projects, and Libya offered more oil and more control over migration by patrolling the Mediterranean.12 Mixed Italian-Libyan crews of patrol boats provided by Italy would begin policing the 2000 kilometers of Libyan coast to prevent irregular crossings.13 Most controversially, in response to populist anti-immigrant agitation from the Lega Nord or Northern League, a crucial partner in center-right government coalitions, the Italian Navy, began repatriating refugees and migrants “without first checking whether or not some of them would be entitled to the status of refugee.”14 The result is detailed in the discussion of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy in the previous section. Since the fall of Qaddafi in August 2011, Libya has struggled unsuccessfully in establishing a stable, unified government. Militias representing different regions and ethnicities with the support of different coalitions of powers now divide the country. The United Nations, the European Union, Turkey, and Qatar support the Government of National Accord in Tripoli as the legitimate government of Libya, while the rebel Libyan National Army of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar is supported by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, and France. Under the erratic President Donald Trump, the United States has hedged its bets, or less charitably, waffled. Since the outbreak of the Libyan civil war, Italian immigration policy vis-à-vis African refugees and migrants seeking to transit by sea has swung from a unilateral  Chorin, Exit the Colonel, 138.  Hickman, “Cue Taking and the Distribution of Japanese Bilateral ODA Among African States.” 12  Carbone and Coralluzo, “The Politics of Italy’s Foreign Policy in the Mediterranean,” 433–434. 13  Ronzitti, “The Treaty of Friendship,” 130. 14  Ibid, 434. 10 11

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Italian humanitarian focus on search and rescue (SAR) operations under Prime Minister Enrico Letta (2013–2014), multilateral responsibility for SAR operations under Prime Minister of Matteo Renzi (2014–2016), support for heightened enforcement and bilateralism under his successor Prime Minister Gentiloni Silveri (2016–2018), to ugly rejection of humanitarian responsibility toward refugees and migrants and reliance of maritime interdiction and bilateralism under Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte (2018–present). Following the nightmarish October 3, 3013, Lampedusa Tragedy, the deaths of almost 400 after a Libyan fishing vessel caught fire and sank near Isola dei Conigli shocked the consciences of Italian officials and the public; Prime Minister Enrico Letta ordered the Italian Navy to undertake Operation Mare Nostrum. Although it undoubtedly saved lives, Operation Mare Nostrum was criticized by other European Union member states as “permissive towards migrants’ aspirations to reach other countries.”15 Thus the morality of the Letta government’s response was ignored and instead the knock-on effects for other member states highlighted. After assuming office in 2014, Matteo Renzi replaced Operation Mare Nostrum with Frontex’s Operation Triton, which remained an overwhelmingly Italian maritime operation but was now partially funded by other European Union member states.16 In keeping with the European Commission’s policy priorities, Operation Triton shifted the focus to border security.17 Renzi was less successful in placing asylum seekers in Italy in other European Union member states, in large part because of near hysteria driven by effective nationalist-populist agitation about the large influx of refugees from the Syrian civil war in Germany. An increasingly resentful Italian public became convinced that Italy had taken on a disproportionately large burden with respect to African refugees and migrants. Mutual resentments among national publics in the European Union over collective action policy problems fanned by nationalist populist political elites reached a fever pitch in 2016 as evidenced by the success of the BREXIT referendum in Britain. In 2016, Prime Minister Gentiloni Silveri shifted policy attention from SAR operations toward the externalization of enforcement, signing a February 2, 2017, bilateral agreement with his Libyan counterpart, Fayez al-Sarraj, wherein Libya pledged to stop refugees and migrants attempting to transit by sea.18 Gentiloni emphasized the importance of “economic commitment” to Libya from other European Union member states.19 A similar bilateral agreement was signed with Tunisia. Following the 2018 general election, the new center-right government of Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte adopted an even harder line, both practically and rhetorically. As of this writing, Conte leads a coalition government of the Five Star

 Gattinara, “The ‘Refugee Crisis’ in Italy as a Crisis of Legitimacy,” 321.  Coticchia and Davidson, Italian Foreign Policy during Matteo Renzi’s Government, 30–33. 17  Ibid, 320; Kasperak and Schmidt-Sembdner, “Renationalization and Spaces of Migration,” 211. 18  Casert, “Italy, Libya Deal on Migration Lays Groundwork for UE Summit.” 19  Ibid. 15 16

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Movement and the Lega or League. The Five Star Movement is a populist political party advocating an ideologically unconventional mix of public policies that range from e-democracy and environmentalism to Euroscepticism and anti-immigration. Conte’s Interior Minister and rival for power is the firebrand Matteo Salvini, who leads the Lega or League, the former Lega Nord or Northern League rebranded to win votes in central and southern Italy. Like Donald Trump in the United States, Salvini has exploited social media and harsh rhetoric in a crusade to exclude immigrants. A foreign client of Russian dictator Vladimir Putin, Salvini began his political career as a northern separatist and only later morphed into an Italian nationalist.20 On June 10, 2018, the Italian Navy ordered the humanitarian SAR vessel Aquarius not to enter its territorial sea 35 nautical miles from its coast and subsequently denied it permission to enter Italian ports and disembark its approximately 600 migrants and refugees. In 2019, Salvini was stealing the political limelight from Conte, ordering the bulldozing of a Roma/Sinto camp in Rome, shutting down a migrant and refugee camp in Sicily, and arresting the crews of humanitarian SAR vessel of Sea Watch.21

Western Mediterranean and Atlantic Sub-crisis What the African migrant and refugee sub-crisis in the Western Mediterranean and Atlantic shares with its counterpart in the Central Mediterranean is the crucial relationship between Muslim and Arabic and Berber-speaking North African states and an overwhelmingly Roman Catholic European Union member state in Southern Europe that once ruled it as a colonial possession. The relationship between Morocco and Spain thus finds its rough parallel in the relationship between Libya and Italy. “Rough” because Morocco has been politically stable since the end of the French and Spanish colonial rule in 1956, while Libya has been politically unstable since 2011. Spain has been a state party to UNLOS since 1997 and the SAR Convention since 1993. Morocco has been a state party to UNLOS since 2007 and the SAR Convention since The two crises also differ in the geographic distances between the country dyads, in the capacity of the coercive apparatuses of the European Union member state in the dyad to control migrant and refugee movement, and in the intensity of xenophobic political mobilization and xenophobic state action. In marked contrast to Libya, Morocco weathered the Arab Spring with little more than superficial institutional reforms and has continued the long-standing bilateral relationship with Spain on shared security/anti-terrorism policy.22 Morocco resisted but ultimately agreed to the readmission of African migrants and refugees

 Franzi and Dadron, 51, 80–8.  Povoledo and Pianigiani, “Rescue Ship Poses New Test for Italy’s Hard-Line Migrant Policies.” 22  Zardo and Cavatorta, “Friends Will Be Friends?” 14. 20 21

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denied asylum who had departed from Morocco and in the custody of European Union member states. The economic relationship between Morocco and the European Union gave the latter powerful leverage. Moroccan and Spanish territories are separated by relatively small distances over open water in some cases and even share two compact land borders: Ceuta and Melilla. Spain’s two remaining African continental possessions are part of the Schengen Agreement and fortified with formidable barriers that have been the scenes of heart-rending mobbing. Migrants and refugees attempting to reach Spanish African territory by boat may cross from the Moroccan coast to the Canarias. With a shorter, more regular coastline than Italy, continental European Spain presents fewer possible destinations for boat transits from North Africa. Most of the attempted transits to Spain initially focused on the nearer Mediterranean coast of Andalusia, where smuggling has both a rich history and well-established criminal networks, but the transits later shifted to the Atlantic via the Canarias. The distance between from Tangier to the Costa de la Luz is only 12 miles. Today the approaches to the Canarias approaches are surveilled by maritime radar as well as cooperation between the security services of Spain, Morocco, Mauritania, and Senegal.23 Greater geographic proximity notwithstanding, by 2016, attempts by African refugees and migrants to reach Spanish territory by sea had declined, both because maritime surveillance had become more sophisticated and because Morocco is farther from the source of refugee flight in Northwest Africa and the Middle East than Libya.24 Migrants and refugees attempting to reach Spanish European territory are presented with an Atlantic coast along the Gulf of Cadiz to the Strait of Gibraltar to the Spanish mainland Mediterranean coast from the Strait of Gibraltar conceivably though improbably to the border with France and the Balearic Islands. Spanish public opinion presents lower levels of xenophobia about refugees and migrants than Italian public opinion. This may be attributable in part because political appeals to defend a European Christian identity resonate with ugly memories of authoritarian government. Fascism is a more recent historical experience in Spain than in Italy and thus a feature of the living memory of many more. Successive Spanish coalition governments of both the center-left and center-right have endorsed similar immigration policies premised on the externalization of border controls in Morocco and elsewhere in Northwest Africa. In return for serving as the frontline in externalization directly for Spain and indirectly the European Union, Morocco won “trade concessions; reduced fees for remittances and emigrant homeland investment; and negotiations on easing visas for Moroccans.”25 The other North and West African Atlantic coast states cooperating with Spain in externalization – Mauritania, Cape Verde, and Senegal – have less

 Godeneau and López-Sala, “Multi-Layered Deterrence and Technology in Spanish Maritime Management,” 157–159. 24  Ibid, 164. 25  Fitzgerald, Refuge Beyond Reach, 183. 23

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bargaining power than Morocco, but they too have been rewarded with official development assistance and equipment for their security forces. In a move similar to recent attempts to move EU ships into Libyan waters, Spanish and EU patrol ships, with liaison officers from the country concerned on board, were granted access to the territorial waters of Senegal, Cape Verde and Mauritania. They also trained the coast guards of these countries. By intercepting migrant boats in the country’s territorial waters, the passengers could be returned immediately, and the EU could avoid any legal responsibilities for them.26

Extended Sovereignty At the heart of the migration and refugee flight crisis or crises in the Mediterranean Sea is the public policy tension between the responsibility to adhere to relevant international law, relevant supranational law of the European Union, and ethical first principles on the one hand and the political impulse to appease populist, xenophobic hostility among some Europeans to African and Middle Eastern refugees and migrants.27 The most important relevant international law is found in two agreements, both of which are crucial elaborations on the post-Second World War liberal international order: the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, hereinafter referred to as the Refugee Convention,28 and the 1992 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, hereinafter referred to by the acronym UNCLOS.29 The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, hereinafter the Refugee Convention, was adopted in response to the tragedy that befell Jews fleeing Germany and the countries it occupied in the Second World War. Jews sought refuge in neighboring countries, especially France and the Low Countries, the United States, Britain and the British Commonwealth, and British Mandate Palestine. High levels of unemployment during the Great Depression led the Western democracies to restrict immigration, and those legal barriers and the political impetus that created them were slow to fall even as news reports of repression against political dissidents and discrimination against Jews in Germany appeared in 1938.30 In response to the rebellion of Palestinian Arabs against Jewish settlement as part of the Zionist Project, which had tied down a large fraction of the British Army troops from the mid-1930s, London imposed a ceiling on the number of Jews given visas to enter Palestine and later established the Palestine Patrol to interdict ships carrying Jews without visas.

 Akkerman, Expanding the Fortress, 62.  Plaut, “Why Migrant Detention Centers in Libya Won’t Be Closed.” 28  The Refugee Convention. 29  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 30  Novick, The Holocaust in American Life, 49–52. 26 27

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From the end of the Second World War to the independence of Israel in 1948, British Royal Navy shadowed suspicious ships as they left southern European ports and boarded the majority of the ships immediately before or after they entered the territorial waters of Mandate Palestine.31 Although the interdictions occurred beyond the territorial waters of Palestine and were therefore possible violations of martime law, they were justified as “self defense” based upon Britain’s responsibility for the defence of Palestine as a Mandatory Power.32 The refugees were arrested in often violent scuffles; after which they were sometimes refouled, returned to the point of embarkation, or more often interned in camps in British colonial Cyprus. Official French and Italian opposition to refoulement made Cyprus the more common destination for the refugees in custody.33 Interestingly, as with the current crisis, London considered both Malta and Italian Lampedusa as destinations for arrested refugees.34 Under the Refugee Convention, which was initially limited to Europeans, foreign nationals within the sovereign territory of a state could claim asylum and be entitled to a legal hearing to determine the validity of the claim. Non-refoulement names the prohibition against returning custody of refugees to the governments that persecuted them. An expression of the collective historical guilt about the treatment of refugee Jews by the Western democracies in the decade before the Second World War, the norm was buttressed by the political advantage it offered those same governments during the Cold War when newsworthy individual defections and the rare mass refugee flight could be used to embarrass communist governments in Eastern Europe. Thus, while France might admit 1,380,000 pieds noires and small numbers of Harkis from Algeria in 1962, any mass refugee flight in a former French colony in Africa was assumed to be the responsibility of neighboring African states.35 Under the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention, the responsibilities and protections of the Refugee Convention were belatedly extended to everyone else on the planet. Although the adoptions of the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problem in Africa by the Organization of African Unity in 1969 together with the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees by Mexico, Venezuela, Belize, Columbia, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Costa Rica in 1984 further strengthened the non-refoulement norm, adherence to the norm during the Cold War was still understood by decision-makers in the wealthy democracies to primarily burden governments in the Global South.36 With the exception of the “boat people” fleeing the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam in 1976, most refugee flight in that period was across land borders from one country in the Global South to another. As such it was of little domestic political consequence in the wealthy democracies.

 Stewart, The Royal Navy and the Palestine Patrol, 69–83, 137–145.  Ibid, 160–162. 33  Ibid, 172–173. 34  Ibid, 108–109. 35  Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 533. 36  Farmbry, Migration and Xenophobia, 35–37. 31 32

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The oceans and seas of our planet are a global common, and the right to sail across them in peacetime was conventional international law for centuries before UNCLOS. Article 87 of UNCLOS guarantees freedom of navigation on the high seas, and the interdiction of any vessel is a violation thereof. So important is the norm that it extends in part to the territorial waters of coastal states. Thus Article 17 of UNCLOS guarantees ships the right of “innocent passage” in those territorial waters. There are exceptions, however. Article 19 of UNCLOS permits coastal states to assert control over weapons, espionage, smuggling, etc. However, it does not empower coastal states to extend such controls beyond their territorial seas or to restrict search and rescue or SAR operations by humanitarian NGOs. That ships should help those in distress is another norm long predating UNCLOS. Under Article 98, Section 1, of UNCLOS, states are required to oblige the captains of their flagged vessels to assist persons in danger at sea, a reflection of the SAR norm that is part of the traditional law of the sea. Under Article 98, Section 2, of UNCLOS, coastal states must organize SAR operations for persons in danger in their territorial waters though not beyond. The latter requirement reiterates the obligation in the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue or SAR Convention. The strength of the non-refoulement and SAR norms was not seriously tested until the flight of Haitian refugees toward the United States, typically in unseaworthy vessels, which began in 1986 and accelerated in 1991. Rather than transporting them to the United States, under US President George H. W. Bush’s Kennebunkport Order, the US Coast Guard carried refugees in interdicted vessels to internment camps at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base.37 Guantánamo Bay was deemed outside the sovereign national territory of the United States. Approximately one-third of the Haitian refugees were eventually granted asylum in the United States, and the rest were repatriated after the United States extracted promises of no reprisal from Haiti. A more recent test of the commitment of Western democracies to the non-­refoulement norm was presented by migrants and refugees fleeing principally from Afghanistan and Iran to Australia by ship. Australia emulated the United States with interdiction at sea and internment for processing asylum claims at locations outside the sovereign national territory, on Nauru and Manus Island in Papua New Guinea. The European Union lacks a comparable dumping ground for the unwanted though populist nationalist decision-makers in the member states are willing to allow other member states such as Malta or Greece to serve that role. Beyond the parochialism that characterizes populist nationalist impulse, loading humanitarian responsibility onto other member states might be motivated by a desire to disrupt the idea of a shared European identity. The extraordinary decision of Germany under Chancellor Angela Merkel to accept as many as 500,000 refugees from the beginning in 2014 outraged populist nationalist sentiment not the least because it represented a rejection of xenophobic fearmongering by the most populous and wealthiest member state in the European Union. Unfortunately, that willingness to

37

 Hickman, Selling Guantánamo, 56–57.

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accept humanitarian responsibility has not extended to Africans fleeing numerous conflicts that have received less news coverage in the international press. Unlike the wealthy democracies outside Europe, the member states of the European Union are constrained by supranational legal institutions, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Schengen Agreement. Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees a right of asylum in language citing the Refugee Convention.38 Protocol 4 of Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits the collective expulsion of aliens.39 Under the “Dublin System,” adopted because the Schengen Agreement dramatically reduced the surveillance and enforcement functionality of national borders inside the European Union, an individual denied asylum in one European Union member state, typically the member state which they initially entered, is prevented from reapplying for asylum in another. Public opinion in Italy and Spain was notably anxious about immigration even before their respective Mediterranean crises. In a 2007 Pew Research Center public opinion poll in 47 countries, 64% of Italian respondents and 42% of Spanish respondents considered immigration to be a very big problem.40 The same survey results found 67% of Italian respondents and 45% of Spanish respondents believed that immigration was negative.41 A subsequent 2009 survey found 83% of Italian respondents and 80% of Spanish respondents supporting stricter immigration control.42 That the xenophobia driving hostility to African refugees and migrants is motivated in great part by racism is widely recognized though often denied by the nationalist populist political elites who agitate for tighter limits on immigration. A 2016 YouGov public opinion poll in 12 European countries again found Italians the most alarmed about immigration with 52% agreeing with the prompt that, “There are so many foreigners living around here, it doesn’t feel like home anymore.”43 Italy and Spain share a complex history of racism in which chauvinist antipathies based on color and culture are evident even between regions. Perceptions among northern Italians that southern Italy was rife with poverty, crime, and corruption and that southern Italians are less European than themselves are captured in the adage, “Africa begins after Rome,” a regional chauvinism that flared into resentment with the post-Second World War internal migration from south to north in search of economic opportunity and which can still be heard in the twenty-first century.44 The bigotry of Catalans and Basques against other Spaniards as less competent or less

 European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights  European Court of Human Rights, Guide to Article 4 of Protocol 4. 40  Horowitz, “Widespread Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Italy.” 41  Ibid. 42  Ibid. 43  Smith, “37% of Britons Say Immigration Has Meant That Where They Live Doesn’t Feel Like Home Anymore.” 44  Franzi and Madron, Matteo Salvini, 41–42. 38 39

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disciplined was premised on the early-twentieth-century belief that the latter were biologically inferior because they had differently shaped crania.45 The anti-African racism of the populist nationalist politicians in Italy and Spain thus builds upon a deep structure of irrational prejudice that mistakes differences in economic and social development for innate differences in individual ability and worth. Where many detect irrational prejudice mobilized by opportunistic politicians, others detect an even more malign purpose. For example, Fekete speculates that the new, more elaborate bureaucratic apparatus of controlling movement may represent a new form of social Darwinism, an “economic natural selection process ensuring the survival of the economically fittest,” a mechanism permitting the Global North to attract the skilled workforce from the Global South needed for economic growth while at the same time rejecting others in need.46 Migrants and refugees who seek the relative prosperity and security of life in a European Union member state but denied visas that might be granted to those with more financial resources understand that international law and the European Union supranational law dictate the necessity of physically entering the territory of a European Union member state, preferably the one in which they hope to reside, before claiming asylum. Concomitantly, European Union member state decision-­ makers intent on responding to the appease populist, xenophobic hostility understands that international law and the European Union supranational law dictate preventing migrants and asylum seekers from physically entering the territory a European Union member state. That is why the first two decades of the twenty-first century have witnessed the elaboration of externalization of border enforcement with the establishment of formal detention and informal squatter camps in North Africa under the supervision of the European Union member states, thereby “exporting” the immigration prison.47 In marked contrast to the rest of Africa, North African states have tightened visa restrictions to exclude migrants and refugees.48 The largest European Union member states with Mediterranean coastlines have also, crucially, extended enforcement beyond their territorial waters into the open Mediterranean Sea to establish a “virtual maritime border.”49 The practical effect of which has been a creeping extension of effective territorial sovereignty. On first encounter, the proposition that territorial sovereignty is in flux is surprising. So too is the observation that maritime border enforcement externalization policies of Italy and Spain, supported by the European Union, are an important reason why territorial sovereignty is being effectively extended. Steven Krasner’s 199 international relations classic, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, unpacked the concept of sovereignty into its four basic components: Westphalian sovereignty, or the much-violated presumption that states may determine their national

 Heywood, The Government and Politics of Spain, 18.  Fekete, A Suitable Enemy, 27. 47  Cornelisse, “Immigration Detention and the Territoriality of Universal Rights,” 120. 48  Flahaux and De Haas, “African Migration,” 19. 49  Karakayali and Rigo, “Mapping the European Space of Circulation,” 124–125. 45 46

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political institutions without external interference; formal diplomatic recognition exchanged between states; domestic authority exercised by the state within its territory; and the constraints on the other three components imposed by globalization, including movement across international borders.50 Maritime externalization implicates both the third and fourth. When combined with extensive surveillance and control over as client Libyan Coast Guard, interdiction by the Italian Navy at the limit of the territorial sea extends effective sovereignty over the high seas between Italy and Libya. That would not be the first time effective territorial sovereignty was extended over maritime space. When the states negotiating UNCLOS conceded that states may exercise control over Exclusive Economic Zones extending 200 nautical miles from their shores, it reflected the victory of Iceland over Britain in their three “cod wars” overfishing rights in the North Atlantic. The result was a dramatic shrinking of the ocean commons. More recently, China has asserted though not yet fully demonstrated the right to control the South China Sea, and Russia has asserted though not yet fully demonstrated the right to control the Lomonosov Peninsula in the Arctic Sea. That externalization of border controls would also shrink the ocean commons in the Central and Western Mediterranean Sea, and Eastern Atlantic is in keeping with that trend. The contradiction is that extending effective sovereignty via the maritime externalization of border control also extends other important elements of sovereignty, crucially the guarantees of human rights. Consistent with the non-refoulement norm in international law, Protocol 4 of Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits the collective expulsion of aliens.51 Individuals may be expelled only after a proper hearing. Most of the case law interpreting the guarantee involved individuals already in the territory of a European Union member state.52 However, in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, the European Court of Human Rights addressed the extraterritorial application of the guarantee in the context of the Central Mediterranean Refugee Crisis.53 The event precipitating the case involved the May 6, 2009 interdiction by the Italian Revenue Police and Coast Guard of three vessels carrying roughly 200 Somali and Eritrean refugees 35 nautical miles from the Italian island of Lampedusa, within the Maltese Search and Rescue Region. The refugees had boarded the vessels in Tripoli in Libya and were attempting to reach the Italian coast. Taken into custody aboard Italian Navy ships, they were returned to Tripoli without being informed of their actual destination or individually interviewed. Italy would later argue that they do not ask for asylum while in Italian custody, but they would have no reason to do so given their belief that they were being taken to Italy rather than Libya.54

 Krasner, Sovereignty, 8–25.  European Court of Human Rights, Guide to Article 4 of Protocol 4. 52  Ibid. 53  European Court of Human Rights. “Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy.” 54  Ibid. 50 51

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On arrival in Tripoli, the refugees were forcibly removed from the Italian Navy ships as they were transferred to the custody of Libyan authorities. Italian Interior Minister Roberto Moroni, one of four Northern League politicians in the fourth government of Silvio Berlusconi, subsequently commented that the operation is consistent with bilateral agreements between Italy and Libya. Purposefully politically provocative, the operation elicited concern from the European Union and Council of Europe as well as condemnation from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. Ongoing political disorder and violence in Libya made it anything other than safe for the refouled refugees. Living conditions in the Libyan camps dismayed observers from Human Rights Watch, who also recorded stories of shocking abuse.55 Given their original departure from Somalia and Eritrea, the refugees were also exposed to possible risks if they were deported from Libya. In its 2012 decision, the European Court of Humans Rights ruled that the operation was a violation of Protocol 4 of Article 4 prohibition of collective expulsion.56 What is evident in the language of the ruling is a less than successful effort to liberate the conception of territory from the idea of territory as exclusively land. It is therefore clear that, while the notion of “jurisdiction” is principally territorial and is presumed to be exercised on the national territory of States…the notion of expulsion is also principally territorial in the sense that expulsions are most often conducted from national territory. Where, however, as in the instant case, the Court has found that a Contracting State has, exceptionally, exercised its jurisdiction outside its national territory, it does not see any obstacle to accepting that the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by that State took the form of collective expulsion. To conclude otherwise, and to afford that last notion a strictly territorial scope, would result in a discrepancy between the scope of application of the Convention as such and that of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, which would go against the principle that the Convention must be interpreted as a whole. Furthermore, as regards the exercise by a State of its jurisdiction on the high seas, the Court has already stated that the special nature of the maritime environment cannot justify an area outside the law where individuals are covered by no legal system capable of affording them the enjoyment of the rights and guarantees protected by the Convention which the States have undertaken to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction.57

Although a legal victory for the human rights of refugees, at least within the European Union and surrounding high seas, the ruling also recognizes the extensions of Italian national sovereignty and European Union supranational sovereignty across the Mediterranean. In effect, it buttressed the European Union’s extension of its supranational effective sovereignty via interdiction at sea and externalization via prevention of departures from non-European Member states and the construction of extraterritorial detention camps to construct what some have described as a “virtual wall” with the support of human rights and humanitarian law.58

 Merill, Black Spaces, 160–161.  Ibid. 57  Ibid. 58  Ibid, Plaut. 55 56

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Conclusion The tension between the constraints of international and supranational law and humanitarian moral intuition on the one hand and virulent xenophobia and racism on the other has resulted in the externalization of border control across the Mediterranean Sea and immediate Eastern Atlantic, with the practical result of extending the territorial sovereignty of Italy and Spain, and with it the territorial sovereignty of the European Union. Much of what were previously understood to be the high seas, and therefore free from interference by governments to enforce border control, has been reduced to the effective sovereign territories of two states and of a supranational entity. The Mediterranean Sea is drying up as a territorial common, a fate that may befall other bodies of water like the South China Sea and Arctic Sea. The Central Mediterranean Sea is by far the sharpest of the two migrant and refugee sub-crises, as is evident in the struggle between the Italian government led by Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte and the humanitarian SAR NGOs. Among the noteworthy differences between the sub-crises in the Central Mediterranean Sea and the Western Mediterranean Sea and immediate Eastern Atlantic are the relative intensity of public opinion vis-à-vis migrants and refugees. That Italian public opinion presents more intense hostility toward migrants and refugees than Spanish public opinion reflects several factors. The Libyan departure point for most Italy-bound migrants and refugees is more chaotic than the Moroccan departure point for most Spain-bound migrants and refugees, and thus those departing the former bear a greater degree of the odium of threatening disorder and violence than those departing the latter. Popular memories of authoritarian populist rule are weaker in Italy than in Spain because they are older, and thus populist politicians find a softer target for appeals to fear and hatred of non-citizen, non-Europeans experiencing obvious distress and humanitarian need.

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Chapter 13

Criminalizing the Mediterranean Crossing: The Regulation of Migrants, Refugees, and Rescue Missions at Europe’s Southern Borders Isabella Alexander-Nathani

“Most of the bodies were floating face down. Some wore life jackets. But there were a lot of life jackets without any bodies inside. It was a moment I’ll never forget.” These are the words of the crew member who first alerted Spanish Maritime Rescue to a capsized boat in the Mediterranean Sea on February 4, 2018. He was on board his ferry, making his daily trip between Almería, a city in Southern Spain, and Melilla, one of two small Spanish enclaves that still remains in Northern Morocco. Four thousand miles away, my cell phone started ringing. I spent most of the following week on the phone with families across West Africa—parents, spouses, and children who were desperately searching for any information about their loved ones: My son, is he alive? My wife, have they found her body yet? When will we know? How will we know? Is anyone looking for them? For tourists seeking a day trip to Morocco, there are a host of ferry options from Spain—most take 30 min and cost 25 euros per passenger. For African migrants1 seeking the chance at a future in Europe, there are a host of smuggling options running the same routes in reverse. Most take several days at sea and cost an average of 2500 euros per passenger. Boarding one of the ferries, you might notice a small sign warning you of seasickness. Boarding one of the rafts or old fishing boats that leave from Morocco’s rocky coast at night, migrants do not need a sign warning them that, as one 14-year-old boy told me, “You’ll make it to Europe or you’ll die trying.”  Unless referring specifically to immigration law, I have chosen to use the term “migrant,” regardless of an individual’s point on their migration journey or their political status as documented or undocumented. Unlike the term “immigrant” and “emigrant,” “migrant” retains a sense of movement, or what Nicholas de Genova calls the “consequent irresolution of social processes of migration” (2005: 3). I find that in the context of contemporary African migrations, applying the term “migrant” to those of documented status—asylum seekers and refugees—and undocumented status is also most reflective of the population’s experiences of social and political marginalization, regardless of their official status.

1

I. Alexander-Nathani (*) Founder & CEO, Small World Films, Santa Barbara, CA, USA e-mail: [email protected]; http://www.isabella-alexander-nathani.com © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. Abegunrin, S. O. Abidde (eds.), African Migrants and the Refugee Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56642-5_13

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After being alerted to the bodies found floating, Spanish Maritime Rescue sent a ship to begin searching for survivors. In the hours that followed, the Royal Navy of Morocco ended up recovering the majority of the bodies, which had already drifted back to the Moroccan coastline. They placed 20 bodies in one massive, blue plastic bag that is made for tragedies like this and transported them to El Hassani Hospital in Nador. The one body recovered by the Spanish was taken to Melilla. At the morgue in Nador the following week, I was told that 16 of the 20 bodies remained unidentified. “We have a poster hanging in the police station with pictures of each face, so the families can identify them,” one officer explained to me. But I knew that the victims’ families were not in Morocco, and their friends live hidden in forest camps that are routinely under attack by the Moroccan police. I also knew that lack of official reporting by Spain and Morocco leaves family members with more questions than answers, often learning about the passing of their loved ones from Facebook posts many months after a tragedy has occurred. My phone rang with less and less frequency as the families I had spoken to begin losing hope that any answers would be provided.

Policy and Practice on the Other Side of the Border Beginning in 2015, the media turned global attention to a migrant and refugee “crisis” unfolding in Europe, and the numbers were powerful. According to the United Nations (UN), nearly 1.3 million people arrived desperately seeking refuge on European shores. More than 25 percent of them were under the age of 18 and traveling alone. Thousands of unnamed others lost their lives in attempted crossings in the years that followed. But as the number of people fleeing the ongoing war in Syria slowly declined, the number fleeing political and economic instability in other countries across the Middle East and Africa began to rise. They traveled the same well-grooved routes toward Greece, Italy, and Spain, and the Mediterranean Sea quickly became the deadliest migratory route in the world. The lesser-told stories of migration that can be found in hidden camps and forgotten detention centers on the other side of the European border in Morocco, Algeria, and Libya reveal an unfolding crisis of equally grave proportion. While headlines continue to direct attention elsewhere, the European Union (EU) has been molding North African countries into final destinations for masses of African migrants attempting to make their way north and setting a precedent for a new era of mass border externalization. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, all men, women, and children are guaranteed several fundamental rights by birth, regardless of the country of their birth.2 Most central among these is the individual’s right to seek asylum 2  Both Morocco and Spain are signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention—a multilateral treaty that defines who is a refugee, the rights guaranteed to individuals who are granted asylum, and the responsibilities of nations that grant asylum. It builds on Article 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which first recognized the right of all individuals to seek asylum from persecution in other countries.

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in another country if they are no longer safe in their own. These laws were created so that every individual would have the chance to seek a better tomorrow. Yet the conditions under which a country should be declared unsafe and an asylum seeker should be granted official refugee status have been contested since the declaration was signed in 1948. Refugee status is not unlimited. The number of people given status every year is determined by quotas that host countries set, which means that asylum seekers must not only “prove” that their claim is valid; they must prove that they are more deserving of refuge than all of the others who will be heard by their caseworker on that given day. While quotas should, in theory, move in tandem with global humanitarian crises and the needs of those who are forced to flee their homes, a clearer correlation can be found with the needs of host countries to bolster their economies through cheap sources of exploitable labor or with the political persuasion of the current administrations in power. The USA, for instance, granted status to the highest number of refugees, over 200,000, under President Jimmy Carter in 1980 and had the lowest refugee resettlement quota to date—granting status to only 21,292 refugees—under President Donald Trump. This latter figure is despite the fact that Trump’s presidency began in the midst of the largest human displacement crisis since World War II. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (also known as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or the UNHCR),3 a record 68.5 million people around the world have now been forced from their homes. This amounts to nearly 1 in every 100 people in the world today. Like the USA, European nations have publicly claimed they are overwhelmed by the number of people fleeing conflict and poverty in their home countries, and bolstered by these claims, they have started pushing back. The Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta represent the frontlines of Europe’s fight against African migration.4 These two small enclaves, no bigger than four and seven square miles in size, are the only land borders to Europe found on the African continent. They bring an internally borderless EU within the confines of the Moroccan state and have made Morocco the primary crossing point for hundreds of thousands. The stories of those who remain trapped at Europe’s southernmost borders in Morocco reveal how the EU is using the Guardia Civil,5 Spain’s oldest law enforcement agency, to routinize the process of pushing migrants back across the border before they can apply for 3  The UNHCR was established in 1950 and continues to be the principal international organization tasked with protecting refugees, or those who have been displaced from their homes around the world. According to the official mandate, “The UNHCR works to provide international protection to refugees and to seek permanent solutions for them.” Their mandate extends to official refugees, forcibly displaced communities, and stateless people, and they seek “permanent solutions” primarily through voluntary repatriation, local integration, or resettlement to a safe third country. 4  Ceuta and Melilla trace their Spanish origins to the fifteenth century. Both port cities were originally developed as military and trade centers linking Africa to Europe, and Spain retained control of them after Morocco’s independence from colonial powers in 1956. Since 1995, they have had a limited degree of self-government as autonomous communities. 5  The Guardia Civil, or Civil Guard, is the oldest law enforcement agency in Spain, and under the authority of the Ministry of Defense, it is now outfitted as a military force and charged with patrolling Spain’s southern land and sea borders with Morocco.

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asylum. Officials operating on Moroccan soil are then free to carry out abuses that would be punishable under European and international law—improperly repatriating, beating, and even killing those who dare to make a second attempt at crossing. It is important to note that the international human rights laws in place today were established in recent history, created to address the large number of Jewish families who were displaced from their homes during World War II and no longer felt safe returning. They were never intended to address displacement on a global scale, nor were they expected to last as long as they have. The legal categories of “refugee” and “asylum seeker” served the particular political climate of post-World War II Europe, and as Europe stands amid a new “crisis” today, they continue to be a reflection of contemporary politics. Today’s media frenzy surrounding migration, whether witnessed in the EU, the USA, or elsewhere, similarly emphasizes the urgency of the situation. The imagined state of emergency that has been created is central to the development and legitimization of border externalization and the spread of violent border regimes. There are countless perilous points along the primary smuggling routes that crisscross the African continent. The final crossings that migrants attempt to make over the razor wire fences surrounding Morocco’s Spanish enclaves or across rough waters of the Mediterranean Sea are only the most recent memories that they hold— not always the most traumatic. In my decade of work with those trapped in North Africa waiting for their next attempted escape, I have never met a single one whose possessions have not at least once, and, usually, multiple times, been stolen from them. If they left home in their best clothes, they are gone. If their parents bought them a new pair of shoes for the journey, it is gone. If they set out with a cell phone or a watch, a pocketknife or a wallet, a flashlight, or a hat, they are all gone. Whatever money they had in their pockets, it is certainly gone. I am always curious about what migrants pack on their day of departure, leaving home with the knowledge that they may never return and able to bring no more than what they can carry on their backs. The answers I have received are surprisingly similar, even across ethnic and socioeconomic divides. What migrants deem “the necessities” usually include a spare pair of clothes, a cellphone, phone charger, a jug of water, a box of crackers, possibly a can of sardines, and all of the money they have to their names. Many also carry a copy of the Bible or the Qur’an, which is notable given the weight of both and the high rates of illiteracy in the communities that many are coming from. Nearly all carry a small and cherished collection of old photographs. By the time I am sitting across from these men, women, and children, they have already been hustled and abused by a long line of smugglers, bandits, border agents, police officers, and detention center guards, and they have lost nearly everything they started out with, backpacks included. Photographs are the one possession that holds no value for others, and as such, they are often the one possession that migrants are able to keep. For the fortunate few who reach safety within the borders of the EU, their photographs of the families and homes left behind, combined with traumatic images of the treacherous fence and boat crossings that have accumulated in their minds, continue to serve as powerful visualizations of how European policy is acting on individual bodies. “It’s hard to ever feel safe,” one Guinean migrant now settled in Spain

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explained to me, “when every day you see that your brothers and sisters are not.” They carry with them not only their scars, but their memories of skin shredded by razor wire and bodies washed ashore. In 2013, the Lampedusa disaster brought global attention to what African migrant communities have long suffered. The horrors of migration in the Mediterranean Sea made headlines when news broke that more than 350 migrants had drowned just 75 miles from Italian shores. For the 518 men, women, and children on board, the lights in the distance signaled that the end of their long journey was near. According to one report, “They had made a difficult journey across the Sahara and through Libya, packed into trucks and walking long stretches over sand on foot, only to pay several times the price of one plane ticket to be packed in—shoulder to shoulder—on a boat much too small and much too old for their numbers” (Schwartz 2014).6 They saw lights on the Italian island of Lampedusa in the distance. But that was before the water started pouring in. That was before the fire erupted, their captain’s failed attempt to signal to those ashore that they were in crisis, and before the boat capsized, the passengers’ failed attempts to escape the flames. That was before everyone on board had to choose, in the final moments of their lives, to go by water or by fire. Body bags lined the beach—shoulder to shoulder once again. “Pray [to] God for the victims of the shipwreck off Lampedusa!” called Pope Francis, “An immense tragedy!” called then Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta. “A European tragedy, not just an Italian one!” then Deputy Prime Minister Angelino Alfano followed. Rescue workers added powerful images to the story with their words—a mother clutching her child to her chest, a teenage boy in a T-shirt that read “Italia,” and a young woman who had given birth on the boat, her infant still attached to her by the umbilical cord. In the weeks after the incident, survivors came forward revealing that the casualty reports had been grossly underestimated. In fact, hundreds of others had been locked in the hold of the vessel by their smugglers. The few who survived the tragedy were taken into custody by Italian officials, where they awaited trial to determine their alleged status as “illegal.”7A “guilty” verdict would result in fines of up to €5000 and immediate deportation. Six years later, in 2019, the remnants of yet another tragedy are on display at the Venice Biennale (La Biennale di Venezia)—a prestigious visual art exhibition in Italy. Visitors are faced with the monstrous remains of a 90-foot fishing boat that capsized on the route between Libya and Lampedusa in 2015. It is the remains of the Mediterranean’s largest tragedy to date—a tragedy in which between 700 and 1100 men, women, and children lost their lives in the sea. There were only 28 survivors. The boat was brought to Venice by artist Christoph Büchel, who calls the project “Barca Nostra” (“Our Ship”) and hopes it will provide a somber reminder of

6  For the complete story, please see Mattathias Schwartz, “The Anniversary of the Lampedusa Tragedy,” The New Yorker, October 3, 2014. 7  Any terms referencing “illegality” have been placed in quotations in order to problematize the notion of the individual as an “illegal” subject and raise questions about the conditions under which such “il”/legalizations were constructed.

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recent tragedies.8 The project name represents the collective politics that allow for daily tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea to continue and our shared responsibility for the lives lost there. It is not “their” ship—it is “ours.” Büchel’s work also raises important questions about the ethics of making art from tragedy. Europe did not want the bodies. Do they deserve the boat? A photograph of the exhibit is pictured in Fig. 13.1. According to the UNHCR, an average of 14 migrants drowned in the Mediterranean Sea every day in 2016—the year following the capsizing of “Our Ship.” The International Organization for Migration’s Missing Migrants Project reported that a record 629 died in one month of 2018 alone. These numbers are good estimates at best. As my research has shown, Mediterranean crossings are poorly reported, and authorities on both sides of the sea have incentives to underreport the deaths that occur there.9 But there is no denying that the three routes commonly referred to as the Western Mediterranean (Algeria and Morocco to Spain), the Central Mediterranean (Tunisia and Libya to Italy), and the Eastern Mediterranean (Turkey to Greece) are active and increasingly deadly, raising alarm in destination countries throughout Europe. Italy, Spain, and Greece each receive tens of thousands of individuals fleeing their homes across the African continent every year, and as this number grows, their individual responses to migration are beginning to diverge.

Fig. 13.1  Tourists enjoy a break in front of the “Barca Nostra” exhibit by artist Christopher Buchel at the Spring 2019 Venice Biennale. Photograph courtesy of Martin Herbert and copied with his permission 8  For more information on Christoph Büchel’s exhibit, please see www.labiennale.org/en/art/2019/ partecipants/christoph-büchel 9  For author’s ongoing research on the African migrant and refugee “crisis,” please see Isabella Alexander-Nathani, Burning at Europe’s Borders, Oxford University Press, 2020.

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Italy’s newly elected populist government signals a major shift in the country’s response to Europe’s ongoing migrant and refugee “crisis.” No longer are migrants simply being pushed back at border fences. Now, their boats are being turned around in international waters, and the critical work of search and rescue missions attempting to prevent more tragedies in the Mediterranean is being criminalized by the states that should be protecting migrants’ basic human rights to seek asylum. “If more people leave, more people die,” Italy’s new Deputy Prime Minister, Matteo Salvini, stated in a recent press conference. His party line focuses attention on the threats that are present along migratory routes, but it fails to recognize the even greater threats that migrants face in their home countries, from Sudan to Syria. Italy has drawn criticism from human rights groups for its new “zero tolerance” approach, which includes closing all of Italy’s ports to humanitarian rescue ships and a plan to institutionalize deportation before migrants have time for their asylum claims to be reviewed. In 2018, the humanitarian ship Aquarius—operated by Doctors Without Borders and the French organization SOS Mediterranée—saved 629 lives in a 3-day search and rescue mission, only to spend the following 12  days stranded in the Mediterranean Sea as they were turned away from one port after another. Italy was the first to close its ports, followed shortly after by Malta. Doctors, aid workers, and the rescued migrants aboard all struggled with dwindling supplies and the threat of a forced return to North Africa until Spain finally agreed to open its ports to the Aquarius. Spain, under a new and comparatively progressive administration, took its moment on the global stage to tell the world it saved one ship, but it cannot possibly save them all. Days later, 70 men, 30 women, and 6 children drowned off the coast of Libya in the same waters where the Aquarius had been patrolling. Every time a ship is turned away from European ports, those aboard—if they do not become another Mediterranean statistic—are forced to return to the places they are fleeing. For many migrants, the choice between a forced return to inhumane conditions in North Africa or death is an easy one to make.

The Weight of Their Journeys According to Spain’s Law on the Right to Asylum and Refugee Status,10 every man, woman, and child arriving on Spanish shores has the right to apply for asylum. Once their application is filed, they have the right to interpreters, legal counsel, and emergency medical assistance. They have the right to state-sponsored accommodation in one of Spain’s four detention centers for 60  days, or until their case has been reviewed. Approval of their application guarantees the right to a work permit and

 Spain’s Law on the Right to Asylum and Refugee Status was adopted in 1984. For Spain’s complete refugee and asylum laws, please reference the Library of Congress: www.loc.gov/law/help/ refugee-law/spain.php

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social welfare, which includes subsidized health care and education.11 Those whose applications are denied are required to leave Spain within 60  days or risk being served a deportation order. But in recent years, Spain’s state-run detention centers have all been overrun, as cases take longer and longer to reach review, and individuals are routinely denied their basic rights to legal counsel and emergency medical assistance. NGOs, like the Spanish Commission for the Assistance of Refugees (SCAR), have tried to fill the widening gap between the services guaranteed and the services provided by offering safe housing and legal guidance at discounted rates. But these organizations, too, are struggling to handle the number of new arrivals. The French Refugee Agency, like the Spanish, has admitted to being completely overwhelmed. Their review process now takes an average of 24 to 36 months and results in a rejection rate of over 90 percent. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency, known as Frontex, claims that the European “crisis” began in 2014 when the number of asylum applications received by EU member states rose by 44 percent. In France and Spain, applications have increased by 73 percent and 64 percent, respectively, in the past 5  years.12 There is no denying that the EU, especially its southern states, carries the weight of a great exodus of men, women, and children fleeing which increasingly fractured political and economic systems across Africa and the Middle East. Southern member states make a powerful argument that this burden outweighs the size of their nations relative to the rest of the world. Given the realities of a failed asylum review system, it is not difficult to understand why Spanish officials, with the purported support of the EU, would attempt to mold Morocco into a final destination for all African migrations north. And it is not difficult to understand why Morocco would accept. North African nations are struggling under the weight of their economic instability, making it difficult to turn down the significant funds received in exchange for their role in controlling migration flows into Europe. Last year alone, Morocco was paid over 30 million euros in the name of “development aid.” In the spring of 2015, then president of Melilla, Juan Jose Imbroda Ortiz, made a shocking announcement. Instead of properly repatriating migrants to their countries of origin as mandated by international human rights law, Spain would now return all Africans to Morocco to eliminate the “prize” of letting those who had migrated to the country “illegally” remain in Spain while their asylum applications were reviewed. This popular argument for “punishing” the journeys of “illegal” migrants is a far cry from Spain’s legal conviction that every individual has “the right to apply for asylum.”13 Where, under international law, do we proclaim that  Those who are granted asylum in Spain are also entitled to €51.60 a month and are able to file for additional funds to support any legal family members who have reunited with or accompanied them. 12  Germany continues to receive the largest number of asylum applications in Europe, followed by France, Sweden, Italy, and the UK. 13  In addition to violating Spain’s Law on the Right to Asylum and Refugee Status, the deportation of migrants to Morocco, a country with minimal reception capacity to guarantee basic human rights, violates Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 11

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those fleeing war-torn and impoverished regions of the world—that men, women, and children who have lost everything and sustained untold abuses in their long journeys toward safer shores—should arrive with neatly arranged dossiers with their claims for asylum? In too many cases, the migrant is the refugee, and the refugee is the migrant. Both arrive at the hands of the same smuggling rings and rarely do either arrive with an application in hand. It is the obligation of the states receiving them to assemble the necessary information to disentangle the two. As Kia, a young mother from Mali, explained to me, “If I lose my children to war or I lose my children to disease or starvation or malnutrition, what’s the difference? There is no way to survive in my country. I will not stay at home and watch them die. Dying on the sea means that at least I died trying to reach something better for them.” Her words highlight the arbitrary legal distinctions that states draw between those who feel they have no choice but to put their lives on the line. President Ortiz’s comments marked the moment when, for the first time, Spain publicly acknowledged its illegal practice of “pushbacks.”14 Spain acknowledged its literal pushing back of migrants at the Spanish borders surrounding Ceuta and Melilla and its symbolic pushing back of those who make it to mainland Europe only to be forcibly returned to Morocco rather than to their countries of origin. President Ortiz said he hoped that Ceuta and Melilla’s routinizing of pushbacks would reduce the incentive for migrants to leave their homes, and the following day, Spain’s cabinet quietly approved a €3 million “aid package” to be divided between the two enclaves, which have a combined population of under 150,000. According to the press release by Spanish Deputy Prime Minister Maria Teresa Fernandez de la Vega, Ortiz intended this package to “compensate the efforts of both cities to address illegal immigration before it reaches our shores.” He failed to field questions from reporters about the six African migrants who had been fatally shot by security forces the previous weekend in their attempts to scale the fence surrounding Ceuta. In addition to structural changes to the border, security forces had recently been outfitted with new weapons, and Moroccan police forces were bolstered by the addition of Spanish border control teams. A map of the primary migratory routes between Africa and Southern Europe is pictured in Fig. 13.2. Integrating studies of racial inequality with those of global inequality illuminates a world in which asylum, citizenship, and other state-sanctioned categories of belonging are no longer just markers of identity constructed to include and exclude. They are now the goods with which people barter. As more lose faith in the possibility of legal pathways to asylum, alternative routes have gained momentum. Passports are bought and sold. Smuggling businesses are thriving. And governments are auctioning citizenship off to the highest bidder, offering special visas to applicants Treatment or Punishment, which maintains that “No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” 14  “Pushbacks” were originally sanctioned under a little-used 1992 agreement allowing Spain to undertake “exceptional repatriation” of immigrants entering Spanish territory “illegally” from Morocco, even if those entering were not Moroccan nationals.

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Fig. 13.2  Map of primary migratory routes between Africa and Southern Europe. Image is based on a 2012 version of MTM i-Map, which can be found at (www.imap-migration.org)

willing to make million-dollar-plus investments, as is routinely done in the USA.15 It should be no surprise that those at the bottom of our global economic pyramid end up paying the highest price for their chance at inclusion. I know there is no easy solution. But having researched migration at Europe’s southernmost borders, embedded with smuggling rings and living in migrant camps across North Africa since 2007, I also know that externalizing border controls and asylum processing centers will not solve the problem. Seeking asylum in foreign countries is a human right guaranteed under international law to those fleeing the African continent as much as it is to those fleeing the Middle East and elsewhere.  The “selling” of citizenship is best evidenced by special EB-5 visas that the USA offers to any applicants who make million-dollar-plus investments guaranteed to create ten or more jobs. 15

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With 54 countries in Africa and multiple factors contributing to the migration of citizens from each one, there is no single solution that could address the African migrant and refugee “crisis” as a whole. It is important to recognize that what would be the right solution for the large percentage of unaccompanied minors may not be the right solution for adults—the right solution for women may not be the right solution for men—and the right solution for those fleeing active conflict may not be the right solution for those fleeing the debilitating effects of extreme poverty, climate change, or political persecution. But unless international laws are amended, every citizen of the world is entitled to the same basic right to seek asylum. This right needs to be guaranteed with safe and legal pathways, with timely and objective asylum case review, and with proper repatriation practices for those whose claims are denied. Writing this a few years ago, I may have made a stronger argument for us to recognize all displaced persons—documented and undocumented—as having the basic rights that are granted to refugees. But today, I am not sure if the language matters. What good does the inclusion of all displaced persons under the protected category of refugee matter if our world no longer protects the refugee? My work has highlighted the failure of both North African and European governmental agencies to uphold international laws and provide those seeking a better life with basic human rights. But I do not overlook the burden that the states situated in our world’s most critical border zones bear. The UK Royal Navy estimates that half a million migrants will attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea this year alone. Contrary to the popular narrative, this strain is not only on the EU, which receives the majority of those crossing. In fact, the world’s poorest countries shoulder the greatest burden of the global crisis. According to UNHCR’s latest annual Global Trends report (2018), “developing” regions host the vast majority of the world’s refugees—a staggering 84 percent. This is a weight that we all should bear. “Like a magnet, Europe pulls them in, until suddenly, without warning, the magnet flips and they are pushed back out,” Myriame, a refugee from Cote d’Ivoire, who now lives in Morocco and runs a small aid organization for migrants, explained to me. She held prestigious positions with both the UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Europe before returning to Morocco to establish her own NGO. “I saw so much suffering on my journey through North Africa,” she said, remembering the migration she made alone at the age of 22, “that I felt compelled to return and offer my hand. I’ve never seen suffering like this before.” Myriame often speaks about Europe’s desire to pull Africans—slaves, soldiers, and workers—from beyond their borders when they were needed and to freely scavenge the African continent for natural resources. “Colonialism left our homes raped and fractured. Of course, we wanted to travel north to seek an education, to seek work, to seek what colonialism had taught us was good and right and civilized, to seek the future that had been stolen from us. But then there emerged a sacred thing they called a border.” She paints a picture of a world in which colonial powers retreated securely behind the borders they had drawn, the humanitarians among them crying out, We will now establish human rights! We will grant you asylum! We will protect and defend! If only you can survive this deadly obstacle course to reach us.

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In my research, I apply “counter-mapping” as a tool for challenging the geopolitical map of Europe and investigating the bordering practices that are being enacted in spaces distinct from European territory. I have documented the EU’s expanding collaboration in border patrolling, surveillance, and interception and how this collaboration affects populations on the ground. I have examined the very practices through which border externalization is enacted: training programs for third countries’ coast guards and border patrols, technical equipment for monitoring migrants’ journeys by land and sea, and the new alliances that are emerging daily between unlikely actors ranging from governmental officials and smuggling rings to NGO workers and police forces. But most central to my work has been my exploration of the new spaces that border externalization is producing at the external frontiers of the global north and the embodied experiences of migrants who remain trapped behind externalized borders across the global south.

A Return to the Beginning The same week that 21 bodies were found just off the coast of Morocco, major news organizations from The New York Times to El Mundo returned global attention to the Mediterranean Sea with news of the latest tragedy. But regardless of which source you followed, you read the same facts: 21 bodies. All Africans. All packed into a small wooden fishing boat that capsized off the coast of Morocco’s Spanish enclave. There were no corrections made as the victim count grew, ultimately being more than double what was originally reported. As I followed the coverage by various sources, I noticed that there was never a single name released. I wanted to correct this error, but I wanted to correct it with more than a number. I did not want to simply break the news that it was 47 migrants, not 21, whose lives were lost to the sea last week. I wanted to report who had been lost. I enlisted the help of fellow migrants and longtime friends of mine who were still living in the hidden forest camps surrounding Morocco’s Spanish enclaves, and together we committed to the goal. We would find the name, the face, and the story of everyone who had been lost. They knew better than anyone the group that had left their camp just after nightfall on February 3 to walk 16 miles to the meeting point their smugglers had given them. The photograph of Abdul Karim Barry—a 17-year-old boy from Guinea—was one of the first I saw. I had been in Karim’s camp only a month before the tragedy struck, and as more details poured in, I realized that I knew many of the victims well. Karim had been in the camp awaiting his chance to escape for over 2 years. After his father died, he felt the responsibility of taking care of his younger siblings and helping his mother, who struggled to find work in their rural community. He wanted to give his siblings the chance to go to school like his father had given him. “Karim was smart and above all, he was generous,” one of his closest friends told me over a crackling phone line. “He always risked the dangers of going into the street to beg for us when we couldn’t find enough food to eat. It was Karim who

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prepared the one daily meal for our brotherhood every night.” I posted a photograph of him and asked his friends in Morocco and Guinea to help me make him more than a number. Over the following days, I received dozens of responses. “Karim studied hard before leaving home,” wrote one friend, “and he used his education to speak up for the other boys who didn’t have any. He was young, but he was a natural leader and he couldn’t stand for anyone to be treated as less than human.” Another wrote, “He dreamed of becoming a soccer player when he was little. He used to play on a team in Guinea, and he was really good. Sometimes, he played with me in the forest. We had a ball we made out of plastic bags and tape.” In the hours before the first bodies were spotted, Karim, along with 46 men, women, and children coming from Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Senegal, and Mali, left their camps. Their smugglers, two Moroccan men, were waiting for them on a rocky beach in Arekmane. They carried a small wooden fishing boat, known as a patera, that had been rigged with an outboard motor down to the water. A witness who traveled with them but did not board the boat that night told me that the winds were too strong for a safe crossing—50 mph, according to official reports. So why would smugglers choose to travel, risking their own lives, under such rough conditions? In previous years, they would not have made the same decision. But new systems established to protect migrants’ financial investments have made tragedies like this one more likely. In 2016, I knew dozens of migrants who were devastated when they paid between 1500 and 2500 euros and failed to reach the other side. This leaves some trapped in Morocco for decades, struggling to save up enough money to try again. Last summer, I noticed a niche market had emerged, with some smugglers stepping into the business of transferring money from migrant to smuggler—only after their boats had reached Spanish soil. For a 10 to 15 percent increase in fee, migrants can now pay these third parties and secure their investments. Those who find themselves back in Morocco after a boat has capsized or after a rescue ship has forcibly rerouted them, as happens more often than not, have the money to try again. For the smugglers who captained the boat on February 4, a postponed departure would have meant the return of approximately 117,500 euros. Mounting surveillance efforts across the Mediterranean also mean more incentives for smugglers to call for last-minute departures when bad weather is on the horizon. They know that storms make it easier to evade the Guardia Civil. With an overcrowded boat and waves reaching 3 meters high, the group’s boat capsized less than 1 hour into their journey. All 47 passengers were thrown into the freezing water without enough life jackets to go around—many of those on board not knowing how to swim. The oldest reported passenger on board was 34. The youngest had just turned 14. There were eight women, one of whom was pregnant. Two days after the tragedy, the Royal Navy of Morocco reported that, miraculously, one young man from Mali had been found alive. After a series of interrogations, he was accused of taking part in an illegal smuggling operation and taken into police custody. The Nadori police told me they are still searching for the top-level smugglers thought to have masterminded the operation and many others like it.

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In the following weeks, the poster was taken down at the police station, and the bodies were taken to a mass grave where they would be buried. But names, photographs, and stories continued to pour in from devastated family members. Along with them, I received final videos that were recorded by some of the young men and women, including Alpha Moron Diallo, 22, who told his mother, “I’ve suffered greatly in my journey to Morocco, but it’s all been worthwhile, Mama, because soon I’ll be calling you from Spain!” And Safourata “Sofia” Sow, 30, who told her three daughters how much she loved and missed them. “Be good girls while I’m away,” she said. “Mama is proud of you.” Again and again, I listened to the video recorded by Karim, who was one of the last boys I interviewed in person. Sitting by his makeshift tent, I remember him telling me, “I finally understand what my brothers meant when they told me, ‘I’ll make it to Europe or I’ll die trying.’ After you’ve endured the horrors of this journey to Morocco, there is only one way home.” I learned that Hassane and Houseine Traoré—28-year-old twin brothers from Cote d’Ivoire—had a similar story to tell. “They were the coolest guys,” said a childhood friend I connected with by phone. “They were the best athletes our village had ever seen, they played music and sang, they did well in school. All the girls loved them. We knew they would become big men someday.” “They were always together,” explained another, “One never did anything without the other.” Including their final crossing to Europe. Both boarded the boat, and neither body was found. Their mother called me day after day, hoping I would have some news to share. Months later, she was still waiting to bury her sons. Although Hassane and Houseine were adored in their camp in Morocco, it was difficult for me to find their actual names because everyone there knew the charismatic young men simply as “the twins.” The Traoré brothers were not the only twins on board. Alhassane Barry, 26, from Guinea was also among the victims. “Hassane was the quiet one. His twin was the outgoing one. Hassane always looked up to his brother, but, in a lot of ways, it was him who the rest of us admired,” one of his closest friends, who survived the crossing from Morocco to Europe last year, told me as we sat side by side with a stack of old photographs between us. “They lost their father when they were young, and they were both devoted to their mother. She worked hard to send them to university, and they wanted to provide a better life for her. Hassane was one of the best students in his class, but when he graduated, he had nothing. In Guinea, it doesn’t matter how smart you are. If you’re not from a wealthy family, you can’t find a good job. He didn’t tell his brother he was leaving because he didn’t want him to worry. I was the one who called him to tell him about the tragedy. I wanted him to hear it from a friend before he saw his brother’s photo on Facebook. He couldn’t breathe. I remember him choking back his tears, saying, ‘how am I going to tell our mother?’” Not everyone had family members at home waiting for news of their safe crossing. Oumou “Belle” Bah, 16, and her little brother, “Bambino,” 14, who was the youngest reported passenger on board, left their home after losing both of their parents. Back in their camp, one of the boys’ friends told me that he cried when he realized there was no one to notify of their death. Belle’s friend, also 16, said, “I made a flower necklace and burned it in the fire last night. Belle and I used to make them together.” Everyone remembered her as kind, beautiful, and fiercely protective of her brother. Some had family members waiting for them on the other side. Tahirou Barry, 24, from Guinea was one of them. His friend told me, “He had a beautiful woman

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waiting for him in France. She was the love of his life. They had known each other since they were little, and they got married after university. Tahirou saved up all of his money to help her get a student visa so she could continue her studies in Europe after their wedding. He was working and trying to save more, so he could join her there, but it was difficult to find work and he couldn’t wait any longer. After two years, he decided to cross through Morocco. Tahirou was counting down the days until he would see her again. She didn’t know he had left.” Like the newlyweds, Marlyatou “Marly” Diallo, 26, was crossing to meet her husband, who had made it to Germany the year before and, soon after, had fallen gravely ill. After her multiple requests for a visa had been denied, she, too, decided to cross through Morocco. “Marly wasn’t just my sister—she was the smartest, kindest, most beautiful woman,” said Fatima, her older sister, who was watching Marly’s only child for her until her return. Her siblings passed the phone around, each sharing with me their memories of “the little one.” She was adored. “She’ll be deeply missed by us,” her older brother, Barry, told me, “But most of all, by her husband and son, whom she loved with all her heart. How can we explain to this child how the world took his mother from him like this?” Marly’s Facebook page is filled with albums documenting every moment of her son’s life—from his first tooth to his most recent birthday, 5 years old last month. The last image she posted was perhaps an answer to her brother’s question. It read, “Son, I carried you for nine months in my body and I’ll carry you always in my heart. If there’s ever a day when I’m not beside you, know that my spirit is there.” A sampling of the photographs provided by the family of Marly and the other victims is pictured in Fig. 13.3.

Fig. 13.3  A sampling of the photographs collected for the author’s “Names not Numbers” campaign, which documents the names, faces, and individual stories of the 47 vicitms of the February 4, 2019 tragedy in the Mediterranean Sea and can be viewed in full at www.twitter.com/isabella_ writes. Photographs courtesy of the victims’ families and copied with their permission

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I hope people will look at the faces of Marly and Tahirou, Karim and Hassane, the twins, and the siblings who had no parents to mourn them. I hope they see that on February 4, 2018, there were 47 individuals who packed what few belongings they had on their backs, handed their savings over to smugglers, and stepped onto a small, wooden fishing boat to begin their lives. They were proud and eager, like students at graduation. I have approximately 47 students in my lecture hall on Wednesday afternoons. Most of them are the same age as those who are smuggled across the rough waters of the Mediterranean Sea at night. I have thought about how much attention would be devoted to remembering each of their lives if a tragedy of this proportion ever struck. For months, I worked tirelessly, with the help of my friends in Morocco, collecting names, images, and stories, and yet in the end, we only had 39. To this day, there are still family members who do not have answers to their questions, who do not know if their loved ones are gone. Twenty-six lives will never be a part of the statistics because no effort was made to recover their bodies from the water. Sixteen of the 21 recovered bodies were buried without names because no effort was made to identify them in the morgue. In the 24 hours following this one tragedy, another boat carrying 39 migrants arrived safely at the Chafarinas Islands off the coast of Morocco; 94 migrants were reported dead in a capsized boat off the coast of Libya; and the Guardia Civil intercepted 31 migrants en route to Spain, forcibly returning their boat to Morocco. Migration in the Mediterranean is growing by the day. And so are the rates of drowning in the small stretch of sea that continues to serve as the world’s deadliest border. Before the waves overthrew the boat, before he fought for one last breath, I imagine Karim was thinking of how long it might take him to save up for a real soccer ball and if the ground in Spain would feel anything like the ground at home. What I know is that he and the others stepped onto that small, wooden fishing boat carrying the dreams of supporting their parents and siblings, partners, and children. In all the years I have spent working with migrants across North Africa, I have never met a single one who did not dream of helping someone they loved. I do not think it is possible to endure the suffering they experience without love motivating them to reach the other side. I hope people will remember these stories the next time they read headlines about overcrowded boats and numbers, not names, of those who were lost at sea. The headlines never change; it’s as if the same bodies are washing ashore again and again. But how could it be the same twins who brought music to their hidden camp, the same siblings who clung tightly to one another, the same big-hearted boy with dreams of being a soccer player? Those 47 are gone, soon to be replaced with others, proud and eager.

Funding Statement  This research has been generously supported by a range of institutions including the National Science Foundation, the American Institute for Maghrib Studies (AIMS), the West African Research Association (WARA), the US Department of Education’s Fulbright-Hays Program, and the Saharan Crossroads Research Fellowship, awarded annually by AIMS and WARA.

Chapter 14

Skilled Female New Canadians and Mental Health Challenges: Effect of Unemployment and Underemployment Felicia Ihuoma Nwalutu and Michael Onyedika Nwalutu

Introduction This chapter uses the healthcare and systems models, The Standing Senate Committee on Mental Health Promotion, and anti-racism and anti-colonial theories to foreground new immigrants’ experiences in Canada. Canada’s attention and commitment to mental health promotion came in 2006 with a report that was presented to the Standing Senate Committee by the honorable Michael Kirby’s recommendation that a mental health commission be set up in Canada. The Federal government responded in 2007 by committing $10 million for 2 years and $15 million per year for each subsequent 2-year period. The bill that will expire in 2017 has received another 10-year commitment by the government; hence mental health promotion is firmly established in Canada.1 The First Ministers’ Accord on healthcare renewal stipulates that all Canadians have the right “to access quality care no matter where they live; and … see their health care system as efficient, responsive and adapting to their changing needs, and those of their families and communities now, and in the future.”2 Regehr and Glancy3 added that a cardinal value of Canada’s Health and 1  Khanlou, N. “Migrant Mental Health”. Canadian Issues: Immigrant Mental Health: Metropolis Project: Bridging Research, Policy and Practice, Summer 2010. 2  First Ministers. “2003 First Minister’s accord on health care renewal”. 2003. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from: www.international.alberta.ca/documents/Canadian.../800039004_e.pdf 3  Regehr, Cheryl, & Glancy, Graham. “Mental health social work practice in Canada”. Don Mills Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2010.

F. I. Nwalutu Faculty of Social Work, Factor Inwentash, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada M. O. Nwalutu (*) The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. Abegunrin, S. O. Abidde (eds.), African Migrants and the Refugee Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56642-5_14

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Mental Healthcare system includes “Informed Choice - involving the ability of all Canadians to choose health options based on best available information.”4 We identify with this contribution for highlighting women’s agency as migrant individuals and for factoring some of the reasons why women chose to migrate that may include economic incentives, family reunification, and educational opportunities, escape from gender-based and/or political violence, and to gain more social independence. This research notes “the number of women immigrants and refugees to Canada has increased over the years and the percentage of women settling in as immigrants (and refugees whose claims have been approved to become permanent residents) is usually 2 to 7% higher than that for men.5” In addition, the number of women entering Canada as economic immigrants in comparison to those entering as family class immigrants is slowly increasing. It is observed that this increase is the result of more women arriving as skilled or temporary workers (Khanlou, 2010). They contend that half of the refugees arriving in Canada are women and that women make up a significant proportion of illegal immigrants. And because these numbers beg attention for health sciences research specifically on the health of women immigrants, their work provide evidence-based data for this chapter. Each person has been endowed with significant psychological and social capacities that control his or her capability to accomplish the best mental health and well-­ being outcome. “Mental health problems and illnesses are clinically significant patterns of behavior or emotions that are associated with some level of distress, suffering, or impairment in one or more areas such as school, work, social and family interactions, or the ability to live independently.”6 According to Pederson, Raphael & Johnson (2010) Statistics Canada states that, average life expectancy at birth in 1999 was 79.0 years. A breakdown by sex shows that women had an average life expectancy of 81.7  years, while men had an average life expectancy of 76.3 years.7 Their work also noted that women have a higher prevalence of chronic diseases especially during later parts of their lives. Women are associated with a higher prevalence of stress than men, and Canada’s new immigrant female population is more predisposed to stress than men. Stress affects women’s health because if the stressor is left untreated, it can lead to heart disease problems, obesity, and diabetes, all of which could be debilitating and challenging.

 Ibid.  Guruge, S., Collins, E., and Bender, A. “Working with Immigrant Women: Guidelines for Mental Health Professionals”. Canadian Issues: Immigrant Mental Health: Metropolis Project: Bridging Research, Policy and Practice, Summer 2010. 6  Canadian Association of Mental Health. “Improving mental health services for immigrant, November 2009 Cited in Nwalutu, F.I. “Canadian Labour Market as a Dispiriting Phenomenon on Skilled Migrants: Mental Health Consequences on Immigrant Canadian.” (Sociology Mind) Vol.9 No.3, July 2019 (2019): 151–167. 7  Pederson, A., Raphael, D., and Johnson, E. “Gender, race, and health inequalities”. In (Eds.) Toba Bryant, Dennis Raphael, and Marcia Rioux, Staying Alive: Critical Perspectives on Health, Illness, and Health Care. Canadian Scholars Press Inc: (2010): 205–237. 4 5

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Mental health has been defined by the World Health Organization “as a state of well-being in which the individual realizes his or her potential, can cope with the normal stresses of life, can work productively and fruitfully, and can contribute to her or his community.”8 The World Health Organization’s definition emphasizes mental health promotion as a preventative measure. Mental health promotion requires a systemic approach to ensure health for all members of a society or nation. This article uses literature reviews to foreground mental health promotion as a policy brief for Canada’s varied immigrant populations. It projects mental health promotion (MHP) as the process of enhancing the capacity of individuals and communities to take control over their lives and improve their mental health. The article describes MHP as a strategy that encourages a supportive environment and personal resilience, as well as showing respect for culture, equity, social justice, interconnections, and personal dignity. This contribution is important for its position that MHP is mainstream based and as such forecloses multiple cultural, linguistic, and systemic barriers affecting all categories of immigrants, legal refugees, and refugees with no legal status (or precarious status). The article also highlights a vulnerable group, adolescent girls who are caught between their developmental identity issues and mediating the new culture for their parents, often shuddering roles far beyond their capacity. According to Khanlou (2010) “Female refugee youth … face resettlement and migration challenges that may put them at added risk for negative mental health outcomes given the often traumatic pre-migration contexts they are coming from and the post-migration identity development.”9 This author outlines three main approaches that have been used to describe the health of new immigrants to Canada, namely, first “that immigrants have worse health than the general population” or “the morbidity-mortality” approach. The second approach views immigrant health as better than the general population or what is termed “the healthy immigrant effect,” and the third approach is “the transitional effect” which contends that the health advantage that immigrants demonstrate upon arrival in Canada soon decreases the longer they live in Canada. The findings from the literature review detail the micro-, meso-, and macro-level factors influencing the mental health of immigrants.10 By recognizing that most efforts made toward improving the mental health of Canadians have largely benefitted individuals from the mainstream population and that social determinants of health that inform the socioeconomic well-being of individuals, communities, and jurisdictions affect the overall physical and mental health; and are lacking for immigrants, this paper points to a pivotal landmark in reducing mental health problems among immigrant populations. Rather than the positive impacts of social determinants of health on immigrant health and mental health, what is witnessed among immigrant populations is a lack and an absence of these vital determinants of well-being. Immigrants’

8  World Health Organization (WHO). “Mental Health: Strengthening mental health promotion”. Fact Sheet #220, 2007. URL.http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs220/en 9  Ibid, Khanlou 2010. 10  Ibid

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e­ xistence in Canada is marked by the influx of barriers: “social and economic integration barriers, access barriers to relevant social and health services due to language and cultural differences and lack of social networks.”11

Situating the Authors in the Work Nigeria’s economy was still booming, but internal mismanagement engendered by protracted military leadership and corruption generated by successive leaderships collaborative activities with Western investors made the lives of many Nigerians so miserable that majority of skilled professionals and nonprofessionals mostly youths between ages 17 to 45 were doing everything conceivably possible to leave the country. Joan Baxter12 aptly captures the situation in these words “…the very term investment badly distorts what’s going on. Plundering, looting, and exploiting the non-renewable resources of Africa is [sic] a far more accurate description.”13 So we considered ourselves lucky to have been granted our permanent residents’ visas to Canada. As new Canadians in the most populous city, who have been privileged to attend two of Canada’s best institutions of higher learning, we approach this topic from the vantage of what has been referred to as “epistemic saliency,” which accordingly, is people “speaking with/from the authenticity of their own experiences and voices, a space that allows local subjects and scholars to speak about their informed knowledge base as opposed to being spoken for.”14 The Canadian job market for most newcomers either females or males often implies working in factories as general laborers, working as healthcare support workers for Canada’s aging or ailing population, and working as security guards, housekeeping/janitorial staff, taxi drivers, farmhands, or as “term” staff for some Canadian provincial government ministries; only a tiny fraction get hired full time. This failure to find decent jobs in the fields we are trained led us into changing our careers and retraining with hopes of being accepted by the Canadian employers. We have also witnessed a lot of new immigrants in the same situations as ours get into severe depression due to the difficulties in navigating the system and finding employment during their first few years in Canada. Thus, the question that arises:

 Ibid.  Baxter, Joan. “Dust from our eyes: An unblinkered look at Africa”. Hamilton, Ontario: Wolsak and Wynn: 193, 2008. 13  Ibid. 14  Nwalutu, M.O. “Dispiriting the spiritual in classroom education: Critiquing spirituality as a tool for transformative education in 21st –century academe”. In N. N. Wane, F.A. Adyanga, & A. A. Ilmi (Eds.). Spiritual discourse in the academy: A globalized Indigenous perspective. Black Studies & Critical Thinking: Spirituality and Indigenous thought. Cynthia Dillard. Series Editor, Rochelle Brock and Richard Greggory Johnson111, Executive Editors, Vol 55. Peter Lang: New York, Washington, 2014. 11 12

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How might the unemployment and underemployment situation of new immigrants affect their mental health condition?

Why Mental Health and Newcomers? • Surveys have found that immigrants have lower rates of depression and substance abuse than people born in Canada; however, their positive health status erodes over time. • Immigrants may be at a higher risk for developing mental health problems during the first 10–24 months after arrival.15 • Lack of culturally and linguistically appropriate mental health services contributes to the stigmatization and marginalization of ethnocultural communities. • Immigrants with the highest risk of developing a mental disorder are those who experienced pre-migration trauma.

Review of Literature MacDonnell, Dastjerdi, Khanlou, Bokore, Tharao, and Vazquez’16 pioneer research in the field of mental health promotion examines immigrant women as a unique group with particular barriers and puts activism at the forefront in promoting women’s mental health and well-being. This study uses a constructivist grounded theory approach and a critical intersectional lens that foregrounds race and gender in qualitative analysis. They agree that generally “immigrant women often experience a disproportionate share of mental health concerns and mental illness that are linked to social determinants of health including employment, violence, socioeconomic status, race and gender.”17 The implication is that women, who immigrate to Canada, are often found to take on a load of their family burdens and as such much of “the stress and burdens of relocating and settling into a new country.”18 Although immigrants make up almost half of the Greater Toronto Area, and more women than men are settling here each year, there is limited understanding of how to promote women’s mental health. In 2006, Citizenship and Immigration Canada recorded 21,380 temporary Canadian residents who arrived for “humanitarian” reasons (refugee claimants) and “special consideration” or “compassionate grounds.” Of these  Beiser, M. “The health of immigrants and refugees in Canada”. Canadian Journal of Public Health 96, no. 2 (2005): 531–544. 16  MacDonnell, J.A., Dastjerdi, M., Khanlou, N., Bokore, N., Tharao, W., Vazquez, L.M. “Activism and Immigrant Women’s Mental Health and Wellbeing”. Page 1. August 2015. www.yorku.ca/ nkhanlou 17  Ibid. 18  Ibid. 15

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r­esidents, 9570 were female. An additional 251,649 newcomers to Canada who  became permanent residents/landed immigrants in 2006. This number has become stable over a 40-year period with slight increases or decreases during the implementation of the special immigration act.19 However, under the leadership of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, these numbers have risen tremendously owing to a change in foreign policy to absorb Syrian refugees and by extension refugees from other war-torn zones of the world. The study on immigrants’ health holds that immigrants are, on the average, in better health than native-born Canadians and have lower mortality rates. However, shortcomings in immigration and resettlement policy jeopardize immigrants’ health advantage. This health gain is because Canada selects immigrants based on characteristics such as schooling, job proficiency, and age; all of these are classified under the rubric of human investment. Initial selection helps determine their level of healthiness. After landing in Canada, the health sector in each province becomes accountable by ensuring they are physically fit for work. Yet, despite the definition of a mandatory waiting period eligibility for healthcare coverage and organizing health examination for immigrants with a record of tuberculosis, provincial health policies have little to say about immigrants. On the other hand, the situation differs slightly for refugees. Refugees have suffered unusual stress and assaults on their health before arriving in Canada. Like immigrants in general, refugees have lower death rates than native-­ born Canadians. However, refugees are in less robust health than their immigrant counterparts, and they have a vulnerability to infectious and parasitic diseases.20 Ali21 compares depression and alcohol dependence ratios of immigrants with those of Canadian-born population in an exploratory research querying if “healthy immigrant effect” observed for physical health holds for mental health? Obtaining data from the 2000/2001 Canadian Community Health Survey that collected information on health status and healthcare utilization from over 131,000 respondents aged 12 years or older from all provinces and territories, she found that “immigrants have lower rates of depression and alcohol dependence than the Canadian-born population, while among immigrants after adaptation on landing in Canada, irrespective of age, gender, marital position, personal revenue, and learning, all immigrants except for those who got here at least 30 years earlier have lower rates of alcohol dependence than the Canadian-born population.” Similarly, adjustment for social factors did not affect the patterns for depression. These demographic and socioeconomic factors do not explain the “healthy immigrant effect.”22 This health gain is because Canada selects immigrants based on attributes such as education,

 Mitchell, K-W. “Mental illness in refugee and immigrant women: A midwife’s perspective on culturally competent care”. Canadian Journal of Midwifery Research and Practice 7, no. 3 (2008): 9–18. 20  Ibid, Beiser 2005. 21  Ali, J. “Mental health of Canada’s immigrants”. Supplement to Health Reports 13, (2002): Statistics Canada, Catalogue 82–003 22  Ibid. 19

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job skills, and age, all of which are grouped under the rubric of human capital.23 After immigrants enter the country, responsibility for assuring they stay healthy devolves to the provinces. However, aside from defining a mandatory waiting period before becoming eligible for healthcare coverage and arranging surveillance for immigrants with a history of tuberculosis, provincial health policies have little to say about immigrants.24 Beiser25 asserts that expending a great deal of effort to select people to become part of Canada and ignoring them once they are here is short-sightedness. Resettlement experiences exert enormous influence on the eventual health of immigrants and refugees and on the likelihood that their human capital will fulfill its promise.26 Dean and Wilson’s27 collaborative in-depth research interviews examined the experiences of employment and perceptions of subsequent health impacts among 22 recent immigrants. All the participants perceived both mental and physical health to be negatively impacted by under−/unemployment. The most frequently mentioned mental health issues identified were stress, anxiety, depression, unhappiness worry, tension, irritation, and frustration, all of which the new immigrant women viewed to be due to difficulty encountered in finding secure employment in their field in Canada. Other studies identify work-related problems and low socioeconomic status to be associated with depressive symptoms and stress in various groups such as Mexican women, South Indian women, and Korean women immigrants.28 Similarly, Mitchell,29 who encountered women immigrants and refugees from Somali, Sudan, Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Vietnam in her practice, observes that the clients may require health counseling, psychotherapy, and/or medication for thyroid disorders, postpartum depression (PPD), bipolar disorder, major depression, and posttraumatic stress syndrome (PTSD). We particularly identify with this study as it is critical to our analysis of

 Jafari, S., Baharlou, S. & Mathias, R. “Knowledge of Determinants” Immigrant Minority Health 12, (2008): 100–106 cited in Nwalutu, F.I. “Canadian Labour Market as a Dispiriting Phenomenon on Skilled Migrants: Mental Health Consequences on Immigrant Canadian.” (Sociology Mind) Vol.9 No.3, July 2019 (2019): 151–167. 24  walutu, F.I. “Canadian Labour Market as a Dispiriting Phenomenon.” (Sociology Mind) Vol.9 No.3, July 2019 (2019): 151–167. 25  Nwalutu, F.I. “Canadian Labour Market as a Dispiriting Phenomenon.” (Sociology Mind) Vol.9 No.3, July 2019 (2019): 151–167. 26  Nwalutu, F.I. “Canadian Labour Market as a Dispiriting Phenomenon (Sociology Mind) Vol.9 No.3, July 2019 (2019): 151–167. Nwalutu, F.I. “Canadian Labour Market as a Dispiriting Phenomenon (Sociology Mind) Vol.9 No.3, July 2019 (2019): 151–167. 27  Dean, J.A. & Wilson, K. “Education? It is irrelevant to my job now. It makes me very depressed…’: Exploring the health impacts of under/unemployment among highly skilled recent immigrants in Canada”. Ethnicity & Health 14, no. 2 (2009): 185–204. 28  Aycan, Z. & Berry, J. W. “Impact of employment-related experiences on immigrants’ psychological well-being and adaptation to Canada”. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science 28, no. 3 (1996): 240–251. 29  Ibid, Mitchell 2008. 23

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immigrant mental health issues, because it not only recognizes the fact that socioeconomic and cultural changes might impact negatively on immigrant mental health, but also that acculturation challenges could be complicated by hormonal and biochemical changes during a woman’s reproductive cycle. These clients range from pubescent girls to postmenopausal women. Underemployment that results when a trained professional is unable to work at the level for which she or he is trained is also a potential risk to psychological well-being. The conclusions of this study demonstrate that work has other purposes than providing income. Works furnish a rationale for survival; it defines status and identity and facilitates the individual establishment of relationships with others in society. The latter role is critical for immigrants because the adjustment is eased by social interactions. The more one interacts with individuals and groups in the larger community; the more rapidly one obtains skills to manage everyday life. The systemic racism inherent in Canadian culture entails that immigrants would end up at the edge of economic margins, despite their possession of the highest educational qualifications. Failure to attain reasonable economic status means that they succumb to precarious jobs for survival, and many remain unemployed because they have been disqualified from survival jobs that ask for people with Canadian experience or due to discrimination by skin-  pigmentation. Considering the situations described above, one could imagine the kind of life recent immigrants live in. It is a desperate, stressful, miserable life of poverty where they struggle to make ends meet. Bauder30 frames his theoretical analysis around Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of institutionalized cultural capital and his concept of the educational system as a site of social reproduction. Using data from interviews with instructional administrators and employers in Greater Vancouver that employ immigrants from South Asia and the former Yugoslavia, his findings support the view that many professional and skilled immigrants to Canada suffer from de-skilling and the nonrecognition of their foreign credentials and experiences. As a result, they fail to get higher-paying jobs, which are reserved for Canadian-born counterparts who may not be better qualified or be better skilled than these new immigrants. This often gives rise to depression, especially for male immigrants. Also, Aycan and Berry31 examine the process of acculturation with specific emphasis on the impact of economic integration on psychological well-being and adaptation of new immigrants to Canada. The research applies a survey questionnaire to 110 Turkish immigrants and found that despite high educational attainment, two-thirds of the samples are either unemployed or underemployed. All the participants perceive both mental and physical health to be negatively impacted by under−/ unemployment. The most frequently mentioned mental health issues identified are stress, anxiety, depression, unhappiness worry, tension, irritation, and frustration, all of which the new immigrants view to be due to difficulty encountered in finding  Bauder, H. “Brain abuse” or the devaluation.” Antipode. Cited in Nwalutu, F.I. “Canadian Labour Market as a Dispiriting Phenomenon.” (Sociology Mind) Vol.9 No.3, July 2019 (2019): 151–167. 31  Aycan and Berry 1996; cited in Nwalutu, F.I. “Canadian Labour Market as a Dispiriting Phenomenon.” (Sociology Mind) Vol.9 No.3, July 2019 (2019): 151–167 30

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secure employment in their field in Canada. These immigrants enumerate three main ways in which employment circumstances affect them, namely, lack of income, loss of employment-related skills, and loss of social status. In addition, Noh and Avison32 examine the interplay among stressors, psychological and social resources, and psychological distress among a large sample of Korean immigrants living in Toronto by using the stress process formulation. Data from a longitudinal study of over 600 respondents indicate that the stress process paradigm provides a useful perspective for understanding how chronic stressors associated with the immigration experience manifest themselves in psychological distress. Their findings suggest that social and psychological resources have important deterrent effects on the experiences of stressors and their subsequent distressful consequences.33 We would continue this chapter by exploring answers to the question, what relations of power and coloniality are evident between the immigrant Canadians and the state apparatuses of mental healthcare?

 anadian Mental Healthcare System Viewed from Race C and Neocolonial Contexts Race and racism cannot be effectively discussed without proper articulation of power relationships, which is where the nineteenth-century relics of colonization (be it Arabic, Western, and the present Indo-Chinese colonization) and the present Western neo-colonial structures and processes play critical roles. Locating the conversations of anti-racist and neo-colonial performatives in Canadian experiences of new immigrants, this chapter attempts to trouble immigrants’ marginalization within the underlying forces of medical and socioeconomic interventions in host societies. We would contextualize the oppressive experiences of minoritized groups and immigrants within the sophistication of the Canadian mental healthcare system. Within this framework, the skewed power relations in the Canadian mental healthcare practices operationalized against the marginalized people at the peripheries begin to emerge. Immigrant Canadians experience mental healthcare that is designed to detect and suppress signifiers of difference and racialized bodies. We would attempt to further interrogate ways the biosocial and colonial control is operationalized beyond racial conversations. To engage this trajectory of reasoning, we call for a re-reading of Fanon and the relationship between psychoanalysis and politics.34 Sefa Dei and Simmons reason that the power of the psychology of the mind also requires the uptake of a critical consciousness which informs and anchors a political  Noh, S. & Avison, W R. “Asian immigrants and the stress process: A study of Koreans in Canada”. Journal of Health and Social Behavior 37, (1996):192–206. 33  Noh and Avison, Asian immigrants”. (1996):192–206 cited in Nwalutu, F.I. “Canadian Labour Market as a Dispiriting Phenomenon.” (Sociology Mind) Vol.9 No.3, July 2019 (2019): 151–167. 34  Sefa Dei, G.J. & Simmons, M. “Fanon & Education.” In Thinking Through Pedagogical Possibilities, edited by George Jerry Sefa Dei and Marlon Simmons. New York, Peter Lang, 2010. 32

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ideology for social action and possible alteration. According to Sefa Dei and Simmons, “Fanon’s desire was to extend human dignity, freedom, love, care and justice to all who are daily exploited.35” He would have the oppressed to continually defend their culture against colonial domination and its destructive effects. Fanon would contend that the uptake of a critical embodied knowledge remains the primary objective of anti-colonial moves to trouble oppressive colonial project, and adopting a Fanonian anti-colonial perspective, therefore, becomes a useful model at this juncture, as it engages a rethinking of the processes and operations of “colonial and pre-colonial relations and the consequences of imperial projects on processes of mental healthcare production and delivery; and the pursuit of agency, resistance, and subjective politics”.36 The thematic relevance of the chapter is in twofold: first, colonization of the bodies of immigrant Canadians depicted in the control and manipulation of their mental health by the medical professionals and the society, reflected in the prescriptions of the Eurocentric neo-colonial ideologies, which is consistent with Michael Oliver’s model of disability. His model of disability comprised the personal tragedy theory (that locates a problem in the body of the colonized), the psychological theory (that takes up authority over normative knowledge), and the medicalization theory that sets out to recover or rehabilitate the dysfunctional body.37 The second theme stresses systemic racism inherent in the Canadian employment structures, be it corporate bodies, non-governmental organizations, or government agencies. Immigrant Canadians are thus pitted between a struggle to subvert and resist the colonizers’ hegemonic impositions on their socioeconomic well-being and their psychological, cognitive, and emotional state. In this context, the Canadian mental health system and mental health of immigrant Canadians and minority groups produce parallel narratives for exploring the metaphors of cultural domination, repression, and resistance. Thus, the mental health conditions of immigrant Canadians become the metaphor of resistance as their bodies are both a site of resistance and a protected space. Simich38 utilizes the International Adult Literacy and Skills Survey (IALSS) on 230,000 Canadians, which shows that 60% of adults in Canada cannot obtain, understand, and act upon health information and services and make appropriate health decisions and choices. This author situates health literacy and its implications for immigrants in Canada as a complex but critical set of communications that takes place between health providers in all categories and their service users. It is not just about language proficiency; “rather it is complex, multidimensional communication process that involves health-care providers’ competencies, the ‘legibility’ of the health system for diverse groups, and appropriate policy and programs to achieve effective communication.”39  Ibid.  Ibid. 37  Oliver, M. “Understanding Disability: From Theory to Practice.” Chap. 3, 30–42. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. 38  Simich, L. “Health literacy, immigrants, and mental health”. Canadian Issues: Immigrant Mental Health. Metropolis Project: Bridging Research, Policy and Practice. Summer 2010. 39  Ibid. 35 36

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Simich holds that a current healthcare definition “describes the ability to obtain, process, understand, and use health information to make appropriate decisions about health. This includes the ability to seek information, learn, appraise, make decisions, communicate information, prevent diseases, and promote individual, family, and community health.40” In other words, health literacy involves a strong grasp of health issues and a comprehension of how to use the healthcare system. This they contend requires educational and healthcare institutions to bridge the gap by smoothing the “two-way communication process and help people obtain needed healthcare.”41 This contribution is important for addressing an important aspect of healthcare provision that is often neglected or ignored in research and analysis. Yet access to healthcare and mental healthcare is navigated and negotiated at this level, and eligibility issues all depend on this crucial but complex health literacy. It is at this fundamental level that the binaries operate within the healthcare system: that is, who gets what, based on eligibility criteria of Canadian born Caucasian citizens, Native-born Canadians, and immigrants. This is where the interplay of racialization, marginalization, and discrimination within the healthcare system gets played out. Therefore, no matter what happens, immigrants are marginalized or tokenized where services considerations are given. The discourse of meritocracy functions to marginalize certain groups of people by allowing Caucasians to direct attention away from their privileges and to ignore larger patterns of racial injustices in their societies. The neo-liberal self-centered assumption that achievement is a function of one’s socioeconomic input runs against the grains of migrants’ epistemic realities. In other words, the basis for drawing a link between people’s success and their socioeconomic efforts, although is reified, normalized, and validated in most Western societies, yet might find repudiation in other sociocultural settings – within which it is taken up as devoid of sound premises – hence counter progressive, parochial, and anti-public practice. In our lopsidedly polarized world that is monitored and girded with neo-colonial vestiges that globalization and multi-ethnicity symbolized, it is not uncommon to be lost in the repressive crater created by essentialization, under-valorization of signifiers of otherness, and willful denial of difference at the spaces of appropriation. The process is therefore set to conceal how social, economic, cultural, and in this context healthcare privileges facilitate the success of some groups of people but not others. Moreover, it allows the privileged to see themselves as innocent spectators rather than accomplices in a system that creates, maintains, and reproduces social inequities42 and injustices.

 Ibid.  Ibid. 42  Applebaum, B. “In the name of morality: moral responsibility, whiteness and social justice education.” Journal of Moral Education (34), no. 3 (2005): 277–290. 40 41

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The Methodology of Study This study uses a healthcare model, The Standing Senate Committee on Health Promotion approach, and anti-racism and anti-colonial theories to analyze the psychological impact of challenges faced by recent skilled immigrants in Canada. And it offers a systems perspective of coping and dealing with mental illness using information from both academic journals and Internet sources. We searched PsycINFO, PubMed, MEDLINE, and Cochrane databases at the University of Toronto Library. We analyzed the consequences of the deterioration in the mental health status of immigrants and how that impacts the individual’s settlement process as well as the Canadian society at large. We identified some of the barriers to getting jobs faced by immigrants and what can be done to reduce this gap. We will also interrogate the other stressors that affect the mental health of the new immigrants and refugees because among the refugees there are also those who came with their foreign credentials who can contribute to the economic development of Canada. However, while we look at all these areas, our focus is on how all these impact the mental health condition of the new immigrants. Then we will propose ways to bridge the gap to accessible mental health delivery systems in the area. We will also propose ways of assessing the nature of stressors that contribute to the deterioration of these immigrants’ mental health.

Findings Barriers to Care Affecting Newcomers  Factors such as lack of awareness of services, stigma, socioeconomic factors, perceived discrimination, language, and inability to understand healthcare systems’ method of communication are potential barriers to care for new immigrants. Mental health institutions lack approved and trained interpreter services which can mean that children or non-medical staff who are illiterate concerning the healthcare system’s communication model will act as interpreters. In addition, structural barriers, such as institutionalized racism, mean that recent immigrant groups are less likely to get the care they need.43 Stressors Affecting Immigrants and Refugees  Stress is a response to a situation that a person feels is beyond her/his ability to manage. It is feeling under pressure because of all the things one must do or worry about. Stress can be physical or psychological. Some people can stay calm and balanced in the most stressful situations, while others cannot stand the least stress (Community Resources Connections of Toronto, CRCT). The following are the stressors that affect new immigrants and refugees:

43

 Ibid, Canadian Association of Mental Health 2009. See also; Ibid, Simich 2010.

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• • • • • • • • •

Not being able to do the work they used to do. Feeling that they are not welcome in Canada. Experiencing racism and discrimination. Learning that Canada does not value their skills and education. Not being able to speak English or speak in Canadian ascent. Having to take on a different role in their family or community. Being separated from their family and friends. Not having the support of the people from their community. Not being respected within the family and community or not being given the status that is usual in their culture. • Having posttraumatic stress because of something that happened before they arrived in Canada.44 Micro-Level: Meaning of Work –  Work-related problems and low socioeconomic status are associated with depressive symptoms and stress in various groups such as African, Mexican, Indian, and South Korean immigrants. Underemployment that results when a trained professional is unable to work at the level for which she or he is trained is also a potential risk to psychological well-being. New immigrants are often told that they are not qualified to work in their profession, while on the other hand they are told that they are overqualified for entry-level positions, leaving them with no option but to accept any precarious jobs offered to support their families. This causes mental distress on the immigrant who is dissatisfied with his or her job status and wages.45 The findings of this study show that work has other functions other than providing income. Work provides a purpose to live; it defines status and identity and enables individuals to establish relationships with others in society. The latter function is critical for immigrants because adaptation is facilitated by social interactions. The more one interacts with the groups in the larger society, the faster one acquires skills to manage everyday life. The implication, therefore, for these new immigrants who are underemployed/unemployed is not only a decline in psychological well-being but also a delay in integration and adaptation.46 Impact of Unemployment on Families and the Mental Health of Newcomers  For new immigrants, income loss could imply a depletion of a person’s assets, a loss/ lack of employment benefits, and the loss/depletion of the income/assets of family members due to resettlement and its demands. Income loss due to unemployment generates new waves of anxiety for new immigrants due to uncertainty about future income and continuous drop in standard of living. Underemployment and insecure

 Community Resource Connections of Toronto (CRCT)  - 210 Dundas St W, Toronto, ON h t t p s : / / w w w. c a n p a g e s . c a / p a g e / O N / t o r o n t o / c o m m u n i t y - r e s o u r c e - c o n n e c t i o n s of-toronto-crct/100671924 45  Nwalutu, F.I. “Canadian Labour Market as a Dispiriting Phenomenon.” (Sociology Mind) Vol.9 No.3, July 2019 (2019): 151–167. 46  Nwalutu, F.I. “Canadian Labour Market as a Dispiriting Phenomenon.” (Sociology Mind) Vol.9 No.3, July 2019 (2019): 151–167. 44

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work conditions cause anxiety. Those who are economically insecure due to underemployment or unemployment have lower morale. Unemployment leads to a drop in status among family and friends and in the community at large. This can lead to a loss of self-esteem. The loss of a job typically means a disconnection with work colleagues and a reduction of social networks. That loss of engagement and social capital can bring about a decline in personal well-being. The enormity of the effects of unemployment might vary with age and gender. Mezo-Level: Impact on the Society –  Mental illness is debilitating on the individual and family. For new immigrants, mental illness may also mean a loss of income and the spending of the already depleted family savings on medication and cure that is not readily available. In some cases, reluctance to seek help due to fear of stigma or ignorance of available services may mean deterioration in the individual’s condition. The larger picture is that the province would end up spending more on health than is necessary if government policy on immigration has been humane enough to provide for adequate employment and affordable housing. Where the affected individual is the family provider, this household would be on the threshold of homelessness creating a social problem. That is why there is a need for more culturally competent agencies in all the provinces in Canada that can provide proactive, linguistically appropriate, and culturally competent services and programs for individuals and families needing help.

Conclusion The focus of this chapter is on the burden of unemployment and underemployment position Canadian job markets dominated by mainstream Caucasians’ assign persons of non-European descent who immigrated into Canada as skilled workers. The tragic consequences of not being able to find jobs in the fields of training or not being supported adequately to remain in job positions for which they are trained in Canada result in various stressors leading to mental illnesses. For newcomers to Canada especially women, mental illness has become a cankerworm eating deep into the fabrics of their physiological and psychological health and seriously affecting their social and professional lives. The consequence is enormous for the healthcare system, a topic that has been dealt with in a different study. This chapter concludes that a more pragmatic approach recommended below would help enable newcomers to Canada to remain healthy and contribute more optimally to their new homes.

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Recommendations Our recommendation draws on a recovery approach proposed by McKenzie et al.,47 which is based on working across sectors to develop comprehensive, coordinated, and accessible services and supports and focuses on the social determinants of health. We suggest that “Canada can promote wellness while decreasing the impacts of potential mental health problems.”48 We firmly insist “Canada’s mental health response should focus on wellness, paying special attention to the social determinants of health which build on the resilience of immigrants and refugee groups. This has the added benefit of decreasing the number of people who develop mental health problems.”49 The authors above observe that several factors increasing mental health problems among refugees include unclear resident status, poor housing, multiple moves, poor access to jobs and education, and poor social support. Both education and trust in the Canadian system, cultural competency of services, and co-operation between service providers may decrease barriers to care. Ethno-specific health promotion and diversity of services including alternative approaches have been shown to facilitate care in some communities. There exists some connection between a range of social factors and mental health problems and illnesses. The impacts of social determinants can be complex; for instance, discrimination has a direct impact on an individual’s psychology and physiology as well as through its links to other social determinants of health at a group level.50 The social forces that push people down the pathway from balance to the development of mental health problems and illnesses are increased in some populations, and those that push people toward balance such as social support are diminished through their social status in Canada.51 Social Work Roles  Social workers should adopt an anti-racist, anti-oppressive, and empowerment approach to social work practice while working with various populations. We could achieve this by challenging dominant discourses that are disempowering to newcomers through language. Larson52 has suggested that although the language is a discourse that constructs and reinforces oppression, language is also a site for deconstructing and challenging oppressive discourses like the medical model that pathologizes persons with mental disability by addressing them as the category of the disease such as the schizophrenic patient. Therefore, social workers would need to support advocacy in:

 Agic, B., McKenzie, K., Tuck, A., and Antwi, M. “Supporting the Mental Health of Refugees to Canada”. Mental Health Commission of Canada January 2016. 48  Ibid. 49  Ibid. 50  Nwalutu, F.I. “Canadian Labour Market as a Dispiriting Phenomenon.” (Sociology Mind) Vol.9 No.3, July 2019 (2019): 151–167. 51  Ibid, Canadian Association of Mental Health 2009. 52  Larson, G. “Anti-oppressive practice in mental health”. Journal of Progressive Human Services 19, no. 1 (2008) 47

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• Sensitizing community consciousness against all forms of stigmatizing labels against individuals suffering from mental illness. • Social workers would need to give voice to clients and ensure that they can express their opinions on matters affecting their care and recovery. • Social workers would also need to educate new immigrant and refugee members in communities that mental disorder is like any other sickness and sufferers should not be viewed as dangerous or feared.

References Agic, B., McKenzie, K., Tuck, A., and Antwi, M. 2016. Supporting the Mental Health of Refugees to Canada. Mental Health Commission of Canada, January 2016. Ali, J. 2002. Mental Health of Canada’s Immigrants. Supplement to Health Reports, 13, (2002): Statistics Canada, Catalogue 82-003. Aycan, Z., and J.W.  Berry. 1996. Impact of Employment-Related Experiences on Immigrants’ Psychological Well-being and Adaptation to Canada. Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science 28 (3): 240–251. Bauder, H. 2003. Brain Abuse or the Devaluation of Immigrant Labor in Canada. Antipode, 699– 717. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Baxter, Joan. 2008. Dust from Our Eyes: An Unblinkered Look at Africa, 193. Hamilton: Wolsak and Wynn. Beiser, M. 2005. The health of immigrants and refugees in Canada. Canadian Journal of Public Health 96 (2): 531–544. Canadian Association of Mental Health (CAMH). 2009. Improving Mental Health Services for Immigrant, Refugee, and Ethnocultural and Racialized Groups: Issues and Options for Service Improvement. Centre for Addiction and Mental Health: Toronto, November 2009. Community Resources Connections of Toronto (CRCT). 2008. Mental Health Services in Toronto: Issues in Immigrant’s Mental Health. July 2008. Dean, J.A., and K. Wilson. 2009. Education? It is Irrelevant to My Job Now. It Makes Me Very Depressed:’ Exploring the Health Impacts of Under/Unemployment Among Highly Skilled Recent Immigrants in Canada. Ethnicity & Health 14 (2): 185–204. First Ministers. 2003. 2003 First Minister’s Accord on Health Care Renewal. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from www.international.alberta.ca/documents/Canadian.../800039004_e.pdf. Guruge, S., Collins, E., and Bender, A. 2010. Working with Immigrant Women: Guidelines for Mental Health Professionals. Canadian Issues: Immigrant Mental Health: Metropolis Project: Bridging Research, Policy and Practice, Summer 2010. Health Council of Canada. Rekindling Reform: Health Care Renewal in Canada, 2003 2008. Retrieved from healthcouncilcanada.ca. Jafari, S., S.  Baharlou, and R.  Mathias. 2008. Knowledge of Determinants of Mental Health Among Iranian Immigrants of BC, Canada: A Qualitative Study. Immigrant Minority Health 12: 100–106. Khanlou, N. 2010. Migrant Mental Health. Canadian Issues: Immigrant Mental Health: Metropolis Project: Bridging Research, Policy and Practice, Summer 2010. Larson, G. 2008. Anti-oppressive Practice in Mental Health. Journal of Progressive Human Services 19 (1). MacDonnell, J.A., Dastjerdi, M., Khanlou, N., Bokore, N., Tharao, W., Vazquez, L.M. 2015. Activism and Immigrant Women’s Mental Health and Wellbeing. Page 1. August 2015. www. yorku.ca/nkhanlou

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Mitchell, K.-W. 2008. Mental Illness in Refugee and Immigrant Women: A Midwife’s Perspective on Culturally Competent Care. Canadian Journal of Midwifery Research and Practice 7 (3): 9–18. Noh, S., and W.R. Avison. 1996. Asian Immigrants and the Stress Process: A Study of Koreans in Canada. Journal of Health and Social Behavior 37: 192–206. Nwalutu, F.I. 2019. Canadian Labor Market as a Dispiriting Phenomenon on Skilled Migrants: Mental Health Consequences on Immigrant Canadians. Sociology Mind 9: 151–167. https:// www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=92968. Accessed 14 June 2020. Nwalutu, M.O. 2014. Dispiriting the spiritual in classroom education: Critiquing spirituality as a tool for transformative education in 21st –century academe. In N. N. Wane, F.A. Adyanga, & A. A. Ilmi (Eds.). Spiritual Discourse in the Academy: A Globalized Indigenous Perspective. Black Studies & Critical Thinking: Spirituality and Indigenous thought. Cynthia Dillard. Series Editor, Rochelle Brock and Richard Greggory Johnson111, Executive Editors, Vol 55. Peter Lang: New York, Washington. Pederson, A., Raphael, D., and Johnson, E. 2010. Gender, Race, and Health Inequalities. In Toba Bryant, Dennis Raphael and Marcia Rioux (Eds.) Staying Alive: Critical Perspectives on Health, Illness, and Health Care. Canadian Scholars Press Inc: 205–237. Regehr, Cheryl, and Graham Glancy. 2010. Mental Health Social Work Practice in Canada. Don Mills Ontario: Oxford University Press. Simich, L. 2010. Health Literacy, Immigrants, and Mental Health. Canadian Issues: Immigrant Mental Health. Metropolis Project: Bridging Research, Policy and Practice. Summer 2010. World Health Organization (WHO). 2007. Mental Health: Strengthening Mental Health Promotion. Fact Sheet #220, 2007. http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs220/en

Chapter 15

The Human Cost of the Refugee Crisis in Africa Elisha J. Dung and Augustine Avwunudiogba

Introduction Globally, about 70.8 million people were forcibly displaced by the end of 2018 of which 25.9 million were refugees, the highest level ever reported. Within this period, there were about 6.34 million refugees in Africa.1 The refugee crisis in Africa is traceable to its colonial vestiges. Since gaining independence in the 1950s and 1960s, political violence arising from civil wars and ethnic conflicts alone has generated millions of refugees across many countries in the African continent. A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country due to factors, such as political and religious persecution, war, or other forms of ethnic or tribal violence or for fear of the same.2 Persecution can occur for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. In addition, there is a consensus that natural disasters, including drought, famine, and the outbreak of diseases among others, are other causes of refugees. Of recent, the dislocation of people has become commonplace on the African continent, forcing people to abandon their homes and seek refuge elsewhere, always at the expense of their welfare, safety, and rights. A cursory look at the refugee crisis in Africa reveals that many of the studies concentrate on the immediate needs of the displaced people. This chapter examines the changing dynamics 1  United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR). Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018. Accessed 23 September 2019. https://www.unhcr.org/the-global-report.htm 2  Ibid.

E. J. Dung (*) Department of Advancement Studies, Alabama State University, Montgomery, AL, USA e-mail: [email protected] A. Avwunudiogba Department of Anthropology, Geography & Ethnic Studies, California State University Stanislaus, Turlock, CA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. Abegunrin, S. O. Abidde (eds.), African Migrants and the Refugee Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56642-5_15

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of the problem of human displacement in Africa. In so doing, the chapter employs the political ecology framework to examine the geography of the refugee crisis on the continent and explore the economic and socio-cultural challenges faced by refugees in their host communities, including culture shock, language barriers, crime and criminality, and health challenges. Based on a general overview of the refugee situation in Africa, the chapter utilizes the numerous findings from the literature to elucidate some entrenched beliefs about refugees on the continent. The chapter also explores the decision of refugees to return based on the prevailing socio-economic conditions in the country of origin versus the country of refuge, as well as the political climate in the returning countries. The chapter concludes by analyzing the role of governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in addressing some of the policy challenges relating to refugees in Africa, such as insecurity in refugee-populated areas, protracted refugee situations, modalities for the return and integration of refugees, and the protection of the displaced people.

Theoretical Basis: Political Ecology Framework To understand the refugee crisis in Africa, it is imperative to explore the complex nexus of human environment interaction in the continent within the context of influencing forces operating at multiple but interacting scales. In this respect, the political ecology framework provides an analytical basis within which to examine and illuminate the refugee crisis in Africa. Political ecology has three central elements that can help in understanding the refugee crisis in Africa, namely: context and scale, historical depth, and structural relationship.3 By context and scale, political ecologists argue that social and environmental problems are better understood within the framework of a two-way multi-scale analysis within which human agency and structure complement each other. Thus, “human-environment relations at local, regional and global scales can be understood only by analyzing the relationships of patterns of resource use to political-economic forces.”4 Thus, the refugee crisis in Africa should be examined from a broader social, environmental, and economic perspectives within the context of local, national, and global scales.5 By historical depth, political ecology posits that complex 3  Kalipeni, Ezekiel and Joseph Oppong. “The refugee crisis in Africa and implications for health and disease: a political ecology approach.” Social Science and Medicine 46, no. 12 (1998): 1637–1653. 4  Mayer, J. D. The political ecology of disease as one new focus for medical geography. Progress in Human Geography 20(4), 441–456. 5  Blaikie, P. “Political ecology in the 1990s: an evolving view of nature and society.” CASID Distinguished Speaker Series 13. Center for Advanced Study of International Development (CASID), Michigan State University, 1994; See also, Bryant, Raymond. (1992) “Political ecology:

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societal environmental interactions are examined within the context of local history and the specific social and biophysical variables that influence these interactions. A deep historical view is required, because the ramifications of societal environmental interactions may take longer to manifest in the landscape.6 Finally, political ecologists argue that human agency and structure is central to the transformation of the environment.7 In this regard, the human agency includes the numerous actors that change the environment, while structure refers to the innumerable approaches in which societal norms, rather than rational choice dictates the actions of these agents as captured by Kalipeni and Oppong: Central to these structured actions are institutions that may or may not restrict the actions of the agent. Examples of agents that determine or erect constraining or facilitating structures at the regional or macro-level include the state and its institutions as well as international institutions which have a direct bearing on economic and environmental change, such as foreign governments and supranational organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).8

Viewed from this political ecology perspective, the refugee crisis in Africa can be examined at three scales within which agents and structures operate to define the nature and magnitude of the crisis. On the global scale are external forces, including colonial experience and international institutions (IMF, World Bank, UNO, etc.). These external forces shape and influence policies at the national level that are made up of internal national forces, non-state actors, governments, and political institutions. National policies in turn influence regional, local, and sub-national causal factors of the refugee crisis.9 Drawing further on this analysis, we can examine in detail the refugee problems in Africa in the local setting. In this regard, a combination of factors, including war/ political, instability/persecution, natural ecological crises/environmental disasters, and ethnic/religious conflicts interact in Africa to lead to forced displacement of people and the emergence of the refugee population.10 These interacting causative factors are mediated by internal national government policies and political institutions which have been shaped and continue to be shaped by external forces of the an emerging research agenda in third world studies.” Political Geography Quarterly 11, 1 (1992): 108–125 and Atkinson, T. “Laying out the ground.” In: Principles of Political Ecology, edited by, T. Atkinson. London: Belhaven Press, 1991. 6  Ibid, Atkinson 1991. 7  Turshen, M. The Political Ecology of Disease in Tanzania. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1984; see also, Bryant, Raymond L. 1998. “Power, knowledge and political ecology in the third world: a review.” Progress in Physical Geography 22, 1 (1998):79–94. 8  Ibid, Kalipeni and Oppong 1998. 9  Wood, W.  B. “Forced migration: local conflicts and international dilemmas.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 84, no. 4 (1994): 607–634. 10  Nahian, Ahmed; M.  Naimal Islam; M.  Ferdous Hasan; Tamanna, Motahar and Mohammed, Sujauddin. “Understanding the political ecology of forced migration and deforestation through a multi-algorithm classification approach: the case of Rohingya displacement in the Southeastern border region of Bangladesh.” Geology, Ecology and Landscape 3, no. 4 (2019): 282–294.

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historical colonial experience, and contemporary politics of international institutions and actors, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), and multinational and transnational ­corporations.11 In summary, the refugee crisis in Africa is defined by local issues which are, nevertheless, influenced by national and international policies, actors, and agents.

The Changing Dynamics of Refugees in Africa Figure 15.1 shows the changing dynamics of the refugee population in Africa between the years 1988 and 2018 divided over a 5-year interval. In broad terms, the number of refugees showed a declining trend between 1988 and 2013, with a notable escalation between 2014 and 2018. The number of refugees increased from 3.3 million between 1988 and 1993 to 6.6 million between 2014 and 2018. This represents about a 50% increase in the population of refugees within the last three decades. Overall, the population of refugees in the continent can be seen to be on an upward trend in the last five years. A country-level analysis reveals the spatial pattern and distribution of the refugee population in Africa (Fig. 15.2).

Refugees in Africa: 1998-2018 70000000

Number of Refugees

60000000 50000000 40000000 30000000 20000000 10000000 0 1988-1993

1994-1998 1999-2003

2004-2008 2009-2013 2014-2018

Years

Fig. 15.1  Temporal pattern of refugees on a 5-year interval in Africa: 1988–2018 Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba (2019)

11

 Ibid, Wood 1994.

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Fig. 15.2  Spatial distribution of refugees in Africa: 1988–2018 Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba (2019)

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The Numbers of Refugees by Country Although Fig. 15.2 presents that most African countries have some refugee populations, however, the population of refugees varies by country. Three broad patterns emerge from the analysis. The first includes countries, such as Congo DRC, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan, with a refugee population of between 7 and 21 million. The second cluster includes countries, such as Nigeria, Guinea, Cote D’Ivoire, Algeria, Chad, Egypt, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Congo, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, Zambia and South Africa, with a refugee population of between 1.3–7 million. The remaining countries (Fig. 15.2) have a relatively low refugee population of between 0.1–1.3 million. To gain further insight into the problems of refugees, the population of refugees in individual countries was expressed as a percentage of the national population (Fig. 15.3). The analysis further highlights the enormousness of the refugee problem, now easily termed a crisis in Africa. There is no doubt that the crisis has reached unprecedented proportions that warrant urgent attention from international organizations especially the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR).

 he Population of Refugees as a Percentage of the National T Population As presented in Fig. 15.3, several contiguous countries, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo DRC), Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Sudan, have refugee populations that are between 16–50% of the national population which is remarkable. The toll and pressure on national resources must be expectedly overwhelming. The second group of countries has a refugee population of between 2–16% of the national population, including Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Algeria, Egypt, South Sudan, Somalia, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, and South Africa. The remaining countries have a refugee population of 0–2% of the national population. This analysis clearly shows that some countries bear a disproportionately higher burden accommodating a large refugee population. This translates into a greater economic burden, even when they receive financial support from UNHCR and other international organizations and donors. Insight into the potential economic burden is further revealed when the population of refugees in each country is expressed as a proportion of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the countries concerned.

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Fig. 15.3  Refugees as a percentage of the national population in Africa: 1988–2018 Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba (2019)

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The Population of Refugees as a Percentage of GDP Figure 15.4 presents the population of refugees as a proportion of the GDP of the individual African countries. The pattern reveals the potential economic burden of the refugee population on the economy of the host countries. Three broad patterns are observed. Countries where the refugee population has potentially high impact representing 0.023–0.182% of GDP include Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Guinea-­ Bissau, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Congo DRC, Burundi, Malawi, Somalia, and Djibouti. The second group of countries is those where the refugee population has a potential medium impact, accounting for between 0.006% and 0.011% of GDP. These countries include Mali, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Togo, Benin Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Botswana, Cameroon, Kenya, and Eritrea. The last group includes countries where the refugee population has a potentially low impact which is an equivalence of a meager 0.002% of GDP. These countries include Ghana, Nigeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Madagascar. The remainder of this chapter examines the cost of the refugee crisis in Africa and proffers some recommendations followed by a summary and conclusion.

The Human Cost of the Refugee Crisis The cost of the refugee crisis in Africa includes economic, human, socio-cultural, political, and health and well-being of the impacted countries and refugee population (host and country of origin). The severity and magnitude of this cost may vary from one refugee case to another and from one country to another depending on the structure, agencies, and actors responsible for their displacement.

Economic Costs of Refugees The economic cost of the refugee crisis is multidimensional. In the first place, displaced populations represent a drain of human capital to their countries of origin. This is because most refugee population demographics are made up of the young and productive population. In their host countries, the refugee populations are often unemployed or underemployed and must depend on the generosity of their host country and international agencies for their economic well-being and stability.12 Money spent by international organizations and host countries on refugees r­ epresents  Easton-Calabria, Evan and Naohiko Omata. “Panacea for the refugee crisis? Rethinking the promotion of ‘self-reliance’ for refugees.” Third World Quarterly 39, no. 8 (2018): 1458–1474.

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Fig. 15.4  Refugees as a proportion of GDP in Africa: 1988–2018 Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba (2019)

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the opportunity cost of other pressing national and international issues, such as public transportation infrastructure, health care, education, and other social services as well as investment in national security, and industrial capital projects that will receive less financial commitment. Overall, whichever angle the refugee crisis is viewed from, it is apparent that the problem represents a major economic challenge. This is more so when viewed from the standpoint of human empathy which prevents governments from tackling other vital issues in the face of competing national needs.

Psychological Costs of Refugees One of the greatest costs of the problem is related to the humanitarian crisis. Refugee populations experience some of the most traumatic human conditions that will be an indelible scar on their psychological, emotional, and mental health for life. The journey from the host country where they are displaced to foreign camps where they become refugees is often fraught with dangerous and challenging conditions. Some refugees may lose their lives before they get to their destination. Vulnerable refugee demographics, including women and young children, are often exploited by unscrupulous persons and organizations. Reported cases of slavery, rape, and forced labor, human trafficking especially by international prostitution rings, have been reported among the refugee population.13 In short, the human condition metrics of the refugee population are so deplorable that it challenges the notion that humanity has superior intellect when it comes to dealing with complex social issues.

Socio-cultural Costs of the Refugees Another important impact relates to the socio-cultural aspects of refugee life. Refugees and their families are uprooted from the community where they have developed and formed long-term socio-cultural bonds. These socio-cultural bonds are important to the collective fabric of society and provide meaning for family cohesion and growth. These important bonds are broken when refugees leave their homeland to settle in a foreign country which results in the degradation and loss of long-term socio-cultural values. In many cases, refugees find themselves in a country where the language, culture, religious belief system, attitude, and values differ from those of their native land. Introduction into a foreign culture and the resulting contact with the new culture may result in cultural assimilation and domination to the detriment of their original culture. In addition, their new country or home may not provide those

 U.S. Department of State. “Trafficking in Person Report 2019”. Accessed 14 December 2019. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-Trafficking-in-Persons-Report.pdf

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meanings and symbols within which social and cultural networks that tie societal value can be nurtured and developed. This may ultimately lead to erosion and loss of social and cultural identity of the refugees, especially in situations where they experience a lengthy sojourn in their adopted country. Younger generations especially those born in refugee camps may not have the opportunity of creating social and cultural memories rooted in their “ancestral homelands.” Consequently, they may have an intergenerational discontinuity in the propagation of the native social and cultural values of the affected population.

Political Costs of the Refugees In addition to the socio-cultural cost, the political cost of the refugee crisis cannot be ignored. Refugees are not citizens of their host countries and therefore do not enjoy the same rights as the citizens of their host countries in the political system. They cannot participate in the political system, such as voting to select their representatives. Similarly, refugees may also not be able to participate in the democratic process of their home countries, especially where such refugee populations result from political disputes in their home countries. In this situation, the refugee population becomes disenfranchised.14 At the national level, the situation may perpetuate political instability in their home country and complicate the processes for a peaceful resolution and eventual return of the refugees back home. Furthermore, their host country may incur some political costs as well. This may be the case where particular ethnic groups flee from oppression from their home country, creating a delicate political dynamic between their host country and their homeland. Such a situation may escalate into hostility between the host country and their home country where such countries share contiguous boundaries. This may be a case in situations where refugees use their new home base as a launching pad to attack the government in their home country either by public propaganda of direct military confrontation.15 Governments in the refugee home countries may also suffer a backlash from their citizens who may not be too sympathetic to the course of the refugees. In fact, in many countries, the issue of refugees is a major item in the internal politics. Thus, if not properly handled, the refugee situation may lead to the loss of power and removal from office of the political party that is sympathetic to the plight of refugees.

 Bidemi, Badmus G. “Electoral violence, disability and internal displacement in Nigeria: A critical assessment of popular participation in Nigeria.” Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies 10, no. 7 (2017): 1–21. 15  Fisk, Kerstin. “Refugee geography and the diffusion of armed conflict in Africa.” Civil Wars 16, no. 3 (2014): 255–275. 14

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Health and Well-Being Costs of the Refugees The refugee crisis also includes health and well-being costs. Obviously, refugees and refugee camps lack standard medical facilities. The level of basic amenities, such as pipe-borne water, electricity, and waste disposal services, are usually less than optimal, especially in Africa where the native residents of the host country do not generally have access to these facilities and utilities. Under these circumstances, refugee populations are more likely to suffer from preventable communicable diseases.16 Children and the aged are particularly vulnerable. Besides, the refugee population may also suffer a decline in their well-being because of the psychological and mental trauma associated with their health condition. The provision of essential medical facilities and services within refugee camps may also be more expensive compared to the traditional population because such facilities need to be built and adapted to the temporary nature and condition of the refugee camp. For example, medical personnel, equipment, and specialized laboratories may be transported off and on between refugee camps and the home base of the providers. This is more so as refugees are often the responsibility of international organizations.

Policy for the Return of Refugees The policy for the return of refugees is addressed in the United Nations’ 1951 Refugee Convention. Article 33 of the Convention prohibits the expulsion or return of refugees without culpable cause. According to Article 33 (1): No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.17

However, Article 33 (2) provides the ground for the expulsion or return of refugees, thus: The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.18

 Carta, M. G., Oumar, W., Moro, M. F., Moro, D., Preti, A., Mereu, A, and Bhugra, D. “Traumaand stressor related disorders in the Tuareg refugees of a camp in Burkina Faso.” Clinical Practice & Epidemiology in Mental Health 9 (2013): 189–195. 17  United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR). The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, 2011. Accessed 12 January 2020. https://www.unhcr.org/ about-us/background/4ec262df9/1951-convention-relating-status-refugees-its-1967-protocol.html 18  Ibid. 16

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Despite this guarantee, there is always an ongoing debate in the host country whether to return or not return refugees to their home countries. Such debates have become heightened in recent times following the emergence of nationalistic movements, especially in Western European and North American democracies which are also acquiring footholds on the African political space. Although the most recent debate is fueled by political consideration, there are elements of economic, cultural, legal, and humanitarian considerations.19 Nevertheless, the safe return of refugees to their ancestral homelands should be a major goal of international organizations, especially the UN. In this regard, Mollie Gerver20 has outlined four ethical considerations for the return of refugees to their home countries. These considerations include the fact that return should be (1) voluntary, that is, refugees should leave willingly to their home countries without direct, indirect, or subtle coercion from their host governments or communities; (2) reversible, that is, refugees should be able to return to their host country, if they find the conditions to be unfavorable in their home countries after being returned voluntarily; (3) informed, that is, refugees should be accorded and provided accurate and up to date information about the conditions in their home countries to enable them to make educated decisions on whether to return or not; and (4) respectful, that is, the refugee host governments should ensure that efforts to facilitate the return of refugees, such as financial inducement are carried out in a dignified manner and is respectful of the unique cultural sensibilities of the refugees and their families.21

Obstacles for the Return of Refugees Although refugees have traditionally enjoyed international recognition and protection due to official UN resolutions on refugees which clearly defines the rights and protection of the refugee population, more needs to be done in prescribing a coherent policy for the return of refugees to their home countries.22 This type of policy is particularly needed for situations where conditions are favorable for the return of the refugees. This includes improved stable political environment and law and order in the home countries of the refugees. Refugee populations should not be made to stay longer than necessary in a foreign country, if the conditions for their quick return are favorable. The UN and other international organizations can help in providing transportation logistics for the safe return of refugees to their respective countries. One area in which the UN can help to facilitate the return of refugees to  Dadush, Uri. “The economic effects of Refugee return. Economics.” The open-access, openassessment E-Journal 12, no. 2018–2033 (2018): 1–17. Accessed 15 August 2019. DOI: https:// doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2018-33 20  Gerver, Mollie. “Paying Refugees to Leave”. Political Studies 65, issue 3 (2017): 631–645. 21  Gerver, Mollie. “Refugee Repatriation and the Problem of Consent”. British Journal of Political Science 48, issue 4 (2018): 855–875. 22  Ibid, Gerver 2017. 19

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their home countries is to enshrine the rights of the refugees to the protection of their properties and possessions, such as land, and homes, in their homelands while they are away.

Political Climate As it should be expected, African refugees dream of one day going back to their home countries. Nevertheless, unfavorable political climate, including unresolved political contestation, unclear political future, including the nature of government setup and power-sharing among diverse ethnic groups, also serve as major bottlenecks for the return of refugees to their home countries in Africa. As Romano has highlighted, some of the problems experienced by refugees worldwide in their quest to return home include: an unclear political future for the country, competing political and sectarian forces that often view IDPs and refugees as strategic tools or weapons, a hesitant and initially undecided Coalition policy on the return issue, unclear mandates for the various actors that could assist with returns, lack of funding, and most importantly of all, an extremely poor security situation which has impeded or even blocked all progress on the return issue.23

The problem is further complicated by weak democratic culture, unstable democratic institutions, and the tendency for dictatorial governments in Africa even in countries that purport to practice democratic governance.

Socio-economic Conditions In addition to the political challenges, perhaps the greatest obstacle for the return of the refugees relates to socio-economic issues. Refugees by their circumstances may have little economic opportunities in their temporary countries to build capital and save money to enable them to engage in productive activities when they return home. This economic challenge is twofold. First, the refugees need the financial resources to address the immediate wants and needs, such as the purchase of essential commodities associated with the day to day living. More profoundly, they may lack the financial resources for the investment in long-term economic activity required to keep them gainfully employed. The returning refugee population may not find it easy and straightforward to integrate into public service and the private sector due to a lack of deliberate policy of governments in their home countries to provide conscious avenues and mechanisms to reintegrate them into public service. In this regard, refugees might believe that they have a better economic future in their

 Romano, David. “Whose House is this anyway? IDP and Refugee return in Post-Saddam Iraq.” Journal of Refugee Studies 18, no. 4 (2005): 430–453.

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host countries and, hence, may be hesitant to return home. Similarly, unfavorable social conditions which may be perceived or real due to misinformation may dampen the spirit and urgency to return home by refugees.

Recommendations The foregone analysis clearly shows that the global refugee crisis is associated with enormous humanitarian, social, economic, and political costs. All these negatively affect the human conditions of the refugees, their host country, and in some cases their native land.

The Role of Government The government has a crucial role to play in preempting the development of refugee crises or finding solutions to resolve the crisis once it has developed. In this regard, governments in refugee home countries may create avenues to avoid the escalation of political disagreements by encouraging participation in governance through democratic institutions. This is particularly the case where refugee crises result from political agitation and ethnonationalist sentiments and aspirations. The government in the host nations of the refugees can also mediate via the instruments of the UNHCR and other international organizations and bodies. This includes ensuring that refugee rights under the international agreements are maintained, facilitating the eventual return of refugees to their home countries when the situation becomes conducive, and helping in the navigation and the processing of refugees who may require asylum in their host or other third countries.

The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) Non-governmental organizations at the national and international levels also have an important role to play in finding a solution to the refugee crisis. Apart from providing immediate humanitarian assistance to refugees as they flee from their native countries, assistance needs to be extended to the refugees at their host countries over a sustained period to enable them to stabilize and get back some semblance of normal life. Furthermore, NGOs should ensure the constant presence of monitoring teams in refugee camps and settlements to document and report the conditions of the refugees to ensure that their rights as enshrined in the UN documents for the protection of refugees is always protected. NGOs can also play an important role by ensuring a harmonious relationship between the refugee population and their immediate host population by extending some of their services to the host population,

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especially where such population is equally economically poor. For example, medical services made available to the refugee population in refugee camps may be extended to the native population. Crucially, because NGOs are non-state actors, they are uniquely placed to serve as impartial arbiters without political agenda in finding a lasting resolution for the return and resettlement of refugees in their native countries.

Security Issues in Refugee Camps One of the greatest challenges refugees are facing are security issues. These include personal and collective security in refugee camps and settlements. The security challenges are consequence of the fact that refugee camps are often deemed temporary. Most facilities in the camps and settlements are, therefore, designed to be temporary, and they lack the traditional security guarantees associated with normal households and communities. Therefore, refugee populations are often highly vulnerable to exploitation and attack by nefarious groups, including organized criminal gangs.24 Therefore, ensuring the safety and security of refugees especially during the transition from their native to their host countries should be of paramount importance, because this is where their vulnerability is at its maximum. Such endeavors may include the creation of a safe transit zone that is monitored and enforced if necessary, by the United Nations (UN) military monitoring groups. In their refugee camps and settlements, their host countries should ensure that some security arrangement is put in place, including the location of security posts, such as policing right in the refugee settlements. Refugees should be encouraged to report security concerns to local authorities who should in turn treat such cases with utmost urgency. Efforts should be made to ensure that organized criminal enterprises, such as human traffickers, do not gain a foothold in the refugee settlements.

Protracted Refugee Situations In many parts of the world, refugee camps and settlements that were designed to be temporary have become almost permanent due to protracted unfavorable conditions for the refugees to return to their native countries. This creates a situation where generations of the refugee population may be born outside their home countries. In this case, efforts should be made to integrate children of refugees who were born inside the refugee camps into the mainstream of their host countries to enable them  Bahlbi, Y. Malk. “Human Trafficking and human smuggling to and from Eastern Sudan: Intended and unintended consequences of States’ policies.” Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 5, no. 1 (2016): 215–225.

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to develop into productive citizens. Such an effort will ensure that they receive ­foundational educational training that will facilitate their acquisition of a skill set that will enable them to engage in productive livelihood when they eventually return home.

Modalities for the Return and Integration of Refugees Perhaps one of the most important issues associated with the resolution of the refugee crisis is the establishment of clear modalities for the return and reintegration of refugees to their home countries. Whereas international agencies, such as the UN, and NGOs have put in place significant measures to protect refugees in their host countries, comparatively less achievement has been attained regarding institutionalizing executable mechanisms for the return of refugees. This later situation is not unrelated to the fact that the causative factors of the initiation of refugee population may differ widely from political persecution to natural disasters, therefore making it complex to develop a one size fits all policy for the return of refugees. This notwithstanding, the UN Committee for Refugees should enforce the existing guidelines for the return of refugees as practical as possible.

Summary and Conclusions Despite the absence of major world political upheaval, such as the World Wars, refugee populations and settlements continue to be a global human problem, although some progress has been made in terms of reduction in the refugee population. The persistent issue of refugees is a major feature in all the continents of the world, although the incidence may be particularly high in non-democratic countries. The foregone analysis shows that the refugee crisis comes with an enormous cost that brings into sharp focus on the nature of the human condition despite a century that has witnessed technological and economic progress in leaps and bounds. This condition demands concerted efforts by national governments to put in place policies to preempt and prevent the development of situations that might translate into the creation of refugee populations. The UN and other international organizations should take proactive measures in preventing nascent political situations from developing into a full-blown crisis that might lead to the emergence of refugee populations. Nevertheless, a situation where the development and formation of the refugee population is unavoidable; efforts should be made to ensure that the rights of refugees as enshrined in international laws are always enforced.

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Bibliograhy Ahmed, Nahian, M.  Naimal Islam, M.  Ferdous Hasan, Motahar Tamanna, and Sujauddin Mohammed. 2019. Understanding the political ecology of forced migration and deforestation through a multi-algorithm classification approach: The case of Rohingya displacement in the Southeastern border region of Bangladesh. Geology, Ecology and Landscape 3 (4): 282–294. Atkinson, T. 1991. Laying out the ground. In Principles of Political Ecology, ed. T.  Atkinson. London: Belhaven Press. Bahlbi, Y.  Malk. 2016. Human Trafficking and human smuggling to and from Eastern Sudan: Intended and unintended consequences of States’ policies. Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 5 (1): 215–225. Bidemi, Badmus G. 2017. Electoral Violence, Disability and Internal Displacement in Nigeria: A Critical Assessment of Popular Participation in Nigeria. Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies 10 (7): 1–21. Blaikie, P. 1994. Political Ecology in the 1990s: An Evolving View of Nature and Society, CASID Distinguished Speaker Series 13. East Lansing: Center for Advanced Study of International Development (CASID), Michigan State University. Bryant, Raymond. 1992. Political Ecology: An Emerging Research Agenda in Third World Studies. Political Geography Quarterly 11 (1): 108–125. Bryant, Raymond L. 1998. Power, Knowledge and Political Ecology in the Third World: A review. Progress in Physical Geography 22 (1): 79–94. Carta, M.G., W. Oumar, M.F. Moro, D. Moro, A. Preti, A. Mereu, and D. Bhugra. 2013. Trauma and Stressor Related Disorders in the Tuareg Refugees of a Camp in Burkina Faso. Clinical Practice & Epidemiology in Mental Health 9: 189–195. Dadush, Uri. 2018. The Economic Effects of Refugee Return. Economics. The Open-Access, Open Assessment E-Journal 12 (2018–2033): 1–17. https://doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal. ja.2018-33. Accessed 15 Aug 2019. Easton-Calabria, Evan, and Naohiko Omata. 2018. Panacea for the Refugee Crisis? Rethinking the Promotion of ‘self-reliance’ for Refugees. Third World Quarterly 39 (8): 1458–1474. Fisk, Kerstin. 2014. Refugee Geography and the Diffusion of Armed Conflict in Africa. Civil Wars 16 (3): 255–275. Gerver, Mollie. “Paying Refugees to Leave”. Political Studies 65, 3 (2017): 631–645. ———. 2018. Refugee Repatriation and the Problem of Consent. British Journal of Political Science 48 (4): 855–875. Kalipeni, Ezekiel, and Joseph Oppong. 1998. The Refugee Crisis in Africa and Implications for Health and Disease: A Political Ecology Approach. Social Science and Medicine 46 (12): 1637–1653. Mayer, J.D. 1996. The Political Ecology of Disease as One New Focus for Medical Geography. Progress in Human Geography 20 (4): 441–456. Nahian, Ahmed, M.  Naimal Islam, M.  Ferdous Hasan, Motahar Tamanna, and Sujauddin Mohammed. 2019. Understanding the Political Ecology of Forced Migration and Deforestation Through a Multi-algorithm Classification Approach: The Case of Rohingya Displacement in the Southeastern Border Region of Bangladesh. Geology, Ecology and Landscape 3 (4): 282–294. Romano, David. 2005. Whose House is this Anyway? IDP and Refugee Return in Post-Saddam Iraq. Journal of Refugee Studies 18 (4): 430–453. Turshen, M. 1984. The Political Ecology of Disease in Tanzania. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Person Report 2019. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2019/06/2019-Trafficking-in-Persons-Report.pdf. Accessed 14 Dec 2019. United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR). Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018. https://www.unhcr.org/the-global-report.htm. Accessed 23 Sept 2019.

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United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR). 2011. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. https://www.unhcr.org/about-us/ background/4ec262df9/1951-convention-relating-status-refugees-its-1967-protocol.html. Accessed 12 Jan 2020. Wood, W.B. 1994. Forced Migration: Local Conflicts and International Dilemmas. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 84 (4): 607–634.

Chapter 16

The Political Economy of Transnational Migration: A Case Study of Nigerian Immigrants in the United States Olayiwola Abegunrin

Introduction History has taught us that wars, natural disasters, and religion have at different times contributed to the mass movement of Africans into other regions of the world. However, economics has played the most prominent and important roles in the lives of African immigrants. For instance, the Slave trade was an economic phenomenon and was only stopped by economic realities, when Britain used the Royal Navy to prevent the labor force it needed in Africa from being moved to the Americas and needed to maintain the African peripheral states for British economic (interest) survival. The focus of this chapter is to show and emphasize the significance of Nigerian immigrants in the United States and how it can be gauged almost everywhere and in most professions. Most of these immigrants are contributing immensely not only to the economy of the United States but also to the American academy and its medical institutions. And Nigerian immigrants’ role and importance in religious organizations – especially, the spread of the new Nigerian Pentecostal churches in the United States – are impacting American society and religion.1 This subject, which has so far been neglected, deserves to be researched. It is an irony that while many Nigerian immigrants relentlessly dream of a physical or spiritual return to Nigeria, many Nigerians in the homeland would literally do

1  Jake Bright, and Aubrey, The Next Africa: An Emerging Continent Becomes a Global Powerhouse, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015, p. 258

I appreciate Lexington books for allowing me to use part of materials in my book, Nigeria, Africa, and the United States: Challenges of Governance, Development, and Security, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017 O. Abegunrin (Deceased) (*) University of Maryland, Hyattsville, MD, USA © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. Abegunrin, S. O. Abidde (eds.), African Migrants and the Refugee Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56642-5_16

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anything, to leave home – Nigeria – and they do as much as possible and move to the United States, especially since the end of the Cold War. Thus, millions of Nigerians have migrated to the United States since the 1990s. The recent exodus of Nigerian immigrants into the United States is largely a product of economics.2 Many recent Nigerian immigrants have come to the United States in pursuit of the Golden Fleece and search for greener pastures. They are intent on making money in the United States and then going back to their homeland (Nigeria) to become somebody. The earlier Nigerian immigrants that came to the United States at the end of the Second World War, between 1945 and 1980, were mostly concerned with search of knowledge and getting the proper education. For the new Nigerian immigrants to the United States, especially since the 1990s to the present, their economic activities are so important, and they adore the economic, democratic system and financial activities of the United States. They live the American dream every day they remain in the United States. But more importantly, they are under intense pressure from home by their families and communities to make it in America and send money home to help their communities.3

Nigerian Immigrants in the United States The significance of Nigerian immigrants to the United States can be gauged almost everywhere and in most professions. Most of these people are contributing immensely to the economy of the United States. Some of this elite group of Nigerian immigrants are the intellectuals and professionals and form the inner core of the relationship between Nigeria and the United States. We can see their influences also within Nigeria itself, as many of them have trained in the United States and have imbibed American ethics of economic and political systems.4 The change brought by the Obama Presidency has also been a welcome thing to them. As for the US attitude, the groundwork was already laid for cooperation between Nigeria and the United States before President Obama came into office. On his assumption of office, Obama found in Nigeria a friendly English-speaking African country. American foreign policy that emphasizes development was marching to the same tune as Nigerians. This feeling has been there for quite a while. However, Obama waved the olive branches rather than throw the arrows. A Nigeria that has assumed superpower

2  Many of us Nigerians in the United States are what I call economic refugees. Because of the economic situation at home (in Nigeria) many of us have decided to stay permanently in the United States 3  For full details see chapter five in my book, Nigeria, Africa, and the United States: Challenges of Governance, Development, and Security, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017 4  Olayiwola Abegunrin, Nigeria, Africa, and the United States: Challenges of Governance, Development and Security. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016. See Chap. 5 for detailed economic contributions of Nigerians to the U.S. Economies

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status akin to that of the United States in Africa; and almost to an idolatry status as if all blessings must flow from the United States. Nigeria and the United States had been having relations since 1960. The question is what changes are we to expect or expecting with the largest Nigerian immigrants among recent African immigrants in the United States?5

Nigerians in the American Academy It will be difficult to find any good university, medical institutions, or institutions of research learning in the United States that do not have Nigerians as some of their brightest and best teachers or students. Nigerian intellectuals are found in almost all American higher institutions, and they are making a lot of contributions to American higher education, as well as to the American economy. Nigerians are the largest African immigrant group in the United States, and one of the most successful immigrant groups in the United States is the Nigerian community.6 From the biggest and most prestigious institutions to the smallest college, you will find them. From the biggest and best hospitals and medical centers, you will find them. From Florida to Alaska and from New York to Hawaii, you will find Nigerian immigrants. Several studies have shown that, among recent immigrant Africans in America, Nigerians are the most educated of them all. Nationwide, thousands of Nigerians are members of academic faculties in American colleges and universities, and the same in American hospitals and medical centers.7 In many American colleges and universities, African history, politics, and economics were neglected until the end of the Cold War. However, since the beginning of the twenty-first century, African history and cultures, politics, and economic have been widely taught. Some notable individual Nigerian scholars in this regard that have put their efforts, resources, and intellects in teaching these subjects in American higher institutions include Peter Ekeh, F. Ugboaja Ohaegbulam, Wande Abimbola, Rowland Abiodun, Oladimeji Aborisade, Layi Abegunrin, Funso Afolayan, E.C. Ejiogu, Emmanuel Ike Udogu, Toyin Falola, Joseph Inikori, Funke Mojubaolu Okome, Oyeronke Oyewumi, Bayo Oyebade, Akin Ogundiran, Segun Gbadegesin, Adeniran Adeboye, Abiola Irele, Biodun Jeyifo, Jacob Olupona, Onaiwu Ogbomo, Jeremiah Dibua, and Soji Akomolafe.8

5  Jill H.  Wilson and Nicole Prchal Svajlenka, “Immigrants Continue to Disperse, With Fastest Growth in the Suburbs,” Immigration Facts Series, Number 17, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 11/4/2014. Also see “African-Born U.S.  Residents Now Total 1.6 million.” The Foreign-Born Population from Africa: 2008–2012, October 2014. www.census.gov/direct URL 6  Ibid 7  Ibid 8  Toyin Falola and Akintunde Akinyemi Editors, Encyclopedia of the Yoruba, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2016

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Healthcare Delivery As many as 1280 Nigerian medical doctors migrated to the United States between 1989 and 1990, and their numbers are increasing. Medical and allied professions, such as pharmacy and nursing, have always been atractive to Nigerian immigrants in the United States who have succeeded in establishing very lucrative medical practices all over the United States.9 There are scores of Nigerian medical doctors who are consultants in major hospitals and medical centers in the Washington Metropolitan Area, including Baltimore, New  York, Atlanta, Houston, and many US big cities. Among them are Dr. Olu Adeniyi-Jones, an AIDS specialist, Dr. Margaret Akpan, Dr. Sunday Nwosu, Dr. Nwaneri, and Dr. Ibitoye to name a few.

Nigerians and Law Practice in the United States The legal profession has always been of immense fascination and attraction to Nigerians. In the United States, this attraction has manifested itself in many ways. The United States is a country that places much premium on the rule of law. As the population of Nigerians and those of other Africans increase, and as they venture into businesses, their legal needs also increase. The demand for legal representation is immediately met by Nigerian attorneys who are trained in the legal profession in the United States and, therefore, are well qualified to meet the needs for legal representation as demanded by Nigerians and African communities in the United States. Most Nigerian immigrants at one point or another will spend at least five thousand dollars ($5,000) to regularize their immigration status, register a business, or file one paper or another as required by law. Some of these Nigerian lawyers specialize in representing people with the following problems: 1. Immigration: permanent residency, deportation, labor certification, and citizenship. 2. Domestic-related problems: separation, divorce, alimony, custody, and adoption of children. 3. Descendant estates: wills, estate trusts, and probate. 4. Personal injuries: automobile accidents, medical malpractice, defective products, and accidental falls. 5. Employment: unemployment compensation, employee relations, and workers compensation. 6. Business law: incorporation registration, and partnerships. 7. Contracts: non-profit corporations and commercial real estate.10

 Abegunrin, op. cit., p. 211  African Business Directory, 3311 Toledo Terrace, Suite B-201, Hyattsville, Maryland, 1992, pp. 56–61

9

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Trading and Nigerian Entrepreneurs in the United States Trading has been very popular among the Nigerian immigrant groups, perhaps because it needs little sophistication to make a profit in buying cheap and selling at a decent profit margin. Groceries, especially food markets and fashion boutique stores, seem to be the most favored or the most prosperous ones. These have been able to attract a cross-section of Nigerian and African customers because they have been able to provide a variety of African traditional foods, and clothes, which are very scarce or sometimes nonexistent in the United States.

Nigerian Business Activities in the United States For example, Tropical Foodmart, owned by Mr. Ogechukwu Victor Eze, bought the 7-Eleven store which is located at 6590 Ager Road, Hyattsville, Maryland, and converted it into a grocery store that provides the needs of both Nigerians and Americans as the 7-Eleven store did and the needs of the Africans. One most popular Nigerian immigrant food store in Washington DC metro areas is Afrik International Wholesale Food Market and Eko Food Store located all over Washington DC areas, Baltimore, and Northern Virginia. The variety of goods they provide are as follows: meat and fish, flour and bulk foods, soup and stew condiments, magazines and newspapers from Nigeria and other African countries, and other miscellaneous items. Other big cities and metropolitan areas of the United States with similar grocery stores run by Nigerian immigrants include Maryland suburban and Northern Virginia; Houston, Texas; New York City; Chicago, Illinois; Los Angeles, California; Atlanta, Georgia; etc.

 frican Fashion Manufacturers and Exports A to the United States Under the structural adjustment programs (SAP) of 1986–1990, the importation of textile and garments was banned in Nigeria. This gave rise to a surge in local manufacturers of garments, which, in turn, promoted business for cotton growers, textile manufacturers, weavers, designers, dyers, and tailors of African and Nigerian dresses. One of the immediate consequences of the structural adjustment programs is the low cost of manufacturers and producers of goods and services. As a result, garments produced in Nigeria yield high profits when imported to the United States. It is important, however, to acknowledge that the Afrocentric renaissance in the United States has brought about an upsurge in the demand among Africans, Nigerians, and African Americans for African dresses and textiles of African designs and prints. Nigerian immigrants have exploited this lucrative trade and have been in

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the vanguard in the trade on African fashion manufacturers and imports in the United States.11 In the Washington metropolitan area, African Boutique Store, owned by Mrs. Yetunde Oladokun, is one of the most popular fashion stores that specialize in African and Nigerian designs of a variety of women and men clothes. It is located at 4926 Annapolis Road, Bladensburg, in Prince George’s County, Maryland. Timbuktu Store, owned by Mr. Jude Ibegwam, is one of the most celebrated fashion houses that specialize in African designs. It has three branches; one of them is located at the Takoma Park Plaza, at 6511 New Hampshire Avenue, Takoma Park, Maryland. It has other branches on Florida Avenue in Washington, DC, and Prince George’s Mall in Prince George’s County, Maryland. Modupe Fashions, owned by Mrs. Mary Modupe Vaughn, is located at 5119 Georgia Avenue, NW, Washington, DC. In addition to importing already made African dresses, Mrs. Modupe Vaughn also imports several selections of textile materials of African designs and provides the availability of custom-made African dresses, which she makes by herself in her shop, and for many other Nigerian fashion stores in the United States.

Nigerian Entrepreneurs in the United States A Nigerian-born entrepreneur Kase Lawal is the epitome of the American dream. Kase Lawal has carved a name for himself in one of the most competitive industries in the United States and the world – particularly in petroleum industry. Now head of a multibillion-dollar empire, his Houston-based company Cameroon-American Corporation (CAMAC) International is one of the largest black-owned businesses in the United States, generating over $2 billion a year.12 Due to Lawal’s visionary zeal and the expansion of his business and financial empire, Black Enterprise Magazine13 named CAMAC International 2006 company of the year. Thus, “Kase Lawal’s business/economic prowess, along with a spike in oil prices, is fueling CAMAC International’s rise to America’s second-largest Black Business.”14 He has guided his oil exploration, refining, and trading company to international prominence. His expertise in the field of international energy business led to his appointments by the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations to the US Trade Advisory Committee on Africa,15 where he is responsible for crafting African trade policy for American administrations. In 2005, CAMAC International acquired a controlling interest in Unity National Bank, the only black-owned federally  Most of these African Fashions and Boutique Stores are in big Malls in American cities  Susannah Palk, “Kase Lawal: Not your Average Oil Baron,” www.CNN.COM, May 19, 2010 13  Alan Hughes, “Oil Baron: How Nigerian-Born CEO Kase Lawal Built His Billion-Dollar Empire,” Black Enterprise, June 2006, pp. 129–134 14  Ibid 15  Mohammed Dewji, “Kase Lawal: Nigerian-Born Oil Baron Who Controls 6 Oil Blocs in Kenya,” African Leadership Magazine, London, July 2015 11 12

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c­ hartered bank in Texas. This bank has two locations in Texas and $55.77 million in total assets as of 2006. Lawal has used the “Unity National Bank as an instrument of economic development for African Americans”16; and by extension, he has used his business empire creating jobs for both the Nigerian immigrants, African immigrants, and African Americans in the United States. To spur importers of Nigerian goods in the United States, in general terms, Nigerian importers and the Nigerian government had sponsored three trade exhibitions to promote Nigerian products in the United States. In 1989, two such exhibitions were hosted in Cleveland, Ohio, and Detroit, Michigan, and the third and largest Nigerian exhibition in the United States was held in July 1990, in Houston, Texas. These events were coordinated by Nigerian immigrant business owners in the United States and high-level ministerial trade delegations led by the Nigerian Minister of Trade and Tourism and included specialized government agencies, notably the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines, and Agriculture (NACCIMA), Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN), Association of Nigerian Exporters (ANE), and Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). See Table 16.1 for the figures of US trade in goods with Nigeria, between 1985 and 2016.

Nigerian Immigrants Population in the United States The new Nigerian immigrants are expanding their economic interests and activities in all areas including accounting and law in the United States, especially in American big cities such as New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Houston, New Orleans, Atlanta, Dallas, Baltimore, Newark, and others. With the growing Nigerian population and increasing interest in Nigerian products in the United States since the beginning of the twenty-first century, Nigerian immigrants’ economic interests continue to grow.17 More than 5,000,000 Nigerian immigrants and their children (the first and second generations) live in the United States, and Nigeria is the largest source of African immigration to the United States. As of 2015, Nigerian immigrants account for about 0.6 percent of the United States’ overall foreign-born population, about half of whom arrived before 2000. And a similar proportion of Nigerian immigrants are naturalized US citizens.18 The largest numbers of Nigerian immigrants in the United States reside in the following states: Texas, Maryland, New York, California, and Georgia. By metropolitan area, Houston has the largest Nigerian immigrant population, followed by Washington, DC, metropolitan area, comprising

 Ibid, p. 134  Olayiwola Abegunrin, Nigeria, Africa and the United States, op. cit., p. 101 18  See “The Nigerian Diaspora in the United States,” www.migrationpolicy.org/about/copyrightpolicy. Retrieved January 28, 2018, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, 2018 16 17

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Table 16.1  US trade in goods with Nigeria, 1985–2016* (All figures are in US million dollars on a nominal basis) Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Exports 675.7 408.8 295.2 356.8 490.3 553.2 831.4 1001.1 894.7 509.0 602.9 818;4 813.0 816.7 627.9 721.9 955.1 1057.7 1016.9 1554.3 1619.8 2233.5 2777.9 4102.4 3687.1 4060.5 4904.8 5029.3 6388.4 5965.9 3435.1 1894.9

Imports 3001.9 2530.3 3573.5 3278.6 5283.9 5982.1 5168.0 5102.4 5301.4 4429.9 4930.6 5978.3 6349.4 4194.0 4385 10,537.6 8774.9 5945.3 10,393.6 16,248.5 24,239.4 27,863.1 32,770.2 38,068.0 19,128.2 30,515.9 33,854.2 19,014.2 11,723.9 3839.5 1915.8 4176.0

Balance −2326.2 −2121.5 −3278.3 −2921.8 −4793.6 −5428.9 −4336.6 −4101.3 −4406.7 −3920.9 −4327.6 −5159.9 −5536.4 −3377.3 −3757.2 −9815.7 −7819.8 −4887.6 −9376.7 −14,694.2 −22,619.6 −25,629.7 −29,992.3 −33,965.6 −15,441.1 −26,455.4 −28,949.4 −13,984.9 −5335.5 2126.4 1519.3 −2281.1

Sources: Foreign Trade, US Trade with Nigeria, Census Bureau, www.census.gov, Washington, DC, 2017.

Maryland-Virginia, followed by New  York City and Atlanta. See Table  16.2 for details of the growth of the Nigerian population in the United States’ States. According to the Rockefeller Foundation-Aspen Institute Diaspora Program (RAD) analysis, Nigerian immigrants are the best educated of the 15 groups studied in the RAD program: A far greater share of the Nigerian first and second generation earned undergraduate degrees than the U.S. population overall (37 percent versus 20 percent), and members of this

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States Population Texas 60,173 Maryland 31,263 New York 29,619 California 23,302 Georgia 19,182 Illinois 15,389 New Jersey 14,780 Florida 8274 Massachusetts 6661 Pennsylvania 6371 Total 215,014 Sources: https://factfinder. census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview. xhtml? Retrieved January 19, 2018 a

p­ opulation are more than twice as likely to have secured an advanced degree (29 percent versus 11 percent). Members of the Nigerian immigrants are also substantially more likely than the general U.S. population to be in the labor force and to work in professional or managerial occupations.19

Nigerian culture has long emphasized the importance of education, placing value on pursuing education to a better life, financial success, and personal fulfillment. One of the Nigerian founding fathers, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, said: One of the purposes of education is to help a person to develop his natural talents fully possible. No other means has been evolved to achieve the same goal. It goes without saying, therefore that if a person with less natural endowment is educated, other things being equal, he will stand in an infinitely better position economically, politically and socially than another person with much greater natural talents, but without opportunity for all in education automatically leads to a good deal of social distortions and waste.20

The Rockefeller Foundation-Aspen Institute Diaspora Program studies showed that: The United States is the primary destination country for Nigerian-born international migrants and the leading source of Nigeria’s remittances. The Nigerian immigrants in the United States transferred approximately $6.1 billion in remittances to Nigeria during 2012. Nigeria’s remittances totaled $20.6 billion and represented 7.9 percent of the country’s $262.2 billion gross domestic product (GDP) as of 2017.21

One major development that should be noted is that Nigerian immigrants’ remittances to the homeland (Nigeria) are contributing tremendously to the Nigerian  Ibid  Obafemi Awolowo, Thoughts of AWO, Ibadan: The Sketch Press Limited, 1980, p. 15 21  “The Nigerian Diaspora in the United States,” www.migrationpolicy.org/about/copyright-policy. Retrieved January 28, 2018, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, 2018 19 20

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economy and helping in supporting many Nigerian families and their communities at home. Besides being of assistance to the family unit, remittances are also of great importance to the Nigerian banking system and allow more availability and circulation of dollars in the country. See the available detailed figures of Nigerian immigrant remittances in Table 16.3 between 1993 and 2010 of Nigerians living in the United States. According to data from the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development, remittances into Nigeria totaled $20.8 billion in 2015.22 These figures represent the total remittances flowing into the country from all Nigerian immigrants abroad, and not only in the United States, but more than 60 percent come from Nigerian immigrants in the United States. And according to the Special Assistant to the President on Foreign Affairs and Diaspora, Mrs. Abike Dabiri Erewa, “In 2016, Nigerians living abroad Remitted $35 billion to the Nigerian economy, higher than 2015. This is the highest in Africa and the third-largest in the world.”23 Table 16.3 Nigerian immigrants remittances from the United States to Nigeria, 1993–2010* (In millions of US dollars)

Year 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993

Dollar amounts remitted $11,000,000 $10,045,000 $9,000,000 $8,000,000 $7,000,000 $6,000,000 $5,000,000 $4,000,000 $1,392,000 $1000,000 $1,392,000 $1,392,000 $1,600,000 $2,000,000 $1000,000 $1000,000 $++ $1000,000

Sources: Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, 2016. ++  −  Less than one million remitted

 Ibid  Chris Agabi, “Nigeria: Diaspora Remittance Hits U.S. $35 billion in 2016,” Daily Trust, Abuja, January 2018

22 23

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Nigerian Religious Organizations and their Impact Since the end of the Cold War, Nigerian Pentecostal churches have started spreading like wild fire all over the world and particularly in the United States. The three major Nigerian Pentecostal churches24 in the United States are led by the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG), led by its General Overseer Pastor Enoch Adejare Adeboye;25 followed by Mountain of Fire and Miracles Ministry (MFM), led by Pastor Daniel Olukoya; and the Winners Chapel International led by Pastor David Oyedepo. The biggest of these three churches is the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG), with its 800 acres of prairie land located in the Hunt County town of Floyd as its North America Headquarters, about 50  miles northeast of Dallas, Texas, USA.26 Two major reasons had led the Nigerian new Pentecostal church to spread in America or abroad. First is the structural adjustment program introduced by General Ibrahim Babangida’s military regime that led to a serious economic crisis from 1986 to 1992. Second is the explosion of many numbers of young university graduates without employment and no hope of getting any job in Nigeria. At the same time, many more universities were being established in the country, and consequently, numbers of university graduates are increasing every year, and without the hope of getting a job at home. Many of these young university graduates saw an opportunity in joining Pentecostal churches and in being trained to become pastors as an open avenue to secure employment. And after their training, many of these newly recruited pastors were sent to the United States and many other overseas countries to establish and pastor churches abroad. This avenue provided these young graduates turned pastors employment and economic means to survive and raise a family. However, there is one important problem facing the new Nigerian Pentecostal churches, particularly in the United States, that is, attracting the American audience to join them as permanent members of their congregations. One of the reasons is that America is an open society that strongly believes in a democratic and  open system. American people want to know where their contributions (money) to the church is going and how the money is being spent and want to see it in black and white  – in an open book. American congregations want their pastors to report to them and tell them how their monetary contributions are being spent. But the new Nigerian Pentecostal church policy does not allow an open policy of how their church finances is being manage. In these Nigerian Pentecostal churches, the pastors control the finance of the church. For example, a certain percentage of the money collected in  local RCCG churches in the United States is remitted to the

 Asonzeh Ukah, A new Paradigm of Pentecostal Power: A Study of the Redeemed Christian Church of God in Nigeria, Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2008 25  Ibid 26  Dallas Morning News, “Pastor Adeboye Dedicates Redeemed Christian Church of God $15.5 million Pavilion Center,” Dallas, Texas, June 13, 2013 24

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North American RCCG Headquarters in Dallas, Texas, and from there to the RCCG Headquarters in Nigeria. And the second most important reason is that the US Diversity Visa Lottery helped many Nigerians who migrated to the United States. These immigrants helped increase the population of the congregations to the Nigerian churches in the United States, particularly in American big cities and urban areas. With the end of the US Diversity Visa Lottery and lack of open and undemocratic policy in running their churches, the hope of Nigerian Pentecostal churches expanding in America is in doubt.

Conclusion As a respectable country, Nigeria should develop and nourish a constituency within the United States. There are many Nigerians in the United States as well as non-­ Nigerians who, when properly cultivated, could lobby for Nigeria. The image of Nigeria is very bad abroad. However, there ought to be a way to make Nigerians aware that the behavior of the bad ones among them hurts the motherland. There is a need to retain a publicist and a very strong pressure group for Nigeria to help rehabilitate as well as sell Nigeria’s good image and positive achievements to the global communities. Nigerian government should take criticisms by foreign observers seriously. Nigerians are prone to the wholesale rejection of these critics, even when they know the truth is being told. Our diplomats should be carefully chosen. The selection and training of Nigerians to serve in the foreign service should include psychological testing and evaluation. The Nigerian Government should be aware that there are people who cannot psychologically thrive outside their own countries’ environment. Nigeria, a serious, committed, and responsible member of the African Union, and the United Nations Organization, must constantly evaluate her role and improve upon it. The states in West Africa sub-region and the African continent should be handled in such a way that they trust Nigeria and would be less open to the blandishments of Nigeria’s powers. To keep Nigeria’s disparate groups unified is a task that must be done. The country’s two biggest problems  – ethnicity and religious conflicts  – must be tackled seriously with skills, building the idea of fairness, dedication, and tolerance into the nation’s school curricula to help create a great civic society and understanding of our history. These issues must be publicly discussed and debated. It is often forgotten that the two major religions (Christianity and Islam) now contending with one another are foreign religions. The basic tenet in indigenous ways had always been religious tolerance, especially in the Southern parts of the country/Nigeria. Nigeria should skillfully tap the skills and concerns of African Americans for Nigeria and Africa. Nigerians should speak out on issues that concern them. Nigerians and African Americans are not drawing as close to one another as, say, the Jews to Israel or as the United States to the Anglos in England. A lot of work needs

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to be done in this area from both sides of the Atlantic; special studies should be encouraged to focus on the United States in Nigerian higher institutions. Nigeria should work closely with the United Nations and be a responsible member of the organization. The UN is a good forum where Nigeria can connect with other nations and let the world know their problems and concerns. This world forum is indispensable for a country like Nigeria in its dealings with countries of enormous power like the United States. And let it be known that the relations between nations must be built on trust and respect. Worldwide in the twenty-first century, nations having relations with the United States are now very cautious and should be. They remember the arrogance, the deception by which the former president George W. Bush went to war with Iraq, saying there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and therefore, the United States was justified in using a preemptive strike.27 The weapons of mass destruction were never found. Consequently, the world was set in confusion. Nigeria must be aware that there is continuity in US foreign policy. And in international relations, there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies.28 Therefore, a friend of today may become an enemy tomorrow. There is no guarantee that the US presidents to follow will not do the same thing or find a unique way of doing the same or a comparable situation and conjure up another scenario. If not careful, Nigeria could be a victim next time. Nigeria should do as other nations are doing: be cautious, take the words of US envoys and agents with agrain of salt, develop an independent way to verify what is said, and demand for respect and guarantees. Remember that Nigeria is an oil-producing country and the United States needs the oil. In late 1999, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US armed forces revealed in its strategic assessment by saying that an “oil war in the Persian Gulf was a serious contingency and that U.S. forces might be used to ensure adequate supplies of oil for the United States.”29 Could it not be possible that sometime soon or in the future the area suggested might be West Africa, now that oil is found in most of African from Angola in south-west Africa to the Coast of Mauritania?30 Many of us Nigerians in the United States are what I call economic refugees because of the economic situation at home (in Nigeria) many of us have decided to stay permanently in the United States. However, Nigeria has transitioned from the economic, political, and cultural margins of the world, away from the victim and pariah status, to become a mainstream player, driving global markets, economic and cultural trends, and her destiny. Whatever the preconceptions, the world cannot and should not ignore Nigeria anymore.  Robert D. Novak, “Colin Powell’s Burden,” The Washington Post, April 10, 2003  See Hans J.  Morgenthau, Politics Among the Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: McGraw Hill, 1993 29  John Chalmers, The Sorrows of Empire p. 226. Also see Ritt Goldstein, “Oil Wars Pentagon’s Policy Since 1999”, Miami Morning Herald, May 20, 2003. 30  Olayiwola Abegunrin, “The Historical and Strategic Significance of Africa in World Affairs,” in Olayiwola Abegunrin, AFRICA, The State of the Continent Fifty Years after the Liberation, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2013, p. 171 27 28

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References Abegunrin, Olayiwola. 2013. The Historical and Strategic Significance of Africa in World Affairs. In Olayiwola Abegunrin, AFRICA, The State of the Continent Fifty Years after the Liberation, 171. New York: Nova Science Publishers. ———. 2016. Nigeria, Africa, and the United States: Challenges of Governance, Development and Security. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. See chapter 5 for detailed economic contributions of Nigerians to the U.S. Economies. African Business Directory, 3311 Toledo Terrace, Suite B-201, Hyattsville, Maryland, 1992, pp. 56–61. Chris Agabi, “Nigeria: Diaspora Remittance Hits U.S. $35 Billion in 2016,” Daily Trust, Abuja, 2018. Awolowo, Obafemi. 1980. Thoughts of AWO, 15. Ibadan: The Sketch Press Limited. Bright, Jake, and Aubrey. 2015. The Next Africa: An Emerging Continent Becomes a Global Powerhouse, 258. New York: St. Martin’s Press. John Chalmers. 2003. The Sorrows of Empire p. 226. Also see Ritt Goldstein. Oil Wars Pentagon’s Policy Since 1999. Miami Morning Herald, May 20, 2003. Dallas Morning News. 2013. Pastor Adeboye Dedicates Redeemed Christian Church of God $15.5 million Pavilion Center. Dallas, Texas, June 13, 2013. Mohammed Dewji, “Kase Lawal: Nigerian-born Oil Baron Who Controls 6 Oil Blocs in Kenya,” African Leadership Magazine, London, July 2015. Falola, Toyin, and Akintunde Akinyemi, eds. 2016. Encyclopedia of the Yoruba. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Hughes, Alan. 2006. Oil Baron: How Nigerian-Born CEO Kase Lawal Built His Billion-Dollar Empire, 129–134. Black Enterprise. Morgenthau, Hans J. 1993. Politics Among the Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: McGraw Hill. Robert D. Novak. 2003. Colin Powell’s Burden. The Washington Post, April 10, 2003. Olayiwola Abegunrin, Nigeria, Africa and the United States, op. cit., p. 101. Susannah Palk. 2010. Kase Lawal: Not your Average Oil Baron. https://www.cnn.com/2010/ WORLD/africa/05/18/kase.lukman.lawal/index.html Accessed 19 May 2010. The Nigerian Diaspora in the United States. 2018. www.migrationpolicy.org/about/copyright-policy. Retrieved January 28, 2018, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, 2018. Ukah, Asonzeh. 2008. A New Paradigm of Pentecostal Power: A Study of the Redeemed Christian Church of God in Nigeria. Trenton: Africa World Press. Jill H. Wilson and Nicole Prchal Svajlenka. 2014. Immigrants Continue to Disperse, With Fastest Growth in the Suburbs. Immigration Facts Series, Number 17, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 11/4/2014. Also, see African-Born U.S.  Residents Now Total 1.6 million. The Foreign-Born Population from Africa: 2008–2012, October 2014. www.census.gov/direct URL.