Acting Like a State: Kosovo and the Everyday Making of Statehood 9781138285330, 9781315269054

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“This timely study captures the discourse and practice of Kosovo’s foreign policy during its critical first decade of independent statehood. Gëzim Visoka’s detailed and insightful analysis offers a masterful account of the contemporary challenges facing new states in the international system.” – Enver Hoxhaj, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo “In this engaging and timely book Gëzim Visoka shines much needed new light on the contested process of international recognition. Through an empirically rich analysis of Kosovo’s diplomatic discourses, practices and entanglements, Visoka addresses crucial questions around how emerging states seek to carve out a meaningful existence within contemporary world politics. He does so by developing a conceptually nuanced and insightful perspective that turns critical attention to the everyday construction of sovereignty and statehood, the oft-neglected role of diplomatic agency, and how political legitimacy is fostered by the actions of contested states.” – Fiona McConnell, University of Oxford “Visoka musters insights from Social Anthropology and International Relations to lay bare the myriad of practices that informed Kosovo’s diplomatic strategy to act like a state and join the international community. Generalisable insights are on ample display.” – Iver B. Neumann, Norwegian Social Research (NOVA) “In this important and innovative book, Gëzim Visoka explores the everyday politics of constructing independent statehood and obtaining international recognition. The rich empirical analysis of Kosovo’s diplomatic efforts shows convincingly that such agency matters: international recognition does not simply depend on international norms or great power politics. The book makes an original and significant contribution to the existing literature and is a must-read for anyone interested in state recognition.” – Nina Caspersen, University of York

Acting Like a State

How do emerging states obtain international recognition and secure membership in international organisations in contemporary world politics? This book provides the first in-depth study of Kosovo’s diplomatic approach to becoming a sovereign state by obtaining international recognition and securing membership in international organisations. Analysing the everyday diplomatic discourses, performances, and entanglements, this book contends that state-becoming is not wholly determined by systemic factors, normative institutions, or the preferences of great powers; the diplomatic agency of the fledgling state plays a far more important role than is generally acknowledged. Drawing on institutional ethnographic research and first-hand observations, this book argues that Kosovo’s diplomatic success in consolidating its sovereign statehood has been the situational assemblage of multiple discourses, practiced through a broad variety of performative actions, and shaped by a complex entanglement with global assemblages of norms, actors, relations, and events. Accordingly, this book contributes to expanding our understanding of the everyday diplomatic agency of emerging states and the changing norms, politics, and practices regarding the diplomatic recognition of states and their admission to international society. Gëzim Visoka is Assistant Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Dublin City University, Ireland. He is author of several books and numerous journal articles on international intervention, peacebuilding, foreign policy, and state recognition.

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Acting Like a State Kosovo and the Everyday Making of Statehood Gëzim Visoka On the Persistence of the Japanese ‘History Problem’ Historicism and the International Politics of History Hitomi Koyama Ontological Entanglements, Agency and Ethics in International Relations Exploring the Crossroads Laura Zanotti For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/series/INT

Acting Like a State Kosovo and the Everyday Making of Statehood

Gëzim Visoka

First published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 Gëzim Visoka The right of Gëzim Visoka to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-138-28533-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-26905-4 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

To my daughter Eira

Contents

List of figure, map, and tables Acknowledgements Abbreviations

x xi xii

1

Becoming a sovereign state

1

2

The everyday making of statehood

23

3

Crafting statehood

53

4

Writing sovereignty

91

5

Performing sovereignty

123

6

Entangling sovereignty

161

7

The price of statehood

198

Appendices Index

217 235

Figure, map, and tables

Figure 1.1 Recognition of Kosovo (2008–2017)

8

Map 1.1 Map of states that have recognised Kosovo’s independence by 2017

5

Tables 3.1 Kosovo’s foreign policy priorities (2008–2017) 5.1 The process of diplomatic recognition 5.2 Kosovo’s differentiated narrative for attracting diplomatic recognition 5.3 Kosovo’s membership in international organisations (2008–2017) 6.1 Countries with secessionist regions/movements withholding recognition of Kosovo (2008–2017)

80 127 137 145 178

Acknowledgements

This book grew out of the time I spent with Kosovo’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 2013 and 2014, where I closely experienced and observed the everyday making of Kosovo’s statehood, a process that involved writing, performing, and entangling state sovereignty. Hence, I am in debt to the many diplomats and civil servants, who devoted themselves to implementing Kosovo’s foreign policy as part of an enormous process of statebuilding under the conditions of external contestation. In particular, former Foreign Minister of Kosovo, Enver Hoxhaj, deserves special recognition for sharing his experience of leading Kosovo’s foreign affairs between 2011 and 2017, which was essential for understanding Kosovo’s diplomatic discourses, performances, and entanglements. Special thanks to Muhamet Brajshori who remains an unsung hero of Kosovo’s everyday struggle for recognition and membership in international organisations. I am grateful to the Assembly of Kosovo for permitting me to access their archives. I am also in debt to Bashmir Xhemaj, Besart Lumi, Dani Ilazi, Edward Newman, Oliver P. Richmond, Sandra Pogodda, Annika Björkdahl, Nina Caspersen, Roger Mac Ginty, Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, Lulzim Pllana, Albert Prenkaj, Nora Weller, Lendita Haxhitasim, Dafina Buçaj, Mimoza Ahmetaj, Ilir Dugolli, Pëllumb Kallaba, Zana Zeqiri-Rudi, Heroina Telaku, Sylë Ukshini, Edona Peci, Leonora Kryeziu, and to many others who cannot be listed here, for their support while I was undertaking the research necessary to write this book. At Dublin City University, I remain grateful to my colleagues John Doyle, Eileen Connolly, Gary Murphy, Ken McDonagh, Walt Kilroy, Iain McMenamin, and Eugene McNulty for their support while I completed this book. The financial support provided by DCU’s Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction (IICRR) and the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences is greatly appreciated. Finally, I am most grateful to my wife Grace Bolton-Visoka for her forbearance while I finalised this book, which coincided with the arrival of our daughter Eira, to whom I dedicate this book.

Abbreviations

ASEAN AU CARICOM CEB CEFTA CoE EBRD ECOWAS EU EULEX FIFA GCC ICJ ICO IMF INTERPOL IOC KFOR KLA LDK LVV MARRI MFA NATO OAS OIC OIF OSCE PCA PDK PISG RCC RYCO

Association of Southeast Asian Nations African Union Caribbean Community Council of Europe Development Bank Central European Free Trade Agreement Council of Europe European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Economic Community of West African States European Union European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo International Federation of Football Associations Gulf Cooperation Council International Court of Justice International Civilian Office International Monetary Fund International Criminal Police Organization International Olympic Committee Kosovo Force (NATO) Kosovo Liberation Army Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (Democratic League of Kosovo) Lëvizja Vetëvendosje! (Movement for Self-Determination) Migration, Asylum and Refugees Regional Initiative Ministry of Foreign Affairs North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Organisation of American States Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Organisation of Francophonie Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Permanent Court of Arbitration Partia Demokratike e Kosovës (Democratic Party of Kosovo) Provisional Institutions of Self-Government Regional Cooperation Council Regional Youth Cooperation Office of the Western Balkans

Abbreviations xiii SAA SADC SEECP U.S. UDI UEFA UK UN UNESCO UNGA UNMIK UNSC WB WB6 WCO WHO

Stabilisation and Association Agreement (European Union) Southern African Development Community South-East Europe Cooperation Process United States of America Unilateral Declaration of Independence Union of European Football Associations United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United Nations Organisation United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UN General Assembly UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UN Security Council World Bank Western Balkans 6 World Customs Organisations World Health Organisation

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Becoming a sovereign state

The puzzle Sovereign statehood and self-determination of peoples remain among the most problematic, yet important aspects of global politics. Between 1816 and 2011, over 400 distinct groups have demanded independence (Griffiths 2016: 5). However, only a very small fraction of ethnic groups seeking independence manage to become sovereign and recognised states. The twentieth century saw the birth of over 150 new states that emerged as a result of tectonic changes in world politics caused by major world wars; the decolonisation process; the dissolution of large federal states; and protracted ethnic and civil wars (Coggins 2014: 5–7; Walter 2009; Fearon and Laitin 2003). At the dawn of the twenty-first century, it became clear that “quests for self-determination around the world are likely to be among the most important factors driving international politics in the next decades” (Callahan 2002: 2). Despite this sudden increase in the number of recognised states, there are still no universally acceptable criteria clarifying who has the right to independent statehood and under what circumstances a distinct group can proclaim independence. Historically, political disintegration and the emergence of new states has been met with considerable resistance because any attempt to redraw the cartography of states not only affects territorial integrity of existing states but can also reshape global order (Hofbauer 2016). Consequently, “for every case of successful secession there are many where claims to selfdetermination are thwarted by the resolute upholding of the principle of territorial integrity” (McConnell 2016: 20). The hostile response to claims for independent statehood has led to the creation of new states attracting different degrees of international recognition, which are often excluded from global politics, institutions, norms, and laws, and they are exposed to external interference and various forms of dependency. How do emerging states obtain international recognition and secure membership in international organisations? Recognition and membership in international organisations – the final stage before a state enters in the club of sovereign states – has been widely debated in international relations, international law, and area studies. While there is no scholarly consensus on the determinants behind the success of secession and diplomatic recognition, existing debates on how

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independent sovereign statehood is achieved generally rest upon systemic factors, normative institutions, and the preferences of great powers. When weighting the major factors and dynamics behind state recognition, a group of scholars place strong emphasis on the support of great powers (Coggins 2014; Sterio 2013). While the support of great powers and collective recognition are identified as international determinants of the acceptance of an emerging state, at the domestic level administrative and territorial autonomy are considered optimal determinants of secession (Pavković and Radan 2011). Others affiliate the desire for independent statehood and the proliferation of new states with changing international norms, which discredit colonial conquest and the use of violence by the host state to prevent secession (Fazal and Griffiths 2014). International lawyers engage in never-ending polemics on the criteria of statehood, the declaratory or constitutive role of recognition, and the consequences of state emergence for international law, political order, and international stability (Lauterpacht 1947; Crawford 2007; Hofbauer 2016). International studies scholars consider the consent of the host state as well as collective recognition and admission to the United Nations (UN) as the most optimal grounds for obtaining international recognition (Dugard 1987; Ker-Lindsay 2012). Individual studies of emerging states have mainly focussed on exploring domestic political order and strategies for survival in the international system (Caspersen 2012; Cunningham 2014). A handful number of studies which consider secession as emancipation and improvement of social condition haven’t been given sufficient attention (see Laoutides 2015). So far, theories of recognition have not managed to profoundly understand the micro-politics, discourses, performances, and entanglements, which are essential for obtaining diplomatic recognition and admission to the international community. Nina Caspersen (2015: 394) rightly points out that “state recognition has not been afforded much attention in the political science or international relations literature”, highlighting that most analyses of state recognition have adopted a top-down approach, focusing on international responses to claims of statehood and emphasizing the importance of system-level factors for state recognition such as the strategic interests of great powers or a concern with the stability of the international system. At best, as Jens Bartelson (2013: 110) argues, they “have been instrumental in justifying different forms of exclusion in world politics, thus bringing about a hierarchical relationship between those entities that merit recognition and those who do not”. While we know a great deal about the philosophical, legal, and sociological aspects of sovereign statehood, we have limited knowledge of how new states emerge and obtain international recognition and membership in international organisations through everyday diplomatic practices. What is the role of emerging states in generating external support for recognition and membership in international bodies? What are the diplomatic strategies and tactics that they use to penetrate international exclusionary order?

Becoming a sovereign state 3 This book explores the everyday politics of constructing independent statehood and obtaining international recognition in a case involving a non-consensual declaration of independence from the former host state. The analysis focuses on the case of Kosovo as an emerging state kept in limbo, neither denied nor conferred full access to the club of sovereign states (see Anderson 2011: 188). The absence of certain sovereign attributes of modern statehood make Kosovo a suitable case for understanding how sovereignty is enacted within the conditions of its absence. As Claire Monagle and Dimitris Vardoulakis (2013: 1) argue, “sovereignty exists only in moments of absence, only when referentiality is abandoned and the nothing is paramount”. On 17 February 2008, Kosovo’s democratic representatives declared independence in close coordination with the U.S. and European partner states. Kosovo was the last entity to declare independence after the violent dissolution of former Yugoslavia, after enduring a decade of state violence and ethnic conflict by the Serbian regime, and another subsequent decade of international administration and supervision. Between 2006 and 2008, the United Nations led talks for defining Kosovo’s future political status, which concluded that supervised independence was the most viable solution for peace, democracy, and prosperity in Kosovo and the wider region (Weller 2009; Visoka 2017). However, this recommended settlement faced objections from Serbia as the former host state backed by Russia and supported by China who threatened to veto the UN’s plan for supervised independence for Kosovo. The failure of the UN Security Council to endorse Kosovo’s independence set the country on a complex path of becoming a sovereign state. Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 and its subsequent efforts to achieve diplomatic recognition have generated a range of reactions and uncertainties (Newman and Visoka 2016). A group of scholars claim that Kosovo’s independence can be supported by international law as an exceptional case, taking into account the remedial case for secession following systematic human rights abuses, the context and constitutional circumstances following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the failed international efforts for conflict resolution, the commitment of the international administration and independent Kosovo to democratic statebuilding process, and a supervised transition to independence (Hannum 2011; Weller 2011; Bolton 2013). This is challenged by others who refer to the overruling norm of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, the necessity of securing consent from the host state before permitting any separation of territory, and the dangerous implications for international order that the Kosovo case presents in relation to other secessionist claims (Pavković and Radan 2011; Wilde 2011; KerLindsay 2012; Milanović and Wood 2015). The Kosovo case has also highlighted broad international divisions on the issue of secession and recognition. On the one hand, the United States and most European states and other allies strongly support Kosovo’s statehood and sovereignty, and its campaign for international recognition. On the other hand, Serbia – backed by Russia – strongly opposes Kosovo’s independence and proactively works to obstruct the granting of diplomatic recognition to it. China, India, Brazil, and South Africa – among other important states rising in international influence – have also rejected Kosovo’s

4

Becoming a sovereign state

legal independence. Other states, including many located in the global south, occupy a middle ground, seeking to balance and maintain their positions, often delaying the decision to recognise Kosovo. Although Kosovo has demonstratively fulfilled the core criteria for modern statehood – a distinct population consisting of different ethnic groups, a defined territory, an effective government with effective authority throughout the territory, and well-proven ability to enter into international relations – it was forced to invest extensive diplomatic efforts to substantiate further its statehood by securing international sovereignty and membership in international organisations. For Kosovo, diplomatic recognition represents the final challenge before being admitted into the club of sovereign states and is a pre-condition for functioning normally in the global system. As stipulated by Kosovo’s Deputy Prime Minister Hajredin Kuçi in 2008: “the recognition of Kosovo is as important as the declaration of independence” (New York Times 2008). Aware of its political salience, the absence of universal recognition has become a threat to Kosovo’s political existence and an encounter that undermines its domestic sovereignty and territorial integrity. Similarly, membership in international organisations has become another important pathway for admission into international society. In particular, “admission to full UN membership is tantamount to collective de jure recognition . . . [and] . . . is also likely to facilitate the entry of the new state into other multilateral organizations” (Geldenhuys 2009: 22). Diplomatic recognition has become one of the crucial obstacles for Kosovo’s international participation, as well as its concrete aspiration to join the Euro-Atlantic community, which is essential for Kosovo’s political and economic survival. Without securing an overwhelming number of recognitions and eventually generating sufficient support among the UN Security Council members (especially Russia and China), Kosovo cannot become a full member of the UN. Remaining outside the UN challenges the political, economic and societal development of Kosovo. Recognition has also negatively affected foreign investment and the country’s integration in global markets, its equal treatment in international affairs and the free movement of Kosovo’s citizens. Despite these challenges, during its first decade as an independent state, Kosovo has secured recognition from 115 states, established diplomatic relations with over 80 states, opened 25 embassies, and became a member of over 60 international and regional organisations (see Map 1.1 and Appendix 1). What explains Kosovo’s success to date in becoming a recognised state and a member of the international community? Has wide international recognition made Kosovo a sovereign state? What role did great powers and their own proactive diplomacy play in strengthening Kosovo’s international subjectivity? As Kosovo has neither been entirely accepted nor rejected as a state by the international community, what are its prospects for surviving this liminal state of affairs? This book is the first ethnographic research seeking to understand thoroughly Kosovo’s diplomatic approach and its everyday micro-politics aimed at consolidating statehood and becoming a sovereign state by obtaining international recognition and securing membership in international organisations. It seeks to examine what role can an emerging, partially recognised state play in its own creation.

Map 1.1 Map of states that have recognised Kosovo’s independence by 2017

States that withhold recognition of Kosovo’s independence

States that have recognised Kosovo’s independence

6

Becoming a sovereign state

State-becoming: discourse, performance, and entanglement This book argues that Kosovo’s diplomatic success in consolidating its sovereign statehood – namely obtaining bilateral recognition and securing membership in international organisations – has been the situational assemblage of multiple discourses, practiced through a broad variety of performative actions, and shaped by a complex entanglement within global assemblages of norms, actors, relations, and events. Although powerful states played an important role in strengthening Kosovo’s international standing, Kosovo’s own diplomatic efforts have shaped the dynamics and outcomes of its campaign for international legitimation. The diplomatic agency of the nascent states lies in their ability to shape and transform their international status not only through discursive and performative actions, but also by mobilising support from global and regional powers. As a result of this prudent diplomatic approach, Kosovo as an emerging state developed its own legitimating narratives, generated support from different states, challenged the international exclusionary norms, and found loopholes in the global legal and political system to fight for its place among the sovereign nations. This book is a study of the micro-politics of the diplomatic agency of emerging states. Emerging states are those state-like entities that possess most of the attributes of modern sovereign statehood, but lack full international recognition. The existing literature tends to use other terms such as “quasi-states” (Jackson 1990), “de facto states” (Pegg 1998), “separatist states” (Lynch 2002), “states-withinstates” (Kingston and Spears 2004), or “unrecognised states” (Caspersen 2012), which will not be extensively used here due to their derogatory and limited ability to comprehend the subject matter of this study. Alternative terms, such as emerging, new and nascent states, are used instead to account for the processual character of state-becoming. The micro-politics of diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations encompasses contextual and differentiated discourses and performances invoked by fledging states in their pursuit of diplomatic recognition, as well as the dialogical dynamics and diplomatic techniques aimed at generating international acceptance and overcoming obstacles from opponents. To make sense of statehood as derivatives of discourses, performances, and entanglements, we need to view state-becoming as an everyday endeavour which is an historically-situated, socially-mediated, and inter-subjectively-constituted process (see Fabry 2013: 168). The analysis in this book seeks to depart from conventional and legal debates on statehood, secession, and recognition to demonstrate that the recognition of states is not only a matter of law or a single act, but is first and foremost a matter related to the performative diplomacy of fledgling states and a process which involves complex entanglement with external forces. Understanding the everyday making of statehood requires looking at how the different discourses are invoked to give meaning to sovereign statehood, how different diplomatic performances are deployed to make sovereignty statehood internationally recognisable, and how entangled relations, events, narratives, and assemblages of actors can facilitate or impede the processes of securing recognition and membership in international

Becoming a sovereign state 7 organisations. The everyday is one of the most promising sites for capturing the praxeological mutation of sovereignty, with all its contradictions and entanglements. The everyday is the site where all social interactions happen, where discursive and material aspects of statehood and sovereignty emerge and disappear, where agencies are performed, where norms, rules, and policies are created and changed, and where ontological security and insecurity is generated (see Gardiner 2000). As Christian Krohn-Hansen and Knut G. Nustad (2005: 12) maintain, “a modern state must be understood as produced by broad and continuously shifting fields of power relationships, everyday practices and formations of meaning”. This level of analysis enables the examination of how Kosovo’s foreign policy community has interpreted the process of international legitimation while also revealing modes of interaction in different diplomatic contexts and settings. The essence of Kosovo’s diplomatic agency has been the persisting character and commitment of its political leadership to achieve sovereign statehood, which was driven by a politics of hope and collective self-confidence that Kosovo should be independent and act as a sovereign state. Kosovo’s active struggle for independent statehood lasted almost two decades, without accounting for earlier historical attempts for self-determination. To achieve independent statehood, Kosovo started a campaign to disassociate from Serbia through peaceful means. Its people endured the violent response of the Milošević regime and subsequently underwent third-party conflict mediation and international military intervention for humanitarian reasons (Judah 2000). Kosovo then accepted international administration and supervision, and finally survived as a contested state, exposed to political, legal, and economic uncertainties. In absence of universal recognition and full access in multilateral organisations, Kosovo was forced to use liminal spaces to perform its diplomatic agency, and it built informal diplomatic networks to bypass formalities and bureaucratic impediments posed by the inhospitable international order towards new states (see Newman and Visoka 2016). The consistency of its diplomatic conduct lay in the fluidity of approaches, discourses, performances, and entanglements utilised for obtaining recognition and membership in international bodies. Although Kosovo historically demonstrates the core features of statehood (permanent population, territory, and self-governance in the form of autonomy), its own prudent and performative diplomatic tactics carry significant merit for generating international support throughout the two-decade journey for independent statehood (see Figure 1.1). The initial campaign of civil resistance following the Serbia’s actions to abolish Kosovo’s autonomy led to the internationalisation of Kosovo’s case for independence. The subsequent armed resistance led to international military intervention, placing Kosovo under UN administration, which permanently removed Serbia’s control over the territory. The UN-led state building process created the necessary structures for Kosovo to function as an independent, normal, democratic, and self-sufficient state. The UN-led talks for the definition of Kosovo’s final status and its subsequent coordinated declaration of independence made the clear majority of the international community co-owners of Kosovo’s struggle for international recognition and membership in international organisations. The

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Becoming a sovereign state

180 150 120 90 60

53

64

72

84

95

104

108

111

113

115

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

30 0

2008

2009

2019

2011

2012

Figure 1.1 Recognition of Kosovo (2008–2017)

long-term presence of U.S. and European states in Kosovo set the country on a special trajectory for integrating itself into the international community through joining the Euro-Atlantic political, economic, and security organisations. Acting like a sovereign state requires recognition by other states and sovereign representation on the world stage, both of which are mediated by and embedded in specific narratives, discourses and speech acts. State sovereignty and the case for recognition are first and foremost social and textual constructs, which come into being and are performed through everyday practices of writing and talking (Neumann 2002). Diplomatic discourse defined as the situational use of written and spoken language to convey certain messages and signal intentions plays a central role in the enactment of statehood because it has the power to constitute certain situations, produce and reproduce knowledge, and most importantly shape interests, identities, relationships, and norms (Hansen 2006; Cornut 2015). Therefore, by placing discourse at the centre of the study of the everyday making of statehood, international relations can be observed as intertextual relations, and we can also unravel how state-becoming is implicated with meaning-making. The way that sovereignty is worded helps its “worlding”. Short of political, economic, and military power, Kosovo based its campaign for international affirmation on normative grounds expressed through a wide range of differentiated discourses and narratives. Most of Kosovo’s diplomatic text has been a product of tactical and practical knowledge, which was partially based on textualisation of its own unique events and adjustment to favourable global narratives and norms on statehood. In general, Kosovo’s discursive framework guiding its quest for recognition was organised around historical, legal, normative, political, and situational arguments. First-order discourses highlighted Kosovo’s remedial right to self-determination arising from Serbia’s abolition of its autonomy, human rights abuses, and violent conflict followed by international

Becoming a sovereign state 9 intervention, as well as successful statebuilding process. Second-order discourses reflected the existing knowledge of sovereign statehood, showing how Kosovo satisfied the core criteria of modern statehood, such as population, territory, effective government, and ability to enter into international relations, and legal legitimacy conferred by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2010. Third-order discourses intended to respond to global situational narratives on political stability, state resiliency, and regional security to make the case for why Kosovo is a peace-loving and responsible state that deserves admission into the club of sovereign and recognised states. Diplomatic narratives and story-telling at the heart of Kosovo’s campaign for recognition were part of a legitimation process which intended to promote and naturalise Kosovo’s status as a sovereign state and make the case for recognition more acceptable. The legitimacy of Kosovo’s quest for recognition was determined by how appealing and persuasive its diplomatic discourse was. These discourses were essential to ensure that Kosovo’s requests for recognition generate positive international responses, to ensure that diplomatic performances change the stance of other states towards Kosovo, and penetrate more easily into global institutions and events that are often inhospitable spaces for outsiders and unrecognised states. These various discourses have been invoked, renewed, and regularly revised to adjust to diplomatic interlocutors and designated audiences. The impact of Kosovo’s diplomatic discourses can be noted in the recognition letters of many states that have recognised its independence, who when justifying their recognition frequently invoked the normative grounds put forward by Kosovo’s diplomats and their international allies. Most of the scholarly work on statehood perceives the existence of states as a priori, as a social and material reality manifested through an effective government, territory, and distinct populace – detached from everyday performances. Similarly, literature on state recognition tends to view recognition as a formal act bestowed upon a claimant entity, conferring onto the status of recognised state (Fabry 2013). This monolithic view not only fails to account for the nuances and the multi-staged process of state recognition, but it also omits a broad range of modes of international engagement of emerging states prior to or without obtaining diplomatic recognition. Contrary to such views, becoming a state is a performative endeavour that comprises patterned and fluid routines, repetition, practices, and spontaneous activities. As Janis Grzybowski and Martti Koskenniemi (2015: 29) rightly point out, “statehood has no ontological status apart from the claims, representations, assumptions and routines performing it in political and legal practices”. Diplomatic performances are what makes new states recognisable entitles in world politics. Performing sovereignty gives meaning to statehood and reproduces and justifies the state’s existence. Kosovo’s quest for diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations was first and foremost a performative process, which consisted of multiple repetitive, patterned, and spontaneous actions seeking to create political effects and create felicitous conditions for enhancing its international subjectivity. Securing diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations

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required a complex performative diplomacy that consisted of everyday actions for requesting recognition through diplomatic correspondences, for undertaking formal and informal visits, and for participating in multilateral events. Without a long-standing diplomatic tradition, Kosovo’s diplomatic performances became embedded in the daily improvisation of lobbying practices and international connections to overcome limited resources, capacities, and networks Kosovo’s diplomacy relied mainly on personal agency, soft power tactics, trying to leverage the diplomatic networks of powerful states, and using a differentiated and processual lobbying strategy (see Pouliot 2016). The recognition strategy has been flexible and adjustable during the performative process depending if the interlocutors were supportive of independence, if they are willing to engage with Kosovo without formal recognition, or if they had a neutral or negative stance towards the fledgling state. The tactics of Kosovo’s performative diplomacy constantly changed, but they generally had three strategic levels. The first level included working with each state individually and adjusting the approach to seek bilateral recognition within a specific context. The second level targeted specific groups of states and regions with the sole purpose of adapting the actions for recognition against the political factors and dynamics specific to particular regions and groups of states. The third level included working with international organisations and mechanisms to establish links with individual states and gain collective recognition from international organisations. The process of recognition usually started with sending requests for recognition to a wide range of countries. Performing the request for recognition has necessitated taking a contextual approach by adjusting the discourses, practices, and entanglements to the specific circumstances, personalities, cultural traditions, and geo-political positions of the interlocutors. Such a situational invocation of narratives has been essential to give substance to this initial stage of performative diplomacy. Depending on the initial responses, follow-up efforts proceeded seeking informal diplomatic contact either bilaterally or within the multilateral sites. Without full access within the international system, Kosovo’s diplomatic approach relied heavily on unconventional tactics establishing contact with foreign diplomats through the diplomatic networks of supportive states, and direct encounters as part of regional and global events. The best outcome from those initial meetings was to secure official bilateral meetings: such face-to-face diplomacy was essential to advance bilateral relations, since they enabled Kosovo’s diplomats to address any prejudices about Kosovo, explain the significance of recognition for Kosovo’s survival, and build personal relationships with foreign ministers and diplomats. To ease the process of formal recognition, Kosovo engaged in institutional cooperation with other states, such as recognising passports, opening economic and trade offices, and intensifying political consultations in bilateral and multilateral settings. Finally, when the domestic and international factors were ripe, the formal recognition act was performed according to the various diplomatic traditions and modalities. Overall, performative diplomacy has been most effective in changing the stance of those countries who did not categorically oppose Kosovo’s independence, but did not have the issue on their

Becoming a sovereign state 11 foreign policy radar. Performative diplomacy enabled Kosovo to subvert dominant international structures, institutions, and legal and bureaucratic orthodoxies that maintain an exclusionary international order. Most importantly, performative diplomacy has enabled Kosovo’s diplomats to manoeuvre more easily and sustain the momentum for recognition. Parallel to securing bilateral diplomatic recognition, Kosovo’s quest for membership in regional and international organisations was crucial for enhancing country’s international standing, reducing the costs of bilateral diplomacy, and benefiting from the political, economic, and social opportunities of multilateralism. Performative diplomacy has also been essential to secure access to international fora initially as a participant, then as an observer and eventually as a member state. The more recognitions Kosovo secured the stronger the chances became to obtain sufficient support for membership in different regional and international organisations. In turn, the more organisations Kosovo joined the stronger its case for recognition became. So far, Kosovo has become a member of over 60 regional and international organisations, which are mainly financial, sporting, and regional organisations. However, Kosovo has not yet managed to join major political and security organisations, such as the United Nations, NATO, Council of Europe, European Union, or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. While admission to the UN would serve as a shortcut to collective recognition and membership in other international bodies, this option was unfeasible due to the opposition of Russia and China to Kosovo’s independence and the eventual exercise of their veto at the UN Security Council. Among all international organisations, for Kosovo, membership in the EU and NATO remain most significant for entrenching the political, security, and geostrategical aspects of its statehood. Although the EU, due to the position taken by five member states, does not yet collectively recognise Kosovo, the country has managed to maintain an open perspective for becoming part of these organisations, which has indirectly helped its case for recognition and integration in other regional bodies. Despite procedural and political blockages, Kosovo’s dissident approach has secured access to low-key international organisations, initially as participant and subsequently as a member state by subverting its political and strategic intentions into technical and functional arguments. Kosovo focussed its efforts on joining organisations whose admission criteria, composition, and political orientation were more favourable to Kosovo. Performing participation and applying for membership in regional and international organisations served both as a rehearsal process for the eventual application to major international organisations, but also as an intermediary instrument to maintain incremental access to the international community before gradually aspiring to full membership (see McConnell 2016). Although membership in regional and international organisations was first and foremost about strengthening its sovereign statehood, Kosovo has portrayed its bid for membership in different bodies as a technical process intended to strengthen human rights protection and support socio-economic development, and to deepen regional cooperation on security and transnational threats.

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State-becoming is a deeply relational process, which entails developing associations with certain geo-political assemblages of actors, discourses, and relations and deliberately dissociating from other actors, narratives, and geo-political assemblages (see Jeffrey 2013; Dittmer 2014, 2017). By the same token, diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations is not only a by-product of diplomatic discourse and performative processes, but also a derivative of entanglement with multiple external forces. Kosovo’s everyday making of statehood was not only shaped by the merits of its case for statehood and its performative diplomacy, but also by global entanglements of actors, events, discourses, and relations that have simultaneously enabled and impeded Kosovo’s integration into the international community. In other words, diplomatic entanglements demonstrate that beyond performative efforts, there are other related and unrelated events, political relations, and developments that may produce enabling or disenabling effects on Kosovo’s process of international legitimation. Such entanglements exposed Kosovo to unexpected assemblages of exclusionary norms, political analogies and normative displacements, great power rivalry, and sudden loss of international attention. Existing accounts of state recognition highlight the significant role that the support of major power plays in the admission of new states to the club of sovereign states. After independence, strengthening Kosovo’s international standing was one of the United States of America’s (U.S.) foreign policy priorities in Europe. Similarly, the United Kingdom (UK) and other major European powers have devoted considerable diplomatic efforts to support Kosovo’s recognition and membership in international bodies. It is difficult to identify how many recognitions can be solely attributed to Kosovo’s international supporters because each case was a complex process involving multiple lobbying efforts, and different actors. However, it can be noted that almost half of the recognitions secured by Kosovo between 2008 and 2011 were influenced by great power support for Kosovo. Often, arguments focussing on power politics and normative factors behind the success of state recognition underestimate the micro-level factors and downplay the role of fledgling states as important diplomatic agents influencing their own destiny (see Kolstø 2006; Caspersen 2012). Unpacking the process of diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations reveals that, although great power support has unambiguously been a factor behind Kosovo’s wide international recognition, the role of Kosovo’s diplomacy as an initiator and coordinator of support from great powers was decisive. The conundrum of Kosovo’s diplomatic success lies in the complementarity of efforts undertaken by Kosovo’s own diplomatic efforts combined with the support provided by its international partners, and entanglements with other situational factors. Great power support for recognition was not static or constant, as often assumed, due to international events and changes in political leadership over time. In any case, such support has been effective only when Kosovo’s diplomacy worked closely with the diplomatic services of great powers. In this regard, fledgling states seeking international legitimation tend to play a far more significant role in mobilising great power support and mingling with global

Becoming a sovereign state 13 political assemblages than is often assumed. Aware of external political, legal and institutional constraints, Kosovo had no choice but to cultivate a prudent approach to seeking international legitimation though situational diplomatic performances and strategic entanglements with other powerful states. Kosovo’s political leadership has intentionally cultivated this strategic dependency to ensure international political support and engagement for Kosovo’s transition to full statehood and international recognition. Moreover, the support of influential states has not been purely altruistic without any strings attached. Kosovo’s international partners have constantly conditioned their international support in exchange for domestic political, economic, and security concessions regarding democratic and institutional reforms, the rule of law, accommodating minorities, and economic development. Geo-political considerations also feature. Support for Kosovo’s independence is often framed as the most optimal solution to maintain stability in the Balkans and mitigate regional conflict. The networked character of diplomatic influences contributed to the expansion of Kosovo’s diplomatic recognition. The recognition of Kosovo’s independence by influential global and regional powers not only added global legitimacy to the quest for international recognition, but also served as a strong pressure point to encourage subsequent recognition from other less influential countries. Kosovo’s socialisation with international diplomatic practices not only helped the country learn how to navigate and penetrate the international system, but also how to identify and utilise temporarily structured diplomatic pecking orders. Kosovo prioritised seeking recognition from regional powers as this often encouraged recognition by neighbouring countries with similar political, economic, and security structures. As many countries coordinated their foreign policy actions, each wave of recognition influenced the following recognitions. These observations notwithstanding, a closer look at the micro-politics and the entangled character of world politics reveals that support from great powers is not always the most important determinant of state-becoming. On the contrary, small states have often resisted great power pressure to recognise Kosovo, which in turn undermined the international prestige and standing of Kosovo’s supporters, gradually pushing them to withdraw from lobbying on behalf of Kosovo. In diplomatic assemblages, agency is not constituted upon the political strengths of the actors concerned, but rather on the monumental combination of political forces with fractural agency and emergent features. Remote global developments such as violent conflicts, sudden regime change, and internal political instability have directly influenced Kosovo’s prospects for international recognition and membership in international organisations. Hence, beyond human agency, the sequences of global events, luck, and chance have played a profound role in enabling or obstructing the consolidation of Kosovo’s statehood. Kosovo’s case for international recognition was entangled in a strange and unexpected way with multiple other geo-political assemblages that impeded its efforts for strengthening international standing. Unsurprisingly, Serbia as the former host state has proactively tried to prevent the recognition of Kosovo’s independence as well as its participation in, and membership in, international organisations. In

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addition to using their own well-established diplomatic network and influence, Serbia has also benefited from the support of Russia and other traditional allies in opposing Kosovo’s access to international society. Kosovo’s opponents often portrayed it as a ‘puppet state’ of the U.S., which did little to endear Kosovo to the global rivals of the U.S., including Russia, China, and other emerging regional powers. To undermine its global legitimacy, Kosovo’s opponents also argued that recognising Kosovo would set a negative and dangerous precedent for other breakaway regions and secessionist conflicts. Around 40 countries that have not yet recognised Kosovo have one or more active internal secessionist groups. For these countries, non-recognition of Kosovo had nothing to do with the normative merits of Kosovo’s case for statehood, but it was first and foremost a domestic political matter. Finally, Kosovo’s quest for diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations was not only shaped by global and external forces, but also by domestic engagements, political developments, and formative events that have served as enabling and impeding factors. The more stable Kosovo institutions became, the more resources and attention were devoted to the campaign for diplomatic recognition. The political stability that prevailed in Kosovo between 2008 and 2014 corresponded with the highest number of recognitions, as well as significant progress regarding membership in regional and international bodies. During these years, on average, Kosovo managed annually to secure around ten recognitions and join two or three international organisations. However, after 2014, delays in forming government and paralysis within the government and parliament unintentionally stalled Kosovo’s proactive diplomacy, which had lost the momentum previously gained in advancing international participation. After independence, the political agenda in Kosovo was dominated by constant domestic crises derived from political conflict between the government and opposition, local resistance against the EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, EU conditionality and pressure for institutional reform, as well as socio-economic problems with employment, migration, and increased religious extremism (Capussela 2015; Visoka 2017). In particular, frequent electoral cycles and protracted stalemates in government formation resulted in losing the momentum for securing recognition from many states who were close to confirming recognition, as well as allowing Kosovo’s opponents the space to pursue their counter-recognition strategy unchallenged. These domestic developments not only tested the extent to which Kosovo’s institutions were capable of running the country without external interference, but also directly affected Kosovo’s ability to dedicate sufficient resources and attention to the recognition process. In February 2018, Kosovo marked its tenth anniversary of independent statehood. Although extensive diplomatic recognition and membership in a good number of international organisations are important indicators of wider international legitimacy, as long as Kosovo remains outside the UN its political existence remains under threat. Kosovo’s prospects for joining the European Union and NATO are grim due to the extensive reforms required and the fact that some of

Becoming a sovereign state 15 the members of these organisations have not yet recognised Kosovo. Admission to the UN is unlikely without the consent of Serbia, Russia, and China, who are increasingly becoming hostile towards the waning international power of the U.S. and European states. A potential way out for Kosovo’s contested statehood would be to reach an agreement with Serbia as part of the journey undertaken by both countries to join the EU, which could require granting Kosovo’s Serbian minority wider autonomy within the context of a complex arrangement whereby Serbia would implicitly accept Kosovo’s independence and consent to its membership in the UN without formally conferring recognition. This would end Kosovo’s decade-long quest for bilateral recognition, but it could expose the country to the potential recursive secession of the Serbian community. If this scenario does not work, Kosovo will be obliged to either continue its current approach of seeking incremental integration into the international system, or seek a radical change to its status by seeking functional reunification with the kin-state of Albania. Such an unlikely move could result in redrawing political borders and return of troubles in the Balkans. Seen from this perspective, the question of Kosovo’s sovereign status is not yet entirely closed and the next stage will be definitive in either making or breaking the country’s desire to become a sovereign state.

Relevance The scope and argument of this book provides an original contribution to the intersecting debates on the creation of new states after international intervention, on the diplomatic agency of contested states, and the changing norms and politics of diplomatic recognition and admission to international society. Kosovo is a widely-researched case study in international relations as it provides fertile epistemological grounds for understanding a wide range of contemporary problems in world politics. While the dynamics of peacebuilding and statebuilding in Kosovo are often discussed, little is known about the micro-politics of Kosovo’s successful campaign for consolidating statehood and becoming sovereignty.1 To date, no detailed study has examined Kosovo’s foreign policy. This book is the first scholarly attempt to understand comprehensively Kosovo’s foreign policy based on first-hand experiences of the actors who were behind the making and practicing Kosovo’s diplomacy for seeking recognition and membership in international organisations. Therefore, this book offers new insights into Kosovo’s campaign for securing diplomatic recognition, the challenges and processes for securing membership in international bodies, and the contextual particularities of engaging in diplomatic relations, reducing dependency on external patron states, negotiating agreements, and becoming part of the society of democratic states. This study also includes new unpublished archival material that can be useful and informative for future research on Kosovo and the foreign policy of emerging states. Although there is extensive research on the politics, legality, and ethics of supporting or opposing external self-determination, and on the normative and political conditions that promote or hinder the formation of new states, less work has been undertaken on the micro-politics and practices of the contemporary making of

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statehood. The book provides insights into what counts as a legitimate and recognised state in world politics, who deserves to achieve external self-determination, and how to redefine the cartography of states considering existing international, norms, rules, and regimes. By exploring everyday diplomatic practices, especially how situational discourses, performances, and agential entanglements contribute to strengthening statehood, this book contributes to expanding our understanding of the changing nature of state sovereignty, the micro-politics of diplomatic recognition, and the membership dynamics of international organisations. First and foremost, this book demonstrates that power-driven and norm-based theories of state recognition have limited ability to account for the processual and performative character of state-becoming in international relations. The practice-based perspective developed by this book provides a better explanation of the micropolitics, complex factors, and fluid dynamics that shape international recognition and the path for nascent states to join global governmental institutions. Furthermore, the book contributes to diplomatic studies by revealing new modes of diplomatic agency and resistance in world politics, especially by outlining how an emerging state can navigate and overcome existing blockages posed by existing international norms, rules, and institutions. The book contributes to the anthropology of the state by unravelling the everyday making of sovereign statehood and documenting a broad range of narratives, performances, and assemblages which contribute to the consolidation, territorialisation, and normalisation of political power, authority, and sovereignty in contested spaces. The book contributes to International Relations (IR) debates by expanding and consolidating further the study of the everyday in world politics. Studying Kosovo’s everyday state-becoming contributes to the pluralisation of our understanding of global political spaces, and expands the political imagining of sovereignty, liminality, and processes of becoming and entanglement in world politics. Everyday struggles for international legitimation are important as they confront the existing sovereignty entrapments in world politics and open the space for new forms of political subjectivity materialised through alternative integration in international society. Most research on post-conflict societies and newly established states focusses on international intervention and the question of how the international shapes local peace, polity, and society. This book illustrates the reverse: how emerging states intervene in the international system to defy and modify norms, values, practices, and orthodoxies concerning international law, sovereign statehood, diplomatic recognition, and the admission to international organisations. This book is not intended as a blueprint for the foreign policy conduct of contested states, nor to serve as a prescriptive rulebook on how to become a sovereign state. The book should be read as a reflexive policy provocation for existing international policies towards emerging states. It intentionally does not compare Kosovo with other emerging states, which have different degrees of international contestation and recognition: it is important to consider emerging states on their own individual merits. The book seeks to illustrate both empirically and conceptually the contemporary politics of state-becoming in world politics, as experienced

Becoming a sovereign state 17 by Kosovo, in the hope that there will be an increasing openness towards subjugated peoples and emerging states who struggle for recognition in world politics. The analysis in this book seeks to demonstrate that international studies ranging from IR and diplomatic studies to political sociology, anthropology, and geography, and area studies need to engage more critically with the question of emerging states and their status in world politics. It is time now to recognise them as political and epistemological categories.

Research approach This book examines the micro-politics of Kosovo’s everyday making of statehood, namely the role of discourse, performance, and entanglement in gaining international legitimacy and overcoming external contestation. Capturing the everyday making of statehood requires combining various tools and methods of observing, conversing, reading, and listening critically to the discursive and performative aspects of the diplomatic life of new states. The analysis focusses on exploring three core dimensions of Kosovo’s diplomatic agency, namely discourses, performances, and entanglements that have been central features in guiding and shaping Kosovo’s campaign for diplomatic recognition and membership in international bodies. In achieving this goal, the analysis draws on institutional ethnography, participant observations, and practice-tracing. Institutional ethnography looks at the everyday life of institutions, performances, power dynamics, and policy-making processes. It enables understanding the micro-politics behind policy actions, the agency of individuals, while making sense of local, national, regional, and international entanglements of agencies, relations, and events, as well as understanding thoroughly a broad variety of diplomatic performances, improvisations, and imitations. As Vincent Pouliot and Jérémie Cornut (2015: 308) have recently argued, capturing diplomatic practices requires a deep understanding of the social context in which actors are caught, and this context is often impenetrable to an external observer . . . practices must be studied through observations over prolonged periods of time, which is often difficult to do for scholars. Accounting for everyday performative practices and entangled agencies of statebecoming inevitably requires in-depth situational knowledge and proximity to the place and actors that have written discourses, performed actions, and articulated entangled agencies. Institutional ethnography is an approach that seeks to explore the everyday knowledge, ruling relations and organisations, power dynamics, and institutional complexes, which are rooted in textual and performative practices (Smith 2005). Institutional ethnography can be a useful methodological guide for understanding, mapping, and exploring the everyday construction and practice of sovereignty within the institutional premises of newly established states that struggle to consolidate sovereignty through literary and interactionist practices (Smith 2005).

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The ethnographic analysis within this book focusses on the everyday work of Kosovo’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its diplomatic service abroad: this is possible as the author served as a foreign policy adviser from 2013 and 2014. Most recent studies show that “one of the strengths of institutional ethnography is the bottom-up approach to data collection” (Klein 2018: 73). This embodiment at the epicentre of Kosovo’s diplomatic agency has enabled the author to observe closely meaning-making, performativity, and entanglements, which have guided Kosovo’s foreign policy of state recognition and membership in international bodies. In exploring the diplomatic discourses, the analysis draws on a wide range of policy documents, diplomatic notes, policy speeches, internal memos, and unpublished and unclassified archival material, which were produced and collected by Kosovo’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the epicentre where the everyday making of sovereign statehood occurred. The examination of diplomatic narratives is also triangulated with event analysis drawing on direct observations, conversations with Kosovo’s diplomats, and reviewing publically available audio-visual material. In examining Kosovo’s diplomatic performances, such as everyday lobbying tactics, official and unofficial visits, participation in multilateral events, face-toface diplomacy, and other remote lobbying efforts, the analysis is based on participant observation and contingent generalisation of practices illustrated by suitable examples and evidence. Finally, for the examination of diplomatic entanglements, the analysis draws on diplomatic correspondence, public statements, and political speeches, as well as interviews with Kosovo diplomats and foreign policy decision-makers. Most research within social sciences is subjective, but often portrayed as unbiased through inventing sophisticated analytical and methodological frameworks, protocols, and approaches to obtain internal and external validity (see Inayatullah 2011). This book attempts to break away from such logics of inquiry and seeks to promote reflexive research on state-becoming, which is congruent with the real world and closer to the complex truth-making processes. Although this book has an auto-ethnographical segment, it is mainly based on the critical analysis of diplomatic documents, interviews and conversations with Kosovo’s diplomats, as well as engagement with broader scholarly debates in international relations and international law, political sociology, state anthropology, and human geography. Focussing on a single case study is the most suitable approach to delve into multiple practices, particularities, and details, which are unlikely to be captured by quantitative or comparative studies. The global historical sociology of state-becoming shows that the birth, consolidation, and transformation of states undergo unique trajectories. Therefore, studying emerging states on their own is the most ethical option to avoid conceptual overstretching, generalisation, and comparison, which can often become the source of epistemic injustice and exclusionary practices in the real world. When examining Kosovo’s diplomatic discourse, performances, and entanglements, the analysis focuses on the period from the declaration of independence in February 2008 until the end of 2017. This period is significant, as it includes a decade of intense diplomatic activity and enables the examination of a wide range of narratives, practices, and entangled

Becoming a sovereign state 19 events, which have played a crucial role in the campaign for international legitimation. Accordingly, this methodological combination represents an attempt to develop a new local critical perspective on state-becoming in world politics. It seeks to illustrate empirically, yet in a comprehendible fashion, the known and unknown particularities of becoming sovereign under the conditions of contestation and dependency on the existing discourses, norms, rules, powerful states, and regularities of global politics.

Outline of the book The book proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 outlines a new conceptual framework for studying the everyday making of statehood, which will guide the empirical analysis of the remainder of the book. The conceptual framework departs from the existing accounts of sovereignty in international relations and political sociology and assembles its key tenets from the critical political sociology of the everyday and institutional ethnography. It elaborates the interconnected nature of language and practices and the importance of pluralist epistemologies for capturing global entanglement in the context of state-becoming. Chapter 3 provides a nuanced history of Kosovo’s quest for independent statehood. It explores three key historical stages of Kosovo’s foreign policy and elaborates key events and developments that shaped Kosovo’s journey to independent statehood. The chapter also provides an overview of Kosovo’s key diplomatic achievements to date and sets the context for exploring Kosovo’s case of state-becoming under the conditions of international contestation. Chapter 4 explores the discursive dimension of Kosovo’s everyday making of statehood. Kosovo’s campaign for consolidating statehood was guided by a framework of discourses, which served to orient the everyday performance and justified why Kosovo deserves international recognition. The chapter provides a novel account of the constitutive elements of Kosovo’s discourse of statehood through the deconstruction of the narratives used in the process of recognition and membership in international organisations. Accordingly, this chapter provides for the first time a complete analysis of unpublished material, such as Kosovo’s foreign policy documents and the recognition notes. It unpacks the intersecting relationship between meaning-making and state-making. Chapter 5 explores Kosovo’s performative diplomacy, which consisted of a wide range of actions, tactics, improvisations, and gestures that were aimed at constructing a diplomatic approach for consolidating international sovereignty. The chapter provides insightful examples of Kosovo’s campaign for securing diplomatic recognition and unpacks the complex process of joining regional and international organisations. Chapter 6 elaborates the enabling and disenabling global entanglements that have shaped Kosovo’s prospects for becoming a sovereign state. The chapter disentangles the complex web of relations with great powers, the performative function of remote events and interests, and the entanglements with unrelated analogies, cases, and developments, which have jointly played a crucial role in Kosovo’s international affirmation. The concluding Chapter 7 provides a critical reappraisal

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of the price paid by Kosovo for becoming a sovereign state and explores the potential scenarios that will shape Kosovo’s future. The book then concludes with an outline for a proposed critical research agenda on state recognition.

Note 1 Some of the main studies of Kosovo published over the past decade include James KerLindsay’s (2009) critical chronology of Kosovo’s final status negotiations and Marc Weller’s (2009) legal account of the different stages of political negotiations leading to the independence of Kosovo. Due to their publication dates, neither work covers the political developments after Kosovo’s independence nor Kosovo’s campaign for strengthening its statehood. David L. Phillips (2012) examines the role of the U.S.’s coercive diplomacy and military intervention in the liberation of Kosovo, but the analysis ends when Kosovo proclaimed its independence. Andrea L. Capussela (2015) only analyses the political developments under the EU’s leadership after Kosovo’s independence and focusses on domestic aspects of statebuilding, such as the rule of law, political institutions, and the economy. Legal analyses undertaken by James Summers (2011); John Dugard (2013); Marko Milanović and Michael Wood (2015) focus on the implications of the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo for international law and the regulation of statehood, self-determination, and secession. These legal perspectives provided valuable comparative, conceptual, and general analyses, but do not explore Kosovo’s struggle for obtaining diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations.

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Becoming a sovereign state 21 Dittmer, J. (2014) ‘Geopolitical Assemblages and Complexity’, Progress in Human Geography 38(3): 385–401. Dittmer, J. (2017) Diplomatic Material: Affect, Assemblage, and Foreign Policy, Durham: Duke University Press. Dugard, J. (1987) Recognition and the United Nations, Cambridge: Grotius Publications Ltd. Dugard, J. (2013) The Secession of States and Their Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, Leiden: Brill. Fabry, M. (2013) ‘Theorizing State Recognition’, International Theory 5(1): 165–170. Fazal, T. and Griffiths, R. D. (2014) ‘Membership Has Its Privileges: The Changing Benefits of Statehood’, International Studies Review 16(1): 79–106. Fearon, J. D. and Laitin, D. D. (2003) ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’, The American Political Science Review 97(1): 75–90. Gardiner, M. E. (2000) Critiques of Everyday Life, London: Routledge. Geldenhuys, D. (2009) Contested States in World Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Griffiths, R. D. (2016) ‘Admission to the Sovereignty Club: The Past, Present, and Future of the International Recognition Regime’, Territory, Politics, Governance 5(2): 177–189. Grzybowski, J. and Koskenniemi, M. (2015) ‘International Law and Statehood: A Performative View’, in R. Schuett and P. Stirk (eds), The Concept of the State in International Relations: Philosophy, Sovereignty, Cosmopolitanism, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 23–47. Hannum, H. (2011) ‘The Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: An Opportunity Lost, or a Poisoned Chalice Refused?’, Leiden Journal of International Law 24(1): 155–161. Hansen, L. (2006) Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, Abingdon: Routledge. Hofbauer, J. A. (2016) Sovereignty in the Exercise of the Right to Self-Determination, Leiden: Brill. Inayatullah, N. (ed) (2011) Autobiographical International Relations: I, IR, London: Routledge. Jackson, R. (1990) Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jeffrey, A. (2013) The Improvised State: Sovereignty, Performance and Agency in Dayton Bosnia, The Atrium: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Judah, T. (2000) Kosovo: War and Revenge, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Ker-Lindsay, J. (2009) Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans, London: I.B. Tauris. Ker-Lindsay, J. (2012) The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested States, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kingston, P. and Spears, I. (eds) (2004) States within States: Incipient Entities in the PostCold War Era, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Klein, M. (2018) ‘Institutional Ethnography as Peace Research’, in G. Millar (ed), Ethnographic Peace Research: Approaches and Tensions, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 65–87. Kolstø, P. (2006) ‘The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States’, Journal of Peace Research 43(6): 723–740. Krohn-Hansen, C. and Nustad, K. G. (eds) (2005) State Formation: Anthropological Perspectives, London: Pluto Press. Laoutides, C. (2015) Self-Determination and Collective Responsibility in the Secessionist Struggle, Abingdon: Routledge.

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Lauterpacht, H. (1947) Recognition in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lynch, D. (2002) ‘Separates States and Post-Soviet Conflicts’, International Affairs 78(4): 831–848. McConnell, F. (2016) Rehearsing the State: The Political Practices of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, Chichester, WS: Wiley-Blackwell. Milanović, M. and Wood, M. (eds) (2015) The Law and Politics of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Monagle, C. and Vardoulakis, D. (2013) ‘Introduction: The Negativity of Sovereignty, Now’, in C. Monagle and D. Vardoulakis (eds), The Politics of Nothing: On Sovereignty, Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 1–6. Neumann, I. B. (2002) ‘Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 31(3): 627–651. Newman, E. and Visoka, G. (2016) ‘The Foreign Policy of State Recognition: Kosovo’s Diplomatic Strategy to Join International Society’, Foreign Policy Analysis. DOI: http:// dx.doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orw042. New York Times (2008) ‘U.S. and Most of the EU Recognize Kosovo’, 18 February. Available at: www.nytimes.com/2008/02/18/world/europe/18iht-kosovo.3.10148493.html (accessed 20 June 2017). Pavković, A. and Radan, P. (eds) (2011) The Ashgate Research Companion to Secession, Farnham: Ashgate. Pegg, S. (1998) International Society and the De Facto States, Brookfield: Ashgate. Phillips, D.L. (2012) Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Pouliot, V. (2016) International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pouliot, V. and Cornut, J. (2015) ‘Practice Theory and the Study of Diplomacy: A Research Agenda’, Cooperation and Conflict 50(3): 297–315. Smith, D. E. (2005) Institutional Ethnography: A Sociology for People, Lanham, MD: Altamira Press. Sterio, M. (2013) The Right to Self-Determination under International Law: “Selfistans”, Secession, and the Rule of the Great Powers, Abingdon: Routledge. Summers, J. (2011) Kosovo: A Precedent?: The Declaration of Independence, the Advisory Opinion and Implications for Statehood, Self-Determination and Minority Rights, Leiden: Brill. Visoka, G. (2017) Shaping Peace in Kosovo: The Politics of Peacebuilding and Statehood, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Walter, B. (2009) Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weller, M. (2009) Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Weller, M. (2011) ‘Modesty Can Be a Virtue: Judicial Economy in the ICJ Kosovo Opinion?’, Leiden Journal of International Law 24(1): 127–147. Wilde, R. (2011) ‘Self-Determination, Secession, and Dispute Settlement after the Kosovo Advisory Opinion’, Leiden Journal of International Law 24(1): 149–154.

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The everyday making of statehood

Introduction Mainstream perspectives on sovereignty and statehood conceive of the state as a static and ahistorical fact and seek to universalise Western models of statehood. These perspectives are inadequate to capture the changing character of contemporary statehood and account for the micro-political segments that constitute world politics. Existing debates on state emergence and diplomatic recognition tend to privilege preferences of great powers, international law and institutions, and other systemic factors (Krasner 1999; Coggins 2014), thus ignore the everyday agency of new states in world politics (see Guillaume 2011; Acuto 2014; Stanley and Jackson 2016). On the other hand, critical perspectives are caught in metatheoretical and discursive critiques of the state and widely ignore alternative performances of statehood. They do not account for micro-politics and the significant role of recognition in the emergence and survival of new states. In particular, the everydayness of diplomatic practices where sovereignty is assembled, constituted, circulated, and articulated through linguistic and performative actions is insufficiently explored (see Sending, Pouliot and Neumann 2015). Therefore, disentangling the everyday politics and diplomatic practices of new states is essential for understanding how new states manage to overcome external contestation and enter in the world of sovereign and recognised states. This chapter sets the conceptual contours for explaining the process of statebecoming, namely strengthening external dimensions of sovereign statehood through everyday discourse-based performative agency. Placing discourse at the centre of the study of everyday politics of statehood not only facilitates the examination of international relations as intertextual relations, but also reveals how state-making is first and foremost an everyday text-making endeavour (Hansen 2006; Epstein 2008). Wording sovereignty plays a significant role in ‘worlding’ sovereignty. However, discourse without performance remains a textual artefact short of social power. Performativity is what gives life to sovereignty. Diplomatic performances rely on the art of circumstances, which entail using situational and tactical knowledge to maximise effects (Scott 1998; Butler 2010). While everyday discursive and performative practices capture diplomatic interactions and mutually constitutive dynamics, the everyday is the site where agencies

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entangle whereby intra-actions – namely related and unrelated actions, events, and processes – may produce effects without direct discursive and performative encounters (Barad 2007; Aradau et al. 2015). In this regard, both situated and remote everyday diplomatic practices are crucial for explaining the complex causation and entanglement that facilitates and obscures the entry of new states into the club of sovereign states. Bringing these three components together, we can assert that the constitution of sovereignty through diplomatic discourse give meaning to the enactment of statehood in world politics. Yet, as sovereignty is inherently performative, it comes into being through practices which are enabled or constrained by various domestic and global entanglements, such as political agencies, events, and floating and (de)contextualised narratives. This chapter also discusses methodological aspects for examining the everyday making of statehood. The dominant approaches to statehood, as much as being byproducts of specific epistemological commitments affiliated with mainstream paradigms in IR, they are also derivative of specific methodological constructs. The scholarly relevance and validity of dominant claims about state formation, sovereignty, and recognition does not rely on in-depth analysis. Rather these accounts are valued for their generalisability based on statistical and quantitative methods which melt together a broader range of secession cases and collapse together historical and contemporary examples (Coggins 2014; Griffiths 2016). Departing from the dominant approaches, a suitable methodological combination chosen to explore the everyday making of statehood include: institutional ethnography, participant observation, and practice-tracing. Matters concerning state-becoming are deeply political and the myth of objective scientific research does not apply when seeking to provide a critical ethnographical study of the everyday making of statehood in contested states. Institutional ethnography enables capturing the everyday textual, relational, and performative aspects of power, institutions, and sovereignty. Participant observation and practice-tracing enables accounting for diplomatic performances, mapping entangled agencies, and exploring known and unknown particularities of becoming sovereign under the conditions of external contestation. Such a methodological combination aims to generate bottom-up and critical knowledge about this category of emerging states that are often misrepresented and misrecognised in world politics. This chapter first offers a critical review of existing literature on sovereign statehood, self-determination and diplomatic recognition to identify the limits and inadequacies of mainstream scholarship for studying the everyday making of statehood. Then, a new conceptual framework for understanding the everyday discourses, performances, and agential entanglements is presented to guide the empirical examination in this book. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the methodological approaches employed in this study for exploring the everyday diplomacy of state-becoming in world politics.

Sovereignty, the everyday, and state recognition Sovereignty is one of the major concepts underpinning contemporary domestic and international politics, while states remain core units of international society

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(James 1999). R. B. J. Walker (1993: 164) argues that “sovereignty has become indispensable to our understanding of what a state, nation or political identity can be” and a defining feature of contemporary statehood with a “supreme ordering power for a particular polity”. Epistemological perspectives currently dominating the study of sovereignty in International Relations (IR) range from mainstream positivist and legalist perspectives to more constructivist and critical perspectives. The dominant perspectives associated with mainstream IR scholarship conceive sovereignty as ahistorical, static, given, and embedded in solid foundations, such as territoriality, power, anarchical equality, constitutional independence, and noninterference (Bartelson 1995; Hofbauer 2016). These accounts offer a rationalist and realist explanation of the contemporary nature of sovereignty. David A. Rezvani (2016: 1) argues that “fully independent sovereign states are peerless and preeminent. They are viewed as the ultimate political system for producing economic and security advantages . . . [and] the only constitutive unit in the international system that possesses territorial sovereignty”. For example, Stephen Krasner (1999: 3) broadly discusses how states construct and practice four segments of sovereignty – international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty – omitting the micro-processes strengthening or weakening state sovereignty. Alan James (1999) approaches sovereign statehood from an institutionalist perspective, which depicts sovereignty as an artefact of legal arrangements that has the force of law, the possession of unlimited power and constitutional independence, and the control of internal and external policy flowing from a single unitary source. Similarly, Anthony Giddens (1985: 282) maintains that “a state cannot become sovereign except within a system of other sovereign states, its sovereignty being acknowledged by them”. International law is also state-centric as it grants unequivocal power to existing states and impose sovereign inequality to new emerging states (Warbrick 2003; Borgen 2010). Duncan French (2013: 3) admits that although the international law of statehood has provided us with the fullest understanding of what entities must do to be accepted as a state . . . it remains a legal understanding of a much more complex social and political process. Becoming a sovereign state remains basically “a phenomenon not regulated by international law” (Abi-Saab 2006: 474). These conceptions of state and sovereignty mainly draw their inferences from historical analysis and are by-products of empiricism and analyticism influenced by Western-centric understanding of statehood. Existing positivist theorisation of sovereignty in IR as part of the analytical production of the existing state of affairs, implicating thus knowledgemaking in world-making. Mainstream institutionalist perspectives take the state and sovereignty as primitive and unproblematic starting points for analysis, which tend to downplay the significance of human agency and everyday practices in the making and breaking of sovereign statehood. As Walker (1991: 452) stipulates, “state appears in the conventional story as a formal and almost lifeless category, when in fact states are constantly being maintained, defended, attacked, reproduced, undermined and relegitimised on daily basis”.

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Contrary to mainstream views, critical perspectives consider sovereignty a historical product that emerges through specific struggles, interactions, practices of states, which produce norms, rules, and institutions that form the structural foundation of international order. Central to critical perspectives of sovereignty are how sovereignty is contingently constructed through linguistic and performative practices. Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (1996: 11) define the “state, as an identity or agent, and sovereignty, as an institution or discourse, [which] are mutually constitutive and constantly undergoing change and transformation”. Endorsing ontological contingency, Walker (1993: 168) perceives the state as “constantly maintained, defended, attacked, reproduced, undermined, and relegitimised on a daily basis”. In the same vein, Christian Reus-Smit (2005: 199–200) shows how “social identities of states are thought to be constituted by the normative and ideational structures of international society and those structures are seen as the product of state practices”. In another piece, Cynthia Weber (1995: 2–3) argues that “treating state sovereignty as an already settled questions . . . is blindness to the historicity of sovereignty” and a failure to “investigate how the meaning of sovereignty is stabilized”, demonstrating thus how the state is written through simulation of the sources of sovereign authority. While these critical accounts of sovereignty and state-making have offered valuable meta-theoretical and conceptual critiques (mainly of Western states), they do not explore sufficiently the everyday constitution, contestation, and transformation of sovereignty. Biersteker and Weber (1996: 12) admit that “precisely what a state has to do to gain sovereign recognition is something that has yet to be specified” (see also Weber 1992). Traditionally, as Michel de Certeau (1984: 20) maintains, the everyday practices are ignored because contextual knowledge and performative aspects have been difficult to the scholars’ interest with transferable knowledge. The everyday is an important site to explore the elementary foundations of state-becoming. The everyday is one of the most promising sites for capturing the praxeological mutation of sovereignty with all its contradictions and entanglements. The everyday is the site where the concept of sovereignty gets its clarity and ambiguity. It is the epistemological location for capturing the public and hidden transcript of sovereignty discourses and performative acts. Most importantly, everyday interactions are “productive of both power and subjectivities” (Edkins and Pin-Fat 2004: 2). Often critical scholars seek to navigate non-institutionalised sites of power and agency to make sense of the productive nature of subjectivities. By doing this, they risk not only omitting the everyday life of political organisations, but also ignoring spaces where political relations, social interactions, epistemic knowledge, and embedded practices and cultures clash, fuse, and produce new forms of symbolic power exemplified through textual interactions, performative practices, and entangled agencies (see Björkdahl and Buckley-Zistel 2016). Gearóid Ó’Tuathail (1996: 137) has rightly criticised the dissident voices in IR for marking their “own exceptionalism” by locating themselves at the margins, which risk becoming another orthodoxy. Although the everyday has always been a subject in sociology and anthropology, in IR we have seen a renewed interest in studying the everyday. The study of

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the everyday in IR has emerged as a resistance to methodological elitism which is associated with sites that explore peoples’ prosaic struggles, indirect defiance and disavowal of public authority, and informal, anonymous social transactions below the public visibility radar (see Stanley and Jackson 2016). As Xavier Guillaume (2011: 446) argues, the everyday illuminates “central practices” of the (re)production of relations of domination. The everyday in IR mostly focuses on the ordinary people and the meaning they give to social identity and political authority, especially the bottom-up experiences of the nation, state, and sovereignty (see Brubaker et al. 2006; Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). In diplomatic studies, the everyday is a synonym for “codes of indirection, listening skills, tact, coded gestures, staged performances and empathy” which take place in non-institutional and non-governmental constellations (Constantinou 2016: 24). In international political sociology, the everyday is understood as “the spatiality of situated, mundane, and habitual practices, often little appreciated in IR because of their “routine” character versus the drive of crisis and globalist thinking” (Acuto 2014: 346). In the context of regional organisations, the study of the everyday explores the “subordinate and ordinary people and their experiences of broader power relations” (Adler-Nissen 2016: 92; McNamara 2015). In critical peace studies, the everyday is perceived as an agencement site for “survival, alienation, mystication, compliance, and resistance”, where emancipatory forms of peace take place through “offering care, respecting but also mediating culture and identity, institutions, and custom, providing for needs, and assisting the most marginalised in their local, state, regional and international contexts” (Richmond 2011: 16, 3–4). In comparative politics, the everyday describes practices of “people embracing, complying with, adjusting, and contesting norms and rules regarding authority over, production of, or allocation of resources” (Kerkvliet 2009: 232). While the notion of everyday has come to be associated with peripheral sites of power and the exceptionality of sovereignty, the everydayness of official politics and institutional life where power and state sovereignty is assembled, constituted, circulated, and articulated through linguistic and performative actions is insufficiently explored. Everyday diplomacy plays an important role for emerging states in improving interactions with other states, thereby reaffirming the former’s existence and acceptance into international society. Costas Constantinou (2016: 23) rightly argues that “the everydayness and ordinariness of diplomacy . . . is not readily acknowledged – at least within the discipline of International Relations (IR)”. Rebecca Adler-Nissen (2015: 297) maintains that “diplomacy is about constituting and representing states as separate units”, hence crucial for understanding the birth of new states in world politics. Everyday diplomatic practices are seen as constitutive of world politics, or as Iver B. Neumann (2012: 3) argues “diplomacy is what states do” and “states are what diplomacy does”, considering it critical for state formation and statebuilding. Moreover, Fiona McConnell, Terri Moreau and Jason Dittmer (2012: 804) maintain, “diplomacy and recognition play central roles in the conventional conferral of state legitimacy and functioning of the inter-state system”. Similarly, Ole J. Sending, Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann (2015: 7) argue that

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diplomacy “helps reproduce the state as the naturalized political arena for the generation of meaning and belonging”, where the change of diplomatic practice may result in changing the meaning of statehood. While the existing research on everyday diplomatic practices might sound critical and alternative to existing diplomatic studies in IR, it is still euro-centric, as it mainly focusses on unpacking how European diplomacies work in everyday life. The majority of research on secession and self-determination discusses the conflict between the principle of state sovereignty and territorial integrity and the right of self-determination, which entails separation of a part of territory and disregarding state sovereignty (Raič 2002; Kohen 2006). However, they engage insufficiently in exploring the micro-politics of unravelling and remaking of state sovereignty through the creation of new states. In particular, we tend to know more about the politics, legality, and ethics of the right to self-determination than the micro-politics and everyday practices of how independent statehood is actually achieved (see Newman and Visoka 2016). The everyday making of sovereignty remains particularly under-researched in contemporary examples of state formation with contested sovereignty, different degrees of international recognition, and external engagement and acceptance. Existing debates on state recognition are caught on the futile debates whether state existing regardless of external recognition or that recognition is constitutive of statehood. Declaratory perspective embedded on the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States hold that the political existence of the State is independent of recognition by the other states as long as the state fulfils certain substantive criteria. This implies that states exist ontologically prior to international society, and recognition is only a formal acknowledgement of what already objectively exists. David Raič (2002: 48), argues that “because the acquisition of statehood does not juridically depend upon recognition by other States, the crucial matter for becoming a State is for an entity to satisfy the customary law criteria for statehood”. Furthermore, Gary Wilson (2009: 45) points out: “recognition of states is regarded by most international lawyers as performing an essentially declaratory function”, whereby “the act of recognition simply reflects the fact that a particular entity satisfies such criteria”. John Dugard (1987: 165) defines recognition as “the acknowledgement by the community of States that an entity possesses necessary international legal personality to entitle it to share in the benefits and to subject itself to the obligations of international law as a State”. It is seen as a valuable “instrument for the validation of claims to statehood on the part of new entities by existing member States of the community of nations” (Dugard and Raič 2006: 94). On the other hand, constitutive theorists see recognition itself as a vital component of statehood, and the State is “viewed as having its genesis in recognition” (Grant 1999: xx). Martha J. Peterson (1997: 1) considers recognition as “the acknowledgement of the existence of an entity or situation indicating that the full legal consequences of that existence will be respected”. Ian Brownlie (1983: 206) holds that “the political act of recognition on the part of States is a precondition of the existence of legal rights”. Mikulas Fabry (2010: 3) suggests that “at some historical juncture . . . the society of states came to exist ontologically prior to any

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new state”. Alan James (1992: 353) adds to this that “the recognition of a state indicates that the entity concerned possesses the characteristics of sovereign statehood, and hence exists as such, rather than helps to bring it into existence”. Christopher Hillbruber (1998: 494) contends that “it is only by recognition that the new state acquires the status of a sovereign state under international law”. David Raič (2002: 19) explains that “the very act of recognition attributes international personality to the recognized State, which means that, according to this view, a State does not exist in international law unless it has been recognized by the already existing States”. Similarly, Bridget Coggins (2014: 32) argues that “recognition does, however, determine whether or not statehood can be exercised in any practical sense within the international community”. For Stephen Krasner (1999: 7), “recognition provides benefits and does not impose costs. Recognition facilitates treaty making, establishes diplomatic immunity, and offers a shield against legal actions taken in other states”. On balance, neither the declaratory theory defended by international lawyers nor the constitutive theory defended by IR scholars and political scientists provide a solid basis for capturing the role, politics and dynamics of international recognition in the state-becoming process. Colin Warbrick (2003: 237) stipulates that the ‘constitutive’ theory and the ‘declaratory’ theory, are neither compatible with the other and neither capable of dealing with all the circumstances in which recognition decisions arise, with the result that adherence to one or the other is apt to mislead in the borderline case. Trying to reconcile the declaratory and constative perspectives to state recognition, Matthew Craven (2010: 241–242) argues that “although the right to be treated as a state is independent of recognition, recognition is the necessary evidence that the right has been acquired”, revealing that “states exist prior to recognition but commence on recognition”. Similarly, Raič (2002: 48, 30), maintains that recognition of statehood “is declaratory in nature, but . . . it may have a consolidating effect as far as the statehood of the entity is concerned”, because recognition “attributes rights and duties to the recognized State, thereby creating the latter’s international personality”. A performative theory of international recognition might be a more viable option, which considers recognition as an important feature of modern state, yet not sufficient without the possession of objective criteria of statehood, namely the existence of a distinct community with territory, with effective government authority, and ability to engage with the outer world. The ability of new emerging states to act like a state and secure diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations requires satisfaction of most of the objective criteria of statehood. In turn, diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations is essential in a deeply interdependent world to give meaning to the factual statehood by permitting access to the international community and the rights, protections, entitlements, and obligations that are offered by the international law and other codified international practices (see Lindermann and Ringmar 2016). In this context, independent statehood becomes

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meaningful only whenever it is performed through domestic and international sovereignty. Recognition is important not only for the aspirant state, but also for existing states because recognising other states is the very act that constitutes international society – namely the collective features that united and differentiates sovereign states (Ringmar 2014: 447). Therefore, another major scholarly debate concerns international responses to the emergence of new states. The distinction between collective and individual recognition is one of the most significant criteria that signifies the legitimation and membership in new states in the international community of sovereign and independent states. Ultimately, the most suitable outcome of a self-determination process is “when this withdrawal is accorded recognition by the host state and by others in the international community” (Hechter 1992: 267). David Raič (2002: 34) explains that “in the absence of the existence of a central organ or institution which is competent to determine with certainty and finality whether a State exists under international law, this function is fulfilled by States through the act of recognition”. Bilateral recognition signifies formal recognition of independence and sovereign statehood, along with the legal personality to share benefits and obligations of international law (see Dugard 1987: 165). It entails the process when a state indicates its decision to recognise the independence and sovereign statehood of the claimant state through an official statement, press release, or a diplomatic note. In certain instances, recognition is implied when diplomatic relations are established. In absence of collective recognition, Stefan Oeter (2014: 66) argues that unilateral recognition divides “the international community into opposing factions” which “tends to erode the potential of collective patterns of recognition, and thus aborts any chance to use collective recognition as a tool of (collective) conflict management”. Collective recognition is the most effective method for entering into international society as it reduces the burden of bilateral recognition, as well as enhancing the international legitimacy of the new state (Ker-Lindsay 2015: 273–274). It is an optimal solution because it does not destabilise the international order, and yet it permits the expansion of the society of states. On the other hand, collective non-recognition is grounded on the conviction that “states are under an obligation not to recognize, through individual or collective acts, the purported statehood of an effective territorial entity created in violation of one or more fundamental norms of international law” (Raič 2002: 442). Of a similar view is Malcolm Shaw (2003: 253), who argues that “states cannot be obliged to recognise, although they may be obliged not to recognise in certain situations as defined by international action”. Although state recognition is a fundamental feature of the state-based international system, there is no regime that can objectively rule on the criteria for international recognition and less so enforce a duty to recognise new states (Tierney 2013; Bartelson 2014). John Dugard (1987: 1) suggests that the law of recognition “may still be seen as the weakest link in international law”. He maintains that “recognition is still characterized by political arbitrariness, States still deny the existence of any duty to recognize new States” (Dugard 1987: 9). Decades of scholarly debate have not resolved deep divisions between scholars, practitioners,

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and lawyers on who has the right to recognise newcomers to international society and under what circumstances new states gain diplomatic recognition (Crawford 2007). This is because the recognition of states – a prerogative held only by other states – remains one of the most unregulated and de-centralised aspects of international relations. As Thomas D. Grant (2015: 204) observes, “international law does not specify a particular procedure or apparatus that a State must use to confer recognition”. It is often stated that “recognition of States is not a matter governed by law but a question of policy” (Lauterpacht 1947: 1). Daniel Philpott (1998: 87) maintains, “recognition, whatever its effect – conferral of legitimacy, implied diplomatic, or military support – will likely be unilateral, and governed by the vicissitudes of the balance of power and domestic politics”. Underling all modes of recognition and non-recognition are multiple variations of recognition ranging, from formal recognition to de facto and implicit recognition, which suggests that there are no simple binary practices and dualisms when it comes to state recognition. Some state practices accept the existence of a state but avoid making a formal statement to that effect, or undertake practical diplomatic actions to imply acceptance while avoiding the potential consequences that may derive from formal recognition. While international law does not regulate the recognition of states, international lawyers favour the recognition of state-like entities in order to fill the legal vacuum in specific geo-political spaces and also to minimise the existence of governable places. Yael Ronen (2013: 44) argues that where a quasi-state is capable of acting like a state, and performs acts that are only regulated for states or are regulated differently for states and quasistates, it may be useful to attribute statehood to it even in the absence of a claim on its parts . . . so that it be required to comply with the international rules commensurate with its capacity. Ronen (2013: 44) elaborates further by arguing that “recognition, exceptional and even to a limited extent, enables a measure of effective monitoring of the wrongdoings of state’s conduct”. Diplomatic recognition of new states is granted by existing sovereign states, but with the rise of regional organisations and supranational bodies, new practices of state recognition are emerging. Dugard (2013: 35), argues that “in principle it is for each State to make such a decision on its own, unilaterally. But in practice today the decision is often made collectively by the United Nations, European Union or other international organization”. A prevailing agreement is that “admission to full UN membership is tantamount to collective de jure recognition” and that it is “likely to facilitate the entry of the new state into other multilateral Organizations” (Geldenhuys 2009: 22). Similarly, scholarly debates on diplomatic recognition have not explored sufficiently the everyday micro-politics and foreign policy aspects of emerging states (see Owtram 2011). James Ker-Lindsay (2012) examines the counter-recognition strategies and attempts of Serbia to prevent the international recognition of Kosovo, the attempts of Georgia to prevent the recognition of Abkhazia and South

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Ossetia, and the attempts of Cyprus to prevent the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Given its focus on the actions of the host states, this study does not examine the diplomatic efforts of the contested entities to secure diplomatic recognition. Nina Caspersen (2012) provides a valuable contribution that examines the internal politics of unrecognised states, looking mainly at how they survive under conditions of constrained sovereignty, imperfect statehood, insecurity, and external rejection. Though in another instance, Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield (2011: 6) argue that “unrecognized states tend to be small, their chances of international recognition is often remote, and the exogenous and endogenous pressures on them are intense”, considering them “doomed to be short-lived anomalies of no great consequence”. Other accounts, such as the one promoted by Pal Kolstø (2006: 723–740), entirely disregards the diplomatic agency of new states and focusses the discussion of the recognition of quasistates on the strengths of the state, the weakness of the parent state, support from an external patron, and the engagement of the international community. James Harvey and Gareth Stansfield (2011: 11) go as far as labelling unrecognised states as “odd”, “schizophrenic”, “anomalous features of the international system and international society”. Christopher Hill (2003: 31) maintains that “where sovereignty is denied or the capacity to exercise is severely impede, foreign policy becomes particularly difficult, but not impossible”. Though, exceptions are Fiona McConnell’s (2016) study on Tibet’s rehearsal of statehood in exile, Alex Jeffrey’s (2013) study on Bosnia’s improvised state, Daria Isachenko’s (2012) work on the making of informal states, John Quigely’s (2010) work on Palestine’s statehood – which together represent important contributions to this field of studies – and Costas Laoutides (2015) work on secession as emancipation. What is missing from existing studies is a more substantial understanding of foreign policy dimensions of state-becoming under the conditions of external contestation, especially the everyday micro-politics of the discourse, politics, and processes that underpin modern statehood. Disentangling the everyday life of sovereignty and how it becomes a social fact through discourses, performances, and entangled agencies is essential for explaining how states become sovereign subjects in world politics. As McConnell (2016: 5) maintains, “despite their relatively small population and territorial size, polities such as dependencies, stateless nations and de facto states can provide a valuable window on the nature of international politics”. Effectively, they “contribute to broader debates on the diversification of international society away from a Westphalian ‘ideal’ of sovereign nation-states and towards a potentially post-sovereign order characterised by geopolitical arrangements displaying varying degrees of sovereignty and territoriality” (McConnell 2009: 1914). Therefore, disentangling the everyday life of sovereignty and how it becomes a social fact through discourses, performances, and entangled agencies is essential for explaining how states become sovereign subjects in world politics. Especially, focussing on the struggle of contested states for recognition and membership in international bodies is as important as exploring the domestic struggle for nation-building and governing a particular territory and populace as a state. Diplomatic recognition and admission to multilateral

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structures gives meaning and legitimacy to domestic sovereignty as it enables engagement with other states on the basis of sovereign equality.

State-becoming through everyday discourses, performances, and entanglements Significant number of scholars approach the emergence of new states mainly from a socio-historical perspective, emphasising the violent and predatory trajectories of state-making and state formation (Tilly 1985), the external efforts for statebuilding through “reconstructing the security, institutional and economic framework of the state” (Richmond 2014: 13). A proper examination of the everyday dynamics of state-becoming in world politics requires integrating together “the material and the symbolic, practices and discourse” (McConnell 2016: 175). It requires seeing the state as an “emergent effect of an assemblage of discourses, performances, and objects” (Dittmer 2017: 8), which is “produced through dynamic social processes and thus [are] constantly in emergence” (McConnell 2016: 31). To conceptualise the diplomatic efforts of new fledgling states, it is crucial to engage with everyday discourse, performance, and entangled agency. The first segment of the everyday making of statehood is discourse and situated knowledge. It is well-established that written and performed discourses play an important role in the creation, representation, and reconstitution of the state and sovereignty. Discourses represent “synthetically and ideologically structured word formations that are arranged systematically and have truly productive powers in world politics” (Adib-Moghaddam 2013: 150). Similarly, Luiza Bialasiewicz et al. (2007: 406) define discourses as “a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible”. Charlotte Epstein (2008: 2) argues that “it is through discourse that individuals, societies, and states make sense of themselves, of their ways of living, and of the world around them”. Discourse is important as it helps capture “meaning- and value-producing practices in language” (Shapiro 1989: 14). In particular, a diplomatic text can constitute institutional realties, as well as transform social relations and meanings. Christian Bueger and Frank Gadinger (2014: 43) maintain: “narratives not only provide stability to practices, but they are also powerful devices for making sense, for justifying of actions, and providing instruction in concrete situations”. Nicolas Onuf (2013: 29) argues that language makes people agents. In this regard, text has the capacity to regulate, order, and coordinate people’s course of action, and is therefore crucial for producing institutional realities. Dorothy Smith (2005: 104) echoes this when stipulating that “text exerts significant control. It is a control exercised through how its words and sentences activate the reader’s responses. In being activated, the reader becomes, in a sense, the text’s agent”. In the absence of political and material power, fledgling states turn to language to make the case for their entitlement to sovereign statehood; namely, why they deserve diplomatic recognition and admission to international organisations. Diplomatic discourse refers to a situational use of written and spoken language

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to convey certain messages and signal intentions (Hansen 2006; Cornut 2015). Discourse plays a central role in the enactment of statehood because it has the power to constitute certain situations, produce and reproduce knowledge, and most importantly shape interests, identities, relationships, and norms. As Epstein (2008: 246) rightly argues: states do not interact with one another from a set of pregiven and fixed interests and identities; rather, their interests and their identities are shaped by the discourses in which they are immersed and the fields of interactions in which they take part. Sovereign statehood, as much as it is a matter of fact, it is also a textual practice and a by-product of the meaning attached to it. State sovereignty is a textually-constructed social fact that is articulated through everyday acts of writing, talking, and performing speech acts. Inter-state relations are first and foremost inter-textual relations. For Neil Walker (2003: 7), sovereignty is “a speech act [whose] capacity to make a difference to the world depends upon its plausibility and its acceptance as a way of knowing and ordering the world”. On the same vein, Wouter G. Werner and Jaap H. de Wilde (2001: 287) explain that “sovereignty is a speech act to re-establish the claimant’s position as an absolute authority, and to legitimize its exercise of power”. Stacy Closson (2011: 64) stipulates that sovereignty “plays an important role in normative discourses by imaginarily bridging the gap between what exists and what could be”. Understanding the sovereignty as text requires revealing how it has been mediated by “historically specific scripts governing the interpretations through which it has emerged” (Shapiro 1989: 12). Diplomatic text resonates agency as policy-making is an everyday text-making activity (see Huysmans 1997; Hansen 2006). Especially, mimicking the language of sovereignty “provides textual and/ or contextual prescriptions for what a state must do to be recognized as sovereign” (Biersteker and Weber 1996: 12). In the context of fledgling states, diplomatic discourse signifies ways how situated language, text, and meaning is co-constituted through the practice of discursive harmonisation or differentiation for advancing political interests and creating new realities. However, the focus on the discourses, text, and writing of sovereignty is often affiliated with detachment from the “real world” (see Campbell 1992: 246–247). Ian Angus (2000: 258) maintains that critical theories focussed on studying discourse have lost touch with reality as they consider discourses and language as disembodied representations of reality rather than a means for “understanding them as figuration of praxis”. Therefore, discourse alone is not sufficient to make sense of the everyday micro-politics of emerging states. Studying diplomatic discourse should go hand in hand with the exploitative examination of performances and the entanglement of practices. The second segment of the everyday making of statehood is the performativity of sovereignty. Claudia Aradau et al. (2015: 75) argue that while discourse “focuses on the matter in which heterogeneous elements are connected”, performativity, on the other hand, “focuses on the matter in which such connections

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acquire seeming fixity”. Theodore R. Schatzki (2001: 44) argues that “discourse is being, while practice is the becoming from which discourses result and to which they eventually succumb. Conversely, discourses are the precarious fixities that precipitate from human practice and from which further practice arises”. This demonstrates that there is an indivisible interplay between discourse and practice in producing “sovereign” actions and consequences (Neumann 2002). Without performativity, discourses almost remain a textual artefact short of social power. Edward L. Schieffelin (1998: 194) maintains that performance “deals with actions more than text: with habits of the body more than structure of symbols, with illocutionary rather than propositional force, with the social construction of reality rather than its representation”. The power of performativity lies in its ability to assemble linguistic, material, and affective segments, which jointly produce new features and effects, identities, frontiers, discourses, and material realities. While performances signify acts of doing and saying something, performativity describes “the citational practices which reproduce and subvert discourse, and which at the same time enable and discipline subjects and their performances” (Gregson and Rose 2000: 441). According to Judith Butler (2010: 147), performativity describes “a set of processes that produce ontological effects, that is, that work to bring into being certain kinds of realities or, fourthly, that lead to certain kinds of socially binding consequences”. Discursive utterance requires practical action to bring about a change. This is primarily a by-product of the temporary nature of performances, which are constantly over ruled by proceeding performances. Thus, performances require continuous iteration, otherwise, because, as Bruno Latour (2005: 37) explains, “the object of a performative definition vanishes when it is no longer performed”. Judith Butler (1993: 2) maintains that “performativity must be understood not as a singular or deliberate ‘act,’ but, rather, as the reiterative and citational practices by which discourse produces the effects that it names”. Butler (2010: 149) also argues that “reiteration is the means through which . . . effect is established anew, time and again”. Similarly, Catherine Nash (2000: 662) submits that performativity is not just “a singular act but a reiteration of a norm or set of norms that have assumed this status through their repetition”. Performativity is essentially a non-representational view of social reality, holding that experience in practice is crucial for becoming a social agent or producing “certain kinds of socially binding consequences” (Butler 2010: 147; see also Thrift 1996), and that “subjects know the world without knowing it” (Nash 2000: 655). Butler (1990: 278) argues that identity “is real only to the extent that it is performed”. There is no being prior to doing; state-becoming takes place in the act of performing. Similarly, Vikki Bell (1999: 2) argues that “taking the temporal performative nature of identities as a theoretical premise means that more than ever, one needs to question how identities continue to be produced, embodied and performed, effectively, passionately and with social and political consequences”. Yet, Butler (2010: 153) admits that “performativity never fully achieves its effect”. While performativity in most of cases takes the shape of citationality, imitation, and repetition, it can appear also as a form of resistance, contestation, and rupture from normalcy, and standardisation, thereby becoming subversive to

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the “very citations that hegemonic performativity enacts (Madison 2005: 165). Lene Hansen (2011: 280) rightly argues that practices might also not be routine, more precisely that there are instances when specific practices are sought to be performed as if they are routine, when in fact they take place on a terrain that is much more contested and unstable. Performativity is essential for rethinking the state, diplomatic practices, and foreign policy conduct. While performativity is widely ignored in IR debates, a number of feminist and post-structuralist scholars have used performance theory to explain the nature and unravelling of international politics. Performative theory provides a unique reading of states. State sovereignty “is real only to the extent that it is performed” (Butler 1990: 278). There is no being prior to doing; becoming takes place in the act of performing. The performative brings into forefront “the processual, unfinished, and constantly renewed function . . . rather than assume the unchanging, static, a priori ontology” (Menon 2013: 12). In this sense, “norms can only be transformed through their iteration, through subversive repetition” (Hopf 2010: 554). Furthermore, Cynthia Weber (1998: 90) argues that “a performative understanding of state sovereignty suggests that sovereignty is undecidable because its meaning cannot be fixed, for whenever the meaning of sovereignty is stabilized one finds that the meaning of sovereignty has already moved on to something else”. The reiterative nature of performativity forms the basis for diplomatic habits, which in turn can serve as an emerging feature that shapes the future performativity of statehood. Ted Hopf (2010: 541) defines habits as “ready-made responses to the world that we execute without thinking”. He argues that habits in world politics play a far more significant role than recognised so far, pointing out that often diplomatic agency is not necessary practiced on the grounds of rationality, instrumentality, and normativity, but is largely a manifestation of habitual perceptions, uncertainty, and unawareness. Hence, ritualised, habitualised, repeated, and performed discourses contribute to the constitution of sovereign statehood. From the perspective of performativity, states are not pre-given in world politics because “statehood has no ontological status apart from the claims, representations, assumptions and routines performing it in political and legal practices” (Grzybowski and Koskenniemi 2015: 29). As Vincent Pouliot (2016: 10) maintains, the “social world is emergent and practice is a key process involved in bringing the many facets of global life into being”. Therefore, seeing the state from the perspective of performances not only challenges the “state as a unified actor or static form” but enables “understanding the state as improvised urges reflection on the unfolding of the state as a process always in motion” (Jeffrey 2013: 176). Alex Jeffrey (2013: 6) further argues that understanding the state as a set of performances sheds light on the grounding of sovereignty claims in social and cultural practice, but it says rather less on

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the rationality that informs the selection of individual performances or how performances are contested and reshaped in everyday life. The essence of making sovereignty is to perform again and again speech acts and performative actions in order to acquire external recognition, acceptance, and legitimacy, as well as normalising the global socialisation with the new sovereign state. It is about using repeated actions and constructing new actions through reparation (see Rai and Reinelt 2015). Timothy Mitchell (1991: 94) argues that the state “should be examined not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist”. Alex Jeffrey (2013: 2) further argues that “performances of the state are often more explicit where changes are desired in the existing inter-state system, where a particular political authority is seeking to assert or solidify a specific claim to the state” In a global political ecology that lacks prescriptive rules on state formation, becoming a sovereign state requires acting as a sovereign state. States become sovereign through the enactment of policies, actions, and discourses. States are nothing but iterative practices. Tracing diplomatic performances allows “a more nuanced understanding of the social context in which statecraft is enacted and identifies spaces of resistance to dominant narratives of state building” (Jeffrey 2013: 6). Equally important, performance helps to overcome essentialising discourses and solid perception of identity, thereby accounting for both continuity and change in the practices of actors (see Jeffrey 2013: 6). Performances reveal how states are improvising entities, whose “legitimacy and ability to lay claim to rule rely on a capacity to perform their power” (Jeffrey 2013: 2). Therefore, understanding the everyday making of statehood requires observing how statehood is performed, imitated, and improvised. Diplomatic performances are what makes new states recognisable entitles in world politics. Performativity helps understand the covert and overt purposes behind diplomatic actions. Diplomatic performances materialise certain segments of intentionality of statehood, while simultaneously contributing to the reconfiguration of state intentions and identity. Helen Gilbert (1994: 104) maintains that “in performance contexts, the truth, if any, is in the telling”. Exploring the performativity and enactment of statehood requires looking at a broad range of practices and events, such as press conferences, foreign policy speeches, diplomatic cables, and political meetings. Seeing diplomatic practices from the perspective of performativity offers several benefits for challenging existing theoretical orthodoxies regarding state formation and recognition. First and foremost, focussing on diplomatic performances allows us to “consider the symbolic, affective, embodied dimensions of statemaking” (Menon 2013: 22). In this regard, performative diplomacy helps capture how actors “adjust and monitor their own behaviour to convey particular meanings to outside observers” (Hall 2015: 17). From this perspective, it can be asserted that diplomatic performances signify the ways in which the actors in ordinary and extraordinary situations present themselves and their activities to other external actors, the way in which they guide and control the impression others form of the

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fledgling state, and the kind of things state actors may or may not do and say while sustaining their performance before external actors. Tracing performed diplomatic practices of contested states enables a better understanding of how political discourse and agency challenge politically and legally constrained practices in international politics, which ultimately aim to reshape how statehood is regulated in contemporary global affairs. As AdlerNissen (2015: 286) argues, “states are not born into this world as fully developed states that then “exist”; states are made in continuous relations with other states and non-state actors”. Focussing on the performance of contested states and their infrapolitics of state formation not only sheds light on the contemporary nature of diplomatic affairs, but also helps to unmask the power of peripheral agencies and identify the limits of systemic and great power politics in shaping the politics of recognition and membership in the international community. Finally, performativity helps to demonstrate the role of everyday diplomatic practices to challenge dominant conceptions of sovereignty (Rose-Redwood and Glass 2014: 2). Exploring performances enables capturing “micro-geographies of habitual practices” (Nash 2000: 656), which supplements the textual and discursive analysis of everyday diplomacies of state formation. Performative diplomacy highlights the power of diplomatic improvisation and creativity in destabilising the current global order, in utilising loopholes in the international legal and political order, and in overcoming conservative policies regarding who has the right to become a state. Through performative acts, states gain internal and external legitimacy and generate global status. Power needs to be performed, and performance are acts of power (see Askew 2002: 8). For these reasons, examining performativity is important to understand how statehood is performed in practice, and to identify the audience of diplomatic performances to trace the entangled agencies shaping the external legitimation of statehood. The third segment of the everyday making of statehood concerns entangled agency. While performativity captures diplomatic interactions between performers and audiences and their mutual constitutive dynamics, entangled agency looks at the role of intra-actions – namely related and unrelated actions, events, and processes – which produce effects without direct encountering. Karen Barad (2007: ix) argues that “to be entangled is not simply to be intertwined with another, as in the joining of separate entities, but to lack an independent, self-contained existence”. Building on this account, Aradau et al. (2015: 75) define entangled agency as “the effect of intra-action – an open-ended practice involving dynamic entanglements of human and nonhumans, through which these acquire their specific boundaries and properties”. Entangled agency is necessary to offer a more complete account of the everyday making of statehood, especially in accounting for the role of agency in complementing or overcoming the limits of discursive practices and performances. Central to understanding diplomatic agency is to explore the entangling agencies and events that cause complementarity and diffraction in relation to the discursive articulations and disruptions of performative practice. Yet, agency is never capable of achieving the desired goal and what we refer to as agency and agents are by-products of different ideas, discourses, and

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actions that are shaped not only by intentional interactions, but also by unintended consequences and distant events and entanglements. State-becoming has material and expressive components glued together through performances. The global arena is an open space where multiple actors, agencies, events, norms, entanglements, and estrangements take place. In such an environment, prospects for diplomatic recognition and admission into international society are not entirely determined by discursive and performative efforts, but also by situational entanglements and the suitability of assemblages of relations. A reality-adequate conception of diplomatic agency of new states make sense only if they are studied as global assemblages of entangled agencies (see Dittmer 2014). Global entanglements depict association and relatedness between unrelated agencies, objects, and events. While performances predominantly are shaped by repetitive and mimetic processes with elements of anticipation, regularity, and preparedness, entangled agency operations within broader temporary assemblages (see Marcus and Saka 2006: 103). Assemblage theory recognises the agency of individuals and larger social assemblages, which can be networks of individuals, organisations, and broader communities (DeLanda 2006: 36). Diplomatic assemblages are organised by heterogeneous elements which are byproducts of practices that “work together for a certain time” (Müller 2015: 28). As Stephen J. Collier and Aihwa Ong (2005: 12) describe it, an assemblage is the product of multiple determinations that are not reducible to a single logic. The temporality of an assemblage is emergent. It does not always involve new forms, but forms that are shifting, in formation, or at stake. Assemblage thinking “foregrounds the ways in which social/political processes are generated through relations between sites, rather than configured through ‘internal relations’ in sites” (Featherstone 2011: 140). While assemblages are not products of specific relations and entities, they are productive of new “territorial organisations, new behaviours, new expressions, new actors and new realities” (Müller 2015: 29). Therefore, entangled agency cannot be captured in advance because its features can only be uncovered in retrospect, and its constitutive parts constantly disassemble and come part. Events are central to the formation of diplomatic entanglements and assemblages. In an entangled, complex, and non-linear world, remote and unrelated events and performances can influence the diplomatic processes elsewhere. According to Aradau et al. (2015: 75), the best method to capture entangled agency is to start “with events, and trace out the way in which an event reveals a complex intra-action between elements through which the specific agencies of these elements that are productive of that event are constituted”. In diplomatic assemblages, agency is not constituted upon the political strengths of involved actors, but on the monumental combination of political forces with fractural agency and emergent features. While these assemblages co-constitute one another, they do not melt into a collective body; they remain fractural parts of a fluid whole. Jason

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Dittmer (2017: 3) conceives the international community as an assemblage consisting of “constant becoming-together of specific media, objects, and bodies/ practices from which individual political subjectivities, states, and broader geopolitical communities”. This signifies that power politics and systemic features are by-products of micro-politics and bottom-up processes. Global interconnectedness produces many effects which are indirect, mediated, and delayed. This is in line with systems thinking, which highlights that “systems often display nonlinear relationships, outcomes cannot be understood by adding together the units or their relations, and many of the results of actions are unintended” (Jervis 1997: 6). Therefore, making sense of diplomatic practices requires exploring how exogenous, remote, and unrelated agencies, events, relations, and dynamics entangle together to form temporary assemblages which simultaneously can facilitate or inhibit emerging states recognition and access in the international system.

Observing the everyday making of statehood While the main protagonists of international studies are sovereign states, other vulnerable subjects and aspirant states that struggle to enter the international society are discriminated not only politically by the conservative global order, but also epistemologically by the existing Western-centric scholarship. Existing accounts on state recognition who claim to be based on scientific, positivist, and comparative epistemologies and methodologies are directly implicated in reproducing the current international order which is exclusionary towards peoples, groups, and state-alike entities who seek external to realise collective self-determination and establish their independent state (see Caspersen and Stansfield 2011; Ker-Lindsay 2012; Coggins 2014). As Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2012: 5) states: “research is not an innocent or distant academic exercise but an activity that has something at stake and that occurs in a set of political and social conditions”. Predominantly, literature on state recognition, as discussed in the preceding section, is written by scholars who do not have in-depth knowledge about the complex realities surrounding the societies excluded from the international system. Who writes is as important as what is being written. In majority of cases, knowledge on emerging states is written by external researchers with vested interests to maintain existing order and discourage change in world politics. They arbitrarily defend the exclusionary norms and practices of the international society and seek through pseudo-inteligibility to retain the boundaries of the entitlements and political status of political communities in global politics. They are implicated in the denial of the right to self-determination of people through a sophisticated technology of knowledge-production about secessionist entities, which use Western-centric lens of what is a normal and permittable pathway to state-becoming. In fact, the historical origin of state recognition and politics of membership in international bodies lies on the self-proclaimed right of Western colonial powers to constrain the rights of colonised people and preserve their dominance through controlling and gatekeeping international order, rules, norms, and institutions governing world politics (Anghie 2004). Writing about emerging states has direct implications on

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the chances of these peoples and groups to fulfil their collective desire for selfdetermination. By producing research which is predisposed to preventing emergence of new sovereign states, scholars are indirectly implicated in committing epistemological injustice, which may play a role in denying peoples’ rights and needs for freedom, development, and prosperity. The absence of first-hand, field-based observations and experiences results in producing apathetic knowledge about the people and states that are left outside the society of recognised states. This epistemic injustice not only has repercussions for producing conceptual and theoretical knowledge, which is far from the lived reality of contested states, but it also contributes to the reproduction of existing power relations, global normative and political orthodoxies, and exclusionary practices towards peoples and groups who seek to realise their collective right to self-determination. Therefore, a critical and emancipatory research agenda on state recognition is long overdue to generate more empathetic knowledge towards subjugated peoples who struggle for recognition of journey to becoming a sovereign state. This also includes interrogating critically existing concepts that are implicated in reproducing the existing global political and normative order and serve as gatekeeping and obstacles for new states to realise collective self-determination and receive international recognition. Observing the everyday making of statehood from a humanistic and empathetic perspective towards emerging states not only requires combining multiple conceptual lenses, as demonstrated in the preceding section, but also requires combining proper methods and methodologies. A suitable methodological combination applied in this study is institutional ethnography, participant observation, and practice-tracing. The added value of this methodological combination is to make the everyday remarkable and identify the remarkable in the everyday (see Vine 2018: 280). This study focusses on the work of Kosovo’s diplomatic service, comprised of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, embassies, and other governmental agencies and bodies involved in the campaign for diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations. In capturing the everyday making of statehood, institutional ethnography is a relevant methodological approach, which seeks to explore the everyday knowledge, ruling relations and organisations, power dynamics, and institutional complexes, which are rooted in textual and performative practices. Dorothy E. Smith (2005: 34) explains that “institutional ethnography begins in the local actualities of the everyday world, with the concerns and perspectives of the people located distinctly in the institutional process” (Smith 2005: 34). Most importantly, Smith (2005: 133) reminds us that “institutions happen in everyday actualities; people produce them in the course of their everyday doings”. In a rather indirect way, Michel-Rolph Trouillot (2001: 133) recognises the importance of institutional ethnography by highlighting the need to study the state processes and effects in the “seemingly timeless banality of daily life”. Institutional ethnography is concerned with the textual, relational, and performative aspects of power and state institutions. As Tobias Hagmann and Didier Peclard (2011: 4) suggest, “states are not only the product and realm of bureaucrats, policies and institutions, but also of imageries, symbols and discourses”. In this

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regard, “institutions are seen as generating power through the coordinating functions of language and texts . . . the texts that constitute and regulate institutions establish agency, that is, textually specified capacities to control and mobilise the work of others” (Smith 2005: 226–227). Moreover, “texts perform at that key juncture between the local settings of people’s everyday worlds and the ruling relations” (Smith 2005: 101). These dimensions of institutional complexes hold the key to disentangling the textual and performative agency of politicians, diplomats and bureaucrats in their quest to consolidate Kosovo’s statehood. Institutional ethnography “rejects the dominance of theory” (Smith 2005: 49), which is suitable for generating new inductive knowledge about the politics and performativity of statehood. In turn, ethnographies of contested statehood require going through “a process of critical immersion, learning the ways things work from the inside, the terminology, procedures, values, and relationships” (Niezen and Sapignoli 2017: 7). As Didier Fassin (2017: 20) argues, the task of producing such institutional ethnography of the everyday making of statehood requires to confront the various discourses with each other, to relate them to the social position of the agents, to compare them with the facts observed in the field, and to interpret them in light of other sorts of knowledge – historical, sociological, and philosophical, in particular. Furthermore, institutional ethnography enables capturing the relational aspects of human engagements, power dynamics, the ruling apparatus, and the entangled agency. Ethnographic writing, Merje Kuus (2013: 117) argues, “can be helpful in producing more ‘peopled’ or embodied accounts of social practices . . . on everyday lived experience”. Vincent Dubois (2015: 468) argues that the power of ethnography “consists in the accuracy of its empirical descriptions, which can be used to contradict representations of the social world based on dominant sociopolitical beliefs and ideologies”. Institutional ethnography also combines an orientation towards subjective experience and individual agency in everyday life with sensitivity to the broader social settings and the historical and institutional dynamics in which these emerge or are embedded (Madison 2005; Foley 2002). Sierk Ybema et al. (2009: 6–7) suggest that “in drawing close to subjects and situations, organisational ethnography has the potential to make explicit the often-overlooked, tacitly known and/or concealed dimensions of meaning-making, including its emotional and political aspects”. By focussing on institutional ethnography and exploring critically diplomatic practices, we can understand “the ordinary knowledge, narrative storytelling, emotional expression and communicative practices generally” (Fischer et al. 2015: 6). Institutional ethnography helps capture the everyday symbolic language expressed through metaphors, jargon, and anecdotes, through everyday symbolic acts expressed through habits, rites, rituals, routines, practices, customs, through everyday symbolic objects resembling spaces, and material artefacts (see Ybema et al. 2009: 8).

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Approaching state-becoming from the perspective of the everyday enables accounting both for agency and structure, namely the intersubjective constitution of individual agencies and structural features of statehood. Institutional and organisational ethnography is also useful in understanding “subjective experience and individual agency in everyday life” combined “with sensitivity to the broader social settings and the historical and institutional dynamics in which these emerge or are embedded” (Ybema et al. 2009: 7). A recent study by Yael Navaro-Yashin (2012) on make-believe spaces in Northern Cyprus demonstrates the significance of exploring institutions as affective spaces of state-becoming beyond their rational bureaucratic functions, thereby helping to bring “state practice down to earth” as a prerequisite for unpacking the constitutive temporalities of statehood. For these reasons, institutional ethnography can be a useful methodological guide to understanding, mapping, and exploring the everyday construction and practice of sovereignty within the institutional premises of newly established states that struggle to consolidate sovereignty through literary and interactionist practices. Notwithstanding the usefulness of institutional ethnography, not combining it with other methods risks atomising social relations by focussing on methodological individualism and failing to identify “generative mechanisms which are often invisible to actors” (Sharp 1982: 48). Or, as Steve Jordan and David Yeomans (1995: 396), argue “without a broader, historical perspective of the constitution of social relations and culture, the ethnographic gaze will amount to no more than a glance”. Capturing everyday performative practices and the entangled agencies of sovereignty construction requires in-depth situational knowledge, which can be mediated through participant observation of practices (Kuus 2013). Hence, to complement this potentially problematic epistemological aspect, the examination of practices provides useful research pathways. Practice theory emphasises the relational and fluid nature of processes and actions, it recognises the linkage between knowledge and action, it explores the interface between identical and material aspects of social life, it apprehends multiplicity, performativity, indeterminacy, and pluriversality (Bueger and Gadinger 2014: 19–20). Therefore, practice analysis effectively complements linguistic analysis: together they provide a better understanding of the performativity of state sovereignty. Vincent Pouliot and Jérémie Cornut (2015: 303), submit that “disaggregating the practices of the state, including diplomacy, are essential to understanding how it actually holds together”. However, they argue that capturing practices requires a deep understanding of the social context in which actors are caught, and this context is often impenetrable to an external observer . . . practices must be studied through observations over prolonged periods of time, which is often difficult to do for scholars. (Pouliot and Cornut 2015: 308) Practice-based inquiry provides the opportunity to explore a wide range of social practices and phenomena, and to assemble their attributes to verify the connection between observed outcomes and the inability to fulfil the declared intentions,

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and to apply the types of consequences when necessary. Especially, “exploring the practice of the state through extended interviews and participant observation captures the multiple sites and scales within which state-like practices unfold” (Jeffrey 2013: 177). This inevitably requires proximity to place and actors that have written discourse, performed actions, and have articulated entangled agencies. The research approach of participant observation is well positioned to explore everyday institutional practices in the state-becoming process. The task of participant observation is ‘not to ascertain the truth, but to understand the way meaning is produced (Bueger and Mireanu 2015: 127). As Christian Bueger and Manuel Mireanu (2015: 123–124) argue, “participant observation has come to be understood as one of the most promising means for studying the problematizations, practice, actions and objects that constitute it”. They suggest that “a return to practice stresses the need for seeking proximity to the world of practitioners and their activities, and more carefully listen and talking to those lives are at stake” (Bueger and Mireanu 2015: 119). Most importantly, “knowledge claims are hence based on ‘being there’ – of having a grasp of the situations, structures and artefacts in which meaning is situated” (Bueger and Mireanu 2015: 124). These observations enable tracing the translation of intentions into performance and consequences. Moreover, participant observation also allows “recording very specific types of data which otherwise stay hidden, or are not immediately visible” (Bueger and Mireanu 2015: 127). Dubois (2015: 472) argues that “observing the daily practices and beliefs of government elites and elected officials usefully contributes to the ethnography of policy making”. Participant observation also allows for “recording very specific types of data which otherwise stay hidden, or are not immediately visible” (Bueger and Mireanu 2015: 127). The practice-tracing and participant observation segment of this study was realised through the author’s policy engagement with Kosovo’s diplomacy between 2013 and 2014, including in-depth interviews and conversations with Kosovo’s diplomats of all ranks, as well as critical engagement with archival and unpublished diplomatic correspondence. It is an empirical and analytical action research rooted in institutional ethnography and participant observation (see Brigg and Bleiker 2010; Inayatullah 2011). Most interpretations of events and political processes draw on the author’s direct experience observing the making and implementation of Kosovo’s foreign policy. Elizabeth Dauphinee (2013) rightly argues that personal narratives in world politics are political narratives, highlighting that scholarly works, which do not recognise the subjective implications behind the subject and object of inquiry fail to be considered as reflexive research. Mats Alvesson and Stanley Deetz (2000: 66), argue that interpretivists and others often labelled as ‘subjective’ often have the better claim to objectivity through the way they allow alternative language games and the possibility of alternative constructions arising from existing communities denying both research community conceptions and preferred methods as privileged and universal.

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This alternative methodological combination seeks to illustrate empirically, yet in a generalizable fashion, the known and unknown particularities of becoming sovereign under the conditions of contestation and dependency on the existing discourses, norms, rules, powerful states, and regularities of global politics. The book hopes to improve our understanding of the anthropology of diplomacy in emerging states, and to serve as a path opener for similar studies of different societies struggling to become recognised and sovereign states.

Conclusion While the main protagonists of international studies are sovereign states, other aspirant states that struggle to enter international society face discrimination not only politically by the conservative global order, but also epistemologically by the existing Western-centric scholarship. This chapter demonstrated that existing scholarship on the changing nature of sovereign statehood does not explore sufficiently the everyday constitution, contestation, and transformation of sovereignty. In turn, the analysis clearly reveals that the everyday is one of the most promising sites for capturing the praxeological mutation of sovereignty with all its contradictions and entanglements. Exploring everyday diplomatic practices, especially how situational discourses, performances, and agential entanglements come to become, can be useful to expanding our knowledge on the changing nature of sovereign statehood and state-becoming in world politics. The chapter outlined a new conceptual framework for studying the everyday making of statehood through looking at the discourse, performance, and entanglements as three core segments that play an essential role in constructing sovereign statehood. These three segments help to unpack the peculiar interplay of agents’ knowledge, situational imitation and improvising, influence of identity and habitus, and the circulation of power and agency from the personal to the social and the global. In particular, studying discourses, practices, and assemblages in their everyday and mundane expression offers promising grounds for uncovering new modes of diplomatic resistance in world politics to navigate and overcome existing blockages posed by international norms, rules, and institutions. Everyday diplomatic struggles for international legitimisation are important as they confront the existing sovereignty entrapments in world politics and open the space for new forms of political subjectivity materialised through alternative routes for integration in the international society. In their everyday articulation, diplomatic discourses, performances, and entanglements provide insights into how norms, institutions, and practices of sovereign statehood operate transversally at local, national, and international levels. Finally, the chapter demonstrated that existing knowledge on state-becoming is influenced by specific positivist, legalistic, and quantitative methodological approaches which are embedded on the existing international exclusionary order and committed to reproducing the normative, political, and legal framework of statehood. To overcome such epistemological and methodological discriminatory contours, this chapter proposed institutional ethnography, participant observation,

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and practice-tracing as alternative methods which enable proximity to the epicentre where sovereign statehood is written, performed, and entangled. The conceptual and methodological framework elaborated in this chapter will guide the empirical analysis of Kosovo’s diplomatic discourse, performances, and entanglements in the remainder of this book.

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3

Crafting statehood

Introduction The emergence of a new state is the product of a non-linear and complex process consisting of multiple stages, different generations of actors, and various political, diplomatic, and military methods. This chapter provides a contextual account of Kosovo’s recent journey to statehood by outlining major developments that characterised its struggle for independence and sovereign statehood. Jason Sorens (2012: 6) argues that independence movements gain momentum only when identity-related cleavages are coupled with interests, and strategies for external self-determination. The analysis in this chapter focusses mainly on the domestic determinants of state-becoming, unpacking the role of local actors and core political processes covering three distinct phases: the campaign for independence that began in the early 1990s; the period of UN transitional administration; and finally, the foreign policy pursued by Kosovo as an independent state. Though the analysis also accounts for the involvement of external actors and their role in shaping Kosovo’s path to independent statehood. Moreover, the discussion in this chapter intents to elaborate the historical bedrock and origins of Kosovo’s discursivebased performative diplomacy of international recognition and membership in international organisations. The first phase of crafting Kosovo’s statehood occurred between 1990 and 1999 and involved a gradual detachment from the fractured remains of Serbiandominated Yugoslavia, which in Kosovo began with peaceful resistance, continued as a quest for democratic separation through a referendum, and ended with a violent conflict and international intervention. Kosovo had a distinctly identifiable ethnic community of majoritarian Albanians with a clearly demarked geographical space and the perseverance of serious discontents expressed through political confrontation as well as indiscriminate use of violence by central government provided strong grounds for the mobilisation of political leadership with wide popular legitimacy in support of independence (see Bartkus 1999: 10). During this phase, Serbia’s violent reaction to the claims for independence solidified Kosovo’s case for independence, including: the substantive abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy; subjecting Kosovo-Albanians to a systematic denial of their basic human rights, including general discrimination, and the mass dismissal of ethnic

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Albanians from public office and commercial enterprises; interference with the judiciary, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment; use of torture; and the disproportionate use of force. While the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia granted Kosovo most features of statehood, during the 1990s struggle to become a sovereign state, Kosovo ultimately formed the necessary social, political, and institutional awareness for becoming and acting like a sovereign state (Mertus 1999). During this phase, every act of seeking independence on the grounds that Kosovo satisfies the core criteria of statehood performed the function of consolidating further the very criteria that it claimed to possess. Under the conditions of denied statehood, the focus of the campaign for independence was to continue local resistance and ensure the survival of the KosovoAlbanian population while pro-actively seeking external support for independence by internationalising the Kosovo crisis, drawing international attention to Serbia’s systematic and state-sponsored human rights abuses and political prosecution, and ultimately triggering international intervention to achieve liberation and independence. Initially, however, the struggle for independence through domestic boycotts and attempts to internationalisation Kosovo’s case for independence produced only limited results, largely since the international community was unwilling to address Kosovo issue at the same time as the Dayton peace process, which aimed to end the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. The initial failure of preventive diplomacy to address the situation in Kosovo led to the escalation of the conflict, which then demanded the urgent attention of the international community. This political stalemate coupled with state’s violence transformed the resistance from peaceful protest to an armed struggle between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Serbian police and armed forces. This in turn exacerbated a dynamic of violence that created a humanitarian emergency by 1998, as Serbian state-sponsored violence took on the form of ethnic cleansing. The armed resistance and the escalation of the crisis finally caught the attention of the international community, which tried to resolve the dispute through diplomatic means. Ultimately, the fully-fledged violent conflict lasted over two years and cost over 13,000 people their lives, including the occurrence of wide spread war crimes and crimes against humanity with genocidal intents (Humanitarian Law Center 2011). Subsequently, NATO’s military intervention tried to stop Serbia’s state-sponsored violence against Kosovo-Albanians, which consisted of ethnic policing to maintain control over the territory, ethnic cleansing in regions where local insurgence was challenging the judicial authority, and then full-scale depopulation of Kosovo by driving Kosovo-Albanians out of the territory in response to NATO’s humanitarian intervention (Ron 2003: 89–108). The second phase of crafting Kosovo’s independent statehood took place between 1999 and 2008, which began with NATO’s military intervention and the subsequent UN transitional administration. This critical phase involved consolidating internal sovereignty, strengthening state capacities, earning the support of major powers and democracies, and preparing the ground for independent statehood. It was NATO’s intervention and the decision, articulated in UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), to place Kosovo under international administration,

Crafting statehood 55 which effectively removed Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo. This period reveals how Serbia’s actions and efforts to prevent state formation unintentionally enhanced Kosovo’s international support along with its chances for independent statehood. The main impetus for utilising the UN administration as a pathway to independence came from the Kosovo-Albanian political elite, who were relentless in shaping the political, legal, and institutional processes to create for Kosovo the attributes of an independent state. The quest for statehood provides almost unquestionable legitimacy to political and military leaders, which raises questions about the true motivations and hidden intentions behind the campaigns for independence. During this phase, everyday diplomacy focussed on steering the statebuilding process in the direction of state formation, thereby generating support within the UN civilian presence and among the diplomatic representatives of foreign countries that were committed to resolving Kosovo’s status.1 In response, the UN administration of Kosovo between 1999 and 2008 tried to counter-balance the KosovoAlbanians’ focus on independence with normative conditions related to minority protection, good governance, and democratisation. In many regards, the UN has channelled statebuilding efforts to respond to the Kosovo-Albanians’ desire for independent statehood while directing peace building activities to accommodate and appease the Serb minority in Kosovo and their objection to independent statehood (Visoka 2017). The third phase of crafting Kosovo’s statehood began with Kosovo’s the declaration of independence in 17 February 2008, which represented a remedial solution and a historical change in Kosovo’s struggle for becoming a sovereign state. Although Kosovo proclaimed independence in close coordination with the international democratic community, it lacked the blessing of the former host state and did not receive endorsement by the UN Security Council. This set the fledgling state into a complex trajectory, pursuing bilateral recognition and membership in second-order international organisations in a hope that it will achieve eventually a critical point and gain full international acceptance. Other issues which preoccupied Kosovo after independence were the struggle to reduce international missions and expand its own domestic sovereignty, a process which was intimately linked with the international support for international recognition. This chapter first examines Kosovo’s early efforts for declaring independence initially through peaceful resistance and then through armed insurgency. The discussion explores everyday diplomacy of internationalising Kosovo’s crisis and making the case for international intervention for resolving Kosovo’s statehood problem. The chapter then explores the shifting grounds of everyday diplomacy under UN transitional administration and the significance of statebuilding process for creating a polity and consolidating effective and democratic government as essential preconditions for functioning as an independent and self-sufficient state. Finally, the chapter explores Kosovo’s challenges after the declaration of independence for expanding domestic sovereignty and creating the institutional and diplomatic service for enacting its statehood international through bilateral recognition, establishment of diplomatic recognition, and membership in international organisations.

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The diplomacy of peaceful resistance and armed insurgency Across the Balkans, history remains highly contested and sensitive. Accordingly, tracing and discussing the historic background to the claim for Kosovo’s independence remains beyond the scope of this book. Here, the focus is on examining the contemporary quest for Kosovo’s statehood since 1990s, when the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia began. Historiographical accounts by Noel Malcolm (1998); Misha Glenny (2000); and Tim Judah (2000) provide a comprehensive overview of Kosovo as a political, cultural, demographic, and geographical space throughout centuries. Julie A. Mertus (1999); Howard Clark (2000); and Denisa Kostovicova (2005) provide solid analysis of the political and social condition in Kosovo during 1990s. Throughout history the current territory of Kosovo has been populated by Albanians and other Slavic groups and has been a site of consecutive conquest by different empires, include the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent appropriation by the different mutation of Yugoslavia. During World War II, Kosovo was promised self-determination once the war would end. However, such a promise wasn’t kept by Communist leaders, who granted Kosovo an autonomous status instead. However, following continuous political and latent resistance, under the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, Kosovo was granted the status of federal unit with well-defined boundaries, same as the international borders of the former Yugoslav Federation and those of other entities, with extensive constitutional powers. Kosovo had the same state attributes as the other federal units, including: its own Constitution; direct representation in all federal institutions; its own presidency; assembly; government; police; territorial defense; constitutional court; intelligence service; central bank; and a secretariat for external relations (see Malcolm 1998). With the death of President Josip Broz Tito, nationalism and ethnic antagonism re-emerged in Yugoslavia leading to the gradual dissolution of this multi-national state (Ramet 1999). Initially, the Kosovo-Albanians’ quest for statehood was pursued through peaceful and democratic means, seeking first equal republican status with a reformed Yugoslav Federation, and later, when the federation dissolved, Kosovo aspired to external self-determination through a democratic referendum. At the time, it seems that Kosovo had a fluid plan: if the dissolution of Yugoslavia would create independent states, Kosovo would demand independence as well; if Yugoslavia ended up as a confederation, then Kosovo would demand to be part of this confederation; and if Yugoslavia’s dissolution resulted in creating ethnic states, then Kosovo was ready to create a state that would unify all the parts populated by Albanians (Kelmendi 2015: 234). However, the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 consisted of a set of radical measures undertaken by the Serbian authorities to prevent and crush the nascent independence struggle. This legal centralisation reduced significantly Kosovo’s ability to exercise the political, economic, and cultural autonomy that it enjoyed during the last two decades of Yugoslavia’s existence. Other anti-independence pre-emptive measures consisted of the large-scale expulsion of Kosovo-Albanian employees from public sector jobs, crushing the autonomous education system by imposing curricula

Crafting statehood 57 from Belgrade, controlling and shutting down Albanian-language media outlets, as well as policing everyday life in Kosovo (Pula 2004: 806; Koinova 2013a: 5). Serbia’s oppression in Kosovo was framed within the discourse of constitutionality and legality, thereby exploiting the language of the rule of law to prevent state formation in Kosovo. This was part of Serbia’s policy of “ethnic distinction” which included policies of expanding Serb settlements in Kosovo and taking steps to “de-naturalize Kosovo-Albanians living abroad”, while disturbing daily life to ultimately “encourage” a collective population movement into Albania (Weller 1999b: 36). Initially, Kosovo-Albanians tried to build the case for statehood through declaratory measures instituted by the representative bodies. In June 1990, the Albanian political parties of Kosovo issued a declaration which strongly supported “the peaceful solution to all political disagreements excluding any use of force in order to impose certain political aims” (see Weller 1999b: 64). This expressed Kosovo’s right for self-determination during Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution, whereby political leadership considered international involvement as the most promising avenue for peaceful conflict resolution. In July 1990, the Kosovo Assembly passed a constitutional declaration objecting to the illegal and undemocratic abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy and demanded equal republican status for Kosovo within the Yugoslav Federation. Later, in September 1990, the same assembly passed a new constitution that proclaimed Kosovo a sovereign and democratic state based on “the right of self-determination in respect to the overwhelming sovereign will of the Albanian people expressed by a plebiscite all over Kosovo” (see Weller 1999b: 65). One year later, in September 1991, the declaration of independence, which was only recognised by Albania, represented another democratic expression by the political representatives of the majority of Kosovo’s population (Judah 2000). In order to ground this struggle with democratic foundations, Kosovo-Albanians organised a referendum for independence in October 1991. From a population of one million Kosovo-Albanian citizens, 87% (914,802 citizens) participated, of whom 99% reconfirmed their overwhelming support for Kosovo’s independence and sovereignty (see Weller 1999b: 73). From this point on, Kosovo-Albanian representatives considered the referendum results “a real force which cannot be ignored by anybody” (Weller 1999b: 73). Subsequently, they demanded that Kosovo-Albanians be included in the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, warning that “its unsettlement would represent reason and latent possibility for tension and confrontations with undetermined consequences for peace and security in the Balkans and Europe” (see Weller 1999b: 85). The European states intentionally ignored Kosovo problem and focussed on resolving the volatile situation in other former Yugoslav republics (see Caplan 2005a). Serbia’s use of violence to prevent state-becoming process unintentionally contributed to the consolidation and homogenisation of Kosovo-Albanian political groups, which was a prerequisite for coordinating the strategy for independence initially through peaceful resistance then through parallel state institutions and later through internationally-supported armed resistance (see Stephan 2006: 72). Kosovo-Albanians chose initially methods of peaceful resistance, such as sit-ins,

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hunger strikes, and public disobedience which later became crucial aspects for the formation of a critical agency in Kosovo that provided the most sustainable grounds for performing and acting like a state under the conditions of occupation (Kostovicova 2005). During this period, Kosovo’s independence project was glued together by the “shared collective goals, experiences, and cultural repertoires of contention” among Kosovo-Albanians for freedom, democracy, and statehood (Pula 2004: 798). Kosovo’s peaceful approach to pursuing its case for independence consisted of strengthening ethnic capital, ensuring cultural survival, and preventing the depopulation of Kosovo through strengthening within-group social solidarity, resolving interpersonal and inter-community disputes through indigenous mechanisms (see Hofbauer 2016). Howard Clark (2006: 86) argues that “there has never been such great social solidarity among Albanians as in the period 1991–1994”. Gëzim Krasniqi (2012: 93–94) identifies the following factors behind the strategic decision to pursue statehood through nonviolent means: the desire to oppose anti-democratic movements in Serbia through democratic methods; the dominance of the democratisation discourse during the fall of communism in Eastern Europe; and finally, the desire to prevent Kosovo’s resistance movement from being affiliated with the stereotypes against Albanians as being violent, uncivilised, and backward-looking. Kosovo’s political leadership aspired to secure the recognition of statehood based on the right for self-determination and the overwhelming will of the people for statehood (see Çeku 2016). The abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy by the Milošević regime and the discriminatory exclusion of Kosovo-Albanians from state institutions necessitated an alternative self-organisation to provide the basic functions of state and political order. Kosovo-Albanian leadership soon realised that independence would not be secured without an active resistance to protect the population and an active diplomatic campaign to secure international support for independence. The state formation movement in Kosovo consisted of multiple actors, para-political structures, and institutional mechanisms, which all aspired through different strategies to achieve Kosovo’s independence (Clark 2000). Besnik Pula (2004: 797) argues that the parallel state that emerged in Kosovo during the 1990s was a “largely unplanned-for phenomenon”, which consisted of “a loose conglomeration of educational and cultural institutions, health services, social assistance networks, political parties, local financial councils, and a government-in-exile”. This parallel state in Kosovo performed most of the functions of modern statehood, while formally being a state within another state and without formal international recognition (see Spears 2004: 16). During the 1990s, this Kosovar state had political institutions which were democratically elected, some of which functioned from exile while the rest existed across the territory of Kosovo. The parallel state provided key public services, such as education and healthcare; promoted social order through traditional dispute-resolution mechanisms; collected taxes to fund service provision; and had a diplomatic network based in Kosovo and in diaspora (Clark 2000). One of the key functions of the parallel structure was to ensure the implementation of peaceful resistance in Kosovo in the hope of securing international support in realising sovereign statehood.

Crafting statehood 59 The emergence of a state-within-state was not only a pragmatic solution to Serbia’s abolition of Kosovo’s statehood-like attributes, but also represented a collective response to delegitimate the Serbian state apparatus within Kosovo. Viva O. Bartkus (1999: 79) argues that understanding “how a distinct community perceives the state and its own position within it is critical to understanding how changes in those circumstances could provoke secession”. By refusing to cooperate with the Serbian regime, Kosovo-Albanians undermined the empirical sovereignty of the regime, thereby opening pathways for developing alternative political order. In turn, peaceful resistance increased the international legitimacy for statehood and generated external support for Kosovo’s cause. Throughout the 1990s, Kosovo-Albanians also boycotted Serbian-organised elections, fearing that “through a democratic vote the Albanians would have given domestic and international legitimacy to a new Serbian nationalist government that would be able to prevent them from achieving independence for Kosovo” (Koinova 2013a: 73). The mimicry of state-like attributes while avoiding confrontation with the regime significantly disrupted and undermined Serbia’s power in Kosovo. However, external support remained necessary to consolidate Kosovo’s independence: such support was pursued by the government-in-exile, assemblages of loosely networked diaspora groups, human rights groups, and liberal political figures. During the 1990s, the main activity of Kosovo-Albanian representatives at the international level has been the establishment of direct contacts with foreign diplomats, reporting about human rights abuses, putting pressure on Serbia to comply with human rights standards, seeking international condemnation of Serb political violence in Kosovo, and mobilizing the diaspora and the creation of support centres for Kosovo’s quest for statehood (see Kostovicova 2005). Though Veton Surroi maintains that “in fact, one of the tasks of the government in exile was to prepare for war” (Kelmendi 2015: 240). In October 1991, when the Kosovo elected its government-in-exile, the portfolio of foreign affairs was also created. This position was entrusted to Edita Tahiri who was initially stationed abroad, but immediately decided to return to Kosovo to run Kosovo’s diplomacy from Prishtina. Bujar Bukoshi, the prime minister in exile, also performed the function of foreign minister. During the 1990s, Kosovo’s foreign policy leaders were primarily selected for their ability to speak foreign languages, for educational studies completed abroad, for political courage and performative loyalty to the independence project, as well as other related factors, such as family history and patriotism (Gazeta Express 2015). Since the main task of the foreign minister was to raise international awareness regarding human rights abuses and the prosecution of civilians in Kosovo, the presence of a foreign minister on the ground gave strong legitimacy and credibility to the diplomatic outreach to foreign government, human rights groups, and international public opinion (Gazeta Express 2015). To delegitimise Kosovo-Albanians’ quest for statehood, the Serbian authorities portrayed the government-in-exile as an organised crime and “mafia” organisation, while characterising the civil resistance in Kosovo as “tribal solidarity” and the parallel institutions as “illegal” (see Weller 1999b: 39). The Serbian government

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condemned the parallel state of Kosovo-Albanians as offering “false promises, backwardness, uncertainty and poverty” (see Weller 1999b: 38). Belgrade’s official discourse described the peaceful demonstration of Kosovo-Albanians “in defence of terrorists and separatists and that the protesters acted precisely like that – they were destructive” (see Weller 1999b: 40). They condemned the Kosovo-Albanian focus on human rights abuses as “the internationalization of a non-existent problem”, admitting that the internationalisation of Kosovo issue would lead to international intervention and eventual support for independence (see Weller 1999b: 41). Serbia characterised the Kosovo-Albanian quest for statehood with labels including: terrorism; secessionist irredentism; separatism; and organised crime – derogatory language aimed at delegitimising Kosovo-Albanian claims internationally to justify its political violence and apartheid-alike policies in Kosovo (Clark 2006: 87). However, evidence collected by human rights bodies and international organisations suggested that police brutality amounted to state terrorism against the civilian population in Kosovo. Nevertheless, this did not stop Serbia blaming the international community for “equating terrorism with legitimate police action to suppress it, this deliberately sows confusion and covers up support for terrorism and separatism” (see Weller 1999b: 41). During the 1990s, Kosovo’s foreign policy focus was the internationalisation of the struggle for statehood. Track-two diplomacy was used also to reach out to foreign governments and build the case for international mediation of the conflict (Kelmendi 2015: 241). This is a common practice among statehood claimants who seek foreign support by harnessing diaspora representatives to lobby in foreign capitals for recognition. Such diplomatic moves enable emerging states and resistance groups “to disseminate tailored messages, shape their international image, and ultimately win credibility and support on the world stage” (Huang 2016: 101). Kosovo’s government-in-exile received different levels of diplomatic acceptance by the host states, ranging from tolerating their operation across Europe to gradually forming supportive political links. President Ibrahim Rugova and his representatives of Kosovo’s government-in-exile were initially received privately by foreign governments. Later, as the Kosovo issue was internationalised, more visible and formal interaction occurred with foreign governments. The recognition of Kosovo’s quest for statehood represented a significant delegitimation of Serbian rule over Kosovo and marked a crucial milestone towards state formation. Key to the internationalisation was the formation of strategic alliances with the United States of America and other European powers, which enabled Kosovo to expand its diplomatic contacts to then generate political support for Kosovo (Gazeta Express 2015). This was precisely because Kosovars knew that “independent statehood is unobtainable without explicit endorsement by the great powers and a great number of other states” (Huang 2016: 103). Internationalisation of Kosovo issue also entailed building an international understanding about Kosovo’s geographical, historical, and political position, as well as alerting the international community to Serbia’s oppression in Kosovo. The main goal of internationalisation though was to generate external acceptance of Kosovo’s quest for independence (Koinova 2013a: 112). Kosovo’s diplomacy

Crafting statehood 61 highlighted human rights abuses to generate external sympathy and persuade powerful states to back its case for self-determination and statehood. Kosovo’s diplomacy tapped into the Western normative agenda of democracy promotion, human rights, and liberalism. As Elton Skendaj (2014: 48) maintains, “the Albanian elites had learned that the international organizations and the United States reacted positively to their cause when they received information about the repression of human rights violations in Kosovo”. Subsequently, Kosovo-Albanians’ peaceful resistance secured the attention of UN General Assembly, which urged “Serbian authorities to refrain from the use of force, to stop immediately the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and to respect fully the rights of persons belonging to ethnic communities or minorities” (UN General Assembly 1992). Peaceful resistance at home played a positive role for Kosovo’s informal diplomacy and its policy of internationalisation which intended to resolve Kosovo crisis through diplomatic means. In other words, peaceful resistance provided Kosovo diplomacy with international legitimacy and credibility for seeking diplomatic solutions. In general, “regime violence against nonviolent movements is more likely to backfire against the regime” (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008: 9). Beyond internationalising the Kosovo problem, the diplomacy of Kosovo’s parallel state intended to enact state-alike behaviour and demonstrate the ability to perform a vital function of modern statehood, while indicating the capacity and willingness to engage in diplomatic talks and the peaceful resolution of conflict. Diplomacy was the crucial mechanism for the parallel state to maintain and regenerate legitimacy at home for the pacifist course of resistance and the pursuit of independent statehood through international engagement. Over the years, Kosovo’s diaspora communities have harboured and rejuvenated the thrust for state formation. Such cycles of exile and political migration aimed to circumvent the repressive policies of the Serbian regime, while also increasing leverage for internationalising the Kosovo problem. However, as Maria Koinova (2013b: 440) argues, “LDK’s strategy to internationalize the conflict needed to incorporate links to alternative non-state actors, including diaspora entrepreneurs”. The diaspora was organised around groups who collected funding to support the Kosovo-Albanian parallel state, especially for education, healthcare, and political organisation. They also supported human rights activists, who documented and disseminated human rights abuses against civilians in Kosovo: this in turn was used to generate political legitimacy for an independent statehood, and to encourage international intervention in Kosovo. As Yossi Shain (2007: 109) argues, “diasporic support of the homeland during conflicts can be critical to the homeland’s well-being and its very existence”. A significant number of political activists who were prosecuted by the Serbian regime went into exile where they continued their political activity of mobilising the diaspora and building political relations with foreign governments and non-state actors to strengthen international support for Kosovo’s independence. Before the international intervention in 1999, Kosovo’s government-in-exile ran information offices, which engaged mainly in public diplomacy. The Kosovo-Albanian diaspora across Europe and America identified political figures who became lobbyists and situational ambassadors for

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Kosovo’s quest for self-determination and statehood. In the United States, the Kosovo-Albanian diaspora influenced U.S. foreign policy by mobilising funding and votes for political representatives and major parties (Phillips 2012: 32). However, Kosovo’s diplomacy of internationalising the case for independence produced limited results, largely because the international community was preoccupied with resolving other violent conflicts in former Yugoslav space and were therefore unwilling to antagonise further the Slobodan Milošević regime (Holbrooke 1998). Between 1993 and 1997, international responses to the Kosovo crisis focussed mainly on praising the moderation of the parallel state in Kosovo, condemning human rights abuses and violence against civilians, and trying to encourage the resolution of the Kosovo issue through peaceful dialogue (Weller 1999b: 29). Kosovo’s Prime Minister in exile at that time, Bujar Bukoshi, argues that all the diplomatic and political methods, including appeals to internationalise Kosovo’s issue, failed to achieve independent statehood wanted or assert pressure of Belgrade, which subsequently opened the path to add a military component to the non-violent resistance (see Kelmendi 2015: 133). In his memoirs, Christopher Hill (2014: 112), a senior U.S. diplomat involved in the Kosovo crisis, claims that “compared to the brutal ongoing war in Bosnia, the issue of Kosovo could not be included in already complex talks”. However, Marc Weller (1999b: 79) considers that the delayed international response in Kosovo related to “the nature of the dispute as one involving a claim to self-determination and possible secession, there was a reluctance to address it”. Consequently, the political agency of peaceful resistance in Kosovo “weakened after the 1995 Dayton Accords did not include a political future for Kosovo” (Koinova 2013b: 439). Carole Rogel (2003: 175) argues that “the lesson the Kosovars gained from the Dayton Treaty was that pacifism led nowhere. The way was thus open to those elements who favored a more military approach”. Similarly, Louis Sell (2002: 274), a former U.S. diplomat, argues that “Dayton convinced most Albanians that the world would never honour the promises diplomats had made over the years to require Milošević to restore justice and human rights to the province”. Upholding its commitment to non-violent resistance, Rugova’s movement was criticised for pursuing a futile and rhetorical resistance that produced no results (see Russell 2009). Tim Judah (2000: 59) described Kosovars’ passive resistance as “an extraordinary experiment”, which ultimately “failed”. Adding to this, Krasniqi (2012: 101) argues, “non-violence started losing its appeal as a result of the lack of concrete international support for Kosovo, deterioration of the security situation and emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army”. Consequently, “the credibility of the international commitment suffered as well, because it was unable to establish a long-term presence on the ground in Kosovo” (Koinova 2013a: 96). What Kosovo-Albanians learnt during this period is that the more peaceful the resistance in Kosovo, the less interested the international community was to engage in resolving the conflict (Shala 2003). For most of the 1990s, Kosovo’s diplomacy aimed to secure international intervention, while domestically still maintaining the peaceful character of resistance. This was convenient for the U.S. and major European powers as it did not demand a resolute intervention.

Crafting statehood 63 However, the more the U.S. demanded the continuation of peaceful resistance, the more fragmented Kosovar political groups became, creating serious divisions and factions among the resistance factions with detrimental consequences for the post-conflict statebuilding process (Shala 2003: 33–35). When the U.S. became interested in resolving the Kosovo problem, they became more receptive to the armed resistance as a last resort option to justify their intervention in Kosovo. After the Dayton peace process, the U.S. provided signals to Kosovo diplomats that nonviolent resistance might no longer be the only pathway to securing international support for Kosovo, ambivalently signalling support for a different, more robust, and effective form of resistance (Gazeta Express 2015). This gradually changed the political mood in Kosovo in favour of more confrontational form of resistance to the Serbian police and military forces installed in Kosovo. As recalled by a U.S. diplomats, Rugova “was increasingly being dismissed in Washington as ineffectual, and more tellingly, as not in charge of the men with guns” (Hill 2014: 132). In adopting this confrontational form of resistance in pursuit of statehood, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged in 1996 as a guerrilla movement for the liberation of Kosovo through armed resistance. The Kosovo Liberation Army included: former political prisoners who led the ideological orientation of the armed resistance; the former Kosovo-Albanian police fired by the Milošević regime who had the requisite training and expertise; and former pacifist leaders and elders who were frustrated with the futile nonviolent resistance. Sell (2002: 278) considers that “disappointment with U.S. policy was also a crucial factor in the rise of the KLA”. In addition, civil unrest in neighbouring Albania enabled arms trafficking to Kosovo, which provided military means to expand the armed resistance in Kosovo. While the Dayton peace process weakened the diplomacy of peaceful resistance, civil unrest in Albania in 1997 reinforced a new dynamic of diplomatic engagement to explain the armed struggle. The crisis in Albania enabled the Kosovo Liberation Army to move “freely through the Albania-Serbia border and acquired many of its weapons in Albania” (Gjevori 2017: 10). However, this shift in strategy from peaceful to armed resistance in pursuit of independent statehood significantly affected the internal cohesion of Kosovo society: it divided the diaspora groups and changed the focus of international attention on Kosovo. In exchange for securing an official meeting with President Bill Clinton in 1998, Rugova agreed to meet with Milošević, a choice which illustrates the importance given to the external recognition of Kosovo at the expense of Rugova’s popularity in Kosovo, internal fragmentation among Kosovar politicians, and providing additional justification for armed resistance (see Judah 2000). The KLA’s insurgency tactics involved provoking Serbian security forces and retreating into the hills or mixing with the civilian population. This triggered a violent response from the Serbian military and police forces, often with detrimental consequences for the civilian population (Mulaj 2008; Pettifer 2012). The causalities and damages provided strong grounds for the Kosovar human rights activists, international media, and external commentators to exert pressure on the international community for intervening in Kosovo (Hill 2014). Domestically,

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civilian causalities strengthened the morale and popular legitimacy of the armed resistance and encouraged the diaspora to finance the supply of arms and to protest across Europe for international support. As part of the armed resistance, the KLA gradually expanded its domestic political scenery by putting pressure on the pacifist structures. At the height of the conflict, U.S. Ambassador to Serbia, Robert Gelbard, tried to discourage armed resistance by referring to the KLA as a terrorist organisation, which was misread by Belgrade as a green light for intensifying the violent campaign in Kosovo and thereby undermined the legitimacy of armed resistance in Kosovo (BBC 1998). The UN Security Council (1998: 2) also referred to the KLA’s armed resistance as “terrorism in pursuit of political goals by any group or individual”. In Kosovo, the KLA were widely perceived as freedom fighters whose role was to protect the civilian population and liberate Kosovo from the Serbian occupation. To mitigate the negative image of the KLA as terrorists and its wider repercussion for Kosovo’s struggle for statehood, the KLA utilised a visit of U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke to a village in southern Kosovo where they appear next to the U.S. envoy, thereby creating the impression of a friendly exchange and dialogue between the KLA and U.S. diplomats (Hill 2014: 132–133). As Weller (1999a: 215) illustrates, the international community “took a restrictive view of constitutional self-determination and did not accept a right to statehood for Kosovo”. However, this was changed by the rapid deterioration of the diplomatic and humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. It was not until 1998, when the U.S. sent special envoys to start talks for resolving the Kosovo conflict, that Serbia granted international verification missions access to Kosovo in an attempt to de-escalate tensions in the region. During 1998, U.S. diplomats proposed several peace plans, which essentially offered Kosovo broader autonomy, but dashed hopes for eventual independence. The UN Security Council also issued several resolutions which called for a peaceful resolution of Kosovo problem and an enhanced status for Kosovo. With this intensified diplomatic activity, the internationalisation of the Kosovo issue – one of the goals of Kosovar diplomacy during the 1990s – was effectively achieved, but with a high cost in terms of human causalities, physical destruction, and ultimately the collective expulsion of the civilian population. Accordingly, this led to a new situation “where a central government persistently and systematically represses a territorially organised, and perhaps also constitutionally recognised, segment of the population, a right of secession might be constituted” (Weller 2008: 59). The major diplomatic attempt to resolve the Kosovo problem was the Rambouillet conference of spring 1999, where for the first time Kosovar and Serbian authorities met under the mediation of United States, European powers, and Russia, aiming to negotiate a political settlement for Kosovo. Kosovo’s goal articulated in the early 1990s of achieving independence through international mediation was never closer than at the Rambouillet peace talks. The framework for peace talks were set by the Contact Group in January 1999. With increased international pressure, Kosovo was represented by a negotiating team including leaders from both peaceful and armed resistance. However, Hashim

Crafting statehood 65 Thaçi, political director of KLA, was appointed as the lead Kosovar negotiator, superseding Ibrahim Rugova who up until then was the leading political figure in Kosovo. This power shift among Kosovo’s political representatives marked the beginning of a more complex power struggle between pacifist and armed resistance factions that endures decades into the post-conflict period (see Schwandner-Sievers 2013). At this point, Kosovo’s diplomatic strategy was to encourage international intervention through a constructive policy of complying with the conditions and processes established by the international community. Kosovo-Albanians’ representatives participated fully in the international diplomacy of peace talks and agreed to all the externally-set non-negotiable principles of an eventual peace settlement. Through painful negotiations, at the end of Rambouillet talks, Kosovo’s delegation agreed to a three-year transitional political arrangement, securing for Kosovo broader autonomy and self-government within Serbia, undertaking to demilitarise the armed resistance under international supervision, and securing a commitment that the people of Kosovo would have the opportunity to express their collective will regarding their future political status through a free and fair referendum. This arrangement was not granting Kosovo full independence, but potentially creating the conditions for a future proclamation of statehood. Serbia rejected this peace proposal, and set about intensifying its military campaign against civilians in Kosovo, which resulted in NATO’s first major humanitarian intervention that targeted Serbia’s military infrastructure. NATO’s three months of military actions targeting Serbian military and policy premises in Kosovo and Serbia tended to exert pressure on Milosevic’s regime, who was forced in the end to accept capitulation and was forced to withdraw all the police and military forces from Kosovo territory. Sabina P. Ramet’s (1999: 320) study shows that between 24 March and 3 June [1999], NATO conducted 12,575 strike sorties against FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], destroying more than one third of the Yugoslav Air Force, 314 artillery pieces, 120 tanks, 203 APCs, 40 bridges, 29 percent of ammunition storage, and 57 percent of petroleum reserves. Aware of Serbia’s untrustworthy commitment to peace processes, NATO and the wider international community portrayed the intervention as preventing atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and other potential genocidal acts in Kosovo on the scale of Serbia’s previous actions in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Weller 1999a: 238). The conflict between claims for self-determination by secessionist entities and territorial integrity and unity of existing states has been one of the dominant causes of civil wars in the past two decades, as well as one of the major factors triggering international intervention. In the contemporary world of politics, becoming a sovereign state without undergoing a violent conflict is almost impossible. As stipulated by Allen Buchanan (1998: 14), “secessionist attempts, and the efforts of states to resist them, have usually led to severe economic dislocations

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and massive violations of human rights”. According to Bartkus (1999: 24), some of the major costs of secession include: “sacrifice, seizure, or dispossession of economic opportunities, political rights, autonomy, or cultural heritage, and can escalate into political repression and systematic violence”. The Kosovo violent conflict of 1998 and 1999 resulted in widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law against Kosovo-Albanian civilians, including mass killings, organised and systematic detention and rape of women, as well as enforced disappearances and large-scale ethnic cleansing (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000). The number of casualties in the Kosovo conflict is estimated at 13,535, of whom 10,812 (80%) were members of the ethnic Albanian majority, 2,197 (16%) were members of the ethnic Serb minority, and 526 (4%) were Roma, Bosniaks, and members of other minority communities in Kosovo (Humanitarian Law Center 2011). The overwhelming majority of casualties were killed by Serbian army, police, and paramilitary forces in a state-orchestrated ethnic cleansing campaign, which also aimed to crush the peaceful and armed resistance groups seeking self-determination and independent statehood (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000). Over 855,000 Kosovo-Albanians were forcefully expelled from Kosovo as part of ethnic cleaning campaign, most of which returned after the end of the conflict (Ramet 1999: 320). Moreover, 1,600 persons from all ethnic groups in Kosovo disappeared or were kidnapped remained still missing in 2017. Most of these criminal acts amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, which are prohibited in international criminal law, international humanitarian law, and the law of armed conflict. While most ethnic Albanian casualties were civilians, around 45% of ethnic Serb casualties were military and police personnel. Although Kosovo-Albanians experienced a bitter conflict, they managed to attract international intervention and remove Serbia’s factual sovereignty over Kosovo, thereby opening prospects for future state formation. The subsequent deployment of the UN interim administration of Kosovo, and NATO peacekeepers under the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), represented the implementation of some of the provisions of Rambouillet peace plan and marked a significant turning point in the path towards Kosovo’s full independence.

The everyday diplomacy of statebuilding under UN administration Despite international controversies concerning NATO’s military intervention, the decision of the UN Security Council to place Kosovo under UN administration represented a major victory for the Kosovo-Albanian political and military elite in Kosovo’s long path to independent statehood. In this context, NATO military intervention demonstrated that pro-independence movements “can benefit from the defense of international norms around human rights to advance their agenda of self-determination” (Seymour 2017: 828). As Bartkus (1999: 166) submits, “foreign powers have throughout history played decisive military, diplomatic, or economic patronage roles in the creation of new states through secession”. Between

Crafting statehood 67 1999 and 2008, The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) played a crucial and leading role in guiding the political, economic, and social transition. It was the key international actor that determined, in consultation with local political representatives, the nature of Kosovo’s political and institutional setting, the dynamics of economic development and reform, as well as setting the principles for minority protection and local governance (Rücker 2011). The UN in close coordination with the European Union and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe were vested with extensive authority to govern all political, economic, judicial, and social affairs in Kosovo (King and Mason 2006: 249). UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), which established UNMIK, was the founding document of the post-war order in Kosovo. Despite the resolution’s preambular commitment to the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the flow of events demonstrate that it wasn’t UNMIK’s intention to adhere to the principle of territorial integrity. In addition to rebuilding Kosovo’s state institutions and its economy, a major challenge for UNMIK was to prepare the grounds for defining Kosovo’s future political status. Resolution 1244 did not define the future territorial status of Kosovo but rather called for a political process leading towards a final settlement. However, following NATO’s intervention and the deployment of the UN civilian administration Kosovo faced many obstacles regarding independent statehood, a situation which triggered local resentment on the international community. This was expressed through a complex everyday diplomacy of subverting the statebuilding and peace building processes aimed at asserting independent statehood. Local political groups in Kosovo never expected such a large-scale international administration in Kosovo (Visoka and Bolton 2011). For Serbia, placing Kosovo under UN administration enabled Milošević to save face following his capitulation to NATO’s military intervention. It also represented Serbia’s best hopes to eventually reoccupy Kosovo after the UN mission largely because the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) intentionally left Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo unclear (Perritt 2010: 51). The UN’s prudent policy in Kosovo consisted of a complex incremental policy of building state institutions to stabilise and appease Kosovar society, while withholding powers on matters of foreign affairs which would give Kosovo the attributes of an independent state. From 1999–2003, UNMIK delayed transferring power to local institutions, and did little to promote local ownership of reconstruction processes (Visoka 2017). This was partly due to Kosovo’s unresolved political status and the fear that transferring power to Kosovo’s local institutions would be viewed by KosovoSerbs as a threat. In late 1999, a joint interim administrative structure was established with local representatives, as a first step towards establishing Kosovo’s self-governing institutions (Caplan 2005b). In 2001, UNMIK promulgated the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, which set out the division of responsibilities among these institutions and created a legal platform for the slow transition of power from the international administration to locally-elected political representatives. This Constitutional Framework included one provision, which represented a modest victory for Kosovo statehood. The

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new constitutional arrangement considered Kosovo as “an entity under interim international administration which, with its people, has unique historical, legal, cultural and linguistic attributes” with “an undivided territory” (Assembly of Kosovo 2002: 8). In an attempt to “balance” these fears, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General Michael Steiner outlined benchmarks in April 2002 that “should be achieved before launching a discussion on status” (UN Security Council 2002: 3). Following consultations with the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), UNMIK formulated these benchmarks as “Standards for Kosovo” in December 2003 and unveiled a more complex “Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan” in March 2004. These “standards before status” incorporated critical areas such as rule of law, functioning democratic institutions, the economy, freedom of movement, the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, and contributions to regional dialogue and stability (see Rücker 2011). After these developments, Kosovo-Albanian political leadership feared that UNMIK’s presence in Kosovo was obstructing its path to independence (Perritt 2010: 76). For this reason, the project of international peace building and statebuilding has been utilised differently by Kosovar actors, often deviating from the expressed goals of the international community for these processes. Under these circumstances, Kosovo’s institutions have tried to expand their authority while strengthening Kosovo’s domestic sovereignty by opposing UN administration. Meanwhile, the UN has tried to maintain its power in Kosovo through retaining control over local institutions. The Kosovo-Albanian elites adopted the tactic of promoting the politics of cooperation and partnership with international missions. Through this pragmatic approach, they expanded their institutional powers and gradually put the factual conditions in place for claiming statehood (see Covey, Dziedzic and Hawley 2005). On the other hand, Kosovo-Serbs initially pursued a policy of promoting autonomy for Kosovo, and when this policy did not work, they turned to the politics of boycott and non-participation as methods of political defiance. The Kosovo-Albanian elites viewed statehood as inherently linked to peace (Visoka 2017). After the conflict, their ongoing struggle focussed on interacting with the international missions and defying Serbian opposition to independence. The political philosophy of Kosovo-Albanians was rooted in the majoritarian right to self-determination. Like most historical cases of state formation, this conception of peace and state formation was fostered by narratives of nationalism, the demarcation of ethnic differences, the reinforcement of power hierarchies, and the reproduction of antagonistic histories. The everyday diplomacy of KosovoAlbanian elites aimed to create the legal, political, and institutional environment and preconditions for statehood.2 The Kosovo-Albanian political representatives within the PISG tended to shape the legislative agenda of the Kosovo Assembly with legal provisions and laws that would expand the competences of local institutions, incrementally making Kosovo more like an independent state. However, this was not a straightforward process: any law drafted by local experts, which had elements expanding Kosovo’s subjectivity and independence, was blocked and returned by UNMIK for revision with the justification that it affected the vital interests of minority communities in Kosovo (Visoka 2017).

Crafting statehood 69 Although UNMIK established local institutions, it retained executive competences that could over-rule any decision made by local democratically-elected institutions. By 2001, Kosovars could govern domestic and foreign trade, but UNMIK retained control of foreign policy and acted on Kosovo’s behalf in international relations. Due to Kosovo’s unresolved political status, UNMIK prevented local authorities from engaging in international relations and acting as a sovereign state (see Guehenno 2015). Kosovo’s fledgling institutions were given only a consultative role on external relations, whereas UNMIK enjoyed the legal authority to conclude and implement international agreements and to conduct external relations with states and international organisations on behalf of Kosovo. Historically, the governing of foreign affairs of post-conflict states by foreign entities was a typical attribute of states and territories under protectorates and trusteeship systems. In such cases, the protecting state often took over foreign relations, as Carsten Stahn (2008: 47) maintains, to prevent the protected entity from “communicating with other states without the permission of the protecting state”. However, this specific concentration of interest on foreign relations distinguishes protectorates from international territorial administrations, which are usually not established with the particular aim of exercising control over the international relations of the administered territory. (Stahn 2008: 47) In practice, UNMIK was not well equipped to conduct foreign affairs on behalf of Kosovo, as they possessed neither the capacity nor the legitimacy. Although UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) did not specify the international legal personality of Kosovo or UNMIK’s competence regarding foreign relations, the UN administration later concluded over 20 agreements with states and international organisations on Kosovo’s behalf, mainly cooperation agreements covering trade, development, and transport (Visoka 2017). This included several international and regional treaties on human rights, including the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe as well as free trade agreements with Croatia, Bosnia, Albania, and Macedonia. UNMIK also regulated the presence of foreign diplomatic offices in Kosovo (Visoka and Bolton 2011). Despite such limitations, Kosovo-Albanian elites interacted with the international missions in Kosovo and aimed to engage with aspects of the statebuilding process that facilitated opening talks on Kosovo’s future political status. As part of this process, the Kosovo-Albanian elite made it clear that any status other than independence would be unacceptable and could provoke renewed conflict.3 Some promoted the alternative narrative that, if Kosovo did not become independent, unification with Albania would be the only other option. However, when local actors realised that UNMIK and other states were not opening talks on Kosovo’s final status, they embarked on a policy of complex institutional resistance against international missions in Kosovo. The Kosovo-Albanian elite pursued this strategy of resistance by expanding the competences of local institutions, questioning the democratic deficit of international

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governance in Kosovo, and exerting continuous pressure to open final status negotiations (Visoka 2015). The more the international community delayed the resolution of Kosovo’s final status, the more Kosovo-Albanians intensified local processes of state formation and nation redefinition (Visoka 2012). As Kosovo’s newly established institutions had limited access to the international arena, Kosovo’s diplomacy during this period was a “homo-diplomacy” performed at home. UNMIK pursued diplomatic communications with Western powers on behalf of Kosovo’s authorities, while consulting with local actors on an ad hoc basis. Homo-diplomacy captures “the nontechnical, experimental, and experiential diplomacy of everyday life” and “the transformative potential of diplomacy” not to control others, but to know and govern the self (Constantinou 2006: 352). The international governance pushed the diplomatic efforts of Kosovo’s new institutions to focus on “home-diplomacy”, meaning the management of relations with the new international presence in Kosovo.4 Rather than traveling abroad, home-diplomacy engaged with the diplomatic representations and international organisations in Kosovo. It involved influencing their positions on Kosovo’s internal affairs (such as minority protection), consolidating Kosovo’s liberal statehood and expanding domestic sovereignty, and seeking to leverage the security and economic interests of foreign governments in Kosovo. Consequently, Kosovo’s political elite became acquainted with diplomatic activities not through interactions with foreign counterparts abroad, but at home with international missions, organisations, and embassies based in Kosovo. A wide range of daily diplomatic negotiations occurred between local politicians and the UN, which equipped the former with the skills that were later used to establish and consolidate Kosovo’s diplomatic presence abroad (see Copeland 2009). During the UN administration, Kosovo was a hive of diplomatic activity and daily interactions with foreign diplomats helped Kosovo’s elites and institutions build their diplomatic skills and capacities. The strategies of compliance, compromise, and cooperation with the international community remained the crucial components of home-diplomacy for generating local political capital and external support for Kosovo’s independence. In response to growing pressure from local leaders and as a means of avoiding parallelism in foreign affairs, UNMIK established the Office of International Cooperation and Regional Dialogue based at the Office of the Prime Minister as “a compromise between Kosovo’s ambitions for a ministerial portfolio in foreign affairs and UNMIK’s reserved powers and legal limitations” (KIPRED 2007: 35). As an institutional prototype of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this office oversaw the protocol arrangements for foreign delegations visiting Kosovo institutions, arranged foreign visits, prepared policy briefings for the Prime Minister, and coordinated the preparation of international and regional technical cooperation agreements (UNMIK 2004: 2–3). This arrangement was one of the first proper institutional mechanisms that enabled Kosovars to enact their external relations powers, learn how to interact through diplomatic channels, and develop their own ability to shape Kosovo’s foreign affairs.5 However, institutional conflict between Kosovo’s President and Prime Minister, who were required to belong to different

Crafting statehood 71 political parties under the UN’s power-sharing government, meant that the role of this office was significantly undermined. Accordingly, Kosovo’s nascent foreign policy competences were weakened at this time, not by any international hesitancy to grant Kosovo’s institutions such powers, but by local inter-party conflicts that dominated Kosovo’s post-conflict institutions. Over the years, Kosovo’s institutions gradually developed sufficiently to begin communicating directly with foreign governments and international organisations, and thereby began influencing the international agenda on Kosovo. Knowing that UNMIK’s agenda and its status-neutral policy was delaying Kosovo’s final status, Kosovo’s institutions conducted a parallel foreign policy with the international community by representing and communicating the legitimate interests of Kosovo citizens while explaining Kosovo’s desire for independence and statehood. After the March 2004 troubles, the diplomatic representation of U.S., UK, Germany, France, and Italy increased their direct involvement in Kosovo by mediating and supporting Kosovo’s institutions and UNMIK, and by securing international support for Kosovo.6 Kosovo’s institutions also established contacts and held regular and private meetings with these diplomatic representations, thereby managing to articulate local perspectives and interest directly to the key countries that were keen to support Kosovo’s state consolidation in exchange for maintaining social peace, protecting minorities, and improving the overall quality of governance in Kosovo, including the rule of law and justice system. The discourse of gratitude dominated meetings between Kosovar officials and foreign officials: they welcomed international support for intervention, post-conflict recovery, and statebuilding, and openly asked for support to resolve the final status and accept Kosovo’s desire for independent statehood. While Kosovo was under UN administration, the President and Prime Minister of the PISG were not permitted to address directly the UN Security Council. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) spoke on behalf of Kosovo. After a lengthy diplomatic struggle, in 2006 Kosovo’s Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi accompanied the delegation of the Special Representative, although he was not granted the right to address the UN Security Council. Kosovo’s attendance at the UN Security Council was approved so that Kosovo’s leaders could hear directly the calls for more reforms in Kosovo. However, Kosovo’s representatives presented it differently to the Kosovar public: they portrayed it as the first step towards Kosovo’s attending the UN to speak on its own behalf. In the absence of a designated ministry of foreign affairs, a preliminary committee on international cooperation performed the function of lobby groups. By way of enacting state practices, Kosovo’s Prime Minister appeared periodically at hearing sessions of Kosovo’s Parliamentary Committee on International Cooperation and Euro-Atlantic Integration. During one of the hearings held in 2007, Prime Minister Agim Çeku highlighted Kosovo’s international affirmation through official diplomatic visits, highlighting specific symbolic and performative segments, such as being received by state protocol (Assembly of Kosovo 2007). To create the sense of parliamentary accountability, this committee also invited representatives from the EU to clarify the future of international presence in Kosovo (Assembly

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of Kosovo 2006). These meetings were formalities, but served the performative function for Kosovo of acting as a sovereign state. While Kosovo’s politicians became increasingly frustrated by the UN’s delay in defining Kosovo’s political status, in March 2004 violent riots erupted across Kosovo (OSCE 2004: 4). The UN Secretary-General viewed these riots as the failure of UNMIK and subsequently commissioned a comprehensive re-evaluation of UN strategy in Kosovo. Norwegian Ambassador Kai Eide was tasked with identifying the flaws of the complex “standard before status” policy and ultimately recommended that the time was ripe to determine Kosovo’s future status (UN Security Council 2005: 7). In 2005, the UN Security Council appointed Marti Ahtisaari as Special Envoy to mediate between Serbia and Kosovo. The “future status” negotiations began in February 2006 and lasted for 14 months, comprising 17 rounds of direct talks between Kosovo and Serb delegations at the highest level, with 26 expert missions (UNOSEK 2007). The framework for negotiating Kosovo’s final status was set in August 2006 by the Contact Group,7 an informal group of states interested in Kosovo, which made it clear that “there will be no changes in the current territory of Kosovo, i.e. no partition of Kosovo and no union of Kosovo with any country or part of any country”,8 indicating support for a type of independence that would provide extensive rights and protection for minorities, ensure regional stability, and develop sustainable development in Kosovo. This collective position taken by the international community was a realistic response to the new circumstances on the ground while also responding to the continuous lobbying efforts of Kosovo-Albanians for independence. During the talks on Kosovo’s future status, both parties remained divided on Kosovo’s political status. Serbia’s desired outcome throughout the negotiations was extensive autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia (Ker-Lindsay 2009). On the other hand, Kosovo-Albanians demanded full independence from Serbia, with institutional safeguards for minorities, including extensive decentralisation for Serbs in Kosovo (Weller 2009). The international community was divided between those who supported Kosovo’s independence, those who were more neutral and open to a negotiated compromise, and those who opposed Kosovo’s independence due to their relationship with Serbia and/or the perceived repercussions that Kosovo could have on other secessionist and contested territories around the world. Countries who were sympathetic to Kosovo’s independence included the U.S., UK, France, Germany, Italy, and a large number of other European states. To overcome the intractable positions of both parties, the UN special envoy focussed the talks on accommodating the rights of minorities and providing institutional safeguards in Kosovo. However, at the end of negotiations, the UN Special Envoy concluded that: I had hoped, and very much preferred, that this process would lead to a negotiated agreement. But it has left me with no doubt that the parties’ respective positions on Kosovo’s status do not contain any common ground to achieve

Crafting statehood 73 such an agreement. No amount of additional negotiation will change that. It is my firm conclusion that the potential of negotiations is exhausted. (UNOSEK 2007) This led him to conclude that “independence is the only option for a politically stable and economically viable Kosovo” (UN Security Council 2007a: 4). The UN Special Envoy further maintained that “with continued political ambiguity, the peace and stability of Kosovo and the region remains at risk. Independence is the best safeguard against this risk. It is also the best chance for a sustainable longterm partnership between Kosovo and Serbia” (UN Security Council 2007a: 4). Serbia rejected UN Special Envoy’s proposal on the grounds that Kosovo’s independence breached Serbia’s sovereignty, was against international law, would set a negative precedent, and above all represented a one-sided solution imposed by the UN Special Envoy, who was supposed to be a mediator rather than an arbitrator. Serbia’s National Assembly passed a resolution, which condemned the UN Special Envoy’s proposal warning that: the imposed independence of the province will have unforeseeable negative consequences. Such an outcome will have far-reaching consequences on the stability of the region, impede the European perspective of the entire Western Balkans and present an extremely dangerous precedent for resolving minority issues and territorial disputes throughout Europe and the world. (Government of Serbia 2007) In an attempt to find a compromise solution, the Contact Group for Kosovo proposed additional talks undertaken by a Troika of diplomatic representatives from the U.S., EU, and Russia.9 After four additional months of unsuccessful talks between the Serbian and Kosovar authorities, the Troika concluded that “the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the final status of Kosovo. Neither party was willing to cede its position on the fundamental question of sovereignty over Kosovo” (UN Security Council 2007b: 2). The failure of Troika-led process confirmed the parties’ incompatible positions, thereby opening the path for Kosovo’s declaration of independence. In close cooperation with the U.S. and major European states, Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008. Kosovo’ perceived its right to declare independent statehood as a measure of last resort after all other options were effectively exhausted and the never-ending negotiations were not producing a viable outcome. In the Declaration of Independence, political representatives in the Assembly of Kosovo (2008) committed to pursue the path of a “democratic, secular and multi-ethnic republic, guided by the principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law”. They took the obligations contained in the UN Special Envoy’s proposal and welcomed the new international presence. Serb legislators boycotted this historical event. This framing of its case for statehood is in line with Allen Buchanan’s (1998: 25) influential stance which holds that “a group has the right to secede (in the absence of any

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negotiations or constitutional provisions that establish a right) only as a remedy of last resort to escape serious injustices”.

Supervised sovereignty and foreign policy of independent Kosovo Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence marked the beginning of a new phase that would include supervised independence during Kosovo’s long journey to secure international recognition and join international organisations. However, a significant problem arose when Kosovo’s sovereignty continued to be shared with the international community, even after proclaiming independent statehood. Kosovo was hoping to enjoy domestic sovereignty (the ability to regulate behaviour according to the rule of law and to enjoy independence from outside interference) and international legal sovereignty (the ability to enter into mutually beneficial contractual relations other states).10 One day after the Kosovo’s coordinated declaration of independence, the Government of Serbia (2008) adopted a decision to annul the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo. The decision considered that the independence of Kosovo violated the international law and Serb Constitution, and jeopardised Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The U.S. and European powers were reluctant to bring the UN Special Envoy’s proposal for supervised independence to the Security Council, fearing that the Russian Federation and China would veto the plan and jeopardise the coordinated declaration of independence. The UN’s failed mediation process left Kosovo in a “sovereignty limbo”, where it tried to consolidate statehood despite significant challenges. In the period after its declaration of independence, Kosovo had some of the constitutive elements of sovereign statehood, such as a constitution, functioning government, and permanent population. However, it lacked universal recognition, formal diplomatic relations with other states, a seat at the UN and other international bodies, limited access to international society, and limited control over certain parts of the territory populated by Kosovo-Serb communities (see MacShane 2011). Kosovo’s domestic sovereignty was hindered in particular by the presence of Serbia’s parallel structures in the north of the country, and the continuation of international missions who continued to exercise certain sovereign powers (Visoka 2016). Furthermore, Kosovo also lacked an institutional and policy infrastructure to govern its foreign policy which would later demonstrate its importance for completing international recognition and securing membership in major international and regional bodies. Under these conditions, the Government of Kosovo gradually started to exercise and expand its constitutional, sovereign authority to manage these external affairs independently, thereby consolidating its own institutions to govern foreign affairs. Supervised independence was granted on condition that Kosovo would accept the UN’s envoy plan for Kosovo and extend “shared sovereignty” with the international community. The core function of supervised independence, according to Weller (2008: 139), has been trading international recognition of statehood in

Crafting statehood 75 exchange for “a commitment by the newly independent entity to certain permanent or temporary limitations of its sovereignty or the exercise of its sovereignty”. However, after Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the international missions were divided among those who were “status-committed” and “status-neutral”. While the role of the international presence after Kosovo’s declaration of independence focussed on strengthening state institutions and making the country a viable state, this inevitably caused friction with the government, who wanted to perform sovereign statehood at home after decades of rule by foreign powers. While UNMIK, the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), the NATO peacekeepers, and the OSCE were status-neutral, only the International Civilian Office (ICO) actively supported Kosovo’s independence (Visoka and Bolton 2011). The ICO was mandated to strengthen Kosovo’s domestic sovereignty by supporting the implementation of decentralisation and the protection of minorities, and by improving governance and implicitly abolishing so-called Serbian parallel structures, to minimise Serbia’s interference in Kosovo’s domestic affairs (Visoka 2016). Kosovo’s nascent international legal sovereignty was constrained by the ongoing ambiguous situation, which discouraged the international recognition of Kosovo and prevented the country from joining and participating in international organisations. After independence, sceptics argued that Kosovo was not an independent and sovereign state due to the presence of multiple international missions (see Visoka and Bolton 2011). This was compounded by Serbia’s preference for an international presence in post-independence Kosovo as a political method of undermining Kosovo’s claim for authority and sovereignty vested in an effective independent government. The Government of Serbia (2009: 336) argued that Kosovo “does not fulfil the constituent requirements of a state, as there is no effective independent government in Kosovo”, claiming that this fact is demonstrated by the presence in Kosovo of UNMIK, EULEX, and NATO. Of all the international missions present in Kosovo after its declaration of independence, UNMIK was particularly problematic for Kosovo’s authorities. After independence, the UN Secretary-General reconfigured UNMIK to “ensure international peace and security . . . including the need to ensure that the rights of all communities in Kosovo are fully protected and preserved” (UN Security Council 2008b: 5). Considering UNMIK’s status-neutral role, the Serb authorities accepted this reconfigured function, but the Kosovo government rejected UNMIK’s readjustment, arguing that it was an infringement upon “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Kosovo” (UN Security Council 2008b: 9). Following the UN’s decision to take a neutral stance on independence, Kosovo’s institutions downgraded their official contacts, communication, and cooperation with UNMIK. The President and Prime Minister ceased meeting with UNMIK’s SRSG and other senior officers, while some informal communication remained at the technocratic ministerial and municipal levels.11 From Kosovo’s perspective, UNMIK’s neutrality towards Kosovo’s independence affected negatively the implementation of the UN’s status settlement proposal in the north of Kosovo; it empowered Serb parallel structures in Kosovo, obstructed Kosovo’s regional

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participation and external cooperation, and created hostile relations with local authorities and other international organisations present in Kosovo. Kosovo’s government argued that UNMIK’s presence in Kosovo could become a barrier that would complicate Kosovo’s path to European integration.12 They argued that the UN Security Council Resolution has been entirely implemented and Kosovo had achieved sufficient progress regarding political and inter-ethnic stability and normalcy, as well as institutional self-sufficiency (UN Security Council 2013: 10). Moreover, UNMIK’s presence and their regular reporting continues to keep Kosovo as an agenda item at the UN Security Council, which effectively retains a negative narrative focussed on reporting concerns, which the impression of political stagnation to necessitate international engagement. The presence of UNMIK in Kosovo provided an opportunity for Russia to delegitimise Kosovo’s independence, block international recognition, and undermine the investment of the international community in Kosovo over two decades. While Kosovo wasn’t powerful enough to end the UN’s protracted mission in Kosovo, it oriented its efforts towards ending the supervised independence. Paradoxically, the international presence in Kosovo was both a precondition for internationally recognised statehood but also an impediment to Kosovo’s exercise of domestic and international sovereignty. The presence of multiple international missions with both status-supportive and status-neutral arrangements undermined Kosovo’s domestic sovereignty and its ability to run internal and external affairs independently (Capussela 2015; Fanoulis and Musliu 2017). International support for Kosovo’s diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations recognition was directly related to the ability and willingness of Kosovo to undertaken domestic reforms. The necessity for completion of external aspects of statehood meant that Kosovo government was forced to seek legitimation not only from the citizens of Kosovo, but also from the wider international community, namely acceptance by states and organisations that have supported Kosovo in its struggle for liberation and independence. Hence, central to expanding domestic sovereignty was the end of supervised independence which was impeding Kosovo’s constitutional and political ability to represent itself as a sovereign state in international affairs and take on international obligations. Eventually, Kosovo’s supervised independence was completed in September 2012, after a number of laws were adopted providing further reassurance that Kosovo’s authorities would adhere to democratic governance and protect minorities (see ICO 2012). Even after the end of supervised independence, an international military presence continued to operate in Kosovo under NATO’s leadership, whose mandate included providing a safe and secure environment throughout the territory of Kosovo and training local security forces. On the occasion of the end of supervised independence, Kosovo’s Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi hailed the event as “a major beginning for the Republic of Kosovo”, considering it “the moment that marked our political maturity and increased our social responsibilities” (MFA of Kosovo 2013a: 1). Similarly, MFA of Kosovo (2013c) held that the end of supervised independence means that Kosovo’s government is the supreme authority in Kosovo that operates based on the constitution and its

Crafting statehood 77 laws, and it has the full capacity to engage and represent itself as a sovereign State in international affairs. From Kosovo’s perspective, also confirmed that the country is governed by a democratic regime and as such it promotes civil liberties, protects minority rights, supports an active and liberal civil society, and runs a market economy which provides for growth, social welfare, and development. In addition, MFA of Kosovo (2013c: 4) framed the end of supervised independence as Kosovo’s fulfilment of this international obligation and its full capacity to function as a completed state that has the supreme legal authority and popular and democratic legitimacy to government the country, and find a deserved place in the family of peace-loving nations. Demonstrating strong international support, U.S. President Barack Obama welcomed the end of supervised independence for Kosovo, hailing it as a historic milestone in which “Kosovo takes another important step towards its rightful place in a free, whole and peaceful Europe” (White House 2012). Parallel to consolidating domestic sovereignty, after independence Kosovo prioritised foreign policy consolidation (UN Security Council 2008a: 5). To facilitate this, Kosovo began establishing the legal and institutional infrastructure to govern and execute its foreign policy and external relations. As UNMIK did not allow Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self-Government to establish institutional mechanisms on foreign affairs, after independence Kosovo was caught unprepared in terms of institutional frameworks and diplomatic capacities for advancing the country’s quest for recognition and membership in international bodies. Initially, as Gëzim Krasniqi (2014: 206) argues, “Kosovo’s foreign policy was characterized by a lack of a platform, a lack of wider political consensus on foreign policy, a lack of international relevance and lack of real objectives”. Though, Deputy Prime Minister Hajredin Kuçi explained that “we know that Kosovo has exercised its foreign policy since 1990s, but now we are structuring it and making it in the statehood sense” (Assembly of Kosovo 2008: 11). Soon after, Kosovo adopted specific laws regulating: the activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo; diplomatic and consular service; international agreements and sanctions; and the status of foreign diplomatic missions in Kosovo.13 These laws mimicked the structure and functions of ministries of foreign affairs and diplomatic representations in the region. In normal circumstances, the function and roles of Ministries of Foreign Affairs involve making foreign policy and managing external relations. However, Kosovo’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was granted a much more significant role: to consolidate the state’s external sovereignty by obtaining diplomatic recognition, seeking membership in international organisations, and expanding bilateral relations with partner countries. The MFA’s organisational structure consists of two strands of departments covering policy and organisational aspects. Under the leadership of the General Director, the policy aspects are covered by the following: Department of Policy Planning; Europe and the EU; NATO and Security Policy; Bilateral Relations;

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Regional Relations; Economic Diplomacy; International Organisations, and Political Affairs. Under the leadership of the General Secretary, the organisational departments cover: matters of state protocol; legal issues and international treaties; consular affairs; and finance and general services. The above organisation reflects the standard European model including three components: office of the Minister; the permanent secretary, and the director general (see Berridge 2010). The annual budget for running Kosovo’s foreign policy activities varies between 15 and 20 million Euros, from which over 70% of the budget is spent on running embassies and consular services.14 Whereas other ministries and governmental institutions in Kosovo received extensive international technical assistance for capacity-building, the MFA has been mainly developed without much international assistance largely because foreign assistance was perceived as damaging Kosovo’s sovereignty and undermining the development of Kosovo’s independent foreign policy. An exception has been a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) training programme for Kosovo diplomats to manage a wide range of diplomatic affairs, ranging from organisational and crisis management aspects, to international negotiations, diplomatic writing and communication, and public relations. U.S. diplomats also assisted Kosovo in establishing functional diplomatic missions abroad and developing management capacity to run Kosovo’s foreign affairs effectively (USAID 2009: 5). The UK supported the MFA’s public diplomacy campaigns, Baltic countries shared their experience of foreign policy development, whereas Norway supported the provision of visa and consular services in Kosovo’s diplomatic missions abroad. Central to the consolidation of external sovereignty was establishment of diplomatic missions abroad. Between 2008 and 2017, Kosovo accredited around 40 Diplomatic and Consular Missions in countries with a wide geographic scope (see Appendix 2). This is hailed as fulfiling the fourth objective criteria of statehood, namely the capacity to enter into international relations, as set out by the Montevideo Convention. As stipulated by Kosovo’s President Jahjaga: After the declaration of independence, Kosovo had to prove itself as a state, strengthen its external legitimacy by building bridges of cooperation, strengthening relations with our friends and empowering our common values. Opening new diplomatic missions around the world has reflected and strengthened the systematic and continuous interest in the bilateral relations of the Republic of Kosovo. (President of Kosovo (2015) Kosovo’s diplomatic missions contributed to strengthening bilateral relations with the host state, concluded economic cooperation initiatives. provided consular services, and represented the interests of Kosovo nationals abroad (MFA of Kosovo 2013b). By 2017, Kosovo established diplomatic relations with over 80 states that have recognised Kosovo. To strengthen its international legal personality, Kosovo has signed over 100 international bilateral and multilateral agreements, including over 70 agreements from the process of treaty succession from former

Crafting statehood 79 Yugoslavia.15 Most of the international agreements relate to political, economic, justice and security, and social cooperation. These figures are perceived as strong testimony that Kosovo had acquired a solid international legal personality and that it is capable of entering in international relations and acting in accordance with international law, in the sense of benefiting from the rights and obligations that derive from contractual relations between states. Since its declaration of independence, Kosovo’s foreign policy objectives have remained largely consistent as outlined in Table 3.1. However, Kosovo’s government gradually clarified and articulated its foreign policy objectives (Assembly of Kosovo 2008). Since then, the core goal of Kosovo’s foreign policy remains completing international recognition, which is seen as a crucial step towards consolidating statehood and advancing the country’s foreign policy. A diplomatic memo of the MFA of Kosovo (2014) stated that: Recognition is a priority of Kosovo’s foreign policy as it determines the external dimension of Kosovo’s political existence. Recognition of Kosovo is important as it would strengthen our international position, it would bring stability internally and in the region of Balkans, it would bring economic investments, as well as help Kosovo integrate in the international organizations. In addition to diplomatic recognition, membership in major regional and international organisations is seen as an essential feature of independent statehood and a prerequisite for Kosovo’s active participation in international society. In particular, the EU and NATO are seen as vital target organisations, membership in which would ensure Kosovo’s prosperity and security. UN membership also remains a long-term aspiration for Kosovo. Furthermore, nurturing special relationships with the U.S. and major European powers is seen as crucial for Kosovo’s survival as an independent and widely recognised state. At the regional level, Kosovo’s foreign policy priorities include: deepening ties with Albania; promoting good neighbourly relations in the region; and normalising relations with Serbia. The final foreign policy priority involves protecting the interests and rights of Kosovo citizens living abroad and promoting country’s culture and identity. Although Kosovo’s legal framework for foreign policy decision-making is clearly defined, in practice the conduct of foreign affairs is decentralised and practiced across several institutions (see Weller 2009). Constitutionally, the Office of the President of Kosovo has a leading role in foreign affairs matters but to date this institution has played a symbolic role in representing the country during state visits and receiving foreign dignitaries. In the current institutional setting, the Ministry of European Affairs is Kosovo’s main interlocutor with the EU, and as such it plays a leading role in implementing the domestic political, legal and institutional reforms necessary for Kosovo’s EU accession. In coordination with the Office of Prime Minister, between 2011 and 2017, the Ministry for Dialogue (MfD) was responsible for leading the negotiation and implementation of agreements derived from the EU-facilitated technical and political dialogue for the normalisation of relations with Serbia. The Ministry for Kosovo Security Force

Table 3.1 Kosovo’s foreign policy priorities (2008–2017) 2008–2011 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

“Accelerate the process of international recognition of the independent and sovereign state of Kosovo; Deepen special relations with United States of America, EU states, neighbouring states and other countries; Build up the diplomatic and consular service of Kosovo; Work towards Kosovo’s full membership of the main political, economic and financial international organisations and institutions; Protect the interests of citizens of Kosovo abroad; and Promote the special identity of Kosovo” (Government of Kosovo 2008: 35). 2011–2014

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

“Continue the process of international recognition of Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state; Strengthen the special ties with the United States of America, EU countries, neighbouring countries and other states; Continue the build-up and functional development of the Republic of Kosovo’s Diplomatic and Consular Services; Obtain full membership of the main international political, economic and financial organizations and institutions, foremost in the United Nations; European integration and Euro-Atlantic structures, as a strategic priority of the country; Defend the interests of Kosovar citizens abroad; and Promote the identity and image of Kosovo abroad” (Government of Kosovo 2011: 20). 2015–2018

1. 2.

3. 4. 5.

“Lobby for international recognition by UN member states, in order to strengthen the international position of Kosovo and to establish diplomatic relations with most UN member states; Achieve full normalisation of interstate relations with Serbia and the continuation of the dialogue, which will aim to be finalized with mutual recognition that will allow the construction of sustainable peace between both countries and the establishment of good-neighbourly diplomatic relations; Implement the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU and submit the application for status of candidate country to join the EU; Continue the commitment to achieve membership of NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) and in other Euro-Atlantic mechanisms; and Continue efforts to become a full member of the UN, its specialized agencies and to increase Kosovo’s participation and representation in multilateral mechanisms” (Government of Kosovo 2015: 42–61). 2017–2021

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

“Strengthen Kosovo’s international standing by securing new diplomatic recognition, obtaining full membership of international and regional organisations and attracting foreign direct investments in the country; Strengthen and further deepen the special partnership with the United States of America and enhance bilateral relations with other countries that have recognised Kosovo; Deepen the strategic partnership with Albania to foster political, economic, and cultural cooperation; Promote regional cooperation, including the normalisation of relations with Serbia; Advance Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic integration process, including the application for EU candidate status, form Kosovo Armed Forces, and enhance interactions with NATO Contribute to regional and international security through global security alliances; and Enhance Kosovo’s foreign and consular service” (Government of Kosovo 2017: 10).

Crafting statehood 81 mainly focussed on strengthening interactions with NATO institutions and fostering defence and bilateral cooperation with individual NATO member states. In addition, a Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs was charged with promoting Kosovo’s foreign policy through parliamentary diplomacy and overseeing the institutional accountability of Kosovo’s foreign policy actors. This decentralised institutional framework governing Kosovo’s conduct of foreign affairs has in practice complicated the coordination and implementation of foreign policy.16 Despite establishing institutional structures, the sources of Kosovo’s diplomatic agency have been the individual diplomats who have driven the campaign for recognition through their ability to perform knowledgeable practices, and their situational manoeuvring, relational skills, and their ability to seize the right moment (see Bode 2015). At the forefront of the recognition campaign were the Foreign Ministers supported by a small diplomatic team and a wider network of international partners. Those diplomats played a crucial for guiding a multi-dimensional agenda for strengthening Kosovo’s statehood (see Pacolli 2010, 2014; Hoxhaj 2016) They invested in the cultivation of interpersonal relations and the politics of friendship with foreign leaders through persuasion and other performative gestures, which helped to overcome many structural, legal, and political obstacles on Kosovo’s path to strengthen its sovereignty. Yet, as much as practices of seeking diplomatic recognition were about strengthening Kosovo’s statehood, it also about domestic personal and political self-legitimation as rulers and statesmen (Assembly of Kosovo 2012; Pacolli 2014). Beyond the personal agency of Kosovo’s foreign policy leaders, ordinary diplomats have also been instrumental in securing diplomatic recognition for Kosovo. While their hard work has not generally been publically recognised, Kosovo’s low-key diplomats and advisers are the unsung heroes of Kosovo’s campaign for international legitimisation. Their agency has involved using their personal ability to: communicate persistently with highranking diplomats in countries where Kosovo requested establishing diplomatic relations; ensure open channels of communication; arrange visits for the minister; and support the formalities and practicalities of recognition processes. Therefore, their enabling role has been essential for making the recognition and membership campaign successful and productive. For most of the time, there has been a wide cross-party consensus on Kosovo’s foreign policy. The Former Speaker of Kosovo’s Parliament stated that “in the state formation plans and the demonstration of statehood capacities, there is and there should not be opposition” (Assembly of Kosovo 2009). However, one major exception to this cross-party consensus on Kosovo’s foreign policy priorities was Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (LVV) (Movement for Self-Determination), which considered the priority given to diplomatic recognition as creating another mode of international dependency. LVV argued that Kosovo needed to make concessions on its domestic sovereignty for every recognition that it secured. They argued that the presence of international missions rendered diplomatic recognition meaningless. Additionally, LVV argued that pleading other countries for recognition in the absence of clear bilateral or mutual interests deepened Kosovo’s dependency on other states, rather than reaffirming its sovereignty and authority (LVV 2008a: 2).

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Furthermore, LVV argued that the government’s obsession with the quantification of diplomatic recognitions served as a distraction from their responsibility to resolve Kosovo’s lack of domestic sovereignty and its persistent poverty (LVV 2008b: 2). Moreover, LVV argued against presenting Kosovo as a sui generis case. They claimed that Kosovo’s right to external self-determination is based on universal right to liberation, decolonisation, and self-determination. By treating Kosovo as a unique case, they argued that new forms of neo-trusteeships, and protectorates were imposed on Kosovo short of full sovereign statehood. While Kosovo’s foreign policy ought to strengthen country’s external sovereignty, it was also shaped by domestic determinants, such as government instability, externally-imposed priorities, socio-economic conditions, and change of diplomatic leadership. As stated by Kosovo’s Foreign Minister: “the process of internal statebuilding has determined the character and goals of Kosovo’s foreign policy, and vice versa, foreign policy has shaped developments within the country” (Hoxhaj 2016: 14). The stability of government is essential for productive foreign policy. The more stable Kosovo institutions became the more resources and attention was given to the campaign for diplomatic recognition. Immediately after independence, a stabile coalition between LDK and PDK was openly supported by the international community to ensure that the package of controversial legislation that came out of UN’s special envoy status settlement plan would be passed in parliament without institutional resistance. While Kosovo secured over 50 diplomatic recognitions in its first year of independence, between 2011 and 2014, on average 12 countries have recognised Kosovo’s independence and have established diplomatic relations. During this period, Kosovo also managed to join a significant number of regional organisations, which were enabled by the EU-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. Between 2014 and 2017, Kosovo held two rounds of early national elections, accompanied by four to six months of political vacuum due to disagreements on government formation, as well as three rounds of local elections. The entire government, and especially the foreign minister, were preoccupied with managing political crisis, and thus dropped off diplomatic recognition as a national priority. This resulted in fewer visits abroad to lobby for recognition, lack of political guidance and operational strategy for application in important international bodies, as well as less attention by Kosovo’s international partners.17 Consequently, after 2014 the number of recognitions dropped drastically, with only four recognitions in 2014, three in 2015, two in 2016, and two in 2017. These domestic crises and struggle for power harmed Kosovo’s international standing by losing the momentum for securing diplomatic recognition and membership in international bodies, antagonising international partners, which permitted Kosovo opponents to take advantage of this situation to undo and reverse Kosovo’s diplomatic achievements.

Conclusion This chapter explored the historical trajectory that Kosovo took in its quest for independent statehood, highlighting how difficult it is to become a sovereign state

Crafting statehood 83 in the current transitional international order. The analysis in this chapter demonstrated that state-becoming is a long-term, non-linear, and unpredicted process, which is shaped by multiple international and domestic factors. Kosovo’s campaign for independence was not entirely a planned endeavour. It was rather an open-ended and multi-directional pursuit undertaken by different actors through different methods, shifting between non-violent and violent methods for realising independent statehood. The three phases which shaped Kosovo’s path to independence illustrate clearly why the majority of the international community considers Kosovo a special case with no parallel or analogy from other situations elsewhere. During the first phase, Kosovo’s struggle for self-determination was initially undertaken through peaceful methods, which involved boycotting Serbia’s harsh regime through the creation of parallel state institutions and the establishment of a government in exile. Although the quest for Kosovo’s independence was inevitably an elite-driven process, its legitimacy was underscored by the overwhelming political will and commitment among Albanians in Kosovo for realising independent statehood: this served as the foundation for Kosovo’s independence. The rationale for seeking statehood was not embedded in the calculation of potential risks and uncertain futures. Rather, it was driven by values, hope, and the belief that independence is indispensable as the only path for Kosovo-Albanians to realise their historical aspiration for collective freedom and self-determination. The process of state-becoming involved creating a cohesive social and political structure that was enabled by peaceful resistance and state-alike parallel institutions. Yet, as the Serbian regime did not respect the majoritarian quest for independence in Kosovo, the pro-independence political leadership engaged in a complex campaign for internationalisation of the problem of Kosovo through a government-in-exile and broad network of diaspora community. The response of the international diplomacy, only after the crisis reached its tipping point, reflects the frequent failure of the international community to prioritise conflict prevention and the subsequent phase of crisis management. The first phase of Kosovo’s state-becoming was completed only after a bloody and violent conflict ended with international intervention which marked de facto political, economic, and military decoupling of Kosovo territory from Serbia main. During the second period of state-becoming, Kosovo had to undergo a period of international administration to develop the proper domestic features of statehood, which marked the end of Serbia’s legal and factual sovereignty over Kosovo. Although the UN and NATO never formally supported Kosovo’s independence, the peace building and state building processes they facilitated ultimately created the conditions that led to full independence in 2008. At least in retrospect, the period of UN administration played a significant role in resolving the “recognition dilemma” experienced in the aftermath of the Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence. The UN transitional administration of Kosovo provided an externally-designed pathway to full sovereign statehood by creating the political, economic, and social infrastructure whereby the entity consolidates its statehood capacities with functioning democratic institutions, a self-reliant market economy, the capacity to make and implement law, and contribute to

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regional stability. The UN-mediated talks on the final status represented the final attempt to resolve the dispute through peaceful negotiations and compromise. As Serbia opposed the demand for independence, Kosovo authorities, with the backing of U.S. and major European powers, declared independence on 17 February 2008. However, the declaration of independence was not sufficient for Kosovo to become a sovereign and independent state. During the third and final stage of state-becoming, Kosovo was obliged to endure another period of international supervision in exchange for diplomatic recognition while gradually expanding domestic authority in exchange for providing strong safeguards for minorities, and demonstrating capabilities of a functioning a normal state. Most importantly, this period was marked with the most complex task of obtaining international recognition and membership in international bodies under the conditions of partial external contestation and inhospitable global environment for new states. The earning of independent statehood has come with great prices and compromises, which in turn is constantly shaping the political character of the state of Kosovo. Kosovo’s external relations were entirely preoccupied with completing diplomatic recognition and expanding access to regional and international organisations. The three phases of crafting Kosovo’s statehood performed different functions, which ultimately added legitimacy to the entire campaign for independence, statebuilding, and international recognition. The first phase added moral legitimacy to the case for statehood, whereby independence became the remedial choice after the abolishment of Kosovo’s autonomy, political violence and systematic human rights abuses, and international involvement. Subsequently, the 1990s events formed the historical, normative, and political justificatory discourse for international recognition, and bonded Kosovo’s special relationship with the U.S. and the majority of European powers. The second phase of statebecoming added procedural and deliberative legitimacy to Kosovo’s struggle for independence by demonstrating that the territory prior to the declaration of independence satisfied core attributes of modern statehood and was ready to function as a sovereign and self-sufficient state. After almost a decade of international administration and de facto abrogation of Serbia’s sovereignty and authority over Kosovo, it was practically and politically impossible for Kosovo to return to the pre-war political status or another autonomous arrangement within Serbia. This marked the phase which for many was significant for Kosovo to earn its sovereignty. Finally, the third phase of state-becoming added functional and political legitimacy to the case of independence whereby Kosovo demonstrated that it was ready to act like a state, to take international obligations, to implement the UN’s proposal which led to supervised independence, and integrate into regional and international political and socio-economic organisations. The remainder of this book explores the external aspects of Kosovo’s state-becoming by examining its diplomatic discourses, performances, and entanglements as part of efforts for securing recognition and obtaining membership in international bodies as two core segments for full enactment of sovereign statehood in the contemporary world politics.

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Notes 1 Interview by author with former Prime Minister of Kosovo, Pristina, July 2012. 2 Interview by author with a Kosovo-Albanian member of the Assembly of Kosovo, Pristina, April 2016. 3 Interview by author with former Prime Minister of Kosovo, Pristina, July 2012. 4 Interview by author with a former member of Kosovo delegation in Vienna Talks, Pristina, April 2016. 5 Interview by author with a former Spokesperson in the Government of Kosovo, via Skype, February 2016. 6 Interview by author with former Prime Minister of Kosovo, Pristina, July 2012. 7 The Contact Group includes the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia. 8 ‘Guiding Principles of the Contact Group for a Settlement of the Status of Kosovo’, 7 October 2005. Available at: www.esiweb.org/pdf/kosovo_Contact%20Group%20-% 20Ten%20Guiding%20principles%20for%20Ahtisaari.pdf (accessed 20 December 2017). 9 ‘Secretary-General’s Statement on the New Period of Engagement on Kosovo’, 1 August 2007. Available at: www.unosek.org/docref/2007-08-01_-_Secretary-General%20 Statement_on_the_new-period-of-engagement.pdf. 10 Interview by author with a former Foreign Affairs Minister of Kosovo, via phone, July 2015. 11 Interview by author with a Senior Political Officer in the Government of Kosovo, Pristina, July 2013. 12 Interview by author with a former Political Adviser at the Office of Prime Minister of Kosovo, Pristina, May 2016. 13 ‘List of the Laws Governing the Activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo’. Available at: www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,9 (accessed 16 December 2017). 14 Interview by author with a Senior Official at the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, March 2017. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Interview by author with a former Political Adviser at the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, April 2016.

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Introduction “Today, Kosovo is opening a new page in history, and is changing the political map of Europe” “Leaving behind bitter memories of hatred and tragic strife we went through, we are now entering the age of independence, peace and prosperity of our country” “We make Kosovo independent, aiming that all citizens enjoy the freedom and other benefits of our country” “With today’s act, Kosovo also assumes responsibilities as a state” “Today, the whole world is with us, and we are becoming an equal part of the democratic world. We are becoming an equal part of a world we deserve.” “And from this point on, the political position of Kosovo has changed. Kosovo is a republic, an independent, democratic and sovereign state”. (Assembly of Kosovo 2008b)

The above lines were pronounced by Kosovo leaders upon declaring Kosovo’s independence on 17 February 2008. They capture Kosovo’s declarative passage to independent statehood and express the power of words when breaking from the past and constructing the future. The state as an entity does not exist before its declaration (Derrida 2002: 49). A declaration of independence, as a textually expressed and bodily performed act, represents a sublime articulation of the collective will for self-determination and transformative rupture of a sequence of social, political, and legal events. James Crawford (2009: 48) explains that declaration of independence “historically, they were the main method by which new States came into existence”. He further stipulates that international law, including UN’s “Charter says nothing as to the lawfulness or otherwise of declarations of independence adopted by groups or peoples within a State” (Crawford 2009: 49). Yet, Jure Vidmar (2013: 61) points out that although “declarations of independence fall entirely outside the purview of international legal regulation . . . what is important is what happens afterwards – whether or not such a declaration is accepted by the international community”. The chapter explores diplomacy as a discursive practice of knowing, envisaging, and talking about Kosovo’s statehood. It examines the

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language of stateness that Kosovo and its international partners have invoked while consolidating and enacting its sovereign statehood, illustrating how language and discursive modes of representation both enabled and constrained Kosovo’s diplomatic campaign. Diplomatic discourse – as a situational use of written and spoken language to convey certain intentions and utterances – is articulated through multiple diplomatic texts, which are used by diplomatic representatives to express government positions on political, legal, and technical matters (see Campbell 1992; Neumann 2002; 2005; 2013; Epstein 2008). Lene Hansen (2006: 53) maintains that exploring official foreign policy discourse helps to unpack “the discourse through which state action is legitimized, and thus under any circumstances crucial for understanding political and social relations within and beyond state boundaries”. Therefore, exploring the role of Kosovo’s diplomatic discourse for pursuing independent statehood is important as it helps to demonstrate its power to constitute certain situations, produce and reproduce knowledge, and most importantly, to shape interests, identities, relationships, and norms. When a state does not have political, economic, and military power, it turns to language to perform discursive sovereign power, which takes on an agential character because it produces consequences, thereby shaping the material and social world. This chapter argues that discourse plays a central role in the enactment of statehood. As much as sovereign statehood is a matter of fact, it is also a textual practice and a by-product of the meaning attached to it via a multiplicity of discursive practices. Textual and contextual articulations can contribute to the prescription of sovereignty and can facilitate the birth of a new state. As Kosovo’s sovereignty was not accepted lightly by the international community, the fledgling state and its partners were obliged to develop elaborative arguments not only to defend independence but also to facilitate the process of recognition and membership in international bodies. The ultimate purpose of Kosovo’s discourse of independent statehood was to make the recognition and integration of Kosovo acceptable for the wider international community. The making of Kosovo’s diplomatic discourse was a process of converting specific events into discourses, which provided significant grounds for strengthening Kosovo’s statehood and were simultaneously used to frame the diplomatic narrative to advocate for diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations. Kosovo’s campaign for consolidating statehood first and foremost was guided by a framework of discourses, which served to orient the everyday performances of Kosovo’s new diplomatic corps, and ensure that decisions and actions feed in to the long-term goals and values, as well as avoid mistakes and reduce uncertainties. Kosovo assembled multiple discourses which historicised and actualised arguments why Kosovo deserves independence and admission in the club of sovereign states through recognition and membership in international organisations. Putting emphasis on the everyday process of writing and wording sovereign statehood which formed the basis of Kosovo’s diplomatic discourse reveal that the narrative of why Kosovo deserved independent statehood and subsequent international recognition were in a constant flux of making and becoming actual are intertextually influenced by other diplomatic narratives and inter-subjectively shaped

Writing sovereignty 93 by diplomatic practices. This multiplicity of discourses amount to what Michel Foucault (1980: 94) calls a dispositive, which is “a thoroughly heterogeneous set consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions”. Kosovo’s discursive framework for defending independent statehood was organised along three distinct scalar orders. First-order discourse presented the case for remedial recognition grounded on historical and normative grounds, such as: the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia; a case for selfdetermination as a “remedy of last resort” after the violent removal of Kosovo’s autonomy by the Milošević regime; the endurance of a decade of state-sponsored violence and human rights abuses against the Albanian majority population in Kosovo; the failure of preventive diplomacy; the humanitarian intervention that paved the way for a UN transitional administration of Kosovo; and Serbia’s failure to accept the outcome of UN sponsored negotiations for defining Kosovo’s final status (MFA of Kosovo 2011). The invocation of a particular language, concepts, and legal references mimicking existing states has a significant role to play in supporting international recognition and the legitimation of independent statehood. Second-order discourse invoked arguments highlighting the satisfaction of core criteria and requirements of statehood, as outlined within the Montevideo Convention of 1933 and inscribed in general international law. Kosovo emphasised that it has a permanent population, a defined territory, effective government, and the competence and powers to enter into external relations. Third-order discourse involved the discursification of specific domestic and global events, which provided significant grounds for strengthening Kosovo’s statehood. including: the ICJ’s ruling on the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2010; the end of supervised independence for Kosovo in 2012; the first EU-facilitated agreement for normalisation of relations with Serbia in 2013; the advancement of EU integration in 2015 with the conclusion of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA); and membership in regional and international organisations. Increasingly, the practice of state recognition is blurring classical arguments about the criteria and threshold for statehood, to give greater consideration to human rights records, commitments to regional peace and security, and internal capacity for resiliency, normalcy, and self-sufficiency. Although Kosovo’s trajectory to independent statehood emphasised that it is a unique and unprecedented case, the campaign for recognition required reverting this argumentative technique and making the case using globally-acceptable narratives. With the increase of global insecurity and hybrid threats, Kosovo made the case for recognition and UN admission to enforce international law and contribute to international security, thereby moving from being a receiver to a provider of external security. The process of participation and application for membership in international organisations was also embedded on a complex multiplicity of discourses. Due to political and legal blockages, Kosovo was forced to adapt functionalist arguments why it aspires to participate and become a member of international bodies. While the true intention for seeking membership in international bodies was strengthening the sovereign statehood, Kosovo’s diplomacy had to convert this

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aspiration into technical arguments highlighting socio-economic reasons behind such endeavours. This chapter does not claim that nothing exists beyond discourse: it demonstrates the powerful role of text, inter-text, and intertextuality more broadly in writing sovereignty. The chapter also argues that, as much as the support from the U.S. and leading European powers helped Kosovo to become an independent state, its own diplomatic agency communicated via an assemblage of discourses played a far more important role than often acknowledged. The quality of arguments played its part in strengthening Kosovo’s international subjectivity. In particular, the ability to write convincing arguments and diplomatic texts was essential for strengthening Kosovo’s collective agency for performing successful diplomacy. Effectively communicating Kosovo’s diplomatic narrative not only facilitated its transition towards recognised independence, but also opened pathways for establishing bilateral relations with countries that Kosovo would not otherwise have encountered, thereby contributing to changing international attitudes towards Kosovo’s independence. To demonstrate the textual nature of sovereignty, this chapter first examines Kosovo’s diplomatic discourse and written and public arguments put forward by over many states when expressing and justifying the formal recognition of Kosovo’s independence. The chapter then explores functionalist arguments invoked by Kosovo for joining international bodies.

Diplomatic discourse for international recognition When Kosovo declared independence, it was caught unprepared as it had neither a foreign policy apparatus in place nor a strategy how to achieve international recognition. Over time it started to gradually develop both a discursive and institutional repertoire to guide its campaign for international legitimation. Understanding state recognition through a contextualised and discursive approach requires exploring what types of claims Kosovo’s diplomacy made to appeal to the world community for acceptance as well as what discursive justifications are invoked by other states that have granted diplomatic recognition to the fledging state (Coppieters 2003). In a nutshell, Kosovo’s discursive repertoire consisted of legal, political, historical, and contextual arguments that foregrounded Kosovo’s campaign for diplomatic recognition and membership in international bodies. From the outset, Kosovo realised that wording of its request for recognition needed to build a compelling case to overcome the inhospitable international normative order regarding the recognition of new states.1 It was a dual challenge of framing the quest for recognition using existing universal norms and addressing the contextual peculiarities that shaped Kosovo’s diplomatic narrative, which consisted of fluid arguments outlining why states should recognise Kosovo while highlighting several historical, legal, political, and contextual aspects. Beyond this, Kosovo’s quest for recognition has emphasised its commitment to building a democratic, peaceful, and multi-ethnic state. Finally, requests for recognition were couched in more conventional diplomatic language, seeking recognition as a pathway to establishing cordial diplomatic relations with other states. These

Writing sovereignty 95 discourses gradually started to take the shape of diplomatic stories, which for Ingvild Bode (2015: 34) are “narrative representations of events in a chronological fashion that impose a certain account and interpretation of events, shape possible responses and limit other potential representations”. As summarised in one of the position papers produced by Kosovo’s MFA, the case for recognition was justified along the following lines: the independence of Kosovo has not set any precedent; its case has always been a special one; it has greatly contributed to regional peace and stability and, therefore, served the best interests of the whole Western Balkans region and European continent; its independence is legal under international law; its international legal personality confirmed by admission to various international organizations and recognition by a significant number of independent and sovereign States; and that, in order for the new State to further develop internally and consolidate internationally, including by securing its rightful place in the United Nations and other international organizations, new recognitions are crucial. (MFA of Kosovo 2013d: 4) Kosovo’s discourse of diplomatic recognition was expressed through a wide range of diplomatic documents encompassing the request for recognition, miscellaneous correspondence and in-depth diplomatic dossiers. These documents contained the request for deepening bilateral cooperation and establishing diplomatic relations, a summary of Kosovo’s recent diplomatic achievements, and an appendix with adjustable facts and arguments about Kosovo’s independence. Writing of Kosovo’s diplomatic text was undertaken by a small group of political advisors and diplomats who constantly adjusted the diplomatic narrative in line with changing circumstances to adapt to the diplomatic counterparts, and to maximise and leverage the impact of performative diplomacy.2 The letter requesting recognition was periodically renewed, revised and re-sent to different states. While it was insufficient to rely on such letters to secure diplomatic recognitions, these diplomatic notes served the purpose of establishing the initial contact and reminding states about Kosovo’s independence, thus opening the path for more direct efforts to arrange official meetings and discuss the establishment of diplomatic relations. Accompanying the requests for recognition and establishing diplomatic relations, a position paper on recognition played an important role in communicating in writing Kosovo’s case for sovereignty. The position paper was drafted by the MFA of Kosovo in consultation with experts and served as the guiding framework for the recognition campaign (see MFA of Kosovo 2013c). This position paper was used by all of Kosovo’s diplomatic representations in their lobbying for recognition efforts, and the key arguments were emphasised in official meetings and public appearances.3 Kosovo’s key international partners also developed special position papers outlining therein the arguments why Kosovo deserves international recognition, which have been included in demarches issued to their diplomatic networks to encourage countries around the world to recognise Kosovo.

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Kosovo’s diplomatic discourse did not portray the case of recognition on the grounds of being a case of secession, but a specific case emerging from the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia. Kosovo argued that its right to statehood derived from the fact Kosovo was granted, under the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia, autonomous rights almost equivalent to other federal units in the former Yugoslavia, which ceased to exist following the violent and non-consensual dissolution of its constitutive units (republics).4 Kosovo’s constitutional status granted it equal representational rights within federal structures, de facto possession of powers like other republics and institutions, as well as clearly defined boundaries and the sovereign right to determine its internal affairs. When speaking for the first time after independence at a UN Security Council debate, Kosovo’s President Fatmir Sejdiu noted that “the Republic of Kosovo is the seventh State to emerge out of the non-consensual collapse of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia” (UN Security Council 2008: 8). Non-consensual declarations of independence by the other former Yugoslav republics gave Kosovo grounds to justify taking a similar procedural pathway to independent statehood. Kosovo argued that the government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) also opposed the declarations of independence made by Slovenia and Croatia, considering both countries moves as anti-constitutional and unilateral acts (MFA of Kosovo 2009a). This discourse intended to displace Kosovo classification as a case of non-consensual secession to a case of self-determination taking effect after the host state ceased to exist. The argument that “Kosovo’s independence was the last chapter of the final dissolution of Yugoslavia” (MFA of Kosovo 2016b: 6), aimed at ensuring that first and foremost Kosovo’s independence would not be labelled as breach of international law and practice on state formation, thereby undermining Serbia’s claims against Kosovo’s independence and encouraging support from the European powers (who collectively recognised other states emerging from the ashes of Yugoslavia). The diplomatic discourse also aimed to distance Kosovo from comparisons with other unrecognised emerging states by arguing that Kosovo is sui generis – a unique and incomparable case that does not set any precedent in international relations (see Hoxhaj 2016). Kosovo was challenged by Serbia’s active diplomatic campaign, which was backed by Russia and framed around universalistic claims that would appeal to many states, such as state sovereignty, territorial integrity, dangerous precedents, regional instability, and breaches of international law (see Ker-Lindsay 2012). Therefore, Kosovo’s institutions and its international partners faced the challenge of convincing other states that its independence does not set any dangerous precedent in other regions, but instead rather contributes to regional stability.5 Snežana Trifunovska (2011: 379) maintains that “a majority of the Western countries hold that Kosovo is not a precedent, but a unique case because of the historical circumstances creating conditions that have finally led to its independence”. Underlining the specificity of the situation, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence stated that “Kosovo is a special case arising from Yugoslavia’s non-consensual break-up and is not a precedent for any other situation” (Assembly of Kosovo 2008a: 3). The argument follows that “the emergence into statehood of the Republic of Kosovo occurred under circumstances that are most unlikely to be replicated elsewhere” (MFA of Kosovo 2009a: 189).

Writing sovereignty 97 The sui generis discourse has been prevalent among almost in all the justification of Western democracies for recognising Kosovo’s independence. The UN’s Special Envoy, Martti Ahitsaari, also emphasised that “Kosovo is a unique case that demands a unique solution” (UN Security Council 2007: 4). Even the EU, who failed to agree on a common position on recognition, agreed that “Kosovo constitutes a sui generis case” (Council of the European Union 2008: 7). In several instances, the UK has assertively stated that “Kosovo is a unique case. Its independence is contingent on its particular facts. It does not provide a template for secession elsewhere” (UN Security Council 2010: 16). The UK also argued that “there is no parallel or analogy from this situation to other circumstances in other places in which some group or other may wish to assert independence” (UK FCO 2009: 9). Most importantly, in a specially designed nonpaper, the UK instructed its diplomats to defend the position that: Kosovo’s independence creates no wider precedent for any other situation and cannot be relived on as a template for secessionist or self determination claims elsewhere. Kosovo is a unique case and its independence is contingent on these facts: the history of human rights abuses by Milošević’s regime, the lengthy UN administration; and the legal and constitutional framework established under UNSC Resolution 1244 which aimed at reaching, but not requiring, a mutually agreeable resolution of Kosovo’s final status including the possibility of independence. (UK FCO 2013: 2) Similarly, when Canada recognised Kosovo they asserted that “Kosovo is a unique case, as illustrated by its recent history characterized by war and ethnic cleansing, the role subsequently played by the United Nations and NATO in administering the territory” (DFAIT of Canada 2008). Other countries argued that federal states are not at any risk of facing possible secessions as a result of recognising Kosovo as Kosovo is a unique case highlighting the fact that many federal states including Austria, Belgium, Canada, the U.S., Germany, etc. have recognised Kosovo. The Maldives also highlighted that they recognise Kosovo’s independence “as representing a sui generis case which does not create a precedent” adding further that they believe that “the declaration of independence by Kosovo reflected a remedy of last resort that embodied the best prospects for peace and stability in the region” (MFA of Maldives 2009: 1). In constructing the sui generis discourse, history played an important role, especially the events in the aftermath of the violent break-up of Yugoslavia. Past suffering and systematic human rights abuses against Kosovo’s civilian Albanian population served as a strong argument, which facilitated the discursive grounds of the campaign for recognition while serving as a significant “pull factor” to attract international solidarity. According to Gary Wilson (2009: 472), arguably the strongest argument for a right of secession arises in situations where the members of the group seeking to secede are subjected to severe human rights violations or oppression of the worst kind at the hands of state authorities.

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He further maintains that “the logic underlying toleration of secession lies essentially in the failure of governmental authorities to provide representatives of all the state’s population and to treat all groups without discrimination” (Wilson 2009: 472). This narrative was behind Kosovo’s campaign for recognition, which held that the declaration of independence was issued as a remedy of last resort following the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, Serbia’s aggression, ethnic cleansing, and attempted genocide. In support of this, Kosovo and its international allies have provided compelling arguments of the systematic human rights abuses during the 1990s, which formed the bedrock of Kosovo’s remedial case for self-determination.6 The remedial secession doctrine is based on the moral argument that living freely and with dignity under the Serbian regime was politically, morally, and legally impossible (see Buchanan 2003). Kosovo’s written submission to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) proceedings reaffirmed that the people of Kosovo constitute a self-determination unit and were entitled to declare independence through their democratically elected representatives given the massive human rights’ violations perpetrated and the systematic denial of the right of self-determination by the FRY/ Serbia. (MFA of Kosovo 2009a: 76) In this regard, the UN resolutions and reports by UN bodies served as undisputable documentary sources, which convincingly increased international sympathy and support in favour of independence. Here it is argued that “the crimes against humanity and human right abuses suffered by the people of Kosovo in 1998/1999 reinforced their demands for independence, and their unwillingness to return to Serbia” (MFA of Kosovo 2009a: 127). Although in the case of Kosovo, the international community has widely used the conditions which give rise to remedial right to self-determination, they “have resisted the recognition of such a right, and have thus prevented its crystallisation into a rule of customary international law” (Jaber 2011: 927). Though, there have been cases when such arguments are used by states and legal experts. James Crawford (2009: 52–53) makes a compelling case for remedial self-determination arguing that when Serbia actually controlled Kosovo, it eliminated its constitutional status, it went close to expelling its population: after lawfully losing control, in the aftermath of resolution 1244, it now seeks to elevate Kosovo into a subject of international law – but only in order to regain the sovereignty it so signally abused. The remedial secession argument was invoked by Costa Rica in its letter of recognition, which highlighted that “after the crimes against humanity (ethnic cleansing) perpetrated by the regime of Slobodan Milošević, the decision of the authorities and of people of Kosovo not to remain part of the Republic of Serbia is explicable” (cited in Bolton and Visoka 2010: 19). Similarly, Samoa argued

Writing sovereignty 99 that “it is our hope that as Kosovo’s independence gains wider acceptance that it would help bring closure to the 1990s conflicts that plagued the Western Balkans and achieve lasting stability in the region” (Prime Minister of Samoa 2008). In other instances, Kosovo invoked the case for statehood on the grounds of the collective right to self-determination. Self-determination of peoples “implies a unilateral right to initiate a change in the status of a territory through an act of will of the population of that entire territory” (Weller 2008: 26). Invoking the discourse of self-determination intended to relate Kosovo’s case to global norms but also to generate international sympathy and support. Yet, internationally there is a tendency to restrict the application of self-determination claims, arguing that “self-determination breeds failed states, terror, and violent conflicts, which are harder to contain in a globalized world, self-determination itself must be contained in the intrastate sphere” (Abulof 2016: 553). However, Kosovo completely and intentionally ignored conservative claims among international lawyers and scholars that the right to self-determination does not apply outside the context of decolonisation (see Fazal and Griffiths 2014: 95). Although the arguments of selfdetermination hasn’t appeared much in the justifications provided by states recognising Kosovo’s independence, there are few exceptions. The kin-state of Albania justified its recognition of Kosovo’s independence “based on the right of peoples for self-determination, driven from the principle for good neighbourly relations”, and considering that the independence of Kosovo “ends the dissolution process of former Yugoslavia” (Prime Minister of Albania 2008). Afghanistan also welcomed and expressed support for the “self-determination of the people of Kosovo to proclaim their independence” (MFA of Afghanistan 2008). Liberia’s recognition justification is worth quoting in its entirety, which held that: Following a long struggle for self determination in pursuit of liberty, freedom, and justice, the Assembly of Kosovo voted to declare independence on February 17, 2008. In this regard, an appeal was made to all countries of the world to accord Kosovo recognition. The Republic of Liberia, herself, a product of the desire for self determination, justice, freedom, liberty and peace, do welcome the elements and contents of the Declaration of Independence, and in this regard has resolved to recognize the independence of the Republic of Kosovo. (MFA of Liberia 2008) Furthermore, Kosovo argued that its path to independence followed a process implemented through multilateral involvement in negotiating Kosovo’s political status. This added processual and procedural legitimacy to Kosovo’s willingness to resolve the status question via peaceful, multilateral, and diplomatic means.7 The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) mandated the UN to support Kosovo in developing state-like institutions as a prerequisite for opening talks for defining the territory’s future political status. Kosovo’s achievement of factual independence under UN administration and the empirical sovereignty gained through building its democratic state institutions were given prominence

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in Kosovo’s discursive framework of statehood. Kosovo’s diplomacy argued that the “declaration of independence was not only an expression of the general political will of the people of Kosovo but also the result of an U.N.-led international process for determining Kosovo’s status” (MFA of Kosovo 2015a: 1). In pursuit of this goal, the UN Secretary General established in 2006 the UN Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo (UNOSEK), which was led by Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. The two-year negotiation process was closely observed and monitored by the Contact Group for Kosovo, an informal group of states led by the U.S., EU member states, and Russia. The Kosovo institutions and Serbian government were engaged in the negotiation process as equal parties. As part of this diplomatic discourse, Kosovo highlighted that independence was proposed by the UN mediator as the most reasonable solution for Kosovo and that returning to Serbian administration was not viable. The subsequent failure of the UN Security Council to endorse the Comprehensive Status Settlement was the direct responsibility of Russia, who for their own political reasons objected to Kosovo’s independence. Having exhausted all options for a negotiated settlement, Kosovo was left with no other option but to declare independence. Accordingly, Kosovo argued that its declaration of independence was pursued through democratic methods and in full coordination with the international community, and in congruence with the UN’s mediation efforts. Here, Kosovo’s diplomacy argued that its case for statehood “is a unique, incomparable and unprecedented case that has managed to enhance democratic governance internally, contribute to regional peace and stability, and not set internationally any negative chain effect” (MFA of Kosovo 2013a). It argued that no action was taken by Kosovo without any involvement of the international community in launching, negotiating, and concluding a final status settlement” (MFA of Kosovo 2009a: 115). In support of this, the U.S. confirmed that “Kosovo’s elected leaders, meanwhile, consulted extensively with UNMIK, interested governments and others both in Pristina and elsewhere regarding its intention to declare independence” (U.S. Department of State 2009b: 32). Hungary used similar justification when recognising Kosovo, maintaining that it has become clear that the status quo in Kosovo was unsustainable and moving forward in the settlement was necessary for the lasting stability and development of the region. It has also become evident that there was no optimal solution acceptable to both sides, and the potential for further negotiations had been exhausted. (cited in Bolton and Visoka 2010: 20) The international presence in Kosovo not only reduced the chances for a military confrontation with Serbia following the declaration of independence, but also enhanced its global legitimacy since Kosovo did not declare independence unilaterally but in close coordination with a concerned number of states. An internal NATO document issued in 2008 confirms the coordinated character of Kosovo’s independence and the subsequent linkage with wide international recognition:

Writing sovereignty 101 While, after the failure of negotiations, they made clear their intention to declare independence unilaterally, the new Kosovar authorities also agreed to coordinate the timing of this declaration with Western governments, in order to ensure that independence would be recognized swiftly by a significant number of countries and that arrangements would be in place to manage the transition. (NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2008: 3, emphasis added) In addition to its historical and contextual circumstances, Kosovo has invoked the discourse of satisfying the core criteria and requirements of statehood as outlined in the Montevideo Convention of 1933 and inscribed in general international law. Kosovo tried to demonstrate that it has a permanent population, a territorial definition, effective government and the competence and powers to enter into external relations. When Kosovo declared its independence, it did not have entire control of its northern territory and was sharing the governance of the country with international missions, and did not have demarked borders. Opponents considered recognition of Kosovo under these conditions as a premature act. Yet, the Government of Kosovo and its international allies argued that statebuilding process in Kosovo was on-going and that the country has effective control over the territory. In legal theory and practice, as Georges Abi-Saab (2006: 475) explains, “a State may come into being and exist before its borders are totally defined, and even if some parts of its territory are subject to claims by other States”. He further maintains that “the crucial element in evaluating the effectiveness of the State is . . . the existence of an effective government which rules the people within the territory, and which embodies the sovereignty of the State” (Abi-Saab 2006: 475). Growing concerns that secession creates failed and quasi-states, which become sources of international instability and disorder, have pushed scholars to suggest that the international community should “provide international recognition to the governmental units that are actually providing order to their citizens as opposed to relying on the fictions of the past” (Herbst 2004: 315). The rationale for merging state effectiveness with diplomatic recognition tends to incentivise respect for international norms on human rights and make them compliant with international law. Sean D. Murphy (1999) demonstrates that democratic legitimacy has increasingly become an important consideration for the recognition of emerging states. As Antoine Buyse and Rick Lawson (2007: 786) maintain, “the traditional criteria of statehood have become overshadowed by less neutral and more political yardsticks, such as the presence of democracy and human rights protection”. Therefore, Kosovo’s discourse corresponded broadly with global political trends according higher consideration to human rights conditions, the treatment of minorities, promoting regional peace and stability, as well as internal democratic governance and effectiveness. Over time, Kosovo refocussed its discourse for recognition from outlining its historical right to statehood to emphasising its democratic character and successful process of statebuilding after violent conflict (MFA of Kosovo 2015a: 3). During its first decade of independent statehood, Kosovo has been recognised by most liberal democracies in the world, which implies a link between

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the type of polity and prospects for recognition. As illustrated in Appendix 6, out of 113 UN member states that have recognised Kosovo, 62 countries are categorised as democracies by Freedom House in 2017, while 31 countries are semiauthoritarian regimes, and 20 are undemocratic nations. On the other hand, among the UN member states that withhold recognition of Kosovo, 29 are undemocratic nations, whereas 50 other countries are evenly divided into democratic and semiauthoritarian nations. This is congruent with broader studies which suggest that “liberal democracies always receive more recognition from the international community than authoritarian regimes” (Berg and Toomla 2009: 43). Delving into individual cases, a widely-used argument to support Kosovo’s recognition involves highlighting it as a successful example of UN-led statebuilding, emphasising aspects including: the prevailing political stability in the country; the establishment of a secure environment; the successful conduct of democratic elections; and constitutionally enshrined protection for minorities (MFA of Kosovo 2013c). These elements are emphasised to reassure the international community that Kosovo is far from being a failed state or a producer of instability. This entangled discourse of stability and democracy was invoked to support the recognition of Kosovo’s statehood: integrating Kosovo into international society would strengthen further stability and democracy in the region. Rebecca Richards and Robert Smith (2015: 165) point out that emerging states “look and act like states that comply with the norms of acceptable statehood” and by doing so they have “the greatest chance of recognition”. In this context, the internationally-led democratic statebuilding process, Kosovo’s commitments to promote and protect minority rights, and contribute to regional stability, have been cited as justifications by states recognising Kosovo, and were subsequently invoked by Kosovo’s diplomatic discourse to seek further recognitions. In its recognition letter, the U.S. highlighted that “Kosovo has since worked to rebuild its war-shattered society, establish democratic institutions, hold successful elections for a new government, and foster prosperity. As an independent state, Kosovo now assumes responsibility for its destiny” (U.S. President 2008). Similarly, the UK recognised Kosovo’s independence on the grounds of its strong commitment to “the process of settlement implementation leading to the creation of a stable, multi-ethnic, democratic and prosperous Kosovo capable of moving down the path towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration”. The UK’s letter further highlighted that “reconciliation between Kosovo’s communities, and between Kosovo and Serbia, will be an indispensable element for the long term stability of Kosovo and the region as a whole” (Prime Minister of UK 2008). France also justified its recognition of Kosovo’s independence because of its commitment “to implement in the status prepared by the UN Special envoy Martti Ahtisaari, including the provisions for the Serb community and the call for an international presence to supervise Kosovo’s implementation of this status” (President of France 2008). Similarly, Switzerland grounded its justification for recognising Kosovo in the full implementation of all obligations contained in the Comprehensive Proposal of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General M. Ahtisaari,

Writing sovereignty 103 including those with regard to the promotion of a multi-ethnic, democratic future for Kosovo, the promotion and protection of the rights of all communities in Kosovo and to the international supervision of Kosovo. (President of the Swiss Confederation 2008) Austria added that “securing the equal participation of all communities in the political process is a precondition for being integrated in the circle of democraticpluralistic states of Europe” (MEIA of Austria 2008). A good number of European states, including from the Western Balkans, justified the recognition of Kosovo to ensure regional stability. Croatia argued that they recognise Kosovo in the hope that the new state will “act as an important and responsible factor of peace and stability in the region” (MFA of Croatia 2008). Similarly, neighbouring Montenegro argued that “we are convinced that . . . the Republic of Kosovo will give contribution to development and strengthening of good-neighbourly relations and regional cooperation, and to the European and Euro Atlantic perspective of the region and its stability” (MFA of Montenegro 2008). Bulgaria noted Kosovo’s commitment to “consolidating the stability of the region, notably by establishing good-neighbourly relations with all its neighbours”. While welcoming Kosovo “into the community of nations”, Turkey expressed “no doubt that Kosovo will spend all efforts to maintain good relations with all countries in the region” (MFA of Turkey 2008). Speaking on behalf of the EU, France reiterated that the EU “never considered the declaration of independence a threat to international peace and security in the region” nor “condemned Kosovo’s declaration of independence in any way” (MFEA of France 2009: 29, 45). Over the years, Kosovo’s recognition narrative has expanded to include significant recent events that have been incorporated into the diplomatic discourse. A major milestone in this regard is the 2010 Advisory Opinion issued by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on Kosovo’s “Unilateral” Declaration of Independence. In an attempt to block further recognition of Kosovo independence, Serbia secured a vote at the UN General Assembly in 2008 to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the accordance of Kosovo’s independence with the international law. In a nutshell, Serbia argued that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was unilateral, illegal, without the consent of the host state, and against international law and the international system of states based on inalienability of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Prior to 2010, one of the weakest arguments in defence of international recognition was the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Kosovo authorities feared the entrenchment of its status-quo as a partially-recognised state as well as Serbia’s discursive campaign calling all countries that recognise Kosovo to reverse their decision, because this situation could arise in future in any part of the world. Kosovo’s argument that its independence did not breach international law was supported by a wide range of scholarly opinions and preceding legal cases which all confirm that self-determination and secession are not prohibited in international law. Fearing its ramifications, Kosovo argued that the ICJ case should be treated as a “campaign to impede the democratic development of the new state of Kosovo, to

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obstruct its further international diplomatic recognition as well as membership in international organisations, including the UN” (Assembly of Kosovo 2008b). Kosovo’s representatives argued that “the General Assembly was only a vehicle for the Republic of Serbia to achieve its own goal for its own purposes: a judicial pronouncement on the legality of the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo” (MFA of Kosovo 2009b: 8). In any case, Kosovo argued that ICJ would grant only an advisory opinion that does not have a legally binding effect on parties. The ICJ announced its Advisory Opinion on 22 July 2010, concluding that the adoption of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) or the Constitutional Framework. Consequently, the adoption of that declaration did not violate any applicable rule of international law. (ICJ 2010: 53) Indeed, the ICJ Advisory Opinion responded in this restrictive manner to the narrow and specific question posed. It deliberately avoided pronouncing who has the right to self-determination, does Kosovo fulfil the statehood criteria, and what is the validity or legal effects of the recognition of Kosovo. Though, a significant proportion of states’ written and oral submissions to the ICJ emphasised that Kosovo fulfils the criteria of statehood, its path to independence was unique, and that the declaration of independence has not posed any threat to international peace and security in the region. Following the ICJ opinion, Serbia claimed that “Kosovo remains subject to the interim administration”, and that the Court did not approve the “right of secession from Serbia or any purported right to self-determination for Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians” (UN Security Council 2010: 6–7). As ICJ ruling was perceived as being in favour of Kosovo, the narrative completely changed becoming a major argument to country’s international legitimation. In 2013, Kosovo’s Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj (2013) argued that the ICJ ruling not only contributed to the confirmation of the legality of Kosovo’s independence. It also documented and clarified extensively the variety of opinions of different states that strongly argued in favour of Kosovo and its path to a well-deserved moral, political, and legal right to statehood. He went further to argue that the ICJ ruling has been a crucial argument for international recognition of Kosovo. Indeed, as Foreign Minister, I have constantly referred to the ruling as a crucial landmark in legitimizing Kosovo’s quest for full participation in the family of nations. (Hoxhaj 2013) Many states became interested in Kosovo and recognised its independence thereafter. Countries such as Oman, Egypt and Togo explicitly referred to the

Writing sovereignty 105 ICJ’s advisory opinion to justify their recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Egypt’s recognition letter demonstrates this point: As part of the permanent efforts of the Arab Republic of Egypt to consolidate international peace and security, and in light of the content of the United Nations Charter for the right of peoples to self-determination, and in accordance with the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice issued on 22 July 2010 that considered the Declaration of Kosovo Independence in accordance with the international law, the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt has decided on June 26, 2013, to recognize Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state. (MFA of Egypt 2013, emphasis added) Oman’s recognition letter explicitly acknowledged the “position of the International Court of Justice towards the independence of Kosovo”, stating that “the Government of the Sultanate of Oman will welcome the membership of the Republic of Kosovo to the United Nations and other International and Regional Organisations which Kosovo would like to join” (Sultan of Oman 2011, emphasis added). Similarly, Togo’s recognition letter held that taking note of the proclamation of independence of this country on February 17, 2008 and referring to the legal opinion of the International Court of Justice, has the honor to inform it to the attention of the highest authorities of Kosovo that the Government of the Republic of Togo formally recognizes the Republic of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent State. (MFA of Togo 2014) An additional argument put forward by Kosovo was that its independence was not opposed by the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council, while the UN General Assembly’s query was addressed by the ICJ’s advisory opinion, which ruled that Kosovo’s independence did not breach international law. James Crawford (2009: 47–48), representing the UK in the Kosovo ICJ advisory proceedings, formulated this argument accordingly: A declaration issued by persons within a State is a collection of words writ in water; it is the sound of one hand clapping. What matters is what is done subsequently, especially the reaction of the international community. That reaction may take time to reveal itself. But here the basic position is clear. There has been no condemnation by the General Assembly or the Security Council; there have been a substantial number of recognitions. This is significant, because, in international practice, there have been cases when the international community took collective actions to condemn and pursue the nonrecognition of entities proclaiming statehood, which were constituted through acts of aggression, and in breach of the applicable rules of international law. There

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is wide international consensus enshrined also in the UN’s diplomatic doctrine of demanding collective non-recognition of situations and states that are created in violation of a set of preemptory norms (jus cogens), which concern the prohibition of aggression, systematic violations of human rights, and breach of territorial integrity and sovereignty. As David Raič (2002: 442) maintains, “states are under an obligation not to recognize, through individual or collective acts, the purported statehood of an effective territorial entity created in violation of one or more fundamental norms of international law”. In the case of Kosovo, the declaration of independence was not objected to by the international community, strengthening thus Kosovo’s claim that its birth did not violate the fundamental norms of international law. On the contrary, the overwhelming scale of recognition and the gradual membership in regional and international body speak of a promising place for Kosovo in the international community. As events unfolded in Kosovo after 2012, the rationale for seeking diplomatic recognition was updated to include more arguments such as the end of Kosovo’s supervised independence, the EU-led dialogue with Serbia on the normalisation of relations, and the advancement of integration in Euro-Atlantic structures and membership in international organisations. In 2013, Kosovo signed the first agreement for the normalisation of relations with Serbia, which was branded in Kosovo’s diplomatic discourse as “a de facto recognition of the political existence of Kosovo” (MFA of Kosovo 2013d: 1). This intended to relativise Serbia’s longstanding claim that they “will never recognize the independence of Kosovo” (UN Security Council 2008: 4). Accordingly, Kosovo argued that after signing this agreement with Serbia, “we see no legal or political reasons for countries to delay further their recognition of Kosovo” (MFA of Kosovo 2013d: 2). They further claimed that universal recognition of Kosovo’s independence is fundamental for advancing Kosovo’s perspective for integration in Euro-Atlantic structures, strengthening Kosovo’s international standing, membership in regional and international bodies, as well as preserving peace and stability in the Balkans. (MFA of Kosovo 2013c) Kosovo turned this into a discursive event to reach out to countries that had not yet recognised its independence arguing that “if Serbia has changed its position on Kosovo, who used to be the main opponent to Kosovo, why aren’t they changing their position on Kosovo” (MFA of Kosovo 2014b). Immediately after securing the first agreement on the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia on 19 April 2013, Kosovo issued a non-paper stating that: The Agreement represents the first inter-state agreement between Kosovo and Serbia after the independence of Kosovo in 2008, and as such it has resolved all outstanding inter-state issues. Through this Agreement Serbia has accepted Kosovo’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, as well as has accepted the reality of independent Kosovo as joint partners in the European integration

Writing sovereignty 107 process. . . . The Agreement has opened the prospects for Kosovo to complete international recognition and membership of international bodies. (MFA of Kosovo 2013c) This process in turned encouraged more countries to recognise Kosovo’s independence. For instance, Lesotho’s justification for recognising Kosovo acknowledged the “steady emergence of peaceful coexistence for mutual benefit between Kosovo and Serbia”, arguing that “after a clearer understanding of these positive developments and achievements . . . the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho has reached a decision to officially recognize the Republic of Kosovo as a sovereign, independent State” (MFAIR of Lesotho 2014). Similarly, in diplomatic correspondence with Kosovo’s authorities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Saint Christopher and Nevis congratulated Kosovo for making “tremendous strides in pursuing international recognition” while also considering “the signing of contractual agreement with the European Union as well as . . . improved relations with NATO are a testament to your achievements” (MFA of Saint Christopher and Nevis 2017). This small state in West Indies region also pledged to support Kosovo’s pursuit of UN membership. Finally, as Kosovo’s recognition gained significant support and the number of UN member states who recognised Kosovo went over 100 by 2013, this became a strong argument in itself for attracting further recognition. Foreign Minister Hoxhaj stated that now “Kosovo’s independence is a geopolitical fact, and its diplomatic recognition is unstoppable and part of global geography” (MFA of Kosovo 2016a). Bridget Coggins (2014: 37), who places great value on securing recognition by great powers, also recognises the importance of securing a critical mass of recognition: Each state’s recognition of an aspiring member increases the probability that the actor will become a state, but the individual recognition decisions mean little in isolation. Only once a certain threshold of recognitions has been reached is the actor endowed with the full rights and responsibilities of a state. A new state need not secure every other state’s recognition, but it must receive it from a critical mass. In its pleadings submitted to the ICJ’s consideration of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the UK argued that “just as collective non-recognition has legal significance in denying status to the entity in question, so widespread recognition is significant in confirming status” (UK FCO 2009: 99). Addressing the Assembly of Kosovo in 2009, former Finnish President and UN Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari stated that “Kosovo’s independence is irreversible and this is evident from the recognitions that continue to arrive from around the world”.8 Serbia admitted that “recognition of new States plays an important part in the process of acceptance or confirmation of the statehood of a particular aspirant within the international community” (MFA of Serbia 2008: 340). The “quantitative” legitimation of Kosovo’s statehood not only intended to demonstrate the wide

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international support and legitimacy that Kosovo enjoys, but also put pressure on the remaining countries to join the majority of international society in recognising Kosovo’s statehood. In almost all diplomatic correspondence and requests for recognition, Kosovo diplomats highlighted how many counties have recognised its independence, the global geography of recognition and the membership in recognising states in international organisations (MFA of Kosovo 2017b). The importance of critical mass in the recognition process was present in Kosovo’s foreign policy discourses. Egypt was the 100th country to recognise Kosovo which represented a major milestone for Kosovo, as well as a symbolic breaking point, by achieving recognition by over half of the UN’s member states. Kosovo’s Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj, who lobbied for Egypt’s recognition for over two years, marked this event my stating that: The oldest state in the world, Egypt, recognizes the newest state in Europe, Kosovo! This being the 100th recognition, it marks a great milestone for Kosovo’s statehood. It confirms that the recognition process has an unstoppable course as well as a global geography. This is a new momentum and the point of no return. (MFA of Kosovo 2013b) Similarly, the significance of wide recognition was noted in legal opinions reaffirming Kosovo’s admission to international bodies, which highlight that “while it is clear that Kosovo is not universally (or near-universally) recognized by other states, it is also clear that it is recognized by a majority of states, and can thus in good faith be seen and treated as such” (Klabbers 2017: 14). When Maldives decided to recognise Kosovo, they “took note of the fact that the Republic of Kosovo enjoyed widespread recognition in the international community as an independent state, including most of its neighbours and states from all continents” (MFA of Maldives 2009: 2). This broad range of arguments discussed so far demonstrates how the meaning of Kosovo’s diplomatic discourse for pursing international recognition evolved over the years through the discursification of socio-historical events and adapting intertextually to globally-acceptable discourses. As Kosovo’s diplomatic approach is embedded in discursive contingency and fluidity, it is likely that arguments for the recognition of Kosovo will continue to evolve and adapt to changing domestic and global circumstances.

Diplomatic discourse for membership in international organisations Parallel to securing diplomatic recognition, seeking membership in international organisations represented a major priority in Kosovo’s quest to consolidate its international sovereignty. In fact, without membership in all relevant international organisations, especially the UN and major regional bodies, international recognition conferred bilaterally is an insufficient expression of sovereign

Writing sovereignty 109 statehood in contemporary global politics.9 For Kosovo, participation and membership in international bodies involved an exercise of its full state sovereignty in the multilateral forum (Government of Kosovo 2015c: 42). Kosovo’s aspiration for membership in international organisations was also motivated by the desire to increase security and reduce external interference.10 Moreover, Kosovo’s membership in certain international and regional bodies serves to reconfirm Kosovo’s acceptance as a member of international society, and to demonstrate its ability to take on international obligations (MFA of Kosovo 2013f). Multilateral spaces were more cost effective than bilateral diplomacy as they gave Kosovo access to member state diplomats from countries that are supportive, neutral, and hostile to Kosovo’s independence. Moreover, membership in multilateral organisations enabled Kosovo to gradually constitute its international positions on global affairs and to expand its diplomatic network, thereby overcoming international estrangement. In seeking membership in regional and international organisations, Kosovo has faced a major challenge in that many such organisations require unanimity or a support from a high proportion of members in order to admit new member states. Various weighted voting systems and complex procedural criteria make membership campaigns highly political, thereby complicating Kosovo’s prospects for admission to international organisations. There has been considerable scope for certain states to oppose Kosovo’s membership for politically-motivated reasons (see Barros, Ryngaert and Wouters 2017). To overcome some barriers, Kosovo prioritised organisations where it could secure consensus and sufficient votes; organisations that would advance Kosovo’s economic and political interests; and organisations that would pave the way for Kosovo to join more influential organisations. Although membership in international organisations was primarily focussed on strengthening statehood and expanding international legitimation and participation, Kosovo often used technical and procedural arguments to justify its bid for accession to such organisations. As indicated by Kosovo’s MFA in an internal paper, “full integration into the international community is only possible through a gradual integration, especially through a more intensified technical cooperation in the area of rule of law and human rights” (MFA of Kosovo 2015c: 2). In certain instances, Kosovo linked its desire to become part of international organisations with the promotion of international norms such as human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. In other cases, the bid for membership was linked to the non-controversial issues such as socio-economic development, the promotion of good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation (MFA of Kosovo 2013f). This discursive framing of Kosovo’s campaign for membership in international organisations combining legal, contextual, normative, and political aspects while ensuring procedural conformity intended to maximise Kosovo’s likelihood of joining the organisations, thereby generating further external legitimation through normative and practical arguments. The entire discourse for membership in regional and international organisations tended to avoid politicisation of Kosovo’s statehood and act like a state when following the procedural steps for application for membership.

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Membership in the United Nations remains an important aspiration for Kosovo as it would grant Kosovo universal recognition and end its international contestation (Weller 2009). However, Kosovo currently has not attempted to join the UN as full member due to insufficient support within the UN General Assembly and the anticipated veto of Russia and China at the UN Security Council. Instead, Kosovo tried to join UN agencies and programmes as incremental steps towards an eventual application for admission as a full member or as an observer. As part of this strategy, Kosovo joined the IMF and World Bank in 2009. The United States as the depository government claimed that Kosovo’s membership in the IMF and World Bank “marked the Republic of Kosovo’s formal integration into the global financial system and will have a positive influence on its economic and financial development” (U.S. Department of State 2009a). Kosovo’s strategy to seek early membership in the IMF and World Bank was primarily influenced by the voting system, whereby the voting powers of Kosovo’s international partners were much higher than those of its opponents. However, the functionalist approach to membership in these two specialised agencies was useful as there have been several countries who had not yet recognised Kosovo for political reasons, that voted in favour of membership or abstained (GAP Institute 2008: 2). In 2015, Kosovo applied for membership in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), but was ultimately three votes short of securing a seat at this UN Agency. Procedurally, Kosovo’s institutions argued that the country “is eligible to become a UNESCO member before becoming a UN member state, provided that it secures a two-thirds majority of votes in the General Conference” (MFA of Kosovo 2015c: 18). The discursive justification for Kosovo’s application to join UNESCO were framed around “the desire of the people of Kosovo to establish and maintain closer cooperation with other nations in the field of education, science and culture” (Government of Kosovo 2015a). Anticipating Serbia’s objection, Kosovo emphasised that Serbia would gain from Kosovo’s UNESCO membership because “it would impose strict and formal international obligations upon Kosovo to preserve and protect monuments of distinct historic and cultural importance to the Serb community” (MFA of Kosovo 2015c: 18). The argument went on to highlight that “Kosovo’s membership of UNESCO will only have positive effects on the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo” (Government of Kosovo 2015c: 2). During this first attempt, Kosovo did not manage to become a member of UNESCO short of three votes, partially because Kosovo miscalculated the support it would get from countries who did recognise Kosovo and failed to work with most important foreign policy decision-makers of countries from whom it was seeking affirmative votes. While admission to the UN remains elusive, integration into Euro-Atlantic structures remains most promising pathway for full integration in the international community. The discursive framework used by Kosovo to justify its aspiration for joining the European Union and NATO focussed on its geographic position, its affiliation with European identity and culture, and the desire to honour the values and norms of democracy and human rights. The Government of Kosovo (2015c: 43) considers membership in the European Union as “a national priority for the

Writing sovereignty 111 social, economic and political development and transformation of Kosovo”, which will “enable the country to strengthen the international subjectivity, and to contribute to security, stability and prosperity in this part of Europe, based on democratic principles and values”. However, Kosovo’s unresolved political status while under UN administration and the subsequent lack of consensus among EU member states regarding Kosovo’s independence has made Kosovo’s path to EU accession a slow and complex process.11 After a lengthy legal and political battle, which involved persistent lobbying efforts towards the EU member states and institutions, Kosovo managed in 2015 to sign the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), which marks the first major contractual relationship between Kosovo and the EU. This makes Kosovo a potential candidate for EU membership, which enables Kosovo to strengthen the bilateral ties and enhance the cooperation with the EU institutions and its member states, while seeking EU support for advancing its regional policy and consolidating external dimensions of statehood. To establish contractual relations with Kosovo, the European Commission managed to find legal grounds to sign the agreement without the consent of the national parliaments. The European Commission stated that the fact that some Member States do not recognise Kosovo as an independent state does not constitute an obstacle for Kosovo to implement the obligations that arise from the SAA, nor for the EU to continue to provide assistance to Kosovo as it has done until now. (see European Parliament 2016) Discursively, Kosovo perceived the contractual relations with the EU as a major victory for country’s additional diplomatic recognitions and participation in other regional and international organisations. Kosovo argued that this landmark agreement “signifies the acceptance and recognition of Kosovo’s sovereignty and statehood, and Kosovo’s equal status within the family of free, independent, and peace-loving nations” (MFA of Kosovo 2013d; Visoka 2017). Kosovo’s diplomacy has used technical arguments also in the case of desired aspiration for application for membership in the Council of Europe (CoE). As part of this process, Kosovo put forward normative, legal, procedural, and sociospatial arguments to support why it deserves to join the largest inter-governmental organisation in Europe. The MFA of Kosovo (2008) framed its desire for membership on the grounds for “advancing the ideals and principles which are common to the family of European countries comprising the ethical values that underpin individual freedom, political liberty, the rule of law, and human dignity”. Later on, the MFA of Kosovo (2014a) argued it “has all the democratic attributes to be a full member of the Council of Europe”, highlighting that the country “is a democratic and multi-ethnic young state that has enshrined democratic principles in its political system, including the rule of law, human rights protection, and civil society”. On normative grounds, Kosovo argued that its membership in the Council of Europe would expand the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights and enhance human rights protection within the country, including

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the promotion of minority rights. Here, Kosovo’s MFA argued that “by keeping Kosovo outside the Council of Europe, the potential of the people of Kosovo to protect and advance their rights and achieve economic and social progress, is being hindered” (MFA of Kosovo 2014a). Moreover, Kosovo argued that its human rights standards compared more favourably than even existing member states of the Council of Europe – for example, Russia and Azerbaijan are widely considered as semi-authoritarian states. Finally, MFA of Kosovo (2014a) invoked functionalist arguments highlighting membership in the Council of Europe as a requirement in the European integration process. Even though 36 out of 47 member states of the Council of Europe have already recognised Kosovo’s independence, Kosovo has not yet officially applied for membership in the Council of Europe. Several times it has announced the intention to apply but for domestic political reasons and the unsuitable rotation of the chairmanship of the Council of Minister part of the Council of Europe among states that haven’t recognised Kosovo has pushed the country to delay the formal application.12 In the meantime, to keep the momentum going and build procedural legitimacy, Kosovo has joined two of the Council of Europe bodies: Venice Commission and the Development Bank. The main discursive framework justifying Kosovo’s application to the Venice Commission focussed on normative aspects, such as the important role that the Commission has played and continues to play in promoting and strengthening democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Europe. In an attempt to add normative legitimacy to the bid for membership in the Venice Commission, the Government of Kosovo expressed commitment to continue strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law; improving the independence, effectiveness, accountability, and impartiality of the judiciary; and promoting human rights and equality for all the citizens in Kosovo by ensuring the respect and fulfilment of the minority rights (see MFA of Kosovo 2015b). Regarding the membership in the Council of Europe Development Bank, the Government of Kosovo argued that this body would help Kosovo address issues of displaced persons, youth mobility and migration, unemployment – job creation, low income groups, and natural or ecological disasters.13 Another important dimension of Kosovo’s foreign policy has been membership in regional organisations and initiatives. During the period of international administration, Kosovo was represented by the UN in regional bodies. After independence, Kosovo began campaigning for equal participation and representation in regional initiatives as an important step towards engaging in foreign affairs and claiming its place in the region. However, both Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have constantly posed procedural and political challenges, deliberately blocking Kosovo’s participation in regional fora. For the MFA of Kosovo (2013e), its “exclusion from regional initiatives not only disrupts the interests of Kosovo to become an actor in the region, but it also disrupts the regional process of European integration, and the EU approach to the Western Balkan’s European perspective”. It further claimed that “any tendency to downgrade or block this format of representation runs against the spirit of regional cooperation and good neighborly relations” (MFA of Kosovo 2013g: 2–3). To overcome these procedural

Writing sovereignty 113 and political challenges, Kosovo invoked the discursive framework of “regional cooperation” and “good neighbourly relations”, which represent the “cornerstone of the EU’s policy framework for the Western Balkans . . . which offers to the countries of the region the possibility of eventual EU membership” (European Commission 2005: 2). Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans has come to signify “collective intergovernmental action”, which aims “to promote security on the fringes of the EU and NATO . . . with politics rather than economic development as the principal driver” (Bechev 2011: 3–5). What attracted Kosovo to this process was intergovernmental action, namely the opportunity to become an equal member of the regional community. Discursively, placing the emphasis on regional cooperation, rather than on Kosovo’s right to join regional bodies made it politically easier for the EU and other countries within the Western Balkans region to allow Kosovo to participate.14 Kosovo’s participation in regional fora was granted on the grounds of serving the common interest of advancing stability, peace, cooperation, and helping the Western Balkans region pursue its collective path towards EU integration. Eventually, in 2012 Kosovo secured a breakthrough when it signed with Serbia the Arrangements Regarding Regional Representation and Cooperation part of the EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations (Visoka and Doyle 2016). This agreement stipulated that Kosovo would participation on its own account and speak for itself at all regional meetings, on the condition that an asterisk will be attached to Kosovo’s official designation, which reads: “this designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence”.15 This reference permitted both recognisers and non-recognisers to refer to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence. Though in fact, as discussed earlier, the ICJ advisory opinion held that the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) did not prohibit Kosovo’s declaration of independence, which implicitly represented double confirmation of the legality and legitimacy of Kosovo’s independence. Subsequently, this agreement enabled Kosovo to become member of numerous regional organisations as a participating state as well as expanding the scope of its membership in other important European organisations. The most significant outcomes for Kosovo include joining the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) in 2013 and the South-East Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP) in 2014, both of which seek to strengthen regional cooperation promote intergovernmental trust, good neighbourly relations, and stability. To facilitate Kosovo’s membership in regional initiatives such as the RCC and the SEECP, the organisations changed references within their by-laws from “countries” to “participants”. Serbia took this one step further and argued to remove references to heads of states and governments from official documents of these organisations. Prior to joining these two organisations, Kosovo framed its case for membership on the need for regional cooperation and equality among states. The argumentative focus was that “regional cooperation without Kosovo is incomplete. Therefore, we are very committed to be part of all institutions and organizations in the region” (Hoxhaj

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2014: 2). Having secured membership in these organisations, Kosovo’s discourse shifted to hailed its membership in the RCC and SEECP as great achievements for strengthening country’s regional role and as a step towards European integration. As Alison Duxbury (2011: 20) maintains, “representation presupposes membership and deals with the question of which persons or entities are permitted to represent a particular state”. Similarly, regarding international security arrangements, such as NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme, the Adriatic Charter, and INTERPOL, Kosovo invoked functionalist and technical arguments. The MFA of Kosovo (2013c) argued that the “inclusion of the Republic of Kosovo in regional security mechanisms continues to be in the function of integration into the European Union and NATO, which constitute the model, purpose and our final and irreplaceable destination”. In particular, membership of bodies such as the Adriatic Charter and the NATO’s Partnership for Peace help “further democratic reforms, respect for human rights and minorities, efforts in the fight against terrorism, trafficking of human beings, cross-border control, and control of weapons of mass destruction” (MFA of Kosovo 2013c). Similarly, Kosovo phrased its discursive campaign for membership in INTERPOL in 2016 on functionalist and technical arguments. Kosovo’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, who led this campaign, emphasised that Kosovo has a highly professional police force (as it was trained by the U.S., the UN, and OSCE), which cooperates closely with international organisations in combating transnational crimes. Echoing this argument, Kosovo’s Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj (2016b: 4) explained that Kosovo being part of INTERPOL would mean better police and intelligence coordination to tackle corruption, organised crime, narcotics, radicalisation, and terrorism in the Balkans. I don’t know how some states think we will be able to cooperate with international and regional police forces when we do not have access to INTERPOL. Yet, despite these efforts, Kosovo was not able to join INTERPOL due to politicisation of the process by Serbia and its international allies and sudden entanglement with Palestine’s simultaneous bid for membership in this law enforcement organisation. Kosovo applied the same discursive logic during its campaign for membership in international legal organisations. In 2015, Kosovo’s admission to the Permanent Court of Arbitration was hailed as a move that would strengthen further Kosovo’s international subjectivity, while at the same time expanding Kosovo’s possibilities to “treat and settle different international disputes with states or other public or private parties” (MFA of Kosovo 2017a). Defending its accession to international legal bodies, Kosovo argued that it “is a state under international law and it is recognized as such by the majority of the state members of the United Nations”, highlighting that “since its inception, the Republic of Kosovo has undertaken to respect international law and has given constitutional status to most of the international human rights instruments” (MFA of Kosovo 2016c: 2).

Writing sovereignty 115 As a result of this functionalist diplomatic discourse, within less than ten years, Kosovo has managed to become a member of 60 international regional and international organisations.16 While Kosovo has managed to become a member of a wide range of international financial, sport, and socio-economic organisations and regional bodies; it has faced many challenges for securing membership in major international security and political organisations (see Appendix 5.1 and 5.2). Regardless of their political significance in global politics, Kosovo’s MFA viewed membership in these international organisations as “strengthening further Kosovo’s subjectivity, strengthening the state identity in international politics, advancing the country’s role and position in international affairs, and improving its global image” (MFA of Kosovo 2013f: 3). Consequently, Kosovo’s domestic capacities to absorb the obligations arising from membership in international bodies was less of a consideration, since the main priority for Kosovo in joining these organisations was to achieve the status of an equal member of the international community.

Conclusion This chapter has explored the role of diplomatic discourse in enacting, defending, and expanding Kosovo’s independent statehood. The analysis focussed on different discursive approaches deployed by Kosovo to justify its independence and obtain diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations. Kosovo’s diplomatic discourse as expressed in the form of diplomatic correspondences, reports, speeches, non-papers, and verbal notes had a performative function: it gave meaning to Kosovo’s diplomatic campaign for international legitimation and served as a key to its international access. At the heart of Kosovo’s discursive campaign was the attempt to portray Kosovo as a unique case, which merits recognition for reasons including: Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence came as a last resort choice following systematic human rights abuses by the former host state; Kosovo’s commitment to contributing to regional peace and stability; and Kosovo’s desire to establish diplomatic relations and close ties of friendship and cooperation. This was supported through the discursification of domestic events. As much as Kosovo tried to build the case of being a unique case without global precedence, it inevitably had to engage intertextually with universalist discourses and norms of justice, human rights, and self-determination to ease its admission into international society. In this regard, Kosovo has engaged discursively with existing facets of sovereign statehood, including legal, historical, and political conceptions of sovereignty, and it has tried to use them contextually as legitimising discourse to support Kosovo’s case to be recognised as a sovereign state. The Kosovo experience regarding diplomatic recognition demonstrates that the norms of recognition are determined in practice and constantly evolving. Therefore, to make the case for statehood globally acceptable, Kosovo had to adjust its discourse and invoke regional and global concepts such as democracy, good governance, peaceful resolution of disputes, and human rights protection, especially

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those affecting minority communities. Although Kosovo enjoyed all the classical attributes of an independent state, it had to rephrase its case for recognition on globally-acceptable narratives that would attract international support and overcome counter-narratives promoted by Serbia and other opponents of Kosovo’s independence. This forced Kosovo to make the case for diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations on multiple normative, functional, and contextual arguments which applied with different nuances to different actors, geographical locations, situations, and events. This discursive multiplicity and plasticity made a difference as it transformed the position of other states towards Kosovo’s statehood, it weaved a discourse of hope, progress, and acceptability around Kosovo statehood, and it enabled the maintenance of international support for Kosovo’s independence through the discourse of historical friendship and normative solidarity. Tracing the multiple discourses that Kosovo invoked, and its intertextuality with the public justifications put forward by countries who have recognised (and opposed) its independence, provides an optimal opportunity to recast the contemporary norms, values, and interests underpinning state recognition in global politics. Especially, exploring public justifications for recognising Kosovo’s independence offers the possibility to clearly see that each state responds to each case of recognition differently and that there are contextual nuances that shape those decisions. Seen from this point of view, it is rare to find a country that has a written policy on state recognition. An overwhelming number of countries who have recognised Kosovo justified their decisions, citing contextual factors alongside political calculations that Kosovo’s independence would bring regional stability, would contribute to international peace and security, and would also normalise interstate relations in the Western Balkans. These arguments put forward by many states for recognising Kosovo’s independence have been intertextually related to Kosovo’s own discursive campaign for seeking recognition. In turn, after receiving broad recognition, Kosovo has adjusted its diplomatic discourse to use some of the arguments put forward by supportive states tailored with discursification of domestic events and contextualisation of the norms and values that underpin Kosovo’s desire for membership in international society. Kosovo’s diplomacy considered membership in international bodies as a constitutive element of external sovereignty, a stepping stone for more recognition, as well as an opportunity to move towards UN membership. After joining these international organisations, Kosovo has undertaken complex lobbying at the member state and institutional levels of these organisations, through the assistance of strategic partners, and through detailed negotiations. Core discourses which informed Kosovo’s quest for joining international organisations were a combination of functionalist and technical arguments, which intended to de-politicise the process and overcome blockages created by Kosovo’s opponents. The desire for external sovereignty and recognition was strategically expressed through procedural and functional arguments for membership in international bodies as the most pragmatic pathways for overcoming external contestation. The growth of regional organisations and initiatives provided Kosovo the opportunity to gradually overcome

Writing sovereignty 117 isolation and integrate into intergovernmental structures. Although for Kosovo membership in international bodies was more difficult, its geographical location at the heart of the Balkans and the momentum for regional cooperation and integration as part of regional efforts for accession to the EU were provided a valuable opportunity for international integration. The broad range of diplomatic narratives discussed in this chapter gave meaning to Kosovo’s diplomatic practices and performances and in turn created a sense of coordination and direction in the conduct of foreign policy of state recognition. Yet, Kosovo’s diplomatic discourse obtained meaning only through performances and interactions with other international interlocutors, which is the subject of discussion in the next chapter.

Notes 1 Interview by author with Deputy Director of the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, May 2017. 2 Interview by author with a former Foreign Affairs Minister of Kosovo, via phone, July 2015. 3 Interview by author with a Kosovo Ambassador, Pristina, May 2017. 4 Interview by author with former Prime Minister of Kosovo, Pristina, July 2012. 5 Interview by author with a former Legal Adviser at the Office of Prime Minister of Kosovo, Pristina, April 2017. 6 For a full account of legal and political arguments in favour and against Kosovo’s independence see the written submissions, comments, and oral statements provided by 36 UN member states as part of the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo. Available at: www. icj-cij.org/en/case/141 (accessed 19 December 2017). 7 Interview by author with a former Political Adviser at the Office of Prime Minister of Kosovo, Pristina, May 2016. 8 Presentation by President Martti Ahtisaari to the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, 15 June 2009. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/15708.pdf (accessed 12 April 2018). 9 Interview by author with a former Minister for European Integration in the Government of Kosovo, Pristina, April 2017. 10 Interview by author with former President of Kosovo, Pristina, May 2017. 11 Interview by author with a European Commission official, Brussels, May 2017. 12 Interview by author with a Senior Official at the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, March 2017. 13 Interview by author with a former Legal Adviser at the Office of Prime Minister of Kosovo, April 2017. 14 Interview by author with a European Commission official, Brussels, May 2017. 15 ‘Arrangements Regarding Regional Representation and Cooperation’, Agreed Conclusions 24 February 2012. Available at: www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/agree ment_0210_representation.pdf (accessed 20 December 2017). 16 Interview by author with Deputy Director of the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, May 2017.

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Writing sovereignty 119 Foucault, M. (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972– 1977, ed. C. Gordon, New York: Pantheon Books. GAP Institute (2008) ‘Joining International Financial Institutions: The Road Ahead’. Policy Brief No. 2. www.institutigap.org/documents/38218_Policy%20Brief%20Membership% 20in%20IMF%20and%20WB.pdf (accessed 23 June 2017). Government of Kosovo (2015a) ‘Application Letter for Membership in UNESCO’, 16 July. Government of Kosovo (2015b) ‘Letter Signed by Kosovo Leaders to the National Delegations in UNSCO’, 7 October. Government of Kosovo (2015c) ‘The Programme of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo (2015–2018)’. Available at: www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/Government_ Programme_2015-2018_eng_10_mars.pdf (accessed 23 June 2017). Hansen, L. (2006) Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, Abingdon: Routledge. Herbst, J. (2004) ‘Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice’, in R. I. Rotberg (ed), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 302–318. Hoxhaj, E. (2013) ‘Thank You, Canada! From Europe’s Youngest State’, Huffington Post, 22 July. Available at: www.huffingtonpost.ca/enver-hoxhaj/kosovo-thanks-canadarecognition_b_3635936.html (accessed 24 March 2017). Hoxhaj, E. (2014) ‘Statement at the SEECP Meeting in Romania’, 18 February. Hoxhaj, E. (2016a) Ngritja e Një Shteti: Politika e Jashtme e Kosovës, Tirana: Dudaj. Hoxhaj, E. (2016b) Lecture at the University of Bern, Switzerland, 9 November. ICJ (International Court of Justice) (2010) ‘Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Govern ment of Kosovo’, Advisory Opinion, 22 July. Available at: www.icj-cij.org/files/ case-related/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf (accessed 20 February 2017). Jaber, T. (2011) ‘A Case for Kosovo? Self-Determination and Secession in the 21st Century’, The International Journal of Human Rights 15(6): 926–947. Ker-Lindsay, J. (2012) The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested States, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Klabbers, J. (2017) ‘Opinion on the Accession of Kosovo to the World Customs Organization’, 2 October. MEIA of Austria (2008) Recognition Letter, 18 February. MFA of Afghanistan (2008) Recognition Letter, 18 February. MFA of Croatia (2008) Recognition Letter, 19 March. MFA of Egypt (2013) ‘The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt Recognizes the Republic of Kosovo as an Independent and Sovereign State’, 26 June. Available at: www. mfa.gov.eg/English/Ministry/News/Pages/NewsDetails.aspx?Source=6781921f-3993444a-859e-ee26ce851de8&newsID=22818175-5cf6-4e90-956a-9a09497ca11e (accessed 25 May 2017). MFA of Kosovo (2008) ‘Draft Letter of Application to the Council of Europe’, Internal policy document. MFA of Kosovo (2009a) ‘Written Contribution of the Authors of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence’, 17 April. Available at: www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/15678. pdf (accessed 25 March 2017). MFA of Kosovo (2009b) ‘Further Written Contributions of the Authors of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence Regarding the Written Statements’, 17 July. Available at: www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/15708.pdf (accessed 27 March 2017). MFA of Kosovo (2011) ‘Strategy for the Achievement of Full International Recognition of the Republic of Kosovo’, Internal policy document.

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MFA of Kosovo (2013a) ‘Draft Letter Sent to Countries on the Third Anniversary of ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’, Internal policy document. MFA of Kosovo (2013b) ‘Egypt Recognizes Kosovo as an Independent and Sovereign State’, Press Release, 26 June. Available at: www.mfa-ks.net/?page=1%2C4%2C1775 (accessed 28 March 2017). MFA of Kosovo (2013c) ‘Explanatory Note on the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations between Kosovo and Serbia’, Internal policy document. MFA of Kosovo (2013d) ‘Kosovo’s Right to Statehood and the Need for Recognition of Its Independence’, Internal policy document. MFA of Kosovo (2013e) ‘Regional Organisations’, Internal policy document. MFA of Kosovo (2013f) ‘The Membership of Kosovo in International Organisations’, Internal policy document. MFA of Kosovo (2013g) ‘Non-Paper on SEECP’, Internal policy document. MFA of Kosovo (2014a) ‘Non-Paper on Arguments why Kosovo Should Become a Member of the Council of Europe’, Internal policy document. MFA of Kosovo (2014b) ‘Minister Hoxhaj Called OIC Member Countries to Recognize Kosovo’, Press Release, 19 June. Available at: www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,217,2410 (accessed 2 January 2017). MFA of Kosovo (2015a) ‘Explanatory Note Concerning the Request for the Admission of the Republic of Kosovo to UNESCO’, Internal policy document. MFA of Kosovo (2015b) ‘Non-Paper on Kosovo and International Organizations: Further Potential for Cooperation’, Internal policy document. MFA of Kosovo (2015c) ‘Kosovo in UNESCO II: As We Are: Stories Old and New of a Country Thriving’. Available at: www.mfa-ks.net/repository/docs/AS_WE_ARE_ VO2_S.pdf (accessed 23 July 2017). MFA of Kosovo (2016a) ‘Hoxhaj Seeks Recognition from Five CARICOM’s NonRecognizing Countries’, Press Release, 7 July. Available at: www.mfa-ks.net/? page=2,217,3572 (accessed 20 August 2017). MFA of Kosovo (2016b) ‘Non-Paper on Arguments for the Recognition of Kosovo’s Independence’, Internal policy document. MFA of Kosovo (2016c) ‘Note Verbal on Kosovo’s Membership of International Legal Organisations’, Internal policy document. MFA of Kosovo (2017a) ‘Kosovo towards Accession to the Apostille Convention and to the Permanent Court of Arbitration’. Available at: www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,217,2973 (accessed 18 October 2017). MFA of Kosovo (2017b) ‘Revised Non-Paper on Arguments for the Recognition of Kosovo’s Independence’. Internal policy document. MFA of Liberia (2008) Recognition Letter, 2 June. MFA of Maldives (2009) ‘Written Statement of Maldives’, 17 April. Available at: www. icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/15670.pdf (accessed 23 March 2017). MFA of Montenegro (2008) Recognition Letter, 9 October. MFA of Saint Christopher and Nevis (2017) Letter to Kosovo’s Deputy Prime Minister Enver Hoxhaj, 24 October. MFA of Serbia (2008) ‘Written Statement by Serbia’, 17 April. Available at: www.icj-cij. org/files/case-related/141/15642.pdf (accessed 27 March 2017). MFA of Togo (2014) Recognition Letter, 2 July. MFA of Turkey (2008) Recognition Letter, 18 February. MFAIR of Lesotho (2014) Recognition Letter, 17 February.

Writing sovereignty 121 MFEA of France (2009) ‘Written Statement by France’, 17 April. Available at: www. icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/15607.pdf (accessed 20 March 2017). Murphy, S. D. (1999) ‘Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments’, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 48(3): 535–581. NATO Parliamentary Assembly (2008) ‘Kosovo and the Future of Balkan Security’, Doc. 155 CDS 08 E bis, 18 November 2008. Available at: www.nato-pa.int/document/2008-155cds-08-e-bis-kosovo-canas-report (accessed 3 November 2017). Neumann, I. B. (2002) ‘Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 31(3): 627–651. Neumann, I. B. (2005) ‘“A Speech That Entire Ministry May Stand for”: On Generating State Voice’, in C. Krohn-Hansen and K. G. Nustad (eds), State Formation: Anthropological Perspectives, London: Pluto Press, pp. 195–211. Neumann, I. B. (2013) Diplomatic Sites: A Critical Enquiry, London: Hurst. President of France (2008) Recognition Letter, 18 February. President of the Swiss Confederation (2008) Recognition Letter, 27 February. Prime Minister of Albania (2008) Recognition letter, 18 February. Prime Minister of Samoa (2008) Recognition Letter, 9 September. Prime Minister of UK (2008) Recognition Letter, 18 February. Raič, D. (2002) Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, The Hague: Kluwer Law International. Richards, R. and Smith, R. (2015) ‘Statebuilding and the Politics of Non-Recognition’, in Ch. Daase et al. (eds), Recognition in International Relations: Rethinking a Political Concept in a Global Context, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 162–177. Trifunovska, S. (2011) ‘The Impact of the “Kosovo Precedent” on Self-Determination Struggles’, in J. Summers (ed), Kosovo: A Precedent?: The Declaration of Independence, the Advisory Opinion and Implications for Statehood, Self-Determination and Minority Rights, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 375–393. UK FCO (United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office) (2009) ‘Written State of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’, 17 April. Available at: www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/15638.pdf (accessed 23 March 2017). UK FCO (United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office) (2013) ‘Non-Paper on Kosovo Recognition Lines: Proposed Revisions’, Unclassified. UN Security Council (2007) Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s Future Status, UN Doc. S/2007/168, 26 March. UN Security Council (2008) Provisional Verbatim of the 5917th Meeting, UN Doc. S/ PV.5917, 20 June. UN Security Council (2010) Provisional Verbatim of 6367th Meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.6367, 3 August. U.S. Department of State (2009a) ‘Kosovo Joins the IMF and World Bank’, Media Note, 29 June. Available at: https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/06a/125489.htm (accessed 27 March 2017). U.S. Department of State (2009b) ‘Written Statement by the United States of America’, 17 April. Available at: www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/15640.pdf (accessed 24 March 2017). U.S. President (2008) Recognition Letter, 18 February. Vidmar, J. (2013) ‘Unilateral Declaration of Independence in International Law’, in D. French (ed), Statehood and Self-Determination: Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 60–78.

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Visoka, G. (2017) The Political Dialogue between Kosovo and the EU in the Framework of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), Pristina: GIZ (German Development Agency). Visoka, G. and Doyle, J. (2016) ‘Neo-Functional Peace: The European Union Way of Resolving Conflicts’, Journal of Common Market Studies 54(4): 862–877. Weller, M. (2008) Escaping the Self-Determination Trap, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Weller, M. (2009) Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wilson, G. (2009) ‘Self-Determination, Recognition and the Problem of Kosovo’, Netherlands International Law Review 56(3): 455–481.

5

Performing sovereignty

Introduction The previous chapter examined a broad array of discourses invoked by Kosovo’s diplomacy to secure diplomatic recognition and to advance Kosovo’s membership in international organisations. However, applying discourse analysis to the everyday writing of statehood without examining diplomatic performances provides an incomplete picture of contemporary dynamics of state-becoming. This chapter turns the attention to diplomatic performances to understand what practical actions Kosovo’s diplomacy and political leadership undertook to enact its independent statehood. Contrary to mainstream institutionalist views on statehood, which perceive the existence of states as a priority to our practices, this chapter demonstrates that state-becoming, including diplomatic recognition and membership in international bodies takes place through performative practices that comprises patterned and/or discarded routines, repetition, practices, and spontaneous activities (Butler 1993; Weber 1998). States as ontological categories are not pregiven in world politics. Rather, they are what Cynthia Weber (1998: 78) calls “ontological effects of practices which are performatively enacted”. The meaning of sovereignty and statehood is constantly modified “in the process of practicing diplomacy” (Constantinou 2013: 146). Seeing the state from the perspective of performances not only challenges the “state as a unified actor or static form” but enables “understanding the state as improvised urges reflection on the unfolding of the state as a process always in motion” (Jeffrey 2013: 176). Performances are the essential ingredient for producing discourses, because “texts must be performed to be experienced” (Bruner 1986: xx). Performances “deal with actions more than text: with habits of the body more than structure of symbols, with illocutionary rather than propositional force, with the social construction of reality rather than its representation” (Schieffelin 1998: 194). The power of performativity lies in its ability to assemble linguistic, material, and affective segments, which jointly produce new features and effects, identities, frontiers, discourses, and material realities (de Goede, Simon and Hoiujink 2014: 217; see also Butler 1997; 2010). Therefore, understanding the everyday making of statehood requires observing how statehood is performed, imitated, and improved on an everyday basis.

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In disentangling the performative nature of Kosovo’s consolidation of statehood, this chapter explores how Kosovo performed sovereignty in the process of seeking diplomatic recognition and membership in regional and international organisations. The overall argument of this chapter is that diplomatic performances are what makes new states recognisable entitles in world politics. As David L. Phillips (2012: 185) explains, while Kosovo realised its historic struggle for independence, “gaining greater global recognition would depend on its performance as a member of the family of nations”. Expanding diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations were the two crucial aspects of Kosovo’s struggle to perform independent statehood. In the absence of universal recognition, Kosovo had to pursue a diplomacy of bilateral recognition which entailed performing context-specific and differentiated diplomatic actions for securing country-by-country recognition and joining the multilateral world organisation-by-organisation. This ultimately forced Kosovo to devise a processual understanding of recognition and membership in international bodies. Contrary to existing perspectives, diplomatic recognition is not a single political act, but a complex and multi-stage process not entirely driven by strategy and rationality, a by-product of situational prudence and contingency. The process of securing diplomatic recognition involved four major stages, which included: sending the request for recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations; establishing informal diplomatic contact; holding bilateral and formal meetings; and formalising the recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations. The first stage of recognition involved submitting the request for recognition, where Kosovo sent continuously requests for recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations. In certain occasions the request was made indirectly via another powerful and influential state, regional organisation, or influential personality. The essence of making sovereignty is to perform again and again speech acts and gestures, which enhance the chances for acquiring external recognition, acceptance, and legitimacy. Kosovo’s performative diplomacy consisted of a wide array of actions, behaviours, and gestures, which aimed at constructing an identity for sovereign Kosovo. These actions consisted of official and unofficial visits and meetings, public speeches, visits of important sites, and ceremonies, appearances in press conferences, and engaging with social media. The second stage in the recognition process was direct encountering and communication, whereby Kosovar diplomats met formally or informally with representatives of states that was seeking recognition in bilateral or multilateral settings, or exchange letters for a conventional or non-conventional event. This often led to the third stage, which involved official communication, where there is bilateral discussion on the recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations and the modalities and deals were made in exchange of recognition. Following this, if diplomatic recognition was not granted immediately, intermediary measures and signs of mutual acceptance were made evident, for example through waiving of visa regime, official visits, invitation to important events, regular meetings, affirmative voting in international organisations, and opening of liaison offices. Finally, when the internal and

Performing sovereignty 125 external conditions were fulfilled and were at its tipping point, the formal recognition took place, which had a textual and performative dimension, through sending the official recognition letter or signing diplomatic relations. Parallel to diplomatic recognition, Kosovo’s membership in international organisations served the function of strengthening its independent statehood, expanding access to international bodies, and also benefiting domestically from the wide range of political, economic, and socio-cultural activities that are enabled by this integration in the international community. For Kosovo, membership in regional and international organisations served to build international legitimacy and increased its chances for individual and collective recognition. The diplomatic strategy for joining multilateral bodies has involved using prudent tactics of participating as widely as possible in multilateral sites at the UN, EU, and other regional events to become initially a member of specialised agencies as a step towards membership in the larger parent organisation. This then provided a platform to access multilateral spaces and lobby for further recognition and eventual membership in major organisations. As political-temporal acts, everyday diplomatic performances served the double purpose of acting like a state and simultaneously strengthening the domestic and international attributes of Kosovo’s statehood. The added value of performative diplomacy was the successful adaptation of shifting political circumstances and the ability to decide what course of action to take as events unfolded, especially how to seek alternative trajectories for overcoming the external impediments to Kosovo’s statehood (see Scott 1998: 313). Moreover, Kosovo’s diplomatic performances have been crucial for overcoming political, legal, normative, and socio-cultural barriers and prejudices, which dominated external conceptions of Kosovo and its quest for statehood. This situational resourcefulness – as strategic as it may sound – was a by-product of the daily struggle to cope with obstacles related to the existing inhospitable environment for the birth of new states in the international system. In absence of diplomatic tradition and limited international access, Kosovo was forced to improvise its conduct of foreign policy, which involved the daily impersonation and improvisation of discourses, practices, and enactments that characterise sovereign states. Kosovo’s strategy was ultimately an experiential and tactical knowledge built on many similar or different moments from the past, which were embodied, condensed, and hidden memories, experiences, and events. Hence, key to Kosovo’s diplomatic agency has been flexibility of methods used in reaching out to other states and the persistence and endurance of prolonged and multi-staged process of diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations. This chapter first explores the process of diplomatic recognition to disentangle the core stages, efforts, and tactics which Kosovo had to deploy to secure bilateral recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. The second part then examines Kosovo’s performative diplomacy for participating in and becoming a member of international organisations. The concluding section examines the added value of diplomatic practices for understanding the state-becoming as a performative process.

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Performative agency and the process of diplomatic recognition Although Kosovo hasn’t considered diplomatic recognition constitutive of its statehood, wide international recognition has played a crucial role in facilitating Kosovo’s full integration into the club of sovereign states. As Gary Wilson (2009: 460) points out, “regardless of whether an entity objectively satisfies the criteria of statehood, without the recognition – express or implied – of other states, it is likely to prove difficult to operate as a state within the international system”. In the absence of immediate universal recognition and admission to the UN, seeking bilateral recognition was the only viable way for Kosovo to overcome international contestation and consolidate international sovereignty. Dominant perspectives on state recognition conceive recognition as a single act expressed in a specific time, space and with explicit declarative intent and consequential effects. There is also understanding that a state is either recognised or unrecognised. For instance, Ian Brownlie (2003: 89–90) conceives recognition as “a public act of state” which is “an optional and political act”. David Raič (2002: 35) considers recognition as an act, which is “a legal act in the sense that it is intended to create legal consequences”. Similarly, Mikulas Fabry (2010: 7) considers recognition as “a single act with both legal and political aspects”, similar to “an act of employing military force or an act of imposing economic sanctions or an act of expelling a foreign diplomat”. Milena Sterio (2013: 48) also defines recognition as “a political act exercised by sitting governments of existing states vis-à-vis a newly created entity”. From the perspective of performative diplomacy, diplomatic recognition is not a single and formal act but a complex process, which consists of multiple variations and stages. For example, James Crawford (2007: 27) speaks of multiple individual acts and stages of recognition. Marcelo G. Kohen (2006 :14) also considers the quest for recognition, “not an instant fact”, but “a complex series of claims and decisions, negotiations and/or struggle”. Georges Abi-Saab (2006: 471) further explains that “the creation of the State from the standpoint of international law is always a legal fact and not a legal act, even when this fact is based on a legal act such as a treaty”. Similarly, James Ker-Lindsay (2012: 17) holds that “recognition is the process whereby a state joins the international community of states and is considered to have full sovereign rights and obligations that must be respected by its peers”. Moreover, Stephen Tierney (2013: 376–377) argues that “the recognition of new states emerges from state practice on an individual basis, against the backdrop of international diplomacy”. Therefore, considering recognition as a process rather than an act provides space to disentangle the micro-politics of diplomatic recognition and to account for the complex entangling of political, economic, normative, and institutional rationales at different stages of the recognition process (see Newman and Visoka 2016). During its campaign for recognition, Kosovo devised a processual approach to diplomatic recognition, which consisted in reaching out to other states individually and engage with them for as long as necessary, using both diplomatic and undiplomatic means to encourage the state to confer recognition on Kosovo.1

Performing sovereignty 127 As part of this process, Kosovo categorised states on a scale including: those states who are willing to grant Kosovo formal recognition; states who accepted Kosovo’s independence indirectly through institutional interactions and indirect political and economic cooperation; states that had unclear positions and avoided diplomatic recognition; and states that had a negative and hostile attitude towards Kosovo (MFA of Kosovo 2011: 3). As a Kosovo diplomat puts: There is no single formula that Kosovo has used to secure recognition. In some cases, it is a matter of luck. In other cases, it depends on the agency of diplomatic interlocutors and their influence within their government. Ultimately, the mood of foreign ministers and heads of states also plays a critical role in the recognition process.2 Although each case of seeking recognition was unique and brought its own dynamics and uncertainties, the overall recognition process consisted of four major steps, as illustrated in Table 5.1 below. The first step involved sending the formal request for recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations, followed by standard non-papers and tailored memos outlining why that particular country should recognise Kosovo’s sovereign statehood. Often, countries hesitated to grant Kosovo diplomatic recognition on the basis of the initial request for recognition. In most cases, the second step involved establishing direct contact and arranging a meeting in a bilateral or multilateral setting, where Kosovo could make the case for recognition more assertively and present it in a manner comprehendible for the Table 5.1 The process of diplomatic recognition Process of recognition

Kosovo’s performative diplomacy

1. Request bilateral recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations 2. Establish initial contacts

• Send regular requests for establishing diplomatic relations to individual states • Lobby for recognition through powerful supportive states and sympathetic Western diplomats and statesman • Utilise bilateral and multilateral fora to arrange informal meetings and seek recognition from targeted states • Work proactively and intensively with targeted groups of states and deploy various strategic responses to convince these states to recognise Kosovo • Arrange special visits to the states that have not yet recognised Kosovo • Build personal relations and direct communication with Ministers of Foreign Affairs • Pursue an incremental approach to recognition, and when formal recognition is not possible enter into alternative institutional cooperation arrangements • Ensure that the performative engagement with the supportive target state concludes in the written confirmation of recognition and/or establishing diplomatic relations

3. Conduct official meetings and intensify bilateral cooperation

4. Secure diplomatic recognition and establish diplomatic relations

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interlocutors. In certain instances, Kosovo targeted specific groups of states and regions with the sole purpose of adapting the recognition campaign to the political factors and dynamics specific to these regions and groups of states. Similarly, Kosovo tried to use multilateral spaces to establish links with individual states who were on the unclear or negative end of the recognition scale, while also seeking collective recognition from international organisations. If the target state indicated its willingness to consider recognising Kosovo, then the third step involved more intense bilateral communication, including official visits and face-to-face conversations. This was the most important stage in the process of recognition as it enabled Kosovo’s officials to perform the rich discursive arguments to address any political misconceptions and explain why Kosovo deserves recognition as an independent state. However, in many cases bodily diplomacy was a stepping stone to further diplomatic engagement and talks, which often resulted with the final step of formal recognition. Although many cases followed this linear depiction of Kosovo’s performative process of securing diplomatic recognition, there have also been cases where the efforts stagnated at one of the stages. While seeking recognition, Kosovo’s diplomats realised that there is a multiplicity of variations and possibilities encompassing the practice and politics of diplomatic recognition.3 Kosovo became aware that certain countries would not respond to the request for recognition for reasons pertaining to domestic considerations, geo-political calculations, or cultural distance. Another strand of states would have unclear or neutral positions, considering recognition as an interference in the internal affairs of the former host state (MFA of Kosovo 2011). There have been also states which offered Kosovo diplomatic acceptance without conferring formal recognition or establishing diplomatic relations. This has often taken the form of implied and de facto recognition expressed through institutional and technical cooperation, occasional diplomatic interaction, or voting in favour of Kosovo’s membership in international bodies. In other words, acceptance emerged as a pragmatic way for some states to engage positively with Kosovo without committing to confer formal recognition with its attendant political and legal consequences. Finally, the most advanced form of recognition manifested itself as formal recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. Diplomatic recognition is rarely granted pre-emptively before the aspirant state actively requests it. An exception are cases of consensual secession and those involving internationally-supervised referendums. Accordingly, the first step in seeking recognition involves sending request letters for recognition to all the states. On the same day as the declaration of independence, the President of Kosovo sent letters to all foreign governments requesting the recognition of Kosovo. The letter sent to countries known to be supportive of Kosovo’s independence, including most EU member states, highlighted Kosovo’s irrevocable commitment to implement the UN Special Envoy’s comprehensive proposal, including the constitutional protection of minorities and full cooperation with the international civilian presence (see MFA of Kosovo 2009). On the basis of these assurances, the President of Kosovo invited the foreign governments “to recognize the Republic of Kosovo as an independent state and to establish full

Performing sovereignty 129 diplomatic relations” (President of Kosovo 2008). Performing the request for recognition required combining conventional and unconventional diplomatic practices and habits. On certain occasions the request was made indirectly via another powerful and influential state, regional organisation, or influential personality. As external recognition was not constitutive of Kosovo’s independence, the request for recognition was always phrased as an invitation for the establishment of diplomatic relations, which is a more affiliative synonym for extending diplomatic recognition. Sending requests for establishing diplomatic relations was a regular and everyday diplomatic activity. Kosovo’s diplomatic discourse highlighted that prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations, the natural requisite step would be the recognition of Kosovo’s independence, an act that would enormously help the new State and its people to prosper and join the world’s family of free nations. (MFA of Kosovo 2013b: 1) Kosovo has regularly made diplomatic overtures to countries across the world with the purpose of renewing the request for establishing diplomatic relations, expressing congratulations on national days, offering sympathy at times of national tragedy, and extending an invitation to visit Kosovo or vote in favour of Kosovo’s membership in international bodies. In particular, MFA of Kosovo sent renewed requests for recognition following significant political developments that demonstrated the strengthening of Kosovo’s sovereignty. Such events included: the ICJ advisory opinion on Kosovo’s independence; the end of supervised independence; the signing of the first agreement for the normalisation of relations with Serbia; and the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU.4 This “diplomacy of correspondence” incurred minimal costs and provided Kosovo with the opportunity to test which countries would respond and signal their willingness to recognise Kosovo, but it also created diplomatic space to organise visits or meetings at multilateral events. Requests for establishing diplomatic relations was the first step in the enactment of discursive frameworks elaborated in the previous chapter. As a significant diplomatic text, these letters performed the function of shaping knowledge and changing external perceptions of Kosovo, and intended to ease the willingness of other states to meet Kosovar diplomats and discuss prospects for bilateral recognition. Following the letter requesting recognition, the next stage involved establishing direct contacts with foreign interlocutors, whereby Kosovar diplomats met formally or informally with representatives of targeted states in bilateral or multilateral settings, or exchanged letters for a conventional or non-conventional event. Each year, Kosovo usually identified five to ten “priority” states from whom to seek recognition. However, this varied from one year to another and was determined by factors including: responses to Kosovo’s request for recognition; domestic developments in Kosovo that affected how proactive its diplomacy was in chasing individual countries; the success of Serbia’s counter-recognition diplomacy; and various exogenous events.5 At the heart of Kosovo’s foreign affairs was a performative

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struggle of making choices based on available resources, capacities, and the likelihood for success. Improvisations represent those “moments of practice where the subject may utilize, subvert and reformulate existing discourses in order to produce a new and previously unseen event or practice” (Jeffrey 2013: 32). For Kosovo, conventional diplomatic habits and communication channels were insufficient: hybrid approaches combining convention and unconventional diplomatic practices were required. Kosovo intensified its diplomatic presence in major international capitals, such as New York, London, Paris, and Brussels, which host major international organisations as well as a large diplomatic community in resident embassies.6 Diplomats from friendly states posted in the countries where Kosovo was seeking recognition have been instrumental in sharing their knowledge, contacts, and instructions how to approach the host government in a politically and culturally acceptable manner. During each visit in countries where Kosovo was seeking recognition it held meetings with the embassies of friendly states where situational micro-strategies were devised on how to approach discursively and performatively the political leadership of the host country. To ease and sustain the process of widening diplomatic recognition, Kosovo had to expand its diplomatic representation beyond Europe. Kosovo’s diplomatic network consisting of over 40 diplomatic missions has played a modest role in engaging with the designated ambassadors of countries who haven’t recognised Kosovo and through them Kosovo diplomats have requested bilateral meetings, signing of diplomatic relations, and affirmative votes in multilateral organisations. While fully recognised countries retain resident embassies in countries with whom they desire close ties for geo-political or socio-economic reasons, Kosovo went beyond this conventional diplomatic practice by sometimes opening embassies in regions and continents where direct political, economic, and security interests were of secondary importance: such embassies were opened to prove that Kosovo enjoys global recognition and can access to all the regions of the world. Kosovo’s embassies included: Panama to cover the Western Hemisphere and Latin America; Senegal to cover south-eastern Africa; Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia to cover the Middle East; Australia and Japan to cover Southeast Asia and Pacific region. Kosovo has utilised its embassies to expand its diplomatic network and establish direct contacts with other states through their resident ambassadors or ambassadors stationed in major multilateral capitals.7 While in most of the cases such diplomatic encounters with long-ranking diplomats has not resulted in immediate recognition, they have helped keep Kosovo on their foreign policy agenda and wait for a suitable momentum to intensify the efforts for recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations. During initial interactions in neutral spaces, such as multilateral organisations or at events in major diplomatic centres, Kosovo faced challenges in meeting with foreign diplomats and politicians from countries who had not yet recognised Kosovo as they feared that interacting with Kosovo’s diplomats could be seen as an implicit form of recognition.8 Such neutral spaces were invaluable since Kosovo’s diplomats were often unable to travel to countries who had not recognised Kosovo, as that non-recognition also extended to the Kosovo passport. In

Performing sovereignty 131 such cases, Kosovar diplomats often used other means of communication, such as email exchanges and phone calls following on from initial encounters in a bilateral or multilateral setting. These performative gestures not only involved speech acts but also establishing and strengthening interpersonal relations, making promises and seeking commitments to recognise Kosovo’s independence. Kosovo’s diplomats also engaged in regular phone calls and contact via text message with foreign ministers from small states that were geographically away from Kosovo: such performative acts played an important role in advancing the recognition process.9 The MFA of Kosovo performed an innovative digital diplomacy with a strong presence across social media platforms, notably including Twitter. Often, the effectiveness of Kosovo’s performative diplomacy has been disregarding diplomatic protocols and using unconventional spaces for lobbying for recognition. Kosovo’s foreign minister and other senior diplomats performed new practices of meeting and conversing with their foreign homologues in unconventional sites and through innovative methods. Diplomatic opportunism and flexibility gave rise to an effective approach including unplanned meetings with foreign ministers and heads of states at multilateral gatherings, and unexpected encounters in corridors and lobbies of sites where events took place (see Pouliot 2016). For example, at the margins of a Caribbean states summit Kosovo’s Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj met with Suriname diplomats who then instantly facilitated a meeting with the President of Suriname and his advisers who were sympathetic to Kosovo due to their connections with Turkey and other Islamic states.10 Kosovo was recognised by Suriname next day following their consultation with Brazil as their most powerful neighbour, who apparently did not want to interfere in the process of recognition. Given its slow entry into the multilateral world, one of the challenges for Kosovo’s diplomats was to secure the participation of Kosovo’s political leaders at important international summits and conferences. The quest for recognition has forced Kosovo to attend multilateral events around the globe, which had little political or economic significance other than providing an opportunity to establish contacts with foreign governments, to seek the establishment of diplomatic relations and recognition, and to secure affirmative votes for membership in international organisations. In establishing initial contact with states who had not yet recognised it, Kosovo used multilateral events, such as the annual session of the UN General Assembly or region-specific gatherings organised by the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Organisation of Francophonie.11 On the occasion of the UN General Assembly’s annual session, Kosovo’s Consulate General in New York sent request to countries who had not recognised Kosovo to arrange meeting with Kosovo’s political leaders explicitly raising the possibility of discussing the prospects of establishing diplomatic relations and enhancing relations between the two countries.12 Most of the diplomatic events at which Kosovo lobbied for recognition were held at organisations that Kosovo had not yet joined. Accordingly, the struggle began with seeking a formal invitation where possible, or simply to gain access and to use the margins of these events to hold arranged and

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spontaneous meetings with particular countries. In participating formally or informally in these international events, Kosovo had to seek support from other friendly nations who were either hosting the event or who could invite Kosovo’s representatives as guests. For instance, in 2013 Malawi (who recognised Kosovo in 2009) hosted the SADC Council of Ministers annual meeting and facilitated Kosovo’s attendance. As part of its efforts for consolidating and strengthening the bilateral relations with Southern African countries, Kosovo sent a letter to Malawi’s government expressing its interest to attend this event, arguing that the attendance of Kosovo as an observer and participant of this event would be . . . beneficial for reaching out in the outset of this event to other participating countries and explore ways of establishing mutual bilateral and regional cooperation in the future. (MFA of Kosovo 2013a) In most cases, the diplomatic lobbying took place in the margins of these events, whereby the request for recognition was performed often through informal interactions. Attending regional events was useful for Kosovar diplomats to establish initial contacts with other states and initiate the lobbying campaign for recognition.13 Recognition by Fiji is an example of how Kosovo’s diplomacy utilised regional events as spaces for lobbying for recognition. With the help of Japan and coordination by Kosovo’s Embassy in Tokyo, Kosovo’s Foreign Minister Hoxhaj attended a regional conference of pacific states in August 2012. Kosovo intentionally targeted Fiji as the second largest island in Oceania after New Zealand (MFA of Kosovo 2012a). The face-to-face meeting with Fijian Foreign Minister Ratu Inoke Kubuabola who was sympathetic to Kosovo’s independent statehood was essential momentum in the recognition process. However, according to Fijian institutional procedures, the decision for recognising other states is a competency of the Prime Minister. Following this meeting, Kosovo’s Foreign Minister used an informal reception hosted by the Prime Minister of Fiji with the participants of this regional conference to request the recognition of Kosovo’s independence. In principle, the Prime Minister of Fiji agreed to recognise Kosovo, though it decided to announce the decision at a later stage. After this visit, several months of active lobbying was required with Fijian Permanent Representation at the UN to convince this country to finally recognise Kosovo in November 2012. The critical role played by Kosovo’s performative diplomacy and personal agency of Foreign Minister have been key factors in obtaining Fiji’s recognition of Kosovo. In addition, Kosovo’s geographical location as a European country also was appealing for small states such as Fiji who seek to enhance political and economic relations with the European Union. Furthermore, the absence of counter-recognition campaign by Serbia, Russia, or China provided a futile terrain for Kosovo to obtain recognition by Fiji without investing much diplomatic efforts. The campaign for diplomatic recognition also involved paying visits to the countries from whom Kosovo was seeking recognition. Haiti is a typical example

Performing sovereignty 133 of the power of performative diplomacy, whereby Kosovo has managed to obtain diplomatic recognition during the same visit.14 Kosovo’s MFA arranged directly the visit to Haiti after sustained efforts with the Haitian counterparts. During the meeting in Port-au-Prince, Kosovo’s Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj used his persuasion tactics and managed to convince his Haitian homologue to recognise Kosovo’s independence, including the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations. During this face-to-face diplomatic exchange, Haitian Foreign Minister suggested to announce the recognition of Kosovo in the following week. However, after Kosovar delegation insistence, the Haitian Foreign Minister decided to arrange an additional meeting with the Prime Minister at the Port-au-Prince airport where he was travelling abroad in an official visit. The meeting with Haitian Prime Minister at the airport sealed the recognition process, whereby the announcement and the formal letter of recognition was made public the following day. The key factors behind securing recognition from Haiti was Kosovo’s Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj persistence and seizure of this favourable momentum to formalise the decision during the same visit. This diplomatic prudence Kosovar diplomats learnt from other examples where promises for recognition after official visits were not often kept, and the possibility for complications and delays was ever present. Moreover, Haiti is an illustrative example of the performative character of diplomatic encounters where we have seen the rupture of Kosovo from unrecognised entity into a recognised state during the same visit. When Kosovo’s Foreign Minister and its associates entered Haiti, they were not received from their state protocol but after managing to secure recognition and establish diplomatic relations during the same visit they have left the country as special foreign guests attended by the state protocol. This example and many others are strong evidence that Kosovo’s own proactive diplomatic efforts and bodily diplomacy has been one of the core factors for consolidating Kosovo’s international political, diplomatic and legal personality. Kosovo’s lobbying tactics involved assigning its officials to cultivate warm relationships with political leaders and diplomats from certain regions. Those diplomatic contacts then were called on when Kosovo needed to secure votes for membership in international organisations or to support any other diplomatic initiative (see Hoxhaj 2016). Kosovo’s Foreign Minister, Behgjet Pacolli (2017) stated that “recognition of Kosovo’s statehood is a unique example to be studied in the international law manuals, whereby the combination of international reputation, expertise, and high level friendship with all the countries of the world have determined our success”. In most cases, Kosovo diplomats identified sometimes by chance and sometimes by intention ambassadors or government officials of different seniority who had personal or professional relationships with the president, government, or foreign minister of the country.15 Such networked relationships are especially important for states where, who for cultural and political reasons, diplomatic representatives are often closely linked to the political leaders (see Ringmar 2014). Such personal relationships played an important role in securing recognition and establishing diplomatic relations. Kosovo’s former foreign minister commented that, “one of the most important aspects of Kosovo’s foreign

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policy has been personal diplomacy, which entailed mobilizing Kosovo’s political leadership to communicate with influential international personalities” (Hoxhaj 2016: 136). Face-to-face encounters provided spaces for performing personal diplomacy which represents “a form of diplomatic encounters and interactions among individual leaders in which persuasion, personal ‘chemistry’, mutual trust, gestures, and convictions often play an important role” (Vogt 2017: 9). Multilingualism of some of Kosovo’s diplomats has been the most important asset in certain situations in building personal relations, especially in non-English speaking regions. Identification of common interests, experiences, or educational background have also been important forms of diplomatic socialisation which have open the path for discussing recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Recognition by Togo is an illustrative example of a multi-staged process of recognition where again personal relationships played a crucial role.16 After Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Togo was in the category of states with an undefined stance mainly due to its two-year stint on the UN Security Council, and its strong ties with China, Russia, and to a certain extent Serbia. Kosovo’s efforts to gain recognition from Togo took over a year, starting from lobbying through French and German diplomats and utilising the influence of Senegal and other states part of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). While these supportive structures helped Togo to open communications channels with Kosovo, it was the direct efforts of Kosovo diplomats and the persistent communication at various levels with Togolese diplomats that enabled an official visit by the Kosovo’s Foreign Minister to Lome in January 2014. For domestic reasons, Togolese authorities did not take the decision at that time but promised that they would clarify their position in the near future. Subsequently, Kosovar diplomats utilised global events such as the EU-Africa Summit in Brussels in 2014 and other multilateral gatherings to meet Togolese diplomats and maintain the momentum in favour of a decision to recognise Kosovo. These interactions led to the development of personal relationships between Kosovo and Togolese diplomats which helped the recognition process. In particular, direct and regular communication between the two foreign ministers was crucial for maintaining momentum, though additional pressure from European diplomats following these efforts also contributed. Finally, the decision to recognise Kosovo was taken only after the second visit conducted by Kosovar senior diplomats to Togo in late 2014. Yemen is an interesting example of a complex entanglement of factors shaping their decision for extending diplomatic recognition to Kosovo.17 Since the declaration of independence, Yemen has promised that they will recognise Kosovo in a near future. However, internal regime change and political transition delayed of recognition of Kosovo. While the support from the U.S., Germany, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) was crucial, the direct efforts of Kosovo played the determining role for securing recognition from this country. In securing recognition by Yemen, Kosovo had to visit Sanaa, organise several follow-up meetings as part of UN and OIC conferences, and maintain regular contacts both at the highest political and technical levels. During the diplomatic interactions with Yemeni authorities, Kosovo’s Foreign Minister highlighted that Kosovo

Performing sovereignty 135 has been recognised by the two-thirds of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation member states as well as all member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (United Arab Emirates, Kingdom of Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Sultanate of Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait). Kosovo’s Foreign Minister then highlighted historical similarities between two countries, having struggled for freedom and self-determination, and experience foreign rule and occupation and only achieved statehood in the recent past. As with all other Muslim countries, Kosovo’s Foreign Minister brought up religious affiliations and pointed out that recognition of Kosovo’s independence would be a moral recognition of Kosovo citizens cultural and religious rights, which would open the prospects for diplomatic and economic relations between two countries. Finally, after over six months of targeted efforts, Yemen took the decision to recognise Kosovo in June 2013. Later, a Yemeni diplomat confessed that their decision was delayed by internal tensions, and particularly the pressure that came from Russian diplomatic envoys in Yemen.18 What made the difference in cases where there was polarised pressure from supporters and opponents of Kosovo independence is the direct efforts and persistence of Kosovo’s diplomacy. During diplomatic performances, Kosovo had limited resources and power to shape other countries’ positions. Symbolic power and emotional diplomacy performed strategically became a valuable tool for Kosovo in the quest for diplomatic recognition. It intended to impress other states and shape their attitude towards Kosovo. Todd H. Hall (2015: 16) defines emotional diplomacy as “coordinated state-level behavior aimed at officially and explicitly projecting the image of a particular emotional response towards other states”. Hall (2015: 31) explains that “emotional diplomacy can shape how state actors perceive one another, how they act, and how they react. The potential results are substantive outcomes that we would not expect, nor could be achieved, with the traditionally theorized tools of statecraft”. Kosovo’s diplomacy of affinity was expressed through official statements, communications by political leaders, behaviour during official visits, and interactions in multilateral forums. To build political empathy, Kosovo used various public diplomacy strategies to reach out to various audiences within non-recognising countries, to facilitate decision-making by these governments. In interactions with countries that recognised Kosovo’s independence, Kosovo promoted a discourse of gratitude for recognising its independence and for supporting its campaign for obtaining further recognition (see MFA of Kosovo 2014a). The discourse of appreciation for recognising Kosovo performed the function of recognising the other state’s international agency and justifying their foreign policy conduct. For instance, what maintained the U.S. support for Kosovo over the years was not only its stability-seeking foreign policy or economic interests in the Balkans but also the affectionate friendship developed with Kosovar society. With other more distant regions, Kosovo also expressed the diplomacy of sympathy to other countries for both celebratory occasions and for disastrous situations. This mode of support, sympathy, sorrow, and concern intended to solidify relations with existing partners and open possibilities for interaction with other countries. The diplomacy of affinity performed through emotional solidarity presented

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Kosovo with the possibility of requesting recognition without need to reciprocate or offer favours in return. Performing the request for recognition entailed articulating arguments that would resonate with the interlocutor by identifying common reference points and citing historical analogies from their country or region to draw parallels with Kosovo’s struggle for statehood (see Table 5.2). The diplomatic narratives were rehearsed and turned into diplomatic story-telling practices. Story-telling performances, as Ingvild Bode (2015: 5) maintains, are often a “chronologically structured narrative interpretation of reality around the constitutive or regulative ideas they seek to promote”. Kosovo’s diplomats did not have a single common narrative explaining why their interlocutors should recognise Kosovo or support its bid to join international organisations. They rather drew on a repertoire consisting of situated narratives that were adjusted to the type of interlocutors, their geographical, cultural, and political background. The narrative sometimes evolved in the course of conversation. The purpose of diplomatic performances is to shape the position of a particular audience. In Kosovo’s case the audience were the diplomatic interlocutors from whom it was seeking recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. The discourses discussed in the previous chapter were used prudently by Kosovo’s diplomats to resonate with certain geo-cultural regions and were adjusted to the foreign policy values of the diplomatic interlocutors. For instance, when lobbying democratic states within Europe, North America, and beyond, Kosovo invoked the discourse of a successful statebuilding process, highlighting Kosovo’s promotion of democracy, stability, minority protection, and socio-economic development. In diplomatic interactions with Asian states that cherish state sovereignty and authority, Kosovo’s diplomats highlighted its functioning as sovereign state that had no intention of interfering with other country’s internal affairs. When approaching states in Africa and Latin America who shared histories of national self-determination after colonialism, Kosovo’s diplomatic discourse focussed on presenting: Kosovo as a colony under the Serb regime; how Kosovo experienced apartheid; how Kosovo’s citizens demonstrated their will for self-determination; and Kosovo’s willingness to promote regional peace and stability. In its diplomatic interactions with Middle Eastern and Arab states, Kosovo highlighted its Ottoman past and the influence of Islam in the Western Balkans, as well highlighting Kosovo’s commitment to the religious tolerance. When engaging with remote small states, Kosovo used the discourse of solidarity, state resilience, and self-sufficiency. The performative function of this differentiated approach was the creation of a knowledge-base which granted Kosovo with an ability to adapt to different diplomatic cultures without much difficulty. These differentiated discourses and approach have been crucial for Kosovo’s diplomatic campaign. As Appendix 3 shows, Kosovo has been recognised by 34 countries from Eurasia, 34 countries from Asia-Pacific, 27 countries from Africa, and 19 countries from Americas. Another important aspect of Kosovo’s performative diplomacy has been the documentation of meetings with photographs and other audio-visual means, where handshakes, flags, and body language played a crucial role in portraying

Table 5.2 Kosovo’s differentiated narrative for attracting diplomatic recognition World regions

Key foreign policy values

Kosovo’s contextualised arguments for recognition

Euro-Atlantic community

• Democracy, human rights, market economy, peace and stability, and minority protection

Asia

• Sovereignty, external non-interference, security, and strong state authority.

Africa and Latin America

• National selfdetermination, decolonialism, economic development and modernization, and strong state borders.

Middle-east

• Religious identity, sovereignty, and military and economic security.

Oceania-Pacific

• Small state resilience, socio-economic development, supportive of multilateralism.

• Kosovo is a successful case of statebuilding as it has built a multiethnic, democratic and secular state, as enshrined by its constitution • Kosovo provides advanced rights and protection for minorities • Kosovo has developed its economy, liberal civil society and is a stable and secure state • Kosovo complies with its international obligations and contributes to regional stability • Kosovo is a sovereign and independent state that fulfils the modern criteria for statehood • Kosovo does not have any intention to interfere in the internal affairs of other states • Kosovo is one of the most stable states in the Western Balkans region • Kosovo was a colony under the Serbian regime and experienced state-sponsored apartheid • Kosovo independence is the fulfilment of Kosovo’s right to external self-determination and the will of the people • Kosovo has a clearly defined border with its neighbours and does not interfere in the internal affairs of other states • Kosovo could become a European partner for Africa in the future • Throughout history, Kosovo has been a multi-ethnic, multi-religious place with significant interfaith tolerance • Although Kosovo is a secular state, Serbia intentionally destroyed its Islamic heritage • Recognising Kosovo implies recognising the historical legacy and identity of Islam in the Western Balkans region • Kosovo is a small state and small states should stick together • Kosovo can be a European partner for other small states

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Kosovo as a sovereign and equal member of the international community. Diplomatic discourses without visual and aesthetical aspects represent an insufficient depiction of the world. The power of images was often more important than the substance of diplomatic conversations. Recent work on visual assemblages in international relations explain that images work more indirectly, by performing the political, by setting the ‘conditions of possibility’ for politics . . . they shape what can and cannot be seen, and thus also what can and cannot be thought, said and done in politics. (Bleiker 2014: 80) Visuality helps not only undercover everyday diplomatic practices, but also depicts diplomatic sites, emotions, and relations (see Neumann 2013: 151). For example, shaking hands with significant international personalities served multiple functions. Images with the U.S. and European leaders reinforced Kosovo’s acceptance by major international powers who supported and recognised its independence. It signalled the continuous legitimation of Kosovo as a young democracy. Photographs with powerful statesmen affiliated Kosovo with powerful countries and portrayed Kosovo as an equal and reliable partner within the international community. While photographs of handshakes between Kosovo’s president, prime minister, and foreign minister, and their homologues illustrated good bilateral ties, group photographs signified Kosovo’s equal place among other recognised states. In certain instances, Kosovar diplomats have shared images of meetings with representatives of countries that have not recognised Kosovo to signal eventual recognition. The “handshake diplomacy” compensated for Kosovo’s lack of formal recognition and depicted the possibility of future diplomatic relations. Kosovo’s aesthetic diplomatic engagement helped to state facts and uncontested truths such as confirming that the meeting took place, but the images cannot tell us exactly what happened, which leaves space for speculation, exaggeration, and misrepresentation. Such ambiguities have been essential for Kosovo to project power without possessing international power, to reflect visual and discursive influence without factual abilities and responsibility for them. For external audiences, photo diplomacy visually demonstrated that Kosovo is an accepted member of the international community and intended to put pressure on countries who have not recognised Kosovo to do so. For internal audiences, such visual diplomacy intended to strengthen collective ontological security that Kosovo is not an isolated country; this also helped boost the popularity of political leaders, because in Kosovo, external legitimation is as important as domestic legitimation through electoral processes. There have been instances that half way in the process of recognition Kosovo and its international allies failed to convince other states to recognise Kosovo. Botswana is another example of the limitations of performative diplomacy and the influence of regional entanglements, which will be discussed more broadly in the next chapter. Kosovo’s Foreign Minister Hoxhaj managed to arrange a visit to Botswana with the support of its international allies, where intensive

Performing sovereignty 139 talks with Botswanan counterpart failed to persuade them to recognise Kosovo’s independence. Follow-up efforts via phone diplomacy and diplomatic lobbying by influential states were unsuccessful. However, Botswana’s stance on Kosovo’s independence was widely influenced by the position of neighbouring South Africa, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Zambia who haven’t recognised Kosovo’s independence yet. In addition, change of government resulted in the loss of the momentum for recognition. However, when states denied recognition or membership in international organisations. Kosovo did not have the comfort of punishing or demonstrating anger towards other states. Rather, Kosovo had to take a pragmatic approach by promoting positive emotions, such as appreciation, sympathy, and empathy, which intended to promote the politics of attachment and overcome estrangement caused by a lack of diplomatic and social contact and counter-recognition forces. At this point, the power of foreign ministers within the government and their personal relationship with the president also can play a role in accelerating or slowing down the process of recognition. Although Kosovo aspired to conclude its diplomatic engagement with other states with formal recognition and the signing of diplomatic relations, the other states often needed more time or had domestic constraints that needed to be resolved. Short of formal recognition, entering institutional cooperation arrangements was a promising alternative. In international relations, a lack of recognition does not signify the absence of formal or non-formal diplomatic communication between governments, and often this space for interaction is utilised tactically by aspiring states to bargain and negotiate eventual diplomatic recognition. If the recognition did not proceed immediately, intermediary measures and signs of mutual acceptance were performed. Kosovo was open to interim arrangements such as engagement without recognition with certain countries of specific significance as an intermediary stage in the hope of eventual formal recognition. Acceptance without recognition entails diplomatic communication and exchange, as well as institutional and technical cooperation. Colin Warbrick (2003: 248) explains that “states can find ways of conducting relations with entities they do not recognise where practical considerations so dictate”. Institutional cooperation has taken different shapes with each of these states, and examples of this institutional cooperation include: recognising Kosovo’s passport; regular diplomatic exchanges in bilateral and multilateral settings; undertaking arrangements for economic cooperation; operating liaison offices; officially receiving Kosovo’s most senior government and diplomatic officials; and supporting Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations (see Newman and Visoka 2016). Kosovo’s engagement with these non-recognisers intended to keep the channels of communication open, establish institutional cooperation in order to eventually create the momentum and suitable conditions for recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. Relevant examples of acceptance through institutional cooperation are Greece, Slovakia, and Romania: these countries have not yet recognised Kosovo but have accepted institutional cooperation with Kosovo as a temporary measure for delaying or substituting formal

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recognition. They recognise Kosovo’s passports and have diplomatic offices in Kosovo, as well as maintain political and diplomatic contacts in regular basis. Acceptance and institutional cooperation is not an end point but a hallmark in the recognition process. The Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar announced in 2010 the establishment of diplomatic relations with Kosovo after having voted in favour of Kosovo’s membership to the World Bank, and after having recognised passports issued by the Government of Kosovo (State of Qatar 2010). The recognition of Kosovo’s independence by Singapore took almost two years which required a complex performative diplomacy.19 The first serious diplomatic contacts between Kosovo and Singapore were established as part of a UN-organised event in New York where Kosovo was lobbying for UNESCO membership. As Kosovo does not have a strong presence in South-east Asia, communication with Singaporean middle ranking diplomats was channelled via e-mails and phone conversations. This obviously wasn’t a smooth and easy process, but with sustained persistence of Kosovo diplomats it was an economically efficient method of lobbying. The entry point was to explore possibilities for deepening institutional cooperation as an incremental process towards full diplomatic recognition. At this stage, personal sympathy for Kosovo among Singaporean diplomats was the key factor which has placed Kosovo in Singapore’s foreign policy radar. The discussion on institutional cooperation focussed on the mutual recognition of passports as an important step to facilitated travel, trade, and educational exchanges between two societies. What convinced Singaporean diplomats to recognise Kosovo passports was a document sent by Kosovo diplomats listing countries who have recognised Kosovo passports, including those countries with which Kosovo doesn’t have diplomatic relations. Though, Singaporean diplomats to recognise Kosovo’s passport required additional diplomatic contacts and exchanges as part of multilateral forums. At this point, what shaped Singapore’s decision to recognise Kosovo’s independence was also their interest to conclude free trade agreement with the EU, where the recognition of Kosovo as a European state was a positive gesture well-received by a good number of EU member states. Finally, in August 2016, Singapore recognised Kosovo’s passport which ultimately implied recognition of Kosovo’s sovereign statehood and constituted an important basis for negotiating the establishment of diplomatic relations, which eventually took place during December 2017.20 The final stage of performative diplomacy was formal recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. The act of recognition as the final stage in a lengthy process has a textual and performative dimension. In certain cases, the recognition letter concluded the process, while in other cases a ceremonial event was organised. In most cases, the recognition note was communicated directly to Kosovo’s MFA or to one of its embassies in capitals hosting multilateral organisations. However, in certain cases, the recognition letter was passed on via a third country.21 In other instances, Kosovo’s leaders had to go and collect the recognition letter and undergo a public diplomatic performance in accordance with local diplomatic traditions. For example, when Guyana took the decision to

Performing sovereignty 141 recognise Kosovo, it required Kosovo’s Foreign Minister to visit the country to establish diplomatic relations as a condition for granting recognition. Similarly, Togo’s Foreign Minister requested to visit Kosovo to communicate the decision for recognising Kosovo and establishing diplomatic relations. In the final stage, countries born out of the decolonisation process without strong diplomatic traditions who took political decision to recognise Kosovo often have asked Kosovo diplomats to supply sample texts of recognition as they did not know how to frame such valuable diplomatic documents. While Kosovo was often satisfied with obtaining diplomatic recognition, in the long run it also worked to establish diplomatic relations with countries that have recognised Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state. Establishing diplomatic relations was seen as the next stage to “strengthen the position as a full member of the international community” as well as to open up opportunities for “other important benefits, such as foreign investment, trade exchanges” (Government of Kosovo 2015: 43). For most of the time, the process of securing recognition wasn’t smooth for Kosovo, and there were many failed attempts. In contemporary politics, state recognition is not driven by normative and legal principles, but it is a process shaped by domestic and global political interests. In most of the cases, matters concerning recognition of other states involve preparation of a legal and political statement by the minister of foreign affairs justifying to the cabinet of ministers, president’s office, and the parliament why they should recognise another country. Often, the ability to recognise other states serves existing states to affirm their power, to reinforce their authority, and bargaining power for advancing their foreign policy goals (Anghie 2004: 100). Erik Ringmar (2014: 447) argues that “it was through practices of recognition, affirming sameness, and through practices of non-recognition, affirming difference, that international society came to constitute itself as such”. In the struggle for recognition, Kosovo was the unequal party that was obliged to request recognition while awaiting the response and potential demands of stronger parties. Notwithstanding these achievements, Kosovo’s struggle for recognition has shown that in unusual instances, countries can revert their decision and de-recognise Kosovo and break diplomatic relations. De-recognition is defined as a political decision to withdraw or revoke the recognition of international legal sovereignty of a state or government. In general, Kosovo couldn’t afford “checkbook” diplomacy or provide foreign aid in exchange of recognition due to its own poor economic condition. Most of the recognitions are merit of Kosovo’s proactive diplomacy coupled with extensive support from powerful and prestigious states. However, Kosovo’s weak economy and the lack of trade with many regions meant that the recognition was granted on intangible prospects for future political and economic cooperation. Kosovo received recognition by these countries but failed to continue establishing diplomatic relations and deepening bilateral relations. In certain instances, Kosovo has offered scholarships, supported small social and technical projects, as well as shared its expertise as antecedent grounds for a niche diplomacy. The lack of Kosovo’s resources to deepen bilateral relations with many countries represented a constant threat that with the growing economic

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incentives of Russia and Serbia they could reverse the decision and de-recognise Kosovo’s independence. Serbian and Russian diplomats have constantly tried to use their political and economic leverages to prevent, delay, or reverse the decisions for recognising Kosovo. There are also cases of visits taking place after Kosovo’s request for recognition as well as protest notes for accepting Kosovar representatives or taking the decision to recognise Kosovo. This was the case for example with Suriname, whereby Serbia’s and Russia’s active diplomacy pushed this country to revise its stance on Kosovo. In late 2017, Russia together with Serbia convinced Suriname to withdraw the recognition of Kosovo independence, a move which was received with great concern among Kosovo authorities and its international allies. Suriname originally recognised Kosovo in July 2016 after a sustained lobbying campaign by Kosovo diplomacy through the OIC and other allies. Back then, Suriname not only “decided to recognise the Republic of Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state”, but also offered to further “the establishment of diplomatic relations” (MFA of Suriname 2016). However, on 27 October 2017, Suriname sent a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo informing that “after careful consideration, the Government of the Republic of Suriname has decided to revoke the recognition of Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state” (MFA of Suriname 2017). In an immediate visit to Belgrade, Suriname’s Minister of the Interior Mohamed Neorsalim justified de-recognition with their alleged principled stance on noninterference in internal affairs of friendly countries. Caught by surprise, Kosovo initially denied receiving the revocation letter from Suriname, while Serbia praised it as an important development for reversing the course of recognition of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. Serbia’s Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić considered this as “a historic event for us – we haven’t achieved this with money since we don’t have it, nor by exerting pressure since we are not able to do so – but through our dedication instead” (MFA of Serbia 2017). Yet, despite claims by Serbia that there wasn’t any economic incentive involved, Suriname openly admitted that their decision to de-recognise Kosovo “represents a good basis for the development of bilateral cooperation between Serbia and Suriname, especially in the field of the economy” (Government of Serbia 2017). The U.S. immediately sent a demarche to the Government of Suriname expressing disappointment to rescind its 2016 recognition of Kosovo, calling on them to recognise Kosovo as a rightful member of the international community on the grounds that de-recognition of Kosovo risks undermining regional stability in the Balkans and undermine U.S. and EU’s efforts to normalise the relations between Kosovo and Serbia. This shows that the process of recognition and de-recognition is a performative process, which shows that enactment of statehood is contingent to constant reiteration of sovereign conduct in world politics.

Performing international participation and membership As discussed so far, diplomatic recognition served the function of confirming global acknowledgment that Kosovo fulfilled the statehood criteria, and indicated

Performing sovereignty 143 a wide willingness to accept Kosovo into the club of sovereign states with equal rights and duties under international law. However, the enactment of sovereign statehood required participating and joining international organisations. The primary goal of Kosovo’s membership in international organisations was to expand international legitimacy and solidify statehood. Traditionally, diplomatic recognition of new states is granted by other sovereign states, but with the rise of regional organisations and supranational bodies new practices of state recognition are emerging. Across all debates on state recognition, membership in international organisations amounts to indirect recognition by its constituent member states (Dugard 1987; Raič 2002). Admission to the UN confirms membership in the international community and provides additional confirmation of sovereign statehood largely because, “after the decision has been taken to admit a state to the United Nations, its statehood cannot be called into question with the effect of contesting the validity of mutual rights and obligations arising from membership” (Hillgruber 1998: 492). James Ker-Lindsay (2012: 16) maintains that “membership of various international organizations, even if statehood is not a requirement for membership, can confer a great deal of legitimacy on a breakaway state”. Malcolm Shaw (2008: 466’) argues that “membership of the United Nations constitutes powerful evidence of statehood. But that, of course, is not binding upon other member states”. Deon Geldenhuys 2009: 22) maintains that in diplomatic practices, “admission to full UN membership is tantamount to collective de jure recognition”. However, Colin Warbrick (2003: 251) explains that “while admission to membership – may be a confirmation of statehood, non-membership does not necessarily imply that an entity is not a state”. James Crawford (2007: 194) adds to this, “statehood and UN membership are not to be conflated. It is one thing to say that statehood is regulated under law; quite another to claim that it has been bureaucratized under the auspices of an international organization”. In contemporary world politics, denying a state membership in an international organisation is often related to that state’s unsatisfactory fulfilment of certain organisation-specific criteria, which are increasingly related to breaches of norms relating to human rights and democracy (Duxbury 2011: 4). The main challenge for Kosovo has not been fulfiling the mission of international organisations of which it was seeking membership, but rather political obstacles set by Serbia and its allies. By all accounts, Kosovo satisfies all the criteria required for admission to the UN. It fulfils the core criteria of statehood as inscribed in the Montevideo Convention; it has demonstrated that it is a peace-loving state by virtue of its commitment to democracy, human and minority rights, and its commitment to the peaceful resolution of outstanding issues within the region, as well as its willingness and ability to accept the obligations of the UN Charter.22 In the case of Kosovo, the main obstacle to securing a UN seat are the veto powers of Russia and China in the Security Council and the considerable support enjoyed by Serbia within the UN System. It is also uncertain whether the necessary two-thirds of states represented in the UN General Assembly would support Kosovo’s bid for UN admission. In other organisations, Serbia has utilised its position as an insider and as a member state to vote and lobby against Kosovo’s participation

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and membership in various international bodies. This included building temporary alliances with other states to vote against Kosovo’s bid for membership, as well as discursive and legal battles to interpret legal and procedural rules restrictively to quash Kosovo’s bid for membership. Aware of these external constrains, Kosovo and its partner states aspired to secure recognition from two thirds of UN member states as a symbolic figure, which would influence other countries to recognise Kosovo thereby opening the path for full membership in international organisations, including the UN (see Assembly of Kosovo 2013). Kosovo’s participation and membership in regional and international bodies amounted to implicit recognition of its independent statehood. Article 7 of the Montevideo Convention defined recognition as any tacit act which “implies the intention of recognizing the new state”.23 Acts of implied recognition can include a broad range of acts, including: concluding bilateral and multilateral treaties; exchanging diplomatic representatives; participating in international conferences; and participating in multilateral treaties and international organisations (Chen 1951: 191; International Law Commission 2003: 55). Kosovo was aware that its involvement in international organisations would perform several functions, such as: establishing new contacts with countries that have not yet recognised Kosovo; reducing costs arising from bilateral diplomacy; benefiting from privileges and developmental opportunities arising from membership; and expanding opportunities to join other international organisations (Government of Kosovo 2015: 47). The lack of collective recognition and its consequent exclusion from the main multilateral organisations forced Kosovo to engage in a campaign of diplomatic dissidence. According to Svenja Gertheiss and Stefanie Herr (2017: 10), international dissidence involves “not only substantively divergent claims but also a rejection of the international legal framework (or the dominant interpretation of this) and a recourse to disruptive means”. Kosovo’s strategy of diplomatic dissidence consisted of a hybrid approach of adapting to and complying with certain norms, rules and institutions, while challenging, changing, and subverting other international norms and practices in pursuit of its diplomatic goals.24 For better or worse, the lack of universal and codified rules on state recognition has enabled Kosovo to exploit the loopholes of the existing conservative international order and orthodoxies surrounding self-determination, sovereignty, and the admission of new states to international society. While Serbia intended to politicise Kosovo’s quest for recognition and membership in international organisations, Kosovo tried to depoliticise the process and make it congruent with international law and existing state practice. The tactic of depoliticisation was a self-styled dissidence to disrupt and divide its opponents. Kosovo’s strategy of dissidence enabled it to secure membership in regional organisations and specialised international agencies, and to become a party to international treaties. Between 2008 and 2017, Kosovo became a member of around 60 regional and international organisations (see Table 5.3). Unable to join the most influential international and regional organisations, Kosovo focussed its efforts for obtaining membership in multilateral bodies through joining regional initiatives

Performing sovereignty 145 Table 5.3 Kosovo’s membership in international organisations (2008–2017) International Organisation

Admission year

Political, Economic, and Cultural Organisations Energy Community* European Common Aviation Area (ECAA)* International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Bank (WB) European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) Organisation of Francophonie (OIF) World Customs Organisations (WCO) Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)

2006 2006 2009 2009 2012 2013 2014 2017 2016

Regional Organisations and Initiatives (Western Balkans) Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) Migration, Asylum and Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI) South-East Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP) Western Balkans 6 Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO)

2013 2014 2015 2015 2017

International Sporting Federations International Olympic Committee (IOC) International Federation of Football Associations (FIFA) Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) Including membership in over 40 other international and European sporting associations and federations

2014 2016

International Conventions, Treaties, and Agreements Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)* Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU Apostille Convention

2007 2016 2016

*Membership before the declaration of independence, during the UN administration.

on trade, political cooperation, healthcare, security, transport, and environment. To ensure its entry into international society “through the backdoor”, Kosovo constantly improvised its intentions, capacities, and strategies for membership in international organisations. This was partially to bypass external constraints set by international political and legal exclusionary rules, while also a by-product of limited domestic resources, expertise, and experience in handling international affairs (see MFA of Kosovo 2014c). Its liminal international status pushed Kosovo to perform improvisation, which in turn contributed to the development of new modes of diplomatic resourcefulness. Kosovo’s performative strategy for membership in international bodies consisted of prioritising those organisations where most members recognise Kosovo’s independence, while ensuring that no veto mechanisms could be used by Kosovo’s adversaries. What followed was a targeted campaign conducted at the bilateral and multilateral level to secure

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votes from each member state. Within international organisations, Kosovo’s only way to overcome procedural and institutional blockages was to work informally with representatives of friendly states within multilateral structures to exchange information, provide support and guidance, and coordinate the participation and application process (MFA of Kosovo 2012b: 12). In each case, a sponsor state was identified within each organisation, who advocated on behalf of Kosovo within the internal structure of organisations to help advance Kosovo’s membership. When selecting sponsors for multilateral affairs, Kosovo generally chose small and medium states that enjoyed international credibility, were smart diplomatic powers, and who hosted international organisations. In most cases, Kosovo focussed its diplomatic tactics on identifying legal loopholes for membership in specialised international agencies. As part of its long-term campaign to join the Council of Europe, Kosovo first became a member of the Council of Europe Development Bank and the Venice Commission. Joining these bodies were important steps for Kosovo on the path towards full membership in the Council of Europe; one of the key pan-European institutions along with the European Union. Membership in the Venice Commission served as a useful platform for strengthening democracy, constitutional and electoral reforms. Similarly, in 2015 Kosovo managed to become a party to the Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legislation for Foreign Public Documents, or known also as Apostille Convention, as well as admission to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, also known as the Convention of 1907 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.25 Beyond its functional benefits for Kosovo citizens and for consular services abroad, membership of these two bodies intended to send the message that Kosovo is gradually integrating itself into the international legal community. A statement issued by the MFA of Kosovo (2015), emphasises that by joining this organization Kosovo will strengthen further its international subjectivity, same time, our state obtains another additional important instrument to treat and settle different international disputes with states or other public or private parties. On January 2017, Kosovo became a contracting party to the Convention Establishing a Customs Co-operation Council, through which it became a member of the World Customs Organization. Kosovo’s accession involved depositing the instruments of accession to the Belgian Government in accordance with the Convention. Consideration was given for Kosovo to deposit notices of succession to various UN treaties prior to applying for admission as a UN member state for those instances where the UN Security Council could be avoided.26 In other cases, Kosovo’s acts of diplomatic dissidence included seeking to modify the rules for the admission of new members, playing within the existing rules of the game by securing membership via invitation from an existing member, and entering an organisation by exploiting procedural and legal loopholes. For example, membership in regional bodies such as the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) and the

Performing sovereignty 147 South-East Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP) resulted only after Kosovo managed to change the statutory criteria for membership in these regional bodies. Unable to join major international organisations, Kosovo gradually moved to use the Vienna Formula, which enabled Kosovo to become a party of international treaties. For Kosovo, thus far, the most promising avenue to confirm its membership in the international community was to pursue integration into the European Union. Tanisha M. Fazal and Ryan D. Griffiths (2014: 93) rightly argue that “of all the regional and global economic international organisations existing today, the European Union appears to provide the biggest gain for its members”. Similarly, Geldenhuys (2009: 22) argues that “admission to regional organizations such as the EU amounts to further joint de jure recognition”. The perspective for Kosovo’s EU membership was confirmed by the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit, which confirmed that all countries of the Western Balkans had an EU perspective. For Kosovo, EU accession not only represents a unique opportunity for political, economic, and social development, but joining would also help Kosovo to overcome its contested statehood and partial international isolation. The process for joining the EU is complex and lengthy, involving comprehensive political and economic reforms, as well as the harmonisation of national legislation with the EU’s Acquis Communautaire – the accumulated body of EU law and obligations. However, it has taken countries in the Eastern Europe and Western Balkans at least ten years to fulfil the membership criteria to join the European Union. Although, the perspective for EU integration remains open for Kosovo, five EU member states continue to withhold recognition from Kosovo for their own domestic reasons, such as secessionist regions with minorities seeking broader autonomy. These countries include: Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain. The other 23 EU member states, which have recognised Kosovo and have established diplomatic relations, have acted in accordance with the EU’s instruction to proceed to recognise Kosovo in accordance with their national practices (see Newman and Visoka 2018). Yet, lack of collective recognition of Kosovo by the EU did not constitute an obstacle for the EU to offer Kosovo a perspective for eventual membership. In support of this stance, the European Parliament through numerous non-binding resolutions has openly called “those EU Member States which have not already done so to recognise the independence of Kosovo” (European Parliament 2009), “in order to make EU policies more effective for all the people in Kosovo” (European Parliament 2010). In dealing with Kosovo, the EU used most of the instruments, procedures, and criteria that it used with other sovereign states in the region in the accession process. After a lengthy waiting period, in 2015 Kosovo signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, which is considered an important stage prior to applying for candidate states and opening accession talks. Prior to this important event, in 2012 the EU undertook a feasibility study whether Kosovo’s can become a future member of the EU. The European Commission’s legal opinion concluded that “the possibility for the Union to conclude international agreements is not limited to generally recognised independent states or international organisations”, therefore “there is no legal obstacle for the Union to

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conclude on that basis an association agreement with Kosovo” (European Commission 2012: 3). Furthermore, the European Commission concluded that “the fact that some Member States do not recognise Kosovo as an independent state does not constitute a legal obstacle for the Kosovo authorities to implement the obligations that would arise from an association agreement” (European Commission 2012: 34; see also European Parliament 2016). Although the SAA is an early stage in the membership process, for Kosovo it represented important momentum in its quest to perform sovereign statehood. The SAA is the most important and wide-ranging international agreement that Kosovo has signed since its declaration of independence. Kosovo is expected to benefit from the SAA with the EU in four key dimensions: 1) establishing contractual relations with the European Union and solidifying the pathway to eventual full accession into the EU; 2) strengthening political, economic, security, and cultural relations between Kosovo and the EU institutions and its member states; 3) enhancing country’s political, economic, and social modernisation; and 4) expanding space for Kosovo’s participation and membership in the international community (Visoka 2017). The scope of new forms of cooperation with the EU provides Kosovo with an opportunity to expand its political cooperation with the EU across several levels on all foreign and security policy matters, including diplomatic recognition, membership in international organisations and treaty bodies, as well as policy alignment. Undoubtedly, this segment of the SAA is one of the most promising aspects to support Kosovo’s full integration into the international democratic community. Furthermore, the SAA enables Kosovo to strengthen bilateral ties and enhance cooperation with the EU institutions and its member states, as well as seek the EU’s support in advancing its regional policy and consolidating the external dimensions of statehood.27 All countries in the Western Balkans who are in the process of joining the EU were required, in the period leading to accession, to progressively align their policies towards third countries (non-EU states), and their positions within international organisations with the policies and positions adopted by the EU and its member states. Article 11 of the SAA provides Kosovo the possibility of “convergence with certain Common Foreign and Security Policy measures”. This entails the harmonisation of Kosovo’s bilateral, regional, and multilateral policies with the EU’s common positions on a broad range of external relations. Moreover, the new contractual relationship with the EU provides Kosovo with some space for political consultations regarding its application for membership in certain regional and international bodies that would facilitate a more effective approximation of Kosovo’s foreign policy with the EU’s common foreign, security, defence policies. The EU undertakes to promote “Kosovo’s participation in the international democratic community, should objective circumstances so permit” (European Commission 2015: 15). For Kosovo to participate in the international democratic community implies membership in major regional and international organisations, such as the UN, the Council of Europe, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The EU has already supported Kosovo’s membership in regional bodies that were considered necessary for facilitating its European integration process.

Performing sovereignty 149 Kosovo has also received support for membership in multilateral bodies from a wide number of EU member states, including from those that have not formally recognised Kosovo’s independence. As part of foreign policy alignment, countries within the Western Balkans region were expected to contribute to the EU’s crisis management operations and conflict prevention missions. Similarly, Kosovo has the possibility to gradually participate in the EU’s crisis management operations. This would not only enhance Kosovo’s international image as a promoter of international peace and stability, but would also serve as strong evidence of Kosovo’s peace-loving character, an essential criteria for admission to the UN. Building on its own experience of post-conflict reconstruction, Kosovo can provide technical expertise of peacebuilding and support local civil society groups to undertake international track-two diplomacy initiatives. Moreover, countries in the region that have undergone the Stabilisation and Association Process were required to align with and contribute to the EU’s conflict prevention policy by supporting the EU’s conflict resolution efforts in the region, as well as providing technical expertise and assistance to the EU’s humanitarian and development actions. Within the SAA framework, the EU expects that aspirant countries align their policy with the EU’s policy towards third countries, align with the EU’s positions within major international organisations, and build direct political links with third countries with whom the EU has political, economic, and strategic interests. Many countries within the Caucasus region, North Africa, and major emerging powers that are covered by the EU’s external policies have not yet recognised Kosovo’s independence. Therefore, during the EU integration process Kosovo has the possibility to reach out to these countries, and through a functionalist and collaborative EU assistance process, expand the scope of Kosovo’s international integration and recognition. Kosovo at least can utilise informally the EU’s delegations and embassies of member states stationed in third countries or multilateral organisations to expand diplomatic presence and engagement as a crucial step for strengthening its international standing. Despite establishing contractual relations with the EU, Kosovo’s path to EU membership most likely will encounter political and legal obstacles posed by the five EU member states that have withheld the recognition of Kosovo (RIDEA 2017). Article 2 of the SAA explicitly states that none of the terms, wording or definitions used in this Agreement, including the Annexes and Protocols thereto, constitute recognition of Kosovo by the EU as an independent State nor does it constitute recognition by individual Member States of Kosovo in that capacity where they have not taken such a step. (European Commission 2015) Nevertheless, as Article 216 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU states, “agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States” (European Union 2012: 144). This means that the SAA is binding also for the five EU member states that have not yet recognised

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Kosovo and that they would violet the EU law if they would block Kosovo’s path towards membership in the EU. Beyond this, the lengthy process for membership in the EU is likely to bring new obstacles and uncertainties to Kosovo. In order for Kosovo to apply for accession to the EU it needs first to apply for candidate status and advance the implementation of the SAA, which will likely take years. If this stage is completed successfully, then Kosovo’s application for accession to the EU undergoes a complex process whereby the European Commission initially provides an opinion assessing of Kosovo fulfilment of the political and economic conditions, which then requires approval by the European Council, where a unanimous vote among all the EU member states is required. Even if the EU finds a modality to open the accession talks with Kosovo, the fact that the ratification of the accession agreement would require the consent of all member states in accordance with their constitutional requirements. Therefore, unless Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain recognise Kosovo’s statehood chances are grim for Kosovo to overcome these legal, political, and technical obstacles. Kosovo’s approach of attempting to integrate into the structures of international organisations by formal and informal means was also applied to NATO. Joining NATO remains one of Kosovo’s main foreign and security priorities. NATO is symbolically important for Kosovo as its military intervention in 1999 played a vital role in Kosovo’s liberation and in the provision of military protection during and after independence. NATO’s presence in Kosovo was one of its first large peacekeeping missions with an initial force of 50,000 troops, which by 2017 had been reduced to around 4,000. Despite this close relationship, Kosovo’s perspective of joining NATO remains distant as significant domestic and international blockages are forestalling membership in this important security alliance. Domestically, Kosovo needs to transform the existing security forces into a proper defence and security army, which requires changing the existing constitution, a process opposed by the Serb minority who hold veto powers within the parliament on such constitutional changes. Internationally, four NATO member states (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, and Spain) have not yet recognised Kosovo, which constrains NATO’s ability to advance Kosovo’s case for membership, especially regarding participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, the first significant step towards eventual membership (see Appendix 5.1).28 Despite these challenges, Kosovo has advanced its ambition to become a NATO member state and security provider by gradually enhancing its relations with NATO’s member states and structures. In 2014, Kosovo managed to become an observer state at NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly, which is the first major step in enhancing cooperation and partnership. In 2016, the U.S. Congress cited in the Defence Authorisation Act the need to work with Kosovo to prepare it for joining the PfP. Most importantly, from 2016 Kosovo enhanced its interactions with NATO in a number of ways, including: intensifying bilateral meetings with NATO’s political and military leadership; entering into an institutional cooperation with NATO Advisory Liaison Team in Kosovo; holding political and practical dialogue with North Atlantic Council; participating in capacity building for Kosovo’s security forces on cyber defence, training, and logistics; participating in

Performing sovereignty 151 NATO’s disaster response coordination exercises; and cooperating with NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division (NATO 2016). Kosovo has also participated as an observer in the U.S.-Adriatic Charter (A5) meetings, which is considered an important forum for enhancing the relationships between NATO and the Western Balkans, as well as becoming a member of the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC). These incremental moves intend to maintain the momentum for Kosovo’s eventual membership in NATO as well as expand Kosovo’s possibilities for integration in the international system. While most countries use multilateral diplomacy for “agenda-setting, coalitionbuilding, norm creation” (Karns and Mingst 2013: 148), Kosovo utilised international fora for building relationships, lobbying for recognition, signing diplomatic relations, and asking for membership votes. Aware that membership in certain organisations was out of reach, Kosovo has participated in multilateral events, which provide opportunities to advance bilateral diplomacy and build strategic relations with individual states with the overall aim of attracting additional bilateral recognition. The UN General Assembly served as an annual event to lobby for recognition, for interacting with all UN member states, and for signing documents establishing diplomatic relations with states that have already recognised Kosovo. Speeches delivered by Kosovo’s leadership at the UN Security Council’s quarterly debates on Kosovo served the purpose of defending Kosovo’s statehood textually and performatively. These quarterly updates on Kosovo remain on the UN Security Council (UNSC) agenda 18 years since the end of the conflict. After independence, debates at the UNSC served as a platform for Kosovo’s diplomats to highlight the progress made in the country, especially in consolidating statehood and acting like a state, while also providing a platform to lobby for further diplomatic recognition. Kosovo’s presentations to the UN Security Council were multidirectional diplomatic performances aimed at: defending Kosovo’s sovereignty; highlighting Kosovo’s progress to the international community; reducing the international presence in Kosovo; and confronting the opponents of Kosovo’s independence, mainly Serbia and Russia.29 Although the UN Security Council is not the most effective platform to lobby for recognition, Kosovo used this platform to record the results of its campaign for diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations. For example, on 6 February 2015, Kosovo’s Foreign Minister stated that “the recognition accorded to my country has shown that the State of Kosovo is an irreversible reality and an indispensable factor of peace and stability in the region” (UN Security Council 2015: 8). Such performative acts not only intended to normalise Kosovo’s presence in important regional and international events and forums, but they also provided an important space to survey the attitude of global powers – including supporters and opponents of Kosovo’s independence – in order to adjust the diplomatic discourse and strategy to mitigate external constraints on Kosovo’s path to recognisable statehood. There have been also instances when host countries invited Kosovo to attend events, sometimes providing Kosovo with protocol services, which enhanced its visibility and access. For example, Kosovo has participated in the OIC’s

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Islamic summits and meetings of Foreign Ministers, where it was given the right to address all member states and lobbied for issuing a joint resolution to recognise Kosovo. This diplomatic approach to reach out to non-Western states and organisations was undertaken independently by Kosovo, with minimal assistance from the U.S. or other major European powers. During an OIC session, Kosovo’s Foreign Affairs Minister Enver Hoxhaj stated: “participation in this forum is a good opportunity to expand and strengthen Kosovo’s international subjectivity and deepened the cooperation in bilateral and multilateral level” (MFA of Kosovo 2014b). The OIC is the second largest international intergovernmental organisation after the UN, comprised of 57 member states across four continents. During its first decade of independence statehood, Kosovo has been recognised by 37 out of 57 OIC member states (see Appendix 5.2). In other instances, Kosovo had to join second-order international organisations to use them as a lobbying platform for diplomatic recognition and membership in first-order international organisations, such as the UN and NATO. For example. Kosovo joined the Organisation of Francophonie not due to the extent of French language and culture in Kosovo, but to engage positively and enhance cultural and diplomatic relations with Francophone countries, offering also the opportunity to seek recognition from those member states who had not yet recognised Kosovo – notably the French-speaking countries of Africa.30 Kosovo’s regional policy intended to secure full diplomatic recognition from the remaining countries in the region (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania, Greece, and Slovakia); and to obtain full and equal membership in all regional organisations and initiatives. In service of this, Kosovo has actively attended regional summits, as they provide an opportunity to physically represent Kosovo as a sovereign state. Kosovo has been active in promoting regional cooperation by participating in the Regional Cooperation Council, Western Balkans Six (WB6) initiative, the Berlin Process, the annual high-level summits held in Bled (Slovenia) and Dubrovnik (Croatia), as well as other meetings as part of the South-East Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP), and the most recent initiative, the Regional Youth Cooperation Office of the Western Balkans (RYCO). These initiatives have served Kosovo’s diplomacy as spaces for performing international participation and equal representation in regional forums. In addition, they provide effective spaces for enhancing diplomatic interactions with countries that have not recognised Kosovo’s independence such as Slovakia, Romania, Moldova, etc. Such regional events also provided Kosovo with the opportunity to encourage the EU to play a more proactive role in resolving regional disputes, including those relating to Kosovo on an issue by issue basis that encourages non-recognisers to engage with Kosovo in a pragmatic manner in the spirit of good neighbourly relations. In the recent years, Kosovo has tried to increase its presence in global affairs not only to lobby for recognition and membership in international organisation, but also to act as a responsible and trustful member of the international community. Kosovo joined the U.S.-led Global Coalition against Daesh (so called

Performing sovereignty 153 Islamic State) in 2014. Kosovo’s Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj (2017), during one of the annual gatherings of this coalition, stated: Kosovo, as a small country, is playing an active role in promoting regional security and tackling global challenges. Our presence in the global coalition against Daesh is a testimony why Kosovo should be an equal member of all regional and international organisations, because we are committed to taking international responsibilities for our common security and prosperity. The equal representation among other nations performed the symbolic function of belonging to the society of responsible states working together to tackle global terrorism. While the threat from violent extremism did not spare Kosovo, it has taken strong domestic measures and has supported the U.S.’s regional and global efforts as a symbolic gesture to perform loyalty towards the U.S. and the EuroAtlantic alliance and to perform capacity for operating as a responsible state. Participation in this coalition also intended to channel messages that Kosovo is a secular state and that the global phenomenon of foreign fighters and violent extremism was a transnational threat seeking to derail the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans.

Conclusion This chapter has explored Kosovo’s rocky road to securing diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations through complex performative acts in a constraining international order to emerging states. Diplomatic performances were crucial for Kosovo as it had no previous experience of running a state, it did not have a clear tradition of diplomacy nor a clear end goal in its foreign affairs. Kosovo’s performative diplomacy with well-developed arguments and strategic entanglement with external forces has played a far more significant role in achieving wide international recognition and membership in international bodies than often admitted among scholars and practitioners. The chapter has demonstrated that statehood needs to be performed if a new state wants to challenge the existing global order and join the states making up international society. Performativity as a political-temporal creation, articulation, and enactment of foreign policy served the purpose of identification as a sovereign state. Each diplomatic move created specific effects that facilitated the conditions for securing diplomatic recognitions and joining international bodies. Although this hasn’t been easy or possible for many contested states, Kosovo’s wide international acceptance provides a rare example of how state-becoming takes place through performative agency. Without prior history of independent statehood or a solid bureaucratic tradition for foreign policy implementation, Kosovo’s performative diplomacy relied on daily improvisation, experimentation, and imitating the discourses, practices, and enactments that resembled sovereign states. Over the course of diplomatic performances, Kosovo was forced to construct its own foreign policy identity through

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impactful actions, which did not have pre-determined appearances that often led to diplomatic breakthroughs and changes. Observing Kosovo’s performative diplomacy has facilitated unpacking the complexities surrounding the recognition process and membership in international organisations. The analysis has disentangled the efforts and diplomatic stages that fledgling states undergo to ensure international interaction, acceptance, and finally recognition and membership in an international society. Possessing the objective criteria of statehood and having a legitimate case for recognition based on historical, normative, and political arguments proved to be insufficient for Kosovo’s survival as independent state: it was necessary to perform statehood and seek international legitimation in practice. This chapter outlined how seeking diplomatic recognition and membership in international bodies required reaching out to other states and inter-governmental organisations through tailored diplomatic discourses, dissident methods to overcome external contestation, as well as leveraging diplomatic skills, resources, and relationships. In this regard, Kosovo’s experience shows that diplomatic performances are not strictly pre-meditated (as it often assumed), given that the country faced contested sovereignty and various internal and external obstacles. To overcome structural and atomised perceptions of international politics, Kosovo had to adjust to a fluid understanding of global politics, which fostered confidence to overcome orthodoxies surrounding when and how a state should act, the legal and social rituals of global politics, and to deploy prudent new diplomatic methods. While diplomatic performances consist of mutually-agreed rituals, protocols, shared agendas, and indicative talking points, and are often facilitated by preparatory work, expected behaviour, and pre-determined diplomatic conventions, in practice every new effort to secure diplomatic recognition involved situational adjustments and improvisations. Although diplomatic improvisation was a symptom of Kosovo’s international vulnerability, it has often been its most valuable and resourceful asset to ensure the required diplomatic dissidence and unpredictability, which was essential for surpassing the counter-recognition campaign mounted by Serbia and its allies. Approaching state recognition from the performativity perspective enables accounting for recognition not only as an act but a multi-stage process. The process of diplomatic recognition consisted of four major stages. The first stage consisted of reaching out to countries that did not recognise Kosovo’s independence by transmitting the formal request for establishing diplomatic relations and opening direct channels of communication. The differentiated diplomatic discourse elaborated in the previous chapter was effective in attracting the attention of the targeted countries. At this point, the diplomatic strategy was to reach out to as many countries as possible to understand their position on Kosovo and, if receptive signs were given, to take the necessary steps to secure recognition. The second stage of performative diplomacy was to seek direct diplomatic interactions with targeted countries either as part of a bilateral arrangement or as part of a multilateral forum. These initial contacts intended to reduce estrangement and build interpersonal relations, which were later nurtured through different modes of

Performing sovereignty 155 follow-up communication. Often, Kosovo has worked with its international allies to nurture further these contacts and ensure that the targeted states give the request for recognition serious consideration. Kosovo’s approach has focussed on identifying around ten countries that have shown some interest in considering Kosovo’s recognition and working more intensively with those countries. The third and most crucial stage was arranging bilateral meetings to discuss the recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations. At this critical stage, the effectiveness of Kosovo’s diplomatic agency was tested when it had to perform specific discursive speech acts while tailoring them to the interests and values of the host country. Kosovo’s case for recognition had to be performed through face-to-face diplomacy to convince interlocutor states to recognise Kosovo’s statehood. The fourth and final stage was the formalisation of recognitions and the establishment of diplomatic relations, which consisted of different diplomatic rituals that were imposed by the recognising state, ranging from sending the recognition note to more formal and ceremonial events. Parallel to seeking diplomatic recognition, Kosovo’s struggle to join international organisations required undergoing complex stages to perform its sovereign statehood in regional and multilateral bodies. Recognition without membership in international bodies was insufficient to enact international sovereignty and enjoy the same rights and obligations under international law. Similarly, membership in international bodies without recognition risked limiting Kosovo’s presence in regional and international bodies to symbolic, empty-shelled sovereignty. Although Kosovo’s independent statehood was not jeopardised by its lacking membership in international organisation, it was clear that a seat at the UN and an unambiguous presence in the multilateral world could not be replaced by bilateral diplomacy. In the absence of universal recognition and being outside the UN system, Kosovo was forced to perform a liminal diplomacy within multilateral organisations. In such circumstances, seeking participation and membership in international bodies required simultaneously adjusting to and exploiting the loopholes in the rules and procedures of membership, rehearsing engagement in multilateral affairs by joining initially low-key organisations, as well as pursuing functional and depoliticised approaches. Europe’s complex regional integration dynamics have provided Kosovo with a suitable normative and functional terrain to frame its quest for participation and membership in the international democratic community while advancing the widely-accepted norms, such as: regional economic cooperation and good neighbourly relations; promotion of stability; resilience; and democracy. In addition, emerging transnational security threats have played an important role in widening Kosovo’s opportunities to tap into regional security initiatives, which have ultimately served Kosovo’s foreign policy objective of strengthening its international standing. Although Kosovo’s political disintegration from Serbia resulted in creating an independent state, the need for international recognition and membership in regional and international organisations pushed Kosovo to seek re-integration into supranational political, economic, and security structures, thereby weakening its hard-won sovereignty. This is not an argument against Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic integration, but a

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symptom of tamed sovereignty in an interdependent world in which Kosovo has no alternative but become part of such international system. This chapter has shown that sovereign statehood, as much as it is a material and discursive fact, is also a by-product of social performances; a socio-material fact constantly in becoming. Kosovo’s performative diplomacy was not entirely based on instrumental reasoning, rather it was sustained on instrumental acting, which is slightly different as it reduces the scope of rationality and permits exposure to the surprises that performative actions can bring. Especially, diplomatic performances as social interactive phenomena, when exposed to wider global assemblages, tend to be defuse in their agency and often end up producing undesired and unanticipated results. The next chapter highlights the role of great powers and global entanglements in shaping Kosovo’s campaign for international legitimation.

Notes 1 Interview by author with former Political Adviser at the MFA of Kosovo, via phone, December 2017. 2 Interview by author with the Deputy Director of the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, March 2017. 3 Interview by author with the Deputy Director of the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, May 2017. 4 Interview by author with a Senior Official at the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, March 2017. 5 Interview by author with a former Political Adviser at the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, April 2016. 6 Interview by author with Kosovo’s Ambassador to Belgium, June 2011; Interview by author with a Kosovo Diplomat, Brussels, January 2016. 7 Interview by author with a Senior Official at the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, March 2017. 8 Interview by author with a former Foreign Policy Adviser at the Office of President of Kosovo, Pristina, May 2017. 9 Ibid. 10 Interview by author with a former Foreign Affairs Minister of Kosovo, Pristina, April 2017. 11 Interview by author with a Senior Official at the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, March 2017. 12 Interview by author with a Kosovo Diplomat in New York, via phone, June 2016. 13 Interview by author with a former Political Adviser at the MFA of Kosovo, via phone, December 2017. 14 Ibid. 15 Interview by author with a Kosovo Diplomat, Washington DC, April 2014. 16 Interview by author with Deputy Director of the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, March 2017. 17 Interview by author with a diplomatic adviser at the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, June 2013. 18 Interview by author with a Yemeni Diplomat, Pristina, August 2013. 19 Interview by author with Deputy Director of the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, May 2017. 20 Ibid. 21 Interview by author with a U.S. Diplomat, Pristina, May 2017. 22 The procedure for admission to the UN is simple and straightforward (see Grant 2009). Pursuant to Rule 134 of the Rules of Procedures of the UN General Assembly and

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23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Rule 58 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, any state seeking membership must apply to the UN Secretary-General, which is generally in a form of a letter. The letter should include a declaration that the aspirant accepts the obligations of the UN Charter. Pursuant to Rule 135 of the Rules of Procedures of the General Assembly, the UN Secretary-General then would notify the UN General Assembly that an application was received by sending a copy of the application. Following this, the Committee on the Admission of New Members, which is comprised of a representative from each member of the UN Security Council, would prepare a report for the UN Security Council prior to the UN General Assembly regular session. For an application to be recommended for membership before the UN General Assembly, the aspirant state must receive at least nine affirmative votes from the UN Security Council, provided that none of the five permanent members would not veto the application. Finally, then the UN General Assembly would take into consideration a detailed report of the UN Security Council on whether the aspirant state is a “peace-loving” state that accepts the obligations of the UN Charter. ‘Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States’, June 15 1934. Available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp (accessed 23 December 2017). Interview by author with a former Political Adviser at the Office of Prime Minister of Kosovo, Pristina, May 2016. Interview by author with a former Legal Adviser at the Office of Prime Minister of Kosovo, Pristina, April 2017. Interview by author with the Deputy Director of the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, May 2017. Interview by author with a Desk Officer at European External Action Service, Brussels, March 2016; Interview by author with a European Commission official, Brussels, May 2017. Interview by author with a U.S. Diplomat, Pristina, May 2017. Interview by author with a Kosovo Diplomat in New York, via phone, June 2016. Ibid.

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Newman, E. and Visoka, G. (2016) ‘The Foreign Policy of State Recognition: Kosovo’s Diplomatic Strategy to Join International Society’, Foreign Policy Analysis. DOI: http:// dx.doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orw042. Newman, E. and Visoka, G. (2018) ‘The European Union’s Practice of State Recognition: Between Norms and Interests’, Review of International Studies, forthcoming. Pacolli, B. (2017) ‘Post to Behgjet Pacolli Facebook Page’, 11 September. Available at: www.facebook.com/behgjeti/posts/10159271341500153 (accessed 3 October 2017). Phillips, D. L. (2012) Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Pouliot, V. (2016) International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. President of Kosovo (2008) ‘Letter to the President of the Federal Republic of Germany’, 17 February. Available at: www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/15624.pdf (accessed 24 August 2017). Raič, D. (2002) Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, The Hague: Kluwer Law International. RIDEA (2017) Building the Case for Kosovo’s Application for Membership in the EU, Pristina: Research Institute of Development and European Affairs. Ringmar, E. (2014) ‘Recognition and the Origins of International Society’, Global Discourse 4(4): 446–458. Schieffelin, E. (1998) ‘Problematizing Performance’, in M. Hughes-Freeland (ed), Ritual, Performance, Media, London: Routledge, pp. 194–207. Scott, J. C. (1998) Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, New Haven: Yale University Press. Shaw, M. (2008) International Law, 6th ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. State of Qatar (2010) Recognition Letter, 30 December. Sterio, M. (2013) The Right to Self-Determination under International Law: “Selfistans”, Secession, and the Rule of the Great Powers, Abingdon: Routledge. Tierney, S. (2013) ‘Legal Issues Surrounding the Referendum on Independence for Scotland’, European Constitutional Law Review 9(3): 359–390. UN Security Council (2015) Provisional Verbatim of the 7377th Meeting, UN. Doc. S/ PV.7377, 6 February. Visoka, G. (2017) The Political Dialogue between Kosovo and the EU in the Framework of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), Pristina: GIZ (German Development Agency). Vogt, R. (2017) Personal Diplomacy in the EU: Political Leadership and Critical Junctures of European Integration, Abingdon: Routledge. Warbrick, C. (2003) ‘States and Recognition in International Law’, in M. D. Evans (ed), International Law, 1st ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 205–267. Weber, C. (1998) ‘Performative States’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 27(1): 77–95. Wilson, G. (2009) ‘Self-Determination, Recognition and the Problem of Kosovo’, Netherlands International Law Review 56(3): 455–481.

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Introduction Diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations are intersubjective processes, which requires exploring the struggle for consolidating international subjective both from those who demand and receive such a status, as well as those who grant and withhold granting such a status. It is rare to find another phenomenon which influences and is influenced by exogenous factors and entanglements than matters concerning diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations. This chapter explores how Kosovo’s quest for strengthening independent statehood was not only shaped by discursive and performative diplomatic interactions, but also from entanglement with related and unrelated assemblages of events, relations, political processes, and material changes elsewhere in world politics. Karin Fierke (2017: 177) argues that “claims to independence express contestation through which not only norms but identity and forms of relationality and entanglement are produced through processes of co-constitution”. This chapter demonstrates that the struggle of new states for international legitimation and membership in the international community, can be characterised as part of a complex and entangled assemblage of heterogonous actors, unrelated events, and remote processes. According to Jane Bennett (2010: 23–24) “assemblages are ad hoc groupings of diverse elements” which “are not governed by any central head”. These elements can be “any collection of actors, equipment, texts, technical devices or tools which, by their interconnection, give rise, and meaning, to action” (Ring 2015: 392). The notion of entanglement adequately captures “processes of domination and resistance which are always implicated in, and mutually constitutive of, one another”, as well as “countless material spaces, places, and networks, which sustain, practically as well as imaginatively and symbolically” the knotted threads and possibilities for change (Sharp et al. 2000: 1). From the perspective of entangled agency, “there is no agency prior to assemblages, only the effervescence of the agency of individuals acting alone or in concert with each other” (Bennett 2010: 29). This approach provides a much more nuanced depiction of the dynamics that enable (or block) a country’s entry into the society of sovereign states. From the perspective of global entanglements it is important to explore how agency in diplomatic assemblages is not constituted upon the political strengths of

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the actors involved but rather on the monumental combination of political forces with fractured agency and emergent features (see Dittmer 2017). Diplomatic assemblages should be seen as the “product of multiple determinations that are not reducible to a single logic” (Ong and Collier 2005: 12). In global assemblages, there is no central power with sufficient competence to fully determine the outcomes of activities that take place in temporary discursive, performative, and material assemblages. This opens the possibility for the diplomacy of a nascent state to make a difference by mobilising support from great powers and by utilising remote events and situational and systemic changes in global politics. In particular, this entangled character of world politics simultaneously provided opportunities, as well as obstacles, to Kosovo in the struggle to strengthen its international personality. Kosovo’s diplomacy of state-becoming was implemented through a situational entanglement of different local and international diplomats and the intermingling effect of domestic and global events, which simultaneously enabled and obstructed the enactment of Kosovo’s independent statehood. This is congruent with Noe Cornago’s (2017: 335) view that “the political outcomes of secession depend less on their alleged legitimacy or legal certainty than on the particular domestic and international configuration of power surrounding each case”. The major entanglement which positively enabled Kosovo to strengthen its international sovereignty was recognition by and lobby through global and regional powers, which had a multiplying and leveraging effect by expanding the coverage of recognitions. Kosovo could only perform its diplomacy for recognition and membership in international organisations by entangling with global assemblages of power, norms, relations, and institutions. As Joanne P. Sharp et al. (2000: 24) maintain, “the entanglements are a precondition for the appearance of power, and in a sense we might say that such entanglements are precisely what releases power, enables power, permits power to ‘do its business’’’. Most states have their diplomatic activity entangled with wider networks of strategic allies and partners. Kosovo’s diplomatic success has been in identifying the assemblages of states with interdependent diplomacies whereby recognition by a member of that group would influence the other states’ diplomatic behaviour and encourage them to bestow full diplomatic recognition. To grab global attention, Kosovo had to connect its case for recognition with “other players rhetorically as well as practically” (Gertheiss and Herr 2017: 27). When Kosovo was recognised by influential leaders high up the pecking order of multilateral organisations, geographical regions, and alliances, this contributed to influencing the decision of other states to extend diplomatic recognition to Kosovo. However, the coordination of state recognition between states is not as cohesive and collective as is often portrayed; particularly with regard to large groups of states. This is largely because almost half of the countries that do not recognise Kosovo do so, not because they have any particular issue with Kosovo, but because they fear that such a move would have negative domestic and regional effects. Dominant narratives on secession and state formation consider the support of big powers as the most important factor for securing diplomatic recognition

Entangling sovereignty 163 (Coggins 2014; Sterio 2013). Notably, recognition by the U.S. or other major global and regional powers gives the recipient state stronger international and domestic legitimacy. In the case of Kosovo, diplomatic recognition was neither determined entirely by great power politics, nor by normative considerations, but by situational entanglements and performative processes and enabling and disabling global assemblages. Support from great powers is often a by-product of the diplomatic agency of the aspirant state and a by-product of complex entanglements of domestic and global assemblages of discourses, events, and practices. In other words, the degree to which the aspirant state mobilises and its ability and resourcefulness to build alliances with great powers influences the extent of diplomatic support from the international community, including global and regional powers. As the analysis within this chapter demonstrates, endogenous factors have played an influential role on the likelihood and timing of Kosovo’s diplomatic recognition and membership in international bodies. Successes and setbacks on the recognition campaign were not determined in advance, nor could they have been conceptualised or anticipated prior to their occurrence. Determinants of diplomatic success were not singular or static; they took the shape of emerging features that were constantly evolving. They resemble the emergent causation that is associated with contributing factors, triggers, ontological entities, structures, relations, conditions, and processes that contribute to the emergence of particular outcomes (Kurki 2008: 295). However, the very same logic of global entanglements often worked against Kosovo’s foreign policy interests. Major disenabling entanglements such as counterrecognition campaigns by former host states and their great power allies and association with harmful precedents and other secessionist conflicts and regions have significantly undermined Kosovo’s pace to full integration in the international system. While state recognition is primarily contingent upon the contextual circumstances under which a case requests, and receives recognition, the act and practice itself can have legacies and implications for other cases. The sequence of domestic and global events, luck and chance have played a profound role in enabling or obstructing Kosovo’s foreign policy goal of consolidating statehood. Most significantly, the process of diplomatic recognition is entangled with broader global analogies and dissimilar cases of state-like entities seeking international recognition. While many states are sympathetic towards the Kosovo issue, they are unable to recognise its independence due to problems with their own domestic secessionist groups or problems with minority groups. In certain cases, the recognition process was delayed or reversed by sudden international changes, such as the outburst of violent conflicts, governmental and regime change, the emergence of new contested and unrecognised states, and the reshuffling of regional and global power relations. This chapter first discusses the core global enabling and disenabling entanglements which played a positive role in Kosovo’s campaign for international recognition. Then the discussion moves to explore complex multilateral entanglements which complicated Kosovo’s path for joining international organisations.

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Global entanglements for diplomatic recognition When Kosovo declared independence in 2008, its enthusiastic political leadership believed that during its first year, Kosovo would be recognised by the overwhelming majority of states and join the UN shortly thereafter. However, they soon realised the complex nature of the international system and the large extent to which its foreign policy would be influenced by remote actors, events, and developments. President of Kosovo (2015) Atifete Jahjaga admitted Kosovo’s vulnerability to such global entanglements: The international scenery, relations between states, alliances, positioning of the multilateral organisations and the weight they carried, has continuously changed. Today, states are more inter dependent and inter connected than ever before in the history of mankind. Such a situation creates many challenges, but also a multitude of opportunities to advance our aspirations based upon mutual interests and values. In a complex world of multiple entanglements, diplomatic recognition was not entirely driven by the strength of normative arguments or the performative campaign, but also by evolving global developments. Kosovo’s prospects for diplomatic recognition were simultaneously shaped by enabling and disenabling entanglements as the proceeding discussion in this chapter illustrates. The entangled character of state-becoming pushed Kosovo’s diplomacy to carefully analyse how different global entanglements could be navigated to advance Kosovo’s international recognition, while also cautiously dissociating from entanglements that would jeopardise Kosovo’s case for recognition. Enabling entanglements A key feature of Kosovo’s own contribution to diplomatic recognition has been coordinating efforts with other friendly and supportive states. As a vulnerable state with incomplete international sovereignty, Kosovo’s diplomacy was aware of the unequal diplomatic playing field and the significance of associating with states that have greater international influence. Kosovo’s socialisation into international diplomatic practices helped to identify and utilise temporarily-structured diplomatic pecking orders. Vincent Pouliot (2016: 2) defines international pecking orders as “the informal hierarchies of standing that pervade multilateral organisations . . . [and] social stratification dynamics on the world stage”. Kosovo worked with countries that had substantial spheres of regional influence due to their colonial past, cultural similarity, or geo-political cooperation. The strategic coordination of recognition among the big powers is considered the most important factor for obtaining external recognition and membership in international bodies. Brigid Coggins (2014: 42) finds that recognitions by great powers “constitute the most critical of the critical mass required to surpass the threshold to secure external sovereignty”. Diego Muro (2017: 23) maintains that “realpolitik,

Entangling sovereignty 165 not ideals, determine the success of pro-independence movements”. Expressing a similar opinion, Kathleen G. Cunningham (2014: 14) holds that “recognition by the international community of states, and by the great powers is essential for the creation of a new state”. This is largely the case because “a state’s decision to extend or retract diplomatic recognition depends heavily on the decisions of other states”, thus considering endogenous network influences among “the most consistent and substantively powerful determinants of diplomatic recognition” (Kinne 2014: 247). According to Thomas J. Volgy et al. (2011: 6): a state is attributed major power status if it is perceived by policy makers of other states within the international community as being unusually powerful and willing to influence the course of global affairs, and if they act toward it consistent with that perception. Bridget Coggins (2014: 206) argues that “state interest, rather than the facts on the ground determine recognition, and collectively, whether the secessionist actor will be admitted full membership in international society”. Coggins has a point when arguing that recognition is a foreign policy instrument of states. However, the facts on the ground, especially the diplomatic agency of the fledgling state, play a profound role in enabling the nascent states to relate and mobilise support from other states. Admittedly, key global and regional powers have played a crucial role in encouraging states in different regions to recognise Kosovo’s independence. Kosovo’s foreign affairs leadership has openly admitted that “American support in our external and internal affairs has been one of the basic preconditions for a successful statebuilding process” (Hoxhaj 2016b: 266). Kosovo’s diplomatic approach has fundamentally benefited from strategic dependency and entanglement with the U.S. and major European powers, who have played a crucial role in securing Kosovo’s recognition and membership in international bodies. In particular, Kosovo’s relations with the U.S. were essential for advancing the country’s international standing. The U.S. envoy for Kosovo’s final status, Ambassador Frank G. Wisner (2008: 194) maintains that “Kosovo would not be independent today without strong American involvement”, considering it a right choice to commit their national prestige and diplomacy in the achievement of independence. The period of most intense external support for Kosovo independence occurred between 2008 and 2011. With the support of the U.S. and most European states, Kosovo managed to secure over 50 recognitions in the first two years after its declaration of independence. The wide diplomatic recognition that Kosovo received immediately after independence were not a merit of Kosovo’s own diplomacy because the country lacked institutional structures, resources, and capacities to lobby for recognition. Rather, the first wave of recognitions was a by-product of other states’ desire to promote stability in the Balkans. Recognition of Kosovo’s independence by the U.S., the vast majority of the European states, Japan, Australia, and Canada, represented a continuation of these country’s sustained interest for peace, stability, and conflict resolution in Kosovo and wider region.

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Moreover, Kosovo’s geographical location played an important entangling role whereby most of the European states and the immediate neighbours have recognised Kosovo in hope that such a move would promote regional peace and stability and end a decade-long wave of violent conflicts in the Western Balkans. In the foreign policies of Western countries, recognition of Kosovo’s independence became a crucial hallmark for making international intervention and post-conflict statebuilding in Kosovo a success story. The U.S. and leading European powers coordinated their efforts in support of Kosovo’s recognition through actions ranging from: sending diplomatic demarches; facilitating Kosovo’s participation in international events; and using their bilateral diplomacy and multilateral influence in pressing other states to recognise Kosovo’s statehood (see Mak 2015). The U.S. support for Kosovo’s independence was coordinated by the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs within the Department of State. For example, the Department of State instructed U.S. Ambassadors to send demarches on Kosovo to the highest government levels within targeted countries in Africa instructing those “governments that have either previously expressed interest in recognizing Kosovo’s independence or appeared sympathetic, know that now is the time to act”.1 The U.S. diplomatic demarche continued by arguing that recognition “would help support a smooth transition for Kosovo, bolster regional stability, and promote closure for the conflicts that plagued the Western Balkans in the 1990s”.2 It concluded that “Kosovo’s existence is a fact, turning back the clock is not possible, and maintaining momentum on recognitions will help avoid a new frozen conflict”.3 Similarly, the UK. has been a global supporter of Kosovo’s campaign for recognition, though most of its influence has been in the Commonwealth members and former colonies. Germany has been instrumental in supporting Kosovo’s European integration, regional participation, and normalisation of relations with Serbia. Regarding diplomatic recognition, Germany was involved in “working closely with the Kosovan leadership on pursuing Kosovo’s membership in international organisations” (Himmrich 2017: 19). The kin-state of Albania also tried to share its diplomatic spaces, networks, and resources with Kosovar diplomats in an effort to facilitate the process of reaching out to other states and being present in important regional and global events. The U.S. support for Kosovo’s recognition was driven by three entangled factors: 1) personal commitment of U.S. leadership in resolving the Kosovo crisis; 2) foreign policy seeking stability in the Western Balkans; and 3) Kosovo’s engagement of U.S. lobbying companies to maintain bipartisan support for Kosovo’s independence and recognition. Regarding the first factor, before and immediately after the declaration of independence, Kosovo was one of the most important priorities for the U.S. in Europe. Because of the long-term and intimate engagement of key Euro-Atlantic states in resolving the Kosovo conflict and in negotiating Kosovo’s final status, these countries have been the key supporters and co-owners of Kosovo’s process of state formation and consolidation over the past 15 years. Democrats and the close diplomatic circle of the Bill Clinton administration viewed Kosovo as more than a foreign policy issue: they had a personal attachment to human rights promotion and humanitarian intervention dating back

Entangling sovereignty 167 to the late 1990s (B92 2012). The second factor is related to the U.S. foreign policy priorities in Europe, partially driven by its stability-seeking foreign policy but also the political priority given by successive U.S. administrations to handling crises within the Balkans. For the U.S. Government, Kosovo’s successful development as “a peaceful, multiethnic, democratic and independent state is a critical element in the international community’s long-standing efforts to bring stability to the Balkans regions”.4 In achieving this, the U.S. priority was to “help Kosovo fully establish its status as a state, including joining multilateral organizations, to encourage more countries to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with Kosovo, and to promote Kosovo’s fullest possible engagement with international organizations”.5 Defending Kosovo’s independence and strengthening its international standing also protected the legacy of NATO’s military intervention in 1999 and its subsequent peacekeeping presence. Moreover, the U.S. openly admits that, by supporting Kosovo’s independence, they defended European and American unity against Russian pressure, and “gave Europe and America a chance to redefine our common purpose and put it to work” (Wisner 2008: 195–196). The third factor behind U.S. support for Kosovo wasn’t entirely based on solidarity and altruism: Kosovo’s government has paid millions of dollars to lobbying companies based in Washington D. C. to maintain good relations with the U.S. Administration and Congress (see Pacolli 2010; 2014). These lobbying companies used political, governmental, diplomatic, business, and journalist contacts and resources to maintain U.S. support for Kosovo and to expand Kosovo’s relationships with U.S.-based international institutions and diplomatic missions. Countries that are part of common political, economic, and security alliances tend to coordinate their foreign policy actions. Many small and medium size states are regional followers rather than leaders on issues of state recognition given the sensitivity of regional power entanglements and the presence of breakaway entities in the region. In the same vein, diplomatic recognition is often granted in concert by a group of states with common political, geographical, and ideological affinity. Brandon J. Kinne (2014: 256) argues that “states take cues from other states in determining whether and when to extend or retract recognition”. Similarly, Mikulas Fabry (2010: 8) argues that “recognition by the great powers has normally preceded, and carried far more weight than, recognition by other states”. Grace Bolton (2013: 137–138) adds that “support of powerful countries is a significant factor when considering remedial secession”, highlighting the risk that powerful countries may instrumentalise the norms and criteria of state recognition to “assert their power over vulnerable people”. In particular, “recognition by the American superpower has a greater impact on the process of secession than recognition by any other state” (Paquin 2010: 7). This is mostly evident among small states who can be guided by major powers when it comes to the recognition of new states. For them, bilateral relations and regional factors are more important than domestic factors when deciding on establishing or breaking diplomatic relations with other countries (see Shaohua 2015: 4). Christopher O. Quaye (1991: 223) explains that “the attitude of individual states toward specific

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secessionist struggles has tended to depend on the political and strategic benefits that the state expects to derive from each case”. In particular, as Kinne (2014: 249, 252) explains, “the preference for attachment to prestigious partners reflects a rational interest in maximizing the returns from diplomatic ties” while trying to “minimize political risks by taking cues from their partners”. A major function of Kosovo’s diplomacy was to identify countries with whom supportive states have good relations and thereby influence the recognition process. Every act of recognition had an entangling function; other countries were encouraged to follow the trajectory for recognising Kosovo set by leaders of pecking orders within multilateral organisations, geographical regions, and alliances. In turn, these recognitions played an important role in influencing the decision of states for extending diplomatic recognition to Kosovo. Aware of these entanglements, Kosovo’s diplomats prioritised qualitative recognitions, which entailed seeking recognition from states with international power and prestige who would influence other smaller and dependent states to recognise Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state. Former Foreign Minister Hoxhaj (2016b: 131) argued that Kosovo’s diplomacy needed “to understand which countries have greater influence in specific regions and to mobilise adequate people to secure recognition”. To disentangle the regional assemblages of relations and influences, Kosovo analysed the role of political and geographical alliances, economic cooperation, aid dependency, cultural and historical affinity between states, as well as other specific determinants of the foreign affairs priorities of other states. Kosovo perceived recognition by regional powers or internationally respected countries as “psychological” recognitions, as they tend to set a positive chain response by other countries. Many states that recognised Kosovo were influenced more by the potential diplomatic gains from Kosovo’s international supporters (U.S. and most western Europe states) than by due consideration of the merits of Kosovo’s case for recognition or the potential benefits of diplomatic ties with Kosovo. Milena Sterio (2013: 63) relates this to the fact that “many neutral states were persuaded into recognizing Kosovo after witnessing the great powers’ support of this new state”, while considering that “many smaller states depend on the great powers for trade and economic aid, and will choose to follow the great powers in foreign relations and diplomacy matters”. Kosovo intentionally maximised its efforts to secure recognition from regional powerful states to then leverage recognition from other smaller countries in the region. Each new wave of recognition built upon the previous wave of recognitions, while subsequently influencing the following wave. In this way, Kosovo successfully leveraged its bilateral diplomacy to obtain new recognitions and secure affirmative votes for membership in international organisations. Countries within Europe and the broader Atlantic community recognised Kosovo around the same time and their recognition was motivated by discursive and processual dynamics, which intended to demonstrate their unwavering role in shaping postindependence Kosovo. Recognition by Muslim and Middle Eastern countries demonstrated path dependency. Turkey immediately recognised Kosovo, followed by the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman. The next

Entangling sovereignty 169 wave of recognitions came from Pakistan, Egypt, Yemen, and most recently Bangladesh. Each wave of countries played a positive role in encouraging recognition by other countries in their geo-spheres of influence. The widely-known perception is that Kosovo’s international success derives predominantly from the support provided by the U.S. and majority of European powers. However, in practice, Kosovo has benefited from the solidarity of small states without any vested economic and political interest on Kosovo. Peripheral small states have also recognised Kosovo in consecutive order. For example, the 2012 wave of recognition by Guinea, Niger, and Benin was followed by Gabon, Ghana, Brunei Darussalam, Chat, and Burundi. These waves of recognition came as a result of Kosovo’s strategy to target specific groups of countries and to secure recognition by an influential regional power so that other smaller affiliative countries would follow. For example, in June 2013, Kosovo was recognised by Yemen, El Salvador, Guyana, Egypt, and Tanzania. On this occasion, MFA of Kosovo (2013c) declared that “these recognitions have a particular weight as it opens doors for the recognition of Kosovo by influential countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa, as well as other multilateral organizations”. For instance, Kosovo’s foreign policy decision-makers considered “enhancing the relations with Egypt should be a foreign policy priority for Kosovo towards the Arab, Islamic, and African countries. Egypt should become Kosovo’s port in Africa” (MFA of Kosovo 2013a: 15). Similarly, Kosovo invested extensive diplomatic efforts and resources to secure recognition by the Vatican, which has strong influence over many other Christian-populated countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Kosovo framed the recognition of their independence by the Vatican as recognition of Kosovo people and particularly catholic community historic role in protecting and preserving Christianity in Kosovo and the wider region. It is recognition of Kosovo’s people’s sacrifice for basic freedom, human dignity, social self-determination, and desire for enjoying moral and religious freedom. (MFA of Kosovo 2013d) By 2014, Kosovo had been recognised by over 100 UN member states and had secured membership in several important international bodies; this served as a pressure point that encouraged many more states to recognise Kosovo. Alexis Heraclides (1991: 14) maintains, “numerous recognitions . . . will transform a secessionist entity . . . into a state”. In the case of Kosovo, wide recognition not only increased the confidence of the nascent state, but also became the driving force for new recognitions. Overall, Kosovo’s foreign policy alignment with the U.S. and other European states played a positive role in most cases, it did also antagonise many countries who oppose U.S. foreign policy. Although Kosovo was willing to establish ties with many countries willing to recognise its independence, it maintained a distance from the major adversaries of the U.S., such as Iran and North Korea. Some

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states viewed Kosovo as a vassal state of the U.S., which undermined its prospects for recognition. Being deeply in debt to U.S. support, Kosovo could not afford to alter its image to that of a non-aligned state, which could appeal equally to all major regional alliances and constellations. This illustrates that when it comes to state recognition, big powers have limited ability to press other states to follow their desired course of action in foreign affairs. The combination of wider factors and diplomatic momentum play a much more significant role than admitted in scholarly debates on state recognition. Kosovo has made a strategic calculation, considering recognition by 100 states as a critical mass for enabling the country sufficient grounds for existing and interacting in the international system.6 After 2011, external assistance for Kosovo’s recognition reduced significantly due to changing global circumstances, shifting foreign policy priorities, and the emergence of more urgent global crisis, leaving Kosovo’s own diplomatic abilities and skills to advance further its recognition campaign. The initial support by the great powers has created the perception that they hold all the merit for Kosovo’s wider international recognition. For instance, James Ker-Lindsay (2017: 13) argues that the UK’s and the U.S.’s support “saw Kosovo recognized by more than half the members of the United Nations and helped pave the way for Kosovo’s membership of many key international bodies”. Although Kosovo has been recognised by most powerful states in the world, they were unable to impose on smaller states the decision to recognise Kosovo’s independence. Global and regional powers that backed Kosovo internationally found difficult to lobby on behalf of the fledgling states in certain regions as they were asked political and economic favours in exchange of extending diplomatic recognition to Kosovo. Such favours have ranged from erasing debt to asking for foreign aid and political support on certain foreign policy matters. The ability of Kosovo’s supporting states to convince states with indifferent or hardliner stance on Kosovo’s independence became of threat to their own international standing and prestige. In fact, it has become embarrassing for major European powers to continuously fail to attract new recognition for Kosovo. Under these conditions, the role of Kosovo’s diplomacy was to inform powerful friendly states that certain countries have signaled a willingness and openness to discussing the recognition of Kosovo independence. Aware that there is no unique formula for recognising new states and being outside the club of fully recognised states, Kosovo’s foreign policy has faced unusual situations and unfavourable developments, which in turn have shaped its diplomatic conduct. Congruent with its prudent diplomacy, Kosovo’s diplomacy embraced the performative function of events, perceiving them “are not simply out there and ready-made, waiting to be seen, recognised, or described” (Schwartz 2008: 55), but as valuable opportunities for strengthening its international standing. For Kosovo, global events bringing about changes in government or strategic geo-political shifts opened possibilities for establishing direct diplomatic contacts with foreign governments. The recognition process in several cases has benefited from sudden changes of government in the countries it was lobbying for recognition. Especially, factors such as stability of governments, legal competency and

Entangling sovereignty 171 procedures for recognising other states, as well as political relations between foreign policy leaders play a critical role. For instance, the change of Cuban-influenced government in Antigua and Barbuda with a more pro-Western government opened possibilities for Kosovo to approach this small Caribbean island state. However, in other stances, regime change meant that the political and diplomatic contacts also changed and any recognition momentum was lost. For example, regime change in Thailand delayed recognition of Kosovo for several years, whereas political instability in Tunisia after the Arab Spring derailed entire prospects for recognition of Kosovo. There have been cases when ministries of foreign affairs were willing to recognise Kosovo, but this was blocked or delayed by presidents or parliaments. Although the Iraqi Foreign Minister formally sent the request for the recognition of Kosovo to the government cabinet, it was refused by the prime minister fearing that such a move would posed a significant threat for secessionist tendencies within Iraq.7 In this case, the Foreign Minister was of Kurdish origin was more favourable towards Kosovo, while the prime minister and the rest of the Iraqi cabinet took a negative stance. Equally, inter-institutional disagreements, bureaucratic delays and unexpected internal destabilisation postponed the decision for recognising Kosovo. In some countries, continuous electoral cycles and changes of political leadership affected the prospects for establishing solid diplomatic contacts to secure support for recognition. In other cases, fears for the domestic politicisation of recognition and electoral loss forced statesmen to delay recognising Kosovo. As Marijke Breuning (2011: 24) maintains, in many countries “foreign policy behaviour changes as different groups attain power . . . as a result of election cycles”. Kosovo benefited from the power reshuffle in the Muslim world following the Arab Spring, which opened the possibility for recognition from Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. Egypt’s recognition of Kosovo in 2013 is a case in point. Egypt recognised Kosovo officially in June 2013, becoming the 100th state to recognise Kosovo, following a long process lobbying the Egyptian authorities directly and via other states. The main enabling factor was regime change and the fall of Mubarak government in 2011, whose stance on Kosovo had been more aligned with Serbia and Russia. Following the Arab Spring, Kosovo’s Foreign Affairs Minister engaged in proactive lobbying involving several visits to Cairo. In Egypt, Morsi’s new government was keen to send a signal to the U.S. and the major European powers that Egypt’s foreign policy was being aligned with the democratic world: recognising Kosovo was part of this discursive gesture. Egypt sent a team of retired ambassadors to assess political developments in Kosovo and concluded affirmatively in favour of Kosovo’s recognition. When the decision was taken, however, the recognition note was not sent directly to Kosovo but to German authorities in Berlin, while a press release provided general justifications for recognition, which highlighted Kosovo’s right to self-determination and the ICJ ruling on the legality of Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence (MFA of Egypt 2013). This short description illustrates that most instances recognising Kosovo’s independence involved multiple entangled agencies and events that complemented one another in creating a momentum and sufficient support for recognition.

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Disenabling entanglements Parallel to enabling entanglements, Kosovo’s independent statehood was also influenced by other actors, analogies, and remote events, which had a disenabling function on Kosovo’s foreign policy. Soon after declaring independence, the MFA of Kosovo (2011) identified four possible obstacles that could affect the process of lobbying for international recognition. The first potential obstacle arose after the UN Security Council failed to endorse the supervised independence proposed by the UN special envoy, which highlighted the absence of a global consensus on Kosovo’s independence. In particular, the rejection of Kosovo’s independence by Russia and China set Kosovo on an undesired trajectory. The second potential obstacle was the lack of unity within the EU, where five out of 28 member states withheld their recognition of Kosovo’s independence. This created the image of Kosovo being an unresolved European issue, where recognition could constitute a premature move what would harm the peaceful resolution of unresolved differences among Europeans regarding Kosovo’s political status. The third potential obstacle encompassed Serbia’s discursive attempts to categorise Kosovo’s independence as a case of non-consensual secession, rather than a unique case emerging from the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia. This caused many states with internal secessionist problems to hesitate to recognise Kosovo’s sovereign statehood. The fourth and final potential obstacle included a shift of global priorities and policy attention away from the Balkans following the departure of certain influential personalities from the international political scene. This reduced the scope to attract the interest of a large number of states, which had no firm position on Kosovo or are politically and geographically remote from Kosovo and the region. Kosovo’s former Foreign Minister Skender Hyseni admitted that “the global crises” has “indirectly had a negative impact on the recognition process” (Assembly of Kosovo 2009). Remote events such as Russia’s 2008 conflict with Georgia and its subsequent recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia fostered hesitation among states considering Kosovo, while providing Serbia and other states with internal secessionist claims with arguments citing Kosovo as a dangerous precedent. In the meantime, the international environment has changed dramatically, with developments including: the conflict in Syria; Russian aggression against Ukraine; the rise of ISIS in the Middle East; renewed political rivalry in the region; Europe’s financial and migration crisis; and the UK’s referendum to withdraw from the EU. These developments have diverted the attention of the U.S. and major European powers away from the Balkans, also reducing their interest in lobbying for Kosovo’s recognition. A growing number of independence referenda in Europe and actualisation of claims for secession elsewhere have indirectly impacted on the mood of Kosovo’s international partners for pushing forward with the campaign for Kosovo’s recognition. Moreover, the election of Donald Trump as U.S. President in 2016 and the subsequent turbulence within the U.S. Department of State during 2017 also had direct ramifications for Kosovo’s “special” relationship with the U.S., interrupting the close

Entangling sovereignty 173 coordination between Kosovo and the U.S. diplomacy for securing recognition and membership in international organisations. Notwithstanding support from the U.S. and major European powers, Kosovo hasn’t enjoyed complete international support. Kosovo’s quest for diplomatic recognition has encountered several obstructions as a result of directly intended and unintended actions of countries that oppose its independence. As Shpend Kursani (2017a: 5) argues, “when Kosovo declared its independence, there was no unified international policy adopted in regard to Kosovo’s recognition; as such, neither was it recognized collectively, nor was it rejected collectively”. Albania as a kin-state of most Kosovo-Albanians was too weak and unable to help Kosovo diplomatically. What influenced the wider discordant responses was the lack of consensus among great powers demonstrated by the failure of UN to endorse the status settlement of its own special envoy, accompanied by significant concerns among the international community about the potential impact of Kosovo on other breakaway entities and more broadly on the norms, politics, and rules of state recognition in world politics. Global political entanglements and rivalries among dominant powers also had a negative effect on Kosovo’s international standing, not only by slowing the anticipated pace of completing international recognition but also by bringing to the forefront the reversal, revocation, and de-recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Worse than non-recognition, proactive counter-recognition efforts are used as a political weapon to maintain enmity, isolate and deviate politically and economically the aspirant state, diminish its prestige, morale, and most destructively license domestic and instability (see Berridge 1994: 6). Obviously, the main obstruction came from Serbia as the former host state. Serbia has made it a foreign policy priority to object to, Kosovo’s independence, its recognition, and its membership in international bodies. Backed by Russia’s bilateral and multilateral diplomatic network, Serbia focussed its counter-recognition campaign on three strands: 1) express discursive appreciation and deepen political and economic relations with countries that haven’t recognised Kosovo; 2) anticipate and undermine the recognition of Kosovo through diplomatic pressure, sabotage, and by exploiting global diplomatic networks; and 3) lobby vulnerable states to de-recognise Kosovo (see Ker-Lindsay 2012). Kosovo’s Foreign Minister, Skender Hyseni, admitted that the reason why many states have not yet recognised Kosovo is largely as a result of a hard campaign that Russia is pursuing against Kosovo at different levels and through different means (Assembly of Kosovo 2008). Serbia and Russia have constantly tried to undermine Kosovo’s lobbying efforts by sending their ambassadors or special envoys to countries that Kosovo visited to pressure them against taking any affirmative decision regarding recognition.8 James Ker-Lindsay (2012: 80–108) shows that the diplomatic campaign to prevent Kosovo’s recognition entails measures such as: developing arguments against secession; boycotting or breaking diplomatic relations with states that recognise Kosovo; appealing to international judiciary bodies, rewarding and symbolically recognising states who withhold recognition; reaching out directly, or through diaspora and lobby groups to states and appealing to them not to recognise Kosovo; utilising public

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diplomacy and demonising self-determination and its global repercussions; and isolating and blocking Kosovo’s participation in events or membership in international bodies. Beyond these techniques, working with great powers, regional and emerging powers, and old allies is considered the cornerstone of this counterrecognition strategy. In particular, Russia’s objection to Kosovo’s independence harped back to the great powers and their special responsibilities for maintaining international peace and security. As Pëllumb Kallaba (2017: 29) stipulates the impact of Russia on Kosovo’s integration in the international community is immense. Russia has the ability to block Kosovo’s full-membership in the UN and other important pan-European organizations through its veto power, but also in other organizations and other countries through its direct influence. Russia’s rejection of Kosovo’s independence was directly linked to their desire to revive Russia’s international influence by opposing U.S. foreign policy in the Balkans and wider Europe (see Bechev 2017). Robert Gates (2014), former U.S. Secretary of Defence, suggested that disagreements between the United States and Russia on the placement of a missile defence system in Europe played a role in Russia’s decision to block Kosovo’s independence at the UN Security Council back in 2008. At the regional level, Russia’s objection to Kosovo’s recognition and membership in international bodies is part of their policy to disrupt the enlargement of NATO and the EU to the Balkans. As Janusz Bugajski (2008: 3–4), maintains, Kosovo’s case for independence enables Russia to elevate its international position, to interpose in Balkan and European affairs, to promote splits within the EU, to gain veto powers over Europe’s enlargement, and to construct a Eurasian pole of power as a counterbalance to the United States. Moreover, for Russia Kosovo represents a suitable confrontation point with the West to justify its interventions in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and Ukraine (Crimea) and the exploitation of frozen conflicts to protect Russia from the further enlargement of NATO and the EU into eastern Europe. The question of whether Kosovo’s case for independence is unique or whether it sets a dangerous precedent has been one of the most controversial aspects of the battle for and against recognition. Those who argued that Kosovo is a unique case intended to dissociate it from other secessionist conflicts, while those who argued that Kosovo constitutes an international precedent intended to entangle it with other contested and unrecognised states. Kosovo’s international partners have worked proactively to dissociate Kosovo from other breakaway and secession claims. In the request for recognition, MFA of Kosovo (2013d) used the ICJ advisory opinion to argue that “this ruling treated Kosovo as sui generis, a unique

Entangling sovereignty 175 case that does not determine other disputes that may superficially appear similar”. Supporters of Kosovo’s independence claim that it is a unique case in terms of political, historical and legal details, which has nothing to do with other cases in the world. In support of the claim that Kosovo is a unique case, the then U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice declared that the unusual combination of factors found in the Kosovo situation – including the context of Yugoslavia’s breakup, the history of ethnic cleansing and crimes against civilians in Kosovo, and the extended period of UN administration – are not found elsewhere and therefore make Kosovo a special case. Kosovo cannot be seen as a precedent for any other situation in the world today. (U.S. Department of State 2008) In the absence of clear criteria for the right to secession in international law, Gary Wilson (2009: 456) questions whether “Kosovo should nonetheless be treated as a very unique and exceptional situation in which secession ought to be tolerated without this serving as a precedent for future attempted instances of secession elsewhere”. While this argument is handled with caution by Kosovo’s supporters, Serbia, Russia, and Kosovo’s other opponents have extensively used it to prevent and discourage countries from recognising Kosovo. They constantly argue that Kosovo’s independence should not be internationally recognised for fear of creating precedents for other breakaway territories, thereby reinforcing negative reactions to Kosovo’s right to statehood. A statement by Serbia’s Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić at the UN Security Council (2008: 2) encapsulates this attitude: Recognizing the unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence from Serbia legitimizes the doctrine of imposing solutions to ethnic conflicts. It legitimizes the act of unilateral secession by a provincial or other non-State actor. It transforms the right to self determination into an avowed right to independence. It legitimizes the forced partition of internationally recognized sovereign States. And it provides any ethnic or religious group with a grievance against its capital with a playbook on how to achieve its ends. Similarly, Russia’s Duma reacted to Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence by stating that “the right of nations to self-determination cannot justify recognition of Kosovo’s independence along with the simultaneous refusal to discuss similar acts by other self-proclaimed states, which have obtained de facto independence exclusively by themselves” (New York Times 2008). The discourse of unilateralism intended to delegitimate Kosovo’s quest for recognition on the pretext that, without the consent of the host state, the break-up of states is illegal under international law. On the contrary, Kosovo’s experience shows that declaration of independence and subsequently recognition are never a unilateral act, but always a coordinated act with a regional and great power.

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From the perspective of entanglements, every possible past event or political and legal action can be used as a justification for similar or different action elsewhere. While state recognition is primarily contingent upon the contextual circumstances under which a case merits and receives recognition, the act and practice itself can have legacies and implications for other cases. Each case of secession and practice of recognition is informed by the failures and/or successes of preceding cases, which similarly inform the nature of recognition in the future, both in positive and negative ways. Identifying precedents is essential for international entanglements and for making general norms and rules within global society. Precedents do not have causal functions nor are they legally binding; they merely represent a rhetorical and opportunistic tool to justify and interpret unrelated political actions. The causal effects of precedent cases are not determined by the original act, which is used as precedent but by the interpretative effect it creates to render new situations as possible and influence the behaviour of designated audiences. Rein Müllerson (2009: 5) maintains that “whether certain situations, facts or acts can serve as precedents depends to a great extent on whether one is interested in seeing them as precedents or not”. In a conservative world order where the birth of new states is often an unwelcome international development, a case like Kosovo that has managed to proclaim independence and secure wide international recognition is certainly attractive: other secessionist movements can use it as a legitimating analogy while opponents of secessionism can use it as a delegitimating analogy. As Harlen G. Cohen (2015: 288) argues, states “invoke or respond to particular precedents as part of a broader effort to justify their positions and persuade other players to go along with them”. In this vein, Sherrill Stroschein (2013: 875, 886) argues, “Kosovo is used as an example when it suits politicians and their political projects”, and “the question whether it constitutes a precedent for other groups becomes a de facto political, rather than a legal, matter”. Snežana Trifunovska (2011: 393) submits that “while Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence did not create a precedent, it cannot remain without impact on the developments in other countries”. Accordingly, the question of precedence has not much to do with the similarity of cases – because every case of self-determination is ontologically unique and incomparable – but is first and foremost a self-interested discursive argument that intends to generate international sympathy by creating the interpretative impression that other states should expect similar consequences for their own territorial integrity. For other nascent states lacking international recognition, the rhetorical argument that Kosovo sets international precedents provided hope that secession would also be possible for them in the future. The President of Moldova’s breakaway region of Transdniestria welcomed Kosovo’s independence because for them “the recognition of the unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo is creating a concrete precedent and is providing a new powerful impulse to the struggle by Transdniestria for [the] recognition of its independence”.9 One of the major challenges that Kosovo faced in securing diplomatic recognition was avoiding such associations with other contested territories and unrecognised states: for obvious

Entangling sovereignty 177 reasons this discouraged many states to recognise Kosovo. However, as Karin Fierke (2017: 178) argues, “in a globally entangled world, composed of fixed territorial spaces, claims to independence are performative, but become a site of contestation”. For Kosovo, analogies with other emerging states have harmed its quest for international legitimation. Although Kosovo identified commonalities in struggles for independence when seeking recognition from established states, Kosovo categorically rejected identifying commonalities with these state-like entities regarding its normative, political, and legal pathway to statehood and recognition. Attempting to dissociate itself from other breakaway regions, Kosovo has categorically denied any affiliation, objected to any diplomatic contact, and withheld their recognition. In response to these intractable entanglements, Kosovo was forced to pursue a complex policy to dissociate itself from other contested states and breakaway territories. In certain instances, external obstacles to Kosovo’s recognition were not limited to the hostile attitude of political institutions but also the unfavourable public opinion shaped by historical, cultural, and political relations by the opponents of Kosovo’s independence. To date, Kosovo has been recognised by 115 sovereign states, 113 of whom are members of the UN. Of the 80 UN member states that continue to withhold recognition from Kosovo, nearly half of these countries have active secessionist regions and movements with different degrees of autonomy that are at different stages of state-becoming (see Table 6.1). As expected, these states have been unable to extend Kosovo diplomatic recognition, fearing that such a move could have direct ramifications for their own domestic stability and territorial integrity. In the Eurasian region, Kosovo has been recognised by 34 countries, whereas 15 countries continue to withhold recognition of the fledgling state (see Appendix 3). In the Western Balkans, Kosovo has been recognised by all neighbours except Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been able to recognise Kosovo because the Serb-dominated entity and their representatives in the country’s three-member presidency have threatened to use their reserved powers to block any recognition of Kosovo’s independence. On another level, the recognition of Kosovo’s independence could be a costly endeavour as the Republika Srpska itself has regularly threatened to secede from Bosnia to unify with Serbia. Five EU member states, namely Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain, have withheld the recognition of Kosovo’s independence fearing it will set a precedent for their own internal domestic problems with minorities and breakaway regions (see KFOS 2012). This prevented the EU from granting Kosovo collective recognition. On individual basis, Kosovo has been so far recognised by 23 out of 28 EU member states (see Appendix 5.1). Spain opposes Kosovo’s independence fearing that it would have domestic repressions, especially as the Basque Country and Catalonia actively seek more autonomy and independent statehood. As a result, Spain has increasingly obstructed Kosovo’s EU integration and its desire to enhance relations with NATO. In the written proceedings for the Kosovo ICJ case, Spain argued in April 2009 that “UDI [unilateral declaration of independence] issued by the Kosovo PISG [Provisional Institution of Self-Government] seeks to produce an effect that

Table 6.1 Countries with secessionist regions/movements withholding recognition of Kosovo (2008–2017) Country

Secessionist region/movement Europe

Bosnia and Herzegovina Cyprus Spain

Republika Srpska Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Basque Country and Catalonia Caucasus and Central Asia

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Kyrgystan Moldova Russian Federation Tajikistan Ukraine Uzbekistan

Nagorno-Karabakh Nagorno-Karabakh Abkhazia and South Ossetia Osh and Jalalabad Transdniestria Chechnya Badakhashan Crimea Karakalpakstan Middle East and North Africa

Israel Morocco Iraq

State of Palestine Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara) Kurdistan South-East Asia

China Myanmar Indonesia India Laos Nepal Philippines Sri Lanka

Taiwan, Tibet, Uighur region Rakhine Aceh and West Papua Kashmir ChaoFa Madhesh Bangsamoro Tamil Eelam Africa

Angola Cameroon Ethiopia Kenya Mali Nigeria Democratic Republic of the Congo Sudan Zambia Zimbabwe

Lunda-Tchokwé and Cabinda Bakassi and Ambazonia Afaria, Oromia, and Sidama Mombasa Azawad Biafra Brazzaville and Loango Darfur Lozi tribe Mthwakazi Latin America

Argentina Bolivia Chile Guatemala Nicaragua

Falkland Islands Media Luna Wallmapu Sapodilla Cay Miskitia

Entangling sovereignty 179 has negative consequences for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia and of the other States in the region” (MFAC of Spain 2009: 15). Kosovo tried to reach out to Spanish diplomats and convince them that Kosovo is a different case and reassured them that Kosovo would not recognise any declaration of independence issued by Catalonia if Spain would ease its stance on Kosovo (TV Klan 2017). Kosovo differentiated between the two cases, arguing that Catalan self-determination is not justified as there are no human rights abuses against the Catalan people, and they do not suffer from discrimination in economic, political, or cultural terms by the Spanish government. Members of the European Parliament raised the issue of Spain’s recognition of Kosovo, suggesting that the Spanish state is one of the few countries in the EU which has still not recognised the independence of Kosovo, thereby aligning itself with countries severely lacking in democracy and recognition of human rights and individual liberties such as China and Russia. (European Parliament 2011) Romania is another EU member state which has not yet recognised Kosovo due to internal problems with national minorities. Romania has publically justified its decision not to recognise Kosovo’s independence due to “the fact that the two parties could not reach an understanding, but also on the fact that there is no UN Security Council resolution to legalize the declaration of independence” (MFA of Romania 2009: 4). However, domestic considerations also influenced Romania’s position, namely fearing that accepting Kosovo’s independence would trigger secessionist attempts by the Hungarian minority in Romania. The Romanian President Traian Băsescu argued that Kosovo-Albanians, as a national minority within Serbia, did not enjoy the right to external self-determination. This aimed to pre-empt possible claims by national minorities for more autonomy or secession (President of Romania 2008). The Parliament of Romania also issued a statement underlining that “the decision of the authorities in Pristina, as well as the eventual recognition of the unilaterally-declared independence by other States, cannot be interpreted as a precedent for other regions or as recognizing or guaranteeing collective rights for national minorities”.10 Therefore, Romania’s reasons for not recognising Kosovo’s independence had more to do with its own domestic issues with Hungarian national minority who are seeking wider autonomy and self-determination than with Kosovo’s own contextual merits for statehood. Similarly, Greece has not yet recognised Kosovo, not only due to its special relationship with Serbia, but also because of disagreements with Albania concerning the Cham question, the rights of the Greek minority in south-east Albania, and the demarcation dispute over the sea border with Albania.11 Cyprus is another EU member state that has not yet recognised Kosovo, due to its own internal problem with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The international community does not recognise the TRNC, instead considering the territory as an occupied area of Cyprus. UN Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the creation of TRNC to be “legally invalid”. Turkey is the only country to

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recognise the TRNC as an independent state. Accordingly, MFA of Cyprus (2016) has stated that it “fully adheres to the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, including Serbia, and does not recognise the unilaterally declared independence (UDI) of Kosovo”. Although Kosovo has good relationships with Turkey, it does not engage with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus hoping to encourage eventual recognition by Greece and Cyprus. Slovakia does not recognise Kosovo largely due to a combination of domestic legal and socio-political factors. During the UN-led talks on Kosovo’s final status, the Slovak parliament passed a resolution conditioning eventual recognition of Kosovo’s future status only after Serbia consents to such a process. Furthermore, Slovak public opinion is empathetic to Serbia for historical, cultural, and religious reasons, which has created a wide political reluctance among country’s political leadership for recognising Kosovo’s independence. Despite this, Slovakia has played constructively towards Kosovo’s which strongly supports European integration of the Western Balkans, including Kosovo. In Caucasus, the presence of multiple frozen conflicts and de facto states explain why Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Armenia have not recognised Kosovo yet. Georgia itself has secessionist issues: Abkhazia and South Ossetia are breakaway areas of Georgia that declared de facto independence in 1990. The justifications invoked for the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia include its autonomous status within the former Soviet Union, attempts at ethnic cleansing by the Georgian state, the exhaustion of negotiations, and the presence of a democratic regime. They are currently recognised as an independent sovereign state by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, and Tuvalu, which have all established official diplomatic relations with the entity. In 2011, the country of Vanuatu recognised Abkhazia, however they withdrew with recognition on 20 May 2013, restating their support for Georgian territorial sovereignty. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are also recognised by other unrecognised entities such as Transdniestria, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia’s recognition was widely denounced by most major powers and the international community. Another country which has not recognised Kosovo is Moldova, fearing that such a move would undermine their own territorial integrity and encourage their own breakaway region of Transdniestria. Similarly, Azerbaijan does not recognise Kosovo’s independence and has stated that it views Kosovo as a dangerous precedent for other separatist movements, including Nagorno-Karabakh. Nagorno-Karabakh is a territory located in Azerbaijan, which is currently the source of a long-standing dispute with Armenia, who supports the Armenian populace of the territory in their quest for independence. Nagorno-Karabakh so far has been recognised by Transdniestria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Armenia has avoided recognising Kosovo due to the sensitive domestic situation regarding Armenia’s support for the ethnic-Armenian Azerbaijani province of Nagorno-Karabakh. In fact, Armenia, have expressed concern that by over-emphasising that Kosovo is a unique case, that same “unique nature” would harm the prospects of other breakaway regions for independence.12 Recognition prospects are also shaped by the entanglement of dyads of enmity and competing states. While the entanglement of Kosovo with the U.S. and major

Entangling sovereignty 181 European powers has brought the fledgling state many benefits and facilitated international access, the same affiliation has been a disadvantage for dealing with a specific group of states. Gëzim Krasniqi (2014: 216) rightly argues that “Kosovo’s dependence on the U.S. and the EU, and its subsequent compliance in the field of foreign policy, risks the forging of a negative image – that of a ‘satellite’ or ‘client’ state – for Kosovo in international relations”. As a result of Kosovo’s affiliation and strategic dependency on the U.S., most democratic countries have recognised its independence. This helped to overcome what Kosovo’s diplomacy called “prejudices and even malicious propaganda against Kosovo and it’s to build a successful, secular republic entrenched in EU and NATO” (MFA of Kosovo 2014b: 6). Most countries that have withheld recognition from Kosovo are part of the club of undemocratic regimes and opponents of the U.S.-led international liberal order. China does not recognise Kosovo partially because of its objection to U.S. global dominance, but also to avoid setting a precedent for Taiwan, Tibet, and the Uighur region. Aware of China’s veto power in the UN Security Council and its growing global influence, Kosovo has been careful not to antagonise China by engaging with Taiwan, despite calls by the latter to deepen political and economic cooperation. Similarly, Brazil withheld its recognition of Kosovo pending an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo on consensual secession. Brazil’s public justification explained that “the Unilateral declaration of Independence of Kosovo by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo bas divided the international community and disregarded the authority of the Security Council in regards to the maintenance of international peace and security” (Embassy of the Federative Republic of Brazil 2009: 2). More recently, Brazilian diplomats have explained their decision to withhold recognition due to their commitment to promote multilateralism and international law, which they perceive were not being served well by Western powers when recognising Kosovo’s independence. Despite Kosovo’s efforts to argue that its independence is not a precedent for the emergence of other states, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and effective annexation of Crimea cited Kosovo as a precedent. Following the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Crimea declared independence and subsequently voted to reintegrate with Russia. Russian and Crimean politicians referred to Kosovo, and especially the ICJ ruling on Kosovo, as a precedent to justify Crimea’s declaration of independence. Arguably none of the circumstances supporting the case for Kosovo’s independence were in place in the case of Crimea: Russia disregarded the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, broke several bilateral and international agreements in relation to Ukraine’s security, and acted unilaterally without the consent of the international community. Kosovo argued that its people suffered a decade of severe Serbian repression, whereas Ukraine had not repressed or expelled its ethnic Russian population, nor had it used force in Crimea (MFA of Kosovo 2014a). Legally, Kosovo stipulated that its independence was directly linked with the violent dissolution of a federal state, whereas Ukraine as a unitary state had not tried to revoke Crimea’s constitutional status. Moreover, Kosovo argued that there was no suggestion that Ukraine was dissolving, which could have allowed its constituent units to claim statehood. Furthermore, Kosovo argued that an entity within

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a state that is neither repressed nor denied the opportunity to exercise internal self-determination cannot simply leave the host state, recalling that remedial selfdetermination would only be justified if peaceful efforts for a negotiated settlement had failed (MFA of Kosovo 2014a). In the case of Crimea, the move towards sudden independence was instigated by Russia’s political and military intervention to orchestrate a declaration of independence and to hold the referendum for unification with Russia. While Kosovo declared independence to become a sovereign state, Crimea was immediately incorporated into the Russian Federation by force. Despite these substantial differences, references to Kosovo were made to antagonise Western states and to deflect Russia’s political intentions regarding the unlawful occupation and annexation of Crimea. Invoking Kosovo in this way primarily related to justifying Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, while relativising and neutralising Western criticism and sanctions, thereby attempting to weaken the moral and normative claims made by the U.S. and most European nations regarding Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Kosovo has not managed to secure sufficient recognition in the Latin America due to internal secessionist threats. In the Americas, so far Kosovo has been recognised by 19 countries, whereas 16 continue to withhold the recognition of the fledgling state (see Appendix 3). While some countries delayed recognising Kosovo in deference to warm relationships with Serbia, others feared that recognition would trigger internal political divisions. For instance, Argentina declared if we were to recognize Kosovo, which has declared its independence unilaterally, without an agreement with Serbia, we would set a dangerous precedent that would seriously threaten our chances of a political settlement in the case of the Falkland Islands.13 Guatemala hesitated to recognise Kosovo, fearing that such a diplomatic move would adversely impact its own border dispute with Belize. In certain instances, religion also played a role in the recognition of Kosovo. While Paraguay had no specific reason for delaying the recognition of Kosovo, their diplomats expressed concerns that part of their border territory populated by Brazilians could seek secession.14 Although a secular state, most of Kosovo’s population are moderate Muslims, so Serbia tried to undermine Kosovo’s quest for recognition by claiming that such a move would undermine Christian religious and cultural heritage in Kosovo. In response, Kosovo invested extensive diplomatic efforts to secure recognition from the Holy See as a strategic recognition, which would benefit Kosovo’s image as a secular state home to many religions, and thereby encourage recognition by Catholic countries within the global south, especially Latin America and Africa. Countries who were caught between major powers and were geo-politically and economically depended on complex, balanced, and neutral foreign policy often hesitated to recognise Kosovo. This was mainly the case with Central Asian states who used the pretext of foreign policy neutrality for not recognising

Entangling sovereignty 183 Kosovo, as such a move would expose them to Russia’s pressure to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For example, Turkmenistan refused to recognise Kosovo because they pursue a foreign policy of neutrality and as such for them recognition would constitute an interference in the internal affairs of other states. Other Central Asian states that were once part of the Soviet Union have refused to recognise Kosovo due to close foreign policy coordination with Russia, and fears that recognising Kosovo would leave them unable to withstand Russian pressure to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia.15 Similarly, Indonesia has not recognised Kosovo for fear of harming its own campaign to prevent the secession of the breakaway provinces of Aceh and West Papua. Meanwhile, Sri Lanka has not recognised Kosovo due to its internal problem with Tamil separatism. In Southeast Asia, non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence by India who had its own internal issues with Kashmir, also managed to influence the decision of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka. This trend of withholding the recognition of Kosovo’s independence due to internal problems with indigenous secessionist movements is also prevalent among 12 countries in the African continent. Kosovo so far has been recognised by 27 African countries, whereas another 27 countries in this world region continue to withhold recognition of Kosovo (see Appendix 3). Among these countries include: Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Algeria claimed that Kosovo’s status should be resolved within the UN framework and through a UN Security Council resolution. Otherwise, they feared that any solution outside the UN framework would set bad precedents for Africa’s fragile post-colonial states and contested border. Though, non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence by South Africa influences the decision of other countries in the region, such as Namibia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe.16 In North Africa, Morocco has delayed recognising Kosovo due to its own concerns with the Western Sahara, a region whose statehood was foreseen as part of decolonisation process before it was occupied by Morocco. Regarding Algeria, a U.S. diplomatic cable commented that “the Algerians are clearly finding Russian and Serbian opposition to Kosovo independence to be a convenient way to avoid dealing with the matter”.17 In the Middle East, Israel has not recognised Kosovo fearing that such an act could legitimate the Palestinian claim for statehood. Similarly, Iraq, Iran, and Syria have not recognised Kosovo’s independence. While Iraq’s justification is grounded on fears that such a move would support the Kurds’ campaign for independence, Syria and Iran were deeply suspicious of Kosovo’s close ties with the U.S. and other Western powers. An additional reason why countries who have emerged from decolonisation process and endure internal secessionist problems, withhold the recognition of Kosovo also because of special relationships they have with Serbia as successor state of Yugoslavia who was leader of the Non-Aligned Movement who played a key role in the decolonisation process.18 Serbia’s diplomatic influence is not a by-product of what it does now but what Tito’s Yugoslavia

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did for Third World Countries during the Cold War. For Kosovo, dissociating from and overcoming such historical foreign policy entanglements would require extensive diplomatic efforts and strong economic and political investment, which it has not managed to deliver in the first decade. There were also other instances whereby states couldn’t recognise Kosovo for reasons related to their leadership positions within multilateral organisations, such as holding the presidency of the UN Security Council or the EU Council, or bidding for leadership seats in multilateral bodies. For example, Panama and Togo who had no problem recognising Kosovo, but had to wait until they completed their rotating seats in the UN Security Council. A U.S. demarche on Kosovo quotes Panama’s foreign minister stating that “Panama has no problem recognizing Kosovo, but we could not do so while Panama still held the presidency of the UN Security Council”.19 Similarly, Togo delayed the recognition of Kosovo until it finished its two-year term in the UN Security Council and gradually prepared the stage and found the right momentum to recognise Kosovo without Russia’s and Chinese strong opposition.20 Portugal delayed the recognition of Kosovo in 2008 until it concluded its EU presidency and responded to Serbia’s request to “allow Serbia to save face and avoid breaking diplomatic ties with Portugal over the issue”.21 Although Kosovo during its first decade of existence as an independent state has not managed to obtain universal recognition it does not suffer from collective non-recognition. The 115 states what have conferred recognition to Kosovo is a sufficient testimony that the country has not been barred by the community of existing sovereign states. The remaining states who continue to withhold the recognition of Kosovo independence is not testimony of the lack of Kosovo’s international legal personality or that these states do not consider Kosovo a state. It is a matter of their own political decisions, as state recognition is considered a competency solely reserved to states as key subjects of international law. When a state does not recognise an emerging state as a sovereign and independent state, it could mean that they accept that the new state has state-like attributes and they could recognise it, but decide not to recognise for political reasons related to domestic or foreign policy priorities. Although almost half of the countries that have not yet recognised Kosovo are experiencing internal secessionist conflicts, many other countries granted recognition despite having their own internal problems with secessionist movements. For example, Turkey, despite having a troubled relation with Kurds in the east of the country, immediately recognised Kosovo after its declaration of independence. Somalia took an affirmative and supportive stance on Kosovo despite its own problems with the disputed Somaliland. Despite the fact that Solomon Islands had its own domestic secessionist problems, they recognised Kosovo in 2014. Similarly, the UK has proactively supported Kosovo in international affairs despite increasing demands for independence in Scotland. These examples show that countries with historical or ongoing secessionist tensions considered Kosovo a unique case and granted recognition based on the historical, political, and legal merits without allowing potential domestic repercussions to cloud their judgement.

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Multilateral entanglements for membership in international organisations The entangled character of world politics, events, and developments has also affected Kosovo’s quest for admission to international bodies. Although within a decade, Kosovo managed to secure recognition from 115 states and established diplomatic relations with over 80 states, it struggled to translate this affirmation into votes for membership in international bodies (see Appendix 4). In other instances, Kosovo and its international allies have successfully discouraged changes of rules for membership in international bodies (often pursued by Serbia and Russia), which would have blocked or delayed Kosovo’s accession prospects. Securing access to multilateral bodies was far more challenging than anticipated largely because of the complex global entanglements between different countries’ interests, alliances, and attitudes towards Kosovo during its path to independent statehood. Among all international organisations, Kosovo views membership in the EU and NATO as the most significant way to entrenching the political, security, and geo-strategical aspects of its statehood. Kosovo’s prospects for joining the EU are directly entangled with the EU’s internal developments, Kosovo’s own domestic reforms, and regional developments within the Western Balkans. However, the refusal of five EU member states to recognise Kosovo’s independence complicates Kosovo’s perspective for joining the EU. The first step in the accession process is signing a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), which seeks the approximation of laws, trade, and foreign policy prior to beginning the formal accession process. When the other countries of the Western Balkans signed similar agreements, the national parliaments of the EU member states were consulted (MFA of Kosovo 2013b). However, the European Commission tried to avoid such a procedural pathway for Kosovo’s SAA fearing that it would be blocked by the five non-recognisers and other Eurosceptic member states. As an alternative, the EU proposed to conclude the SAA without the consent of national parliament based on legal competences granted to the Commission. Concluding the SAA as an “EU only” agreement was challenged by the UK, and eventually also by Spain and a few other EU member states, who wanted to maintain a clear delineation between the competences exercised by national governments and the EU institutions. In particular, the UK’s conservative Government and Parliament expressed concerns about the growing powers of the European Commission to sign international agreements without securing the consent and ratification of national parliaments. The UK informed Kosovo’s authorities that their objections to the “EU only” SAA had nothing to do with Kosovo; it was purely an issue between the UK and the EU institutions. Similarly, Ireland and Denmark objected to the “EU only” agreement including certain provisions under Title V (Justice and Home Affairs), competences for which these two countries had secured an opt-out under the EU treaties. Although these tensions between the EU member states and the European Commission regarding the exercise of competences was resolved after almost one year of negotiations, this delay negatively affected Kosovo’s path to the EU. However, Kosovo’s prospects for joining

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the EU are also linked to its ability to undertake comprehensive political, economic, and legal reform: for a young state without much institutional experience and a complex power-sharing system operating within a polarised political environment, these reforms have so far proven very difficult. Beyond this, Kosovo’s European future is directly linked with progress achieved in the normalisation of relations with Serbia, as well as resolving other outstanding issues, such as border demarcation, the return of refugees, and other economic matters. Given its size and geo-political situation, Kosovo currently exists outside a wider military alliance, leaving this small young country vulnerable to external influence. Kosovo’s desire to join NATO is shaped by wider political and security entanglements. For Kosovo, developing a proper security and defence force is framed as aiming to protect “Kosovo’s territorial integrity but also to enhance peace and stability in the region and to be fully integrated in NATO and other Euro-Atlantic structures” (President of Kosovo 2017). However, Kosovo’s path to NATO membership remains uncertain as it first needs to establish its own defence forces, join NATO’s programme Partnership for Peace, and then undergo a formal application process, which requires additional institutional and operational reforms. Kosovo initiated the process of constitutional change to transform the existing Kosovo Security Force into Kosovo’s Armed Forces, but Serbian members of the Kosovo Assembly opposed such changes under direct instructions from Belgrade. Without securing the consent of minorities, it is unlikely that NATO and the wider international community will accept the formation of Kosovo’s Armed Forces. There are also other impediments, such NATO statusneutral approach towards Kosovo taken even after its declaration of independence and continued to operate in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). Moreover, four NATO member countries – Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain – did not recognise Kosovo due to their own internal issues with secessionist movements. Kosovo’s quest to enhance relations with NATO was regularly impeded by these four member states (Avdiu 2015: 18). Kosovo’s campaign for membership in international organisations was directly influenced by global and remote diplomatic entanglements. Diplomatic blockages sometimes had little to do with Kosovo but arose due to the foreign policy interests of other states. For example, Kosovo applied to join the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in 2015 to expand “its presence within the UN specialized structures and also to reconfirm the degree of legitimacy it has among the member states of the world community” (MFA of Kosovo 2016). Kosovo chose UNESCO because it satisfies the criteria for membership in accordance with UNESCO’s Constitution (Article II.2), confirming that “states not members of the United Nations Organisation may be admitted to membership of the Organization, upon recommendation of the Executive Board, by a two-thirds majority vote of the General Conference”. Kosovo intentionally chose UNESCO because the “voting process for UNESCO membership could serve as an important indicator about the voting for future membership in the United Nations” (MFA of Kosovo 2016). However, Kosovo did not manage to secure membership in UNESCO, falling three votes short of the required

Entangling sovereignty 187 two-thirds majority among member states. Apparently, many countries switched their votes at the last moment as a result of diplomatic intervention by Serbia and its international allies (MFA of Kosovo 2016). Although the campaign was wellpresented as far as public diplomacy is concerned, the strategic actions and diplomatic entanglements were miscalculated.22 Serbia focussed its counter-campaign on religious grounds appealing effectively to many Latin American countries that have fervent Christian populations (MFA of Kosovo 2016). Kosovo lacked the requisite diplomatic presence and network in many countries and Kosovo failed to reach out many countries. There was also apparently lack of expertise, coordination, and sufficient diplomatic resources to design and implement an effective lobbying campaign for membership in UNESCO (MFA of Kosovo 2016). In addition, its international partners did not lobby actively at the highest political levels. Most importantly, Kosovo’s diplomacy miscalculated the extent of international support for its UNESCO bid by assuming that all of the countries who recognised Kosovo would automatically vote in favour of Kosovo’s membership in UNESCO. Countries such as Poland and South Korea, who have recognised Kosovo, did not vote in favour of Kosovo. Around 15 countries that have recognised Kosovo but had not right to vote due to their failure to pay financial contributions to UNESCO. Kosovo’s UNESCO bid was also affected by the politics within countries who have recognised Kosovo and the broader hesitancy to admit non-UN member states to UN agencies. Overtime, Kosovo’s fate to join international bodies became unintentionally entangled with Palestine’s efforts to establish independent statehood. The U.S. could not support Kosovo’s UNESCO membership bid because it did not have the right to vote having withdrawn its funding for UNSECO after Palestine successfully secured membership in the organisation. The U.S. Department of State was obliged to take this position as the U.S. Congress has passed a resolution earlier where it ceased funding international organisations that Palestine becomes a member. Accordingly, the precedent set by Palestine’s membership in UNESCO harmed Kosovo’s prospects as many countries wanted to avoid the further politicisation of the UN system and feared that other major contributing countries would withdraw their funding. Following Kosovo’s failed attempt to join UNESCO, the U.S. discouraged Kosovo from applying for membership in the World Health Organisation (WHO), arguing that U.S. would not be able to support Kosovo since if Kosovo joined Palestine might follow. The U.S. would then be obliged to withdraw funding from the WHO, which would undermine U.S. multilateral diplomacy and its role in these organisations. Due to such global interactions, Kosovo’s quest to join multilateral organisations became entangled with the unrelated case of Palestine, and unintentionally threatened the foreign policy interests of the U.S. in multilateral organisations. In such diplomatic assemblages, agency was not constituted upon the political strengths of the actors involved but on the monumental combination of political forces with fractural agency and emergent features. Moreover, Kosovo also encountered blockages by individuals with ambitions to secure prestigious multilateral posts. For example, UNESCO’s Director-General Irina Bokova played a negative role in Kosovo’s

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UNESCO bid to avoid damaging her candidacy for UN Secretary-General in 2016. An internal assessment of the MFA of Kosovo claimed that it is confirmed that DG Bokova has played an important and active role to impede Kosovo’s membership because she did not want it to damage her future candidacy for UNSG in 2016. She is already blamed for allowing Palestine to join UNESCO, and Kosovo’s victory might have harmed her further. (MFA of Kosovo 2016: 2) Kosovo’s bid to join the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) was also entangled with exogenous processes, which had both positive and negative effects on the campaign and its outcomes. In terms of positive effects, the prevalence of transnational terrorism, regional organised crimes, and violent radicalisation gave rise to strong functional arguments: Kosovo needs to be part of INTERPOL to share intelligence and cooperate more effectively with international law enforcement structures. This global insecurity encouraged Kosovo’s international partners to support its bid for membership. The letter sent by Kosovo’s Prime Minister Isa Mustafa, framed the desire for membership on the grounds that Kosovo remains committed to the mission of INTERPOL, and will continue to engage the international law enforcement community to address vial issues such as combatting terrorism, violent extremism, trafficking, and other international criminal activity, and to close a critical gap in the law enforcement capabilities in the Western Balkans. (Prime Minister of Kosovo 2016) Yet, Kosovo’s bid for INTERPOL was advanced mainly for domestic reasons, including the desire to remove from INTERPOL’s terrorist lists former KLA members (who are occasionally arrested via Serbian-issued INTERPOL arrest warrants), and other reasons related to public security and the prevention of rising violent extremism in the region. As with the UNESCO situation, negative entanglements emerged that undermined Kosovo’s short-term term chances of joining INTERPOL. Kosovo’s 2016 bid to join INTERPOL happened to coincide with Palestine’s attempt to join this organisation, which undermined Kosovo’s prospects as Israel and other states were working actively to prevent Palestine’s bid. As noted by the Times of Israel (2016): Israel is hoping that the combination of the Palestinian Authority with Kosovo, which, along with the Solomon Islands, is also requesting INTERPOL membership, will bring Russia and other countries to side with Israel. Russia does not recognise Kosovo, which declared independence in 2008. As with the case of UNESCO, Israel and Serbia made similar diplomatic arguments in separate and uncoordinated campaigns. They considered that the bids of

Entangling sovereignty 189 Kosovo and Palestine represented the politicisation of international professional bodies, making efforts to secure statehood through a back door by evading direct negotiations. Palestine’s desire to join INTERPOL was motivated by their efforts to involve international law enforcement agencies to bring justice to Israel’s systematic human rights abuses and war crimes against Palestinian civilians, which have been documented by the UN and other international bodies. While Kosovo was counting on the support from the U.S. and most European states, it failed to secure membership in 2016 due to the objections raised by Israel to Palestine’s bid (Reuters 2016). In 2017, following advice from the U.S. and other close allies, Kosovo postponed reapplying for INTERPOL membership. Meanwhile Palestine and the Solomon Islands managed to secure membership in 2017. Serbia was quick to consider Kosovo’s decision not to reapply for admission to INTERPOL as a diplomatic victory backed by China and Russia (B92 2017). In principle, Kosovo’s rationale to postpone its application to INTERPOL intended to disentangle its association with Palestine in multilateral organisations, take more time to generate more global support and consensus, and re-apply when the annual meeting is held in a country that has recognised Kosovo. In practice, Kosovo’s government had to withdraw its application for INTERPOL membership due to unfavourable external circumstances and under pressure from the U.S. and European countries. The U.S. apparently made a deal with Russia, China, and Serbia to postpone Kosovo’s application in exchange for rejecting Palestine’s bid for membership (Jerusalem Post 2017). The U.S. strategy was to propose new amendments on the criteria for admission to INTERPOL, which would make Palestine’s membership more difficult in the future. However, as these amendments failed to secure support, it seems that U.S. was outfoxed by its major global opponents to support Palestine’s membership while managing to exclude Kosovo for another year. This is an example of the heterogeneity of global diplomatic assemblages, which increasingly complicated Kosovo’s efforts to join international society and entangled its political fate with other unrelated disputed states and territories. Kosovo’s authorities reacted to these global entanglements by stating that we remain grateful to many states who have helped and continue to help us in the journey of completing our international recognition. However, with the increased polarisation among big powers and regional frictions, we often feel that we are neglected and not given the sufficient attention. But, this is the goal and challenge of Kosovo’s foreign policy to push forward our recognition agenda. (Hoxhaj 2016a) In response, political commentators argued that “Kosovo should apply to as many international organizations as it can, regardless of the propensity to gain membership”, it is better to be “refused membership by other sovereign nations . . . than refusing yourself the sovereign right to apply for membership” (Kursani 2017b). Parallel to external factors impeding Kosovo’s membership in international bodies, after 2014 consecutive domestic political crises have significantly undermined

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Kosovo’s ability to advance its foreign policy objectives. Evidently, membership in international bodies required a functioning institutional system in Kosovo. Foreign Minister Hoxhaj (2016b: 85) admitted that “political crises in Kosovo have paralysed Kosovo’s foreign policy, including in times of favourable international conditions”. For example, consecutive domestic crises played a major role in delaying Kosovo’s application for membership in the Council of Europe and other international specialised agencies and bodies. In 2017, Kosovo did not re-apply for UNESCO and INTERPOL partially due to the delays in the consolidation of the new parliament and government.23 Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj admitted that 2017 was a year “marred by institutional deadlock, elections, delays in forming institutions and the absence of consistent work beforehand. So, an unsustainable agenda of unconsolidated achievements towards membership in these two institutions made us rethink our strategy” (Radio Evropa e Lirë 2017). While for Kosovo membership in international bodies was seen as beneficial to the consolidation of statehood, in certain instances, Kosovo has avoided joining organisations, such as the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which are deemed unsuitable for Kosovo’s strategic orientation in foreign affairs. Kosovo’s lobbying efforts among Islamic states and multilateral organisations are a sensitive process. The OIC has proactively supported Kosovo’s efforts for recognition by its member states and votes in multilateral organisations. Lobbying through the OIC, which represents the largest number of states within the UN General Assembly, helped to influence UN dynamics concerning Kosovo. For several years, OIC member states such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Albania, have sponsored resolutions calling on OIC member states to recognise Kosovo. In 2013, the OIC’s Secretary-General stated that the OIC has always been in favour of Kosovo’s independence. Almost a third of the states that have recognized Kosovo are members of the OIC . . . and we expect to have new recognitions in the future . . . OIC will continue to mobilize member states to recognize Kosovo’s independence. (Government of Kosovo 2013) Later in 2014, the OIC called on Russia to “reconsider its position towards the independence of Kosovo and not to be an obstacle before the right of the people of Kosovo to self-determination” (OIC 2014). However, this support came with a price. The OIC constantly lobbied that in return for supporting Kosovo, this new European country populated by a Muslim majority would join the organisation. Kosovo was not interested in joining the OIC, fearing an affiliation with Islamic states that are implicated in global terrorism, and concerned about domestic repercussions given Kosovo’s constitutional commitment to being a secular and multiethnic state. To avoid joining the OIC, Kosovo used the procedural argument that it first needs to join the UN before it can consider applying for the OIC. Yet, a group of Kosovo diplomats with strong religious orientation who were posted in the Middle East actively lobbied for Kosovo to become an observer member of the OIC on the grounds that such a move would strengthen Kosovo’s international

Entangling sovereignty 191 standing, as well as would benefit politically, economically, and culturally without jeopardising Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic and pro-Western foreign policy orientation (MFA of Kosovo 2013a).

Conclusion This chapter examined temporary assemblages of enabling and disabling global entanglements, which have underpinned Kosovo’s process for securing recognition and membership in international bodies. Due to complex global and domestic entanglements, the process of state-becoming is non-linear and is mostly a self-organised process shaped by multiple actors; this often leads to features that are often unintended, unplanned, and perhaps undesired. Kosovo’s international legitimation was a product of multiple determinants that cannot be reduced to a single discursive and normative framework, nor to the strength of internal and external actors, systematic factors, or historical moments and events. Rather, the logic of Kosovo’s consolidation of statehood has operated as a loose assemblage of multiple actors, events, and processes, which have become entangled and interrelated in unexpected and unplanned manners. From a position of vulnerability and incomplete international sovereignty, Kosovo’s diplomacy was aware of the unequal and unlevelled diplomatic playing field and the significance of associating with states that enjoy greater international influence. While the quest for recognition intended to expand Kosovo’s international sovereignty and fulfil the aspiration for self-determination, such a process required temporal dependency on external forces. In a globally connected world, the effectiveness of Kosovo’s diplomacy was to mobilise support from regional and global powers and entangle Kosovo’s interests with other countries’ foreign policy interests. Seeking diplomatic recognition and support for participating and becoming a member of international bodies inevitably pushed Kosovo to engage with other countries and become part of wider political and geo-strategic assemblages of relations, interests, and affiliations. While the U.S. and the major European powers have supported Kosovo’s lobbying efforts, many countries would have not recognised Kosovo’s statehood without Kosovo’s proactive diplomatic mobility and persistence. The strength of Kosovo’s diplomacy lay in its ability to figure out how to work with great powers and utilise their global influence and diplomatic network. Thus, contrary to existing views, the support of great powers for Kosovo’s recognition and membership in international organisations was a by-product of Kosovo’s strategic dependency on its international patrons. However, in most instances, international support for Kosovo has come with strings attached. In exchange for strengthening Kosovo’s international standing, U.S. and European partners have forced Kosovo to undertake domestic reforms and comply with externally-set political, economic, and geo-political agendas. As demonstrated in this chapter, over the years, it has become clear that recognition of Kosovo was caught between great power rivalries, which significantly undermined the consideration given to contextual aspects and the performative merits of Kosovo’s quest for statehood. It is widely known that consensus among

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great powers is pivotal for securing the international recognition of new states. However, the growing number of unrecognised states has deepened polarisation among major powers, which in turn has complicated Kosovo’s chances for joining the club of sovereign states. Recognition of Kosovo’s independence by one political bloc of states has significantly politicised and complicated the recognition process in a broader perspective. Kosovo has received wide recognition from most states belonging to the Euro-Atlantic community, while no recognition has been received from other emerging powers and those who are positioned behind Russia on the question of Kosovo’s independence. Beyond entangling with powerful states, Kosovo’s struggle for recognition was intertwined with broader global developments. While many states exercise the right to recognise other states in based their own geo-strategic interests, the interconnected nature of states and alliances in global politics influences the foreign policy behaviour of states. The networked character of world politics meant that recognition of Kosovo by a regional leader or strategic allies had a positive spillover effect on other follower countries. The same logic applied to those states that withheld their recognition of Kosovo’s independence, whereby their closeness to Serbia, Russia, and China shaped their negative attitude towards Kosovo. Although Kosovo tried to portray its case for independence as unique, incomparable, and unprecedented, while seeking recognition it unintentionally became entangled in other unrecognised states and secessionist regions. Almost half of the countries that have withheld bilateral recognition of Kosovo have either domestic secessionist movements or are entangled into close alliances with Kosovo’s main opponents and their international allies. This entrapment remains impassable for the foreseeable future, unless Kosovo joins the UN, which would be equivalent to collective recognition and ultimately mark the end of the saga for bilateral recognition.

Notes 1 ‘Kosovo Recognition Lobbying: Target Countries in Africa’, U.S. Department of State Cable, 7 May 2008, released by WikiLeaks. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/ cables/08STATE48545_a.html (accessed 23 July 2017). 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 ‘Engaging OIC States on Kosovo Recognition’, U.S. Department of State Cable, 24 April 2009. released by WikiLeaks. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/ 09STATE41665_a.html (accessed 23 July 2017). 5 ‘Supporting Kosovo in International Bodies’, U.S. Department of State Cable, 21 April 2009, released by WikiLeaks. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/ 09STATE39345_a.html (accessed 23 July 2017). 6 Interview by author with Deputy Director of the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, May 2017. 7 Interview by author with a Kosovo Diplomat in New York, via phone, June 2016. 8 Interview by author with a Senior Official at the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, March 2017. 9 ‘Smirnov Says Kosovo Recognition Will Only Speed Up Transnistria’s Struggle for Independence’, 19 March 2008. Available at: www.moldova.org/en/smirnov-sayskosovo-recognition-will-only-speed-up-transnistrias-struggle-for-independence105102-eng/ (accessed 23 September 2017). 10 Official Gazette, Part II, 176 (XIX), NO. 12, 28 February 2008, p. 3. See also: www. icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15616.pdf, p. 4.

Entangling sovereignty 193 11 Interview by author with a Senior Official at the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, March 2014. 12 ‘Algeria Remains Distant on Kosovo Recognition’, U.S. Department of State Cable, 7 July 2008, released by WikiLeaks. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08YERE VAN112_a.html (accessed 20 June 2017). 13 ‘Argentina Rules Out Recognition’, 29 February 2008. Available at: www.b92.net/eng/ news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=02&dd=29&nav_id=48079 (accessed 20 June 2017). 14 Interview by author with a Kosovo Diplomat, Brussels, January 2016. 15 ‘Uzbekistan: Engaging States on Kosovo Recognition’, U.S. Department of State Cable, 7 July 2008, released by WikiLeaks. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/ cables/09TASHKENT183_a.html (accessed 23 June 2017). 16 Interview by author with Deputy Director of the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, May 2017. 17 ‘Algeria Remains Distant on Kosovo Recognition’, U.S. Department of State Cable, 7 July 2008, released by WikiLeaks. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/ 08ALGIERS762_a.html (accessed 23 June 2017). 18 Interview by author with a former Political Adviser at the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, April 2016. 19 ‘Panama: Additional Kosovo Recognition Demarche Delivered’, U.S. Department of State Cable, 28 March 2008, released by WikiLeaks. Available at: https://wikileaks. org/plusd/cables/08PANAMA255_a.html (accessed 23 June 2017). 20 Interview by author with a Kosovo Ambassador, Pristina, May 2017. 21 ‘Portuguese FM Amado Explains Stance on Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Russia: Announces September Kosovo Recognition’, U.S. Department of State Cable, 8 August 2008, released by WikiLeaks. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08LISBON1976_a.html (accessed 23 June 2017). 22 Interview by author with a Senior Official at the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, March 2017. 23 Interview by author with Deputy Director of the MFA of Kosovo, Pristina, March 2017.

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MFA of Kosovo (2016) ‘Analysis of the 2015 Campaign of Kosovo to Gain Membership in UNESCO’, Internal policy document. MFA of Romania (2009) ‘Written Statement of Romania’, 19 April. Available at: www. icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/15616.pdf (accessed 14 July 2017). MFAC of Spain (2009) ‘Written Statement of Spain’, 17 April. Available at: www.icj-cij. org/files/case-related/141/15644.pdf (accessed 18 June 2017). Müllerson, R. (2009) ‘Precedents in the Mountains: On the Parallels and Uniqueness of the Cases of Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia’, Chinese Journal of International Law 8(1): 2–25. Muro, D. (2017) ‘Strategies of Secession and Counter-Secession’, in D. Muro and E. Woertz (eds), Secession and Counter-Secession: An International Relations Perspective, Barcelona: Centre for International Affairs, pp. 19–25. New York Times (2008) ‘Kosovo Is Recognized But Rebuked by Others’, 19 February. Available at: www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/world/europe/19kosovo.html (accessed 20 September 2017). Ong, A. and Collier, S. J. (2005) Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems, London: Blackwell. Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (2014) ‘Statement of H.E. Iyad Ameen Madani Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation at the 41st Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers Session of Exploring Areas of Islamic Cooperation’, 18 June. Available at: www.oic-oci.org/topic/?t_id=9147&ref=3666&lan=en (accessed 23 June 2017). Pacolli, B. (2010) Nga Sfida ne Sfidë – Jeta, Behgjet Pacolli, Pristina. Pacolli, B. (2014) Të Lobosh për Kosovën: Pavarësia dhe SHBA-të, Tirana: Bota Shqiptare. Paquin, J. (2010) A Stability-Seeking Power: U.S. Foreign Policy and Secessionist Conflicts, Ithaca, NY: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Pouliot, V. (2016) International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. President of Kosovo (2007) ‘Letter to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’, 10 May. President of Kosovo (2015) ‘President Jahjaga’s Speech at the Ambassadors’ Conference’, n.d. Available at: www.president-ksgov.net/?page=2,8,3938#.WHQU-baLQ0o (accessed 20 October 2017). President of Romania (2008) ‘Official Position of Romania towards the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo Province’, Press Statement, 18 February. Available at: http://old.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date_arhiva&id=10227&_PRID=arh (accessed 22 July 2017). Prime Minister of Kosovo (2016) ‘Letter Sent to the Secretary-General of INTERPOL’, Pristina, 5 November. Quaye, C. O. (1991) Liberation Struggles in International Law, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Radio Evropa e Lirë (2017) ‘Haradinaj: Për Demarkacionin vendosim pasi ta gjejmë të vërtetën’, 5 October. Available at: www.evropaelire.org/a/ramush-haradinaj-demarkacionidialogu-/28775712.html (accessed 7 October 2017). Reuters (2016) ‘Israel says Blocked Palestinian bid to Join Interpol’, 8 November. Available at: www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-interpol-idUSKBN1331Z6 (accessed 20 March 2017). Ring, P. J. (2015) ‘Analysing the reform of the retail financial advice sector in the United Kingdom from an agencement and performativity perspective’, Competition and Change 19(5): 390–405.

Entangling sovereignty 197 Schwartz, R. (2008) ‘Events Are What We Make of Them’, in T. F. Shipley and J. M. Zacks (eds), Understanding Events: From Perception to Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 54–60. Shaohua, H. (2015) ‘Small State Foreign Policy: The Diplomatic Recognition of Taiwan’, China: An International Journal 13(2): 1–23. Sharp, J. P. et al. (2000) ‘Entanglements of Power: Geographies of Domination/Resis tance’, in J. P. Sharp et al. (eds), Entanglements of Power: Geographies of Domination/ Resistance, London: Routledge, pp. 1–42. Sterio, M. (2013) The Right to Self-Determination under International Law: “Selfistans”, Secession, and the Rule of the Great Powers, Abingdon: Routledge. Stroschein, S. (2013) ‘Discourse in Bosnia and Macedonia on the Independence of Kosovo: When and What Is a Precedent?’, Europe-Asia Studies 65(6): 874–888. Times of Israel (2016) ‘Israel Trying to Block Palestinians from Interpol’, Times of Israel, 31 October. Available at: www.timesofisrael.com/israel-trying-to-block-palestiniansfrom-interpol/ (accessed 12 June 2017). Trifunovska, S. (2011) ‘The Impact of the “Kosovo Precedent” on Self-Determination Struggles’, in J. Summers (ed), Kosovo: A Precedent?: The Declaration of Independence, the Advisory Opinion and Implications for Statehood, Self-Determination and Minority Rights, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 375–393. TV Klan (2017) ‘Kosovo Is Not Catalonia, Thaçi Appeals to Spain to Recognize Kosovo’, 20 February. Available at: http://tvklan.al/kosovo-is-not-catalonia-thaci-appeals-to-spainto-recognize-kosovo/ (accessed 27 August 2017). UN Security Council (2008) ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo’, UN Doc. S/2008/354, 12 June. U.S. Department of State (2008) ‘US Recognizes Kosovo as Independent State’, Press Statement. Available at: https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/100973.htm (accessed 14 June 2017). Volgy, M. J. et al. (2011) ‘Major Power Status in International Politics’, in M. J. Volgy et al. (eds), Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–26. Wilson, G. (2009) ‘Self-Determination, Recognition and the Problem of Kosovo’, Netherlands International Law Review 56(3): 455–481. Wisner, F. G. (2008) ‘The United States and the Balkans: Achieving Kosovo’s Independence’, American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy 30(4): 189–195.

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A critical reappraisal On 17 February 2018, Kosovo marked the tenth anniversary of its Declaration of Independence. Kosovo has much to celebrate: within two decades, Kosovo transitioned from war to peace, from an authoritarian regime to democracy, from socialist to market economy, from international administration to supervised statehood, and Kosovo is now gradually integrating itself into the European and international community. For many, Kosovo is a success story of western liberal interventionism, especially in creating a state from scratch whose hard-won statehood was a remedy of last resort following Serbia’s grave human rights violations and whose wide diplomatic recognition was granted to promote democracy, multi-ethnicity and regional peace. Focussing mainly on Kosovo’s efforts to secure diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations, this analysis revealed the utility of discourse, performance, and entangled agency in shaping the prospects for Kosovo to obtain a place in the community of independent and sovereign states. Despite many internal and external constraints, Kosovo managed to build the foundations of a modern state in less than two decades, while generating widespread international legitimacy and support for its independent statehood by securing extensive diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations. With its discourse-based performative diplomacy, and the help of great powers, Kosovo has managed to secure recognition from almost two-thirds of the UN member states. By December 2017, Kosovo obtained recognition from 115 sovereign states and has established diplomatic relations with 87 countries. Kosovo so far has been recognised by 23 out of 28 European Union member states; 25 out of 29 NATO member states; 34 out of 47 Council of Europe member states; 36 out 57 OSCE member states; 28 out of 55 African Union member states; 37 out of 56 Organisation of Islamic Cooperation member states; 19 out of 35 Organisation of American States members; and four out of ten ASEAN member states (see Appendix 5.1 and 5.2). Among the countries that recognised Kosovo, 62 are democratic, 30 are semi-authoritarian, and 20 are undemocratic countries. Among those countries who continue to withhold the recognition of Kosovo, 29 are ranked as undemocratic, whereas 25 are democratic and another 25 are considered

The price of statehood 199 semi-democratic countries. This reveals not only that democracies do not go to war with other democracies, but also that democracies tend to recognise emerging states that are committed to democratic norms. The geography of Kosovo’s recognition is global. Kosovo has been recognised by 34 countries in Eurasia, 34 countries in Asia-Pacific, 27 countries in Africa, and 19 countries in the Americas (see Appendix 4). It is almost unprecedented for a country outside the UN system to receive such extensive recognition during its first decade of existence as an independent state. Yet, the price of statehood has been relatively high for Kosovo: it suffered from oppression, ethnic violence, and war, underwent a decade of international intervention and administration, and endured the challenges of statebuilding and constrained sovereignty after independence. Despite this, Kosovo remains committed to investing in hard work in the hope of securing the vast opportunities associated with independent statehood and integration into the international community as a full contributing member (see MFA of Kosovo 2012: 5–6; Bartkus 1999). While Kosovo has argued that its statehood is not constitutive of diplomatic recognition, in practice diplomatic recognition has played an important role in strengthening its ontological security, as well as creating grounds for the further consolidation of domestic and international sovereignty. As Mikulas Fabry (2010: 7) explains, “recognition is an indispensable precondition for a political community’s status as a sovereign state in international relations and law”. The utility of diplomatic recognition is not only to establish diplomatic relations and engage with all the countries of the world, but first and foremost it intends to enhance Kosovo’s selfconfidence and ontological security, expand the support base for membership in international organisations, and exert pressure on Serbia and other non-recognising states to overcome their contestation of Kosovo’s international sovereignty. Within a decade, Kosovo successfully secured recognition from almost twothirds of the UN member states and joined a significant number of international and regional organisations. These achievements cannot be solely attributed to Kosovo’s powerful friends without acknowledging the pivotal role that Kosovo’s own discourse-based performative diplomacy has played in the struggle to secure international affirmation of its sovereign statehood. As the discussion in this book has illustrated, examining the everyday dynamics, micro-politics, and the interplay of normative and performative factors provides the opportunity to understand the struggle of contested states to exist in international society. This book argued that Kosovo’s success in consolidating its sovereign statehood has been the assemblage and situational linkage of multiple integrated discourses, practiced through a broad variety of performative actions, which was enabled by the complex entanglement of different actors, events, and relations. Despite the many challenges discussed in this book, Kosovo’s quest for diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations is a distinct case that illustrates the resilience of emerging states for surviving and navigating through the messy fabric of the existing international order, which is inhospitable towards newcomers. This book examined some of the core dynamics underpinning Kosovo’s everyday struggle to become an independent and sovereign state in modern world

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politics. The analysis in Chapter 2 began by examining how the existing literature engages with the question of sovereignty and recognition in international relations. While many state-like entities have a distinct population and territory with various forms of self-governance, the lack of international recognition inhibits them from entering the club of sovereign states. The creation of a new state inevitably reshuffles regional geo-political dynamics bringing opportunities for some while undermining the influence of others. New states are often contested due to the establishment of independent and sovereign statehood without a formal agreement with the host state from which it is seceding. Yet, throughout history, new states have emerged without the blessing of the host state. Proclaiming independence is not prohibited in international law, but existing states seek to control newcomers by way of granting or withholding diplomatic recognition. State practice shows that emerging states gain international subjectivity and legal personality when they enjoy wide international recognition, have established diplomatic relations with a considerable number of states, and are part of relevant regional and international organisations. Such a status enables states to exercise their rights and duties under international law, especially to overcome isolation from the international community and enjoy relative protection from external interference. While the enactment of sovereign statehood requires diplomatic recognition and admission to international organisations, the existing literature insufficiently explores the everyday micro-politics and dynamics that determine the acceptance of emerging states in the club of sovereign states. The everyday making of statehood can be most suitably examined when the discourses, performances and entanglement of specific emerging states are brought together to explore the knowns and unknowns of state-becoming. Furthermore, this chapter demonstrated that an epistemological shift away from systematic and normative analyses of state-becoming requires combining suitable methods and methodologies that enable access and proximity to the actors, practices and documents behind writing, performing, and entangling sovereign statehood in the contemporary affairs. Understanding the writing, performing, and entangling of sovereignty requires exploring the historical trajectories and core events, which have shaped the path and claims to independence. Chapter 3 offered a detailed account of the three phases, which determined Kosovo’s political destiny and later shaped Kosovo’s diplomatic strategy to seek recognition and membership in international bodies. In addition to embedded historical grievances, a chain of events since the early 1990s set the trajectory for Kosovo’s lengthy and difficult campaign for statehood. Initially, the Kosovo-Albanian community demanded equal treatment within the federal structures of Yugoslavia. In response, Serbia revoked Kosovo’s autonomy pushing the territory to proclaim independence. However, since the international community ignored the demands of Kosovo-Albanians for self-determination – a diplomatic response widely applied to all claims for secession by peoples and minority groups – a peaceful resistance and parallel state started to emerge in Kosovo, which created the political and social organisation of the future independent state of Kosovo. The failure of preventive diplomacy to address the grievances of Kosovo-Albanians and to respond to Serbia’s state-sponsored violence

The price of statehood 201 against Kosovo’s civilian population transformed the struggle from a peaceful to armed resistance. Currently, there is no legal and political consensus on the right of state-like entities to proclaim independent statehood. Under these conditions, the birth of new states and their subsequent recognition takes place through instigation of crises which requires making exceptions to the existing norms and rules of statebecoming. The Kosovo case indicates that the international community is more likely to respond to a secessionist crisis only when the situation is sufficiently ripe for a resolution to be more likely to be achieved. However, the international response to Kosovo’s quest for statehood was not predominantly driven by the desire to respect the will of the majority of Kosovo’s citizens for self-determination but it was primarily a by-product of stability-seeking foreign policy interests. In 1999, the international community had waited for a full-scale violent conflict to erupt in Kosovo before intervening to stop the bloodshed. In 2006, the international community initiated talks for Kosovo’s political status only after ethnic violence erupted in the country during 2004 and threatened stability. Subsequently, after 2008, Kosovo’s coordinated declaration of independence took place in the context of the failure of the international community to reach a consensus on Kosovo. As the Kosovo case demonstrates, the lack of international responses to early stages of secessionism – either by preventing the conditions which make the quest for statehood inevitable or by supporting self-determination through peaceful means – was one of the major contributing factors to violent conflict (see Buchanan 1998). Although Kosovo has been widely perceived as a case emerging from the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia that underwent a period of international supervision, it has struggled to obtain sovereign equality on the international stage. Along with enduring collective political prosecution and systematic human rights abuses, to gain independence Kosovo underwent a period of dependency towards the international community. States seeking diplomatic recognition are inevitably vulnerable and dependent on external support. Between 1999 and 2008, Kosovo was placed under UN administration and allowed to exercise limited self-government, but could neither hold a referendum to measure the popular will for independence nor govern its own external relations. After the declaration of independence, between 2008 and 2012, Kosovo was placed under international supervision to ensure that it would grant minorities extensive political and institutional rights, as well as build mature state institutions in the area of the rule of law, justice, and effective governance. Although Kosovo exists as an independent state since 2008, it does not yet exercise complete sovereignty, as evidenced by constraints on its international participation, including the presence of multiple international missions. Ironically, Kosovo may ultimately need to hand over aspects of its hardearned sovereignty during its path to become a member of the European Union. The examination of Kosovo’s diplomatic discourse for recognition and membership in international organisations in Chapter 4 provided a comprehensive outlook of how the narratives and meanings of state-becoming are constructed contextually and intertextually to generate international legitimacy. Kosovo’s diplomatic discourse contained multiple elements that were intentionally and

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unintentionally assembled to create a narrative, which was fluid and changed over time depending on the configuration of actors, relations, and situations. This diplomatic discourse was self-sustained while being reproduced and reinforced intertextually and contextually by its constitutive and performative aspects. Kosovo and its international allies grounded their diplomatic narratives for recognition with reference to historical, normative, and situational factors. These included: the violent break-up of Yugoslavia and the right of Kosovo-Albanians for external self-determination thereafter, the period of peaceful resistance to Serbia’s systematic oppression of Albanian rights and the exhaustion of attempts to peacefully resolve the conflict. In addition, Kosovo’s experience of conflict, which necessitated NATO’s humanitarian interventions, the period of statebuilding under UN administration and Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, which was presented as an inevitable course of action, reflecting Kosovo’s commitment to implement the UN comprehensive status settlement. By contrast, states that withhold recognition refer to Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, arguing that international law does not allow secession outside the colonial context and that “unilateral secession” – secession in the absence of host state consent – sets a negative precedent and should not be recognised. Kosovo’s participation in, and membership in, international organisations also required a discursive grounding. In addition to invoking procedural and legal grounds for membership, Kosovo was constantly forced to subvert its true political intentions by emphasising technical and functional reasons for wanting to join regional and multilateral bodies. Tracing the constitutive intertextuality of Kosovo’s diplomatic discourse, this book illustrated how the norms and practice of diplomatic recognition continue to change, reflecting the trending narratives among the international community. The multiplicity of diplomatic discourses discussed in this book played an important role in securing international legitimacy to support Kosovo’s case for recognition. The differentiated discourse justifying Kosovo’s independent statehood combined historical and contextual factors with global normative entanglements to give substantive meaning to Kosovo’s performative diplomacy and its campaign for recognition and membership in international bodies. Kosovo’s diplomatic discourse presented its case for recognition as normatively legitimate and globally relatable, which helped to overcome the prejudices and uncertainties held by certain countries regarding the merit and implications for granting diplomatic recognition to Kosovo. The discussion of Kosovo’s performative diplomacy in Chapter 5 offered new insights into the peculiarities and micro-processes that determined Kosovo’s prospects for obtaining diplomatic recognition and joining international organisations. Examining the everyday making of statehood was useful to unravel the role of diplomatic performances ranging from patterned routines to spontaneous activities. The performative diplomacy entailed creativity and mimicry of existing diplomatic practices where sovereignty is exercised through diplomatic visits, performing as a sovereign equal in bilateral and multilateral events, and promoting rituals of statehood. The analysis in this chapter revealed that recognition is a multi-stage process driven by unconventional diplomacy and requiring extensive

The price of statehood 203 diplomatic interaction beyond that suggested by the existing literature. This book has illustrated that diplomatic recognition is a socially emergent phenomenon, which is derived from performative interactions between the representatives of the claimant state and the recognising state. Diplomatic recognition is never separate from the social world and everyday interactions that shape actors’ interests, attitudes, and political positions. Unravelling the process of diplomatic recognition shows that emerging states play a far more significant role than is often assumed and that great power support is important, but not as decisive as previously considered. Kosovo’s international diplomatic success was inherently reliant on the agency of empowered individuals – and not strictly embedded within a solid institutional structure, diplomatic capacity, and resources. Central to Kosovo’s everyday diplomacy was an opportunism expressed through informal and alternative methods of interaction with other states and incremental membership in international bodies, which enabled Kosovo to gradually gain international legitimation in the absence of universal recognition. At the heart of Kosovo’s performative diplomacy was the individual agency of Kosovo’s foreign policy leaders and diplomats who honed their diplomatic skills during the very process of requesting diplomatic recognition from other states. Kosovo adopted an opportunistic approach for securing diplomatic recognition and obtaining membership in international organisations. Securing diplomatic recognition requires reaching out to other states and adjusting both diplomatic discourse and tactics to the specifies of interlocutors. The diplomatic efforts were rather driven by situational circumstances, external factors, and chance. Face-to-face diplomacy enabled building personal relationships with foreign ministers of other countries and diplomatic prudence permitted Kosovo to use unconventional and informal channels of communication to overcome the barriers set by conventional diplomatic practices, institutions, and rules. Kosovo’s experience reveals that countries’ foreign policy interests are fluid and their stance on Kosovo was often successfully changed due to Kosovo’s effective performative diplomacy along with appropriate discourse and entanglements with relevant regional and global powers. The performative aspect of Kosovo’s state-becoming struggle required constantly repeating, improvising, and readjusting multiple diplomatic discourses and actions to each individual country from which recognition was sought. A similar approach was used when Kosovo was seeking to informally participate in, and ultimately to formally join, regional and international organisations. Unable to secure membership in major organisations, such as the UN, Kosovo rehearsed its multilateral diplomacy by joining less significant agencies and organisations to incrementally increase its participation in, and access to the international community. In this way, Kosovo could continue accessing multilateral sites to lobby for bilateral recognition and to consolidate support for its eventual membership in more significant international organisations. Paradoxically, to safeguard its domestic sovereignty and expand its international sovereignty, Kosovo aspires to secure membership in regional and international organisations, a process which entails sharing and delegating sovereignty to supranational structures. This demonstrates that the contemporary political value of self-determination does not

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involve being an independent and sovereign state in the sense of being detached from regional and global structures, but rather using independence as a transitory phase before securing more complex forms of transnational interdependencies. For an emerging state, consolidating sovereignty does not rest entirely on the merits of its case for statehood and its diplomatic competence, but also arises as a result of co-constitution and entanglement with wider assemblages of actors, relations, events, and global norms. The process of obtaining diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations forces emerging states to entangle themselves with external forces, such as utilising wider networks of states, relations, and events, and to perform strategic dependency and subordination towards influential states and organisations. The discussion in Chapter 5 examined some of the exogenous forces which enabled and disenabled Kosovo’s diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations. The analysis within this book clearly showed that states generally do not have a coherent policy on state recognition as they decided on a case-by-case basis. This has provided opportunities and challenges for Kosovo. Kosovo intentionally prioritised seeking recognition from influential states who were at the top of pecking orders of states, who subsequently exerted further pressure and influence on smaller neighbouring states to recognise Kosovo. The early recognition of Kosovo by the U.S. and most European powers set it on a positive trajectory, which influenced the decision of other states to also recognise Kosovo. The more recognitions Kosovo secured, the more it created the conditions and momentum for further recognition because other countries were under pressure not to be excluded from the international movement in support of Kosovo’s independence. Admittedly, Kosovo’s international success owes a great deal to the diplomatic support provided by the U.S. and certain European states, especially during the first years after independence. However, the role of the international community, especially the supportive global and regional powers, has been reactive after 2011. In other words, after the first wave of recognitions, the lobbying activities of U.S. and other major European powers have been by-products of Kosovo’s proactive lobbying campaign that secured the ongoing support from these states. This combination of great power support together with Kosovo’s proactive diplomacy shaped the dynamics and outcomes of Kosovo’s campaign for international legitimacy. Moreover, international support for Kosovo was largely conditioned on Kosovo’s willingness to accommodate the Serb community within Kosovo and to undertake domestic reforms in line with externallyimposed blueprints of post-conflict statebuilding. In addition to this entanglement with influential states, Kosovo benefited from sudden regime change in certain regions whereby change of government opened opportunities for Kosovo to pursue its campaign for international recognition. The entangled character of Kosovo’s state-becoming showed how the process of securing diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations was entangled and shaped by global assemblages of events, processes, and dynamic relations. While in certain instances Kosovo managed to take advantage of favourable international circumstances to accelerate the recognition process,

The price of statehood 205 such global developments were outside Kosovo’s scope of influence. International responses to Kosovo’s quest for recognition illustrated that great powers are not so powerful when it comes to the question of secession and recognition: any state can construct and change their stance on recognition during diplomatic interactions with nascent states, and these states can selectively invoke norms, international laws, and domestic considerations to justify their recognition or non-recognition policies. Due to the former host state’s opposition to Kosovo’s declaration of independence and growing rivalry among global powers, Kosovo became entangled by the disenabling dynamics launched by Serbia and its international ally Russia, who proactively tried to prevent and reverse Kosovo’s international recognition. The fear that Kosovo sets a negative precedent played an important role in forcing many countries to withhold the recognition of Kosovo, fearing that such a move would undermine international order and encourage more breakaway regions and secessionist movements to claim independent statehood. Although Kosovo has tried to dissociate itself from the precedent discourse by emphasising the sui generis nature of its case for independence, other emerging states seeking international recognition have proactively tried to use Kosovo as an analogy for their own circumstances. While around 40 countries have not recognised Kosovo due to their own domestic problems with pro-independence movements, this is not inevitable: numerous countries that recognise Kosovo continue to have autonomous regions who aspire independence. Similarly, Kosovo’s efforts to expand its participation and membership in international organisations has been widely influenced by the procedural rules, voting powers, and constellations of power among the supporters and opponents of Kosovo within each organisation, while also evaluating the extent to which other contested states have pursued membership in the same international organisations. This struggle entangled Kosovo with other contested states who seek membership by highlighting their own merits, often competitively with Kosovo. Such dynamics have undermined Kosovo’s chances to be participate in multilateral processes. Beyond global entanglements, the success of Kosovo’s foreign policy was also influenced by domestic stability and the political priority given to the external consolidation of its sovereignty. Domestic events in Kosovo such as protracted delays in forming governments after holding democratic elections significantly undermined Kosovo’s diplomatic efforts to strengthen the country’s international standing. There is a strong correlation between the scale of domestic political instability and a fall-off in the pace of international recognition and membership in international bodies. This illustrates that becoming a state involves consistently acting like a state. When Kosovo stopped actively performing sovereignty by seeking diplomatic recognition and access to multilateral bodies, the momentum is lost: no state will grant recognition without being lobbied and international allies understandably did not lobby in Kosovo’s absence. Costas Laoutides (2015: 92) demonstrates that “self-determination like resistance ought to lead to an improved, more liberal political system that would secure for the members of the new state the rights they were denied under the previous regime”. The

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difficulty Kosovo experienced in securing diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations demonstrates the high cost of state-becoming in the present world order. To date, the utility of Kosovo’s widespread recognition has been mainly symbolic: reinforcing the collective ontological security and Kosovo’s sense of belonging to the community of independent nations. Bilateral recognition hasn’t translated automatically into membership in international organisations and admission to multilateral treaties, which hold the key to access collective security arrangements and to benefit from legal, financial, and logistical services. For those at the forefront of the recognition campaign, securing recognition for Kosovo simultaneously secured personal recognition, which was also translated into domestic legitimacy and political power. Strengthening Kosovo’s sovereignty was almost a second-order effect for individual interests and political agendas, which could be camouflaged as an acceptable popular discourse. The aspiration for independent statehood has been one of the major political goals that has united most Kosovo citizens in the hope that wide international recognition would bring collective ontological security and reduce Kosovo’s vulnerability to external exploitation and discrimination, thereby ultimately promoting democratic self-government. Beyond this, diplomatic recognition and membership in regional and international organisations has not translated into tangible political and socio-economic benefits for the citizens of Kosovo. Kosovo’s preoccupation with achieving steady progress in consolidating statehood externally was given precedence over crucial internal institutional reforms and capacity-building to absorb the obligations derived from membership in international organisations and treaties. The national budget has also been overburdened with extensive membership fees without providing Kosovo’s citizens with tangible benefits in return. Indeed, the priority given to securing Kosovo’s international sovereignty relegated consular services to Kosovo’s citizens abroad to a second-order priority, whereas this is generally a major priority for the foreign ministries of established states. Independent statehood has not delivered Kosovo’s citizens with the well-deserved political space and infrastructure for self-determination, democratic governance, and economic prosperity. This is evidenced by Kosovo’s ongoing relative poverty, under-development, and limited access to global markets. Kosovo citizens continue to remain most isolated people in Europe for a number of reasons. First, they cannot travel to countries that do not recognise Kosovo’s independence or its passport. Second, due to Kosovo’s economic situation and the likelihood that its citizens would seek employment abroad, most states impose a visa regime for all forms of travel, including casual tourism. This policy is most painfully inflicted by Kosovo’s closest normative power: the European Union, which thereby undermines its own soft power among Kosovo’s citizens. Ten years since independence, many in Kosovo now feel that its international partners have left the country in limbo by failing to fulfil their promise to help Kosovo gain its rightful place within the international democratic community. David L. Phillips (2012: 215) argues that “the United States helped birth Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state”, therefore “it cannot let Kosovo fail” because “if Kosovo becomes a failed state, it could lead to Kosovo’s partition and renewed

The price of statehood 207 conflict with Serbia”. One decade since its declaration of independence, Kosovo has not managed to secure recognition from all UN member states. The path for international legitimation through individual recognition is lengthy and requires interacting with each state individually, which consumes extensive time and resources. After 2011, Kosovo’s international partners have laterally tried to encourage Kosovo’s leadership to take a more proactive role in the process of obtaining new diplomatic recognition and securing membership in international organisations. This discourse conferring diplomatic ownership on Kosovo is not a symptom of Kosovo’s diplomatic maturity but rather reflects the strategic withdrawal of Kosovo’s international partners from their commitment and promise to integrate Kosovo fully in the international community of sovereign and independent states. Despite the success of its initial diplomatic efforts, Kosovo is now entering its second decade of independent statehood facing domestic and external challenges that may affect its international standing. Domestically, political polarisation and instability have significantly damaged Kosovo’s campaign for diplomatic recognition and membership in regional and international organisations. Internationally, the increased rivalry between Kosovo’s allies and their opponents has entangled the emerging state into complex processes, which can further stagnate Kosovo’s process of seeking recognition and membership in international bodies, or even undermine Kosovo’s achievements during its first decade of independent statehood. Strategic patience and diplomatic cooperation with great powers has paid off for Kosovo so far. However, Kosovo’s international partners are now facing their own challenges and lobbying on Kosovo’s behalf is no longer the priority it once was. In addition, among the remaining 80 UN member states who have not recognised Kosovo most have internal problems with secessionism while others regard Kosovo’s key international supporters with suspicion. Although Kosovo might increase the number of recognition beyond the two-thirds of the UN membership, further diplomatic breakthroughs will depend on the attitude of Russia, China, and other regional powers who continue to withhold recognition of Kosovo for their own geo-political interests. The emerging multipolar order and the fading global power of the U.S. under President Trump’s leadership has facilitated the rise of Russia and other regional powers, who have seized on Kosovo’s international standing among several battlefields on which to undermine the U.S. global position. Therefore, Kosovo’s political fate continues to be exposed to political uncertainties and is far from being permanently settled.

The future state of the state of Kosovo Emerging states that are contested and lack universal recognition often end up either gaining full independence or reintegrating forcefully or voluntarily with the former host state (Anderson 2011: 200). The pertaining situation in the case of Kosovo could push the fledgling state in three slightly different directions: 1) continuation of the current situation of partial recognition and liminal status in multilateral organisations; 2) admission to the UN and acceptance of Kosovo by Serbia without formal recognition; and 3) functionalist reunification with Albania.

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The first obvious scenario involves continuing the existing approach to consolidating statehood whereby Kosovo would continue the campaign of individual recognition until it manages to become a full UN member state. Kosovo understands “many challenges lie ahead”, yet with confidence it considers them as “reasonable, acceptable and surmountable . . . ordinary challenges for independent states and responsible societies” (MFA of Kosovo 2013: 1). Despite being recognised by almost two-thirds of the world’s states, Kosovo’s international standing continues to be affected by not having a seat in the UN due to Serbia’s opposition to its independence, as supported by other major international powers, such as Russia and China. In principle, Kosovo fulfils the basic requirements for admission to the UN and has repeatedly demonstrated that it possesses the core attributes of modern states and is ready to accept the UN Charter and act as a peace-loving state. From the point of view of ensuring that the spread of international law is universal and that there are no contested territories in international politics, it would be advantageous for the UN if the Kosovo issue were resolved so that Kosovo could become a member state. However, Kosovo’s admission remains unrealistic due to the considerable number of states that have not yet recognised Kosovo, as well as the anticipated resistance and refusal by Serbia, Russia, and China, among other states. Ten years ago, key U.S. diplomats openly admitted that “because of Russian opposition, membership [for Kosovo] in the UN is not likely for some time” (Wisner 2008: 194). Short of admission to the UN, Kosovo is cursed to pursue its struggle for bilateral recognition and membership in international organisations through lengthy diplomatic battles supported by major international powers. Aiming to secure recognition by 129 UN member states (representing the twothirds of votes necessary for sending the bid for admission to the UN General Assembly) is an important target, but without affirmative support of the UN Security Council, prospects for admission are grim. Even if Kosovo is recognised by two-thirds of UN membership and does not secure a seat in the UN, it has no choice but to continue the diplomacy of individual recognition. The rationale for this is clear and simple: if Kosovo loses the momentum and does not continue increasing the number of recognitions, the country could end up stagnating in an unstable status quo, which is risky and could end up losing ground if countries reverse their positions by de-recognising Kosovo. For this reason, it is important for Kosovo to continue gradually increasing the number of individual recognitions of independence: this can help Kosovo strengthen its international legitimacy, obtain sufficient support for membership in international bodies, and consolidate new bilateral relations. To maintain this momentum, Kosovo needs to establish diplomatic relations with all the countries that have recognised Kosovo. This is a natural step after recognition, which can solidify bilateral relations, establish stronger political, economic, and legal ties, and reduce the undesired possibility of eventual de-recognition. Kosovo can adopt a pragmatic approach of seeking to join the UN’s specialised agencies and less-significant organisations, which can be an effective short-term measure as by keeping the process moving, gradually building the case for full membership, while also building trust within the UN system regarding Kosovo’s

The price of statehood 209 capacity and willingness to participate in UN activities. Given the blockages in accessing multilateral fora, another option is for Kosovo to voluntarily and unilaterally commit to report to UN human rights bodies as part of the universal periodical review, which would demonstrate Kosovo’s compliance with the international conventions on civil, political, and economic rights that are already enshrined in Kosovo’s Constitution. Recently, the option of first applying as an observer state is seen as viable alternative, especially if the status-quo is maintained or if de-recognitions occur. As Thomas D. Grant (2009: 188) maintains, “nonmembership has not been fatal to States in the past; if its international sponsors remain committed to Kosovo politically, Kosovo could exist as a non-member, too, without incurring unacceptable direct cost to itself”. State practice shows that small countries with enhanced diplomatic competency and high standards of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law have managed to compensate for their existence outside the UN and major international organisations. Although this might be a lengthy and costly process, in the long run building a strong state capacity and performing the highest international standards would give Kosovo a chance to eventually overcome external contestation and become a successful example of democratic statebuilding. Without strong and long-term diplomatic, trade, and civilian exchanges with other countries, Kosovo’s diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations will remain symbolic by falling short of the vitality required for cultivating diplomatic relations. Hence, the key to Kosovo’s foreign policy success lies in its eventual strengthening of state institutions and economy. Kosovo has not sufficiently exploited its potential to develop a niche diplomacy, which would offer other countries expertise in managing political transitions, technical assistance regarding digital diplomacy, and support for developmental and humanitarian projects. Niche diplomacy may provide more tangible grounds for building relations with other states as it creates the basis for entering contractual relations and building diplomatic connections, which may by followed by formal recognition in a more sustainable manner than it has done so far. Due to its current liminal international position, Kosovo may be forced to explore the possibility of bypassing the practice and ritual of diplomatic recognition in order to engage with alternative diplomatic, political, economic, and legal relations with other states who have not recognised Kosovo through a niche diplomacy of functional cooperation of areas of mutual interest. Such areas of mutual interest may include health, education, technological, and developmental projects where Kosovo can provide human expertise and in certain areas and explore the financial scope for co-funding certain projects. The second possible scenario would involve Serbia accepting Kosovo’s independence, even without formally recognising it, as part of the EU-brokered agreement for the normalisation of its relations with Kosovo. Such a move would greatly enhance Kosovo’s prospects for UN membership. The EU enlargement process remains the most effective instrument of peace-making in the Western Balkans, which provides the main incentives for Serbia and Kosovo to engage in the dialogue. Serbia has opened accession negotiations with the EU in 2014 but the whole process is conditional on Serbia making progress regarding the

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normalisation of relations with Kosovo under Chapter 35 of the negotiation process. The EU has already set as a condition that before Serbia joins the EU it should reach a “comprehensive normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, in the form of a legally binding agreement . . . with the prospect of both Serbia and Kosovo being able to fully exercise their rights and fulfil their responsibilities” (Council of the European Union 2013: 6). One possible outcome may therefore involve an arrangement of implied recognition that would entail the comprehensive normalisation of political, economic, and societal relations without establishing diplomatic relations. The Kosovo side insists that full normalisation will only be realised when Serbia relinquishes its territorial claim over Kosovo, removes references to Kosovo in its Constitution and legal order, and accepts Kosovo’s independent statehood in one form or another. Some commentators foresee a breakthrough in 2018, whereby Serbia might ease its stance on Kosovo in exchange for accelerated accession to the EU. Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker indicated in late 2017 that Serbia is one of the frontline candidates for joining the EU in the near future. Another possible scenario, the exchange of the northern part of Kosovo populated mainly by Kosovo-Serbs, with Serbia’s Southern regions populated by Albanians, is unlikely. Such a territorial swap is seen as an unbearable threat to regional stability and a potential source of violent conflicts. Therefore, a compromise solution could be to conclude an agreement similar to the Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic of 1972. According to this scenario, Serbia could offer Kosovo implied recognition by signing a peace treaty and expressing its desire to: establish normal and goodneighbourly relations; embrace the principles embodied in the UN Charter; peacefully settle all disputes; refrain from the threat or use of force; recognise existing administrative borders; respect territorial integrity; establish permanent missions; refrain from obstructing Kosovo’s admission to the UN; and set no impediment to Kosovo’s eventual membership in regional, political, and security organisations. The above undertakings, including the duty to respect the territorial integrity of the other state, would amount to mutual recognition without having such a legal and political connotation. While Kosovo has openly expressed its interest for this option, it is uncertain whether Serbia would accept such an arrangement. However, “Russia is extremely unlikely to recognize Kosovo in the current situation unless granted a concession in other disputed issues” (Bečka 2017: 208). Unlocking Russian opposition to Kosovo’s eventual bid for UN membership would require a major compromise with the U.S., even if Serbia agrees not to obstruct Kosovo’s UN membership bid. A possible compromise package would most likely involve securing a commitment from the U.S. and EU to end sanctions on Russia over the annexation of Crimea, agree for NATO not to enlarge farther east, and possibly for Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be accepted as Russian-governed independent entities. However, such a compromise package is highly unlikely given the increased multipolar tensions between Russia, the EU, and the U.S. The third and less likely option would involve Kosovo’s functional reunification with Albania. If a final settlement is not reached with Serbia, which would confer

The price of statehood 211 implicit or explicit recognition on Kosovo to facilitate its UN membership, and if Kosovo’s current status quo becomes unbearable, one possible future scenario should not be entirely ruled out: Kosovo’s functional unification with its kin-state, Albania. For many in Kosovo, independence was a compromise solution implemented under the guidance of the international community (see Pettifer and Vickers 2007). An independent Kosovo, with its blue and gold flag reflecting its EU orientation, represented a middle way between the desire of many Kosovo-Albanians to unite all ethnic Albanians within one country and Serbia’s desire to keep the territory of Kosovo inside Serbia and thereby deny the majoritarian Albanian community their right to self-determination. Although often proposed by the Movement for Self-Determination (LVV), the option of Kosovo unifying with Albania is unlikely at present: it could derail Albania’s own aspiration to join the EU, so it would most likely be invoked as a strategic threat to overcome Kosovo’s current limbo status. If it were to be pursued, a functional reunification with Albania would end Kosovo’s recognition dilemma by allowing Kosovo to operate within Albania either as an integral unit of a unitary state or as part of a political union or (con)federal arrangement whereby Kosovo could participate in international organisations and be represented abroad via Albania’s existing diplomatic structures. Currently, Kosovo and Albania enjoy a special relationship including free cross-border travelling, extensive trade and cultural exchanges, periodic joint meetings between governments, joint consular services, and close cooperation on foreign, security, and regional affairs. Within the context of the common goal of European integration, a project of national unification is gradually being unfolded within the technocratic and functionalist parameters of good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation. If the European perspective is removed from either country, such approximation could ultimately serve an amended end goal of Albanian unification. However, for such a tectonic geo-political change to occur, Kosovo needs to be prepared to undertake major institutional changes and Albania would need to ensure that it would not be censured internationally for allowing Kosovo to join Albania. Kosovo’s Constitution undertakes not to seek unification with another state. This commitment is one of the justificatory factors cited by countries recognising Kosovo’s independence. Moreover, in the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU, Kosovo has undertaken obligations not to alter its territorial integrity or that of its neighbours. Nevertheless, if Kosovo is not offered the possibility to become an equal member of the international community, then unification with Albania may emerge as the most appropriate long term solution: a remedy of last resort if multi-ethnic Kosovo is not accepted into international society. This notwithstanding, most likely Kosovo’s political fate with be overcoming contested statehood and de facto recognition with Serbia as part of the European integration process and further self-governance concession for Serbian minority in Kosovo. Laoutides (2015: 117) makes a relevant point when he argues that responsible emancipation in the secessionist context connotes a twofold meaning. Towards domestic society, it should adopt the form of political action that will not repeat past mistakes that brought the community to the

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The price of statehood initial secessionist position. At the international level, the responsible action of secessionists should be underlined by the need not to harm the emancipatory potential of others.

The normative fate of Kosovo’s statehood in the future will be judged on the extent to which it will be able to deliver prosperity to the domestic society and emancipated from the past bitter experiences, as well as act responsibly at the international stage, by becoming an exporter of peace, security, and stability.

Towards a critical research agenda on state recognition By way of conclusion, and looking beyond Kosovo, it is important to revisit some of the theoretical and methodological issues discussed in this book. In Chapter 2, we examined some of the main accounts and perspectives on state-becoming. Predominantly, knowledge on sovereignty, statehood, and recognition is generated by scholars embedded in Western-centric ontologies, epistemologies and methodologies. The onto-politics of the existing research on state recognition perceives states outside the UN system, as well as those who do not enjoy universal recognition, as problematic “pariah” entities that produce political and economic instability, undermine the international rule of law and globally acclaimed norms and institutions, challenge the balance of power, and redraw the cartography of world politics (see Riegl and Doboš 2017). Although state recognition is a matter of diplomacy and politics, most of the research to date has been undertaken by legal scholars. International law does not regulate matters of statehood and self-determination. In fact, it has become an instrument used by the powerful and existing sovereign states to block or exploit newcomers within the international system. International law regarding statehood has been and continues to be a source of epistemic injustice towards emerging states (see Pavković and Radan 2011; Crawford 2007). Beyond international law, there is a tendency among political scientists embedded within positivists episte-methodologies to view the question of secession and recognition through the lens of large-N studies to identify general patterns and dynamics across many centuries, places, and cases (Coggins 2014; Griffith 2016). Other comparativist accounts tend to mix different cases and dynamics to search for similarities and differences across many different cases of state emergence and subsequent recognition (Fabry 2010; Ker-Lindsay 2012). IR scholars tend to adopt a negative view of emerging states as failed entities and puppets of big powers, which pose security threats and seek to undermine the existing international system (see Caspersen and Stansfield 2011). Positivist research on state recognition, such as those works undertaken by political scientists and comparativists, tend to be unethical and unreflexive as they tend to become the voice of existing global power structures and narratives that silence histories, stories, and the agency of the societies denied recognition in international system. Existing research on state recognition is complicit in producing knowledge that inhibits rights and entitlements to emerging states and their communities.

The price of statehood 213 Theoretical, comparative and empirical research is performative as it can have real-world implications, it can be exploited by state actors to justify their foreign policy, and can grant epistemic legitimacy to global institutions to deliberately discriminate against emerging states. By silencing the voices and perspectives of emerging states, mainstream scholars of state recognition are complicit in the epistemic dehumanisation of emerging states. Nevnita C. Behera (2016: 154) maintains that “state-centric ontology of IR has effectively ended up dehumanizing the discipline in a way so that normally it has little to do with human relations, human needs, and the larger imperatives of humanity”. An exception to existing research on state recognition is work done by a narrow group of area studies experts, political geographers, and anthropologists who have come closest to capturing the micro-politics undermining the diplomatic activity of unrecognised states, governments in exile, stateless people, and ungoverned spaces. They tend to produce more nuanced and reflective research on emerging and unrecognised states and bring to the forefront questions, knowledge, and perspectives that are often omitted and intentionally ignored by mainstream scholars (Ó Tauthail 1996; McConnell 2016). A critical and emancipatory research agenda on state recognition is overdue in international relations and wider area studies. As Laoutides (2015: 107) shows “both resistance and emancipation are interested in self-realization which in secessionist politics was encapsulated in the principle of national self-determination”. This agenda would follow critical turns taking place within security studies, peace research, gender, and regional studies (Fierke 2007; Jackson, Smith and Gunning 2009; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010; Richmond and Mac Ginty 2015). From an emancipatory perspective, as Roger Spegele (2014: 1) stipulates, the purpose of knowledge production is “liberating individuals, groups and peoples from structures that hinder them from actualizing freedom in thought and in practice”. Critical perspectives are committed to revealing the inconsistencies and flaws of existing theories and practices, offering emancipatory alternatives. As part of this critical movement, there are growing calls in scholarship to decolonise knowledge from Euro-centric and Western dominance to make space for more pluralist and particularist modes of knowledge (Smith 2012). For instance, Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (2010: 2) argue that IR theory should be “an open domain into which it is not unreasonable to expect non-Westerners to make a contribution at least proportional to the degree that they are involved in its practice”. Similarly, Andrew Hurrell (2016: 151) argues that “the pathway to a global IR will need to look beyond “IR” and is likely to require new models for organizing social science research and knowledge production”. Critical perspectives on state-becoming should aim to revise and expand the existing vocabulary of statehood in world politics. Normatively and politically overloaded terms such as “unilateral secession”, “contested states”, and “unrecognised states”, among other terminology has become a derogatory language intended to undermine the social and political subjectivity of emerging states, which fails to capture the true character of these societies excluded from the

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international system. By using these terms, scholars are implicated in othering these societies and reproducing exclusionary state practices. There are alternative terms such as state-becoming, emerging states, or pro-independence movements which may depict a more neutral and reality-adequate representation of this category of states. Qualitative and comparative studies on emerging states often tend to do injustice to the unique historical trajectories and the incomparable contextual factors. Such a grouping of states tends to gloss over the different degrees of recognition and international support, thereby conflating those genuine cases of bottom-up struggles of peoples for self-determination with externallymanipulated cases of aggression aimed at manufacturing new states for the geopolitical interests of big powers. An emancipatory agenda on state recognition would reverse this by paying stronger attention to the particularities of each individual case. A critical agenda on state recognition needs to offer a new normative framework for statehood in world politics beyond the restrictions imposed by existing international law and state practice. Such an agenda needs to generate emancipatory alternatives to existing norms, rules, and institutions governing state-becoming in world politics. This includes sustained critiques of the existing exclusionary international order, revising norms, ethics, and rules governing subjugated peoples in world politics, as well as unravelling discriminatory structures, policies, and practices that undermine unrecognised states. Such a move would require combining imagination and practicality to generate new modes of recognising and categorising states that would not prohibit peoples and communities around the world from exercising their right to self-determination. Normative research is also required to study needs-based and rights-based approaches to societies and communities prohibited from acquiring statehood within world politics. Stronger epistemological empathy is essential to re-humanise them into international society in the interest of enhancing stability and ensuring that all territories abide by international law and principles. Recognition studies need to expand and explore alternative modes of recognition beyond that conferred between states, such as parliamentary recognition, societal recognition, and moral recognition of emerging states. The policy of “engagement without recognition” recently discussed in policy and scholarly cycles may sound as an emancipatory alternative, but it tends to preserve the status quo and deny recognition to emerging states. Last, but not least important, emancipatory research on state recognition would reverse the order of knowledge, placing the local first and then the regional and international as spatial and ontological scales for understanding statebecoming. Voices from emerging states should be heard within international relations, and there should be deliberate institutional and practical efforts to include scholars from these regions in debates regarding sovereignty, self-determination, and diplomatic recognition. This book represents a modest attempt to provide an alternative account of how an emerging state worked to obtain diplomatic recognition and membership in international organisations. Yet, there is much more to be done to profoundly understand the politics and practices of state-becoming in world politics.

The price of statehood 215

References Acharya, A. and Buzan, B. (2010) ‘Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction’, in A. Acharya and B. Buzan (eds), Non-Western International Relations Theory Perspectives on and Beyond Asia, Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 1–25. Anderson, L. (2011) ‘Reintegrating Unrecognized States: Internationalizing Frozen Conflict’, in N. Caspersen and G. Stansfield (eds) (2011) Unrecognized States in the International System, London: Routledge, pp. 183–206. Bartkus, V. O. (1999) The Dynamics of Secession, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bečka, J. (2017) ‘Long Way to Recognition: Challenges Facing the European “Newborn” from the 2015 Perspective’, in M. Riegl and B. Doboš (eds), Unrecognized States and Secession in the 21st Century, Cham: Springer Nature, pp. 205–222. Behera, N. C. (2016) ‘Knowledge Production’, International Studies Review 18(1): 153–155. Buchanan, A. (1998) ‘Democracy and Secession’, in M. Moore (ed), National SelfDetermination and Secession, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 14–33. Caspersen, N. and G. Stansfield (eds) (2011) Unrecognized States in the International System, London: Routledge. Coggins, B. (2014) Power Politics and State Formation in the Twentieth Century: The Dynamics of Recognition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Council of the European Union (2013) ‘General EU Position for the Accession Negotiations with Serbia. Brussels: European Union’. Doc No. 17976/13, 17 December. Crawford, J. (2007) The Creation of States in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fabry, M. (2010) Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States since 1776, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fierke, K. M. (2007) Critical Approaches to International Security, Cambridge: Polity Press. Grant, T. D. (2009) Admission to the United Nations: Charter Article 4 and the Rise of Universal Organization, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Griffiths, R. (2016) Age of Secession: The International and Domestic Determinants of State Birth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hurrell, A. (2016) ‘Beyond Critique: How to Study Global IR?’, International Studies Review 18(1): 149–151. Jackson, R., Smith, M. B. and Gunning, J. (eds) (2009) Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, Abingdon: Routledge. Ker-Lindsay, J. (2012) The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested States, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Laoutides, C. (2015) Self-Determination and Collective Responsibility in the Secessionist Struggle, Abingdon: Routledge. McConnell, F. (2016) Rehearsing the State: The Political Practices of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, Chichester, WS: Wiley-Blackwell. MFA of Kosovo (2012) ‘Long-Term Foreign Policy Goals of the Republic of Kosovo’, Internal policy document. MFA of Kosovo (2013) ‘Kosovo’s New Diplomat’, Issue 12. Available at: www.mfa-ks. net/repository/docs/NewDiplomat_12.pdf (accessed 24 November 2017). Ó Tauthail, G. (1996) Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space, London: Routledge.

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Pavković, A. and Radan, P. (eds) (2011) The Ashgate Research Companion to Secession, Farnham: Ashgate. Peoples, C. and Vaughan-Williams, N. (2010) Critical Security Studies: An Introduction, Abingdon: Routledge. Pettifer, J. and Vickers, M. (2007) The Albanian Question: Reshaping the Balkans, London: I.B. Tauris. Phillips, D.L. (2012) Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Richmond, O. P. and Mac Ginty, R. (2015) ‘Where Now for the Critique of the Liberal Peace?’, Cooperation and Conflict 50(2): 171–189. Riegl, M. and Doboš, B. (2017) ‘Conclusion: Future of International Recognition?’, in M. Riegl and B. Doboš (eds), Unrecognized States and Secession in the 21st Century, Cham: Springer Nature, pp. 223–224. Smith, L. T. (2012) Decolonizing Methodologies, 2nd ed., London: Zed. Spegele, R. D. (2014) Emancipatory International Relations: Critical Thinking in International Relations, Abingdon: Routledge. Wisner, F. G. (2008) ‘The United States and the Balkans: Achieving Kosovo’s Independence’, American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy 30(4):189–195.

Appendices

Appendix 1 List of countries who have recognised and established diplomatic relations with Kosovo (2008–2017)

Nr.

Country

Date of Recognition

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

Costa Rica United States of America France Albania Turkey United Kingdom Afghanistan Australia Senegal Germany Latvia Denmark Estonia Italy Luxembourg Peru Belgium Poland Switzerland Austria Ireland Sweden Netherlands Iceland Slovenia Finland Japan Canada Monaco Hungary Croatia Bulgaria Liechtenstein South Korea Norway

17.02.2008 18.02.2008 18.02.2008 18.02.2008 18.02.2008 18.02.2008 18.02.2008 19.02.2008 19.02.2008 20.02.2008 20.02.2008 21.02.2008 21.02.2008 21.02.2008 21.02.2008 22.02.2008 24.02.2008 26.02.2008 27.02.2008 28.02.2008 29.02.2008 04.03.2008 04.03.2008 05.03.2008 05.03.2008 07.03.2008 18.03.2008 18.03.2008 19.03.2008 19.03.2008 19.03.2008 20.03.2008 25.03.2008 28.03.2008 28.03.2008

23.9.2013 18.2.2008 18.2.2008 18.2.2008 18.2.2008 18.2.2008 17.6.2013 21.05.2008 14.02.2014 20.02.2008 11.06.2008 06.03.2008 24.04.2008 15.05.2008 16.06.2011 – 10.04.2008 – 28.03.2008 28.2.2008 11.11.2008 28.03.2008 27.06.2008 15.05.2012 15.05.2008 02.02.2009 25.02.2009 07.04.2009 19.03.2008 27.06.2008 30.06.2008 27.05.2008 28.06.2012 – 25.10.2008 (Continued )

(Continued) Nr.

Country

Date of Recognition

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84.

Marshall Islands Burkina Faso Nauru Lithuania San Marino Czech Republic Liberia Sierra Leone Colombia Belize Malta Samoa Portugal Montenegro Macedonia United Arab Emirates Malaysia Micronesia Panama Maldives Palau Gambia Saudi Arabia Comoros Bahrain Jordan Dominican Republic New Zealand Malawi Mauritania Swaziland Vanuatu Djibouti Somalia Honduras Kiribati Tuvalu Qatar Guinea-Bissau Oman Andorra Central African Republic Guinea Niger Benin Saint Lucia Gabonese Republic Côte d’Ivoire Kuwait

17.04.2008 23.04.2008 23.04.2008 06.05.2008 12.05.2008 21.05.2008 30.05.2008 11.06.2008 04.08.2008 07.08.2008 22.08.2008 15.09.2008 07.10.2008 09.10.2008 09.10.2008 14.10.2008 30.10.2008 05.12.2008 16.01.2009 19.02.2009 06.03.2009 07.04.2009 20.04.2009 14.05.2009 19.05.2009 17.07.2009 10.07.2009 09.11.2009 14.12.2009 14.09.2010 12.04.2010 28.04.2010 08.05.2010 19.05.2010 03.09.2010 29.10.2010 18.11.2010 07.01.2011 10.01.2011 04.02.2011 08.06.2011 22.07.2011 12.08.2011 15.08.2011 18.08.2011 19.08.2011 15.09.2011 16.09.2011 11.10.2011

28.10.2013 06.12.2012 23.04.2008 01.09.2008 03.05.2012 16.06.2008 – 24.11.2015 – 29.04.2016 22.09.2011 10.03.2017 14.11.2011 15.01.2010 18.10.2009 27.04.2010 23.03.2011 19.09.2013 28.08.2013 16.04.2009 25.03.2009 22.09.2016 07.08.2009 28.05.2015 12.03.2014 05.06.2013 – 09.11.2009 21.07.2016 14.09.2010 – 19.05.2014 19.03.2013 28.05.2015 02.12.2010 – – 07.01.2011 – – 14.09.2011 – – 25.01.2013 – 19.08.2011 19.03.2014 24.08.2016 16.01.2013

Nr.

Country

Date of Recognition

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115.

Ghana Haiti São Tomé and Príncipe Brunei Darussalam Chad Timor-Leste Papua New Guinea Burundi Fiji Saint Kitts and Nevis Dominica Pakistan Guyana Tanzania Yemen Egypt Salvador Thailand Grenada Libya Tonga Lesotho Togo Solomon Islands Cook Islands* Antigua and Barbuda Niue* Suriname Singapore Bangladesh Madagascar

23.01.2012 10.02.2012 13.03.2012 25.04.2012 01.06.2012 20.09.2012 03.10.2012 16.10.2012 19.11.2012 28.10.2012 11.12.2012 25.12.2012 16.03.2013 29.05.2013 11.06.2013 26.06.2013 29.06.2013 24.09.2013 25.09.2013 25.09.2013 15.05.2014 11.02.2014 02.07.2014 05.08.2014 18.05.2015 19.05.2015 23.06.2015 08.07.2016 01.12.2016 27.02.2017 24.11.2017

04.10.2012 – – 20.02.2017 – – – – 13.02.2013 04.03.2016 12.12.2012 27.01.2013 13.06.2013 02.04.2014 – – 10.10.2014 22.11.2013 25.09.2013 05.05.2014 – – 22.07.2014 27.04.2015 18.05.2015 – 23.06.2015 – 01.12.2016 – –

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo, 2017. *Non-UN states

Appendix 2 List of diplomatic missions of Kosovo (2008–2017)

Country

Type of mission Africa

Egypt Senegal

• Liaison Office in Cairo • Embassy in Dakar Americas

Canada Panama United States

• • • • • •

Embassy in Ottawa Embassy in Panama City Non-Resident Embassy for El Salvador Embassy in Washington, D. C. Consulate General in New Work Consulate Des Moines

Asia and Middle East Japan Saudi Arabia Turkey

• • • • • • • •

Embassy in Tokyo Embassy in Riyadh Non-Resident Embassy of Maldives Non-Resident Embassy for Qatar Embassy in Ankara Consulate General in Istanbul Non-Resident Embassy for Jordan Non-Resident Embassy for Pakistan

Europe Albania Austria Belgium Croatia Bulgaria Czech Republic France

• • • • • • • • • • • • •

Embassy in Tirana Embassy in Vienna Embassy in Brussels Non-Resident Embassy for Estonia Non-Resident Embassy for Luxemburg Embassy in Zagreb Embassy in Sofia Embassy in Prague Embassy in Paris Consulate General in Strasbourg Non-Resident Embassy for Andorra Non-Resident Embassy for Monaco Non-Resident Embassy for Portugal

Country

Type of mission

Germany

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Hungary Italy

Macedonia Montenegro Netherlands Serbia Slovenia Sweden

Switzerland

United Kingdom

Embassy in Berlin Consulate General in Munich Consulate in Frankfurt Consulate in Stuttgart Non-resident Embassy for Denmark Embassy in Budapest Embassy in Rome Consulate General in Milan Consular Office in Bari Non-Resident Embassy for Malta Non-Resident Embassy for San Marino Embassy in Skopje Embassy in Podgorica Embassy in The Hague Liaison Office in Belgrade Embassy in Ljubljana Embassy in Stockholm Non-Resident Embassy for Finland Non-Resident Embassy for Island Non-Resident Embassy for Latvia Non-Resident Embassy for Lithuania Non-Resident Embassy for Norway Embassy in Bern Consulate General in Geneva Consulate in Zurich Non-Resident Embassy for Liechtenstein Embassy in London Non-Resident Embassy for Ireland

Oceania Australia

• • • •

Embassy in Canberra Non-Resident Embassy for Cook Islands Non-Resident Embassy for Vanuatu Non-Resident Embassy for New Zealand

Not Recognised 1. Argentina 2. Bahamas 3. Barbados 4. Bolivia 5. Brazil 6. Chile 7. Cuba 8. Guatemala 9. Jamaica 10. Mexico 11. Nicaragua 12. Paraguay 13. Saint Vincent and Grenadines 14. Trinidad and Tobago 15. Uruguay 16. Venezuela

Recognised 1. Antigua and Barbuda 2. Belize 3. Canada 4. Columbia 5. Costa Rica 6. Dominica 7. Dominican Republic 8. Ecuador 9. El Salvador 10. Grenada 11. Guyana 12. Haiti 13. Honduras 14. Panama 15. Peru 16. Saint Kitts and Nevis 17. Saint Lucia 18. Suriname

Not Recognised 1. Algeria 2. Angola 3. Botswana 4. Cameroon 5. Cape Verde 6. Congo Brazzaville 7. Democratic Republic of the Congo 8. Equatorial Guinea 9. Eritrea 10. Ethiopia 11. Kenya 12. Mali 13. Mauritius 14. Morocco 15. Mozambique 16. Namibia 17. Nigeria

Recognised 1. Benin 2. Burkina Faso 3. Burundi 4. Central African Republic 5. Chad 6. Comoros 7. Djibouti 8. Egypt 9. Gabon 10. Gambia 11. Ghana 12. Guinea 13. Guinea Bissau 14. Ivory Coast 15. Lesotho 16. Liberia 17. Libya

Not Recognised 1. Bhutan 2. Cambodia 3. China 4. India 5. Indonesia 6. Iran 7. Iraq 8. Israel 9. Kazakhstan 10. Kyrgyzstan 11. Laos 12. Lebanon 13. Mongolia 14. Myanmar 15. Nepal 16. North Korea 17. Philippines 18. Sri Lanka 19. Syria 20. Tajikistan 21. Turkmenistan

Recognised

1. Afghanistan 2. Australia 3. Bahrain 4. Bangladesh 5. Brunei Darussalam 6. East Timor 7. Fiji 8. Japan 9. Jordan 10. Kiribati 11. Kuwait 12. Malaysia 13. Maldives 14. Marshall Islands 15. Micronesia 16. Nauru 17. New Zealand 18. Oman 19. Pakistan

Not recognised

1. Armenia 2. Azerbaijan 3. Belarus 4. Bosnia and Herzegovina 5. Cyprus 6. Georgia 7. Greece 8. Moldova 9. Romania 10. Russia 11. Serbia 12. Slovakia 13. Spain 14. Ukraine 15. Vatican

1. Albania 2. Andorra 3. Austria 4. Belgium 5. Bulgaria 6. Croatia 7. Czech 8. Denmark 9. Estonia 10. Finland 11. France 12. Germany 13. Holland 14. Hungary 15. Iceland 16. Ireland 17. Italy 18. Latvia 19. Lichtenstein 20. Lithuania 21. Luxembourg

Americas

Recognised

Africa

Asia-Pacific

Eurasia

Recognition of Kosovo by world regions (2008–2017)

Appendix 3

22. Macedonia 23. Malta 24. Monaco 25. Montenegro 26. Norway 27. Poland 28. Portugal 29. San Marino 30. Slovenia 31. Sweden 32. Switzerland 33. Turkey 34. United Kingdom

20. Palau 21. Papua New Guinea 22. Qatar 23. Samoa 24. Saudi Arabia 25. Singapore 26. Solomon Islands 27. South Korea 28. Thailand 29. Timor-Leste 30. Tonga 31. Tuvalu 32. United Arab Emirates 33. Vanuatu 34. Yemen

22. Uzbekistan 23. Vietnam

18. Madagascar 19. Malawi 20. Mauritania 21. Niger 22. Senegal 23. Sierra Leone 24. Somalia 25. Swaziland 26. Tanzania 27. Togo

18. Rwanda 19. Sao Tome and Principe 20. Seychelles 21. South Africa 22. South Sudan 23. Sudan 24. Tunisia 25. Uganda 26. Zambia 27. Zimbabwe

19. United States of America

26. Dominica

30. Estonia 34. Gabon 38. Grenada

42. Haiti 46. Ireland 50. Jordan 54. Lesotho

25. Djibouti

29. El Salvador 33. France 37. Ghana

41. Guyana 45. Iceland 49. Japan 53. Latvia

14. Burkina Faso 18. Chad

13. Bulgaria

22. Croatia

6. Austria 10. Belize

5. Australia 9. Belgium

17. Central African Republican 21. Costa Rica

2. Albania

1. Afghanistan

Recognised

43. Honduras 47. Italy 51. Kiribati 55. Liberia

23. Czech Republic 27. Dominican Republic 31. Fiji 35. Gambia 39. Guinea

19. Columbia

15. Burundi

7. Bahrain 11. Benin

3. Andorra

32. Finland 36. Germany 40. Guinea Bissau 44. Hungary 48. Ivory Coast 52. Kuwait 56. Libya

28. Egypt

24. Denmark

20. Comoros

4. Antigua and Barbuda 8. Bangladesh 12. Brunei Darussalam 16. Canada

61. Seychelles

62. Slovakia

22. Democratic Republic of the Congo 25. Eritrea 26. Ethiopia 29. Guatemala 30. India 33. Iraq 34. Israel 37. Kenya 38. Kyrgyzstan 41. Mali 42. Mauritius 45. Mongolia 46. Morocco 49. Namibia 50. Nepal 53. North Korea 54. Paraguay 57. Russia 58. Rwanda

14. Cambodia 18. China

13. Brazil 17. Chile 21. Cyprus

2. Algeria 6. Bahamas 10. Bolivia

1. Armenia 5. Azerbaijan 9. Bhutan

Not recognised

Recognition of Kosovo by UN member states (2008–2017)

Appendix 4

27. Georgia 31. Indonesia 35. Jamaica 39. Laos 43. Mexico 47. Mozambique 51. Nicaragua 55. Philippines 59. Saint Vincent and Grenadines 63. South Africa

3. Angola 7. Barbados 11. Bosnia and Herzegovina 15. Cameroon 19. Congo Brazzaville 23. Ecuador

64. South Sudan

28. Greece 32. Iran 36. Kazakhstan 40. Lebanon 44. Moldova 48. Myanmar 52. Nigeria 56. Romania 60. Serbia

24. Equatorial Guinea

16. Cape Verde 20. Cuba

4. Argentina 8. Belarus 12. Botswana

98. Suriname 102. Tanzania 106. Tonga 110. United Kingdom

97. South Korea 101.Switzerland 105.Togo 109.United Arab Emirates

113.Yemen

91. Senegal

90. Saudi Arabia 94. Slovenia

95. Solomon Islands 99. Swaziland 103. Thailand 107. Turkey 111. United States of America

83. Portugal 87. Samoa

100. Sweden 104. Timor-Leste 108. Tuvalu 112. Vanuatu

96. Somalia

92. Sierra Leone

80. Papua New Guinea 84. Qatar 88. San Marino

79. Panama

82. Poland 86. Saint Lucia

72. Netherlands 76. Oman

71. Nauru 75. Norway

59. Luxemburg 60. Macedonia 63. Malaysia 64. Maldives 67. Mauritania 68. Micronesia

81. Peru 85. Saint Kitts and Nevis 89. Sao Tome and Principe 93. Singapore

57. Lichtenstein 58. Lithuania 61. Madagascar 62. Malawi 65. Malta 66. Marshall Islands 69. Monaco 70. Montenegro 73. New 74. Niger Zealand 77. Pakistan 78. Palau 73. Uganda 77. Venezuela

65. Spain 69. Tajikistan

66. Sri Lanka 70. Trinidad and Tobago 74. Ukraine 78. Viet Nam 75. Uruguay 79. Zambia

67. Sudan 71. Tunisia

76. Uzbekistan 80. Zimbabwe

68. Syria 72. Turkmenistan

1. Austria 2. Belgium 3. Bulgaria 4. Croatia 5. Czech Republic 6. Denmark 7. Estonia 8. Finland 9. France 10. Germany 11. Hungary 12. Ireland 13. Italy 14. Latvia 15. Lithuania 16. Luxembourg 17. Malta

Recognised

European Union (EU)

1. Cyprus 2. Greece 3. Romania 4. Slovakia 5. Spain

1. Albania 2. Belgium 3. Bulgaria 4. Canada 5. Croatia 6. Czech Republic 7. Denmark 8. Estonia 9. France 10. Germany 11. Hungary 12. Iceland 13. Italy 14. Latvia 15. Lithuania 16. Luxembourg 17. Montenegro

Not recognised Recognised

Council of Europe (CoE)

1. Greece 2. Romania 3. Slovakia 4. Spain

1. Albania 2. Andorra 3. Austria 4. Belgium 5. Bulgaria 6. Croatia 7. Czech Republic 8. Denmark 9. Estonia 10. Finland 11. France 12. Germany 13. Hungary 14. Iceland 15. Ireland 16. Italy 17. Latvia

Not recognised Recognised

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Not recognised 1. Armenia 2. Azerbaijan 3. Belarus 4. Bosnia and Herzegovina 5. Cyprus 6. Georgia 7. Greece 8. Kazakhstan 9. Kyrgyzstan 10. Moldova 11. Mongolia 12. Romania 13. Russia 14. Serbia 15. Slovakia 16. Spain 17. Tajikistan

Recognised 1. Albania 2. Andorra 3. Austria 4. Belgium 5. Bulgaria 6. Canada 7. Croatia 8. Czech Republic 9. Denmark 10. Estonia 11. Finland 12. France 13. Germany 14. Hungary 15. Iceland 16. Ireland 17. Italy

Not recognised 1. Armenia 2. Azerbaijan 3. Bosnia and Herzegovina 4. Cyprus 5. Georgia 6. Greece 7. Moldova 8. Romania 9. Russia 10. Serbia 11. Slovakia 12. Spain 13. Ukraine

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

Recognition of Kosovo by members of regional organisations (2008–2017) I

Appendix 5.1

18. Netherlands 19. Poland 20. Portugal 21. Slovenia 22. Sweden 23. United Kingdom

18. Netherlands 19. Norway 20. Poland 21. Portugal 22. Slovenia 23. Turkey 24. United Kingdom 25. United States

18. Liechtenstein 19. Lithuania 20. Luxembourg 21. Macedonia 22. Malta 23. Monaco 24. Montenegro 25. Netherlands 26. Norway 27. Poland 28. Portugal 29. San Marino 30. Slovenia 31. Sweden 32. Switzerland 33. Turkey 34. United Kingdom

18. Latvia 19. Liechtenstein 20. Lithuania 21. Luxembourg 22. Macedonia 23. Malta 24. Monaco 25. Montenegro 26. Netherlands 27. Norway 28. Poland 29. Portugal 30. San Marino 31. Slovenia 32. Sweden 33. Switzerland 34. Turkey 35. United Kingdom 36. United States of America

18. Turkmenistan 19. Ukraine 20. Uzbekistan 21. Vatican City

Not recognised 1. Cambodia 2. Indonesia 3. Lao 4. Myanmar 5. Philippines 6. Viet Nam

Recognised 1. Brunei Darussalam 2. Malaysia 3. Singapore 4. Thailand

Not recognised 1. Argentina 2. Barbados 3. Bolivia 4. Brazil 5. Chile 6. Cuba 7. Guatemala 8. Jamaica 9. Mexico 10. Nicaragua 11. Paraguay 12. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 13. The Bahamas 14. Trinidad and Tobago 15. Uruguay 16. Venezuela

Recognised 1. Antigua and Barbuda 2. Belize 3. Canada 4. Colombia 5. Costa Rica 6. Dominica 7. Dominican Republic 8. Ecuador 9. El Salvador 10. Grenada 11. Guyana 12. Haiti 13. Honduras 14. Panama 15. Peru 16. Saint Kitts and Nevis 17. Saint Lucia 18. Suriname

Not recognised 1. Algeria 2. Azerbaijan 3. Cameroon 4. Indonesia 5. Iran 6. Iraq 7. Kazakhstan 8. Kyrgyzstan 9. Lebanon 10. Mali 11. Morocco 12. Mozambique 13. Palestine 14. Sudan 15. Syria 16. Tajikistan 17. Tunisia 18. Turkmenistan 19. Uzbekistan

Recognised

1. Afghanistan 2. Albania 3. Bahrain 4. Bangladesh 5. Benin 6. Brunei 7. Burkina Faso 8. Chad 9. Comoros 10. Côte d’Ivoire 11. Djibouti 12. Egypt 13. Gabon 14. Gambia 15. Guinea 16. GuineaBissau 17. Guyana 18. Jordan

Not recognised

28. Algeria 29. Angola 30. Botswana 31. Cameroon 32. Cape Verde 33. Congo Brazzaville 34. Democratic Republic of the Congo 35. Equatorial Guinea 36. Eritrea 37. Ethiopia 38. Kenya 39. Mali 40. Mauritius 41. Morocco 42. Mozambique 43. Namibia 44. Nigeria

28. Benin 29. Burkina Faso 30. Burundi 31. Central African Republic 32. Chad 33. Comoros 34. Djibouti 35. Egypt 36. Gabon 37. Gambia 38. Ghana 39. Guinea 40. Guinea Bissau 41. Ivory Coast 42. Lesotho 43. Liberia 44. Libya

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Recognised

Organisation of American States (OAS)

Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)

African Union (AU)

Recognition of Kosovo by members of regional organisations (2008–2017) II

Appendix 5.2

45. Madagascar 46. Malawi 47. Mauritania 48. Niger 49. Sao Tome & Principe 50. Senegal 51. Sierra Leone 52. Somalia 53. Swaziland 54. Tanzania 55. Togo

45. Rwanda 46. Sahrawi Republic (Western Sahara) 47. Seychelles 48. South Africa 49. South Sudan 50. Sudan 51. Tunisia 52. Uganda 53. Zambia 54. Zimbabwe

19. Kuwait 20. Libya 21. Malaysia 22. Maldives 23. Mauritania 24. Niger 25. Oman 26. Pakistan 27. Qatar 28. Saudi Arabia 29. Senegal 30. Sierra Leone 31. Somalia 32. Suriname 33. Togo 34. Turkey 35. Uganda 36. United Arab Emirates 37. Yemen

19. United States of America

Not Free 1. Algeria 2. Angola 3. Azerbaijan 4. Belarus 5. Cambodia 6. Cameroon 7. China 8. Democratic Republic of the Congo 9. Congo Brazzaville 10. Cuba 11. Equatorial Guinea 12. Eritrea 13. Ethiopia 14. Iran 15. Iraq 16. Kazakhstan 17. Laos

Partially Free 1. Armenia 2. Bhutan 3. Bolivia 4. Bosnia and Herzegovina 5. Georgia 6. Guatemala 7. Indonesia 8. Kenya 9. Kyrgyzstan 10. Lebanon 11. Mali 12. Mexico 13. Moldova 14. Morocco 15. Mozambique 16. Myanmar 17. Nepal 18. Nicaragua 19. Nigeria 20. Paraguay

Not Recognised Free 1. Argentina 2. Bahamas 3. Barbados 4. Botswana 5. Brazil 6. Cape Verde 7. Chile 8. Cyprus 9. Greece 10. India 11. Israel 12. Jamaica 13. Mauritius 14. Mongolia 15. Namibia 16. Romania 17. Saint Vincent and Grenadines 18. Sao Tome and Principe 19. Serbia

Not Free 1. Afghanistan 2. Bahrain 3. Brunei Darussalam 4. Burundi 5. Central African Republican 6. Chad 7. Djibouti 8. Egypt 9. Gabon 10. Gambia 11. Libya 12. Mauritania 13. Oman 14. Qatar 15. Saudi Arabia 16. Somalia 17. Swaziland 18. Thailand

Partially Free

1. Albania 2. Bangladesh 3. Burkina Faso 4. Columbia 5. Comoros 6. Dominican Republic 7. Ecuador 8. Fiji 9. Guinea 10. Guinea Bissau 11. Haiti 12. Honduras 13. Ivory Coast 14. Jordan 15. Kuwait 16. Lesotho 17. Liberia 18. Macedonia 19. Madagascar 20. Malawi

Recognised

Free

1. Andorra 2. Antigua and Barbuda 3. Australia 4. Austria 5. Belgium 6. Belize 7. Benin 8. Bulgaria 9. Canada 10. Costa Rica 11. Croatia 12. Czech Republic 13. Denmark 14. Dominica 15. El Salvador 16. Estonia 17. Finland 18. France 19. Germany 20. Ghana

Recognition of Kosovo and global democracy in 2017

Appendix 6

21. Grenada 22. Guyana 23. Hungary 24. Iceland 25. Ireland 26. Italy 27. Japan 28. Kiribati 29. Latvia 30. Lichtenstein 31. Lithuania 32. Luxemburg 33. Malta 34. Marshall Islands 35. Micronesia 36. Monaco 37. Nauru 38. Netherlands 39. New Zealand 40. Norway 41. Palau 42. Panama 43. Papua New Guinea 44. Peru 45. Poland 46. Portugal 47. Saint Kitts and Nevis

21. Malaysia 22. Maldives 23. Montenegro 24. Niger 25. Pakistan 26. Sierra Leone 27. Singapore 28. Tanzania 29. Timor-Leste 30. Togo 31. Turkey

19. United Arab Emirates 20. Yemen

20. Slovakia 21. South Africa 22. Spain 23. Trinidad and Tobago 24. Tunisia 25. Uruguay

21. Philippines 22. Seychelles 23. Sri Lanka 24. Ukraine 25. Zambia 26. Zimbabwe

(Continued )

18. North Korea 19. Russia 20. Rwanda 21. South Sudan 22. Sudan 23. Syria 24. Tajikistan 25. Turkmenistan 26. Uganda 27. Uzbekistan 28. Venezuela 29. Viet Nam

Partially Free

Not Free

Source: Freedom House (2017), ‘Freedom in the World 2017’. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/fiw-2017-table-country-scores (accessed 20 December 2017).

48. Saint Lucia 49. Samoa 50. San Marino 51. Senegal 52. Slovenia 53. Solomon Islands 54. South Korea 55. Suriname 56. Sweden 57. Switzerland 58. Tonga 59. Tuvalu 60. United Kingdom 61. United States of America 62. Vanuatu

Free

Not Free

Free

Partially Free

Not Recognised

Recognised

(Continued)

Index

Abkhazia 31, 172, 174, 178, 180, 183 Advisory Opinion (ICJ) 34, 117, 118, 119, 127, 131 agency 6, 7, 10, 13, 15–18, 23, 25–6, 32–4, 36, 38–9, 42–3, 45, 58, 62, 81, 94, 110, 125–7, 132, 135, 153, 155, 161–3, 165, 187, 198, 203, 212 Ahtisaari, M. 72, 100, 102, 107 Albania 15, 53–7 Anthropology of diplomacy 45 Arab Spring 171 Aradau, C. 24, 34, 38, 39 Argentina 178, 182, 224, 226, 230, 232 ASEAN 198, 230 assemblages 138, 156, 161–3, 187, 189, 191, 204 Assemblage theory 39 Assembly of Kosovo 68, 71, 73, 77, 79, 81, 96, 99, 104, 107, 144, 172–3 Australia 130, 165, 219, 223–4, 226, 232 autonomy 2, 7–8, 15, 53, 56–8, 64–6, 68, 72, 84, 93, 147, 177, 179, 200 Balkans, Western 73, 95, 99, 103, 113, 116, 136–7, 145, 147–9, 151–3, 166, 177, 180, 185, 189, 209 Bartelson, J. 2, 25, 30 Bartkus, V. O. 53, 59, 66, 199 Bechev, D. 113, 174 bilateral relations 10, 77–8, 80, 94, 132, 141, 167, 208 Bosnia and Herzegovina 54, 65, 152, 177–8, 226, 228, 232 Brownlie, I. 28, 126 Buchanan, A. 65, 73, 98, 201 Bulgaria 103, 219, 222, 224, 226, 228, 232 Butler, J. 23, 35–6, 123 Canada 97, 165, 219, 222, 224, 226, 228, 230, 232 Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 131, 232

Caspersen, N. 2, 6, 12, 32, 40, 212 China 3–4, 11, 14–15, 74, 110, 132, 134, 143, 172, 178–9, 181, 189, 192, 207–8, 224, 226, 232 civil resistance 7, 59 Clinton, B. 63, 166 Coggins, B. 1–2, 23–4, 29, 40, 107, 163–5, 212 Cold War 184 collective non-recognition 30, 106–7, 184 collective recognition 2, 10–11, 30, 125, 128, 144, 147, 177, 192 Constantinou, C. 27, 70, 123 contact group 64, 72–3 contested sovereignty 27–8, 154 Costa Rica 98, 219, 224, 226, 230, 232 Council of Europe (CoE) 11, 69, 111–12, 145–6, 148, 190, 198, 228 Council of Europe Development Bank 112, 145–6 Crawford, J. 2, 31, 91, 98, 105, 126, 143, 212 cultural heritage 66, 182 Cyprus 32, 43, 147, 150, 177–80, 224, 226, 228, 232 Dačić, I. 142 declaration of independence 3–4, 7, 18, 55, 57, 73–5, 78–9, 83–4, 91, 93, 96–100, 103–4, 106–7, 113, 115, 128, 134, 142, 145, 148, 165–6, 171, 175–7, 179, 181–2, 184, 186, 198, 201–2, 205, 207 democratic governance 76, 100–1, 206 de-recognition 141–2, 173, 208–9 Diaspora 58–64, 83, 173 diplomacy: conventional 202; face-to-face 10, 155, 203; niche 141, 209; proactive 4, 14, 141, 204; unconventional 202 diplomatic: agency 6, 7, 15–18, 32, 36, 38–9, 81, 94, 125, 155, 163, 165; approach 4, 6, 10, 19, 108, 152, 165; assemblages

236

Index

13, 39, 161–2, 187, 189, 202; discourse 8, 9, 12, 18, 24, 33–4, 45, 84, 92, 94, 96, 100, 102–3, 106, 108, 115–17, 129, 136, 138, 151, 154, 201–3; dissidence 144, 146, 154; entanglements 12, 18, 39, 186–7; network 7, 10, 14, 58, 95, 109, 130, 173, 191; performances 6, 9–10, 13, 17–18, 23–4, 37–8, 123–5, 135–6, 151, 153–4, 156, 202; practices 2, 13, 16–17, 23–4, 27–8, 36–8, 40, 42, 45, 93, 117, 125, 129, 130, 138, 143, 164, 202–3; recognition 1–4, 6, 9, 11–17, 19, 23–4, 29, 31–3, 39, 41, 55, 76–7, 79, 80–2, 84, 92, 94–5, 101, 104, 106–8, 111, 115–16, 123–9, 130, 132–5, 137, 139, 140–3, 148, 151–5, 161–8, 170, 173, 176–7, 191, 198–9, 200–8, 209, 214; relations 4, 15, 30, 74, 78, 80–2, 94–5, 115, 124–5, 127–9, 130–1, 133, 136, 138–9, 140–2, 147, 151–2, 154–5, 167, 173, 180, 185, 198–9, 200, 208–9, 210, 219, 220–1 Dittmer, J. 12, 27, 33, 39, 40, 152 domestic crises 14, 82, 190 Doyle, J. 113 Dugard, J. 2, 28, 30–1, 143 Edkins, J. 26 Egypt 104–5, 108, 130, 169, 171, 221–2, 224, 226, 230, 232 emerging states 1–2, 6, 9, 15–18, 24–5, 27, 29, 31, 34, 40–1, 60, 96, 101–2, 153, 177, 199, 200, 203–5, 207, 212–4 entangled agency 33, 38–9, 42, 161, 198; see also Agency entanglements 2, 6–8, 10, 12–13, 16–19, 24, 26, 33, 38–9, 45–6, 84, 138, 156, 161–4, 167–8, 172–3, 176–7, 184–9, 191, 202–3, 205 ethnic cleansing 54, 61, 65–6, 97–8, 175, 180 ethnic groups 1, 4, 66 ethnography: organisational 42–3; see also institutional, ethnography Euro-Atlantic: Integration 71, 102, 153, 155; Structures 80, 106, 110, 186 European Commission 111, 113, 147–9, 150, 185 European Parliament 111, 147–8, 179 European Union (EU) 11, 14, 31, 67, 97, 107, 110, 114, 132, 146–9, 152, 198, 201, 206, 210, 228 everyday: diplomacy 6–9, 24, 27, 55, 203; diplomatic practices 2, 16, 24, 27–8, 38, 45, 138

Fabry, M. 6, 9, 28, 126, 167, 199, 212 Fierke, K. 161, 177, 213 Fiji 132, 221, 224, 226, 232 fledgling state 6, 10, 12, 33–4, 38, 55, 92, 154, 165, 170, 177, 181–2, 207, 232 foreign policy 7, 11–13, 15–16, 18–19, 31–2, 36–7, 44, 53, 59, 60, 62, 69, 71, 74, 77–9, 81–2, 92, 94, 108, 110, 117, 125, 130, 135–7, 140–1, 148–9, 153, 155, 163–7, 169, 170–4, 181–2, 184–7, 189, 190–2, 201, 203, 205, 209, 213 France 71–2, 102–3, 219, 222, 224, 226, 228, 232 Geldenhuys, D. 4, 31, 143, 147 genocidal acts 68 Georgia 31, 172, 174, 178, 180, 224, 226, 228, 232 Germany 71, 74, 97, 134, 166, 210, 219, 223–4, 226, 228, 232 global entanglements 12, 19, 24, 39, 156, 161, 163–4, 185, 189, 191, 205 good neighbourly relations 79, 99, 103, 109, 113, 152, 155, 211 Grant, T. D. 31, 209 great powers 2, 4, 12–13, 19, 23, 60, 107, 156, 162–4, 167–8, 170, 173–4, 191, 192, 198, 205, 207 Greece 139, 147, 150, 152, 177, 179, 180, 186, 224, 226, 228, 232 Griffiths, R. 1, 2, 24, 98, 147 Guatemala 178, 182, 224, 226, 230, 232 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 135 Haiti 132–3, 221, 224, 226, 230, 232 Hansen, L. 8, 23, 34, 36, 92 Hoxhaj, E. 81–2, 96, 104, 107–8, 113–14, 131–4, 138, 152–3, 165, 168, 189, 190 human agency 13, 25 humanitarian intervention 54, 65, 93, 165, 202 human rights violations 61, 97–8, 198 Hyseni, S. 172–3 improvisation 10, 17, 19, 38, 125, 13, 145, 153–4 independence: of Kosovo 103, 105, 135, 137, 142, 165, 170, 183–4, 211; struggle for 53–4, 84, 124; supervised 3, 74, 76–7, 84, 93, 106, 109, 172 Independent International Commission on Kosovo 66 independent statehood 1–3, 7, 14, 19, 28–9, 53–5, 60–3, 66–7, 71, 73–4, 79,

Index 82–4, 91–3, 96, 101, 115, 123–5, 132, 144, 153, 155, 161–2, 172, 177, 185, 187, 198–9, 201–2, 205–7, 210 institutional: cooperation 10, 127, 139, 140, 150; ethnography 17–19, 24, 41–5 international: humanitarian law 66; intervention (see Humanitarian intervention); Law 1–3, 16, 18, 23, 25, 28–9, 30–1, 73–4, 79, 91, 93, 95–6, 98–9, 101, 103–6, 114, 126, 133, 143–4, 155, 175, 181, 184, 188–9, 200, 202, 205, 208, 212, 214; legitimacy 14, 17, 30, 59, 61, 125, 143, 198, 201–2, 204, 208; legitimation 6–7, 12–13, 16, 19, 94, 104, 109, 115, 154, 161, 177, 191, 203, 207; organisation 1–2, 4, 6–7, 9, 10–16, 19, 29, 33, 41, 53, 55, 60, 69, 70–1, 74–9, 80, 84, 92–3, 104, 106, 108–9, 111, 114–16, 123–5, 128, 130–1, 133, 136, 139, 143–9, 150–5, 161–3, 166, 168, 173, 185–7, 191, 198–9, 200–9, 211, 214; system 2, 10, 13, 15–16, 25, 30, 32, 40, 103, 125–6, 151, 163–4, 170, 201, 212, 214 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 9, 98, 103, 105 internationalisation 7, 54, 60–1, 64, 83 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 145 INTERPOL 114, 188–9, 190 intertextuality 94, 116 Iraq 171, 178, 183, 202, 224, 226, 230, 232 Ireland 185, 219, 223–4, 226, 228 Ker-Lindsay, J. 2–3, 30–1, 40, 72, 96, 126, 143, 170, 173, 212 Kosovar diplomacy 64 Kosovo: Albanians 53–9, 60–2, 65–6, 68, 70, 72, 83, 173, 179, 200, 202, 211; Liberation Army 54, 62–3; Security Force 79, 150, 186 Krasner, S. 23, 25, 29 Krasniqi, G. 58, 62, 77, 181 Lauterpacht, H. 2, 31 law of armed conflict 66 Lesotho 107, 221, 224, 226, 230, 232 Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (LVV) 81 lobbying tactics 18, 133 local ownership 70 Macedonia 72, 220, 223, 225, 227, 229 Malawi 132, 220, 225, 227, 229 Malcolm, N. 30, 56 Maldives 100, 108, 220, 222, 224, 227, 231 McConnell, F. 1, 11, 27, 32–3, 213

237

MFA of Kosovo 76–9, 93, 95–6, 98, 100–2, 104, 106–9, 110–12, 114–15, 127–9, 131–2, 135, 145–6, 152, 169, 172, 174, 181–2, 185–8, 191, 202, 208 micro-politics 2, 4, 6, 13, 15, 17, 23, 28, 31–2, 34, 40, 126, 199, 200, 213 Milošević, S. 7, 58, 62–3, 65, 67, 93, 97–8 mimicry 59, 202 minority groups 163, 200 Moldova 152, 176, 178, 180, 224, 226, 228, 232 Montevideo Convention 28, 78, 93, 101, 143–4 multilateral organisations 10, 109, 130, 140, 144, 149, 155, 162, 164, 168, 184, 187, 189, 190, 207 Mustafa, I. 188 narrative 6, 8–9, 10, 12, 16, 18–19, 24, 33, 37, 42, 44, 68–9, 76, 92–5, 98, 103–4, 116–17, 136–7, 162, 201–2, 212 NATO 11–12, 14, 54, 58, 65–7, 75–7, 79, 80, 83, 97, 100–1, 107, 110, 113–14, 150–2, 167, 174, 177, 181, 185–6, 198, 202, 210, 214, 228 Neumann, I. B. 8, 23, 27, 35, 92, 138 Newman, E. 3, 7, 28, 126, 139, 147 normalisation 14, 16, 79, 80, 93, 106, 113, 129, 166, 186, 209, 210 norms 1–2, 6–8, 12, 15–16, 19, 26–7, 30, 34–6, 39, 40, 45, 66, 92, 94, 99, 101–2, 106, 109, 110, 115–16, 143–4, 155, 161–2, 167, 173, 176, 199, 202, 204–5, 212, 214 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 11, 67, 148, 228 Organisation of Francophonie (OIF) 131, 145, 152 Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 134–5, 198, 230 Pacolli, B. 81, 133, 167 Palestine 32, 114, 178, 187–9 parallel state 57–8, 60–2, 83, 200 Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs (Kosovo) 81 participant observation 17–18, 24, 41, 43–5 Partnership for Peace (NATO) 80, 114, 150, 186 peacebuilding 15, 149 peace-loving states 9, 77, 111, 143, 149, 208 performances 2, 6–7, 9, 10, 13, 16–19, 23–4, 27, 32–9, 44–6, 48, 84, 92,

238

Index

123–5, 135–6, 140, 151, 153–4, 156, 198, 200, 202 performative: agency 26, 42, 126, 153; diplomacy 6, 10–12, 19, 37–8, 53, 95, 124–7, 131–3, 136, 138, 140, 153–4, 156, 198–9, 202–3, 228; practices 17, 23, 26, 38, 41, 43, 123 performativity 18, 23, 34–8, 43, 123, 153– 4 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) 114, 145–6 Phillips, D. L. 62, 124, 206 Pouliot, V. 10, 17, 23, 27, 36, 43, 131, 164 practice tracing 17, 24, 41, 44 President of Kosovo 78–9, 128–9, 164, 186 Pula, B. 58 Qatar 135, 140, 168, 220, 222, 225, 227, 231 Raič, D. 28–9, 30, 106, 126, 143 Rambouillet 64–6 recognition: diplomatic 1–4, 6, 9, 11–17, 19, 23–4, 29, 31–3, 39, 41, 55, 76–7, 79, 80–2, 84, 92, 94–5, 101, 104, 106–8, 111, 115–16, 123–9, 130, 132–5, 137, 139, 140–3, 148, 151–5, 161–8, 170, 173, 176–7, 191, 198–9, 200–7, 209, 214; formal 10, 30–1, 94, 125, 127–8, 138–9, 140, 207, 209; implied 140, 144, 210; indirect 143; state 2, 9, 12, 16, 18, 20, 24, 28–9, 30–1, 40–1, 93–4, 116–17, 126, 141, 143–4, 154, 162–3, 167, 170, 173, 176, 184, 204, 212–14; unilateral 30 referendum 53, 56–7, 65, 128, 172, 182, 201 Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) 113, 145–6, 152 regional security 9, 114, 153, 155 remedial: right to self-determination 11, 98; secession 98, 167 resistance: peaceful 53, 55–8, 61–3, 83, 200, 202 Richmond, O. P. 27, 33, 213 Ringmar, E. 29, 133, 141 Romania 139, 147, 150, 152, 177, 179, 186, 224, 226, 228, 232 Rugova, I. 60, 62–3, 65 Russia 3, 11, 14–15, 64, 73–4, 76, 96, 100, 110, 112, 132, 134–5, 142–3, 151, 167, 171–5, 178–9, 180–9, 190, 192, 205, 207–8, 210, 224, 226, 228 Saudi Arabia 130, 135, 168, 190, 220, 222, 225, 227, 231 Scott, J. C. 23, 125

secession 1–3, 6, 14–15, 24, 28, 32, 40, 59, 60, 62, 64–6, 72, 96–8, 101, 103–4, 128, 147, 162–3, 165, 167–9, 171–9, 180, 182–4, 186, 192, 200, 201, 202, 205, 207, 211–13 Sejdiu, F. 96 self-determination: collective 40–1; right to 8, 28, 40, 68, 98–9, 104, 171, 211, 214 Serbia 3, 7–8, 13–15, 31, 53–9, 60–8, 72–5, 79, 80, 82–4, 93, 96, 98, 100, 102–4, 106–7, 110, 112–14, 116, 129, 132, 134, 137, 142–4, 151–2, 154–5, 166, 171–3, 175, 177, 179, 180–9, 192, 198–9, 200, 202, 205, 207–9, 210–11, 223–4, 226, 228, 232 Serbian Orthodox Church 110 Serb parallel structures 75 Shaw, M. 30, 143 Singapore 140, 221, 225, 227, 230 situational: discourses 16, 45; knowledge 17, 43 Slovakia 142, 147, 150, 152, 177, 180, 186, 224, 226, 228, 233 small states 13, 131–2, 136–7, 167, 169 soft power 10, 206 Somalia 183–4, 220, 225, 227, 231 Somaliland 184 South-East Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP) 113, 145, 152 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 131 South Ossetia 172, 174, 178, 180, 183, 210 sovereignty: domestic 4, 25, 33, 55, 68, 70, 74–7, 81–2, 203; international legal 25, 74–5, 141 Spain 147, 150, 177–9, 185–6, 224, 227–8, 233 Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) 68, 71 Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) 80, 93, 111, 129, 145, 147, 185, 211 Standards for Kosovo 68 state-becoming 6, 8, 12–13, 16, 18–19, 24, 26, 29, 32–3, 35, 39, 40, 43–5, 53, 57, 83–4, 123, 125, 153, 162, 164, 177, 191, 200–1, 203–4, 206, 212–14 statebuilding 3, 9, 15, 20, 27, 33, 55, 63, 66–9, 71, 82, 84, 101–2, 136–7, 165–6, 199, 202, 204, 209, 214 state formation 24, 27–8, 33, 37–8, 55, 57–8, 60–1, 66, 68, 70, 81, 96, 162, 166 statehood: criteria of 2, 29, 52, 78, 101, 104, 126, 143, 154; enactment of 8, 24, 34, 37, 92, 142, 214; everyday making

Index of 6, 8, 12, 17, 19, 23–4, 33–8, 40–2, 45, 123, 200, 202; sovereign 1–2, 6–7, 9, 11, 16, 18, 23, 24–5, 29, 30, 33–4, 36, 45–6, 53, 58, 74–5, 82–4, 92–3, 115, 127, 140, 143, 148, 155–6, 172, 199, 200 sui generis 82, 96–7, 174, 205 Suriname 131, 142, 221, 224, 227, 230 Switzerland 102, 221, 223, 225, 227, 229 territory 3–4, 7, 9, 28–9, 32, 54, 56, 58, 65, 68–9, 72, 74, 83–4, 93, 97, 99, 101, 179, 180, 182, 200, 211 textualisation 8, 116 Thaçi, H. 65, 76 Togo 104–5, 134, 141, 184, 221, 225, 227, 231 Troika 73 Trump, D. 172, 207 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) 32, 178–9, 180 UN: General Assembly 61, 103, 105, 110, 131, 143, 151, 190, 208; Security Council 3–4, 11, 54–5, 64, 66–9, 71–7, 96–7, 99, 100, 104–6, 110, 113, 134, 143, 146, 151, 172, 174–5, 179, 181, 183–4, 186, 208

239

UNESCO 110, 140, 186–8, 190 United Arab Emirates 135, 168, 220, 225, 227 United Nations 2–3, 11, 31, 80, 95, 97, 105, 110, 114, 143, 170, 186 United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 67–9, 70–2, 75–7, 100 United States of America (U.S.A.) 3, 8, 12, 14–15, 60, 62–4, 71–4, 77–9, 80, 84, 94, 97, 100, 102, 110, 114, 134–5, 138, 142, 150–3, 163, 165–9, 170–5, 181–4, 187, 189, 191, 204, 207–8, 210, 219, 225, 227, 229, 231 Venice Commission 112, 146 Visoka, G. 3, 7, 14, 28, 55, 67–9, 70, 74–5, 98, 100, 111, 113, 126, 139, 147–8 Walker, R. B. J. 25–6, 34 Weber, C. 26, 34, 36, 123 Weller, M. 3, 57, 59, 60, 62, 64–5, 72, 74, 79, 99, 110 World Bank (WB) 110, 140, 145 World Health Organisation (WHO) 187