Accountability, Philosophy and the Natural Environment 2020033172, 2020033173, 9780367481018, 9781003037989

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Accountability, Philosophy and the Natural Environment

Using a philosophical and interdisciplinary approach, this book looks at how accountability can provide solutions to our current environmental and global political problems. When a social system has external elements imposed upon it, or presented to it, political problems are likely to emerge. This book demonstrates that what is needed are connecting social elements with a natural affinity to bring people together despite their differences. This book is different from others in the field. It provides new insights by critiquing the extant understandings of accountability and expands the possibilities by building on Charles Taylor’s philosophies. Central to the argument of the book are perspectives on authenticity and expressivism that are found to provide a radical reworking of our understanding of being in the world, and a starting point for rethinking the way individuals and communities ought to be dealing politically with accountability and ecological crises. The argument builds to an accountability perspective that utilises work from interpretivism, liberalism, and postmodern theory. The book will be of interest to researchers in environmental philosophy, critical perspectives on accounting, corporate governance, corporate social reporting, and environmental accounting. Glen Lehman is Associate Professor and Senior Research Fellow in the School of Accounting and Information System, University of South Australia.

Routledge Research in Sustainability and Business

Environmental Certification for Organisations and Products Management approaches and operational tools Tiberio Daddi, Fabio Iraldo and Francesco Testa Corporate Responsibility and Sustainable Development Exploring the nexus of private and public interests Edited by Lez Rayman-Bacchus and Philip R. Walsh Contemporary Developments in Green Human Resource Management Research Towards Sustainability in Action? Douglas W.S. Renwick Corporate Social Responsibility and Natural Resource Conflict Kylie McKenna Corporate Social Responsibility, Human Rights and the Law Stéphanie Bijlmakers Corporate Sustainability The Next Steps Towards a Sustainable World Jan Jaap Bouma and Teun Wolters Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility in Malaysia Edited by Rusnah Muhamad and Noor Akma Mohd Salleh Renewable Energy Enterprises in Emerging Markets Strategic and Operational Challenges Cle-Anne Gabriel Accountability, Philosophy and the Natural Environment Glen Lehman For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/Routledge-Research-in-Sustainability-and-Business/book-series/RRSB

Accountability, Philosophy and the Natural Environment

Glen Lehman

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Glen Lehman The right of Glen Lehman to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Lehman, Glen, 1961- author. Title: Accountability, philosophy and the natural environment / Glen Lehman. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021. | Series: Routledge research in sustainability and business | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020033172 (print) | LCCN 2020033173 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367481018 (hbk) | ISBN 9781003037989 (ebk) Subjects: LCSH: Social accounting. | Environmental auditing. | Human ecology. | Philosophy of nature. Classification: LCC HN25 .L429 2021 (print) | LCC HN25 (ebook) | DDC 304.2--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020033172 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020033173 ISBN: 978-0-367-48101-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-03798-9 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by MPS Limited, Dehradun

Contents

Acknowledgements Introduction

vii 1

PART I

Critical accountability

5

1 Key themes in accountability research

7

2 The art of interpretation and Nature

20

3 Markets, the business case, and interpretivism

36

4 Postmodernism and interpretivism: Basic issues

61

5 The public sphere, corporations, and society

82

6 External relations: Re-engaging the company with the community in which it operates

95

PART II

Philosophical perspectives

113

7 Basic concepts in accountability research: Key accountability theorists and issues

115

8 Basic issues in accountability: Interpretivism, openness, and transparency

133

vi

Contents

9 Liberal accountability: Current environmental and social challenges and policy 10 Critical and radical accounting and accountability: Basic philosophical issues in accountability research

147

173

PART III

The environment

195

11 Deep Ecology and interpretivism

197

12 Deep Ecology, community, and interpretation

207

13 Perspectives on Deep Ecology: Basic issues

217

14 Deep Ecology and interpretation: Social Ecology and how people relate to the world

227

15 Perspectives on Nature: An environmental values perspective

246

16 New directions for environmental democracy

270

Index

272

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my parents, Douglas and Patricia, for supporting this research over many years. I have also benefitted from many very helpful discussions on these topics with various scholars. I should also thank those among the social and environmental accounting community who have supported me and my various scholarly endeavours unstintingly. In particular, I have received support from Dr. George Couvalis, Dr. Andrew Grienke, Professor Russell Craig, Professor David David, Emeritus Professor Chris Mortensen, Professor David Parker, Emeritus Professor Prem Sikka and Caitlin Pendergrast.

Introduction

This book advocates for an expressivist language of accountability that enables a moral endeavour beyond the constraints of a narrow economic focus. The main aim of the book is to offer alternative possibilities to reflect on the damage unleashed by technical accounting and neoliberal ideology. It challenges current approaches to reform accounting processes that often embed assumptions such as commodifying nature as a reserve for consumption with little regard for values external to human representation. Transformative action in the form of an evaluative framework is offered to embrace discursive priorities for accounting to better enable ecological (and thereby moral) understanding. In recent times, modern management and processes of accountability have been subject to critical scrutiny. This problem arises because these processes have focussed on markets and efficiency without full consideration of their environmental and social impacts. Often these problems arise because bureaucratic managerial processes mask these factors in the design of all-encompassing business procedures. These problems are not new, but they have been made increasingly salient with reports of companies damaging relationships with employees, other members of our community, and the natural environment. The accountability, environmental and management perspective, offered focuses on how we conceive the meaning of Nature and its importance to the project of ‘emancipatory accountability’, enabling the creation of a richer encompassing narrative and policies to protect Nature.1 Interpretation is a critique of accountability researchers’ over-reliance on the methods of the natural sciences advocating objectivity, arguing truth is not correctness as espoused by such research. Rather, truth emerges from an interpretivist process that involves how values are expressed through language. The examination, analysis, and arguments are based on the values and views expounded by interpretative thinkers who bring a particular focus to politics, conflict resolution, and the ideas of a civil society. By taking an interpretivist perspective, the argument offers a framework that critiques the excessive reliance on procedure and a certain procedural form of moral naturalism that dominates the social sciences. In philosophy, naturalism is the supposition or belief that only natural (as opposed to supernatural or

2 Introduction spiritual) laws and forces operate in the world. Challenging naturalism involves an interpretivist turn that offers frameworks of evaluation. Interpretivist evaluation in conjunction with an expressivist language debates issues in accountability, politics, and environmental ethics. It refashions moral realism through engagement with frameworks such as accountability, critical theory, liberalism, and ecological theory to name a few. The view of politics that arises is neither derived from moral philosophy nor simply adapting liberalism in a market direction. It eschews the contradictions in modern forms of deconstruction and postmodernism that separate humanity from Nature or the cosmos. The framework developed contends that neutral, instrumental, and procedural management approaches are unable to solve problems that emanate from humanity’s relationships with Nature. That is, modern accountability, management, and neoliberalism use precise and scientific techniques which are more appropriate for the natural sciences. Understanding dilemmas such as coal mining, global warming, and pandemics requires a complex politics that engages with reality. The interpretive perspective, as adapted in this accountability, environmental and management book, has also been used to examine the dangers of instrumental political perspectives which have neglected the social consequences of unlimited economic growth (Latouche, 2012; Taylor, 1978). This approach, it is worth noting, animates broader political attempts to escape the problems of environmental harm and cultural conflict that have engulfed the procedural and bureaucratic politics of today.2 Throughout the text that follows, modern accountability, management and political perspectives are seen to rely on free markets. However, market approaches do not focus on significant local cultural values and assume that procedure and technique can predict human behaviour. In reality, people work in contexts, and this involves understanding the beliefs, perspectives, and values of workers. This understanding is unlikely to be created when managers and politicians rely solely on the technical and scientific management practices (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015).

Notes 1 For present purposes, the meaning and beauty in Nature are revealed through a focus on the role of language. Some of these ideas can be found in the philosophy of pragmatism, which was defined by the Oxford philosopher Schiller (1947) as originating from ‘a criticism of fundamental conceptions like “truth”, “error”, “fact”, and “reality” the current accounts of which it finds untenable or unmeaning. “Truth”, for instance, cannot be defined as the agreement or correspondence of thought with “reality” for how can thought determine whether it correctly “copies” what transcends it?’ (pp. 413–414). 2 Underlying this management argument lies a series of environmental issues concerned with limits to growth and how they will be managed. To move towards what Taylor (1978) calls a ‘steady state society’, economic systems will have to recognise and operate within these limits.

Introduction 3

Bibliography Dreyfus, H. L. & Taylor, C. (2015). Retrieving Realism, Harvard, Harvard University Press. Latouche, S. (2009). Farewell to Growth, Cambridge, MA, Polity. Latouche, S. (2012). Degrowth, Whether You Like It or Not. Blog. Retrieved from https://Degrowth.Org/2012/02/02/Degrowth-Whether-You-Like-It-Or-Not/. Laughlin, R. C. (1987). Accounting Systems in Organizational Contexts: A Case for Critical Theory, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 12, pp. 479–502. Schiller, F. C. S. (1947). Pragmatism. The Encyclopaedia Brittanica, Volume 18, pp. 413–414. Taylor, C. (1978). Politics of the Steady State. New Universities Quarterly, Volume 32, Number 2, pp. 157–184.

Part I

Critical accountability

1

Key themes in accountability research

Defining interpretivism The complexity of accountability and ecological issues as they relate to business is well illustrated with recent pandemics and environmental catastrophes. The art of interpretation is used in this book to expose how bureaucratic and procedural logic ignores workers’ rights and environmental values, and potentially damages the corporation’s longevity. These issues are addressed critically through transformative action in the form of an evaluative framework embracing languages that reveal meaning and truth, enabling accountability to offer a different and moral sense-making. With the failure of socialist economics, it is useful to introduce ideas from MacIntyre (1984) and Taylor (2017a, 2020) as they apply to current environmental problems. Critical social theory and political interpretivism can be used to reveal the environmental implications of existing political dualisms that are dominant in Western philosophy. Drawing on Alisdair MacIntyre’s (1981, 1984) famous After Virtue which suggested that we have lost our moral compass and Charles Taylor’s (2016) work on The Language Animal. Interpretation, as opposed to procedure, suggests that organisations are not simply profit mechanisms, but active and dynamic civil societies.1 By better understanding the facilitating processes of accountability, administrative and management thinking, it is possible that we can develop alternative strategies that empower individuals to circumvent the negative consequences of instrumental rationality and enable them to act more responsibly in the public interest (Taylor, 2017a). The interpretative and phenomenological locus classicus is Taylor’s work on Hegel (1970), Heidegger (1971), Merleau-Ponty (1964, 2013), and Rousseau (1762). His work provides a multifaceted understanding of the specificity of communal life, and the common purposes that exist for everyone as included within the natural environment. Using the interpretive approach of Taylor (2007), the chapter explores connections between environmental theory and liberal and neoliberal political theory. A framework is developed to outline the key contributions to critical accounting from

8 Critical accountability these philosophical perspectives. These elements contain the components of my matrix which includes an ‘epistemological dimension’ and an ‘ontological dimension’. The ‘epistemological’ dimension classifies research on accounting ethics according to whether the underlying assumption of the research is that the ethical decision is made by an individual acting alone or whether the decision is made by a group. The ‘ontological’ dimension classifies accounting and accountability research according to whether the underlying assumption of the research is that the goal of the ethical decision is the welfare of society as a whole or whether the goal is the welfare of the individual. This book explores four principal approaches to accountability: overviewing procedural, critical, subversive, and interpretivist research. Despite the increased emphasis on critical accounting and accountability research in recent years, there seems to be a lack of focus in this area of research. I offer a matrix (Table 1.1) that has two dimensions to explore the philosophical input to critical accounting. The first dimension of the matrix deals with what is referred to as epistemology which involves the subject in the ethical act. The second aspect relates to the ontology of the philosophical approach. This chapter attempts to bring a greater degree of focus into research on accounting ethics by looking at the relative degree of emphasis placed by different critical approaches to research on accounting on these two dimensions of my matrix. Of course, there are various types of interpretive theory which offer different ways to understand meanings in human communities. They can be expressions of various reasons, intentions, beliefs, or signs. Interpretation is used to explain meanings as expressed in language and how it develops appreciation of humanity’s place in the world (Bevir & Rhodes, 2000). In short, interpretive approaches study beliefs, ideas, or discourses in the context of human communities. Importantly, interpretation is used to study beliefs as they unfold within, and invariably frame, actions, practices, and institutions. Interpretive theory applies to all of political studies. Behind the different types of interpretive theory, there lies the shared assumption that we cannot understand human affairs properly unless we grasp the relevant meanings. The aim of this approach is to use interpretation as a meta-narrative in analysing, combining, and exploring the various meanings that shape human actions and political institutions. Traditionally, interpretation has been about how epistemology poses the question of ‘how do we know what we know about environmental and political science’. Traditional Table 1.1 Prominent theorists used in accountability research Epistemology

Ontology

Procedural (Kantian to liberalism) Subversive (Postmodern and radical feminism)

Critical (Radical Critique of Marx) Interpretivist (Qualitative and moral distinctions)

Key themes in accountability research 9 interpretive theories constitute one set of answers to questions about how I know things in the world. The interpretivism used in this book goes further in challenging the over-reliance on an epistemological approach to knowledge. The approach offered here uses Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) interpretivist phenomenology to explore humanity’s basic interactions in the world. This takes interpretation in an ‘anti-epistemological’ direction concerned with how humans are part of the natural environment.

Applying interpretation Overcoming the damage unleashed by technical ways to manage human communities, the argument utilises MacIntyre’s (1981, p. 263) quest to construct local forms of community. Forms of community must be constructed within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained. MacIntyre argues that we are in the grips of a new dark age where we have lost sight of the common bonds needed for societies to function. These common bonds and goods are needed to create strong environmental policies. If the tradition of the virtues was able to survive the horrors of the last dark ages, we are not entirely without grounds for hope. Using MacIntyre’s work on virtue ethics and Taylor’s (1971b) analysis of interpretation, this book considers humanity’s being-in-the-world. I argue that how we remember and think about what a good society leads to the construction of policies to handle the relationships between people and with Nature. In this book, interpretation is about creating, developing, and remembering how ideas and imaginaries shape communities (Chabrak, Haslam, & Oakes, 2019).

Objections and contrary opinions A useful way to deepen the argument for the interpretation of environmental and management accountability is to suggest a contrary opinion. Many theorists have made the point that the environment is in crisis and urgent solutions are needed (Scranton, 2015). For example, some people have argued that the coronavirus is part of an impending environmental catastrophe. But some conservative commentators have argued that humankind does not face a serious environmental crisis and we do not need environmental constraints or regulations. Examining this assertion implies questioning whether such environmental awareness must be accompanied by the conviction that we will perish unless changes are made in how we live, then whether the solution is interpretivist, liberal, socialist, or does not seem irrelevant; imminent extinction may necessitate drastic responses. This chapter is based on the assertion that society is at a point of bifurcation. One route points towards proceeding with present neoliberal market-based solutions to economic and accounting problems using

10 Critical accountability techniques such as ‘decision-usefulness’ and ‘neoliberal procedure’. However, an alternative approach is possible which posits an interpretivist solution developed via accountability based on social and moral obligations that then can go some way to rectifying justly the damage already exacted on the environment.

Aims and objectives Accordingly, we have lost our moral compass, we have lost sight of how contemporary ecological debates must be explored against the strongest accounts of liberal, libertarian, socialist, feminist, and deep ecological approaches to environmental politics. A viable interpretivist approach must illustrate how ecological-interpretivism compares with them, showing along the way how this approach can correct the weaknesses of these rival theories. Of course, there are no ultimate panaceas for solving the dilemmas between humanity and Nature but new approaches must be developed in civil society. Interpreters begin their analysis by explaining how our current accountability and social science practices have ignored, how we are related to and shaped by the world we live in. They emphasise feeling and perception as having a valid role in the experience of embodied agents making their way in the world. Taylor continues that political theory relies excessively on adapting a model of the natural sciences without full consideration of mind and world dualisms. It is for this reason that interpretation is referred to as an ‘anti-epistemology’. Taylor defines anti-epistemology by stating the problems with the dominant ideology: There is a big mistake operating in our culture, a (mis)understanding of what it is to know, which has had dire effects on both theory and practice in a host of domains. To sum it up in a pithy formula, we might say that we (mis)understand knowledge as ‘mediational’. In its original form, this emerged in the idea that we grasp external reality through internal representations. Descartes in one of his letters, declared himself ‘assure, que je ne puis avoir aucune connaissance de ce qui est hors de moi, que par l’entremise des idees que j’ai eu en moi’.2 When states of minds correctly and reliably represent what is out there, there is knowledge. (Taylor as quoted in Dreyfus (2004), ‘Taylor’s (Anti-) Epistemology’, p. 53) Taylor criticises Descartes’ mediational picture of the world and offers a different theory that the mind is in the world and not separate from it. He argues that Descartes’ picture was part of a scientific revolution that had a predilection for measurement, procedure, and technique. This framework has been applied to the humanities without fully addressing its applicability; more fundamentally, Taylor’s concern is that scientific approaches to

Key themes in accountability research 11 governance might not be the best means to order human differences and affairs. From this observation, interpreters argue that a scientific approach treats the natural environment as a simple commodity and submerges other ways to value the natural environment. The application of a technical method to the humanities can submerge an appreciation of the moral frameworks more applicable to human sciences. Taylor explains the dilemmas confronting humanity: For the two powerful aspirations – to expressive unity and to radical autonomy – have remained central to preoccupations of modern man; and hope to combine them cannot but recur in one form or another, be it in Marxism or integral to anarchism, technological Utopianism or the return to nature. The Romantic rebellion continues undiminished, returning ever in unpredictable new forms – Dadaism, Surrealism, the yearning of the ‘hippy’, the contemporary cult of unrepressed consciousness. With all this surrounding us we cannot avoid being referred back to the first great synthesis which was meant to resolve our central dilemma: which failed but which remains somehow unsurpassed. (Taylor, 1975, pp. 49–50) Humanity’s power of reason and rationality provide the human race with objectifying powers that transform the natural environment. Challenging the current dominant neoliberal agenda, the argument advocates for an expressivist language of accountability to address issues such as climate change, resource depletion, and how to govern the global commons (Taylor, 2008). The aim of the framework is to make it a moral endeavour beyond the constraints of a narrow economic focus, for the betterment of all democratic citizens in environmental and social crises (Fremaux, 2019). This book is about how modern communities are guided by ideologies and philosophies that shape how we think about many vexing issues such as whether to continue mining coal, how to handle never-ending fires in Australia, California, and the apocalyptic floods in the UK. Are they induced by climate change? Current approaches to accountability, environmental management, and sustainability imbue assumptions such as commodifying Nature as a reserve for consumption; that there are no values external to human representation; that unlimited economic growth is possible; and its reliance on perpetuating the neoliberal logic of markets.

Environmental dilemmas This section provides a simple interpretivist example to explore the various accountability and political interpretations that relate to the future of the Great Barrier Reef in Queensland, Australia. The reef is suffering, and some claim many fragile members of the ecosystem will cease their existence.

12 Critical accountability Eco-critics claim that climate change is responsible. They sound like environmental activists from the 1970s and their message should have been heeded. This of course is despite some calls for monkey-wrenching, treespiking, and other counter-growth actions. These strategies were, and still are, promoted by some green groups. Yet, another interpretation was offered when the Adani mine’s go-ahead was given support by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Queensland. The Chamber said the mine would be a big win for the state’s central and northern regions, particularly for Townsville where the project’s headquarter is expected to be located. Charters Towers and Moranbah have also been earmarked as service centres for the mines, while Bowen is expected to be the base for rail construction (Chang, nd). It’s about supporting our regions and not leaving them behind, creating new jobs and supporting our ‘youth’, CCIQ policy adviser Catherine Pham said. ‘Projects such as Adani is definitely a win for our regions, but all Queenslanders should see the positive economic impacts of the project once it kicks off’. Not everyone agrees. GetUp environmental justice campaign director Miriam Lyons said Adani was a reckless company that threatened people’s lives and livelihoods across Australia. Their track record reveals they put profits ahead of people, every time. If Adani wins, the reef, our water and people everywhere will lose, she said. (Chang, nd). On June 6,, 2019, the Department of Environment and Science officers approved Adani Mining’s latest groundwater-dependent environmental management plan after Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk last month forced Queensland authorities to set deadlines for the mine’s decisions. The Queensland government has approved the groundwater plan for Adani’s controversial Carmichael mine, clearing the company’s last significant environmental hurdle in the Galilee Basin. The proposed coal mine is the first of six-waiting approval to begin mining in Queensland’s Galilee Basin, described as Queensland’s last significant coal resources. The environmental lacuna is revealed by Senator Tony Windsor when he stated that Adani will need 12.5 billion litres of water for its mine. While in The Sydney Morning Herald, it was reported: But did you know that water impacts of large coal mines and coal seam gas fields have only been protected under federal law for five years? In 2013, an independent MP for New England, Tony Windsor, managed to get a ‘water trigger’ in federal law after farmers were worried about the water impacts of mines on the Liverpool Plains. So if you want to build one of the biggest new open-cut coal mines in the world, but you need a 61-kilometre pipeline that will pump 12.5 billion litres of water a year out of the Suttor River to water your coal stockpiles, what do you do? (Greenpeace, 2018, np).

Key themes in accountability research 13 Utilisation and over-dependence on coal is to essay a serious concern. It is argued that climate change is like ‘green swans or “climate black swans” – they may be rare events but challenge the conventional stasis. Climate change presents many features of typical black swans’, reported Jana Ranbow (2020). She analysed the report by BIS Deputy General Manager Luiz Pereira da Silva that: [T]raditional approaches to risk management consisting in extrapolating historical data and on assumptions of normal distributions are largely irrelevant to assess future climate-related risks. (Ranbow, 2020, np) The interpretivist framework is designed to shape thinking about these issues without resorting to tired old neoliberal procedures. The dominant economic and instrumental framework in Australia is reflected in the anthropocentric bias that we can control Nature. Qualitative distinctions about the constitution and value of environmental and moral goods have been dismissed as nonsense. Neoliberalism and other free-market reforms join with a form of reductive naturalism that holds that all human activity can be reduced to the laws of neoclassical economics. These laws in turn are said to allow us to control Nature. This present book opposes the reduction of human life to the laws of neoclassical economics and those other approaches which treat Nature as a simple commodity for consumption. This is because economic laws of neoclassical economics and neoliberalism preclude qualitative distinctions among moral goods. That is, they dismiss an appreciation of Nature’s intrinsic value and obfuscate the environmental and moral dilemmas that confront us.

Environmental sustainability and neoliberalism In liberal democracies, environmental issues have been entwined with principles of free-markets and neoliberalism. Moreover, issues of sustainability have recently begun to be framed within a business case to create environmental awareness. For example, modern social and environmental reform has followed a managerial and procedural path. Arguably, this approach perpetuates the idea that humanity can control and manage Nature (Hunt, 2020, p. 1). Yet, the Adani mine in Queensland was stymied for several years. The Labour Party of Queensland changed its stance and approved the mine. It was granted approval by the local state government when it feared for its political future. The environmental dimensions of the Adani mine have been lost within the self-regulatory structures recently developed for environmental management such as the modern corporation, integrated reporting, and the business case for environmental management. I use metaphysical

14 Critical accountability and political arguments to explore how Nature is a necessary condition of humanity’s being-in-the-world. A part of the metaphysical and interpretivist analysis calls for environmental thinking about whether value in the natural world exists. Appreciating the value in Nature has the potential to inspire commonalities broad enough for all political actors to contribute to political structures. The aim of the commonalities approach is to address the difficulties of modern party-political approaches. In recent work, Taylor has observed: I think we’re still crippled by many of our policies. We are crippled with the idea that there is such a thing as socialism, a totally coherent solution to all political problems, and that if you think differently you’re on the other side; either you’re going further into socialism or you’re betraying it. I think the way to conceive [of] our situation is that we are living through a set of extremely painful dilemmas, and are going to go on doing so. In other words, capitalism is, if you like, the source of a number of terrible dilemmas. We can’t live with it; we can’t live without it. We can’t live without it because it’s tied to certain kinds of growth and so on. (Taylor, 2008, p. 15) Addressing these dilemmas involves an ethics of ‘community’ which must address ‘new saliences’ and to learn how to see that the environmental and moral dilemmas have changed (Herman, 1996, p. 56). Obviously, ecological concerns have developed a new salience. Interpretivist politics is, in part, about recognising that no indubitable solutions are possible through ordinary time, but that compromises must be made. That is, once we outline not only the type of society we want to live in, and how our basic institutions support that viewpoint. Interestingly, many Australians used to support Adani because the coal was to support India’s development. But, in terms of Adani, the research underlying this book has revealed that India has loads of thorium and intends to develop a whole new series of thorium, rather than uranium, nuclear fission power plants. As Doherty (2009) observed: [T]here are Indian advances in nanotechnology that have already increased the efficiency of experimental solar cells to the 35-40 per cent range’. Now India is aiming for 60 per cent. (Doherty, 2009, np) Furthermore, the former president of India, Abdul Kalam talked about the tremendous importance of education at every level as we seek to counter climate change. Australia could be thought of as the biggest solar collector in the world. With its small, and relatively educated population, stable political system, and massive resources of metals, we could and should lead the world when it comes to developing and exploiting renewable energy. Sources such

Key themes in accountability research 15 as geothermal, wind, waves, and tides can become a hub for cheap, renewable energy. Focus on renewables will make it feasible to build refineries and new industries here. These alternative directions will need to be framed around a public sphere model where business is part of a technology that can be employed to develop new ideas. As Garnaut (2019, np) argued: [M]oving to cut emissions further would nurture the three great assets for Australian industrial leadership in the post carbon world economy: globally competitive renewable power; an abundance of biomass for the chemical manufacturing industries; and low cost biological and geological sequestration of carbon wastes. Obviously, accountability and new environmental policies and structures must be integrated into decision-making processes of modern liberal democracies.

Limiting neoliberalism in the Anthropocene The environmental and social effects of economic activity must be framed within the public sphere where business models focus on how stakeholder interactions secure or put at risk the viability and sustainability of all citizens and their communities. Over a period, relations with stakeholders (financial, physical, environmental, and regulatory) will change and may either promote the community’s viability or undermine or compromise its value proposition. In a democratic society, new technologies such as corporate social responsibility must explore how business could operate in a steady-state community, exploring the limits of the current system (Latouche, 2009, 2012). Taylor observes that ‘our present pattern of inequality [which] is made provisionally tolerable only by rapid growth’ (Taylor, 1978, p. 168). This leads to the view that sustainability theorists must work towards minimising the incompatibilities between economic growth and ecological sustainability. Some of the more difficult environmental solutions include: [A] population limit beyond which the supply of basic necessities, especially food, cannot be assured for larger numbers; a resources limit, where the supply of non-renewable resources is so reduced as first to make increasing consumption impossible and later to force us to do without altogether; a pollution limit, whereby the ecologically harmful side effects of production become a danger to life. (Taylor, 1978, p. 157) The book proposes that the role of accountability is to engage in the public sphere. This is to be achieved by narrating and reporting corporate impacts on Nature and communities while recognising that language ‘perpetuates the logic of that particular [economic] sphere’. The language of

16 Critical accountability environmental ethics challenges the logic of instrumental and market-based approaches. The importance of the interpretivist framework becomes apparent when thinking about the future of humanity. If climate change and global warming alter the planet, then the role of business and CSR3 must change with it. For accountability purposes, information must be provided about corporations broad stakeholder relations and how these are enhancing or degrading a reporting entities value proposition and sustainability. That is, to what extent are company stakeholder relations contributing to sustainability in terms of reducing carbon emissions generation and dependency. How do we secure financial viability in terms of liquidity, solvency, and sustainability and whether corporate concepts such as a going concern are now achievable? The business case has surrendered the mainstream political debate to neoliberalism and market relations. As a consequence, the system’s ability to help non-elites is diminished and many countries do not have the public resources in times of crisis. At time of writing, the coronavirus began its journey throughout the global commons, creating further challenges for human communities. While purporting to act in the interests of sustainability, much CSR research illustrates that business, corporate, and sustainability research requires further analysis and interpretation. Interpretivism, the common good and skilful coping rather than primarily profit, should direct business. No longer can we assume that models of sustainability and universal methodologies will solve our dilemmas. Humanity’s last line of defence might be critique and interpretation – especially given the absence of alternative visions and the failure to offer reforms to the corporate colonisation of business ethics, CSR and the sustainability agenda.

Notes 1 Hermeneutics, interpretivism, and evaluative pragmatism are used often interchangeably in the political philosophical literature to explore relationships between meaning and the philosophy of language (Lehman, 1995, 2002, 2010a, 2010b, 2015, 2017). Evaluative interpretivism is a form of pragmatism developed from Dewey (1925), James (1985), and Taylor (2007). For example, James (1916) presents a set of ideas which opens us to the meaning in Nature as does Charles Sanders Peirce (1958) in his famous book Nature (1958). 2 From the letter to Gibieuf, January 19, 1642, which comes from the mediational passage, ‘You inquire about the principle by which I claim to know that the idea I have of something is not an idea made inadequate by the abstraction of my intellect. I derive this knowledge purely from my own thought or consciousness. I am certain that I can have no knowledge of what is outside me except by means of the ideas I have within me; and so I take great care not to relate my judgements immediately to things in the world, and not to attribute to such things anything positive which I do not first perceive in the ideas of them: Descartes Philosophical Letters, trans. Anthony Kenny (Descartes, 1970, p. 123). 3 Corporate Social Reporting (CSR) which I argue incorporates Social and Environmental Accounting (SEA) and Social Environmental Accounting Research (SEAR). See Mokhtar, Jusoh, and Zulkifli (2016).

Key themes in accountability research 17

Bibliography Evir, M. & Rhodes, R. A. (2000). Theories and Methods, in Marsh, D. & Stoker, S. (Eds.), Political Science, London, McMillan. Chabrak, N., Haslam, J. & Oakes, H. (2019). What is Accounting? The “Being” and “Be-ings” of the Accounting Phenomenon and Its Critical Appreciation, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Volume 32, Number 5, pp. 1414–1436. Chang, C. (2020). Queensland Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk Gets Confronted in India over Adani Mine Plans, https://kractivist.org/adani-carmichael-coal-minethe-worst-mistake-australia-could-make/ (Accessed April 12, 2020). Descartes, R. (1970). Descartes Philosophical Letters, translated by A. Kenny, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Dewey, J. (1925). Experience and Nature, Southern Illinois University Press, Reproduced 1988. Doherty, P. (2009). We Cannot Go on Living like This, The Sydney Morning Herald, np. https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/we-cannot-go-on-livinglike-this-0090614-c7dx.html. Dreyfus, H. L. (2004). Taylor’s (Anti-)Epistemology, in Abbey, R. (Ed.), Charles Taylor, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Fremaux, A. (2019). After the Anthropocene, Springer International Publishing. Garnaut, R. (2019). Superpower: Australia’s Low-Carbon Opportunity, Black Inc. Greenpeace (2018). Adani, Coal, and the Queensland Water Heist, June 22, 2018, https://www.greenpeace.org.au/blog/adani-coal-and-the-great-queensland-waterheist/. Hegel, G. W. F. (1970). Philosophy of Nature, edited and translated by A. V. Miller (Foreword by J. N. Findlay), Oxford, Clarendon Press. Heidegger, M. (1971). The Thing, in Hofstader, A. (trans.), Poetry, Language, Thought, New York, NY, Harper and Rowe. Herman, B. (1996). Making Room for Character, in Engstrom, S. & Whiting, J. (Eds.), Aristotle, Kant and the Stoic: Rethinking Happiness and Duty, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Hunt, P. (2020). Cubbies Water Grab, The Weekly Times, March 4, 2020, p. 1. James, W. (1916). The Varieties of Religious Experience, New York: Longmans, Green. James, W. (1985). The Varieties of Religious Experience (Vol. 15), Harvard University Press. Latouche, S. (2009). Farewell to Growth, Cambridge, MA, Polity. Latouche, S. (2012). Degrowth, Whether You Like It or Not. Blog, retrieved from Https://Degrowth.Org/2012/02/02/Degrowth-Whether-You-Like-It-Or-Not/. Lehman, G. (1995). A Legitimate Concern with Environmental Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 6, Number 5, pp. 393–413. Lehman, G. (2002). Globalisation and the Authentic Self: Cosmopolitanism and Charles Taylor’s Communitarianism, Global Society, Volume 16, Number 4, pp. 419–437. Lehman, G. (2004). Social and Environmental Accounting: Trends and Thoughts for the Future, Accounting Forum, Volume 28, Number 1, pp. 1–5. Lehman, G. (2010a). Interpretive Accounting Research, Accounting Forum, Volume 34, Number 3–4, pp. 231–235.

18 Critical accountability Lehman, G. (2010b). Perspectives on Accounting, Commonalities & the Public Sphere, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 21, Number 8, pp. 724–738. Lehman, G. (2013). Critical Reflections on Laughlin’s Middle Range Research Approach: Language not Mysterious?, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 24, Number 3, pp. 211–224. Lehman, G. (2015). Charles Taylor’s Ecological Conversations, London, PalgraveMacmillan. Lehman, G. (2017). The Language of Environmental and Social Accounting Research: The Expression of Beauty and Truth, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 44, pp. 30–41. 10.1016/j.cpa.2016.11.005. MacIntyre, A. (1981). After Virtue (1st ed.), Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press. Meadows, D. H., Meadows, D. L., Randers, J. & Behrens, W. W. (1972). The Limits to Growth, New York, NY, Universe Books. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). The Primacy of Perception And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History, and Politics, Evanston, Ill, Northwestern University Press. Merleau-Ponty, M. (2013). Phenomenology of Perception, London, Routledge. Mokhtar, N., Jusoh, R. & Zulkifli, N. (2016). Corporate Characteristics and Environmental Management Accounting (EMA) Implementation: Evidence from Malaysian Public Listed Companies (PLCs), Journal of Cleaner Production, Volume 136, Part A, 111–122. Morioka, S. N. & de Carvalho, M. M. (2016). A Systematic Literature Review Towards a Conceptual Framework for Integrating Sustainability Performance into Business, Journal of Cleaner Production, Volume 136, pp. 134–146. Peirce, C. S. (1958). Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 8 vols. Edited by Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1931–1958; vols. 1–6 edited by Charles Harteshorne and Paul Weiss, 1931–1935; vols. 7–8 edited by Arthur W. Burks, 1958). Ranbow, J. (2020). Green Swan’ Climate Event Could Trigger Global Financial Crisis, BIS Warns, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-20/-greenswan-event-could-trigger-global-crisis-bis-warns. Rousseau, J.-J. (1762). The Social Contract of Principles of Political Right, translated by G. D. H. Cole, Public Domain. Rousseau, J.-J. (1994). Discourse on Political Economy and the Social Contract, translated by C. Betts, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Scranton, R. (2015). Learning to Die in the Anthropocene: Reflections on the End of a Civilization, San Francisco, CA, City Lights Publishers. Taylor, C. (1957). Marxism and Humanism, New Reasoner, Volume 2, Number Autumn, pp. 92–98. Taylor, C. (1960a). What’s Wrong with Capitalism? New Left Review, Volume 2, Number March/April, pp. 5–11. Taylor, C. (1960b). Changes of Quality, New Left Review, Volume 4, Number July/ August, pp. 3–5. Taylor, C. (1966). Marxism and Empiricism, in Williams, B. & Montefiore, A. (Eds.), British Analytic Philosophy, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Key themes in accountability research 19 Taylor, C. (1969a). Responsibility for Self, in Rorty, A. O. (Ed.), The Identities of Persons, California, University of California Press (pp. 281–301). Taylor, C. (1969b). Two Issues about Materialism, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 19, Number 74, pp. 73–79. Taylor, C. (1971a). The Agony of Economic Man, in LaPierre, L. (Ed.), Essays on the Left, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart (pp. 221–235). Taylor, C. (1971b). Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, The Review of Metaphysics, Volume 25, Number 1, pp. 3–51. Taylor, C. (1974). Socialism and Weltanschauung, in Kolakowski, L. & Hampshire, S. (Eds.), The Socialist Idea: A Reappraisal, New York, Basic Books. Taylor, C. (1975). Hegel, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. (1976). Responsibility for Self, in Rorty, E. O. (Ed.), The Identities of Persons, Berkley & California, CA, University of California Press (pp. 281–301). Taylor, C. (1977). What is Human Agency, in Mischel, T. (Ed.), The Self: Psychological and Philosophical Issues, Oxford, Oxford University Press (pp. 103–135). Taylor, C. (1978). Politics of the Steady State, New Universities Quarterly, Volume 32, Number 2, pp. 157–184. Taylor, C. (2007). A Secular Age, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. (2008). Interviewed by Ben Rogers, Prospect Magazine (February 29, 2008; Number 143, 15). Taylor, C. (2016). The Language Animal, Oxford, Blackwell. Taylor, C. (2017a). Is Democracy Slipping Away, https://items.ssrc.org/democracypapers/is-democracy-slipping-away/. Taylor, C. (2017b). Converging Roads Around Dilemmas of Modernity,, InLowney, C. W. II (Ed.), Charles Taylor, Michael Polanyi and the Critique of Modernity: Pluralist and Emergentist Directions, London, Palgrave Macmillan (pp. 15–26). Taylor, C. (2017c). Dialogue, Discovery, and an Open Future, in Lowney, C. W. II (Ed.), Charles Taylor, Michael Polanyi and the Critique of Modernity: Pluralist and Emergentist Directions, London, Palgrave Macmillan (pp. 27–49). Zuckert, M. (2016). Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, in Levy, J. T. (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Classics in Contemporary Political Theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198717133.013.13.

2

The art of interpretation and Nature1

Key perspectives – modernity’s baggage The preceding chapter considered criticisms of classical rights-based liberalism and market approaches and their implications for the environment. I must now devote a lengthy part of the book to a discussion of the ideas of Charles Taylor because he does not fall into either category. Taylor (1989d), of course, is a trenchant critic of market-based approaches and utilitarianism.2 Despite the affirmations of some of his admirers, however, his starting point is not simply community but intuition. Intuition, it will be remembered, may also be an important element in interpretivist accountability. Taylor, however, is certainly not a proceduralist. Taylor started his political journey with a concern for behaviour in psychology and decision-making in ethics, and eventually explained important environmental and theistic values in A Secular Age (2007a). His interpretivism and analysis of secularism challenges the political theory behind rights-based and market-based liberalism. He questions why these liberal environmental and sustainability approaches gradually bracketed off the metaphysical from the political.3 However, or in Taylor’s terms moving away from advocacy to deep ecology and theism, he left the way open for ontological thinking which supplements his work. More generally, he moved in an interpretivist direction. Does he bridge the liberal-interpretivist divide? (Taylor, 1989d, pp. 159–182). Some scholars have argued that such a bridge is vital in the face of a changing world. The ethics of political ‘character’ must address ‘new saliences’, to learn ‘how to see that the moral facts have changed’ (Herman, 1996, p. 51). Obviously, ecological concerns have developed a new salience. The book explores environmental challenges to the view that Nature is there simply to be consumed. The argument doubts whether humanity is capable of mastering the natural environment which is far more intractable than most liberal assumptions allow.4 Far from mastering Nature, we may perhaps never fully understand it but at least interpretivist proposals for informed discussion might highlight what we do know about Nature’s processes. Arguably, communities will need to explore limits to growth and the

The art of interpretation and Nature 21 possible shape of steady-state communities (Latouche, 2009; Taylor, 1978a, pp. 157–184; Zuckert, 2016). The argument concurs with ecologists, deep and shallow, though I prefer to concentrate more on developing ways to think about how to organise modern communities so that citizens are aware of the decisions being made on their behalf. Therefore, democratic and non-imperialistic discourses must recognise the cultural and environmental values of significance that have shaped modern accountability criteria. This is to be achieved through the art of interpretation which is associated with Weber’s notion of an ideal type, Taylor’s work on philosophical expressivism, and the view that Nature contains meaning and value.

The art of interpretation and modern politics This leads to the view that interpretivism is not simply a vague critique of contemporary capitalism. Rather, interpretation is about the ideas we use to explore our place in the world – the frameworks we use to explore that world. Interpretivism helps develop our appreciation of the natural world by combining ideas of relevance that emanate from sources such as conservativism, deism, environmentalism, liberalism, socialism, and theism. For example, the interpretivism developed in this book uses deep ecological notions that Nature contains meaning and combines them with a critical perspective on processes of corporate colonisation and globalisation. It echoes early environmentalists, such as David Attenborough, Paul Erhlich, and Rachel Carson, who offered challenging interpretations about humanity’s impact on Nature. Humanity believed it could control Nature argued Carson. She is famous for showing how DDT caused many unforeseen side-effects on humans. Both Erhlich and Carson drew attention to connections between ecosystems, institutions, and human communities. Issues of water resource, population, and the value of Nature were examined. The earth was likened to a spaceship. Interpretation is useful in remembering the importance of Nature. Drawing on forgotten environmental concepts, new ideas, and trajectories can be developed for our communities and their public spheres.5 Supporters of Taylor like to consider interpretation as about thinking about contradictory concepts and dilemmas. Taylor explains: A successful interpretation is one which makes clear the meaning originally present in a confused, fragmentary, cloudy form. But how does one know that this interpretation is correct? Presumably because it makes sense of the original text: what is strange, mystifying, puzzling, contradictory is no longer so, is accounted for. The interpretation appeals throughout to our understanding of the ‘language’ of expression, which understanding allows us to see that this expression is

22 Critical accountability puzzling, that it is in contradiction to that other, etc., and that these difficulties are cleared up when the meaning is expressed in a new way. (Taylor, 1971b, p. 5) One feature of Taylor’s solution is to understand that it is through frameworks that we view the world. Interpretivist frameworks act as a lens allowing us to perceive the world which reflect qualitative distinctions about the constitution and the value of moral goods that are intrinsic to human existence. The interpretivist challenges the hegemony of the scientific and naturalist understanding of human life. Taylor begins by considering how a reductive naturalist holds that all human activity (and hence all human values) can be reduced to a particular scientific approach to the laws of Nature. Taylor opposes the reduction of human life to a certain form of procedural science that closes humanity to values in the cosmos. This is because such procedural scientific approaches preclude qualitative distinctions among moral goods that reflect how we perceive what Nature is. In response to reductive naturalism, Taylor first notes the ad hominem argument that those who promote some form of reductive naturalism ‘nonetheless make, and cannot avoid but to make, qualitative distinctions as to the goods by which they live their lives’ (Taylor, 1993a; Zuckert, 2016). Interpretivism therefore involves an account of the person focusing on self-interpretations and the best account of that form of life. It is not a way of thinking that offers market-based points of equilibrium but involves our full engagement in the world. The world cannot be understood with absolute and indubitable certainty and new approaches are needed (Baynes, 1997). Taylor responds to this objection by discussing identity. The best account framework is not simply an ad hominem argument that the reductive naturalist cannot avoid making qualitative distinctions among moral goods (Taylor, 1993c; Zuckert, 2016). Rather, the qualitative distinctions that the reductive naturalist, or any other theorist, makes are constitutive of that person’s identity: an identity that involves one’s understandings of self as a person within a particular family, religion, profession, and nation (Taylor, 1993c; Zuckert, 2016). Taylor argues that the qualitative distinctions we make are intrinsic to the way we conduct our lives; they constitute an orientation towards the good and world. To provide the best account of human life, the identity that orients each of us towards particular kinds of activity and social understandings must be given an account. Such an orientation is irreducible to any set of laws of Nature that does not account for the qualitative distinctions in moral goods. These are the values that particular individual or particular cultural community subscribe to; furthermore, they reflect distinctions in differing cultural communities at differing times place differing values upon differing social intuitions. Taylor has argued:

The art of interpretation and Nature 23 On this model – to offer here at any rate a first approximation – practical arguments start off on the basis that my opponent already shares at least some of the fundamental dispositions toward good and right which guide me. The error comes from confusion, unclarity, or an unwillingness to face some of what he cannot lucidly repudiate; and reasoning aims to show up this error. (Taylor, 1993e, pp. 208–209) Through practical reasoning, unity and diversity must be balanced in hermeneutic fashion, itself reflecting Taylor’s total dissatisfaction with the alleged neutrality of liberalism, naturalism, and postmodern attempts at continual deconstruction (see also Gadamer, 1975a). Zuckert (2016) notes that Taylor recognises a more sophisticated form of naturalism. He refers to it as projectionist naturalism and is associated with the work of Simon Blackburn. The latter recognises the irreducibility of human identity to laws of Nature. However, people orient to the world within moral frameworks that guide their action. Moreover, the projectionist will argue, such orientations are a subjective focus upon a value-neutral universe. The projectionist claim can be highlighted by two cultural approaches to utilising Nature: one moral claim is that Nature is for human convenience and must be utilised which conflicts with the environmental view that Nature must be preserved. In such a case, a moral axis (the survival of humans) can be understood within very different frameworks. And yet, the projectionist will argue, there is no resolution to the conflict because there are no universal criteria for resolving the subjective beliefs of different cultural communities. There are no universal criteria because qualitative distinctions of goods cannot be measured against a value-neutral universe. Taylor thinks the projectionist thesis is more coherent than the reductionist thesis. However, he followed the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein by noting that humans occupy a form of life. Within a form of life, there are projectable properties that are intrinsic to that form of life. Following Zuckert (2016, np): Just as colours such as ‘red’ or shapes such as ‘square’ pick out properties of the world we react and engage with, so virtue terms such as ‘courage’ or ‘generosity’ pick out essential properties of our form of life. (Taylor, 2003) Our best account of the human form of life must determine ‘the properties and entities that are “real, objective or part of the furniture of things”’ (Zuckert, 2016, np). Of course, understanding moral values as intrinsic to the human form of life does not ‘bestow a singular, correct valuation to a particular cultural community or attribute a particular moral framework with universal truth status.’ However, in a universe where humans exist, there must be a human form of life (Zuckert, 2016, np).

24 Critical accountability Of course, one might argue that considerations of randomness and indeterminacy might render us powerless against Nature. Conversely, there is sufficient literature on ‘structured chaos’ for us to fashion ways of responding to it, perhaps in a modern equivalent of the old republican manner of handling Fortuna (Harrington, 1991, pp. 23–24, 54–56, 61–64). A useful concept for accountability researchers is the notion of fortuna, which was to be handled through republican virtue (virtu) and offers a means to escape the restrictions of procedural rationality. The implication is that naturalist and procedural approaches to accountability are based on the Enlightenment assumption that humanity can control the world, but recent environmental impacts suggest otherwise. The attempt to move beyond stable and universal models of politics allows us to create a common ground whereby the community works to create accountability responses to how we are to relate with the natural environment. These responses involve a ‘best account’ of our relationships with Nature based on the most up-todate interpretivist and scientific knowledge. At the very least, such considerations challenge modern accountability and political theory to reconsider what Nature means. In searching for a common ground to accommodate difference, diversity, and the environment, an interpretivist stance towards the natural environment offers the most promising strategy. Here, theorists such as Habermas, Sandel, and Taylor refer us to a dialogic conception of politics which is built on a broad and disclosing theory of language which might allow us to fashion new political responses to the natural environment (for a contrary view, see Rorty, 2000, pp. 23–26). For example, interpretivism has been subject to trenchant attacks by postmodern theorists in that it allegedly imposes their interpretation of the good on people (Avnon & de-Shalit, 1999; Connolly, 1991, 2017; Cooper & Morgan, 2013; Roberts, 1991, 2009). It will be demonstrated that postmodernism is denounced for a performative contradiction in making the universal statement that no universal truth claims exist (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2019; Habermas, 1993, p. 60). The distinction between the local, partial, and fragmentary as against the universal, representative, and harmonious, moreover, can only ‘be such if they are outside an awareness of their position as postmodern discourses’ (Stoekel, 1997, p. 37). At a practical level, some claim, postmodernism offers us few political alternatives save resistance to domination (Taylor, 2000, pp. 115–134). But who is to say what are good values? This postmodern response, however, misses the supposition that the politics of the common good takes seriously people’s difference in the endeavour to find that political space where commonality exists alongside difference.

Interpretivism and Nature Interpretivism iss a way of thinking that explores humanity’s being in the world. It can be thought of as an attempt to unravel the mysteries of

The art of interpretation and Nature 25 life – how should we treat Nature for example? For some deep environmentalists, humanity has created an Anthropocene. Traditional social structures have been replaced with economic-based approaches. Taylor has put the dilemma in the following way: To sum it up in a pithy formula, we might say that we (mis)understand knowledge as ‘mediational’. Accordingly, when states of minds correctly and reliably represent what is out there, there is knowledge. (The comment is from Dreyfus’s 2004, p. 60, interview with Taylor.) To repeat, Taylor is pointing out that modern culture focuses on how knowledge emerges from states of minds. Knowledge is mind dependent. An extreme interpretation of such a view would suggest that there is no knowledge outside of the mind. Of course, that is not what Taylor means but he does mean that we have overly focused on human thinking about what is valuable. Is there value in Nature? If that were so, then new thought processes are needed to access such value. Bridging the gap between extreme free-market approaches (referred to as Radical Individual Autonomy) and expressivism (reflecting the view that Nature contains meaning) is needed. This involves exploring how the radical separation between free-markets and expressivism has created a disenchanted world. This separation is based on a conception of engaged knowledge where value resides in human thinking minds, and the natural environment contains no meaning and is imbued with no moral significance. This social imaginary of the thinking mind reflects a reliance on causation, economic logic, and the scientific method. Arguably, issues associated with empathy and interpretation are dismissed as nonsense. If we act as if the world has intrinsic value, we can still work in the meantime on ways as to how we may better understand and access the fullness of that value. However, if we act as if the world does not have intrinsic value, it does not matter what we do, and Nature remains merely a resource to be consumed. If that occurs and we are wrong, then we have the potential to destroy our surroundings before we have come to realise the means through which we can truly value them.

Frameworks and methods – the ideal type The various components of my interpretivist argument are built around what is known as an ‘ideal type’. The concept of an ideal type stems from the work of Weber (1905) who argued that it is a mental image or conception of reality. The term type means a kind, class, or group as distinguished by a character. Weber was particularly concerned with the problem of objectivity in social sciences. This book explores how objectivity is more than the application of the scientific method to accountability and environmental issues.

26 Critical accountability Hence, ideal types are designed to reflect reality. The approach scrutinises, classifies, systematises, and defines social reality without subjective bias. At this level of analysis, the ideal types are not designed to engage with moral theory. They function as a research tool for classification and comparison. Just as an ideal model is constructed by natural scientists as an instrument and mechanism for knowing Nature; the interpreter creates ideal types as a tool for systematising and comprehending individual facts, against which the interpreter can measure reality. In this sense, interpretivism shares with Weber the construction of a series of ideal types to compare various perspectives. Through the medium of ideal type, the chapter derives structures for comparative accountability research. This is so because engagement ethically and politically with others requires recognition of people’s deep set of commitments. That is, interlocutors must understand such commitments in action as exploratory and somewhat uncertain, at least initially, in terms of what they mean in new inter-subjective contexts. The pragmatism of Habermas and Taylor has much to recommend it and is a welcome relief to those who are tired of the philosophical exercise of pushing a position to its extreme to demonstrate how problematic its outcomes are (Taylor, 2004a). Thus, interpretivists such as Sandel and Taylor emphasise the meaning within not only intersubjective engagement but also with the external and natural world. That is, accountability must engage democratic structures even in the face of nationalistic policies such as those promoted by China and North Korea. Nevertheless, metaphors such as ‘space-ship earth’ are advanced to ‘think global/act local’ or to respect Nature’s intrinsic value when we consider the type of community in which we want to live. Thinking about how we live and act in the world involves many things, not the least is an awareness of the processes of global capitalism. Accountability must explore how humans are endowed with a moral sense, ‘an intuitive feeling of right and wrong’. The original point of moral thinking is to combat a rival view that knowing right and wrong was a matter of calculating consequences, in particular those concerned with divine reward and punishment. Thus, understanding right and wrong is not a matter of dry calculation, but is anchored in our feelings. Morality has, in a sense, a voice within us. Next, Iris Marion Young’s (1990) stopping points ideal are discussed in the light of interpretivism.

Frameworks and methods – the ideal type and stopping points The work of Young is useful for interpretivism in that she attempts to balance different political proposals without pushing any theory to a logical extreme (Young, 1990). This component of interpretivism can be called ‘stopping points’. The feminist scholar Linda Nicholson insists: ... that theorising needs some stopping points and that for feminists an important theoretical stopping point is gender. To invoke the ideal of

The art of interpretation and Nature 27 endless difference is for feminism either to self-destruct or to finally accept an ontology of abstract individualism. (Young, 1990, p. 8) A theory, therefore, should not be extended to the point where its recommendations become contradictory and illogical. For example, liberalism could develop the fiction of abstract individualism to the ludicrous point of seeing the self as completely independent from the community and Nature. Marxism could be extended to totalitarianism. Similarly, extreme environmental proposals, such as those proposed by some Deep Ecologists, could be used to justify authoritarian social structures in the name of protecting the ecosystem (Norton, 1995). But they need not be so extended (Preston, 2000, pp. 227–241). Stopping points are essential to interpretivism and Taylor’s work is most definitely cognisant of these dilemmas.

Interpretivism – basic terms and ideas Furthermore, interpretivism emphasises understanding the human factor in its environmental and social contexts. Central to an interpretivist conception of accountability involves critically analysing instrumental means-end approaches – for example, interpretivism is about exploring neoliberalism and other ideologies in their social and environmental contexts. Instrumental methodologies fail to fill the ‘silence’ surrounding what we report to relevant user groups. Willmott (2008) provides another definition of interpretivism: Let me state my take on the identity of IAR (Interpretivist Accounting Research). I start from the assumption that IAR lacks an essential identity; and, relatedly, that (necessary) efforts to provide it with such an identity are problematical and ultimately elusive (impossible). What does this lack mean or imply? I do not mean that when one examines what passes for IAR, it is found to lack some of the characteristics which have been authoritatively associated with, or attributed to, it. (Willmott, 2008).6 Willmott points out that he is not arguing that the criteria used to identify interpretivist accounting and accountability research (IAR) ‘clearly differentiate it from mainstream research’. Rather, Willmott argues that ‘any boundary drawn between mainstream and interpretive is arbitrary shifting and dogged by the paradoxes of othering’. Willmott (2008) argues that interpretivism may not have an essential identity and likens it to an empty signifier which is open and drained of particularity. He continues that the empty signifier may render it having numerous, and to a degree competing, meanings, none of which are able to grasp or fix what neoliberal research aspires to define, represent, or fill.

28 Critical accountability Roslender (2013) takes a slightly different approach and argues that IAR is about making clear the various assumptions on which different neoliberal approaches are constructed. He refers us to Colville’s (1981) Accounting, Organizations and Society chapter which critiques behavioural neoliberalism and advocates an ‘action approach’. Colville (1981) also rejects the natural science model in favour of his action approach which involves a sensitive analysis of issues such as the impact of neoliberal reforms. The researcher is assumed to be expert in their ability to choose the appropriate sociological approach which will shed light on the problematic scenario under consideration. Roslender (2013) identifies how accountability researchers might utilise the broad-church concept of interpretivism. This is to incorporate new social science approaches that offer non-reductive explanations of reality. From broader social science, these evaluative approaches include symbolic interactionism, grounded theory, and social constructivism. Roslender (2013) argues that to understand complexity, a raft of approaches must be adopted. This places the interpretivist researcher as mandala of reality; for example, symbolic interactionism is often used to explore the language and symbols that people use in their everyday lives. Roslender (2013) argues that interpreting particular social interactions leads to an appreciation of the intricate relationships that exist in particular, neoliberal, organisational, and social contexts. He aligns symbolic interactionism with grounded theory: this is an approach that begins with the researcher entering a field of action. The researcher has no preconceived theory or strategy to understand the problematic situation. The researcher then begins with a research question and then builds up a picture through observation, discussion, and collection of various qualitative data. As more data are collected and as data are reviewed, codes can then be grouped into concepts and then into categories. These categories may become the basis for new theory. Although Roslender (2013) suggests that this approach is really a form of evaluative interpretivism.

Accounting and interpretivism The approach of Lehman (2004, 2010, 2017) as well as the sociological approach of Gadamer (1975a, 1975b, 1987) and Taylor (2007a, 2017a, 2017d) shares affinities with the interpretivist approach of Willmott (2008). That is, interpretivism is about building richer narratives and stories such as the impact of neoliberalism on society. Willmott (2008) has provided a useful list of interpretivist approaches and the accountants who advocate them. The sheer number of interpretivist studies reveals another feature of interpretation which is a maze-like approach to understanding the world. Willmott (2008, p. 921) notes that interpretivism can be useful for (a) understanding the everyday practice of neoliberalism – such as target setting, performance evaluation, etc. (Granlund, 2001); (b) contributing to

The art of interpretation and Nature 29 conventional and mainstream problems of neoliberalism by providing its distinctive insights (Hansen, 2010); (c) illuminating the fundamental, systematic mismatches between espoused theories and theories-in-use (Mikes, 2007); (d) developing answers on how to do things and carry on (Quattrone, 2006); (e) advancing interventionist and activist research (Khalifa et al., 2007); (f) offering a different way of reporting whose cornerstone is showing the impossibility of giving an objective account of financial transactions (Quattrone, 2006); (g) providing materials for building interpretivist theories (Granlund, 2001); (h) considering the implications of neoliberal practices in relations of ruling and in the (re)production of social, economic, and cultural differences and inequalities (Mennicken, 2008).

Conclusion Interpretivism is a philosophy that maintains that societies cannot be understood in isolation from the members who comprise that society. To attempt to get an understanding of the relationship between people and the natural environment, this interpretivist understanding is developed through a critique of liberal individualism and postmodernism. It utilises a philosophy of language approach that puts humanity in touch with external values such as those found in the cosmos, Nature or the other. Interpretivists offer new ways to think about what Nature is; they explore the metaphysics of the natural environment; what it may mean for humanity. Neoliberalism and postmodern ideologies do not theorise sufficiently humanity’s presence in Nature and do not address fully the impact which industrialisation and corporatisation have on the environment. Furthermore, as later chapters will illustrate, they differ from other deep and social ecologists in their insistence on the intrinsic value of the environment. This is despite the fact that they have also been accused of being more mystical. Although the interpretivist position has itself been subject to many and various critiques, not least of which has been that it is selfcontradictory and politically vacuous. In later chapters, various responses to these critiques of interpretivism will be developed. It will be shown that an eco-centric focus on interpretivism is different to that criticised by interpretivist critics, thereby allows us to address the moral and environmental dilemmas confronting us.

Notes 1 Early sections of this chapter were produced in Lehman (2017). Earlier arguments are to be found in Lehman (2002, 2010a, 2010b). 2 Rawls’ (1971) Theory of Justice expressed dissatisfaction with the tendency in modern political theory to rely on utilitarian political ideas. Rawls, in the tradition of the New Deal, clearly feels that utilitarianism neglected the poor and needy (Rawls, 1980, 1985).

30 Critical accountability 3 In the spirit of Larmore’s (1997) observation that the unmasking of liberal neutrality by illiberal thinkers such as MacIntyre (1981) and Sandel (1998) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice calls for a recasting of liberal theory political liberalism attempts to respond to these concerns and explore how liberalism can be a political doctrine rather than a philosophy of human Nature. Rawls states that political liberalism is committed to toleration and he promises to apply ‘the principle of toleration to philosophy itself’ (Rawls, 1993, p. 10). Both Larmore and Rawls recognise the importance of culture and identity, and argue that political liberalism is strictly political in the way it respects the diversity of different cultural, social, and political ways of being. 4 For example, Kant’s categorical imperative binds all rational actors who utilise this faculty of instrumental conception of practical reasoning through time and space. According to Taylor (1994c), liberalism relies on technical reasoning but this modern way of thinking about politics misses another way to think about the good which frames how Nature is defined. 5 There has been a special issue of Critical Perspectives on Accounting concerning this topic but the focus was on the theory of interpretation as opposed to the evaluative dimensions within the hermeneutic approach. The latter aims to disclose new visions for human communities. In this sense, interpretivism contains a teleological dimension concerning what is a good society. For present purposes, this involves the type of information and thinking that challenges the problematics within contemporary managerialism and positivism (Ahrens et al., 2009; Lehman, 2000, 2002, 2010a, 2015). 6 For example, Baxter and Chua (2003), Chua (1986, 1988), Morgan and Willmott (1993), and Willmott (2008, p. 921).

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34 Critical accountability Taylor, C. (1971a). The Agony of Economic Man, in LaPierre, L. (Ed.), Essays on the Left, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart (pp. 221–235). Taylor, C. (1971b). Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, The Review of Metaphysics, Volume 25, Number 1, pp. 3–51. Taylor, C. (1978a). Politics of the Steady State, New Universities Quarterly, Volume 32, Number 2, pp. 157–184. Taylor, C. (1978b). Hegel’s Sittlichkeit and the Crisis of Representative Institutions, in Yovel, Y. (Ed.), Philosophy and the History of Action, Jerusalem, The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University (pp. 133–154). Taylor, C. (1989a). Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom: A Reply, Political Studies, Volume 37, Number 2, pp. 277–281. Taylor, C. (1989b). The Diversity of Goods, in Clarke, S. G. & Simpson, E. (Eds.), Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism, Albany, NY, State University of New York (pp. 223–240). Taylor, C. (1989c). Cross-purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate, in Rosenblum, N. (ed.), Liberalism and the Moral Life, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, (pp. 159–182). Taylor, C. (1989d). Sources of the Self, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. (1990). Modes of Civil Society, Public Culture, Volume 3, Number 1, pp. 95–118. Taylor, C. (1993a). To Follow a Rule ..., in Calhoun, C., LiPuma, E. & Postone, M. (Eds.), Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives, Cambridge, Polity Press (pp. 35–45). Taylor, C. (1993b). Shared and Divergent Values, in Laforest, G. (Ed.), Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism, Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press (pp. 155–187). Taylor, C. (1993c). Reconciling the Solitudes, edited by G. Laforest, McGill, Queens University Press. Taylor, C. (1993d). Embodied Engaged Agency and background to Heidegger, in Guignon, C. (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (pp. 317–337). Taylor, C. (1993e). Explanation and Practical Reason, in Nussbaum, M. & Sen, A. (Eds.), The Quality of Life, Oxford, Clarendon Press (pp. 208–232). Taylor, C. (1994a). Precis of Sources of the Self, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 54, Number 1, pp. 185–186. Taylor, C. (1994b). Response to my Critics, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 54, Number 1, pp. 203–212. Taylor, C. (1994c). Can Liberalism Be Communitarian?, Critical Review, Volume 8, Number 2, pp. 257–263. Taylor, C. (1994d). Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition: Examining the Politics of Recognition, edited by A. Gutmann, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press (expanded edition of Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, 1992). Taylor, C. (2000). What’s Wrong with Foundationalism?: Knowledge, Agency and World, in Wrathall, M. A. & Malpas, J. (Eds), Heidegger, Coping and Cognitive Science, Massachusetts, University of Massachusetts Press, pp. 115–134. Taylor, C. (2003). Heidegger, Language, Ecology, in Dreyfus, H. L. & Wrathall, M. (Eds), Companion to Heidegger, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing.

The art of interpretation and Nature 35 Taylor, C. (2004a). What is Pragmatism? in Pragmatism, Critique, Judgement: Essays for Richard J Bernstein, edited by S. Benhabib & N. Fraser, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts (pp. 73–92). Taylor, C. (2004b). Modern Social Imaginaries, Durham & London, Duke University Press. Taylor, C. (2007a). A Secular Age, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. (2007b). What is Secularity? in Vanhoozer, K. & Warner, M. (Eds), Transcending Boundaries in Philosophy and Theology: Reason, Meaning, and Experience, Aldershot, Ashgate (pp. 97–130). Taylor, C. (2007c). On Social Imaginaries, in Gratton, P. & Manoussakis, J. P. (Eds.), Traversing the Imaginary: Richard Kearney and the Postmodern Challenge, Evanston, Northwestern University Press. Taylor, C. (2007d). The Sting of Death: Why We Yearn for Eternity, Commonweal, Volume 134, Number 17, pp. 13–16, http://www.commonwealmagazine.org/ article.php3?id_article=2022. Taylor, C. (2007e). Cultures of Democracy and Citizen Efficacy, Public Culture, Volume 19, Number 1 (Winter 2007), pp. 117–150. Taylor, C. (2017a). Is Democracy Slipping Away, https://items.ssrc.org/democracypapers/is-democracy-slipping-away/. Taylor, C. (2017b). Converging Roads Around Dilemmas of Modernity, in Lowney, C. W. II (Ed.), Charles Taylor, Michael Polanyi and the Critique of Modernity: Pluralist and Emergentist Directions, London, Palgrave Macmillan (pp. 15–26). Taylor, C. (2017c). Dialogue, Discovery, and an Open Future, in Lowney, C. W. II (Ed.), Charles Taylor, Michael Polanyi and the Critique of Modernity: Pluralist and Emergentist Directions, Palgrave Macmillan, London (pp. 27–49). Taylor, C. (2017d). The Importance of Engagement, in Lowney, C. W. II (Ed.), Charles Taylor, Michael Polanyi and the Critique of Modernity: Pluralist and Emergentist Directions, London, Palgrave Macmillan (pp. 215–234). Weber M. (1905). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: With Other Writings on the Rise of the West, London, Routledge. Published by Routledge 2002. Willmott, H. (2008). Listening, Interpreting, Commending: A Commentary on the Future of Interpretive Accounting Research, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 19, Number 6, pp. 920–925. Young, I. M. (1990). Justice and the Politics of Difference, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. Zuckert, M. (2016). Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, in Levy, J. T. (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Classics in Contemporary Political Theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198717133.013.13.

3

Markets, the business case, and interpretivism

Introduction The preceding chapter considered features of interpretivism including Weber’s notion of an ideal type and postmodern feminist concepts of stopping points. I must now devote a lengthy part of the book to marketbased and business case approaches to environmental accountability. Here, Taylor’s (1985g) work is relevant because in his essay, ‘Alternative Futures: Legitimation, Identity, and Alienation in Late Twentieth-Century Canada’, he explored the limitations of free-market reforms. These reforms have taken shape through neoliberalism and other procedural approaches. In the 20th century, there has been a resurgence of 19th century ideas associated with laissez-faire economic liberalism and free-market capitalism. This has constituted a paradigm shift away from the post-war Keynesian consensus that had lasted from 1945 to 1980. Neoliberalism is generally associated with policies of economic liberalisation, including privatisation, deregulation, free trade, austerity, and reductions in government spending in order to increase the role of the private sector in the economy and society. Taylor, of course, is a trenchant critic of market-based and utilitarian solutions.1 His work is used to challenge the radical right’s fixation on unattainable market-based solutions. Through interpretivist thinking, we return to ideas from feminism, deep ecology, and postmodernism that offer solution. Ultimately the next 20 years promises far more hope, innovation, and inclusion than the distorted prism of the past through which the radical right wants us to view it. Every major period of change ushers in growing pains. The current one is epochal in terms of the dislocations and shocks it will continue to bring. But as we have seen throughout history, the size of change is proportionate to the scope of economic and social progress it potentially opens. Political accountability can contribute by examining how would each approach deal with these dilemmas, and how the business case offers a neoliberal view that leads to the supposition that no role for government exists. Procedural liberalism constructs rules and regulations concerning

Markets, the business case, and interpretivism 37 Nature’s value as a primary good. Socialism focuses on the means of production and the needs of workers. This interpretivist book attempts to synthesis what is useful from various perspectives subject to the supposition that humanity is entwined in the natural environment.

The business case for sustainability This section explores why environmental research must move beyond introductory statements concerning neoliberalism, markets, and trading schemes (Spash, 2010). Environmental accounting (CSR, SEA, and SEAR) and accountability and management must encourage humanity to interact with Nature in direct and perceptible ways. An environmental values perspective (EVP), developed through interpretivism, alerts humanity to the problems arising from narrow economic and neoliberal assumptions that can emerge when thinking about environmental transformations. The key concern is that modern sustainability is based on narrow economic and neoliberal assumptions. Furthermore, business-based sustainability research overemphasises economic growth and procedural solutions by focusing on economic-based initiatives such as the Triple Bottom Line (TBL), Green Reporting (GR), Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), and Integrated Reporting (IR).2 For example, IR has been touted as a way of offering a holistic view (Beck, Dumay, & Frost, 2017; Global Reporting Initiative, 2011, 2012). The mission of the IR initiative is to ‘establish integrated reporting and thinking within mainstream business practice as the norm in the public and private sectors’ (IIRC, nd, para. 2). Similarly, Stern’s (2006) influential report (The Economics of Climate Change) claims that ‘the world does not need to choose between averting climate change and promoting growth and development’. Even more audaciously, Stern claims that: [W]ith strong, deliberate policy choices, it is possible to decarbonize both developed and developing economies on the scale required for climate stabilization, while maintaining economic growth in both. (Stern, 2006, p. xi) This thinking assumes that business can provide the solution. In contrast, this chapter maintains that environmental issues are a concern for all of the community and involve long-term community-based thinking (Brown, de Jong, & Lessidrenska, 2009; Brown, de Jong, & Levy, 2009; Rowbottom & Locke, 2016). This present chapter suggests that any business path must be shaped through interpretivist (through EVP) political structures: that is, where it is the role of government to facilitate the public sphere by informing all citizens about the options confronting them. Milne and Gray (2013, p. 17) find many aspects of the reporting initiatives cited above lamentable. This is

38 Critical accountability because these initiatives cover few stakeholders, cherry-pick elements of news, and ignore major social issues arising from corporate activity (such as lobbying, advertising, increased consumption, distributions of wealth). Milne and Gray (2013, p. 17) make the case that: The reports often refer to ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’, but leave virtually unaddressed issues of footprints, carrying capacities, equity and social justice … [and completely fail to address] issues of the scale of development, limits and constraints to that development and future generations issues. The proposer of IR, the IIRC (2013), claims to be committed to the goal of sustainable development. However, Milne and Gray (2013, p. 20) continue that the IIRC is ‘exclusively investor-focused and has virtually nothing – and certainly nothing of substance to say about either accountability or sustainability’. This leads to the key point that new, radical solutions are needed based on a ‘deep green’ approach (Devall & Sessions, 1985). For communicative purposes, the public sphere is important in creating an appreciation of the various options confronting communities. That is, information about the impact of development and other transformative business strategies must be provided to all citizens. New options must be debated, and new community pathways considered.

Neoliberalism and Nature In the decade since the 2008 financial crisis, there has been ever-increasing concerns that globalised neoliberal economic reforms and competitive pressures have detached communities from the common goods needed to survive. Moreover, the financial crises that took place both before and after the GFC have created conditions conducive to the spread of neoliberalism in terms of practices that harm Nature and our communities. Economicbased initiatives include the TBL, GR, the GRI, and IR.3 For example, Tomorrow’s Reporting (2011, p. 19) noted: For example, reporting guidelines and standards have been developed by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), Accounting for Sustainability (A4S), the World Intellectual Capital Initiative (WICI), the Enhanced Business Reporting Consortium, the Carbon Disclosure Project, the International Corporate Governance Network, the Sustainability Reporting Standards Board and the Climate Disclosure Standards Board. (Rowbottom & Locke, 2016, pp. 83–84) Eccles in her review essay describes these initiatives as all very similar and in some respects competing. Nevertheless, IR has been touted as a

Markets, the business case, and interpretivism 39 way of overcoming these issues and as offering a holistic view. IR is a single report encompassing financial and non-financial information, embracing the short-term, the medium-term, and long-term consequences and value creation (IIRC, 2013; Jenson & Berg, 2012). The mission is to ‘establish integrated reporting and thinking within mainstream business practice as the norm in the public and private sectors’ (IIRC, ND, para. 2). From the interpretivist perspective, statements from business about their environmental performance have been criticised for offering little of substance about humanity’s relationships with Nature. According to many critics of economic sustainability and business initiatives, their policies have been retrospective and have provided no insight to strategic intent. They offer little theoretical insight (Jenson & Berg, 2012). Rowbottom and Locke (2016) describe the substantial list of standards and guidelines produced. Not surprisingly, within the economic-based sustainability framework that businesses have worked in since The Brundtland Report was published in 1987, humanity has still not achieved ‘sustainable development’. It will be recalled that sustainability was defined as development ‘that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (Brundtland Report; WCED, 1987, p. 3). This reconceptualisation of CSR, SEA, and SEAR is based on interpretivist thinking that provides new ideas for the left. It concurs with the ontology of Upward and Jones (2016) who explore many ways to define business models (for definitions, see Gauthier & Gilomen, 2016; Jacobs, 1999).4 Christensen, Morsing, and Thyssen (2013) summarise key CSR and SEAR approaches as: • • • •

•

‘Nothing more than business as usual’ (Hopwood, Mellor, & O’Brian, 2005). An expression of policies and intentions ‘without any real substance’ (Kolk, 2003). Simply ‘corporate spin’ to gain legitimacy (Jahdi & Acikdilli, 2009). A cheap ‘prosthesis, readily attached to the corporate body, that repairs its appearance, but in no way changes its actual conduct’ (Roberts, 2001, 2003, p. 250). Are nothing but symbols of an ideological movement ‘intended to legitimize and consolidate the power of large corporations’ (Banerjee, 2003, 2008, p. 51).

Issues associated with the inclusion of environmental values in business practice must also be extended to democratic space (Christensen & Cheney, 2011). The space for discussion must be broad enough to contest the direction of modern liberal-democracies. Table 3.1 outlines some of the key differences between interpretivism (using Gadamer and Taylor) and modern economic and business approaches to sustainability.

40 Critical accountability Table 3.1 Conceptual differences between mainstream sustainability and engaged interpretivism Mainstream business sustainability

Taylor’s engaged sustainability

Basic issues

Basic issues

•

Profit through Nature • Brundtland Report • Combine environmental and economic objectives • Markets for sustainability • Global reporting initiatives • Individualism and free-trade Key theoretical insights

•

Steady-state systems

• • • •

Public sphere Politics of recognition Commonalities Communicative public spheres

•

•

• • •

Stakeholder theory Business case approaches Global reporting initiatives Multilateral trade and investment

Taylor’s evaluative framework • • •

Engaged agency Skilful coping Culture and identity Overlapping federations

Humanity in the world

Humanity in the world and cosmos

•

•

Open-world thinking (external

• •

Value exists in the world Mind is in the world

Closed-world thinking (internal

values) • • •

Internal reasons Change within current system Mind and world are separate

values)

From the table, readers will discern that business-based and procedural sustainability research emphasise economic growth and procedural solutions. Following Taylor (1978a), this book questions modern liberalism’s reliance on unlimited economic growth, the company form, and the degradation of communicative political institutions. If limits to growth exist, then steadystate political arrangements warrant discussion in the public sphere. Taylor’s (1992c) arguments challenge the system, and the way humanity depends upon environmental and social value. The three horizontal row panels in Table 3.1 are designed to help readers compare the business case approach with that of Taylor (2020). For example, the first row of Table 3.1 compares the basic issues in the business case approach with Taylor’s (1971a, 1975) focus. Additionally, line 1 highlights the business case emphasis on profit through Nature, whereas Taylor (1971a) calls for steady-state political arrangements. At the business level, it is important to recognise connections between humanity and Nature in the public sphere. Business, like all actors in the public sphere, must conform to standards of civil society. The challenge for political parties is to contribute to the demos through insightful policies for the future. Discourse theorists such as Habermas and Taylor have often pointed out how the citizens of the West are well-educated. Paradoxically,

Markets, the business case, and interpretivism 41 the voters grasp of issues is limited. Years ago, for instance, the voting public would have laughed off the suggestion that stimulus packages will not increase employment. These trends further entrench the neoliberal agenda. The dumbing down of ideas further limits the ability of the demos to consider how to assist non-elites and the working class.

Limits of instrumental reason and business approaches to sustainability This section of the chapter develops the argument that economic modernity has created a social and business world which focuses (overly) on efficiency, effectiveness, and instrumental reasoning. Instrumental thinking, however, has the potential to ignore intrinsic value, otherness, and meaning just as it ignores environmental and other objects of value. These largely ignored values all shape and nurture the spirit of humanity to inspire better ways to live in the world. The business case, and its reliance on neoliberal reforms within the existing social system, overlooks the moral dimension (interpretivism) and its challenging of technical procedure, bureaucratic reason, and experimental business models. The instrumental and technical accounting processes that influence modernity reflect such thinking which leads to a conventional stasis. They do so at the expense of a critical and interpretivist analysis of the business and free-market approach to sustainability. The business case for sustainability has the potential to undermine the environment by looking at sustainability through a super-ordinate lens of profitability which seeks to romanticise the false hope implicit in ‘the creation of economic value while increasing corporate social and environmental performance’ (Schaltegger, Lüdeke-Freund, & Hansen, 2012, p. 95).5 Thus, the assumption is that the financial performance of the corporation within free markets remains the key focus rather than the community and its relationships with the natural environment. Accounting, accountability, and SEAR research often simply mirror the search for more profit. The cognitive implication is that businessbased environmental reforms are caught within a self-referential loop where anthropocentric values dominate decision-making. While modern business case approaches claim to focus on experimentation within current accounting systems, they perpetuate an instrumental approach to the world (an instrumental epistemology), thereby hindering the development of ethical and moral standards. Taylor’s (1980b) work on meaning and the virtues thereof is developed to consider how SEAR can act as an agent for a heightened sense of accountability. In too many areas, accounting benefits finance capital and corporate logic to the detriment of citizens, the environment, and society. It is this latter point which can partly explain:

42 Critical accountability •

•

•

The lack of societal (community) engagement with environmental disclosures made by corporations to date (Michelon, Pilonato, & Ricceri, 2015). The need for a focus on intrinsic value and truth to examine whether the business case can come in contact with Nature’s meaning and value (Lehman, 2010b, 2015). The need to expand on the narrow and instrumental understanding of social and environmental auditing in the public sphere (Gray, 2002, 2010).

Modern environmental accounting and auditing have been developed as part of the business case in conjunction with the spirit of free-market individualism without any state direction and seemingly with limited community discussion. It seems that the community’s environmental and social relationships are deferred to corporations, all competing in a deregulated and increasingly transnational marketplace. What this current chapter proposes is a polysemic and multivalent language of business that focuses on many things, meaning and Nature among them, thereby opening communities to various realities which they then must set out to interpret and understand. The language of business can both constrain and open us to multiple realities which are not necessarily in conflict with each other. In the following sections, the focus on meaning and value is designed to suggest that CSR, SER, and SEAR may benefit humanity by attending to critical reflection on its own grounding. That is, CSR, SER, and SEAR must not only question its deference to instrumental conceptions of Nature and meaning but must open itself to various potential realities if it is to more fully contribute to the hermeneutic task of all people to interpret and understand the world in which they live to human needs.

Sustainability and the business case The business case for sustainability research and initiatives overemphasises economic growth often associated with a master narrative of the free market. One early example of this trend is The Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987), which in its introduction called for ‘a new era of economic growth – growth that is forceful and at the same time socially and environmentally sustainable’ (p. xvi). The dominant business case in SEAR shares much in common with The Brundtland Report, justifying an economic approach to increase sustainability of the existing social system. The following sections are committed to exploring the limitations of the business-based discourse of SEAR and suggest some interesting environmental ideas from the works of Gadamer and Taylor. The current neoliberal agenda legitimised through the business case approach to SEAR (overly) focuses on the corporate form to justify market procedures throughout the global world – often at the expense of local

Markets, the business case, and interpretivism 43 customs and values that have the potential to reconnect humanity with Nature (Callicott, 1992, 1994, 1996).6 Typical of the business narrative in SEAR is the work of Baker and Schaltegger (2015) to whom ‘our environment, our organisations and our social relations exist as a result of the choices and meanings that we, as individuals and collectives, ascribe to them over time’ (p. 270). As such, the value of Nature emanates from human thoughts associated with mind-dependent representations. This approach to connection with Nature occurs without critical reflection on the supposition that Nature itself contains meaning and intrinsic value. The view is associated with a designative approach to language which perpetuates an anthropocentric (human) approach to Nature. Such a viewpoint makes it less likely that SEAR can engage the position that many environmentalists, philosophers, and theists take; that is, Nature (actually) contains meaning and intrinsic value independent of human purpose. Nevertheless, SEAR, as committed to existing business structures, maintains that Nature’s value can be ‘linguistically mediated’ in a manner which is said to moderate adverse corporate impacts on the natural environment (Baker & Schaltegger, 2015, p. 271; Gioia & Thomas, 1996). Business case theorists direct attention to Weick’s (1995) work on sense-making.7 The issue is that sense-making is defined as a human-centred construct allowing ‘people to deal with uncertainty and ambiguity by creating rational accounts of the world, which then enable action’ (Baker & Schaltegger, 2015, p. 270). Like Gray (1989, 2002), Baker and Schaltegger and other proponents of this approach utilise a form of argumentation that seeks to stand outside more pessimistic articulations of dominant business case approaches that emphasise ‘the negative by constructing a counter-image’ of business research (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000, p. 152; also see Deetz, 1982, 1994). However, this approach remains instrumental and procedural in its inability to come into contact with the meaning and intrinsic value that environmentalists such as Callicott, Erhlich, Gadamer, and Taylor ascribe to Nature. The question that immediately presents itself is whether this focus on neoliberal policy directions leads to contact with Nature’s meaning and intrinsic value which would afford opportunities to citizens to consider the intrinsic value of Nature. Thus, the chapter supports the arguments made by accounting scholars such as Chwastiak (2008) and Fremaux (2019) who rightly point out that the neoliberal agenda at best glosses over and at worst ignores the concepts of meaning that emanate from sources such as Nature. For example, Chwastiak (2008) explains how the military-industrial complex perpetuates a certain vision of the world which pursues capital growth to the detriment of Nature. There is limited analysis within neoliberalism and the narrative of free markets concerning the adverse impacts associated with the primacy of capital growth and its associated conceptions of meaning.

44 Critical accountability Business case theorists seem to take the view that language is like a map of impersonal facts which correspond to the real. In this vein, accounting is to be seen as an act of cartography, as the work of Solomons (1991a) suggests. These sorts of cartographic views would hold accounting responsible only to represent the literal tracks of the conversion of Nature into capital and thus never approach the hermeneutic, rather than literal, meanings necessary to overcoming ‘the business case’ as the paradigm of accounting’s relation to Nature. All of this suggests the desirability of a transformation in accounting research which would commit to the hermeneutic and interpretivist view that language is a creative force that gives wings to our perceptions and opens us to the mysteries of the natural environment. Accounting and SEAR can play a role in this transformation if accounting informs organisations through critical reflection where the practice of accounting challenges the public power of global capitalism and neoliberalism. Of course, this is a foreboding task but it is necessary if accounting is to help communities draw upon the hope necessary to overcome the damage of persisting with neoliberal beliefs and practices. Our obligations must now be informed by the meaning in Nature not by the false hope of ‘business-based solutions’, thereby setting accounting on a path to truth where meaning emerges in our interactions with the world (Devall, 1988; Devall & Sessions, 1985; Lehman, 1995, p. 396, 2002, 2004, 2011a, 2017).

Challenging economic sustainability and the business case Perhaps the most important feature of interpretivism is the desire to understand key relationships in communities. For critical theorists, interpretation reveals the impact of market reforms on communities. This provides another avenue to define interpretivism as challenging those economic approaches which tend to ignore people’s identities. The accountability theorist, Anthony Hopwood, argued that market’s defined people within a rhetorical representation of the self. This representation was generally framed by the accounting, legal or capital market regulator (Hopwood, 1994, p. 249). Interpreters challenge this view and offer more complex interpretations. They explain identity as part of a complex and dialogic process. This process situates humanity in various realities. No one perspective on reality holds sway.

Recent environmental and social accounting developments: interstitial accounts This section aims to integrate business and social ecological values into the public sphere. Here the work of Gray, Brennan & Malpas (2014) has been influential in developing a unique approach to social accounting. In their recent work, a more philosophically robust perspective involves the creation

Markets, the business case, and interpretivism 45 8

of interstitial social transformations which emanates from the work of E.O. Wright (Gray, Brennan & Malpas, 2014).9 This unique approach to social and environmental accounting has been offered by Gray, Brennan & Malpas (2014) who develop arguments for interstitial social transformations. They define interstitial accounting as involving: ‘Interstitial’ is a term used by Wright to refer to new institutions that are built ‘in the niches of capitalism’. This notion derives from the obvious recognition that hegemony is never complete and that, equally, a capitalist society is never completely capitalist. There always exists within capitalism many non-capitalist forms whether these be part of the public sector, part of civil society or in family, religious or grass roots initiatives. His personal agenda for change relies upon the building of non-capitalist forms within the niches of capitalism and he illustrates what he means by reference to four examples: participatory city budgeting, Wikipedia, the Mondragon worker cooperatives and unconditional basic income. (Wright, 2010 cited in Gray, Brennan & Malpas, 2014, p. 259) The issue that follows from interstitial accounting is whether corporations can create and develop opportunities for ‘counter-hegemony’ to reflect on humanity’s unsustainable practices.10 This optimism in counter-hegemonic strategies has been eroded over the years by various critics and the search is on for new interstitial accounts (see, for example, Gray, Brennan, & Malpas, 2014). The merit of developing interstitial environmental and social accounting ‘is to confront organisations with the truth of their unsustainability whilst facilitating cooperation with institutions engaged in sustainable transformation are compelling’ (Thomson, 2007, p. 275). However, they argue that there is still value in developing symbiotic social accounts that can be easily and quickly embedded in organisational practices.

Further interpretivist responses to business and the dilemmas of modernity Interpretivists engage the realities of the world, both natural and social, through accounts, narratives, and stories. The point of interpretivism is to explore avenues to inform the importance of community, economy, and identity for citizens, people, and nation-states. Moreover, within interpretivist frameworks lie an expressive approach to language. This approach to language puts us in touch with the external and natural world. Through language, we are challenged to recognise the fallibility and risks we take in the world. On the interpretivist view, our decisions and judgments require careful attention to affects, effects, impacts, and consequences. There is no escape from judgment. It is for these reasons that the preface referred to Taylor’s (2008) important point that we are limited by the idea that there

46 Critical accountability are totally coherent solutions to all political problem. Rather we need new interpretations to conceive [of] our situation as a set of extremely painful dilemma. Difficult choices must be confronted. Can we continue to rely on capitalism? ‘We can’t live with it; we can’t live without it. We can’t live without it because it’s tied to certain kinds of growth and so on’ (Taylor, 2008, p. 15). Furthermore, if we are to overcome the arbitrary Nature of defining interpretivism as a tool to explore capitalism and other social systems, it is useful to refer to the sociological work of Gadamer (1975a) as well as Taylor (1993) from whom this argument is derived. The impact of business and economic programmes can also be articulated politically through its narratives, stories, and other discursive structures. The aim is to enchant the public sphere through an appreciation of our place in Nature. Taylor has stated that interpretivism is about handling and moderating complexity. He argues that to handle complexity requires a broad approach that builds to narratives, pictures, and stories. Of course, it is impossible to arrive at a full appreciation of any complex situation – that would be impossible. The interpretivist point, however, is that to understand complexity itself requires broad and inclusive thinking. On this view, interpretation reflects the revealing dimensions of an ongoing conversation. The conversation continues unabated. The conversation stops only when we take stock and reflect. This of course is a pragmatic point. Therefore, it is important to remember that our appreciation of community and Nature involves complex narratives that cannot be reduced to liberal fictions such as capital market structures. Even more critical for accountability and ecological politics is what are we to do if modern liberal fictions no longer exist. What is to happen if it is the case that Nature cannot be modelled along the lines of traditional scientific models which assume that the world is stable and predictable. If, however, the natural environment is a ‘far-from-equilibrium’ system, then it is particularly urgent to investigate humanity’s impact on Nature and design ways of living and being in a world prone to disequilibrium. Here we are far from the Enlightenment view that stressed the stable, repetitive and universal and missed the dynamic, indeterminate implications of the relationships between humanity and Nature (Berlin, 1981). This leads to the key point that new, radical solutions are needed that might utilise insights from interpretivism, social ecology, and deep green approaches (Devall & Sessions, 1985). This is because a major problem with current sustainability approaches is that they are phrased in terms of ‘growth’ and ‘profit’ but have limited or no analysis about how communities can achieve these objectives. Interpretivist accountability, as developed in this chapter, highlights how humanity is directly connected with the external and Natural world. Such environmental values must be articulated and expressed in the public sphere through languages such as accounting, law, and management. Such articulation and expression of issues can help humanity account for, and

Markets, the business case, and interpretivism 47 develop, an appreciation of their place in the external and natural world. More particularly, interpretivist analysis of accountability addresses the functioning of humanity in the natural environment, and illustrates that language is integral to the public sphere (Boje, Oswick, & Ford, 2004). Thus, a key point for accountability and democratic theory is that when a social system has external elements imposed upon it, or presented to it, to which it has no natural affinity and/or no pre-existing mechanism by which those elements may be introduced and embraced, conflict invariably is the result. As a result, key environmental and social issues concerning the age of neoliberal free-market reforms are being overlooked. The first issue of significance is about whether right-wing neoliberalism can create accountable and meaningful relationships between different cultural groups and nation-states. The second issue is whether neoliberal procedure can put humanity in touch with Nature. Or, does neoliberal ideology perpetuate the idea that people are separate from Nature? This sets a challenge for modern accountability and democratic theory to determine how political systems can accommodate values of significance which include cultural and environmental factors.

Blind loyalty to capitalism or challenging it through the ekklesia? When free-market forces submerge significant components of ethics and morals, the role of the modern public sphere is submerged – we become much too reliant on markets. Taylor (2011) explains the dilemmas which confront humanity when humanity becomes disengaged from the environment. He is not offering arguments for a definitive conception of community and environmental belonging, but instead alerting humanity to the dangers when we operate in closed world systems. These systems are detached from meaning and the cosmos. The point of this for SEAR is that if we operate only within closed world systems our reform frameworks are unlikely to be successful. Taylor continues: [T]his is, as it were, a condition which arises even in a disenchanted world: we are unprotected; now not from demons and spirits, but from suffering and evil as we sense it in a raging world. There are unguarded moments when we feel the immense weight of suffering, when we are dragged down by it, or pulled down into despair. Being in contact with war, or famine, or massacre, or pestilence, will press this on us. But beyond suffering there is evil; for instance, the infliction of suffering, the cruelty, fanaticism, joy or laughter at the suffering of the victims. And then, what is worse, the sinking into brutality, the insensible brute violence of the criminal. It’s almost like a nightmare. One wants to be protected, separated from this. But it can creep under your guard and assail you, even in a disenchanted world. (Taylor, 2007a, p. 661)

48 Critical accountability When humanity operates solely within an imminent frame – the closed world systems of modernity – humanity tends to ignore Nature as a source of the self and the power of language; in the case of SEAR, both are submerged under a high-tide of business-based solutions. No longer can people protect themselves from predilection for more neoliberal procedure; that is, humanity’s aesthetic and moral resources become more limited. Again, it is worth mentioning the view of truth between ourselves and the entities judged because there always intervenes mind and language. It is for this reason that interpreters, inspired by matters of significance such as Nature, draw on the unquiet critics of modernity from romanticism to existentialism. The overall philosophical point reveals a spectre of potential meaninglessness when neoliberal oligarchs and their bureaucratic technologies guide our systems through the business case. On this, Taylor says that in late modernity ‘we are left with a view of human life which is empty, cannot aspire commitment, offers nothing worthwhile, cannot answer the craving for goals we can dedicate ourselves to’ (Taylor, 2007a, p. 717). Human happiness can only inspire ‘us when we have to fight against the forces which are destroying it; but once realised, it will inspire nothing but ennui, a cosmic yawn’ (Taylor, 2007a, pp. 717–718).

The early liberal social accounting model Notably, Gray, Owen, and Maunders (1987) develop liberal themes for social accounting. They develop the rights of stakeholders and other user groups using Rawls’ work which was introduced in Daniels (1985). Their focus on the rights of stakeholders challenges the economic and instrumental focus that dominates modern accounting theory and practice. Their focus on social accounting effectively means that citizens must be informed about the impact of accounting data and business decisions on society. This may not be the case when accounting simply reports economic outcomes that submerge societal demands for improved accountability. Social accountants such as Laughlin and Broadbent (1993) and Milne and Gray (2013) argue that stakeholders must be provided with more detailed information concerning how accounting data, decisions, and reports impact on the natural environment and the social sphere (Gray, 1983, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c; Gray, Owen, & Adams, 1996; Gray et al., 1987). In particular, Gray et al. (1987) emphasise the need for accounts that have a broader focus to address the legitimate interests of stakeholders in the accountability relationship. This then gives rise to a broader focus on pluralism which is a central feature of their approach to accounting and accountability research. This broader focus involves acknowledging the pluralism which is implicit in accountability relationships. They argue that pluralism in its modern form is about acknowledging that there are many different viewpoints and value systems which impact on accountability

Markets, the business case, and interpretivism 49 relationships. Their commitment to accountability reflects their liberal view that the seeds of justice are to be found in existing accounting and accountability structures of governance. Gray et al. (1991) state: [W]e see little fruitful development in merely standardizing social accounting techniques in the absence of a more fundamental political challenge being mounted to the privileges of existing corporate power in capitalist society. However, our analysis parts from that of Puxty [who is a major critic of conventional and social accounting as discussed below] in seeing the necessary seeds of change already implanted in such society and therefore a role for social accounting in developing a far wider form of accountability. (Gray et al., 1991, p. 14) In sum, it is important to remember that social accounting approaches such as the early work of Gray et al. (1987) re-conceptualise not only accountability research but also how concepts such as decision-usefulness might be developed to create a deeper moral appreciation of the role of information (see also Williams and Ravenscroft, 2015). Moreover, the work of Gray et al. could be modified through the consideration of Taylor’s work on critical theory. In that work, Taylor (1986a) explained that there are three dominant methodological traditions on the dialectical method. First, a scientific tradition refutes dialectical methods as mystical and subjective (Taylor, 1986a, pp. 141–153). A second tradition offers a dialectical representation of reality, culture, and Nature. While a third tradition explores an ontic dialectic which investigates culture, history, and politics according to notions of ‘strong-evaluation’ (ibid, p. 141). Western political philosophy, according to Taylor, has taken largely the first direction. It rejects dialectical methods as unscientific that they only mystify social and environmental relationships (ibid). The orthodox Marxist tradition, though it more accurately follows Engels, sees the structure of reality itself as fundamentally dialectical. Schools 1 and 2 are diametrically opposed, despite the fact that they both claim to be founded on a scientific worldview (Taylor, 1975, pp. 550). The third school uses the dialectic to understand human beings, their lives, and history. This way of thinking about revolutionary change implies that an ontic dialectic exists in his post-liberal thought. Moreover, Taylor is at his most compelling when he argues that horizons ‘change for a person who is moving’ (Taylor, 2002a, p. 290). The postmodern misology that flavours much recent accountability research fails to explore what is ‘significant’ for all citizens. Therefore, leaving their interpretations with a narrow means to accommodate difference. When interpreters argue that horizons change for rational interlocutors, they are implicitly challenging those basic institutions and practices that exclude, marginalise, and harm others.

50 Critical accountability Therefore, it is contended that Taylor’s work on solving the differencecommonality conundrum can be recast as a two-stage strategy to obtain a more comprehensive grasp of the assumptions, ideas, and values which frame different cultural, environmental, and social frameworks. That understanding gained, Taylor insists, does not necessarily have to lead to specific advocacy proposals. Significance may or may not result in action. Nor need it contribute to a monolithic view of the common good, fixed for all time – a view, one might add, mistakenly attributed by some to Aristotle. Significant elements may form part of a potentially meaningful totality which contain lacunae, or missing pieces of evidence to be reconstructed through historical inquiry. Those significant elements may be fluid, but they are not purely subjective to be approached in relativistic manner. They may be ascertained in hermeneutic fashion – in the same manner as text. As if in response to this postmodern critique, it will be recalled from Chapter 1 that Taylor has argued: On this model – to offer here at any rate a first approximation – practical arguments start off on the basis that my opponent already shares at least some of the fundamental dispositions toward good and right which guide me. The error comes from confusion, unclarity, or an unwillingness to face some of what he cannot lucidly repudiate; and reasoning aims to show up this error. (Taylor, 1993, pp. 208–209) Through practical reasoning, unity and diversity are balanced in hermeneutic fashion, itself reflecting Taylor’s total dissatisfaction with the alleged neutrality of liberalism and postmodern attempts at continual deconstruction. Intriguingly, critics trace Taylor’s error back to his interpretation of Nietszche and the postmodern tradition. Of discourse in which we do not just move within a worldview or within a cognitive interpretation of a domain of human life. For accounting researchers, the task is to explore the process of reasoning and how they are communicated (reported) through relevant publics (Lehman, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2010a). From a philosophical perspective, Taylor expresses concern about how you can express your experience in a manner which is not tied up with your membership in a community. Habermas argues that Taylor’s talk about being created in God’s image is easily translatable into secular propositions (Taylor, 2009c, 2010b, 2010c). For Habermas, this derives from the Kantian concept of autonomy or from particular interpretations about existence and how being-in-the-world is equipped with human rights (Habermas, 2011, p. 63; Taylor, 2010g).

Conclusion This chapter examined environmental values to challenge those political perspectives that amplify and legitimate the groundswell of disorientation

Markets, the business case, and interpretivism 51 and angst with 21st-century technological change. According to some commentators, this aspect of interpretivism represents an intense desire to retreat deep into the past. These points shape the scenario where a focus on community must end in failure. Communitarianism and interpretation are seen to echo a form of nationalism that focuses on the existing stasis and status quo – as represented by conventional politics and politicians – is out of touch with reality and must be overthrown. Yet why does the radical neoliberal right think they can do a better job by replacing it with another status quo that disappeared decades ago? Ignoring one philosophical or religious perspective at the expense of another can lead to rage, hate, and alternative facts. Logic and proof become hostage to fortune. Leaders of the radical neo-conservative right dedicate themselves and their followers to the ‘philosophy of the impossible’. This is a term used by American writer Robert Ardrey to describe those who ‘pursue the unattainable while making the impossible realisable’. The argument presented here maintains that interpretivist thinking allows one to focus on the strength of significant ideologies while correcting and developing on their fallibilities.

Notes 1 Rawls’ (1971) Theory of Justice expressed dissatisfaction with the tendency in modern political theory to rely on utilitarian political ideas. Rawls, in the tradition of the New Deal, clearly feels that utilitarianism neglected the poor and needy. 2 For further analysis of these initiatives, see Brown, de Jong, and Lessidrenska (2009), and Elkington (1997). 3 For definitional type articles, see Brown, de Jong, and Lessidrenska (2009), Elkington (1997), and Gray et al. (1987). 4 Ontology is a branch of metaphysics that deals with conceptions of being. Quine distinguishes between the ontology of a theory (what the theory says there is) and its ideology (not political ideology, but as the meanings of the terms employed). I use ontological arguments to explore the connections between business and society (Roome & Louche, 2016; Taylor, 2005). 5 Schaltegger, Lüdeke-Freund, and Hansen (2012, pp. 7–8) define ‘[a] business case for sustainability–as a difference to just a conventional business case or a business case of sustainability. Has the purpose to and does realize economic success through (not just with) an intelligent design of voluntary environmental and social activities’ (see also Carroll, 1979, 1999 as well as Carroll & Shabana, 2010). 6 Callicott (1994, 2000, 2006) is well-known in environmental ethics for his work on Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac which set in motion environmental work on how local values put people in touch with the external values of the natural environment. Callicott explains: [e]cology, Leopold points out, represents living Nature as a biotic community, i.e., as a society of plants, animals, minerals, fluids, and gases. This is a genuinely novel conception of Nature. Prior to the emergence of the science of ecology, when natural history was largely a matter of taxonomy, Nature was perceived more as a mere collection of objects, like a room full of furniture, the parts of which were incidentally and externally related. Natural things, thus, had either an indifferent value, a positive

52 Critical accountability

7

8 9 10

utilitarian resource value, or a negative value (as pests, weeds, vermin, and so on) (Callicott 1982, p. 173). Of course, it could well be argued that sense making is a virtue but the argument in this book is that view is incomplete. While we are always in the business of ‘making sense’, even when we recognise the truth and beauty of Nature independently of human needs, this is not the end of the story. The problem is with a particularly narrow horizon of ‘sense making’ which this current essay claims guides much business case research (see also Mokhtar, Jusoh, & Zulkifli, 2016; Montecchia, Giordano, & Grieco, 2016; Morioka & Carvalho, 2016a, 2016b). Interstitial accounts derive from Wright (2010) who searches for niches within capitalism to bring about the desired awareness of environmental and social issues. In recent work, Gray, Brennan & Malpas (2014) aim to locate interstitial institutions to break the power of corporate capital. The use of the term ‘counter-hegemony’ is based on Gray, Brennan, and Malpas (2014) who search to locate social space to challenge the instrumental and exploitative dimensions of capitalism.

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4

Postmodernism and interpretivism Basic issues

Introduction: basic issues in accountability and Nature This chapter examines aspects of the debate between interpretivism and postmodernism. This is to understand the ethics of modernity and its recent developments. Traditionally, accounting, accountability, and neoclassical theory are primarily concerned with the reporting of profit from the transformation of natural capital into commodities. The complexity of ecological issues as they relate to business is well illustrated in the debate between interpretivism and postmodernism. These issues were introduced in Chapter 2. The aim of this discussion is to understand the ideology and thinking behind modernity and its recent critiques and developments. Traditionally, accounting, accountability, and neoclassical economic theory are primarily concerned with the efficiency and reporting of profit from the transformation of natural capital into commodities. This gives rise to a neoliberal process which focuses on markets. The neoliberal agenda occurs, however, without meaningful community deliberation about its impact on citizens, communities, and Nature. These issues are now more pressing given that our environment is threatened with many vexing issues to address including global warming, resource depletion, and population growth (Arnold & Sikka, 2001; Bostrom & Cirkovic, 2011). Over the past 20 years, a postmodern perspective has been influential in criticising Western neoliberal and political thought. Recent corporate scandals point to the need for managers to be subject to heightened accountability and transparency. With this in mind, this chapter uses aspects of the work of Bernstein (2006), Connolly (2015), Taylor (2016), and White (2010) to explore pivotal connections between the concepts of accountability, interpretation and postmodernism (Dingwerth & Eichinger, (2010). The method uses a philosophy of language approach. The role of language in expressing accountability is an area of concern for modern communities. New approaches to accountability are needed. Utilising resources from various language perspectives, the approach connects discourse ethics with critical accountability. Achieving this task involves new language-based approaches to accountability that relate to

62 Critical accountability our ecosystems. As a precursor, Taylor (1985) reminds us that it is important to ‘note that over the past 150 years, there has been an explosive growth in the science of linguistics’ known otherwise as language theory. ‘Explosive’ is not a hyperbolic term here because like other sciences linguistics is pursued through several mutually contradictory approaches that can be characterised metaphorically as three ‘warring schools’: ‘structuralists in the Bloomfieldian sense, proponents of transformational theories, and formalists’ (Taylor, 1985). The book refers to Taylor’s work on Bloomfieldian approaches to language to develop ‘interpretation’ and Derrida’s work on ‘becoming’, there is strong prospect of providing fresh insights on the concept of accountability. This is with the potential to offer ways of incorporating a broader set of principles into accountability processes than those based solely on free-markets, individual property rights, and neoliberal economic values. Political interpretivism could play a large hand in responding to these crises if the agenda were broadened to consider the environment – especially in terms of its meaning and intrinsic value rather than just its economic and instrumental value. These concepts emanate from the philosophy of hermeneutics and interpretivism. From hermeneutics and interpretivism, an expressivist language enables a moral endeavour beyond the constraints of a narrow economic focus. The main aim of the framework is to offer alternative possibilities that enable reflection on the damage unleashed by Western technical procedure (such as accounting, accountability, and modern procedural law). The interpretivist framework challenges current approaches to sustainability and social and environmental accounting research (SEAR) that often embed assumptions such as commodifying Nature as a reserve for consumption, with little regard for values external to human representation. The book argues critically for transformative action in the form of an evaluative framework embracing discursive priorities for communities to better enable ecological (and thereby moral) understanding. A discussion of the need to have more regard for the meaning and value in Nature is constructed. This is important to emancipating accountability, thereby creating a richer, encompassing role for the lexicon and practice of interpretivism in liberal democracies. The key idea to keep in mind is that interpretivism advocates a philosophical view that focuses on language as means to meet Nature’s meaning and value. It proposes that the role of interpretation is to guide an engaged public sphere. This is through a public sphere that narrates and reports the conditions of life in a manner which transcends the conventional logic of the economic, particularly the capitalistic.

Postmodernism and Nature In the context of ecological and identity politics, the concept of ‘pluralism’ has become the common sense of our times. Here, I mark out the

Postmodernism and interpretivism 63 distinctiveness of White’s as well as Taylor’s approach to pluralism vis-à-vis the neo-Kantian turn to metaphysics. These authors draw on depth thinking through language to open politics to the otherness of being. However, political interpretivists such as Taylor’s (2007a) A Secular Age draws on depth thinking through fullness. While the Enlightenment proposed a just world utilising the resources of science, new ideas have been developed. These ideas may loosely be referred to as postmodern and utilise work on depth thinking to re-enchant our thinking. A ‘depth’ experience is like an ‘epiphany’ – it alters and changes our thinking. Moreover, the idea of ‘depth’ experience can be beneficial in improving notions of accountability through the introduction of depth experiences. Here Taylor argues that: The Enlightenment gave rise to a new kind of indignant protest against the injustices of the world. Having demolished the older visions of cosmic order and exposed them as at best illusion, and perhaps even sham, it left all the differentiations of the old society, all its special burdens and disciplines, without justification. It is one thing to bear one’s lot as a peasant if it is one’s appointed place in the hierarchy of things as ordered by God and Nature. But if the very idea of society as the embodiment of such a cosmic order is swept aside, if society is rather the common instrument of men who must live under the same political roof to pursue happiness, then the burdens and deprivations of this station are a savage imposition, against reason and justice, maintained only by knavery and lies. (Taylor, 1975, p. 547) Here Taylor provides a vantage point to think about a key theme of modernity: how can humanity live together despite their differences? I argue that ecological and interpretivist political approaches provide a useful vantage point to examine these issues of difference in environmental contexts. Of course, we cannot simply follow Nature’s meaning or value as that could lead to the politics of eco-fascism. But, does Nature possess meaning or intrinsic value? Or, rather, do we have obligations to other beings-in-the-world and other generations to protect the natural environment? To some considerable extent, as will be outlined in Chapters 10 and 11, Matthews’ biocentric ethic is used because it escapes the pitfalls of anthropocentrism. As noted earlier, however, a useful way to supplement environmental ethical positions is to consider the real implications of social and material effects of humanity on the environment. A useful environmental perspective recently developed is that of Preston’s (2000) early postmodern framework. He searches to reform humanity’s attitude towards the environment. Preston argued: Acknowledging the importance of physical environment to the shape of our bodies and to the shape of our cognitive and perceptual equipment

64 Critical accountability provides a helpful way for postmodern epistemologists to think of how Nature plays an active role in knowledge construction. Nature is no longer reduced to being just the object of knowledge, passive and supplicant to the inscription of politically motivated inquirers. It does not just stand idly by while the transcendental subject freely creates world upon world of words. It is, as Cheney and Harraway insisted, a participant in the construction of knowledge. (2000, p. 238) Preston (2000, 2018) considers humanity’s being in the world and begins to relate the physical environment with broader questions of identity and community. Ecological politics, therefore, must also consider the enormous suffering in modern communities that accentuate ecological problems. When we recognise that our humanity is shaped by our interactions with others, then the role of discourse, communication, and the public sphere become critical in ecological politics. That is, our relationships with the natural environment can move us closer to an interpretivist informed liberal pathway as opposed to more procedural liberal bureaucracy and a postmodern celebration of consumption and desire.

Postmodern environmentalism and accountability The previous section outlined how Preston (2018) offered a postmodern framework to reform humanity’s attitude towards the natural environment.1 Ecological and accountable democratic politics, therefore, must also consider the enormous suffering in modern communities that accentuate ecological problems. When we recognise that our humanity is shaped by our interactions with others, then the role of discourse, communication, and the public sphere become critical in ecological politics. More fundamentally, our relationships with the natural environment can move us closer to an interpretivist inspired liberal pathway as opposed to more procedural bureaucracy and a neoliberal celebration of consumption and desire. Notably, Arrington and Francis (1989) introduce Derrida’s work to deconstruct Western inspired neoliberal and accountability frameworks. They use Derrida’s approach to deconstruct positivist and technical accounting frameworks from the West’s focus on neoliberalism. The focus of postmodern perspectives is on revealing the repressive presence within modernity, whereas their aim is to give space to ideas and voices that have been submerged by procedural approaches such as those outlined in ‘Postmodernism and Nature’ section. The deconstructive strategy is to reveal how Western political thought has been bedded down in procedural and universal frameworks that ignore others who are different from us. For example, Arrington and Francis (1989) in their important essay – ‘Letting the Chat out of the Bag’ – demonstrate through Derrida’s deconstruction ‘that positive theory and the empirical tradition are not entitled to the kind

Postmodernism and interpretivism 65 of epistemic privilege and authority’ that they have enjoyed in silencing other kinds of writings. They offer the following explanation: Deconstruction shares with Foucauldian scholarship a desire to question Enlightenment models of rationality, theory, facticity and history as progress. This critical stance is perhaps best described by the intellectual movement termed postmodernism (see Lyotard, 1984), an attempt to arrive at a new beginning for understanding the Nature of human inquiry. (Arrington & Francis, 1989, p. 3) Arrington and Francis use the technique of deconstruction to reveal the structures of power which privilege Western ways of doing business research. Arrington and Francis (1989) offer argument that is built on Derrida’s perplexing view ‘that we never fully know what we are doing’. This complex phrase boils down to revealing the unforeseen impacts of Western thought. How does Western thought impact others, systems, and the lifeworld? This explanation of deconstruction summarises their concern with Western concepts, ideas, and values which glide over difference and diversity.2 They are particularly concerned with how accountability frameworks rely on Western procedural ways of thinking that erode moral responsibility. Derrida deconstructs Western procedural codes and practices to reveal how Western ethical and responsibility frameworks ‘incite us to irresponsibility’ (Derrida, 1992, p. 61, as cited in McKernan, 2012, p. 259; see also Miller & O’Leary, 1987; Morgan & Willmott, 1993).

Accountability and the postmodernism Postmodern thought deconstructs and can be used to break open neoliberalism and its individualist ontology. The postmodern ideologist aims to escape current procedural constraints and to disclose new possibilities and visions for living on the planet. The professed aim of this new world view is to provide space for alternate possibilities and viewpoints to be given expression. Postmodern philosophy is committed to freeing research from procedural and universal approaches that guide and shape much modern neoliberal research. Here the postmodern work of Nelson (1993) is relevant in the way he discloses the goods revealed through deconstruction. Nelson argues: [T]here is reason to worry that these post-modern goods defined within accounting as a practice remain inadequately acknowledged by the daily conduct of accounting and even by its academic theory. (Nelson, 1993, p. 207) Nelson’s postmodernism focuses on social goods that exist within practices such as accounting and law – honesty, magnanimity, and openness, to name a few. Nelson (1993), in a way similar to that developed by Arrington and

66 Critical accountability Francis (1989, 1993), they search to re-discover new concepts of ethics to open neoliberal research to different ideas and values (Arrington & Schweiker, 1992). According to theorists, who utilise Derrida’s work, the limitations of accountability are not addressed in modern neoliberal and procedural conceptual frameworks. They develop Derrida’s work on deconstruction to critique Western thinking. This is undertaken through two steps – the first step reverses dichotomies and then second works to corrupt the dichotomies themselves. The deconstructive strategy reveals that ethics and philosophy are concepts that are undecidable in their nature. They cannot be expressed through procedure or universal approaches to ethical thinking. That is, undecidable concepts cannot conform to either side of a dichotomy or opposition. This is so because there are no absolutes or universals in the postmodern universe. For example, ‘undecidability’ returns in later periods of Derrida’s work to reveal paradoxes involving concepts such as forgiveness, gift giving, or hospitality. Apparently, and paradoxically, this occurs when the conditions that permit the possibility of concepts are at the same time set out as the conditions for their impossibility. This complex idea is really about what is possible. It boils down to the idea that a concept can never be treated as an absolute point of reference. This is because on this view there are no reference points in time and space which operate with indubitable certainty. The concept itself embodies both its possibility and impossibility. Because of this, it is indeterminate whether authentic interpretivist frameworks are either possible or impossible. In sum, political philosophers argue that the utility of Derrida’s perspective resides in the supposition that ‘there is nothing outside the text, no object, transcendental or empirical, outside of language to provide solid ground and referent for language’ (Derrida, 1976, p. 158). Applied to the philosophy of neoliberalism and accountability there are no absolutes, nor is there an ideal of accountability to strive towards. The implication is that public space must be provided to free people from colonialism, imperialism, and universal proceduralism. Postmodern thinking implies that this space does not currently exist. Hence, we must engage with the unknown. Like a ‘come hither’ approach, the aim is to disclose what is foreign and unknown. I will argue that thinking about the metaphysics of Nature challenges, the postmodern view of language and the idea that the world is like a text. Rather, thinking about Nature involves developing necessary conditions of being-in-the-world. Nature is one such condition that shapes the ontologies and possibilities available to humanity. The next section introduces recent work in postmodern philosophy.

Recent developments: Martin Messner, accountability, and postmodernism Messner (2009) argues that it is well-known that demands for higher accountability standards have been criticised from postmodern quarters.

Postmodernism and interpretivism 67 Messner (2009) points out that it is very difficult or even impossible to provide justifications to impose high ethical standards on neoliberalism. He argues that these standards end up doing ‘violence’ to the accountable self – the concern is that individual selves are imprisoned in procedure. Additionally, more procedure and accountability end up in a bureaucratic structure which limits autonomy and imposes administrative costs on organisations. There are, in other words, certain limits to accountability that need to be acknowledged in order to prevent accountability from turning into what Judith Butler calls ‘ethical violence’ (Butler, 2005, cited in Messner, 2009, p. 918). Messner’s (2009) work on postmodern thinking continues that accountability can place unreasonable demands on individuals in neoliberal systems and accountability structures. Responding to these demands involves understanding the role of deconstruction and interpretation in global and organisational settings. It is important to remember that ethical systems focus on decision-making structures which are instrumental and end up creating more procedure. Moreover, postmodern accountability research aims to subvert the dominant structures of control and power of which neoliberalism is a complaint partner. The subversive elements within the postmodern perspective provides the language of accountability with a focus on plural constituencies. The aim is to move neoliberalism from an ‘accounting for-the-self’ to an ‘accounting for-the-other’. Messner argues that: [Shearer] adopts Levinas’ (1998) claim that our relationship to others, and thus our moral obligation to others, comes before any ontological sense of having a distinct identity as an autonomous self. Put another way, ethics must always precede ontology, if we are to take seriously the fact that we are always already exposed to others and their demands before we can actively manage this relationship on the basis of our own interests and demands. As a consequence, any conception of accountability needs to acknowledge this priority of the other, because the ‘motive for being accountable is never simple, unadorned selfinterest. It entails a constitutive relation to others beyond simple contractual relations’. (Schweiker, 1993, p. 245 cited in Messner, 2009, p. 921) Messner is rehearsing the pre-ontological status of these relationships when he argues that accountability decisions must go through the ordeal of the undecidable. He argues that to do otherwise would mean that these decisions ‘would not be free decision[s] and [would] only be the programmable application or unfolding of a calculable process’ (Derrida, 1992, p. 24 cited in Messner, 2009, p. 925). Derrida’s massive philosophical work on language is important for accountability (Campbell, McPhail, & Slack, 2009; McKernan, 2012; Messner, 2009). The postmodern approach to language

68 Critical accountability can be used to examine accountability, responsibility, and transparency to accommodate various ideas, issues, and values associated with the ubiquitous other (see also Arendt, 1958; Lo and Brennan, 2012; Messner, 2009; Shearer, 2002; Shotter, 2005). A useful strength of Derrida’s approach to accountability and social reality involves his invitation to face up to the remarkable nature of the other. The aim for accountability is to be open to the unknown: we must be open to what is different and foreign. Apparently, through this opening, we can then transcend our existing political structures thereby ushering in a new age. The implication for accountability is that there is still an ideal – perhaps yet unattainable – nevertheless we must make this effort to come in contact with it. We must cross the unknown to this new future. For purposes of accountability and critical research, Derridean arguments suggest that we can only achieve what is possible by doing the impossible. In other words, accountability must pass through an abyss to a new possible world. This is to be created through our languages thereby accommodating and recognising the other. Thus, Derrida’s perspective reflects a view that language does not constitute and does not reflect moral concepts. On this postmodern view, accountability must engage with the other to disclose new forms of living in neoliberal regimes and organisational structures. In the next section, the interpretivist framework is discussed where the aim is to explore the implications of deconstruction. By determining whether knowledge is socially constructed, it is possible to open communities to other values. What is the unknown? How do we engage and account for such activities?

Postmodern engagements with interpretivism: the politics of reconciliation This section outlines how interpretivism emphasises practical reasoning to outline what is significant for a full life. This also involves exploring the role that the natural environment plays in the development of human freedoms (Banerjee, 2003, 2011). The criterion of ‘significance’ is important in shaping human identity and connections with freedom (Taylor, 1969a, pp. 281–301). The strength of people’s motivations depends on the significance that they assign to various decisions and mechanisms of evaluation. In evaluating motivation, there are ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ approaches which emerged from the Enlightenment and all the changes it brought about. Because of its atomistic ontology, liberalism operates with a ‘weak’ explanation of the cultural motivations behind decisions.3 Indeed, liberals and postmodern theorising conceive of decision-making structures to create accountable outcomes. Liberals attempt to be neutral, whereas postmoderns seemingly focus on the unknown – the other. Both ideologies do not explain motivations and what is significant for all citizens, but it is these motivations which invariably impact on others and the

Postmodernism and interpretivism 69 natural environment. In contrast, interpretivism seeks a more comprehensive grasp of the assumptions, ideas, and values as they frame different cultural, environmental, and social frameworks. That understanding gained, Taylor (1969b) insists, does not necessarily have to lead to specific advocacy. Significance may or may not result in action. As noted in Chapter 3, significant elements may form part of a potentially meaningful totality, which contain lacunae or missing pieces of evidence to be reconstructed through historical inquiry (Hinchman, 1994; Lehman, 2000, 2015, 2017).4 Here, hermeneutic notions of ‘understanding’ reflect the fact that elements of significance will unavoidably clash. Obviously one of the greatest contemporary dilemmas is the clash between autonomy and ‘expressive unity’ which is glaringly apparent in framing the significance many people attach to Nature. A constantly recurring theme in modernity and its political discourse has been the attempt to combine autonomy and expressive unity and the inevitable tensions which arise. Hegel, Taylor reminds us, offered the basis of such a synthesis through the development of reason and spirit in history. In the end, however, Hegel probably failed, and few people nowadays would seek reconciliation through Spirit (Geist). But the attempt at reconciliation in general is worth making and, at least, considerations of authenticity might keep alive the possibility of commonalities rather than relying on instrumental rationality. From that perspective, Nature is considered to be an object of consumption: standing simply in wait for humanity (Lehman, 2010a, 2010b; Taylor, 1975, pp. 49–50). At the very least, Taylor’s Hegelian approach makes us aware of the difficulties involved in reconciling human liberty with Nature’s intrinsic value. Reconciling the clash between expressive unity and autonomy is ultimately much the same as reconciling different cultural traditions. Modernity’s preoccupation with formalism and technology has submerged the role that language plays as means to disclose the otherness of being and the values of significance otherwise submerged. Perhaps a total reconciliation between humanity and the natural environment is impossible, but one should not resign oneself, in extreme post-modern fashion, to the idea that we all speak ultimately untranslatable languages. The democratic and social implications of these accounting and accountability issues are implicit in Wilson’s (1986) critical point that Derrida’s approach to language is snared in a self-referential loop in which language is a matter of historical necessity. For Wilson (1986), Derrida makes the logos of justified language use a reflection of human evolution and convention. Derrida (1976, p. 7, cf. 14) explains: By a slow movement whose necessity is hardly perceptible, everything that for at least some twenty centuries tended toward and finally succeeded in being gathered under the name of language is beginning to

70 Critical accountability let itself be transferred to, or at least summarized under, the name of writing. ... Their movement was absolutely necessary with a necessity that can be judged by any other tribunal. For Derrida, history justifies language use, based on the view that ‘the convention of treating all language as conventional is justified because of the non-conventional outcome of history’ (Wilson, 1986, p. 115). Implicitly, Derrida is offering another way to think about language – one that challenges the expressive language approach of this chapter. This leads to the likelihood that difference, at the expense of commonalities, will accentuate the accountability and transparency problems identified by Messner (2009), Roberts (2009), and Brown and Dillard (2015). Accountability is challenged by expressive and anti-subjectivist positions. Derrida views language as indeterminate and open to difference. This view, while postulating an openness to the external world, returns to finitude or ordinary time (Taylor, 2007a, p. 244). Therefore, it is ironic that in Derrida’s preferred approach, language reverts to ordinary time. This interpretation of language is finite and remains locked in the present (Derrida, 2007). Accordingly, ordinary time replaces cosmological time, thereby making transcendental analysis redundant. This results in current concepts of accountability and ordinary time being coded within current conceptual frameworks of accounting. As such, accountability must be developed to examine how cosmological time and notions of meaning are revealed through language, and how they cohere. That is, accountability occupies the same space as market relations and transactions. In accounting, for example, Chambers (2013) questioned whether accounting is precise just like a clock. This conception of ordinary time, however, excludes other conceptions of time, such as cosmological time. The accountability and transparency concern is that human representations remain in control of how representations are expressed in accounts. Not so long-ago, Snow’s (1965) ‘two cultures’ posed a seemingly unbridgeable gap between science and humanistic discourses: …[C]ertainly the rational science model dissociating understanding and attunement has wreaked havoc in its successive misapplications in the sciences of man in the last few centuries. But this again says nothing about its validity as an approach to inanimate Nature. (Snow, 1965, pp. 49–50) That gap is now closing to some extent. Here it is worth reflecting on the Heideggerian insights that Dreyfus and Taylor have developed. Independently, they both argued about how important are the background horizons that shape the humanities and natural sciences (Taylor, 1980a). Taylor, in particular, argued that the background practices of the social

Postmodernism and interpretivism 71 scientist cannot be taken for granted and ignored in precisely the way the background is ignored in natural science. Indeed, Taylor’s (1980b) interpretivism is committed to the perspective that both the natural and social sciences must consider their traditions and practices. My extension argument, therefore, involves modifying Snow’s suppositions and creating a bridge between science and the humanities. Ignoring the background leads to one-sided and narrow conceptions about humanity.

Taylor’s and White’s search for middle-ground between open-world and closed-world thinking It is well-known that the radical right obsesses about quarantining foreign cultures with physical walls and barricades. Yet a far more down-to-earth challenge in a world where the global exchange of digital activity will continue unabated in the search to drive a more inclusive and just economy. The motivation is to empower moral actions – whether in the form of God, Nature, or something other. Here the work of White is useful in his challenge to Taylor’s open world (deism) and theism. Interestingly, Taylor’s (2007a) work on the sacred and secular has informed White’s work to a large degree in that it focuses on the limitations of open-world thinking (and he is worried about arguments reliant on God or such other depth perspective). White observes that Taylor is widely recognised as the most important political theorist dealing with issues of open-world thinking (fullness). The argument for accountability is to draw attention to fullness and explore how the cosmos (of which the world is part) contains meaning and value. He repeats that for Taylor this value can be found in the cosmos, Nature, and the other. Fullness involves a richness, that is, in ‘that place [activity or condition where] life is a fuller, richer, deeper, more worthwhile, more admirable, more what it should be’ (Taylor, 2007a, p. 5). This is a place of power which we experience as deeply moving, as inspiring. This thinking takes interpretivist research far away from neoliberal globalisation. White aims to embrace such insights – he believes that depth experience can also unsettle them and help point us towards more admirable forms of life. He continues: If one does this, at least two tasks are thereby put on the agenda. The first involves a hermeneutics of suspicion deployed to expose how existing frames of power help constitute phenomena such as experiences of grief in wartime. The second task can be gathered under the heading of a hermeneutics of affirmation that involves a self-conscious planting of evidence of the sort that offers the possibility of construing depth experience in alternative ways. (White, 2010, p. 806)

72 Critical accountability White searches for means to validate insights from depth experiences but wants to avoid talk about God, that is, he prefers to focus on depth experiences such as grief and loss. While White is agnostic, and somewhat cautious of theistic ‘depth’ experiences, he seems to be opposed to this as a method of achieving fullness. When associated with the values revealed through depth thinking (dearth and fullness), these experiences are an enabler and force multiplier and may empower moral frameworks. White’s recent work goes further through depth approaches and argues that ‘open world values’ can be expressed using all-to-human values as in ‘closed world’ approaches (White, 2010, p. 815). He speculates about how processes of ‘closed world thinking’ can express admirable virtues when he explores how ‘moderately well-off’ citizens of Western democracies might cultivate such experience. The argument presented in this book is that such interpretations of Taylor’s interpretivism overlook his political search for commonalities that bring people together. Rather, the point of interpretivism is to understand what makes people tick so to speak. It is about people’s strong evaluations. White’s minimalist approach to identity itself ignores the force and commitment people have to their fundamental ontologies or philosophical anthropologies. They operate as paradigms in Kuhnian terms, that is, they define the basic kinds of questions we need to ask in order to pursue our enquiry. This appreciation can be submerged within a broad postmodern approach that ends up focusing on the greatest number (of the other) without full consideration of all people’s needs. Therefore, interpretivism engages with White’s postmodernism by asking the question: are there any necessary correlations between interpretivist ontology and practical policy proposals? The argument is that the interpretivist framework is about exploring what happens when ontology is limited to closed world parameters. As such, interpretivists suggest developing these correlations for the policy level (Taylor, 2003a). Similar thinking is used to explore reasons why Nature is a necessary condition of being-in-the-world. Moreover, the interpretivist search continues the conversation of humanity unabated thereby challenging further closed-world thinking. We must continue to build richer interpretations. That is, closedworld thinking detaches humanity from Nature, God, and the other. Human life becomes empty and meaningless in a disenchanted world. To this point in the book, a new environmental, democratic, and accountability model is needed, one which is able to both interpret and analyse different depth (dearth and fullness) value systems before the imposition of any procedural rule.5 My argument is that interpretivism opens us to a fullness reflective of that space wherein we live our lives. It must, therefore, have a certain moral/spiritual shape if we are to live our lives fully. Accordingly, accountability researchers see that globalisation is a human and hermeneutic practice concerned with identifying and interpreting the impacts of economic and global activity in ways which

Postmodernism and interpretivism 73 encompass things such as Nature, art, and the aesthetic which exceed the capacity of neoliberal modes of interpretation to produce understanding. From White’s perspective, harmonisation processes of neoliberalism are oblivious to these ethical energies. Although he is highly critical of extreme dearth (postmodern) perspectives, he offers a weak ontological approach. This approach is said to overcome postmodern views which have the potential to ignore issues of justice and rights – he argues that issues of dearth ‘cannot possibly be scrubbed free of the associated concepts of rightness, justice, or legitimacy’ (White, 1991, p. 49). Nevertheless, a weak approach to ontology glides over interpretivist processes that search to bring together issues of community and identity.

Conclusion I have used open-world interpretivism thinking to challenge closed world and representational approaches to value. It will be recalled that closed-world postmodernism thinking locates all value as emanating from human thoughts (an extreme depth experience as mentioned earlier). I use sacred values and open-world thinking to challenge the anthropocentric view that all value emanates from human minds. This is the point of the dearth and fullness debate. Recognition of these values must empower political systems, thereby recognising a broader range of values. These arguments focus on key connections between sacred and secular values.6 The key idea is that neoliberalism and accountability processes have become vehicles of secularism and must be challenged. This process of neoliberal-secularisation is similar to that of instrumental reason. That is, both operate by detaching humanity from the external values that are to be found in God, Nature, and or/the other. This present book takes that argument further by developing an appreciation about whether it is possible to cross the sacred-secular divide. The aim of this accountability perspective is to escape the limitations of closed-world thinking. It will be recalled that closed-world thinking is closely associated with the obsession with markets and neoliberalism. Taylor (2011) defines open-world thinking as reflective of the supposition that meaning exists in the cosmos. Open-world thinking has much in common with my earlier interpretivist work on the importance of sacred values.7 Open-world thinking, together with the sacred dimension, open humans to the non-representational values and things (objects) of the world. For Taylor (2003a), our interpretations reveal the importance of those external values that are concealed by instrumental reason and the proceduralism implicit in neoliberalism and the instrumental scientific approach that guides much accountability research. Taylor (2011) calls for a process of unconcealment to reveal the deeper reasoning within such ideologies. This hermeneutic concept draws attention to the revelatory power of cultural and global values that may be found in the cosmos, Nature, and the other. The challenge for modern communities is to create

74 Critical accountability reports which navigate through the maze of globalising neoliberalism and open us to the world. Therefore, this book is guided by the supposition that global neoliberalism must not only question its reliance on instrumental reason and processes of harmonisation but also its over-reliance on representational thought. Research must be open to new interpretations of reality if we are to escape the contradictions of neoliberalism and postmodernism. Guided by depth thinking (dearth and fullness), it is possible to create new pathways, namely, one that creates ‘momentum toward engaging and exploring the other and its world’ (White, 2010, p. 814). On this point, Taylor’s (1980b) chapter ‘Theories of Meaning’ explores the inspiring power of external sources such as spirituality, Nature, and the other. In the next section of the book, from critical accountability, it is Laughlin’s (1987) work that usefully gestures towards the Taylor-White exchange.8 Laughlin’s (1987) focus aims to construct democratic systems and empower communities to give voice to all citizens. For the purposes of critical and environmental accountability, the challenge is how environmental values create openness to the world. Using Laughlin’s work on accountability criteria, it is through language that we are touched by Nature. Extending Laughlin’s (1987, 1990, 1991) work on Habermas involves further awareness of the limitations of sole dependence on human representations. In the chapters that follow, I introduce the Taylor and Habermas (2009) exchange to explore how to challenge the exclusive humanist focus on its never-ending search for consumption and accumulation. This is at the expense of spiritual empowerment.

Notes 1 Preston (2018) offers a different way to think about postmodernism which moves beyond its recent discursive and aesthetic moments. Postmodern can also mean the development of a new set of conditions concerned with political, material, and environmental that give rise to new forms of political agency (see also Lehman, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2015). 2 As Messner points out ‘the active component of agency, in the form of a decision or a judgment, is likewise subject to limits of rationalization that challenge the possibilities of accountability’. A decision or judgment, Derrida (1992, 2007) argues, always happens when calculative logic comes to its end. A decision is decisive insofar as it cannot be derived from any knowledge. It may be based on knowledge (and often should), but at one point, there will be the need to go beyond this knowledge and to take the risk of making a decision. A decision is like a leap into the dark in this respect. It must ‘go through the ordeal of the undecidable’, for otherwise ‘it would not be a free decision, it would only be the programmable application or unfolding of a calculable process’ (Derrida, 1992, p. 24, cited in Messner, 2009, p. 925). 3 Kymlicka (1989) criticises communitarians (now interpretivists) for treating all liberals as if they adhered to an atomist conception of the human agent (pp. 47–48).

Postmodernism and interpretivism 75 4 Chapters 6 and 8 of this book will explore in greater detail Taylor’s hermeneutics as a component part of interpretivism. 5 The work of Laughlin (1987, 1990) and Booth (1992) and the resulting concept of the sacred–secular divide have set the context for much of the subsequent research into the role of accounting in religious organisations (Jacobs & Walker, 2004, p. 362). For example, Hamid, Craig, and Clarke (1993) explained the different financial and social needs of Islamic cultures. More particularly, Hamid et al. (1993) explained how Western cultures operate with a different understanding of property and the common values that are associated in Islamic societies. This thinking points towards an accountability model. 6 In critical accounting, Jacobs (2003) notably explored the importance of nonsecular values. He explored that the values expressed by members of the Iona community illustrate an accountability structure that does not simply exist and interact through mind-dependent representations (secular values). This thinking points towards an accountability model to interpret and analyse different value systems before imposing procedural rules. A simple focus on information for markets fails to account for religious values and virtue. 7 Critics claim that Jacobs and Walker (2004) and Laughlin (1987) have constructed a sacred–secular divide (Hardy & Ballis, 2005; Irvine, 2002). However, fullness opens humanity to a polysemous world imbued with meaning and values. These values reflect culture and identity to energise global and harmonising structures of emancipatory accountability accounting. Jacobs explores these themes through the relationship between accounting and the religious practices of a contemporary Christian community associated with the Church of Scotland (the Iona community). 8 In particular, Jacobs (2003) and Jacobs and Walker (2004) studied the Iona community in Scotland to create a broader accountability. They explore standards and structures that involve comprehensive world views that reflect sacred activity. Jacobs and Walker (2004) observe: In the Church of England considerable effort was taken to keep the secular aspects of accounting separate from, and subservient to, the sacred centres and activities of the Church. Booth (1992) explored similar themes in his study of the Australian Uniting Church. [He] reinforced the distinction between the sacred activity of the Church and the secular functions of accounting and administration.

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78 Critical accountability Connolly, W. E. (2017). Belief, Spirituality, Time, http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2008/04/ 17/belief-spirituality-and-time/accessed (Accessed July 1, 2017). Derrida, J. (1976). Of Grammatology, translated by F. P. Spivak, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press. Derrida, J. (1978). Writing and Difference, translated by A. Bass, Chicago, Il, University of Chicago Press. Derrida, J. (1981). Positions, translated by A. Bass, Chicago, Il, Chicago University Press. Derrida, J. (1982). Margins of Philosophy, translated by A. Bass, Chicago, University of Chicago Press (Chapter Différance). Dingwerth, K. & Eichinger, M. (2010). Tamed Transparency: How Information Disclosure Under the Global Reporting Initiative Fails to Empower, Global Environmental Politics, Volume 10, Number 3, pp. 74–96. Hamid, S., Craig, R. & Clarke, F. (1993). Religion: A Confounding Cultural Element in the International Harmonization of Accounting? Abacus, Volume 29, Number 2, pp. 34–49. Hardy, L. & Ballis, H. (2005). Does One Size Fit All? The Sacred and Secular Divide Revisited with Insights from Nicbuhr’s Typology of Social Action, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Volume 18, Number 2, pp. 238–254. Hinchman, L. P. (1994). Aldo Leopold’s Hermeneutic of Nature, The Review of Politics, Volume 57, Number 2, pp. 225–249. Irvine, H. (2002). The Legitimizing Power of Financial Statements in the Salvation Army in England, 1865–1892, Accounting Historians Journal, Volume 29, Number 1, pp. 1–36. Jacobs, K. (2003). The Sacred and the Profane: Examining the Role of Accounting in the Religious Context, paper presented at the 7th Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Accounting Conference, Madrid, July 13–16, 2003. Jacobs, K. (2005). The Sacred and the Secular: Examining the Role of Accounting in the Religious Context, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Volume 18, Number 2, pp. 189–210. Jacobs, K. & Walker, S. P. (2004). Accounting and Accountability in the Iona Community, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Volume 17, pp. 361–381. Kymlicka, W. (1989). Liberal individualism and liberal neutrality. Ethics, Volume 99, Number 4, pp. 883–905. Laughlin, R. C. (1987). Accounting Systems in Organizational Contexts: A Case for Critical Theory, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 12, pp. 479–502. Laughlin, R. C. (1990). A Model of Financial Accountability and the Church of England, Financial Accountability and Management, Volume 6, Number 2, pp. 93–114. Laughlin, R. C. (1991). Environmental Disturbances and Organisational Transitions and Transformations: Some Alternate Models, Organization Studies, Volume 1, pp. 209–232. Lehman, G. (1993). China after Tiananmen Square: Rawls and Justice, Praxis International, Volume 12, Number 4, pp. 405–420. Lehman, G. (1995). A Legitimate Concern with Environmental Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 6, Number 5, pp. 393–413.

Postmodernism and interpretivism 79 Lehman, G. (1999). Disclosing New World: Social and Environmental Accounting, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 24, pp. 217–241. Lehman, G. (2000). Taylor, Expressivism and Interpretation: Toward a New Evaluative Discourse Lost to Modernity?, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 11, Number 4, pp. 433–445. Lehman, G. (2001). Reclaiming the Public Sphere: Problems and Prospects for Corporate Social and Environmental Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume, 12, Number 6, pp. 713–733. Lehman, G. (2002). Globalisation and the Authentic Self: Cosmopolitanism and Charles Taylor’s Communitarianism, Global society, Volume 16, Number 4, pp. 419–437. Lehman, G. (2004). Social and Environmental Accounting: Trends and Thoughts for the Future, Accounting Forum, Volume 28, Number 1, pp. 1–5. Lehman, G. (2010a). Interpretive Accounting Research, Accounting Forum, Volume 34, Number 3–4, pp. 231–235. Lehman, G. (2010b). Perspectives on Accounting, Commonalities & the Public Sphere, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 21, Number 8, pp. 724–738 Lehman, G. (2011a). The Management of Sustainability: The Art of Interpretation, Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research, Volume 9, pp. 75–88. Lehman, G. (2011b). Interpretivism, Postmodernism and the Natural Environment, Philosophy and Social Criticism, Volume 37, pp. 795–821. Lehman, G. (2013). Critical Reflections on Laughlin’s Middle Range Research Approach: Language Not Mysterious?, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 24, Number 3, pp. 211–224. Lehman, G. (2015). Charles Taylor’s Ecological Conversations, London, PalgraveMacmillan. Lehman, G. (2017). The Language of Environmental and Social Accounting Research: The Expression of Beauty and Truth, Critical perspectives on Accounting, Volume 44, pp. 30–41. Lo, Y. S. & Brennan, A. (2012). Forgiveness: An Heroic Journey, in Lickiss, N. & Malpas, J. (Eds.), Perspectives on Human Suffering, Springer (pp. 79–98). McKernan, J. (2012). Accountability as Aporia, Testimony, and Gift, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 23, pp. 258–278 Messner, M. (2009). The Limits of Accountability, Accounting, Organizations & Society, Volume 34, Number 8, pp. 918–938. Miller, P. & O’Leary, T. (1987). Accounting and the Construction of the Governable Person, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 12, Number 3, pp. 235–265. Morgan, G. & Willmott, H. (1993). The “New” Accounting Research: On Making Accounting More Visible, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Volume 4, pp. 3–36. Nelson, J. S. (1993). Account and Acknowledge, or Represent and Control? On Post-Modern Politics and Economics of Collective Responsibility, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 18, pp. 207–231. Preston, C. J. (2018). The Synthetic Age: Outdesigning Evolution, Resurrecting Species, and Reengineering Our World, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. Roberts, J. (1991). The Possibilities of Accountability, Accounting, Organizations & Society, Volume 16, Number 4, pp. 355–368.

80 Critical accountability Roberts, J. (2001). Corporate Governance and the Ethics of Narcissus, Business Ethics Quarterly, Volume 11, Number 1, pp. 109–127. Roberts, J. (2003). The Manufacture of Corporate Social Responsibility: Constructing Corporate Sensibility, Organization, Volume 10, Number 2, pp. 249–265. Roberts, J. (2009). No One Is Perfect: The Limits of Transparency and an Ethic for ‘Intelligent’ Accountability, Accounting, Organizations & Society, Volume 34, Number 8, pp. 957–970. Roberts J. (2015). The ‘Subject’ of Corruption, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 28, pp. 82–88. Roberts, J. & Jones, M. (2009). Accounting for Self Interest in the Credit Crises, Accounting, Organizations & Society, Volume 34, Number 6-7, pp. 856–867. Roberts, J. & Ng, W. (2012). Against Economic (Mis)conceptions of the Individual: Constructing Financial Agency in the Credit Crisis, Culture and Organization, Volume 18, Number 2, 91–105. Roberts, J. & Wang, T. (2019). Faithful Representation as an ‘Objective Mirage’: A Saussurean Analysis of Accounting and Its Participation in the Financial Crisis. Schweiker, W. (1993). Accounting for Ourselves: Accounting Practice and the Discourse of Ethics, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 18, Number 2–3, pp. 231–252. Shearer, T. (2002). Ethics and Accountability: From the For-Itself to the For-theOther, Accounting, Organizations & Society, Volume 27, Number 6, pp. 541–573. Shotter, J. (2005). Inside the Moment of Managing: Wittgenstein and the Everyday Dynamics of Our Expressive-Responsive Activities, Organization Studies, Volume 26, Number 1, pp. 113–135. Snow, C. P. (1965). Two Cultures: And a Second Look, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. (1969a). Responsibility for Self, in Rorty, A. O. (Ed.), The Identities of Persons, California, University of California Press (pp. 281–301). Taylor, C. (1969b). Two Issues about Materialism, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 19, Number 74, pp. 73–79. Taylor, C. (1975). Hegel, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. (1980a). Understanding in Human Sciences, Review of Metaphysics, Volume 34, Number 1, pp. 25–38. Taylor, C. (1980b). Theories of Meaning, Man and World, Volume 13, pp. 281–302. Taylor, C. (1985). Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity and Alienation in LateTwentieth Century Canada, in Cairns, A., and Williams, C. (Eds.), Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada, University of Toronto Press, Toronto (pp. 183–229) [Reprinted in Taylor, C., Alternative Futures, in Taylor, C. & Laforest, G., (Ed.), Reconciling the Solitudes, McGill, Queen’s University Press, 1993 (pp. 59–120).] Taylor, C. (1999a). A Catholic Modernity, in Heft, J. L. (Ed.), A Catholic Modernity?: Charles Taylor’s Marianist Award Lecture, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Taylor, C. (1999b). Concluding Reflections and Comments, in Heft, J. L. (Ed.), A Catholic Modernity?: Charles Taylor’s Marianist Award Lecture, Oxford, Oxford University Press (pp. 105–127).

Postmodernism and interpretivism 81 Taylor, C. (2003a). Ethics and Ontology, Journal of Philosophy, Volume C100, Number 6, pp. 305–319. Taylor, C. (2003b). Seeking Sovereignty in Europe and Iraq, Project Syndicate, September 2003, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/taylor3. Taylor, C. (2003c). Descombe’s Critique of Cognitivism, Inquiry, Volume 47, Number 3, pp. 203–218 Taylor, C. (2003d). Notes on the Sources of Violence: Perennial and Modern, in Heft, J. L. (Ed.), Beyond Violence: Religious Sources of Social Transformation in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, New York, NY, Fordham University Press (pp. 15–42). Taylor, C. (2003e). Heidegger, Language, Ecology, in Wrathall, M. & Dreyfus, H. L. (Eds.), Companion to Heidegger, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing. Taylor, C. (2007a). A Secular Age, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. (2007b). What is Secularity?, in Vanhoozer, K. & Warner, M. (Eds.), Transcending Boundaries in Philosophy and Theology: Reason, Meaning, and Experience, Aldershot, Ashgate (pp. 97–130). Taylor, C. (2007c). On Social Imaginaries, in Gratton, P. & Manoussakis, J. P. (Eds.), Traversing the Imaginary: Richard Kearney and the Postmodern Challenge, Evanston, Northwestern University Press. Taylor, C. (2011). Recovering the Sacred, Inquiry, Volume 54, pp. 113–125. Taylor, C. (2016). The Language Animal, Oxford, Blackwell. Taylor, C. & Habermas, J. (2009). Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor in Conversation, The Immanent Frame, http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2009/11/20/ rethinking-secularism-jurgen-habermas-and-charles-taylor-in-conversation/. White, S. K. (1989). The Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas: Reason, Justice and Modernity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. White, S. K. (1991). Political Theory and Postmodernism, Cambridge, England, New York, Cambridge University Press. White, S. K. (2000). Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory, Princeton, Princeton University Press. White, S. K. (2002). Edmund Burke: Modernity, Politics and Aesthetics, Lanham, Maryland, Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield. White, S. K. (2009). The Ethos of a Late-Modern Citizen, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. White, S. K. (2010). Fullness and Dearth: Depth Experience and Democratic Life, American Political Science Review, Volume 104, Number 4, pp. 800–816. Williams, P. F. (1987). The Legitimate Concern with Fairness, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 12, Number 2, pp. 169–189. Wilson, F. (1986). Hume and Derrida on Language and Meaning, Hume Studies, Volume XII, Number 2, pp. 99–121.

5

The public sphere, corporations, and society1

Introduction This chapter examines how good management can repair fractured relationships within organisations, addressing problems that if left unattended will threaten the future existence of many of these companies. It analyses why there is a mood for change in management thinking, and what direction that change can take. First there was traditional accountability, the rationalist school of thought – workers considered as units to enhance maximisation of profit. At the fringes were companies that tried to be more inclusive of workers, through participation and incentive schemes (Lehman, 2011a; Sagie & Koslowsky, 1994). This chapter examines how good management can repair fractured relationships within organisations, addressing problems that if left unattended will threaten the future existence of many of these companies. It analyses why there is a mood for change in management thinking, and what direction that change can take. Part of the challenge is how managers can best satisfy the objectives of corporate social responsibility initiatives, and repair organisational and fractured community relationships. A possible role for accountability and management is to examine alternative ways of thinking about the potential benefits for the organisation that can be achieved by enhancing employee relationships. In this regard, this chapter offers strategies to examine management’s adverse effects on workers’ life-plans. life plans. The art of interpretation is used to expose how bureaucratic logic ignores workers’ rights and potentially damages the corporation’s longevity. Interpretation, as opposed to procedure, suggests that organisations are not simply profit mechanisms, but active and dynamic civil societies. Yet, even this could be seen as relatively being window dressing. Given that there is a mood for change in accountability journals and management thinking, it is time and important to explore new ideas and ways to repair relationships damaged in the search to maximise profit. The ticking clock confronting accountability involves the long-term viability of the company – and the community’s license to the company to operate which may be revoked unless appropriate action is taken (Boggs, 1986). It is argued

The public sphere, corporations, and society 83 therefore that employees are critical, core elements of companies who are integral ingredients necessary for its long survival and prosperity. The collapses of corporations such as Worldcom and Enron in the USA, together with HIH in Australia have contributed to a shakedown in accountability attitudes towards how they run their businesses and to what end. The simple profit motive is no longer enough as a main driver in policy, and corporations increasingly find themselves struggling to hire and keep the best staff. In recent times, modern accountability has been subject to critical scrutiny for damaging not only the opportunities for workers to promote themselves, but because important identity issues are not addressed (Lehman, 2011b, 2017; Shotter, 2005). Often this is because bureaucratic managerial processes mask these factors in the design of all-encompassing procedures. These problems are not new, but they have been made increasingly salient with reports of companies damaging relationships with employees and other members of our community and offshore economies. The examination, analysis, and argument in this chapter are based on the values and views expounded by interpretative thinkers who bring a particular focus to politics, conflict resolution, and the ideas of a civil society. The chapter contends that neutral, instrumental, and procedural accountability approaches are unable to solve problems that emanate from employee-employer relationships (Townley, Cooper, & Oakes, 2003). This is because the latter treats the former using precise and scientific techniques which are more appropriate for the natural sciences. The interpretative perspective, as adapted in this accountability chapter, has also been used to examine the dangers of instrumental political perspectives which have neglected the social consequences of unlimited economic growth (Taylor, 1978a). This approach, it is worth noting, animates broader political attempts to escape the problems of environmental harm and cultural conflict that have engulfed the procedural and bureaucratic politics of today.2 The dominant accountability and political perspectives fail to consider not only political structures but also local cultural differences and assumes that procedure and technique can predict human behaviour. In reality, people work in contexts, and this involves understanding the beliefs, perspectives, and values of workers (see Taylor (2002a) for a political approach to reconciliation). This understanding is unlikely to be created when managers rely solely on technical and scientific management practices (Shotter, 2005). Accordingly, the goals of this chapter are to offer a framework which might better repair damaged relationships thereby promoting a new inclusive and participatory line of reasoning for managers’ use (Kerr, 2004; Taylor, 1999b). This builds a conceptual foundation based on interpretative strategies from political theory to develop relationship frameworks for managers to recognise the value of people in organisations. In other words, to provide a framework that will ultimately help reveal the way the hidden human dimension can lead to unforeseen and potentially damaging impacts on the organisation (Townley, 2004).

84 Critical accountability

Accountability and civil society In order to bring about constructive change, modern accountability managers and thinkers must first understand what they are changing from and where they would like to go instead. In this regard, they wrestle with many traditional expectations as to the role of ‘business’ in society. Which raises the issue of expectations about just what is it that accountability theory is supposed to do? Are those expectations reasonable, and in a changing business climate how would we evaluate and decide? If we can establish a reference point, we have means to evaluate just what it is we expect from our corporations. These reference points provide accountability thinkers with different ways to think about how to organise relationships and build respectful and intrinsic practices. Modern accountability and management theory are built on the supposition that the corporate form is the most efficient means to organise social relationships, but this thinking forgets the ethical structures that can be found in other forms of spatial and social coordination. Taylor provided just such a set of reference points with his three definitions of a civil society, each of which brings its own requirements and implications. The examination, analysis, and argument in this chapter are based on the values and views expounded by Taylor who brings a focus to the ideas of a civil society. Taylor’s development of the concept of a civil society builds on its economic foundations (Taylor, 1977). He argues from his Hegelian standpoint that the move from the economic to the political regulatory sphere requires intrinsic social modes of co-ordination to bring people together. Thus, the argument presented in this chapter is built on Taylor’s interpretivist reforms. These reforms can be traced back to Hegel’s work on reconciliation and civil society.3 Taylor is firmly of the view that a civil society is not built on economic and regulatory systems alone. Accordingly, he provides the following useful outline of what a civil society means. They are: 1 2

3

Civil society exists in a minimal sense where there are free associations, not under tutelage of State power. In a stronger sense, civil society exists only where society as a whole can structure itself and coordinate its actions through such associations which are free of State tutelage. As an alternative or supplement to the second sense, we can speak of civil society wherever the ensemble of associations can significantly determine or inflect the course of State policy (Taylor, 1990a, p. 98).

To give context, the first definition is the neo-classical vision – companies are free in their associations, and rule of government is minimised (Bentley, 1967). People are ‘free to choose’ and ‘[t]he social responsibility of business is to increase its profits’, argued economist Milton Friedman. Managers, economists, political economists, and philosophers have been debating the

The public sphere, corporations, and society 85 merits of that absolutist position ever since – and if it were ever true, it is unlikely to be true in the future. One interpretation of this freedom is the market economy, and another interpretation would be the existence of political and community anarchy. It is the irony of the market economy that it is able to create organisation from what would seem to be anarchy – and market economists support it because it does so as if under the influence of an invisible ‘guiding hand’ which arises through spontaneous economic activity. It is ironic because the invisible hand of the market is assumed to be the most expressive means to organise relationships in communities, work organisations, and society. In the second and third definitions, Taylor discusses how associations and non-governmental structures can significantly determine or inflect the course of State policy – in such a conception of civil society, the processes of managing and healing damaged relationships involve processes of magnanimity and understanding other values. In the second and third conceptions of civil society, Taylor has argued that this ethical and moral thinking can offer an image of the way that the world works. What a minimal conception of civil society does is to ignore and submerge common practices and a collective sense of legitimacy (Taylor, 2002). According to Taylor, an ethical therapy for modernity’s ills involves an: [A]pproach is not the same as one which might focus on the ‘ideas’, as against the ‘institutions’ of modernity. The social imaginary is not a set of ‘ideas’; rather it is what enables, through making sense of, the practices of a society. (Taylor, 2002a, p. 1) The ‘social imaginary’ is a product of Enlightenment thought itself a reflection of technique and scientific achievement. As such, it created an individualised and atomised society which gave way to an abstract, instrumental view of others. However, it also creates an environment in which the corporation which chooses to do so can be overly hierarchical and controlling. Procedure can be implemented to create control over its workforce, and extra layers of bureaucracy can be dehumanising. Manifested at its extreme, it is a very Hobbesian way to think about the social world that reflects life as ‘nasty, mean, brutish and short’. Moreover, Hobbes’s (2016) ‘The Leviathan’ was basically a justification for a sovereign to harness the will of the people for their own good. These sentiments are echoed in some strands of accountability and management theory today, which assume that people are economic units in the production process that will create wealth and prosperity for everyone.

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Accountability and the human dimension Of course, the reverse is also true. Once the hidden human dimension is revealed, it can lead to constructive as well as profitable outcomes for the company bold enough to face these challenges and act on them in a dedicated and authentic way. One of the contentions of this chapter is that the following three tests of a company also provide the role model for a company: First, is the company sustainable? Second, is it co-operative? Third, is it communal? These three aspects go further than any one alone. To emphasise one and ignore the other two leaves managers with only a partial understanding of how people live and act within a company together with its role in society. In contrast to the scientific picture of the world, it is our human agency as living beings which reflects the way we live in the world – we are not exact, precise, and calculable units to be utilised as part of a corporate production plan (Dreyfus, 2004). From Dreyfus (2004), Taylor (2002a), and Lehman (1995, 2010a, 2010b), we learn that it is possible that a multifaceted understanding of the specificity of communal life and the common purposes that exist in society can provide a different focus for democratic reform in the organisation (Keane, 2003). This interpretative, as opposed to technical, way to think about the world has been ignored in not only political structures but also is reflected in accountability practices – it involves understanding the background values and practices in which people live and act. This is potentially disastrous for employees whose lives are damaged when companies downsize, privatise, and re-organise – these problems can be avoided, because accountability by interpretation gives us the potential to recognise these intrinsic and significant values as they shape organisational relationships. Indeed, the distinctions between workers and management are already there in our everyday ability to orientate oneself to the world, which is associated with a living being’s perceptual coping skills (Lehman, 2000, 2015, 2017; Shotter, 2005). Nonetheless, the ability to find oneself in the world is overlooked by professional managers to whom instrumental reason and procedure open one to the world. Rather, the technical thinking that shapes modern accountability ignores the finegrained distinctions which shape how people get about in the world. These are the connections and substantive relationships that reflect important intrinsic values and background beliefs, and largely they are currently being ignored. This is because the dominant philosophy throughout much of the 20th century was the neo-classical view of the corporation, in which noneconomic thinking was largely absent in the management of people (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). The neo-classical philosophy includes ideas that actually stretch back to the Enlightenment 300 years ago.4 During the Enlightenment, precise logic and rationality rose to prominence: simply put, if an event, occurrence, or process were not tangible, measurable, definable

The public sphere, corporations, and society 87 in strictly scientific terms, then it did not have the same value as procedures, events (or even ways of thinking) that did. The corporation has been the primary framework for research on business-society relationships which have adopted this same line of reasoning that physicists and scientists use to analyse, measure, and test innate, physical objects. The problem is that this is not fully appropriate for managing the human dimension in business relationships, particularly relationships that were not to arise in all their complexity and richness for a further 200 years (Lehman, 2017; Townley, 2004). In other words, society’s way of interpreting the world had changed during the Enlightenment, but when the world moved on again, our ways of relating and undertaking business remained caught in procedure and bureaucracy. What has happened is that we have competing philosophies that have been vying for dominance over the past several hundred years, and these issues are now being played out unwittingly in the modern boardroom. Moreover, they also underpin many of the problems modern corporations face. What is bringing these issues to prominence is that leverage exists now which was not present to the same degree in previous eras. For example, the difference between the feudal system in which peasants served their lords and masters without hesitation for life is that the modern citizen is more fully aware of their rights and obligations. Therefore, modern citizens are far less likely in the long run to acquiesce to control and hierarchy (Taylor, 1990a, 1990b) and if they do it will become even more difficult to promote authentic practices in the long run. These competing forces exist within the modern corporate and Western world and without a secure anchor in a civil society could create a reverse impact – as Taylor explains in his work on cultural relations – as ‘a movement in history, we can imagine a reversal; should the Taliban offensive ever reach Chicago, you’ll see’ (Taylor, 1999c, p. 162). This outcome is also part of the vicious cycle of rationalism – in the 20th century, workers served under the notion that a company would provide unlimited employment. The destruction of this concept, mass layoffs, downsizing, and outsourcing was to introduce new problems for corporations which were brought entirely on themselves, although largely unforeseen at the time. The modern worker has far less hesitation in switching jobs, companies, careers, and countries when the opportunity presents itself in a suitably compelling way. Control hierarchies predicated on, and legitimised by, appeals to instrumental rationality provide the context for action that sustains the deployment of control and manipulation. Yet, workers are less likely than ever before to accept that control and manipulation are the means to govern their lives (Foucault, 1979; Knights, 1992; Knights & Morgan, 1991). This presents modern corporations with both a paradox and a dilemma. In some respect, the modern company has never had more power to control the lives of its workers; in other respects, it has never been more dependent on the good will of its employees, and increasingly, entire communities in which corporations operate.

88 Critical accountability The ability of the corporation to repair damaged relationships is dictated by the Nature and scope of acceptable practices, engineering the inevitable compromise of making a business case for corporate social responsibility (Quarter, 2000). Accordingly, management’s adoption of corporate social strategies has often been interpreted as simply window-dressing strategies that are designed to sustain a competitive advantage (Kotler & Lee, 2005; Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998). It seems the time has come to look for new and sustainable ways to build relationships that not only drive the company’s profitability, but also strengthen its bonds between people within the company, and the communities that exist outside of its boundary (Kotler & Lee, 2005; Margolis & Walsh, 2003). Through a better understanding, the boundary of a corporation with its communities we can begin to develop alternative criteria to circumvent the negative consequences associated with instrumental reason on which mainstream accountability is enabled. Instrumental reason is the kind of rationality that we draw on when we calculate the most economical application of means to a given end – maximise outputs and minimise costs within a broad cost-benefit legitimation of action (Taylor, 1992a, p. 5). The conventional accountability application of instrumental reason implies a neutral orientation possessing both constructive and destructive potential. The realisation of this potential depends on parameters such as individual morality and ideological commitment distinct from, and independent of, the application of rational processes. Machines, professionals, and administrative hierarchies represent the physical, intellectual, and organisational manifestations of instrumental rationality. These manifestations define and construct the organisational context and over time overwhelm individual morality and community structures. As Dillard and Ruchala (2005) have noted administrative and accountability practices facilitate the divorce of collective norms from their moral context – fractured and damaged relations are the result. Their argument is based on the claims made by Adams and Balfour: One is rarely confronted with a clear, ‘up or down’ decision on an ethical issue; rather a series of small, usually ambiguous choices are made, and the weight of commitment and of habit drives out morality. The skids are further greased if the situation is defined or presented as technical, or calling for expert judgment, or is legitimized by organizational authority. It becomes an even easier choice if the immoral choice has itself been redefined, through a moral inversion, as the ‘good’ or ‘right’ thing to do. (Adams & Balfour, 1998, p. 25) Organisational violence refers to physical or emotional harm done to individuals as a result of actions carried out on behalf of the organisation.5 It is important to differentiate this concept from ‘workplace violence’, which

The public sphere, corporations, and society 89 is physical or emotional violence inflicted by employees or former employees on their colleagues or supervisors. The physical harm inflicted on a co-worker by a disgruntled colleague is an example of workplace violence and would not be related to carrying out his or her organisational responsibilities. Invariably, this political analysis begins by explaining the conceptual limitations of instrumental reason and the dominant scientific approach to culture, life, and accountability of people. It is argued that there is a big mistake operating in our culture which involves how we come to understand what it is to know through instrumental reason. The methods and means through which we arrive at our policies and strategies are designed to maximise outputs and minimise costs. Nevertheless, others have argued that this has had dire effects on both theory and practice in a host of domains including accountability. As stated earlier we might: [S]ay that we (mis)understand knowledge as ‘mediational’ which means that how we grasp external reality is through our internal images in the mind. (The comment is from Dreyfus’s (2004, p. 60) interview with Taylor.)6 It is argued that when states of minds correctly and reliably represent what is out there, there is knowledge but this thinking emphasises the discovery of evidence in favour of explanatory theories (Dreyfus, 2004, p. 53).

Accountability, management, and knowledge Addressing the problems in organisational, civil society, and accountability research involves determining whether such institutions fulfil the objectives of the critical accountability project. That is, it was argued that interpretative inspired frameworks reduce the gap between how accountability implements policy and what workers need for the own life plans to be realised and treated with respect. At issue are the accountability and fairness credentials of management – put simply, it was argued that the neoclassical corporation and modern accountability can be reshaped through interpretation and understanding which searches to create authentic social change. The fundamental feature of modern accountability is the relationship, or association between the worker and the organisation, which is invariably based on control and manipulation through procedure. Therefore, the question may be reduced to one concerning the appropriateness of procedure at the expense of interpretation. A fresh examination is possible when derived from a third conception of civil society of organisational theory – to repair relationships which have been damaged by greed, procedure, and disrespect. In fact, it is argued that understanding civil society from the third perspective provides a deeper way to think about civil society than the

90 Critical accountability dominant discourse which has influenced organisational and accountability theory. The type of activity that would fulfil the aims and objectives of a reconciled organisational structure would reflect a civil society in a broader sense; that is, a workplace, organisation, or society where people are able to seriously influence the policies implemented in society. On such a view, it is possible to construct a role for accountability that does not fall victim to the assimilating logic of capitalism and treat workers as tools in the processes of production. Further to this, the move towards dialectical thinking pieces together the tension between ideas; for example, the conflict between proponents of progressive social change and conservatives to whom civil society needs no change. These are important issues not only for management, because whole social systems have been affected by them. This way to think about the dimension of the employee factor involves not only developing and theorising the tensions between ideas, but also to recognise that economic and managerial ideas cannot be studied in isolation from political and social forces. On this view, social attempts to reform accountability represent an attempt to construct an accountable and democratic public sphere to transform the world, politics, and culture. The limitations of minimalist, pragmatic conceptions of management and organisational change can be better understood by theorising how we understand civil society and how we treat others. When corporate social responsibility programmes are framed within the existing conception of civil society, the possibilities for change are limited. Again, when corporations do good things only to help themselves, there is a profound limit on just how much good they can do in fostering better relationships. Without a full analysis of the contours of that debate, it is probable that policies provide only a superficial interpretation into the processes involved in civil society research. The deeper social problems that civil society research aim to address remain under-theorised and involve whether interpretation and understanding can reveal the ideological problems in corporate and social governance and thus create a truly civil society. Having understood that there are forms of life and intelligible meaning in our everyday practices not only challenges the technical and scientific vision of the world but invites us to rethink our stance towards these practices. These are important insights if we are to repair damaged relations, and they invite us to consider to what extent do current corporate initiatives actually achieve their intended outcomes, and under what conditions these goals could be achieved.

Conclusion In sum, there are profound contradictions between societal expectations of corporations and what corporations can actually deliver in relation to the management of people in organisational settings. Broader social

The public sphere, corporations, and society 91 goals such as democracy, social justice, citizens’ health and welfare, environmental integrity, and cultural identity are sometimes incompatible with the narrower corporate goals of self-interest and shareholder value and require a regulatory system with authority and democratic legitimacy that go beyond those provided by a market-based system. In this era of ‘partnerships’, we need more research done with a critical lens on the actual outcomes delivered by any structured partnerships between governments, non-governmental organisations, and corporations. This may take the form of social and employee accounts which may allow us to say that in some instances the corporation is a useful vehicle for social change but in other circumstances there will be a need for more regulation and community involvement. What kind of future awaits us depends on how we negotiate these profound contradictions and challenges.

Notes 1 Parts of this chapter emanate from Lehman G. (2007). 2 Underlying this management argument lies a series of environmental issues concerned with limits to growth and how they will be managed. To move towards what Taylor (1978a) calls a ‘steady state society’, economic systems will have to recognise and operate within these limits. 3 It will be remembered that Hegel developed a way of thinking which emphasises the social dimensions of civil society. This is to be contrasted with those economic approaches, including taxation, that focus on financial relationships at the expense of the common bonds that make up a society. 4 Townley et al. (2003, p. 2) have explored the logic of modern management, noting that this is a discourse that harkens back to the Enlightenment discourse of rationalisation as the pursuit of reason in human affairs. They argue that traditional management, in following Enlightenment ideals, fails to take into account not only political structures but also local cultural differences. 5 As Dillard and Ruchala observe ‘[o]rganizational violence can be direct, such as in the Holocaust, in which people were killed as a direct result of the organizational policies or indirect, such as the loss of employees’ pensions as a result of the collapse of Enron’. Adams and Balfour (1998) also describe the Challenger space shuttle disaster and the act of tobacco companies’ conspiring to continue to sell cigarettes in the face of known health hazards as other examples of organisational violence. 6 Descartes in one of his letters, declared himself ‘assure, que je ne puis avoir aucune connaissance de ce qui est hors de moi, que par l’entremise des idees que j’ai eu en moi’. From the letter to Gibieuf, January 19, 1642, which comes from the mediational passage ‘You inquire about the principle by which I claim to know that the idea I have of something is not an idea made inadequate by the abstraction of my intellect. I derive this knowledge purely from my own thought or consciousness. I am certain that I can have no knowledge of what is outside me except by means of the ideas I have within me; and so I take great care not to relate my judgements immediately to things in the world, and not to attribute to such things anything positive which I do not first perceive in the ideas of them (Descartes, 1970, p. 123).

92 Critical accountability

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The public sphere, corporations, and society 93 Corporate Social and Environmental Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume, 12, Number 6, pp. 713–733. Lehman, G. (2002). Globalisation and the Authentic Self: Cosmopolitanism and Charles Taylor’s Communitarianism, Global Society, Volume 16, Number 4, pp. 419–437. Lehman, G. (2004). Social and Environmental Accounting: Trends and Thoughts for the Future, Accounting Forum, Volume 28, Number 1, pp. 1–5. Lehman, G. (2007). A Common Pitch and the Management of Corporate Relations: Interpretation, Ethics and Managerialism, Journal of Business Ethics, Volume 71, p. 161–178. Lehman, G. (2010a). Interpretive Accounting Research, Accounting Forum, Volume 34, Number 3–4, pp. 231–235. Lehman, G. (2010b). Perspectives on Accounting, Commonalities & the Public Sphere, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 21, Number 8, pp. 724–738 Lehman, G. (2011a). The Management of Sustainability: The Art of Interpretation, Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research, Volume 9, pp. 75–88. Lehman, G. (2011b). Interpretivism, Postmodernism and the Natural Environment, Philosophy and Social Criticism, Volume 37, pp. 795–821. Lehman, G. (2013). Critical Reflections on Laughlin’s Middle Range Research Approach: Language Not Mysterious?, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 24, Number 3, pp. 211–224. Lehman, G. (2015). Charles Taylor’s Ecological Conversations, London, PalgraveMacmillan. Lehman, G. (2017). The Language of Environmental and Social Accounting Research: The Expression of Beauty and Truth, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 44, pp. 30–41. MacIntyre, A. (1995). The Spectre of Communitarianism, Radical Philosophy, Volume 70, p. 35. Margolis, J. D. & Walsh, J. P. (2003). Misery Loves Companies: Rethinking Social Initiatives by Business, Administrative Science Quarterly, Volume 48, Number 2, pp. 268–305. Neu, D., Warsame, H. & Pedwell, K. (1998). Managing Public Impressions: Environmental Disclosures in Annual Reports, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 23, Number 3, pp. 265–283. Quarter, J. (2000). Beyond the Bottom Line: Socially Innovative Business Owners, Westport, Quorum. Sagie, A. & Koslowsky, M. (1994). Organizational Attitudes and Behaviors as a Function of Participation in Strategic and Tactical Change Decisions: An Application of Path – Goal Theory, Journal of Organizational Behaviour, Volume 15, Number 1, pp. 37–49. Shotter, J. (2005). Inside the Moment of Managing: Wittgenstein and the Everyday Dynamics of Our Expressive-Responsive Activities, Organization Studies, Volume 26, Number 1, pp. 113–135. Taylor, C. (1977). What is human agency? in Mischel, T. (Ed.), The Self: Psychological and Philosophical Issues, Oxford, Oxford University Press (pp. 114–115). Taylor, C. (1978a). Politics of the Steady State, New Universities Quarterly, Volume 32, Number 2, pp. 157–184.

94 Critical accountability Taylor, C. (1978b). Hegel’s Sittlichkeit and the Crisis of Representative Institutions, in Yovel, Y. (Ed.), Philosophy and the History of Action, Jerusalem, The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University (pp. 133–154). Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the Self, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. (1990a). Modes of Civil Society, Public Culture, Volume 3, Number 1, pp. 95–118. Taylor, C. (1990b). Irreducibly Social Goods, in Brennan, G. & Walsh, C. (Eds.), Rationality, Individualism and Public Policy, Canberra, Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, the Australian National University (pp. 45–64). Taylor, C. (1992a). The Ethics of Authenticity, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Taylor, C. (1992b). Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, edited by A. Gutmann, Princeton, New Jersey, NY, Princeton University Press. Taylor, C. (1999a). A Catholic Modernity, in Heft, J. L. (Ed.), A Catholic Modernity?: Charles Taylors Marianist Award Lecture, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Taylor, C. (1999b). Concluding Reflections and Comments, in Heft, J. L. (Ed.), A Catholic Modernity?: Charles Taylors Marianist Award Lecture, Oxford, Oxford University Press (pp. 105–127). Taylor, C. (1999c). Comment on Jurgen Habermas from Kant to Hegel and Back Again, European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 7, Number 2, pp 158–160. Taylor, C. (2002a). On Social Imaginary, http://www.nyu.edu/classes/calhoun/ Theory/Taylor-on-si.htm (Accessed December 12, 2002). Taylor, C. (2002b). Understanding the Other: A Gadamerian View on Conceptual Schemes, in Malpas J., von Arnswald, U. & Kertscher, J. (Eds.), Gadamer’s Century: Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Boston, MIT Press (pp. 279–297). Reprinted as ‘Gadamer and the Human Sciences’ in Dostal, R. J. (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer, Cambridge University Press (2002) (pp. 126–142). Townley, B. (2004). Managerial Technologies, Ethics & Managing, Human Relations, Volume 57, Number 7, pp. 893–909. Townley, B., Cooper, D. J. & Oakes, L. (2003). Performance Measures and the Rationalisation of the Organisation, Organization Studies, Volume 24, Number 7, pp. 1045–1071.

6

External relations Re-engaging the company with the community in which it operates

Once the corporation has repaired the fractured relationships that exist within its ranks, it must then find ways to re-engage with a community and marketplace that is increasingly sceptical of corporate window-dressing and publicity relations exercises.

External relations, re-engaging the community with the community in which it operates Once the corporation has repaired the fractured relationships that exist within its ranks, it must then find ways to re-engage with a community and marketplace that is increasingly sceptical of corporate window-dressing and publicity relations exercises.1 It is one thing for a company to promote its sponsorship, schemes, and environmental strategies as part of ‘social responsibility’ programmes – and another to have the community see that move as an authentic attempt at relevant social reconciliation. Actions taken primarily for public relations reasons will eventually be caught out by a suspicious public – for a company wishing to be seen to be doing the right and good thing, it must not only do right but do it for the right reasons (Bansal & Roth, 2000). The keyword here, again, is authenticity which involves recognising that corporate actions impact the community practices in which they operate (Taylor, 1992a). For example, an external company auditor might look at the social and environmental policies that a company has in place and justify its success in purely quantifiable terms (Carroll, 1979, 1999; Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998). Many company statements emphasise, for example, how many trees were planted over what area in what time frame and at what dollar cost to the company. This is then viewed as a measure of the company’s role as a ‘good corporate citizen’. The problem is that many of the things that would make a genuinely good corporate citizen are not necessarily quantifiable so crudely. This is where civil society as defined by Taylor’s first definition in Chapter 5 of this book is found to be lacking. If we remain locked into one way of viewing the community and the company’s place in it, then other ways of thinking probably will not even enter managerial consciousness. For corporate change to have any

96 Critical accountability chance of engaging the community in which it operates, it must do three things: (a) see the true measure of its environment; (b) understand that environment; and (c) take authentically motivated actions which are productive, in terms seen as productive by that community. A traditional positivist accountability and accountability strategy, informed by scientific principles stretching back to the Enlightenment, probably won’t be able to see the difference because it struggles to recognise alternative frames of reference. It’s like the riddle as to the sound of one hand clapping: how do you learn to ‘see’ a community and the factors that shape culture and value? One positivist response that dominates accountability theory is to generate more procedures and policies and continue to analyse the results in terms of numbers. The proposal of this chapter is that the enlightened manager positioning a company for the years ahead must build up a richer picture and interpret their activities in the light of the communities in which they operate. With regard to the process of accountability, this thinking points towards an ideal of authenticity which is defined as autonomy within context, but the context is not an instrumental one. Authenticity is not something which may be weighed or traded (Taylor, 1992a). It is about people’s being-in-theworld and is something different from economic notions of choosing how to maximise the options which confront us. This awareness has the potential to repair damaged reputations and relationships through a subtle language where communication involves hearing the point of view of the other (Taylor, 1991f). This approach involves the spontaneous, everyday metaphors we use which express our deeper motives and values. While scholars from a variety of theoretical perspectives have long studied the causes and benefits of maintaining positive relationships, it is in the art of interpretation that makes rationally visible the implicit features of usually unnoticed methods that people use to get around in the world. Interpreters have referred to these abilities as everyday coping skills which usually go unnoticed in our explanations of behaviour (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015; Shotter, 2005). Through the provision of better interpretations, one corporate response is to articulate that meaning and value can be considered from a holistic approach to epistemology. This is achieved where people have not only abilities to express thoughts through language but possess pre-conceptual and innate skills that allow us to get about in the world (Taylor, 1992b, 2002b, 2003a).

Engaged agency and practical reason German philosopher Martin Heidegger lectured to business people after the Second World War, when it was reported he doubted the adaptability of the art of interpretation to everyday affairs. One of the contentions of this chapter is that Heidegger probably under-estimated the role that

External relations 97 interpretation and understanding can play. A good manager thinks broadly, has empathy, and learns from the mistakes of their predecessors, it is contended. One of the issues implicit in this is emotional intelligence versus intellectual intelligence, and this requires careful analysis and understanding. Emotional intelligence is not a matter of education, but more a matter of empathy, interpretation, and common sense. The problem, as Voltaire (1764) observed, is that ‘common sense is not so common’, that is, the problem for accountability is that procedure submerges the vitality of human endeavour. Accountability by procedure cuts interpretation off precisely at the time when it is most needed. People’s lives consist of vastly more than artificial structures of governance and corporate procedure – they include customs, habits and traditions, local values, and ways of living that usually stretch back vastly further than the companies operating in their midst. Ironically, the non-traditional business managers can be the vastly better managers if they understand the genuine impact of their corporate actions on the community and conduct themselves in a fashion that is seen to be empathetic, authentic, and productive socially as well as financially. As an analogy, Singer (1983) suggests taking a perspective from above a streetscape where the view might look merely aesthetically pleasing – could this interpretation be regarded as window dressing? The initial answer is equivocal and requires further interpretation and investigation. But if we travel through it at street level and find it functional as well as pleasing to the people who interact with it, then it is likely that the interpreter will find that it works. A too-narrow definition of civil society and the corporate role within it misses so many intrinsic factors that make a company and community work. To understand these, we must understand communities at a broader level which involves the art of interpretation and understanding, that is, in Singer’s example the judgement occurs at the metaphorical street level. The problem with definitions of civil society that are too narrow is that they inevitably reach what seems like an impenetrable impasse in their progress – this is the point at which interpreters, managers, and people might ask ‘is this as far as we can go?’. The question reduces to one concerning whether this the authentic and correct interpretation? If the answer is in the negative, the analysis cannot proceed even though the means by which to do so may not be readily apparent, may not seem easy, and in fact may not lie totally within the realm of control of the corporation at all.2 This is where the third definition of civil society, as defined by Taylor, enters the picture. Let us quickly recap the intent of the first two definitions of a civil society, to give the third context: 1

Involves minimal government involvement, and free association determines the strength and Nature of the bonds of a society.

98 Critical accountability 2 3

Society as a whole structures itself and co-ordinates its own actions, again largely free and independent of the State. In the third definition of civil society, an ensemble of associations directs the State and determines State policy. In other words, communities and corporations operate in a more co-operative fashion to direct governments towards results that are more authentically beneficial for all concerned.

Is this a fanciful vision of a non-existent society? The fact that these authentic communal bonds don’t yet widely exist as standard business practice is not in itself evidence that they cannot exist and will not exist. It is in this space of uncertainty – but also possibility – that the enlightened manager can step in to make their contribution. The positivist viewpoint is that there is no contribution to make until the measure of its success is empirically obvious. The enlightened manager believes that something not yet revealed may be discovered and then revealed. The mere failure to find a better way does not negate the possibilities implicit in a better way. Philosopher Peter Singer offers a useful Hegelian inspired parable that can be adapted to consider dilemmas between employers and employees that result from accountability practices. This parable that may illustrate why modern accountability and technical procedure have been a glorious failure, and what he would have us learn from it: When people first began to live in towns, no one thought of town planning. They just put up their houses, shops, and factories wherever seemed most convenient, and the cities grew higgledy-piggledy. Then along came someone who said: ‘This is no good! We are ruled by chance! We need someone to plan our towns, to make them conform to our ideals of beauty and good living’. So along came the town-planners who bulldozed the old neighbourhoods and erected streamlined highrise apartment buildings, surrounded by swathes of green lawns. Road were widened and straightened, shopping centres were put up in the midst of generous parking areas, and factories were carefully isolated from residential zones. (Singer, 1983, pp. 50–51) At some point, order had entered the system – although order itself eventually gave way to high-rise buildings and traffic jams. In Singer’s example, we can see that a society swapped one set of problems for another. As the new planned cities, emerged based on rational design, many people complained that now no one was walking, and the streets had become unsafe. As new managers and planners were employed, they learned from the mistakes of their predecessors – and the first thing they did was to put a stop to the demolition of old neighbourhoods. Instead, they began to notice the positive features of the old, unplanned towns and supported the varied

External relations 99 ‘vistas of the narrow, crooked streets, and noticed how convenient it was to have shops and residences and even small factories mixed up together’ (Singer, 1983, p. 51). They remarked on how these kept traffic to a minimum, encouraged people to walk, and made the town centre both lively and safe.3 Singer continues that the new town planners discovered that the old cities worked – that there were some things which could never be reduced to rational principles, or procedure. This was, of course, despite the fact that fine-tuning was deemed to be desirable, because when towns were first built there was no notion of town planning – structures were located in a haphazard and undirected way.

Improving corporate relations The relevance of this parable involves the supposition that there is something innate and important in the way that people get about in our everyday lives. Not only does this require interpretation but also recognition that culture and values matter, that is, engagements with others and with communities can never be modelled with abstract neatness. Therefore, it is important to recognise that there are no over-arching principles to manage relations between people – no-one right way exists and no blue-print can be offered. Rather, it is with empathy and magnanimity that engagement, interpretation, and understanding can be nurtured and developed.4 The challenge in re-engaging a company with the community in which it operates is to evolve the nature of the communal relationship between them and to operate with empathy and foresight so that one set of problems does not merely make way for another. As fresh challenges arise, they can be dealt with, but there must be interim growth and benefit to that community, perceived in terms relevant to that community (Taylor, 2002a). To return to the analogy of the streetscape, it is not enough to take action that is based on rational and procedural calculation in mind – actions must be taken with empathy and understanding of a community at the street level. Only then will we have the genuine ability to judge whether it ‘works’. On the one hand, the traditional manager may act to ruthlessly extract as much money out of every employee as possible, during which the worker may have to account for every time interval of their day. On the other hand, the worker who views themselves as unreasonably situated may resign from their job easily and move elsewhere without recrimination or guilt. In the past, one of these statements might have been true, and the opposite expression of the idea was unlikely to be true. But in modern times both statements can be true simultaneously, one does not exclude the other. Again, it is a paradox of modern society that companies have so much potential control over the lives of their workers, and yet are becoming more susceptible to the whims of an increasingly disgruntled workforce which is less afraid to express its displeasure.

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Accountability theory has adopted this way to understand the world and mirrors this objectivity in the design of policy and procedure. More procedure and more rational principles have the potential to mask constitutive and common relationships that reflect people’s humanity. More common incidents have arisen in relationships among co-workers, leaders, and subordinates, or departments for reasons such as conflicting goals, organisational changes, and different values or cultures (Kanter, 1985, 1994, 1999). Recognising the economic, social, and emotional costs of damaged relationships and reputations is one thing, it is another matter entirely to develop a framework to repair them and create a culture that treats living beings as citizens and community members. This thinking recognises that the stance that we adopt has impacts on others and their values. This challenging problem involves how modern managerial fails to engage with others, and this can be attributed to the implausible conception of the person on which neo-classical economic theory has been constructed. Only in a world technical world where there is no ultimate meaning is it possible to think of the citizen, employee, or self as independent of any attachments.5 Clearly though, instrumental reason limits the options available to the self’s being defined as independent of communal affiliations and free to choose its own ends. With respect to the processes of accountability, an economic frame of reference can mislead the organisation into believing that workers are expendable and can be easily replaced in the search to maximise profit. Accordingly, our methods of accountability, based as they are on economic ideals, inexorably tend towards methods of control and manipulation. Fractured relations invariably result.

Rebuilding the corporation from the inside out – the role of the public sphere If managers rely purely on the current logic of procedure and bureaucracy, the art of interpretation as an accountability tool is submerged and masked. In the words of Taylor, a ‘purely procedural ethic … radically misses its goal’ (Taylor 1991f, p. 31). Interpretation and understanding thereby combat the colonising force of instrumental reason and the narrow and technical conception of civil society, freedom, and liberty on which traditional accountability has been based. The company as an enriched civil society of its own would be informed by, and supplemented with, regulatory mechanisms that actually focus on the real contexts and languages that employees and workers use in their everyday practices of the organisation. This, in turn, would allow recognition of the fact that the logic which has been used to govern corporations, communities, and the institutions of society submerges not only the rights of employees but their creative potential. The approach adopted in this chapter calls for the development of organisational approaches and interpretivist frameworks in a manner consistent with the needs of civil society and the provision of common goods.6

External relations 101 More particularly, the recognition that the company is not only a profit centre but a community is helpful in looking behind the reasons for each and every layer upon layer of procedure. This suggests an evolved role for accountability, which is assessable on the basis of familiarity with people and how their individual uniqueness enables them to act and live in the organisation. It also requires that accountability adopt a substantive strategy which engages with the world, that is, it does not rely solely on the basis of how actions and policies affect the bottom line. While technical and procedural accountability have investigated the antecedents and the costs of damaged relationships, there has been only a smouldering interest in the problem of repairing relationships. There has been no concerted effort, and little by way of conceptual foundations or theoretical frameworks, that would stimulate research and facilitate analysis in this area. Often analytic and positivist accountability research consider the links between the realisation of freedom and civil society to be based on a questionable dialectical logic which attempts to explain every social conflict by exposing layers of contradictions. Thus, the key issue is whether accountability satisfies these ideals as they shape people’s freedom. This is not to argue that workers are, or should be, equal partners in the company in a participative framework but involves distinguishing between simple control and the interpretation of patterns of behaviour associated with real-living beings. It is problematic whether broad economic and incentive approaches to accountability reform will bring about the desired organisational and social change (Treviño & Weaver, 1999). The long-run viability of the corporation is seriously compromised when the process of managing has limited strategic vision to accommodate unforeseen impacts and unforeseen contingencies. For example, the dominant corporate social responsibility perspectives assume that people can live together despite their differences, but this assumption ignores how lives are embedded in contexts which might be idiosyncratic yet nevertheless significant for workers (Shotter, 2005). In exploring different means to repair fractured relationships within a more robust democratic framework, it is possible to offer not only procedural reform but also a means to explore how they contribute to the good and wellbeing of the members of the corporation. This way of thinking offers a stark contrast with the many apologetic approaches that rely on corporate value statements that glide over any analysis of social antagonisms. In one study concerning analysis of aggression by employees, Dietz, Robinson, Folger, Baron, and Schulz (2003) noted that organisations have not only a moral but an economic reason to engage in societal efforts to curb social problems such as violence. This might be achieved in a society that interprets and searches for the common purposes that bring people together in a spirit of openness and transparency. This argument has been supported by Robinson and Rousseau (1994) who argued: ‘managers who promote open two-way communication may be able to nip in the bud

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discrepancies in employer commitments and employee experiences’. On this view, the role of the manager is not only to maximise profit but with empathy create channels of communication such that the rights and needs of workers are treated as citizens and given adequate consideration (Taylor, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c). When organisations are structured and managed along the lines of the neo-classical economic corporation, we are left with a minimal conception of a civil society. This thinking limits the role of employees to workers who merely facilitate the processes of profit maximisation. From the history of ideas, however, the minimal conception of civil society can be challenged by a broader dialectical thinking that confronts the tension between ideas, logic, and systems (Heidegger, 1962). The aim of this dialectical thinking is to create a structure – a culture – through which individual demands for self-realisation are given authentic reflection in addressing current conflict, anomie, and disenchantment.7 This is a kind of managing that cannot be done sitting in one’s office, concerned with cost-cutting and the bottom line. It is a management that requires authoring, constructing, and nurturing ways to respect and understand how people get about in the organisation. All involved in the organisation must strive to create authentic practices which enliven our work-life, but to see new worlds and opportunities otherwise hidden behind the routines involved in production scheduling and never-ending mechanical procedures. Overcoming a cycle of conflict, distrust, or revenge is essential in rebuilding trust in interpersonal, intergroup, or inter-organisational relationships. It is the contention of this chapter that only authentically motivated interpretation, rather than procedure, has the potential to develop an organisational structure and accountability system consistent with the needs of a civil society – again, one which heals differences and repairs fractured relationships that have damaged people’s self-identity. Some theorists argue that enlightened corporate accountability – such as corporate responsibility programmes – can only go so far in terms of producing positive organisational outcomes. In problematising the notion that corporate initiatives can address workers’ needs for fair and just treatment, it is useful to determine whether they are compatible with the shareholder wealth-maximising model. That is, do the limits of corporate rationality, together with the neo-classical vision of the firm on which it is based, curtail social responsibility initiatives. This is because if a corporation ‘can do good only to help itself do well, there is a profound limit on just how much good it can do’ (Bakan, 2004, p. 50) – the possibilities for not only enlightened accountability but civic appreciation are curtailed. However, corporations do not exist in isolation but are actors in a much larger and more complex political economy (Shotter, 2005). If the organisational level of analysis produces limited social outcomes, what kind of outcomes could we get if we conducted our analysis at the level of the office-floor as well as the boardroom? Slowly, organisational studies have

External relations 103 been moving towards a dialectical approach to consider and develop new strategies to reform accountability and organisational relationships. According to Purser and Cabana: The self-managing organization requires a radical change in the design and management of the enterprise. The shift to self-management involves uprooting work arrangements and authority structures that have enjoyed immunity from fundamental change under the protection of a dominant hierarchy. Deep, system-wide, and democratic change can cause distress, anger and resistance among those who have become accustomed to the status quo. (Purser & Cabana, 1998, p. 38) One way to respond to these limits of participation and in organisations involves moving the analysis from procedural democratic theory, to a democratic approach which nurtures commonalities in a spirit of openness and share in the organisation (Sagie & Koslowsky, 1994; Taylor, 2002). This thinking requires not simply a movement from cost-benefit thinking, but an avowed commitment to a management that disturbs prejudice and embraces the background values of significance. These accountability ideals are subject to principles of reasonableness and toleration which are explicitly worked out and discussed in a robust conception of civil society (definition three above). Although Kerr (2004) correctly portrays the limits of democracy in organisational theory, his analysis of its limits can be addressed when the analysis moves to the meso and macro levels of interpretation and understanding (Taylor, 2017d). Can corporations work with employees and workers to produce more comprehensive, democratic and justifiable social outcomes? This depends on accountability’s ability to deal with the dynamics of power relations and how political, economic, and social tensions at the macro-organisational level are influenced by relational and network dynamics at the meso level. This sets the perceptible boundaries of what a corporation can or cannot do to promote positive organisational democracy and social change (Taylor, 2017c). From this perspective, neo-classical based theories of the corporation can be theorised not only from a critical perspective but also in terms of their aesthetic and interpretative credentials. This involves understanding the complexities of ordinary life and how it is through language and understanding that accountability can interpret and recognise the background horizons of meaning in people’s lives. This suggests that while managers may not be able to accommodate all values in a meaningful whole, it does suggest that we can improve our practices and facilitate meaningful communication in not only a participatory organisational structure but one connected with the ideals of republicanism with democratic overlays. This approach moves thinking towards an ethic of authenticity which

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involves the development of practices that allow people to fulfil their individual aims and objectives. Traditional thinking ignores the ethic of authenticity and assumes that competition and efficiency lead to unambiguous improvements. As mentioned earlier, Taylor has explained the ethical problems associated with positivist and procedural approaches – these approaches ignore people’s substantive values. This lacuna is at their peril. He points to the role of moral progress and the need to discuss and explore the reasons associated with different moral values. He explains: Take gender equality. It is astonishing how recently the franchise was extended to women. In the 19th century, a great majority of both sexes concurred in the idea that this was against the order of things. Today, these arguments are virtually unrecoverable. Just as an argument held in some timeless empyrean, we can imagine people going either way, being convinced that women were different in some way which justified denying them the vote, or else being convinced to abandon this view. Again, as a movement in history, we can imagine a reversal; should the Taliban offensive ever reach Chicago, you’ll see. (Taylor, 1999c, p. 6) Thus, efforts to accommodate difference within that common appreciation do not impose a common good on the organisational community, leaving less and less room for reasonable divergence. This accountability thinking is about explaining our organisational practices and improving them in ways which bring out the everydayness of how we cope with stresses, pressure, and time commitments. Therefore, ethical, organisational, and accountability research can be used to repair fractured relationships through the provision of frameworks and research-based knowledge that systematically identify how actions, processes, and contexts shape people’s values and ideals. For managers committed to the development of ethical thinking notions of accountability, democracy and governance require not only more discussion about the connection between the common good and organisational dialogue but structures to facilitate that dialogue. From Taylor, this involves dialogue and structures that consider the ontological factors that shape different notions of human agency (Hollenbach & Hollenbach, 2002). According to Taylor (2002c) in his Varieties of Religion Today, the dominant Western ontology of individualism has submerged these discussions concerning the common values that in turn shape people’s background values. The processes of instrumental thinking have the potential to ignore moral and theistic dimensions, as if it is in the private sphere that ethical and moral dilemmas are solved. Again, ethics, morals, and religion involve considering the possibilities involved in a vision of society that explicitly fosters the virtues that are needed to repair fractured relationships in organisational settings. Thus, the ‘social imaginary’ or ‘ontology’ that Taylor offers is at odds with pictures of society that rely on more

External relations 105 procedure which drive a wedge between people’s private morality and their public lives. The dominant social image of a free-market actually has worked in tandem with modernity’s secular processes where procedures define ‘the good’. What this does is make the role of virtuous practice within civil society a matter of procedure (discussed earlier). Other ways to think and act are lost on a high tide of procedure and bureaucracy – civil society and the fostering of ethical relationships is locked into market structures without full dialectical consideration of the connections between the common good and the dialogue needed to take place in order for other voices and values to be articulated. Awareness of both commonalities and outside factors will enable managers to benefit from what this chapter calls ‘moments of recognition’ which are worked out in dynamic civil societies that foster engagement and mutual co-ordination (Lehman, 2002, 2004, 2017).8 These are the daily incidents and interactions through which a manager can see how things move and work in their organisations. It is at these times that a manager preparing for the challenges of the decade ahead will find many opportunities to inspire, recognise, and interpret the activities and people around them.

Conclusion However, needs of the political world are moving on. People are at a certain level of cognitive development where they are beginning to realise, resent, and reject employers who regard them merely as units of production through which maximum profit can be extracted. Therefore, how does one make sense of this in terms of corporate expectations so that managers may find a way of thinking that recognises companies are needed in a capitalist system (given that the alternatives have failed) – but in a way which recognises human dignity and worth? Any alternative must recognise that command and control technologies to facilitate the market are likely not only to damage the rights of workers but fail to nurture the common bonds needed for society to function. One such solution involves the second conception of civil society that Taylor has outlined – which offers new ways to explore relations with others. His second definition of civil society occupies a different political space than that of the free market’s invisible guiding hand and new ways to understand how we can arrive at unique interpretations and understandings of people and how they act. This is not simply an argument to socialise work relations and structures and dismantle the current means of production but does act at the social level to nurture commonalities and intrinsic values, and through finding ways to encourage people to handle their differences. By recognising differences, we can manage them – it is otherwise very difficult to manage that which we cannot see and do not understand. Put differently, the different levels of civil society and the interpretations within each enable us to understand how people act in organisations and the type of factors that are significant for them.

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Notes 1 This section of the chapter focuses on cultural and value differences as they impact the corporate desire to repair relationships. 2 The analysis can be extended to consider damaged relations in a global world order. This involves exploring questions about whether corporations in a free market are the best means to create relationships between communities. What seems to have happened is that some nation-states have sought alliances with global organisations to avoid the universal implications of global free trade where corporations can move offshore at any time (Schuermann, 1999). The net effect has been to give more power to global corporations as agents of economic and political reform without political consideration of the social and environmental consequences. Part of any solution to the problems associated with globalisation, then, would be the development of interlocking mechanisms of governance to administer relationships between nation-states and global structures. That is, if a world government relies on the free market it does not possess the political mechanisms through which we distil and create the conditions for reciprocity and trust between nation-states. 3 Singer (1983) notes that not that their admiration for the old unplanned towns was totally unreserved; there were a few things that needed to be tidied up, some particularly offensive industries were moved away from where people lived, and many old buildings had to be restored or else replaced with buildings in keeping with the surroundings. 4 Dual theories of the corporation, social responsibility programmes, and other corporate initiatives continue to rely on the corporate form and structure. This thinking, as this chapter has argued, does not provide managers with a framework to engage with communities. Nor does the dominant discourse provide a way to think about existing power structures and the part that they play in damaging relationships among corporations, organisations, and its communities. This chapter has offered an interpretative frame to evaluate the viability of management practice and how they can be integrated into communities and societies. 5 For Taylor, Enlightenment methods are based on a division between mind and body, feeling and will, and instrumental and constitutive reason. They are all a part of our ‘normal way of seeing ourselves [and this] is a regrettable confusion’ (Taylor, 1992a, p. 102). Thus, humanity’s vision is restricted by disengaged reason as if humanity can stand back impartially to adjudicate the direction of communities. MacIntyre (1995) suggests that the Enlightenment is to blame, though a reading of Immanuel Kant’s ‘Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan World View’ would cast doubt on that contention (Kant, 1957, pp. 11–27). 6 Thus, efforts to accommodate difference within a common appreciation do not impose goods in organisations and on communities leaving less and less room for reasonable divergence. This management thinking is about explaining our organisational practices and improving them in ways which bring out the everydayness of how we cope with stresses, pressure, and time commitments. 7 In terms of dialectical debates, three dominant dialectical traditions exist: (a) a dominant scientific tradition which refutes dialectical methods as mystical and subjective; (b) a dialectical representation of reality, culture, and Nature; and (c) an ontic dialectic which investigates culture, history, and politics according to notions of ‘strong-evaluation’ (Taylor, 1986a, p. 141). The first definition emanates from logical positivist sources and is critical of dialectical logic claiming that it unscientific and a self-deception because it confuses certain aspects of subjective thought processes with the objects of that thinking. The second group directly challenges the

External relations 107 first and has been labelled Orthodox Marxists who, in following Engels, sees the structure of reality itself as fundamentally dialectical. The third group, the ontic dialectic, sees the place of dialectical structures in the understanding of human beings, of their life and their history. This third group finds it impossible to give up the occidental scientific tradition altogether, and, at the same time, cannot accept that dialectics should be established as a category of reality as such, in the way it is done under a central dogma of so-called dialectical materialism. 8 The ideal of authenticity is adapted from Heidegger (1962), Taylor (1992) and Trilling (1971) to whom liberation involves the development of social practices that are robust in the way that freedom is facilitated (Lehman, 2000, 2004, 2010a, 2010b, 2015). Thus, central to Taylor’s perspective is that ‘our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves’ (Taylor, 1994, p. 25). A reconciled organisation or society can never be created through an overlapping consensus, nor a mere modus vivendi. Rather, it reflects a strong conception of reconciliation which challenges both free-market and postmodern organisational attempts to facilitate worker reform (Lehman, 1993, 1995, 2000, 2002, 2013).

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External relations 109 Purser, R. E. & Cabana, S. (1998). The Self-Managing Organization: How Leading Companies Are Transforming the Work of Teams for Real Impact, New York, NY, The Free Press. Robinson, S. L. & Rousseau, D. M. (1994). Violating the Psychological Contract: Not the Exception but the Norm, Journal of Organizational Behaviour, Volume 15, Number 4, pp. 245–259. Sagie, A. & Koslowsky, M. (1994). Organizational Attitudes and Behaviors as a Function of Participation in Strategic and Tactical Change Decisions: An Application of Path-Goal Theory, Journal of Organizational Behavior, Volume 15, Number 1, pp. 37–47. Schuerman, W. E. (1999). Economic Globalization and the Rule of Law, Constellations, Volume 6, Number 1, pp. 3–25. Shotter, J. (2005). Inside the Moment of Managing: Wittgenstein and the Everyday Dynamics of Our Expressive-Responsive Activities, Organization Studies, Volume 26, Number 1, pp. 113–135. Singer, P. (1983). Hegel: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Taylor, C. (1986a). Dialektik heute, oder: Strukturen der Selbstnegation, in Henrich, D. (Ed.), Hegels Wissenchaft der Logik: Formation und Rekonstruktion, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta (pp. 141–153). Taylor, C. (1986b). The Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice, in Lukash, F. S. (Ed.), Justice and Equality Here and Now, Ithaca, Cornell University Press (pp. 34–67). Taylor, C. (1990a). Modes of Civil Society, Public Culture, Volume 3, Number 1, pp. 95–118. Taylor, C. (1990b). Irreducibly Social Goods, in Brennan, G. & Walsh, C. (Eds.), Rationality, Individualism and Public Policy, Canberra, Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, The Australian National University (pp. 45–64). Taylor, C. (1991a). The Dialogical Self, in Hiley, D. R., Bohman, J. F. & Shusterman, R. (Eds.), The Interpretive Turn, Ithaca, Cornell Press (pp. 304–315). Taylor, C. (1991b). Civil Society in the Western Tradition, in Groffier, E. & Paradis, M. (Eds.), The Notion of Tolerance and Human Rights, Ottawa, Carleton University Press. Taylor, C. (1991c). The Importance of Herder, in Margalit, E. & Margalit, A. (Eds.), Isaiah Berlin: A Celebration, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press (pp. 40–64) (reprinted in Taylor, C. (1995), Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press (pp. 79–100). Taylor, C. (1991d). Comments and Replies, Inquiry, Volume 34, Number 2, pp. 237–254. Taylor, C. (1991e). Hegel’s Ambitious Legacy for Modern Liberalism, in Cornell, D., Rosenfeld, M. & Carlson, D. G. (Eds.), Hegel and Legal Theory, New York, NY, Routledge (pp. 64–78). Taylor, C. (1991f). Language and Society, in Honneth, A. & Joas, H. (Eds.), Communicative Action, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press (pp. 23–36). Taylor, C. (1992a). The Ethics of Authenticity, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Taylor, C. (1992b). Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, Gutmann, A. (Ed.), Princeton, NY, Princeton University Press.

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Taylor, C. (1992c). Modernity and the Rise of the Public Sphere, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Delivered at Stanford University, February 25, 1992, Salt Lake City, Utah, University of Utah Press (pp. 203–260). Taylor, C. (1992d). Heidegger, Language, and Ecology, in Dreyfus, H. L. & Hall, H. (Eds.), Heidegger: A Critical Reader, Oxford, Blackwells (pp. 247–269). (Reprinted in Taylor, C. (1995). Heidegger, Language and Ecology, in Taylor, C. (1995). Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press (pp. 100–126)). Taylor, C. (1994). Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition: Examining the Politics of Recognition, in Gutmann, A. (Ed.) (expanded edition of Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, 1992), Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press. Taylor, C. (1999a). A Catholic Modernity, in Heft, J. L. (Ed.), A Catholic Modernity?: Charles Taylors Marianist Award Lecture, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Taylor, C. (1999b). Concluding Reflections and Comments, in Heft, J. L. (Ed.), A Catholic Modernity?: Charles Taylors Marianist Award Lecture, Oxford, Oxford University Press (pp. 105–127). Taylor, C. (1999c). Comment on Jurgen Habermas from Kant to Hegel and Back Again, European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 7, Number 2, pp. 158–160. Taylor, C. (2001). A Tension in Modern Democracy, in Botwinick, A. & Conolly, W. (Eds.), Democracy and Vision, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press (pp. 79–99). Taylor, C. (2002a). On Social Imaginary, http://www.nyu.edu/classes/calhoun/ Theory/Taylor-on-si.htm (Accessed December 12, 2002). Taylor, C. (2002b). Understanding the Other: A Gadamerian View on Conceptual Schemes, in Malpas, J., von Arnswald, U. & Kertscher, J. (Ed.), Gadamer’s Century: Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Boston, MIT Press (pp. 279–297). Reprinted as Gadamer and the Human Sciences In The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer, in Dostal, R. J. (Ed.), Cambridge University Press (pp. 126–142). Taylor, C. (2002c). Foundationalism and the Inner-Outer Distinction, in Smith, N. H. (Ed.), Reading McDowell: On Mind and World, London and New York, Routledge (pp. 106–121). Taylor, C. (2003a). Ethics and Ontology, Journal of Philosophy, Volume C, Number 6, pp. 305–319. Taylor, C. (2003b). Heidegger, Language, Ecology, in Wrathall, M. & Dreyfus, H. L. (Eds.), Companion to Heidegger. Oxford, Blackwell Publishing. Taylor, C., & Bernstein, R. J. (2004). What is Pragmatism? in Benhabib, S. & Fraser, N. (Eds.), Pragmatism, Critique, Judgement: Essays for Richard J Bernstein, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press (pp. 73–92). Taylor, C. (2017a). Is Democracy Slipping Away, https://items.ssrc.org/democracypapers/is-democracy-slipping-away/ Taylor, C. (2017b). Converging Roads Around Dilemmas of Modernity, in Lowney, C. W. II (Ed.), Charles Taylor, Michael Polanyi and the Critique of Modernity: Pluralist and Emergentist Directions, London, Palgrave Macmillan (pp. 15–26). Taylor, C. (2017c). Dialogue, Discovery, and an Open Future, in Lowney, C. W. II (Ed.), Charles Taylor, Michael Polanyi and the Critique of Modernity: Pluralist and Emergentist Directions, London, Palgrave Macmillan (pp. 27–49).

External relations 111 Taylor, C. (2017d). The Importance of Engagement, in Lowney, C. W. II (Ed.), Charles Taylor, Michael Polanyi and the Critique of Modernity: Pluralist and Emergentist Directions, London, Palgrave Macmillan (pp. 215–234). Treviño, L. K. & Weaver, G. R. (1999). The Stakeholder Research Tradition: Converging Theorists – Not Convergent Theory, Academy of Management Review, Volume 24, Number 2, pp. 222–227. Trilling, L. (1971). Sincerity and Authenticity, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press. Voltaire. (1764). Dictionnaire Philosophique, Self-Love.

Part II

Philosophical perspectives

7

Basic concepts in accountability research Key accountability theorists and issues1

Introduction: Key accountability thinkers shaping modern accountability This chapter explores some of the dominant Western beliefs about humanity’s relationship with the environment, and how current environmental issues have been shaped by government policies in the past 20 years. The chapter provides some succinct summaries of prominent theorists who have influenced accountability research. I explore ideas from key theorists such as Bentham (1816), Habermas (1975), Mill (1874), and Rawls (1971) all of whom have influenced critical accountability theory. More specifically, the chapter explores how these theorists have been adapted in the various works of Gallhofer, Gray, Haslam, Owen, and Tinker to name a few prominent theorists. This chapter uses communication, concepts of systems, lifeworld and steering in the public sphere to deliberate about the development of society towards a more accountable, just and free system. This chapter explores the dominant western beliefs about humanity’s relationship with the environment, and how current environmental issues have been shaped by government policies in the past 20 years. The chapter provides summaries of ideas from Bentham (1797), Habermas (1975), Mill (1874), and Rawls (1971) who have influenced critical accountability theory. Ideas are applied by Gallhofer & Haslam (1994, 2019), Gray, Owen, and Maunders (1987), and Bryer (2013a, 2013b) as well as Tinker (1985) to name a few major theorists. Have times changed, and is accountability still relevant in an increasingly globalised world?

Bentham and Mill Bentham: Gallhofer-Haslam (2019) to Goodin (1992) and back again In this section, I shall use Gallhofer and Haslam’s (2019) work on emancipatory accounting. Also, Robert Goodin’s (1992) early work will be used to introduce a utilitarian approach to critical accountability. In the context

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of critical accountability research, utilitarian theorists, Gallhofer and Haslam (1997, 2006), are inspired by Bentham (1789). These theorists offer an interesting departure from a classical liberal view on the natural environment. Moreover, liberal and utilitarian reasoning has been criticised for limiting practical reasoning to instrumental considerations. Utilitarianism is said to have had little to say about ‘intrinsic value’, much less authenticity. That is not the case with Goodin. His view, however, gives rise to an instrumental conception of authenticity where it is important that we assign weights to the different options that confront us. Nature, according to Goodin, has an intrinsic value which affects the weight humans apply to it. Humans are constantly balancing their own interests against Nature’s interests (Svoboda, 2011, pp. 25–36, 2016). Gallhofer and Haslam are concerned to elaborate upon the Bentham’s accounting texts with the primary aim of arriving at insights which can contribute to and enhance a critical questioning of the institution and practice of accounting and accountability today. They explained that Bentham’s utilitarianism ‘advocated openness [transparency] to as many people as possible so that governance would come to operate in the general interest’ (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003, p. 43). They also assumed that humanity had the technological capacity to solve the problems confronting it. Of course, they recognised the negative dimensions of his work that I explore in Chapter 8 but found that his view of modernity and his work on modern accounting as worthy of rescue. Gallhofer and Haslam (2003) argued: Bentham’s mobilising of accounting can, for example, be interpreted in terms of seeking to better align accounting with progressive and emancipatory social change. And through the historical analysis of Bentham’s writings one might discover potentialities of modernity more generally, consistent with an approach that sees value in attempting to rescue the modern. As well as being a context of import in the formation of many modern institutions and practices, the context in which Bentham intervened was also an environment in which the professional accountancy bodies of today had not yet formally manifested. (p. 25). The utilitarian approach, as developed by Bentham (1789), posits that rather than an act being right or wrong, the strongest and most prominent issue is that it maximises the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Utilitarianism can take two forms known as act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism; in the former case, the consequences of an action are examined, in the latter case the consequences of choosing a rule to follow is assessed. The rule form of utilitarianism leads to it being situated within what Chapter 1 referred to as instrumentalism. Nevertheless, act utilitarianism takes a teleological approach to ethics where the focus is on how

Basic concepts in accountability research 117 good or bad an action is as opposed to developing procedures and rules to adjudicate the rightness or wrongness of those actions. However, utilitarianism is often criticised because it has the potential to ignore the plight of the least advantaged and glosses over the politics of the good. That is, the greatest happiness principle has been widely criticised because it has the potential to glide over structural and social inequalities in the social system. I shall also argue that in moving from utilitarianism to a form of postmodernism, the work of Gallhofer and Haslam point towards further limitations in critical accountability. How do we judge the worth of various moral claims? Mill’s utilitarianism and its view of Nature Often the work of Mill (1874) is seen to be representative of utilitarian philosophy. Human beings were at the centre of the world, as was clearly reflected in Collingwood’s Hegel-inspired Idea of Nature, which held that ‘mind makes Nature; Nature is … a by-product of the autonomous and selfexisting activity of mind’. (Collingwood, 1945, p. 7). Instrumentalism was evident in John Stuart Mill’s essay ‘Nature’ (Mill, 1874, pp. 4–69).2 For Collingwood and Mill, the maxim to ‘follow Nature’ sounded like a return to an animistic ethic. For Mill, the injunction to follow Nature is ambiguous since humanity had the capacity to master it. Mill argued: Everybody professes to approve and admire many great triumphs of Art over Nature: the junction by bridges of shores which Nature had made separate, the draining of Nature’s marshes, the excavation of her wells, the dragging to light of what she has buried at immense depths in the earth; the turning away of thunderbolts by lightning rods, of her inundations by embankments, of her ocean by breakwaters. But to commend these and similar feats, is to acknowledge that the ways of Nature are to be conquered, not obeyed: that her powers are often towards men in the position of enemies, from whom he must wrest, by force and ingenuity, what little he can for his own use, and deserves to be applauded when that little is rather more than might be expected from his physical weakness in comparison to those gigantic powers. (Mill, 1874, pp. 20–21) According to the above argument, Nature was not only a barrier but actually humanity’s antagonist.3 To say the least, modern environmental theorists are more aware of the dangers of instrumentalism and anthropocentrism. Although modern environmental theorists are more aware of the dangers of instrumentalism and anthropocentrism, one can still find echoes of Mill’s views among modern ‘shallow green’ theorists who are sceptical of radical and deep-green ecology. It is easier to talk about the interests of non-humans; and the question of interests which is the stock in

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trade of utilitarians. Indeed, Peter Singer, one of the most famous exponents of animal liberation, uses utilitarian reasoning and so does Robert Goodin, prominent among philosophers who have studied environmental related issues (see also Cullitty, 2004; Dryzek, Goodin, Tucker, & Reber, 2009, pp. 263–288). If Mill’s (1874) essay ‘Nature’ deprecated the notion of ‘following Nature’ and advocated humans dominating it, humans also possessed the ability to improve it. Robert Goodin agrees with the irrelevance of the maxim ‘follow Nature’, but he is less sanguine than Mill about the consequences (Mill, 1874, pp. 18–19). Seeing Nature’s intrinsic role, Goodin (1992) notes that value in Nature is created by processes which are larger than, and thereby necessarily beyond, humanity’s comprehension. Human intervention may detract from Nature’s value with the effect that an object loses ‘that value-imparting property once it has been restored, replicated or recreated through human interventions’ (Mill, 1874, pp. 18–19). It is no longer authentic.

Kant and accountability The consequentialist or utilitarian approach stands in contrast to the deontological approach proposed by Immanuel Kant – the formal term for this approach is a categorical imperative. This approach determines the rightness of an action. A categorical imperative can be defined as a procedural decision-making device to determine the ethical validity of an action. Actions that are consistent with the procedure would be universal and therefore morally permissible. For Kant, an action is moral when it can be universalised against the procedural test. Kant sets out the action in the form of a maxim where a maxim then constructs a general principle that captures the action under consideration. The ethical content of the maxim is then judged according to whether it can be universalised. If the maxim is not universal it contains contrary actions which would be considered to be unethical. The categorical imperative serves as a formal decision-making model that can be applied to accounting to determine the ethical content of accounting reports, conceptual frameworks and standards. Kant states: And could I say to myself that everyone may make a false promise when he is in a difficulty from which he cannot escape? Immediately I see that I could will the lie but not a universal law to lie. For with such a law there would be no promises at all, inasmuch as it would be futile to make pretense of my intention in regard to future actions to those who would not believe this pretense or – if they over hastily did so – would pay me back in my own coin. This maxim would necessarily destroy itself as soon as it was made a universal law. (Kant, 1963, p. 19)

Basic concepts in accountability research 119 In the aforementioned quotation, the teleological application within Kant’s approach becomes evident. For Kant, teleology is about determining the rightness of an action. He endeavours to determine whether an action can be universalised. The example he presents is that of lying. Obviously, a lie could not be universalised because if everyone lied, no one could be believed.4

Rawls and accountability Accounting and accountability theory, in its utilisation of Kantian and Rawlsian decision-making models, is firmly focused on the impacts of corporations on the rights of people. Often Rawls’ (1971) work is introduced by explaining how it develops Kant’s categorical imperative which we have referred to as the principles of justice which are to govern and guide a well-ordered society. The Kantian and Rawlsian focus on rights and justice is particularly appealing to accounting. This is so because the craft of accounting and accountability claims to be about the satisfaction of the rights of citizens, communities and relevant publics. Accounting researchers use Rawls’ decision-making model which is called the original position to determine the fairness and justice of particular actions. The original position is based on 12 crucial elements,5 with the veil of ignorance being the most prominent element (Rawls, 1971). The original position operates behind a veil of ignorance and can be thought of as an ethical device to determine the ethical content of an action (Gaa, 1988). Behind this veil, representative individuals who are motivated by the economic assumptions of rationality and self-interest choose principles of justice. Rawls developed the original position using this economic approach where representative individuals would choose and develop the principles of justice. These principles of justice are concerned with the rights of individuals and the plight of the least advantaged. These are: 1

2

Each person is to have an equal liberty to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just saving principle, and, (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

The accounting theorist, Williams (1987) uses the Rawlsian original position to extend the accounting focus. The focus becomes one on those user groups who are expected to give a just and fair account of their actions. This may involve providing information concerning the environmental and social impacts of corporations to these groups or parties as part of an accountability relationship (Williams, 1987, p. 170). The focus turns to the

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fairness of general-purpose financial reporting where information is assumed to be relevant to making and evaluating decisions about the allocation of scarce resources. In developing the moral dimension in critical accounting, Williams and Ravenscroft (2014) focus on the obligatory implications of the moral dimension.6 Moreover, Williams and Ravenscroft (2014) propose an inclusive democratic structure where accounting plays a pivotal role in reporting corporate impacts7 (Lehman, 1995, 1999, 2015).

Habermas’s critical philosophy Jurgen Habermas has influenced the philosophy of critical accounting. Habermas’s ethical and procedural model – the Ideal Speech Community – can be used to determine the rightness of the various actions that citizens make. It is important to remember that Habermas began as a critical and radical theorist before moving towards a more procedural direction. Habermas’s later work was influenced by Kant and he engaged with the work of John Rawls. Habermas differed from his sources through the development of a theory of communicative action: communication and language were seen as providing a decision-making structure. He referred to this device as the Ideal Speech Community (ISC). Perhaps the clearest definition of the ISC was made by Arrington and Puxty (1991, p. 45). They argued: Habermas provides an ethical-political model – what he calls the ‘Ideal Speech Community’ – as a regulative ideal to guide public argument oriented toward the formation of a rational consensus with respect to the shape and rationality of interested social actions. That model binds public argument to the following procedural conditions of justice-inargument, and it is the ethic that provides the foundation for his social theory. (Arrington and Puxty, 1991, p. 45) Habermas’s ISC is a procedural decision-making device. Ethical actions must pass four procedural tests. They are: (a) the comprehensibility of the utterance; (b) the truth of its propositional component; (c) the correctness and appropriateness of its performatory component; and (d) the authenticity of the speaking subject (Habermas, 1973, p. 18). These four procedures provide the components of the ISC to regulate the discourse in the public sphere. More fundamentally, the claims adjudicated in the ISC move in the theoretical space between the actual and what is possible (Power & Laughlin, 1996, p. 448). That is, accounting research must generate: (a) unrestricted participation in the accounting arena; (b) equality of opportunities in the accounting discourse; (c) correctness and cooperative motives in constructing conceptual frameworks; and (d) the mechanism to determine the communicative claims concerning the ‘good’

Basic concepts in accountability research 121 society. The device has been applied to accounting issues such as the viability of conceptual frameworks, public-private initiatives as well as the role of accounting in society. Habermas argues that the life-world is a cultural space that gives meaning to societal life. Moreover, it is itself a reservoir of human social developments that contrast with the more tangible systems and ‘through social reality which gives these systems meaning and attempts to guide their behaviour through steering media’ (Laughlin, 1987, p. 486). Systems, on the other hand, are the self-regulating actions around specific mechanisms or media, such as money or power (Broadbent, Laughlin & Read 1991, p. 3) are developed. Lifeworlds are the communicatively formed (over time) life experiences and beliefs which guide attitudes, behaviour and actions. Systems are expressions of lifeworld concerns and can be represented at the micro-level as functionally, tangible organisations. Habermas states: We speak of social integration in relation to the systems of institutions in which speaking and acting subjects are socially related (vergellschaften). Systems are seen here as lifeworlds that are symbolically structured. We speak of system integration with a view to the specific steering performance of a self-regulated system. Social systems are considered here from the point of view of the capacity to maintain their boundaries and the continued existence by mastering the complexity of an inconstant environment. Both paradigms, lifeworld and system, are important. (Habermas, 1975, p. 4) The key idea to keep in mind is that the decision-making device (ISC) determines the rightness of social actions through rational discourse. This discourse is said to be free from forms of economic, political and social domination. Arrington and Puxty (1991) explain that the ISC is used to determine the rightness of social actions in the public sphere. They emphasise the concept of justice-in-argument is ascribable to Habermas. I argue that the ISC is similar in purpose to Kant’s categorical imperative (discussed earlier in this chapter).8

Critical theory One useful means through which to introduce critical theory is through the early debates between the Gray et al. school of thought and Tinker’s radical critique. Gray-Owen et al. (1997) were about defining points of intersection between critical, environmental and social accounting models. Their ‘middle ground’ approach where different philosophical perspectives coalesce and enable a consensus to emerge. However, critics of social

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accounting argue that the middle-ground itself has become contested. This is because of the competing and various demands from stakeholders. These arguments are developed in Gray, Khouy, and Lavers (1995) where accountability demands between alternative moral perspectives can be achieved. They argue that their social accounting model did not rely on comprehensive philosophical doctrines. For example, they claim that their position is not necessarily in conflict with more radical philosophical perspectives. They explain: These two points of view are essentially different ways of looking at the issues (Held, 1993) and are, fundamentally, irreconcilable in that the bourgeois perception treats as important issues which the Marxian analysis will see as relatively trivial. (Gray et al., 1995, p. 53) They acknowledge that bourgeois and Marxian political economies are essentially irreconcilable (which is the focus of ‘Rawls and accountability’ section) which is because Marxism aims to overthrow capitalism, whereas bourgeois frameworks aim to create change within the current social structures. Gray et al. (1995) continue in their search for an overlapping consensus or middle ground without drawing on Marx’s political economy. Thus, the middle ground reflects their liberal sources through the provision of additional information (Gray et al. refer to Rawls’ work (1988, p. 13, 1991, p. 23, 1996).) Nevertheless, the early arguments made by Gray et al. (various) remain committed to the belief that environmental and social change can be achieved within the current capitalist system. Gray et al. often refer to their argument as one which offers an evolutionary approach to the reform of accounting. The key question remains, however, concerning whether corporate environmental and social reporting can lead to meaningful change without fundamentally reconstructing capitalism and its corporate structures.

Critical perspectives on accounting reform proposals The previous sections of this chapter introduced key critical and procedural accounting theorists who explore the role of accounting using critical, liberalist and utilitarian frameworks. This section explores how accounting theorists such as Broadbent, Laughlin, Puxty, and Sikka move between various critical and procedural perspectives. Here the work of Puxty is relevant. He was committed to a Habermasian perspective in his early work. A key focus was on language and social change. The power in language is explored to examine connections between accounting, capitalism and the dynamics in language. The first point to remember is that Puxty was highly critical of the social accounting project of Gray et al. (1987). The latter were seen to assume

Basic concepts in accountability research 123 accounting change was to emerge from the existing social institutions. From Puxty’s perspective, critical accountants must enquire why powerful corporations would give up their privileges to enter a ‘middle-ground’ consensus (see also Bryer, 2012). The central issue for critical accounting, then, involves determining whether corporations are the mechanism through which social change is enacted. More fundamentally, this strand of critical accounting explains how early liberal and middle-of-the-road social accounting reforms fail to argue why social accountants accept pluralism, the status quo and capitalism. Puxty argued that this belief seemed unrealistically optimistic. This is because the evolutionary gradualism in procedural and social accounting fails to explore the laws and structural strengths of capitalism. Puxty explains his approach in the following passage: The two levels are related, but independent. Thus although we acknowledge the Marxian insight that labour is fundamental in the economic process, and hence that the employment relation is necessarily one of exploitation, we do not thereby suppose that a political and social superstructure is a result derivative of and dependent on that process. The level of human interaction has its own laws of development. (Puxty, 1991, p. 42) Clearly, Puxty’s work involves exploring connections between Habermas’s work on language and Marx’s critique of capitalism. Puxty has analysed the historical dynamics of capitalism and its impact on communication in the public sphere. Underlying these observations is the supposition that ‘true knowledge’ of the dynamics of capitalism allows us to create unalienated societies. The novelty of Puxty’s developments in accounting theory involves his extensions of Habermas’s argument that human communities and their language are entwined. Obviously communicative structures are integral to Puxty’s philosophy. Through language and communication, it is assumed that understanding and reconciliation can be achieved. On this view, the power of communication and language frees accounting and its governance structures from the colonising potential within economic interests. Puxty is highly critical of capitalism. He advocates the removal of procedural barriers that limit accountability to contributing to a fair and just society. His work is about challenging and freeing the public sphere from instrumental and procedural barriers. Puxty explains how the public sphere has been captured by technical approaches such as accounting. He uses Habermas’s early work to explain and expose the barriers that impede the development of improved relationships. As an example, Puxty enquired whether bankers and other corporate managers would directly assist some of the poorest countries to retrench workers to maximise profits. How are

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these decisions made? What are the connections between profit and identity? Puxty’s communicative and critical work enquires whether the distribution of income and wealth is becoming progressively more unequal. From this communicative and critical perspective, the challenge is not only to develop social accounting, interstitial accounts or extend accounting beyond its initial focus. The challenge is to tackle the entrenched interests of capitalism in the public sphere. In most recent times, Prem Sikka takes up this challenge to develop accounting through Gramsci’s critical work on the public sphere. Sikka (2011, 2014) is concerned with the inequalities and structural problems of contemporary capitalism and also focuses on the voluntarism within the liberal and procedural philosophies of reform social accounting. That is, corporations have ‘structural strengths’ in contrast to other sectors of society – they control the production process. From these radical perspectives, it is argued that procedural, social and technical accounting is just one part of that structural strength that maintains capitalism’s dominant and hegemonic position. Accounting and accountability research, in neglecting the totality in favour of a conceptual framework approach, severs its links with the life-world. This immunises accounting from other social science approaches that endeavour to understand the impact of accounting in society. As a consequence, the exploitative process and instrumental virus that plagues accounting, identified by Tinker, Puxty, Sikka (and others), leads to a blindness and immunity in accounting to social and ecological issues that concern many citizens and communities.

Critical theory and its challenge to interpretivism Tinker, Neimark, and Lehman (1991) developed a philosophical and radical analysis of accounting. Their key contribution is to explain how accounting is implicated in the generation of inequalities in capitalist society through aspects of Karl Marx’s Capital. They explained how accounting is a compliant participant in the capitalist exploitative system that perpetuates class divisions responsible for wealth inequalities. It is then argued that capitalism is an apology for the existing social structure which critical philosophy attempts to change. Accounting is assumed to be a compliant participant in the creation of false realities that are built on the exploitative processes of capitalism. Tinker et al. (1991) argue that emancipatory accounting must be used to unlock systemic inequalities that perpetuate injustice and inequality. The quest is for critical accountants to understand the features of capitalism because they claim that equality and justice should be shared by all social beings (Cooper & Morgan, 2008). A critical and interpretivist philosophy lies behind emancipatory and critical accounting. It aims to reveal distortions between what is reported and the real impact of corporations on the environment. Critical accounting

Basic concepts in accountability research 125 theorists emphasise how accounting is a mechanism that perpetuates the generation of surplus value which in turn creates the inequalities in capitalism, as outlined earlier. Thus, the focus of this strand of critical accounting is on how surplus value is appropriated by the owners of production (capitalists) in the form of surplus economic rents. The challenge for critical accounting philosophy, then, is to design and restructure basic institutions such as accounting to create accountability for modern communities. This would be part of an administrative solution inspired by the Marxist telos of an unalienated society (Taylor, 1960a, 1960b). This strand of critical accounting aims to not only reveal inequalities derived from capitalism but also to emancipate politics and society. But before the emancipatory goals are specified, Tinker (1991) reveal how accounting is implicated in the interconnections and interrelationships which make accounting culpable in major financial scandals, environmental and social disasters. Tinker et al. argue: In assuming that accounting disclosure could help humanise capitalism, they [reform social accounting] seemed to forget that the market imperative often impels corporations to dump chemicals haphazardly rather than employ expensive reprocessing methods, ‘cheat n billings’ to government agencies, bribe government officials, condone shoddy workmanship, etc. These same client interests are also likely to underlie the accounting profession’s technical objections to impounding social costs and benefits in financial statements. These underlying antagonisms, interests and loyalties are inherent in capitalism and were left unanalysed by social responsibility theories. In consequence, their palliatives only dealt with symptoms not causes. (Tinker et al., 1991, p. 33) Tinker (1985) reminds us of some of the more bizarre financial scandals in recent years in both the UK and USA. In Chapter Prophets (1985), Tinker refers to the tragedy of Love Canal in the USA as well as the Slater Walker Scandal in the UK. He reminds us that Hooker Chemical was responsible for releasing toxic chemicals into Love Canal near Niagara Falls. Hooker Chemical was eventually found to be negligent in their disposal of waste, though not reckless in the sale of the land, in what became a test case for liability clauses (Laughlin & Puxty, 1986).9 The critical perspective developed by Tinker (1985) and Tinker et al. (1991) works to reveal the underlying social relationships between business and corporate reporting. Issues such as site contamination, banking collapses and financial scandals are not given full consideration in the accounting conceptual framework. The critical perspective on accounting, therefore, aims to provide a critical realist view of organisational reality. They then emphasise how accounting can assist in changing these oppressive realities by introducing accounting research to Marx’s theory of value.

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This is to explain how accounting is built on principles of utility which support the assumptions of capitalism and wealth inequality. For Tinker et al. (1991) the utility-maximising assumptions that shape modern capitalism are based on neo-classical economic assumptions. They argue that this focus on the maximisation of utility damages social relations and perpetuates an unjust and unfair capitalist social system. These issues are reflected in how processes of economic and utility maximisation guide the construction of modern neo-classical economics which was discussed earlier. In challenging neo-classical economic assumptions, they explain how accounting contributes to a social reality that benefits the owners of capital at the expense of workers. They draw on Marx’s concept that capitalism acts as a process that reifies and then exploits people. Marx used the term reification to explain how social relationships are transformed into subjects and then into objects of production.10 Workers are alienated in the production process. The end result of this process is that people’s identity and values are rendered passive or determined, while the objects of production are rendered as the active and determining factor of social relationships. The social structure is determined by economic factors underlining capitalism which in turn shape social relationships. People are objectified and commodified such that economic relationships determine social relationships, rendering people passive and indeterminate (Lehman, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a).

Conclusion This chapter encouraged accountability theorists to consider the ethical and moral debates concerning the public interest role of accounting. It introduced and explored four dominant philosophical traditions, comprising of procedural, critical, utilitarian and interpretivist traditions. The aim is to develop the connections between accounting and philosophical research. This classification used ideas central to Habermas (1987a), Kant (1949), and Rawls (1971) to provide a framework in which to situate critical accounting approaches. It also offered some ideas to overcome the procedural limitations that have thwarted critical reforms (Lehman, 1993, 1995, 1999, 2015). According to critical accounting, people are turned into mere things in the capitalistic search for more profit. The end result is that the interplay between social relationships and the social structure is the determining factor. Critical theory explains how reform social accounting is unable to create change because it assumes that people’s position in society is fixed and stable. They explain that social accounting reforms glide over the structures of capitalism without providing viable social alternatives. In continuing this critique, they explain how accounting reports are constructed on neo-classical utility maximising assumptions. They argue that the real task for accounting is to explore the underlying relationships that exist among and between accounting, capitalism, and organisations.

Basic concepts in accountability research 127 Each tradition was used to challenge the dominance of economic and positivist approaches to accounting research through a process of evaluation and interpretation. Procedural approaches were considered in the light of liberal and utilitarian theories that have gained prominence in the broader social sciences. The role of procedure in social science research was then examined using critical approaches from the language-based perspectives of Habermas and Taylor.

Notes 1 Early versions of this chapter emanate from Lehman G. (2007), and Lehman, G (1995). 2 Mill’s instrumental perspective seemed to support unlimited economic growth, though in his Principles of Political Economy he deplored conspicuous consumption and interestingly championed a stationary state (Mill, 1929, pp. 748–750). 3 Although it is worth remembering that a lot of Mill’s work actually had a romantic view of Nature. 4 Kant’s work has been applied even more broadly in business ethics. An example often used is that of a contractual situation as it involves the formality of making a promise. If everyone were to break a promise or contract there would be no contracts made. The system would break down. Moreover, the maxim would not be permissible because it cannot be universalised; that is, if everyone broke their promise or contract the economic system could not operate effectively. Kant’s focus on universal rules gives rise to the action-guiding decision model which is often adapted to ethical research. Kant is appealing to ethical researchers’ because his categorical imperative can be easily adapted and applied: this is so because it is a procedural device which may be used to guide decisions about justice in liberal-democratic systems. The ideas developed by Kant have been used by business and ethical theorists to examine notions of fairness and justice. This analysis of ideas occurs within global financial reporting. In the following section, these ideas are developed in a global context. 5 Rawls (1971) lists the 12 elements on pp. 146–147. They are (1) The Nature of the parties, (2) Subject of Justice, (3) Presentation of Alternatives, (4) Time of Entry, (5) Circumstances of Justice, (6) Formal Conditions on Principles, (7) Knowledge and Beliefs, (8) Motivation of Parties, (9) Rationality, (10) Agreement Condition, (11) Compliance Condition, and (12) No Agreement Point. 6 Williams focuses on the obligatory relationships created through transactions drawing attention to the moral dimensions of accounting and accountability. 7 From the perspective developed by Williams (1987) and Williams and Ravenscroft (2014), it is argued that decision-useful information is inadequate as an ethical decision-making device for organising accounting practice and research. They challenge the claim made by the accounting profession that if the information is decision-useful it satisfies its accountability criteria. Williams (1987) points out that in subsuming accountability within the definition of decision-usefulness, accounting has avoided its moral obligations by not developing its accountability relationships. 8 To repeat, the key issue involves the rightness of various claims as reported by accountants in annual, environmental and financial reports. Relying on Habermas’s work, it is important to remember that critical accountants argue

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that the ISC leads to fair and neutral decisions and outcomes. From this perspective, it is claimed that the ISC can replace or supplement the current accounting conceptual framework. Moreover, a feature of Habermas’s philosophy is to reclaim the public sphere from the high tide of technological modernity. The term technological modernity conveys the concern that bureaucrats and procedural administrators colonise communities in their vision of a marketstructured world. 9 They then sold the site to the Niagara Falls School Board in 1953 for $1, with a deed explicitly detailing the presence of the waste and including a liability limitation clause about the contamination. The construction efforts of housing development, combined with particularly heavy rainstorms, released the chemical waste, leading to a public health emergency and an urban planning scandal. 10 The theory’s basic claim is simple: the value of a commodity can be objectively measured by the average number of labour hours required to produce that commodity. Modern economics has rendered the labour theory largely redundant because profits include other factors such as forgone consumption or entrepreneurial endeavour. Marxists continue that notwithstanding problems with the labour theory of value it is the social relationships that must be considered. These social relationships are both changing and changeable. The ability to alter and change the social structure is the determining factor under capitalism. The ability to change social relations is in contrast with those utility-maximising approaches which reify the existing social structure. Reification is defined as the process where labour is commodified and then traded on markets.

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Basic concepts in accountability research 129 Broadbent, J., Laughlin, R. & Read, S. (1991) Recent financial and administrative changes in the NHS: a critical theory analysis, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 2, Issue 1, pp. 1–29. Bryer, R. A. (2012). Americanism and Financial Accounting Theory. Part 1: Was America Born Capitalist?, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 23, Number 7/8, pp. 511–555. Bryer, R. A. (2013a). Americanism and Financial Accounting Theory. Part 2: The Rise of the ‘Modern Business Enterprise’, America’s Transition to Capitalism, and the Genesis of Management Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 24, Number 4/5, pp. 273–318. Bryer, R. A. (2013b). Americanism and Financial Accounting Theory. Part 3: Adam Smith, the Rise and Fall of Socialism, and Irving Fishers Theory of Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 24, Number 7/8, pp. 572–615. Bryer, R. (2014). For Marx: A Critique of Jacques Richard’s ‘The Dangerous Dynamics of Modern Capitalism (from static to IFRS’ Futuristic Accounting), Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 30, pp. 35–43. Collingwood, R. G. (1945). The Idea of Nature, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Cooper, D. J. & Morgan, W. (2008). Case Study Research in Accounting, Accounting Horizons, Volume 22, Number 2, pp. 159–179. Cullitty, G. (2004). The Moral Demands of Affluence, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Derrida, J. (1976). Of Grammatology, translated by F. P. Spivak, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press. Derrida, J. (1978). Writing and Difference, translated by A. Bass, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Derrida, J. (1981). Positions, translated by A. Bass, Chicago, Chicago University Press. Derrida, J. (1982). Margins of Philosophy, translated by A. Bass, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Chapter Différance. Dryzek, J. S., Goodin, R. E., Tucker, A. & Reber, B. (2009). Promethean Elites Encounter Precautionary Publics: The Case of GM Foods, Science, Technology, & Human Values, Volume 34, Number 3, pp. 263–288. Gaa, J. C. (1988). Methodological Foundations of Standard Setting for Corporate Financial Reporting, Sarasota, FL, AAA. Gallhofer, S. & Haslam, J. (1991). The Aura of Accounting in the Context of a Crisis: Germany and the First World War, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 16, Number 5/6, pp. 487–520. Gallhofer, S. & Haslam, J. (1993). Approaching Corporate Accountability: Fragments from the Past, Accounting and Business Research, Volume 23, Number 91, pp. 320–330. Gallhofer, S. & Haslam, J. (1994). Accounting and the Bentham’s: Accounting as Negation, Accounting, Business and Financial History, Volume 4, Number 2, pp. 431–460. Gallhofer, S. & Haslam, J. (1997). Beyond Accounting: The Possibilities of Accounting and “Critical” Accounting Research, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 8, Number 1–2, pp. 71–95. Gallhofer S. & Haslam, J. (2003). Accounting and Emancipation: Some Critical Interventions, London, Routledge.

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Basic concepts in accountability research 131 `Laughlin, R. C. & Puxty, A. G. (1986). The Socially Conditioning and Socially Conditioned Nature of Accounting: A Review and Analysis Through Tinker’s Paper Prophets, The British Accounting Review, Volume 18, Number 1, pp. 77–90. Lehman, G. (1993). China after Tiananmen Square: Rawls and Justice, Praxis International, Volume 12, Number 4, pp. 405–420. Lehman, G. (1995). A Legitimate Concern with Environmental Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 6, Number 5, pp. 393–413. Lehman, G. (1999). Disclosing New World: Social and Environmental Accounting, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 24, pp. 217–241. Lehman, G. (2001). Reclaiming the Public Sphere: Problems and Prospects for Corporate Social and Environmental Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume, 12, Number 6, pp. 713–733. Lehman, G. (2002). Globalisation and the Authentic Self: Cosmopolitanism and Charles Taylor’s Communitarianism, Global Society, Volume 16, Number 4, pp. 419–437. Lehman, G. (2004). Social and Environmental Accounting: Trends and Thoughts for the Future, Accounting Forum, Volume 28, Number 1, pp. 1–5. Lehman, G. (2007). A Common Pitch and the Management of Corporate Relations: Interpretation, Ethics and Managerialism, Journal of Business Ethics, Volume 71, Number 2, pp. 161–178. doi:10.1007/s10551-006-9132-3 Lehman, G. (2010a). Interpretive Accounting Research, Accounting Forum, Volume 34, Number 3–4, pp. 231–235. Lehman, G. (2010b). Perspectives on Accounting, Commonalities & the Public Sphere, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 21, Number 8, pp. 724–738 Lehman, G. (2011a). The Management of Sustainability: The Art of Interpretation, Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research, Volume 9, pp. 75–88. Lehman, G. (2011b). Interpretivism, Postmodernism and the Natural Environment, Philosophy and Social Criticism, Volume 37, pp. 795–821. Lehman, G. (2013). Critical Reflections on Laughlin’s Middle Range Research Approach: Language Not Mysterious?, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 24, Number 3, pp. 211–224. Lehman, G. (2015). Charles Taylor’s Ecological Conversations, London, PalgraveMacmillan. Lehman, G. (2017). The Language of Environmental and Social Accounting Research: The Expression of Beauty and Truth, Critical perspectives on Accounting, Volume 44, pp. 30–41. Mill, J. S. (1874). Nature, in Nature, the Utility of Religion and Theism, London, Longmans, Green Reader, & Dyer (pp. 3–69). Mill, J. S. (1929). Principles of Political Economy, New York, NY, Longmans, Green and Company (pp. 748–750). Power, M. & Laughlin, R. (1996). Habermas, Law and Accounting, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 21, Number 5, pp. 441–465. Puxty, A. G. (1991). Social Accounting and Universal Pragmatics, Advances in Public Interest Accounting, JAI Press. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice, Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press. Sagoff, M. (1984). Ethics and Economics in Environmental Law, in Regan, T. (Ed.), Earthbound: New Introductory Essays in Environmental Ethics, New York, NY, Random House.

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Sikka, P. (2011). Accounting for Human Rights: The Challenge of Globalization and Foreign Investment Agreements, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 22, Number 8, pp. 811–827. 10.1016/j.cpa.2011.03.004. Sikka, P. (2014). Banking in the public interest: Progressive reform of the financial sector, Policy Paper. Svoboda, T. (2011). Why There Is No Evidence for the Intrinsic Value of NonHumans, Ethics and the Environment, Volume 16, pp. 25–36. Svoboda, T. (2012). Is Aerosol Geoengineering Ethically Preferable to Other Climate Change Strategies?, Ethics & The Environment, Volume 17, Number 2, pp. 111–135. Taylor, C. (1960a). What’s Wrong with Capitalism?, New Left Review, Volume 2, Number March/April, pp. 5–11. Taylor, C. (1960b). Changes of Quality, New Left Review, Volume 4, Number July/ August, pp. 3–5. Tinker, T. (1985). Paper Prophets: A Social Critique of Accounting, Holt Reinhart and Winston. Tinker, T. (1988). Waving Goodbye to the TWA Bus: Paper Prophets and the Sfraffian Critique of Marginalism, Advances in Public Interest Accounting, Volume 2, pp. 121–141. Tinker, T. (1991). The Accountant as Partisan, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 13, Number 2, pp. 165–189. Tinker, T., Lehman, C. & Neimark, M. (1991). Falling Down the Hole in the Middle-of-the-Road: Political Quietism in Corporate Social Accounting, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability, Volume 4, Number 2, pp. 28–54. Williams, P. F. (1987). The Legitimate Concern with Fairness, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 12, Number 2, pp. 169–189. Williams, P. F. & Ravenscroft, S. (2014). Rethinking Decision-Usefulness, Contemporary Accounting Research, Volume 32, Number 2, pp. 763–788.

8

Basic issues in accountability Interpretivism, openness, and transparency1

Some basic themes between decision usefulness and emancipator accounting Basic philosophical issues in accountability research are examined in developing emancipatory accounting. In this regard, the following argument develops Chapter 7’s critique of utilitarianism and procedural forms of practical reasoning. The chapter also examines communicative, liberal, and utilitarian ideas for accountability and emancipatory research. The ideas from these schools of thought reflect the prominent role that they play in accountability research and how they must be challenged. They focus on the rightness or wrongness of decisions in civil society. The chapter examines the work of Rawls’ (1971) who, in A Theory of Justice, had developed new ways to develop principles of justice. Notably, accounting theorists such as Gaa 1988 and Williams (1987) have used Rawls’ procedural decision-making model in the contexts such as accounting (Lehman, 1995, 2002, 2017). Rawls extends Kant’s famous categorical imperative to human rights issues (Rawls, 1971, 1980, 1982, 1985). With its origins firmly in Kantian philosophy, the procedural decision-making model has been used to determine the justice of accounting decisions in terms of the rights of people (Dworkin, 1983, 1987). This chapter then develops the argument that procedural forms of liberalism and utilitarianism foreshorten the scope of moral philosophy. They are limited in that they do not focus on the politics of the good and prefer a form of postmodern misology that asserts political solutions without full democratic interchange in the public spheres of modern communities. The key idea to keep in mind is that accounting theorists, such as Gallhofer and Haslam (2019), have moved from Benthamite theory to a postmodern inspired focus on otherness and difference. Both share a commitment to the maximisation of the interests of others to whom Western modernity has been illiberal and unjust.

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Utilitarians Bentham and Mill – some further problems and prospects This section explores key ideas implicit in utilitarianism and liberal procedure. Much of the aforementioned discussion of market liberalism would apply both to the rights-based variety and to the utilitarian. Something specifically must be said about utilitarianism, however, because it may appear more attractive to environmentalists. This is because it is very difficult to consider the rights of non-humans, although a few notable works adopt a rights-based approach to animal liberation and deep ecologists sometimes talk about the rights of ecosystems. It is much easier, however, to talk about the interests of non-humans; interests are the stock in trade of utilitarians. I have already noted that Singer (1975), one of the most famous exponents of animal liberation, is an explicit utilitarian2 and so is Goodin (1992), prominent among philosophers who have studied the environment. I do not intend to rehearse the arguments of classical utilitarians here. The Introduction touched on Mill’s famous essay ‘Nature’ and little more need to be said save to demonstrate how Goodin extended it. Mill, it will be remembered deprecated ‘following Nature’ and advocated humans dominating it. Humans were also to improve it. Goodin agrees about the irrelevance of the maxim ‘follow Nature’ but he is less sanguine than Mill about the consequences. Seeing Nature’s intrinsic role, Goodin (1992, pp. 18–19) notes that value in Nature is created by processes which are larger than, and necessarily beyond, humanity’s comprehension. Human intervention may detract from Nature’s value. An object loses ‘that value-imparting property once it has been restored, replicated or recreated through human interventions’. It is no longer authentic (Goodin, 1992, p. 40). Goodin’s (1992) early arguments are an interesting departure from a classical liberal view as well as utilitarian. We noted earlier that when practical reasoning becomes instrumental, moral sources tend to be submerged and aesthetic values may be criticised as too ‘subjective’. We also noted that an instrumentalist view had little to say about ‘intrinsic value’, much less authenticity. That is not the case with Goodin. His instrumental view, however, gives rise to a conception of authenticity as something to which one may assign weights. Nature has intrinsic value which affects the weights humans apply to it. Humans are constantly balancing their own interests against Nature. Thus, we are presented with a system of trades-off where Nature’s gains are humanity’s loss, and vice versa (Goodin, 1995). It is an all-or nothing zero-sum picture in which public policy advocates cannot pick or choose between parts of the theory (Eckersley, 1993, p. 118). His opinion, moreover, that utilitarianism is simply a valid public policy which does not correlate with personal morality, leads to the view that, one can

Basic issues in accountability 135 affirm the value of Nature while not having to adopt a different lifestyle. He advocates: (a) pursuing green public policies, to secure the larger natural contexts in which we want to see our own projects set; but, (b) refusing to adopt green personal lifestyle recommendations aiming to deprive us of the distinctively personal stance from which harmony with Nature would be satisfying or even meaningful. (Goodin, 1992, p. 81). We are left with little analysis of the structural and social causes of environmental problems and an endorsement of current liberal-democratic institutions. Goodin’s cost-benefit analysis tends to absolve citizens from personal responsibility for environmental problems. Goodin’s approach, which remains within the framework of instrumental rationality, is clearly different from that of the interpretivism advocated here. Interpretivism advocates new structures and is critical of utilitarianism for ignoring the environmental good (Lehman, 2004, 2010b, 2011a). Consider Taylor’s discussion of authenticity. That was defined earlier as autonomy within context. But the context is not an instrumentalist one. Authenticity may not be weighed nor traded. Authenticity is about being rather than choosing. Mark Sagoff put it well: These values we cherish as citizens express not just what we want collectively but what we think we are: We use them to reveal to ourselves and to others what we stand for and how we perceive ourselves as a nation. These values are not merely chosen; rather they constitute and identify we who choose; Wilderness, rivers, estuaries, bays, forests, and farms have voices: They express our shared values and transmit them. They speak for us. (Sagoff, 1984, p. 175). Taylor’s (1992a) critique of utilitarianism is trenchant. Utilitarianism gives undue emphasis to appetite where the definition of the good life is seen to be continuing escalation in living standards. The conception of the person is one who has inescapable appeal to unregenerated persons, which we are. This Plato knew well. Appetite tends to run onto infinity unless controlled by reason. ‘The consumer society appeals to the lowest common denominator in us’. This argument while similar to that of many critics maintains that ‘incessant willing [which] is strongest in utilitarianism, which unleashes desires, proclaims the sovereignty of pleasure and pain, and proposes maximising satisfaction as the sole imperative’ (Rosenblum, 1987, p. 29). Its reasoning, which supports capital accumulation and submerges other values, can degenerate into organised

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egoism, a capitulation before the demands of our lower Nature (Taylor, 1985a). His critics, of course, claim that Taylor’s view of utilitarianism is over-simplified and out of date.

More problems with utilitarianism Kymlicka (1997, 1998) argues that Taylor’s phrase – ‘utilitarianEnlightenment’ ignores the complexities of the processes of modernity. He continues that whether or not Taylor provides a plausible account of nineteenth-century utilitarianism, the fact is that modern-day utilitarians are well aware of the alternative of egoism and recognize that their commitment to benevolence requires a commitment to qualitative distinctions. This has been central to utilitarian self-consciousness since at least J. S. Mill and Sidgwick, who dealt at length with these issues’ (Kymlicka, 1997, p. 167). His answer is: But such ‘hard line’ utilitarians aside, I agree that most of the proceduralists I am attacking have a place for notions of the good life, and many are moral realists like myself. My grievance against them is that they foreshorten the scope of moral philosophy, pay risibly little attention to the good, and concentrate largely on the principles by which we can determine the right. (Taylor, 1991d, p. 243). To repeat, of all those procedural principles, the most suspect is the one which considers that authenticity may be assigned weights. In that context, consider Parfit’s dilemma (Parfit, 1986, pp. 145–165). Lehman (2015) used Parfit’s famous example to explore Taylor’s environmental perspective. He reminded readers to consider choosing between life in a drab eternity or a century of ecstasy. By choosing the drab eternity, we choose a life of muzak and potatoes in which there are no ‘higher-order’ goods to consume nor even contemplate. By choosing the century of ecstasy, we choose the best life available but also to accelerate the rate at which we use the earth’s resources. The obvious choice is the century of ecstasy. ‘[T]hough each day of the Drab Eternity would have some value for me, no amount of this value would be as good for me as the Century of Ecstasy’ (Lehman, 2015; Parfit, 1986, p. 161). He rejects: The Repugnant Conclusion: Compared with the existence of very many people – say, ten billion – all of whom have a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger number of people whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though these people would have lives that are barely worth living. (Parfit, 1986, p. 150).

Basic issues in accountability 137 Apparently, some goods are better than others and yet choosing the century of ecstasy raises huge ethical questions. Lemos’s arguments are useful here and this is because he asks us to consider a world that contains a million people living pleasant and morally virtuous lives, pursuing aesthetically and intellectually excellent activities. Then, we are able to consider a different possible world called W’. The sole sentient beings are worm-like creatures which Lemos names O-worms. The O-worms have no self-consciousness; no awareness of the past or future; no friendship or love for one another; and, of course, no moral, aesthetic, or intellectual life whatsoever. They never feel any pain, but they do feel intense pleasure for a few seconds on the sole occasion in their life cycle when they reproduce. W’ is a dull world, but it does seem to be a good one, containing a vast number of instances of intense pleasure. Lemos concludes: When one reflects on these worlds, it is plausible to think that no matter how many instances of pleasure W’ contains, it is not intrinsically better than W. Speaking roughly, if there were another world just like W’, but containing more O-worms and more instances of pleasure, it would be better than W’, but it would be no better than W. If W is intrinsically better than W’ no matter how many instances of pleasures we find in W’, then it does seem that Bretano, Ross and Parfit are right about the existence of a high class of goods. It might be hard to identify exactly what belongs in this higher class, but if W is better than W’ we can reasonably think that there are such. (Ibid, pp. 487–488). If higher order goods exist, political theory should do away with the utilitarian idea of trying to measure the worth of different states in terms of happiness (Zimmerman, 1999). As Taylor pointed out: …I distinguish ‘life goods’, that is, the kinds of things which are captured in notions of the good life, on the one hand, from ‘constitutive goods’ on the other. By this I mean features of the universe, or God, or human beings, (i) on which the life goods depend, (ii) which command our moral awe or allegiance, and (iii) the contemplation of or contact with which empowers us to be good. (Taylor, 1991d, p. 245). Life and constitutive goods empower moral frameworks. But should one measure them in terms of perfection? Or is the notion of measurement itself otiose? And what are the criteria for perfection? In this way, communitarian-inspired interpretivism can only offer considerations about how people can lead better lives. These must be historically determined and arrived at by hermeneutic procedures and democratic deliberation. The demos may get them wrong but there is no need to assume, as some pre-

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democratic writers insisted, that a concern for appetite means that it will always get them wrong.

Gallhofer and Haslam: from Bentham to Laclau and Mouffe’s postmodernism In Chapter 7, I introduced the work of Gallhofer and Haslam (1994, 1997). They explored Bentham’s utilitarianism as an emancipatory tool for accounting (and accountability). They search for positive potentialities beyond the grasp of those critical interventions that in effect displace such potentialities from our attention. They argued that Bentham’s: [E]nvisioning of an accounting publicity that would be emancipatory, an envisioning that is very much integral to his wider radical project, can still serve as a basic source of insight, inspiration and stimulus today, a radical model, as our main analysis here has brought out. Bentham’s vision, as others, has no necessary class belongingness in its practical articulation. It is a locus of struggle. Bentham’s modern vision of a radical accounting that would be emancipatory constitutes a key historical intervention but one of continuing relevance. (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2002, p. 65). I concur that theorists should seek anew to forge reasonable ideals of political economy that speak to the bumpy realities of the Anthropocene. In recent work, Gallhofer and Haslam (2019) have developed their work on emancipatory accounting. They turned to the ideas of Laclau and Mouffe (1984). They continue: These latter interventions have drawn upon and sought to refine and develop, including with appreciation of what is taken as specific to accounting, work in the humanities and social sciences influenced by postmodern and post-structuralist thought that has engendered more pragmatist, if still critical (see Brown and Dillard, 2013, p. 179; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003; Unger & Busuioc, 2007), and postMarxist readings of emancipation/liberation and democracy (see notably Laclau, 1990, 1992, 1996, 2000a; Laclau & Mouffe, 2014; Mouffe, 1993a, 1993b; Norval, 2004, 2007, 2009; Yar, 2001). (Gallhofer, Haslam, & Yonekura, 2015, p. 848). This turn to the postmodern itself reflects a further utilisation of language and political theory. The ideas of Laclau and Mouffe (1984) echo those arguments developed by Arrington and Francis (1989) which were outlined in Chapter 7. All share an agonistic view that emphasises the potentially positive aspects of certain (but not all) forms of political conflict. It accepts a permanent place for political conflict; however, theorists of agonism show

Basic issues in accountability 139 how people might accept and channel this positively. For this reason, agonists are especially concerned with debates about democracy. But how to handle agonism and fortuna is to essay a serious challenge. Gallhofer and Haslam in developing their Bentham work have steered towards a postmodern position. It seems that they have replaced the greatest happiness principle with a Derridean focus on the other (Derrida, 1976). The postmodern tradition involves agonistic pluralism. In this tradition, Dawkins (2015), like Gallhofer et al. (2015), offers an agonistic view. For radical pluralists, it is the replacement of free-market capitalism with one that focuses on the other to more closely create egalitarian values through agonistic politics. Dawkins quotes: We had therefore abandoned the idea of a need for a radical break with the previous society—the idea of revolution. We began to understand our politics as a radicalisation of ideas and values which were already present, although unfulfilled in liberal capitalism. I think there is nothing more radical than asserting liberty and equality for all. The problem was that these ideas were not put into practice in the societies which claimed to follow them. What a left-wing project should do is to try to force those societies to really put those ideas into practice. (Mouffe, 1998, np). Dawkins (2015) is developing ideas from Laclau and Mouffe (2014) for business ethics calls for agonistic pluralism as a strategy questioning Western metaphysical assumptions in philosophical and literary language. It will be recalled that in Utilitarians Bentham and Mill – some further problems and prospects, I outlined how postmodern (radical humanist) language approaches focused on the elemental oppositions in all speech. Derrida argued that language and texts actually reflect elemental oppositions between words. These differential oppositions are common to all languages. As a consequence, for Derrideans and agonistic pluralists, it is claimed that important expressions and interpretations do not have absolute and indubitable meaning. This was the message outlined earlier in Chapters 3 and 4 of this book. It was argued that the external world impinges on language. Derrida offers a different view that words draw their meaning from their reciprocal relationship with other expressions, terms, and ideas. These ideas also inform thinkers such as Mouffe (1998) and Dawkins (2015) in the development of a radical form of pluralism. The aim is to open society to agonism and differences. For business ethics, the politics of agonism aims to open decisionmaking to reflect those voices that have been marginalised by modernity. Of course, the interpretivist argument concurs with postmodern aims in opening society to all members. No one, not a single person, should be left behind. But one wonders whether agonism at the expense of interpretation will create well-functioning communities. How do communities come

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together? Interpretivism involves recognition of agonism as part of a language that reveals meaning in context. All voices must be given fair hearing. Yet, the view on agonism and language presented in this book differs from that of Gallhofer et al. (2015). While they now defer to the work of Laclau and Mouffe (2014), there is little analysis about how communities are structured in civil society (see earlier Chapter 5). The new work of Gallhofer et al. (2015) echoes that of Derrida’s come hither. In this present book, the ‘come hither’ refers to that which we do not know – that pure space where true justice exists. It leads to acknowledgement in the power of difference and otherness. However, one wonders whether otherness necessarily reflects a progressive language of environmental politics. One wonders how all citizens come together to reduce environmental impact. What is the role of business in such a world? Will it satisfy basic wants and needs? Therefore, agonism reflected in the come higher, at the expense of interpretation, has the propensity to overplay its hand. It can render language as defenceless against the interests of globalisation and the harmonisation of capital. Difference, at the expense of commonality, might further accentuate anomie and social divisiveness in civil society. How will societies function if business and political structures do not develop commonalities? What happens when difference trumps justice? How do we judge the moral worthiness of difference? And is the notion of difference itself otiose? What then are we to make of the injunction to ‘follow Nature’? Furthermore, 20th-century analytical philosophers might consign the notion that Nature possesses value to the category of ought statements concerning what people should do rather than a statement of fact. Others might say that simply to follow Nature is hardly realistic in the modern world. But even if it is unrealistic, one does not have to jump to the conclusion that it is always better to impose humanity’s imprint on Nature.3 That was the position of Leopold’s (1970) famous ‘land ethic’ which has been celebrated by many deep ecologists. Leopold insisted that ‘[a] thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise’ (Ibid, p. 262). Was this a radical rejection of Enlightenment anthropocentrism, as Callicott and other deep ecologists maintain, or was it just a warning against its instrumentalism? On that question, ecologists are divided. Apparently, some goods are better than others and yet choosing the century of ecstasy raises huge ethical questions (Lemos, 1993, pp. 482–496). Utilitarian and postmodern thinking gets us into an ethical morass. If higher order goods exist, political theory should do away with the utilitarian idea of trying to measure the worth of different states in terms of happiness. But should one measure them in terms of perfection? Or is the notion of measurement itself otiose? And what are the criteria for perfection? Interpretivists can only offer considerations about how people can lead better lives. These must be historically determined and, for Taylor,

Basic issues in accountability 141 arrived at by hermeneutic procedures and democratic deliberation. The demos may get them wrong but there is no need to assume, as some predemocratic writers insisted, that a concern for appetite means it will always get them wrong (Lehman, 2002, 2011a, 2011b, 2015).

Conclusion In sum, this chapter has provided an overview of some key figures in critical theory because of the prominent role that they played. Ideas from postmodernists and utilitarians were considered in endeavouring to fill out the signifier in discourse ethics. Following Roslender (2013) and Taylor (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 2016), this approach to interpretivism is seen to focus on the provision of best accounts that attempt to reflect the complexities of the problematic scenario under consideration. Chapter 1 attempted to provide such a useful evaluative approach which incorporated symbolic interactionism, grounded theory, and social constructivism – all sharing a concern with the provision of better and improved accounts of the reality that confronts neoliberal, postmodern, and utilitarian business researchers. Furthermore, this chapter has explored democratic, pluralist, and pluralising interpretivism. Such a formation will challenge things in classical ideals of neoliberalism, Republicanism, Keynesianism, liberalism, communism, nationalism, and interest group pluralism alike. I am concerned to determine whether our modes of social organisation are equipped to curtail growth imperatives and reduce inequality at the same time. The fact is that the most familiar, contending dreams we have inherited rest upon a background assumption of unlimited economic growth. Modernity and its conception of accountability view the earth as a set of resources for productivity and abundance. The prime focus for this book is on environmental measures, actions, policy demands, and regional crossings to come to terms with the ravages of the Anthropocene.

Notes 1 This chapter emanates from Lehman (2007) with permission. 2 Against Singer (1975), Frey (1980) criticises utilitarianism for extending the status of morality to other sentient life forms. He is concerned that if rights were to be granted to non-human entities, then, those rights might submerge human interests. He argues that the interests of humanity and other sentient life-forms need careful political balance. 3 For a more detailed discussion concerning Mill’s modernist environmental views, see Chapter 4 of this book which uses Hinchman (1994, pp. 225–249).

Bibliography Arrington, E. & Francis, J. (1989). Letting the Chat Out of the Bag: Deconstruction, Privilege and Accounting Research. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 21, 1–28. 10.1016/0361-3682(89)90030-5.

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Brown, J. & Dillard, J. (2013). Agonizing Over Engagement: SEA and the “Death of environmentalism” Debates, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 24, Number 1, pp. 1–18. Dawkins, C. (2015). Agonistic Pluralism and Stakeholder Engagement, Business Ethics Quarterly, Volume 25, Number 1, pp. 1–28. Derrida, J. (1976). Of Grammatology, translated by F. P. Spivak, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press. Derrida, J. (1978). Writing and Difference, translated by A. Bass, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Derrida, J. (1981). Positions, translated by A. Bass, Chicago, Chicago University Press. Dworkin, R. (1983). The Original Position, in Daniels, N. (Ed.), Reading Rawls: Critical Studies in A Theory of Justice, Oxford, Basil Blackwell (pp. 16–53). First published 1975. Dworkin, R. (1987). Taking Rights Seriously, London, Duckworth. First published 1977, Fifth Impression. Eckersley, R. (1993). Just Natural Relations? Recent Developments in Environmental Theory, Political Theory Newsletter, Volume 5, Number 2, p. 118. Frey, R. G. (1980). Interests and Rights, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Gaa, J. C. (1988). Methodological Foundations of Standard Setting for Corporate Financial Reporting, Florida, AAA. Gallhofer, S. & Haslam, J. (1991). The Aura of Accounting in the Context of a Crisis: Germany and the First World War, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 16, Number 5/6, pp. 487–520. Gallhofer, S. & Haslam, J. (1993). Approaching Corporate Accountability: Fragments from the Past, Accounting and Business Research, Volume 23, Suppl. 1, pp. 320–330. Gallhofer, S. & Haslam, J. (1994). Accounting and the Bentham’s: Accounting as Negation, Accounting, Business and Financial History, Volume 4, Number 2, pp. 431–460. Gallhofer, S. & Haslam, J. (1997). Beyond Accounting: The Possibilities of Accounting and “Critical” Accounting Research, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 8, Number 1–2, pp. 71–95. Gallhofer, S. & Haslam, J. (2002). Accounting and Emancipation: Some Critical Interventions, London, Routledge. Gallhofer, S. & Haslam, J. (2003). Accounting and Emancipation: Some Critical Interventions. in Routledge studies in accounting, London, Routledge. Gallhofer, S. & Haslam, J. (2019). Some Reflections on the Construct of Emancipatory Accounting: Shifting Meaning and the Possibilities of a New Pragmatism, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 63, p. 101975. Gallhofer, S., Haslam, J. & Yonekura, A. (2015). Accounting as Differentiated Universal for Emancipatory Praxis, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Volume 28, Number 5, pp. 846–874. Goodin, R. E. (1992). Green Political Theory, Massachusetts, Il, Polity Press. Goodin, R. E. (1995). Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Basic issues in accountability 143 Goodin, R. E. (1997). Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy, in Vincent, A. (Ed.), Political Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Hinchman, L. P. (1994). Aldo Leopold’s Hermeneutic of Nature, The Review of Politics, Volume 57, Number 2, pp. 225–249. Kymlicka, W. (1991). The Ethics of Inarticulacy, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Volume 34, Number 2, pp. 155–182, Kymlicka, W. (1995). MultiCultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Kymlicka, W. (1997). Do We Need a Theory of Minority Rights? Reply to Carens, Young, Parekh & Forst, Constellations, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 72–877. Kymlicka, W. (1998). Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada, Toronto, Oxford University Press. Kymlicka, W. (2010). Testing the Liberal Multiculturalist Hypothesis: Normative Theories, and Social Science Evidence, Canadian Journal of Political Science/ Revue Canadienne de Science Politique, Volume 43, Number 2, pp. 257–271. Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (1984). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, London, Verso. Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (2014). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, London, Verso Trade. First edition 1981. Lehman, G. (1993). China after Tiananmen Square: Rawls and Justice, Praxis International, Volume 12, Number 4, pp. 405–420. Lehman, G. (1995). A Legitimate Concern with Environmental Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 6, Number 5, pp. 393–413. Lehman, G. (1999). Disclosing New World: Social and Environmental Accounting, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 24, pp. 217–241. Lehman, G. (2001). Reclaiming the Public Sphere: Problems and Prospects for Corporate Social and Environmental Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume, 12, Number 6, pp. 713–733. Lehman, G. (2002). Globalisation and the Authentic Self: Cosmopolitanism and Charles Taylor's Communitarianism, Global Society, Volume 16, Number 4, pp. 419–437. Lehman, G. (2004). Social and Environmental Accounting: Trends and Thoughts for the Future, Accounting Forum, Volume 28, Number 1, pp. 1–5. Lehman, G. (2007). A Common Pitch and the Management of Corporate Relations: Interpretation, Ethics and Managerialism, Journal of Business Ethics, Volume 71, Number 2, pp. 161–178. Lehman, G. (2010a). Interpretive Accounting Research, Accounting Forum, Volume 34, Number 3-4, pp. 231–235. Lehman, G. (2010b). Perspectives on Accounting, Commonalities & the Public Sphere, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 21, Number 8, pp. 724–738 Lehman, G. (2011a). The Management of Sustainability: The Art of Interpretation, Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research, Volume 9, pp. 75–88. Lehman, G. (2011b). Interpretivism, Postmodernism and the Natural Environment, Philosophy and Social Criticism, Volume 37, pp. 795–821. Lehman, G. (2013). Critical Reflections on Laughlin’s Middle Range Research Approach: Language Not Mysterious?, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 24, Number 3, pp. 211–224. Lehman, G. (2015). Charles Taylor’s Ecological Conversations, London, PalgraveMacmillan.

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Lehman, G. (2017). The Language of Environmental and Social Accounting Research: The Expression of Beauty and Truth, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 44, pp. 30–41. Leopold, A. (1970). A Sand Country Almanac, New York, Sierra Club/Ballantine. Lemos, N. M. (1993). Higher Goods and the Myth of Tithonus. Journal of Philosophy, Volume XC, Number 9, pp. 482–496. 10.2307/2940862. Merton, R. K. (1968). Social Theory and Social Structure, New York, NY, Free Press, Mill, J. S. (1874). Nature, in Nature, the Utility of Religion and Theism, London, Longmans, Green Reader, & Dyer (pp. 3–69). Mill, J. S. (1929). Principles of Political Economy, New York, NY, Longmans, Green and Company, (pp. 748–750). Mouck, T. (1994). Corporate Accountability and Rorty’s Utopian Liberalism Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Volume 7, pp. 6–30. Mouffe, C. (1998a). Hearts, Minds, and Radical Democracy, Interview with Castle, D. (Ed.): Red Pepper, June 1, https://www.redpepper.org.uk/hearts-minds-andradical-democracy/ (Accessed November 18, 2019). Mouffe, C. (1998b). The radical centre. Soundings, Volume 9i, Summer, pp. 11–23. Mouffe, C. (1998c). Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism? Dialogue International Edition, Volume 7–8, pp. 9–21. Mouffe, C. (1999). Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism? Social Research, Volume 66, Number 4, pp. 745–758. Mouffe, C. (2005). On the Political, New York, NY, Routledge. Mouffe, C. (2008). Critique as Counter-Hegemonic Intervention, Vienna, European Institution for Progressive Cultural Politics. Mouffe, C., & Castle, D. (1998). Hearts, Minds, and Radical Democracy, Interview with Castle, D. (Ed.), Red Pepper. Norval, A. J. (2004). Hegemony After Deconstruction: The Consequences of Undecidability, Journal of Political Ideologies, Volume 9, pp. 139–157. Norval, A. J. (2007). Aversive Democracy: Inheritance and Originality in the Democratic Tradition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 59. Parfit, D. (1986). Overpopulation and the Quality of Life, in Singer, P. (Ed.), Applied Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press (pp. 145–165). Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Rawls, J. (1980). Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, John Dewey Lectures, Columbia University Press 1980, The Journal of Philosophy, Volume 77, Number 9, pp. 515–572. Rawls, J. (1982). The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press (pp. 3–87). Rawls, J. (1985). Justice As Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Volume 14, Number 3, pp. 223–251. Rawls, J. (1988). The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Volume 17, Number 4, pp. 251–274. Rawls, J. (1989). The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, New York University Law Review, Volume 64, Number 2, pp. 233–255. Rawls, J. (1993). Political Liberalism, New York, NY, Columbia University Press. Rosenblum, N. (1987). Another Liberalism: Romanticism and the Reconstruction of Liberal Thought, Harvard, Harvard University Press.

Basic issues in accountability 145 Roslender, R. (2013). Stuck in the Middle with Who?: (Belatedly) Engaging with Laughlin while Becoming Reacquainted with Merton and Middle Range Theorising, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 24, Number 3, pp. 228–241. Sagoff, M. (1984). Ethics and Economics in Environmental Law, in Regan, T. (Ed.), Earthbound: New Introductory Essays in Environmental Ethics, New York, Random House. Singer, P. (1974). All Animals Are Equal, Philosophic-Exchange, Volume 74, Number 1, pp. 103–116. Singer, P. (1975). Animal Liberation, London, Jonathan Cape. Singer, P. (1983). Hegel: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Singer, P. (2007). Review Essay on the Moral Demands of Affluence, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 75, Number 2, pp. 475–483. Taylor, C. (1985a). Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. (1985b). What is Human Agency, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers, I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 15–45. Originally in Taylor, C., What is Human Agency, in Mischel, T. (Ed.), The Self: Psychological and Philosophical Issues, Oxford, Oxford University Press (pp. 114–115). Taylor, C. (1985c). Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Philosophical Papers II, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. (1985d). Atomism, in Taylor, C. (Ed.), Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Philosophical Papers II, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (pp. 187–210). Taylor, C. (1991a). The Dialogical Self, in Hiley, D. R., Bohman, J. F. & Shusterman, R. (Eds.), The Interpretive Turn, Ithaca, Cornell Press (pp. 304–315). Taylor, C. (1991b). Civil Society in the Western Tradition, in Groffier, E. & Paradis, M. (Eds.), The Notion of Tolerance and Human Rights, Ottawa, Carleton University Press. Taylor, C. (1991c). The Importance of Herder, in Margalit, E. & Margalit, A. (Eds.), Isaiah Berlin: A Celebration, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press (pp. 40–64). Reprinted In Taylor, C. (1995). Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press (pp. 79–100). Taylor, C. (1991d). Comments and Replies, Inquiry, Volume 34, Number 2, pp. 237–254. Taylor, C. (1992a). The Ethics of Authenticity, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Taylor, C. (1992b). Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, edited by A. Gutmann, Princeton, New Jersey, NY, Princeton University Press. Taylor, C. (1994). Response to My Commentators, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume, 54, Number 1, pp. 203–213. Taylor, C. (1995a). Two Theories of Modernity, Hastings Centre Report (MarchApril, 1995). Taylor, C. (1995b). A Most Peculiar Institution, in Altham, J. E. J. & Harrison, R. (Eds.), World, Mind and Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (pp. 132–156).

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Taylor, C. (1995c). Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press. Taylor, C. (1995d). Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere, in Taylor, C. (Ed.), Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press (pp. 257–287). Taylor, C. (1999). Invoking Civil Society, in Taylor, C. (Ed.), Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press (pp. 204–225). Taylor, C. (2016). The Language Animal, Oxford, Blackwell. Unger, B. & Busuioc, E. M. (2007). The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar Publishing. Williams, P. F. (1987). The Legitimate Concern with Fairness, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 12, Number 2, pp. 169–189. Yar, M. (2001). Recognition and the Politics of Human (e) Desire. Theory, Culture & Society, Volume 18, Number 2–3, pp. 57–76. Zimmerman, M. J. (1999). Virtual Intrinsic Value and the Principle of Organic Unities, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 59, Number 3, pp. 654–667.

9

Liberal accountability Current environmental and social challenges and policy1

Introduction Accounting is part of the public information given by a firm to ‘others’ to justify its behaviour. John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993) are adapted in this chapter to support the argument that a moral obligation to provide not just additional environmental information in published reports exists but reflect on damage done to Nature (Milne & Gray, 2014). This chapter argues that liberalism is more than procedure. Not only do we need to expose the illusions of neoliberalism but also we need to interrogate narrow ontological conceptions of decision-making. The work of John Rawls is used to benchmark the analysis in this chapter. Rawls is useful because he draws out the implications of interpretation at the policy level. The argument in this chapter is based around a discussion of the need for accounting and accountability research to provide information to satisfy accountability relationships. The first substantive section of the chapter provides an overview of Rawls’ theory in order to (1) establish that accounting is a moral discourse; (2) to argue that the environment is a primary good; and (3) that accounting can contribute towards developing a closer and what Lehman (2015) has referred to as a more transparent society. The second section applies Rawls’ theory to argue for environmental accounting (CSEAR) and interpretivist accountability are part of an administrative solution to the environmental crisis. Accounting has the capacity to report on corporate use of the environment and can transmit that data cost-effectively. As Arrington and Puxty (1991) and Power (1992) argue, accounting can become a component of an efficient social approach (praxis) steering corporations towards awareness of social issues. Accomplishing this means investigating accounting critically, within its present procedures (Power, 1992).

Further objections and contrary opinions A useful way to deepen the argument for environmental accountability is to suggest a contrary opinion. Many theorists have made the point that the

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environment is in crisis and urgent solutions are needed (Scranton, 2015). But some environmental information must already be available, otherwise, how could the awareness that humankind faces a serious environmental crisis exist? Also, if this awareness is accompanied by the conviction that we will perish unless changes are made in how we live, then whether the solution is Rawlsian or not seems irrelevant; imminent extinction may necessitate drastic responses. This chapter asserts that society is at a point of bifurcation. One route points towards proceeding with present neoliberal market-based solutions to economic and accounting problems using techniques such as ‘decision-usefulness’. However, an alternative approach is possible which posits an administrative solution developed via accountability based on social and moral obligations that then can go some way to rectifying justly the damage already exacted on the environment.

Accountability and decision-usefulness According to the latter view expressed earlier, accounting must transform itself from its traditional role of providing only useful information for a narrowly constructed notion of business decision-making to providing information that satisfies a broader set of ‘users’ (see, for example, Laughlin, 1990; Lehman, 1995, 1996, 2015; Roberts, 1991; Williams, 1987). ‘Decision-usefulness’ indeed appears now to have completely subsumed ‘accountability’ (FASB, 1978; IAS, 2015; SAC 2, 1992). Consider the following statement from SAC 2 (the Australian adaptation of FASB, 1978): ...the objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide information to users that is useful for making and evaluating decisions about the allocation of scarce resources.… When general purpose financial reports meet this objective, they will also be the means by which managements and governing bodies discharge their accountability to the users of the reports (SAC 2, para. 26 and 27). In so subsuming accountability within the definition of decision-usefulness, accounting has abrogated its moral obligations by deferring to an outside mechanism (the market). ‘Decision-useful’ information is inadequate as a principle for organising accounting practice and research. It fails to recognise that accounting reports do more than just ‘transmit’ a set of numbers; they transmit information that establishes accountability relationships in which legitimate expectations exist that the one giving the account is attempting to satisfy the rights of various groups. When accounting is defined in terms of decision-usefulness, the technical role of providing a ‘set of numbers’ is given prominence at the expense of accountability. There are particularly fundamental problems in using ‘decision-useful’ market-based approaches in addressing current environmental problems.

Liberal accountability 149 Daly warns that it is dangerous to rely solely on the market to solve problems such as the environment because prices ‘do not balance marginal ecosystem services sacrificed against marginal social benefit of a larger population or greater per capita resource use’ (Daly, 1992, p. 190). To achieve the required balance (equilibrium) economists can only use shadow prices ‘that value the in-Nature use of all resources in terms commensurate with the customary pecuniary exchange valuation of commodities’ (Daly, 1992, p. 190). To perform these calculations, however, requires ‘heroic assumptions’ about our knowledge of the ‘external costs resulting from ecosystem disruptions, and how these costs are imputed to the microdecisions that gave them rise’ (Daly, 1992, p. 190).2 On this view, Daly (1992) and other ecological economists (cf. Pearce, 1990, 1991; Soderbaum, 1992) argue that there is no reason to assume that firms are confronted with a well-behaved marginal cost function: it can be affected by discontinuities, thresholds and interdependencies with the ecological system. Daly (1992, p. 10) succinctly summarises the problems with neo-classical based General Equilibrium Economic Analysis (GEEA): The notion that systemic vital costs of collective behaviour (greenhouse effect, ozone depletion) are best dealt with by pretending that every individual could and should, on the basis of assumed perfect knowledge, decide his or her own willingness to pay to avoid the loss of such services, is not an idea that comes easily to the unprejudiced mind. It requires years of indoctrination in ‘methodological individualism’. The importance of these issues becomes clear if we rephrase Sen’s (1992, p. 145) famous discussion concerning market-based Pareto-improving contracts (an individual can be made better off while leaving no other worse off). Pareto-optimality does not automatically lead to a just or environmentally sustainable outcome. Consider two hypothetical characters – Greed and Green in terms of achieving a Pareto-optimal outcome: An economy would be Pareto-optimal when Greed is allowed to pursue business ventures that destroy the environment as long as Green cannot be made better-off without cutting into the pleasures of the rich (Greed). If preventing the destruction of Greed’s business venture that impacted adversely on the environment made Greed feel worseoff, then letting Greed destroy the environment would be Paretooptimal. In short a society or economy can be Pareto-optimal and still be perfectly disgusting.3 In an accounting context, Cooper and Sherer (1984, p. 213) have made the argument that ‘market failures such as information asymmetry and non-excludability may be recognised but by assuming the perfect adaptability and omniscience of market participants, other institutional

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possibilities are dismissed’. Recognising accountants’ abilities to construct ‘facts’ or ‘reality’ (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Hines, 1988; Roberts, 1991), accountability researchers (Gray, 1983; Laughlin, 1990; Williams, 1987) have emphasised that ‘fairness’ needs to be given an explicit recognition in the language of accounting since notions of justice form an important component of peoples’ everyday reality. Within this analysis, accountability becomes an autonomous concept and is no longer subsumed within decisionusefulness (cf. Laughlin, 1990; Nelson, 1993; Roberts, 1991; Wilson, 1993). The definition of accountability that shapes my argument is from Williams4 (1987, p. 170) and specifies accountability as: an obligatory relationship created via transactions in which one party is expected to give an account of its actions to other parties. Accountability is construed as a relationship between a stakeholder and a firm that specifies moral obligations and duties between them. Accountability contrasts with the facilitating features associated with decision-useful financial information (cf. Gray, 1983; Gray, Owen, & Maunders, 1987, 1988, 1991; Laughlin, 1990; Roberts, 1991; Roberts and Scapens, 1985; Williams, 1987). In the spirit of decision-usefulness, accountants argue that the ‘numbers’ reported (cf. FASB, 1978) ‘passively and objectively record and represent the results of organisational reality’ (Roberts, 1991, p. 355). Yet, decision-usefulness neglects to account for the fact that ‘accounting is highly situated in the context of human interests’ (Arrington and Puxty, 1991, p. 31) and that accountability relationships exist as independent criteria. Environmental reporting (1) is essential to satisfying these accountability relationships; and (2) alters corporate consciousness. Environmental accounting ultimately calls for corporations to ‘give and provide reasons’ for their use of the environment (cf. Roberts and Scapens, 1985, p. 447). Accounting is both the means for defending actions and the means for identifying which actions one must defend.

Environmental accountability and transparency Through the accountability nexus accounting would take on the role of constraining organisational activities, particularly those activities that may be considered environmentally degrading. Currently, the awareness that accounting fails to recognise such ‘other’ interests as the environment may be limited, but ‘the more this becomes known by people outside accounting, the less accounting can confer legitimacy’ (Nelson, 1993, p. 224). In defining itself in terms of accountability, accounting would no longer perform a narrow stewardship role. The essence of the notion of accounting implied in accountability is based on not simply what Gray et al. (1987, 1988) call the middle-ground:

Liberal accountability 151 in which the status quo is accepted...[where] the ambition is neither to destroy capitalism nor to refine, deregulate and/or liberate it. (from Tinker et al., 1991, p. 29, quoting Gray et al., 1987, 1988) But this chapter differs from the work of Gray et al. (1987, 1988) and Gray (2010), in that the aim is to argue for basic institutional alterations explicitly using the work of Rawls (1971, 1993). A justice perspective adds theoretical rigour to the middle-road, which was not the original intention of Gray et al. (1988, 1991). Their failure to explore their assumptions has resulted in a major challenge to that position by Tinker et al. (1991) who argue that the middle-ground is ‘relativist’, ‘pluralist’, and is merely an exercise in ‘imminent legitimation’. The case for environmental reporting, moreover, is based on a pluralist model. Rawls’ analysis is concerned with pluralism in its new form, or more correctly in its new meanings. Society is no longer seen as consisting of groups of sovereign individuals nor as interest-maximising groups (as in earlier pluralism) but of groups held together by inter-subjectively shared language.5 As Rawls (1989) argues: Under the political and social conditions that the basic rights and liberties of free institutions secure, a diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines will emerge, if such diversity does not already exist. Moreover, it will persist and may increase. The fact about free institutions is the fact of pluralism. (p. 235). Rawls’ adaptation does not deny the fact that powerful groups may use the basic institutions (of which accounting is an example) as an instrument of domination. However, in his theory a political conception of justice is not necessarily tailored by the dominant group to justify favoured results. Rather, the purpose of a theory of justice, defined on pluralist terms, is ‘to discover and formulate the deeper bases of agreement’ that he hopes are to be found within the present social structures and intuitively in terms of citizens’ considered convictions (Rawls, 1980, p. 518).

Justice and accountability Rawls (1993) has indicated that his theory is inspired by the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, whose essential theme is that each individual is sacrosanct and inviolable. He formulated the idea of a ‘categorical imperative’, where no person is to be treated as a means to an end: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end. (Kant, 1949, p. 96).

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The consequentialist or utilitarian approach stands in contrast to the deontological approach proposed by Immanuel Kant. Kant’s formal term for his approach to determining the rightness of an action is referred to as a categorical imperative (Kant, 1963). A categorical imperative can be defined as a procedural decision-making device to determine the ethical validity of an action. Actions that are consistent with the procedure would be universal and therefore morally permissible. For Kant, an action is moral when it can be universalised against the procedural test. Kant sets out the action in the form of a maxim where a maxim then constructs a general principle that captures the action under consideration.

Applying Rawls and Kant to accountability and environmental ethics In applying a Rawlsian inspired version of Kant, accounting must take seriously the diversity of individual interests by adding ‘accountability’ as a moral term. Rawls adapts Kant because he believes that justice must be grounded in the public sphere (cf. Rawls, 1993). Kant’s categorical imperative has been criticised by Hegel as being based on a narrow and atomistic understanding of community. Rawls avoids the Hegelian critique by grounding Kant’s categorical imperative within the public culture ‘as an ideal conception of citizenship for a constitutional democratic regime, because it presents how things might be, taking people as a just and wellordered society would encourage them to be’ (Rawls, 1993, p. 213). The concept of developing a ‘good’ society is implicit in the work of Gray et al. (1987, 1991) in that their understanding of accountability is based on a vision of society ‘as it is and, to varying degrees, as it can and should be’ (Gray, 1989, p. 53). Rawls is particularly useful in the context of developing a middle-of-the-road justification for environmental reporting because his theory can be used to formulate a vision of the good society that would be concerned about the relationships between people and Nature. Accounting, in such a world, would be concerned with providing information in attaining that vision. The value of a Rawlsian approach is that it adds rigour to accountability (Laughlin, 1990, pp. 96–98) in that fairness is included within accountability and constructors of just social institutions account for ‘primary’ goods (defined next). Justice as fairness is designed to clarify the theoretical bases of the ‘middle-ground’ as part of changing consciousness within capitalist society. The change in consciousness proposed by Rawls is achieved in the public realm where citizens are able to express their desires about the type of society that they would want to inhabit. This means that in the public realm, full reign is given to discursive procedures whereby citizens use their faculty of language to advance their considered convictions in achieving an accountable society. This is probably what Gray et al. (1988) mean when they argue that there are emerging trends in social accounting – one is the fact that the

Liberal accountability 153 accounting profession is beginning to recognise the need for expanded corporate social and environmental reporting. It does not mean that corporations act out of altruism, but they are recognising that they do indeed have duties to the societies they inhabit.

Rawls’ model of justice and primary goods In developing his principles of justice, Rawls argues that capitalist institutions must consider what are to be ‘primary goods’. Primary goods are higher-order interests or needs defined as those desires ‘that govern deliberation and conduct’ (Rawls, 1980, p. 525). Primary goods are ‘things which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants’ (Rawls, 1971, p. 92) and these goods may not have a market value. It is argued that with more of these goods, citizens are assured of greater success in carrying out their intentions ‘and advancing their ends, whatever they may be’ (Rawls, 1971, p. 92). The environment is a higher-order good, the value of which managers of corporations need to preserve in order to satisfy the needs of concerned user groups. A society that is concerned primarily with ‘decision-useful’ information can neglect to account for those factors, for example, that are conducive to the healthfulness and pleasure of our lives. Accounting and the basic institutions of liberal-democracies must take seriously citizens’ demands for primary goods in achieving justice. Rawls argues that justice is an integral component of political liberalism which espouses an overlapping consensus; it is based on the ‘hope of political community’ (Rawls, 1993, pp. 146–148). In achieving this ‘community’-based result, Rawls employs a ‘thought’ experiment called the original position (Rawls, 1971, p. 18, 520, 585). The original position is based on 12 crucial elements,6 the most important of which is the veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1971, p. 146). This is a theoretical device which produces a purely hypothetical result (Gaa, 1986, p. 438). Behind this veil, representative individuals who are motivated by the economic assumptions of rationality and self-interest choose two principles of justice.7 These are: (1) Each person is to have an equal liberty to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. (2) Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they both are: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just saving principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. Using the rational choice assumptions of GEEA, Rawls derives a result that is concerned with the plight of the least advantaged – the ‘difference principle’.

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Rational, representative individuals will choose the above two principles of justice using a process of maximin, where individuals are to choose an alternative that minimises the maximum loss. The principles of justice are ordered according to leximin by which representative individuals choose a ‘social structure so as to minimise the maximum loss to the worst-off individual’ or class of individuals (Gaa, 1986, p. 439). The representative individuals choose the ‘difference principle’ because they do not know whether they will belong to the least well-off socio-economic group (Gaa, 1986, p. 439). In an accounting context, this would translate into providing information to those groups with that are unable to command an account of corporate obligations. This is what Gaa refers to as the principle of user primacy (Gaa, 1986). An additional obligation for accountants that flows from the original position concerns the just savings principle (principle 2a). The just saving rate is defined as that rate that would maintain or improve the lot of each succeeding generation without causing hardship to earlier generations (Turner, 1991, p. 217). A problem attends this formulation in that the first generation must make a specific contribution (sacrifice) without any reward. Rawls’ (1993) revision succinctly addresses this issue:8 Consider the case of just savings: since society is a system of cooperation between generations over time, a principle for savings is required. Rather than imagine a (hypothetical and nonhistorical) direct agreement between generations, the parties can be required to agree to a savings principle subject to the further condition that they must want all previous generations to have followed it. Thus the correct principle is that which the members of any generation (and so all generations) would adopt as the one their generation is to follow and as the principle they would want preceding generations to have followed (and later generations to follow) no matter how far back or forward in time. (Rawls, 1993, p. 274). The problem for accounting then becomes one of providing information concerning the just saving rate, one that may imply foregoing some consumption in consideration of future generations (further discussion of this issue is in the second substantive section of this chapter). These issues are central to the problem of attaining an overlapping consensus in a pluralist society.

Consensus and self-respect In developing a theory to help resolve social conflicts, Rawls states the conditions for an overlapping consensus: The social role of a conception of justice is to enable all members of society to make mutually acceptable to one another their shared

Liberal accountability 155 institutions and basic arrangements, by citing what are publicly recognised as sufficient reasons, as identified by that conception. (Rawls, 1980, p. 517) In Rawls’ conception of a pluralist society, the problem becomes one of resolving incommensurate moral conflicts. In the quest for cooperation between citizens, we need a basic structure that sets aside deep-seated moral differences. This is because the basic structure that determines justice is a democratic society and it does not support any comprehensive doctrine. It is for this reason that the constructors of justice are denied historical and contingent knowledge. The basic structure provides the framework for a ‘self-sufficient scheme of cooperation for all the essential purposes of human life, which purposes are served by the variety of associations and groups within this framework’ (Rawls, 1993, p. 301). In a pluralist society, the task for constructors of justice relates to the attainment of accountability. Rawls says: The real task is to discover and formulate the deeper bases of agreement which one hopes are embedded in common sense, or even to originate and fashion starting points for common understanding by expressing in a new form the convictions found in the historical tradition by connecting them with a wide range of people’s considered convictions: those which stand up to critical reflections. (Rawls, 1980, p. 518) It is important to note that Rawls’ is not proposing that language (which can include accounting discourse) bears the full burden of achieving a consensus. Rather, it is through language that citizens transmit their preferences concerning what they consider to be primary goods. Rawls uses the original position as a model where it is likely that free discourse will lead to the arbitrators achieving a sense of justice. He has clarified this by specifying that ‘the argument for the priority of liberty, like all arguments from the original position, is always relative to a given enumeration of the alternatives from which the parties are to select’ (Rawls, 1993, p. 294). Accounting can assist in achieving consensus by transmitting information that is useful to all interested stakeholders. ‘Decision-usefulness’ is not wholly adequate to the attainment of this task because it inhibits free discussion due to the narrow focus of its procedures. The traditional conception of accounting via ‘decision-usefulness’ has given a false sense of ‘factuality’ thereby abrogating its role in attaining a just consensus. The conditions for achieving an overlapping consensus are based on Rawls’ politically grounded moral mechanism, self-respect, which he defines as follows: First of all it includes a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth

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Self-respect must be used to avoid the charge of relativism that has been levelled at the middle-road approach.9 This is because it orders and adjudicates rival and incommensurate interests via lexically ordering primary goods. Moral progress is achieved in a well-ordered society that locates respect within our confidence as a fully co-operating member of society ‘capable of pursuing a worthwhile conception of the good over a complete life’ (Rawls, 1993, p. 318). Self-respect presupposes that individual citizens can exercise moral powers and, therefore have a fully developed sense of justice (Williams, 1987) in the secure conviction that they can carry out their life-plans. Rawls’ model is based on the supposition of reciprocity that is achieved by elevating the criterion of self-respect. Rawls means by this that the foundation and development of a just society needs individuals who cultivate generosity and equality of respect. In a just society, social relations are based on equality, fairness and justice in relationships, not merely selfinterested agents prepared to work to remedy injustices that affect themselves. The acquisition and development of self-respect and a sense of ‘reciprocity’ in relations is as important in transforming our societies as it is to maintaining a well-ordered society. I believe that reciprocity in social relations must be achieved via self-respect, thereby developing the most important primary goods. Fundamentally, Rawls is arguing for the use of the concept of self-respect as a ‘mechanism’ to order rival claims concerning the distribution of the good.10 In an environmental accounting context, self-respect is adapted to respond to Tinker et al.’s (1991) charge that middle-of-the-road theorising is necessarily relativist, being simply: concerned about what is politically pragmatic and acceptable; not what is socially just, scientifically rational, or likely to rectify social ills arising from waste, exploitation, extravagance, disadvantage, or coercion. (Tinker et al., 1991, p. 29) Self-respect is used to order primary goods in the secure conviction that policy-makers must respond to social and environmental issues. The basic institutions, therefore, must respond to such injustices by rectifying social ills in order of the most important primary goods. I argue that this is a constructivist (diachronic) response to the adverse effects of capitalist enterprises such as waste, exploitation, extravagance, disadvantage and coercion. Indeed, in adapting Rawls’ model, principles of justice are designed to respond to the alienation that is embodied in the capitalist mode of production.

Liberal accountability 157 Self-respect, therefore, is a guiding principle built on the belief in moral progress as part of the construction of a society that orders and evaluates the good society. It does not, however, necessarily do this by seeking out opinions, feelings, perceptions and preferences (Tinker et al., 1991, p. 29). It performs this task by ranking the most important primary goods in terms of whether each individual’s life-plan is being achieved. As a consequence, the environment must be accorded the status of a primary good. In summary, the criterion of self-respect must be used as a foil to the sovereignty of self-interest. Indeed, from the preceding discussion, there are two important issues concerning self-respect. First, the basic institutions must respond to issues of fairness (Williams, 1987), and second, recognise that the environment must be treated as a primary good. In recognising the importance of the environment, accounting must provide the data so that the basic institutions can structure policy for the achievement of an individual’s life-plan. SEAR, as a ‘primary good’, is but a first step in recognising the importance of the environment and the rights that citizens have to this information.11 The aim of this book is to achieve closeness, openness and transparency in responding to social and environmental problems.

Closeness Wenz (1988) summarises the Rawlsian relationships further by stating that a pluralistic conception of justice requires an adjudicating mechanism (self-respect) which advances the concept of closeness. Closeness is the relationship between entities (human and non-human) reflecting the interdependencies between humans and the environment. In this book, closeness and self-respect perform similar functions. As Wenz (1988, p. 316) states ‘the closer our relationship is to someone or to something, the greater the number of our obligations in that relationship, and/or the stronger our obligations in that relationship’. Applied to accounting, closeness becomes a social consideration, an ethical extension of the traditional accounting framework which incorporates ‘fairness’. This means that accounting policy-makers can design standards that ‘legitimate’ communal resource utilisation. Ethical considerations have led Katz to state: Closeness’ is not a biological concept – it is determined by the strength and number of actual and potential interactions: thus Wenz eliminates the biases of racism, speciesism, and anthropocentricism. Closeness is then used to implement, balance, and adjudicate conflicting or incompatible moral duties. (Katz, 1985, p. 271) Social obligations exist to satisfy preferences and positive rights for a viable and stable environment (primary goods). These will be satisfied if the

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theoretical concept of closeness can be advanced. On this view, accountants must take seriously the arguments concerning the environment. This new perspective based on accountability encompasses closeness which utilises the concept of justice and fairness in order to consider whether rival views can lead an overlapping consensus. Accountability, as a formal concept, takes on the role of satisfying relationships between one or more parties thereby contributing to the attainment of an accountable society. In this view, accounting would add environmental accounting to its lexicon thereby achieving the realisation of free public discussion.

Transparency Closeness can be advanced through transparency which is defined as the expansion of corporate reporting to inform the community ‘about the use of its resources and the burdens/(benefits) it has been obliged to bear’ (Gray, 1992, p. 415). New institutions (Gray et al., 1987) may well be created because of the administrative response by accountants informing the community about corporate resource utilisation. Self-respect and closeness are developed abstractly in order to advocate community principles. Thus, a closer and perhaps less divided society can emerge. This leads to the conclusion that accounting has a moral duty to provide corporate information that is transparent in order to advance closeness in society; it is a goal of financial reporting to achieve transparency. Closeness combined with transparency has the propensity to explain, and for society to evaluate, the activities of corporations. As Gray (1992) argues, the deep green view believes society has a right to this information together with transparent financial data: Further, given the prominence of ‘community’ in the vision, the level at which information is reported - the level at which transparency must be sought - must be that of the community. (Gray 1992, p. 415)12 The chapter does not underestimate the difficulties for institutions such as accounting in achieving the radical changes I propose. Given present social structures, it may well be that justice is not an immediate likelihood, but this should not diminish our quest for justice here and now (cf. Nagel, 1991).

The justice model for environmental accounting (Quietism) This chapter has argued that Rawls’ moral system is based on pluralism using self-respect and is hence able to avoid the charge of relativism (cf. Tinker et al., 1991). The Rawlsian mechanism of self-respect provides the opportunity to develop new accounting concepts such as transparency and

Liberal accountability 159 closeness that can lead to the establishment of a more open and accountable democracy (Gray, 1989). Given that there exists an environmental crisis, accountants have a duty to make an account of corporate activity in order to alter awareness of corporate obligations. Rawls accepts the possibility that his principles may necessarily have to be open to adaptation. The chapter adopts such a course in arguing that liberties can be expanded to include ‘the right to be free from environmental degradation and harm’. This provides a theoretical underpinning to Gray et al.’s (1987, 1991) concern about other interests that encompass environmental issues. This does not mean corporations have no right to earn a profit, but that profit is not the sole concern for organisations. Corporations responsible for environmental degradation, either directly through the consumption of natural resources in the name of development, or indirectly by doing nothing, in the name of allowing the market to work (Gray, 1990a, 1990b) must alter their behaviour. Closeness and transparency respond to the political-economists’ concern that GEEA fails to provide a social welfare optimum (Cooper and Sherer, 1984; Gaa, 1986; Williams, 1987). In this view, environmental accountants can provide information about whether we need to maximise certain goods or account for their preservation (sustainability).13 Sustainability is the criterion outlined by Gray (1992) and is consistent with the principles of justice that have been outlined in the first substantive section of the chapter. Sustainability implies an obligation for accountants to provide information concerning a corporation’s utilisation of natural resources. A concern for a sustainable future leads to the following three incommensurate issues, which arise from our earlier discussion of primary goods: (a) Greed versus altruism. (b) Present versus future generations. (c) Human species versus the rest of life.

Greed and altruism Sustainable development is a part of the moral lexicon requiring integration and evaluation. An example of this disputed moral terrain can be seen in our discussion about a corporation’s right to make a profit and developing societal concerns for sustainable development. Waldon’s (1989) solution is to develop basic institutions that can lexically order rights and assist in developing a concern for environmentally sensitive corporate activities that promote sustainable development. An overlapping consensus has the potential to provide a forum to assist in resolving differences such as those between green awareness and economic development. This may require the discontinuation of some corporate activity, or it may temper corporate excesses towards considerations of sustainability.

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Given our present (unjust) institutional arrangements, some citizens are excluded from participating in the democratic process. A part of the reason is that present institutions rely on the market to achieve fairness in terms of efficiency. A market-based solution will not achieve the required change in societal consciousness to adequately respond to the environmental crisis. This is because self-interest does not promote the communal relationships that must be developed to achieve an environmentally aware society. Nevertheless, change through the middle-road does have the potential to transform and create ‘green’ social structures. The chapter has argued that society must explore ameliorative strategies before calling for the ‘destruction’ of basic institutions (Rawls, 1971, p. 243; cf. Rorty, 1991, p. 186). In the foregoing analysis, justice that is guided by self-respect rather than market mechanisms must inform our basic institutions. Self-respect forms the basis of new green reporting practices which in turn represents a fundamental transformation in accounting. Self-respect prompts us to ask whether organisations have complied with the minimum standards of law and on what basis do we want to revise the law? (Gray & Collison, 1991, p. 25). One possibility, for example, would be to refine the compliance with statute approach to corporate social reporting championed by Gray et al. (1987, 1991). This would encompass, for example, developing a vision of the democratic society that recognises the systemic interdependencies between humans and the world they share.

Present and future generations and other sentient life forms Rawls’ device of the original position (Rawls, 1971, p. 137) discussed earlier articulated an obligation for citizens concerning other generations (Rawls, 1971, p. 292). In A Theory of Justice Rawls does not provide a detailed treatment concerning issues of intergenerational equity. It is, however, necessary to address explicitly the respective interests of future and present generations in order to specify information needs that will allow us to make viable decisions concerning the environment. In addressing issues concerning future generations, Norton (1989) argues the problem is not one of arriving at a suitable inter-temporal discount rate but is about arriving at an ontological resolution about the type of society that we want to inhabit: How should we talk about time preference? If, for example, we talk about time preference by discussing what the proper discount rate should be, we have already chosen a vocabulary - the vocabulary of individual preferences. When we do this, we run the risk of begging important questions, of not seeing that we are embodying controversial assumptions about value in our language. We do not yet understand time preference well enough to allow assumptions of this sort. We risk mixing two issues that should be addressed separately: what should be the magnitude of the discount rate, and whether discounting is an

Liberal accountability 161 adequate method at all. By moving to the metalevel, by asking first what sort of vocabulary we should use to discuss these two issues, we may be able to separate them and gain a measure of clarity (Norton, 1989, pp. 138–139) This is not to say, however, that economic and financial data have no role to play. Gray (1992) is correct to argue at the practical level that the use of the natural environment can be measured by the use of economic shadow pricing to measure the opportunity cost of the utilisation of the planet’s resources. Accountants, then, are confronted with the challenge of providing data about the ‘just’ saving rate. However, this chapter argues that the real issue is about exploring the ontological level thereby constructing a society that explicitly recognises the relationships between people and the environment. Furthermore, human utilisation of the environment has often neglected to account for other life forms. Rawls (1971, 1993) offers only a few vague references concerning other sentient life forms. Of our duties to non-human life he says: It is wrong to be cruel to animals and the destruction of a whole species can be a great evil. The capacity for feelings of pleasure and pain and for the forms of life of which animals are capable clearly impose duties of compassion and humanity in their case. (Rawls, 1971, p. 212)14 Part of the administrative approach for an environmental ethic is to order primary goods lexically. A constructivist approach acts as a corrective to the instrumental approach that dominates our way of thinking about other life forms. Equally, this chapter takes issue with deep green approaches that tend to treat the environment as a cathedral. Such a deep green view can be criticised because all sentient life forms have a right to survive and use the planet – this includes humans (cf. Thompson, 1990, p. 150).15 It is the ‘slippery slope’ properties of the deep green argument that have led to the proposal for a shallow green Rawlsian viewpoint. Shallow greens, moreover, recognise human interests that trace the value of Nature to its ‘value to human beings and the place it occupies in their lives’ (Goodin, 1992, p. 42). The shallow green view then connects with the concept of sustainability recognising the place and interdependencies between all life forms in the ecosystem. If duties to other life forms were to be acknowledged it would be likely that, ‘far more of what human beings have done, are doing, and are likely to do would be marked as unjust, than is customarily the case’ (Singer, 1988, p. 231). Various environmental issues would be put on the agenda – for instance, the treatment of animals in some experiments would be deemed unjust – and the use of lower primary goods would be questioned in order to treat other life forms fairly and preserve a viable environment for future generations. In this view, corporations have a duty to present and future generations and to other life forms not to

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damage the environment. The responsibility towards other life forms is in no way generally accepted within the corporate reporting medium.16

Arbitrating through accounting Gray’s (1990b) The Greening of Accountancy: The Profession After Pearce analyses the potential of accounting in the environmental debate. Gray (1990b, 1992) shows that considerations of ethical issues lead to new reporting requirements. Relationships based on fairness require that this environmental data be made available to satisfy accountability obligations to stakeholders and correct unjust treatments to other life forms and to the world we inhabit. Accounting numbers and other relevant information can be used so that members in society can evaluate the direction of their life-plan and seek to achieve their goals. In providing environmental data based on political liberalism we are not ‘going along with the crowd’ (Tinker et al., 1991) but are responding to critical questions confronting humankind. Moreover, Gray (1990b) argues that in making accounting green we can: (a) keep organisational decision-makers informed about their use of economic resources; and also (b) inform the public about the way organisations are using resources (accountability). Ethical frameworks can work to constrain unjust practices at the community level. Accounting can perform this function by moving beyond decision-usefulness frameworks and aiming to ‘expose, enhance and develop social relationships’ (Gray, 1992, p. 413) about the use of the environment by corporations.

Accounting and accountability Accountability relationships are critical now that corporate environmental and social excesses have become more transparent. Accounting is decisionuseful but the theoretical construct of transparency requires that accountants should evaluate the data and its content. It can then become: an emancipatory concept helping to expose, enhance and develop social relationships through a re-examination and expansion of established rights to information. (Gray, 1992, p. 413) Transparency, in an environmental context, would promote accounting reports to satisfy the accountability relationships (outlined earlier). Transparency may seem utopian but with elaboration it reveals the formal concept of accountability. It entails providing information to fulfil the social role between the accountor and the accountee and confirms that individuals require a sustainable environment for the fulfilment of their life-plans (primary goods). Transparency requires that the ethical dimensions in society take on a ‘community’ perspective. A ‘fair’ and ethical framework emphasises the

Liberal accountability 163 maximisation of the ‘good’ of the entire community; what Partridge (1984, p. 122) calls the perspective of the ‘moral spectator’, or more directly, ‘the moral point of view’. This chapter has suggested, and speculated, that this can be achieved by the elevation of self-respect to adjudicate between rival proposals of the good (Rawls, 1971, p. 440). Accountants have a part to play in providing relevant data so that society, as a whole, can evaluate environmental utilisation. The first step in achieving this is to give prominence to justice and selfrespect. The second step entails developing Gray’s concept of accountability at a theoretical level, ‘the right to receive information and duty to supply it’ (Gray, 1990b, p. 23). It is suggested that in the second step accounting theory should recognise the fact that there is more than one underlying set of values in society and that they need to be considered in a non-relativist manner, utilising the Rawlsian concept of self-respect. Partridge (1984, p. 122) paraphrasing Hardin (1968) illustrates the contradiction between the individual and communal approaches in his analysis of the use of common property: And yet, given the lack of communal rules of management or procedures of rule enforcement (ie., no effective moral or legal restraints on range use) the rational decision is to add to one’s personal flock...But once an enforceable regulative order is accepted by each, and imposed upon all, the welfare of each herdsman is enhanced through this system of ‘mutual coercion agreed upon’. The use of common property in this ‘communal’ manner promotes closeness and overall efficiency. Rawls’ theory becomes more important within the communal setting allowing us to escape the straight-jacket of impartiality, the neutrality of decision-usefulness and the limitations of any market-based solution. Moreover, as the rights of all must be protected so market power would not become further entrenched nor would market domination rear its more unpleasant features.

Recent developments in liberal accountability thought To this point, the critical focus in liberal accountability thought has been about how human interests have been eroded when accounting focuses primarily on the criterion of decision-usefulness, the maximisation of profit over people. As aforementioned, Gray et al. (1987) argue that accounting concepts such as decision-usefulness and its reliance on utilitarian maximising strategies share a common goal to maximise the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Social accountants argue that these strategies give undue emphasis to profit-maximising goals. This, of course, is the traditional concern with utilitarianism that in maximising the greatest happiness of the greatest number the rights of the least advantaged are not given full

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consideration. It is, therefore, a contention of social accounting scholarship that utilitarian principles can glide over serious ethical and moral issues. Furthermore, inspired by Rawls’ work on justice the social accounting project argued that the focus on decision-usefulness neglects to recognise the fact that ‘accounting is highly situated in the context of human interests’, that is, accounting fails in its quest to create a just and transparent system (see also Arrington and Puxty, 1991, p. 31; Baynes, 1997; Lehman, 2015; Pallot, 1991). According to social accounting researchers, this leads to a focus on decision-usefulness and an emphasis on economic variables at the expense of an appreciation of the moral relationships between corporations and society (Williams and Ravenscroft, 2014). In this regard, critical and social accounting aims to move beyond economic self-interest to emphasise moral relationships between citizens, stakeholders, and corporations. This liberal social accounting perspective, as developed by Gray et al. (1987) and Williams (1987), concerns the specification of moral obligations and duties between corporations and society. These strands of liberal thought in Gray et al. (1987) challenge the facilitating economic features associated with decision-useful financial information (Gray, 1983; Gray et al., 1987, 1988, 1991; Laughlin, 1990, 2011; Roberts, 1991, 2009; Roberts and Scapens, 1985; Williams, 1987). Moreover, in the spirit of decision-usefulness, technical accountants argue that the ‘numbers’ reported (cf. FASB, 1978) ‘passively and objectively record and represent the results of organisational reality’ (Roberts, 1991, p. 355). That is, the numbers in the financial statements are assumed to accurately reflect the impact of corporations on the natural environment and society.

Conclusion This chapter has explored the moral Nature of accountability and identified the obligations of corporations to provide an account of their actions and use of the environment. Two important and interrelated premises have been developed. The first is that environmental accounting is not a call for more information and more regulation. That information is available and accessible. I am arguing that the inclusion of environmental data in annual reports does more than provide information, it establishes and articulates an accountability relationship between corporations and others. Relying on Williams (1987), the chapter established the fact that beyond providing mere information, there is a moral aspect that is based on a legitimate concern for fairness. This then establishes the second premise that accounting information forms part of a public account given by a firm to justify its behaviour. These premises indicate that accounting is a moral discourse and justifies a Rawlsian argument for accountants to put environmental matters on their agenda. It was then argued that the notion of accountability must be explicitly stated as a legitimate accounting criterion because it cannot be submerged

Liberal accountability 165 within the traditional decision usefulness criteria. This led to the argument that financial reporting must consider what are taken to be democratically arbitrated ‘primary goods’ that reflect values and beliefs in society. As a moral discourse, accountability requires that accounting evaluates and explains its data. This argument does not imply that justice will prevail over powerful interest groups, rather it suggests that failure to account for the different views and life-plans in society will mean that the affected individuals’ life goals will be unattainable – stigmatised, marginalised, humiliated and it will undermine their self-respect (Van Parijs, 1991, p. 105). Rawls suggests that in these situations such individuals will be plagued by failure and self-doubt, their life empty and vain (Rawls, 1971, p. 440). Rawlsian ethical theory has been used to provide a basis to develop and justify the corporate social and environmental project pioneered by Gray et al. (1987, 1988, 1991) and Gray (1983, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 1992) which has inspired this chapter. It has been suggested that pluralism is a feature of modern democracies and that middle-of-the-road theorising can use self-respect in the original position to avoid charges of relativism as an adjudicating mechanism. Developed along these lines the argument cannot be said to be ‘going along with the crowd’ since most businesses would prefer not to be more transparent in their procedures. The notion of closeness adds clarity to the argument for regarding accounting as a moral discourse. As a consequence, a theory of justice has been developed to provide a non-reductionist interpretation to contextualise accountability processes. This interpretation transcends decision-usefulness to satisfy a necessarily larger range of accountability relationships.

Notes 1 Early versions of this work appeared in Lehman (1995) with permission. 2 It is for these reasons that Gray (1992) says that when thinking about the environment we must think in terms of interdependencies and its systemic properties. 3 A variation from a quote from Sen (1970, p. 22). The initial reference can be found in Williams (1987, p. 182). 4 Rawls’ work has been introduced to accounting in Gaa (1986, 1988), Williams (1987), and Pallot (1991). 5 This is indeed probably the pluralism that Gray et al. have in mind but they do not fully explore what they understand by the concept. 6 Rawls (1971) lists the 12 elements on pp. 146–147. They are (1) The Nature of the parties, (2) Subject of Justice, (3) Presentation of Alternatives, (4) Time of Entry, (5) Circumstances of Justice, (6) Formal Conditions on Principles, (7) Knowledge and Beliefs, (8) Motivation of Parties, (9) Rationality, (10) Agreement Condition, (11) Compliance Condition, and (12) No Agreement Point. 7 Manning argues that rational actors operating behind a veil of ignorance would choose principles that take account of the environment, not instrumental human principles which maximise the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This is because under the ‘free’ enterprise system it is possible for some individuals to

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lose basic liberties or equal opportunity; such a system would never be chosen by those who would lose out. ‘It seems that, behind a veil of ignorance, everyone would opt for a system of equal liberty and opportunity for every member of society, as this would guarantee a decent life for everyone; under our constructed system no minority would be left destitute’ (Manning, 1981, p. 157). Rawls (1971) argues that the participants in the original position have filial ties with their descendants and would want to make this sacrifice (Rawls, 1971, p. 292). Barry (1989) responds to the ‘just’ saving argument by saying that once the parties in the original position move back to the ‘real’ world they will adopt these principles because of sentimental ties. It is Turner’s (1991) view that it makes more sense and is less ‘sentimental’ than Rawls to argue that the participants in the original position do not know to which generation they belong. In such a situation, they will choose principles that do not permit the current generation to use up all the land, air, and soil (Turner, 1991, pp. 214–217). Rawls’ (1993) response is similar to Turner (1991) in that he argues for background conditions of justice require we develop alternatives available to us as contemporaries. Gaa (1986, 1998) has adapted Rawls’ framework for accounting standardsetting. Gaa does this by developing a principle of user primacy that can be used by the standard-setters to provide information to some sub-set of the population adversely affected by financial and reporting standards. Relativism is a serious accusation as it implies that a theory cannot rank rival philosophical and moral theories. For liberals this would mean we can only analyse a culture or social system on its own terms – we cannot construct ‘bridge-heads’ between cultures and traditions. Self-respect orders primary goods that must alert accountants’ to environmental issues thereby extending the accountant’s moral lexicon. Critics point out that environmental reporting is a chimera and marketing ploy for capitalist organisations. I realise these problems but because of the political Nature of justice, self-respect is but a useful first step. See, for example, Wolff (1977) and, perhaps, the most powerful Hegelian critique has recently been summarised in Benson (1994). Gray, as an aside, mentions that in New Zealand transparency has taken a new twist. As most communities can identify organisations which operate in ways counter to community values … and could also identify employees up to and including senior management there was not only no anonymity behind which the miscreants could hide but the community values became the values of the employees and thus of the organisation. Transparency appeared to operate making some aspects of formal accountability unnecessarily cumbersome (Gray, 1990c, p. 17). The same is happening in Australia, transparently dishonest actions are resulting in community disenchantment that the guardians of societal institutions (State Banks, Government agencies, etc.) have acted in their own self-interest and have failed to provide ‘reasons for their conduct’. The Brundtland Report defines ‘Sustainable’ development ‘as development that meets the needs of future generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (World Commission On Environment and Development, 1987, p. 47). Partridge (1984) and some environmentalists (Hoff, 1983; VanDeVeer, 1979) argue that animals and other sentient beings should be given a place in the original position. Others, for example, Singer (1988), argue that non-rational motives should be incorporated into the original position as irrationality is a human character trait. Singer argues that it would be very difficult for non-

Liberal accountability 167 sentient life forms to be able to maintain a contractual arrangement. It is impossible to include animals in deliberations about justice. 15 While it is outside the scope of this book to review the shallow and deep green perspectives (cf. Goodin, 1992) accounting researchers involved in the debate must exhibit caution when operating within a deep green ethical framework because in such a world there may exist no role for accounting. 16 There are, however, notable exceptions such as The Body Shop who go to great lengths to point out their cruelty free production methods.

Bibliography Arrington, C. E. & Puxty, A. G. (1991). Accounting, Interests and Rationality, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 2, Number 1, pp. 31–59. Ashcroft, R. (1989). Class Conflict and Constitutionalism in J.S. Mill’s Thought, in Rosenblum, N. (Ed.), Liberalism and the Moral Life (pp. 105–127). Barry, B. (1989). Theories of Justice: A Treatise on Social Justice (Vol. 1), University of California Press. Baynes, K. (1997). Communitarian and Cosmopolitan Challenges to Kant’s Conception of World Peace, in Bohman, J. and Lutz-Bachmann, M. (Eds.), Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Idea, Cambridge, MIT Press (pp. 219–235). Beitz, C. (1975). Justice & International Relations, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Volume 4, Number 4, pp. 360–389. Bentley, A. (1967). The Process of Government, In Odegard, P. H. (Ed.), Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press. Berger P. L. & Luckmann, T. (1967). The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, Anchor Books. Broadbent, J., Laughlin, R. & Read, S. (1991). Recent Financial and Administrative Changes in the NHS: A Critical Theory Analysis, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 2, Number 1, pp. 1–31. Brugger, B. & Caust, L. (1991). Justice, Community and Relativism, The Flinders University of South Australia, unpublished. Buchanan, A. E. (1982). Marx and Justice: The Radical Critique of Liberalism, Rowman and Littlefield. Cheney, J. (1989). Postmodern Environmental Ethics as Bioregional Narrative, Environmental Ethics, Volume 11, Number 2, pp. 117–135. Cooper, D. J. & Sherer, M. (1984). The Political Economy of Accounting Reports: Arguments for a Political Economy of Accounting, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 9, Number 3/4, pp. 207–232. Coopers & Lybrand Consultants. (1982). Environmental Management Services: A Survey of Australian Organisations. Daly, H. E. (1992). Allocation, Distribution, and Scale: Towards an Economics That Is Efficient, Just and Sustainable, Ecological Economics, Volume 6, Number 3, pp. 185–195. Daniels, N. (1985). Reading Rawls, Critical Studies of a Theory of Justice, Basil Blackwell. Dryzek, J. S. (1990). Green Reason: Communicative Ethics for the Biosphere, Environmental Ethics, Volume 12, Number 3, pp. 195–211.

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Dworkin, R. (1983). The Original Position, in Daniels, N. (Ed.), Reading Rawls: Critical Studies in A Theory of Justice, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, pp. 16–53. First published 1975, reprinted 1983. Dworkin, R. (1987). Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth. First published 1977, Fifth Impression. Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB). (1978). Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1: Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises, Stamford, CT, FASB. Francis, J. (1990). After Virtue? Accounting as a Moral and Discursive Practice, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability, Volume 3, Number 3, pp. 5–17. Gaa, J. C. (1986). User Privacy in Corporate Financial Reporting: A Social Contract Approach, The Accounting Review, Volume 61, Number 3, pp. 435–445. Gaa, J. C. (1988). Methodological Foundations of Standard Setting for Corporate Financial Reporting, AAA. Goodin, R. E. (1992). Green Political Theory, Polity Press. Gray, R. H. (1983). Accounting, Financial Reporting and Not-for-Profit Organisations, AUTA Review, Volume 15, Number 1, pp. 3–23. Gray, R. H. (1989). Review of Models of Democracy, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability, Volume 2, Number 3, pp. 52–56. Gray, R. H. (1990a). Accounting and Economics: The Psychopathic Siblings - A Review Essay, British Accounting Review, Volume 2, Number 4, pp. 373–388. Gray, R. H. (1990b). The Greening of Accounting: The Profession After Pearce, The Chartered Association of Certified Accountants. Certified Research Report Number 17. Gray, R. H. (1990c). Business Ethics and Organisational Change, Managerial Auditing, Volume 5, Number 2, pp. 12–22. Gray, R. H. (1992). Accounting and Environmentalism: An Exploration of the Challenge of Gently Accounting for Accountability, Transparency, and Sustainability, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 17, Number 5, pp. 399–425. Gray, R. H. & Collison, D. (1991). The Environmental Audit: Green Gauge or Whitewash?, The Managerial Auditing Journal, Volume 6, Number 5, pp. 17–26. Gray, R. H. & Laughlin, R. C. (1991). Editorial: The Coming of the Green and the Challenge of Environmentalism, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 5–8. Gray, R. H., Owen, D. & Maunders, K. (1987). Corporate Social Responsibility, London, Prentice Hall. Gray, R. H., Owen, D. & Maunders, K. (1988). Corporate Social Reporting: Emerging Trends in Accountability and the Social Contract, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Volume 1, Number 1, pp. 6–20. Gray, R. H., Owen, D. & Maunders, K. T. (1991). Accountability, Corporate Social Reporting and External Social Audits, Advances in Public Interest Accounting, Volume 4, pp. 1–23. Gutmann, A. (1989). The Central Role of Rawls Theory, Dissent, Volume 36, pp. 338–339. Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons, Science, Volume 162, pp. 1243–1248.

Liberal accountability 169 Harte, G., Lewis, L. & Owen, D. (1991). Ethical Investment and the Corporate Reporting Function, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 2, Number 3, pp. 227–255. Harte, G. & Owen, D. (1991). Environmental Disclosure in the Annual Reports of British Companies: A Research Note, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Volume 4, Number 3, pp. 51–61. Hill, T. E. (1992). Kantian Pluralism, Ethics, Volume 102, Number 4, pp. 743–763. Hines, R. D. (1988). Financial Accounting: In Communicating Reality, We Construct Reality, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 13, Number 3, pp. 251–262. Hoff, C. (1983). Kant’s Invidious Humanism, Environmental Ethics, Volume 5, Number 1, pp. 63–71. Huizing, A. & Dekker, H. C. (1992a). The Environmental Issue on the Dutch Political Market, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 17, Number 5, pp. 427–448. Huizing, A. & Dekker, H. C. (1992b). Helping to Pull Our Planet out of the Red: An Environmental Report of BSO/Origin, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 17, Number 5, pp. 449–458. Hussein, M. E. & Ketz, E. J. (1991). Accounting Standards-Setting in the U.S.: An Analysis of Power and Social Exchange, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Volume 10, Number 1, pp. 59–81. Kant, I. (1949). Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals (Originally The Moral Law), translated by H. J. Paton, London, Hutchinson (now Harper and Rowe). Kant, I. (1963). Lectures on Ethics, translated by I. Infield, New York, Harper. Katz, E. (1985). Organism, Community, and the “Substitution Problem”, Environmental Ethics, Volume 7, Number 3, pp. 241–256. Laughlin, R. C. & Puxty, A. G. (1986). The Socially Conditioning and Socially Conditioned Nature of Accounting: A Review and Analysis Through Tinkers’ Paper Prophets, The British Accounting Review, Volume 18, Number 1, pp. 77–90. Lehman, G. (1993). China after Tiananmen Square: Rawls and Justice, Praxis International, Volume 12, Number 4, pp. 405–420. Lehman, G. (1995). A Legitimate Concern with Environmental Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 6, Number 5, pp. 393–413. Lehman, G. (1999). Disclosing New World: Social and Environmental Accounting, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 24, pp. 217–241. Lehman, G. (2001). Reclaiming the Public Sphere: Problems and Prospects for Corporate Social and Environmental Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume, 12, Number 6, pp. 713–733. Lehman, G. (2002). Globalisation and the Authentic Self: Cosmopolitanism and Charles Taylor’s Communitarianism, Global Society, Volume 16, Number 4, pp. 419–437. Lehman, G. (2004). Social and Environmental Accounting: Trends and Thoughts for the Future, Accounting Forum, Volume 28, Number 1, pp. 1–5. Lehman, G. (2010a). Interpretive Accounting Research, Accounting Forum, Volume 34, Number 3–4, pp. 231–235. Lehman, G. (2010b). Perspectives on Accounting, Commonalities & the Public Sphere, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 21, Number 8, pp. 724–738.

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Lehman, G. (2011a). The Management of Sustainability: The Art of Interpretation, Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research, Volume 9, pp. 75–88. Lehman, G. (2011b). Interpretivism, Postmodernism and the Natural Environment, Philosophy and Social Criticism, Volume 37, pp. 795–821. Lehman, G. (2013). Critical Reflections on Laughlin’s Middle Range Research Approach: Language Not Mysterious?, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 24, Number 3, pp. 211–224. Lehman, G. (2015). Charles Taylor’s Ecological Conversations, London, PalgraveMacmillan. Lehman, G. (2017). The Language of Environmental and Social Accounting Research: The Expression of Beauty and Truth, Critical perspectives on Accounting, Volume 44, pp. 30–41. Manning, R. (1981). Environmental ethics and Rawls’ theory of justice. Environmental Ethics, Volume 3, Number 2, pp. 155–165. Nagel, T. (1991). Equality and Partiality, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Nelson, J. S. (1993). Account and Acknowledge or Represent and Control? On Post-Modern Politics and Economics of Collective Responsibility, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 18, Number 2/3, pp. 207–229. Norton, B. G. (1984). Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentricism, Environmental Ethics, Volume 6, Number 2, pp. 131–149. Norton, B. G. (1989). Intergenerational Equity and Environmental Decisions: A Model Using Rawls’ Veil of Ignorance, Ecological Economics, Volume 1, Number 2, pp. 117–137. Pallot, J. (1991). The Legitimate Concern with Fairness: A Comment, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 16, Number 2, pp. 201–208. Partridge, E. (1984). Nature as a Moral Resource, Environmental Ethics, Volume 6, Number 2, pp. 101–131. Pearce, D. (Ed). (1991). Blueprint 2: Greening the World Economy, London, Earthscan Publications Ltd. Pearce, D. W. & Turner, P. (1990). Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment, Harvester and Wheatsheaf. Pezzey, J. (1990). Definitions of Sustainability, Number 9, London, CEED. Pogge, T. W. (1989). Realising Rawls, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press. Power, M. (1992). After Calculation? Reflections on Critique of Economic Reason by Andre Gorz, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 17, Number 5, pp. 477–499. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Rawls, J. (1980). Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, John Dewey Lectures, The Journal of Philosophy, Volume 77, Number 9, pp. 515–572. Rawls, J. (1982). The Basic Liberties and their Priority, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press (pp. 3–87). Rawls, J. (1985). Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Volume 14, Number 3, pp. 223–251. Rawls, J. (1988). The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Volume 17, Number 4, pp. 251–274. Rawls, J. (1989). The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, New York University Law Review, Volume 64, Number 2, pp. 233–255. Rawls, J. (1993). Political Liberalism, New York, NY, Columbia University Press.

Liberal accountability 171 Reiman, J. H. (1983). The Labor Theory of the Difference Principle, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Volume 12, Number 2, pp. 133–159. Rorty, R. (1991). Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers Volume 1, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Roberts, J. & Scapens, R. (1985). Accountability Systems and Systems of Accountability – Understanding Accounting Practices in their Organisational Context, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 10, Number 4, pp. 443–456. Roberts, J. (1991). The Possibilities of Accounting, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 16, Number 4, pp. 355–368. SAC 2. (1992). Accounting Handbook 1992, Volume 1, Australia, Prentice Hall. Reprinted in Financial Reporting Handbook, 2014, Technical Editor, Claire Locke, Institute of Chartered Accountants. Sen, A. (1970). Collective Social Choice and Social Welfare, London, Oliver and Boyd. Sen, A. (1992). Minimal Liberty, Economica, Volume 58, Number 230, pp. 139–159. Shogren, J. F. & Nowell, C. (1992). Economics and Ecology: A Comparison of Experimental Methodologies and Philosophies, Ecological Economics, Volume 5, Number 2, pp. 101–127. Singer, B. A. (1988). An Extension of Rawls Theory of Justice to Environmental Ethics, Environmental Ethics, Volume 10, Number 3, pp. 217–231. Soderbaum, P. (1992). Neoclassical and Institutional Approaches to Development and the Environment, Ecological Economics, Volume 5, Number 2, pp. 127–145. Solomons, D. (1991). Accounting and Social Change: A Neutralist View, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 16, Number 3, pp. 287–295. Taylor, C. (1989). Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate, in Rosenblum, N. (Ed.), Liberalism and the Moral Life, Cambridge, Harvard University Press (pp. 159–182). Taylor, P. W. (1986). Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics, Princeton University Press. Thompson, J. (1990). A Refutation of Environmental Ethics, Environmental Ethics, Volume 12, Number 2, pp. 147–160. Tinker, T. (1985). Paper Prophets: A Social Critique of Accounting, Holt Reinhart and Winston. Tinker, T. (1988). Waving Goodbye to the TWA Bus: Paper Prophets and the Sfraffian Critique of Marginalism, Advances in Public Interest Accounting, Volume 2, pp. 121–141. Tinker, T. (1991). The Accountant as Partisan, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 13, Number 2, pp. 165–189. Tinker, T., Lehman, C. & Neimark, M. (1991). Falling Down the Hole in the Middle-of-the-Road: Political Quietism in Corporate Social Accounting, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability, Volume 4, Number 2, pp. 28–54. Turner, R. K. (1991). Environment, Economics and Ethics, in Pearce, D. (Ed.), Blueprint 2, Earthscan. VanDeVeer, D. (1979). Of Beasts, Persons, and the Original Position, The Monist, Volume 62, pp. 368–377. Van Parijs, P. (1991). Why Surfers Should Be Fed: The Liberal Case for an

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10 Critical and radical accounting and accountability Basic philosophical issues in accountability research1

Introduction One of the biggest challenges to face managers in the 21st century is their failure to recognise how their actions might impact others, and in turn other societies. When management theory remains oblivious to others, it risks not only imposing different values on others, but it risks people responding in ways that were never imagined (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015; Taylor, 2002a, 2002b, 2016). Previously it was possible for a company to impose its corporate will on its staff – and largely on the communities in which they operated – without significant penalty or price for not considering this issue (Arnold & Sikka, 2001; Lehman, 2004). In a globalized trading environ­ ment, this included whole other countries also. But a series of major highprofile corporate collapses with unprecedented losses, a shift in worker expectations, and a general societal mood for change are redefining the corporate arena, and recent civil society research indicates the pace of change in these regards is accelerating.2 Relationships in civil society are more than market-based, and the work of Charles Taylor and Jurgen Habermas demonstrates how commonalities and differences between people can be reconciled in a new political space. Taylor’s view of direct and immediate interaction has been criticized not only by Habermas but also analytic philosophers inspired by logical positivism. This chapter uses the accountability work of Laughlin (1995) and his middle range research approach. It has explored many accounting problems such as publicprivate partnerships, health care reforms and how accounting impacts cultural issues. Laughlin’s (1987) work re-conceptualises accountability in terms of cultural analysis, language and systems theory. Users of his work may en­ counter issues associated with: (1) understanding how to judge assertoric statements concerning various truth claims; (2) exploring the dichotomy be­ tween the secular and sacred; and (3) examining whether language simply designates meaning or opens us to interpretive new pathways. Firstly, the chapter begins by offering Laughlin’s (1995) Habermasian solutions to accountability problems by thinking more broadly about ex­ pectations in the public spheres of civil society. The first substantive section

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of the chapter provides an overview of Laughlin’s use of Habermas’s work in order to (1) deepen our appreciation of accounting as a moral discourse; (2) to argue that Laughlin usefully introduced language theory to accounting; and (3) that accounting can contribute towards developing a closer and what Lehman (2017) has referred to as a more transparent society. The second section explores Laughlin’s work on secularism to understand the current logic of accountability and management, where particular problems lie, and what sort of damage is potentially being done. (see also Dryzek, 1992). The key idea to keep in mind is to enquire about expectations of a com­ pany operating in civil society: are these expectations realistic, are they congruent? How would you judge the merits of alternative ways of doing business in the public sphere? A company is a community, and a society is the sum total of those communities. What is it that companies are being asked to offer to society, in a never-ending sea of political and social change?

Laughlin’s Habermas: accountability and judgement Research informed by Laughlin’s (1987) accounting system involves tracing complex connections between the current language of accounting and how these ideas are integrated in current social systems. The question for ac­ counting researchers is not only the explanatory power of the model, but whether this framework has the potential to create change (Gray, 2002; Lehman, 2002, 2004, 2010a, 2017). From the preceding, it is then im­ portant to examine the nexus between language theory and accountability research (i.e. Dreyfus, 2004; Gadamer, 1975; Taylor, 2007, 2016). This analysis is about connections between accounting, language and moral theory. Such connections reflect the supposition that language as a rule procedure submerges the common goods needed for communities to function. This is to essay a major problem for accounting and account­ ability theory. A focus on the rules of language obscures, rather than re­ veals, the common values of significance confronting the world. On this view, the mysteries of the origin of language present themselves and can be revealed through hermeneutic analysis. Critically, the Habermasian theme involving change through account­ ability relies on a procedural model, that is, the Ideal Speech Situation as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.3 Earlier chapters argued that Habermas associated his work on decision, judgement and morality with Kant’s prin­ ciples of justice. Laughlin’s approach to Habermasian theory develops on the ideal speech situation through a political-economy approach that shuttles between a skeletal ontology and empirical observation. The aim is to imagine what accounting ought to do in the public sphere. Here, Laughlin turned to Merton’s framework to enrich the skeletal ontology with empirical contextualisation. From critical quarters, the question concerns whether accountability research needs a richer ontology. This richer ontology would give emphasis to people’s background values, culture and place.

Critical and radical accounting 175 Nevertheless, it is therefore important to remember Laughlin’s middle range research approach builds on Habermas’s work. He also acknowl­ edges the important role that Merton’s analysis plays in explaining social behaviour. Laughlin has stated that he differs from Merton through an explicit focus on the ideas and values in the social setting. Laughlin has noted that his aim is to engage with value judgements while avoiding ‘a pervasive concern with consolidating special theories into more gen­ eralisable theories’. (Merton & Merton, 1968, pp. 52–53 found in Laughlin, 1995, p. 79). He explained: The ‘middle range’ that is referred to below has no faith in the development of such a general theory. Put simply the ‘middle range’ of this article maintains that there can only ever be ‘skeletal’ theories in social phenomena – the hope for a grand theory, similar to Parsonian thought, is wistful and incorrect quasi-scientific thinking of a highly questionable Nature. But this is only one of the areas of difference – the ‘middle-range’ thinking in this article also differs to Merton’s emphasis on methodology (with its desire finally, although maybe not immedi­ ately, to adopt highly theoretical methods for investigation) and change (with its purposeful distance from getting involved in any value judgements about what is being investigated) dimensions as well. In sum the following ‘middle range’ is markedly different from Merton’s ‘middle range’ and should not be confused with it. (Laughlin, 1995, p. 79) The implied supposition is that accounting is a pragmatic practice that moves in a space of reasoning. The accountability and accounting problem involve the question concerning whether Habermas’s model can assess communication which is incompatible with the good or better life through his formal model of discourse (Habermas, 1993, pp. 56–57). This model shapes Habermas’s development of a procedure that substantive claims must pass in order to be normatively valid. This forms the base on which Laughlin developed aspects of his critical and discursive approach to accounting and accountability processes. This chapter maintains that while this procedural approach is the focus of Habermas’s work, it is subtly altered in Laughlin’s critical discursive analysis of organisations and organisational accounting systems. For ex­ ample, he explicitly states that this process can be guided by certain skeletal prior theories. This involves the extent to which the discursive process incorporates people’s significant values and how they impact the quality of information in creating civil society. This assumption, however, is not independent of prior theories, ontological factors and other as­ sumptions that feed into the discursive process. As we shall see, these theories, however, are not some abstracted notion about right and wrong or sacred and secular.

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It is argued that Laughlin’s subtle language approach represents a move in an interpretivist direction (Taylor, 2011). This is so because however skeletal is the theory; it is guided by some ontology. Habermas’s early work was designed to create a framework that did not discriminate among and between various ontological perspectives. For purposes of accountability, therefore, this process moves towards the recognition of ontologies and significant identity values. Focus on interpretation as opposed to rules of discourse suggests a complex interconnected system. For Laughlin, this complexity represents understanding accounting and corporations in social and environmental contexts. These arguments support the interpretivist quest to create an interactive public sphere that challenges excessive reliance on managerialism and a procedural approach to environmental and social accounting. These ideas are taken up in Gray and Laughlin (2012) when they argue that modern Western society does not have corporations that are directly capable of recognising or responding to such planetary concerns, which is hardly contentious or surprising. It is therefore not surprising that there is always a need for regulation and regimes of control and processes of governmentality. These structures are outlined in Figure 10.1 and illustrate the need for some form of regulation. They explain: Thus there is always a need for regulation and regimes of control and governmentality, through the State and civil society, that provide (at a minimum) the ‘rules of the game’ by which markets operate and the means of coercion to encourage desired performance. The regulations and regime(s) at (B) should, one might hope, direct the actions at C and be, themselves, a reflection of the values at A. (The naivety of this simplicity might be mitigated by some thought about ‘ideal types’). The final element in this interconnected system is at D which is intended to represent the accountability and audit system – what is for many, the heart of the social accounting project. This system, drawn widely, is intended to report on; the aspirations at A; B’s regulatory requirements; and, of course, C’s actual activities. It is principally in D where social accounting and audit works and from whence it draws its value. (Gray & Laughlin, 2012, p. 235) They stress that even from the simplest structure of Figure 10.1, social accounting and auditing are not simply some stand-alone, isolated, activity. They are, and should be, part of a complex interconnected system from which they derive their meaning and purpose. Too often this is forgotten. (Gray & Laughlin, 2012, p. 235). A need exists to understand these in­ terconnections. This presents a further challenge as humanity continues to grapple with issues such as climate change, cultural disharmony and social unrest. This challenge is undertaken by exploring how language can be used to deepen Laughlin’s middle-range position – language is not something

Critical and radical accounting 177

A: ETHICAL + PRAGMATIC CRITERIA: Survival of planetary system, current/future human + other species

B: REGULATORY REGIME REQUIREMENTS: Through Contracts and/or Markets To Attain A Social And Sustainable Wolrd

D: ACCOUNTABILITY + AUDIT: of Corporate Action In Terms of Social, Environment And Sustainable Criteria

C ACTIONS BY CORPORATIONS: Those which are socially and environmentally benign.

Figure 10.1 Process of accountability: ethics, law, and regulation. Reproduced with permission from Gray and Laughlin (2012, p. 234).

that can be reduced to rule procedure and judged in an idealised political framework (ISS). The next section deepens our discussion of interpretation through examination of the debates between Habermas and Taylor. To set the scene, the differ on the role of language and how it expresses external values such as Nature, God, and the Other.

Habermas and Taylor – a succinct introduction to language Accounting scholars committed to Habermas’s regulative model – the Ideal Speech Community (ISC) – are implicitly committed to his theory of lan­ guage. (Laughlin, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012). This is despite the observation that the Laughlin’s middle-range approach and its skeletal ontology re­ presents a movement away from the idealisations in Habermas’s major works. The following argument suggests that a broader approach to language can supplement the middle-range framework. Furthermore, Habermas’s approach to language guides the way critical accounting scholars use his work to examine connections between ac­ counting and democratic theory. It is often argued that accounting is complicit in colonising the social world (Laughlin, 1987) which must be challenged by developing new systems towards a normative model of

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rational argumentation (Shapiro, 1998). Moreover, Laughlin and Broadbent (1997) have explored the effects of accounting on health-care systems and the implications of modern bureaucratic accounting and have offered some political recommendations. For example, Broadbent & Laughlin (2014) offer an interpretation that the health care sector has been colonised by free-market forms of reason and rationality, but this has been at the expense of a caring health system. Free-market reforms put money and rationality first and people second.

Background sources: Habermas and Taylor Central to Jurgen Habermas’s argument is the claim that Taylor’s strong hermeneutic framework is built on a foundation pioneered by Herder, Humboldt, and Heidegger. According to Habermas, the framework pro­ posed by Taylor moves too fast in that it relies on philosophical ethics at the expense of language as a problem-solving structure; that is, Taylor overemphasises the world disclosure function of language and fails to adjudicate between different political claims (Habermas, 1991a, pp. 216–217). This would mean that Taylor’s work contains illiberal possibilities which can be used by cunning political actors to further their own self-interest and thereby perpetuate political corruption (Taylor, 1991f, pp. 23–36). Taylor, however, has responded that his discursive language-based politics is not an abstract blueprint, but involves normative possibilities that aim to create a life free from bureaucratic tutelage. For Taylor, therefore, it is Habermas who per­ petuates an unjust political structure that condemns people to the daily grind of coping; that is, life is defined according to the parameters of a procedural rule without a vision about what it is good to be.4 Taylor explains his conception of significance in the following way: [N]ow this engages me at a depth that using a fixed yardstick does not. I am in a sense questioning the inchoate sense that led me to use the yardstick. And at the same time it engages my whole self in a way that using the yardstick does not. That is what makes it uncommonly difficult to reflect on our fundamental evaluations. The obstacles in the way of going deeper are legion. … [T]here is not only the difficulty of concentration, and the pain of uncertainty, but also all the distortions and repressions which make us want to turn away from this examination; and which make us resist change even when we examine ourselves. ‘Some of our evaluations may in fact become fixed and compulsive, so that we cannot help feeling guilty about X, or despising people like Y, even though we judge with the greatest degree of openness and depth at our command that X is perfectly all right, and that Y is a very admirable person. This casts light on another aspect of the term ‘deep’, as applied to people’ and it is these dimensions of human agency that the interpretative process aims to make clear. (Taylor, 1976, pp. 298–299)

Critical and radical accounting 179 Central to Taylor’s framework is his ethic of authenticity which takes issue with the argument that procedural rules reflect the spirit of liberalism, but do not explore the potential in dialogic and expressive models (Taylor, 1992a, 2016). The modern liberal and neoliberal infatuation with proce­ dure does not explore that common ground where differences are respected in a spirit of openness and democratic healing (Taylor, 2002a, p. 305). For Taylor, the common good reflects that political space where agreement is the fruit of democratic interchange and discourse; namely, it is that space where people’s strong values are articulated, expanded and sometimes challenged in the quest for justice (Taylor, 1971b). Justice might mean that one group gives more ground on a certain issue, owing to their erroneous stance on a particular matter (Taylor, 2016). More particularly, he dis­ mantles the system-building intent of procedural liberal theory and ad­ vocates a republican and discursive democratic model whereby an element of the universal in a particular linguistic phenomenon is retained. Taylor’s work on language and discourse creates workable political relationships between particular cultures by locating what is common between them; this argument is based on the political projection that differences can flourish in a tolerant community. It is therefore a category error to argue that Taylor ignores the dimensions of all that are different and diverse in society by focussing on what is common. Rather, his focus is on the problems of identity which haunt modern politics and he exposes the illusions and pretensions that a fixed yardstick offers. Taylor’s solution is based on his conception of practical reason which squarely faces concerns of common­ ality, difference, foundationalism and proceduralism.

Differences between Habermas and Taylor Briefly, then, the differences between Habermas and Taylor involve the intersubjective and objective role that is performed by language; that is, it involves understanding how conversation, discourse and language cultivate the possibilities for a good life (Taylor, & Habermas, 2009). Taylor’s po­ litical strategy is cultivated within a civilising society that is committed to moral progress and development (Taylor, 1991d). Intriguingly, their very different proposals are based on the work of Herder and Humboldt even though they project different solutions and proposals. As mentioned earlier in the introduction to this chapter, Habermas maintains that language of­ fers a unique opportunity to construct a decision model where differences can be solved once and for all by setting and applying a rule in the discourse arena (Habermas, 1991a). Here, the purpose of Habermas’s model is to assess communication that is incompatible with the good or better life. Habermas sets a procedural test that substantive claims must pass in order to be normatively valid. This test consists in universal rules of discourse – reciprocal accountability, inclusiveness, freedom to question claims and to presuppose counter-claims, non-coercion.5 These reflect the legitimate

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procedural constraints that we are entitled to make, that indicate the basis for rational agreement regarding the ‘justness’ of a given norm, and of assertoric statements. Taylor (1991c), however, responds with the argu­ ment that language discloses new worlds through an ongoing conversation of humanity and opens up new attitudes towards the other. For his part, Taylor (Taylor & Habermas 2009) believes that Habermas ignores the nexus between the structure and practice of language and thereby seriously under-theorises the background contexts and nuances which shape people’s very being in the world: where the nuances of culture and the life-world impact on the formation of a language. Habermas responds and maintains that: Of course Humboldt is not an empiricist trying to pull the rug out from under the feet of the process of reaching understanding and hold the identity of linguistic meanings to emanate from the randomly iterated intentions – constantly superseding each other – of single, isolated speakers. For him, the intersubjectivity of a common perspective does not dissolve, for example, into a series of isolated I-perspectives which are merely reflected in one another; rather, it arises at the same time; and from the same source as intersubjective validity of semantically identical linguistic expressions and is of equal origin (gleich-ursprunglich). (Habermas, 1991a, pp. 216–217) Habermas (2009) argues that Taylor’s Hegelian focus is on the ‘we’ per­ spective implicit in language, which leads to the socialisation of individuals within practices that abrogate personal rights. Habermas argues that this focus leads Taylor to support claims concerning cultural ‘survivance’ at the expense of individual rights. Habermas explains: The ecological perspective on species preservation cannot be trans­ ferred to cultures. Cultural heritages and the forms of life articulated in them normally reproduce themselves by convincing those whose personal structures they shape, that is, by motivating them to appro­ priate productively and continue the traditions. The constitutional state can make this hermeneutic achievement of the cultural reproduction of the life-worlds possible, but it cannot guarantee it. For to guarantee survival would necessarily rob the members of the very freedom to say yes or no that is necessary if they are to appropriate and preserve their cultural heritage. When a culture has become reflexive, the only traditions and forms of life that can sustain themselves are those that bind their members while at the same time subjecting themselves to critical examination and leaving later generations the option of learning from other traditions or converting and setting out for other shores. (Habermas, 1994, pp. 130–131)

Critical and radical accounting 181 For Habermas, it is the search for universal principles in the chaotic and ultimately indeterminate universe, which must be the focus of politics. As noted earlier, Habermas develops a procedure in which substantive claims must pass to be normatively valid. This test consists of universal rules of discourse – reciprocal accountability, inclusiveness, freedom to question claims and to presuppose counter-claims, and non-coercions (Habermas, 1993).6 These reflect the legitimate procedural constraints that citizens are entitled to make, which indicate the basis for rational agreement regarding the ‘justness’ of a given norm, and that of other assertoric statements. One difficulty that researchers may encounter is how Laughlin’s ISS work combines with middle-range thinking. This involves examining the extent to which middle-range research reveals the social forces that operate in organizational and synchronic social space. These forces involve how power and influence can alter the political structures implicit in the ideal speech situation (Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Lehman, 2002, 2017).

The sacred and the secular It is important to remember also that Laughlin explores the role of secular values in society. He did this long before secularism became a hot topic in modern political and social theory. He uses Habermas’s method to explore contexts and how language emerges. It is interesting also to observe that Laughlin explored these questions long before recent exchanges between Habermas (2011) and Taylor (2011). Recent work by Habermas and Taylor has involved uncovering the contours of our pre­ sent cultural and social predicaments by examining the role of processes of secularisation. Indeed, it is fascinating to find in Laughlin’s early work his examination of accounting systems in the Church of England. This research examined how accounting systems emphasised certain processes and not others. Laughlin (1987) reflected: Laughlin (1984, 1986) traces the reasons for the rudimentary nature of accounting systems in the Church of England to central cultural factors concerned with the significance of the sacred and the downgrading of all that is deemed to be secular (e.g. money, accounting etc.). (Laughlin, 1987, p. 492) The issue boils down to whether accounting merely reflects a secular ideal or moves in the logical space of reasons. Recent philosophical work de­ tailing the contours of the relationship between sacred and secular asked us how we are to account, explore and understand these values that shape our being-in-the-world. The research issue involves whether Habermas’s

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approach encompasses such method, and the extent to which Laughlin has taken it in broader interpretivist directions. The research considers the extent to which Habermasian inspired middlerange connects with Habermas’s recent work on the secular (2011). It might be argued that Laughlin’s work on the sacred takes him in a direction different from Habermas’s abstract and procedural work on democratic structures. This leads to arguments concerning how Laughlin has taken a more interpretivist direction to disclose how accounting systems relate to religious and other organisational settings. Moreover, in his work on the Church of England, he uncovered additional accountability issues con­ cerning the alleged divide between the spheres of the sacred and secular. He did not, however, posit any simplistic correlation. (Laughlin, 1990). Laughlin attempts to avoid simplistic correlations by taking language in a more interpretivist direction. This is the challenge he presents for organisa­ tional theorists concerned with tracing the impacts of organisational proce­ dure on culture, difference and identity. Jacobs and Walker (2004) explain that Laughlin’s (1988, 1990) study of the accounting systems of the Church of England has proved a significant contribution to this accountability lit­ erature. They point out that he explains how accounting does indeed play an important role in the life of the church: but also note that accounting and budgeting are not irrelevant to the ‘ongoing life of the parish but are ‘an unhealthy intrusion’ (p. 23) to spiritual values. For example, Jacobs and Walker then review Laughlin’s reflections on Durkheim (1976) and Eliade (1959) to explore how accounting practices were associated with the profane or secular as opposed to the sacred. Jacobs and Walker (2004) observe: In the Church of England considerable effort was taken to keep the secular aspects of accounting separate from, and subservient to, the sacred centres and activities of the Church. Booth (1993) explored similar themes in his study of the Australian Uniting Church. Booth’s (1993) work reinforced the distinction between the sacred activity of the Church and the secular functions of accounting and administration. The work of Laughlin (1988, 1990) and Booth (1993) and the resulting concept of the sacred-secular divide has set the context for much of the subsequent research into the role of accounting in religious organisations. (Jacobs & Walker, 2004, p. 362) Critics claim that Laughlin has constructed a sacred-secular divide (Hardy & Ballis, 2003; Irvine, 2002; Jacobs, 2003). This research has tended to pre­ clude the possibility that accounting can play a role in the spiritual practices, spirituality and theology of religious organisations. These authors have suggested that there are problems with a strict structuralist sacred/secular divide and that accounting can play important roles in areas, organisations and practices which have been seen as sacred. For example, Booth perpe­ tuates this view when he argues that Laughlin (1987, 1990) created a

Critical and radical accounting 183 bifurcation between the sacred and secular. Booth then argues that all ac­ counting is secular and ignores important identity-forming factors. Laughlin’s analysis, however, is not merely about accounting as a secular process because language is used to discover the impacts of accounting sys­ tems in organisations. Again, these insights involve exploring whether accounting perpetuates processes of secularisation. What are the effects on society and how can accounting contribute? Arguably, the distinctions between the sacred and secular exhibit important similarities with those between Kantians and Heideggerians. The first point to remember is that both sets of the­ orists explain the role of belief in understanding the sacred. For Heideggerians, it is the Habermasian/Kantian approach, which is too abstract, ahistorical and asocial. Arguably, their arguments detach the background that shapes our being and it is these social forces that per­ petuate processes of disenchantment and secularisation. While Kantian/ Habermasian theorists are concerned that Heideggerian and Taylorian approaches justify cultural belonging at the expense of individual rights (Habermas, 1987a; 1987b). Briefly, the key issue for accounting researchers is whether Habermasians and Kantians lose sight of the particular phenomenon under consideration. This is the arena where culture itself becomes of critical concern in a world of half-understood cultural disharmony. This philosophical problem haunts universal approaches such as Habermas’s model. This is how accounting im­ pacts on communities and people’s lives. Yet, the question remains whether the Habermasian approach provides enough space in its vision of the public sphere not to impose value systems on others. A further issue arises concerning recent philosophical debates highlight further problems for the sacred (Habermas, 2011; Taylor, 2011). Taylor asks of Habermas: how does he discriminates and determines the validity of discourse on the basis of such deep psychological background? Can people’s background horizons of value be made explicit in the manner Habermas seems to suggest? For the middle-range researcher, it is problematic whether such an approach reveals the deeper motivations that have created the separation between the sacred and secular.

Combining differences in a postmodern world As modern social science research indicates, the number one problem facing accounting is how to combine differences in a world of half-understood cultural fragmentation. The issue confronting theory is that block thinking cuts us from richer sources of the self. Laughlin attempts to avoid such charges by interpreting Habermas’s ideal speech model as a process-based research vehicle. As stated earlier in Chapter 6, it is therefore a processual middle-range approach as opposed to an idealised model. Thus, by carefully reading Laughlin (1995), the key focus is to under­ stand ‘what is going on’ in organisational settings. The framework,

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therefore, is about understanding the problems for communication when constructing procedures and rule focussed strategies for change. It is therefore a category error to argue that Laughlin simply follows Habermas and ends up with a procedural accounting model. However, a careful reading of Laughlin shows that his work charts the subtle forces and vectors of power that are operating within organisational settings. From a broader philosophical perspective, the supposition that ac­ counting may uncover and interpret ‘what is going’ suggests subtle de­ partures from Habermas’s major work on the idealised speech situation. It will be recalled that for Habermas, the problem reflects curtailing the power of language to restrict people’s freedom of choice. Habermas’s advice is to create regulative ideals to order cultural and political differences. Taylor points out that more research is needed concerning ‘the psychological background that Kantians have and so on, and why they get excited by certain things which do not excite me’ (Taylor, 2011). Accounting researchers can benefit by considering how these complex debates impact on real-world problems. In Laughlin (1987), the role of language involved constative speech acts. It will be recalled that these terms involved the adjudicating mechanisms to arrive at consensual outcomes in organisational settings. It seems, however, that Laughlin operates with a ri­ cher understanding of the role of language. This richer approach to language has the potential to re-enchant our understanding of the sacred. This would take us in a direction different from Habermas’s infatuation with Kantian deductions and abstractions from real-world settings. That is, Laughlin’s work on sacred values reveals significant identityforming features that can be excluded if we enter the idealised discourse arena. While Habermas emphasises the abstract nature of discourse, it has been ar­ gued that Laughlin stresses a process-based understanding of language. Clearly, what emerges from these debates is that Habermas is trying to unpack how reasons perpetuate the deep anxieties many people feel when living in the modern world. Here, Taylor’s (2011) question to Habermas is relevant in exploring language and reason when he asks: ‘what has that got to do with the discourse out there? Can people not understand it? Why discriminate on those grounds?’ Habermas responds: How to settle this background consensus in the first place, if not within, so to say, a space of neutral reasons? And “neutral” now in a peculiar sense. They are secular in a non-Christian sense of secularization, for one reason. This, truly, you have described so wonderfully in your A Secular Age. Secularization from within the church means tearing down the walls of the monasteries and getting the serious commands of the Lord and the appeal for imitatio Christi. […] This is secularization from within the Christian community. (Habermas, 2011, p. 65)

Critical and radical accounting 185 For Habermas, the difference is that religious utterances belong to a kind of category of discourse in which we do not just move within a worldview or within a cognitive interpretation of a domain of human life. For accounting researchers, the task is to explore such processes of reasoning and how they are communicated through relevant publics. Again, Habermas’s work ab­ stracts from the process and interpretivist focus that Laughlin (1987) initiated in his paper. From a philosophical perspective, Taylor expresses concern about how you can express your experience in a manner that is not tied up with your membership in a community. Habermas argues that Taylor’s talk about being created in God’s image is, in our tradition, easily translatable into secular propositions. For Habermas, this derives from the Kantian concept of autonomy or from a particular interpretation of being equipped with human rights (Habermas, 2011, p. 63). Taylor (2011) responds by explaining that he is telling another story about the psychological background that Kantians and Habermasians use. Habermas argues that the difference is that religious utterances belong to a kind of category of discourse in which ‘you do not just move within a worldview or within a cognitive interpretation of a domain of human life’ (Habermas, 2011, p. 63). For critical researchers, Habermas invites us to consider the motivations that led us towards the neutral decision model – the ideal speech situation. Habermas argues that: [T]here is no reason to oppose one sort of reason (secular against religious reasons or Hegelian) simply because many people find religious reasons are coming out of a world view which is inherently irrational. (Habermas, 2011, p. 61) The purpose of the analysis is to understand how our common human reason works in religious traditions, as well as in any other cultural enterprise, in­ cluding science. So there is no difference on balance. Habermas continues: However, if it comes to lumping together Kantianism and utilitar­ ianism, Hegelianism and so on with religious doctrines, then I would say there are differences in kind between reasons. One way to put it is that ‘secular’ reasons can be expressed in ‘public’, or generally shared, language. This is the conventional sense that Chuck [Taylor] is trying to circumvent by introducing the term official language. Anyhow, secular reasons, in this sense belong to a context of assumptions—in this case to a philosophical approach, which is distinguished from any kind of religious tradition by the fact that it doesn’t require membership in a community of believers. By using any kind of religious reasons, you are implicitly appealing to membership in a corresponding religious community. Only if one is a member and can speak in the first person from within a particular religious tradition does one share a specific

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Habermas (2011) is avoiding the argument that he ranks differences and does not reconcile them. For Habermas, the key issue involves how we emerge from participating in cultic practices in which reasons are tied to membership. This is the central difference between interpretations con­ cerning the role of language and middle-range thought. Moreover, these interpretations have important implications on how we account, interpret and recognise different kinds of reasons. For accounting researchers, the question boils down to Laughlin’s (1995) predilection for interpretation over abstraction. Additionally, what impact would this have on the middle-range approach and its application to or­ ganisational theory. For Habermas, according to Taylor, what is not con­ sidered, and which is abstracted from in secular space is the giving and taking reasons in terms of cultic practices. Secondly, there is no reference to socialisation in a religious community that can be traced back in the five or four great world religions to a historical thinker or historical origins, and is continued through a doctrine and the interpretation of such a doctrine. Habermas’s recent works explain how this socialisation is related to an ‘understanding of what it means to refer, in our kind of religions, to a kind of revealed truth’. He wants to demarcate different kinds of reasons and states that it is difficult to explain what it means outside those traditions. Furthermore, Habermas offers a personal statement that he was raised as a Lutheran Protestant and now is agnostic. It is these experiences that are abstracted from in the public sphere and must be given expression in our accounts. This process of abstraction is what gives rise to the difference between religious and secular reasons for Habermas. While he argues that we have to abstract from these spaces if you enter a discussion between Kantians and Utilitarians. That is, with Kantian and Utilitarian reasons, there is no internally connected specific path to salvation, a path to salva­ tion which considerably enhances religion, as we understand it. A path to salvation means follow an exemplary figure which draws its authority from ancient origins or testimony. Thus, the key difference is that for Taylor & Habermas (2009), it is impossible to abstract from, or prescind from, the differences among deep commitments, comprehensive world views, whe­ ther they are grounded religiously or otherwise. On this view, the funda­ mental discursive issue is that we cannot abstract enough to carry on the discourse and settle things discursively, from any of these kinds of deep constitutive commitments. Therefore, religion is not a special case.

Conclusion This chapter has argued that Laughlin’s utilisation of Habermas’s critical theory has offered important insights for the purposes of accounting and

Critical and radical accounting 187 accountability research. Laughlin’s work on critical theory and language provides means to bring about change in civil society. It attempted to ex­ tend the language of accounting as a medium through which ideas, nuances, and meaning unfold as conversation proceeds. It was then suggested that a critically oriented research agenda for the future would focus not only on the individual but also on the common goods that accounting affects. From the interpretivist viewpoint, the argument involves exploring how knowledge is a constructive contribution without it being linked to specific cultural and ideological alternatives. This chapter, therefore, offers a funda­ mental challenge to our received wisdom and has criticised the fundamental assumptions of accounting and corporate social responsibility. The arguments in this chapter began with the proposition that Habermas’s universal linguistic strategy is appealing to accountants in that it offers a way to test whether maxims are either true or false. Yet, language can be considered from an entirely different perspective. It has been argued that Habermasian critical theory must be extended and reinterpreted. Language does not function as a precise and austere instrument at our control. We do not have complete mastery over the structures of language and communication. Language is a shared activity. It exists outside of us and is like a web that cannot be unravelled. There are no individual components,components; it is holistic. Taylor’s (2011) further critique of Habermas is that language is not ex­ hausted by constative terms or regulative procedure; rather, it offers a means to create richer interpretations and thereby broaden horizons. It has been argued that language, like the ebbs and flows of a full life, can never be reduced to procedure and rule-driven principles of rational calculation. A broader vision developed through the subtlies of our language has the po­ tential to develop additional middle-range research insights. That is, lan­ guage is not a tool at the hands of any one interlocutor, but reflects interpretation, nuances and ambiguities which reflect and shape the world. Through conversation and dialogue, we may clarify ideas, values and the maxims which confront people thereby contributing to accountability so­ lutions in a world of half-understood structural differences and diversities. A central supposition of this chapter has been that interpretation can develop the middle range research approach and overcome Habermas’s separations of ethics from morality, truth from rightness, and interpretation from scientific precision. These issues have implications for Habermasian inspired middle-range theorists who focus on pragmatic change, public sector reform, managerialism, performance measures and key performance indicators. These issues have implications for users of Habermas’s ideas, especially those middle-range researchers who focus on pragmatic change. However, pragmatism itself requires more detailed analysis in the accounting literature as it is also concerned with our more basic commonalities with the natural environment. Pragmatists of the interpretivist persuasion are also concerned that ruleprocedure over interpretation reflects Habermas’s assumption that a

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democratic system assumes that in allowing people to assert facts they will be transformed by the force of the better argument. This central Habermasian assumption was seen to be problematic in that measuring up to a set of rules like those expounded by Habermas misses the point that reconciliation and transformation involves a process of enrichment, en­ gagement and dialogic interaction. In this regard, Laughlin’s work enriches accounting and points towards a broader engagement with the impacts of accounting systems. This way of thinking, in turn, impacts on accounting and reporting functions. This cannot be achieved when language is con­ strained and reduced to a tool at the disposal of interlocutors who must abstract from their reality to test the validity of their maxims. For these reasons, I have taken Laughlin’s middle-range approach in an expressive and interpretivist direction. Of course, this path is ever wary of the power in, and through, language. Future research informed by Laughlin’s work might develop further the connections between con­ statives, references and differences in language. This accords with Laughlin’s middle-range view that accounting does not follow rules but give public ‘voice’ to the concerns of critical accounting. In our present austere times, this is an increasingly important but unfortunately marginal activity. Implementing this broader way of thinking about language does not di­ minish this need. A final point is encapsulated in Habermas’s famous statement ‘that the rose in the cross of the present may have grown pale, but it is not yet completely faded’ (Habermas, 1999, p. 153).

Notes 1 Early versions of this chapter appeared in Lehman (2013) with permission. 2 The art of interpretation stems from the work of MacIntyre (1995), Heidegger (1971) and Taylor (2002, 2020). In the political theory literature, this thinking is also referred to as interpretative phenomenology. 3 See Habermas (1971, 1984, 1987a, 1987b). For accounting, see Lehman (2010a, 2010b, 2013, 2015, 2017). 4 Taylor has also argued that the vision of a procedural world assumes that the natural environment simply stands in wait for people to use and manipulate (Taylor, 1992, pp. 247–269). 5 Habermas (1993, pp. 56–57), where he states that ‘we presuppose a dialogical situation that satisfies ideal conditions in a number of respects, including… freedom of access, equal rights to participate, truthfulness on the part of parti­ cipants, absence of coercion in taking positions, and so forth’ (p. 56). 6 Habermas (1993, pp. 56–57) states that ‘we presuppose a dialogical situation that satisfies ideal conditions in a number of respects, including: freedom of access, equal rights to participate, truthfulness on the part of participants, absence of coercion in taking positions, and so forth’ (p. 56). (Found in Porter, 2003, pp. 150–160 and see Lehman, 2002, 2004.)

Critical and radical accounting 189

Bibliography Arnold, P. J. & Sikka, P. (2001). Globalization and the State–profession Relationship: The Case the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 26, Number 6, pp. 475–501. Arrington, C. E. & Puxty, A. G. (1991). Accounting, Interests and Rationality, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 2, Number 1, pp. 31–591. Arrington, E. & Francis, J. (1989). Letting the Chat out of the Bag: Deconstruction, Privilege and Accounting Research, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 21, pp. 1–28. Booth, P. (1993). Accounting in Churches: A Research Framework and Agenda, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Volume 6, Number 4, pp. 37–67. Broadbent, J. & Laughlin, R. (1997). Developing Empirical Research: An Example Informed by a Habermasian Approach, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Volume 10, Number 5, pp. 622–649. Broadbent, J. & Laughlin (2014). Middle-range thinking and management control systems. In Otley, D. & Soin, K. (eds.) Management control and uncertainty, pp. 255–268 London, Palgrave Macmillan. Broadbent, J., Jacobs, R. & Laughlin, R. (2001). Organisational Resistance Strategies to Unwanted Accounting and Finance Changes: The Case of General Medical Practice in the UK, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Volume 14, Number 1, pp. 565–587. Cooper, D. J. & Sherer, M. (1984). The Political Economy of Accounting Reports: Arguments for a Political Economy of Accounting, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 9, Number 3/4, pp. 207–232. Dreyfus, H. L. & Taylor, C. (2015). Retrieving Realism, Harvard, Harvard University Press. Dryzek, J. S. (1990). Green Reason: Communicative Ethics for the Biosphere, Environmental Ethics, Volume 12, Number 3, pp. 195–211. Dryzek, J. S. (1992). Ecology and Discursive Democracy: Beyond Liberal Capitalism and the Administrative State, Capitalism, Socialism and Nature, Volume 3, Number 2, pp. 18–42. Durkheim, E. (1976). The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, 2nd ed., translated by Swain, J.W., London, George Allen & Unwin. Eliade, M. (1959). The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, translated by Task, New York, NY, W.R. Harcourt Brace. Francis, J. (1990). After Virtue? Accounting as a Moral and Discursive Practice, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability, Volume 3, Number 3, pp. 5–17. Gadamer, H. G. (1975). Truth and Method, translated by G. Barden and J. Cummings, London, Sheed and Ward Ltd. Fifth reproduction. Gray, R. (2002). The Social Accounting Project and Accounting Organizations and Society: Privileging Engagement, Imaginings, New Accountings and Pragmatism over Critique? Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 27, Number 7, pp. 687–708. Gray, R. & Laughlin, R. C. (2012). It Was 20 Years Ago Today: Sgt Pepper, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Green Accounting and the Blue Meanies, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Volume 25, Number 2, pp. 228–255. Habermas, J. (1968). Knowledge and Human Interests, London, Polity.

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Habermas J. (1971). Knowledge and Human Interests, Boston and London, Boston Press and Heinemann. Habermas, J. (1975). Legitimation Crisis (Vol. 519), Boston, Beacon Press. Habermas J. (1976). Legitimation Crisis, Boston and London, Boston Press and Heinemann. Habermas, J. (1979). What is Universal Pragmatics? I: Communication and the Evolution of Society, translated by T. McCarthy, Boston, Beacon Press (pp. 1–68). Habermas, J. (1984). Theory of Communicative Action Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalisation of Society, Cambridge and Oxford, Beacon Press and Polity Press in Association with Basil Blackwell. Habermas, J. (1987a). Theory of Communicative Action Volume 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, Cambridge and Oxford, Beacon Press and Polity Press in Association with Basil Blackwell. Habermas, J. (1987b). The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Cambridge, Polity Press in Association with Basil Blackwell (pp. 185–210). Habermas, J. (1990). Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, London, Polity Press. Habermas, J. (1991a). What Does Socialism Mean Today? The Revolutions of Recuperation and the Need for New Thinking, in Blackburn, R. (Ed.), After the Fall: The Failure of Communism and the Future of Socialism, London, Verso. Habermas, J. (1991b). A Reply, in Honneth, A. & Joas, H. (Eds.), Communicative Action, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press (pp. 216–217). Habermas, J. (1992a). Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe, Praxis International, Volume 12, Number 1, pp. 1–20. Habermas, J. (1992b). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, translated by T. Burger with the assistance of F. Lawrence, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1993). Justification and Application, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1994). Struggles for Recognition in the Constitutional Democratic State, in Gutman, A. (Ed.), Multiculturalism, Princeton, Princeton University Press (pp. 107–149). Habermas, J. (1999). From Kant to Hegel and Back Again—The Moves toward Detranscendentalization, The European Journal of Philosophy, Volume, 7, Number 2, pp. 129–157. Habermas, J. (2011). “The Political”: The Rational Meaning of a Questionable Inheritance of Political Theology, in Butler, J., Habermas, J., Taylor, C. & Cornell, W. (Eds.), The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, New York, NY, Columbia University Press. Hamid, S., Craig, R. & Clarke, F. (1993). Religion: A Confounding Cultural Element in the International Harmonization of Accounting? Abacus, Volume 29, Number 2, pp. 34–49. Hardy, L. and Ballis, H. (2003). Does One Size Fit All? The Sacred and Secular Divide Revisited with Insights from Niebhur’s Typology of Social Action, paper presented at the 3rd International Accounting History Conference, Siena, September.

Critical and radical accounting 191 Heidegger, M. (1971). The Thing, in Hofstader, A. (trans.), Poetry, Language, Thought, New York, NY, Harper and Rowe. Herder, J. G. (1969). On the Origin of Language, in Barnard, F. M. (Ed.), J. G. Herder on Social and Political Culture, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Irvine, H. (2002). The Legitimizing Power of Financial Statements in the Salvation Army in England, 1865–1892, Accounting Historians Journal, Volume 29, Number 1, pp. 1–36. Jacobs, K. (2003). The Sacred and the Profane: Examining The Role of Accounting in the Religious Context, paper presented at the 7th Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Accounting, Conference, Madrid, 13–16 July. Jacobs, K. & Walker, S. P. (2004). Accounting and accountability in the Iona Community, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Volume 17, Number 3, pp. 361–381. Laughlin, R. C. (1987). Accounting Systems in Organizational Contexts: A Case for Critical Theory, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 12, pp. 479–502. Laughlin, R. C. (1990). A Model of Financial Accountability and the Church of England, Financial Accountability and Management, Volume 6, Number 2, pp. 93–114. Laughlin, R. (1991). Environmental Disturbances and Organisational Transitions and Transformations: Some Alternate Models, Organization Studies, Volume 1, pp. 209–232. Laughlin, R. (1995). Empirical Research in Accounting: Alternate Approaches and a Case for “Middle-Range” Thinking, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Volume 8, pp. 63–87. Laughlin, R. (2004). Putting the Record Straight: A Critique of Methodology Choices and the Construction of Facts: Some Implications from the Sociology of Knowledge, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 15, Number 2, pp. 261–277. Laughlin, R. C. (2008). A Conceptual Framework for Accounting for Public-Benefit Entities, Public Money and Management, Volume 24, Number 4, pp. 247–254. Laughlin, R. C. (2010). A Comment on ‘Towards a Paradigmatic Foundation for Accounting Practice’, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Volume 23, Number 5, pp. 759–763. Laughlin, R. C. (2012a). Private Communication, 1st March 2012. Laughlin, R. C. (2012b). Debate: Accrual Accounting: Information for Accountability or Decision Usefulness, Public Money & Management, Volume 32, Number 1, pp. 45–46. Laughlin, R. & Broadbent, J. (1991). Accounting and Juridification: An Exploration with Special Reference to the Public Sector in the United Kingdom, Third Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Accounting Conference, Manchester, University of Manchester. Laughlin, R. & Broadbent, J. (1993). Accounting and Law: Partners in the Juridification of the Public Sector in the UK, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 4, pp. 337–369. Laughlin, R. C. & Puxty, A. G. (1986). The Socially Conditioning and Socially Conditioned Nature of Accounting: A Review and Analysis Through Tinker’s Paper Prophets, The British Accounting Review, Volume 18, Number 1, pp. 77–90.

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Lehman, G. (1993). China after Tiananmen Square: Rawls and Justice, Praxis International, Volume 12, Number 4, pp. 405–420. Lehman, G. (1995). A Legitimate Concern with Environmental Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 6, Number 5, pp. 393–413. Lehman, G. (1999). Disclosing New World: Social and Environmental Accounting, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 24, 217–241. Lehman, G. (2001). Reclaiming the Public Sphere: Problems and Prospects for Corporate Social and Environmental Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume, 12, Number 6, pp. 713–733. Lehman, G. (2002). Globalisation and the Authentic Self: Cosmopolitanism and Charles Taylor’s Communitarianism, Global Society, Volume 16, Number 4, pp. 419–437. Lehman, G. (2004). Social and Environmental Accounting: Trends and Thoughts for the Future, Accounting Forum, Volume 28, Number 1, pp. 1–5. Lehman, G. (2010a). Interpretive Accounting Research, Accounting Forum, Volume 34, Number 3-4, pp. 231–235. Lehman, G. (2010b). Perspectives on Accounting, Commonalities & the Public Sphere, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 21, Number 8, pp. 724–738 Lehman, G. (2011a). The Management of Sustainability: The Art of Interpretation, Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research, Volume 9, pp. 75–88. Lehman, G. (2011b). Interpretivism, Postmodernism and the Natural Environment, Philosophy and Social Criticism, Volume 37, pp. 795–821. Lehman, G. (2013). Critical Reflections on Laughlin’s Middle Range Research Approach: Language Not Mysterious?, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 24, Number 3, pp. 211–224. Lehman, G. (2015). Charles Taylor’s Ecological Conversations, London, PalgraveMacmillan. Lehman, G. (2017). The Language of Environmental and Social Accounting Research: The Expression of Beauty and Truth, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 44, pp. 30–41. Merton, R. K. & Merton, R. C. (1968). Social Theory and Social Structure, New York, Simon and Schuster. Porter, M. E. (2003). Building the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: Findings from the Business Competitiveness Index, The Global Competitiveness Report, 2004, pp. 29–56. Shapiro, B. (1997). Objectivity, Relativism and Truth in External Financial Reporting: What’s Really at Stake in the Disputes, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 22, Number 2, pp. 165–185. Shapiro, B. (1998). Toward a Normative Model of Rational Argumentation for Critical Accounting Discussions, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 23, Number 7, pp. 641–663. Taylor, C. (1971a). The Agony of Economic Man, in LaPierre, L. (Ed.), Essays on the Left, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart (pp. 221–235). Taylor, C. (1971b). Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, The Review of Metaphysics, Volume 25, Number 1, pp. 3–51. Taylor, C. (1976). Responsibility for Self, in Rorty, E. O. (Ed.), The Identities of Persons, Berkley and California, CA, University of California Press (pp. 281–301).

Critical and radical accounting 193 Taylor, C. (1991a). The Dialogical Self, in Hiley, D. R., Bohman, J. F., & Shusterman, R. (Eds.), The Interpretive Turn, Ithaca, Cornell Press (pp. 304–315). Taylor, C. (1991b). Civil Society in the Western Tradition, in Groffier, E. & Paradis, M. (Eds.), The Notion of Tolerance and Human Rights, Ottawa, Carleton University Press. Taylor, C. (1991c). The Importance of Herder, in Margalit, E. & Margalit, A. (Ed.), Isaiah Berlin: A Celebration, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press (pp. 40–64) (reprinted in Taylor, C., Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1995, pp. 79–100). Taylor, C. (1991d). Comments and Replies, Inquiry, Volume 34, Number 2, pp. 237–255. Taylor, C. (1991e). Hegel’s Ambitious Legacy for Modern Liberalism, in Cornell, D., Rosenfeld, M., & Carlson, D. G. (Ed.), Hegel and Legal Theory, New York, Routledge (pp. 64–78). Taylor, C. (1991f). Language and Society, in Honneth, A. & Joas, H. (Eds.), Communicative Action, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press (pp. 23–36). Taylor, C. (1992). The Ethics of Authenticity, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Taylor, C. (2002a). On Social Imaginary, http://www.nyu.edu/classes/calhoun/ Theory/Taylor-on-si.htm (Accessed December 12, 2002). Taylor, C. (2002b). Understanding the Other: A Gadamerian View on Conceptual Schemes, in Gadamer’s Century: Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer, in Malpas, J., von Arnswald, U. & Kertscher, J. (Eds.), Boston, MIT Press (pp. 279–297). Reprinted as ‘Gadamer and the Human Sciences’, in Dostal, R. J. (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer, Cambridge University Press (2002) (pp. 126–142). Taylor, C. (2011). Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism, in Butler, J., Habermas, J., Taylor, C. & West, C. (Eds.), The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, Columbia University Press, pp. 34–60. Taylor, C. (2016). The Language Animal, Oxford, Blackwell. Taylor, C. (2020). Is democracy slipping away? https://items.ssrc.org/democracypapers/is-democracy-slipping-away/ Taylor, C. & Habermas, J. (2009). ‘Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor in Conversation’ The Immanent Frame. http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2009/11/20/rethinkingsecularism-jurgen-habermas-and-charles-taylor-in-conversation/. Taylor, C. & Smith, J. K. A. (2014). Imagining an “Open” Secularism: The Intersection of Ideas and Public Life for Understanding Our “Secular Age”, Compass Online Journal, https://www.cardus.ca/comment/article/imagining-anopen-secularism/

Part III

The environment

11 Deep Ecology and interpretivism

Introduction This chapter deepens the interpretivist quest to challenge the excessive naturalism that dominates modern social science. The argument utilises ideas from Deep and Social Ecology to explore how self-interpreting humans relate to the external and natural environment. The Deep Ecology movement emerged in the late 1960s as a non-violent philosophy that advocated the belief that Nature possesses intrinsic value, and that humanity should realign its economic and social activities accordingly. Human-centred ethics were viewed as morally defective and ultimately unsustainable, and Deep Ecologists were therefore committed to an ecologically sound new world order in which humanity no longer considered itself to be sovereign in the world.

Basic definitions The Deep Ecology movement emerged in the late 1960s as a non-violent philosophy which advocated the belief that Nature possessed intrinsic value, and that humanity should realign its economic and social activities accordingly. Deep Ecology in its purest form is highly critical of Western values, modern societies, and traditional relationships between humanity and the environment. It maintains that the environment has value in and of itself, independent of any involvement of human valuing subjects. Humanity’s needs and values need no particular consideration, does not need to be incorporated into any meta-narrative, and the only obligations existent in a relationship between humanity and the environment arise in the context of what is ultimately most beneficial to the natural realm. Issues of marketplace, societal interests, and communal values run a distant second place to preservation of the environment in its untouched natural state (Lehman, 2015). It is claimed that Western current lifestyles and market practices have submerged environmental interests at the expense of capitalist development. They reject the classical political belief that Nature is a simple

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resource to be called upon and consumed as necessary, and also the belief that ecosystems can be controlled in states of general economic equilibrium (in which the free market is believed to be the determinant of all and any necessary solutions to pressing environmental problems). Key figures in the early Deep Ecology movement, such as Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, were also members of the peace movement – in their early writings, this is made obvious in their repeated emphasis of harmony and tranquillity in interactions with the natural environment. Their beliefs, at odds with prevailing social and political conditions at the time, struggled to gain traction – and indeed their early writings on the subject did not make it clear how their claimed peaceful agendas would do otherwise. It is therefore interesting that in the 30 years, the original non-violent and passive aspects have been gradually overtaken by increasingly more overt and extreme forms of environmental activism, which operate under the principles of Deep Ecology but emphasise the use of violence where necessary to achieve stated environmental aims. To that extent, the FBI in 2002 identified more than 600 attacks. Attacks on facilities and infrastructure were the most common forms of terrorist attacks in the USA between 2002 and 2018, with 239 total attacks. The largest number of attacks was carried out by animal rights and environmentalist groups. However, these types of attacks result in very low casualties and rarely have loss of life as the main goal. These are initiatives that had been initiated by protest organizations and individuals involved in physical attacks on corporations, developments, societal assets, and facilities that were perceived to be operating in violation of natural environments, or whose activities directly affected such environments (Jarboe, 2002). One wonders how early environmentalists such as Leopold would have reacted to such extremist interpretations of environmental philosophies, culminating in activities such as monkey-wrenching (Foreman, nd) and tree spiking Foreman & Hellenbach, 1991). Immediately, we see one of the causes of consternation in adopting a deep ecological perspective – that it can lead to such outcomes at all. A monistic environmental ethic potentially becomes a narrow conception about how to reason about the world and may exclude possible compromises and novel political solutions. Monistic solutions may not ultimately provide the most successful outcome, except in their own terms. On the other hand, Deep Ecologists claim that the dominant Western tradition is itself limiting because it uses practical reason and instrumental constructions that remove imagination and creativity from environmental decision-making. Ultimately, the quest of this chapter is to explore the core values of Deep Ecology, and whether it is possible to separate the antagonistic elements towards Western rational thought from those that nonetheless might usefully inform a more considered relationship between humanity and the environment. Politics can often be perceived as a zero-sum game, but this chapter searches nonetheless for a politics that creates commonalities

Deep Ecology and interpretivism 199 between people and Nature, so that we may choose a better and more positive direction with insight and full consideration of options. Accordingly, this chapter critically explores the concepts of intrinsic value, biocentric ethics, eco-communitarianism and Deep Ecology to compare them with an interpretivist approach associated with philosophers from Hegel (1970) to Heidegger (1971) and Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) to Capra (2004).

Origins of Deep Ecology Deep Ecology originated as an eco-political movement founded by philosophers Arne Naess, George Sessions, and Bill Devall. Although these authors wrote on the subject throughout the 1970s, it ultimately took almost 35 years for their ideas to find a wider audience. The breakthrough occurred with the now-famous journal The Trumpeter in 1986, in which Naess and Sessions condemned humanity’s anthropocentric attitude towards the natural environment. They challenged the inability of Enlightenment theories of modernity to appreciate Nature’s intrinsic value, which they contend exists independently of human valuing subjects. For Naess: The well-being of non-human life on Earth has value in itself. This value is independent of any instrumental usefulness for limited human purposes. (Naess, 1973, p. 266. See also Naess, 1973, pp. 85–100) Further to this, Callicott, a contemporary writer and philosopher on environmental ethics said: Ecology represents living Nature as a biotic community, i.e., as a society of plants, animals, minerals, fluids, and gases. This is a genuinely novel conception of Nature. Prior to the emergence of the science of ecology, when natural history was largely a matter of taxonomy, Nature was perceived more as a mere collection of objects, like a room full of furniture, the parts of which were incidentally and externally related. Natural things, thus, had either an indifferent value, a positive utilitarian resource value, or a negative value (as pests, weeds, vermin, and so on). (Callicott, 1982, p. 173) Devall and Sessions (1985) published a book called Deep Ecology which is regarded as a seminal work on the subject and developed the axiom that the natural environment possesses intrinsic value. They outlined eight core principles of the Deep Ecology manifesto, under which humanity was expected to live. They include:

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2 3 4

5 6

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8

The environment The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease. Present human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent worth) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to participate in the attempt to implement the necessary changes (Sessions & Naess, 1986, p. 14).

These eight principles demonstrate a commitment to an eco-centric world view, romanticising pre-industrial and subsistence lifestyles where humanity and the natural environment reflect an inter-connected organic relationship. Its strong political message is that Nature’s intrinsic value should always be the principal focus in decision-making. Accordingly, Deep Ecology is critical of grand narratives which broadly assume that humanity can control the world and scientifically shape it in its image for human economic benefit. Devall and Sessions argued that for deep ecologists, it is easier to express fundamental values, a fundamental view of what’s meaningful in life, what’s worth maintaining. They continue: The material standard of living should be drastically reduced and the quality of life, in the sense of basic satisfaction in the depths of one’s heart or soul, should be maintained or increased ... There is a basic intuition in deep ecology that we have no right to destroy other living beings without sufficient reason. Another norm is that, with maturity, human beings will experience joy when other life forms experience joy and sorrow when other life forms experience sorrow. (Devall & Sessions, 1985, p. 75)

Deep Ecology and interpretivism 201 Of critical importance was the need to explore how modernity has created a technical stance towards different cultures and how this stance has led to a vision of the world where accumulation and control held sway. One may perhaps differentiate between what has been called ‘Deep Ecology’ (with capitals) and ‘deep ecology’ (in lower case).1 The former refers to an ecological manifesto for humanity to reform the way it lives on the planet, placing environmental interests first and foremost above human interests. This is the purer, and some would say extreme, version of Deep Ecology from which radical activists have arguably drawn their inspiration. The latter version of deep ecology still maintains that the natural environment as having intrinsic value but emphasises the development of a political democratic system which nurtures commonalities, as opposed to provoking radical environmentalism and politics. Accordingly, it allows deeper engagement with other philosophies concerning humanity’s being in the world, as well as the ways through which environmental and human interests connect. In this more moderate strand of deep ecology, we are beings in interaction with the world. Therefore, we do not operate with stark dualisms, but we do try to work out compromises that enable the furthering of the interests of both. Following Leopold, we question the modernist dualisms on which our communities are based, and search for the common values between people and the environment. In part, the ideas developed from Hegel (1970), Heidegger (1971), and Taylor (1989) provide a means to temper the extreme anthropocentricism which exists within the dominant assumptions of modernity. Nevertheless, Deep Ecologists such as Naess (1987), Capra, and Westra (1985) aim to provide a way to transform humanity’s consciousness away from the mechanistic paradigms of Enlightenment modernity. One is never sure, however, what their concrete action programme would look like.

Features of deep ecology A focus on intrinsic value can take environmental ethics not only in fringe directions but also ignores the possibilities opened when we begin to work out commonalities between people and Nature. We remain enthralled by critique without proposal. It is for this reason that Deep Ecology may also be criticised from the opposite direction – that it goes too far when exploring the value of the natural environment (Dicks, 2018; Fox, 1980). However, my early chapters revealed just how precarious are market-based solutions to environmental proposals. It was for that reason that I introduced the dilemma concerning coal mining in Queensland as an example. To this point in the book, it has been argued that at one end of the spectrum you have the deep ecological perspective, and its connections to eco-terrorism at the extreme; at the other end, you have an interpretivist perspective that uses our engaged and perceptive abilities to recognise that we are in touch with those intrinsic values, or the world as it really is. That is, we are part of the world. In the middle is the real world, the world as it is, and has intrinsic value.

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A politics based on the philosophy of perception and interpretation might provide a more viable and attractive political perspective that is not selfcontradictory, monistic and leading to unattractive political programs and movements such as eco-terrorism.

Deep Ecology and Nature The criticisms raised in the first section are to the effect that deep ecology offers a limited understanding of the social relationships commodified by capitalism. It may also be criticised from the opposite direction which is that it goes too far when exploring the intrinsic value of the natural environment. Deep Ecology, associated with the writings of Devall and Sessions (1985), Foreman (nd), Fox (1980), and Naess (1989), explores humanity’s anthropocentric attitude towards the natural environment and the inability of Enlightenment theories of modernity to appreciate what they call Nature’s ‘intrinsic value’, which apparently exists independently of human-valuing subjects. The environmental strategy proposed here, of course, does not assume that humanity is a blight on the planet, but it does contend that our understanding of culture is crucial in thinking about what Nature is. Of critical importance is the need to explore how modernity has created a technical stance towards different cultures and how this stance leads to a vision of the world where accumulation and control hold sway.

Deep ecology and structure For Deep Ecologists, anthropocentrism is an outcome of social structures ingrained in the culture of modernity. On that point eco-feminists agree, believing that the domination of Nature derives from male-controlled corporate élite structures. Eco-feminists hold that the hierarchical institutions of modern liberal-capitalist societies reflect a ‘patriarchal’ structure which submerges ‘other’ voices, such as those which attempt to express the value of Nature. In patriarchal society, male rationality and culture have categorised several ‘others’, of which women and Nature are the most prominent. That rationality shapes capitalism and submerges different ways of being in the world. As a result, communities have become alienated from half of their number and from Nature, both of which are often subject to ‘exploitation’. One might argue about the extent to which eco-feminism should be seen as a branch of Deep Ecology, or a different form of anthropocentrism. Suffice it to say that its advocates usually mirror the Deep Ecologists’ concern with combating the tendency to devalue ‘otherness’ as embodied in Nature (Lehman, 2011a, 2011b; Salleh, 1984, 1992, 1993). Clearly, Deep Ecologists draw our attention to vital problems and dangerous attitudes. As Callicott insists, they offer new ways to think about what Nature and the natural environment mean. But they do not theorise

Deep Ecology and interpretivism 203 sufficiently humanity’s presence in Nature and do not address adequately the impact which industrialisation and corporatisation have on the environment (Callicott, 2013). Furthermore, they differ from social ecologists in their insistence on the intrinsic value of the environment and have also been accused of being more mystical. Indeed, Bookchin rejects Deep Ecology because of that mysticism, apparent in the concept ‘intrinsic value’.2 As he puts it: To frivolously speak of ‘biocentrism’, of ‘intrinsic worth’, and even metaphorically, of a ‘biocentric democracy’ (to use the deplorable verbiage of mystical deep ecology), as though human beings were equitable in terms of their ‘worth’ to, say, mosquitoes-and then ask human beings to bear a moral responsibility to the world of life-is to downgrade the entire project of a meaningful ecological ethics. (Bookchin, 1995, p. 34) Some Deep Ecologists also differ from social ecologists by undemocratic or authoritarian political agendas. Nevertheless, some have advocated grassroot forms of government which are assumed to reflect a concern for the natural environment. These are like the social ecologists’ small-scale decentralised communities in which people’s lives mirror Nature’s spontaneous processes. Both Deep Ecologists and social ecologists in this respect might be advised to address more thoroughly the processes of corporate colonisation in their historical, social, and cultural contexts. More fundamentally, Taylor’s hermeneutic perspective has purchase on these problems as it attempts to create political space within modern communities to engage with environmental suppositions concerning the determination of value. For example, Taylor’s work on people’s strong evaluations creates a need for public space to engage with Bookchin’s (1982, 1987, 1990) ‘social ecology’ and its recommendation that only small scale and decentralised communities are capable of relating effectively with the land. For interpretivists, such as Taylor, however, democratic communities will not automatically ‘mirror Nature’ and require a process of change which involves teasing out how these values are to be implemented. In teasing out differences between anthropocentric and deep ecology/Deep Ecology, some tentative steps towards political reconciliation can be advanced in moderating adverse ecological damage (Lehman, 2010a, 2010b, 2017). In sum, if Earth is viewed as a spaceship in need of oxygen, then it is possible to offer anthropocentric arguments to preserve rainforests. In contrast, if Earth is viewed in terms of the Gaia book, that all life is intrinsically valuable, then it is possible to launch arguments for saving forests as ends in themselves. This is because they are a part of a complex interconnected web of life and such awareness can be understood in either anthropocentric, or deep ecological terms.

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Conclusion The key issues boil down to those attempts to persuade fellow citizens about the value of their ideals. Are interpretivist processes and thinking enough to bring all people together? Is liberalism right to promote neutrality? Interpretivist and social ecological theory are used to examine neutral and procedural liberalism together with affinities with postmodern thinking. Do they have the potential to take us further than liberal extensionism or the creation of a politics that is open to all? This is in the quest to offer answers to these pressing questions through an exploration into the connections between humanity and the natural environment.

Notes 1 See Reitan (1996, pp. 411–425). Distinctions between and within the deep ecology/Deep Ecology movements can be detected in the environmental ethics literature. Devall and Sessions seem to have asserted the existence of intrinsic value in Nature. The supposition that Nature possesses intrinsic value has been supported by Naess. Bookchin rejects the view that value is projected by valuing subjects onto a world devoid of intrinsic value (Naess, 1987, pp. 35–42). While from another deep ecology/Deep Ecology perspective, Fox seems to move away from such extreme viewpoints. 2 Bookchin’s work can be seen as a form of ecological libertarian thought. In some of his works, he refers to a libertarian political eco-community; see Bookchin (1987).

Bibliography Bookchin, M. (1982). The Ecology of Freedom, Palo Alto, CA, Cheshire Books. Bookchin, M. (1987). The Rise of Urbanization and the Decline of Citizenship, San Francisco, CA, Sierra Club Books. Bookchin, M. (1990). Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Society, Boston, MA, South End Press. Bookchin, M. (1993). Which Way for the Ecology Movement?, Edinburgh and San Francisco, A. K. Press. Bookchin, M. (1994). The Concept of Social Ecology, in Merchant, C. (Ed.), Ecology, New Jersey, Humanities Press (pp. 125–140). Bookchin, M. (1995). The Philosophy of Social Ecology: Essays on Dialectical Materialism, Montréal, Black Rose Books. Callicott, J. B. (1982). Humes Is/Ought Dichotomy and the Relation of Ecology to Leopold’s Land Ethic, Environmental Ethics, Volume 4, Number 2, pp. 163–175. Callicott, J. B. (1992). Rolstrom on Intrinsic Value: A Deconstruction, Environmental Ethics, Volume 14, Number 2, pp. 129–145. Callicott, J. B. (1994). Earths Insights: A Multicultural Survey of Ecological Ethics from the Mediterranean Basin to the Australian Outback, Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA, The Regents of the University of California. Callicott, J. B. (1996). Do Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology Undermine Leopold’s Land Ethic, Environmental Ethics, Volume 18, Number 4, pp. 353–373.

Deep Ecology and interpretivism 205 Callicott, J. B. (2000). Many Indigenous Worlds or the Indigenous World?, Environmental Ethics, Volume 22, Number 3, pp. 273–291. Callicott, J. B. (2011). The Worldview Concept and Aldo Leopold’s Project of World View Remediation, Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature & Culture, Volume 5, pp. 510–529. Callicott, J. B. (2013). Thinking like a Planet: The Land Ethic and the Earth Ethic, New York, NY, Oxford University Press. Capra, F. (2004). Frank Capra: Interviews, Mississippi, Univ. Press of Mississippi. Devall, B. (1980). The Deep Ecology Movement, Natural Resources Journal, Volume 20, pp. 299–322. Devall, B. (1988). Simple in Means, Rich in Ends: Practicing Deep Ecology, Layton, Utah, Gibbs M. Smith. Devall, B. & Sessions, G. (1985). Deep Ecology, Salt Lake City, UT, Peregrine Smith Books. Dicks, H. (2016). The Philosophy of Biomimicry, Philosophy & Technology, Volume 29, Number 3, pp. 223–243. Dicks, H. (2018). From Anthropomimetic to Biomimetic Cities: The Place of Humans in ‘Cities like Forests’, Architecture Philosophy, Volume 3, Number 1, pp. 91–106. Dreyfus, H. & Taylor, C. (2015). Retrieving Realism, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. Foreman, D. (nd). Ecodefense: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching, Earth First. Frodeman, R. (1992). Radical Environmentalism and the Political Roots of Postmodernism. Environmental Ethics, Volume 14, pp. 307–319. Hegel, G. W. F. (1970). Philosophy of Nature, edited and translated by A. V. Miller (Foreword by J. N. Findlay), Oxford, Clarendon Press. Heidegger, M. (1971). The Thing, in Hofstader, A. (trans.), Poetry, Language, Thought, New York, NY, Harper and Rowe. Jarboe, F. F. (2002). Domestic Terrorism Section Chief, Counterterrorism Division, FBI, February 12, 2002. http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/jarboe021202. htm (Accessed July 7, 2019). Lehman, G. (1993). China after Tiananmen Square: Rawls and Justice, Praxis International, Volume 12, Number 4, pp. 405–420. Lehman, G. (1995). A Legitimate Concern with Environmental Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 6, Number 5, pp. 393–413. Lehman, G. (1999). Disclosing New World: Social and Environmental Accounting, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 24, pp. 217–241. Lehman, G. (2001). Reclaiming the Public Sphere: Problems and Prospects for Corporate Social and Environmental Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume, 12, Number 6, pp. 713–733. Lehman, G. (2002). Globalisation and the Authentic Self: Cosmopolitanism and Charles Taylor’s Communitarianism, Global Society, Volume 16, Number 4, pp. 419–437. Lehman, G. (2004). Social and Environmental Accounting: Trends and Thoughts for the Future, Accounting Forum, Volume 28, Number 1, pp. 1–5. Lehman, G. (2010a). Interpretive Accounting Research, Accounting Forum, Volume 34, Number 3–4, pp. 231–235.

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Lehman, G. (2010b). Perspectives on Accounting, Commonalities & the Public Sphere, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 21, Number 8, pp. 724–738 Lehman, G. (2011a). The Management of Sustainability: The Art of Interpretation, Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research, Volume 9, pp. 75–88. Lehman, G. (2011b). Interpretivism, Postmodernism and the Natural Environment, Philosophy and Social Criticism, Volume 37, pp. 795–821. Lehman, G. (2013). Critical Reflections on Laughlin’s Middle Range Research Approach: Language Not Mysterious?, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 24, Number 3, pp. 211–224. Lehman, G. (2015). Charles Taylor’s Ecological Conversations, London, PalgraveMacmillan. Lehman, G. (2017). The Language of Environmental and Social Accounting Research: The Expression of Beauty and Truth, Critical perspectives on Accounting, Volume 44, pp. 30–41. Naess, A. (1973). The Shallow and the Deep, Long‐range Ecology Movement. A Summary, Inquiry, Volume 16, Number 1–4, pp. 95–100. Naess, A. (1984a). A Defence of the Deep Ecology Movement, Environmental Ethics, Volume 6, Number 3, pp. 265–270. Naess, A. (1984b). Notes on the Politics of the Deep Ecology Movement, in Mercier, A. & Bern, M.S. (Eds.), Philosophers on Their Own Work, Switzerland, Peter Lang. Naess, A. (1987). Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World, The Trumpeter, Volume 4, Number 3, pp. 35–42. Naess, A. (1989). Ecology, Community & Lifestyle, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Reitan, E. H. (1996). Deep Ecology and the Irrelevance of Morality, Environmental Ethics, Volume 18, Number 4, pp. 411–425. Salleh, A. (1984). Deeper Than Deep Ecology: The Eco-Feminist Connection, Environmental Ethics, Volume 6, Number 4, pp. 339–345. Salleh, A. (1992). The Ecofeminism/Deep Ecology Debate, Environmental Ethics, Volume 14, Number 3, pp. 195–216. Salleh, A. (1993). Class, Race, and Gender Discourse in the Ecofeminism/Deep Ecology Debate, Environmental Ethics, Volume 15, Number 3, pp. 225–245. Sessions, G. & Naess, A. (1986). The Basic Principles of Deep Ecology, The Trumpeter, Volume 3, Number 4, p. 14. Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the Self, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. (1990). Modes of Civil Society, Public Culture, Volume 3, Number 1, pp. 95–118. Westra, L. (1985). Let It Be: Heidegger and Future Generations, Environmental Ethics, Volume 7, Number 4, pp. 341–350. Westra, L. (1989). Ecology and Animals: Is there a Joint Ethic of Respect, Environmental Ethics, Volume 11, Number 3, pp. 215–260. Westra, L. (1997). Why Norton’s Anthropocentricism is Insufficient, Environmental Ethics, Volume 19, Number 3, pp. 279–299. Woolcock, P. G. (2000). Objectivity and illusion in evolutionary ethics: Comments on Waller. Biology and Philosophy, Volume 15, 39–60. 10.1023/A:1006556229960.

12 Deep Ecology, community, and interpretation

Introduction Deep Ecology was one of the first environmental movements to argue that Nature is more than just a simple resource and has intrinsic value. The interpretivist approach connects with Deep Ecology by exploring how resource value and intrinsic value are not necessarily incompatible in environmental decision-making. The argument in this chapter is based around a discussion of the need for accounting and accountability research to engage with Deep/deep ecological perspectives. The first substantive section of the chapter provides an overview of Devall and Sessions in order to (1) establish that accountability research is on a wrong path; (2) to argue that the environment is a necessary condition of being; and (3) that basic institutions such as accountability in structure can contribute towards developing a closer and what was referred to in Chapter 9 as a more transparent society.

Some philosophical implications of Deep Ecology A core feature of Deep Ecology is its belief in the intrinsic value of the environment and environmental interests. Zimmerman (1999) describes intrinsic value in terms of the value that something has ‘in itself’, or ‘for its own sake’, or ‘as such’, or ‘in its own right’. This being the point at which you reach something whose goodness is not derivative for its value on something else in some way (Zimmerman, 1999). On the other hand, once you have established the intrinsic worth of something, it can provide a flow-on effect of derivative goods, to which it is related. Deep Ecologists argue that the environment has such intrinsic value, and that benefits enjoyed by humanity are derivative from, and subject to, such intrinsic value being acknowledged and upheld. This forms the ideological basis on which communities would be constructed, built around, and the principle by which political decisions would be judged. It also forms the base for Aldo Leopold’s maxim in his Sand County Almanac, which posited in the 1940s that ‘a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity,

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stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise’ (Leopold, 1970, pp. 224–225). A major feature of the Deep Ecological literature is its obsession with rejecting anthropocentrism (a human-centred, worldview). In the case of Devall and Sessions, what they advocate as their alternative reflects their own beliefs and feelings in ultimately naïve terms: It can potentially satisfy our deepest yearnings: faith and trust in our most basic institutions; courage to take direct action; joyous confidence to dance with the sensuous harmonies discovered through spontaneous, playful intercourse with the rhythms of our bodies, the rhythms of flowing water, changes in the weather and seasons, and the overall processes of life on earth. (Devall & Sessions, 1985, p. 7) Such a simplistic political world view does not consider fully the public sphere, political systems or engage with the overall will of the people (Taylor, 2016, 2017a). That is the charge levelled at many animal liberationists who, to the casual observer, might seem to be on the same side. Much of the animal liberation literature, however, might be commended for avoiding the charge of mysticism so often felt to be characteristic of Deep Ecologists. Criticisms of Deep Ecology essentially fit into three categories, which are as follows: 1 2 3

It is too mystical and subjective. It is potentially highly undemocratic and authoritarian. It lacks pragmatism and unworkable in the real world.

Since intrinsic value is core to Deep Ecology, it is appropriate to explore what it means, how such value is judged, by whom, what implications does such value have in human dealings with the environment, what are the implications and complications?

Mysticism and Deep Ecology Social ecologist Murray Bookchin rejects Deep Ecology because of that mysticism, apparent in the concept of intrinsic value. As noted in Chapter 11, Bookchin’s argument about ‘biocentrism’, ‘intrinsic worth’, and ‘biocentric democracy’ was seen to be ‘the deplorable verbiage of mystical deep ecology’ (Bookchin, 1995, p. 34). As though human beings were equitable in terms of their ‘worth’ to, say, mosquitoes – and then ask human beings to bear a moral responsibility to the world of life – ‘is to downgrade the entire project of a meaningful ecological ethics’ (Bookchin, 1995, p. 34). Bookchin (1991, 1995) claims that intrinsic value is such a nebulous concept that it cannot be implemented successfully, and that deep ecology is

Deep Ecology, community, and interpretation 209 a doctrine urgently in need of pragmatic political recommendations. He claims that Deep Ecologists emphasise intrinsic value, but that the value that they emphasise is really just a reflection of their own personal subjective motivations. Interestingly, Naess (1989) has emphasised his own deep feeling of identification with Nature and the caring of other life-forms to a sense of estrangement from humans. He notes: For thousands of years, and in various cultures, mountains have been venerated for their equanimity, greatness, aloofness, and majesty. The process of identification is the prerequisite for feeling the lack of greatness. (Naess, 1989, p. 172; quoted in Taylor, 2001, p. 181) Naess eventually named his personal philosophy ‘ecosophy T’ after his mountain hut which inspires many of his writings on the environment. Ecosophy was a shorthand word for environmental philosophy. His personal subjectivism is evident in his claim that: Green philosophy or the philosophy of the deep ecology movement is largely an articulation of the implicit philosophy of 5 year old children who have access to at least a minimum of animals, plants, and natural places. These children experience animals as beings like themselves in basic respects. They have joys and sorrows, interests, needs, loves and hates. Even flowers in places are alive to them, thriving or having a bad time. The personal identity of the small child has environmental factors. They are a part of himself or herself, the personal, social and natural self being one and indivisible. Philosophers of the deep ecology movements have never found arguments to undermine those attitudes implicit in childhood. (Naess, 1984b, p. 180; quoted in Taylor, 2001, p. 181) Naess’s ideas can be implemented through the creation of a more substantive moral framework that promotes respect for environmental values, local values and depth experiences to inspire a contextualised form of accountability – one that is broad enough to critique globalisation and the internationalisation of neoliberal free-market ideology. Conceptions of human agency that underpin this imaginary of accountability and globalisation must be challenged to overcome what Part I of this book referred to as neoliberalism. It will be recalled that neoliberalism excessively relies on instrumental reasoning. Obviously, instrumental reasoning is the type of reasoning as utilised by economic technocrats to arrive at maximal outputs at minimal costs. In such a view, capitalism is obviously condemned. This is to be achieved through a discussion of Nature’s meaning and fullness as these ideals affect issues of culture, environment, and identity. The point made is that governance and accountability frameworks must address the neoliberal profession’s inattention to these experiences of Nature, time, causality, duration, and freedom, and that moral sources

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should inform and shape humanity. Is it a valid concern? What is the role it plays? Are the critics correct?

Undemocratic and authoritarian: eco-terrorism and anarchism Eco-terrorism has been a fundamental threat to the foundations of Western civilisations. From monkey-wrenching to pipe-bombings of pharmaceutical companies, the issues and threats from this ideology have rarely been given full consideration. The connections between eco-terrorism, intrinsic value theory, and deep ecology have not been fully explored. Without this examination, the environmental ethical approach lacks credibility and full philosophical examination. It will be recalled that in more extreme versions of Deep Ecology, political theorist Robert Frodeman (1992) reported that Foreman and Hellenbach (1991, p. 48) referred to humanity as a cancer on the planet.1 Some Deep Ecologists also differ from social ecologists by undemocratic or authoritarian political agendas. Nevertheless, some have advocated grassroot forms of government which are assumed to reflect a concern for the natural environment. These are similar to the social ecologists’ small-scale decentralised communities in which people’s lives mirror Nature’s spontaneous processes. Both Deep Ecologists and social ecologists in this respect might be advised to address more thoroughly the processes of corporate colonisation in their historical, social, and cultural contexts. Meanwhile, Eco-feminists hold that the hierarchical institutions of modern liberal-capitalist societies reflect a ‘patriarchal’ structure which submerges ‘other’ voices, such as those which attempt to express the value of Nature. In patriarchal society male rationality and culture have categorised several ‘others’, of which women and Nature are the most prominent. That rationality shapes capitalism and submerges different ways of being in the world. As a result, communities have become alienated from half of their number and from Nature, both of which are often subject to ‘exploitation’. One might argue about the extent to which eco-feminism should be seen as a branch of Deep Ecology, or a different form of anthropocentrism. Suffice it to say that its advocates usually mirror the Deep Ecologists’ concern with combating the tendency to devalue ‘otherness’ as embodied in Nature.

Pragmatism: Deep Ecology lacks a process for achieving environmental and social change In Chapter 1, it was argued that a theory should not be extended to the point where its recommendations become contradictory and illogical which is a problem for many environmental and social positions. The interpretivist attempts to overcome these problems through examination of the inter-relationships

Deep Ecology, community, and interpretation 211 between humanity and Nature. Environmental issues must be considered in conjunction with the social causes which accentuate environmental problems. In contrast with the arguments of some Deep Ecologists, the interpretivist perspective recognises that processes of government simply must consider the enormous suffering in modern communities. For example, the clash between environmental preservation and the need for development in many parts of the globe is to essay a serious concern. It is human suffering and misery which accentuates ecological problems in developing economies who want to continue their own lives (Lehman, 2017). When we recognise that it is through conversation that we begin to discuss our relationships with the natural environment, we move closer to an interpretivist pathway as opposed to the postmodern. The question then arises: is Deep Ecology an ideology without a method for engagement with political, economic, and social structures? What are the political transmission mechanisms for moving from one social system to another? Moreover, Deep Ecology is limited in that it does not provide sufficient analyses of the social conditions limiting the effectiveness of institutions. The deep ecologist believes heavily in the notion of intrinsic value which leads to political ideas such as the preservation of Nature above any possible benefits of development. The political implication is that the preservation of the natural environment is above that of economic development. But is Deep Ecology’s commitment to intrinsic value too distant from the actual political problems modern communities are experiencing? Long ago, Australia debated issues about whether to have more wind farms or to preserve precious parrot (Burritt & Lehman, 1995). The practical issue is too important to write about in a way that appeals only to consequentialists, or to Kantians, or to virtue theorists. For such reasons, this book has used an interpretivist perspective to bring together divergent views while addressing perceived limitations. Interpretivism is about imagining an entirely new way of life – one which includes environmental values. While Deep Ecologists tend to assume that it is possible for humanity to dismantle its present social structures and return to pre-modern ways of organising life in communities. One is never sure, however, what their concrete action programme would look like and it is probably for this reason that political theorists continue to search for political connections between people and Nature. Here I use Bookchin’s imaginative arguments that small communities might enter the political picture. The key issue for the public sphere is: how are resource value and intrinsic value compatible in large-scale cities? (Bookchin, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995). Thus, there exists a need to find new political ways, and the first thing to do is to escape the dominant mediational picture. It will be recalled that this view of humanity separates us from the world. To escape the dominant picture, we begin to do this by questioning our traditions, epistemologies,

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and theories of knowledge to understand that we are part of the world. Deep ecology posits the idea of intrinsic value in the natural world; that is, value in the environment that exists in and of itself. Value, stability, and integrity are the values that Leopold (1970) wrote about in A Sand County Almanac. One might make that case that while we might not have any way currently to fully understand the existence of intrinsic value, if we degrade the environment terminally then we preclude all future possibility of finding it. Here Taylor (2015) reminds us of the biblical story of the mustard seed. If you take the mustard seed parable, our understanding of community becomes quite different (Taylor, 2015). That is, the mustard seed is planted and it grows and there are different mustard seeds moving all over and they do not fit together in a single movement. That is, they do not impart a linear direction to things: so in a sense, living by all these periods is living by all these growing mustard seeds that you are aware of it in history. Here Taylor (2015) is trying to understand how to manage society in a nonreductionist manner. This discussion echoes that of Peter Singer whose work we discussed in Chapter 5. Singer reminded us of Hegel’s street-scape and the need for careful planning in city functioning. At a very pragmatic level, sometimes we just need to act as if and accept things as inherently valuable. This is whether we can see such value currently or not. Rarely in accountability and environmental ethics has there been a settling of the accounts between communitarianism, interpretivism, and intrinsic value theory as articulated by Leopold. In settling this account, we begin to understand how interpretivists such as Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) offer means to engage the world; that is, interpretations search for way to keep in touch with reality as it is. Or, putting us in touch with reality in a way which recognises value in the world such that we remind ourselves of the limits of representational means to value things in the world. The argument therefore connects between deep ecology with interpretivism putting us in the world. At the very least, a bridge is constructed between intrinsic value theory and interpretation. Market-based and procedural ethics are inadequate because they do not fully deal with human social structures in a way which includes how we are to live in the natural world in a new technological world. For something to be authentic, it has to be allowed to realise its full potential: the process is similar to Heidegger’s (1971) notion of the ‘thing’ thinging. This simple Heideggerian analogy means that we need to understand how the world works, or at least provide a better account of that reality. That is, the book is concerned about some of the political offshoots of Deep Ecology: the undemocratic implications of Deep Ecology which can move towards anarchical political positions which claim that humanity is a blight on the planet. The strength of the interpretivist position is that it is trying to integrate environmental values in a world where disengaged

Deep Ecology, community, and interpretation 213 reason rules supreme, where disengaged reason assumes that humanity can control the planet. At the very least, an interpretivist position developed using the ideas of Dreyfus, Heidegger (1971), and Taylor (2015) helps to clarify some of the strengths and weaknesses of Callicott’s (1994) work on intrinsic value and deep ecology. If Deep Ecology maintains that there is intrinsic value in Nature, does that mean they are asking the same question as interpreters who believe that we can come in touch with things-in-themselves? This deep ecological way of thinking about politics is found to be challenged by the interpretivist approach in its search to unravel the goods that shape how one is primed to act towards the natural environment. Often, though not necessarily always, the goods confronting people reflect different cultural and social factors and these in turn frame people’s stance to the natural environment. To accommodate these diverse ranges of values requires a broader political thinking that considers not only liberal rights between people, but also the politics of the common good as it shapes our being in the world. In this book, the politics associated on the common good is used to consider humanity’s shared impact on the question: ‘What does Nature mean?’. In developing this perspective, a politics of the common good reflects those shared endeavours that exist between people, cultures, and the natural environment. In particular, the chapter explores within the rubric of Deep Ecology the relevance of interest-based theory and the viability of biocentric ethics as a means to relate humanity with the natural environment.2 The chapter argues that biocentric and deep ecology are ineluctably entwined with social processes in communities and cannot be divorced from questions of human freedom. This chapter contends that a re-visiting of what beliefs we are embedding will help build up a richer picture and a more robust understanding of the world on which to construct policies and strategies to address environmental concerns and practices. Recent insights from phenomenological research offer new ideas to explain how people have direct interaction with the world. This way of thinking also provides a response to liberal critics of Deep Ecology who criticise the doctrine because it is claimed that there is no motivational or justificational gap to explain between an awareness of a preferred course of action and the action which best furthers the values deep ecologists wants to promote (Woolcock, 2000).

Conclusion This book uses deep ecology, interpretivism, and social ecology to challenge cultural, environmental, and neoliberal reforms and the binary dialectic between current business practices and the ideal neoliberal framework. The book advances a global accountability and democratic model to address, with justness, ethical issues in pluralistic communities. This is to be achieved through a discussion of dearth and fullness as these ideals affect

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issues of culture, environment, and identity. The point made is that governance and accountability frameworks must address the neoliberal profession’s inattention to these experiences of Nature, time, causality, duration, and freedom, and that moral sources should inform and shape humanity.

Notes 1 Foreman and Hellenbach (1991, p. 48); (an interview moderated by M. Pollan together with Botkin, Foreman, Lovelock, Turner, & Yaro). In recent work, Foreman argues with more care that strategies such as monkey-wrenching of environmentally destructive machinery must be non-violent. See Foreman and Hellenbach (1991, pp. 225–228). 2 Bookchin’s work can be seen as a form of ecological libertarian thought. In some of his works, he refers to a libertarian political eco-community; see Bookchin (1987).

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A. & Bern, M. S. (Eds.), Philosophers on Their Own Work, Switzerland, Peter Lang. Naess, A. (1984b). A Defence of the Deep Ecology Movement, Environmental Ethics, Volume 6, Number 3, pp. 265–270. Naess, A. (1989). Ecology, Community & Lifestyle, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Taylor, B. (2001). Earth and Nature-Based Spirituality (Part I): From Deep Ecology to Radical Environmentalism, Religion, Volume 31, pp. 175–193. Taylor, C. (2015). In Discussion with William Desmond, the Church in a Secular Age, https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=charles+taylor+william+desmond& docid=608035122573151746. Taylor, C. (2016). The Language Animal, Oxford, Blackwell. Taylor, C. (2017a). Is Democracy Slipping Away?, https://items.ssrc.org/democracypapers/is-democracy-slipping-away/. Taylor, C. (2017b). Converging Roads Around Dilemmas of Modernity, in Lowney, C. W. II (Eds.), Charles Taylor, Michael Polanyi and the Critique of Modernity: Pluralist and Emergentist Directions, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan (pp. 15–26). Taylor, C. (2017c). Dialogue, Discovery, and an Open Future, in Lowney, C. W. II (Ed.), Charles Taylor, Michael Polanyi and the Critique of Modernity: Pluralist and Emergentist Directions, London, Palgrave Macmillan (pp. 27–49). Taylor, C. (2017d). The Importance of Engagement, in Lowney, C. W. II (Ed.), Charles Taylor, Michael Polanyi and the Critique of Modernity: Pluralist and Emergentist Directions, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan (pp. 215–234). Taylor, C. (2017e). Democratic Degeneration: Three Easy Paths to Regression, The Berlin Journal, https://www.americanacademy.de/democratic-degeneration-three-easy-pathsregression/. Taylor, C. (2020). Is Democracy Slipping away? https://items.ssrc.org/democracypapers/is-democracy-slipping-away/. Zimmerman, M. E. (1994). Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity, California, University of California Press. Zimmerman, M. J. (1999). Virtual Intrinsic Value and the Principle of Organic Unities, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 59, Number 3, pp. 654–667. Woolcock, P. G. (2000). Objectivity and Illusion in Evolutionary Ethics: Comments on Waller, Biology and Philosophy, Volume 15, Number 1, pp. 39–60.

13 Perspectives on Deep Ecology Basic issues

Introduction Previous chapters introduced deep ecological ideas to the accountability debate. The issue is then how to satisfactorily incorporate such useful ideas into contemporary political structures which reflect humanity’s being-inthe-world, while advancing human understanding as it also includes people’s attitude towards the natural environment. It is important we begin to consider political approaches which strive for imaginative and creative solutions to these dilemmas (Lehman, 2017; Preston, 2018). Fringe environmentalists are gaining mainstream political leverage, with a range of beliefs from the destruction of capitalism, to full social anarchy followed by the return to small village communities (Bookchin, 1994, 1995; Taylor, 1960a, 1960b). This chapter explores how activists such as Murray Bookchin are gaining influence in the environmental debate. In its more extreme form, these principles have been used to justify acts carried out by proponents who regard themselves as eco-warriors, where others might view the outcomes of their actions as ranging from common vandalism of corporate and societal property, through to acts of ecoterrorism. Although there are many strands to Deep Ecology, they all share a profound dissatisfaction with the way modernity has reshaped the world in humanity’s image. Moreover, they all concur that the ethical framework of modernity ought to be replaced with a non-anthropocentric perspective that expresses the independent value of Nature. It explores in more depth, and with more rigour, the epistemological, philosophical, and ethical implications of ecological theory. Such ecological principles have been presented by adherents as intrinsic to the debate about sustainability. Yet, some critics have said that such ideas were less about sustainability and more about a desire to submerge humanity’s interests as secondary to the environment, even if environmental equilibrium was not in danger (Woolcock, 2000). This maxim could be interpreted as a philosophical precursor to the distinctions explored between humanity and environmental interests. How are they to be resolved? According to the original philosophy, many different strands in Deep Ecology never fully offer clear pragmatic

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political programmes. In its strongest form, it has been argued that Dave Foreman advocates an ethic of non-interference when it comes to the starving masses of Africa, while less moderates advocate a spurious nondescript approach which reflects a misology towards reason and rationality. Deep ecology can be broken into several different political and philosophical platforms, which range from individualistic to biocentric approaches. For example, Matthews (1991) and Singer (1976) offer approaches which can be traced back to humanity’s embeddedness in holistic ecological structures. Earlier sections of the book found Singer’s approach to be limited by its utilitarian base. Matthews provides a particularly useful attempt to align biological and egalitarian principles, but in attempting to treat people as equals with other members of the biotic community, also committed the problem we have found with ranking ecological interests above human interests. The search to combine humanity and Nature remained unfulfilled at that point.

A middle way: a focus on interests A major feature of the Deep Ecological literature is its obsession with anthropocentrism. That is the charge levelled at many animal liberationists who, to the casual observer, might seem to be on the same side. Much of the animal liberation literature, however, might be commended for avoiding the charge of mysticism so often felt to be characteristic of Deep Ecologists. In Chapter 4 of this book, one of the most famous, Singer (1975), was introduced because he employs utilitarianism (that most unmystical of theories) which is based on interests and involves the avoidance of pain. As he puts it: To have interests, in a strict metaphorical sense, a being must be capable of suffering or experiencing pleasure … If a being is not capable of suffering, or of enjoyment, there is nothing to take into account. (Singer, 1975, p. 185) Singer’s ‘preference utilitarianism’, which relates the rights of animals to the ability to identify pain and suffering, has encountered many critics. Frey (1980), for example, argues that conflating a capacity to hold interests and having moral rights is questionable (Frey, 1980). Comatose people may not feel pleasure or pain but they still have moral interests and reflect their humanity. Thus, the capacities to feel pleasure or pain do not offer a means to consider the moral values but rather invite moral consideration. Taylor (1985a, p. 192) mounts a similar argument, noting that the attempt to extend interests to other sentient beings ignores the fact that rights embody a capacity for mutual exchange and an ability to enjoy them. Rights must ‘be rights to something’. This presupposes a capacity for reciprocity which is something unique to language-bearing beings (Lehman, 2010a, 2010b).

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Thus, the constitutive relationships between humanity and the natural environment becomes more complicated when the question of pain is extended to tackle the interests of wider entities such as eco-systems. Johnson’s (1991) A Morally Deep World, for example, offers a philosophical investigation into the moral worth of ecosystems. Living systems, he argues, are entities in a persistent state of low entropy. They are sustained by metabolic processes which accumulate energy. Their organic unity and self-identity of which is maintained in equilibrium by homeostatic feedback systems. Johnson explains the notion of moral considerability: The thing for us to do is to find our way in the world, while giving due respect to the widely disparate interests of other beings. This is not essentially different from what we ought to do concerning other humans. Other humans also have widely divergent interests, ranging from the insignificant to the monumental, and it is for us to make the appropriate moral responses. In morally dealing with others, human or nonhuman, we must estimate the importance of various interests of various entities (including ourselves). In so doing it would be appropriate to consider how highly developed an entity and its interests are, how vital an interest is to it, and what the alternatives are. (Johnson, 1991, pp. 287–288) Johnson (1991) essentially offers utilitarian means to rank interests. Starting from the view that ‘what we value … expresses what we are’, he extends his purview to the moral consideration of other entities: It is in those depths that our well-being interests have their roots. Even among humans, neither rationality nor sentience is a necessary condition for the moral significance of an interest. For us to recognise the moral standing of only those beings who are like us in being human, rational, or sentient would be arbitrary and morally unjustifiable. (Johnson, 1991, p. 287) Johnson proposes a method to solve disputes between, for example, preservationists and the interests of developers. While noting the useful extensions, Johnson makes to utilitarian theory, he only provides a means to weigh activities in communities against each other. Interpretivism continues to argue against utilitarian ideology which is said to be limited in the way it submerges considerations concerning what deep/Deep ecologists refer to as Nature’s intrinsic value. Deep/deep ecologists express extreme concern with utilitarian theory because it only offers a human centred means to think about the value in Nature. Communitarians concur with deep/Deep ecology when they explore what is intrinsically valuable in relationships of significance. Taylor argues that political philosophy needs to consider the notion of a ‘strong-evaluator’. He explains:

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The notion of strong evaluations provides an important link for ecological politics as it suggests that some goods define and frame other goods. It connects politics with environmental values. For ecological politics, the natural environment is a higher order good that frames and shapes other goods such as freedom, autonomy, and reciprocity. From this perspective, a further problem with deep and social ecology is that they tend to overplay their political hand; that is, when pushed to an extreme position, some have claimed that humanity is simply a blight on the planet which leaves limited hope for viable political engagement with the mainstream. The prospects for a common political appreciation of the ecological issue seems a distant shore from this perspective.

A middle way: biocentric egalitarianism? Yet, another middle way is the attempt to create a biocentric ethic which is sensitive to human interests. A broad continuum exists from individualism to holism. At the individualist end is the work of Paul Taylor, who advocates principles of species impartiality: …every species counts as having the same value in the sense that, regardless of what species a living thing belongs to, it is deemed prima facie deserving of equal concern and consideration on the part of moral agents… Species impartiality … means regarding every entity that has a good of its own [humans, animals and plants] as possessing inherent worth – the same inherent worth, since none is superior to another. (Taylor, 1986, p. 155) His individualism has been duly criticised along with the view that ecosystems tend towards equilibrium (Sterba, 1998). A more holist biocentric framework has been put forward by Freya Matthews, who attempted to find a balance between humanity’s interests and Nature’s value. She is concerned with constructing principles which will provide guidance on the difficult choices which Nature poses for humanity. For example, she asks: what principle do we use to decide between saving an endangered species or a child in danger when all we can do is to save only one? (Matthews, 1991, p. 128). She stresses the interconnectedness of

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species, using biodiversity as a yardstick to evaluate relationships in Nature. The result is an ethic that strives to locate humanity’s place in ecosystems (which may be non-equilibrium, spatial structures).1 It takes humans into account but does not privilege humanity. In what appears as an extended version of communitarianism, where an organic community is seen as one in which each element is related to, and dependent on other elements, she attempts to balance the good of the collective ecosystem with the interests of individual entities residing in it (Matthews, 1991). The resulting framework might accord ‘preference for the rarer party [which may] prevail even when it is a much less complex creature than its competitor’ (Matthews, 1991, p. 126). Matthews argues that: The intrinsic value of a given self, then, is a dual function of its relative autonomy, or power of self-maintenance, on the one hand, and its interconnectedness, or dependence on the other selves, on the other hand. Both aspects of the self are real, and neither can be wholly reduced to the other, and both components of its value are relevant for normative purposes. If we were faced with the choice of taking the life of an individual whale and that of an individual krill, then we should spare the whale, because viewed as an individual in its relative autonomy is its more important aspect, and the whale plainly possesses a greater power of self-maintenance than does the krill. But if the choice is between the whale and krill as species, then it is a toss-up, because viewed as species they are mutually inextricable, and it therefore makes no sense to assign a higher value to one or the other. (Ibid). For Matthews, therefore, value is determined by the relative autonomy of an entity and its interconnectedness with other entities. Biocentric egalitarianism relates humanity to Nature. Individuals are a part of the natural environment and should ‘[preserve] the greatest possible diversity of lifeforms’ (Ibid). Matthews’ stress on interconnectedness attempts to avoid the philosophical problem of Deep Ecologists, which locates ‘intrinsic value’ in Nature. Her approach is exemplified in the treatment of the choice between the whale and the krill. This way of thinking about ecological matters highlights practical dilemmas. If the choice involves saving one’s own species, then no dilemma exists because of loyalty to one’s own kind. As pointed out in Chapter 1, Matthews’ pragmatism has much to recommend it and is a welcome relief to those who are tired of the philosophical exercise of pushing a position to its extreme to demonstrate how ludicrous it is. Here it will be recalled from Chapter 1 that the approach proposed by Young (1990) is cogent. Young attempts to balance different political proposals without pushing any theory to a logical extreme. Her ‘stopping points’ is apposite and similar to interpretivist endeavours that avoid the pitfall of succumbing to the

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ideal of endless difference. The example she used was that of feminism which could either to self-destruct or to finally accept an ontology of abstract individualism (Nicholson, 1990, p. 8). Stopping points are essential and Matthews’ biocentricism is cognizant of these dilemmas. To some considerable extent, Matthews’ biocentric ethic escapes the pitfalls of anthropocentrism. As noted earlier, however, a useful way to supplement environmental ethical positions is to consider the social and material effects of humanity on the environment. A useful environmental perspective developed recently is Preston’s (2000, 2018) postmodern framework to reform humanity’s attitude towards the environment.2 It will be recalled that he argued that the importance of physical environment to the shape of our bodies and to the shape of our cognitive and perceptual equipment provides a helpful way for postmodern epistemologists to think of how Nature plays an active role in knowledge construction. Nature is no longer reduced to being just the object of knowledge, passive, and supplicant to the inscription of politically motivated inquirers. It does not just stand idly by while the transcendental subject freely creates world upon world of words (Preston, 2000, p. 248). Preston (2000) considers humanity’s being in the world and begins to relate the physical environment with broader questions of identity and community. Ecological politics, therefore, must also take into account the enormous suffering in modern communities that accentuate ecological problems. When we recognise that our humanity is shaped by our interactions with others, then the role of discourse, communication, and the public sphere become critical in ecological politics. That is, our relationships with the natural environment can move us closer to a communitarian informed liberal pathway as opposed to procedural liberal bureaucracy and a postmodern celebration of consumption and desire.

Deep Ecology and the biocentric ethic Biocentric egalitarianism relates humanity to Nature. Individuals are a part of the natural environment and should ‘[preserve] the greatest possible diversity of life-forms’. A biocentric ethic, however, differs from Deep Ecology in that it advocates the development of commonalities between people and the world. It is not simply about the concept of intrinsic value. In this sense, the argument overlaps with the aspects of Norton’s (1995) call to find unity among environmentalists and with the natural world. It differs, however, from Norton in that it emphasises the limitations of freemarket and other approaches which take the current social system as a given – a focus on commonalities is about critiquing where we are going and how we have arrived at this position. Here, it will be recalled from Chapter 1 that the political approach proposed by Iris Marion Young is cogent. Young attempts to balance different political proposals without pushing any theory to a logical extreme

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(Young, 1990). In Chapters 1 and 3, I explored what she calls ‘stopping points’. It will be recalled that for feminist scholar Nicholson (1990), theorising needs some stopping points and that for feminists an important theoretical stopping point is gender. To invoke the ideal of endless difference is for feminism either to self-destruct or to finally accept an ontology of abstract individualism. For example, liberalism could develop the fiction of abstract individualism to the ludicrous point of seeing the self as completely independent from the community and Nature. Marxism could be extended to totalitarianism. Similarly, extreme environmental proposals, such as those proposed by some Deep Ecologists, have been criticised for the potential to justify authoritarian social structures in the name of protecting the ecosystem. But they need not be so extended. Stopping points and good judgement are essential and Matthews’ (1991) biocentricism is cognizant of these dilemmas.

Conclusion This chapter has argued that ecological values have been submerged by instrumental approaches to practical reasoning shored up by a technical approach to politics. It was then argued that the technical approach to modern environmental and social problems was also shaped by a way of thinking that separated the mind from the world in which it interacts. This approach was associated with the Enlightenment, which was in turn correlated with the assumption that it is only through the mind that people can appreciate Nature. It was then argued that Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) provide an approach to knowledge which can inform a broader politics where ‘significant’ values are revealed in context. One such value was that of Nature’s intrinsic value which was expressed by expressivists such as Herder, Humbodlt, and Rousseau. Although current discourses of sustainable development do recognise environmental and social consequences of economic growth, they still operate within the economic growth paradigm, only it is recast as ‘sustainable’ growth with little information as to how sustainable patterns will be achieved in the current system. A concern for such values and the future of the world, however, is something that is not necessarily self-evident within procedural liberal and postmodern discourse (Heidegger, 1971, p. 70). It was argued that a danger in postmodern positions involved creating a conversation with the natural realm without a coping strategy that connects with it. Postmodern contingency cuts us off from our expressive sources of the self precisely when interpretation is most needed. From this perspective, our coping skills orient us to the world where language is the means through which the otherness of Nature is expressed (Lehman, 2011a, 2011b, 2013). Climate change, global warming, and over-population require us to contemplate new social arrangements which might involve steady-state

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alignment of social practices with the reality that unlimited economic growth might not be possible in the long term. In this sense, the art of interpretation takes environmental ethics in a precautionary direction that maintains that where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental damage. At the very least, interpretation, perception, and moral theory provide humanity with a political and theoretical means to rethink the value and political structures that allow us to visualise the value of the natural environment. Also, that such decisions are regularly detrimental to environmental interests (although, on the other hand, Deep Ecologist might be using their own form of practical reasoning, but one which precludes any notion of compromise, and which often makes it arguments in mystical and subjective terms).

Notes 1 Chaos theory and the new physics, which focuses on dissipative and nonequilibrium structures, has posed new problems for environmental theorists who are reforming Leopold’s views on the stability of ecosystems. 2 Preston (2018) offers a different way to think about postmodernism which moves beyond its recent discursive and aesthetic moments. Postmodern can also mean the development of a new set of conditions concerned with political, material, and environmental that give rise to new forms of political agency.

Bibliography Bookchin, M. (1971). Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Palo Alto, CA, Ramparts Press. Bookchin, M. (1982). The Ecology of Freedom, Palo Alto, CA, Cheshire Books. Bookchin, M. (1987). The Rise of Urbanization and the Decline of Citizenship, San Francisco, CA, Sierra Club Books. Bookchin, M. (1990). Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Society, Boston, South End Press. Bookchin, M. (1991). The Ecology of Freedom, Montreal, Black Rose Books. Bookchin, M. (1993). Which Way for the Ecology Movement?, Edinburgh and San Francisco, A. K. Press. Bookchin, M. (1994). The Concept of Social Ecology, in Merchant, C. (Ed.), Ecology, New Jersey, Humanities Press (pp. 125–140). Bookchin, M. (1995). The Philosophy of Social Ecology: Essays on Dialectical Materialism, Montréal, Black Rose Books. Bookchin, M., Foreman, D., Chase, S. & Levine, D. (1991). Defending the Earth: A Dialogue between Murray Bookchin and Dave Foreman, Boston, MA, South End Press. A Learning Alliance Book. Bookchin, M. & Scalzone, L. M. (1987). The Modern Crisis (2nd revised ed.), Montreal & New York, Black Rose Books. Dicks, H. (2016). The Philosophy of Biomimicry, Philosophy & Technology, Volume 29, Number 3, pp. 223–243.

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Dicks, H. (2018). From Anthropomimetic to Biomimetic Cities: The Place of Humans in ‘Cities like Forests’, Architecture Philosophy, Volume 3, Number 1, pp. 91–106. Dreyfus, H. L. & Taylor, C. (2015). Retrieving Realism, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. Fiedler, B. & Lehman, G. (1995). Accounting, Accountability and the Environmental Factor, Accounting Forum, Volume 19, Number 2/3, pp. 195–204. Frey, R. G. (1980). Interests and Rights, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Heidegger, M. (1971). The Thing, in Hofstader, A. (trans.), Poetry, Language, Thought, New York, NY, Harper and Rowe. Johnson, L. E. (1991). A Morally Deep World, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Lehman, G. (1993). China after Tiananmen Square: Rawls and Justice, Praxis International, Volume 12, Number 4, pp. 405–420. Lehman, G. (1995). A Legitimate Concern with Environmental Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 6, Number 5, pp. 393–413. Lehman, G. (1999). Disclosing New World: Social and Environmental Accounting, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 24, pp. 217–241. Lehman, G. (2001). Reclaiming the Public Sphere: Problems and Prospects for Corporate Social and Environmental Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume, 12, Number 6, pp. 713–733. Lehman, G. (2002). Globalisation and the Authentic Self: Cosmopolitanism and Charles Taylor’s Communitarianism, Global Society, Volume 16, Number 4, pp. 419–437. Lehman, G. (2004). Social and Environmental Accounting: Trends and Thoughts for the Future, Accounting Forum, Volume 28, Number 1, pp. 1–5. Lehman, G. (2010a). Interpretive Accounting Research, Accounting Forum, Volume 34, Number 3–4, pp. 231–235. Lehman, G. (2010b). Perspectives on Accounting, Commonalities & the Public Sphere, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 21, Number 8, pp. 724–738. Lehman, G. (2011a). The Management of Sustainability: The Art of Interpretation, Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research, Volume 9, pp. 75–88. Lehman, G. (2011b). Interpretivism, Postmodernism and the Natural Environment, Philosophy and Social Criticism, Volume 37, pp. 795–821. Lehman, G. (2013). Critical Reflections on Laughlin’s Middle Range Research Approach: Language Not Mysterious?, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 24, Number 3, pp. 211–224. Lehman, G. (2015). Charles Taylor’s Ecological Conversations, London, PalgraveMacmillan. Lehman, G. (2017). The Language of Environmental and Social Accounting Research: The Expression of Beauty and Truth, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 44, pp. 30–41. Mathews, F. (1991). The Ecological Self, London, Routledge. Mathews, F. (Ed.) (1996). Ecology and Democracy, London, Frank Cass. Meadows, D. H., Meadows, D., Rangers, J., and Behrens, W. (1972). The Limits to Growth, New York, NY, Universe Books.

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Nicholson, L. J. (1990). Introduction, in Nicholson, L. (Ed.), Feminism/ Postmodernism, New York, NY, Routledge. Norton, B. G. (1989). Intergenerational Equity and Environmental Decisions: A Model Using Rawls’ Veil of Ignorance, Ecological Economics, Volume 1, Number 2, pp. 138–139. Norton, B. G. (1995). Why I Am Not a Nonanthropocentricist: Callicott and the Failure of Monistic Inherentism, Environmental Ethics, Volume 17, Number 4, pp. 341–358. Preston, C. (2000). Conversing with Nature in a Postmodern Epistemological Framework, Environmental Ethics, Volume 22, Number 3, pp. 227–241. Preston, C. J. (2018). The Synthetic Age: Outdesigning Evolution, Resurrecting Species, and Reengineering Our World, Massachusetts, MA, MIT Press. Singer, P. (1974). All Animals Are Equal, Philosophic-Exchange, Volume 74, Number 1, pp. 103–116. Singer, P. (1975). Animal Liberation, London, Jonathan Cape. Singer, P. (1983). Hegel: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Singer, P. (2007). Review Essay on the Moral Demands of Affluence, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 75, Number 2, pp. 475–483. Sterba, J. P. (1998). A Biocentricist Strikes Back, Environmental Ethics, Volume 20, Number 4, pp. 361–377. Taylor, C. (1985a). Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. (1985b). What is Human Agency, in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers, I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (pp. 15–45). (Originally in Taylor, C., What is Human Agency, in Mischel, T. (Ed.), The Self: Psychological and Philosophical Issues, Oxford, Oxford University Press (pp. 114–115)). Taylor, J. R. & van Every, E. (2000). The Emergent Organization. Communication as Its Site and Surface, Mahwah, NJ, Erlbaum. Taylor, P. W. (1986). Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Woolcock, P. G. (2000). Objectivity and Illusion in Evolutionary Ethics: Comments on Waller, Biology and Philosophy, Volume 15, Number 1, pp. 39–60. Young, I. M. (1990). Justice and the Politics of Difference, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

14 Deep Ecology and interpretation Social Ecology and how people relate to the world

Communitarian, Deep and radical ecology Of critical importance in developing an accountable and democratic ecological politics is to integrate deep/Deep and social ecology approaches. To say the least, both approaches have been highly critical of modern rational and scientific methods that have attempted to determine what is of value. For example, it will be demonstrated that Deep Ecology offers a different way to think about the natural environment through consideration of the supposition that the natural environment possesses intrinsic value. Fringe environmentalists are gaining mainstream political leverage, with a range of beliefs from the destruction of capitalism, to full social anarchy followed by the return to small village communities (Bookchin, 1982; Taylor, 1960a, 1960b). This chapter explores how activists such as Murray Bookchin are gaining influence in the environmental debate. The chapter explores how social and deep ecology can inform the art of interpretation. The otherness of the natural environment is a central preoccupation of Radical, Social, and Deep Ecology. Within these perspectives, a response to the environmental limitations of the unfinished project of modernity is advanced. They carry the promise of creating accountability and environmental political programmes to reform humanity’s attitude towards the natural environment. Yet, like the proceduralism that grips modern liberal environmental reforms, these radical ecological proposals have rarely been the ground for reworking modern political debates. In many respects, the ecological, political and social implication of radical and Deep/deep ecology methods reflect a search to express Nature’s intrinsic value. They offer important responses to the ‘inwardness’ associated with the culture of modernity. Indeed, radical and deep ecology usefully clarify the selfconscious realisation of Nature’s value as something other than a technical good for humanity’s convenience. It is argued, moreover, that these ecological perspectives offer a unique opportunity to clarify Taylor’s critique of modernity and its culture of accumulation. This is even though they have succumbed to attack from conservative quarters. The key conceptual argument is that the values of self-conscious realisation make good the

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supposition that humanity and Nature are entwined in a great chain of being. This argument can then be carried forward in constructing a common political framework that accommodates diversity in a reform approach to our current destructive attitude towards the natural environment. Central to all these ecological perspectives are ideas to moderate modernity’s stance to the natural environment. A satisfactory ecological perspective, however, might be one that explores the differences between deep ecology and social ecology and integrate these values into political space that searches for the common ground between them. Here, Taylor’s work finds itself at its zenith in exploring democratic means to accommodate differences and reveal points of agreement between and within different political perspectives (Lehman, 2017). In this regard, it is important to remember that Taylor (1994b) has argued that his interpretivist perspective accommodates deep ecological values. It is worth recalling that he argues that anthropocentrism offers an impoverished explanation of the human condition and that people’s background horizons include Nature as a necessary condition of being. It will be recalled from the Introduction to this book that Taylor has argued that deep ecologists tend to concur from one point of view and theists from another (Taylor, 1994a, p. 13). An interpretivist perspective might be able to move beyond the deadlock between deep and social ecology in a way that finds agreement between divergent traditions and ways of being-in-the-world. The commonalities and differences between interpretivist, radical and social ecology are explored in four sections. The first section of the chapter examines Bookchin’s social ecology to determine whether it is possible to return to small-scale decentralised communities as advocated by social ecologists. The second explores a Marxian response to Social and Deep Ecology and the way they define questions of community, difference and identity. The third and fourth sections examine the relevance of interestbased ecological theory and the viability of biocentric ethics as a means to relate humanity with the natural environment. The chapter argues that biocentric and deep ecology are ineluctably entwined with social processes in communities and cannot be divorced from questions of human freedom.

Social ecology and nature In an ecological context, the work of Devall and Sessions (1985) offers an important deep ecology perspective where Nature has intrinsic, or inherent value which should be preserved. This perspective, however, runs into pragmatic problems when people enter political space. It is for this reason that Taylor’s perspective is useful in connecting with the ‘shallow’ green axiom that Nature is worthy of respect in the attempt to integrate ecological values into modern cultures that treat Nature as a refilling station. It is argued that Taylor’s ethic can be adapted through Bookchin’s principle as a

Deep Ecology and interpretation 229 clarifying principle in the debate surrounding humanity’s relationship with other Nature. The social ecologist, Bookchin, argues: To reverse this trend, capitalism [has] to be replaced by an ecological society based on non-hierarchical relationships, decentralized communities, eco-technologies like solar power, organic agriculture, and humanly scaled industries – in short by face to face democratic forms of settlement economically and structurally tailored to the ecosystems in which they [are] located. (Bookchin, 1990, p. 155) Bookchin’s perspective is also highly critical of Marx’s work. Furthermore, social ecology is especially hostile to liberalism, neoliberalism and Marxism because its critique of capitalism fails to consider the way all human communities dominate both citizens and the natural environment. Marx, apparently, did not understand humanity’s drive for domination. Bookchin claims that Marx exaggerated the potential of the proletariat while ignoring the fact that the consumption patterns of the proletariat perpetuate capitalism. Clearly, Bookchin presents a vision of an ecological self that is diametrically opposed to Marx’s understanding, which is constructed through social labour and alienated by capitalism. In Our Synthetic Environment (1974) and Post-Scarcity Anarchism (1971), Bookchin developed a ‘social ecological’ position informed by anarchist political theory. He argues that modernity and its social structures disrupt Nature’s processes and require the abandonment of modernity (Bookchin, 1982, p. 2). Following the classical anarchist Peter Kropotkin (1914). Bookchin maintains that human practical reasoning has served simply to justify and legitimate ‘hierarchy and domination’ in all aspects of human civilisation. He offers the counter-argument that the search for intrinsic value in Nature is futile since all value depends on a valuing subject. He urges the development of a dialectical understanding of the relationship between freedom and hierarchy to work out how humanity can realign its practices with Nature. Modern communities cannot liberate humanity from the natural environment and this is because the domination of Nature itself reflects ‘the real domination of human by human’ (Rudy & Light, 1995, p. 90). Domination: …must be viewed as institutionalized relationships, relationships that living things literally institute or create but which are neither ruthlessly fixed by instinct on the one hand nor idiosyncratic on the other. By this, I mean that they must comprise a clearly social structure of coercive and privileged ranks that exist apart from the idiosyncratic individuals who seem to be dominant within a given community, a hierarchy that is guided by a social logic that goes beyond individual interactions or inborn patterns of behavior. (Bookchin, 1982, p. 29)

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Social ecologists maintain that environmental problems stem from modernity’s emphasis on consumerism, growth and wasteful duplication. Thus, the major problem lies in social hierarchy which exacerbate capitalism’s consumerism and wasteful duplication (Bookchin, 1991, p. 29). The opposite of domination is freedom according to Bookchin.1 In particular, he argues that environmental problems result from humanity’s need to dominate other humans which, in turn, leads to the domination and destruction of the natural environment. What is relevant and useful in Bookchin’s social ecology is the notion of humanity as Nature rendered self-conscious which connects with the argument of this book that human practical reason can be informed by powers of perception and spontaneity to explore the intricate commonalities between humanity and Nature. His general view of human civilisation, as an ongoing dialectic between domination and freedom, and concludes that historical changes have been quantitative rather than qualitative; that is, there is simply more and more human domination over other humans which has dire ecological effects. He advocates a return to small-scale, non-hierarchical communities as the only way to moderate harm to the natural environment. The task is to localise politics so that environmental damage is minimised. Bookchin argues that an ‘ecology society [is one] structured around social ecology’s ideals of a nonfederal, directly democratic, and ecologically oriented network of communities’ (Bookchin, 1993, p. 28). In small-scale communities, each person’s role is to minimise harm to the natural environment; such communities are also democratic where citizens have the greatest possible opportunities to participate in governance. Moreover, educational systems would be designed to develop eco-awareness so that individuals are aware of their impacts on the natural environment (Harvey, 1986). For social ecologists, humanity is not inherently ‘aggressive, dominating and competitive’ (Harvey, 1986). Society makes it so. Neither is Nature irredeemably competitive. Ecosystems reflect Nature’s ‘evolutionary co-operation’, involving ‘mutualism’ and ‘symbiosis’ (Bookchin, 1995, p. 2). Human life may be altered to resemble Nature. After all, according to Bookchin: [T]he natural processes that operate in animal and plant evolution along the symbiotic lines of participation and differentiation reappear as social processes in human evolution, albeit with their own distinctive traits, qualities and gradations or phases of development. (Bookchin, 1995, p. 2) While he does not underestimate ecological competition and predation among species, Bookchin emphasises mutualism and symbiosis as the determining forces of evolution. ‘Mutualism, not predation, seems to have been the guiding principle for the evolution of [the] highly complex aerobic life forms that are common today’ (Bookchin, 1995, p. 359). In such a view, capitalism is obviously condemned.

Deep Ecology and interpretation 231 As mentioned earlier, Bookchin’s perspective is also highly critical of Marx’s work. Marxism, however, is no solution according to Bookchin, because it also reproduces hierarchy. Social ecology is especially hostile to Marxism because its critique of capitalism fails to consider the way all human communities dominate both citizens and the natural environment. Marx, apparently, did not understand humanity’s drive for domination. Bookchin argues, that he overlooked the threat that modes of domination pose to all life on the planet. He claims that Marx exaggerated the potential of the proletariat while ignoring the fact that the consumption patterns of the proletariat perpetuate capitalism. Clearly, Bookchin presents a vision of an ecological self that is diametrically opposed to Marx’s understanding, which is constructed through social labour and alienated by capitalism. The dominant Western ideology, when combined with a philosophy of representational realism, has maintained an environmental vision that there are no limits to growth. Or put differently, human consumption patterns can be continually satisfied by new and improved technologies. Western thinking, it is contended, assumes that the environment stands in wait for humanity and other environmental visions are too unscientific to be considered. According to this interpretation of Western thinking, modern environmental ethics and political strategies are infatuated with empirical and scientific approaches. These scientific and technical approaches maintain that the natural world can be modelled and shaped by human-based thinking; it is probably for this reason that Heidegger claimed that modernity operates with a vision of Nature as a gigantic service station – a simple provider of resources, goods and services. Rudy and Light (1995), in particular, are advocates of critical environmental politics which relies on the Marxian heritage. They reject simple explanations of capitalism in terms of domination and attempt to explain the processes that perpetuate incessant demand and consumerism in modern societies (Rudy & Light, 1995, p. 90). At a practical level, critical environmental theory involves strategies to resist the increasing corporatisation of social and environmental relationships. While social ecology exposes modernity’s modes of domination, it does not explain how environmental problems result from a complex set of forces which include, but extend beyond, the fact that power influences market outcomes. Ecological problems are not caused by the anonymity of the market, but inter alia by capitalism’s tendency to commodify significant relationships. Bookchin’s ‘social ecology’ does not relate ‘social labour’ to the means by which communities organise their daily activities and modes of reproduction. Therefore, he is wrong to argue that ‘capitalism is not a social phenomenon but an economic one’. Rudy and Light argue that: Only by terminologically reifying both society and economy can the inherently social Nature of all human (re)production, for economic reasons or not, be denied. In fact, Bookchin’s approach to capitalist

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The environment economics treats it as ‘the buyer-seller relationship’ and fails to mention the centrality of production…This follows from Bookchin’s sense that ‘the grand secret from which [the market] draws its power’ is ‘the power of anonymity’. (Bookchin, 1987, p. 204). But the key to capitalism after mercantilism is, in fact, not anonymity in the marketplace, but that waged labor is the root of the production and classbased extraction of a social surplus which is treated as abstract exchange-value. (Rudy & Light, 1995, p. 95)

Bookchin emphasises the limitations of the market but does not explain how capitalism alienates workers from their labour power. Nor does Bookchin consider the political interpretivist strategy which might respond to ecological problems in modern communities by proposing the transcendence of older tyrannical orders and hierarchical societies (Ibid). Extending Bookchin involves exploring Taylor’s interpretivist l search to imagine a new social order which relies not simply on economic structures, but a committed sense of reconciliation through dialogue where common purposes are articulated as a good the outcome of which is a fruit of democratic interchange. Bookchin’s social ecology prioritises individual self-realisation, but this approach fails to explore the social processes which limit workers and citizens from reaching their full potential. Critics contend that Bookchin homogenises the category of ‘Nature’ and does not consider adequately how Nature is ‘an unparalleled field of difference’. That is, they fail to consider the effects that Nature poses dilemmas for human freedom. Considerations about the natural environment invite us to consider the meaning of the term ‘Nature’. Yet, a limitation of Bookchin’s social ecology gives undue stress to the power of regional autonomy and the systemic relationships between people and the natural environment. Notwithstanding its limitations, social ecology may be supplemented by an exploration into the social forces which give rise to patterns of hierarchy and domination. The utility of Marx is his totalising dialectical method which can be extended to consider and extend the supposition that history progresses through discrete stages towards the good society. Anderson (1974) extended this argument to the Asian region and shows that it is Marx’s method which is important. Bookchin, however, fails to differentiate between societies and assumes that his solutions are applicable to all communities irrespective of their stage of development, and could profit by considering Anderson’s careful analysis of the differences in social environments and the role that they play in the politics of the environment.

Marxism and critical theory’s response to social ecology While Marx may be criticised for under-theorising certain forms of domination, it might be argued that Bookchin underestimates the utility of the

Deep Ecology and interpretation 233 Marxian method and the value of its dialectical approach. Since the focus is on domination, Bookchin criticises Marxism and other grand narratives which overlooked the threat posed to all life on the planet by modes of domination. Domination is the problem, not alienation, as Marx conceived it. However, the relevance of Marx may continue to lie in his understanding of the relationship between modes of production and relations of production. Despite the changes in capitalism since Marx’s time, and the failure of socialism during the 20th century, Marx’s ideas may still provide insights into how we ought to conceive of ecological relations, as part of the modes of production/relations of production dialectic. Taylor is important in extending Heidegger’s critique of Marx to understand the interconnectedness between entities in the natural environment. Marx, after all, developed a dialectical method demonstrating how humanity’s creative labour power is constrained by social processes that limit emancipatory politics. This throws the ball back into Bookchin’s court, because it is not clear whether a simple focus on domination is sufficient to understand the processes whereby labour power is commodified when compared with Marx’s work. Marx’s approach to alienation, moreover, is not one which reduces the phenomenon simply to a product of capitalism (Marx, 1970). Nor, does he suggest that all social and environmental problems will be solved when capitalism is superseded by communism. Though Marx was not particularly ecologically sensitive, his method might be extended to matters at the heart of ecological concern. Marx could well be interpreted as developing a method that explores social arrangements where workers might reach their full potential. This might involve understanding the importance the natural environment has for people’s lives. As we will see later, Taylor’s perspective aims to understand the processes of social transformations that move us from one social imaginary to another. His aim is to explore the otherness of being by recognising differences and minimising harm towards the natural environment. From a Marxist perspective, Bookchin’s focus on domination does not adequately consider the social dilemmas that the natural environment poses for humanity (Harvey, 1986). While his argument that small-scale communities create less damage needs further elaboration, there is also a need to further explore the resilient characteristics of capitalism which persist in causing wasteful consumption. Alan Rudy and Andrew Light, in particular, are advocates of a critical environmental politics which relies on the Marxian heritage. They reject simple explanations of capitalism in terms of domination and attempt to explain the processes which perpetuate incessant demand and consumerism in modern societies. At a practical level, critical environmental theory involves strategies to resist the increasing corporatisation of social and environmental relationships. While social ecology exposes modernity’s modes of domination, it does not explain how environmental problems result from a complex set of forces which include, but

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extend beyond, the fact that power influences market outcomes. Ecological problems are not caused by the anonymity of the market, but inter alia by capitalism’s tendency to commodify significant relationships. Bookchin’s ‘social ecology’ does not relate ‘social labour’ to the means by which communities organise their daily activities and modes of re-production. Therefore, he is wrong to argue that ‘capitalism is not a social phenomenon but an economic one’. Bookchin emphasises the limitations of the market but does not explain how capitalism alienates workers from their labour power (Ibid). Nor does Bookchin consider the communitarian and interpretivist strategy which Taylor emphasises as a response to ecological problems in modern communities. Taylor proposes the transcendence of older tyrannical orders and hierarchical societies – the search is to create social relationships within communities that allow people to understand their place in the world. This involves exploring the limitations implicit within traditional political approaches which assume that humanity can control the world. Rather than control the natural environment, the ecological perspective offered by interpretivists searches for new narrative structures that reveal to people the options and possibilities available to them. On this view, social ecology must also engage the patterns of meaning within societies and how these forces impact on the processes of social change. Bookchin’s social ecology prioritises individual self-realisation, but this approach can fail to explore the social processes which limit workers and citizens reaching their full potential. Critics contend that Bookchin homogenises the category of ‘Nature’ and does not consider adequately how Nature is ‘an unparalleled field of difference’ that poses dilemmas for human freedom. Interpretivists contend that the natural environment invites us to consider the meaning of the term ‘Nature’ and how we relate to it. For Taylor, the natural environment is a source of the self that can motivate and re-enchant our being-in-the-world. A further limitation of Bookchin’s social ecology is that it gives undue stress to the power of regional autonomy and the systemic relationships between people and the natural environment (Bookchin, 1994, pp. 125–140). One wonders, however, how anarchical Social Ecologists would determine the point where a human community has expanded beyond its environmental threshold? Moreover, how can communities reduce the size of their cities? Notwithstanding its limitations, social ecology may be supplemented by an exploration into the social forces which give rise to patterns of hierarchy and domination. Taylor is useful in this regard because of his engagement with Marx’s totalising dialectical method. He extends the dialectical method in an ontic direction to consider and extend Marx’s supposition that history progresses through discrete stages towards the good society. For example, Anderson (1974) extended this argument to the Asian region and showed that it is Marx’s method which is important to understanding how communities evolve. Bookchin’s (1987, 1991) analysis

Deep Ecology and interpretation 235 can be extended to differentiate between societies and assumes that his solutions are applicable to all communities irrespective of their stage of development and could profit by considering Anderson’s careful analysis of the differences in social environments. While Marx may be criticised for under-theorising certain forms of domination, it might be argued that Bookchin underestimates the utility of the Marxian method and the value of its dialectical approach. Since the focus is on domination, Bookchin criticises Marxism and other grand narratives which overlook the threat that modes of domination pose to all life on the planet. Domination is the problem not alienation as Marx conceived it. However, the relevance of Marx may continue to lie in his understanding of the relationship between modes of production and relations of production. Despite the changes in capitalism since Marx’s time, and the failure of socialism during the 20th century, Marx’s ideas may still provide insights into how we ought to conceive of ecological relations, as part of the modes of production/relations of production dialectic. Marx, after all, developed a dialectical method demonstrating how humanity’s creative labour power is constrained by social processes which limit emancipatory politics. This throws the ball back into Bookchin’s court, because it is not clear whether a simple focus on domination is sufficient to understand the processes whereby labour power is commodified when compared with Marx’s work. Contrary to Bookchin, Marx’s dialectical approach is not simply economic analysis. His dialectic is concerned with how contradictory social relations are reflected in different spheres of society and how they may change. Marx’s focus is on social relationships, as described in his famous statement of method in the ‘Introduction’ to the Grundrisse: The population is an abstraction if I leave out, for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes in turn are an empty phrase if I am not familiar with the elements on which they rest. E.g. wage labour, capital etc. These latter in turn pre-suppose exchange, division of labour, prices etc. For example, capital is nothing without wage labour, without value, money, price etc. Thus, if I were to begin with the population, this would be a chaotic conception (Vorstellung) of the whole, and I would then, by means of further determination, move analytically towards ever more simple concepts (Begriff), from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until I had arrived at the simplest determinations. From there the journey would have to be retraced until I had finally arrived at the population again, but this time not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and relations. (Marx, 1973, p. 100) Marx’s dialectical method, therefore, breaks down the various elements of society and reassembles them showing the ‘rich totality of many

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determinations and relations’ (Ibid). Thus, a commodity is not a thing but the product of relationships. Changing relationships alter the Nature of the commodity. The value of the Marxian method is that it analyses a particular in the light of a totality. A simple stress on domination will not do that and ignores Marx’s emphasise in the Grundrisse that the self is dependent on and belongs to a greater whole. It is for these reasons that Marx emphasised the movement of human history as a progressive dialectic that is reflected in the movement from ‘clan and then to different communal forms of organisation in pursuing only their self-interest’. Marx may not easily be dismissed, even though other parts of his work might be used to justify domination over the natural environment. Marx’s approach to alienation, moreover, is not one which reduces the phenomenon simply to a product of capitalism (Marx, 1970). Nor, does he suggest that all social and environmental problems will be solved when capitalism is superseded by communism. Marx notoriously offered no blueprint for communism; that, in his view, would be ‘utopian’. He simply said that in a communist society freedom would be achieved as ‘an association in which the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all’. Lukács (1971) once argued that the value of Marxism lies not in its prediction but in its method. Though Marx was not particularly ecologically sensitive, his method can be extended to matters at the heart of ecological concern. Marx could well be interpreted as developing a method that explores social arrangements where workers might reach their full potential. This might involve understanding the importance, which the natural environment has for people’s lives. From a Marxist perspective, Bookchin’s focus on domination does not adequately consider the social causes and dilemmas that the natural environment poses for humanity (Harvey, 1986, p. 183). While his argument that small-scale communities create less damage needs further elaboration, there is also a need to explore further the resilient characteristics of capitalism which persist in causing wasteful consumption and duplication. More fundamentally, Taylor’s hermeneutic perspective has purchase on these problems as it attempts to create political and interpretivist space within modern communities to engage with environmental suppositions concerning the determination of value. For example, Taylor’s work on people’s strong-evaluations creates a need for public space to engage with environmental perspectives and recommendations such that only smallscale and decentralised communities are capable of relating effectively with the land. For interpreters, such as Taylor, however, democratic communities will not automatically ‘mirror Nature’ and require a process of change that involves exploring political arrangements about how these values are to be implemented. In teasing out differences between anthropocentric and deep/Deep ecology some tentative steps towards political reconciliation can be advanced in moderating adverse ecological damage.

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Interpretation, Deep Ecology to radical critique This section argues that phenomenology is useful for accountability and ecological politics in that it aims to understand how this radical separation between people and the world has led to the current status quo. That is, an equilibrium that relies on markets and ‘sustainable’ solutions to address environmental problems. A phenomenologist argues along the lines that we cannot help but see the world, because we are Dasein, Heidegger’s German word for being in the world. We cannot help but be in the world, our being is immersed in that reality. Heidegger reaches into Dasein as into a colony of algae – the endeavour to seize something to hand and taking along with it that is connected with it (Sarfranski, 1998). One wonders whether a phenomenologist believe in intrinsic value then, or do they alternately say that while we are already immersed in the real world, we can do with it as we might like. Therefore, a decision must be reached. Firstly, either we can see things as they really are, or we are locked into a representational frame. If we cannot, then what does it matter what we do? It might be the case that we act in accord with what is perceived at whatever level as our best interests at the time. If we can improve our interpretations then we must decide whether we will act in accordance with the notion of intrinsic value or not (Taylor, 1971a, 1971b). If we do not, then free market principles can prevail unfettered, and there is then no logical reason why they should not. But if we do decide to act in accordance with intrinsic value, then there are two obligations that follow – the first is to act as if intrinsic value should be protected and upheld wherever we see it, and the second obligation is to then attempt to find ways to better come to grips in an accurate perception of that value, and the concepts and categories through which we understand it. Nevertheless, there exist other ways to interpret and perceive the world and its intrinsic value, and this involves the full utilisation of all our senses and capacities that allow us to come in contact with a deeper realism. This deeper appreciation of realism involves both perception and coping skills. These skills in adroit coping allow us to make our way in the world and interpret that world more fully. This then exposes some more problems with the modern infatuation with procedure, and how the social sciences assume that there are no direct means to appreciate the connections between the objects of Nature and humanity. More particularly, our thinking is limited by the supposition that the mind is separate and distinct from the world such that intrinsic values are dismissed, and we only have resources that emanate from the current social system to alleviate the perceived decline of Nature. While many environmental perspectives cherish a full life as it includes interactions with Nature, that literature has not explained the connections between people’s concepts and categories, and their perception of the world.

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A full life, arguably, involves the ability to appreciate Nature involved in the formation of knowledge and practices. This does not mean that Nature defines the morally good but involves recognising that Nature does not exist simply for human convenience. This involves a politics of recognition that respects others together with the natural world, and this involves recognising how these non-contingent and intrinsic relationships that shapes our beingin-the-world. This is not to say that people’s background coping skills shape the good because there is no simple correlation between these relationships and the policies that we adopt. It does mean, however, that to ignore these values impoverishes humanity and leaves us without an appreciation of our place in the world. Therefore, the interpretative thinking offered in this chapter involves a politics of recognition that respects others together with the natural world – these observations are built on recognising how non-contingent relationships shape our being-in-the-world.

World disclosers and Nature As world disclosers the interpretivist perspective reveals that people are in the world directly. Actions need to be considered in the light of their identity and the factors important for being. As world disclosers, therefore, we are not simply searching for intrinsic value but a broader understanding of Nature’s value in the world and humanity’s place in that world. One implication is that humanity no longer considers itself solely as controller of the world for economic production, but as steward of the earth. Recent global events surrounding the coronavirus illustrate the fragility of ecosystems as outlined in Chapter 1. Nevertheless, in Chapters 4 and 5 of this book, interpretivism was used to expose problems with instrumental and utilitarian theory. It was argued that utilitarianism is said to be limited in the way it submerges considerations concerning what deep/Deep ecologists refer to as Nature’s intrinsic value. Deep/deep ecologists express extreme concern with utilitarian theory because it only offers a human-centered means to think about the value in Nature. Interpretivists concur with deep/Deep ecology when they explore what is intrinsically valuable in relationships of significance. Taylor argues that political philosophy needs to consider the notion of a ‘strong-evaluator’. He explains: Whereas for the simple weigher what is at stake is the desirability of different consummations, those defined by his de facto desires, for the strong evaluator reflection also examines the different possible modes of being of the agent… Whereas a reflection about what we feel like more, which is all the simple weigher can do in assessing motivations, keeps us as it were at the periphery; a reflection on the kind of beings we are takes us to the centre of our existence as agents… It is in this sense deeper. (Taylor, 1985b, pp. 25–26)

Deep Ecology and interpretation 239 If Earth is viewed as a spaceship in need of oxygen, then it is possible to offer anthropocentric arguments to preserve rainforests. If, on the other hand, Earth is viewed in terms of the Gaia hypothesis that all life is intrinsically valuable then it is possible to launch arguments for saving forests as ends in themselves and because they are a part of a complex interconnected web of life. This awareness can be understood in either anthropocentric, or deep ecological terms. An interpretivist says that you cannot understand the full dimensions of being a person unless you consider culture, history, being, and belonging to a community and the natural environment in which it operates. The interpretivist approach is critical of approaches that believe principles of justice, fairness, and environmental equity can be constructed using idealised political constructs and logical approaches. Interpretivism often referred to as an intermittently fashionable critique of procedural liberalism but this book argues that humanity cannot be divorced from its social and environmental contexts. This is central to interpretivists in the way that they construct their political system to create reconciled relationships with other people and the natural environment. Dreyfus and Taylor, who believe that we can access and see the world using our capacities of perception and language to express values that have been excluded by traditional political approaches that claim scientific status without recognising that science itself is a discourse shaped by its context. This is to say that to understand human relationships requires more than idealised principles of justice but careful attention to the contexts and environments in which we live and act. But how do we access intrinsic value, and does it really exist. One perspective: If through our mediational view of the world we believe that we can mirror the firm foundations of the way the world really is then we have nothing to worry about. However, if one can see the world as it is, then this is not itself a solution because merely seeing something as it does not solve the problem if we are not acting in accordance with that. And, if we cannot see it, does it matter what we do? If we act as if Nature has intrinsic value, then that has certain obligations implicit with it. If we act as if Nature has no intrinsic value, and we then destroy it, we later discover we were wrong, but it is then too late to do anything about it.

Ecological politics and moral theory Exploring different environmental positions draws attention to the need to consider proposals for humanity to restructure its basic institutions to realise environmental values. In particular, social ecology and deep/Deep Ecology are limited in that they do not provide sufficient analyses of the social conditions limiting the effectiveness of our basic institutions of governance. The inter-relationships between humanity and Nature must be considered in conjunction with the social causes that give rise to social

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problems. In sum, social and deep ecology fail to recognise the aesthetic dimensions that Taylor refers to as the awe of Nature. Complex intrinsicbased arguments, constructed at a meta-theoretical level, can obfuscate real-world dilemmas. Here, Matthews seems to accept the thrust of what Young calls a ‘stopping point’ approach, offers some hope (see Chapter 1 of this book). While metaphors such as ‘space-ship earth’ are advanced to ‘think global/ act local’ or to respect Nature’s intrinsic value can be avoided when we consider the type of community in which we want to live. Thinking about how we live and act in the world involves many things, not the least is an awareness of the processes of global capitalism. Arguably, interpretivism thinking invites us to keep in mind those factors that involve the construction of new political arrangements where Nature’s non-instrumental good is expressed (Lehman, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b). It was argued, then, that humanity’s aims and aspirations might be combined within a different vision of the natural environment. Taylor’s work extends those 18th-century thinkers who were concerned to show that humans were endowed with a moral sense, ‘an intuitive feeling of right and wrong’. The original point of moral thinking is to combat a rival view, that knowing right and wrong was a matter of calculating consequences, in particular those concerned with divine reward and punishment. Thus, understanding right and wrong is not a matter of dry calculation but is anchored in our feelings. Morality has, in a sense, a voice within each person that connects us with the natural world. First, interpretative strategists associated with hermeneutic thought have, in recent times, been taking an interpretive and realist perspective. They follow Gadamer and Heidegger in focusing on the coping skills that people use in their everyday life. Direct coping suggests a way of explaining human action which is at odds with the supposition that the mind must first represent an idea before thinking and processing it. These developments in hermeneutic thought maintain that it is possible to articulate how understanding and meaning imbue the practices in which we live and act. This argument is based on developing a ‘best account’ of a problematic situation: on a hermeneutic account, this involves exploring how modes of thought and action characteristic of certain horizons and practices bear upon the structures of thought we use to make particular interpretations. The art of interpretation, on this view, builds a richer picture; one which draws out both the expressive and individual dimensions associated with ideological, political and philosophical positions. Second, the reasons for preserving Nature and exploring its value involve strong evaluations that offer reasons that shape the horizons and beings that we are. In this tradition, hermeneutic thinkers such as Gadamer and Taylor have been notable in articulating some reasons why moral terms can be used to account for human life and the natural environment. These terms involve understanding the sources and structures of the self which involves

Deep Ecology and interpretation 241 the supposition that Nature is a voice within each of us. This way of thinking, in turn, shapes how we think about our practices so that they can be structured to accommodate the well-being of citizens and also preserve authentic Nature. The argument in this book maintains that well-being and authentic Nature are not mutually exclusive concepts and reflect a misology towards reason: that is, attitudes towards Nature need not reflect hatred towards humans and human society. Extreme environmentalists have expressed arguments that humanity is against Nature. It will be recalled that Frodeman famously declared humanity to be ‘a blight on the planet’, but these marginal positions are politically problematic. Central to the argument of this book is that a well-functioning, cosmopolitan social system which is properly organised and structured should be able to combine these twin objectives. According to Dreyfus, Heidegger, and Taylor, our human nature involves our capacity to reason as world disclosers. That is, by means of our equipment and coordinated practices we human beings open coherent, distinct contexts or worlds in which we perceive, act, and think. Each such vision of the world makes possible a distinct and pervasive way in which things, people, and selves can appear and in which certain ways of acting make sense. Heidegger’s (1962) Being and Time called a world an understanding of being and argued that such an understanding of being is what makes it possible for us to encounter people and things as such. He considered his discovery of the ontological difference – which is the difference between the understanding of being and the beings that can show up given an understanding of being. This of course being his famous contribution to Western thought. The key to my argument is to relate these ideas to the Natural world without imposing values on others. It seems that a core truth in both deep ecology and interpretivism is that humanity cannot control the world. And from deep ecology to Heidegger’s work we have different elements about how to understand the whole, and parts within it. In Singer’s case, his work on animal liberation drew attention to the plight of farmyard animals, and the unethical treatment our current social systems put upon other beings. In Johnson’s case, he was trying to tease out the moral worth implicit in deep ecology using some of the richer techniques introduced by Singer. Thirdly, the research isolated Freya Matthew’s work which used some biological principles to explore the holistic dimension of deep ecology. To this point, the book has found that from deep ecology to Matthews’ biocentricism, all these theories had a somewhat narrow view of a holistic political ethic. The aim was to find not only political problems in each of these theories which explored deep ecological concepts but to work towards an ethic which could see value in the world in a way that did not rely on giving trees rights, weighing interests arbitrarily – the search was to find an ethic that accommodated the notion of earth as a whole without denigrating or ignoring the suffering of many communities throughout the

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world. The interpretivist search was seen to balance environmental value, community rights and understand what being in the world means.

Conclusion The otherness of the natural environment is a central preoccupation of Radical, Social, and Deep Ecology. This chapter has used interpretivist, radical and social perspectives to create accountability and environmental political programmes to reform humanity’s attitude towards the natural environment. In many respects, the ecological, political and social implication of radical and Deep/deep ecology methods reflect a search to express Nature’s intrinsic value. While the sections on Marxian environmental accountability suggested a political method that offered important responses to the ‘inwardness’ associated with the culture of modernity. It was argued that though Marx was not particularly ecologically sensitive, his method might be extended to matters at the heart of ecological concern. Marx could well be interpreted as developing a method that explores social arrangements where workers might reach their full potential. This might involve understanding the importance the natural environment has for people’s lives. Indeed, radical and deep ecology usefully clarify the self-conscious realisation of Nature’s value as something other than a technical good for humanity’s convenience. While political and environmental interpreters, such as Dreyfus and Taylor, conclude that a culture of indulgence and selffulfilment follows directly from the images and practices which shape our contemporary culture; that is, our access to the world is through the mind and that the fullness, beauty, and subliminal dimensions are assumed out of the equation. In this regard, the chapter argued that Taylor’s interpretivism, in particular, offers new governance and social practices and strategies have the potential to access the world and the values ignored by Western thinking. Arguably, value exists in the world which requires examination and interpretation for environmental ethics to develop means to reveal these values and the role that they play in our lives. The phenomenological point is that to follow a procedural rule inevitably reduces our powers of imagination and perception, which leads to bureaucracy and then more procedure. Consequentially, environmental reforms are shaped by the commitment to procedure, as opposed to a false belief that natural values exist for human purposes only. This is despite the fact that modern Enlightenment theories can be extended and developed through the ideal of authenticity, utilising a direct realism that articulates the taken-forgranted background assumptions that make life possible. The challenge for political and environmental thinkers involves how to escape anthropocentric value which calculates worth only in human terms – often fcalculated using monetary measurements.

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Note 1 Bookchin’s position can be classified as either a libertarian-socialist position or, as anarcho-communitarian position. The classification depends on how one perceives the social arrangements which he advocates.

Bibliography Anderson, P. (1974). Lineages of the Absolutist State, London, Verso. Boje, D. M., Oswick, C. & Ford, J. D. (2004). Introduction to Special Topic Forum. Language and Organization: The Doing of Discourse, Academy of Management Review, Volume 29, Number 4, pp. 571–577. Bookchin, M. (1971). Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Palo Alto, Ramparts Press. Bookchin, M. (1982). The Ecology of Freedom, Palo Alto, Cheshire Books. Bookchin, M. (1987). The Rise of Urbanization and the Decline of Citizenship, San Francisco, Sierra Club Books. Bookchin, M. (1990). Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Society, Boston, South End Press. Bookchin, M. (1991). The Ecology of Freedom, Montreal, Black Rose Books. Bookchin, M. (1993). Which Way for the Ecology Movement?, Edinburgh and San Francisco, A. K. Press. Bookchin, M. (1994). The Concept of Social Ecology, in Merchant, C. (Ed.), Ecology, New Jersey, Humanities Press (pp. 125–140). Bookchin, M. (1995). The Philosophy of Social Ecology: Essays on Dialectical Materialism, Montréal, Black Rose Books. Bookchin, M., Foreman, D., Chase, S. & Levine, D. (1991). Defending the Earth: A Dialogue between Murray Bookchin and Dave Foreman, Boston, Massachusetts, South End Press. A Learning Alliance Book. Bookchin, M. & Scalzone, L. M. (1987). The Modern Crisis (2nd revised ed.), Montreal & New York, Black Rose Books. Devall, B. (1980). The Deep Ecology Movement, Natural Resources Journal, Volume 20, pp. 299–322. Devall, B. (1988). Simple in Means, Rich in Ends: Practicing Deep Ecology, Layton, Utah, Gibbs M. Smith. Devall, B. & Sessions, G. (1985). Deep Ecology, Salt Lake City, UT, Peregrine Smith Books. Harvey, D. (1986). Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Blackwells. Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time, translated by J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, New York, Harper and Rowe. Lehman, G. (1993). China after Tiananmen Square: Rawls and Justice, Praxis International, Volume 12, Number 4, pp. 405–420. Lehman, G. (1995). A Legitimate Concern with Environmental Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 6, Number 5, pp. 393–413. Lehman, G. (1999). Disclosing New World: Social and Environmental Accounting, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 24, pp. 217–241. Lehman, G. (2001). Reclaiming the Public Sphere: Problems and Prospects for Corporate Social and Environmental Accounting, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume, 12, Number 6, pp. 713–733.

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Lehman, G. (2002). Globalisation and the Authentic Self: Cosmopolitanism and Charles Taylor's Communitarianism, Global Society, Volume 16, Number 4, pp. 419–437. Lehman, G. (2004). Social and Environmental Accounting: Trends and Thoughts for the Future, Accounting Forum, Volume 28, Number 1, pp. 1–5. Lehman, G. (2010a). Interpretive Accounting Research, Accounting Forum, Volume 34, Number 3-4, pp. 231–235. Lehman, G. (2010b). Perspectives on Accounting, Commonalities & the Public Sphere, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 21, Number 8, pp. 724–738 Lehman, G. (2011a). The Management of Sustainability: The Art of Interpretation, Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research, Volume 9, pp. 75–88. Lehman, G. (2011b). Interpretivism, Postmodernism and the Natural Environment, Philosophy and Social Criticism, Volume 37, pp. 795–821. Lehman, G. (2013). Critical Reflections on Laughlin’s Middle Range Research Approach: Language Not Mysterious?, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 24, Number 3, pp. 211–224. Lehman, G. (2015). Charles Taylor’s Ecological Conversations, London, PalgraveMacmillan. Lehman, G. (2017). The Language of Environmental and Social Accounting Research: The Expression of Beauty and Truth, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 44, pp. 30–41. Lukács, G. (1971). History and Class Consciousness, London, Merlin Press. Lukács, G. (1972). Political Writings, 1919–1920, London, New Left Books. Marx, K. (1970). Theses on Feuerbach, in Arthur, C. J., Marx, K., & Engels, F. (Eds.), The German Ideology, London, Lawrence and Wishart. Marx, K. (1973). Grundrisse, Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft), Harmondsworth, Penguin. Rudy, A. & Light, A. (1995). Social Ecology and Social Labor: A Consideration and Critique of Murray Bookchin, Capitalism Nature Socialism, Volume 6, Number 2, pp. 75–106. Sarfranski, R. (1998). Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. Taylor, C. (1957). Marxism and Humanism, New Reasoner, Volume 2, Number Autumn, pp. 92–98. Taylor, C. (1960a). What’s Wrong with Capitalism? New Left Review, Volume 2, Number March/April, pp. 5–11. Taylor, C. (1960b). Changes of Quality, New Left Review, Volume 4, Number July/ August, pp. 3–5. Taylor, C. (1960c). Clericalism, Downside Review, Volume 78/252, pp. 167–180. Taylor, C. (1966). Marxism and Empiricism, in Williams, B. and Montefiore, A. (Eds.), British Analytic Philosophy, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. Taylor, C. (1969a). Responsibility for Self, in Rorty, A. O. (Ed.), The Identities of Persons, California, University of California Press (pp. 281–301). Taylor, C. (1969b). Two Issues about Materialism, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 19, Number 74, pp. 73–79. Taylor, C. (1971a). The Agony of Economic Man, in LaPierre, L. (Ed.), Essays on the Left, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart (pp. 221–235).

Deep Ecology and interpretation 245 Taylor, C. (1971b). Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, The Review of Metaphysics, Volume 25, Number 1, pp. 3–51. Taylor, C. (1985a). Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. (1985b). What is Human Agency, in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers, I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (pp. 15–45). Originally in Taylor, C. (1977). What is Human Agency, in Mischel, T. (Ed.), The Self: Psychological and Philosophical Issues, Oxford, Oxford University Press (pp. 114–115). Taylor, C. (1985c). Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Philosophical Papers II, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. (1985d). Atomism, in Taylor, C. (Ed.), Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Philosophical Papers II, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (pp. 187–210). Taylor, C. (1994a). Precis of Sources of the Self, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 54, Number 1, pp. 185–186. Taylor, C. (1994b). Response to My Critics, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 54, Number 1, pp. 203–212. Taylor, C. (1994c). Can Liberalism Be Communitarian?, Critical Review, Volume 8, Number 2, pp. 257–263. Taylor, C. (1994d). Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition: Examining the Politics of Recognition, edited by A. Gutmann, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press. Expanded edition of Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, 1992. Taylor, C. (1994e). Reply and Rearticulation: Charles Taylor Replies, in Tully, C. (Ed.), Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: The Philosophy of Charles Taylor in Question, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (pp. 213–258). Woolcock, P. (1999). The Case Against Evolutionary Ethics Today, in Ruse, M.& Maienschein, J. (Eds.), Biology and the Foundation of Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (pp. 276–306).

15 Perspectives on Nature An environmental values perspective

Introduction This chapter offers a further critique of business and economic approaches to sustainability and introduces an environmental values perspective (EVP) approach (based on the works of Fox, 1980; Henry, 2016; Taylor, 1989) should be invoked to address the world’s current unpresented climate change (and other) issues. I introduce an environmental values perspective (EVP) approach based on the works of Dicks (2018), Fox 1980, and Taylor (2016) and their ideas should be invoked to address the world’s current unpresented climate change (and other) issues. The chapter is motivated by Bendell’s (2018) challenge to explore how environmental values can be integrated into community and corporate decisions and structures to help ensure the survival of all communities, people, and entities on the planet. I address this challenge by adopting an environmental values perspective (EVP) which investigates four specific research questions: • • • •

Does sustainability and environmental management explore fully Nature’s intrinsic value and meaning? How can Nature’s value be given consideration when making accounting and economic decisions? Can the market-based individualism of the business case achieve environmental objectives? Does environmental policy require some level of public intervention?

These research questions involve the intrinsic qualities, meaning, and value of Nature. Answers to these questions are achieved through the EVP approach that has been developed by Dick, Fox, and Taylor. The key argument is that without a full appreciation of Nature’s meaning and intrinsic and extrinsic value, it is likely that Bendell’s (2018) concerns about the field will remain apposite. The examination, analysis, and argument conducted here use environmental and ontological thinking. Environmental values must influence decisions about large-scale economic developments and the direction of communities.

Perspectives on Nature 247 In particular, Nature’s value should be a part of the criteria that assess actions in a more environmentally enlightened manner.1 The focus on environmental value also raises the subsidiary issue of how to reconcile environmental preservation against the right of people to work. These observations involve re-ordering of priorities if we are to preserve ecosystems and habitats. Vaughan et al. (2018) have re-introduced Fox’s (1980) transpersonal ecology to develop different ways to think about how people relate to the natural environment. Fox develops the philosophical idea that the self (individuals) are directly connected with Nature. Transpersonal ecology denotes or relates to states or areas of consciousness beyond the limits of personal identity (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Elkington, 1997). This thinking challenges the dominant view of sustainability; that is, the human representations can model the natural world in encounters with it. Taylor (1993d) further explains how human representations themselves are part of Nature; that is, we misunderstand our place in Nature when we assume our human thoughts directly mirror Nature. Business and economic models rely on transforming Nature; however, the preservation of Nature requires challenging the current business model. This chapter offers some speculative steps towards an enabling environmental accounting (CSR, SEA, and SEAR) in a way that is compatible with sustainable economic growth targets (Banerjee, 2003; Senge, 2014; Spash, 2010). The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section is about the current dominant discourse and the EVP. The sectionreviews key literature that constructs an EVP and uses the EVP as a social imaginary. The next section is Transformation involving an EVP which discusses some preliminary issues about social and environmental discourse accounts. These establish various meanings and interpretations of CSR, SEA, and SEAR to promote the nature of Nature. Following this brief discussion is some further problems with the business which is followed by some discussion about accountability as a secular (anti-realist) discourse for Nature. The final substantive section discusses some possibilities for introducing a ‘deep green’ or ‘transpersonal’ accounting which is followed byconclusions.

The current dominant discourse and the EVP A key argument of this chapter is that the EVP guides transition from growth-focussed societies to communities that embrace engaged agency, biomimicry, and transpersonal ecology, and rethink humanity’s relationship with Nature. For example, Dicks (2018) introduces biomimicry as the imitation of the models, systems, and elements of Nature as a means of solving complex problems confronting humanity (Kramer & de Smit, 1977). Both Fox and Taylor argue that humanity relates to Nature through an unarticulated background set of interactions that allow us to make sense of the world. Such a focus helps to create awareness of the extent to which

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environmental values are embedded in society. Much can be gained from adopting a deep ecological approach (EVP) involving biomimicry, engaged agency, and transpersonal ecology, that is, by adopting an EVP.2 The environmental dilemmas confronting humanity are examined here by exploring two opposing schools of thought that exist in the EVP genre: the ‘instrumentalist-sustainable’ school and the ‘environmental-interpretivist’ (EVP) school (Jacobs, 1999). Whichever of these two schools prevails has major repercussions in understanding what humanity should do in preserving the environment. These two labels have been used to characterise a spectrum of positions. The instrumental-sustainability view is associated with the business case for environmental management (Jenson & Berg, 2012; Schaltegger, Hansen, & Lüdeke-Freund, 2016; Schaltegger, Lüdeke-Freund, & Hansen, 2012; Taylor & van Every, 2000). Aspects of the EVP position can be found in Hrasky and Jones (2016), Milne (1991, 1996a, 1996b), Ball and Milne (2005), and Perkiss and Tweedie (2017), among others. Furthermore, the EVP view is aligned with Deep ecology and uses Fox’s Transpersonal Ecology and Taylor’s Sources of the Self to challenge economic, instrumental, and religious forms of secular reasoning. An EVP is needed if environmental mechanisms (CSR, SEA, and SEAR) are to align humanity with Nature. The following argument develops aspects of Perkiss and Tweedie (2017), Lehman (2004, 2017), and Malscha and GuéninParacini (2013) through its search to determine how humanity is open to the world (EVP). The chapter explores whether current business models have an adequately developed analysis of Nature (Gauthier & Gilomen, 2016). This is prompted by belief that the metaphysics of Nature seems to be a distant shore for the business case; and it is mindful too that Nature presents serious dilemmas for human communities confronted with global warming, climate change, and habitat loss. The chapter makes a case to rethink the role of accounting when the interests of Nature and economic development conflict.3 The chapter draws on ideas from deep ecology and earlier work on the public sphere by Lehman (2002, 2004, 2010a, 2017) to suggest how some deep ecological ideas might be implemented (Bentele & Nothhaft, 2010; Luhmann, 1995, 1998, 2001).4 This chapter specifically considers key economic and political implications when EVP are accorded priority over accounting numbers and economic development. The implication is that environmental accounting (CSR, SEA, and SEAR) and the reform of business have to go beyond current business and sustainability research to engage deep green theorising.5 The question then involves whether the social whole – cities, companies, and communities – can embody an EVP. Business-based approaches are entwined with maximising economic returns. Difficulties arise because Nature challenges the claims of CSR, SEA, and SEAR that purport to align humanity with Nature’s intrinsic value and worth (Bansal & Song, 2017; Schaltegger & Burritt, 2010) and because economic and neoliberal

Perspectives on Nature 249 ideology continues to support an unaccountable, unsustainable mode of accountability and urban development.6

Transformation involving an EVP Researchers have tried to resolve the dilemma between economic development and environmental preservation by reconceptualising the role of business in society. Business has operationalised this, inter alia, through integrated reports, open systems research, and triple bottom line reporting (Checkland, 1981, 2000; Gray & Milne, 2018; Kramer & de Smit, 1977; von Bertalanffy, 1962, 1967, 1968). While such operationalisation can be useful, accounting interpretations of Nature remain under-theorised. An EVP perspective is developed here to bring humanity and Nature. Social and environmental accounting (CSR, SEA, and SEAR) should be recognised as interlocking mechanisms to engage the hegemonic and destructive forces of capitalist factors of production (for example, by developing measures to verify the effects of such things as the costs of plant closure, levels of emission, waste, and pollution). Communities need to go further and interrogate, discuss, and debate these external corporate effects. One way to do this is to recognise the central role of an EVP, and that an EVP is similar to a dolorosa. Thus, adoption of an EVP implies that consciousness must undergo a process of discovery to attain a better appreciation of Nature. As Berthold-Bond (1993, p. 83) observes, the dolorosa is similar to a ‘dialectic [which] may be likened to the painful path which Plato describes in his Republic by which the person chained to the world of representational appearances becomes liberated and gradually arrives at genuine knowledge’. CSR, SEA, and SEAR are like appearances that reflect a reality that is beyond current consciousness. Further problems with the business case Baker and Schaltegger (2015, p. 270) describe a business case where ‘our environment, our organisations and our social relations exist as a result of the choices and meanings that we, as individuals and collectives, ascribe to them over time’ (p. 270). The business case focuses on individual human choices. As such, the value of Nature emanates from human thoughts associated with mind-dependent representations. The business case to connect with Nature focuses on win-win outcomes for both economic and environmental purposes. However, the business case does not focus on an EVP where Nature’s meaning emerges through interactions with it. As noted earlier, the dominant discourse assumes that growth and Nature’s preservation can be achieved simultaneously. This is easier said than done. Recent proposals to mine in Australia and Papua New Guinea argue that the company complies with local and national laws, creates employment, and generates export

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income and thus, the development should be allowed. Yet, there is dispute from indigenous people for whom the mine impacts on local customs, sites and the viability of indigenous rights; and from environmental activists concerned about the effect of future GHG emissions and land degradation. Here, social and environmental accounting (CSR, SEA, and SEAR) could be constructed in conjunction with a state that monitors, regulates and improves the quality of information in the public realm. The role of accounting is to contribute by helping to appreciate the dilemmas and various viewpoints that exist about mining. In other words, social and environmental accounting (CSR, SEA, and SEAR) can be constrained by the practices used to develop its proposals – practices which are based on instrumental reasoning (Morioka & de Carvalho, 2016; Puxty, 1991; Tinker, Lehman, & Neimark, 1991). A further major problem with current sustainability approaches in accounting (CSR, SEA, and SEAR) is that when sustainability is phrased in terms of ‘growth’ and ‘profit’, the environmental rift between humanity and Nature is obscured. Such approaches make limited or no analysis of the social structures needed if communities are to achieve ‘growth’ and ‘profit’ sustainably (Atkins & Maroun, 2018). To help redress this, the EVP approach advanced here highlights the direct connection of humanity with the external and Natural world; it focuses on how environmental values would benefit from articulation with, and expression in, the public sphere (Christensen & Cheney, 2011; Lehman, 2001, 2010a). This can occur through a language of accounting and interpretation that offers a fresh challenge to neoliberalism and its connections with integrated approaches to CSR, SEA, and SEAR (Adams, 2002; Aras & Crowther, 2009; Baker, Brown, & Malmi, 2012; Baker & Schaltegger, 2015; Lehman, 2011a, 2015; Schaltegger et al., 2012; Tregidga, Kearins, & Milne, 2013). The hegemonic forces of global capitalism that harm Nature and communities in the long term need to be challenged. For sustainability research, the utilisation of moral frameworks provides the means through which people perceive and understand the world. This gives rise to a set of choices for humanity. Taylor explains the dilemmas confronting humanity: For the two powerful aspirations – to expressive unity and to radical autonomy – have remained central to preoccupations of modern men; and the hope to combine them cannot but recur in one form or another, be it in Marxism or integral anarchism, technological Utopianism or the return to Nature. … With all this surrounding us we cannot avoid being referred back to the first great synthesis which was meant to resolve our central dilemma: which failed but which remains somehow unsurpassed. (Taylor, 1975, pp. 49–50)

Perspectives on Nature 251 On this view, humanity’s power of reason and rationality provide the human race with objectifying powers that transform the natural environment. The choice that confronts humanity involves whether humanity’s power should be exercised to radically transform the planet for economic purposes, or to synthesise lives in accord with ambient ecosystems. This argument does not mean that we simply follow Nature’s spontaneous processes as some Deep Ecologists might advocate. However, it implies that people have the ability to choose different life plans and that their choices are ultimately ones for communities to make. Interpretivists argue that ethics and moral theory must be extended to exploring and resolving differences that are significant for our being-in-the-world. Such articulation and expression of issues can help humanity account for, and develop, a better appreciation of its place in the external and natural world. More particularly, an interpretivist analysis of accountability offers better prospect than do alternatives that address the functioning of humanity in the natural environment. Such mode of analysis can also help illustrate the integrative function that language can play in the public sphere (Boje, Oswick, & Ford, 2004; Heidegger, 1971; Lehman, 2015, 2017; Taylor, 1971, 1978–1979). Current sustainability reporting initiatives (CSR, SEA, and SEAR) have been ‘[exclusively] investor-focused’. They have had little to report about dilemmas arising from the relationship between humanity and Nature (Aras & Crowther, 2009; Milne & Gray, 2013, p. 20; Stacchezzini, Melloni, & Lai, 2016; Thomson, 2007). They use current economic structures to integrate environmental values. They appeal to business managers because the discourse involved is part of the language of business and is easy to digest and operationalise. However, what is needed is commitment to a new social imaginary (EVP) – one that guides modern communities to appreciate Nature’s value and worth. In Modern Social Imaginaries, Taylor (2004b, p. 1) defines the idea of a social imaginary as the set of values, institutions, laws, and symbols through which people ‘imagine their social whole’. From Taylor’s (2004b) perspective, the dominant CSR, SEA, and SEAR discourse is deficient because it does not imagine a ‘social whole’ between humanity and Nature (Tomorrow’s Reporting, 2011). Rather, it is merely a procedural social imaginary that emphasises ‘growth’ and ‘profit’ in a way that will appeal to business managers and the corporate cognoscenti who dominate Western business society. On my philosophical view, nothing of substance has changed despite detailed corporate responses (Lehman, 2010b, 2015, 2017). New directions for sustainability can be achieved using biomimicry, engaged agency, and transpersonal ecology. These concepts help in exploring how accountability and critical accounting values shape social fabric and social objectives (see ‘Accountability as a secular (anti-realist) discourse for Nature’ section). The shared thesis involved in an EVP is that a culture of individualism has destabilised and undermined the various common relationships and structures in modern society. Each perspective explains and

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reveals various aspects of Nature’s value that can be concealed when one theoretical approach dominates the public sphere. The explanation of value is achieved through a sustainable and decentralised ecological model that is connected to principles of justice.

Accountability as a secular (anti-realist) discourse for Nature A procedural and secular approach to ecological and environmental matters leaves core issues of critical sustainability unaddressed. For example, issues scale of development, limits to growth, and constraints on global trade usually are largely ignored (Meadows, Meadows, Randers, & Behrens, 1972). Furthermore, such a business-based and secular approach does not interrogate humanity’s basic understanding of the world and whether this understanding depends (solely) on human mental representations (internal reasons). Considerable benefit would accrue from engaging in deeper philosophical analysis of the type described by environmental and ecological theorists. Moreover, additional community value is added through the EVP by exploring connections between humanity and Nature in a deeper and more philosophical way. Nature contains meaning and value that develops a common thread between humanity and the natural environment. Such awareness through philosophical exploration will help society avoid becoming disengaged and detached from Nature. The implication is that the future of humanity and Nature can be reconciled. The observations presented thus far lead to a further concept referred to as ‘world as world’. This is found in Heidegger’s (1971) work on realism and the natural world (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015). This concept is used by EVP interpretivists to understand the connections within the natural world that can be achieved through construction of, and appreciation for, meaning in Nature. For accounting researchers concerned with the natural environment, interpreters worry about the tendency to reduce practical reason7 to business logic, together with instrumental and secular reasoning. Thinking about human affairs in this manner owes much to economists who aim to achieve optimal solutions at minimal costs (Taylor, 2007, 2008, 2016). Such reasoning is a central strand in contemporary business, liberal, and accountability models. Moreover, an EVP focuses on external sources such as Geist, Nature, or the other. These concepts are the values firmly explored within a broad democratic framework.

Engaged agency – an EVP Taylor offers a way to connect the EVP with the meaning in Nature. He argues that we interact in the world in a host of different ways. This means that the dominant view in accounting and philosophy is incorrect to assume that we interact solely through our mental representations. Our representations themselves are part of a background that remains inarticulate

Perspectives on Nature 253 as we interact and move about in the world. On occasion we do follow rules by explicitly representing them to ourselves, but Taylor reminds us that rules do not contain the principles of their own application: application requires that we draw on an unarticulated understanding or ‘sense of things’ – the background which includes Nature. Humans are not isolated thinking machines. They are part of the world. Thus, to understand the human agent as embodied implies an understanding of the human condition in natural settings. The aim of the EVP is to deepen our appreciation of humanity in Nature. The world of an engaged agent ‘is shaped by his or her form of life, or history, or bodily existence’ (Taylor, 1993d, p. 318). Humanity interacts directly in the world, dealing with natural objects and environments (Taylor, 1993d, p. 325). Engagement is a more fruitful way to think about human agency because experience is made intelligible by being placed in the context of the kind of agency involved. Thereby, a challenge is presented to CSR, SEA, and SEAR to account for humanity’s more basic interactions in the world. Such accounting involves acknowledging that context is ‘the vantage point from out of which – [engaged agency] can be understood’ (Taylor, 1993d, p. 325). Background context makes intelligible the place of humans in Nature. Humans are not explicitly or focally aware of the ‘background’ because it is permanently in operation. Background context ‘confer[s] intelligibility’ (Taylor, 1993d, p. 325). Hutto, Kirchhoff, and Myin (2014) support the view that humans do not simply interact in the world through the mind. Rather, they regard humans as interacting directly and conceive meaning as emerging in the forms of evolving enactivism (engaged agency, biomimicry, and transpersonal ecology). This thinking starkly challenges the representational structures of neoliberal accounting and business theory. Businesses and the general population must be more open to the possibility of coping in different ways with Nature as a meaningful reality. One way of doing this is by embracing an EVP, in conjunction with a commitment to a transpersonal society, a moral concern for Nature, and a concern to nurture Nature in business and in the public spheres of civil society (Contrafatto, Thomson, & Monk, 2015; Lehman, 2017). The challenge to accountability, accounting, the business case, CSR, SEA, and SEAR is to engage directly with Nature. From this standpoint, it is argued that new options and thinking emerge in the ongoing conversation of humanity (public spheres). Can environmental accounting, CSR, SEA, or SEAR, lead to sustainability and a vision of Nature as source? (Atkins & Maroun, 2018).8 This dominant discourse of CSR, SEA, and SEAR is inadequate; it leads to the natural environment to be defined merely as an economic resource in global accounting and business (such as by the International Integrated Reporting Council IIRC, 2011, 2013; see Casselman & Power, 2010; Freire, 2005; Gilbert, Rasche, & Waddock, 2011; Tregidga et al., 2013). Biomimicry and

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transpersonal ecology are used to implement engaged relationships by exploring the common theoretical foundations between the economics, environment, and accounting disciplines by seeking to identify a theoretical thread to unite the respective disciplines in a common basis of understanding of global environmental issues (Brown, de Jong, & Lessidrenska, 2009).

Biomimicry and transpersonal ecology Dicks (2016, 2018) highlights Rousseau and McCarthy (2007) in inviting us to think about modelling civilisation on the ecosystem dynamics of the natural forest. This thinking offers a fresh challenge to the business-based view of sustainability in which Nature is imagined in terms of economic value. The term ‘biomimicry’ derives from concepts used in philosophy to deal with life and imitation. This philosophy uses ecological theory and invites environmental solutions that imagine buildings to be like trees and cities to be like forests. The concept is used to challenge how business-based sustainability is constructed using economic and neoliberal paradigms that emerged from Enlightenment philosophy. Biomimicry represents an emerging synthesis of ecology and accountability and involves skillful application of ecological insights to the practice of accountability. It also develops our emotional bond with the planet and defines environmental sensibility as if the whole world mattered. The concept of biomimicry offers a further fundamental challenge to the Enlightenment view that human freedom simply involves being free to choose how to use Nature. Fox’s (1980) ideas of transpersonal ecology distinguish between a formal, popular, and philosophical sense of deep ecology. Fox (1980) investigates whether deep ecologists miss theoretical aspects addressed by Devall and Sessions (1985), and whether greater commonality in approach and consideration can benefit all disciplines and lead to a more coherent, integrated deep ecology (Thoreau, 1862). Transpersonal ecology creates environmental and evidence-based concepts of Nature and decision-making for community benefit. Fox’s (1984) commonality approach challenges the formal sense of deep ecology by offering ‘deep questioning’ of modern society’s ultimate norms. Fox (1984) concludes that what is distinctive about his vision of deep ecology is its philosophical sense, that self-realisation leads beyond egoistic (profitfocused) identification towards a wider sense of identification (Maunders & Burritt, 1991; Thoreau, 1862). Fox (1980) proposes a wider identification with Nature – something that is compatible with, and part of, transpersonal psychology. Accordingly, deep ecology should change its name to transpersonal ecology. That is, processes of biomimicry, engaged agency, and transpersonal ecology offer a more coherent set of connections between humanity with Nature. Humanity is related directly to, and considered to be part of, Nature.

Perspectives on Nature 255 Interacting in the world in this way not only challenges the line between humanity’s depiction of Nature but also offers wider scope for commonalities with Nature. Applying the EVP: accounting in communicative action for Natural assets This section examines the implications of the new engaged and deep ecological insights for environmental praxis vis-à-vis accounting. How is this environmental accounting best expressed in an EVP?9 Account 1: the interpretivism of Perkiss and Tweedie Perkiss and Tweedie (2017) view religion as important for making accounting accountable. They argue that religion is a source of the self. However, religion is not necessarily a source of the self in Taylor’s recent work. Rather, it is an ideal type (also) with the power to conceal the empowering force of external values that emanate from the cosmos, the other or Nature (Russell, Milne, & Dey, 2017). Yet, Perkiss and Tweedie (2017) do not explore the connections through which humanity is connected with Nature. For this reason, this present chapter turns to other work on conceptualising Nature as a moral source – and how communities might be put in touch with it. According to Taylor (1989, p. 91) ‘conceptualising moral sources can help sustain commitment to shared social projects, because “articulation [of moral sources] is a condition of adhesion”…’. In discussing moral sources, it is possible to clarify and reinforce the norms that motivate the behaviour of professionals such as accountants, and, in this way, make moral sources more effective. Conversely, research or public discourse that ignores moral sources, which Taylor (1989, p. 53) terms the ‘ethics of inarticulacy’, can impair their motivational value. Perkiss and Tweedie turn to more recent interpretations of Taylor (1971, 1975, 1978a, 1989) that can be developed through recent critiques of secularism and thereby expand the applicability of their accountability model. Implicit in Taylor’s account of enchantment is that religion itself may create social structures that limit humanity’s appreciation of Nature (and external value). For this reason, Taylor asks: the church speaks to whom? This question turns on whether it opens humanity to the supposition that Nature is an external reason that (may) impose constraints on humanity. However, if religion does not do this, then a further challenge to modern secular institutions is presented. Perkiss and Tweedie (2017) share a view that processes of instrumental and secular reasoning set out a new paradigm after the Enlightenment. The individual consumer is thereby placed as the mandala of social policy (Francis, 1991; Lehman, 2002, 2004, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a; Schweiker, 1993). Interestingly, this task is being undertaken by ecological economists,

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who calculate the ecological footprint of human activities. This process involves calculating each person’s (or company’s) total net use of natural resources (Wackernagel & Rees, 1996).10 From the theistic (religious) perspective of Perkiss and Tweedie (2017), the decision to mine or pursue development is detached from these new philosophical models. These models (EVP) put us in touch directly with Nature and require careful processes of implementation. EVP and engaged agency promote transpersonal identification with Nature (Lehman, 1999, 2015, 2017). Account 2: basic issues in communication and the public sphere Any role that business plays in society must be accompanied by a broader democratic, discursive, and evaluative framework – one that investigates humanity’s impact on the natural environment. Together EVP, SEAR, biomimicry, and engaged agency can reveal the necessary conditions that are likely to create better relationships with the natural environment. Critical accounting has integrated aspects of EVP into its lexicon. However, it has not developed a sufficiently detailed concept of Nature. Future directions for CSR, SEA, and SEAR research must explore the links between accounting, evaluative frameworks, and information systems in order to (in Taylor’s sense) ‘enchant’ the social system (EVP). EVP invokes a process of interpretation and explanation whereby the concerns of all citizens are given a fair hearing (Lehman, 2011a). Despite economic development not being wanted everywhere, people must find paid employment. In this case, the dilemma for the EVP involves reconciling economic imperatives with the demands of the environment, Nature, and indigenous people. To do otherwise is to treat the local people’s beliefs and customs with disrespect, ultimately impacting their sense of self-worth and value (Lehman, 2010b). The dominant business view is associated with a designative approach to language which perpetuates an anthropocentric (human) approach to Nature. Accounting and Nature are shaped unduly by a pervading form of human reasoning that reflects a scientific and secular approach to human rationality. By considering humans to be the most significant being in the Universe, this form of reasoning creates an anthropocentric culture – one that visualises the world only in terms of human values and experiences. The EVP focuses not only on issues of identity but the real damage that can occur when people or society destroy Nature (Lehman, 2004; Taylor, 1992c, p. 25). The key point is that communities must have work and income – yet preservation dictates the need for new structures and opportunities. The EVP uses discourse and nuanced expressions about Nature’s value in the public sphere to create new ideas and concepts (Christensen, Morsing & Thyssen, 2013; Laughlin, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 2004; Lehman, 2017).

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Deep ecology and the politics of Nature For Fox (1984), as with Naess (1989), the environmental crisis requires changing consciousness and involving our widest possible identification with the non-human world. The usual ethical concern of formulating principles and obligations thus becomes unnecessary, according to Fox, for once the appropriate consciousness is established, one will naturally protect the environment and allow it to flourish, for that will be part and parcel of the protection and flourishing of oneself (Fox, 1990). Dicks (2018) concurs: [B]iomimetic urbanism holds remarkable potential for making cities sustainable. Indeed, whereas the paradigm of the human body or organism underpinned an unsustainable, centralized mode of urban development in which the city consumed ever more resources and produced ever more waste, the model of the forest ecosystem makes it possible to completely rethink the city according to a sustainable and decentralized, ecological model (p. 3). This thinking aligns with the EVP disposition outlined earlier. The EVP involves how people ‘imagine their social whole’. A new transpersonal thinking is needed that transforms the dominant view that ‘growth’ and ‘profit’ are compatible with Nature’s meaning and value. The future of the planet is likely to be better assured if accountability and social systems cultivate this awareness and refine the way humans perceive the aesthetic and spiritual meaning of Nature. For accounting purposes, Dicks (2016a) offers three further key points regarding anthropomimetic processes: accounting, political philosophy, and social philosophy. In political philosophy, one finds a strong tendency to focus on the soul or mind of the human individual and its mimetic counterpart at the level of the State. Plato, for example, focuses on what he sees as the three different parts of the soul and their mimetic counterparts in the State. The emergence of sociology in the 19th century did not amount to a change of model – away from the ‘anthropological’ one favoured by political philosophers from Plato to Rousseau and towards a new and different physiological or biological one. What has happened is that there has been a shift in focus within the same basic model – the social imaginary – to use the terminology outlined above (see ‘Transformation involving an EVP’ section). Dicks (2017) emphasises how modern social imaginaries emphasise the mind, and therewith also the activities of government and science. Such imaginaries were replaced by a focus on the body, and therewith also on socio-economic activity, particularly the activities of the workers. There is now relatively broad acceptance that sustainability transitions call for accounting innovation of some description, but issues concerning what type of innovation, how it might be achieved and by whom remain unclear and often deeply contested.

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The third key point from Dicks (2018) is that all the political and social philosophy discussed earlier offer an anthropocentric ethic focused solely of human beings. For example, Plato’s State is composed of people, not things. The parts of Hobbes’s State that correspond to the different parts or attributes of the human individual (the soul, memory, joints, nerves, strength, etc.) are all people (the sovereign, counsellors, magistrates, etc.). Dicks (2018, p. 6) concludes that ‘In short, human beings provide not just the form but also the matter of the traditional view of the State’. The dominant sustainability reform discourse is shaped by anthropocentric thinking – the business case for environmental reform. Yet there is a great deal of literature on the role of external reasons, Nature and religion that are ignored in this technical literature. A new vision that aligns with a deep ecology view must question modernity’s quest to control Nature or create win-win solutions. Rather, the key point of recent environmental and theistic work is that cultural and social forces have led to a disenchanted world – a world where individual self-aggrandisement has replaced external values and sacred meaning (the other, God, or Nature). This disenchanted Promethean confrontation between humanity, Nature, and reason leads to social structures becoming detached from external and moral frameworks. Without connection to Nature, as an external reason, it is likely that environmental accounting (CSR, SEA, and SEAR) will not be able to achieve its objectives. As such, the focus is not on what I ought to do for the community and Nature but on what is good for me. Without mechanisms such as biomimicry, engaged agency, and transpersonal ecology, it is likely that environmental accountability will remain committed to consumerism and individualism, and that accounting and its human communities will remain detached from Nature (Tregidga et al., 2013).

Conclusions: enchanting the public sphere The EVP developed in this chapter integrates biomimicry (Dicks, 2016, 2018), engaged agency (Taylor, 2004a), and transpersonal ecology (Fox, 1999) through the dialectical character of thought. It aims to take steps into the structure of the world where connections between humans and Nature are integrated through a dialectical structure (thought and being, consciousness and object, subject and substance). Humanity and Nature should not contradict each other but be mutually illuminating. An EVP perspective encourages the development of business-based sustainability to create reconciliation when environmental and business interests come together. Locating a position between extreme environmentalists (those who would just shut down business) and pure economic approaches (which focus solely on profit) is a challenging task. An EVP, and concern with the environmental and public goods that are necessary for humanity’s survival, challenges the business case. An EVP built on on engaged agency and on transpersonal ecology has much to offer

Perspectives on Nature 259 processes of accountability and ecological awareness. In particular, they can help identify inconsistencies in how we value and measure Nature’s worth. Embrace of an EVP outlook can help to deepen the meaning of Nature and inform ideas of business-based sustainability and approaches by accountants to determine environmental value. The EVP reveals the dialectical implications of environmental obligation and reveals a mode of thought that it is not employed speculatively, but philosophical (Allen, Marshall, & Easterby-Smith, 2015). Nonetheless, it is one that should be attempted because markets do not seem capable of fully accommodating human, environmental and moral obligations towards Nature, even after humans accept that they are directly engaged in Nature. The EVP advocates a communicative and interpretivist strategy to inform communities about corporate activity. The aim is to distinguish between what organisations say they will do, and what they actually do. Increasing disappointment in the feebleness (or total absence) of positive initiatives to involve citizens in SEAR, and in environmental and management policies, can be fruitfully addressed to by appealing to an EVP. Although new visions are needed, accounting and business seems partially sighted, constrained by closed-world thinking. When alternative visions are in abeyance, as they are now, the task becomes one of devising pathways to challenge current economic and political structures. All too often, environmental decisions of many large companies are shaped by the imperatives of a market social imaginary that seeks to maximise profit. The way business has recognised and operationalised this social imaginary has obscured Nature's meaning and criticality. Business managers and business school academics must put aside resistance to change, including any supposition that Nature is simply an economic resource. Accounting, accountability, and environmental research should be more committed to exploring humanity’s connections with Nature (EVP). The EVP should become the mechanism by which a type of environmental accounting occurs – one in which there is a clear depiction of the type of world humanity is creating. The EVP searches for a form of reconciliation between humanity and Nature; it requires a different way of orienting and thinking about the world. Political decisions guided by interpretation must reveal different possible scenarios from a given narrative – such as the narrative presented by accounting and instrumental processes of accountability in financial reports. Currently, accountants are guided by a business logic that conceals important environment impacts and values (EVP) such as those promoted by implementing profit-focused technologies. Such practice stems from erroneously believing that humanity can control the natural environment, using closed-world and instrumental thinking. An EVP is useful in that it offers a different way to think about the role of accounting in the public sphere. It supposes that new ideas emerge in the process of debate, dialogue, and negotiation.

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Notes 1 The EVP is developed in conjunction with the interpretivist argument that new ideas and policies emerge in an interactive and democratic social structure that is committed to fairness. In accounting these ideas are developed from Habermas. See Habermas (1991, 1993, 1994) and Taylor (2007, 2008, 2016). 2 Deep ecology was initially developed by Devall and Sessions (1985) to focus on the inherent worth of all living beings regardless of their instrumental utility to human needs, and advocacy of a radical restructuring of modern human societies in accord with such ideas. 3 Hrasky and Jones (2016) examined the accounts The Franklin River in Tasmania, Australia. It was a pristine environment with the only inland beach in the world until it was dammed. It was irreplaceable. It has been lost forever. 4 A caveat, deep ecology has been criticised by animal liberationists. Regan (2004, pp. 361–362) argues that the individual may be [wrongly] sacrificed for the greater biotic good, in the name of ‘the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community’, and that if culling [a euphemism for murder] an individual is necessary for the protection of this one and only one land-ethical good, ‘then it is (not just might be) a land-ethical requirement to do so’. 5 It will be recalled that Corporate Social Reporting (CSR), Social and Environmental Accounting (SEA), and Social Environmental Accounting Research (SEAR). 6 One, for example, in which the city consumes ever more resources and produces ever more waste (Dicks, 2018). 7 Practical reason’ is the type of reasoning used in everyday deliberations to make moral and ethical decisions. Taylor (1989), like MacIntyre (1981), argues that modern political theory reduces morality to ethical rule-governing procedures. Consider Taylor’s views on Rawlsian and Habermasian frameworks. Taylor argues that however welcome their views are in broadening the role of the state, they offer only procedural principles to redress inequality and deprivation. ‘The “worst-off” members of society, to use Rawls’s term, may still be left wrestling with debilitating self-images that mere procedural recognition of their intrinsic worth as persons is scarcely able to assuage’ (Porter, 1988, p. 204). 8 The business case for sustainability, developed by Schaltegger et al. (2012, pp. 7–8), refers to the bottom-line financial and other reasons for businesses pursuing CSR, SEA, and SEAR (see also Carroll 1979, 1999) and Carroll and Shabana (2010). 9 The task is facilitated, however, by substantive efforts in prior literature. The chapter builds on ideas from Gallhofer, Haslam, and Yonekura (2015) and related environmental work (e.g. Hrasky and Jones, 2016; Lehman, 2002, 2004, 2010a, 2010b, 2015, 2017; Perkiss and Tweedie, 2017). 10 For example, the Brundtland Report argues for up to a five to ten-fold increase in economic growth in both developed and developing economies. Wackernagel and Rees (1996) calculate that the present world population requires at least 9.6 billion hectares to sustain its present activities. If we were to follow the policies advocated by Brundtland, this would require about 48 to 96 billion hectares, or 6–12 additional planets.

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16 New directions for environmental democracy

Interpreters offer a political strategy to safeguard the natural environment and future generations. This is to be achieved through face-to-face community relationships in a democratic structure that is attentive to the otherness of Nature. A concern for such values and the future of the world, however, is something that is not necessarily self-evident within procedural liberal, market-based reforms and postmodern discourse. A new, interpretative inspired age might be one where people relate to, and cope with, the turbulent environment in which they live and act. Accordingly, liberal and postmodern meta-ethics beg the ontological features of human identity associated as they are with environmental and political realism. Interpreters suggest that there is a connection between intrinsic value in the world and how external reasons might put people in touch with the natural world. Postmodern contingency cuts us off from our expressive sources of the self precisely when interpretation is most needed. From this, it follows that it is possible that our coping skills articulate and orient us to the world where language is the conduit through which the otherness of nature is articulated; that is, replacing sustainability with steady-state social arrangements that challenge capitalism and technological modernity. This interpretivism can be connected with the environmental precautionary principle which states that ‘where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental damage’ (Brown, 1995, p. 67). These arguments reflected two interlocking premises. First, there was an argument outlining why secular societies have had difficulty recognising the otherness of the natural world. Second, moral realism was seen to put people directly in touch with the world. When combined a political vision that emphasised common endeavours as a reflection of humanity as the voice of Nature . It was argued that those critics who focussed on the notion of a voice of Nature invested too much in analysing his focus on community without attention to work on the politics of recognition and what is significance. Of course, a focus on the criterion of significance is not at the expense of individual rights because the purpose is about understanding our place in the world. The first issue in the present

New directions for environmental democracy 271 book asked how we arrived at the present disastrous environmental and political position. The second involved images of commonality, community, interpretation, and how to shape civil society. The book argued that civil society is not built on economic and regulatory systems alone. Accordingly, a civil and environmentally aware community is more than being from free associations under the tutelage of state power. In a stronger and secondary sense, civil society exists only where society can structure itself and co-ordinate its actions through such associations that are free of state tutelage. In this regard, an environmentally aware society acts as an alternative or supplement to the second sense, we can speak of civil society wherever the ensemble of associations can significantly determine or inflect the course of state policy. Furthermore, the book has responded to interpretivist criticisms levelled by some critical theorists. These criticisms are not necessarily a problem in this accountability argument because discourse using these nuanced expressions leads to new ideas and concepts that are focussed on justice. Critics do not develop the interpretive two-stage process where concepts and ideas concerning justice must be considered in the light of the place and context to which they belong. The first stage involved entering into dialogue and understanding the perspective of other interlocutors. The second stage worked out political principles of justice that allow interlocutors to live together. In reworking our understanding of being in the world, Taylor has provided a starting point for rethinking the way individuals and communities ought to be dealing politically with ecological crises. Of course, this does not mean that the interpretivist-ecological and social politics transcends individual rights. The development of the interpretivist framework, in a critical and environmentally aware direction, together with the delineation between the demands of individual rights and cultural survivance offered insights into the political and moral structures needed to create awareness that Nature is a source of the self.

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Index

Page numbers in bold indicate tables, in italics indicate figures abstract individualism 27, 222, 223 accountability: accounting and 162–3; basic issues 133–41; civil society and 84–5; critical accountability see critical accountability; human dimension and 86–89; justice and 151–2; Kant and 118–19; liberal 147–67; modern 2, 21, 24, 47, 67, 83, 84, 86, 89, 98, 115; need for 147–8, 150; postmodernism and 64–6; Rawls and 119–20 Accounting, Organizations and Society (Colville) 28 accounting and interpretivism 28–9 accounting research 120–1 act utilitarianism 116–17 action approach 28 ad hominem argument 22 Adani Mining 12, 13, 14 After Virtue (MacIntyre) 7 alienation 233, 235 altruism 159–60 anarchism 210 Anderson, P. 232, 234 animal liberationists 218 Anthropocene 25, 138; limiting neoliberalism in 15–16 anthropocentrism 63, 117, 140, 199, 202, 208, 210, 218, 222, 228 anti-epistemology 9, 10 anti-realist discourse 247, 252 Ardrey, R. 51 Aristotle 50 Arrington, C. E. 120, 121, 147 Arrington, E. 64–5, 138 assess communication 179 assumption, interpretive theory 8 attacks, environmental activism and 198 Attenborough, D. 21

authenticity 69, 95, 96, 103–4, 107n8, 116, 135 authoritarian political agendas, Deep Ecology 203, 208, 210, 212 autonomy 221, 234 Being and Time (Heidegger) 241 Bentham, J. 115–17, 134, 138, 139 biocentric democracy 203, 208 biocentric egalitarianism 220–2 biocentric ethic 63, 199, 203, 208, 213, 218, 220, 222–3, 228, 241 biomimicry 251, 254–6 Blackburn, S. 23 Bookchin, M. 203, 204n1, 204n2, 208–9, 214n2, 217, 227, 243n1; social ecology 228–32 Brennan, A. 45 Broadbent, J. 48, 178 broad-church concept 28 The Brundtland Report 39, 42 business case approach: limits of 41–2; neoliberalism and nature 38–41; overview 36–7; problems 249–52; sustainability and 37–8, 42–4 business models 15, 39, 41, 247, 248 business-society relationships 87 Butler, J. 67 Cabana, S. 103 Callicott, J. B. 199, 202, 203 Capital (Marx) 124 capitalism 47–8, 90, 123, 202, 230, 231, 233 Carson, R. 21 categorical imperative 30n4, 118, 119, 121, 127n4, 133, 151, 152 Chamber of Commerce and Industry Queensland 12

Index 273 Chaos theory 224n1 Chapter Prophets 125 civil society 84–5; definition 84, 97–8, 105 “climate black swans” 13 climate change 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 37, 176, 223, 246, 248 closed-world thinking 71–3 closeness 157–8 coal mining 2, 12, 13, 14, 201 Collingwood, R. G. 117 Colville, I. 28 ‘come hither’ approach 66, 140 communal life 86 communication, basic issues in 256 communism 233, 236 communitarianism 51, 74n3, 212, 219, 221, 222, 227, 234 community: forms of 9; re-engaging company with 95–107 conflict resolution 1, 83, 100, 102 consensus 154–7 constitutive goods 137 consumerism 230, 231, 233, 258 consumption patterns 229, 231 contrary opinion: environmental accountability 147–8; interpretivist approach 9–10 coping skills 16, 86, 96, 178, 223, 237, 238, 240, 270 coronavirus 9, 16, 238 corporate change 90, 95–6 corporate relations 82–91; improving 99–100 corporate social reporting (CSR) 16, 16n3, 37, 39, 82, 247, 248, 249, 250, 253, 256, 258, 260n5, 260n8 counter-hegemonic strategies 45 critical accountability: external relations 96–107; interpretivism see interpretivism; key themes in research 7–16; postmodernism 61–76; prominent theorists 8; public sphere 82–91, 100–5 critical theory 121–2; accounting reform proposals 122–4; challenge to interpretivism 124–6; response to social ecology 232–6 CSR (corporate social reporting) 16, 16n3, 37, 39, 42, 83, 247, 248, 249, 250, 253, 256, 258, 260n5, 260n8 cultural survivance 180, 271

da Silva, Luiz Pereira 13 Daly, H. E. 149 damaged relations 82–91 Dasein 237 Dawkins, C. 139 DDT 21 decision-making device (ISC) 120–1 decision-usefulness 10, 49, 127n7, 153, 155, 162, 163–4, 165; accountability and 148–50; emancipator accounting and 133 deconstructive strategy 2, 23, 50, 64–8 Deep Ecologists 27, 134, 140, 197, 198, 200–3, 207–11, 213, 218, 219, 221, 223, 224, 228, 254 Deep Ecology 197–204; authoritarian political agendas 203, 208, 210, 212; biocentric ethic and 222–3; core principles 200; criticisms of 208–13; features of 201–2; interpretation and 227–42; mysticism and 208–10; Nature and 202; origins of 199–201; overview 197; perspectives on 217–24; philosophical implications of 207–8; politics of Nature and 257–8; pragmatism, lacking 210–13; structure and 202–3; undemocratic political agendas 203, 208, 210, 212 Deep Ecology (Devall and Sessions) 199 ‘deep green’ approach 38, 46, 117, 158, 161, 167n15, 247, 248 democracy: environmental 270–1; organisational 103 democratic theory 47, 103, 177 Department of Environment and Science 12 depth thinking 63, 71–2, 73, 74, 209 Derrida, J. 64–70, 75n2 Descartes, R. 10 Devall, B. 199–200, 207, 208, 228 dialectical methods 49, 102, 106–7n7, 232, 233, 234, 235 Dicks, H. 257–8 Doherty, P. 14 domination 230–1, 233, 235 Earth 203, 239 eco-fascism 63 eco-feminists 202, 210 ecological politics 239–42 ‘ecosophy T’ 209 eco-terrorism 201, 202, 210

274

Index

education, climate change and 14 egalitarianism, biocentric 220–2 elements of significance 68–9 emancipator accounting 1, 115, 124–5, 133, 138 emotional vs. intellectual intelligence 97 employee-employer relationships 82–91 engaged agency 96–9, 252–4 Enlightenment 24, 46, 63, 65, 68, 85, 86–7, 91n4, 96, 106n5, 140, 199, 202, 223, 242, 254, 255 environment. see also Nature: Deep Ecology; see Deep Ecology; environmental democracy 270–1; environmental values perspective (EVP) 246–60 environmental accountability: contrary opinion 147–8; justice model for 158–9; transparency and 150–1 environmental awareness 9, 13 environmental democracy 270–1 environmental dilemmas 11–13 environmental sustainability 13–15 environmental values perspective (EVP) 37, 246–60, 260n1; current dominant discourse and 247–9; engaged agency 252–4; ‘environmental-interpretivist’ school 248; ‘instrumentalistsustainable’ school 248; transformation involving 249–52 ‘environmental-interpretivist’ (EVP) school 248 epistemological dimension 8, 9 Erhlich, P. 21 ethical violence 67 ethics, accountability process 177 evolution 230 EVP. see environmental values perspective expressivism 21, 25 external relations 95–107; overview 95–6 form of life 23 formal sense, deep ecology 254 forms of community 9 fortuna 24, 139 Fox, W. 247, 248, 254, 257 Francis, J. 64–5, 138 free-market approach 13, 25, 36, 41, 47, 62, 105, 178, 209 Frey, R. G. 141n2 Friedman, M. 84

Frodeman, R. 210 full life 68, 237–8 Gaa, J. C. 154, 166n9 Gadamer, H. G. 28, 42, 46 Gaia hypothesis 203, 239 Gallhofer, S. 115–17, 133, 138–41 Garnaut, R. 15 GEEA (general equilibrium economic analysis) 149, 153 Geist 69, 252 general equilibrium economic analysis (GEEA) 149, 153 Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 37 God’s image 50, 185 good corporate citizen 95 Goodin, R. 115, 116, 118, 134–5 Gray, R. 37–8, 45, 48–9, 121–2, 150–1, 161, 162, 163, 166n12, 176, 177 Great Barrier Reef (Queensland, Australia) 11–12 greed 159–60 Green Reporting (GR) 37 The Greening of Accountancy: The Profession After Pearce (Gray) 162 GRI (Global Reporting Initiative) 37 Grundrisse (Marx) 235, 236 Habermas, J. 50, 120–1, 126, 173, 177–9, 184–6, 188n5, 188n6; Laughlin’s Habermasian solutions 174–7, 186–7; Taylor and 177–81 Hardin, G. 163 Haslam, J. 115–17, 133, 138–41 health care sector 178 Hegel, G. W. F. 69, 84, 117, 152 Heidegger, M. 96–7, 231, 237 Heideggerians 70, 183, 212 hermeneutic perspective 30n5, 44, 50, 62, 69, 71, 72, 74, 75n4, 137, 141, 174, 178, 203, 236, 240, 270 holism 220 Hooker Chemical 125 Hopwood, A. 44 human evolution 230 human form of life 23 humanity 2, 8, 10, 21, 40, 197, 241, 250, 253, 254, 258 humanity’s imprint 140 IAR (interpretivist accounting research) 27–8 Idea of Nature (Collingwood) 117

Index 275 Ideal Speech Community (ISC) 120–1, 177 ideal type, concept of 25–6 IIRC (International Integrated Reporting Council) 38, 39, 253 India 14 instrumental epistemology 41 instrumental reasoning 41–2, 104, 134 instrumentalism 117 ‘instrumentalist-sustainable’ (EVP) school 248 Integrated Reporting (IR) 37, 38, 39 intellectual vs. emotional intelligence 97 International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) 38, 39, 253 interpretive theory 8, 8–9 interpretivism: accounting and 28–9; aims and objectives 10–11; applying 9; art of 21–4; basic terms and ideas 27–8; deep ecology and 197–204; defining 7; environmental dilemmas 11–13; Nature and 24–5; see also Nature; objections and contrary opinions 9–10; perspective, overview 1–2; postmodern engagements with 68–71; ‘stopping points’ 26–7; studying beliefs 8; traditional 8–9; vs. business approaches to sustainability 40 interpretivist accounting research (IAR) 27–8 interpretivist frameworks 13, 22, 45, 62, 66, 68, 72, 100, 228, 239, 240, 271 interstitial accounting 44–5 intrinsic value 116, 134, 197, 199, 201, 202, 203, 207, 208–9, 213, 221, 227, 229, 237, 239 intuition 20, 240 inwardness, culture of modernity 227, 242 IR (Integrated Reporting) 37, 38, 39 ISC (Ideal Speech Community) 120–1, 177 Johnson, L. E. 219 justice 179; accountability 151–2 justness, of norm 180–1 Kalam, A. 14 Kant, I. 118–19, 120, 126, 127n4, 133, 151–3 Katz, E. 157 knowledge 25, 89–90, 222

Kropotkin, P. 229 Kymlicka, W. 136 Laclau, E. 138–40 lacunae 50, 69 The Language Animal (Taylor) 7 language theory 62, 174, 176, 177–9, 184 Laughlin, R. C. 48, 173, 173–7, 177, 178; secular/sacred values in society 181–3; use of Habermas’s work 174–7, 186–7 law, accountability process 177 Lehman, G. 28, 174 Lemos, N. M. 137, 140 Leopold, A. 51n6, 140, 198, 201, 207–8, 212 ‘Letting the Chat out of the Bag’ (Arrington & Francis) 64 liberal accountability 147–67; recent developments 163–4 liberal social accounting model 48–50 liberalism 133, 134–6, 147 life goods 137 lifestyle 135, 197 Light, A. 231–2, 233 locus classicus 7 MacIntyre, A. 7, 9 Malpas, J. 45 management and organisational change 89–90 Marx, Karl 124, 229, 232 Marxism 11, 27, 122, 223, 229, 231, 232–6 Matthews, F. 63, 218, 220–2, 241 Merton, R. C. 175 Merton, R. K. 175 Messner, M. 66–8 metaphysical analysis 13, 14, 20, 139, 248 methodological individualism 149 ‘middle ground’ approach 121–2, 150–1 Mill, J. S. 117–18, 127n2, 127n3, 134, 136 Milne, M. J. 37–8, 48 mind 257 mines and mining 12, 201, 249, 250 modern accountability 2, 21, 24, 47, 67, 83, 84, 86, 98, 115; feature of 89 modern politics 21–4 Modern Social Imaginaries (Taylor) 251 moral considerability 218–19 moral dilemmas 13, 14, 104

276

Index

moral realism 2, 270 moral theory 26, 174, 224, 239–42, 251 moral value/framework 1, 2, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 22, 23, 25, 26, 41, 47, 48, 62, 65, 71, 72, 104, 118, 137, 147, 150, 155–6, 158–9, 163–4, 166, 209, 219, 240, 250, 255, 258, 259, 270 A Morally Deep World (Johnson) 219 Mouffe, C. 138–40 mutualism 230 mysticism and Deep Ecology 208–10 Naess, A. 198, 199, 201, 209, 257 naturalism 1–2 Nature: Deep Ecology and 202; environmental values perspective (EVP) 246–60; interpretivism and 24–5; intrinsic value 116, 134, 197, 199, 201, 202, 203, 207, 208, 213, 221, 227, 229, 237, 239; mastering 20, 21; politics of 257–8; postmodernism and 62–4; secular (anti-realist) discourse for 247, 252; world disclosers and 238–9 ‘Nature’ (Mill) 134 Nelson, J. S. 65 neoliberalism 10, 13–15, 64, 67, 209; environmental theory and 7; limiting in Anthropocene 15–16; Nature and 38–41 ‘new saliences’ 14, 20 Nicholson, L. 26–7, 223 non-traditional managers 97 Norton, B. G. 160, 222 ontological dimension 8 open-world thinking 71 organisational change 89–90, 100–5 organisational management 82–91 organisational violence 88 Our Synthetic Environment (Bookchin) 229 pain 218–19 pandemics 2, 7 pareto-optimality 149 Parfit, D. 136 Partridge, E. 163, 166n14 ‘patriarchal’ structure 202, 210 peace movement 198 Perkiss, S. 255–6 phenomenology 237

philosophical perspectives: basic issues in accountability 133–41; Deep Ecology see Deep Ecology; key accountability theorists and issues 115–28 philosophical sense, deep ecology 254 ‘philosophy of the impossible’ 51 Plato 135, 249, 257, 258 pluralism 48, 62–3, 123, 139, 141, 151, 158, 165, 165n5 pluralist society 155 point of bifurcation, society 9, 148 political interpretivism 7, 11, 62, 63, 232 Political Liberalism (Rawls) 147 political philosophy 257 politics 21–4 postmodernism: accountability and 64–6; elements of significance 68–9; environmentalism and 64–5; Laclau and Mouffe 138–41; Messner on 66–8; Nature and 62–4; overview 61–2; recent developments 66–8 Post-Scarcity Anarchism (Bookchin) 229 power of reason 11, 251 Pragmatism, Deep Ecology and 210–13 preference utilitarianism 218 Preston, C. 63–4, 74n1, 222, 224n2 primary goods 152, 153–4, 157, 159, 165 procedural, accountability research 8, 8, 127 procedural liberalism 36–7, 204, 239 procedural test (Habermas) 179 procedure vs. interpretation 7 projectionists 23 public relations 96 public sphere 82–91, 100–5, 256, 258–9 Purser, R. E. 103 Puxty, A. G. 120, 121, 122–4, 147 qualitative distinctions 13, 22, 23, 136 Queensland, coal mining in 11–12, 13, 201 radical ecology 227–8 Ranbow, Jana 13 Ravenscroft, S. 120 Rawls, J. 119–20, 122, 126, 127n5, 133, 147, 151, 159–60, 161, 166n8; self-respect 155–7, 158

Index 277 reductive naturalism 13, 22 re-engaging company with community 95–107 reference point, corporate relationships 84 regulation, accountability process 177 relationships, corporate 82–91 relativism 156, 158, 165, 166n10 renewable energy 14–15 Republic (Plato) 249 Roslender, R. 28, 141 Rudy, A. 231–2, 233 rule utilitarianism 116–17 sacred values 181–3, 185 Sagoff, M. 135 Sand County Almanac (Leopold) 51n6, 207–8, 212 scientific approach 2, 10–11, 22, 24, 25, 46, 49, 74, 83, 86, 89, 90, 96, 106–7n7, 227, 231, 256 SEA (social and environmental accounting) 16n3, 37, 39, 247, 248, 249, 250, 253, 256, 258, 260n5, 260n8 SEAR (social environmental accounting research) 16n3, 37, 39, 41, 42–4, 47, 48, 62, 157, 248, 253, 256, 259, 260n5, 260n8 A Secular Age (Taylor) 20, 63 secular (anti-realist) discourse 247, 252 secular values 181–3, 184 self (individuals) 247 self-conscious realisation 227, 230, 242 self-interpretation 22 self-respect 155–7, 158, 160, 166n11 Sen, A. 149 sense-making 7, 43 Sessions, George 199–200, 207, 208, 228 ‘shallow green’ approach 117, 161, 228 Sikka, P. 124 Singer, P. 97–99, 106n3, 118, 134, 141n2, 212, 218 Slater Walker Scandal (UK) 125 ‘slippery slope’ 161 Snow, C. P. 70, 71 social accounting: developments 44–5; model 48–50 social and environmental accounting (SEA) 16n3, 37, 39, 247, 248, 249, 250, 253, 256, 258, 260n5, 260n8

social ecology 228–32; critical theory’s response to 232–6; limitations 234 social environmental accounting research (SEAR) 16n3, 37, 39, 41, 42–4, 47, 48, 62, 157, 248, 253, 256, 259, 260n5, 260n8 social imaginary 25, 85, 104, 233, 247, 251, 257, 259 social labour 231, 234 social structures, Deep Ecology and 202–3 soul 257 Sources of the Self (Taylor) 248 ‘space-ship earth’ 26, 240 species impartiality 220–1 spiritual values 181–3 Stern, N. 37 stopping points: interpretivism 26–7, 240; Matthews’ biocentricism 221–2 strong-evaluator 219–20, 238 structural strengths, corporations 124 structured chaos 24 subversive, accountability research 8, 8, 67 sustainability 13–15, 16, 250, 251; business case approach 37–8, 42–4; interpretivism vs. modern economic and business approaches 40 The Sydney Morning Herald 12 symbiosis 230 Taylor, C. 2, 7, 9, 14, 15, 173, 188n4; anti-epistemology 10; civil society 84–5; dilemmas confronting humanity 11; engaged sustainability 40; Enlightenment and 63; EVP view 248; Habermas and 177–81; hermeneutic perspective 75n4, 203, 236; interpretivist approach 20, 21–2, 23, 26, 28; market-based and business case approaches 36, 39, 40–2, 45–6, 47, 48–50; on utilitarianism 135–6 Taylor, P. 220 TBL (Triple Bottom Line) 37 A Theory of Justice (Rawls) 133, 147, 160 think global/act local 24, 240 Tinker, T. 121, 125–6, 151, 156 traditional, interpretive theories 8–9 traditional manager 99 tragedy of Love Canal (USA) 125 transformative action 1, 7, 62 transparency 150–1, 158, 162

278

Index

transpersonal ecology 247–8, 251, 254–5, 254–6, 257, 258–9 Triple Bottom Line (TBL) 37 The Trumpeter (Naess and Sessions) 199 Tweedie, D. 255–6 undemocratic political agendas, Deep Ecology 203, 208, 210, 212 utilitarianism 116–17, 133; Bentham 115–17, 134, 138, 139; problems with 134–8 utility-maximising assumptions 126 Varieties of Religion Today (Taylor) 104 Voltaire 97 Weber M. 25–6 Wenz, P. 157

Western thinking 66, 231, 242 White, S. K. 71–4 Williams, P. F. 119–20, 127n6, 127n7, 164 Willmott, H. 27, 28 Wilson, F. 69 Windsor, Tony 12 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 23 worker and organisation, relationship 82–91 workers’ rights 7, 82 workplace violence 88–89 ‘world as world’ concept 252 world disclosers 238–9 Wright, E. O. 45 Young, I. M. 26, 222 Zimmerman, M. J. 207 Zuckert, M. 23