Activism in Hard Times in Central and Eastern Europe: People Power [1 ed.] 1032738235, 9781032738239

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ACTIVISM IN HARD TIMES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Activism in Hard Times in Central and Eastern Europe elevates the voices of civic activists from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and analyzes a wealth of information to generate new insights into how activism in the region manages to be vibrant, diverse, and consequential. Because of these countries’ unique historical trajectory, CEE activists have, in important ways, leap-​frogged their counterparts in the West. Giving special attention to activists in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, the book focuses on responses to the recent “hard times” –​the shrinking of public space for civil society, democratic backsliding, polarization, and Russia’s war in Ukraine. The contributors contend that CEE activists provide important lessons for others confronting similar challenges around the world. The book is well-​suited for a variety of undergraduate and graduate courses, such as comparative politics, human rights, global governance, social movements, Central and East European politics, and contemporary world politics. This timely and readable book, co-​created by academics and activists and written in a conversational tone, will also be of interest to the interested public and practitioners. The book encourages readers to think differently about the role of civil society and activism, as well as about how new tools and polarizing dynamics affect activism in this region. Patrice C. McMahon is Director of the University Honors Program and Professor of Political Science at the University of Nebraska-​Lincoln, USA. Paula M. Pickering is Richard S. Perles Professor of Government and Faculty Affiliate of the Global Research Institute at William & Mary, USA. Dorota Pietrzyk-​Reeves is Professor of Political Philosophy at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland.

Innovations in International Affairs Series Editor: Raffaele Marchetti, LUISS Guido Carli, Italy

Innovations in International Affairs aims to provide cutting-​edge analyses of controversial trends in international affairs with the intent to innovate our understanding of global politics. Hosting mainstream as well as alternative stances, the series promotes both the re-​assessment of traditional topics and the exploration of new aspects. The series invites both engaged scholars and reflective practitioners, and is committed to bringing non-​western voices into current debates. Innovations in International Affairs is keen to consider new book proposals in the following key areas: • Innovative topics: related to aspects that have remained marginal in scholarly and public debates • International crises: related to the most urgent contemporary phenomena and how to interpret and tackle them • World perspectives: related mostly to non-​western points of view Titles in this series include: World War Aid Interventionist Aid and War in Ukraine Igor Pellicciari Activism in Hard Times in Central and Eastern Europe People Power Edited by Patrice C. McMahon, Paula M. Pickering, and Dorota Pietrzyk-​Reeves For more information about this series, please visit: www.routle​dge.com/​Inno​vati​ons-​in-​ Intern​atio​nal-​Affa​irs/​book-​ser​ies/​IIA

ACTIVISM IN HARD TIMES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE People Power

Edited by Patrice C. McMahon, Paula M. Pickering, and Dorota Pietrzyk-​Reeves

Designed cover image: cover photo courtesy of Eko forum Zenica First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 selection and editorial matter, Patrice C. McMahon, Paula M. Pickering, and Dorota Pietrzyk-​Reeves; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Patrice C. McMahon, Paula M. Pickering, and Dorota Pietrzyk-​Reeves to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-​in-​Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 9781032738239 (hbk) ISBN: 9781032717593 (pbk) ISBN: 9781003466116 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/​9781003466116 Typeset in Sabon by Newgen Publishing UK

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments Notes on contributors 1 Introduction to civil society 2.0 Paula M. Pickering and Patrice C. McMahon 2 Polarization as driver and barrier to civic activism Dorota Pietrzyk-​Reeves and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom 3 Democratic innovations as a response to shrinking public space Paulina Pospieszna and Dorota Pietrzyk-​Reeves

vii viii 1 27

47

4 Conflict and collaboration in generational divides Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom and Patrice C. McMahon

71

5 The lure of digital activism Patrice C. McMahon, Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, Darko Brkan, and Alena Popova

89

6 Everyday environmentalism Laura A. Henry, Samir Lemeš, and Paula M. Pickering

111

vi Contents

7 Crises: COVID-​19 and Russia’s war on Ukraine Ella Rossman, Valerie Sperling, and Paula M. Pickering

136

8 From the margins to central stage: Insights and lessons Paula M. Pickering, Patrice C. McMahon, and Dorota Pietrzyk-​Reeves

158

Glossary Index

177 181

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to acknowledge financial support provided by the National Science Centre in Poland (project no. 2018/​30/​M/​HS5/​00437) without which this book would not be possible. We also acknowledge the International Research Roundtable grant from the Peter Wall Institute for Advanced Studies at the University of British Columbia, and financial support of the Richard S. Perles Professorship at William & Mary. We also want to thank colleagues Vesna Bojicic-​ Dzelilovic, Denisa Kostovicova, Valery Perry, Randall Puljek-Shank, and Tsveta Petrova; research assistants Mykhailo Volokhai, Antoni Gaweł, Maja Stefańska from Jagiellonian University, and Ola Pozor from William and Mary; and editorial assistants Rowan Havranek, Huy Le, Anna Warmka, and Kelly Zach from the University of Nebraska-​Lincoln.

CONTRIBUTORS

Editors Patrice C. McMahon is Director of the University Honors Program and

Professor of Political Science at the University of Nebraska-​Lincoln. Her research focuses on humanitarianism, peacebuilding, and civil society. She is the author of The NGO Game (Cornell, 2017) and Taming Ethnic Hatred: Ethnic Cooperation and Transnational Networks in Eastern Europe (Syracuse, 2007) and the co-​editor of four other books. Her scholarly articles have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Human Rights Quarterly, East European Politics and Societies, Ethnopolitics, and Political Science Quarterly, and her research has been supported by funding from the U.S. Department of State, the American Council for Learned Societies (ACLS), the National Research Council (NRC), and the National Science Centre in Poland. Currently, she is the co-​principal investigator on “The Conditions of Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe Thirty Years After: A Comparative Perspective,” supported by the National Science Centre in Poland. In 2023, she was a Fulbright Scholar at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, Poland. Paula M. Pickering is Richard S. Perles Professor of Government and Faculty

Affiliate of the Global Research Institute at William & Mary. Her research focuses on peacebuilding, local governance, and civic engagement in Southeastern Europe. Pickering is a co-​editor with Zsuzsa Csergő and Daina Eglitis of Central and East European Politics: Changes and Challenges, 5th Ed. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2021) and the author of Peacebuilding in the Balkans (Cornell, 2007). Recent articles were published in East European Politics and Societies, the Journal of Experimental Political Science, and the

Notes on contributors  ix

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Her research has received support from Evidence in Politics and Governance, the US Institute of Peace, NCEEER, IREX, the Social Science Research Council, and Fulbright-​Hays. Dorota Pietrzyk-​Reeves is Professor of Political Philosophy and Political

Science at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. Her research interests include normative political theory, democratic theory, civil society, and democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, republicanism, and political education. She has published in Politics, Acta Politica, Education, Citizenship and Social Justice, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, East European Politics and Societies, and Communist and Post-​Communist Studies. Her recent books include Polish Republican Discourse in the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge University Press, 2020) and Civil Society, Democracy and Democratization (2016). Currently, she is the principal investigator on an international research project “The Conditions of Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe Thirty Years After: A Comparative Perspective,” supported by the National Science Centre in Poland. Authors Darko Brkan is the Director of the Civic Association “Zasto ne,” one

of the most prominent Bosnian NGOs that promotes civic activism, government accountability, and the use of technology and digital media in deepening democracy. He also acts as the board president of the regional network ActionSEE, advisory board member of Open government partnership in BiH, and has been a fellow of numerous prominent global fellowships. He holds degrees from the Faculty of Electrical Engineering in Computer Science and Faculty of Economics in Strategic Informational Management. His professional interests are in technology and its social impacts, government accountability and transparency, social media, media accountability, fact-​checking, elections, and civic activism. He is a regular contributor to many local and international media and a speaker at several prominent events. Laura A. Henry is Professor of Government and Legal Studies at Bowdoin

College in Brunswick, Maine. Her research investigates Russia’s post-​Soviet transformation with a particular focus on civil society, citizen activism, and environmental politics. Henry is the co-​author (with Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom) of Bringing Global Governance Home: NGO Mediation in BRICS States (Oxford, 2021) and the author of Red to Green: Environmental Activism in Post-​Soviet Russia (Cornell, 2010). She is also the co-​editor of Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assessment (M.E. Sharpe, 2006). Her work has appeared in Environmental Politics, Global Environmental Politics,

x  Notes on contributors

Post-​Soviet Affairs, and Europe-​Asia Studies among other journals. She has been a Watson Foundation fellow and a Fulbright Scholar. Samir Lemeš is Dean of the Polytechnic Faculty and Professor of Computer

Graphics at the University of Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). He earned a PhD in mechanical engineering at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, in 2010. He has (co)authored 20 books and more than 100 scientific papers. Lemeš is also an environmental activist and President of the Board of Directors of the Citizens Association “Eko Forum Zenica.” His activism started in 2009, after the privatization of the local steelworks by an international corporation ArcelorMittal. Using his academic background, he used civic engagement to force the corporation to invest in environmental protection and pollution reduction and to make the Bosnian government improve environmental legislation. Alena Popova is a Russian opposition politician and founder of the Ethics and

Technology think tank. In 2021, she ran for elections to the State Duma. As a researcher, Alena is focusing on digital authoritarianism, models of digital democracies, digital activism, regulation of the use of data and AI, export of digital repression technologies, disinformation campaigns, and human rights. In 2018, during a protest in Moscow, she was detained using a facial recognition system. Alena filed a lawsuit against the use of a facial recognition system in Moscow, which is now being considered in the European Court of Human Rights. Alena is also a women’s rights activist. She is one of the co-​ authors of the first anti-​domestic violence laws in Russia. Alena holds a law degree from Kutafin Moscow State Law University and a journalism degree from Lomonosov Moscow State University. In October 2021, the Russian authorities called Alena, along with other prominent activists, scientists, artists, politicians, and journalists, a foreign agent for her anti-​war views and criticism of the Russian authorities. Paulina Pospieszna is Associate Professor of political science at the Adam

Mickiewicz University of Poznan, Poland. She received her Ph.D. (2010) in Political Science from the University of Alabama and worked as a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Konstanz and University of Mannheim, Germany. Her main research interests are democracy promotion, civil society, political participation, aid and sanctions as foreign policy tools, deliberative democracy, and democratic innovations. Geographically, she focuses on Central and Eastern Europe. She is the author of Democracy Assistance Bypassing Governments in Recipient Countries Supporting the “Next Generation” (Routledge, 2019).

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Notes on contributors  xi

Ella Rossman is a doctoral student at the School of Slavonic and East European

Studies, University College London, and a feminist activist who co-​organized the Feminist Anti-​War Resistance group, protesting the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ella participated in Russian independent education and gender studies initiatives, like Free University Moscow and AntiUniversity Moscow. Her research is now focused on late Soviet girlhood; she is also interested in the history of gender studies and feminism in Soviet and post-​Soviet Russia. Ella’s articles were published in academic journals Ab Imperio, History of Science and Humanities, and New Perspectives. As a columnist, she wrote for openDemocracy, Meduza, Novaya Gazeta, Riddle, and others. Valerie Sperling is Professor of Political Science at Clark University (Worcester,

Massachusetts). Her research interests lie at the intersection of Russian politics and gender studies. She is the author of Organizing Women in Contemporary Russia (Cambridge University Press, 1999), Altered States: The Globalization of Accountability (Cambridge, 2009), and the award-​winning Sex, Politics, and Putin: Political Legitimacy in Russia (Oxford, 2015). She and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom (with Melike Sayoglu) co-​authored Courting Gender Justice: Russia, Turkey, and the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford, 2019). Her most recent book, co-​authored with Robert Boatright, is Trumping Politics as Usual: Masculinity, Misogyny, and the 2016 Elections (Oxford, 2020). Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom is a Professor of Political Science at the University of

British Columbia. She is an expert on Russian politics, and her major research interests include democratization, human rights, gender issues, the politics of international democracy assistance, legal mobilization, and NGO activism in both domestic and transnational politics. Her recent books include Bringing Global Governance Home: How BRICS NGOs Engage the World (2021, co-​ authored with Laura A. Henry) and Courting Gender Justice: Russia, Turkey, and the European Court of Human Rights (2019, co-​authored with Valerie Sperling and Melike Sayoglu), both from Oxford University Press. She has published in scholarly journals including International Organization, Global Environmental Politics, Communist and Post-​Communist Studies, Europe-​ Asia Studies, Post-​Soviet Affairs, and Human Rights Quarterly.

1 INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL SOCIETY 2.0 Paula M. Pickering and Patrice C. McMahon

At 15, Anna Bondarenko was an exchange student living in California, where her most profound experience was volunteering in her town. Volunteering, she realized, allowed her to help others and get to know her neighbors and community. Volunteering also made her feel good. She was finally living her values. When she returned to Ukraine in 2017, she and a group of friends from her hometown of Odesa founded the Ukrainian Volunteer Service.1 Odesa had a lot of needs, but few volunteering opportunities. Six years later, and after Russia’s full-​blown invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the movement she inspired and helped lead, Ukraine’s volonteri movement,2 is matching more than 100,000 people to some 900 organizations around the country (Applebaum, 2022). Ukrainian volunteers are delivering food, taking care of the elderly, and supporting and sustaining the country and its people. As activist Iryna Svets, director of OPORA Lviv3 (2023), puts it, this is “Ukraine’s superpower”: regular people just doing things on their own. This is just one vivid example of the raw power of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the second decade of the 21st century. A great deal has changed in Ukraine and throughout the entire region since the 1980s, when shipyard workers, plumbers, playwrights, and students mobilized to confront communist governments. Yet, more than 30 years later, civil society is stepping up again to respond to peoples’ needs and to confront autocratic forces. Throughout CEE, it is ordinary individuals who are taking matters into their own hands, addressing environmental threats to their water and air, standing up for women’s rights, and holding corrupt governments accountable. While that is inspiring, why should we care about civic activism in CEE? For us, the actions of people like Bondarkenko and Svets and the others we interviewed for this book remind us why average DOI: 10.4324/9781003466116-1

2  Paula M. Pickering and Patrice C. McMahon

citizens fight for democracy; how they act to improve political, social, and economic conditions; and when they work to make their governments more accountable or support those in need who have been neglected by the authorities. As Vaclav Havel, dissident turned president of Czechoslovakia, suggested long ago,4 we should all care about civic activism, because of our own individual responsibility –​not only to engage in public life but to improve it. Ukrainian civil society is shaped tragically by Russia’s ongoing war on its territory. Yet, in this book, we contend that the courage of activists whom we are witnessing in Ukraine is part of a larger picture of civic engagement on a variety of issues that is occurring throughout this region. What we observe from our work and what we describe and analyze in this book are the inspiring people who are mobilizing in innovative and exciting ways. Those acting are often not full-​time professional activists, who attract a lot of media attention and make significant sums of money, but ordinary citizens. Some activists are engaged to expand democratic governance or to advance human rights. Others work to improve social well-​being and address everyday issues like environmental degradation. Still, other activists are advocating for the values and goals they argue resonate better with national or traditional ideals such as patriotism. This chapter introduces the main themes of our book and explains why civic activism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) should, again, be regarded by scholars, practitioners, and students of social science as an important component in the developments taking place in this region. We define civil society activism and discuss its dynamics during unexpected hard times –​the recent decade of changes and challenges that these and many other societies around the world had to face, such as growing polarization, democratic backsliding, the so-​called shrinking of the public space,5 the pandemic, and war. After clarifying a few crucial terms that we use throughout the book, we present our central argument that civil society in CEE is diverse, dynamic, and consequential, despite current hard times. We also provide an explanation for the unique method we used in this book based on interviews, testimonials, and stories of a selected group of activists from five countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina [BiH], Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine). We feature activists representing various spheres of activism, from citizens’ panels, everyday patriotism, environmental action, and women’s rights to digital and anti-​war activism, while engaging a rich literature on civil society in CEE. People Power elevates the voices and the stories of courageous activists from this region. We gather stories of what individuals have been doing in the last tumultuous decade of what we call “hard times.” Academics and activists co-​create our book, examining how citizens in this region make the most of possibilities for civic activism, how and why activism has evolved, as well as what activism has hoped to and, in many cases, did achieve and how.

Introduction to civil society 2.0  3

Key terms

This book is about people and groups engaging in civic activism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)6 (Kublius, 2022). This is a geographic region that has shifted over the centuries, but it has had a distinctive political and economic past after the end of the Second World War (WWII).7 Countries in this region were subjected to top-​down political, economic, and social control from communist governments for at least 45 years (from roughly 1945 to 1989 or 1991). Although many of the similarities have dissipated, their common communist history makes these countries an excellent laboratory in which to understand the vital role of activists and to analyze variation and change. This book describes, explains, and analyzes recent and emerging forms of civic engagement that animate civil society in CEE today. To be sure, we are more interested in providing real-​world examples of dynamic civic activists and their activities than in debating definitions or testing theoretical propositions. The concept of civil society owes much of its ongoing popularity today to the role that individuals and civil society groups played in the fall of communist governments in CEE in the late 1980s (World Bank, 2022). At the same time, much has happened in this region and beyond that pushes our thinking in new directions in terms of the organizational forms, strategies, and goals adopted by activists in civil society. We thus define civil society quite broadly as the array of formal and informal organizations, social movements, community groups, civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-​governmental organizations (NGOs),8 charitable organizations, faith-​ based organizations, professional associations, and foundations, as well as grassroots initiatives that are separate from the state, the market and family, and use peaceful ways to achieve collective goals. Our capacious definition means that People Power is interested in activism that is beyond what is being conducted by organized groups with full-​time staff, offices, large budgets, and donor-​friendly mission statements. That narrow depiction of civil society was embraced in the 1990s by those interested in promoting liberal democracy (Carothers & Ottaway, 2000). Yet, this mischaracterization led to an underestimation of the diversity and dynamism of activities that take place in civil society, as well neglect as to the variety of impacts (Bojicic-​Dzelilovic et al., 2013). This book joins scholars who use more comprehensive, context-​sensitive, and less normatively biased measures, which allows depiction of the diversity of civil society in CEE (Ekiert & Kubik, 2014). Michael Bernhard (2020), for example, recognizes that CSOs do not always support democracy but also highlights a variety of roles that these organizations have played in CEE. These include their “insurgent” role, where groups fight against authoritarian regimes. The role of providing institutionalization occurs when formal civil society groups organize and advocate interests following the transition to democracy. Another role

4  Paula M. Pickering and Patrice C. McMahon

consists of “semi-​loyal” groups that support democracy but only when it benefits them and who are willing to support illiberal agendas when they are in power.9 For Fareed Zakaria (1997),10 illiberal agendas are those that ignore constitutional limits on power and deprive citizens of their basic rights and freedoms. Finally, as Bernhard suggests, civil society groups can work as a “firewall” for democracy, serving as a final layer of accountability when anti-​democratic forces have captured democratic institutions. Our book focuses even more on the key category of civic activism, which refers to different forms of voluntary public engagement at individual and group levels which may take both institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms. We believe that civic activism better captures the new trends of civic engagement in CEE than the well-​known term civil society. It is a more dynamic category that refers to real civic action while civil society is often associated with registered NGOs and CSOs, which should be a vehicle of democratization. Our theoretical innovation is to follow the dynamic approach to civil society research (Jacobsson and Korolczuk, 2017; Pietrzyk-​ Reeves, 2022) in which civic activism and its vibrant and evolving nature is seen as the key dimension of civil society. Several studies have noticed that the rapid process of foreign-​sponsored “NGOization of civil society” and the focus on NGOs’ role in democratic consolidation left grassroots activities and non-​institutionalized civic activism beyond the scope of research (Sundstrom, 2006; Pietrzyk-​Reeves and Samonek, 2023). The recent wave of research on civil society in the region prioritizes not the institutionalization of civil society and its role in democratic process, but the actual forms of civic activism. A real test for any civil society is whether active citizens can speak out and mobilize in different ways, either formally through volunteering, establishing, and joining CSOs and social movements or informally and locally. We also argue that although civic activism can be supportive of democracy, its normative focus is not given and should be treated as an empirical question (Pietrzyk-​Reeves & McMahon, 2022). We demonstrate this by analyzing various forms of publicly oriented activity, including protests, social movements, use of social media, and ad hoc participation, which comply with the norms of civility and do not involve violent action. This social self-​organization at the heart of civil society focuses on different goals, norms, and values. This book elevates the voices of activists in CEE from the last decade, rather than summarizing history or theoretical debates. Depending on the country, the last decade’s hard times include shrinking public space for activism, loss of international funding, growing inequality, the strengthening of extreme right-​ wing forces, polarized societies, the brain drain, and the crises of COVID-​19 and Russia’s war in Ukraine. We maintain that, even just in the last few years, activists have responded in various and even ground-​breaking ways to their countries’ experiences of tough times. In each chapter, we follow a similar

Introduction to civil society 2.0  5

format that illuminates how a number of activists have innovatively turned challenges into opportunities to increase the impact of their work, alongside examples where people participate because activists have taken the initiative and are creating and leveraging technology to accomplish important things. But we also make clear that Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine has had a detrimental impact on civil societies in both countries, if in different ways. Activists in Ukraine and Russia have felt compelled to react to the extent possible in such dire circumstances. The chapters, half of which are co-​written by a team of academics and activists, describe and analyze activities and individuals from at least two countries in the region, using dynamic online content. By featuring the stories of real-​life activists in every chapter, we demonstrate how academic terms come alive. Strong, unique, and bellwether

People Power makes three core arguments. First, through a multitude of examples and types of evidence, we demonstrate that civil society in CEE is not weak, as some scholars maintained in the 1990s and early 2000s (Howard, 2003). In fact, each of our chapters demonstrates that civil society in most of these countries is dynamic, diverse, and consequential, even though it is influenced by its experiences of and exit from communist party rule and the subsequent political and economic transformations. Second, because of these countries’ unique historical trajectory in emerging from similar political, economic, and social conditions –​autocratic, less economically developed, and rarely tolerant of pluralism –​we apply Alexander Gerschenkron’s (1962) ideas11on “the advantages of relative backwardness” to help understand activism in CEE today. Gerschenkron, although writing in the 1960s and addressing economic backwardness, contended that underdeveloped countries may enjoy “certain advantages” over developed countries since they learn quickly and can more easily adopt recent technologies and management techniques. These ideas help explain why CEE activists in some cases have leap-​frogged their counterparts in the West. Decades of top-​down control by communist governments were followed quickly by Western efforts to promote (and even purchase) a certain form of civil society in the 1990s and 2000s. As activists themselves reveal, these unique conditions were then layered with the exit of international donors, democratic backsliding, economic inequality, and social dislocation, creating fertile environments for more spontaneous, informal grassroots activism and innovation. At the same time, civic activism in CEE has also adapted to the specific contexts of each country. Finally, because of the region’s historical development and recent hard times, we contend that CEE activists provide useful lessons and models

6  Paula M. Pickering and Patrice C. McMahon

for responding to challenges and opportunities that many countries and societies around the world face today. These include democratic backsliding, polarization, inequality but also affordable and accessible technology and new engagement tactics. The shrinking or closing of public space in CEE has encouraged activists to use different strategies, depending on the activist, the context in which they work, and their goals. Engaging Albert Hirschman’s (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty helps us organize and frame the range of these strategies and responses in our case studies. Exercising “voice” in places like Poland and Hungary, for example, does look different than elsewhere in CEE. In both countries and despite democratic backsliding, people are regularly marching in the streets, openly protesting government policies, as well as engaging in digital activism. We also observe and highlight a growth of voices around what we call “everyday activism,”12 of engagement that is place-​based and focused on social, environmental, or political problems that affect people’s daily lives (Mansbridge, 2013). Often, concrete concerns, such as fighting for clean air, as activist and co-​author Samir Lemeš does in his hometown in BiH, can resonate and mobilize ordinary citizens in ways beyond those common to traditional civil society organizations. Another example of everyday environmental activism is rural women in BiH, Žene Kruščice,13 who camped out for over 500 days to prevent the construction of a mini hydroelectric dam that would jeopardize their water for drinking and crops and contributed to a coalition that successfully advocated for a law banning such dams (Kurtic, 2022). Yet, war, the threat of war, arrest, repression, long-​term unemployment and poverty, and corruption have forced many young and highly educated people to leave their countries. The difficult decision to “exit” is palpable in the communities of BiH, Russia, and Ukraine, posing various threats to the countries’ future. It also makes the work of activists like Svets, whose organization OPORA Lviv that once monitored elections in Ukraine but is now focused on documenting war crimes by Russia, even more important. Like Darko Brkan, a Bosnian activist and co-​author we profile in Chapter 5 who refused to “exit” Bosnia and Herzegovina, these activists use their voice to take actions to hold political leaders and media accountable. Although Ella Rossman, a Russian activist and contributor, felt compelled to leave Russia after Putin’s full invasion of Ukraine, she has boldly chosen to continue to use information and communications technology (ICT) to link with like-​minded activists and voice her support for women’s rights and opposition to the war. Finally, it is important to remember that not everyone in the countries of CEE that we study is opposed to their current governments and their ideas. Many, in fact, embrace their current governments’ activities, advocating “loyalty” to their nation or state. Loyalty is embraced by patriotic

Introduction to civil society 2.0  7

organizations, which are focused on reviving and elevating traditional or national values. People Power synthesizes activists’ voices and academic insights, telling the stories, as Jakub Wygnański,14 an activist from Poland, put it, of “the geeks and freaks” who inspire and teach us all. We want to understand the people who, often under quite difficult circumstances, engage in activities to work for the public good. Given their ability to engage in other, much more lucrative activities, we want to figure out what motivates them, why they persist, and how they muster and sustain their willpower and civic actions. And even though some of us are not activists ourselves, we believe we can learn from these modest heroes. We hope that these activists and their actions might push us to embrace our own responsibilities and power as citizens. How thinking has evolved

Activism and civil society in CEE have been influenced significantly by, and have fundamentally shaped, outcomes in the region’s historical development. By highlighting scholars’ responses to five of the most important questions about civil society and civic activism in the region, we provide a foundation for understanding the recent civic activism we depict in the book’s chapters. 1. What role did civil society play in the collapse of communism? Civil society groups in CEE have been celebrated for the significant role they played in peacefully bringing an end to communist rule, particularly in Poland in the 1980s (Chandhoke, 2022). In Poland, after more than a decade of pressure, the independent trade union Solidarity, former members of the Workers’ Defence Committee (KOR), and the Catholic Church participated in the Roundtable Accords that allowed for the first multiparty elections in CEE to occur in 1989. Beyond Poland, embryonic civil society organizations contributed, and sometimes quite consequentially, to the fall of one-​party regimes in CEE (Ash, 1993). 2. Was civil society weak after the collapse of communism? Scholars like Marc Howard (2003) drew on data from surveys conducted across Europe in the mid-​1990s to argue that civil society in post-​communist Europe was weak. He attributed this to individual factors and to the legacy of communism, when only communist-​run social organizations were allowed. This left most citizens with a lasting aversion to public activities. Yet, a number of scholars have challenged this characterization, partly due to a narrow definition of what counted as civil society and civic activism (Ekiert & Foa, 2016). For Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik (1999), civil society, particularly organized protests documented in newspapers, remained common in Poland and were essential to shaping its democratic transition and consolidation in the early 1990s. Examples

8  Paula M. Pickering and Patrice C. McMahon

of the continuing power and importance of civil society organizations to democracy were evident throughout the late 1990s and early-​2000s when “insurgent” civil society helped bring down post-​ communist but autocratic-​leaning governments in CEE, such as those in Slovakia, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia. Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik (2011) also detail the conditions and tactics used by civil society groups in these countries, including civil society’s ability to effectively contest rigged elections that resulted in the establishment of democratic regimes. This includes civic activism’s role in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004 (Snyder, 2018). 3. How did Western donors influence civil society and activism in the region? During the transition away from communist party rule in the 1990s, Western donors and scholars often viewed strengthening civil society as key to supporting and deepening democracy in the region (Carothers & Ottaway, 2000). Western donors’ ability to “strengthen” civil society by successfully exporting and funding a Western model of civil society to CEE was soon questioned by scholars from the region and those relying on in-​depth fieldwork (Henderson, 2003; Wedel, 1998). Not only was the Western vision of civil society overly optimistic and limited to certain kinds of organizations, but funding often created perverse incentives for civil society leaders to develop organizational structures and be more responsive to international donors than to citizens. In addition, international donors often overlooked the importance of ideas and projects that would resonate in local contexts and failed to appreciate that the countries were different from Western democracies, requiring approaches that navigate informal power structures (Sampson, 1996). Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-​Dzelilovic (2013), for example, argue that Western donors failed to understand the complexities of supporting civil society in the context of triple transitions in politics, economics, and state-​building after violence in the Western Balkans. Books on civil society in Russia prior to Putin’s imposition of a full autocracy highlight the ways in which the Soviet legacy has influenced patterns and repertoires of civic activism, as well as the beneficial but also the perverse influences of Western donors on civil society (Henderson, 2003). The unfortunate fact is external funds often distort the kinds of activism possible and have mixed success in achieving policy goals and responding to domestic constituents. Several independent NGOs in CEE (except in Russia) still use funds from external foundations and select donors to support their work. Yet, many of the NGOs or CSOs that were created using Western funds did not last. Together, these missteps fostered citizen disillusionment with formal civil society organizations and groups that were already unfamiliar to most CEE citizens. Particularly in post-​conflict environments, international involvement in civil society development

Introduction to civil society 2.0  9

was criticized for being transactional and mechanistic, undermining sustainable peace (Belloni, 2020). Efforts to develop civil society in a specific way thus led to what Patrice McMahon (2017) describes as “the NGO game” in places like BiH where internationals wasted the time of locals by pushing them to endlessly document their activities to allow them to receive money that they needed to continue their civil society activities. 4. How has civil society and civic activism evolved since the early 1990s? Civic activism has become more informal, often less reliant on international funds, more attentive to citizens, and adaptive to shrinking public space. Kerstin Jacobsson and Elzbieta Korolczuk’s (2017) edited volume emphasizes the incredible diversity and fluidity of today’s civil society in Poland, providing examples of how individuals are moving beyond NGOs and the need for international funds to engage in activism. They and other scholars also chart the rise of grassroots movements in urban areas across CEE, including those advocating for LGBTQ+​rights (Jacobsson & Korolczuk, 2020; Shevtsova & Buyantueva, 2019). These authors argue that the growth of informal activism is spurred partly by governments’ closure of the public space, reactions against internationally funded formal civil society groups that are often criticized for being more interested in their survival than in achieving goals valued by citizens, as well as the growth of ICT and digital activism. Laura Henry (2010) and Lisa Sundstrom (2006) depict the importance of “everyday” issues of socioeconomic and local neighborhood environmental concerns with Russian citizens. Recent research demonstrates the variety of ways that activism persists in Russia, despite an increasingly authoritarian regime (Morris, Semenov, & Smyth, 2023). And a growing number of studies look at how digital activism in Russia is used to circumvent restrictions (Lonkila, Shpakovskaya, & Torchinsky, n.d.). Civic activism in conflict-​affected societies like BiH and Ukraine has also had to consider peacebuilding (Shapovalova & Burlyuk, 2018). In the Western Balkans, Jasmin Mujanović (2018) highlights the conditions of poor governance and flawed Western policies that have facilitated the rise of protest movements, which are often informally organized. In post-​ war BiH’s divided political and social systems, civic activism that is not ethnically framed occurs only under rare conditions (Arsenijević, 2014; Milan, 2019). Our interviews with activists allowed us to better understand how civic activism in our case countries has evolved and has been shaped by various responses to new challenges, as well as new strategies that often were necessary to sustain activism. Our chapters reveal that some of these challenges were used as opportunities for action, for instance networking with like-​minded organizations and activists in and outside the country

10  Paula M. Pickering and Patrice C. McMahon

or using digital tools to reach out to those in need and those willing to support their work. 5. Has civil society contributed to or pushed back against recent democratic backsliding? So far, scholars have argued that whether civil society actors have contributed to, abetted, or pushed back against recent democratic backsliding depends on the goals of civil society organizations and activists, as well as political opportunities (Applebaum, 2022; Kapidžić & Stojarová, 2021; Krastev & Holmes, 2020). Michael Bernhard (2021) discusses both how conservative civic groups, including those connected to the Catholic church, have supported Poland’s former illiberal government and how “firewall” civil society groups have pushed back. A number of scholars have viewed conservative civil society organizations as contributors to political backsliding in Hungary and in Poland (Bernhard, 2020; Greskovits, 2020; Kossakowski, 2021, Youngs, 2018). These diverse studies help us understand the varying roles that civic activism and civil society have played in CEE in specific times, in particular places, and on concrete issues. Yet, they still leave many questions about the motivations, actions, goals, and impact of civic activism in the last decade, when democratic rights have declined to varying degrees across the region (and beyond). For example, why do these individuals make activism such a central part of their life? What are the approaches civic activists can most effectively use to work as a firewall against authoritarianism? How can civic activists work to bridge gaps between polarized segments of societies? Our interviews help answer these questions and shed more light on the adaptability and creativity of activists who address these challenges in their work. Each of the chapters considers some or all of these questions. From communism to democracy to crises

Our book seeks to address these and other questions, highlighting and assessing civic activism in the last decade in the region of CEE. Because regional and country contexts shape the evolution and impact of civic activism, we focus here on key characteristics. While the boundaries of the region are debated, the countries included in it share the common experiences of centuries of rule by empires, control by the communist party at least between the end of WWII and 1989, and a transition period away from one-​party rule in the 1990s. The communist party attempted to control not just politics but also economic and social activities. As a result, citizens’ voluntary participation in social organizations beyond those controlled by the communist party was not possible. Activism and civil society were suppressed or controlled by the state and could not freely develop in this region until the last half

Introduction to civil society 2.0  11

of the 1980s, when communist parties across the region started to reform or weaken (Rothschild, 2008). Consequently, the people of this region have lacked long-​term, sustained opportunities to develop CSOs and habits of civic participation. Indeed, rather than foster civic engagement, the communist party propagated compliance with ruling party officials, distrust of individuals, and punished both political dissidents and often those who refused to be obedient to party dictates about everyday public life. Some scholars maintain that this historical legacy, particularly for those who lived through it, continues to encourage distrust of democratic institutions and withdrawal from civic participation (Pop-​Eleches & Tucker, 2017). When communist regimes began to reform in the late 1980s, civil society organizations in Poland and civic activism elsewhere in CEE helped topple communist party rule (Curry, 2022; Kenney, 2003). Importantly, it is not just the legacy of communism but also the experiences in the difficult transitions away from one-​party rule that affected the evolution of civil society and civic activism. This transition period varied by country, depending on the comprehensiveness of the communist party’s control over the economy and society, the goals of the leaders who won multiparty elections, and the preferences of citizens. Overall, the transition period allowed for a blossoming of political parties and civil society organizations, alongside an influx of Western aid to support CSOs as a bottom-​up approach to democratization (Carothers & Ottaway, 2000). However, market economic reforms were particularly painful for the most vulnerable populations: the least skilled, those living in rural areas, and minorities, while opening opportunities for corruption. While political and civic pluralism created opportunities for civic action to improve politics and societies, many of the new political and civic actors were considered as opportunists by citizens. This view was fueled by what many citizens contended was the lack of effective policies and perceptions that civic actors and the CSOs they led were more responsive to Western donors than to citizens. Our cases

The tumultuous transition away from communism in the 1990s resulted in political regimes with various levels of openness, ranging from consolidated liberal democracies to regimes that were a mix of democratic and authoritarian (hybrid) to full authoritarian. Our book features civic activists from BiH, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, though chapters also highlight examples of activism in other CEE countries. These countries all took steps to varying degrees to democratize after one-​party rule but then to undermine democratic institutions. Poland and Hungary were front-​runners in democratic reforms in the 1990s and after a process of conditionality became members of the European Union in 2004. Democratic reforms were

12  Paula M. Pickering and Patrice C. McMahon

more troubled and made less progress in BiH. There, initial reforms were cut short by a war in the early 1990s supported by its neighbors and domestic extremists and then resumed after the war, but only with heavy international intervention. Internationally backed quotas for ethno-​national representation in the political system and broad rights for minorities to veto legislation have benefited ethno-​nationalist parties and contributed to a dysfunctional political system unresponsive to civil society groups and citizens’ concerns (Bieber & Brentin, 2018; Gordy, 2015; Mujkić, 2015; Pickering, 2007). In Russia, democratic reforms occurred only in the 1990s. However, these were reversed beginning in 1999 by Putin, who relied on the power of the Presidency, informal networks, and wealth from the export of natural resources to stamp out independent institutions, civic groups, and opposition to his rule (Fish, 2005; Greene, 2014; Hale, 2015; Levitsky & Way, 2010). Russia has had the shallowest and shortest experience with democracy; it has also had the deepest decline in civic and political rights with Putin imposing full authoritarianism following the full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The war has significantly worsened the conditions for civic activism that would even hint at opposing the government’s actions, forcing many activists to leave the country. Yet, our other case studies have also recently curtailed democratic institutions and rights. Measures of the level of democracy and the extended erosion of democratic rights by organizations such as Varieties of Democracy15(V-​Dem) (2023) and Freedom House16 (2023), along with measures of the space for civil society by CIVICUS17 (2020), indicate that Russia and Hungary have experienced the steepest decline in citizens’ rights in the past two decades. Hungary has slipped from a democracy into a hybrid regime and Russia from a hybrid regime into a consolidated authoritarian regime. Part of the decline in rights in these countries included the adoption of laws, such as Russia’s “foreign agent law,” designed to effectively block foreign funding of civil society organizations and punish criticism of ruling parties (Kövér, Antal, & Deák, 2021; Moser & Skripchenko, 2018; Sundstrom, Henry, & Sperling, 2022). The specific drivers and timing of the curtailment of rights vary by country. Illiberal politicians have commonly used certain elements of democracy, particularly elections, to get into office and then concertedly pursue policies that undermine the checks and balances that prevent the tyranny of the majority and protect individual rights (Bankuti, Halmai, & Scheppele, 2012; Bermeo, 2016; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). Railing against the very real economic precariousness that has been exacerbated by market economic reforms and globalization, as well as against public corruption, has contributed to victories by right-​wing parties in Hungary and Poland. In the run-​up to gaining power and once in power, these parties have promoted pure visions of the nation and culturally and socially conservative policies, as well

Introduction to civil society 2.0  13

as cultivated and steered funding toward civic groups and segments of the population that support these policies (Grzymala-​Busse, 2017). Right-wing party policies combine to weaken liberal and democratic rights-​based CSOs. They bolster those CSOs that demonstrate loyalty, promoting “traditional,” patriotic, and ethno-​national values, and, at the same time, seek to reshape the space for civic activism in ways that redress the early transition period’s favoritism toward “Western” ideologies and agendas. Part of the enabling environment for democratic backsliding in those CEE countries that joined the EU (in our cases: Hungary and Poland) is that once they became members, the EU was no longer able to credibly offer meaningful carrots and sticks to encourage those countries’ leaders to put into practice democratic principles onto which they signed. Once in power, these ruling authorities have weakened institutional checks (for example, politicizing courts and oversight bodies) and counteracting the influence of independent media or CSOs, particularly those critical of the regime. These policies shore up their power. People Power explores the varying roles that individuals and civil society organizations have played in these curtailments of democratic rights. Have they fought against them, abetted them by adapting, or supported them because they are aligned with their goals? Finally, our case studies allow for the book to explore civic activism in different subregions of Central European states (Poland and Hungary), post-​ war states (BiH), and post-​Soviet states (Ukraine and Russia). While these subregions are often treated separately, including cases in all of them helps us identify commonalities and differences in the evolution and impact of civic activism, as well as the conditions that explain these. The comparative case study approach allows us to use multiple methods to shed light on the dynamics of civic activism. Types of evidence

Our book includes various kinds of information from diverse sources and at different levels of analysis (individual, group, locality, and nation-​wide), which we triangulate to present a clear-​eyed and holistic vision of civic activism, its drivers, and its impacts. We emphasize first-​hand stories of civic activists’ experiences and perspectives and include insights from semi-​ structured interviews conducted with over 100 activists since 2019. For these interviews, we used snowball sampling18 (2010), where we asked people we located through public data or had interviewed in the past due to their activism to give us names of other activists, particularly those who might provide a different perspective and additional diversity on the theme of focus. To create a cohesive volume, we feature activists in each chapter through long-​form profiles who were asked the same core open-​ended questions,19 conduct activism in different countries, and have been selected by different

14  Paula M. Pickering and Patrice C. McMahon TABLE 1.1 Activists Profiled in People Power

Chapter

Activists Profiled

Civil Society Organization

2. Polarization

Móra

Hungarian Hungary Environmental Partnership

Gosiewski

Odra-​Nieman Poland Association Center for Blue Poland Democracy aHang/​The Voice Hungary

3. Democratic innovations

Gerwin Madarász

4. Generational divides Mazurek Svets 5. Digital activism Popova

6. Environmentalism

Brkan

Why Not?

Lemeš

Eko Forum Zenica

“Ivanova” 7. Crises

OPORA

Muzyka

Rossman

Country

Poland Ukraine Russia

Focus of Activism Advocacy for open civic space and environmental activism Everyday patriotism Deliberative democracy Democratic innovations Gender equality Accountability Against domestic violence Accountability

Bosnia and Herzegovina Clean air Bosnia and Herzegovina Russia

Association of Ukraine Wives and Mothers of Soldiers Participating in the Anti-​ Terrorist Operation Feminist Anti-​ Russia war Resistance

Sustainable communities Soldiers’ families

Feminists against war

authors to ensure that these individuals do not come solely from one network (see Table 1.1). The chapters describe real-​world examples of activists who may be well known within their countries but are not necessarily professional activists and/​or part of “the golden few” who receive large and regular grants from large international donors. In addition, we incorporate data from a nationally representative survey specifically designed for our project on civic activism in three of the case studies, systematic review of donor and domestic policies influencing the possibilities for civic activism, and analysis of recent scholarly research on activism.

Introduction to civil society 2.0  15

How our book is different

We set out to make this book different from the other valuable scholarly works that have both contributed to our understanding of, but also raised additional questions about, civic activism in CEE. COVID-​19 slowed our joint efforts, but the time we as academics and activists were able to spend together both online and in-​person helped us clarify our primary interests and objectives. First, our book is centrally about activists and their work in CEE, allowing them to convey to readers their experiences and perspectives. This contrasts with typical social scientific approaches that treat civic activists as subjects, retelling their stories and imposing scholarly frameworks of meaning on them. Activists tell their stories not just through prose but also through providing links to digital and visual examples of their activism to facilitate learning in up-​to-​date and interactive ways (“Under the Loupe 004: Darko Brkan,” 2022; “Understanding the Problem of Domestic Violence in Russia,” 2020). In addition, activists and scholars partner as co-​authors in most chapters, thereby co-​creating the book and its central arguments. Second, the book embraces a broad notion of civic activism to increase understanding of the diversity and dynamism of civic activism occurring across the region. This avoids the use of normatively biased, narrow, and static definitions that mischaracterize the nature and dynamism of civic activism. It also frees us to describe diverse, real-​world examples of activism that may not be “eventful” or fit liberal or illiberal advocacy. These tend to miss the attention of English-​language media and require the intensive, context-​sensitive research we feature. Our systematic, multi-​method approach to civic activism means that we can depict what is happening on the ground, rather than present cherry-​picked examples of the actions of “people like us” or those that fit pre-​conceived notions of what constitutes activism. Third, we analyze recent changes in the content, forms, and impact of civic activism. We emphasize activism in the last decade, which has experienced the shocks of varying levels of decreasing democratic rights, the accelerated decline of international donors, a pandemic, and the full invasion of Ukraine. We feature activists’ understandings of how the role of civic space and activism has changed over time and how they have adapted. Activists’ voices and other data we have collected illuminate how early exposure to declining democratic standards has compelled activists to innovate to pursue their goals. Innovations include creative and emotionally appealing use of social media, the use of less hierarchical and more spontaneous civic activism beyond Western-​supported NGOs, and everyday activism focused on problems citizens often encounter daily in their local communities. Fourth, by focusing on recent “hard times” in CEE, the book explores issues and obstacles for civic activism which has relevance for citizens in

16  Paula M. Pickering and Patrice C. McMahon

many countries, including the West. The election of far right or populist leaders, for example, who promise stability and tap into and then manipulate resentments among segments of the population, the failures of democratic governance, the problems of corruption, imposed polarization and migration combine to generate challenging times in CEE but also in many countries around the world. Hard times have also contributed to the pillarization of civil society, or its vertical segregation into distinct compartments (religious, ethnic, or political) with limited interaction across dividing lines, in CEE and beyond (Ekiert, 2019–​2020). Truthfully, we address themes that are increasingly relevant for democracies and non-​democracies alike. Right-​wing parties’ capture of state institutions has allowed them to use their power to make independent activism increasingly difficult and risky. Ruling parties in Russia and Hungary have directly and indirectly threatened civic activists critical of them, demonizing them as “traitors” and/​or “foreign mercenaries” (Applebaum, 2022). Russia has gone the farthest in imposing costs on activists (especially citizens who protested20 after the full invasion of Ukraine) that range from media harassment, prohibitive fines, firing from public jobs, poisoning, and imprisonment. Putin’s policies that effectively eliminate free speech and action after February 2022 have accelerated what was already a brain drain, with thousands of civic activists and independent journalists fleeing Russia in 2022. Remarkably, civic activists in this region have not disengaged. A fifth way that People Power is different is that it illuminates the unexpected and innovative ways that civic activists have responded to these hard times. Despite, or even in part because of, these obstacles, civic activists have taken on new challenges and created new initiatives. One way that activists have demonstrated their adaptability and resourcefulness is their careful and creative use of ICT to work toward social and political change. When the moment called for it, activists stepped up. They have done so in the wake of millions of Ukrainian refugees streaming across its Western borders21; a near total ban on abortion in Poland; shocking violence against women22 in Russia; illegal air pollution emitted by factories in BiH23; and endless disinformation across CEE intended to undermine democracy, efforts to fight COVID-​19, and opposition to Russia’s war in Ukraine (Catanzano, Hetfield, & Jackson, 2022; Geoghegan & Ahmetasevic, 2017; “Poland Protests Erupt over Abortion Law,” 2021; “Understanding the Problem of Domestic Violence in Russia,” 2020). By embracing technology in innovative ways and often combining it with activists’ expertise, creative in-​person strategies, and outreach to international networks, civic activists in CEE have often outmaneuvred governments and efforts to limit speech and action, leapfrogging over more cumbersome formal civil society organizations. Civic activist and co-​author Alena Popova,24 for example, combines her expertise in law, her use of emotion-​evoking social

Introduction to civil society 2.0  17

media campaigns, and her engagement in transnational networks of women activists to continue the battle against violence against women in Russia. Corrupt and/​ or dysfunctional governance, economic precariousness, political and social polarization, and crises like COVID can engender frustration and even anger. Activists with different goals all recognize that these emotions can be used to mobilize action. For activists critical of governments, calling out ruling parties for their failures to address existential problems or for causing harm can help harness ordinary citizens who struggle everyday with humiliating injustices (Carnaghan, 2022). Tapping into anger can also be used by those in power and activists favoring traditional values to mobilize for the status quo (Blackington, 2023). A final potential opportunity presented by an examination of hard times in CEE is the fact that illiberal governments have not solved, but have deflected responsibility for, real and complex problems that their citizens confront. For example, illiberal leaders have increasingly blamed domestic actors (such as the establishment or ethnic and sexual minorities) and external actors (such as the European Union (EU) and migrants). Mere deflection leaves space for civic activists to point out illiberal leaders’ shortcomings, act on real problems, and advocate for effective policies to address them. The plan

People Power’s unique approach focuses on individuals and their stories. It also provides an analysis of activists’ understanding of civil society and how it has evolved over time. In each chapter, we follow a similar format, foregrounding the voices of civic activists, grounding their experiences in recent events, illustrating the diversity of activism in the region, while using online content to allow readers to learn in engaging and timely ways. Key concepts and terms come first, followed by the experience of a specific activist and analysis of how that activist’s experience speaks to scholarly work about activism on that topic. This is followed by another activist’s story and analysis of how that experience speaks to different debates in scholarly literature on activism, which segues into takeaways and suggestions for the future of activism on this topic. The chapters are comparative, providing recent examples from at least two countries to reinforce the importance and complexity of the theme and to illustrate the similarities and differences in how activists adapt to unique environments. Using interviews to complement primary and secondary sources, we incorporate engaging stories of courage, creativity, and resilience. We also candidly describe the challenges and complexities of activism, including how and why good intentions sometimes go awry or fail to accomplish their goals. Accounts of civic activism too often include

18  Paula M. Pickering and Patrice C. McMahon

only success stories that can easily lead to flawed policies. Our book instead depicts the diversity of goals animating activism, as well as the policies and practices that have produced varying degrees of change. Chapter 2 examines the divisions within civil society and the polarization that plagues so many societies in CEE and beyond. It considers how increasing political and social polarization in CEE countries, such as Hungary and Poland, have impacted and been impacted by civil society and activism. While illustrating the ways polarization has threatened democracy, this chapter also discusses how activists have built bridges among groups to address pressing problems or values that many on both sides share. A good example of this is the work of the Odra-​Niemen Association,25 which is inspired by traditional and conservative values of patriotism, civic community, and national remembrance and thus encourages loyalty to the nation (Stowarzyszenie, 2023). Chapter 3 turns to the phenomenon of “the shrinking public space” and innovative responses to it that come from civic actors. It focuses on Hungary and Poland, where governments have taken similar but often ineffective steps to restrict civic mobilization by their critics. Activists have used a variety of ways to survive and even thrive under these threats. One of their responses has been actions that engage citizens, such as a national consultation platform provided by aHang26 (the Voice) in Hungary, and democratic innovations that promote deliberative civic panels27 in Poland (Gerwin, 2018; theVoice, 2017–​2023). These platforms for citizens’ engagement can play a key role in guiding policy development and, as examples from Hungary and Poland show, they might push local or sometimes national governments to change policies or decisions. Chapter 4 examines how intergenerational relationships and tensions affect the ability of activists to build coalitions and learn from one another. It highlights collaboration across generations of civic activists in Poland (around women’s and reproductive rights) and Ukraine (around government accountability and civic engagement). Although intergenerational coalitions were essential to the Black Protests28 in Poland from 2016 to 2018 and to creating Poland’s feminist movement, there were also generational divides that prevented women from working together earlier, despite sharing common causes (“Mass Protests in Poland against Law Banning Almost All Abortions –​BBC News,” 2020). The second story profiles an activist from Ukraine’s OPORA Civil Network,29 a watchdog NGO that has also worked to bridge generational gaps (Civil Network Opora, 2006–​2023). The chapter highlights factors that affect developing and sustaining intergenerational relationships and the impact of using different strategies and tactics. Chapter 5 examines why and how activism in this region has moved online. Digital activism is increasingly important as a means by which people in CEE mobilize and connect. To explain what digital activism does,

Introduction to civil society 2.0  19

the chapter profiles activists from Russia and BiH, who are also co-​authors of the chapter. Digital activism has been growing, it has allowed for push back against shrinking public space, and it has been quite effective in many different campaigns, raising awareness of women’s rights and violence against women (in Russia) and holding governments accountable, as in BiH30 (Latal, 2009). Yet, there are many challenges to sustaining digital activism, and governments are increasingly able to monitor and manipulate the activists and their messages. Thus, although the shift to online activism is considered positive overall, particularly for younger activists and in more oppressive environments, as with all technology, the effects are not one-​sided. Chapter 6 delves into activism outside major cities and the “everyday activism” of place-​ based problems. This chapter highlights everyday environmentalism, such as activism around preventing dumps from polluting drinking water, stopping factories from poisoning the air,31 and practicing sustainable farming (Geoghegan & Ahmetasevic, 2017). These problems affect and mobilize ordinary citizens –​not just full-​time professional activists –​ to act. We profile too-​often ignored activists from smaller towns in Russia and BiH as they navigate the constraints of fewer resources to take advantage of the salience of locally based problems that have broad resonance to bring local-​level change. This chapter depicts how activists grapple with challenges for everyday activism, including how to sustain and scale action to affect more powerful and entrenched power structures that hinder the improvement of governance, the environment, and everyday lives. Chapter 7 looks at how recent crises and shocks, specifically the COVID-​ 19 pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine, have impacted activism in this region. Russia’s war in Ukraine has, not surprisingly, also had a profound but varying impact on activists, depending on which country they call home. This chapter highlights responses to these recent shocks. In this chapter, we profile the work of Ukraine’s Association of Wives and Mothers of Soldiers Participating in the Anti-​Terrorist Operation,32 which is working to support and empower the families of Ukrainian soldiers. We also feature Russia’s Feminist Anti-​War Resistance33 group, which is working with activists in more than 100 cities in Russia and abroad to take actions opposing the war (Chevtayeva, 2022). The pandemic has demonstrated the growing importance of civil society for identifying and addressing transnational threats. We end with a discussion of how women’s groups stepped up to support women in Russia and in BiH who experienced a spike in domestic violence during the pandemic, just as authorities were preoccupied or hamstrung. The concluding chapter explains why activists and activism in CEE are important in and beyond this region. Although civic engagement rarely influences policies immediately or directly, this should not be interpreted as a failure or as inconsequential. In fact, in the countries we discuss, we assert that this is just not the case. What we observe, again, is the strength

20  Paula M. Pickering and Patrice C. McMahon

of average people to respond, confront, and transform and civil society often playing a significant role in shaping outcomes, even if incrementally. This chapter synthesizes the book’s findings on how activism has remained vital and suggests the conditions under which activism achieves change. To be clear about what our purpose and goals are, we did not write theoretically about civil society or what activism ought to be or do, which is true of so many books on civil society or activism. People Power’s approach, instead, is designed to, primarily, focus on activists, their stories and perceptions, and their work. Consequently, this is not meant to be a systematic examination of activism in CEE. And while the book indeed focuses on activists and their achievements, each chapter also identifies different kinds of challenges and obstacles, as well as the uncertain future of activism in different sectors and countries. Rather than conclusive generalizations about what activism is or is not in the region, our book is interested in providing diverse, real-​world examples of activism, both organized and spontaneous, while synthesizing activist’s voices with academic writings and insights. In a world where many are despairing over the existential crises that we face, whether it is climate change, global pandemics, the erosion of democracy, or states using violence against their neighbors, we maintain that we have much to learn from the creativity, energy, and resilience that activists in CEE display. Notes 1 “Ukrainian Voluneer Service” (2023). SOIN. https://​soin-​netw​ork.org/​en/​netw​ ork/​list/​tprod​uct/​324613​641-​73374​4431​580-​ukrain​ian-​volunt​eer-​serv​ice. 2 Applebaum, A. (2022, August 10). “The Other Ukrainian Army.” The Atlantic. www.thea​tlan​tic.com/​ideas/​arch​ive/​2022/​08/​ukra​ine-​volunt​eer-​army-​rus​sia-​ odesa/​671​088/​. 3 OPORA Lviv. (2023). https://​opora.lviv.ua/​. 4 Havel, V. (1978, October). “The Power of the Powerless.” www.non​viol​ent-​confl​ ict.org/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​1979/​01/​the-​power-​of-​the-​powerl​ess.pdf. 5 For more on democratic backsliding, see Cianetti, L., Dawson, J., & Hanley, S., eds. (2020). Rethinking Democratic Backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe. Routledge. 6 TripSavvy. (2023). “Maps of Eastern European Country.” www.tripsa​vvy.com/​ maps-​of-​east​ern-​eur​ope-​4123​431. 7 On the distinctiveness of this region, see Rothschild, J. (2008). Return to Diversity. Oxford University Press. 8 In our book, we use the terms civil society organization (CSO) and non-​ governmental organization (NGO) interchangeably, though we use the terms that activists use. However, law in Bosnia and Herzegovina recognizes only “associations and foundations,” both of which are commonly referred to as NGOs. Thus, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an NGO is considered a formal organization established as a legal subject, while CSO is a much broader term.

Introduction to civil society 2.0  21

9 For this third modality of civil society in regime change, Bernhard (2020) labels it “uncivil society.” We exclude from this book groups and activists who use violence. For more on “uncivil society,” see Kopecký, P., & Mudde, C. (2003). “Rethinking Civil Society.” Democratization, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 1–​14; and K. Kostovicova and V. Bojicic-​Dzelilovic, “Introduction: Civil Society and Multiple Transitions -​ Meanings, Actors and Effects,” in Civil Society and Transitions in the Western Southeastern Europe, eds. V. Bojicic-​Dzelilovic, J. Ker-​Lindsay, & D. Kostovicova (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 1–​25.. 10 Zakaria, F. (1997). “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6, pp. 22–​43. https://​bodoc.net/​lag/​y18​0201​_​sel​fgov​ernm​ent/​zac​kari​a_​de​mocr​acy.pdf. 11 Gerschenkron, A. (1962). Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Harvard University Press. www.hup.harv​ard.edu/​cata​log.php?isbn=​978067​4226​ 005&cont​ent=​bios. 12 Mansbridge, J. (2013). “Everyday Activism.” The Wiley-​Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements. Wiley-​Blackwell. www.hks.harv​ard.edu/​publi​ cati​ons/​every​day-​activ​ism. 13 Kurtic, A. (2022, July 7). “Bosnia Green Celebrates as Federation Bans Small Hydropower Plants.” Balkan Insights. https://​balkan​insi​ght.com/​2022/​07/​07/​bos​ nia-​gre​ens-​celebr​ate-​as-​fed​erat​ion-​bans-​small-​hyd​ropo​wer-​pla​nts/​. 14 “Jakub Wygnański” (2023). Instytut Spraw Obywatelskich. https://​ins​tytu​tspr​ awob​ywat​elsk​ich.pl/​lud​zie/​jakub-​wygnan​ski/​. 15 “Varieties of Democracy” (2023). https://​v-​dem.net/​. 16 “Freedom House” (2023). https://​freed​omho​use.org/​. 17 “CIVICUS” (2020). www.civicus.org/index.php/what-we-do/innovate/civicusmonitor​. 18 “Snowball Samping” (2010). Human Research Protection Program and Institutional Review Board. Oregon State University. https://​ins​tytu​tspr​awob​ywat​ elsk​ich.pl/​lud​zie/​jakub-​wygnan​ski/​. 19 We asked the following questions of all activists profiled in our book: (1) Why did you get involved in civic activism? What is your motivation? (2) What does your activism look like and what are its goals? (3) What are the benefits/​ advantages of your activism? (4) What are the challenges to/​or problems with your activism? (5) What is the impact of your activism? and (6) What is the future of your activism? Beyond these core questions, which were designed to facilitate comparison, the book’s contributors frequently added a question tailored to shed light on their chapter’s topic. 20 Dougherty, J. (2022, March 3). “Russians Struggle to Understand Ukraine War: ‘We didn’t choose this.”” CNN. https://​edit​ion.cnn.com/​2022/​03/​03/​eur​ope/​ rus​sia-​react​ion-​war-​ukra​ine-​doughe​rty-​intl-​hnk/​index.html. 21 Catanzano, A., Hetfield, M., Jackson, N., & Yager, S. (2022, March 24). “Ukrainian Refugees Fleeing West.” Council on Foreign Relations. www.cfr.org/​ event/​ukrain​ian-​refug​ees-​flee​ing-​west. 22 Woodrow Wilson Center. (2020, October 14). Understanding the Problem of Domestic Violence in Russia [Video]. Youtube. www.yout​ube.com/​watch?v=​ r6BH​HwKL​dXg. 23 Geoghegan, P., & Ahmetasevic, N. (2017, February 14). “Zenica, Bosnia: The Steel Town Where Even Taking a Breath Can Be a Struggle.” The Guardian. www. theg​uard​ian.com/​cit​ies/​2017/​feb/​14/​arce​lor-​mit​tal-​fail​ing-​emissi​ons-​air-​pollut​ion-​ zen​ica-​bos​nia.

22  Paula M. Pickering and Patrice C. McMahon

24 “Alena Popova” (2023). Wilson Center. www.wilso​ncen​ter.org/​per​son/​alena-​ pop​ova. 25 Stowarzyszenie Odra-​Niemen. (2023). https://​odr​anie​men.org/​. 26 “aHang” (2023). The Voice. https://​ahang.hu/​en/​. 27 “Marcin Gerwin” (2018). Citizens’ Assemblies. https://​cit​izen​sass​embl​ies.org/​ aut​hor/​. 28 BBC News. (2020, November 22). Mass Protests in Poland against Law Banning Almost All Abortions [Video]. Youtube. www.yout​ube.com/​watch?v=​crGn​ IkN4​RBI. 29 OPORA Civil Networks. (2023). https://​opor​aua.org/​en. 30 Latal, S. (2009). “Controversial Bosniak Premier Resigns.” BalkanInsight. https://​ balkan​insi​ght.com/​2009/​05/​27/​contro​vers​ial-​bosn​iak-​prem​ier-​resi​gns/​. 31 Geoghegan, P., & Ahmetasevic, N. (2017, February 14). “Zenica, Bosnia: The Steel Town Where Even Taking a Breath Can Be a Struggle.” The Guardian. www. theg​uard​ian.com/​cit​ies/​2017/​feb/​14/​arce​lor-​mit​tal-​fail​ing-​emissi​ons-​air-​pollut​ion-​ zen​ica-​bos​nia. 32 “Association of Wives and Mothers of Soldiers Participating in ATO” (2014). Wikipedia. https://​short​url.at/​clno9. 33 Chevtayeva, I. (2022, October 20). “Russian Feminists Help Men Avoid Draft.” DW. www.dw.com/​en/​femin​ist-​group-​in-​rus​sia-​help​ing-​men-​dodge-​consc​ript​ion/​ a-​63509​559.

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Carnaghan, E. (2022). “Humor and Persistence: How Russian Opposition Groups Survive Hard Times.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Montreal, CA. Carothers, T., & Ottaway, M. eds. (2000). “The Burgeoning World of Civil Society Aid.” In Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion, 3–​18. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Catanzano, A., Hetfield, M. & Jackson, N.I. (2022). “Ukrainian Refugees Fleeing West.” Presided by Sarah Yager. Council on Foreign Relations. www.cfr.org/​event/​ ukrain​ian-​refug​ees-​flee​ing-​west Chandhoke, N. (2022). “Civil society.” Development in Practice 17, no. 4–​5 (2007): 607–​614. Chevtayeva, I. (2022). “Russian feminists help men avoid draft.” Deutsche Welle Online. www.dw.com/​en/​femin​ist-​group-​in-​rus​sia-​help​ing-​men-​dodge-​consc​ript​ ion/​a-​63509​559 Cianetti, L., Dawson, J., & Hanley, S. eds. (2020). Rethinking Democratic Backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe. London: Routledge. CIVICUS. (2020). “Civicus Monitor: Tracking Civic Space.” www.civi​cus.org/​index. php/​what-​we-​do/​innov​ate/​civi​cus-​moni​tor Civil Network OPORA. Copyright (2006–​2023). https://​opor​aua.org/​en Curry, J.L. (2022). “Poland.” In Z. Csergo, D. Eglitis, & P.M. Pickering, eds. Central and East European Politics: Changes and Challenges, 305–​331. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. Ekiert, G. (2019–​2020). “Civil Society as a Threat to Democracy: Organizational Bases of the Populist Counterrevolution in Poland.” CES Open Forum Series 2019–​2020. Minda de Gunzburg: Center for European Studies Harvard. Ekiert, G., & Foa, R. (2016). “The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society Reassessed.” European Journal of Political Research 56, no. 2: 419–​439. Ekiert, G., & Kubik, J. (1999). Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989–​1993. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. Ekiert, G., & Kubik, J. (2014). “Myths and Realities of Civil Society.” Journal of Democracy 25, no. 1: 46–​58. Fish, S.M. (2005). Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Freedom House. (2023).“Nations in Transit 2023: War Deepens a Regional Divide.” https://​freed​omho​use.org/​rep​ort/​nati​ons-​tran​sit/​2023/​war-​deep​ens-​regio​nal-​div​ ide#key-​findi​ngs. Geoghegan, P., & Ahmetasevic, N. (2017). “Zenica, Bosnia: The Steel Town Where Even Taking a Breath Can Be a Struggle.” The Guardian Online. www.theg​uard​ ian.com/​cit​ies/​2017/​feb/​14/​arce​lor-​mit​tal-​fail​ing-​emissi​ons-​air-​pollut​ion-​zen​ica-​ bos​nia Gerschenkron, A. (1962). Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Gerwin, M. (2018). Citizens’ Assemblies: Democracy that Works. https://​cit​izen​sass​ embl​ies.org/​aut​hor/​ Gordy, E. (2015). Dayton’s “Annex 4 Constitution at 20: Political Stalemate, Public Dissatisfaction and the Rebirth of Self-​Organisation.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 15, no. 4: 611–​622.

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Greene, S.A. (2014). Moscow in Movement: Power and Opposition in Putin’s Russia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Greskovits, B. (2020). “Rebuilding the Hungarian Right through Conquering Civil Society: The Civic Circles Movement.” East European Politics 36, no. 2: 247–​266. Grzymala-​Busse, A. (2017). “Global Populisms and Their Impact.” Slavic Review Online Forum 76, no. 1: S1–​S2. Hale, H.E. (2015). Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press. Henderson, S.L. (2003). Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Henry, L.A. (2010). Red to Green: Environmental Activism in Post-​Soviet Russia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Hirschmann, A.O. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Howard, M.M. (2003). The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-​Communist Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jacobsson, K., & Korolczuk, E. eds. (2017). Civil Society Revisited: Lessons from Poland. New York: Berghahn Books. Jacobsson, K., & Korolczuk, E. eds. (2020). “Mobilizing Grassroots in the City: Lessons for Civil Society Research in Central and Eastern Europe.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 33, no. 2, 125–​142. Kapidžić, D., & Stojarová, V. (2021). Illiberal Politics in Southeast Europe: How Ruling Elites Undermine Democracy. London: Routledge. Kenney, P. (2003). A Carnival of Revolution Central Europe 1989. Woodstock: Princeton University Press. Klandermans, B., Snow, D. A., della Porta, D., & McAdam, D. (2013). The Wiley-​ Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements. London: Wiley-​Blackwell. Kopecký, P. (2003). “Civil Society, Uncivil Society and Contentious Politics in Post-​Communist Europe.” In P. Kopecký, & C. Mudde, eds. Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics inPost-​Communist Europe, 1–​18. London: Routledge. Kossakowski, R. (2021). Hooligans, Ultras, Activists: Polish Football Fandom in Sociological Perspective. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Kostovicova, D & Bojicic-​Dzelilovic, V. “Introduction: Civil Society and Multiple Transitions -​Meanings, Actors and Effects.” In V. Bojicic-​ Dzelilovic, J. Ker-​ Lindsay, & D. Kostovicova, eds. Civil Society and Transitions in the Western Southeastern Europe, 1–​25. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Kövér Á., Antal, A., & Deák, I. (2021). “Civil Society and COVID-​ 19 in ‘Hungary: The Complete Annexation of Civil Space.’ ” Nonprofit Policy Forum 12, no. 1 (2021): 93–​126. Krastev, I., & Holmes, S. (2020). The Light that Failed: Why the West Is Losing the Fight for Democracy. New York: Pegasus Books. Kublius, K. (2022). “Maps of Eastern European Countries.” Tripsavvy. https://​tripsa​ vvy.com/​maps-​of-​east​ern-​eur​ope-​4123​431 Kurtic, A. (2022). “Bosnia Greens Celebrate as Federation Bans Small Hydropower Plants.” BIRN. https://​balkan​insi​ght.com/​2022/​07/​07/​bos​nia-​gre​ens-​celebr​ate-​as-​ fed​erat​ion-​bans-​small-​hyd​ropo​wer-​pla​nts/​

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Latal, S. (2009). “Controversial Bosniak Premier Resigns.” BalkanInsight Online. https://​balkan​insi​ght.com/​2009/​05/​27/​contro​vers​ial-​bosn​iak-​prem​ier-​resi​gns/​ Levitsky, S., & Way, L.A. (2010). Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. New York: Crown. Lonkila, M., Shpakovskaya, L., & Torchinsky, P. (2021). “Digital Activism in Russia: The Evolution and Forms of Online Participation in an Authoritarian State.” In Gritsenko, Daria, Wijermars, Mariëlle, Kopotev & Mikhail, eds. The Palgrave Handbook of Digital Russia Studies, 135–​153. “Mass Protests in Poland against Law Banning Almost All Abortions –​BBC News.” (2020). BBC News on YouTube, November 22, 2020. www.yout​ube.com/​ watch?v=​crGn​IkN4​RBI McMahon, P. (2017). The NGO Game: Post-​Conflict Peacebuilding in the Balkans and Beyond. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Milan, C. (2019). Social Mobilization Beyond Ethnicity: Civic Activism and Grassroots Movements in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis. Morris, J., Semenov, A., & Smyth, R. (2023). Varieties of Russian Activism: State-​ Society Contestation in Everyday Life. Bloomington: University of Indiana, Press. Moser, E., & Skripchenko, A. (2018). “Russian NGOs and Their Struggle for Legitimacy in the Face of the ‘Foreign Agents’ Law: Surviving in Small Ecologies.” Europe-​Asia Studies 70, no. 4: 591–​614. Mujanović, J. (2018). Hunger and Fury: The Crisis of Democracy in the Balkans. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mujkić, A. (2015). “In Search of a Democratic Counter-​ power in Bosnia–​ Herzegovina.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 15, no. 4: 623–​638. Pickering, P. M. Peacebuilding in the Balkans: The View from the Ground Floor. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007. Pietrzyk-​Reeves, D. (2022). “Rethinking Theoretical Approaches to Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe: Towards a Dynamic Approach.” East European Politics and Societies & Cultures 36, no. 4: 1335–​1354. Pietrzyk-​Reeves, D., & McMahon, P. eds. (2022b). Special Section: “Civic Activism Thirty Years After: The Changing Realities of Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe.” East European Politics and Societies 36, no. 4. Pietrzyk-​Reeves, D. & Samonek, A. (2023). “Measuring Civil Society: Lessons from Central and Eastern Europe.” Communist and Post-​Communist Studies 56, no. 1: 152–​165. “Poland: Protests Erupt over Abortion Law | International News | English | Latest Update.” (2021). WION on YouTube. www.yout​ube.com/​watch?v=​ulGu​ WrUI​djM Pop-​Eleches, G., & Tucker, J.A. (2017). Communism’s Shadow: Historical Legacies and Contemporary Political Attitudes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rothschild, J. (2008). Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe since World War II. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sampson, S. (1996). “The Social Life of Projects: Importing Civil Society to Albania.” In C. Hann, & E. Dunn, eds. Civil Society: Challenging Western Models 1996, 121–​142. London: Routledge. Shapovalova, N., & Burlyuk, O. (2018). Civil Society in Post-​Euromaidan Ukraine. Vol. 193. Stuttgart: ibidem Press.

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Shevtsova, M. & Buyantueva, R. (2019). LGBTQ+​Activism in Central and Eastern Europe: Resistance, Representation, and Identity. Cham: Springer International Publishing. Snyder, T. (2018). The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America. New York: Tim Duggan Books. Stowarzyszenie Odra-​Niemen. (2023). https://​odr​anie​men.org/​ Sundstrom, L.M. (2006). Funding Civil Society: Foreign Assistance and NGO Development in Russia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Sundstrom, L.M., Henry, L.A., & Sperling, V. (2022). “The Evolution of Civic Activism in Contemporary Russia.” East European Politics and Societies 36, no. 4: 1377–​1399. theVoice. (2017–​2023). https://​ahang.hu/​en/​ “Under the Loupe 004: Darko Brkan.” (2022). Digital Forensic Center. https://​dfcme. me/​en/​under-​the-​loupe-​004-​darko-​brkan/​ “Understanding the Problem of Domestic Violence in Russia.” (2020). Woodrow Wilson Center on YouTube. www.yout​ube.com/​watch?v=​r6BH​HwKL​dXg Varieties of Democracy (V-​Dem) Institute. (2023) Democracy Report 2023: Defiance in the Face of Autocratization. https://​v-​dem.net/​publi​cati​ons/​democr​acy-​repo​rts/​. Wedel, J.R. (1998). Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe, 1989–​1998. New York: St. Martin’s Press. World Bank. (2022). “Civil Society.” www.worldb​ank.org/​en/​about/​partn​ers/​civil-​ soci​ety/​overv​iew Youngs, R., Fowler, G., Larok, A., Marczewski, P., Mj, V., Nodia, G., Shapovalova, N., Sombatpoonsiri, J., Von Bülow, M., & Zihnioğlu, Ö. (2018). The Mobilization of Conservative Civil Society. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://​car​negi​eeur​ope.eu/​2018/​10/​04/​mobil​izat​ion-​of-​conse​rvat​ive-​civil-​ soci​ety-​pub-​77366 Zakaria, F. (1997). “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs 76, no 4: 22–​43.

2 POLARIZATION AS DRIVER AND BARRIER TO CIVIC ACTIVISM Dorota Pietrzyk-​Reeves and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom

Among the phenomena shaping civic activism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), political and social polarization is one of the most destructive and influential in certain countries. By definition, polarization divides society. The Cambridge Dictionary defines polarization1 as “the act of dividing something, especially something that contains different people or opinions into two completely opposing groups.” Political polarization occurs when political attitudes diverge to ideological extremes. This can happen in democracies when political parties or political elites more broadly take very strong opposing positions asserting there is no room for deliberation and consensus on policy issues with their political opponents. A good example to illustrate this phenomenon is the government-​ sponsored anti-​abortion campaign in Poland and the legislative proposal to almost completely ban the right to legal abortion that divided society and prompted the rise of a new social movement called the Women’s Strike in 2016. Following mass protests and a nationwide strike known as Black Monday, organized in 147 towns and cities by the new social movement, the bill was voted down. Rather than trying to pass new legislation, conservative politicians asked Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal to review the existing law, and in October 2020, its judges declared abortion, even in the case of fetal abnormalities, illegal. This effectively eliminated legal abortion in Poland. In response, the movement brought women and men back to the streets in great numbers despite the Covid-​19 threat. Once again, the battle over the right to abortion polarized society, with many conservative groups supporting the Courts’ ruling, and although many people turned out to protest the Court decision, they were not able to stop the new, stricter legislation on abortion from coming into force. DOI: 10.4324/9781003466116-2

28  Dorota Pietrzyk-Reeves and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom

This chapter examines how increasing political and social polarization, especially in Poland and Hungary, has affected civic activism. Polarization takes different forms, with varying consequences in these countries. Some of this polarization can be traced back to the populist rhetoric of political leaders, combined with new authoritarian political tactics, which makes it a phenomenon largely constructed by the governing parties rather than a naturally occurring divide. Other divisions have been exacerbated by social media, contributing to the growing significance of identities and identity politics2 (Kubin & von Sikoriski, 2021). Social media has also contributed to solidifying value orientations of various groups, most notably in rhetoric on gender issues, female reproductive rights, refugees, minority groups, and climate action. We explore how political and cultural polarization affects civic activism and, in some cases, “pillarizes” activists and movements into different segments that do not interact (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014). In recent years, scholars have observed growing social splits across movements which produced, for instance, parallel demonstrations or marches –​one in favor of an issue (e.g., reproductive rights of women in Poland), the other against that issue or its supporters. There are also splits within movements due to disagreements about issues that emerge. When society is pillarized into extremely separate groups, fierce debates can emerge more often within movements about how to act most purely in accordance with their group’s principles. In Russian civil society, for instance, there are emotionally charged arguments related to how best to react to the invasion of Ukraine. This debate centers mainly on how much to speak out against the war publicly, and whether to remain in Russia or leave the country –​not so much on pro or anti-​war battles. Another example is the ongoing debate among activists –​at least prior to the full-​ scale invasion of Ukraine –​about how much to cooperate with the Russian government in response to increasing government repression in Russia. In our activist profiles in this chapter, we ask: to what extent does polarization on certain issues prevent civic activists from cooperating on other issues and gaining the attention of a broad swathe of the public, thus decreasing the chance to be heard by public authorities? While there is considerable analysis of how political parties, leaders, and media environments are influenced by these processes of polarization, the impacts on civic groups and activism are important but understudied (Vachudova, 2019). Both political leaders and media outlets manipulate public opinion, which often leads to demonization of parts of civil society and mobilization or valorization of others. We link this problem to the growing significance of identities and identity politics. If old battles were largely about socioeconomic policies and reforms, new ones are about migration, nationalism, and gender issues. In Poland, Hungary, Russia, and elsewhere in the region, as governments become more extremely conservative

Polarization as driver and barrier to civic activism  29

or one-​sided in their views over time, huge political and societal rifts develop over identity issues. Right-​wing groups encouraged by right-​wing government rhetoric have escalated actions against feminist, LGBTQ, or migrant rights groups, which no longer can apply for public funding and are harassed and marginalized in other ways (Ekiert, 2021). In this chapter, we look specifically at the impact of top-​down, elite-​created polarization, which is used instrumentally by those in power. Poland and Hungary have suffered from democratic erosion under their political elites (PiS and Fidesz, respectively) who used several different strategies to maintain power. Among them, polarization through media and the identification of enemies not only in the political sphere but also in civil society, accompanied with anti-​liberal rhetoric and disregard for the rights of minorities, have created a climate that made dialogue and compromise on important issues almost impossible. Researchers have warned that divisions within civil society can easily weaken its chance to influence decisions and policies especially if channels for effective communication with decision-​makers and dialogue are closed (Ekiert, 2021; Platek, 2023). A divided civil society can be treated instrumentally and lose its potential to protect democracy (Bernhard, 2020). Our findings suggest that, perhaps paradoxically, they can also contribute to the resilience of civic groups or make them stronger in how they rethink their strategies and long-​term goals. A large part of this chapter is devoted to what we learn from activists, their perceptions of the impact of polarization, and the strategies they use to either ameliorate the hostility between sides or try to find common ground wherever possible. The stories of activists from Hungary and Poland, who hold different perspectives and work in different contexts, provide valuable insights into how polarization can be seen as both a barrier to and a driver of civic activism. Our profiles of Veronika Móra (Hungary) and Eugeniusz Gosiewski (Poland) illustrate how polarization can be addressed by civic activists and what strategies their organizations developed to integrate members, supporters, and citizens. They do so in different ways, with Móra attempting to combat polarization directly, and Gosiewski finding ways to work around or accommodate it. Veronika Móra –​creating a parallel society in Hungary

Veronika Móra (see Photo 2.1) has been an environmental activist since her teenage years. For her whole adult life, she worked in civil society organizations involved in environmental issues and later in civil society development. She is a biologist by education and has an MA degree in organizational psychology and a diploma in environmental law. In 1997, she joined Ökotárs Alapítvány3 (Hungarian Environmental Partnership Foundation or HEPF) and has held the position of the director since 2007. Earlier, she was a national consultant

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PHOTO 2.1 Picture

of Veronika Móra.

for a Dutch foundation and an ecological foundation in Hungary. In these positions, she has worked on a variety of issues related to ecological consumption, gene technologies, and public participation. Since 2003, she has been leading HEPF’s Civil Partner Program, which aimed to improve the legal-​fiscal environment for civil society. But she also has experience in managing and overseeing grant programs of various sizes, not least of which is the Hungarian NGO Fund under the European Economic Agreement (EEA) Norwegian Financial Mechanism. In addition, she has voluntary positions in several NGOs, including serving as the chair of the Hungarian Donors Forum, which works on developing corporate philanthropic culture in Hungary. After 30 years in operation, Ökotárs Alapítvány (HEPF) has a wide range of goals and activities, starting with support for community initiatives that aim to contribute to the development of a democratic and equitable society and institutional system based on citizen participation. It also promotes Hungary’s environmental movement, assisting the realization of specific programs by providing grants, training, and assistance. To put it simply, HEPF is involved in “reclaiming civil space” which Móra sees as “broadening the grassroots basis and constituency of civil society, facilitating cooperation and networking as well as bringing the civil society voice to the European level.” For Móra, polarization in Hungarian society is extreme; it is divided between those supporting the government and those who do not support

Polarization as driver and barrier to civic activism  31

it, which she says, “are light years from one another… they are living in different realities.” At the same time, civil society is also divided by the government’s rhetoric and communication, which praises charitable and recreational organizations but stigmatizes as enemies those which go beyond such goals. The landscape of civil society in Hungary, as Móra explains, is also populated by GONGOs, or government-​organized NGOs established to be “the vocal supporters of the government to create a kind of parallel civil society.” There are also organizations that try to be apolitical, but in Móra’s view, this approach does not make much sense in the present circumstances, because everything is so politicized. As she explains, “It is quite impossible to be apolitical in the sense that even if you do not want to engage in politics, politics engages in you.” However, independent civil society has not disappeared in Hungary, and it is more important for democracy than ever, even if there are clear tensions within civil society and between civil society and the state. As Móra clarifies, the mission of her organization has not changed and, under the present circumstances, should not change, because civil society “needs support more than ever.” This requires that social organizations are sustained and strengthened. There is a clear need to support existing hubs of knowledge and expertise, to provide financial and non-​financial support, and to continue the transfer of knowledge to other organizations. For example, Móra’s organization opened in 2023 a new grant program supported by the European Union’s “Citizens, Equality, Rights, and Values Program,”4 which will secure new funding opportunities for Hungarian civil society organizations. Such programs are not, however, a panacea to polarization, which by now is deep. There are no feasible channels for communication with the other side, especially under the present media landscape. According to Móra, what civil society and activists can do instead is to expand their constituency among those who are open to issues and causes that are salient in society. Móra has watched how Hungary’s Fidesz-​led government has taken more actions over time to repress liberal groups within civil society. However, she has also been heartened by the reactions of civil society to organize and resist these measures. Hungarian civic activists have responded in four crucial areas. First is the constituency, which involves building stronger ties with society. Second is the community, which is about encouraging active citizens’ participation in public debate and civic action. Third is communication, which is about better and more transparent processes of communicating about what civil society’s work is and gaining support among the citizens. The final area is coalitions, which are focused on building trust and mutual support among civic organizations so that they can cooperate and stand up for each other. The best example of the last strategy is the coalition Civilizacio, which HEPF helped establish in 2017. This network of NGOs was created to enable civil society organizations to support one another and work for a

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livable Hungary, where “the conservation of nature, the protection of the disadvantaged and the care of our communities is the common cause.” Importantly, this required broadening the circle of organizations that work together and including those that operate in small towns and villages, encouraging them to also create their own networks. As NGOs found themselves increasingly attacked by the government, legally and rhetorically, “individual CSOs are most often not strong enough to defend themselves in the face of attacks, and easily become afraid and insecure if they feel isolated.” Cooperation and networking are the main ways to counter this: civic actors together can stand up for one another, express solidarity, and support those most in need. Also, as a coalition, they can show and communicate better and more loudly why and how civil society is important for us all and what organizations do for the public good. According to Móra, “coalition building is absolutely essential in the situations of shrinking space” in Hungary. In the spring of 2017, Civilizacio activists organized several high-​profile actions, including the Civic Heart initiative5 at Heroes’ Square and a silent protest6 in the Parliament. The civic heart (a heart formed by people, with the word “civil” in the center) became the symbol of the network. The Civilizacio coalition fought for over three years against the LexNGO, a 2017 Hungarian law that stigmatized organizations receiving foreign funding. The coalition developed into about 40 active members, with an “outer circle” of more than 300 organizations, including human rights, environmental, and education organizations, among many others, all supporting their joint statement in opposition to the law. Móra contends7 that, counter-​intuitively, government’s attacks “have managed to bring NGOs together and enabled them to grow together and be in solidarity with one another.” The collective effort ultimately resulted in the repeal of the law by the European Union’s Court of Justice (CJEU) (2020), and in June 2020, it declared that “the restrictions imposed by Hungary on the financing of civil organizations by persons established outside that Member State do not comply with EU law.” The Hungarian government finally repealed the law in April 2021. Móra argues that Civilizacio’s longevity stems from the boundaries that we established: we limit our structured cooperation to issues that concern civil society. We do not interfere with what the member organizations do or the way they do it. We must acknowledge that members of Civilizacio are very different, not only in terms of areas of work but also in their capacity. We accept that everybody contributes according to their capacity while ensuring that we are all on equal footing. The coalition’s members also learned important lessons from a 2014 attempt to build a national NGO coalition, which did not survive because of rigid

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attempts to unify a diverse set of organizations. Civilizacio members realized that most of all, a sustainable coalition needs to be “less formalized” and “introduce basic cooperation mechanisms, [and] find common ground on certain aspects.” This will be key to its future success. Democratic backsliding and polarization

Móra’s story illustrates how a Hungarian civic activist has responded to polarization and the surprising decline in quality of democratic institutions and processes in the recent decade in Hungary and Poland, which were once touted democratic pioneers in post-​communist CEE. Scholars have called this decline “democratic backsliding” which in both countries was associated with the tenures of their incumbent governments, the Victor Orban-​ led Fidesz8 9 government in Hungary and the Law and Justice (PiS) coalition government in Poland. Despite some important differences, democratic decline in both countries involved decisions and policies that led to the shrinking of public space for civil society actors, especially those associated with liberal or progressive values. It also resulted in deep and persistent social and political polarization. Although there had already been some cleavages in both societies that developed after 1989, none of them was strong enough on their own to cause extreme polarization. Many scholars, practitioners and activists in Hungary and Poland agree that today’s polarization was not bottom up but was instead driven from the top down by a segment of the political class that donned the cloak of radical populist anti-​establishment rhetoric to gain popular support, win an election, and rewrite the constitutional rules of the game to its own benefit. (Tworzecki, 2019) In Poland, democratic backsliding started in 2015 when the Law and Justice party (PiS) came to power, after various efforts by the government and government-​ sponsored organizations to limit the public space for certain activities and voices or undermine trust in independent NGOs. The government centralized public funding for civil society organizations in one governmental body, also disrupting the functioning of many social organizations. And some of those regarded as progressive or working in the sphere of human rights or refugees no longer received public funds, including funds which come from the EU and are administered by the Polish government. In addition to legislation and practices that restrict funding for certain NGOs, the government has fostered an environment that allows, enables, and even encourages discrimination against certain groups of people and specific kinds of activism. The result of these laws, reforms, and practices means the narrowing of “civic and political space,” especially for those who

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oppose the government’s nationalistic-​conservative agenda or advocate for liberal, progressive causes. Civic groups in Hungary and Poland have reacted to democratic backsliding and the related phenomenon of polarization. But the picture that emerges from both countries is mixed. To be sure, there are many NGOs that oppose the governments’ actions and democratic backsliding, including the phenomenon of shrinking civic space (Moroska-​Bonkiewicz & Domagała, 2023). As Móra mentions, however, on the other side of the polarized political spectrum, there are also many pro-​governmental organizations that do support recent policies and thus not surprisingly have preferred status when it comes to the distribution of public funds for civil society and NGOs. At the same time, in both Hungary and Poland, there were more and more attempts among NGOs to build a broader network and international support for their efforts to counteract democratic backsliding and the erosion of the rule of law (Negri, 2020). In 2020, we interviewed Péter Sárosi, executive director of the Hungarian Rights Reporter Foundation, on the problem of shrinking civic space in Hungary. He indicated that public support for liberal democracy was not strong, even before Orban’s government and Fidesz took power. Sárosi argues that the problem in Hungary is that the people are expecting the decisions from the state; they don’t really understand the concept of democratic participation in decisions. There is no culture of supporting civil society organizations, and people tend to expect strong leaders to manage things, which has long roots in Hungary. This attitude, he believes, comes from state socialism. The persistence of this attitude is also paradoxical, given that Hungary was among the leaders of liberal-​democratic transition that started in 1989 and there was a lot of support for civil liberties in the society before the communist regime collapsed. Democratic decline in Hungary and Poland has also led to what Grzegorz Ekiert calls the “pillarization” of civil society, which weakens civil society’s capacity to contribute to lasting democratic consolidation and democratic quality. Pillarization “is the vertical segregation of civil society into distinct compartments with limited interaction across a dividing boundary (religious, ethnic, political)” (Ekiert, 2021, p. 58). Pillarization tends to fuel social conflicts and political instability. As Ekiert (2021, p. 54) argues, it creates “a zero-​sum vision of politics,” leading to “political instability and electoral backlash against liberal values and the affiliated political forces,” which benefits right-​wing parties. This sharp ideological divide of the political elite into two camps (expressed by those in government and those in opposition) can also stimulate similar divisions in society, where political convictions are sorted into roughly two distinct camps, even if opinion is polarized only on a

Polarization as driver and barrier to civic activism  35

few issues (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Bafumi & Shapiro, 2009). Elite polarization and social polarization can also occur at the same time, or they can be independent of each other. A central issue in recent studies of political polarization in CEE has been the relationship between elite polarization and social polarization, particularly to see if one is causing the other (Vegetti, 2019). Some scholars see Hungary as one of the most polarized polities in Europe, stemming initially from the ideological polarization of political parties beginning in the late 1990s (Vegetti, 2019). It is also an example of the “entrenchment” of polarization, in which all dimensions of polarization reinforce themselves in the same direction (Vegetti, 2019). When polarization follows this pattern, we call politics “pillarized,” as like-​ minded groups become increasingly tightly connected within themselves and hostile to outside groups –​a scenario that leads to conflict. The landscape of civil society and politics under Hungary’s Fidesz and Poland’s PiS has been that of a radical division into “tribes” of friends and enemies, supporters and opponents (Krekó et al., 2018). The first group includes civic groups, communities, and individuals who share the governing party’s conservative or anti-​ progressivist agenda, which is often focused on national values and a new anti-​individualistic, sometimes openly anti-​liberal rhetoric. Key questions are whether polarization from above can endure at the social level, and how do civil society actors react to it? In both countries, the government’s extra-​ constitutional actions were given full support by the public media and private pro-​government media outlets, which also helped delegitimize parliamentary opposition, labeling progressive, rights-​based NGOs as enemies or traitors. In the case of these NGOs, the most radical measures were taken in Hungary with the so-​called Stop Soros law which targets “foreign funding” received by NGOs, as well as criminally charging individuals and organizations involved in any migration-​ related activity. Consequently, NGOs receiving funds from abroad have been labeled as “agents of foreign influence” and are accused of being politically motivated. Some of them, including Móra’s HEPF, had their offices raided by police in 2014. Despite these government actions, the voices of some independent NGOs, such as the Hungarian Helsinki Committee,10 have been amplified, not only domestically but also abroad. A report published in 2014 by the Committee with three other well-​established Hungarian NGOs contained a comprehensive assessment of the erosion of fundamental norms and values of a liberal-​democratic order along four key dimensions: the rule of law, democratic principles and mechanisms, pluralism, and fundamental rights (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2014). The impact of such civic initiatives which attract attention both domestically and abroad is even more crucial, given the country’s extreme political and social polarization. In addition, in both Hungary and Poland, we agree with

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scholars who do not expect that external influences from non-​Polish or non-​ Hungarian sources will have much of an effect or achieve much (Ploszka, 2020). Re-​consolidating democracy in these countries without the will of those holding political office is most likely impossible as long as authoritarian and illiberal tendencies have significant support in society. Unfortunately, these dynamics may have a vicious cyclical pattern: Polish and Hungarian civil societies were not strong enough to oppose or reverse these trends when they first materialized, and once civil society organizations are weakened by institutional attacks, such a task becomes even more unrealistic. This suggests that the role of civil society in democracy needs serious rethinking. While civil society alone cannot reconsolidate democracy, it may be better positioned to reduce polarization. Provoking polarization in society is a strategy used by political parties, especially those in power, to control narratives, distract from politicians’ incompetence, vilify opponents, and keep supporters in a state of agitation, often through promoting a “culture war”, moralizing rhetoric and division into, as Timothy Snyder (2017) puts it, two distinct “tribes with distinct worldviews, beholden to manipulations.” Snyder argues that to counter this tendency, there is a need for more debates and dialogue directly and in person, rather than online, to reduce the echo chamber effect that drives tribalism. Recent research and civic projects indicate that in both Poland and Hungary, these divisions are not as deep as expected, and broad consensus among the Hungarian and Polish people about values and priorities is possible when they are given a chance and are willing to talk to one another ( LSE Arena, 2021). At the same time, some civic activists in Poland and Hungary perceive today’s polarization and other difficulties as opportunities: to rethink their mission and strategies, to innovate, to become closer to target groups and to each other, to become independent and diversify funding, and to improve communication with people across the board. This is true of Móra, with her coalition-​building efforts to defend the wider civil society space. Moreover, for those civic groups that benefit from state support of one pillarized camp on the spectrum, the situation can appear much more positive. We see this demonstrated in the optimistic views of a Polish patriotic association leader, Eugeniusz Gosiewski. Eugeniusz Gosiewski –​overcoming polarization in Poland

Eugeniusz Gosiewski is a musician by training, but he has been actively involved in civil society in Poland for almost 30 years. Being a social activist has become his real passion, as well as his profession. Before 1989, he was a member of the Independent Students Association, which was created in 1980 as a student society linked with the Solidarity movement. The Odra-​Niemen Association,11 which he and his wife established in 2002, was a natural

Polarization as driver and barrier to civic activism  37

result of his activity in Wspólnota Polska (Polish Community association) that supported Poles living abroad. Gosiewski was specifically involved in helping Polish people living in Belarus establish better economic and business cooperation with Polish businesses, and Odra-​Niemen was originally set up to support Polish-​Belarusian economic exchange. Things changed in 2009 with a project that aimed to support the community of the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa)12 or World War II veterans still living in Belarus. Since then, Odra-​ Niemen has transformed to focus its activity on helping Poles living abroad in different ways, and especially veterans who are interested in taking care of Polish historical monuments and shaping patriotic values among young Polish people. This fresh start allowed Gosiewski to devote all his time to the work of the organization, and “to combine the hobby and the passion, so that it could at the same time be a job that allows to make a living.” Odra-​Niemen is perhaps the best example in Poland of an intergenerational group that “through patriotic actions” and values “connects people beyond divisions.” Over the years, this “traditional values” organization attracted almost 500 members as well as thousands of volunteers, including a large group of young people. For Gosiewski, the real story of this organization started in 2009 with the initiation of the campaign “Christmas parcels for the Polish Veterans in Eastern Borderlands.” Today called “Compatriots for Heroes,” this initiative takes place every year and involves educating people on Poland’s history, taking care of Polish graves and war cemeteries, monuments, and other places of national remembrance in places that were once Polish, as well as extensive cooperation with veterans’ societies in Poland and in territories that were once part of Poland. Its main symbol is still a parcel with gifts delivered to veterans before Christmas. So far, over 30,000 such parcels have been delivered. This action would not be possible without volunteers, working in several locations in Poland, as well as those who travel to Belarus, Ukraine, Latvia, or Lithuania. These volunteer efforts represent the desire to remember and honor Polish citizens who fought for Poland’s independence on these territories as Polish Army soldiers or serving in the armies of the allies during World War II. Many of these Polish soldiers voluntarily stayed in these territories after the war, while some were prisoners of war or prisoners of Nazi camps and Soviet gulags. Since 2010, Gosiewski’s efforts have also been devoted to supporting other Polish communities13 elsewhere in the world. He cooperates with students, youth, activists, educators, seniors, and NGOs on projects that are based on Polish history, patriotism, volunteering, as well as practical activities. And in recent years, another sphere of activity was established, called regranting projects. This approach allows the association to distribute public money to small organizations operating among the Polish diaspora and at the regional level to support civic activism by small organizations and informal groups in Lower Silesia. For Gosiewski, regranting is a natural way of supporting the

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development of social organizations and strengthening cooperation between the regranting organization, in this case Odra-​Niemen, and various formal and informal groups which not only receive funds but also technical know-​ how and can join projects and co-​organize events. In recent years, the Odra-​Niemen Association has developed along with the needs of the growing Polish community abroad, and it now supports not only Poles living in Eastern Europe but also those living in Central and Western Europe, New Zealand, and the US. Its primary focus on Polish veteran communities has also transformed, with support extended to activists of the anti-​communist opposition, members of the Solidarity movement, and all those who had a hand in fighting for Poland’s independence, often risking their life, health, or career. Related to this is Odra-​Niemen’s involvement in education and building a sense of traditionally understood patriotism among young people, which Gosiewski sees not as something unfashionable but “a very important feature of every nation, every society.” The Association has also worked hard on strengthening various social activities, building the third sector environment for all CSOs, helping other organizations and foundations, and thus contributing to the development of Poland’s civic community. It is not surprising that with such a wide spectrum of activities, Odra-​ Niemen, which is based in Wroclaw, needed to establish branches in other cities in Poland, as well as in Lviv, Ukraine (since there are many Polish people living there). There are nine such associated organizations that share many of the same goals. Over the years, the association’s efforts have been well-​ received by those who benefited from them. In addition, its apolitical, patriotic efforts have contributed to the association’s reputation, increasing support among the Polish population, attracting new members, and volunteers. For Gosiewski, Odra-​Niemen is an association that seeks to create a supportive atmosphere for those who want to be active and who share its core values of “everyday patriotism.” At the same time, it is also an organization where people can have very different opinions on political and social issues, as well as different personal attitudes and identities. This, as Gosiewski explains, makes it unique and resistant to the country’s growing polarization. Odra-​ Niemen attracts many volunteers among young people who find its model of engagement with historical remembrance, contemporary history, and support for Poles living outside the borders appealing. Gosiewski sees the problem of polarization in Poland mainly as a political issue, a top-​down development for which political elites are largely responsible, with the media reinforcing the image of Poland’s polarized society. As a result, polarization has become firmly established in the country; it “is very significant at the moment,” and it obviously has an impact on public life. Gosiewski adds that one of its obvious consequences is the fact that discussion has disappeared. It is all but impossible to talk and engage in a productive dialogue

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or conversation on various public issues, since there are more arguments than discussion. According to Gosiewski, “people do not seek reasoning, they do not listen to argumentation. It is something that sort of kills the possibility of doing important things together.” Even obvious topics that require social and political consensus such as public health or public security are affected by the lack of will to engage in a debate and compromise. Gosiewski has no doubt that polarization also affects other social organizations since they often take sides in political disputes, and this polarizes their activities to some extent. The best remedy for this challenge, according to Gosiewski, is for Odra-​Niemen to stay the course and try to remain apolitical, which is a different strategy from that taken by Móra and her association in Hungary. For Gosiewski, Odra-​Niemen focuses on “a fundamental value-​system that is unchangeable”; at the same time, it allows members and volunteers to discuss politics and have different opinions if they adhere to the norms of civility, do not offend others, or use methods of discussion that the organization considers unethical (like violence). Gosiewski argues that this apolitical strategy has succeeded for Odra Nieman: A few years ago it was difficult for us to have a discussion with liberal organizations; these discussions were practically nonexistent. There were only arguments, insults, and avoidance of any real discussion. By contrast, we are currently being invited by various groups, including organizations that have very distant views from us –​because we are seen as an authentic NGO which does not represent any political influence or any political ideology. Cooperation can be possible when civil society actors realize that they all work within the same sector and, regardless of their views or activities, they all care about its condition and its development. Gosiewski asserts that he and his organization are actively trying to minimize polarization. We try to encourage discussion in the civil sphere, to invite different people to this discussion, and to convince them that this apolitical approach is important, because this is probably the only way for the NGO environment to grow, develop and avoid polarization. Gosiewski admits that this has not been an easy approach and it requires a lot of effort and work. While agreeing with Ekiert’s analysis of Poland’s pillarization of civil society, he sees the potential to gradually overcome these divisions and polarization through discussion within a framework of shared norms and concerns. He highlights ecology as a topic that both traditional and liberal organizations see as very important. For discussions and even

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cooperation, Gosiewski argues that people only need to “disconnect from everyday politics.” When this happens, they can work together in different areas, if they respect their own civic activities and the activities of others. Gosiewski believes that the civic sector is not and should not be “a place of competition” but instead for cooperation. Gosiewski appeals to other social activists and organizations to focus on their social activities and to put politics aside: “politics should be dealt with by politicians, not with social activists.” In this formulation, he does not exclude advocacy organizations, which in his view should also be apolitical so that their work can be done on behalf of citizens at large. The faces of polarization

Like Móra and Gosiewski, many activists in the CEE region feel that citizens have little sense of shared community at the national level, especially on political issues. At the same time, there are many well-​ functioning neighborhood groups, religious organizations, parents’ councils, associations, and social initiatives that exist on the local level and have shared goals based on historical bonds and mutual respect. There is also a growing awareness among those who work in civil society that people can find a common ground more easily when space for dialogue is provided. A few years ago, Wawrzyniec Smoczyński established The New Community Foundation,14 which was a direct response to the problem of Poland’s polarization. As the Foundation’s website puts it, “Poland, like so many societies, is fractured. Fear and hatred have gripped the nation, polarizing communities, families and citizens.” Its goal and mission are to “reduce polarization and enable dialogue across divisions” so that Poles can “reclaim their sense of community.” The Foundation’s strategy, even if on a small scale, is to provide a platform for dialogue and honest conversation about what ideas they share and what they disagree about. The Foundation tries to achieve this by offering a platform called “community dialogues,” inviting people from various parts of the country who represent different belief systems, values, and attitudes to social and policy issues to participate. Although community dialogues are a new initiative, launched in 2021, they have already demonstrated that highly polarized groups can have productive conversation –​if they are offered an appropriate opportunity and space to talk to each other. Dialogues have been organized on topics such as: how the media influences our perception of reality, legalizing same-​sex marriage, the positive and negative roles of social media, and most recently, the meaning of Christmas.15 Much commentary today in Hungary and Poland focuses on the rise of right-​ wing groups, nationalism, nativism, anti-​ migration sentiment, populism, illiberalism, authoritarianism, and other terms that are all

Polarization as driver and barrier to civic activism  41

somewhat interchangeably associated with a conservative drift in popular values.16 However, the most interesting questions are: how do these various conservative groups define themselves and how do they perceive their civic goals and agendas? What precisely is civic in their civic engagement? As the term “civic” comes from Latin civicus, it certainly refers to that sphere of activity which is concerned with the sphere outside one’s household or family and with roles the people have as members of a political community. But in recent centuries, the term has also taken on the connotation of “civility” and that is a certain set of norms that are required for the public engagement of citizens (Ferguson, 2011). Civil society, almost by definition, is supposed to be liberal, supporting freedoms and institutions that uphold an individual’s freedom of thought and association in the public sphere, and, if necessary, fighting against threats coming from illiberal groups, such as nationalist movements. There is however a significant difference between saying certain NGOs are conservative, patriotic, or even non-​progressive and saying that they are uncivil. Today, Polish and Hungarian NGOs are divided along conservative/​ liberal lines, with conservative groups gaining more visibility under the Fidesz and Law and Justice governments, especially if they were pro-​government. Not all these conservative groups and movements, however, should be associated with “the pushback against liberal-​democratic norms” (Youngs & Shapovalova, 2018). Unlike insurgent conservative organizations, those who support traditional values such as patriotism, family, or faith do not engage politically and respect others’ preferences. Looking at Odra-​Niemen, for example, we see an association that is focused on traditional values and patriotism that strongly supports civic freedom and democratic institutions, as well as independent and sustainable civil society. “Closing space” for activism occurs when ideological polarization in civil society is used by the government to support groups that are loyal and supportive of government policies and to stigmatize or limit NGOs that are critical of their policies. In both Poland and Hungary, civil society has become weaker, not only because of government attacks on critical voices but also because of a widening gap within the civic sector itself. The first division is between anti-​ and pro-​government organizations. The second division is between large, well-​established, often capital city-​based NGOs that historically held foreign funding (recently disrupted) and smaller, locally based NGOs that have little foreign funding.17 In Hungary, these small organizations were affected more severely, because they lost the support of local government, upon which they depended for resources, while this did not happen in Poland. And thirdly, there is the division between progressive, liberal NGOs and conservative or more traditional groups in both countries. As Móra stresses, the existing divisions are further exacerbated by governmental rhetoric, which uses particularly strong language in Hungary, and which differentiates between

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the “good” and the “bad” NGOs, often treating the “bad” ones as “foreign agents.” Despite these divisions, there are many attempts in both countries to address and combat polarization. One final example from Poland is the first civic panel18 on “energy poverty” that was organized by Jakub Wygnański and the Stocznia Foundation19 in autumn 2022. Almost a hundred citizens from all over the country gathered in Warsaw to deliberate on the question: “how to counteract the problem of energy poverty in Poland?” Others could participate in local “citizens’ meetings on energy costs,” which were organized in 45 towns and cities and attracted almost 700 participants. People could also express their views via an online survey. Wygnański, a sociologist by training who spent over 30 years in the civic sector and created many mechanisms to strengthen social innovations and civic activism, sees the need to deliberate on public issues and to supplement citizens’ votes (in elections) with actual voice in public debates (Jędrzejczyk, 2022). “As citizens, we are not experts on policy issues,” but “we have the right to say what is right or just, and expressing such opinions is the essence of democracy,” explains Wygnański (Jędrzejczyk, 2022). This cannot be done if people are separated by polarized narratives and do not want to talk to each other. Deliberative innovations, such as civic panels, identify many issues that ordinary people can talk about regardless of their political preferences, opinion, and belief systems. More civic activists are trying to follow this route, designing specific strategies for civic mobilization to address polarization and allow people to talk to each other directly and to search for common ground. There are similar initiatives in Hungary, often in the form of deliberative citizen juries or citizen assemblies (see Chapter 3). In 2022, a five-​ year Central Europe Civic Engagement Program20 was initiated to support citizen engagement in public affairs through advocacy, collective action, representative and deliberative processes, principally at the local level. The program is implemented through partnership of the National Democratic Institute, DemNet in Hungary, and the Institute of Public Affairs in Poland. Observers of Hungarian civil society similarly see the potential for well-​ crafted public dialogue platforms to ameliorate the mistrust among citizens created by political polarization. As Veszna Wessenauer21 argues, Hungarian society is characterized by a high level of polarization between groups with different political identities, which leads to an artificial “war-​like atmosphere between supporters of different political camps.” Elite political actors use ideological divisions within society to help control and mobilize voters by depicting political opponents as the enemy. Similar to what we hear from activists in Poland, Wessenauer believes that “by creating innovative and appealing ways of participation and supporting citizens in finding ways to make their interests heard and better represented, polarization might start to decrease.”

Polarization as driver and barrier to civic activism  43

Challenges and the future

Despite polarization and pillarization, a lot of civic organizations in Poland and Hungary have found their own space to pursue their goals and overcome these artificial divisions. What is also similar and important is the awareness among NGO communities that they must deal with the situation of shrinking space themselves, working together and resisting the attacks and intimidation, as Móra emphasized. Activists in both countries stress that this problem cannot be solved from abroad, by foreign governments, the EU, foreign NGOs, or international courts. Instead, more effective strategies can be created and implemented by local activists, and this includes coalition building and networking at home and abroad, and, above all, strengthening social trust in NGOs and making citizens aware of the role, mission, and purposes of civic activism. Average people must learn how important everyday activities and participation are for society’s wellbeing and democracy. This requires that organizations are well-​rooted in society and engaged with the public sphere, but it also requires working with local authorities wherever possible. Dividing civic groups into liberal and conservative does not help overcoming polarization; a more fruitful way is to think about common issues that what we call traditional and progressive CSOs may share. We are yet to see if the defeat of the PiS governing coalition in October 2023 Polish parliamentary election will lead to a re-​opening of the public space for civil society actors no matter whether they stand for progressive or traditional values. What we learn is that activists in these countries, but also elsewhere in CEE, see polarization as yet another challenge that also provides opportunities to act, despite existing divisions. For Móra in Hungary, the strategy has been to mobilize as broad a coalition of NGOs as possible for a political campaign to combat government restrictions. For Gosiewski in Poland, the strategy has been to build broad support for the values his organization stands for by avoiding politics and controversial issues. His apolitical strategy implies that civic activists can concentrate on issues that are important to people regardless of political divisions. Móra, on the other hand, does not believe that in the current circumstances in Hungary being apolitical is an option since everything has been politicized. These contrasting views on how to deal with polarization are likely rooted in their particular experiences and how they were affected by the government’s attacks on civil society groups in recent years. Still others in CEE try to confront polarization in society head-​on by designing conversations that address disagreements directly, like those organized by Wygnański to try to build bridges and social dialogue across the divides. All these strategies, which contain both participatory and deliberative components, are important for addressing polarization and the future of democracy not only in Hungary and Poland, but in other CEE countries as well.

44  Dorota Pietrzyk-Reeves and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom

Notes 1 Cambridge Dictionary. (n.d.). Polarization. Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary & Thesaurus. https://​dic​tion​ary.cambri​dge.org/​dic​tion​ary/​engl​ish/​ polar​izat​ion 2 Heyes, C. (2020). Identity Politics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://​ plato.stanf​ord.edu/​entr​ies/​ident​ity-​polit​ics/​ 3 Ökotárs Alapítvány. (n.d.). https://​okot​ars.hu/​en 4 “Citizens, Equality, Rights, and Values programme.” (n.d.). European Commission. https://​short​url.at/​kxRS4 5 “Anti-​ government demo forms giant heart in Budapest.” (2017, April 13). Euractiv. www.eurac​tiv.com/​sect​ion/​electi​ons/​news/​anti-​gov​ernm​ent-​demo-​forms-​ giant-​heart-​in-​budap​est/​ 6 Reuters Staff. (2017, April 25). Silent Protesters Block Hungarian Parliamentary Committee. Reuters. www.reut​ers.com/​arti​cle/​us-​hung​ary-​law-​activi​sts-​idUSKB​ N17R​1BJ 7 Schultheis, S. (2017, July 4). Veronika Móra: “Solidarity is a very strong force.” Heinrich Böll Stiftung. www.boell.de/​en/​2017/​07/​24/​veron​ika-​mora-​sol​idar​ity-​ very-​str​ong-​force 8 Fidesz. (n.d.). https://​fid​esz-​eu.hu/​en/​ 9 “Law and Justice.” (n.d.). Prawo i Sprawiedliwość. https://​pis.org.pl/​par​tia/​law-​ and-​just​ice 10 Hungarian Helsinki Committee. (n.d.). https://​helsi​nki.hu/​en/​ukr/​ 11 Odra-​Niemen Association. (n.d.). Stowarzyszenie Odra-​Niemen. https://​odr​anie​ men.org/​ 12 Utracka, K. (2019, December 4). The Phenomenon of the Polish Underground State. The Warsaw Institute Review. https://​wars​awin​stit​ute.org/​phe​nome​non-​pol​ ish-​unde​rgro​und-​state/​ 13 “Polacy na świecie.” (n.d.). Stowarzyszenie Odra-​Niemen. https://​odr​anie​men. org/​pol​acy-​na-​swie​cie/​ 14 “Depolarization.” (n.d.). The New Community Foundation. www.ncf.org.pl/​ 15 Ten to twelve people who do not know each other meet for three hours and talk about a controversial or divisive issue. Participants have their own views, but the aim of the meeting is a facilitated conversation based on arguments rather than opinions. Pismo nr 59, 11/​2022: https://​magaz​ynpi​smo.pl/​idee/​osobis​ta_​h​ isto​ria/​waw​rzyn​iec-​smo​czyn​ski-​daj​emy-​glos-​milcza​cej-​wie​kszo​sci/​?seo=​pw See also: www.fnw.org.pl/​dial​ogi 16 Youngs, R., & Shapovalova, N. (2018). The Mobilization of Conservative Civil Society. Carnegie Europe, p. 8. https://​car​negi​eeur​ope.eu/​2018/​10/​04/​ mobil​izat​ion-​of-​conse​rvat​ive-​civil-​soci​ety-​pub-​77366. The authors define conservative civil society as that which promotes any one or a combination of the following: conservative social values, religious values, strong national identities, exclusionary ethnic identities, traditional or customary identities and institutional forms, illiberal political ideology, or a curtailment of liberal personal rights. However, they do not assume that groups situating themselves under a collective banner of conservative civil society are all identical. Indeed, a core aim is to uncover the different varieties of conservative civil society that are ascendant across different countries and regions.

Polarization as driver and barrier to civic activism  45

17 Open Society Foundation, EU, and various other international funding bodies and EEA grants in Poland are not available in Hungary. “No agreement reached on funding for Hungary,” https://​eeagra​nts.org/​news/​no-​agreem​ent-​reac​hed-​fund​ ing-​hung​ary. 18 “O panelu.” (n.d.). Narada Obywatelska. https://​nar​adao​ener​gii.pl/​o-​pan​elu/​o-​ pan​elu/​ 19 “About Shipyard.” (n.d.). Shipyard. https://​stocz​nia.org.pl/​en/​about-​shipy​ard/​ 20 “Central Europe Civic Engagement Program (2022–​2027).” (2023, January 31). DemNet. https://​dem​net.hu/​en/​projek​tek/​cecep-​civil-​reszve​tel/​ 21 Wessenauer, V. (2018, January 29). 4 Ideas to Overcome Polarization in Hungary. Dpart. https://​dpart.org/​4-​ideas-​to-​overc​ome-​polar​izat​ion-​in-​hung​ary/​.

References Abramowitz, A.I., & Saunders, K.L. (2008). “Is Polarization a Myth?”. The Journal of Politics 70, no. 2: 542. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00223​8160​8080​493 Bafumi, J., & Shapiro, R.Y. (2009). “A New Partisan Voter.” The Journal of Politics 71, no. 1. https://​doi.org/​10.1017/​S00223​8160​8090​014 Bernhard, M. (2020). “What Do We Know about Civil Society and Regime Change Thirty Years after 1989?” East European Politics 36, no. 3: 1–​22. Bernhard, M.H., & Kubik, J. (2014). Twenty Years After Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration. New York: Oxford University Press. Ekiert, G. (2021). “Civil Society as a Threat to Democracy.” In N. Stoltzfus, & C. Osmar, eds. The Power of Populism and People: Resistance and Protest in the Modern World, 53–​72. New York: Bloomsbury. European Courte of Justice (CJEU). (2020). “The restrictions imposed by Hungary on the financing of civil organisations by persons established outside that Member State do not comply with EU law”. Press release no. 73/​20. https://​curia.eur​opa. eu/​jcms/​upl​oad/​docs/​appl​icat​ion/​pdf/​2020-​06/​cp2​0007​3en.pdf Ferguson, A. (2011). An Essay on the History of Civil Society [1767], ed. F. Oz-​ Salzberger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hungarian Helsinki Committee. (2014). “Disrespect for European Values in Hungary, 2010–​2014.” https://​helsi​nki.hu/​en/​dis​resp​ect-​for-​europ​ean-​val​ues-​in-​ hung​ary-​2010-​2014/​ Jędrzejczyk, A. (2022). Pierwszy W historii Ogólnopolski panel obywatelski. O kosztach energii. OKO.press. https://​oko.press/​pierw​szy-​w-​histo​rii-​ogoln​opol​ski-​panel-​ obyw​atel​ski-​o-​koszt​ach-​ener​gii Krekó, P., Molnár, C., Juhász, A., Kucharczyk, J., & Pazderski, F. (2018). “Beyond Populism: Tribalism in Poland and Hungary. A Study by Political Capital Institute.” www.isp.org.pl/​en/​publi​cati​ons/​bey​ond-​popul​ism-​tribal​ism-​in-​pol​and-​ and-​hung​ary Kubin, E., & Sikorski, C.V. (2021). “The Role of (Social) Media in Political Polarization: A Systematic Review.” Annals of the International Communication Association 45, no. 3: 188–​206. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​23808​985.2021.1976​070. London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Arena (2021). URL: www. lse.ac.uk/​iga/​ass​ets/​docume​nts/​arena/​2021/​Exec-​Summ​ary-​Hung​ary-​Mov​ing-​Bey​ ond-​Pol​aris​ing-​Popul​ist-​Pro​paga​nda.pdf

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Moroska-​ Bonkiewicz, A., & Katarzyna, D. (2023). “Opposing Populists in Power: How and Why Polish Civil Society Europeanised Their Opposition to the Rule of Law Crisis in Poland.” Comparative European Politics. https://​doi.org/​ 10.1057/​s41​295-​023-​00339-​3 Negri, G. (2020). “How European Civil Society Is Pushing Back Against Democratic Erosion.” Carnegie Europe. https://​car​negi​eeur​ope.eu/​2020/​03/​12/​how-​europ​ean-​ civil-​soci​ety-​is-​push​ing-​back-​agai​nst-​dem​ocra​tic-​eros​ion-​pub-​81254 Platek, D. (2023). “Towards Pillarisation? Coalitions of Polish Protest in 2020.” East European Politics. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​21599​165.2023.2199​984 Ploszka, A. (2020). “Shrinking Space for Civil Society: A Case Study of Poland.” European Public Law 26, no. 4: 941–​960. Pomerantsev, P., et al. (2021). “Moving Beyond Polarizing Populist Propaganda: The Case of Hungary. Research Summary.” LSE. www.lse.ac.uk/​iga/​ass​ets/​docume​ nts/​arena/​2021/​Exec-​Summ​ary-​Hung​ary Moving-​Beyond-​Polarising-​Populist-​ Propaganda.pdf Snyder, T. (2017). On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century. New York: Tim Duggan Books. Tworzecki, H. (2019). “Poland: A Case of Top-​Down Polarization.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 681, no. 1: 97–​119. Vachudova, M.A. (2019). “From Competition to Polarization in Central Europe: How Populists Change Party Systems and the European Union.” Polity 5, no. 4: 689–​706. Vegetti, F. (2019). ”The Political Nature of Ideological Polarization: The Case of Hungary.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 681, no. 1: 78–​96. Youngs, R., & Shapovalova, N. (2018). The Mobilization of Conservative Civil Society. Carnegie Europe, p. 8. https://​car​negi​eeur​ope.eu/​2018/​10/​04/​mobil​izat​ ion-​of-​conse​rvat​ive-​civil-​soci​ety-​pub-​77366.

3 DEMOCRATIC INNOVATIONS AS A RESPONSE TO SHRINKING PUBLIC SPACE Paulina Pospieszna1 and Dorota Pietrzyk-​Reeves

More than a decade ago, it would have been difficult to imagine that Poland and Hungary, new member states of the European Union2 (EU) that joined the community in 2004, would experience problems with democratic backsliding.3 How is it possible that in these challenging political circumstances, and when certain civil rights have been limited and the space for civil society has shrunk, we observe new types of civic participation and even innovations in democratic decision-​making processes within civil society? These developments are possible because of civic activists who are courageous enough to step up, speak up, and act, advocating for issues that are important to them and their countries’ democracy. Democratic backsliding in both countries, however, has had a direct impact on civil society, as discussed in Chapter 2. In particular, backsliding has negatively impacted liberal or progressive civil society organizations (CSOs) and movements such as those opposing the government’s rhetoric and policies on an independent judiciary, minority rights, migration, and gender issues. But this is not the end of the story. This chapter focuses on how civic activists in Poland and Hungary have responded to the problem of the shrinking public space for civil society actors by introducing democratic innovations. We focus specifically on these two countries where governments have taken similar but often ineffective steps to restrict civic mobilization by their critics. The aim of the chapter is to better understand the steps activists have taken not only to survive and even thrive under unfavorable conditions but also to raise public awareness of issues and strengthen citizens’ engagement and “voice.” The two activist stories that we present illustrate the adaptability and creativity of civic actors responding to the problem of shrinking public space as well as civil society resilience and DOI: 10.4324/9781003466116-3

48  Paulina Pospieszna and Dorota Pietrzyk-Reeves

strength in face of the new threats and challenges which in this case come from their governments and political elites’ attempts to silence critical voices. The first activist presents a local response from Poland to the increased threat to democratic quality, and efforts to establish and promote deliberative civic panels for the purpose of structured and engaged deliberation that involves inhabitants of local communities. The second activist who represents aHang (The Voice) movement in Hungary discusses new efforts to defend liberal democratic norms and implement a deliberative model at the local level and the “voice” movement at the national level. The liberal democracy that triumphed in Poland and Hungary after the collapse of communism in 1989 is at risk today. The rise of populism and right-​wing political parties can be explained in many ways: economic grievances; elite promotion of polarization, especially liberal attitudes among the population, which are perceived as a threat to social conservatives; lack of proper civic education; and not enough appreciation of democracy as a desired political system (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Suteu, 2019). Yet, these same factors have also created opportunities for civic activists to respond to shrinking public space by engaging in new forms of democratic participation. The limitations of representative democracy and the lack of an emphasis on engaging citizens in the decision-​making process, as well as ensuring that people come together to discuss common problems and to agree on common solutions, have pushed activists to advocate for a revival of interest in democratic reforms in CEE (Dalton et al., 2013). An important aspect of citizens’ engagement in democracies is their participation in processes that shape public opinion (Tilly, 2007; Haerpfer et al., 2009). This is what also distinguishes citizens in democratic states from citizens in authoritarian regimes. Policy decisions in democracies, even in democracies that are fragile, can still be impacted by citizens’ views and their preferences. In a healthy democracy, civil society organizations and civic engagement can enhance the responsiveness of democratic institutions and the accountability of governments, especially at the local level. In this chapter, we explain how activists in Poland and Hungary are responding to democratic backsliding and the shrinking of the public space by creating new mechanisms for greater public direct engagement and the empowerment of citizens, seeking to strengthen institutions and decision-​ making from the bottom-​ up. This is another instance of how, despite backsliding in democratization, these societies could now experience a bottom-​up move toward democratic innovations, even if at a small scale, because of the availability of innovative technologies and new incentives. We profile Marcin Gerwin from Poland, a political scientist, activist, and co-​founder of the Center for Blue Democracy,4 and Csaba Madarász from Hungary, a co-​founder and Chief Technology Officer of the aHang5 (The Voice) movement. Both activists argue that democracy should be designed to enable citizens to see others’ points of view, understand others’ interests

Democratic innovations as a response to shrinking public space  49

and arguments, and provide channels for effective communication between the government and citizens. Democracies should thus encourage citizens to be actively engaged and include specific mechanisms for citizen participation and deliberation. This is why, even if in slightly different contexts, these two activists promote and try to implement democratic innovations from the ground up. Despite the odds, they are borrowing solutions developed elsewhere, adjusting them to the realities and challenges in Poland and Hungary and meaningfully engaging citizens. Both activists have created what are called “deliberative mini-​publics” –​spaces in which citizens can engage in face-​to-​face discussions on political issues. These mini-​publics have been praised for their high deliberative quality and democratic representativeness (Bohman, 1998; Dryzek, 2000). At these events, citizen participants, who have been selected randomly, receive expert information on some important political issues and weigh different arguments to reach recommendations on policies (Fung & Wright, 2003; Smith, 2009). Outside the formal political system, deliberative mini-​publics, such as citizens’ assemblies, citizens’ juries, and participatory budgeting can play a key role in guiding policy development. As examples from Hungary show, they can even push governments to change or adjust unpopular policies or decisions. They might also motivate political parties that face the prospect of a tough election to pay careful attention to what people say about policy proposals once they have had a chance to learn about and discuss them (Mansbridge et al., 2010). The activists interviewed stress that participatory and deliberative forms of civic action, often followed by large-​scale petitions, contribute to changes in legislators’ political will and greater responsiveness from the government. These “deliberative democrats” prioritize discussion and consent, not simply an exchange of information, and they make randomly selected citizens debate their political opinions, providing them with equal access to express their views and take positions on policy problems. At the same time, deliberative democrats insist that political institutions at the local level guarantee citizens’ participation in decision-​making processes, which contributes to better political outcomes. This chapter discusses democratic innovations created by civic actors in Hungary and Poland as an important response to the current problem of shrinking civic space.6 These responses provide an interesting laboratory for advancing democratic solutions when democracies are in decline. They also indicate how “voice” rather than exit or loyalty can be exercised even in difficult political or legal conditions (Hirschman, 1970). Marcin Gerwin –​how to heal Poland’s democracy?

Marcin Gerwin7 is an activist with a PhD in political science. He wrote his dissertation on sustainable development, providing various methods

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of cultivating fields and gardens in an ecologically responsible way, using renewable energy, biodiversity conservation, and sustainable buildings. While writing his dissertation, he realized that many of these solutions to help build a sustainable world already exist and are available for use. If this is the case, he asked himself, “Why are so many solutions not implemented, especially if they are known and assessed positively by society?” The answer to this question, he realized, lay in inadequate decision-​making processes and the fact that citizens’ voices are not considered. This is unfortunately the case even in countries with strong democratic political systems. This realization gave Gerwin the impetus to alter the rules of the game, as well as to propose innovative mechanisms to meet societies’ challenges, such as climate change. Initially, Gerwin was inspired to take actions at the local level in Poland, since it was easier to act in his own community. At the national level, problems are often too complex and implementing changes takes too long. This led him to co-​create the Sopot Development Initiative for the residents of Sopot, his home city. The Initiative sought to encourage residents to take part in democratic decision-​making in matters related to city planning and sustainable development. It focused on activities aimed at improving local democracy and activating residents. The Initiative successfully promoted the idea of introducing participatory budgeting in Sopot,8 a process in which community members discuss and directly decide how to spend part of the public budget. At that time, no city in Poland had such a mechanism, and Sopot was the first city to test the participatory budgeting process. Thanks to Gerwin, among other activists, participatory budgeting is now quite popular in Poland. In fact, this mechanism has been adopted by all major cities and incorporated into local laws and local budget expenditure plans. However, Gerwin realized that this type of democratic innovation was not enough to solve pressing political and policy problems. It turned out that the formula for making decisions by a popular vote was also not sufficient for getting people to think about the future and to develop proposals or solutions. There was also no opportunity for residents to meet face-​to-​face and discuss the direction of development in local affairs. This first experience with participatory budgeting motivated Gerwin to explore new ways that citizens’ participation could help improve their quality of life. At the same time, a more important issue in Poland was the need to improve democratic decision-​making processes in general. As Gerwin explains, It is not only about civic activity. It is about democratic decision-​making. This, of course, means that citizens are involved. But for me it is not only important that people are activated, but that decisions are made in a sensible way; (…) adopting solutions to improve the quality of life. That is the goal –​getting people in Poland to realize that being an active citizen is a means to an end, not an end in and of itself.

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Recognizing that the formal opportunities for citizen participation in the political process –​like voting –​reinforce and amplify existing influence within society, Gerwin began to seek out mechanisms that would be more inclusive and do a better job making decisions for everyone. This thinking had a great impact on how he designed citizens’ assemblies9 in Poland. As he put it, (…) this democratic feature, that everyone participates, was something that I thought to be crucial. But then I realized that it can lead to compromising the overall quality of the process. So, I was moving from participatory budgeting and participatory planning to citizens’ assemblies. According to Gerwin, there are several elements that contribute to the quality of the decision-​making process in democracies. First, participants should be selected at random to meet and discuss a topic they are presented with. Gerwin has devoted a great deal of his attention to sortition10 and argues that the credibility of a citizens’ assembly is partially related to how the selection process is designed and executed. Selected participants should represent the broader population rather than only the segment most likely to participate politically. Second, defining the topic precisely to develop specific solutions is also important. Gerwin emphasizes that the topic for the meetings and discussions should be an issue that is important to the local community, and, ideally, falls within the responsibilities of the local authorities. Moreover, the topic for the citizens’ assembly cannot be too complicated and should fit the time allocated for the learning phase of the process. Third, the elected representatives should have the political will to implement the recommendations developed by participants in the citizens’ assembly. The promise of legislative action is thus important for getting people to participate. The remaining conditions for generating high-​ quality decisions made by people during citizens’ assemblies involve the learning and deliberation phases. Informational panels should involve experts who aim to educate assembly participants. Finally, the fifth feature for holding high-​ quality assemblies includes deliberation, or an opportunity to discuss the topic openly and with facilitation that encourages a comfortable conversation. In Gdańsk, Poznań, and Kraków, Poland, citizens deliberated on the nuts and bolts of climate change policies. They first listened to experts, then read the materials given to them, and finally they reached a consensus on proposals that they then provided to their local governments. Even the COVID-​19 pandemic did not stop Poznań’s citizens from engaging in deliberation; they moved their decision-​making online. Gerwin organized the first citizens’ assembly in Poland in Gdańsk in 2016, only a few years after the wave of enthusiasm for popular deliberation arrived in Europe (see Photo 3.1).11 His idea to promote and organize

52  Paulina Pospieszna and Dorota Pietrzyk-Reeves

PHOTO 3.1 Marcin Gerwin and Citizens’ Assembly in Gdansk on the topic “How

to Improve Rainwater Retention in the Tricity Landscape Park?”, 2016 Source: https://www.gdansk.pl, used with permission of Marcin Gerwin

citizens’ assemblies in Poland as a more advanced form of participation was inspired primarily by experiences from Australia, where the New Democracy Foundation12 organized citizens’ juries (CJs).13 CJs are a form of deliberative mini-​publics where a small group of citizens is randomly selected (usually ranging from 12 to 25 people); they are particularly suitable for addressing complex issues where deeper understanding is required. This experience with democratic innovations also encouraged him to create the organization Center for Blue Democracy,14 which promotes processes that put citizens at the center of decision-​making. The organization is currently involved with both capacity building and improving the model for citizens’ assemblies. It builds capacity by organizing training camps for the coordinators of citizens’ assemblies, inspiring others to take up such activities elsewhere around the world. There is still little knowledge and understanding of what this process entails because it is still a new process, and there is not much awareness of it in Poland. Furthermore, there is no formal education in schools on what deliberative democracy is. Gerwin points out that there is a certain paradox associated with representative democracy –​that those who are elected representatives sometimes do not want to share power with the people, while those who choose to do so share power only when it is convenient for them.

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For example, the local authorities might turn to citizens’ assemblies when the issue they are addressing is controversial or politically sensitive. Then, it is advantageous for officials to transfer responsibility to the public to settle the issue instead of being punished by their constituents for whatever decision they make. For Gerwin, citizens’ assemblies are a good laboratory for Poland as well as other countries, building solid ground for more and more complicated democratic initiatives. Right now, a citizens’ assembly is a single ad hoc process that deals with a given issue, and its role is to develop recommendations. Once it has done so, the assembly is dissolved. However, Gerwin believes that this form of decision-​making should eventually be institutionalized, either in the form of a citizens’ chamber or as a full-​scale model of deliberative democracy. When asked about the future, he mentioned that the plan is for citizens’ assemblies to enter the parliament, as a citizens’ chamber, with the power to legislate: [T]‌he goal is to create a full-​scale model of deliberative democracy,15 which allows for a departure from general elections, and for basing the entire way of managing the state on citizens’ assemblies. Gerwin concludes that changes are desperately needed, not only to improve representative democracy in Poland but eventually to move toward a fully deliberative model of democracy. He believes that deliberative democracy ensures higher quality decision-​making while reducing polarization. This is because decisions lie in the hands of citizens, rather than politicians. And politicians are unfortunately able to fight for a mandate in today’s competitive political system and have daily incentives to fuel differences and conflicts. Gerwin is aware that plenty of work must be done before the mechanism of deliberative democracy can be institutionalized. Citizens’ assemblies give society an opportunity to correct politicians’ decisions and serve as an accountability mechanism between elections. Gerwin compares this mechanism to a referendum,16 a mechanism that is used in Switzerland, as well as in other democracies. Yet, decisions made by a citizens’ assembly can be better and they are less costly than organizing referendums. For Gerwin, a citizens’ assembly is a basic democratic mechanism that is sorely needed in Poland. Democratic innovations and deliberative democracy

There are many definitions and examples of democratic innovations, but their goal is simple: to increase and deepen the ways in which ordinary people can participate in and influence polices directly (Fung & Wright, 2003). These mechanisms are beyond or complement “traditional” modes of democratic

54  Paulina Pospieszna and Dorota Pietrzyk-Reeves

political participation, like voting, campaigning, contacting politicians, engaging in communal activity, and protest. Despite their differences, scholars and practitioners agree that democratic innovations are needed to enhance democracy, support citizens’ participation, and to facilitate a more inclusive or responsive political decision-​making process. Some additional examples of democratic innovations beyond those described by Gerwin include: neighborhood governance councils, habitat conservation planning, decentralized planning, deliberative polling,17 and citizens’ initiative reviews. Some of these have been developed by practitioners and activists while others emerged from scholarly research. Databases like LATINNO,18 the database created by the Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development (OECD),19 describes a handful of democratic innovations that have been developed worldwide. Various studies have emphasized the importance of increasing and deepening citizens’ participation through democratic innovations in political decision-​ making to improving the quality of democracy.20 Deliberative democrats, for example, value participation as the most effective defense against arbitrary power and consider it as a virtue on its own, paying particular attention to the process by which decisions are made (Smith, 2009). Numerous democratic innovations thus rely heavily on deliberation and the decision-​making process itself. Deliberation involves mutual communication and weighing and reflecting on preferences, values, and interests regarding matters of common concern (Bächtiger et al., 2018). Deliberative democracy is thus defined as a form of democracy in which deliberation is central to decision-​making. Research on deliberative democracy suggests that when citizens are given the opportunity to learn and engage with a diverse group of people in a space where expressing their opinions is safe, they will carefully consider the complexity of the problems and weigh the possible consequences of alternative solutions (Chambers, 2018). And for democracy to really work, people must be engaged and thinking deeply and in an informed way (Fishkin, 2018). Such a process seeks to improve political decision-​making, increase the legitimacy and trustworthiness of the decisions made, and hopefully solve or ameliorate political and social problems. Various centers, labs, and networks have been established to promote, enhance, and help institutionalize mechanisms of deliberative democracy.21 Studies conducted by the popular media that look at output and impact suggest that that deliberative democracy is indeed desirable for societies, because it can combat rising polarization (Financial Times, 2019). Citizens’ assemblies are a type of deliberative mini-​publics, like those facilitated by Gerwin, which means that they are carefully designed forums, where “a representative subset of the wider population comes together to engage in open, inclusive, informed and consequential discussion on one or

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more issues” (Curato et al., 2021, p. 3). The fact that they are composed of a representative subset of the wider population ensures that a range of voices is considered in deliberation, unlike consultations or participatory budgeting, where only citizens who volunteer take part. Overall, the important point is that conventional forms of participation are not enough in democracies, because participation is strongly positively correlated to income and education. Those without income or education are usually left out of the process. In citizens’ assemblies, participants are selected through random selection, ensuring greater representation and diversity. Open and inclusive deliberation in citizens’ panels is also enforced by trained facilitators selected by the organizers. Although these democratic innovations are new to CEE, there are many different examples of deliberative mini-​publics throughout the world. In fact, the OECD22 identified 12 models, though there are many other databases that also categorize mini-​publics. Like many deliberative mini-​publics, citizens’ assemblies conclude with recommendations or the write-​up of a report that is given to policymakers or the wider citizenry to inform their decisions about an issue. From some studies, we know that politicians can and often do follow the recommendations provided by citizens (Jacquet & van der Does, 2021). Importantly, many democratic innovations like citizens assemblies combine lay citizens with representatives of civil society organizations, academics, experts, and interest groups. Representatives of organizations are usually invited to participate in the panels, together with local or national authorities, experts, and some professional organizations. They also take part in the learning phase that is meant to educate citizens before participants engage in deliberations. Digital communication adds opportunities for how deliberations can be offered.23 Citizens’ assemblies alone do not create a deliberative democracy, but through enforcing norms of deliberation, they can contribute to building deliberative democracy and supplementing institutions of representative democracy (Setälä, 2017; Smith & Setälä, 2018). Many organizations are engaged in the promotion of this form of democracy and institutionalizing it. In Europe, for example, the Council of Europe24 and the European Union (EU) are well known as promoters of deliberative democracy mechanisms, both inside and outside its borders. These international organizations, especially the Council of Europe, supported Gerwin’s work in Poland. Acknowledging the crisis of democracy that many member states face, the EU encourages deliberative mechanisms to improve representative democracy and decision-​ making processes at the local and national levels.25 Given the positive consequences of these innovative solutions, particularly citizens’ assemblies, the EU chose to introduce them also within its own structures. Building on the success of the Conference on the Future of Europe,26 which took place in 2022, the Commission decided to use citizens’ panels to facilitate

56  Paulina Pospieszna and Dorota Pietrzyk-Reeves

policymaking in certain key areas. Thus, recently, the European Commission organized the first citizens’ panel, consisting of randomly selected EU citizens to consider the issue of food waste. After learning about the problem from experts, citizens were asked to formulate recommendations regarding the policies that the EU should endorse as well as the actions that the EU member states, as well as citizens and private and public stakeholders, should take to reduce food waste.27 By taking such a step, the EU seeks to promote citizens’ participation and greater inclusion to strengthen democracy at the local, national, and supranational levels. Csaba Madarász –​giving voice back to the people

Csaba Madarász is President of the small Közösségi Digitális Eszközök Alapítvány (Community Digital Tools Foundation28) (see Photo 3.2). His first experience with activism was related to the Club of Budapest29 in his hometown, which encouraged him to think globally and helped him become a person who tries to do his best to understand and overcome social challenges. Later, he became a member of the Hungarian homebirth movement,30 which opened another dimension of experience in community and activism for him. Since then and after more than 20 years, he has realized that being an activist is a “very interesting, deep and personal thing, that it is very, very close to [his] habits” and his “general personal world view.” Being an activist offers the opportunity “to implement some of the dreams that we are dreaming in terms of large social changes.” It is especially important to

PHOTO 3.2 Picture

of Csaba Madarász.

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those who realize that individuals can have an impact, particularly when they acquire knowledge of the existing challenges and try their best to overcome them. “So, I ended up somewhere around the Internet and democracy, where I found that new technologies are offering different ways to interact.” As explained in Chapter 2, civic activists in Hungary and Poland who had experienced broad democratic freedoms in the 1990s and 2000s suddenly had to face a shrinking public space and subsequently worked hard to create new ways of engaging citizens in democratic decision-​ making processes. Hungarian civil society has been under significant pressure since 2010 when the right-​wing Fidesz party-​run government restricted civil society activity and formally and informally attacked activists defending democratic norms. Consequently, many non-​governmental organizations (NGOs) and CSOs in Hungary had to design new strategies to secure funding and interact better with their stakeholders and beneficiaries as well as the larger public. The bottom-​up mobilization of citizens to act and express their voices and the ever-​expanding digital and Internet technology have helped civic activists such as Madarász to design new tools of democratic participation. Eighteen years ago, Madarász contacted Hungarian state authorities, offering to help with civic education31 initiatives and programs that raised awareness of civic issues and promoted civic involvement. But the authorities were not interested. However, he ended up working with local governments in the field of e-​democracy, and he also had the opportunity to work internationally with the Council of Europe and other larger European networks focused on e-​participation and open democracy. The Hungarian government’s refusal of his offer helped him recognize some of the systemic problems with communication in his country. Many of the recommendations coming from the European level were not written in Hungarian and thus were not implemented. Although efforts to improve local governments were partly due to lack of political will, they were also the result of a failure of communication. The importance of information-​sharing and communication made him more aware of how the Internet and democracy might collide. These early experiences and realizations turned his interests into a new profession. Madarász’s degree in Communication Studies helped him realize some of the problems involved in democratic politics, as well as ways to address them. I have been working on developing local and national democratic institutional systems for almost twenty years. I am convinced that one of the best remedies for the current political crisis is developing genuine communication between decision-​ makers and those affected by their decisions. When his international experience ended, he started to support many of the NGOs in Hungary, which became pioneers in bridging the information

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PHOTO 3.3 Democratic

innovations, Hungary.

gap with new software. One such initiative is the Hungarian Freedom of Information32 portal. This helped improve transparency and democracy and encouraged other non-​profit organizations to adapt to new digital means of communication. After working for several years in this area, Madarász, along with several other specialists in IT, economics, and communication in 2016 helped create the small organization Közösségi Digitális Eszközök Alapítvány (Community Digital Tools Foundation) to support the development of free digital tools necessary for transparent community decision-​making: “We started to translate and develop open software for better decision-​making, which is our core mission.” It was a very new initiative organized on a community and voluntary basis, which focused on local democratic challenges by offering new methods and innovations that strengthen social participation at various levels including municipalities (see Photo 3.3). At that time, the Fidesz government effectively froze or abandoned democratic institutions for citizen consultation, deliberation, and opinion formation. This, as Madarász stresses, was a big loss for the citizens and the non-​profit sector. It also meant that civic activists themselves had to reinvent an alternative means of consultation and deliberation to counter official governmental propaganda. However, since it was difficult for independent NGOs to find an open channel of influence that would work at the national level, it seemed obvious that it might be easier at the local level. This is why aHang –​The Voice,33 a social enterprise (a good example of social entrepreneurship34), was established in 2017 by Madarász and like-​minded activists. Their mission statement clarifies their values and goals:

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We take action regarding public affairs that are important for our membership, looking for new ways and means of advocacy. We hear everybody’s voice, yet we are independent of politicians or party politics (…) We look at diversity as a value: in our eyes, everybody is equal and has the right to participate. Against the level of divisiveness experienced across the country, we strive to achieve concord among people with different social groups. Madarász also realized that the Internet and new technologies offer new ways of interacting in a democratic society. This is especially important if the state is not interested in supporting mechanisms of participation in democracy or civic education. For the last five years, The Voice has been supporting civic community in Hungary thorough digital tools and by giving voice to citizens on public matters. One example is people using these tools to launch petitions to influence the authorities. Citizens’ participation is higher at the local level where there is more trust in governing institutions. Therefore, there have been various attempts to find new ways for citizens to interact with their local governments and to engage local publics. The Voice also created a national digital petition platform and other participatory devices that have become important political tools for improving participation and offering an effective response to the challenge of democratic backsliding. These methods enable a larger, more representative group of citizens to influence policy change. The movement acts on important public issues and designs new ways to find solutions, spread news about them, and address everyone concerned: “We explore areas in which joint action is needed to enact change, and use new digital telecommunication tools to expand the scope of democracy.” Madarász believes that since most citizens have an idea about how to influence, change, and improve local governmental institutions, they have the right to submit their complaints or recommendations. For this to happen, however, a mechanism of communication is needed. The digital petition platform was a good way to reach a lot more people in Hungary and help with many different issues, “so we can make their voices heard and support their campaigning with tools ranging from community organizing to Facebook ads and whatever else campaigns may need.” In Hungary, the current regime has made such participatory devices important political tools. Although Hungary holds regular democratic elections and maintains other democratic institutions, it scores quite low on liberal and constitutional standards such as pluralism and media freedom according to the Freedom House35 index. Madarász stresses that there are very few cities where citizens’ participation exists because local governments have not been trained in participatory democracy and thus are not open to integrating civic engagement. Things started to change a bit in places where civic activists who do not represent Fidesz became local representatives.

60  Paulina Pospieszna and Dorota Pietrzyk-Reeves

A good example is the eighth district in Budapest where public consultation and other participatory mechanisms have been established. Although activists can mobilize citizens, Madarász is aware that without the political will to strengthen political participation, little will change. Activists in Hungary have tried many tools to influence public debate, but it was difficult to reach decision makers through public debate channels and to influence legislation. Even at the more accessible level of local government, public efforts still require confronting an administrative culture that has no training or understanding of a participatory approach. Only a few cities in Hungary have a strategy for citizens’ participation and consultation. Yet, with 600,000 people on their list of supporters, and good digital tools, aHang has initiated policy change by collaborating with groups involved in community organizing. The first major success occurred in 2018 with the Home Care campaign, which involved aHang’s cooperation with interest groups and other NGOs to mobilize citizens for a policy change that recognizes full-​time care for a sick family member at home as a job that warrants the minimum salary.36 The campaign also helped to increase the amount of home care benefit by 200%. As the official poster had it, “With the help of aHang’s mass mobilization, this was the first truly big civil society victory in eight years. It is a huge societal break.”37 For Madarász, this joint victory was the most impactful and nearly the only authentic change that they could obtain at the national level that also had an impact on the budget of the country. It proved that there are tools to express the will of the citizens. These include a tool expressing public support for the referendum on a planned Shanghai-​based Fudan University campus in Budapest in 2022 and a tool for opinion polling or helping organize primaries for the selection of a common opposition candidate for the mayor of Budapest. This last initiative resulted in 840,000 people trusting the system that included aHang’s innovation and casting their votes in the mayoral primaries in 2019. This was the first version of a digital voting tool that was later used during the country-​wide primaries. Citizens appreciated that activists reached out to them so that they could discuss whom to vote for and participate in choosing a common candidate to support from among the opposition. For Madarász, “The 2019 Budapest mayoral primary elections brought diverse and manifold experiences for the team of aHang. This eventually strengthened our conviction that in an irregular democratic environment, we must achieve positive change by irregular means.” aHang’s (2021) work engaged approximately 10,000 people, including many volunteers, and was coordinated during the two rounds of the mayoral primary election. Other recent actions that aHang supported included nature protection in Balatonrendes38 and a Hungarian teachers’ strike. According to Madarász,

Democratic innovations as a response to shrinking public space  61

We supported the event [teachers’ strike] with around 5.000.000 HUF in part, thanks to the support of the aHang followers! We raised this amount (providing part of it from aHang’s own budget) so that the organizers could use it for the strike and related actions, such as the demonstration on Saturday, so that everyone could hear the speeches with the help of professional sound and stage technology. All these activities seek to make Hungary’s democracy more transparent and more legitimate and to improve the decision-​making process, giving voice to the people and engaging citizens. Madarász admits that this new civic effort is related to the current situation. Innovation happens only when there is a need for it or when there is a strong commitment and money. It might sound paradoxical, but “oppression can boost a lot of good activities as well.” When addressing challenges, Madarász first refers to his work as President of the Community Digital Tools Foundation which adopts software already developed elsewhere to provide a platform for different forms of citizen participation. The major difficulty they face is the lack of understanding of participatory culture among average local representatives. A lot of effort is needed to change attitudes among local bureaucrats and elected representa­ tives alike. One example of such an effort that Madarász shared was a citizens’ jury panel organized with the help of the Sortition Foundation. Such panels consist of a small group of randomly selected citizens representative of the given area’s demographics that reach together a decision or recommendation on a policy issue through informed deliberation. Another example is participatory budgeting that has gained more prominence in Hungary. Yet, unlike in Poland, where local government administration is much more open and supportive of such initiatives, convincing local authorities and their staff of the importance of participatory potential is significantly harder. The second challenge is securing sufficient funds for the implementation of participatory innovations. Cities have their own budgets, but either none of these funds are meant to contribute to such projects or there might only be funds for small pilot projects. Local governments need to rely heavily on central authorities’ decisions about funds, especially taxes, which also grossly limits their capacity to support civic participation. The third challenge is the lack of trust or understanding among local representatives who are not prepared to fully support independent political or civic initiatives that would convey more voice and transparency. In terms of the future, especially whether there is potential for organizing more citizens’ assemblies and juries at the local level, the picture in Hungary, at least according to Madarász, seems much more complex and difficult than in Poland. This is because there is less openness, less support among local representatives, limited funding, and much less money for participatory

62  Paulina Pospieszna and Dorota Pietrzyk-Reeves

budgeting in Hungary. There is also less understanding of the benefits of participatory mechanisms and the reasons to introduce them in the first place than in Poland. Madarász admits that the political openness of Budapest is perhaps the most promising, also in terms of giving an example to other cities. But the greatest challenge seems to be increasing understanding of the importance of participation among locally elected decision makers, whether it be through formal activities or education for city representatives. Another crucial issue is the availability of digital platforms that would serve citizens and elevate their independent voices. This is where activists like Madarász are stepping in and building such services, as they already have sufficient knowledge and case studies of participatory initiatives, though they also need support of the citizens and their willingness to participate. As Madarász explains, “It has to work in parallel, both from inside and outside, to make changes for more participation.” Evidence of democratic innovations

In the past, many advocacy and rights organizations in Poland and Hungary have cooperated with state authorities. Once the political environment changed and the space for civic activities shrank, activists had to rethink their goals and strategies and become more innovative. Some now focus more on monitoring the legislative and constitutional process, providing legal information and analysis to the public and raising awareness about how the rule of law and civic space function under the new circumstances. At the same time, many organizations started to focus a lot more on the public, as their attention turned from policy and decision makers to the citizens, their needs, and awareness. This prompted organizations like those for which Madarász works to invest time and skills in participatory democratic innovations in Hungary. And in Poland, Gerwin embarked on introducing democratic innovations with deliberative features to provide the basis for effective and legitimate public participation. His goal is to improve the quality of representative democracy, especially at the local level. The deterioration of the rule of law in Poland after 2015 and in Hungary after 2010 has had serious negative consequences for CSOs that tried to continue their activities in the sphere of democracy, civil rights, the environment. They faced a new style of politics for which any bottom-​up impact on decision makers and cooperation with civil society on policy issues was no longer a standard. However, for many organizations that did not have to struggle financially, the challenge of a shrinking public space brought new opportunities for self-​reflection and new incentives to act. They had to find new strategies for better interaction with their stakeholders, beneficiaries, and the larger public. They sought to become better rooted in their constituencies and to raise awareness and support for their work.

Democratic innovations as a response to shrinking public space  63

An important aspect of this shift, especially in Hungary, is the attempt by organizations and activists not only to fight back against the government’s new anti-​democratic threats and measures but also to raise awareness of their work among the public and to have better links with their constituencies. In both countries, despite all the efforts of the government and the public media to discredit the sector of independent NGOs, social support, measured by the level of trust people have in non-​governmental organizations, has not been reduced. In Poland, public trust in NGOs was even higher after the smear campaign of 2016 than before.39 Democratic innovations seek to change the existing political culture of alienation and low participation through allowing citizens to learn, listen, reflect, and engage in discussion with others, thus bridging the gap between people who would otherwise not be acquainted.40 The merit of democratic innovations is not only that the activists put a great effort to organizing programs meant to engage citizens, but that these programs allow citizens to get to know each other and to hear the perspective of people who are different from themselves. As a result, these individuals build trust and tolerance (Gronlund, 2010). Scholarly research on deliberative innovations in countries outside CEE shows that deliberative innovations can not only address the crisis of representative democracy but can also: improve the legitimacy of policy decisions, increase trust in democratic institutions, allow for greater inclusion; empower citizens, serve as an antidote to civil society polarization, present a way of addressing misinformation, and offer high-​quality political decisions.41 In addition to the Polish and Hungarian cases, there are other democratic innovations that have taken place in other CEE countries, specifically in Serbia: Citizens’ Assembly in Valjevo42 on pollution problems, in Bosnia: Mostar Citizens’ Assembly,43 in Moldova: IDIS “Viitorul” participatory budgeting online platform,44 in Estonia: Democracy festivals45 (a national citizen-​initiated process), and in Georgia: Citizens’ Assembly in Mestia.46 Since these democratic innovations are recent in CEE, it is still too early to assess their impact. However, our activists have provided several examples that show how these innovations have already improved the quality of some public decisions in both Poland and Hungary. Moreover, they have highlighted that participation in democratic innovation increases citizens’ political efficacy and their trust in their capacity to change the government and have an influence on public life. This has already increased political participation in traditional politics (e.g., elections). Undoubtedly, for this to happen, the content of conclusions reached by citizens matters, as well as how responsive authorities are to their recommendations. When Gerwin (2018) was co-​ organizing citizens’ assemblies in cities like Gdańsk and Poznań in Poland, he negotiated an agreement with local mayors that if the

64  Paulina Pospieszna and Dorota Pietrzyk-Reeves

established mini-​publics reached a broad consensus (of at least 80%),47 the mayors would implement the recommendations. Similarly, Madarász has designed or has been involved in designing tools and processes that improved communication between citizens and between citizens and authorities, as the Home Care campaign and other examples of aHang actions illustrate. Most democratic innovations are not free from manipulation and cooptation by politicians who sometimes may use these mechanisms to legitimate the policy decisions they would take otherwise (Smith, 2009; Johnson, 2015). To improve external legitimacy of such new democratic innovations, it is important to have wider audiences approving of such mechanisms, though research shows that citizens are overall supportive of democratic innovations.48 These innovations can increase non-​participants’ knowledge of the issue and their eagerness to participate, including by voting (Suiter et al., 2020). Such innovations can potentially fulfill important democratic functions (Warren, 2017), when representation fails or falters, and when elections seem to be insufficient to bring change or create genuine democracies. These innovations might even improve democracy, at least at the local level. They can push the democratic system toward its lost equilibrium between the power of the government and the governed. But since such a process takes place from below, it also requires a sufficient degree of responsiveness from national and local representatives. This responsiveness, however, is worse during democratic backsliding and when the official public space has become more and more limited. As activists here pointed out, it has been difficult for independent NGOs in such countries to reach decision makers through public debate channels and influence legislation. Thus, to remain effective in their activities when implementing democratic innovations, they choose to bypass the central government where official public space has become more and more compromised and to work at the local level. Challenges and the future

Democratic backsliding and the decline of liberal and democratic standards in Poland and Hungary unveiled both the strength and weakness of civil society in these countries. It also prompted reflection among activists about how they can help organize collective life and create a process of communication, including deliberation, where people can make better decisions together. Democratic innovations provide a chance and, more importantly, specific ways for citizens to trust experts, engage directly in decision-​making about problems, be more immune to fake news, and be skeptical of the charisma of populists. But democratic innovations cannot be reduced to mere templates to emulate. Some features are universal, like the use of new technologies, which

Democratic innovations as a response to shrinking public space  65

can enable citizen participation, especially when offline activism is limited, as pointed out by Madarász. The widespread adoption of the Internet and social media make it easier for citizens to connect with each other and with their representatives and has opened new channels for dialogue and deliberation. This has the potential to increase the transparency and accountability of the democratic process and to give citizens greater influence over the decisions that affect their lives. However, as our activists highlight, most of the democratic innovations need to be adapted to the local context, including the political context. Thus, the activists’ work reflects a diversity of formats of democratic innovations. Such innovations, like the deliberative mini-​publics described by Gerwin, can help heal and supplement local-​ level institutions of representative democracy, empower citizens, and strengthen local authorities in decision-​ making. However, they should not serve as a “democratic shortcut” (Lafont, 2019; Curato et al., 2020). According to Gerwin, who is optimistic, deliberative democracy might eventually replace purely representative democracy. Madarász is less hopeful and prefers to find a remedy for the current shrinking of public space and to strengthen participation and the role of citizens in decision-​making processes wherever possible. Even during periods of democratic backsliding, democratic innovations make a difference. Despite the challenges discussed, these examples of activism and the mechanisms created and implemented in Poland and Hungary demonstrate that their civic sectors are dynamic, innovative, and self-​reflective. Activists also realize better than before that the success of their efforts in the future depends on closer and more consistent interaction with citizens. These are valuable lessons in civil society resilience for activists in other countries and regions who struggle with the process of shrinking public space. The first lesson is that citizens’ voices can be expanded and strengthened with the use of new technologies. The second lesson is that democratic innovations and various other forms of mobilization that activists use are more attentive to citizens than before and actions that require citizens’ engagement which was often not the case with formal NGOs relying on external funding. This can be seen as anti-​NGOization process (Jacobsson & Saxonberg, 2016). The third lesson is that activists can use new tools and incentives to mobilize and engage citizens and raise their political awareness which, as the October 2023 Polish parliamentary election shows, might be decisive for bringing about political change. Notes 1 Research for this chapter was supported by the National Science Centre in Poland (project no. UMO-​2021/​42/​E/​HS5/​00155). 2 “Your gateway to the European Union.” (n.d.). European Union. https://​europ​ ean-​union.eur​opa.eu/​index​_​en

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3 Lindberg, S. I. (2018, July 24). The Nature of Democratic Backsliding in Europe. Carnegie Europe. https://​car​negi​eeur​ope.eu/​2018/​07/​24/​nat​ure-​of-​dem​ocra​tic-​ back​slid​ing-​in-​eur​ope-​pub-​76868 4 “Welcome.” (n.d.). Center for Blue Democracy. https://​bluede​mocr​acy.pl/​ 5 “#freeVoice.” (n.d.). aHang. https://​ahang.hu/​en/​ 6 European Parliament. (2022). Shrinking Space for Civil Society in Europe. European Parliament. www.europ​arl.eur​opa.eu/​doceo/​docum​ent/​TA-​9-​2022-​ 0056​_​EN.pdf 7 “Marcin Gerwin.” (n.d.). Citizens’ Assemblies. https://​cit​izen​sass​embl​ies.org/​ aut​hor/​ 8 “Learn about PB.” (n.d.). Participatory Budgeting Project. www.par​tici​pato​rybu​ dget​ing.org/​about-​pb/​ 9 Gerwin, M. (2018). Citizens’ Assemblies. Open Plan Foundation. https://​cit​izen​ sass​embl​ies.org/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2018/​10/​Citiz​ens-​Assemb​lies​_​EN_​web.pdf 10 Toucido, I. A., & Dejaeghere, Y. (2022, November). Organizating a Democratic Lottery. Federation for Innovation in Democracy-​ Europe. https://​stat​ic1.squa​ resp​ace.com/​sta​tic/​5fe06​832b​fc2b​9122​d70c​45b/​t/​63811​fa46​6ef1​55fd​6bf6​acf/​ 166940​6633​663/​FIDE+​-​+​Org​anis​ing+​a+​Dem​ocra​tic+​Lott​ery.pdf 11 See for example Claudia Chwalisz. A New Wave of Deliberative Democracy. Carnegie Europe, November 2019, available at https://​car​negi​eeur​ope.eu/​2019/​ 11/​26/​new-​wave-​of-​delib​erat​ive-​democr​acy-​pub-​80422 12 “New Democracy Foundation.” (n.d.). newDemocracy. www.newde​mocr​acy. com.au/​ 13 “Citizens’ Jury.” (n.d.). Participedia. https://​parti​cipe​dia.net/​met​hod/​155 14 “Welcome.” (n.d.). Center for Blue Democracy. https://​bluede​mocr​acy.pl/​ 15 Gerwin, M. (2020, December 18). Waldenia Model for Deliberative Democracy. Deliberative Democracy Digest. www.pub​licd​elib​erat​ion.net/​walde​nia-​model-​for-​ delib​erat​ive-​democr​acy/​ 16 “Referendum.” (n.d.). The Britannica Dictionary. www.bri​tann​ica.com/​dic​tion​ ary/​ref​eren​dum 17 “What Is Deliberative Polling?” (n.d.). Stanford University. https://​delib​erat​ion. stanf​ord.edu/​what-​delib​erat​ive-​polli​ngr 18 ”What Is LATINNO?” (n.d.). LATINNO. www.lati​nno.net/​en/​proj​ect-​info​ rmat​ion/​ 19 “OECD Database of Representative Deliberative Processes and Institutions.” (2020). OECD. https://​airta​ble.com/​app8WH​ymua​eTMs​vCp/​shrRYP​pTSs​9Nsk​ Hbv/​tblfOH​uQuK​uOpP​nHh 20 See for example Michael MacKenzie. “Deliberation and Long-​Term Decisions: Representing Future Generations.” In The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy, ed. Andre Bachtinger, John Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge, and Mark Warren (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 21 See The Centre for Deliberative Democracy and Global Governance (CDDGG) at www.canbe​rra.edu.au/​resea​rch/​cent​res/​cddgg and The Deliberative Democracy Lab, Stanford University, at https://​cdd.stanf​ord.edu. Journal of Public Deliberation synthesizes the research, opinion, projects, experiments, and experiences of academics and practitioners in the emerging multi-​ disciplinary field and political movement. https://​deli​bdem​jour​nal.org As for networks, see Democracy R & D International network of organizations, associations, and

Democratic innovations as a response to shrinking public space  67

individuals helping decision makers take hard decisions and build public trust https://​demo​crac​yrd.org/​about/​. 22 “OECD.” (2020, June 10). Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions. OECD. www.oecd.org/​gov/​inn​ovat​ive-​citi​zen-​partic​ipat​ion-​and-​new-​ dem​ocra​tic-​insti​tuti​ons-​33930​6da-​en.htm 23 Citizenlab that discusses various tools that facilitate digital deliberation. They were very much developed during the pandemic. www.cit​izen​lab.co/​blog/​civic-​eng​ agem​ent/​how-​to-​fac​ilit​ate-​digi​tal-​delib​erat​ion/​ 24 “Council of Europe.” (n.d.). Council of Europe. www.coe.int/​en/​web/​por​tal 25 See The Council of Europe promoting deliberative democracy at www.coe.int/​ en/​web/​good-​gov​erna​nce/​-​/​delib​erat​ive-​democr​acy-​forum-​talk; https://​rm.coe. int/​09000​0168​0a90​29a. Also, The Competence Centre on Participatory and Deliberative Democracy, available at https://​cop-​demos.jrc.ec.eur​opa.eu 26 “Conference on the Future of Europe.” (n.d.). Publications Office of the European Union. Retrieved April 18, 2023. https://​wayb​ack.arch​ive-​it.org/​12090/​202​3041​ 8091​815/​https:/​futu​reu.eur​opa.eu/​ 27 See more about the panel at the European Commission website at. https://​ec.eur​ opa.eu/​com​miss​ion/​pres​scor​ner/​det​ail/​en/​ip_​22_​7​734 28 “Az alapítványról.” (n.d.). Közösségi Digitális Eszközök Alapítvány. https://​kdea. hu/​az-​alapit​vany​rol/​ 29 “Club of Budapest.” (n.d.). The Club of Budapest. www.clu​bofb​udap​est.com/​ 30 “Free Geréb Ágnes.” (n.d.). https://​freege​reb.hu/​en/​ 31 “Civic Education.” (n.d.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://​plato. stanf​ord.edu/​entr​ies/​civic-​educat​ion/​ 32 “Freedom of Information.” (n.d.). Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság. https://​naih.hu/​ 33 “#freeVoice.” (n.d.). aHang. https://​ahang.hu/​en/​ 34 Dees, J. G. (2001). The Meaning of Social Entrepreneurship. Case at Duke. https://​cent​ers.fuqua.duke.edu/​case/​know​ledg​e_​it​ems/​the-​mean​ing-​of-​soc​ial-​entre​ pren​eurs​hip/​ 35 “Hungary.” (n.d.). Freedom House. https://​freed​omho​use.org/​coun​try/​hung​ary/​ free​dom-​world/​2022 36 The website of the organization reports the results of the campaign at https://​ ahang.hu/​en/​campai​gns/​is-​car​ing-​for-​a-​disab​led-​fam​ily-​mem​ber-​a-​job/​2018/​ 09/​13/​. 37 The website of the organization reports the results of the Home Care Campaign at https://​ahang.hu/​en/​campai​gns/​home-​care-​campa​ign-​hung​ary/​2018/​11/​08/​. 38 Reported by the aHang at https://​ahang.hu/​en/​campai​gns/​we-​have-​defu​sed-​an-​eco​ logi​cal-​bomb/​2022/​09/​19/​. 39 According to the most recent opinion poll conducted in November 2020, 56% of Poles trust social organizations, and among those who had contact with CSOs, 74% declare trust in social organizations. https://​publi​cyst​yka.ngo.pl/​pod-​lupa-​ coraz-​lep​szy-​wizeru​nek-​orga​niza​cji (accessed: 2 June 2021). 40 See for example the evidence collected by European Partnership for Democracy and Carnegie Europe at https://​epd.eu/​explor​ing-​worldw​ide-​dem​ocra​tic-​inno​ vati​ons/​. 41 See for example Majia Setälä. “Connecting deliberative mini-publics to representative decision making.” European Journal of Political Research 56, no. 4 (2017): 846–​863.

68  Paulina Pospieszna and Dorota Pietrzyk-Reeves

42 “Citizens’ Assembly in Valjevo.” (2020, November-​December). https://​act-​wb.net/​ wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2021/​06/​The-​Citi​zens​_​Ass​embl​ies_​Valj​evo.pdf 43 “Citizens’ Assembly of Mostar.” (n.d.). Grad Mostar. https://​mostar​grad​imo.ba/​ en/​home/​ 44 bE-​Open. (n.d.). Citizen Participation. Council of Europe. www.beo​pen-​congr​ess. eu/​en/​4-​cat-​citi​zen-​partic​ipat​ion.html 45 Estonian World. (2017, August 9). Grass-​Root Democracy: What Is the Power of Democracy Festivals? Estonian World. https://​estoni​anwo​rld.com/​opin​ion/​grass-​ root-​democr​acy-​power-​democr​acy-​festiv​als/​ 46 Panchulidze, E., & Sultanishvili, T. (2020). Shortfalls of Deliberative Democracy in Rural Georgia: Analysis of the General Assembly of a Settlement in Mestia Municipality. PMC Research Center. https://​pmcg-​i.com/​app/​uplo​ads/​old-​site/​ data/​public​atio​ns_​f​i le/​106d5f​e348​711c​8d2.pdf 47 Gąsiorowska, A., & Gerwin, M. (2020, September). Rules and Procedures for Citizens’ Assemblies. Center for Climate Assemblies. https://​bluede​mocr​acy.pl/​ rivend​ell-​model/​ 48 See for example Camille Bedock and Jean-​Benoit Pilet. “Enraged, engaged, or both? A study of the determinants of support for consultative vs. binding mini publics.” Representation: Journal of Representative Democracy 59, no. 1 (2023): 33–​53; Daan Jacobs and Wesley Kaufmann. “The right kind of participation? The effect of a deliberative mini public on the perceived legitimacy of public decision-​making.” Public Management Review 23, no. 1 (2021): 91–​111.

References aHang. 2021. “Primary Elections: Special Edition.” December (pdf. at courtesy of Csaba Madarasz). Bächtiger, A., Dryzek, J., Mansbridge, J.S., & Warren, M. eds. (2018) The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bedock, C., & Pilet, J.-​ B. (2023). “Enraged, Engaged, or Both? A Study of the Determinants of Support for Consultative vs. Binding Mini Publics.” Representation: Journal of Representative Democracy 59, no 1: 33–​53. Bohman, J. (1998). “Survey Article: The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy.” Journal of Political Philosophy 6, no 4: 400–​425. Chambers, S. (2018). “Human Life Is Group Life: Deliberative Democracy for Realists.” Critical Review 30, no 1–​2: 36–​48. Curato, N., Farrell, D.M., Geissel, B., et al. (2021). Deliberative Mini Publics: Core Design Features. Bristol: Bristol University Press. Curato, N., Vrydagh, J., & Bächtiger, A. (2020). “Democracy without Shortcuts: Introduction to the Special Issue.” Journal of Deliberative Democracy 16, no 2: 1–​9. Dalton, R., Scarrow, S., & Cain Bruce, B. (2013). “New Forms of Democracy? Reform and Transformation of Democratic Institution.” In B.E. Cain, R.J. Dalton, & S.E. Scarrow, eds. Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1–​22. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dryzek, J. (2000). Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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European Partnership for Democracy and Carnegie Europe at https://​epd.eu/​explor​ ing-​worldw​ide-​dem​ocra​tic-​inno​vati​ons/​ Financial Times. (2019). Deliberative democracy is just what politics need, editorial 11 August, www.ft.com/​cont​ent/​6bc19​9c8-​b836-​11e9-​96bd-​8e884​d3ea​203 (accessed 7 January 2023). Fishkin, J.S. (2018). Democracy When the People Are Thinking: Revitalizing Our Politics through Public Deliberation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fung, A., & Wright, E.O. (2003). “Thinking about Empowered Participatory Governance.” In A. Fung, & E.O. Wright, eds. Deepening Democracy. Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance, 3–​42. London: Verso. Gerwin, M. (2018). Citizens’ Assemblies: Guide to Democracy That Works. Krakow: Open Plan Foundation, accessed on 27 January 2023. http://​cit​izen​sass​ embl​ies.org Gronlund, K., Setälä, M., & Herne, K. (2010). “Deliberation and Civic Virtue: Lessons from a Citizen Deliberation Experiment.” European Political Science Review 2, no 1: 95–​117. Haerpfer, C.W., Bernhagen, P., Welzel, C., & Inglehart, R.F. eds. (2009). Democratization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hirschman, A.O. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and State. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Jacobs, D., & Kaufmann, W. (2021). “The Right Kind of Participation? The Effect of a Deliberative Mini Public on the Perceived Legitimacy of Public Decision-​ Making.” Public Management Review 23, no 1: 91–​111. Jacobsson, K., & Saxonberg, S. eds. (2016). Beyond NGO-​ization: The Development of Social Movements in Central and Eastern Europe. London: Routledge. Jacquet, V., & van der Does, R. (2021). “The Consequences of Deliberative Minipublics: Systematic Overview, Conceptual Gaps, and New Directions.” Representation: Journal of Representative Democracy 57, no 1: 131–​141. Johnson, G.F. (2015). Democratic Illusion: Deliberative Democracy in Canadian Public Policy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Lafont, C. (2019). Democracy without Shortcuts: A Participatory Conception of Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mansbridge, J., Bohman, J., Chambers, S., et al. (2010). “The Place of Self-​Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy.” Journal of Political Philosophy 18, no 1: 64–​100. Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pod lupą. Coraz lepszy wizerunek organizacji. https://​publi​cyst​yka.ngo.pl/​pod-​lupa-​ coraz-​lep​szy-​wizeru​nek-​orga​niza​cji (accessed: 2 June 2021). Setälä, M. (2017). “Connecting Deliberative Mini Publics to Representative Decision Making.” European Journal of Political Research 56, no 4: 846–​863. Smith, G. (2009). Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, G., & Setälä, M. (2018). “Mini-​Publics and Deliberative Democracy.” In A. Bächtiger, J.S. Dryzek, J. Mansbridge & M.E. Warren, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Suiter, J., Muradova, L., Gastil, J., & Farrell, D. (2020). “Scaling Up Deliberation: Testing the Potential of Mini-Publics to Enhance the Deliberative Capacity of Citizens.” Swiss Political Science Review 26, no 3: 253–​272.

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Suteu, S. (2019). “The Populist Turn in Central and Eastern Europe: Is Deliberative Democracy Part of the Solution?” European Constitutional Law Review 15, no 3: 488–​518. Tilly, C. (2007). Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Warren, M.E. (2017). “A Problem-​Based Approach to Democratic Theory.” American Political Science Review 111, no 1: 39–​53.

4 CONFLICT AND COLLABORATION IN GENERATIONAL DIVIDES Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom and Patrice C. McMahon

“If you can’t find us, it’s because we’re online… starting our own communities and pioneering a feminist revolution on our own terms” (Hunt, 2022). As this quote, from a young Polish feminist activist to her older colleagues suggests, different generations often mobilize in diverse ways, believing that they, in fact, are the pioneers and creators of a social movement. But regardless of how people mobilize, their experiences, especially during their formative years, can have a lasting effect on their political consciousness. Sometimes, these common cultural experiences lead a specific cohort of people, or what is known as a generation with similar characteristics and values to mobilize and advocate for political and social change in particular ways. Intergenerational dynamics present both challenges and opportunities for civic activists, and generational theories are, thus, useful for explaining how generational differences can shape activists’ behavior and can either deter or encourage effective activism across different age groups. But what do we mean by generations in the context of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)? While some may consider generations to be defined strictly by age or by birth year ranges, we adopt the approach of other scholars who view generations as more flexibly defined by crystallizing events and experiences. This is because, “generations are not natural; they are produced through common experience and through discourse about it” (Yurchak, 2013). We argue that in the context of CEE, intergenerational dynamics are important to understanding the characteristics of contemporary activism, as well as its effectiveness, because collective responses to common experiences or events can lead to conflict or to consensus across different ages and cohorts. In CEE, generations are often defined and divided by peoples’ experiences with more than four decades of communist rule. Thus, as we suggested in the DOI: 10.4324/9781003466116-4

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Introduction, using generational theory to understand civic activism helps explain how and why some activists who have some of the same goals are unable to bridge social divisions (Poland) and why other activists (Ukraine) recognize generational differences but still share best practices to work together to achieve common goals. This chapter uses a generational lens to explore activism in CEE, specifically in Poland and Ukraine, countries where cooperation and collaboration among different generations has resulted in powerful and effective coalitions of activism. We also provide examples from other countries, including Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Serbia, for comparative analysis. We find that country context matters tremendously to the role that generations play in shaping activism, and that generations of activists are most likely to build coalitions with one another when they face a crisis. By highlighting the activism of Marta Mazurek (Poland) and Iryna Svets (Ukraine), we demonstrate why generations matter and how powerful intergenerational coalitions can be for bringing society together and making activists’ voices and demands heard. Marta Mazurek –​from academic to activist to city council woman in Poland

Marta Mazurek was not a feminist growing up in communist Poland; in fact, she never really felt discriminated against. Without a doubt, she was profoundly uncomfortable with what she was told regularly as a child: Despite her good grades, “the fact” that she was a woman meant that she would never achieve much. But Mazurek still did not debate this point. Instead, she remained quiet and focused on being “a nice, pretty girl.” Later, at university, after she was exposed to feminist ideas, Mazurek found the words to express herself and realized that women in Poland experienced consistent discrimination and regular microaggressions. Sometimes, it was only verbal reminders of what they could not achieve as women. Other times, women were taught to be ashamed of their bodies, or they were touched inappropriately. For many years, Mazurek merely accepted this, assuming that this was just Polish society. In response, she tried to keep her head down and not react or engage. Until her late 20s, Mazurek did this to her best ability, not questioning or protesting the seemingly dominant social order. But her experiences as a PhD student and then as an English professor at Adam Mickiewicz University (AMU) in Poznań changed her thinking and behavior, paving the way for her to become one of Poznań’s most well-​known feminists and politicians. The tipping point for Mazurek was reading the book, The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-​ Century Literary Imagination, written by Sandra Gilbert1 and Susan Gubar,2 which examines

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Victorian literature through a feminist perspective. Suddenly, everything came together for her, and she knew that she needed to do something with her knowledge and education. For almost two decades, while working at AMU, Mazurek consumed as much feminist and gay literature as she could get her hands on. Since publications on feminist theory and gender were still rare in Poland in the early 1990s, Mazurek helped form a group for AMU faculty and students to engage in consciousness raising and discuss the unique problems women faced. In 2012, Mazurek helped create AMU’s Gender Studies Center, becoming one of several Polish centers devoted to gender and feminist studies. It was through her work at the Gender Studies Center that Mazurek met all kinds of activists and started to attend protests. Referring to herself as a “late bloomer,” it was only in her 30s that she started to focus seriously on gender and women’s rights, recognizing the depth and wide-​reaching grasp of discrimination against women and LGBTQ+​individuals –​even in democratic Poland. Although Polish feminists hoped that the new democratic government would embrace women and women’s rights, feminist ideas continued to be ignored and even ridiculed as a “foreign ideology” (Hall, 2019). For almost ten years, Mazurek worked as a teacher and academic, raising awareness through her classes and research, some of which analyzed how gender discrimination and inequality were expressed in Polish textbooks. But with the election of the conservative Law and Justice Part in 2015, with its distinctively traditional approach to society and family-​oriented values, Mazurek started to look for different ways to advocate for women and to address what was quickly becoming a “war” on gender, or any progressive initiatives aimed at protecting the rights of women and sexual minorities. In 2016, Poznań’s progressive Mayor3 (of the Civic Platform Party which war in opposition to the former Law and Justice government coalition) created a new city position, one of the first in Poland that focused on overseeing equal treatment policies and implementing gender mainstrea­ ming.4 Officially part of the national government’s Plenipotentiary for Combating Exclusions,5 this local government position would help the mayor’s office promote gender equality in city laws and practices. Mazurek decided to leave academia and apply. In her new position as the mayor’s representative for equal treatment, she spearheaded a variety of gender initiatives, some of which were symbolic and meant to start people thinking, while others immediately improved the situation for women and sexual minorities (Szczygielska, 2019). As one of the first in Poland to hold such a position, Mazurek had the opportunity to make a difference not only in her hometown but also on gender mainstreaming throughout the country. One of the acts she is most proud of is introducing feminine words (feminitives) in the Polish language for career names, especially those with positions of power, like mayor, minister, and professor, so that now both

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options are available: instead of being called Councilman, Mazurek herself is called Councilwoman.6 Although some younger women in Poland today take this for granted, Mazurek was one of Poland’s earliest promoters of feminized endings for certain nouns, even though many women of her own generation resisted the trend. But as a scholar who did research on language and understood the power of words and framing, she realized that changing how Poles address people is important, especially since so many prestigious positions could only be expressed in a masculine way in the Polish language. Mazurek also led efforts for the city to name streets after women and advocated that Poznań formally celebrate 100 years of women’s suffrage. With 26 streets named after famous Polish women to celebrate the anniversary, the city of Poznań was recognized by the European Union as a leader in what has become a transnational trend, making women and their lived experiences more visible in public spaces. In this way, Mazurek’s activism and convictions have translated into policies recognizing women’s rights and empowering Polish women. Poland’s so-​called Black Protests7 started in September 2016 in response to a government proposal for stricter abortion legislation, which aimed to prevent abortions, even in cases of rape or when the mother’s health was threatened. As the mayor’s representative, Mazurek was regularly invited to meetings and protests. Sometimes, she spoke on behalf of the mayor’s office, sometimes she spoke as a former activist and a feminist, but often she just showed up to demonstrate the city’s support for what became the All-​Women’s Strike or the Polish Women’s Strike.8 These marches continued for a few years, but according to Mazurek, they were an inflection point for women and feminism in Poland, because this fight for reproductive rights unified women from all over the country and women both young and old. In fact, men also joined in the protests, and the movement brought together all who were opposed to the government and its anti-​democratic tendencies. Realizing that Poznań was moving in a more progressive and even feminist direction, in 2018, Mazurek ran for city council, and she won. As a Councilwoman, Mazurek has regular contact with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and members of civil society. And while she is involved in many different facets of local governance, she remains committed to gender mainstreaming and ensuring that women’s views are heard and respected. As the Vice Chair of the Human Rights and Equality Commission in the Association of Polish Cities (APC), she helped establish a formal platform with the APC for gender equality and human rights activists from local governments all over Poland. Mazurek is particularly intrigued by how younger women understand feminism and how they approach their activism. Unlike the way her generation addressed discrimination, Mazurek appreciates the very personal and emotional ways younger activists or influencers talk about patriarchy, communicating challenges, as well as projects through Instagram and other

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social media. Mazurek recognizes that while her generation of feminists tended to be quieter and more formal, and they usually participated in feminist action as a part of a larger group, younger feminists’ activism in Poland is different and individualistic, with most not wanting to join a group or movement. Mazurek admires the boldness of the younger generation and marvels at their tactics, which can be both provocative and irreverent. Despite the Law and Justice’s grip on power until the fall of 2023, and its ability to pass some of the strictest abortion legislation in Europe, Mazurek remains optimistic about the fate of Poland’s women’s movement. This is mostly because she recognizes that young women see and understand better the oppression women face and how important structures are. Perhaps most integrally, younger women are genuinely motivated to do something as the October 2023 parliamentary elections demonstrated with more women than men voting for the first time in Poland’s history. Referring to the academic research of Bogumila Hall (2019) and Agnieszka Graff (2003), whom Mazurek humbly acknowledges better explain the trajectory of Polish feminism and how it is different from what has happened in the West, she claims that Polish feminism is best understood not in terms of waves or generations that build from or react to each other’s work. In fact, this did not really happen in Poland, and even today, some young activists say that feminism is new and that the recent protests mark the “beginning” of Poland’s women’s movement. For Mazurek and others of her generation, this is not how they see things at all, but such ideas exemplify the intergenerational problems within Poland’s women’s movement. In truth, while some aspects of Polish feminism are new, feminist ideas have been around for quite a while; the real problem is generational conflict, or the absence of dialogue and discussion among women across generations who have similar goals. For Mazurek, as bright as the future might be, there are at least three challenges that stand in the way of more equality and sustaining Poland’s women’s movement. First, the fragmentation of the movement sometimes pits older women against younger women, or more conservative groups against progressive initiatives, exacerbating differences and undermining group cohesion. Second, like the generational gaps (or waves)9 we see in the United States and elsewhere, younger women are sometimes using different terms to describe similar phenomena or challenges. Finally, there is the perennial challenge of competition between groups and individuals. In some cases, people want to be “the” leaders and not followers. In other cases, it is competition for attention, audience, or funding. In some situations, it seems, younger feminists are not interested in learning from previous generations, and older feminists, for their part, are unwilling to accept and appreciate what younger women are doing. Recognizing her own place in Poland’s feminist movement, as well as her official position as a Councilwoman, Mazurek now channels her activism into actions that seek to attract young and old and bring women together,

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using the internet to educate and engage in discussions. In 2022, she launched a project with three other local Councilwomen to create a podcast called “Female Councillors in the Morning.10” This Sunday morning show features different topics, but they are always covered from women’s perspectives, because this is the point: to have women be able to hear from other women and to realize that women can have different perspectives. Although the podcast is just one year old, Mazurek believes that it has attracted a large and diverse audience. She is still seen by some as the radical feminist in the group, and others who are on the show are perceived as more moderate. That is their aim: to demonstrate the diversity of women’s voices and their backgrounds. More recently, Mazurek started another new project, a project of her own, called “Live, Up Close,11” where she intentionally reaches out to younger feminists to engage in open and informal conversations. She remarks that since I don’t have a daughter, and my cooperation with female students terminated when I left academia for local government, these conversations allow me to engage into genuine dialogue with women in their 20s and 30s. What I learn about how they see feminism and what they do as women for women is precious. The conversations provide me with great insights. Plus, I do my best to promote my interlocutors’ activities and make them visible to audiences that I can reach via my social media. They also make Mazurek hopeful, not only about the future of activism but also for the future of women’s rights and equality in Poland. Generations and generational divides

Generations are contextually situated in specific times and geographical places (Rintala, 1963) and generational influences can contain both “cohort” and “lineage” elements. Cohorts are defined by age groups, presumably experiencing similar cultural and political elements at the same time (Yurchak, 2013). People can also be socialized by their bonds with close family members (their lineage) or friends of different ages, through the discussions and practices they may share that encourage a degree of continuity in values, if not patterns of behavior across age groups (DeMartini, 1985). Writing in the 1950s, the sociologist Karl Mannheim initiated research on generations, arguing that they were, indeed, important to understanding, predicting, and explaining social change, largely because different generations are prone to conflict. Since children’s views were defined by events occurring around them and their peers during their formative years, they inevitably have contrasting views to their parents and grandparents (Mannheim, 1952; Pilcher, 1994; McCourt, 2012). Later research concluded that there was not

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strong evidence of an automatic rebellion of children against their elders, and values are often shared and passed on within households, although age cohorts can certainly differ in what they value and how they express their views (Abramowitz and Nassi, 1981; DeMartini, 1985). We know, for example, that generally younger generations tend to be more prone to protest and are frequently the “first movers” in opposition organizations. This is certainly the case in CEE, and part of the explanation for why the “color revolutions” –​the mobilizations that toppled authoritarian governments that rigged elections –​in places like Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine from 2000 to 2004 happened when they did, and the protests were a result of the frustrations of young adults of the “post-​ Soviet generation” (Nikolayenko, 2020). There is also research that argues that generational dynamics and formative experiences in the communist and post-​ communist period were important predictors of support for democratic values and behavior, including civic activism (Pop-​Eleches and Tucker, 2013). Intergenerational dynamics are often important to understanding the characteristics of activism, but generational divides or differences between cohorts of people can hurt communication and undermine the effectiveness of activism. As Mazurek’s story suggests, generational differences among different cohorts of feminist activists in Poland often prevented groups, even those with common goals, from coming together and learning from each other. Unfortunately, women’s activism in Poland has not benefited much from intergenerational knowledge or input and analysis from different age groups.12 This means that the experiences and accomplishments of previous generations of feminists are often not known by younger activists, and there are few opportunities for sharing experiences across generations. Women’s activism started in most CEE countries in the 1980s, but the political transitions in the region in the late 1980s and early 1990s triggered significantly more activism among women eager for democratic changes to translate into equal rights for women (Sloat, 2005). In most CEE countries during these years, however, women’s activism was isolated and sporadic, preventing scholars from categorizing women’s activism as full-​ fledged “women’s movements.” As Mazurek, and the scholars Hall and Graff have observed, this means that young feminists in Poland often believe that they are the pioneers and initiators of feminism in their country (Hall, 2019). One teenage activist put it this way: “For the first time in our history women have united. Well, we all united against PiS [Law and Justice]” (Hall, 2019). At the same time, younger activists, who developed political awareness in response to the authoritarianism of the Law and Justice Party and the Catholic Church’s war on “gender ideology” after 2015, accuse older activists of “being obstructive, dismissive, and patronizing” and unaware of changing political and social realities (Hall, 2019).

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These generational conflicts bear striking similarity to intergenerational dynamics in feminist activism in Russia, where younger activists typically do not know the history and theories of feminism that preceded them, much less the actual women who are still alive who were part of the late Soviet and early post-​Soviet era of feminism. For example, Olga Lipovskaya, a Russian feminist in St. Petersburg who got her start during the late Soviet period, recalled in an interview near the end of her life, regarding her appearance at a 2018 “FemFest13” public festival: When I appeared there like a dinosaur… I croaked about a few things, and no one knew what I was talking about. That we at the end of the 1980s, and at the beginning of the 1990s, did something. … We knew about (Tatiana) Mamonova, (Yulia) Voznesenskaia [from the 1970s], that there was a wave then. Back then we had no communication resources, no social circles or internet, but now it’s as if they have all these resources, and all the same, they don’t know. They didn’t know about government programs, neither the first (Independent Women’s) Forum nor the second one, nor about the League of Women Voters I worked with. That was a bit of a sad moment.14 Like Mazurek in Poland, Lipovskaya complained about younger feminists and their lack of knowledge about Russia’s feminist history while simultaneously praising them for their savvy public-​facing skills of performance art and online social media campaigns. Many feminists in Poland and Russia in the 1990s were in academic institutions and saw their tasks primarily as creating the academic study of gender and feminism. They created gender studies courses,15 centers, and degree programs16 –​as well as conducted research and engaged in advocacy to inform public policy. For this work, they were heavily supported by Western funding programs and found ways to make a livelihood through their feminism at a time when their national economies and labor markets were undergoing difficult transitions to capitalism. Throughout the post-​communist region, this period of “empowerment of women through the study of women” led to a proliferation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that were committed to advocacy and advancing women’s rights (Bias, 2019). However, much of this activism was funded by external actors and influenced heavily by the ideas of Western feminists (Henderson, 2003). This NGO-​ization of women’s activism in CEE meant that the feminist movement was, to a large extent, limited and perceived by many as elitist, with women associated with academia or businesses dominating the ranks. These activists, moreover, were often detached from the lives of ordinary people, especially those living outside urban centers.

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Similar to the negative consequences of NGO-​ization discussed in the Introduction, this NGO-​ization of feminist activism garnered a great deal of criticism from observers both within and outside these movements in CEE about misguided attention to external preferences, how external actors shaped feminism, and the need for more connection with local communities and their interests. Given the profile of these feminists –​educated, from urban areas, and middle-​class –​and that their goals often matched those identified by the EU, their ideas and activism attracted little interest among ordinary women. They also failed to attract many new participants in their initiatives, including young women, because they did not reach out beyond their immediate NGO networks. By the mid-​2000s, Western donors had retreated significantly from CEE countries, focusing on other regions, and by the 2010s, Russian feminists in particular were suffering17 from the effects of Russia’s “foreign agents” law (see Chapters 1 and 7 for more on Russia and Russian feminist activism) that made it difficult for them to receive funding from outside the country. The shrinking of space for civil society was also a feature of the Law and Justice regime in Poland, with the government and government-​sponsored organizations engaging in multiple efforts to disrupt international funding to local liberal civil society organizations, limit the public space for their activities, and reduce organizations’ political voice through legal restrictions or other forms of repression (Yurchak, 2013). In both countries, this behavior led to two choices for feminists in terms of resource mobilization: either partner with local governments or find new bottom-​up methods of organizing that do not rely on much money. Governments’ harsh restrictions, as well as innovations in digital communications, led younger women to experience these events in a somewhat different way than older women (Hall, 2019). In Poland, the PiS government not only threatened women’s rights, but it put the country’s democracy into question. Since democratic backsliding occurred during the formative years of younger feminists in both Poland and Russia, these women are more inclined to take to the streets in protest than older generations have been. Thus, according to Bogumila Hall (2019), these collective and affective experiences pushed even nonpolitical citizens in Poland to act, marking the “birth of a political generation, forged in opposition to the ruling regime.” Women, both young and old, went to the streets in the tens of thousands during the Black Protests that started in the fall of 2016. Although united by a common threat –​the most restrictive abortion legislation in Europe18 –​ younger Polish feminists reacted differently. While older feminists tended to work within the existing NGO structure, younger feminists intentionally embraced social media to share information, mobilize activists but also to democratize feminist spaces, opening them to wider groups of women from

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different backgrounds and facilitating new conversations about topics that were previously taboo in Poland. Like feminists in Russia and elsewhere in CEE, the younger generation of Polish activists has changed how the feminist movement looks, becoming more focused on volunteer efforts, online engagement, and crowdfunding for financial support. Other transnational shifts in feminism and Generation Z19 attitudes encouraged women in CEE to turn away from formal politics. Instead, they concentrate on art, performance, and activism and mass protest rather than running for office or lobbying government policymaking venues. These changes, in important ways, democratized women’s activism. New forms of activism did not require money or English language skills to write grant applications and allowed women with a wider range of types of views and socioeconomic backgrounds to participate. Although some feminists in Poland and Russia and elsewhere in the region remain divided by their experiences and approaches to activism, we do know that existential threats can and often do push different ages and groups to work together. And this is exactly what happened in Poland after 2016 when the government proposed its restrictive abortion legislation. For activist Iryna Svets from Ukraine, different generations and their unique perspectives on shared existential threats can serve to bring people together and encourage common values and behavior, even facilitating strong and highly effective intergenerational coalitions. Iryna Svets –​different threats, common impulses in Ukraine

Iryna Svets, director of the Lviv office of OPORA, a watch-​dog organization in Ukraine, has been thinking about justice since she was a young girl. In fact, she remembers that in third grade there was a school competition, and the daughter of the school’s director won and Iryna came in second. Iryna knew that the director’s daughter was not deserving of the award. Even at that age, she recognized the pervasive corruption in Ukrainian society. And she also knew that it was unjust and unacceptable. Svets’ activism started in 2004 during Ukraine’s color revolution –​the Orange Revolution20 –​while she was a first-​year student at university in Lviv.21 Many of the leaders of the movement were students like Svets, predominantly from Western Ukraine and more pro-​European (because of the region’s history as part of Poland and the Austrian Hungarian empire). At that time, the students were outraged by the massive corruption that had become engrained in Ukrainian life. The Orange Revolution focused on rejecting the results of a rigged election and ensuring free and fair elections.22 But it also taught Svets and others in Ukrainian society about how much ordinary individuals could accomplish. According to Svets, this is the Ukrainian people’s superpower: “We know how to do things on our own. And we will.”

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Corruption, unfortunately, remained a big part of Ukrainian life in the 2000s.23 Everyone experienced some form of corruption –​in the educational sphere, in the medical sphere, and certainly in the political sphere. Fortunately, many Ukrainians believed that free and fair elections would bring pro-​European candidates, and they would address these problems, preventing the country from becoming a totalitarian or quasi-​democratic state. But Svets knew that politicians alone were not the only solution. As the Orange Revolution demonstrated, the solution needed to come from society and from the people between elections. As Svets explains, “we won the Orange Revolution,” but there was still no trust in democratic institutions. And Ukrainian leaders would not be able to build a pro-​democratic, pro-​ European country without local people who must be involved in holding the government accountable and creating different societal norms. These were the concerns and goals that gave rise to OPORA24 (“Support”), which formally registered in 2007 as an electoral monitoring organization. The Orange Revolution gave birth to numerous civil society initiatives, but many of them did not survive. According to Svets, OPORA not only survived, but it thrived because the movement stuck to its core principles and values. Each OPORA chapter engages in different activities, depending on local interests and needs, but the members are all committed to the same principles: activism, responsibility, and solidarity. OPORA is now a massive network with chapters all over Ukraine. Yet, it remains important that OPORA members are “united by the same mission and ambition.” Ukraine’s unique history of periodic but regular crises has made generations important, allowing people to have common crystallizing experiences, despite differences in age. By discussing lessons learned from these crises and sharing practices with other citizens, Ukrainian society and different generations have enjoyed a high degree of continuity in values across age groups. In fact, Svets believes that the Orange Revolution and what transpired was a huge gift to Ukrainian activism, because it helped teach people the importance of sticking together and creating connections and networks with different groups of people. More than 15 years later, the connections forged by activists involved in the Orange Revolution are still important today, and people regularly reach out to friends from these networks, regardless of where they are in the world, and they continue to support one another. During the Orange Revolution, activism was new and quite risky. Protestors were beaten, detained, and anti-​government leaflets had to be posted at night for safety. The EuroMaidan protests that took place in 2014 pushed for retaining closer ties with the European Union after the existing authoritarian and pro-​Russian government in Ukraine rejected a negotiated EU-​Ukraine association agreement. These protests were easier because of the experiences and lessons learned a decade earlier in the Orange Revolution. Simply put, Ukrainians realized how powerful and effective mass protests

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could be to pressuring the government. Although the EuroMaidan movement was followed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and fomenting conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the crisis succeeded in bringing about a more democratic government in Kyiv and it pushed EuroMaidan student activists to seek out the advice and help of older generations. While EuroMaidan activists “initially pushed us older activists away, thinking they did not need our advice or involvement, this all changed when the students were beaten up in Kyiv,” according to Svets. “And everything became much more serious.” This is when older activists –​ like those of us who were involved in the Orange Revolution and even older (from the Soviet period) –​stepped in and helped. The protests in 2014 however proved to be much more dangerous, and more was at stake than during the Orange Revolution. EuroMaidan was not just about an election; it was about Ukraine’s autonomy and the direction the country was headed: east or west? As the situation intensified, everyone’s parents joined in the protests, in addition to students. In fact, what was remarkable about these protests was the unity of different generations and how young and old worked together. In Ukraine today, people still talk about what happened, and what would have transpired if students hadn’t been beaten up during the EuroMaidan protests. Would there have been this massive intergenerational mobilization and support? Svets explains that “we” (older activists) understand that the students and younger generation are an important group that we need to cooperate with, because younger activists can make a huge difference. Moreover, older activists need to be aware of the trends among youth, making sure that they will be involved in activism. According to Svets, “if you want to respond to the needs of the population, you have to listen to younger people.” The coming together of different generations persisted after the EuroMaidan protests, and many groups have since stayed together. On this point on intergenerational dynamics, and Ukrainian activism, Svets is clear: “it doesn’t matter how old you are, everyone participates and pitches in to provide services and help others.” In Ukraine, there are many ways for different generations to work together and to support each other, because civil society remains open and active and activism is vibrant and diverse, engaging in a wide variety of activities. Because of similar ongoing challenges with Ukraine’s development, it is easier to communicate across age groups, especially now as Ukrainians see the democratic path that Ukraine is pursuing. Today, young people, in particular, are encouraged to join a political party, which was not always the case when Svets was a student. And despite the ongoing war, there are many opportunities for activism in Ukraine. Young people also have opportunities to win fellowships or to travel abroad, and then Svets believes, they will return to contribute to Ukraine’s democratic future.

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With Russia’s full-​blown invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Svets explains, activists in Ukraine have stepped up their activities and as a result have gained even more societal respect. “Because of our experiences and accomplishments, activists are now perceived by wider society as being a stakeholder group and an important political actor.” The “Heavenly Hundred25” is a good example of this intergenerational solidarity –​people who were killed on Instytutka Street during the EuroMaidan protests in February 2014. The mission of the national memorial complex is to preserve, present, and share information about individuals who have been involved in Ukraine’s struggle for freedom and revitalizing public initiatives to establish democratic life in Ukraine. Again, this is why a generational lens is important to understand the effectiveness and success of activism in Ukraine, because of the range in ages of the people who were killed, from age 16 to 83. There are a lot of stereotypes about young people and their lack of interest in politics, so activists and others are setting up programs with universities to work directly with students to try to get them involved; all of this takes a lot of effort from civil society. The future of Ukrainian activism, like the future life of the country itself, is hard to predict. Currently, the whole society has become one of volunteers, undertaking urgent social tasks related to the war, and many of these volunteers and the groups that were created have changed their activities (as discussed in Chapter 7). For example, anti-​corruption groups have shifted to working internationally on the need for tribunals to judge war crimes. But these changes in the direction of activism are not necessarily a bad thing, as they are responding to evolving problems. Svets emphasizes at least 85% of the population continues to have trust in civil society, a uniquely high level of confidence earned by activists, due to its work since 2014 as a voice for the people. Svets is looking to the future, anticipating that Ukraine will have a different sociological landscape after the war. There will be a huge number of veterans, huge burdens on the state, and a need for massive reconstruction of infrastructure. There will also be a need for mental health recovery. Rebuilding in all ways will be another enormous challenge for Ukrainian civil society. Generations bridging divides

There is a small but important scholarly literature on intergenerational conflicts within social movements, but researchers have spent less time focused on instances and facilitating factors for intergenerational collaboration among activists. This is unfortunate, because as Svets’ story makes plain, intergenerational coalitions and learning across age groups can be essential for successful activist campaigns. From the instances of cross-​generational collaboration we observe in CEE, situations of perceived existential crisis in a society can spur and encourage intergenerational alliances and

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coalitions, which positively impacts activism. In other CEE countries, like BiH, intergenerational collaboration has been rare. Still, we see evidence in certain sectors, and specifically when threats are fundamental and transcend age groups, different generations can build strong coalitions with one another, at least temporarily. On the other hand, if the issues at stake are perceived differently by generations, because of their varied lived experiences, tensions and disagreements can emerge between different cohorts (Garić-​ Humphrey, 2020). In the case Svets describes in Ukraine, different groups of activists and everyday citizens were united by the EuroMaidan struggle in 2014. Different age groups of pro-​democracy activists joined together to defend their country’s democratic independence at a moment of crisis, and especially after student protestors were violently attacked. Research on one point is clear: students and young people are typically the first to protest injustices (Greenberg, 2014; Roberts, 2015). As Samuel Huntington (1993) once wrote, “Students are the universal opposition.” Then, when authorities or opponents crack down on young demonstrators, protest participation expands to include older groups of citizens who are appalled by this violent reaction. This was exactly what occurred during the EuroMaidan protests. As Svets explains, this tragic violence against students in 2014, and the existential threat it posed to Ukraine, provided a unique opportunity for slightly older activists, who had experience in organizing during the Orange Revolution, to join forces with younger activists who were new to protests and the risks involved. Perceived existential threats to a huge category of citizens characterized the Black Protests for reproductive rights in Poland in 201626 and beyond. Up until that point, intergenerational dynamics were more conflictual among Polish feminists, hindering the feminist movement and decreasing the effectiveness of activism. As Mazurek describes, because of the government’s harsh position toward women and reproductive rights, the Black Protests spurred collaboration and cooperation, as women of diverse ages, classes, and regions came together to fight against legislation to restrict access to abortions that they all viewed as a critical deprivation of their basic rights as women. Ever since, women of different age groups in Poland have intentionally come together to talk, discuss strategies, protest, and even dance to show their solidarity.27 In Russia, there have been similarly unifying protests, sparking action28 not only by women of all ages and beyond those who would even call themselves feminists. These protests also included many men who opposed Russia’s partial decriminalization29 of domestic violence in 2017 and were outraged by specific domestic violence cases30 that were not adequately addressed by Russia’s legal system (see Chapter 7). This existential crisis and reactions to it suggest the argument made by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) many years ago in their analysis of successful transnational advocacy campaigns: that the norm against bodily harm to vulnerable individuals is

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one that is largely universal and can bring a wide range of activists together in their efforts. It may be the case that the unifying intergenerational campaigns in Ukraine and among feminists in Poland and Russia will inspire further interest among activists of multiple generations to learn from one another. It is notable, for example, that in Russia, some young feminists have recently picked up the torch to revive and celebrate the histories (or as they prefer, herstories) of Soviet and Russian feminism, in a manner that Olga Lipovskaya would have found heartening. For instance, Ella Rossman, a Russian history graduate student and a co-​author of Chapter 7, produced in 2020 a reprint publication31 of the 1980s Russian Women’s Almanac, with commentaries by current Russian feminists. Another Russian graduate student historian, Asya Khodyreva –​the daughter of a longtime Russian feminist –​is focusing her own research on the history32 of Soviet/​Russian feminist movements. In Poland, Mazurek’s project “Live, Up Close,” involving conversations with young feminists, which began after the unifying Black Protests movement, is another hopeful example of intergenerational collaboration. Challenges and the future

An interesting question for further comparative study is whether intergenerational gaps and conflicts among activists are wider in the CEE region than they are in other regions of the world, especially in countries that have had long histories of stable democratic regimes? If generations are defined and distinguished by crystallizing events during key coming of age periods, the CEE region has had more dramatic events in the past century than many other regions: the collapse of communism, the chaotic 1990s, the sudden possibility of travel or study around the world, war in the Balkan states, encroaching authoritarianism and polarizing left-​ right politics in several countries, and now Russia’s war in Ukraine. These events have been formative experiences for young adults of each period, shaping their social and political views profoundly. If we add this to the usual tendency for young people to reject the advice of their elders, it is not surprising that conflicts may arise in civic activism across generations in CEE. Still, as Mazurek and Svets illustrate, certain kinds of events, including existential crises like war or threats to whole categories of people’s basic wellbeing (like strict abortion laws in Poland) can, at least temporarily, facilitate alliances across different age groups of activists. And this is heartening. In some cases, as we have seen in pro-​democracy and feminist movements in Ukraine, Poland, and Russia, it may even spark lasting and effective intergenerational collaborations that lead to powerful social movements and revolutions. Perhaps, the difference between crucial events that widen divides and those that unite generations is intentional efforts by activists of multiple generations to bridge gaps between them.

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Notes 1 Sandra Gilbert. https://​en.wikipe​dia.org/​wiki/​San​dra_​Gilb​ert 2 Susan Gubar. https://​en.wikipe​dia.org/​wiki/​Susa​n_​Gu​bar 3 Jacek Jaskowiak. www.thema​yor.eu/​en/​pol​and/​poz​nan/​may​ors/​jacek-​jaskow​ iak-​269 4 What is gender mainstreaming. https://​eige.eur​opa.eu/​gen​der-​mainst​ream​ing/​ what-​is-​gen​der-​mainst​ream​ing 5 Poland. https://​eige.eur​opa.eu/​gen​der-​mainst​ream​ing/​countr​ies/​pol​and?lang=​it 6 Like many Slavic languages, the Polish language has necessarily gendered nouns, meaning they must be grammatically masculine or feminine. For that reason, in several countries of the region, including Poland as well as Russia, feminists have advocated for adoption of feminine versions of career names that had previously been mandatorily masculine-​gendered titles. 7 “Black Monday: Polish Women Strike Against Abortion Ban.” (2016). BBC. www.bbc.com/​news/​world-​eur​ope-​37540​139 8 “What We Do.” [translated] (2023) Strajk Kobiet. https://​straj​kkob​iet.eu/​co-​ rob​imy/​ 9 Pruitt, S. (2023). “What Are the Four Waves of Feminism?” History Channel. www.hist​ory.com/​news/​femin​ism-​four-​waves 10 “Councilors in the Morning” [translated]. (2022). Poznań City Hall. www.poz​ nan.pl/​mim/​bm/​news/​ini​cjat​ywy-​radn​ych,c,13/​radne-​o-​pora​nku,175​958.html 11 Mazurek, M. [@marta.mazurek.official]. (2023) [Video]. Instagram. www.instag​ ram.com/​tv/​Cnuo​zD6j​p4d/​?igs​hid=​YmMy​MTA2​M2Y%253D&fbc​lid=​IwAR​ 2aFC​VJwE​oaAG​pMCv​eOGJ​DDJj​wK_​-​Rtcz​kOWw​Jfmh​8pg1​6D6H​KQCq​9y7-​Q 12 This paper distinguishes feminist activism from women’s activism. While women’s activism can focus on many different issues, feminist activism focuses specifically on women’s rights and sexism. 13 Moscow FemFest 2018. www.yout​ube.com/​watch?v=​iPTY​edEO​Jl8 14 Interview with Olga Lipovskaya, Russian feminist and founder of the St. Petersburg Center for Gender Issues, conducted by Valerie Sperling and Lisa Sundstrom, St. Petersburg, May 2019. Mamonova and Voznesenskaia were late Soviet feminists who created the foundational samizdat journal Woman and Russia: An Almanac for Women About Women and were expelled from the country for doing so. See Rochelle Ruthchild, “Sisterhood and Socialism: The Soviet Feminist Movement,” Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 7, no. 2 (1983): 4–​ 12. On the First Independent Women’s Forum in 1991, see Valentina Konstantinova, “The Women’s Movement in the USSR: A Myth or a Real Challenge?” in Women in the Face of Change (New York: Routledge, 1992), 200–​217. 15 Russian Summer Schools on Gender Studies (RSSGS). www.owl.ru/​eng/​women/​ summe​rsch​ool/​index.htm 16 Gender Studies Program. https://​eusp.org/​en/​gen​der-​stud​ies/​about 17 ‘They Want To Shut Me Up’: Russian Artist Vows To Fight ‘Foreign Agent’ Label. www.rferl.org/​a/​russ​ian-​art​ist-​vows-​to-​fight-​fore​ign-​agent-​label/​31027​157.html 18 Women call for tougher EU stance on Poland’s abortion laws. www.aljaze​era.com/​ featu​res/​2022/​11/​18/​women-​call-​for-​toug​her-​eu-​sta​nce-​on-​pola​nds-​abort​ion-​laws 19 Generation Z. www.bri​tann​ica.com/​topic/​Gen​erat​ion-​Z 20 Kennan Institute. (2005, March 8). “Orange Revolution: Ukraine Votes for Change.” Wilson Center. www.wilso​ncen​ter.org/​arti​cle/​ora​nge-​rev​olut​ion-​ukra​ine-​ votes-​for-​cha​nge

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1 Lviv. (2023) In Wikipedia. https://​en.wikipe​dia.org/​wiki/​Lviv 2 22 It was also successful in achieving free and fair elections. 23 “Ukraine’s Other War –​on Corruption.” (2015) NATO Reviews. www.nato.int/​ docu/​rev​iew/​artic​les/​2015/​02/​05/​ukrai​nes-​other-​war-​on-​cor​rupt​ion/​index.html 24 Opora. www.opor​aua.org/​en 25 Heavenly Hundred. www.maida​nmus​eum.org/​en/​node/​348 26 Mass protests in Poland against law banning almost all abortions –​BBC News. www.yout​ube.com/​watch?v=​crGn​IkN4​RBI 27 Taniec przeciw przemocy w Poznaniu. Akcja właśnie 14 lutego, żeby zwrócić uwagę także na przemoc podczas randki. www.faceb​ook.com/​drA.Kozlow​ska/​vid​ eos/​7971​4698​7102​903 28 Russian domestic violence: Women fight back. www.bbc.com/​news/​elect​ion-​ 2019-​50493​758 29 Decriminalisation of domestic violence in Russia leads to fall in reported cases. www.theg​uard​ian.com/​world/​2018/​aug/​16/​decrim​inal​isat​ion-​of-​domes​tic-​viole​ nce-​in-​rus​sia-​leads-​to-​fall-​in-​repor​ted-​cases 30 Putin’s Other War: Domestic Violence, Traditional Values, and Masculinity in Modern Russia. https://​hir.harv​ard.edu/​put​ins-​other-​war/​ 31 40 лет спустя: интервью с авторками переиздания альманаха советских феминисток. https://​daily.afi​sha.ru/​relat​ions​hip/​17395-​40-​let-​spus​tya-​inter​vyu-​s-​ avtork​ami-​pereiz​dann​ogo-​alman​aha-​sovets​kih-​fem​inis​tok/​ 32 Почему нам пора собрать демократический феминистский форум. www.colta.ru/​ artic​les/​she/​27252-​ana​stas​iya-​hodyr​eva-​femin​izm-​ross​iya-​40-​let#ad-​image-​0

References Abramowitz, S.I., & Nassi, A.J. (1981). “Keeping the Faith: Psychosocial Correlates of Activism Persistence into Middle Adulthood.” Journal of Youth and Adolescence 10, no. 6: 507–​523. Bias, L. (2019, November). NGOisation and generational divides in Serbia's feminist movement. Women's Studies International Forum 77, 102292. DeMartini, J.R. (1985). “Change Agents and Generational Relationships: A Reevaluation of Mannheim’s Problem of Generations.” Social Forces 64, no. 1: 1–​16. Garić-​Humphrey, N. (2020). “Negotiating ‘True’ Politics: Intergenerational Dynamics During Social Uprising in Sarajevo, Bosnia-​Herzegovina.” PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 43, no. 1: 69–​86. Graff, A. (2003). “Lost between the Waves? The Paradoxes of Feminist Chronology and Activism in Contemporary Poland.” Journal of International Women’s Studies 4: 18. Greenberg, J. (2014). After the Revolution: Youth, Democracy, and the Politics of Disappointment in Serbia. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Hall, B. (2019). “Gendering Resistance to Right-​Wing Populism: Black Protest and a New Wave of Feminist Activism in Poland?” American Behavioral Scientist 63, no. 10: 1497–​1515. Henderson, S. (2003). Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Huntington, S.P. (1993). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. London: University of Oklahoma Press.

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Keck, M.E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Mannheim, K. (1952). “The Problem of Generations.” In Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 276–​320. London: Routledge. McCourt, D.M. (2012). “The ‘Problem of Generations’ Revisited: Karl Mannheim and the Sociology of Knowledge in International Relations.” In B.J. Steele & J.M. Acuff, eds. Theory and Application of the “Generation” in International Relations and Politics, 47–​70. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US. Nikolayenko, O. (2020). “The Significance of Human Dignity for Social Movements: Mass Mobilisation in Ukraine.” East European Politics 36, no. 3: 445–​462. Pilcher, J. (1994). “Mannheim’s Sociology of Generations: An Undervalued Legacy.” The British Journal of Sociology 45, no. 3: 481–​495. Pop-​ Eleches, G., & Tucker, J.A. (2013). “Associated with the Past? Communist Legacies and Civic Participation in Post-​communist Countries.” East European Politics and Societies 27, no. 1: 45–​68. Rintala, M. (1963). “A Generation in Politics: A Definition.” Review of Politics 25, no. 4: 509–​522. Roberts, K. (2015). “Youth Mobilisations and Political Generations: Young Activists in Political Change Movements during and since the Twentieth Century.” Journal of Youth Studies 18, no. 8: 950–​966. Sloat, A. (2005). “The Rebirth of Civil Society: The Growth of Women’s NGOs in Central and Eastern Europe.” European Journal of Women’s Studies 12, no. 4: 437–​452. Szczygielska, M. (2019). “ ‘Good Change’ and Better Activism: Feminist Responses to Backsliding Gender Policies in Poland. In A. Krizsan, & C. Roggeband, eds. Gendering Democratic Backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe: A Comparative Agenda. Budapest: Central European University Press. Yurchak, A. (2013). Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

5 THE LURE OF DIGITAL ACTIVISM Patrice C. McMahon, Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, Darko Brkan, and Alena Popova

Not that long ago, political participation1 and civic activism,2 by definition, meant that individuals needed to go to physical spaces and to do something (Longley, 2021). Whether this was marching on the streets or meeting with public officials, activities aimed at promoting change required people to be in person. When we recall the mobilization to end communism in this region, we remember crowds of people on the streets, protesting and making demands of the government. In the second decade of the 21st century, this is no longer the case in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) or in many parts of the world. Access to and the prevalence of information and communication technologies (ICT), which includes the internet and social media, provide individuals and organizations with a growing array of strategies for engagement –​without leaving their homes. Although not without problems, the appeal of the virtual world makes activism easier, cheaper, and sometimes even more effective. The Introduction suggested that there are certain advantages to “backwardness,” and that activists in CEE have taken advantage of their historical and political conditions to learn from others and to take advantage of technology. By elevating activists from Russia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), this chapter demonstrates both the importance and effectiveness of digital activism in CEE. Digital activism3 is a form of civic participation that people sometimes label with other names, such as e-​activism, digitally enabled protest, and virtual activism (“What is Digital Media? All You Need to Know About this Booming Industry,” 2022). But regardless of the term used, it takes the form of collective action,4 or actions that are at least partially virtual and conducted online, to achieve a common economic, social, or political goal. Using ICT for mobilization and action has fundamentally altered what DOI: 10.4324/9781003466116-5

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activism looks like, and where and how it appears in CEE. At the same time, this form of activism is also difficult to measure and sustain. Because digital activism discourages hierarchy, it offers more opportunities for individuals to act alone and to share their personal stories. It can, moreover, manifest itself in ways that combine both virtual and in-​person actions, and it evolves as needed and as circumstances allow. This chapter discusses the growth of digital activism in the CEE region, the opportunities and obstacles this form of activism faces, and why it is important for the goals civic activists seeks to achieve. It does so by highlighting the stories of two activists in CEE –​Alena Popova from Russia and Darko Brkan from BiH –​who vividly illustrate the dynamics of digital activism on two diverse topics, violence against women and government accountability, including impact. We start with Popova’s story of embracing digital activism to bring social and political change to deter violence against women. Alena Popova –​fighting for women, their rights, and their lives in Russia

The trajectory of Alena Popova’s civic activism in Russia illustrates how digital tools can be particularly effective in mobilizing regular citizens for political change. Popova’s experiences also demonstrate that these same tools and strategies have their dark sides and can facilitate online disinformation and the harassment of activists. In 2014, Popova received a call from her pregnant friend Olga (pseudonym for safety). Olga was in hospital, having been beaten by her husband and miscarried her baby. Yet, a day later, when Popova visited the hospital again, her friend explained that her husband had come to see her and brought flowers. Defending her husband’s actions, she told Popova, “He is perfect; he is my future. Perhaps this was all my fault5” (Gentleman, 2015). Popova understood the situation well. She had seen it many times before. Although domestic violence is common in Russia, few are willing to name it, and even fewer are willing to say that any crime was committed. In Russia, there are no laws against domestic violence. When Olga lost her baby, Popova was already a journalist and starting to appreciate the power of the internet and social media. As a girl growing up in Ekaterinburg, Popova wanted to be a TV journalist. In 1999, with a journalism degree in hand, she made her way to Moscow to seek work in television broadcasting, but her Siberian accent put her at a disadvantage. The only good advice she received was that she should enroll in a program on cyber journalism. Despite her dislike for computers, she was soon hooked. The internet was still underdeveloped in Russia, but her computer-​savvy friends convinced her that the future of the world was online. In the 2000s,

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as a journalist in Putin’s Russia, Popova realized that she had less and less freedom over the stories she could report on. Putin’s desire to control the media made it hard for any journalist to have an independent voice. As the situation in Russia steadily deteriorated, she accepted that she needed to find a different way to report on what was happening in Russia outside of traditional media formats. After a trip to the United States in 2009, Popova started to think of different ways she could realize her goals, using her new technological skills in Information Technology (IT) while gaining the professional independence she sought. By this point, Popova was impressed by technology’s ability to influence people, particularly what it could do for ordinary women in Russia. Modeling what she saw in the United States, Popova started to bring together Russian women to talk about IT, entrepreneurship, and how they could leverage technology to hold government accountable, tell their own stories, and even make money. Urged on by her friends, in 2011, Popova ran for a seat in the State Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament. She did not win, but she continued to look for creative ways to make change in Russia, especially around women’s rights. Frustrated with traditional journalism, she started to experiment on platforms like YouTube and Facebook. For Popova, this was an easy way to keep people informed, without editors taking out the most important parts of the story. Popova’s budding digital activism may have been exactly why her friend Olga called Popova in 2014. When Popova left the hospital, she already knew what she would do and how she could help her friend and millions of other women in Russia. She would take the issue of domestic violence online, using different social media platforms to elevate her friend’s story and other stories like it. Since it was taboo in Russia to talk about these topics in the government-​controlled media, online campaigns gave voice and space to victims who could anonymously share their stories and, hopefully, realize that they were not alone. While statistics were hard to come by, Popova believed that as many as 16 million women in Russia were victims of domestic violence every year6 (AFP, 2019). She also knew that women were often not protected by the police and therefore had to figure out how to defend themselves. And this had been the end of the story because the government does not collect data on domestic violence. Given this, Popova made it her mission to gather the facts and provide the context, putting the stories of average women online to make Russians, especially those in power, aware of domestic violence in Russia (Photo 5.1). By 2018, with a newly minted law degree, Popova became involved in a complicated and high-​profile legal case involving three sisters, Maria, Angelina, and Kristina Khachaturyan,7 who killed their father in self-​defense after years of his abuse (Luxmore, 2020). Popova’s job was not in the courtroom but in the court of public opinion.

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PHOTO 5.1 Picture

of Alena Popova.

Late one summer night, she received an interesting message from a famous Russian influencer, Sasha Mitroshina8 (2017) who told her, “I can help you with the sisters’ case.” Although Popova’s efforts failed,8 in the sense that all three Khachaturyan sisters were eventually indicted, and they still await trial, pending investigation into their fathers’ abuse, the offer of help from Mitroshina became a turning point for Popova’s activism. In fact, it totally transformed how she shared information and got her message out, discovering the world of Instagram and what it could do. Previously, Popova thought Instagram was about “lovely pictures, beauty, and happy lives.” Mitroshina pledged to help Popova learn how to tell women’s stories of domestic abuse by using Instagram. Although Mitroshina was only in her early 20s, she knew how powerful social media could be in connecting with average people and telling their stories. Better yet, the internet got people to act; as the adage goes, “Don’t just tell, show.” This is exactly what the internet and Instagram offered: easy and cheap ways to show people. Images and videos were also more powerful than words for evoking emotions and action. Blending her knowledge of law with her growing expertise online, Popova started to put her support behind a new petition to create legislation on domestic violence. Telling the stories of victims of domestic violence in grave detail, the graphic online campaign

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Popova and her new young team created included pictures of women wearing makeup simulating cuts and bruises, with the slogan, “I did not want to die.9” (“Flashmob #IDidn’tWantToDie,” 2021). What Popova did not fully realize at the time was that although about 70% of her audience on social media were women, she did not really know how to communicate with them directly. Now, Mitroshina had taught her how to connect with women and to tell their stories. Most importantly, she learned how to show others what domestic violence looks like while informing about its prevalence in Russian society. Russian women could also use their own words and images, making them realize that they too can make a difference. For Popova, five years later, using the internet and social media to educate people and amplify messages is a “no brainer.” What is essential is not just explaining to people what is happening: but showing them. And thanks to Mitroshina and other young influencers in Russia, Popova has honed her online skills and is now a social media celebrity with thousands of followers. The keys to being an effective social influencer are, according to Popova, quite easy. Show people who you are and express your emotions. It is passion that matters, and this is what gets people mobilized. This is what changes their minds. In no time, Popova had several mentors, women in their teens and 20s who were themselves social media celebrities with millions of followers, supporting her domestic violence campaign. With her team, Popova tried a few more times to become a politician. Although she has not succeeded yet, she knows that her digital activism is working. For example, when a bill on domestic violence10 was being considered at a meeting at the State Duma of politicians, judges, and members of law enforcement in 2019, Popova saw first-​hand how powerful social media campaigns could be. As she braced herself for battle with these officials over domestic violence legislation, the speaker of the Duma immediately put her at ease, saying: “We’re for the law, don’t worry. You can relax.” Online campaigns and flash mobs may not have made it to these individuals, but the stories of the victims and their images had made their way to the officials’ children and grandchildren. As Popova explains, through social media, “We touched the hearts of these people, and that is exactly what digital activism can do.” Popova is not naïve. She knows that while digital activism can amplify her messages cheaply and easily, helping to push for positive changes in Russia, it can also do harm. One way of measuring Popova’s success is the number of enemies she has created, especially among “anti-​gender” conservatives within and beyond Putin’s government. Importantly, her opponents are also using online technology to discredit Popova and her team, engaging in disinformation campaigns about Popova, victims of domestic violence, and other activists11 (Merkuryeva & Coalson, 2021). In Putin’s Russia, Popova’s career in cyber journalism has transformed into a cyber war, with critics

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and opponents spreading falsehoods to undermine Popova and prevent the passage of legislation on domestic violence. In 2021, Popova’s activism helped her earn the Galina Starovoitova fellowship at the Woodrow Wilson center in Washington, DC, where she currently conducts research on digital authoritarianism and its impact on human rights and democracy. But her commitment to digital activism and to work with young Russian women has not only helped individuals; it has elevated digital activism in Russia as a means of achieving political and social change. Recently, some of her fellow digital warriors, studying and living in the United States, have launched a new online movement, Students against Dictatorship, which is opposed to Russia’s war in Ukraine (sad media, 2022). Popova’s activism has been particularly effective at using digital images and videos online, combining them with her legal knowledge and journalistic skills of telling personalized stories, to harness support for her campaigns. Because of this work and her other criticisms of the government, the Russian Ministry of Justice listed Popova as a foreign agent12 in October 2022. The Russian government’s response to Popova’s digital activism is symptomatic of broader trends throughout the region. Although new internet technologies may offer more opportunities for collective and connective action previously unavailable to activists, they also present challenges to digital campaign organizers to keep up with the latest platforms to reach their audiences while avoiding government censure. And autocratic governments have adopted, used, and spread disinformation campaigns,13 shut down access to online platforms14 (as Russia has with Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter in 2022), while governments of all types created new surveillance techniques to monitor online activities (“Influence Campaigns and Disinformation,” 2022). Moreover, although popular and user-​friendly social media and video content platforms are extremely useful to activists, corporate ownership structures controlling them also contain risks in terms of data privacy, surveillance, and potential future costs to users. These platforms also sometimes agree to government demands for information, access, censorship, and surveillance to maintain markets and increase revenues. But before we discuss further these challenges, we turn more broadly to the evolution and goals of digital activism in the region. The evolution and goals of digital activism

Popova’s story illustrates the evolution of digital activism in CEE and how quickly it has become so central to mobilizing people and sharing information within Russia. It also demonstrates, as suggested in the Introduction, that activists in CEE are using technology to respond to democratic backsliding and push back against illiberalism. Historically, it was governments that exploited new technology to concentrate power and to use it over or against

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society. However, in the late 1990s and with the advent of mobile phones, average people gained access to personal technology, allowing them to connect with others and to organize themselves. Although it took a while for this technology to make its way to CEE, starting in the early 2000s, citizens were using phones to text and call but also to bring people together. By this point, individuals also started using platforms like Facebook to inform, protest, advocate, and mobilize for change. So-​called smart mobs15 were also used to bring people together to share information and advocate for change. Over time, these technologies have provided new, alternative ways of participating in the public realm. Examples include political chat rooms, remote electronic voting in elections, referenda and plebiscites, petitions to change laws, and the mobilization of virtual communities. In the beginning of the 2010s, activists used digital tools to encourage individuals to create, post, and share information as part of their online campaigns16; in Popova’s case, she advocated for policies that would criminalize domestic violence while encouraging an informal social movement to promote women’s rights.17 These strategies further extended activists’ decentralized networks (Daigneault, 2011; “Social Movement,” 2022). As technologies evolved, new tactics and actions were adopted and adapted to advance political or social causes; these included hacktivism,18 Distributed Denial-​of-​Service (DDoS) attacks,19 open source advocacy, and hashtag activism,20 like Popova’s #ЯНеХотелаУмирать (#IDidn’tWantToDie) campaign to empower individuals to participate in campaigns to change social attitudes and policy on domestic violence. In another example, Facebook was used quite effectively in Poland’s western city of Poznań in 2018 to bring people together to protest the government’s failure to create enough green spaces in the city’s downtown (“The Power of ‘The Street’,” 2022). According to Franciszek Sterczewski,21 activists and ordinary people used Facebook to invite others to “picnics” around town, mobilizing people without attracting the government’s attention (“Franciszek Sterczewski,” 2022). Especially for young people, participating in online campaigns, sharing information about civic action, raising awareness, or organizing events online is now common. In important ways, digital activism has revitalized mass participation in public affairs, even in countries where authorities have shrunk (Poland) or dramatically reduced (Russia) public space. In fact, as one digital activist in Poland put it in 2019, it is crucial to include online activities in any analysis of civic activism in this region, because the divisions between online and offline activities are neither clear-​cut nor that important and leveraging technology to engage citizens has a growing impact on Polish society.22 But Russia and Poland are not exceptions, and digital activism is common throughout the entire region. As these examples show, a key goal of digital activism is merely to encourage citizens to participate and mobilize. For decades, activists in CEE

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were distinctly aware that they were economically, technologically, and organizationally behind their counterparts in Western Europe and North America. In the last two decades, and as new democracies struggled or experienced democratic backsliding,23 activists like Alena Popova made up for lost time (Bermeo, 2016). Although this was not true for all countries in CEE, Russian activists were pushed to the virtual world and to online platforms, because the government prevented journalists from publishing on issues considered taboo, critical of the government, or focused on gender. Digital activism can make it easier, cheaper, and safer for ordinary people to participate in social and political activities. In fact, they have advantages of developing later, because once a country catches up, it is often able to make incredible advances quickly. For example, by the time smart phones were popular throughout the region, there were already sophisticated online platforms like Facebook and Instagram, allowing activists to use social media regularly. Digital activism is about what is called “connective action,24” which purposefully utilizes information systems to organize and communicate news or facts and to amplify messages (Bennet, 2014; Vaast et al., 2017). While activism in the past relied on people engaging in activities in large numbers and in person (demonstrating collective action), digital activism allows individuals to participate in voluntary self-​expression, sharing information and views in a way that creates networks. These issue-​oriented and even multi-​issue networks can be completely online25 and virtual or they can be hybrid, containing both digital and in-​person components. In CEE today, digital action tactics are part of activists’ toolkit for social change. Even low-​level action on social media may lead to greater involvement, such as volunteering, and this is intensified if others in a social network are involved. Reinforcement is a key facet of social media that provides an abundance of reminders, reiterations, and confirmations from one’s social network. The connections made by individuals or the networks created are not just precursors of collective action, they are themselves organizational structures that can transcend individuals and geographic locations. Moreover, unlike collective action and traditional social movements, digital participation tends to have less hierarchy while encouraging cross-​border solidarity. This why some suggest that these “liberation technologies” have the potential to revolutionize societies (Wigmore, 2022). Despite some calling it slacktivism,26 because it does not require much physical activity, digital activism does not merely imitate in-​ person participation in CEE (Wigmore, 2022). Instead, this virtual space has become a vibrant ecosystem in which digitally native generations of citizens create culture, forge shared grievances and aspirations, and engage with the world. Practically, all contemporary social movements in CEE have established online footprints, if only because digital space is far too crucial a battlefield to

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cede in the struggle against anti-​democratic action, including disinformation. Clearly, the digital age is changing the nature of social movements, if not guaranteeing their success. Consider social media. By dramatically reducing coordination costs, social media facilitates decentralized and sometimes even leaderless27 protests that are quick to mobilize but difficult to repress once they gather momentum (Tufekci, 2017). In CEE, this kind of organizing is also more important, because in the last three decades, people were reluctant to join civic groups or formal nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Comparative research on membership in NGOs or civil society organizations (CSOs), in fact, suggests a bleak but misleading story regarding civic activism in CEE. In a region where people were once forced by communist governments to join state-​run peace groups and student organizations, and to march in communist party parades, a lack of interest in joining groups is not particularly surprising, particularly for older individuals. At the same time, for young people who grew up with social media, digital activism is an intuitive and attractive way to engage civically. In 2023, when activism is less formally organized, more localized, and increasingly online, membership in organizations is not particularly useful for understanding activism or measuring civic engagement. While it is difficult to measure how much digital activism exists in CEE today, almost every country in CEE in the last decade has had at least one major online campaign. For example, Slovakia’s “#I do care about it” (#niejenamtojedno28) contributed to the resignation of the Prime Minister, who faced serious corruption allegations, in 2018. The other, related goal of digital activism involves achieving social or political change. As Popova’s powerful story suggests, activists in CEE are now making the most of technology that took longer to arrive and take root to advance human rights. Popova’s online petition demanded that the Russian government adopt a law against domestic violence. Evidence that she raised widespread public awareness of this issue includes the nearly one million signatures she obtained for the proposed law. Darko Brkan, the activist we profile below, has used digital activism to strengthen democratic accountability in BiH, forcing the resignation of a corrupt official. Yet, the goals of digital activism are not inherently pro-​democratic or pro-​human rights. In Russia, the misogynistic, homophobic group “Male State29” has engaged in aggressive social media campaigns to harass feminists and LGBTQ+​people. Globally, social media has sometimes facilitated the undermining and even toppling of democratically elected governments and coups, such as through the Yellow Shirts movement in Thailand.30 Thus, the kind of change digital activism seeks to bring about, including its relationship to democracy, needs to be investigated rather than assumed.

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Explaining the growth of digital activism in CEE

The reasons for the growth of digital activism are varied. In CEE, countries that are catching up economically, and where traditional civic organizing is sometimes more difficult, it is not surprising that digital activism has become so appealing as internet access has grown rapidly since the 2000s. Online activism is not only inexpensive and easy to engage in, but it has the potential to make geography less relevant, allowing individuals to communicate with people everywhere. But especially in countries that have experienced democratic backsliding in the last decade, like Russia, Hungary, and Poland, social media technologies offer a safer way to reach constituencies and to communicate in many settings. In CEE countries experiencing democratic backsliding, there is a notice­ able shift in where activism happens and the growth of digital activism, because of fear of government reprisals against in-​person engagement. This is certainly true for issues that are sensitive to these governments, like human rights, reproductive rights, and LGBTQ+​rights. Polish scholars, for example, highlight this important shift to online activism, as well as the growth of grassroots and local activism which is facilitated by technology. Called “new social movements” by some Polish scholars, these online social initiatives are intentionally creating virtual alternatives to existing civil and socio-​economic models of activism and traditional NGOs or CSOs. As Popova’s story suggests, there are obvious advantages to participating in activities online, especially in countries where the government is autocratic and is inclined to punish protestors, like Russia. In Hungary, the group One Million for the Freedom of the Press in Hungary, or “Milla,31” was created in late 2010 in response to the newly elected Fidesz government and the creation of what critics called a one-​party state (Wilkin et al., 2015). Established after the government’s introduction of a new media law, Milla provided an online platform to challenge government policies. Milla had no formal leadership or governing body, and it organized itself through regular meetings and online interaction between its key members, referring to itself as a ‘grassroots movement for activists’ intent on keeping alive a critical voice in Hungary. Its Facebook page served as a virtual wall for stories that would not likely appear in the traditional Hungarian media and to generate action. As in Russia, social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are extensively used to create alternative online publics with their own tools and technologies and to facilitate mobilization. In recent years in Russia, this practice has been crucially important, as repression of dissenting voices has heightened, especially since Russia’s full-​ scale attack on Ukraine in February 2022. However, because many global platforms have been banned, this has necessitated quick and nimble actions by activists to maintain their audiences’ access to their communications,

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such as informing audiences how to access VPN networks to bypass bans and avoid state online surveillance. Many Russian NGOs, such as OVD-​ Info,32 a longtime documenter of police abuses in the country, also moved to social media channels like Telegram, after their website was blocked within Russia (OVD-​INFO, 2022). OVD-​Info has been able to provide advice and information updates quickly to their 187,000 subscribers while gathering reports from followers about protests and arrests, as government censorship of independent information further tightened. Organizing through the internet is quite appealing for people who are wary of organizations and the hierarchy that often comes with NGOs. This is often the case in CEE, which experienced a dramatic boom in NGO growth in the 1990s, thanks to funding from Western countries and international organizations. Since digital activism is non-​ hierarchical, dispersed, and decentralized, it does not always require a leader, which is attractive to activists in post-​Communist countries where politics tends to be more hierarchically organized. Akcja Demokracja33 (Action Democracy) in Poland, for example, was established in 2015 by a handful of people who believed that Polish NGOs were distant, outdated, and ineffective. Its members also wanted to cultivate an “open style environment” in Poland, fostering a community of people who are committed to advancing progressive, democratic causes and protecting human rights, rule of law, and the environment, which was a response to a new style of government introduced by the party that started using anti-​democratic methods. Yet, the founders did not want to create just another NGO that would require donors, funding, and office space and “concentrated on its own survival.” They instead created an online platform that provided a virtual space for people with similar values the opportunity to act, often on issues of national significance. Importantly, digital activism has the potential to be truly grassroots and reflect the interests and goals of ordinary people. As Popova explained, digital activism is particularly popular among younger people who are eager for ways to authentically express themselves and their grievances. In fact, some say digital activism is essential today because of the ubiquity of online activities throughout CEE. Another advantage of digital activism is that it rarely works in isolation, and it usually operates in tandem with other forms of activism, helping organize events and support organizations. As Darko Brkan’s story of the campaign to bring down a Bosnian regional prime minister will show, digital activism in Bosnia is often supported in person activism, using different tools, formats, and content for civic engagement and political participation to support democracy. Similarly, Komitet Obrony Demokracji-​ KOD (the Committee for the Defense of Democracy) in Poland operates both online and in person. As one KOD activist explained, “Our movement arose as a reaction to the abuses of power that began to attack democratic institutions.”34 KOD

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leaders intentionally did not want to create an NGO. Instead, they wanted to support “a few forms of protest and political participation” (Karolewski, 2016). Since 2016, it is registered as an association, but instead of creating a single organization that engages in one activity, it facilitates different discussions and campaigns, like those described next in profiled activist Brkan’s Zašto ne? organization. It organizes educational and social activities both in person and online, encouraging its supporters to demonstrate in the streets, distribute leaflets, and keep others informed.35 Technology allows and encourages activists to respond quickly, and it offers the possibility of anonymity. Nevertheless, digital activism can be dangerous, especially as repressive governments become savvier at undermining activists’ ability to retain anonymity, through tracing IP address origins or monitoring online communications. Some governments, like Russia’s, are even criminalizing various forms of information dissemination online. For example, the young feminist activist and artist Yulia Tsvetkova was tried and placed under house arrest on “gay propaganda” charges in 2019 for her website content of body-​positive drawings of female genitalia, though eventually acquitted36 in 2022 (Wertheimer, 2022). Many other LGBTQ+​information websites in Russia have been shut down37 under the same law. For activists, engaging and participating online is beneficial not only because it is less expensive and safer than protesting in the streets but it also solves other challenges by bringing people together. There are, in fact, many good reasons why people often decide not to mobilize and engage in political or social activities. Before the internet, it was hard and costly to become involved, because of the time and resources needed to inform people about a perceived injustice and to organize. Now, ordinary people can be engaged in collective action and arrange events ‘without much advance planning,’ and they no longer rely on slow and costly means of contacting and coordinating. Darko Brkan’s story of civic activism in BiH highlights the lure and potential of digital activism but also some of the challenges of digital activism as technology evolves and governments also use information and communication technologies to maintain their power and advance their goals. Darko Brkan –​holding government accountable in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Darko Brkan grew up during war in BiH that started in the early 1990s. He was practical and while his family imagined that he would become an engineer like so many of his family members, Brkan only remembers that as a boy, he was always hungry (Photo 5.2). Thus, he wanted to become a butcher to have access to good quality meat. His experiences with BiH’s war that lasted until the end of 1995 with the Dayton Peace Accords,38 however, fundamentally

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PHOTO 5.2 Picture

of Darko Brkan.

changed his course. During the conflict, his family moved around Serbian, Croatian, and Bosniak-​dominated parts of the country, trying to find safety. After his mother was wounded, Brkan realized safety was elusive, and he learned how important it was to be prepared for anything. Brkan’s first activism had nothing to do with digital platforms. It was just after the war ended in BiH and before such tools were available. At that time, military service was compulsory for all young men. Having lived through war, he did not want to be forced to serve in the military. He learned that in some Western countries there was an alternative to mandatory conscription and individuals could instead opt for public service. Once he started thinking about conscription, demilitarization, and the values that were important to him, he realized that it would not matter how good he was at whatever career he chose (in Brkan’s case, information science and technology), he would not be able to succeed if he lived in a society that didn’t hold any prospect of fulfilling those values. This was Brkan’s initial reason for devoting himself full-​time to activism: he wanted to change BiH. And then “one thing led to another.” Following his conscientious objection to activism, and because of the corruption and lack of transparency in BiH in the mid-​2000s, Brkan started to collaborate with like-​minded people to create a social movement called “Dosta!” (Enough!) to hold public officials accountable. Even though “accountability” is a word that does not have a direct translation in the Bosnian language, Brkan realized that only by everyone in the society being accountable to one another –​whether they are politicians, media, citizens,

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or whomever –​could BiH become “a proper society.” The informal group decided to focus its work on holding public officials to account for corruption and serious misdeeds. Fortunately, the creation of Dosta! coincided with the expanded use of digital technology. At that time, in the mid-​2000s, the internet was expanding rapidly in BiH, with the use of computers, mobile devices, and the beginning of social networks. Between 2005 and 2010, and following his university studies, Brkan looked for ways to incorporate his education in IT into his activism. He realized that, as with traditional in-​person activism, in which you need to go to where people gather, like a central city square, to get their attention, activists now needed to go to digital spaces that were becoming “the major square” of people’s lives and for civic participation and activism. The first of many campaigns that taught him this lesson was in 2008–​2009 after a tragic incident in Sarajevo39 where a young man was killed in the middle of the day in a tram full of people (Latal, 2019a). In response, Dosta! mounted a campaign demanding that the mayor of the city and the prime minister of the Sarajevo Canton region resign because of the lack of security in the city. For this campaign, Dosta! organized offline and in-​person protests, as well as other campaign activities. Initially, they failed to get those officials to resign. However, months later, in 2008, there were local elections, and the party of the prime minister and of the mayor lost heavily, arguably because of the campaign that Dosta! had led against them. Later that year, Dosta! uncovered a corrupt real estate transaction undertaken by the Prime Minister of the Federation, Nedžad Branković, who had purchased an apartment for his own personal use, through a government program that provided highly subsidized apartments for victims and veterans of the 1990s war in BiH. This time Dosta! went after the prime minister using online organizing tactics. Brkan and his colleagues realized then that “the government… didn’t know how to respond to online [actions], and it was for us much cheaper and easier to organize online.” The peak of the campaign occurred when some people wrote graffiti on the prime minister’s apartment building, saying “give back the apartment.” In Brkan’s words, the prime minister then “made a big mess out of this.” He used the police to interrogate people and claim that there was a major security threat to his family. A primetime TV news show followed, in which one of Brkan’s friends was a guest. Dosta! managed to get the TV host to ask the guest: “Who wrote the graffiti?” –​which was the hot topic of the day, the month, even the year in BiH. The guest replied: “I wrote the graffiti.” But the activists in Dosta! had conspired to call one by one into the show to say, “No, it wasn’t him; I wrote the graffiti! Come and arrest me if you want to question me!” This spiraled into a Facebook page where users posted that they had written graffiti. In two days, approximately 20,000 people had joined the Facebook page, saying the same thing. Simultaneously, they were

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calling and writing emails to the police, confessing to “the crime.” After a month of these activities, and because it was also close to the 2010 elections, the prime minister was forced to resign from office in May 2009.40 According to Brkan, this was how Dosta! moved into the realm of an online group that was recognized as one that could do important things and influence political change. Having organized an online campaign that led to the resignation of a prime minister, suddenly Brkan had credibility like never before. It also allowed him to expand the activities of another citizens’ association, “Zašto ne (Why not)?” which was created in 2001. Although “Zašto ne?” was established as a peace organization with the aim of working on demilitarization and the right to conscientious objection in BiH, Brkan and others were keen to broaden its mission to focus on government accountability and creating a safe, healthy, active, and responsible society, using digital tools. Digital activism has many benefits for Brkan and his colleagues. One is that digital platforms allow them to organize multiple campaigns with different goals simultaneously and in parallel, giving each of them a different “brand.” The Zašto ne association thus has five or six “flagship projects” that are focused on different tasks, such as advocacy, monitoring, media fact-​ checking, and politician fact-​checking. This allows the organization’s teams to shift from project to project while maintaining clear and separate identities for each without confusing audiences. This would be more difficult to achieve with in-​person activities and a physical location. When organizations do too many things, citizens also suspect that the organization is not credible because it is spreading itself too thinly. Multi-​pronged campaigns online also make it possible for Zašto ne to test out strategies easily on small audiences, before expanding and launching much bigger digital campaigns. There are, of course, many challenges with digital activism. Brkan points to the profit motives of tech platform companies, which increasingly build information ecosystems that are echo chambers, exploiting people’s emotions and their biases. Unfortunately, he says, this has led to politicians doing the same thing, realizing that if politicians are pushing messages that people want to hear, they do not have to be concerned with whether their messages are well informed or even truthful. In 2022, for example, a regional election campaign was taking place in one of BiH’s two entities (Republika Srpska) during Russia’s war against Ukraine. The leader of the governmental right-​ wing Bosnian Serb party, the only strong pro-​Russian party in the country, claimed that Zašto ne’s research findings on his government’s failings were wrong and accused Zašto ne of being foreign mercenaries paid by the U.S. government. Since the war in Ukraine has become such a polarizing issue, misleading and false information is being promoted on both sides of the conflict to influence public opinion. These messages are amplified within their own loyal echo chambers. Brkan argues that to fix this problem, tech

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companies need to be held accountable for their practices and the algorithms that maximize profit by encouraging further polarization of audiences. It is also the true that online petitions and campaigns sometimes fail to make a difference and contribute to citizen fatigue and apathy. In other words, “If you’re going to say, ‘Commit to my cause, let’s gather a million online signatures to get this dealt with,’ you’re going to present it as a good thing if you collected a million signatures. But you might be able to solve the issue. And if you fail at that, they’re not going to come back to you.” Even if it is not your fault, people feel deceived and dispirited. For Brkan, another challenge with digital activism is the increasing rate of generational change in the social media and communication platforms that citizens use. In such an environment, it is hard to hire and maintain staff who can anticipate and keep up. As Brkan puts it: If you look at everybody between age 30 and 55, they are using the same technology. Those over 55 use no technology or almost no technology, 20 to 30 use one thing, but already that one thing is outdated. Then, from age 16 to 22 you have three generations in terms of what their user experience is and how different it is. People my age can all relate to being on Facebook, on internet portals, and on some sort of email provider. But if you go younger than us, then you see at least four different generations of technology. Online activists and groups, thus, need to put in more effort and resources into reaching younger audiences while still having someone from each of these generations to communicate effectively. Brkan’s Zašto ne? and Dosta! initiatives are good examples of the many ways activists in BiH are using ICT, relying on a variety of strategies to promote government accountability, encourage civic participation, and improve democracy in BiH. This activism includes distinct kinds of activities and tactics, some of which are in person, like protests, flash mobs, and marches, while others are focused on raising awareness, debunking misinformation, and changing social norms. Often, however, it involves a combination of in-​ person and online activities. Many of the outcomes are intangible and hard to measure. Online campaigns that garner significant public support or signatures from citizens but do not result in policy change may, as Brkan suggests, lead to supporters becoming frustrated and withdrawing from civic engagement. Still, Brkan believes that political activism of any kind is important to support democracy, even when it does not produce immediate or tangible results. Challenges and the future

There are many advantages to engaging politically and civically online. There are also downsides to personalized, individualized, and technologically

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organized processes that can reduce the importance of collective identity framing and formal organizational structures that require resources for membership. Even Popova and Brkan, who recognize the power of digital activism, readily admit that the presence and growth of digital activism does not necessarily mean that face-​to-​face interactions are irrelevant or that in-​ person activism is completely outdated. Quite the contrary in fact. Sharing physical space, meeting in person, and leadership are equally important to creating a strong, sustainable movement and to achieving goals. Some claim that engaging in “high-​risk activism” in physical locations rather than anonymous online actions leads to more movement success in achieving their goals (McAdam, 1986; Gladwell, 2010; Kidd & McIntosh, 2016). This is why some scholars suggest that digitally enabled forms of protest tend to be short-​lived and temporary, issue or event-​focused, and are increasingly subject to advanced forms of digital state control and surveillance (Morozov, 2012). However, in CEE, digital activism often goes hand in hand with in-​ person activism and alongside activities by CSOs and NGOs. Horizontal, less hierarchical digital activism and digital movements do have their own perils. Research has shown that networks and campaigns that rely less on single individuals–​whether online or in person –​lack shared consistent messaging and risk losing momentum (Price, 2017). They often crumble in the face of external threats and challenges due to a lack of decision-​making procedures (Tufekci, 2017). Milla’s history in Hungary demonstrates the limitations of virtual solidarity that is not rooted in physical organizations (Wilkin et al., 2015). Milla, for example, sought to make geographic location unimportant, but this ended up being a problem for the virtual movement. Since its founders were based in Budapest and were mostly individuals in academia, even the digital environment could not overcome this reality, and it limited Milla’s appeal and capacity to reach wider Hungarian society. Although virtual status allows campaigns to turn to forces outside the country for support, this can also present challenges and backlash. This is exactly what happened with Milla, using its online status and transnational contacts to mobilize support globally in a manner that is now common practice. However, this led to a debate among supporters and critics alike over the role and influence of foreign actors. Many argued that since Milla is addressing Hungarian concerns, these are problems that can and should only be solved by Hungarians. In this way, gaining foreign support through online activities, while initially an advantage, became a distraction and liability for Milla. The limitations of virtual solidarity in this context came to light when Milla decided to enter formal political life41 by creating a formal organization with official members. What is clear is that repressive governments like those in Russia and Hungary (and elsewhere around the world) are themselves embracing

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technology to increase censorship and surveillance to limit online activism. These governments are also increasingly reaching beyond their borders through digital means42 of transnational repression43 to threaten digital activists who have sought refuge in other countries (Al-​Jizawi et al., 2022; “Transnational Repression: About the Project,” 2022). A new era of digital authoritarianism is increasingly relying on algorithmic content monitoring, facial recognition, and spyware to track what activists are saying and doing online. As governments become more sophisticated, they may even prevent people from being active online. Activists are, of course, responding in kind, adopting various measures like using VPNs, encryption, and vanishing messages to fight back against these new forms of government repression. Digital activism is cause for neither triumphalism nor despair, but it does require more attention and careful consideration, especially in CEE. As activists try to preserve the benefits of digital activism, while mitigating the risks and state involvement, it is likely to continue to become more prevalent and popular. It will not, however, operate in isolation from other forms of activism, as the work of Popova and Brkan demonstrate. And while digital activism has been quite useful to activists and to fomenting political and social change, its future is uncertain. Debates over its outlook have created camps among practitioners and scholars –​of cyber-​optimists and cyber-​pessimists. Optimists assume that new technology will not only facilitate activism, but that it will enable protests that will be more effective over time. Cyber-​pessimists, on the other hand, argue either that the internet will not have a substantial effect on activists’ ability to mobilize or that it might even have a negative effect. Between these poles is the largest group of scholars and practitioners like us, who acknowledge the benefits of new digital strategies and tactics for activism, while recognizing that the effects tend to be a matter of degree and carry their own risks and downsides. As Popova herself recognizes, governments now understand the lure of the virtual world and its potential power. Governments are thus looking for new ways to monitor what people say and do. Understanding how activists will resist governments and advance public issues while effectively coupling online and offline mobilization will therefore be a key topic in the years ahead. Notes 1 What Is Political Participation? Definition and Examples. www.though​tco.com/​ politi​cal-​partic​ipat​ion-​def​i nit​ion-​examp​les-​5198​236 2 Civic Activism. https://​isd.iss.nl/​home/​civic-​activ​ism/​ 3 Digital activism. www.bri​tann​ica.com/​topic/​digi​tal-​activ​ism 4 Collective action. https://​en.wikipe​dia.org/​wiki/​Collec​tive​_​act​ion 5 Breaking the taboo: the Moscow women taking a stand against domestic violence. www.theg​uard​ian.com/​cit​ies/​2015/​jun/​10/​mos​cow-​domes​tic-​viole​nce-​prob​lem-​ rus​sia

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6 Over 650,000 sign Russia petition to boost domestic violence law. www.then​ews. com.pk/​print/​505​577-​over-​650-​000-​sign-​rus​sia-​petit​ion-​to-​boost-​domes​tic-​viole​ nce-​law 7 How the killing of an abusive father by his daughters fueled Russia’s culture wars. www.theg​uard​ian.com/​world/​2020/​mar/​10/​khach​atur​yan-​sist​ers-​kill​ing-​of-​abus​ ive-​fat​her-​rus​sia-​trial-​fam​ily-​val​ues 8 How the killing of an abusive father by his daughters fueled Russia’s culture wars. www.theg​uard​ian.com/​world/​2020/​mar/​10/​khach​atur​yan-​sist​ers-​kill​ing-​of-​abus​ ive-​fat​her-​rus​sia-​trial-​fam​ily-​val​ues 9 #ЯНеХотелаУмирать. (#IDidn’tWantToDie) Ihttps://​tineo​dna.ru/​flash​mob 10 Colling, J. (2019, December 20). “Russia has no domestic violence law, but that could soon change.” Al Jazeera. www.aljaze​era.com/​featu​res/​2019/​12/​20/​rus​sia-​ has-​no-​domes​tic-​viole​nce-​law-​but-​that-​could-​soon-​cha​nge 11 “We Are Coming for You”: Russian Feminists Face Intimidation Campaign Online. www.rferl.org/​a/​russ​ian-​femini​sts-​face-​intim​idat​ion-​campa​ign-​onl​ine/​ 31136​971.html 12 Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation. (2022). “Russian rapper Oxxxymiron and writer Dmitry Glukhovsky declared foreign agents.” Meduza. https://​med​uza. io/​en/​news/​2022/​10/​07/​oxx​xymi​ron-​and-​dmi​try-​glu​khov​sky-​decla​red-​fore​ign-​ age​nts 13 Influence Campaigns and Disinformation. www.cfr.org/​influe​nce-​campai​gns-​and-​ dis​info​rmat​ion 14 FFE/​FL’s Russian Service. (2022). “Russian Media Watchdog Blocks Facebook After Limiting Access to Multiple Other Sites.” RadioFreeEurope/​RadioLiberty. www.rferl.org/​a/​rus​sia-​rferl-​bbc-​faceb​ook-​goo​gle-​twit​ter-​bloc​ked/​31735​597.html 15 Smart mob. https://​en-​acade​mic.com/​dic.nsf/​enw​iki/​176​464 16 What’s an online campaign? www.mrss.com/​lab/​whats-​an-​onl​ine-​campa​ign/​ 17 Social movement. www.newwo​rlde​ncyc​lope​dia.org/​entry/​Soci​al_​m​ovem​ent 18 Hacktivism. www.tec​htar​get.com/​sea​rchs​ecur​ity/​def​i nit​ion/​hac​ktiv​ism 19 What is a DDoS attack? www.clo​udfl​are.com/​learn​ing/​ddos/​what-​is-​a-​ddos-​ att​ack/​ 20 Media psychology expert explains hashtag activism. www.yout​ube.com/​watch?v=​ g2et​wj9J​yek 21 Franciszek Sterczewski. https://​en.wikipe​dia.org/​wiki/​Fra​ncis​zek_​Ster​czew​ski 22 Interviewee 1019, interviewed by authors (by Zoom), 2019. 23 On Democratic Backsliding. www.jou​rnal​ofde​mocr​acy.org/​artic​les/​on-​dem​ocra​ tic-​back​slid​ing/​ 24 Connective action: the public’s answer to democratic dysfunction. https://​thec​ onve​rsat​ion.com/​con​nect​ive-​act​ion-​the-​publ​ics-​ans​wer-​to-​dem​ocra​tic-​dysf​unct​ ion-​33089 25 Funk, M. (Host). (2022). Nina Hall –​Author of “Transnational Advocacy in the Digital Era: Think Global, Act Global” [Audio podcast episode]. In One Planet Podcast. The Creative Process. www.crea​tive​proc​ess.info/​educat​ion/​ nina-​hall-​mia-​funk-​6gthe 26 Slacktivism. www.tec​htar​get.com/​wha​tis/​def​i nit​ion/​slac​ktiv​ism 27 Zeynep Tufekci. Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest. www.twitte​rand​tear​gas.org/​ 28 Nie je nám to jedno. www.faceb​ook.com/​niej​enam​to1/​

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29 Meet the Male State: Russia’s Nastiest Online Hate Group. www.bel​ling​cat. com/​news/​uk-​and-​eur​ope/​2021/​10/​20/​meet-​the-​male-​state-​russ​ias-​nasti​est-​onl​ ine-​hate-​group/​ 30 Yellow shirts and red shirts. www.bri​tann​ica.com/​place/​Thail​and/​Yel​low-​shi​rts-​ and-​red-​shi​rts 31 Wilkin, P., Dencik, L., and Bognár, É. (2015). Digital activism and Hungarian media reform: The case of Milla. European Journal of Communication 30(6), pp. 682–​697. doi:10.1177/​0267323115595528 32 Пропаганда войны уже не запрещена законом? Юристы ОВД-​Инфо и «Мемориала» обратились в ООН. https://​ovd.info/​ 33 Akcja Demokracja. www.akcj​adem​okra​cja.pl/​ 34 Interview 3619. 35 For more on its mission and goals, see: “Statute of The Association ‘committee For Defense Democracy.’ ” Komitet Obrony Demokracji. Last updated September 26, 2021. https://​ruch​KOD.pl/​sta​tut/​ 36 Yulia Tsvetkova: Russian LGBT activist acquitted of “porn” charges. www.bbc. com/​news/​world-​eur​ope-​62180​659 37 Banned and blocked: LGBT+​websites censored from Russia to Indonesia. www. reut​ers.com/​arti​cle/​lgbt-​rig​hts-​inter​net-​idUSL8​N2Q2​3D4 38 Dayton Peace Agreement. www.osce.org/​bih/​126​173 39 Bosnia: Teenagers Sentenced in Murder Case. https://​balkan​insi​ght.com/​2009/​06/​ 23/​bos​nia-​teenag​ers-​senten​ced-​in-​mur​der-​case/​ 40 Latal, S. (2009b). “Controversial Bosniak Premier Resigns.” BalkanInsights. https://​balkan​insi​ght.com/​2009/​05/​27/​contro​vers​ial-​bosn​iak-​prem​ier-​resi​gns/​ 41 Democratic Audit UK. (2015). “Hungary’s ‘Milla’ Movement Shows That Social Media Driven Protest Movements Only Succeed When They Connect Meaningfully With Civil Society.” Democratic Audit UK. www.demo​crat​icau​dit. com/​2015/​08/​31/​hunga​rys-​milla-​movem​ent-​shows-​that-​soc​ial-​media-​dri​ven-​prot​ est-​moveme​nts-​only-​succ​eed-​when-​they-​conn​ect-​meani​ngfu​lly-​with-​civil-​soci​ety/​ 42 Psychological and Emotional War: Digital Transnational Repression in Canada. https://​cit​izen​lab.ca/​2022/​03/​psycho​logi​cal-​emotio​nal-​war-​digi​tal-​transn​atio​nal-​ rep​ress​ion-​can​ada/​ 43 Transnational Repression: About the Project. https://​freed​omho​use.org/​rep​ort/​ transn​atio​nal-​rep​ress​ion/​about-​ackno​wled​geme​nts#2021

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Tufekci, Z. (2017). Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest. New Haven: Yale University Press. Vaast, E., Safadi, H., Lapointe, L., & Negoita, B. (2017). “Social Media Affordances for Connective Action: An Examination of Microblogging Use During the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill.” MIS Quarterly 41, no. 4: 1179–​1206. Wertheimer, T. (2022). “Yulia Tsvetkova: Russian LGBT activist acquitted of ‘porn’ charges.” BBC online. July 15, 2022. www.bbc.com/​news/​world-​eur​ope-​ 62180​659 “What is Digital Media? All You Need to Know About this Booming Industry.” Maryville University. Copyright 2022. Accessed November 30, 2022. https://​onl​ ine.maryvi​lle.edu/​blog/​what-​is-​digi​tal-​media/​ Wigmore, I. “Slacktivism.” WhatIs.com. Copyright 1999–​2022. Accessed December 8, 2022. www.tec​htar​get.com/​wha​tis/​def​i nit​ion/​slac​ktiv​ism Wilkin, P., Dencik, L., & Bognár, É. (2015). “Digital Activism and Hungarian Media Reform: The Case of Milla.” European Journal of Communication 30, no. 6: 682–​697.

6 EVERYDAY ENVIRONMENTALISM Laura A. Henry, Samir Lemeš, and Paula M. Pickering

This chapter focuses on everyday environmental activism and the countries of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, BiH) and Russia as windows into understanding the motivations, actions, and impact of everyday activism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Everyday activism focuses on practical problems that people encounter in their day-​to-​day lives, attracting participation by regular citizens and often lacking formal organizational structure (Sundstrom et al., 2022). Citizens’ repeated interactions with visible problems that are close to home may compel them to take action. By definition, this type of activism is primarily grassroots in nature, initiated by ordinary people and tending to start at the local or regional level, although it may develop, formalize, and expand over time. Everyday activism often exhibits a strong attachment to a place or community. Local identities may coexist and compete with national patriotism (Polese et al., 2018). Thus, the values or emotions that drive activists to improve the quality of life in their home communities may differ from those of political opposition movements. This activism may not become visible to outside observers unless it generates large gatherings that attract media attention. Aggrieved citizens often first seek to solve their problems through institutional channels, asking bureaucrats or politicians to provide more information or resolve a complaint before resorting to protests. As everyday activism tends to be bottom-​up and decentralized, it can be hard to characterize tactically. The forms of activism are quite varied, with different networked participants taking the initiative at various times. This fragmentation may be beneficial, especially in less democratic contexts, as there is no “head” of the movement who can be decapitated but also may result in uncoordinated and ineffective activism. To sustain their campaigns, DOI: 10.4324/9781003466116-6

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everyday activists may need to formalize their efforts through organization building. Everyday activists generally have few resources at their disposal, relying more on volunteers, in-​kind donations, or crowdfunding than donors. Everyday activists may accept support from established donors but only if it contributes to the original cause. Everyday activism emerges around issues ranging from urban development and labor issues to minority cultural rights; yet, grassroots environmental activism is becoming increasingly common across CEE and beyond (Evans et al., 2006; Jacobsson & Korolczuk, 2020; Maltby et al., 2022; Morris et al., 2023). Everyday environmentalism is tied to locally experienced environmental issues. The air people breathe; the water they drink and use for their crops; the soil they use to plant vegetables and fruit trees; the parks they use to cool off during sweltering summer days; the rivers, lakes, forests, and mountains that draw tourists to their communities. It includes efforts to preserve green space,1 to object to air pollution,2 and to decry waste disposal practices.3 The activists we profile in this chapter, Samir Lemeš (BiH) and Sasha Ivanova (a pseudonym, Russia), offer examples of a shared commitment to place/​ community-​ based action driven by repeated interaction with a problem. These stories also provide examples of environmental activism at different ends of the spectrum of everyday activism in terms of how they engage average citizens; the issue of concern; their level of organizational structure; and their interaction with domestic and international networks, donors, and political authorities. Samir Lemeš –​fighting for clean air in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Samir Lemeš’ breaking point occurred in 2009, when his father passed away. Lemeš could not separate his father’s fate from the environmental conditions in his town. The air pollution resumed in his hometown of Zenica, BiH in 2008, when its newly privatized steel plant restarted production. Lemeš was sure that Zenica’s air pollution, which is the worst in a country that has the world’s fifth highest incidence of death by air pollution,4 contributed to his father’s premature death. Lemeš decided to join a group of citizens with no prior experience in civic activism, who gathered around a common cause: to force the steel factory and domestic officials to comply with environmental laws. As a professor at Zenica University, Lemeš feels that it is his responsibility to teach his engineering students and improve society. Lemeš saw a devastating problem, an injustice in his community, and knew he was expected to do something about it. He is tackling a problem so complex it is, as a Bosnian saying goes, like trying to straighten the country’s curvy Drina river. In this long battle, he is encouraged by his wife and by his upbringing in socialist Yugoslavia, which valued the common good over the profit of a few. Within

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months of meeting informally to discuss what public actions they should take to advocate for clean air, concerned citizens registered Eko Forum Zenica5 as a citizens’ association in 2009. Lemeš believes that formalizing the group was needed to put pressure on political authorities, which own 8% of the factory, and on the multinational corporation ArcelorMittal, which owns the remaining 92%, to take them seriously. Being taken seriously is no small task for a civil society organization (CSO) up against the world’s largest steelmaker, whose turnover is 20 times the annual budget of BiH. The Government of the Federation of BiH,6 moreover, has continuously prioritized employment and followed an unofficial policy of not discussing pollution for fear of deterring investment. With this said, the drawbacks of creating a CSO include the costs of office space, the insecurity of constantly seeking funding to support their work, and harassment and pressure by authorities. Eko Forum wants the factory to live up to its pledge made in the privatization agreement to make investments to reduce emissions and to comply with BiH environmental laws and domestic government institutions to enforce laws. The initial strategies Eko Forum used to achieve these goals were unfortunately ignored. These included demanding public information about the privatization agreement, monitoring air quality, attending public hearings, and advocating for legal enforcement. Undeterred, Lemeš and fellow activists in 2012 organized a protest of thousands of Zenica citizens7 (Photo 6.1). Buoyed by the large show of support, Lemeš took the microphone to voice their demands to state institutions and the factory’s leadership. The protest got the attention of national and international media8 and of municipal authorities, even if higher levels of government and the factory ignored them. After the watershed protest, things started to change. Local authorities relented and began conducting regular public measurements of air quality,9 which often showed sulfur dioxide levels at three times the legal limit (and more than 166 times the legal limit in the European Union (EU)). These toxic air quality measurements, which are made visible to the community on the roof top of Zenica’s tallest building, led the city’s Mayor to issue the first air quality alert in December 2013, compelling the factory to make temporary changes to reduce air pollution. Instantly, the air quality in Zenica improved. Yet, long-​term investments in cleaner technology and installing filters were partial and slow. In 2015, Lemeš and activists at Eko Forum partnered with the Czech-​based Arnika CSO, which works in all countries where ArcelorMittal owns factories, to sue the factory and federal authorities for violations of environmental laws. These charges finally got higher level governmental institutions to take notice of Eko Forum’s demands. Unfortunately, the politically influenced judicial system eventually dismissed the charges, arguing that the factory had already paid the penalties

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PHOTO 6.1 Samir Lemeš (with megaphone) prepares to speak to a citizens’ march

advocating for clean air that was organized by Eko Forum Zenica in 2012 (courtesy of Eko Forum Zenica).

(however paltry) and that Eko Forum failed to provide solid proof that the factory was responsible for intentionally polluting the air. Undiscouraged, Lemeš and Eko Forum activists seized the opportunity of the upcoming expiration of the factory’s environmental permit to press the Federal Government to raise fines for non-​compliance with environmental laws. Low fines failed to punish polluters, because it was cheaper to pay fines than to make necessary environmental investments. In 2021, the Federal Government accepted a new regulation that raised fines, as Eko Forum requested. In the spring of 2022, the threat of higher fines forced the factory to finally conduct measurements of benzene concentrations in Zenica, an obligation that was delayed for more than a decade. Another approach that brought change is working with international banks and financial institutions. Lemeš and Eko Forum deterred international banks from investing in the steel factory10 and in a hydroelectric dam in Zenica11 by raising the projects’ non-​compliance with environmental regulations. Finally, in 2020, these actions forced ArcelorMittal to invest in technologies to cut emissions. Lemeš believes that to achieve his goals, his activism needs to be fought simultaneously on two fronts: the local level and the international level. He also believes citizens are more likely to act if they see the problem

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as an injustice that directly affects them, like toxic air. Lemeš has learned that to mobilize citizens to support environmental causes requires talking not just about climate change in general but also about the more visible and direct problem of air pollution. Lemeš uses different types of media to engage local citizens. His first task was creating Eko Forum’s website,12 which documented the CSO’s work, facts about the environment, and even financial reports,13 which show how every dollar the CSO received has been spent. Lemeš views financial transparency as vital for building citizens’ trust in CSOs. It also demonstrates that they are not just another “grant-​catcher” CSO looking for high salaries but are genuinely committed to improving the environment. He complements regular appearances on TV with the use of social media platforms like Facebook and Instagram. Lemeš uses all these tools to encourage Bosnians to take action themselves, rather than wait for someone else to solve problems. Citizens’ tendency to adapt to, rather than fight to improve, poor policies is learned through historical experiences with authoritarianism and the country’s painful transition from socialism. This behavior is also nurtured by religious and political officials. Encouraging sustained engagement, particularly by youth, who Lemeš sees as either tending to avoid problems or participating in a single action and then disengaging after it does not immediately achieve results, requires creativity. One such effort was awarding Certificates of No Appreciation on the CSO’s 10th anniversary14 to groups that failed to fight for cleaner air. For Lemeš, effective environmental activism uses plain and concise language to inform and engage local citizens while also providing expertise and putting pressure on institutions to improve policies and law enforcement. Despite encountering many challenges, Lemeš and Eko Forum’s activism has achieved tangible benefits. Zenica’s air, on average, is less polluted now than it was when the steel factory started working again in 2008. They also improved environmental permits, introducing clear deadlines, significantly raising penalties for violations, and making emission limits stricter. In addition, environmental activists have compelled authorities to provide the public with reports on emissions15 and the implementation of environmental action plans,16 as well as a register of polluters.17 One of the major obstacles that Lemeš has confronted in his environmental activism is the lack of relevant scientific information. While activism resulted in regular and public measurements of sulfur dioxide in Zenica’s air, the community lacks the precise scientific information that would pinpoint the factory as the source of carcinogenic elements in the air and the negative health outcomes. Lack of this specific information hampered the criminal case Eko Forum filed against ArcelorMittal and domestic authorities. Not surprisingly, none of the domestic institutions, which are influenced by political and economic factors,

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are interested in producing this information. They simply ignore or obfuscate the problem instead of finding solutions. As a result, a priority for Lemeš is conducting genotoxicity testing, which would provide scientific evidence connecting the factory to carcinogenic elements in the air and their adverse public health consequences. Eko Forum did manage to obtain international funding for sampling, performing DNA tests, and conducting an analysis. It also changed the environmental permit, requiring ArcelorMittal to measure concentrations of carcinogenic air pollutants throughout 2023. Building on their success in deterring banks to invest in projects harming Zenica’s environment, Lemeš is currently working with colleagues to use the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s Complaint Resolution Mechanism18 to demonstrate ArcelorMittal’s non-​compliance with conditions for a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) loan.19 To achieve cleaner air in Zenica and in BiH, Eko Forum needs more younger activists to engage. It also needs multi-​year funding that allows them to do the work they know needs to be done, instead of the work donors prioritize. Even when laws change, there will always be self-​ interested individuals who are eager to find new investors, draw out legal challenges, demobilize activists, and undermine enforcement of laws. Thus, the battle for clean air and a better environment is on-​going for Lemeš. How everyday environmentalism connects local and global concerns

Lemeš’ family suffered harm from air pollution, which highlighted a devastating problem in his local community. As a result, he took action. Action on concrete problems by citizens without prior experience in formal civil society organizations is a hallmark of everyday activism. As mentioned in the Introduction, everyday activism is an increasingly popular expression of domestic rather than foreign donor-​ driven activism. In nationally representative surveys conducted in 2019 in BiH and Russia, for example, respondents were more likely to report that their activism was motivated by a concrete rather than an abstract problem (Pickering, 2022). Lemeš’ activism was encouraged by repeated interaction with a local problem. But he boldly took on a corporation with global reach and unresponsive political authorities for an extended time. As he indicated, this requires waging a battle simultaneously at the local and global levels. Lemeš’ account challenges scholarly assessments that Russia and BiH’s historical experience with decades of rule by communist parties has solely weakened the capacity of these societies to engage in civic activism (Introduction). Instead, Lemeš and other activists have identified positive aspects of the socialist legacy with its emphasis on the common good, rather than individual profit, and rhetoric about the importance of collective action.

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In the socialist period, citizens also developed expectations around the government’s guarantee of their social rights to things like health care and basic social services (Smyth & Sokhey, 2021). Examples of civic activism that helped bring down communist governments in the late 1980s and develop democracies in CEE include environmental movements that emerged in reaction to the dramatic harm caused by the explosion of Ukraine’s Chernobyl nuclear power plant and to address damage from Communist-​party-​led rapid industrialization drives. However, civic activists in CEE struggled after regime change in 1989 and 1991, and Lemeš’ everyday activism stands out in a region whose citizens have been commonly characterized as passive (Civil Society Forum of the Western Balkans, 2019; Dvornik, 2009; Džihić et al., 2018; Fiket & Pudar Draško, 2018; Pinjo Talevska, 2019; Rakaj-​Vrugtman et al., 2019; Vishinova & Mladenovska, 2022). There are many scholarly explanations for societal disengagement, including the networks and expectations of the socialist past; political culture, low levels of trust; partial economic reforms leading to deindustrialization and reduced social services (Howard, 2003; Jowitt, 1992; Mishler & Rose, 1997). And in BiH, war. In addition, people in post-​ socialist societies that have become more religious use it as an excuse for not civically engaging, saying things like “nothing can be done, it is just God’s will” (Ipgrave, 2008; Naumescu, 2007; Pipes, 2015; Wax, 2021). There is also a gap in generational mentalities, where young people lose interest in activism after a few days or avoid problems rather than trying to solve them (Galimberti, 2017). In BiH, young people’s dominant coping strategies of “tuning out,” as Lemeš mentions, or “getting out” through emigration20 from villages or small towns with struggling economies like Zenica is a formidable obstacle for civic activism (Perry & Stefanovski, 2021). This is why engaging youth is such a priority for sustaining Eko Forum’s activism. Activists in Russia and BiH working for social change who persisted in the 1990s and early 2000s did so under difficult economic and political conditions. Russia was mired in a prolonged economic recession, limiting domestic sources of financial support and preoccupying the population. While the Russian state did not actively repress social organizations during this period, it failed to offer a predictable arena for policymaking and governance that activists could navigate (Evans et al., 2006; Henderson, 2001). War in BiH between April 1992 and December 1995, in which nearly 98,000 citizens were killed and 2.2 million forcibly displaced, created even tougher conditions for civic activism in the 1990s (Cutts, 1999). The effectiveness of international aid to BiH after the war has been undermined by the internationally endorsed ethnic power-​sharing rules that monoethnic nationalist parties have manipulated to dominate politics and the economy and demobilize civic activists (Gordy, 2015; Mujkić, 2015; Milan, 2019; Puljek-​Shank & Fritsch, 2019).

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As a result of these challenging domestic conditions, many civic activists working in both countries seized on opportunities to participate in transnational dialogues and partnerships, relying heavily on international donors. To attract international donors, these activists often had to create organizations and develop projects –​even before attracting a robust base of supporters in their local communities. This dynamic emphasizes global forces over local ones. This is why the most common form of environmental activism in the 1990s was based in NGOs. Laura Henry’s (2010) research on environmental activism illustrates how new organizations were encouraged by donors to professionalize and develop their capacity, similar to interest groups in Western political systems. While these organizations had some success in changing attitudes and laws in Russia and BiH, scholars identified important challenges to their work (Belloni, 2020; Bojicic-​Dzelilovic et al., 2013; Fagan & Sircar, 2015; Martus, 2017; McMahon, 2017; Oldfield, 2005; Yanitsky, 2010). As with other types of organizations we mention in the Introduction, these challenges included donor-​driven agendas, the NGO-​ization or projectization of civic work, and the elevation of English-​speaking activists preferred by international donors. Consequently, these social organizations were often detached from their domestic constituents, failing to reflect their priorities and to bring tangible change (Henry, 2010). In Putin’s Russia, the government came to view many of these organizations with suspicion, as not representative of the country’s national interests, characterizing many of them as “foreign agents” (Tysiachniouk et al., 2018). In BiH, nationalist parties and many citizens also grew skeptical of Western-​ funded NGOs, if not as deeply as in Russia (Perry & Stefanovski, 2021). Lemeš illustrates how some activists have tried to rectify some of the negative consequences of NGO-​ization. Eko Forum has worked to address citizens’ concerns about NGOs by practicing financial transparency, using plain language to talk to citizens about the concrete problem they are tackling, their achievements, and why the work is important for citizens’ health. At the same time, Eko Forum seeks donors who empower rather than dictate their work to improve air quality. Yet, the backlash against NGOs in the 2010s throughout CEE has contributed to governments “shrinking the space” for civic activism, which our book stresses as part of the recent “hard times” in CEE. This backlash also facilitates shifts toward more locally based and informal, grassroots activism. In BiH, ruling parties have tightened their control over political and economic institutions, rewarding those loyal to them with jobs, cultivating compliance through promoting the idea that change is not possible, while punishing critics through harassment and threats of job loss (Perry & Stefanovski, 2021). Lemeš, for example, was targeted by social media and a defamation lawsuit (which he won), and Eko Forum has suffered harassment

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from public authorities, who dislike the organization’s political independence and efforts to hold public authorities and the factory accountable. Meanwhile, Russia has moved from a part authoritarian, part democratic regime reliant on compliance from a disengaged majority to a “hard” authoritarian one (Volkov, 2012). Laws adopted around the full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 have made public action even more dangerous for Russian activists like Sasha Ivanova. To protect her safety, we use a pseudonym. Taking into account these contexts, we view local communities in Russia and BiH as sites both conducive to everyday environmentalism but also difficult for such activism to realize change. Sasha Ivanova –​building sustainable rural communities in Ukraine

Some everyday activists do not engage in organization-​ based advocacy directed toward the state or private companies. Indeed, they may not even address mainstream environmental problems such as pollution, waste, and the preservation of green space. Instead, these activists may choose to work on small projects, engaging directly with “ordinary” people beyond the urban context, where activism is more likely to flourish. This everyday environmental activism is, instead, centered on community-​ building and changing each participant’s lived experience. Prefigurative activism21 is a type of new social movement activity in which participants try to craft a life that embodies their principles and to construct communities based on alternative models of social organization. Such models often focus on sustainability and seek to avoid hierarchy. This is another form of everyday activism and may be especially likely in countries where the political and legal context for activism is highly repressive, as in Putin’s Russia today. Sasha Ivanova has attempted to construct several sustainable communities in Russia since the 1990s, drawing upon Russia’s rural heritage and blending it with more recent sustainability practices. Trained as an economist, Ivanova could have pursued more conventional environmental activism and occasionally has worked as a team member on grant-​funded international projects. But she ultimately found more value in efforts to revitalize a rural community and to pass on the traditional, sustainable practices of the Russian countryside. In the course of these efforts, Ivanova’s activism confronted the challenges prevalent in rural areas across Russia22 –​poor infrastructure and services, high costs, depopulation –​while also celebrating the joy of returning to the land. While these community-​based projects were difficult to sustain in the long run, Ivanova still expresses pride in how this model of activism provides people with a hands-​on opportunity to experience sustainable living and to change their conceptions of the world and their role in it. In explaining her journey to everyday environmental activism, Ivanova recounts how each summer as a child she had the opportunity to leave the

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city where she attended school to live with her extended family in their village. These summers in the countryside allowed Ivanova to explore the forest and inspired her deep love of nature. After initially studying biology in school, at university, Ivanova decided to switch to economics. She attempted to connect her two interests by researching environmental economics and natural resource management. After graduating from university in the late 1990s, Ivanova moved to a village with her husband. The village was small, but Ivanova discovered that there was a club focused on nature and health in the capital city of the region. She made contact and became friends with the members of this club, eventually inviting them to visit her village. Together, they began to imagine environmentally oriented programs related to health that could take place in the village. They decided to start a small family camp to offer urban parents and children the chance to experience life in the countryside. Over time, news of the camp spread through friends and family networks. Ivanova began to offer more programs to a wider array of people. Programs ranged from the study of ecology and the promotion of healthy living to demonstrations of how traditional practices from the village can still be used today to cultivate sustainability in food production, shelter, energy use, and even recreation. Ivanova had many motives for undertaking this work. She is passionately committed to a sustainable lifestyle for her own family, and she is a natural educator. Her life experience had also given her connections in both urban and rural areas, and she wanted to bridge this divide. In the midst of Russia’s economic and social crisis of the 1990s,23 she wanted to try to create a community for herself and others. As Ivanova recounts, “Why did I do it? Well, I wanted to make connections beyond my children and neighbors and to cultivate some kind of wider engagement, some kind of exchange of experience.” Ivanova views community-​building as the most valuable result of her activism. Ivanova’s efforts continued to grow over the course of several years. The work was concentrated in the summer months when the countryside was more accessible, and visitors could camp or live in unheated accommodations. Ivanova engaged in outreach to summer vacationers in the area and descendants of those who had lived in this village. She also asked her neighbors to help with the programs, drawing on their knowledge of how to survive and be self-​sufficient in remote and climatically challenging areas of Russia. Eventually, visitors to Ivanova’s camp and other environmental programs came not only from the relatively proximate regional capital but also from St. Petersburg, Moscow, and beyond. At this point, Ivanova did not describe herself as an activist. Her life was multifaceted and busy. She was the primary caregiver for her three children, but after the birth of her third child, she decided to return to graduate school to study the economic aspects of sustainable development, even as

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she continued her summer activities in the village. In her graduate courses, Ivanova met a small group of people who were interested in environmental activism and research. At that time, in the early 2000s, this group began a dialogue with some U.S. environmental organizations and began to envision how they could work together; they also interacted with international donors to Russian civil society organizations, a trend that was common then.24 In one memorable collaboration, Ivanova hosted an international group of scientists and activists in her village to discuss how to protect bodies of water in the area and analyze water quality. Ivanova invited teachers and schoolchildren from the districts neighboring the village to learn these techniques as well. Inspired by this experience, Ivanova applied for a small grant to work with local schoolchildren and teachers on the conservation of lakes and rivers. Ivanova states, “In this way, my activity in my village and my wider work are intertwined. For me, this is a special kind of activism.” In the early 2010s, Ivanova moved to a village in a new region, where she lived for eight years. In this new village, her ambitions went beyond organizing a family camp. Ivanova tried “to create an ecological community –​a community based on ecological and social principles with a social organization that is not hierarchical.” For this community, Ivanova sought to synthesize knowledge she had gained about village life in Russia and put it into practice. Eventually, Ivanova pooled resources with several like-​minded friends and bought four inexpensive houses in a remote, run-​ down village. She invited her acquaintances and colleagues from various cities to contribute to this idealistic and ambitious project. And some of her university colleagues arrived with their students in tow. Soon after, they broke ground for a large vegetable garden guided by principles of traditional peasant agriculture in the region. They purchased livestock –​two cows, a horse, ten goats. Ivanova and her partners also devised a cultural program to entertain and enrich the participants. “People came to be educated, to learn how to do things ecologically and in a traditional way. It is very valuable for them to see how it is possible to live on earth and to try to do something with their own hands.” The community was run on a collaborative basis, with daily planning meetings and rotation for different tasks. Everyone contributed to the substantial, common work of the community –​preparing food, tending the garden, and caring for livestock. They sowed grain and planted potatoes. The community also sponsored social activities, which included physical training, yoga, singing lessons, and theatrical performances. Ivanova fondly remembers intense discussions late into the night. Of this period, Ivanova recalls, “Of course, it was difficult, but this was the best time.” For example, when Ivanova first started the community garden, she found that the soil seemed poor and depleted. She invited an expert in permaculture25 who taught classes about soil regeneration. Four years later, this expert

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returned and marveled at the improvement in the soil, even though the community had been growing crops throughout that period. Ivanova drew a broad lesson from this experience that goes beyond gardening. “In our country, the soils are generally depleted, but we saw that we could increase its fertility. This is a specific result that meant a lot to me, and it shows what is possible.” It is this kind of practical example that inspires Ivanova that broader ecological and social change is possible in Russia. Many of those who joined the community, seeking a more environmentally friendly lifestyle and an escape from urban culture, had faced serious problems in the past and were escaping personal difficulties. As a result, Ivanova recounts how the community became a kind of rehabilitation center. “We are not professionals, not psychologists, but we started to study how to help people with different kinds of rehabilitation.” Ivanova recounts the story of a middle-​aged man26 who just appeared one day and ended up living in the community for more than four years. She also recalls how much he changed while living in the community, developing new interests and adapting his worldview, finally leaving as a completely different person. Ivanova concludes, “People’s horizons expanded in our community.” Ivanova envisioned the community as a microcosm for broader social and environmental renewal in Russia. From the start, however, the sustainable community was challenging to maintain. The living conditions were difficult and the housing rudimentary, with many people sleeping in one room. It was a non-​commercial venture and thus had little revenue. They relied on volunteers to contribute labor and teach. Any money paid by visitors was funneled into hiring master craftsmen to teach courses and contribute to the community’s restoration or to purchase necessary food to supplement what they could grow. Ivanova never received a salary for her efforts. Occasionally, they were involved in small, grant-​ funded projects that brought in modest funds. For example, in 2020, a group of Russian university students engaged in an EU-​funded project to study adaptation to climate change in rural Russia hired Ivanova as a partner and used the village as a base for their research. The challenges began to mount over time. The community faced rising prices27 and rural depopulation.28 “The local area emptied out, there was almost no one left in the countryside –​some died due to old age and some left.” Services from the Soviet era also began to disappear, including a relatively nearby shop and library. The government no longer maintained the road to the village, snow was not plowed, and firewood was no longer delivered to support villagers. In this struggle, “You can only rely on your own strength,” Ivanova concluded. Recalling the end of this experiment in rural sustainability: “I realized that we could not continue further. We could no longer fulfill our ecological or educational tasks, our mission. What happens next? We don’t know. It’s not

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easy.” Ivanova notes that while some environmental activists are focused on passing legislation, her passion has always been sustainable development. She has focused on the quality of each person’s unique experience with the environment. Ivanova hopes to continue this work in the future. “Even if a person came to our community for a short time or came only once, the experience will influence him somehow, change him in some way. The village is such a natural environment for me because you are directly in contact with nature. That is what I am interested in.” What facilitates everyday environmentalism?

Ivanova’s experience, alongside Lemeš’ work with Eko Forum, demonstrates the breadth of what we might mean by everyday activism. Ivanova’s work is undeniably more limited in its scale and scope. For example, Ivanova did not build a formal organization or scale up her activism to broaden its reach. Instead, she worked informally, drawing participants from within friendship and professional networks mostly in a rural setting. Yet, Ivanova’s efforts are also a response to the broader context for activism in CEE and especially in Putin’s Russia. She saw her work on sustainability as responding to multiple, overlapping crises in post-​Soviet Russia –​environmental, economic, and social. In Ivanova’s view, self-​interested political authorities make progress on sustainability unlikely. Over time, Ivanova’s concerns about engaging the authorities were borne out both by her contentious interactions with some local educational officials who were skeptical of her courses for school children and by broader trends such as the Russian government’s label leading of some environmentalists as “foreign agents”29 for their efforts to change policies. Ivanova’s orientation toward politics is, in part, a reflection of Russia’s more authoritarian political context. Her work also represents an alternative “theory of change.”30 Specifically, Ivanova hopes that the personal transformation of many individuals experiencing a connection to nature will lead to broader political transformation. In that sense, Ivanova’s embrace of local activism is an effort inspired by international norms and discourses around sustainability to look within Russian history and culture for appropriate models of development. As Lemeš and Ivanova’s stories illustrate, there are both negative and positive drivers of everyday environmental activism. On the negative side, persistent and pervasive corruption, which is facilitated by weak institutions responsible for enforcing the rule of law, has become a shared grievance in BiH and Russia. A key goal for Lemeš and many everyday activists interviewed across BiH is to get the political authorities to follow and enforce laws that exist mostly on paper. There is also a widespread sense among ordinary people that elites are gaining at the expense of the average person. As Ivanova’s story demonstrates, many governments’ increasing restrictions

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on rights has limited the ability of civic activists to advocate for change through formal organizations; at the national political level; and, in Russia, by using foreign funding. Large mobilizations for political change in 2011/​ 12 in Russia (Dollbaum, 2020) and in 2014 in BiH (Arsenijević, 2014) failed to achieve desired results. Authorities in both countries resisted changes, punished protesters, and further closed the civic and political space. In BiH and Russia, these failures shifted activism to the local level, where community-​based activism, like Ivanova’s for sustainable development or Lemeš’ for clean air, might garner more community support and also realize change (Puljek-​Shank & Fritsch, 2019). Ivanova changed lived experiences and minds, while Lemeš and fellow Eko Forum activists improved Zenica’s air quality and environmental permitting requirements. Public corruption and global climate change have exacerbated locally experienced environmental problems. At the same time, local campaigns may be able to connect with transnational environmental actors who focus on scientific evidence that links adverse health impacts, for example, to air pollution (World Health Organization, 2014). On the positive side, technology increasingly facilitates information-​ sharing, networking, and crowdfunding, which can partly substitute for organization building. Social media also allows for self-​representation and alternative framings to the state-​dominated media. Economic growth and rising living standards have created greater material security for citizens –​ security threatened by economic downturns. In addition, relative stability at home and greater exposure to politics outside of one’s home country have led to higher expectations for governance. Other positive drivers are linked to where political opportunity structures provide space for civic activism. As Ivanova and Lemeš illustrate, much of everyday environmentalism focuses on problems at the local level, which is further away from political power struggles at the national level. Local problems often have a closer chain of accountability, which encourages local politicians to be responsive to local citizens vs. a national party, particularly in decentralized countries like BiH and Ukraine after the EuroMaidan Revolution in 2014 (Shapovalova, 2019). The high salience of local, place-​ based problems that people experience repeatedly in their daily lives facilitates mobilization. One study of recent environmental activism in Ukraine, for example, found that individuals’ activism started as a response to accruing problems, such as living next to and experiencing daily polluted areas and rivers (Pietrzyk-​Reeves et al., 2022). A plethora of serious local environmental problems have spurred activism across CEE. The following examples highlight how local peoples throughout CEE have stepped up to fight environmental threats produced by industry, development and landfills to their communities’ water, soil, air quality, and green space. In response to growing problems with air pollution in their

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communities, activists in Russia and in Poland have demanded authorities take action. Residents of the Russian city of Chelyabinsk demanded that the city and regional authorities address a persistent smog known locally as “black sky.” The pollution exacerbates suffering by Chelyabinsk residents, who already experience high levels of cancer and other diseases31 due to several major Soviet-​ era accidents32 involving radioactive contamination. Following citizens’ repeated protests33 and their grassroots pollution monitoring system34 that challenges official data, the Federal Government in 2021 required35 cities like Chelyabinsk with severe air pollution to develop strategies to mitigate the problem. In Poland, which has the dirtiest air in the EU, residents have joined Polish Smog Alert,36 an umbrella organization of initially three community-​based initiatives in severely polluted communities that grew to 44 initiatives working to monitor and improve air quality (Maltby et al., 2022). The more open political system in Poland has created opportunities for these environmental activists to use a variety of initiatives: citizen use of air quality apps, protests, participation in public consultation, and media campaigns. Activists’ focus on the specific adverse health effects of air pollution, particularly on children –​ rather than on climate change more generally–​has helped everyday activists in Poland garner support from the public, the Catholic Church, and populist leaders. Environmental activism contributed to 10 of 16 Polish regional governments adopting anti-​smog resolutions (Metalfachtg, 2022). In BiH, citizens have also mobilized against threats to their communities’ water by hydropower plants and landfills. Concerned that construction of a mini-​hydropower plant would jeopardize water for drinking and crops, women in the village of Kruščica, BiH,37 camped out for over 500 days and endured violence, blocking the project. The success of these ordinary citizens encouraged citizens in other small communities across BiH to prevent construction of these mini-​ hydropower plants approved through non-​transparent procedures and pushed by investors with close ties to the authorities. Their activism also contributed to and was supported by a network of informal and formal activists, working for ten years at the local, national (the Coalition for the Protection of Rivers in BiH38), and international levels (Save the Blue Heart of Europe39). Harnessing activism that is rooted in local problems and identities, this movement scaled up action, achieving a 2022 ban on the construction of mini-​hydropower plants in half of the country40 (the Federation entity) and an end to subsidies in the other half (Republika Srpska) (Kurtic, 2022; Puljek Shank & Popov-​Momčinović, 2022). Hazardous landfills have spurred angry citizens into civic action in Russia and BiH. Russian environmental activists led the “Russian North is Not a Dump!41” campaign to protest plans for an enormous landfill near the Shies railway station. The landfill was intended as a repository for trash from Moscow, approximately 1,200 km away. In 2018–​2019, local residents from

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nearby towns and villages used social media networks to coordinate protests across the region. In January 2019, some activists established a camp near Shies42 and blocked the delivery of fuel and equipment to the construction site. After local government officials and activists won a series of court victories43 in 2020, the project was abandoned. In BiH, the local civic movement “Jer me se tiče” (“Because it matters to me”) started a litigation case against the environmental permit for a city dump in 2019. The movement was started by residents living next to the dump, whose toxins poisoned the neighborhood’s soil and water. After years of harassment, lawsuits against activists, and bans on gatherings, the court finally decided in December 202244 that Mostar city council must close the city dump and find a new location for communal waste disposal. Thousands of residents of the Russian city of Ekaterinburg in May 2019 protested a plan to build a cathedral in a popular downtown park.45 Protesters lamented the lack of recreational sites in the city, with one commenting, “There are three green spaces in the city center and they’re taking one away.46” When confronted by riot police, protesters shouted “This is our city47!” Citizens demanding the preservation of the park eventually emerged victorious, after the authorities calmed the situation by organizing a referendum on the issue. Efforts by activists to halt construction of a planned nuclear waste disposal site48 for the Croatian and Slovenian-​owned nuclear power plant Krško near BiH’s natural park “Una” and just hundreds of meters away from the water supply have been more difficult. While the local NGO “Green Team” started an advocacy campaign49 against this project on Croatia’s side of the border and even managed to engage some politicians, the effort has confronted many political obstacles. Not even referral to the international treaties such as the ESPOO Convention or Aarhus Convention50 has helped, as key Bosnian politicians are influenced by and acting in the interest of Croatia. The power of actors beyond a country, such as neighboring governments in the proposed Krško nuclear waste disposal site or the multinational corporation (MNC) ArcelorMittal, to pollute in CEE has compelled many activists to engage cross-​national networks of local environmental activists to hold polluters accountable. For example, the Czech NGO Arnika51 has coordinated efforts by NGOs in the 16 countries where ArcelorMittal works to share experiences and find ways to make the MNC more environmentally responsible. Challenges and the future

Everyday activism is a big tent –​encompassing a wide variety of issues, campaigns, and tactics. Some everyday activist movements succeed in drawing attention to their demands and changing minds or policy, though many struggle to sustain themselves. What these activist efforts have in

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common is their roots in the “everyday” in two senses of the term: first, in the nature of the problems addressed and, second, in the movements’ early participants. The everyday problems that people directly experience in their daily lives sometimes inspire them to demand change from the status quo, often because they perceive that their own or their family’s health or quality of life is at risk. We have considered activism focused on issues ranging from air pollution to waste disposal and healthy food production to green space. Everyday participants are those people who come to activism without previous experience in campaigns, protests, or politics. In other words, they are not professional activists –​NGO staff members or specialists in the issue, and they rarely are paid for their involvement. They, instead, are individuals who are motivated by concern, frustration, and a sense that if they do not act, who will? A great advantage of everyday activism is that it can start small. Over time, everyday activism may grow beyond its modest beginnings. The challenges of scaling-​up and sustaining a movement, however, can be especially acute for new activists who have little experience at raising funds, rely on volunteers, or work in communities with few resources. In addition, few environmental issues are truly confined to a specific locality. Air pollution may be caused by a local factory owned by a multinational corporation with headquarters in a distant capital. To address the problem, activists may need to develop the organizational capacity to carry out multifaceted campaigns over time and to overcome skepticism of NGOs to attract new participants. They may need to extend their reach to identify regional and international partners who can offer funding or increase their leverage over an MNC. Sustaining activism also can be hard, due to the difficulty of engaging young people, especially if they are more likely to leave the area to escape problems than to voice their concerns (as in BiH). Another challenge of everyday activism is how activists relate to politics and those who work in government institutions. To resolve pressing issues, activists often must engage the authorities at different levels, contacting the relevant municipal or regional elected officials or bureaucrats in charge of the issue to change and/​or implement policies. Indeed, elected authorities have often exacerbated the problem by making decisions without considering their adverse environmental impact. Such harmful policymaking often compels grassroots activists to push back against political authorities, not out of ideological or partisan motives –​as claimed by their detractors –​but out of evidence-​based concern for environmental and health damage. Yet, local political institutions and networks can be difficult to navigate. Local politicians may capture local power, controlling local media, funneling funds to friendly CSOs, steering employment and investment to loyalists, and deflecting blame. They may have the power to intimidate, punish, or defame those who speak out.

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Many everyday activists see little value in engaging deeply in party politics or in politicizing their activism. In fact, activists may choose to frame their demands as “apolitical” –​simply “enforcing existing laws” or demanding basic “good governance.” An apolitical approach seeks to bolster activists’ legitimacy by conveying that they have no ulterior motive of profit or political power and to attract the broadest range of possible sympathizers. Communist party rule left its mark in a deep public cynicism about and distrust of politicians and view of the political arena as corrupt. By engaging authorities in post-​socialist countries where all politics is seen as “dirty,” much less directly affiliating with or participating in party politics, everyday activists risk alienating some groups of potential supporters. In this sense, activists’ portrayal of themselves as just “average citizens” may combine both an authentic position and strategic framing to achieve their goals. In some cases, especially when movement participants become deeply frustrated by political inaction or abuse, everyday activism might become overtly political. Despite failed projects in other countries, MNC Rio Tinto started exploratory excavations of lithium ore in a rural part of western Serbia and gradually gained the trust of the Serbian government and local citizens. The company performed classic “greenwashing” techniques, helping the local football team, rebuilding a school and church, and even attending religious events. When locals realized that their agricultural lands and water supply would be endangered by mining, they started to act. This led to massive protests52 in November 2021, fueled by anger against the government’s non-​ transparent procedures for the sale of land and permits allowing environmental damage. These protests expanded to more cities in Serbia and included sharp criticism of the government. The ruling political party broke the agreement with Rio Tinto just before the elections but allowed the multinational corporation to restart preparations for mining53 after winning elections. In this case, everyday activists became more directly involved with politics but ultimately were not able to stop mining or mobilize citizens to vote out the ruling party. It also illustrates the difficulties of activism in a more centralized or authoritarian political context like Serbia and Russia. Everyday activism –​in its varied forms in pursuit of varied issues –​is likely to persist in CEE and beyond because it represents responses to immediate concerns about enduring problems, and it does not require significant resources or experience to begin. As with any form of activism, everyday efforts have strengths and limitations. While everyday activism may offer the opportunity for citizens in CEE to leave their homes and enter the public arena to solve problems, it also faces serious challenges in scaling-​up and sustaining itself. Can average citizens really change cynical minds and win in their appeals against poor governance, self-​ interested politicians, and profit-​ seeking corporations? Our activist profiles and examples of everyday environmentalism in CEE show us that sometimes they can. In fact, small victories and the

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experience of activism may inspire citizens in other communities to engage and empower activists to work toward broader political change in the future. The problems of everyday activism are often symbolic of issues at higher levels of the political system, highlighting the need for government accountability and responsiveness to citizens (CIVICUS, 2019). Taking civic action through everyday activism ultimately may signal deeper social and political transformation from the ground up. Notes 1 “Clashes Break Out over Plans to Clear Moscow Forest.” (2022, February 2). The Moscow Times. https://​the​mosc​owti​mes.com/​2022/​02/​02/​clas​hes-​break-​out-​over-​ plans-​to-​clear-​mos​cow-​for​est-​a76​232. 2 Baynes, C. (2019). “Green Snow Falls on Russian City, Sparking Protests over Pollution.” The Independent. https://​inde​pend​ent.co.uk/​news/​world/​eur​ope/​ green-​snow-​rus​sia-​pollut​ion-​prote​sts-​envi​ronm​ent-​perv​oura​lsk-​a8795​676.html. 3 RFE/​ FL’s Russian Service. (2019). “Thousands Protest in Russia’s Northwest against Becoming Moscow’s Dumping Ground.” RadioFreeEurope/​RadioLiberty. https://​rferl.org/​a/​thousa​nds-​prot​est-​in-​rus​sia-​s-​northw​est-​agai​nst-​becom​ing-​mos​ cow-​s-​dump​ing-​gro​und/​30315​683.html. 4 “Ambient Air Pollution.” (2016). World Health Organization. https://​iris.who. int/​bitstr​eam/​han​dle/​10665/​250​141/​978924​1511​353-​eng.pdf;jse​ssio​nid=​6678D ​ D892​E619​AD16​FA97​A6CA​2B46​8D1?seque​nce=​1. 5 Eko Forum Zenica. (2023). www.eko​foru​mzen​ica.ba/​. 6 Bosnia and Herzegovina is a decentralized state divided into two entities –​The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska –​and a district. The Federal Ministry of Environment and Tourism has the competency for environmental laws on its territory, including the steelworks in Zenica. 7 Eko Forum. (2012). “Protest March 22.12.2012.” www.eko​foru​mzen​ica.ba/​ 2012/​12/​21/​protes​tni-​mars-​21-​12-​2012/​. 8 Geoghegan, P., & Ahmetasevic, N. (2017). “Zenica, Bosnia: The Steel Town Where Even Taking a Breath Can Be a Struggle.” The Guardian. www.theg​uard​ ian.com/​cit​ies/​2017/​feb/​14/​arce​lor-​mit​tal-​fail​ing-​emissi​ons-​air-​pollut​ion-​zen​ica-​ bos​nia. 9 Zenica Grad. (2021). www.zen​ica.ba/​grad​ska-​upr​ava/​grad​ske-​slu​zbe/​sek​tor-​za-​ ekolog​iju-​i-​komuna​lne-​posl​ove/​ekolog​ija/​. 10 Nordea. (2018). “Field Visit to Bosnia: Zenica Engulfed in Smoke.” Climate Home News. www.climat​echa​ngen​ews.com/​2018/​05/​29/​field-​visit-​bos​nia-​zen​ica-​ engul​fed-​smoke/​. 11 Stojanovic, M. (2022). “German Bank Won’t Finance Bosnian Power Plant, NGOs Say.” BalkanInsight. https://​balkan​insi​ght.com/​2022/​01/​28/​ger​man-​bank-​ wont-​fina​nce-​bosn​ian-​power-​plant-​ngos-​say/​. 12 Eko Forum Zenica. (2023). www.eko​foru​mzen​ica.ba/​. 13 “Financial Reports of the Association.” (2022). Eko Forum Zenica. www.eko​foru​ mzen​ica.ba/​o-​nama/​fina​nsij​ski-​izv​jest​aji-​udruze​nja/​. 14 Eko Forum. (2018). “Ten Years of Struggle for Ecologically Sustainable Zenica.” [translated]. Eko Forum Zenica. www.eko​foru​mzen​ica.ba/​2018/​12/​11/​deset-​god​ ina-​borbe-​za-​ekolo​ski-​odrz​ivu-​zen​icu/​.

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15 “Registers and Reporting.” (2023). Federal Ministry of Environment and Tourism. www.fmoit.gov.ba/​bs/​okoli​sne-​dozv​ole/​regis​tri-​i-​izvje​siva​nje. 16 Ministry of Spatial Planning, Transport and Communications and Environmental Protection. (2016). “Action Plan for Environmental Protection of the Zeničko-​ doboj Canton.” [translated]. Ministry of Spatial Planning, Transport and Communications and Environmental Protection. https://​zdk.ba/​vije​sti/​item/​4140-​ akci​oni-​plan-​za-​zast​itu-​okol​isa-​zeni​cko-​dobojs​kog-​kant​ona. 17 Ministry of Spatial Planning, Transport and Communications and Environmental Protection. (2018). “Portal of Spatial Distribution of Emissions.” [translated]. http://​77.78.201.36:8080/​zdk/​. 18 “About IPAM.” (2023). EBRD. www.ebrd.com/​ipam#. 19 Reiserer, A. (2019). “EBRD Secures Greener Energy for Bosnian City of Zenica.” EBRD. www.ebrd.com/​news/​2019/​ebrd-​secu​res-​gree​ner-​ene​rgy-​for-​bosn​ian-​city-​ of-​zen​ica.html. 20 “Cost of Youth Emigration from Bosnia and Herzegovina.” (2019). Westminister Foundation for Democracy & Wester Balkans Democracy Initiative. https://​green-​ coun​cil.org/​green-​coun​cil/​pub​lik/​Cost_​of_​Y​outh​_​Emi​grat​ion_​from​_​BH.pdf. 21 Fians, G. (2022). “Prefigurative Politics.” In The Open Encyclopedia of Anthropology, edited by Felix Stein. Facsimilie of the first edition in The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Anthropology. Online: http://​doi.org/​10.29164/​22pre​figp​olit​ics. 22 MacFarquhar, N. (2017). “Russia’s Villages, and Their Way of Life, Are ‘Melting Away.’ ” The New York Times. www.nyti​mes.com/​2017/​07/​29/​world/​eur​ope/​rus​ sia-​pop​ulat​ion-​chan​ges.html. 23 “Russia’s ‘Wild Nineties’ As You’ve Never Seen Them Before” [gallery]. (2016). RadioFreeEurope/​RadioLiberty. www.rferl.org/​a/​russ​ian-​90s-​captu​red-​in-​arch​ ive-​proj​ect/​28074​462.html. 24 Carothers, T. (1999). “Western Civil-​ Society Aid to Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://​ carneg​ieen​dowm​ent.org/​1999/​09/​01/​west​ern-​civil-​soci​ety-​aid-​to-​east​ern-​eur​ ope-​and-​for​mer-​sov​iet-​union-​pub-​145ild​ing-​democr​acy-​in-​conte​mpor​ary-​rus​sia/​ #bookT​abs=​1. 25 Pilarski, M. (2010). “Russia’s Anastasia and Permaculture.” Inland Northwest Permaculture Guild. https://​inla​ndno​rthw​estp​erma​cult​ure.com/​arti​cle/​russ​ias-​ anasta​sia-​and-​perma​cult​ure. 26 Ashwin, S., & Lytkina, T. (2004). “Men in Crisis in Russia: The Role of Domestic Marginalization.” Gender and Society, 18(2), 189–​ 206. www.jstor.org/​sta​ble/​ 4149​432. 27 Mirovalev, M. (2017). “Death Throes of Russia’s Iconic Countryside.” Al Jazeera. www.aljaze ​ e ra.com/​ f eatu​ r es/​ 2 017/​ 2 /​ 1 4/​ d eath-​ t hr​ o es-​ o f-​ r uss​ i as-​ i co​ n ic-​ c oun​ trys​ide. 28 Light, F. (2021). “ ‘The Young People Don’t Stay Here’: Depopulation Haunts Russia’s Breadbasket.” The Moscow Times. www.the​mosc​owti​mes.com/​2021/​08/​ 03/​the-​young-​peo​ple-​dont-​stay-​here-​depop​ulat​ion-​hau​nts-​russ​ias-​brea​dbas​ket-​ a74​683. 29 “Leading Russian Environmental Group Closes after Being Deemed ‘Foreign Agents.’ ” (2023). The Moscow Times. www.the​mosc​owti​mes.com/​2023/​01/​11/​ lead​ing-​russ​ian-​enviro​nmen​tal-​group-​clo​ses-​after-​being-​dee​med-​fore​ign-​agent-​ a79​923.

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30 “Theories of Change.” (2023). The Commons: Social Change Library. https://​ com​mons​libr​ary.org/​topic/​theor​ies-​of-​cha​nge/​. 31 Akleyev, A.K. (2017). “Consequences of the Radiation Accident at the Mayak Production Association in 1957 (the ‘Kyshtym Accident’).” Journal of Radiological Protection, 37, R19. 32 Rabl, T. (2012). “The Nuclear Disaster of Kyshtym 1957 and the Politics of the Cold War.” Arcadia, 2012, no. 20 –​Arcadia Collection: Technology and Expertise. www.enviro​nmen​tand​soci​ety.org/​arca​dia/​nucl​ear-​disas​ter-​kysh​tym-​ 1957-​and-​polit​ics-​cold-​war. 33 “Residents of Russian City Protest ‘Black Sky’ Air Pollution.” (2018). APNews. https://​apn​ews.com/​arti​cle/​ind​ustr​ial-​pollut​ion-​eur​ope-​rus​sia-​pollut​ion-​air-​pollut​ ion-​0093b​7d52​f174​e538​44c2​2795​c40c​ed7. 34 Davydova, A. (2021). “Environmental Activism in Russia: Strategies and Prospects.” CSIS. www.csis.org/​analy​sis/​enviro​nmen​tal-​activ​ism-​rus​sia-​str​ateg​ ies-​and-​prospe​cts. 35 “Chelyabinsk Ranked 1st among Russian Cities with Highest Air Pollution Levels.” (2021). Interfax. https://​inter​fax.com/​newsr​oom/​top-​stor​ies/​70945/​. 36 Polish Smog Alert. https://​www.poli​shsm​ogal​ert.org/​. (Accessed 2023). 37 Heil, A. (2019). “Bosnian Villagers Stave Off ‘Mini-​Dams,’ But for How Long?” RadioFreeEurope/​RadioLiberty. https://​www.rferl.org/​a/​bosn​ian-​villag​ers-​stave-​ off-​mini-​dams-​but-​for-​how-​long-​/​30110​892.html. 38 Derevisbegovic, N. (2020). “Bosnia’s Federation Entity Moves to Curb Hydro-​ Power Blight.” BalkanInsight. https://​balkan​insi​ght.com/​2020/​06/​24/​bosn​ias-​fed​ erat​ion-​ent​ity-​moves-​to-​curb-​hydro-​power-​bli​ght/​. 39 “Blue Heart.” (2023). Patagonia. https://​bluehe​art.patago​nia.com/​. 40 Kurtic, A. (2022). “Bosnia’s Federation to Ban Small Hydropower Plants.” BalkanInsight. https://​balkan​insi​ght.com/​2022/​06/​07/​bosn​ias-​fed​erat​ion-​to-​ban-​ small-​hyd​ropo​wer-​pla​nts/​. 41 RFE/​RL’s Russian Service. (2019). “Thousands Participate in ‘Russia Is Not a Dump’ Protests.” RadioFreeEurope/​RadioLiberty. https://​www.rferl.org/​a/​thousa​ nds-​part​icip​ate-​in-​rus​sia-​is-​not-​a-​dump-​nat​ionw​ide-​prote​sts/​29748​950.html. 42 “The Shies Camp: How Moscow’s Trash Become Treasure for a Group of Environmental Protestors.” Bellona. https://​bell​ona.org/​news/​ind​ustr​ial-​pollut​ ion/​2020-​01-​the-​shies-​camp-​how-​mosc​ows-​trash-​bec​ame-​treas​ure-​for-​a-​group-​ of-​enviro​nmen​tal-​pro​test​ors. 43 Zabolotnaya, K., & Coalson, R. (2020). “Russian Landfill Protesters Grapple with What Comes Next Following Court Win.” RadioFreeEurope/​RadioLiberty. https://​www.rferl.org/​a/​russ​ian-​landf​i ll-​pro​test​ers-​grap​ple-​with-​what-​comes-​next-​ follow​ing-​court-​win/​30926​164.html. 44 Omanovic, D. (2022). “The Association ‘Jer nas se zače’: The Last Verdict Restored Faith in a Better Tomorrow and in the BiH Judiciary” [translated]. AA. https://​www.aa.com.tr/​ba/​bal​kan/​udru%C5%BEe​nje-​jer-​nas-​se-​ti%C4%8De-​pos​ ljed​nja-​pres​uda-​vrat​ila-​vjeru-​u-​bolje-​sutra-​i-​u-​bh-​prav​osu%C4%91e/​2764​616#. 45 “Activists Storm Yekaterinburg Russia Park in Protest against New Church.” (2019, May 15). BBC. https://​www.bbc.com/​news/​world-​eur​ope-​48276​170. 46 Luxmoore, M. (2019, May 15). Thousands Protest Proposed Church for Third Day in Russia’s Yekaterinburg. RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty. https://​www. rferl.org/​a/​thousa​nds-​prot​est-​propo​sed-​chu​rch-​for-​third-​day-​in-​rus​sia-​s-​yekate​ rinb​urg/​29942​780.html.

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47 Luxmoore, M. (2019, May 15). Thousands Protest Proposed Church for Third Day in Russia’s Yekaterinburg. RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty. https://​www. rferl.org/​a/​thousa​nds-​prot​est-​propo​sed-​chu​rch-​for-​third-​day-​in-​rus​sia-​s-​yekate​ rinb​urg/​29942​780.html. 48 Jović, N., & Popović, V. (2020). “The Case of Disposal of Nuclear Waste in Trgovska Gora in the Republic of Croatia: Economic and Legal Consequences for Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Acta Economica, 20(36). http://​www.ae.ef.unibl.org/​ index.php/​ae/​arti​cle/​view/​430. 49 “Recommendation Regarding the Problem of Radioactive Waste Disposal in the Area of Trgovska Gora in the Republic of Croatia.” (2021, December 16). The Institution of Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina. https://​ ombuds​men.gov.ba/​Nov​ost.aspx?new​sid=​2124&lang=​EN. 50 “Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention).” (2017). UNECE. https://​unece.org/​envi​ronm​ent-​poli​cyen​ viro​nmen​tal-​ass​essm​ent/​text-​con​vent​ion. 51 “Fighting Air Pollution in the Industrial Cities of Europe.” (2018, November). Arnika. https://​arn​ika.org/​en/​eve​nts/​con​fere​nce-​fight​ing-​air-​pollut​ion. 52 Agence France-​Presse. (2021, December, 4). “Rio Tinto Lithium Mine: Thousands of Protesters Block Roads across Serbia.” The Guardian. https://​www.theg​uard​ ian.com/​world/​2021/​dec/​05/​rio-​tinto-​lith​ium-​mine-​thousa​nds-​of-​pro​test​ers-​ block-​roads-​acr​oss-​ser​bia. 53 Dragojlo, S. (2023, February 23). “Rio Tinto Spends Million Euros on Serbian Land since Mine Cancellation.” BalkanInsight. https://​balkan​insi​ght.com/​2023/​ 02/​23/​rio-​tinto-​spe​nds-​mill​ion-​euros-​on-​serb​ian-​land-​since-​mine-​cance​llat​ion/​.

References Arsenijević, D. ed. (2014). Unbribable Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Fight for the Commons. Baden-​Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Belloni, R. (2020). The Rise and Fall of Peacebuilding in the Balkans. London: Palgrave McMillan. Bojicic-​Dzelilovic, V., Ker-​Lindsay, J., & Kostovicova D. eds. (2013). Civil Society and Transitions in the Western Southeastern Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. CIVICUS. (2019). State of Civil Society Report 2019: The Year in Review. Johannesburg: CIVICUS. Civil Society Forum of the Western Balkans. (2019). “Civil Society and Youth Engagement in the Western Balkans.” Policy Brief 05/​19. https://​wb-​csf.eu/​docs/​ CSF-​PB-​05-​19-​full-​6.pdf.pdf Cutts, M. (1999). The Humanitarian Operation in Bosnia, 1992–​95: Dilemmas of Negotiating Humanitarian Access. Geneva: Policy Research Unit, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. www.unhcr.org/​3ae6a0​c58.pdf Dollbaum, J.M. (2020). “Protest Trajectories in Electoral Authoritarianism: From Russia’s ‘For Fair Elections’ Movement to Alexei Navalny’s Presidential Campaign.” Post-​Soviet Affairs 36, no. 3: 192–​210. Dvornik, S. (2009). Actors without Society: The Role of Civil Actors in the Postcommunist Transformation. Heinrich Böll Stiftung, November. www.boell. de/​en/​democr​acy/​conte​mpor​ary-​hist​ory-​7875.html

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Džihić, V., Pudar Draško, G., Turčalo, S., Beshku, K., & Cerovac, I. (2018). Overcoming the Democratisation Deficit in the Western Balkans: A Road to (No) Where? Belgrade: Friedrich-​Ebert-​Stiftung Belgrade, August. https://​libr​ary.fes.de/​ pdf-​files/​bue​ros/​belg​rad/​14631.pdf Evans Jr, A.B., Henry, L.A., & Sundstrom, L.M. (2006). Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assessment. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe. Fagan, A., & Sircar, I. (2015). Europeanization of Western Balkans: Environmental Governance in Bosnia-​Herzegovina and Serbia. Houndmills: Palgrave. Fiket, I., & Pudar Draško, G. (2018). Balkan 2025 –​Direct Participation of Citizens for True Democracy. Belgrade Security Forum. www.belgra​defo​rum.org/​wp-​cont​ ent/​uplo​ads/​2018/​08/​Bal​kan-​2025-​%E2%80%93-​Dir​ect-​partic​ipat​ion-​of-​citiz​ ens-​for-​True-​Democr​acy.pdf Galimberti, U. (2017). Disquieting Guest. The Nihilism and the Youth. Milano: Feltrinelli, 2008. Geoghegan, P., & Ahmetasevick, N. (2017). “Zenica, Bosnia: The Steel Town Where Even Taking a Breath Can Be a Struggle.” Guardian, February 14, 2017. www. theg​uard​ian.com/​cit​ies/​2017/​feb/​14/​arce​lor-​mit​tal-​fail​ing-​emissi​ons-​air-​pollut​ion-​ zen​ica-​bos​nia Gordy, E. (2015). “Dayton’s Annex 4 Constitution at 20.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 15, no. 4: 611–​622. Hayes, G., et al. (2021). “Trajectories in Environmental Politics.” Environmental Politics 30, nos. 1–​2: 4–​16. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​09644​016.2021.1882​721 Henderson, S.L. (2001). “Civil Society in Russia: State-​Society Relations in the Post-​ Yeltsin Era.” Problems of Post-​Communism 58, no. 3: 11–​27. Henry, L.A. (2010). Red to Green: Environmental Activism in Post-​Soviet Russia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Howard, M.M. (2003). The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-​Communist Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ipgrave, M. (2008). Building a Better Bridge –​Muslims, Christians, and the Common Good. Washington: Georgetown University Press. Jacobsson, K., & Korolczuk, E. (2020). “Mobilizing Grassroots in the City: Lessons for Civil Society Research in Central and Eastern Europe.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 33, no. 2, 125–​142. Jowitt, K. (1992). New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction. Berkeley: University of California Press. Kurtic, A. (2022). “Bosnia Greens Celebrate as Federation Bans Small Hydropower Plants.” BIRN. https://​balkan​insi​ght.com/​2022/​07/​07/​bos​nia-​gre​ens-​celebr​ate-​as-​ fed​erat​ion-​bans-​small-​hyd​ropo​wer-​pla​nts/​ Maltby, T., Birch, S., Fagan, A., & Subašić, M. (2022). “Activism and Air Pollution: Explaining Changes in Civil Society Mobilisation and Policy.” Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the Association for the Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies, Chicago, IL. Martus, E. (2017). Russian Environmental Politics: State, Industry and Policymaking. London: Routledge. McMahon, P. (2017). The NGO Game: Post-​Conflict Peacebuilding in the Balkans and Beyond. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Metalfachtg. (2022). “ ‘Clean Air’ Program Antismog Resolution in the Voivodship Program.” https://​meta​lfac​htg.com.pl/​uchw​ala-​anty​smog​owa-​w-​wojew​odzt​wie/​ #pll_​s​witc​her

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Milan, C. (2019). Beyond Ethnicity: Civic Activism and Grassroots Movements in Bosnia and Herzegovina. London: Routledge. Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (1997). “Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-​Communist Societies.” Journal of Politics 59, no. 2: 323–​656. Morris, J., Semenov, A., & Smyth, R. (2023). Varieties of Russian Activism State-​ Society Contestation in Everyday Life. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Mujkić, A. (2015). “In Search of a Democratic Counter-​ Power in Bosnia–​ Herzegovina.” Journal of Southeast European & Black Sea Studies 15, no. 4: 623–​ 638. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​14683​857.2015.1126​094 Naumescu, V. (2007). Modes of Religiosity in Eastern Christianity. Religious Processes and Social Change in Ukraine. Berlin: LIT-​Verlag. www.eth.mpg.de/​ 3334​112/​book_​071 Nordea (2018). “Field Visit to Bosnia: Zenica Engulfed in Smoke.” Climate Home News, May 29. https://​climat​echa​ngen​ews.com/​2018/​05/​29/​field-​visit-​bos​nia-​zen​ ica-​engul​fed-​smoke/​ Oldfield, J.D. (2005). Russian Nature: Exploring the Environmental Consequences of Societal Change. Burlington: Ashgate. Perry, V., & Stefanovski, I. (2021). Sell Out, Tune Out, Get Out, Or Freak Out? Understanding Corruption, State Capture, Radicalization, Pacification, Resilience, and Emigration in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia. Skopje: EUROTHINK –​Center for European Strategies. Pickering, P.M. (2022). “Civic Engagement and Its Disparate Goals in Bosnia-​ Herzegovina.” East European Politics and Societies 36, no. 4: 1400–​1421. https://​ doi.org/​10.1177/​088832​5422​1081​043 Pietrzyk-​Reeves, D., Monkosk, A., & Volokhai, M. (2022). “Environmental Activism in Ukraine: Everyday Concerns as Reasons for Civic Mobilization.” Unpublished manuscript. Pinjo Talevska, M., ed. (2019). Balkan Barometer 2019 –​Public Opinion –​Analytical Report. Sarajevo: Regional Cooperation Council. www.rcc.int/​seeds/​files/​RCC_​ BalkanB​arom​eter​_​Pub​licO​pini​on_​2​019.pdf Pipes, D. (2015). “Are Muslims Fatalists?” Middle East Quarterly 22, no. 4: 1–​18. www.dani​elpi​pes.org/​16113/​are-​musl​ims-​fatali​sts Polese, A., Morris, J., Pawłusz, E., & Seliverstova, O. (2018). Identity and Nation Building in Everyday Post-​Socialist Life. London: Taylor and Francis. Puljek-​Shank, R., & Fritsch, F. (2019). “Activism in Bosnia-​Herzegovina: Struggles against Dual Hegemony and the Emergence of ‘Local First.’ ” East European Politics and Societies 33, no. 1: 135–​ 156. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​08883​2541​ 8767​505 Puljek-​ Shankc, R., & Popov-​ Momčinović, Z. (2022). Advocacy Manual for Associations and Citizens in BiH. Banja Luka: Transparency International BiH. https://​ti-​bih.org/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2022/​12/​TI-​BIH-​ADVOC​ACY-​MAN​UAL-​ FOR-​ASSOC​IATI​ONS-​AND-​CITIZ​ENS-​IN-​BIH-​ENG-​WEB.pdf Rakaj-​ Vrugtman, L., et al. (2019). “Role of Religion in the Western Balkans’ Societies.” Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe 39, no. 5, Article 2. https://​dig​ital​comm​ons.george​fox.edu/​cgi/​view​cont​ent.cgi?arti​cle=​2134&cont​ ext=​ree

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Shapovalova, N. (2019). Assessing Ukrainian Grassroots Activism Five Years After Euromaidan. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://​car​negi​eeur​ope.eu/​2019/​02/​06/​assess​ing-​ukrain​ian-​gra​ssro​ots-​activ​ism-​ five-​years-​after-​eur​omai​dan-​pub-​78248 Smyth, R., & Sokhey, S.W. (2021). “Constitutional Reform and the Value of Social Citizenship.” Russian Politics 6, no. 1: 91–​111. Stojanovic, M. (2022). “German Bank Won’t Finance Bosnian Power Plant, NGOs Say.” BIRN. https://​balkan​insi​ght.com/​2022/​01/​28/​ger​man-​bank-​wont-​fina​nce-​ bosn​ian-​power-​plant-​ngos-​say/​ Sundstrom, L.M., Henry, L.A., & Sperling, V. (2022). “The Evolution of Civic Activism in Contemporary Russia.” East European Politics and Societies 36, no. 4: 1377–​1399. https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​088832​5421​1070​851 Tysiachniouk, M., Tulaeva, S., & Henry, L.A. (2018). “Civil Society under the Law ‘On Foreign Agents’: NGO Strategies and Network Transformation.” Europe-​ Asia Studies 70, no. 4: 615–​637. Vishinovcha, M., & Mladenovska, S. (2022). Civil Society Accountability in Restricted Civic Space: A Perspective from the Western Balkans. CSO Standard. www.csos​tand​ard.org/​cso-​stand​ard/​civil-​soci​ety-​acc​ount​abil​ity-​in-​res​tric​ted-​civic-​ space-​a-​pers​pect​ive-​from-​the-​west​ern-​balk​ans/​ Volkov, D. (2012). “Putinism under Siege: The Protesters and the Public.” Journal of Democracy 23, no. 3: 55–​62. Wax, T. (2021). “Do We Need to Develop ‘Holy Indifference’?” The Gospel Coalition. www.the​gosp​elco​alit​ion.org/​blogs/​tre​vin-​wax/​do-​we-​need-​to-​deve​lop-​holy-​indif​ fere​nce/​ World Health Organisation. (2014). 7 Million Premature Deaths Annually Linked to Air Pollution. www.who.int/​news/​item/​25-​03-​2014-​7-​mill​ion-​premat​ure-​dea​ths-​ annua​lly-​lin​ked-​to-​air-​pollut​ion Yanitsky, O. (2010). Russian Environmentalism: The Yanitsky Reader. Moscow: TAUS, 2010.

7 CRISES COVID-​19 and Russia’s war on Ukraine Ella Rossman, Valerie Sperling, and Paula M. Pickering

As the previous chapters demonstrated, activists in CEE have struggled with many challenges. Certainly, Russia’s war against Ukraine, starting in 2014, its full-​ scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the COVID-​ 19 pandemic created considerable obstacles for activists in the region. However, such crises and “shocks to the system” also offer new ways for civic activists to organize and build the resilience of civil society. This chapter looks at how two crises –​Russia’s war on Ukraine and the COVID-​19 pandemic –​have impacted activism in Ukraine, Russia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). We look first at how Russia’s unprovoked war against its neighbor led to the creation of a grassroots women’s mutual aid organization in Ukraine and a network of feminist anti-​war activists in Russia. Then, we illustrate how civic activists stepped up when the COVID crisis exacerbated another, longer-​ term crisis –​that of domestic violence –​in Russia and BiH. These activists’ responses to different crises share an intentional bottom-​ up, horizontal approach that emphasizes empowering women. The activities of Nataliia Muzyka (Ukraine) and Ella Rossman (Russia) are featured in this chapter and highlight the similarities and differences entailed in building civil society and engaging in civic activism in the context of two radically different political systems –​Ukraine’s besieged democracy and Russia’s increasingly repressive dictatorship. Nataliia Muzyka –​supporting defenders of Ukraine and their families

Nataliia Muzyka started her activism not long after Russia’s war against Ukraine began in late February 2014. At that time, Russian troops –​initially without official identification and in unmarked uniforms –​entered the DOI: 10.4324/9781003466116-7

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southern Ukrainian province of Crimea and occupied the region under the pretext that the troops were there to protect the Russian-​speaking population from the new Ukrainian government that Russian president Vladimir Putin baselessly condemned as “nationalists, neo-​Nazis, Russophobes, and anti-​ Semites.”1 Putin’s political ally, Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, had recently been ousted in a popular revolution (EuroMaidan) after he reneged on his promise to pursue closer trade ties with the European Union and signed an economic agreement with Russia instead. While under military occupation in mid-​ March, Crimeans voted in a Russia-​orchestrated referendum to secede from Ukraine. Russia then illegally annexed Crimea. Shortly thereafter, in April 2014, military conflict began in eastern Ukraine, where pro-​Russian separatists in border regions took up arms and were countered by Ukrainian government forces. Fighting there intensified as Russia shipped troops, weapons, and supplies across the Ukrainian border while denying its involvement. By late summer, more than 2500 people2 had been killed in the war. In the aftermath of a brutal battle in the eastern Ukrainian town of Ilovaisk in August 2014,3 when Russian-​backed separatists encircled Ukrainian forces and inflicted a lot of casualties, the families of Ukrainian soldiers in that battle had no information about their loved ones. This is when Muzyka started her activism, wanting to fill this information vacuum and develop a network of mutual assistance so that mothers and wives could support one another in concrete ways as they coped with the shock of their loved ones being killed, wounded, taken as prisoners of war, or deployed to defend Ukraine. Muzyka allowed her phone number to be distributed on mass media, but she lacked the official information she needed to respond to the many people who called her, and Ukraine’s governmental institutions would not provide information to just anyone who asked for it. Within months, Muzyka and another woman created the formal civil society organization the Association of Wives and Mothers of Soldiers Participating in the Anti-​Terrorist Operation (or ATO –​ what Ukraine’s government called the war at that time). This allowed them to gather information from Ukrainian governmental institutions and provide that information to the families of Ukrainian soldiers who were brought into the Association. Remarkably, neither Muzyka nor her colleague had any experience in civic activism or the civil society sector. Prior to August 2014, Muzyka was an ordinary citizen who mostly focused on taking care of her children and family. But, as she puts it, she was “motivated by fear and anxiety about her relatives” to take public action. Muzyka’s engagement in civic activism fits with the notion of “everyday activists” –​ordinary citizens whose experience with a problem spurred them to take civic action to address it (as explained in Chapter 6). Muzyka is part of what is now known as “Ukraine’s volunteer

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movement,”4 which is made up of hundreds of thousands of ordinary citizens trying to do their part for the war effort. In the beginning, Muzyka and the Association focused on small practical issues, giving clothes to prisoners of war (POWs) or asking the Ukrainian security service whether soldiers were alive. Over eight years, however, the Association expanded to engage in four main streams of activity in support of its goals. The Association seeks to unite women from families of military servicemen and families of fallen soldiers for the purpose of solving common problems, providing comprehensive support, and protecting their own rights. In addition, it wants to develop an active, nationally conscious civil society capable of holding authorities accountable and actively influencing the development of Ukraine as a peaceful, sovereign, democratic state. Initially, the Association was focused on two, interconnected areas: psychological and social activities. Psychological activities aimed to assist veterans and their families, who had no prior experience with combat, address their post-​traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). At first, the Association provided help through a horizontal network of “mutual assistance” groups, where members talked with and supported one another. After it received funding, the Association also helped treat PTSD and assisted veterans who came back from the front with the process of returning to a normal and peaceful life. This included organizing social activities, such as educational and recreational trips for recovering veterans and their families, which were connected to psychological services. The social activities also sought to bring Ukrainians together around the shared threat of Russia’s aggression. In 2017, Muzyka and the Association’s members launched a third stream of activities –​focused on advocacy and human rights. During this time, the Association grew to include 20–​30 consistent participants –​the “backbone” of the organization –​and more than 2500 members. Their advocacy focuses on government institutions at the national level and seeks to commemorate veterans who died during the Russian-​Ukrainian war. The Association has organized marches and other events in Kyiv to “honor [Ukraine’s] heroes” so that others do not forget about them and their families. It has also advocated for the construction of new memorials.5 These activities have been praised by the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Social Policy, and the Ministry of Veterans Affairs of Ukraine, with whom the Association has collaborated. The second part of this stream of activities –​human rights –​is in response to requests from families of deployed soldiers from small towns and villages for information, material assistance, and help securing the rights of returning veterans to healthcare, assistance, and psychological care. The Association’s human rights activism is focused on providing legal support to veterans to help them obtain the care and assistance to which they are entitled from regional or district authorities.

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Russia’s full-​ scale, overt invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, pushed the Association to shift its focus to its fourth stream –​humanitarian activism. Currently, the Association is providing humanitarian aid to family members of those who are fighting on the front lines, regardless of whether they are members of the organization. As of early January 2023, they had distributed about 3000 humanitarian aid kits to families in areas of eastern Ukraine liberated in winter 2022 and to those who have been displaced by the war. The Association’s evolution since 2014 is impressive. It now includes four streams of activities, a headquarters in Kyiv, professional development training for team members, and a robust network of membership that includes 19 separate divisions in 14 regions across Ukraine. Russia’s full invasion in February 2022 compelled the Association to accelerate building its capacity to effectively communicate and respond to the evolving and escalating needs of families of soldiers. This demonstrates both the flexibility and vitality of the Association. Throughout the Association’s evolution, Muzyka stressed its commitment to its approach of developing horizontal ties between people for mutual help: “We don’t have a division between the team and those whom we are helping.” This egalitarian, networked approach seeks to empower, rather than lead or serve, citizens, an approach similar to that of the Feminist Anti-​ War Resistance (that Rossman describes below). The networked approach also enhances the Association’s flexibility. For example, the Association’s local members cooperate independently of its headquarters in Kyiv with other small, locally based organizations on the specific needs of the locality or region. Cooperation with large-​scale civil society organizations (CSOs) based in Kyiv –​what Muzyka calls “big players” –​has been more difficult, as these CSOs do not seem interested in cooperation. Muzyka finds it much easier to cooperate with Ukraine’s national-​level governmental institutions. Muzyka identifies three significant challenges that the Association has confronted: (1) increasing members’ skills; (2) raising funds; (3) and further decentralizing the Association’s structure. An initial challenge that was addressed early on was helping members, especially women in rural areas who were often between 50 and 60 years old, develop managerial skills. While members were civic activists ready to speak up for themselves, defend their rights, and make demands, they did not have the skills to be project managers. By 2017, the Association created a special project office staffed by women who either specialize in project management, possess managerial experience, or practice law so that they can help veterans obtain social benefits from regional authorities. The second problem has been financial. The specialists in the project office needed salaries, but there were no sustainable grants available to cover the cost. In response, the Association embraced social entrepreneurship,6 organizing seminars, lectures, and trainings for a small fee. This social

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entrepreneurship approach strives to work toward meeting social needs while allowing the Association to create and support their own budget and experts more independent of governmental assistance. Muzyka identified the third problem as the structure of the organization as it has grown. She believes it is important to enhance the flexibility of the organization and reduce reliance on the headquarters for making the most critical decisions. To address this challenge, Muzyka envisions a restructuring of the Association, creating a Council of Directors consisting of representatives from different areas of Ukraine who would rotate leadership and engage in collective decision-​making about important issues. This would grant authority to more members while maintaining an egalitarian structure. It would also provide regional representatives with more experience in decision-​ making and empower regional groups to make decisions more independently, based on the region’s needs. For example, in case there are pressing regional problems, but war has prevented communication between regional groups and the center, this stronger, even more decentralized structure would make it easier and faster for regional groups to make and implement decisions. Though war makes planning for the future extremely difficult, Muzyka continues to hold strategic meetings with members in the Association’s administrative body to plan for the near future. She wants to continue the Association’s focus on addressing the needs of soldiers, veterans, and their families. In addition, she views as essential helping raise Ukrainians’ consciousness, seeking through the Association’s work to build a larger community of people who support and engage in nation-​building in Ukraine, a process in which people embrace a spirit of activism in defense of the country, not only militarily but also socially, politically, and economically. Part of this vision involves Ukrainians investing in the future development of the country so that Ukraine will be an “independent, peaceful, and strong state” within its internationally recognized borders in the foreseeable future. Non-​hierarchical activist networks

Contemporary activism is often characterized by decentralized structures challenging strict hierarchical models of organization, like those fostered early on by Western donors to CEE, and political leadership. Good examples include movements like Occupy Wall Street or Black Lives Matter in the United States and the All-​ Poland Women’s Strike movement and the “Colorful Revolution” against corruption in North Macedonia in CEE. As Muzyka’s profile illustrates, these kinds of structures are frequently shaped like networks rather than hierarchies and include various forms of collective decision-​making and practices aimed at involving group members and the general public in the exchange of ideas, content creation, and collective

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action. Activists often use digital technologies, like social media, to emphasize participation and build connections –​horizontal ties –​between members (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). Non-​hierarchical activist networks that use these organizational tactics are especially successful in fostering greater political engagement and creating feelings of interpersonal trust, agency, and identification with a political movement (Bimber et al., 2012). At the same time, activists in these structures face particular challenges, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Networks tend to be more chaotic than classic organizations; they often lack clear coordination and accountability, which can lead to movements’ decline (Disalvo, 2015). Yet, as the activists profiled and the cases in this chapter, from Ukraine, Russia, and BiH, show, the flexibility and adaptability of decentralized structures can be especially effective in uncertain or rapidly changing environments that accompany major crises like the COVID-​19 pandemic and Russia’s war against Ukraine. The effects of Russia’s full-​scale invasion of Ukraine on activism

In the early morning of February 24, 2022, Russian launched a full-​scale invasion of Ukraine and started bombing both military and civilian targets. The unprovoked invasion led to anti-​war street protests in many regions of Russia, which, however, were soon suppressed through mass arrests and new repressions against activists and protesters. The authorities immediately took control of public discussion about the war. On March 4, the Russian State Duma adopted amendments to the criminal and civil codes, which allowed for punishing those who disseminate “deliberately false” information about the Russian army with significant fines and up to 15 years in prison (Troianovski, 2022). Organizing protests or participating in them, and even using the word “war,” rather than the regime-​ approved “special military operation” to describe Russia’s invasion of Ukraine became criminal acts. The authorities quickly started using these laws against anti-​war activists and other citizens who criticized the Russian invasion or shared information about it from sources other than official Russian media and government reports. As of October 2022, the largest number of criminal charges related to the war had been made under what is known informally as the “fake news” law. Another amendment criminalized “discrediting” Russian military operations, resulting in penalties of up to five years in prison. The authorities also attacked independent media and blogs covering the war, blocking them or accusing them of violating Russian laws and imposing huge fines. Social media platforms like Twitter (now known as X), Facebook, and Instagram were blocked; the Meta company, which owns Instagram and Facebook, was officially declared an extremist organization. Russia’s 2013 “gay propaganda” ban was expanded in October 2022, criminalizing the

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distribution of information about same-​sex relationships to any audience (not only to minors). In general, while the Russian state had been on an authoritarian trajectory for two decades, the situation for human rights and freedom of speech deteriorated sharply after the start of the full-​scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s government became increasingly intolerant of opposition, civic activism, and any open criticism of the state’s actions. However, even in these circumstances, protest activities continued in Russia. For example, the mass mobilization7 of soldiers, announced in September 2022, led to protests8 by women in the minority ethnic areas of Russia, from which soldiers were being disproportionately recruited and mobilized. Ella Rossman –​protesting Russia’s war on Ukraine

When Russia began its full-​scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Ella Rossman, a Russian feminist activist and PhD student, knew she had to do something about it. She texted her friend, Daria Serenko, a Moscow-​ based activist and writer, as well as several other prominent Russian feminists, including Alexandra Talaver and Lolja Nordic, to say “We need to organize something.”9 On February 25, Rossman was among a handful of activists who launched the Feminist Anti-​War Resistance (FAR), a non-​hierarchical network of Russian speakers opposing Russia’s unprovoked war on Ukraine. FAR’s manifesto10 proclaimed, “As Russian citizens and feminists, we condemn this war,” noting that war exacerbates the very problems that the feminist movement aims to address, from poverty and gender inequality to sexual violence. The manifesto’s authors called on feminists in Russia to “unite forces to actively oppose the war and the government that started it” and invited feminists abroad to do the same. The new organization proclaimed its support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and encouraged allies to organize anti-​war actions, share accurate information about Russia’s war of aggression, and spread the word about FAR’s manifesto. By the end of March 2022, FAR was a rapidly expanding network with a dynamic online presence. Thousands of people had posted images of their anti-​war protests, stickers, and flyers on FAR’s Telegram channel, which had more than 25,000 followers. Eight months later, there were more than 42,000. A powerful movement was underway. At the time that Russia’s assault on Ukraine began, Rossman had already been an activist for nearly a decade, having become involved in Russia’s LGBTQ+​rights movement in 2013 when the federal government adopted legislation informally known as the “gay propaganda” law11 banning the promotion of “non-​traditional sexual relations” to minors. In 2012, Rossman had moved to Moscow to live with friends who brought her to activist events, where she became acquainted not only with LGBTQ+​activists but feminists, anarchists, and others who challenged the status quo. Rossman’s first foray

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into LGBTQ+​activism took the form of co-​organizing the LGBT Cinema Club at the Sakharov Center in Moscow, where fifty to sixty people would gather monthly to discuss films on LGBT-​related topics, such as New York’s Stonewall Uprising in 1969 and the AIDS-​anti-​discrimination movement Act Up!12 Rossman’s first feminist action took an educational form. In 2014, while an undergraduate at the Higher School of Economics (a prestigious university in Moscow), she and a group of like-​minded students created a Saturday seminar project they called “GIFT” –​an acronym for “gender studies and feminist theory” in Russian –​since there were no gender courses offered in her major (Cultural Studies). For two years, she and her peers explored the broad landscape of gender studies, examining topics like feminism in Russia and the links between feminist organizing, LGBTQ+​organizing, and queer theory. With this new and multifaceted knowledge of feminism, in 2016, Rossman co-​created her first feminist activist project, titled “Library 1+​1,” the goal of which was to counter the isolation often faced by women with young children. Working with Serenko and several other activists, Rossman acquired space at a public library in Moscow where women could attend weekly lectures or support groups while babysitting was provided for their children; the project also offered aid to women facing family violence and economic dependence. For the first six months, the head of the library welcomed the undertaking, believing it supported families and traditional values. But when a local man objected to the project, claiming it discriminated against men, the librarian who had allowed the activists to use the space then decried them as feminists and forced them out. While Rossman regretted the end of the Library 1+​1 project –​in part because the librarian who had sponsored them was, in turn, punished by her own boss and deprived of her bonuses –​it did not deter her from further feminist activism. This included working in 2017–​2018 for a non-​ governmental organization, “Lend a Hand,” which offered assistance to women in prison and to their families. Rossman also began an intensive research project collecting data on feminist groups and projects across the territory of Russia and producing an annual digest of their events –​such as film festivals, lectures, and street protests –​starting in 2019. That year she also co-​founded the Anti-​University (Koval’ski, 2021), a two-​year long project designed on the principles of critical and feminist pedagogy, offering lectures and courses on feminist theory, women in philosophy, the history of LGBTQ+​people in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, postcolonial theory and other topics. The advent of COVID expanded the project’s audience beyond Moscow, bringing participants from a variety of Russian cities and towns into discussions remotely. Such activities were not without negative consequences. In 2020, organizers of the “Anti-​University” were reported to the police under Russia’s notorious “gay propaganda” law for their lecture offerings on LGBTQ+​history, for instance.

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When the war began in February 2022, Rossman was already a practiced organizer, highly motivated to act. In reaching out to Serenko, Talaver, Nordic, and others, Rossman felt strongly that Russian feminists had to “raise our voices against the war” in part because “all the things we had been building for many years would disappear, because you can’t develop these kinds of projects during wartime –​it was quite clear that the authorities would launch repressions.” FAR’s activities early in the war included street protests as well as “guerilla” stickering13 and other creative ways to draw public attention to Russian anti-​ war voices. In the first month of the war, activists wrote “no to war” messages on Russian coins and banknotes before returning them to circulation and posted “missing person”14 flyers in public places, each one featuring a photo and description of a soldier killed in Ukraine and calling on people to help stop the war. FAR’s activities countered the Russian authorities’ monopoly over information and their denial that Russia was engaged in a war at all. After the Russian government passed laws making it illegal to spread “fake news” or “disinformation” about the war, street protests became too dangerous for FAR to encourage. By the end of November 2022, Russian police had detained more than 19,000 people for anti-​war protests,15 and 353 Russian citizens had been convicted or were being prosecuted as suspects in anti-​war criminal cases. However, activists in FAR’s network continued to carry out artistic street actions to draw attention to Russian war crimes in Ukraine. In one powerful action called “Mariupol 5000,” activists put crosses and objects resembling gravestones on the streets of Russian cities and towns accompanied by messages about the war’s civilian victims in Mariupol, Bucha, and other sites devastated by Russian attacks. This action was a graphic echo of the fact that residents of those places had to bury their relatives in their own yards, as they were constantly being bombed and could not safely access cemeteries. Rossman saw this action as particularly potent because it made people think about the war, bringing it into the spaces of their daily lives; hundreds of photos were posted to FAR’s chat board by activists moved to participate in it. As Rossman explained, at the start of the war, these kinds of actions were less risky than street protests and brought in people looking for ways to resist the regime without being arrested immediately. Six months into the war, FAR’s network boasted several branches focusing on different activities which included the distribution of information, such as anti-​ war memes and (starting in May 2022) a printable newspaper called Women’s Truth (Zhenskaia Pravda)16, to help spread word about the war beyond the “activism bubble.” In addition to their media and social media, which includes a rubric for sharing Ukrainian women’s stories (#GolosaUkrainok), FAR also offers psychological support to activists facing persecution and works with groups offering humanitarian assistance to Ukrainian civilians (for example, in 2022, together with the foundation

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“Warmth for Ukraine,” FAR collected money to buy a power generator for the Third Cherkasy City Emergency Hospital). FAR’s decolonial division links anti-​war resistance with anti-​colonial resistance, critiquing discrimination against non-​ Russian ethnic groups inside Russia as well as Russian imperialism abroad. The network also collaborates with organizations that help Russian activists and social groups facing state persecution safely leave the country and raise funds to help activists who lose their jobs17 as a result of their anti-​war positions. While working closely with other anti-​war organizations,18 FAR is especially attentive to the war’s impact on women and queer people. And while the group has attracted a lot of media attention in the independent Russian press (as well as in Europe and the United States), Rossman is committed to its status as an egalitarian network, and is not looking to be heroized. For Rossman, FAR’s structure –​a network of autonomous cells where each decides on their own actions –​is desirable not just for its inherent equality but also for safety reasons. FAR also faces the challenge of keeping its participants safe in the digital world of their social media. Before posting photos of any actions on FAR’s Telegram channel, they delete the metadata encrypted in the photos themselves so that the identities of those who send FAR their photos will be protected. For any sensitive communications, they use only apps that are end-​ to-​end encrypted and stored solely on users’ own devices. FAR faces other difficulties in Russia’s authoritarian environment. Not wanting to create additional risks for people, FAR tries to carry out actions that won’t land activists in jail. However, because laws are not applied in a predictable way, any activism can be dangerous in Russia. Other challenges include the inevitable divisions between some activists who have left the country and others who have stayed. Initially, it was seen as necessary to have some activists outside Russia who could try to help those arrested at home (by sharing the news with NGOs abroad). Yet, misinformation has also spread –​aided perhaps by the Russian security services –​claiming that FAR’s activists live comfortable lives abroad, making “big bucks” in London or Tbilisi, while others rot in Russian jails. Many who left the country are also vulnerable, some having fled from criminal charges in Russia, lacking money, jobs, and places to live; for activists enduring those circumstances, activism becomes impossible. As Rossman explained it, “We’ve sustained the organization by ‘spelling’ each other” –​giving one another a break, to avoid burnout while preserving FAR’s network for the future. Dictatorship in Russia, democracy in Ukraine: different contexts for civic activism

Ukraine and Russia, having taken politically divergent paths since the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, present different environments for

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civic activism. At the most fundamental level, the difference between the two governments is that between a struggling but competitive democracy and a consolidated dictatorship. The contrast is obvious if we compare the relationship between Ukrainian government institutions and the Association of Wives and Mothers of Soldiers Participating in the ATO, with the relationship between the Russian government and FAR. Russia’s government has taken numerous steps to suppress and destroy civil society groups it perceives as even potentially oppositional to the regime. One of the main tools in Russia’s arsenal has been the law on foreign agents. The “foreign agent” designation arose in 2012 and was aimed at CSOs that received foreign funding and engaged in any (ill-​defined) political activities. In practice, the term was used to identify and punish groups that the Russian government believed to be oppositional. Russia’s foreign agent registry and the definition of the term have expanded over time to include not only organizations but individuals, including journalists. All so-​called “foreign agents” must identify themselves as having that status whenever they publicly share any information, or they will face criminal charges and fines for failing to do so. As part of its crackdown on civil society, the Russian government stepped up its identification of ostensible foreign agents in Russia following the February 2022 full-​scale assault on Ukraine. In July 2022, the requirement that someone had to receive foreign funding to be considered a “foreign agent” was changed to a vague implication that the person was under some unspecified foreign “influence.”19 A total of 129 people and organizations were officially labeled as “foreign agents” in the first eight months of the war, and in December 2022, Russia’s Ministry of Justice labeled FAR as a foreign agent,20 singling out Rossman and two of her activist colleagues for inclusion on the registry. By contrast, rather than avoiding the state, Nataliia Muzyka’s Association seeks to work closely with Ukrainian state institutions, and, as she noted, to hold them accountable. In turn, Ukraine’s government appreciates and supports the Association’s activities. In fact, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine in 2019 gave the group an award for its work. Despite the stark variation in the type of government under which they operate, the Association and FAR have much in common, from their organizational structure to their tactics, to some of the challenges they face. They were also both created by women because of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Both groups have a decentralized, horizontal, non-​ hierarchical, networked, cellular structure, and in both cases, an important reason for this is the Russian state’s violence and oppression. The advantage of such a structure is that the “cells” (or regional groups in the Association’s case) can act independently of each other, depending on their needs or circumstances. In FAR’s case, this kind of structure is useful and even necessary, because the activists are trying to remain safe in the context of the repressive Russian government. If FAR activists are arrested in Russia, those in cells outside the

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country can publicize it. Using a network of small local cells in which only trusted activists are included also reduces the likelihood of infiltration by the Russian security services. In the Association’s case, they must consider the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine and the distinct possibility that regional branches of the Association may be physically cut off from the other parts of the organization and may need to make decisions independently of the rest. While both groups have some central administration, the ethos of these organizations is to encourage anyone interested to be as involved as possible. Neither group aims to create “star” activists or to create a division between the core members and others. Avoiding this is challenging in the context of the contemporary media, which seeks out such “stars” to feature and prefers to promote individuals and their personal stories rather than the work of collectives. For these groups, however, the goal is to encourage people (typically women) to engage in their own activism, rather than the core members engaging in activism on behalf of others. With regard to techniques, one tactic used by both groups is holding public actions to express their organizational purpose. The Association organized commemorative marches to honor Ukrainian soldiers who have perished defending their country since the start of the war in 2014. And FAR organized street protests after the mass-​scale invasion in 2022, and then, when demonstrations became too dangerous, used other techniques, such as “guerilla stickering” against the war and public artwork like the Mariupol-​ 5000 gravesite project. Both groups also engaged in the distribution of information and offered psychological and humanitarian support. Both groups also work on advocacy and human rights protection. While FAR cannot advocate for activists’ or forcibly resettled Ukrainians’ rights with the Russian government (which seeks to destroy anti-​war activists, not to collaborate with them), the Association offers help to veterans who need assistance accessing the various benefits they are owed by the Ukrainian state. Importantly, grassroots networking, establishing horizontal ties, and developing interpersonal trust –​as both these organizations do –​are crucial to building civil society and eventually helping hold governments accountable. Building a civil society that can better hold the Ukrainian government accountable is one of the Association’s goals –​while achieving such a goal regarding Russia’s current government seems comparatively out of reach. In that sense, civil society building is shaped by the political context of the state, creating radically different circumstances for activism. The impact of Russia’s war on collaboration between feminist activists in Russia and Ukraine

While Russia’s assault on Ukraine in 2022 led to new forms of organizing for women in both countries, it had a negative impact on collaboration between

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Ukrainian and Russian feminists, which had started to decline in 2014 with Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine. In the 1990s and 2000s, feminism in Russia developed in close connection with Ukrainian feminism –​especially the digital feminist movement. The first Russian-​language online blog on feminism, “feminism_​ua”, on the Livejournal platform, was actually bilingual; it was created in 2004 by feminists from Ukraine (Solovey, 2021). Likewise, the 2016 online action #яНеБоюсьСказати /​#яНеБоюсьСказать (“I am not afraid to speak up”) –​which appeared a year before its American analog, #MeToo –​was launched by Ukrainian activist Anastasia Melnichenko in both the Ukrainian and Russian languages and strongly influenced feminism in both countries (“Po-​nastoyashchemu”, 2016). Russia’s full-​scale invasion in 2022, however, made collaboration and the exchange of ideas between Russian and Ukrainian feminists much more difficult, which was a significant loss for the whole movement. For many Ukrainian feminists, the separation from Russian feminist networks was important21 as a way to resist long-​standing Russian efforts to dominate and control Ukraine.22 Ukrainian feminists sought to counter the prevalence of imperialist attitudes that they observed even among some Russian activists and to draw long-​deserved attention away from Moscow and St. Petersburg to Ukrainian feminist institutions like the Kharkiv Center for Gender Studies.23 Some Russian feminists also brought a postcolonial, anti-​racist lens24 to their analysis of the war. FAR’s “decolonial” division collects and publishes personal stories of everyday xenophobia experienced by Russia’s ethnic minorities. It publishes these reports of ethnicity-​based discrimination under the hashtag #golosa_​ natsmenok (“the voices of national minorities”), and they are often republished by friendly independent media, like “Verstka.”25 The hashtag is quite intentional and reclaims the Soviet term “natsmeny,” used in official documents for the USSR’s ethnic minorities, which became a slur in everyday speech. Concern over Russian imperialism is not unique to FAR. Russian imperialism (internal and external) became a more important topic within Russian feminism and left-​wing activism following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Activists familiarized themselves with postcolonial and decolonial theory, primarily through Madina Tlostanova’s scholarship (Tlostanova, 2009). Ethnic minority organizations that oppose Russia’s war on Ukraine, like the “Free Buryatia Foundation” and “Kalmyks Against the War In Ukraine,”26 have further emphasized the importance of using the lens of anti-​colonialism. Russian feminists, in particular, have increasingly recognized the power dynamics of Russia as an empire –​an awareness that has been manifested in their activism. In the last few years, feminist activists organized several online and offline projects like “Feminist Translocalities,”27 the “Femaktivizm v regionakh” (Feminist Activism in the Regions) Telegram Channel, and the “Feminizm v regionakh” podcast,28 all

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aimed at decentralizing the view of Russian feminism and making regional activists more visible in the community, as well as discussing territorial power dynamics in Russian activism. The increase in state repression accompanying the war also affected activism more generally in Russia. In the first half of 2022, more than 400,000 people fled the country, with another 200,000 leaving after Putin’s government announced a partial military mobilization in September 2022. Numerous activists left, while others stayed, producing deep conflicts within some activist groups and networks. Many who remained in Russia did so because they were unable to leave (for a range of reasons), while those who left did so because it was simply too dangerous for them to stay. Some feminist anti-​war activists, for example, fled the country after facing charges in the so-​called “telephone terrorism” criminal case. After the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Russian authorities launched a series of arrests of activists, journalists, and human rights defenders who participated in a variety of anti-​war activities, accusing them of deliberate, false reporting of a terrorist act (which carries a sentence of up to ten years imprisonment). At least two of the “telephone terrorism” accusations were dropped after the activists left Russia (OVD-​Info, 2022a, 2022b, 2022c). This fact suggests that one of the goals of the case was to force people organizing the anti-​war movement to leave the country. Despite their de facto expulsion, Russian anti-​war activists, including FAR, adapted quickly and continued organizing their actions abroad, raising their “voices” for change. The COVID crisis and activism against domestic violence

A different crisis –​the COVID-​19 pandemic –​also produced both challenges and opportunities for civic activism throughout CEE. The COVID-​ 19 pandemic emerged in China in late 2019, and by the end of January 2020 was declared a global health emergency by the World Health Organization. As modern crises go, the COVID-​19 pandemic was unprecedented in its scale and scope. The pandemic and the accompanying lockdown put a spotlight on domestic violence29 in many countries, given concerns about people trapped at home with abusive partners.30 Although this section examines the pandemic’s impact on domestic violence activism in Russia and BiH, it is also a concern in other parts of the region and beyond. Russia

Activism against domestic violence in Russia long predates the COVID pandemic. For decades, feminists in Russia have tried to draw society’s attention to this issue and have made dozens of yet unsuccessful attempts since the mid-​1990s to pass a law against domestic violence (see Chapter 5).

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Russia’s first domestic violence hotline and women’s crisis centers were founded in the 1990s and are some of the feminist organizations that have persisted in an increasingly repressive political context, raising popular consciousness about an issue that had been taboo during the Soviet era. In the 1990s, Russian feminist journalists began to write about domestic violence, but street protest on the topic remained rare. In recent years, activism on domestic violence has become more visible, in part due to several brutal and sensationalized cases of domestic violence. In December 2017, Margarita Gracheva’s husband took her into the woods and chopped off both her hands with an ax. He had previously accused her of cheating on him and threatened her with a knife, but when Gracheva turned to the police for help, they did not take it seriously. The second recent case of “family violence” garnering enormous public attention was that of the Khachaturyan sisters –​three teenagers living in Moscow, who killed their father in July 2018 after years of suffering physical and sexual violence at his hands. In November 2019, the public was shocked again when it emerged that a 24-​year-​old student at St Petersburg State University had been killed and dismembered by her partner, who was also her history professor; he was caught when trying to rid himself of her body parts in the Moika river. Changes in the law on domestic violence have helped attract more attention to this issue. The partial decriminalization of domestic battery in February 2017 was an impetus for new organizing to push for a law on domestic violence (Johnson, 2023). At the end of November 2019, a watered-​down draft of the law was published for societal commentary and spurred some controversy, with ultra-​ conservatives and the Russian Orthodox Church opposing the law, arguing that it was a plot by feminists and other nefarious actors to break up the Russian family. But the COVID-​19 pandemic put a stop to those discussions. On April 22, 2020, when asked about the draft law, Valentina Matviyenko, the speaker of the Federation Council, said that Russia’s legislators would return to discussions of the domestic violence bill after the pandemic had passed. As she put it, “I doubt there’ll be a spike in domestic violence. On the contrary, families are going through this tough period together.” But Matvienko was wrong; the pandemic, which confined families to their dwellings, made matters worse.31 Fears that domestic violence would increase during the pandemic were raised by Russian activists when the shutdown was imposed at the end of March 2020. Women who had planned to escape their abusers would not be able to do so because their partners were never out of the house at work or on a business trip. Moreover, the quarantine had made it harder for women to get help from the authorities; police stations were temporarily closed to the public, and police were primarily concerned with maintaining the quarantine. On April 2, within days of the lockdown, a group of nine NGOs working with domestic violence victims wrote an open letter32 to the

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government with an urgent request to protect and support vulnerable people, including domestic violence victims. They noted that most cities lacked domestic violence shelters, and those that had them lacked space. Oksana Pushkina, a Duma deputy who had been an ally on these issues, pointed out on March 30 that there were only about 15 state-​run crisis centers for victims of domestic violence, many of which had closed due to the quarantine regulations. Activists’ concerns were not misplaced. On May 5, 2020, Russia’s human rights commissioner announced that domestic violence incidents reported to Russian NGOs had more than doubled33 since the lockdown began in late March, from 6000 in March to over 13,000 in April. In response to this escalation, the ANNA Center, Russia’s only national hotline for victims of domestic violence, expanded its hours to accommodate the escalating numbers of calls. At the same time, a group of activists from the feminist faction of the libertarian movement “Civil society” established “Fortress,” a new crisis center for women in Moscow. However, their lack of experience in the field made them the subject of criticism by long-​time activists in Russia’s movement against domestic violence (Vilisova & Shevelev, 2020). The pandemic had drawn attention to domestic violence, but it did not result in legislative changes to address the problem. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)

As in Russia, the battle against domestic violence in BiH long predates the pandemic. Unlike in Russia, however, efforts against domestic violence in BiH have been influenced by the brutal war there from 1992 to 1995, which killed almost 98,000 people, mainly Bosnian Muslims, and a postwar political, social, and economic environment that has increased women’s vulnerabilities. During the war, ethnic extremists used mass violence against citizens, including women, in BiH to maintain and expand their power (Nikolić-​Ristanović, 2002), while women’s groups provided support to female victims. In fact, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia recognized rape as a weapon of war and convicted dozens of men for crimes of sexual violence (International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, 2011). In the aftermath of the war, BiH’s political, social, and economic institutions designed and supported by international actors have remained weak and controlled by ethno-​nationalist political parties. Nonetheless, women activists played a significant role in the adoption of legislation on gender equality in 2003, criminalizing domestic violence in 2005 and creating state-​funded safe houses. Despite these achievements, evidence suggests violence against women has increased during the postwar period (Kostovicova et al., 2020). Weak state institutions have failed to fully implement the laws (Puljek-​Shank,

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2017; Deiana, 2018; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], 2019). In addition, political and cultural elites promote traditional gender norms that ostensibly offer the stability that many in postwar societies seek. When the pandemic struck BiH, the government directed institutions to prioritize enforcing lockdown protocols and treatment. These measures exacerbated the already uneven implementation of laws protecting women against violence and victims’ mistrust of these institutions to protect them. The pandemic highlighted the dysfunction and negligence of BiH’s system in protecting victims of violence (Husić, 2021). As domestic violence increased during the pandemic, activists raised the alarm about the devastating consequences for vulnerable women and children (OSCE, 2020; Husić, 2021). As in Russia and elsewhere in the region, measures to reduce the spread of COVID trapped women in their homes with their violent partners and re-​traumatized prior survivors of domestic violence (OSCE, 2020, p. 24). Victims’ calls to centers for social work and the police often went unanswered. In the midst of this breakdown in social institutions, female activists stepped up and women’s groups added new SOS hotline numbers for victims of violence. They also took on greater roles to staff safe houses and provide psychological, medical, and legal support to women victims; and they intensified their work with rural women. In 2020, the number of women who called hotlines jumped to its highest since the war in some areas, but in others, survivors of domestic violence were afraid to report violence because their perpetrator was in their home (OSCE, 2020, p. 26). Several women’s organizations offered direct services to more clients than ever before (Center ženskih prava, 2021; Husić, 2021). In 2020, a prominent women’s organization needed to dramatically increase its legal aid services for criminal cases of domestic violence (Center ženskih prava, 2021). Most female activists feel they need to work with BiH state institutions by providing training and advocating for the implementation of laws to protect women. And in comparison to the situation in Russia, there is more opportunity for women’s activists in BiH to collaborate with state institutions. But they emphasize the grassroots nature of their work with women.34 In BiH, women’s organizations provide opportunities for women to help one another, to build skills for economic self-​sufficiency and self-​advocacy, and to influence citizens’ attitudes toward domestic violence. This bottom-​up approach emphasizes empowering women, as Rossman’s and Muzyka’s approaches do, despite the varying political contexts in which they work. Challenges and the future

Unfortunately, the countries of CEE –​and the rest of the world –​are likely to suffer future pandemics and possibly more wars and violent conflicts, as

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well as further iterations and consequences of the crises discussed in this chapter. Civil rights activists in the countries of CEE will also likely face other challenges like the rise of anti-​democratic repressive governments and right-​ wing populist political groups. Global issues, including climate change and economic crises, will continue creating uncertain environments and extreme societal disruptions that impede the development of civil societies and the work of independent activist groups, including those who struggle for gender equality. One lesson is that crises often shift the focus of activists away from their central issues and toward more immediate concerns related to the emergency itself, and this can negatively affect their activities and goals. Despite the challenges, there are still reasons to be optimistic about activism and activists in CEE. As we showed in this chapter, crises can simultaneously generate disruptions and lead to the creation of new activist groups. Crises can also provoke groups’ expansion and development of new networks, activist agendas, and political strategies. The cases from Ukraine, BiH, and Russia demonstrated that grassroots activists can be both flexible and resilient in managing a crisis and restructuring their work to address new challenges, “leapfrogging” to be responsive. Both the Association of Wives and Mothers of Soldiers Participating in the ATO in Ukraine and the Feminist Anti-​War Resistance in Russia employ flexible and horizontal organizational structures with self-​sufficient local divisions to address the challenges they face. In the case of the Association, this structure will allow continued work under the risk of possible Russian occupation of parts of Ukraine. For FAR, this structure will allow it to withstand Russian state repression and political prosecutions. Ultimately, grassroots activists show remarkable sustainability in the dangerous and unstable environment of wars and pandemics. Both Muzyka and Rossman demonstrate not only their willingness to continue their activities but also the fact that, even during these particularly hard times, their organizations managed to gain resources to ensure further development. They also pursue clear goals. In the case of Muzyka’s Association, this mission is tightly connected with the idea of nation-​building and developing Ukraine as a strong, peaceful and democratic country. Speaking about the long-​term goals of FAR, Rossman mentions building an international network that will bring anti-​war sentiments back to the feminist agenda not only regarding Russia’s war on Ukraine but more broadly. As these organizations continue to grow and develop, their flexibility and resilience should enable them to adapt as they pursue their goals in an ever-​changing and challenging environment. Notes 1 Chalupa, A. (April 4, 2020), “Putin’s Fabricated Claim of a Fascist Threat in Ukraine.” Forbes.com. www.for​bes.com/​sites/​reals​pin/​2014/​04/​04/​put​ins-​fab​rica​ ted-​claim-​of-​a-​fasc​ist-​thr​eat-​in-​ukra​ine/​?sh=​4a921​28b5​901

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2 “Ukraine crisis: Government setbacks in Luhansk and Donetsk.” September 1, 2014. www.bbc.com/​news/​world-​eur​ope-​29019​032 3 “Ukraine’s deadliest day: The battle of Ilovaisk,” August 2014. September 1, 2014. www.bbc.com/​news/​world-​eur​ope-​29019​032 4 Judah, T. (2023), “Ukraine’s Volunteers.” New York Review, January 19. www. nybo​oks.com/​artic​les/​2023/​01/​19/​ukrai​nes-​vol​unte​ers-​tim-​judah/​ 5 The BEARR Trust (2022), “Project report: Association of wives and mothers of soldiers participating in the war in Eastern Ukraine.” https://​bearr.org/​2022/​02/​ 01/​proj​ect-​rep​ort-​women-​uni​ted-​by-​war/​ 6 Dees, J. (2021), “The Meaning of ‘Social Entrepreneurship.’ ” https://​cent​ers.fuqua. duke.edu/​case/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​sites/​7/​2015/​03/​Article_​Dees_​Meaningof​Soci​ alEn​trep​rene​ursh​ip_​2​001.pdf 7 Meduza (2022), “Women in Dagestan and other regions protest mobilization ‘Our children are not fertilizer!’ https://​med​uza.io/​en/​feat​ure/​2022/​09/​26/​women-​ in-​dages​tan-​and-​other-​regi​ons-​prot​est-​mobil​izat​ion 8 Meduza (November 4, 2022), “Anti-​war protesters’ arrest in Ulan-​Ude disrupts pro-​Kremlin rally.” https://​med​uza.io/​en/​news/​2022/​11/​04/​anti-​war-​pro​test​ers-​ arr​est-​in-​ulan-​ude-​disru​pts-​pro-​krem​lin-​rally 9 The Moscow Times (March 29, 2022), “The Feminist Face of Russian Protests.” www.the​mosc​owti​mes.com/​2022/​03/​29/​the-​femin​ist-​face-​of-​russ​ian-​prote​sts-​ a77​106 10 Feminist Anti-​ War Resistance (2022), “Russia’s Feminists Are in the Streets Protesting Putin’s War.” https://​jaco​bin.com/​2022/​02/​russ​ian-​femin​ist-​anti​war-​res​ ista​nce-​ukra​ine-​putin 11 Martirosyan, L. (2022), “Explainer: What does new ‘gay propaganda’ law mean for LGBTIQ+​Russians?” www.opende​mocr​acy.net/​en/​5050/​rus​sia-​gay-​pro​paga​ nda-​law-​ame​ndme​nts-​explai​ner/​ 12 Sanders, S. (2019), “ACT UP: A History of AIDS/​HIV Activism.” www.npr.org/​ 2021/​06/​16/​100​7361​916/​act-​up-​a-​hist​ory-​of-​aids-​hiv-​activ​ism 13 Smith, A. (2022), “Inside the Russian Resistance Against Putin’s War.” https://​spe​ ctre​jour​nal.com/​ins​ide-​the-​russ​ian-​res​ista​nce-​agai​nst-​put​ins-​war/​ 14 Silina, M. (2022), “Russia’s feminists are using art to protest against Putin’s war and its propaganda.” https://​scr​oll.in/​arti​cle/​1021​410/​russ​ias-​femini​sts-​are-​using-​ art-​to-​prot​est-​agai​nst-​put​ins-​war-​and-​its-​pro​paga​nda 15 https://​en.ovdi​nfo.org 16 Dergacheva, D. (2022), “We were born in a situation of hellish urgency’: How the Russian Feminist Anti-​War Resistance Movement works.” https://​globa​lvoi​ ces.org/​2022/​11/​16/​we-​were-​born-​in-​a-​situat​ion-​of-​hell​ish-​urge​ncy-​how-​the-​russ​ ian-​femin​ist-​anti-​war-​res​ista​nce-​movem​ent-​works/​ 17 www.instag​ram.com/​str​ikef​und/​ 18 Meduza (2022), “ ‘We won’t be destroyed. And we won’t be silenced.’ A guide to the most important anti-​war initiatives in Russia and abroad.” https://​med​uza.io/​ en/​sli​des/​we-​won-​t-​be-​destro​yed-​and-​we-​won-​t-​be-​silen​ced 19 RFE/​RL’s Russian Service (2022), “Putin Signs Off on Harsher ‘Foreign Agent’ Law.” www.rferl.org/​a/​putin-​signs-​off-​hars​her-​fore​ign-​agent-​law/​31943​645.html 20 Meduza (2022), “Human rights activist, an Internet freedom organization, and the Feminist Anti-​war Resistance movement added to Russia’s list of ‘foreign agents.” https://​med​uza.io/​en/​news/​2022/​12/​23/​

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21 Gritsenko, G. (2020), “Російсько-​українська війна з 2014 року і фемінізм.” https://​gen​deri​ndet​ail.org.ua/​sea​son-​topic/​femin​ism-​in-​det​ail/​rosiy​sko-​ukrain​ska-​ viyna-​z-​2014-​roku-​i-​femin​izm-​1341​516.html 22 Earlier, after Russia’s first incursions into Ukraine in 2014, some Ukrainian feminists sought to separate from the Russian feminist community. See Gritsenko, G. (2020), “Російсько-​українська війна з 2014 року і фемінізм.” https://​gen​deri​ ndet​ail.org.ua/​sea​son-​topic/​femin​ism-​in-​det​ail/​rosiy​sko-​ukrain​ska-​viyna-​z-​2014-​ roku-​i-​femin​izm-​1341​516.html 23 N.d (2022), “Grieving for Others, Not for Ourselves: An Interview with Irina Zherebkina.” www.e-​flux.com/​notes/​473​291/​griev​ing-​for-​oth​ers-​not-​for-​oursel​ ves-​an-​interv​iew-​with-​irina-​zhe​rebk​ina 24 https://​femini​sms.co/​ru/​about 25 For example: https://​vers​tka.media/​kolon​inal​izm-​v-​ros​sii/​ 26 www.yout​ube.com/​watch?v=​Jun3​vVqZ​MJA 27 https://​femini​sms.co/​en 28 https://​open.spot​ify.com/​show/​0qn​PucQ​fJJR​sAZW​GH9M​YrP 29 Gumka, C., et al. (2020), “The shame or the shining: Covid-​19’s trap of domestic violence in France and Russia.” www.iba​net.org/​arti​cle/​74B42​FAB-​A8BA-​4EDD-​ 8543-​D97C2​496C​32F 30 Saur, P. (2020), “When Your Home Isn’t a Safe Space. Russian Women Fear Rise in Domestic Violence as Coronavirus Quarantine Starts.” The Moscow Times, March 30. www.the​mosc​owti​mes.com/​2020/​03/​30/​ 31 Chatham House (2020), “Domestic Violence in Russia: The Impact of the COVID-​19 Pandemic.” www.chath​amho​use.org/​2020/​07/​domes​tic-​viole​nce-​rus​ sia-​imp​act-​covid-​19-​pande​mic 32 Shevchenko, A. (2020). “As Russia goes into lockdown, feminists fear an epidemic of domestic violence.” https://​globa​lvoi​ces.org/​2020/​04/​03/​as-​rus​sia-​goes-​into-​ lockd​own-​femini​sts-​fear-​an-​epide​mic-​of-​domes​tic-​viole​nce/​ 33 The Guardian (2020), “Russia domestic violence cases more than double under lockdown.” www.theg​uard​ian.com/​world/​2020/​may/​05/​rus​sia-​domes​tic-​viole​ nce-​cases-​more-​than-​dou​ble-​under-​lockd​own 34 Interviews conducted by Paula M. Pickering with civic activists in BiH: FC, city in the Federation of BiH, June 30, 2019, TC, medium town in the Federation of BiH, July 15, 2022; JT, medium town in the Federation of BiH, October 8, 2022, and SA, medium town in Republika Srpska, October 10, 2022.

References Bennett, L., & Segerberg, A. (2012). “The Logic of Connective Action: Digital Media and the Personalization of Contentious Politics.” Information, Communication & Society 15, no. 5: 739–​768. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​13691​18X.2012.670​661 Bimber, B., Flanagin, A., & Stohl, C. (2012). Collective Action in Organizations: Interaction and Engagement in an Era of Technological Change. New York: Cambridge University Press. Center ženskih prava (2021). Godišni Izvješaj [Annual Report]. Zenica: center ženskih prava, mart 2021. Deiana, M. (2018). “Navigating Consociationalism’s Afterlives: Women, Peace and Security in Post-​Dayton Bosnia-​Herzegovina.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 24, no. 1: 33–​49. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​13537​113.2017.1422​638

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Disalvo, J. (2015). “Occupy Wall Street: Creating a Strategy for a Spontaneous Movement.” Science & Society 79, no. 2: 264–​287. Gritsenko, G. (2020). “Російсько-​українська війна з 2014 року і фемінізм,” https://​ gen​deri​ndet​ail.org.ua/​sea​son-​topic/​femin​ism-​in-​det​ail/​rosiy​sko-​ukrain​ska-​viyna-​z-​ 2014-​roku-​i-​femin​izm-​1341​516.html. Husić, S., ed. (2021), Utecaj i posljedice pandemije u pružanu podrške ženama I djevojčicama u zdravstvenim ustanovama, [Influence and consequences of the pandemic on health institutions’ offering of support to women and girls] Zenica: Medica Zenica. International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (2011). “Crimes of Sexual Violence: Landmark Cases.” www.icty.org/​en/​featu​res/​cri​mes-​sex​ual-​viole​nce/​ landm​ark-​cases Johnson, J. (2023). “Authoritarian Gender Equality Policy Making: The Politics of Domestic Violence in Russia.” Politics & Gender, first view: 1–​26. Kostovicova, D., Bojicic-​ Dzelilovic V., & Henry, M. (2020). “Drawing on the Continuum: A War and Postwar Political Economy of Gender-​Based Violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 22, no. 2: 250–​272. Koval’ski, A. (2021). “ ‘Utopicheskii kruzhok,’ ‘Levochki,’ ‘Antiuniversitet’. Chemu posviashcheny i kak ustroeny obrazovatel’nye fem-​proekty.” Takie Dela. https://​ takied​ela.ru/​news/​2021/​01/​19/​ot-​soc​iali​zma-​do-​trans​gend​erno​sti/​ Nikolić-​Ristanović, V. (2002). Social Change, Gender and Violence. Belgrade: Social Indicators Research Series, vol. 10. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (2019). OSCE-​Led Survey on Violence against Women: Bosnia-​Herzegovina Results Report. Vienna: OSCE Secretariat. www.osce.org/​secr​etar​iat/​423​470 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (2020). Covid-​19 Crisis Response: A Gender and Diversity Analysis. Sarajevo: OSCE Mission in Bosnia-​ Herzegovina, Gender and Youth Unit/​Human Rights Section. www.osce.org/​miss​ ion-​to-​bos​nia-​and-​herz​egov​ina/​470​655 OVD-​Info (2022a). “Sledstvie prekratilo presledovaie peterburgskoi aktivistki po delu o lzeminirovanii.” https://​ovd.news/​expr​ess-​news/​2022/​08/​24/​sledst​vie-​pre​ krat​ilo-​presle​dova​nie-​peterb​urgs​koy-​akt​ivis​tki-​po-​delu-​o?page=​3 OVD-​Info (2022b). “V otnoshenii femaktivistki prekratili ugolovnoe presledovanie po delu o lzheminirovanii.” https://​ovd.news/​expr​ess-​news/​2022/​08/​05/​v-​otn​oshe​ nii-​femakt​ivis​tki-​pre​krat​ili-​ugolov​noe-​presle​dova​nie-​po-​delu-​o OVD-​Info (2022c). “’Zalozhena atomnaia bomba’: kak na protivnikov voiny zavodiat dela o ‘telefonnom terrorizme.’ ” https://​ovdi​nfo.org/​artic​les/​2022/​04/​20/​zalozh​ ena-​atomn​aya-​bomba-​kak-​na-​prot​ivni​kov-​voyny-​zavod​yat-​dela-​o-​tel​efon​nom “ ‘Po-​nastoyashchemu strashnyye istorii byli na zakrytykh stranichkakh’ Monolog Anastasii Melnichenko. pridumavshey fleshmob #yaNeboyusSkazat.” (2016) Meduza. https://​med​uza.io/​feat​ure/​2016/​07/​08/​po-​nastoy​asch​emu-​strash​nye-​isto​ rii-​byli-​na-​zakry​tyh-​stra​nich​kah Puljek-​ Shank, R. (2017). “Dead Letters on a Page? Civic Agency and Inclusive Governance in Neopatrimonialism.” Democratization 24, no. 4: 670–​688. https://​ doi.org/​10.1080/​13510​347.2016.1206​081 Solovey, V. (2021). “The Contemporary Feminist Movement in Russia. Action, Community, and Difference.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlin. https://​edoc.hu-​ber​lin.de/​han​dle/​18452/​25414

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Tlostanova, M. (2009). Dekolonialnyye Gendernyye Epistemologii. Moscow: Maska. Troianovski, A. (2022). “Russia Takes Censorship to New Extremes, Stifling War Coverage.” The New York Times. www.nyti​mes.com/​2022/​03/​04/​world/​eur​ope/​ rus​sia-​cen​sors​hip-​media-​crackd​own.html Vilisova, A., & Shevelev I. (2020). “Dvizheniye Mikhaila Svetova otkrylo ‘Krepost’ –​ubezhishche dlya zhertv domashnego nasiliya. U spetsialistov, davno rabotayushchikh s postradavshimi, k nemu mnogo voprosov.” Meduza. https://​ med​uza.io/​feat​ure/​2020/​05/​30/​dvizhe​nie-​miha​ila-​svet​ova-​otkr​ylo-​krep​ost-​ube​zhis​ che-​dlya-​zhe​rtv-​dom​ashn​ego-​nasil​iya-​u-​spetsi​alis​tov-​davno-​rabota​yusc​hih-​s-​pos​ trad​avsh​imi-​k-​nemu-​mnogo-​vopro​sov

Interviews conducted by Paula M. Pickering with civic activists from Bosnia and Herzegovina: Interview with FC, city in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 30, 2019. Interview with JT, medium town in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, October 8, 2022. Interview with SA, medium town in Republika Srpska, October 10, 2022. Interview with TC, medium town in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, July 15, 2022

8 FROM THE MARGINS TO CENTRAL STAGE Insights and lessons Paula M. Pickering, Patrice C. McMahon, and Dorota Pietrzyk-​Reeves

As a college professor teaching classes on gender and women’s rights in the early 1990s, Marta Mazurek never imagined that her advocacy work would someday become her vocation. Years later, as a city councilwoman in Poznań, Poland, Mazurek appreciates the different but crucial roles activists play in addressing social problems, and she knows first-​hand that activists in CEE can be important agents of change. Our discussions of civic activism in this volume show that in a world where many are despairing over the existential crises that we face, we have much to learn from the creativity, energy, and resilience that civic activists in CEE display. In this concluding chapter, we synthesize our findings on the vitality and importance of activism in bringing desired social and political change. We also identify important lessons from our conversations with activists in several CEE countries and activists’ experiences, which suggest the conditions under which civic activism in the region is successful in achieving change. Since this book sought to elevate activists’ voices and activities, showing how citizens in CEE make the most of possibilities for activism, it is appropriate that we conclude this volume with activists’ suggestions for how to support and strengthen civic activism. Responding creatively to challenges

Our book examines how activists from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, working in different spheres of activism and toward different goals, responded to various political and social challenges while addressing people’s needs. These challenges, what we refer to as hard times, include polarization, democratic backsliding, generational divides, environmental degradation, and crises caused by Covid-​ 19 and DOI: 10.4324/9781003466116-8

From the margins to central stage: Insights and lessons  159

war on Ukraine. Table 1.1 in the Introduction provides a summary of our volume’s activists, their organizations, countries, and the focus of their activism. Again, in this book, we did not try to be comprehensive, and our selection of cases and activists was influenced by our authors’ expertise and experience, as well as the issues we wanted to cover. That said, we did select countries that allowed for comparison within three distinct parts of the post-​ communist region: Central Europe (Poland and Hungary), post-​ conflict (BiH), and post-​Soviet (Russia and Ukraine). Choosing activists to serve as co-​authors or to be interviewed was more difficult, but we endeavored for diversity in many respects, including country, focus of activism, and organizational form. Because the activists featured in our book are clearly not a representative sample of activists in these countries, we cannot generalize about what motivates civic activists or explains the varying impact of civic activism. Instead, highlighting activists’ voices through co-​authorship and/​or profiles of activists provides first-​hand testimony from activists’ experiences and perspectives that contribute to a more holistic understanding of these important questions and generates theory that can be later tested in other cases and using different data. Our book’s approach responds to a recent call for scholarship that is collaboratively produced at the intersection between activist and academic knowledge to understand how and why activism and civil society matter more broadly (Hayes et al., 2021). The profiles we provided demonstrate that civic activists engage in long and twisting journeys that do not unfold in a straight line toward failure or success. Instead, civic activists seek to learn from what did and did not work, adapting to evolving social and political conditions to try to realize their goals. These profiles also provide powerful evidence that challenges common ideas about activism in CEE. This includes the proposition that the communist legacy has had a similar impact on these societies, specifically a universally negative legacy on civic engagement, or that civic activists in CEE are generally ineffective. The activists in this book use self-​organization to step up and step in when governments are not capable or refuse to act, or when grassroots action around everyday problems or crises is deemed more effective. In the last decade alone, many countries in CEE faced multiple crises and challenges, some of which are global in nature (e.g., democratic backsliding, shrinking public space, COVID-​ 19 pandemic, or environmental crises), and some which are local or regional (legacies of one-​party authoritarianism, Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine). The history of activism in CEE is decidedly multidimensional, sustained, and transcends issue areas, if mixed in terms of its impact. In some countries and at certain points in time, bursts of activism were responses to a particular crisis and were quite consequential, such as anti-​regime protests in Ukraine. Often, however, it is hard to measure the

160  Paula M. Pickering, Patrice C. McMahon, and Dorota Pietrzyk-Reeves

impact of social activism on desired outcomes, because outcomes are neither direct nor immediate, and social activism occurs alongside other behavior (Chenoweth et al., 2017). Examples presented in this book show different patterns of activism by pro-​ democratic elements of civil societies. In one pattern, civic actors politically engage in contentious efforts against political elites, democratic erosion, and/​or more broadly against inefficient states that neglect everyday needs of the people and certain rights. In another pattern, activists organize when something important is at stake and a crisis becomes a threat that people need to react to (Zarembo & Martin, 2023). These responses sometimes take the form of in-​person protests, but gradually everyday sustained efforts to organize, mobilize, and act have also been visible, often facilitated by social media and communication technology. Digital platforms, like those developed by Madarász’s aHang in Hungary or Akcja Demokracja in Poland, enable cooperation and collaboration of like-​minded citizens, groups, and organizations, allowing for information sharing and organizing online petitions designed to strengthen democracy. These digital platforms also became hubs for civic education and raising citizens’ awareness, promoting both in-​person and online mobilization from new and enduring active citizens. Importantly, we have learned that democratic backsliding does not necessarily lead to a decline in activism. In fact, the attacks on liberal-​ democratic norms in Poland and Hungary, attempts to shrink public space, and political polarization in these countries and in others have been important motivating factors for many pro-​ democratic activists to engage in the protection of human rights, democratic innovations, and coalition building. As one activist suggested, “What I observe is that the polarization of society hinders our work on the one hand, but, on the other hand, it consolidates each side. People are ready, have greater motivation, and are more mobilized and willing to participate” (Arczewska et al., 2019). Polish activists stress that the PiS government’s behavior and social and political polarization has impacted even the language used to describe individuals’ behavior and activities. In Poland, for example, the term “activism” has suddenly become more important and the social potential for activism, which was dormant for the last twenty years, cannot be ignored even by authoritarian governments (Chimiak, 2022). As we see, mobilizing citizens today is easier, because of the availability of social media and information but also because of growing civic awareness among individuals and local communities, or at least among some segments of the societies. These individuals have encouraged collaboration with others across sectors of activism. What this means, for example, is that female activists who support liberal ideas participate not only in feminist activities or activism to support women’s rights; when needed, they may also engage in ecological movements, join climate protests, and support other groups with similar progressive goals.

From the margins to central stage: Insights and lessons  161

Despite a widespread perception among scholars and practitioners that public space has been shrinking in certain Central European countries, activists in Poland and Hungary emphasize that a much more significant process is taking place as a response to this constantly changing situation. Instead, social mobilization, which happens both in-​person and online and is sometimes institutionalized but more often is intentionally spontaneous and ad hoc, undermines the static view of civil society (Putnam et al., 1993; Howard, 2003; Pietrzyk-​Reeves, 2022) weakened by a shrinking or closing public space in CEE. Good examples of such evolving forms of engagement are participation in online consultations, signing online petitions, or criticizing certain policies via ad hoc protest and movements that are vibrant, spontaneous, and well-​organized. Table 8.1 summarizes the key empirical trends in innovative adaptation that our book reveals. Tactics featuring the creation and use of horizontal networks have been embraced by activists seeking to enhance accountability, as illustrated by Brkan’s story of digital activists Why Not? in BiH and Svets’ testimony on local monitoring groups such as OPORA in Ukraine. Activists working in tough conditions or battling specific hard times have, thus, adopted horizontal networks that intentionally contrast with the hierarchical, NGO model decisively promoted by international donors in CEE in the 1990s and criticized by scholars who pointed out that “NGO-​ization” often pulled civic groups toward foreign donors and away from citizens (Helms, 2003; Henderson, 2003; Sundstrom, 2006; McMahon, 2017; Belloni, 2020). These horizontal networks, which take advantage of digital communications, allow each of their parts to adapt to deteriorating safety, legal, or local conditions. Horizontal approaches are also intentionally taken to empower citizens themselves to act, rather than to act on behalf of others. Put another way, these agents of change are using leaderful approaches (Milkman, 2017) designed to cultivate many leaders and to democratize decision-​making, as championed by young Polish feminists (Chapter 4). We also need to stress that not all challenges and crises can be seen as opportunities for activists. As the Russian government continues its full-​ scale war against Ukraine and tightens its authoritarian regime, the war has had a profound impact on both Ukrainian and Russian civil societies and activism. While volunteerism in Ukraine is still high, the Russian military’s daily attacks have inflicted mass death, injury, displacement, and trauma on Ukrainian society (Zarembo & Martin, 2023). Working in such an incredibly dangerous environment, Muzyka has exerted tremendous effort to step up and work with like-​minded fellow citizens, mostly women, to empower citizens through creating local branches of her association during Russia’s war. Since its full-​ scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian government has imposed fines, arrest, detention, or imprisonment on more than 21,000 Russians for criticizing the authorities and participating in protests (Amnesty International

162  Paula M. Pickering, Patrice C. McMahon, and Dorota Pietrzyk-Reeves TABLE 8.1 Key Empirical Trends in Innovative Adaptation to Shrinking Civic Space

Empirical Trend

Examples

Civic Activists Illustrating This Trend

Embracing digital tools

Advocacy campaigns, either Popova in Russia, Brkan in wholly or significantly online BiH, Rossman in Russia, Madarász in Hungary

Engaging through Activism organized in ways informal activism beyond hierarchical formal organizations

Popova in Russia, Ivanova in Russia, Rossman in Russia

Developing horizontally structured networks

Coalitions of local activist groups Groups comprised of locally based branches or activists

Móra in Hungary, Lemeš in BiH Gosiewski in Poland, Svets in Ukraine, Muzyka in Ukraine, Rossman in Russia

Focusing on local-​ level change

Efforts to increase citizen engagement in or change polices of municipalities or cities

Gerwin in Poland, Mazurek in Poland, Lemeš in BiH, Ivanova in Russia

Adapting goals

Shift to pressing, concrete everyday problems Shift to work toward individual-​level change, raising awareness

Svets in Ukraine, Muzyka in Ukraine, Lemeš in BiH Rossman in Russia Popova in Russia, Ivanova in Russia

Enhancing citizen participation in democratic decision-​making

Deliberative practices of participatory budgeting, citizens assemblies

Gerwin in Poland, Madarász in Hungary

Building bridges across divides

Group’s inclusion of Gosiewski in Poland, individuals across ideological Madarász in Hungary, or generational lines Mazurek in Poland, Svets in Group forming coalitions with Ukraine organizations or activists Brkan in BiH and beyond, across ethnic or national Lemeš in BiH and beyond, lines Rossman in Russia and beyond

UK, 2023). The war sparked a horizontal ecosystem of emerging resistance groups among Russians; these efforts might serve as a future foundation of a new civil society (Terekhov, 2023). Thousands of Russian activists who oppose the war fled the country. Rossman and her colleagues at the Feminist Anti-​ War Resistance (FAR) have worked assiduously using a networked approach to support and give individual feminists inside and outside Russia who oppose the war the power to act in ways that make the most sense

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given their resources and localities. Yet, the war cannot be seen as creating opportunities in Ukraine and Russia for civic activism but rather as imposing severe limitations and the need to act in different ways. Activists’ ability to adapt to closing public space at the national level by bringing change at the local level is an important take-​home lesson from our activists, and it supports recent scholarly work on the evolution of civic activism in the last decade (Puljek-​Shank & Fritsch, 2019; Pudar Draško et al., 2020). This tactic also helps ensure that activism accomplishes specific desired changes. In terms of process, a wider mobilization takes place at the local level where cooperation with authorities is focused on certain everyday issues like the natural environment. All of this is happening despite democratic backsliding, which indicates a certain resilience and robustness of civic activism in countries where citizens’ expectations for the quality of democracy are relatively high. Although activism in BiH has had fewer opportunities to make an impact on policies due to the unresponsiveness of political elites and the country’s complicated structure which reinforces divisions along ethnic lines, we still observe activists like Lemeš who persist, resist, and bring change at local and regional levels. In other countries, such as Russia where autocracy has suppressed independent voices and action, civic activism concentrates more on finding ways to protect certain groups, to meet the needs of the most vulnerable, or to work on a small scale and focusing on everyday local efforts. Our book illustrates the resourcefulness of activists who respond to oppression, crisis or harm, and policies limiting the rights of certain groups by stepping up, raising awareness, mobilizing, and innovating, developing new strategies and tools. For example, the aHang movement in Hungary has managed to, as Madarász emphasized, “boost a lot of good activities” in response to the government’s oppression, seeking to address weaknesses in Hungary’s democracy while enhancing citizens’ role in democratic decision-​ making. Participatory mechanisms such as citizen assemblies and juries in Hungary, community dialogues, civic panels, and everyday patriotism in Poland are efforts to bring people together, find a common ground despite divisions and reduce polarization. People power in democracy has long been focused on voting in elections. These new participatory tools are used by activists not only to oppose the government and its harmful measures or inaction but also to find a way forward, change people’s attitudes and raise awareness of their work among the public, and perhaps invent a new type of democracy. We argue that even and perhaps especially in times of crisis, individuals’ power and engagement can be significant. As the example of the Ukrainian civil network OPORA shows, crises such as the authoritarian government’s violent crackdown on EuroMaidan protesters and Russia’s war bring people across generations together, increasing solidarity with those whose rights are under threat. To a lesser extent, this could also be observed in Poland, as different generations of women have supported activists defending women’s

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reproductive rights. Other examples that we discuss in this volume illustrate how crises can lead to activists’ strengthening their work by expanding networks, deepening ties to citizens, and developing new agendas and strategies. In this unstable environment, grassroots activists show remarkable courage, sustainability, and willingness to adapt and find better organizational solutions such as those sought by both the Association of Wives and Mothers of Soldiers Participating in the Anti-​Terrorist Operation (ATO) in Ukraine and the Feminist Anti-​War Resistance in Russia. At the same time, they also pay a price in terms of making a broader impact when new challenges force them to shift the focus of activity from their main goals and issues to more immediate concerns and threats. Another type of activism that we explored is everyday activism, which pursues immediate and enduring problems that affect people’s lives such as environmental and health issues but also social justice or work-​related problems (Sundstrom et al., 2022). As our examples of everyday activism from BiH show, addressing locally rooted problems may lead to building networks of allies at the national or regional level to trigger change of policy or highlight the issue of concern. Here also innovation and strategy building, including for funding, expression, and support, play a significant role and require a lot of effort to make the grassroots work sustainable. Starting at the local level and building support of local citizens and authorities can be a decisive first step for everyday grassroots activism to sustain, advocate, and pursue goals. Importantly, activists use lessons they have learned from responding to needs during prior crises and applying them quickly to new challenges. For example, Brkan mentioned how the responses Why Not? developed to counter disinformation about the COVID-​19 pandemic helped digital activists quickly pivot to work against disinformation about the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In addition, women activists in BiH and Russia long advocating for vulnerable women stepped up and strengthened horizontal networks within and across groups to protect the women made even more vulnerable by the pandemic. In some cases, like in Poland now, we also learn of the importance of building ad hoc partnerships of different kinds of groups and organizations to manage the humanitarian and refugee crises produced by Russia’s war on Ukraine. These common goals may prompt other efforts and activities for which a shared platform or network can be very consequential in times of top-​down division and polarization. How civic activism matters

Even after reading about activists’ creativity and ability to create opportunities out of crises, readers may wonder whether civic activism really matters in a region that has experienced varying degrees of

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democratic backsliding and/​or a closing of the public space for autonomous civic action. We recognize that civic engagement rarely influences policies immediately or directly, but this, as we have demonstrated, should not be interpreted as a failure or as inconsequential. What the activists presented in our book and featured in our research show is that civic activism in CEE plays an unparalleled role in shaping social and political outcomes, even if it is delayed and indirect or its goals are altered, as in a war situation. Also, the activism highlighted in the book illustrates the capacity of ordinary people to respond, confront, and transform attitudes, practices, and policies. This section synthesizes insights from activists’ stories and the research on activism presented in the book to address this very criticism of civic activism, as well as to discuss how civic activism matters and the factors that help activists realize their goals. But how can civic activism make a difference in the face of powerful non-​ democratic actors? It is certainly important to be realistic about what civic actors can do. Bernhard, for example, argues civil society actors can work as a “firewall” for democracy, serving as a final layer of accountability when anti-​ democratic forces have captured democratic institutions (Bernhard, 2020). However, on their own, civic activists cannot prevent powerful political authorities from re-​asserting authoritarian rule (Deegan-​Krause, 2022), as the cases of Russia and Hungary after 2010 illustrate. It is also important to point out that our approach of featuring long-​form profiles of a small number of activists supportive of democracy in a handful of CEE countries and supplementing these profiles with other types of data about activism in the region is designed to highlight activists’ experiences and their perspectives on their work. These generate insights into the dynamics and impact of civic activism that can be later tested in different cases and using different data.1 The civic activists we feature have persevered under difficult conditions, adapting and working by using horizontal approaches that operate at the local level and use locally rooted groups to build networks of groups within their countries and across the region and globe (Brkan, Lemeš, Móra, Gosiewski, and Rossman). These strategies appear to increase the likelihood that activism will lead to change and challenge a potential criticism that activists featured in our book are isolated, or what scholars of one-​party communist systems called atomized (Havel, 1985; Arendt, 1994). What is different from earlier activism that included external networks of activists and donors is that these networks are initiated and maintained by actors more firmly rooted in CEE, rather than formed by powerful external actors. Far from being exceptions, several activists profiled here began their activism without prior experience in formal civil society organizations, including Lemeš, Ivanova, and Muzyka. These everyday activists were driven by intimate experience with an acute problem to take public action, reminding

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us of the power of citizens. Although citizens often criticize civic activism for failing to achieve concrete results, the activists profiled demonstrate that they have shaped outcomes, albeit over time but even under considerable risk to their careers and even their personal safety. Indeed, our profiles of activists bring to light the long-​term battles activists undertake to achieve their goals in a way that common social scientific approaches that extract chopped up short excerpts from interviews cannot. Russian activists have not been able to stop the Russian government from waging war or to get it to pass a law on domestic violence that includes the protection and rehabilitation of survivors or to encourage the widespread practice of sustainable development. However, the activists working on these issues have adopted longer-​term strategies that work to change minds, debunk the myth that Putin’s policies have universal support, and make small steps forward to improve people’s lives or Russian society. These include obtaining signatures to demand a law on domestic violence (Popova), creatively using artistic protests and securing digital communications to express opposition to war and in favor of gender equality (Rossman), and combining Russian rural traditions with science to practice sustainable farming (Ivanova). Even during the horrific war in Ukraine, activists are collecting evidence of war crimes that can be used in later trials (Svets) and giving decision-​making power to and building the skills of female family members of soldiers to help them get assistance for recovery, not just now but also in the future (Muzyka). Lemeš’s organization’s participation in campaigns to compel action to improve air quality in his hometown and pass a law preventing the construction of dams that threaten rivers took more than a decade. Yet, these efforts ended up having a measurable impact on the country’s environment. These examples illustrate that activists adopt different theories of change and have diverse goals. As a result, their efforts should be evaluated according to their approaches and their intended goals. Sometimes, they emphasize policy change. Working mainly locally but also nationally, Mazurek is changing policies to address gender inequalities in Poland, while Gerwin and Madarász are improving the quality of political decision-​making by engaging more broadly and deliberatively citizens in Poland and Hungary, respectively. Other times, activists seek to hold elected officials accountable, as Brkan in BiH and Svets in Ukraine demonstrate. Another group of activists profiled in our volume aspire to change social attitudes and behavior. This group includes Gosiewski’s encouragement of everyday patriotism in Poland, or consciousness raising and prefigurative ecological activism practiced by Ivanova in Russia, Popova’s digital sharing of stories of Russian survivors of domestic violence, and Rossman’s support of anti-​ war resistance in Russia. These grassroots approaches are intended not only to bring about some immediate change but also to work cumulatively, from the bottom up in society, to foster long-​term, deeper change. Still other activists work to

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solve immediate problems, as illustrated by Muzyka’s efforts to inform and support family members of Ukrainian soldiers and Lemeš’s fight for clean air in his hometown in BiH. What affects civic activism’s impact?

Several factors shape the strategies activists choose and their impact. Naturally, a regime’s approach toward civic space matters a great deal because it influences the political opportunities and constraints for civic action. It thus makes sense that context affects activism’s impact the most, and civic activists working in countries whose governments are the most authoritarian and who have adopted and implemented laws restraining or punishing independent activists face the most difficult conditions in participating in activism that brings about change. The activism of Popova, Ivanova, and Rossman in Russia vividly make this clear. Both Popova and Rossman have been declared foreign agents for their activism but have decided to continue to act even after “exiting” from Russia to use digital forms to promote gender equality and oppose Russia’s war on Ukraine. Ivanova has remained in Russia, but under the current circumstances and regime, she has put on hold her grassroots work in developing sustainable communities. These Russian activists are currently using horizontal approaches to activism, which aim to change societies’ attitudes and everyday actions but recognize that Russia’s dangerous conditions do not now allow much room for civic actors to affect policy. Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine has dramatically reduced the space for civic activism, creating unsafe conditions for merely living in Ukraine. However, even Russia’s daily military assaults throughout the country have not stopped Ukrainian civic activists. Instead, war has compelled them to work in more decentralized ways that enhance effectiveness and sustainability while minimizing physical harm. It also has compelled a shift in the focus of their work toward goals that are both closest to the activists’ original goals while also addressing society’s most pressing humanitarian needs. In comparison to Russia and war-​ time Ukraine, the other countries featured in this book –​BiH, Hungary, and Poland –​have more, albeit still constrained, space for civic activism. In these countries, activists can leverage domestic, regional, and transnational networks of activists and donors, as well as popular support to realize social and policy change. Efforts that have affected social conditions include those that engage citizens in community dialogues and Gosiewski’s educational initiatives on everyday patriotism in Poland, Brkan’s digital activism to combat disinformation, and Lemeš’s work to improve his city’s air quality in BiH. Activists working in these countries have often been most successful in bringing change at the subnational –​ local and/​or regional level, where political opportunities are more open than

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at the national level. Examples include Gerwin’s work, resulting in Polish cities adopting participatory budgeting, Mazurek’s work on implementing gender equality policies in Poznań, Brkan’s combined digital and in-​person activism, resulting in the resignation of a corrupt regional prime minister in BiH, and Lemeš’s work resulting in stricter regional environmental permits in BiH. Finally, our profiles of activists working in Hungary, BiH, and Poland show that it is indeed possible –​with carefully crafted strategies and tactics–​ to affect national policy. Madarász initiative contributed to the adoption of a new policy of homecare in Hungary, Brkan’s efforts resulted in a BiH law on conscientious objection, Móra’s coalition worked through the EU’s Court of Justice to bring about the repeal of Hungary’s law punishing CSOs for receiving foreign funding, and women’s activists in BiH allied with international supporters to enact a law criminalizing domestic violence. The history of civic activism in a country can also affect its strength and impact today. In Ukraine, Svets argues that positive examples of civic activism bringing about change during the Orange Revolution (2004–​ 2005) and the EuroMaidan Revolution (2013–​2014) continue to provide Ukrainians today with the belief that they can make a difference when they are civically engaged. This belief has helped fuel volunteerism in Ukraine during Russia’s full invasion that is working to counter Russia’s existential threat to the Ukrainian nation, its democratic institutions, and the state. With the help of intergenerational coalitions, civic activists across Ukraine have stepped up to address critical humanitarian needs and to help sustain the nation. Examples include Muzyka and the Association of Wives and Mothers of Soldiers’ provision of humanitarian, psychological, and legal support to soldiers and their family members; the work of more than 100,000 of Ukrainians taking action through Ukrainian Volunteer Service, and OPORA activists’ collection of evidence of war crimes. Despite democratic backsliding, Poland’s parliamentary elections in October 2023 demonstrated that a country’s history of civic activism can be revived and used to help it return to a liberal-​democratic path. With a record-​ high turnout (74%), Poland also reversed a trend across Europe toward increased youth disenchantment with electoral policies with Poles under 29 years old voting in larger number than those over 60 (Higgens, 2023). And according to Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski, “it’s thanks to our civil society, nongovernmental organizations and local government” that opposition parties were able to push the Law and Justice party from power (Tharoor, 2023). Beyond Poland and Ukraine, our other countries have fewer positive historical experiences with civic activism bringing about desired changes. Chapter 2 discussed how political and social polarization can weaken the chances for broad-​based civic activism, even in Poland, to bring change at

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the national level. Russia, BiH, and Hungary have had bursts of grassroots activism that have contributed to short-​term changes, but they have failed to bring about deeper or longer-​term change, which has contributed to citizens’ sense that their civic engagement does not in the end make a difference. One lesson is that citizens need to see results –​even if small –​of civic activism that improves social or political conditions for a broad base of society (rather than a narrow slice) to feel empowered and encouraged to continue their engagement. This is also true for youth; to encourage their continued engagement rather than “exit,” they need some sense of positive change. An ongoing challenge for civic activists is then to sustain activism and scale up changes made at the local level, for example, on the problem of citizen participation in decision-​making to the more contentious national level of politics. Regime and country context, however, are not enough to explain variation in the impact or success of civic activism; individuals and strategies also matter. Activists need to recognize, appreciate, and capitalize on different ways that citizens engage community needs, as well as how activists, strategies, and tactics interact with evolving country conditions. In Hungary, activists have responded to democratic backsliding and the shrinking civic space by forming coalitions of CSOs working together to protect independent space for engagement (Móra) and in efforts mainly at the local level to involve citizens in decision-​making (Madarász). Moreover, according to the activists featured in our book, coalitions of activists appear most powerful and effective if they bring together those with different but complementary skills. This is illustrated by the coalitions of activists of different generations with different skill sets that Mazurek and Svets have worked to build in Poland and Ukraine, respectively. They have brought together older activists with experience and younger, more nimble activists, with better digital and informal mobilization skills. As Mazurek and Svets indicate, bridging social divides, whether they are generational, ideological, rural-​ urban, or approaches to activism, to effectively respond to existential threats to a large group of citizens, like threats to reproductive rights in Poland or Ukraine’s authoritarian ruler’s use of violence against civilians in 2014, requires concerted and careful effort. Another is the example of the Coalition to Protect Rivers in BiH, which bridges urban-​ rural, ethnic, and subregional divides by linking together grassroots activists rooted in rural communities with regional or national NGOs with experience in advocacy and expertise in legal processes (Chapter 6). The humility of urban NGOs in learning from and collaborating with –​vs. taking over from –​small grassroots groups has helped maintain the coalition and increase its effectiveness.2 In these examples, civic activists generate social capital that bridges divisions most often through building coalitions focused on a common cause rather than within their own groups.

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Our stories of activists shed light on the effectiveness of participatory approaches aimed at building and mobilizing mass support and transactional approaches, where activists seek to influence policy makers to realize change (Petrova & Tarrow, 2007). A few activists featured, including Móra in the opposition to the closing public space, Lemeš in the fight for clean air, and Svets in the fight for accountability, have worked hard to win the trust of and participation of their constituents –​ordinary citizens to bring change. Without mass support, Svets would not have been successful in contributing to the pro-​democratic EuroMaidan movement in 2014 and efforts afterward to sustain that democracy through oversight of democratic elections. Participatory approaches that broadly engage citizens are often embraced by activists who seek to change society’s attitudes and behavior, building change from the ground up. Yet, mass participation in civic action does not guarantee policy change, as illustrated by the Women’s Strike in Poland. While it mobilized people who had not previously engaged in civic action, it was not successful in preventing the further restriction of reproductive rights. In contrast to participatory approaches, activists can directly lobby and work with politicians to enact change. Mazurek’s work changing laws on gender equality is a good example. But activists’ approaches need not be either transactional or participatory but can employ both. Our book supports scholars who argue that activists combining participatory and transactional approaches can bring substantial change (Puljek-​Shank & Fritsch, 2019). Mazurek in Poland, for example, uses transactional activism to advocate for gender equality from her perches in Poznań’s university and then local government but also engages in participatory activism on reproductive rights. Another example is Lemeš’s work first to mobilize citizens to protest toxic air, which gave teeth to Eko Forum’s legal and advocacy approaches, that eventually resulted in policy change, factory investments in reducing emissions, and cleaner air in Zenica. Yet, Tufekci’s (2017) study of informal activism facilitated by digital tools warns that non-​institutionalized activism that lacks good leadership, clear goals, and supporting coalitions can fail to bring enduring change. Nonetheless, in the most repressive and dangerous environments, like Russia after its full invasion of Ukraine, institutionalized activism is often not feasible. In these conditions, it is too easy for the Russian government to target and disable formal CSOs. Another lesson is that those who adopt a non-​institutionalized or horizontal approach are intentionally doing so to democratize activism, as with young Polish feminists (Chapter 4), Ivanova’s prefigurative activism promoting sustainable communities, and Rossman’s feminist anti-​war action. Each of these activists provides evidence of their impact on participants. Indeed, these activists take such an approach because they are in it for the duration, to bring about long-​term change. In addition, as with participatory and transactional approaches to activism,

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non-​ institutionalized and institutionalized approaches can be combined. Lemeš’s locally based CSO joined a coalition of both formal and informal groups to advocate for policies to protect BiH’s rivers, achieving a regional level law banning the construction of mini-​ hydroelectric power plants (Chapter 6). Beyond the most repressive environments, digital and in-​person approaches to activism can also be combined, as illustrated by Brkan and Why Not?’s work that compelled the resignation of a regional prime minister in BiH. Engagement in critical self-​reflection has also played a role in activists’ decisions to innovate and develop their current approaches. Móra’s current coalition of CSOs is rooted in more flexibility, includes CSOs closer to their constituents, and develops flexible coordination mechanisms around some shared goals. She adopted this approach only after learning from the disintegration of a more rigid attempt to unify a diverse coalition of CSOs in 2014. As discussed earlier, the lessons Brkan, women’s activists, and Muzyka learned while battling prior crises were quickly applied toward responding to new ones, such as new disinformation campaigns, a spike in vulnerable women, and mounting needs of soldiers’ families. Lemeš adopted his current approach of working simultaneously with citizens and with policy makers, as well as at the local and international level, after learning that prior isolated approaches failed to bring change. Popova and Mazurek both reflected upon the differences in their own activism and those of younger activists to appreciate and embrace the use of emotion in their appeals to citizens to end patriarchal practices. Many activists featured have reflected upon their strategies and the rapid evolution of digital technologies to both use digital technologies as essential tools in their activism but also to recognize the power of activism that combines digital and in-​person activism to realize their goals. Profiled activists have made different decisions about whether or how to engage politics, depending on their goals, theory of change, and/​ or regime context. Popova and Mazurek have sought out political positions to promote gender equality. While Mazurek became a public official in Poland, Popova did not in Russia, which is hardly surprising given Putin’s regime. Though they both work in Poland, Mazurek went into political office, while Gosiewski chose to take an apolitical or non-​partisan approach to everyday patriotism, which he felt could reduce polarization. In the narrower space for civic action in Hungary, Móra views an apolitical approach as infeasible and instead has formed a coalition of CSOs to oppose the government’s shrinking of space. Because he sought to change environmental policy, Lemeš felt it necessary to remain non-​partisan but to engage political authorities who make policy. Using a non-​partisan, apolitical approach seeks also to build support among a broad base of citizens, who often view politicians and parties as self-​interested (Chapter 6). Even apolitical approaches can

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change social attitudes, conversations, and sometimes behavior and policy. An apolitical approach is different than an anti-​political approach (Brković, 2016), where activists view the only avenue for change as rejecting interaction with politicians or authorities in state institutions and instead working to build a parallel society. Of the activists featured here, Ivanova’s work on building sustainable communities is closest. Her goals are more modest than other activists we profile. The decision of several of the activists profiled to use an apolitical approach to build support among a broad base of citizens points to the importance of careful, calculated framing to enhance activism’s impact. Environmental activists in BiH, for example, have used apolitical framing to describe environmental problems as an injustice that directly and concretely affects them to mobilize citizens for policy change. In developing their digital activism, Popova has emphasized her choice to use campaigns that evoke emotions while Brkan has considered how his campaigns connect with issues that personally touch citizens. Activists’ suggestions for the future

It is fitting to end a book featuring activists so centrally with their ideas and specifically their suggestions for how to strengthen civic activism in an uncertain future. It is activists themselves who have been, as Brkan admits, “living the work” of civic activism day in and day out. They work persistently, despite often enduring setbacks due to harassment, different types of insecurity, and a variety of formidable obstacles. Seven of the activists involved in this research provided suggestions for strengthening civic activism to different stakeholders: citizens in CEE, other civic activists in the region, domestic policy makers, and potential donors.3 In their suggestions to citizens in CEE, activists urged people to realize their own capacity to express their views and to bring about change by using all possible legal means. This appeals to citizens to “voice” their interests and concerns to improve their communities rather than to cope with challenges by laying low or deciding to “exit.” As Móra put it: “active citizens build better communities.” Brkan adds, “engaging feels good.” Activists from different countries also encouraged citizens to engage in and support public activities, including digital and online activities, issues that personally touch them and impact their lives. In interviews for their profiles, many activists told us that they were motivated to engage in civic activism on a topic they or their family members directly experienced, such as domestic violence against a friend (Popova), illness from air pollution (Lemeš), or corruption in high school (Svets). Finally, Lemeš urged citizens to better understand what he views as the role of civil society: to get institutions to do their jobs properly rather than to solve complicated problems. This understanding would discourage

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frustration that citizens often have, because civic activists cannot solve all of societies’ problems but can encourage the government and other actors to do so. Most activists counseled their fellow activists to learn, be persistent, and to build partnerships to work toward their goals. Learning, however, involves both listening and sharing. Rossman, for example, urged grassroots activists working in CEE to allow others from her region to “speak in their own voice at events” and to do more to bring to light their stories of activism, which too often remain invisible. Highlighting the importance of learning from experiences and from others helps activists deal with setbacks, boost morale, and put into practice effective strategies. All these contribute to resilience and sustained work toward goals. The suggestion to focus on building partnerships demonstrates that civic activists recognize that they are stronger when they build allies than they would be on their own. Lemeš encouraged activists in BiH to use dialogue to try to form partnerships –​even with those who were former enemies. Activists advised others to innovate, including using digital means and unconventional ways to work toward goals. Several also emphasized the importance of building trusted connections with citizens, with Brkan pointing out the importance of understanding citizens and Ogrodnik urging activists to work transparently and apolitically. A widely supported message to domestic policy makers was to consider civic activists as allies and partners that can help society solve problems. Those activists working in political systems that are more open and allow for more public engagement encouraged policy makers, especially at the local level, to consider civic activists as effective partners in developing and implementing better policies. But Popova believes further autocratization in countries like Russia mean that policy makers have unsustainably avoided or been unable to improve social conditions. Activists urged donors to prioritize local citizens’ needs, rather than their own shifting interests, in their programs. When designing their programs and deciding whom to support, donors should empower activists, including those who do not belong to CSOs, to work in ways they know are effective in the often-​long-​term struggle to achieve their goals. This allows activists to build on their wealth of experience and their understanding of the local context, important factors that no donor can fully comprehend. Activists encouraged donors to emphasize activists’ record of effectiveness in achieving outcomes (not just activities) and their commitment toward their goals when selecting recipients. Even convening like-​minded activists or those working across sectors can help cross-​fertilize ideas and bolster activists. Madarász urged donors to sustain their support of activists, understanding that activists can use technology, to innovate and bring about positive change –​without a lot of resources and even during hard times.

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There are many possible futures for activism in CEE, but what we established in this book is that activists from CEE have much to offer activists around the world, as well as to those who worry about the future of civic activism and democracy. Their wealth of experiences with transitions, democratic backsliding, generational dynamics, polarization, and environmental degradation, among other challenges, provide useful lessons and even models for responding to challenges and opportunities that many countries and societies around the world face today. Since we are writing this book at such a unique time, with Russia’s full-​ blown war in Ukraine already more than two years old, it is hard to predict the future of activism and civil society in this region. However, Poland’s October 2023 election in which women, youth, and civil society organizations fueled record voter turnout provides meaningful evidence that people power does matter and that there is much the world can learn from this region. As in the past, there are several likely futures, depending on the outcome of the war, economic realities, and domestic political conditions, as well as an array of other domestic and international factors. Regardless of the challenges or the opportunities, civic activists in CEE will find ways to respond and to try to bring about positive change, at least at the local or community level. In countries as diverse as Brazil, Egypt, and India, we are also observing new forms of activism emerging, which are less hierarchical, grounded in local issues, exist both in-​person and online, and focus on everyday practical issues to avoid political polarization (Youngs, 2017). Thus, as in CEE, it may indeed be the case that civic activism is moving from the margins to a more central place, addressing rising populism, economic inequality, democratic backsliding, and the shrinking space for civil society, among other challenges and hard times. Notes 1 We cannot claim that the strategies profiled activists find successful can be generalized to all activists in the CEE countries of focus since we neither used a nationally representative sample of activists nor included substantially prior activists who gave up their activism. Thanks to Chris Howard for highlighting this. In addition, while the activists in our book sought to achieve a range of different goals and advocated for values ranging from progressive to traditional, none advocated for illiberal democracy or autocracy. Future research should include understudied activists: those who have given up and those who use non-​ violent means to support illiberal democracy. 2 Interview by Pickering with Civic Activist BL in Bosnia and Herzegovina on October 18, 2022. 3 Thanks to activists who provided suggestions: Darko Brkan, Samir Lemeš, Csaba Madarász, Marcin Ogrodnik, Alena Popova, Ella Rossman, and Galia Chimiak. Ogrodnik and Chimiak participated in a workshop on civic activism hosted by Pietrzyk-​Reeves at Jagiellonian University in September 2022.

From the margins to central stage: Insights and lessons  175

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GLOSSARY

Black Monday  refers to mass protests and strikes that took place in Poland in 2016 over proposed legislation that would severely limit access to legal abortion. Citizens’ assembly  a body that comes into being on an ad hoc basis in reaction to a specific issue. Its aim is to develop recommendations, and once it has done so, it is dissolved. Citizens’ juries  a form of deliberative mini-​publics composed of a small (usually 12–​ 25 people), randomly selected group of citizens. They are particularly suitable for addressing complex issues where deeper understanding is required. Civic activism different forms of voluntary public engagement at individual or group levels which may take both institutionalized and un-​ institutionalized forms. Civic pluralism  the recognition of diverse faiths, worldviews, values, and political stances, as well as civil society organizations representing them, as legitimate elements of the society. Civic space  defined by OECD as “the set of legal, policy, institutional, and practical conditions necessary for non-​ governmental actors to access information, express themselves, associate, organize, and participate in public life.” Civil society  the array of formal and informal organizations, social movements, community groups, civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-​ governmental organizations (NGOs), charitable organizations, faith-​based organizations, professional associations, and foundations, as well as grassroots initiatives that are separate from the state and family and use peaceful ways to achieve collective goals.

178 Glossary

Civility  a set of norms that are required for the public engagement of citizens such as politeness or respect as well as individual attitudes that are based on these norms. Colour Revolutions the social mobilizations that toppled several authoritarian governments in Central and Eastern Europe from 2000 to 2004. Conscientious objection  the refusal to perform (obligatory) military service on moral or ethical grounds. DDoS attacks  Distributed Denial of Service attacks aim to overwhelm targeted servers/​networks with a flood of bot (zombie) requests to the target’s IP address, leading it to deny service to regular traffic. Deliberative democracy  a form of democracy in which deliberation is central to decision-​making. Deliberative mini-​publics provide the opportunity for face-​ to-​ face deliberation where citizen participants, who have been selected randomly, receive expert information on some important political issues and can weigh different arguments to reach recommendations on policies. Democratic backsliding  the decline in quality of democratic institutions and processes. Democratic erosion  the erosion of fundamental norms and values of the liberal-​democratic order. Digital activism  activities that use information and communication technology (ICT) and digital media as platforms for mobilization and political action. Also known as e-​activism, digitally enabled protest, and virtual activism. EuroMaidan Revolution  protests that took place in 2014 in Ukraine to push for retaining closer ties with the European Union after the pro-​ Russian government rejected an EU-​Ukraine association agreement. Everyday activism  engagement that is place-​based and focused on social, environmental, or political problems that affect people’s daily lives. Foreign agents’ law  first introduced in Russia in 2012 as legislation aimed at civil society organizations receiving foreign funding and engaging in political activities, it broadened later to include individuals. Similar legislation was introduced later by some other countries (e.g., Hungary). All “foreign agents” must identify themselves as having that status whenever they publicly share any information. Gender mainstreaming  first introduced in 1985 by the Nairobi World Conference on Women, it aims to take under consideration interests of both women and men in policymaking. Generational theory  proposed by Strauss and Howe, it posits that there exist recurring generational archetypes, succeeding each other historically, each characterized by certain traits different from those of both its predecessor and successor. It attempts to explain differences existing

Glossary  179

between generations and propose an explanation of the conflicts existing between them. Greenwashing the practice of presenting a company’s actions as environmentally friendly without following through on such claims. While there exist many kinds of this phenomenon, all of them are characterized by a mix of poor performance in terms of eco-​friendliness and ostensible environmental awareness declared in public communications and through PR (public relations) actions. Hacktivism  consists in hacking computer systems to advance social or political causes; can take many forms, i.e., mirroring (bypassing censorship blocks on websites), protestware (using malware to promote a social cause), doxing (breaking confidential documents out of servers and making them public), etc. Hashtag activism  the use of social media hashtags to draw attention to and gather support for a cause. High-​risk activism  the type of activism that puts the activist in danger (as opposed to the “safe” low-​risk activism) Identity politics  social and political activity oriented on rectifying wrongs suffered by members of a marginalized group within a society. International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)  a UN court of law established to address the war crimes committed during the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s. Its mandate lasted from 1993 to 2017. GONGOs  organizations initiated by the government and established to be the vocal supporters of the government to create a kind of parallel civil society. NGO-​ization  the process of professionalization and bureaucratization of social movements becoming institutionalized as non-​governmental organizations (NGOs) Open-​Source Advocacy  aims to promote open-​source software, often as an alternative to proprietary, for-​profit software. Orange revolution  a set of protests, civil disobedience actions, and strikes taking place in Ukraine between November 2004 and January 2005 following the runoff vote of the presidential elections, which was perceived as rigged in favor of Viktor Yanukovych. The protests succeeded in forcing an annulment of the results and organization of a new vote, which was won by Yanukovych’s rival, Viktor Yushchenko. Participatory budgeting  a process in which community members directly decide how to spend part of a public budget. Participatory planning  an urban planning modality in which decisions are reached and solutions designed in an inclusive way, on a community level. It emerged as an alternative to centralized, exclusive practices that characterized traditional urban planning.

180 Glossary

Pillarization the vertical segregation of civil society into distinct compartments with limited interaction across a dividing boundary (religious, ethnic, political). Plenipotentiary for Combating Exclusion  a central administration unit established in 2008 to overcome Poland’s transposition of EU equality directives. Polarization  the act of dividing something, especially something that contains different people or opinions into two completely opposing groups. (Polish) Women’s strike  a cross-​generational social movement that emerged in Poland in 2016 to protest the changes to abortion law which severely reduced the legal access to it. (Political) Generation  a group of similarly aged people within a society who share certain experiences of political socialization. Prefigurative activism  a type of new social movement activity consisting in the creation of communities based on alternative forms of social organization, embodying principles such as sustainability and lack of hierarchy. Referendum  a process in which citizens vote directly on an issue (as opposed to elected representatives doing so in their name). Roundtable Accords  historic negotiations between the Polish Communist Party and the representatives of the Solidarnosc movement, held between 6 February and 5 April 1989 in Warsaw, which paved the way for Poland’s democratic transition and the abolition of the Communist rule. Slacktivism  the practice of supporting a cause in a way that requires minimal effort, e.g., through online petitions or social media. Snowball sampling  a recruitment technique in which research participants are asked to assist researchers in identifying other potential subjects. Social entrepreneurship  a model blending the commercial aim of generating income with the civil society’s aspiration to introduce positive change. Sortition  a method of selecting representatives randomly, by lot. Yellow Shirts  the unofficial name of the People’s Alliance for Democracy, a political movement that emerged in 2005 in Thailand in support of the monarchy.

INDEX

Note: Endnotes are indicated by the page number followed by “n” and the note number e.g., 44n16 refers to note 16 on page 44. abortion, in Poland 27, 75 aHang 58–​9, 60, 64 Akcja Demokracja 99 ANNA Center 151 anti-​abortion movement 27 ArcelorMittal 113, 115–​16, 126 Arnika 113, 126 authoritarianism 12, 16, 16, 31, 32, 34, 35, 48, 57, 62, 79, 91, 98–​9, 100, 118, 123, 141–​2, 144, 145, 146, 149 Bernhard, Michael 3, 4, 10, 165 BiH. See Bosnia and Herzegovina Black Monday 27 Black Protests 74, 79, 84 Bondarenko, Anna 1 Bosnia and Herzegovina: civic activism in, 101, 102, 103–​4, 113, 114, 115–​16, 124, 125, 152; COVID-​19 pandemic, 152; democratic reforms, 12; domestic violence, 151–​2; internet, 102; NGOs, 101–​2, 103, 104, 113, 125, 126; polarization, 103; pollution, 112–​13, 116, 126; war, 100–​1, 117, 151 Bosnian Serb party 103 Branković, Nedžad 102 Brkan, Darko 100–​1, 103, 104 Bunce, Valerie 8

CEE: activism in, 4–​5, 6, 7–​8, 9, 16–​17, 96–​7, 98–​9, 164–​5; characteristics, 3, 5; and communism, 3, 5, 7, 10–​11, 89, 116–​17; democratic innovations, 53–​4, 55, 61–​2, 63; environmental issues, 124–​5; hard times, 4, 5–​6, 152–​3, 158–​9; illiberalism in, 12–​13, 17; loyalty in, 6–​7; technology in, 94–​5; and Western donors, 8, 118 see also individual country names Center for Blue Democracy 52 Central and Eastern Europe. See CEE Chernobyl 117 citizens’ juries 52 civic activism: apolitical approach, 171–​2; in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 101, 102, 103–​4, 113, 114, 115–​16, 124, 125, 152; in CEE, 4–​5, 6, 7–​8, 9, 16–​17, 164–​5; coalition building, 32, 34, 160, 169; in communist countries, 10–​11; definition, 4; and engagement, 48–​9; future of, 172–​4; in Hungary, 31–​2, 33, 34, 43, 57, 59–​60, 61–​2, 105; intergenerational dynamics, 71–​2, 74–​5, 77, 78, 79–​80, 85; in Poland, 37, 42, 43, 50, 71, 73–​4, 80, 95, 125; polarization, 28–​9; reasons for, 2, 71; resourcefulness, 16, 32; in Russia, 9, 16, 78, 91, 92–​3, 94, 96, 124, 144,

182 Index

145, 149, 166; self-​reflection, 171, 173; structures of, 140–​1, 146–​7; and technology, 16–​17, 58–​9, 89–​90, 94–​5, 100, 124; in Ukraine, 81–​2, 83, 137–​8, 139–​40, 166. See also individual activist and country names Civic Heart initiative 32 Civic Platform Party 73 Civilizacio 31–​2, 33 civil society 3, 4, 41, 44n16 Club of Budapest 56 communism 3, 5, 7, 10–​11, 89. See also Bosnia and Herzegovina, CEE, Hungary, Poland, Russia Community Digital Tools Foundation 56, 58, 61 Compatriots for Heroes 37 Conference on the Future of Europe 55 corruption 80–​1, 97, 101–​2, 123, 124 Council of Europe 55 COVID-​19 149, 150–​1, 152 Dayton Peace Accords 100 decision-​making, in democracies 50–​1, 52, 53, 58 deliberative democracy 54 deliberative mini-​publics 49, 54–​5 democratic innovations 53–​4, 55, 61–​2, 63, 64–​5 digital activism 89–​90, 91, 96, 99, 105 domestic violence 19, 84–​5, 90, 91, 92–​3, 95, 97, 149–​52, 166 Dosta! 101–​2, 104 Ekiert, Grzegorz 34, 39 Eko Forum Zenica 113, 114–​15, 116, 118 environmental activism 29–​30, 112–​13, 114–​15, 116–​18, 119–​20, 123–​4, 125, 126 EuroMaidan protests 81–​2, 83, 84, 137. See also Russia, Ukraine everyday activism 111–​12, 116–​17, 123–​4, 126–​7, 128 Facebook 95, 102, 141 “Female Councillors in the Morning” 76 Feminist Anti-​War Resistance 142, 144, 145, 162 Fidesz 31, 33, 34, 35, 57 Gender Studies Center (Adam Mickiewicz University) 73 generational divides 76–​7, 83–​4, 117

Gerschenkron, Alexander 5 Gerwin, Marcin 49–​50, 51–​2, 62, 63–​4 GONGOs 31 Gosiewski, Eugeniusz 36–​7, 38 government-​organized NGOs. See GONGOs Gracheva, Margarita 150 Hall, Bogumila 79 hard times, in CEE 4, 5–​6, 152–​3, 158–​9 Havel, Vaclav 2 “Heavenly Hundred” 83 Henry, Laura 9, 118 HEPF (Hungarian Environmental Partnership Foundation) 29, 30, 31 Hirschman, Albert 6 Home Care campaign 60 Howard, Marc 7 Hungarian Freedom of Information 58 Hungarian Helsinki Committee 35 Hungary: authoritarianism 16, 31, 32, 34, 35, 48, 57, 62; civic activism in 31–​2, 33, 34, 43, 57, 59–​60, 61–​2, 105; democratic reforms 11, 34, 48; as a hybrid regime 12; NGOs 30, 31–​2, 35, 41–​2, 56, 58; polarization in 30–​1, 33–​4, 35, 36, 41–​2 Huntington, Samuel 84 Independent Students Association 36 informal activism 170 Instagram 92, 141 Ivanova, Sasha 119–​20, 121, 122 Jacobsson, Kerstin 9 Khodyreva, Asya 85 Komitet Obrony Demokracji 99–​100 Korolczuk, Elzbieta 9 Közösségi Digitális Eszközök Alapítvány. See Community Digital Tools Foundation LATINNO 54 Law and Justice Party. See PiS Lemeš, Samir 112–​13, 114–​15, 118–​19 LexNGO 32 LGBT Cinema Club 143 Library 1+​1 143 Lipovskaya, Olga 78 “Live Up Close” 76, 85 loyalty 6–​7

Index  183

Madarász, Csaba 56–​7, 58–​9, 60, 61, 62, 64 Male State 97 Mannheim, Karl 76 Mariupol 5000 144 Matviyenko, Valentina 150 Mazurek, Marta 72–​3, 74–​5, 76, 77, 158 McMahon, Patrice 9 Melnichenko, Anastasia 148 Meta. See Facebook, Instagram Milla 98, 105 Mitroshina, Sasha 92, 93 Móra, Veronika 29–​30, 31, 32, 34, 36 Mujanović, Jasmin 9 Muzyka, Nataliia 136–​7, 138, 139–​40, 146 New Community Foundation 40 New Democracy Foundation 52 NGO-​ization 4, 65, 78–​9, 118, 161 Odra-​Niemen Association 36–​7, 38, 39, 41 Ökotárs Alapítvány. See HEPF OPORA 6, 81 Orange Revolution 80, 81, 82, 84 Orbán, Victor 33 OVDInfo (Department of Internal Affairs Info) 99 pillarization 34, 35, 39 PiS 33, 35, 73, 75, 79 Poland: abortion 27, 75; citizens’ assemblies 50–​1, 53; civic activism in 37, 42, 43, 50, 71, 73–​4, 80, 95, 125; community dialogues 40, 44n15; democratic backsliding 33–​4, 48, 62, 79; democratic reforms 11, 48, 50–​1; feminism 73, 74–​5, 76, 77, 78, 84; generational differences 75, 77, 79–​80; LGBTQ community 73; new social movements 98; NGOs 36–​7, 40, 50, 52, 99, 125; participatory budgeting 50; polarization in 33–​4, 35, 36, 38–​9; pollution 125; protests 74, 79, 84; sexism 72, 73 polarization: definition 27; entrenchment 35; in Hungary 30–​1, 33–​4, 35, 36, 41–​2; impact on civic activism 28–​9, 41–​2, 160; and the media 28; in Poland 33–​4, 35, 36, 38–​9; political 27, 28

Polish Smog Alert 125 Popova, Alena 90–​1, 92, 94, 95, 99 prefigurative activism 119 Pushkina, Oksana 151 Putin, Vladimir 12, 16, 91, 118, 137, 149 reproductive rights movement 74, 84, 170 Rossman, Ella 85, 142–​3, 145, 146, 162 Russia: annexation of Crimea 82, 136–​7, 148; authoritarianism 12, 16, 91, 98–​9, 100, 118, 123, 141–​2, 144, 145, 146, 149; civic activism in 9, 16, 78, 91, 92–​3, 94, 96, 124, 144, 145, 149, 166; COVID-​19 pandemic 150–​1; democratic reforms 12; disinformation campaigns 93–​4; domestic violence in 91, 92–​3, 149–​50, 151; feminism 78, 79, 84–​5, 142, 144, 148, 150, 151; generational divides 78; imperialism 148; invasion of Ukraine 1, 83, 139, 141–​2, 144, 146, 161–​2; LGBTQ oppression 141, 142–​3; NGOs 99; protests 84–​5, 125, 126, 141, 149; support of Ukrainian separatists 137; sustainability 119, 120, 121–​2 Sárosi, Péter 34–​5 slacktivism. See digital activism Smoczyński, Wawrzyniec 40 Snyder, Timothy 36 social media 28, 65, 79–​80, 92–​3, 95, 96–​7, 98, 102, 124, 141 Sopot Development Initiative 50 Soviet Union. See Russia Stocznia Foundation 42 Stop Soros law 35 Sundstrom, Lisa 9 Svets, Iryna 80, 81, 82, 83, 84 Tlostanova, Madina 148 Tsvetkova, Yulia 100 Tufecki, Zeynep 170 Ukraine: Chernobyl disaster 117; civic activism in 81–​2, 83, 137–​8, 139–​40, 166; conflict with separatists 137; corruption 80–​1; feminism 148; intergenerational dynamics 82, 83; invasion by Russia 1, 83, 139, 141–​2,

184 Index

144, 146, 161–​2; NGOs 81, 137; volunteers 1, 83, 137–​8 Ukrainian Volunteer Service 1 USSR. See Russia

Wolchik, Sharon 8 Women’s Strike 27 Women’s Truth 144 Wygnański, Jakub 42

war: in Bosnia and Herzegovina 100–​1, 117, 151; and exiting one’s country 6, 167; opposition to 141–​2, 144, 145, 149; in Ukraine 1, 83, 139, 141–​2, 144, 146, 161–​2 Wessenauer, Veszna 42

Yanukovych, Viktor 137 Zakaria, Fareed 4 Zašto ne? 100, 103, 104 Zhenskaia Pravda. See Women’s Truth