Advertising and Propaganda in World War II: Cultural Identity and the Blitz spirit 9780755623907, 9780857725172

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David Clampin is Lecturer in History at Liverpool John Moores University. He completed his PhD at Aberystwyth University.

ADVERTISING AND PROPAGANDA IN WORLD WAR II Cultural Identity and the Blitz spirit

DAVID CLAMPIN

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2014 by I.B. Tauris & Co. Paperback edition first published 2020 Copyright © David Clampin, 2014 David Clampin has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgements on p. viii constitute an extension of this copyright page. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-1-7807-6434-4 PB: 978-1-3501-5773-6 ePDF: 978-0-8577-2517-2 eBook: 978-0-8577-3732-8 Series: International Library of Twentieth Century History, volume 69 Typeset in Garamond Three by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

For Anna, without whom none of this would have been possible

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements Preface

viii xii

Introduction 1. The Place of Commercial Advertising in Wartime Britain 2. War Begins at Home 3. Instruction and Direction 4. Fighting the War via Consumption 5. Gender Identities through the War 6. Defining the Postwar World

1 27 70 97 128 171 210

Conclusion

225

Notes Bibliography Index

233 255 262

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To be given the opportunity to write this history of British advertising during the Second World War has been a huge privilege and it has only been made possible through the help and support of numerous people along the way. In addition to those named below, there are also those who have shown either genuine interest, or at least feigned interest in a convincing fashion, as to enthuse and encourage me to carry on in the belief that what I was doing was of interest to a wider group. Whilst many remain nameless their contribution is acknowledged here nevertheless. Special thanks to Tomasz Hoskins at I.B.Tauris who enthusiastically embraced this project from the outset. This research would not have been possible without the work done by the History of Advertising Trust (HAT) in Ravingham, Norfolk. Without HAT’s work advertising in Britain would have no history. Whilst all the staff were fantastic during the weeks I worked there, I would particularly like to acknowledge the help of the late Michael Cudlipp and Chloe Veale. Michael’s personal experiences of the British advertising industry proved a great asset and opened up new avenues of research. Chloe’s patience and tolerance is acknowledged in meeting my various demands for material from the archive with efficiency and good humour. In gratitude for their generous support and acknowledging the central part that advertising and marketing plays in our modern history, all royalties from this edition are donated to the History of Advertising Trust.

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The knowledge and guidance of those working in other archives is also acknowledged. Sarah Foden at Cadbury Trebor Bassett and Carmelina Field at Cadbury Schweppes European Beverages. In addition, I would like to thank all at the Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge; the St Bride Printing Library, London; The National Archives at Kew; the British Library and especially the British Library Newspaper Library at Colindale. The Mass-Observation material quoted in this book is reproduced with the permission of Curtis Brown Group Ltd., London on behalf of The Trustees of the Mass Observation Archive. Copyright q the Trustees of the Mass Observation Archive. Throughout my research I have been given access to a variety of libraries and thank all those responsible at the Hugh Owen Library, Aberystwyth University; the National Library of Wales; Warwick University Library; and, the Lanchester Library, Coventry University. The support and assistance of the following are also acknowledged: Siobhann Carolan, Tracy Murray and Julie Phillips at Ogilvy & Mather Worldwide; Jane Campbell-Garrat, Now & Then; Ken Dormand and Elizabeth Hennessy, Dorland Advertising; Professor Nick Alexander, now at Lancaster University; John Downham; and, Bryan A. Bates. For the most part, the companies whose advertisements I wanted to use and reproduce in this book have been most cooperative and generous in their permissions as outlined here. B.S.A. Bicycles advertisements appear with thanks to Raleigh UK Ltd.; D.D.D. Prescription advertisement reproduced with the permission of the brand owner, D.D.D. Limited; Guinness with the consent of Diageo plc.; Homesun Lamps thanks to Halma p.l.c.; and, Horlicks appears thanks to GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare. The HP word, flag device and sauce brand associated trademarks, and are owned by HP Foods Limited and are used with permission. Miner’s Liquid Make-up appears thanks to Paul Murray Plc. Rosebank Fabrics was acquired by Arthur Sanderson in 1964 and these advertisements appear courtesy of Arthur Sanderson & Sons. Advertisements for Creamola Custard Puddings and Vita-Gravy appear with the consent of Symington’s Limited; those of Wincarnis Tonic Wine courtesy of

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Ian Macleod Distillers Limited. In numerous other cases it has not been possible to establish the current holder of some of these brands despite extensive research. In all cases every effort has been made to trace copyright holders and to obtain their permission for the use of copyright material. The author apologizes for any errors or omissions in the above list and would be grateful if notified of any corrections that should be incorporated in future reprints or editions of this book. The financial support of the Royal Historical Society has been gratefully received. Their generosity facilitated many of my travel expenses when working in archives and enabled me to attend conferences that have greatly benefited my research. Similarly, great gratitude is expressed to Professor Phillip Schofield and all associated with the Department of History and Welsh History Postgraduate Research Fund at Aberystwyth University. Stefan Schwarzkopf has been the source (in so many ways) of inspiration throughout my research and I am grateful to him for allowing me to draw on his gargantuan knowledge of the history of British advertising on numerous occasions. I would also like to thank Dr Rebecca Lewis who kindly supplied me with a copy of her PhD thesis. The contribution made by Dr Nick Barnett is also gratefully acknowledged here. Friends and family have all helped out along the way. Sally Clampin and Paul Faldo provided me with most generous accommodation whilst I was working at HAT. When in London I was happy to enjoy superior hospitality courtesy of Alun and Lisa Evans. All too often I have imposed on both my mother and Robin and Freda Rowe to undertake dog-sitting duties that allowed me to go off and do whatever I needed to do. Thanks to Rob Griffith who, on occasion, acted as my ‘image consultant’. Steve Lawler who many a time came to my aid in overcoming the confounding nature of MS Word when trying to embed images. My immense gratitude also goes to Andrew Argyle for his IT support: he has given me vast amounts of his time and knowledge in the midst of computer related panics when it seemed to the uninitiated that all would be lost!

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This book started life as a PhD thesis and therefore special thanks go to my supervisors in the Department of History and Welsh History at Aberystwyth University, Dr Siaˆn Nicholas and Dr Richard Coopey. Richard was able to offer me insight from a business history perspective as well as great enthusiasm for the project in hand. My inestimable gratitude goes to Siaˆn who worked most closely alongside me as this research took form. Although at times she must have been truly fed up with British commercial advertising during the Second World War, she never allowed this to show through. Her immense knowledge of the British home front during the Second World War has made an immense contribution to this book and has helped to make it a more worthy piece of research than it might otherwise have been. Her interest and enthusiasm for my research spurred me on and convinced me that my research was making a genuine contribution to our understanding of the British home front during the Second World War. I thank her for her patience and wise counsel. In many ways, this book started out from a boyhood fascination with the Second World War, influenced in large part by family holidays in the Netherlands courtesy of the Schroots family. Immersed as they were in Operation Market Garden, the thwarted Allied attempt to capture bridges over the Rhine at Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Arnhem, I spent many hours in a landscape scarred by this gruesome battle and captivated by energetic reconstructions of those events alongside Hans Schroots. In large part, I hold him accountable for where I am now and this, the product of misspent summers. Finally, my greatest gratitude is saved for my wife, Anna, without whom this story would never have been told. She has tolerated this latest eccentricity with generosity and good humour, financing a selfindulgent return to academia and offering unflagging support. She has shown stoicism and outstanding fortitude in the face of my great excitement over the most trivial of discoveries and the lowest of moods when all seemed impossible. To have the opportunity to gain a greater understanding of Britain between 1939 and 1945 has been a great privilege and the greatest of pleasures: she made it possible and I will be forever in her debt.

PREFACE

World War II was a crucial episode in British history. It was a period in which the British nation and Empire stood on the threshold of utter defeat, invasion and subjugation under an evil, totalitarian regime. It was a time in which everything that we conceive of as being British was threatened and risked being ripped asunder and utterly changed. It was the only time when the entire British nation was engaged in war: a total war the like of which had never been witnessed before. Throughout much of the 1930s, faced by Fascist Italy, Hitler’s rise to power and the civil war in Spain, most British people cared little about the apparent threat that Fascism represented, at least in the period up to the Munich crisis, preferring instead to concentrate on their own, personal, inward-looking, day-to-day life. While that disengagement with the business of government had been largely driven by the rise of independent affluence for many and the surrender of responsibility to an increasingly interventionist state, the people’s attitude and engagement with the oncoming war was also governed by an aversion to the whole prospect of modern warfare and the expectations of what that would be like. Public opinion in the interwar years was tempered by the memory of the Great War, the enduring legacy of which had been ‘Never again!’. Further, war, in its modern idiom, was a most dreadful prospect wrought large by graphic portrayals of the shape of death in the home that

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accompanied the alarming vision of aerial bombardment. In a speech to the House of Commons in 1932, Stanley Baldwin had warned that ‘the bomber will always get through’.1 Such warnings were reinforced in the media of both fact and fiction: it was seen in the terror meted out during the Spanish Civil War, vividly captured in cinema newsreels, and in such features as the 1936 film Things to Come. Combined, such material helped to create a prevalent atmosphere of fear that especially focused the beginning of any future conflict with a rain of death from the skies. The reality was that modern technology ensured that war could reach into the home of the private citizen. Yet, though war was widely regarded as an abhorrent concept, it became apparent through the last years of the 1930s that it was an unfortunate inevitability. Thus, when war came in September 1939, there was no crusading belief in the cause, and the declaration of war itself received an entirely different reception from that of August 1914. Chamberlain’s broadcast of 3 September 1939 was no clarion call but ‘a tired, old man telling of the bitter blow to his hopes of peace’.2 Yet, it was understood that this modern war required the complete and wholehearted engagement of the people. War would now reach into the heart of combatant nations and force ordinary people to confront it face to face—a prospect encapsulated in the expression ‘People’s War’. The essence of this concept was neatly outlined by Churchill in a speech to the House of Commons on 20 August 1940 in which he stated: The whole of the warring nations are engaged, not only soldiers, but the entire population, men women and children. The fronts are everywhere. The trenches are dug in the towns and streets. Every village is fortified. Every road is barred. The front line runs through the factories. The workmen are soldiers with different weapons but the same courage.3 The key distinction within the context of World War II was the role that was to be played by ‘the people’. This was the first modern

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conflict in which the people had been called centre-stage from the outset and upon whom final victory depended. Writing from a somewhat different perspective, Tom Wintringham, socialist activist, military theorist and veteran of the Spanish Civil War, wrote in 1942 that ‘the essence of the People’s War is confidence in the common people, and their confidence in those who lead them’.4 Wintringham really highlighted the unity of that spirit and the crucial factor that this was to be a two-way exchange of trust and confidence: the ‘People’s War’ depended on a state of mutual dependence. Emanating from this was a spirit of ‘voluntaryism’, a natural inclination to do the right thing. This was at the core of the ‘People’s War’. Wintringham goes on: ‘You do not make a People’s War by ordering men and women to do things. You do it by convincing, arousing, letting loose their strength.’5 Further, particularly within Wintringham’s definition, the ‘People’s War’ depended on positive action: not merely sitting back and ‘taking it’ but getting actively involved, actually ‘fighting’ the war. Such ideas were in keeping with the government’s own attitude and expectations of what would be required, especially in relation to the centrality of popular ‘morale’ within that. In many cases, good morale—a fundamental component of the ‘People’s War’—was synonymous with concerted, well-directed, well-meaning action: making the necessary sacrifices for the war effort in a sense of positive engagement. What is more, it should be natural and free-flowing. These rather grandiose definitions really encapsulate the government’s own aspirations in relation to the ‘People’s War’. They represent a determination that the people actively engage in the war, do so voluntarily and, very often, with a degree of enthusiasm. For the government, the ‘People’s War’ equated to whole-hearted and enthusiastic engagement with the war best indicated by ‘good morale’. This was to be the war of the ‘common people’, an idiom often invoked by Churchill, where the quintessential British character would come to the fore and ultimately prevail. Within this, key characteristics of the ‘people’ making up the ‘People’s War’ were widely promoted: a sense of community and fair play, an instinct for

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decency, justice and the rule of law and, above all, a determination to win the war.6 The ‘People’s War’ depended on the people. This was a war fought by a conscript army rather than a professional fighting force. Elsewhere, almost the entire workforce would have to be pressed into the service of the war effort. The ‘People’s War’ was: a unified community of ordinary people contributing to the war effort. These characterizations made ‘the common man’ central to the nation at war, celebrated diversity, implicitly advocated tolerance, and recognized Britain as a class- and gender-divided society but denied that it mattered to national unity—to the image of the British as essentially one people.7 When war did come, this fanciful vision of the ‘People’s War’ was more muted, a reaction vindicated by events as they unfolded. Indeed, it was not until sometime into the war that people were really challenged to engage in such a way. The attitude of the British people through the first months of the war was more one of a grim determination to get on with a job that had to be done, however unpleasant. The nation did not readily rally to the cause or demonstrate any outstanding commitment to make the sacrifices or face the disruption that war would entail, and this attitude towards the war was only enhanced by the situation as it actually developed through the period known as the ‘Phoney War’, between the declaration of war and the invasion of France and the Lowlands in May 1940. It is also worth recognizing that the government itself was reluctant to embroil the nation in a state of total war. Chamberlain had taken the nation into war as a last resort; he was personally very reticent about the idea of such a declaration or entirely abandoning the peacetime demeanour, and his government was eager to promote the hope that, after Poland, the war would simply peter out without bloodshed. They put their faith in victory through economic blockade. This is hardly tantamount to the stirring invocations that it was thought would be required in the face of modern war or likely to stir the people into unconditional engagement.

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In the face of the anticlimax that characterized the Phoney War, people were apt to disregard the war as far as possible, adopt a countenance of ‘wishful thinking’ and persist with living as normal a life, outside of the war, as possible. The combination of a horror and revulsion at the prospect of modern war, associated with the reassuring realization that, in actual fact, the cataclysm predicted failed to materialize, served to turn people away from the war and back to a normal existence, as far as that was possible. As Mark Connelly suggests, the first six months of the war were a period when ‘the British decided to pretend the war wasn’t happening and tried to laugh it into oblivion’.8 In this respect, there was something of a complacent attitude towards the war. During the period of the Phoney War, the country’s ‘need’ was not obvious and, as a consequence, those who had thrown themselves into war work felt content to drift out of it if they found it not to their taste. As the British people drifted along in this most peculiar of wars, their lack of enthusiasm or zeal appeared entirely vindicated via the stunning lack of activity and absence of any imperative to adjust one’s way of life, despite the best efforts of the government. From September 1939 through to March 1940, the nation relaxed. Germany was allowed to swallow up Poland and the Soviet Union and Finland. Then, in the spring of 1940, Britain began fighting in Norway. Suddenly the war was coming to life: whereas previously it had been possible to regard it as a distant enterprise, that changed as the British forces were drawn into the Norwegian campaign. Further, the fact that that first military engagement on land of any significance proved disastrous, shocked the people and brought the war to the centre of their attention. In his postwar memoirs, Churchill reckoned that the disastrous Norwegian campaign was ‘the stroke of catastrophe and the spur of peril [that] were needed to call forth the dormant British nation’.9 With the Norway debacle, so came the fall of Neville Chamberlain as prime minister and the ascent of Winston Churchill into that role. As German troops stormed through the Low countries, war for the first time forced itself centrestage in people’s day-to-day lives. As the apparently inconceivable was played out on mainland Europe, the degree of wishful thinking

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subsided and there was a marked increase in public anxiety. This sense of crisis, the burgeoning interest of the people in the war and their involvement in it, reached its peak with the evacuation of Dunkirk at the end of May 1940. In the aftermath of Dunkirk the British people, arguably, took control of the war. Dunkirk served to steel the spirits of the Home Front. Against all odds, the bulk of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) were being evacuated, pointing to the great British talent for improvization and relieving any anxiety that Britain would be left defenceless. Nevertheless, Dunkirk played a crucial part in World War II because it drew the people in. It shook them out of their grumbling complacency and forced them into the war—it represents the apogee of the ‘People’s War’. Through this experience, the people engaged with the war and in a manner and to an extent that were perhaps unique to the history of World War II. After Dunkirk, the nation was forced into a state of unity in the face of a common danger that resulted in self-sacrifice, social levelling and community spirit best captured in the notion of ‘Blitz spirit’. It might be argued that the people’s engagement with the war only truly started when they directly faced the lethal threat of enemy action from late August 1940: this was delivered to British streets and into British homes via the aerial bombardment that had so long been predicted. Yet the Phoney War had been a crucial precursor to this, in which people were able to adjust to the idea of being at war, to adapt to living at peace in war. Thus, the people were well prepared for when the ‘real’ war started. Further, the actual prospect of directly engaging the enemy served to steel morale yet further. One important aspect of living through the Blitz was to experience a bomb closely. Alongside this came a ‘general atmosphere of excitement, adventure, a form of “heroism” by escape’.10 Each time you, or someone you knew, was able to survive this onslaught, it served to prove that the British people did have what was required, that they were made of stern stuff and that it would take more than bombs to break their spirits. Thus, people adapted to the experience, and generally quite quickly.

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Part of that acclimatization, growing out of exposure to the threat—the actual experience of being bombed rather than idea or imagination—was such that the whole event was taken as a new fact of life. The bomb retreated into the background, lives were adjusted and many managed to resume with pre-war interests and occupations. By October 1940, Home Intelligence was commenting on how raids had been accepted as part of an unpleasant routine. Despite the tumultuous events that enveloped them, there was an amazing propensity to carry on. What emerged through the Blitz was a spontaneous spirit of neighbourliness, of improvization. The essence of this spirit, widely exhibited by the British people through this time, was one of simple heroism where they were, apparently, acutely aware of the contribution they were making to the war and their part within the British nation. In part, this came out of the commonality of the experience: as certain towns and cities were all affected by a bombing raid, a community of like-minded people were drawn together. There was a general sense of ‘mucking in’ as the people laughed and joked their way through the ordeal, determined that it should be ‘business as usual’. The real spirit of the British during World War II is generally best found through the years of the Blitz. Prior to this, through the period of Phoney War, it had been possible to maintain some semblance of ‘normal’ life; after the Blitz war once again became a more distant prospect and life could settle into a sort of routine. Thus, the period of the Blitz is the real crucible of the British people’s engagement with the war and in many instances, both at the time and subsequently, the attitude, behaviour and actions of those that were embroiled in those events were pointed to as the greatest characterization of that: this was their ‘finest hour’. The iconic image of St Paul’s Cathedral rising up out of the smoke and destruction inflicted on London in the raid of 29 December 1940 might be taken to encapsulate the very essence of Blitz spirit: St Paul’s, unyielding despite the flames around it, the British people unmoved and resolute despite this most vicious pounding. In spite of the fears, reservations and reluctance of the British people to become engaged in this war in 1939, at its end in 1945 the nation could

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reflect on what it had achieved. Under the most extraordinary of strains, pressures and deprivations the British people had prevailed. As Arthur Marwick notes: There is real evidence of the heroism, the high active morale, and the much vaunted humour [. . .]. It does no good to glorify World War II, or to minimize the grinding boredom, the real grievances and the terrible suffering. But it does no good either to deny the exaltation, the sense of achievement and the heightening of consciousness.11

INTRODUCTION

Given that World War II was ‘total war’, civilians on the Home Front were drawn into the conflict in a very real and direct way. As Calder points out, between 1939 and 1945 ‘the people of Britain were called into a participation which was wider, deeper and longer’ than any other earlier conflict.1 The fact that British society withstood this onslaught and emerged victorious proves that the people were behind the war effort and were prepared to make sacrifices, as necessary, in its pursuit. However, there is a question to be asked in respect of the extent to which the people were duly motivated by and engaged in the war. Thus, was the good morale of the Home Front, on which victory was partially built, sustained by commitment to an ‘imagined’ People’s War or something more personal? Did the people succumb to an entirely new way of life or were they actually sustained by an ability to maintain, as far as possible, a ‘normal’ life, seeking out those sources that would guide and inform them in practical ways to this end? In effect, did people abandon a ‘regular’ demeanour in favour of a new, wartime, cultural identity? With this in mind, this study considers how the average citizen coped with everyday life in wartime and questions the place of commercial advertising that offered practical guidance and information in shaping that life. That is not to deny the commitment of the people to the cause or their stoicism in the face of adversity, but rather treat that with a degree of circumspection when considering

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what it was that spurred them on and enabled them to cope in wartime, with reference to how they adapted their lives in more down-to-earth, practical ways. It ought to be noted that, of course, commercial advertising did not have exclusive purchase in regard to shaping that life. As Martin Doherty observes in his examination of Nazi broadcasts to Britain during World War II, ‘The most difficult aspect of propaganda analysis, historical or otherwise, is the attempt to assess its impact.’2 The effort to disentangle the mass of influences and messages that fill modern society in order to extract the ‘pure’ effect of just one of them on public opinion is fraught with difficulties, if not altogether impossible. Added to this, assessing what is ‘truly’ the public’s opinion on any given issue complicates the matter further. This is no less the case here. Despite the fact that market research around advertising was becoming well established in the interwar period, such research was not continued through the war. The advertising industry had been at the heart of the growth of public opinion surveys and market research from the early 1920s, with the use of market research for commercial purposes being inextricably linked to advertising agencies. The interwar advertising industry was instrumental in gathering large volumes of data on a wide variety of matters in order to educate the design of advertising campaigns and to test their ongoing success. However, this labour-intensive and time-consuming commercial enterprise fell victim to the war. John Downham records in his history of BMRB International (the market research company that grew out of the advertising agency J. Walter Thompson (JWT)) that ad hoc commercial surveys fell by around 75 per cent in 1940 and that by 1942 – 3 they were less than 10 per cent of their prewar level.3 Quite simply, there were not the resources available to conduct such work. Consequently, there is no precise evidence to establish whether people did stay cheerful and keep smiling as a result of the efforts of Odol toothpaste, or became ‘enthusiastic farm hands’ as HP Sauce suggested they should.4 In this respect, a conclusive answer cannot be offered in terms of how far commercial advertising

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3

shaped life on the Home Front, if indeed propaganda ever had the desired effect. The government certainly encountered some resistance in its own efforts to make the people more ‘war-minded’. Lord Reith, previously director-general of the BBC and Minister of Information between January and May 1940, reported early in his tenure that a: passive, negative feeling of apathy and boredom is apparent [. . .]. There is a general feeling that individuals do not count in the conduct of the war, and that the only thing to do is to live as normal a life as possible.5 Such a public reaction stood in stark contrast with the mood that the government felt was necessary. The government was determined that the ‘People’s War’ required a mood of enthusiastic bravado: ‘cheerfulness’ to ‘bring us victory’, fighting with ‘all your might’ to defend ‘freedom’ rather than a complacency that was more concerned with living ‘as normal a life as possible’. The ultimate test of this, and the challenge to this preferred mode of life, came in the Blitz.

The Significance of the Blitz The experience of the Blitz set down a clear marker in respect of the nature of the British during World War II and also in respect of the ideals that it was considered the people ought to subscribe to. This was the most obvious and direct contact that the ordinary man and woman had with warfare, never widely experienced before or subsequently. Out of that ‘test’ emerged a clear image of what it was that Britishness, at this time, was all about, encapsulating the spirit of the People’s War. If the experience of World War II is popularly imagined as a moment that forged a sense of national community, a great coming together, then it might be fairly argued that it was through the direct experience of being blitzed that this came into being. The facts, for the most part, stand firm and prove the idea that ‘the British people were one people fighting a people’s war’.6 Alongside Dunkirk and the Battle of

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Britain, the Blitz stands as a key motif within Britain’s wartime experience.7 The Blitz is taken to symbolize the very essence of the distinct British national character. It is held up as a time where differences were put aside and all stood together, irrespective of class or creed. It is a key moment in history. Penny Summerfield remarks how, for many historians, Dunkirk was ‘the point at which the “real” Second World War began’.8 Indeed, she observes how Richard Titmuss, in his official history, noted a change in the mood of the people in the wake of Dunkirk, bringing about a spirit of wartime collectivism.9 It is this underlying idea that really sits at the very heart of the popular memory of the British Home Front during World War II, as well as being an ideal that was perpetuated at the time as the essence of the spirit that would be required if the nation were to prevail: a vision of the nation as of one mind, unified around the war effort. However, much of the reality and application of such ideas was not to be found until the period of Blitz. Whereas much was, and is, made of the supposed ‘Dunkirk spirit’, there is perhaps more to be said in respect of the ‘Blitz spirit’, especially when the experience of World War II is considered in relation to the nature of everyday life. It was the Blitz that accounted for the fact that, up until the invasion of mainland Europe in mid-1944, it was the civilian population that bore the brunt of the war, given that there were more fatalities in that population than there were in the fighting forces. Much of the history of the British Home Front is to be found in the experience of the Blitz. It was these events that, for the most part, sealed the history of this time: when World War II is remembered as ‘a time when civilians mustered their energies to “do their bit” and “to keep smiling through”’, it was the Blitz that forged and tested this idea.10 It is for these reasons that the Blitz becomes such a crucial historical moment and a marker against which to measure the real extent of popular engagement with the war, just how far people bought into the official narrative versus finding their own, personal ways to deal with these extraordinary events, and indeed alternative

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channels through which to interpret and make sense of them. The Blitz really brought the war to the people. However, the idea of Blitz spirit also had purchase at the time as a day-to-day credo, something more than a mere historical moment to be subsequently held up and admired. That there should be such a thing as Blitz spirit was important in and of itself: there were definite and deliberate efforts at the time to identify and then define it. Indeed, that such a spirit should emerge was a very welcome discovery by those in positions of authority, especially relative to their pre-war pessimism. Morale was found to hold up surprisingly well in the face of the Luftwaffe’s first heavy strike on the East End of London in September 1940. The Ministry of Home Security was happy to report: Morale continues to be excellent even in heavily bombed areas, and Chief Officers of Police in all parts of the country comment on the calmness and courage which the public are showing, in some cases to the point of foolhardiness.11 As the experience unfolded, the Ministry of Information (MoI) believed that it had identified a surprising and very welcome spirit characterized by a sense of determination to ‘see it through’, forging on towards ‘ultimate victory’.12 Clearly, to find and present this spirit was a vital propagandistic tool: this could be held up as the ideal, the ultimate objective against which people could measure their own reaction and performance. Obviously, there was no shortage of opportunities to present this back to the people as life was breathed into the Blitz spirit. This was well encapsulated in the 1940 short film Britain Can Take It. In the book that accompanied that film, Douglas Williams, the director of the American Division within the MoI, noted: Through all the horrors of raids, of death from the skies, of the imminent daily risk of disability, they [the British people] have carried on their daily task, superbly, and with a courage as great as that of any soldier facing an enemy on the field of battle.13

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Churchill himself believed that he had witnessed something unique and distinctive within the British people in the midst of these events, finding: [A]n exaltation of spirit in the people which seemed to lift mankind and its troubles above the level of material facts into that joyous serenity we think belongs to a better world than this.14 In a war such as this, where so much depended on the people on the Home Front standing firm and resolute, it became an essential matter to be able to point to this newfound spirit that seemed to be emerging directly out of the experience of the Blitz. Whether that was actually the case or whether the public had always had these inherent qualities was of little real consequence as long as the response of the people could be effectively labelled in this way. This was a very important step in the fighting of the war, most notably for those in positions of authority who perhaps had not looked at the people with quite the same attention and interest as they had done before to highlight this wartime phenomenon. This was, indeed, a significant development, given that it was suggestive of the people breaking out of a selfish, inward-looking and insular frame of mind, abandoning their state of apathy in favour of ‘active citizenship’. Blitz spirit was significant because it heralded a greater sense of participation in and engagement with society. Whether there was ever really such a thing as Blitz spirit was irrelevant as long as this label could be applied to those now directly engaged in the fight.

The Nature of the Experience The British people did not crumble under the onslaught of the Blitz and, for the most part, they did show an extraordinary ability to cope with these events. The Blitz is generally said to have started in response to stray bombs dropped by German aircraft on the East End of London on Saturday 24 August 1940. An infuriated Churchill

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ordered a reprisal attack on Berlin, and Hitler in turn ordered a heavy attack on Merseyside over the last four nights of August. The intense operation, commonly referred to as the ‘Big Blitz’, really got under way by daylight on the clear morning of Saturday 7 September 1940, when the Luftwaffe began to concentrate its efforts on London. Before darkness fell, great dock fires were raging in the East End of London and this was followed by 247 planes bombing indiscriminately until near dawn. London was not to have another alert-less night until 3 November. The period of the ‘Big Blitz’ is generally said to have ended with a record assault on London on 10 May 1941 and a final night over Birmingham on 16 May. In this sense, a ‘blitz’ is defined as an air raid where over 100 German piloted bombers were involved over one conurbation on one night. Alongside London, the heaviest raids in terms of intensity and duration fell on Liverpool and Birkenhead. They endured 16 large attacks, eight ranking as full blitzes, between August 1940 and May 1941. Through 1940 and 1941, approximately 43,000 civilians in Britain were killed by bombs, and some 17,000 died in the remaining years of the war. Throughout the war, an e stimated 3.75 million—or two houses out of every seven—were damaged or destroyed, a quarter of a million beyond repair. The Blitz touched every corner of the island. No place escaped the impact entirely, but the direct blows were on the few great cities and more numerous small ones. Notwithstanding the horrific statistics and grim descriptions of ‘panic [. . .] horrified revulsion [. . .] post-raid depression [. . .] antisocial behaviour’, the British nation prevailed.15 The people proved, in the words of the MoI film of 1940, that Britain Can Take It. In the commentary to that film, the American journalist Quentin Reynolds describes how ‘[t]hese civilians are good soldiers’ and that: Britain doesn’t look down upon the ruins of its houses, upon those made homeless during the night, upon the remains of churches, hospitals, workers’ flats. Britain looks upwards towards the dawn and faces the new day with calmness and confidence.16

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For all its propagandistic rhetoric, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that this was, indeed, what happened and, ultimately, the nation did keep going and everyday life prevailed. However, in characterizing that experience, attention needs to be paid to the struggles to keep going that happened away from the direct impact of enemy action. As Titmuss records, ‘Between the first bomb on Britain and the last, 2,019 days elapsed—a long and wearisome period during which, for the most part and for most people, nothing happened.’17 In this sense, the spirit of the people had little to do with the direct impact of the enemy and more to do with the weary drudge of everyday life. Through those periods, and in those places where bombs were not falling, life was to be sustained through seeking out diversions from the grey monotony of war rather than in the ‘excitement’ of engaging directly with it. The Blitz was episodic in nature and lacked much of the vainglory that might come to mind in imagining the heroic deeds of those who confronted this rude intrusion. That is not to diminish or understate the nature of the experience of living through these events, but rather place some measure on the history of this episode as frequently something more subdued rather than an animated spirit directly engaging with the war. For the most part, the attitude that seemed to serve best was a sense of resilience, the quiet and unassuming practice of everyday life and just keeping on. In the government’s popular portrayal of the Blitz, a passive rather than active engagement is shown, recording that the ordinary citizen: [S]hould make no heedless demand of his fellows whether by panicking, becoming a casualty, or merely making a fuss; that he should carry on with his ordinary work, despite bombs, lost sleep, and trains that did not run; and that he should himself be ready to give help where the need of it came his way.18 Frequently, Blitz spirit was not outward-facing, nor outwardly expressed, but was more an inner state of mind that kept people

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going, moving along in the same old groves of everyday life. Much of the Blitz spirit was to do with self-control. In the accounts of the experience, in letters, diaries and observations, the key characteristic that comes through again and again is resilience, a dogged determination to hold onto what was near and dear to them: to live on a day-to-day basis in a fashion that was, as far as possible, unaffected by the war and, effectively, outside of that experience. Alongside this, those qualities that helped to ensure that state, and that are embedded in the national memory and the national character, is that talent for improvization as well as an enhanced spirit of cooperation brought on by this experience. While it might seem extraordinary, bombing raids were accepted as one of the consequences of being at war and people were determined to carry on despite them. In this respect, it is difficult to know whether the actions of the people were a demonstration of a unique Blitz spirit in terms of an active, engaged citizenry, or whether these responses were more akin to normal practices and behaviour. Rather than bombardment knocking people out of the grooves of normal life, it seemed to encourage a more dogged determination to stay in them. Thus, Mollie Panter-Downes records for 14 September 1940: The amazing part of it is the cheerfulness and fortitude with which ordinary individuals are doing their jobs under nervewracking conditions. Girls who have taken twice the usual time to get to work look worn when they arrive, but their faces are nicely made up and they bring you a cup of tea or sell you a hat as chirpily as ever. On all sides one hears the grim phrase ‘We shall get used to it’.19 The British people did stand up to the onslaught of the Blitz and morale was sustained, but whether this constituted a new spirit, a specific Blitz spirit, is a matter of contention. That there was a sense of resilience, a certain calmness and courage might be because there

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was little alternative. For the most part, people faced up to the Blitz because they had to, they had work or business to attend to, it was not feasible to simply abandon this and give up. If nothing else, the British people proved themselves to be extremely stubborn in their determination to hold onto what was important and precious to them. Nevertheless, it proved convenient in certain cases to label and brand this as ‘Blitz spirit’.

The Utility of the ‘Blitz spirit’ Despite the dire pre-war predictions in government, the people did prevail through the Blitz and did so in what was regarded as an exceptional fashion. They proved themselves to be extraordinarily adaptable and thereby demonstrated how they were brave and active. Clearly it served the purposes of all very well to portray this cavalier spirit of a population apparently casually going about their business. Further, this portrayal became self-perpetuating: there were many stories to be told and many willing and enthusiastic listeners. The commonality of the experience did create a stronger sense of community and with it a certain pride within those self-supporting groups. It was then a simple step to extend this natural welling-up of community feeling, this relapse to the ordinary, as something more special and directly and deliberately in the service of the war. Churchill was at the forefront in expressing what might be considered to be his astonishment at the turn of events and reading into that this very direct engagement with the war. In his speech of 27 April 1941, he noted: All are proud to be under the fire of the enemy. Old women, little children, the crippled veterans of former wars, aged women, the ordinary hard-pressed citizen or subject of the King, as he likes to call himself, the sturdy workmen who swing hammers or load the ships; skilful craftsmen; the members of every kind of ARP service, are proud to feel that they stand in the line together with fighting men, when one of the greatest of causes is being fought out, as fought out it will

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be, to the end. This is indeed the grand heroic period of our history, and the light of glory shines on all.20 Certainly the evidence would seem to bear witness to this appraisal. When public officials reviewed the state of the nation in the face of the Blitz and the reactions of the people, they found a ‘nation composed of self-sacrificing, relentlessly cheerful, and inherently tolerant people who had heroically witnessed the Blitz’.21 Clearly, here was a good story to tell and they subsequently went to great lengths to perpetuate this vision, a vision, which stands undiminished to this day: the image of a nation composed of selfless individuals enduring and stoically carrying on in a quiet, calm manner. The ideal of the People’s War had apparently been realized through the Blitz: the ordinary people of Britain were responding to the challenge and actively engaging in the war. At the core of the Blitz were everyday people: their example of stoicism and endurance was a symbol to the rest of the world of how they cherished liberty and the extent to which they were prepared to defend it. Blitz spirit was seemingly encapsulated in these quiet, unassuming people who endured the greatest brutalities with great forbearance and steadfastness. They had proven themselves to be most adaptable, artists when it came to improvization and, above all, good humoured. For those in a position of authority, it made good sense to read into this reaction a distinctively British engagement with the war fuelled by a keen sense of national identity, and indeed national unity. From the reactions of the people to the direct onslaught of war, the Blitz spirit was manifest. As the filmmaker Humphrey Jennings wrote to his wife: Some of the damage in London is pretty heart-breaking but what an effect it has had on the people! What warmth—what courage! What determination. People sternly encouraging each other [. . .]. Everybody absolutely determined: secretly delighted with the privilege of holding up Hitler. Certain of beating him: a certainty which no amount of bombing can weaken, only strengthen.22

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However, the question is: to what extent were the people really imbued with a new spirit? How far were their reactions driven by the war? The extent to which it was a secret delight to hold up Hitler and how far this was a driving force is a matter of contention. The real meaning and significance of the Blitz spirit may be found elsewhere and perhaps within a less glamorous idiom. At the core of Blitz spirit is ordinary people: these events are all about how ordinary people adapted, coped and continued to lead their lives. There is an interesting conundrum at the heart of that with regards to the extent to which these actions and reactions were spurred on by a desire to defeat an evil enemy, or whether motivations were more inward-looking, private and idiosyncratic, in effect a selfperpetuating culture. In the face of bombardment, the will of the people prevailed but it was a desire to live a normal life that was the primary driver. It might be argued that people diligently and determinedly returned to work each morning after a night-time raid not so much because this would be another nail in Hitler’s coffin but because that is simply what they did, this was the rhythm and structure of their life. It is this dogged persistence that stands out through the Blitz, and indeed throughout the entirety of the war on the Home Front. The matters that they drew reference to and that kept them going frequently lay outside of wartime rhetoric. For much of the war, the people were content to focus on the mundane and everyday. Recall Titmuss’ observation: ‘Between the first bomb on Britain and the last, 2,019 days elapsed—a long and wearisome period during which, for the most part and for most people, nothing happened.’23 There is more to be found in the dogged persistence of the British people in the face of the austerity and drudgery of wartime life than in any more vainglorious notion of a specific and exceptional Blitz spirit. The reactions of the people in the face of the Blitz were not necessarily out of the ordinary but rather a consequence of circumstance.

Wartime Culture and the Nature of Everyday Life British wartime culture and the cultural identity of the people were never so simplistic as to sit uniformly and unquestioningly under the

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rubric of Blitz spirit. It is misleading to suggest that war would be the cause of a complete rupture with pre-existing culture and bring about the wholesale adoption of an entirely new wartime demeanour. Culture is seldom a monolithic or uniform body that is easily conceptualized; there are instead a variety of cultures at any one time that are personal and adapted to suit individual circumstances and the broader social environment. In essence, culture and a resultant cultural identity are key facets within one’s existence and well-being and offer some organizing principle around which a chaotic life might be orientated. Clifford Geertz refers to culture as ‘the informal logic of actual life’, an organic process that draws on a variety of sources to create a ‘useable’ protocol for living.24 For Bellah et al., it is ‘patterns of meaning that any group or society uses to interpret and evaluate itself and its situation’.25 Given that wartime situations varied greatly according to time and place, it seems inadequate to accept, unquestioningly, a uniform culture that equates to Blitz spirit. Rather, individuals held onto, adapted and adjusted their cultural identity as they saw fit in an effort to make sense of these radical new circumstances and, crucially, to e stablish a useable protocol for living. Within this schematic, it is argued here, commercial advertising played an important part in shaping cultural identities as individuals selectively drew on advertisements as points of reference. Advertisements focusing on the practical, giving information and advice, or even those portraying scenarios that people might aspire to, giving hope and feeding ambition, play a crucial part in helping people make sense of their surroundings and environment and, during wartime, offered reassurance and direction amidst the upheaval and disruption. This varied and multifaceted impression of culture, and individual cultures, explain how it can be that the British people through the war could, on the one hand, appear to subscribe to the highest notions of Blitz spirit and People’s War, while at the same time maintaining an existence that frequently appeared to be outside of the war. Such characterizations of culture at once deny the complete imposition of a prevailing, uniform culture and give credence to the presence of active, thinking individuals

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within society drawing on the symbols and messages around them to help to make sense of their place in the world and devise a workable system for the practice of everyday life. Thus cultural identities cannot simply be imposed but, as Peter Burke has suggested, are themselves a product of society.26 While the elite may have the power to produce language, the knowledge and the symbols, these are manipulated, interpreted and used according to the predisposition of the receiver. In this respect, advertising is a form of propaganda, one of those forces present in the modern world determined to contribute to the shaping of society. Any distinction between propaganda and advertising appears arbitrary and false: advertising, despite its commercial overtones, does not exist outside society as a mere practice wholly concerned with selling more but is an integral part of the society in which it operates, and during World War II played as much of a part in the ‘formation of men’s attitudes’ and the moulding of public opinion as did cinema, the press and propaganda in general. Where advertising was so effective in wartime was in its constantly shifting view, reflection and interpretation of a society in turmoil that served to offer some clarity and direction to those who viewed it, mediating their experience and allowing them to adapt to the challenges presented and maintain a normal life. Advertising uses information and language to bring society together. Judith Williamson suggests that ‘[w]e feel a need to belong, to have a social “place” [. . .]. All of us have a genuine need for a social being, a common culture.’27 Advertising reflects back what are thought to be the prevalent interests, desires and anxieties of the people, simplifying them and validating them in the process. Seeing such views and opinions represented in the media makes them ‘real’ for those members of society who see them, and legitimates their own personal interests, desires and anxieties. Advertising offers a simplified source of information, along with a variety of symbolic associations that help individuals to define who they are, especially in relation to ‘others’. Through the common understanding of an advertising message or the consumption of certain products, especially high-profile brands,

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an association is struck between the values that support that item and the like-minded individuals who also consume them. Douglas Holt has suggested that skilfully marketed brands become ‘iconic’, ‘anchors of meaning’: ‘Effective advertising tells stories to the public that helps them to manage their identities.’28 In this respect, it becomes quite simple to ‘acquire’ an identity ‘off the peg’ via consumption practices. Commercial advertising does not just offer basic information about the product in an effort to educate consumers, but graphically demonstrates where that product fits into life, the situation in which it can be used and the ‘relief’ that it can bring to those who use it. It is a form of propaganda in the manner in which E. D. Martin described it as offering ‘ready-made opinions for the unthinking herd’.29 This was one of the greatest contributions of commercial advertising in Britain during World War II: it presented realistic situations with which people could identify, highlighting that they were not alone in their fears and anxieties, for example, and demonstrating how they might prevail, even if that depended on the consumption of the advertised goods. However, beyond that, through the simple process of consumption, you could effectively place yourself within that scenario and benefit from the various extensions flowing from that. The simple consumption of goods was often presented as a means via which to ‘directly’ engage in the war effort. Here was a low-impact, easily achieved means through which to demonstrate your commitment to the war. While this might sit comfortably alongside a nominal belief in Blitz spirit, it required no direct input and could actually serve to keep the war at arm’s length. Consumption acts to ‘classify’ individuals as they acquire cultural and personal meaning through that very act: ‘The consuming-asclassification metaphor references the ways in which consumers use consumption objects to classify themselves in relation to relevant others.’30 Consuming, in union with a group of like-minded individuals, creates bonds of unity that helps define a tangible group and at the same time defines that group relative to those that do not consume that product. This is a fast route to the formation of society: advertising imbues inanimate products with certain values and

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credence that are transferred to the individual in the process of consumption; it provides a comprehensive conceptual framework. The repetition and widespread advertising of common attitudes and patterns of behaviour thereby codifies social, political and moral standards in the form of the prevailing culture. This ‘reflective’ aspect of advertising can be viewed as a ‘proactive’ role in respect of morale on the British Home Front via the practice of presenting in print some of the tensions and frustrations of wartime life that in the process are validated, drawing people together into like-minded groups. In this manner, many people could get a sense of engagement with the war while actually keeping it at arm’s length and, often, doing little more than adapting their consumption practices. Thus, the process of selecting Vim ensured that you offered ‘More help for [the] war effort’ and, thereby, were engaged in the battle.31 In effect, Blitz spirit could be something to be admired but would not necessarily entail any direct engagement and was, in this way, superficial. Actual cultural identity proved to be more durable and was, for the most part, little changed by the war. Frequently it was the case that people’s e ngagement with the war was limited and conditional. Although wholehearted engagement with the war was asked for and expected, there was no widespread enthusiasm for it. While the people were unequivocally behind the Allied victory, this commitment was tempered with reference to past and present experience, which meant that the government could not merely make the people feel or act in a prescribed way unless such demands appeared to be relevant to those at whom such messages were aimed. The people’s engagement with the war was shaped more by their dayto-day experiences than by lofty rhetoric and the demands made of them in posters. The spirit of the People’s War that characterized the daily practices of the average British citizen were localized and personal rather than extravagant and bellicose. When it came to surviving the war years, communities and individuals turned inwards. This coping strategy was insular, making reference to what they were already used to and to what had been known previously. In this respect, British society survived with reference to the familiar rather than adopting a

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completely new way of life: the terms of reference became their ‘normality’ rather than any exalted construct of the People’s War. References to ‘normal life’ and those efforts designed to protect it were entirely in keeping with the spirit of ‘good morale’ that, it was widely believed, was required of the people if the nation was to survive. Good morale was not characterized by enthusiasm and cheerfulness but rather by a certain stubbornness and stolidity: [A] readiness to accept current conditions and future challenges, coupled with faith and determination that present and future difficulties will be overcome: thus, a tolerance of wartime conditions, a sense of commitment to the war effort, and a belief in ultimate victory.32 The people saw the war as a temporary aberration (if of long and uncertain duration), an interruption to the usual struggles of life that would be resumed when the war reached its conclusion. Thus society acclimatized to the effects of the war and kept them in proportion to their day-to-day lives. In her novel The Heat of the Day, Elizabeth Bowen drew on her own experience of living in London through the Blitz to recount the experience of her character Stella Rodney in what is regarded as a ‘vivid and convincing’ portrayal of life in London at that time.33 Despite the tumultuous events through which Stella lives, she adapts her response and is able to take all in her stride. Having passed through the turbulent period of the Blitz, she reflects in the autumn of 1940: War moved from the horizon to the map. And it was now, when you no longer saw, heard, smelled war, that a deadening acclimatization to it began to set in.34 In this way the war was absorbed into the normal routine of life, becoming the background to the practice of everyday life. In contrast, those features of the war that asserted themselves more forcibly, thereby causing the greatest disruption to regular routine, were those most damaging to morale.

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In keeping with this measured response to the war, propagandistic messages had to be ‘realistic’ and ‘credible’ if they were to solicit an appropriate response. The mere act of invoking the war or calling on people to take action determined by those in authority to be what was required did not necessarily guarantee popular engagement. The people were fighting to protect a familiar way of life, to get through the war and return to a state of normality as soon as possible. In this sense, it was only those messages that resonated with that objective that were effective. Government efforts to exhort the people to act or think in certain ways simply failed. This was recognized at the time when Dr Stephen Taylor, Director of Home Intelligence, observed, in relation to the ‘Mightier Yet’ campaign, that ‘exhorting campaigns aimed at producing alterations in states of mind’ simply did not work.35 The British people preferred simple instruction above rhetorical exhortation. Simple instruction, after all, would equip them to live as normal a life as possible and this was their objective. It was the basic rhythm of life that motivated people to carry on. According to Jose Harris: If there is one common theme that constantly recurs in letters and diaries (and indeed in the poetry and creative writing) of the period, it is not the grandeur of great events but the passionate cherishing of small, private, domestic, idiosyncratic matters: matters that often seemed doubly important because pressures of war rendered them fleeting and precarious.36 Routine, through its reassurance, would prevail through emergency. The retention of those signs of normal life was to prove an anchor by which to weather the storm. As John Baxendale points out, ‘In the destruction and disruption of war, the minutiae of ordinary life became all the more precious’.37 In the upheaval of war, routine became essential to good morale. Establishing a routine on a personal level acted as a measure of one’s place, a point of reference. By holding onto those routines from the pre-war world, a sense of normalcy could be achieved. It was this normalcy that, in large part, the people of Britain were fighting for between 1939 and 1945. This point is astutely made in Betty’s Wartime Diary: ‘It is because we can still live a

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normal life in times like these that makes the war worth winning, and our winning certain. That is what morale is all about.’38 In this respect, the efforts of the people on the Home Front seem unexceptional: they were simply doing what needed to be done to get by, to live life as normally as possible. These efforts, while often considerable, were unassuming. People were motivated less by lofty ideals than by a burning desire to return to a normal life, and in the interim maintain as much of that life as was possible. Commercial advertising thus filled a vacuum with its references to the rather mundane and with its down-to-earth portraits of day-today life. That closer connection with the experience of daily life had greater resonance and was a more practical guide for how to conduct oneself in wartime. Those references to the war that were grounded in the familiar were of greater merit in relation to the people fighting the war. On this basis, commercial advertising might be considered to have some real value in relation to Home Front morale: guidance on how to make your clothes last longer via gentle washing and timesaving advice courtesy of the Rinso ‘no-boil method’ had more direct relevance to the people than exhibitions of how the Empire was contributing to the war effort. In this respect, the good morale that the government searched for and was thought to be so crucial to the war effort had more to do with the ability of the people to ‘keep on keeping on’: an essential adaptability and tolerance.39 The evidence suggests that the way in which the people got through the war was, as far as possible, by disregarding its worst features and living a ‘normal life’, by treating it as an unwelcome interruption rather than a wholesale dislocation. The war was in this respect a sideshow in people’s lives rather than at the centre of their existence, and the most useful aids to perpetuating that ‘normal life’ were those rather mundane, everyday references that related to the day-to-day experience of life and offered practical help and advice to protect it.

Structure of the Book This book seeks to explore in detail how it was that commercial advertising was allowed to persist in a nation engaged in total war,

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the messages that were propagated via this channel and the implications of those in respect to the morale of the British Home Front and how the war was characterized. Throughout, there is a need to consider the advertising industry as a business, the parameters within which they operated and the considerations and concerns that they held in private but which shaped their output in public. Chapter 1 does this in a most obvious sense but there are references to this often hidden agenda throughout. This is of primary importance, given that these messages never happened by accident but were deliberately created and purposefully constructed. Sometimes it might be considered that it is fairly obvious what the advertiser is seeking to achieve, but on other occasions there is another purpose hidden beneath the surface. In a similar fashion, the demands and influences of government are considered throughout, along with the criticism that was encountered as many considered such messages a flagrant waste and distraction from the war effort. Against this backdrop, what follows plots the changing advertising messages according to time and circumstance, or identifies key themes and campaigns that were picked up on or extended by these commercial concerns. Thus, Chapter 2 sets out how press advertisements captured the mood of the nation as war was declared and through its first months. At a time when those at the centre of government were expressing such grave concern in regard to the ability of the British people to withstand this modern war, advertisers on occasion stood aside from the rhetorical propaganda of the MoI and tended to paint a picture of what life was really like and what the average Briton really thought of the war. From then on, a course was set that determined to provide the British people with help and advice in terms of how the effects of war might be mitigated against rather than wholly embraced. These actions were ordinary and unexceptional but were positioned as a part of the war effort, clearly set out as unequivocal instruction and direction (as described in Chapter 3), further refined as the very act of consumption (as outlined in Chapter 4) and were determined to be a means via which to fight the war.

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The case of gender is given special consideration in Chapter 5, because gender roles and gender identity proved to be such a crucial part of the British Home Front and an issue frequently occupying the mind of government. While there were clear messages coming out of government and embodied in its propaganda in terms of what it meant to be a man or a woman in wartime Britain and what was expected of each, press advertising took this a step further and was unrelenting in its portrayal of gender in wartime. Finally, in Chapter 6, a brief look is taken at the role of commercial advertising in projecting and shaping the postwar world. In the end, this was really what drove advertising on throughout the war. If war was nothing more than a temporary interruption, then the actions of advertisers between 1939 and 1945 had but one thing in mind: keeping the wheels of commerce turning and maintaining the presence of their brands ready for when peace would come and competition would be restored. Commercial advertisers were at the forefront in describing what that postwar world would be like and, alongside that, what it was that the people were fighting for. The continued presence of advertising in the press serves to highlight one of the crucial features of wartime life in Britain and, further, helped to steel morale, by supporting that basic idea that normal life went on. Commercial advertising was an obvious sign of the continuities of life for ordinary people, despite the war that went on around them. By chance, this was exactly what the people of Britain needed through the years of war, and this also suited the purposes of those in the advertising industry very well. This is the central tenet of this study: the extent to which the British people adopted a wholly new cultural identity through the war, a Blitz spirit characterized by a state of war-mindedness, an enthusiastic engagement with the war, or whether popular engagement with the war was more limited and conditional. Despite the best efforts of the government, and especially the MoI, to foster this sense of active, enthusiastic and direct engagement through their propaganda, it is argued here that, except in rare cases, that was never achieved, or at least achieved and sustained. In preference, the propaganda that tended to have greater utility, meaning and resonance was that which

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helped to guide people to carry on with their normal lives despite the war. At the forefront of this ‘campaign’ was commercial advertising as they set out ‘to guide, help and hearten millions who are still carrying on on the Home Front’.40 The nature of these messages and the manner in which they were presented offers a further insight into the mindset of the average Briton through World War II if it is accepted that, to some extent at least, e ffective commercial advertising is predicated on speaking in the idiom of the time and accurately reflecting potential consumers of those products advertised.

Sources This book is based on extensive research conducted in three significant archive collections: the material held at the History of Advertising Trust (HAT) in Raveningham, Norfolk, the MassObservation Archive (M-O Archive), and the weekly magazine Picture Post, published by Hulton Press, Ltd., between 9 September 1939 and 29 September 1945. Given that HAT holds the archives for the two leading advertising trade bodies, the Institute of Incorporated Practitioners in Advertising (IIPA, now the Institute of Practitioners in Advertising) and the Advertising Association, it was possible to gain an understanding of the private concerns and machinations of these bodies in response to the extraordinary circumstances that affected them. This understanding was complemented by issues of the weekly trade journal, Advertiser’s Weekly, throughout the period of the war. This not only made reference to the concerns of the industry but also presented a public face (in comparison to those internal papers) that highlighted how the advertising industry wished to be seen and the useful role it felt it might play in a nation at war. The other main source of materials at HAT was the archives of individual advertising agencies active through the war and client-based archives held there. These included the London Press Exchange, W. S. Crawford Ltd., J. Walter Thompson Co. Ltd., as well as Greenlys, Sells and Higham. Alongside examples of advertisements, on rare occasions, these

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archives gave some indication in regard to the rationale for a certain advertising approach or an insight to the agencies’ perception of the public mood. The archives held at HAT for the war years are generally complete, with apparently no papers being lost during the Blitz or otherwise. That is not to suggest that there is a complete and detailed record. The ephemeral nature of commercial advertising is such that much of what is done is not preserved for posterity, being viewed by those practitioners within the industry as being of a temporary or transient nature. This was particularly the case for the advertising agency archives for this period. The M-O Archive has been used to gauge the public mood in regard to those issues associated with the practices and products being advertised, as well as advertising specifically. While providing such a valuable insight, this needs to be set alongside the nature of the work done by M-O and the bearing that this has on the use of this material. M-O did not exist in an apolitical hiatus, on the contrary, as Tom Jeffery observes: ‘Mass-Observation was a political challenge of the man in the street, of us against them.’41 Set up in 1937 by Charles Madge and Tom Harrisson, M-O, when conducting its research, had its own specific objectives: its aim was to achieve social change. As Penny Summerfield suggests, for many, M-O represents ‘a social movement with quasi-political objectives’.42 Added to that, the sample sizes that were used were often small and unrepresentative of the general population, being generally drawn from the lower-middle class and, while not necessarily belonging to a political party, tending towards the left of centre. That is not to suggest that this research is invalid, but rather to highlight the motivation for undertaking some of those surveys that relate to commercial advertising and the way in which those questions were framed. The main source for copies of advertisements from the war years, as well as the basis of some statistical analysis, is the weekly magazine Picture Post. This publication offered the most extensive selection of advertisements through the war years of any popular mass-market publication. It was a crucial choice when it came to advertisers

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deciding where to place their advertisements. Throughout the war, Picture Post had an unrivalled position as the country’s most popular news magazine.43 From its launch on 1 October 1938, Picture Post was a huge success. By the time of its first audit, undertaken by the Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC), for the period July to December 1938, it was reporting an average circulation of 881,274. By the January to June 1939 audit, this had risen to 1,300,492. For the majority of the war, when newspaper and magazine circulation was capped, Picture Post achieved an average circulation of 970,638.44 Added to that, it was claimed that each issue circulated had five readers.45 It was unique as a weekly, illustrated, general-interest magazine. In essence, it was a picture paper that drew on outstanding photographs to convey its story. Nevertheless, it would be foolhardy to suggest that Picture Post was just a light-hearted, entertainment magazine. Instead it was a vehicle through which the editorial team intended to publicise its opinions, as well as those of like-minded individuals, and make a difference. Published by Edward Hulton’s Hulton Press Ltd., its first editor was Stefan Lorant, who was succeeded by his deputy editor, Tom Hopkinson, in June 1940. While it is undeniable that both Lorant and Hopkinson were determined that Picture Post should be a left-leaning, anti-Fascist magazine, this was tempered by the fact that Hulton, the proprietor, was a staunch Conservative. According to Tom Hopkinson, writing in 1970: Picture Post, for a great part of its life, applied itself to the issues which most concerned the young and thoughtful people of its time. . . [it] became for millions of young men and women, the magazine which handled the subjects they talked and argued about among themselves.46 This was well illustrated in one of the publication’s early features, ‘Back to the Middle Ages’, which appeared in the issue of 26 November 1938 in response to the ‘persecution’ of the Jews in Nazi Germany. While many were still enjoying the relief that came with Neville Chamberlain’s ‘successful’ negotiations with Hitler in

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Munich in October 1938, Picture Post felt compelled to warn its readers ‘never to trust men or a party which could act like this’.47 Similarly, while a debate raged from early in the war in regard to whether Britain should have any clearly stated war aims or ‘get on with the fighting and think about that afterwards,’ Picture Post produced a special issue that boldly outlined what it believed these should be.48 Irrespective of any ambitions on the part of the editorial team, the publication was hugely and widely popular, often because it did handle those popular subjects. It went to some lengths to report on ‘the lives of ordinary people’ (alongside the excitement and glamour of celebrities and scantily clad dancing girls) and as such a broad audience was drawn to it. It had a wide readership across all classes, both sexes and geographically in a way in which no single newspaper from the period did.49 It is for this reason that it is used extensively here. Given that Picture Post had such excellent market coverage, both in terms of volume and variety, it was a vital component in the media schedule of any advertising campaign between 1939 and 1945. All the main advertisers regularly bought space in that publication, and where any reference is made to an advertising campaign in the trade press of the time, one can be sure to find examples of it within its pages. Further, the format of the magazine was such that it allowed larger spaces to be used, which facilitated the creative energies of the advertising agents concerned. When considering British commercial advertising of during World War II, Picture Post is the definitive choice. In approaching this source, a record of every advertisement that appeared in Picture Post through that period was made, noting the size of the advertisement in terms of column inches and whether it made reference to the war, made no reference, or whether it was government advertising. Where an advertisement made reference to the war, a database was built recording the product advertised and key copy within the advertisement relating to the war. This resulted in a database of 3,252 records. This detailed database forms an important element of this research, offering a rigorous statistical underpinning.

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Product groups, and individual products within those, that were most prevalent through the war have thereby been revealed, those advertising agencies that were most active have been identified, and prevalent trends in theme and content of advertisements over time have been highlighted.

CHAPTER 1 THE PLACE OF COMMERCIAL ADVERTISING IN WARTIME BRITAIN

‘To guide, help and hearten millions’ Advertiser’s Weekly, 30 May 1940, p. 234 Commercial advertising appears to be entirely out of place in a state embroiled in total war, driving up consumer demand at a time when the government was urging consumers to save, alluding to a world of luxury that was no longer accessible and consuming valuable space in the press that might usefully be employed to convey important information to the public. Indeed, the advertising industry in Britain faced the outbreak of war in September 1939 with anxiety and dread: there was great uncertainty as advertisers contemplated what the impact on their businesses would be, reviewing their advertising plans accordingly. Further, the advertising industry was unsure how much freedom it would have to operate as the government began to implement a raft of restrictions and regulations directly curtailing the practice of agencies—there was an implicit suggestion that commercial advertising was superfluous to the pursuit of the war. However, throughout World War II, private companies continued to spend large sums of money on advertising, often at a time when they were unlikely to meet the demand that that advertising was

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designed to create or even when those products were simply not available. That commercial advertising persisted is testament to the efforts of the commercial advertising industry and especially the main industry bodies, the Advertising Association and the Institute of Incorporated Practitioners in Advertising (IIPA). Between them, concerned that the very survival of the industry was under threat, they launched a concerted campaign to protect their concerns and project a positive image into the marketplace, to persuade government and people that, contrary to first impressions, they were making a positive contribution to the war effort. As it transpired, for the most part, that contribution was appreciated and fitted very well with the mood of the nation, largely because the ongoing presence of these advertisements the continued existence in the press of familiar, well-known brands, offered some form of continuity with the pre-war world. The persistence of commercial press advertising was a clear and obvious sign that normal life had not come to a complete end or been entirely displaced. Contrary to dire pre-war predictions, here was evidence that normal life could continue in wartime, as well as practical suggestions as to how that might be achieved, alongside the conclusive proof that was the result of the period of the Phoney War between September 1939 and May 1940. There is evidence to suggest that the government was amenable to this perspective and was generally convinced that ongoing advertising did, indeed, provide evidence that, despite the war, British life did go on. Thus, the government tended to be acquiescent in its actions and despite the plethora of new rules, regulations and restrictions, took no decisive action to stop advertising outright. The advertising industry was further ‘aided’ in its efforts to retain its place in society and its freedom to operate by the apparent inability of the Ministry of Information (MoI) to impose its will in the face of the actions of the press and advertising industry either acting independently to protect its interests or, on occasion, in combination. In its dealings with the advertising industry and in relation to commercial advertising in the press, an impression is given of an organization paralysed by a sense of powerlessness, either unwilling

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or unable to enforce its will and prepared to sacrifice its own perceived needs in order to placate the press. Consequently, not only was the advertising industry able to persist in the face of ongoing criticism but also, in some respects, it was strengthened to the extent that it felt able to act contrary to the expressed wishes of the government. Despite pressure from inside and outside the government to act to curtail advertising, the government failed to take decisive action. This was in part out of fear of the consequences, a negative or uncooperative stance in press editorial or an obstructive attitude on the part of the industry in general, but also in recognition that the press had to retain a pre-war appearance if it was to be read and trusted by the public. The continued presence of commercial advertising in the press was an important factor in newspapers and magazines preserving a pre-war appearance rather than appearing to be wholly concerned with government pronouncements and official news. Without this spirit of compromise, it is doubtful whether the advertising industry would have been able to survive the years of war in the manner in which it did. To some extent, ongoing commercial advertising, for all its irrelevance, frivolity and triviality in the face of total war, highlighted continuities in life despite the challenge that the nation now faced. Further, extending from this hint that life would not come entirely to an end as war was declared, or that an entirely new countenance or way to go about conducting oneself would not be required, a beacon was held up that suggested that the British nation would never become totally absorbed by the war, or give itself over completely to a state of war-mindedness. For their part, those in positions of authority were resigned to this point of view, nervous as they were of the unity and strength of popular morale. They thereby found room to accommodate such distractions on the Home Front. It was quickly apparent to those within government that the people could not be forced into active engagement in the ‘People’s War’ and, extending from this, the notion of Blitz spirit was more an ideal than an actual, all-embracing pattern for life: it was totemic. Those who encountered commercial advertising on a day-to-day basis, though

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most likely unaware of the significance, could find in it an obvious and deliberate sign that diversions from the war were both acceptable and encouraged, and that wartime concerns ought to be kept in balance alongside the more mundane and everyday. Compared to the rest of the British war economy and its constituent parts, the advertising industry appears unique in the extent to which it was able to preserve its autonomy during the war. The very survival of the wartime advertising industry was the result, at least in part, of the extraordinary efforts that the main trade bodies went to in order to demonstrate that commercial advertising had a legitimate role to play in a nation at war. In so doing, the function of advertising in wartime was defined and subsequent actions, along with the design, style and look of advertisements, were compromised by the divined need to act in such a way as to protect the advertising industry’s interests and income while retaining the goodwill of the people. The commercial advertising of World War II is coloured by those ongoing efforts to quell public anxieties while proving to all that advertising could play a constructive role in society both in the present and in a future postwar world. However, the ultimate consequence of all these efforts and machinations is that commercial advertising continued to have a presence in the press throughout the war and, while not necessarily a d eliberate intention, the allencompassing nature of the war was relieved, or at least diluted to some extent, by the garish efforts of producers to draw attention to themselves and frequently provide a distraction from the war. Four key themes characterise the performance of the advertising industry during the war. First, the necessity on the part of the commercial advertising industry to consolidate its position and reorientate its approach on the outbreak of war to ensure that its voice was heard in official circles and to guarantee, as far as was possible, that its opinion would be solicited when it came to the government taking decisions that might have an impact on its business. Second, as the dust settled, the efforts of the industry to more forcibly dictate the role to be played by advertising (including its argument that this was vital to the war effort) alongside economic arguments that required advertisers to keep advertising in their own interests,

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holding up advertising as an investment and as a guarantor of brands and private profits. The third theme was the use of advertising to ‘inform and direct’ the public, with commercial advertisers acting (in their own words) to ‘guide, help and hearten millions’. The fourth and final theme was the efforts of advertising trade bodies to maintain appearances, to exercise a degree of circumspection in regard to just how far the war could be turned to the advertisers’ advantage without tarnishing the good name of the advertising industry itself. Partly by design, the advertising industry played a role in shaping wartime society in such a way as to stress the need to retain elements of a normal, pre-war life. Of course, in so doing it was absolutely in its best interests given that the end result would be proof that commercial advertising did have a part to play in the war on the Home Front.

Consolidation and Re-orientation: War Begins at Home The advertising industry considered the prospect of war with some dread. The role that it could hope to play in such a conflict was not obvious, and considering the war’s likely extent, it was widely believed that the government would at once give the nation over to a state of total war in which there would be no space for private companies producing and promoting a variety of consumer goods. In the face of an increase in government regulation of the economy, advertising would, it was feared, prove to be redundant and thereby sound the death knell for the industry. Many advertisers, resigned to this fate, took the decision to withdraw their advertising by choice before being officially compelled to do so. Further, the advertising industry trade bodies recognised that if, in the event of war, commercial advertising was banned outright, many of their members would, literally, be rendered redundant. The acting secretary of the Advertising Association reported as early as September 1938 that it had received requests ‘from advertising men’ in regard to how best their services could be ‘utilised in the event of a war’. In response, the council drafted a resolution to the government ‘offering the services of the Association during the present crisis’.1

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Its offer consisted of providing assistance to the government in formulating any advertising or propaganda scheme, or putting at the disposal of the government the services of experienced and qualified advertising personnel. The IIPA made a similar offer and reported that the ‘replies received evidenced sincere appreciation of the Institute’s offer’.2 In an effort to prove that the advertising industry could play a vital part in a nation at war, and to ensure that it might have some influence in official circles, deliberate efforts were made to move closer to the government. The initial pessimism of commercial advertisers was corroborated by a drastic fall in advertising expenditure on the outbreak of war. Advertising expenditure in September 1939 was just 49 per cent of what it had been in September 1938.3 In response, many agencies fired staff and, for those who remained, reduced their level of pay. Advertiser’s Weekly reported with bravado what it might have hoped would become a self-fulfilling prophecy: [T]he whole of the advertising and newspaper world are endeavouring to adjust themselves to vastly changed conditions so that they may uphold the ‘carry on’ tradition of British business.4 On the outbreak of war, the president of the IIPA, Sir William Crawford, closing ranks in response to the predicted assault on its free practice, issued ‘an appeal to all Members for co-operation and mutual assistance’, while at the same time offering the IIPA’s services to the MoI.5 The Advertising Association was also keen to ensure that the voice of advertisers was well heard, and moved to set up its Government Contact Committee. This committee was made up of representatives of the Newspaper Proprietors’ Association, the Periodical Trade Press and Weekly Newspaper Proprietors’ Association, the Newspaper Society, the Advertising Association, the IIPA and the Incorporated Society of British Advertisers. Its chairman was Lord Ashfield, chairman of the London Passenger Transport Board and, from 1940, chairman of the Advertising Association. The committee became commonly known as the

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Ashfield Committee, its task to ‘co-operate with the Government and all trade organizations in an endeavour to bring about a new effort on the part of British trade and commerce’ with a view to ‘a restoration of trade activities’.6 Meanwhile, the Advertising Association mounted a concerted campaign to ensure that advertisers kept advertising. Its General Purposes Committee in its meeting of 21 September 1939 concluded: Direct approaches to be made to leading advertisers and distributors to maintain and, where possible, to increase their trade and selling activities, and the weight of the support of these large interests to be used in various ways to bear upon the trade situation.7 Such an attitude accorded with the position of the Chamberlain government, which was keen to protect ‘business as usual’ and not to interfere with normal trade activities. Indeed, Ivison Macadam, director of the Co-ordination Division of the MoI, told a meeting of the heads of the Publicity Division in September 1939 that, rather than create new organizations to undertake propaganda, it made more sense for the government to exploit the spirit of cooperation with industry that had been built up since the First World War. Business was already in close partnership with government: this merely represented an extension of that spirit. What is more, such a vehicle fitted the ethos of the Chamberlain government well by not overtly extending the role of the state or causing undue alarm among the public. The heads of the Publicity Divisions therefore resolved: It is intended to use business firms extensively for publicity purposes [. . .] since publicity received through normal channels is much more effective than that received through ad. hoc bodies.8 The MoI was persuaded that industry and the press, and especially commercial advertising, could play a useful role in helping to spread

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government messages and attitudes thought to be advantageous to the war effort. Here is clear evidence of the caution with which the government approached the British people and its timidity when it came to the prospect of compelling them to adopt a wartime demeanour or act in proscribed ways. That the MoI should seek out such insidious means of communication might be cause to give it at least some credit in terms of understanding the state of the nation and the limits and extent of its influence. As a consequence, this would prove beneficial to the advertising industry: if advertisers could not expect the active support of government, they had at least its tacit acquiescence in their own efforts to maintain a semblance of normality in their trade efforts, thereby keeping the wheels of commerce turning. Such efforts seemed to be rewarded since, despite serious initial setbacks, ‘towards the end of September business was coming back’.9 Indeed, advertising expenditure in October 1939 was up 26 per cent on the preceding month, if still down 52 per cent year-on-year.10 Nevertheless, concern persisted that the advertising industry would never recover during the war years. It was speculated that advertising would be superfluous in a market where demand was high and manufacturers would be able to sell all they could produce and more, without the need to advertise. However, the motives for advertising were influenced in a new way with the introduction of the Excess Profits Tax in the September 1939 budget. With profits frozen at prewar levels, many companies decided to invest their increased profits in advertising rather than hand them over to the government, thereby side-stepping this new government intrusion into the private concerns of business. At the same time, ongoing advertising of this nature could be seen as an outward sign that it was business as usual. However, it was feared that other government plans would not be so easily avoided. The whole strategy of ‘pooling’ mooted from the very outbreak of war (whereby manufacturers of, for example, margarine and cooking fats, would combine production into one site and produce a uniform, non-branded product—as we shall see further on in this chapter was of particular concern: in a market where all products are of the same

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quality and bear no branding, the need to promote specific goods ceases to exist.11 The chairman of the Sub-Committee of the General Purposes Committee of the Advertising Association, a Mr Teasdale, reported on 26 October 1939 that ‘evidence had been produced that the various Ministries were considering the control of industry to an extent that might preclude advertising altogether, in particular of branded goods’.12 The rules of censorship and the associated Defence Notices were seen as a further hindrance to ‘business as usual’. The Committee of Imperial Defence had laid out the objective of press censorship in 1938 as being ‘to prevent the publication or dissemination, whether at home or abroad, of matter which is likely to assist the enemy or to be prejudicial to the national security or well being’.13 In considering what constituted a publication subject to censorship, the ‘press’ was taken to include editorial, news features, photographs, advertisements, financial or trade columns, reports of company meetings, letters from correspondents and so on. Advertising was, in principle, to be subject to the same scrutiny as all other aspects of the press on the basis of the inferences that might be drawn from it: Advertising matter may often convey information of vital interest to the enemy. Advertisements inserted by firms engaged in work of national importance, or containing aerial views of factories, docks or similar places, are obvious examples.14 Defence Notice 2/IT stated that nothing should be published without the prior approval of the MoI regarding ‘the production, stocks, distribution, consumption or prices of ores, minerals, metals, textile fabrics or other materials in the United Kingdom’. The Daily Mail, in private correspondence with the MoI, feared that while ‘it may become important not to disclose the fact that the prices of a great many articles of ordinary use are very high’, to strictly follow the instructions in this Defence Notice would ‘prevent prices being shown in a great many advertisements of fabrics and materials which

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are appearing every day’.15 The implications of such instructions, if taken literally, were likely to severely curtail the actions of a great many advertisers. In fact, such concerns proved to be unfounded as the government stopped short of taking the action against advertisers in the way that had been feared by the Daily Mail. Indeed, the advertising industry was able to make representations to the government in terms of how the rules of censorship were implemented, and Lord Ashfield’s committee was able to report at the end of February 1940 that: [S]o far as any restrictions or controls are concerned in an attempt to interfere with the accepted normal methods for trade, the Departments of the Government have been very loath to interfere any more than necessary, and in some instances would consult with the Committee before they took that step.16 The advertising industry, as war approached, had tacitly acknowledged that the role it could helpfully play might well be limited, and feared the implications of government interference. When war actually broke out, it had already taken some steps to ensure that it was in a good position to protect its interests and in the first weeks and months of the war it moved to consolidate its position. Its fundamental objective was to protect ‘business as usual’ and it believed that the attitude of the Chamberlain government was in accord with that position. While there were signs that the face of the industry would be changed beyond recognition for the duration and that commercial advertising in this situation would serve no useful purpose, such fears proved unfounded as the situation settled and, thus far, the advertising industry was free to carry on.

‘Keep Going!’: The Need for Ongoing Advertising Beyond the feared implications of strict government control, the advertising industry in a nation at war faced a more fundamental challenge: many producers could simply see no need to carry on

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advertising. When it was possible only to produce and sell much lower quantities of a product than their customers wanted to buy, the most basic need to advertise was dispelled: there was no point in advertising to stimulate demand if that demand could not subsequently be met. Advocates of advertising pointed to how, in the years preceding the war, many companies had invested heavily in building brand awareness to the extent that the consumer’s familiarity and trust of certain well-known products had become a valuable commodity in itself. The war threatened to undermine and destroy that investment. In order to counter the dire consequences for the advertising industry of this situation in which demand naturally outstripped supply, advertisers were urged by industry representatives, namely the Advertising Association and the IIPA, to look forward to a time of freer markets, where the wheels of commerce were again allowed to turn freely but where consumers had no recollection of certain brands and products. Picture Post, for instance, in an appeal to encourage its advertisers to keep advertising (albeit in the publication’s own interests), warned: ‘If advertising was necessary in peace-time to build and maintain goodwill, then goodwill must gradually perish if that advertising is withdrawn.’17 The Advertising Association urged business to carry on advertising in the interests of safeguarding that goodwill. Meeting on the 7 November 1939, it cautioned: [T]he goodwill built up by manufacturers, which was of immense value to the trade of the country, should not be allowed to be destroyed as a result of the war.18 It was only advertising, argued the Advertising Association, which could help to preserve market position through the war. Those who failed to maintain brand awareness and consumer familiarity would face having to build their business again from scratch when peace returned. Even where goods were being consumed by necessity because no alternative was available, there was still an argument for maintaining or building brand awareness. It was considered by those representing the advertising industry to be a duty to preserve the

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machinery of commerce with a view to business being in a healthy state when peace returned. Further, it was argued that advertising was an important part of the economy and that the successful continuance of business was in itself essential to the war effort. The advertising agency Osbourne-Peacock, whose clients included Aertex Underwear and Corsets, Mackintosh’s Toffee and Vimto, concerned by the high level of cancellations of space orders following the outbreak of war, took a full-page advertisement themselves in Advertiser’s Weekly in October 1939 entitled ‘Keep going!’ and declared in their copy: Commerce and Trade must go on if we are to win through. And to those who are contemplating advertising, a word of advice: ‘DO IT NOW!’19 Advertiser’s Weekly, supporting the notion that the maintenance of brand awareness was an important factor, urged advertisers to come up with new creative angles to keep the image of products fresh and in the forefront of consumers’ minds, irrespective of the other concerns and pressures that they were facing. Using the example of Murphy Radio (Figure 1.1) in its series ‘Advertisers Under Fire’, Advertiser’s Weekly was able to demonstrate how, by employing an appropriate advertising message, the war could actually be to the client’s benefit. In this advertisement Murphy’s portable set is promoted as ‘a reliable set, which you can carry anywhere’, making it a ‘very wise investment to make in these days’. Murphy, and its agent C. R. Casson Ltd., were quick to realize that a radio in wartime would be a necessity rather than a luxury and, further, that making such a purchase could be rationalised as being in the national interest, not just in terms of helping Murphy Radio maintain its business (and thereby giving ‘employment and income to some thousands of good people’), but also helping on the Home Front by bringing news and entertainment to sustain the morale of the people.20 Businesses were urged to look on the war as merely an unwelcome interruption to the normal functioning of business. It was suggested that the best course of action was to continue to advertise, even if that meant stimulating demand that simply could not be met at the time,

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Figure 1.1

39

Source: Picture Post, 21 October 1939, p. 5.

in the hope that at some point in the not-too-distant future they would be able to turn that frustrated demand into profit. Writing in Advertiser’s Weekly, Martin H. Perry, director of The Wellington Press Postal Advertising Services, Ltd., cautioned against those advertisers who withdrew from advertising on the basis that they were currently

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working to capacity on government contracts rather than their normal peacetime output. Just six months into the war, he looked to a postwar world in which government contracts and sub-contracts were no more and markets were in turmoil. The solution? [P]lan and use wise advertising NOW and to maintain it throughout the war [. . .]. Only in this way will they ensure that when the war ends they can return at once to their normal markets without a costly delay or a heavy loss.21 A similar theme was taken up by Mr B. E. Wilkinson, joint managing director of the advertising agency Erwin, Wasey and Co. Ltd., who cautioned: [E]ven though consumers are having to buy goods due to no alternative, for example consuming cereal in the absence of bacon and eggs, they should still maintain brand awareness. If people only eat cereals because bacon or eggs are unobtainable, cereals psychologically fall into the same category as gas-masks—one of war’s minor horrors, to be laid aside after the war with relief [. . .] to-day is the cereal manufacturers’ great opportunity to convert a case of necessity into a case of preference—via advertising— whether they can fill to-day’s demand or not.22 Advertising throughout the war was described by H. Lewis Selby of the hosiery manufacturer Kayser-Bondor Ltd. as ‘rearming for the world war for world markets’.23 It was the duty of advertisers to continue to keep up their brand awareness and maintain a firm defence against the foreign imports that would inevitably saturate the home market at the cessation of hostilities. Ongoing advertising, the careful nurturing of consumer goodwill and the maintenance of brand awareness were deemed by those advocates of commercial advertising to be the only way to prepare for the competition that lay ahead. In December 1940, The Times took a d ouble page spread advertisement in Advertiser’s Weekly in an effort to explain

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advertising’s role within the economy, a role that was becoming more, not less, important as a result of the war. It stated: [F]undamental economic laws do not change. The need is to drive output up to the maximum; find markets for our goods abroad while still maintaining a decent standard of living at home; to find money to finance the war on a scale never before imagined. The ability of the manufacturer to do this effectively was based on the robust functioning of the home market, given that ‘the home market remains the greatest asset of the home producer’, alongside ongoing consumer goodwill towards those well-known brands that helped to demonstrate to overseas buyers that British was indeed best: ‘The home market is the fundamental basis of all healthy export trade. Faithful customers near at hand enable the enterprising trader to push out and make profits further afield.’24 Such an approach was incorporated into an advertising campaign devised by the Advertising Association itself in 1940. Number 8 in the series stated that commerce must continue in order to ‘pay as we go’ on the basis that if shopkeepers could continue to prosper, so that industry is sustained, and dividends and workers’ salaries are paid, this would in turn feed the war effort via income tax. While providing businesses with a sound argument to carry on advertising, the Advertising Association also urged consumers to do their bit: Save a little by all means, but spend some money too—food, clothes and recreation are all necessary things. You will not be helping to win the war by being miserly.25 In this way it was suggested that advertising was not only legitimate, but that it was also playing a crucial part in the war economy. Even if demand was being deliberately depressed, if advertising could encourage people to spend even a little, this would, the argument went, feed back into the government coffers and enter into ‘the credit side of the National Ledger’.

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All the arguments of those advocates of advertising were focused on maintaining their presence in front of the public, nurturing and protecting the familiarity, loyalty and goodwill of consumers towards branded, advertised goods. The Advertising Association, the IIPA and Advertiser’s Weekly, in combination, were determined to ensure that the place of commercial advertising in society was recognised and valued both by those producers of goods and advertisers, and by a broader audience who might come to appreciate the role of advertising in the economy. Their success in communicating this point of view would decide whether advertising in wartime would survive or whether advertising expenditure would continue on that alarming downward trend witnessed at the outbreak of war. However, even if they were able to sustain advertising volumes, they had a broader task ahead of them in legitimizing their presence in the press to the public and those who were concerned to protect their livelihood.

Informing and Directing The advertising industry hoped that wartime advertising might be seen to be serving a useful purpose by informing and directing the people. Advertisers believed that the messages that they were producing, being a part of the everyday fabric of life, might be viewed with more trust than the officially sanctioned output of the MoI or Ministry of Food, for example, since the information that it conveyed had the endorsement of well-known and well-trusted brands and products. What is more, the language of advertising tended toward the more colourful and graphic compared to the more staid output of the MoI. In a letter of March 1939 to Mr F. P. Bishop of The Times, Mr H. Broadly, director at the advertising agency W. S. Crawford Ltd., stated his belief that: [T]he public likes to have advertisements in its newspapers. They may denounce advertising, say they never read it, and would not touch it with a barge pole; but give them a newspaper with no advertisements at all in it and they will be entirely bored.26

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Similarly Mr William E. Rootes, president of the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, and chairman of the Rootes Group of Companies, declared in December 1939: ‘The public to-day regards press advertising with even greater interest than in peace time.’27 Contemporary research would certainly seem to corroborate such views. Prior to the war, Mark Abrams carried out extensive surveys into attitudes towards commercial advertising on behalf of the advertising agency London Press Exchange (LPE).28 As part of a broad survey into the public’s attitude towards the press between 1934 and 1939, in-depth surveying was conducted to establish specific attitudes towards commercial advertising in the press. For Part IX of that survey, 20,000 readers of nine national papers were interviewed in the early spring of 1934, and a further 5,000 readers of the London evening papers in June. Despite the fact that these surveys were conducted five years prior to the outbreak of war, the results can be taken as indicative of attitudes towards press advertising in this period, especially given that the nature of press advertising did not alter substantially in the intervening period. This reader survey found that the ‘average advertisement is seen by 29 per cent of the men and women who look at the page on which it appears’, and of that 29 per cent, 15 per cent ‘merely glance at it’, 11 per cent partially read it and 3 per cent ‘read it all through’. This system of measurement was known as ‘attention value’, defined as ‘the number of persons who saw the advertisement expressed as a percentage of those who saw the page it was on’.29 In a later survey based on 7,867 interviews carried out between March and April 1938, the ‘Attention Value of Average Advertisements’ across all national morning papers surveyed was 28.3 per cent.30 In summary, the Mark Abrams survey found that the public had an awareness of advertising, if only of a cursory nature, catching the eye of just under one third of the people who looked at the page on which it appeared. Further, a Mass-Observation (M-O) survey of December 1938 found that, in general, a ‘high proportion [of those surveyed]. . . are in favour of advertising’ and that it was ‘informative’.31 It reported: Analysis of the replies shows that a fifth of them are absolutely in favour of advertising as a useful and necessary institution in

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their lives, another fifth is opposed to it on social grounds and as a dangerous influence, while the remaining three-fifths have a divided opinion. While this may not be a ringing endorsement of the ‘value’ of advertising, it is not an outright condemnation either. Among those who thought positively of advertising, this male responded: I think that advertising is a great factor in human progress. It educates and civilises more than any other force. It has brought about unbelievably great improvements in the personal cleanliness of people. While another male respondent said: Naturally I approve of advertising whole-heartedly since it makes the world brighter and far more interesting.32 This is exactly what those advocates of commercial advertising had in mind as they considered their role in wartime: advertising was widely regarded by the public and in many cases its value was understood in terms of its educative properties. By drawing on this positive utility, for example by informing the public about how products might be used in times of wartime scarcity to best advantage, it was hoped that commercial advertising would be seen to be acting responsibly. At the same time (and in the personal interest of the advertiser), they could hope to gain greater attention via such an empathetic approach. Advertiser’s Weekly singled out Ryvita for praise in this way for its advertisement ‘Making the butter ration go round’ (Figure 1.2). This example was held up as the epitome of advertisers seizing the opportunities presented by the war. It was praised for being ‘topical, informative, persuasive and convincing’, especially given that it appeared on the very day that butter rationing began.33 It promised to increase sales while maintaining goodwill among the public by offering advice on how best to save butter. According to Geoffrey Searby, an associate of the IIPA, this should be the role of advertising

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in wartime: redirecting consumer demand by teaching the public how to buy wisely.34 He saw the role of advertising during the war as being to direct consumers and to gradually persuade the nation to consume less, especially of luxury and semi-luxurious goods. Responding to Mr Searby’s comments, Advertiser’s Weekly concurred:

Figure 1.2

Source: The Times, 8 January 1940, p. 4.

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[I]t is our task to educate the public to purchase those branded basic materials or ingredients which by domestic work in the home can be turned into consumable goods replacing those existing highly processed articles that use labour needed for the prosecution of the war.35 In this way, commercial advertising could be seen to be playing its part in the successful prosecution of the war. At the same time, there was another implicit purpose to such advertising: it was also a means by which consumers could be instructed and educated in how to make the necessary adaptations in an effort to sustain at least some of the continuities of normal life. Beyond that, such a beneficent approach would be in the best interests of the advertising industry, both now and in the longer term. If the public could see advertising taking on such a responsible role and fulfilling a public service, then the whole business of advertising might be imbued with a ‘new integrity’ and seen as a profession that ‘puts service before gain’.36 In this way, it was hoped that the reputation of advertising could be improved and a legitimate role in wartime found—a role that was actually accepted and extended by the government as part of its ‘Anger Campaign’ of June 1940. In mid-1940, the MoI was devising a substantial campaign to ‘heighten the intensity of the personal anger felt by the Individual British citizen against the German people and Germany’, employing photographs, cartoons, posters, film, radio, leaflets, speeches, exhibitions and window displays that were ‘all pervasive, subtle and persistent’.37 In the initial stages of the campaign, the hand of the government was to be concealed, given that it was felt that an overt identification of the government with the campaign would render it ineffective in trying to generate an emotional response. As part of this more covert approach, well-established and trusted channels of communication were to be employed. For example, influential journalists would cooperate, producing features that reflected this new theme. Similarly, commercial advertising was seen as a suitable vehicle through which this new invective could be successfully channelled as ‘individual advertisers’ were ‘to be encouraged to issue similar appeals

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at their own cost’.38 The government believed that commercial advertising could prove an effective method of reaching people in such a way that the message would be transferred effectively and without the hand of government seen at play. Once the people were beginning to come around to this way of thinking, and anger was being aroused, then the MoI would be seen to enter the fray. Even if initial indications suggested to the MoI that the desired response to the preliminary stages of the campaign were not being achieved and the Anger Campaign was never implemented ‘on the heroic scale originally contemplated,’ this example serves to highlight the effective role that commercial advertising could play on the Home Front.39 Advertising was already an established part of the public’s terms of reference, and spoke with the authority of tried and tested brands. In recognizing this, the government accepted its own shortcomings, understanding that it could take advantage of this channel of communication, carrying messages in an unobtrusive manner that it would be denied as soon as its name appeared on any pronouncement. Crucially, commercial advertising was not a wartime aberration but rather a part of the fabric of everyday life, and with that, all the more effective at soliciting public engagement. The advertising industry was thus establishing a clear foothold in the war effort. It was recognised how advertisers frequently had the ear of the public. Beyond surreptitiously feeding it important messages, they could also set out to imbue in readers a more general positive feeling. The normal rationale for advertising expenditure— that of selling goods—was extended as it was invested with a more philanthropic purpose. Norman Moore, president of the IIPA, addressing the Annual General Meeting of Fellows and Associates of the Institute in 1940, claimed that advertising had ‘a special opportunity of serving the public by maintaining a spirit of cheerfulness. In helping the public it was serving the Nation’s interests.’40 Thus, for instance, Lever Brothers’ ‘Thro’ the Sunlight Window’ campaign, launched in 1940 through their agents Lintas Ltd., was designed to present a series of ‘talks in print’ that offered ‘an outlook on today’s problems’. The first six of these advertisements, which appeared at weekly intervals in the national press between

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6 May and 15 June 1940, featured ‘talks’ by the popular author J. B. Priestley.41 In those initial executions, he dealt with issues ranging from the scrapping of iron railings through to ‘The reason for prayer’, all in the same format as number one in that series, reproduced (Figure 1.3).42 Explaining their approach in Advertiser’s Weekly, Lever Brothers maintained: In using our advertising space for a series of helpful talks by eminent modern thinkers, we believe we can help in sustaining good spirits at a time when the men and women of this country are bearing extra burdens of responsibility and care.43 This same explanation appeared on the advertisements. Reflecting on this campaign in 1964, Len Sharpe, who worked at Lintas at the time this campaign was devised, drew attention to the special advantage that Sunlight had in delivering such messages to the people effectively by exploiting the product’s already established prestige. He also alluded to the benefit that accrued to the company by engendering public goodwill.44 Further, this clearly demonstrates the efforts of advertisers to align themselves with the popular mood and is a testament to their ability to achieve this. The use of J. B. Priestley is highly significant in this regard. He was selected by Lever Brothers to speak with the people, at their level, in a manner in which perhaps more ‘official’ figures could not. The accuracy of this appraisal by advertisers of the public’s moods and sensibilities was vindicated when the BBC turned to Priestley, in preference to barrister Maurice Healy, to broadcast their Postscripts to the 9 o’clock news on Sundays from June 1940 at a time when these advertisements were still running.45 This self-appointed role as sustainers of morale was believed by those in the advertising industry to be most crucial after Dunkirk. Advertiser’s Weekly observed in its issue of 20 June 1940: The news is grave. It would be foolish and irresponsible to deny the fact. But, for the very reason that our country is in peril, we in the advertising field must do everything within our power to maintain the splendid spirit of the public.

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And it is within our power to do a very great deal to keep a sane balance of opinion among those who are so easily inclined to be depressed, to adopt defeatism as their code of inevitability, at the first news (or rumour) of reverse.46

Figure 1.3

Source: Daily Express, 6 May 1940, p. 5.

49

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Ongoing advertising could help to demonstrate that business was going on apparently unaffected. This became especially important through the Blitz. Thus, in September 1940, Advertiser’s Weekly suggested that not only was this important internally, but also to outside observers who watched advertising for signs that life had been dislocated.47 If the rest of the world could observe well-planned and imaginative advertising campaigns, they would find evidence of far-sighted business enterprise and ‘the unconquerable spirit of Britain’.48 By the middle of 1940, Advertiser’s Weekly was declaring that the work of commercial advertisers was ‘vital’ to the war effort, given the power of the advertising industry ‘to guide, help and hearten millions who are still carrying on on the Home Front’.49 Commercial advertisers were described as working magnanimously in the best interests of the nation. Oxo’s ‘ARP’ (‘A Really Popular beverage’) campaign, see Figure 1.4, was taken as a particular example of this approach. Advertiser’s Weekly saw in this advertisement the very epitome of advertisers being responsive to the needs of the nation—in this case, to make tea, which had been rationed from 9 July 1940, go further. This advertisement, they reported, was a direct response to comments made by Lord Woolton, Minister of Food, at a press conference on 24 June 1940 at which he referred to a letter he had received from a correspondent suggesting that air raids had brought about a heavy increase in the consumption of tea.50 Air raids at night created a need in many people for a soothing cup of tea after the all-clear had sounded. In an effort to preserve the increasingly scarce supplies of tea, Oxo presented itself as an alternative to fill the gap and promoted itself accordingly as ‘A comfort in the shelter’. The advertiser achieved a double objective: Oxo could be seen to be behind the war effort and acting in the people’s best interests, and thereby could hope to solicit public goodwill. This, as well as the simple brand reminder conveyed by the advertisement, would hopefully result in an increase in the sales of Oxo (which, for the producer, was of course the ultimate objective). Such expenditure could thus be given a patriotic defence.

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Figure 1.4

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Source: Picture Post, 20 July, 1940, p. 34.

Even where those consumer goods were increasingly not available on the home market, the advertising industry still felt that it could play an important role. As the government moved to restrict the production and consumption of certain classes of goods, the advertising industry maintained that it could help consumers adjust to these changing circumstances while at the same time providing them with a vehicle for ‘reminder’ advertising. One of the most significant government policies for the advertising industry in this regard was the introduction

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of ‘pooling’ schemes, under whose terms firms producing similar goods were asked to arrange among themselves to transfer civilian production to one ‘nucleus’ firm that would produce a uniform, non-branded product. On 1 July 1940, those companies producing margarine and cooking fats agreed to the pooling of their resources and at once familiar, branded products disappeared from the shelves, along with the immediate need for those producers to promote their brand in preference to their competitor’s. The traditional objective of advertising—that of stressing the unique qualities of a specific product—thus ceased to exist for the duration, and those companies and their advertising agents were compelled to consider how they could protect the heritage of their brand until such time as the pooling arrangement came to an end. Not only had the brand name to be kept in the public eye, but it also had to be seen to be actually contributing to wartime life to such an extent that consumers might retain, or even enhance, their loyalty to that product by seeing it make a positive contribution to life on the Home Front. This is well demonstrated in the advertising of Stork margarine (Figure 1.5). While the Stork Wartime Cookery Book had been introduced in March 1940 in an effort to add value to the Stork brand, in that initial wartime advertising Stork, specifically, had been a prerequisite for producing ‘attractive’ and ‘nourishing’ meals. Stork was promoted as the margarine to ensure that ‘you get your full supply of the essential Sunshine Vitamins A and D’. Stork margarine, it was said, ‘Wins your favour with its flavour’.51 However, with the pooling of margarine, Stork instead promoted itself as committed to ‘National Service’. Its advertisements were now given over entirely to the ‘Stork Margarine Cookery Service’, as seen here in the example from 8 August 1940, which often offered advice and information that had nothing to do with margarine per se, and certainly not Stork in particular. The only concession in these advertisements to explicit self-promotion (aside from the artwork) was the statement that after the war Stork would once again be the choice of the ‘discerning housewife’. The whole advertising approach had to be much more subtle and even ostensibly selfless while keeping the brand name in the public eye and gently nurturing positive associations.

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The advertising industry’s traditional purpose of d riving consumption was further curbed with the introduction of purchase tax in the July 1940 budget. Luxury goods were taxed at a basic rate of 33.33 per cent and ‘more necessary items’ were taxed at 16.67 per cent.52 At a stroke, prices for a long list of consumer goods rose significantly. Advertiser’s Weekly predicted that the impact on the advertising industry would be ‘a faster trend towards using reminder type of advertising in place of “selling” copy’. Given that such goods were more expensive and effectively out of the reach of many consumers, rather than encouraging people to buy their goods outright, there would be a switch to advertising copy in favour of

Figure 1.5 Source: The Times, 1 August 1940, p. 3; The Times, 8 August 1940, p. 3.

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simple statements reminding consumers about the benefits of the product. Instead of withdrawing from the market altogether, it was hoped that advertisers would use advertising to keep the name of their goods alive, alluding to the product’s qualities and aspiring to a day when consumers would once again be able to purchase these goods freely. In this way, the wartime advertising industry sought to demonstrate that its role now was not to ‘excite desire’ for unnecessary goods but ‘to maintain the standard of living without increasing the total of consumption’ by directing demand towards those goods that are available and away from those in short supply, while at the same time preserving goodwill in those markets no longer functioning normally.53 Even those goods that might be deemed to be towards the luxury end of the market could take heart from this approach and thereby justify their ongoing advertising. All this, it was hoped, would be advantageous to the profile of advertising in general, since it demonstrated how the industry was selflessly committed to assisting consumers in disregard of their own personal interests. Advertiser’s Weekly declared that advertising was putting itself wholly in the service of the national cause by offering education and direction: [B]y helping the housewife to practise economy in the home, by directing consumption away from things imported to things made here, by explaining what products are scarce, and why, and what substitutes can be used and how.54 Nevertheless, Advertiser’s Weekly still feared a further fall in the volume of advertising. As the immediate returns that a client might be likely to enjoy as a result of a concerted advertising campaign diminished, so would the incentive for them to continue such campaigns. Advertisers, it was feared, would then withdraw altogether.55 While ‘acting in the national interest’, advertisers also had an eye on the future. The goodwill that they could engender via their public-spirited approach during the war would stand them in good stead at the end of the war. They could take a frank and honest approach in their advertising, explaining with candour the difficulties they faced, and consequently maintaining, or building

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up further, the trust and loyalty of the consumer. This approach, if used carefully, could serve the producer well and be a useful byproduct of their role as adviser and informer.

Keeping up Appearances With that more philanthropic role for advertising came a responsibility to ensure that cracks did not appear in the positive image being constructed and to make sure that individual advertisers did not exploit the war situation to their own advantage. The Advertising Association had been monitoring the type of advertising being undertaken since the outbreak of war. Its earliest cases related to those companies who were offering a variety of ancillary products related to life on the Home Front: armlets, luminous badges, torches, blinds and curtaining for use in the black-out, ARP badges, identity discs and so on.56 In pursuing those companies producing goods not capable of fulfilling the task as advertised or, at worst, likely to put life in danger, it met with some success in ensuring that these were withdrawn. Subsequently, in association with the Ministry of Home Security, it was able to ensure that the media would only carry advertisements for such products that had been tested and approved by the Ministry.57 This proved an excellent compromise. It relieved the Advertising Association of enforcing an outright ban on such advertising (a practice that it could not endorse) but still introduced an element of control that suggested it was acting responsibly. It also had the added advantage of lending official endorsement to those advertisers who continued advertising. Further, the IIPA had been approached by the MoI in April 1940 asking for any assistance it could offer in order to induce its members to avoid using advertising appeals based on ‘war nerves’.58 Between September 1939 and April 1940, a variety of clients had relied on such an approach in selling products ranging from Ovaltine and Sanatogen Nerve-Tonic Food, to Rose’s Lime Juice and Maldano’s Egg Flip. The IIPA was in this instance happy to oblige. However, while undoubtedly keen to maintain a positive relationship with the government, it was also conscious that such advertising copy, which could be interpreted as

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taking advantage of the situation for selfish gain, would reflect badly on the advertising industry as a whole. The Advertising Association similarly was happy to state in its annual report for 1940 that it had ‘co-operated with conspicuous success with the Government in curbing undesirable advertising’.59 It was important to the Advertising Association, both in the present and into the longer term, that the advertising industry was not seen to be acting in bad taste or exploiting the war situation to its own advantage and to the advantage of its clients. The Advertising Association, in fact, had a well-established system via its Advertisement Investigation Department (AID) for dealing with what were deemed to be infringements of the good practice of its members.60 The AID took on the responsibility of ‘policing’ standards in commercial advertising. Under its terms of reference, it had a responsibility to uphold the good name of advertising and: [T]o promote confidence in advertising through correction or suppression of abuses which tend to undermine that confidence upon which return from advertising and sales effort depends.61 While in times of peace that task was largely confined to cautioning advertisers against making extravagant or fraudulent claims in their advertising or otherwise misleading consumers, in the time of war that role was extended. Throughout the conflict, the AID was concerned with tempering any over-zealous efforts on the part of advertisers to encourage consumers to ‘spend some money’ and with ensuring that their output was entirely appropriate and unlikely to bring the name of advertising into disrepute. For instance, in October 1941, the Ministry of Food had approached the AID and expressed its concern in regard to advertisements for Seven Seas Cod Liver Oil, which it considered to be of a depressing nature and thus bad for morale.62 In response, the AID spoke to the advertising agency concerned, which at once agreed to change the copy. However, disturbed by the government’s involvement in this particular case, and keen not to have its autonomy infringed, the AID wrote to all media owners advising them that they had a responsibility to project

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positive images and messages into the public domain, and drawing their attention to examples of the type of copy that might meet with its disapproval.63 Such an advertisement, thought to be in breach of this code, but initially unchanged despite the protestations of the MoI in April 1940, and even after these new guidelines had been issued, came from Wincarnis Tonic Wine (Figure 1.6).

Figure 1.6

Source: Picture Post, 18 October 1941, p. 28.

In the eyes of the AID, this clearly breached its rules of conduct, given that it was playing on people’s anxieties associated with the Blitz in order to sell the product by stating that: A blitz leaves more than bomb damage behind—it leaves nerve damage too, and over a much wider area.

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It might even be argued that such an advertisement was in breach of the Defence Notices, since it suggested that people are vulnerable on a number of levels to the effects of bombing, and thereby might be considered to be ‘prejudicial to the national well being’. The agent was contacted and responded that their client was very anxious not to cause offence and the advertisement copy was altered at once: whereas Wincarnis had previously been known as ‘The Tonic Wine for trying times’, it was now ‘The Wine of Life’.64 While these cases came under the remit of, or at least extremely close to, the terms of the Defence Notices, and were thereby likely to draw unwelcome attention to the advertising industry as acting in contravention of the national interest, the Advertising Association was also keen that advertisers did not exploit wartime messages and themes to their own personal advantage. To be seen to be acting selfishly would definitely be considered contrary to the war effort in the public’s eyes. The AID thus concerned itself with the nature and implied tone of advertising copy where it was thought that certain themes were being overexploited. One such example was the use of the ‘V’ for victory sign in advertisements, which it investigated after having received a letter from a Mr Edward Tillett of the Yorkshire Post asking the department if it could discourage its use.65 M-O noted in its report on the Victory-V campaign of September 1941 that: During the two months between July 3 and September 2 [1941] inclusive, 30 advertisers made use of the V symbol, and produced between them 118 advertisements covering 736 inches of space.66 Such use can be seen in Figure 1.7 for Miner’s Liquid Make Up. Here we see a ‘pretty girl doing her daily dozen and kicking the Victory V at the same time’. This might fairly be seen as advertisers capitalizing on a current trend and manipulating it to fit their own purpose. But by overexposure and, perhaps, inappropriate use, the fear was that the true meaning of the message would be undermined. Such an accusation, if made, would not sit well with the advertising

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Figure 1.7

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Source: Picture Post, 13 September 1941, p. 2.

industry and would bring it into disrepute. In this case, the AID agreed that ‘this campaign had got beyond control’ but felt that it had ‘gone too far to be checked’. Nevertheless, Mr Tillett’s comments were ‘noted with approval’ and a d egree of circumspection was adopted in regard to future excesses.

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The Advertising Association was not always entirely selfless in its actions and, irrespective of any greater pressure arising from the impact of advertising on consumer demand, was always eager to bear in mind its own interests. In April 1942, for instance, it was approached by the Ministry of Supply (MoS) and asked to exert its influence to secure a reduction in the amount of advertising of aspirin, which was in short supply. Yet, on this occasion, the Advertising Association deemed that this was outside its terms of reference.67 The rationale behind this response was stated as being that it did not have the necessary authority to issue such edicts to private advertising concerns. Yet such a response was, at best, misleading given that, as has been demonstrated, the AID was well versed in policing advertising. It might be speculated that the real motivation for this response was that it felt that its autonomy, and that of the advertising industry, was being directly infringed by such an approach. It could not be seen to be supporting such a direct cut in advertising, which would be contrary to its role as advocate of advertising and as promoter for maintaining advertising expenditure, even if it might have been in the best interests of the war effort in general. Nevertheless, details of the government’s request were passed on to the Proprietary Association, which passed a resolution that advertising of this description should be cut to 50 per cent of that appearing during 1939, 1940 and 1941.68 Despite the otherwise sterling efforts of the Advertising Association to ensure that advertisers presented a measured and responsible face to the public, at the end of 1941 questions were being asked in the House of Commons in regard to the advertising of products that were either unobtainable or in short supply financed from funds that otherwise would have gone to the Treasury via Excess Profits Tax. The Advertising Association looked on with alarm, uncomfortable with the attention that was being called to the industry and the likely impact that this might have for its continued free practice. Mr Bishop warned that: [T]here seemed to be a considerable volume of opinion among M.P.’s and elsewhere that advertising was a luxury which

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provided profits for a large number of people in business and had no purpose except the immediate sale of goods.69 While the Advertising Association might be satisfied in its belief that advertising in wartime was performing a useful national function, this evidence suggests that the government and the public at large were as yet to be convinced. Mr Bishop, keen that such criticisms be roundly rebuffed, suggested that a ‘brief but well documented’ statement be prepared. In the final draft of that document, entitled ‘Advertising in War-Time’, the rationale for ongoing advertising was defended on two specific counts: advertising as a vehicle to inform and guide consumers, and advertising intended to maintain goodwill among the public toward large manufacturers. Under the heading ‘The informative function of advertising’, it was argued: [T]he life of the public has to go on and most of the present advertising of ‘goods for sale’ is not so much offering inducements to purchase as helping the public in the difficult task of adaptation to war conditions.70 Commercial advertising was positioned in the vanguard of the government’s efforts to help and guide the housewife in these difficult circumstances: Hints on food, clothing, washing and cleaning; on how to keep her household contented and happy, and herself attractive in spite of her cares—she has been accustomed to find these things in the advertisement columns, and this is no time to rob her of them.71 References to goodwill advertising, which had no immediate relation to the sale of goods, were more difficult to defend and required the public and other critics to take a long view of the marketplace. In that document, it was argued that such advertising was designed to safeguard the position of large industrial concerns for

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the postwar period. Critics were asked to consider the reconstruction of a postwar world when leading firms, currently fully occupied by war work, would be required to urgently revert to normal production. Widespread goodwill, it was stated, was particularly important in relation to overseas trade: [E]xport trade cannot stand by itself. The goodwill of British industry is all one. Famous names and trademarks must be kept alive at home if they are to have a fair chance in world markets after the war.72 The argument was that the success of these companies in overseas markets was not only in their own interests but in the national interest as well. In drawing up this document, Mr Teasdale, chairman of the Advertising Association’s General Purposes Committee, expressed grave concern that the intended statement was overly obsessed with the role of advertising in peacetime conditions and might draw unwelcome attention to the practice of advertising in a postwar world. Further, it was his belief that under the current wartime conditions, the advertising industry was actually enjoying a great deal of autonomy. To illustrate his point, he referred to the draft of the statement quoted above that declared that ‘the normal life of the public has to go on’. He went on: The real fact is, the normal life of the public is going on—so far as advertising is concerned—very much better than some publishers and some advertisers even dared to hope. To draw attention to this is very unwise politically [. . .]. Do not put forward a case which will provide government departments with something in which they can find reasons for reducing or redirecting advertising.73 In effect, his argument was that, thus far, the advertising industry had been able to go peaceably about its business with the minimum of interference. Commercial advertising still had a significant

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presence in the pages of the press and advertisers were continuing to promote their goods in much the same way as before the war, even in those cases where the goods were not actually available. To deliberately draw attention to advertising in this way might be to ask for trouble in the form of further public criticism and even direct government action. He felt that the advertising industry was trying just a bit too hard to try and find justification for the presence of advertising in the wartime press and attempting to attribute to it functions that perhaps it was unable to fulfil. Indeed, in a review of the pamphlet on publication, The Economist, while appreciating that advertising could help to sustain a free and independent press, called those arguments that went beyond that basic assertion ‘so pompously foolish as to come near to spoiling a sound case’.74 Mr Teasdale was not alone in his concerns and there was some discussion that, as a compromise, a memorandum be produced but not made public, being used instead as a useful exercise to clarify in their own minds what the role of advertising was in wartime. Mr Bishop, the memorandum’s author, spoke out in its defence and reiterated the very real concern that public opinion was turning against advertising in the belief that ‘advertising is an unnecessary activity in war time; that it is done solely to benefit the private pockets of advertisers’.75 Given the overwhelming concern about the damage being done to the long-term reputation of the advertising industry, the motion was carried and Advertising in War-Time was duly circulated. Mr Teasdale and Mr Simon of the Daily Telegraph subsequently resigned from the Advertising Association. The pressure to produce this leaflet and thereby further justify the place of advertising in wartime was prompted not only by public protest and criticism but by the increasingly difficult market in which the advertising industry had to operate. Throughout this period, as supplies of newsprint became limited and production costs went up, advertising rates rose accordingly.76 The Daily Express had on 1 November 1939 increased its advertisement rates from £6 10s per column inch to £7 10s, eventually rising to £12 0s in 1945. In the spring of 1940, the council of the Newspaper Proprietors’ Association issued a recommendation that members should from

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1 May impose a 25 per cent surcharge on advertisement rates.77 Space was already at a premium by this time. Advertising agencies were facing the dual pressure of having little space available through which to communicate their clients’ message and paying more for the little space they could get. Matters were made worse when the Newsprint Supply Company, in association with the MoS, introduced a 10 per cent reduction in the permitted consumption of newsprint. However, the most direct assault on advertising’s place in the print media came with the Control of Paper (No. 48) Order of 15 March 1942. Under its terms, a definite ratio of advertisements to editorial was laid down. Morning and Sunday newspapers were restricted to a total of 40 per cent, evenings to 45 per cent and weeklies to 55 per cent of the total available space.78 Nevertheless, despite these pressures, and indeed the decline in volume, the place of commercial advertisements persisted throughout the war, and to some extent was ring-fenced as one of those important signs that normal life had not entirely been disrupted. Indeed, the government was largely appreciative of this basic idea and, thereby, could itself see a place for commercial advertising in wartime Britain. It was acutely aware that the press was a crucial vehicle for communicating with the people and sustaining morale. As such, it recognised that newspapers had to retain their appeal rather than being overrun by official pronouncements; commercial advertising offered a useful diversion while maintaining a semblance of normality. In April 1941, the MoI observed that ‘there was a limit to the amount of advertising which papers and the public could stand if newspapers were to sell and remain readable’.79 For the government, the press, alongside the BBC, was one of the munitions of war: it was a crucial route to informing the public and keeping it engaged. As such, the government was dependent on the media as a vehicle for its own propaganda. However, for that vehicle to be effective, the illusion had to be created that, despite the war, the press remained free and independent. The government determined to engineer via its ‘intimate and cordial relations with the newspapers through their proprietors, editors and reporters’ the impression that the press was

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free.80 Commercial advertising was seen as part of that mix: an essential component of a ‘regular’ newspaper’s make-up. This increasingly liberal attitude towards advertising was further encouraged with the appointment of Brendan Bracken as Minister of Information in July 1941, which has been described by Ian McLaine as a ‘masterstroke’.81 Under his guidance, the MoI was said to have had a greater degree of ‘flexibility and enterprise’ than it had previously.82 Business concerns, via the Commercial Relations Division, were increasingly used as a useful vehicle for communicating with the people, with suggestions being made in regard to creative executions that advertisers might choose to take in their advertising to reinforce the government’s own message and convey certain information and attitudes. This approach was outlined in the scope and responsibilities of the Home Section of the Commercial Relations Division in September 1941: There are many cases in which the Ministry [of Information] wish to get a message across to the public without appearing themselves to be associated with it, and there are many commercial channels which the Section could develop to this end.83 In effect the advertising industry was working as part of the MoI, undetected by its own audience. It was thus of great value to the government and by virtue of that alliance, despite criticism from those outside of the prevalence of inappropriate commercial advertisements, the advertising industry was able to protect its freedom of practice throughout the war. If the advertising industry was active in promoting a positive image of advertising during war, justifying its existence on a number of positive grounds on the basis that it was making a real contribution to the war effort, it was equally keen to defend its position from attack from the outside and the misplaced activities of those within the industry. The Advertising Association, via the well-established organization of the AID, was active in persuading advertisers not to take what it deemed to be an undesirable approach

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in their advertising. It was crucial that the public profile of advertising remained unblemished, as far as was possible, ensuring that no unwelcome attention was drawn to its activities.

Conclusion Total war represented a major challenge for the commercial advertising industry: in a situation where it could apparently serve no useful function and, at worst, prove an unwelcome distraction from the war effort, its very survival was called into question. The advertising industry’s representative bodies were keenly aware of this even before the outbreak of open hostilities and took appropriate moves to protect their livelihood. Much of the output of the Advertising Association and the IIPA was wrapped up in lofty rhetoric designed to demonstrate to outside parties that, in common with the rest of the country, advertisers were selflessly determined to make a positive contribution to the war effort. They were determined to demonstrate that, contrary to first impressions, the successful waging of the war took precedence over their own economic interests (just how sincere they were in those public outpourings is of course open to debate). However, their underlying concern throughout was to preserve their place in society and the returns that they could hope to enjoy within a free market economy, whether now or in the longer term. This concerted effort, to be seen to be acting responsibly, had a d efinite impact on the type of advertising that appeared through the war. In the face of the growing scarcity of paper and the shrinking pagination of newspapers and magazines, manufacturers continued to place advertisements, often for goods that were wholly unobtainable, in the hope that they would be able to maintain consumer goodwill and thereby hold their place in the market. The advertising industry was especially keen to avoid any unwelcome intervention from outside bodies and so ensure that it survived the war intact. In the first place, it went to some lengths to align itself with the government, conscious that the latter might impose certain controls on industry that would seriously inhibit its

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free practice. By offering its services to the government, it might hope to bring some influence to bear on that action that might be to its detriment. However, it had a larger job to do in convincing both government and public that advertising that consumed valuable space in the press, often for goods wholly unobtainable, was in the national interest. This is an important point: the notion that the advertising industry and individual advertisers set out in a very calculated fashion to circulate messages that they believed to be in step with the war and how their consumers conceived of it. Cognisant that their place in wartime society was under threat, they took a very measured approach to the coming of war, carefully adjusting their copy in such a way as to render a very deliberate picture of the Home Front and foster a sense of a definite war-orientated cultural identity. In an effort to blend into the new wartime setting, commercial advertisers could dress up certain product purchases as now being directly in the national interest, while at the same time taking advantage of the fact that this would help to prop up flagging wartime advertising expenditure. Their defence could thus be that they were playing an important role in directing the public within the dramatically changed landscape, indeed to ‘guide, help and hearten millions’. In certain respects, this was nothing new: in their more philanthropic moments, some might have considered this to be the role of commercial advertising per se, but in wartime this became all the more pronounced and important. However, there was a corollary to this in that these advertisers were now painting a very definite image of responsible citizenship and also proving a conduit whereby through nothing more than the simple purchase of certain goods, consumers could demonstrate their engagement with the war and thereby consider themselves active on the Home Front. The significance and impact of this is accentuated when the power and influence that such messages might expect to bear is considered. Unlike the efforts of ‘official’ wartime agencies that sought to invoke a more war-minded cultural identity and sense of public engagement, commercial advertising was already established as a recognized and trusted means of communication—it was a part of the everyday fabric

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of life. The wartime identity that commercial advertising tended to cultivate was more insidious than the more obvious outpourings of the MoI, for example, and, as such, might slip under the radar and be more affective and effective. What is more, the very nature of commercial advertising was that it tended to be more empathetic towards its target consumers, in step with their true attitudes and beliefs, and consequently more likely to assimilate themselves into a new wartime consciousness or cultural identity. However, the key point is that the images circulated by advertisers during the war were deliberate and conscious in their efforts to blend into the wartime landscape and afford a means whereby the people of Britain could be directed towards the war effort with the least disruption to their lives and to the advertisers’ livelihood. In order to achieve that, those at the heart of the advertising business understood that they needed to maintain a degree of autonomy and the freedom to define wartime life as they saw fit. They did this by asserting that advertising had a role above and beyond simply driving up consumer demand. They argued that advertising could inform and direct the people, sustain morale and also preserve the free-market economy, ready for when peace returned. Whether they were successful in convincing the people that advertising was indeed helping to win the war cannot be unequivocally stated. However, what is evident is a very deliberate effort on the part of the advertising industry to defend its livelihood by deliberately constructing a positive public image, and then policing those within the industry to ensure that that image was not subsequently tarnished. The key advocates of commercial advertising, the Advertising Association and the IIPA, were active throughout the war in warding off excessive government interference while actively encouraging producers to carry on advertising and providing what they considered to be a sound argument for the place of commercial advertising in a nation at war. While much of the credit for the persistence of commercial advertising in Britain during World War II must go to those champions of the cause as introduced here, they were also able to take advantage of the state of the relationship between the

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government and the press. Finding themselves in a powerful position within this relationship, and to some extent taking advantage of the government’s fear of adverse press and public reaction, advertisers struck a balance between a need to keep the government onside, and ideally at arm’s length, while remaining committed to speaking in the idiom of their primary constituency: consumers. For advertising to be effective, it had to keep in step with the people: when they regarded advertisements in the press, they ought to see themselves and their situation faithfully reflected back, and as war began, advertisers were largely successful at staying true to that basic goal.

CHAPTER 2 WAR BEGINS AT HOME

‘The war has turned our lives upside-down’ Horlicks, Picture Post, 18 November 1939, p. 54 From the outbreak of the war, and through its first months, the advertising industry was sensitive to the environment in which it now found itself and how it might be regarded both by those in positions of authority and the wider public at large. As previously outlined, in surveying this new environment it was determined to take what steps it could in order to avoid both undue attention and draconian action that would strike at the very heart of its business: that ability to speak faithfully and accurately in the idiom of the time and, most notably, in a manner that accorded with the outlook of their customers. Those first, tentative steps in wartime were expressly designed to be empathetic towards its audience as the nation contemplated the idea, once again, of being engaged in war. As the nation confronted the prospect of being at war, commercial advertisers were swift to take stock of the situation and adjust their copy and creative execution accordingly in an effort to reflect and draw on these new circumstances. Certain advertisers sought to address the practical implications and consequences of being at war, positioning their products as the answer to such newfound concerns occasioned by it. In those instances, they could prove how the consumption of their goods could alleviate what was likely to be an

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unpleasant and austere existence. Others highlighted the dread and anxiety that accompanied the war with a similar objective in mind: maximizing opportunities for product sales. In all cases, the response of commercial advertisers appears flexible and broadly responsive to the situation as it actually developed, not least because the nature of the advertiser’s relationship with the consumer was such that it generally proved to be prudent, as far as was possible, to speak in the idiom of the time. The success of the advertiser’s message is predicated on credibility: the consumer has to identify with the scenario shown. It is a relationship built on trust rather than sanction. Given the honesty at the heart of such advertising messages, what is found is a reflection of the attitude of the British Home Front as it actually was rather than some rhetorical device or projected ideal. Commercial advertisers offered an explicit appraisal of how the war was affecting the average citizen in a way the government was not prepared to. In fact, what these advertisers were portraying, in part, equated to some of the early fears of the government and what it believed might prove to be the cause of the nation’s downfall. The government’s attitude to modern warfare prior to the outbreak of hostilities was characterized by foreboding around the expected catastrophic impact that this would have on the civilian population. It was reckoned in 1937 that a German declaration of war would be accompanied by immediate and continuous bombing resulting in 600,000 deaths and twice that number injured.1 In October 1938, a committee of psychiatrists predicted between 3 and 4 million cases of acute panic, hysteria and neurosis among the general population in the first six months of the war.2 The British government entering into such an enterprise was mindful of forestalling a total breakdown of society. It believed that the people would have to be buoyed along and set about finding ‘the best ways of selling to the people the commodities and attitudes which it thought were good for them’.3 According to the International Broadcasting and Propaganda Enquiry’s memorandum of June 1939, it was the task of propaganda ‘to win popular support for a cause by captivating the emotions and flattering the reason of the public,’ substituting ‘emotion for reason under the guise of facilitating the process of reasoning’.4 The key

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expression in the government’s conception of the ‘People’s War’ was ‘enthusiasm’ and it was believed that propaganda was the ‘machine for generating and maintaining enthusiasm’.5 Such enthusiasm was the essence of ‘good morale’, which the government felt predicated victory in wartime. This rather superficial approach stands in contrast to the more honest appraisal offered by advertisers, which tended to reflect the situation as it actually was. They did not attempt to paper over the cracks in the way in which the government hoped to be able to. The divergence between these two parties and, as it transpires, the efficacy of the approach taken by advertisers, is clearly demonstrated in the Ministry of Information’s (MOI’s) early efforts. The MoI’s initial output was designed to bring home to the people the notion that this was indeed their war and that their active and enthusiastic commitment to it was crucial. This can be seen in its very first poster campaign. In September 1939, posters were placed at 24,000 railway sites, in 27,000 telephone booths and on scores of thousands of sites in pubs, shops, factories, service establishments, public libraries, buses and trains, imploring ‘Keep Calm and Carry On’, ‘Your courage, your cheerfulness, your resolution, will bring us victory’, and ‘Freedom is in Peril—Defend it with all your Might!’6 Yet, such invocations proved to be entirely misplaced and inappropriate. Despite their best intentions, the MoI had completely misread the public mood and this poster campaign was broadly condemned, with The Times claiming: [T]he insipid and patronising invocations to which the passerby is now being treated have a power of exasperation which is all their own. There may be no intrinsic harm in their faint, academic piety, but the implication that the public morale needs this kind of support, or, if it did, that this is the kind of support it would need, is calculated to provoke a response which is neither academic nor pious.7 The MoI had failed to capture the actual mood of the people, which was not inclined towards enthusiasm, or indeed cheerfulness, in respect of this war.

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When war came in 1939, it was greeted with a sense of weary resignation as the prospect presented itself, however grim, of resolving this running issue of German aggrandisement once and for all. Not a sense of enthusiasm or euphoria but rather a grim determination to get on with a job, however unpleasant, that had to be done. Thus, war for the Englishman was simply another inconvenience in his own familiar life, ‘not the end of the world, but just one more menace like blizzards or floods which countrymen must deal with’.8 The nation ‘drifted’ into war , apparently uninterested and disengaged. Many had done their utmost through the interwar period to ignore the spectre that loomed on the horizon, happier to concentrate on an insular and inward-looking existence, largely leaving the government of the day to do what it thought best. Britain in 1939 did not readily rally to the cause or demonstrate any outstanding commitment to make the sacrifices or face the disruption that war would entail. This withdrawal and passive attitude towards the war was only enhanced further as it actually developed through the period known as Bore or Phoney War between the declaration of war on 3 September 1939 and the Germans seizing Denmark and invading Norway in April 1940. The war that had been expected and planned for failed to materialise in September 1939. It was widely believed that the outbreak of war would immediately be met by an overwhelming aerial bombardment, and while air-raid sirens did sound across southern England immediately after war was declared, this was a false alarm, thought to have been caused by a stray French airman. The first eight months were characterized by an overall lack of activity or excitement. Quite simply, nothing happened, at least as far as the Home Front was concerned, and the most prevalent reaction was boredom. As Robert Mackay puts it, ‘The nation was at action stations, but the action refused to start.’9 Despite all the efforts of the government to invoke the spirit of the ‘People’s War’, encouraging active and enthusiastic commitment and engagement, most of the people in these first months became less, not more, engaged. This was part of a broader trend that had witnessed increasing apathy among the people around the issues of the management of the country and international

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relations, in part a consequence of an increasingly interventionist state, relieving the people of the need to participate actively in society. Further, there had been a general aversion to the prospect of war and an overriding desire to deny its possibility, captured extensively in the early work of Mass-Observation as ‘wishthinking’.10 Irrespective of the very real prospect of war and its obvious presence after September 1939, the people held onto their peacetime demeanour and demonstrated an utter reluctance to surrender a normal way of life. In the face of the anticlimax that characterized the Phoney War, people were apt to disregard the war as far as possible and persist with living as normal a life, outside of the war, as possible. That is not to deny any impact at all—indeed, the first weeks and months brought about massive disruption to life. In many respects, the outbreak of war did have the feared impact on morale that had been predicted by the government’s pre-war planning committee, but not as a result of enemy action or bombing, rather as a result of the very apparatus set up to allay such fears, and advertisers were swift to reflect and draw on this situation. For many advertisers, the war represented a complete departure from the life they had known. Their attention was drawn to the raft of new circumstances and, generally, problems that the average citizen would now be required to face. An image is clearly conveyed via commercial advertisers of a daunting new world with multiple concerns and worries. Very often in advertising scenarios, it was the womenfolk who were left to pick up this new burden. The example below from Wincarnis Tonic Wine is typical of that approach. It points to ‘WOMEN’S STRUGGLE TO KEEP GOING’ and lists among her new-found problems: ‘tense farewells’, ‘evacuation’, ‘food problems’ and ‘money worries’ (Figure 2.1). This was presented as an added burden to be carried as a consequence of the war and helped to highlight that women on the Home Front were now moving into a very different world and one in which life would not be easy. With the declaration of war, ‘wartime’s worries and problems’ were also ushered in.11 A contrast is drawn between the pre-war world and the current situation, with Alka-Seltzer adding ‘blackout blues,

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Figure 2.1

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Source: Picture Post, 27 January 1940, p. 8.

irregular meals, wages cut, overworked, nervy, family evacuated’ to the list of the consumer’s unavoidable woes.12 Horlicks highlighted these ‘problems’ further by graphically illustrating the dire consequences of the war’s infringement on the practice of everyday life (Figure 2.2). In the example shown here from 21 October 1939, we see a newly created policeman explain: ‘Three weeks ago I was a hairdresser and now I’m a policeman. When I’m off duty I’ve still got to think about my business. In a way the war’s a double job for me.’ In the example from 18 November, the physical scars of the war are illustrated as the young couple dig up their garden in order to install their air-raid shelter (a very real reminder of the nature of the threat and a manifestation of how modern war reaches into such personal spaces). They remark: ‘The war has turned our lives upside-down. Our worries have been doubled.’ Meanwhile, speaking from a position of

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Figure 2.2 Source: Picture Post, 21 October 1939, p. 8; Picture Post, 18 November 1939, p. 54.

authority, ‘a doctor’ observes: ‘Doctors know best of all what a strain the war is putting upon men and women everywhere. People find themselves unaccountably tired. Nerves are taxed. Anxiety plagues us.’

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Figure 2.3

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Source: Picture Post, 14 October 1939, p. 52.

The war was shown to be casting its shadow everywhere, with the danger that if steps were not taken at once, it was all too easy to fall prey to an overwhelming sense of fear, anxiety and depression. Horlicks, in a further advertisement of 27 January 1940, shows a wife and mother writing a ‘letter to “somewhere in France”’ in ‘the shadow of war worry’.13 Via these examples, a sense of dread and gloom is portrayed as spreading over the nation, with dire consequences for the mental health of the populace. Exploiting this apparent emotional vulnerability, the Parker Pen Company (Figure 2.3) highlights the emotional trauma of separation and uncertainty. War is described as, ‘a tragic reality, with anguish of partings and absence of loved ones’, with only ‘the long days of waiting to look forward to’. If life on the Home Front in those first months was akin to Martin Green’s description of ‘an atmosphere of dos and don’ts, of

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punishments and reports, of lights out and school meals and pedagogical praise and blame [as well as] solicited sacrifices and exhortations to show the right spirit’,14 then advertisers effectively captured that mood and were able to win the appreciation of those who saw such advertisements. This propaganda was effective because there was a measure of reality in it that captured the attention of the public. The British people saw themselves in this advertising and could draw on these examples to vindicate their position relative to the war, and alleviate the situation of being at war. While the government had unleashed a barrage of official regulations in an effort to compel the people to act in the prescribed way, these proved an inconvenience and annoyance, especially in the face of the lack of activity that characterized the Phoney War. The people, through this period, were harangued for their apathy, boredom and frustration, which were taken in official circles to be indicative of low morale. Harold Nicolson, M.P. and from May 1940 Parliamentary Secretary to the MoI, recorded in his diary at the end of September 1939: ‘We have all the apparatus of war without war conditions. The result is general disillusion and grumbling, from which soil defeatism may grow,’15 a situation accurately conveyed in commercial advertising. Whilst the government might exhort the people to be cheerful in the face of this rather austere environment, advertisers could highlight how being at war was a ‘bind’, that it was acceptable to think in this manner and how people might focus on an ordinary life, outside of the war, and make the best of a bad lot. Despite the government’s ambitions that a sense of popular ownership of the war and active engagement in it would evolve, this was not necessarily the case, with commercial advertisers reflecting this mood of reluctance. Such advertisements did not suggest a volte face on the part of the public as it embraced a new, war-spirited demeanour but rather highlighted means by which a regular cultural identity might be perpetuated. Despite the best efforts of the government, the dramatic impact of the war was not felt and the exhortations of the MoI to show the right spirit and engage with the war appeared particularly misplaced, if not wholly irrelevant. As Angus Calder observes, ‘The first impact of the

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war was felt, not like a hammer blow at the head, to be warded off, but as a mass of itches, to be scratched and pondered.’16 The prevalent ‘official’ message for the first six months of the war was at odds with the situation as it actually was and as such could be either ignored or sneered at. Meanwhile, commercial advertisers stepped into the breach to show people how a normal life could indeed be lived in spite of the war. Yet this did not accord with the government’s determination that the ‘People’s War’ required a mood of enthusiastic bravado: ‘cheerfulness’ to ‘bring us victory’, fighting with ‘all your might’ to defend ‘freedom’ rather than a complacency that was more concerned with living ‘as normal a life as possible’. Nevertheless, the people’s engagement with the war was shaped more by their day-to-day experiences than by lofty rhetoric and the demands made of them in posters. The government, especially given the absence of an intelligence division at this time, remained committed to propaganda that was designed to be calming and reassuring in the face of a terrifying airborne bombardment.17 That this did not actually materialise for the first 12 months of war served to make government messages inappropriate, if not wholly irrelevant. In contrast, commercial advertisers appeared to have a better appreciation of the mood of the public and were prepared to draw on this (if not exploit it) in the interests of selling their products. Rather than relying on reassuring exhortation as in the case of the MoI, commercial advertisers offered a frank description of the situation as it actually was at that time while simultaneously offering their products as the solution to overcoming some of the difficulties being faced. Advertisers’ interests were best served by referring to the fact that ‘most of last Saturday’ was spent ‘filling sandbags on Hampstead Heath’, making your ‘muscles ache in places where I didn’t know I had any’ and that writing ‘A LETTER TO “SOMEWHERE IN FRANCE”’ would, naturally, be a cause for worry (see Horlicks advertisements above). In such ways, advertisers were able to offer some validation of the worries and anxieties of those who read their advertisements, suggesting they were natural, while also offering a solution in the consumption of their product. By such measures advertisers painted a picture of a world turned

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‘upside-down’, with the spectre of war being greeted with a certain dread. Commercial advertising was at once more in tune with the British people than other forms of propaganda and keys into the prevailing mood at that time. Advertisers painted a realistic scenario and set out to offer practical solutions to the disruptions to everyday life. This was particularly the case when it came to food and drink.

Adding to ‘Your Wartime Worries’ Rationing was not launched immediately on the outbreak of war (although it was obvious that such a system would be introduced in time) and, as such, food and drink advertisers were, in theory, free to continue ‘business as usual’.18 Yet, September 1939 saw a dramatic fall of 43 per cent in food and non-alcoholic drink advertising expenditure as compared to August.19 Certain product groups within this sector faired better than the sector as a whole, as advertisers anticipated the pressures on consumers to use the limited and bland goods that would inevitably soon be all that was available. This is seen in the increased advertising of beef and chicken extracts, sauces and pickles, soups and gravy makers, and table salt. Unlike other sectors, these product groups started growing on the outbreak of war and continued to show an overall growth throughout. The advertising message that wartime food was likely to be bland and would need pepping up, adopted from the outbreak of the war, was repeated and extended throughout the conflict. This group used the wartime situation extensively to promote their goods as the answer to improving wartime fare. Through their advertising, manufacturers of sauces, meat extracts, condiments and soups positioned themselves as a friend to the housewife who was now required to maintain varied and appetizing menus in the face of a dwindling variety and volume of food. Producers could hope to drive up product sales by positioning their goods as the solution to a drab and uninspiring diet. Hence, from October 1939, Bovril ‘makes meat more tasty and more “interesting”’ and by October 1940 had become ‘an essential item in war-time diet’, making ‘other foods more appetising’20 (Figure 2.4).

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Figure 2.4

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Source: Picture Post, 12 October 1940, p. 4.

In the examples in Figure 2.5, Mason’s OK Sauce promised to make ‘War‘Fare’ breakfasts appetizing’. HP Sauce suggested that its product could make wartime dishes delicious, and Vita-Gravy made the ‘mixed vegetables under their crisp wheatmeal crust [. . .] taste twice as good’ in this Woolton Pie. The manufacturers of products in these groups were able to exploit a niche that was particularly apposite in wartime. Further, such an approach appeared to accord with the attitude of consumers and provided advice that was appreciated and acted upon. Between 30 November and 18 December 1942, the government carried out a survey to ‘determine the relative importance to housewives of twenty-one foods’ and ‘the extent to which their use has changed’. Of the sample of 4,760 housewives, two-thirds were found to use Bovril (which was often used as a generic heading for a variety of similar products, such as Oxo or Bisto) more often now

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Figure 2.5 Source: Picture Post, 2 December 1939, p. 10. Picture Post, 1 March 1941, p. 33; Picture Post, 25 October 1941, p. 3.

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than before the war.21 Oxo was promoted as the means to give your vegetables a meaty effect while Bisto was the means to ‘tasty gravy’ and for ‘helping out the stews’.22 Such products could come to the aid of the housewife in the face of the shortage of meat, and it may well have been in such advertisements that inspiration was found and a positive purpose served. Advertising was quick to take advantage of the new opportunities opened up for certain products by the war and, as such, while the overall impact of the outbreak of war may have appeared dire for the advertising industry in general, there were some glimmers of hope that, far from sounding the death knell for commercial advertising, the war merely represented a new challenge to reposition products in sympathy with the new situation. As a consequence, the overall fall in food and drink advertising proved to be short lived, and from October 1939 onwards, expenditure started to recover. The most startling growth from any one single advertiser in this period came from Kellogg’s Corn Flakes, who increased its spend from just £15 in October to £3,009 in November 1939.23 It seems likely that this was in response to the impending rationing of bacon, which was made public in a statement to the House of Commons on 1 November. Kellogg’s, seeing its opportunity of eclipsing bacon as the preferred breakfast, increased its advertising spend accordingly.24 Through such efforts, advertisers set out to prove that life did not necessarily have to change beyond all recognition on account of the war and, further, that it was possible to retain some pleasures in life. Food was a key marker as far as this was concerned and it was hoped, not least by producers of those goods, that the careful and thoughtful use of certain products meant that you did not have to wholly resign yourself to the grim, austere conditions of wartime. Such a message was likely to meet with a highly receptive audience and consequently be effective. Clearly people wanted to retain the flavour and variety in their diet that they had been used to, and advertisers suggested how that might be done, offering a route by which, if fleetingly, to escape the war. The extent of people’s engagement with the war, contrary to the ambitions of the government, was limited and conditional. There was

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a pronounced gap between supporting the war per se and making substantial and significant sacrifices in its interests purely for the sake of it. The people engaged with the war on their terms and on the condition that, in certain respects, in certain ways, and at certain times, they could live a normal life. The example of evacuation provides a good example of the British attitude to war and the situation as it unfolded. The idea of evacuation, while appreciated in principle, placed an extraordinary burden on families, a situation that was exacerbated by the absence of the threat that was the initial motivation. While evacuation was initially widespread, as evidence of a further effort to exclude the war and live a normal life many parents soon brought their children back home. Calder notes: ‘Cambridge had expected 24,000 evacuees. It received 6,700. By November 11th, 1939, only 3,650 remained. By July 14th 1940, this had fallen to 1,624. These figures were not exceptional. Evacuation failed.’25 Nearly 700,000 evacuees in England and Wales had gone home by the beginning of 1940. This figure represented four out of every ten children and approaching nine-tenths of the mothers and children under five, and really typifies the people’s early engagement with the war: an initial acceptance of the terms being imposed upon them followed by a growing realization that a total disruption of life was both unnecessary and unwelcome, as further witnessed in popular reactions to the blackout. The most common grounds for grumbling was in regard to the blackout, given that it was the cause for a dramatic transformation of life, with many people choosing simply not to venture out during the hours of darkness but staying in instead. The blackout had the effect of making people feel inferior as they groped around in the dark. George Beardmore recorded in his diary for 7 October 1939: ‘It all seems very humiliating, this cowering down in expectation of death falling from the heavens.’26 Notwithstanding the psychological trauma associated with the blackout, it represented a very real danger in other ways. In September 1939, the total number of people killed in road accidents increased by nearly 100 per cent. According to a Gallup Poll published in January 1940, one person in five claimed to have sustained some injury as a result of the blackout.27

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Thus, the blackout really characterized the popular reaction to the outbreak of war, a feeling of gloom and despondency, a deep-seated dissatisfaction that the government should impose itself in this way when it appeared that such measures were wholly unnecessary. In all, a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the war coupled with a determination not to engage with what was going on around them in an effort to sustain normal life. Advertisers stand out in capturing this mood and offering an honest portrayal of how the people were actually feeling as identified in the blackout—a source of great depression among the general public and a clear signal of the very real dislocation of normal life. They warned the British people that it might, if they relaxed their guard, sap their positive spirit and good humour. Worthington beer cautioned: ‘There is a simple duty laid upon you that may yet steal your cheerfulness (and with it some of your courage)—the “black-out”’.28 Those on the Home Front were shown skulking around in subdued light that would effectively put an end to a cheerful, normal life if it were allowed to. In the case of Osram Lamps, ‘low light’ meant ‘low spirits’, and customers, or potential customers, were urged to switch to Osram: ‘Light up— and smile!’29 Meanwhile, Rosebank Fabrics went to some lengths to demonstrate how the blackout could put paid to normal life in the home in a series of advertisements that appeared in Picture Post through December 1939 (Figure 2.6). Rosebank offered simple steps to lift the spirits and cope with the blackout while giving ‘official’ recognition that it was a source of great inconvenience and depression. In the example from 2 December, Mrs Bright suggests that you ‘can still be cheerful, yet show no light’. In the execution from 9 December, Mr and Mrs Gloom can stand the dreary blackout no more and therefore take to bed early in a state of defeat. However, a much more commendable spirit is shown, once again, by Mrs Bright who has shut her door ‘on old devil Black-out’ and greets ‘the long evenings “chins up”.’ In the example from 16 December, we are warned that the blackout can be the source of ‘a permanent frown’ and that every effort should be made not to fall into this slough of despair.

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Figure 2.6 Source: Picture Post, 2 December 1939, p. 57; Picture Post, 9 December 1939, p. 5; Picture Post, 16 December 1939, p. 58.

Advertising in this period drew on the blackout as a further source of depression, if you would allow it to be as much. In effect, it appears to be suggesting that the natural reaction of the average person on being greeted by the blackout was gloom and despondency, but that this was entirely unacceptable if the nation was to prevail, hence the need to purchase the product in question. Thus, Worthington urged: ‘Defend your home; fight for its smiles, its cheerfulness.’30 Further, not only was there a new war to be fought against the blackout, but also against a plethora of healthrelated conditions brought on by the war and the new, creeping spectre of ‘war nerves’. Feeding off this, the pharmaceutical sector showed resilience similar to advertisers of food and drink in bucking the prevailing downward trend in advertising expenditure. Expenditure in the pharmaceutical sector fell by just 10 per cent between September

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and December 1939 compared to the previous year, rather than 43 per cent as was the case for total advertising expenditure.31 Advertising of cough and cold cures, inhalants and vapour rubs actually increased. In common with other sectors, the war gave advertisers a new voice. Famel Syrup actually doubled its advertising, year-on-year, between September and December 1939, as its product came to the fore as the cure for coughs and colds caused by ‘black-out nights’.32 Such appeals reflect growing anxieties among the British people in regard to the state of their health, even if that might have been more imagined than real. Reporting in March 1943, the Minister of Health acknowledged that through the war there had been an increase in short-term sickness and that while 10 per cent thought that their health had improved during the war, 37 per cent thought their health had worsened.33 Through the war, people were being urged by the government to pay closer attention to their health and well-being while they were at the same time finding themselves in situations where they might have felt their health was put in danger, such as overcrowded communal shelters, or being confined indoors through the night as a consequence of the blackout with ‘close-shut windows’ and ‘badly-ventilated’ rooms. Then there was the change in diet that, notwithstanding the facts, many found to be inadequate and the main cause for the ‘low state of health’.34 The pharmaceutical sector was able to draw on this increased ‘interest’ among the public in its health and pander to this heightened need for pampering and care in the avoidance of the ‘risks’ associated with ‘coughs & colds’ and thereby continued to weather the effects of the war. Many advertisers took the apparent existence of wartime anxiety for granted, branding this (rather cynically) as ‘war nerves’. This new ailment was thought to be the obvious accompaniment to the new, troubled times in which the populace now found itself. Whether giving rise to a completely new set of ailments, or perhaps now attributed as the cause of other well-established complaints, an image was persistently conveyed of the health of the nation being adversely affected by the war. On top of all the other worries so clearly outlined

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in commercial advertisements, ill-health brought on by the war was yet another problem to be contended with in these trying times. In the case of D.D.D. Prescription, ‘rashes, itching, irritation, eczema, all become more prevalent in these nerve racking times’, thereby adding to ‘your war-time worries’ (Figure 2.7).

Figure 2.7

Source: Picture Post, 11 November 1939, p. 9.

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A further consequence of ‘war nerves’ was that they tended to rob you of your valuable sleep. As part of an ongoing campaign, Ovaltine warned: ‘Don’t let “War Nerves” destroy your Sleep!’35 Such a theme was common among most advertisers of ‘tonic food beverages’ and came against a backdrop of similar pre-war advertisements that had cautioned against getting a good, sound night’s sleep in order to be effective by day. In the pre-war world, sound sleep would ensure that you got the job of your dreams or maximised your potential in the marketplace, with commensurate reward. Now, ‘in times of nervous tension’, Ovaltine, Horlicks and Bourn-Vita were once again held up as the ideal solution and the antidote to what Horlicks referred to as a ‘widespread war-time problem’. In its advertisement of 10 February 1940, reference is made to those people who ‘crack under war strain’, leaving them feeling ‘depressed, “nervy”, tired, unable to throw off war worry’, to the overall detriment of the nation’s war effort.36 According to Ovaltine, ‘Strong Nerves and Restorative Sleep’ were in the best interests of national defence. With the comforting assistance of Ovaltine, those on the Home Front were assured that they could conquer ‘abnormal nerve-strain’ and maintain ‘a cheerful and confident outlook’.37 These advertisers, in exploiting wartime tensions in the pursuit of sales, brought such problems out into the open and were quick to point out that these should be caught early on (ideally via the purchase of the product in question) rather than allowing them to wear down the resolve of the nation. Energen Bread and Food, in its advertising, offered a similarly empathetic approach: it admitted that ‘There can never have been a time when nerve strain has been greater than it is at present, or when the logical advice to avoid it has been more impossible to follow.’ According to the company, such nerve strain was ‘inevitable’.38 Nevertheless, that is not to suggest, according to these advertisers, that the nation was resigned to its fate: such ailments, with the assistance of the variety of tonics offered as a solution, coupled with the resolve of the people, would overcome these setbacks. In the words of ‘Sanatogen’ Nerve-Tonic Food: ‘In these days it is good to know that science can help us to stand the

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extra strain, the extra stress, the extra responsibility and work which we all cheerfully accept.’39 Not all advertising painted such an honest and, at times, downbeat image of the people in the first months of the war. Indeed, many embraced the government’s ambitions to engender a sense of cheerfulness, in the same way that advertisers in the pharmaceutical sector held up their goods as a means to foster that willing resolve and natural propensity for cheerfulness that was promoted as the archetypal disposition of the average citizen in the advertising of this period.

‘There is No Propaganda Like a Smile’ Alongside those proprietary goods offered as a means to overcome the stresses and strains that, they asserted, was the consequence of the declaration of war, many advertisers in this period urged the people to smile and be cheerful and by this simple expedient steel their nerve for the fight that lay ahead in an approach that was much more in keeping with early MoI policy. In contrast to those advertisers that painted a picture of a nation burdened down with the war (and, in places, all but cracking under the strain), Guinness asked, ‘What’s the use of worrying?’ (Figure 2.8). Invoking memories of the First World War anthem, ‘Pack Up Your Troubles’, Macleans Peroxide Tooth Paste urged: ‘Pack your MACLEANS up in your old kit bag—and smile, smile, SMILE’.40 Thus, as part of the antidote to war nerves and strain, the people were being told not to worry, be cheerful and smile. According to the well-known figure of Mr Barratt of the Barratt’s shoes advertisements, ‘I don’t believe that a war— particularly a “war of nerves”—is won by gloomy faces and sackcloth and ashes. Why, the sight of a smart woman is a tonic to everybody!’41 The onus on remaining strong and cheerful was not just in terms of your own, personal good health but also in the broader interests of the nation as a whole. Cadbury’s Bourn-Vita exhorted: ‘Don’t walk about feeling like a blackout in a coal cellar—it hinders you and everyone else.’42 Worthington, for its part, ran a concerted campaign between

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Figure 2.8

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Source: Picture Post, 18 November 1939, p. 62.

December 1939 and March 1940, urging people to keep smiling. In the first of that series, appearing on 30 December 1939, while the potentially farcical nature of such requests is acknowledged, the worth of such advice is lauded: ‘For a worried face pulls others down, but a smile can go round the world.’43 The onus was placed upon all

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to maintain a cheerful countenance that would help the people to ‘brave all’ consequent upon the ‘kindliness, loving smiles, and cheerful bearing of each one of us’.44 Further, it was the very nature of the situation in which the nation now found itself that made it all the more imperative to adopt a smile and to share it with others. The implication is, of course, that such an attitude was not, naturally, to be found abroad at that time. As if to condone the picture created of the Home Front by, among other advertisers of a nation racked by stress and anxiety, Worthington cast itself as helping to lift the nation out of this apparent slough of despair, which, it is suggested, was generally prevalent. In its execution of 24 February 1940, the nation is again portrayed as vulnerable and lacking in natural courage, with Worthington offered as a useful expedient to help rectify this situation: ‘If your courage flags a little, put your troubles in their place with a Worthington.’45 However, above and beyond that, a smile is the most valuable of commodities ‘just now’: ‘The man worth while is the one who will smile when everything goes dead wrong’. For Worthington, ‘there is no propaganda like a smile’.46 In the face of the dread that these advertisers suggest was the response of the British people to the declaration of war, the ideal remedy was presented as cheerfulness, and the public was encouraged to embrace this ideal. Further, it was urged to play a positive part on the Home Front, to get engaged with the war and do all it could to contribute to the war effort, especially when achieving that state could be advanced by the consumption of their products. According to HMV, ‘we must have cheerfulness on the Home Front’.47 While the population at this time may not have been naturally disposed towards smiling, commercial advertisers hoped that perhaps those who read their advertisements would find something of themselves reflected there and would identify with the sentiment at least. It was the smile that would win through, as pointed out by Odol: ‘Let’s all smile the winning smile, the Odol Smile! Nothing more quickly dispels depression. Nothing more surely conquers all hearts. So, pack up your troubles and smile the Odol Smile.’48

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In that first period of the war from September 1939 through to March 1940, this was the predominant message of commercial advertisers as they presented a picture of the British people at war, a nation racked by ‘war nerves’, stress and strain that instead needed to ‘Keep calm, Keep confident’ and above all take all that was being thrown at them with an outwardly cheerful expression.49

Conclusion As the dreaded prospect of war gave way to the reality, the nation once again finding itself embroiled in a war in continental Europe, the scale of which could only be fearfully imagined, commercial advertisers did not shy away from telling it like it was and portraying in a graphic fashion how the war threatened to turn lives upside down. Unlike the official propaganda of the government that hoped to promote a willing and enthusiastic acceptance of the war, advertisers portrayed scenarios where the reaction was far from enthusiastic or, in many cases, averse to any real, direct engagement with war. In this manner, advertisers tried to set out how the war need not necessarily disrupt the everyday lives of the people and how, generally through the consumption of the products advertised, steps could be taken to exclude the war, as far as that was possible. What advertisers set out to do was to situate the extraordinary nature of being at war into the ordinary. They went to some lengths to prove that it would be possible for people to hold onto a peacetime life and demeanour despite the strictures and austerity that would come to colour their lives. That they should choose to take this approach accords well with the mood of the nation. War was an unwelcome spectre through the second half of the 1930s, it was not a welcome prospect, and there was a general attitude to deny it and instead engage in a sense of wishful thinking that might facilitate its demise. This attitude persisted in the first months of the war, spurred on by the fact that little happened through the period of the Phoney War, as people felt able and inclined to turn their backs on the war, make only those adjustments absolutely necessary and live a normal life. The combination of horror and revulsion at the prospect of modern

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war, associated with the reassuring realization that, in actual fact, the cataclysm predicted failed to materialise served to turn people away from the war and back to a normal existence, as far as that was possible. What these advertisers did, albeit in their own interests, was to promote their products in such a way as to illustrate how these goods could be used to alleviate the impact of war and maintain a normal existence. In effect, as the government attempted to encourage people to become directly engaged, to take ownership of the war as the war of the people, advertisers were showing the war as simply another inconvenience in the practice of everyday life. Through the scenarios illustrated, the war could be absorbed into the ordinary: these goods could create a distance from the war, keep it at arm’s length, rather than drawing the people in entirely and allowing the war to become a day-to-day credo. While this may be a rather ambitious prospect given the forecast cataclysmic nature of this war, it accorded well with the mood of the nation and was more in tune with the people than the early efforts of the MoI. As Paul Fussell observes: Wars are all alike in beginning complacently. The reason is psychological and compensatory: no one wants to foresee or contemplate the horror, the inevitable ruin of civilised usages, which war will entail. Hence the defensive exercise of the optimistic imagination.50 This was particularly accentuated in Britain at the beginning of World War II. There was an overriding desire among the majority of people to deny the war, despite its obvious manifestations around them: to ignore its threatening prospect and just ‘keep on, keeping on’. Advertisers fulfilled an informative function in attempting to illustrate how that might be achieved. Clearly this was contrary to the wishes of the government and how it felt the people should be preparing themselves and engaging with the war. This was not the willing, enthusiastic and unquestioning commitment that it felt would be required if the nation was to prevail. This honest portrait painted by advertisers of a nation racked with stress and anxiety, grumbling about the prospect of digging up

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the back garden to accommodate an Anderson shelter, having to take on additional duties above and beyond their normal work was not the courage, cheerfulness and resolution that the government believed would be essential, and more or less equated to the ideal of ‘People’s War’. As the war unfolded beyond its declaration in September 1939, the people became less, not more engaged, a situation arguably not helped by the overarching policies of the government. There was widespread disengagement with the war, a situation encouraged by the Chamberlain administration, which stopped short of taking decisive action to move the nation on to a total war footing. In this respect, there was a complacent attitude towards the war. The power of advertising was that it showed life as it was, it sought to reflect back the lives of people and thereby hoped to be able to find a place for its products within that scenario. War was shown to be an unwelcome intrusion into everyday life, and advertisers set out to demonstrate how life need not be changed beyond all recognition. That is not to suggest that the people were not committed to the fact that the nation was at war, or even that they were not prepared to do what was necessary, including making extraordinary sacrifices in its service; rather that they preferred to keep the war at arm’s length instead of at the very centre of their being. The people’s engagement with the war was limited and conditional: if a normal life could to some extent be led, if the oppressive prospect of war could, at times, be excluded, then this served the people well and, ultimately, would steel them for the battle that lay ahead. As Nella Last recorded in her diary for 29 February 1940: Some days I am so busy I can only think of what I’m doing, or the immediate tasks ahead, and I’ll have a static feeling of happiness—a rhythm of mind—when the realisation of WAR sweeps over me [. . .]. It passes, but I often wonder what I’d do if my days were not so full.51 In the first months of the war a distinctive attitude emerged, largely fostered by actual events, or the lack of them. The British people, while broadly supportive of the war, were not necessarily enamoured

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at its prospect and were determined, as far as possible, to hold onto some semblance of normal life. As yet this was really to be tested and, in these first days, was certainly not lauded as something commendable or noteworthy. However, this bloody-minded determination to keep going, to hold onto those aspects of life which were private, personal and important, despite their apparent triviality, was to evolve into a sense of stoicism at the heart of the war effort and that was, in time, broadly promoted as the Blitz spirit of the British people.

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‘A National Duty’ Benger’s, Picture Post, 12 October 1940, p. 3 If the public’s engagement with the war over the first months had been less than enthusiastic and lacking in commitment, in the wake of Dunkirk, as the nation awoke to the magnitude of the undertaking it faced, a renewed vigour and concentration on the war swept across the country. In this climate, commercial advertisers came in for their greatest criticism and also enjoyed their strongest defence by the government. Irrespective of paper shortages and the pressing need to use all available space to keep the public informed, the place of advertising was defended on the basis that it sent out a clear signal to those at home and overseas that life in Britain had not been entirely disrupted. Further, it was generally accepted that such advertising could play an important part in communicating specific instructions and conveying what was thought to be the correct attitude in keeping with the ideal of the ‘People’s War’ and, subsequently, foster a sense of engagement that came to be characterized as ‘Blitz spirit’. Various attitudes could be projected that clothed the inevitability of wartime life within the more dramatic garments of a specific war-orientated culture. Thus, the regrettable fact that so many proprietary goods were unavailable could be presented as a means via which the people

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could demonstrate tolerance and forbearance: key notions within the spirit of the Blitz. As the Phoney War subsided, so the nature of commercial advertisements evolved, both to key into the heightened sensitivity of the people and in an effort to quieten critics who maintained that such advertising had no place as the nation was sucked more deeply into war. In so doing, these advertisers played a part in the projection of a clear set of norms, determining appropriate conduct in wartime and a simple means by which that might be achieved. Through the simple expedient of placing their goods within the war on the Home Front, these producers could paint consumption under a patriotic guise. At a time when many in Britain were crying out for practical instruction that told them what they should be doing, commercial advertisers dressed up their campaigns in such a way as to cast the simple practice of using their products as part of the war effort.

A ‘Great National Service’ As part of an ongoing trend, set in motion on the declaration of war, commercial advertisers tentatively set about adjusting their copy to reflect the changes across society and to key into the new vernacular that was emerging. There had been cases from early in the war where advertisers had set out to incorporate government messages in their own advertising, even if they often did so with a degree of cynicism in keeping with their first reactions to the state of the nation as it entered the war. That well-known brands, in well-accustomed locations within the media, should incorporate these rather alien messages further served to make such attitudes more pervasive. Thus, when the Ministry of Information (MoI) warned ‘Don’t Help the Enemy. Careless Talk May Give Away Vital Secrets,’ commercial advertisers embraced this new message. However, crucially they tended to take a more light-hearted approach than the MoI’s heavyhanded and didactic line, generally more in keeping with the popular mood and reaction.1 Cooltipt cigarettes, for instance, ran a series of advertisements in Picture Post between November and December

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1939 that parodied the MoI’s ‘Careless Talk’ campaign. The example seen below clearly pastiches the BBC, with the announcer admonished for being reckless in the content of the ‘statement previously broadcast’ and an MoI-style poster clearly visible in the background (Figure 3.1): here was an excellent example of one of those ‘itches’ to be ‘scratched and pondered’. The fact that such a message is drawn on is suggestive that the issue at hand is of broad interest and thereby likely to grab the attention of the reader. In other examples of this series of Cooltipt advertisements, clandestine conversations take place between a female hairdresser and her customer, a gentleman on the street and a woman walking her dog (both of whom, of course, diligently carry their gas masks), and between two ladies, one of whom sits in her limousine with her chauffeur listening in. Cooltipt was not unique in its approach or in its choosing to reproduce current posters. In January 1940, Julysia Hair Tonic Cream used another poster, ‘familiar to all our troops in France’.

Figure 3.1

Source: Picture Post, 25 November 1939, p. 5.

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The message here, albeit in the service of selling hair cream, is clear: those in the services should keep what they know under their hat. A similar version of the poster featured here (Figure 3.2) subsequently appeared on the Home Front in February 1940, adjusted to make reference to munitions production. Through such methods, commercial advertisers might reinforce prevalent government campaigns while at the same time drawing attention to their own advertising messages via the expedient of using images already familiar and deemed to be of importance to the public in general. While there is no definite evidence relating to such campaigns to suggest that the MoI was keen to encourage the inclusion of such messages in commercial advertising (for instance through successive repetition of the ‘Careless Talk Costs Lives’ slogan), the impact and influence that this was likely to have could only be reinforced, and the posters and images of that campaign became all the more familiar. As the MoI’s creative approach to the ‘Careless Talk Costs Lives’ campaign altered, so advertisers were quick to take heed of this and ensure that the most up-to-date posters appeared in the background of those advertisements that incorporated that message themselves. Thus, Cherry Blossom Boot Polish in the example in Figure 3.3 from April 1940 incorporated one of the popular Fougasse posters.

Figure 3.2

Source: Picture Post, 20 January 1940, p. 43.

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Figure 3.3

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Source: Picture Post, 20 April 1940, p. 62.

Based on this evidence, it would appear that commercial advertisers were more sensitive to the public mood than the MoI at handling issues around gossip and rumours on the Home Front. While advertisers had been using humour in handling the matter of ‘Careless Talk’ from November 1939, it was not until towards the end of July 1940 that the MoI came around to this way of thinking. While the

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Fougasse posters (first introduced in February 1940) were a notable success, the later ‘Silent Column’ campaign introduced in early July was described as a ‘ghastly failure’.2 This campaign failed where others succeeded because, according to Home Intelligence, the public was fed up with campaigns of this type that took the form of ‘unconstructive prohibitions’ compared to other campaigns along this theme, such as ‘Keep it under your hat!’, which avoided browbeating the public.3 Commercial advertisers persisted in not taking the war too seriously and appeared to be more in step with the public mood than the government. While advertisements played their part in insisting on the need for secrecy, caution and censorship as part of the new language of British society, by employing a humorous approach they dressed up these austere measures as a new part of everyday life to be accepted with good humour. In essence, commercial advertisers were more subtle in the manner in which they conveyed such measures, helped a good deal by the fact that familiar brands and characters had not changed wholesale but rather adapted to the new wartime life in a more measured fashion. There was no volte face on the part of these advertisers and their spokesmen, rather a change in atmosphere and background. An entirely new wartime cultural identity was not adopted; instead life was shown to be carrying on in its normal grooves but with these new guidelines tagged on. Such messages were clearly not in earnest and if an air of cynicism might be noticeable in these advertisements, it accorded well with the mood of the nation and, given the general lack of urgency around the war in general, was unlikely to attract the attention of critics. This rather cavalier attitude was also reflected within the government. Throughout the period of the Phoney War, with the Chamberlain administration characterized by a lack of urgency in regard to the war effort, the commercial advertising industry was able to avoid the unwelcome scrutiny of those in positions of power. As pointed out by Paul Addison, Chamberlain hoped for only a limited war and believed it would be possible to get through it without any major upheaval in the pre-war order.4 However, as the nature of the war dramatically changed and the enemy loomed large on the horizon, attention was turned to the extent to which the new

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Churchill coalition, which had come to power in May 1940, would more truly embrace the notion of total war, ensuring that the economy was wholly focused on its successful prosecution. Alongside this newly invigorated spirit, there was more open criticism of the government and the way the war was being conducted, with advertising proving an easy target as an example of the flagrant waste in a nation that was supposed to be engaged in total war. Nevertheless, the Churchill government was quick to demonstrate that it was only prepared to ‘interfere’ as much as was absolutely necessary. Although the formation of the Churchill coalition focused on the economic war effort, pragmatism was the guiding principle. Later in the war, Churchill explained that the principle on which the coalition had been based was ‘everything for the war, whether controversial or not, and nothing controversial that is not bona fide needed for the war’.5 The advertising industry was able to take advantage of this approach and consolidate its relationship with the government further, being drawn into its confidence and working closely with the MoI. This association, in effect, helped to shield the advertising industry from criticism, with the government keen to protect the interests of advertisers. In June 1940, Lewis Silkin, M.P. for Camberwell and Peckham, asked the Minister of Supply, Herbert Morrison, in the House of Commons whether it was his intention to prohibit the use of posters for advertising altogether. In response, Morrison referred to the new Control of Paper (No. 16) Order that had come into effect on 27 May 1940 and restricted the use of posters. Under the terms of that order, certain types of poster were prohibited altogether and the size of other posters and their exhibition were restricted. Speaking in defence of posters, Thomas Levy, M.P. for York, West Riding and Elland, suggested that certain benefits might well accrue from the persistence of poster advertising, claiming that the poster industry was ‘of great national service, particularly in these times’.6 Morrison was in agreement that such advertising could be valuable. The government was sympathetic to the notion that advertising could serve a useful purpose by informing the people and directing them towards the best form of conduct in time of war.

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Feeding the ‘Will-to-Win’ In the period from April to July 1940, the picture of a nation racked by stress, strain and war nerves painted by commercial advertisers subsided as they began to offer more practical advice on how to conduct life on the Home Front. With the Norwegian fiasco, and subsequently as Hitler turned his attentions westwards, launching a devastating attack on the Low countries and ultimately France, war for the first time forced itself centre-stage in people’s day-to-day lives. Albeit belatedly, the people now sought to engage with the war and looked to those in power for direction and explanations. Muriel Green, an 18-year-old garage assistant from Snettisham, Norfolk, wrote in her Mass-Observation (M-O) diary for 14 May: Why have we not had instructions? Why not a Public Information leaflet on the subject along with other wartime instructions we have had? After all we had plenty of pre-war ARP and ever since the war not a word to the civil population on what to do on enemy invasion. I wonder if the government has any plans.7 Meanwhile Doris Melling, a 23-year-old shorthand typist and hospital library assistant from Liverpool, reckoned: ‘Slowly but surely the British public is realising the predicament we are in.’8 As the apparently inconceivable was played out in mainland Europe, the degree of wishful thinking subsided and there was a marked increase in public anxiety. This reinvigorated national mood is clearly reflected in the advertising of this period. Despite the grim picture on the continent and evidence suggesting the overwhelming superiority of German forces, morale remained high and Robert Mackay suggests that ‘the overall picture is of a nation apparently undismayed by setback and committed to resistance in a spirit of optimism about ultimate victory’.9 This invigorated public spirit was evidenced in a desire among the people for guidance and instruction. M-O recorded that ‘everywhere people were eagerly waiting for directions’.10 In keeping with this desire to

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get involved, commercial advertisers gave over their space to highlighting the various new ‘institutions’ and situations and suggested means by which the people could interact with these. By adopting this ‘responsible’ position, the advertising industry could hope to quieten its critics, reassured by the idea that it was making a useful contribution to the war on the Home Front. The government appeared to be appreciative of this attitude, believing that commercial advertising could perform a complementary service to its own activities. Judicious advertising that was instructive and in accord with the government’s attitudes would at least complement its activities—a situation that became even more pronounced as the war moved physically closer. With the signing of the French/German armistice on 22 June 1940, the notion of a German invasion became a distinct possibility. There was a discernible sense of panic within the MoI as it was particularly concerned with the public’s perception of the government. In the wake of the circulation of its pamphlet ‘If the Invader Comes’ in mid-June, people were expressing some confusion as to whether they were expected to engage the enemy or merely stand aside. The message from the government appeared ambiguous. Such confusion was blamed on the government’s unwillingness to issue orders and this was taken in some quarters to mean that it was weak and irresolute. In presenting the Home Morale Emergency Committee’s June report, Duff Cooper, the new Minister of Information, warned the government that: [T]he public is tired of being left to find itself ways of helping in the war effort. People want to be ordered about, to have sacrifices imposed on them [. . .] unless the demand for compulsion is met, the public will feel the Government lacks efficiency and energy.11 In the light of this renewed sense of urgency and the demand for sacrifice, the MoI looked askance at the commercial advertisers who were consuming valuable space within a diminishing press. The MoI was of the opinion that government advertising should take

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precedence over commercial concerns, given its duty to keep the people informed on matters of national importance. In an internal memorandum, the MoI observed: The reduction of newspapers to six pages will probably raise as an urgent issue the matter of accommodating Government as well as commercial advertisements. There is no question but that Government publicity must have ‘first show’.12 Such action, if taken, would fundamentally change the appearance of the press and have serious implications for commercial advertisers. In the event of advertisers being unable to secure space in the press, and with poster advertising having been effectively stopped through paper rationing, producers would have had no option but to stop advertising altogether. This would mean the end of the commercial advertising industry. However, a variety of factors conspired to ensure that no action was taken. Not only did the advertising industry and the press represent a powerful body that the government was unwilling to antagonise but, as has been demonstrated above, the government believed that commercial advertising had an important part to play in the war effort. The MoI, instead of effectively requisitioning press advertising space, acted to guard the variety of advertisers in the press, appreciative that this was important in keeping people engaged with the news. This approach was enshrined in its ‘Press Advertising: General Policy’ of July 1940, which ensured that a ‘balance is kept so that the newspapers do not become merely official news sheets’.13 Having escaped sanction from the government, commercial advertisers engaged in their role, offering instruction and direction to those on the Home Front with a continued degree of honesty which, it was hoped, would prove to be in the interests of all. While highlighting the multiple problems associated with living through wartime, they also set out to provide solutions and explain how the judicious use of the products advertised might be in the best service of

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the war effort and a simple expedient by which to engage with the war. In this respect, the overwhelming weight of advertising pointed to the difficulties and frustrations that were to be associated with diet. Advertisers were determined to draw attention to food shortages along with the predicted dull and uninteresting fare that soon would be all that was on offer. As such messages came to dominate the advertising appearing in Picture Post; they painted a picture of a dreary wartime diet that would need pepping up in order to get around shortages and relieve the likely anxiety that would inevitably be associated with preparing appetizing meals in wartime; they pointed to the need to make the little food that would be available go further; they indicated the changing nature of eating, highlighting the need for ‘food on the go’ in keeping with the new busy lifestyle and the need for quick energy; and they drew attention to the nature of the food being consumed, alerting readers to issues of nutrition, good health and vitamin content. For many companies, the prospect of a dull diet represented an opportunity as their products could be used to plug gaps and add flavour to what was on offer. As such, advertising from this sector in this period painted a dire picture of wartime diet that might in turn have acted as a self-fulfilling prophecy, whether the diet was as bad as portrayed or not. Graphic imagery was used to demonstrate the deprivation that the British people were expected to endure. Although often taking a humorous approach, the message being propagated was clear: there would be less food to go around. The advertisement for Red, White and Blue Coffee is typical in drawing attention to the new wartime regime, even if in this case they could not hope to benefit directly (Figure 3.4). The relatively miniscule wartime ration of meat is graphically illustrated and the deficiency of coupons pointed out. Alongside this, advertisers made constant reference to the drab nature of the food that was to be inflicted on the nation. As illustrated previously, advertisers of sauces saw in this new austerity the ideal opportunity to promote their goods and Mason’s OK Sauce was at the forefront of those efforts. Mason’s cautioned that ‘All your meals need a dash on, Now that rations are the fashion’ and that if you were to enjoy ‘War‘fare’, you would need

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Figure 3.4

Source: Picture Post, 13 April 1940, p. 14.

to put a ‘dash on your ration’.14 Thus, commercial advertisers reflected the national dialogue in regard to the inadequacies of the food situation from the very introduction of rationing in January 1940. However, while food rationing was portrayed in a negative light in terms of the limited volumes available and the drab nature of what was on offer, it was to be accepted as a necessary evil. Goodall, Backhouse & Co. Ltd., in their advertising for Yorkshire Relish, suggested: Don’t face your ration with a frown And feel the Butcher’s let you down!

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Prime cuts are rather hard to get, But there’s a better way to whet That jaded War-time appetite And give your dishes new delight.15 In this way, difficulties in the kitchen were added to the burden of those on the Home Front and the suggested sense of stress and anxiety that advertisers had been so keen to illustrate in the first months of the war. In its advertising of April 1940, Stork Margarine made a long list of the difficulties that faced the housewife: she would now need to know how to cook unrationed meats; how to use up scraps; how to save money on meat dishes; how to make cakes without sugar; the best ways to use tinned foods; and how to save her dinner if a warning came. Stork Margarine offered its wartime cookery book for answers to these questions and ‘ways to save money, to save waste, and to save anxiety about wartime food’.16 Once in possession of this valuable item, ‘there are NO FOOD PROBLEMS’, whether the average consumer was finding the new wartime regime problematic or not.17 As new items were added to the list of rationed goods, so new advertising campaigns appeared in order to assist the housewife in this difficult and rapidly changing environment but also to exploit these new gaps in the market. At certain points, new advertisers entered the marketplace as a result of new developments directly related to the war, while others reoriented their response. This was particularly pronounced in response to the growing scarcity of fresh eggs. From 14 June 1941, customers were required to register with a retailer in order to obtain eggs. Those who failed to do so would be unable to purchase them from 1 July. While the government’s intention was not, in the strictest sense, to ration eggs, it was concerned to ensure their equitable distribution and curtail black market activity. Through this scheme, it was hoped that each person would obtain one egg a week. However, from the outset it became apparent that it would be difficult to meet this target. As a consequence, egg substitutes came to the fore. In response, producers of such items began to advertise, while manufacturers of other products that purported to produce a real egg effect adjusted their

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advertising activity in order to exploit this attribute. Thus, on 16 August 1941, Chieftain Egg Substitute began an advertising campaign in Picture Post (Figure 3.5).

Figure 3.5

Source: Picture Post, 16 August 1941, p. 5.

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As dried egg became more of a prerequisite in the wartime kitchen, so Chieftain sought to educate the public in regard to the versatility of this product and how it should be used by offering a free recipe leaflet. Creamola Food Products Ltd., while not a new entrant to the advertising market place (having been advertising throughout the war), altered its creative execution in the face of the quasi-rationing of eggs in order to accentuate its product’s qualities in a time of egg scarcity, as shown in Figure 3.6. While employing the same visual, Creamola is repositioned from ‘the greatest pudding success of to-day’ in May 1941, to become, by August, ‘like a real egg pudding . . . yet requires no eggs’. Henceforth, Creamola was promoted as the pudding that either required no eggs or could be made with a variety of milk substitutes rather than fresh milk, thereby exploiting the niche in the market for a dessert that could be produced in the face of wartime scarcities: the

Figure 3.6 Source: Picture Post, 31 May 1941, p. 8; Picture Post, 9 August 1941, p. 3.

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product remained the same, all that changed were the attributes that were accentuated in order to increase product sales.18 In addition to the growing scarcity of food and the monotonous nature of what was available, advertisers also chose to highlight the different ways in which food was being consumed in wartime and the enhanced role that food would now be required to serve. Thus, they presented themselves as working side-by-side with their customers as they adjusted to the new wartime lifestyle. If the public took their advice and ideally bought their products, then there was no problem that could not be overcome. An image was created of a society running at all-out speed, perfectly in keeping with Morrison’s call towards the end of May 1940 to ‘Go To It’.19 Within this schematic, chocolate, for example, was positioned as the perfect complement to this all-out lifestyle (Figure 3.7). Cadbury’s was keen to point out that its milk chocolate was indeed a food and ‘the world’s most delicious way of giving yourself quick energy’ with it. However, one of its greatest qualities for those working full out for the war effort was the fact that it ‘feeds you on your feet’. Notwithstanding the veracity of this nutritional advice, here was a practical solution to one of the difficulties of wartime life. Irrespective of whether your diet would really be best served through the consumption of Cadbury’s chocolate, here was something that you could do to invoke your all-out commitment to the war. Similarly, Fry’s Sandwich Chocolate was a ‘stand-up meal’ that was ‘packed with quick energy and nourishment’ making it ‘the perfect emergency ration’. The prevalence of such advertising messages conveys a strong image of life on the Home Front where all were working at ‘war speed’ with no time to stop and eat, instead preferring to take a ‘stand-up meal’ offering the nourishment and energy needed to get that job done. Further, in the interests of the nation, the public was urged to pay close attention to its diet in order to protect good health and maintain that eager efficiency. According to Ovaltine, ‘Health and Efficiency MUST BE Maintained!’. All were shown to be contributing to the war effort: in the workshop, in the home and in the services. Ovaltine declared: ‘Never before has it been so urgent a duty for everyone to maintain the health, energy and

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Figure 3.7 Source: Picture Post, 30 March 1940, p. 52; Picture Post, 11 May 1940, p. 10.

will-to-win which are so vital to the success of the national effort.’20 A variety of food producers in turn each pointed to the health-giving properties of their particular product. Thus, ‘If they’ve rationed your Bacon and Restricted your Meat . . . You can still Shop for Health if

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you get SHREDDED WHEAT’ (a message precisely in keeping with the suggestion made by Mr B. E. Wilkinson of the advertising agency Erwin, Wasey and Co. Ltd. in April 1940). Meanwhile, Florida Canned Grapefruit would ‘Keep the Family “FIGHTING FIT”’.21 The overwhelming message was that the consumption of their products would help to guarantee that everybody was getting sufficient nourishment, ensuring that they would give 100 per cent commitment to the war effort. It was only at this point that such messages should appear entirely appropriate. Efforts made previously by the government had been patently unsuccessful in drawing the people in and getting them involved in the war. However, the time was now ripe for messages of this type and advertisers were quick to respond. There was now a desire to get involved in the war, to engage with it. According to the MoI, ‘what the public wanted were not words of comfort but of command’.22 Crucially, this greater involvement and engagement with the war came not as a result of compulsion from the government but on a voluntary basis. By the middle of 1940, for the first time civilians on the Home Front felt truly involved in the war and were keen to play an active part. Home Intelligence reported on 20 July: ‘The civilian is beginning to feel, and has been encouraged to feel, that he is in the front line.’23 Whereas advertisers might have previously shown civilians on the edge of the war, aggrieved and irritated by its imposition in their lives, they now showed them more actively engaged and prepared to get involved, even if that was on a very measured basis, precisely in keeping with the ideal of Blitz spirit. Thus, while difficulties in diet might persist, messages exhorting that ‘Health and Efficiency MUST BE Maintained!’ now resonated with the audience and by adjusting their consumption practices, or even viewing their ordinary course of practice in this new light, they could imagine themselves as part of the much vaunted engaged citizenry. The sense of urgency and importance displayed in such advertisements could help to mediate the experience and, with little effort, gave one access to the frontline of the war. Simply by caring for one’s health, or by going about one’s everyday business in the home or at work, one was portrayed as a war worker and as

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making an important contribution to the war effort. Many such images cast the ordinary and mundane as extraordinary and exceptional. Through the simple process of now placing these rather ordinary consumption practices in wartime fatigues, all could signal their commitment to the war while staying in the grooves of ‘normal life’ and sustaining a regular cultural identity rather than abandoning that in favour of a wholly new, war-minded demeanour. Between April and July 1940, perhaps the greatest impact on life on the Home Front was created by the growing imposition of rationing.24 Concomitant to this, the overwhelming weight of food advertising appearing in Picture Post in this period made reference to the new wartime diet. On this basis, concerns and anxieties regarding how to make the ration go around and how to devise appetizing and interesting meals seemed to dominate the national dialogue. Advertisers alluded to the dire situation and pointed to the ‘monotony’ of wartime fare.25 In this way, the war was seen as presenting a whole set of new challenges to the housewife who might well be overwhelmed by the situation without the help and assistance offered by well-known brands: a dash of Mason’s OK Sauce and an otherwise bland and uninspiring diet was transformed; the Stork Wartime Cookery Book would be an end to a comprehensive range of ‘food problems’; Chieftain Egg Substitute Powder and Creamola got around the absence of real eggs. Not only might such advertising be seen to be in support of the government’s own endeavours to manage the national effort, but it also alluded to the total commitment and total effort being put into the war. Advertisers pointed to those workers who had no time to stop to eat, preferring instead to take a ‘stand-up meal’ offering the ‘quick energy and nourishment’ they needed in order to go to it. Through this advertising, the nation’s thoughts were focused on the all-out war at hand, in which all were involved and in which all were keen to maintain their ‘health and efficiency’.

‘Line Up with the Fighters!’ As another reflection of the increasing seriousness of the situation as it now developed, there was an increased incidence of representations

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of the armed forces around this time. Despite the nation’s overwhelming military bearing during the war, images of the armed forces were relatively sparse in the advertising during the early part of the war. While images relating to the Home Front dominated those first months, there was a brief period between August 1940 and April 1941 when representations of the armed forces became more frequent. That such images became more frequent specifically in this period might be expected, since it was through this phase of the war that those at home came into much closer contact with it, first as the Battle of Britain was fought in the skies overhead between August and September 1940, and then with the air raids of the ‘Big Blitz’ between August 1940 and May 1941. However, despite the aerial nature of the combat, advertisers seldom chose to draw on images of or make references to the Royal Air Force (RAF), perhaps unsure of just how well it was performing and unwilling to draw further attention to the closely matched battle under way. Instead the Royal Navy was predominant. Those advertisers in this period that did choose to make reference to the armed forces in their advertising did so under three broad headings: the promotion of products that, it was suggested, would enable fighting men to commit themselves fully to the war effort, thereby guaranteeing that they were ‘fit to serve’; the suggested endorsement of the products by individual ‘fighters’, which thereby positioned such goods as the ‘product of warriors’; and the incidental inclusion of military images, perhaps to get the attention of the reader. In common with the wider popular discourse of the time, in advertisements appearing in Picture Post in this period, all men were urged to commit themselves wholeheartedly to the fighting of the war. Advertisements suggested that it was not merely sufficient to resign oneself to the realities of conscription but that one should be entirely committed to fighting the war and ensure that one was 100 per cent fit and healthy in order to give the country one’s all. Throughout all such advertisements, a vivid image is conveyed of cool, confident, well-humoured men willingly engaged in the defence of the nation and taking all necessary steps to ensure that they gave it their all. The men of Britain’s armed forces are always ‘Handsome,

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courageous, smart and bright’ and cheerful.26 Given the virtuous persona of such individuals, and the central part they were playing in the drama at hand, they proved excellent characters for product endorsement. Products ranging from cigarettes to cocoa, from razors to lozenges, from raincoats to pet condition powders, were shown to be the first choice of the nation’s gallant fighting forces. However, alongside these product associations were eager messages about just how wonderful those who made up the armed forces were. Thus, Army Club was positioned as ‘THE FRONT-LINE CIGARETTE’ best suited to ‘the fellow with a full-size man’s job to do’, while Fry’s Cocoa is endorsed by a young member of the RAF who, we are told, has ‘iron nerve’.27 Even if such ‘fliers’ might need some aid, whether it is via cocoa or the correct blend of tobacco, they are always portrayed as confident, on top of their game and trustworthy. While such advertisements were designed to sell product—in this case on the basis of the positive associations that might be drawn from such claims—a corresponding image of the high quality and immaculate credentials of those defending the country was conveyed. Those consumers thus reading these advertisements might be reassured that victory would prevail. With regard to the RAF, another cheery pilot explains that, ‘In my job you can’t afford to take chances.’ This advertisement for Four Square Tobacco is littered with quasitechnical slang that helps to demonstrate that these ‘young men’ are competent and in complete control (Figure 3.8). Meanwhile, Player’s Navy Cut cigarettes invoke the memory of Nelson to reassure readers that the nation is being afforded the protection of ‘the same fine Navy’.28 Alongside the inherent qualities of the ‘ordinary men’ that make up the armed forces, Gillette was keen to make reference to the input of the state by suggesting that those defending the country were ‘finely equipped’. With reference to both the Navy and the Air Force, readers were told that ‘[t]he country gives them the latest and best’.29 Readers of these advertisements could rest assured that ‘nothing [was] too good for our Royal Air Force in the way of equipment’. The implication was that Britain’s armed forces had the capability to

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Figure 3.8

Source: Picture Post, 5 October 1940, p. 6.

reign supreme, with Victory V Lozenges making reference to bombers flying freely ‘over land and sea’ in order to make their raids, while an army officer speaking on behalf of Afrikander tobacco explained how he was freely ‘Knocking about all over the place’.30 Thus, not only were advertisers able to draw on the armed services in order to endorse their products, but in so doing were also serving to propagate definite messages about those armed services and the men that served in them.

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In other instances, references to the armed forces appeared in a more incidental way in order to place certain products in a more obviously contemporary setting. This is well demonstrated by advertising for Cherry Blossom Boot Polish, which is now ‘Amongst all the famous regiments . . . “the stuff to give the Boots”,’ while Bob Martin’s Condition Powders dresses Tim’s ‘master’ in naval fatigues, joyfully reunited while he is on leave.31 In this example, the changes in the household are manifested by the new responsibility of caring for the dog now placed upon ‘the missus’. It is also an opportunity to reinforce once again the necessity of those on the Home Front to remain cheerful, with this weighty responsibility being accorded to Tim, whereas perhaps before the man about the house would have served this purpose (Figure 3.9). That those now appearing in advertisements happened to be in uniform added an extra force and authority to their instruction and recommendation: a military bearing suggested that the information being conveyed in such advertising was incontrovertible. Thus Wolsey pullovers, underwear and socks were the choice of colonels, admirals and commanders, while Colgate Brushless Shave Cream employed a Blimpish type to command, ‘COMPANY WILL ADVANCE—TO A SPEEDIER, SMOOTHER SHAVE’.32 Generally, however, images of men active in the armed forces were sparse for most of the war. That is not to suggest that commercial advertising through this period made no direct references to the actual events that were at large. While those in the south of the country experienced the Battle of Britain and then, in a more geographically widespread way, the ‘Big Blitz’, there are few references to the RAF and those references that are made tend to be reassuring: smiling young men of ‘iron nerve’ are shown well equipped and taking no chances. Such an approach appears to be exactly in accord with the government’s own efforts at this time, best demonstrated by its ‘Mightier Yet!’ poster campaign launched in August 1940 (Figure 3.10). Such efforts were in direct response to reported concerns among the British people that the nation did not have sufficient resources with which to successfully repel a German invasion attempt.

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Figure 3.9

Source: Picture Post, 1 March 1941, p. 5.

This campaign was devised by the MoI specifically with reassurance in mind.33 In this way, the Gillette advertising mentioned above fits in nicely with this general approach and, if not actively encouraged by the MoI, suggests an approach on the behalf of the advertiser precisely in accord with the official mood at that time. However, in more subtle ways, a clear message is given alongside all advertising of that period that features the armed forces, namely that all men are

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Figure 3.10

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Source: Imperial War Museum, IWM PST 14798.

enthusiastically dedicated to making a 100 per cent commitment to fighting the war, even if that does mean employing the services of, for instance, a Linia Belt. Initial advertising for the Linia Belt, an ‘anatomically designed’ support designed to ‘relieve weight from the spinal column . . . improving the breathing and correcting faulty posture’, thereby counteracting ‘the slackness of a sedentary life’, showed an officer of the Royal Navy ‘standing at ease’, well prepared for the ‘long hours of standing on the “Bridge Watch”’ which required ‘supreme fitness’.34 By the end of October 1940, its advertising had become more explicit: beside the strong image of the apparently confident and relaxed officer types shown in the background, we are told of ‘Momentous days—an inspiration to all men to serve their country’.35 Britain’s fighting men are shown to be cheerful in their confidence, but not to the extent that they are cocky and careless, and they are

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well equipped in order to complete the job. This brief increase in the volume of advertising featuring the armed forces and the nature of the message demonstrates the great empathy that the British advertising industry had in relation to the national mood. The advertising seen here fits in precisely with the concerns and attitude of the public and reflects what was the prevailing national dialogue. If explicit mention of the armed forces was sparse in the commercial advertising of the war years, representations of war workers, by comparison, were vast. The message propagated in the advertising of Picture Post was unequivocal: all those who remained on the Home Front were shown to be ‘in the front line now’, they were portrayed as voluntarily and cheerfully committing themselves to new and often strenuous types of work, and undertaking this at ‘war-speed’ as a vital contribution to allied victory. Munition workers were illustrated as the ‘MILLIONS LIKE ME’, ‘thousands’ of women and ‘girls’ were shown to be answering ‘the Nation’s call’ and becoming ‘enthusiastic farm hands’, while alongside a full day’s work it was expected that the average citizen would also serve, for example, in the ARP and tend an allotment.36 Such messages and images came to dominate the advertising of Picture Post between August 1940 and September 1941, contributing to an overwhelming impression of the total (and cheerful) commitment of all to fighting the enemy through useful and productive employment. Answering the nation’s call to service was only the beginning of it. While advertisers at this time were keen to highlight that the ideal citizen was quick to embrace a new wartime existence by volunteering to take an active part in fighting the war, merely adopting battle fatigues would not guarantee victory. People were repeatedly told that they had to work to their maximum potential and that they had a responsibility to ensure they retained that ‘Fitness for Service’. Homesun lamps explained how all were ‘in the front line now’ and urged, ‘Line up with the fighters! Victory depends on you at your best.’ What was required of the people was to ‘keep strong and fit in mind and body [. . .] and stay in the Front Line of fitness for the duration’ (Figure 3.11).

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Figure 3.11

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Source: Picture Post, 7 September 1940, p. 3.

No compromise would be acceptable as the nation demanded ‘100% fitness’ and Ovaltine insisted, ‘In whatever form of national work you are engaged, be sure that your service is fully efficient.’37 In a later execution, it explained that, ‘In times like these your health,

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cheerfulness and confidence are national assets. No matter where your duty lies, fitness-for-service should be your chief concern.’38 Through the extensive efforts of commercial advertisers in this period, an impression is given that to be tired, weary or ill was tantamount to collaborating with the enemy, and not in keeping with the imagined Blitz spirit that had at its core a sense of tolerance, forbearance, and stoicism. There was an onus placed upon all to ensure your ‘WARSPEED ENERGY’, whether you turned to Ovaltine, Allenburys Diet or Litesome Supporter Underwear (Figure 3.12), which even came in a gasproof ARP Service Model. Through the winter of 1940, the public was urged to take extra special care to guard its health, given that illness might easily sap the war effort. Vapex proclaimed ‘THE NATION CANNOT AFFORD COLDS’, while Kay Linseed Compound warned ‘DON’T LET COUGHS KEEP YOU OFF

Figure 3.12

Source: Picture Post, 28 September 1940, p. 37.

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DUTY’.39 Aspro also joined this dogmatic chorus declaring that there was ‘NO TIME for ’FLU’, obviously pointing out how responsible ‘millions’ turn to its product and thereby ‘avoid the complications—the lying up—loss of time—they carry on, fit and well, producing the nation’s vital needs’.40 Aspro was thus positioned as ‘Helping the Nation by HELPING the WORKERS!’.41 In the society constructed in commercial advertising, illness was simply unacceptable. In the all-out commitment to the war, the people were warned: ‘Remember a cough can make you a casualty.’42 By using devices that were meant to induce guilt and fear of inadequacy in the British people, the advertising industry effectively cautioned them not to slack off, to fiercely guard their good health and to keep fit in order to ensure that they were working to 100 per cent efficiency. Anything less was intolerable. If Herbert Morrison, speaking as Minister of Supply in his broadcast of 22 May 1940, had fired the starting gun when he declared, ‘Work is the call. Work at war speed. Good-night—and go to it,’ commercial advertisers in the following phase were keen to dominate the race.43 Throughout this period, representation of cheery and enthusiastic war workers appears to be the most common in Picture Post. Repeated images showed the ‘average’ citizen not only resigned to the needs of the nation but enthusiastically embracing the longer hours and extra work. Those on the Home Front could not avoid the message that all were in the front line now and that only by each working to their absolute capacity would victory prevail. The ideal citizen worked long hours in factory or office, then dug for victory on the allotment before meeting danger head on on ARP duty. Anybody looking on these advertisements who found themselves outside of this idealized lifestyle might have felt alienated. In the wake of the events of April and May 1940, the dominant message in the commercial advertising that appeared in Picture Post was unequivocal: work is the call, work at war speed, go to it, and while going to it, do it willingly, cheerfully and with enthusiasm, and at all cost protect your fitness to serve as victory depends on you at your best.

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Conclusion Out of Dunkirk, and as a reaction to it, a new spirit was born in Britain. Nella Last reflected on her mood on reading of the news of the ‘miracle of Dunkirk’ in her diary for 5 June 1940: a middle-aged woman who often got tired and who had backache [. . .] somehow I felt everything to be worthwhile, and I felt glad I was of the same race as the rescuers and rescued.44 The Dunkirk evacuations, the fall of France and then the period of ‘Big Blitz’ brought war into much closer proximity to the British people, drawing the nation more fully into the enterprise. And as part of this new spirit, there was a demand for instruction and direction. While the government made its own efforts, commercial advertisers also stepped boldly into the breach to fill this vacuum. That they did this, and were permitted to do this, serves to further reinforce the hold that commercial advertising had in Britain at that time. For the government’s part, the simple persistence of commercial advertising was believed to send out a vital signal that life in Britain had not been entirely disrupted by the war at a time in which there were few other signs. However, the impact of this sentiment might have been felt all the more on the Home Front. As war became much closer and as the nation endured the horrors of the Blitz, advertisers directly engaged with this new environment, frequently presenting a frank, if not negative, impression of the situation before making efforts to offer a solution to the new-found wartime problems. Although those solutions inevitably entailed the acquisition of the advertised product, frequently no mean feat in itself, advertisers were tackling problems head on: making public and more widespread what might otherwise have been private concerns and thereby sharing the load. Not only did advertisers in this period offer clearly presented instruction and direction, they also had an advantage over the government in not only getting their message heard through their sheer pervasiveness, but they had the ear of the people and represented a most effective channel for communication.

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As has already been established, the success of commercial advertising depends on being ‘in conversation’ with customers rather than taking a more high-handed or didactic tone. Given that advertisers presented ordinary domestic scenes that people could identify with, they immediately keyed into that overwhelming desire to retain a sense of ordinariness. Thus, while masquerading under the notion of the ‘grand struggle’ of the war, they presented a means by which the war might be excluded and an ordinary life maintained. Further, using well-established channels of communication and under the guise of well-known and trusted brands, the new language of war could be mediated and important instruction and direction conveyed effectively.

CHAPTER 4 FIGHTING THE WAR VIA CONSUMPTION

‘Economise now’ Mazda Lamps, Picture Post, 27 January 1940, p. 52 Despite, arguably, finding a role for themselves in offering instruction and direction as the Phoney War subsided in favour of very real threat and an enemy in much closer proximity, commercial advertisers still had to contend with the idea that their principle driver, encouraging people to spend more and consume more, apparently stood in direct contravention of the basic ideals of austerity and willing sacrifice in the interests of the war. While a rapprochement might have been reached with the government along the lines that commercial advertising could provide a useful channel of communication and could, coincidentally, convey the impression that life in Britain carried on despite the war, there was still a need for advertisers to curtail any activity that might be seen to be overtly targeted at stimulating wanton demand while also remaining true to their principles and the very raison d’eˆtre of commercial advertising. Thus, from September 1939, a growing number of advertisers chose to insist in their advertisements that it was the duty of the British people to economize in the interests of the war effort. A variety of different products were put forward as solutions to this need, but underlying those product promotions was the principle that the

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nation was now in a very different economic situation and that adjustment was required by everybody. Clearly, taking such an approach would serve the purposes of these advertisers well, given that the apparently inappropriate act of urging consumers to expend energy and money in the pursuit of specific products might otherwise have been construed as being contrary to the best interests of the nation’s war effort. The messages propagated by such advertisers could serve as a further demonstration that it might be possible to engage in the war ‘directly’ with minimum effort. For producers, there was an overwhelming desire to keep the memory of their brands alive with a view to the postwar world. In a good deal of advertising, these twin motives could be combined whereby the purchase of a branded item, whatever the obstacle may be in acquiring the same, could be seen as an act of patriotism, given that an individual’s private income was being deployed in the most prudent manner possible and in a fashion least likely to draw more resources than necessary out of the war. Further, the government was not only able to accommodate this position but offered its support. Such advertisers portrayed a grim picture of life on the Home Front and urged the people to ‘Economise now’.1 Using three ‘case studies’, Acme Wringers outlined the situation in detail (Figure 4.1). Mrs T. of Rugby observes: ‘Harry’s stopped smoking cigars—and put the car up’, while Mrs A. of Ealing Common makes reference to her husband’s salary cut. Such sacrifices contribute to that sense of hardship that, according to Acme, was a companion to the war, and as Mrs B. of Sunderland surmises, ‘It’s been harder than ever, since the war started, to keep the home going nicely.’ Whether these scenarios were more imagined than real, such advertisers cast a grim light over wartime life where salaries would be depressed, goods would become scarce and costs would go up. For example, Mothaks moth balls warned: ‘Now . . . MORE THAN EVER it will pay you to take steps to prevent the terrible damage done by moths . . . It is going to cost you much more now to replace damaged items.’2 In the light of such dire predictions, the responsibility for ‘making ends meet’ fell squarely on the shoulders of the housewife. Even Mrs S.-H., with a

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Figure 4.1

Source: Picture Post, 30 March 1940, p. 56.

‘four-figure income’, was said to be feeling ‘the pinch’ and had therefore resigned herself to doing some of the washing at home.3 Lux urged the housewife to make ‘Monday THRIFT DAY’: So many things—including clothes—are increasing in price that I think it’s time we took stock of our economies. There must be some way to cut down household expense and at the same time save money by making things last longer.4 As the war settled down to the long slog to victory in the wake of Dunkirk and the meanest effects of the ‘Big Blitz’, far from advertisers wholly resigning themselves to the dreary life of austerity,

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they took an active role in mediating engagement with the war through the consumption of their products. Even in the face of rationing, advertisers merely rose to the challenge to either keep the memory of their brand alive, or demonstrate how their product might make good a deficit found elsewhere. Thus, advertisers adopted an empathetic approach that acknowledged the hardships that their customers were facing while at the same time positioning their products as the solution. Also, making things go that little bit further was in the national interest and such economies were portrayed clearly as part of the war effort: it was seen as a ‘National Duty to Economise’.5 Such advertising offers a realistic appraisal of the situation in a direct manner that perhaps the government felt uncomfortable adopting given the early attitude of the Ministry of Information (MoI) to be calming and reassuring. So in its advertisement ‘Making Monday THRIFT DAY’, Lux can point to rising costs and scarcity of goods and, in its best interests, also position its product as the ideal and patriotic solution. The onus here for Lever Brothers is to circumvent the idea that the purchase of a higher priced, branded product should be abandoned. According to this advertisement, this would be ‘penny-wise and pound-foolish’. Now is the time to insist on high-quality branded goods. In the case of Lux, despite the higher cost, less is required (thereby making it equitable with that ‘bargain’ soap). Further, Lux ‘works at lower temperatures’ and can thus ‘make a big difference in your gas bill’, and clothes can be ‘soaked beautifully clean in 15 minutes’, therefore saving time. In one execution, all those concerns common to a wartime existence are overcome. Advertisers could thus hope to demonstrate that by the simple expedient of buying Lux, for example, you were getting involved with the war in a spirit entirely in keeping with the state of the nation post-Dunkirk. For these advertisers, adjusting to rationing and the supply of food in wartime was a part of the war on the Home Front and they were keen to highlight that ‘difficulties’ would be the result of this new legislation and that these might actually lead to further ‘anxiety’ but that they, as producers, were there in the vanguard to come to the rescue of the irascible housewife. Other advertisers gave

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their space over to offering helpful advice and suggestions as to how to make what little there was available go even further, which was the duty of every responsible citizen. According to Phoenix, ‘the clear glass oven-ware’, ‘Meat for two, does for three WHEN YOU COOK IT IN PHOENIX’. With reference to the great help they had offered to the home economist in the last war, it was claimed that the Phoenix dish ‘causes less meat shrinkage’ and ‘every drop of goodness is conserved’.6 This advertisement, which appeared in Picture Post on 30 March 1940, was particularly well timed given that meat rationing was introduced on 11 March. Meanwhile, Hovis was an additional aid given that, according to the advertisers, it needed less butter, while Bird’s Custard would make ‘MILK GO FURTHER!’.7

Maintaining Brand Awareness While some advertisers had called on consumers to exercise caution and show signs of economy from the outset of war, as the supply situation deteriorated after January 1941 others were compelled to admit that much of what the public wanted would be simply unavailable. This placed them in a potentially invidious position whereby they were keen to keep their products in the public eye via advertising but concerned that arousing desires that they could not subsequently satisfy would frustrate and alienate customers both now and in the longer term. In many cases, producers resigned themselves to the idea that the only real option open to them was to suspend their advertising. Consequently, the Statistical Review of Press Advertising reported that expenditure in 1941 was down on the previous year by 15 per cent. While there were falls across all sectors, those of tobacco and cosmetics and toiletries were the most dramatic: 42 per cent and 44 per cent respectively. In essence, the demand for products in these sectors was naturally buoyant. In the case of cosmetics and toiletries, women went to even greater lengths to maintain their femininity in the face of the adoption of increasingly male roles and came to rely more on cosmetics to maintain their appearance in the face of

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increasing limitations on their wardrobe. Advertisers who persisted in this sector moved to position their goods as the answer to such dilemmas, as in this rather extreme example in Figure 4.2. Despite in

Figure 4.2

Source: Picture Post, 2 August 1941, p. 2.

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this case being completely bereft of clothing coupons, the subject ‘hasn’t lost her looks’. Instead she is making do with her swim suit for everyday wear, enhancing her appearance by using ‘Miner’s Liquid Make Up wherever her swim suit isn’t’. While tobacco sales were sustained without the need for the expense of advertising, there was a further consideration for producers concerning the satisfaction of consumer demand in the face of growing difficulties in the supply of leaf tobacco, and it seems likely that certain advertisers curbed their advertising in order to avoid frustrating customers. In this respect, Lord Dulverton, chairman of the Imperial Tobacco Company, called on the public to adopt a ‘selfimposed ration’.8 Added to this, demand in wartime appeared to be naturally high, thereby removing the need to advertise in volume: the public was tending to smoke more, a trend that was inflated by higher salaries and wages. However, this seems to be contrary to the advice of the Advertising Association, which was encouraging producers to keep advertising to protect brand loyalty, and the actions of other advertisers who were keen to ensure that in times of scarcity consumers either insisted on seeking out their specific brand or at least choosing this in preference when it did become available. Tye, Warner and Glantz suggest that cigarettes ‘enjoy one of the most tenacious brand loyalties of any consumer product’.9 Further, when brand switching does take place, it tends to be between the brands of a single company. The combination of these factors applied to the situation of World War II suggests that tobacco producers could simply cut their advertising expenditure to little or no detrimental effect. They apparently felt sufficiently confident that consumer brand loyalty would withstand the war whether consumers were able to acquire their preferred brand or not. Besides, since the market was dominated by just three companies, any brand switching that did take place was likely to be inconsequential given the probability that consumers would merely switch between brands owned by one company, so the producer’s position would not be affected.10 In other cases, the situation was not so relaxed and advertisers had to adopt a wholly alien approach and admit that their traditional practice of driving up consumer demand would now be entirely out

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of place. For fear of frustrating consumers, copy that might in the past have been designed to extol the virtues of the products in whose service it appeared now had to be tempered. However, at the same time, advertisers and producers alike were not willing to simply stop advertising and allow the brand awareness that had taken so long to build and the goodwill invested in so heavily to dissipate. Also, the government was happy to offer its tacit support in this regard as a partial trade-off for the support that private firms were giving to the war effort. The government persisted in its belief that private concerns be allowed to make a reasonable profit where they were able to do so, anxious as it was not to antagonize private industry, which underpinned the war effort. This was directly to the advantage of the advertising industry, which effectively had its place protected in the press, and ensured that brand awareness could be maintained, even if goods were not available on shop shelves or were very hard to acquire. While such understandings were generally kept private, the government also on occasion spoke out publicly, if not to argue outwardly in favour of commercial advertising, at least tacitly acknowledging its place in wartime society. In March 1941, Reginald Sorenson, M.P. for Leyton, West, drew the attention of the Minister of Supply, Sir Andrew Duncan, to the paper being wasted as a result of ‘competitive advertisements of rival brands of drink and food’, claiming that such advertisements could not be justified either from an economic or a national standpoint. Unwilling to act, Duncan pointed out that the use of paper for advertising was already severely curtailed. Despite being pressed, the government in this instance refused to commit itself to regulating the content of advertising space. Duncan responded: I am afraid it is hardly the function of the Ministry of Supply to distinguish between advertisements of one kind and another. We are endeavouring to do it along the lines of restricting the amount of paper which may be used.11

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What is more, the cooperation of industry was particularly key in the government’s policy of ‘pooling’, or concentration of industry, and here, advertising was protected as a partial trade-off. Under the terms of concentration, firms producing similar goods were asked to arrange among themselves to transfer civilian production to one ‘nucleus’ firm that would produce a uniform, nonbranded product. Given the disappearance of well-known brands, the government was sympathetic to the desire of advertisers to maintain their brand awareness and sustain goodwill towards their products where they were temporarily unavailable. Allowing such a degree of latitude might have helped the government in its efforts to encourage certain industries to voluntarily concentrate production. In introducing Concentration of Production legislation in the House of Commons in March 1941, Oliver Lyttelton, President of the Board of Trade, said: I must say one word about brands and trade marks. Most people desire to keep their brands and trade marks in front of the public, and I think it is interesting to see that in many instances where manufacturers are engaged in Government work they are keeping their brands in front of the public by means of advertisement. We shall give all the help we can to keeping alive these trade marks.12 This was a vital lifeline to the advertising industry and the Advertising Association reproduced these words, verbatim, in an advertisement in The Times on 16 April 1941.13 The government was prepared to take only those measures deemed absolutely necessary in order to protect the nation and conserve resources. Beyond this, the advertising industry was allowed to practise freely, to preserve the market for when peace returned and trading could be resumed as normal. The government and the media evolved a tacit understanding in regard to the role that each had to play. According to Philip Taylor: [the] essential realisation that both Fleet Street and the MoI were part of the same business of winning the war, and that

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their partnership in shaping morale might help to determine its outcome, led to a mutual appreciation of the limits to which they could and could not go.14 There was an understanding within the government that the press was a crucial vehicle for communicating with the people and sustaining morale. As such, it recognized that newspapers had to retain their appeal rather than being overrun by official pronouncements; commercial advertising offered a useful diversion while maintaining a semblance of normality. What advertisers chose to say in their copy was left to their discretion. For its part, all the government was concerned to do was to manage overall paper supply. Thus, when Samuel Hammersley, M.P. for Willesden, East, asked the Minister of Supply, Sir Andrew Duncan, whether he was aware of ‘large quantities of printed advertising matter urging the community to spend, while the War Savings movement is urging them to save’ (which, he claimed, was ‘a gross waste of war effort’), the Minister of Supply was content to point out that paper control orders restricted the distribution of such material without choosing to address the issue of the nature of those messages.15 Indeed, many advertisers elected to turn the war to their advantage in their advertising copy. For manufacturers, the fact that they were now undertaking government contracts was an accolade or at least a worthy explanation as to why their products were temporarily unavailable. The fact that such advertisements appeared throughout the war suggests that the censors were prepared to take a liberal approach to the interpretation of the rules of censorship encoded in the Defence Notices. Advertisements appeared that stated that a product was not available, which might have been taken by the authorities as conveying information of vital interest to the enemy. Certain advertisers even went as far as to explain in their advertisements that their products were not available due to enemy action, without the apparent interference of the censor. As the perfumer Bourjois declared, ‘With two factories bombed and the limitation of supplies, these perfumes cannot, for a little time, always be obtained.’16

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Figure 4.3

Source: Picture Post, 12 July 1941, p. 32.

Other advertisers resorted to reminder advertising where their business had been severely affected by government action. Fuel rationing had a profound impact on the normal practices of companies that, in turn, felt compelled to respond, often positioning their products in the vanguard of the war effort. Champion Sparking Plug Company Limited provides an interesting example (Figure 4.3). This advertisement appeared as a full-page on the back cover of Picture Post, arguably the most prestigious advertising space in the entire magazine, on 12 July 1941. There is no obvious sales message; instead, attention is drawn to the ‘unique gas-tight construction’ of Champion Sparking Plugs and the consequent ‘engine-efficiency and economy’ that makes a crucial contribution to ‘all branches of motorised Government and Civilian Service’. This advertisement was intended to serve a number of purposes in the face of the evolving nature of fuel rationing. A straight promotional message to civilian

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motorists encouraging them to use their sparking plugs would have been out of place: the government was at that time taking action to curb civilian motoring and it would therefore have been inappropriate to suggest that the plugs be changed in the average civilian vehicle, since this would only be necessary if there had been extensive driving. However, it could also hope to attract positive association by highlighting how the plugs could make the petrol ration go further for those users where motoring was considered ‘essential’. Fuel efficiency was becoming increasingly important through the first half of 1941. From 31 May, there was a cut of onesixth in the basic petrol ration for goods vehicles. Then, on 2 July, it was announced that there would be a similar reduction in the basic ration for private cars in the next ration period (August, September and October).17 In the face of these developments, Champion could no longer ignore the war but instead could incorporate it in its advertising, reminding consumers of the positive attributes of its product (whether they should need to make such a purchase in the present or in a future, postwar world), while at the same time allying itself with the war effort in terms of its contribution to those ‘branches of motorised Government’ as well as the struggling commercial motorists. Despite these apparently selfless acts on the part of advertisers, suggestions persisted that some advertising might be prejudicial to the national well-being. In July 1941, Captain John Dugdale, M.P. for West Bromwich, asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Kingsley Wood, whether: in view of the adverse effect that they were having on the National Savings Campaign, will he take steps to prohibit, for the duration of the war, the display of advertisements upon hoardings throughout the country calling upon people to spend money upon the purchase of proprietary articles? In fact, of all forms of advertising, poster advertising was that most adversely affected by the war on account of the large volumes of paper it consumed, as Wood outlined in his response. However, the point

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made by Dugdale had more to do with the nature of the message than the disposal of paper. He went on: Does not the right hon. Gentleman consider it unfortunate that posters encouraging people to spend should be placed side by side with the posters of his Department which encourage people to save? Wood stonewalled, stating his belief that ‘the National Savings Campaign will not be adversely affected by leaving the position as it is’.18 While the Control of Paper (No. 48) Order of 15 March 1942 set a definite ratio of advertisements to editorial, commercial advertising was allowed to persist rather than being banned outright. William Cluse, M.P. for Islington South, spoke in defence of advertising, alluding to its support of a free and independent press. He claimed that to stop display advertisements would be to stop newspapers.19 The government’s principal objective was simply to reduce the amount of paper being used in total. When in May 1942 James Griffiths, the Labour M.P. for Carmarthen, Llanelly, suggested to the Minister of Production, Oliver Lyttelton, that the publishing of Vogue magazine be stopped by the government on the basis that it was ‘largely devoted to luxury advertisements’, Lyttelton responded: This magazine, like others, is allowed to consume paper at the rate of 1912 per cent. of its pre-war usage, with a small addition in respect of export, and its advertisements are restricted to the same proportion of its space as pre-war. The policy has been to reduce paper supplies uniformly to all types of periodicals, and I think this is the best plan. The position of the government was explicit: it was not prepared to ban Vogue and thereby enter into what Lyttelton described as ‘wholesale censorship’.20 While the government was prepared to take certain steps to ensure that any profits generated as a result of the war were not ‘misused’ and to ration paper as far as was necessary, it was

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not prepared to extend its arm to the realms of determining what private companies could and could not say in their advertising. As Charles Peat, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply, pointed out in response to further questions in June 1942: There is already a limitation on the proportion of space that may be used for advertisements of any kind in newspapers and periodicals. My right hon. Friend [Geoffrey Mander, M.P. for Wolverhampton, East] does not propose to prescribe the types of advertisements which shall be inserted in the space available.21 So long as these messages did not explicitly contradict those of the government, the advertising industry and the media were to be allowed to practise freely. Far from contradicting government messages, many advertisers had already established a habit of presenting the consumption of their goods, or at least a stoical attitude towards the difficulties associated with acquiring those goods, as an integral part of the war effort. Caley’s Chocolates was explicit in making this point. Readers were reminded of the perils facing those working the Atlantic convoys in order to bring essential supplies to the nation, supplies that took precedence over ingredients for Caley’s Fortune Chocolates. This was the ‘acceptable sacrifice’: There’s not one of us who wouldn’t forego some of the cocoa, sugar, butter, nuts and delicious ingredients which go into Caley’s Chocolates. We all have to make sacrifices.22 This appears as a warning shot across the bows of anyone who might moan about not being able to get what they want in the shops by highlighting what is more important and therefore has priority. Nevertheless, the advertiser still manages to convey something of the quality of its product by incorporating a tantalizing list of ingredients. Later, as certain products disappeared altogether from shop shelves, advertisers suggested that the public would be entirely

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in accord with this course of action. In January 1942, Fry’s Assorted Chocolates bid ‘FAREWELL—Till Victory’, declaring, ‘Fry’s are happy to release their most highly trained workers, and you, they feel assured, will willingly forego your favourite Assortment until victory is won’.23 Clearly such action was non-negotiable, whether consumers were willing to forego their ‘favourite Assortment’ or not. In December 1941, ‘blocked reservations’ for certain occupations had been scrapped and therefore Fry’s would have had little choice in releasing its ‘highly trained workers’ for ‘more vital and important tasks’. Nevertheless, such a spirit of voluntarism would reflect well on the company and such advertising copy was highly prescriptive in terms of what the reaction of consumers should be when their demands were frustrated at the shop counter: consumers were told that they should ‘willingly forego’ such pleasures.24 In this spirit of presenting consumption practices as a patriotic act and as an explicit contribution to the war effort, the radio sector was quick to realize the opportunities that the war presented to the medium. This trend is best typified by the advertising of Murphy Radio. Promoting the role of radio in a nation at war from the very outset, Murphy branded radio as one of the ‘Munitions for the Home Front’. In a campaign that ran in Picture Post between April and November 1940, Murphy maintained that a ‘good wireless set is indeed a “defence weapon” for the Home Front’, being a vital commodity in every home, ‘a precious possession . . . precious for news and information and precious for its cheering entertainment’.25 While apparently cautious not to inflate demand or encourage consumer spending at a time when the onus was on saving as a vital contribution to the war effort, Murphy was able to encourage the purchase of its products in specific circumstances. Where a home did not have a wireless set or where the one currently owned was below the exacting standards and reliability of a Murphy set, then ‘it is patriotism and wisdom to go out and buy a good wireless set just as quickly as you can’.26 However, later in the war, it could also turn this to its advantage to explain why its sets would be unavailable while keeping its products to the front of consumers’ minds. Advertising for Ultra Radio combined the promotion of ‘exciting’

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products alongside the dashing of hopes of acquiring such an item. Its advertising through January and February 1941 used large illustrations of its ‘beautiful new range of Ultra receivers’ while cautioning consumers ‘PLEASE DON’T GET TOO EXCITED’. Despite the graphic image and self-professed aim of rousing ‘your admiration’, such desires that may have built up are dashed a few sentences later.27 The advertiser even confesses that ‘it may be irritating to be told what fine sets they are’. However, the point is that by grabbing the attention of the reader, they can then remind him that their existing radio set will offer good service and that the very reason that such ‘A BEAUTY’ is not available is because Ultra is ‘very busy helping to win this war’, thus it can hope to engender the reader’s ‘patience and understanding’.28 While the intention is the same, Murphy Radio (Figure 4.4) takes a different approach. Its use of white space, artistic styling and ‘brutal’ war imagery are equally designed to arrest attention but the advertising of the product itself is confined to the body copy. The tag line that positions the company that appears in both these executions is: ‘MURPHY DOING OUR LEVEL BEST ON TWO FRONTS.’ Its position is outlined explicitly in the example from January 1941: ‘We have made up our minds about 1941. The first call on our energies and materials must be for Service requirements.’ As a consequence, it has taken the decision to risk frustrating consumer demand in the belief that its customers will be similarly committed to the war effort and willing to forego a new model because ‘[t]his is right and patriotic’. While demonstrating what it clearly believes to be a most laudable and noble attitude, it still finds room to extol the virtues of Murphy sets, which ‘will give you good service for far longer than you might reasonably expect, because it was a well-made set in the first place’. Through these various means, well-known brands continued to have a presence on the Home Front, and above and beyond that, could be presented in such a way as to suggest that they were making contributions to the war effort. To some extent, the maintenance of brand awareness became embedded within Britain’s fragile wartime state. Despite the extraordinary extension of the government’s

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Figure 4.4 Source: Picture Post, 25 January 1941, p. 7; Picture Post, 22 February 1941, p. 7.

powers, it still depended on the cooperation of private industry, notably in respect of the policy of concentration. As a partial trade-off for that, and the disappearance of well-known brands, advertising was to be tolerated as part payment and as a means of keeping the

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names of familiar brands alive. Far from proving detrimental to these advertising campaigns, such circumstances frequently gave advertisers something to say, and something to say that precisely keyed into the wartime demeanour. Prudent commercial advertising, in an effort to maintain a sense of presence, could also flag how companies were directly feeding the war and how the consumption of these specific brands could allow consumers to further extend that ambition.

The Thrill of the Chase: ‘Remember—Quality is Better than Quantity’ Where advertising could be arranged in such a way as to highlight the contribution that a company was making to the war effort, there were other instances where it might be suggested that advertisers were not entirely in accord with this wartime spirit. This is most readily highlighted in responses to the imposition of rationing. Rather than sounding the death knell for product promotion, the introduction of a scheme of rationing in certain product sectors served only to increase advertising activity. While general advertising expenditure in 1942 was down year-on-year by 5 per cent, the food and drink sector put on a 32 per cent year-on-year growth, despite the tightening of food rationing.29 Starting in January 1942, dried fruit, rice, sago, tapioca and pulses were added to the points rationing scheme. These were followed in February with the addition of canned fruit, tomatoes and peas, condensed milk and breakfast cereals in April, and syrup and treacle in July. Finally, biscuits were added in August, and oatflakes and rolled oats in December. Nevertheless, advertising in the sector of food and non-alcoholic drink persisted as producers desperately tried to forestall the wrath of consumers’ frustrated demand being turned against them and their well-loved brands. Responding to this state of affairs, advertisers attempted to appease potential consumers who might be frustrated in their efforts to find these scarce, yet advertised goods by invoking the totality of the struggle facing the nation and therefore asked consumers to be patient.

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While some advertisers resigned themselves to the disappearance of their products, others maintained that, with perseverance, it might just be possible to acquire the branded goods they advertised in preference to whatever came immediately to hand. However, more prevalent in this period were those advertisements that painted a picture of scarcity and shortage and urged consumers to work alongside them in making limited supplies go that bit further, while disposing of bottles, rubber stoppers and tubes in a responsible manner. Throughout this phase, the underlying message from advertisers was that consumers should remain loyal to brands because their very absence demonstrated the responsible and wholehearted engagement with the war that producers of those goods were making. Manufacturers were totally involved with and committed to the war, and the public, likewise, should show similar stoicism and sacrifice while remembering, in the face of the magnitude of the events that surrounded the British people, that ‘it’s not the shopkeeper’s fault’. In 1942, advertising expenditure in the confectionery sector increased, despite being the year when the ‘Personal Points’ scheme was introduced for chocolate and sweets. The introduction of rationing did not come as a deterrent to advertisers but rather as a call to action: a reason to advertise in order to explain the new situation or to extol the virtues of a particular product within this new regime, while at the same time reiterating that supplies were still restricted and that consumers should act in a ‘responsible’ manner when buying chocolate and confectionery. Mars Confections Ltd., for instance, devised a wholly new campaign in response to the introduction of the points scheme. Up to July 1942, Mars Bars had been promoted as a general diet supplement in response to the introduction of rationing and the associated difficulties in obtaining food and the need to maintain good health. In an advertisement from July 1941, the calorific value of a Mars Bar is compared to 212d worth of eggs, milk, beef and boiled sweets. The Mars Bar is clearly the out-and-out ‘winner’, being ‘man-sized’, offering ‘a meal in every bar!’30 However, starting in July, the Mars Bars were repositioned as exclusively for children as ‘M.B.s’, ‘Mars (for Merit) Bars’ and ‘D.C.M’s’ (Distinguished Conduct Mars), described as wartime ‘medals’ for children (Figure 4.5).

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Figure 4.5 Source: Picture Post, 11 July 1942, p. 2; Source: Picture Post, 15 August 1942, p. 26.

In 1941, Mars Bars were the ‘“little something” to keep you going’; in 1942, consumers were told to ‘let the kiddies know that, from now on, Mars are strictly reserved for work warranting the award of a . . . DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MARS’. By taking this approach, it might be hoped that children would come to appreciate that such confectionery had to be ‘earned’ rather than just expected. Such sacrifices were clearly positioned within the war effort and seen as a necessity if there was to be victory. Economizing, or going without altogether, was one of the new facts of life which, according to these advertisers, was to be embraced willingly as a necessary inconvenience. According to Yardley cosmetics, ‘Economy in the use of your Beauty Preparations is just one more sacrifice you must make for our War Effort.’31 It was important to stress, in the unified, patriotic struggle, that the willing sacrifice of all was called for. Short-sighted blame was unacceptable as Yardley urged, ‘It’s not the shopkeeper’s fault!’ Similarly, Stead Razor Blades told customers,

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‘Don’t see red if you can’t get STEAD’ while pointing out that it was still worth insisting on their particular brand given that they ‘last longer’.32 This was one of the inherent contradictions in the advertising of this period: while they were keen to point out that their specific brand was the very best that was available, consumers should not be disappointed if they were unable to get hold of their superior product. In one breath, they were insisting that customers bought their product because of its superiority, and in the next they were asking them not to be frustrated when they could not get what they were after and, by implication, had to compromise. For those who chose not to heed the advice of those advertisers of proprietary brands, the predicted consequences were dire. Realizing that in a restricted marketplace consumers might just accept whatever they could get their hands on, advertisers of those wellknown proprietary brands were keen to impress on the general public that this was a false economy, made all the more foolish in the light of the austerity brought on by the war. If there was ever a time when consumers were well advised to purchase well-established, tried-andtested brands, this was it. Lux was at the forefront in stressing the need to buy quality brands. On 1 March 1941, a word of caution was sounded: ‘Once the silk stockings we already have are gone, most of us will have to go without. The government will see to that.’33 The tone suggests that maybe this will be one sacrifice too far, and one not to be willingly embraced. A later example (Figure 4.6) spells out the consequences of being reckless with this most precious of resources. Here we meet ‘the Silly Young Thing’ who failed to take proper care of her silk stockings and, at the ‘Office Party to celebrate the Anniversary of the Blitz’, is forced to appear in ‘a horrid thick Pair of Stockings with no Sex Appeal at all’. ‘None of the Young Men—especially the Sailors, Soldiers and Airmen on Leave—would look at her’ and thus, rejected, she returns home alone and lives ‘unhappily ever after’. Yet all such ills can easily be overcome by using Lux soap, readers are told. In the new situation brought about by the scarcity of silk stockings, it becomes of even greater value than before the war (and the fact that it dissolves in ‘lukewarm water’ is an added advantage here). In a similar vein, Vim

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Figure 4.6

149

Source: Picture Post, 22 March 1941, p. 40.

cleaner was positioned as the essential ingredient for preserving scarce pots and pans: SHE’S SUCH A CLEVER LITTLE WIFE, And we agree with him!

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Now pots and pans are scarce and dear She keeps hers new with Vim!34 The advertising of tinned food producer Poulton & Noel also stands out in this period. Prior to July 1941, the company had been happy to persist with its regular peacetime style of advertising, with Poulton & Noel’s Vegetable Soup being advertised on the basis of its high concentration and consequent value for money.35 Despite having been through the rigours of the Blitz on London and its environs (production for Poulton & Noel was based in Southall, Middlesex), no reference is made to the war or how the product might be affected. However, from July 1941, the message was changed to state that ‘Business isn’t “AS USUAL”.’ From this point, Poulton & Noel embraces the impact of the war and harnesses it to its advantage to promote its commitment to quality, despite the fact that ‘never before in the 70 years which Poulton & Noel have been selling good foods have there been times quite like these’. While the pre-war message of value for money and the high quality of its product might have been equally relevant in the face of rationing, the firm also had to counter the fact that arousing customer desire for its products on this basis might have the unfortunate effect of antagonizing the customer when they are unable to get what they want. Its advertising now had to offset that negative reaction by embracing ‘nosethumbing gestures to Hitler’, making an effort to maintain ‘business as usual’ (despite conditions that caused ‘erratic’ supply) but not at the cost of compromising on the quality of its product.36 It is because of this overarching commitment to quality in the face of adversity that, while the customer’s first choice may not be available, by selecting any of the Poulton & Noel range they can have ‘the certain knowledge that the contents are good, pure food, full of nutriment and delicious flavour’. Changing its advertising message at this time was an essential adaptation to the realities that while it may have been able to sustain demand for its products, customers may be frustrated by disruptions to supply. Chappie Dog Food, for example, began advertising in Picture Post from the end of October 1941 in an effort to address the increasing

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difficulties facing consumers in obtaining its product. The objective of such advertising was twofold: while previously Chappie Dog Food’s aim had been to sell the advantages of its product in order to secure sampling and future or ongoing purchase, it now had the added need to encourage people to develop a loyalty to that brand even when they might not be able to obtain it. While reinforcing the notion that Chappie is ‘the ideal, all-round food for a dog’, it is acknowledged that ‘you may wonder if you’ll be able to keep faithful to his [your dog’s] trust’ in providing him with the very best diet. Irrespective of difficulties in supply, customers are urged to make ‘A “Victory” Resolution’ that ‘when conditions again permit the manufacture of sufficient “Chappie” to cope with the demand your dog shall enjoy the full benefits of a “Chappie” diet’.37 In this way, the company maintained name awareness while promoting an understanding of its product’s qualities with a view to some future purchase. Irrespective of the resilience of consumers’ brand loyalty, as shortages began to affect those brands themselves, so it was necessary to urge a little caution while still retaining that commitment to the great qualities of those products. This is well demonstrated by Lux. From February 1942, soap was rationed and therefore the quantities available to ensure that ‘silk stockings last’ were limited. At once its emphasis changed and it adopted the headline ‘A VERY LITTLE LUX CAN GO A LONG, LONG WAY’.38 While all the qualities of Lux were retained, including its ability to make ‘clothes last longer’, all this could be achieved by using less powder than beforehand. In previous advertising, there had been no suggestion that only a little of the product was required. Indeed it might have been hoped, as a result of the earlier advertising strategy, that more Lux would be sold and used assuming that consumers accepted that this was the best way to guarantee that their precious clothes would last. The whole notion that consumers should use less of a product as a result of advertising rather than more appears as something of a volte face for the advertising industry, which might normally have been more attuned to encouraging profligate consumption. Rinso spelt out the new strategy in detail with its ‘wartime way to do your Monday wash

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which makes your soap coupons go farther’. Now consumers were told to ‘take two-thirds of the amount of Rinso you used to use’. Given that Rinso could be so effective in much weaker concentration, it must have left some consumers wondering why they had not been told this before, thereby allowing them to make such a saving. The only reference to the pre-war method of using Rinso points to the decadent and superficial: ‘Of course, it’s nicer to wash with lots of suds.’39 Where advertisers adopted such an approach, evidence would seem to suggest that those who consumed such messages were broadly appreciative. A survey undertaken by Mass-Observation (M-O) later on in the war found that advertising tended to play a positive role in reassuring consumers in their purchases, a need that might have been accentuated during the war when so much was invested in the little that was available making the correct choice all the more important, as demonstrated by this respondent: When buying anything, if two similar products were offered me, one much advertised and the other not, I should buy the well known one, because I would feel it more dependable. If any product can be advertised extensively for a long period, it must mean it has a certain standard to keep up.40 Ongoing commercial advertising encouraged consumers to insist on buying known brands, thereby maximizing the worth of their ration coupons and points. Thus, far from frustrating consumers by advertising goods that were difficult to come by, this evidence seems to suggest that when consumers chose to actively engage with advertising it was seen as an aid in the decision-making process, an effect that was perhaps enhanced through the war years. A further M-O report of January 1944 reported: The housewife, looking for fresh household hints, is grateful to the advertiser who tells her how to wash her washing whiter, or how to prepare new and varied dishes from a limited war-time supply of food.41

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In a small street survey in London in February 1944, 48 per cent of respondents claimed that advertisements were ‘useful’, especially during wartime.42 Beyond offering explicit help and advice, ongoing advertising might be taken to indicate that those advertised products were of high quality, returning the best value for money and directing consumers towards the most effective investment. This was enhanced further by those advertisers who now took the extraordinary step of encouraging consumers to use less of their product rather than more. Indeed, in many cases, in stark contrast to the practice of advertisers in the pre-war world, advertising space was ironically given over to urging consumers to use less of the products on offer. A variety of companies adopted this approach for a wide array of products, from Brylcreem to Bovril, the underlying message always being that it was by virtue of the very superiority of these products that it was possible to achieve the same results by using a smaller quantity.43 A new challenge was issued to the consumer that, instead of using the product in a variety of different combinations and thereby consuming more, they should see how far they could make that product go, as in the example from Marmite (Figure 4.7). While such an approach stands in contrast to the pre-war model, it still retains, at its core, one of advertising’s driving principles, namely that customers should insist on well-known brands. Only those producers of reliable and dependable goods would be prepared to invest large sums of money in advertising, confident that the products they advertise will fulfil the promises made on their behalf. In this respect, these years of austerity proved to be dependent on advertising: producers could argue that advertised brands offered the very best value for money and were likely to yield the very greatest satisfaction, even if it was necessary to use those goods in much smaller quantities. By virtue of this, certain advertisers took to urging consumers to hunt their products down. Despite Ultra Radio’s ostensibly patriotic stance, it still pointed to ‘the persevering few’ who would get hold of a new Ultra receiver and went on that ‘they are well worth searching for’.44 Although advertisers urged ‘willing sacrifice’ onto the people,

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Figure 4.7

Source: Picture Post, 5 September 1942, p. 2.

they also promoted the idea of expending a great deal of effort to track down their goods. Vine Products Limited, vintners, drew on Sherlock Holmes to make its point: ‘Perseverance my dear Watson. . .’ ‘You know my methods . . . if you don’t find V.P. at the first wine merchants you investigate, try another and keep on trying till you finally track it down. It’s elementary my dear Watson!’45 As the shortages became more severe and the variety of goods being rationed increased, advertising that advocated the ideal consumption of a specific brand became more, not less, prolific, much to the chagrin of critics of commercial advertising, predominantly M.P.s, who regarded this seemingly one-way relationship, which allowed the advertising industry to act with virtual impunity, as being indicative of the government kowtowing to the media and the

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advertising industry and, in the process, denying them revenue that was rightfully theirs under the terms of the Excess Profits Tax.46 The greatest affront was the advertising of products that were simply not available. Sir Reginald Clarry, M.P. for Newport, asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he could give: an estimate of the amount of unnecessary expenditure on advertising totally unprocurable products and products restricted in supply; and, as this expenditure is due to the existing excess profit legislation and is money which would otherwise be paid to the Government as Excess Profit Tax, will he consider revising this allowance, especially considering the wastage both of paper, labour and transport under existing conditions?47 Sir Kingsley Wood simply pointed out that existing legislation gave the Inland Revenue powers to ‘disallow expenses in excess of the amount they consider reasonable and necessary, having regard to the requirements of the trade or business’.48 The implication was that the government, in this instance at least, did not consider such advertising to be unreasonable or unnecessary. However, it is difficult, in the face of such criticism, to establish how such advertising could be deemed to be a necessity, a point made by Clarry who went on: ‘Will my right hon. Friend tell us what is the necessary expenditure in advertising for things which are unprocurable in any circumstances?’49 No answer was forthcoming. This question was raised again by Arthur Creech Jones, M.P. for York, West Riding, Shipley, a few weeks later in December 1941 when he asked the Chancellor if: [H]is attention has been called to the costly advertising in national newspapers of goods which cannot be supplied during war-time; that this expenditure deprives the nation, in many cases, of large amounts which otherwise would be available for taxation; and whether he will take steps to prevent the advertising of goods which cannot be supplied and/or to

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prevent advertising the object of which is, in fact, to evade taxation?50 All that the Chancellor was prepared to say was that he had certain powers in regard to taxation that he was prepared to use but that he would go no further. He did not deem it to be his responsibility to determine what form such advertising would take and, based on this example, seemed to adopt a liberal approach in terms of what was deemed to be ‘necessary and reasonable’ expenditure. To some extent, those who criticized commercial advertising in Parliament were well justified in doing so, given that there is evidence to suggest that the public was on occasion frustrated by seeing goods advertised that they could not subsequently obtain. In a 1940 M-O survey, a barmaid, 35, reported: ‘I’ve been trying all the morning to get some Persil, but I can’t. They advertise it all over the place, but when you ask for it they haven’t got it.’51 This observation came at a time when advertisers of ‘household stores’, including washing powders and washing liquids, were, according to the Statistical Review of Press Advertising, spending £42,230 on advertising, a sum 17 per cent higher than August 1938 and 30 per cent higher than 1937!52 However, equal or greater frustration was felt by those who confronted such demand face-to-face and had to turn customers away. M-O reported in its survey of advertisements in shop windows in Fulham of January 1940 that shopkeepers were in the ‘utmost doubt’ as to their value.53 The ire of shopkeepers only seems to have increased as the war went on and as commercial advertising continued despite the growing scarcity of goods. In June 1941, M-O surveyed shoe retailer outlets in London and the Home counties. It reported that ‘strong feeling was found to exist on the subject of National advertising of shoe manufacturers when there was a shortage of shoes’. Of those surveyed, 72 per cent were found to be ‘strongly critical’ and 28 per cent ‘approving, with qualifications’. The attitude of this respondent was common among those surveyed: There’s no sense in it at all. They’ve been advertising Walkeezi in the Sunday papers and a woman came in and asked for them.

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I’ve put an order through but you just can’t get the stuff. It’s stupid to go on advertising—a bad thing.54 Such opinions of commercial advertising in wartime were not purely confined to those in the retail trade or in response to specific shopping dilemmas; such views rang true among a broader section of the population. In a January 1942 survey, among those asked ‘What do you think of the advertising you see in the papers or on the hoardings nowadays?’, M-O found 30 per cent to be unfavourable and 33 per cent favourable. While not an overwhelming endorsement, at least there was more favourable opinion than unfavourable. However, perhaps of greater interest is the remaining 37 per cent who were reported to be either ‘Half & half’ or to have ‘No opinion’.55 Notwithstanding those outspoken critics who argued that commercial advertising in wartime was a ‘gross waste’ that was likely to be detrimental to morale by exciting demand that could not subsequently be met, based on this evidence it would appear that whatever the content the majority were either not really bothered or found it to be in some way beneficial. Nevertheless, M-O was keen to report that those who did not approve of such advertisements did so more strongly than those of other opinions, providing typical responses such as ‘Complete waste’, ‘It should be cut out altogether’ or ‘Utterly useless, now that they are advertising articles which are unprocurable’. This last response, it was claimed, was frequently repeated, with respondents struggling to understand why goods that were unobtainable were still being advertised. According to that M-O report: There is an appreciable amount of definite resentment against press advertising. This resentment is focussed on commercial advertising, especially of goods which cannot be bought at the present time. Many people don’t understand the purpose of such advertising. There is little talk about it being done to evade taxation or any other of the nefarious purposes alleged from time to time by

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M.P.s etc. People simply don’t appreciate the need or purpose of such advertising, and are distinctly puzzled by it.56 Drawing on this report in a ‘Note for Mary Adams on Advertising in Press’, M-O was unequivocal in its belief that the public was of the opinion that commercial advertising had no place in the press in wartime, given that it took up large amounts of space at a time when there was ‘a great shortage of paper’ and that the people believed that advertisers were ‘wasting money that should go into the war effort’. However, in that ‘Note for Mary Adams’, M-O was obliged to conclude that, based on a sample of Londoners, commercial advertising was ‘not an issue that inflames much passion in the mind of an average citizen’.57 This is an important caveat in an otherwise negative report and appears consistent with the public’s opinion of commercial advertising stretching back to the London Press Exchange surveys of the mid-1930s: commercial advertising is perpetually battling for the attention of the reader and when it is acknowledged is often merely glanced at; even when the trouble is taken to read an advertisement at length it may still not arouse a vigorous response (see pages 43–4). Irrespective of what the public mood might have been, as far as the advertisers were concerned their actions were ‘necessary and reasonable’ in the face of goods becoming more difficult to obtain. Where the consumer was restricted in the volume that he or she could buy, it was imperative that those valuable points were used on their high-quality branded products. In this sense, competition between brands increased and there was some compulsion felt to increase advertising in order to protect market share. This was also reflected in the advertising message. Canned vegetables were added to the points rationing scheme in November 1941, followed by canned peas in February 1942. Batchelor responded with a change in advertising message (see Figure 4.8). While in May 1941 Batchelor was educating consumers about the versatile nature of canned fruit and vegetables in general, by 1942 it was telling consumers to ‘[insist] on Batchelor’s Peas’. In the days prior to rationing, Batchelor could hope to drive up unit sales (and might even be seen, contrary to the wishes of the government, to be encouraging hoarding): ‘A few tins of Batchelor’s

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Canned Fruits and Vegetables in the larder and you are “well-set” for any meal emergency.’ However, by 1942, with the onset of rationing, rather than hoping to grow the sector as a whole, all it could hope to achieve was to attract brand switchers. The message was that, when only a limited supply was available, the consumer had to be sure that what they were getting was the very best: To make the most of their ‘Points’ housewives everywhere are realising the wisdom of insisting on Batchelor’s Peas [. . .] their quality and value are the finest obtainable. Advertisers increased their advertising expenditure in this sector at this time in order to guarantee brand loyalty. While the government might have hoped that consumers would be happy to simply obtain their designated allocation of that product, advertisers were keen to ensure that they were more discerning in their choice and thereby protect their brands. Otherwise, advertisers adjusted their approach

Figure 4.8 Source: Picture Post, 3 May 1941, p. 36; Picture Post, 2 May 1942, p. 6.

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in order to make their product the most suitable according to the changing situation. As the impact of rationing grew and moved into new areas, so advertisers found it necessary to reposition their products relative to the times. In so doing, they sparked a growth in advertising expenditure in the food sector in 1942. A well-established sales message might be abandoned if it was felt that a new message would be more in tune with the situation. In this way, as is well demonstrated in the advertising of Bournville Cocoa, products were presented as incredibly versatile, adapting to meet whatever the perceived need might be or ready to fill a new gap in the market. Prior to the war and during the early war years, Cadbury’s Bournville Cocoa was promoted on the basis of its ability to aid sound sleep and also to steady the nerves.58 However, in October 1941, the government moved to control the supply of milk to ensure that ‘priority consumers’—expectant and nursing mothers, children and invalids— got a guaranteed ration, while the general public got what was left and National Dried Milk.59 Up to that point, Cadbury was using advertisements similar to that featured above, and Bournville Cocoa was marketed as ‘a natural food and it helps your nerves!’. From November 1941 however, the new copy headline was introduced: ‘I [milk] GO FURTHER WHEN YOU DRINK COCOA’ (Figure 4.9). Henceforth, advertising promoted the ability of Bournville Cocoa to make the milk ration go further. It also claimed to make powdered milk more palatable.60 When the ‘Personal Points’ scheme was introduced for chocolate and sweets in July 1942, Bournville Cocoa could be made to serve yet another function—it could now be used as a substitute for chocolate (Figure 4.10). Playing on the deficiencies of the chocolate ration, Cadbury’s responded: ‘When the chocolate ration is finished, the children can get that chocolaty flavour they like so much as a drink.’ Bournville Cocoa was thus the product for all occasions and, given that such food products could now be used to serve a variety of different purposes, the volume of advertising went up in 1942 in order to exploit these opportunities and ensure the survival of such goods.

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Figure 4.9

161

Source: Picture Post, 1 November 1941, p. 27.

Once more, the advertising industry showed itself to be in step with the people and, it might be argued, providing helpful advice and direction: the government’s 1942 survey into ‘the relative importance to housewives of twenty-one foods’ and ‘the extent to which their use has changed’ found that the ‘amount of cocoa used has increased appreciably. The main reason given was that it takes the place of tea, and it is also used to eke out the milk ration.’61 Such a response was exactly in keeping with the advertising of Bournville Cocoa. While such action cannot be wholly attributed to the actions of commercial advertisers, in this respect at least, their actions and sentiment appear to be entirely in accord with those of the people. Where consumers find solutions to problems in advertising (for example, in this case the ‘solution’ to the shortage of milk in the advertising of cocoa), a positive association is formed. The reaction of the public to commercial advertising in this way may have been one of appreciation, with advertising being seen as a

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Figure 4.10

Source: Picture Post, 21 November 1942, p. 28.

source of useful hints and suggestions, rather than being exploitative of the situation. In other cases, new circumstances called for new approaches from certain advertisers. For instance, 1943 saw an increase in the advertising of bicycles, as the growing scarcity of fuel coincided with a greater need for more people to get, for example, to a place of work, brought about by the enlistment of women from the beginning of 1942. That situation became worse when the basic civilian petrol ration was abolished from July 1942 onwards; the response, in the case of Hercules Cycles, was a huge increase in advertising expenditure. According to Statistical Review data, by 1941 virtually all advertising by Hercules Cycles had ceased. However, the company dramatically increased its press advertising expenditure in 1942. The announcement of the government’s intention to do away with the

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basic petrol ration was made on 12 March; Hercules’ advertising expenditure leaped from £34 in February to £1,822 in March. As the situation became more serious, and the demand for cycles greater, its expenditure grew a further 29 per cent in 1943. The advertising of the Birmingham Small Arms Company Ltd. (makers of BSA bicycles) followed a similar pattern, although it had identified a role for the bicycle early in the war, turning the disadvantages of the transport situation into a positive by getting around on a bicycle and thereby keeping fit, and as a means of escape, to get out to the country for leisure and pleasure. From March through to May 1940, BSA advertising promoted its bicycles as the ideal solution to transport difficulties: ‘B.S.A. for convenience; B.S.A. for exercise; B.S.A. for pleasure. It’s a bicycle age—a B.S.A. Bicycle age.’62 However, from May 1940, BSA dropped that approach in its advertising and, from July 1941, promoted the company generally in terms of the contribution it was making to the war effort. Drawing attention to the growing absence of many of its products, it points out how ‘To-day B.S.A. gives its all in the race for victory. Tomorrow—and it will carry on with those products of peace worthy of its great name.’63 However, as the situation changed through 1942 and into 1943, BSA, like Hercules Cycles, changed its approach again in recognition of the increasing importance of bicycles and its place within that market. From July 1943, it once again began actively promoting its ‘Wartime standard models’. In this example from December 1943, the bicycle is held up as ‘the main means of transport’ (Figure 4.11). The combined circumstances of the ending of the basic civilian petrol ration and the growing workforce owing to the enlistment of women proved to be an excellent opportunity for manufacturers of bicycles to increase their advertising activity. While it may not have been possible for consumers to buy new cycles, such advertising could at least draw attention to the valuable role that existing machines were playing in their lives at this time. Such positive associations not only reflected well on those companies at that time but might also foster a positive association into a postwar world where it might be possible to purchase such items.

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Figure 4.11

Source: Picture Post, 18 December 1943, p. 3.

Despite the tightening grip of rationing, advertising expenditure increased in order to guarantee the selection of a particular brand of good, as in the case of Batchelor, or in order to maximize sales by demonstrating its versatility and its ability to plug the holes created by those shortages, as in the case of Bournville Cocoa. If 1942 was the nadir of food rationing, it was, relatively, a boom year for the advertising of food and drink, as the battle was fought by manufacturers to ensure that either points were used on their particular brand or that any shortfalls in diet were made up by their goods. The very fact that supplies were limited and distribution was inconsistent was turned to the advantage of advertisers by trying to imbue in consumers a form of habit buying. Thus, some advertising explicitly suggested that goods should be acquired every week, when available, whether they were required or not, as in the Fry’s Cocoa campaign: ‘The food you should

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buy EVERY WEEK’. In this case, Fry’s was the ultimate solution to whatever shortages there might be and in order to overcome the danger where ‘children aren’t getting enough nourishment and variety in their food’.64 Further, it might help to reassure anxious parents that they could indulge their children’s sweet tooth given their claim that ‘it’s a treat to see the children drink it up—they love the real chocolate taste’. Fry’s was keen to inculcate a habit of purchasing its product every week: ‘It’s the regular buying that helps you most. Whatever’s short that week you can be sure Fry’s will help make up for it.’65 By creating a sense of dependence on its product and positioning it as a safety net when undertaking the weekly shop, Fry’s could ensure high volume sales of its product and create a sense of loyalty to the brand. The approach of commercial advertisers to the growing scarcity of goods was highly prescriptive: the public was urged to willingly make sacrifices ‘for our War Effort’. However, in urging them to make such sacrifices, advertisers could take the opportunity to remind them just what it was that they were missing out on, in the case of Caley’s a long list of delicious ingredients that they were ‘willing’ to forego. However, a general review of such advertising in this period throws up a number of contradictions. For instance, Murphy Radio’s advertising demonstrating that its ‘first call on our energies and materials must be for Service requirements’ and therefore that it would simply not be possible to acquire a new Murphy set, appeared alongside advertising for V.P. Rich Ruby (British sherry), which pressed people to go in search of their specific named product. Other advertisers insisted that buying their brands was the very route to making the desired (and/or necessary) war economies. Alongside willingly making those ‘acceptable sacrifices’, exercising patience and tolerance in the face of shopkeepers unable to give customers what they wanted, using less and buying of what little there was available wisely, the British people were encouraged further by advertisers to engage with the war by ensuring that they disposed of their packaging responsibly and made efforts to recycle all that they could. Not only could they thus make a very definite

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contribution to fighting the war, but manufacturers could equally be seen to be doing the right thing, acting responsibly and putting themselves at the disposal of the bigger struggle. This campaign by commercial advertisers intensified from the middle of 1942, in conjunction with ‘official’ campaigns by the government designed to encourage fuel economy and salvage. They were concerned by the necessity to encourage salvage, but of course they also needed to educate consumers with respect to new packaging enforced by war, for fear that their new packaging would be missed as customers went about their weekly shop. Although the packaging may have changed (for example, substituting glass jars for metal tubes as part of the metal-saving drive), the advertisers were keen to point out that the product remained the same.66 In a similar way, Gibbs Dentifrice changed its packaging, also dispensing with metal tubes, and at the same time chose to make a very deliberate reference to the war by christening it a ‘handy battledress refill’. The manufacturer, by selflessly adopting this new approach, could claim that if consumers were to choose their product, they could ‘save the country’s much needed metal’.67 While this campaign was specific to Gibbs, it ran alongside an ongoing effort on the part of The Dentifrice Manufacturers of Great Britain to encourage the public to return old metal tubes to their chemist. Within this campaign, named brands donated their space to the cause, explaining that empty tubes were ‘wanted for Munitions!’.68 Other examples include Lyle & Scott Limited, makers of Cooper’s Y-fronts, who asked ‘in the National interests, to return elastic bands from your old Y-fronts to your Y-front Retailer’.69 Nothing was to be lost, according to these advertisers, in the drive for salvage. Such advertising formed a pervasive dialogue, ensuring that the war was always front of mind. And, if anyone was in any doubt as to why one should go to such efforts, Quaker Oats was quick to make the point (Figure 4.12). Salvage was essential in order to ‘SPEED THE DAY WHEN WE CAN ALL ENJOY ALL WE WANT OF WHAT WE LIKE’. A noble rallying cry in itself, but doubly effective for the advertiser by suggesting that one of the things that the nation was fighting for was

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Figure 4.12

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Source: Picture Post, 19 June 1943, p. 26.

a greater profusion of Quaker Oats, ‘famous the world over for its appetizing creamy flavour and nutritive goodness’. Bovril, too, suggested that it could help, albeit indirectly, in the drive for salvage: ‘Keep up your salvage with persistence—Keep up your ENERGY with BOVRIL.’70 Irrespective of any tedium that might be expected after five years of total war, everyone was to make every effort in regard to salvage, even pets. Between April and November 1944, Chappie Dog Food demonstrated how its character Chappie the dog was doing his bit. In the first in that series, an emblematic bulldog urges Chappie to ‘SAVE THAT BONE FOR SALVAGE . . . don’t bury it!’. The welleducated bulldog goes on that ‘to shorten the war we’ve got to salvage every scrap of bone we can’. From that point onwards, Chappie makes a resolution to save all his bones and records his exploits in ‘Chappie’s Diary’ (Figure 4.13).

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Figure 4.13 1944, p. 6.

Source: Picture Post, 22 April 1944, p. 6; Picture Post, 17 June

So confident is Chappie in his new-found efforts that he declares in June 1944 that ‘this is going to be Victory year’. Among his other exploits, he is found chasing rats out of the hen house, scaring ‘cheeky sparrows off Master’s new seed beds’ and retrieving an old rubber ball from the river.71 The message is that those ‘who do their duty will reap their reward’. According to this and other advertisers there could be no slacking if victory was to prevail, and a little more effort invested now would soon bring rewards, many of which, no doubt, would take the form of those advertised products.

Conclusion As the war dragged on, concern was periodically voiced about the valuable amount of space being consumed by commercial advertising, but despite the pressure building on the government in some quarters, and the open criticism that it endured (e.g. in Parliament), it still would not take the act of compulsion in dealing with advertising. It remained firmly committed to voluntarism. This was the product of a tripartite entente between the government, industry and the print media. The government needed the cooperation of industry. It also needed the goodwill of the press.

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Advertising proved to be a happy beneficiary of these machinations. Through the ongoing advertising of those concentrated industries, the memory of branded products that were forced to disappear during the war could be kept alive. Continued commercial advertising in the press proved a useful distraction from war news and official pronouncements. Thus, the advertising industry was able to enjoy a degree of autonomy and liberty that ensured its survival. From producers, there was a cautious undercurrent that urged consumers to be tolerant, in the best interests of the nation, in the face of the growing scarcity of a wide variety of goods. Producers and their advertisers were put in the invidious position whereby they wanted to continue advertising in order to maintain their public profile and sustain the goodwill invested in so heavily in the preceding period, but were at the same time cautious not to excite demand that they subsequently could not meet. The solution clearly lay in being honest about their predicament and asking for the sympathy of the public: that new products were not available was, indirectly, not their fault but a consequence of their total commitment to the war, which they expected their customers to endorse by being tolerant and patient in the absence of those goods. After all, it was ‘not the shopkeeper’s fault’. However, in the face of such shortage, they could still undertake some useful work in promoting their goods: in this new austere environment there was ‘even more reason’ to invest in high-quality, tried-and-tested proprietary brands. A high-quality, reliable brand, such as Lux, could be made to go ‘a long, long way’ and at the same time would ensure that those precious items that were becoming increasingly difficult to get hold of could be made to last longer. Via this simple expedient, it was suggested that consumers could demonstrate that they were being ‘war-minded’. In contrast to the pre-war, free-market world where advertisers sought to maximize use of their product and push it as the solution for a wide variety of problems, advertisers now urged consumers not to use too much. ‘Please use less’ cried Brylcreem, while swift to point out that the same benefits could be had even if a smaller quantity were used. Advertisers forced the war to centre stage in everything that they imagined the consumer to be doing: taking

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care of their shoes, gently washing their precious clothes and seeing just how far they could stretch their Marmite. In this way, advertisers tapped into current concerns, apparently operating side-by-side with the government, appearing to be relevant and patriotic while also providing a convenient explanation for enforced packaging changes. Branded goods, the very life blood of commercial advertising, were now presented as being embroiled in the very conflict that frequently necessitated their absence from shop shelves. It was because named, advertised goods were so dependable and of such high quality that consumers should remain committed to them and, wherever possible, hunt them down both as a vital part of the smooth running of their household but also in the best interests of the war effort. Consumers that heeded the advice of advertisers and remained true to familiar, branded goods were helping to win the war through their prudence and discretion in their weekly shop. Such goods would get the job done effectively and efficiently, thereby freeing the user up to contribute to the war effort in other ways, and because it was now revealed how you could actually use less of such products, this would also relieve pressure on production. However, on occasion, advertisers had to admit, with resignation, that despite customers’ perseverance, it would just not be possible to obtain their preferred items. That being the case, they could once more engage with the war (with the minimum of effort) by not complaining and showing great stoicism. Otherwise, alternative products could come to the rescue as advertisers demonstrated how a variety of goods could be pressed into new and unusual service in the face of shortages elsewhere. Whatever the case, thoughtful, prudent, well-considered consumption could now be interpreted under the guise of engaging directly in the war.

CHAPTER 5 GENDER IDENTITIES THROUGH THE WAR

‘Can a warden make a good wife?’ Mrs Peek’s Puddings, Picture Post, 23 November 1940, p. 34 If producers and advertisers were active in incorporating a contribution to the war through the simple expedient of consuming a certain product, they were equally keen to join the chorus that set out to impress upon the nation the importance of maintaining a strict demarcation between the genders. Swanson notes how the war challenged ‘nineteenth-century models of sexual difference which relied on the motif of separate spheres to define distinctive and complementary masculine and feminine natures’.1 In response, one of the key motifs on the British Home Front was the idea that the sustenance and durability of society depended on maintaining traditional gender roles. From the outset, those in positions of authority outlined a clear demarcation establishing the conflict along gender lines. Hence, men were conscripted into the armed forces from April 1939, and directed into war work at home, while, in the first phase of the war, the government went to great lengths to avoid directly engaging women in the conflict. That the government, until March 1941, chose not to compel women to enter the workplace is indicative of its attitude towards the maintenance of peacetime norms and the position of women within family life: ‘Government

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mobilisation policy proclaimed that the housewife was not to be one of the war’s first casualties.’2 If there was some ambiguity around defining masculinity and representing men within the British war effort, as outlined below, the same could not be said of the demands and expectations made of women. As far as women were concerned, the prevalent public discourse had it that their rightful place, and first priority, lay in the home: the ‘good’ female citizen remained committed to domesticity.3 This fundamental principle around which ideals of femininity were constructed and projected throughout the war was unequivocal and has been well recorded and analysed in the various histories that consider the place of women in Britain during World War II.4 While there may have been some dramatic changes to the roles and position of women within British wartime society, these were clearly portrayed as being of a temporary nature—women, at their core, were ‘“really” wives and mothers and their place was at home’.5 But there is a contradiction within this ideal as the need for women to take on less feminine tasks is juxtaposed with the demand that they retain their femininity. Acknowledging this central paradox drove those projecting an ‘appropriate’ vision of society to insist that women were ‘female first and workers second’.6 Commercial advertisers were active and complicit in protecting these regular, peacetime roles, while projecting on to them what were considered to be the ideals required for the successful prosecution of the war. An overwhelming barrage of messages was presented that implored women to maintain their female allure, most notably through the use of toiletries and cosmetics. However, in so doing, some sensitivity is displayed to the limits to which women should promote their femininity, stopping short of becoming too sexualized or stand the risk of being denigrated as ‘Good-Time’ girls.7 Following on from this, advertisers triumphed the input of women in the war effort but reinforced the idea that there are limits to such praise and constantly reminded women that their ultimate ambitions and objectives ought to remain in the domestic sphere. Considering the place of men in wartime Britain, a more equivocal picture is presented. In histories of wartime Britain, the

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place of men is seldom considered, or a basic assumption is made that confers the ‘traditional’ characteristics of the man at war with the simple expedient of donning a uniform. This is clearly replicated in the extant body of literature around gender in wartime: as already outlined, there are dedicated volumes on the role of women, notably Summerfield (1987, 1998), yet no comparative volumes on men, while Minns (1980) implies that the ‘domestic front’ was a wholly feminine space. From the perspective of commercial advertising and consumption practices, this is clearly a shortcoming given that the male played a significant role in the disposal of the household income and, indeed, was a direct target for advertisers as they encouraged men to consume their products, often with a view to enhancing the consumer’s masculinity and gender identity. In so doing, commercial advertisers were able to cast men into specific roles in keeping with prevailing norms that serviced an underlying belief about the war and about how life ought to be lived on the Home Front. Noakes observes: Masculinity became bound up with notions of honour and valour, as men went to war to defend the nation and the principles for which it stood. National identity, the ways in which women and men identified themselves as members of the nation in wartime, was shaped by gender.8 However, while this might hold true, there was room for variety in those gender identities and definitions that present a much more complex picture than the simple image of the male as warrior. In a situation where masculine roles might be considered monolithic (men are pressed into the armed service, they don a uniform, they are warriors), the portrayal of diverse guises, roles and dispositions serve to enrich the experience and set out a variety of alternative roles that can then be made ‘real’ via consumption practices. From this perspective, masculinity on the British Home Front was never so simple as being what the outward appearance of a uniform might suggest but was instead characterized by diversity, not least as advertisers called on men, alongside their archetypal wartime roles,

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to maintain an attractive appearance, to ensure that the household laundry was carried out to the highest standard, and to be gentle, caring fathers. In considering masculinity on the British Home Front, representations of men in uniform are considered that illustrate a more nuanced vision of the man at arms than is ordinarily to be found, and certainly standing in contradistinction to their counterparts in the Axis forces and American servicemen. This perspective is extended as the more ordinary and mundane motivations of men are examined, which places a greater emphasis, for example, on keeping up appearances in an effort to attract and retain a ‘mate’. Finally, in accord with their depictions of women, advertisers also offered a comprehensive image of the ‘domesticated’ man, which at one level appears to contradict the traditional image of the aggressive warrior and serves to reinforce the ideal of gender stability. In considering gender in press advertising, the thesis presented by Rose, Summerfield and Swanson is developed and reinforced, as an unequivocal image of British society is presented that, it is argued, depends on the continuation of traditional gender roles.

Women at War: ‘It’s Your Duty to Look Your Best’ For commercial advertisers, the role of women in wartime was twofold. Alongside praising and encouraging them to enter the services or contribute in some definite way to the war effort, they also expected them to retain their ‘feminine charm’. Not content with accepting that they were undertaking strenuous and difficult tasks, women were expected to bring beauty to the Home Front and thereby boost the spirits of the nation and especially their menfolk home on leave. In effect, advertisers were keen to highlight the continuities in wartime life with a pre-war existence and culture: just because the nation now found itself at war, there need be no absolute volte-face in popular attitudes and the way people conducted themselves. This deliberate construct was outlined in force in commercial advertising, presenting a dominant image of the woman in the forces, in the workplace and in the home.

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The cosmetics industry in particular was determined to play a key role within wartime society, positioning its products among the munitions of war as it promoted the notion of ‘beauty as duty’. All that changed here from pre-war messages was the more bombastic and militaristic slant now given to what had always been the main message. Thus, Tattoo lipstick declared ‘England expects these days that every woman shall be a beauty’, while ‘Grenadier—Tattoo’s new Military red’ was trumpeted as ‘a call to arms!’ No longer is this just a simple red lipstick, but instead it is a: grand, courageous, heads-up red that looks particularly effective with any uniform . . . yours or your boy friend’s! It’s a come-on-men-we’ll-back-you-up sort of shade that puts a swagger into your step—and a sparkle into your eye . . . and HIS!9 Such messages were a reaction to the supposed new role that women were expected to fill in wartime and the implications that this might have for the toiletries and cosmetics industry. Whereas the norm might previously have been a clear separation of the masculine and feminine spheres, the war challenged that distinction as women moved into more traditionally male-dominated areas, potentially offering them a new identity. However, while moving into more masculine roles and, on occasion, adopting a uniform that inclined towards a masculine appearance, women were not predisposed towards a wholesale c hange in appearance and instead were encouraged to use a variety of devices to accentuate their femininity. As Kirkham notes, ‘[d]espite all the hardships, what they looked like remained a central concern for millions of British women throughout the war. Far from being ignored, fashion and femininity remained firmly on the female agenda.’10 For those women entering the services, commercial advertisers maintained that the efficient execution of such new roles in part depended on their appearance. Potter and Moore’s Powder-Cream, for instance, was offered as the ideal solution to ensure that women obtained that ‘Instant Beauty’. Taking the example of the Women’s

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Royal Naval Service (WRNS), they insisted that ‘[t]he W.R.N.S. girl must be trim and sleek, groomed to a hairsbreadth, to play her part’.11 Feminine appearance in this way was shown to be a prerequisite to efficient service, and, according to these advertisers, make-up and styling were as much a part of being in the services as stamina or endurance in regard to the task at hand. In a similar way, Tangee Lipstick was promoted as a vital part of service life, contributing as it did to ‘Beauty on Duty’, with the claim that: ‘On duty she [in this case a member of the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force] must look smart—but not painted.’12 While this advertisement was obviously designed to encourage the consumption of Tangee Lipstick, it demonstrates a sensitivity to the wider discourse concerning the role of women in wartime and the appropriate ‘extent’ of femininity in these circumstances. According to Goodman, women’s appearance and conduct during wartime became a matter of public concern extending to the image that was being portrayed.13 While the public, may have been keen for women to retain their femininity and to even overtly express this, there were limits placed on the extent to which this was acceptable. The use of cosmetics, for example, might be accepted as appropriate conduct, ‘over-indulgence’ was not. An element of restraint was essential to the ideal (young) woman in wartime. Nevertheless, femininity was shown to be a central part of military life as women were urged to make sure they ‘[l]ive up to that smart uniform’ by maintaining their appearance, even if, in reality, that might prove rather difficult. Certain situations made retaining that feminine appearance almost impossible, despite a desire to do so. Ruby Brown, a lathe operator in a wartime factory, later recalled how the nature of her work did not ‘tie up with being attractive [. . .] it did not help you to appear at your best and let’s face it a lot of women want that. They wanted their hair nice, their make-up nice and they wanted to appear elegant.’14 Further, some war production plants banned women from wearing cosmetics in an attempt to curb male sexual harassment.15 While some advertisers were sympathetic to the strictures of military life, women were still urged not to surrender their female charms altogether. Eve Shampoo, in the example seen in

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Figure 5.1, appreciated that contemporary fashions were not entirely practical in military life but urged women not to entirely surrender their beauty regime and, in this case, care for their hair. They implored: ‘Already you’ve probably sacrificed your elaborate upswept hair style to accommodate your uniform cap—but there’s no need to sacrifice the health and the beauty of your hair as well.’

Figure 5.1

Source: Picture Post, 4 November 1939, p. 54.

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While advertisers in the toiletries and cosmetics sector were determined that women should make every effort to be truly feminine, at the same time they took heed of the paradox at the centre of that conception that demanded that women take on roles diametrically opposed to that mode of conduct and appearance. This was an issue that vexed the government as much as commercial concerns, though advertisers tended to have more scope to highlight actual problems and circumstances than government propagandists. The dilemma, according to Summerfield, was that: Mobilisation policy placed women at the interface of two conflicting versions of patriotism: on the one hand, the demands of the national war effort for more workers implied the sacrifice of conventional domestic arrangements and gender roles within them; on the other, national stability and morale required the continuation of family forms based on women’s conventional roles.16 Though commercial advertisers acknowledged that to enter the services was highly commendable, they stressed that this was still not to take precedence over ‘women’s conventional roles’. The potentially incompatible demands being made of women (the need to take on war work that often tended towards more masculine roles while at the same time that retaining their femininity) was highlighted as producers of goods were able to proffer a solution via the consumption of their products. Advertisers championed the notion that femininity and a total commitment to the war effort were entirely compatible, with fear of damaging one’s hands or complexion not being allowed to stand in the way of committing to the war effort. Zixt Soap Tablet in particular was instrumental in offering a ‘solution’ to these two apparently conflicting roles. In April 1940, it demonstrated how it was possible to do ‘a land-girl’s work’ but keep ‘a glamour-girl’s hands’. Reassuringly, it declared: ‘So go on with the good work. Thanks to Zixt, it can’t spoil your hands.’17 Meanwhile, on a more domestic level, women were urged to join the crusade to ‘Dig for Victory’ without a concern for the rough and dirty

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nature of this work. Thus, Jane is happy to involve herself and ‘doesn’t let dirty hands defeat her’.18 Women were urged to remember the onus that was on them to ensure that they did not become slovenly in their appearance and that, despite the hard work they were undertaking, they should still take measures to ensure that their hands remained soft and feminine. A regular, peacetime cultural identity ought to be retained rather than being abandoned wholesale. Thus, by day Ida is an Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS) clerk with ink-stained fingers, but by evening her hands are ‘smooth and white’ again.19 Such advertisements acknowledged that women would be in the factories, working on the land, in the services or maintaining the home but that there was an onus on them to retain their looks and distinctive feminine characteristics. Glymiel Jelly cautioned: ‘At the bench or on the farm, Guard your busy hands from harm, Keep their smooth efficient charm.’ Accordingly, ‘Munition workers, nurses, land-girls, housewives—all need Glymiel’.20 For these commercial advertisers, women had a national duty to be beautiful and charming. By taking such efforts over their appearance, they were making as much of a contribution to the war effort as men serving in frontline positions, while at the same time ensuring product sales for those advertisers. The evidence available seems to suggest that such calls were heeded as women on the Home Front joined the battle to ensure ‘standards’ did not slip, despite the war. One girl of 18 told MassObservation in June 1941: I lay greater store by a good appearance than I did a few months ago, and I hate to be found at any time of the day looking dirty or untidy. I shouldn’t like to think that the effect the war has on women is to make them slovenly and careless of their appearances.21 In this respect, at least, it would appear that the efforts of commercial advertisers were in accord with at least one section of the public. Such threats to femininity were considered to become even more manifest with the introduction of the National Service (No. 2) Act,

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effective from 18 December 1941, by which unmarried women between the ages of 20 and 30 were to be called up into either industry or the auxiliary services (19-year-olds were to follow suit early in 1942). In response, advertisers took the opportunity to tie their copy into this new patriotic message, effectively exploiting the new concerns and anxieties being faced by women. The advertising of deodorants and antiperspirants provide a good example of the response of advertisers to the concerns of women taking on such new roles (Figure 5.2). While there had been advertising for deodorants and antiperspirants in the preceding months and years and those products had

Figure 5.2 Source: Picture Post, 1 August 1942, p. 23; Picture Post, 29 August 1942, p. 5; Picture Post, 10 October 1942, p. 27.

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remained of a constant manufacture, from 1942 producers identified a new demand for them. From August 1942, Odo-Ro-No drew on the enlistment of women in order to promote its product in a campaign that lasted throughout the remainder of the war. As women found themselves in these new, more demanding vocations, the need for effective deodorant became greater and Odo-Ro-No was able to adopt war fatigues and advertise itself as the solution to this new-found wartime problem. Such advertising appears to accurately reflect the anxieties of women of the time, especially in relation to the ATS. When women were asked, as part of the War-Time Social Survey of October 1941, what their dislikes of the ATS were, 21 per cent related to uniform, hair style, regulations and loss of femininity.22 Commercial advertisers drew on these anxieties and fears in promoting their goods, positioning toiletries as a crucial means to retaining that all-important femininity. Advertisers adopting those messages that stressed the need to retain femininity explained their rationale not simply in terms of the need to retain gender conventions in the face of overwhelming demands but also on the basis that taking care over one’s appearance was, in itself, making a direct contribution to the war effort, wherever women may find themselves and whatever their situation. In the first instance, it was in the best interests of the individual to make an effort in regard to personal appearance: Ann Dudley, writing on behalf of Pond’s Preparations, offered a series of ‘[t]ips for the woman with no time to spare’ in the form of ‘2-minute treatments that keep you looking lovely’. She reasoned that putting a little time aside in this way was ‘as good as a tonic’.23 Meanwhile, Phillips’ Dental Magnesia went so far as to suggest that ‘Sound White Teeth are half-the-battle’.24 According to this advertiser, ‘[y]our teeth play an important part in helping you to “win through”’. Second, commercial advertisers suggested that appearance, especially feminine charm, had a useful role to play in buoying up the morale of the nation in general and, alongside that, attention to personal appearance might have been considered a useful contributory factor to that sense of well-being that would help to sustain those on the Home Front in the face of whatever was thrown

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at them. While Vinolia was promoted as helping to maintain ‘[c]harm on duty’ among those in the ATS, it was also noted that men would appreciate ‘Vinolia’s unmistakeable freshness’ and ‘a careful toilet’.25 In this way, victory was, in part at least, dependent on women retaining their charm in order to lift the spirits of the menfolk wholly engaged in the war. As part of Odol toothpaste’s ongoing ‘Keep the winning Odol Smile’ campaign, readers were reminded that ‘It’s every girl’s duty to Smile’, going on that ‘To-day a real Odol Smile means more than ever before. It’s your duty to preserve it.’26 Maintaining charm, freshness and a beaming smile was considered to be an important contribution made by women to fighting the war. According to Norma Knight, spokesperson for Knight’s Castile, ‘[i]t’s your duty to look your best’.27 Such points were made unequivocally by advertisers, irrespective of the difficulties and time constraints that might infringe on ‘keeping charm up to pre-war standard’—women were duty-bound to see to it in the interests of the war effort.28 It was a duty, part of national service, especially given that ‘the men of the Services on leave will expect and deserve it’.29 Implicit in the images of women widely abroad was the role that they were expected to play in ‘sustaining’ the menfolk engaged in the war. Women were portrayed as providing relief and a necessary distraction from the horrors of war, especially for men in the armed forces. In this way, women were portrayed as making every effort necessary to make themselves attractive and put themselves at the disposal of the armed services. Hence ‘Lonesome Lou’ turned to Colgate Ribbon Dental Cream to remedy her halitosis and is consequently with the ‘AIR FORCE ONE NIGHT, NAVY THE NEXT’.30 Those men of the Army, Navy and Air Force deserved to have charming and beautiful women at their beck and call. In the words of P & B Knitting Wools, ‘ONLY The FAIR DESERVE The BRAVE’. In its advertisement of April 1940, it explained in detail what the role of women in wartime was to be: They look to you, ladies! They expect you to stay lovely and feminine, shining like a good deed in a naughty world.

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Not easy? That’s why your unruffled poise should put heart into those around you.31 As women were urged by the government to adopt more masculine roles, there was a danger for those in the toiletries and cosmetics industry that they would no longer have the money, time or inclination to bother about ‘a careful toilet’. However, as has already been demonstrated, moving into such roles, women were determined to go to even greater efforts to protect and project their femininity. According to Sonya Rose, ‘being physically attractive and focussing on self-adornment were necessary preoccupations for women in wartime’.32 Irrespective of the difficulties in obtaining the materials necessary to retain and project that femininity, and the added burdens placed on women that either removed them altogether from a familiar environment or placed further pressure on the time that they could devote to such practices, there is evidence to suggest that female use of cosmetics in such circumstances becomes accentuated and actually proves to be a useful ‘coping’ mechanism. Indeed, a government social survey revealed that between 18 January and 8 February 1943, while 28 per cent of women questioned were buying the same amount of cosmetics, 37 per cent were buying more.33 Linda Scott suggests that personal appearance, especially in times of crisis, becomes a deliberate aid to carrying on by shoring up ‘dignity’: ‘When their survival is threatened, humans must maintain social conventions and expressions that shore up their dignity, or else fall into despair.’34 Cosmetics and toiletries play an important part in maintaining those ‘social conventions and expressions’, especially by helping to facilitate ongoing social contact. Maintaining standards of dress and grooming are important facets of staying socially active, a trait that was particularly pronounced in Britain during World War II. Concern for personal appearance becomes an outward expression of a will to survive and, in keeping with the indomitable spirit of the British throughout the war, the use of cosmetics was a deliberate effort to outwardly express that commitment. Commercial advertisers were thus able to go to some lengths to reflect and

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encourage this attitude. Alongside those images and messages in the advertising of the period, government agencies, cinema and the public at large expected, if not demanded, that women retain their femininity while taking on masculine roles. Such images and messages had a dominant presence in advertisements appearing in Picture Post throughout the war. One of the clearest delineations of this approach on the part of the government came with the publication of the Ministry of Information pamphlet Eve in Overalls in 1942. In that pamphlet, in a manner reminiscent of the efforts of Zixt Soap Tablet, women in the factories are described as having ‘wellcared for hands and hair and they wear, whenever possible, pretty shoes’. It goes on: ‘they have not given up their necklaces nor their bracelets nor their lipsticks’.35 Whether more imagined than real, this was projected as the ideal as far as women on the Home Front were concerned, with commercial advertising playing an important role in its successful propagation.

‘The Girls on Whom So Much Depends’ In an effort to ensure that their messages had veracity, c ertain advertisers did highlight the difficulties facing women in wartime, especially in relation to those twin demands that urged them to move into areas of productive labour that tended towards the more masculine while at the same time retaining their essential femininity. In such cases, it was acknowledged that the heroism expected of women had to take place alongside the day-to-day practice of life, requiring considerable adjustment and forethought, particularly for the housewife, leaving ‘Mr. X’ to wonder ‘CAN A WARDEN BE A GOOD WIFE?’ (Figure 5.3). Mrs Peek’s Puddings has ‘Mrs. X’ fretting that her overwhelming desire to contribute to the war is upsetting her household, calling on her to reassess her priorities. She has ‘been on duty all day’ and therefore ‘really hadn’t the time to cook a meal’, much to the displeasure of ‘Jim’. As a consequence, ‘Mrs. X’ regrettably considers resigning from the Warden’s Post, given that family life takes precedence—until, that is, she is introduced to the joys of Mrs Peek’s

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Figure 5.3

185

Source: Picture Post, 23 November 1940, p. 34.

Puddings. The message is clear: new ways must be found to balance these two demands. Normal life, the stability of the home and family, were key elements in the war effort. Mrs Peek’s Puddings offers a way to combine being a good wife with the war, ‘I’m still helping my country and Mrs. Peek is looking after your dinner.’ While commercial advertising in this period endorsed commitment to the war effort, it was sympathetic to the tensions inherent in wartime society, especially in regard to the role played by women. As Penny Summerfield has pointed out, ‘gender stability’ was crucial to the war effort as the mainstay of ‘normal’ society.36 Any commitment that women made, as seen in the example from Mrs

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Peek’s Puddings in particular, was conditional on her first fulfilling her role in the home. The commitment is negotiated, the ‘plucky young girl’ who ‘gives up her own rest hours to help her neighbours, making her new wartime life even more exhausting than it need be’ does so alongside her normal role.37 In this way, commercial advertisers reflect a society trying to retain as much of the ‘ordinary’ as possible while committing to getting as involved with the war as that allows. Throughout the war, women were shown making an extraordinary contribution to the war effort and going about it cheerfully while bringing much-needed charm and attractiveness to the Home Front. As principal consumers, to do so was of course in the best interest of advertisers. Women and ‘girls’ are held up as the epitome of the Home Front spirit, a point well made by Rinso with reference to ‘Mothers on Munitions’.38 This advertisement makes reference to women’s dual existence as munition workers by night and housewives and housekeepers by day. The advertisement marvels at their stamina and ingenuity in solving the conundrum of how ‘mothers of families now working all day or all night on munitions get their washing done’. The speaker in this advertisement reports how they ‘went to a town where hundreds of volunteers have answered the call for more women munition workers’. The language is explicit in making reference to the commitment and willing sacrifice of women who now find themselves in the front line yet are willing to stretch themselves still further in answering the call of the nation.39 It goes on: ‘I met some of these new recruits to the munition factories coming off their shift. They’d done a night’s work, putting threads into nuts and boring holes in shell caps— strange work for women accustomed only to running a home.’ However, in keeping with the pervasive popular image, they willingly embrace this new work: ‘One and all said they enjoyed the change and were glad to be doing their bit.’ Thus nearly all elements of the ideal female citizen are outlined, held up as an example by this advertiser and neatly summed up in the c onclusion: ‘Cheerful, capable of doing two full-time jobs at once and liking it, these women are the very salt of the nation. More power to them!’ There is

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an implicit message here that women want to be viewed almost as equals to the menfolk who fight in the more traditionally designated front line, thus Bourn-Vita refers to a ‘bonny ex-waitress’ who has joined the Women’s Land Army (WLA) observing: ‘She’s got to be fit, too—as “fighting fit” as her boy friend in the army.’40 The ideal woman is portrayed as being up to the task and pleased to be doing her bit to bring forth victory. As Palmolive stipulates, ‘[e]very woman is proud to make sacrifices these days’.41 Not only is she proud to make sacrifices, but she does so with enthusiasm. HP Sauce makes further reference to the WLA, noting how the women have gone ‘Back to the Land’: ‘They’ve answered the Nation’s call in their thousands and have become enthusiastic farm hands.’42 However, while it might be claimed that they are enjoying the change and undertaking such tasks with enthusiasm, women are equally committed to take the job in hand seriously and ensuring that a good job is done. Thus, when ‘[t]here’s hard work that must be done’, they are turning to Glymiel Jelly in order to ‘keep hands comfortable and efficient during unaccustomed work’.43 According to HP Sauce, they are ‘[t]he Girls on whom so much depends’.44 Aware of the implications of the work in hand, ‘[t]hey’re working harder now than they’ve ever worked before’. In the case of the ‘SHOW GIRL’ who joins the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF): Many a glamour girl is now doing her bit in Britain’s ‘big show’. No bouquets now, but real admiration for the way these young women have adapted themselves to the stern hard work their new lives have brought them.45 The idealized women of Britain were projected as having answered the nation’s call and not been found wanting. Not only have they taken to the munitions factories, gone ‘back to the land’ and joined the WAAF, but also in many cases they have continued to run their homes with aplomb. As such, they are held up as making a vital contribution to the war effort, and in common with a broader

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discourse, they are keeping fit and joining in with the national effort to ‘work at war-speed’.

‘Here’s our Jack, Breezy and Bright’ The most obvious representation of the British man during World War II was the man in military uniform. The wearing of this could be taken as the ultimate manifestation of masculinity: the defender and protector, the life-taker. This fulfils a long and well-entrenched tradition in Western society that places the soldier as the ultimate expression of masculinity, as exemplified in Dawson’s study of the ‘soldier hero’ where ‘[m]ilitary virtues such as aggression, strength, courage and endurance have repeatedly been defined as natural and inherent qualities of manhood, whose apogee is attainable only in battle’.46 Thus, military service was broadly projected as a crucial manifestation of masculinity. Rose observes: ‘Being visibly a member of the fighting services was necessary to the performance of wartime masculinity’.47 Yet, in terms of the advertisements featuring men that appeared in Picture Post, there was but a slim majority (51 per cent) that depicted men in uniform, suggesting that this was not the exclusively ‘appropriate’ role for men in wartime Britain. Nevertheless, where men were depicted in uniform—which, of course, encompassed a range of roles such as civil defence, fire service and police—the most pervasive uniforms depicted were those associated with the three main armed services: the Army, Navy and Air Force. However, those depictions rarely subscribed to those ‘natural and inherent qualities of manhood’, even when men were shown explicitly as members of the Army, Navy or Air Force; most of the time (69 per cent) they were shown in more domestic settings rather than being engaged with the war in an overtly aggressive or macho fashion. Where men are depicted in a combat situation, their machismo is tempered by a cool and rational approach. Thus, while Wills’s Gold Flake cigarettes use the setting of an aircraft carrier at sea, the ‘action’ is actually centred on finding the ‘force and direction of the wind in the upper air by means of a sextant compass and a balloon’.48 In this respect, those natural inclinations towards the

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destruction of the enemy, and even overt signs of aggression and courage, are displaced by a much more nuanced response. Irrespective of the idea of the ‘soldier hero’ as being quintessentially aggressive as the ultimate, and necessary, expression of manhood, what is presented in these advertisements is much more measured, suggesting that the British ‘soldier hero’ of World War II was a more complex and multifaceted being. After all, seldom, if ever, do advertisements present men in the war zone clearly expressing their macho instincts; the British character is much more refined. Where advertisements do show men directly in the war zone, they are clearly separated from death and destruction: the focus instead is on a ‘surgical’, dispassionate execution of duty. In a rare example depicting soldiers in the field on behalf of Ever-Ready Razor Products, the focus is not on the target but on the British infantry man operating ‘equipment’. In ‘WE’RE NOT SHOOTING A LINE’, two infantrymen are firing a PIAT antitank projector, preoccupied in the task of ensuring a ‘direct hit’.49 There are a number of significant features regarding this exceptional advertisement: the men are shown in the field and clearly might be said to be in a dangerous situation that denies the chirpy, cheerful execution that is so prevalent elsewhere; they are depicted carrying out their task with precision, implying that collateral damage will be minimal, and pointing to the very measured terms via which British servicemen carry out their duties; and this advertisement appears very late in the war when, it might be suggested, the outcome of the war is known and a more measured appraisal is more feasible. Such representations are thrown into even sharper contrast when compared to the manner in which American servicemen were represented in commercial press advertisements— these were frequently much more akin to the ‘ideal’ soldier hero. For example, in 1943, Canned Florida Grapefruit Juice depicted three Marines, two stripped to the waist, muscle-bound and with teeth gritted as they relished firing a ship-borne machine gun with apparent abandon into the air. The copy reads: Just ask a Jap what it feels like to be up against men who are fortified with ‘Victory Vitamin C’

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You bellowed it forth to the world, Mr. Tojo—a year or so ago. ‘Americans have grown soft.’ Tell that to your Zero pilots today. Tell ’em if you dare! Or find a survivor from Guadalcanal—and ask him what it feels like to meet a U.S. Marine! How well every Jap knows the truth today [. . .] for he’s up against men with iron wills and nerves of steel—and bodies hard as nails.50 The contrast is stark, not least in the vitriolic references to the enemy, which were almost entirely absent throughout all British commercial advertising, but also in casting men in such unequivocal terms, virtually relishing the death and destruction: such ‘blood lust’ was never a part of the make-up of the British male during World War II. The British man at war was defined via these advertisements, as elsewhere, with reference to a number of key features relative to the immediate past and also relative to representations of the enemy widely abroad. The key distinction was that the British male was not an automaton or a faceless component within the war machine. In relation to the enemy male, the Nazi or Japanese ‘robot’, the British man pressed into the armed services was crucially a more sensitive and sensible individual capable of possessing a range of emotions. There appears to be a deliberate effort throughout the range of British propaganda to represent men as softer than elsewhere, or if not softer, those natural masculine inclinations were shown to be tempered and conditional. This is a crucial distinction in respect of the British male during World War II: the majority of those who found themselves in the armed service were not career military men but merely there for the duration. Ultimately their values were those of the civilian society to which they would one day return. This is clearly demonstrated in the example cited above for Ever-Ready Razors: these men are calmly and rationally going about a job of work. For Noakes: ‘[D]uring the war, men in the armed service were encouraged to view themselves as fighting men, yet men who were doing their duty rather than simply giving free rein to supposedly masculine impulses.’51 Rose has extended this perspective to c haracterize British men as ‘temperate heroes’ whereby, while not denying that they were in possession of all the

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manly qualities required to take on the enemy in combat, these were not always allowed to predominate and, instead, the inclinations of the solider hero were tempered.52 This was, in part, a propaganda construct that clearly sought to position the British male/soldier in contradistinction to the enemy, where the enemy was portrayed as the unbridled hyper-masculine. Indeed, government posters, for example, rarely offered direct representations of fighting men or even men in uniform. When men did appear in government posters in uniform, they were usually placed in domestic settings, which once again reflected their more sensitive and caring side.53 The contrast of the British man-at-war in relation to the German ‘other’ was blatantly set out in Korda’s 1939 film The Lion Has Wings, most notably when the respective aircrews are being briefed for their mission: the British airmen lounge around in the briefing room, making quips and jokes as they depart, whereas their German counterparts stand to attention in serried ranks, receiving their orders without emotion, ‘a striking contrast to the friendly atmosphere that is Britain’s way’, we are told.54 When it came to commercial advertisers representing the men of the armed forces, the vast majority adhered to this picture of the ‘British Tommy’ as the happy-go-lucky type with a c heerful demeanour and a rather cavalier approach to those in positions of authority. Clearly, the British man at arms was not considered to be so highly disciplined and dispassionate in the style of his German opposite—not entirely war-minded. On the contrary, the whole process of being at war was portrayed as being ‘a bit of a lark’, with Cavanders Limited branding its lively characters the ‘Army Clublets’, seen in Figure 5.4 at play in the ‘tub’. Elsewhere, the British man in uniform was seen ‘[t]aking it easy’ or as ‘our Jack, breezy and bright’.55 Such an impression fits into a wider narrative that conjures up the British people in wartime as a jocular bunch, laughing in the face of adversity, not taking life too seriously and generally muddling through, a view given currency during the war, reinforced subsequently in the official history of Titmuss (1950), then recycled and reworked most notably by Taylor (1965), Marwick (1968) and Pelling (1970).

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Figure 5.4

Source: Picture Post, 23 December 1939, p. 8.

While it might be argued that the adoption of such portrayals by commercial advertisers was, in part, a result of necessity and a means by which Britain’s parlous state of preparation and the, at best, lacklustre performance of its armed forces in the first years of the war could be justified and refocused into something of a positive—in much the same way as the Dunkirk evacuations were

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characterized—they also set out something of the actual male spirit and attitude when faced with war in 1939. Summerfield makes reference to the experience of the First World War, and the period of reflection on this in the interwar period, to explain this tempered sense of masculinity that typified the male attitude in World War II.56 She maintains that the ‘classic’ masculine role as soldier hero, aggressive, strong, courageous, persistent, was reconsidered in the light of the experience of the First World War. The idea of the man as the focused, determined and emotionally reserved soldier had been seen to fail in trench warfare: by the time World War II came around, the stiff upper lip was beginning to wane as British men were encouraged to show a greater range of emotions. Further, the appetite for adventure and challenge that might be embodied in the British adventurer who built the Empire, and which proved a strong rallying cry for recruitment in the first years of the First World War, was less in evidence by 1939. This is clearly reflected in the lack of volunteers into the armed services as war approached, which forced the Chamberlain government to introduce conscription in April 1939. As Gardiner observes: The majority of those drafted into the Army regarded the war as an unpleasant but necessary job that they had to despatch before they could get on with their lives. Few had any ideological commitment to an anti-Nazi crusade, any particular hunger to ‘kill the Hun’, or even any very clear idea precisely why Britain was at war and who were her Allies.57 Thus, commercial advertisers depicted British men at arms not as a coldly efficient killing machine, and not even as the disciplined and focused military men but rather as more detached and temperate individuals going about a job of work while retaining much of his fun-loving spirit. That is not to suggest that they were not up to their job at hand, or that they were not capable of executing their duties in combat, but rather that they were calm and rational, refined and tempered. As seen in the examples for Wills’s Gold Flake and EverReady Razors, they were often portrayed as executing their duties

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with precision and efficiency. As Summerfield highlights, military masculinity was frequently ‘linked with technology’.58 Most importantly, the British male stood in contradistinction to the enemy. The British male possessed not just physical might, which of course it was suggested that there was a natural reservoir of, but a sense of ‘decency’ and ‘fair play’ alongside that—what Rose refers to as ‘moral toughness’.59 The British man at arms was represented in a more nuanced fashion compared to the monolithic representation of the aggressive, military male, and this extended into commercial advertising. There was more to the British male in wartime than an exclusive focus on destruction. Indeed, most of the time that men were represented in advertisements they were not ‘at war’ but in entirely different settings and displaying a range of different interests and occupations.

Only the Brave Deserve the Fair If the men of the armed forces were portrayed as more sensitive and considered than their German counterparts, the majority of advertisements that featured men not in the fighting forces certainly subscribed to this impression, frequently placing them in a domestic setting and attributing to them concerns and interests apparently far removed from the exigencies of warfare. Of all the wartime advertisements in Picture Post featuring men, 20 per cent advertised products from the toiletries and cosmetics sector. This stands out as exceptional, given that of all advertising expenditure recorded in the contemporary Statistical Review of Press Advertising for the full years of the war (1940– 1944), just 8 per cent was for toiletries and cosmetics. Clearly, personal appearance was considered to be a major concern for men in wartime. In terms of advertising activity, the greatest concern for men during the war was dental hygiene, with one-third of advertisements being for these products. The rationale behind the promotion of these products linked in directly to the basic masculine instinct of attracting a mate and such commercial advertisements played on the anxieties that might be associated with men being away from home,

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for whatever reason. This is well illustrated in the example in Figure 5.5 for Colgate Ribbon Dental Cream. Within this scenario, Jill suggests breaking off her engagement to Ken on account of his halitosis. Irrespective of those advertisements aimed at women and the underlying narrative that appealed to them to do all they could to

Figure 5.5

Source: Picture Post, 17 February 1940, p. 4.

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attract and hold onto a man, Jill is shown to have a more cavalier attitude. Further, the war is placed firmly in the background: despite the fact that Ken is merely home on leave and due to imminently depart, Jill is not prepared to take this into account in dropping her bombshell. This advertisement highlights a number of interesting features around appeals to male identity and masculinity during the war. Not least that, irrespective of the overt masculinity inherent in being a part of the war effort, a defender and protector of the nation, the need to take care of one’s appearance and actively court women remains a constant. Thus, male identity was not as simple as to be, for example, a soldier and then let all associations flow from that; the British male also had to be attentive, kind and caring. In a similar manner, there was a profusion of advertisements for hair dressings. Along the lines adopted by the makers of dental care products, those manufacturers of hair dressings also stressed the need for men to maintain their appearance, in part to ensure they remained attractive to the opposite sex but also because they equated care for personal appearance with being able to carry out one’s duties effectively and efficiently and as an important contributor to good morale. By far the largest advertiser in this sector was Brylcreem, who advertised throughout the war. Its underlying message was that ‘Men of Action need BRYLCREEM’; in the same way that women were urged to care for their appearance as a direct contributor to the war effort, so men, in this case in the armed forces, were advised that personal grooming was an important facet of their carrying out their task.60 In this respect, the exigencies of the war effort that demanded self-sacrifice and a selfless approach, appear to give way to a more individual and self-centred attitude. In keeping with the broader evidence, it frequently appears to be the case that the unity of spirit and need for personal sacrifice seemed to be undermined by these advertisers and, arguably, is more broadly reflective of prevailing attitudes. The meaning of the uniform was also challenged and reinterpreted in these advertisements. The express purpose of uniform is to eliminate the exercise of individual choice and distinction: the right to determine appearance in the armed forces was a right reserved for those in command. Variance and variation in uniform was not to be

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tolerated, given that it suggested deviance from ‘conformity to both the institution as a whole, and to its image of the masculine ideal’.61 The formality and strict regulation of appearance via uniformity of dress was taken as an expression that ‘the wearer exercised special powers of self-control, that his emotional and intellectual life had special qualities of rigour and discipline’.62 Yet here, it was less a leveller designed to bring a corps of men together as much as a fashion statement to be used as a mark of distinction. Hence: MODERN ARMY DRESS CALLS FOR BRYLCREEM You can’t hide untidy hair under the modern army cap. You’ve got to have it right dressed by the right dressing.63 In effect, recruits were implored that donning the uniform was only half the battle that needed pepping up through careful personal appearance: the uniform, in itself, was inadequate in achieving what was required. Thus, while women might remark that ‘there’s something about a soldier’, a caveat was added that ‘there’s something about everyman who has well cared-for hair’.64 Advertisers aimed to generate a range of anxieties in men during the war that suggested that if they wanted to attract a partner, care for individual appearance above and beyond the smartness of a uniform was required. This is in much the same way that women were cautioned not to ‘let themselves go’ and use the demands of war as an excuse for a slovenly appearance, or even a more masculine mode and form of dress. This might key into the idea that uniforms serve as a great leveller, in this case making all members of the armed forces look essentially the same, whereas to be attractive required an individual and distinctive trait. This point was reiterated by Brylcreem throughout the war and is graphically illustrated in the example in Figure 5.6 from January 1940. Alongside the prevailing narrative that called on every man to ‘do his duty’, another scenario called on men to maintain their appearance, not merely in keeping with military regulations but in pursuit of more personal objectives and a pervasive demand that they ought to look attractive and thereby attract and retain a partner.

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Figure 5.6

Source: Picture Post, 20 January 1940, p. 48.

Thus, there was ‘no denying the smartness of your service uniform— but you want to have your hair smart to match’. This focus on norms within society remained a durable feature of the British Home Front: irrespective of the magnitude of the task at hand, and the ideological nature of the battle, for many, motivations for engaging in the war remained private, idiosyncratic and grounded in the ordinary. If the maintenance of gender stability was an important preoccupation for women, this was no less the case for men. Indeed, the traditional bonds, pursuits and patterns of life alluded to in these advertisements were central to the morale of the British people throughout the war. While the men in the armed forces might have been fighting to defeat an evil enemy, they were equally fighting to return to a normal life as soon as that was possible. Yet one of the central facets of that, gender stability, the bedrock of modern Western society, with family life as the cornerstone, was challenged as men joined the armed services. Further, wartime questioned the idea of monogamy: with men away from home, maybe in a foreign country, opportunities were presented that may not have been the case under normal circumstances. In addition, there was a concern among those in command that an oversensitivity towards partners, wives and family might cloud a fighting man’s judgement and stand in the way of the effective prosecution of the war.

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Reading these advertisements from this perspective, it might be argued that such messages sought to play on the anxieties of men and consider the level of commitment they ought to show to a partner, or even play on the difficulties of attracting a spouse, thereby serving to reinforce a certain stability to society, keeping up the pretence of ‘business as usual’. However, more than this, such a commitment to a partner proved to be an effective motivating force in fighting the war. Francis has shown in his study of the RAF ‘Flyer’ how such ideas of gender stability and fidelity were an important facet of morale by providing a ‘necessary antidote to the dehumanizing effects of military discipline and the violence of combat’.65 Home and family life were key motivating forces for men during World War II. However, these welcomed distractions were the preserve of those in the armed forces. Men who were not in uniform were not portrayed in the company of women or courting their attention. Of all advertisements featuring men that appeared in Picture Post in the period under consideration, there were only two occasions where nonuniformed men were seen in the presence of a single female who appeared to be their wife or partner. Turning the maxim of P & B Knitting Wools on its head, it would appear that it was only the brave that deserved the fair. Overall, when it came to representing men who were not in uniform, the portrayal tended to be much more serious and in greater earnest. Summerfield observes how soldiers were ‘depicted as fit young men who assumed the identity of the soldier wholeheartedly [. . .] wartime heroism and masculinity were embodied in the military man’, leaving her to wonder where that left the civilian male worker.66 Indeed, she notes, there was little done to counter the impression that the civilian worker was less in earnest than his military counterpart; industrial workers were seldom explicit in propaganda posters. Drawing on the contemporary appraisal of J. B. Priestley, it is suggested that the ‘soldier was serious, a hero, the c ivilian man was comical’.67 However, representations in commercial advertising seem to contradict that picture: as illustrated above, it was the men of the armed forces who were depicted as laid back and flippant, their civilian counterparts tending to be more serious and in earnest.

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Perhaps in an effort to counteract the impression that those not in the armed services were not effectively serving the nation, commercial advertisers went to great lengths to depict civilian men in general as wholly committed to the war effort, prepared to make great sacrifices and strenuous in their efforts. The virtues of serving the war at home were extolled at length, and in detail. A welder speaking for Kruschen salts declared: ‘It’s a fine thing to be a skilled man these days—though this job’s as tough as they make ’em. I wouldn’t work these hours in peace time for a large gold clock.’68 Attempts to make the contribution of such workers important and valued were explicit. In such representations, there was no time for jollity or tomfoolery in the style of the ‘Army Clublets’; the men shown in these advertisements were wholly focused on productive output. This might be taken as a clear and deliberate manifestation of masculinity. Albeit based on a later period, Roper’s study of managers who entered British industry during the 1940s and 1950s found that physical involvement in the production process was a key distinction in setting out their masculinity,69 a point reiterated by Mosse, who observes that a key feature of the ideal male is his capacity to engage in productive work.70 As if to stress this point and ensure that those working on the Home Front felt valued, commercial advertisers were persistent in making such points explicit, perhaps in the hope of assimilating themselves with an important group of potential consumers. Advertisers were unequivocal in placing men working on the Home Front at the centre of the war effort, and in a much more explicit and concerted manner than they ever did for those in the armed services. They were styled ‘conscientious workers’ by T.C.P., ‘apt to disregard a slight cut or graze, in order to “get on with the job”’, while Bulmer’s Cider was keen to point out how ‘[n]o less an active part is the “Civilian Brigade”’.71 Such esteem and praise were not reserved for those most directly involved in industrial production of munitions; the dedication of those men whose connection to the war was more tenuous were also held up as an example. Horlicks, in its advertisement ‘Grass Widower’ of December 1941, takes the example of the ‘chief working partner’ of a firm of builders and house decorators who initially saw his business dwindle with the onset of

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war, only to have it revived with work from the ‘Town Hall’ for factory extensions and concrete shelters. Being ‘knee-deep in work again’, this individual works tirelessly around the clock, observing: ‘I revelled in it, and found time to do Home Guard duty once a week too.’72 Contrary to the idea that ‘the only “real” men were servicemen’—an impression that might have been conveyed via official propaganda—commercial advertisers triumphed the lot of civilian workers and placed them at the heart of the war effort.73 Any impression that those men not in the military had fallen short or had failed in some way was effectively countered by advertisers. There was none of the frivolity and amorous pursuits that characterized representations of those in uniform. As ‘Andy the riveter’ declares, ‘We’ve no time to waste these days! If the old country wants more ships then we’ll see she gets ’em.’74

‘There’s No Place Like Home. . .’ Irrespective of the herculean efforts of these men left on the Home Front, there is one characteristic that was most pronounced across all representations of men in wartime advertisements: that relating to their core values and essential characteristics. As suggested above, much of British male identity was set in opposition to the hypermasculine nature of the German male, with British masculinity being tempered and subdued. As if to reiterate the innate British qualities, commercial advertisers frequently represented men as being domesticated in the sense that they were devoted to the home, home life and family. For Rose, the British soldier is contrasted to ‘Jerry’, who ‘shoots and smashes everything with “men” who would rather “try to talk to Ma—or mend things for the kid”’.75 The British serviceman was rarely seen in action on the battlefield, but there were many occasions where he was seen in a domestic setting and engaging himself with matters far removed from the death and destruction of war. This is well illustrated in the Rinso advertisement ‘Her sailor son insisted’. In this case, the ‘sailor son’, home on leave, is insistent that his mother joins him for a day out only to be told, ‘I can’t dear! I’ve a huge wash to boil.’ However, the son is sufficiently familiar

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with the nature of laundry that he is able first to recommend that she use the Rinso ‘no boil method’ and then manages to acquire some for her. The end result is that the sailor is able to take his mother out to tea.76 Throughout this vignette, the sailor is not only shown to be loyal and dedicated to his mother but also prepared to engage in domestic arrangements. Ultimately, he seeks pleasure in the company of his mother rather than in the presence of his friends and peers. This gentleness of character is a recurring motif in advertisements that clearly show that the British male is a kind and gentle spirit. That homeliness and domestic outlook was held up to embody what it means to be ‘a Good Man’: ‘Quiet, stay-at-home, good, ideal husbands, good neighbours, but not forceful and not leaders.’77 Irrespective of the propagandistic nature of such portrayals, they clearly were designed to appeal to an extant set of beliefs and understandings about what it meant to be a British man during the war. This less adventurous, more cautious attitude might be attributed to the reaction in the interwar period to the experience of the First World War. During that conflict, the idea of emotional repression and a sense of manly stoicism had been shown to fail, leading to a more open display of a range of emotions. Further, men became more inward-looking, taking up interests around the home and becoming more connected to their family, a ‘suburban paterfamilias’, frequently the subject of comic interpretations between the wars: ‘dull and predictable, obsessed with order and routine, and caricatured as “the pipe-smoking, slipper-loving archetype”’.78 Rose describes this as the ‘anti-heroic’ mood of the interwar years: ‘Men became more “homely”, and the private, domestic sphere became the heart of the nation.’79 The First World War largely dispelled the Victorian characteristic of emotional repression, the stereotypical ‘hard’ male, in preference for a softer and more domesticated persona. Francis notes: ‘The possession, as opposed to the denial, of heightened sensibility was celebrated as an essential quality of the national character at war.’80 Such characteristics were celebrated in commercial advertising throughout the war, displaying men as softer and more caring

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members of society. This is made explicit in a 1943 advertisement for Sunlight Soap entitled ‘Home’. Within that scenario, the wife greeting the sailor home on leave has her plans for a ‘gay time’ thwarted by a bout of ‘flu curtailing their trip to the cinema. However, he immediately adopts the role of carer as ‘[c]arefully and tenderly he took her home’: Next day he insisted on her staying in bed. With her apron tied around his waist he worked away in the kitchen, cooking and getting meals ready, whistling happily all the time. Not only is this sailor (although still depicted in uniform) placed within a more feminine zone, he even has his uniform desensitized by donning the apron. What is most important for this British man is not the all-out destruction of the enemy but, in this instance, keeping home. Clearly no impression is given that this does anything to undermine his authority or his place in the hierarchy within that domestic setting, but it displays a character of greater depth who is happy to adopt what might be considered to be a feminine role. This also feeds into a broader narrative around what it was that these men were fighting for, the extent to which this was an ideological war to defeat an evil enemy and restore liberty, or whether motivations were more personal, private and idiosyncratic: what proved most important was protecting one’s own home and family. The sailor in this execution has no taste for adventure: ‘I’ve done all the sightseeing I want on convoys. There’s no place like home, you know.’ In the final paragraph the case is set out unequivocally: When a wanderer returns, when a woman has been waiting, it is home that holds them, that binds them closer together. There is comfort and companionship in the old familiar surroundings. Yes, the old sayings are still the truest. There is no place like home!81 While there may have been a need to have a more assertive sense of masculinity as war was declared, this was always portrayed as playing second fiddle to a more refined and tempered sense of manhood.

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The ‘People’s War’ was being fought to return, as soon as possible, to a normal, ordinary and mundane life. Frequently, the war effort was spurred on by reference to traditional, peacetime gender roles with a clear focus on the importance of family life. In a letter left for his parents by air-gunner Eric Rawlings, killed over Germany in 1942, there is no doubt regarding what it was that he was fighting for: private obligations to ‘the things which I revere and esteem most in the world—my family and my home’.82 The man’s role within the family was also celebrated in numerous advertisements that placed the father figure not as some distant patriarch but as an active and involved constituent, once more promoting the softer side of the British man at war. The father is displayed as an approachable, amiable character, happy and prepared to engage with his children, as seen in the example for HP Sauce in Figure 5.7.

Figure 5.7

Source: Picture Post, 6 April 1940, p. 57.

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Meanwhile, Fry’s has the father within their ‘happy family’ taking a personal interest in household provisions, endorsing his wife’s decision to make up for the deficit in diet created by the absence of bacon with cocoa.83 Fry’s was persistent in placing men at the heart of the family and directly engaged with the bringing up of children; their version of masculinity painted a soft and caring image of the man, even in uniform. Through a series of advertisements that appeared between October 1943 and July 1945, British men were shown to be gentle and caring, with limited ambitions, focused on home and family life, and spending time at one with their children, as seen in the examples in Figure 5.8. There is a very clear message specifically in these advertisements but also common to a range of advertisements featuring men: that it is the male role in Britain not as an aggressive warrior but as a protector of home, of women and of children. While this might be a very definite construct in relation to the hyper-masculine German other, it also speaks of the sensibilities and motivations of men in Britain during World War II. There was little or no ambition among men to prove themselves, as might have been the case in the first years of the First World War. The approach of war and its actual declaration was not embraced with any enthusiasm but with a weary sense of inevitability. The rush to the colours that had characterized Britain in 1914 was altogether absent in 1939: as war approached,

Figure 5.8 Source: Picture Post, 9 October 1943, p. 4; Picture Post, 6 November 1943, p. 28; Picture Post, 19 February 1944, p. 28.

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the government struggled to recruit volunteers into the armed forces, meaning that it was reluctantly obliged to introduce conscription in April of that year. Throughout the war, c ommercial advertisers reflected this underlying popular mood—this very measured response to the war—and presented an honest appraisal of what it was that the men were fighting for, be that in the armed services or serving the country in other ways: men were grounded in the ordinary and mundane, what they were fighting to protect was a ‘normal’ way of life. Their ambitions were limited and they were inclined to do what was required to achieve that goal and little else. What is presented here is a clear picture that the quintessential British male, ‘dull’, inward-looking and with limited ambitions, did not cease to exist as war was declared but remained largely intact. These were, indeed, ‘temperate heroes’.

Conclusion When it came to commercial advertisers reflecting and projecting issues of gender on the British Home Front, while the nature of femininity was set out in an unequivocal, and perhaps unsurprising, manner, representations of men, and especially men in uniform, were less clear. Nevertheless, what does stand out in both cases is the dominance of advertisers from the toiletries and cosmetics sector who were determined that their products provided the means whereby men could be clearly demarcated as men, and women as women. They highlighted how the use of toiletries and cosmetics stood at the heart of the gender divide as a means to attract and retain a mate. Irrespective of the difficulties and challenges that individuals might face in adhering to pre-war standards of appearance with the loss of distinctive character that came with wearing a uniform, the employment of women within non-feminine roles and the difficulties of obtaining such goods, there was an overwhelming discourse that placed the maintenance of gender identity at the heart of British society. This served to complement the government’s own efforts to try, as long as possible, to keep a ‘masculine’ war well away from women, and adhere to the centrality of home and family as a vital

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factor in the war effort. Advertisers further sustained this argument by suggesting that there was more to this need to take care over one’s appearance than the mere exigencies of courting, and that the use of their products made a direct contribution to the war effort: both men and women were urged to take care of their appearance as part of the successful execution of their duties. Clearly, to do so was in the producer’s best interests in an effort to sustain product sales but this tied into that discourse that suggested that taking pride in one’s self made a direct contribution to your effectiveness. This was not just a shallow attempt on the part of advertisers to hype their products but fitted in with propaganda elsewhere that urged people to take care of themselves to sustain morale and help the war effort. The Ministry of Information set this out clearly in Eve in Overalls and the press joined in with regular features along similar lines.84 Thus, far from the selfless spirit that, in certain quarters, was promoted as the ideal wartime ‘community’, there was a contrary narrative that promoted a focus on self and the maintenance of a distinctive character. While this might have been more obviously the case for women, as they were urged to avoid being subsumed by their more masculine roles, it is more surprising in terms of encouraging men to pep up their uniforms and break out of the uniformity of service life. Overall, in considering messages targeted at women, the picture presented by these advertisements is largely unexceptional and complements the extant body of literature that considers the role of women in wartime. There was a very clear message that dominated the British Home Front: women should remain women and, if anything, project an enhanced sense of femininity. For advertisers, this presented an excellent opportunity to promote their products as a counter to the defeminizing nature of wartime life. However, they were careful to temper their messages in order to keep in step with the idea that women were required to get involved in the war: they certainly gave no impression that women should shy away from making a c ontribution, merely that producers could provide solutions to overcome the anxieties associated with taking on those roles. In fact, these advertisements stand out in representing women

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in the auxiliary services from very early in the war. Clearly, these producers felt that women should become directly engaged in the war from the outset and they provided the means whereby those dual functions—volunteering for active service while still retaining ‘feminine charm’—were achievable. Further, advertisers were able to highlight how the simple expedient of projecting an air of femininity was making a very direct contribution to the war effort by sustaining the nation’s morale, especially that of the menfolk. Where representations of women may have been very clearly set out, and fitted into a pre-existing picture of femininity, it is argued here that the idea of masculinity that is presented is less clear cut and less ‘traditional’. The first point to note is that men in uniform did not dominate the advertisements appearing in Picture Post. Where it might have been expected that the only man in wartime Britain was the man in uniform, this advertising would seem to suggest that there was room for a range of representations and a range of roles. Second, where men were seen in uniform, they were not depicted as the archetypal warrior. In most cases, where advertisements showed men in uniform, they were not seen in the field, and certainly not in violent combat situations, but rather in domestic settings. An impression is thus conveyed of the British man in uniform as a much more measured and nuanced individual, especially relative to the enemy and even to American servicemen. These representations would seem to wholly support Rose’s description of the ‘temperate hero’: men merely doing their duty in a very measured fashion rather than giving free rein to their aggressive impulses. This equates with their motivations and objectives: certainly they were committed to the war effort, especially in the case of the civilian workers portrayed in these advertisements, but they were motivated by the private, ordinary and idiosyncratic. British men were frequently represented as being soft and caring; they were pictured in the home, and with the home being at the centre of their being, caring for their partners or children. This commercial advertising portrays the domesticated male. Whereas this might be entirely expected, given that many of the products advertised were to be found and used in the home, it does not

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necessarily hold true that this was the only way in which such products could be represented. In the case of British advertising, there were instances where ‘domestic’ products ranging from sparking plugs, refrigerators and camera film were shown directly in the frontline, but these formed a minority and, what is more, when those products were shown in a domestic setting, there appears to be no reticence in having the man of the house present and using them. Clearly this feeds into a broader narrative around what it was that men were fighting for and what it was that motivated them and, indeed, sustained the nation. Representations of both men and women seem to reinforce the idea that the British nation was sustained through the war by the overwhelming desire to retain as much of the ordinary, normal and mundane as was possible. In relation to gender, much of morale centred on keeping up appearances, trying to avoid wholesale change to the nature of everyday life despite the war. Hence the idea that despite taking on more masculine roles, women were encouraged to retain their femininity and hold onto the ultimate objective of being a partner and having a family and home. The same holds true for men, who were encouraged to maintain their appearance, attract a partner and care for the family. Family and home lay at the heart of these advertising messages: with the family and home established, ‘all’s well’. The message that comes from these advertisements focusing on gender is that ‘normal’ relations are the mainstay of society and at the core of the war effort.

CHAPTER 6 DEFINING THE POSTWAR WORLD

‘Something to look forward to’ Kayser-Bondor, Picture Post, 17 May 1941, p. 33 From 1941, as the prospect of defeat began to recede, people started to lift their heads and look beyond the struggle for survival towards a postwar world. J. B. Priestley, basing his observations on the three years he had spent travelling up and down the country as a speaker from the summer of 1940, reported: In hotels, camps, factory canteens, hostels, railway trains, bars, restaurants, I listened and talked and argued. Topic Number One was probably the state of the war at the particular time; but Topic Number Two, running Number One very close, was always the New World after the war.1 Commercial advertisers were early exponents of such a forwardlooking approach. In so doing, they placed themselves firmly in the vanguard of the reconstruction debate. Such efforts were designed to serve many purposes; not least among these was the determined effort to sustain Home Front morale and to urge the people to fight on, with the promise of a bountiful future world. However, producers believed that with peace would come the restoration of a free-market

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economy and they were determined that they would enjoy their respective (un)fair shares of that market. However, there was not a universal acceptance within the government that such discussions should be taking place at all. Churchill in particular was adamant that plans should not be laid in respect of postwar Britain until the war was won. The Labour Party on the other hand was keen to seize the initiative and begin to lay the foundations for a more equitable society after the war.2 This created a fundamental division, crudely along party political lines, in regard to references to the world of the future. On the one hand, those within the Labour Party and those allied to it tended to conjure up forwardlooking visions of modernity, while on the other, more conservative elements made nostalgic appeals with promises of a postwar return to the pre-war ‘good old days’. Commercial advertisements appearing in Picture Post in this period appear to replicate this distinction, with both messages pursued, often in parallel.

‘The World of the Future’: Visions of Modernity For many, World War II presented a major opportunity to move forward, making a break with the past and working to ‘improve’ Britain and British society. According to Kevin Jefferys, from 1941 there was a ‘new and widespread interest in creating a better Britain’.3 In April 1943, Mass-Observation reported that 57 per cent of those questioned expressed a desire to see ‘great changes’ after the war.4 Certain advertisers wholeheartedly embraced this attitude. Milk of Magnesia stated unequivocally in February 1943 that ‘[m]ost of us are thinking about the sort of world we are going to have after the war’ and that ‘[w]e have made up our minds that it has got to be a better world’.5 Those subscribing to this attitude were determined to move the nation ‘forward’ and avoid reverting to the situation as it had been before the war. In the words of Aneurin Bevan, Labour M.P. for Ebbw Vale and vocal critic of the coalition government, ‘The British Army are not fighting for the old world.’6 The Labour Party’s National Executive Committee 1942 publication, The Old World and the New Society, announced that

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the war had ‘socially and economically effected a revolution in the world’. In the same year, the Fabian Society declared, ‘We are at the end of an age. No matter how the war ends, there can be no return to the old ways of living.’7 Part of that vision of the future was borne out of the increased role of the state in wartime society, especially in respect to the planning and organization of the economy alongside a concern for the welfare of all members of society. Those who championed a modernizing reconstruction agenda hoped to carry that spirit over into the postwar world and retain that sense, as described by Herbert Morrison, of ‘social idealism’.8 Identifying the opportunities that this approach presented, many advertisers chose to adopt similar language in their advertisements in order to tap into the popular discourse and in the process depoliticizing such issues. Pears Toilet Soap typifies the approach of advertisers who adopted a ‘futuristic’ approach in their advertising that saw a bright new future growing out of the ‘mechanical terrors of this war’.9 Between June and November 1941, it ran a series of six advertisements that tried to encapsulate ‘the World of the Future’. The rationale for drawing on the war for positive inspiration (despite the fact that at the time these advertisements appeared there was little or no cheering news regarding the progress of the war) was explained in the first advertisement in the series, reproduced in Figure 6.1. Pears maintained that ‘even in this concentration on destruction there is much that will benefit mankind when this war is over’. These advertisements go on to raise high expectations among their readers, conjuring up idealized visions of a postwar world. Number one in the series promises ‘better health, better homes, a better standard of living and a happier life for all’. The third in the series, which focuses on the ‘thorough reorganisation of Industry’, promises ‘shorter working hours, allowing more time for leisure and for living’.10 Irrespective of the nature of the claims and promises made in these advertisements, what is particularly noticeable is the absence of any sales message on behalf of the advertiser. The only reference to how this space is funded is the inclusion of the Pears logo at the bottom and the use of the tag line ‘Renowned as the leading toilet soap since

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Figure 6.1

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Source: Picture Post, 21 June 1941, p. 2.

1789’. The only exception to this was in the final advertisement in the series, which gave a brief history of Pears toilet soap before offering an explanation for this series of advertisements:

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Each advertisement has been the subject of an aspect of our national life, and the aim of each has been to arouse interest in post-war Britain, to stimulate constructive thought upon worthwhile developments of British resources after the war and, above all, to encourage others to share our enthusiasm for the prospects of ‘the World of the Future’.11 While the advertiser may have been genuinely enthusiastic to ‘arouse interest in post-war Britain’, a more compelling motive would have been to obtain the attention of the public by appearing to be in accord with the popular mood. Indeed, when advertisers in this period began imagining ‘The World of the Future’, their understanding of that situation was less politically engaged than inextricably linked (in their own best interests) to the consumption of the goods that they hoped to be producing at war’s end. Another advertiser adopting a similar approach to that of Pears was Max Factor cosmetics. It too looked forward to a ‘bright new world’ enhanced by the advance of science promising ‘a world of new beauty just around the corner’ thanks to the pioneering work of ‘ingenious cosmetic chemists’. It wistfully looked forward to ‘the happy carefree days of peace to come’.12 For many commercial advertisers, the idea of modernity and their visions of the postwar world that appeared in Picture Post at this time were inseparable from the desire of the public to acquire the goods that they ordinarily produced. Such imaginings were not necessarily peculiar to commercial advertisers in this period but represent a wider rhetoric around ideas of modernity linked to ideas of consumption.13 Thus, Pears’ ‘World of the Future’ spoke to the ‘opportunity to enjoy the thousand and one useful things that post-war Industry will produce for the happiness of all mankind’.14 This opportunity to acquire more consumer goods was, according to Kayser-Bondor (makers of hosiery and underwear), the reward to be enjoyed on victory in the new, postwar world (see Figure 6.2). According to Martin Francis, the emblem of modernity in postwar Britain was to be personal choice. This consumer-orientated conception of modernity was embodied in ‘self-indulgence and self-fulfilment’.15 If commercial

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Figure 6.2

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Source: Picture Post, 28 July 1945, p. 3.

advertisers could not be held to be entirely responsible for this trend, based on the examples found in Picture Post around this time, they were certainly keen to encourage unbridled consumption in the postwar world. Thus Meltis confectioners portrayed a mother looking forward to ‘the joy of unrationed shopping’ while the British Commercial Gas Association promised that in a ‘BRIGHTER NEW WORLD . . . New equipment will bring effortless cooking, constant hot water, smokeless house heating and refrigeration, within reach of every family purse.’16 Such advertising appears to integrate with the bright new future that many in Britain were looking forward to and was clearly designed to drive consumption. The broad acceptance of this approach and these expectations seems to be corroborated by a Mass-Observation survey of April 1944 that predicted a high level of consumer demand after the war.17 In certain respects, this approach appeared to be implicitly endorsed by the Labour Party’s approach to reconstruction. According to Paul Addison: ‘A simple but vital point about the 1945 election is that Labour put the material needs of the average family above all else in its campaign.’18 Advertisements that looked forward to the postwar world were characterized by a great sense of optimism,

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with commercial advertisers making bold and ambitious generalizations about what victory might actually entail for the people at home. Advertisers rode off the back of the rising popular consciousness regarding postwar planning (even the Ministry of Information was obliged to admit that there was a direct correlation between the promotion of reconstruction and public morale) and contributed to it in turn, hoping that adopting such a forwardlooking approach would reflect well on them with the public.19

‘All Our PAST Proclaims Our FUTURE’: Appeals to Nostalgia In contrast to those advertisers who looked forward to a ‘brave new world’, many advertisers adopted a more conservative approach that instead looked backwards and promised a postwar return to the prewar ‘good old days’. The appeal of such an approach suggests a desire among the public to escape from the disruption of war, put the experience behind them and return to a pre-war state of ‘normality’. From this perspective, the ambitions of the public were limited rather than being determined in forging a modern new future. Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo, who suggest that the British people in approaching the general election of 1945 were more apathetic than wholly committed to the Labour Party’s vision of a socialist society, have expounded such a thesis.20 They argue that the majority of ‘ordinary citizens’ had little or no interest in ambitious visions of the country’s future: ‘Above all else, the war had been extremely disruptive and so there was a common desire that it should be followed by a period of normalcy.’21 In keeping with this approach, many advertisers relied on images of the pre-war world in an effort to lead the people forward. KayserBondor Full-Fashioned Stockings used their advertising between 17 May and 5 July 1941 to paint a variety of idealized pictures of what life had been like in pre-war days and to which it would return. These advertisements featured such events as Ascot, Wimbledon and an Eton v Harrow cricket match, as well as Piccadilly Circus fully illuminated in all its glory (Figure 6.3).

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Figure 6.3 Source: Picture Post, 17 May 1941, p. 33; Picture Post, 21 June 1941, p. 5; Picture Post, 5 July 1941, p. 5.

However, the examples used by Kayser-Bondor here are suggestive of a rather exclusive market and appear to target this nostalgic appeal towards a very specific group. Indeed Lewis and Maude suggest that it was specifically ‘middle-class opinion’ that desired little more than a ‘return to the comforts of 1939’.22 Such an approach appears to be reflected in the efforts of the Conservative Party as it approached the 1945 general election. Whereas Labour’s 1945 manifesto, ‘Let Us Face the Future’, was forward-looking and progressive, the Conservatives’ own efforts (‘Mr Churchill’s Declaration of Policy to the Electors’) did ‘little but to cling to a pre-war status quo’.23 For many advertisers in this period, the pre-war world and the heritage of the past became a key motif in looking forward. Poulton & Noel, producers of ‘high quality foods in glass and tins’, found ‘Great Britain’s solid foundations’ in the past: ‘All our PAST proclaims our FUTURE.’ For advertisers, this was a useful sales message, given that it could rekindle fond memories of products that were no longer available and use that past performance as a benchmark for the future: ‘For that is, after all, what the Poulton & Noel label stands for; the continuance of a tradition of high quality— past, present and future.’24 Heritage and the past were key appeals in

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commercial advertising. The Standard Motor Company called ‘Ring out Wild Bells’, with reference to the ‘bells of countless hidden steeples in the shires of our land’ ringing out from ‘square Norman towers, from belfreys fashioned into unearthly loveliness by the hand of Wren’.25 For those making appeals to nostalgia, the war was seen not as a catalyst for change, as was the case with those who championed notions of modernity, but an unwelcome interruption to the continuity of high service and quality goods with whom their name had previously been associated. Such advertising relied on conjuring up visions of a world returning to an idealized, pre-war state best characterized by the joys of Ascot. Commercial advertisers looked backward to a pre-war world through rose-tinted spectacles that recalled ‘the happy days of peace’ which would soon return.26 Dubarry Talcum Powder was lyrical in its recollections, asking that its product be used sparingly in order to ‘recapture for a fleeting hour the thrill of those distant pre-war days’ (Figure 6.4). It recalled: ‘Those happy summer nights beneath the silver moon, the rhythm of soft music and sounds of happy voices must surely come again in the not too-distant future.’ With the return of Dubarry, so too would return the joys of life found in the pre-war world. Zweiniger-Bargielowska suggests that despite the efforts of the Labour Party ‘to make socialists’ through the 1940s, it was ‘essentially unsuccessful since popular attitudes were dominated by an individualistic focus on family and personal life, a desire for privacy, and a longing for a return to normalcy’.27 Many advertisers appeared to be sympathetic to this popular attitude by extolling the virtues of such limited and simple desires. Meltis ‘New Berry’ Fruits ran a campaign in Picture Post between May and December 1941 that described ‘The Fruits of Victory’. These did not look forward to the advances that would grow out of the ‘mechanical terrors of this war’ but rather alluded to more simple pleasures enjoyed before the war: ‘to sit blissfully in the sunshine’, ‘[t]he flash of headlamps in the night, like “silver scissors cutting through dark velvet”’.28

DEFINING THE POSTWAR WORLD

Figure 6.4

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Source: Picture Post, 25 April 1942, p. 3.

Meanwhile, ‘Tomlinson’, acting as spokesperson for Rose’s Lime Juice (Figure 6.5), limits his ‘post-war planning’ to ‘Bacon and eggs—eggs in the plural. A couple of feet of water in my bath. Bananas. Tails and white ties. Asking the man at the petrol pump to “fill her up”.’ Crawford’s Biscuits took a similar approach. In a campaign that ran in Picture Post between January and October 1944, it showed ‘average’ citizens outlining their ‘peace terms’ grounded in the ordinariness of the ‘little luxuries’ of a pre-war world (Figure 6.6). While making reference to the war, greater emphasis is given to the more reasonable demands that highlight a return to ‘normality’. Thus, in the example of 8 January 1944, alongside ‘Hitler brought

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Figure 6.5

Source: Picture Post, 16 December 1944, p. 6.

to trial’ this spokesperson’s ‘peace terms’ are for the ‘front of our house re-painted’, as well as ‘fresh butter, strawberry jam and Crawford’s Cream Crackers’. In February, it is ‘Germany to disarm . . .

Figure 6.6 Source: Picture Post, 8 January 1944, p. 2; Picture Post, 5 February 1944, p. 2; Picture Post, 1 April 1944, p. 2.

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George to give me some silk stockings.’ In April, ‘A new type of government for Germany . . . A fresh set of chair covers.’ According to this interpretation, all that the average citizen really wanted was nothing more than to see ‘all together again’.29 These war aims are more basic and lacking in the reforming zeal that was being expressed elsewhere, crucially focusing on the advertiser’s desires for the future: that the public will want to consume their products in an unregulated market. Kia-Ora, cordial manufacturer, also suggested that what the people were looking forward to was not the ‘new’ but what they had known previously, as in the examples from a campaign that ran in Picture Post between August 1944 and April 1945 (Figure 6.7). As part of the many advertisements that appealed to the nostalgia of a pre-war world, there were numerous references to the ‘little luxuries’ that were so cherished by the average citizen through the war, being reminiscent of a pre-war world. In reaching their target audience and speaking in the prevailing idiom, these efforts appear to be entirely in keeping with the popular mood. Speaking at the Labour Party conference in 1945, the candidate for East Grinstead explained: [T]wo years ago, when I was in Africa, we fell to talking one day about what we hoped to see in the post-war world, and the fellow who put the point best was the one who said he wanted to settle down with his wife in a cottage, with the kiddies, and to enjoy chocolates and looking after the chickens.30

Figure 6.7 Source: Picture Post, 2 September 1944, p. 2; Picture Post, 16 December 1944, p. 26; Picture Post, 28 April 1945, p. 27.

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When ‘the Happy Days of Peace Return’: the Paradox of Commercial Advertisements and Its Consequence in 1945 Irrespective of any divergence that may have been present among those who turned their attentions to the nature of a postwar world, commercial advertisers appear to have been adept at adapting their approach in order to blend in with the prevailing discourse. While, as demonstrated, many focused on the appeal of the modern in looking forward, an equal number chose to hark back to the pre-war ‘good old days’.31 In some cases, references to both appear in one advertisement. For example, in the advertisement for the Standard Motor Company Ltd. alluded to above, alongside evoking the spirit of ‘countless hidden steeples in the shires’, the bells it refers to are encouraged to ‘ [r]ing out the old, ring in the new . . . This is the new world, these are the days to come!’32 According to Conekin, Mort and Waters, this is entirely in keeping with the spirit of the time. Speaking of the period from the end of the war through to the early 1960s, they suggest that ‘the modern [. . .] was a hybrid affair, assembled out of tales about the past as well as narratives of the future’.33 While there may have been an underlying impetus towards a new and better Britain, this was not to be at the expense of the nation’s heritage which, in its turn, helped to define that progress. Modernization is inextricably linked to the prior state.34 This was especially important to these commercial advertisers, given that much of their effort through the war was concerned with maintaining brand awareness, a fond recollection of the products that they once again hoped to sell in a postwar world. While keen to look forward to a market of unbridled consumption, they were keen for consumers to recall the pleasure that their products had brought before and their place in a cherished ‘normal’ life. Despite the context of the future and the modern, advertisers were keen to hold onto ‘tradition’. As Mica Nava and Alan O’Shea point out: [W]ithin modernity there is no escape from historicisation; in fact, it is only within modernity that tradition is invented, and that the past is an essential tool for addressing the new.35

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Therefore, while commercial advertisers may have been perceived as supporting the Labour Party’s reforming agenda, they appear to do so with an air of caution that seeks to hold onto their place in society of the past, ‘the orchestration of change under the guise of continuity’.36 Whilst commercial advertisers may have been keen to speak in the idiom of the time, this was only in the interest of securing the most effective exposure to their target audience. Although producers may have had political interests with regard to the nature of the postwar government, the final arbiter in their actions was what would be most effective in selling their products. Whatever the circumstances, commercial advertisers, in characterizing the postwar world, were keen to encourage consumption. Despite their best efforts to reassure the public, inform and educate it in the best interests of the nation in time of war, the advertising in this period thinly conceals the overriding drive of producers and advertisers to protect their livelihood. As part of that ongoing campaign, advertisers suggested to the people what it was that they were fighting for, principally acquiring as much and as many consumer goods as one wanted. Whether wistful and nostalgic or otherwise, the underlying principle for all this advertising is the notion that the end of war will create the opportunity to realize the desire of the public to consume more, which ultimately was in the producers’ best interest. According to commercial advertisers, what was fundamental ‘among the blessings of peace’ was the opportunity to acquire, for example, a pair of Kayser-Bondor stockings.37 This was to be the ‘reward’ for which you had been fighting.38 Of course, the end of the war did not bring about the freedom to consume that advertisers had promised. On the contrary, austerity was continued and even intensified. Zweiniger-Bargielowska suggests that the ‘expectations of improved consumption engendered by victory, d epressed morale and contributed to the growing disaffection with the Attlee government’.39 While she makes no reference to the impact that commercial advertising may have had on those frustrations in her book, it seems extraordinary that the actions of commercial advertisers in this period, with their grandiose promises around what the end of the war would bring, could not be

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held to account at least in part for that ‘growing disaffection’. Further, with the end of the war, commercial advertisers dramatically increased their expenditure, thereby fuelling those expectations and demands even further. Irrespective of the severe economic conditions, they began to boost their expenditure from the end of the war, growing by 50 per cent between 1945 and 1948, then growing most dramatically by 231 per cent between 1948 and 1954 when rationing effectively came to an end.40 If, as Austerity in Britain suggests, the Attlee government’s popularity was critically undermined by its failure to ‘deliver the goods’, the commercial advertisements appearing in Picture Post from May 1941, and with growing intensity and volume into the postwar world, must be held to account for the part they played in conjuring up visions of a postwar world that were subsequently to appear unrealistic.41

CONCLUSION

On 14 June 1945, the journal of the British advertising industry, Advertiser’s Weekly, announced that advertising had ‘[h]elped to win the war’. In certain respects, it did indeed make a contribution to the successful conclusion of that enterprise largely because, either by design or by default, it provided the people with a means via which their regular cultural identity could be sustained and maintained rather than falling victim to a new wartime persona. Commercial advertising in Britain during World War II made a significant contribution to the culture of everyday life in wartime. Given that the main preoccupation of most people was to live as normal a life as possible through the war, commercial advertising provided a key point of reference. Further, it dressed up the ordinary and mundane in such a way as to suggest that regular practices were now unequivocally a part of the war effort and, by simply keeping on, you were after all showing Blitz spirit. For most of the people, most of the time Blitz spirit had nothing to do with heroism or the vainglory of directly engaging with the enemy but rather was about the ongoing practice of everyday life. Actual Blitz spirit was to be found in the dogged determination of the British people to keep firmly within the grooves of their normal lives. Commercial advertisers were at the forefront in promoting this as an acceptable form of behaviour and explaining how it might be achieved, albeit via the consumption of their products. Indeed, the simple presence of

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commercial advertising was, for many, a reassurance that life still went on, providing practical help and advice in the task of adapting to the new wartime lifestyle while retaining as much of that normal life as possible. Although this may not have been the conscious or principal intention of those working within the industry—there is sufficient evidence to indicate that their greater interest was in actually protecting their livelihood—advertising did indeed ‘help to win the war’. It did so largely by virtue of the fact that commercial advertisers themselves just kept on ‘keeping on’, moving with the people, maintaining the pretence of business as usual and grounding references to the war in the mundane nature of everyday life. The key contribution made by advertising was quite simply that the messages propagated helped to explain and support what many conceived to be a ‘new’ wartime lifestyle. Frequently this meant merely stating that indeed life need not be so very different from a regular peacetime demeanour or, at least if it was or appeared to be, there was a means via the consumption of certain goods whereby the worst of those effects could be legislated against. Commercial advertising provided practical advice in terms of enabling people to accommodate the war within their everyday lives. The nature of these commercial announcements, and what made them all the more effective in comparison to official pronouncements, was that they were characterized by clarity and an unambiguous sense of direction, qualities that lay at the very heart of effective modern advertising. In effect, commercial advertising presented a means by which one’s identity might be managed and situated within an extant and recognisable culture. Accordingly these messages suggested how engagement in the war might be brought to them rather than the people having to go out of their way to engage with it. Rather than a wholesale change brought about by the war, cultural identities altered very little. The culture of a society is derived from the people and is an organic process. The propagators of cultural symbols feed off the people at whom they aim and contribute to the creation of a useable protocol for life. Culture is the representation of the ‘lived practices’ of that society.1 From a historical perspective, value is to be found in

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commercial advertising, given that it reflects the society in which it appears. It is firmly anchored within society and aims to move with the people, speaking in their language, while highlighting their concerns and problems and proposing solutions through the consumption of their products. This modus operandi of commercial advertising was no less the case in Britain during World War II. This was not necessarily a likely or obvious state of affairs within a nation embroiled in total war but the advertising industry, as war approached and in its first months, was ever mindful that such a freedom to operate was crucial to its survival and well-being and thereby took all the steps that it could to ensure that this would be the case. On occasion this meant toeing the party line in respect to the demands of government and conveying the impression that those in positions of authority felt should be conveyed in respect to Britain’s engagement with the war. However, at the same time, advertisers were ever mindful of their primary constituency, their customers, and fought hard to walk a fine line between vacuous propaganda and staying true to that group, retaining their longearned trust. Much of the output of advertisers during the war was propagandistic in nature, but they always had an eye on their customers and determined to portray the war in the manner in which those customers conceived of it. The advertising industry fought throughout the war to maintain that freedom to operate that would enable it to keep in step with the public in the interests of maximizing its present or future profitability in unprecedented market conditions: it did not strive to identify with the people purely in order to be at one with them but to sell product. This is the very raison d’eˆtre of commercial advertising: it exists in order to drive up product sales, in part at least by developing brand loyalty among consumers and engendering a spirit of goodwill towards certain products. It was argued at the time that if the presence of brand names and advertisements were to cease, the consequences for the economy and the advertising industry would be dire. This was the starting point for the actions of the advertising industry: the protection of its livelihood and that of its clients. The first step for the advertising industry in ‘surviving’ through the war was to prove that

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it had a valid place in wartime society. Irrespective of the war going on around them, and despite the scarcity of many of the goods that they advertised, business and the advertising industry as its vocal advocates were concerned that there would come a time when normal business practices would be restored. Everything that commercial advertisers did through the war looked towards that postwar world and the maintenance of normal trading conditions. The war was seen as an interruption and therefore it was considered important to maintain brand awareness ready for when normal business resumed. For its part, the government appreciated that commercial advertising in the press had a useful role to play as a foil for its own activities: the continued presence of ‘peacetime-style’ advertising in the press would suggest to the general public that the newspapers and magazines of wartime were in essence the same as those from the years of peace, largely independent, rather than ‘official newssheets’ filled with government exhortations and propaganda. The government believed that its own publicity would be all the more effective if it appeared alongside other ‘regular’ advertisements. The combination of these factors ensured that commercial advertising continued through the war, and that advertisers were largely free to go about their normal business, marked most notably by the rather grim complexion cast onto wartime life as war was declared and in its first months. Nowhere is the contrast between the high-handed and didactic propaganda of the government and the more honest and down-toearth portrayal of the situation presented in advertising more pronounced than in those commercial advertisements of the first months of the war. As key advocates of the advertising industry continued their efforts to curry favour and support the government to the extent that they were then accorded a degree of liberty to go about their business, advertisers stayed true to their aim to speak in the popular idiom and thereby captured the mood of the nation. While the Ministry of Information called for calm, courage and cheerfulness, press advertisements showed images of the burdensome and tiresome nature of war. Clearly, war was identified as a problem rather than something to be enthusiastically embraced, and central to the

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narrative set out in advertisements was the idea that the war could seriously disrupt your everyday life and sap your spirits. Advertisers described war honestly as an unwelcome disruption to everyday life and presented their products as a means to escape from the war, exclude it as far as possible, rather than shifting to a more war-minded demeanour. In effect, the propaganda of commercial advertising set out to demonstrate how to sustain a regular state of affairs rather than giving oneself over entirely to a new cultural identity: the consumption of advertised products was set up as a means to mediate the worst effects of the war. Thus, advertisers did not advocate a sense of Blitz spirit characterized by active participation and direct engagement with the war but rather suggested that one could ‘do one’s bit’ by taking efforts to maintain a normal existence. That they were able to do this depended on sustaining the argument that commercial advertisers were playing a useful role in informing and directing the people. Information conveyed by commercial advertising could be held up as being of genuine use to the people in guiding them in how to adapt to the new wartime lifestyle. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that when it was referred to, advertising was viewed as a source of information and helped to shape consumption practices. Much of this stems from the fact that commercial advertisers remained closely aligned to their customers and their perspective on the new Home Front lifestyle: these advertisements were marked by their variety and responsiveness in shifting with the nature of everyday life. This was most marked as the Phoney War shifted to a very real war and threat in the wake of Dunkirk. At that moment advertisers were at the forefront, issuing clear guidance and instruction as the government floundered in terms of how it felt the people should be responding and the extent of the action they should take. While those instructions might have been limited to advice in adapting to the latest wave of rationing, this still stood out as something the people could do, albeit of a limited or even inconsequential nature. The very fact that the people were not wholly resigned to their fate and were determined to serve appetizing and imaginative meals, within the limitations of what was available and with the assistance of Mason’s O.K. Sauce, suggested that the

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nation was not defeated and life still went on. The government itself came to appreciate this source and even found utility in commercial advertising in wartime as a more indirect way to feed information to the public. The great advantage enjoyed by commercial as opposed to government advertising or propaganda was that it had a history, continuity with the peacetime past. This aspect was to prove of crucial importance in wartime Britain. The very presence of commercial advertising in the press gave the impression of a semblance at least of normality, that life had not been entirely disrupted. For this reason, if for no other, the government went to considerable lengths to ‘protect’ the place of advertising. Further, those messages freely created and circulated by commercial concerns proved to be more appropriate and relevant as far as the British people were concerned. Many people through the war did not necessarily draw comfort and solace in the notion that the nation was ‘Mightier Yet’ but in the ability to sustain a normal life well rooted in otherwise mundane routine. If Blitz spirit was really about active, engaged citizenry, then this was more imagined than real and the propaganda put out by commercial concerns was wholly irrelevant. However, if Blitz spirit was less bombastic and more grounded in the everyday, a sense of tolerance, forbearance and stoicism, then commercial advertisements were at the forefront in terms of suggesting means via which the people could carry on and sustain a normal life. In the end, this is what they were fighting for; this is what sustained morale and Bournville Cocoa was playing as much a part in that as the heroes of the Auxiliary Fire Service. The power of advertising in World War II was in the help it gave in guiding consumers in how to live life, making the milk ration go that bit further, providing ideas to supplement children’s inadequate sweet ration, instruction on how to do the weekly wash more efficiently while using less fuel and caring for precious clothes. Where they had the trust of consumers built up over the preceding decades, advertisers were better able to address the realities of the situation in a way in which perhaps the government was not able to. Whereas the output of the Ministry of Information may have been highbrow, prescriptive and distant from the majority

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of the people, commercial advertisers took the same message and grounded it in the ordinary: they spoke in the language of the people. Their representations of, for example, women war workers, did not concentrate exclusively on the extraordinary but made reference to the difficulties that accompanied the compulsion felt to be a warden as well as running a home, offering practical help and advice, while at the same time making such concerns ‘valid’ by lending them an air of legitimacy via their very inclusion in the press. The extent to which the people drew on this advertising and how far it really went to bolster morale and sustain ordinary life is difficult to assess. However, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that what kept people going through the war was those references to normal life, in a sense their disengagement from the war. Ongoing advertising in the press was a useful distraction from war news and official pronouncements and, what is more, following the guidance and advice offered in such advertisements could be regarded as much as a sense of engagement with the war as paying close attention to the comings and goings of the Eighth Army in North Africa. If the suggestions made in such advertisements were accepted, individuals could believe that they were making a direct and important contribution to the war effort via the simple expedient of making thoughtful and well-considered purchases. The argument was that the purchase of branded goods was the most sensible course of action and was absolutely in the national interest: branded goods offered the greatest value for money and the utmost reliability, thereby cutting down on waste. The scant evidence available from the war would seem to support this as consumers were determined to ensure that the little they got came from reputable manufacturers, were bona fide and recognized brands supported by ongoing and sustained advertising. If there was little inclination among the British people to become directly engaged in the war, then here was a simple means by which an appropriate gesture could be made and a sense conveyed to the consumer that they were helping the war effort. Consumption was dressed up as a patriotic act, part of the war effort. As was clearly demonstrated, from the outbreak of war, and in the face of the imposed government rules and regulations (many of which

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seemed to be entirely unnecessary, certainly in the Phoney War period), the war was often regarded as above all a huge ‘inconvenience’, an obstacle to the overwhelming desire to just keep on living one’s life. Day-to-day life through the war was guided, as in peacetime, with reference to experience: this proved a greater guide than any efforts from on high to try to shape behaviour into appropriate forms. While it may not have been ‘an issue that inflames much passion in the mind of the average citizen’, the continued presence of commercial advertising carried on in the background as a kind of safety net, consistent with a pre-war world, that could be drawn on for help and advice as appropriate. This is the nature of popular culture: it provides a framework within which independent, free-thinking individuals make use of and ‘creatively adapt’ what is presented to them to help them to make sense of their place in the world and help to guide them through the living of their day-to-day life. Commercial advertising thus played a significant role in Britain during World War II. While the motives of the advertising industry may not have been quite as laudable as their public declarations suggested, the end product was consistent with that suggestion that they did have a useful role to play in wartime society in helping to ‘guide, help and hearten millions’. The continued presence of commercial advertising in the press, with the acquiescence of the government, helped to protect and project the ideal of the media as free and independent, with all the implications that that had for wartime morale. The ongoing efforts of commercial advertisers to speak ‘honestly’ and in the idiom of the time meant that people were happy to accept commercial advertising as one more means to help them get by and live a normal life. The information that commercial advertisers provided tended to be practical and firmly rooted in the daily routines of life. However, above all, the continued presence of commercial advertising was part of the fabric of everyday life in wartime, as previously in peacetime, and, as such, advertising did indeed help to win the war.

NOTES

Preface 1. Jay, Anthony, The Oxford Dictionary of Political Quotations (Oxford, 1996), p. 29. 2. Mowat, Charles Loch, Britain Between the Wars, 1918– 1940 (London, 1955), p. 649. 3. ‘The first year. A speech to the House of Commons, August 20, 1940’ in Charles Eade (ed.), The War Speeches of the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill, Vol. 1 (London, 1951), p. 235. 4. Wintringham, Tom, People’s War (Harmondsworth, 1942), p. 45. 5. Wintringham: People’s War, p. 57. 6. Morgan, David and Mary Evans, The Battle for Britain: Citizenship and Ideology in World War II (London, 1993), p. 21. 7. Rose, Sonya O., Which People’s War? National Identity and Citizenship in Britain, 1939– 1945 (Oxford, 2003), p. 6. 8. Connelly, Mark, We Can Take It! Britain and the Memory of World War II (Harlow, 2004), p. 26. 9. Churchill, Winston S., World War II, Vol. I: The Gathering Storm (London, 1967), p. 584. 10. Harrisson, Tom, Living Through the Blitz (London, 1976), p. 78. 11. Marwick, Arthur, The Home Front. The British and World War II (London, 1976), p. 181.

Introduction 1. Calder, Angus, The People’s War. Britain 1939– 1945 (London, 1969), p. 17. 2. Doherty, Martin A., Nazi Wireless Propaganda. Lord Haw-Haw and British Public Opinion (Edinburgh, 2000), p. 87. 3. Downham, John, BMRB International. The First Sixty Years, 1933– 1993 (London, 1993), p. 40.

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4. ‘Back to the land’, HP Sauce, Picture Post, 26 April 1941, p. 7. 5. Quoted in Lewis, Peter, A People’s War (London, 1986), p. 5. 6. Rose, Sonya O., Which People’s War? National Identity and Citizenship in Wartime Britain, 1939– 1945 (Oxford, 2003), p. 21. 7. Connelly, Mark, We Can Take It! Britain and the Memory of World War II (Harlow, 2004), p. 128. 8. Summerfield, Penny, ‘Dunkirk and the popular memory of Britain at war, 1940– 58’, Journal of Contemporary History, xlv/4 (2010), p. 789. 9. Titmuss, Richard M., History of World War II: Problems of Social Policy (London, 1950), p. 508. 10. Rose: Which People’s War?, p. 1. 11. Memorandum by Minister of Home Security, 7 September 1940, TNA CAB 68/7. Quoted in McLaine, Ian, Ministry of Morale. Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II (London, 1979), p. 108. 12. Home Intelligence Weekly Report, 28 October – 4 November 1940, TNA INF 1/292. 13. Williams, Douglas, ‘Introduction’ in Britain Can Take It. The Book of the Film (London, 1941), n.p. 14. Churchill, Winston, ‘A world broadcast, April 27, 1941’ in Charles Eade (ed.), The War Speeches of the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill, Vol. 1 (London, 1951), p. 389. 15. Calder, Angus, The Myth of the Blitz (London, 1991), p. 120. 16. Britain Can Take It, n.p. 17. Titmuss: Problems of Social Policy, p. 324. 18. Front Line 1940– 1941. The Official Story of the Civil Defence of Britain (London, 1942), p. 60. 19. Quoted in Calder: The Myth of the Blitz, pp. 33– 4. 20. Eade: The War Speeches, p. 390. 21. Rose: Which People’s War?, p. 2. 22. Humphrey Jennings to his wife, 20 October 1940. Quoted in Calder: The Myth of the Blitz, p. 180. 23. Titmuss: Problems of Social Policy, p. 324. 24. Geertz, Clifford, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, 1973), p. 17. 25. Bellah, Robert N., Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler and Steven M. Tipton, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life quoted in Billington, Rosamund, Sheelagn Strawbridge, Lenore Greensides and Annette Fitzsimons, Culture and Society (Houndmills, 1991), p. 28. 26. Burke, Peter, Varieties of Cultural History (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 18– 20. 27. Williamson, Judith, Decoding Advertisements. Ideology and Meaning in Advertising (London, 1978), p. 13. 28. Holt, Douglas B., How Brands Become Icons. The Principles of Cultural Branding (Boston, 2004), p. 73. 29. Quoted in Jowett, Gareth S. and Victoria O’ Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (Thousand Oaks, 1999), pp. 164 – 65. 30. Holt, Douglas B., ‘How consumers consume: a typology of consumption practices’, The Journal of Consumer Research, xxii/1 (June 1995), p. 2.

NOTES TO PAGES 16 –31

235

31. ‘More help for war effort’, Vim, Picture Post, 29 March 1941, p. 2. 32. Nicholas, Siaˆn, The Echo of War. Home Front Propaganda and the Wartime BBC, 1939– 1945 (Manchester, 1996) p. 4. 33. Calder: The Myth of the Blitz, p. 258. 34. Bowen, Elizabeth, The Heat of the Day (London, 1949), pp. 87– 8. 35. TNA INF 1/251. ‘Home Front propaganda’, November 1941, quoted in McLaine, Ian: Ministry of Morale, p. 251. 36. Harris, Jose, ‘War and social history: Britain and the Home Front during World War II’, Contemporary European History, i/1 (March 1992), p. 34. 37. Baxendale, John, ‘“You and I – all of us ordinary people”: renegotiating “Britishness” in Wartime’ in Nick Hayes and Jeff Hill (eds), ‘Millions Like Us’? British Culture in World War II (Liverpool, 1999), p. 300. 38. Entry for Saturday 14 December 1940. Webley, Nicholas (ed.), Betty’s Wartime Diary, 1939– 1945 (London, 2002), p. 106. 39. Orwell, George, ‘London letter to Partisan Review’, 5 June 1945 in Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (eds), The Collected Essays, Journalism & Letters. George Orwell, Vol. 3: As I Please, 1943– 1946 (New York, 1968), p. 384. 40. Advertiser’s Weekly, 30 May 1940, p. 234. 41. Jeffery, Tom, Mass Observation. A Short History (Brighton, 1999), p. 3. 42. Summerfield, Penny, ‘Mass-Observation: social research or social movement?’, Journal of Contemporary History, xx/3 (1985), p. 439. 43. The number of publications that have come out subsequently that herald the merit of that magazine further reinforces the enduring and popular nature of that publication. See Hopkinson, Tom (ed.), Picture Post 1938– 50 (Harmondsworth, 1970); Kee, Robert, The Picture Post Album (London, 1989); Weightman, Gavin, Picture Post Britain (London, 1991). 44. Figures kindly supplied by the Audit Bureau of Circulation. While impressive on the surface, all such circulation figures should be taken relative to the market. However, in many ways, Picture Post was unique and therefore there is nothing against which to compare it. A ‘competitor’ did not come along until the launch of Illustrated in March 1939, however no ABC figures are available for this title in this period. 45. Kee: The Picture Post Album, p. 9. 46. Hopkinson: Picture Post, p. 8. Emphasis added. 47. Tom Hopkinson in Hopkinson: Picture Post, p. 38. 48. See ‘A plan for Britain’, Picture Post, 4 January 1941. 49. Kee: The Picture Post Album, p. 9.

Chapter 1

The Place of Commercial Advertising in Wartime Britain

1. History of Advertising Trust (hereafter HAT), AA 3/1/2/4, The Advertising Association Meeting of Council Minutes, Proposed Resolution to the Home Office, 29 September 1938, p. 7.

236

NOTES TO PAGES 32 –37

2. HAT IPA Archive Section 2: IPA Annual Reports and Council Reports, Council’s Report, 1 January – 31 December 1938, p. 11. 3. Statistical Review of Press Advertising (The Legion Publishing Co., Ltd., London), v/2 (January 1937)– xiv/2 (January 1946). 4. Advertiser’s Weekly, 7 September 1939, p. 253. 5. HAT IPA Archive Section 2: IPA Annual Reports and Council Reports, IIPA Council Report, 1 January – 31 December 1939, p. 9. 6. HAT AA 4/1/3, The Advertising Association Executive Committee Minutes, 23 September 1935– 6 January 1949, General Purposes Committee Minutes, 21 September 1939, p. 2. 7. HAT AA 4/1/3. 8. The National Archives (hereafter TNA) INF 1/50, Draft minutes of a meeting of Heads of Publicity Divisions, held in Room No.136 of the Senate House, University of London, W.C.1 on Monday, September 11th, 1939, at 2.45 p.m. 9. Advertiser’s Weekly, 4 January 1940, p. 9. 10. Statistical Review of Press Advertising. 11. The spectre of ‘pooling’ was first raised by the government in regard to margarine and cooking fats under the terms of the Margarine and Cooking Fats (Provisional Control) Order of 4 September 1939 and the Margarine and Cooking Fats (Requisition) Order of 7 October 1939. See The Times, 6 October 1939, p. 10. 12. HAT AA 4/1/3, The Advertising Association Executive Committee Minutes, 23 September 1935– 6 January 1949, Minutes of Meeting of Sub-Committee of the General Purposes Committee to Consult with the President, 26 October 1939, p. 1. William Teasdale was the one-time advertising manager of London North Eastern Railways. 13. TNA INF 1/159, Committee of Imperial Defence Regulations for Censorship 1938. Approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence on July 27, 1938. 14. TNA INF 1/522, Defence Notices, General Observations, n.d. (probably November 1939). 15. TNA INF 1/522, Draft letter to Mr Memory [Press] Representative ‘Drawn up by one of the legal staff of the Daily Mail þ handed to me at a meeting of the press sub-committee 12.x.39. DAE [D’Arcy Edmondson, Press and Censorship Bureau].’ 16. HAT AA 3/1/2/4, The Advertising Association Meeting of Council Minutes, 29 February 1940, p. 9. 17. ‘To Advertisers YOUR PRODUCT – will it become a pre-war legend?’, Picture Post advertisement in Advertiser’s Weekly, 19 October 1939, p. 45. It should be noted that the press itself had a vested interest in maintaining advertising expenditure given its dependence on this important revenue stream. Political and Economic Planning’s Report on the British Press (1938) found that, excluding the contribution of commercial advertising, most newspapers were running at a loss. It reported that a penny newspaper cost a penny halfpenny to produce and returned just two-thirds of a penny per sale. Therefore, the prospect of a drastic drop in advertising expenditure would have serious implications for the press (Political and Economic Planning (PEP), Report on the British Press. A Survey of its

NOTES TO PAGES 37 –46

18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28.

29.

30. 31.

32.

33. 34. 35.

237

Current Operations and Problems with Special Reference to National Newspapers and Their Part in Public Affairs (London, 1938)). HAT AA 3/1/2/4, The Advertising Association Meeting of Council Minutes, Report of the Sub-Committee Appointed by the General Purposes Committee, Council Minutes, 7 November 1939. Advertiser’s Weekly, 19 October 1939, p. 49. ‘To buy or not to buy’ and ‘The folk at home’, Murphy Radio advertisements in Picture Post, 18 November 1939, p. 7 and 11 May 1940, p. 36 respectively. ‘The readers forum’, Advertiser’s Weekly, 15 February 1940, p. 128. Advertiser’s Weekly, 18 April 1940. Quoted in Advertiser’s Weekly, 5 September 1940, p. 146. ‘What is this goodwill? The function of advertising during the war’, The Times advertisement, Advertiser’s Weekly, 12 December 1940, pp. 196–97. Obviously, in undertaking this advertising, The Times had a vested interest in ensuring that advertising in the press continued. HAT AA 13/1/6, The Advertising Association 1940 Series of War-Time Advertisements, ‘keeping our balance. . .’ HAT WSC 5/3/1, W. S. Crawford Misc. Correspondence, Letter from W. S. Crawford Ltd. to F. P. Bishop Esquire, The Times, 1 March 1939. Quoted in Advertiser’s Weekly, 21 December 1939, p. 214. Mark Abrams was a pioneer researcher in newspaper and magazine readership and consumer behaviour. During the war, he worked for the BBC Overseas Research Department and the Psychological Warfare Board. After the war, he founded Research Services Limited and was instrumental in founding the Market Research Society. A Survey of Reader Interest in the National Morning and London Evening Press, Part IX. Conclusions, November 1934. Box 91, London Press Exchange (LPE) Published Reader Interest Surveys, 1934, pp. 15 – 6. Churchill Archives Centre, The Papers of Mark Abrams (hereafter ABMS). Reader Interest Survey, 1938. ABMS 2, LPE Reports 1937– 1939. Such an appreciation of advertising seems consistent with contemporary attitudes, with Stephanie O’Donohoe reporting an underlying ambivalence among the public. The Advertising Association’s survey in 2000, ‘Public Attitudes to Advertising’, found that 76 per cent of respondents approved of advertising ‘a little’ or ‘a lot’. Further, some modern consumers reported how they use advertising to inform their consumption practices, with 30 per cent of a BRMB sample for Mintel in 1998 agreeing that advertising ‘tells you about new products and services’. See O’Donohoe, Stephanie, ‘Living with ambivalence: attitudes to advertising in postmodern times’, Marketing Theory, i/91 (2001). Mass-Observation Archive (hereafter MOA), File Report (FR) #A10, Reactions to Advertising, December 1938. Also, Topic Collection (TC) 22, Commercial Advertising 1938– 47. Box 1/A. Advertiser’s Weekly, 11 January 1940, p. 20. Advertiser’s Weekly, 18 January 1940, p. 41. Advertiser’s Weekly, 18 January 1940, p. 44.

238

NOTES TO PAGES 46 –56

36. ‘1940 calls to advertising’s younger generation’, Advertiser’s Weekly, 4 January 1940, p. 4. 37. TNA INF 1/849, General Production Division, ‘Anger’ Campaign recommendations, 17 June 1940. 38. TNA INF 1/849. 39. McLaine, Ian, Ministry of Morale. Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II (London, 1979), p. 147. 40. HAT IPA 16/2, Committee Minutes, President’s Address, Minutes of the Annual General Meeting of Fellows and Associates of the Institute, 16 April 1940. 41. J. B. Priestley was a Yorkshire-born writer who achieved great popularity in the interwar period. He was best known for his novel The Good Companions (1929) as well as Angel Pavement (1930) and his social commentary, English Journey (1933). During the war, he was best known for his Postscripts, broadcast after the 9 o’clock news. See Judith Cook’s entry in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, www.oxforddnb.com, and Nicholas, Siaˆn, The Echo of War. Home Front Propaganda and the Wartime BBC, 1939– 45 (Manchester, 1996), pp. 57– 62. 42. The term ‘execution’ is common advertising parlance for the creation or production of an advertisement. 43. Advertiser’s Weekly, 9 May 1940, p. 186. 44. Sharpe, Len, The Lintas Story. Impressions & Recollections (London, 1964), p. 66. 45. See Nicholas: The Echo of War, pp. 57– 62. 46. Advertiser’s Weekly, 20 June 1940, p. 282. 47. Advertiser’s Weekly, 26 September 1940, p. 192. 48. Advertiser’s Weekly, 31 October 1940, p. 74. 49. Advertiser’s Weekly, 30 May 1940, p. 234. 50. ‘No scarcity of food supplies’, The Times, 25 June 1940, p. 3. 51. ‘Free. The Stork wartime cookery book’, The Times, 20 March 1940, p. 7. 52. Calder, Angus, The People’s War. Britain 1939– 1945 (London, 1969), p. 114. 53. Advertiser’s Weekly, 25 July 1940, p. 54. 54. F. P. Bishop, ‘Here is where advertising should be going’, Advertiser’s Weekly, 8 August 1940, p. 90. 55. Advertiser’s Weekly, 8 August 1940, p. 87. 56. HAT AA 3/1/2/4, The Advertising Association Meeting of Council Minutes, Report of the AID Committee, Council Minutes Thursday October 19, 1939. HAT AA 3/1/2/4. 57. HAT AA 3/1/2/4, The Advertising Association Meeting of Council Minutes, Ministry of Home Security and ARP Advertisements, Meeting of Council Minutes Wednesday September 18, 1940. 58. HAT IPA 16/3, Committee Minutes 1930– 1950s, Minutes of the Trade Relations Committee, 4 April 1940. 59. Advertiser’s Weekly, 24 October 1940, p. 57. 60. The Advertisement Investigation Department (AID) was a division of the Advertising Association that ‘policed’ standards in commercial advertising. It was initially set up under the title of the National Vigilance Committee, becoming the Advertisement Investigation Department in 1928.

NOTES TO PAGES 56 – 63

61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

239

Where advertisements transgressed the codes and ethics of the Advertising Association, the advertiser and their agency were first approached. In the event of their failing to respond, either by way of a satisfactory justification for their advertising approach or by amending or withdrawing the offending advertisement altogether, the AID would issue instructions to all recognized media owners advising them not to carry this client’s advertisements. The AID was to evolve into the Advertising Standards Authority of today. HAT AA 1/1/4, Advertisement Investigation Department Committee Meeting Minutes, 22 April 1936– 24 April 1941. Despite extensive searches, the author has been unable to find an example of the advertisements referred to here. HAT AA 1/1/5, Advertisement Investigation Department Committee Meeting Minutes, 16 October 1941. See for example Picture Post, 2 October 1943, p. 4. HAT AA 1/1/5, Advertisement Investigation Department Committee Meeting Minutes, “V” for Victory Reference in Advertising, 18 September 1941. Mass-Observation Archive, File Report 863. HAT AA 3/1/2/4, The Advertising Association Meeting of Council Minutes, Meeting of the Executive Committee Minutes, Friday, 17 April 1942. HAT AA 3/1/2/4. HAT AA 4/1/3, The Advertising Association Executive Committee Minutes, 23 September 1935– 6 January 1949, Executive Committee Minutes, 18 December 1941. TNA BT 60/68/4, Advertising in War-time, p. 3. TNA BT 60/68/4, Advertising in War-Time, p. 3. TNA BT 60/68/4, Advertising in War-Time, p. 4. HAT AA 3/1/2/4, The Advertising Association Meeting of Council Minutes, 20 February 1942. The Economist, 28 March 1942, p. 423. HAT AA 3/1/2/4, The Advertising Association Meeting of Council Minutes, Meeting of the Council Minutes, Tuesday, October 28, 1941. Gerald outlines the decline in pagination of a ‘large national daily newspaper’ as follows: Pages September 1939 to April 1940 April to July 1940 July 1940 to March 1941 March and April 1941 April 1941 to end of 1945

12 8 6 6 on 6 days 4 on 2 days 4

Gerald, J. Edward, The British Press Under Government Economic Controls (Minneapolis, 1956), p. 219.

240

NOTES TO PAGE 64

77. Advertiser’s Weekly, June 14, 1945, p. 394. 78. Gerald: The British Press, p. 225. Another implication of this dwindling supply of advertising space is the suggestion that, to some extent, the press was now freed from its dependence on advertisers. Both prior to and after the war, there was a popular discourse which suggested that given the crucial income generated by advertising, newspapers were being unduly influenced by business (this is best illustrated by the PEP report on the British press (1938) and the Royal Commission on the Press (1949)). With the restricted amount of advertising space available, the situation was changed and the press could now ‘enjoy’ operating in a seller’s market. By virtue of this, James Curran has suggested that the effect was ‘to liberate the press from some of the economic pressures that had previously inhibited the development of radical journalism’. Clearly there is some validity in this argument given that some of the pressure exerted on the press to pursue a ‘higher class’ readership which would be of greatest interest to advertisers was removed and they could therefore write, for example, for the working classes. However, two caveats need to be placed on this argument. First, the true extent of the influence those advertisers were really able to exert on newspapers and, second, the extent to which the press could really adopt such a ‘cavalier’ approach. In the case of both the PEP report and the Royal Commission, very little evidence was found of direct pressure from advertisers to secure the suppression of particular items of news or opinion, and those that were found were mostly of a trivial nature. In truth, it would be fair to conclude that even prior to the extraordinary situation that was brought to bear on the press through the war, newspapers, irrespective of the money being spent by advertisers, would have been free to pursue whichever editorial line they should choose. In the second case, while demand for advertising space outstripped supply through the war, the returns that the press was able to enjoy were not so high as to give it carte blanche in its operations. Gerald reports that while there was a significant increase in ‘net profit on trading’ in 1940 versus 1938, for the remainder of the war this situation was either reversed or was on a par. It should also be remembered that the press itself, in the same manner as the advertising industry, would have an eye on the postwar world and therefore could not afford to depart radically from its pre-war editorial position for fear that when ‘normal’ trading conditions resumed it would be unable to attract advertisers. Rather than suggesting that the relationship between press and advertiser was one of constant tension, it is better to understand it is a situation of mutual dependency whereby the newspaper needs the advertiser and the advertiser needs the newspaper. See PEP, ‘Report on the British Press’; Royal Commission on the Press 1947– 1949 (London, 1949); Curran, James, ‘Press history’ in James Curran and Jean Seaton (eds), Power Without Responsibility. The Press and Broadcasting in Britain (London, 1997), pp. 5 – 108. 79. TNA INF 1/686, Press Advertising for Government Departments, Minutes of Meeting of 10th April 1941.

NOTES TO PAGES 65 –78

241

80. War Cabinet minutes, WP(41) 142, quoted in Taylor, Philip M., ‘Censorship in Britain in World War II: an Overview’ in Duke, A. C. and C. A. Tamse (eds), Too Mighty to be Free. Censorship and the Press in Britain and the Netherlands (Zutphen, 1987), p. 165. 81. McLaine: Ministry of Morale, p. 7. 82. TNA INF 1/941, Draft Report of the Official Committee on the Machinery of Government on the post-war plans for the MoI, 28 March 1944, quoted in McLaine: Ministry of Morale, p. 241. 83. TNA INF 1/82, Scope and Responsibilities of the Home Section, Commercial Relations Branch, 19 September 1941.

Chapter 2 War Begins at Home 1. Calder, Angus, The People’s War. Britain 1939– 1945 (London, 1969), p. 60. 2. Titmuss, Richard M., History of World War II: Problems of Social Policy (London, 1950), pp. 19– 20. 3. Calder: The People’s War, p. 471. 4. TNA INF1/724, Memorandum by the International Broadcasting and Propaganda Enquiry, 21 June 1939, quoted in Taylor, Philip M., ‘Techniques of persuasion: basic ground rules of British propaganda during World War II’, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, i/1 (1981), p. 61. 5. TNA INF 1/724, quoted in Taylor: ‘Techniques of persuasion’, p. 62. 6. McLaine, Ian, Ministry of Morale. Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II (London, 1979), p. 54. TNA INF 13/213, quoted in Yass, Marion, This Is Your War. Home Front Propaganda in World War II (London, 1983), p. 10. 7. The Times, 23 September 1939, p. 7. 8. Baxendale, John ‘‘You and I – All of Us Ordinary People’: renegotiating ‘Britishness’ in wartime’ in Nick Hayes and Jeff Hill (eds), ‘Millions Like Us’? British Culture in World War II (Liverpool, 1999), p. 318. 9. Mackay, Robert, Half the Battle. Civilian Morale in Britain during World War II (Manchester, 2002), p. 50. 10. Madge, Charles and Tom Harrisson, Britain by Mass-Observation (Harmondsworth, 1939), p. 57. See also Harrisson, Tom and Charles Madge (eds), War Begins at Home (London, 1940), p. 134. 11. ‘YOU MUSTN’T LET WARTIME GET YOU DOWN’, Wincarnis, Picture Post, 9 March 1940, p. 16. 12. ‘WORRY UPSETS YOU PHYSICALLY’, Alka-Seltzer, Picture Post, 24 February 1940, p. 11. 13. ‘There are 3 Sleep Groups’, Horlicks, Picture Post, 27 January 1940, p. 3. 14. Green, Martin, Children of the Sun, quoted in Fussell, Paul, Wartime. Understanding and Behaviour in World War II (New York, 1989), p. 59. 15. Nicolson, Nigel (ed.), Harold Nicolson. Diaries and Letters 1939– 1945 (London, 1967), p. 36.

242

NOTES TO PAGES 79 –90

16. Calder: The People’s War, p. 63. 17. McLaine: Ministry of Morale, p. 54. 18. The first food items to be rationed were bacon/ham, sugar and butter on 8 January 1940. This was followed by meat in March, and then tea, margarine and cooking fats in July 1940. For a comprehensive survey of rationing during World War II, see Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Ina, Austerity in Britain. Rationing, Controls, and Consumption, 1939– 1955 (Oxford, 2000). For details of Britain’s wartime food policy, see Hammond, Richard James, Food and Agriculture in Britain 1939– 45. Aspects of Wartime Control (Stanford, 1954). 19. Statistical Review of Press Advertising. 20. ‘Lucky BOVRIL isn’t rationed!’, The Times, 3 October 1939, p. 6. 21. TNA RG 23/31, Manufactured Food Inquiry Part II, December 1942, p. 19. 22. ‘SOW. . .GROW. . .AND THEN ADD OXO’; ‘Christina Emma Gladys Taylor’, Bisto. Both Picture Post, 2 May 1942, p. 26 and 7 November 1942, p. 4 respectively. 23. Statistical Review of Press Advertising. 24. It has not been possible to establish if this strategy was successful in terms of increased consumption of Kellogg’s Corn Flakes in the absence of bacon. The Kellogg Company was unable to supply any sales statistics for this period. 25. Calder: The People’s War, p. 45. 26. Beardmore, George, Civilians at War. Journals 1938–1946 (Oxford, 1986), p. 42. 27. Calder: The People’s War, p. 63. 28. ‘There is a simple duty laid upon you. . .’, Worthington, Picture Post, 13 January 1940, p. 45. 29. ‘Light up – and smile!’, Osram Lamps, Picture Post, 23 December 1939, p. 48. 30. ‘There is a simple duty laid upon you. . .’, Worthington, Picture Post, 13 January 1940, p. 45. 31. Statistical Review of Press Advertising. 32. ‘TAKE NO RISKS WITH COUGHS & Colds THIS AUTUMN’, Famel Syrup, Picture Post, 4 November 1939, p. 2. 33. ‘Summary report of the Ministry of Health for the year ended 31 March, 1943’, Parliamentary Papers 1942– 43, vol. 4, Cmd. 6468, London, 1943, in Smith, Harold L., Britain in World War II. A Social History (Manchester, 1996), pp. 36– 7. 34. ‘Health’, Home Intelligence report, 11 March 1943, INF 1/292 in Smith: Britain in World War II, p. 37. 35. ‘Don’t let “War Nerves” destroy your Sleep’, Ovaltine, Picture Post, 13 January 1940, p. 43. 36. ‘Why Do Some People Crack Up Under War Strain?’, Horlicks, Picture Post, 10 February 1940, p. 50. 37. ‘FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE Strong Nerves and Restorative Sleep!’, Picture Post, 9 March 1940, p. 57. 38. ‘Nerve Strain’, Energen Bread and Food, Picture Post, 18 November 1939, p. 52. 39. ‘In the last war. . .’, Sanatogen Nerve-Tonic Food, Picture Post, 30 September 1939, p. 48.

NOTES TO PAGES 90 –104

243

40. ‘Pack your MACLEANS. . .’, Macleans Peroxide Tooth Paste, Picture Post, 18 November 1939, p. 56. 41. ‘They cheer one up just to look at them, Mr Barratt!’, Barratt’s Shoes, Picture Post, 9 March 1940, p. 52. 42. ‘I Have “Peace-Time Sleep”. . .’, Cadbury’s Bourn-Vita, Picture Post, 24 February 1940, p. 56. 43. ‘There is strong temptation in these troubled times. . .’, Worthington, Picture Post, p. 49. 44. ‘That our homes may be unfettered in their happiness. . .’, Worthington, Picture Post, 27 January 1940, p. 49. 45. ‘A smile is as infectious as a yawn. . .’, Worthington, Picture Post, 24 February 1940, p. 55. 46. ‘There is no propaganda like a smile’, Worthington, Picture Post, 9 March 1940, p. 61. 47. ‘Here’s a picture of happiness’, His Master’s Voice Radio, Picture Post, 18 November 1939, p. 5. 48. ‘Let’s all Smile – the Odol Smile’, Odol Dentifrice, Picture Post, 28 October 1939, p. 57. 49. ‘Keep calm, Keep confident, Keep well!’, Phosferine Tonic Wine, Picture Post, 25 November 1939, p. 60. 50. Fussell: Wartime, p. 10. 51. Broad, Richard and Suzie Fleming (eds), Nella Last’s War. A Mother’s Diary 1939– 1945 (London, 1981), pp. 40– 1.

Chapter 3

Instruction and Direction

1. See McLaine, Ian, Ministry of Morale. Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II (London, 1979), Chapter 3, esp. pp. 81–7 with reference to the ‘Silent Column’ campaign and ‘Cooper’s Snoopers’. See also Yass, Marion, This is your War. Home Front Propaganda in World War II (London, 1983), Chapters 2 and 3. 2. Harold Nicolson, Parliamentary Secretary to the MoI, diary entry for 21 July 1940, quoted in McLaine: Ministry of Morale, p. 83. 3. INF 1/264, ‘Morale – summaries of daily reports’, 26 July 1940, p. 82, quoted in Lewis, Rebecca, ‘The planning, design and reception of British Home Front propaganda posters of World War II’, PhD thesis, 2004, p. 183. 4. Addison, Paul, The Road to 1945 (London, 1975) pp. 62 – 3. 5. Quoted in Calder, Angus, The People’s War. Britain 1939– 1945 (London, 1969), p. 99. 6. Hansard, Vol. 361, 5 June 1940, cc. 863 – 4. 7. Quoted in Wing, Sandra Koa (ed.), Our Longest Days. A People’s History of World War II (London, 2008), p. 33. 8. Quoted in Wing: Our Longest Days, pp. 34.

244

NOTES TO PAGES 104 –118

9. Mackay, Robert, Half the Battle. Civilian morale in Britain during World War II (Manchester, 2002), p. 60. 10. Mass-Observation Archive (MOA) FR #2130, June 1940, quoted in Mackay: Half the Battle, p. 61. 11. TNA INF 1/250, Draft Cabinet memorandum, no date, quoted in McLaine: Ministry of Morale, p. 71. 12. TNA INF 1/686, Press Advertising: General Policy. 1939– 1943. Memorandum from Mr Clifford Bloxham to Mr W. G. V. Vaughan re. Reduction of newspapers to 6 pages, 1 July 1940. 13. TNA INF 1/686. 14. ‘All your meals need a dash on’; ‘Put a dash on your ration’, Mason’s OK Sauce, Picture Post, 13 April 1940, p. 54, and 15 June 1940, p. 5 respectively. 15. ‘I say. . . RISSOLES are nicer with Yorkshire Relish!’, Goodall, Backhouse & Co. Ltd., Picture Post, 8 June 1940, p. 3. 16. ‘Do you know – ’, Stork Margarine, Picture Post, 27 April 1940, p. 13. 17. ‘Free! The Stork Wartime Cookery Book’, Picture Post, 6 April 1940, p. 5. 18. See ‘Fresh Milk, Condensed Milk or Powdered Milk! It’s all the same to CREAMOLA’, Picture Post, 18 October 1941, p. 2. 19. See Mackay: Half the Battle, p. 61. 20. ‘Health and Efficiency MUST BE Maintained!’, Ovaltine, Picture Post, 6 July 1940, p. 34. 21. ‘HERE IS FOOD FOR THOUGHT’, Shredded Wheat, 13 April 1940, p. 58; ‘Keep the Family “FIGHTING FIT”’, 25 May 1940, p. 2. Both in Picture Post. 22. TNA INF 1/848, Policy Committee minutes, 27 May 1940, quoted in McLaine: Ministry of Morale, pp. 68 – 70. 23. TNA INF 1/264, HI Daily Report, 20 July 1940, quoted in McLaine: Ministry of Morale, p. 83. 24. For more on wartime food policy and rationing, see Hammond, Richard James, Food and Agriculture in Britain 1939– 45. Aspects of Wartime Control (Stanford, 1954) and Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Ina, Austerity in Britain. Rationing, Controls, and Consumption, 1939– 1955 (Oxford, 2000). 25. ‘With War‘fare’ rations. . .’, Mason’s OK Sauce, Picture Post, 6 July 1940, p. 36. 26. ‘Handsome, courageous, smart and bright, His smile shows teeth made “Eucryl White”’, Eucryl Tooth Powder, Picture Post, 13 July 1940, p. 3. 27. ‘ARMY CLUB. THE FRONT-LINE CIGARETTE’, Picture Post, 10 August 1940, p. 32; ‘WHY MEN OF IRON NERVE DRINK FRY’S COCOA. . .’, Fry’s Cocoa, Picture Post, 7 September 1940, p. 39. 28. ‘Still the same fine Navy’, Player’s Navy Cut, Picture Post, 16 November 1940, p. 8. 29. ‘The country gives them the latest and best. . .’; ‘They’re finely equipped for this comfortless job. . .’, Gillette, Picture Post, 14 December 1940, p. 10, and 30 November 1940, p. 8 respectively. 30. ‘FLYING OVER LAND AND SEA. . .’, Victory V Lozenges, Picture Post, 15 February 1941, p. 39. ‘Knocking about all over the place. . .’, Afrikander Tobacco, Picture Post, 8 March 1941, p. 39.

NOTES TO PAGES 119 –134

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31. ‘Buy the Right – ’, Cherry Blossom Boot Polish, Picture Post, 5 October 1940, p. 34. 32. ‘The Colonel hums and haws in them!’, Wolsey, Picture Post, 1 March 1941, p. 34. ‘COMPANY WILL ADVANCE. . .’, Colgate Brushless Shave Cream, Picture Post, 26 April 1941, p. 3. 33. McLaine: Ministry of Morale, p. 76. 34. ‘Standing. . . at ease’, Linia Belt, Picture Post, 24 August 1940, p. 3. 35. ‘Fitness for service’, Linia Belt, Picture Post, 26 October 1940, p. 6. 36. ‘Munition worker says. . .’, Brooks Saddles & Accessories, 19 April 1941, p. 3. ‘Back to the Land’, H. P. Sauce, 26 April 1941, p. 7. ‘I can continue to have a Manikin’, Manikin Cigars, 2 November 1940, p. 7. All in Picture Post. 37. ‘Fitness for Service’, Ovaltine, Picture Post, 7 September 1940, p. 37. 38. ‘Restorative Sleep’, Ovaltine, Picture Post, 8 March 1941, p. 35. 39. ‘STOP THAT COLD WITH VAPEX’, Vapex, Picture Post, 23 November 1940, p. 2. ‘DON’T LET COUGHS KEEP YOU OFF DUTY’, Kay Linseed Compound, Picture Post, 21 December 1940, p. 37. 40. ‘NO TIME for ’FLU’, Aspro, Picture Post, 25 January 1941, p. 6. 41. ‘Helping the Nation by HELPING the WORKERS!’, Aspro, Picture Post, 31 May 1941, p. 2. 42. ‘On duty to-night?’, Evans Pastilles, Picture Post, 23 November 1940, p. 38. 43. Jay, Anthony (ed.), The Oxford Dictionary of Political Quotations (Oxford, 1996) p. 266. 44. Broad, Richard and Suzie Fleming (eds), Nella Last’s War. A Mother’s Diary 1939– 1945 (London, 1981), p. 62.

Chapter 4 Fighting the War via Consumption 1. ‘NOW is the time’, Mazda Lamps, Picture Post, 27 January 1940, p. 52. 2. ‘The most effective MOTH PREVENTATIVE’, Mothaks, Picture Post, 4 May 1940, p. 3. 3. ‘3 women from different homes. . .’, Acme Wringers, Picture Post, 13 April 1940, p. 54. 4. ‘Making Monday THRIFT DAY. . .’, Picture Post, 4 May 1940, p. 44. 5. ‘It is Your National Duty. . .’, Mitchell, Russell & Co. Ltd., Picture Post, 7 October 1939, p. 48. 6. ‘Meat for two, does for three’, Phoenix Clear Glass Oven-Ware, Picture Post, 30 March 1940, p. 54. 7. ‘Hovis needs less Butter‘, Picture Post, 6 April 1940, p. 59; ‘Bird’s Custard. . .’, Picture Post, 20 April 1940, p. 64. 8. ‘Restoring tobacco supplies’, The Times, 7 July 1941, p. 2. 9. Tye, Joe B., Kenneth E. Warner and Stanton A. Glantz, ‘Tobacco advertising and consumption: evidence of a causal relationship’, Journal of Public Health Policy, viii/4 (Winter 1987), pp. 493 – 4. 10. The three main players in the tobacco sector in Britain through World War II, based on advertising volumes appearing in Picture Post, were George Dobie and

246

11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37.

NOTES TO PAGES 135 –151 Son Ltd., Imperial Tobacco Company Ltd. and J R Freeman & Sons Ltd. Between them, they accounted for 70 per cent of all tobacco advertising placed. Hansard, Vol. 370, 26 March 1941, cc. 584 – 5. Hansard, Vol. 370, 27 March 1941, c. 737. ‘IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS – ’, The Times, 16 April 1941, p. 9. Taylor, Philip M., ‘Censorship in Britain in World War II’ in A. C. Duke and C. A. Tamse (eds), Too Mighty to be Free. Censorship and the Press in Britain and the Netherlands (Zutphen, 1987), p. 166. Hansard, Vol. 371, 28 May 1941, c. 1871. ‘Two Great Perfumes’, Picture Post, 12 July 1941, p. 8. The Times, 15 May 1941, p. 2, and 2 July 1941, p. 4. See also ZweinigerBargielowska, Ina, Austerity in Britain. Rationing, Controls, and Consumption 1939– 1955 (Oxford, 2000), pp. 192 – 4. Hansard, Vol. 373, 29 July 1941, c. 1238. Hansard, Vol. 379, 15 April 1942, c. 205. Hansard, Vol. 380, 20 May 1942, cc. 232 – 3. Hansard, Vol. 380, 11 June 1942, c. 1256. ‘Fewer chocolates, of course. . .’, Caley Fortune Chocolates, Picture Post, 5 July 1941, p. 8. ‘FAREWELL – till Victory’, Fry’s Assorted Chocolates, Picture Post, 3 January 1942, p. 28. Emphasis added. ‘A CIVILIAN’S JOB IN WARTIME’; ‘The folk at HOME’, Murphy Radio, Picture Post, 20 April 1940, p. 10, and 11 May 1940, p. 36 respectively. ‘IS IT PATRIOTIC TO BUY A WIRELESS SET?’, Murphy Radio, Picture Post, 28 September 1940, p. 4. ‘HAVING ROUSED YOUR ADMIRATION. . .’, Ultra Radio, Picture Post, 4 January 1941, p. 6. ‘YES, IT IS A BEAUTY’, Ultra Radio, Picture Post, 15 February 1941, p. 8. The Statistical Review of Press Advertising (The Legion Publishing Co. Ltd., London), ix – x. ‘Make up what you’re missing – with Mars!’, Mars, Picture Post, 5 July 1941, p. 30. ‘WHAT! No Lipstick?’, Yardley, Picture Post, 29 March 1941, p. 3. ‘Don’t see red if you can’t get STEAD’, Picture Post, 2 May 1942, p. 26. ‘When spring comes – will you have any silk stockings left to wear?, Lux, Picture Post, 1 March 1941, p. 33. ‘SHE’S SUCH A CLEVER LITTLE WIFE’, Vim, Picture Post, 7 June 1941, p. 4. See ‘Not only more flavour. . .more generous helpings too!’, 26 April 1941, p. 5, and ‘Magnificent flavour – and extra-large quantity’, 14 June 1941, p. 4, both Picture Post. ‘Business isn’t “AS USUAL” but QUALITY can be’, Poulton & Noel, Picture Post, 19 July 1941, p. 3. ‘A “Victory” Resolution every dog-owner should make’, Chappie Dog Food, Picture Post, 13 December 1941, p. 6.

NOTES TO PAGES 151 –161

247

38. ‘A VERY LITTLE LUX CAN GO A LONG, LONG WAY’, Lux, Picture Post, 14 February 1942, p. 4. 39. ‘THIS WARTIME WASHING METHOD SAVES SOAP COUPONS AND FUEL’, Rinso, Picture Post, 15 August 1942, p. 27. 40. MOA FR #1992, Resistance to Advertising: Panel Views on the Impact of Press Advertising, January 1944. 41. MOA FR #2010, Directive and Bulletin Sent to Panel, Bulletin Topic: Press Advertising, 10/1/44. 42. MOA FR #2019, Pilot Survey of Public Attitudes to Advertisements, 17 February 1944. 43. ‘EAT LESS BREAD – ’, Hovis, Picture Post, 10 April 1943, p. 26. See also ‘Please use less BRYLCREEM’, Picture Post, 1 November 1941, p. 2, and ‘DON’T WASTE’, Bovril, Picture Post, 7 February 1942, p. 2. 44. ‘HAVING ROUSED YOUR ADMIRATION. . .’, Ultra Radio, Picture Post, 4 January 1941, p. 6. 45. ‘Perseverance my dear Watson. . .’, VP Rich Ruby, Picture Post, 22 November 1941, p. 6. 46. The Excess Profits Tax (EPT), first introduced in the budget of September 1939, determined that increased profits brought about by the war would go to the government. The allegation was that some companies invested some of that revenue in advertising rather than let it accrue as profit and thereby be subject to taxation. 47. Hansard, Vol. 376, 25 November 1941, cc. 597 – 8. 48. Emphasis added. 49. Hansard, Vol. 376, 25 November 1941, cc. 597 – 8. 50. Hansard, Vol. 376, 16 December 1941, c.1816. 51. MOA Box 1/E, Worcester 21.8.40, Publicity. 52. Statistical Review of Press Advertising. 53. MOA FR #21, Shop Notices: Observations of Adverts in Shop Windows (Fulham), January 17 to January 20, 1940. 54. MOA FR #754, Shoe Retailer Display: Study of Shop Window Displays and Shoe Advertising, 24.6.41. 55. MOA Box 1/E, 22.1.42. 56. MOA FR #1055, Note on Public Attitude to Press Advertising: People’s Feelings About Whether Newspaper Space Should Be Used For Advertisements, 25.1.42. 57. MOA FR #1160, Advertising: Note for Mary Adams on Advertising in Press, 7/3/42. N.B. Mary Adams was Director of Home Intelligence within the Ministry of Information. 58. See for example, ‘My nerves are steadier now I have a cup of Bournville Cocoa last thing at night’, Bournville Cocoa, Picture Post, 1 March 1941, p. 6. 59. Calder, Angus, The People’s War. Britain 1939– 1945 (London, 1969), p. 381. 60. See for example, ‘POWDERED MILK tastes fine WITH BOURNVILLE COCOA’, Bournville Cocoa, Picture Post, 13 June 1942, p. 24. 61. TNA RG 23/31, p. 32.

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NOTES TO PAGES 163 –175

62. See, for example, ‘Follow the fashion on a B.S.A’; ‘Happy week-end by B.S.A’, The Times, 4 March 1940, p. 11, and 4 April 1940, p. 12 respectively. 63. ‘What meaning has the common slide rule for the many’, BSA, Picture Post, 23 August 1941, p. 5. 64. ‘MY MOTTO IS – WEEKLY FRY’S WITH WEEKLY RATIONS’, Picture Post, 7 March 1942, p. 28. 65. ‘I GET MY FRY’S EVERY FRIDAY!’, Picture Post, 14 March 1942, p. 2. 66. See for example, ‘THE OLIVE OIL SHAVE NOW CARRIES ON IN JARS’, Palmolive Shaving Cream, Picture Post, 1 August 1942, p. 3. 67. ‘GIVE YOUR TEETH A SHINE WITH Gibbs DENTIFRICE’, D. & W. Gibbs Limited, Picture Post, 19 December 1942, p. 5. 68. See ‘TAKE ME BACK!’, Kolynos Dental Cream, Picture Post, 20 June 1942, p. 28, ‘I’m wanted for Munitions!’, Macleans Peroxide Tooth Paste, Picture Post, 29 August 1942, p. 2, and ‘TO CHEMISTS and their Customers’, Colgate Dental Ribbon, Picture Post, 13 March 1943, p. 3. 69. ‘SALVAGE of RUBBER’, Lyle & Scott Limited, Picture Post, 31 October 1942, p. 4. 70. ‘Keep up your salvage with persistence’, Bovril, Picture Post, 18 October 1943, p. 4. 71. See ‘Chappie’s Diary’ nos 2, 3 and 4, Picture Post, 8 July 1944, p. 26, 26 August 1944, p. 26, and 25 November 1944, p. 6 respectively.

Chapter 5 Gender Identities through the War 1. Swanson, Gillian, ‘“So much money and so little to spend it on”: morale, consumption and sexuality’ in Christine Gledhill and Gillian Swanson (eds), Nationalising Femininity. Culture, Sexuality and British Cinema in World War II (Manchester, 1996), p. 70. 2. Summerfield, Penny, ‘“The girl that makes the thing that drills the hole that holds the spring. . .” – discourses of women and work in World War II’ in Gledhill and Swanson: Nationalising Femininity, p. 39. 3. Rose, Sonya O., Which People’s War? National Identity and Citizenship in Wartime Britain, 1939– 1945 (Oxford, 2003) p. 150. 4. Of particular note see Braybon, Gail and Summerfield, Penny, Out of the Cage. Women’s Experiences in Two World Wars (London, 1987); Summerfield, Penny, Reconstructing Women’s Wartime Lives. Discourse and Subjectivity in Oral Histories of World War II (Manchester, 1998); Rose: Which People’s War? 5. Braybon and Summerfield: Out of the Cage, p. 281. 6. Rose: Which People’s War?, p. 110. 7. See Rose: Which People’s War?, chapter 3. 8. Noakes, Lucy, War and the British. Gender and National Identity, 1939– 91 (London, 1998), p. 14. 9. ‘ENGLAND EXPECTS THESE DAYS THAT EVERY WOMAN SHALL BE A BEAUTY’, Tattoo Lipstick, Picture Post, 27 April 1940, p. 58; ‘TOOT-A

NOTES TO PAGES 175 –183

10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34.

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TATTOO A LIPSTICK THAT’S NEW’, Grenadier by Tattoo, Picture Post, 29 June 1940, p. 35. Kirkham, Pat, ‘Fashioning the feminine: dress, appearance and femininity in wartime Britain’ in Gledhill and Swanson: Nationalising Femininity, pp. 170– 1. See also Summerfield in the same volume and Summerfield: Reconstructing Women’s Wartime Lives. ‘Instant Beauty FOR WOMEN IN WARTIME’, Potter & Moore’s PowderCream, Picture Post, 27 April 1940, p. 61. ‘TANGEE LIPSTICK for Beauty on Duty’, Picture Post, 28 October 1939, p. 6. Goodman, Phil, ‘“Patriotic femininity”: women’s morals and men’s morale during World War II’, Gender & History, x/2, August 1998, p. 290. Quoted in Goodman: ‘“Patriotic femininity”’, p. 279. See Parkin, Di, ‘Women in the armed services, 1940– 5’ in Raphael Samuel (ed.), Patriotism. The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity. Volume II: Minorities and Outsiders (London, 1989). Summerfield: ‘“The girl that makes the thing”’, p. 40. ‘DOING A LAND-GIRL’S WORK’, Zixt Soap Tablet, Picture Post, 27 April 1940, p. 8. ‘JANE’S BUSY DIGGING FOR VICTORY’, Zixt Soap Tablet, Picture Post, 6 July 1940, p. 39. ‘IDA’S FINGERS ARE INK STAINED NOW’, Zixt Soap Tablet, Picture Post, 25 May 1940, p. 5. ‘At the bench or on the farm’, Glymiel Jelly, Picture Post, 6 July 1940, p. 39. MOA FR #728, Report on Changes in Clothing Habits. A. Women. 9.6.41. ‘An investigation of attitudes to the ATS’, quoted in Parkin: ‘Women in the armed services’, p. 165. ‘Tips for the woman with no time to spare’, Pond’s Preparations, Picture Post, 23 March 1940, p. 5. ‘War on dingy teeth’, Phillips’ Dental Magnesia, Picture Post, 25 May 1940, p. 5. ‘Charm on duty’, Vinolia, Picture Post, 16 March 1940, p. 12. ‘It’s every girl’s duty to Smile’, Odol, Picture Post, 24 August 1940, p. 8. ‘Norma Knight’s WARTIME BEAUTY HINTS’, Knight’s Castile, Picture Post, 16 November 1940, p. 3. ‘Tips for the woman with no time to spare’, Pond’s Creams, Picture Post, 23 March 1940, p. 5. ‘Hair Beauty – is a duty, too!’, Evan Williams Shampoo, Picture Post, 16 December 1939, p. 66. ‘HERE’S LONESOME LOU’, Colgate Ribbon Dental Cream, Picture Post, 27 April 1940, p. 4. ‘ONLY The FAIR DESERVE The BRAVE’, Picture Post, 13 April 1940, p. 56. Rose: Which People’s War?, p. 134. Emphasis added. TNA RG 23/17, The Social Survey. Retail Service and Shortages. A Collection of Reports on Enquiries into the Impact of Shortages and the Adequacy of Repair and Other Services, May 1942– March 1943. Scott, Linda M., Fresh Lipstick. Redressing Fashion and Feminism (New York, 2005), p. 192.

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NOTES TO PAGES 184 –194

35. ‘Eve in Overalls’, quoted in Rose: Which People’s War?, pp. 130– 1. 36. Summerfield: Reconstructing Women’s Wartime Lives, p. 91. 37. ‘NEW LIVES – NEW NEEDS’, Bourn-Vita, Picture Post, 7 December 1940, p. 36. 38. ‘Monday’s still Washday for Mothers on Munitions’, Rinso, Picture Post, 10 May 1941, p. 8. 39. This advertisement appears to be well timed to take advantage of the increased interest and concern among women consequent upon the National Service (Enlistment of Women) Act and the registration of women for war work of March 1941. 40. ‘NEW LIVES – NEW NEEDS’, Bourn-Vita, Picture Post, 19 April 1941, p. 7. 41. ‘DIFFERENT JOB. . . DIFFERENT CLOTHES’, Palmolive, Picture Post, 14 June 1941, p. 6. 42. ‘Back to the Land’, HP Sauce, Picture Post, 26 April 1941, p. 7. 43. ‘Out in wind and dust and rain’, Glymiel Jelly, Picture Post, 14 September 1940, p. 2. 44. ‘The Girls on whom so much depends’, H. P. Sauce, Picture Post, 10 August 1940, p. 32. 45. ‘NEW LIVES – NEW NEEDS’, Bourn-Vita, Picture Post, 14 December 1940, p. 41. 46. Dawson, Graham, Soldier Heroes. British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinities (London, 1994), p. 1. 47. Rose: Which People’s War?, p. 178. 48. ‘Men and Women with WILLS TO WIN are smoking WILLS’s GOLD FLAKE’, Picture Post, 2 March 1940, p. 6. 49. Ever-Ready Razor Products Limited, Picture Post, 21 April 1945, p. 2. 50. Florida Grapefruit Juice, 1943, in Heimann, Jim (ed.), 40s. All-American Ads (Cologne, 2001) p. 441. 51. Noakes: War and the British, p. 50. 52. Rose: Which People’s War?, Ch. 5. 53. See for example posters forming part of the MoI’s ‘Careless Talk Costs Lives’ campaign, such as the well-known ‘Keep mum, she’s not so dumb!’ and ‘Tell NOBODY – not even HER’. Rare exceptions to this style of representation can be found in the graphic battle scenes shown in the series of posters that appeared under the various titles, ‘BACK THEM UP’/‘THE ATTACK BEGINS IN THE FACTORY’/‘THE DOWNFALL OF DICTATORS IS ASSURED’. 54. The Lion Has Wings (Michael Powell, Adrian Brunel, Brian Desmond Hurst, 1939, UK, London Film Productions). 55. ‘Taking it easy’, Cherry Blossom Boot Polish, Picture Post, 18 November 1939, p. 62; ‘Here’s our Jack, breezy and bright, His teeth are strong and Eucryl White’, Eucryl Tooth Powder, Picture Post, 13 April 1940, p. 53. 56. Summerfield: Reconstructing Women’s Wartime Lives, pp. 116– 7. 57. Gardiner, Juliet, Wartime Britain 1939– 1945 (London, 2004), p. 68. 58. Summerfield: Reconstructing Women’s Wartime Lives, p. 116– 7.

NOTES TO PAGES 194 –204

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59. Rose, Sonya O., ‘Temperate heroes: concepts of masculinity in Second World War Britain’ in Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagermann and John Tosh (eds), Masculinities in Politics and War. Gendering Modern History (Manchester, 2004), p. 183. 60. ‘Men of Action need BRYLCREEM’, Brylcreem, Picture Post, 16 March 1940, p. 52. 61. Colville, Quintin, ‘Jack Tar and the gentleman officer: the role of uniform in shaping the class- and gender-related identities of British naval personnel, 1930– 1939’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, xiii (2003) p. 115. 62. McCracken, Grant, ‘The voice of gender in the world of goods’ in Katherine Martinez and Kenneth L. Ames (eds), The Material Culture of Gender. The Gender of Material Culture (Delaware, 1997), p. 452. 63. ‘SHUN! untidiness – BRYLCREEM your hair’, Brylcreem, Picture Post, 1 January 1940, p. 45. 64. ‘There’s something about a soldier – BRYLCREEM THE PERFECT HAIR DRESSING’, Brylcreem, Picture Post, 17 February 1940, p. 52. 65. Francis, Martin, The Flyer. British Culture and the Royal Air Force 1939– 1945 (Oxford, 2008), p. 85. 66. Summerfield: Reconstructing Women’s Wartime Lives, p. 119. 67. Ibid. 68. ‘IF UNCLE ADOLF COULD SEE ME NOW’, Kruschen, Picture Post, 11 May 1940, p. 4. 69. Roper, Michael, ‘Yesterday’s model. Product fetishism and the British company man, 1945– 85’ in Michael Roper and John Tosh (eds), Manful Assertions. Masculinities in Britain Since 1800 (London, 1991), p. 195. 70. Mosse, George L., The Image of Man. The Creation of Modern Masculinity (Oxford, 1996) p. 152. 71. ‘Don’t take risks with cuts and grazes on your job. . .’, T.C.P., Picture Post, 23 October 1943, p. 6, and ‘A queer new world we’re living in’, Bulmer’s Cider, Picture Post, 28 June 1941, p. 7. 72. ‘Grass Widower’, Horlicks, Picture Post, 13 December 1941, p. 26. 73. Summerfield: Reconstructing Women’s Wartime Lives, p. 121. 74. ‘ANDY’S out for fresh production!’, Lifebuoy Toilet Soap, Picture Post, 6 June 1942, p. 27. 75. Rose: Which People’s War?, p. 154. 76. ‘HER SAILOR SON INSISTED’, Rinso, Picture Post, 27 January 1945, p. 5. 77. ‘What is a Good Man’, ‘Living Opinion’, 24 April 1941, BBC Home Service quoted in Rose: Which People’s War?, p. 158. 78. Samuel, Raphael, ‘The middle class between the wars: part 3’, New Socialist, May/June 1983, p. 29. 79. Rose: ‘Temperate heroes’, pp. 179 – 80. 80. Francis: The Flyer, p. 127. 81. ‘Home’, Sunlight Soap, Picture Post, 23 January 1943, p. 2. 82. Quoted in Francis: The Flyer, p. 123.

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NOTES TO PAGES 205 –214

83. ‘You can get the energy value of more than a week’s Bacon Ration from a 6D tin of FRY’S COCOA’, Fry’s Cocoa, Picture Post, 9 March 1940, p. 60. 84. See, especially, ‘Two pages for Elsie’, Sunday Pictorial, 22 August 1943, pp. 14 – 5.

Chapter 6 Defining the Postwar World 1. Priestley, J. B., Here Are Your Answers, quoted in Addison, Paul, The Road to 1945 (London, 1975) p. 162. 2. Kevin Jefferys suggests that there was a sense of urgency within the Labour Party in its efforts to get legislation on to the statute book that would shape postwar society. This urgency was borne out of a belief that Allied victory would ensure Churchill would remain prime minister, at the helm of the Conservative Party, following a general election at war’s end with Labour out of power. See Jefferys, Kevin, The Churchill Coalition and Wartime Politics, 1940– 1945 (Manchester, 1995). 3. Jefferys: The Churchill Coalition, p. 115. 4. Quoted in Fielding, Steven, ‘What did “the people” want? The meaning of the 1945 general election’, The Historical Journal, xxxv/3 (September 1992), p. 633. 5. ‘POST-WAR PROSPERITY – THE TRUE FOUNDATION’, Milk of Magnesia, Picture Post, 13 February 1943, p. 26. The timing of this advertisement suggests that it is a direct reaction to the Beveridge Report, published in December 1942 and receiving widespread coverage and support early in 1943. 6. Aneurin Bevan responding to a speech by Lord Croft defending the Empire and implying that there was no need for a new order after the war. V. 385 H.C. Deb., 5s., c. 138, 12 November 1942, quoted in Jefferys: The Churchill Coalition, p. 117. 7. Labour Party, The Old World and the New Society. A Report on the Problems of War and Reconstruction; Fabian Society, ‘A word on the future to British socialists’, Fabian Tracts, 256 (1942), quoted in Fielding, Steven, Peter Thompson and Nick Tiratsoo, “England Arise!” The Labour Party and Popular Politics in 1940s Britain (Manchester, 1995), p. 80. 8. Labour Party Archive, Herbert Morrison [Labour politician and by this time home secretary] News Cuttings, Press Releases 4 March 1944, quoted in Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo: “England Arise!”, p. 81. 9. ‘THE WORLD OF THE FUTURE’, Pears Soap, Picture Post, 21 June 1941, p. 2. 10. ‘INDUSTRY IN THE FUTURE’, Pears Soap, The Times, 1 August 1941, p. 3. 11. ‘. . .AND PEARS IN The FUTURE’, Pears Soap, The Times, 4 November 1941, p. 3. 12. ‘YOUR WORLD OF NEW Beauty IS JUST AROUND THE CORNER’, Max Factor, Picture Post, 22 January 1944, p. 3.

NOTES TO PAGES 214 –222

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13. According to Alan O’Shea, the move towards modernity in Britain from the late nineteenth century and into the twentieth century was often characterized by a vision of a ‘good life’ underpinned by increased consumption. O’Shea, Alan, ‘English subjects of modernity’ in Mica Nava and Alan O’Shea (eds), Modern Times. Reflections on a Century of English Modernity (London, 1996), p. 16. 14. ‘INDUSTRY IN THE FUTURE’, Pears soap, The Times, 1 August 1941, p. 3. 15. Francis, Martin, ‘The Labour Party: modernisation and the politics of restraint’ in Becky Conekin, Frank Mort and Chris Waters (eds), Moments of Modernity. Reconstructing Britain 1945– 1964 (London, 1999), p. 154. 16. ‘MOTHER’S MELTICIPATING’, Meltis Confectionery, Picture Post, 21 April 1945, p. 26; ‘GAS WILL SERVE BRITAIN’S HOMES IN A BRIGHTER WORLD’, British Commercial Gas Association, Picture Post, 16 September 1944, p. 27. 17. MOA FR 2066, ‘Postwar Buying’, April 1944, quoted in ZweinigerBargielowska, Ina, Austerity in Britain. Rationing, Controls, and Consumption, 1939– 1955 (Oxford, 2000), p. 67. 18. Addison: The Road to 1945, p. 267. 19. INF 1/864, Memorandum by S. G. Gates, 21 April 1942, quoted in McLaine, Ian, Ministry of Morale. Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II (London, 1979), p. 173. 20. See Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo: “England Arise!” and Fielding: ‘What did ‘the people’ want?’ 21. Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo: “England Arise!”, p. 39. 22. Lewis, R. and A. Maude, The English Middle Classes, quoted in ZweinigerBargielowska: Austerity in Britain, p. 68. 23. Cockett, Richard, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think Tanks and the Economic Counter-revolution, 1931– 1983, quoted in Zweiniger-Bargielowska: Austerity in Britain, p. 211. 24. ‘All our PAST proclaims our FUTURE’, Poulton & Noel, Picture Post, 2 August 1941, p. 2. Emphasis added. 25. ‘Ring out Wild Bells. . .’, Standard Motor Company Ltd., Picture Post, 24 January 1942, p. 3. 26. ‘LOOKING INTO A BRIGHT FUTURE’, Berkeley Easy Chairs & Settees, Picture Post, 22 July 1944, p. 6. 27. Zweiniger-Bargielowska: Austerity in Britain, p. 204. 28. ‘The Fruits of Victory’, Meltis ‘New Berry’ Fruits, Picture Post, 12 July 1941, p. 2, and 1 November 1941, p. 4. 29. ‘MY PEACE TERMS’, Crawford’s Biscuits, Picture Post, 5 August 1944, p. 27. 30. Quoted in Fielding: ‘What did “the people” want?’, p. 633. 31. Based on an analysis of the type of language used in the advertisements recorded in the author’s Picture Post database between May 1941 and September 1945, 50 per cent used appeals relating to a ‘brave new world’ while 49 per cent used appeals based on nostalgia for the pre-war world. This is based on key word searches in the data. The expressions analyzed for those relating to appeals to the modern were ‘future’, ‘forward’, ‘progress’, ‘new’, ‘better’, and ‘advance’.

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32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

NOTES TO PAGES 222 –226 For nostalgic appeals ‘past’, ‘pre-war’, ‘before’, ‘tradition’, ‘old’ and ‘return’ were searched for. ‘Ring out Wild Bells. . .’, Standard Motor Company Ltd., Picture Post, 24 January 1942, p. 3. Conekin, Mort and Waters, ‘Introduction’ in Conekin, Mort and Waters: Moments of Modernity, p. 3. O’Shea: ‘English subjects of modernity’, p. 14. Nava and O’Shea, ‘Introduction’ in Nava and O’Shea: Modern Times, p. 4. Conekin, Mort and Waters: ‘Introduction’, pp. 19 – 20. ‘Not least of all that you will prize. . .’, Kayser-Bondor Full-Fashioned Stockings, Picture Post, 28 April 1945, p. 26. ‘Patience, darling!’, Kayser Tailored Underwear, Picture Post, 28 July 1945, p. 3. Zweiniger-Bargielowska: Austerity in Britain, p. 60. Statistical Review of Press Advertising. Zweiniger-Bargielowska: Austerity in Britain, p. 203.

Conclusion 1. Hall, Stuart, ‘Culture and the State’ quoted in Billington, Rosamund, Sheelagn Strawbridge, Lenore Greensides and Annette Fitzsimons, Culture and Society (Houndmills, 1991), p. 28.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary sources 1. Manuscript sources Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge. The Papers of Mark Abrams (ABMS): ABMS, London Press Exchange Reports, 1937– 1939. ABMS, London Press Exchange Published Reader Interest Surveys, 1934.

2. History of Advertising Trust (HAT), Norwich AA 1/1/4: Advertisement Investigation Department Committee Meeting Minutes, 1941– 1947. AA 3/1/2/4: The Advertising Association Meeting of Council Minutes. AA 4/1/3: The Advertising Association Executive Committee Minutes, 23 September 1935– 6 January 1949. AA 13/1/6: The Advertising Association 1940 Series of War-Time Advertisements. AA 13/7: The Advertising Association Journal. IPA Annual Reports and Council Reports. IPA Committee Minutes, 1930– 1950s. JWT Box Files. London Press Exchange, Misc. Papers, 1934– 1944. WSC 5/3/1: W. S. Crawford Misc. Correspondence.

3. Mass-Observation Archive (MOA), University of Sussex File Reports 1938– 1945. Topic Collection (TC) 22, Commercial Advertising 1938– 47. TC42. Posters 1939– 47.

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4. The National Archives (TNA), Kew Board of Trade, BT 60, Committee on Commercial Publicity, 1941. Ministry of Food, MAF 101/407, 1944. Ministry of Information 1938– 1945. Ministry of Supply, Control of Paper, Historical Records. The Social Survey, RG 23/17, 1942– 1943.

5. Official publications The Control of Paper (No. 36) Order, 1941. The Control of Paper (No. 48) Order, 1942. The Control of Paper (No. 49) Order, 1942. Finance (No. 2) Act, 1940. Purchase Tax. Front Line 1940– 1941. The Official Story of the Civil Defence of Britain (London: HMSO, 1942). Restriction of Advertisement (War Risks Insurance) Act, 1939. Royal Commission on the Press 1947– 1949 Report, Cmd. 7700, HMSO, London, 1949. Hansard (House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series).

6. Contemporary newspapers and periodicals The Advertiser’s Annual, 1938– 45 The Advertising Monthly, 1939– 45 Advertiser’s Weekly, 1938– 45 Daily Express, 1938 –45 Daily Herald, 1938– 45 Daily Mail, 1938– 45 Daily Mirror, 1938– 45 Daily Sketch, 1938– 45 Daily Telegraph, 1938– 45 Draper’s Record, 1939– 45 The Economist, 1939– 45 The Evening Standard, 1938– 45 National News-Letter, 1942 News Chronicle, 1938– 45 Picture Post, 1938– 45 Statistical Review of Press Advertising, 1937– 56 Sunday Pictorial, 1939– 45 The Times, 1938– 45

7. Contemporary printed sources Britain Can Take It. The Book of the Film (London: HMSO, 1941). Baster, Albert Stephen James, Advertising Reconsidered. A Confession of Misgiving (London: P. S. King & Son, Ltd., 1935). Cromwell, Peter, ‘The propaganda problem’, Horizon, cxi/13, January 1941, pp. 17 – 32.

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Harrisson, Tom, ‘What is public opinion?’, Political Quarterly, xi/8, 1940, pp. 368– 83. Harrisson, Tom and Charles Madge (eds), War Begins at Home (London: Chatto and Windus, 1940). Idle, E. Doreen, War Over West Ham. A Study of Community Adjustment (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1943). MacCurdy, John T., The Structure of Morale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943). Madge, Charles and Harrisson, Tom. Britain by Mass-Observation (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1939). Mass-Observation, Change No. 2. Bulletin of the Advertising Service Guild. Home Propaganda. A Report Prepared by Mass-Observation for the Advertising Service Guild, London, November 1941. Mercer, F. A. and Fraser, G. L. Modern Publicity in War (London: The Studio Publications, 1941). Mercer, F. A. and Fraser, G. L. Modern Publicity in War 1942– 48 (London: The Studio Publications, 1948). Political and Economic Planning (PEP), ‘Report on the British press. A survey of its current operations and problems with special reference to national newspapers and their part in public affairs’ (London: PEP, 1938). Thompson, Denys, Voice of Civilisation. An Enquiry into Advertising (London: Frederick Muller, Ltd., 1943). Wintringham, Tom, People’s War (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1942).

8. Diaries, memoirs and biographies Beardmore, George, Civilians at War. Journals 1938– 1946 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). Bowen, Elizabeth, The Heat of the Day (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1949). Broad, Richard and Fleming, Suzie (eds), Nella Last’s War. A Mother’s Diary 1939– 1945 (London: Falling Wall Press, 1981). Calder, Angus and Sheridan, Dorothy (eds), Speak For Yourself. A Mass-Observation Anthology 1937 –1949 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). Churchill, Winston S., The Second World War, Vol. I: The Gathering Storm (London: Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1967). Donnelly, Peter (ed.), Mrs. Milburn’s Diaries. An Englishwoman’s Day-to-day Reflections 1939– 45 (London: Harrap, 1979). Garfield, Simon, We Are At War. The Remarkable Diaries of Five Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times (London: Ebury Press, 2005). Hodgson, Vere, Few Eggs and No Oranges: The Diaries of Vere Hodgson 1940– 45 (London: Persephone Books, 1971). Nicolson, Nigel (ed.), Harold Nicolson. Diaries and Letters 1939– 1945 (London: Collins, 1967). Orwell, Sonia and Angus, Ian (eds), The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters. George Orwell, Vol. 1: An Age Like This, 1920– 1940 (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1968).

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Orwell, Sonia and Angus, Ian (eds), The Collected Essays, Journalism & Letters. George Orwell, Vol. 2: My Country Right or Left, 1940– 1943 (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1968). Orwell, Sonia and Angus, Ian (eds), The Collected Essays, Journalism & Letters. George Orwell, Vol. 3: As I Please, 1943– 1946 (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1968). Sharpe, Len, The Lintas Story. Impressions & Recollections (London: Lintas Limited, 1964). Sheridan, Dorothy (ed.), Wartime Women. A Mass-Observation Anthology (London: Phoenix Press, 1990). Webley, Nicholas (ed.), Betty’s Wartime Diary, 1939–1945 (London: Thorogood, 2002). Wing, Sandra Koa (ed.), Our Longest Days. A People’s History of the Second World War (London: Profile Books Ltd, 2008).

Secondary works 1. Books Addison, Paul, The Road to 1945 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1975). Begley, George, Keep Mum! Advertising Goes to War (London: Lemon Tree Press, 1975). Billington, Rosamund, Strawbridge, Sheelagn, Greensides, Lenore and Fitzsimons, Annette, Culture and Society (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1991). Bloome, David, Sheridan, Dorothy, and Street, Brian, Reading Mass-Observation Writing. Theoretical and Methodological Issues in Researching the Mass-Observation Archive (Brighton: Mass-Observation Archive, 1993). Braybon, Gail and Summerfield, Penny, Out of the Cage. Women’s Experiences in Two World Wars (London: Pandora, 1987). Brooke, Stephen, Labour’s War. The Labour Party During the Second World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). Burke, Peter, Varieties of Cultural History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997). Calder, Angus, The People’s War. Britain 1939– 1945 (London: Pimlico, 1969). Calder, Angus, The Myth of the Blitz (London: Pimlico, 1991). Conekin, Becky, Mort, Frank, and Waters, Chris (eds), Moments of Modernity. Reconstructing Britain 1945– 1964 (London: Rivers Oram Press, 1999). Connelly, Mark, We Can Take It! Britain and the Memory of the Second World War (Harlow: Pearson, 2004). Curran, James and Seaton, Jean (eds), Power Without Responsibility. The Press and Broadcasting in Britain (London: Routledge, 1997, 5th ed.). Dawson, Graham, Soldier Heroes. British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinities (London: Routledge, 1994). Doherty, Martin A., Nazi Wireless Propaganda. Lord Haw-Haw and British Public Opinion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000). Downham, John, BMRM International. The First Sixty Ye ars, 1933– 1993 (London: BMRB International, 1993).

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Dudink, Stefan, Hagermann, Karen, and Tosh, John (eds), Masculinities in Politics and War. Gendering Modern History (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004). Duke, A. C. and Tamse, C. A. (eds), Too Mighty to be Free. Censorship and the Press in Britain and the Netherlands (Zutphen: De Walbury Pers, 1987). Eade, Charles (ed.), The War Speeches of the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill, Vol. 1 (London: Purnell, 1951). Ellul, Jacques, Propaganda. The Formation of Men’s Attitudes (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1965). Ewen, Stuart, Captains of Consciousness. Advertising and the Social Roots of the Consumer Culture (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976). Fielding, Steven, Thompson, Peter, and Tiratsoo, Nick, “England Arise!” The Labour Party and Popular Politics in 1940s Britain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995). Francis, Martin, The Flyer. British Culture and the Royal Air Force 1939– 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Fussell, Paul, Wartime. Understanding and Behaviour in the Second World War (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989). Gardiner, Juliet, Wartime Britain 1939– 1945 (London: Headline, 2004). Geertz, Clifford, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1973). Gerald, J. Edward, The British Press Under Government Economic Controls (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1956). Gledhill, Christine and Swanson, Gillian (eds), Nationalising Femininity. Culture, Sexuality and British Cinema in the Second World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996). Hammond, Richard James, Food and Agriculture in Britain 1939– 45. Aspects of Wartime Control (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954). Harrisson, Tom, Living Through the Blitz (London: Collins, 1976). Hayes, Nick and Hill, Jeff (eds), ‘Millions Like Us’? British Culture in the Second World War (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999). Heimann, Jim (ed.), 40s. All-American Ads (Cologne: Taschen, 2001). Holt, Douglas B., How Brands Become Icons. The Principles of Cultural Branding (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2004). Hopkinson, Tom (ed.), Picture Post 1938– 50 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970). Jay, Anthony, The Oxford Dictionary of Political Quotations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Jeffery, Tom, Mass Observation. A Short History (Brighton: Mass-Observation Archive, 1999). Jefferys, Kevin, The Churchill Coalition and Wartime Politics, 1940 – 1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991). Jowett, Gareth S. and O’Donnell, Victoria, Propaganda and Persuasion (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc., 1999, 3rd ed.). Kee, Robert, The Picture Post Album (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1989). Kirkham, Pat and Thoms, David (eds), War Culture: Social Change and Changing Experience in World War Two (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1995). Lewis, Peter, A People’s War (London: Thames Methuen, 1986). MacKay, Robert, The Test of War. Inside Britain 1939– 45 (London: UCL Press, 1999).

260

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MacKay, Robert, Half the Battle. Civilian Morale in Britain During the Second World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002). Martinez, Katherine and Ames, Kenneth L. (eds), The Material Culture of Gender. The Gender of Material Culture (Delaware, DE: Winterthur Museum and Gardens, 1997). Marwick, Arthur, Britain in the Century of Total War (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968). Marwick, Arthur, The Home Front. The British and the Second World War (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976). McLaine, Ian, Ministry of Morale. Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979). Minns, Raynes, Bombers and Mash (London: Virago Press, 1980). Morgan, David and Evans, Mary, The Battle for Britain: Citizenship and Ideology in the Second World War (London: Routledge, 1993). Mosse, George L., The Image of Man. The Creation of Modern Masculinity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Mowat, Charles Loch, Britain Between the Wars, 1918–1940 (London: Methuen, 1955). Nava, Mica and O’Shea, Alan (eds.), Modern Times. Reflections on a Century of English Modernity (London: Routledge, 1996). Nevett, T. R., Advertising in Britain: A History (London: Heinemann, 1982). Nicholas, Siaˆn, The Echo of War. Home Front Propaganda and the Wartime BBC, 1939– 1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996). Noakes, Lucy, War and the British. Gender and National Identity, 1939– 91 (London: I.B.Tauris, 1998). Pelling, Henry, Britain and the Second World War (London: Fontana, 1970). Roper, Michael and Tosh, John (eds), Manful Assertions. Masculinities in Britain Since 1800 (London: Routledge, 1991). Rose, Sonya O., Which People’s War? National Identity and Citizenship in Wartime Britain, 1939– 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Samuel, Raphael (ed.), Patriotism. The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity. Volume II: Minorities and Outsiders (London: Routledge, 1989). Scott, Linda M., Fresh Lipstick. Redressing Fashion and Feminism (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Smith, Harold L., Britain in the Second World War. A Social History (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996). Summerfield, Penny, Women Workers in the Second World War. Production and Patriarchy in Conflict (London: Routledge, 1984). Summerfield, Penny, Reconstructing Women’s Wartime Lives. Discourse and Subjectivity in Oral Histories of the Second World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998). Taylor, A. J. P., English History 1914–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965). Titmuss, Richard M., History of the Second World War: Problems of Social Policy (London: HMSO, 1950). Weightman, Gavin, Picture Post Britain (London: Collins & Brown, 1991). Williamson, Judith, Decoding Advertisements. Ideology and Meaning in Advertising (London: Marion Boyars Publishers Ltd., 1978). Yass, Marion, This Is Your War. Home Front Propaganda in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1983).

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Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Ina, Austerity in Britain. Rationing, Controls, and Consumption, 1939– 1955 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

2. Articles in journals Colville, Quintin, ‘Jack Tar and the gentleman officer: the role of uniform in shaping the class- and gender-related identities of British naval personnel, 1930– 1939’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, xiii, 2003, pp. 105–29. Fielding, Steven, ‘What did “the people” want? The meaning of the 1945 general election’, The Historical Journal, xxxv/3, September 1992, pp. 623– 39. Goodman, Phil, ‘“Patriotic femininity”: women’s morals and men’s morale during the Second World War’, Gender & History, x/2, August 1998, pp. 278–93. Harris, Jose, ‘War and social history: Britain and the home front during the Second World War’, Contemporary European History, i/1, (March 1992), pp. 17– 35. Holt, Douglas B., ‘How consumers consume: a typology of consumption practices’, The Journal of Consumer Research, xxii/1 (June 1995), pp. 1– 16. O’Donohoe, Stephanie, ‘Living with ambivalence: attitudes to advertising in postmodern times’, Marketing Theory, i/91 (2001), pp. 91– 108. Samuel, Raphael, ‘The middle class between the wars: part 3’, New Socialist, (May/ June 1983), pp. 28 – 32. Summerfield, Penny, ‘Mass-Observation: social research or social movement?’, Journal of Contemporary History, xx/3 (1985), pp. 439 – 52. Summerfield, Penny, ‘Dunkirk and the popular memory of Britain at war, 1940– 58’, Journal of Contemporary History, xlv/4 (2010), pp. 788 –811. Taylor, Philip M., ‘Techniques of persuasion: basic ground rules of British propaganda during the Second World War’, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, i/1 (1981), pp. 57 – 66. Tye, Joe B., Warner, Kenneth E., and Glantz, Stanton A., ‘Tobacco advertising and consumption: evidence of a causal relationship’, Journal of Public Health Policy, viii/4 (Winter 1987), pp. 492 – 508.

3. Unpublished manuscripts and theses Lewis, Rebecca, ‘The planning, design and reception of British home front propaganda posters of the Second World War’, University College, Winchester, Unpublished PhD, 2004.

4. Websites Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, www.oxforddnb.com, last accssed 5 February 2014

5. Film The Lion Has Wings: 1939; London Film Productions; produced by Alexander Korda; directed by Michael Powell, Adrian Brunel and Brian Desmond Hurst.

INDEX

Abrams, Mark 43, 237 n.28, Acme Wringers 129 Addison, Paul 102, 215 Advertiser’s Weekly 22, 28, 39 – 40, 42, 48, 53; claiming to have helped win the war 225 and Dunkirk 48; maintaining brand awareness 38; and Ryvita 44 – 5; and war effort 32, 38, 50, 54; Advertisers, approach to wartime 95 commercial 21, 31– 2, 50, 67, 70 –1, 74, 78 – 9, 92 –3, 97 – 8, 100 – 2, 104 – 6, 108, 124 – 6, 128, 161, 165 – 6, 172 –5, 178 encourage consumers to use less 153 Advertising Association 22, 28, 32 – 3, 35, 37, 41 – 2, 55 – 6, 58, 60 – 3, 65 – 6, 68, 134, 136 advertisement Investigation Department (AID) 56, 238 – 9 n.60 general Purposes Committee 33, 35, 62 government Contact Committee 32 Advertising, appeal to nostalgia 217 – 8 Advertising, expenditure 32, 34, 42, 47, 60, 67, 80, 86– 7, 134,

145 –6, 159 – 60, 162– 4, 194, 236 –7 n.17 Advertising, goodwill 37, 40–2, 44, 48, 50, 54, 61– 2, 66, 135– 6, 168 –9, 227 Advertising, ‘reminder’ 50– 1, 53, 75, 138 Afrikander (tobacco) 118 Alka-Seltzer 74 Allenburys Diet 124 Analysis, statistical 23 Anderson Shelter 95 Anger Campaign, the 46– 7 Armed forces 116– 122, 171, 182, 191 – 2, 194, 196– 9, 200 Army Club, the ‘front-line cigarette’ 117 Army, British 118, 182, 187– 8, 191, 193, 197, 200, 211 Air Raid Precautions (ARP) 10, 50, 55, 104, 122, 125 Aertex Underwear and Corsets 38 Ascot 216, 218 Ashfield Committee see Government Contact Committee Ashfield, Lord 32 Aspro 125 Attlee Government 223– 4

INDEX Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC) 24, 235 n.44 Austerity 12, 93, 107, 128, 130, 148, 153, 223 Auxiliary Fire Service 230 Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS) 179, 181 – 2 Bacon 40, 83, 113, 205, 219, 242 n.18 n.24 Barratt’s Shoes 90 Batchelor’s 158 – 9 Battle of Britain, the 116, 119 Baxendale, John 18 Beardmore, George 84 Berlin, bombing of 7 Betty’s Wartime Diary 18 Bevan, Aneurin 211 Bicycles 162 – 3 Birds Custard 132 Birkenhead 7 Birmingham 7 Birmingham Small Arms Company Ltd. 163 Biscuits 145, 219 Bisto 81, 83 Black market 109 Blackout 74, 84 – 7, 90 Blackout, injuries and trauma sustained during 84 Blitz, the 12, 17, 23, 50, 57, 98, 116, 119, 126, 130, 150 office parties to celebrate the 148 Blitz spirit 4 – 12, 13, 15 – 6, 21, 29, 96 – 7, 114, 124, 225, 229 – 30 Bob Martin’s Condition Powders 119 Bore War see Phoney War Bornville Cocoa 160 – 1, 164, 230 Bourjois, perfumer 137 Bourn-Vita see Cadbury’s Bourn-Vita Bovril 80 – 1, 153, 167 Bowen, Elizabeth 17 Bracken, Brendan 65

263

Brand awareness and reminder advertising 36 – 41, 50– 3, 132, 132 –45, 222, 228 Brand loyalty 134, 151, 159, 227 Branded products, disappearance of 52, 169 Britain Can Take It 5, 7 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the 3, 48, 64, 99 British Commercial Gas Association, the 215 Britishness 3 Brylcreem 153, 169, 196– 7 BSA cycles see Birmingham Small Arms Company Bulmer’s Cider 200 Burke, Peter 14 Business as usual 33– 36, 80, 150, 199, 226 Butter 44, 132, 141, 220, 242 n.18 C. R. Casson Limited 38 Cadbury’s 112, 160 Cadbury’s Bourn-Vita 90 Calder, Angus 1, 78, 84 Caley’s Chocolates 141, 165 Cambridge 84 Canned goods 114, 145, 158– 9, 189 Careless Talk Costs Lives 98– 102 Cavanders Limited 191 Cereal, consumption of 40 Chamberlain Government 33, 36, 95, 193 Chamberlain, Neville 102 Champion Sparking Plug Company Limited 138– 9 Chappie Dog Food 150– 1, 167– 8 Cherry Blossom Boot Polish 100, 119 Chieftain Egg Substitute 110 –1, 115 Chocolate 112, 146, 160, 165 Churchill Government 103 Churchill, Winston 6–7, 10, 211

264

ADVERTISING AND PROPAGANDA IN WORLD WAR II

Citizenship 6, 8 – 9, 67, 114, 122, 125, 131 – 2, 172, 186, 230 Clarry, Reginald 155 Clothes, washing of 130 – 1, 151, 170, 230 Cluse, William 140 Cocoa 117, 141, 160 – 1, 164 – 5, 205, 230 colgate, Brushless Shave Cream 119 colgate, Dental Ribbon Cream 182, 195 Committee of Imperial Defence, the 35 Concentration of Production legislation 136, 144 Condensed milk 145 Confectionery see sweets Conservative Party 217, 252 n.2 Consumption 15 – 6, 20, 50 – 1, 53 – 4, 70 – 1, 79, 92 – 3, 98, 112, 114–5, 129 – 131, 141 – 2, 145, 154, 170, 173, 176, 178, 214 – 5, 223, 225 – 7, 229, 231, 237 n. 31, 253 n.13 Control of Paper 64, 103, 140 Cooltipt 98 – 9 Cooper, Duff 105 Corn Flakes, Kelloggs 83, 242 n.24 Cosmetics 132, 147, 172, 175 – 6, 178, 183, 194, 206, 214 Cough and Cold remedies 87, 125 Crawford’s Biscuits 219 – 20 Creamola Food Products Limited 111, 115 Creech Jones, Arthur 155 Cricket 216 Culture, definitions of 13 – 6 D.D.D. Prescription 88 Daily Express 49, 63 Daily Mail 36 Dancing Girls 25 Dawson, Graham 188 Defence Notices 35, 58, 137 Dentifrice Manufacturers of Great Britain, the 166

Diet 80, 83, 87, 107, 114– 5, 124, 146, 151, 164, 205 Dig for Victory 1787– 9 Doherty, Martin 2 Domesticity, women and 172 Downham, John 2 Dried fruit 145 Dubarry Talcum Powder 218 Dugdale, John 139–40 Dulverton, Lord 134 Duncan, Andrew 135, 137 Dunkirk 3– 4, 48, 97, 126, 130, 131, 192, 229 Dunkirk Spirit 4 Economist, the 63, 132 Economy drive (economize)128 – 31 Economy, free-market 66, 68, 169 Eggs 40, 109, 111, 115, 146, 219 Empire 19, 193, 252 n.6 Energen Bread and Food 89 Erwin, Wasey and Co, Limited 40, 114 Evacuation 74, 84 Eve in Overalls 184, 207, 216, 228, 230 Eve Shampoo 176– 7 Ever-Ready Razor Products 189– 90, 193 –4 Everyday life, during World War Two 1, 4, 8 – 9, 12–18, 47, 75, 80, 94– 5, 102, 209, 226, 229, 232 Extracts, meat 80 Fabian Society 212 Famel Syrup 87 Fatalities, civilian 4 Fats, cooking 34, 52, 236 n.11, 242 n.18 Femininity 132, 172, 176, 178, 179 –81, 208 –9 advertiser’s role in promoting 181 – 4, 206 cosmetics and 176 fashion and 175 loss of 181

INDEX Fleet Street 136 – 7 Florida Caned Grapefruit 114, 189 Fougasse, posters 100, 102 Four Square Tobacco 117 France 73, 77, 79, 99, 104, 105, 126 Francis, Martin 214 Fry’s 205 Fry’s, Cocoa 117, 164 – 5 Fry’s, Sandwich Chocolate 112 Fry’s, Assorted Chocolates 142 Gallup, opinion polling company 84 Gas masks 40, 99 Geertz, Clifford 13 Germany 6 – 7 24, 46, 71, 73, 104, 105 119, 191, 194, 201, 204, 205, 220 – 1 Gibbs Dentifrice 166 Gillette 119 – 20 Glymiel Jelly 179, 187 Go To It 112, 125 Goodall, Backhouse & Co. Limited 108 Goods, consumable 46 Goods, luxury 1, 38, 45, 53, 54, 140 Goodwill, maintenance of 30, 37, 40 – 2, 48 – 50, 61– 2, 135 – 6 Government Contact Committee 32 – 33, 36 Gravy 80 – 1, 83 Green, Martin 77 – 8 Griffiths, James 140 Guinness 90 Hammersley, Samuel 137 Harris, Jose 18 Harrisson, Tom 23 Health, and efficiency 112 – 115, 123 – 5, 146, 177, 212 Hercules Cycles 162 – 3 Healy, Maurice 48 History of Advertising Trust 22 Hitler, Adolf 7, 11– 2, 24, 104, 150, 219 – 20 HMV 92

265

Holt, Douglas 15 Home Front, the British 1, 3, 4, 6, 12, 16, 19 – 22, 29, 31, 38, 47, 50, 52, 55, 67, 71, 77, 85, 89, 98, 100, 104 –6, 109, 112, 114– 6, 119, 122, 125, 126, 129, 131, 142– 3, 171, 173 – 4, 198, 200, 210, 229 anxiety and 92 boredom on 73 masculinity and 201, 206 rumours and 102 women and the 174, 184, 186, 206 – 7 Home Intelligence 18, 102, 114 Homesun Lamps 122 Hopkinson, Tom 24 Horlicks 70, 75, 77, 79, 89 ‘Grass Widower’ Campaign 200 Hosiery 40, 214 House of Commons 60, 83, 103, 136 Housewife, the 52, 54, 61, 80, 83, 109, 115, 129 – 31, 152, 172, 184 Hovis 132 HP Sauce 2, 81, 187, 204 Hulton, Edward 24 Hulton Press 22, 24 Identities, cultural 1, 12–4, 16, 21, 67 –8, 78, 102, 115, 225– 6, 229 Imperial Tobacco Company 134 Incorporated Society of British Advertisers 32 Information, Ministry of 5, 28, 98, 131, 184, 207, 216, 228, 230 Institute of Incorporated Practitioners in Advertising (IIPA) 22, 23, 28 J. Walter Thompson Co. Ltd. 22 Japan, representations of 190 Jeffery, Tom 23 Jefferys, Kevin 211, 252 n.2 Jennings, Humphrey 11 Julysia Hair Tonic Cream 99

266

ADVERTISING AND PROPAGANDA IN WORLD WAR II

Kay Linseed Compound 124 Kayser-Bondor Limited 40, 211, 214, 217 Kayser-Bondor, Stockings 216, 223 Keep Calm and Carry On, poster campaign 72 Kelloggs’ 83 Kia-Ora 221 Knight, Norma 182 Knight’s Castile 182 Korda, Alexander, The Lion has Wings (1939) 191 Kruschen 200 Labour Party, the 211 – 2, 215, 216, 218, 221, 223, 252 n.2 Land-Girls 179 see also Women’s Land Army Last, Nella 95, 126 Leisure 163, 212 Lever Brothers, 47 – 8, 131, 203 Levy, Thomas 104 Lewis Selby, H. 40 Linia Belt 121 Lintas Limited 47 –8 Litesome, Support Underwear, ARP Gasproof model 124 Liverpool 7, 104 London Passenger Transport Board 32 London Press Exchange 22, 43 London, bombing of 5 –7, 11, 17, 150 London, illumination of Piccadilly Circus 216 Lorant, Stefan 24 Lozenges 117 –8 Luftwaffe 7 Lux Soap 130 – 1, 148, 151, 169 Lyle and Scott, Cooper’s Y-Fronts, return of elastic bands 166 Lyttelton, Oliver 136, 140 McLaine, Ian 65 Macadam, Ivision 33

Mackay, Robert 73, 104 Mackintosh’s Toffee 38 Macleans, peroxide toothpaste 90 Madge, Charles 23 Magazines 29, 66, 228 Maldano’s Egg Flip 55 Mander, Geoffrey 141 Margarine 34, 52, 109, 236 n.11, 242 n.18 Marmite 153, 170 Mars Confections Limited 146 –7 Masculinity 172– 4, 188, 193, 194, 196, 199– 201, 203, 205, 208 Mason’s OK Sauce 81, 107, 115, 229 Mass-Observation 22, 23, 43, 74, 104, 152, 179, 211, 215 Max Factor 214 McLaine, Ian 65 Meat 80, 83, 107, 109, 113, 132, 242 n.18 Meltis 215, 218 Merseyside 7 Milk 111, 132, 146, 160, 161, 230 Milk of Magnesia 211 Miner’s Liquid Make-up 58– 9, 133– 4 Ministry of Food 42, 56 Ministry of Home Security 5, 55 Ministry of Information (MOI) 7, 20, 21, 28, 32, 34, 35, 42, 46, 47, 55, 57, 64, 68, 72, 78, 79, 90, 94, 103, 105– 6, 114, 120, 131, 136 –7 American Division 5 Co-ordination Division 33 Commercial Relations Division 65 Publicity Division 33 Ministry of Supply 60, 64, 135, 141 Modernity 211– 216, 222 Monogamy, wartime and 198– 9 Moore, Norman 47 Morale, civilian 1, 5, 9, 16, 17, 18–9, 20, 21, 29, 38, 48, 56, 64, 68, 72,

INDEX 74, 78, 104–5, 137, 157, 178, 181, 196, 198–9, 207, 208, 209, 210, 216, 223, 230, 231, 232 Morrison, Herbert 103, 125, 212 Mothaks, moth balls 129 Motorists 139 Mrs Peek’s Puddings 171, 184, 185 Murphy Radio 38, 142, 143, 165 National character, the British 4, 9, 202 National Dried Milk 160 National Savings Campaign 139 – 40 Nelson, Horatio 117 Newspaper Proprietors Association 32, 63 Newspaper Society 32 Newspapers 29, 42, 64, 66, 106, 137, 140, 141, 155, 228, 236 n.17, 240 n.78 Newsprint Supply Company 64 Nicolson, Harold 78 Noakes, Lucy 173, 190 Normality 1, 3, 9, 12, 14, 16– 19, 28, 31, 46, 62, 64, 74, 79, 83 –5, 93 – 6, 102, 115, 137, 185 – 6, 198, 203 – 6, 216– 222, 225 – 6, 230 – 2 Nostalgia 216 – 221 Oats 145, 166, 167 Odol 2, 92, 182 Odo-Ro-No 181 Old World and the New Society, the (Labour Party NEC) 211 – 2 Osbourne-Peacock 38 Osram Lamps 85 Ovaltine 55, 89, 112, 123 – 4 Oxo 50, 51, 81 – 3 P & B Knitting wools 182, 199 Palmolive 187 Panter-Downes, Mollie 9 Paper, Control of Order 64, 103, 140 Parker Pen Company 77

267

Patriotism 129, 142, 178 Peace, anticipation of 21, 37–8, 43, 56, 68, 136, 163, 200, 210, 214, 218 –20 Peace, arrival of 220, 223 Peace, comparison to war 228 Pears Soap 212 – 4 Peas 145, 158 –9 Peat, Charles 141 People’s War 1, 3, 11, 13– 17, 29, 72– 3, 79, 95, 96, 204 Periodical Trade Press 32 Perry, Martin. H. 39 Persil 156 Pharmaceutical, industry 86– 7, 90 Phoenix, Glassware 132 Phillip’s Dental Magnesia 181 Phoney War, the 28, 73, 74, 78, 93, 98, 102, 128, 229, 232 Pickles 80 Picture Post 22 –5, 37, 107, 115, 116, 122, 125, 150– 1, 199, 208, 214 –5, 218, 235 n.44 Player’s Navy Cut 117 Pond’s Preparations 181 ‘Pooling’ schemes 34, 52, 136, 236 n.11 Posters 16, 46, 72, 79, 99 – 103, 140, 191, 199, 250 n.53 Postscripts 48, 238 n.41 Potter and Moore’s Powder Cream 175 Poulton & Noel 150, 217 Powders, pet condition 117, 119 Press censorship 35– 6, 102, 137, 140 Priestley, J.B. 48, 199, 210, 238 n. 41 Proprietary Association 60, 90, 97, 139, 148, 169 Public Opinion 2, 14, 63 Pulses 145 Quaker Oats 166– 7 Radio 38 – 9, 142– 4, 153 Raincoats 117

268

ADVERTISING AND PROPAGANDA IN WORLD WAR II

Rationing, food 44, 80, 83, 106, 115, 131 – 2, 145 – 6, 150, 158 – 60, 164, 224, 229, 242 n.18 fuel 138 – 9, 162 – 3, 166 milk 230 paper 106 sweets 230 Razors 117, 148, 189 – 90, 193 Recreation 41 Red, White and Blue Coffee 107 Reith, Lord (Director General of BBC and Minister of Information) 3 Research, market 2 Reynolds, Quentin 7 Rice 145 Rinso 151 – 2 Rinso, ‘no boil method’ 19, 201 – 2 Rootes Group 43 Rose, Sonya 174, 183, 188, 190, 194, 201, 202 Rosebank Fabrics 85 Rose’s, Lime Juice 55, 208, 219 Royal Air Force (RAF) 116, 117, 119, 199 Royal Navy 116, 121 Ryvita 44 Sago 145 Salvage 165 – 8 Sanatogen, Nerve Tonic Food 55, 89 Scott, Linda 183 Searby, Geoffrey 44 Servicemen 174, 189, 201, 208 Seven Seas, Cod Liver Oil 56 Sexual harassment 176 Sharpe, Len 48 Shelter, bomb 50, 75, 95 Sherlock Holmes 154 Shredded Wheat 114 Silkin, Lewis 103 Smile, as propaganda technique 90– 92, 182 Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders 43

Sorenson, Reginald 135 Soup 80 Standard Motor Company 218, 222 Statistical Review of Press Advertising 132, 156, 162, 194 Stead Razor Blades 54, 148 Stockings, silk 148, 151, 22 Stoicism 1 – 2, 11, 95 – 6, 124, 141, 146, 170, 202, 230 Stork (margarine) 52– 3, 109 Stork Wartime Cookery Book, the 52, 115 Summerfield, Penny 4, 23, 173, 174, 178, 185, 193, 194, 199 Sweets and confectionery 146– 7, 160 –2 Syrup 145 Tangee Lipstick 176 Tapioca 145 Tattoo (lipstick) 175, Tax excess profits 34, 60, 155, 247 n.46 income 41 purchase 53 Taylor, Philip 136– 7 Taylor, Stephen 18 TCP 200 Tea 9, 50, 161, 242 n.18 The Heat of the Day (Novel) 17 Tillett, Edward 58 Times, the 40, 42, 46, 53, 72, 136, 237 n.24 Tinned foods 109, 150 Titmuss, Richard 4, 8, 12, 191 Tobacco 117 – 8, 132, 134, 245–6 n.10 Toiletries see cosmetics Tomatoes 145 Total war 1, 20, 27, 29, 31, 66, 95, 103, 167, 227 Treacle, see syrup Ultra Radio 142– 3, 153 Underwear 38, 119, 124, 214 Under-garments, Gasproof see Litesome

INDEX Uniform 173 – 7, 181, 188, 196 – 8 V.P. Rich Ruby (British Sherry) 165 Vapex 124 Vegetables, canned 158 Victory-V 58, 118 Vim 16, 149 – 50 Vimto 38 Vine Products Limited 154 Vinolia 182 Vita-Gravy 81 Vogue 140 W. S. Crawford Limited 22, 43 Walkeezi 156 Weekly Newspaper Proprietors Association 32 Wellington Press Postal Advertising Services, Ltd., the 39 Wilkinson, B.E. 40, 114 Williams, Douglas 5 Williamson, Judith 14 Wills’s Gold Flake (cigarettes) 188, 193

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Wimbledon 216 Wincarnis Tonic Wine 57, 74 ‘the wine for life’ 58 Wireless see radio Women, ‘feminine charm’ reinforced through advertising 174– 5 Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) 176, 187 Women’s Land Army (WLA) 187 Women’s Royal Naval Service (WRNS) 176 Wood, Kingsley 139– 40, 155 Woolton, Lord 50 Woolton Pie 81 Worthington (beer) 85–6, 90, 92 Yardley Cosmetics 147 Yo rkshire Post 58 Yorkshire Relish see Goodall, Backhouse & Co. Ltd. Zixt Soap Tablet 178, 184 Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Ina 218, 223