Across Boundaries: Essays in Honour of Robert A.Young 9780228007098

Citation preview

across boundaries

Across Boundaries Essays in Honour of Robert A. Young

edited by

André Blais Cristine de Clercy Anna Lennox Esselment Ronald Wintrobe

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Chicago

© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2021 ISB N ISB N ISB N ISB N

978-0-2280-0607-7 978-0-2280-0608-4 978-0-2280-0709-8 978-0-2280-0710-4

(cloth) (paper) (eP df) (eP UB)

Legal deposit second quarter 2021 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free Funding has been received from the J.B. Smallman Publication Fund, Faculty of Social Science, University of Western Ontario.

We acknowledge the support of the Canada Council for the Arts. Nous remercions le Conseil des arts du Canada de son soutien.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Title: Across boundaries : essays in honour of Robert A. Young / edited by André Blais, Cristine de Clercy, Anna Lennox Esselment, Ronald Wintrobe. Other titles: Across boundaries (2021) Names: Blais, André, 1947– editor. | De Clercy, Cristine, editor. | Esselment, Anna Lennox, editor. | Wintrobe, Ronald, editor. | Young, Robert Andrew, honouree. Description: Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: Canadiana (print) 20210144491 | Canadiana (ebook) 20210144637 | ISB N 9780228006084 (softcover) | IS BN 9780228006077 (hardcover) | I SB N 9780228007098 (P DF ) | IS BN 9780228007104 (eP U B ) Subjects: l cs h: Political science. | l cs h: Federal government. | l c sh: Central-local government relations. | l cs h: Secession. | l cs h : Economics. Classification: l ccja 66 .a 27 2021 | ddc 320—dc23

This book was typeset in 10.5/13 Sabon.

Contents

Tables, Figures, and Equations Acknowledgments 1

•

•

vii

ix

Introduction: The Work of Robert A. Young

3

•

André Blais, Cristine de Clercy, Anna Lennox Esselment, and Ronald Wintrobe

part one | multilevel governance 2

Bob Young, Big Projects, and the Study of Local and Urban Politics in Canada

•

15

Martin Horak, Andy Sancton, and Allison Bramwell 3

Exchange Rates, Energy Royalties, Carbon Pricing, Fiscal Federalism: An Integrative Framework for Equity and Competitiveness

•

33

Thomas J. Courchene 4

Do Ideas Matter? Competing Models of Municipal Public Administration and Their Influence on Policy and Implementation of a Toronto Social Program Carol Agocs

•

47

vi

Contents

part two | secession politics 5

Democracy Against Unilateral Secession

•

83

Stéphane Dion 6

Has the Economic Risk Associated with Quebec’s Independence Increased?

•

113

Philippe Faucher 7

How Do Secessions Not Happen? The Cases of Scotland and Catalonia

•

128

•

148

François Rocher and Nadia Verrelli 8

The Self-Determination Conundrum: Wrong Answers or Wrong Question? Michael Keating

part three | political economy 9

The Left and the Fiscal Deficit: A Beautiful Hypothesis Slain by an Ugly Fact

•

165

Louis M. Imbeau and Jérôme Couture 10

Gandhi’s Satyagraha: An Economic Interpretation Ronald Wintrobe

11

On Blessing and Cursing Matters: Some Political Economy

•

199

Mario Ferrero 12

In Defense of Majoritarianism

•

214

Stanley L. Winer Appendix: Publications of Robert A. Young Contributors Index

•

251

•

245

•

231

•

185

Tables, Figures, and Equations

tables 3.1

The anatomy of provincial finances, 2012–13 ($ per capita) • 37

6.1

Interprovincial and international trade, Quebec, 1990 and 2016 (percentage of provincial gdp ) • 120

figures 9.1

Voters on the spending dimension

9.2

A two-dimensional fiscal policy space

9.3

The bottom-up budget

9.4

The top-down budget

•

•

•

171 •

172

173 175

9.5a

A more fiscally conservative top-down budget

•

9.5b

A less fiscally conservative top-down budget

176

9.6 12.1

Ideological zones regarding fiscal policy

•

•

176

178

Loosemore-Hanby and Gallager Indexes, Elections 19–42 (1940–2015) • 224

viii

Tables, Figures, and Equations

equations 12.1

Gallagher index of proportionality

12.2

Loosemore-Hanby index of proportionality

•

223 •

223

Acknowledgments

This volume was produced with the help and support of many people. As one might expect, compiling a manuscript featuring the work of eighteen authors and supervised by four co-editors presented some significant logistical challenges. Moreover, much of the production preparation was accomplished in the summer and fall of 2020 as the Covid-19 pandemic disrupted work and tangled communications. Nevertheless, the patience and commitment of everyone involved in this project secured its completion. We thank McGill-Queen’s University Press for agreeing to pursue this project after an initial meeting with the then chair of Western Political Science, Don Abelson, in November of 2017. Among the press’s personnel we especially appreciate the help of Philip Cercone, Jacqueline Davis, Filomena Falocco, Kathleen Fraser, Elena Goranescu, Jacqueline Mason, Joanne Pisano, and Grace Seybold. We also thank Virgil Duff at University of Toronto Press. We appreciate the useful comments and suggestions of two anonymous external reviewers concerning the original manuscript. The professional editing and proofreading services of Dawn Oosterhoff were invaluable in turning the rough draft into a coherent manuscript. At the University of Western Ontario, several people made large contributions to the project. In particular the chair of the Department of Political Science, Matt Lebo, supplied advice concerning internal funding. The office of Dean Joan Finegan and the associate dean of Research, Ken McRae, provided valuable support. The editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the J.B. Smallman Publication Fund and the Faculty of Social Science, the University of Western Ontario. The editors also gratefully acknowledge the assistance of

x

Acknowledgments

the Elaine Bjorkland Faculty Research Awards Fund in the Faculty of Social Science. Thanks to Professor Samuel Clark and Professor Peter Neary who provided important advice and suggestions. Finally, thanks to Louise Gadbois who contributed selections from her husband’s large collection of doodle art to grace the cover of this volume.

across boundaries

1

Introduction: The Work of Robert A. Young André Blais, Cristine de Clercy, Anna Lennox Esselment, and Ronald Wintrobe

This book honours our colleague, Robert Andrew Young. Bob, as most people knew him, was a remarkably dedicated and prolific academic. Past president of the Canadian Political Science Association, holder of a prestigious Tier 1 Canada Research Chair in Multilevel Governance, valued adviser to research centres and governments, he contributed deeply to the discipline of political science and its development within Canada and abroad. Bob was not only a prolific scholar, but also a devoted and dedicated teacher. Two of the editors of this volume (André Blais and Ron Wintrobe) were counterparts of Bob’s generation – both friends and colleagues in academe. André and Bob co-authored papers together, including one on the “paradox of voting,” so-called because the economic theory of rational behaviour predicts that people should not vote, yet most people in most jurisdictions do. Ron and Bob jointly ran a workshop on political economy together for over twenty years, which combined the resources of the economics and political science departments at the University of Western Ontario and was frequently attended by historians and philosophers. Ron and Bob often met in the afternoons for coffee and in the evenings and on weekends for drinks and dinners to discuss potential themes and visitors for the seminar, as well as other aspects of life. Two other editors (Cristine de Clercy and Anna Esselment) were Bob’s doctoral students, who were lucky enough to also become his friends and colleagues.

4

A. Blais, C. de Clercy, A. Esselment, and R. Wintrobe

Undergraduate and graduate students at Western and elsewhere benefited from Bob’s knowledge and commitment to teaching excellence. He was a steady and reassuring supervisor. While not prone to overly enthusiastic praise, Bob would spend hours advising, counselling, and reviewing the progress of his students’ dissertations. He encouraged them to break their own paths, publish their work as single authors in the early stages of their careers, and “follow the footnotes” of the literature they read, since footnotes would often tell the more interesting stories. Bob Young’s body of work is exemplary in the depth of his attention to concrete policy issues and in the breadth of his interest across many of the subfields of political science. We have summarized his areas of research and his extensive body of published work in the Appendix for interested readers. Here one finds superb studies across a range of subjects, from Canadian industrial policy to interest groups in New Brunswick to the dynamics of secession in Quebec and Czechoslovakia. Importantly, examining his life’s work demonstrates Bob was among a handful of Canadian political scientists located outside Quebec who published regularly in both official languages. He appreciated the many benefits he enjoyed as a consequence of his bilingualism, and as an educator, he was a firm supporter of French-language education and expanded immersion opportunities. To paraphrase one of his favourite article titles, for Bob, bilingual capacity in French and English created the bonds to tie together a highly valued network of superb scholars from sea to sea. Writing in both languages was just one of the ways in which Bob worked across boundaries. He wrote on economics and history as well as politics, and he interacted with policy-makers as well as academics. He was also interested in a wide variety of subjects, and that diversity of interests is reflected in the diversity of contributions to this book, which contains essays by economists and political scientists on a variety of subjects, ranging from city politics to the problem of secession to the economic approach to religion. Hence, the title of this volume: Across Boundaries. In tracing the trajectory of Bob’s research, one sees clearly that much of his later work followed up on areas of early interest. Bob attended Lindsay Place High School near Beaconsfield, Quebec. He entered McGill University and completed a Bachelor of Arts (Hons) in political science and sociology in 1970. He studied at

Introduction

5

the Institut d’études politiques, then finished a Master’s degree in political science at McGill. Bob’s ma thesis was titled “Prospects for Québec Independence: A Study of National Identification in English Canada.” This area of research interest concerning the structure and evolution of Canadian federalism with respect to Canada-Quebec relations became a foundational one. Bob continued his graduate studies at Oxford University, and in 1980, he completed his doctoral dissertation on “Development, Planning and Participation in New Brunswick: 1945–1975.” This study articulated his keen attention to the role of government in economic development and planning, and it signalled his interest in pursuing questions located at the intersection of the fields of politics and economics. It also demonstrated his fondness for examining key policy issues from a provincial perspective and with attention to the jurisdictional prerogatives of Canada’s subnational governments. Some examples of these inquiries: in 1984, Bob collaborated with André Blais and Phillipe Faucher on two notable studies related to federal-provincial aspects of industrial policy and development that were published in the Canadian Journal of Political Science. The first was “La dynamique de l’aide financière directe du gouvernement fédéral à l’industrie manufacturière au Canada,” while the second commentary, “The Concept of Province-Building: A Critique,” exposed the centralizing tendencies of the province-building literature. Bob joined the department of Political Science at Western in 1981. He established deep connections with colleagues there in politics, history, sociology, and economics. When the debate over creating a free trade pact between Canada and the United States rose to the top of the political agenda in the mid-1980s, Bob contributed several thoughtful studies on the agreement’s political economy. As well, his interest in the field of political economy and in public choice approaches to political issues remained steady areas of research activity throughout his career. For example, in 1991, he published a study of “Tectonic Policies and Political Competition” in Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe, eds., The Competitive State, and in 1995, he co-authored a study with André Blais and Miriam Lapp testing whether people vote on the basis of minimax regret. In the wake of the failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown constitutional accords in the early 1990s, which sought to address the future of Quebec’s role in the federation, Bob’s work in the area

6

A. Blais, C. de Clercy, A. Esselment, and R. Wintrobe

of federalism turned to focus on the subject of secession. His first book, The Breakup of Czechoslovakia, was a short, focused study of the dynamics of peaceful secession in a federal state and some of the consequences of this process for the new states of Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The insights generated by this study informed Bob’s magnum opus, The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada, published several months before the October 1995 Quebec independence referendum. In that book, Bob aimed to predict the course of history through carefully analyzing three main issues: the characteristics and constitutional structure of Canada after a Quebec secession; the longerterm future of Canada after Quebec’s secession; and the political and economic relationships that might be established between the two parties in the wake of a peaceful secession. Reviewing the work in April 1995 for the Globe and Mail, the eminent journalist Jeffrey Simpson called Bob’s study “the definitive book on the subject from an English-Canadian writer [which] will be grabbed by anyone involved in secession negotiations should matters ever reach that point.” Bob probed the fallout from the referendum, the implications of the 1997 federal election, and the federal government’s policies to accommodate Quebeckers’ desire for change in another book, titled The Struggle for Quebec. As the passions of the constitutional wars cooled, Bob turned his attention to considering how governments and intergovernmental relationships within the Canadian federation might evolve to meet the demands and pressures of the new century. Working with his colleague at Western, Dr Andrew Sancton, Bob crafted a large-scale research project that was designed to rapidly advance knowledge about a large number of pressing policy issues. In 2004, the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada awarded Bob $2.49 million to accomplish the “Multilevel Governance and Public Policy in Canadian Municipalities” project. The objective of the project was to document what policies exist in a variety of fields and to explain their nature – first, as a function of the intergovernmental relations through which they are shaped, and second, as a function of how various social forces are involved in the policy process. The group of researchers included more than ninety scholars along with a great number of student assistants who explored six policy fields: emergency planning, federal property, municipal image-building, immigrant settlement, infrastructure, and urban Aboriginal policy.

Introduction

7

In one of his final conference papers, given to the 2013 meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association, Bob summarized the project’s findings to date. He concluded that, among other desirable objectives, Canadian municipalities need to have policies that are internally coherent. Larger cities benefit from specialized units devoted to intergovernmental relations, while the effectiveness of smaller municipalities depends heavily on mayoral leadership. Another obstacle to effective multilevel governance is the federal government’s propensity to unilateralism. As noted, Ottawa has no central institution for liaison with the municipal sector as a whole, despite the longstanding efforts of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities. The project’s findings were communicated in a series of seven edited volumes published by McGill-Queen’s University Press, along with many additional journal articles, conference papers, newspaper pieces, media interviews, and unpublished studies. This remains the single largest study of municipal government in Canada ever undertaken, and certainly it has had a large impact on Canadian public policy in a variety of areas. To reflect Bob’s distinguished career and the areas of his scholarly activity, we identified three broad domains: multilevel governance, secession politics, and political economy, subjects that are all firmly established within the study of Canadian politics writ large. We invited a small group of colleagues and associates to contribute work in his honour to this volume. We sincerely appreciate the care and attention the authors demonstrated in crafting their contributions, and we thank them for their patience as the manuscript has taken shape. We have organized the essays into three parts, corresponding to the three broad domains mentioned above. Chapter 2 provides a wonderfully comprehensive analysis of Bob’s major work on multilevel governance in Canada. All three authors – Martin Horak, Andy Sancton, and Allison Bramwell – were invited by Bob to work with him on his major sshrc -funded project. The third chapter, by Tom Courchene, looks at the relationship between the Canadian federal government and the provinces in the context of what he calls Canada’s version of the “Dutch Disease”: that high oil prices drive up our exchange rate and reduce the competitiveness of our manufacturing sector. In addition, in Canada, since energy royalties belong, constitutionally, to the provinces, high

8

A. Blais, C. de Clercy, A. Esselment, and R. Wintrobe

oil prices mean trouble for the equalization formula. Courchene proposes that both these problems could be solved if the energy-rich provinces were to put their energy-associated revenues into provincial sovereign wealth funds (swf s) invested in international markets and draw down annually only the return on these provincial swf s. This would serve not only to significantly temper the operations of the Dutch Disease and its negative impact on manufacturing, but also to stabilize equalization payments and ensure that resource endowments are available for current and future generations. Chapter 4 by Carol Agocs contributes to the pressing need for more research on the connection between the ideational context of municipal governance and concrete policy outcomes. She examines the impact of political ideas and policy preferences on the effectiveness of local government in the City of Toronto. Agoc’s contribution studies the City’s Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy under two mayors with fundamentally different visions of governance: David Miller and Rob Ford. She argues that the mayoralties reflect two different models: the market or “neoliberal” model, and the “citizenship model,” inspired by the work of Jane Jacobs, in which policies are fashioned using democratic participation. A left-leaning politician, Miller’s response to the worsening crisis of gangs, growing poverty, and inequality in Toronto was to invest in, and listen to, the communities on the front lines of these troubles. He led Toronto’s municipal council to invest millions of dollars in social and recreational infrastructure, in tandem with promoting a community safety plan. This plan included emphasizing community policing, hiring 450 more officers, diversifying the police force, and taking a more aggressive approach to gun and gang violence. All these measures have been shown to reduce big-city crime rates. This paradigm of governance was replaced with the market model when Ford was elected mayor in 2010, along with a right-leaning council committed to reducing taxation and cutting costs. The new Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy shifted resources away from neighbourhood-level interventions and toward managerial solutions such as database development, while diminishing the avenues for citizen participation. This chapter’s focus on the connection between ideas about municipal governance and actual policy outcomes is exactly the sort of research Bob thought would help to deepen the local governance research agenda in Canada. The second set of essays focuses specifically on secession politics, Bob’s second major field of scholarly contribution. His good

Introduction

9

friend and colleague Stéphane Dion (chapter 5) considers the legal and strategic characteristics of secession in democracies, aiming to explain exactly why secessionists have never managed to split up a mature democracy. Dion explores the absence of a legal right to unilateral secession in international law, emphasizing that unilateral declarations of independence do not legally oblige the rest of the country to grant and participate in the breakup of the state. He goes on to explain why members of the international community are consistently reluctant to recognize the secessionist declarations of legislatures, such as the Parliament of Catalan’s October 2017 resolution declaring its independence from Spain and the founding of an independent Catalan Republic. Dion notes that secession is difficult to conciliate with democracy partly because if a democratic state sanctions a secession occurring in a different state, then, necessarily, it puts itself at risk in terms of legitimately quashing separatist movements at home. Moreover, the civic solidarity conferred by citizenship is incompatible with the “grave and unusual” exercise of secession, where a country’s inhabitants are required to choose whom to keep as fellow citizens and whom to turn into foreigners. Dion concludes that although Canada is among a handful of democracies that recognize their potential divisibility in law, Canada’s breakup would constitute an unreachable goal if pursued without clarity and the rule of law. The sixth chapter asks whether the economic risk associated with independence has increased or decreased since the 1995 referendum on Quebec sovereignty. Philippe Faucher notes that the chief merit of Bob’s study of the secession of Quebec and the future of Canada was to recognize that the “unthinkable” separation of Quebec should be analyzed and the diversity of possible paths to or from it should be carefully enumerated and evaluated. Noting that Quebec’s economy has not improved over the last thirty-five years, Faucher observes that in the case of a secession today, Quebec would be in no better position than it was in 1995, when the last referendum was held. Turning to consider the role of globalization in post-secession dynamics, Faucher observes that a large amount of post-secession Quebec debt would become foreign debt, thereby considerably increasing the new state’s exposure to financial markets. He concludes the answer is clear: the economic risk has increased. The main reason, according to Faucher, is rising economic globalization. The economy of the province in our time is more vulnerable because

10

A. Blais, C. de Clercy, A. Esselment, and R. Wintrobe

of its exposure to international markets. The verdict is that “given the level of globalization reached, it appears that an independent Quebec would remain a policy-taker.” Faucher’s study in this volume directly builds upon and extends Young’s seminal research. In chapter 7, François Rocher and Nadia Verelli investigate the conditions for peaceful secession. They focus on the first three conditions that were laid out by Bob: (1) secession follows protracted constitutional and political dispute; (2) the seceding state declares its intent to withdraw; and (3) the predecessor state accepts the principle of secession. Rocher and Verelli evaluate, through the systematic analysis of two cases (Scotland and Catalonia), in trademark Bob Young fashion, the merits and limits of that perspective. They conclude that Bob’s approach is both fruitful and capable of being pushed further. In the final chapter of part 2, Michael Keating squarely addresses the self-determination conundrum. He notes that Bob’s work on secession reminds us that the nationalities question returns constantly in new forms. After cogently laying out all the problems that theories of self-determination fail to solve, Keating logically concludes, “If we are faced with a question to which no answer has been discovered in two hundred years, it is probably time to change the question.” Keating approaches nations and nationalism as claims-based conceptualizations. He argues that “the right to self-determination cannot be reduced to a single grid or hierarchy of norms such that there is a determinate outcome in each case. Rather, there is a series of criteria, which may be incommensurate or conflict.” Underscoring the complex, multidimensional, and changeable terrain of secession studies, he concludes that the search for accommodation among communities is rooted in politics and requires expert statecraft. Part 3 of the collection features several essays on political economy. Chapter 9, by Louis Imbeau and Jérôme Couture, reflects Bob’s firm belief that a hypothesis that is repeatedly rejected by empirical tests ought to be firmly discarded. Imbeau and Couture consider the partisan cycle hypothesis (based on Hibbs’s seminal 1977 contribution), which holds that governments of the left create systematically higher fiscal deficits than do governments of the right. This thesis is common among political economists and generally proposes that parties of the right favour low taxes, low inflation, and modest, balanced budgets, while opposing equalization and increases in the inflation rate. In contrast, the hypothesis claims, parties on the political left support equalization, low unemployment, and larger

Introduction

11

budgets featuring less emphasis on budget balance, and they accept higher unemployment more willingly than higher inflation. To test this hypothesis, the authors review the substantial empirical literature and argue that support for the partisan hypothesis is, at best, weak. They look at eighty-two publications reporting a total of 522 statistical tests on the relationship between party ideology and fiscal deficit. Only 25 per cent of these tests were significant and 7 per cent contradicted the hypothesis of a partisan cycle in deficits. The authors then propose a median voter model to make sense of this result. They demonstrate theoretically that governments of the left do not indulge in more fiscal deficit and public debt than do governments of the right, and they show that, in fact, most empirical studies on this issue fail to reject the null hypothesis. Imbeau and Couture firmly conclude that the partisan cycle hypothesis should be laid to rest. Chapter 10, by Ronald Wintrobe, looks at Gandhi’s method of satyagraha (non-violent protest) from an economic or rational choice point of view. The chapter briefly traces the origins and development of satyagraha and then offers an interpretation of it as a rational strategy of communication, dialogue, and trust-building. It suggests some conditions under which satyagraha might be expected to succeed and, most importantly, its particular characteristic flaw, which is its fragility with respect to the free riding problem. The chapter then contrasts this method of non-violent protest with what would appear to be its polar opposite: the methods of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (isis ). Wintrobe shows that the methods of isis are exactly the opposite of Gandhi’s, namely the creation of distrust and fear rather than the building of trust. He suggests a number of reasons that pushed isis ’s leadership to adopt such extreme methods of protest and terror. The chapter also shows, in contrast to standard economic models of conflict, that the ideas or goals of the protagonist (how extreme and how urgent their goals are) shape the choice of violent over more peaceful methods of conflict. Finally, the chapter argues that one feature of isis ’s most infamous and peculiar form of violence is that, as a technique of protest, it is free from the characteristic flaw of Gandhi’s satyagraha (the free rider problem). In turn, the choice of the medium of protest itself both communicates the movement’s goals and affects the nature of the goals themselves. To put a twist on Marshall McLuhan’s famous aphorism, for both Gandhi and isis , “the medium (of protest) is the message.”

12

A. Blais, C. de Clercy, A. Esselment, and R. Wintrobe

Mario Ferrero focuses chapter 11 “on blessing and cursing,” and outlines a political-economy approach to saints and martyrs – people who willingly endure lifelong sacrifice or give their life for a purpose, and who encompass the whole range from holy to evil, thus including religious saints, revolutionary heroes, jihadists, suicide terrorists, rampage shooters, and more. In line with rational approaches to political questions, Ferrero looks for a way to neatly locate the core motivations for the actions of such saints and martyrs. He explains their diverse behaviours in terms of a rational quest for lasting fame or infamy. By infamy he means to signal the accomplishment of deeds that will lodge in the memory of those who will have witnessed their sacrifice and who will keep this memory alive by means of a cult of saints and martyrs. In this approach, the ideological or religious motive, even when present, is both insufficient and unnecessary to explain action. Ferrerro draws upon a wide range of examples from both recent and past history to illustrate the theory. Turning to public policy, Ferrero suggests that an adequate response to incentives that span beyond the grave should be punishment that pursues agents into their very graves: for example, forms of organized cursing to match the supporters’ blessings. However, there are nontrivial free rider problems inherent in this policy. Stan Winer’s chapter 12 concludes the volume with a vigorous defence of majoritarianism compared to the oft-discussed alternative of proportional representation. He acknowledges that the arguments are not new, although they are not well known in the current Canadian context. The majoritarian parliamentary electoral system of Canada has been in existence in the same form since the founding of the modern state in 1867. It has been under attack at various levels of government and in the press periodically over the past two decades or so and has not often been defended. Winer’s basic argument is simple and powerful: with a majoritarian system, it is much easier for voters to “throw the bums out” – get rid of a government they dislike – than it is with any form of proportional representation. The chapters assembled here present an engaging set of essays that neatly reflect the main areas of Bob’s academic interest, his high standards for scholarly work, and his willingness to move beyond traditional disciplinary borders. We thank the authors again sincerely for their fine contributions, and we hope you enjoy this book.

pa rt o n e

Multilevel Governance

2

Bob Young, Big Projects, and the Study of Local and Urban Politics in Canada Martin Horak, Andrew Sancton, and Allison Bramwell

Bob Young did not conduct research in the field of local and urban politics until late in his career. But when he went into the field, he went big. Between 2004 and 2014, he led the Multilevel Governance and Public Policy in Canadian Municipalities (ppm ) project, the largest-ever municipally-focused research enterprise in Canada. The ppm project studied how localized policies in municipalities are shaped by the interaction of various levels of government and social forces. At around the same time, David Wolfe and Meric Gertler, both leading scholars of regional innovation, launched the Innovation Systems Research Network (isrn ), a major collaborative research initiative that investigated the social dynamics shaping economic governance in Canadian urban regions. In this chapter, we review the analytical aims, research agendas, and key findings of each of these research projects. We focus in more detail on the ppm project to highlight Bob’s leading role in this enterprise. We briefly compare the findings of both projects and assess their significance for the study of local and urban politics in Canada. Taken together, the ppm and isrn projects had a significant impact on the field. The projects aligned Canadian work with the international trend toward the study of local and urban governance, as distinct from government; they demonstrated the value of variation-finding work; and they linked the study of local and urban matters to theoretical concerns in other fields of political inquiry. That both the ppm and the isrn projects were led by scholars who did not identify in the first instance as students of local and

16

M. Horak, A. Sancton, and A. Bramwell

urban politics may help to account for their innovative features and their impact on the field. They provided a shot of energy from the outside that has stimulated innovative work on local and urban governance by an emerging generation of Canadian scholars. The lasting impact of these projects on the field illustrates how the intellectual versatility that Bob exemplified throughout his career promotes cross-fertilization across subfields and helps to ensure that they do not stagnate in mutual isolation.

t he p p m p ro j e c t : o r ig in s, uni que features , a n d r e s e a rc h c hallenges After arriving at Western University in 1981, Bob soon established himself as one of Canada’s foremost political scientists. But probably unknown to most of his many academic colleagues and friends outside Western, Bob had become, since the mid-1980s, increasingly interested in municipal government. He played a major role in designing Western’s Master of Public Administration (mpa ), a program aimed at current and prospective municipal managers, which is still running today. Starting in the early 1990s, Bob taught the mpa research methods course. Although the course was a challenge for many, some of the brightest students chose Bob as their research project supervisor, and through them, he began to better understand some of the practical issues in the municipal policy-making environment. By the early 2000s, Bob had decided to do his own research in this field. In 2001, he put together a small team1 of specialists in municipal government and public policy aimed at formulating what would become the massive ppm research project. By 2004, a sshrc grant under the Major Collaborative Research Initiatives program for $2,484,650 had been awarded. In the meantime, in 2003, Bob was awarded a Canada Research Chair in multilevel governance (mlg ). All the pieces had come together for the largest-ever social science research project relating to Canadian municipalities. From the perspective of prior Canadian research, there were at least four innovative or unusual features of the ppm project: 1 It was the first to use the term “multilevel governance” in the Canadian context, although the initial publication funded by the project was more traditionally entitled Federal-ProvincialMunicipal Relations in Canada (Young and Leuprecht 2006).

Big Projects

17

Nevertheless, after briefly explaining mlg in the context of the European Union, the volume’s editors, Young and Leuprecht, claim that mlg “is a useful framework for thinking about many aspects of municipal governments and their relations with other levels of government” (13). They go on to explain that mlg encompasses not just established “levels” of multifunctional governments, but authorities that “are designed around specific functions … (like American special districts or Swiss intercommunal associations), have non-identical voluntary memberships, and are impermanent and flexible” (13). 2 Much of the research for ppm was focused on six policy fields, but they were not the fields that many prior students of “federal-provincial-municipal” relations might have expected. For example, the policy fields did not include housing or homelessness, about which there was already quite an extensive academic literature. They certainly did not include land-use planning and urban development, the mainly local issues that had been the focus of much previous scholarship about municipal policy-making. Each of the six fields that were chosen involved all three levels of Canadian government. They were infrastructure, immigration and settlement, urban Aboriginals, image-building, emergency management, and federal land. The number of Canadian social scientists who had studied any of the last four subjects could easily be counted on the fingers of one hand. 3 Although it is certain that ppm was inspired by the growing emphasis on the economic and social importance of large cities, Bob focused his attention more on municipalities than on cities. In his letter of intent to sshrc , written in 2003, he stated that “[t]his proposal is a reaction to a global increase of scholarly and practical interest in cities, local places generally and municipal governments in particular.” He went on to observe that “[t]here are problems in Canadian municipalities, and not only in the big cities.” Because Bob wanted to treat all provinces equally, the smaller ones and their largest cities (Charlottetown, Saint John, Saint John’s, and Saskatoon) received similar treatment to Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. This might have made perfect sense to a student of Canadian federalism,

18

M. Horak, A. Sancton, and A. Bramwell

but it no doubt puzzled the geographers and urbanists who were enthralled by new writing about “global cities.” Within the planned volumes for the project that related to each policy field, researchers were instructed to investigate even smaller places. Bob was proud of his plans to investigate policymaking in one policy field or another in at least eighty Canadian municipalities. A random example: the volume on image-building contains five pages about how Swan River, Manitoba (population 3,859 in 2006) markets itself to the outside world (Lehr and Zubrycki 2012, 57–61). 4 The research design explicitly included an attempt to assess the quality of the policies that were being studied in each particular place. Social scientists are often queasy about making such assessments, precisely because they claim scientific objectivity. Bob was more methodologically rigorous than most of us, but he did not want ppm to be only of interest to other academics; he wanted it to be relevant and important to policy-makers and citizens generally. In his introduction to Sites of Governance (Young 2012a), Bob explained his criteria for determining the quality of policies. One criterion is speed: was the policy created and implemented in good time, or were there delays? Another concerns the scale of the policy: whether it was adequate to address the problems at hand. A third is the coherence of the policy: were policies logically constructed and did they fit with related policies or work at cross-purposes to them? Other criteria were the more familiar ones of effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. As Bob put it, the last “more normative and contestable” criterion is “whether the problem or issue that the policy was designed to address was defined appropriately at the outset” (19). Early iterations of plans for the ppm project focused exclusively on the kinds of public institutions that are at the heart of the literature on multilevel governance. Everyone involved always understood that the policies advanced by these institutions were influenced in varying ways by different “social forces,” especially at the local level by local business interests. Nevertheless, many of Bob’s initial collaborators urged that the project explicitly analyze the social forces at work across all levels of government in each of the policy fields. Such an

Big Projects

19

approach was eventually adopted, thereby encouraging researchers to go beyond the stated positions of governmental actors and examine more closely why they took the positions that they did. The result was that many of the case studies were richer in content than what had been expected in the project’s initial conception. A corollary, however, was that the researchers’ tasks were more difficult. This leads us to the first of two major challenges faced by the project. The first challenge related to its size and complexity. More than ninety researchers were directly involved, not counting at least as many student research assistants whose work was also financed by the project. Only someone with Bob Young’s vast range of contacts within Canadian social science could possibly have brought the team together. Some of the researchers were experts in at least one of the policy fields under investigation. Others, often geographers or land-use planners, knew a great deal about the planning issues associated with the city they were assigned to write about, but had likely never given any thought to such issues as emergency management or immigrant settlement. The result was that many of the researchers, including some well-established academics, were writing about matters quite outside their comfort zones. Added to this were the normal academic difficulties posed by differing methodological approaches and overloaded personal research agendas. Despite such obstacles, almost the entire original publishing agenda was eventually accomplished.2 Another challenge is more difficult to describe. It was the direct result of the federal elections of 2006 and 2008, the ones that led to Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party of Canada capturing Parliament and the Prime Minister’s Office during much of the time that the ppm project was underway. In May 2003, when ppm was still being conceived, Paul Martin resigned as federal Finance minister after making a speech to the Federation of Canadian Municipalities calling for a “New Deal for Canadian Cities” (Sancton and Young 2004). After a few months crisscrossing the country promoting this new deal, Martin became prime minister in 2003. These were heady days for anyone wanting municipal governments in Canada to gain new respect and attention, not just from their respective provinces but from the federal government as well. It is not a criticism to suggest that Bob wanted to ride this wave. As he had already proven in his prior work on North American free trade (Young 1989) and the politics of Quebec secession (Young and Leuprecht 1995), he

20

M. Horak, A. Sancton, and A. Bramwell

wanted his academic work to make a difference. In the Canadian political context of that time, the framework of multilevel governance was the best way to study municipal policy-making. It was in this environment that ppm was born. During the short-lived Martin government, progress was made on federal recognition of municipal roles in public policy development. A federal ministry of state for infrastructure and communities was established, and the government announced a plan that would lead to municipalities receiving five cents a litre from all funds raised by the federal excise tax on gasoline (Adams and Maslove 2014). These were exactly the kinds of changes that ppm was designed to study, analyze, and publicize. The federal election of 2006 changed everything. The new prime minister, Stephen Harper, was not committed to multilevel governance. His doctrine of “open federalism,” which Bob (2006) analyzed in some detail, made it clear that Harper was a “strict constructivist”: municipalities were provincial responsibilities and Harper’s government would not be dealing directly with them. Federal actions and programs that were within its own spheres of jurisdiction would still be crucially important for municipalities; so would the federal spending power. There was still much for ppm researchers to study. But the prospect that ppm researchers would be on the ground documenting the emergence of a new form of Canadian multilevel governance was largely extinguished as a consequence of the change in government.

k e y f in d in g s o f t h e ppm project In a 2012 paper on the findings of the ppm project, Bob Young noted that “there has been little linkage between research on federalprovincial relations and research on municipal government, and this is the gap that our project aimed to fill” (2012b, 3). By framing research through the new conceptual lens of multilevel governance, the ppm project succeeded in this aim. The project’s focus on several little-studied policy fields, as well as Bob’s insistence that researchers examine municipalities both large and small, produced an extensive body of policy case studies spread across almost a hundred municipalities. Taken together, the cases showed that notwithstanding the constitutional structure of Canadian federalism, multilevel interaction spanning all three levels of government is quite widespread, not only in places and policy fields where we would most expect it –

Big Projects

21

such as big urban infrastructure projects – but in everything from place-marketing initiatives in Humboldt, Saskatchewan (de Clercy and Ferguson 2012) to emergency management in Cape Breton, Nova Scotia (Grieve and Turnbull 2013). The character of multilevel interaction, ppm research found, varies hugely. Among other things, there is a great deal of diversity in terms of dominant actors, the degree of policy and resource coordination across levels of government, and the extent to which multilevel interaction produces policies that respond to local concerns. In other words, there is no clearly dominant pattern of interaction in Canadian multilevel governance. Which actors are dominant in multilevel policy processes and how they are involved varies significantly by policy field. In infrastructure, for example, municipalities typically play a dominant role in designing and implementing projects, but other levels of government provide critical funding and are often able to influence projects this way (Horak 2012, 342–3). Image-building and place-marketing, by contrast, are typically “dominated by local business interests” (Young 2012, 194). In urban Indigenous policy, the federal and (in some cases) provincial governments often work directly with local non-profit organizations, while municipalities play a marginal role (Peters 2011). To some extent, this variation reflects the differing division of jurisdictional responsibilities across policy fields. But resources (both financial and organizational) also matter a great deal; control over resources “allows agents to insert themselves into (or even to dominate) policy processes over which they have no formal jurisdiction” (Horak 2012, 349). This finding applies to both governments and social forces. In the case of the latter, the importance of resources means that local business actors – who are often relatively rich in money, organizational resources, and local political influence – tend to be much more visible and influential in multilevel policy processes than are other local forces (unless they are disinterested, as in the case of urban Indigenous policy). Multilevel governance thus amplifies the dominance of business interests in place-based policy processes (Young 2012b, 10–13; Horak 2012, 356–7). One of the main evaluative criteria used in the ppm research was “effectiveness,” defined simply as achieving intended policy goals. To be effective, multilevel policy-making requires all levels of government to “coordinate their agendas and co-operate in supplying

22

M. Horak, A. Sancton, and A. Bramwell

resources” (Young 2012b, 5). Such coordination, the ppm research found, is far from universal in multilevel interaction, and this is in part due to the lack of partisan integration across levels of government. Connections between federal and provincial political parties are often tenuous, and most municipalities operate without parties. Electoral turnover at any one level of government thus frequently scuttles efforts at multilevel agenda coordination. This problem is more likely to be manageable when municipal political leaders pursue a long-term policy direction and when intergovernmental co-operation among administrators is well-developed (Young 2012b, 5–6). Nonetheless, electoral dynamics remain a major obstacle to effective multilevel governance. Horak (2012, 363) notes that the institutionalization of coordination through tri-level mechanisms such as the Vancouver Agreement or Toronto’s Waterfront Redevelopment Corporation can address this problem, but the ppm case evidence suggests that political leaders are often reluctant to delegate power in this manner. In addition to effectiveness, the ppm research also assessed multilevel governance in terms of its responsiveness to local preferences. We have already discussed the prominence of local business interests, but what of responsiveness to local government priorities? The ability of a municipality to articulate and pursue its own policy priorities, as well as its electoral and economic clout, were important factors here. In this regard, small municipalities often fare worse than large ones, since they lack both intergovernmental clout and autonomous policy capacity, and so (more often than not) they end up as policy-takers, rather than agents in their own right. However, the research also found significant differences among the big city case studies. Here, the results point toward the importance of overall municipal policy orientation. “Minimalist” municipal administrations, focused on providing standard local services at minimal cost, tend to have less influence in multilevel policy processes; “comprehensive” administrations, which are “prepared to expand their traditional role as service providers and to take on activities beyond those allocated to them by provincial governments,” tend to be more influential multilevel players (Young 2012b, 14). Through local case research of unprecedented scope and variety, the ppm project assembled the first comprehensive survey of multilevel governance in Canadian municipalities. Together, the selected findings we have sketched here reveal a country in which multilevel

Big Projects

23

policy interaction plays a major and previously under-acknowledged role in localized policy-making. By the same token, this multilevel interaction rarely produces what Bob called “true multilevel governance” (2012a, 4) – that is, the sustained coordination of power and resources among multiple levels of government and social forces. Indeed, the very shift in federal government in 2006 that profoundly altered the political setting for the ppm research accentuated the overall finding that multilevel governance in the Canadian institutional context is – and is likely to remain – a rather “thin” affair: less institutionalized, less stable, and more beholden to the political dynamics of federalism than its European counterpart (Young 2012b, 13–14).

t h e is r n : in n ovat ion and urban e c o n o m ic g ov ernance Over roughly the same period as the ppm research, the isrn projects, based at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto and co-chaired by David Wolfe and Meric Gertler, also examined the importance of multilevel interaction to local policy outcomes in Canada, but from a different intellectual starting point. With a focus on the technological innovation essential to the growth and vibrancy of urban economies operating in the highly ambiguous and rapidly changing twenty-first-century global environment, the first isrn project privileged local governance networks involving public, private, and civic actors rather than intergovernmental interaction as the primary explanatory factor. Not surprisingly, with its distinct theoretical grounding and research questions that more explicitly explored the role of societal forces in shaping regional economic advantage, the isrn project arrived at different but complementary conclusions. We focus here on a brief summary of project questions and findings relevant to understanding the local dimension of multilevel governance for regional economic transformation in Canada. Clearly, some regional economies outperform others. The ongoing impacts of deindustrialization and economic change continue to illustrate the crucial importance of urban economic vitality not just to national competitiveness, but also to the employment and entrepreneurial opportunities essential to community well-being. Growing awareness of the importance of urban economies to

24

M. Horak, A. Sancton, and A. Bramwell

national competitiveness in a globalizing world has catapulted urban and regional development onto policy and research agendas over the past twenty years. Policy-makers across oecd countries have been experimenting with ways to shape regional growth trajectories while mitigating the negative socio-spatial consequences of innovation-intensive economic activities that privilege those with higher levels of education. Evolving out of traditions in Canadian political economy and economic geography, each of which has historically investigated ways to support endogenous national economic growth, the isrn project set out to explore how these processes unfold in Canada. Based on the widely shared premise that it is beyond the scope of governments alone to confront the complex and accelerating challenges wrought by rapid globalization, the isrn project explicitly brought societal actors “in” to multilevel policy-making, using a neo-institutionalist lens to examine the social dynamics underlying economic performance in urban regions. Wolfe and Gertler presided over two successive sshrc -funded Major Collaborative Research Initiatives, each of which examined different dimensions of urban and regional development in Canada. The first examined how and why technology-intensive clusters develop in certain places, and highlighted the context-specific nature of industrial transformation and knowledge-intensive economic growth in Canadian urban regions. Building on this, the second isrn project investigated the factors that shape regional economic resilience and the ways in which public policies and local governance interact to support strategic economic transformation, human capital formation, and community development. This research was conducted between 2006 and 2011, with the results published between 2014 and 2016 in four edited volumes published by the University of Toronto Press (Wolfe 2014; Grant 2014; Bradford and Bramwell 2014; Wolfe and Gertler 2016). Research in the United States and Europe suggests that in resilient regions, transformation strategies are collectively devised by multiple actors operating within and across levels of governance. Though configurations and policy objectives vary, local governments, the private sector, and the community-based or civic sector in these places collaborate for adaptation to changing economic circumstances by strategically leveraging emerging market opportunities and public policy resources from other levels of government (Katz and Nowak

Big Projects

25

2017; Storper 2013). These dynamics remained under-explored in the Canadian context, inspiring empirical questions about the extent to which these more coordinated and strategic approaches to economic governance were emerging in Canadian city-regions. Through comparative case studies of sixteen small, medium, and large city-regions, isrn researchers tracked networks between federal and provincial public policy-makers and local governmental and societal actors for shaping regional development, and they documented the socioeconomic and socio-spatial implications of these dynamics. The isrn network found that considerable experimentation with new forms of governance is indeed under way at the local level in Canada. Civic associations are forming to identify local issues, formulate new strategies, and tackle both social and economic challenges. For example, Wolfe (2010) finds that cities with development coalitions that have a diverse cross-section of civic stakeholders exhibit higher levels of “civic capital,” which supports collaboration for regional economic growth. However, consistent with other work in urban political economy, isrn researchers also found that civic networks demonstrate social rigidities, which limit urban policy innovation. Important conflicts, trade-offs, and power asymmetries emerge, both within and between jurisdictions (Bramwell 2014). While virtually all the case studies present some evidence of urban policy innovation in the areas of both economic development and community development, along with novel governance arrangements to support these efforts, the nature, scope, and durability of this innovation vary considerably, indicating that some places have higher levels of institutional capacity than others. To capture such variation analytically, Bradford and Bramwell (2014) elaborate a threefold typology – institutionalized collaboratives, sector networks, and project partnerships – the first of which conforms most closely to the collaborative civic networks identified by Wolfe (2010). Involving institutionalized arrangements that regularize interactions among all three levels of government, non-profits, and the private sector to articulate and implement a long-term vision for a city’s social and economic development, the institutional collaboratives type is comparatively rare in Canada, exhibited to some extent in only Toronto, Montreal, Waterloo, and Hamilton. Consistent with Wolfe’s point about rigid networks and narrow interests, Bramwell and Pierre (2017) also find that despite efforts to the contrary,

26

M. Horak, A. Sancton, and A. Bramwell

community-driven forms of governance are often elite-dominated and spark political conflicts among and between elected officials and societal actors over development goals. Other researchers found that some smaller and medium-sized urban centres with limited political and fiscal resources were locked in to more traditional forms of governance, precluding urban policy experimentation (Bradford 2014). The isrn project concluded that the prospects for strategic economic transformation in urban regions depend not just on supportive public policies and favourable markets but also on their underlying social, economic, and institutional structures. Three key isrn takeaways advance our understanding of the urban dimension of multilevel governance. First, political, administrative, and fiscal resources matter, but so does the capacity to coordinate them. The challenge of organizing collectively for long-term planning indicates the need for analytical attention to civic leadership and societal participation, as well as to the institutional structures and deliberative processes involved (see also Emerson and Nabatchi 2015). Second, variation in institutional capacity according to size and economic specialization suggests the value of more nuanced views of private-sector involvement in urban governance. Assumptions about unitary interests in land development and locational incentives belie business participation in urban policy initiatives aimed at both economic and social prosperity (see also Benner and Pastor 2015; Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2014). Finally, the weak overlap of networks for innovation and inclusion in most cases underscores enduring questions about social equity and democratic accountability at the urban level in Canada. The dominant logic of economic development typically operates without regard to these considerations, producing innovation policies – local or otherwise – that overlook the socioeconomic and socio-spatial implications.

t h e p p m a n d is r n projects: a p p roac h e s a n d f in d i ngs compared The intellectual starting points and analytical focuses of the ppm and isrn projects were quite different. The primary conceptual device animating the ppm research was multilevel governance, a contemporary extension of the study of federalism; the analytical focus was on how localized public policies are produced by the interaction of multiple levels of government and local social forces. By contrast,

Big Projects

27

the isrn project was grounded in political economy and economic geography and focused on the development and institutionalization of governance networks involving societal actors alongside formal governmental institutions and policies. In addition, although the research certainly paid attention to multilevel dynamics, the primary scale of focus was the city-region. Despite these differences, the two projects shared a couple of key attributes (beyond the obvious common focus on localized policy concerns). One was the assumption that understanding localized policies in Canada today requires an analytical approach that moves beyond local government itself, and instead focuses on governance – that is, the coordination of authority across institutional boundaries. This in turn made the processes and conditions that underpin coordination (and that shape its success or failure) the overarching analytical focus of both projects. The other was the emphasis on comparative, variation-finding, multi-case research. While the scope of the two projects differed in this regard, with the ppm project including more cases and various policy concerns, both departed from the dominant focus of most local and urban work on single-case research (Taylor and Eidelman 2010). These commonalities in approach at least partly account for the largely complementary, and at times strikingly aligned, findings of the two projects. First, both the ppm and the isrn projects found wide variation in the character of governance processes and outputs. Just as there was no single dominant model of multilevel governance, there was no single model of regional economic governance. Second, both projects found that institutionalization – that is, the development of rules and norms that facilitate and stabilize collective action – was key to coordinated governance, but that institutionalization was difficult and subject to multiple barriers. For example, competing policy priorities at different spatial scales frequently destabilize multilevel coordination mechanisms; as a result, multilevel governance is by no means replacing the formal federal division of authority in Canada, but rather, operates alongside – and is significantly constrained by – this formal division. Finally, both projects found that complex governance processes systematically privilege societal actors with more resources (be these money, expertise, or discursive power) and, as a result, tend to amplify the concerns of economic actors, such as local business elites, and attenuate non-economic concerns.

28

M. Horak, A. Sancton, and A. Bramwell

s t u dy in g u r ba n a n d l o cal governance: t he in t e l l e c t ua l l e g acy of ppm and i s rn While the extent to which the ppm and isrn projects influenced Canadian work on local and urban politics is difficult to measure precisely, their impact is undeniable. Both brought together a large number of established and emerging researchers, forming professional relationships and facilitating intellectual exchange on an unprecedented scale. In the preface to his book The Limits of Boundaries, Andrew Sancton writes that “the influence of the [ppm ] project can be found on almost every page” (2008, xiii). A brief review of recent work by Canadian scholars of local and urban politics clearly shows the imprint of the approach and focus taken in both collaborative research projects. Contemporary research on local political representation and elections necessarily retains a focus on local government institutions (Siemiatycki 2011; McGregor and Spicer 2016; Moore, McGregor, and Stephenson 2017). But contemporary work on localized policy-making, which constitutes the bulk of scholarship, generally focuses on governance, be it across levels of government or across the public-private divide. Key areas of inquiry include explaining variation (across cases or over time) in urban governing arrangements (Horak 2013; Taylor 2014; Lucas 2017); the impact of non-local rules and policies on local policy processes (Moore 2013; Hughes 2013); the conditions that shape the prospects for coordinated governance (Bramwell and Pierre 2017; Bradford 2016; Spicer 2016); and performance and accountability in various governance arrangements (Lyons 2015). While some of this work focuses on qualitative single cases, a significant proportion involves structured comparative case work, both within Canada and beyond (Horak and Dantico 2014). The simultaneous turn toward governance and comparative method in local and urban political scholarship has opened the field to a variety of other scholarly literatures. In addition to multilevel governance work and literature on regional economic governance, Canadian local and urban scholars now engage with literatures ranging from historical institutionalism and the study of institutional collective action to work on environmental governance and geographical writing on state scales. But this opening, while invigorating, also invites an important question: what now holds the study

Big Projects

29

of local and urban politics together in Canada? The number of scholars working in the field is small, which makes the identification of a shared set of intellectual concerns all the more important. Perhaps it is time for another large collaborative research project, but this would require a leader. Those of us who observed Bob Young as he deftly shepherded a large and unruly flock of ppm researchers in pursuit of a common goal know that individuals who can do such work are few and far between. no t e s 1 In addition to Bob Young, the core group comprised Caroline Andrew, Katherine Graham, Harvey Lazar, and Andrew Sancton. 2 Two exceptions were projected volumes on the multilevel governance of infrastructure and on how each of the provincial governments mediated relations between their municipalities and the federal government.

r e f e r e n ce s Adams, Erika, and Allan M. Maslove. 2014. “The Federal Gas Tax Cession: From Advocacy Efforts to Thirteen Signed Agreements.” In Canada in Cities: The Politics and Policy of Federal-Local Governance, edited by Katharine A.H. Graham and Caroline Andrew, 102–30. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press. Benner, Christopher, and Manuel Pastor. 2015. “Whither Resilient Regions? Equity, Growth and Community.” Journal of Urban Affairs 38, no. 1: 5–24. Bradford, Neil. 2014. “Challenge and Change in London: The Social Dynamics of Urban Economic Governance.” In Governing Urban Economies: Innovation and Inclusion in Canadian City-Regions, edited by Neil Bradford and Allison Bramwell, 205–28. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. – 2016. “Ideas and Collaborative Governance: A Discursive Localism Approach.” Urban Affairs Review 52, no. 5: 659–84. Bradford, Neil, and Allison Bramwell, eds. 2014. Governing Urban Economies: Innovation and Inclusion in Canadian City-Regions. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Bramwell, Allison. 2014. “The Politics of Coalition-Building in a Deindustrializing City: Linkages, Leadership, and Agendas in

30

M. Horak, A. Sancton, and A. Bramwell

Hamilton.” In Governing Urban Economies: Innovation and Inclusion in Canadian City-Regions, edited by Neil Bradford and Allison Bramwell, 110–34. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Bramwell, Allison, and Jon Pierre. 2017. “New Community Spaces: Regional Governance in the Public Interest in the Greater Toronto Area.” Urban Affairs Review 53, no. 3: 603–37. de Clercy, Cristine, and Peter A. Ferguson. 2012. “Leadership and Image Building Policy in Four Saskatchewan Municipalities.” In ImageBuilding in Canadian Municipalities, edited by Jean Harvey and Robert Young, 49–91. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press. Dreier, Peter, John Mollenkopf, and Todd Swanstrom. 2014. Place Matters: Metropolitics for the Twenty-First Century, 3rd ed. Lawrence, ks: University of Kansas Press. Emerson, Kirk, and Tina Nabatchi. 2015. Collaborative Governance Regimes. Washington, dc : Georgetown University Press. Grant, Jill, ed. 2014. Seeking Talent for Creative Cities: The Social Dynamics of Innovation. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Grieve, Malcolm, and Lori Turnbull. 2013. “Emergency Planning in Nova Scotia.” In Multilevel Governance and Emergency Management in Canadian Municipalities, edited by Daniel Henstra, 62–90. Montreal, qc, and Kingston, on: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Horak, Martin. 2012. “Conclusion: Understanding Multilevel Governance in Canada’s Cities.” In Sites of Governance: Multilevel Governance and Policy Making in Canada’s Big Cities, edited by Martin Horak and Robert Young, 339–70. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGillQueen’s University Press. – 2013. “State Rescaling in Practice: Urban Governance Reform in Toronto.” Urban Research & Practice 6, no. 3: 311–28. Horak, Martin, and Marilyn Dantico. 2014. “The Limits of Local Redistribution: Neighborhood Regeneration Initiatives in Toronto and Phoenix.” International Journal of Canadian Studies 49: 135–58. Hughes, Sara. 2013. “Authority Structures and Service Reform in Multilevel Urban Governance.” Urban Affairs Review 49, no. 3: 381–407. Katz, Bruce, and Jeremy Nowak. 2017. The New Localism: How Cities Can Thrive in the Age of Populism. Washington, dc : Brookings Institution Press. Lehr, John C., and Karla Zubrycki. 2012. “Image-Building in Manitoba.” In Image-Building in Canadian Municipalities, edited by Jean Harvey

Big Projects

31

and Robert Young, 49–91. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGillQueen’s University Press. Lucas, Jack. 2017. “Patterns of Urban Governance: A Sequence Analysis of Long-Term Institutional Change in Six Canadian Cities.” Journal of Urban Affairs 39, no. 1: 68–90. Lyons, Joseph. 2015. “Conservation Authority Board Composition and Watershed Management in Ontario.” Canadian Public Administration 58, no. 2: 315–32. McGregor, Michael, and Zachary Spicer. 2016. “The Canadian Homevoter: Property Values and Municipal Politics in Canada.” Journal of Urban Affairs 31, no. 1: 123–39. Moore, Aaron. 2013. Planning Politics in Toronto. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Moore, Aaron, Michael McGregor, and Laura B. Stephenson. 2017. “Paying Attention and the Incumbency Effect: Voting Behaviour in the 2014 Toronto Municipal Election.” International Political Science Review 38, no. 1: 85–98. Peters, Evelyn J., ed. 2011. Urban Aboriginal Policy Making in Canadian Municipalities. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press. Sancton, Andrew. 2008. The Limits of Boundaries: Why City-Regions Cannot Be Self-Governing. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGillQueen’s University Press. Sancton, Andrew, and Robert Young. 2003. “Paul Martin and Cities: Show Us the Money.” Policy Options 25, no. 1: 29–34. Siemiatycki, Myer. 2011. “Governing Immigrant City: Immigrant Political Representation in Toronto.” American Behavioral Scientist 55, no. 9: 1214–34. Spicer, Zachary. 2016. The Boundary Bargain: Growth, Development, and the Future of City-County Separation. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press. Storper, Michael. 2013. Keys to the City: How Economics, Institutions, Social Interaction and Politics Shape Development. Princeton, nj : Princeton University Press. Taylor, Zack. 2014. “If Different then Why? Explaining the Divergent Political Development of Canadian and American Local Governance.” International Journal of Canadian Studies 49: 53–79. Taylor, Zack, and Gabriel Eidelman. 2010. “Canadian Political Science and the City: A Limited Engagement.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 43, no. 4: 961–81.

32

M. Horak, A. Sancton, and A. Bramwell

Wolfe, David. 2010. “The Strategic Management of Core Cities: Path Dependency and Economic Adjustment in Resilient Regions.” Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy, and Society 3 (March): 139–52. – , ed. 2014. Innovating in Urban Economies: Economic Transformation in Canadian City-Regions. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Wolfe, David, and Meric Gertler, eds. 2016. Growing Urban Economies: Innovation, Creativity, and Governance in Canadian City-Regions. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Young, Robert. 1989. “Political Scientists, Economists, and the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement.” Canadian Public Policy 15, no. 1: 49–56. – 2006. “Open Federalism and Canadian Municipalities.” In Open Federalism: Interpretations, Significance, edited by Keith Banting, 7–24. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press for the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. – 2012. “Conclusion.” In Image-Building in Canadian Municipalities, edited by Jean Harvey and Robert Young, 167–96. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press. – 2012a. “Introduction: Multilevel Governance and Its Central Research Questions in Canadian Cities.” In Sites of Governance: Multilevel Governance and Policy Making in Canada’s Big Cities, edited by Martin Horak and Robert Young, 3–25. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press. – 2012b. “Multilevel Governance and Public Policy in Canadian Municipalities.” Paper presented to the International Political Science Association, Madrid, 11 July. Young, Robert, and Christian Leuprecht, eds. 1995. The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press. – 2006. Canada: The State of the Federation 2004: Municipal-FederalProvincial Relations in Canada. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press for the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations.

3

Exchange Rates, Energy Royalties, Carbon Pricing, Fiscal Federalism: An Integrative Framework for Equity and Competitiveness Thomas J. Courchene

Bob Young and I were colleagues and close friends while we were both at the University of Western Ontario, a relationship that continued after I left for Queen’s University not only because Bob had a relationship with Queen’s Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, but also because he and his partner, Louise, spent an academic year at Queen’s. While we all knew that Bob was an outstanding scholar and able to work across disciplines (among others, politics, economics, history, public policy, and the breakup of nations), what I found astounding was the sheer range and magnitude of his many published academic articles, conference papers, and invited lectures, literally across the globe. A version of this chapter was presented at a 2016 conference celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of Western’s stand-alone economics department.1 As will be abundantly clear, the thrust of much of the chapter is not likely to find favour with my fellow economists since it embraces policy options that are offside not only with the economics profession and the Bank of Canada (e.g., linking the Canadian dollar to the American dollar), but also with the energy-rich provinces (e.g., proposing sovereign wealth funds). As it happened, Bob was in the audience when I delivered this paper. As a scholar open to both new ideas and different ways of thinking about old ideas, Bob’s view was that it deserved to see the light of published day, especially given its general equilibrium or integrative framework. It is thus a special privilege to have it published in this collection.

34

Thomas J. Courchene

in t ro du c t i on With the Trump administration having taken office in 2016, and especially with the “America first” message emanating from the White House, the role of this chapter is to assess the efficacy of several of Canada’s key socioeconomic policy levers, both in their own right and how they perform in aggregate. To anticipate the findings, not only are some key policy areas found wanting but, in addition, the interplay among these policy areas is problematic, arguably verging on the dysfunctional. As noted in the title, the four policy areas at play are: • • • •

the exchange rate / oil resource revenues nexus; resource revenues and intergenerational stewardship; provincial per capita revenue disparities; and carbon pricing and export-import neutrality.

The role of the ensuing analysis is to rethink and rework these areas within an interactive policy framework, with the goal of increasing their effectiveness both individually and collectively. However, and as already noted, readers will quickly realize that the proposed approaches or frameworks run counter to accepted policy wisdom and practice in Canada.

e n e rg y, e xc h a n g e r at e s , and competi ti venes s Other things being equal, a lower value for the Canadian dollar relative to the American dollar (i.e., a depreciation of the “loonie,” the common name for Canada’s dollar coin) means that more Canadian cents are needed to purchase a US dollar. On the flip side, it also means that depreciation of the Canadian dollar will increase the international competitiveness of Canadian manufacturing. Additionally, the greater is the Canadian value added in the product in question, the more this will be the case. However, if inputs are denominated in US dollars (as are the salaries of the Blue Jays, for example), a depreciation of the loonie will hurt a Canadian company’s competitiveness. But this is a static, or other-things-equal, vision of the impact of the exchange rate on Canadian competitiveness. We need to introduce some dynamics, and we do so by drawing on some recent data. Using data from the first ten years of this century,2 it is easy to see that the relationship is clear and close: the higher the price of oil, the

A Framework for Equity and Competitiveness

35

greater the revenue for Canadian exports (as well as some likely associated foreign investment in our energy sector), with the result that the Canadian dollar appreciates. Given the volatility of the global energy sector, the result is that wide swings in energy prices drive wide swings in our exchange rate. In the process, the upward part of these wide swings tends to clobber Canada’s manufacturing sector. This relationship has come to be referred to as the “Dutch Disease,” so named because the discovery and export of North Sea gas by the Netherlands so appreciated the guilder that the result was to undermine Dutch manufacturing. The amplitude of Canada’s version of the Dutch-Disease-driven exchange rate swings is so wide, and the impact on manufacturing so strong, because our currency area is too small to simultaneously accommodate a world-class energy sector and a global manufacturing sector, especially since they are geographically separate. For example, an upward spike in the price of oil increases the prospects of the energy-rich western region of Canada while hurting manufacturing-intense central Canada. In contrast, an inflow of this magnitude into the US would have little impact on the international value of the American dollar because of the sheer size of the US domestic and international sectors. One solution, then, would be to tie the value of the Canadian dollar to that of the American, or to become part of a North American currency area, both of which I have proposed only to find that my audiences (especially the economics profession) were completely non-receptive. This time around I will come at this issue from a different vantage point. Toward this end, we can look at Canadian and American unit labour costs (ulc s). Let’s express them in US dollars, and set them both at 100 for the year 2002. These relative ulc s can be viewed as a proxy for competitiveness. By 2010, the index of US ulc s fell to roughly 90, whereas the Canadian ulc s rose to almost 170. Much of this deterioration in our ulc s came from appreciation of our exchange rate. However, some of the rise in the Canadian ulc s in US dollars occurred because Canadian ulc s in Canadian dollars also rose. I draw two implications from these observations about the high degree of exchange rate volatility. The first is that given the dramatic deterioration in our competitiveness after 2002 (and even prior to this), it should come as little surprise that there was a corporate exodus to the US, which involved major corporations such as Kellogg’s, Caterpillar, Heinz, ccl, Aerosol, and General Motors. The second implication is

36

Thomas J. Courchene

also worrying. In comparison with the US, Canadians have, among other social assets, medicare, a generous social envelope, an educated and skilled labour force, better and safer schools, and safer neighbourhoods. Yet foreign enterprises desiring to sell into nafta economic space tend to shy away from Canada as a location – arguably, I would assert, because our exchange rate is volatile and the wild swings in Canadian ulcs in US dollars create major challenges for international companies that wish to access the US market from a Canadian location. Moreover, and increasingly importantly, I expect that this degree of exchange rate volatility decreases the likelihood that Canadian-based firms will be invited to become part of global supply chains. Intriguingly, this is also inappropriate policy in terms of the rationale for economic stabilization: Canadian monetary policy is stabilizing the Canadian dollar price of the immobile factor (oil in the ground) and destabilizing the Canadian dollar price of the mobile factor (footloose manufacturing). From an economics perspective, this is clearly perverse. In the current context, with President Donald Trump’s extreme focus on trade balances, a further concern is that our energy-pricedriven floating exchange rate may be met with countervailing measures from Washington. For example, were our exchange rate to depreciate dramatically compared to the US dollar, Trump’s America might well view this as Canada’s attempt to gain a competitive export edge, and he could respond by implementing neutralizing measures. To be sure, this is a political rationale for rethinking our tie of the exchange rate to the price of oil. However, the rationale meshes well with the economic arguments that are the substance of this chapter. Prior to addressing how this competitive challenge arising from volatile energy prices might be alleviated, I want to turn attention to another way that provincial energy revenues complicate the operations of the Canadian federation.

p rov in c ia l p e r c a p ita fi s cal di spari ti es a n d e n e r g y r e venues Table 3.1 presents an overview of provincial per capita revenues for fiscal year 2012–13. Row 1 contains provincial per capita fiscal capacities as measured by the equalization program, and row 2 contains the resulting equalization payments. Since only 50 per cent of energy revenues enter the equalization formula, the remaining 50

1,200

8,290

1,200

12,307

CHT/CST Transfers

Overall Fiscal Capacity

8,344

1,200

7,144

54

1,993

5,097

nb

8,367

1,200

7,167

188

943

6,036

qc

8,298

1,200

7,098

9

249

6,840

on

8,362

1,200

7,162

73

1,368

5,721

mb

11,086

1,200

9,886

1,420

0

8,466

sk

13,930

1,200

12,730

1,379

0

11,351

ab

8,992

1,200

7,792

339

0

7,453

bc

8,709

7,509

7,174

Canada (avg.)

Source: Department of Finance Canada, “Government Expenditure Plan and Main Estimates: 2012–13 Estimates,” 16 December 2011.

8,367

1,200

7,167

7,090

11,107

164

Subtotal (1–4)

2

1,347

5,501

ns

155

2,663

Other 50% of Resource Revenues

2,377

4,711

pe

Offshore Accords

0

8,444

Equalization

Fiscal Capacity

nl

Table 3.1 | The anatomy of provincial finances, 2012–13 ($ per capita)

38

Thomas J. Courchene

per cent appear in row 3, with the Nova Scotia offshore royalties (pursuant to the Offshore Accords) appearing in row 4. The sum of post-equalization total per capita provincial revenues appears in row 5. To these post-equalization revenues, row 6 adds the then$1,200 equal-per-capita Canada Health and Social Transfers (cht and cst ). Row 7 finally presents the overall provincial fiscal capacities. Before focusing in more detail on the implications of the data in row 7, one needs to note that there are long lags in the manner in which equalization payments are calculated. The payments are three-year averages (weighted 50-25-25) lagged two years, with the result that data five years ago have a 25 per cent weight in the formula. Hence, the length of the calculation procedure runs the risk on occasion of the payments ending up being pro-cyclical. The much more relevant observation for the purposes of this chapter is that when energy prices are high (as they were for the period shown in table 3.1), the resource-rich provinces will have per capita revenues well above the all-province average. This is clear from the table. For example, Alberta’s fiscal capacity is roughly $5,500 per capita more than Ontario’s, while Newfoundland and Saskatchewan have per capita fiscal capacities that are roughly $4,000 and $2,800 larger respectively. Intriguingly, at just under $7,100 per capita, Ontario has the lowest per capita fiscal capacity in the table. To be sure, and as already noted, the data in table 3.1 relate to a period of high energy prices. Were energy prices lower, the revenues of the energy-rich provinces would be smaller and the fiscal disparities between the have and have-not provinces would be lower. It is also important to note that the per capita revenues in table 3.1 relate to what the provinces would receive were they taxing or accessing all revenues valued at national standards. The principal implication here is that although Alberta chooses not to levy a sales tax, for the purposes of table 3.1, it is assumed that Alberta is levying one. In other words, table 3.1 measures a province’s fiscal capacity whether or not the province accesses this capacity. More on this later.

re v e n u e t e s t in g t h e canada health a n d c a n a da s o c ia l transfers As part of its approach to addressing income inequality, Ottawa “income tests” most of its transfers, such as Old Age Security, the Guaranteed Income Supplement, and Employment Insurance. Given

A Framework for Equity and Competitiveness

39

the wide per capita revenue disparities across provinces revealed in Table 3.1, why not “revenue test” the $1,200 equal-per-capita Canada Health and Canada Social Transfers (cht /cst ) that appear in Row 6? For example, if a province’s total fiscal capacity (row 5 of table 3.1) is, say, 15 per cent above the national average, then for each additional dollar per capita it has above this threshold, Ottawa would reduce cht /cst to the province by 25 cents per capita. This means that a province would receive no cht /cst if it had a fiscal capacity of $4,800 per capita or more above the 15 per cent threshold. These cht /cst clawbacks would then be distributed to those provinces with per capita revenues below the threshold. This would reduce (modestly) the provincial revenue disparities and would be in line with the spirit of sections 36(1) and 36(2) of the Constitution Act (1982), which affirm governmental commitment to promoting equal opportunity and reducing regional disparities.

p rov in c ia l e n e r g y r e v e nues and tax havens Following up on an earlier point, there is one other issue relating to equalization that merits highlighting, namely that what enters the equalization formula is not a province’s actual revenues but rather its “fiscal capacity” – that is, the revenues that a province could collect if it applied the national average tax rate to all the tax bases. This is particularly relevant to Alberta because, thanks to revenues arising from energy royalties and the energy sector more broadly, Alberta has chosen not to levy a provincial sales tax. Therefore, Alberta’s actual revenues are less than its fiscal capacity listed in row 7 of table 3.1. Arguably, Canada is lucky that Albertans hate sales taxes, because if Alberta introduced a provincial sales tax at, say, Ontario rates, the tax would generate enough revenue that Alberta could dispense entirely with its provincial corporate income tax and still have money to spare! However, our luck on this front may be running out. In a 2013 working paper from the University of Calgary’s School of Public Policy, authors Philip Bazel and Jack Mintz recommended that Alberta should introduce a sales tax (yielding $8 billion) and then “spend” the resulting revenues by increasing the personal exemption under the Alberta income tax system from $17,595 to $57,250. This would mean that a couple earning up to $114,500 would pay no provincial personal income tax. In addition, the authors would also

40

Thomas J. Courchene

reduce the flat Alberta personal income tax rate from 10 per cent to 9 per cent, reduce the Alberta corporate income tax from 10 per cent to 8.43 per cent, and introduce some version of a guaranteed annual income for low-income Albertans. These measures would surely motivate corporate head offices and production plants to locate in or relocate to Alberta. The collapse in the price of oil intervened so that the Bazel-Mintz proposal fell by the wayside. However, as a result of the collapse of oil prices (and the resulting revenue drop), many Albertans may well have recognized the value of a stable revenue base so that the introduction of a sales tax is likely to emerge as a credible option – an option that, along Bazel-Mintz lines, would clearly wreak havoc with interprovincial and perhaps federal-provincial fiscal relations. The story thus far is that both exchange rate volatility and provincial per capita revenue disparities are driven by volatile resource royalties. Given that Canada is unique among federations in that royalties belong, constitutionally, to the provinces, we need to come at the potential issues from a perspective other than direct federal intervention. Enter what I shall call “intergenerational resource stewardship.”

r e s o u rc e roya lti es and in t e r g e n e r at io n a l s tewardshi p Writing in Policy Options / Options politiques (2012; 2013), David Emerson reasons as follows: • Natural resources are long-term assets that belong to Canadians now and into the future. • Governments have a custodial and stewardship responsibility to manage across the generations. • Non-renewable energy and natural resources are long-lived, fixed assets that, when sold and monetized, should be reinvested in ways that will benefit Canadians over the long term. • Pretending that resource revenue is just another form of operating revenue, to be spent on current consumption of public services, is an abrogation of this responsibility. • Provinces pretend that the income statement and the balance sheet are exchangeable: the provinces sell assets and call the proceeds income to be brought into current spending.

A Framework for Equity and Competitiveness

41

One obvious alternative approach in accordance with the Emerson vision would be for the resource-rich provinces to embrace the essence of former Alberta premier Peter Lougheed’s Alberta Heritage Fund and create provincial Sovereign Wealth Funds (swf s).3 And, as is the case with Norway’s swf , these provincial swf s should be invested in international capital markets. These funds should then embrace the Hartwick Rule (named after Queen’s University economist John Hartwick), namely drawing down into provincial consolidated revenue funds each year only the current return on the provincial swf . This will ensure that the sum of energy assets (in the ground and in the provincial swf ) will be preserved across the generations. I now turn to some implications of this approach. Energy Royalties, the Dutch Disease, and Provincial Sovereign Wealth Funds Canada’s current approach is to allow rising energy prices, energy royalties, and foreign energy-driven investments in our energy sector to drive exchange rates. As previously noted, the result is the Dutch Disease and exchange rate volatility, with the manufacturing sector bearing the consequences. However, if the energy-rich provinces were to put their energy-associated revenues into provincial swf s invested in international markets, and they were to draw down annually only the return on these provincial swf s, this would serve not only to significantly temper the operations of the Dutch Disease and its negative impact on manufacturing, but also to ensure that resource endowments are available for current and future generations. To be sure, some expenditure flexibility may be warranted, such as allowing expenditures to reduce provincial debt or to create long-term assets, since these benefit both present and future Canadians. Moreover, the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (cppib ) is likely to help out here. Other things being equal, it makes economic sense for the cppib to buy foreign assets when the Canadian dollar is high (i.e., it has appreciated) and to sell foreign assets when the Canadian dollar is low or depreciated. This will work in tandem with the provincial swf s in reducing the amplitude of exchange rate swings, which in turn will lessen the impact of energy price swings on manufacturing competitiveness.

42

Thomas J. Courchene

Provincial swf s and Equalization This approach to provincial swf s would also substantially ameliorate the per capita provincial revenue disparities in the equalization formula, since royalties would not go into the equalization formula. Rather, the annual return on the swf would go into the formula, since this is what would enter a province’s consolidated revenue fund. Further, in the presence of swf s, the existing degree of resource revenue volatility associated with the equalization would be substantially lessened. In addition, the annual value of the provincial swf s would be rather predictable so that the five-year calculation period for equalization could be shortened, thereby lessening the likelihood that equalization payments would be rising when actual interprovincial per capita revenue disparities were falling, and vice versa. To be sure, in the unlikely event of an uninterrupted series of high energy prices, the swf s could grow to such an extent that they might well create a challenge of their own.

car b o n p r ic in g : f e d e r al or provi nci al? If the resource-rich provinces are allowed to pocket the revenues from a provincial carbon tax in addition to their constitutional right to collect resource royalties, then the resulting overall per capita revenue differentials across provinces may well become far too large for the federation to accommodate and equalize. We need an alternative approach. Beyond this potential challenge, there is a further reason for some federal role in carbon pricing: provinces cannot constitutionally make their carbon taxes export-import neutral, either interprovincially or internationally. For example, the bc carbon tax cannot be applied to goods produced elsewhere, even if these products are from a subsidiary of a bc corporation located outside the province. Far more seriously, a province cannot make its carbon taxes export-import neutral internationally because it cannot constitutionally apply a carbon tax on imports nor rebate the tax on exports. This will put Canadian industry at a competitive disadvantage, especially those industries identified as energy-intensive and trade-exposed (eite industries). Again, we need another option.

A Framework for Equity and Competitiveness

43

A Carbon-Added Tax In a Policy Options / Options politiques article (Courchene and Allan 2008), John Allan and I suggest that the ideal carbon tax would be a carbon-added tax (cat ) that would operate like a value-added tax, like Canada’s gst . The cat would be levied on carbon emissions at each stage of the supply chain, and at each stage, the carbon tax already collected on inputs would be rebated to the producer. Thus, the cumulative carbon tax would be paid by the final consumers. As with the gst , if the product is exported, the accumulated tax at the point of export would be rebated and the carbon tax would be assigned on the carbon content on imports. The result is that the cat would be export- and import-neutral so that taxing carbon emissions would not imperil our eite sectors. Importantly, a cat would be able to tax the greenhouse gases emitted by ocean shipping and assign the tax to the products the ships carry. This is important since just sixteen of the world’s largest tankers produce more sulphur pollution than all of the world’s cars (“Green Finance” 2017). Yet the Paris Agreement ignores ocean shipping’s carbon emissions, with the wholly unacceptable result that, carbon-tax-wise, Germany, China, and others are the same economic distance from the United States as is Windsor, Ontario. While the cat would be a federal tax, the resulting revenues, after collection expenses, should be distributed to the provinces on an equal-per-capita basis since, in principle, climate change affects all Canadians equally no matter where they live. This should make the tax appealing to the provinces as well as to Ottawa. This equalper-capita allocation of carbon tax revenues would be “equalization friendly” in that this approach to carbon pricing would not exacerbate provincial per capita revenue disparities, unlike provincially run programs. If this cat approach is not possible, Ottawa must find another way to ensure export-import neutrality. The provinces should resolutely refuse to go along with a carbon tax that is not export-import neutral since this would impair both their domestic and international competitiveness. If carbon-added taxation is not feasible, then Ottawa must find a way to impose export-import neutrality based on the carbon tax accruing domestically on similar exported or imported products. This may displease the World Trade Organization, but my

44

Thomas J. Courchene

view is that it is not likely to risk the future of the planet. More importantly, some version of export-import carbon neutrality is essential for global carbon taxation. Carbon Sequestration Saskatchewan may be a holdout on carbon pricing because it has devoted considerable money and effort to carbon sequestration, namely capturing co2 and storing it underground. However, logic and fairness require that for each tonne of co2 sequestered, the province would receive the value of the carbon tax – $30 per tonne as assumed in the above analysis. Why Would Either Ottawa or the Provinces Be on Side? I accept that the provinces might not be in favour of my proposal for a cat , but the focus here is why they would adopt the scheme, or at least why they might. On Ottawa’s part, allowing the revenues from carbon pricing to go to the provinces is arguably the only way that the provinces would agree to carbon pricing, since the fallback would be that the provinces would follow bc and mount their own carbon tax regimes that would surely embrace conflicting cross-province incentives and preferences, including the inability to ensure export-import neutrality domestically or internationally. While Ottawa would prefer that it should receive some revenues to offset the impact of carbon pricing on selected societal groups, it would have to satisfy itself that this role too would fall to the provinces. Many of them might want to follow bc ’s approach and make the carbon tax revenue-neutral in aggregate to their citizens. However, Ottawa is not without some bargaining power if the energy-rich provinces attempt to stall the move toward carbon pricing. At one extreme, if the provinces balk at carbon pricing, Ottawa could resort to the courts to assume federal control over carbon pricing by invoking one or more constitutional provisions, such as the peace, order, and good government clause (section 91), the regulation of trade and commerce (section 91(2)), or works for the general advantage of Canadians (section 91(10)). Alternatively, and sure to trigger provincial hostility, the federal government could follow Boadway and Dachis’s (2015) recommendation that it consider removing (or at least reducing) the deductibility

A Framework for Equity and Competitiveness

45

of provincial royalties for resource-based firms when filing their federal corporate income taxes. Provincial royalties are as high as they are precisely because Ottawa allows them as a deduction. This amounts to a direct revenue transfer of taxation from Ottawa to the energy-rich provinces. Given the resource provinces’ privileged status as the only subnational governments anywhere with full control over natural resources, Ottawa’s approach to royalty deductibility is a modern day Canadian version of the proverbial “carrying coals to Newcastle.” Phrased differently, the energy provinces ought to be aware that stonewalling carbon pricing could well be costly.

c o n c l u si on From my perspective, two divergent conclusions flow from the above analysis. My first conclusion is that while there is merit in each of the policy proposals, the macro and efficiency impacts would be significantly enhanced were we to embrace them all. In more detail, the key proposal is the creation of provincial swf s. Were these swf s to be invested in international markets, this would temper the implications of wide swings in the price of oil for the international value of the Canadian dollar. Arguably, this enhanced stability of our exchange rate would make Canada more welcoming as part of the increasingly important global supply chains. Beyond this, provincial swfs would lead to much greater internal fiscal stability in terms not only of the stability of the equalization formula, but also in terms of ameliorating the fiscal challenges associated with collapsing energy prices. Further, the swf s would ensure that resource endowments will be available for current and future generations alike. In addition, a federally run Canada-wide carbon-pricing regime embodying export-import neutrality with the proceeds going to the provinces on an equal per capita basis would seem to be the optimal way to proceed with regard to climate change. Unfortunately, my second conclusion is that I anticipate that none of these proposals is ever likely to be legislated. not e s 1 When I arrived at Western in 1965, economics and sociology were in the same department. Economics became a stand-alone department in 1966. Also worth noting is that the chapter offered here is a reworking and an

46

Thomas J. Courchene

updating of an earlier paper that appeared in Inroads: The Canadian Journal of Opinion (Courchene 2014). 2 These data can be seen in Courchene (2012, 92), figure 2. 3 A sovereign wealth fund is a government- or state-owned investment fund that assists in managing a country’s national savings.

r e f e r e nce s Bazel, Philip, and Jack M. Mintz. 2013. “Enhancing the Alberta Tax Advantage with a Harmonized Sales Tax.” School of Public Policy Publications, University of Calgary 6, no. 29: 1–40. Boadway, Robin, and Benjamin Dachis. 2015. “Drilling Down on Royalties: How Canadian Provinces Can Improve Non-Renewable Resource Taxes.” C.D. Howe Institute, Commentary No. 435: 1–28. Courchene, Thomas J. 2012. “Surplus Recycling and the Canadian Federation: The Horizontal Fiscal Balance Dimension.” In Canada: The State of the Federation, 2012: Regions, Resources, and Resiliency. Edited by Loleen Berdahl, André Juneau, and Carolyn Hughes Tuohy. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press, 71–98. – 2014. “A Modest Proposal for Monetary Policy.” Inroads: The Canadian Journal of Opinion 35: 30–9. Courchene, Thomas J., and John R. Allan. 2008. “Climate Change: The Case for a Carbon Tax/Tariff.” Policy Options / Options politiques (March): 59–64. Emerson, David L. 2012. “Reversing the Curse: Starting with Energy.” Policy Options / Options politiques (February): 53–7. – 2013. “Government Must Regain a Sense of Caring for the Next Generation.” Policy Options / Options politiques (March): 21–3. “Green Finance for Dirty Ships.” 2017. Economist, 11 March.

4

Do Ideas Matter? Competing Models of Municipal Public Administration and Their Influence on Policy and Implementation of a Toronto Social Program Carol Agocs People today want more than citizenship. They want to be involved in decisions whose outcomes affect them. They want participant democracy. Robert Young (1968)

p ro l o gue It is an honour to contribute to this volume recognizing Bob Young’s foundational contributions to research and theory on Canadian urban governance, among other topics. My own thinking is particularly indebted to his analysis of the interdependence of the spheres of politics, public administration, and policy development and implementation, which have too often been treated as specialized silos in research and practice. I also owe homage to Bob’s work on the interdependence of federal, provincial, and local governments and social forces in the development of policy responses to the urban issues of our time, which gave rise to an ambitious and path-breaking research program under his Canada Research Chair in Multilevel Governance at the University of Western Ontario. As a member of Bob’s advisory committee for the research program, I came to appreciate his practical genius in inspiring and guiding collaboration among over eighty scholars and numerous students

48

Carol Agocs

from across Canada as they examined multilevel governance across six policy fields in ten Canadian cities. Bob accomplished the miracle of bringing individual creativity and intellectual power together in a focused culture of productivity, ultimately producing a series of volumes that I believe will influence the practice of public administration and the scholarship of Canadian urban governance for years to come.

in t ro du c t i on Many have argued that the local governance of the future must focus on citizens, respond to their voices, and enable their democratic participation in shaping their communities (e.g., Durose, Greasley, and Richardson 2009). However, the administration of local governments has been influenced primarily by governance approaches that effectively marginalize citizens. What is more, a bureaucratic organizational structure and approach to service delivery dominant in larger municipal governments in the twentieth century remains entrenched today despite criticisms of its limitations in a complex and changing society. Critiques of bureaucracy in public administration gave rise to the dominance of new public management (npm ), inspired by neoliberalism, which took business relationships in the marketplace as a paradigm for local government operations. In turn, critics of npm have advocated for a citizen-centred model that envisions local government not as a machine for efficient service delivery, but as an institution enabling citizens to be involved in making community-level choices in a democratic society (e.g., Denhardt and Denhardt 2015; Mintzberg 1996). While the “citizenship model” has emerged as a theoretical construct, its application in practice has been in small and disjointed steps within a local government structure and culture that remain rooted in the models of the past. This chapter introduces two divergent models of governance and examines how they were reflected in the structure, culture, and administrative practices of a local government program in Toronto. It presents a case study of the City of Toronto’s Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy under two mayors with fundamentally different visions of governance: David Miller (mayor from 1 December 2003 to 30 November 2010), and Rob Ford (mayor from 1 December 2010 to 30 November 2014). Miller was guided by assumptions about the centrality of citizen and resident participation, while Ford represented

Municipal Public Administration

49

a populist incarnation of neoliberal ideology and npm practices. The chapter ends with an epilogue on the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 in the aftermath of Ford’s mayoralty, when John Tory became mayor. The Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy, initiated by Miller, was designed to address a complex and compelling urban issue: the inequality suffered by racialized communities. This chapter explores the question of whether the program he created was altered or derailed under the influence of Ford’s opposing assumptions and ideologies about public administration. Under the leadership of both mayors, the underlying problems of poverty, inequality, and systemic racism addressed by the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy persisted; the rationale for the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy as implemented by Miller did not change. However, the two mayors’ leadership and policy commitments and their ideas about public administration diverged sharply. While Miller was strongly committed to attacking poverty and inequality by means of an ambitious strategy of resident engagement and mobilization of resources through cross-sectoral partnerships, Ford’s primary commitments as mayor were to cut the budget and taxes and to advance subway and development projects. After reviewing the development and implementation of Miller’s Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy, this chapter explores the question of whether, and how, this innovative program was affected when the mayor who created and championed it was replaced by a mayor with antithetical interests and ideas about public administration. This case study addresses, in a microcosm and in a Canadian context (where most municipal elections are officially non-partisan), the question explored in recent research on whether it matters for policy if a municipal government has a Democratic or a Republican mayor, given the constraints involved in local governance. In a study of nearly 1,000 elections in medium and large US cities over the past sixty years in which the Democratic or Republican affiliation of mayoral candidates was known, De Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw (2016) found that “mayoral elections matter for policy in medium and large cities” in both strong mayor and mayor-council systems, whether mayoral elections are partisan or non-partisan. The authors note that their finding contrasts with the prevailing view in the research literature that municipal policy is largely independent of mayors’ political leanings.

50

Carol Agocs

In the Canadian context, Bob Young noted that “ideological and programmatic differences between politicians” influence the policy process. For example, he suggested that political leaders in local governments may differ as to whether their orientation toward governance is minimalist or comprehensive. A mayor who sees the municipal role as limited to the efficient provision of traditional services will be a different kind of leader from one who sees their role as providing an aspirational vision and access to means through which communities can realize their collective goals (Young 2012, 16–17).

con f l ic t in g m o d e l s o f p u bli c admi ni strati on in l o c a l g ov ernment Neoliberal and citizen-focused assumptions about how municipalities should be governed and managed give rise to differing visions, decisions about the content of policy and programs, and ways of allocating government resources. Neoliberalism has been defined as “a theory and practice of running the economy in a way that frees markets from state and bureaucratic control” (Boudreau, Keil, and Young 2009, 25). The practice of neoliberal ideology, in the form of a managerial approach referred to as npm in the language of public administration, advocates reducing the size of government and its cost to taxpayers by delivering a limited menu of services and shifting service delivery from the municipality to the private or not-for-profit sectors (e.g., Osborne and Gaebler 1992). A core npm belief is that local government should be run like a business and should maintain a business-friendly environment that encourages growth, especially property development, which produces revenue for the city, thus keeping taxes low. Many features of npm have become prominent at the local level in Canada (Tindal et al. 2013, 333). In the neoliberal lexicon, the language of “customer” or “consumer” is often used to refer to citizens and residents. These terms reflect an assumption, rooted in public choice theory in economics, that residents are individuals maximizing their private economic interests and convenience rather than members of communities and neighbourhoods who share a public interest and have rights to participate in governance (Mintzberg 1996). In the world of npm , the role of citizens is largely limited to voting, paying taxes and fees for services, and perhaps responding to occasional citizen satisfaction

Municipal Public Administration

51

surveys. For convenience, below I refer to npm ideas and practices as the “market model.” In contrast, I use “citizenship model” as shorthand for a paradigm of governance that puts the needs of citizens, as articulated through processes of democratic participation, at the centre of local government policy and programs. Ideas about citizen-focused governance are contained in a large literature dating back to the 1960s on topics of community organizing and planning, such as Jane Jacobs’s influential work, theories about democratic participation (e.g., Pateman 1970; Fung 2006), and work by Richard Florida (2009; 2012) and others who assume that a diverse and liveable city that engages residents and visitors will attract investment and create economic and cultural vitality for all. This paradigm envelops approaches to public administration that enable citizens or residents to be involved beyond voting, to exercise influence, and even to be decision-makers in their neighbourhoods, communities, and cities (e.g., Nalbandian 1999). The citizenship model proposes that there is a shared public interest in liveable neighbourhoods and vibrant communities, and working on behalf of this public interest is the core mission of public servants. The citizenship model assumes that government is different from the private sector and requires methods of governance and administration attuned to government’s central responsibilities to promote democracy, public discourse, and the public interest. This is achieved by making investments in people and communities to build capacity for democratic participation in decisions concerning local community issues such as development, infrastructure, environmental sustainability, and community programs and services. Members of the public are considered active citizens with rights as well as responsibilities, not just passive consumers. Janet V. Denhardt and Robert Denhardt (2015, xi) proposed that “public servants do not deliver customer service; they deliver democracy.” They argue that public administration should be guided by an ethic of public service and dedication to citizen involvement in meeting the diverse needs of communities and neighbourhoods. The task of public administration goes beyond using technical and managerial expertise to deliver public services; it also involves working with communities and stakeholders to ensure good governance. As Bob Young and Andrew Sancton pointed out, “if … municipal government is about making collective choices that represent the will

52

Carol Agocs

of a community about its future direction, then a solid democratic foundation for those decisions is essential” (2009, 44). The influence of citizen-focused governance ideas has increased in recent years in the administration of some local governments, in part due to legislated and regulatory requirements and permissive measures enacted by provincial governments (Tindal et al. 2013, ch. 10). The result has been a burgeoning of arrangements that invite the public and a range of stakeholder groups to be informed of, and have a voice in, decisions of local governments. This has not diminished the power of corporate interests, particularly developers, nor the influence of neoliberalism. Whether participatory processes have opened opportunities for people who are poor and powerless to have influence is unclear; citizens who use participatory processes to exercise influence are typically middle- and upper-class homeowners, businesspeople, and professionals. Weaver (2018, 234) notes that “neoliberal ideas, institutions, and policy frameworks continue to dominate urban governance.” However, while controversy thrives about the extent to which citizen participation initiatives actually empower citizens or are just window dressing, their proliferation has provided something of a counterweight and a broader agenda and arena for decision-making. The interesting point about Toronto’s Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy as designed during the Miller mayoralty is that the strategy was intended to involve residents of poor neighbourhoods in decision-making, and it created structures and processes to encourage this. Resident involvement clearly occurred, and it made a difference in the priority neighbourhoods. For these reasons, the strategy is an example worthy of study. In this case, and others involving similar Canadian communities that are home to many newcomers, the citizenship model must be understood as inclusive of residents who are not Canadian citizens but who are integral participants in civic life.

davi d m il l e r a n d ro b f o rd: two mayors, two con f l ic t in g id e o l o g ie s of governance Toronto’s Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy was initiated by Mayor David Miller, a city councillor in post-amalgamation Toronto. He was first elected mayor in 2003 and was re-elected in 2006, when he received 57 per cent of the vote. He served until 2010 and declined to run for a third term. Miller ran on a left-leaning platform of

Municipal Public Administration

53

change envisioned as more powers and financial support for Toronto (wrested from the provincial and federal governments), environmental sustainability, and responsiveness to citizens. While Miller, with support from City Council, advocated citizen participation and influence on local government policy, he governed within a pre-existing structure of neoliberal policies and practices that had become normalized. It might be fitting to characterize his approach to governance as progressive neoliberalism, although his values reflected those of the citizenship model. Under Miller, “Toronto re-emerged as a progressive city with a neoliberal twist”; he represented a “synthesis of reformist ideas implemented with neoliberal tools” (Boudreau, Keil, and Young 2009, 37, 199). Miller began his first term with an extensive series of open community consultations from which he took policy guidance on issues facing Toronto. He carried on the practice of using partnerships between the City and private- and non-profit-sector organizations to deliver services, and he used non-elected citizen commissions and organizations such as the Toronto City Summit Alliance as vehicles for developing consensus around policy development (Boudreau, Keil, and Young 2009, 50–1). Among the accomplishments of Miller’s mayoralty, working through Council, were attaining new legal powers and financing tools for Toronto (in the City of Toronto Act1); funding agreements with the federal and provincial governments for affordable housing and transit; sustainability initiatives; and a revised official plan and zoning bylaw. Miller also appointed Toronto’s first integrity commissioner and established a lobbyist register. To boost revenues for the city, he used new powers in the City of Toronto Act to introduce taxes on land transfers and vehicle registrations over strong opposition from Council. Perhaps the most innovative initiatives under his leadership were the Tower Renewal Program, designed to revitalize Toronto’s crumbling concrete-slab apartment buildings where many people with low incomes were concentrated, and the creation of the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (Keenan 2013, 95–6). Miller’s service as mayor was followed by that of Rob Ford, who was elected for a four-year term in 2010. Ford was previously a city councillor for Etobicoke North, a pre-amalgamation suburb of Toronto, for ten years, during which time he developed a loyal following and a sizable base of citizens whom he had assisted and with whom he maintained contact. Ford’s campaign and political

54

Carol Agocs

style combined right-wing populism with appeals for small and efficient government (Perrella, Kiss, and Spicer 2018, 3). His electoral promises included repealing Miller’s vehicle registration and land transfer taxes, cutting the size of City Council in half, taking on the labour unions, and making transit an essential service (which would remove the right to strike from transit workers). He appealed to suburban voters by promising an end to what he considered to be “the war on the car,” represented by measures to encourage travel by bicycle, streetcars, and other surface transit. With a call to “stop the gravy train,” Ford campaigned against “waste” at City Hall, code for expenditures on administrative staff and operations. He received little support from downtown voters, business leaders, or professionals, but because he had strong backing in pre-amalgamation inner suburbs, he received 46 per cent of the vote – a “convincing win” in an election in which voter turnout was high (Sancton 2011, 244). Many of Ford’s suburban supporters, whom he labelled “Ford Nation,” included middle-class homeowners, commuters who used cars, people with low incomes who were relatively recent immigrants, non-unionized private-sector workers, and those struggling with financial insecurity due to rising costs in a recessionary time (Isin 1998; Perella et al. 2018). Ford was able to connect with their anger and alienation despite his own privileged background as part of a powerful political and business family. He projected an image of being an outsider to the downtown “elites,” similar to the experience of the voters he appealed to. But rather than seeking community involvement, Ford tended to make decisions unilaterally and cultivate relationships with individual constituents, whom he encouraged to contact him personally about their problems. This political style conforms to analyses of the hallmarks of populism, a movement that includes rhetorical opposition to established political power structures, and clientelism, involving narratives of personal and mass connections with the public in which benefits are exchanged for political support with little citizen input into decision-making. Weyland argues that populism is best understood as an opportunistic political strategy intended to build and maintain the leader’s personal power, rather than to implement a platform, advance an ideology, or build an organization (Barr 2009; Weyland 2017). “Large, brash, and uncouth, Ford engaged in behavior and made utterances that would have sunk a traditional politician, but that appeared to enhance his standing with his core supporters”

Municipal Public Administration

55

(Kohler 2016, 2). His electoral win secured council support for some of his proposals for Toronto until publicity about his scandalous personal behaviour finally ended that support and Council stripped him of many of his mayoral powers (Doolittle 2014a). Ford’s ideas about governance were a populist incarnation of simplified neoliberal canards, including an aversion to government itself and to the elected and administrative people who make it work; a devaluing of public services; antipathy toward unions, “elites,” and “special interests”; and advocacy for “taxpayers,” “business,” and privatization of services. Under Ford’s leadership, Toronto contracted out some garbage collection, cut the City’s budget and some staff and community services, and pushed transit planning toward subways and away from the rapid transit plan envisioned by Miller (Sancton 2011, 246, 242). In this case study of Toronto’s Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy, we see the sequential leadership styles of two mayors, one operating from assumptions of a citizenship approach to governance, albeit within a structure of managerial neoliberalism, and the other from the standpoint of populist neoliberalism. These contrasting perspectives constructed divergent ways of defining values, voice, and choice in the administration of the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy. Once elected mayor, their political ideologies and appeals found expression in their decisions about public administration. Miller’s response to the crisis of guns and gangs, and growing poverty and inequality in Toronto, was to invest in and listen to communities on the front lines of these troubles. He made use of the deep social policy expertise within the Toronto public service and in his own extensive network in the private, not-for-profit, and government sectors (Good 2009). In contrast, Ford’s response was to drive budget cuts through Council while communicating disrespect for public servants and the community-level work they had been doing and disinterest in community needs or viewpoints beyond keeping taxes low.

t h e s t ro n g n e ig h b o u r hoods strategy: t h e m il l e r years The Miller and Ford mayoralties occurred at a time of growing diversity as immigration proceeded, accompanied by deepening inequality that was reflected in the growing concentration of poverty and racial inequality in the inner suburbs of Toronto. There was

56

Carol Agocs

polarization between high- and middle-income neighbourhoods and low-income neighbourhoods, the latter of which made up 53 per cent of neighbourhoods in 2005 (Hulchanski 2007; Paperny 2010). Toronto was a city of 2.5 million people, 43 per cent of whom were members of visible minorities (Hulchanski 2007, 20). In 2004–05, during Miller’s first mandate, there were a startling number of shooting deaths in Toronto, a matter that carried great political weight. Most shooters and most victims were young Black men (Black 2012; McMurtry and Curling 2008). However, a victim who became the centre of media attention was a fifteen-year-old white girl, Jane Creba, who was fatally shot while shopping with her family near the Eaton Centre in downtown Toronto on Boxing Day 2005. Creba and six others who were also shot were bystanders caught in crossfire between young men whose argument spiralled into gunfire (Jones 2010). Following this violent incident, demands for government action grew and pressures for vigorous police response were strong. Spokespersons for community groups and youth, as well as religious leaders and academics, called for solutions that would go beyond law-and-order responses to attack the root causes of the situation – poverty and lack of opportunity, systemic racism, concentration of disadvantage in certain neighbourhoods, and criminalization of minority youth (McMurtry and Curling 2008). Miller responded to the developing crisis of gun violence in 2004 with the mayor’s community safety plan, which was intended to balance tougher law enforcement with an attack on the root causes of crime.2 The plan, which was approved by Council, included an emphasis on community policing, the hiring of 450 more officers, a more diverse police force, and a more aggressive approach to gun and gang violence. Miller’s plan also called for opportunities for youth, focusing on investments in thirteen priority neighbourhoods identified as having high levels of poverty and low levels of city services. Miller explained that these neighbourhoods required “focused attention and targeting of resources,” noting that they were “strong, resilient communities where residents and community groups are actively working to improve the quality of life.”3 To assist the youth, neighbourhood action plans would be developed “in collaboration with residents, community leaders and local agencies.”4 The plans would include programs and services to combat gun and gang involvement and initiatives to improve economic opportunities and community services for residents. These would be developed

Municipal Public Administration

57

through partnerships with businesses, educational institutions, and labour and community groups to create job and educational opportunities, training, and apprenticeships for youth.5 Council approved a $13 million6 investment over four years in social and recreational infrastructure in the at-risk neighbourhoods, which leveraged $25 million from private donors.7 Council also endorsed a new “Strong Neighbourhoods Task Force,” jointly led by the City; the Toronto City Summit Alliance, composed of civic and business leaders; and the United Way. The task force recommended that actions be implemented through financing agreements with the federal and provincial governments and through partnerships with community organizations (Strong Neighbourhoods Task Force 2005). It also developed a set of quantitative measures used to identify the neighbourhoods requiring targeted investments (McMurtry and Curling 2008). The thirteen identified neighbourhoods had many needs linked to the geographical concentration of poverty and inadequate access to services. The intent of the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy was to stop the cycle of neighbourhood decline. A central tenet was that “community safety is not just the absence of crime, but the presence of equity and opportunity for all residents” (Nann 2010). Toronto’s strategy learned from the successes of place-based neighbourhood renewal programs in the United Kingdom (McMurtry and Curling 2008). To deliver the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy, the City organized a cross-functional neighbourhood action team in each of the thirteen priority neighbourhoods. Each team was composed of city staff drawn from a cross-section of functions and agencies, including economic development, children’s services, culture, facilities and real estate, parks and recreation, property standards, shelter support and housing, finance administration, social services, Toronto Community Housing, Toronto Public Health, Toronto Police Services, Toronto Public Library, and Toronto District School Board.8 Council approved the assignment of twelve community development officers from the community development unit to work with city staff, community residents, and partners in the priority neighbourhoods (Weile 2012, 34). The task of the neighbourhood action teams was to coordinate integrated, place-based planning and delivery of city services in the priority neighbourhoods and to develop partnerships with organizations external to the City that could provide additional investments

58

Carol Agocs

and services in each neighbourhood (Matthews 2008). A core idea was that residents would be at the table to identify local needs and priorities and collaborate with other partners to see that neighbourhood needs were met.9 The entire project was coordinated by an interdivisional directors committee with representation from all participating city divisions and other agencies (Corke 2006).10 In phase two of the strategy, the neighbourhood action teams transitioned into “Neighbourhood Action Partnership Committees” representing city departments, agencies, and boards as well as the private sector, community funders and service providers, residents’ organizations, faith groups, and residents, including youth. These committees were expected to identify community strengths and assets, needs, and priorities and develop plans and projects, secure resources, and monitor implementation. In 2007, the City created the Partnership Opportunity Legacy Fund to spark investments in new and enhanced infrastructure projects. As of September 2008, new investments totalling $88 million were made in priority neighbourhoods in addition to $16 million invested by United Way. There were also two large-scale housing revitalization projects to create mixed-income communities. By the fall of 2010, partner organizations had invested $1.90 for every dollar invested by the City in twenty-six community infrastructure projects (Nann 2010). The City’s costs for staffing the neighbourhood services program were spread across its divisions and agencies; little new city funding was allocated. The program initially emphasized creating increased economic opportunities and building capacity for racialized youth.11 But it soon took on a holistic approach, recognizing that youth are embedded in families and communities who must participate in and benefit from the program’s projects.12 In 2010, the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy reported the following projects developed through partnerships (Campbell 2009):13 • training and employment of youth in the construction of infrastructure; • twenty-six new and retrofit capital projects at varying scales, including playgrounds, thirteen multi-service hubs to house a mix of service providers, a cricket pitch, a basketball court, and conversion of a former gun club into a multi-purpose youth space;

Municipal Public Administration

59

• additional youth employment opportunities developed by the City and partner organizations in the private and public sectors; • employment skills training by community college partners; • job fairs and employment support for youth; • an ibm -sponsored employment and community building project; • a media centre providing free access to digital arts training for youth through a partnership between the City and Microsoft Corporation; • a youth entrepreneurship program; • elimination of city recreation user fees for children and youth in at-risk communities; • neighbourhood youth councils in twelve priority neighbourhoods; • youth meeting spaces and outreach provided by library services; • a community crisis response program to enhance community members’ capacity to deal with incidents, including crime and violence; and • a collaborative program between Toronto Police and the provincial Community Safety Secretariat to provide services to gang members and identify ways they could be re-integrated into the community as positive leaders. Toronto’s place-based work prior to 2012 “launched over 1,200 initiatives, reached more than 50,000 youth and 38,000 other residents, and left a legacy of much needed community facilities and strong partnerships that will continue to benefit neighbourhood residents over time.”14 Despite these notable accomplishments, Toronto staff who worked on the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy have said that there were issues and problems. Staff resources were inadequate, and lack of dedicated staff for the strategy and staff turnover limited the consistency of points of contact with neighbourhoods. There was competition among community development officers for resources, and anxiety over a sense that staff jobs depended on how much money they could bring in to support partnerships in the neighbourhoods. The pot of city money was small and some neighbourhoods got more than others, not always on the basis of need or evidence. It

60

Carol Agocs

was hard to establish partnerships, and contracting was not used to ensure implementation.15 There was no formal evaluation of the program and a monitoring plan was not included at the start. However, a consultation report on the accomplishments and challenges of the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy was compiled from a 2011 survey, focus groups with participants (including residents, service providers, and staff involved in the neighbourhood partnerships), and meetings with councillors and key institutional partners. While not a formal evaluation, the anecdotal report provides details about the strengths and weaknesses of community engagement, capacity-building, outcomes, and other dimensions of the program as a guide to considerations for future programming.16 The Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy under Miller had several distinguishing features that accord with the citizenship model of public administration. “Miller always called the program one of his ‘core values’” (Keenan 2013). There was a conviction that investing in impoverished neighbourhoods and building their capacity was in the interest of the city as a whole, and staff shared a strong public service commitment that animated their work. The diversity of Toronto’s population had long been viewed as a positive asset, an idea captured in the City’s slogan, adopted in 1998, “Diversity Our Strength.” The city engaged citizens in planning and decision-making at the neighbourhood level, invested in community development, and established partnerships with a variety of public- and private-sector organizations. The program’s strategy was implemented through cross-functional collaboration among city departments and agencies, and staff who were community development officers were to some extent empowered to act on community priorities. City staff in community and social services had the experience, expertise, and community networks essential to make the strategy work. What they needed, however, were the resources, political will, and time for the program to develop and prove itself. The limited commitment of new investments in the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy by the municipal, provincial, and federal governments was a major impediment to the strategy’s success and longevity. The City’s initial capital investment was $13 million, and existing city resources were intended to be used for program implementation (Doolittle 2014b). The program was rolled out against the background of the 2008–09 recession, which resulted

Municipal Public Administration

61

in financial pressures and constraints on program spending for the city and provincial governments. Federal assistance was not forthcoming after the Conservatives defeated the Liberal government in 2006, and short-term provincial funding of $50 million was targeted to the support of policing and youth programs (Horak and Moore 2015, 200–1). Finally, Rob Ford’s replacement of Miller as mayor brought a hiatus to the innovative, place-based community engagement and investment program that was embodied in Miller’s Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy.

t h e s t ro n g n e ig h b o urhoods program w it h o u t a c h a m p io n : the ford years In 2010, Rob Ford and a new right-leaning council were elected to lead the city. The 2008–09 recession shocked Toronto with unemployment rates of 9.4 per cent in 2009 and 9.1 per cent in 2010; part-time and contingent work grew while regular full-time work contracted (Hennessy and Stanford 2013). Reflecting economic anxiety, pre-election debates centred on cutting the cost of municipal government; complex issues of poverty, precariousness, and socioeconomic polarization were neglected.17 As Keenan (2013, 120) observed, “In the sprawling, isolated neighbourhoods of the suburbs, people rich and poor chose Ford. Every single polling station in every single priority neighbourhood showed a win for Ford on election day.” Keenan’s interpretation of this outcome is that City Hall seemed far away to people in these neighbourhoods, most of whom had probably not been directly touched by the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy. But they had heard Ford’s messages about “stopping the gravy train” at City Hall, and they heard his warnings about garbage and transit strikes, new taxes, and threats to the hegemony of cars on Toronto’s streets while their needs for transit remained unmet (Keenan 2013, 121–2). Ford’s pitch to voters fell on receptive ears. The requirement of Canadian citizenship as a prerequisite for voting in Toronto municipal elections may also have played a role, since the priority neighbourhoods were home to many immigrants. In his post-election budget, Ford proposed the cuts that he had promised following a core service review, service efficiency studies, and a user fee review by kpmg . Ford expected the kpmg review to identify immediate cost reductions in the form of staff cuts and cuts to operating and capital budgets for human services; however,

62

Carol Agocs

the kpmg review ranked 90 per cent of city services as core.18 Nonetheless, Ford directed city departments to cut their budgets by 10 per cent (Block 2011, 5), and Council approved a voluntary separation program for city staff for which 1,100 staff applied. City asset sales, a tax freeze, and increased user fees also ensued (Fanelli 2016, 52–4). These actions reduced the size of government but also reduced its revenues and mobilized community opposition. In January 2012, the Council’s executive committee, whose members had been hand-picked by Mayor Ford, approved a budget proposing substantial cuts to service funding and increases in user fees.19 At the following special meeting of Toronto City Council, the proposed budget was approved unanimously. However, the minutes of the meeting report that numerous emails, surveys, and petitions were presented containing thousands of citizens’ signatures urging the continuation of threatened services and expressing opposition to cuts and user fees, messages that followed a succession of public deputations at earlier meetings. The public’s advocacy provoked a response from ward councillors. At the council meeting, Councillor Josh Colle, with the support of a coalition of progressive and centrist councillors and a couple of conservatives, proposed an amendment to rescue budgets for children’s services; youth programs run by Parks, Forestry, and Recreation; the Toronto Transit Commission; homeless shelters; and other services. Some of these were related to the priority neighbourhoods, where the amendment restored funds for youth programs and turned back user fees. Colle’s motion was approved by a vote of twenty-three to twenty-one. The councillors who voted against the motion included the members of Ford’s executive committee. This revolt by Council upset Ford’s fiscal plan. The motion was followed by a series of additional successful motions to reverse cuts or provide operational funding for services, including arenas, pools, homeless shelters, and grants to community organizations and immigrant women’s health,20 ultimately reversing $20 million in cuts proposed by Ford (Moloney and Rider 2012). Ford claimed victory because the 2012 budget still reduced spending compared to 2011 and would result in staff cuts. However, this was a political defeat from which Ford’s leadership and plan for Toronto never recovered, and a victory for Toronto’s neighbourhoods and the members of the public and Toronto City Council who stood up for them.

Municipal Public Administration

63

Meanwhile the priority neighbourhoods program created under David Miller’s leadership was not without challenge. In June 2011, the City’s Community Development and Recreation Committee, which reported to Council on the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy, considered a letter submitted by Councillor Vincent Crisanti, a Ford ally, which asserted that “the designation of ‘priority neighbourhoods’ has … added to the stigma of these communities, is prejudicial and divides Torontonians.” The letter recommended that the Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy be reviewed and updated, and that in future, the strategy should “allow for more targeted investments to any and all Toronto neighbourhoods depending on the specific conditions, assets and needs of each neighbourhood.” In turn, the committee recommended that the executive director of Social Development, Finance and Administration, which oversaw implementation of the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy, prepare a report that included recommendations on “how to better serve and invest in all neighbourhoods with identified needs,” changes to designations of neighbourhoods, and a “city-wide approach to monitoring neighbourhood health, safety and well-being across all Toronto neighbourhoods as part of a Community Partnership Strategy, with a focus on fostering economic and employment opportunities whenever possible.”21 The committee was chaired by Giorgio Mammoliti, a Ford ally and member of the executive committee, but the other five committee members typically voted in a progressive direction. As a follow-up, the committee heard a staff presentation on “Well-Being Toronto,” a new web-based mapping, measurement, and monitoring tool for data on all of Toronto’s neighbourhoods. The database was designed to assist the public, staff, and Council in using a place-based perspective to monitor well-being across all neighbourhoods. It had been developed with several academic and community partners and served as the support system for a new incarnation of Toronto’s Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy. The database became the focus of work on Toronto’s place-based strategy through 2012 and 2013. On 5 March 2012, Council approved a new program entitled the “Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020” (tsns 2020) with no funding or implementation commitments.22 The goal of the new incarnation of the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy was reframed: citing Crisanti’s letter, the program was to “advance equitable outcomes for all neighbourhoods” rather than focusing on addressing

64

Carol Agocs

the specific needs, discussed earlier, that had been identified in the thirteen priority neighbourhoods. The tsns 2020 was based on the new mapping tool for reporting and monitoring data on Toronto’s 140 social planning neighbourhoods. Neighbourhood improvement areas (nia s) were identified for “targeted investments” to create “equitable opportunities for residents required to advance equitable outcomes for neighbourhoods.”23 Initially, the thirteen priority neighbourhoods were included among the nia s, but later some of these were transitioned out of the program because they did not meet the new criteria. The City was to work with United Way on a plan to engage “a wide array of private, public and community funders in the development of nia s” and to work with federal, provincial, and regional funding priorities. With regard to community engagement, the tsns 2020 contained only a general statement that “local residents, businesses and community-based organizations and groups will be engaged in planning the social and economic development of the nias,” with no specifics about how this would be done, the role (if any) of staff community development experts, or the part that engagement would play in the planning and implementation of the strategy.24 City resources for the implementation of projects in the neighbourhoods were not allocated. Ford appeared to have no interest in the new strategy; his priorities were cost-cutting and transit. He voted against accepting $350,000 from the federal government for a gang prevention program,25 and he cast the only vote in Council against 214 community service partnership grants worth more than $13 million.26 Although the terms of reference for tsns 2020 did not specifically refer to Toronto’s need for neighbourhood-level interventions to address poverty, systemic racism, and lack of supports for youth, the urgency of the need continued to grow. On 17 July 2012, there was a shocking incident in an impoverished neighbourhood on Danzig Street: twenty-five residents were shot in an exchange of gunfire among members of teenaged gangs during a community barbecue for children. Two of the victims, who were young bystanders, died (Yang et al. 2012). In response, Bill Blair, Toronto’s police chief since 2005, advocated continued investment in social programs, particularly employment opportunities for youth in the priority neighbourhoods, alongside an increased police presence in high crime areas to help residents to feel safer in public space (Mills 2012). The

Municipal Public Administration

65

enhanced police presence in neighbourhoods focused on building relationships with residents, a shift toward community policing in an effort to build trust (Gillis 2015; Mills 2012). Mayor Ford’s reaction to the Danzig shootings was to maintain that “this is the safest city in the world” (DiManno 2012). His response to the issue of gun violence was to argue for increased funding for policing and tougher laws to deal with crime, and he attacked communitybased social programs as “hug a thug” programs (“Youth Workers Defend” 2012). The following year, Ford’s use of crack cocaine and his association with drug dealers became public with the release of an incriminating video and other evidence from a police investigation (Star Investigations 2013). In response to these scandals, City Council passed two motions on 15 November 2013 transferring Ford’s primary executive powers and most of his staff and budget to the deputy mayor, Norm Kelly. During the years in which Ford exercised his powers as mayor, the development of the Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 focused on the construction of “Urban Heart,” a database and measures of selected characteristics of social planning areas to be used to monitor all Toronto neighbourhoods and identify twelve nia s, with up to thirty-one nia s to be included in the future. Indicators and benchmarks to track “neighbourhood equity” were developed through research co-operation between the City, United Way Toronto, and the Centre for Research on Inner City Health to address five policy areas: physical environment and infrastructure, social and human development, economic opportunity, governance, and health.27 None of the fifteen indicators addressed resident participation in neighbourhood development and improvement, nor were residents consulted about what measures would be useful or meaningful to them. The indicator of “participation in decision-making” was the percentage of eligible voters who voted in the last municipal election.28 Public consultation with residents, councillors, funders, city agencies, the private sector, and the community sector took place after the indicators had been developed by experts.29 The goal of tsns 2020 was “advancing equity across all neighbourhoods,” which, it was assumed, could not be done by focusing on nia s. By 2013, the focus of the City had shifted away from addressing the most pressing problems of Toronto’s poorest and most underserved communities by involving neighbourhood

66

Carol Agocs

residents in identifying community needs. However, there is no evidence that the resources needed to support a larger city-wide neighbourhood investment strategy were on the horizon. The staff report to the Community Development and Recreation Committee stated that with its existing resources, Social Development, Finance and Administration would be able to recommend twelve designated nias to Council, “each with an operating fund of $1,000 per year to support resident engagement, and no capital support.”30 Reporting to Council on indicators and benchmarks would be possible, but an evaluation of the program could not be completed with existing resources. tsns 2020 was a policy in name only at this stage. Funding for tsns 2020 was to be part of the City’s 2014 budget. City Council’s meeting to approve the 2014 budget was an unusual event in which Ford, having been stripped of most of the authority of his office, proposed motion after motion to cut costs. One of these moved a reduction in the operating budget of Social Development, Finance and Administration, the city department that oversaw tsns 2020; the proposed cut was $390,000, intended for community programs. The motion was lost on a vote of six in favour, including Ford and his allies Mammoliti and Crisanti, and thirty-eight opposed. Subsequent motions by Deputy Mayor Kelly to increase the department’s budget by $300,000 for “emerging social needs, with priority to underserved areas,” and another to approve an increase in its staff complement, were carried, with Ford and Mammoliti among the small minority opposed.31 In 2014, Council approved the new “Neighbourhood Equity Score and Benchmark” system for identifying neighbourhoods, based on the Urban Heart database, as well as thirty-one nia s identified as having scores lower than the equity benchmark for Toronto neighbourhoods.32 In comparison with other Toronto neighbourhoods, the nia s had larger low-income populations, higher rates of unemployment and social assistance, and larger populations of visible minorities and newcomers. The analysis of neighbourhood equity suggested that “systemic racism is playing an important role in shaping Toronto’s neighbourhoods.”33 tsns 2020 was to be funded in 2014 with $300,000 in operational community funding to be used for former priority neighbourhoods that were not among the thirty-one nia s and $12 million in infrastructure funding over four years beginning in 2015, as approved by Council in its 2014 budget.34 Future implementation of the strategy in the approved nia s

Municipal Public Administration

67

would be undertaken through engagement with partners, including city agencies and external funders. The 2014 report to Council contained a strong statement linking inequality in the nia s to a broader pattern of inequity beyond the scope of place-based policy. It noted that “low-income residents do not experience poverty because of the neighbourhoods they live in,” but they live in the neighbourhoods they do largely because of their low incomes and the nature of the housing market.35 The report states, because of the central role that systemic issues and policies play in shaping equity across neighbourhoods, all place-based approaches are necessarily limited in what they can accomplish with location-specific efforts. At the local level, their true strength and effectiveness lie in their ability to develop collective assets such as community facilities, programs and services, and community leadership that can create significant improvement in the quality of residents’ lives.36 To summarize the history of the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy as it was reframed during the Ford years, we can say that there was a shift toward cost-cutting, database development, and managerial initiatives, and away from commitment to citizen engagement, capacity-building, and investments in neighbourhood programs and facilities. This turn signalled a shift away from the citizenship model evident in the original Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy, and away from its place-based policy for responding to those neighbourhoods in greatest need. Ford’s pattern was to ignore the strategy and oppose efforts to invest city resources in it; mayoral leadership was replaced by neglect and opposition. Ford allies Crisanti and Mammoliti can be seen as pushing at the committee level to reframe the program as a city-wide exercise, which undermined the intent of the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy to focus on work with neighbourhood residents to address inequality. For the public servants responsible for implementing the tsns , a focus on database and indicator development during that period made sense because they had the resources to support this, and they needed to respond to the mandate to build a foundation for a city-wide program. Yet at the community level, support for community engagement to make change at the neighbourhood scale remained strong. The public consultation conducted in 2013 with community members

68

Carol Agocs

and others involved in tsns 2020 identified “participation in decision-making” as one of five keys to neighbourhood well-being. According to the consultation report, meaningful engagement includes continuous, transparent communication with residents on what the City is doing, inclusion of all residents as opposed to a select few, and a transparent link showing how participation is leading to decisions … There is a clear concern that existing civic engagement efforts are token efforts.37 The consultation exercise also identified neighbourhood residents’ concerns about poverty. They recognized that their needs for better-paying jobs and affordable housing could not be addressed through a place-based program with a neighbourhood focus alone. There was a realization that neither place-based approaches nor broad systemic reforms are enough: both are needed, and citizens’ voices and choices are essential in shaping policy and implementation at both levels.

e p i l ogu e : s t ro n g n e ig h b o urhoods strategy 2 0 2 0 a f t e r ford On 1 December 2014, John Tory succeeded Rob Ford as mayor, and was re-elected in 2018. Tory was an early supporter of Miller’s Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy as a leader of the Greater Toronto Civic Action Alliance (formerly Toronto City Summit Alliance), a non-partisan group of community leaders from the private and public sectors and academia. The staff report to the Community Development and Recreation Committee that proposed tsns 2020 quoted Tory as saying, In my view the Priority Neighbourhood Programs may well offer the best rate of return of almost any dollars spent … [I]f there is to be any review of the Priority Neighbourhood initiatives do it clearly and unequivocally with a view to maintain and make more effective the current programs and to continue to treat this as a high priority of the Toronto government.38

tsns 2020 during Tory’s first term developed in several directions in ways that connected the strategy to other ongoing city programs

Municipal Public Administration

69

and to potential relationships with funders. In 2015, a link was made to Toronto’s participatory budget pilot in which residents proposed and voted on capital projects in three neighbourhoods, adding another dimension to community engagement. A funders’ table was established with United Way and York Region, involving thirteen funding organizations to influence the funding priorities of the federal and provincial governments and other potential partners and granting agencies. A program-wide resident advisory committee was struck to work with city staff on implementing and monitoring the strategy, with one resident to be recruited from each of the nia s. Some community capital projects were funded in the nia s, and fifteen neighbourhood planning tables were initiated involving all interested residents as well as community agencies, local businesses, city councillors, and staff working in the nia . Each neighbourhood planning table was supported by a community development officer who was a city staff member, although these resource people were stretched thin. Most tables covered two to five nia s, and there were only seven community development officers. Four district staff teams of managers at the city were formed to coordinate services and provide links between neighbourhoods and decision-making at City Hall.39 It might be fair to assume that the involvement of councillors in the implementation of tsns 2020 and the participation of numerous citizens and residents who were engaged and benefiting was building political support for the strategy’s future. In March 2017, City Council unanimously adopted a motion to request a report from Social Development, Finance and Administration on “recommendations for reinvigorating the emerging neighbourhoods strategy, including funding opportunities.”40 One could read this as an expression by Council of renewed interest in and support for tsns 2020, described in the staff report as “based on the principle that residents should be at the core of the decisions that impact their lives and community.”41 At the same time, the limitations of a place-based policy in addressing the large structural issues of social and economic inequality and systemic racism are recognized in the report, and the City of Toronto was developing broad city-wide strategies to provide opportunities for youth and to reduce poverty. At this point in its maturation, one can again take tsns 2020 as an example of the citizenship model of public administration in action. After a hiatus, David Miller’s vision is becoming a reality and is in the process of being scaled up.

70

Carol Agocs

co n c l u s ion Despite the similarity of their names, there was a disjunction between the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy in the Miller years and the Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 during Ford’s mayoralty. Miller’s vision of a strong role for citizens and a variety of stakeholders in making change at the neighbourhood level gave way to a focus on cost-cutting and decision-making by officials and experts during the Ford years. However, following the end of Ford’s active role as mayor, there was a gradual evolution of the tsns 2020 toward a more mature incarnation of Miller’s original vision. Miller’s approach was to create a place-based approach to addressing complex issues of inequality and systemic racism, especially as these affected youth, by mobilizing citizen engagement at the community level. City staff assigned to each neighbourhood used their functional and community development expertise to organize collaboration among neighbourhood actors, city staff from many service areas, not-for-profit organizations and agencies, educational institutions, labour, and private-sector actors. Through these partnerships, specific infrastructure and community development projects were established and funded that addressed needs identified through community engagement. These projects resulted in community facilities and social programs, and they built capacity among community participants who were involved in identifying community needs and in planning and organizing ways to address them. In the process, residents were developing organizational and leadership skills and benefiting from opportunities to learn and contribute to their own well-being and that of their community. Under Ford, tsns 2020 became a centrally designed database management project for the city as a whole. This work did not involve communities in developing policy designed to identify and address the specific needs of neighbourhoods impacted by poverty and racial inequality. While Miller’s strategy relied on extensive collaboration between city agencies, the United Way, and civic and business leaders to mobilize expertise and investment in addressing community needs, this was not continued under Ford’s leadership. Following Ford’s active role as mayor, and during the mayoralty of his successor John Tory, tsns 2020 may be finding its way to becoming a coherent, albeit limited, policy response to the continuing distress caused by poverty and systemic racism in Toronto’s

Municipal Public Administration

71

neighbourhoods. It remains to be seen whether tsns 2020 has sufficient political and financial support to accomplish the broad goals it has set, and whether its implementation is guided by neighbourhood residents and responsive to their needs. An important legacy of the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy during the Miller years was its mobilization of participation, leadership, and voice in communities. There are some signs that this is continuing as tsns 2020 matures. In 2020, the strategy is scheduled to be reviewed and its future will be decided. We will watch what happens with interest. It is probably too early to tell whether the place-based policy approach represented by the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy is successful, since its implementation is now developing after a hiatus during the Ford years. However, it is reasonable to make preliminary judgments based on two fundamental criteria of policy quality and success suggested by Young (2012, 19): responsiveness to local stakeholders, and effectiveness – whether the policy achieved its stated objectives. In considering responsiveness, we must recognize the inherent strengths and limitations of a place-based policy focused on addressing the inadequate infrastructure, services, and access to power and opportunity suffered by residents of those Toronto neighbourhoods most disadvantaged by poverty and systemic racism. There is no question that the strategy as it evolved under Miller provided a voice to communities that previously lacked a means to make their needs and preferences known. It improved many services and opportunities for youth and provided new neighbourhood infrastructure. These outcomes were achieved by community members and associations, city staff, and an array of private- and public-sector organizations working together on project development, planning, and implementation. This result demonstrates a high level of responsiveness to neighbourhoods. However, it is an inherent limitation of a placebased policy that it is unable to change the fundamental structural conditions of poverty, inequality, and racism in society that result in limited employment opportunities and incomes, sub-standard living conditions, and lack of safety for community members. Recognizing this large constraint, we can say that the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy has improved the lives and living conditions of members of the participating neighbourhoods. Since it has strong support from residents, an indicator of responsiveness will be whether the City decides to continue the program beyond 2020 and ensure that it has the resources needed for success.

72

Carol Agocs

Effective policy requires coordinated, coherent, and goal-directed administration combined with “sustained political leadership over long periods of time” (Young 2012, 20). Both qualities were present during Miller’s two terms as mayor. After Miller left office, political leadership was replaced by neglect and withdrawal of resources. There are indications that this began to change when John Tory became mayor and a new council was elected in 2014. It would be interesting to examine whether the political clout of neighbourhoods benefiting from the strategy has increased as residents’ political engagement and competence grow through their participation in neighbourhood activities, and whether this engenders a virtuous cycle of political support. The history of the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy suggests that within the structural constraints that mark the governance of a Canadian city in neoliberal times, the commitment of leaders, city staff, and community members to a citizenship model of making and implementing policy can inspire a new kind of public administration that is rooted in communities. Research is needed to identify characteristics of this kind of public administration and the conditions under which governance informed by the citizenship model can develop and be sustained. For example, the commitment and expertise of City of Toronto staff were essential to its accomplishments, suggesting that the role of administrative staff and their dedication to empowering citizens may be at least as important as the influence of elected officials, and more enduring. Another critical issue is the continuity of the political will and resources needed to sustain an innovative policy approach over a time sufficient for it to take root, develop, and demonstrate its potential. As Young observed, the quality of a policy response to an urban problem depends on “competent and cohesive administration … supported by sustained political leadership” (2012, 13). While the focus of this chapter is the impact of two mayors’ differing approaches to public administration on the implementation of a social program, there is no intent to de-emphasize the role of structural and economic factors in the case of the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy. The larger political, economic, and structural context must be acknowledged as a limiting factor in the strategy’s success in addressing the impacts of poverty and racism on residents of neighbourhoods where these realities are concentrated. Horak and Dantico (2014, 148–50) identified constraints Miller

Municipal Public Administration

73

faced in maintaining financial and political support from the federal and provincial governments for his plan. As mentioned earlier, Young’s broad analysis demonstrates the critical importance of intergovernmental relations to the success or failure of innovative policy development and implementation in Canadian local governments. These realities form the background against which the two mayors influenced the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy differently in line with their divergent assumptions about how Toronto should be governed. The ideas of leaders do not drive policy, but they play a role that deserves to be recognized. As Horak and Dantico observed, citing Rosdil (2010), “urban progressivism is not easily explained by political economy theories that emphasize structural constraints. Thus, explanations often turn from structure to agency, emphasizing local political action and the political preferences that drive it” (2014, 138). New public management and the political economy of neoliberalism are complementary and their hold on public administration is institutionalized, at least for now. The citizenship model reaches for structural change, and this requires commitment to a program of local political action to bring it about. At this writing in the spring of 2020, the streets of many Canadian cities, and cities around the world, are filled with citizens asserting that Black Lives Matter and demanding fundamental change in the ways local governments handle policing and address systemic racism more broadly. It is a moment of opening minds and hearts to the need for and possibility of change, led by the voices of those who know best how inequality and oppression affect residents of local communities. It is time to heed these voices, learn from their experience, and act. Weaver (2018, 240) suggests that “although some scholars have investigated the role of ideas in the processes of neoliberalization, their work tends not to chart systematically the concrete means by which ideas shape political development at the urban scale … Too little space is devoted to explaining and showing how, why, and by whom ideology becomes rendered into policy outcomes.” This case study of a Toronto social program under two mayors has attempted to illustrate how a Toronto policy and its implementation were influenced in ways that reflected the important part ideas played in governance and public administration. It makes clear both their power to initiate change and their limitations in sustaining change in the political, social, and economic context of a Canadian city.

74

Carol Agocs

no t e s

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

10 11 12

I acknowledge with thanks the knowledge and insights I gained about the City of Toronto from my students in Western’s Diploma in Public Administration program that was offered to staff at the City in 2011, 2013, and 2015 when I taught local government management there. Several of these staff members had worked closely with the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy during those years and earlier. In 2008–11, I also interviewed other staff members and reviewed documents related to the program in preparation for writing a teaching case on the Neighbourhood Action Teams program for instructional use; this chapter’s account of the program is partially based on this case. In addition, I acknowledge the work of Kathy Weile, whose mpa research report, written with my supervision in 2012, examined the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy during the administrations of David Miller and Rob Ford. I also appreciate the helpful suggestions of the editors and reviewers of this volume on an earlier draft of this chapter. City of Toronto Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 11, Sched. A. City of Toronto, “Community Safety Plan and Malvern Youth,” Council, Policy, and Finance Committee Report no. 2, March 2004, clause 2. Ibid., clause 2, 13. Ibid. Ibid., clause 2. All dollar amounts are in Canadian dollars unless otherwise indicated. City of Toronto, “Making a Safe City Safer Annual Review 2007,” Social Development, Finance, and Administration Division, 2007. City of Toronto, “Neighbourhood Action: City of Toronto Place-Based Coordinating Mechanism Terms of Reference,” Social Development, Finance and Administration Division, n.d. Ibid.; City of Toronto, “Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy,” Council, Policy, and Finance Committee Report no. 9, October 2005, clause 6. City of Toronto, “Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy,” Council, Policy, and Finance Committee Report no. 9, October 2005, clause 6. City of Toronto, “Community Housing: Neighbourhood Action Teams,” Communities Committee Report cc : 2006-16, 14 June 2006, item 2. City of Toronto, “Neighbourhood Action: City of Toronto Place-Based Coordinating Mechanism Terms of Reference,” Social Development, Finance and Administration Division, n.d.

Municipal Public Administration

75

13 City of Toronto, “Community Safety Initiatives, Past Initiatives,” 2 February 2010. 14 City of Toronto, “Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020,” Council cd 10.3, 5 March 2012, 4. 15 Program staff, in discussion with the author, various dates in 2011, 2013, and 2015. 16 City of Toronto, “Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 Implementation,” Social Development, Finance and Administration Report to Community Development and Recreation Committee of Council, afs #16105, 12 June 2013. 17 Myer Siemiatycki (professor, Politics and Public Administration, Ryerson University), “Economic Cracks Show in Toronto as Election Looms,” interview by Bill Doskoch, ctv News, 23 October 2010. 18 City of Toronto, “Minutes, Agenda: Core Services Review,” Executive Committee of Council, 19–20 September 2011. 19 City of Toronto, “Agenda and Minutes, 2012 Capital and Operating Budget, Final Review,” Executive Committee, 12 January 2012. 20 City of Toronto, “2012 Capital and Operating Budgets,” Council Special Meeting ex 14.1, 17 January 2012. 21 City of Toronto, “Priority Neighbourhood Designation,” cd 5.9, Community Development and Recreation Committee, 29 June 2011. 22 City of Toronto, “Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020,” Social Development, Finance and Administration Report to Community Development and Recreation Committee of Council, 8 February 2012, Appendix A: Consultation Report. 23 City of Toronto 2012. 24 City of Toronto, “Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020,” Council cd 10.3, 5 March 2012. 25 City of Toronto, “Bridging High-Risk Gang Involved Youth to Labour Market Participation,” Council bu 24.2, 6 June 2012. 26 City of Toronto, “Community Service Partnerships Program – 2012 Allocation Recommendations,” Council cd 14.16, 11 July 2012. 27 City of Toronto, “Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 Implementation,” Social Development, Finance and Administration Report to Community Development and Recreation Committee of Council, afs #16105, 12 June 2013, 1. 28 City of Toronto, “tsns 2020 Neighbourhood Equity Index, Methodological Documentation,” Social Development, Finance and Administration, Social Policy Analysis and Research, March 2014, 5.

76

Carol Agocs

29 City of Toronto, “Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 Implementation,” Social Development, Finance and Administration Report to Community Development and Recreation Committee of Council, afs #16105, 12 June 2013, 6–7. 30 Ibid., 10. 31 City of Toronto, Council Minutes, 29–30 January 2014, Meeting 47, 2014 Capital and Operating Budgets, Motions (City Council), 1d, 1g, 2q. 32 City of Toronto, “Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 – Recommended Neighbourhood Improvement Areas,” Council cd 27.5, 1 April 2014. 33 City of Toronto, “Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 – Recommended Neighbourhood Improvement Areas,” Social Development, Finance and Administration Report to Community Development and Recreation Committee of Council, afs #18226, 4 March 2014, 10. 34 Ibid., 2, 10. 35 Ibid., 14. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid., Appendix C: Public Consultation Results. 38 City of Toronto, “Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020,” Social Development, Finance and Administration Report to Community Development and Recreation Committee of Council, 8 February 2012, Appendix A: Consultation Report, 5. 39 City of Toronto, “Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 Implementation Update,” Social Development, Finance and Administration, Community Development Unit, D9, February 2017. 40 City of Toronto, “Activating People, Resources and Policies: Progress on Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy,” Council cd 18.4, 28 March 2017. 41 City of Toronto, “Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 Implementation Update,” Social Development, Finance and Administration, Community Development Unit, D9, February 2017.

r e f e r e nce s Barr, Robert. 2009. “Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics.” Party Politics 15, no. 1: 29–48. Black, Simon. 2012. “Youth Violence in Toronto and Our Hierarchy of Victimhood.” Toronto Star, 6 June. Block, Sheila. 2011. Countdown to Zero: Balancing Toronto’s Budget. Toronto: Wellesley Institute, November.

Municipal Public Administration

77

Boudreau, Julie-Anne, Roger Keil, and Douglas Young. 2009. Changing Toronto: Governing Urban Neoliberalism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Campbell, Denise A. 2009. Partnership Initiatives and Achievements in Priority Neighbourhoods. Toronto: City of Toronto, Department of Social Development, Finance and Administration, Community Resources, 11 May. Corke, Sue. 2006. Neighbourhood Action in Toronto: Why Now? Toronto: City of Toronto, 26 May. De Benedictis-Kessner, Justin, and Christopher Warshaw. 2016. “Mayoral Partisanship and Fiscal Policy.” Journal of Politics 78, no. 4: 1124–38. Denhardt, Janet V., and Robert B. Denhardt. 2015. The New Public Service: Serving, Not Steering, 4th ed. New York: Routledge. DiManno, Rosie. 2012. “Mass Shooting on Danzig Puts the Lie to Toronto’s ‘Safe City’ Mantra.” Toronto Star, 18 July. Doolittle, Robyn. 2014a. Crazy Town: The Rob Ford Story. Toronto: Penguin Canada. – 2014b. “Toronto to Expand ‘Priority Neighbourhoods’ to 31.” Toronto Star, 9 March. Durose, Catherine, Stephen Greasley, and Liz Richardson, eds. 2009. Changing Local Governance, Changing Citizens. Bristol, uk : The Policy Press; New York: Routledge. Fanelli, Carlo. 2016. Megacity Malaise: Neoliberalism, Public Services and Labour in Toronto. Black Point, ns : Fernwood Publishing. Florida, Richard. 2009. Who’s Your City? New York: Basic Books. – 2012. The Rise of the Creative Class, rev. ed. New York: Basic Books. Fung, Archon. 2006. “Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance.” Public Administration Review (December): 66–75. Gillis, Wendy. 2015. “The Legacy of Toronto Police Chief Bill Blair.” Toronto Star, 17 April. Good, Kristin R. 2009. “Determinants of Multiculturalism Policies in the Greater Toronto Area.” In Municipalities and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Immigration in Toronto and Vancouver, 92–142. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Hennessy, Trish, and Jim Stanford. 2013. More Harm than Good: Austerity’s Impact in Ontario. Toronto: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. Horak, Martin, and Marilyn Dantico. 2014. “The Limits of Local Redistribution: Neighbourhood Regeneration Initiatives in Toronto and Phoenix.” International Journal of Canadian Studies 49: 135–58.

78

Carol Agocs

Horak, Martin, and Aaron A. Moore. 2015. “Policy Shift without Institutional Change: The Precarious Place of Neighbourhood Revitalization in Toronto.” In Urban Neighborhoods in a New Era: Revitalization Politics in the Postindustrial City, edited by Clarence N. Stone and Robert P. Stoker, et al., 182–208. Chicago, il : University of Chicago Press. Hulchanski, D.J. 2007. The Three Cities within Toronto: Income Polarization among Toronto’s Neighbourhoods, 1970–2005. Toronto: University of Toronto Cities Centre. Isin, Engin F. 1998. “Governing Toronto without Government: Liberalism and Neoliberalism,” Studies in Political Economy 56, no. 1: 169–91. Jones, Allison. 2010. “Jury Finds Two Guilty in Jane Creba Boxing Day Death: Four Now Convicted.” Canadian Press, 5 April. Keenan, Edward. 2013. Some Great Idea: Good Neighbourhoods, Crazy Politics and the Invention of Toronto. Toronto: Coach House Books. Kohler, Nicholas. 2016. “The Calculated Populism of Rob Ford.” New Yorker, 24 March. Matthews, Nancy J. 2008. “Place-Based Neighbourhood Renewal.” Presented to chra Symposium, Montreal, 10 September. McMurtry, Roy, and Alvin Curling. 2008. The Review of the Roots of Youth Violence. Vol. 1, Findings, Analysis and Conclusions. Toronto: Service Ontario. Mills, Carys. 2012. “Police Alone Can’t Stop Gangs, Toronto Chief Bill Blair Says.” Globe and Mail, 1 August. Mintzberg, Henry. 1996. “Managing Government, Governing Management.” Harvard Business Review (May–June): 75–83. Moloney, Paul, and David Rider. 2012. “23–21 Vote Undoes Many of Mayor Rob Ford’s Budget Cuts.” Toronto Star, 17 January. Nalbandian, John. 1999. “Facilitating Community, Enabling Democracy: New Roles for Local Government Managers.” Public Administration Review 59, no. 3: 187–97. Nann, Nrinder, Community Development, City of Toronto. 2010. “An Overview of Priority Neighbourhoods and Neighbourhood Action.” Toronto: Presentation to city planning students, University of Toronto, October. Osborne, D., and T. Gaebler. 1992. Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector. Reading, ma : Addison-Wesley.

Municipal Public Administration

79

Paperny, Anna. 2010. “Shrinking Middle Class Makes Toronto a City of Socioeconomic Extremes.” Globe and Mail, 15 December. Updated 28 April 2018. Pateman, Carol. 1970. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Perrella, Andrea, Simon Kiss, and Zachary Spicer. 2018. “Economic Anxiety, Visible Minorities and Populism: Public Support for Toronto Mayor Rob Ford.” Regina: Paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, 30 May–1 June. Rosdil, Donald. 2010. “Testing Cultural and Economic Explanations for Local Development Politics.” Journal of Urban Affairs 32, no. 1: 105–30. Sancton, Andrew. 2011. Canadian Local Government: An Urban Perspective, 2nd ed. Don Mills, on : Oxford University Press. Star Investigations. 2013. “Rob Ford Scandal: Toronto Police Have Video Apparently Showing Mayor Smoking Crack.” Toronto Star, 31 October. Strong Neighbourhoods Task Force. 2005. Strong Neighbourhoods – A Call to Action. Toronto: City of Toronto and United Way. Tindal, C. Richard, Susan Nobes Tindal, Kennedy Stewart, and Patrick Smith. 2013. Local Government in Canada, 8th ed. Toronto: Nelson. Weaver, Timothy P.R. 2018. “By Design or by Default: Varieties of Neoliberal Urban Development.” Urban Affairs Review 54, no. 2: 234–66. Weile, Kathy. 2012. “Ideas Matter: A Comparative Analysis of Two Neighbourhood Regeneration Programs Associated with the Administrations of Two Toronto Mayors Between 2005 and 2012.” London, on : mpa Research Report, Local Government Program, Department of Political Science, University of Western Ontario. Weyland, Kurt. 2017. “Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach.” In The Oxford Handbook of Populism, edited by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, 1–31. Oxford, uk: Oxford Handbooks Online. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/ 9780198803560.013.2. Yang, Jennifer, et al. 2012. “Scarborough Shootings: What Really Happened on Danzig?” Toronto Star, 21 July. Young, Robert. 1968. “Chicago: Who Were They Fighting?” Beaconsfield News and Chronicle, 12 September. – 2012. “Introduction: Multilevel Governance and Its Central Research Questions in Canadian Cities.” In Sites of Governance: Multilevel Governance and Policy Making in Canada’s Big Cities, edited by Martin

80

Carol Agocs

Horak and Robert Young, 3–25. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press. Young, Robert, and Andrew Sancton. 2009. “Foundations of Governance.” Municipal World 119 (September): 37–8, 44. “Youth Workers Defend Toronto ‘Hug a Thug’ Programs.” 2012. ctv News, 25 July. https://toronto.ctvnews.ca/youth-workers-defendtoronto-hug-a-thug-programs-1.892160.

pa rt t w o

Secession Politics

5

Democracy against Unilateral Secession Stéphane Dion

Secession is the act of separating from a state to form a new one or to join another state. Around the world, secession is not something that is encouraged outside of the colonial setting. It is even considered with definite mistrust, if not aversion, when it is done unilaterally – that is, without an agreement negotiated with the predecessor state.1 In fact, “no state which has been created by unilateral secession has been admitted to the United Nations against the declared wishes of the government of the predecessor state” (Crawford 1997, para. 26). No one will be surprised that authoritarian regimes oppose secession, especially domestically, since they repress everything that stands against them. However, what must be explained is why democratic states show great reluctance toward the secessionist phenomenon as well. Proposing an answer to this question will be my contribution to this book, dedicated to the memory of Bob Young, who provided so much to the study of secession. On this topic as on many others, I have accumulated a considerable intellectual respect for Bob over the course of a thirty-year friendship. I cannot say for sure what he would have thought of this chapter, but what I do know is that I would have taken great pleasure in discussing it with him. A first question that must be explored is why no separatist party has managed to achieve secession in a well-established democratic state. When I began to study this question in the early 1990s, I first considered it from the point of view of the electoral challenge facing secessionist parties in democracy. The explanation that I proposed at the time related to a strategic dilemma that makes it difficult for the separatist parties to rally a sufficient number of voters for their project. Secession is a radical rupture that many voters are likely to

84

Stéphane Dion

consider unnecessary or too risky, or both. The separatist parties must convince the electorate both to fear staying in the existing state and to be confident in the one they would be creating on their own. It is difficult to combine the feelings of fear and confidence and to spread them to a sufficient portion of the electorate. Either the region enjoys broad autonomy and a strong economy, in which case there are no compelling reasons to fear remaining in the existing state, or the region possesses few institutions of its own and its economy is weak, in which case it will be difficult to build enough confidence to leave the existing state and to create a new one (Dion 1995a). This fear-and-confidence dilemma poses a major obstacle to the electoral success of separatist parties. However, this explanation leaves unanswered the main question to be addressed in this chapter: why do democratic states manifestly dislike secession? More precisely, why does international law, which has been largely shaped by Western democracies, not recognize a positive right to secession outside of a colonial context? Why is it the usual practice of democratic states not to recognize unilateral secessions? Finally, why do the vast majority of democratic states consider themselves indivisible? I will first describe these realities: the rarity of secession in a democracy, the absence of a positive right to secession, the non-recognition of unilateral secession, and the indivisibility of the vast majority of democratic states. I will then offer my explanation about democratic states’ reluctance toward secession. I will argue that if secession is difficult to reconcile with democracy, it is because it contradicts a fundamental democratic principle: the right to citizenship. Although secession is not a right, it remains a possibility, and so the last three parts of the chapter will be devoted to the circumstances under which secession may be acceptable in a democracy. I will argue that the surest way would be to follow the conditions of legality and clarity set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in its 1998 opinion on the secession of Quebec (Reference re Secession of Quebec) and the Clarity Act of 2000 that gave legislative effect to those conditions. I contributed on the front line to the Government of Canada’s efforts to clarify the rules of secession and I had the honour to be the minister who sponsored the Clarity Act in the House of Commons of Canada. So, I will not pretend to be a neutral player or an indifferent observer. I simply ask that my proposals be considered on their merits, in a spirit of intellectual openness and scientific rigour, worthy of our enduring memory of Bob Young.

Democracy against Unilateral Secession

85

t h e r a r it y o f s e c e s s i on i n democracy In the fall of 1995, at the time of the Quebec referendum on sovereignty-partnership, I reviewed for the Canadian Journal of Political Science (Dion 1995b) books published on this referendum, including Bob’s seminal work, The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada (Young 1995). I made the following observation: “There has never been a single case of secession in democracies if we consider only the well-established ones, that is, those with at least ten consecutive years of universal suffrage” (534). Indeed, the cases most often mentioned happened only a few years after the introduction or significant expansion of universal suffrage: Norway and Sweden in 1905, Iceland and Denmark in 1918, and Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1922 (Dion 1995a; Greenleaf 1988, 206–7; Lindgren 1951; Tomasson 1980, 21). When Bob, in The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada, set out to predict what would happen after a yes vote in the 1995 Quebec referendum, he attempted to circumvent the lack of precedents to guide theoretical assumptions by drawing on the most closely related possible cases of peaceful secession in a well-established democracy. He chose the examples of Hungary and Austria in 1867, Norway and Sweden in 1905, Singapore and Malaysia in 1965, and Slovakia and the Czech Republic in 1993 (see also Young 1994). These four cases may indeed be the ones most analogous to the breakup of a mature democracy, but then they only highlight to what extent there is no precedent for what the secession of a region from a modern democratic state such as Canada would represent. In fact, one may even hesitate to call the first three cases real secessions. The 1867 Austria and Hungary compromise was not a secession. The Austrian emperor became king of Hungary and the two units maintained various common links, particularly in diplomacy and the militia. The army was by far the most important public-sector issue at the time. Had the two political units really separated from each other, the process would have been much more difficult and dangerous (Fejtö 1994). In the case of Sweden and Norway, the ties between the two political entities were very loose at the outset. Sweden and Norway were already recognized as almost hermetically distinct before 1905. There were two judicial systems and two governments without hierarchies

86

Stéphane Dion

between them, as well as two citizenships, two armies, two currencies, and no Swedish population living in Norway. The two countries shared only diplomacy and kingship (Lindgren 1951). The federation of Malaysia was only two years old and the jury is still out on whether or not what happened could be more appropriately characterized as an expulsion, or as a “bloodless coup” (Lim 2015; Milne 1966). Fresh out from under communism, Czechoslovakia had barely set up its democratic institutions when the two prime ministers decided to divide the state in “an almost conspiratorial way” without their respective populations being consulted (Draper 1993). Hundreds of referendums have been held on sovereignty issues (territorial boundaries, sub-unit delimitations, territorial status, decolonization) since the nineteenth century (Mendez and Germann 2018; Qvortrup 2014, 2019). None has split up a well-established democracy. Upon the disintegration of the Soviet Union, new states were recognized following referendums, with the agreement of Russia as the successor state of the ussr , but the Soviet Union was obviously not a democracy. The same may be said about the new states that were recognized after the international community had determined that the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation was irreversible. The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro lasted only three years, from 2003 to 2006. The independence of East Timor (2002) and South Sudan (2011) did not happen peacefully and did not involve a secession from a well-established democracy. Secessionists have never managed to split up a mature democracy; this assessment remains true today. However, the fact that it has never happened does not mean that it is impossible. Secessionists in Canada, the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, or elsewhere may one day succeed. From this point of view, the question arises whether Canada would have provided the first case of secession in a democratic state if the close result of the 1995 Quebec referendum had tilted toward yes rather than no . We will never know for sure, but I was convinced in 1995 (Dion 1995b), and remain so today (Dion 2015), that a yes result, with the confusing and unlawful process contemplated by the secessionist government, would not have led to the independence of Quebec but rather to serious instabilities. The question submitted to voters during the 1995 referendum was too confusing to have led to the emergence of a secessionist majority strong enough not to crumble in the face of the serious difficulties created by the attempt at secession

Democracy against Unilateral Secession

87

(Pinard 2000). The unilateral secession procedure that the premier of Quebec at the time, Jacques Parizeau, intended to follow was illegal and he would not have had the means to impose it. It would not have led to independence but to chaos or, at a minimum, to months of turmoil, bringing good to no-one. The shock would have been felt throughout Canada, but nowhere more than in Quebec, particularly in Montreal. Two decades after the 1995 referendum, the charismatic leader of the yes side, Lucien Bouchard, revealed what he thought would have happened after Jacques Parizeau’s unilateral declaration of independence (udi ): “It would have been dramatic; it shouldn’t happen that way because it would be chaos the day after.”2 It was in large part precisely to avoid such chaos that, a few months after the 1995 referendum, I accepted the offer of the prime minister of Canada at the time, Jean Chrétien, to become his government’s minister of Intergovernmental Affairs – in practice, the Canadian unity minister. I entered politics and I pushed hard to clarify the rules of secession as a Quebecker who did not want his society to be profoundly divided in the aftermath of an eventual future yes vote without a legal framework to help overcome its internal divisions. It is interesting to trace the evolution of Bob’s thinking on this topic. In The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada, which he wrote before the referendum, he predicted that a yes vote would lead to a quick secession after tough negotiations because political leaders, both in Quebec and in Ottawa, would want to avoid at all costs the prolongation of uncertainty. However, after the referendum, he came to a completely different conclusion than his original in-a-hurry secession. In the revised edition of his book, published in 1998, Bob wrote that with a tight yes vote, tainted with “transparent irregularities in the democratic process,” the secessionists “would not have been able to consolidate their victory” (Young 1998, 322). In the event of another referendum in the future, he envisaged a panoply of scenarios (six, with sub-scenarios), of which only one, a clear majority “on the order of 70 or 75 percent,” would really make probable a peaceful secession; but even in this case, he no longer forecast or commented on the speed of the process (382). When I reviewed Bob’s book in 1995 for the Canadian Journal of Political Science, one of the other books I also reviewed in the article was Nationalisme et démocratie, written by a political scientist from Laval University, Jean-Pierre Derriennic (1995), an expert

88

Stéphane Dion

on political violence phenomena. The main argument of his book is that what can make conflictual situations degenerate into violence has less to do with the peaceful or aggressive predispositions of the populations involved than with the conditions into which they are plunged. If the institutions are well-entrenched and accepted by all, if the rule of law is scrupulously respected, then populations have clear benchmarks that help them to overcome their disagreements in a peaceful manner. From this point of view, it is dangerous in a democracy for a government to place itself above the law, yet still require the obedience of its citizens, especially on an issue as divisive and existential as secession. The secessionist process proposed by Quebec’s separatist leaders in 1995 was dangerous because it was unlawful, confusing, and doomed to deadlock; and being so, it was in the interest of no-one, including supporters of secession. The juridical aspect of secession is, therefore, fundamental, and I will review it now.

t he abs e n c e o f a p o s it iv e ri ght to uni lateral s e c e s s io n in in t e r nati onal law In international law, any attempt at unilateral secession is without legal foundation, except in exceptional circumstances where there is a right to secession, namely in the case of colonies, subjugation, or foreign occupation. International law places great importance on the territorial integrity and stability of existing states. However, while international law does not authorize unilateral secessions, it does not prohibit them either. The recognition of new states is a matter left to state practice, not international law per se. International law has no rule prohibiting unilateral secession, and conversely, no rule allowing a secessionist government to impose secession legally on those who do not want it. The absence of an international rule prohibiting secession does not create a positive right to secession that would oblige citizens or states to recognize or acquiesce to it. Yet, that is exactly what a secessionist government would require if it wanted to proceed unilaterally: a legally effective means of compelling everyone to accept a change of the international map, including those who are against that change. International law does not provide for unilateral secession, nor does it contain any peremptory norms that would make it possible to ignore the domestic laws of the state from which the secessionist government is trying to separate.

Democracy against Unilateral Secession

89

On 22 July 2010, the International Court of Justice declared in an advisory opinion that Kosovo’s udi , enacted on 17 February 2008, did not violate international law.3 The International Court noted that there is no applicable rule in international law under which such declarations can be disallowed. It did not say that Kosovo had a right to secede from Serbia. In fact, the International Court did not rule on the legal consequences of this udi . In paragraphs 55 and 56 of its opinion, it explicitly refused to say whether or not Kosovo has the status of a state, and it did not tell other states whether they should recognize Kosovo as such: “Indeed, it is entirely possible for a particular act – such as a unilateral declaration of independence – not to be in violation of international law without necessarily constituting the exercise of a right conferred by it. The Court has been asked for an opinion on the first point, not the second.”4 However, it is precisely this second question – that of the existence or not of a right to unilateral secession – that was submitted to the Supreme Court of Canada, the answer to which I will now examine. In its 1998 advisory opinion in Reference re Secession of Quebec, the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed a fundamental tenet of international law: the distinction between internal self-determination and external self-determination. Internal self-determination is a people’s pursuit of its development “within the framework of an existing state” (para. 126); external self-determination may include a right to unilateral secession that “arises in only the most extreme of cases” (para. 126) such as colonial contexts or “alien subjugation, domination or exploitation” (para. 133). The Supreme Court concluded that since “such exceptional circumstances are manifestly inapplicable to Quebec … neither the population of the province of Quebec, even if characterized in terms of ‘people’ or ‘peoples,’ nor its representative institutions, the National Assembly, the legislature or government of Quebec, possess a right, under international law, to secede unilaterally from Canada” (para. 138). According to the Court, “there is no such right applicable to the population of Quebec, either under the Constitution of Canada or at international law” (para. 139), even if Quebeckers might be considered as a people or nation (para. 138, 154). Should the Government of Quebec attempt unilateral secession, such an attempt would be “contrary to the rule of law” in Canada (para. 108), would have no “colour of a legal right” (para. 144), and would take place in a context where Quebec’s governing institutions

90

Stéphane Dion

“do not enjoy a right at international law to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally” (para. 154). Hence, a unilateral attempt at secession would have no legal foundation. It would contravene domestic law and would have no legal standing in international law. This lack of a right to unilateral secession has a concrete, fundamental consequence. It means that the Government of Quebec has no right to take Canada away from Quebeckers who want to keep it. The Government of Quebec has no legal foundation that would allow it to compel anybody – the Government of Canada, foreign governments, Quebeckers themselves – to recognize it as the government of an independent state. International law does not grant the Government of Quebec a right to set Canadian law aside and Canadian law does not allow the Government of Quebec to take over the legislative and other jurisdictions granted by the Canadian Constitution to the federal level of government. It should be noted that the Supreme Court’s opinion did not create a new legal rule; the Court only outlined the state of the law. It did not take away an existing right of the Government of Quebec to secede unilaterally, as there was never such a right. During the 1980 referendum, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau (1980) was legally correct to warn that a yes would lead to a standoff, not to sovereignty-association: “If you knock on the sovereignty-association door, there is no negotiation possible.” After the 1995 referendum, Lucien Bouchard, then leader of the official opposition, roundly criticized Prime Minister Jean Chrétien for his refusal to commit to accepting secession in case of a narrow majority for the yes : “We will recall that [the prime minister of Canada] said in this House he reserved the right not to honour a narrow yes majority in favour of sovereignty.”5 But the prime minister was legally entitled not to divide Canada in the absence of clear support for secession. The illegality of the Parizeau government’s planned unilateral attempt at secession was already under scrutiny before the 1995 referendum, when Superior Court of Quebec Justice Lesage rendered a preliminary ruling that, while refusing an injunction to stop the holding of a referendum, noted that the proposed secession process would cause “a rupture in the legal order … manifestly contrary to the Constitution of Canada” and declared that the Quebec government’s proposed sovereignty legislation would pose “a serious threat to the applicant’s rights and freedoms as guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”6

Democracy against Unilateral Secession

91

Indeed, the Parizeau government’s Bill 1, An Act Respecting the Future of Québec, introduced in the National Assembly in September 1995 shortly before the referendum, stated, in section 2, that Quebec would become a sovereign state at a date to be set by the National Assembly of Quebec and that it would “acquire the exclusive power to pass all its laws, levy all its taxes and conclude all its treaties.”7 However, the Parizeau government would have had no legal standing to usurp such powers and exercise such exclusive authority over Quebeckers. On 19 April 2018, the Superior Court of Quebec in Henderson v Quebec ruled that Bill 99, An Act Respecting the Exercise of the Fundamental Rights and Prerogatives of the Québec People and the Québec State, enacted by Quebec’s legislature in 2000, was valid because it does not confer any right to unilateral secession.8 It is telling to compare Bill 99 (from 2000) with Bill 1 (from 1995). Bill 1 clearly announced unilateral secession. Let me quote again its section 2: “On the date fixed in the proclamation of the National Assembly, the Declaration of sovereignty appearing in the Preamble shall take effect and Québec shall become a sovereign country.”9 In comparison, Bill 99 lists a series of principles that – according to the Superior Court of Quebec – do not include external self-determination or the right to secede. One can argue that secessionists may ignore the law and declare independence anyway, claiming that the issue is purely political, not legal. However, they would then put themselves in the untenable situation of denying the relevance of the law, yet raising it when it suits them. For example, the Quebec government labelled as illegal the two referendums held in 1995 by Indigenous peoples in Northern Quebec, which confirmed that these populations, almost unanimously, intended to remain with their territories in Canada. The illegality of these Indigenous consultations is a claim that Jacques Parizeau repeated after the 1995 Quebec referendum.10 Hence, the secessionist leaders would have been obliged to raise the issue of legality, inevitably, requiring obedience to the law from others while denying its relevance for themselves. As for the declaration of independence, one must keep in mind that it would be precisely that: a declaration. There is a gulf of difference between udi and unilateral independence – that is, between a udi and ui. Secession is not effected simply because the head of the secessionist government declares it. How would they make this declaration effective? How would the secessionists impose their authority without the

92

Stéphane Dion

support of the law and of the central or federal government? In fact, not only the consent of the central or federal government, but its active participation would be needed to effect secession, if only for practical reasons. In the case of Quebec, means would have to be found to transfer tens of thousands of public servants from federal departments and Crown corporations to the Quebec public service, as well as to revise the application of a vast array of laws and regulations and millions of tax returns, not to mention the question of federal Crown property, assets, and liabilities. The breakup of a modern state such as Canada could turn into an administrative nightmare (Derriennic 1995, 62–6). The Government of Canada’s assent and active participation in the breakup of the country could not be secured through a unilateral declaration of independence. Not only would unilateral secession be unlawful, it would also be a practical impossibility. Now, could the Government of Quebec – or any secessionist government – work around this absence of legal support for unilateral secession by obtaining international recognition of a udi ? That would be highly unlikely, when one considers the obvious aversion of the international community to unilateral secessions.

t he ave rs io n o f t h e in t e r n ati onal communi ty to u n il at e r a l secessi ons The Supreme Court of Canada weighed prudently the probability of international recognition of Quebec secession against the will of the Government of Canada: “Thus, a Quebec that had negotiated in conformity with constitutional principles and values in the face of unreasonable intransigence on the part of other participants at the federal or provincial level would be more likely to be recognized than a Quebec which did not itself act according to constitutional principles in the negotiation process” (Reference 1998, para. 103). The Court’s prudence is understandable in light of the international community’s extreme reluctance to recognize unilateral secessions, a reluctance shared by democratic states. It is more than doubtful that Quebec would be recognized as an independent state without the Government of Canada’s agreement. In fact, there is no such precedent. In only one case, that of Kosovo, did an entity manage to get significant – albeit still partial – international recognition against the will of the parent state (Germann 2017, 123). That case itself illustrates how difficult it is to secure international recognition via

Democracy against Unilateral Secession

93

unilateral secession. Should Serbia recognize Kosovo, all other countries would follow suit. But as long as Serbia objects, one cannot see when Kosovo will be allowed to join the United Nations, which would require the affirmative votes of nine of the fifteen members of the Security Council, including those of all five of its permanent members, and a two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly. Kosovo declared independence in 2008. As of 2 March 2020, 96 of the 193 United Nations member states have not recognized Kosovo, including China and Russia – which both hold veto power on the un Security Council and therefore on accession to the un – and democratic states such as India, Spain, Greece, Brazil, and Mexico. The democratic states that recognized Kosovo against the will of Serbia, notably the United States, most European Union countries, Japan, and Canada, have taken endless precautions. They insist that Kosovo is a unique case that, in their opinion, does not create a precedent. They invoke a combination of four factors. First, the people of Kosovo were victims of serious abuse, particularly during the bloody attempt at ethnic cleansing under the Miloševic´ regime at the end of the 1990s. Second, there is no doubt that nearly all people of Albanian descent in Kosovo want independence (the independence referendum of 1991 gave a yes vote of 99.98 per cent with a turnout of 87 per cent). Third, the separation of Kosovo from Serbia is already an established fact in the territory itself. Indeed, in the spring of 1999, nato drove the Serbian forces out of Kosovo to put an end to a humanitarian disaster; Kosovo was placed under un authority for nearly ten years. Fourth, forcing the people of Kosovo to return under Serbian authority would inevitably cause instability in an already fragile region. Notwithstanding these four solid arguments in support of Kosovo’s recognition as an independent state, many states continue to support Serbia’s point of view, including two veto power countries: China and Russia. This leaves Kosovo, three decades after its first unilateral declaration of independence, with only partial, restricted recognition – a situation that would be unacceptable to a population such as Quebec’s, who are accustomed to having their Canadian citizenship, passports, and government routinely recognized all over the world. A situation more akin to the Quebec-Canada context is the Government of Catalonia’s unfulfilled desire to have the international community, especially the European Union, commit to recognizing its udi from Spain. In fact, no state in the world has recognized the Parliament of Catalonia’s 27 October 2017 resolution, which

94

Stéphane Dion

declared the independence of Catalonia from Spain and the founding of an independent Catalan Republic. Despite sympathy for those Catalan citizens who were targeted by rather harsh actions by the police during the events of 1 October 2017, Catalan independence has received no recognition from any sovereign state. Donald Tusk (2017), then president of the European Council, declared, “For the eu nothing changes. Spain remains our only interlocutor.” The president of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani, also stated, “The declaration of independence voted on today in the Catalan Parliament is a breach of the rule of law, the Spanish constitution and the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, which are part of the eu ’s legal framework. No one in the European Union will recognise this declaration.”11 The failure of the Catalan government’s unilateral attempt discourages many Scottish secessionists from walking this same path. Anthony Salamone, a political analyst sympathetic to some of the Scottish secessionist claims, concluded that unilateral action would not result in statehood: “a process of independence without the agreement of the uk … would not result in effective independence … The international community would accept the uk Government’s view that Scotland was still part of the uk … it would be highly improbable that a single state in the world would recognize Scotland as an independent state.”12 In a controversial book, Frédéric Bastien (2013, 81) argued that London and Washington would have recognized Quebec as an independent state following the 1980 and 1995 referendums “without too many problems.” As proof of his theory, he quotes four pronouncements from ministers or diplomats of the day. However, those quotations do not validate the author’s claims. What those foreign dignitaries said, in essence, is that “it is up to Canadians to deal with this issue” (Dion 2013). Quebec separatists cannot count on the international community recognizing a unilateral declaration of independence. The world has no reason to treat Canadian unity with less consideration than the unity of other countries.

i n di vis ib il it y as a u s ua l norm i n democracy Not only are democratic states very reluctant to recognize unilateral secessions, they are also inclined to reject this eventuality for themselves. Most external self-determination referendums have taken place in situations of decolonization or disintegration of authoritarian or

Democracy against Unilateral Secession

95

totalitarian regimes. Seldom have they been held in well-established democracies, for the simple reason that almost all of these states consider themselves inseparable entities. Many of them affirm their indivisibility in their constitution or jurisprudence. They reject secession as a legal impossibility. In both 2006 and 2010, when the Supreme Court of Alaska twice rejected a citizens’ initiative to hold a referendum on Alaska’s secession from the United States, or when in June 2015 the Italian Constitutional Court ruled an independence referendum by an Italian region to be contrary to the Constitution, or again in December 2016, when the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany ruled that a German Land would not have the right to hold a referendum on secession and that “there is no rule under the Constitution for individual states to attempt to secede,”13 these courts acted as courts would in almost all other democratic states (Biondani 2015; Delledone and Monti 2019, 201; Martos 2016). No referendum on secession can be held within those democratic states because the issue at stake would be deemed unconstitutional. As summarized by the European Commission for Democracy through Law, better known as the Venice Commission (1999), after examining the constitutions of its member states, “To say that secession is inimical to national constitutional law would be an understatement … [T]he Constitution is in general opposed to secession and instead emphasizes concepts such as territorial integrity, indivisibility of the state and national unity.” From this point of view, Spain is the rule and Canada the exception, since the former considers itself indivisible and the latter is among the very few states that contemplate in law the possibility of their divisibility.

t he d if f ic u lt c o n c il iat ion between s ecessi on a n d d e m ocracy An obvious reason for the aversion to secession is the states’ concern that their own territorial integrity could be challenged. The golden rule of “do unto others as you would have others do unto you” has a powerful dissuasive effect. It is difficult for a state to demand that its own unity be respected if it does not respect that of others. It will be more difficult for it to prevent separatist movements at home if it encourages them in other states.

96

Stéphane Dion

Another obvious reason is the constant concern for international stability. Separatist movements are potential sources of grave disorder. If the international community is opposed to recognizing unilateral secession as an automatic right outside of the colonial context, it is largely because it would be very difficult to determine to whom that right should be granted, with hundreds if not thousands of groups each claiming a collective identity for itself in the world. The creation of each new state would risk mobilizing, within that same state, minorities that would in turn claim their own independence. An automatic right to secession would have dramatic consequences for the international community. As former un Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated, “If every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve” (United Nations 1992, 17). In addition to these considerations of state and international stability, I suggest that there is a third element that opposes an automatic right to secession, an element fundamental to democracies: the right to citizenship. The principle underlying the indivisibility of the state in a democracy is the right to citizenship. All citizens are entitled to full membership in their state and have the right to pass down that citizenship to their offspring. No group of citizens, even when claiming to form a people or a nation, may take it upon itself to take the country away from other citizens. Thus, section 2 of the Spanish Constitution, which states that Spain is an indivisible country, confers upon each Catalan the right to be a Spaniard and entitles all Spaniards to consider Catalonia part of their country. That is a constitutional right in the hands of each and every citizen. I am convinced that this touches upon the fundamental reason why international law and state practice alike only recognize a right to secession in situations of colonization or flagrant human rights violations. In extreme circumstances where a state refuses to treat a group of citizens as citizens – where it rides roughshod over their right to citizenship – those citizens in turn may have the right to consider themselves no longer part of this oppressive state. They have that right not by virtue of distinctive traits pertaining to race, language, or religion, but because, like all human beings, they have a universal right to citizenship.

Democracy against Unilateral Secession

97

In a democracy, where citizenship is recognized as a full right, each citizen is entitled to belong to the whole country and to pass this right to her or his children. Secessionists ignore this right on behalf of nationalist bonds: language, religion, history, or other specific affiliations. Their perspective is what the philosopher Allan Buchanan (2017) has called “ascriptivist,” which means that they claim a right to secede by virtue of “being of the same nation or being a ‘distinct people.’” But the rule of law in a democracy gives all citizens fundamental rights whatever their background, and the democratic ideal encourages all citizens of a country to be loyal to each other, without prejudice of language, race, religion, or regional considerations. Secession requires the opposite, asking its citizens to break the civic solidarity that unites them. Secession is that rare, grave, and unusual exercise when a country’s inhabitants are required to make a choice as to those they wish to keep as fellow citizens and those they wish to turn into foreigners. Such an exercise is hardly compatible with the democratic ideal of solidarity between all citizens. Besides, a philosophy of democracy based on the logic of secession would be unworkable. It would incite groups within the state to nourish and amplify grievances and to seek to separate from one another, rather than trying to find common ground or to resolve disputes internally and through agreement. Automatic secession would prevent democracy from absorbing the tensions inherent in differences. Recognition of the right to secession on demand would invite separation on the basis of collective attributes such as religion, language, or ethnicity as soon as difficulties develop. This does not mean that a democratic state must reject any and all secessionist demands. Some democratic states, such as the United Kingdom and Canada, accept their potential divisibility. A democratic state may conclude that in light of a clear desire for secession, allowing it to be negotiated would be the lesser of two evils.

u n d e r w h ic h c o n d it ions i s secessi on ac c e p ta b l e in a democracy? A democratic government has the obligation to ensure that the desire for secession is truly clear and unambiguous, and that it would not be carried out unilaterally but, instead, within the framework of legality and a search for justice for all. This brings

98

Stéphane Dion

us back to the Supreme Court of Canada’s 20 August 1998 opinion on secession. The Supreme Court confirmed that “the secession of a province from Canada must be considered, in legal terms, to require an amendment to the Constitution, which perforce requires negotiation” (Reference 1998, para. 84). The Court outlined a constitutional obligation to enter into this negotiation in the context of a clear support for secession. The obligation is to negotiate, which is not the equivalent of an obligation of result: “While the negotiators would have to contemplate the possibility of secession, there would be no absolute legal entitlement to it and no assumption that an agreement reconciling all relevant rights and obligations would actually be reached” (para. 97). This negotiation must be done “within the existing constitutional framework” (para. 149; see also para. 87, 139). That means that negotiations would have to be carried out within Canada’s constitutional framework and not between independent states. The Government of Quebec would not have the right to unilaterally give itself the status of a government of an independent state. It would not have that right before, during, or after any negotiations that it may deem unsuccessful. Difficulties during the course of negotiations would not give cause to assume such a right. At no time in the negotiation process would the Government or National Assembly of Quebec have the right to take away the constitutional rights of Quebeckers as Canadians. For secession to comply with the law, the Constitution of Canada would need to be amended: “It is foreseeable that even negotiations carried out in conformity with the underlying constitutional principles could reach an impasse. We need not speculate here as to what would then transpire. Under the Constitution, secession requires that an amendment be negotiated” (para. 97). All participants would be required to enter into negotiations on secession in accordance with the four constitutional principles identified by the Court: “federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and the protection of minorities” (para. 90). The Government of Quebec could not determine on its own what would and would not be negotiable. It “could not purport to invoke a right of self-determination such as to dictate the terms of a proposed secession to the other parties” (para. 91). It would have the “right to pursue secession” through these negotiations founded on the above-mentioned principles “so long as in doing so, Quebec respects

Democracy against Unilateral Secession

99

the rights of others” (para. 92). These “rights of all Canadians both within and outside Quebec” (para. 92) are enshrined in the Constitution of Canada and, therefore, cannot be altered without “radical and extensive” constitutional amendments (para. 84). Negotiating secession would inevitably touch upon “many issues of great complexity and difficulty” (para. 96). In particular, the Court mentioned issues related to the economy, minority rights, Indigenous peoples, and territorial boundaries: “Nobody seriously suggests that our national existence, seamless in so many aspects, could be effortlessly separated along what are now the provincial boundaries of Quebec” (para. 96; see also para. 139). It is important to see how the Court came to outline this obligation to negotiate. The Court did not reserve this obligation for the exceptional issue of secession; it is valid for any request for constitutional amendment duly initiated by a partner of the federation. Indeed, the Court inferred the constitutional duty to negotiate from the right to initiate the procedures for a constitutional amendment. This right to initiate belongs, according to para. 46(1) of the Constitution Act (1982), to the Senate, the House of Commons, or the legislative assembly of a province. If one of these federation partners requests by resolution a constitutional amendment, the other partners are required to come to the negotiation table: “The corollary of a legitimate attempt by one participant in Confederation to seek an amendment to the Constitution is an obligation on all parties to come to the negotiating table” (Reference 1998, para. 88).14 If, for example, a province requests by resolution to amend the Constitution so that equalization is no longer a constitutional principle, the other partners are required to enter into negotiation (Knopff 2020). However, they are not obliged to accept the alteration – in this case, the withdrawal of equalization as a constitutional principle. Negotiations, although carried out in perfect good faith, may still lead to no constitutional amendment. As summarized by dean of law Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, “This duty is the logical consequence of the right conferred on federal actors to initiate, but not realize unilaterally, constitutional change … However, being solely an obligation of means, this duty to negotiate would not guarantee any particular outcome” (Gaudreault-DesBiens 2019, 39, 54). Hence, the constitutional duty to negotiate never leads to an obligation of result. It exists in all cases where a participant of the federation exercises its right to initiate a proposal for constitutional

100

Stéphane Dion

amendment. However, if the issue at stake is secession, then the Supreme Court requires an additional condition of democratic legitimacy for there to be an obligation to negotiate: the province must clearly demonstrate that its population wants secession. It would indeed have been odious to oblige partners of the federation to undertake negotiations on the loss of Canada for a part of the Canadian population, without having the assurance that it is indeed what this population clearly wants.

t h e o b l ig at io n of clari ty According to the Supreme Court, the constitutional obligation to enter into negotiations on secession could be precipitated only by “a decision of a clear majority of the population of Quebec on a clear question to pursue secession” (Reference 1998, para. 93). That obligation does not exist “if the expression of the democratic will is itself fraught with ambiguities. Only the political actors would have the information and expertise to make the appropriate judgment as to the point at which, and the circumstances in which, those ambiguities are resolved one way or the other” (para. 100). Whereas, as is written in the preamble to the Clarity Act, “[t]he government of any province of Canada is entitled to consult its population by referendum on any issue and is entitled to formulate the wording of its referendum question,” only a clear question on secession may lead to an obligation to enter into negotiations on secession. Obviously, clarity cannot come from a double-barrelled question, nor a question that addresses something other than secession, nor one that mixes in other considerations (Babbie 1973, 140; Blais and Durand 1997, 385; Lemieux 1992, 98).15 The Supreme Court mentions the wish to no longer remain in Canada (Reference 1998, para. 92, 104, 151). The closer the question is to such wording, the clearer it is. If a secessionist government is confident that it has the support of the public, it would be in its interest, as well as everybody else’s, to formulate a clear question that allows no doubt. In its opinion, the Supreme Court mentioned the words “clear majority” no fewer than seventeen times and also referred to a “strong” majority (“l’ampleur de la majorité” in the French version; para. 151). Further, the Court (para. 93) refers to a “clear majority of the population of Quebec,” a concept that includes much more than the number of votes expressed.

Democracy against Unilateral Secession

101

In Scotland’s case, a simple majority of the vote cast would be regarded as sufficient to enter into negotiations on secession, but no legal referendum may be held without the uk government’s authorization. “Now is not the time,” said uk Prime Minister Theresa May (2017) to Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon during the spring of 2017, and May’s successor, Boris Johnson, guaranteed he would hold the same view (Brooks 2020). In the case of Northern Ireland, the Good Friday Agreement confers upon the uk secretary of state the power to organize a referendum. Moreover, they shall exercise this power only if “it appears likely to him that a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.”16 The painful saga of the Brexit negotiations between Britain and the European Union illustrates the degree to which a breakup may be difficult when premised off sharply divided views among a population, cut through its middle. In most referendums of external self-determination, the majority threshold needed for a decision was not an issue because an overwhelming majority for secession was a certainty. In some cases, a threshold has been fixed in advance: Iceland: three-quarters of votes cast; Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia: majority of eligible voters; Montenegro: 55 per cent of votes cast; Nevis: two-thirds of votes cast. In Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada advised not to determine in advance what constitutes a clear majority: “It will be for the political actors to determine what constitutes ‘a clear majority on a clear question’ in the circumstances under which a future referendum vote may be taken” (Reference 1998, para. 153).17 This is very wise advice for such a huge and irreversible decision, one so difficult to negotiate. There is a qualitative dimension to assessing clarity, which begs for a political assessment to be done in full understanding of the circumstances. As a former dean of law of Osgoode Law School, the late Peter Hogg (2000), stated, “I just don’t think there is a constitutional basis for doing that [setting a threshold in advance] and that’s why fidelity to the Court’s judgment requires us now to wait until after the referendum.” Similarly, in the words of Alain Pellet (1999, translated by author), former president of the United Nations International Law Commission, “It is not possible, according to the Court, to proceed with such determination in abstraction and in advance.” This is in line with the Canadian tradition of considering referendums as consultations,

102

Stéphane Dion

the consequences of which need to be evaluated in light of their results (Dion 2018). To limit the risk of disagreement over the clarity of a majority, a secessionist government needs only to avoid holding a referendum until it is reasonably assured of the existence of that clear majority, the referendum being the opportunity to formalize this consensus.

t he r e as o n t h e

c l a r i t y ac t

was neces sary

The Supreme Court’s opinion described the conditions under which secession could take place in Canada: with clear support, in accordance with the rule of law, through the negotiation of a constitutional amendment, and with concern for fairness for all. So if that opinion was so clear and flawless, why did the Government of Canada feel the need in 2000 – two years later – to have Parliament enact a law, the Clarity Act, that would give it effect? The answer is not found in the content of the Court’s opinion, but rather in the Quebec government’s refusal to accept the Court’s opinion. The Government of Canada was fully satisfied with the Court’s 1998 opinion; it provided the clarification the government sought. The Attorney General of Canada did not argue for Canada’s indivisibility. Rather, the attorney general submitted that “the Constitution is capable of accommodating any alteration to the federation, including such an extraordinary change as the secession of a province,” and that “the risks of political impasse, with its attendant consequences, are far greater if one is operating outside the framework of the rule of law and the Constitution than under it” (Newman 1999, 40, 54–5). The Government stated that negotiations would occur, within the constitutional framework, if there was a clear support for secession. For example, on 8 December 1997, months before the Court issued its opinion, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien declared, “In such a situation [clear support for secession], there will undoubtedly be negotiations with the federal government” (translated by the author from Bellavance 1997). I myself had often highlighted this principle in my speeches and public letters, beginning with my first ministerial statement, in January 1996, in which I said (in French), “In the unfortunate eventuality that a firm majority in Quebec were to vote on a clear question in favour of secession, I believe that the rest of Canada would have a moral obligation to negotiate the division of the territory” (translated by the author from H. Young 1996).

Democracy against Unilateral Secession

103

On 23 March 1998 in Montreal, in an address delivered before the Canadian Bar Association, I spoke in a way that would be echoed in the Court’s opinion five months later: If it were to be determined that Quebeckers no longer wanted to be Canadians, negotiations would be undertaken within the legal framework. In that eventuality, the secessionist government would be in no position to decide alone what would be negotiable and what wouldn’t. Secession would be very difficult to achieve, there would be numerous pitfalls and risks of derailment, the economic situation would be deeply disturbed, but at least one could hope to avoid chaos. A mutually agreed-on secession could be based only on very clear support by Quebeckers, recognized by all, and would have to be negotiated with concern for fairness for all. The different interests that would be expressed within Quebec would also have to be taken into account, as well as the concerns of all Canadians (Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs 1998). The substance of the Clarity Act derives from the Supreme Court’s opinion. Closely following that opinion, the Act deals with the clarity of the question, the clarity of the majority, and those issues that must be discussed during negotiations. The Clarity Act forbids the Government of Canada from entering into negotiations on secession unless and until the House of Commons has concluded that there is clear support for secession, and forbids the Government from proceeding with a constitutional amendment on secession until it has been duly negotiated within the constitutional framework. Such prescriptions clearly flow from the Court’s opinion. Appearing before the House Standing Committee charged with studying Bill C-20 (which became the Clarity Act), Dean Peter Hogg (2000) testified, “Bill C-20 is completely consistent with the Supreme Court’s judgment and I think it would be difficult to both support the decision of the Court and reject the Bill.” The reason it became necessary to proceed with the Clarity Act is that the Quebec government of the day, the Bouchard government, refused to accept the Supreme Court’s opinion in its entirety. The government only recognized what best suited it – the obligation to negotiate – and rejected everything else, notably the need for clear support and the absence of a legal foundation for unilateral secession (Dion 1999).

104

Stéphane Dion

The Quebec secessionist parties’ position – that the Government of Canada has no authority at all over the secession process – is not only contrary to the Supreme Court’s opinion and the Clarity Act, but it is also inherently untenable. The Government of Canada has the moral duty to oppose the loss of Quebec from Canada unless Quebeckers have clearly expressed support for secession, and until secession has been duly negotiated. In a democratic state, the government cannot proceed to dismantle the country and put an end to its constitutional obligations toward a given part of its population if it does not have the assurance that this is what the population in question truly desires and if a separation agreement has not been negotiated. It is sometimes claimed that the Clarity Act makes secession impossible because, allegedly, other Canadians would never accept the secession of Quebec, and therefore the secessionist government would be entitled, in keeping with the 1998 opinion of the Supreme Court, to give Quebec the status of an independent state after negotiations that it had deemed fruitless (Binette 2018; Laporte 2018; Turp 2013). However, this reasoning is flawed both legally and politically. Legally, we have seen that the Court explicitly refused to speculate on what would happen in the event of a deadlock in negotiations, but underlined that, in any case, for secession to be constitutional, an amendment must be negotiated (Reference 1998, para. 97). Politically, if it is believed that other Canadians would never accept Quebec’s independence, why then would they ever accept it should it be declared without the agreement of the Canadian state? Why would they want to co-operate in an attempt at secession rejected by a large number of Quebeckers with the law on their side? A unilateral secession is a legal and practical impossibility; a legal secession is not. Constitutionally, secession is possible by an enabling amendment. The reality is that in Canada, no political party represented in Parliament, or in a provincial or territorial legislative assembly, has called for Quebeckers to stay as part of Canada against their clearly expressed will. In Canada, the reason why effective secession would be tremendously difficult to achieve does not lie in the rejection of a legal secession as a possibility; it is simply because breaking up a democratic, modern state is, in itself, even with the best will in the world, an extremely sensitive, complex, and daunting task, which cannot be carried out without clear support and outside the legal framework.

Democracy against Unilateral Secession

105

The Clarity Act, which gives statutory effect to the opinion of the Supreme Court, does not make secession impossible. It outlines the only way in which it could be done legally and practically if, of course, Quebeckers were clearly willing to secede instead of staying committed to Canada.18

c o n c l u s i on Outside extreme circumstances, international law does not recognize a positive right of unilateral secession; the international community does not support the recognition of unilateral secessions; democratic states, with few exceptions, reject secession as a constitutional impossibility; and all of them reject unilateral secession. The principle underlying the indivisibility of the state in a democracy is the right to citizenship. All citizens are entitled to the entire state and hold the right to transmit that entitlement to their children. No group of citizens, even when claiming to form a people or a nation, may take it upon itself to remove a part of the country from other citizens. Canada is one of the very few democracies that recognize their potential divisibility in law. But even in these few democratic states, secession is not recognized as a unilateral right, but as a possibility that requires a negotiated agreement with the government of the state. In the Canadian case, negotiations on secession would become an obligation only in the case of clear support. Secession would occur only if these negotiations were to result in an agreement duly negotiated within the constitutional framework resulting in an amendment to the Constitution of Canada, and with a search for a just outcome for everyone. Being unprecedented, the breakup of a modern democratic state such as Canada would be a grave and difficult thing – and an unreachable goal if pursued without clarity and outside the rule of law. This conclusion highlights the universal scope and significance of the 1998 opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada, and of the Clarity Act, which gives the Court’s opinion statutory effect.

106

Stéphane Dion

no t e s

1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8

As Canada’s minister of intergovernmental affairs from 1996 to 2003, Stéphane Dion sponsored the Clarity Act in Parliament in 2000. He is currently a Canadian diplomat. This text is written in his personal capacity. The author is indebted for comments on earlier versions of this chapter to the editors and anonymous readers of this book, to Jenna Renée Martinuzzi, and to Warren Newman. One may be surprised that my definition of unilateral secession includes the notion of negotiation while the usual definitions of unilateral secession do not, as is the case with that of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Buchanan 2017): “secession that is undertaken without the consent of the state and without constitutional sanction.” I am guided by the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1998 advisory opinion in Reference re Secession of Quebec, which, as we will see in this chapter, refers to a secession “without principled negotiation with other participants in Confederation within the existing constitutional framework” (para. 149) aiming to reach an “amendment to the Constitution” (para. 84) necessary for a secession to be legal (para. 84 and 97). Translated by the author from “24/60,” Info Radio-Canada, 22 August 2014. “Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion,” icj Reports 2010: 403, http://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/141/14120100722-adv -01-00-en .pdf (accessed 4 October 2020). On this advisory opinion, see Gaudreault-DesBiens 2019 and Crema 2019. Ibid., para. 56. Debates (Hansard), House of Commons Canada, 1 November 1995: 16063, https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/35-1/house/ sitting-252/hansard. For a review of Jean Chrétien’s declarations during the 1995 referendum, see Young 1998, 304–11. Translated by the author from Bertrand v Quebec (Attorney General), [1995] rjq 2500. On this ruling, see Newman 1999, 12–14. Bill 1, An Act Respecting the Future of Québec, 1st Sess., 35th Leg, Quebec, 1995, https://www.sqrc.gouv.qc.ca/documents/positionshistoriques/positions-du-qc/part3/Document30_en.pdf. Henderson v Quebec (Attorney General), [2018] scq 500-05-065031-013, https://blogueaquidedroit.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/2018-qccs-10301. pdf. This ruling is currently under appeal before Quebec’s Court of Appeal.

Democracy against Unilateral Secession

107

9 Bill 1, An Act Respecting the Future of Québec. 10 La Presse (Montreal), 22 May 1997. 11 As quoted in European Parliament, “European Parliament President Statement on the Situation in Catalonia,” press release, 27 October 2017, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/former_ep_presidents/president-tajani/en/ newsroom/european-parliament-president-statement-on-thesituation-in-catalonia.html. 12 Salamone, Anthony. “Right to Decide. Strategic Perspective on Scotland’s Independence Referendum Debate,” European Merchants, 14 July 2020. https://www.merchants.scot/media/em -Right-to-Decide.pdf. 13 Kohlhaas v State, [2006] S-11866, http://www.touchngo.com/sp/html/ sp-6072.htm; Kohlhaas v State, [2010] S-13024, http://www.touchngo. com/sp/html/sp-6450.htm. bv erfg , Beschlus der 2. Kammer des Zweiten Senats [2016] vom 16, 2 B vR 2499/16. 14 See also para. 69: “The Constitution Act, 1982 gives expression to this principle, by conferring a right to initiate constitutional change on each participant in Confederation. In our view, the existence of this right imposes a corresponding duty on the participants in Confederation to engage in constitutional discussions in order to acknowledge and address democratic expressions of a desire for change in other provinces. This duty is inherent in the democratic principle, which is a fundamental predicate of our system of governance.” 15 As translated by the author from Blais and Durand (1997, 385), “A question is ambiguous if it deals with more than one dimension. So it is best to introduce only one idea at a time.” 16 Northern Ireland Act 1998, c. 47, schedule 1. 17 Similarly, the Court chose not to determine in advance which constitutional amending procedure would apply to effect secession. See para. 105: “In accordance with the usual rule of prudence in constitutional cases, we refrain from pronouncing on the applicability of any particular constitutional procedure to effect secession unless and until sufficiently clear facts exist to squarely raise an issue for judicial determination.” That is the position that the Attorney General of Canada consistently took during the course of the Reference. See Newman 1999, 57–8. 18 According to a recent poll, eight Quebeckers out of ten are proud to be Canadian: Association of Canadian Studies – Association d’études canadiennes, “In the News: Canadian vs American Pride,” Leger’s Weekly Survey, 29 June 2020, https://acs-aec.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ Legers-Weekly-Survey-June-29-2020.pdf.

108

Stéphane Dion

r e f e r e nce s Babbie, Earl. 1973. Survey Research Methods. Australia: Wadsworth Publishing Company. Bastien, Frédéric. 2013. La bataille de Londres. Montreal: Boréal. Bellavance, Joël Denis. 1997. “oui : Pas question d’accepter une déclaration unilatérale.” Le Soleil (Quebec), 8 December. Binette, André. 2018. “La Cour supérieure rejette la vision de Stéphane Dion.” L’Action nationale (May): 76–81. Biondani, Di Paolo. 2015. “Zaia, la Corte boccia l’indipendenza veneta.” L’Espresso (Rome), 25 June. http://espresso.repubblica.it/attualita/2015/06/25/news/zaia-la-corte-boccia-l-indipendenza-veneta1.218949. Blais, André, and Claire Durand. 1997. Recherche sociale. Montreal, qc : Presse de l’Université du Québec, 1997. Brooks, Libby. 2020. “Boris Johnson Refuses to Grant Scotland Powers to Hold Independence Vote.” Guardian, 14 January. https://www. theguardian.com/politics/2020/jan/14/boris-johnson-refuses-to-grantscotland-powers-to-hold-independence-vote/. Buchanan, Allen. 2017. “Secession.” In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/fall2017/entries/secession (accessed 4 October 2020). Clarity Act. 2000. sc 2000, c. 26. Crawford, James. 1997. “State Practice and International Law in Relation to Unilateral Secession.” Report to the Canadian Department of Justice. Crema, Luigi. “The Reference re Secession of Quebec, the Kosovo Advisory Opinion and the Questions They Leave Open: The Right to Decide, the Principle of Stability, and the Duty to Negotiate.” In The Canadian Contribution to a Comparative Law of Secession, edited by Giacomo Delledone and Giuseppe Martinico, 89–110. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Delledone, Giacomo, and Matteo Monti. 2019. “Secessionist Impulses and the Italian Legal System: The (Non)Influence of the Secession Reference.” In The Canadian Contribution to a Comparative Law of Secession, edited by Giacomo Delledone and Giuseppe Martinico, 201. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Derriennic, Jean-Pierre. 1995. Nationalisme et démocratie: réflexion sur les illusions des indépendantistes Québécois. Montreal, qc : Boréal.

Democracy against Unilateral Secession

109

Dion, Stéphane. 1995a. “Why Is Secession Difficult in Well-Established Democracies? Lessons from Quebec.” British Journal of Political Science 25: 1103-17. – 1995b. “The Dynamic of Secessions: Scenarios after a Pro-Separatist Vote in a Quebec Referendum.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 28, no. 3: 533–51. – 1999. Letter to Mr Lucien Bouchard, 25 August 1998. In Straight Talk, 243–7. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press. – 2013. “Une autre thèse réfutée.” La Presse (Montreal), 17 July. https:// www.lapresse.ca/debats/votre-opinion/201307/16/01-4671372-uneautre-these-refutee.php. – 2015. “Jacques Parizeau’s House of Cards; Stéphane Dion Reviews Chantal Hébert and Jean Lapierre’s The Morning After.” Inroads 36 (Winter/Spring). http://inroadsjournal.ca/jacques-parizeaus-houseof-cards. – 2018. “La signification des référendums au Canada.” In La démocratie référendaire dans les ensembles plurinationaux, edited by Patrick Taillon and Amélie Binette, 167–80. Quebec: Presses de l’Université Laval. Draper, Theodore. 1993. “The End of Czechoslovakia.” New York Review of Books 40: 20–6. Fejtö, François. 1994. Requiem pour un empire défunt. Histoire de la destruction de l’Autriche-Hongrie. Paris: Edima/Lieu commun. Gaudreault-DesBiens, Jean-François. 2019. “The Law and Politics of Secession: From the Political Contingency of Secession to a ‘Right to Decide’? Can Lessons Be Learned from the Quebec Case?” In The Canadian Contribution to a Comparative Law of Secession, edited by Giacomo Delledone and Giuseppe Martinico, 56–63. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Germann, Micha. 2017. “Pax Populi or Casus Belli? On the Conflict Resolution Potential of Self-Determination Referendums.” PhD diss., eth Zürich. Greenleaf, W.H. 1998. The British Political Tradition, vol. 1 in The Rise of Collectivism. London: Routledge. Hogg, Peter. 2000. Testimony to the Legislative Committee on Bill C-20, An Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as set out in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession

110

Stéphane Dion

Reference. Ottawa: House of Commons Canada (Hansard), 22 February. https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/36-2/clar / meeting-6/evidence. Knopff, Rainer. 2020. “Refining Alberta’s Equalization Gambit.” Fraser Research Bulletin. https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/ refining-albertas-equalization-gambit.pdf (accessed 4 October 2020). Laporte, Maxime. 2018. “Loi 99: L’être et le droit.” L’Action nationale (May): 62–75. Lemieux, Vincent. 1992. “La formulation de la question.” In Démocratie et référendum: la procédure référendaire, edited by Pierre F. Côté et al. Montreal, qc : Québec-Amérique. Lim, Edmund. 2015. “Behind the Scenes: What Led to Separation in 1965.” Straits Times, 5 August. https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/ behind-the-scenes-what-led-to-separation-in-1965. Lindgren, Raymond. 1951. Norway-Sweden: Union, Disunion, and Scandinavian Integration. New York: Praeger Publishers. Martos, José Antonio Montilla. 2016. “The Independence Referendum in Germany.” Blog post to Instituto de Derecho Publico, Universitat de Barcelona. http://idpbarcelona.net/docs/blog/referendum_germany.pdf (accessed 4 October 2020). May, Theresa. 2017. “‘Now Is Not the Time’: May on Second Scottish Referendum.” Guardian, 17 March. https://www.theguardian.com/ politics/video/2017/mar/16/theresa-may-second-scottish-referendumnow-is-not-the-time-video. Mendez, Fernando, and Micha Germann. 2018. “Contested Sovereignty: Mapping Referendums on the Reallocation of Sovereign Authority over Time and Space.” British Journal of Political Science 48, no. 1: 141–65. Milne, R.S. 1966. “Singapore’s Exit from Malaysia; the Consequence of Ambiguity.” Asian Survey 6, no. 3: 175–84. Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs. 1998. “The Practical Difficulties of a Unilateral Secession.” Address to the Canadian Bar Association, Montreal, qc , 23 March. Republished in Dion, Stéphane. 1999. Straight Talk, 233–8. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press. Newman, Warren J. 1999. The Quebec Secession Reference; the Rule of Law and the Position of the Attorney General of Canada. Toronto: York University. Pellet, Alain. 1999. “Avis juridique sommaire sur le projet de loi donnant effet à l’exigence de clarté formulée par la Cour suprême du Canada

Democracy against Unilateral Secession

111

dans son avis sur le Renvoi sur la sécession du Québec.” 13 December. http://vigile.quebeclarchives/9912/pelletclarte.html. Pinard, Maurice. 2000. “Confusion et incompréhension entourant l’option souverainiste.” Brief presented to the House Standing Committee charged with studying Bill C-20, February. Qvortrup, Matt. 2014. “Referendum on Independence, 1860–2011.” Political Quarterly 85, no. 1: 57–64. – 2019. “Independence Referendums. History, Legal Status and Voting Behaviour.” In Between Democracy and Law. The Amorality of Secession, edited by Carlos Closa, Costanza Margiotta, and Giuseppe Martinico, 132–51. New York: Routledge. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 scr 217. Tomasson, Richard F. 1980. Iceland: The First New Society. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Trudeau, Pierre Elliott. 2008. “Speech Delivered at the Paul-Sauvé Arena, Montreal, 14 May 1980,” in Great Canadian Speeches: Words that Shaped a Nation, edited by Brian Busby, 163. London: Capella. Turp, Daniel. 2013. “Can Quebec Unilaterally Secede from Canada? yes .” Ottawa Citizen, 20 June. https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/ can-quebec-unilaterally-secede-from-canada-yes. Tusk, Donald (@eucopresident). 2017. “For EU nothing changes. Spain remains our only interlocutor. I hope the Spanish government favours force of argument, not argument of force.” Twitter, 27 October. https:// twitter.com/eucopresident/status/923914819631271936. United Nations Secretary General. 1992. “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping.” Report pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. un Doc A/47/277. http://www.un-documents.net/a47277.htm. Venice Commission. 1999. “Self-Determination and Secession in Constitutional Law.” Report adopted by the Commission at its 41st meeting, Venice, Italy, 10–11 December. https://www.venice.coe.int/ webforms/documents/?pdf=cdl-inf (2000)002-e. Newman, Warren J. 1999. The Quebec Secession Reference: The Rule of Law and the Position of the Attorney General of Canada. Toronto: York University. Young, Huguette. 1996. “Référendum au Québec: Dion prêt à reconnaitre un oui majoritaire.” Le Soleil (Quebec), 27 January.

112

Stéphane Dion

Young, Robert A. 1994. “The Breakup of Czechoslovakia.” Research Paper no. 32. Kingston, on : Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. – 1995. The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada. Montreal, qc, and Kingston, on: McGill-Queen’s University Press with the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. – 1998. The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada, rev. ed. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press with the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations.

6

Has the Economic Risk Associated with Quebec’s Independence Increased? Philippe Faucher

After fifty years of party politics (the Parti Québécois was founded in 1968) and two referendums (1980 and 1995), it should be clear by now that if some economic advantages to the population of Quebec were associated with independence, these would be known and widely promulgated (and regularly challenged). If there had been a collective understanding that there are economic gains to be made and reduced pain to endure by declaring Quebec an independent country, it is also probable that the option to remain in the federation would not have won in two popular consultations. Nevertheless, the matter is still a question of debate. It is understood and accepted that Quebec’s sovereignty is not a matter of economic gains. There is much more to it – not least, issues of cultural identity; recurrent fears of assimilation in the French-speaking community; some historical, if no longer openly religion-based, antagonism with the rest of Canada; and an overall aspiration for national self-determination. In short, the debate about independence is not over money. Thus, an exhaustive appraisal of the economic risk associated with secession would represent an interesting but certainly not conclusive argument to the central debate over the creation of an independent country. It was imperative for Bob Young, as an intellectual and a political scientist, to think and write about “important questions.” He would challenge himself to address difficult questions and embrace a commitment to find answers to problems that concerned a large audience. This is why he focused his books, his most personal works,

114

Philippe Faucher

on the raging political battle over the secession of Quebec. In his two related books, The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada (1995) and The Struggle for Quebec (1999), the starting point is a question: What if Quebec were to separate after a victorious referendum? Simple enough! How to think the unthinkable without being derailed, and be enlisted in the fight? How to produce a work of scientific value on an issue where the pounding of emotions from all sides was intense? This jump into an arena where reputations are at stake and public stabbing the norm required a long training that resulted in a substantial research paper on the breakup of Czechoslovakia. A few articles were published like trial balloons (Young 1994a; 1994b), evidence of intense activity, for there was a deadline, “un rendez-vous avec l’Histoire” (to use a rather pompous French saying), that could not be missed. My hope, with this contribution, is to bear witness to the total intellectual integrity that characterized Bob’s work. In The Secession of Quebec and The Future of Canada (1995), Bob considered the institutional arrangements that might link Canada and a sovereign Quebec. The book was inspired and written as an appeasing contribution to the heated debates that led to the referendum of October 1995. The economics of transition and the related strategies of the orders of government and institutions involved are an important element of Bob’s contribution. These will be presented in the first part of this chapter. In the second section, I analyze the economic situation. The relative wealth of Quebec compared with most of the other provinces has a double cutting edge. If Quebec’s economic condition has improved since the last referendum, federalists can claim that the province has prospered in the current institutional setting and that there is no need for separation. Using the same evidence, separatists may argue that those economic gains were realized because of renewed pressures for autonomy and that an independent Quebec without the burden of the federation can only perform better. I will examine how the economic situation has evolved since the second referendum. Markets have evolved and the international economic order has changed. Most of the changes that affected the world economy during the past forty years can be expressed in a word: globalization. This can be characterized by an increase in financial liberalization, market integration, and international competition and mobility. As a small nation,1 Quebec’s viability as a developed economy is a matter

Economic Risk and Quebec Independence

115

of continuous speculation. For a small economy, unrestricted access to the world market is crucial. In the third section, I ask: does globalization increase or lower the risk of secession? To be independent as a country is to assume as much responsibility as possible over matters of economic development and control over monetary and fiscal instruments. In the course of history, very few countries have had this power. Developing economies have often denounced imperialistic countries and international institutions for their “dependent” condition. For the past decades, emerging economies, such as China, India, and Brazil, have challenged the international economic system. Developed countries are now facing intense competitive pressure as their former colonies become competing economies. But there is a debate about how independent public policies can be, and about the capacity of a government to implement a set of policies in conformity with the democratic process while collecting the benefits of being an open market. Trade, financial flows, international regulations, environmental awareness, and practices have evolved, with a significant impact on national governance. In an age of commercial integration and unrestricted capital flows, it is no longer clear if an “independent” economic policy is feasible.

rob e rt yo u n g o n s e c e s si on: the argument Bob’s merit was to understand that the “unthinkable” separation of Quebec should be analyzed and contingency plans elaborated. In his analysis of secessions, Bob lucidly considered the diversity of options and strategies available to all stakeholders following a vote in favour of secession and its aftermath. Regarding economic matters, there are three types of costs to be considered. Transaction costs are the first that come to mind, the most technical and eventually the first ones to be negotiated. Governmental assets (roads, bridges, land, etc.), distribution of debts, social security, pensions, and numerous other commitments will be evaluated, reinterpreted, and somehow redesigned. Although the items on the negotiators’ agenda can be listed with accuracy, the actual transition costs associated with Quebec’s independence are not a simple matter of accounting. A number of “rules” and “measures” would need to be created in this “period of redefinition” to create a mutually acceptable negotiation environment. There is no predetermined “fair share” rule to guide the partition.

116

Philippe Faucher

Even less predictable are what Bob called the costs to the “real” economy. Firms will have to adjust to changes in rules and regulations, administrative practices will be altered, taxes and permits adjusted, and much more. All these changes will involve costs. Value chains may be transformed according to the firms’ redefined strategies in the new environment. Managing operations and production facilities will move across borders and investment decisions will be re-evaluated, jobs will be lost, and workers will be invited to move. These market adjustments will take place over several years, and governments will not remain passive bystanders as they try to redefine favourable market environments at a substantial cost to taxpayers. Any realistic scenario needs to consider the most unpredictable “polarization” costs that, as acknowledged by Bob, are beyond the scope of rationality (Young 1995, 268). It is difficult to predict the outcome of polarization for each economy. This is not a “mutually assured destruction” scenario and there are reasons to believe that “moderation,” mutually beneficial, may prevail. Nevertheless, some firms will intentionally change suppliers, give priority to other markets and customers, and even eventually consciously incur losses out of resentment in order to damage “the other side,” thus making a strong political public statement in the hope of a return to the status quo ante. The collective cost of such reactions can only be estimated through comparison with other cases of secession.2 There is no reason to believe that any significant change has occurred for any of these costs during the twenty-five years since the last referendum. The factors of risk have remained the same. The situation has not been made either easier or more complex, and no blueprint or contingency plan has been designed by either side. Uncertainty, “the fear factor” often denounced and “instrumentalized,” plays in favour of the status quo. But the economic situation has evolved, which may have an impact on the process and costs of secession. To evaluate changes in the economic risk associated with independence, we need to look at the evolution of the economic relations between Canada and Quebec, to consider the level of integration associated with trade, and also to look at currency and monetary policy. Following Bob’s reasoning, there are four institutional formulas for market integration: • Canada operates as an economic union3 associated with the highest level of integration. This is the current situation,

Economic Risk and Quebec Independence

117

which, if maintained, would minimize risks but limit Quebec’s autonomy. If secession is to happen, it is difficult to consider maintaining an economic union an acceptable option. • The next step takes the form of a custom union,4 whose main features are common external tariffs, implying for policy purposes a joint commercial policy. This union remains for goods and services a fairly seamless market environment, thus implying limited uncertainty. • In a free trade area, each country maintains an independent commercial policy, and thus border controls are required for enforcement, implying costs and added uncertainty linked to the capacity of each country to alter its policies unilaterally. • Finally, multilateral integration according to international rules, such as those of the World Trade Organization, is the stage of least integration, associated with high uncertainty. Any alteration in the structure of commercial integration generates costs and uncertainty combined with changes in constraints on policy autonomy. The bigger a share of Quebec’s economic output is sold to other provinces and to the rest of the world, the more pressures can be expected in favour of the status quo. I return to this topic in the next section of this chapter. The other major aspect of economic relations concerns monetary policy and the currency. (This section draws from Young 1995, ch. 4.) Basically a national currency is a policy tool that through changes in the money supply participates in the management of inflation. Exchange rate fluctuations, either through voluntary intervention or as a result of speculation, can contribute to changes in trade flows, and the uncertainty will reflect on access to credit in the form of a premium over borrowing rates. Bob identifies four policy options, from the status quo – that is, sharing the Canadian dollar – to the adoption of the US dollar.5 Again, there is a continuum between policy autonomy and greater uncertainty and costs the further we move from the status quo. Also, the choice of currency raises issues of credibility that are distinct in the short- and long-term horizons: • Adopting the Canadian dollar will be a factor of stability in the short term. Quebec’s autonomy will be limited under such an arrangement. Because of diverging economic policies or market

118

Philippe Faucher

expectations, tensions may appear and speculative pressures may impose the creation of distinct currencies in the long term. • A Canada-Quebec common currency with representation in the Bank of Canada is probably an economically viable compromise. Quebec would be entitled to a share of seigniorage.6 Being the minority partner, Quebec would remain a policy-taker on matters of monetary policy. On the other hand, Canada would be sharing responsibility for Quebec’s fiscal and balance-of-payments deficits. The resulting loss in confidence would have to be compensated for by premiums on credit, and an increased vulnerability to speculation would also make this arrangement unstable. • Another possibility would be the adoption by Quebec of the US dollar. It is difficult to imagine how this option could be compatible with any claim of sovereignty. The new state would place itself as a permanent policy-taker, with American inflation becoming Quebec’s (Young 1995, 47). Ottawa would resist such a policy option because a larger share of its foreign trade would be labelled in US dollars. • The creation of Quebec’s own national currency is a radical leap into the unknown because we cannot predict how credit agencies and financial markets would react, even though the new currency could be pegged to the Canadian dollar. This is a last-resort proposition associated with no gain of policy autonomy for the secessionist government. There is a general trade-off for an independent Quebec between acquiring more control over economic policy, through various instruments, and the costs and uncertainty generated by secession. There is also a built-in structural incentive for Canada to resist both changes and accommodations because both will involve costs in the institutional economic framework. The theory has not changed since the last referendum, but the market reality has evolved over the years. In the next sections I consider how much stronger or more vulnerable Quebec’s economy has become, and the new constraints associated with the recent evolution of international markets.

Economic Risk and Quebec Independence

119

t he e vo l u t io n o f q u e bec’s economy over t h e pas t t w e n t y-fi ve years A few basic indicators are helpful to characterize the evolution of Quebec’s economy within the Canadian federation. First is the gross domestic product (gdp ), a global measure of wealth. If we divide the gdp by population, we get a measure of per capita income. That measure can be compared with similar data from other provinces and territories of Canada. The unemployment rate is also a measure of economic activity, and the debt as a proportion of total revenues is a measure of market exposure. For the period 1995–2015, Quebec’s average growth was 2.3 per cent, below that of Ontario (2.7 per cent) and the Canadian average (2.5 per cent).7 The Quebec economy represented 24 per cent of that of Canada in 1981; 21.9 per cent in 1995; and 19.2 per cent in 2015 – a notable decline. In that same year, Quebec’s per capita gdp was 20 per cent lower than Ontario’s and Canada’s. This proportion has not changed for the past forty years. Unemployment is also a measure of economic dynamism with strong political connotations. It is currently claimed – mostly erroneously – that governments have a responsibility (at least indirectly) for job creation (for which they certainly take ample credit). Quebec’s unemployment rate was high in the 1980s and 1990s, oscillating between 10 and 15 per cent. It diminished in 2000 and has remained below 8 per cent since, slowly declining recently to reach 6 per cent in 2017, the lowest rate in over thirty years. Unemployment has remained significantly lower in Ontario for most of this period.8 Another part of the answer regarding the economic risk associated with independence comes from examining the evolution of interprovincial and international trade (see table 6.1). In 1990, the interprovincial exports of Quebec represented 22 per cent of the total supply of gdp , and imports 21 per cent. That same year, international exports amounted to 21 per cent of gdp , and imports 25 per cent. Considering the situation in 2016, we note that both exports and imports with the rest of Canada have declined by four points to 18 per cent and 17 per cent respectively. During the same period, international trade increased significantly to 28 per cent for exports (+7 points) and 33 per cent for imports (+8 points). A complete analysis would require looking at specific sectors, distinguishing between the manufacturing, service, and primary sectors, and

120

Philippe Faucher

Table 6.1 | Interprovincial and international trade, Quebec, 1990 and 2016 (percentage of provincial gdp ) Quebec

1990

2016

Change in % 1990–2016

Interprovincial export

21.7%

17.8%

–18.0%

Interprovincial import

20.7%

16.7%

–20.0%

International export

21.3%

28.0%

+31.0%

International import

25.4%

33.3%

+31.0%

Total export

43.0%

45.8%

+6.5%

Total import

46.1%

50.0%

+8.4%

Source: Cirano, “Le Québec économique,” https://qe.cirano.qc.ca (accessed 12 October 2020).

considering specific industries. An analysis of the global value-adding chain in order to appreciate the level of integration of Quebec’s production into regional and/or international markets would also be relevant (Institut de la statistique du Québec 2015). At this point, the data confirm what we already know about the Canadian economy: that it is very open and depends on trade. The total value of Quebec exports amounts to 46 per cent of total value, and imports to 50 per cent of gdp for 2016. These data also reaffirm the intrinsic value for Quebec of integration into larger markets – mostly the United States, where 71 per cent of Quebec exports are sent and where 35 per cent of imports originate. The challenges of global integration confronting economic policy are addressed in the following section. Quebec’s economy has not improved during the past thirty-five years because the standard of living remains 20 per cent lower than the Canadian average. On the other hand, the economic situation has not deteriorated, although rates of growth have declined for the past twenty years. If secession were to be to be negotiated now, Quebec would be in no better a position than it was in 1995. This is why the fear of losing to a richer and stronger Canada will likely dominate the political agenda the day following a victorious referendum.

Economic Risk and Quebec Independence

121

g l o ba l iz at io n a n d i ndependence Access to a large market, domestic and foreign, is an advantage to firms. It spares economic actors the hassles and uncertainty of currency fluctuations and costs related to exports (transports, insurance, exchange rate, permits, etc.). Extending borders and gaining access to a global market, thus lowering the costs and uncertainties of exports, is a basic argument in favour of market integration. Here it is worth repeating. For Quebec, the sum of imports and exports amounted in 2016 to 95 per cent of total value of output (gdp ); it is slightly more (103 per cent) for Ontario. 71 per cent of Quebec’s exports and 35 per cent of its imports are traded with the United States. Market integration is a reality and Quebec, being a small economy, needs access to wealthy Canadian and American customers. Bob, in an earlier paper, had considered the impact of this new market structure. In his terms globalization is understood as “increases in international flows of capital, direct investment, trade, and labour, along with greater transnational corporate activity, often in new forms like joint ventures and strategic alliances, and a massive increase in communications and in formation flows worldwide” (Young 1992, 122). Globalization can be considered from a different angle. It offers an alternative for subnational entities to generate revenues to implement developmental and social agendas. Size is no longer relevant, goes the argument. Globalization provides access to markets, which works to the advantage of smaller economies. Holitscher and Suter (1999) make the following argument: (1) unrestricted access to other societies will multiply opportunities and stimulate competition in the political system; (2) worldwide economic competition will create tensions as local interests are threatened; (3) the need for “competitive regulation” will reduce state revenues; (4) demands for compensation for lost market shares will increase; (5) diverse social entities (regional, cultural, linguistic, religious) will find support for their claims in the international system. Thus the traditional nation-state is no longer the exclusive focus of a group or region. Greater economic integration within the world economy may lower the costs of secession.9 International institutions, such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund, will guarantee access to markets and capital flows. Also, homogenous national entities are less burdened by costs resulting

122

Philippe Faucher

from compromise in conflict-ridden and inefficient polities within larger countries (Young 1992, 123). Overall, Bob sees limited reassurance in globalization. He believes that the transition costs associated with secession, compounded with Quebec’s increased exposure to the intense competition of international markets, are a matter of high risk. This skepticism about the benefits of globalization to ensure the sustainability of political fragmentation finds echo in an argument that identifies an irreconcilable tension between international integration and democratically expressed policy choices, known as “the globalization trilemma.” This argument goes to the core of the issue of political autonomy associated with independence. In strictly economic terms, the trilemma focuses on financial markets and monetary policy: “A country can maintain no more than two of the following three conditions: (i) A fixed rate of exchange between its currency and other currencies; (ii) Unregulated convertibility of its currency and foreign currencies; (iii) a national monetary policy capable of achieving domestic macroeconomic or development objectives” (Tobin 2000, 1102). Another version of the trilemma has to do with the democratic deficit resulting from globalization, as found in the works of Dani Rodrik (2011). According to this view, a high level of integration in the world economy (hyper-globalization) requires open markets to maximize investments, to the detriment of stability, and (most importantly from a democratic point of view) limits possibilities for financial protection and distribution through social programs. This view was recently challenged on the ground that there is no inherent national expression of sovereignty other than the one shaped by the political process (in this case democracy). Thus the trilemma in its political incarnation is reduced to a dilemma “between more globalization and reduced national policy space,” which is not necessarily contradictory (Palley 2017). This author insists that globalization will not only reduce the policy space but will eventually “twist it,” “shrinking it in some dimensions and expanding it in others (2). Once again, the dilemma faced by government is reduced to a trade-off between “the benefits of globalization vs. the costs of diminished policy space” (8). To determine how exposed Canada and Quebec is to this dilemma, we need a measure of globalization. Referring to a respected globalization index, that of the kof Swiss Economic Institute,10 Canada was attributed a score of 65.9

Economic Risk and Quebec Independence

123

in 1970; it increased in 1995 to 78.6, reaching 83.5 in 2015 – above a world average of 64.8. (Respective numbers for the United States were 59.9, 75.2, and 79.9.) It is safe to believe that Quebec’s globalization has increased accordingly in that same period. Any impact globalization may have on the policy space must be considered in any secession scenario. As part of Canada, Quebec is engaged in deep integration not far from the top of the most globalized countries. (This title belongs to the Netherlands, with its 90.24 rating on the 2015 kof index.) Following secession, the rest of Canada becomes, for all matters, a foreign market, implying a reduced level of integration with Quebec (depending under which formula Canada-Quebec relations are negotiated). As a result, the Quebec globalization index will increase accordingly (as “foreign trade” increases), limiting its expressions of sovereignty and reducing its government’s policy space with respect to the international market. Independence, therefore, implies a trade-off between more autonomy from Canada, more integration into the world economy, more exposure to the fluctuations of the US economy, and overall less policy autonomy. Aside from trade, the national debt can become a concern for an independent government. Rating agencies (Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch, among many) put a value on the perceived risk a borrower represents for lenders. Uncertainty associated with independence would certainly increase the cost of borrowing. Quebec is the most indebted province, second only to Newfoundland and Labrador. The Quebec public-sector debt in 2017 represented 69 per cent of gdp .11 Interestingly, more than 80 per cent of the debt is in Canadian dollars; there is no foreign debt, thus no exposure to foreign markets. However, in case of secession, whatever the currency adopted, there is no possibility to finance a ca $270 billion debt, which requires annually over $20 billion for refinancing, on the local market. Once secession is voted, a large amount of Quebec’s public debt, not to mention the private debt, will become foreign debt, increasing the new country’s exposure to financial markets. Today the Quebec public debt is appreciated by operators as partly protected by the overall credit enjoyed by the Canadian economy on international financial markets. In the event of secession, Quebec (unless it uses the Canadian dollar as currency) will lose that implicit guarantee and see its borrowing costs increase accordingly. Canada will too, incidentally.

124

Philippe Faucher

As corollary, following the trilemma/dilemma arguments, in the status quo, given the pressures of international competition, Quebec is provided a protected space by the Canadian market, allowing democratic expression of policy preferences (such as labour standards, health programs, social security, and pensions) that otherwise would be challenged by the economic interests who binge on hyper-globalization.12

c o n c l u s ion Has the economic risk associated with independence increased since the referendum of 1995? The population of Quebec is not significantly richer or poorer in comparison with the rest of Canada than it was in 1995. However, the risk has increased. The economy of the province is more vulnerable because of its exposure to international markets. The potential costs associated with the reaction of the “real” economy are more important as foreign multinationals control shares of the domestic market, and a number of local firms (from Couche-Tard to Bombardier to Cirque du Soleil) have expanded their activities in the world markets. As noted, it remains unclear how much autonomous economic policy can be achieved through political independence by a new country. In all configurations of an institutional economic system, given the level of globalization reached, it appears that an independent Quebec would remain a policy-taker. Over the past fifty years, the process of becoming an independent country has changed in a radical way. Economic and political links to the world have evolved in a way that limits the capacity of most states to implement a democratic collective preference over their development process. All aspects of governance are concerned: trade, the environment, security, immigration, education, and culture. Protection from intense foreign competition does not come only from national governments, but from international alliances, such as trade and security agreements, treaties, and conventions. A new country has to gain alliances and seek acceptance into various international networks, making commitments at each step that limit its policy autonomy in the process. The nation-state is no longer the compulsory and exclusive institutional instrument of collective affirmation. During the pre-referendum debates, the role of the United States, in the event of a victory of the separatist option, was raised. The Government of Quebec campaigned in the hope that the French

Economic Risk and Quebec Independence

125

government would support the nationalist position, at the cost of creating tensions between Ottawa and Paris. It is legitimate for a new country to seek international recognition and support from established powers. Nationalism has lost its appeal, being associated with protectionism, traditional values, and exclusion; it is no longer considered progressive, as it was when it found inspiration and legitimacy in the antiimperialist movement of the immediate post-war period. Suspicion has replaced benevolent support or indifference of foreign countries. Bob made it clear that the amount of co-operation between Quebec and the rest of Canada will determine how risks are managed and costs shared. In the past twenty-five years, there has been no progress in the political debate over the cost of transition. Is it a matter of strategy or indifference? In the months following the second referendum (1995), transition teams were disbanded, strategic reports shelved. Periodically, the Parti Québécois announces that when in power, it will fund new studies to support and promote the feasibility of independence. Invariably these announcements are followed by denunciations that public funds are not to be appropriated in support of a controversial partisan cause (Pilon-Larose 2018). As a result, uncertainty lingers as the debate revolves around the management of fear based on the fabricated threat of collective annihilation. In contrast with this partisan polarization, Bob made an important contribution in his academic studies on secession. The depth and accuracy of his analysis are remarkable. His work on the transition process, which cleverly considers the conflicting interests, the diversity of motives, and the strategies available to actors, is a clear demonstration of the crucial role that rigorous political analysis can play in such contexts. A much-needed relief from the shrieking noise of confrontation. not e s 1 The status of Quebec’s society as a nation was recognized by Parliament in 2006. The practical implications of this motion remain unclear. 2 Bob has a chapter on the “Breakup of Czechoslovakia” in his book (1995). 3 The Canadian economic union has the following features: “goods, services, and factors of production flow relatively freely within it. The federal government has established a common regulatory framework for many sectors and provides uniform enforcement of competition policy and many

126

4 5

6

7 8

9

10

11

Philippe Faucher

product standards. Tax systems are highly harmonized, especially on the corporate side” (Young 1995, 31). A common market stands between the economic union and the custom union (Young 1995, 33). “Quebec could (1) establish a separate currency with a floating exchange rate; (2) establish a currency and peg the rate to the Canadian dollar or the U.S. dollar; (3) keep using the Canadian dollar, either without or with a voice in monetary policy; or (4) use the U.S. dollar” (Young 1995, 43). In Canada today, seigniorage can be calculated as the difference between the interest the Bank of Canada earns on a portfolio of Government of Canada securities – in which it invests the total value of all bank notes in circulation – and the cost of issuing, distributing, and replacing those notes (“Understanding Seigniorage,” Bank of Canada, https://www. bankofcanada.ca/2020/05/seigniorage, accessed 27 July 2020). Cirano, “Le Québec économique,” http://qceco.ca/n/4511 (accessed 1 April 2020). In 2018, Ontario’s unemployment climbed above Quebec’s. The gap widened (+1%) on average for 2019 (Statistics Canada, “Unemployment Rate, Participation Rate and Employment Rate by Sex, Annual,” https:// www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1410032702, accessed 1 July 2020). “Globalization contributes to the disposition of unsatisfied groups to secede by diminishing the group’s (economic) dependence on the host state and thus … lowering the costs of exit” (Holitscher and Suter 1999, 261). The index is based on three dimensions, or core sets of indicators: economic, social, and political. Via these three dimensions, the overall index of globalization is based on current economic flows, economical restrictions, data on information flows, data on personal contact, and data on cultural proximity within surveyed countries. Globalization is defined as the process of creating networks of connections among actors at multi-continental distances, mediated through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital and goods. It is a process that erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies and governance and produces complex relations of mutual interdependence. A graphic evolution of the index (1970–2017) is available on the kof Swiss Economic Institute website. See eth Zürich, “kof Globalisation Index,” https://kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/ indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html (accessed 1 July 2020). “The public sector debt includes the government’s gross debt as well as the debt of Hydro-Québec, municipalities, universities and other government

Economic Risk and Quebec Independence

127

enterprises” (Ministère des Finances, Québec, “Debt Concepts,” http:// www.finances.gouv.qc.ca/en/Quebecs_debt329.asp, accessed 1 July 2020). Those opposed to independence always stress that an independent Quebec would have to increase the debt by its share of the federal debt. 12 The total federal transfer, including equalization, represented over ca $20 billion in 2015–16 (“Transferts fédéraux, 2019–2020,” cited in Cirano, “Le Québec économique,” https://qe.cirano.qc.ca/theme/financespubliques/transferts-federaux/tableau-transferts-federaux-2015-2016, accessed 1 July 2020).

r e f e r e n ce s Holitscher, Marc, and Roy Suter. 1999. “The Paradox of Economic Globalisation and Political Fragmentation: Secessionist Movements in Quebec and Scotland.” Global Society 13, no. 3: 257–86. Institut de la statistique du Québec. 2015. “Les chaines de valeur mondiales au Québec.” [email protected] 16, no. 1. Palley, Thomas I. 2017. “The Fallacy of the Globalization Trilemma: Reframing the Political Economy of Globalization and Implications for Democracy.” fmm Working Paper 08-2017. Düsseldorf, Germany: Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute. Pilon-Larose, Hugo. 2018. “Souveraineté: investir des fonds publics ‘n’est pas raisonnable,’ dit Couillard.” La Presse (Montreal), 23 February. http://www.lapresse.ca/actualites/politique/politique-quebecoise/201802/ 23/01-5155071-souverainete-investir-des-fonds-publics-nest-pasraisonnable-dit-couillard.php. Rodrik, Dani. 2011. The Globalization Paradox. New York: W.W. Norton. Tobin, James. 2000. “Financial Globalization.” World Development 38, no. 6: 1101–4. Young, Robert A. 1992. “Does Globalization Make an Independent Quebec More Viable?” In Federalism in Peril, edited by A.R. Riggs and Tom Velk, 121–34. Vancouver, bc : Fraser Institute. – 1994a. “How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?” Canadian Journal of Political Science 27, no. 4: 773–92. – 1994b. “The Political Economy of Secession: The Case of Quebec.” Constitutional Political Economy 5, no. 2: 221–45. – 1995. The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada. Montreal, qc, and Kingston, on: McGill-Queen’s University Press. – 1999. The Struggle for Quebec. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press.

7

How Do Secessions Not Happen? The Cases of Scotland and Catalonia François Rocher and Nadia Verrelli

The creation of a new state as a result of a peaceful and mutually agreed-upon process of secession is a phenomenon that rarely occurs. In How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen? Robert Young identified a number of conditions for this to happen, some before secession, others to be met after the decision to secede is made (Young 1994a). Using his preconditions, we analyze the secessionist attempts in Scotland and Catalonia. The goal of this chapter is to determine whether the failure of these recent attempts at secession can be explained using Young’s identified preconditions. Specifically, which of the preconditions were not met? Are there other conditions, not identified by Young? The first part of the chapter summarizes these conditions in the light of some theoretical contributions. The second section reviews these preconditions in the two selected cases.

s o m e t h e o r eti cal con s id e r at io n s : yo u n g’s contri buti on There is a wealth of literature on the legal aspects of the secessionist process (Tomuschat 1993; Webber 1997; Cassese 1998; Kohen 2006; Walter 2014), as well as on the moral foundations justifying such a decision and making it reasonable and fair (Christiano 1995; Buchanan 1991; 1997; Philpott 1995; Moore 1998; van den Driest 2013). Robert Young’s work is written from another perspective, that of rational choice and game theory.

How Do Secessions Not Happen?

129

According to Young, communities, like individuals, assess the benefits they can derive from such a significant change and seek to predict the gains and losses that may be incurred. From this perspective, the issues associated with secession must be analyzed mainly from a calculation of possible losses rather than potential benefits, strategic games of actors deployed by political actors, realpolitik rather than rights (Young 1994c, 222). He is not the only one to take such an approach. For example, John R. Wood had previously questioned the preconditions necessary for the success of a secession process (Wood 1981). Among these, he identified a territorial dimension (the secessionist group must be geographically concentrated); the presence of a certain degree of solidarity based on the existence of a common or distinctive culture; the belief that the overall situation of the group will be better off in a new state; the decline of the legitimacy and integrative capacity of the central state; and the perception that the central state threatens the integrity (economic, cultural, social, etc.), identity, and security of the secessionist group (121–2). A similar approach is adopted by Hechter, who also identifies sequentially a series of four configurations, each with its own dynamics, necessary for a secessionist process to come to an end (Hetcher 1992). For instance, on the issue of regional identification, it is important that the secessionist territory displays a high level of economic specialization combined with a well-rooted distinct culture, that the interests are shared by most individuals, that there is an unfavourable cultural division at the expense of the secessionist group, and that the social structure within the dissenting region favours interaction. Hechter argues that identification with the group must be strong enough to fuel the secessionist movement, which must then be sufficiently well-organized to support a functional institutional and partisan structure to maintain strong support until secession. Much depends, finally, on the response formulated by the host state. In particular, the latter must consider that the secessionist region is of little strategic interest and that the international community supports secession. For Hechter, the perfect alignment of these four configurations rarely occurs in advanced democracies. For his part, the political scientist Stéphane Dion developed a deductive model, inspired by a moderate rationalist approach, based on two simple propositions: “First, I suggest secessionist movements

130

François Rocher and Nadia Verrelli

are rooted in two types of perceptions: the fear inspired by the union and the confidence inspired by secession. Secondly, I propose that secessions are improbable in well-established democracies because these two perceptions are unlikely to exist simultaneously at a high level of intensity” (Dion 1996, 270). Fear is based on the expectation that the cultural, economic, or political situation of the national minority will deteriorate within the existing union. Self-confidence is based on the group’s beliefs that it can do better on its own and that secession is not too risky. Dion observes, “the secessionist links fear with the union, confidence with the secession. Obviously, the opponents’ strategy is the reverse: they must link confidence with the union and fear with the secession” (Dion 1996, 271). He concluded that it was extremely rare for the fear of a secessionist minority group in the union to be positively combined with the assurance that the latter would be better off outside of it. Secession therefore occurs only in exceptional circumstances. It is the exceptional nature of successful secession processes that has fuelled Robert Young’s work. However, much of his research is characterized by its prospective dimension – concerning first of all the potential secession of Quebec (Young 1994c; 1998; 1999), but also that of Scotland (Young 2014). He proposed a detailed analysis of the political debate surrounding the issues affecting the accession of Quebec to independence, the difficulties that would punctuate a secessionist victory, and the likely consequences for both Quebec and the new Canada (Young 1998; 1999). On the other hand, based on the secession of the former Czechoslovakia (Young 1994b), he identified a number of conditions that must be met in order for the process to find a “happy ending.” His model is close to that proposed by Hetcher and is more complex than the one developed by Dion. These elements are presented in a sequential manner as follows: i ii iii iv v

Secession follows protracted constitutional and political dispute; Secessor state declares its intent to withdraw; The predecessor state accepts the principle of secession; Secession is a momentous, galvanizing event; The government is broadened and strengthened on each side, and there is a premium on solidarity;

How Do Secessions Not Happen?

vi vii viii ix x xi xii xiii

131

The negotiations involve few participants; The settlement is made quickly; The settlement involves a relatively short list of items; Foreign powers play an important role; The secession is accomplished constitutionally; There are no other substantial constitutional changes in either the seceding or the predecessor state; Policies in the two states soon begin to diverge; Secession is irrevocable. (Young 1994a, 776–91)

It is interesting to note that only the first three dimensions relate to the process preceding the decision to secede. The others are set up after a decision has been made by political actors. It should also be noted that Young puts more emphasis, in this sequence, on partisan political dynamics and the institutional framework in which they unfold than on the mobilization, before and during the process, of civil society in favour of or against the secessionist project. The first dimension (i) refers to the presence of a long period of disagreement between the parties: “secession results from an impasse about an important matter of principle, even though this may be only one of many irritants, or one which becomes important as the symbolic focus of autonomist yearnings” (Young 1994a, 776–7). The second (ii) refers to the political dynamics present within both the secessionist region and the host state. The third (iii) is crucial in that the host state must accept the possibility of one of its constituent units leaving the union. On the other hand, inspired by research by political scientist Louis Imbeau (1991), Young was particularly interested in what he called “secession games,” in which the actors may choose to be conciliatory depending on the preferences attached to each of the possible outcomes, the amount of information available (including that relating to opponent preferences), the ability to predict the behaviour of the other party, and the expectation that opponents will participate in the same game in the future. The model gives rise to the following possibilities: Compromise or a new political arrangement; Independence with a high degree of Economic Integration; fh : a settlement that Favours the Host state, with minimal change from the status quo; or c:

iei :

132

François Rocher and Nadia Verrelli

rr : a Rupture of Relations after the region declares itself independent (adapted from Young 1994c, 236–7).

This model has the advantage of highlighting scenarios where the region seeking to review its constitutional status could increase its margin of autonomy (c and iei ) or permanently break with the host state (rr ). It is also possible that the secessionist process will fail but will result in either a host-state-driven (fh ) reorganization or a reshaping of the political system in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the host state (c ). In this model, based on the rationality of the actors and their strategic calculations, the use of credible threats is constant: not to participate in the negotiations; not to maintain the economic union; limiting the mobility of people; erecting borders; seeking to partition the territory; job loss and financial/industrial disinvestment; etc. This is partly because secession is perceived by the host state as a threat to its stability and integrity. In this context, we are witnessing a phenomenon of polarization and the growth of a feeling of hostility that is not conducive to compromise. The political dynamic is all the more complex as this polarization is also manifested within the secessionist region between supporters and opponents of secession (Young 2004, 390). Of course, political actors must evaluate the seriousness of the threats and the likelihood that they will be confirmed in the aftermath of the breakup. Thus, the threat of a lack of co-operation is a very logical option in the process that precedes the decision to break or not. In the same vein, the secessionist region must be able to play the card of non-co-operation (absence of economic association, for example). If the costs of not co-operating are too high for both parties, this can lead to a compromise position. As Young points out, “[a]nticipated economic loss is a powerful motive for constitutional flexibility, and a strong inhibition to radical constitutional change” (Young 1994c, 243). Therefore, and taking into account that neither of the two cases under review successfully seceded, we will analyze Scotland and Catalonia considering the first three dimensions preceding the secession as identified by Young. A secessionist process has been initiated in Scotland (2014) and Catalonia (2017). In these two cases, the process was not successful, although the immediate consequences were different.

How Do Secessions Not Happen?

133

whe n s e c e s s io n at t e m p ts fai l: the cases of s c o t l a n d a n d cataloni a Protracted Constitutional and Political Disputes scotland Nationalist sentiments in Scotland began to take shape in the sixties with a Scottish National Party (snp ) member winning a seat in the British Parliament in 1967, signalling the start of “home rule and/or independence for Scotland [in Britain] discourse on the political stage” (Mullen 2014, 629). Further, oil was discovered in the North Sea in 1970, promising economic stability, and bolstering nationalism and calls for devolution. These electoral victories, along with the rise of nationalism and perceived economic stability in Scotland, began the process of devolution whereby British governments, in an attempt to address the growing nationalists’ sentiments, began devolving power to Scotland. In 1973, the Kilbrandon Commission, a Royal Commission set up by the British government to review the situation in Scotland, released its report recommending legislative devolution (Mullen 2014, 629). While the Conservative government at time decided to shelve the recommendation, the Labour Party, forming a government in 1978, responded to the growing snp influence by legislating for substantial powers to be devolved to Scotland (and Wales). This culminated in the 1978 proposed Scotland Act, promising devolution, which was put to the people of Scotland in a referendum (Verrelli and Cruickshank 2014, 203). Not all Labour Members were in favour of devolution. Indeed, prior to the referendum day, an amendment to the Scotland Act was implemented stipulating that unless 40 per cent of eligible voters supported the Act, it would be null and void (Verrelli and Cruickshank 2014, 203). So, while 51.6 per cent of those who cast a ballot voted Yes, only 63.6 per cent of eligible voters voted. The Yes side did not achieve the 40 per cent threshold and the results were ignored. After the 1979 general election that saw the return of the Conservatives, the idea of devolution was shelved (Mullen 2014, 629). But the quest for increased Scottish autonomy remained. In 1988, the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, formed in the aftermath of the referendum and made up of Labour Party and some snp members and others, issued A Claim of Right for Scotland

134

François Rocher and Nadia Verrelli

affirming that “the will of the Scottish people was sovereign,” and recommended that a “convention should be established to draw up a scheme for a Scottish Assembly or Parliament” (Priddy 2016, 2). The Convention began meeting in 1989, and different proposals were considered; independence was not on the table, leading the snp to withdraw its participation, and the Conservatives simply refused to participate (Priddy 2016, 2–3). In 1995, the Convention released its plan for devolution; the plan eventually informed the Labour Party’s detailed 1997 proposal for devolution (Mullen 2014, 629). The proposal was put to the people in a two-question referendum. The victory of the Yes side led to the passing of the Scotland Act establishing the Scottish Parliament; the devolution of taxing power was, however, minimal (Mullen 2014, 630). For a majority of Labour Party members, devolution was a “means of saving the Union”; for those against devolution, the Conservative Party in particular, it was “a first step to independence” (Mullen 2014, 631). Devolution may have addressed the concerns of nationalists; however, it did not seem to go far enough for separatists. Over the next decade and a half, support for the snp grew, culminating in the snp forming the government in Scotland in 2007 and again in 2011, setting the stage for the 2014 referendum. catalonia The pro-independence movement began to take shape after 2003, when the coalition between the Socialist Party of Catalonia (psc ), the Republican Left of Catalonia (erc ), and the Greens (icv ) formed a government and quickly went to work to update Catalonia’s 1979 Statute of Autonomy, soon proposing the 2006 Statute of Autonomy. Previously, nationalism in Catalonia had mainly striven for greater autonomy within Spain and not necessarily separation from it. Montserrat Guibernau argues that “different alternative options – ranging from federation to political autonomy – have embodied the main Catalan nationalists’ projects” (Guibernau 2013, 380). The attempt to revise the 1979 Statute of Autonomy was acrimonious and led to demands for independence. Passing the 2006 Statute of Autonomy involved a three-step process: first, it was passed and ratified by the Catalan Parliament; second, it was sent to the Spanish Parliament, where it was revised and modified to ensure it complied with the Spanish Constitution; and third, the new statute was ratified by Catalans in a referendum

How Do Secessions Not Happen?

135

(Guibernau 2013, 381). The importance of the statute cannot be overstated; had it been fully implemented, the statute would have reaffirmed Catalan autonomy and its ability to express this autonomy within Spain. However, the Popular Party (pp ), the Spanish Ombudsman, and the governments of Murcia, La Rioja, Aragon, Valencia, and the Balearic Islands challenged the constitutionality of various aspects of the statute, “generat[ing] a sense of outrage among Catalans, who could not understand how the newly approved statute – after following all the procedures and modifications as requested by Spanish political institutions and the Constitution – could still be challenged” (Guibernau 2013, 381). On 28 June 2010, the Constitutional Court released its decision: fourteen articles were found unconstitutional and thirty severely modified, strengthening the Spanish state and hindering Catalans’ ability to express their autonomy. Not surprisingly, the decision upset the Catalans, leading to nearly one million people demonstrating on 10 July 2010 in Barcelona. Both the ruling and the demonstration “led to a change in the discourse of the main Catalan nationalism to the so-called ‘right to decide’ of the Catalans” (Marti 2013, 508). During this period, the political atmosphere was changing. After the 2000 general election in Spain, the pp , a party hostile to and “dismissive of claims for greater autonomy for the historical nationalism (Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country),” formed the government (Guibernau 2013, 381). Its hostility led Catalans to support the leader of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (psoe ), who promoted a plural Spain, during the 2004 general election. While he became the president of Catalonia, he was, according to Guibernau, “unable or unwilling to stand by his promise to support the new Statute of Autonomy [2006]” (Guibernau 2013, 381). Further, there was an emerging sentiment that the economic situation that Catalonia found itself in, especially in the period leading up to the referendum (particularly its high unemployment rate and increasing annual deficit), was a result of the financial arrangement the Spanish state imposed on Catalonia (Guibernau 2013; Serrano 2013). In 2012, Rajoy, then prime minister of Spain, continued to reject Catalonian president Artur Mas’s demands for a new fiscal agreement that included fiscal autonomy (Marti 2013, 509). Considering the political and economic atmosphere whereby the attempt by the Catalans and their government to define and/or assert

136

François Rocher and Nadia Verrelli

their autonomy politically and economically had been thwarted by Spain and its institutions, it seemed independence would be the only option for many Catalans. Intent to Secede scotland While founded in 1934, the secessionist snp first formed a minority government in the Scottish Parliament in 2007, an important and early feat considering the modern-day Scottish Parliament was only inaugurated in 1999. The original snp platform called for “Home Rule”; dominion status for Scotland within the British Empire; and independence within Britain (Lynch 2005, 504). After the failed 1979 referendum, the snp began discussing and promoting “independence in Europe,” wishing to remain a part of the Commonwealth, but not necessarily part of the United Kingdom. Once the snp began discussing independence, its goal became to win a majority of seats in the Scottish Parliament and “use this mandate to [declare] independence.” After the devolved Scottish Parliament was established, snp leaders realized that electoral victory was not enough, and so they began to discuss the idea of holding a referendum; since then, they remain committed to holding a referendum on Scottish independence (Lynch 2005, 504). After the 2007 election in Scotland, the minority snp government was limited in what it was able to do. One of its first action as a government was the launching of a “National Conversation” on Scotland’s constitutional future. The uk responded by establishing the Commission of Scottish Devolution (also known the Calman Commission) mandated to explore options for constitutional reform. Publishing its report in June 2009, the Commission recommended minor devolution and enhancement of tax-raising powers, the latter of which was enacted in the Scotland Act, 2012 (Mullen 2014, 631). In November 2009, the snp released Your Scotland, Your Voice: A National Conversation, proposing to hold a referendum on Scotland’s future and to establish a “national conversation” whereby the public and civil society would be encouraged to “engage in debating Scotland’s constitutional future” (Tierney 2013, 361). The Scottish Parliament, however, did not endorse this, and because the snp was a minority government, it did not introduce a referendum bill in

How Do Secessions Not Happen?

137

Parliament. This all changed in 2011. During the 2011 electoral campaign, the snp promised to hold a referendum on Scotland’s political future if it formed the government. When the results of the election were in, the snp had won 69 of the 129 seats in Parliament, enough to form a majority government, thus finding itself in a strong position to keep its campaign promise. And so the stage was set for the referendum on the future of Scotland. After working within the parameters of the Edinburgh Agreement (discussed below), the question “Should Scotland be an independent country?” and the date, 18 September 2014, were set. The referendum campaign began in late May 2014 with support for an independent Scotland hovering at 36 per cent (Ipsos mori 2014), jumping to 45 per cent in the final days (YouGov 2014) despite the No campaign’s (Better Together) promises of further devolution. Indeed, as the Guardian reported on 9 September 2014, there was “a growing sense of panic in Westminster that Scotland might do the unthinkable and break away” (Kellner 2014). In the end, Scottish independence was rejected with 44.7 per cent voting Yes and 55.3 per cent No, with a voter turnout rate of 86.4 per cent. This loss, however, did not mark the end, as the desire for an independent Scotland persists today. Not only were marches and demonstrations held in cities across Scotland throughout the summer of 2018 (bbc News 2018), but a poll published in July 2018 indicated that support for independence had risen by 2 per cent to 47 per cent since the referendum (Nutt 2018). catalonia After the Constitutional Court released its decision in 2010 on the 2006 Statute of Autonomy, the intent to secede became more pronounced in Catalonia. “Popular support for independence constantly grew from 25% in 2010 to 44% in 2012” (quoted in Marti 2013, 509). Further, as of March 2012, 65.7% of Catalans felt “frustrated by insufficient autonomy [and this number] rose to 71.6% in November 2012” (Guibernau 2013, 384). Catalans continued to demonstrate their growing support for independence through public peaceful demonstrations: in 2012, 1.5 million people gathered in Barcelona to demonstrate for independence; on 13 December 2009, “166 Catalan towns and cities held referendums on Catalonia independence” (Guibernau 2013, 384). Both events served as precursors to the two referendums held on Catalonian independence.

138

François Rocher and Nadia Verrelli

After President Mas was unable to secure a new fiscal arrangement with Spain, he called a snap election to be held on 25 November 2012. Throughout the electoral campaign, independence dominated the discourse, with Mas clearly indicating that if the Convergence and Union (CiU) party were to lead the next government, he would call a referendum (Marti 2013, 509). While the CiU did not form an absolute majority, they joined forces with the pro-independence party, the erc , and the two reached a governability agreement where one aspect was “to call a referendum to decide the future of Catalonia” (Marti 2013, 514). Thus they quickly began to take the necessary steps to hold a referendum. First, on 23 January 2013, the Catalan Parliament approved a Declaration of Sovereignty which “defines Catalonia as a sovereign political subject … emphasizes the democratic character of the decision on the future status of the country … [and] reaffirms the parliament’s attachment to eu principles” (Marti 2013, 514). Second, a delegation from the Catalonian government formally asked the Spanish Parliament to transfer the necessary powers to the Catalan government to enable it to hold a referendum on independence. Essentially, the Catalan government was looking for powers similar in scope to those that were recognized for Scotland in the Edinburgh Agreement. When the Spanish government rejected this request, the Catalan government went ahead and passed its own referendum law in September 2014, enabling it to hold a non-binding referendum (Marti and Cetra 2016, 108). The Spanish government responded to this action by challenging it at the Constitutional Court, which suspended the law. After the suspension of the referendum law, President Artur Mas decided to go ahead with the referendum, calling it a participation process. On 9 November 2014, Catalans were asked, “Should Catalonia be a state and if yes, should it be an independent state?” (Marti and Cetra 2016, 108). Once again, the Spanish government challenged the Catalonia government, specifically Mas’s decision to hold the referendum. And once again, the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of Spain, declaring that the referendum could not go ahead. In response, Mas argued that volunteers had organized the participation process and so it would proceed. On 9 November 2017, 36 per cent of eligible voters cast a ballot where 80.7 per cent voted Yes to both questions. The victory was a symbolic one at best.

How Do Secessions Not Happen?

139

The second referendum took place under a similarly constraining political atmosphere. Mas called a snap election to be held on 27 September 2013 and announced it “would be considered a de facto referendum on independence” (Marti and Cetra 2016, 108). Once again, independence dominated the discourse. Together for the Yes (JxS), a coalition between pro-secessionist parties CiU and erc , with Popular Unity Candidacy (cup ), another secessionist party, together won 72 seats. Soon after, JxS and cup passed a joint resolution to lay out an eighteen-month plan for Catalonia to disconnect from Spain (Marti and Cetra 2016, 115, 117). Not surprisingly, the Spanish government challenged the constitutionality of the resolution at the Constitutional Court, which suspended it until a ruling could be issued. Nonetheless, in June 2017, Charles Puigdemont, president of Catalonia, called for a referendum to be held in October 2017. The Constitutional Court, on 7 September 2017, ruled the referendum illegal, citing clause 2 of the Spanish Constitution, which states “the indissoluble unity of the Spanish State” (Spanish Constitution 1978). Nonetheless, the referendum took place on 1 October 2017, and while the voter turnout was low (42 per cent), an overwhelming majority voted for independence. So while both referendums resulted in favour of independence, both were plagued by low turnout rates, and more importantly both were regarded as illegal and symbolic at best. Predecessor States’ Acceptance of the Principle of Secession scotland While the uk government was an active participant during the Scottish referendum campaign, recognizing the legitimacy of popular consultation and accepting that the people of Scotland were entitled to a referendum, it was not convinced of the Scottish Parliament’s role in such a referendum. At first, it questioned whether the “Scottish Parliament had the legal power to authorize such a referendum under the Scotland Act, 1998” (Mullen 2014, 631). Soon afterward, it acknowledged that the “Scottish Parliament could hold a consultative, but not binding referendum” (Tierney 2013, 361). Eventually, the uk government entered into negotiations with the Scottish Parliament to set out the terms of the referendum. This latter effort resulted in an agreement between the Scottish and British Parliaments reached on 15 October 2012. The Edinburgh Agreement,

140

François Rocher and Nadia Verrelli

and the associated memorandum of agreement, confirmed that the Scottish Parliament would pass referendum legislation that would set the date of the referendum, the franchise, the wording of the question, rules on financing, and miscellaneous other rules for the conduct of the referendum (Tierney 2013, 362). It is important to note that while the agreement affirmed Scotland’s autonomy, especially in regard to setting the question, Scotland did have to work within some parameters: “the referendum [question] is to be concerned with ‘the independence of Scotland from the rest of the United Kingdom’ and that there can be only ‘one ballot paper at the referendum … giv[ing] the voter a choice between only two responses” (Tierney 2013, 362). Further, and equally important, the Scottish government decided to send the referendum question to the Electoral Commission for review even though it was not required to and even though the Commission did not have direct jurisdiction over Scotland. When the Commission expressed some concern over the original question, the Scottish government revised the question to read simply: “Should Scotland be an independent country?” (For a detailed look at the Electoral Commission’s involvement, see Verrelli and Cruickshank 2014.) The British government’s actions were notable and remarkable. As Stephen Tierney states, “The uk government has entered consensually, if somewhat reluctantly, into a process which could lead to the breakup of the state, a level of acquiescence which itself is unprecedented in the eu context” (Tierney 2013, 360). Further, the involvement of the Electoral Commission, a uk institution, legitimized the question and, in turn, legitimized the referendum. As a result, the uk could not come out after (or before or during) the referendum campaign and claim that the question was misleading or that the referendum was unconstitutional, as was the case for Catalonia, or that secession was illegal or the unilateral declaration of it was unconstitutional, as also occurred in Catalonia’s case. As a result of the British Parliament’s close involvement, the will of the Scottish people to be independent from Britain was legitimized by the uk government and its institutions, whereas for the Catalans, as we will see below, it was outright denied. catalonia From the outset, the Spanish government and state institutions were against the two referendums and increased autonomy for Catalonia. This is evident in the political parties’ and various

How Do Secessions Not Happen?

141

regional governments’ decision to challenge the constitutionality of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy at the Constitutional Court and the subsequent court ruling. The government’s decision to legally challenge and subsequently forbid both referendums, and again the court’s ruling whereby the indissolubility of the Spanish state was guaranteed in Article 2 of the Constitution, trumped the will and voice of the Catalan people. As Guibernau (2013) points out, Article 2 is the most controversial regarding Catalonia’s endeavour to seek full autonomy. It is not surprising, therefore, that the referendums and Catalonia’s ability to declare independence were challenged and forbidden. Considering these state actions, the rulings of the court, and the Constitution, one can safely assume that the Spanish state not only does not accept the principle of popular consultation or secession but will go to great lengths to suppress it, and likewise – it would seem – Catalonia’s autonomy. This became especially evident in the aftermath of the 2017 referendum. A few weeks after the referendum, a secret ballot was taken in the Catalan Parliament whereby it approved a motion “declaring independence.” The Spanish government quickly responded the next day by invoking Article 155 (referred to as the nuclear option) enabling the Spanish government to suspend the political autonomy of Catalonia and impose direct rule (bbc News 2017). Soon after, the Spanish government dissolved the Catalan Parliament and called for a new election to be held on 21 December 2017. Furthermore, the Spanish prosecutor laid charges against Puigdemont and other Catalan members behind the secessionist movement for rebellion, sedition, and misuse of public funds. At the time of writing, Puigdemont is in exile and an international warrant that was issued by the Spanish court has been retracted; however, the domestic warrants remain in place (Jones and Carrell 2018). On 21 December 2017, the regional election took place wherein the three pro-independence parties won a majority of seats (Clarke 2017). Seven months later, the Catalonia Parliament voted in “hard line secessionist” Quinn Torra as president (Jones 2018), which not only set the stage to end Spain’s direct rule in Catalonia but also signalled that the independence movement continued to thrive (Burgen 2018). According to Catalan News, while “independence is unlikely to happen in 2018 … the path towards a Catalan state will continue” (Jordan 2018). However, in polls published in El Periodico in July 2018, 21.5 per cent favoured independence and 62 per cent

142

François Rocher and Nadia Verrelli

indicated they were in favour of increased self-government (Masreal 2018). Both clearly demonstrate that for a majority of Catalans, the status quo remains insufficient.

c o n c l u s ion We began the chapter by stating that the creation of a new state as a result of a peaceful and mutually agreed-upon process of secession is a phenomenon that rarely occurs. Indeed, the two cases we reviewed reinforce this idea. The question becomes: why? Of Bob’s first three conditions, it is obvious that Scotland and Catalonia failed to meet the second condition: secessor state declares its intent to withdraw. However, this does not tell us the whole story. We need to recognize the importance and role of the third condition identified by Bob – the predecessor state accepts the principle of secession; negotiations follow – which played and possibly continues to play on how people vote and view the secessionist project and/or the prospect of independence. And so we need to consider the relationship between these two conditions, which Bob does not necessarily do. Indeed, the relationship between the second and third conditions demonstrates the shortcomings of his model. Specifically, in relation to the cases reviewed, condition (ii) is much less developed than Hetcher’s model and to a certain extent Dion’s thoughts. Bob does not necessarily consider the dynamics of each of the four configurations discussed by Hetcher, nor how fear and confidence, discussed by Dion, can be and are used by both the host state and secessionist parties to influence voters. This was especially evident in both cases here. During the referendum in Catalonia, the Spanish government questioned the very legality of the referendum and used the courts to prevent the referendum from legally happening. The court then ruled in favour of the central government and found the referendum to be illegal, citing Article 2 guaranteeing the indissolubility of Spain. These actions clearly indicated that the host state did not accept the principle of secession. Arguably, this rejection had a significant effect on the second condition, and so it is not surprising that the turnout rate was low. Scotland also presents an interesting example of how and why we need to consider the complementary relationship between conditions (ii) and (iii). The governments of the uk and Scotland entered into the Edinburgh Agreement and put it into force. It is

How Do Secessions Not Happen?

143

almost certain that if Scotland holds another referendum on independence, the Edinburgh Agreement will be the guiding document, regardless of who is in power. Further, the Electoral Commission was involved in setting the referendum question. Both these aspects contributed to legitimizing the process and signalled the state’s (not just the uk government’s) acceptance of the principle of secession, arguably assuaging the fears of the voters. In short, criteria (ii) and (iii) need to be considered together and not as mutually exclusive or sequential, as is implied by Bob in his 1992 paper. In doing so, his model needs to be complemented by Hetcher’s model and Dion’s thoughts in order to better understand how peaceful secessions do not happen. Further, we need to acknowledge that condition (iii), specifically how the state is understood, is limited in that Bob only considers the government, central or regional (this is also true with Hetcher and Dion). While it is true that Bob expands on his thoughts on the state in other works (on secessionist games, discussed above), the idea of the state and its acceptance of the principle of consultation or secession remains focused on what the central government does not do. The two cases demonstrate that the third condition of accepting the principle of secession (and how this can influence the voter) goes beyond the actions of government. Indeed, state institutions beyond government, including constitutions, courts, quasi-constitutional laws, and electoral bodies, played a role in either legitimizing (Scotland) or delegitimizing (Catalonia) the process. This reconsideration does not and should not detract from the importance of the first criterion. Indeed, it is important to remember that condition (i) must imperatively be met. It is not enough that political and constitutional tensions be salient and historically rooted; the dissatisfaction and the feeling of an impossible constitutional reform must be shared by a large majority of the population. This precondition is essential for the other two conditions to be met. In short, Bob’s model contributes to our understanding of how peaceful secessions happen or do not happen. However, to help us understand why they do not happen, we need to reconsider his second and third criteria by, first, expanding our understanding of the state, and second, complementing them with other thoughts and models on successful and unsuccessful secessions and considering them as symbiotic and not mutually exclusive.

144

François Rocher and Nadia Verrelli

Marked by the rise of the sovereigntist movement in Quebec, Bob Young invested a lot of time and intellectual energy into understanding and analyzing its roots and multiple ramifications. As a final personal note, we would like to recall that François Rocher met him at many conferences in the late 1980s and many exchanges and encounters followed. Bob’s articles and books have always been a source of inspiration, to which he added the indispensable comparative perspective. Nadia Verrelli, as a young graduate student, joined the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations at Bob’s invitation. Not only did he guide her in her career choices, even helping her negotiate her contract, but he was always ready to discuss new ideas to help her navigate her latest research project. Indeed, the topic of one of her last conversations with Bob was the ongoing independence movement in Scotland. Nadia had been working on a paper comparing the political and judicial responses in the uk , Spain, and Canada. Bob was in Scotland during the last referendum and was talking to her about the importance of immersing oneself in research to get a different perspective. All he said was, “You should go.” In preparing for our chapter, we knew we wanted to write about secession, not only because it was topical, but also because of Bob’s influence on our work and his prominence in the study of secession and independence movements. As we reviewed his many publications and our many conversations on the subject, his analysis of peaceful secession was one idea that continued to strike us as an ongoing important and influential contribution to the field. Considering our past collaborations, it seemed natural and fitting for us to build on the work Bob started, and to look at how the conditions he laid out related to Catalonia and Scotland. r e f e r e nc e s News. 2017. “Catalans Declare Independence as Madrid Imposes Direct Rule.” bbc News, 27 October 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-41780116. – 2018. “Thousands Take Part in Scottish Independence March.” bbc News, 28 July. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-highlandsislands-44980334. Buchanan, Allen. 1991. Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec. Boulder, co : Westview Press. bbc

How Do Secessions Not Happen?

145

– 1997. “Theories of Secession.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 26, no. 1: 31–61. Burgen, Stephen. 2018. “Catalonia’s Parliament Elects Hardline Secessionist as President.” Guardian, 14 May. https://www.theguardian. com/world/2018/may/14/catalonia-parliament-elects-hardline-nationalistas-president. Cassese, Antonio. 1998. Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Christiano, Thomas. 1995. “Secession, Democracy, and Distributive Justice.” Arizona Law Review 37, no. 1: 65–72. Clarke, Seán. 2017. “Catalonia Election: Full Results.” Guardian, 22 December. https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/ dec/21/catalonia-election-full-results. Dion, Stéphane. 1996. “Why Is Secession Difficult in Well-Established Democracies? Lessons from Quebec.” British Journal of Political Science 26 (April): 269–83. Guibernau, Montserrat. 2013. “Secessionism in Catalonia: After Democracy.” Ethnopolitics 12, no. 4: 368–93. Hechter, Michael. 1992. “The Dynamics of Secession.” Acta Sociologica 35: 267–83. Imbeau, Louis-Marie. 1991. “Le compromis est-il encore possible? La négociation constitutionnelle de l’après-Meech à la lumière de la théorie des jeux.” In Le Québec et la restructuration du Canada 1980–1992, edited by Louis Balthazar, Guy Laforest, and Vincent Lemieux, 283–309. Sillery, qc : Septentrion. Ipsos mori . 2014. “Scottish Public Attitudes and Opinion Monitor – Wave 19.” https://web.archive.org/web/20140605103647/http://www. ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Scotland/scottish-independence-referendumtables-june-2014.pdf. Jones, Sam. 2018. “Quim Torra Sworn In as Catalan President amid Xenophobia Claims.” Guardian, 17 May. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2018/may/17/quim-torra-sworn-in-catalan-president-xenophobiaclaims. Jones, Sam, and Severin Carrell. 2018. “Spanish Court Drops International Warrant for Carles Puigdemont.” Guardian, 19 July. https://www. theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/19/spanish-court-drops-internationalwarrant-puigdemont-catalan. Jordan, Guifre. 2018. “What’s Next for Catalonia in 2018.” Catalan News, 1 January. http://www.catalannews.com/politics/item/ what-s-next-for-catalonia-in-2018.

146

François Rocher and Nadia Verrelli

Kellner, Peter. 2014. “Scotland: No Enters Polling Day 4% Ahead.” YouGov, 18 September. https://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/09/18/ scotland-no-enters-polling-day-4-ahead. Kohen, Marcelo G., ed. 2006. Secession: International Law Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lynch, Peter. 2005. “Scottish Independence, the Quebec Model of Secession and the Political Future of the Scottish National Party.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 11, no. 4: 503–31. Marti, David. 2013. “The 2012 Catalan Election: The First Step towards Independence.” Regional and Federal Studies 23, no. 4: 507–16. Marti, David, and Daniel Cetra. 2016. “The 2015 Catalan Election: A De Facto Referendum on Independence.” Regional and Federal Studies 26, no. 1: 107–19. Masreal, Fidel. 2018. “La mayoría de los Catalanes piden negociar más autogobierno.” El Periódico, 8 July. https://www.elperiodico.com/es/ politica/20180708/la-mayoria-de-los-catalanes-piden-negociar-masautogobierno-6930862. Moore, Margaret. 1998. “The Self-Determination Principle and the Ethics of Secession.” In National Self-Determination and Secession, edited by Margaret Moore, 1–13. Oxford, uk : Oxford University Press. Mullen, Tom. 2014. “The Scottish Independence Referendum 2014.” Journal of Law and Society 41, no. 4: 627–40. Nutt, Kathleen. 2018. “Latest Poll Shows Rising Support for Scottish Independence.” National, 12 July. http://www.thenational.scot/ news/16349978.latest-poll-shows-rising-support-for-scottishindependence. Philpott, Daniel. 1995. “In Defense of Self-Determination.” Ethic 105 (January): 352–85. Priddy, Sarah. 2016. “Claim of Right for Scotland.” House of Commons Debate Pack Number 2016-0158, 2 September. http://researchbriefings. files.parliament.uk/documents/cdp -2016-0158/cdp -2016-0158.pdf. Serrano, Ivan. 2013. “Just a Matter of Identity? Support for Independence in Catalonia.” Regional and Federal Studies 23, no. 5: 523–45. Spanish Constitution. 1978. Cortes Generales «boe » no. 311, boe-a 1978-40001. 29 December. https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id= boe-a-1978-40001. Tierney, Stephen. 2013. “Legal Issues Surrounding the Referendum on Independence for Scotland.” European Constitutional Law Review 9: 359–90.

How Do Secessions Not Happen?

147

Tomuschat, Christian, ed. 1993. The Principle of Self-Determination in International Law. New York: Nellen Publishing Co. van den Driest, Simone. 2013. Remedial Secession: A Right to External Self-Determination as a Remedy to Serious Injustices. Cambridge: Intersentia. Verrelli, Nadia, and Neil Cruickshank. 2014. “Exporting the Clarity Ethos: Canada and the Scottish Independence Referendum.” British Journal of Canadian Studies 27, no. 2: 195–216. Walter, Christian, ed. 2014. Self-Determination and Secession in International Law. Oxford, uk : Oxford University Press. Webber, Jeremy. 1997. “The Legality of a Unilateral Declaration of Independence under Canadian Law.” McGill Law Journal 42: 281–318. Wood, John R. 1981. “Secession: A Comparative Analytical Framework.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 16, no. 1: 107–34. Young, Robert A. 1994a. “How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?” Canadian Journal of Political Science 27, no. 4: 773–92. – 1994b. “The Breakup of Czechoslovakia.” Research Paper No. 32. Kingston, on : Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. – 1994c. “The Political Economy of Secession: The Case of Quebec.” Constitutional Political Economy 5, no. 2: 221–45. – 1998. The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada, rev. ed. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press and the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. – 1999. The Struggle for Quebec. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press. – 2004. “Secession as Revolution.” Homo Oeconomicus 21, no. 2: 373–95. – 2014. “Transition Costs in Secessions, with a Brief Application to Scotland.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 30, no. 2: 392–405.

8

The Self-Determination Conundrum: Wrong Answers or Wrong Question? Michael Keating

t h e n at io n a l q u e s t i on revi s i ted One of Bob Young’s enduring interests was secession. As a Quebecker, he had lived with this question for many years, and his publications made a notable contribution to the debate around the referendum of 1995. The Secession of Quebec (Young 1995) was a characteristically meticulous analysis of the political, legal, and economic issues that would arise should Quebec choose sovereignty. This followed from his comparative work on when, why, and above all how secessions happen (Young 1994). It was not surprising that his expertise was in demand when, in 2012, the uk government agreed to an independence referendum in Scotland. Bob was appointed to the Economic and Social Research Panel for the Future of the uk and Scotland program, and was a valued member of the advisory board of our Centre on Constitutional Change in Edinburgh. In the run-up to the 2014 vote, he was a keen observer, whether at seminars in Edinburgh or pubs in Glasgow, and was briefly caught in the crossfire when his work on the costs of transition was cited, a challenge he met with his usual sang-froid (Young 2013). Bob’s work reminded us that the nationalities question, far from having been resolved by 1989 as Eric Hobsbawm (1990) had announced, returns constantly in new forms. Bob’s studies focused on the practicalities of independence from a public policy perspective. This contribution addresses a prior question, on which he also touched: Who has the right to self-determination in what circumstances?1

The Self-Determination Conundrum

149

In its classic formulation, the self-determination demand postulates that each nation (or people) should have its own sovereign state in a defined and bounded territory. This can be, and has been, dismissed rather easily. Ivor Jennings (1965, 56) famously declared of the doctrine of self-determination, “On the surface it seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people.” Ernest Gellner (1983, 1) defined nationalism as “primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.” This also looks straightforward until we try to define the political and the national unit, a matter which, as Gellner himself demonstrated, is by no means straightforward. Generations of political theorists have sought to find a way around this. Primary right theories attach the right of self-determination to peoples or nations. Yet nearly all sociologists nowadays concur that nations are not natural, but are socially constructed and often contested. To endow such an ontologically fragile entity with rights is to reify the group and impose upon it a unity that may be lacking. As Renan (1992) reminded us, the ways in which the group was forged might not be normatively appealing, whatever its members think about themselves now. Defining the self-determining community as an ethnic group merely raises the question of what that is. Ethnicity is, moreover, widely regarded nowadays as an ethically dubious criterion. Self-determination claimants themselves have increasingly argued from the basis of democracy and often take pains to eschew ethnic particularism. This has not, however, stopped many political theorists from continuing to reify national groups, confining themselves to asking what rights they have and what concessions should be allowed them. Associative or voluntarist theories seek to get around this problem by allowing any group of people to declare themselves a self-determining unit and set up their own polity (Beran 1998). The objection often raised, that this is too permissive and would lead to a proliferation of invented nations, is perhaps overstated. The problem, rather, is that the objection is sociologically naïve. Selfdetermination issues do not arise because groups of individuals spontaneously decide on self-government. Nor do they appear because people make instrumental calculations about the economic benefits of large- or small-scale political units (as suggested by Alesina and Spolaore 2002). The making of nations is an arduous and sometimes

150

Michael Keating

long-drawn-out process of social construction, requiring commitment and resources, which explains why there are so few of them. A third set of theories (remedial right) holds that peoples or nations have the right to self-determination and secession if they have been oppressed or colonized (Buchanan 1991). The “salt-water” doctrine favoured by international bodies tries to limit it to cases of foreign conquest and there has been little dispute as to its application to the European overseas empires in the twentieth century. It does not, however, help with cases such as Quebec or Scotland, in which the population enjoys full democratic rights. Moreover, if remedial right is regarded as legitimate, this may provide an incentive for nationalists to provoke oppression. We would then end up in the paradoxical position of endorsing self-determination claims on the part of violent movements while discounting those that proceed by constitutional and peaceful means. Most tellingly, perhaps, remedial right theory does not justify the statehood of existing nation-states, which are just assumed to have a moral right to determine their own mode of government, while denying rival claims. All of the above theories of self-determination face another classic problem: that claims overlap, as different national claims are made upon the same people and over the same territory. Given these contradictory claims, there is no set of lines on a map that could produce the “right” answer. If we are faced with a question to which no answer has been discovered in two hundred years, it is probably time to change the question.

r e f r a m in g t h e questi on Reframing the question entails rethinking both the subject and the object of self-determination claims, as well as the relationship between the two. Instead of defining the issue as being about reconciling empirical facts (the existence of multiple nations) with normative claims (they have a right to self-determine), we need to recognize that nationalism is about claims rather than facts. Some claims are ontological: for example, that the nation or people exists. Others are normative: that a right to self-government is entailed by its condition of nationality or peoplehood. Others again are teleological: that it is destined for self-government as the normal condition of nations and that this should take a specific form, which at the limit is a sovereign, territorially bounded state. We will proceed in three steps.

The Self-Determination Conundrum

151

Modern turns in the social sciences allow us to reframe the question in such a way as to address these ontological, teleological, and normative claims in new ways. The relational turn in ontology allows us to specify the subject of self-determination without falling into the twin traps of reification or pure voluntarism. New understandings of statehood and sovereignty permit us to specify the object in more complex ways. New theories of territory present it as open and weakly bounded and able to be defined in numerous ways. Normative theorizing has moved away from seeking ideal and complete solutions, and toward recognizing the incommensurability of some claims and the acceptability of less-than-perfect outcomes. Nation, state, and territory can thus be linked in new ways.

t h e s u b j ect Nations, peoples, or other social collectivities are now rarely defined according to objective criteria as earlier generations of nationalists sought to do. Nations, as indeed Renan (1992) noted long ago, cannot be reduced to bloodlines, language, or any other ascriptive characteristic or objective factor. They may have a common history, but this is a matter of both remembering and forgetting. They are constructed in a bewildering variety of ways without ceasing to have something in common. Nor can they be reduced to purely subjective feelings. For me to be a national, it is necessary for other people to share the same sentiment. Nations are, rather, intersubjective entities, based on mutual recognition and shared understandings about who they are. These, too, come in multiple and complex forms, often expressed in apparently trivial symbols or historical anecdotes. Nations are never homogeneous or clearly bounded, their claims often overlap, and they are constructed and reconstructed over time. They are frequently contested. There is certainly an intrinsically normative charge to the term “nation,” since the doctrine of national self-determination has been so powerful, but the effect is often the reverse of what might be expected. It is not so much that nations exist and then make the claim to self-determination. The ontological claim to be a nation, rather, is part of the self-determination strategy itself. In the late nineteenth century, the Catalan movement changed its terminology from regionalist to nationalist for that reason. In cases such as Brittany, the use of nationalist and regionalist terminology reflects different aims in relation to the French state. To

152

Michael Keating

show how nations are discursively constructed in this way, however, does not mean that these communities do not constitute realities in a sociological sense. This does not allow us to definitively arbitrate national claims, but it does make them empirically researchable using social science. Methods can include survey work, ethnographic studies, patterns of political mobilization, elections, and the structure of civil society organizations. We can discount the claims to existence of Padania, imagined by the Lega Nord as a national community, not because it is “artificial.” All nations and all social entities are artificial in the sense of being created at some time. It is rather that Padania never commanded the allegiance of more than a small minority of its inhabitants in spite of the effort put into making it, including a suitably retrofitted history and culture (Oneto 1997). Padania was not destined to fail, but it did so. Quebec and Scotland, on the other hand, need to be taken more seriously, not because they exist in any absolute or primordial sense, but because they have been constructed and, critically, reconstructed in modern times, so as to constitute political communities. In other cases, the nation is fundamentally contested. It may be contested internally, with no agreement on the nature of the common political community, or externally, by neighbouring states and communities staking claims for its territory or people.

t h e o b j e ct The object of national self-determination has often been seen as being the creation of a nation-state; secession is fundamentally about leaving one state and setting up another one. Yet as the meaning of statehood itself has changed over time, so have the objectives of nationalists. In the late nineteenth century, nationalists in imperial systems, whether in Ireland or the Habsburg domains, aware of their exposure in a world of big powers, often aimed at domestic self-government (home rule) within a continuing federal or confederal arrangement. With the collapse of empire in the First World War, independence became the goal. In the case of Ireland, where the central power did not collapse, the process of independence was prolonged until 1949, when the Free State became a Republic. In the late twentieth century, the nation-state was penetrated by global economic influences (even if the term “globalization” was

The Self-Determination Conundrum

153

over-used). Transnational economic and political orders, including the European Union and nafta , constrained independent states but provided secessionist movements with a new external support system. In transnational regimes, the threshold for independence is lowered, just as the content of independence is diluted. Independence-seeking movements have thus embraced transnationalism in a way that is logically coherent even if it sometimes mystifies their opponents (and some of their supporters). As the meaning of independence in a functional sense has changed, so has the normative principle of sovereignty. As they adapt to an interdependent world, many nationalist movements have abandoned the idea that sovereignty is indivisible and located only in the nation-state. Post-sovereigntists (MacCormick 1999; Keating 2001) see sovereignty as shared and negotiated. This, too, reflects shifts within both political science and law, to seeing sovereignty less as a thing that a nation possesses than a relationship that is continually negotiated (Loughlin 2003). It is no coincidence that such ideas have found an echo in places where sovereignty has always been contested and in which rival traditions of pactism and negotiated order are familiar. Such traditions include the Basque historic rights or fueros, the Catalan tradition of pactism and complex authority (Herrero de Miñon 1998), the Scottish doctrine of limited sovereignty, and the Canadian “two nations” theory of Confederation, now expanded to include the rights of Indigenous peoples (Keating 2001). Such theories oppose the state, not with a rival claim to absolute sovereignty, but with a different way of thinking about sovereignty itself. So successive Quebec referendums have been fought on the concept of sovereignty-association or sovereignty with partnership. Most Catalan nationalists, until recently, eschewed independence in favour of more autonomy within Spain and links with Europe. The Basque Nationalist Party, having passed through a radical phase, has returned to ideas of negotiated autonomy within a reformed Spain. Scottish nationalists, in the independence referendum of 2014, presented an attenuated form of independence that critics dubbed “independence lite.” They argued that Scotland was currently in six unions (political, monarchical, monetary, security, European, and social) and proposed to withdraw only from the political one. As their opponents promised more autonomy, the two sides converged. Opinion polling in stateless nations has regularly suggested that the electorate is more attracted by these “third way” formulas

154

Michael Keating

than by sovereignty in the traditional sense, whether of the state or the smaller nation. There is evidence from Scotland and Northern Ireland suggesting that insertion into multilevel unions is the first preference of majorities in both places, not merely a second-best option to secure co-existence (Keating 2021).

t e r r ito ry Self-determination claims usually refer to territory, for a number of reasons. Territory may itself be part of the definition of the nation; states are territorially bounded; political control is usually exercised on a territorial basis. Yet modern, constructivist understandings of territory see it as more than merely a topographical category (lines on maps); it is also a sociological one (Pike 2007; Jessop, Brenner, and Jones 2008). Territory is imbued with meaning by its social and political content and the way in which it is used to construct political and social structures and cleavages. Borders and boundaries can be rigid, separating spaces from each other, or they can be open and flexible. Borders as hard lines (limes) are different from boundaries as zones of transition (marches) or frontier areas penetrated by influences from both sides. Spatial rescaling (Keating 2013) and the opening of boundaries now mean that different spatial scales might be relevant for different social, economic, cultural, and political systems, and boundaries can influence who wins and who loses in political exchange. In addition to its functional importance, territory can carry symbolic meaning, in the form of historic sites and places. Often it happens that such sites lie not in the claimed national heartland but in disputed border territories. This might seem to complicate the definition of nation hopelessly, but in practice many national claims have indefinite borders. The Basque Country can be defined in multiple ways, depending on how historical, cultural, linguistic, identitarian, or jurisdictional criteria are used. The Autonomous Community of the Basque Country is the focus of most political claims, but the historic rights pertain to its constituent territories. Beyond are Navarre and the three Basque provinces in France, and further out still are other symbolic references. For Catalan nationalism, the immediate focus is the Autonomous Community, based on the historical principality, but there is a broader concept of the Països Catalans (Catalan countries). There are arguments about the boundaries of Quebec

The Self-Determination Conundrum

155

and the rights of Indigenous peoples and Anglophone communities within it (Young 1995). Scotland is unusual in having unchallenged territorial boundaries. One way out of the territorial trap, pioneered by the AustroMarxists of the late Habsburg Empire but revived more recently (Nimni 2005), is personal or “national cultural” autonomy, which allows communities to organize their own affairs on a non-territorial basis. Such arrangements are indeed used in various places (such as Brussels) for education or social services, but, as a general solution, run into the problem that many public services are inescapably territorial. There is also the problem, mentioned already, that territory is often an intrinsic part of the national claim. So reifying territory and setting fixed boundaries does not work, but neither does eliminating territory altogether.2 A flexible and constructivist conception of territory allows us to avoid the rigid topological definition and allows for multiple territorial imaginations. It also allows for territorially provided services and responsible government. This can complicate the analysis of territory as a straightforward basis for political autonomy, but it allows new understandings and ways of combining territorial autonomy with recognition of the internal complexities and external aspects of territories themselves (Keating 2013). The Northern Ireland settlement includes both territorial autonomy and consociational elements, as well as allowing the province to link both imaginatively and functionally with both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Recent Basque claims propose stronger self-government for the constitutionally recognized Autonomous Community of the Basque Country, along with cultural recognition of and co-operation with the wider Basque territories. Recognition of dual citizenship in various forms beyond the core national heartland can in some contexts be seen as dangerous irredentism, but in others as an instrument to satisfy some national claims without imposing hard borders (Stjepanovic 2018). Short of full citizenship, other forms of kin-state relationship in social or cultural fields may provide avenues for the negotiation of identity claims.

r e f r a m in g t h e nati on Nations and nationalism in the past have often been seen as different things, the one a social reality and the other a normative doctrine about self-determination. Hence, political theorists have puzzled over

156

Michael Keating

how one can lead to the other. What I am proposing here is to treat them both as claims: an ontological claim that the nation exists and a linked normative claim that it has a right to determine its political future. The elements of that claim – nation, state, territory, and rights – are linked in complex and non-determinate ways. So rather than being assumed, as was the case in the past, to be a zero-sum game about absolutes, national self-determination is a field of contestation in which the elements are constantly being defined and redefined. This is the stuff of politics, where the nature of the polity itself as well as social and economic issues within it are at stake. Post-sovereign and spatially open approaches to self-determination might be seen as a second-best option for nationalists. For political theorists, they may represent a non-ideal solution in the sense of an application of normative theory to the real world, which accepts the constraints of statehood and the global order, as well as the necessity to compromise with competing national claims. Yet they may be more than this and provide a first-order and morally defensible theory about how the world should be, given the normative difficulties of classical nationalist claims. This might appear as a recipe for continual strife, but it is also a framework for accommodation. I am often asked these days why there are so many secessionist claims springing up across Europe. State leaders have reacted negatively to the Catalan independence movement with the argument that Europe does not have room for a hundred (or whatever number of) new states. Such a reductio ad absurdum often reveals an inability to debate about the cases that are actually at issue. The reality is that in western Europe there are just two serious secessionist movements, that is, with a serious prospect of gaining a popular majority in a referendum. They are in Catalonia and Scotland, and even there, opinion is evenly divided. There have been referendums in Lombardy and Veneto, but these are about more autonomy, rejecting the separatism preached by the Lega Nord. Nationalists have advanced in Corsica, but on a post-sovereigntist platform, fully aware that independence for the island is economically and politically impossible. The Basque Nationalist Party has retreated from its sovereigntist vision and proposes a revised statute of autonomy. In North America, the Quebec question remains an issue, but sovereignty is off the agenda for now and no other North American jurisdiction has followed the Quebec path.

The Self-Determination Conundrum

157

We are, however, witnessing a continuing rescaling of functional systems in spheres including the economy, welfare, public services, and the environment, so that issues can no longer be encompassed within the boundaries of the nation-state. Spatial imaginations and political claims are newly articulated at the sub-state, transnational, and interstate level. The territorially bounded state, never more than an ideal type, no longer serves to contain the panoply of social, economic, and political systems, and expanding or shrinking its boundaries is not going to enable it to do so. Rather, there exists a constellation of territorial arrangements within which claims to self-determination are managed, with varying degrees of success. If this is so, and is increasingly recognized, why, then, did the Scottish and Catalan movements veer toward secession in the 2000s? The Parti Québécois abandoned sovereignty-association in favour of full independence after 1980. The Basque first minister attempted a bid for sovereignty (albeit with association) in the early 2000s (Keating and Bray 2006). Plaid Cymru–Party of Wales elected a new leader in 2018 committed to full national independence. The New Flemish Alliance (nva ), while accepting confederalism in the short term, aims at independence in the long run. A common factor here may be the urge to realize not just the normative claim but the ontological one. Nationalists seek to use the international norm of sovereignty in order to achieve recognition as a nation. This does not preclude the option of joining another form of union, such as the European Union, however much this means sharing sovereignty again. This evokes Walker’s (2018) distinction between teleological nationalism, aiming at an independent state, and reflexive nationalism, focused on reproducing the nation in different political conditions without a fixed constitutional objective. Both insist on self-determination but draw different political and strategic conclusions. We might see historical Catalan nationalism (or Catalanism as it is sometimes called) as reflexive, with an idea of Catalonia but also an idea of Spain and a strategy of playing in both arenas and also in Europe. The pactist (as opposed to the separatist) strand of Basque nationalism is similar, as is most Welsh nationalism. Scotland does not have a word equivalent to Catalanism, but there is a tradition of playing Scottish politics, and defending Scottish particularism, within the United Kingdom. The division between this strategy and independence-seeking is often a fluid one, as was the case for Ireland in the nineteenth century. We might say the same of Quebec.

158

Michael Keating

This all permits a reformulation of the right to self-determination. The subject is a community of people, related in mutually recognizing ways but not necessarily forming a homogeneous body on any criterion, and more, or less, territorially bounded. The community’s object may be a new state but can take the form of other types of polity. There may be political communities where nationhood and boundaries are fixed and uncontentious and where there is a shared aspiration to statehood. In other places, community, territory, and statehood are all contested. The right to self-determination cannot be reduced to a single grid or hierarchy of norms such that there is a determinate outcome in each case. Rather, there is a series of criteria, which may be incommensurate or conflict. This is not a recipe for the pure eclecticism that has often characterized the response of international actors and organizations (including the United Nations and the European Union) to secession claims. It is, rather, a plea for a form of contextual reasoning, using shared concepts and deploying normative criteria in a cumulative manner, in which different combinations may be equally valid. This departs from deductive theories of self-determination that erect a grid in advance of knowing the cases. It also avoids the need for a fictional arbitrator such as “the international community” to apply a fixed set of rules. Self-determination rather becomes a matter of political practice and accommodation of competing claims, all of which may contain an element of validity. Claims nowadays tend to focus on the democratic principle. This may be disingenuous, such as the claim of the Republika Srpska, a unit created by ethnic cleansing, which was then advanced as the relevant unit for democratic choice, but that kind of reasoning can be exposed (Keating 2015). More to the point is the ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada (Reference 1998) in the Quebec secession case, with its combination of arguments based on sociological realities, political demands, and democratic principles. Rather than address the issue of nationhood, it argued that if any province demonstrated, in a referendum with a clear question and a clear majority, that it desired to secede, the demand would have to be taken seriously. It did not say that such a demand would have to be accepted, merely that there should be negotiation. This moves the issue from essentialist arguments about what a nation is and onto the ground of democratic practice, while allowing a variety of solutions to be negotiated. Of course, this might constitute against that classic, and seemingly democratic, mechanism for resolving secession claims, the

The Self-Determination Conundrum

159

referendum, at least if it presents the case as a choice between membership in one of two sovereign states. There may be times when resorting to referendum is inescapable and there is certainly an argument that it should be required for secession, given that secession is based on the sovereignty of the relevant people. Yet, unless the outcome is overwhelming, as in Norway in 1905, secession merely replaces one problematic border with another. At best, a referendum can rehearse the question, take stock of public opinion, and provide a guide to further action. The Quebec outcome in 1995 suggested a need for compromise, which came rather late and grudgingly. After the Scottish referendum of 2014, on the other hand, the uk responded quickly with a further measure of devolution, negotiated between the unionist and nationalist parties. However technically flawed the resulting settlement, it did represent a meeting on the middle ground. There is a growing acceptance on all sides that a simple majority in Northern Ireland to unite with the Republic of Ireland would not suffice if not accompanied by mechanisms for minority protection and even concurrent majorities. The contrast with the uk ’s 2016 referendum on leaving the European Union is striking. A 52 per cent majority overall to leave, with majorities to remain both in Scotland and in Northern Ireland, was taken as a binding mandate for whatever form of Brexit the uk government decided upon. There are no simple answers to the normative and practical issues of secession. They cannot be reduced to a single logic, with a consistent set of answers. This does not, however, mean that national self-determination demands can be dismissed as meaningless. They can be explored on the basis of normative theories rooted in democracy and they can be examined empirically as sociological phenomena. Accommodation is, then, not a simple application of abstract principles, nor a process of muddling through according to the balance of power, but a form of statecraft that combines normative ideals with social realities. Bob Young left a rich legacy of work on the question of secession and, in showing how the matter is complex and multidimensional, inspires continued work on a problem that is not going to go away.

160

Michael Keating

not e s 1 These arguments are also explored in Michael Keating, “Is a Theory of Self-Determination Possible?” Ethnopolitics 18, no. 3 (2019): 315–23. 2 To be fair to the Austro-Marxists, they advocated a mixture of territorial federalism and national cultural autonomy.

r e f e r e nc e s Alesina, Alberto, and Enrico Spolaore. 2003. The Size of Nations. Cambridge, ma : mit Press. Beran, Harry. 1998. “A Democratic Theory of Political Self-Determination in the New World Order.” In Theories of Secession, edited by Percy Lehning, 33–60. London: Routledge. Buchanan, Allen. 1991. Secession: The Legitimacy of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec. Boulder, co : Westview Press. Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford, uk : Blackwell. Herrero de Miñon, Miguel. 1998. Derechos Históricos y Constitución. Madrid: Tecnos. Hobsbawm, Eric. 1990. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jennings, Ivor. 1956. The Approach to Self-Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jessop, Bob, Neil Brenner, and Martin Jones. 2008. “Theorizing SocioSpatial Relations.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 26: 389–401. Keating, Michael. 2001. Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era. Oxford, uk : Oxford University Press. – 2013. Rescaling the European State: The Making of Territory and the Rise of the Meso. Oxford, uk : Oxford University Press. – 2015. “Territorial Autonomy in Nationally Divided Societies: The Experience of the United Kingdom, Spain, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.” In Assessing Territorial Pluralism, edited by Karlo Basta, John McGarry, and Richard Simeon, 121–47. Vancouver, bc: ubc Press. – 2021. State and Nation in the United Kingdom: The Fractured Union. Oxford, uk : Oxford University Press. Keating, Michael, and Zoe Bray. 2006. “Renegotiating Sovereignty: Basque Nationalism and the Rise and Fall of the Ibarretxe Plan.” Ethnopolitics 5, no. 4: 347–64.

The Self-Determination Conundrum

161

Loughlin, Martin. 2003. “Ten Tenets of Sovereignty.” In Sovereignty in Transition, edited by Neil Walker, 55–86. Oxford, uk : Hart. MacCormick, Neil. 1999. Questioning Sovereignty. Oxford, uk : Oxford University Press. Nimni, Ephraim. 2005. “Introduction: The National Cultural Autonomy Model Revisited.” In National Cultural Autonomy and Its Contemporary Critics, edited by Ephraim Nimni, 1–14. London: Routledge. Oneto, G. 1997. L’invenzione della Padania. La rinascità della communità più antica d’Europa. Ceresola, Italy: Foedus. Pike, Andy. 2007. “Editorial: Whither Regional Studies?” Regional Studies 41, no. 9: 1143–8. Renan, Ernest. 1992. Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? Et autres essais politiques. Paris: Presses-Pocket. Stjepanovic, Dejan. 2018. “Self-Determination Constellations: Sub-State Regions and Citizenship in Europe.” In Changing Borders in Europe: Exploring the Dynamics of Integration, Differentiation and SelfDetermination in the European Union, edited by Jacint Jordana, Michael Keating, Axel Marks, and Jan Wouters, 95–109. London: Routledge. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 scr 217. Walker, Neil. 2018. “Teleological and Reflexive Nationalism in the New Europe.” In Changing Borders in Europe: Exploring the Dynamics of Integration, Differentiation and Self-Determination in the European Union, edited by Jacint Jordana, Michael Keating, Axel Marks, and Jan Wouters, 163–80. London: Routledge. Young, Robert A. 1994. “How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?” Canadian Journal of Political Science 27, no. 4: 773–92. – 1995. The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada. Montreal, qc, and Kingston, on: McGill-Queen’s University Press. – 2013. “The Road to Secession: Estimating the Costs of Independence in Advanced Industrial States.” London School of Economics blog, 12 May.https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/12/05/the-road-to-secessionestimating-the-costs-of-independence-in-advanced-industrial-states.

pa rt t h r e e

Political Economy

9

The Left and the Fiscal Deficit: A Beautiful Hypothesis Slain by an Ugly Fact Louis M. Imbeau and Jérôme Couture The great tragedy of Science – the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis by an ugly fact. Thomas Henry Huxley, 1825–1895 (1870)

We have always admired Bob Young’s capacity to translate complex political economy issues into simple yet important hypotheses, and to put these to rigorous empirical tests. We think he would have agreed with us that we must discard a hypothesis that is repeatedly rejected by empirical tests. We argue here that such is the case with the partisan cycle hypothesis linking leftist ideology to fiscal deficit. Based on Hibbs’s seminal contribution, the partisan cycle hypothesis holds that, when in power, parties of the left adopt policies that differ from the policies chosen by governments led by parties of the right (Hibbs 1977; 1986; 1992; 1994). Hibbs argues that leftist governments adopt macroeconomic policies that contribute to lower unemployment even at the cost of higher inflation; rightist governments prefer a lower inflation rate even if that implies higher unemployment. Generalizing the argument, many political economists argue that “parties of the right favor low taxes, low inflation, and modest, balanced budgets; they oppose equalization and accept higher unemployment more willingly than inflation. Parties of the left favor equalization, low unemployment, and larger budgets with less emphasis on balance; they accept inflation more willingly than unemployment” (Franzese 2002, 391).

166

Louis M. Imbeau and Jérôme Couture

In this chapter, we specifically consider the hypothesis according to which governments of the left make systematically higher fiscal deficits than do governments of the right. We oppose this hypothesis to the fact that most empirical studies published on this issue failed to reject the null hypothesis. Finally, we argue that it is time to definitely abandon this hypothesis. We first review the empirical literature showing that the support for the partisan hypothesis in fiscal deficits is at best weak. Then we propose a median voter model to make sense of this result.

t h e pa rt isa n cyc le i n the p o l it ic a l e c o n o m y li terature Scholars interested in the positioning of political parties in the policy space traditionally emphasize the left-right dimension without explicitly considering whether fiscal discipline pertains to the right. For example, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey considered two leftright dimensions: “General left-right” and “Economic left-right.” It asked: • General left-right: “We now turn to a few questions on the ideological positions of political parties in [country] in 2010. Please tick the box that best describes each party’s overall ideology on a scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).” • Economic left-right: “Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state. An 11-point scale ranges from 0 (extreme left) to 5 (centre) to 10 (extreme right)” (Bakker et al. 2012, 3). There was no mention of fiscal discipline or budget balance. The literature generally considers two compatible mechanisms through which party ideology affects fiscal policy: political leaders’ vision, and voters’ vision. In the case of the first mechanism, political leaders follow their own preferences and choose the fiscal policy that better aligns with their preferences. Therefore, the presence of

The Left and the Fiscal Deficit

167

differing policy preferences ensues from differences in founding ideologies (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Thus, some parties prefer more government allocation (the left), and others prefer more market allocation (the right). More government allocation translates into higher spending, tax, and debt. More market allocation yields policies in the opposite direction. In this perspective, leaders of the right are associated with more fiscal discipline, while leaders of the left are associated with less fiscal discipline. In the case of the second mechanism, voters’ vision affects fiscal policy, and the impact of ideology on policy choices is mediated through voters’ preferences. Voters have more influence on the government when a party whose ideology they share is in power. Hence, leftist voters are more successful in imposing their policy preferences when a party of the left is in power. They support more government allocation, and therefore opportunistic leftist leaders adopt policies reflecting the preference of their supporters. The same is true of rightist voters and political leaders. Leaders support more market allocation policies (such as lower spending, lower tax, and lower debt) in response to their followers’ preferences. So, more fiscal discipline is again associated with the right of the ideological spectrum. Borrowing on the work by Müller et al. (2016), Alesina and Passalacqua (2015) draw our attention to an alternative mechanism that associates fiscal discipline with the left. They consider two types of voters, left-wing and right-wing, who differ in terms of their consumption preferences. Leftist voters prefer public good consumption (hence, higher taxes and spending), while rightist voters favour more private consumption (hence, lower taxes and spending). However, this view posits that leftist voters are concerned today with their public good consumption when they become old in the future. In other words, they worry that fiscal resources may become depleted, and so when they are old, and desire more public good consumption, the resources to provide this will have been depleted. Therefore, at the current time they support fiscal discipline so that debt accumulation will not prevent future governments from providing their preferred public goods. Under a government of the left, the demand for fiscal discipline is stronger, as leftist voters have more influence than rightist voters. So, the responsive government on the left adopts a countercyclical policy, including accumulating deficits in recessions, but generates lower deficits in normal times.

168

Louis M. Imbeau and Jérôme Couture

In contrast, in this perspective rightist voters are less concerned about the provision of public goods in the future than their leftist counterparts. Instead, voters on the right prefer private consumption, and are willing to support higher debts in order to use the resources made available by lower taxes as subsidies for private consumption. Under a government of the right, rightist voters have more influence. They demand less fiscal discipline so as to increase their private consumption. Thus, this perspective suggests rightist governments are more prone to accumulate deficits in normal periods of economic performance. These various theoretical accounts have been the object of an important body of research, and the empirical evidence that one finds in this literature is mixed. In their meta-analysis of 693 statistical tests published in 43 quantitative analyses of the partisan hypothesis, Imbeau, Pétry, and Lamari (2001) reported an overall “success rate” of 0.22. This is to say that 22 per cent of the published statistical estimates confirm the hypothesis stating that governments of the left spend more than governments of the right. The success rate varied from 0 (where the dependent variable captures specific fiscal aspects such as “progressivity of taxes,” or “alliance membership,” or “military expenditures”) to 0.37 (a broader measure reflecting “total spending”). The analysts found 71 per cent of estimates failed to reject the null hypothesis. This is to say, these studies did not confirm the hypothesis linking leftist governments to higher spending. Moreover, 7 per cent of the studies actually contradicted the partisan hypothesis. Thus, Imbeau and his colleagues found that there is limited support for the idea that parties in government differ in fiscal policy on ideological grounds. Similarly, Clark (2003, 49) concludes that the evidence for the “Hibbsian relationship between fiscal policy and the ideological orientation of the government is mixed at best.”1 Moreover, it has been shown that this party differentiation does not occur when it comes to predicting a government’s approach to fiscal discipline. Indeed, it is often argued that “the preferences of left-wing politicians for large governments that stimulate economic activity … translate into fiscal deficits when they are in power, while the opposite is expected when right-wingers are in power” (Eslava 2011, 655). Interestingly, this hypothesis has been examined via several empirical tests that generally failed to support it, and even contradicted it. For example, Alesina and Perotti (1995) showed that the

The Left and the Fiscal Deficit

169

probability of a left-wing government adopting a tight fiscal policy is higher than for a right-wing government. Other empirical analyses report results in the same direction (Borelli and Royed 1995; Franzese 1999; Persson and Svensson 1989). In his review of the literature on oecd country deficits, Imbeau (2004a) reported that sixteen out of seventeen studies reporting empirical results on the partisan hypothesis disconfirmed it. Likewise, his review of the literature on public deficits in federated states provided the same picture: nine out of twelve empirical studies failed to reject the null hypothesis (Imbeau 2004b). Imbeau further reported that many studies contradicted the partisan hypothesis: governments of the centre or of the right sometimes have systematically higher fiscal deficits. In a more recent paper, Portrafke (2018, 191) concludes: “Previous studies have shown that government ideology is not associated with deficits and public spending.” To document further this lack of empirical support, we performed a systematic review of the literature using the Web of Science platform.2 Among the 3,960 titles generated by a search with relevant keywords, we found 82 publications reporting a total of 522 statistical tests on the relationship between party ideology and fiscal deficit. Only 25 per cent of these tests were significant and 7 per cent contradicted the hypothesis of a partisan cycle in deficits. On the basis of these findings, and given the bias one finds in the literature in favour of significant empirical results, we argue that it is time to declare that the hypothesis of a partisan cycle in deficits and debts has been definitely falsified by systematic empirical observation. Like Huxley’s famous quote, this is yet another example of a “beautiful theory killed by an ugly fact” (Larkey et al. 1981, 202). In the next section, we present our argument in theoretical terms. We first depict the basic workings of two median voter models of fiscal policy (pre-election politics and post-election politics models) showing how politicians evaluate voters’ preferences and derive a “median voter budget.” Second, we look at the interaction between institutions and preferences and find that, for a given distribution of preferences, a change in institutions from a bottom-up to a top-down budget process may affect the resulting fiscal balance. We further show that, for a given budget process, a change in the distribution of preferences may also change the fiscal balance. In other words, institutions and preferences trump each other. Third, we finally show why empirical research generally fails to confirm the

170

Louis M. Imbeau and Jérôme Couture

hypothesis relating leftist governments to higher deficits and even sometimes concludes that it is, rather, governments of the right that indulge in higher deficits.

t h e o r e t ic a l f o undati ons: a m e d ia n vo t er model The “Pre-Election Politics” Form of the Median Voter Theorem In an institutional setting constrained by the democratic requirement of gathering a majority of votes in order to win office, politicians have no choice but to care for voters’ preferences in addition to their own. So, a good way to understand fiscal policy choices is to think in terms of the spatial representation of voters’ preferences developed by Downs (1957), after Hotelling’s seminal insight (1929), in the median voter theorem. This theorem generally supposes a single dimension corresponding to the only issue on which voters are asked to vote in an election, say the level of government expenditure. Voters are distributed on this dimension: some want more spending (the left), some want less (the right). Assuming a three-voter electorate, the distribution may resemble that of figure 9.1. Voter 1 prefers less spending than voters 2 and 3; voter 3 prefers more spending. When two political parties compete in an election on the issue of spending level, they locate themselves on the continuum so as to minimize the distance between their position and that of a majority of voters. Indeed, the distance a voter has to “travel” between her policy position and that of the closest candidate may be interpreted as a cost. When she decides to vote, she chooses the candidate closest to her own ideological position, thus minimizing her cost. This rational choice perspective on voters’ choices holds, in spite of the so-called “paradox of voting,” when a sense of duty is included in a voter’s utility function (Blais and Young 1999, 39).3 It is easy to see that under a simple majority rule and single-peaked preferences,4 the party that convinces the median voter wins the election. Imagine an election where party a proposes a budget that corresponds to the preference of voter 2 in figure 9.1, and party b proposes less spending, a proposal to the left of voter 2’s most preferred choice. Voter 2 and voter 3 will vote for party a and voter 1 will vote for party b . Party a wins the election. This result is said to be stable or to be an equilibrium because, once there, there is

The Left and the Fiscal Deficit

Voter 1

Voter 2

171

Voter 3

Figure 9.1 | Voters on the spending dimension

no possibility to gather a majority against it, as voter 1 and voter 2 would oppose any proposal to the right of party a ’s proposal, and voter 2 and voter 3 would oppose any proposal located to its left. This is the basic teaching of the “pre-election politics” median voter theorem (Persson and Tabellini 2000). In its weak form, this theorem “says the median voter always casts his or her vote for the policy that is adopted … [T]he strong form of the median voter theorem says the median voter always gets her most preferred policy” (Congleton 2003). A “Post-Election Politics” Model of Fiscal Policy In contrast to the pre-election politics model discussed above, in “post-election politics” models the analysis focuses on “how voters’ backward-looking behaviour in deciding whether to re-elect incumbent politicians can constrain the set of policies chosen by those incumbents” (Dharmapala and Lehmann 2003, 2). The median voter theorem assumes that politicians are opportunists; that is, they are willing to do what is necessary to be re-elected. Knowing that voters will reward or punish them according to the degree that the realized budget corresponds to the budget preferred by the median voter, politicians align their budget on the median voter’s preference. To do so, they evaluate voters’ preferences, and derive from these preferences the type of budget preferred by the median voter. Let’s look at the logic of this evaluation while focusing on the budget balance (a deficit when it is negative, a surplus when it is positive). In addition to the expenditure level, the budget balance depends on the taxation level. Indeed, governments rely on two revenue sources to finance their expenditures, namely taxation and borrowing.5 The difference between spending and tax revenues, or the budget balance, communicates an indication of the borrowing requirements of a government. Therefore, in addition to the level of government expenditure,

172

Louis M. Imbeau and Jérôme Couture

Taxation



z

x   y

Spending

Figure 9.2 | A two-dimensional fiscal policy space

voters have preferences on a second issue: should there be more or less taxes? Adding this second dimension allows us to locate each voter on a two-dimensional space as depicted in figure 9.2. Any point on this space represents specific levels of taxation and expenditure, as well as budget balance (which is the difference between the two). Each voter has a preferred combination of taxing and spending levels, an ideal point, x, with a circular indifference curve. When asked to choose between two alternatives, say y and z, she will choose the one closer to her ideal point, and she will be indifferent toward the positions that are equidistant from her ideal point. With these assumptions, each voter’s preferences are completely described by her ideal point.6 We argued in note 7 that if issues are voted upon sequentially (that is, if choice is restricted to a one-dimensional subset of the space at a time), and if preferences are single-peaked, then there is a unique majority rule equilibrium on that subset. Now, the key question is: exactly how does the politician evaluate voters’ preferences and derive a “median voter budget”? Let’s consider again the model of our three-voter electorate, where each voter possesses a given ideal point (figure 9.3). The perpendicular projection of each ideal point on the expenditure dimension identifies the median voter

The Left and the Fiscal Deficit

173

Taxation

 x2 t1

x1





bu

 x3

s2

Spending

Figure 9.3 | The bottom-up budget

(voter 2), and consequently determines the spending level that gathers a majority: s 2. This result is an equilibrium since, once there, no other proposal could win in a simple majority contest, as voters 2 and 3 would vote against any spending level lower than s 2 while voters 1 and 2 would oppose any spending level higher than s 2. The same reasoning applies to the taxation dimension. The perpendicular projection of the ideal points on this dimension identifies the median voter on this dimension (voter 1) and a taxation level (t 1) that gathers a majority. This result is also an equilibrium since once there no other proposal could win in a simple majority contest. The perpendicular projections of the ideal points of these two median voters (voter 2 on spending and voter 1 on taxation) cross at bu , the bottom-up budget, collectively preferred by Ricardian voters, those for whom the Ricardian equivalence holds.7 Indeed, convinced as they are that financing expenditure through borrowing is equivalent to financing expenditure through taxation, these voters do not care much about the budget balance. For them, the balance simply ensues from their preferences on taxation and expenditure. bu is an equilibrium since once it is reached no majority can be formed to support any other choice in a sequential vote.

174

Louis M. Imbeau and Jérôme Couture

t he in t e r ac t io n b e t w een i ns ti tuti ons a n d p r e f e r ences In light of the considerations above, it is worth asking: what happens when some budget institution – for example, an anti-deficit law – obliges the government to care about the budget balance? We depict this in figure 9.4. There, budget balances are represented by secondary or “positive” 45-degree diagonals. The diagonal passing through the origin represents balanced budgets. Indeed, each point forming this diagonal represents a budget where revenues equal spending. Diagonals located above the balanced budget diagonal correspond to surplus budgets, while those lying below this diagonal correspond to deficit budgets. Therefore, in our example in figure 9.4, one can see that voters 1 and 2 prefer a surplus, as their ideal points are located above the balanced budget diagonal, whereas voter 3 prefers a deficit. Note that each such diagonal is made of a number of points, each one representing a combination of spending and taxation levels with a constant difference. These points represent possible ideal points for a voter who chooses that specific budget balance. The perpendicular to the budget balance diagonals, b +b –, provides a metric for budget balances on this space, b + standing at the upper end of the spectrum (high surplus) and b – at the lower end (high deficit). Thus, the points on b +b – where the perpendicular projections of voter 1’s and voter 2’s ideal points cross b +b – define a surplus (taxation – spending > 0) and the point where the perpendicular projection of voter 3’s ideal point crosses b +b – defines a deficit (taxation – spending < 0). Projecting the ideal points on b +b –, we find that x2 is the median voter on this dimension and bb 2 is the collectively chosen budget balance. This choice is an equilibrium because once bb 2 is chosen, no majority can be formed to change it. That is, voter 1 will not support a lower budget balance than bb 2 and voter 3 will not support a higher one. Knowing that bb 2 will be the bottom line of the budget, our three-voter electorate chooses its budget among the possible combinations of spending and taxation levels on the diagonal going through bb 2. Projecting voters’ ideal points on that diagonal, we find that voter 3 is the median voter on the bb 2 diagonal. Therefore, the point labelled td, representing the top-down budget, is the choice of the median voter on this line, and this budget is an equilibrium choice.

The Left and the Fiscal Deficit

175

Taxation

 x1

b+

x2

 td





bb2

x3

Spending

b– Figure 9.4 | The top-down budget

It should be clear that we have two types of budget processes created by budget institutions such as a constitution provision, a tradition, an anti-deficit law, etc. On the one hand, a bottom-up process starts with the levels of taxation and expenditure, and so the budget balance simply results from them. When this approach prevails, budget balance is not looked at as an issue but rather as simply resulting from taxation and expenditure levels. Preferences are therefore aggregated without considering the balance, as in figure 9.3 above. On the other hand, a top-down process gives precedence to the budget balance over taxation and expenditure levels, as in figure 9.4 above, yielding a targeted budget balance. According to the process that prevails, the budget preferred by the median voter is derived from voters’ preferences using one of these two approaches. Consequently, the budget derived from voters’ preferences varies from one approach to the other. Here, a top-down process yields a higher budget balance than a bottom-up approach (see figure 9.5a).

Taxation x2

td



x1





bu

 x3 Spending

Figure 9.5a | A more fiscally conservative top-down budget

Taxation

x2

 bu

x3







td

 x1 Spending

Figure 9.5b | A less fiscally conservative top-down budget

The Left and the Fiscal Deficit

177

This result confirms the position of those who believe that strong institutions can make politicians adopt balanced budgets. But it can be shown that a top-down process may yield a higher deficit than a bottom-up process. Indeed, for a given budget process, a change in preferences may change the resulting level of deficit. In figure 9.5a we compare the two budgets chosen in figures 9.3 and 9.4 and illustrate that the top-down budget balance is higher. If they consider the level of surplus or deficit before considering taxation and expenditure levels, politicians deduce a more fiscally conservative budget (td) as the one preferred by the median voter. But if voter preferences are differently distributed, the conclusion is different. In figure 9.5b, we slightly change the preferences of the three voters, with the paradoxical effect that the top-down budget is less fiscally conservative than the bottom-up budget. In this case, if they first consider preferences regarding the balance level, politicians choose a budget with a lower balance than if they had not cared about the balance in the first place. In this case, it is not institutions that prevail, but voters’ preferences.8 Why? To see why, let’s modify our geometric representation by moving the origin to the equilibrium reached in the last budget (b t-1), assuming that it was a bottom-up budget (figure 9.6). Each zone thus defined corresponds to a concentration of ideal points. We know that opposing quadrants include an equal number of voters since they are defined by medians and that a top-down approach yields a higher budget balance if, and only if, the number of ideal points above the diagonal is higher than below.9 For an intuitive explanation, consider the 11-voter electorate displayed in figure 9.6. This electorate is split into two halves by the sixth voter on the vertical axis (5 voters / 5 voters) and likewise on the horizontal axis. Opposing quadrants are equal, but within each half, quadrants need not be equal. The 4/1.5/4/1.5 distribution of voters shown in figure 9.6 respects the fact that quadrants are defined by medians. Now, let’s add the budget balance diagonal. We see that the number of voters above the diagonal (5 voters) is not equal to the number of voters below (6 voters). Because of this inequality, the top-down budget would imply a lower budget balance, since a majority of voters prefer a lower budget balance than that implied in bu.10 Therefore, if these voters were to consider the budget balance first, they would choose a higher deficit. For a given budget process, a change in voters’ preferences may yield a different outcome.

178

Louis M. Imbeau and Jérôme Couture

b

Total Vision Partial Vision

a

 











More Redistribution

bu td





c

Less Redistribution



f

  e

 More Market Allocation

d

More Government Allocation

Figure 9.6 | Ideological zones regarding fiscal policy

t h e l e f t a n d t h e f is cal defi ci t Why, then, did empirical research generally fail to confirm the hypothesis linking leftist governments to higher fiscal deficits, and why did it sometimes conclude that it was rather governments of the right who indulged in higher deficits? We now directly address this issue. Figure 9.6 defines ideological zones on three dimensions. On the taxation dimension, voters are split between those who want more redistribution through taxation (zones a , b , and c ) and those who want less (zones d , e , and f ). On the expenditure dimension, the split is between those who want more market allocation of resources (lower spending: zones a , f , and e ) and those who want more

The Left and the Fiscal Deficit

179

government allocation (zones b , c , and d ). The third dimension splits the electorate between those who have a partial vision of the budget (they give more importance to their preferences on taxation and expenditure than to the budget balance: zones c , d , and e ) and those who have a total vision of the budget (for them, the budget balance prevails over their preferences on taxation and expenditure: zones a , b , and f ). Thus, six ideological zones are defined (a through f ). In light of these six zones, it is easy to locate voters of the right (they want less redistribution and more market allocation: zones e and f ) and voters of the left (they want more redistribution and more government allocation: zones b and c ). Further, we note that both the right and the left are split between what we call here a total vision and a partial vision of the budget. Many voters of the right share a partial vision of the budget. They value lower taxes more than a balanced budget. Hence their promotion of tax cuts that deepen the deficit. These voters would be located in zone e . Likewise, many voters of the left share a total vision of the budget and give more importance to fiscal discipline than to more generous social programs. They would be located in zone b . When an empirical study shows that there is no significant relationship between the partisan orientation of governments and the budget balance, we must conclude that, under a post-election median voter model, the number of voters in zones f or b is not significantly different from the number of voters in zones e or c respectively. And when an empirical study shows that governments of the right have significantly higher deficits than governments of the left, our median voter model leads us to conclude that the number of voters in zone e is significantly higher than in zone f and that the equivalent numbers in zones b and c are not significantly different. In other words, the ideological dimension that is relevant for predicting the level of deficit is not the left-right dimension but the total-partial vision dimension.

c o n c l u si on Given the bias of the empirical literature in favour of significant results, we hold that the weak support of the hypothesis linking leftright party ideology to budget balance should prompt us to consider that this hypothesis has been proven wrong. Empirically, governments of the left do not indulge more in fiscal deficit and public debt

180

Louis M. Imbeau and Jérôme Couture

than do governments of the right. At the theoretical level, our median voter model helps us understand the reason for this lack of support. Indeed, the ideological spaces depicted in figure 9.6 above shed some light on the empirical findings on the relationship between party and budget balance. They suggest that leftist governments do not have systematically higher deficits because their electorate is concentrated more in zone b than in zone c – i.e., some (those in located in zone b ) have a total vision of the budget as they prefer fiscal discipline over their ideological preference for higher spending, while others (those located in zone c ) have a partial vision of the budget as they privilege their ideology over fiscal discipline. As a majority of leftist voters prefer a better budget balance, leftist governments refrain from increasing public spending and balance their budget as demanded by their constituents. Moreover, several empirical studies have found that, under certain circumstances, rightist governments do tend to have systematically higher deficits. This is because rightist voters are often concentrated in zone e , as they have a partial vision of the budget, preferring lower taxes over balanced budgets. Therefore, it is not the left-right dichotomy that matters when predicting budget balance, but the total-partial vision dichotomy. It is time to definitely abandon the hypothesis of a partisan cycle in explaining budget balance. no t e s This chapter has a long history and went through several iterations. A first version was written while the first author was on sabbatical leave at the Institut d’études politiques de Lille, France, and was presented to a graduate seminar under Jean-Dominique Lafay at the department of economics of the Université de Paris I – Sorbonne in February 1999. A second version was presented to the annual conference of the European Public Choice Society (epcs ) in Durham, England, in April 2005. These annual conferences of the epcs were privileged moments when we could regularly meet and converse with Bob. We are indebted to the many people who read and commented on our text over the years, especially to the editors of this volume – more precisely to Cris de Clercy for her helpful comments and suggestions. All remaining weaknesses are our own. 1 For other reviews of this literature, see Eslava 2011, Franzese 2002, Imbeau 2004a and b, and Imbeau and Chenard 2002 and 2005.

The Left and the Fiscal Deficit

181

2 Web of Science (formerly isi Web of Knowledge) is the premier research platform for information in the sciences, social sciences, arts, and humanities. https://clarivate.com/products/web-of-science. 3 Here is how Blais and Young (1999, 39) describe this paradox: “A rational citizen who calculates the expected utility of voting may estimate that who wins will make some difference to her. But she must recognize, when there are many electors, that her vote has only an infinitesimal probability of affecting the outcome of the election. At the same time, the costs of voting are not negligible. The result is clear: the expected utility of voting is close to zero, there are costs involved, and the rational citizen should therefore abstain. That so many people do vote presents a paradox in rational choice theory.” In their experiment involving university students, Blais and Young found that those students to whom the apparent irrationality of voting was presented reduced their participation in the election by seven percentage points “mainly because the presentation diminished [their] sense of duty” (39). 4 This is one of the basic assumptions of game theoretic voting models. The assumption of single-peaked preferences implies that a voter’s preferences are ordered in a unimodal fashion; that is, if for example their most preferred level of government spending is 40 per cent of gdp , then they would prefer a 45 per cent level to a 50 per cent level, and a 35 per cent level to a 30 per cent level. The further we move away in either direction from their most preferred choice, the less they like it. This preference ordering could be represented as 30 per cent < 35 per cent < 40 per cent > 45 per cent > 50 per cent and is most often displayed as a bell-shaped curve. A bimodal preference ordering could mean, for example, that they prefer a society with either a very weak (30 per cent) or a very strong (50 per cent) government, and that they dislike middle-ground and extreme solutions. This bi-peaked preference ordering could be represented as 20 per cent < 25 per cent < 30 per cent > 35 per cent > 40 per cent < 45 per cent < 50 per cent > 55 per cent > 60 per cent or displayed as a bimodal curve. Though it is possible to find voters who support both extreme-left and extreme-right positions at the same time, people usually have single-peaked preferences and game theoretic models assume that rational voters do. 5 Given the independence of central banks in recent decades, we ignore money-printing as a third source. 6 We are aware that the addition of a second dimension raises a problem since the literature shows that, “unless extremely restrictive assumptions are made

182

7

8

9 10

Louis M. Imbeau and Jérôme Couture

about the distribution of the ideal points” (Ferejohn and Khrebiel 1987, 300), there is no pure majority rule equilibrium when the choice is made on the several dimensions simultaneously. However, as Osborne remarks (1995, 266), “Hotelling recognized that his main idea – the fact that in a twocandidate competition each candidate has an incentive to move toward the other – applies to the case in which the policy space is multidimensional.” And Osborne concludes his review by saying, “In summary, Hotelling’s basic idea survives when the space of policies is multidimensional, though in this case a pure strategy equilibrium may not exist” (267). In the following development, we assume that the politician considers one subset of the policy space at a time (first spending, then taxation) and that preferences are single-peaked, thus allowing for majority-rule equilibria. Ricardo’s equivalence theorem, or Barro’s neutrality theorem, is the most often-cited economic model in the literature on budget deficits. It states that a benevolent planner and a rational economic agent will concur to conclude that financing public spending through taxes is “equivalent” to financing it through borrowing (Barro 1989, 38–9). This interaction between preferences and institutions is central to the literature on the political economy of fiscal deficits. See, for example, Sakamoto 2001. For reviews based on this interaction, see Imbeau 2004a and 2004b. For a formal proof, see Ferejohn and Khrebiel 1987, 305–7. To locate the top-down budget, one needs to project the median voter’s ideal point on the b +b - perpendicular to the budget balance diagonal – not shown here but depicted in figure 9.4 – and then to project the median voter’s ideal point onto the chosen budget balance. The result is td .

r e f e r e nc e s Alesina, Alberto, and Andrea Passalacqua. 2015. “The Political Economy of Government Debt.” nber Working Paper Series 21821. Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti. 1995. “The Political Economy of Budget Deficits.” imf Staff Papers 42, no. 1: 1–31. Bakker, Ryan Sean, Catherine de Vries, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Anna Vachudova. 2012. “Measuring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1990–2010.” European Union Politics 13, no. 2: 219–45. Barro, Robert J. 1989. “The Ricardian Approach to Budget Deficits.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, no. 2: 37–54.

The Left and the Fiscal Deficit

183

Blais, André, and Robert A. Young. 1999. “Why Do People Vote? An Experiment in Rationality.” Public Choice 99: 39–55. Borrelli, Stephen A., and Terry J. Royed. 1995. “Government ‘Strength’ and Budget Deficits in Advanced Democracies.” European Journal of Political Research 28: 225–60. Clark, William Roberts. 2003. Capitalism, Not Globalism: Capital Mobility, Central Bank Independence, and the Political Control of the Economy. Ann Arbor, mi : University of Michigan Press. Congleton, Roger D. 2003. “The Median Voter Model.” In Encyclopedia of Public Choice, edited by Charles K. Rowley and Friedrich Schneider, 707–12. New York: Springer. Dharmapala, Dhammika, and Etienne Lehmann. 2003. “A Median Voter Theorem for Postelection Politics.” Economics Working Papers 200347. Storrs, ct : University of Connecticut. Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row. Eslava, Marcela. 2011. “The Political Economy of Fiscal Deficits: A Survey.” Journal of Economic Surveys 25, no. 4: 645–73. Ferejohn, John, and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. “The Budget Process and the Size of the Budget.” American Journal of Political Science 31, no. 2: 296–320. Franzese, Robert J. 1999. “Electoral and Partisan Manipulation of Public Debt in Developed Democracies, 1956–1990.” In Institutions, Politics, and Fiscal Policy, edited by R. Strauch and J.V. Hagen, 61–83. New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers. – 2002. “Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Economic Policies and Outcomes.” Annual Review of Political Science 5: 369–421. Hibbs, Douglas A. 1977. “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy.” American Political Science Review 71, no. 4: 1467–87. – 1986. “Political Parties and Macroeconomics Policies and Outcomes in the United States.” American Economic Review 76, no. 2: 66–70. – 1992. “Partisan Theory after Fifteen Years.” European Journal of Political Economy 8: 361–73. – 1994. “The Partisan Model and Macroeconomic Cycles: More Theory and Evidence from the United States.” Economics and Politics 6, no. 1: 1–23. Hotelling, Harold. 1929. “Stability in Competition.” Economic Journal 39, no. 153: 41–57. Huxley, Thomas. 1870. “Biogenesis and Abiogenesis: The Presidential Address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science for

184

Louis M. Imbeau and Jérôme Couture

1870.” Full Online Books. http://fullonlinebook.com/essays/biogenesisand-abiogenesis/vsoz.html. Imbeau, Louis M. 2004a. “The Political-Economy of Public Deficits.” In Politics, Institutions, and Fiscal Policy: Deficits and Surpluses in Federated States, edited by Louis M. Imbeau and François Pétry, 1–19. Lanham, md : Lexington Books. – 2004b. “Public Deficits and Surpluses in Federated States: A Review of the Public Choice Empirical Literature.” Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 23, no. 3: 123–45. Imbeau, Louis M., and Kina Chenard. 2002. “The Political-Economy of Public Deficits: A Review Essay.” Paper presented to the European Public Choice Society, Belgirate, Italy. – 2005. “Déficits et surplus budgétaires dans les États fédérés.” In Politiques publiques comparées dans les États fédérés, edited by L.M. Imbeau, 211–42. Quebec: Presses de l’Université Laval. Imbeau, Louis M., François Pétry, and Moktar Lamari. 2001. “Left-Right Party Ideology and Public Policies: A Meta-Analysis.” European Journal of Political Research 40, no. 1: 1–29. Larkey, Patrick D., Chandler Stolp, and Mark Winer. 1981. “Theorizing About the Growth of Government: A Research Assessment.” Journal of Public Policy 1: 157–220. Müller, Andreas, Kjetil Storesletten, and Fabrizio Zilibotti. 2016. “The Political Color of Fiscal Responsibility.” Journal of European Economic Association 14, no. 1: 252–302. Osborne, Martin J. 1995. “Spatial Models of Political Competition under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions They Take.” Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d’économique 28, no. 2: 261–301. Persson, Torsten, and Lars E.O. Svensson. 1989. “Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, no. 2: 325–45. Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. Cambridge, ma , and London: mit Press. Potrafke, Niklas. 2018. “Government Ideology and Economic Policy-Making in the United States – A Survey.” Public Choice 174, no. 1: 145–207. Przeworski, Adam, and John D. Sprague. 1986. Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism. Chicago, il : University of Chicago Press. Sakamoto, Takayuki. 2001. “Effects of Government Characteristics on Fiscal Deficits in 18 oecd Countries, 1961–1994.” Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 5: 527–54.

10

Gandhi’s Satyagraha: An Economic Interpretation Ronald Wintrobe

Bob Young was a great admirer of Gandhi, as I am. I remember one conversation with him about Gandhi’s visit to London in 1931 to negotiate with the then viceroy of India, Lord Irwin. We both loved the famous photo of Gandhi walking on the street in London in the rain, bareheaded and in his usual dhoti and bare feet, beside the British with their umbrellas, hats, and trench coats.1 The photograph itself tells you a lot about Gandhi’s satyagraha – his approach to non-violent protest. Bob and I had a lot of discussions about non-violent protest and when and under what circumstances it might be expected to succeed, as we had discussions about so many other subjects. And our discussions were always non-violent. In this chapter, I look at Gandhi’s method of satyagraha from the point of view of an economic or rational choice. I interpret satyagraha as a technique of communication, dialogue, and trust-building. I suggest some conditions under which it might be expected to succeed, and its particular characteristic flaw. I then contrast this method of non-violent protest with its apparent polar opposite: the methods of the militant group isis . I argue that one feature of isis ’s most infamous and peculiar form of violence is that, as a technique of protest, it is free from the characteristic flaw of Gandhi’s satyagraha. The next section briefly traces the origins and development of satyagraha. The section after that then suggests an economic interpretation of the strategy of satyagraha and show the conditions under which it tends to be successful. Finally, before concluding, I

186

Ronald Wintrobe

contrast Gandhi’s methods with those of isis and suggest a number of reasons that pushed isis ’s leadership to adopt such extreme methods of protest and terror. A brief note on the literature: Gandhi is one of the most discussed figures in history. He was himself a prodigious writer, biographies of him appear regularly, and there is a large body of literature on non-violent protest. I have profited greatly from some selections of Gandhi’s own writings (Gandhi 1962; 2008) and from Tidrick’s (2013) fascinating biography of him. While there is not much on satyagraha that is analytical from a contemporary social science perspective, I have found Bondurant (1988) and Juergensmeyer (2005) most helpful. Among recent contributions to the literature on non-violence, Chenoweth’s work (e.g., Chenoweth and Stephan 2011) on the attractiveness of non-violent protest in general has deservedly attracted wide attention.

g a n d h i’ s sat yagraha What is satyagraha? To some extent, it is a strategy of non-violent protest. But Gandhi did not invent non-violent protest, and there is more to satyagraha than this. The beginning, in South Africa, of satyagraha has been briefly described as follows: The crucial event in Gandhi’s development came soon after his arrival in South Africa when he was thrown off a train at Martizburg station because of the color of his skin. He decided that he would stay and he would fight but on behalf of all and in that fight he would not resort to any tactic that would diminish the humanity he was fighting for. The following day he was again refused a place on the carriage though there was room and he was forced to sit in a degrading place outside … When he refused the driver tried to drag him off. “Gandhi refused to yield but also refused to defend himself and clung to the carriage rail until the white passengers were moved to pity and begged the driver to let him join them at their side … [H]e glimpsed a new image of himself. He was not just a separate, physical creature. He saw that he – and, crucially, every other human being – was essentially spiritual, with strength [that] does not come from physical capacity [but] from an indomitable will” (Eswaran 1962, xix, xx).

Gandhi’s Satyagraha

187

What did Gandhi discover? To begin, non-violent resistance implies the withdrawal of co-operation or loyalty, demonstrating to the agent of oppression that their power over the resistor ultimately rests on the resistor’s willing acquiescence, and that, without that acquiescence, the oppressor has no power over them. Sometimes this is called “delegitimation” (e.g., Juergensmeyer 2005). By itself, this action may sometimes motivate the oppressor to bargain. The strategy works in part because under all political systems, even dictatorships or occupations, power rests on loyalty, active acquiescence, or support as well as on violent repression (see Wintrobe 1998). But this point applies to any kind of civil disobedience. What is distinctive about satyagraha compared to other methods of civil disobedience? The word satyagraha comes from two roots, satya- or sat, meaning truth, and agraha from grah, meaning grasp (Bondurant 1988, 12), or agraha, meaning firmness (Tidrick 2013, 81). So satyagraha means the force of truth – literally, “holding on to the truth.” But Gandhi also used a different interpretation in which satya means soul, in which case satyagraha means “soul force.” Let us start with the first interpretation, truth. What truth is being communicated? To understand this, let us consult Tidrick’s (2013) description of one of the most famous and successful of satyagraha actions, the Salt March: By the end of February he [Gandhi] knew that civil disobedience would take the form of disobeying the salt laws. Non-payment of the tax was not practicable because the tax was included in the price of salt. But the government monopoly of salt production could be challenged by the simple act of picking up salt deposits on the seashore. This was Gandhi’s inspiration, and the place selected for the crime was Dandi in Gujarat. He would walk there, with his chosen band, all the way from Sabarmati – a distance of over 200 miles … On 6 April he broke the salt laws. All around India thousands spontaneously followed, wading into the sea with bowls and pans in one of the strangest acts of rebellion the world had ever seen. (228–30) Gandhi was arrested on 5 May and removed once again to Yeravada jail on 21 May. As Gandhi prayed and spun in what he had taken to calling “Yeravda Mandir” (“temple”), the raid on the Dharsana salt works took place.

188

Ronald Wintrobe

Gandhi’s inspiration had proven sublime. About 2,500 volunteers, mostly from the patidar villages of Kheda, under the leadership of Sarojini Naidu and the ever-underestimated Manilal Gandhi, advanced on the salt works in groups of twenty-five. As one group crumpled under the blows of police lathi, another, with perfect discipline, took its place (Tidrick 2013, 234). With this description in mind, let us ask the question again: what truths were communicated by the Salt March satyagrahi? a) They were suffering – in this case, from the high price of salt caused by the tax. What the satyagraha did was make the suffering visible. b) They were willing to suffer further by exposing themselves to violence, and they would continue to demonstrate their suffering but not respond violently. So they demonstrated their commitment both to the cause and to this method of fighting for it. c) They were strong. Gandhi always denied that satyragraha was a weapon of the weak. In not fighting back, the group demonstrated strength, not weakness. As Gandhi once put it, “A mouse cannot be commonly said to refrain from hurting a cat. You do not love him whom you fear. Immediately you cease to fear, you are ready for your choice – to strike or to refrain. To refrain is proof of awakening of the soul in man, to strike is proof of bodyforce. The ability to strike must be present when the power of the soul is demonstrated” (letter to Ester Faering, 1917, quoted in Tidrick 2013, 124). d) They wished to communicate with their oppressor and with the public. The point of the action was to initiate a dialogue for change. In Gandhi’s way of thinking, connecting with your opponents is as important as connecting with your followers. But there is a problem of dominance. When one party dominates the other, having an open dialogue is difficult. The disobedience, by showing the oppressor that they needed the consent and support of the dissenters to govern, removed the inequality of power and made it is possible to establish the trust necessary for dialogue to take place. It also exposed the actions of the oppressor’s agents to a wider public, who were also, in effect, invited to participate in the dialogue.

Gandhi’s Satyagraha

189

an e c o n o m ic in t e r p r e tati on of satyagraha To go further in understanding satyagraha, I suggest interpreting the process just described as trust-building. To see this point, let me use a more rigorous concept of trust than that normally employed in everyday language, relying on a concept first developed in Breton and Wintrobe (1982). From an economic point of view, trust is a capital good. It can be accumulated through investment or sacrifices in the present, and its value is that it permits exchanges to take place that could not have happened otherwise. The context in which trust is valuable, therefore, is one where either the possibilities of communication or the enforcement of an exchange are difficult. Trust is a valuable capital asset under these conditions. It can be built in private exchange or in politics. Here is a simple illustration of how trust may be built in private exchange: suppose I go to a restaurant and I happen to leave my wallet there. Someone finds it and gives it back to me with all the money still in my wallet.2 After that, I know I can trust that person. But can I trust them completely? Suppose there was $100 in the wallet. Then, because the finder did not take this opportunity to cheat me, I have some reason to believe that if an opportunity arose in the future to cheat me and earn $100 in the process, the finder would not take it. But I cannot be certain they would not cheat me. Trust is never perfect. Maybe on another occasion, the finder would be more desperate for the money. And if there had been $1,000 in my wallet instead of only $100, the temptation might have been too great to pass up. We can describe this scenario using the following notation: Let at b1.00 represent the degree to which a person, a, trusts that another person, b, will not cheat them on a transaction where the potential gain to b from cheating is $1.00. We also assume that y x at b < at b if y < x where x, y = $0.01, 1.00, 2.00, … $∞. We can use the same notation for generalized trust, or general social capital, or trust between groups – that is, the degree to which an individual, a, trusts any individual in a group, j. This is the sense in which the concept of generalized trust is used by Fukuyama (1995) or Knack and Keefer (1997). So generalized trust is just aTj x where j = 1, … n , x = $0.01, 1.00, 2.00, … $∞(4) where a nd j represent any individual in group a or j respectively. Again, the degree of trust is specified for a given opportunity to cheat ($x).

190

Ronald Wintrobe

Now look at the satyagrahi and their opponents in the Salt March. The Salt March created an opportunity for the two groups to establish trust with one another. It did this first by challenging the dominance of the British, declaring in effect that individual Indians could not be forced to obey laws that they regarded as unjust. This established them as equal participants in a trust dialogue. Second, the march created an opportunity for the Indian participants to show the British that they could be trusted not to use violence to oppose these laws. Hundreds of Indians were beaten, and they could have responded violently to being beaten, but they did not. So they showed that, although they would no longer obey the law (the salt monopoly), they would not respond violently to punishment. They could have counterattacked, but they did not. They, in effect, forced the British to assault them, but they sacrificed the opportunity to hit back. After that, the British had some reason to trust the protestors. Here the “investment” is not only the forgone opportunity to assert their physical strength – they were, after all, much more numerous than the British – but also the physical suffering they endured for the cause. From the economic point of view, these costs may be thought of as investments that provided the British with a reason to trust the protestors. Of course, again the trust is not perfect. Suppose, to illustrate, that the gain from violence on some future occasion appeared to the protestors to be much larger than could have been expected from the Salt March (e.g., that a single violent act could bring down British rule). Then the British might not be at all confident that the satyagrahi would not use violence on that occasion. And sometimes, it is obviously going to be difficult to build any trust at all. For example, it is hard to imagine that the Jews could have successfully used this technique against the Nazis who were bent on the Jews’ destruction.3 One can imagine many circumstances where the cost of building trust by this or other means is high and so the technique may not achieve much, but that is part of my point: trust is not zero or one, but variable, and the amount that may be created depends on the costs and benefits of trusting. What are the benefits of the establishing of satyagraha as I have interpreted it? The process initiates a dialogue. Non-violent resistance means holding on to the truth without striking back. Satyagraha communicates the truth (the Salt Laws are unjust), the message of resistance (they will not put up with it anymore), and the strength of the group. A successful satyagraha action therefore builds the group’s power, and

Gandhi’s Satyagraha

191

it communicates that power to its oppressors. It also communicates the information about the suffering of the group, its capacity for non-violent action, and its power to a wider public. In the case of governments that are responsive to public opinion, this process may be effective. One other aspect of satyagraha should be stressed: that one is always willing to listen. Gandhi insisted that he did not have a monopoly on truth. In his view, it is the dialogue among groups that builds collective intelligence – that is, gets closer to the truth. To see this point more precisely, let us look at some conditions under which information aggregation is known to improve the quality of information and decision-making by a group. To begin, there are the well-known conditions from Condorcet’s jury theorem: 1 Each person’s probability of being right has to be greater than 0.5. 2 Each person forms their own opinion, as opposed to domination or herd behaviour. In either of the latter cases, there is no pooling of independent judgment. To these conditions, we could add some further conditions for what is sometimes referred to as the “collective intelligence” of a group (as discussed, for example, by Pentland 2014): 3 Everyone listens. 4 No one dominates. 5 There is a mechanism for aggregating information and reaching a decision. Pentland suggests that these latter three conditions provide a mechanism for pooling information and getting closer to the truth than any one individual could. Satyagraha may not always fulfill all these conditions, but by airing a viewpoint different from that of the government, it helps to fulfill condition 1. By opposing domination, satyagraha helps to fulfill conditions 2, 3, and 4. And it points the way toward 5. So we can grasp how satyagraha can help opposing groups to get closer to the truth by allowing information to flow more freely. This provides a simple but solid rational choice foundation for Gandhi’s intuitive claim that satyagraha is a truth-building process. Now we turn to a different aspect of satyagraha – one that differentiates it from the example of the wallet used earlier. In satyagraha, the

192

Ronald Wintrobe

trust and the power built are collective. The trust is built not only (1) between the leader and their followers, but also (2) with each other, and (3) with the adversary. Because trust is collective, the bonds are fragile. To illustrate, one satryagrahi who loses control and responds violently destroys the trust of the opponent, not only with that person but, to some extent, also in the collectivity as well as with its leader. This “free rider” problem is the “Achilles heel” of the method of satyagraha. More than anything else, the problem explains why the method can break down or is simply not used. A good example of this is the never-ending dispute between Israelis and Palestinians. In that case, moderates on both sides have often agreed to pursue peace, only to be sabotaged by the actions of extremists on both sides. Now, the problem of free riding is not always insoluble. Indeed, the modern political science literature has identified a number of ways of overcoming it.4 Gandhi himself and the other leaders of the movement intuitively used some of them effectively. Two of these techniques, shaming and identification, were often employed by Gandhi. And the Salt March employed the contagion or network effect: the more people marched and the greater the number of people who joined, the more others were motivated to join. To sum up, this economic interpretation of satyagraha as a process of building collective trust, dialogue, and power is my interpretation of how “ahimsa [non-violence] converts goodness into power” (Tidrick 2013, 114).

t h e c o n t r as t w i th i si s isis

and Gandhi Appear to Be Opposites

Gandhi and isis are polar opposites on the scale of morality for many if not most people. Gandhi used his goodness in the sense of commitment to ahimsa and the goodness of the South African and later the Indian people in their willingness to fight for the cause in a way that ruled out violence as a matter of principle. They were willing to suffer for the cause by allowing themselves to be bludgeoned without fighting back. isis , on the other hand, uses the most savage methods of protest – methods that are totally repugnant to most people. Clearly, the behaviour of the leaders of isis appears to be the opposite of Gandhi’s. One could say that their methods are techniques for converting evil into power.

Gandhi’s Satyagraha

193

Now, “good” and “bad” appear in normative economic theory only in one sense: something may be said to be good only if it is efficient in the Pareto sense, and bad if it is not. In other words, the only sense of evil in economic theory is found in the concept of waste. If something is wasteful, then it may be said to be bad. And this is indeed the case with violence. It is easy to see this: if two sides have a dispute, it would always be less costly to bargain to a solution and save the costs of the violence itself.5 In order to explain why violence is sometimes used, therefore, the standard economic theory of conflict has to resort to ideas such as misinformation: for example, if the two sides to a conflict have fundamentally different expectations about who will prevail if they engage in violent conflict, then they may be unable to agree on a bargain that will prevent war. Moreover, violence itself breeds further misinformation. It destroys trust and thus makes it harder for the two sides to communicate. Further, it tends to escalate. By contrast, with satyagraha, the power of the oppressor to force submission is destroyed and, instead, trust between equals is built between the oppressor and the people. Information can flow more freely, and the tendency for conflict to escalate is reduced. Indeed, Gandhi and the leaders of isis appear to agree that violence leads to escalation. But in the case of isis , violent escalation is exactly what they want. To illustrate, here is an extract from a letter that isis ’s founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi wrote to Osama bin Laden, dated January 2004, in which al-Zarqawi says the actions of his group are an attempt to get his opponents, the Shiites, to reveal their “inner vengeance”: “Targeting and striking their [the Shiite population’s] religious, political, and military symbols will make them show their rage against the Sunnis and bear their inner vengeance … If we succeed in dragging them into a sectarian war, this will awaken the sleepy Sunnis who are fearful of destruction and death” (italics added, quoted in Charles Rivers 2014, 19). In other words, isis wants to goad its enemies into attacking its supporters. Its purpose is to sow distrust and fear. One could model this sowing of distrust with the same notation and concepts of the model of trust-building above, with everything reversed: thus, a dt bx indicates the extent to which a believes b would cheat a for a gain of x. In the case of distrust, the smaller x is, the greater the distrust, dt . Similarly, and of even greater interest, isis , like other terrorist organizations, wishes to sow distrust in general within the society

194

Ronald Wintrobe

it attacks. Thus, a dt j x indicates the degree to which a distrusts j, where a and j represent any individual in group a or j respectively. The more people become afraid to interact with others within their society as a result of actions like those of isis , the more successful are the terrorist actions. Thus isis ’s strategy is in all of these respects the exact opposite of Gandhi’s. Like all terrorist organizations, isis practises a form of judo politics in which the idea is to get the much stronger enemy to overreach and defeat themself. isis also expanded the number of groups and people Muslims are at war with to include fellow Muslims. Al-Qaeda did not believe in this, and this is the chief doctrinal difference between them and isis . isis ’s doctrine includes the idea that other Muslims, Shiites in particular, are targets. What is the consequence of extreme ideas like this? In earlier works (Wintrobe 2006a and b), I showed that more extreme views imply more violent methods of terror. The intuition is simple: a goal such as re-establishing the caliphate is not only distant and extreme, but pursuing it is likely to result in increasing returns. The more extreme the ideas, the less likely they are ever to be realized, and the less likely that moderate methods will advance the group toward its goal. So, the more extreme the ideas, the more a group is driven to take greater risks so that there is at least a possibility of getting out of the increasing returns section of the curve, relating the protest actions of the group and its goal, and achieving nationhood. Another aspect of extremism involves the time factor. How urgently or how soon does the protagonist wish their dreams to be fulfilled? Gandhi was patient; he did not want to initiate an independent India until the people were “ready” (Tidrick 2013; Gandhi 1962). Bin Laden “dreamed” about the caliphate being re-established in the future. The leaders of isis , on the other hand, apparently believe that the time for the caliphate is now. What effect does the variable of “the urgency of achievement of the final objective” have on the proclivity to violence? Only violent methods can be expected to achieve results quickly, so again, this implies a predisposition toward violence. It is worth pausing to note the contrast between this result and the standard economic theory of conflict. In that theory (e.g., Grossman 1991; Hirshleifer 2001; Collier 2011), the ideas or goals of the protagonists (protestor, originator of civil war, etc.) play no role

Gandhi’s Satyagraha

195

whatsoever as a cause of overt conflict. Instead, the only important variable is “the possibility of predation,” as represented, for example, by the weakness of the state. In the analysis here, by contrast, important aspects of the ideas of the protagonist (how extreme or how urgent their goals are) do affect the choice of violent over more peaceful methods of conflict. Fragility with Respect to Free Riding The economics of free riding is an important subject in understanding the success of different kinds of protest, rebellion, and revolution. Indeed, I had many discussions with Bob about the application of this concept to Quebec separatism, a subject he explored in great depth in his book The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada (1998). We also talked about why the Palestinians did not engage more in non-violent protest, which we both thought would be particularly effective in the context of Israeli-Palestinian politics. One particular advantage of violent strategies over non-violent ones is that, at least with certain kinds of violence, they are less vulnerable to free riding. Thus, if a member of isis is observed to be non-violent, that is unlikely to destroy the reputation of the whole organization for violence. On the other hand, an organization’s reputation for non-violence is fragile; it needs disciplined collective action to sustain it and police possible acts of violence. An organization’s reputation for violence is less vulnerable to individual defection. Put another way, a reputation for non-violence is more easily destroyed with a single violent act than a reputation for violence is damaged by a single non-violent act. Moreover, if the violence chosen is a video of some individual atrocity that is directed and televised like a media commercial, as isis often uses, then the free riding issue does not arise at all. So another reason for isis ’s choice of this method is that they need not worry about issues such as individual disobedience, defection, or free riding. Thus, this kind of violence is inherently less risky than, say, the type of terrorist activities sponsored by al-Qaeda, where the co-operation of many individuals is required in a delicate operation, to say nothing of wartime operations where many individuals and tight discipline are involved. Consequently, at least until this kind of atrocity loses its appeal, or its capacity to shock, it is easy to see the attractiveness from isis ’s point of view.

196

Ronald Wintrobe

c o n c l u s ion In this chapter I offered an economic interpretation of satyagraha as a technique of communication and trust-building. Satyagraha not only erases the difference in power between protestor and oppressor, but it also promotes dialogue with one’s opponents. In this sense, it promotes the truth, as Gandhi often said. I also noted the characteristic flaw of sagyagraha: because the built trust is collective, it is particularly vulnerable to the free rider problem. I also contrasted Gandhi’s methods with those of isis . Gandhi and isis are polar opposites in their methods of political protest or rebellion. Gandhi’s satyagraha emphasized non-violence, while isis seems to glorify extreme, individualized violence. I also suggested that, in part, isis ’s choice of violent methods follows from (a) the extremity of the organization’s beliefs; (b) the urgency of the agenda of the organization, which is to build the caliphate now; and (c) the fact that isis ’s peculiar form of violent propaganda is free from the free rider problem. It is therefore particularly useful in contexts where there are many competing extremist movements and followers are thus especially fluid and untrustworthy, as in contemporary Iraq and Syria. Extreme violence is also a form of communication, but its purpose is to build distrust and fear. isis ’s extreme violence has the opposite goal from building trust: it is a form of judo politics designed to enrage its opponents into attacking its supporters. This legitimates the repression inside the Islamic State and buttresses its basic point of view that Sunni Muslims can only deal with foreigners by force. And the choice of medium (of protest) itself both communicates what the movement’s goals are and affects the nature of the goal itself. To put a twist on Marshall McLuhan’s famous aphorism, in both cases, Gandhi and isis , “the medium is the message” (1964). no t e s 1 See for example Tidrick 2013, 249. 2 The first part of this story did happen to me recently; sadly, the second part of the story did not. 3 Though Gandhi did imagine that the technique could have been used and wrote a piece in the journal Harijan advocating as much (11 November 1938, quoted in Clement 1989, 146). The result was that the Nazi press

Gandhi’s Satyagraha

197

launched a fierce counterattack against Gandhi. In addition, Gandhi’s Jewish friends were shocked by Gandhi’s suggestion that non-violence could be effective against the Nazis (Clement 1989, 146). But at other times Gandhi did think that violence was the only option, and he supported the violent resistance of the Poles against the Nazis in 1939 (Hardiman 2003, 59). 4 For examples of some widely adopted techniques, including shame and intimidation, see Green and Gerber (2004), where their effectiveness at getting out the vote and therefore solving the free rider problem involved in the voting paradox are also discussed. They were used explicitly by Barack Obama in his presidential campaign of 2008. 5 This point was first made by Gould (1973) in the context of the question of why litigators go to court rather than find a settlement without incurring court costs, and it was then extended to the case of war by Fearon (1995) and others.

r e f e r e nce s Bondurant, Joan. [1958] 1988. Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict. Princeton, nj : Princeton University Press. Breton, Albert, and Ronald Wintrobe. 1982. The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct: An Economic Analysis of Competition, Exchange, and Efficiency in Private and Public Organizations. New York: Cambridge University Press. Charles River Editors. 2014. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria: The History of isis / isil . Cambridge, ma : Charles River Editors. Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. New York: Columbia University Press. Clement, Catherine. 1989. Gandhi: The Power of Pacifism. London: Harry N. Abrams. Collier, Paul. 2004. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers 56: 563–95. Eswaran, Eknath. 1962. Preface to The Essential Gandhi, by Mahatma Gandhi. Edited by Louis Fischer. New York: Random House Vintage Books. Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49, no. 3: 379–414. Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. Trust: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order. New York: Simon and Schuster.

198

Ronald Wintrobe

Gandhi, Mahatma. 1962. The Essential Gandhi: An Anthology. Edited by Louis Fischer. New York: Random House Vintage Books. – 2008. The Essential Writings. Oxford, uk : Oxford University Press. Green, Donald P., and Alan S. Gerber. 2004. Get Out the Vote: How to Increase Voter Turnout. Washington, dc : Brookings Institution Press. Gould, J.P. 1973. “The Economics of Legal Conflicts.” Journal of Legal Studies 2: 279–300. Grossman, Herschel. 1991. “A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections.” American Economic Review 81, no. 4: 912–21. Hardiman, David. 2003. Gandhi in His Time and Ours: The Global Legacy of His Ideas. London: Hurst and Co. Hirshleifer, Jack. 2001. The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Juergensmeyer, Mark. 2005. Gandhi’s Way: A Handbook of Conflict Resolution. Oxford, uk : Oxford University Press. Knack, Stephen, and Philip Keefer. 1997. “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross Country Investigation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 4: 1251–88. McLuhan, Marshall. [1964] 1967. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. New York: McGraw Hill. Pentland, Alex. 2014. Social Physics: How Good Ideas Spread. New York: Penguin Press. Tidrick, Kathryn. 2013. Gandhi: A Political and Spiritual Life. London: Verso. Wintrobe, Ronald. 1998. The Political Economy of Dictatorship. New York: Cambridge University Press. – 2006a. “Extremism, Suicide Terror, and Authoritarianism.” Public Choice 128, no. 1: 169–95. – 2006b. Rational Extremism: The Political Economy of Radicalism. New York: Cambridge University Press. Young, Robert A. 1998. The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada, rev. ed. Montreal, qc : McGill-Queen’s University Press and the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations.

11

On Blessing and Cursing Matters: Some Political Economy Mario Ferrero

This chapter summarizes my work on saints and martyrs; hence, it deals with good and evil. Although much of my work on this subject is of recent years, Bob Young was familiar with the earlier parts of it and was often eager to argue about it. In general, we were united by a preoccupation with issues of good and evil in people and society and the ways to control evil, and frequently had conversations on such topics. More specifically, in his wide-ranging work on secession, summarized in Young (1997), and applied to the peaceful breakup of Czechoslovakia in Young (1994) and to the topic of revolution in Young (2004), he was keenly aware of the fine, brittle line that divides peaceful from violent secession. While he focused on the peaceful side, his research could speak to my own that focused on the violent side of ethnic and nationalist conflict, which is related to the topic addressed here. So, I like to think that Bob would have enjoyed reading and discussing this piece with me – as I surely would have enjoyed discussing it with him. Saints and martyrs – people who willingly endure lifelong sacrifice or give their life for a purpose – have been with us at least since the time of Samson in the Bible. They may be good or evil, the good type ostensibly acting to benefit someone or society at large, and the evil type devoting themselves to the destruction of people or objects, and both possibly giving their lives in the process. Members of the first class range from Roman Catholic saints to revolutionary and war heroes, while the second class accommodates characters from terrorists and suicide bombers to mass school shooters.

200

Mario Ferrero

As these casual examples immediately reveal, the label of “good” or “evil” often depends on the observer’s point of view. For example, the Bengali nationalists who took to armed action in the pursuit of India’s independence were stigmatized as terrorists by the British but are to this day honoured as freedom fighters in Bengal. The revolutionaries in the Irish nationalist conflict were similarly seen as both terrorists and heroes, depending on one’s perspective. And in this age of the internet, almost any imaginable behaviour that the vast majority of us would consider heinous will find a fan group willing to support, cheer, and imitate it. This, as we will see below, raises non-trivial problems for public policy because repression of the behaviour may further lionize the target in the eyes of their fans. The American tv series The Following (2013–15), which focused on a cult serial killer, nicely illustrates the point. Many saints and martyrs, both good and bad, operate in the framework of organizations such as armies, militias, revolutionary movements, terrorist groups, or religious groups, which implies that their sacrificial behaviour may in some ways be directed. Even then, if membership in the group is voluntary, the organization must still provide sufficient incentive for the individual to join and comply with an implicit “martyrdom contract” that includes the possible request of ultimate sacrifice (Ferrero 2006). More intriguing is the range of individual agents who, even when referring to an ideology, faith, or ongoing struggle, act without coordination, direction, or organization, in a completely decentralized way. They are aware, however, that they are acting not in a vacuum but in a context populated by similar agents – and indeed are competing with them – which makes them a proper subject for an economist to study. This second group of saints and martyrs will be the focus of this chapter.1 We will first try to understand their sacrificial choices as rational behaviour and examine the working of this peculiar competition for sainthood or martyrdom, then turn to the (often unsavoury) implications for policy.

r at io n a l it y b e yo nd the grave When we deal with extreme choices that are apparently not motivated by material benefit, there are only three possibilities. Either the agents are mad, which is simply another way of saying that we understand nothing about them. Or they are driven by faith or

On Blessing and Cursing Matters

201

ideology of some kind, religious or secular, including being brainwashed or fanaticized. Or, finally, the agents are rationally pursuing a goal that may not be obvious, in which case it is our task to understand and infer the goal from the agents’ observable behaviour. This last option should not be trivialized by conflating it with the second, such as, “He believes he will go to heaven if he dies as a martyr; therefore, killing himself for his faith is rational.” That is just a tautology. Some media commentators and pundits may reason in this way, but economists should be wary of such circular reasoning. We should not assume the goal the agents are seeking by accepting their self-reported beliefs at face value; rather, we should derive the goal from the choices they made under observable constraints, in the manner suggested by economists’ revealed preference theory. Ideology or belief is a poor explanation of sacrificial behaviour for two reasons. First, it does not explain why some people act while others holding the same beliefs do not. Second, the observed behaviour changes in response to changes in constraints while the ideology does not. At a deeper methodological level, we see that widely different or even incompatible beliefs give rise to remarkably similar behaviour. A single explanation for a full range of behaviours instead of the different ideologies would be a more parsimonious model, and therefore, on the principle of Occam’s razor, a superior one. The basic hypothesis of this chapter is that the motive for (some) people to make a sacrifice throughout their life is the pursuit of a benefit that is expected to accrue when they are dead. While this benefit may take the form of an altruistic drive to benefit a future generation,2 I focus here, instead, on a selfish drive to be celebrated by witnesses and survivors after the agent’s death – inter-temporal selfishness that extends beyond the grave. I assume that (some) people care about the way they will be remembered after death. Even though their preferences may give no weight to life in the next world, altruism toward family or community, or solidarity within a group as such, they value the survival of their deeds in the collective memory of those who will have witnessed their sacrifice. The device that ensures survival in memory is the cult of saints, martyrs, or heroes, which an organization or society itself is expected to keep alive long past death. This key assumption does not seem outlandish. On reflection, most people value some kind of earthly survival beyond death: most ordinary people through their offspring, Ludwig van Beethoven or Leonardo Da Vinci through their immortal art, and some people

202

Mario Ferrero

through becoming the object of the survivors’ cult. This does not require a belief in life after death: the expectation of a cult developing around a person’s manner of life or death may be a psychological reward that the person values while still alive and spurs them to action. This pleasure is imagined or anticipated, but many pleasures take this form. Thus, in contrast to the standard economics of suicide (Hamermesh and Soss 1974), in this approach an individual kills himself not when his remaining, discounted lifetime utility becomes zero but when he sees an opportunity to enhance this utility over and above what it would be if he continued his life. For this theory to have meaning, there must be an intention driving the action, so that the anticipation of gaining a place in people’s memory becomes an incentive. This may seem more difficult to envisage for evil agents, but in fact the idea has a long pedigree. As Azam and Ferrero (2019) discuss, the idea may have started with Herostratos, a man who in the fourth century bce burned to ashes one of the greatest temples of the ancient world in the Greek city of Ephesus. When questioned about his motives by the city authorities before his execution, Herostratos answered that he had done it so that his name might live forever on account of the enormity of his crime. Hence Herostratos’s name went down in history as a byword for a perverted quest for fame and immortality when the pursuit was joined to a perception of one’s mediocrity and failure. The ancient world had a lively cult of heroes – men whose names long outlived them on account of their virtue and worthy deeds. If a man, so reasoned the ancient writers, is desperate for fame but is too base ever to hope to achieve it by heroic acts, he may try to satisfy his craving by uncommonly heinous acts. Although no emulation thereof seems to have occurred in antiquity, Herostratos set a pattern that was only awaiting more favourable times for a competition for infamy to develop. In the most general formulation of such a competitive setting, uncoordinated or unorganized agents are characterized by a hybrid motivation, combining in different proportions the quest for notoriety after death, sustained by a martyr’s cult, with ideological motives. At one extreme, there is the pure Herostratic type, at the other the pure ideological type, with most real-world examples falling somewhere in between. However, unlike the cult of martyrs discussed below, which is organized by a church or other sponsoring group, here the cult essentially feeds on the media and relies on spontaneous

On Blessing and Cursing Matters

203

fan groups, so agents must try to outdo one another to capture the headlines and establish new records. Hence the agents compete with one another over the lethality of their suicide attacks. At the Nash equilibrium (here called the Herostratic equilibrium), the active killers are the people with stronger Herostratic leanings – a higher taste for notoriety – and, in one relevant case of the model, the lethality of attacks increases with their number. Further, it can be shown (Apolte 2020) that an individual’s decision to embark on a suicide-killing path may be time-inconsistent because they may find it in their interest to defect at the last moment. This commitment problem identifies different profiles of lifetime reservation utility. Simply put, only a person beset by a serious “burden of life” will fulfill his “contract with himself” and carry out the suicidal attack as a “lone wolf,” while those not so burdened will need an external enforcement mechanism, such as the kind provided by a terrorist organization, to keep them from defecting. This model – and in particular the race to increase lethality as a ticket to notoriety – fits well the recent wave of lone wolf terrorist attacks that have struck Europe and other parts of the world. In particular, the self-styled jihadist attacks on European Jews clearly damage the Palestinian cause, at least in the short run, by triggering extensive Jewish emigration to Israel. On this interpretation, isis has been trading off Palestinian interests against the opportunity to recruit more militants by leveraging their thirst for instant stardom, which is ensured by killing European Jews – in other words, by leveraging the Herostratos syndrome. In this way, evidence for the Herostratic, self-glorifying nature of these actions is found in the disconnect, or outright contradiction, between the alleged ideological purpose and the actual effect of the action. An extreme example of Herostratic competition is the epidemic of shootings in schools, which involves killers who are willing to kill and die (often through “suicide by cop”) with no ideology or social purpose to speak of. After the landmark Columbine massacre of 1999, the epidemic dramatically picked up in both numbers and lethality of attacks, and recently went beyond American school premises to become global, as well as coming to involve other venues and contexts. The evidence of explicit imitation, referencing, and emulation of Columbine by subsequent shooters is overwhelming, while the body count is self-consciously used by the shooters as a method of generating media attention. Coupled with the basically

204

Mario Ferrero

random choice of victims during the rampage, this behaviour reveals the fundamental motive of post-Columbine killers: killing for notoriety. To these killers, “payback consists of killing convenient targets, making a statement, and dying in a blaze of glory” (Larkin 2009, 1323). In one of the most revealing pieces of circumstantial evidence, as his foster mother reported, mall shooter Robert Hawkins wrote in his suicide note that “he was a piece of shit all of his life and now he’ll be famous” (Lankford and Hakim 2011, 105). Like a slow-motion, evolving riot, the epidemic has progressed from the early psychopaths to more and more “normal” types who identify with the school-shooting tradition and celebrate its heroes. This picture fits the pattern of Herostratic competition well. The killers are engaged in a quest for notoriety and compete with one another over the increasing (intended) lethality of their attacks. The more recent recruits might not have started the movement but are ready to join the stream. The pattern of non-ideological loners who join a movement to be part of the ongoing cult is, however, not limited to evil characters: it extends to people who would not kill but who immolate themselves for a collective cause. A thorough quantitative study of self-immolation from 1963 to 2002 (Biggs 2005) notes that there is no evidence of otherworldly motivation, but rather that “vanity” (gaining recognition from others) coupled with the desire to make up for past personal failures seems to be the main driver. The site and date of the event can become focal points of commemoration and celebration for a long time afterward. Ferrero (2013) counts this phenomenon among the evidence of a cult of martyrs as an incentive to sacrifice, though there is no formal organization supporting the cult. Were it not for the atrocity of the most popular means of death – by fire – entry into this cult would be relatively easy: the act requires no organization; the person need not have made any prior commitment or investment as member of a religious or secular organization to qualify; and in many cases, though not all, the act generates a tremendous response – a wave of imitation – that both ensures that the initiator will be revered and provides incentives for others to join the chain. Thus, by joining a collective cause and volunteering for fiery death, an individual gains a (probabilistic) opportunity to secure a martyr cult for himself. And indeed, self-immolation acts are often clustered in time and place, producing waves: in South Vietnam in the

On Blessing and Cursing Matters

205

1960s (by Buddhist monks protesting the American war), in South Korea in 1991 (by leftist students protesting the government), and, above all, in India in 1990, when over 200 people (mostly students from privileged castes) burned themselves to death in protest against the reservation of jobs and university places for lower castes. Most recently, some 150 Tibetan monks and nuns self-immolated from 2009 to 2017 in protest against the Chinese occupation of Tibet (Wikipedia 2018e). So, despite being a world apart in the content and moral worth of their acts, self-immolating martyrs are remarkably similar to school killers. Turning to religious martyrs, the rational explanation of their sacrifice proposed here can be challenged by a conventional alternative based on a quest for afterlife rewards. Also, if a religious organization does not have full control of its cult of martyrs, the possibility arises of the opposite extremes of insufficient martyrdom, or defection, and of excessive martyrdom, or fanaticism, from the organization’s point of view. To discriminate between the two explanations, the one just offered here and the conventional one, three conditions must be met: first, it must be possible for the agents to avoid death without apostatizing; second, the theology must be such that the heavenly rewards granted a martyr are equally available for other kinds of virtuous behaviour; and third, there must be an observable correlation between differential propensities to become a martyr and some characteristics or strengths of the cult. Some examples can be drawn from Christian history, which consistently satisfies all these conditions (Ferrero 2006; 2013). The most spectacular example of someone who underwent martyrdom for the sake of a cult among the living and not to gain access to heaven is none other than Jesus of Nazareth.3 This is true whether one looks at the historical figure of Jesus the man or accepts the Christian claim about the divinity of Jesus the Christ. If Jesus was divine, he was one of the persons of the Godhead, who was incarnated, died, and rose again to deliver the hope of salvation to all who would accept his gospel and worship him. So we can say that the purpose of his supreme sacrifice was to found a cult centred on himself as the Son of God. If Jesus was a man, then he was an apocalyptic Jewish prophet who preached the impending coming of the kingdom of God for the redemption of all Israel and then willingly faced execution, while promising to return soon in glory to establish the kingdom. He was certainly not striving to earn a place in heaven

206

Mario Ferrero

for himself; he thought of himself as God-blessed and God-sent, let his followers hail him as Messiah, and looked confidently to his place back at the right hand of God. All his followers had to do to earn themselves a place in the upcoming kingdom was to believe his promise, remember him, and keep the hope alive, which they did. In the event, this particular cult of a martyr survived the waning of apocalyptic hope and gave rise to a major world religion. Further, Jesus appears as the prototype of the fanatical martyr. The Judaism of his time was filled with messianic expectations, but it was never envisioned that the Messiah – a victorious leader and redeemer of the people of Israel – should sacrifice his life and die on a cross. The two centuries before Emperor Constantine’s edict of toleration (313 ce ) were the age of Christian martyrs in the Roman Empire. The Roman authorities typically put Christians to the sacrifice test: a largely symbolic acknowledgment of the Roman gods as a token of loyalty to the empire, upon which the Christians would be free to continue to practise their religion. Large, though unquantifiable, numbers no doubt yielded to the persecutors and apostatized, but several thousands died, while another untold but large number, for a variety of reasons, were lucky enough to escape execution without recanting. There are a number of reasons to think that the pursuit of a cult explanation offered here is a better description of the motivations of martyrs than the commonly held idea that they are motivated simply by an imperative to witness the faith. First, voluntary martyrdoms were pervasive: many Christians were not sought out and apprehended but spontaneously offered themselves up to the Roman authorities, courting their own deaths. Church leaders and theologians were only too aware of this widespread eagerness for martyrdom and diligently tried to restrain it. However, their message did not always get through because the church itself was of two minds: other prominent leaders enthusiastically endorsed and supported the voluntary martyrs. Second, Christian voluntary martyrdom connected to, and drew support from, an influential precedent: the time-honoured, Roman pagan tradition of noble suicide. The great orator Tertullian was perhaps the most outspoken apologist for this view among the Christians. Third, since persecutions always struck in the cities and were often localized and unevenly enforced, those Christians who chose not to be martyred in a persecution had the option of leaving the city and thus

On Blessing and Cursing Matters

207

avoiding apostasy, as Jesus himself had instructed them to do (Matthew 10:23). Again, some leaders condemned flight, others did not. Fourth, and perhaps most important, martyrdom was an urban phenomenon. The martyrs regularly showed up in the big cities or, if imprisoned elsewhere, requested to be transferred there to be executed in public spectacles of blood sport in the city amphitheatres, preaching lengthy sermons to an intrigued audience, presumably to advance the cause of the church with maximum impact. This fact strongly speaks for the cult theory, since no variety of Christian theology of salvation has ever claimed that heavenly rewards are denied to those who are interrogated in small towns or executed out of sight. Finally, substantial sections of the rank and file endorsed and supported the voluntary martyrs, providing the expected cult with support whatever the bishops might say and, in the aftermath, triggering serious schisms in the church. So, from the point of view of the mainline church, the decentralized cult was too strong – and this fanaticism is again a strong indication that the cult was the main driver. This is confirmed by other instances of martyrdom in subsequent Christian history, particularly in the century following the Reformation, which witnessed three rival martyrdom traditions (Protestant, Anabaptist, and Catholic) competing with one another. No religious organization is more hierarchical than the modern Roman Catholic Church; and indeed, the second millennium witnessed an epochal shift to the centralization of saint-making in the hands of a papal bureaucracy that peaks at the pope himself – a shift that reached completion in 1634 when all canonizations and beatifications at the local level were disallowed. Therefore, it would seem that the church’s modern crop of saints and martyrs should fall outside our framework of uncoordinated, decentralized action. However, as I have argued elsewhere (Ferrero 2002), this is not so. I will here briefly outline my argument that the institution of saint-making provides an answer to the dual incentive and information problem facing the monopolist bureaucracy that the church is, and that the best way for the monopoly to fully benefit from this institution is to accommodate internal competition at the grassroots level. The church faces the problem of providing incentives for subordinates to disclose their private information and act in the best interest of the organization. The scope for material incentives to its clergy is, however, severely curtailed, at least since the Counter-Reformation.

208

Mario Ferrero

At the same time, the information problem is staggering due to the hugely diverse and constantly evolving facets of society that need to be targeted at any one time, and to the lack or distortion of incentives for the ordinary clerics to pass the relevant information upward. So the papacy cannot simply monitor for problems and then order its clergy to take appropriate action. Detection of problem spots and consequent action have to be left to decentralized initiatives, with the top hierarchy evaluating outcomes ex-post and awarding prizes to the best performers in the church’s interests. Thus, centralized saint-making works as a competitive, open-access, rent-seeking contest. The participants in the contest are not the candidates, who are dead,4 but their followers, who almost invariably turn out to be members of religious orders. This is because the modern requirements for canonization are demanding and, consequently, the adjudication procedure is a lengthy and expensive affair. Religious orders are long-lived institutions, capable of sustained pressure for decades or even centuries. The canonization of a new saint brings benefits to the saint’s followers in the form of donations, bequests, and enhanced power of their order within the church. Such benefits are compatible with austerity in personal consumption, and therefore the followers have incentives to press the canonization cause through and to field new candidates. Two implications follow from this model. The first is that the characteristics of recognized sainthood should be hugely diverse. Each candidate saint is a volunteer who discovered and devoted themself to some purpose or social group that was comparatively neglected and in need of attention, and this became the volunteer’s specialization and that of their followers. If the volunteer’s innovation is eventually rewarded with canonization, this is like the licensing of a new enterprise within the church. A second implication is that the profiles of saints should change over time because they are driven by changing social demands as perceived by the church hierarchy; some brands of sanctity will decline and die out and will be replaced by new ones. The quantitative evidence brings out both implications. The saints are overwhelmingly members or associates of religious orders, and all the founders of religious orders or congregations have been canonized or beatified. Further, the breakdown of canonizations by religious orders shows the changing directions of church demands and, consequently, the changing structure of church power through the centuries. The beginning of the period saw the pre-eminence of

On Blessing and Cursing Matters

209

Benedictines, followed by the rise of the Mendicant orders in the thirteenth century, then by the Jesuits and other new militant orders in the time of the Counter-Reformation and the development of colonial empires, and finally by a vast crop of socially minded orders born of the Industrial Revolution and the age of liberalism and socialism. Finally, the explosion of canonizations under Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI, made possible by a reform of the judicial procedure that made access to sainthood easier, signalled a true globalization of sainthood, dramatically broadening the range to accommodate saints and blessed from “under-represented” genders, countries, peoples, occupations, and minorities of every description. This strongly suggests that the church made a determined effort to reach out to neglected corners of the world, such as Latin America and East Asia, that are particularly vulnerable to competition from Protestant churches. So, despite the religious character of the participants, religion is not necessary to explain the evolution of Catholic saint-making. The pursuit of recognition by the candidates’ promoters in their own selfish interest, joined with the church’s interest in acknowledging and rewarding them, is sufficient. In earlier periods, the slow motion and long duration of the canonization causes seems to suggest that candidates were too many for the needs and capabilities of the church and crowded one another out. By contrast, the rapidly increasing pace of canonizations in the last two centuries, and especially in recent decades, suggests that the candidates were now few enough that “crowding in” resulted, with each promoter’s action driving more promoters to join the contest, intensifying the competition for sainthood.

p urs u in g in d iv idua l s i nto thei r graves Consider now the subset of sacrificial actions that are thought to be bad and therefore call for collective counteraction. As mentioned at the outset, such judgments are often subjective, which immediately raises the question of who the collective agent of counteraction should be. Leaving this aside for now, the obvious first line of defence is to raise the individual’s material cost of action, which is the daily work of counterterrorism worldwide. Then, since the agent is acting out of a selfish quest for fame or infamy, something can be done in the way of muting the media resonance that determines the public impact of the action (see Azam and Ferrero 2019 for discussion).

210

Mario Ferrero

These standard responses, however, are not nearly adequate to the challenge, for the model described in the previous section yields a fundamental policy implication: if, as I have argued, incentives for these agents to self-sacrifice go beyond the grave, fully fledged deterrence policies should also track them down beyond the grave, or into their very graves. Deterrence policies that “stop at the grave” are not enough. In effect, death provides a safe haven where criminals can take shelter and not be extradited. Once dead, they are beyond the reach of the law. If punishment stops at the grave, the playing field is not level because the positive incentives to action – the cult – are still at work when the offenders are dead. It was the very anticipation of the post-mortem cult that spurred the martyrs to action. The logical, fully adequate response to these offences would be to strike down the cults or set up offsetting counter-cults, possibly reaching into not just the memory and ideal legacy of the offenders but also their physical remains and resting places. A punishment that strikes the dead would, of course, not affect the dead themselves, but would function as a disincentive for others to follow in their steps, which is what deterrence means. Punishing the dead is more easily said than done. Modern Western society joins the three main monotheistic religious traditions in a deeply engrained presumption that the dead should be allowed to rest in peace. Even Osama bin Laden in 2011 was buried at sea with proper Muslim rites within twenty-four hours of his death, and even that burial, as opposed to interment, was considered offensive by many Islamic religious authorities (Wikipedia 2018b). It was not always so, however. Precisely to defeat Herostratos’s purpose, the city authorities decreed that his name should never be mentioned so as to erase it from the historical record.5 This type of punishment for the most grievous offences against the state was widespread in the ancient world and known in Roman law as “condemnation of memory” (damnatio memoriae). Such a memory ban, however, was soon flouted by the ancient authors themselves, through whose writings Herostratos’s name and deed have come down to us. In this sense, his endeavour proved to be a resounding success. The reason for the ban’s failure was, of course, the enormity of the deed itself. The prospects for enforcement of a memory ban in the age of the internet are even dimmer. If obliterating the memory is impractical, organizing counter-cults seems to be the only resort – an organized malediction of the name and deeds of individuals that lasts through time. However, counter-cults

On Blessing and Cursing Matters

211

are beset by a basic free riding problem: while a cult in favour of someone is a private good to the believers and supporters, a cult against someone is a public good that benefits society at large but, like all public goods, is unlikely to bring forth a sufficient voluntary supply. This is probably why we do not see organized cursing of the Caliph Omar (who reportedly ordered the destruction of the great library at Alexandria), Francisco Pizarro (the exterminator of the Incas), or Adolf Hitler. Hence, the need for government action and even more, perhaps, for the promotion of voluntary clubs of “cursers,” unlikely a suggestion as this may be. A rare example of direct government action is offered by the Turkish authorities, who in July 2016 began to bury the insurgents who died in the failed military coup in a separate cemetery in Istanbul where the public could come and curse them (Associated Press 2016). As to voluntary clubs, the decision by more than 130 British imams and other Muslim religious leaders to refuse to say the traditional funeral prayers for the perpetrators of the deadly attack on London Bridge of 3 June 2017 (Sherwood 2017) was a highly unusual move because this ritual is normally performed for every Muslim, regardless of their actions. The leaders’ decision may be a start in the right direction, even though there is still precious little of this around. Even this route, however, is not without its problems. To be effective as a deterrent to action in the first place, a counter-cult must promise to be sustained for an exceedingly long time, and the incentives for any group to credibly commit to such a long-lasting undertaking are weak or non-existent – a key issue that deserves further study. To conclude on a more optimistic note, the whole idea of counter-cults and cursing is almost uncharted territory, so some fresh approach may be discovered once we start thinking about it. For example, dissenting Catholics could begin to publicly disallow recognition of the most outrageous cases of proclaimed saints, whose cult is mandatory for the faithful – a more stinging form of dissent than using contraception while hoping that the priests are looking the other way. Dissenting Catholics might begin with Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer, the founder of the Opus Dei congregation and a notorious supporter of fascism in Spain and elsewhere (Wikipedia 2018d), or Mother Teresa of Calcutta, variously accused of stealthy baptism of the dying, glorifying the sick’s suffering instead of relieving it, and cozy relationships with dictators and fraudsters around the world

212

Mario Ferrero

(Wikipedia 2018a). Of course, such counter-cults would spark the rise of supporters’ cults from within the church. But a world where cults and counter-cults vie with each other for the public’s attention and support would be more even-handed – and perhaps more fun – than one dominated by one-sided cults. not e s 1 For formal modelling and more extended discussion see Azam and Ferrero 2017. 2 This is modelled and discussed in Azam 2005. 3 The Jesus story is extensively discussed and modelled in Ferrero 2016. 4 However, a good case could be made for the proposition that many would-be Roman Catholic saints intended to qualify as candidates in the canonization contest and behaved accordingly during their life, although the evidence for it is only anecdotal. For a good example see the case of Dominic Savio, the youngest non-martyr to be canonized by the Church until 2017 (Wikipedia 2018c). 5 It is interesting that, at a much earlier time, a name ban was decreed by God on Amalek, an arch-enemy of the Israelites during the period of their exodus from Egypt: they were enjoined to “blot out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven” (Deuteronomy 25:19; cf. Exodus 17:14). This ban, too, obviously failed because the writers of the Bible later recorded Amalek’s name and deeds, although it has survived in Judaism to this day as a ritual curse against the most egregious enemies of the Jewish people.

r e f e r e nce s Apolte, Thomas. 2020. “I Hope I Die before I Get Old: The Supply Side of the Market for Suicide Attackers.” Defence and Peace Economics 31, no 5: 469–84. Associated Press. 2016. “Turkey Builds ‘Traitors’ Cemetery’ for Insurgents Who Died in Failed Coup.” Guardian, 28 July. Azam, Jean-Paul. 2005. “Suicide Bombing as Inter-Generational Investment.” Public Choice 122, no. 1–2: 177–98. Azam, Jean-Paul, and Mario Ferrero. 2017. “Incentives Beyond the Grave.” Unpublished manuscript. – 2019. “Jihad Against Palestinians? The Herostratos Syndrome and the Paradox of Targeting European Jews.” Defence and Peace Economics 30, no. 6: 687–705.

On Blessing and Cursing Matters

213

Biggs, Michael. 2005. “Dying without Killing: Self-Immolations, 1963–2002.” In Making Sense of Suicide Missions, edited by Diego Gambetta, 173–208. Oxford, uk : Oxford University Press. Ferrero, Mario. 2002. “Competition for Sainthood and the Millennial Church.” Kyklos 55, no. 3: 335–60. – 2006. “Martyrdom Contracts.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 6: 855–77. – 2013. “The Cult of Martyrs.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 5: 881–904. – 2016. “Jesus and the Ratchet.” Homo Oeconomicus 33, no. 1–2: 173–95. Hamermesh, Daniel S., and Neal M. Soss. 1974. “An Economic Theory of Suicide.” Journal of Political Economy 82, no. 1: 83–98. Larkin, Ralph W. 2009. “The Columbine Legacy: Rampage Shootings as Political Acts.” American Behavioral Scientist 52, no. 9: 1309–26. Lankford, Adam, and Nayab Hakim. 2011. “From Columbine to Palestine: A Comparative Analysis of Rampage Shooters in the United States and Volunteer Suicide Bombers in the Middle East.” Aggression and Violent Behavior 16, no. 2: 98–107. Sherwood, Harriet. 2017. “Imams Refuse Funeral Prayers for ‘Indefensible’ London Bridge Attackers.” Guardian, 5 June. Wikipedia. 2018a. “Criticism of Mother Teresa.” https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Criticism_of_Mother_Teresa (accessed 12 September 2018). – 2018b. “Death of Osama bin Laden.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Death_of_Osama_bin_Laden (accessed 12 September 2018). – 2018c. “Dominic Savio.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominic_Savio (accessed 12 September 2018). – 2018d. “Josemaría Escrivá.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Josemaría_ Escrivá (accessed 12 September 2018). – 2018e. “Self-Immolation Protests by Tibetans in China.” https://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-immolation_protests_by_Tibetans_in_China (accessed 12 September 2018). Young, Robert A. 1994. “The Breakup of Czechoslovakia.” Research Paper No. 32. Kingston, on : Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. – 1997. The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada, rev. ed. Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press. – 2004. “Secession as Revolution.” Homo Oeconomicus 21, no. 2 (Special issue, “Rationale of Revolutions,” ed. Mario Ferrero): 373–95.

12

In Defence of Majoritarianism Stanley L. Winer

Few people have bothered to defend the majoritarian, winner-takeall character of the Canadian electoral system, in which the party that wins the most seats in plurality-rule constituency elections is granted a franchise to govern by itself for a maximum term. This electoral system has been in existence in the same form since the founding of the modern state in 1867. In this chapter, I offer a vigorous defence of our majoritarian arrangement when the alternative is some form of proportional representation (pr ). While the individual arguments I employ are well known, the train of reasoning here is, to my knowledge, unusual in the current Canadian context.1 My support for majoritarianism does not mean that I reject any kind of electoral reform. All electoral systems are imperfect, reflecting trade-offs among important criteria made in the past. (Some of the compromises embedded in our current arrangements will become evident in the course of my discussion.) In view of that fact, it makes sense to think about changes that might improve our system of self-government. I do so toward the end of the chapter, where I consider alternative rules for local elections as a way of showing that my argument, and the majoritarian vision, is robust in this respect. But the choice of voting rule is not the most important issue we must address. One defence of majoritarianism that has been offered at various times in Canada is that the existing winner-take-all system makes it difficult for proponents of extreme or odious ideas to win a seat in the legislature because like-minded supporters must be geographically concentrated in reasonably large numbers. This may be so, but it too is

In Defense of Majoritarianism

215

not the central issue that we have to deal with.2 Nor do I think that the form of the electoral system is central to the maintenance of civil liberty in Canada, which depends on the countervailing powers provided by our constitutional, legal, civil, and administrative institutions.3 I outline what I think is the central issue in the choice between electoral systems in the next section. But before doing so, I want to pay tribute to Bob Young’s work on the nature and instrumental consequences of Canadian political institutions, expressed in his papers and books over many years. Bob was writing about the issues addressed in this chapter thirty years ago (Young 1991).

t h e m a in a r gument The critical issue in the debate about electoral reform is how to deal with the leap of faith required in going from representative government, on the one hand, to good government, on the other. By good government, I mean a system of self-government that contributes substantially to our social and economic well-being. Whether we choose to err on the side of principles of responsibility if we stay with our existing majoritarian system, or to err on the side of principles of representation if we adopt PR in some form, we must make a well-considered leap of faith in judging which system best promotes good government in this sense. This leap is analogous to the one that was an essential ingredient in the 1988 election fought between political parties and interest groups opposing and promoting freer trade with the United States. How are these fundamentally different principles supposed to work in choosing a legislature? In the proportional vision, an election is a means of obtaining a representative legislature that mirrors opinions in the country by assigning seats to parties in proportion to their share of the national vote. As Young (1991, 78) and others have pointed out, in a geographically diverse country such as Canada this will also include more “balanced” regional representation within the ranks of the governing party or coalition.4 The majoritarian vision is radically different. An election is not a means of producing a representative legislature, though it may do so in an electoral equilibrium or outcome. It is in the first instance a means for voters to impose a government on a legislature, and to give that government the means to act decisively during the life of the legislature. Each government obtains and uses its franchise

216

Stanley L. Winer

for a limited period, and then is re-evaluated to see if the franchise should be renewed or given to another party. This is what we mean by responsible government: a government able to act decisively and which can, as a result, be clearly held responsible for its actions. How do these principles actually work when we look at the legislature? What is clear is the effect of either system on the equilibrium number of parties in Parliament and in the government, which is well short of what we want to know about how good government is best nurtured. The majoritarian system we have now leads to a smaller number of parties, because voters have an incentive to desert candidates and parties that are most unlikely to win, while proportionality will lead to a larger number. Moreover, majoritarian governments almost always consist of a single party, while government under pr is almost always a coalition of smaller parties that is produced after the general election, sometimes long after,5 since one party will rarely have a majority of seats, with the formation of such coalitions depending on negotiations among the parties represented in the legislature.6 It should also be noted that, unlike under pr where the formation of government is handed over to the parties, in a majoritarian system voters are directly responsible for electing a government, which is part of its greater emphasis on accountability. Because of the winner-take-all plurality rules at both the constituency and national levels in our current system, votes for local candidates or parties that do not win a plurality are, as proponents of pr put it, “wasted.” Seats and votes of national parties in Parliament are usually not strictly proportional, and the governing party usually has less than fifty percent of the national votes, a situation often referred to by proponents of pr as the problem of “false majorities.” It should be recognized, however, that “wasted” and “false” are pejorative terms that have clear meaning in the present context only if you start with a principle of representation in mind, and in the majoritarian vision, as we shall see, disproportionality is a virtue. In any case, the most difficult part of the assessment we must make is not about wasted votes (a concern I do not simply dismiss, and to which I will return). The most difficult matter to deal with is what happens after the legislature is chosen. Here we have to rely on arguments about how things evolve in the long run – that is, about what public policies are adopted and about how these government actions affect our lives over many years. If you think that is hard to deal with, you are right. If you think it doesn’t matter, and we can make a

In Defense of Majoritarianism

217

choice between electoral systems without going into such deep waters, I beg to differ. Maintaining a system of self-government that actually improves the way we and our children live is the central problem. Under pr , good government in this important sense is made subservient to balanced party representation in the legislature in the hope that in the long run, the two will be the same. In the majoritarian vision, good government is made subservient to the election of a government that can act decisively and accountably over its term, with the hope that in the long run the two will be the same.7 pr systems, by design, produce representation in the legislature in accordance with each party’s percentage of votes. If a portrait of society in the legislature that reflects voting by party is what you want, regardless of how this portrait comes about and regardless of how everything works out in the end, there is no better alternative. But a judgment on this basis alone would be short-sighted. In the first place, implementation of this vision is short-sighted because the nature of the parties and the distribution of their seats in the legislature both depend on the electoral system. As Duverger (1984, 34) points out in his assessment of majoritarian methods as opposed to pr : “The basic argument of the pr advocates is that it gives a photographic image of public opinion that is as faithful a likeness as possible. That is true if we compare the vote percentages received by the different parties and their seat percentages. But the distribution of the votes is itself dependent on the country’s party system, which in turn depends on the type of electoral system. pr projects as much as it records.”8

e n c o u r ag in g g o o d government We can go further. Consider this: in any democratic system, it is essential that parties face the prospect of losing office, that they do lose from time to time, and that they also face the prospect of returning to office. The prospect of alternation in office induces parties who want to continue to govern to cater to all sorts of voters by never moving too far toward their own party’s most preferred choices at the expense of various other, minority interests. This is because electoral opposition mounts, the ability to govern erodes, and the probability of defeat at the polls in the next election rises when minority interests are substantially ignored in favour of the interests of core supporters of the party in power. Moreover, and for essentially the same reason, since risk-averse voters do not like to be jerked around – from left

218

Stanley L. Winer

to right, and then vice versa – when partisan control changes, we see substantial continuity in major policies across adjacent governments.9 One may ask about this reasoning when the insights of behavioural economics and psychology are considered. Experimental evidence indicates that people prefer riskier choices when threatened with losses than when expecting gains, in contrast to standard expected utility theory in which such choices are (more) symmetrical with respect to gains and losses (Quattrone and Tversky 1988). As Quattrone and Tversky point out, voters’ preference for the incumbent when times are good and for the challenger when times are bad fits this behavioural evidence. In that case, and if in fact that is the case, politicians who in a competitive environment are likely to be classically rational expected-utility maximizers – as Wallerstein (2004) suggests they are likely to be, unlike voters who may be predictable but not entirely rational in this sense – will try even harder (than might be expected on the basis of standard expected utility theory) to avoid policies that impose losses on minorities, because these voters are likely to react even more vigorously to policies they think will harm them than standard theory predicts. Behind such a prediction is, again, the threat of losing office. In other words, the prospect of alternation in office forces majorities to consider the interests of minorities who vote, or might vote, even if they are not well organized, and thus leads majority parties to avoid engineering policies that expropriate parts of the electorate or that involve radical departures from established policies. This is so provided that the parties also see some prospect of returning to office if they are defeated.10 (Otherwise they have nothing to lose by pursuing their self-interest once elected.) Herein lies an important reason for the majoritarian, winner-takeall system to have a stronger claim to our attention. Because of the winner-take-all, plurality-rule voting at the local level, a small change in the popular vote for a party can have large and even devastating consequences for the total number of seats in Parliament the party wins, depending on how its total vote is distributed across electoral districts. Remember the Conservative incumbent government that dropped from 169 to 2 seats for a seat share of 0.6 per cent in the 1993 election, while its popular vote dropped from 43 per cent but only to 16 per cent? In contrast, in a pr system, a small change in a party’s total vote share leads to only a small change in seat shares, sometimes allowing losing parties to remain in a governing coalition.

In Defense of Majoritarianism

219

Thus, the disproportionality in national votes and seats by party that proponents of pr often point to as a serious defect of the existing system is, from the majoritarian point of view, an essential strength, helping to create and maintain the threat of turnover that is a source of reasonably efficient and harmonious public policy. In this light, the Loosemore-Hanby (1971) and Gallagher (1991) indexes of proportionality for post-war elections in Canada, provided for the 1940–2015 period in the appendix, are telling. They show that disproportionality in Parliament peaked when Diefenbaker threw out the Liberals with a huge majority in 1958 after more than twentyfive years of Liberal government, when the Mulroney Conservatives again soundly defeated the Liberals in 1984 after twenty more years of Liberal governments, when the Liberals under Chrétien destroyed the Conservative party for a decade in 1993, and when Harper won a clear majority of seats in 2011.11

p ro t e c t io n ag a in s t bad government There is a second, related advantage of the majoritarian vision that addresses the core problem of ensuring that representative government leads to good government. While majoritarianism by its nature creates conditions conducive to turnover if the government falls out of favour, neither it nor the proportional vision contains any absolute guarantee as to the goodness of the government that emerges over the longer run. How could they? The philosopher Karl Popper took up the question of what sort of system we ought to adopt in the absence of such a guarantee, and in view of the additional, and perhaps even more fundamental, problem of agreeing on what “good” government means. He concluded that the best political system is one that is better at avoiding situations in which a bad government does too much harm. From this point of view, we could say that the best electoral system is the one that allows a “bad” government to be replaced most easily.12 Which of the electoral systems under consideration is better in this sense? Without doubt, it is the majoritarian one. Obviously we will not always, or even usually, agree on what “bad” means in this context. But in choosing between systems, we can agree to build in a bias against renewing the franchise of a government about which a sizable group of citizens is substantially displeased, rather than adopting a system that is more robust to such opposition.

220

Stanley L. Winer

re f orm in a m ajo r ita r ia n sys tem: fai r voti ng an d d e f e n c e ag a in s t c ondorcet los ers So far I have explained why pr , which ranks higher on representativeness, crucially lacks accountability and robust defence against bad government when compared to our majoritarian system.13 No electoral system is perfect, however, and it is instructive in the present context to consider a reform of the rule for election of individual Members of Parliament that addresses the issue of wasted votes. This was a charge against the current system I did not dismiss out of hand, despite its pejorative origin. The challenge is to improve the voting rule while retaining the benefits of majoritarianism that I have identified. To think about this matter, it is useful to begin by considering two related characteristics that we would like any method of electing Members of Parliament to possess: (i) fairness, as I define it in what follows, and (ii) insurance against the election of Condorcet losers – candidates who win a plurality under existing rules, but who would lose to at least one other candidate in a pairwise sequence of simple majority-rule votes.14 The unfairness of simple plurality-rule voting stems from the fact that a person who casts their single vote in support of some candidate is in a better position than a citizen who wants to vote against that candidate. One vote to oppose a candidate allows only one alternative to be supported, while anyone but that candidate may be preferred. This is a well-known problem, one that may be at least partially dealt with by the adoption of some form of instant run-off voting (irv ), also referred to as ranked choice voting. irv systems, such as the Alternative Vote used in elections for Australia’s lower House and (as of 2018) a system that is used in the state of Maine, allows voters to better express their preferences against, as well as for, each candidate by permitting them to rank candidates. These numerical rankings are then aggregated in easy-to-understand ways to determine the single winner. 15 (Brief descriptions of the Alternative Vote and another irv method – the Borda count – referred to below are provided in the notes.16) While caution is warranted in making such a change, for a reason I will point to later, the use of an irv system for local elections, which places proponents and opponents of any candidate or party on a more equal footing, would attenuate the feeling of futility some

In Defense of Majoritarianism

221

voters have when their preferred party is seldom if ever elected. Now their opposition to the usual winner would have more force, their preferences over alternatives would be more fully taken into account, and sometimes a candidate they rank second may be elected.17 The other characteristic of a voting mechanism I identified concerns the insurance it offers against the election of Condorcet losers. Electoral competition in a plurality rule election does not always eliminate undesirable or even extreme candidates when compared to pr. Centrist candidates may split the vote, or it may be advantageous for voters to support a “bad” candidate or party that others also support, who still would offer some value to the voter, than to vote for a “better” party that few are likely to support (Myerson 1993). If the winning candidate in such a situation were to stand against each of the other contestants in a pairwise majority-rule vote, however, that person would likely lose one of these votes. In other words, he or she is unlikely to be a Condorcet winner. Fortunately, there are reforms of the voting rule that may be compatible with the majoritarian vision, and which offer better protection against Condorcet losers while at the same time being fairer. Eric Maskin, in his testimony before the Special Committee on Electoral Reform (2016), argued for an electoral system called “majority rule,” in which voters rank all candidates so that each candidate’s aggregate ranking may be tested against each other candidate’s ranking, pair by pair (how many voters prefer this candidate to that one?), with the Condorcet winner (who beats every other candidate in the simulated pairwise matchups) being selected, if one exists. Such a procedure is complicated compared to others, but it is feasible with the use of modern computing. The problem is that there may not be a Condorcet winner, only a vote cycle over the alternatives.18 It is difficult to know how often a vote cycle will arise, and what to do if it does. irv methods such as the Alternative Vote or the Borda count are somewhat easier to understand and to implement, although they cannot offer as much protection against Condorcet losers. Majority rule aside, the investigation conducted by Gehrlein and Lepelley (2011) suggests that the Borda count is likely to provide the best overall defence. A reason for caution in adopting an irv procedure is that it is not known, or even studied, so far as I know, how the Alternative Vote or the Borda count would affect the sensitivity of support for the governing party in the face of swings in its popular support. This sensitivity

222

Stanley L. Winer

is an essential, socially productive characteristic of the existing system. Before proceeding, it is important that the effect of alternative irv voting mechanisms on the sensitivity of electoral support for the governing party be investigated, so that we can see what we must give up in this respect when adopting an irv voting mechanism.

c o n c l u s io n : w h at s h ould we do? Canada has had the same winner-take-all parliamentary electoral system since 1867, and the country has developed into one of the better places to live. This is not only because we are endowed with natural resources; there are several countries with rich resource endowments that are much worse. The good quality of Canadian institutions has undoubtedly also played an important role. Recently some people have argued that we would be better off if one of the key institutions in Canada – our electoral system – were radically altered. To be fair to those who want some form of pr , it should be noted that the fact that Canada is a relatively prosperous part of the world does not tell us what the counterfactual under pr would have been like, though I also think that the economic history of the country is not irrelevant when important, hard-to-reverse decisions are involved. In a recent study of electoral history, Blais, Gunterman, and Bodet (2017) use internationally comparable surveys of citizen opinion to conclude that governing parties are better liked than non-governing parties in countries with majoritarian systems (Australia, Canada, France, and Great Britain) compared to in countries with some form of pr . While this evidence does not bear directly on the extent to which representative government of one kind or another leads to good government, it is consistent with the understanding I have provided of how majoritarianism works, and it too is not irrelevant.19 How should we finally decide? I return, then, to the main issue, which is conceptual as much as empirical. Choosing between proportional and majoritarian visions requires us either to err on the side of principles of representation, or to err on the side of principles of responsibility. Both choices necessarily involve a leap of faith – an informed guess – as to which system best promotes good government. pr produces a representative legislature by design, but that does not guarantee good government. Majoritarianism is a sensible way of encouraging good governments and is also a sensible way of

In Defense of Majoritarianism

223

protecting ourselves against bad ones. It is likely robust enough to encompass a carefully chosen reform of the voting rule for local elections to improve fairness among voters, and to provide additional defence against bad government. In my view, there is no decisive reason to replace our majoritarian system of self-government, one that we have lived with for 150 years and which is, for good reasons, likely to serve us reasonably well in the future.

ap p e n d ix : vo t e s , s e at s , a nd proporti onali ty i n t h e p o s t- w w ii c a n a d ian electoral sys tem The standard Gallagher (1991) index of proportionality of votes and seats is the following, where Vi refers to the national vote share of party i, while Si refers to its seat share in Parliament:

√ ½ ∑ (Vi – Si)2 Equation 12.1 | Gallagher index of proportionality

This index was discussed in Parliament during recent debates concerning electoral reform. (The minister for electoral reform was photographed holding up a poster with this formula on it.) The earlier Loosemore-Hanby (1971) index of proportionality, which has a simpler form but leads to a similar pattern of results for Canada, is:

½ ∑ |Vi – Si | i

Equation 12.2 | Loosemore-Hanby index of proportionality

Taagepera and Grofman (2003) compare these and other indexes of proportionality from an axiomatic point of view and conclude that the Gallagher and Loosemore-Hanby indexes are both useful and methodologically better than others that have been proposed.

224

Stanley L. Winer

24. Diefenbaker cvs: .39 to .54 css: .42 to .78 lvs: =.33

21. M-K to St Laurent lvs: .40 to .49 lss: .48 to .73 cvs: .30

35. Chrétien lvs: .32 to .42 lss: .28 to .6 cvs: =.16 c: 169 to 2 seats

33. Mulroney cvs: .32 to .50 css: .36 to .75 lvs: .28

0.5

41. Harper cvs: .38 to .40 css: .46 to .54 lvs: .19

28. Trudeau lvs: .4 to .45 lss: .49 to .58 cvs: .31

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1 Gallagher Index

Index -. . /01 . Loosemore-Hanby 20345678"96: 0; " < 5==5>?0239 6: 0; "

0

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 2015

2011

2008

2006

2004

2000

1997

1993

1988

1984

1980

1979

1974

1972

1968

1965

1963

1962

1958

1957

1953

1949

1945

1940

Figure 12.1 | Loosemore-Hanby and Gallager Indexes, Elections 19–42 (1940–2015)

In figure 12.1, based on work by undergraduate research student Meghan Byars (2016), the two indexes are graphed for the 19th to the 42nd general elections – all post-WWII elections in Canada. The correspondence of substantial government turnovers to peaks in the indexes, referred to in the text, is clearly apparent. The calculations are based on the votes and seats received by the major parties in Canada, where a “party” must have won at least one seat in at least two elections. (Reform and the Conservative Alliance are considered to be one party in these calculations.) In the figure a C refers to the Conservative party, and an L refers to the Liberal party. A subscript vs refers to a vote share, and a subscript ss refers to a seat share. The changes in shares referred to in the boxes are from the election prior to the one whose number is cited in the boxes.

In Defense of Majoritarianism

225

no t e s

1

2

3

4

This is a revised version of Carleton Economic Paper #17-06. My thanks to Arnaud Dellis, Stephen Ferris, Bernard Grofman, and Walter Hettich for helpful comments. Meghan Byars computed the indexes of proportionality referred to in the text and provided in the appendix. The ideas here formed the basis for my opening statement in a debate on electoral reform at a Faculty of Public Affairs conference in honour of Carleton University’s 75th anniversary, 3 March 2017. The debate arose because of the prime minister’s intention to reform the method for election of local candidates that formed part of his successful campaign in the general election of 2015. This debate occurred several months after the release of a lengthy report on electoral reform by a special all-party committee of the House of Commons. A few weeks before the debate at Carleton, the prime minister announced – independently of our upcoming debate, of course – that his government would no longer pursue electoral reform, perhaps because it became apparent that electoral reform was going to move out of the hands of the government into some sort of quasi-constitutional venue, the outcome of which would be hard to predict. Since then, the issue has arisen again, most recently in British Columbia. Some background to the debate is provided by recent books on electoral reform in Canada, including Seidle and Docherty 2003; Howe, Johnstone, and Blais 2005; and Blais 2008. See also Parliament of Canada 2016; and Ferris, Winer, and Grofman 2016. I say, “may be so,” because circumstances could arise in which centrist candidates split the vote, allowing a more extreme candidate to win (the case of Donald Trump in the US presidential primaries?), and other pathologies are possible. I return to this sort of problem later when considering reform of the voting rule. One of the big questions in the contemporary world is what makes it harder for a strong government to arise that then sets about destroying existing democratic institutions. If voters are risk-averse in choosing between alternative political institutions, they would surely take that problem into account. However, I know of no evidence that the choice between majoritarianism and pr alters risk in this respect. As Young puts it (1991, 78),“No longer would hundreds of thousands of western Liberal votes, for instance, elect only one or two mp s.” In fact, in the recent 2019 election, the Liberal Party, which formed a minority government, failed to elect a single member in Saskatchewan or Alberta. This likely happened because of the negative consequences of the previous

226

5

6

7

8

Stanley L. Winer

majority Liberal government’s policies with respect to the non-renewable energy sector in the western economies. One should also note that it seems reasonable to think that the Liberal Party paid a higher political price for its treatment of the energy sector in 2019 than it would have if Canada had a pr system. I return to the issue of accountability at various points later. (How would Bob Young have responded here and to my argument as a whole? Despite our many conversations over the years, I regret that Bob and I never discussed the merits of alternative electoral systems.) For example, in Israel the negotiations the followed the election of April 2019 failed, and it took two more elections to finally produce a government in May of 2020. This is a somewhat unusual example. But lengthy government-formation processes where only one election was held are not uncommon. In the negotiations after an election takes place, a small party with odd or extreme views may play a role, upsetting the representativeness of the outcome. In this respect, it is important to note that most governments in pr systems are coalitions. Blais, Guntermann, and Bodet (2017) report that in their study covering a large number of countries using some form of pr over a period from the late 1990s to 2011 and a smaller set using non-proportional systems, about 82 per cent of governments under pr were coalitions, while in the non-pr countries, none of the cabinets formed were coalitions. This approach to the central problem of governance identified here is inspired by Scott Gordon (1961). See also Gordon 1999. Gerring and Thacker (2008) acknowledge the importance of this problem. But they do not arrive at the same conclusion as I do because they try to combine both electoral traditions, seeking representativeness or inclusion and responsibility. They advocate a unitary state with closed-list pr in a parliamentary setting, which they refer to as centripetal government. I leave judgment of their argument to the reader, noting here only that the elimination of federalism in Canada is not a viable option. It can be added that if Canadian society were badly divided into factions or ethnicities to the point of civil unrest, as unfortunately is the case in some parts of the world, the principle of representation would be more significant, and thus pr would take on added value, as a way of containing civil unrest by giving the various factions formal representation in the legislature. In my view, Canadian society is not even close to such a state of affairs. On the role of pr in highly divided societies, see Reilly 2001.

In Defense of Majoritarianism

227

9 In a formal model of electoral politics, lying behind such behaviour is the concavity of functions describing voting behaviour, at least in the neighbourhood of an electoral equilibrium. 10 See also Przeworski 2010, 144–5. 11 Note that I do not claim that majoritarianism leads to more observed turnover of governments than does pr . The claim is that the identity or composition of the government is more sensitive to a given change in popular support, should such a change in support occur. If the majoritarian vision works well, turnover may actually decline relative to that in pr systems. 12 See Popper 1988. The only paper I have found that explicitly considers Popper’s concern in the Canadian context is Derriennic 2005, though he does not agree with the idea of engineering a bias against the incumbent. In Derriennic 2016, he advocates a mild form of pr coupled with one of the voting mechanisms discussed in the next section. 13 For some interesting recent empirical evidence concerning the trade-off between representation and accountability in the choice of an electoral system, see Becher and Gonzalez 2019. 14 Condorcet (1743–94) was an important mathematician and social choice theorist who discovered that majority rule does not generally provide a transitive ranking of alternatives. Party A may be preferred under simple majority rule to B, and B to C. But A may not beat C. It can happen that C may beat A in a simple majority rule vote, leading to cycling over the alternatives if we persist in trying to find a Condorcet winner – one candidate or party that beats every other in a pairwise sequence of simple majority rule votes. Arrow (1951) generalizes this result to a wide class of social choice mechanisms. 15 In the election campaign of 2015, the Liberals proposed to adopt the Alternative Vote, perhaps because it was thought that the enhanced role it gives to second-choice rankings in close contests would favour it in many constituencies. It is difficult to know if such a judgment is correct, because people condition the way they vote on the voting mechanism in place, as the earlier quote from Duverger (1984) illustrates. Past elections thus provide only a partial view of what might happen in the future. 16 In an Alternative Vote system, electors rank candidates numerically in order of preference, or may simply vote for one candidate. If no candidate receives a majority of the first-place votes, the last place candidate’s votes are redistributed to his or her voters’ next choices until someone achieves 50 per cent of the total. In a Borda count, voters rank candidates numerically from best to worse. Each candidate’s total vote based on every

228

Stanley L. Winer

ranking across all voters is tabulated, with the candidate with the largest total declared the winner. A useful online introduction to voting rules is idea 2005. See also Parliament of Canada 2016. Among the important alternatives I do not consider here is Approval Voting (see Brams 2008), a non-ranking system in which a voter simply puts a mark beside each candidate of whom they approve, with the candidate that receives the most approvals declared the winner. 17 One may note that the av method contains a bias against centrist candidates whom everyone may prefer as a second choice, but who are eliminated in the first round because they are the first choice of only a minority of the electorate. Is this enough of a problem to rule it out? 18 See again note 11. 19 Indeed, this result may be more important that the authors acknowledge, for “[t]he only way we can single out particular decisions as ‘rational’ in a society with heterogeneous preferences is that they minimize the popular dissatisfaction with the outcome” (Przeworski 2010, 90).

r e f e r e nce s Arrow, Kenneth J. 1951. Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: Wiley. Becher, Michael, and Irene M. Gonzalez. 2019. “Electoral Reform and Trade-offs in Representation.” American Political Science Review 113, no. 3: 694–709. Blais, André, ed. 2008. To Keep or to Change First Past the Post: The Politics of Electoral Reform. Oxford, uk : Oxford University Press. Blais, André, Eric Guntermann, and Marc A. Bodet. 2017. “Linking Party Preferences and the Composition of Government: A New Standard for Evaluating the Performance of Electoral Democracy.” Political Science Research and Methods 5, no. 2: 315–31. Brams, Steven. 2008. Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures. Princeton, nj : Princeton University Press. Byars, Meghan. 2016. “Measuring Electoral Fairness in Canada.” Unpublished research essay. Ottawa: Carleton University, 31 December. Derriennic, Jean-Pierre. 2005. “Three Dimensions of Justice for Evaluating Electoral Systems.” In Strengthening Canadian Democracy, edited by Paul Howe, Richard Johnstone, and André Blais, 107–14. Montreal, qc: Institute for Research on Public Policy.

In Defense of Majoritarianism

229

– 2016. A Better Electoral System for Canada. Quebec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval. Duverger, Maurice. 1984. “Which Is the Best Electoral System?” In Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives, edited by Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman, 31–40. New York: Praeger. Ferris, J. Stephen, Stanley L. Winer, and Bernard Grofman. 2016. “The Duverger-Demsetz Perspective on Electoral Competitiveness and Fragmentation: With Application to the Canadian System, 1867–2011.” In The Political Economy of Social Choices, edited by Maria Gallego and Norman Schofield, 93–122. New York: Springer. Gallagher, Michael. 1991. “Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems.” Electoral Studies 10: 33–51. Gallagher, Michael, and Paul Mitchell. 2005. The Politics of Electoral Systems. Oxford, uk : Oxford University Press. Gehrlein, William V., and Dominique Lepelley. 2011. Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence: The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules. New York: Springer. Gerring, John, and Strom C. Thacker. 2008. A Centripetal Theory of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gordon, Scott. 1961. “The Bank of Canada in a System of Responsible Government.” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 27, no. 1: 1–22. – 1999. Controlling the State: Constitutionalism from Ancient Athens to Today. Cambridge, ma : Harvard University Press. Howe, Paul, Richard Johnstone, and André Blais, eds. 2005. Strengthening Canadian Democracy. Montreal, qc : Institute for Research on Public Policy. Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (idea ). 2005. Electoral System Design: The New International idea Handbook. https://www. idea.int/publications/catalogue/electoral-system-design-newinternational-idea-handbook (accessed 11 October 2020). Loosemore, John, and Victor Hanby. 1971. “The Theoretical Limits of Maximum Distortion: Some Analytical Expressions for Electoral Systems.” British Journal of Political Science 1, no. 4: 467–77. Myerson, Roger. 1993. “Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis.” Games and Economic Behavior 5, no. 1: 118–32. Popper, Karl. 1988. “The Open Society and Its Enemies Revisited.” Economist, 23 April.

230

Stanley L. Winer

Przeworski, Adam. 2010. Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Quattrone, George A., and Amos Tversky. 1988. “Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice.” American Political Science Review 82, no. 3: 719–36. Reilly, Benjamin. 2001. Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Special Committee on Electoral Reform. 2016. Strengthening Democracy in Canada: Principles, Process and Public Engagement for Electoral Reform. Ottawa: Parliament of Canada. https://www.ourcommons.ca/ Content/Committee/421/erre /Reports/rp 8655791/errerp03/errerp03-e. pdf (accessed 11 October 2020). Taagepera, Rein, and Bernard Grofman. 2003. “Mapping the Indices of Seats-Votes Disproportionality and Inter-Election Volatility.” Party Politics 9, no. 6: 659–77. Wallerstein, Michael. 2004. “Behavioral Economics and Political Economy.” Nordic Journal of Political Economy 30: 37–48. Young, Robert A. 1991. “Effecting Change: Do We Have the Political System to Get Us Where We Want to Go?” In Canada at Risk? Canadian Public Policy in the 1990s, edited by G. Bruce Doern and Bryne B. Purchase, 59–80. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute.

appendix

The Publications of Robert A. Young

r e se a rc h e nd e avo u rs Forest Management in Finland (1980) The Canada World Youth Program: Evaluation (1980) Canadian Industrial Policy (1982–87) Canada-US Free Trade (1985–90) Development Policy in Ontario (1985–90) Conglomerates in the Canadian Economy (1986–87) Interest Groups in New Brunswick (1986–2017) Provincial Development Policies (1990–92) Quebec Secession and Constitutional Reform (1990–2017) Voting Behaviour (1993–2017) Federal-Provincial-Municipal Relations (2001–17) Scottish Independence (2012–17)

a rt i c l e s i n r e f e r ee d jo u rn al s R.A. Young. 1977. “National Identification in English Canada: Implications for Quebec Independence.” Journal of Canadian Studies 12, no. 3 (July): 69–84. R.A. Young. 1978. “Steven Lukes’s Radical View of Power.” Canadian Journal of Political Science XI, no. 3 (September): 636–49. R.A. Young. 1980. “Sociology in Finnish Forest Research.” The Forestry Chronicle 56 (October): 209–12. R.A. Young. 1981. “Reining in James: The Limits of the Task Force.” Canadian Public Administration 24, no. 4 (Winter): 596–611.

232

Appendix: Publications of Robert A. Young

R.A. Young. 1982. “Planning for Power: The New Brunswick Electric Power Commission in the 1950s.” Acadiensis XII, no. 1 (Autumn): 73–99. P. Faucher, A. Blais, and R.A. Young. 1983. “L’aide financière directe au secteur manufacturier au Québec et en Ontario, 1960–1980.” Journal of Canadian Studies 18, no. 1 (Spring): 54–78. R.A. Young. 1983. “Business and Budgeting: Recent Proposals for Reforming the Revenue Budgetary Process.” Canadian Public Policy IX, no. 2 (September): 347–61. R.A. Young, P. Faucher, and A. Blais. 1984. “The Concept of ProvinceBuilding: A Critique.” Canadian Journal of Political Science XVII, no. 4 (December): 783–818. R.A. Young. 1984. “L’Édification de l’état provincial et le développement régional au Nouveau-Brunswick.” égalité 13–14 (Fall 1984–Winter 1985): 124–52. A. Blais, P. Faucher, and R.A. Young. 1986. “La dynamique de l’aide financière directe du gouvernement fédéral à l’industrie manufacturière au Canada.” Canadian Journal of Political Science XIX, no. 1 (March): 29–52. R.A. Young. 1986. “Teaching and Research in Maritimes Politics: Old Stereotypes and New Directions.” Journal of Canadian Studies 21, no. 2 (Summer): 133–56. R.A. Young. 1986. “The Political Economy of Canada-U.S. Free Trade.” Atlantic Canada Economics Association Papers 15: 7–14. R.A. Young. 1987. “Remembering Equal Opportunity: Clearing the Undergrowth in New Brunswick.” Canadian Public Administration 30, no. 1 (Spring): 88–102. R.A. Young. 1988. “‘... and the people will sink into despair’: Reconstruction in New Brunswick, 1942–1952.” Canadian Historical Review LXIX, no. 2 (June): 127–66. R.A. Young and Peter McDermott. 1988. “Employment Training Programs and Acculturation of Native Peoples in Canada’s Northwest Territories.” Arctic 41, no. 3 (September): 195–202. R.A. Young. 1989. “Political Scientists, Economists, and the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement.” Canadian Public Policy XV, no. 1 (March): 49–56. Ruth Abbott and R.A. Young. 1989. “‘Cynical and Deliberate Manipulation’? Child Care and the Reserve Army of Female Labour in Canada.” Journal of Canadian Studies 24, no. 2 (Summer): 22–38.

Appendix: Publications of Robert A. Young

233

R.A. Young and S.M. Forsyth. 1991. “Leaders’ Communications in Public-Interest and Material-Interest Groups.” Canadian Journal of Political Science XXIV, no. 3 (September): 525–40. R.A. Young. 1992. “Schism in the Temple.” Canadian Public Policy XVIII, no. 1 (March): 111–19. R.A. Young. 1994. “The Political Economy of Secession: The Case of Quebec.” Constitutional Political Economy 5, no. 2 (Spring/Summer): 221–45. R.A. Young. 1994. “How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?” Canadian Journal of Political Science XXVII, no. 4 (December): 773–92. André Blais, Robert Young, Christopher Fleury, and Miriam Lapp. 1995. “Do People Vote on the Basis of Minimax Regret?” Political Research Quarterly 48, no. 4 (December): 827–36. Robert Young. 1998. “A Most Politic Judgement.” Constitutional Forum 10, no. 1 (Fall): 14–18. André Blais and Robert Young. 1999. “Why Do People Vote? An Experiment in Rationality.” Public Choice 99: 39–55. André Blais, Robert Young, and Miriam Lapp. 2000. “Calculus of Voting: An Empirical Test.” European Journal of Political Research 37: 181–201. Robert Young. 2002. “Pour la rationalité dure.” Sociologie et Sociétés XXXIV, no. 1 (Spring; special issue on “La théorie du choix rationnel contre les sciences sociales”): 125–32. Robert Young. 2004. “Jean Chrétien’s Québec Legacy: Coasting then Stickhandling Hard.” Review of Constitutional Studies 9, no. 1–2: 31–52. Robert Young. 2004. “Secession as Revolution.” Homo Oeconomicus 21, no. 2: 373–95. André Blais, Robert Young, and Martin Turcotte. 2005. “Direct or Indirect? Assessing Two Approaches to the Measurement of Strategic Voting.” Electoral Studies 24: 163–76. Robert Young and Kelly McCarthy. 2009. “Why Do Municipal Issues Rise on the Federal Policy Agenda in Canada?” Canadian Public Administration 52, no. 3 (September): 347–70. Jordan Dolson and Robert Young. 2012. “Explaining Variation in E-Government Features of Municipal Websites: An Analysis of E-Content, E-Participation, and Social Media Features in Canadian Municipal Websites.” Canadian Journal of Urban Research 21, no. 2: 1–24.

234

Appendix: Publications of Robert A. Young

Robert Young. 2013. “La gouvernance multiniveau et les politiques publiques au sein des municipalités du Canada: reddition de comptes et efficacité.” Télescope: Revue d’analyse comparée en administration publique 19, no. 1 (June): 25–42. Robert Young. 2014. “Transition Costs in Secessions, with a Brief Application to Scotland.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 30, no. 2 (Spring): 392–405.

b ook s R.A. Young. 1994. The Breakup of Czechoslovakia. Research Paper No. 32. Kingston, on : Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. R.A. Young. 1995. The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada. Montreal, qc : McGill-Queen’s University Press and the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. R.A. Young. 1995. La sécession du Québec et l’avenir du Canada. Translated and edited by Pierre R. Desrosiers. Quebec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval. R.A. Young. 1998. The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada, revised and expanded edition. Montreal, qc : McGill-Queen’s University Press and the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. R.A. Young. 1999. The Struggle for Quebec. Montreal, qc : McGillQueen’s University Press.

e d i t e d b o o ks R.A. Young, ed. 1991. Confederation in Crisis. Toronto: James Lorimer and Company. Douglas Brown and Robert Young, eds. 1992. Canada: The State of the Federation 1992. Kingston, on : Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. Douglas Brown, Robert Young, and Dwight Herperger, eds. 1992. Constitutional Commentaries: An Assessment of the 1991 Federal Proposals. Kingston, on : Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. John Trent, Robert Young, and Guy Lachapelle, eds. 1996. QuebecCanada: New Challenges and Opportunities. Ottawa: Ottawa University Press. R.A. Young, ed. 1999. Stretching the Federation: The Art of the State in Canada. Kingston, on : Institute of Intergovernmental Relations.

Appendix: Publications of Robert A. Young

235

R.A. Young and Christian Leuprecht, eds. 2006. Canada: The State of the Federation 2004, Municipal-Federal-Provincial Relations in Canada. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press for the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. Andrew Sancton and Robert Young, eds. 2009. Foundations of Governance: Municipal Government in Canada’s Provinces. Toronto: University of Toronto Press and the Institute of Public Administration of Canada. Erin Tolley and Robert Young, eds. 2011. Immigrant Settlement Policy in Canadian Municipalities. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGillQueen’s University Press. Jean Harvey and Robert Young, eds. 2012. Image-Building in Canadian Municipalities. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press. Martin Horak and Robert Young, eds. 2012. Sites of Governance: Multilevel Governance and Policy Making in Canada’s Big Cities. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press. Michael C. Ircha and Robert Young, eds. 2013. Federal Property Policy in Canadian Municipalities. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGillQueen’s University Press.

o t he r e di t e d wo rks Jointly responsible, with Ronald Wintrobe, for Political Economy Research Group, Papers in Political Economy, no. 1–83. Series editor, Fields of Governance Series, McGill-Queen’s University Press. Editor of all books in the series except the following two, which he supervised: • Evelyn J. Peters, ed. 2012. Urban Aboriginal Policy Making in Canadian Municipalities. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGillQueen’s University Press. • Daniel Henstra, ed. 2013. Multilevel Governance and Emergency Management in Canadian Municipalities. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press.

c h a p t e rs i n bo o ks P. Faucher and R.A. Young. 1984. “Le déclin de l’industrie manufacturière et la politique industrielle au Canada.” In Les Stratégies de Reprise,

236

Appendix: Publications of Robert A. Young

edited by D. Bellemare and C. Saint-Pierre, 169–200. Montreal, qc : Éditions Saint-Martin. R.A. Young. 1984. “Non-Development on the Periphery: The Case of New Brunswick Multiplex.” In Proceedings of the Atlantic Provinces Political Studies Association, 1984, edited by S. Holloway and P. Wood. Antigonish, ns : St. Francis Xavier University, 18–20 October. P. Faucher, A. Blais, R.A. Young, and M. de la Fuente. 1985. “Politique commerciale et politique industrielle au Canada, 1960–1980.” In Le Canada et la nouvelle division internationale du travail, edited by D. Cameron and F. Houle, 181–217. Ottawa: Les presses de l’Université d’Ottawa. R.A. Young. 1987. “Canadian-United States Free Trade: Economic Realities and Political Choices.” In Canadian-American Free Trade: Historical, Political and Economic Dimensions, edited by A.R. Riggs and Tom Velk, 115–40. Halifax: irpp . R.A. Young. 1987. “L’Ontario et la fédération libre-échangiste.” In Un marché, deux sociétés: Libre-échange et autonomie politique, edited by Christian Deblock and Maurice Couture, 141–50. Montreal, qc : acfas . R.A. Young. 1987. “The Political Sociology of Voluntary Associations in New Brunswick.” In Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Atlantic Provinces Political Studies Association, edited by P. Aucoin and H. Bakvis. Halifax: Dalhousie University. R.A. Young. 1988. “The Canada-U.S. Agreement and Its International Context.” In Trade-offs on Free Trade: The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, edited by Marc Gold and David Leyton-Brown, 20–8. Toronto: Carswell. R.A. Young. 1989. “Voluntary Associations in New Brunswick: Past and Future.” In Le Nouveau-Brunswick en l’an 2000 – New Brunswick in the Year 2000, edited by Maurice Beaudin and Donald Savoie, 139–50. Moncton, nb : Institut canadien de recherche sur le développement régional. R.A. Young. 1991. “Budget Size and Bureaucratic Careers.” In The Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat, edited by A. Blais and S. Dion, 33–58. Pittsburgh, pa : University of Pittsburgh Press. R.A. Young. 1991. “A Canada of Regions: Sovereignty for Five Regions.” In Toolkits and Building Blocks: Constructing a New Canada, edited by Richard Simeon and Mary Janigan, 150–3. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute. R.A. Young. 1991. “Effecting Change: Do We Have the Political System to Get Us Where We Want to Go?” In Canada at Risk? Canadian Public

Appendix: Publications of Robert A. Young

237

Policy in the 1990s, edited by G. Bruce Doern and Bryne B. Purchase, 59–80. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute. R.A. Young. 1991. “Tectonic Policies and Political Competition.” In The Competitive State, edited by R. Wintrobe, A. Breton, P. Salmon, and G. Galeotti, 129–45. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Press. R.A. Young. 1992. “Aboriginal Inherent Rights of Self-Government and the Constitutional Process.” In Aboriginal Governments and Power Sharing in Canada, edited by Douglas Brown, 31–44. Kingston, on : Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. R.A. Young. 1992. “Le Canada hors Québec voudra-t-il coopérer avec un Québec souverain?” In Répliques aux détracteurs de la souveraineté du Québec, edited by Alain-G. Gagnon and François Rocher, 392–407. Montreal, qc : vlb éditeur. R.A. Young. 1992. “Does Globalization Make an Independent Quebec More Viable?” In Federalism in Peril, edited by A.R. Riggs and Tom Velk, 121–34. Vancouver, bc : The Fraser Institute. R.A. Young and Douglas Brown. 1992. “Overview.” In Canada: The State of the Federation 1992, edited by Douglas Brown and Robert Young, 3–24. Kingston, on : Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. R.A. Young. 1993. “Comments [on Paul Hobson, ‘Efficiency and the Local Public Sector’].” In Competitiveness and Size of Government, edited by Bryne Purchase, 81–5. Government and Competitiveness Project, Seminar Series. Kingston, on : School of Policy Studies. R.A. Young. 1993. “Organized Groups and the (Mis?)transmission of Public Preferences.” In Preferences and Democracy, edited by A. Breton, G. Galeotti, P. Salmon, and R. Wintrobe, 101–33. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Press. R.A. Young. 1994. “Political Competition and Economic Competitiveness.” In Policy Making and Competitiveness, edited by Bryne Purchase, 13–27. Government and Competitiveness Project. Kingston, on : School of Policy Studies. R.A. Young. 1994. “What Is Good about Provincial Governments?” In Crosscurrents: Contemporary Political Issues, 2nd ed., edited by Mark Charlton and Paul Barker, 124–33. Toronto: Nelson. R.A. Young. 1995. “Maybe Yes, Maybe No: The Rest of Canada and a Quebec ‘Oui.’” In Canada: The State of the Federation 1995, edited by Douglas M. Brown and Jonathan W. Rose, 47–62. Kingston, on : Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. R.A. Young. 1996. “1939: Maritimers Rise to War.” In A Country of Limitations: Canada and the World in 1939, edited by Norman Hillmer,

238

Appendix: Publications of Robert A. Young

Robert Bothwell, Roger Sarty, and Claude Beauregard, 148–64. Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War. R.A. Young. 1996. “Conclusion.” In Quebec-Canada: New Challenges and Opportunities, edited by John Trent, Robert Young, and Guy Lachapelle, 351–6. Ottawa: Ottawa University Press. R.A. Young and Campbell Sharman with Andrew Goldstein. 1996. “The Partisan Component in Intergovernmental Transfers.” In Reforming Fiscal Federalism for Global Competition: A Canada-Australia Comparison, edited by Paul Boothe, 163–83. Western Studies in Economic Research #4. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press. R.A. Young. 1996. “Political Economy: Interconnectedness and Questions Arising Therefrom.” In Quebec-Canada: New Challenges and Opportunities, edited by John Trent, Robert Young, and Guy Lachapelle, 201–8. Ottawa: Ottawa University Press. R.A. Young. 1997. “How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?” In Wars in the Midst of Peace: The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict, edited by David Carment and Patrick James, 45–60. Pittsburgh, pa : University of Pittsburgh Press. R.A. Young. 1997. “Rapporteur’s Summary: Globalization and Political Space.” In The Nation State in a Global/Information Era: Policy Challenges, edited by Thomas J. Courchene, 333–49. The Bell Canada Papers on Economic and Public Policy, No. 5. Kingston, on : John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy. R.A. Young. 1998. “Games of Secession.” In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol. 2, edited by Peter Newman, 183–8. London and New York: Macmillan Reference Limited and Stockton Press. R.A. Young. 1998. “Quebec Secession and the 1995 Referendum.” In Challenges to Canadian Federalism, edited by Martin Westmacott and Hugh Mellon, 112–26. Scarborough, on : Prentice Hall Canada. R.A. Young. 1998. “Quebec’s Constitutional Futures.” In Canadian Politics, 3rd ed., edited by James Bickerton and Alain-G. Gagnon, 301–21. Scarborough, on : Prentice Hall Canada, 1998. R.A. Young. 1999. “Introduction.” In Stretching the Federation: The Art of the State in Canada, edited by Robert Young, 3–7. Kingston, on : Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. R.A. Young. 1999. “A Most Politic Judgement.” In The Quebec Decision: Perspectives on the Supreme Court Ruling on Secession, edited by David Schneiderman, 107–12. Toronto: James Lorimer & Company.

Appendix: Publications of Robert A. Young

239

R.A. Young. 2000. “Quebec 1995: The Rhetoric of the Referendum.” In Competition and Structure. The Political Economy of Collective Decisions: Essays in Honor of Albert Breton, edited by Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe, 309–36. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. R.A. Young. 2001. “The Programme of Equal Opportunity: An Overview.” In The Robichaud Era, 1960–70: Colloquium Proceedings, 23–35. Moncton, nb : Canadian Institute for Research on Regional Development. R.A. Young. 2003. “Managing Interdependence in a Federal Political System: Comments.” In The Art of the State: Governance in a World without Frontiers, edited by Thomas J. Courchene and Donald J. Savoie, 153–9. Montreal, qc : Institute for Research on Public Policy. R.A. Young. 2003. “The Politics of Paying for Cities in Canada.” In Paying for Cities: The Search for Sustainable Municipal Revenues, edited by Paul Boothe, 83–97. Edmonton: The Institute for Public Economics. R.A. Young. 2005. “Introduction.” In the Carleton Library Edition of H.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines & HydroElectric Power in Ontario 1859–1941, 2nd ed., ix–xiii. Montreal, qc : McGill-Queen’s University Press. R.A. Young. 2006. “The Changing Role of Cities in Canadian Federalism.” In New Actors in Northern Federations: Cities, Mergers and Aboriginal Governance in Russia and Canada, edited by Peter H. Solomon Jr., 193–201. Toronto: University of Toronto, Centre for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies. R.A. Young and Christian Leuprecht. 2006. “Introduction: New Work, Background Themes, and Future Research about Municipal-FederalProvincial Relations in Canada.” In Canada: The State of the Federation 2004, Municipal-Federal-Provincial Relations in Canada, edited by R.A. Young and Christian Leuprecht, 3–22. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on: McGill-Queen’s University Press for the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. R.A. Young. 2006. “Jean Chrétien’s Québec Legacy: Coasting then Stickhandling Hard.” In The Chrétien Legacy: Politics and Public Policy in Canada, edited by Lois Harder and Steven Patten, 37–61. Montreal, qc, and Kingston, on: McGill-Queen’s University Press. R.A. Young. 2006. “Open Federalism and Canadian Municipalities.” In Open Federalism: Interpretations, Significance, edited by Keith G. Banting, Roger Gibbins, Peter M. Leslie, Alain Noel, Richard Simeon,

240

Appendix: Publications of Robert A. Young

and Robert Young, 7–24. Kingston, on : Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. R.A. Young. 2006. “Qu’est-ce qu’un « Bon » gouvernement?” In Le Parti Liberal. Enquête sur les réalisations du gouvernement Charest, edited by Francois Pétry, Éric Bélanger, and Louis M. Imbeau, 401–13. Quebec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval. R.A. Young. 2007. “Canada: A Creaking System.” In Dialogues on Local Government and Metropolitan Regions in Federal Countries, edited by Raoul Blindenbacher and Chandra Pasma, 18–20. A Global Dialogue on Federalism Booklet Series, vol. 6. Ottawa: Forum of Federations and International Association of Centers for Federal Studies. R.A. Young. 2008. “Governance of Megacities in Federal Orders.” In Local Government in Federal Systems, edited by John Kincaid and Rupak Chattopadhyay, 110–18. Vol. 4 of Unity in Diversity: Learning from Each Other. New Delhi: Viva Books and Forum of Federations. Robert Young. 2009. “Canada.” In Local Government and Metropolitan Regions in Federal Systems, edited by Nico Steytler and John Kincaid, 104–35. A Global Dialogue on Federalism, vol. VI. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press for Forum of Federations and International Association of Centers for Federal Studies. Robert Young. 2009. “Conclusion.” In Foundations of Governance: Municipal Government in Canada’s Provinces, edited by Andrew Sancton and Robert Young, 487–99. Toronto: University of Toronto Press and the Institute of Public Administration of Canada. Robert Young with David Laidler. 2010. “What Is Good Government? David Laidler’s Views.” In David Laidler’s Contributions to Economics, edited by Robert Leeson, 93–113. London: Palgrave McMillan. Robert Young. 2011. “Conclusion.” In Immigrant Settlement Policy in Canadian Municipalities, edited by Erin Tolley and Robert Young, 295–320. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press. Robert Young. 2011. “The Federal Role in Canada’s Cities: The Pendulum Swings Again.” In The Federal Idea: Essays in Honour of Ronald L. Watts, edited by Thomas J. Courchene, John R. Allan, Christian Leuprecht, and Nadia Verrelli, 313–22. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations and McGill-Queen’s University Press. Robert Young. 2011. “Foundations of Governance: Municipal Government.” In Approaching Public Administration: Core Debates and

Appendix: Publications of Robert A. Young

241

Emerging Issues, edited by Roberto P. Leone and Frank L.K. Ohemang, 319–24. Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications. Robert Young. 2011. “How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?” In Federalism, vol. 4: Fiscal Features, Federal Failures and the Future of Federalism, edited by John Kincaid, 217–36. London: sage . Robert Young. 2012. “Conclusion.” In Image-Building in Canadian Municipalities, edited by Jean Harvey and Robert Young, 167–96. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press. Robert Young. 2012. “Conclusion.” In Urban Aboriginal Policy Making in Canadian Municipalities, edited by Evelyn J. Peters, 202–28. Montreal, qc, and Kingston, on: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Robert Young. 2012. “Introduction.” In Sites of Governance: Multilevel Governance and Policy Making in Canada’s Big Cities, edited by Martin Horak and Robert Young, 3–25. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press. Michael C. Ircha and Robert Young. 2013. “Conclusion.” In Federal Property Policy in Canadian Municipalities, edited by Michael C. Ircha and Robert Young, 157–80. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGillQueen’s University Press. Robert Young and Daniel Henstra. 2013. “Conclusion.” In Multilevel Governance and Emergency Management in Canadian Municipalities, edited by Daniel Henstra, 190–212. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGill-Queen’s University Press. Michael C. Ircha and Robert Young. 2013. “Introduction.” In Federal Property Policy in Canadian Municipalities, edited by Michael C. Ircha and Robert Young, 3–36. Montreal, qc , and Kingston, on : McGillQueen’s University Press. Robert Young. 2013. “Quebec and Canada: Associated States.” In Les Relations Québec-Canada: arréter le dialogue des sourds? edited by Pierre Hamel and Jean-Michel Lacroix, 113–28. Brussels: Peter Lang.

no n- r e f e r e e d p u bl i cat i o n s Numerous articles, book reviews, and restaurant reviews, the Plain Dealer and the Daily Gleaner (Fredericton), 1976–78. R.A. Young. 1985. “Free Trade: The Effect on Canada.” The Globe and Mail, 9 May. R.A. Young. 1985. “Last, Worst Deal.” Policy Options 6, no. 6 (July–August): 4–9. Reprinted in Contemporary Canadian Politics:

242

Appendix: Publications of Robert A. Young

Readings and Notes, edited by Robert Jackson, Doreen Jackson and Nicholas Baxter Moore, 380–5. Scarborough, on : Prentice-Hall, 1987. R.A. Young. 1986. “There Is a Logical Exit to Free-Trade Box.” The Financial Post, 22 March. R.A. Young. 1986. “A Way Out for Mr. Mulroney.” Policy Options 7, no. 4 (May): 3–8. R.A. Young. 1987. “Why Quebec Should Seek a U.S. Buyer for Domtar.” The Montreal Gazette, 8 January. R.A. Young. 1987. “Canadians May Balk at Free-Trade Price.” The Financial Post, 20 April. R.A. Young. 1987. “Conglomerates: The Need to Know.” Policy Options 8, no. 4 (May): 35–7. B.B. Kymlicka and R.A. Young. 1987. “Free-Trade Brinksmanship May Be Costly for Canada.” The Globe and Mail, 21 May. R.A. Young. 1988. “Breaking the Free Trade Coils.” Policy Options 9, no. 2 (March): 6–10. R.A. Young. 1988. “A Free Trade Argument.” Agenda 1, no. 1 (September): 5–7, 35–6. R.A. Young. 1988. “Why Did We Ignore the Middle Ground?” The Globe and Mail, 24 November. R.A. Young. 1990. “Tracking the fta .” Policy Options 11, no. 1 (Jan.–Feb.): 10–13. R.A. Young. 1991. “How to Head Off the Crisis.” The Globe and Mail, 10 January. R.A. Young. 1992. “Life in the Constitutional Lane.” The Canadian Political Science Association Bulletin XXI, no. 1 (February): 13–20. R.A. Young. 1992. “Aboriginal Rights and Four Constitutional Games.” Inroads, no. 1 (Fall): 80–93. R.A. Young. 1995. “Six Big Lies in the Referendum Debate.” Policy Options 16, no. 3 (April): 12–16. R.A. Young. 1995. “Qui joue les prophètes de malheur?” Le Devoir [Montreal], 4 April. R.A. Young. 1995. “Six ‘Big Lies’ to Watch For in Sovereignty Debate.” The Financial Post, 22 April. R.A. Young. 1995. “Le référendum et le ‘neutre.’” Société québécoise de science politique, Bulletin 4, no. 2 (May): 6–8. R.A. Young. 1995. “The Czech-Slovak Breakup,” for the Southam papers (e.g., “When a Country Is Pulled Apart,” The Spectator [Hamilton, on ], 20 October). R.A. Young. 1995. Letter to the Editor [solicited]. The Weekly Telegraph [London], no. 225, 8–14 November.

Appendix: Publications of Robert A. Young

243

Group of 22 [one author among many]. 1996. “Making Canada Work Better.” N.p., n.d., 23 pp. Released 1 May. R.A. Young. 1996. “After the Referendum: What Next?” Western Alumni Gazette [London, on ] 73, no. 1 (Fall): 42. R.A. Young. 1997. “Defending Decentralization.” Policy Options 18, no. 2 (March): 42–4. Reprinted in the Ottawa Citizen. R.A. Young. 2002. “Two by H.V. Nelles.” Policy Options 23, no. 1 (Jan.–Feb.): 40–2. R.A. Young with Andrew Sancton. 2003–04. “Paul Martin and Cities: Show Us the Money.” Policy Options 25, no. 1 (Dec.–Jan.): 29–34. R.A. Young. 2004. “Just What Is a ‘Liberal-Friendly’ Ad Firm? Why the Spin on the Sponsorship Scandal Is Wrong.” Inside Ottawa 12, no. 15 (17 September): 6–7. R.A. Young. 2006. “Intergovernmental Relations Includes Municipalities.” Municipal World 116, no. 10 (October): 31–2. R.A. Young. 2008. “Canada’s Federal Government Reluctant to Fund Cities.” Federations 7, no. 2 (March): 10–12, 22. R.A. Young. 2008. “Four Hundred Years of Cities: Is the Best Yet to Come?” Policy Options 29, no. 7 (July–August): 66–9. Robert Young and Andrew Sancton. 2009. “Foundations of Governance.” Municipal World 119, no. 9 (September): 37–8, 44. Robert Young. 2012. “The Inconvenient Truth about Seceding States.” New York Times, Room for Debate (online), 1 November. Robert Young. 2013. “Imagine … an Image.” Municipal World 123, no. 5 (May): 5–6. Robert Young. 2013. “The Road to Secession: Estimating the Costs of Independence in Advanced Industrial States.” Invited post, lse Politics and Policy Blog, 3 December. Robert Young. 2014. “Financial Reflections: Clarifying Transition Costs in Secessions.” Economic and Social Research Council blog, Future of the uk and Scotland, 2 June. Michael C. Ircha and Robert Young. 2014. “Federal Property Policy in Canadian Municipalities.” Municipal World 124, no. 8 (August): 25–6.

r e se a rc h re p o rt s W.A. Young and R.A. Young. 1980. “Youth and Development: A Follow-Up Study of Former Canadian Participants of the Canada World Youth Program.” 3 vols. For the Canadian International Development Agency. R.A. Young. 1996. “Quebec Secession and Ontario’s Interests.” For the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, Ontario. June.

244

Appendix: Publications of Robert A. Young

R.A. Young. 2005. “Cities: Issues in Demography, Governance and Finance.” Background paper for the Ditchley Foundations Conference, “The World’s Cities: Can They Take the Strain?” Cambridge, on : Langdon Hall, 16–18 September. R.A. Young. 2006. Open Federalism and Canadian Municipalities: A Briefing Note. 31pp. Briefing note for the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations and the Privy Council Office, 17 April. R.A. Young. 2010. “Case Study: The 1995 Referendum in Quebec.” For the United States Institute of Peace for distribution to leaders in North and South Sudan, September.

o t he r p ub l i c at i o n s A. Blais, P. Faucher, and R.A. Young. 1983. L’aide financière directe du gouvernement fédéral à l’industrie canadienne, 1960–1980. Note de recherche no. 12 (September). Montreal, qc : Université de Montréal, Départment de science politique. P. Faucher, A. Blais, R.A. Young, and R. Poupart. 1983. Les avantages fiscaux du gouvernment fédéral à l’industrie manufacturière canadienne. Note de recherche no. 13 (October). Montreal, qc : Université de Montréal, Départment de science politique. R.A. Young. 1987. Canada-United States Free Trade: Economic Realities and Political Choices. Centre for the Analysis of National Economic Policy, Working Paper 87-03 (July). London, on : Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario. Ronald Wintrobe and R.A. Young. 1993. Social Efficiency: Models of Efficiency Wages, Fair Wages and Competitiveness. Economic Council of Canada, Government and Competitiveness Reference, discussion paper 93-27 (December). Kingston, on : School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University. André Blais and R.A. Young. 1996. Why Do People Vote? An Experiment in Rationality. Political Economy Research Group, Working Paper #64. London, on : University of Western Ontario.

Contributors

carol agocs is professor emerita in Western University’s Department of Political Science (London, Ontario). Her PhD studies were in sociology and she earned an mba and a master’s degree in history. Carol was the director of the Local Government Program from 2002 to 2005 and taught Organizational Behaviour and Local Government Management in Western’s mpa program from its inception in 1990. Her publications include Employment Equity in Canada (University of Toronto Press, 2014), Workplace Equality: International Perspectives on Legislation, Policy and Practice (Kluwer Law International, 2002), and Employment Equity: Cooperative Strategies for Organizational Change (Prentice Hall, 1992, co-authored with Catherine Burr and Felicity Somerset). andré blais is a professor in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal, where he holds a research chair in electoral studies. He studies elections and voting, electoral systems, turnout, and public opinion. allison bramwell is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. She teaches courses in urban politics, public policy and administration, and community and economic development in both the undergraduate and mpa programs. Her current research focuses on how multilevel and collaborative urban governance processes shape urban economic transformation, with an emphasis on digital economy implications for mid-sized cities in Canada, the US, and Europe. Other recent work includes local labour market planning

246

Contributors

and workforce development, the role of colleges and universities in regional economic development, and the social dynamics of economic performance in urban regions.

cristine de clercy is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Western University, and director of the Leadership and Democracy Lab. She holds a ba (Hons) and an ma from the University of Saskatchewan, and a PhD from Western University, which she earned under Bob Young’s supervision. She studies political leadership, Canadian politics, and comparative politics. Her recent work focuses on how citizens adjudicate the character of their political leaders, executive succession in business and politics, and the intersection of populism and leadership. In 2020 she edited a special issue of the Politics and Governance journal on “Leadership, Populism and Power.” jérôme couture has a PhD in political science from Université Laval and is currently a postdoctoral fellow at Institut national de la recherche scientifique. His thesis is about the link between public finance and municipal elections in Quebec. His work has been published in, among others, Environment and Planning C, the European Journal of Public Health, Policy and Internet, and the Canadian Journal of Political Science. His co-edited book, Accountability and Responsiveness at the Municipal Level: Views from Canada, was published in 2018 by McGill-Queen’s University Press. stéphane dion is Canada’s ambassador to Germany and the prime minister’s special envoy to the European Union and Europe. Prior to this, he was Canada’s minister of foreign affairs (2015–17), leader of the opposition (2006–08), minister of the environment (2004–05), minister responsible for official languages (2001–03), and the federal member of Parliament for Saint-Laurent-Cartierville (1996–2015) and for Saint-Laurent (2015–16). He served as minister of intergovernmental affairs (1996–2003) longer than any other Canadian since Confederation and he played a primary role promoting Canadian unity. He sponsored the Clarity Act in Parliament in 2000. Mr Dion taught political science at Université de Moncton (1984), then at Université de Montréal (1984–96), and has authored many publications on various topics, including secession.

Contributors

247

anna lennox esselment is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Waterloo. She earned her PhD at Western University under Bob Young’s supervision, and has published works about parties, campaigns, Canadian institutions, and intergovernmental relations. philippe faucher is a retired professor and former chair of the Political Science Department of the Université de Montréal. He is also a research fellow at the Montreal Centre for International Studies. He studied at McGill University in economics and political science (ba 1972, ma 1973) and earned a PhD from the École des hautes études en sciences sociales and Université de Paris (1977). He published works on economic policies, trade, economic development, industrial and technological policies, and state enterprises. He worked as consultant to the minister of administration and reform of the state (1995), and with the science and technology minister (1999) of the federal government of Brazil. mario ferrero is a professor of economics at the University of Eastern Piedmont, Italy. He has published widely in economics and related journals on the application of an economic approach to the study of political institutions, conflict, terrorism, and religion. One of his current projects focuses on competition in polytheistic religions and the birth of monotheism. louis m. imbeau is professor emeritus of political science and an associate professor at Université Laval. He is the co-author of Le contrôle parlementaire des finances publiques dans la Francophonie, and co-author or editor of several other books, as well as of many papers on public deficit, the budgetary process, constitution-making, and social science methods. He is currently working on a book on the epistemology of the social sciences. michael keating is a professor of politics at the universities of Aberdeen and Edinburgh and director of the Centre on Constitutional Change. He graduated from the University of Oxford and in 1975 was the first PhD graduate from what is now Glasgow Caledonian University. Michael is a fellow of the British Academy, the Royal Society of Edinburgh, the Academy of Social Sciences, and

248

Contributors

the European Academy, and has taught in universities in Scotland, England, Canada, the US, France, and Spain, and at the European University Institute in Italy. Among his publications are Plurinational Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2001), The Independence of Scotland (Oxford University Press, 2009), and Rescaling the European State (Oxford University Press, 2013), and he edited Debating Scotland: Issues of Independence and Union in the 2014 Referendum (Oxford University Press, 2017). He is currently leading a major project on the uk constitution and Brexit, and preparing a monograph on constitutional accommodation in the uk and Ireland for Oxford University Press.

françois rocher is a full professor at the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa. He has been co-director of the Canadian Journal of Political Science, a member of the board of directors of the Canadian Political Science Association, president of the Société québécoise de science politique in 2001–02 and of the Canadian Political Science Association in 2018–19. He was a professor in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University from 1990 to 2006. In 2006, he joined the University of Ottawa. His research interests include issues related to multi-ethnic and multi-national diversity, citizenship, constitutional politics, Canadian federalism, and Quebec nationalism. andrew sancton is professor emeritus of Western University (London, Ontario). A native of Montreal, he received his honours ba from Bishop’s University in Quebec and his doctoral degree in politics from Oxford University. Most of his academic career was spent as a professor of political science at Western. He is working on the third edition of Canadian Local Government: An Urban Perspective, published by Oxford University Press Canada. nadia verrelli is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science, Laurentian University (Sudbury, Ontario), and a research associate at the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University (Kingston, Ontario). Her research interests include Canadian federalism, Canadian institutions, constitutional politics, and the Supreme Court of Canada. Currently she is working on research relating to media and court responses to domestic violence.

Contributors

249

stanley l. winer is Canada Research Chair professor in public policy in the School of Public Policy and Administration and the Department of Economics, Carleton University (Ottawa), former chair of the editorial board of the Carleton Library Series, and a research associate at ces ifo, Munich. He was the Fulbright-Duke University Visiting Chair in 2003. His published work includes Coercion and Social Welfare in Public Finance, co-edited with Jorge Martinez-Vazquez for Cambridge University Press (2014), and Democratic Choice and Taxation, co-authored with Walter Hettich, also for Cambridge (1999). His book with Kathleen Day, Interregional Migration and Public Policy in Canada (McGill-Queen’s, 2012), was awarded the Purvis Memorial Prize from the Canadian Economics Association. ronald wintrobe is professor emeritus and adjunct research professor at Western University. He is the author of The Political Economy of Dictatorship and Rational Extremism, and co-author or editor of several other books, as well as of many papers in professional journals. His favourite subjects are dictatorship, the mafia, political extremism, and the relationship between economics and Buddhism. Currently, he is working on research relating to the fall of democracy and the rise of illiberalism.

Index

ahimsa, 192. See also satyagraha Alaska, 95 Alberta, 37–41, 225n4 Alberta Heritage Fund, 41. See also sovereign wealth funds (swf s) al-Qaeda, 194–5 al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab, 193 anti-Semitism, 190, 203 Australia, 220 Austria, 85 Autonomous Community of the Basque Country, 154–5 Bank of Canada, 33, 118, 126n6 Basque Country, 153–4, 157. See also Autonomous Community of the Basque Country Basque Nationalist Party, 153, 156 behavioural economics, 218 Belgium, 86 bin Laden, Osama, 193–4, 210 Black Lives Matter, 73 Blair, Bill, 64 Blais, André, 3, 181n3, 222, 226n6 borders, 116–7, 121, 132, 154–5, 159 Bouchard, Lucien, 87, 90, 103

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 96 Brazil, 93, 115 Brexit, 101, 159 British Columbia, 37, 42, 44, 225 British Conservative Party, 133–4 British Empire, 136, 190, 200 British Labour Party, 133–4 Brittany, 151 budgets. See fiscal policy Calman Commission, 136 Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, 133 Canada: economy of, 119–20, 122–4, 125n3; electoral system of, 12, 214–6, 222–5; federalism in, 5–6, 99–100; monetary policy of, 36, 117–8; municipal government in, 7, 15, 50; and Quebec, 114, 116–7, 125; regional development in, 24; secession from, 9, 85–7, 90–2, 97–8, 102, 104–5, 130; socioeconomic policy of, 34, 45; “two nations” theory of, 153. See also Constitution Act (1982); equalization formula; exchange rates; federal

252

Index

government of Canada; Indigenous peoples; majoritarianism; municipal government; provinces Canada Health and Social Transfers, 38–9. See also equalization formula Canada Pension Plan, 41 Canada Research Chair, 3, 16, 47–8 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 90 Canadian Political Science Association, 3, 7 Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, 21 carbon sequestration, 44 carbon tax, 42–5 Catalonia, 9–10, 93–4, 96, 151, 153–4; secession attempt of, 128, 134–6, 137–9, 140–42, 143, 156–7 Centre for Research on Inner City Health, 65 Centre on Constitutional Change (Edinburgh), 148 Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 166 Charlottetown constitutional accord, 5 China, 43, 93, 115, 205 Chrétien, Jean, 87, 90, 102, 219 Christianity, 205–7. See also religion cities, 4, 17, 23, 25; livability of, 51. See also local governance; multilevel governance; municipal government; Toronto, City of citizenship, 47; and elections, 61; and identity, 155; model of municipal policy development, 8, 48, 53, 55, 60, 67, 69, 72; and municipal governance, 50–2;

right to, 84; and secession, 9, 93, 96–7, 105. See also democracy; Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (Toronto) City of Toronto Act, 53 civil disobedience, 187–8 civil liberties, 215 civil service. See public service Clarity Act (2000), 84, 100, 102–5 clientelism, 54 climate change, 43, 45. See also carbon tax Colle, Josh, 62 colonialism, 88–9, 96, 150. See also British Empire; decolonization Columbine massacre, 203–4 Commission of Scottish Devolution, 136 Commonwealth, 136 community policing, 8, 56, 65 Condorcet jury theorem, 191 Condorcet winners and losers, 220–1, 227n14 Conservative Party of Canada, 19, 61, 218–9, 224 Constitution Act (1982), 39, 89–90, 98–9, 105, 107n14 constitutionalism, 98 Convergence and Union Party (Catalonia), 138–9 Corsica, 156 counterterrorism, 209–10 Creba, Jane, 56 crime, 8, 56–7, 59, 64–5 Crisanti, Vincent, 63, 66–7 currency, 34–5, 116–8, 122–3, 126. See also “Dutch Disease”; exchange rates Czechoslovakia, 6, 86, 114, 130, 199

Index Czech Republic, 6, 85 Danzig Street shooting, 64–5 de Clercy, Cristine, 3 decolonization, 86, 94 deficits, 10–11, 165–70, 174, 177–9, 181n7. See also fiscal policy; Ricardian equivalence theorem; taxation deindustrialization, 23. See also manufacturing sector democracy, 9; and globalization, 122; participant, 47–8, 51; and secession, 83–6, 88, 92, 95–8, 100, 105, 130; and selfdetermination, 149, 158–9 Denmark, 85 Derriennic, Jean-Pierre, 87 developers, 52. See also private sector devolution, 133–4, 136–7, 159. See also Commission of Scottish Devolution; Scotland Diefenbaker, John, 219 diversity and inclusion, 8, 26, 56, 60. See also inequality; systemic racism “Dutch Disease,” 7–8, 35, 41. See also exchange rates East Timor, 86 Economic and Social Research Panel for the Future of the uk and Scotland, 148 economic development, 5, 25, 115 economic geography, 24, 27 economic governance, 25, 27–8 economics, 4, 33, 50; of canonization, 208–9; of extremism, 200–2; of secession, 84, 113,

253

115–6, 129, 132; trust in, 189–90, 192; and waste, 193. See also Canada; fiscal policy; globalization; monetary policy; political economy; Quebec economic theory of conflict, 194–5, 197n5 Edinburgh Agreement, 137–40, 142–3 elections, 19–20, 22–3, 170–3, 214, 218–9; municipal, 49, 54, 61, 64; ranked, 220; in Scotland, 133, 136–7; in Spain, 135, 138–9, 141. See also instant run-off voting (irv ); majoritarianism; median voter theorem; proportional representation (pr ); referendums; voting emergency management, 17, 19, 21 energy sector, 35, 38, 225n4. See also oil industry environmental governance, 28 equalization formula, 8, 10–11, 36–9, 42–3, 127n12; amendment of, 99; opposition to, 165; stability of, 45. See also Canada Health and Social Transfers Esselment, Anna Lennox, 3 Ethiopia, 97 ethnicity, 97, 149, 199. See also nationalism; nations; self-determination European Union, 17, 23, 93–4, 101, 138; and self-determination, 153, 156–9 exchange rates, 34–6, 40–1, 45, 117. See also “Dutch Disease”; oil industry extremism, 11, 166, 194, 196, 200, 214. See also terrorism

254

Index

federal government of Canada, 7; and cities, 19–20, 25, 53, 57, 60–1, 73; economic regulation of, 125n3; and Indigenous policy, 21; lands of, 17; and secession, 84, 90, 92–3, 102–4; tax policy of, 44; transfers to provinces, 38–9; unilateralism of, 7. See also Canada; Clarity Act (2000); Constitution Act (1982); equalization formula; federalism; municipal government; provinces; responsible government federalism: Canadian, 5, 27, 40, 102, 153, 226n7; and deficits, 169; economics of, 114; and equalization, 42–3; and home rule, 152, 160n2; and multilevel governance, 17–18, 20, 23, 26; and secession, 98–100. See also equalization formula; federal government of Canada; secession Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 7, 19 financial markets, 9–10, 41, 45 fiscal policy, 10–11, 49, 55, 61–2, 165–6, 166–70, 181n7; and ideology, 178–80; and voting, 170–8, 181n4. See also deficits; monetary policy; partisan cycle hypothesis; taxation Following, The, 200 Ford, Rob, 8, 48–9, 53–5, 61–6, 70 France, 124, 151 free rider problem, 11–12, 192, 195–6, 197n4, 211 Free Trade Agreement (fta ), 5, 19, 215. See also nafta

game theory, 128, 131, 181n4 Gandhi, Mahatma, 11, 185–8, 191–2, 194, 196, 196n3 gang violence, 8, 55, 59. See also Danzig Street shooting Germany, 43, 95 Gertler, Meric, 15, 23–4 globalization, 9–10, 126n10; and cities, 24; of sainthood, 209; and secession, 114–5, 121–4, 126n9, 152–3; and supply chains, 36 Good Friday Agreement, 101 Goods and Services Tax (gst ), 43 governance, 15, 27–8, 55, 226n7; and citizenship, 48, 51, 53; and economy, 115, 124; and globalization, 126n10; and ideology, 73; participation in, 50. See also economic governance; environmental governance; Innovation Systems Research Network (isrn ); local governance; multilevel governance; Multilevel Governance and Public Policy in Canadian Municipalities (ppm ); urban governance Greater Toronto Civic Action Alliance. See Toronto City Summit Alliance Green Party of Catalonia, 134 guaranteed annual income, 40 gun violence, 8, 55–6, 64–5. See also Danzig Street shooting Habsburg Empire, 152, 155 Hamilton, 25 Harper, Stephen, 19–20, 219 Hartwick Rule, 41 heroes, 12, 199–204. See also saints and martyrs

Index Herostratic equilibrium, 203–4 Herostratos, 202, 210 “home rule,” 133, 136, 152 housing, 17, 53, 57–8, 67–8 human rights, 96 Humboldt, Saskatchewan, 21 Hungary, 85 Iceland, 85, 101 ideology, 73, 179, 200–1; and deficits, 165–7, 169, 178; and martyrdom, 202–4. See also partisan cycle hypothesis; partisanship immigration and settlement, 17, 19, 52, 54–5, 61 India, 115, 185, 192, 194, 200, 205 Indigenous peoples, 17, 21, 91, 99, 153, 155 industrial policy, 5. See also deindustrialization; manufacturing sector Industrial Revolution, 209 inequality, 49, 55, 67, 69–71, 73. See also poverty; race infrastructure, 8, 17, 21, 57–8, 70 Innovation Systems Research Network (isrn ), 15–16, 23–9 instant run-off voting (irv ), 220–2, 227n15–16, 228n17 Institut d’études politiques, 5, 180 Institute of Intergovernmental Relations (Queen’s University), 33, 144 “intergenerational resource stewardship,” 40 intergovernmental relations, 6, 73, 87. See also federal government of Canada; multilevel governance; municipal government; provinces

255

International Court of Justice, 89 international law, 9, 84, 88–90, 96, 105 International Monetary Fund, 121 internet, 200, 210 Iraq, 196 Ireland, 85, 101, 152, 155, 157, 159, 200. See also Northern Ireland Islam, 211 Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (isis ), 11, 185–6, 192–6, 203 Israel, 203, 205–6, 226n5 Italy, 95 Jacobs, Jane, 8, 51 Japan, 93 Jesus of Nazareth, 205–7 Johnson, Boris, 101 Judaism, 206, 212n5 Kelly, Norm, 65–6 Kilbrandon Commission, 133 kof Swiss Economic Institute, 122–3 Kosovo, 89, 92–3 labour, 35–6, 54, 57, 70, 121, 124 language, 96–7 Lega Nord, 152, 156 liberalism, 209. See also neoliberalism Liberal Party of Canada, 61, 219, 224, 225n4, 227n15 local governance, 8, 15–16, 23–4, 28, 48; partisanship in, 49–50; and regional development, 25–6. See also cities; Innovation Systems Research Network (isrn ); multilevel governance; municipal government

256

Index

Lombardy, 156 Lougheed, Peter, 41 majoritarianism, 12, 214–23, 225n3, 227n11 Malaysia, 85–6 Mammoliti, Giorgio, 63, 66–7 manufacturing sector, 7, 34–6, 41 Martin, Paul, 19–20 martyrdom. See saints and martyrs Mas, Artur, 135, 138–9 May, Theresa, 101 McGill University, 4–5 McLuhan, Marshall, 11 media, 201–3, 209 median voter theorem, 170–5, 177, 179–80. See also taxation medicare, 36 Meech Lake constitutional accord, 5 Miller, David, 8, 48–9, 52–3, 55–6, 60–1, 70, 72–3 minorities, 56, 96, 98–9, 159, 209; electoral, 217–8 monetary policy, 117–18, 126n5. See also fiscal policy Montenegro, 86, 101 Montreal, 25, 87 Mulroney, Brian, 219 multilevel governance, 7, 15–18, 20, 27–8, 48; and federalism, 26; and local business, 21; and partisanship, 22–3; and regional economic transformation, 23–4. See also cities; Innovation Systems Research Network (isrn ); intergovernmental relations; local governance; Multilevel Governance and Public Policy in Canadian

Municipalities (ppm); municipal government Multilevel Governance and Public Policy in Canadian Municipalities (ppm ), 15–23, 26–9, 29n1, 47 municipal government, 7–8; and democracy, 51–2; multilevel interactions of, 15, 20–1; and policy development, 8, 20; priorities of, 22; research on, 15–17; service delivery of, 48, 50, 56–7. See also cities; Federation of Canadian Municipalities; intergovernmental relations; local governance; multilevel governance; Multilevel Governance and Public Policy in Canadian Municipalities (ppm ); public policy; Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (Toronto); urban governance Munk School of Global Affairs, 23

nafta , 36, 153 Naidu, Sarojini, 188 Nash equilibrium. See Herostratic equilibrium nationalism, 10, 97, 125, 133–5, 149, 157; claim of, 150–2, 155–6; and violence, 199–200 nations, 10, 96–7, 105; claim of, 155–6; construction of, 151–2; self-determination of, 149–51; sovereignty of, 153, 157; and territory, 154–5. See also ethnicity; self-determination nation-state, 121, 124, 150, 152–3, 157 nato , 93

Index natural resources, 40–1, 45. See also oil industry neoliberalism, 48–50, 52–3, 55, 73. See also new public management (npm ) New Brunswick, 5, 37 New Flemish Alliance, 157 Newfoundland and Labrador, 37, 38, 123 new public management (npm ), 48–50 non-profit organizations, 25, 50, 53, 70 Northern Ireland, 101, 154–5, 159 Norway, 41, 85–6, 159 Nova Scotia, 37, 38 Obama, Barack, 197n4

oecd, 24, 169 oil industry, 7, 34, 36, 40, 133 Ontario, 37, 38–9, 119, 121, 126n8 Oxford University, 5 Padania, 152 Palestinian-Israeli conflict, 192, 195, 203 Paris Climate Agreement, 43 Parizeau, Jacques, 87, 90–1 Parliament of Canada, 19, 102, 125n1, 216, 218–9, 223–4; election to, 220, 222. See also federal government of Canada Parti Québécois, 113, 125, 157 partisan cycle hypothesis, 10–11, 165–6, 168–70, 178–80 partisanship, 49, 131 Partnership Opportunity Legacy Fund, 58 Plaid Cymru, 157

257

police, 56, 59, 61, 64–5, 73. See also community policing political economy, 3, 5, 7, 10–12, 24, 165–6; urban, 25, 27, 73. See also partisan cycle hypothesis; rational behaviour theory political parties, 22. See also Conservative Party of Canada; elections; Liberal Party of Canada; partisanship political science, 3–4, 7, 33, 192 Popper, Karl, 219, 227n12 Popular Party (Spain), 135 Popular Unity Candidacy (Catalonia), 139 populism, 49, 54–5 poverty, 49, 55, 57, 61, 64, 67–71 ppm project. See Multilevel Governance and Public Policy in Canadian Municipalities (ppm ) private sector, 23, 25–6, 53; and local governance, 50, 58–60, 65, 70–1; workers in, 54 privatization, 55, 166 proportional representation (pr ), 214–22, 225n3, 226n6–226n8. See also elections; voting protest, 11, 185–6, 192, 195. See also satyagraha provinces: and a carbon tax, 44; and equalization, 7–8; and Indigenous policy, 21; and municipalities, 20, 22, 25, 52–3, 57, 60–1, 73; perspectives of, 5; revenues of, 36–43, 45; and secession, 100, 102, 107n14, 158. See also federal government of Canada; individual provinces public administration, 47–51, 60, 69, 72–3. See also new public

258

Index

management (npm ); public policy; public servants public debt, 9, 11, 41, 126, 167–8; and secession, 115, 119, 123 public policy, 6–7, 16, 33; assessment of, 71; citizen participation in, 8, 48, 50, 53, 72; coordination across governments, 21–2, 26; development of, 8, 24, 181n6, 216; and ideology, 73; independence of, 122–4; and the internet, 200; left-right dimension of, 165– 6; municipal, 17–18, 20, 23, 25–6, 28; partisanship in, 50; and secession, 148. See also fiscal policy; monetary policy public sector, 59–60, 71 public servants, 51, 67, 72, 92 public service, 55, 57, 92, 155 Puigdemont, Charles, 139, 141 Quebec, 5–6, 9–10; as colonized, 150; economy of, 37, 119–24, 126n8; international recognition of independence of, 92–4; as a nation, 125n1, 152; people of, 89–90, 98, 107n18; public debt of, 126n11; risk of independence of, 113–8, 125; secession of, 87–92, 98–100, 102–5, 130, 144, 148, 156, 195; territory of, 154–5. See also Clarity Act (2000); sovereignty-association; Superior Court of Quebec Quebec independence referendum (1980), 90, 113 Quebec independence referendum (1995), 6, 9, 85–7, 113–4, 124–5, 148, 159 Queen’s University, 33, 41

race, 49, 55–6, 70, 96. See also systemic racism Rajoy, Mariano, 135 rational behaviour theory, 3, 128–9, 200–1 referendums, 86, 93, 95, 100–2, 156, 158–9. See also Catalonia; Quebec independence referendum (1980); Quebec independence referendum (1995); Scotland religion, 4, 96–7, 113, 205–6, 209–10. See also Christianity; Islam; Judaism; saints and martyrs Republican Left of Catalonia, 134, 138–9 Republika Srpska, 158 responsible government, 155, 215–6, 222 revealed preference theory, 201 revolution, 195, 199–200 Ricardian equivalence theorem, 173, 181n7 Roman Catholic Church, 207–9, 212n4 Roman Empire, 206–7 rule of law, 88–9, 97–8, 102 Russia, 86, 93 saints and martyrs, 12, 199–202, 204–10, 212n4; counter-cults of, 210–2 Salt March, 187–8, 190, 192 Saskatchewan, 37, 38, 44, 225n4 satyagraha, 11, 185–93, 196 school shootings, 203–5 Scotland, 10, 94, 101, 150, 152, 155; secession attempt of, 128, 130, 133–4, 136–7, 139–140,

Index 142–4, 156–7, 159; sovereignty of, 153–4. See also Edinburgh Agreement; United Kingdom Scottish National Party, 133–4, 136–7 secession, 4, 6–7, 9–10, 19, 83–4, 106n1; aim of, 152; conditions for, 128–32, 142–4; and democratic states, 85–6, 95–6; economic risk of, 113, 115–8, 123–4; in Europe, 156; and globalization, 121–2, 153; right to, 150; rules of, 87–8, 98, 102–4, 141, 158; unilateral, 88–93, 96, 105; and violence, 199. See also Canada; Catalonia; Clarity Act (2000); Quebec; Scotland; self-determination; sovereignty; sovereigntyassociation; unilateral declaration of independence self-determination, 10, 89, 91, 94, 101, 113; claim to, 157; national, 151, 155–7, 159; object of, 152–3; right to, 148–51, 158; and territory, 154. See also “home rule”; secession; sovereignty; unilateral declaration of independence self-immolation, 204–5 Serbia, 86, 89, 93 Shiites, 193–4 Simpson, Jeffrey, 6 Singapore, 85 Slovakia, 6, 85 Socialist Party of Catalonia, 134 Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 6, 16–17, 24 South Africa, 186, 192

259

South Sudan, 86 sovereignty, 86, 118, 122–3, 151, 153–4, 157, 159 sovereignty-association, 85, 90, 153, 157 sovereign wealth funds (swf s), 8, 33, 41–2, 45, 46n3 Soviet Union, 86 Spain, 9, 86, 93–6, 153; and Catalan independence, 134, 136, 138–9, 140–2 Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, 135 Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (Toronto), 8, 48–9, 52–3, 55, 57–61, 70–3; under John Tory, 68–9; under Rob Ford, 61, 63–8 Sturgeon, Nicola, 101 Sunnis, 193, 196 Superior Court of Quebec, 90–1, 158 Supreme Court of Canada, 84, 89–90, 92, 98–103, 106n1, 107n17 Swan River, Manitoba, 18 Sweden, 85–6 Syria, 196 systemic racism, 49, 56, 64, 66, 69–71, 73. See also inequality; poverty Tajani, Antonio, 94 taxation, 8; and budgets, 171–5, 177; corporate, 125n3; on gasoline, 20; municipal, 50, 53–4; and partisan politics, 165–8, 178–80; powers of, 45; provincial differences in, 38–9. See also carbon tax; federal government of Canada; Goods and Services Tax (gst )

260

Index

terrorism, 193–5, 199–200, 203. See also Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (isis ) Tibet, 205 Toronto, City of, 8, 22, 25, 48, 53–5, 72; budget of, 61–2; inequality in, 55–6; services of, 57–9. See also City of Toronto Act; Ford, Rob; Miller, David; Partnership Opportunity Legacy Fund; Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (Toronto); Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020; Tory, John; Tower Renewal Program; Urban Heart database Toronto City Summit Alliance, 53, 57, 68 Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020, 63–71 Torra, Quinn, 141 Tory, John, 49, 68–70, 72 Tower Renewal Program, 53 transit, 53–5, 61–2 transnationalism, 153, 157 Trudeau, Pierre Elliot, 90 Trump, Donald, 34, 36, 225n2 Turkey, 211 Tusk, Donald, 94 unilateral declaration of independence, 87, 89, 91–4, 140–1 United Kingdom, 85–6, 94, 97, 101, 148, 157; and Northern Ireland, 155; and secession, 133, 136, 139–40, 142–3, 159. See also Brexit; British Empire; devolution; Edinburgh Agreement; Northern Ireland; Scotland

United Nations, 83, 93, 158 United States, 34–6, 93; dollar, 118, 126n5; local governance in, 49; market, 120–1, 123; and Quebec, 124; secession from, 95 United Way, 57–8, 64–5, 69–70 University of Toronto, 23 University of Western Ontario, 3, 5, 16, 33, 45n1 urban governance, 15–16, 47–8, 72. See also local governance; municipal government Urban Heart database, 65–6 utility theory, 218 Vancouver Agreement, 22 Veneto, 156 Venice Commission, 95 violence, 11, 88, 185, 190, 193–6, 196n3; and secession, 199. See also gang violence; gun violence; terrorism voting, 5, 50–1, 167, 169–73; paradox of, 3, 181n3, 197n4; systems of, 214, 221–3, 227n12; wasted, 216, 220. See also elections; instant run-off voting (irv ); majoritarianism; median voter theorem; proportional representation (pr ); referendums Wales, 133, 157 Waterfront Redevelopment Corporation (Toronto), 22 Waterloo, 25 Web of Science, 169, 181n2 welfare state, 36, 38–9, 122, 124, 166. See also Canada Health and Social Transfers; guaranteed annual income

Index Wintrobe, Ronald, 3, 11, 185 Wolfe, David, 15, 23–4 World Trade Organization, 43, 117, 121 World War I, 152 Young, Bob (Robert Andrew), 3–7, 33; on federalism, 7–8; on Gandhi, 185; on multilevel governance, 15–20, 23, 29, 47–8; on political economy, 165; on secession politics, 9–10, 83, 85, 87, 113–8, 121–2, 125, 128–32, 142–4, 148; on urban governance, 50, 71; on violence, 195, 199, 215, 225n4; on voting, 181n3 youth, 56–9, 61–2, 64, 69–71 Yugoslavia, 86

261